{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_34580/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_34580","id":"gutenberg_34580","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/34580","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Egoism","Individualism"],"text":"THE EGO AND HIS\n                                  OWN\n\n                                  BY\n\n                              MAX STIRNER\n\n\n                     TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY\n                          STEVEN T. BYINGTON\n\n                        WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY\n\n                             J. L. WALKER\n\n\n                               NEW YORK\n                      BENJ. R. TUCKER, PUBLISHER\n                                 1907\n\n\n                          Copyright. 1907, by\n                          BENJAMIN R. TUCKER\n\n\n\n\n                           TO MY SWEETHEART\n\n                            MARIE D\u00c4HNHARDT\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                          PAGE\n  PUBLISHER'S PREFACE                                      vii\n\n  INTRODUCTION                                             xii\n\n  TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE                                     xix\n\n  ALL THINGS ARE NOTHING TO ME                               3\n\n  PART FIRST: _MAN_                                          7\n      I.--A HUMAN LIFE                                       9\n     II.--MEN OF THE OLD TIME AND THE NEW                   17\n          I.--THE ANCIENTS                                  17\n         II.--THE MODERNS                                   30\n             \u00a7 1.--THE SPIRIT                               34\n             \u00a7 2.--THE POSSESSED                            42\n             \u00a7 3.--THE HIERARCHY                            85\n        III.--THE FREE                                     127\n             \u00a7 1.--POLITICAL LIBERALISM                    128\n             \u00a7 2.--SOCIAL LIBERALISM                       152\n             \u00a7 3.--HUMANE LIBERALISM                       163\n\n  PART SECOND: _I_                                         201\n      I.--OWNNESS                                          203\n     II.--THE OWNER                                        225\n          I.--MY POWER                                     242\n         II.--MY INTERCOURSE                               275\n        III.--MY SELF-ENJOYMENT                            425\n    III.--THE UNIQUE ONE                                   484\n\n  INDEX                                                    491\n\n\n\n\nPUBLISHER'S PREFACE\n\n\nFor more than twenty years I have entertained the design of publishing\nan English translation of \"_Der Einzige und sein Eigentum_.\" When I\nformed this design, the number of English-speaking persons who had ever\nheard of the book was very limited. The memory of Max Stirner had been\nvirtually extinct for an entire generation. But in the last two decades\nthere has been a remarkable revival of interest both in the book and in\nits author. It began in this country with a discussion in the pages of\nthe Anarchist periodical, \"Liberty,\" in which Stirner's thought was\nclearly expounded and vigorously championed by Dr. James L. Walker, who\nadopted for this discussion the pseudonym \"Tak Kak.\" At that time Dr.\nWalker was the chief editorial writer for the Galveston \"News.\" Some\nyears later he became a practising physician in Mexico, where he died in\n1904. A series of essays which he began in an Anarchist periodical,\n\"Egoism,\" and which he lived to complete, was published after his death\nin a small volume, \"The Philosophy of Egoism.\" It is a very able and\nconvincing exposition of Stirner's teachings, and almost the only one\nthat exists in the English language. But the chief instrument in the\nrevival of Stirnerism was and is the German poet, John Henry Mackay.\nVery early in his career he met Stirner's name in Lange's \"History of\nMaterialism,\" and was moved thereby to read his book. The work made such\nan impression on him that he resolved to devote a portion of his life to\nthe rediscovery and rehabilitation of the lost and forgotten genius.\nThrough years of toil and correspondence and travel, and triumphing over\ntremendous obstacles, he carried his task to completion, and his\nbiography of Stirner appeared in Berlin in 1898. It is a tribute to the\nthoroughness of Mackay's work that since its publication not one\nimportant fact about Stirner has been discovered by anybody. During his\nyears of investigation Mackay's advertising for information had created\na new interest in Stirner, which was enhanced by the sudden fame of the\nwritings of Friedrich Nietzsche, an author whose intellectual kinship\nwith Stirner has been a subject of much controversy. \"_Der Einzige_,\"\npreviously obtainable only in an expensive form, was included in Philipp\nReclam's Universal-Bibliothek, and this cheap edition has enjoyed a wide\nand ever-increasing circulation. During the last dozen years the book\nhas been translated twice into French, once into Italian, once into\nRussian, and possibly into other languages. The Scandinavian critic,\nBrandes, has written on Stirner. A large and appreciative volume,\nentitled \"_L'Individualisme Anarchiste: Max Stirner_,\" from the pen of\nProf. Victor Basch, of the University of Rennes, has appeared in Paris.\nAnother large and sympathetic volume, \"Max Stirner,\" written by Dr.\nAnselm Ruest, has been published very recently in Berlin. Dr. Paul\nEltzbacher, in his work, \"_Der Anarchismus_,\" gives a chapter to\nStirner, making him one of the seven typical Anarchists, beginning with\nWilliam Godwin and ending with Tolstoi, of whom his book treats. There\nis hardly a notable magazine or a review on the Continent that has not\ngiven at least one leading article to the subject of Stirner. Upon the\ninitiative of Mackay and with the aid of other admirers a suitable stone\nhas been placed above the philosopher's previously-neglected grave, and\na memorial tablet upon the house in Berlin where he died in 1856; and\nthis spring another is to be placed upon the house in Bayreuth where he\nwas born in 1806. As a result of these various efforts, and though but\nlittle has been written about Stirner in the English language, his name\nis now known at least to thousands in America and England where formerly\nit was known only to hundreds. Therefore conditions are now more\nfavorable for the reception of this volume than they were when I formed\nthe design of publishing it, more than twenty years ago.\n\nThe problem of securing a reasonably good translation (for in the case\nof a work presenting difficulties so enormous it was idle to hope for an\nadequate translation) was finally solved by entrusting the task to\nSteven T. Byington, a scholar of remarkable attainments, whose specialty\nis philology, and who is also one of the ablest workers in the\npropaganda of Anarchism. But, for further security from error, it was\nagreed with Mr. Byington that his translation should have the benefit of\nrevision by Dr. Walker, the most thorough American student of Stirner,\nand by Emma Heller Schumm and George Schumm, who are not only\nsympathetic with Stirner, but familiar with the history of his time, and\nwho enjoy a knowledge of English and German that makes it difficult to\ndecide which is their native tongue. It was also agreed that, upon any\npoint of difference between the translator and his revisers which\nconsultation might fail to solve, the publisher should decide. This\nmethod has been followed, and in a considerable number of instances it\nhas fallen to me to make a decision. It is only fair to say, therefore,\nthat the responsibility for special errors and imperfections properly\nrests on my shoulders, whereas, on the other hand, the credit for\nwhatever general excellence the translation may possess belongs with the\nsame propriety to Mr. Byington and his coadjutors. One thing is certain:\nits defects are due to no lack of loving care and pains. And I think I\nmay add with confidence, while realizing fully how far short of\nperfection it necessarily falls, that it may safely challenge comparison\nwith the translations that have been made into other languages.\n\nIn particular, I am responsible for the admittedly erroneous rendering\nof the title. \"The Ego and His Own\" is not an exact English equivalent\nof \"_Der Einzige und sein Eigentum_.\" But then, there is no exact\nEnglish equivalent. Perhaps the nearest is \"The Unique One and His\nProperty.\" But the unique one is not strictly the _Einzige_, for\nuniqueness connotes not only singleness but an admirable singleness,\nwhile Stirner's _Einzigkeit_ is admirable in his eyes only as such, it\nbeing no part of the purpose of his book to distinguish a particular\n_Einzigkeit_ as more excellent than another. Moreover, \"The Unique One\nand His Property\" has no graces to compel our forgiveness of its slight\ninaccuracy. It is clumsy and unattractive. And the same objections may\nbe urged with still greater force against all the other renderings that\nhave been suggested,--\"The Single One and His Property,\" \"The Only One\nand His Property,\" \"The Lone One and His Property,\" \"The Unit and His\nProperty,\" and, last and least and worst, \"The Individual and His\nPrerogative.\" \"The Ego and His Own,\" on the other hand, if not a precise\nrendering, is at least an excellent title in itself; excellent by its\neuphony, its monosyllabic incisiveness, and its telling--_Einzigkeit_.\nAnother strong argument in its favor is the emphatic correspondence of\nthe phrase \"his own\" with Mr. Byington's renderings of the kindred\nwords, _Eigenheit_ and _Eigner_. Moreover, no reader will be led astray\nwho bears in mind Stirner's distinction: \"I am not an ego along with\nother egos, but the sole ego; I am unique.\" And, to help the reader to\nbear this in mind, the various renderings of the word _Einzige_ that\noccur through the volume are often accompanied by foot-notes showing\nthat, in the German, one and the same word does duty for all.\n\nIf the reader finds the first quarter of this book somewhat forbidding\nand obscure, he is advised nevertheless not to falter. Close attention\nwill master almost every difficulty, and, if he will but give it, he\nwill find abundant reward in what follows. For his guidance I may\nspecify one defect in the author's style. When controverting a view\nopposite to his own, he seldom distinguishes with sufficient clearness\nhis statement of his own view from his re-statement of the antagonistic\nview. As a result, the reader is plunged into deeper and deeper\nmystification, until something suddenly reveals the cause of his\nmisunderstanding, after which he must go back and read again. I\ntherefore put him on his guard. The other difficulties lie, as a rule,\nin the structure of the work. As to these I can hardly do better than\ntranslate the following passage from Prof. Basch's book, alluded to\nabove: \"There is nothing more disconcerting than the first approach to\nthis strange work. Stirner does not condescend to inform us as to the\narchitecture of his edifice, or furnish us the slightest guiding thread.\nThe apparent divisions of the book are few and misleading. From the\nfirst page to the last a _unique_ thought circulates, but it divides\nitself among an infinity of vessels and arteries in each of which runs a\nblood so rich in ferments that one is tempted to describe them all.\nThere is no progress in the development, and the repetitions are\ninnumerable.... The reader who is not deterred by this oddity, or rather\nabsence, of composition gives proof of genuine intellectual courage. At\nfirst one seems to be confronted with a collection of essays strung\ntogether, with a throng of aphorisms.... But, if you read this book\nseveral times; if, after having penetrated the intimacy of each of its\nparts, you then traverse it as a whole,--gradually the fragments weld\nthemselves together, and Stirner's thought is revealed in all its unity,\nin all its force, and in all its depth.\"\n\nA word about the dedication. Mackay's investigations have brought to\nlight that Marie Daehnhardt had nothing whatever in common with Stirner,\nand so was unworthy of the honor conferred upon her. She was no\n_Eigene_. I therefore reproduce the dedication merely in the interest of\nhistorical accuracy.\n\nHappy as I am in the appearance of this book, my joy is not unmixed with\nsorrow. The cherished project was as dear to the heart of Dr. Walker as\nto mine, and I deeply grieve that he is no longer with us to share our\ndelight in the fruition. Nothing, however, can rob us of the masterly\nintroduction that he wrote for this volume (in 1903, or perhaps\nearlier), from which I will not longer keep the reader. This\nintroduction, no more than the book itself, shall that _Einzige_,\nDeath, make his _Eigentum_.\n\n  _February, 1907._\n\n                                                            B. R. T.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nFifty years sooner or later can make little difference in the case of a\nbook so revolutionary as this.\n\nIt saw the light when a so-called revolutionary movement was preparing\nin men's minds, which agitation was, however, only a disturbance due to\ndesires to participate in government, and to govern and to be governed,\nin a manner different to that which prevails. The \"revolutionists\" of\n1848 were bewitched with an idea. They were not at all the masters of\nideas. Most of those who since that time have prided themselves upon\nbeing revolutionists have been and are likewise but the bondmen of an\nidea,--that of the different lodgment of authority.\n\nThe temptation is, of course, present to attempt an explanation of the\ncentral thought of this work; but such an effort appears to be\nunnecessary to one who has the volume in his hand. The author's care in\nillustrating his meaning shows that he realized how prone the possessed\nman is to misunderstand whatever is not moulded according to the\nfashions in thinking. The author's learning was considerable, his\ncommand of words and ideas may never be excelled by another, and he\njudged it needful to develop his argument in manifold ways. So those who\nenter into the spirit of it will scarcely hope to impress others with\nthe same conclusion in a more summary manner. Or, if one might deem that\npossible after reading Stirner, still one cannot think that it could be\ndone so surely. The author has made certain work of it, even though he\nhas to wait for his public; but still, the reception of the book by its\ncritics amply proves the truth of the saying that one can give another\narguments, but not understanding. The system-makers and\nsystem-believers thus far cannot get it out of their heads that any\ndiscourse about the nature of an ego must turn upon the common\ncharacteristics of egos, to make a systematic scheme of what they share\nas a generality. The critics inquire what kind of man the author is\ntalking about. They repeat the question: What does he believe in? They\nfail to grasp the purport of the recorded answer: \"I believe in myself\";\nwhich is attributed to a common soldier long before the time of Stirner.\nThey ask, What is the principle of the self-conscious egoist,--the\n_Einzige_? To this perplexity Stirner says: Change the question; put\n\"who?\" instead of \"what?\" and an answer can then be given by naming him!\n\nThis, of course, is too simple for persons governed by ideas, and for\npersons in quest of new governing ideas. They wish to classify the man.\nNow, that in me which you can classify is not my distinguishing self.\n\"Man\" is the horizon or zero of my existence as an individual. Over that\nI rise as I can. At least I am something more than \"man in general.\"\nPre-existing worship of ideals and disrespect for self had made of the\nego at the very most a Somebody, oftener an empty vessel to be filled\nwith the grace or the leavings of a tyrannous doctrine; thus a Nobody.\nStirner dispels the morbid subjection, and recognizes each one who knows\nand feels himself as his own property to be neither humble Nobody nor\nbefogged Somebody, but henceforth flat-footed and level-headed Mr.\nThisbody, who has a character and good pleasure of his own, just as he\nhas a name of his own.\n\nThe critics who attacked this work and were answered in the author's\nminor writings, rescued from oblivion by John Henry Mackay, nearly all\ndisplay the most astonishing triviality and impotent malice.\n\nWe owe to Dr. Eduard von Hartmann the unquestionable service which he\nrendered by directing attention to this book in his \"_Philosophie des\nUnbewussten_,\" the first edition of which was published in 1869, and in\nother writings. I do not begrudge Dr. von Hartmann the liberty of\ncriticism which he used; and I think the admirers of Stirner's teaching\nmust quite appreciate one thing which Von Hartmann did at a much later\ndate. In \"_Der Eigene_\" of August 10, 1896, there appeared a letter\nwritten by him and giving, among other things, certain data from which\nto judge that, when Friedrich Nietzsche wrote his later essays,\nNietzsche was not ignorant of Stirner's book.\n\nVon Hartmann wishes that Stirner had gone on and developed his\nprinciple. Von Hartmann suggests that you and I are really the same\nspirit, looking out through two pairs of eyes. Then, one may reply, I\nneed not concern myself about you, for in myself I have--us; and at that\nrate Von Hartmann is merely accusing himself of inconsistency: for, when\nStirner wrote this book, Von Hartmann's spirit was writing it; and it is\njust the pity that Von Hartmann in his present form does not indorse\nwhat he said in the form of Stirner,--that Stirner was different from\nany other man; that his ego was not Fichte's transcendental generality,\nbut \"this transitory ego of flesh and blood.\" It is not as a generality\nthat you and I differ, but as a couple of facts which are not to be\nreasoned into one. \"I\" is somewise Hartmann, and thus Hartmann is \"I\";\nbut I am not Hartmann, and Hartmann is not--I. Neither am I the \"I\" of\nStirner; only Stirner himself was Stirner's \"I.\" Note how comparatively\nindifferent a matter it is with Stirner that one is an ego, but how\nall-important it is that one be a self-conscious ego,--a self-conscious,\nself-willed person.\n\nThose not self-conscious and self-willed are constantly acting from\nself-interested motives, but clothing these in various garbs. Watch\nthose people closely in the light of Stirner's teaching, and they seem\nto be hypocrites, they have so many good moral and religious plans of\nwhich self-interest is at the end and bottom; but they, we may believe,\ndo not know that this is more than a coincidence.\n\nIn Stirner we have the philosophical foundation for political liberty.\nHis interest in the practical development of egoism to the dissolution\nof the State and the union of free men is clear and pronounced, and\nharmonizes perfectly with the economic philosophy of Josiah Warren.\nAllowing for difference of temperament and language, there is a\nsubstantial agreement between Stirner and Proudhon. Each would be free,\nand sees in every increase of the number of free people and their\nintelligence an auxiliary force against the oppressor. But, on the other\nhand, will any one for a moment seriously contend that Nietzsche and\nProudhon march together in general aim and tendency,--that they have\nanything in common except the daring to profane the shrine and sepulchre\nof superstition?\n\nNietzsche has been much spoken of as a disciple of Stirner, and, owing\nto favorable cullings from Nietzsche's writings, it has occurred that\none of his books has been supposed to contain more sense than it really\ndoes--so long as one had read only the extracts.\n\nNietzsche cites scores or hundreds of authors. Had he read everything,\nand not read Stirner?\n\nBut Nietzsche is as unlike Stirner as a tight-rope performance is unlike\nan algebraic equation.\n\nStirner loved liberty for himself, and loved to see any and all men and\nwomen taking liberty, and he had no lust of power. Democracy to him was\nsham liberty, egoism the genuine liberty.\n\nNietzsche, on the contrary, pours out his contempt upon democracy\nbecause it is not aristocratic. He is predatory to the point of\ndemanding that those who must succumb to feline rapacity shall be taught\nto submit with resignation. When he speaks of \"Anarchistic dogs\"\nscouring the streets of great civilized cities, it is true, the context\nshows that he means the Communists; but his worship of Napoleon, his\nbathos of anxiety for the rise of an aristocracy that shall rule Europe\nfor thousands of years, his idea of treating women in the oriental\nfashion, show that Nietzsche has struck out in a very old path--doing\nthe apotheosis of tyranny. We individual egoistic Anarchists, however,\nmay say to the Nietzsche school, so as not to be misunderstood: We do\nnot ask of the Napoleons to have pity, nor of the predatory barons to\ndo justice. They will find it convenient for their own welfare to make\nterms with men who have learned of Stirner what a man can be who\nworships nothing, bears allegiance to nothing. To Nietzsche's\nrhodomontade of eagles in baronial form, born to prey on industrial\nlambs, we rather tauntingly oppose the ironical question: Where are your\nclaws? What if the \"eagles\" are found to be plain barnyard fowls on\nwhich more silly fowls have fastened steel spurs to hack the victims,\nwho, however, have the power to disarm the sham \"eagles\" between two\nsuns?\n\nStirner shows that men make their tyrants as they make their gods, and\nhis purpose is to unmake tyrants.\n\nNietzsche dearly loves a tyrant.\n\nIn style Stirner's work offers the greatest possible contrast to the\npuerile, padded phraseology of Nietzsche's \"_Zarathustra_\" and its false\nimagery. Who ever imagined such an unnatural conjuncture as an eagle\n\"toting\" a serpent in friendship? which performance is told of in bare\nwords, but nothing comes of it. In Stirner we are treated to an\nenlivening and earnest discussion addressed to serious minds, and every\nreader feels that the word is to him, for his instruction and benefit,\nso far as he has mental independence and courage to take it and use it.\nThe startling intrepidity of this book is infused with a whole-hearted\nlove for all mankind, as evidenced by the fact that the author shows not\none iota of prejudice or any idea of division of men into ranks. He\nwould lay aside government, but would establish any regulation deemed\nconvenient, and for this only _our_ convenience is consulted. Thus there\nwill be general liberty only when the disposition toward tyranny is met\nby intelligent opposition that will no longer submit to such a rule.\nBeyond this the manly sympathy and philosophical bent of Stirner are\nsuch that rulership appears by contrast a vanity, an infatuation of\nperverted pride. We know not whether we more admire our author or more\nlove him.\n\nStirner's attitude toward woman is not special. She is an individual if\nshe can be, not handicapped by anything he says, feels, thinks, or\nplans. This was more fully exemplified in his life than even in this\nbook; but there is not a line in the book to put or keep woman in an\ninferior position to man, neither is there anything of caste or\naristocracy in the book.\n\nLikewise there is nothing of obscurantism or affected mysticism about\nit. Everything in it is made as plain as the author could make it. He\nwho does not so is not Stirner's disciple nor successor nor co-worker.\n\nSome one may ask: How does plumb-line Anarchism train with the unbridled\negoism proclaimed by Stirner? The plumb-line is not a fetish, but an\nintellectual conviction, and egoism is a universal fact of animal life.\nNothing could seem clearer to my mind than that the reality of egoism\nmust first come into the consciousness of men, before we can have the\nunbiased Einzige in place of the prejudiced biped who lends himself to\nthe support of tyrannies a million times stronger over me than the\nnatural self-interest of any individual. When plumb-line doctrine is\nmisconceived as duty between unequal-minded men,--as a religion of\nhumanity,--it is indeed the confusion of trying to read without knowing\nthe alphabet and of putting philanthropy in place of contract. But, if\nthe plumb-line be scientific, it is or can be my possession, my\nproperty, and I choose it for its use--when circumstances admit of its\nuse. I do not feel bound to use it because it is scientific, in building\nmy house; but, as my will, to be intelligent, is not to be merely\nwilful, the adoption of the plumb-line follows the discarding of\nincantations. There is no plumb-line without the unvarying lead at the\nend of the line; not a fluttering bird or a clawing cat.\n\nOn the practical side of the question of egoism _versus_ self-surrender\nand for a trial of egoism in politics, this may be said: the belief that\nmen not moved by a sense of duty will be unkind or unjust to others is\nbut an indirect confession that those who hold that belief are greatly\ninterested in having others live for them rather than for themselves.\nBut I do not ask or expect so much. I am content if others individually\nlive for themselves, and thus cease in so many ways to act in opposition\nto my living for myself,--to our living for ourselves.\n\nIf Christianity has failed to turn the world from evil, it is not to be\ndreamed that rationalism of a pious moral stamp will succeed in the same\ntask. Christianity, or all philanthropic love, is tested in\nnon-resistance. It is a dream that example will change the hearts of\nrulers, tyrants, mobs. If the extremest self-surrender fails, how can a\nmixture of Christian love and worldly caution succeed? This at least\nmust be given up. The policy of Christ and Tolstoi can soon be tested,\nbut Tolstoi's belief is not satisfied with a present test and failure.\nHe has the infatuation of one who persists because this _ought_ to be.\nThe egoist who thinks \"I should like this to be\" still has the sense to\nperceive that it is not accomplished by the fact of some believing and\nsubmitting, inasmuch as others are alert to prey upon the unresisting.\nThe Pharaohs we have ever with us.\n\nSeveral passages in this most remarkable book show the author as a man\nfull of sympathy. When we reflect upon his deliberately expressed\nopinions and sentiments,--his spurning of the sense of moral obligation\nas the last form of superstition,--may we not be warranted in thinking\nthat the total disappearance of the sentimental supposition of duty\nliberates a quantity of nervous energy for the purest generosity and\nclarifies the intellect for the more discriminating choice of objects of\nmerit?\n\n                                                       J. L. WALKER.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE\n\n\nIf the style of this book is found unattractive, it will show that I\nhave done my work ill and not represented the author truly; but, if it\nis found odd, I beg that I may not bear all the blame. I have simply\ntried to reproduce the author's own mixture of colloquialisms and\ntechnicalities, and his preference for the precise expression of his\nthought rather than the word conventionally expected.\n\nOne especial feature of the style, however, gives the reason why this\npreface should exist. It is characteristic of Stirner's writing that the\nthread of thought is carried on largely by the repetition of the same\nword in a modified form or sense. That connection of ideas which has\nguided popular instinct in the formation of words is made to suggest the\nline of thought which the writer wishes to follow. If this echoing of\nwords is missed, the bearing of the statements on each other is in a\nmeasure lost; and, where the ideas are very new, one cannot afford to\nthrow away any help in following their connection. Therefore, where a\nuseful echo (and there are few useless ones in the book) could not be\nreproduced in English, I have generally called attention to it in a\nnote. My notes are distinguished from the author's by being enclosed in\nbrackets.\n\nOne or two of such coincidences of language, occurring in words which\nare prominent throughout the book, should be borne constantly in mind as\na sort of _Keri perpetuum_: for instance, the identity in the original\nof the words \"spirit\" and \"mind,\" and of the phrases \"supreme being\" and\n\"highest essence.\" In such cases I have repeated the note where it\nseemed that such repetition might be absolutely necessary, but have\ntrusted the reader to carry it in his head where a failure of his memory\nwould not be ruinous or likely.\n\nFor the same reason,--that is, in order not to miss any indication of\nthe drift of the thought,--I have followed the original in the very\nliberal use of italics, and in the occasional eccentric use of a\npunctuation mark, as I might not have done in translating a work of a\ndifferent nature.\n\nI have set my face as a flint against the temptation to add notes that\nwere not part of the translation. There is no telling how much I might\nhave enlarged the book if I had put a note at every sentence which\ndeserved to have its truth brought out by fuller elucidation,--or even\nat every one which I thought needed correction. It might have been\nwithin my province, if I had been able, to explain all the allusions to\ncontemporary events, but I doubt whether any one could do that properly\nwithout having access to the files of three or four well-chosen German\nnewspapers of Stirner's time. The allusions are clear enough, without\nnames and dates, to give a vivid picture of certain aspects of German\nlife then. The tone of some of them is explained by the fact that the\nbook was published under censorship.\n\nI have usually preferred, for the sake of the connection, to translate\nBiblical quotations somewhat as they stand in the German, rather than\nconform them altogether to the English Bible. I am sometimes quite as\nnear the original Greek as if I had followed the current translation.\n\nWhere German books are referred to, the pages cited are those of the\nGerman editions even when (usually because of some allusions in the\ntext) the titles of the books are translated.\n\n                                                 STEVEN T. BYINGTON.\n\n\n\n\nTHE EGO AND HIS OWN\n\n\n\n\nAll Things are Nothing to Me[1]\n\n\nWhat is not supposed, to be my concern[2]! First and foremost, the Good\nCause,[3] then God's cause, the cause of mankind, of truth, of freedom,\nof humanity, of justice; further, the cause of my people, my prince, my\nfatherland; finally, even the cause of Mind, and a thousand other\ncauses. Only _my_ cause is never to be my concern. \"Shame on the egoist\nwho thinks only of himself!\"\n\nLet us look and see, then, how they manage _their_ concerns--they for\nwhose cause we are to labor, devote ourselves, and grow enthusiastic.\n\nYou have much profound information to give about God, and have for\nthousands of years \"searched the depths of the Godhead,\" and looked into\nits heart, so that you can doubtless tell us how God himself attends to\n\"God's cause,\" which we are called to serve. And you do not conceal the\nLord's doings, either. Now, what is his cause? Has he, as is demanded of\nus, made an alien cause, the cause of truth or love, his own? You are\nshocked by this misunderstanding, and you instruct us that God's cause\nis indeed the cause of truth and love, but that this cause cannot be\ncalled alien to him, because God is himself truth and love; you are\nshocked by the assumption that God could be like us poor worms in\nfurthering an alien cause as his own. \"Should God take up the cause of\ntruth if he were not himself truth?\" He cares only for _his_ cause, but,\nbecause he is all in all, therefore all is _his_ cause! But we, we are\nnot all in all, and our cause is altogether little and contemptible;\ntherefore we must \"serve a higher cause.\"--Now it is clear, God cares\nonly for what is his, busies himself only with himself, thinks only of\nhimself, and has only himself before his eyes; woe to all that is not\nwell-pleasing to him! He serves no higher person, and satisfies only\nhimself. His cause is--a purely egoistic cause.\n\nHow is it with mankind, whose cause we are to make our own? Is its cause\nthat of another, and does mankind serve a higher cause? No, mankind\nlooks only at itself, mankind will promote the interests of mankind\nonly, mankind is its own cause. That it may develop, it causes nations\nand individuals to wear themselves out in its service, and, when they\nhave accomplished what mankind needs, it throws them on the dung-heap of\nhistory in gratitude. Is not mankind's cause--a purely egoistic cause?\n\nI have no need to take up each thing that wants to throw its cause on us\nand show that it is occupied only with itself, not with us, only with\nits good, not with ours. Look at the rest for yourselves. Do truth,\nfreedom, humanity, justice, desire anything else than that you grow\nenthusiastic and serve them?\n\nThey all have an admirable time of it when they receive zealous homage.\nJust observe the nation that is defended by devoted patriots. The\npatriots fall in bloody battle or in the fight with hunger and want;\nwhat does the nation care for that? Joy the manure of their corpses the\nnation comes to \"its bloom!\" The individuals have died \"for the great\ncause of the nation,\" and the nation sends some words of thanks after\nthem and--has the profit of it. I call that a paying kind of egoism.\n\nBut only look at that Sultan who cares so lovingly for his people. Is he\nnot pure unselfishness itself, and does he not hourly sacrifice himself\nfor his people? Oh, yes, for \"his people.\" Just try it; show yourself\nnot as his, but as your own; for breaking away from his egoism you will\ntake a trip to jail. The Sultan has set his cause on nothing but\nhimself; he is to himself all in all, he is to himself the only one, and\ntolerates nobody who would dare not to be one of \"his people.\"\n\nAnd will you not learn by these brilliant examples that the egoist gets\non best? I for my part take a lesson from them, and propose, instead of\nfurther unselfishly serving those great egoists, rather to be the egoist\nmyself.\n\nGod and mankind have concerned themselves for nothing, for nothing but\nthemselves. Let me then likewise concern myself for _myself_, who am\nequally with God the nothing of all others, who am my all, who am the\nonly one.[4]\n\nIf God, if mankind, as you affirm, have substance enough in themselves\nto be all in all to themselves, then I feel that _I_ shall still less\nlack that, and that I shall have no complaint to make of my \"emptiness.\"\nI am nothing in the sense of emptiness, but I am the creative nothing,\nthe nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything.\n\nAway, then, with every concern that is not altogether my concern! You\nthink at least the \"good cause\" must be my concern? What's good, what's\nbad? Why, I myself am my concern, and I am neither good nor bad. Neither\nhas meaning for me.\n\nThe divine is God's concern; the human, man's. My concern is neither the\ndivine nor the human, not the true, good, just, free, etc., but solely\nwhat is _mine_, and it is not a general one, but is--_unique_,[5] as I\nam unique.\n\nNothing is more to me than myself!\n\n\n\n\nPart First\n\nMan\n\n\n\n\n  _Man is to man the supreme being_, says Feuerbach.\n\n  _Man has just been discovered_, says Burno Bauer.\n\n  Then let us take a more careful look at this supreme being and\n                                          this new discovery.\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nA HUMAN LIFE\n\n\nFrom the moment when he catches sight of the light of the world a man\nseeks to find out _himself_ and get hold of _himself_ out of its\nconfusion, in which he, with everything else, is tossed about in motley\nmixture.\n\nBut everything that comes in contact with the child defends itself in\nturn against his attacks, and asserts its own persistence.\n\nAccordingly, because each thing _cares for itself_ and at the same time\ncomes into constant collision with other things, the _combat_ of\nself-assertion is unavoidable.\n\n_Victory_ or _defeat_--between the two alternatives the fate of the\ncombat wavers. The victor becomes the lord, the vanquished one the\n_subject_: the former exercises _supremacy_ and \"rights of supremacy,\"\nthe latter fulfils in awe and deference the \"duties of a subject.\"\n\nBut both remain _enemies_, and always lie in wait: they watch for each\nother's _weaknesses_--children for those of their parents and parents\nfor those of their children (_e. g._ their fear); either the stick\nconquers the man, or the man conquers the stick.\n\nIn childhood liberation takes the direction of trying to get to the\nbottom of things, to get at what is \"back of\" things; therefore we spy\nout the weak points of everybody, for which, it is well known, children\nhave a sure instinct; therefore we like to smash things, like to rummage\nthrough hidden corners, pry after what is covered up or out of the way,\nand try what we can do with everything. When we once get at what is back\nof the things, we know we are safe; when, _e. g._, we have got at the\nfact that the rod is too weak against our obduracy, then we no longer\nfear it, \"have outgrown it.\"\n\nBack of the rod, mightier than it, stands our--obduracy, our obdurate\ncourage. By degrees we get at what is back of everything that was\nmysterious and uncanny to us, the mysteriously-dreaded might of the rod,\nthe father's stern look, etc., and back of all we find our--ataraxy,\n_i. e._ imperturbability, intrepidity, our counter force, our odds of\nstrength, our invincibility. Before that which formerly inspired in us\nfear and deference we no longer retreat shyly, but take _courage_. Back\nof everything we find our _courage_, our superiority; back of the sharp\ncommand of parents and authorities stands, after all, our courageous\nchoice or our outwitting shrewdness. And the more we feel ourselves, the\nsmaller appears that which before seemed invincible. And what is our\ntrickery, shrewdness, courage, obduracy? What else but--_mind!_[6]\n\nThrough a considerable time we are spared a fight that is so exhausting\nlater--the fight against _reason_. The fairest part of childhood passes\nwithout the necessity of coming to blows with reason. We care nothing\nat all about it, do not meddle with it, admit no reason. We are not to\nbe persuaded to anything by _conviction_, and are deaf to good\narguments, principles, etc.; on the other hand, coaxing, punishment, and\nthe like are hard for us to resist.\n\nThis stern life-and-death combat with _reason_ enter later, and begins a\nnew phase; in childhood we scamper about without racking our brains\nmuch.\n\n_Mind_ is the name of the _first_ self-discovery, the first\nundeification of the divine, _i. e._ of the uncanny, the spooks, the\n\"powers above.\" Our fresh feeling of youth, this feeling of self, now\ndefers to nothing; the world is discredited, for we are above it, we are\n_mind_.\n\nNow for the first time we see that hitherto we have not looked at the\nworld _intelligently_ at all, but only stared at it.\n\nWe exercise the beginnings of our strength on _natural powers_. We defer\nto parents as a natural power; later we say: Father and mother are to be\nforsaken, all natural power to be counted as riven. They are vanquished.\nFor the rational, _i. e._ \"intellectual\" man there is no family as a\nnatural power; a renunciation of parents, brothers, etc., makes its\nappearance. If these are \"born again\" as _intellectual, rational\npowers_, they are no longer at all what they were before.\n\nAnd not only parents, but _men in general_, are conquered by the young\nman; they are no hindrance to him, and are no longer regarded; for now\nhe says: One must obey God rather than men.\n\nFrom this high standpoint everything \"_earthly_\" recedes into\ncontemptible remoteness; for the standby point is--the _heavenly_.\n\nThe attitude is now altogether reversed; the youth takes up an\n_intellectual_ position, while the boy, who did not yet feel himself as\nmind, grew up in mindless learning. The former does not try to get hold\nof _things_ (_e. g._ to get into his head the _data_ of history), but of\nthe _thoughts_ that lie hidden in things, and so, _e. g._, of the\n_spirit_ of history. On the other hand, the boy understands\n_connections_ no doubt, but not ideas, the spirit; therefore he strings\ntogether whatever can be learned, without proceeding _a priori_ and\ntheoretically, _i. e._ without looking for ideas.\n\nAs in childhood one had to overcome the resistance of the _laws of the\nworld_, so now in everything that he proposes he is met by an objection\nof the mind, of reason, of his _own conscience_. \"That is unreasonable,\nunchristian, unpatriotic,\" and the like, cries conscience to us,\nand--frightens us away from it. Not the might of the avenging Eumenides,\nnot Poseidon's wrath, not God, far as he sees the hidden, not the\nfather's rod of punishment, do we fear, but--_conscience_.\n\nWe \"run after our thoughts\" now, and follow their commands just as\nbefore we followed parental, human ones. Our course of action is\ndetermined by our thoughts (ideas, conceptions, _faith_) as it is in\nchildhood by the commands of our parents.\n\nFor all that, we were already thinking when we were children, only our\nthoughts were not fleshless, abstract, _absolute, i. e._ NOTHING BUT\nTHOUGHTS, a heaven in themselves, a pure world of thought, _logical_\nthoughts.\n\nOn the contrary, they had been only thoughts that we had about a\n_thing_; we thought of the thing so or so. Thus we may have thought \"God\nmade the world that we see there,\" but we did not think of (\"search\")\nthe \"depths of the Godhead itself\"; we may have thought \"that is the\ntruth about the matter,\" but we did not think of Truth itself, nor unite\ninto one sentence \"God is truth.\" The \"depths of the Godhead, who is\ntruth,\" we did not touch. Over such purely logical, _i. e._ theological\nquestions, \"What is truth?\" Pilate does not stop, though he does not\ntherefore hesitate to ascertain in an individual case \"what truth there\nis in the thing,\" _i. e._ whether the _thing_ is true.\n\nAny thought bound to a _thing_ is not yet _nothing but a thought_,\nabsolute thought.\n\nTo bring to light _the pure thought_, or to be of its party, is the\ndelight of youth; and all the shapes of light in the world of thought,\nlike truth, freedom, humanity, Man, etc., illumine and inspire the\nyouthful soul.\n\nBut, when the spirit is recognized as the essential thing, it still\nmakes a difference whether the spirit is poor or rich, and therefore one\nseeks to become rich in spirit; the spirit wants to spread out so as to\nfound its empire--an empire that is not of this world, the world just\nconquered. Thus, then, it longs to become all in all to itself; _i. e._,\nalthough I am spirit, I am not yet _perfected_ spirit, and must first\nseek the complete spirit.\n\nBut with that I, who had just now found myself as spirit, lose myself\nagain at once, bowing before the complete spirit as one not my own but\n_supernal_, and feeling my emptiness.\n\nSpirit is the essential point for everything, to be sure; but then is\nevery spirit the \"right\" spirit? The right and true spirit is the ideal\nof spirit, the \"Holy Spirit.\" It is not my or your spirit, but just--an\nideal, supernal one, it is \"God.\" \"God is spirit.\" And this supernal\n\"Father in heaven gives it to those that pray to him.\"[7]\n\nThe man is distinguished from the youth by the fact that he takes the\nworld as it is, instead of everywhere fancying it amiss and wanting to\nimprove it, _i. e_. model it after his ideal; in him the view that one\nmust deal with the world according to his _interest_, not according to\nhis _ideals_, becomes confirmed.\n\nSo long as one knows himself only as _spirit_, and feels that all the\nvalue of his existence consists in being spirit (it becomes easy for the\nyouth to give his life, the \"bodily life,\" for a nothing, for the\nsilliest point of honor), so long it is only _thoughts_ that one has,\nideas that he hopes to be able to realize some day when he has found a\nsphere of action; thus one has meanwhile only _ideals_, unexecuted ideas\nor thoughts.\n\nNot till one has fallen in love with his _corporeal_ self, and takes a\npleasure in himself as a living flesh-and-blood person,--but it is in\nmature years, in the man, that we find it so,--not till then has one a\npersonal or _egoistic_ interest, _i. e._ an interest not only of our\nspirit, for instance, but of total satisfaction, satisfaction of the\nwhole chap, a _selfish_ interest. Just compare a man with a youth, and\nsee if he will not appear to you harder, less magnanimous, more selfish.\nIs he therefore worse? No, you say; he has only become more definite,\nor, as you also call it, more \"practical.\" But the main point is this,\nthat he makes _himself_ more the centre than does the youth, who is\ninfatuated about other things, _e. g._ God, fatherland, and so on.\n\nTherefore the man shows a _second_ self-discovery. The youth found\nhimself as _spirit_ and lost himself again in the _general_ spirit, the\ncomplete, holy spirit, Man, mankind,--in short, all ideals; the man\nfinds himself as _embodied_ spirit.\n\nBoys had only _unintellectual_ interests (_i. e._ interests devoid of\nthoughts and ideas), youths only _intellectual_ ones; the man has\nbodily, personal, egoistic interests.\n\nIf the child has not an _object_ that it can occupy itself with, it\nfeels _ennui_; for it does not yet know how to occupy itself with\n_itself_. The youth, on the contrary, throws the object aside, because\nfor him _thoughts_ arose out of the object; he occupies himself with his\n_thoughts_, his dreams, occupies himself intellectually, or \"his mind is\noccupied.\"\n\nThe young man includes everything not intellectual under the\ncontemptuous name of \"externalities.\" If he nevertheless sticks to the\nmost trivial externalities (_e. g._ the customs of students' clubs and\nother formalities), it is because, and when, he discovers _mind_ in\nthem, _i. e._ when they are _symbols_ to him.\n\nAs I find myself back of things, and that as mind, so I must later find\n_myself_ also back of _thoughts_,--to wit, as their creator and _owner_.\nIn the time of spirits thoughts grew till they overtopped my head,\nwhose offspring they yet were; they hovered about me and convulsed me\nlike fever-phantasies--an awful power. The thoughts had become\n_corporeal_ on their own account, were ghosts, such as God, Emperor,\nPope, Fatherland, etc. If I destroy their corporeity, then I take them\nback into mine, and say: \"I alone am corporeal.\" And now I take the\nworld as what it is to me, as _mine_, as my property; I refer all to\nmyself.\n\nIf as spirit I had thrust away the world in the deepest contempt, so as\nowner I thrust spirits or ideas away into their \"vanity.\" They have no\nlonger any power over me, as no \"earthly might\" has power over the\nspirit.\n\nThe child was realistic, taken up with the things of this world, till\nlittle by little he succeeded in getting at what was back of these very\nthings; the youth was idealistic, inspired by thoughts, till he worked\nhis way up to where he became the man, the egoistic man, who deals with\nthings and thoughts according to his heart's pleasure, and sets his\npersonal interest above everything. Finally, the old man? When I become\none, there will still be time enough to speak of that.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nMEN OF THE OLD TIME AND THE NEW\n\n\nHow each of us developed himself, what he strove for, attained, or\nmissed, what objects he formerly pursued and what plans and wishes his\nheart is now set on, what transformations his views have experienced,\nwhat perturbations his principles,--in short, how he has to-day become\nwhat yesterday or years ago he was not,--this he brings out again from\nhis memory with more or less ease, and he feels with especial vividness\nwhat changes have taken place in himself when he has before his eyes the\nunrolling of another's life.\n\nLet us therefore look into the activities our fore-fathers busied\nthemselves with.\n\n\nI.--THE ANCIENTS\n\nCustom having once given the name of \"the ancients\" to our pre-Christian\nancestors, we will not throw it up against them that, in comparison with\nus experienced people, they ought properly to be called children, but\nwill rather continue to honor them as our good old fathers. But how have\nthey come to be antiquated, and who could displace them through his\npretended newness?\n\nWe know, of course, the revolutionary innovator and disrespectful heir,\nwho even took away the sanctity of the fathers' sabbath to hallow his\nSunday, and interrupted the course of time to begin at himself with a\nnew chronology; we know him, and know that it is--the Christian. But\ndoes he remain forever young, and is he to-day still the new man, or\nwill he too be superseded, as he has superseded the \"ancients\"?\n\nThe fathers must doubtless have themselves begotten the young one who\nentombed them. Let us then peep at this act of generation.\n\n\"To the ancients the world was a truth,\" says Feuerbach, but he forgets\nto make the important addition, \"a truth whose untruth they tried to get\nback of, and at last really did.\" What is meant by those words of\nFeuerbach will be easily recognized if they are put alongside the\nChristian thesis of the \"vanity and transitoriness of the world.\" For,\nas the Christian can never convince himself of the vanity of the divine\nword, but believes in its eternal and unshakeable truth, which, the more\nits depths are searched, must all the more brilliantly come to light and\ntriumph, so the ancients on their side lived in the feeling that the\nworld and mundane relations (_e. g_. the natural ties of blood) were the\ntruth before which their powerless \"I\" must bow. The very thing on which\nthe ancients set the highest value is spurned by Christians as the\nvalueless, and what they recognized as truth these brand as idle lies;\nthe high significance of the fatherland disappears, and the Christian\nmust regard himself as \"a stranger on earth\";[8] the sanctity of\nfuneral rites, from which sprang a work of art like the Antigone of\nSophocles, is designated as a paltry thing (\"Let the dead bury their\ndead\"); the infrangible truth of family ties is represented as an\nuntruth which one cannot promptly enough get clear of;[9] and so in\neverything.\n\nIf we now see that to the two sides opposite things appear as truth, to\none the natural, to the other the intellectual, to one earthly things\nand relations, to the other heavenly (the heavenly fatherland,\n\"Jerusalem that is above,\" etc.), it still remains to be considered how\nthe new time and that undeniable reversal could come out of antiquity.\nBut the ancients themselves worked toward making their truth a lie.\n\nLet us plunge at once into the midst of the most brilliant years of the\nancients, into the Periclean century. Then the Sophistic culture was\nspreading, and Greece made a pastime of what had hitherto been to her a\nmonstrously serious matter.\n\nThe fathers had been enslaved by the undisturbed power of existing\nthings too long for the posterity not to have to learn by bitter\nexperience to _feel themselves_. Therefore the Sophists, with courageous\nsauciness, pronounce the reassuring words, \"Don't be bluffed!\" and\ndiffuse the rationalistic doctrine, \"Use your understanding, your wit,\nyour mind, against everything; it is by having a good and well-drilled\nunderstanding that one gets through the world best, provides for himself\nthe best lot, the pleasantest _life_.\" Thus they recognize in _mind_\nman's true weapon against the world. This is why they lay such stress\non dialectic skill, command of language, the art of disputation, etc.\nThey announce that mind is to be used against everything; but they are\nstill far removed from the holiness of the Spirit, for to them it is a\n_means_, a weapon, as trickery and defiance serve children for the same\npurpose; their mind is the unbribable _understanding_.\n\nTo-day we should call that a one-sided culture of the understanding, and\nadd the warning, \"Cultivate not only your understanding, but also, and\nespecially, your heart.\" Socrates did the same. For, if the heart did\nnot become free from its natural impulses, but remained filled with the\nmost fortuitous contents and, as an uncriticised _avidity_, altogether\nin the power of things, _i. e._ nothing but a vessel of the most various\n_appetites_,--then it was unavoidable that the free understanding must\nserve the \"bad heart\" and was ready to justify everything that the\nwicked heart desired.\n\nTherefore Socrates says that it is not enough for one to use his\nunderstanding in all things, but it is a question of what _cause_ one\nexerts it for. We should now say, one must serve the \"good cause.\" But\nserving the good cause is--being moral. Hence Socrates is the founder of\nethics.\n\nCertainly the principle of the Sophistic doctrine must lead to the\npossibility that the blindest and most dependent slave of his desires\nmight yet be an excellent sophist, and, with keen understanding, trim\nand expound everything in favor of his coarse heart. What could there be\nfor which a \"good reason\" might not be found, or which might not be\ndefended through thick and thin?\n\nTherefore Socrates says: \"You must be 'pure-hearted' if your shrewdness\nis to be valued.\" At this point begins the second period of Greek\nliberation of the mind, the period of _purity of heart_. For the first\nwas brought to a close by the Sophists in their proclaiming the\nomnipotence of the understanding. But the heart remained\n_worldly-minded_, remained a servant of the world, always affected by\nworldly wishes. This coarse heart was to be cultivated from now on--the\nera of _culture of the heart_. But how is the heart to be cultivated?\nWhat the understanding, this one side of the mind, has reached,--to wit,\nthe capability of playing freely with and over every concern,--awaits\nthe heart also; everything _worldly_ must come to grief before it, so\nthat at last family, commonwealth, fatherland, and the like, are given\nup for the sake of the heart, _i. e._ of _blessedness_, the heart's\nblessedness.\n\nDaily experience confirms the truth that the understanding may have\nrenounced a thing many years before the heart has ceased to beat for it.\nSo the Sophistic understanding too had so far become master over the\ndominant, ancient powers that they now needed only to be driven out of\nthe heart, in which they dwelt unmolested, to have at last no part at\nall left in man.\n\nThis war is opened by Socrates, and not till the dying day of the old\nworld does it end in peace.\n\nThe examination of the heart takes its start with Socrates, and all the\ncontents of the heart are sifted. In their last and extremest struggles\nthe ancients threw all contents out of the heart and let it no longer\nbeat for anything; this was the deed of the Skeptics. The same purgation\nof the heart was now achieved in the Skeptical age, as the understanding\nhad succeeded in establishing in the Sophistic age.\n\nThe Sophistic culture has brought it to pass that one's understanding no\nlonger _stands still_ before anything, and the Skeptical, that his heart\nis no longer _moved_ by anything.\n\nSo long as man is entangled in the movements of the world and\nembarrassed by relations to the world,--and he is so till the end of\nantiquity, because his heart still has to struggle for independence from\nthe worldly,--so long he is not yet spirit; for spirit is without body,\nand has no relations to the world and corporality; for it the world does\nnot exist, nor natural bonds, but only the spiritual, and spiritual\nbonds. Therefore man must first become so completely unconcerned and\nreckless, so altogether without relations, as the Skeptical culture\npresents him,--so altogether indifferent to the world that even its\nfalling in ruins would not move him,--before he could feel himself as\nworldless, _i. e._ as spirit. And this is the result of the gigantic\nwork of the ancients: that man knows himself as a being without\nrelations and without a world, as _spirit_.\n\nOnly now, after all worldly care has left him, is he all in all to\nhimself, is he only for himself, i. e. he is spirit for the spirit, or,\nin plainer language, he cares only for the spiritual.\n\nIn the Christian wisdom of serpents and innocence of doves the two\nsides--understanding and heart--of the ancient liberation of mind are\nso completed that they appear young and new again, and neither the one\nnor the other lets itself be bluffed any longer by the worldly and\nnatural.\n\nThus the ancients mounted to _spirit_, and strove to become _spiritual_.\nBut a man who wishes to be active as spirit is drawn to quite other\ntasks than he was able to set himself formerly: to tasks which really\ngive something to do to the spirit and not to mere sense or\nacuteness,[10] which exerts itself only to become master of _things_.\nThe spirit busies itself solely about the spiritual, and seeks out the\n\"traces of mind\" in everything; to the _believing_ spirit \"everything\ncomes from God,\" and interests him only to the extent that it reveals\nthis origin; to the _philosophic_ spirit everything appears with the\nstamp of reason, and interests him only so far as he is able to discover\nin it reason, _i. e._ spiritual content.\n\nNot the spirit, then, which has to do with absolutely nothing\nunspiritual, with no _thing_, but only with the essence which exists\nbehind and above things, with _thoughts_,--not that did the ancients\nexert, for they did not yet have it; no, they had only reached the point\nof struggling and longing for it, and therefore sharpened it against\ntheir too-powerful foe, the world of sense (but what would not have been\nsensuous for them, since Jehovah or the gods of the heathen were yet far\nremoved from the conception \"God is _spirit_,\" since the \"heavenly\nfatherland\" had not yet stepped into the place of the sensuous,\netc?)--they sharpened against the world of sense their _sense_, their\nacuteness. To this day the Jews, those precocious children of antiquity,\nhave got no farther; and with all the subtlety and strength of their\nprudence and understanding, which easily becomes master of things and\nforces them to obey it, they cannot discover _spirit_, which _takes no\naccount whatever of things_.\n\nThe Christian has spiritual interests, because he allows himself to be a\n_spiritual_ man; the Jew does not even understand these interests in\ntheir purity, because he does not allow himself to assign _no value_ to\nthings. He does not arrive at pure _spirituality_, a spirituality such\nas is religiously expressed, _e. g._, in the _faith_, of Christians,\nwhich alone (_i. e._ without works) justifies. Their _unspirituality_\nsets Jews forever apart from Christians; for the spiritual man is\nincomprehensible to the unspiritual, as the unspiritual is contemptible\nto the spiritual. But the Jews have only \"the spirit of this world.\"\n\nThe ancient acuteness and profundity lies as far from the spirit and the\nspirituality of the Christian world as earth from heaven.\n\nHe who feels himself as free spirit is not oppressed and made anxious by\nthe things of this world, because he does not care for them; if one is\nstill to feel their burden, he must be narrow enough to attach _weight_\nto them,--as is evidently the case, for instance, when one is still\nconcerned for his \"dear life.\" He to whom everything centres in knowing\nand conducting himself as a free spirit gives little heed to how\nscantily he is supplied meanwhile, and does not reflect at all on how he\nmust make his arrangements to have a thoroughly free or enjoyable\n_life_. He is not disturbed by the inconveniences of the life that\ndepends on things, because he lives only spiritually and on spiritual\nfood, while aside from this he only gulps things down like a beast,\nhardly knowing it, and dies bodily, to be sure, when his fodder gives\nout, but knows himself immortal as spirit, and closes his eyes with an\nadoration or a thought. His life is occupation with the spiritual,\nis--_thinking_; the rest does not bother him; let him busy himself with\nthe spiritual in any way that he can and chooses,--in devotion, in\ncontemplation, or in philosophic cognition,--his doing is always\nthinking; and therefore Descartes, to whom this had at last become quite\nclear, could lay down the proposition: \"I think, that is--I am.\" This\nmeans, my thinking is my being or my life; only when I live spiritually\ndo I live; only as spirit am I really, or--I am spirit through and\nthrough and nothing but spirit. Unlucky Peter Schlemihl, who has lost\nhis shadow, is the portrait of this man become a spirit; for the\nspirit's body is shadowless.--Over against this, how different among the\nancients! Stoutly and manfully as they might bear themselves against the\nmight of things, they must yet acknowledge the might itself, and got no\nfarther than to protect their _life_ against it as well as possible.\nOnly at a late hour did they recognize that their \"true life\" was not\nthat which they led in the fight against the things of the world, but\nthe \"spiritual life,\" \"turned away\" from these things; and, when they\nsaw this, they became--Christians, _i. e._ the moderns, and innovators\nupon the ancients. But the life turned away from things, the spiritual\nlife, no longer draws any nourishment from nature, but \"lives only on\nthoughts,\" and therefore is no longer \"life,\" but--_thinking_.\n\nYet it must not be supposed now that the ancients were _without\nthoughts_, just as the most spiritual man is not to be conceived of as\nif he could be without life. Rather, they had their thoughts about\neverything, about the world, man, the gods, etc., and showed themselves\nkeenly active in bringing all this to their consciousness. But they did\nnot know _thought_, even though they thought of all sorts of things and\n\"worried themselves with their thoughts.\" Compare with their position\nthe Christian saying, \"My thoughts are not your thoughts; as the heaven\nis higher than the earth, so are my thoughts higher than your thoughts,\"\nand remember what was said above about our child-thoughts.\n\nWhat is antiquity seeking, then? The true _enjoyment of life_! You will\nfind that at bottom it is all the same as \"the true life.\"\n\nThe Greek poet Simonides sings: \"Health is the noblest good for mortal\nman, the next to this is beauty, the third riches acquired without\nguile, the fourth the enjoyment of social pleasures in the company of\nyoung friends.\" These are all _good things of life_, pleasures of life.\nWhat else was Diogenes of Sinope seeking for than the true enjoyment of\nlife, which he discovered in having the least possible wants? What else\nAristippus, who found it in a cheery temper under all circumstances?\nThey are seeking for cheery, unclouded _life-courage_, for _cheeriness_;\nthey are seeking to \"be of good _cheer_.\"\n\nThe Stoics want to realize the _wise man_, the man with _practical\nphilosophy_, the man who _knows how to live_,--a wise life, therefore;\nthey find him in contempt for the world, in a life without development,\nwithout spreading out, without friendly relations with the world,\n_i. e._ in the _isolated life_, in life as life, not in life with\nothers; only the Stoic _lives_, all else is dead for him. The\nEpicureans, on the contrary, demand a moving life.\n\nThe ancients, as they want to be of good cheer, desire _good living_\n(the Jews especially a long life, blessed with children and goods),\n_eudaemonia_, well-being in the most various forms. Democritus, _e. g._,\npraises as such the calm of the soul in which one \"_lives_ smoothly,\nwithout fear and without excitement.\"\n\nSo what he thinks is that with this he gets on best, provides for\nhimself the best lot, and gets through the world best. But as he cannot\nget rid of the world,--and in fact cannot for the very reason that his\nwhole activity is taken up in the effort to get rid of it, that is, in\n_repelling the world_ (for which it is yet necessary that what can be\nand is repelled should remain existing, otherwise there would no longer\nbe anything to repel),--he reaches at most an extreme degree of\nliberation, and is distinguishable only in degree from the less\nliberated. If he even got as far as the deadening of the earthly sense,\nwhich at last admits only the monotonous whisper of the word \"Brahm,\" he\nnevertheless would not be essentially distinguishable from the _sensual_\nman.\n\nEven the Stoic attitude and manly virtue amounts only to this,--that\none must maintain and assert himself against the world; and the ethics\nof the Stoics (their only science, since they could tell nothing about\nthe spirit but how it should behave toward the world, and of nature\n[physics] only this, that the wise man must assert himself against it)\nis not a doctrine of the spirit, but only a doctrine of the repelling of\nthe world and of self-assertion against the world. And this consists in\n\"imperturbability and equanimity of life,\" and so in the most explicit\nRoman virtue.\n\nThe Romans too (Horace, Cicero, etc.) went no further than this\n_practical philosophy_.\n\nThe _comfort (hedone)_ of the Epicureans is the same _practical\nphilosophy_ the Stoics teach, only trickier, more deceitful. They teach\nonly another _behavior_ toward the world, exhort us only to take a\nshrewd attitude toward the world; the world must be deceived, for it is\nmy enemy.\n\nThe break with the world is completely carried through by the Skeptics.\nMy entire relation to the world is \"worthless and truthless.\" Timon\nsays, \"The feelings and thoughts which we draw from the world contain no\ntruth.\" \"What is truth?\" cries Pilate. According to Pyrrho's doctrine\nthe world is neither good nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly, etc., but\nthese are _predicates_ which I give it. Timon says that \"in itself\nnothing is either good or bad, but man only _thinks_ of it thus or\nthus\"; to face the world only _ataraxia_ (unmovedness) and _aphasia_\n(speechlessness--or, in other words, isolated _inwardness_) are left.\nThere is \"no longer any truth to be recognized\" in the world; things\ncontradict themselves; thoughts about things are without distinction\n(good and bad are all the same, so that what one calls good another\nfinds bad); here the recognition of \"truth\" is at an end, and only the\n_man without power of recognition_, the _man_ who finds in the world\nnothing to recognize, is left, and this man just leaves the truth-vacant\nworld where it is and takes no account of it.\n\nSo antiquity gets trough with the _world of things_, the order of the\nworld, the world as a whole; but to the order of the world, or the\nthings of this world, belong not only nature, but all relations in which\nman sees himself placed by nature, _e. g._ the family, the\ncommunity,--in short, the so-called \"natural bonds.\" With the _world of\nthe spirit_ Christianity then begins. The man who still faces the world\n_armed_ is the ancient, the--_heathen_ (to which class the Jew, too, as\nnon-Christian, belongs); the man who has come to be led by nothing but\nhis \"heart's pleasure,\" the interest he takes, his fellow-feeling,\nhis--_spirit_, is the modern, the--Christian.\n\nAs the ancients worked toward the _conquest of the world_ and strove to\nrelease man from the heavy trammels of connection with _other things_,\nat last they came also to the dissolution of the State and giving\npreference to everything private. Of course community, family, etc., as\n_natural_ relations, are burdensome hindrances which diminish my\n_spiritual freedom_.\n\n\nII.--THE MODERNS\n\n\"If any man be in Christ, he is a _new creature_; the old is passed\naway, behold, all is become _new_.\"[11]\n\nAs it was said above, \"To the ancients the world was a truth,\" we must\nsay here, \"To the moderns the spirit was a truth\"; but here, as there,\nwe must not omit the supplement, \"a truth whose untruth they tried to\nget back of, and at last they really do.\"\n\nA course similar to that which antiquity took may be demonstrated in\nChristianity also, in that the _understanding_ was held a prisoner under\nthe dominion of the Christian dogmas up to the time preparatory to the\nReformation, but in the pre-Reformation century asserted itself\n_sophistically_ and played heretical pranks with all tenets of the\nfaith. And the talk then was, especially in Italy and at the Roman\ncourt, \"If only the heart remains Christian-minded, the understanding\nmay go right on taking its pleasure.\"\n\nLong before the Reformation people were so thoroughly accustomed to\nfine-spun \"wranglings\" that the pope, and most others, looked on\nLuther's appearance too as a mere \"wrangling of monks\" at first.\nHumanism corresponds to Sophisticism, and, as in the time of the\nSophists Greek life stood in its fullest bloom (the Periclean age), so\nthe most brilliant things happened in the time of Humanism, or, as one\nmight perhaps also say, of Machiavellianism (printing, the New World,\netc.). At this time the heart was still far from wanting to relieve\nitself of its Christian contents.\n\nBut finally the Reformation, like Socrates, took hold seriously of the\n_heart_ itself, and since then hearts have kept growing visibly--more\nunchristian. As with Luther people began to take the matter to heart,\nthe outcome of this step of the Reformation must be that the heart also\ngets lightened of the heavy burden of Christian faith. The heart, from\nday to day more unchristian, loses the contents with which it had busied\nitself, till at last nothing but empty _warm-heartedness_ is left it,\nthe quite general love of men, the love of Man, the consciousness of\nfreedom, \"self-consciousness.\"\n\nOnly so is Christianity complete, because it has become bald, withered,\nand void of contents. There are now no contents whatever against which\nthe heart does not mutiny, unless indeed the heart unconsciously or\nwithout \"self-consciousness\" lets them slip in. The heart _criticises_\nto death with _hard-hearted_ mercilessness everything that wants to make\nits way in, and is capable (except, as before, unconsciously or taken by\nsurprise) of no friendship, no love. What could there be in men to love,\nsince they are all alike \"egoists,\" none of them _man_ as such, _i. e._\nnone _spirit_ only? The Christian loves only the spirit; but where could\none be found who should be really nothing but spirit?\n\nTo have a liking for the corporeal man with hide and hair,--why, that\nwould no longer be a \"spiritual\" warm-heartedness, it would be treason\nagainst \"pure\" warm-heartedness, the \"theoretical regard.\" For pure\nwarm-heartedness is by no means to be conceived as like that kindliness\nthat gives everybody a friendly hand-shake; on the contrary, pure\nwarm-heartedness is warm-hearted toward nobody, it is only a theoretical\ninterest, concern for man as man, not as a person. The person is\nrepulsive to it because of being \"egoistic,\" because of not being that\nabstraction, Man. But it is only for the abstraction that one can have a\ntheoretical regard. To pure warm-heartedness or pure theory men exist\nonly to be criticised, scoffed at, and thoroughly despised; to it, no\nless than to the fanatical parson, they are only \"filth\" and other such\nnice things.\n\nPushed to this extremity of disinterested warm-heartedness, we must\nfinally become conscious that the spirit, which alone the Christian\nloves, is nothing; in other words, that the spirit is--a lie.\n\nWhat has here been set down roughly, summarily, and doubtless as yet\nincomprehensibly, will, it is to be hoped, become clear as we go on.\n\nLet us take up the inheritance left by the ancients, and, as active\nworkmen, do with it as much as--can be done with it! The world lies\ndespised at our feet, far beneath us and our heaven, into which its\nmighty arms are no longer thrust and its stupefying breath does not\ncome. Seductively as it may pose, it can delude nothing but our _sense_;\nit cannot lead astray the spirit--and spirit alone, after all, we really\nare. Having once got _back_ of things, the spirit has also got _above_\nthem, and become free from their bonds, emancipated supernal, free. So\nspeaks \"spiritual freedom.\"\n\nTo the spirit which, after long toil, has got rid of the world, the\nworldless spirit, nothing is left after the loss of the world and the\nworldly but--the spirit and the spiritual.\n\nYet, as it has only moved away from the world and made of itself a being\n_free from the world_, without being able really to annihilate the\nworld, this remains to it a stumbling-block that cannot be cleared away,\na discredited existence; and, as, on the other hand, it knows and\nrecognizes nothing but the spirit and the spiritual, it must perpetually\ncarry about with it the longing to spiritualize the world, _i. e._ to\nredeem it from the \"black list.\" Therefore, like a youth, it goes about\nwith plans for the redemption or improvement of the world.\n\nThe ancients, we saw, served the natural, the worldly, the natural order\nof the world, but they incessantly asked themselves whether they could\nnot, then, relieve themselves of this service; and, when they had tired\nthemselves to death in ever-renewed attempts at revolt, then, among\ntheir last sighs, was born to them the _God_, the \"conqueror of the\nworld.\" All their doing had been nothing but _wisdom of the world_, an\neffort to get back of the world and above it. And what is the wisdom of\nthe many following centuries? What did the moderns try to get back of?\nNo longer to get back of the world, for the ancients had accomplished\nthat; but back of the God whom the ancients bequeathed to them, back of\nthe God who \"is spirit,\" back of everything that is the spirit's, the\nspiritual. But the activity of the spirit, which \"searches even the\ndepths of the Godhead,\" is _theology_. If the ancients have nothing to\nshow but wisdom of the world, the moderns never did nor do make their\nway further than to theology. We shall see later that even the newest\nrevolts against God are nothing but the extremest efforts of \"theology,\"\n_i. e._ theological insurrections.\n\n\n\u00a7 1.--THE SPIRIT\n\nThe realm of spirits is monstrously great, there is an infinite deal of\nthe spiritual; yet let us look and see what the spirit, this bequest of\nthe ancients, properly is.\n\nOut of their birth-pangs it came forth, but they themselves could not\nutter themselves as spirit; they could give birth to it, it itself must\nspeak. The \"born God, the Son of Man,\" is the first to utter the word\nthat the spirit, _i. e._ he, God, has to do with nothing earthly and no\nearthly relationship, but solely with the spirit and spiritual\nrelationships.\n\nIs my courage, indestructible under all the world's blows, my\ninflexibility and my obduracy, perchance already spirit in the full\nsense, because the world cannot touch it? Why, then it would not yet be\nat enmity with the world, and all its action would consist merely in not\nsuccumbing to the world! No, so long as it does not busy itself with\nitself alone, so long as it does not have to do with _its_ world, the\nspiritual, alone, it is not _free_ spirit, but only the \"spirit of this\nworld,\" the spirit fettered to it. The spirit is free spirit, _i. e._\nreally spirit, only in a world of _its own_; in \"this,\" the world, it is\na stranger. Only through a spiritual world is the spirit really spirit,\nfor \"this\" world does not understand it and does not know how to keep\n\"the maiden from a foreign land\"[12] from departing.\n\nBut where is it to get this spiritual world? Where but out of itself? It\nmust reveal itself; and the words that it speaks, the revelations in\nwhich it unveils itself, these are _its_ world. As a visionary lives and\nhas _his_ world only in the visionary pictures that he himself creates,\nas a crazy man generates for himself his own dream-world, without which\nhe could not be crazy, so the spirit must create for itself its spirit\nworld, and is not spirit till it creates it.\n\nThus its creations make it spirit, and by its creatures we know it, the\ncreator; in them it lives, they are its world.\n\nNow, what is the spirit? It is the creator of a spiritual world! Even in\nyou and me people do not recognize spirit till they see that we have\nappropriated to ourselves something spiritual,--_i. e._, though thoughts\nmay have been set before us, we have at least brought them to life in\nourselves; for, as long as we were children, the most edifying thoughts\nmight have been laid before us without our wishing, or being able to\nreproduce them in ourselves. So the spirit also exists only when it\ncreates something spiritual; it is real only together with the\nspiritual, its creature.\n\nAs, then, we know it by its works, the question is what these works are.\nBut the works or children of the spirit are nothing else but--spirits:\n\nIf I had before me Jews, Jews of the true metal, I should have to stop\nhere and leave them standing before this mystery as for almost two\nthousand years they have remained standing before it, unbelieving and\nwithout knowledge. But, as you, my dear reader, are at least not a\nfull-blooded Jew,--for such a one will not go astray as far as this,--we\nwill still go along a bit of road together, till perhaps you too turn\nyour back on me because I laugh in your face.\n\nIf somebody told you you were altogether spirit, you would take hold of\nyour body and not believe him, but answer: \"I _have_ a spirit, no doubt,\nbut do not exist only as spirit, but am a man with a body.\" You would\nstill distinguish _yourself_ from \"your spirit.\" \"But,\" replies he, \"it\nis your destiny, even though now you are yet going about in the fetters\nof the body, to be one day a 'blessed spirit,' and, however you may\nconceive of the future aspect of your spirit, so much is yet certain,\nthat in death you will put off this body and yet keep yourself, _i. e._\nyour spirit, for all eternity; accordingly your spirit is the eternal\nand true in you, the body only a dwelling here below, which you may\nleave and perhaps exchange for another.\"\n\nNow you believe him! For the present, indeed, _you_ are not spirit only;\nbut, when you emigrate from the mortal body, as one day you must, then\nyou will have to help yourself without the body, and therefore it is\nneedful that you be prudent and care in time for your proper self. \"What\nshould it profit a man if he gained the whole world and yet suffered\ndamage in his soul?\"\n\nBut, even granted that doubts, raised in the course of time against the\ntenets of the Christian faith, have long since robbed you of faith in\nthe immortality of your spirit, you have nevertheless left one tenet\nundisturbed, and still ingenuously adhere to the one truth, that the\nspirit is your better part, and that the spiritual has greater claims on\nyou than anything else. Despite all your atheism, in zeal against\n_egoism_ you concur with the believers in immortality.\n\nBut whom do you think of under the name of egoist? A man who, instead of\nliving to an idea,--_i. e._ a spiritual thing--and sacrificing to it his\npersonal advantage, serves the latter. A good patriot, _e. g._, brings\nhis sacrifice to the altar of the fatherland; but it cannot be disputed\nthat the fatherland is an idea, since for beasts incapable of mind,[13]\nor children as yet without mind, there is no fatherland and no\npatriotism. Now, if any one does not approve himself as a good patriot,\nhe betrays his egoism with reference to the fatherland. And so the\nmatter stands in innumerable other cases: he who in human society takes\nthe benefit of a prerogative sins egoistically against the idea of\nequality; he who exercises dominion is blamed as an egoist against the\nidea of liberty,--etc.\n\nYou despise the egoist because he puts the spiritual in the background\nas compared with the personal, and has his eyes on himself where you\nwould like to see him act to favor an idea. The distinction between you\nis that he makes himself the central point, but you the spirit; or that\nyou cut your identity in two and exalt your \"proper self,\" the spirit,\nto be ruler of the paltrier remainder, while he will hear nothing of\nthis cutting in two, and pursues spiritual and material interests just\n_as he pleases_. You think, to be sure, that you are falling foul of\nthose only who enter into no spiritual interest at all, but in fact you\ncurse at everybody who does not look on the spiritual interest as his\n\"true and highest\" interest. You carry your knightly service for this\nbeauty so far that you affirm her to be the only beauty of the world.\nYou live not to _yourself_, but to your _spirit_ and to what is the\nspirit's--_i. e._ ideas.\n\nAs the spirit exists only in its creating of the spiritual, let us take\na look about us for its first creation. If only it has accomplished\nthis, there follows thenceforth a natural propagation of creations, as\naccording to the myth only the first human beings needed to be created,\nthe rest of the race propagating of itself. The first creation, on the\nother hand, must come forth \"out of nothing,\"--_i. e._, the spirit has\ntoward its realization nothing but itself, or rather it has not yet even\nitself, but must create itself; hence its first creation is itself, _the\nspirit_. Mystical as this sounds, we yet go through it as an every-day\nexperience. Are you a thinking being before you think? In creating the\nfirst thought you create yourself, the thinking one; for you do not\nthink before you think a thought, _i. e._ have a thought. Is it not your\nsinging that first makes you a singer, your talking that makes you a\ntalker? Now, so too it is the production of the spiritual that first\nmakes you a spirit.\n\nMeantime, as you distinguish _yourself_ from the thinker, singer, and\ntalker, so you no less distinguish yourself from the spirit, and feel\nvery clearly that you are something beside spirit. But, as in the\nthinking ego hearing and sight easily vanish in the enthusiasm of\nthought, so you also have been seized by the spirit-enthusiasm, and you\nnow long with all your might to become wholly spirit and to be dissolved\nin spirit. The spirit is your _ideal_, the unattained, the otherworldly;\nspirit is the name of your--god, \"God is spirit.\"\n\nAgainst all that is not spirit you are a zealot, and therefore you play\nthe zealot against _yourself_ who cannot get rid of a remainder of the\nnon-spiritual. Instead of saying, \"I am _more_ than spirit,\" you say\nwith contrition, \"I am less than spirit; and spirit, pure spirit, or the\nspirit that is nothing but spirit, I can only think of, but am not; and,\nsince I am not it, it is another, exists as another, whom I call 'God'.\"\n\nIt lies in the nature of the case that the spirit that is to exist as\npure spirit must be an otherworldly one, for, since I am not it, it\nfollows that it can only be _outside_ me; since in any case a human\nbeing is not fully comprehended in the concept \"spirit,\" it follows that\nthe pure spirit, the spirit as such, can only be outside of men, beyond\nthe human world,--not earthly, but heavenly.\n\nOnly from this disunion in which I and the spirit lie; only because \"I\"\nand \"spirit\" are not names for one and the same thing, but different\nnames for completely different things; only because I am not spirit and\nspirit not I,--only from this do we get a quite tautological explanation\nof the necessity that the spirit dwells in the other world, _i. e._ is\nGod.\n\nBut from this it also appears how thoroughly theological is the\nliberation that Feuerbach[14] is laboring to give us. What he says is\nthat we had only mistaken our own essence, and therefore looked for it\nin the other world, but that now, when we see that God was only our\nhuman essence, we must recognize it again as ours and move it back out\nof the other world into this. To God, who is spirit, Feuerbach gives the\nname \"Our Essence.\" Can we put up with this, that \"Our Essence\" is\nbrought into opposition to _us_,--that we are split into an essential\nand an unessential self? Do we not therewith go back into the dreary\nmisery of seeing ourselves banished out of ourselves?\n\nWhat have we gained, then, when for a variation we have transferred into\nourselves the divine outside us? _Are we_ that which is in us? As little\nas we are that which is outside us. I am as little my heart as I am my\nsweetheart, this \"other self\" of mine. Just because we are not the\nspirit that dwells in us, just for that reason we had to take it and set\nit outside us; it was not we, did not coincide with us, and therefore we\ncould not think of it as existing otherwise than outside us, on the\nother side from us, in the other world.\n\nWith the strength of _despair_ Feuerbach clutches at the total substance\nof Christianity, not to throw it away, no, to drag it to himself, to\ndraw it, the long-yearned-for, ever-distant, out of its heaven with a\nlast effort, and keep it by him forever. Is not that a clutch of the\nuttermost despair, a clutch for life or death, and is it not at the\nsame time the Christian yearning and hungering for the other world? The\nhero wants not to go into the other world, but to draw the other world\nto him, and compel it to become this world! And since then has not all\nthe world, with more or less consciousness, been crying that \"this\nworld\" is the vital point, and heaven must come down on earth and be\nexperienced even here?\n\nLet us, in brief, set Feuerbach's theological view and our contradiction\nover against each other!\n\n\"The essence of man is man's supreme being;[15] now by religion, to be\nsure, the _supreme being_ is called _God_ and regarded as an _objective_\nessence, but in truth it is only man's own essence; and therefore the\nturning point of the world's history is that henceforth no longer _God_,\nbut man, is to appear to man as God.\"[16]\n\nTo this we reply: The supreme being is indeed the essence of man, but,\njust because it is his _essence_ and not he himself, it remains quite\nimmaterial whether we see it outside him and view it as \"God,\" or find\nit in him and call it \"Essence of Man\" or \"Man.\" _I_ am neither God nor\n_Man_,[17] neither the supreme essence nor my essence, and therefore it\nis all one in the main whether I think of the essence as in me or\noutside me. Nay, we really do always think of the supreme being as in\nboth kinds of otherworldliness, the inward and outward, at once; for\nthe \"Spirit of God\" is, according to the Christian view, also \"our\nspirit,\" and \"dwells in us.\"[18] It dwells in heaven and dwells in us;\nwe poor things are just its \"dwelling,\" and, if Feuerbach goes on to\ndestroy its heavenly dwelling and force it to move to us bag and\nbaggage, then we, its earthly apartments, will be badly overcrowded.\n\nBut after this digression (which, if we were at all proposing to work by\nline and level, we should have had to save for later pages in order to\navoid repetition) we return to the spirit's first creation, the spirit\nitself.\n\nThe spirit is something other than myself. But this other, what is it?\n\n\n\u00a7 2.--THE POSSESSED.\n\nHave you ever seen a spirit? \"No, not I, but my grandmother.\" Now, you\nsee, it's just so with me too; I myself haven't seen any, but my\ngrandmother had them running between her feet all sorts of ways, and out\nof confidence in our grandmothers' honesty we believe in the existence\nof spirits.\n\nBut had we no grandfathers then, and did they not shrug their shoulders\nevery time our grandmothers told about their ghosts? Yes, those were\nunbelieving men who have harmed our good religion much, those\nrationalists! We shall feel that! What else lies at the bottom of this\nwarm faith in ghosts, if not the faith in \"the existence of spiritual\nbeings in general,\" and is not this latter itself disastrously unsettled\nif saucy men of the understanding may disturb the former? The\nRomanticists were quite conscious what a blow the very belief in God\nsuffered by the laying aside of the belief in spirits or ghosts, and\nthey tried to help us out of the baleful consequences not only by their\nreawakened fairy world, but at last, and especially, by the \"intrusion\nof a higher world,\" by their somnambulists, prophetesses of Prevorst,\netc. The good believers and fathers of the church did not suspect that\nwith the belief in ghosts the foundation of religion was withdrawn, and\nthat since then it had been floating in the air. He who no longer\nbelieves in any ghost needs only to travel on consistently in his\nunbelief to see that there is no separate being at all concealed behind\nthings, no ghost or--what is naively reckoned as synonymous even in our\nuse of words--no \"_spirit_.\"\n\n\"Spirits exist!\" Look about in the world, and say for yourself whether a\nspirit does not gaze upon you out of everything. Out of the lovely\nlittle flower there speaks to you the spirit of the Creator, who has\nshaped it so wonderfully; the stars proclaim the spirit that established\ntheir order; from the mountain-tops a spirit of sublimity breathes down;\nout of the waters a spirit of yearning murmurs up; and--out of men\nmillions of spirits speak. The mountains may sink, the flowers fade, the\nworld of stars fall in ruins, the men die--what matters the wreck of\nthese visible bodies? The spirit, the \"invisible spirit,\" abides\neternally!\n\nYes, the whole world is haunted! Only _is_ haunted? Nay, it itself\n\"walks,\" it is uncanny through and through, it is the wandering\nseeming-body of a spirit, it is a spook. What else should a ghost be,\nthen, than an apparent body, but real spirit? Well, the world is\n\"empty,\" is \"naught,\" is only glamorous \"semblance\"; its truth is the\nspirit alone; it is the seeming-body of a spirit.\n\nLook out near or far, a _ghostly_ world surrounds you everywhere; you\nare always having \"apparitions\" or visions. Everything that appears to\nyou is only the phantasm of an indwelling spirit, is a ghostly\n\"apparition\"; the world is to you only a \"world of appearances,\" behind\nwhich the spirit walks. You \"see spirits.\"\n\nAre you perchance thinking of comparing yourself with the ancients, who\nsaw gods everywhere? Gods, my dear modern, are not spirits; gods do not\ndegrade the world to a semblance, and do not spiritualize it.\n\nBut to you the whole world is spiritualized, and has become an\nenigmatical ghost; therefore do not wonder if you likewise find in\nyourself nothing but a spook. Is not your body haunted by your spirit,\nand is not the latter alone the true and real, the former only the\n\"transitory, naught\" or a \"semblance\"? Are we not all ghosts, uncanny\nbeings that wait for \"deliverance,\"--to wit, \"spirits\"?\n\nSince the spirit appeared in the world, since \"the Word became flesh,\"\nsince then the world has been spiritualized, enchanted, a spook.\n\nYou have spirit, for you have thoughts. What are your thoughts?\n\"Spiritual entities.\" Not things, then? \"No, but the spirit of things,\nthe main point in all things, the inmost in them, their--idea.\"\nConsequently what you think is not only your thought? \"On the contrary,\nit is that in the world which is most real, that which is properly to be\ncalled true; it is the truth itself; if I only think truly, I think the\ntruth. I may, to be sure, err with regard to the truth, and _fail to\nrecognize_ it; but, if I _recognize_ truly, the object of my cognition\nis the truth.\" So, I suppose, you strive at all times to recognize the\ntruth? \"To me the truth is sacred. It may well happen that I find a\ntruth incomplete and replace it with a better, but _the_ truth I cannot\nabrogate. I _believe_ in the truth, therefore I search in it; nothing\ntranscends it, it is eternal.\"\n\nSacred, eternal is the truth; it is the Sacred, the Eternal. But you,\nwho let yourself be filled and led by this sacred thing, are yourself\nhallowed. Further, the sacred is not for your senses,--and you never as\na sensual man discover its trace,--but for your faith, or, more\ndefinitely still, for your _spirit_; for it itself, you know, is a\nspiritual thing, a spirit,--is spirit for the spirit.\n\nThe sacred is by no means so easily to be set aside as many at present\naffirm, who no longer take this \"unsuitable\" word into their mouths. If\neven in a single respect I am still _upbraided_ as an \"egoist,\" there is\nleft the thought of something else which I should serve more than\nmyself, and which must be to me more important than everything; in\nshort, somewhat in which I should have to seek my true welfare,[19]\nsomething--\"sacred.\"[20] However human this sacred thing may look,\nthough it be the Human itself, that does not take away its sacredness,\nbut at most changes it from an unearthly to an earthly sacred thing,\nfrom a divine one to a human.\n\nSacred things exist only for the egoist who does not acknowledge\nhimself, the _involuntary egoist_, for him who is always looking after\nhis own and yet does not count himself as the highest being, who serves\nonly himself and at the same time always thinks he is serving a higher\nbeing, who knows nothing higher than himself and yet is infatuated about\nsomething higher; in short, for the egoist who would like not to be an\negoist, and abases himself (_i. e._ combats his egoism), but at the same\ntime abases himself only for the sake of \"being exalted,\" and therefore\nof gratifying his egoism. Because he would like to cease to be an\negoist, he looks about in heaven and earth for higher beings to serve\nand sacrifice himself to; but, however much he shakes and disciplines\nhimself, in the end he does all for his own sake, and the disreputable\negoism will not come off him. On this account I call him the involuntary\negoist.\n\nHis toil and care to get away from himself is nothing but the\nmisunderstood impulse to self-dissolution. If you are bound to your past\nhour, if you must babble to-day because you babbled yesterday,[21] if\nyou can not transform yourself each instant, you feel yourself fettered\nin slavery and benumbed. Therefore over each minute of your existence a\nfresh minute of the future beckons to you, and, developing yourself, you\nget away \"from yourself,\"--_i. e._ from the self that was at that\nmoment. As you are at each instant, you are your own creature, and in\nthis very \"creature\" you do not wish to lose yourself, the creator. You\nare yourself a higher being than you are, and surpass yourself. But that\n_you_ are the one who is higher than you,--_i. e._ that you are not only\ncreature, but likewise your creator,--just this, as an involuntary\negoist, you fail to recognize; and therefore the \"higher essence\" is to\nyou--an alien[22] essence. Every higher essence, such as truth, mankind,\netc., is an essence _over_ us.\n\nAlienness is a criterion of the \"sacred.\" In everything sacred there\nlies something \"uncanny,\" _i. e._ strange,[23] such as we are not quite\nfamiliar and at home in. What is sacred to me is _not my own_; and if,\n_e. g._ the property of others was not sacred to me, I should look on it\nas _mine_, which I should take to myself when occasion offered. Or, on\nthe other side, if I regard the face of the Chinese emperor as sacred,\nit remains strange to my eye, which I close at its appearance.\n\nWhy is an incontrovertible mathematical truth, which might even be\ncalled eternal according to the common understanding of words,\nnot--sacred? Because it is not revealed, or not the revelation of a\nhigher being. If by revealed we understand only the so-called religious\ntruths, we go far astray, and entirely fail to recognize the breadth of\nthe concept \"higher being.\" Atheists keep up their scoffing at the\nhigher being, which was also honored under the name of the \"highest\" or\n_\u00eatre supr\u00eame_, and trample in the dust one \"proof of his existence\"\nafter another without noticing that they themselves, out of need for a\nhigher being, only annihilate the old to make room for a new. Is \"Man\"\nperchance not a higher essence than an individual man, and must not the\ntruths, rights, and ideas which result from the concept of him be\nhonored and--counted sacred, as revelations of this very concept? For,\neven though we should abrogate again many a truth that seemed to be made\nmanifest by this concept, yet this would only evince a misunderstanding\non our part, without in the least degree harming the sacred concept\nitself or taking their sacredness from those truths that must rightly be\nlooked upon as its revelations. _Man_ reaches beyond every individual\nman, and yet--though he be \"his essence\"--is not in fact _his_ essence\n(which rather would be as single[24] as he the individual himself), but\na general and \"higher,\" yes, for atheists \"the highest essence.\"[25]\nAnd, as the divine revelations were not written down by God with his own\nhand, but made public through \"the Lord's instruments,\" so also the new\nhighest essence does not write out its revelations itself, but lets them\ncome to our knowledge through \"true men.\" Only the new essence betrays,\nin fact, a more spiritual style of conception than the old God, because\nthe latter was still represented in a sort of embodiedness or form,\nwhile the undimmed spirituality of the new is retained, and no special\nmaterial body is fancied for it. And withal it does not lack corporeity,\nwhich even takes on a yet more seductive appearance because it looks\nmore natural and mundane and consists in nothing less than in every\nbodily man,--yes, or outright in \"humanity\" or \"all men.\" Thereby the\nspectralness of the spirit in a seeming-body has once again become\nreally solid and popular.\n\nSacred, then, is the highest essence and everything in which this\nhighest essence reveals or will reveal itself; but hallowed are they who\nrecognize this highest essence together with its own, _i. e._ together\nwith its revelations. The sacred hallows in turn its reverer, who by his\nworship becomes himself a saint, as likewise what he does is saintly, a\nsaintly walk, saintly thoughts and actions, imaginations and\naspirations, etc.\n\nIt is easily understood that the conflict over what is revered as the\nhighest essence can be significant only so long as even the most\nembittered opponents concede to each other the main point,--that there\nis a highest essence to which worship or service is due. If one should\nsmile compassionately at the whole struggle over a highest essence, as a\nChristian might at the war of words between a Shiite and a Sunnite or\nbetween a Brahman and a Buddhist, then the hypothesis of a highest\nessence would be null in his eyes, and the conflict on this basis an\nidle play. Whether then the one God or the three in one, whether the\nLutheran God or the _\u00eatre supr\u00eame_ or not God at all, but \"Man,\" may\nrepresent the highest essence, that makes no difference at all for him\nwho denies the highest essence itself, for in his eyes those servants of\na highest essence are one and all--pious people, the most raging atheist\nnot less than the most faith-filled Christian.\n\nIn the foremost place of the sacred,[26] then, stands the highest\nessence and the faith in this essence, our \"holy[27] faith.\"\n\n\nTHE SPOOK\n\nWith ghosts we arrive in the spirit-realm, in the realm of _essences_.\n\nWhat haunts the universe, and has its occult, \"incomprehensible\" being\nthere, is precisely the mysterious spook that we call highest essence.\nAnd to get to the bottom of this _spook_, to _comprehend_ it, to\ndiscover _reality_ in it (to prove \"the existence of God\")--this task\nmen set to themselves for thousands of years; with the horrible\nimpossibility, the endless Danaid-labor, of transforming the spook into\na non-spook, the unreal into something real, the _spirit_ into an entire\nand _corporeal_ person,--with this they tormented themselves to death.\nBehind the existing world they sought the \"thing in itself,\" the\nessence; behind the _thing_ they sought the _un-thing_.\n\nWhen one looks to the _bottom_ of anything, _i. e._ searches out its\n_essence_, one often discovers something quite other than what it\n_seems_ to be; honeyed speech and a lying heart, pompous words and\nbeggarly thoughts, etc. By bringing the essence into prominence one\ndegrades the hitherto misapprehended appearance to a bare _semblance_, a\ndeception. The essence of the world, so attractive and splendid, is for\nhim who looks to the bottom of it--emptiness; emptiness is == world's\nessence (world's doings). Now, he who is religious does not occupy\nhimself with the deceitful semblance, with the empty appearances, but\nlooks upon the essence, and in the essence has--the truth.\n\nThe essences which are deduced from some appearances are the evil\nessences, and conversely from others the good. The essence of human\nfeeling, _e. g._, is love; the essence of human will is the good; that\nof one's thinking, the true; etc.\n\nWhat at first passed for existence, such as the world and its like,\nappears now as bare semblance, and the _truly existent_ is much rather\nthe essence, whose realm is filled with gods, spirits, demons, _i. e._\nwith good or bad essences. Only this inverted world, the world of\nessences, truly exists now. The human heart may be loveless, but its\nessence exists, God, \"who is love\"; human thought may wander in error,\nbut its essence, truth, exists; \"God is truth,\"--etc.\n\nTo know and acknowledge essences alone and nothing but essences, that is\nreligion; its realm is a realm of essences, spooks, and ghosts.\n\nThe longing to make the spook comprehensible, or to realize _non-sense_,\nhas brought about a _corporeal ghost_, a ghost or spirit with a real\nbody, an embodied ghost. How the strongest and most talented Christians\nhave tortured themselves to get a conception of this ghostly apparition!\nBut there always remained the contradiction of two natures, the divine\nand human, _i. e._ the ghostly and sensual; there remained the most\nwondrous spook, a thing that was not a thing. Never yet was a ghost more\nsoul-torturing, and no shaman, who pricks himself to raving fury and\nnerve-lacerating cramps to conjure a ghost, can endure such soul-torment\nas Christians suffered from that most incomprehensible ghost.\n\nBut through Christ the truth of the matter had at the same time come to\nlight, that the veritable spirit or ghost is--man. The _corporeal_ or\nembodied spirit is just man; he himself is the ghastly being and at the\nsame time the being's appearance and existence. Henceforth man no\nlonger, in typical cases, shudders at ghosts _outside_ him, but at\nhimself; he is terrified at himself. In the depth of his breast dwells\nthe _spirit of sin_; even the faintest _thought_ (and this is itself a\nspirit, you know) may be a _devil_, etc.--The ghost has put on a body,\nGod has become man, but now man is himself the gruesome spook which he\nseeks to get back of, to exorcise, to fathom, to bring to reality and to\nspeech; man is--_spirit_. What matter if the body wither, if only the\nspirit is saved? everything rests on the spirit, and the spirit's or\n\"soul's\" welfare becomes the exclusive goal. Man has become to himself a\nghost, an uncanny spook, to which there is even assigned a distinct seat\nin the body (dispute over the seat of the soul, whether in the head,\netc.).\n\nYou are not to me, and I am not to you, a higher essence. Nevertheless a\nhigher essence may be hidden in each of us, and call forth a mutual\nreverence. To take at once the most general, Man lives in you and me.\nIf I did not see Man in you, what occasion should I have to respect you?\nTo be sure you are not Man and his true and adequate form, but only a\nmortal veil of his, from which he can withdraw without himself ceasing;\nbut yet for the present this general and higher essence is housed in\nyou, and you present before me (because an imperishable spirit has in\nyou assumed a perishable body, so that really your form is only an\n\"assumed\" one) a spirit that appears, appears in you, without being\nbound to your body and to this particular mode of appearance,--therefore\na spook. Hence I do not regard you as a higher essence, but only respect\nthat higher essence which \"walks\" in you; I \"respect Man in you.\" The\nancients did not observe anything of this sort in their slaves, and the\nhigher essence \"Man\" found as yet little response. To make up for this,\nthey saw in each other ghosts of another sort. The People is a higher\nessence than an individual, and, like Man or the Spirit of Man, a spirit\nhaunting the individual,--the Spirit of the People. For this reason they\nrevered this spirit, and only so far as he served this or else a spirit\nrelated to it (_e. g._ the Spirit of the Family, etc.) could the\nindividual appear significant; only for the sake of the higher essence,\nthe People, was consideration allowed to the \"member of the people.\" As\nyou are hallowed to us by \"Man\" who haunts you, so at every time men\nhave been hallowed by some higher essence or other, like People, Family,\nand such. Only for the sake of a higher essence has any one been honored\nfrom of old, only as a ghost has he been regarded in the light of a\nhallowed, _i. e._, protected and recognized person. If I cherish you\nbecause I hold you dear, because in you my heart finds nourishment, my\nneed satisfaction, then it is not done for the sake of a higher essence\nwhose hallowed body you are, not on account of my beholding in you a\nghost, _i. e._ an appearing spirit, but from egoistic pleasure; you\nyourself with _your_ essence are valuable to me, for your essence is not\na higher one, is not higher and more general than you, is unique[28]\nlike you yourself, because it is you.\n\nBut it is not only man that, \"haunts\"; so does everything. The higher\nessence, the spirit, that walks in everything, is at the same time bound\nto nothing, and only--\"appears\" in it. Ghosts in every corner!\n\nHere would be the place to pass the haunting spirits in review, if they\nwere not to come before us again further on in order to vanish before\negoism. Hence let only a few of them be particularized by way of\nexample, in order to bring us at once to our attitude toward them.\n\nSacred above all, _e. g._, is the \"holy Spirit,\" sacred the truth,\nsacred are right, law, a good cause, majesty, marriage, the common good,\norder, the fatherland, etc.\n\n\nWHEELS IN THE HEAD.\n\nMan, your head is haunted; you have wheels in your head! You imagine\ngreat things, and depict to yourself a whole world of gods that has an\nexistence for you, a spirit-realm to which you suppose yourself to be\ncalled, an ideal that beckons to you. You have a fixed idea!\n\nDo not think that I am jesting or speaking figuratively when I regard\nthose persons who cling to the Higher, and (because the vast majority\nbelongs under this head) almost the whole world of men, as veritable\nfools, fools in a madhouse. What is it, then, that is called a \"fixed\nidea\"? An idea that has subjected the man to itself. When you recognize,\nwith regard to such a fixed idea, that it is a folly, you shut its slave\nup in an asylum. And is the truth of the faith, say, which we are not to\ndoubt; the majesty of (_e. g._) the people, which we are not to strike\nat (he who does is guilty of--lese-majesty); virtue, against which the\ncensor is not to let a word pass, that morality may be kept pure;\netc.,--are these not \"fixed ideas\"? Is not all the stupid chatter of\n(_e. g._) most of our newspapers the babble of fools who suffer from the\nfixed idea of morality, legality, Christianity, etc., and only seem to\ngo about free because the madhouse in which they walk takes in so broad\na space? Touch the fixed idea of such a fool, and you will at once have\nto guard your back against the lunatic's stealthy malice. For these\ngreat lunatics are like the little so-called lunatics in this point\ntoo,--that they assail by stealth him who touches their fixed idea. They\nfirst steal his weapon, steal free speech from him, and then they fall\nupon him with their nails. Every day now lays bare the cowardice and\nvindictiveness of these maniacs, and the stupid populace hurrahs for\ntheir crazy measures. One must read the journals of this period, and\nmust hear the Philistines talk, to get the horrible conviction that one\nis shut up in a house with fools. \"Thou shalt not call thy brother a\nfool; if thou dost--etc.\" But I do not fear the curse, and I say, my\nbrothers are arch-fools. Whether a poor fool of the insane asylum is\npossessed by the fancy that he is God the Father, Emperor of Japan, the\nHoly Spirit, etc., or whether a citizen in comfortable circumstances\nconceives that it is his mission to be a good Christian, a faithful\nProtestant, a loyal citizen, a virtuous man, etc.,--both these are one\nand the same \"fixed idea.\" He who has never tried and dared not to be a\ngood Christian, a faithful Protestant, a virtuous man, etc., is\n_possessed_ and prepossessed[29] by faith, virtuousness, etc. Just as\nthe schoolmen philosophized only _inside_ the belief of the church; as\nPope Benedict XIV wrote fat books _inside_ the papist superstition,\nwithout ever throwing a doubt upon this belief; as authors fill whole\nfolios on the State without calling in question the fixed idea of the\nState itself; as our newspapers are crammed with politics because they\nare conjured into the fancy that man was created to be a _zoon\npoliticon_,--so also subjects vegetate in subjection, virtuous people in\nvirtue, liberals in humanity, etc., without ever putting to these fixed\nideas of theirs the searching knife of criticism. Undislodgeable, like a\nmadman's delusion, those thoughts stand on a firm footing, and he who\ndoubts them--lays hands on the _sacred_! Yes, the \"fixed idea,\" that is\nthe truly sacred!\n\nIs it perchance only people possessed by the devil that meet us, or do\nwe as often come upon people _possessed_ in the contrary way,--possessed\nby \"the good,\" by virtue, morality, the law, or some \"principle\" or\nother? Possessions of the devil are not the only ones. God works on us,\nand the devil does; the former \"workings of grace,\" the latter \"workings\nof the devil.\" Possessed[30] people are _set_[31] in their opinions.\n\nIf the word \"possession\" displeases you, then call it prepossession;\nyes, since the spirit possesses you, and all \"inspirations\" come from\nit, call it--inspiration and enthusiasm. I add that complete\nenthusiasm--for we cannot stop with the sluggish, half-way kind--is\ncalled fanaticism.\n\nIt is precisely among cultured people that _fanaticism_ is at home; for\nman is cultured so far as he takes an interest in spiritual things, and\ninterest in spiritual things, when it is alive, is and must be\n_fanaticism_; it is a fanatical interest in the sacred (_fanum_).\nObserve our liberals, look into the _Saechsischen Vaterlandsblaetter_,\nhear what Schlosser says:[32] \"Holbach's company constituted a regular\nplot against the traditional doctrine and the existing system, and its\nmembers were as fanatical on behalf of their unbelief as monks and\npriests, Jesuits and Pietists, Methodists, missionary and Bible\nsocieties, commonly are for mechanical worship and orthodoxy.\"\n\nTake notice how a \"moral man\" behaves, who to-day often thinks he is\nthrough with God and throws off Christianity as a bygone thing. If you\nask him whether he has ever doubted that the copulation of brother and\nsister is incest, that monogamy is the truth of marriage, that filial\npiety is a sacred duty, etc., then a moral shudder will come over him at\nthe conception of one's being allowed to touch his sister as wife also,\netc. And whence this shudder? Because he _believes_ in those moral\ncommandments. This moral _faith_ is deeply rooted in his breast. Much as\nhe rages against the _pious_ Christians, he himself has nevertheless as\nthoroughly remained a Christian,--to wit, a _moral_ Christian. In the\nform of morality Christianity holds him a prisoner, and a prisoner under\n_faith_. Monogamy is to be something sacred, and he who may live in\nbigamy is punished as a _criminal_; he who commits incest suffers as a\n_criminal_. Those who are always crying that religion is not to be\nregarded in the State, and the Jew is to be a citizen equally with the\nChristian, show themselves in accord with this. Is not this of incest\nand monogamy a _dogma of faith_? Touch it, and you will learn by\nexperience how this moral man is a _hero of faith_ too, not less than\nKrummacher, not less than Philip II. These fight for the faith of the\nChurch, he for the faith of the State, or the moral laws of the State;\nfor articles of faith, both condemn him who acts otherwise than _their\nfaith_ will allow. The brand of \"crime\" is stamped upon him, and he may\nlanguish in reformatories, in jails. Moral faith is as fanatical as\nreligious faith! They call that \"liberty of faith\" then, when brother\nand sister, on account of a relation that they should have settled with\ntheir \"conscience,\" are thrown into prison. \"But they set a pernicious\nexample.\" Yes, indeed: others might have taken the notion that the\nState had no business to meddle with their relation, and thereupon\n\"purity of morals\" would go to ruin. So then the religious heroes of\nfaith are zealous for the \"sacred God,\" the moral ones for the \"sacred\ngood.\"\n\nThose who are zealous for something sacred often look very little like\neach other. How the strictly orthodox or old-style believers differ from\nthe fighters for \"truth, light, and justice,\" from the Philalethes, the\nFriends of Light, the Rationalists, etc. And yet, how utterly\nunessential is this difference! If one buffets single traditional truths\n(_e. g._ miracles, unlimited power of princes, etc.), then the\nrationalists buffet them too, and only the old-style believers wail.\nBut, if one buffets truth itself, he immediately has both, as\n_believers_, for opponents. So with moralities; the strict believers are\nrelentless, the clearer heads are more tolerant. But he who attacks\nmorality itself gets both to deal with. \"Truth, morality, justice,\nlight, etc.,\" are to be and remain \"sacred.\" What any one finds to\ncensure in Christianity is simply supposed to be \"unchristian\" according\nto the view of these rationalists; but Christianity must remain a\nfixture, to buffet it is outrageous, \"an outrage.\" To be sure, the\nheretic against pure faith no longer exposes himself to the earlier fury\nof persecution, but so much the more does it now fall upon the heretic\nagainst pure morals.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPiety has for a century received so many blows, and had to hear its\nsuperhuman essence reviled as an \"inhuman\" one so often, that one\ncannot feel tempted to draw the sword against it again. And yet it has\nalmost always been only moral opponents that have appeared in the arena,\nto assail the supreme essence in favor of--another supreme essence. So\nProudhon, unabashed, says:[33] \"Man is destined to live without\nreligion, but the moral law is eternal and absolute. Who would dare\nto-day to attack morality?\" Moral people skimmed off the best fat from\nreligion, ate it themselves, and are now having a tough job to get rid\nof the resulting scrofula. If, therefore, we point out that religion has\nnot by any means been hurt in its inmost part so long as people reproach\nit only with its superhuman essence, and that it takes its final appeal\nto the \"spirit\" alone (for God is spirit), then we have sufficiently\nindicated its final accord with morality, and can leave its stubborn\nconflict with the latter lying behind us. It is a question of a supreme\nessence with both, and whether this is a superhuman or a human one can\nmake (since it is in any case an essence over me, a super-mine one, so\nto speak) but little difference to me. In the end the relation to the\nhuman essence, or to \"Man,\" as soon as ever it has shed the snake-skin\nof the old religion, will yet wear a religious snake-skin again.\n\nSo Feuerbach instructs us that, \"if one only _inverts_ speculative\nphilosophy, _i. e._ always makes the predicate the subject, and so makes\nthe subject the object and principle, one has the undraped truth, pure\nand clean.\"[34] Herewith, to be sure, we lose the narrow religious\nstandpoint, lose the _God_, who from this standpoint is subject; but we\ntake in exchange for it the other side of the religious standpoint, the\n_moral_ standpoint. _E. g._, we no longer say \"God is love,\" but \"Love\nis divine.\" If we further put in place of the predicate \"divine\" the\nequivalent \"sacred,\" then, as far as concerns the sense, all the old\ncomes back again. According to this, love is to be the _good_ in man,\nhis divineness, that which does him honor, his true _humanity_ (it\n\"makes him Man for the first time,\" makes for the first time a man out\nof him). So then it would be more accurately worded thus: Love is what\nis _human_ in man, and what is inhuman is the loveless egoist. But\nprecisely all that which Christianity and with it speculative philosophy\n(_i. e._ theology) offers as the good, the absolute, is to\nself-ownership simply not the good (or, what means the same, it is _only\nthe good_). Consequently, by the transformation of the predicate into\nthe subject, the Christian _essence_ (and it is the predicate that\ncontains the essence, you know) would only be fixed yet more\noppressively. God and the divine would entwine themselves all the more\ninextricably with me. To expel God from his heaven and to rob him of his\n\"_transcendence_\" cannot yet support a claim of complete victory, if\ntherein he is only chased into the human breast and gifted with\nindelible _immanence_. Now they say, \"The divine is the truly human!\"\n\nThe same people who oppose Christianity as the basis of the State,\n_i. e._ oppose the so-called Christian State, do not tire of repeating\nthat morality is \"the fundamental pillar of social life and of the\nState.\" As if the dominion of morality were not a complete dominion of\nthe sacred, a \"hierarchy.\"\n\nSo we may here mention by the way that rationalist movement which, after\ntheologians had long insisted that only faith was capable of grasping\nreligious truths, that only to believers did God reveal himself, etc.,\nand that therefore only the heart, the feelings, the believing fancy was\nreligious, broke out with the assertion that the \"natural\nunderstanding,\" human reason, was also capable of discerning God. What\ndoes that mean but that the reason laid claim to be the same visionary\nas the fancy?[35] In this sense Reimarus wrote his \"Most Notable Truths\nof Natural Religion.\" It had to come to this,--that the _whole_ man with\nall his faculties was found to be _religious_; heart and affections,\nunderstanding and reason, feeling, knowledge, and will,--in short,\neverything in man,--appeared religious. Hegel has shown that even\nphilosophy is religious. And what is not called religion to-day? The\n\"religion of love,\" the \"religion of freedom,\" \"political religion,\"--in\nshort, every enthusiasm. So it is, too, in fact.\n\nTo this day we use the Romance word \"religion,\" which expresses the\nconcept of a condition of being _bound_. To be sure, we remain bound, so\nfar as religion takes possession of our inward parts; but is the mind\nalso bound? On the contrary, that is free, is sole lord, is not our\nmind, but absolute. Therefore the correct affirmative translation of the\nword religion would be \"_freedom of mind_\"! In whomsoever the mind is\nfree, he is religious in just the same way as he in whom the senses have\nfree course is called a sensual man. The mind binds the former, the\ndesires the latter. Religion, therefore, is boundness or _religio_ with\nreference to me,--I am bound; it is freedom with reference to the\nmind,--the mind is free, or has freedom of mind. Many know from\nexperience how hard it is on _us_ when the desires run away with us,\nfree and unbridled; but that the free mind, splendid intellectuality,\nenthusiasm for intellectual interests, or however this jewel may in the\nmost various phrase be named, brings _us_ into yet more grievous straits\nthan even the wildest impropriety, people will not perceive; nor can\nthey perceive it without being consciously egoists.\n\nReimarus, and all who have shown that our reason, our heart, etc., also\nlead to God, have therewithal shown that we are possessed through and\nthrough. To be sure, they vexed the theologians, from whom they took\naway the prerogative of religious exaltation; but for religion, for\nfreedom of mind, they thereby only conquered yet more ground. For, when\nthe mind is no longer limited to feeling or faith, but also, as\nunderstanding, reason, and thought in general, belongs to itself the\nmind,--when, therefore, it may take part in the spiritual[36] and\nheavenly truths in the form of understanding, etc., as well as in its\nother forms,--then the whole mind is occupied only with spiritual\nthings, _i. e._ with itself, and is therefore free. Now we are so\nthrough-and-through religious that \"jurors,\" _i. e._ \"sworn men,\"\ncondemn us to death, and every policeman, as a good Christian, takes us\nto the lock-up by virtue of an \"oath of office.\"\n\nMorality could not come into opposition with piety till after the time\nwhen in general the boisterous hate of everything that looked like an\n\"order\" (decrees, commandments, etc.) spoke out in revolt, and the\npersonal \"absolute lord\" was scoffed at and persecuted; consequently it\ncould arrive at independence only through liberalism, whose first form\nacquired significance in the world's history as \"citizenship,\" and\nweakened the specifically religious powers (see \"Liberalism\" below).\nFor, when morality not merely goes alongside of piety, but stands on\nfeet of its own, then its principle lies no longer in the divine\ncommandments, but in the law of reason, from which the commandments, so\nfar as they are still to remain valid, must first await justification\nfor their validity. In the law of reason man determines himself out of\nhimself, for \"Man\" is rational, and out of the \"essence of Man\" those\nlaws follow of necessity. Piety and morality part company in this,--that\nthe former makes God the lawgiver, the latter Man.\n\nFrom a certain standpoint of morality people reason about as follows:\nEither man is led by his sensuality, and is, following it, _immoral_, or\nhe is led by the good which, taken up into the will, is called moral\nsentiment (sentiment and prepossession in favor of the good); then he\nshows himself _moral_. From this point of view how, _e. g._, can Sand's\nact against Kotzebue be called immoral? What is commonly understood by\nunselfish it certainly was, in the same measure as (among other things)\nSt. Crispin's thieveries in favor of the poor. \"He should not have\nmurdered, for it stands written, Thou shalt not murder!\" Then to serve\nthe good, the welfare of the people, as Sand at least intended, or the\nwelfare of the poor, like Crispin,--is moral; but murder and theft are\nimmoral; the purpose moral, the means immoral. Why? \"Because murder,\nassassination, is something absolutely bad.\" When the Guerrillas enticed\nthe enemies of the country into ravines and shot them down unseen from\nthe bushes, do you suppose that was not assassination? According to the\nprinciple of morality, which commands us to serve the good, you could\nreally ask only whether murder could never in any case be a realization\nof the good, and would have to endorse that murder which realized the\ngood. You cannot condemn Sand's deed at all; it was moral, because in\nthe service of the good, because unselfish; it was an act of punishment,\nwhich the individual inflicted, an--_execution_ inflicted at the risk of\nthe executioner's life. What else had his scheme been, after all, but\nthat he wanted to suppress writings by brute force? Are you not\nacquainted with the same procedure as a \"legal\" and sanctioned one? And\nwhat can be objected against it from your principle of morality?--\"But\nit was an illegal execution.\" So the immoral thing in it was the\nillegality, the disobedience to law? Then you admit that the good is\nnothing else than--law, morality nothing else than _loyalty_. And to\nthis externality of \"loyalty\" your morality must sink, to this\nrighteousness of works in the fulfilment of the law, only that the\nlatter is at once more tyrannical and more revolting than the old-time\nrighteousness of works. For in the latter only the _act_ is needed, but\nyou require the _disposition_ too; one must carry _in himself_ the law,\nthe statute; and he who is most legally disposed is the most moral. Even\nthe last vestige of cheerfulness in Catholic life must perish in this\nProtestant legality. Here at last the domination of the law is for the\nfirst time complete. \"Not I live, but the law lives in me.\" Thus I have\nreally come so far as to be only the \"vessel of its glory.\" \"Every\nPrussian carries his _gendarme_ in his breast,\" says a high Prussian\nofficer.\n\nWhy do certain _opposition parties_ fail to flourish? Solely for the\nreason that they refuse to forsake the path of morality or legality.\nHence the measureless hypocrisy of devotion, love, etc., from whose\nrepulsiveness one may daily get the most thorough nausea at this rotten\nand hypocritical relation of a \"lawful opposition.\"--In the _moral_\nrelation of love and fidelity divided or opposed will cannot have place;\nthe beautiful relation is disturbed if the one wills this and the other\nthe reverse. But now, according to the practice hitherto and the old\nprejudice of the opposition, the moral relation is to be preserved above\nall. What is then left to the opposition? Perhaps the will to have a\nliberty, if the beloved one sees fit to deny it? Not a bit! It may not\n_will_ to have the freedom, it can only _wish_ for it, \"petition\" for\nit, lisp a \"Please, please!\" What would come of it, if the opposition\nreally _willed_, willed with the full energy of the will? No, it must\nrenounce _will_ in order to live to _love_, renounce liberty--for love\nof morality. It may never \"claim as a right\" what it is permitted only\nto \"beg as a favor.\" Love, devotion, etc., demand with undeviating\ndefiniteness that there be only one will to which the others devote\nthemselves, which they serve, follow, love. Whether this will is\nregarded as reasonable or as unreasonable, in both cases one acts\nmorally when one follows it, and immorally when one breaks away from it.\nThe will that commands the censorship seems to many unreasonable; but he\nwho in a land of censorship evades the censoring of his book acts\nimmorally, and he who submits it to the censorship acts morally. If some\none let his moral judgment go, and set up _e. g._ a secret press, one\nwould have to call him immoral, and imprudent into the bargain if he let\nhimself be caught; but will such a man lay claim to a value in the eyes\nof the \"moral\"? Perhaps!--That is, if he fancied he was serving a\n\"higher morality.\"\n\nThe web of the hypocrisy of to-day hangs on the frontiers of two\ndomains, between which our time swings back and forth, attaching its\nfine threads of deception and self-deception. No longer vigorous enough\nto serve _morality_ without doubt or weakening, not yet reckless enough\nto live wholly to egoism, it trembles now toward the one and now toward\nthe other in the spider-web of hypocrisy, and, crippled by the curse of\n_halfness_, catches only miserable, stupid flies. If one has once dared\nto make a \"free\" motion, immediately one waters it again with assurances\nof love, and--_shams resignation_; if, on the other side, they have had\nthe face to reject the free motion with _moral_ appeals to confidence,\netc., immediately the moral courage also sinks, and they assure one how\nthey hear the free words with special pleasure, etc.; they--_sham\napproval_. In short, people would like to have the one, but not go\nwithout the other; they would like to have a _free will_, but not for\ntheir lives lack the _moral will_. Just come in contact with a servile\nloyalist, you Liberals. You will sweeten every word of freedom with a\nlook of the most loyal confidence, and he will clothe his servilism in\nthe most flattering phrases of freedom. Then you go apart, and he, like\nyou, thinks \"I know you, fox!\" He scents the devil in you as much as you\ndo the dark old Lord God in him.\n\nA Nero is a \"bad\" man only in the eyes of the \"good\"; in mine he is\nnothing but a _possessed_ man, as are the good too. The good see in him\nan arch-villain, and relegate him to hell. Why did nothing hinder him in\nhis arbitrary course? Why did people put up with so much? Do you suppose\nthe tame Romans, who let all their will be bound by such a tyrant, were\na hair the better? In old Rome they would have put him to death\ninstantly, would never have been his slaves. But the contemporary \"good\"\namong the Romans opposed to him only moral demands, not their _will_;\nthey sighed that their emperor did not do homage to morality, like them;\nthey themselves remained \"moral subjects,\" till at last one found\ncourage to give up \"moral, obedient subjection.\" And then the same \"good\nRomans\" who, as \"obedient subjects,\" had borne all the ignominy of\nhaving no will, hurrahed over the nefarious, immoral act of the rebel.\nWhere then in the \"good\" was the courage for the _revolution_, that\ncourage which they now praised, after another had mustered it up? The\ngood could not have this courage, for a revolution, and an insurrection\ninto the bargain, is always something \"immoral,\" which one can resolve\nupon only when one ceases to be \"good\" and becomes either \"bad\"\nor--neither of the two. Nero was no viler than his time, in which one\ncould only be one of the two, good or bad. The judgment of his time on\nhim had to be that he was bad, and this in the highest degree: not a\nmilksop, but an arch-scoundrel. All moral people can pronounce only this\njudgment on him. Rascals such as he was are still living here and there\nto-day (see _e. g._ the Memoirs of Ritter von Lang) in the midst of the\nmoral. It is not convenient to live among them certainly, as one is not\nsure of his life for a moment; but can you say that it is more\nconvenient to live among the moral? One is just as little sure of his\nlife there, only that one is hanged \"in the way of justice,\" but least\nof all is one sure of his honor, and the national cockade is gone before\nyou can say Jack Robinson. The hard fist of morality treats the noble\nnature of egoism altogether without compassion.\n\n\"But surely one cannot put a rascal and an honest man on the same\nlevel!\" Now, no human being does that oftener than you judges of morals;\nyes, still more than that, you imprison as a criminal an honest man who\nspeaks openly against the existing constitution, against the hallowed\ninstitutions, etc., and you entrust portfolios and still more important\nthings to a crafty rascal. So _in praxi_ you have nothing to reproach me\nwith. \"But in theory!\" Now there I do put both on the same level, as two\nopposite poles,--to wit, both on the level of the moral law. Both have\nmeaning only in the \"moral\" world, just as in the pre-Christian time a\nJew who kept the law and one who broke it had meaning and significance\nonly in respect to the Jewish law; before Jesus Christ, on the contrary,\nthe Pharisee was no more than the \"sinner and publican.\" So before\nself-ownership the moral Pharisee amounts to as much as the immoral\nsinner.\n\nNero became very inconvenient by his possessedness. But a self-owning\nman would not sillily oppose to him the \"sacred,\" and whine if the\ntyrant does not regard the sacred; he would oppose to him his will. How\noften the sacredness of the inalienable rights of man has been held up\nto their foes, and some liberty or other shown and demonstrated to be a\n\"sacred right of man\"! Those who do that deserve to be laughed out of\ncourt--as they actually are,--were it not that in truth they do, even\nthough unconsciously, take the road that leads to the goal. They have a\npresentiment that, if only the majority is once won for that liberty, it\nwill also will the liberty, and will then take what it _will_ have. The\nsacredness of the liberty, and all possible proofs of this sacredness,\nwill never procure it; lamenting and petitioning only shows beggars.\n\nThe moral man is necessarily narrow in that he knows no other enemy than\nthe \"immoral\" man. \"He who is not moral is immoral!\" and accordingly\nreprobate, despicable, etc. Therefore the moral man can never comprehend\nthe egoist. Is not unwedded cohabitation an immorality? The moral man\nmay turn as he pleases, he will have to stand by this verdict; Emilia\nGalotti gave up her life for this moral truth. And it is true, it is an\nimmorality. A virtuous girl may become an old maid; a virtuous man may\npass the time in fighting his natural impulses till he has perhaps\ndulled them, he may castrate himself for the sake of virtue as St.\nOrigen did for the sake of heaven: he thereby honors sacred wedlock,\nsacred chastity, as inviolable; he is--moral. Unchastity can never\nbecome a moral act. However indulgently the moral man may judge and\nexcuse him who committed it, it remains a transgression, a sin against a\nmoral commandment; there clings to it an indelible stain. As chastity\nonce belonged to the monastic vow, so it does to moral conduct. Chastity\nis a--good.--For the egoist, on the contrary, even chastity is not a\ngood without which he could not get along; he cares nothing at all about\nit. What now follows from this for the judgment of the moral man? This:\nthat he throws the egoist into the only class of men that he knows\nbesides moral men, into that of the--immoral. He cannot do otherwise; he\nmust find the egoist immoral in everything in which the egoist\ndisregards morality. If he did not find him so, then he would already\nhave become an apostate from morality without confessing it to himself,\nhe would already no longer be a truly moral man. One should not let\nhimself be led astray by such phenomena, which at the present day are\ncertainly no longer to be classed as rare, but should reflect that he\nwho yields any point of morality can as little be counted among the\ntruly moral as Lessing was a pious Christian when, in the well-known\nparable, he compared the Christian religion, as well as the Mohammedan\nand Jewish, to a \"counterfeit ring.\" Often people are already further\nthan they venture to confess to themselves. For Socrates, because in\nculture he stood on the level of morality, it would have been an\nimmorality if he had been willing to follow Crito's seductive incitement\nand escape from the dungeon; to remain was the only moral thing. But it\nwas solely because Socrates was--a moral man. The \"unprincipled,\nsacrilegious\" men of the Revolution, on the contrary, had sworn fidelity\nto Louis XVI, and decreed his deposition, yes, his death; but the act\nwas an immoral one, at which moral persons will be horrified to all\neternity.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nYet all this applies, more or less, only to \"civic morality,\" on which\nthe freer look down with contempt. For it (like civism, its native\nground, in general) is still too little removed and free from the\nreligious heaven not to transplant the latter's laws without criticism\nor further consideration to its domain instead of producing independent\ndoctrines of its own. Morality cuts a quite different figure when it\narrives at the consciousness of its dignity, and raises its principle,\nthe essence of man, or \"Man,\" to be the only regulative power. Those who\nhave worked their way through to such a decided consciousness break\nentirely with religion, whose God no longer finds any place alongside\ntheir \"Man,\" and, as they (see below) themselves scuttle the ship of\nState, so too they crumble away that \"morality\" which flourishes only in\nthe State, and logically have no right to use even its name any further.\nFor what this \"critical\" party calls morality is very positively\ndistinguished from the so-called \"civic or political morality,\" and\nmust appear to the citizen like an \"insensate and unbridled liberty.\"\nBut at bottom it has only the advantage of the \"purity of the\nprinciple,\" which, freed from its defilement with the religious, has now\nreached universal power in its clarified definiteness as \"humanity.\"\nTherefore one should not wonder that the name \"morality\" is retained\nalong with others, like freedom, benevolence, self-consciousness, etc.,\nand is only garnished now and then with the addition, a \"free\"\nmorality,--just as, though the civic State is abused, yet the State is\nto arise again as a \"free State,\" or, if not even so, yet as a \"free\nsociety.\"\n\nBecause this morality completed into humanity has fully settled its\naccounts with the religion out of which it historically came forth,\nnothing hinders it from becoming a religion on its own account. For a\ndistinction prevails between religion and morality only so long as our\ndealings with the world of men are regulated and hallowed by our\nrelation to a superhuman being, or so long as our doing is a doing \"for\nGod's sake.\" If, on the other hand, it comes to the point that \"man is\nto man the supreme being,\" then that distinction vanishes, and morality,\nbeing removed from its subordinate position, is completed\ninto--religion. For then the higher being who had hitherto been\nsubordinated to the highest, Man, has ascended to absolute height, and\nwe are related to him as one is related to the highest being, _i. e._\nreligiously. Morality and piety are now as synonymous as in the\nbeginning of Christianity, and it is only because the supreme being has\ncome to be a different one that a holy walk is no longer called a\n\"holy\" one, but a \"human\" one. If morality has conquered, then a\ncomplete--_change of masters_ has taken place.\n\nAfter the annihilation of faith Feuerbach thinks to put in to the\nsupposedly safe harbor of _love_. \"The first and highest law must be the\nlove of man to man. _Homo homini Deus est_--this is the supreme\npractical maxim, this the turning point of the world's history.\"[37]\nBut, properly speaking, only the god is changed,--the _deus_; love has\nremained: there love to the superhuman God, here love to the human God,\nto _homo_ as _Deus_. Therefore man is to me--sacred. And everything\n\"truly human\" is to me--sacred! \"Marriage is sacred of itself. And so it\nis with all moral relations. Friendship is and must be _sacred_ for you,\nand property, and marriage, and the good of every man, but sacred _in\nand of itself_.\"[38] Haven't we the priest again there? Who is his God?\nMan with a great M! What is the divine? The human! Then the predicate\nhas indeed only been changed into the subject, and, instead of the\nsentence \"God is love,\" they say \"love is divine\"; instead of \"God has\nbecome man,\" \"Man has become God,\" etc. It is nothing more or less than\na new--_religion_. \"All moral relations are ethical, are cultivated with\na moral mind, only where of themselves (without religious consecration\nby the priest's blessing) they are counted _religious_.\" Feuerbach's\nproposition, \"Theology is anthropology,\" means only \"religion must be\nethics, ethics alone is religion.\"\n\nAltogether Feuerbach accomplishes only a transposition of subject and\npredicate, a giving of preference to the latter. But, since he himself\nsays, \"Love is not (and has never been considered by men) sacred through\nbeing a predicate of God, but it is a predicate of God because it is\ndivine in and of itself,\" he might judge that the fight against the\npredicates themselves, against love and all sanctities, must be\ncommenced. How could he hope to turn men away from God when he left them\nthe divine? And if, as Feuerbach says, God himself has never been the\nmain thing to them, but only his predicates, then he might have gone on\nleaving them the tinsel longer yet, since the doll, the real kernel, was\nleft at any rate. He recognizes, too, that with him it is \"only a matter\nof annihilating an illusion\";[39] he thinks, however, that the effect of\nthe illusion on men is \"downright ruinous, since even love, in itself\nthe truest, most inward sentiment, becomes an obscure, illusory one\nthrough religiousness, since religious love loves man[40] only for God's\nsake, therefore loves man only apparently, but in truth God only.\" Is\nthis different with moral love? Does it love the man, _this_ man for\n_this_ man's sake, or for morality's sake, for _Man's_ sake, and so--for\n_homo homini Deus_--for God's sake?\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe wheels in the head have a number of other formal aspects, some of\nwhich it may be useful to indicate here.\n\nThus _self-renunciation_ is common to the holy with the unholy, to the\npure and the impure. The impure man _renounces_ all \"better feelings,\"\nall shame, even natural timidity, and follows only the appetite that\nrules him. The pure man renounces his natural relation to the world\n(\"renounces the world\") and follows only the \"desire\" which rules him.\nDriven by the thirst for money, the avaricious man renounces all\nadmonitions of conscience, all feeling of honor, all gentleness and all\ncompassion; he puts all considerations out of sight; the appetite drags\nhim along. The holy man behaves similarly. He makes himself the\n\"laughing-stock of the world,\" is hard-hearted and \"strictly just\"; for\nthe desire drags him along. As the unholy man renounces _himself_ before\nMammon, so the holy man renounces _himself_ before God and the divine\nlaws. We are now living in a time when the _shamelessness_ of the holy\nis every day more and more felt and uncovered, whereby it is at the same\ntime compelled to unveil itself, and lay itself bare, more and more\nevery day. Have not the shamelessness and stupidity of the reasons with\nwhich men antagonize the \"progress of the age\" long surpassed all\nmeasure and all expectation? But it must be so. The self-renouncers\nmust, as holy men, take the same course that they do as unholy men;\nas the latter little by little sink to the fullest measure of\nself-renouncing vulgarity and _lowness_, so the former must ascend\nto the most dishonorable _exaltation_. The mammon of the earth\nand the _God_ of heaven both demand exactly the same degree\nof--self-renunciation. The low man, like the exalted one, reaches out\nfor a \"good,\"--the former for the material good, the latter for the\nideal, the so-called \"supreme good\"; and at last both complete each\nother again too, as the \"materially-minded\" man sacrifices everything to\nan ideal phantasm, his _vanity_, and the \"spiritually-minded\" man to a\nmaterial gratification, the _life of enjoyment_.\n\nThose who exhort men to \"unselfishness\"[41] think they are saying an\nuncommon deal. What do they understand by it? Probably something like\nwhat they understand by \"self-renunciation.\" But who is this self that\nis to be renounced and to have no benefit? It seems that _you_ yourself\nare supposed to be it. And for whose benefit is unselfish\nself-renunciation recommended to you? Again for _your_ benefit and\nbehoof, only that through unselfishness you are procuring your \"true\nbenefit.\"\n\nYou are to benefit _yourself_, and yet you are not seek _your_ benefit.\n\nPeople regard as unselfish the _benefactor_ of men, a Franke who founded\nthe orphan asylum, an O'Connell who works tirelessly for his Irish\npeople; but also the _fanatic_ who, like St. Boniface, hazards his life\nfor the conversion of the heathen, or, like Robespierre, sacrifices\neverything to virtue,--like Koerner, dies for God, king, and fatherland.\nHence, among others, O'Connell's opponents try to trump up against him\nsome selfishness or mercenariness, for which the O'Connell fund seemed\nto give them a foundation; for, if they were successful in casting\nsuspicion on his \"unselfishness,\" they would easily separate him from\nhis adherents.\n\nYet what could they show further than that O'Connell was working for\nanother _end_ than the ostensible one? But, whether he may aim at making\nmoney or at liberating the people, it still remains certain, in one case\nas in the other, that he is striving for an end, and that _his_ end;\nselfishness here as there, only that his national self-interest would be\nbeneficial to _others too_, and so would be for the _common_ interest.\n\nNow, do you suppose unselfishness is unreal and nowhere extant? On the\ncontrary, nothing is more ordinary! One may even call it an article of\nfashion in the civilized world, which is considered so indispensable\nthat, if it costs too much in solid material, people at least adorn\nthemselves with its tinsel counterfeit and feign it. Where does\nunselfishness begin? Right where an end ceases to be _our_ end and our\n_property_, which we, as owners, can dispose of at pleasure; where it\nbecomes a fixed end or a--fixed idea; where it begins to inspire,\nenthuse, fanaticize us; in short, where it passes into our\n_stubbornness_ and becomes our--master. One is not unselfish so long as\nhe retains the end in his power; one becomes so only at that \"Here I\nstand, I cannot do otherwise,\" the fundamental maxim of all the\npossessed; one becomes so in the case of a _sacred_ end, through the\ncorresponding sacred zeal.--\n\nI am not unselfish so long as the end remains my _own_, and I, instead\nof giving myself up to be the blind means of its fulfilment, leave it\nalways an open question. My zeal need not on that account be slacker\nthan the most fanatical, but at the same time I remain toward it\nfrostily cold, unbelieving, and its most irreconcilable enemy; I remain\nits _judge_, because I am its owner.\n\nUnselfishness grows rank as far as possessedness reaches, as much on\npossessions of the devil as on those of a good spirit: there vice,\nfolly, etc.; here humility, devotion, etc.\n\nWhere could one look without meeting victims of self-renunciation? There\nsits a girl opposite me, who perhaps has been making bloody sacrifices\nto her soul for ten years already. Over the buxom form droops a\ndeathly-tired head, and pale cheeks betray the slow bleeding away of her\nyouth. Poor child, how often the passions may have beaten at your heart,\nand the rich powers of youth have demanded their right! When your head\nrolled in the soft pillow, how awakening nature quivered through your\nlimbs, the blood swelled your veins, and fiery fancies poured the gleam\nof voluptuousness into your eyes! Then appeared the ghost of the soul\nand its eternal bliss. You were terrified, your hands folded themselves,\nyour tormented eye turned its look upward, you--prayed. The storms of\nnature were hushed, a calm glided over the ocean of your appetites.\nSlowly the weary eyelids sank over the life extinguished under them, the\ntension crept out unperceived from the rounded limbs, the boisterous\nwaves dried up in the heart, the folded hands themselves rested a\npowerless weight on the unresisting bosom, one last faint \"Oh dear!\"\nmoaned itself away, and--_the soul was at rest_. You fell asleep, to\nawake in the morning to a new combat and a new--prayer. Now the habit of\nrenunciation cools the heat of your desire, and the roses of your youth\nare growing pale in the--chlorosis of your heavenliness. The soul is\nsaved, the body may perish! O Lais, O Ninon, how well you did to scorn\nthis pale virtue! One free _grisette_ against a thousand virgins grown\ngray in virtue!\n\nThe fixed idea may also be perceived as \"maxim,\" \"principle,\"\n\"standpoint,\" and the like. Archimedes, to move the earth, asked for a\nstandpoint _outside_ it. Men sought continually for this standpoint, and\nevery one seized upon it as well as he was able. This foreign standpoint\nis the _world of mind_, of ideas, thoughts, concepts, essences, etc.; it\nis _heaven_. Heaven is the \"standpoint\" from which the earth is moved,\nearthly doings surveyed and--despised. To assure to themselves heaven,\nto occupy the heavenly standpoint firmly and for ever,--how painfully\nand tirelessly humanity struggled for this!\n\nChristianity has aimed to deliver us from a life determined by nature,\nfrom the appetites as actuating us, and so has meant that man should not\nlet himself be determined by his appetites. This does not involve the\nidea that _he_ was not to _have_ appetites, but that the appetites were\nnot to have him, that they were not to become _fixed_, uncontrollable,\nindissoluble. Now, could not what Christianity (religion) contrived\nagainst the appetites be applied by us to its own precept that _mind_\n(thought, conceptions, ideas, faith, etc.) must determine us; could we\nnot ask that neither should mind, or the conception, the idea, be\nallowed to determine us, to become _fixed_ and inviolable or \"sacred\"?\nThen it would end in the _dissolution of mind_, the dissolution of all\nthoughts, of all conceptions. As we there had to say \"We are indeed to\nhave appetites, but the appetites are not to have us,\" so we should now\nsay \"We are indeed to have _mind_, but mind is not to have us.\" If the\nlatter seems lacking in sense, think _e. g._ of the fact that with so\nmany a man a thought becomes a \"maxim,\" whereby he himself is made\nprisoner to it, so that it is not he that has the maxim, but rather it\nthat has him. And with the maxim he has a \"permanent standpoint\" again.\nThe doctrines of the catechism become our _principles_ before we find it\nout, and no longer brook rejection. Their thought, or--mind, has the\nsole power, and no protest of the \"flesh\" is further listened to.\nNevertheless it is only through the \"flesh\" that I can break the tyranny\nof mind; for it is only when a man hears his flesh along with the rest\nof him that he hears himself wholly, and it is only when he wholly hears\n_himself_ that he is a hearing or rational[42] being. The Christian does\nnot hear the agony of his enthralled nature, but lives in \"humility\";\ntherefore he does not grumble at the wrong which befalls his _person_;\nhe thinks himself satisfied with the \"freedom of the spirit.\" But, if\nthe flesh once takes the floor, and its tone is \"passionate,\"\n\"indecorous,\" \"not well-disposed,\" \"spiteful,\" etc. (as it cannot be\notherwise), then he thinks he hears voices of devils, voices _against\nthe spirit_ (for decorum, passionlessness, kindly disposition, and the\nlike, is--spirit), and is justly zealous against them. He could not be a\nChristian if he were willing to endure them. He listens only to\nmorality, and slaps immorality in the mouth; he listens only to\nlegality, and gags the lawless word. The _spirit_ of morality and\nlegality holds him a prisoner; a rigid, unbending _master_. They call\nthat the \"mastery of the spirit,\"--it is at the same time the\n_standpoint_ of the spirit.\n\nAnd now whom do the ordinary liberal gentlemen mean to make free? Whose\nfreedom is it that they cry out and thirst for? The _spirit's_! That of\nthe spirit of morality, legality, piety, the fear of God, etc. That is\nwhat the anti-liberal gentlemen also want, and the whole contention\nbetween the two turns on a matter of advantage,--whether the latter are\nto be the only speakers, or the former are to receive a \"share in the\nenjoyment of the same advantage.\" The _spirit_ remains the absolute\n_lord_ for both, and their only quarrel is over who shall occupy the\nhierarchical throne that pertains to the \"Vicegerent of the Lord.\" The\nbest of it is that one can calmly look upon the stir with the certainty\nthat the wild beasts of history will tear each other to pieces just like\nthose of nature; their putrefying corpses fertilize the ground for--our\ncrops.\n\nWe shall come back later to many another wheel in the head,--for\ninstance, those of vocation, truthfulness, love, etc.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhen one's own is contrasted with what is _imparted_ to him, there is no\nuse in objecting that we cannot have anything isolated, but receive\neverything as a part of the universal order, and therefore through the\nimpression of what is around us, and that consequently we have it as\nsomething \"imparted\"; for there is a great difference between the\nfeelings and thoughts which are _aroused_ in me by other things and\nthose which are _given_ to me. God, immortality, freedom, humanity,\netc., are drilled into us from childhood as thoughts and feelings which\nmove our inner being more or less strongly, either ruling us without our\nknowing it, or sometimes in richer natures manifesting themselves in\nsystems and works of art; but are always not aroused, but imparted,\nfeelings, because we must believe in them and cling to them. That an\nAbsolute existed, and that it must be taken in, felt, and thought by us,\nwas settled as a faith in the minds of those who spent all the strength\nof their mind on recognizing it and setting it forth. The _feeling_ for\nthe Absolute exists there as an imparted one, and thenceforth results\nonly in the most manifold revelations of its own self. So in Klopstock\nthe religious feeling was an imparted one, which in the \"Messiad\" simply\nfound artistic expression. If, on the other hand, the religion with\nwhich he was confronted had been for him only an incitation to feeling\nand thought, and if he had known how to take an attitude completely _his\nown_ toward it, then there would have resulted, instead of religious\ninspiration, a dissolution and consumption of the religion itself.\nInstead of that, he only continued in mature years his childish feelings\nreceived in childhood, and squandered the powers of his manhood in\ndecking out his childish trifles.\n\nThe difference is, then, whether feelings are imparted to me or only\naroused. Those which are aroused are my own, egoistic, because they are\nnot _as feelings_ drilled into me, dictated to me, and pressed upon me;\nbut those which are imparted to me I receive, with open arms,--I cherish\nthem in me as a heritage, cultivate them, and am _possessed_ by them.\nWho is there that has never, more or less consciously, noticed that our\nwhole education is calculated to produce _feelings_ in us, _i. e._\nimpart them to us, instead of leaving their production to ourselves\nhowever they may turn out? If we hear thee name of God, we are to feel\nveneration; if we hear that of the prince's majesty, it is to be\nreceived with reverence, deference, submission; if we hear that of\nmorality, we are to think that we hear something inviolable; if we hear\nof the Evil One or evil ones, we are to shudder; etc. The intention is\ndirected to these _feelings_, and he who _e. g._ should hear with\npleasure the deeds of the \"bad\" would have to be \"taught what's what\"\nwith the rod of discipline. Thus stuffed with _imparted feelings_, we\nappear before the bar of majority and are \"pronounced of age.\" Our\nequipment consists of \"elevating feelings, lofty thoughts, inspiring\nmaxims, eternal principles,\" etc. The young are of age when they twitter\nlike the old; they are driven through school to learn the old song, and,\nwhen they have this by heart, they are declared of age.\n\nWe _must not_ feel at every thing and every name that comes before us\nwhat we could and would like to feel thereat; _e. g._, at the name of\nGod we must think of nothing laughable, feel nothing disrespectful, it\nbeing prescribed and imparted to us what and how we are to feel and\nthink at mention of that name.\n\nThat is the meaning of the _care of souls_,--that my soul or my mind be\ntuned as others think right, not as I myself would like it. How much\ntrouble does it not cost one, finally to secure to oneself a feeling of\none's _own_ at the mention of at least this or that name, and to laugh\nin the face of many who expect from us a holy face and a composed\nexpression at their speeches. What is imparted is _alien_ to us, is not\nour own, and therefore is \"sacred,\" and it is hard work to lay aside the\n\"sacred dread of it.\"\n\nTo-day one again hears \"seriousness\" praised, \"seriousness in the\npresence of highly important subjects and discussions,\" \"German\nseriousness,\" etc. This sort of seriousness proclaims clearly how old\nand grave lunacy and possession have already become. For there is\nnothing more serious than a lunatic when he comes to the central point\nof his lunacy; then his great earnestness incapacitates him for taking a\njoke. (See madhouses.)\n\n\n\u00a7 3.--THE HIERARCHY\n\nThe historical reflections on our Mongolism which I propose to insert\nepisodically at this place are not given with the claim of thoroughness,\nor even of approved soundness, but solely because it seems to me that\nthey may contribute toward making the rest clear.\n\nThe history of the world, whose shaping properly belongs altogether to\nthe Caucasian race, seems till now to have run through two Caucasian\nages, in the first of which we had to work out and work off our innate\n_negroidity_; this was followed in the second by _Mongoloidity_\n(Chineseness), which must likewise be terribly made an end of.\nNegroidity represents _antiquity_, the time of dependence on _things_\n(on cocks' eating, birds' flight, on sneezing, on thunder and lightning,\non the rustling of sacred trees, etc.); Mongoloidity the time of\ndependence on thoughts, the _Christian_ time. Reserved for the future\nare the words \"I am owner of the world of things, and I am owner of the\nworld of mind.\"\n\nIn the negroid age fall the campaigns of Sesostris and the importance of\nEgypt and of northern Africa in general. To the Mongoloid age belong the\ninvasions of the Huns and Mongols, up to the Russians.\n\nThe value of _me_ cannot possibly be rated high so long as the hard\ndiamond of the _not-me_ bears so enormous a price as was the case both\nwith God and with the world. The not-me is still too stony and\nindomitable to be consumed and absorbed by me; rather, men only creep\nabout with extraordinary _bustle_ on this _immovable_ entity, _i. e._ on\nthis _substance_, like parasitic animals on a body from whose juices\nthey draw nourishment, yet without consuming it. It is the bustle of\nvermin, the assiduity of Mongolians. Among the Chinese, we know,\neverything remains as it used to be, and nothing \"essential\" or\n\"substantial\" suffers a change; all the more actively do they work away\n_at_ that which remains, which bears the name of the \"old,\" \"ancestors,\"\netc.\n\nAccordingly, in our Mongolian age all change has been only reformatory\nor ameliorative, not destructive or consuming and annihilating. The\nsubstance, the object, _remains_. All our assiduity was only the\nactivity of ants and the hopping of fleas, jugglers' tricks on the\nimmovable tight-rope of the objective, _corv\u00e9e_-service under the\nlordship of the unchangeable or \"eternal.\" The Chinese are doubtless the\nmost _positive_ nation, because totally buried in precepts; but neither\nhas the Christian age come out from the _positive, i. e._ from \"limited\nfreedom,\" freedom \"within certain limits.\" In the most advanced stage of\ncivilization this activity earns the name of _scientific_ activity, of\nworking on a motionless presupposition, a _hypothesis_ that is not to be\nupset.\n\nIn its first and most unintelligible form morality shows itself as\n_habit_. To act according to the habit and usage (_morem_) of one's\ncountry--is to be moral there. Therefore pure moral action, clear,\nunadulterated morality, is most straightforwardly practised in China;\nthey keep to the old habit and usage, and hate each innovation as a\ncrime worthy of death. For _innovation_ is the deadly enemy of _habit_,\nof the _old_, of _permanence_. In fact, too, it admits of no doubt that\nthrough habit man secures himself against the obtrusiveness of things,\nof the world, and founds a world of his own in which alone he is and\nfeels at home, _i. e._ builds himself a _heaven_. Why, heaven has no\nother meaning than that it is man's proper home, in which nothing alien\nregulates and rules him any longer, no influence of the earthly any\nlonger makes him himself alien; in short, in which the dross of the\nearthly is thrown off, and the combat against the world has found an\nend,--in which, therefore, nothing is any longer _denied_ him. Heaven is\nthe end of _abnegation_, it is _free enjoyment_. There man no longer\ndenies himself anything, because nothing is any longer alien and hostile\nto him. But now habit is a \"second nature,\" which detaches and frees man\nfrom his first and original natural condition, in securing him against\nevery casualty of it. The fully elaborated habit of the Chinese has\nprovided for all emergencies, and everything is \"looked out for\";\nwhatever may come, the Chinaman always knows how he has to behave, and\ndoes not need to decide first according to the circumstances; no\nunforeseen case throws him down from the heaven of his rest. The morally\nhabituated and inured Chinaman is not surprised and taken off his guard;\nhe behaves with equanimity (i. e. with equal spirit or temper) toward\neverything, because his temper, protected by the precaution of his\ntraditional usage, does not lose its balance. Hence, on the ladder of\nculture or civilization humanity mounts the first round through habit;\nand, as it conceives that, in climbing to culture, it is at the same\ntime climbing to heaven, the realm of culture or second nature, it\nreally mounts the first round of the--ladder to heaven.\n\nIf Mongoldom has settled the existence of spiritual beings,--if it has\ncreated a world of spirits, a heaven,--the Caucasians have wrestled for\nthousands of years with these spiritual beings, to get to the bottom of\nthem. What were they doing, then, but building on Mongolian ground? They\nhave not built on sand, but in the air; they have wrestled with\nMongolism, stormed the Mongolian heaven, Tien. When will they at last\nannihilate this heaven? When will they at last become _really\nCaucasians_, and find themselves? When will the \"immortality of the\nsoul,\" which in these latter days thought it was giving itself still\nmore security if it presented itself as \"immortality of mind,\" at last\nchange to the _mortality of mind_?\n\nIt was when, in the industrious struggle of the Mongolian race, men had\n_built a heaven_, that those of the Caucasian race, since in their\nMongolian complexion they have to do with heaven, took upon themselves\nthe opposite task, the task of storming that heaven of custom,\n_heaven-storming_[43] activity. To dig under all human ordinance, in\norder to set up a new and--better one on the cleared site, to wreck all\ncustoms in order to put new and better customs in their place,\netc.,--their act is limited to this. But is it thus already purely and\nreally what it aspires to be, and does it reach its final aim? No, in\nthis creation of a \"_better_\" it is tainted with Mongolism. It storms\nheaven only to make a heaven again, it overthrows an old power only to\nlegitimate a new power, it only--_improves_. Nevertheless the point\naimed at, often as it may vanish from the eyes at every new attempt, is\nthe real, complete downfall of heaven, customs, etc.,--in short, of man\nsecured only against the world, of the _isolation_ or _inwardness_ of\nman. Through the heaven of culture man seeks to isolate himself from the\nworld, to break its hostile power. But this isolation of heaven must\nlikewise be broken, and the true end of heaven-storming is the--downfall\nof heaven, the annihilation of heaven. _Improving_ and _reforming_ is\nthe Mongolism of the Caucasian, because thereby he is always setting up\nagain what already existed,--to wit, a _precept_, a generality, a\nheaven. He harbors the most irreconcilable enmity to heaven, and yet\nbuilds new heavens daily; piling heaven on heaven, he only crushes one\nby another; the Jews' heaven destroys the Greeks', the Christians' the\nJews', the Protestants' the Catholics', etc.--If the _heaven-storming_\nmen of Caucasian blood throw on their Mongolian skin, they will bury the\nemotional man under the ruins of the monstrous world of emotion, the\nisolated man under his isolated world, the paradisiacal man under his\nheaven. And heaven is the _realm of spirits_, the realm _of freedom of\nthe spirit_.\n\nThe realm of heaven, the realm of spirits and ghosts, has found its\nright standing in the speculative philosophy. Here it was stated as the\nrealm of thoughts, concepts, and ideas; heaven is peopled with thoughts\nand ideas, and this \"realm of spirits\" is then the true reality.\n\nTo want to win freedom for the _spirit_ is Mongolism; freedom of the\nspirit is Mongolian freedom, freedom of feeling, moral freedom, etc.\n\nWe may find the word \"morality\" taken as synonymous with spontaneity,\nself-determination. But that is not involved in it; rather has the\nCaucasian shown himself spontaneous only _in spite of_ his Mongolian\nmorality. The Mongolian heaven, or morals,[44] remained the strong\ncastle, and only by storming incessantly at this castle did the\nCaucasian show himself moral; if he had not had to do with morals at\nall any longer, if he had not had therein his indomitable, continual\nenemy, the relation to morals would cease, and consequently morality\nwould cease. That his spontaneity is still a moral spontaneity,\ntherefore, is just the Mongoloidity of it,--is a sign that in it he has\nnot arrived at himself. \"Moral spontaneity\" corresponds entirely with\n\"religious and orthodox philosophy,\" \"constitutional monarchy,\" \"the\nChristian State,\" \"freedom within certain limits,\" \"the limited freedom\nof the press,\" or, in a figure, to the hero fettered to a sick-bed.\n\nMan has not really vanquished Shamanism and its spooks till he possesses\nthe strength to lay aside not only the belief in ghosts or in spirits,\nbut also the belief in the spirit.\n\nHe who believes in a spook no more assumes the \"introduction of a higher\nworld\" than he who believes in the spirit, and both seek behind the\nsensual world a supersensual one; in short, they produce and believe\n_another_ world, and this other _world, the product of their mind_, is a\nspiritual world; for their senses grasp and know nothing of another, a\nnon-sensual world, only their spirit lives in it. Going on from this\nMongolian belief in the _existence of spiritual beings_ to the point\nthat the _proper being_ of man too is his _spirit_, and that all care\nmust be directed to this alone, to the \"welfare of his soul,\" is not\nhard. Influence on the spirit, so-called \"moral influence,\" is hereby\nassured.\n\nHence it is manifest that Mongolism represents utter absence of any\nrights of the sensuous, represents non-sensuousness and unnature, and\nthat sin and the consciousness of sin was our Mongolian torment that\nlasted thousands of years.\n\nBut who, then, will dissolve the spirit into its _nothing_? He who by\nmeans of the spirit set forth nature as the _null_, finite, transitory,\nhe alone can bring down the spirit too to like nullity. _I_ can; each\none among you can, who does his will as an absolute I; in a word, the\n_egoist_ can.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBefore the sacred, people lose all sense of power and all confidence;\nthey occupy a _powerless_ and _humble_ attitude toward it. And yet no\nthing is sacred of itself, but by my _declaring it sacred_, by my\ndeclaration, my judgment, my bending the knee; in short, by\nmy--conscience.\n\nSacred is everything which for the egoist is to be unapproachable, not\nto be touched, outside his _power_,--_i. e._ above _him_; sacred, in a\nword, is every _matter of conscience_, for \"this is a matter of\nconscience to me\" means simply \"I hold this sacred.\"\n\nFor little children, just as for animals, nothing sacred exists,\nbecause, in order to make room for this conception, one must already\nhave progressed so far in understanding that he can make distinctions\nlike \"good and bad,\" \"warranted and unwarranted,\" etc.; only at such a\nlevel of reflection or intelligence--the proper standpoint of\nreligion--can unnatural (_i. e._ brought into existence by thinking)\n_reverence_, \"sacred dread,\" step into the place of natural _fear_. To\nthis sacred dread belongs holding something outside oneself for\nmightier, greater, better warranted, better, etc.; _i. e._ the attitude\nin which one acknowledges the might of something alien--not merely\nfeels it, then, but expressly acknowledges it, _i. e._ admits it,\nyields, surrenders, lets himself be tied (devotion, humility, servility,\nsubmission, etc.) Here walks the whole ghostly troop of the \"Christian\nvirtues.\"\n\nEverything toward which you cherish any respect or reverence deserves\nthe name of sacred; you yourselves, too, say that you would feel a\n\"_sacred dread_\" of laying hands on it. And you give this tinge even to\nthe unholy (gallows, crime, etc.) You have a horror of touching it.\nThere lies in it something uncanny, _i. e._ unfamiliar or _not your\nown_.\n\n\"If something or other did not rank as sacred in a man's mind, why, then\nall bars would be let down to self-will, to unlimited subjectivity!\"\nFear makes the beginning, and one can make himself fearful to the\ncoarsest man; already, therefore, a barrier against his insolence. But\nin fear there always remains the attempt to liberate oneself from what\nis feared, by guile, deception, tricks, etc. In reverence,[45] on the\ncontrary, it is quite otherwise. Here something is not only feared,[46]\nbut also honored[47]: what is feared has become an inward power which I\ncan no longer get clear of; I honor it, am captivated by it and devoted\nto it, belong to it; by the honor which I pay it I am completely in its\npower, and do not even attempt liberation any longer. Now I am attached\nto it with all the strength of faith; I _believe_. I and what I fear are\none; \"not I live, but the respected lives in me!\" Because the spirit,\nthe infinite, does not allow of coming to any end, therefore it is\nstationary; it fears _dying_, it cannot let go its dear Jesus, the\ngreatness of finiteness is no longer recognized by its blinded eye; the\nobject of fear, now raised to veneration, may no longer be handled;\nreverence is made eternal, the respected is deified. The man is now no\nlonger employed in creating, but in _learning_ (knowing, investigating,\netc.), _i. e._ occupied with a fixed _object_, losing himself in its\ndepths, without return to himself. The relation to this object is that\nof knowing, fathoming, basing, etc., not that of _dissolution_\n(abrogation, etc.) \"Man is to be religious,\" that is settled; therefore\npeople busy themselves only with the question how this is to be\nattained, what is the right meaning of religiousness, etc. Quite\notherwise when one makes the axiom itself doubtful and calls it in\nquestion, even though it should go to smash. Morality too is such sacred\nconception; one must be moral, and must look only for the right \"how,\"\nthe right way to be so. One dares not go at morality itself with the\nquestion whether it is not itself an illusion; it remains exalted above\nall doubt, unchangeable. And so we go on with the sacred, grade after\ngrade, from the \"holy\" to the \"holy of holies.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMen are sometimes divided into two classes, _cultured_ and _uncultured_.\nThe former, so far as they were worthy of their name, occupied\nthemselves with thoughts, with mind, and (because in the time since\nChrist, of which the very principle is thought, they were the ruling\nones) demanded a servile respect for the thoughts recognized by them.\nState, emperor, church, God, morality, order, etc., are such thoughts\nor spirits, that exist only for the mind. A merely living being, an\nanimal, cares as little for them as a child. But the uncultured are\nreally nothing but children, and he who attends only to the necessities\nof his life is indifferent to those spirits; but, because he is also\nweak before them, he succumbs to their power, and is ruled by--thoughts.\nThis is the meaning of hierarchy.\n\n_Hierarchy is dominion of thoughts, dominion of mind!_\n\nWe are hierarchic to this day, kept down by those who are supported by\nthoughts. Thoughts are the sacred.\n\nBut the two are always clashing, now one and now the other giving the\noffence; and this clash occurs, not only in the collision of two men,\nbut in one and the same man. For no cultured man is so cultured as not\nto find enjoyment in things too, and so be uncultured; and no uncultured\nman is totally without thoughts. In Hegel it comes to light at last what\na longing for _things_ even the most cultured man has, and what a horror\nof every \"hollow theory\" he harbors. With him reality, the world of\nthings, is altogether to correspond to the thought, and no concept to be\nwithout reality. This caused Hegel's system to be known as the most\nobjective, as if in it thought and thing celebrated their union. But\nthis was simply the extremest case of violence on the part of thought,\nits highest pitch of despotism and sole dominion, the triumph of mind,\nand with it the triumph of _philosophy_. Philosophy cannot hereafter\nachieve anything higher, for its highest is the _omnipotence of mind_,\nthe almightiness of mind.[48]\n\nSpiritual men have _taken into their head_ something that is to be\nrealized. They have _concepts_ of love, goodness, and the like, which\nthey would like to see _realized_; therefore they want to set up a\nkingdom of love on earth, in which no one any longer acts from\nselfishness, but each one \"from love.\" Love is to _rule_. What they have\ntaken into their head, what shall we call it but--_fixed idea_? Why,\n\"their head is _haunted_.\" The most oppressive spook is _Man_. Think of\nthe proverb, \"The road to ruin is paved with good intentions.\" The\nintention to realize humanity altogether in oneself, to become\naltogether man, is of such ruinous kind; here belong the intentions to\nbecome good, noble, loving, etc.\n\nIn the sixth part of the \"_Denkwuerdigkeiten_\" p. 7, Bruno Bauer says:\n\"That middle class, which was to receive such a terrible importance for\nmodern history is capable of no self-sacrificing action, no enthusiasm\nfor an idea, no exaltation; it devotes itself to nothing but the\ninterests of its mediocrity; _i. e._ it remains always limited to\nitself, and conquers at last only through its bulk, with which it has\nsucceeded in tiring out the efforts of passion, enthusiasm,\nconsistency,--through its surface, into which it absorbs a part of the\nnew ideas.\" And (p. 6) \"It has turned the revolutionary ideas, for which\nnot it, but unselfish or impassioned men sacrificed themselves, solely\nto its own profit, has turned spirit into money.--That is, to be sure,\nafter it had taken away from those ideas their point, their consistency,\ntheir destructive seriousness, fanatical against all egoism.\" These\npeople, then, are not self-sacrificing, not enthusiastic, not\nidealistic, not consistent, not zealots; they are egoists in the usual\nsense, selfish people, looking out for their advantage, sober,\ncalculating, etc.\n\nWho, then, is \"self-sacrificing\"?[49] In the full sense, surely, he who\nventures everything else for _one thing_, one object, one will, one\npassion, etc. Is not the lover self-sacrificing who forsakes father and\nmother, endures all dangers and privations, to reach his goal? Or the\nambitious man, who offers up all his desires, wishes, and satisfactions\nto the single passion, or the avaricious man who denies himself\neverything to gather treasures, or the pleasure-seeker, etc.? He is\nruled by a passion to which he brings the rest as sacrifices.\n\nAnd are these self-sacrificing people perchance not selfish, not\negoists? As they have only one ruling passion, so they provide for only\none satisfaction, but for this the more strenuously; they are wholly\nabsorbed in it. Their entire activity is egoistic, but it is a\none-sided, unopened, narrow egoism; it is possessedness.\n\n\"Why, those are petty passions, by which, on the contrary, man must not\nlet himself be enthralled. Man must make sacrifices for a great idea, a\ngreat cause!\" A \"great idea,\" a \"good cause,\" is, it may be, the honor\nof God, for which innumerable people have met death; Christianity, which\nhas found its willing martyrs; the Holy Catholic Church, which has\ngreedily demanded sacrifices of heretics; liberty and equality, which\nwere waited on by bloody guillotines.\n\nHe who lives for a great idea, a good cause, a doctrine, a system, a\nlofty calling, may not let any worldly lusts, any self-seeking interest,\nspring up in him. Here we have the concept of _clericalism_, or, as it\nmay also be called in its pedagogic activity, school-masterliness; for\nthe idealists play the schoolmaster over us. The clergyman is especially\ncalled to live to the idea and to work for the idea, the truly good\ncause. Therefore the people feel how little it befits him to show\nworldly haughtiness, to desire good living, to join in such pleasures as\ndancing and gaming,--in short, to have any other than a \"sacred\ninterest.\" Hence too, doubtless, is derived the scanty salary of\nteachers, who are to feel themselves repaid by the sacredness of their\ncalling alone, and to \"renounce\" other enjoyments.\n\nEven a directory of the sacred ideas, one or more of which man is to\nlook upon as his calling, is not lacking. Family, fatherland, science,\netc., may find in man a servant faithful to his calling.\n\nHere we come upon the old, old craze of the world which has not yet\nlearned to do without clericalism,--that to live and work _for an idea_\nis man's calling, and according to the faithfulness of its fulfilment\nhis _human_ worth is measured.\n\nThis is the dominion of the idea; in other words, it is clericalism.\n_E. g._, Robespierre, St. Just, etc., were priests through and through,\ninspired by the idea, enthusiasts, consistent instruments of this idea,\nidealistic men. So St. Just exclaims in a speech, \"There is something\nterrible in the sacred love of country; it is so exclusive that it\nsacrifices everything to the public interest without mercy, without\nfear, without human consideration. It hurls Manlius down the precipice;\nit sacrifices its private inclinations; it leads Regulus to Carthage,\nthrows a Roman into the chasm, and sets Marat, as a victim of his\ndevotion, in the Pantheon.\"\n\nNow, over against these representatives of ideal or sacred interests\nstands a world of innumerable \"personal\" profane interests. No idea, no\nsystem, no sacred cause is so great as never to be outrivaled and\nmodified by these personal interests. Even if they are silent\nmomentarily, and in times of rage and fanaticism, yet they soon come\nuppermost again through \"the sound sense of the people.\" Those ideas do\nnot completely conquer till they are no longer hostile to personal\ninterests, _i. e._ till they satisfy egoism.\n\nThe man who is just now crying herrings in front of my window has a\npersonal interest in good sales, and, if his wife or anybody else wishes\nhim the like, this remains a personal interest all the same. If, on the\nother hand, a thief deprived him of his basket, then there would at once\narise an interest of many, of the whole city, of the whole country, or,\nin a word, of all who abhor theft; an interest in which the\nherring-seller's person would become indifferent, and in its place the\ncategory of the \"robbed man\" would come into the foreground. But even\nhere all might yet resolve itself into a personal interest, each of the\npartakers reflecting that he must concur in the punishment of the thief\nbecause unpunished stealing might otherwise become general and cause him\ntoo to lose his own. Such a calculation, however, can hardly be assumed\non the part of many, and we shall rather hear the cry that the thief is\na \"criminal.\" Here we have before us a judgment, the thief's action\nreceiving its expression in the concept \"crime.\" Now the matter stands\nthus: even if a crime did not cause the slightest damage either to me or\nto any of those in whom I take an interest, I should nevertheless\n_denounce_ it. Why? Because I am enthusiastic for _morality_, filled\nwith the _idea_ of morality; what is hostile to it I everywhere assail.\nBecause in his mind theft ranks as abominable without any question,\nProudhon, _e. g._, thinks that with the sentence \"Property is theft\" he\nhas at once put a brand on property. In the sense of the priestly, theft\nis always a _crime_, or at least a misdeed.\n\nHere the personal interest is at an end. This particular person who has\nstolen the basket is perfectly indifferent to my person; it is only the\nthief, this concept of which that person presents a specimen, that I\ntake an interest in. The thief and man are in my mind irreconcilable\nopposites; for one is not truly man when one is a thief; one degrades\n_Man_ or \"humanity\" in himself when one steals. Dropping out of personal\nconcern, one gets into _philanthropism_, friendliness to man, which is\nusually misunderstood as if it was a love to men, to each individual,\nwhile it is nothing but a love of Man, the unreal concept, the spook.\nIt is not [Greek: tous anthr\u00f4pous], men, but [Greek: ton anthr\u00f4pon],\nMan, that the philanthropist carries in his heart. To be sure, he cares\nfor each individual, but only because he wants to see his beloved ideal\nrealized everywhere.\n\nSo there is nothing said here of care for me, you, us; that would be\npersonal interest, and belongs under the head of \"worldly love.\"\nPhilanthropism is a heavenly, spiritual, a--priestly love. _Man_ must be\nrestored in us, even if thereby we poor devils should come to grief. It\nis the same priestly principle as that famous _fiat justitia, pereat\nmundus_; man and justice are ideas, ghosts, for love of which everything\nis sacrificed; therefore the priestly spirits are the \"self-sacrificing\"\nones.\n\nHe who is infatuated with _Man_ leaves persons out of account so far as\nthat infatuation extends, and floats in an ideal, sacred interest.\n_Man_, you see, is not a person, but an ideal, a spook.\n\nNow, things as different as possible can belong to _Man_ and be so\nregarded. If one finds Man's chief requirement in piety, there arises\nreligious clericalism; if one sees it in morality, then moral\nclericalism raises its head. On this account the priestly spirits of our\nday want to make a \"religion\" of everything, a \"religion of liberty,\"\n\"religion of equality,\" etc., and for them every idea becomes a \"sacred\ncause,\" _e. g._ even citizenship, politics, publicity, freedom of the\npress, trial by jury, etc.\n\nNow, what does \"unselfishness\" mean in this sense? Having only an ideal\ninterest, before which no respect of persons avails!\n\nThe stiff head of the worldly man opposes this, but for centuries has\nalways been worsted at least so far as to have to bend the unruly neck\nand \"honor the higher power\"; clericalism pressed it down. When the\nworldly egoist had shaken off a higher power (_e. g._ the Old Testament\nlaw, the Roman pope, etc.), then at once a seven times higher one was\nover him again, _e. g._ faith in the place of the law, the\ntransformation of all laymen into divines in place of the limited body\nof clergy, etc. His experience was like that of the possessed man into\nwhom seven devils passed when he thought he had freed himself from one.\n\nIn the passage quoted above all ideality, etc., is denied to the middle\nclass. It certainly schemed against the ideal consistency with which\nRobespierre wanted to carry out the principle. The instinct of its\ninterest told it that this consistency harmonized too little with what\nits mind was set on, and that it would be acting against itself if it\nwere willing to further the enthusiasm for principle. Was it to behave\nso unselfishly as to abandon all its aims in order to bring a harsh\ntheory to its triumph? It suits the priests admirably, to be sure, when\npeople listen to their summons, \"Cast away everything and follow me,\" or\n\"Sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have\ntreasure in heaven; and come, follow me.\" Some decided idealists obey\nthis call; but most act like Ananias and Sapphira, maintaining a\nbehavior half clerical or religious and half worldly, serving God and\nMammon.\n\nI do not blame the middle class for not wanting to let its aims be\nfrustrated by Robespierre, _i. e._ for inquiring of its egoism how far\nit might give the revolutionary idea a chance. But one might blame (if\nblame were in place here anyhow) those who let their own interests be\nfrustrated by the interests of the middle class. However, will not they\nlikewise sooner or later learn to understand what is to their advantage?\nAugust Becker says:[50] \"To win the producers (proletarians) a negation\nof the traditional conception of right is by no means enough. Folks\nunfortunately care little for the theoretical victory of the idea. One\nmust demonstrate to them _ad oculos_ how this victory can be practically\nutilized in life.\" And (p. 32): \"You must get hold of folks by their\nreal interests if you want to work upon them.\" Immediately after this he\nshows how a fine looseness of morals is already spreading among our\npeasants, because they prefer to follow their real interests rather than\nthe commands of morality.\n\nBecause the revolutionary priests or schoolmasters served _Man_, they\ncut off the heads of _men_. The revolutionary laymen, those outside the\nsacred circle, did not feel any greater horror of cutting off heads, but\nwere less anxious about the rights of Man than about their own.\n\nHow comes it, though, that the egoism of those who affirm personal\ninterest, and always inquire of it, is nevertheless forever succumbing\nto a priestly or schoolmasterly (_i. e._ an ideal) interest? Their\nperson seems to them too small, too insignificant,--and is so in\nfact,--to lay claim to everything and be able to put itself completely\nin force. There is a sure sign of this in their dividing themselves into\ntwo persons, an eternal and a temporal, and always caring either only\nfor the one or only for the other, on Sunday for the eternal, on the\nwork-day for the temporal, in prayer for the former, in work for the\nlatter. They have the priest in themselves, therefore they do not get\nrid of him, but hear themselves lectured inwardly every Sunday.\n\nHow men have struggled and calculated to get at a solution regarding\nthese dualistic essences! Idea followed upon idea, principle upon\nprinciple, system upon system, and none knew how to keep down\npermanently the contradiction of the \"worldly\" man, the so-called\n\"egoist.\" Does not this prove that all those ideas were too feeble to\ntake up my whole will into themselves and satisfy it? They were and\nremained hostile to me, even if the hostility lay concealed for a\nconsiderable time. Will it be the same with _self-ownership_? Is it too\nonly an attempt at mediation? Whatever principle I turned to, it might\nbe to that of _reason_, I always had to turn away from it again. Or can\nI always be rational, arrange my life according to reason in everything?\nI can, no doubt, _strive_ after rationality, I can _love_ it, just as I\ncan also love God and every other idea. I can be a philosopher, a lover\nof wisdom, as I love God. But what I love, what I strive for, is only in\nmy idea, my conception, my thoughts; it is in my heart, my head, it is\nin me like the heart, but it is not I, I am not it.\n\nTo the activity of priestly minds belongs especially what one often\nhears called \"_moral influence_.\"\n\nMoral influence takes its start where _humiliation_ begins; yes, it is\nnothing else than this humiliation itself, the breaking and bending of\nthe temper[51] down to _humility_.[52] If I call to some one to run away\nwhen a rock is to be blasted, I exert no moral influence by this demand;\nif I say to a child \"You will go hungry if you will not eat what is put\non the table,\" this is not moral influence. But, if I say to it \"You\nwill pray, honor your parents, respect the crucifix, speak the truth,\netc., for this belongs to man and is man's calling,\" or even \"this is\nGod's will,\" then moral influence is complete; then a man is to bend\nbefore the _calling_ of man, be tractable, become humble, give up his\nwill for an alien one which is set up as rule and law; he is to _abase_\nhimself before something _higher_: self-abasement. \"He that abaseth\nhimself shall be exalted.\" Yes, yes, children must early be _made_ to\npractise piety, godliness, and propriety; a person of good breeding is\none into whom \"good maxims\" have been _instilled_ and _impressed_,\npoured in through a funnel, thrashed in and preached in.\n\nIf one shrugs his shoulders at this, at once the good wring their hands\ndespairingly, and cry: \"But, for heaven's sake, if one is to give\nchildren no good instruction, why, then they will run straight into the\njaws of sin, and become good-for-nothing hoodlums!\" Gently, you prophets\nof evil. Good-for-nothing in your sense they certainly will become; but\nyour sense happens to be a very good-for-nothing sense. The impudent\nlads will no longer let anything be whined and chattered into them by\nyou, and will have no sympathy for all the follies for which you have\nbeen raving and driveling since the memory of man began; they will\nabolish the law of inheritance, _i. e._ they will not be willing to\n_inherit_ your stupidities as you inherited them from your fathers; they\ndestroy _inherited sin_.[53] If you command them, \"Bend before the Most\nHigh,\" they will answer: \"If he wants to bend us, let him come himself\nand do it; we, at least, will not bend of our own accord.\" And, if you\nthreaten them with his wrath and his punishment, they will take it like\nbeing threatened with the bogie-man. If you are no longer successful in\nmaking them afraid of ghosts, then the dominion of ghosts is at an end,\nand nurses' tales find no--_faith_.\n\nAnd is it not precisely the liberals again that press for good education\nand improvement of the educational system? For how could their\nliberalism, their \"liberty within the bounds of law,\" come about without\ndiscipline? Even if they do not exactly educate to the fear of God, yet\nthey demand the _fear of Man_ all the more strictly, and awaken\n\"enthusiasm for the truly human calling\" by discipline.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA long time passed away, in which people were satisfied with the fancy\nthat they had the _truth_, without thinking seriously whether perhaps\nthey themselves must be true to possess the truth. This time was the\n_Middle Ages_. With the common consciousness--_i. e._ the consciousness\nwhich deals with things, that consciousness which has receptivity only\nfor things, or for what is sensuous and sense-moving--they thought to\ngrasp what did not deal with things and was not perceptible by the\nsenses. As one does indeed also exert his eye to see the remote, or\nlaboriously exercise his hand till its fingers have become dexterous\nenough to press the keys correctly, so they chastened themselves in the\nmost manifold ways, in order to become capable of receiving the\nsupersensual wholly into themselves. But what they chastened was, after\nall, only the sensual man, the common consciousness, so-called finite or\nobjective thought. Yet as this thought, this understanding, which Luther\ndecries under the name of reason, is incapable of comprehending the\ndivine, its chastening contributed just as much to the understanding of\nthe truth as if one exercised the feet year in and year out in dancing,\nand hoped that in this way they would finally learn to play the flute.\nLuther, with whom the so-called Middle Ages end, was the first who\nunderstood that the man himself must become other than he was if he\nwanted to comprehend truth,--must become as true as truth itself. Only\nhe who already has truth in his belief, only he who _believes_ in it,\ncan become a partaker of it; _i. e._, only the believer finds it\naccessible and sounds its depths. Only that organ of man which is able\nto blow can attain the further capacity of flute-playing, and only that\nman can become a partaker of truth who has the right organ for it. He\nwho is capable of thinking only what is sensuous, objective, pertaining\nto things, figures to himself in truth only what pertains to things. But\ntruth is spirit, stuff altogether inappreciable by the senses, and\ntherefore only for the \"higher consciousness,\" not for that which is\n\"earthly-minded.\"\n\nWith Luther, accordingly, dawns the perception that truth, because it is\na _thought_, is only for the _thinking_ man. And this is to say that man\nmust henceforth take an utterly different standpoint, viz., the\nheavenly, believing, scientific standpoint, or that of _thought_ in\nrelation to its object, the--_thought_,--that of mind in relation to\nmind. Consequently: only the like apprehend the like. \"You are like the\nspirit that you understand.\"[54]\n\nBecause Protestantism broke the medi\u00e6val hierarchy, the opinion could\ntake root that hierarchy in general had been shattered by it, and it\ncould be wholly overlooked that it was precisely a \"reformation,\" and so\na reinvigoration of the antiquated hierarchy. That medi\u00e6val hierarchy\nhad been only a weakly one, as it had to let all possible barbarism of\nunsanctified things run on uncoerced beside it, and it was the\nReformation that first steeled the power of hierarchy. If Bruno Bauer\nthinks:[55] \"As the Reformation was mainly the abstract rending of the\nreligious principle from art, State, and science, and so its liberation\nfrom those powers with which it had joined itself in the antiquity of\nthe church and in the hierarchy of the Middle Ages, so too the\ntheological and ecclesiastical movements which proceeded from the\nReformation are only the consistent carrying out of this abstraction of\nthe religious principle from the other powers of humanity,\" I regard\nprecisely the opposite as correct, and think that the dominion of\nspirits, or freedom of mind (which comes to the same thing), was never\nbefore so all-embracing and all-powerful, because the present one,\ninstead of rending the religious principle from art, State, and science,\nlifted the latter altogether out of secularity into the \"realm of\nspirit\" and made them religious.\n\nLuther and Descartes have been appropriately put side by side in their\n\"He who believes is a God\" and \"I think, therefore I am\" (_cogito, ergo\nsum_). Man's heaven is _thought_,--mind. Everything can be wrested from\nhim, except thought, except faith. _Particular_ faith, like faith in\nZeus, Astarte, Jehovah, Allah, etc., may be destroyed, but faith itself\nis indestructible. In thought is freedom. What I need and what I hunger\nfor is no longer granted to me by any _grace_, by the Virgin Mary, by\nintercession of the saints, or by the binding and loosing church, but I\nprocure it for myself. In short, my being (the _sum_) is a living in the\nheaven of thought, of mind, a _cogitare_. But I myself am nothing else\nthan mind, thinking mind (according to Descartes), believing mind\n(according to Luther). My body I am not; my flesh may _suffer_ from\nappetites or pains. I am not my flesh, but _I_ am _mind_, only mind.\n\nThis thought runs through the history of the Reformation till to-day.\n\nOnly by the more modern philosophy since Descartes has a serious effort\nbeen made to bring Christianity to complete efficacy, by exalting the\n\"scientific consciousness\" to be the only true and valid one. Hence it\nbegins with absolute _doubt_, _dubitare_, with grinding common\nconsciousness to atoms, with turning away from everything that \"mind,\"\n\"thought,\" does not legitimate. To it _Nature_ counts for nothing; the\nopinion of men, their \"human precepts,\" for nothing: and it does not\nrest till it has brought reason into everything, and can say \"The real\nis the rational, and only the rational is the real.\" Thus it has at last\nbrought mind, reason, to victory; and everything is mind, because\neverything is rational, because all nature, as well as even the\nperversest opinions of men, contains reason; for \"all must serve for the\nbest,\" _i. e._ lead to the victory of reason.\n\nDescartes's _dubitare_ contains the decided statement that only\n_cogitare_, thought, mind--_is_. A complete break with \"common\"\nconsciousness, which ascribes reality to _irrational_ things! Only the\nrational is, only mind is! This is the principle of modern philosophy,\nthe genuine Christian principle. Descartes in his own time discriminated\nthe body sharply from the mind, and \"the spirit 'tis that builds itself\nthe body,\" says Goethe.\n\nBut this philosophy itself, Christian philosophy, still does not get rid\nof the rational, and therefore inveighs against the \"merely subjective,\"\nagainst \"fancies, fortuities, arbitrariness,\" etc. What it wants is that\nthe _divine_ should become visible in everything, and all consciousness\nbecome a knowing of the divine, and man behold God everywhere; but God\nnever is, without the _devil_.\n\nFor this very reason the name of philosopher is not to be given to him\nwho has indeed open eyes for the things of the world, a clear and\nundazzled gaze, a correct judgment about the world, but who sees in the\nworld just the world, in objects only objects, and, in short, everything\nprosaically as it is; but he alone is a philosopher who sees, and points\nout or demonstrates, heaven in the world, the supernal in the earthly,\nthe--_divine_ in the mundane. The former may be ever so wise, there is\nno getting away from this:\n\n  What wise men see not by their wisdom's art\n  Is practised simply by a childlike heart.[56]\n\nIt takes this childlike heart, this eye for the divine, to make a\nphilosopher. The first-named man has only a \"common\" consciousness, but\nhe who knows the divine, and knows how to tell it, has a \"scientific\"\none. On this ground Bacon was turned out of the realm of philosophers.\nAnd certainly what is called English philosophy seems to have got no\nfurther than to the discoveries of so-called \"clear heads\", such as\nBacon and Hume. The English did not know how to exalt the simplicity of\nthe childlike heart to philosophic significance, did not know how to\nmake--philosophers out of childlike hearts. This is as much as to say,\ntheir philosophy was not able to become _theological_ or _theology_, and\nyet it is only as theology that it can really _live itself out_,\ncomplete itself. The field of its battle to the death is in theology.\nBacon did not trouble himself about theological questions and cardinal\npoints.\n\nCognition has its object in life. German thought seeks, more than that\nof others, to reach the beginnings and fountain-heads of life, and sees\nno life till it sees it in cognition itself. Descartes's _cogito, ergo\nsum_ has the meaning \"One lives only when one thinks.\" Thinking life is\ncalled \"intellectual life\"! Only mind lives, its life is the true life.\nThen, just so in nature only the \"eternal laws,\" the mind or the reason\nof nature, are its true life. In man, as in nature, only the thought\nlives; everything else is dead! To this abstraction, to the life of\ngeneralities or of that which is _lifeless_, the history of mind had to\ncome. God, who is spirit, alone lives. Nothing lives but the ghost.\n\nHow can one try to assert of modern philosophy or modern times that they\nhave reached freedom, since they have not freed us from the power of\nobjectivity? Or am I perhaps free from a despot when I am not afraid of\nthe personal potentate, to be sure, but of every infraction of the\nloving reverence which I fancy I owe him? The case is the same with\nmodern times. They only changed the _existing_ objects, the real ruler,\netc., into _conceived_ objects, _i. e._ into _ideas_, before which the\nold respect not only was not lost, but increased in intensity. Even if\npeople snapped their fingers at God and the devil in their former crass\nreality, people devoted only the greater attention to their ideas. \"They\nare rid of the Evil One; evil is left.\"[57] The decision having once\nbeen made not to let oneself be imposed on any longer by the extant and\npalpable, little scruple was felt about revolting against the existing\nState or overturning the existing laws; but to sin against the _idea_ of\nthe State, not to submit to the _idea_ of law, who would have dared\nthat? So one remained a \"citizen\" and a \"law-respecting,\" loyal man;\nyes, one seemed to himself to be only so much more law-respecting, the\nmore rationalistically one abrogated the former defective law in order\nto do homage to the \"spirit of the law.\" In all this the objects had\nonly suffered a change of form; they had remained in their prepollence\nand pre-eminence; in short, one was still involved in obedience and\npossessedness, lived in _refection_, and had an object on which one\nreflected, which one respected, and before which one felt reverence and\nfear. One had done nothing but transform the _things_ into _conceptions_\nof the things, into thoughts and ideas, whereby one's _dependence_\nbecame all the more intimate and indissoluble. So, _e. g._, it is not\nhard to emancipate oneself from the commands of parents, or to set aside\nthe admonitions of uncle and aunt, the entreaties of brother and sister;\nbut the renounced obedience easily gets into one's conscience, and the\nless one does give way to the individual demands, because he\nrationalistically, by his own reason, recognizes them to be\nunreasonable, so much the more conscientiously does he hold fast to\nfilial piety and family love, and so much the harder is it for him to\nforgive himself a trespass against the _conception_ which he has formed\nof family love and of filial duty. Released from dependence as regards\nthe existing family, one falls into the more binding dependence on the\nidea of the family; one is ruled by the spirit of the family. The\nfamily consisting of John, Maggie, etc., whose dominion has become\npowerless, is only internalized, being left as \"family\" in general, to\nwhich one just applies the old saying, \"We must obey God rather than\nman,\" whose significance here is this: \"I cannot, to be sure,\naccommodate myself to your senseless requirements, but, as my 'family,'\nyou still remain the object of my love and care\"; for \"the family\" is a\nsacred idea, which the individual must never offend against.--And this\nfamily internalized and desensualized into a thought, a conception, now\nranks as the \"sacred,\" whose despotism is tenfold more grievous because\nit makes a racket in my conscience. This despotism is broken only when\nthe conception, family, also becomes a _nothing_ to me. The Christian\ndicta, \"Woman, what have I to do with thee?\"[58] \"I am come to stir up a\nman against his father, and a daughter against her mother,\"[59] and\nothers, are accompanied by something that refers us to the heavenly or\ntrue family, and mean no more than the State's demand, in case of a\ncollision between it and the family, that we obey _its_ commands.\n\nThe case of morality is like that of the family. Many a man renounces\nmorals, but with great difficulty the conception, \"morality.\" Morality\nis the \"idea\" of morals, their intellectual power, their power over the\nconscience; on the other hand, morals are too material to rule the mind,\nand do not fetter an \"intellectual\" man, a so-called independent, a\n\"freethinker.\"\n\nThe Protestant may put it as he will, the \"holy[60] Scripture,\" the\n\"Word of God,\" still remains sacred[61] for him. He for whom this is no\nlonger \"holy\" has ceased to--be a Protestant. But herewith what is\n\"ordained\" in it, the public authorities appointed by God, etc., also\nremain sacred for him. For him these things remain indissoluble,\nunapproachable, \"raised above all doubt\"; and, as _doubt_, which in\npractice becomes a _buffeting_, is what is most man's own, these things\nremain \"raised\" above himself. He who cannot _get away_ from them\nwill--_believe_; for to believe in them is to be _bound_ to them.\nThrough the fact that in Protestantism the _faith_ became a more inward\nfaith, the _servitude_ has also become a more inward servitude; one has\ntaken those sanctities up into himself, entwined them with all his\nthoughts and endeavors, made them a \"_matter of conscience_,\"\nconstructed out of them a \"_sacred duty_\" for himself. Therefore what\nthe Protestant's conscience cannot get away from is sacred to him, and\n_conscientiousness_ most clearly designates his character.\n\nProtestantism has actually put a man in the position of a country\ngoverned by secret police. The spy and eavesdropper, \"conscience,\"\nwatches over every motion of the mind, and all thought and action is for\nit a \"matter of conscience,\" _i. e._ police business. This tearing apart\nof man into \"natural impulse\" and \"conscience\" (inner populace and inner\npolice) is what constitutes the Protestant. The reason of the Bible (in\nplace of the Catholic \"reason of the church\") ranks as sacred, and this\nfeeling and consciousness that the word of the Bible is sacred is\ncalled--conscience. With this, then, sacredness is \"laid upon one's\nconscience.\" If one does not free himself from conscience, the\nconsciousness of the sacred, he may act unconscientiously indeed, but\nnever consciencelessly.\n\nThe Catholic finds himself satisfied when he fulfils the _command_; the\nProtestant acts according to his \"best judgment and conscience.\" For the\nCatholic is only a _layman_; the Protestant is himself a\n_clergyman_.[62] Just this is the progress of the Reformation period\nbeyond the Middle Ages, and at the same time its curse,--that _the\nspiritual_ became complete.\n\nWhat else was the Jesuit moral philosophy than a continuation of the\nsale of indulgences? only that the man who was relieved of his burden of\nsin now gained also an _insight_ into the remission of sins, and\nconvinced himself how really his sin was taken from him, since in this\nor that particular case (Casuists) it was so clearly no sin at all that\nhe committed. The sale of indulgences had made all sins and\ntransgressions permissible, and silenced every movement of conscience.\nAll sensuality might hold sway, if it was only purchased from the\nchurch. This favoring of sensuality was continued by the Jesuits, while\nthe strictly moral, dark, fanatical, repentant, contrite, praying\nProtestants (as the true completers of Christianity, to be sure)\nacknowledged only the intellectual and spiritual man. Catholicism,\nespecially the Jesuits, gave aid to egoism in this way, found\ninvoluntary and unconscious adherents within Protestantism itself, and\nsaved us from the subversion and extinction of _sensuality_.\nNevertheless the Protestant spirit spreads its dominion farther and\nfarther; and, as, beside it the \"divine,\" the Jesuit spirit represents\nonly the \"diabolic\" which is inseparable from everything divine, the\nlatter can never assert itself alone, but must look on and see how in\nFrance, _e. g._, the Philistinism of Protestantism wins at last, and\nmind is on top.\n\nProtestantism is usually complimented on having brought the mundane into\nrepute again, _e. g._ marriage, the State, etc. But the mundane itself\nas mundane, the secular, is even more indifferent to it than to\nCatholicism, which lets the profane world stand, yes, and relishes its\npleasures, while the rational, consistent Protestant sets about\nannihilating the mundane altogether, and that simply by _hallowing_ it.\nSo marriage has been deprived of its naturalness by becoming sacred, not\nin the sense of the Catholic sacrament, where it only receives its\nconsecration from the church and so is unholy at bottom, but in the\nsense of being something sacred in itself to begin with, a sacred\nrelation. Just so the State, etc. Formerly the pope gave consecration\nand his blessing to it and its princes; now the State is intrinsically\nsacred, majesty is sacred without needing the priest's blessing. The\norder of nature, or natural law, was altogether hallowed as \"God's\nordinance.\" Hence it is said _e. g._ in the Augsburg Confession, Art.\n11: \"So now we reasonably abide by the saying, as the jurisconsults\nhave wisely and rightly said: that man and woman should be with each\nother is a natural law. Now, if it is a _natural law, then it is God's\nordinance_, therefore implanted in nature, and therefore a _divine_ law\nalso.\" And is it anything more than Protestantism brought up to date,\nwhen Feuerbach pronounces moral relations sacred, not as God's ordinance\nindeed, but, instead, for the sake of the _spirit_ that dwells in them?\n\"But marriage--as a free alliance of love, of course--is _sacred of\nitself_, by the _nature_ of the union that is formed here. _That_\nmarriage alone is a _religious_ one that is a _true_ one, that\ncorresponds to the _essence_ of marriage, love. And so it is with all\nmoral relations. They are _ethical_, are cultivated with a moral mind,\nonly where they rank as _religious of themselves_. True friendship is\nonly where the _limits_ of friendship are preserved with religious\nconscientiousness, with the same conscientiousness with which the\nbeliever guards the dignity of his God. Friendship is and must be\n_sacred_ for you, and property, and marriage, and the good of every man,\nbut sacred _in and of itself_.\"[63]\n\nThat is a very essential consideration. In Catholicism the mundane can\nindeed be _consecrated_ or _hallowed_, but it is not sacred without this\npriestly blessing; in Protestantism, on the contrary, mundane relations\nare sacred _of themselves_, sacred by their mere existence. The Jesuit\nmaxim, \"the end hallows the means,\" corresponds precisely to the\nconsecration by which sanctity is bestowed. No means are holy or unholy\nin themselves, but their relation to the church, their use for the\nchurch, hallows the means. Regicide was named as such; if it was\ncommitted for the church's behoof, it could be certain of being hallowed\nby the church, even if the hallowing was not openly pronounced. To the\nProtestant, majesty ranks as sacred; to the Catholic only that majesty\nwhich is consecrated by the pontiff can rank as such; and it does rank\nas such to him only because the pope, even though it be without a\nspecial act, confers this sacredness on it once for all. If he retracted\nhis consecration, the king would be left only a \"man of the world or\nlayman,\" an \"unconsecrated\" man, to the Catholic.\n\nIf the Protestant seeks to discover a sacredness in the sensual itself,\nthat he may then be linked only to what is holy, the Catholic strives\nrather to banish the sensual from himself into a separate domain, where\nit, like the rest of nature, keeps its value for itself. The Catholic\nchurch eliminated mundane marriage from its consecrated order, and\nwithdrew those who were its own from the mundane family; the Protestant\nchurch declared marriage and family ties to be holy, and therefore not\nunsuitable for its clergymen.\n\nA Jesuit may, as a good Catholic, hallow everything. He needs only\n_e. g._ to say to himself: \"I as a priest am necessary to the church,\nbut serve it more zealously when I appease my desires properly;\nconsequently I will seduce this girl, have my enemy there poisoned,\netc.; my end is holy because it is a priest's, consequently it hallows\nthe means.\" For in the end it is still done for the benefit of the\nchurch. Why should the Catholic priest shrink from handing Emperor\nHenry VII the poisoned wafer for the--church's welfare?\n\nThe genuinely--churchly Protestants inveighed against every \"innocent\npleasure,\" because only the sacred, the spiritual, could be innocent.\nWhat they could not point out the holy spirit in, the Protestants had to\nreject,--dancing, the theatre, ostentation (_e. g._ in the church), and\nthe like.\n\nCompared with this puritanical Calvinism, Lutheranism is again more on\nthe religious, _i. e._ spiritual, track,--is more radical. For the\nformer excludes at once a great number of things as sensual and worldly,\nand _purifies_ the church; Lutheranism, on the contrary, tries to bring\n_spirit_ into all things as far as possible, to recognize the holy\nspirit as an essence in everything, and so to _hallow_ everything\nworldly. (\"No one can forbid a kiss in honor.\" The spirit of honor\nhallows it.) Hence it was that the Lutheran Hegel (he declares himself\nsuch in some passage or other: he \"wants to remain a Lutheran\") was\ncompletely successful in carrying the idea through everything. In\neverything there is reason, _i. e._ holy spirit, or \"the real is\nrational.\" For the real is in fact everything, as in each thing, _e. g._\neach lie, the truth can be detected: there is no absolute lie, no\nabsolute evil, and the like.\n\nGreat \"works of mind\" were created almost solely by Protestants, as they\nalone were the true disciples and consummators of _mind_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHow little man is able to control! He must let the sun run its course,\nthe sea roll its waves, the mountains rise to heaven. Thus he stands\npowerless before the _uncontrollable_. Can he keep off the impression\nthat he is _helpless_ against this gigantic world? It is a fixed _law_\nto which he must submit, it determines his _fate_. Now, what did\npre-Christian humanity work toward? Toward getting rid of the irruptions\nof the destinies, not letting oneself be vexed by them. The Stoics\nattained this in apathy, declaring the attacks of nature _indifferent_,\nand not letting themselves be affected by them. Horace utters the famous\n_Nil admirari_, by which he likewise announces the indifference of the\n_other_, the world; it is not to influence us, not to arouse our\nastonishment. And that _impavidum ferient ruinae_ expresses the very\nsame _imperturbability_ as Ps. 46.3: \"We do not fear, though the earth\nshould perish.\" In all this there is room made for the Christian\nproposition that the world is empty, for the Christian _contempt of the\nworld_.\n\nThe _imperturbable_ spirit of \"the wise man,\" with which the old world\nworked to prepare its end, now underwent an _inner perturbation_ against\nwhich no ataraxy, no Stoic courage, was able to protect it. The spirit,\nsecured against all influence of the world, insensible to its shocks and\n_exalted_ above its attacks, admiring nothing, not to be disconcerted by\nany downfall of the world,--foamed over irrepressibly again, because\ngases (spirits) were evolved in its own interior, and, after the\n_mechanical shock_ that comes from without had become ineffective,\n_chemical tensions_, that agitate within, began their wonderful play.\n\nIn fact, ancient history ends with this,--that _I_ have struggled till I\nwon my ownership of the world. \"All things have been delivered, to me\nby my Father\" (Matt. 11.27). It has ceased to be overpowering,\nunapproachable, sacred, divine, etc., for me; it is _undeified_, and now\nI treat it so entirely as I please that, if I cared, I could exert on it\nall miracle-working power, _i. e._ power of mind,--remove mountains,\ncommand mulberry trees to tear themselves up and transplant themselves\ninto the sea (Luke 17.6), and do everything possible, _i. e. thinkable_:\n\"All things are possible to him who believes.\"[64] I am the _lord_ of\nthe world, mine is the \"_glory_.\"[65] The world has become _prosaic_,\nfor the divine has vanished from it: it is my property, which I dispose\nof as I (to wit, the mind) choose.\n\nWhen I had exalted myself to be the _owner of the world_, egoism had won\nits first complete victory, had vanquished the world, had become\n_worldless_, and put the acquisitions of a long age under lock and key.\n\nThe first property, the first \"glory,\" has been acquired!\n\nBut the lord of the world is not yet lord of his thoughts, his feelings,\nhis will: he is not lord and owner of the spirit, for the spirit is\nstill sacred, the \"Holy Spirit,\" and the \"worldless\" Christian is not\nable to become \"godless.\" If the ancient struggle was a struggle against\nthe _world_, the medi\u00e6val (Christian) struggle is a struggle against\n_self_, the mind; the former against the outer world, the latter against\nthe inner world. The medi\u00e6val man is the man \"whose gaze is turned\ninward,\" the thinking, meditative man.\n\nAll wisdom of the ancients is _the science of the world_, all wisdom of\nthe moderns is _the science of God_.\n\nThe heathen (Jews included) got through with the _world_; but now the\nthing was to get through with self, the _spirit_, too; _i. e._ to become\nspiritless or godless.\n\nFor almost two thousand years we have been working at subjecting the\nHoly Spirit to ourselves, and little by little we have torn off and\ntrodden under foot many bits of sacredness; but the gigantic opponent is\nconstantly rising anew under a changed form and name. The spirit has not\nyet lost its divinity, its holiness, its sacredness. To be sure, it has\nlong ceased to flutter over our heads as a dove; to be sure, it no\nlonger gladdens its saints alone, but lets itself be caught by the laity\ntoo, etc.; but as spirit of humanity, as spirit of Man, it remains still\nan _alien_ spirit to me or you, still far from becoming our unrestricted\n_property_, which we dispose of at our pleasure. However, one thing\ncertainly happened, and visibly guided the progress of post-Christian\nhistory: this one thing was the endeavor to make the Holy Spirit _more\nhuman_, and bring it nearer to men, or men to it. Through this it came\nabout that at last it could be conceived as the \"spirit of humanity,\"\nand, under different expressions like \"idea of humanity, mankind,\nhumaneness, general philanthropy,\" etc., appeared more attractive, more\nfamiliar, and more accessible.\n\nWould not one think that now everybody could possess the Holy Spirit,\ntake up into himself the idea of humanity, bring mankind to form and\nexistence in himself?\n\nNo, the spirit is not stripped of its holiness and robbed of its\nunapproachableness, is not accessible to us, not our property; for the\nspirit of humanity is not _my_ spirit. My _ideal_ it may be, and as a\nthought I call it mine; the _thought_ of humanity is my property, and I\nprove this sufficiently by propounding it quite according to my views,\nand shaping it to-day so, to-morrow otherwise; we represent it to\nourselves in the most manifold ways. But it is at the same time an\nentail, which I cannot alienate nor get rid of.\n\nAmong many transformations, the Holy Spirit became in time the\n\"_absolute idea_,\" which again in manifold refractions split into the\ndifferent ideas of philanthropy, reasonableness, civic virtue, etc.\n\nBut can I call the idea my property if it is the idea of humanity, and\ncan I consider the Spirit as vanquished if I am to serve it, \"sacrifice\nmyself\" to it? Antiquity, at its close, had gained its ownership of the\nworld only when it had broken the world's overpoweringness and\n\"divinity,\" recognized the world's powerlessness and \"vanity.\"\n\nThe case with regard to the _spirit_ corresponds. When I have degraded\nit to a _spook_ and its control over me to a _cranky notion_, then it is\nto be looked upon as having lost its sacredness, its holiness, its\ndivinity, and then I _use_ it, as one uses _nature_ at pleasure without\nscruple.\n\nThe \"nature of the case,\" the \"concept of the relationship,\" is to guide\nme in dealing with the case or in contracting the relation. As if a\nconcept of the case existed on its own account, and was not rather the\nconcept that one forms of the case! As if a relation which we enter into\nwas not, by the uniqueness of those who enter into it, itself unique! As\nif it depended on how others stamp it! But, as people separated the\n\"essence of Man\" from the real man, and judged the latter by the former,\nso they also separate his action from him, and appraise it by \"human\nvalue.\" _Concepts_ are to decide everywhere, concepts to regulate life,\nconcepts to _rule_. This is the religious world, to which Hegel gave a\nsystematic expression, bringing method into the nonsense and completing\nthe conceptual precepts into a rounded, firmly-based dogmatic.\nEverything is sung according to concepts, and the real man, _i. e._ I,\nam compelled to live according to these conceptual laws. Can there be a\nmore grievous dominion of law, and did not Christianity confess at the\nvery beginning that it meant only to draw Judaism's dominion of law\ntighter? (\"Not a letter of the law shall be lost!\")\n\nLiberalism simply brought other concepts on the carpet, _viz._, human\ninstead of divine, political instead of ecclesiastical, \"scientific\"\ninstead of doctrinal, or, more generally, real concepts and eternal laws\ninstead of \"crude dogmas\" and precepts.\n\nNow nothing but _mind_ rules in the world. An innumerable multitude of\nconcepts buzz about in people's heads, and what are those doing who\nendeavor to get further? They are negating these concepts to put new\nones in their place! They are saying: \"You form a false concept of\nright, of the State, of man, of liberty, of truth, of marriage, etc.;\nthe concept of right, etc., is rather that one which we now set up.\"\nThus the confusion of concepts moves forward.\n\nThe history of the world has dealt cruelly with us, and the spirit has\nobtained an almighty power. You must have regard for my miserable shoes,\nwhich could protect your naked foot, my salt, by which your potatoes\nwould become palatable, and my state-carriage, whose possession would\nrelieve you of all need at once; you must not reach out after them. Man\nis to recognize the _independence_ of all these and innumerable other\nthings: they are to rank in his mind as something that cannot be seized\nor approached, are to be kept away from him. He must have regard for it,\nrespect it; woe to him if he stretches out his fingers desirously; we\ncall that \"being light-fingered!\"\n\nHow beggarly little is left us, yes, how really nothing! Everything has\nbeen removed, we must not venture on anything unless it is given us; we\ncontinue to live only by the _grace_ of the giver. You must not pick up\na pin, unless indeed you have got _leave_ to do so. And got it from\nwhom? From _respect_! Only when this lets you have it as property, only\nwhen you can _respect_ it as property, only then may you take it. And\nagain, you are not to conceive a thought, speak a syllable, commit an\naction, that should have their warrant in you alone, instead of\nreceiving it from morality or reason or humanity. Happy _unconstraint_\nof the desirous man, how mercilessly people have tried to slay you on\nthe altar of _constraint_!\n\nBut around the altar rise the arches of a church, and its walls keep\nmoving further and further out. What they enclose is--_sacred_. You can\nno longer get to it, no longer touch it. Shrieking with the hunger that\ndevours you, you wander round about these walls in search of the little\nthat is profane, and the circles of your course keep growing more and\nmore extended. Soon that church will embrace the whole world, and you be\ndriven out to the extreme edge; another step, and the _world of the\nsacred_ has conquered: you sink into the abyss. Therefore take courage\nwhile it is yet time, wander about no longer in the profane where now it\nis dry feeding, dare the leap, and rush in through the gates into the\nsanctuary itself. If you _devour the sacred_, you have made it your\n_own_! Digest the sacramental wafer, and you are rid of it!\n\n\nIII.--THE FREE\n\nThe ancients and the moderns having been presented above in two\ndivisions, it may seem as if the free were here to be described in a\nthird division as independent and distinct. This is not so. The free are\nonly the more modern and most modern among the \"moderns,\" and are put in\na separate division merely because they belong to the present, and what\nis present, above all, claims our attention here. I give \"the free\" only\nas a translation of \"the liberals,\" but must with regard to the concept\nof freedom (as in general with regard to so many other things whose\nanticipatory introduction cannot be avoided) refer to what comes later.\n\n\n\u00a7 1.--POLITICAL LIBERALISM\n\nAfter the chalice of so-called absolute monarchy had been drained down\nto the dregs, in the eighteenth century people became aware that their\ndrink did not taste human--too clearly aware not to begin to crave a\ndifferent cup. Since our fathers were \"human beings\" after all, they at\nlast desired also to be regarded as such.\n\nWhoever sees in us something else than human beings, in him we likewise\nwill not see a human being, but an inhuman being, and will meet him as\nan unhuman being; on the other hand, whoever recognizes us as human\nbeings and protects us against the danger of being treated inhumanly,\nhim we will honor as our true protector and guardian.\n\nLet us then hold together and protect the man in each other; then we\nfind the necessary protection in our _holding together_, and in\nourselves, _those who hold together_, a fellowship of those who know\ntheir human dignity and hold together as \"human beings.\" Our holding\ntogether is the _State_; we who hold together are the _nation_.\n\nIn our being together as nation or State we are only human beings. How\nwe deport ourselves in other respects as individuals, and what\nself-seeking impulses we may there succumb to, belongs solely to our\n_private_ life; our _public_ or State life is a _purely human_ one.\nEverything un-human or \"egoistic\" that clings to us is degraded to a\n\"private matter\" and we distinguish the State definitely from \"civil\nsociety,\" which is the sphere of \"egoism's\" activity.\n\nThe true man is the nation, but the individual is always an egoist.\nTherefore strip off your individuality or isolation wherein dwells\ndiscord and egoistic inequality, and consecrate yourselves wholly to the\ntrue man,--the nation or the State. Then you will rank as men, and have\nall that is man's; the State, the true man, will entitle you to what\nbelongs to it, and give you the \"rights of man\"; Man gives you his\nrights!\n\nSo runs the speech of the commonalty.\n\nThe commonalty[66] is nothing else than the thought that the State is\nall in all, the true man, and that the individual's human value consists\nin being a citizen of the State. In being a good citizen he seeks his\nhighest honor; beyond that he knows nothing higher than at most the\nantiquated--\"being a good Christian.\"\n\nThe commonalty developed itself in the struggle against the privileged\nclasses, by whom it was cavalierly treated as \"third estate\" and\nconfounded with the _canaille_. In other words, up to this time the\nState had recognized caste.[67] The son of a nobleman was selected for\nposts to which the most distinguished commoners aspired in vain, etc.\nThe civic feeling revolted against this. No more distinction, no giving\npreference to persons, no difference of classes! Let all be alike! No\n_separate interest_ is to be pursued longer, but the _general interest\nof all_. The State is to be a fellowship of free and equal men, and\nevery one is to devote himself to the \"welfare of the whole,\" to be\ndissolved in the _State_, to make the State his end and ideal. State!\nState! so ran the general cry, and thenceforth people sought for the\n\"right form of State,\" the best constitution, and so the State in its\nbest conception. The thought of the State passed into all hearts and\nawakened enthusiasm; to serve it, this mundane god, became the new\ndivine service and worship. The properly _political_ epoch had dawned.\nTo serve the State or the nation became the highest ideal, the State's\ninterest the highest interest, State service (for which one does not by\nany means need to be an official) the highest honor.\n\nSo then the separate interests and personalities had been scared away,\nand sacrifice for the State had become the shibboleth. One must give up\n_himself_, and live only for the State. One must act \"disinterestedly,\"\nnot want to benefit _himself_, but the State. Hereby the latter has\nbecome the true person, before whom the individual personality vanishes;\nnot I live, but it lives in me. Therefore, in comparison with the former\nself-seeking, this was unselfishness and _impersonality_ itself. Before\nthis god--State--all egoism vanished, and before it all were equal; they\nwere without any other distinction--men, nothing but men.\n\nThe Revolution took fire from the inflammable material of _property_.\nThe government needed money. Now it must prove the proposition that it\nis _absolute_, and so master of all property, sole proprietor; it must\n_take_ to itself _its_ money, which was only in the possession of the\nsubjects, not their property. Instead of this, it calls States-general,\nto have this money _granted_ to it. The shrinking from strictly logical\naction destroyed the illusion of an _absolute_ government; he who must\nhave something \"granted\" to him cannot be regarded as absolute. The\nsubjects recognized that they were _real proprietors_, and that it was\n_their_ money that was demanded. Those who had hitherto been subjects\nattained the consciousness that they were _proprietors_. Bailly depicts\nthis in a few words: \"If you cannot dispose of my property without my\nassent, how much less can you of my person, of all that concerns my\nmental and social position? All this is my property, like the piece of\nland that I till; and I have a right, an interest, to make the laws\nmyself.\" Bailly's words sound, certainly, as if _every one_ was a\nproprietor now. However, instead of the government, instead of the\nprince, the--_nation_ now became proprietor and master. From this time\non the ideal is spoken of as--\"popular liberty\"--\"a free people,\" etc.\n\nAs early as July 8, 1789, the declaration of the bishop of Autun and\nBarr\u00e8re took away all semblance of the importance of each and every\n_individual_ in legislation; it showed the complete _powerlessness_ of\nthe constituents; the _majority of the representatives_ has become\n_master_. When on July 9 the plan for division of the work on the\nconstitution is proposed, Mirabeau remarks that \"the government has only\npower, no rights; only in the _people_ is the source of all _right_ to\nbe found.\" On July 16 this same Mirabeau exclaims: \"Is not the people\nthe source of all _power_?\" The source, therefore, of all right, and the\nsource of all--power![68] By the way, here the substance of \"right\"\nbecomes visible; it is--_power_. \"He who has power has right.\"\n\nThe commonalty is the heir of the privileged classes. In fact, the\nrights of the barons, which were taken from them as \"usurpations,\" only\npassed over to the commonalty. For the commonalty was now called the\n\"nation.\" \"Into the hands of the nation\" all _prerogatives_ were given\nback. Thereby they ceased to be \"prerogatives\":[69] they became\n\"rights.\"[70] From this time on the nation demands tithes, compulsory\nservices; it has inherited the lord's court, the rights of vert and\nvenison, the--serfs. The night of August 4 was the death-night of\nprivileges or \"prerogatives\" (cities, communes, boards of magistrates,\nwere also privileged, furnished with prerogatives and seigniorial\nrights), and ended with the new morning of \"right,\" the \"rights of the\nState,\" the \"rights of the nation.\"\n\nThe monarch in the person of the \"royal master\" had been a paltry\nmonarch compared with this new monarch, the \"sovereign nation.\" This\n_monarchy_ was a thousand times severer, stricter, and more consistent.\nAgainst the new monarch there was no longer any right, any privilege at\nall; how limited the \"absolute king\" of the _ancien r\u00e9gime_ looks in\ncomparison! The Revolution effected the transformation of _limited\nmonarchy_ into _absolute monarchy_. From this time on every right that\nis not conferred by this monarch is an \"assumption\"; but every\nprerogative that he bestows, a \"right.\" The times demanded _absolute\nroyalty_, absolute monarchy; therefore down fell that so-called absolute\nroyalty which had so little understood how to become absolute that it\nremained limited by a thousand little lords.\n\nWhat was longed for and striven for through thousands of years,--to wit,\nto find that absolute lord beside whom no other lords and lordlings any\nlonger exist to clip his power,--the _bourgeoisie_ has brought to pass.\nIt has revealed the Lord who alone confers \"rightful titles,\" and\nwithout whose warrant _nothing is justified_. \"So now we know that an\nidol is nothing in the world, and that there is no other god save the\none.\"[71]\n\nAgainst _right_ one can no longer, as against a right, come forward with\nthe assertion that it is \"a wrong.\" One can say now only that it is a\npiece of nonsense, an illusion. If one called it wrong, one would have\nto set up _another right_ in opposition to it, and measure it by this.\nIf, on the contrary, one rejects right as such, right in and of itself,\naltogether, then one also rejects the concept of wrong, and dissolves\nthe whole concept of right (to which the concept of wrong belongs).\n\nWhat is the meaning of the doctrine that we all enjoy \"equality of\npolitical rights\"? Only this,--that the State has no regard for my\nperson, that to it I, like every other, am only a man, without having\nanother significance that commands its deference. I do not command its\ndeference as an aristocrat, a nobleman's son, or even as heir of an\nofficial whose office belongs to me by inheritance (as in the Middle\nAges countships, etc., and later under absolute royalty, where\nhereditary offices occur). Now the State has an innumerable multitude of\nrights to give away, _e. g._ the right to lead a battalion, a company,\netc.; the right to lecture at a university; and so forth; it has them to\ngive away because they are its own, _i. e._ State rights or \"political\"\nrights. Withal, it makes no difference to it to whom it gives them, if\nthe receiver only fulfils the duties that spring from the delegated\nrights. To it we are all of us all right, and--_equal_,--one worth no\nmore and no less than another. It is indifferent to me who receives the\ncommand of the army, says the sovereign State, provided the grantee\nunderstands the matter properly. \"Equality of political rights\" has,\nconsequently, the meaning that every one may acquire every right that\nthe State has to give away, if only he fulfils the conditions annexed\nthereto,--conditions which are to be sought only in the nature of the\nparticular right, not in a predilection for the person (_persona\ngrata_): the nature of the right to become an officer brings with it,\n_e. g._, the necessity that one possess sound limbs and a suitable\nmeasure of knowledge, but it does not have noble birth as a condition;\nif, on the other hand, even the most deserving commoner could not reach\nthat station, then an inequality of political rights would exist. Among\nthe States of to-day one has carried out that maxim of equality more,\nanother less.\n\nThe monarchy of estates (so I will call absolute royalty, the time of\nthe kings _before_ the revolution) kept the individual in dependence on\na lot of little monarchies. These were fellowships (societies) like the\nguilds, the nobility, the priesthood, the burgher class, cities,\ncommunes, etc. Everywhere the individual must regard himself _first_ as\na member of this little society, and yield unconditional obedience to\nits spirit, the _esprit de corps_, as his monarch. More, _e. g._, than\nthe individual nobleman himself must his family, the honor of his race,\nbe to him. Only by means of his _corporation_, his estate, did the\nindividual have relation to the greater corporation, the State,--as in\nCatholicism the individual deals with God only through the priest. To\nthis the third estate now, showing courage to negate _itself as an\nestate_, made an end. It decided no longer to be and be called an\n_estate_ beside other estates, but to glorify and generalize itself into\nthe \"_nation_.\" Hereby it created a much more complete and absolute\nmonarchy, and the entire previously ruling _principle of estates_, the\nprinciple of little monarchies inside the great, went down. Therefore it\ncannot be said that the Revolution was a revolution against the first\ntwo privileged estates: it was against the little monarchies of estates\nin general. But, if the estates and their despotism were broken (the\nking too, we know, was only a king of estates, not a citizen-king), the\nindividuals freed from the inequality of estate were left. Were they now\nreally to be without estate and \"out of gear,\" no longer bound by any\nestate, without a general bond of union? No, for the third estate had\ndeclared itself the nation only in order not to remain an estate\n_beside_ other estates, but to become the _sole estate_. This sole\n_estate_ is the nation, the \"_State_.\" What had the individual now\nbecome? A political Protestant, for he had come into immediate\nconnection with his God, the State. He was no longer, as an aristocrat,\nin the monarchy of the nobility; as a mechanic, in the monarchy of the\nguild; but he, like all, recognized and acknowledged only--_one lord_,\nthe State, as whose servants they all received the equal title of honor,\n\"citizen.\"\n\nThe _bourgeoisie_ is the _aristocracy of_ DESERT; its motto, \"Let desert\nwear its crowns.\" It fought against the \"lazy\" aristocracy, for\naccording to it (the industrious aristocracy acquired by industry and\ndesert) it is not the \"born\" who is free, nor yet I who am free either,\nbut the \"deserving\" man, the honest _servant_ (of his king; of the\nState; of the people in constitutional States). Through _service_ one\nacquires freedom, _i. e._ acquires \"deserts,\" even if one\nserved--mammon. One must deserve well of the State, _i. e._ of the\nprinciple of the State, of its moral spirit. He who _serves_ this spirit\nof the State is a good citizen, let him live to whatever honest branch\nof industry he will. In its eyes innovators practise a \"breadless art.\"\nOnly the \"shopkeeper\" is \"practical,\" and the spirit that chases after\npublic offices is as much the shopkeeping spirit as is that which tries\nin trade to feather its nest or otherwise to become useful to itself and\nanybody else.\n\nBut, if the deserving count as the free (for what does the comfortable\ncommoner, the faithful office-holder, lack of that freedom that his\nheart desires?), then the \"servants\" are the--free. The obedient\nservant is the free man! What glaring nonsense! Yet this is the sense of\nthe _bourgeoisie_, and its poet, Goethe, as well as its philosopher,\nHegel, succeeded in glorifying the dependence of the subject on the\nobject, obedience to the objective world, etc. He who only serves the\ncause, \"devotes himself entirely to it,\" has the true freedom. And among\nthinkers the cause was--_reason_, that which, like State and Church,\ngives--general laws, and puts the individual man in irons by the\n_thought of humanity_. It determines what is \"true,\" according to which\none must then act. No more \"rational\" people than the honest servants,\nwho primarily are called good citizens as servants of the State.\n\nBe rich as Croesus or poor as Job--the State of the commonalty leaves\nthat to your option; but only have a \"good disposition.\" This it demands\nof you, and counts it its most urgent task to establish this in all.\nTherefore it will keep you from \"evil promptings,\" holding the\n\"ill-disposed\" in check and silencing their inflammatory discourses\nunder censors' cancelling-marks or press-penalties and behind dungeon\nwalls, and will, on the other hand, appoint people of \"good disposition\"\nas censors, and in every way have a _moral influence_ exerted on you by\n\"well-disposed and well-meaning\" people. If it has made you deaf to evil\npromptings, then it opens your ears again all the more diligently to\ngood _promptings_.\n\nWith the time of the _bourgeoisie_ begins that of _liberalism_. People\nwant to see what is \"rational,\" \"suited to the times,\" etc., established\neverywhere. The following definition of liberalism, which is supposed\nto be pronounced in its honor, characterizes it completely: \"Liberalism\nis nothing else than the knowledge of reason, applied to our existing\nrelations.\"[72] Its aim is a \"rational order,\" a \"moral behavior,\" a\n\"limited freedom,\" not anarchy, lawlessness, selfhood. But, if reason\nrules, then the _person_ succumbs. Art has for a long time not only\nacknowledged the ugly, but considered the ugly as necessary to its\nexistence, and taken it up into itself; it needs the villain, etc. In\nthe religious domain, too, the extremest liberals go so far that they\nwant to see the most religious man regarded as a citizen--_i. e._ the\nreligious villain; they want to see no more of trials for heresy. But\nagainst the \"rational law\" no one is to rebel, otherwise he is\nthreatened with the severest--penalty. What is wanted is not free\nmovement and realization of the person or of me, but of reason,--_i. e._\na dominion of reason, a dominion. The liberals are _zealots_, not\nexactly for the faith, for God, etc., but certainly for _reason_, their\nmaster. They brook no lack of breeding, and therefore no\nself-development and self-determination; they _play the guardian_ as\neffectively as the most absolute rulers.\n\n\"Political liberty,\" what are we to understand by that? Perhaps the\nindividual's independence of the State and its laws? No; on the\ncontrary, the individual's _subjection_ in the State and to the State's\nlaws. But why \"liberty\"? Because one is no longer separated from the\nState by intermediaries, but stands in direct and immediate relation to\nit; because one is a--citizen, not the subject of another, not even of\nthe king as a person, but only in his quality as \"supreme head of the\nState.\" Political liberty, this fundamental doctrine of liberalism, is\nnothing but a second phase of--Protestantism, and runs quite parallel\nwith \"religious liberty.\"[73] Or would it perhaps be right to understand\nby the latter an independence of religion? Anything but that.\nIndependence of intermediaries is all that it is intended to express,\nindependence of mediating priests, the abolition of the \"laity,\" and so\ndirect and immediate relation to religion or to God. Only on the\nsupposition that one has religion can he enjoy freedom of religion;\nfreedom of religion does not mean being without religion, but inwardness\nof faith, unmediated intercourse with God. To him who is \"religiously\nfree\" religion is an affair of the heart, it is to him his _own affair_,\nit is to him a \"sacredly serious matter.\" So, too, to the \"politically\nfree\" man the State is a sacredly serious matter; it is his heart's\naffair, his chief affair, his own affair.\n\nPolitical liberty means that the _polis_, the State, is free; freedom of\nreligion that religion is free, as freedom of conscience signifies that\nconscience is free; not, therefore, that I am free from the State, from\nreligion, from conscience, or that I am _rid_ of them. It does not mean\n_my_ liberty, but the liberty of a power that rules and subjugates me;\nit means that one of my _despots_, like State, religion, conscience, is\nfree. State, religion, conscience, these despots, make me a slave, and\n_their_ liberty is _my_ slavery. That in this they necessarily follow\nthe principle, \"the end hallows the means,\" is self-evident. If the\nwelfare of the State is the end, war is a hallowed means; if justice is\nthe State's end, homicide is a hallowed means, and is called by its\nsacred name, \"execution,\" etc.; the sacred State _hallows_ everything\nthat is serviceable to it.\n\n\"Individual liberty,\" over which civic liberalism keeps jealous watch,\ndoes not by any means signify a completely free self-determination, by\nwhich actions become altogether _mine_, but only independence of\n_persons_. Individually free is he who is responsible to no _man_. Taken\nin this sense,--and we are not allowed to understand it otherwise,--not\nonly the ruler is individually free, _i. e., irresponsible toward men_\n(\"before God,\" we know, he acknowledges himself responsible), but all\nwho are \"responsible only to the law.\" This kind of liberty was won\nthrough the revolutionary movement of the century,--to wit, independence\nof arbitrary will, of _tel est notre plaisir_. Hence the constitutional\nprince must himself be stripped of all personality, deprived of all\nindividual decision, that he may not as a person, as an _individual\nman_, violate the \"individual liberty\" of others. The _personal will of\nthe ruler_ has disappeared in the constitutional prince; it is with a\nright feeling, therefore, that absolute princes resist this.\nNevertheless these very ones profess to be in the best sense \"Christian\nprinces.\" For this, however, they must become a _purely spiritual_\npower, as the Christian is subject only to _spirit_ (\"God is spirit\").\nThe purely spiritual power is consistently represented only by the\nconstitutional prince, he who, without any personal significance, stands\nthere spiritualized to the degree that he can rank as a sheer, uncanny\n\"spirit,\" as an _idea_. The constitutional king is the truly _Christian_\nking, the genuine, consistent carrying-out of the Christian principle.\nIn the constitutional monarchy individual dominion,--_i. e._, a real\nruler that _wills_--has found its end; here, therefore, _individual\nliberty_ prevails, independence of every individual dictator, of every\none who could dictate to me with a _tel est notre plaisir_. It is the\ncompleted _Christian_ State-life, a spiritualized life.\n\nThe behavior of the commonalty is _liberal_ through and through. Every\n_personal_ invasion of another's sphere revolts the civic sense; if the\ncitizen sees that one is dependent on the humor, the pleasure, the will\nof a man as individual (_i. e._ as not authorized by a \"higher power\"),\nat once he brings his liberalism to the front and shrieks about\n\"arbitrariness.\" In fine, the citizen asserts his freedom from what is\ncalled _orders_ (_ordonnance_): \"No one has any business to give\nme--orders!\" _Orders_ carries the idea that what I am to do is another\nman's will, while _law_ does not express a personal authority of\nanother. The liberty of the commonalty is liberty or independence from\nthe will of another person, so-called personal or individual liberty;\nfor being personally free means being only so free that no other person\ncan dispose of mine, or that what I may or may not do does not depend on\nthe personal decree of another. The liberty of the press, for instance,\nis such a liberty of liberalism, liberalism fighting only against the\ncoercion of the censorship as that of personal wilfulness, but\notherwise showing itself extremely inclined and willing to tyrannize\nover the press by \"press laws\"; _i. e._, the civic liberals want liberty\nof writing _for themselves_; for, as they are _law-abiding_, their\nwritings will not bring them under the law. Only liberal matter, _i. e._\nonly lawful matter, is to be allowed to be printed; otherwise the \"press\nlaws\" threaten \"press-penalties.\" If one sees personal liberty assured,\none does not notice at all how, if a new issue happens to arise, the\nmost glaring unfreedom becomes dominant. For one is rid of _orders_\nindeed, and \"no one has any business to give us orders,\" but one has\nbecome so much the more submissive to the--_law_. One is enthralled now\nin due legal form.\n\nIn the citizen-State there are only \"free people,\" who are _compelled_\nto thousands of things (_e. g._ to deference, to a confession of faith,\nand the like). But what does that amount to? Why, it is only the--State,\nthe law, not any man, that compels them!\n\nWhat does the commonalty mean by inveighing against every personal\norder, _i. e._ every order not founded on the \"cause,\" on \"reason,\"\netc.? It is simply fighting in the interest of the \"cause\"[74] against\nthe dominion of \"persons\"! But the mind's cause is the rational, good,\nlawful, etc.; that is the \"good cause.\" The commonalty wants an\n_impersonal_ ruler.\n\nFurthermore, if the principle is this, that only the cause is to rule\nman--to wit, the cause of morality, the cause of legality, etc.,--then\nno personal balking of one by the other may be authorized either (as\nformerly, _e. g._, the commoner was balked of the aristocratic offices,\nthe aristocrat of common mechanical trades, etc.); _i. e. free\ncompetition_ must exist. Only through the thing[75] can one balk another\n(_e. g._ the rich man balking the impecunious man by money, a thing),\nnot as a person. Henceforth only one lordship, the lordship of the\n_State_, is admitted; personally no one is any longer lord of another.\nEven at birth the children belong to the State, and to the parents only\nin the name of the State, which, _e. g._, does not allow infanticide,\ndemands their baptism, etc.\n\nBut all the State's children, furthermore, are of quite equal account in\nits eyes (\"civic or political equality\"), and they may see to it\nthemselves how they get along with each other; they may _compete_.\n\nFree competition means nothing else than that every one can present\nhimself, assert himself, fight, against another. Of course the feudal\nparty set itself against this, as its existence depended on an absence\nof competition. The contests in the time of the Restoration in France\nhad no other substance than this,--that the _bourgeoisie_ was struggling\nfor free competition, and the feudalists were seeking to bring back the\nguild system.\n\nNow, free competition has won, and against the guild system it had to\nwin. (See below for the further discussion.)\n\nIf the Revolution ended in a reaction, this only showed what the\nRevolution _really_ was. For every effort arrives at reaction when it\n_comes to discreet reflection_, and storms forward in the original\naction only so long as it is an _intoxication_, an \"indiscretion.\"\n\"Discretion\" will always be the cue of the reaction, because discretion\nsets limits, and liberates what was really wanted, _i. e._ the\nprinciple, from the initial \"unbridledness\" and \"unrestrainedness.\" Wild\nyoung fellows, bumptious students, who set aside all considerations, are\n_really_ Philistines, since with them, as with the latter,\nconsiderations form the substance of their conduct; only that as\nswaggerers they are mutinous against considerations and in negative\nrelations to them, but as Philistines, later, they give themselves up to\nconsiderations and have positive relations to them. In both cases all\ntheir doing and thinking turns upon \"considerations,\" but the Philistine\nis _reactionary_ in relation to the student; he is the wild fellow come\nto discreet reflection, as the latter is the unreflecting Philistine.\nDaily experience confirms the truth of this transformation, and shows\nhow the swaggerers turn to Philistines in turning gray.\n\nSo too the so-called reaction in Germany gives proof that it was only\nthe _discreet_ continuation of the warlike jubilation of liberty.\n\nThe Revolution was not directed against _the established_, but against\n_the establishment in question_, against a _particular_ establishment.\nIt did away with _this_ ruler, not with _the_ ruler--on the contrary,\nthe French were ruled most inexorably; it killed the old vicious rulers,\nbut wanted to confer on the virtuous ones a securely established\nposition, _i. e._ it simply set virtue in the place of vice. (Vice and\nvirtue, again, are on their part distinguished from each other only as a\nwild young fellow from a Philistine.) Etc.\n\nTo this day the revolutionary principle has gone no farther than to\nassail only _one_ or _another_ particular establishment, _i. e._ be\n_reformatory_. Much as may be _improved_, strongly as \"discreet\nprogress\" may be adhered to, always there is only a _new master_ set in\nthe old one's place, and the overturning is a--building up. We are still\nat the distinction of the young Philistine from the old one. The\nRevolution began in _bourgeois_ fashion with the uprising of the third\nestate, the middle class; in _bourgeois_ fashion it dries away. It was\nnot the _individual man_--and he alone is _Man_--that became free, but\nthe _citizen_, the _citoyen_, the _political_ man, who for that very\nreason is not _Man_ but a specimen of the human species, and more\nparticularly a specimen of the species Citizen, a _free citizen_.\n\nIn the Revolution it was not the _individual_ who acted so as to affect\nthe world's history, but a _people_; the _nation_, the sovereign nation,\nwanted to effect everything. A fancied _I_, an idea, such as the nation\nis, appears acting; _i. e._, the individuals contribute themselves as\ntools of this idea, and act as \"citizens.\"\n\nThe commonalty has its power, and at the same time its limits, in the\n_fundamental law of the State_, in a charter, in a legitimate[76] or\n\"just\"[77] prince who himself is guided, and rules, according to\n\"rational laws\"; in short, in _legality_. The period of the\n_bourgeoisie_ is ruled by the British spirit of legality. An assembly\nof provincial estates, _e. g._, is ever recalling that its authorization\ngoes only so and so far, and that it is called at all only through favor\nand can be thrown out again through disfavor. It is always reminding\nitself of its--_vocation_. It is certainly not to be denied that my\nfather begot me; but, now that I am once begotten, surely his purposes\nin begetting do not concern me a bit and, whatever he may have _called_\nme to, I do what I myself will. Therefore even a called assembly of\nestates, the French assembly in the beginning of the Revolution,\nrecognized quite rightly that it was independent of the caller. It\n_existed_, and would have been stupid if it did not avail itself of the\nright of existence, but fancied itself dependent as on a father. The\ncalled one no longer has to ask \"what did the caller want when he\ncreated me?\" but \"what do I want after I have once followed the call?\"\nNot the caller, not the constituents, not the charter according to which\ntheir meeting was called out, nothing will be to him a sacred,\ninviolable power. He is _authorized_ for everything that is in his\npower; he will know no restrictive \"authorization,\" will not want to be\n_loyal_. This, if any such thing could be expected from chambers at all,\nwould give a completely _egoistic_ chamber, severed from all\nnavel-string and without consideration. But chambers are always devout,\nand therefore one cannot be surprised if so much half-way or undecided,\n_i. e._ hypocritical, \"egoism\" parades in them.\n\nThe members of the estates are to remain within the _limits_ that are\ntraced for them by the charter, by the king's will, and the like. If\nthey will not or can not do that, then they are to \"step out.\" What\ndutiful man could act otherwise, could put himself, his conviction, and\nhis will as the _first_ thing? who could be so immoral as to want to\nassert _himself_, even if the body corporate and everything should go to\nruin over it? People keep carefully within the limits of their\n_authorization_; of course one must remain within the limits of his\n_power_ anyhow, because no one can do more than he can. \"My power, or,\nif it be so, powerlessness, be my sole limit, but authorizations only\nrestraining--precepts? Should I profess this all-subversive view? No, I\nam a--law-abiding citizen!\"\n\nThe commonalty professes a morality which is most closely connected with\nits essence. The first demand of this morality is to the effect that one\nshould carry on a solid business, an honorable trade, lead a moral life.\nImmoral, to it, is the sharper, the demirep, the thief, robber, and\nmurderer, the gamester, the penniless man without a situation, the\nfrivolous man. The doughty commoner designates the feeling against these\n\"immoral\" people as his \"deepest indignation.\" All these lack\nsettlement, the _solid_ quality of business, a solid, seemly life, a\nfixed income, etc.; in short, they belong, because their existence does\nnot rest on a _secure basis_, to the dangerous \"individuals or isolated\npersons,\" to the dangerous _prol\u00e9tariat_; they are \"individual bawlers\"\nwho offer no \"guarantee\" and have \"nothing to lose,\" and so nothing to\nrisk. The forming of family ties, _e. g., binds_ a man: he who is bound\nfurnishes security, can be taken hold of; not so the street-walker. The\ngamester stakes everything on the game, ruins himself and others;--no\nguarantee. All who appear to the commoner suspicious, hostile, and\ndangerous might be comprised under the name \"vagabonds\"; every\nvagabondish way of living displeases him. For there are intellectual\nvagabonds too, to whom the hereditary dwelling-place of their fathers\nseems too cramped and oppressive for them to be willing to satisfy\nthemselves with the limited space any more: instead of keeping within\nthe limits of a temperate style of thinking, and taking as inviolable\ntruth what furnishes comfort and tranquillity to thousands, they\noverleap all bounds of the traditional and run wild with their impudent\ncriticism and untamed mania for doubt, these extravagating vagabonds.\nThey form the class of the unstable, restless, changeable, _i. e._ of\nthe _prol\u00e9tariat_, and, if they give voice to their unsettled nature,\nare called \"unruly fellows.\"\n\nSuch a broad sense has the so-called _prol\u00e9tariat_, or pauperism. How\nmuch one would err if one believed the commonalty to be desirous of\ndoing away with poverty (pauperism) to the best of its ability! On the\ncontrary, the good citizen helps himself with the incomparably\ncomforting conviction that \"the fact is that the good things of fortune\nare unequally divided and will always remain so--according to God's wise\ndecree.\" The poverty which surrounds him in every alley does not disturb\nthe true commoner further than that at most he clears his account with\nit by throwing an alms, or finds work and food for an \"honest and\nserviceable\" fellow. But so much the more does he feel his quiet\nenjoyment clouded by _innovating_ and _discontented_ poverty, by those\npoor who no longer behave _quietly_ and endure, but begin to _run wild_\nand become restless. Lock up the vagabond, thrust the breeder of unrest\ninto the darkest dungeon! He wants to \"arouse dissatisfaction and incite\npeople against existing institutions\" in the State--stone him, stone\nhim!\n\nBut from these identical discontented ones comes a reasoning somewhat as\nfollows: It need not make any difference to the \"good citizens\" who\nprotects them and their principles, whether an absolute king or a\nconstitutional one, a republic, etc., if only they are protected. And\nwhat is their principle, whose protector they always \"love\"? Not that of\nlabor; not that of birth either. But that of _mediocrity_, of the golden\nmean: a little birth and a little labor, _i. e._, an _interest-bearing\npossession_. Possession is here the fixed, the given, inherited (birth);\ninterest-drawing is the exertion about it (labor); _laboring capital_,\ntherefore. Only no immoderation, no ultra, no radicalism! Right of birth\ncertainly, but only hereditary possessions; labor certainly, yet little\nor none at all of one's own, but labor of capital and of the--subject\nlaborers.\n\nIf an age is imbued with an error, some always derive advantage from the\nerror, while the rest have to suffer from it. In the Middle Ages the\nerror was general among Christians that the church must have all power,\nor the supreme lordship on earth; the hierarchs believed in this \"truth\"\nnot less than the laymen, and both were spellbound in the like error.\nBut by it the hierarchs had the _advantage_ of power, the laymen had to\n_suffer_ subjection. However, as the saying goes, \"one learns wisdom by\nsuffering\"; and so the laymen at last learned wisdom and no longer\nbelieved in the medi\u00e6val \"truth.\"--A like relation exists between the\ncommonalty and the laboring class. Commoner and laborer believe in the\n\"truth\" of _money_; they who do not possess it believe in it no less\nthan those who possess it: the laymen, therefore, as well as the\npriests.\n\n\"Money governs the world\" is the keynote of the civic epoch. A destitute\naristocrat and a destitute laborer, as \"starvelings,\" amount to nothing\nso far as political consideration is concerned; birth and labor do not\ndo it, but _money_ brings _consideration_.[78] The possessors rule, but\nthe State trains up from the destitute its \"servants,\" to whom, in\nproportion as they are to rule (govern) in its name, it gives money (a\nsalary).\n\nI receive everything from the State. Have I anything without the\n_State's assent_? What I have without this it _takes_ from me as soon as\nit discovers the lack of a \"legal title.\" Do I not, therefore, have\neverything through its grace, its assent?\n\nOn this alone, on the _legal title_, the commonalty rests. The commoner\nis what he is through the _protection of the State_, through the State's\ngrace. He would necessarily be afraid of losing everything if the\nState's power were broken.\n\nBut how is it with him who has nothing to lose, how with the\nproletarian? As he has nothing to lose, he does not need the protection\nof the State for his \"nothing.\" He may gain, on the contrary, if that\nprotection of the State is withdrawn from the _prot\u00e9g\u00e9_.\n\nTherefore the non-possessor will regard the State as a power protecting\nthe possessor, which privileges the latter, but does nothing for him,\nthe non-possessor, but to--suck his blood. The State is a--_commoners'\nState_, is the estate of the commonalty. It protects man not according\nto his labor, but according to his tractableness (\"loyalty\"),--to wit,\naccording to whether the rights entrusted to him by the State are\nenjoyed and managed in accordance with the will, _i. e._ laws, of the\nState.\n\nUnder the _r\u00e9gime_ of the commonalty the laborers always fall into the\nhands of the possessors,--_i. e._ of those who have at their disposal\nsome bit of the State domains (and everything possessible is State\ndomain, belongs to the State, and is only a fief of the individual),\nespecially money and land; of the capitalists, therefore. The laborer\ncannot _realize_ on his labor to the extent of the value that it has for\nthe consumer. \"Labor is badly paid!\" The capitalist has the greatest\nprofit from it.--Well paid, and more than well paid, are only the labors\nof those who heighten the splendor and _dominion_ of the State, the\nlabors of high State _servants_. The State pays well that its \"good\ncitizens,\" the possessors, may be able to pay badly without danger; it\nsecures to itself by good payment its servants, out of whom it forms a\nprotecting power, a \"police\" (to the police belong soldiers, officials\nof all kinds, _e. g._ those of justice, education, etc.,--in short, the\nwhole \"machinery of the State\") for the \"good citizens,\" and the \"good\ncitizens\" gladly pay high tax-rates to it in order to pay so much lower\nrates to their laborers.\n\nBut the class of laborers, because unprotected in what they essentially\nare (for they do not enjoy the protection of the State as laborers, but\nas its subjects they have a share in the enjoyment of the police, a\nso-called protection of the law), remains a power hostile to this State,\nthis State of possessors, this \"citizen kingship.\" Its principle, labor,\nis not recognized as to its _value_; it is exploited,[79] a _spoil_[80]\nof the possessors, the enemy.\n\nThe laborers have the most enormous power in their hands, and, if they\nonce became thoroughly conscious of it and used it, nothing would\nwithstand them; they would only have to stop labor, regard the product\nof labor as theirs, and enjoy it. This is the sense of the labor\ndisturbances which show themselves here and there.\n\nThe State rests on the--_slavery of labor_. If _labor_ becomes _free_,\nthe State is lost.\n\n\n\u00a7 2.--SOCIAL LIBERALISM\n\nWe are freeborn men, and wherever we look we see ourselves made servants\nof egoists! Are we therefore to become egoists too? Heaven forbid! we\nwant rather to make egoists impossible! We want to make them all\n\"ragamuffins\"; all of us must have nothing, that \"all may have.\"\n\nSo say the Socialists.\n\nWho is this person that you call \"All\"?--It is \"society\"!--But is it\ncorporeal, then?--_We_ are its body!--You? Why, you are not a body\nyourselves;--you, sir, are corporeal to be sure, you too, and you, but\nyou all together are only bodies, not a body. Accordingly the united\nsociety may indeed have bodies at its service, but no one body of its\nown. Like the \"nation\" of the politicians, it will turn out to be\nnothing but a \"spirit,\" its body only semblance.\n\nThe freedom of man is, in political liberalism, freedom from _persons_,\nfrom personal dominion, from the _master_; the securing of each\nindividual person against other persons, personal freedom.\n\nNo one has any orders to give; the law alone gives orders.\n\nBut, even if the persons have become _equal_, yet their _possessions_\nhave not. And yet the poor man _needs_ the rich, the rich the poor, the\nformer the rich man's money, the latter the poor man's labor. So no one\nneeds another as a _person_, but needs him as a _giver_, and thus as one\nwho has something to give, as holder or possessor. So what he _has_\nmakes the _man_. And in _having_, or in \"possessions,\" people are\nunequal.\n\nConsequently, social liberalism concludes, _no one must have_, as\naccording to political liberalism _no one was to give orders_; _i. e._,\nas in that case the _State_ alone obtained the command, so now _society_\nalone obtains the possessions.\n\nFor the State, protecting each one's person and property against the\nother, _separates_ them from one another; each one _is_ his special part\nand _has_ his special part. He who is satisfied with what he is and has\nfinds this state of things profitable; but he who would like to be and\nhave more looks around for this \"more,\" and finds it in the power of\nother _persons_. Here he comes upon a contradiction; as a person no one\nis inferior to another, and yet one person _has_ what another has not\nbut would like to have. So, he concludes, the one person is more than\nthe other, after all, for the former has what he needs, the latter has\nnot; the former is a rich man, the latter a poor man.\n\nHe now asks himself further, are we to let what we rightly buried come\nto life again? are we to let this circuitously restored inequality of\npersons pass? No; on the contrary, we must bring quite to an end what\nwas only half accomplished. Our freedom from another's person still\nlacks the freedom from what the other's person can command, from what he\nhas in his personal power,--in short, from \"personal property.\" Let us\nthen do away with _personal property_. Let no one have anything any\nlonger, let every one be a--ragamuffin. Let property be _impersonal_,\nlet it belong to--_society_.\n\nBefore the supreme _ruler_, the sole _commander_, we had all become\nequal, equal persons, _i. e._ nullities.\n\nBefore the supreme _proprietor_ we all become equal--_ragamuffins_. For\nthe present, one is still in another's estimation a \"ragamuffin,\" a\n\"have-nothing\"; but then this estimation ceases. We are all ragamuffins\ntogether, and as the aggregate of Communistic society we might call\nourselves a \"ragamuffin crew.\"\n\nWhen the proletarian shall really have founded his purposed \"society\" in\nwhich the interval between rich and poor is to be removed, then he\n_will be_ a ragamuffin, for then he will feel that it amounts to\nsomething to be a ragamuffin, and might lift \"Ragamuffin\" to be an\nhonorable form of address, just as the Revolution did with the word\n\"Citizen.\" Ragamuffin is his ideal; we are all to become ragamuffins.\n\nThis is the second robbery of the \"personal\" in the interest of\n\"humanity.\" Neither command nor property is left to the individual; the\nState took the former, society the latter.\n\nBecause in society the most oppressive evils make themselves felt,\ntherefore the oppressed especially, and consequently the members in the\nlower regions of society, think they find the fault in society, and make\nit their task to discover the _right society_. This is only the old\nphenomenon,--that one looks for the fault first in everything but\n_himself_, and consequently in the State, in the self-seeking of the\nrich, etc., which yet have precisely our fault to thank for their\nexistence.\n\nThe reflections and conclusions of Communism look very simple. As\nmatters lie at this time,--in the present situation with regard to the\nState, therefore,--some, and they the majority, are at a disadvantage\ncompared to others, the minority. In this _state_ of things the former\nare in a _state of prosperity_, the latter in a _state of need_. Hence\nthe present _state_ of things, _i. e._ the State, must be done away\nwith. And what in its place? Instead of the isolated state of\nprosperity--a _general state of prosperity_, a _prosperity of all_.\n\nThrough the Revolution the _bourgeoisie_ became omnipotent, and\nall inequality was abolished by every one's being raised or\ndegraded to the dignity of a _citizen_: the common man--raised, the\naristocrat--degraded; the _third_ estate became sole estate,--_viz._,\nthe estate of--_citizens of the State_. Now Communism responds: Our\ndignity and our essence consist not in our being all--the _equal\nchildren_ of our mother, the State, all born with equal claim to her\nlove and her protection, but in our all existing _for each other_. This\nis our equality, or herein we are _equal_, in that we, I as well as you\nand you and all of you, are active or \"labor\" each one for the rest; in\nthat each of us is a _laborer_, then. The point for us is not what we\nare _for the State_ (_viz._, citizens), not our _citizenship_ therefore,\nbut what we are _for each other_,--_viz._, that each of us exists only\nthrough the other, who, caring for my wants, at the same time sees his\nown satisfied by me. He labors, _e. g._, for my clothing (tailor), I for\nhis need of amusement (comedy-writer, rope-dancer, etc.), he for my food\n(farmer, etc.), I for his instruction (scientist, etc.). It is _labor_\nthat constitutes our dignity and our--equality.\n\nWhat advantage does citizenship bring us? Burdens! And how high is our\nlabor appraised? As low as possible! But labor is our sole value all the\nsame; that we are _laborers_ is the best thing about us, this is our\nsignificance in the world, and therefore it must be our consideration\ntoo and must come to receive _consideration_. What can you meet us with?\nSurely nothing but--_labor_ too. Only for labor or services do we owe\nyou a recompense, not for your bare existence; not for what you are _for\nyourselves_ either, but only for what you are _for us_. By what have\nyou claims on us? Perhaps by your high birth, etc.? No, only by what you\ndo for us that is desirable or useful. Be it thus then: we are willing\nto be worth to you only so much as we do for you; but you are to be held\nlikewise by us. _Services_ determine value,--_i. e._ those services that\nare worth something to us, and consequently _labors for each other_,\n_labors for the common good_. Let each one be in the other's eyes a\n_laborer_. He who accomplishes something useful is inferior to none,\nor--all laborers (laborers, of course, in the sense of laborers \"for the\ncommon good,\" _i. e._ communistic laborers) are equal. But, as the\nlaborer is worth his wages,[81] let the wages too be equal.\n\nAs long as faith sufficed for man's honor and dignity, no labor, however\nharassing, could be objected to if it only did not hinder a man in his\nfaith. Now, on the contrary, when every one is to cultivate himself into\nman, condemning a man to _machine-like labor_ amounts to the same thing\nas slavery. If a factory-worker must tire himself to death twelve hours\nand more, he is cut off from becoming man. Every labor is to have the\nintent that the man be satisfied. Therefore he must become a _master_ in\nit too, _i. e._ be able to perform it as a totality. He who in a\npin-factory only puts on the heads, only draws the wire, etc., works, as\nit were, mechanically, like a machine; he remains half-trained, does not\nbecome a master: his labor cannot _satisfy_ him, it can only _fatigue_\nhim. His labor is nothing taken by itself, has no object _in itself_,\nis nothing complete in itself; he labors only into another's hands, and\nis _used_ (exploited) by this other. For this laborer in another's\nservice there is no _enjoyment of a cultivated mind_, at most crude\namusements: _culture_, you see, is barred against him. To be a good\nChristian one needs only to _believe_, and that can be done under the\nmost oppressive circumstances. Hence the Christian-minded take care only\nof the oppressed laborers' piety, their patience, submission, etc. Only\nso long as the downtrodden classes were _Christians_ could they bear all\ntheir misery: for Christianity does not let their murmurings and\nexasperation rise. Now the _hushing_ of desires is no longer enough, but\ntheir _sating_ is demanded. The _bourgeoisie_ has proclaimed the gospel\nof the _enjoyment of the world_, of material enjoyment, and now wonders\nthat this doctrine finds adherents among us poor: it has shown that not\nfaith and poverty, but culture and possessions, make a man blessed; we\nproletarians understand that too.\n\nThe commonalty freed us from the orders and arbitrariness of\nindividuals. But that arbitrariness was left which springs from the\nconjuncture of situations, and may be called the fortuity of\ncircumstances; favoring _fortune_, and those \"favored by fortune,\" still\nremain.\n\nWhen _e. g._ a branch of industry is ruined and thousands of laborers\nbecome breadless, people think reasonably enough to acknowledge that it\nis not the individual who must bear the blame, but that \"the evil lies\nin the situation.\"\n\nLet us change the situation then, but let us change it thoroughly, and\nso that its fortuity becomes powerless, and a _law_! Let us no longer\nbe slaves of chance! Let us create a new order that makes an end of\n_fluctuations_. Let this order then be sacred!\n\nFormerly one had to suit the _lords_ to come to anything; after the\nRevolution the word was \"Grasp _fortune_!\" Luck-hunting or\nhazard-playing, civil life was absorbed in this. Then, alongside this,\nthe demand that he who has obtained something shall not frivolously\nstake it again.\n\nStrange and yet supremely natural contradiction. Competition, in which\nalone civil or political life unrolls itself, is a game of luck through\nand through, from the speculations of the exchange down to the\nsolicitation of offices, the hunt for customers, looking for work,\naspiring to promotion and decorations, the second-hand dealer's petty\nhaggling, etc. If one succeeds in supplanting and outbidding his rivals,\nthen the \"lucky throw\" is made; for it must be taken as a piece of luck\nto begin with that the victor sees himself equipped with an ability\n(even though it has been developed by the most careful industry) against\nwhich the others do not know how to rise, consequently that--no abler\nones are found. And now those who ply their daily lives in the midst of\nthese changes of fortune without seeing any harm in it are seized with\nthe most virtuous indignation when their own principle appears in naked\nform and \"breeds misfortune\" as--_hazard-playing_. Hazard-playing, you\nsee, is too clear, too barefaced a competition, and, like every decided\nnakedness, offends honorable modesty.\n\nThe Socialists want to put a stop to this activity of chance, and to\nform a society in which men are no longer dependent on _fortune_, but\nfree.\n\nIn the most natural way in the world this endeavor first utters itself\nas hatred of the \"unfortunate\" against the \"fortunate,\" _i. e._, of\nthose for whom fortune has done little or nothing, against those for\nwhom it has done everything.\n\nBut properly the ill-feeling is not directed against the fortunate, but\nagainst _fortune_, this rotten spot of the commonalty.\n\nAs the Communists first declare free activity to be man's essence, they,\nlike all work-day dispositions, need a Sunday; like all material\nendeavors, they need a God, an uplifting and edification alongside their\nwitless \"labor.\"\n\nThat the Communist sees in you the man, the brother, is only the Sunday\nside of Communism. According to the work-day side he does not by any\nmeans take you as man simply, but as human laborer or laboring man. The\nfirst view has in it the liberal principle; in the second, illiberality\nis concealed. If you were a \"lazybones,\" he would not indeed fail to\nrecognize the man in you, but would endeavor to cleanse him as a \"lazy\nman\" from laziness and to convert you to the _faith_ that labor is man's\n\"destiny and calling.\"\n\nTherefore he shows a double face: with the one he takes heed that the\nspiritual man be satisfied, with the other he looks about him for means\nfor the material or corporeal man. He gives man a twofold _post_,--an\noffice of material acquisition and one of spiritual.\n\nThe commonalty had _thrown open_ spiritual and material goods, and left\nit with each one to reach out for them if he liked.\n\nCommunism really procures them for each one, presses them upon him, and\ncompels him to acquire them. It takes seriously the idea that, because\nonly spiritual and material goods make us men, we must unquestionably\nacquire these goods in order to be man. The commonalty made acquisition\nfree; Communism _compels_ to acquisition, and recognizes only the\nacquirer, him who practises a trade. It is not enough that the trade is\nfree, but you must _take it up_.\n\nSo all that is left for criticism to do is to prove that the acquisition\nof these goods does not yet by any means make us men.\n\nWith the liberal commandment that every one is to make a man of himself,\nor every one to make himself man, there was posited the necessity that\nevery one must gain time for this labor of humanization, _i. e._ that it\nshould become possible for every one to labor on _himself_.\n\nThe commonalty thought it had brought this about if it handed over\neverything human to competition, but gave the individual a right to\nevery human thing. \"Each may strive after everything!\"\n\nSocial liberalism finds that the matter is not settled with the \"may,\"\nbecause may means only \"it is forbidden to none\" but not \"it is made\npossible to every one.\" Hence it affirms that the commonalty is liberal\nonly with the mouth and in words, supremely illiberal in act. It on its\npart wants to give all of us the _means_ to be able to labor on\nourselves.\n\nBy the principle of labor that of fortune or competition is certainly\noutdone. But at the same time the laborer, in his consciousness that the\nessential thing in him is \"the laborer,\" holds himself aloof from egoism\nand subjects himself to the supremacy of a society of laborers, as the\ncommoner clung with self-abandonment to the competition-State. The\nbeautiful dream of a \"social duty\" still continues to be dreamed. People\nthink again that society _gives_ what we need, and we are _under\nobligations_ to it on that account, owe it everything.[82] They are\nstill at the point of wanting to _serve_ a \"supreme giver of all good.\"\nThat society is no ego at all, which could give, bestow, or grant, but\nan instrument or means, from which we may derive benefit; that we have\nno social duties, but solely interests for the pursuance of which\nsociety must serve us; that we owe society no sacrifice, but, if we\nsacrifice anything, sacrifice it to ourselves,--of this the Socialists\ndo not think, because they--as liberals--are imprisoned in the religious\nprinciple, and zealously aspire after--a sacred society, such as the\nState was hitherto.\n\nSociety, from which we have everything, is a new master, a new spook, a\nnew \"supreme being,\" which \"takes us into its service and allegiance\"!\n\nThe more precise appreciation of political as well as social liberalism\nmust wait to find its place further on. For the present we pass this\nover, in order first to summon them before the tribunal of humane or\ncritical liberalism.\n\n\n\u00a7 3.--HUMANE LIBERALISM\n\nAs liberalism is completed in self-criticising, \"critical\"[83]\nliberalism, in which the critic remains a liberal and does not go beyond\nthe principle of liberalism, Man,--this may distinctively be named after\nMan and called the \"humane.\"\n\nThe laborer is counted as the most material and egoistical man. He does\nnothing at all _for humanity_, does everything for _himself_, for his\nwelfare.\n\nThe commonalty, because it proclaimed the freedom of _Man_ only as to\nhis birth, had to leave him in the claws of the un-human man (the\negoist) for the rest of life. Hence under the _r\u00e9gime_ of political\nliberalism egoism has an immense field for free utilization.\n\nThe laborer will _utilize_ society for his _egoistic_ ends as the\ncommoner does the State. You have only an egoistic end after all, your\nwelfare! is the humane liberal's reproach to the Socialist; take up a\n_purely human interest_, then I will be your companion. \"But to this\nthere belongs a consciousness stronger, more comprehensive, than a\n_laborer-consciousness_.\" \"The laborer makes nothing, therefore he has\nnothing; but he makes nothing because his labor is always a labor that\nremains individual, calculated strictly for his own want, a labor day\nby day.\"[84] In opposition to this one might, for instance, consider the\nfact that Gutenberg's labor did not remain individual, but begot\ninnumerable children, and still lives to-day; it was calculated for the\nwant of humanity, and was an eternal, imperishable labor.\n\nThe humane consciousness despises the commoner-consciousness as well as\nthe laborer-consciousness: for the commoner is \"indignant\" only at\nvagabonds (at all who have \"no definite occupation\") and their\n\"immorality\"; the laborer is \"disgusted\" by the _idler_ (\"lazybones\")\nand his \"immoral,\" because parasitic and unsocial, principles. To this\nthe humane liberal retorts: The unsettledness of many is only your\nproduct, Philistine! But that you, proletarian, demand the _grind_ of\nall, and want to make _drudgery_ general, is a part, still clinging to\nyou, of your pack-mule life up to this time. Certainly you want to\nlighten drudgery itself by _all_ having to drudge equally hard, yet only\nfor this reason, that all may gain _leisure_ to an equal extent. But\nwhat are they to do with their leisure? What does your \"society\" do,\nthat this leisure may be passed _humanly_? It must leave the gained\nleisure to egoistic preference again, and the very _gain_ that your\nsociety furthers falls to the egoist, as the gain of the commonalty, the\n_masterlessness of man_, could not be filled with a human element by the\nState, and therefore was left to arbitrary choice.\n\nIt is assuredly necessary that man be masterless: but therefore the\negoist is not to become master over man again either, but man over the\negoist. Man must assuredly find leisure: but, if the egoist makes use of\nit, it will be lost for man; therefore you ought to have given leisure a\nhuman significance. But you laborers undertake even your labor from an\negoistic impulse, because you want to eat, drink, live; how should you\nbe less egoists in leisure? You labor only because having your time to\nyourselves (idling) goes well after work done, and what you are to while\naway your leisure time with is left to _chance_.\n\nBut, if every door is to be bolted against egoism, it would be necessary\nto strive after completely \"disinterested\" action, _total_\ndisinterestedness. This alone is human, because only Man is\ndisinterested, the egoist always interested.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIf we let disinterestedness pass unchallenged for a while, then we ask,\ndo you mean not to take an interest in anything, not to be enthusiastic\nfor anything, not for liberty, humanity, etc.? \"Oh, yes, but that is not\nan egoistic interest, not _interestedness_, but a human, _i. e._\na--_theoretical_ interest, to wit, an interest not for an individual or\nindividuals ('all'), but for the _idea_, for Man!\"\n\nAnd you do not notice that you too are enthusiastic only for _your_\nidea, _your_ idea of liberty?\n\nAnd, further, do you not notice that your disinterestedness is again,\nlike religious disinterestedness, a heavenly interestedness? Certainly\nbenefit to the individual leaves you cold, and abstractly you could cry\n_fiat libertas, pereat mundus_. You do not take thought for the coming\nday either, and take no serious care for the individual's wants anyhow,\nnot for your own comfort nor for that of the rest; but you make nothing\nof all this, because you are a--dreamer.\n\nDo you suppose the humane liberal will be so liberal as to aver that\neverything possible to man is _human_? On the contrary! He does not,\nindeed, share the Philistine's moral prejudice about the strumpet, but\n\"that this woman turns her body into a money-getting machine\"[85] makes\nher despicable to him as \"human being.\" His judgment is, The strumpet is\nnot a human being; or, So far as a woman is a strumpet, so far is she\nunhuman, dehumanized. Further: The Jew, the Christian, the privileged\nperson, the theologian, etc., is not a human being; so far as you are a\nJew, etc., you are not a human being. Again the imperious postulate:\nCast from you everything peculiar, criticise it away! Be not a Jew, not\na Christian, etc., but be a human being, nothing but a human being.\nAssert your _humanity_ against every restrictive specification; make\nyourself, by means of it, a human being, and _free_ from those limits;\nmake yourself a \"free man,\" _i. e._ recognize humanity as your\nall-determining essence.\n\nI say: You are indeed more than a Jew, more than a Christian, etc., but\nyou are also more than a human being. Those are all ideas, but you are\ncorporeal. Do you suppose, then, that you can ever become \"a human being\nas such\"? Do you suppose our posterity will find no prejudices and\nlimits to clear away, for which our powers were not sufficient? Or do\nyou perhaps think that in your fortieth or fiftieth year you have come\nso far that the following days have nothing more to dissipate in you,\nand that you are a human being? The men of the future will yet fight\ntheir way to many a liberty that we do not even miss. What do you need\nthat later liberty for? If you meant to esteem yourself as nothing\nbefore you had become a human being, you would have to wait till the\n\"last judgment,\" till the day when man, or humanity, shall have attained\nperfection. But, as you will surely die before that, what becomes of\nyour prize of victory?\n\nRather, therefore, invert the case, and say to yourself, _I am a human\nbeing_! I do not need to begin by producing the human being in myself,\nfor he belongs to me already, like all my qualities.\n\nBut, asks the critic, how can one be a Jew and a man at once? In the\nfirst place, I answer, one cannot be either a Jew or a man at all, if\n\"one\" and Jew or man are to mean the same; \"one\" always reaches beyond\nthose specifications, and,--let Isaacs be ever so Jewish,--a Jew,\nnothing but a Jew, he cannot be, just because he is _this_ Jew. In the\nsecond place, as a Jew one assuredly cannot be a man, if being a man\nmeans being nothing special. But in the third place--and this is the\npoint--I can, as a Jew, be entirely what I--_can_ be. From Samuel or\nMoses, and others, you hardly expect that they should have raised\nthemselves above Judaism, although you must say that they were not yet\n\"men.\" They simply were what they could be. Is it otherwise with the\nJews of to-day? Because you have discovered the idea of humanity, does\nit follow from this that every Jew can become a convert to it? If he\ncan, he does not fail to, and, if he fails to, he--cannot. What does\nyour demand concern him? what the _call_ to be a man, which you address\nto him?\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs a universal principle, in the \"human society\" which the humane\nliberal promises, nothing \"special\" which one or another has is to find\nrecognition, nothing which bears the character of \"private\" is to have\nvalue. In this way the circle of liberalism, which has its good\nprinciple in man and human liberty, its bad in the egoist and everything\nprivate, its God in the former, its devil in the latter, rounds itself\noff completely; and, if the special or private person lost his value in\nthe State (no personal prerogative), if in the \"laborers' or\nragamuffins' society\" special (private) property is no longer\nrecognized, so in \"human society\" everything special or private will be\nleft out of account; and, when \"pure criticism\" shall have accomplished\nits arduous task, then it will be known just what we must look upon as\nprivate, and what, \"penetrated with a sense of our nothingness,\" we\nmust--let stand.\n\nBecause State and society do not suffice for humane liberalism, it\nnegates both, and at the same time retains them. So at one time the cry\nis that the task of the day is \"not a political, but a social, one,\" and\nthen again the \"free State\" is promised for the future. In truth, \"human\nsociety\" is both,--the most general State and the most general society.\nOnly against the limited State is it asserted that it makes too much\nstir about spiritual private interests (_e. g._ people's religious\nbelief), and against limited society that it makes too much of material\nprivate interests. Both are to leave private interests to private\npeople, and, as human society, concern themselves solely about general\nhuman interests.\n\nThe politicians, thinking to abolish _personal will_, self-will or\narbitrariness, did not observe that through _property_[86] our\n_self-will_[87] gained a secure place of refuge.\n\nThe Socialists, taking away _property_ too, do not notice that this\nsecures itself a continued existence in _self-ownership_. Is it only\nmoney and goods, then, that are a property, or is every opinion\nsomething of mine, something of my own?\n\nSo every _opinion_ must be abolished or made impersonal. The person is\nentitled to no opinion, but, as self-will was transferred to the State,\nproperty to society, so opinion too must be transferred to something\n_general_, \"Man,\" and thereby become a general human opinion.\n\nIf opinion persists, then I have _my_ God (why, God exists only as \"my\nGod,\" he is an opinion or my \"faith\"), and consequently _my_ faith, my\nreligion, my thoughts, my ideals. Therefore a general human faith must\ncome into existence, the \"_fanaticism of liberty_.\" For this would be a\nfaith that agreed with the \"essence of man,\" and, because only \"man\" is\nreasonable (you and I might be very unreasonable!), a reasonable faith.\n\nAs self-will and property become _powerless_, so must self-ownership or\negoism in general.\n\nIn this supreme development of \"free man\" egoism, self-ownership, is\ncombated on principle, and such subordinate ends as the social \"welfare\"\nof the Socialists, etc., vanish before the lofty \"idea of humanity.\"\nEverything that is not a \"general human\" entity is something separate,\nsatisfies only some or one; or, if it satisfies all, it does this to\nthem only as individuals, not as men, and is therefore called\n\"egoistic.\"\n\nTo the Socialists _welfare_ is still the supreme aim, as free _rivalry_\nwas the approved thing to the political liberals; now welfare is free\ntoo, and we are free to achieve welfare, just as he who wanted to enter\ninto rivalry (competition) was free to do so.\n\nBut to take part in the rivalry you need only to be _commoners_; to take\npart in the welfare, only to be _laborers_. Neither reaches the point of\nbeing synonymous with \"man.\" It is \"truly well\" with man only when he is\nalso \"intellectually free\"! For man is mind: therefore all powers that\nare alien to him, the mind,--all superhuman, heavenly, unhuman\npowers,--must be overthrown, and the name \"man\" must be above every\nname.\n\nSo in this end of the modern age (age of the moderns) there returns\nagain, as the main point, what had been the main point at its beginning:\n\"intellectual liberty.\"\n\nTo the Communist in particular the humane liberal says: If society\nprescribes to you your activity, then this is indeed free from the\ninfluence of the individual, _i. e._ the egoist, but it still does not\non that account need to be a _purely human_ activity, nor you to be a\ncomplete organ of humanity. What kind of activity society demands of you\nremains _accidental_, you know; it might give you a place in building a\ntemple or something of that sort, or, even if not that, you might yet on\nyour own impulse be active for something foolish, therefore unhuman;\nyes, more yet, you really labor only to nourish yourself, in general to\nlive, for dear life's sake, not for the glorification of humanity.\nConsequently free activity is not attained till you make yourself free\nfrom all stupidities, from everything non-human, _i. e_. egoistic\n(pertaining only to the individual, not to the Man in the individual),\ndissipate all untrue thoughts that obscure man or the idea of humanity:\nin short, when you are not merely unhampered in your activity, but the\nsubstance too of your activity is only what is human, and you live and\nwork only for humanity. But this is not the case so long as the aim of\nyour effort is only your _welfare_ and that of all; what you do for the\nsociety of ragamuffins is not yet anything done for \"human society.\"\n\nLaboring does not alone make you a man, because it is something formal\nand its object accidental; the question is who you that labor are. As\nfar as laboring goes, you might do it from an egoistic (material)\nimpulse, merely to procure nourishment and the like; it must be a labor\nfurthering humanity, calculated for the good of humanity, serving\nhistorical (_i. e._ human) evolution,--in short, a _humane_ labor. This\nimplies two things: one, that it be useful to humanity; next, that it be\nthe work of a \"man.\" The first alone may be the case with every labor,\nas even the labors of nature, _e. g._ of animals, are utilized by\nhumanity for the furthering of science, etc.; the second requires that\nhe who labors should know the human object of his labor; and, as he can\nhave this consciousness only when he _knows himself as man_, the crucial\ncondition is--_self-consciousness_.\n\nUnquestionably much is already attained when you cease to be a\n\"fragment-laborer,\"[88] yet therewith you only get a view of the whole\nof your labor, and acquire a consciousness about it, which is still far\nremoved from a self-consciousness, a consciousness about your true\n\"self\" or \"essence,\" Man. The laborer has still remaining the desire for\na \"higher consciousness,\" which, because the activity of labor is unable\nto quiet it, he satisfies in a leisure hour. Hence leisure stands by the\nside of his labor, and he sees himself compelled to proclaim labor and\nidling human in one breath, yes, to attribute the true elevation to the\nidler, the leisure-enjoyer. He labors only to get rid of labor; he wants\nto make labor free, only that he may be free from labor.\n\nIn fine, his work has no satisfying substance, because it is only\nimposed by society, only a stint, a task, a calling; and, conversely,\nhis society does not satisfy, because it gives only work.\n\nHis labor ought to satisfy him as a man; instead of that, it satisfies\nsociety; society ought to treat him as a man, and it treats him as--a\nrag-tag laborer, or a laboring ragamuffin.\n\nLabor and society are of use to him not as he needs them as a man, but\nonly as he needs them as an \"egoist.\"\n\nSuch is the attitude of criticism toward labor. It points to \"mind,\"\nwages the war \"of mind with the masses,\"[89] and pronounces communistic\nlabor unintellectual mass-labor. Averse to labor as they are, the masses\nlove to make labor easy for themselves. In literature, which is to-day\nfurnished in mass, this aversion to labor begets the universally-known\n_superficiality_, which puts from it \"the toil of research.\"[90]\n\nTherefore humane liberalism says: You want labor; all right, we want it\nlikewise, but we want it in the fullest measure. We want it, not that we\nmay gain spare time, but that we may find all satisfaction in it itself.\nWe want labor because it is our self-development.\n\nBut then the labor too must be adapted to that end! Man is honored only\nby human, self-conscious labor, only by the labor that has for its end\nno \"egoistic\" purpose, but Man, and is Man's self-revelation; so that\nthe saying should be _laboro, ergo sum_, I labor, therefore I am a man.\nThe humane liberal wants that labor of the _mind_ which _works up_ all\nmaterial; he wants the mind, that leaves no thing quiet or in its\nexisting condition, that acquiesces in nothing, analyzes everything,\ncriticises anew every result that has been gained. This restless mind is\nthe true laborer, it obliterates prejudices, shatters limits and\nnarrownesses, and raises man above everything that would like to\ndominate over him, while the Communist labors only for himself, and not\neven freely, but from necessity,--in short, represents a man condemned\nto hard labor.\n\nThe laborer of such a type is not \"egoistic,\" because he does not labor\nfor individuals, neither for himself nor for other individuals, not for\n_private_ men therefore, but for humanity and its progress: he does not\nease individual pains, does not care for individual wants, but removes\nlimits within which humanity is pressed, dispels prejudices which\ndominate an entire time, vanquishes hindrances that obstruct the path of\nall, clears away errors in which men entangle themselves, discovers\ntruths which are found through him for all and for all time; in\nshort--he lives and labors for humanity.\n\nNow, in the first place, the discoverer of a great truth doubtless knows\nthat it can be useful to the rest of men, and, as a jealous withholding\nfurnishes him no enjoyment, he communicates it; but, even though he has\nthe consciousness that his communication is highly valuable to the rest,\nyet he has in no wise sought and found his truth for the sake of the\nrest, but for his own sake, because he himself desired it, because\ndarkness and fancies left him no rest till he had procured for himself\nlight and enlightenment to the best of his powers.\n\nHe labors, therefore, for his own sake and for the satisfaction of _his_\nwant. That along with this he was also useful to others, yes, to\nposterity, does not take from his labor the _egoistic_ character.\n\nIn the next place, if he did labor only on his own account, like the\nrest, why should his act be human, those of the rest unhuman, _i. e._\negoistic? Perhaps, because this book, painting, symphony, etc., is the\nlabor of his whole being, because he has done his best in it, has spread\nhimself out wholly and is wholly to be known from it, while the work of\na handicraftsman mirrors only the handicraftsman, _i. e._ the skill in\nhandicraft, not \"the man\"? In his poems we have the whole Schiller; in\nso many hundred stoves, on the other hand, we have before us only the\nstove-maker, not \"the man.\"\n\nBut does this mean more than \"in the one work you see _me_ as completely\nas possible, in the other only my skill\"? Is it not _me_ again that the\nact expresses? And is it not more egoistic to offer _oneself_ to the\nworld in a work, to work out and shape _oneself_, than to remain\nconcealed behind one's labor? You say, to be sure, that you are\nrevealing Man. But the Man that you reveal is you; you reveal only\nyourself, yet with this distinction from the handicraftsman,--that he\ndoes not understand how to compress himself into one labor, but, in\norder to be known as himself, must be searched out in his other\nrelations of life, and that your want, through whose satisfaction that\nwork came into being, was a--theoretical want.\n\nBut you will reply that you reveal quite another man, a worthier,\nhigher, greater, a man that is more man than that other. I will assume\nthat you accomplish all that is possible to man, that you bring to pass\nwhat no other succeeds in. Wherein, then, does your greatness consist?\nPrecisely in this, that you are more than other men (the \"masses\"), more\nthan _men_ ordinarily are, more than \"ordinary men\"; precisely in your\nelevation above men. You are distinguished beyond other men not by being\nman, but because you are a \"unique\"[91] man. Doubtless you show what a\nman can do; but because you, a man, do it, this by no means shows that\nothers, also men, are able to do as much; you have executed it only as a\n_unique_ man, and are unique therein.\n\nIt is not man that makes up your greatness, but you create it, because\nyou are more than man, and mightier than other--men.\n\nIt is believed that one cannot be more than man. Rather, one cannot be\nless!\n\nIt is believed further that whatever one attains is good for Man. In so\nfar as I remain at all times a man--or, like Schiller, a Swabian; like\nKant, a Prussian; like Gustavus Adolphus, a near-sighted person--I\ncertainly become by my superior qualities a notable man, Swabian,\nPrussian, or near-sighted person. But the case is not much better with\nthat than with Frederick the Great's cane, which became famous for\nFrederick's sake.\n\nTo \"Give God the glory\" corresponds the modern \"Give Man the glory.\" But\nI mean to keep it for myself.\n\nCriticism, issuing the summons to man to be \"human,\" enunciates the\nnecessary condition of sociability; for only as a man among men is one\n_companionable_. Herewith it makes known its _social_ object, the\nestablishment of \"human society.\"\n\nAmong social theories criticism is indisputably the most complete,\nbecause it removes and deprives of value everything that _separates_ man\nfrom man: all prerogatives, down to the prerogative of faith. In it the\nlove-principle of Christianity, the true social principle, comes to the\npurest fulfilment, and the last possible experiment is tried to take\naway exclusiveness and repulsion from men: a fight against egoism in its\nsimplest and therefore hardest form, in the form of singleness,[92]\nexclusiveness, itself.\n\n\"How can you live a truly social life so long as even one exclusiveness\nstill exists between you?\"\n\nI ask conversely, How can you be truly single so long as even one\nconnection still exists between you? If you are connected, you cannot\nleave each other; if a \"tie\" clasps you, you are something only _with\nanother_, and twelve of you make a dozen, thousands of you a people,\nmillions of you humanity.\n\n\"Only when you are human can you keep company with each other as men,\njust as you can understand each other as patriots only when you are\npatriotic!\"\n\nAll right; then I answer, Only when you are single can you have\nintercourse with each other as what you are.\n\nIt is precisely the keenest critic who is hit hardest by the curse of\nhis principle. Putting from him one exclusive thing after another,\nshaking off churchliness, patriotism, etc., he undoes one tie after\nanother and separates himself from the churchly man, from the patriot,\netc., till at last, when all ties are undone, he stands--alone. He, of\nall men, must exclude all that have anything exclusive or private; and,\nwhen you get to the bottom, what can be more exclusive than the\nexclusive, single person himself!\n\nOr does he perhaps think that the situation would be better if _all_\nbecame men and gave up exclusiveness? Why, for the very reason that\n\"all\" means \"every individual\" the most glaring contradiction is still\nmaintained, for the \"individual\" is exclusiveness itself. If the humane\nliberal no longer concedes to the individual anything private or\nexclusive, any private thought, any private folly; if he criticises\neverything away from him before his face, since his hatred of the\nprivate is an absolute and fanatical hatred; if he knows no tolerance\ntoward what is private, because everything private is _unhuman_,--yet he\ncannot criticise away the private person himself, since the hardness of\nthe individual person resists his criticism, and he must be satisfied\nwith declaring this person a \"private person\" and really leaving\neverything private to him again.\n\nWhat will the society that no longer cares about anything private do?\nMake the private impossible? No, but \"subordinate it to the interests of\nsociety, and, _e. g._, leave it to private will to institute holidays,\nas many as it chooses, if only it does not come in collision with the\ngeneral interest.\"[93] Everything private is _left free_; _i. e._ it has\nno interest for society.\n\n\"By their raising of barriers against science the church and\nreligiousness have declared that they are what they always were, only\nthat this was hidden under another semblance when they were proclaimed\nto be the basis and necessary foundation of the State----a matter of\npurely private concern. Even when they were connected with the State and\nmade it Christian, they were only the proof that the State had not yet\ndeveloped its general political idea, that it was only instituting\nprivate rights----they were only the highest expression for the fact\nthat the State was a private affair and had to do only with private\naffairs. When the State shall at last have the courage and strength to\nfulfil its general destiny and to be free; when, therefore, it is also\nable to give separate interests and private concerns their true\nposition,--then religion and the church will be free as they have never\nbeen hitherto. As a matter of the most purely private concern, and a\nsatisfaction of purely personal want, they will be left to themselves;\nand every individual, every congregation and ecclesiastical communion,\nwill be able to care for the blessedness of their souls as they choose\nand as they think necessary. Every one will care for his soul's\nblessedness so far as it is to him a personal want, and will accept and\npay as spiritual caretaker the one who seems to him to offer the best\nguarantee for the satisfaction of his want. Science is at last left\nentirely out of the game.\"[94]\n\nWhat is to happen, though? Is social life to have an end, and all\ncompanionableness, all fraternization, everything that is created by the\nlove or society principle, to disappear?\n\nAs if one will not always seek the other because he _needs_ him; as if\none must not accommodate himself to the other when he _needs_ him. But\nthe difference is this, that then the individual really _unites_ with\nthe individual, while formerly they were _bound together_ by a tie; son\nand father are bound together before majority, after it they can come\ntogether independently; before it they _belonged_ together as members of\nthe family, after it they unite as egoists; sonship and fatherhood\nremain, but son and father no longer pin themselves down to these.\n\nThe last privilege, in truth, is \"Man\"; with it all are privileged or\ninvested. For, as Bruno Bauer himself says, \"privilege remains even when\nit is extended to all.\"[95]\n\nThus liberalism runs its course in the following transformations:\n\"First, the individual _is_ not man, therefore his individual\npersonality is of no account: no personal will, no arbitrariness, no\norders or mandates!\n\n\"Second, the individual _has_ nothing human, therefore no mine and\nthine, or property, is valid.\n\n\"Third, as the individual neither is man nor has anything human, he\nshall not exist at all: he shall, as an egoist with his egoistic\nbelongings, be annihilated by criticism to make room for Man, 'Man, just\ndiscovered'.\"\n\nBut, although the individual is not Man, Man is yet present in the\nindividual, and, like every spook and everything divine, has its\nexistence in him. Hence political liberalism awards to the individual\neverything that pertains to him as \"a man by birth,\" as a born man,\namong which there are counted liberty of conscience, the possession of\ngoods, etc.,--in short, the \"rights of man\"; Socialism grants to the\nindividual what pertains to him as an _active_ man, as a \"laboring\" man;\nfinally, humane liberalism gives the individual what he has as \"a man,\"\n_i. e._ everything that belongs to humanity. Accordingly the single\none[96] has nothing at all, humanity everything; and the necessity of\nthe \"regeneration\" preached in Christianity is demanded unambiguously\nand in the completest measure. Become a new creature, become \"man\"!\n\nOne might even think himself reminded of the close of the Lord's Prayer.\nTo Man belongs the _lordship_ (the \"power\" or _dynamis_); therefore no\nindividual may be lord, but Man is the lord of individuals;--Man's is\nthe _kingdom_, _i. e._ the world, consequently the individual is not to\nbe proprietor, but Man, \"all,\" commands the world as property;--to Man\nis due renown, _glorification_ or \"glory\" (_doxa_) from all, for Man or\nhumanity is the individual's end, for which he labors, thinks, lives,\nand for whose glorification he must become \"man.\"\n\nHitherto men have always striven to find out a fellowship in which their\ninequalities in other respects should become \"non-essential\"; they\nstrove for equalization, consequently for _equality_, and wanted to come\nall under one hat, which means nothing less than that they were seeking\nfor one lord, one tie, one faith (\"'Tis in one God we all believe\").\nThere cannot be for men anything more fellowly or more equal than Man\nhimself, and in this fellowship the love-craving has found its\ncontentment: it did not rest till it had brought on this last\nequalization, leveled all inequality, laid man on the breast of man. But\nunder this very fellowship decay and ruin become most glaring. In a more\nlimited fellowship the Frenchman still stood against the German, the\nChristian against the Mohammedan, etc. Now, on the contrary, _man_\nstands against men, or, as men are not man, man stands against the\nun-man.\n\nThe sentence \"God has become man\" is now followed by the other, \"Man has\nbecome I.\" This is _the human I_. But we invert it and say: I was not\nable to find myself so long as I sought myself as Man. But, now that it\nappears that Man is aspiring to become I and to gain a corporeity in me,\nI note that, after all, everything depends on me, and Man is lost\nwithout me. But I do not care to give myself up to be the shrine of this\nmost holy thing, and shall not ask henceforward whether I am man or\nun-man in what I set about; let this _spirit_ keep off my neck!\n\nHumane liberalism goes to work radically. If you want to be or have\nanything especial even in one point, if you want to retain for yourself\neven one prerogative above others, to claim even one right that is not a\ngeneral \"right of man,\" you are an egoist.\n\nVery good! I do not want to have or be anything especial above others, I\ndo not want to claim any prerogative against them, but--I do not measure\nmyself by others either, and do not want to have any _right_ whatever. I\nwant to be all and have all that I can be and have. Whether others are\nand have anything _similar_, what do I care? The equal, the same, they\ncan neither be nor have. I cause no _detriment_ to them, as I cause no\ndetriment to the rock by being \"ahead of it\" in having motion. If they\n_could_ have it, they would have it.\n\nTo cause other men no _detriment_ is the point of the demand to possess\nno prerogative; to renounce all \"being ahead,\" the strictest theory of\n_renunciation_. One is not to count himself as \"anything especial,\" such\nas _e. g._ a Jew or a Christian. Well, I do not count myself as anything\nespecial, but as _unique_.[97] Doubtless I have _similarity_ with\nothers; yet that holds good only for comparison or reflection; in fact I\nam incomparable, unique. My flesh is not their flesh, my mind is not\ntheir mind. If you bring them under the generalities \"flesh, mind,\"\nthose are your _thoughts_, which have nothing to do with _my_ flesh,\n_my_ mind, and can least of all issue a \"call\" to mine.\n\nI do not want to recognize or respect in you anything, neither the\nproprietor nor the ragamuffin, nor even the man, but to _use you_. In\nsalt I find that it makes food palatable to me, therefore I dissolve it;\nin the fish I recognize an aliment, therefore I eat it; in you I\ndiscover the gift of making my life agreeable, therefore I choose you as\na companion. Or, in salt I study crystallization, in the fish animality,\nin you men, etc. But to me you are only what you are for me,--to wit, my\nobject; and, because _my_ object, therefore my property.\n\nIn humane liberalism ragamuffinhood is completed. We must first come\ndown to the most ragamuffin-like, most poverty-stricken condition if we\nwant to arrive at _ownness_, for we must strip off everything alien. But\nnothing seems more ragamuffin-like than naked--Man.\n\nIt is more than ragamuffinhood, however, when I throw away Man too\nbecause I feel that he too is alien to me and that I can make no\npretensions on that basis. This is no longer mere ragamuffinhood:\nbecause even the last rag has fallen off, here stands real nakedness,\ndenudation of everything alien. The ragamuffin has stripped off\nragamuffinhood itself, and therewith has ceased, to be what he was, a\nragamuffin.\n\nI am no longer a ragamuffin, but have been one.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nUp to this time the discord could not come to an outbreak, because\nproperly there is current only a contention of modern liberals with\nantiquated liberals, a contention of those who understand \"freedom\" in a\nsmall measure and those who want the \"full measure\" of freedom; of the\n_moderate_ and _measureless_, therefore. Everything turns on the\nquestion, _how free_ must _man_ be? That man must be free, in this all\nbelieve; therefore all are liberal too. But the un-man[98] who is\nsomewhere in every individual, how is he blocked? flow can it be\narranged not to leave the un-man free at the same time with man?\n\nLiberalism as a whole has a deadly enemy, an invincible opposite, as God\nhas the devil: by the side of man stands always the un-man, the\nindividual, the egoist. State, society, humanity, do not master this\ndevil.\n\nHumane liberalism has undertaken the task of showing the other liberals\nthat they still do not want \"freedom.\"\n\nIf the other liberals had before their eyes only isolated egoism and\nwere for the most part blind, radical liberalism has against it egoism\n\"in mass,\" throws among the masses all who do not make the cause of\nfreedom their own as it does, so that now man and un-man, rigorously\nseparated, stand over against each other as enemies, to wit, the\n\"masses\" and \"criticism\";[99] namely, \"free, human criticism,\" as it is\ncalled (\"_Judenfrage_,\" p. 114), in opposition to crude, _e. g._\nreligious, criticism.\n\nCriticism expresses the hope that it will be victorious over all the\nmasses and \"give them a general certificate of insolvency.\"[100] So it\nmeans finally to make itself out in the right, and to represent all\ncontention of the \"faint-hearted and timorous\" as an egoistic\n_stubbornness_,[101] as pettiness, paltriness. All wrangling loses\nsignificance, and petty dissensions are given up, because in criticism a\ncommon enemy enters the field. \"You are egoists altogether, one no\nbetter than another!\" Now the egoists stand together against criticism.\n\nReally the egoists? No, they fight against criticism precisely because\nit accuses them of egoism; they do not plead guilty to egoism.\nAccordingly criticism and the masses stand on the same basis: both fight\nagainst egoism, both repudiate it for themselves and charge it to each\nother.\n\nCriticism and the masses pursue the same goal, freedom from egoism, and\nwrangle only over which of them approaches nearest to the goal or even\nattains it.\n\nThe Jews, the Christians, the absolutists, the men of darkness and men\nof light, politicians, Communists,--all, in short,--hold the reproach of\negoism far from them; and, as criticism brings against them this\nreproach in plain terms and in the most extended sense, all _justify_\nthemselves against the accusation of egoism, and combat--egoism, the\nsame enemy with whom criticism wages war.\n\nBoth, criticism and masses, are enemies of egoists, and both seek to\nliberate themselves from egoism, as well by clearing or whitewashing\n_themselves_ as by ascribing it to the opposite party.\n\nThe critic is the true \"spokesman of the masses\" who gives them the\n\"simple concept and the phrase\" of egoism, while the spokesmen to whom\nthe triumph is denied in \"_Lit. Ztg._\" V. 24 were only bunglers. He is\ntheir prince and general in the war against egoism for freedom; what he\nfights against they fight against. But at the same time he is their\nenemy too, only not the enemy before them, but the friendly enemy who\nwields the knout behind the timorous to force courage into them.\n\nHereby the opposition of criticism and the masses is reduced to the\nfollowing contradiction: \"You are egoists\"! \"No, we are not\"! \"I will\nprove it to you\"! \"You shall have our justification\"!\n\nLet us then take both for what they give themselves out for,\nnon-egoists, and what they take each other for, egoists. They are\negoists and are not.\n\nProperly criticism says: You must liberate your ego from all limitedness\nso entirely that it becomes a _human_ ego. I say: Liberate yourself as\nfar as you can, and you have done your part; for it is not given to\nevery one to break through all limits, or, more expressively: not to\nevery one is that a limit which is a limit for the rest. Consequently,\ndo not tire yourself with toiling at the limits of others; enough if you\ntear down yours. Who has ever succeeded in tearing down even one limit\n_for all men_? Are not countless persons to-day, as at all times,\nrunning about with all the \"limitations of humanity\"? He who overturns\none of _his_ limits may have shown others the way and the means; the\noverturning of _their_ limits remains their affair. Nobody does anything\nelse either. To demand of people that they become wholly men is to call\non them to cast down all human limits. That is impossible, because _Man_\nhas no limits. I have some indeed, but then it is only _mine_ that\nconcern me any, and only they can be overcome by me. A _human_ ego I\ncannot become, just because I am I and not merely man.\n\nYet let us still see whether criticism has not taught us something that\nwe can lay to heart! I am not free if I am not without interests, not\nman if I am not disinterested? Well, even if it makes little difference\nto me to be free or man, yet I do not want to leave unused any occasion\nto realize _myself_ or make myself count. Criticism offers me this\noccasion by the teaching that, if anything plants itself firmly in me,\nand becomes indissoluble, I become its prisoner and servant, _i. e._ a\npossessed man. An interest, be it for what it may, has kidnapped a slave\nin me if I cannot get away from it, and is no longer my property, but I\nI am its. Let us therefore accept criticism's lesson to let no part of\nour property become stable, and to feel comfortable only\nin--_dissolving_ it.\n\nSo, if criticism says: You are man only when you are restlessly\ncriticising and dissolving! then we say: Man I am without that, and I am\nI likewise; therefore I want only to be careful to secure my property to\nmyself; and, in order to secure it, I continually take it back into\nmyself, annihilate in it every movement toward independence, and swallow\nit before it can fix itself and become a \"fixed idea\" or a \"mania.\"\n\nBut I do that not for the sake of my \"human calling,\" but because I call\nmyself to it. I do not strut about dissolving everything that it is\npossible for a man to dissolve, and, _e. g._, while not yet ten years\nold I do not criticise the nonsense of the Commandments, but I am man\nall the same, and act humanly in just this,--that I still leave them\nuncriticised. In short, I have no calling, and follow none, not even\nthat to be a man.\n\nDo I now reject what liberalism has won in its various exertions? Far be\nthe day that anything won should be lost! Only, after \"Man\" has become\nfree through liberalism, I turn my gaze back upon myself and confess to\nmyself openly: What Man seems to have gained, _I_ alone have gained.\n\nMan is free when \"Man is to man the supreme being.\" So it belongs to the\ncompletion of liberalism that every other supreme being be annulled,\ntheology overturned by anthropology, God and his grace laughed down,\n\"atheism\" universal.\n\nThe egoism of property has given up the last that it had to give when\neven the \"My God\" has become senseless; for God exists only when he has\nat heart the individual's welfare, as the latter seeks his welfare in\nhim.\n\nPolitical liberalism abolished, the inequality of masters and servants:\nit made people _masterless_, anarchic. The master was now removed from\nthe individual, the \"egoist,\" to become a ghost,--the law or the State.\nSocial liberalism abolishes the inequality of possession, of the poor\nand rich, and makes people _possessionless_ or propertyless. Property is\nwithdrawn from the individual and surrendered to ghostly society. Humane\nliberalism makes people _godless_, atheistic. Therefore the individual's\nGod, \"my God\", must be put an end to. Now masterlessness is indeed at\nthe same time freedom from service, possessionlessness at the same time\nfreedom from care, and godlessness at the same time freedom from\nprejudice: for with the master the servant falls away; with possession,\nthe care about it; with the firmly-rooted God, prejudice. But, since the\nmaster rises again as State, the servant appears again as subject; since\npossession becomes the property of society, care is begotten anew as\nlabor; and, since God as Man becomes a prejudice, there arises a new\nfaith, faith in humanity or liberty. For the individual's God the God of\nall, _viz._, \"Man,\" is now exalted; \"for it is the highest thing in us\nall to be man.\" But, as nobody can become entirely what the idea \"man\"\nimports, Man remains to the individual a lofty other world, an\nunattained supreme being, a God. But at the same time this is the \"true\nGod,\" because he is fully adequate to us,--to wit, our own \"_self_\"; we\nourselves, but separated from us and lifted above us.\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT\n\nThe foregoing review of \"free human criticism\" was written by bits\nimmediately after the appearance of the books in question, as was also\nthat which elsewhere refers to writings of this tendency, and I did\nlittle more than bring together the fragments. But criticism is\nrestlessly pressing forward, and thereby makes it necessary for me to\ncome back to it once more, now that my book is finished, and insert this\nconcluding note.\n\nI have before me the latest (eighth) number of the \"_Allgemeine\nLiteratur-Zeitung_\" of Bruno Bauer.\n\nThere again \"the general interests of society\" stand at the top. But\ncriticism has reflected, and given this \"society\" a specification by\nwhich it is discriminated from a form which previously had still been\nconfused with it: the \"State,\" in former passages still celebrated as\n\"free State,\" is quite given up because it can in no wise fulfil the\ntask of \"human society.\" Criticism only \"saw itself compelled to\nidentify for a moment human and political affairs\" in 1842; but now it\nhas found that the State, even as \"free State,\" is not human society,\nor, as it could likewise say, that the people is not \"man.\" We saw how\nit got through with theology and showed clearly that God sinks into dust\nbefore Man; we see it now come to a clearance with politics in the same\nway, and show that before Man peoples and nationalities fall: so we see\nhow it has its explanation with Church and State, declaring them both\nunhuman, and we shall see--for it betrays this to us already--how it can\nalso give proof that before Man the \"masses,\" which it even calls a\n\"spiritual being,\" appear worthless. And how should the lesser\n\"spiritual beings\" be able to maintain themselves before the supreme\nspirit? \"Man\" casts down the false idols.\n\nSo what the critic has in view for the present is the scrutiny of the\n\"masses,\" which he will place before \"Man\" in order to combat them from\nthe standpoint of Man. \"What is now the object of criticism?\" \"The\nmasses, a spiritual being!\" These the critic will \"learn to know,\" and\nwill find that they are in contradiction with Man; he will demonstrate\nthat they are unhuman, and will succeed just as well in this\ndemonstration as in the former ones, that the divine and the national,\nor the concerns of Church and of State, were the unhuman.\n\nThe masses are defined as \"the most significant product of the\nRevolution, as the deceived multitude which the illusions of political\nIllumination, and in general the entire Illumination movement of the\neighteenth century, have given over to boundless disgruntlement.\" The\nRevolution satisfied some by its result, and left others unsatisfied;\nthe satisfied part is the commonalty (_bourgeoisie_, etc.), the\nunsatisfied is the--masses. Does not the critic, so placed, himself\nbelong to the \"masses\"?\n\nBut the unsatisfied are still in great mistiness, and their discontent\nutters itself only in a \"boundless disgruntlement.\" This the likewise\nunsatisfied critic now wants to master: he cannot want and attain more\nthan to bring that \"spiritual being,\" the masses, out of its\ndisgruntlement, and to \"uplift\" those who were only disgruntled, _i. e._\nto give them the right attitude toward those results of the Revolution\nwhich are to be overcome;--he can become the head of the masses, their\ndecided spokesman. Therefore he wants also to \"abolish the deep chasm\nwhich parts him from the multitude.\" From those who want to \"uplift the\nlower classes of the people\" he is distinguished by wanting to deliver\nfrom \"disgruntlement,\" not merely these, but himself too.\n\nBut assuredly his consciousness does not deceive him either, when he\ntakes the masses to be the \"natural opponents of theory,\" and foresees\nthat, \"the more this theory shall develop itself, so much the more will\nit make the masses compact.\" For the critic cannot enlighten or satisfy\nthe masses with his _presupposition_, Man. If over against the\ncommonalty they are only the \"lower classes of the people,\" politically\ninsignificant masses, over against \"Man\" they must still more be mere\n\"masses,\" humanly insignificant--yes, unhuman--masses, or a multitude of\nun-men.\n\nThe critic clears away everything human; and, starting from the\npresupposition that the human is the true, he works against himself,\ndenying it wherever it had been hitherto found. He proves only that the\nhuman is to be found nowhere except in his head, but the unhuman\neverywhere. The unhuman is the real, the extant on all hands, and by the\nproof that it is \"not human\" the critic only enunciates plainly the\ntautological sentence that it is the unhuman.\n\nBut what if the unhuman, turning its back on itself with resolute heart,\nshould at the same time turn away from the disturbing critic and leave\nhim standing, untouched and unstung by his remonstrance?\n\n\"You call me the unhuman,\" it might say to him, \"and so I really am--for\nyou; but I am so only because you bring me into opposition to the human,\nand I could despise myself only so long as I let myself be hypnotized\ninto this opposition. I was contemptible because I sought my 'better\nself' outside me; I was the unhuman because I dreamed of the 'human'; I\nresembled the pious who hunger for their 'true self' and always remain\n'poor sinners'; I thought of myself only in comparison to another;\nenough, I was not all in all, was not--_unique_.[102] But now I cease to\nappear to myself as the unhuman, cease to measure myself and let myself\nbe measured by man, cease to recognize anything above me:\nconsequently--adieu, humane critic! I only have been the unhuman, am it\nnow no longer, but am the unique, yes, to your loathing, the egoistic;\nyet not the egoistic as it lets itself be measured by the human,\nhumane, and unselfish, but the egoistic as the--unique.\"\n\nWe have to pay attention to still another sentence of the same number.\n\"Criticism sets up no dogmas, and wants to learn to know nothing but\n_things_.\"\n\nThe critic is afraid of becoming \"dogmatic\" or setting up dogmas. Of\ncourse: why, thereby he would become the opposite of the critic,--the\ndogmatist; he would now become bad, as he is good as critic, or would\nbecome from an unselfish man an egoist, etc. \"Of all things, no dogma!\"\nthis is his--dogma. For the critic remains on one and the same ground\nwith the dogmatist,--that of _thoughts_. Like the latter he always\nstarts from a thought, but varies in this, that he never ceases to keep\nthe principle-thought in the _process of thinking_, and so does not let\nit become stable. He only asserts the thought-process against\nstationariness in it. From criticism no thought is safe, since criticism\nis thought or the thinking mind itself.\n\nTherefore I repeat that the religious world--and this is the world of\nthoughts--reaches its completion in criticism, where thinking extends\nits encroachments over every thought, no one of which may \"egoistically\"\nestablish itself. Where would the \"purity of criticism,\" the purity of\nthinking, be left if even one thought escaped the process of thinking?\nThis explains the fact that the critic has even begun already to gibe\ngently here and there at the thought of Man, of humanity and humaneness,\nbecause he suspects that here a thought is approaching dogmatic fixity.\nBut yet he cannot decompose this thought till he has found a--\"higher\"\nin which it dissolves; for he moves only--in thoughts. This higher\nthought might be enunciated as that of the movement or process of\nthinking itself, _i. e._ as the thought of thinking or of criticism.\n\nFreedom of thinking has in fact become complete hereby, freedom of mind\ncelebrates its triumph: for the individual, \"egoistic\" thoughts have\nlost their dogmatic truculence. There is nothing left but the--dogma of\nfree thinking or of criticism.\n\nAgainst everything that belongs to the world of thought, criticism is in\nthe right, _i. e._ in might: it is the victor. Criticism, and criticism\nalone, is \"up to date.\" From the standpoint of thought there is no power\ncapable of being an overmatch for criticism's, and it is a pleasure to\nsee how easily and sportively this dragon swallows all other serpents of\nthought. Each serpent twists, to be sure, but criticism crushes it in\nall its \"turns.\"\n\nI am no opponent of criticism, _i. e._ I am no dogmatist, and do not\nfeel myself touched by the critic's tooth with which he tears the\ndogmatist to pieces. If I were a \"dogmatist,\" I should place at the head\na dogma, _i. e._ a thought, an idea, a principle, and should complete\nthis as a \"systematist,\" spinning it out to a system, _i. e._ a\nstructure of thought. Conversely, if I were a critic, _viz._, an\nopponent of the dogmatist, I should carry on the fight of free thinking\nagainst the enthralling thought, I should defend thinking against what\nwas thought. But I am neither the champion of a thought nor the champion\nof thinking; for \"I,\" from whom I start, am not a thought, nor do I\nconsist in thinking. Against me, the unnameable, the realm of thoughts,\nthinking, and mind is shattered.\n\nCriticism is the possessed man's fight against possession as such,\nagainst all possession: a fight which is founded in the consciousness\nthat everywhere possession, or, as the critic calls it, a religious and\ntheological attitude, is extant. He knows that people stand in a\nreligious or believing attitude not only toward God, but toward other\nideas as well, like right, the State, law, etc.; _i. e._ he recognizes\npossession in all places. So he wants to break up thoughts by thinking;\nbut I say, only thoughtlessness really saves me from thoughts. It it not\nthinking, but my thoughtlessness, or I the unthinkable,\nincomprehensible, that frees me from possession.\n\nA jerk does me the service of the most anxious thinking, a stretching of\nthe limbs shakes off the torment of thoughts, a leap upward hurls from\nmy breast the nightmare of the religious world, a jubilant Hoopla throws\noff year-long burdens. But the monstrous significance of unthinking\njubilation could not be recognized in the long night of thinking and\nbelieving.\n\n\"What clumsiness and frivolity, to want to solve the most difficult\nproblems, acquit yourself of the most comprehensive tasks, by a\n_breaking off_!\"\n\nBut have you tasks if you do not set them to yourself? So long as you\nset them, you will not give them up, and I certainly do not care if you\nthink, and, thinking, create a thousand thoughts. But you who have set\nthe tasks, are you not to be able to upset them again? Must you be bound\nto these tasks, and must they become absolute tasks?\n\nTo cite only one thing, the government has been disparaged on account of\nits resorting to forcible means against thoughts, interfering against\nthe press by means of the police power of the censorship, and making a\npersonal fight out of a literary one. As if it were solely a matter of\nthoughts, and as if one's attitude toward thoughts must be unselfish,\nself-denying, and self-sacrificing! Do not those thoughts attack the\ngoverning parties themselves, and so call out egoism? And do the\nthinkers not set before the attacked ones the _religious_ demand to\nreverence the power of thought, of ideas? They are to succumb\nvoluntarily and resignedly, because the divine power of thought,\nMinerva, fights on their enemies' side. Why, that would be an act of\npossession, a religious sacrifice. To be sure, the governing parties are\nthemselves held fast in a religious bias, and follow the leading power\nof an idea or a faith; but they are at the same time unconfessed\negoists, and right here, against the enemy, their pent-up egoism breaks\nloose: possessed in their faith, they are at the same time unpossessed\nby their opponents' faith, _i. e._ they are egoists toward this. If one\nwants to make them a reproach, it could only be the converse,--to wit,\nthat they are possessed by their ideas.\n\nAgainst thoughts no egoistic power is to appear, no police power and the\nlike. So the believers in thinking believe. But thinking and its\nthoughts are not sacred to _me_, and I defend _my skin_ against them as\nagainst other things. That may be an unreasonable defence; but, if I am\nin duty bound to reason, then I, like Abraham, must sacrifice my dearest\nto it!\n\nIn the kingdom of thought, which, like that of faith, is the kingdom of\nheaven, every one is assuredly wrong who uses _unthinking_ force, just\nas every one is wrong who in the kingdom of love behaves unlovingly, or,\nalthough he is a Christian and therefore lives in the kingdom of love,\nyet acts unchristianly; in these kingdoms, to which he supposes himself\nto belong though he nevertheless throws off their laws, he is a \"sinner\"\nor \"egoist.\" But it is only when he becomes a _criminal_ against these\nkingdoms that he can throw off their dominion.\n\nHere too the result is this, that the fight of the thinkers against the\ngovernment is indeed in the right, _viz___., in might,--so far as it is\ncarried on against the government's thoughts (the government is dumb,\nand does not succeed in making any literary rejoinder to speak of), but\nis, on the other hand, in the wrong, _viz._, in impotence, so far as it\ndoes not succeed in bringing into the field anything but thoughts\nagainst a personal power (the egoistic power stops the mouths of the\nthinkers). The theoretical fight cannot complete the victory, and the\nsacred power of thought succumbs to the might of egoism. Only the\negoistic fight, the fight of egoists on both sides, clears up\neverything.\n\nThis last now, to make thinking an affair of egoistic option, an\naffair of the single person,[103] a mere pastime or hobby as it were,\nand to take from it the importance of \"being the last decisive\npower\"; this degradation and desecration of thinking; this equalization\nof the unthinking and thoughtful ego; this clumsy but real\n\"equality,\"--criticism is not able to produce, because it itself is only\nthe priest of thinking, and sees nothing beyond thinking but--the\ndeluge.\n\nCriticism does indeed affirm, _e. g._, that free criticism may overcome\nthe State, but at the same time it defends itself against the reproach\nwhich is laid upon it by the State government, that it is \"self-will and\nimpudence\"; it thinks, then, that \"self-will and impudence\" may not\novercome, it alone may. The truth is rather the reverse: the State can\nbe really overcome only by impudent self-will.\n\nIt may now, to conclude with this, be clear that in the critic's new\nchange of front he has not transformed himself, but only \"made good an\noversight,\" \"disentangled a subject,\" and is saying too much when he\nspeaks of \"criticism criticising itself\": it, or rather he, has only\ncriticised its \"oversight\" and cleared it of its \"inconsistencies.\" If\nhe wanted to criticise criticism, he would have to look and see if there\nwas anything in its presupposition.\n\nI on my part start from a presupposition in presupposing _myself_; but\nmy presupposition does not struggle for its perfection like \"Man\nstruggling for his perfection,\" but only serves me to enjoy it and\nconsume it. I consume my presupposition, and nothing else, and exist\nonly in consuming it. But that presupposition is therefore not a\npresupposition at all: for, as I am the Unique, I know nothing of the\nduality of a presupposing and a presupposed ego (an \"incomplete\" and a\n\"complete\" ego or man); but this, that I consume myself, means only that\nI am. I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just\npositing or creating myself, and am I only by being not presupposed but\nposited, and, again, posited only in the moment when I posit myself;\n_i. e._, I am creator and creature in one.\n\nIf the presuppositions that have hitherto been current are to melt away\nin a full dissolution, they must not be dissolved into a higher\npresupposition again,--_i. e._ a thought, or thinking itself, criticism.\nFor that dissolution is to be for _my_ good; otherwise it would belong\nonly in the series of the innumerable dissolutions which, in favor of\nothers, (_e. g._ this very Man, God, the State, pure morality, etc.),\ndeclared old truths to be untruths and did away with long-fostered\npresuppositions.\n\n\n\n\nPart Second\n\nI\n\n\n\n\n     At the entrance of the modern time stands the \"God-man.\" At its\n     exit will only the God in the God-man evaporate? and can the\n     God-man really die if only the God in him dies? They did not\n     think of this question, and thought they were through when in\n     our days they brought to a victorious end the work of the\n     Illumination, the vanquishing of God; they did not notice that\n     Man has killed God in order to become now--\"sole God on high.\"\n     The _other world outside us_ is indeed brushed away, and the\n     great undertaking of the Illuminators completed; but the _other\n     world in us_ has become a new heaven and calls us forth to\n     renewed heaven-storming: God has had to give place, yet not to\n     us, but to--Man. How can you believe that the God-man is dead\n     before the Man in him, besides the God, is dead?\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nOWNNESS[104]\n\n\n\"Does not the spirit thirst for freedom?\"--Alas, not my spirit alone, my\nbody too thirsts for it hourly! When before the odorous castle-kitchen\nmy nose tells my palate of the savory dishes that are being prepared\ntherein, it feels a fearful pining at its dry bread; when my eyes tell\nthe hardened back about soft down on which one may lie more delightfully\nthan on its compressed straw, a suppressed rage seizes it; when--but let\nus not follow the pains further.--And you call that a longing for\nfreedom? What do you want to become free from, then? From your hardtack\nand your straw bed? Then throw them away!--But that seems not to serve\nyou: you want rather to have the freedom to enjoy delicious foods and\ndowny beds. Are men to give you this \"freedom,\"--are they to permit it\nto you? You do not hope that from their philanthropy, because you know\nthey all think like--you: each is the nearest to himself! How,\ntherefore, do you mean to come to the enjoyment of those foods and beds?\nEvidently not otherwise than in making them your property!\n\nIf you think it over rightly, you do not want the freedom to have all\nthese fine things, for with this freedom you still do not have them; you\nwant really to have them, to call them _yours_ and possess them as _your\nproperty_. Of what use is a freedom to you, indeed, if it brings in\nnothing? And, if you became free from everything, you would no longer\nhave anything; for freedom is empty of substance. Whoso knows not how to\nmake use of it, for him it has no value this useless permission; but how\nI make use of it depends on my personality.[105]\n\nI have no objection to freedom, but I wish more than freedom for you:\nyou should not merely _be rid_ of what you do not want, you should also\n_have_ what you want; you should not only be a \"freeman,\" you should be\nan \"owner\" too.\n\nFree--from what? Oh! what is there that cannot be shaken off? The yoke\nof serfdom, of sovereignty, of aristocracy and princes, the dominion of\nthe desires and passions; yes, even the dominion of one's own will, of\nself-will, for the completest self-denial is nothing but\nfreedom--freedom, to wit, from self-determination, from one's own self.\nAnd the craving for freedom as for something absolute, worthy of every\npraise, deprived us of ownness: it created self-denial. However, the\nfreer I become, the more compulsion piles up before my eyes; and the\nmore impotent I feel myself. The unfree son of the wilderness does not\nyet feel anything of all the limits that crowd a civilized man: he seems\nto himself freer than this latter. In the measure that I conquer freedom\nfor myself I create for myself new bounds and new tasks: if I have\ninvented railroads, I feel myself weak again because I cannot yet sail\nthrough the skies like the bird; and, if I have solved a problem whose\nobscurity disturbed my mind, at once there await me innumerable others,\nwhose perplexities impede my progress, dim my free gaze, make the limits\nof my _freedom_ painfully sensible to me. \"Now that you have become free\nfrom sin, you have become _servants_ of righteousness.\"[106] Republicans\nin their broad freedom, do they not become servants of the law? How true\nChristian hearts at all times longed to \"become free,\" how they pined to\nsee themselves delivered from the \"bonds of this earth-life\"! they\nlooked out toward the land of freedom. (\"The Jerusalem that is above is\nthe freewoman; she is the mother of us all.\" Gal. 4. 26.)\n\nBeing free from anything--means only being clear or rid. \"He is free\nfrom headache\" is equal to \"he is rid of it.\" \"He is free from this\nprejudice\" is equal to \"he has never conceived it\" or \"he has got rid of\nit.\" In \"less\" we complete the freedom recommended by Christianity, in\nsinless, godless, moralityless, etc.\n\nFreedom is the doctrine of Christianity. \"Ye, dear brethren, are called\nto freedom.\"[107] \"So speak and so do, as those who are to be judged by\nthe law of freedom.\"[108]\n\nMust we then, because freedom betrays itself as a Christian ideal, give\nit up? No, nothing is to be lost, freedom no more than the rest; but it\nis to become our own, and in the form of freedom it cannot.\n\nWhat a difference between freedom and ownness! One can get _rid_ of a\ngreat many things, one yet does not get rid of all; one becomes free\nfrom much, not from everything. Inwardly one may be free in spite of the\ncondition of slavery, although, too, it is again only from all sorts of\nthings, not from everything; but from the whip, the domineering temper,\netc., of the master, one does not as slave become _free_. \"Freedom lives\nonly in the realm of dreams!\" Ownness, on the contrary, is my whole\nbeing and existence, it is I myself. I am free from what I am _rid_ of,\nowner of what I have in my _power_ or what I _control_. _My own_ I am at\nall times and under all circumstances, if I know how to have myself and\ndo not throw myself away on others. To be free is something that I\ncannot truly _will_, because I cannot make it, cannot create it: I can\nonly wish it and--aspire toward it, for it remains an ideal, a spook.\nThe fetters of reality cut the sharpest welts in my flesh every moment.\nBut _my own_ I remain. Given up as serf to a master, I think only of\nmyself and my advantage; his blows strike me indeed, I am not _free_\nfrom them; but I endure them only for _my benefit_, perhaps in order to\ndeceive him and make him secure by the semblance of patience, or,\nagain, not to draw worse upon myself by contumacy. But, as I keep my eye\non myself and my selfishness, I take by the forelock the first good\nopportunity to trample the slaveholder into the dust. That I then become\n_free_ from him and his whip is only the consequence of my antecedent\negoism. Here one perhaps says I was \"free\" even in the condition of\nslavery,--to wit, \"intrinsically\" or \"inwardly.\" But \"intrinsically\nfree\" is not \"really free,\" and \"inwardly\" is not \"outwardly.\" I was\nown, on the other hand, _my own_, altogether, inwardly and outwardly.\nUnder the dominion of a cruel master my body is not \"free\" from torments\nand lashes; but it is _my_ bones that moan under the torture, _my_\nfibres that quiver under the blows, and _I_ moan because _my_ body\nmoans. That _I_ sigh and shiver proves that I have not yet lost\n_myself_, that I am still my own. My _leg_ is not \"free\" from the\nmaster's stick, but it is _my_ leg and is inseparable. Let him tear it\noff me and look and see if he still has my leg! He retains in his hand\nnothing but the--corpse of my leg, which is as little my leg as a dead\ndog is still a dog: a dog has a pulsating heart, a so-called dead dog\nhas none and is therefore no longer a dog.\n\nIf one opines that a slave may yet be inwardly free, he says in fact\nonly the most indisputable and trivial thing. For who is going to assert\nthat any man is _wholly_ without freedom? If I am an eye-servant, can I\ntherefore not be free from innumerable things, _e. g._ from faith in\nZeus, from the desire for fame, and the like? Why then should not a\nwhipped slave also be able to be inwardly free from unchristian\nsentiments, from hatred, of his enemy, etc.? He then has \"Christian\nfreedom,\" is rid of the unchristian; but has he absolute freedom,\nfreedom from everything, _e. g._ from the Christian delusion, or from\nbodily pain, etc.?\n\nIn the meantime, all this seems to be said more against names than\nagainst the thing. But is the name indifferent, and has not a word, a\nshibboleth, always inspired and--fooled men? Yet between freedom and\nownness there lies still a deeper chasm than the mere difference of the\nwords.\n\nAll the world desires freedom, all long for its reign to come. O\nenchantingly beautiful dream of a blooming \"reign of freedom,\" a \"free\nhuman race\"!--who has not dreamed it? So men shall become free, entirely\nfree, free from all constraint! From all constraint, really from all?\nAre they never to put constraint on themselves any more? \"Oh yes, that,\nof course; don't you see, that is no constraint at all?\" Well, then at\nany rate they are to become free from religious faith, from the strict\nduties of morality, from the inexorability of the law, from--\"What a\nfearful misunderstanding!\" Well, _what_ are they to be free from then,\nand what not?\n\nThe lovely dream is dissipated; awakened, one rubs his half-opened eyes\nand stares at the prosaic questioner. \"What men are to be free\nfrom?\"--From blind credulity, cries one. What's that? exclaims another,\nall faith is blind credulity; they must become free from all faith. No,\nno, for God's sake,--inveighs the first again,--do not cast all faith\nfrom you, else the power of brutality breaks in. We must have the\nrepublic,--a third makes himself heard,--and become--free from all\ncommanding lords. There is no help in that, says a fourth: we only get a\nnew lord then, a \"dominant majority\"; let us rather free ourselves from\nthis dreadful inequality.--O hapless equality, already I hear your\nplebeian roar again! How I had dreamed so beautifully just now of a\nparadise of _freedom_, and what impudence and licentiousness now raises\nits wild clamor! Thus the first laments, and gets on his feet to grasp\nthe sword against \"unmeasured freedom.\" Soon we no longer hear anything\nbut the clashing of the swords of the disagreeing dreamers of freedom.\n\nWhat the craving for freedom has always come to has been the desire for\na _particular_ freedom, _e. g._ freedom of faith; _i. e._, the believing\nman wanted to be free and independent; of what? of faith perhaps? no!\nbut of the inquisitors of faith. So now \"political or civil\" freedom.\nThe citizen wants to become free not from citizenhood, but from\nbureaucracy, the arbitrariness of princes, and the like. Prince\nMetternich once said he had \"found a way that was adapted to guide men\nin the path of _genuine_ freedom for all the future.\" The Count of\nProvence ran away from France precisely at the time when she was\npreparing the \"reign of freedom,\" and said: \"My imprisonment had become\nintolerable to me; I had only one passion, the desire for--_freedom_; I\nthought only of it.\"\n\nThe craving for a _particular_ freedom always includes the purpose of a\nnew _dominion_, as it was with the Revolution, which indeed \"could give\nits defenders the uplifting feeling that they were fighting for\nfreedom,\" but in truth only because they were after a particular\nfreedom, therefore a new _dominion_, the \"dominion of the law.\"\n\nFreedom you all want, you want _freedom_. Why then do you higgle\nover a more or less? _Freedom_ can only be the whole of freedom; a\npiece of freedom is not _freedom_. You despair of the possibility of\nobtaining the whole of freedom, freedom from everything,--yes, you\nconsider it insanity even to wish this?--Well, then leave off chasing\nafter the phantom, and spend your pains on something better than\nthe--_unattainable_.\n\n\"Ah, but there is nothing better than freedom!\"\n\nWhat have you then when you have freedom, _viz._,--for I will not speak\nhere of your piecemeal bits of freedom,--complete freedom? Then you are\nrid of everything that embarrasses you, everything, and there is\nprobably nothing that does not once in your life embarrass you and cause\nyou inconvenience. And for whose sake, then, did you want to be rid of\nit? Doubtless _for your sake_, because it is in _your_ way! But, if\nsomething were not inconvenient to you; if, on the contrary, it were\nquite to your mind (_e. g._ the gently but _irresistibly commanding_\nlook of your loved one),--then you would not want to be rid of it and\nfree from it. Why not? _For your sake_ again! So you take _yourselves_\nas measure and judge over all. You gladly let freedom go when unfreedom,\nthe \"sweet _service_ of love,\" suits _you_; and you take up your freedom\nagain on occasion when it begins to suit _you_ better,--that is,\nsupposing, which is not the point here, that you are not afraid of such\na Repeal of the Union for other (perhaps religious) reasons.\n\nWhy will you not take courage now to really make _yourselves_ the\ncentral point and the main thing altogether? Why grasp in the air at\nfreedom, your dream? Are you your dream? Do not begin by inquiring of\nyour dreams, your notions, your thoughts, for that is all \"hollow\ntheory.\" Ask yourselves and ask after yourselves--that is _practical_\nand you know you want very much to be \"practical.\" But there the one\nhearkens what his God (of course what he thinks of at the name God is\nhis God) may be going to say to it, and another what his moral feelings,\nhis conscience, his feeling of duty, may determine about it, and a third\ncalculates what folks will think of it,--and, when each has thus asked\nhis Lord God (folks are a Lord God just as good as, nay, even more\ncompact than, the other-worldly and imaginary one: _vox populi, vox\ndei_), then he accommodates himself to his Lord's will and listens no\nmore at all for what _he himself_ would like to say and decide.\n\nTherefore turn to yourselves rather than to your gods or idols. Bring\nout from yourselves what is in you, bring it to the light, bring\nyourselves to revelation.\n\nHow one acts only from himself, and asks after nothing further, the\nChristians have realized in the notion \"God.\" He acts \"as it pleases\nhim.\" And foolish man, who could do just so, is to act as it \"pleases\nGod\" instead.--If it is said that even God proceeds according to eternal\nlaws, that too fits me, since I too cannot get out of my skin, but have\nmy law in my whole nature, _i. e._ in myself.\n\nBut one needs only admonish you of yourselves to bring you to despair\nat once. \"What am I?\" each of you asks himself. An abyss of lawless and\nunregulated impulses, desires, wishes, passions, a chaos without light\nor guiding star! How am I to obtain a correct answer, if, without regard\nto God's commandments or to the duties which morality prescribes,\nwithout regard to the voice of reason, which in the course of history,\nafter bitter experiences, has exalted the best and most reasonable thing\ninto law, I simply appeal to myself? My passion would advise me to do\nthe most senseless thing possible.--Thus each deems himself\nthe--_devil_; for, if, so far as he is unconcerned about religion, etc.,\nhe only deemed himself a beast, he would easily find that the beast,\nwhich does follow only _its_ impulse (as it were, its advice), does not\nadvise and impel itself to do the \"most senseless\" things, but takes\nvery correct steps. But the habit of the religious way of thinking has\nbiased our mind so grievously that we are--terrified at _ourselves_ in\nour nakedness and naturalness; it has degraded us so that we deem\nourselves depraved by nature, born devils. Of course it comes into your\nhead at once that your calling requires you to do the \"good,\" the moral,\nthe right. Now, if you ask _yourselves_ what is to be done, how can the\nright voice sound forth from you, the voice which points the way of the\ngood, the right, the true, etc.? What concord have God and Belial?\n\nBut what would you think if one answered you by saying: \"That one is to\nlisten to God, conscience, duties, laws, etc., is flim-flam with which\npeople have stuffed your head and heart and made you crazy\"? And if he\nasked you how it is that you know so surely that the voice of nature is\na seducer? And if he even demanded of you to turn the thing about and\nactually to deem the voice of God and conscience to be the devil's work?\nThere are such graceless men; how will you settle them? You cannot\nappeal to your parsons, parents, and good men, for precisely these are\ndesignated by them as your _seducers_, as the true seducers and\ncorrupters of youth, who busily sow broadcast the tares of self-contempt\nand reverence to God, who fill young hearts with mud and young heads\nwith stupidity.\n\nBut now those people go on and ask: For whose sake do you care about\nGod's and the other commandments? You surely do not suppose that this is\ndone merely out of complaisance toward God? No, you are doing it--_for\nyour sake_ again.--Here too, therefore, _you_ are the main thing, and\neach must say to himself, _I_ am everything to myself and I do\neverything _on my account_. If it ever became clear to you that God, the\ncommandments, etc., only harm you, that they reduce and ruin _you_, to a\ncertainty you would throw them from you just as the Christians once\ncondemned Apollo or Minerva or heathen morality. They did indeed put in\nthe place of these Christ and afterward Mary, as well as a Christian\nmorality; but they did this for the sake of _their_ souls' welfare too,\ntherefore out of egoism or ownness.\n\nAnd it was by this egoism, this ownness, that they got _rid_ of the old\nworld of gods and became _free_ from it. Ownness _created_ a new\n_freedom_; for ownness is the creator of everything, as genius (a\ndefinite ownness), which is always originality, has for a long time\nalready been looked upon as the creator of new productions that have a\nplace in the history of the world.\n\nIf your efforts are ever to make \"freedom\" the issue, then exhaust\nfreedom's demands. Who is it that is to become free? You, I, we. Free\nfrom what? From everything that is not you, not I, not we. I, therefore,\nam the kernel that is to be delivered from all wrappings and--freed from\nall cramping shells. What is left when I have been freed from everything\nthat is not I? Only I; nothing but I. But freedom has nothing to offer\nto this I himself. As to what is now to happen further after I have\nbecome free, freedom is silent,--as our governments, when the prisoner's\ntime is up, merely let him go, thrusting him out into abandonment.\n\nNow why, if freedom is striven after for love of the I after all,--why\nnot choose the I himself as beginning, middle, and end? Am I not worth\nmore than freedom? Is it not I that make myself free, am not I the\nfirst? Even unfree, even laid in a thousand fetters, I yet am; and I am\nnot, like freedom, extant only in the future and in hopes, but even as\nthe most abject of slaves I am--present.\n\nThink that over well, and decide whether you will place on your banner\nthe dream of \"freedom\" or the resolution of \"egoism,\" of \"ownness.\"\n\"Freedom\" awakens your _rage_ against everything that is not you;\n\"egoism\" calls you to _joy_ over yourselves, to self-enjoyment;\n\"freedom\" is and remains a _longing_, a romantic plaint, a Christian\nhope for unearthliness and futurity; \"ownness\" is a reality, which _of\nitself_ removes just so much unfreedom as by barring your own way\nhinders you. What does not disturb you, you will not want to renounce;\nand, if it begins to disturb you, why, you know that \"you must obey\n_yourselves_ rather than men!\"\n\nFreedom teaches only: Get yourselves rid, relieve yourselves, of\neverything burdensome; it does not teach you who you yourselves are.\nRid, rid! so rings its rallying-cry, and you, eagerly following its\ncall, get rid even of yourselves, \"deny yourselves.\" But ownness calls\nyou back to yourselves, it says \"Come to yourself!\" Under the \u00e6gis of\nfreedom you get rid of many kinds of things, but something new pinches\nyou again: \"you are rid of the Evil One; evil is left.\"[109] As _own_\nyou are _really rid of everything_, and what clings to you _you have\naccepted_; it is your choice and your pleasure. The _own_ man is the\n_freeborn_, the man free to begin with; the free man, on the contrary,\nis only the _eleutheromaniac_, the dreamer and enthusiast.\n\nThe former is _originally free_, because he recognizes nothing but\nhimself; he does not need to free himself first, because at the start he\nrejects everything outside himself, because he prizes nothing more than\nhimself, rates nothing higher, because, in short, he starts from himself\nand \"comes to himself.\" Constrained by childish respect, he is\nnevertheless already working at \"freeing\" himself from this constraint.\nOwnness works in the little egoist, and procures him the\ndesired--freedom.\n\nThousands of years of civilization have obscured to you what you are,\nhave made you believe you are not egoists but are _called_ to be\nidealists (\"good men\"). Shake that off! Do not seek for freedom, which\ndoes precisely deprive you of yourselves, in \"self-denial\"; but seek for\n_yourselves_, become egoists, become each of you an _almighty ego_. Or,\nmore clearly: Just recognize yourselves again, just recognize what you\nreally are, and let go your hypocritical endeavors, your foolish mania\nto be something else than you are. Hypocritical I call them because you\nhave yet remained egoists all these thousands of years, but sleeping,\nself-deceiving, crazy egoists, you Heautontimorumenoses, you\nself-tormentors. Never yet has a religion been able to dispense with\n\"promises,\" whether they referred us to the other world or to this\n(\"long life,\" etc.); for man is _mercenary_ and does nothing \"gratis.\"\nBut how about that \"doing the good for the good's sake without prospect\nof reward? As if here too the pay was not contained in the satisfaction\nthat it is to afford. Even religion, therefore, is founded on our egoism\nand--exploits it; calculated for our _desires_, it stifles many others\nfor the sake of one. This then gives the phenomenon of _cheated_ egoism,\nwhere I satisfy, not myself, but one of my desires, _e. g._ the impulse\ntoward blessedness. Religion promises me the--\"supreme good\"; to gain\nthis I no longer regard any other of my desires, and do not slake\nthem.--All your doings are _unconfessed_, secret, covert, and concealed\negoism. But because they are egoism that you are unwilling to confess to\nyourselves, that you keep secret from yourselves, hence not manifest\nand public egoism, consequently unconscious egoism,--therefore they are\n_not egoism_, but thraldom, service, self-renunciation; you are egoists,\nand you are not, since you renounce egoism. Where you seem most to be\nsuch, you have drawn upon the word \"egoist\"--loathing and contempt.\n\nI secure my freedom with regard to the world in the degree that I make\nthe world my own, _i. e._ \"gain it and take possession of it\" for\nmyself, by whatever might, by that of persuasion, of petition, of\ncategorical demand, yes, even by hypocrisy, cheating, etc.; for the\nmeans that I use for it are determined by what I am. If I am weak, I\nhave only weak means, like the aforesaid, which yet are good enough for\na considerable part of the world. Besides, cheating, hypocrisy, lying,\nlook worse than they are. Who has not cheated the police, the law? who\nhas not quickly taken on an air of honorable loyalty before the\nsheriff's officer who meets him, in order to conceal an illegality that\nmay have been committed, etc.? He who has not done it has simply let\nviolence be done to him; he was a _weakling_ from--conscience. I know\nthat my freedom is diminished even by my not being able to carry out my\nwill on another object, be this other something without will, like a\nrock, or something with will, like a government, an individual, etc.; I\ndeny my ownness when--in presence of another--I give myself up, _i. e._\ngive way, desist, submit; therefore by _loyalty_, _submission_. For it\nis one thing when I give up my previous course because it does not lead\nto the goal, and therefore turn out of a wrong road; it is another when\nI yield myself a prisoner. I get around a rock that stands in my way,\ntill I have powder enough to blast it; I get around the laws of a\npeople, till I have gathered strength to overthrow them. Because I\ncannot grasp the moon, is it therefore to be \"sacred\" to me, an Astarte?\nIf I only could grasp you, I surely would, and, if I only find a means\nto get up to you, you shall not frighten me! You inapprehensible one,\nyou shall remain inapprehensible to me only till I have acquired the\nmight for apprehension and call you my _own_; I do not give myself up\nbefore you, but only bide my time. Even if for the present I put up with\nmy inability to touch you, I yet remember it against you.\n\nVigorous men have always done so. When the \"loyal\" had exalted an\nunsubdued power to be their master and had adored it, when they had\ndemanded adoration from all, then there came some such son of nature who\nwould not loyally submit, and drove the adored power from its\ninaccessible Olympus. He cried his \"Stand still\" to the rolling sun, and\nmade the earth go round; the loyal had to make the best of it; he laid\nhis axe to the sacred oaks, and the \"loyal\" were astonished that no\nheavenly fire consumed him; he threw the pope off Peter's chair, and the\n\"loyal\" had no way to hinder it; he is tearing down the divine-right\nbusiness, and the \"loyal\" croak in vain, and at last are silent.\n\nMy freedom becomes complete only when it is my--_might_; but by this I\ncease to be a merely free man, and become an own man. Why is the freedom\nof the peoples a \"hollow word\"? Because the peoples have no might! With\na breath of the living ego I blow peoples over, be it the breath of a\nNero, a Chinese emperor, or a poor writer. Why is it that the\nG.....[110] legislatures pine in vain for freedom, and are lectured for\nit by the cabinet ministers? Because they are not of the \"mighty\"! Might\nis a fine thing, and useful for many purposes; for \"one goes further\nwith a handful of might than with a bagful of right.\" You long for\nfreedom? You fools! If you took might, freedom would come of itself.\nSee, he who has might \"stands above the law.\" How does this prospect\ntaste to you, you \"law-abiding\" people? But you have no taste!\n\nThe cry for \"freedom\" rings loudly all around. But is it felt\nand known what a donated or chartered freedom must mean? It is not\nrecognized in the full amplitude of the word that all freedom is\nessentially--self-liberation,--_i. e._, that I can have only so much\nfreedom as I procure for myself by my ownness. Of what use is it to\nsheep that no one abridges their freedom of speech? They stick to\nbleating. Give one who is inwardly a Mohammedan, a Jew, or a Christian,\npermission to speak what he likes: he will yet utter only narrow-minded\nstuff. If, on the contrary, certain others rob you of the freedom of\nspeaking and hearing, they know quite rightly wherein lies their\ntemporary advantage, as you would perhaps be able to say and hear\nsomething whereby those \"certain\" persons would lose their credit.\n\nIf they nevertheless give you freedom, they are simply knaves who give\nmore than they have. For then they give you nothing of their own, but\nstolen wares: they give you your own freedom, the freedom that you must\ntake for yourselves; and they _give_ it to you only that you may not\ntake it and call the thieves and cheats to an account to boot. In their\nslyness they know well that given (chartered) freedom is no freedom,\nsince only the freedom one _takes_ for himself, therefore the egoist's\nfreedom, rides with full sails. Donated freedom strikes its sails as\nsoon as there comes a storm--or calm; it requires always a--gentle and\nmoderate breeze.\n\nHere lies the difference between self-liberation and emancipation\n(manumission, setting free). Those who to-day \"stand in the opposition\"\nare thirsting and screaming to be \"set free.\" The princes are to\n\"declare their peoples of age,\" _i. e._ emancipate them! Behave as if\nyou were of age, and you are so without any declaration of majority; if\nyou do not behave accordingly, you are not worthy of it, and would never\nbe of age even by a declaration of majority. When the Greeks were of\nage, they drove out their tyrants, and, when the son is of age, he makes\nhimself independent of his father. If the Greeks had waited till their\ntyrants graciously allowed them their majority, they might have waited\nlong. A sensible father throws out a son who will not come of age, and\nkeeps the house to himself; it serves the noodle right.\n\nThe man who is set free is nothing but a freedman, a _libertinus_, a dog\ndragging a piece of chain with him: he is an unfree man in the garment\nof freedom, like the ass in the lion's skin. Emancipated Jews are\nnothing bettered in themselves, but only relieved as Jews, although he\nwho relieves their condition is certainly more than a churchly\nChristian, as the latter cannot do this without inconsistency. But,\nemancipated or not emancipated, Jew remains Jew; he who is not\nself-freed is merely an--emancipated man. The Protestant State can\ncertainly set free (emancipate) the Catholics; but, because they do not\nmake themselves free, they remain simply--Catholics.\n\nSelfishness and unselfishness have already been spoken of. The friends\nof freedom are exasperated against selfishness because in their\nreligious striving after freedom they cannot--free themselves from that\nsublime thing, \"self-renunciation.\" The liberal's anger is directed\nagainst egoism, for the egoist, you know, never takes trouble about a\nthing for the sake of the thing, but for his sake: the thing must serve\nhim. It is egoistic to ascribe to no thing a value of its own, an\n\"absolute\" value, but to seek its value in me. One often hears that\npot-boiling study which is so common counted among the most repulsive\ntraits of egoistic behavior, because it manifests the most shameful\ndesecration of science; but what is science for but to be consumed? If\none does not know how to use it for anything better than to keep the pot\nboiling, then his egoism is a petty one indeed, because this egoist's\npower is a limited power; but the egoistic element in it, and the\ndesecration of science, only a possessed man can blame.\n\nBecause Christianity, incapable of letting the individual count as an\nego,[111] thought of him only as a dependent, and was properly nothing\nbut a _social theory_,--a doctrine of living together, and that of man\nwith God as well as of man with man,--therefore in it everything \"own\"\nmust fall into most woeful disrepute: selfishness, self-will, ownness,\nself-love, etc. The Christian way of looking at things has on all sides\ngradually re-stamped honorable words into dishonorable; why should they\nnot be brought into honor again? So _Schimpf_ (contumely) is in its old\nsense equivalent to jest, but for Christian seriousness pastime became a\ndishonor,[112] for that seriousness cannot take a joke; _frech_\n(impudent) formerly meant only bold, brave; _Frevel_ (wanton outrage)\nwas only daring. It is well known how askance the word \"reason\" was\nlooked at for a long time.\n\nOur language has settled itself pretty well to the Christian standpoint,\nand the general consciousness is still too Christian not to shrink in\nterror from everything unchristian as from something incomplete or evil.\nTherefore \"selfishness\" is in a bad way too.\n\nSelfishness,[113] in the Christian sense, means something like this: I\nlook only to see whether anything is of use to me as a sensual man. But\nis sensuality then the whole of my ownness? Am I in my own senses when I\nam given up to sensuality? Do I follow myself, my _own_ determination,\nwhen I follow that? I am _my own_ only when I am master of myself,\ninstead of being mastered either by sensuality or by anything else (God,\nman, authority, law, State, Church, etc.); what is of use to me, this\nself-owned or self-appertaining one, _my selfishness_ pursues.\n\nBesides, one sees himself every moment compelled to believe in that\nconstantly-blasphemed selfishness as an all-controlling power. In the\nsession of February 10, 1844, Welcker argues a motion on the dependence\nof the judges, and sets forth in a detailed speech that removable,\ndismissable, transferable, and pensionable judges--in short, such\nmembers of a court of justice as can by mere administrative process be\ndamaged and endangered,--are wholly without reliability, yes, lose all\nrespect and all confidence among the people. The whole bench, Welcker\ncries, is demoralized by this dependence! In blunt words this means\nnothing else than that the judges find it more to their advantage to\ngive judgment as the ministers would have them than to give it as the\nlaw would have them. How is that to be helped? Perhaps by bringing home\nto the judges' hearts the ignominiousness of their venality, and then\ncherishing the confidence that they will repent and henceforth prize\njustice more highly than their selfishness? No, the people does not soar\nto this romantic confidence, for it feels that selfishness is mightier\nthan any other motive. Therefore the same persons who have been judges\nhitherto may remain so, however thoroughly one has convinced himself\nthat they behaved as egoists; only they must not any longer find their\nselfishness favored by the venality of justice, but must stand so\nindependent of the government that by a judgment in conformity with the\nfacts they do not throw into the shade their own cause, their\n\"well-understood interest,\" but rather secure a comfortable combination\nof a good salary with respect among the citizens.\n\nSo Welcker and the commoners of Baden consider themselves secured only\nwhen they can count on selfishness. What is one to think, then, of the\ncountless phrases of unselfishness with which their mouths overflow at\nother times?\n\nTo a cause which I am pushing selfishly I have another relation than to\none which I am serving unselfishly. The following criterion might be\ncited for it: against the one I can _sin_ or commit a _sin_, the other I\ncan only _trifle away_, push from me, deprive myself of,--_i. e._ commit\nan imprudence. Free trade is looked at in both ways, being regarded\npartly as a freedom which may _under certain circumstances_ be granted\nor withdrawn, partly as one which is to be held _sacred under all\ncircumstances_.\n\nIf I am not concerned about a thing in and for itself, and do not desire\nit for its own sake, then I desire it solely as a _means to an end_, for\nits usefulness; for the sake of another end; _e. g._, oysters for a\npleasant flavor. Now will not every thing whose final end he himself is\nserve the egoist as means? and is he to protect a thing that serves him\nfor nothing,--_e. g._, the proletarian to protect the State?\n\nOwnness includes in itself everything own, and brings to honor again\nwhat Christian language dishonored. But ownness has not any alien\nstandard either, as it is not in any sense an _idea_ like freedom,\nmorality, humanity, and the like: it is only a description of\nthe--_owner_.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE OWNER\n\n\nI--do I come to myself and mine through liberalism?\n\nWhom does the liberal look upon as his equal? Man! Be only man, and that\nyou are anyway,--and the liberal calls you his brother. He asks very\nlittle about your private opinions and private follies, if only he can\nespy \"Man\" in you.\n\nBut, as he takes little heed of what you are _privatim_,--nay, in a\nstrict following out of his principle sets no value at all on it,--he\nsees in you only what you are _generatim_. In other words, he sees in\nyou, not _you_, but the _species_; not Tom or Jim, but Man; not the real\nor unique one,[114] but your essence or your concept; not the bodily\nman, but the _spirit_.\n\nAs Tom you would not be his equal, because he is Jim, therefore not Tom;\nas man you are the same that he is. And, since as Tom you virtually do\nnot exist at all for him (so far, to wit, as he is a liberal and not\nunconsciously an egoist), he has really made \"brother-love\" very easy\nfor himself: he loves in you not Tom, of whom he knows nothing and wants\nto know nothing, but Man.\n\nTo see in you and me nothing further than \"men,\" that is running the\nChristian way of looking at things, according to which one is for the\nother nothing but a _concept_ (_e. g._ a man called to salvation, etc.),\ninto the ground.\n\nChristianity properly so called gathers us under a less utterly general\nconcept: there we are \"sons of God\" and \"led by the Spirit of God.\"[115]\nYet not all can boast of being God's sons, but \"the same Spirit which\nwitnesses to our spirit that we are sons of God reveals also who are the\nsons of the devil.\"[116] Consequently, to be a son of God one must not\nbe a son of the devil; the sonship of God excluded certain men. To be\n_sons of men_,--_i. e._ men,--on the contrary, we need nothing but to\nbelong to the human _species_, need only to be specimens of the same\nspecies. What I am as this I is no concern of yours as a good liberal,\nbut is my _private affair_ alone; enough that we are both sons of one\nand the same mother, to wit, the human species: as \"a son of man\" I am\nyour equal.\n\nWhat am I now to you? Perhaps this _bodily I_ as I walk and stand?\nAnything but that. This bodily I, with its thoughts, decisions, and\npassions, is in your eyes a \"private affair\" which is no concern of\nyours: it is an \"affair by itself.\" As an \"affair for you\" there exists\nonly my concept, my generic concept, only _the Man_, who, as he is\ncalled Tom, could just as well be Joe or Dick. You see in me not me, the\nbodily man, but an unreal thing, the spook, _i. e._ a _Man_.\n\nIn the course of the Christian centuries we declared the most various\npersons to be \"our equals,\" but each time in the measure of that\n_spirit_ which we expected from them,--_e. g._ each one in whom the\nspirit of the need of redemption may be assumed, then later each one who\nhas the spirit of integrity, finally each one who shows a human spirit\nand a human face. Thus the fundamental principle of \"equality\" varied.\n\nEquality being now conceived as equality of the _human spirit_, there\nhas certainly been discovered an equality that includes _all_ men; for\nwho could deny that we men have a human spirit, _i. e._ no other than a\nhuman!\n\nBut are we on that account further on now than in the beginning of\nChristianity? Then we were to have a _divine spirit_, now a _human_;\nbut, if the divine did not exhaust us, how should the human wholly\nexpress what we are? Feuerbach, _e. g._, thinks that, if he humanizes\nthe divine, he has found the truth. No, if God has given us pain, \"Man\"\nis capable of pinching us still more torturingly. The long and the short\nof it is this: that we are men is the slightest thing about us, and has\nsignificance only in so far as it is one of our _qualities_,[117]\n_i. e._ our property.[118] I am indeed among other things a man, as I\nam, _e. g._, a living being, therefore an animal, or a European, a\nBerliner, and the like; but he who chose to have regard for me only as a\nman, or as a Berliner, would pay me a regard that would be very\nunimportant to me. And wherefore? Because he would have regard only for\none of my _qualities_, not for _me_.\n\nIt is just so with the _spirit_ too. A Christian spirit, an upright\nspirit, and the like may well be my acquired quality, _i. e._ my\nproperty, but I am not this spirit: it is mine, not I its.\n\nHence we have in liberalism only the continuation of the old Christian\ndepreciation of the I, the bodily Tom. Instead of taking me as I am, one\nlooks solely at my property, my qualities, and enters into marriage\nbonds with me only for the sake of my--possessions; one marries, as it\nwere, what I have, not what I am. The Christian takes hold of my spirit,\nthe liberal of my humanity.\n\nBut, if the spirit, which is not regarded as the _property_ of the\nbodily ego but as the proper ego itself, is a ghost, then the Man too,\nwho is not recognized as my quality but as the proper I, is nothing but\na spook, a thought, a concept.\n\nTherefore the liberal too revolves in the same circle as the Christian.\nBecause the spirit of mankind, _i. e._ Man, dwells in you, you are a\nman, as when the spirit of Christ dwells in you you are a Christian;\nbut, because it dwells in you only as a second ego, even though it be as\nyour proper or \"better\" ego, it remains otherworldly to you, and you\nhave to strive to become wholly man. A striving just as fruitless as the\nChristian's to become wholly a blessed spirit!\n\nOne can now, after liberalism has proclaimed Man, declare openly that\nherewith was only completed the consistent carrying out of Christianity,\nand that in truth Christianity set itself no other task from the start\nthan to realize \"man,\" the \"true man.\" Hence, then, the illusion that\nChristianity ascribes an infinite value to the _ego_ (as _e. g._ in the\ndoctrine of immortality, in the cure of souls, etc.) comes to light. No,\nit assigns this value to _Man_ alone. Only _Man_ is immortal, and only\nbecause I am man am I too immortal. In fact, Christianity had to teach\nthat no one is lost, just as liberalism too puts all on an equality as\nmen; but that eternity, like this equality, applied only to the _Man_ in\nme, not to me. Only as the bearer and harborer of Man do I not die, as\nnotoriously \"the king never dies.\" Louis dies, but the king remains; I\ndie, but my spirit, Man, remains. To identify me now entirely with Man\nthe demand has been invented, and stated, that I must become a \"real\ngeneric being.\"[119]\n\nThe HUMAN _religion_ is only the last metamorphosis of the Christian\nreligion. For liberalism is a religion because it separates my essence\nfrom me and sets it above me, because it exalts \"Man\" to the same extent\nas any other religion does its God or idol, because it makes what is\nmine into something otherworldly, because in general it makes out of\nwhat is mine, out of my qualities and my property, something alien,--to\nwit, an \"essence\"; in short, because it sets me beneath Man, and thereby\ncreates for me a \"vocation.\" But liberalism declares itself a religion\nin form too when it demands for this supreme being, Man, a zeal of\nfaith, \"a faith that some day will at last prove its fiery zeal too, a\nzeal that will be invincible.\"[120] But, as liberalism is a human\nreligion, its professor takes a _tolerant_ attitude toward the professor\nof any other (Catholic, Jewish, etc.), as Frederick the Great did\ntoward every one who performed his duties as a subject, whatever fashion\nof becoming blest he might be inclined toward. This religion is now to\nbe raised to the rank of the generally customary one, and separated from\nthe others as mere \"private follies,\" toward which, besides, one takes a\nhighly _liberal_ attitude on account of their unessentialness.\n\nOne may call it the _State-religion_, the religion of the \"free State,\"\nnot in the sense hitherto current that it is the one favored or\nprivileged by the State, but as that religion which the \"free State\" not\nonly has the right, but is compelled, to demand from each of those who\nbelong to it, let him be _privatim_ a Jew, a Christian, or anything\nelse. For it does the same service to the State as filial piety to the\nfamily. If the family is to be recognized and maintained, in its\nexisting condition, by each one of those who belong to it, then to him\nthe tie of blood must be sacred, and his feeling for it must be that of\npiety, of respect for the ties of blood, by which every blood-relation\nbecomes to him a consecrated person. So also to every member of the\nState-community this community must be sacred, and the concept which is\nthe highest to the State must likewise be the highest to him.\n\nBut what concept is the highest to the State? Doubtless that of being a\nreally human society, a society in which every one who is really a man,\n_i. e. not an un-man_, can obtain admission as a member. Let a State's\ntolerance go ever so far, toward an un-man and toward what is inhuman it\nceases. And yet this \"un-man\" is a man, yet the \"inhuman\" itself is\nsomething human, yes, possible only to a man, not to any beast; it is,\nin fact, something \"possible to man.\" But, although every un-man is a\nman, yet the State excludes him; _i. e._, it locks him up, or transforms\nhim from a fellow of the State into a fellow of the prison (fellow of\nthe lunatic asylum or hospital, according to Communism).\n\nTo say in blunt words what an un-man is is not particularly hard: it is\na man who does not correspond to the _concept_ man, as the inhuman is\nsomething human which is not conformed to the concept of the human.\nLogic calls this a \"self-contradictory judgment.\" Would it be\npermissible for one to pronounce this judgment, that one can be a man\nwithout being a man, if he did not admit the hypothesis that the concept\nof man can be separated from the existence, the essence from the\nappearance? They say, he _appears_ indeed as a man, but _is_ not a man.\n\nMen have passed this \"self-contradictory judgment\" through a long line\nof centuries! Nay, what is still more, in this long time there were\nonly--_un-men_. What individual can have corresponded to his concept?\nChristianity knows only one Man, and this one--Christ--is at once an\nun-man again in the reverse sense, to wit, a superhuman man, a \"God.\"\nOnly the--un-man is a _real_ man.\n\nMen that are not men, what should they be but _ghosts_? Every real man,\nbecause he does not correspond to the concept \"man,\" or because he is\nnot a \"generic man,\" is a spook. But do I still remain an un-man even if\nI bring Man (who towered above me and remained otherworldly to me only\nas my ideal, my task, my essence or concept) down to be my _quality_,\nmy own and inherent in me; so that Man is nothing else than my humanity,\nmy human existence, and everything that I do is human precisely because\n_I_ do it, but not because it corresponds to the _concept_ \"man\"? _I_ am\nreally Man and the un-man in one; for I am a man and at the same time\nmore than a man; _i. e._, I am the ego of this my mere quality.\n\nIt had to come to this at last, that it was no longer merely demanded of\nus to be Christians, but to become men; for, though we could never\nreally become even Christians, but always remained \"poor sinners\" (for\nthe Christian was an unattainable ideal too), yet in this the\ncontradictoriness did not come before our consciousness so, and the\nillusion was easier than now when of us, who are men and act humanly\n(yes, cannot do otherwise than be such and act so), the demand is made\nthat we are to be men, \"real men.\"\n\nOur States of to-day, because they still have all sorts of things\nsticking to them, left from their churchly mother, do indeed load those\nwho belong to them with various obligations (_e. g._ churchly\nreligiousness) which properly do not a bit concern them, the States; yet\non the whole they do not deny their significance, since they want to be\nlooked upon as _human societies_, in which man as man can be a member,\neven if he is less privileged than other members; most of them admit\nadherents of every religious sect, and receive people without\ndistinction of race or nation: Jews, Turks, Moors, etc., can become\nFrench citizens. In the act of reception, therefore, the State looks\nonly to see whether one is a _man_. The Church, as a society of\nbelievers, could not receive every man into her bosom; the State, as a\nsociety of men, can. But, when the State has carried its principle clear\nthrough, of presupposing in its constituents nothing but that they are\nmen (even the North Americans still presuppose in theirs that they have\nreligion, at least the religion of integrity, of respectability), then\nit has dug its grave. While it will fancy that those whom it possesses\nare without exception men, these have meanwhile become without exception\n_egoists_, each of whom utilizes it according to his egoistic powers and\nends. Against the egoists \"human society\" is wrecked; for they no longer\nhave to do with each other as _men_, but appear egoistically as an _I_\nagainst a You altogether different from me and in opposition to me.\n\nIf the State must count on our humanity, it is the same if one says it\nmust count on our _morality_. Seeing Man in each other, and acting as\nmen toward each other, is called moral behavior. This is every whit the\n\"spiritual love\" of Christianity. For, if I see Man in you, as in myself\nI see Man and nothing but Man, then I care for you as I would care for\nmyself; for we represent, you see, nothing but the mathematical\nproposition: A = C and B = C, consequently A = B,--_i. e._, I nothing\nbut man and you nothing but man, consequently I and you the same.\nMorality is incompatible with egoism, because the former does not allow\nvalidity to _me_, but only to the Man in me. But, if the State is a\n_society of men_, not a union of egos each of whom has only himself\nbefore his eyes, then it cannot last without morality, and must insist\non morality.\n\nTherefore we two, the State and I, are enemies. I, the egoist, have not\nat heart the welfare of this \"human society,\" I sacrifice nothing to it,\nI only utilize it; but to be able to utilize it completely I transform\nit rather into my property and my creature,--_i. e._ I annihilate it,\nand form in its place the _Union of Egoists_.\n\nSo the State betrays its enmity to me by demanding that I be a man,\nwhich presupposes that I may also not be a man, but rank for it as an\n\"un-man\"; it imposes being a man upon me as a _duty_. Further, it\ndesires me to do nothing along with which _it_ cannot last; so _its\npermanence_ is to be sacred for me. Then I am not to be an egoist, but a\n\"respectable, upright,\" _i. e._ moral, man. Enough, before it and its\npermanence I am to be impotent and respectful,--etc.\n\nThis State, not a present one indeed, but still in need of being first\ncreated, is the ideal of advancing liberalism. There is to come into\nexistence a true \"society of men,\" in which every \"man\" finds room.\nLiberalism means to realize \"Man,\" _i. e._ create a world for him; and\nthis should be the _human_ world or the general (Communistic) society of\nmen. It was said, \"The Church could regard only the spirit, the State is\nto regard the whole man.\"[121] But is not \"Man\" \"spirit\"? The kernel of\nthe State is simply \"Man,\" this unreality, and it itself is only a\n\"society of men.\" The world which the believer (believing spirit)\ncreates is called Church, the world which the man (human or humane\nspirit) creates is called State. But that is not _my_ world. I never\nexecute anything _human_ in the abstract, but always my _own_ things;\n_i. e._, _my_ human act is diverse from every other human act, and only\nby this diversity is it a real act belonging to me. The human in it is\nan abstraction, and, as such, spirit, _i. e._ abstracted essence.\n\nBr. Bauer states (_e. g._ \"_Judenfrage_,\" p. 84) that the truth of\ncriticism is the final truth, and in fact the truth sought for by\nChristianity itself,--to wit, \"Man.\" He says, \"The history of the\nChristian world is the history of the supreme fight for truth, for in\nit--and in it only!--the thing at issue is the discovery of the final or\nthe primal truth--man and freedom.\"\n\nAll right, let us accept this gain, and let us take _man_ as the\nultimately found result of Christian history and of the religious or\nideal efforts of man in general. Now, who is Man? _I_ am! _Man_, the end\nand outcome of Christianity, is, as _I_, the beginning and raw material\nof the new history, a history of enjoyment after the history of\nsacrifices, a history not of man or humanity, but of--_me_. _Man_ ranks\nas the general. Now then, I and the egoistic are the really general,\nsince every one is an egoist and of paramount importance to himself. The\nJewish is not the purely egoistic, because the Jew still devotes\n_himself_ to Jehovah; the Christian is not, because the Christian lives\non the grace of God and subjects _himself_ to him. As Jew and as\nChristian alike a man satisfies only certain of his wants, only a\ncertain need, not _himself_: a _half_-egoism, because the egoism of a\nhalf-man, who is half he, half Jew, or half his own proprietor, half a\nslave. Therefore, too, Jew and Christian always half-way exclude each\nother; _i. e._, as men they recognize each other, as slaves they\nexclude each other, because they are servants of two different masters.\nIf they could be complete egoists, they would exclude each other\n_wholly_ and hold together so much the more firmly. Their ignominy is\nnot that they exclude each other, but that this is done only _half-way_.\nBr. Bauer, on the contrary, thinks Jews and Christians cannot regard and\ntreat each other as \"men\" till they give up the separate essence which\nparts them and obligates them to eternal separation, recognize the\ngeneral essence of \"Man,\" and regard this as their \"true essence.\"\n\nAccording to his representation the defect of the Jews and the\nChristians alike lies in their wanting to be and have something\n\"particular\" instead of only being men and endeavoring after what is\nhuman,--to wit, the \"general rights of man.\" He thinks their fundamental\nerror consists in the belief that they are \"privileged,\" possess\n\"prerogatives\"; in general, in the belief in _prerogative_.[122] In\nopposition to this he holds up to them the general rights of man. The\nrights of man!--\n\n_Man is man in general_, and in so far every one who is a man. Now every\none is to have the eternal rights of man, and, according to the opinion\nof Communism, enjoy them in the complete \"democracy,\" or, as it ought\nmore correctly to be called,--anthropocracy. But it is I alone who have\neverything that I--procure for myself; as man I have nothing. People\nwould like to give every man an affluence of all good, merely because\nhe has the title \"man.\" But I put the accent on me, not on my being\n_man_.\n\nMan is something only as _my quality_[123] (property[124]), like\nmasculinity or femininity. The ancients found the ideal in one's being\n_male_ in the full sense; their virtue is _virtus_ and _arete_,--_i. e._\nmanliness. What is one to think of a woman who should want only to be\nperfectly \"woman\"? That is not given to all, and many a one would\ntherein be fixing for herself an unattainable goal. _Feminine_, on the\nother hand, she is anyhow, by nature; femininity is her quality, and she\ndoes not need \"true femininity.\" I am a man just as the earth is a star.\nAs ridiculous as it would be to set the earth the task of being a\n\"thorough star,\" so ridiculous it is to burden me with the call to be a\n\"thorough man.\"\n\nWhen Fichte says, \"The ego is all,\" this seems to harmonize perfectly\nwith my theses. But it is not that the ego _is_ all, but the ego\n_destroys_ all, and only the self-dissolving ego, the never-being ego,\nthe--_finite_ ego is really I. Fichte speaks of the \"absolute\" ego, but\nI speak of me, the transitory ego.\n\nHow natural is the supposition that _man_ and _ego_ mean the same! and\nyet one sees, _e. g._, by Feuerbach, that the expression \"man\" is to\ndesignate the absolute ego, the _species_, not the transitory,\nindividual ego. Egoism and humanity (humaneness) ought to mean the same,\nbut according to Feuerbach the individual can \"only lift himself above\nthe limits of his individuality, but not above the laws, the positive\nordinances, of his species.\"[125] But the species is nothing, and, if\nthe individual lifts himself above the limits of his individuality, this\nis rather his very self as an individual; he exists only in raising\nhimself, he exists only in not remaining what he is; otherwise he would\nbe done, dead. Man with the great M is only an ideal, the species only\nsomething thought of. To be _a_ man is not to realize the ideal of\n_Man_, but to present _oneself_, the individual. It is not how I realize\nthe _generally human_ that needs to be my task, but how I satisfy\nmyself. _I_ am my species, am without norm, without law, without model,\nand the like. It is possible that I can make very little out of myself;\nbut this little is everything, and is better than what I allow to be\nmade out of me by the might of others, by the training of custom,\nreligion, the laws, the State, etc. Better--if the talk is to be of\nbetter at all--better an unmannerly child than an old head on young\nshoulders, better a mulish man than a man compliant in everything. The\nunmannerly and mulish fellow is still on the way to form himself\naccording to his own will; the prematurely knowing and compliant one is\ndetermined by the \"species,\" the general demands, etc.,--the species is\nlaw to him. He is _determined_[126] by it; for what else is the species\nto him but his \"destiny,\"[127] his \"calling\"? Whether I look to\n\"humanity,\" the species, in order to strive toward this ideal, or to God\nand Christ with like endeavor, where is the essential dissimilarity? At\nmost the former is more washed-out than the latter. As the individual\nis the whole of nature, so he is the whole of the species too.\n\nEverything that I do, think, etc.,--in short, my expression or\nmanifestation--is indeed _conditioned_ by what I am. The Jew, _e. g._,\ncan will only thus or thus, can \"present himself\" only thus; the\nChristian can present and manifest himself only christianly, etc. If it\nwere possible that you could be a Jew or Christian, you would indeed\nbring out only what was Jewish or Christian; but it is not possible; in\nthe most rigorous conduct you yet remain an _egoist_, a sinner against\nthat concept--_i. e._, _you_ are not the precise equivalent of Jew. Now,\nbecause the egoistic always keeps peeping through, people have inquired\nfor a more perfect concept which should really wholly express what you\nare, and which, because it is your true nature, should contain all the\nlaws of your activity. The most perfect thing of the kind has been\nattained in \"Man.\" As a Jew you are too little, and the Jewish is not\nyour task; to be a Greek, a German, does not suffice. But be a--man,\nthen you have everything; look upon the human as your calling.\n\nNow I know what is expected of me, and the new catechism can be written.\nThe subject is again subjected to the predicate, the individual to\nsomething general; the dominion is again secured to an _idea_, and the\nfoundation laid for a new _religion_. This is a _step forward_ in the\ndomain of religion, and in particular of Christianity; not a step out\nbeyond it.\n\nThe step out beyond it leads into the _unspeakable_. For me paltry\nlanguage has no word, and \"the Word,\" the Logos, is to me a \"mere\nword.\"\n\n_My essence_ is sought for. If not the Jew, the German, etc., then at\nany rate it is--the man. \"Man is my essence.\"\n\nI am repulsive or repugnant to myself; I have a horror and loathing of\nmyself, I am a horror to myself, or, I am never enough for myself and\nnever do enough to satisfy myself. From such feelings springs\nself-dissolution or self-criticism. Religiousness begins with\nself-renunciation, ends with completed criticism.\n\nI am possessed, and want to get rid of the \"evil spirit.\" How do I set\nabout it? I fearlessly commit the sin that seems to the Christian the\ndirest, the sin and blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. \"He who\nblasphemes the Holy Spirit has no forgiveness forever, but is liable to\nthe eternal judgment!\"[128] I want no forgiveness, and am not afraid of\nthe judgment.\n\n_Man_ is the last evil _spirit_ or spook, the most deceptive or most\nintimate, the craftiest liar with honest mien, the father of lies.\n\nThe egoist, turning against the demands and concepts of the present,\nexecutes pitilessly the most measureless--_desecration_. Nothing is holy\nto him!\n\nIt would be foolish to assert that there is no power above mine. Only\nthe attitude that I take toward it will be quite another than that of\nthe religious age: I shall be the _enemy_ of every higher power, while\nreligion teaches us to make it our friend and be humble toward it.\n\nThe _desecrator_ puts forth his strength against every _fear of God_,\nfor fear of God would determine him in everything that he left standing\nas sacred. Whether it is the God or the Man that exercises the hallowing\npower in the God-man,--whether, therefore, anything is held sacred for\nGod's sake or for Man's (Humanity's),--this does not change the fear of\nGod, since Man is revered as \"supreme essence,\" as much as on the\nspecifically religious standpoint God as \"supreme essence\" calls for our\nfear and reverence; both overawe us.\n\nThe fear of God in the proper sense was shaken long ago, and a more or\nless conscious \"atheism,\" externally recognizable by a wide-spread\n\"unchurchliness,\" has involuntarily become the mode. But what was taken\nfrom God has been superadded to Man, and the power of humanity grew\ngreater in just the degree that that of piety lost weight: \"Man\" is the\nGod of to-day, and fear of Man has taken the place of the old fear of\nGod.\n\nBut, because Man represents only another Supreme Being, nothing has in\nfact taken place but a metamorphosis in the Supreme Being, and the fear\nof Man is merely an altered form of the fear of God.\n\nOur atheists are pious people.\n\nIf in the so-called feudal times we held everything as a fief from God,\nin the liberal period the same feudal relation exists with Man. God was\nthe Lord, now Man is the Lord; God was the Mediator, now Man is; God was\nthe Spirit, now Man is. In this threefold regard the feudal relation has\nexperienced a transformation. For now, firstly, we hold as a fief from\nall-powerful Man our _power_, which, because it comes from a higher, is\nnot called power or might, but \"right,\"--the \"rights of man\"; we further\nhold as a fief from him our position in the world, for he, the mediator,\nmediates our _intercourse_ with others, which therefore may not be\notherwise than \"human\"; finally, we hold as a fief from him\n_ourselves_,--to wit, our own value, or all that we are worth,--inasmuch\nas we are worth nothing when _he_ does not dwell in us, and when or\nwhere we are not \"human.\" The power is Man's, the world is Man's, I am\nMan's.\n\nBut am I not still unrestrained from declaring _myself_ the entitler,\nthe mediator, and the own self? Then it runs thus:\n\nMy power _is_ my property.\n\nMy power _gives_ me property.\n\nMy power _am_ I myself, and through it am I my property.\n\n\nI.--MY POWER\n\n_Right_[129] is the _spirit of society_. If society has a _will_, this\nwill is simply right: society exists only through right. But, as it\nendures only by exercising a _sovereignty_ over individuals, right is\nits SOVEREIGN WILL. Aristotle says justice is the advantage of\n_society_.\n\nAll existing right is--_foreign law_; some one makes me out to be in the\nright, \"does right by me.\" But should I therefore be in the right if all\nthe world made me out so? And yet what else is the right that I obtain\nin the State, in society, but a right of those _foreign_ to me? When a\nblockhead makes me out in the right, I grow distrustful of my rightness;\nI don't like to receive it from him. But, even when a wise man makes me\nout in the right, I nevertheless am not in the right on that account.\nWhether _I_ am in the right is completely independent of the fool's\nmaking out and of the wise man's.\n\nAll the same, we have coveted this right till now. We seek for right,\nand turn to the court for that purpose. To what? To a royal, a papal, a\npopular court, etc. Can a sultanic court declare another right than that\nwhich the sultan has ordained to be right? Can it make me out in the\nright if I seek for a right that does not agree with the sultan's law?\nCan it, _e. g._, concede to me high treason as a right, since it is\nassuredly not a right according to the sultan's mind? Can it as a court\nof censorship allow me the free utterance of opinion as a right, since\nthe sultan will hear nothing of this _my_ right? What am I seeking for\nin this court, then? I am seeking for sultanic right, not _my_ right; I\nam seeking for--_foreign_ right. As long as this foreign right\nharmonizes with mine, to be sure, I shall find in it the latter too.\n\nThe State does not permit pitching into each other man to man; it\nopposes the _duel_. Even every ordinary appeal to blows, notwithstanding\nthat neither of the fighters calls the police to it, is punished; except\nwhen it is not an I whacking away at a you, but, say, the _head of a\nfamily_ at the child. The _family_ is entitled to this, and in its name\nthe father; I as Ego am not.\n\nThe \"_Vossische Zeitung_\" presents to us the \"commonwealth of right.\"\nThere everything is to be decided by the judge and a _court_. It ranks\nthe supreme court of censorship as a \"court\" where \"right is declared\"\nWhat sort of a right? The right of the censorship. To recognize the\nsentences of that court as right one must regard the censorship as\nright. But it is thought nevertheless that this court offers a\nprotection. Yes, protection against an individual censor's error: it\nprotects only the censorship-legislator against false interpretation of\nhis will, at the same time making his statute, by the \"sacred power of\nright,\" all the firmer against writers.\n\nWhether I am in the right or not there is no judge but myself. Others\ncan judge only whether they endorse my right, and whether it exists as\nright for them too.\n\nIn the meantime let us take the matter yet another way. I am to\nreverence sultanic law in the sultanate, popular law in republics, canon\nlaw in Catholic communities, etc. To these laws I am to subordinate\nmyself; I am to regard them as sacred. A \"sense of right\" and\n\"law-abiding mind\" of such a sort is so firmly planted in people's heads\nthat the most revolutionary persons of our days want to subject us to a\nnew \"sacred law,\" the \"law of society,\" the law of mankind, the \"right\nof all,\" and the like. The right of \"all\" is to go before _my_ right. As\na right of all it would indeed be my right among the rest, since I, with\nthe rest, am included in all; but that it is at the same time a right of\nothers, or even of all others, does not move me to its upholding. Not as\na _right of all_ will I defend it, but as _my_ right; and then every\nother may see to it how he shall likewise maintain it for himself. The\nright of all (_e. g._ to eat) is a right of every individual. Let each\nkeep this right unabridged for _himself_, then all exercise it\nspontaneously; let him not take care for all though,--let him not grow\nzealous for it as for a right of all.\n\nBut the social reformers preach to us a \"_law of society_.\" There the\nindividual becomes society's slave, and is in the right only when\nsociety _makes him out_ in the right, _i. e._ when he lives according to\nsociety's _statutes_ and so is--_loyal_. Whether I am loyal under a\ndespotism or in a \"society\" _\u00e0 la_ Weitling, it is the same absence of\nright in so far as in both cases I have not _my_ right but _foreign_\nright.\n\nIn considerations of right the question is always asked, \"What or who\ngives me the right to it?\" Answer: God, love, reason, nature, humanity,\netc. No, only _your might_, _your_ power gives you the right (your\nreason, _e. g._, may give it to you).\n\nCommunism, which assumes that men \"have equal rights by nature,\"\ncontradicts its own proposition till it comes to this, that men have no\nright at all by nature. For it is not willing to recognize, _e. g._,\nthat parents have \"by nature\" rights as against their children, or the\nchildren as against the parents: it abolishes the family. Nature gives\nparents, brothers, etc., no right at all. Altogether, this entire\nrevolutionary or Babouvist principle[130] rests on a religious, _i. e._\nfalse, view of things. Who can ask after \"right\" if he does not occupy\nthe religious standpoint himself? Is not \"right\" a religious concept,\n_i. e._ something sacred? Why, \"_equality of rights_,\" as the Revolution\npropounded it, is only another name for \"Christian equality,\" the\n\"equality of the brethren,\" \"of God's children,\" \"of Christians,\" etc.:\nin short _fraternit\u00e9_. Each and every inquiry after right deserves to be\nlashed with Schillers words:\n\n  Many a year I've used my nose\n  To smell the onion and the rose;\n  Is there any proof which shows\n  That I've a right to that same nose?\n\nWhen the Revolution stamped equality as a \"right,\" it took flight into\nthe religious domain, into the region of the sacred, of the ideal.\nHence, since then, the fight for the \"sacred, inalienable rights of\nman.\" Against the \"eternal rights of man\" the \"well-earned rights of the\nestablished order\" are quite naturally, and with equal right, brought to\nbear: right against right, where of course one is decried by the other\nas \"wrong.\" This has been the _contest of rights_[131] since the\nRevolution.\n\nYou want to be \"in the right\" as against the rest. That you cannot; as\nagainst them you remain forever \"in the wrong\"; for they surely would\nnot be your opponents if they were not in \"their right\" too; they will\nalways make you out \"in the wrong.\" But, as against the right of the\nrest, yours is a higher, greater, _more powerful_ right, is it not? No\nsuch thing! Your right is not more powerful if you are not more\npowerful. Have Chinese subjects a right to freedom? Just bestow it on\nthem, and then look how far you have gone wrong in your attempt: because\nthey do not know how to use freedom they have no right to it, or, in\nclearer terms, because they have not freedom they have not the right to\nit. Children have no right to the condition of majority because they are\nnot of age, _i. e._ because they are children. Peoples that let\nthemselves be kept in nonage have no right to the condition of majority;\nif they ceased to be in nonage, then only would they have the right to\nbe of age. This means nothing else than \"What you have the _power_ to be\nyou have the _right_ to.\" I derive all right and all warrant from _me_;\nI am _entitled_ to everything that I have in my power. I am entitled to\noverthrow Zeus, Jehovah, God, etc., if I _can_; if I cannot, then these\ngods will always remain in the right and in power as against me, and\nwhat I do will be to fear their right and their power in impotent\n\"god-fearingness,\" to keep their commandments and believe that I do\nright in everything that I do according to _their_ right, about as the\nRussian boundary-sentinels think themselves rightfully entitled to shoot\ndead the suspicious persons who are escaping, since they murder \"by\nsuperior authority,\" _i. e._ \"with right.\" But I am entitled by myself\nto murder if I myself do not forbid it to myself, if I myself do not\nfear murder as a \"wrong.\" This view of things lies at the foundation of\nChamisso's poem, \"The Valley of Murder,\" where the gray-haired Indian\nmurderer compels reverence from the white man whose brethren he has\nmurdered. The only thing I am not entitled to is what I do not do with\na free cheer, _i. e._ what _I_ do not entitle myself to.\n\n_I_ decide whether it is the _right thing_ in _me_; there is no right\n_outside_ me. If it is right for _me_,[132] it is right. Possibly this\nmay not suffice to make it right for the rest; that is their care, not\nmine: let them defend themselves. And if for the whole world something\nwere not right, but it were right for me, _i. e._ I wanted it, then I\nwould ask nothing about the whole world. So every one does who knows how\nto value _himself_, every one in the degree that he is an egoist; for\nmight goes before right, and that--with perfect right.\n\nBecause I am \"by nature\" a man I have an equal right to the enjoyment of\nall goods, says Babeuf. Must he not also say: because I am \"by nature\" a\nfirst-born prince I have a right to the throne? The rights of man and\nthe \"well-earned rights\" come to the same thing in the end, to wit, to\n_nature_, which _gives_ me a right, _i. e._ to _birth_ (and, further,\ninheritance, etc.). \"I am born as a man\" is equal to \"I am born as a\nking's son.\" The natural man has only a natural right (because he has\nonly a natural power) and natural claims: he has right of birth and\nclaims of birth. But _nature_ cannot entitle me, _i. e._ give me\ncapacity or might, to that to which only my act entitles me. That the\nking's child sets himself above other children, even this is his act,\nwhich secures to him the precedence; and that the other children approve\nand recognize this act is their act, which makes them worthy to\nbe--subjects.\n\nWhether nature gives me a right, or whether God, the people's choice,\netc., does so, all of that is the same _foreign_ right, a right that _I_\ndo not give or take to myself.\n\nThus the Communists say, equal labor entitles man to equal enjoyment.\nFormerly the question was raised whether the \"virtuous\" man must not be\n\"happy\" on earth. The Jews actually drew this inference: \"That it may go\nwell with thee on earth.\" No, equal labor does not entitle you to it,\nbut equal enjoyment alone entitles you to equal enjoyment. Enjoy, then\nyou are entitled to enjoyment. But, if you have labored and let the\nenjoyment be taken from you, then--\"it serves you right.\"\n\nIf you _take_ the enjoyment, it is your right; if, on the contrary, you\nonly pine for it without laying hands on it, it remains as before, a\n\"well-earned right\" of those who are privileged for enjoyment. It is\n_their_ right, as by laying hands on it it would become _your_ right.\n\nThe conflict over the \"right of property\" wavers in vehement commotion.\nThe Communists affirm[133] that \"the earth belongs rightfully to him who\ntills it, and its products to those who bring them out.\" I think it\nbelongs to him who knows how to take it, or who does not let it be taken\nfrom him, does not let himself be deprived of it. If he appropriates it,\nthen not only the earth, but the right to it too, belongs to him. This\nis _egoistic right_: _i. e._, it is right for _me_, therefore it is\nright.\n\nAside from this, right does have \"a wax nose.\" The tiger that assails me\nis in the right, and I who strike him down am also in the right. I\ndefend against him not my _right_, but _myself_.\n\nAs human right is always something given, it always in reality reduces\nto the right which men give. _i. e._ \"concede,\" to each other. If the\nright to existence is conceded to new-born children, then they have the\nright; if it is not conceded to them, as was the case among the Spartans\nand ancient Romans, then they do not have it. For only society can give\nor concede it to them; they themselves cannot take it, or give it to\nthemselves. It will be objected, the children had nevertheless \"by\nnature\" the right to exist; only the Spartans refused _recognition_ to\nthis right. But then they simply had no right to this recognition,--no\nmore than they had to recognition of their life by the wild beasts to\nwhich they were thrown.\n\nPeople talk so much about _birthright_, and complain:\n\n  There is--alas!--no mention of the rights\n  That were born with us.[134]\n\nWhat sort of right, then, is there that was born with me? The right to\nreceive an entailed estate, to inherit a throne, to enjoy a princely or\nnoble education; or, again, because poor parents begot me, to--get free\nschooling, be clothed out of contributions of alms, and at last earn my\nbread and my herring in the coal-mines or at the loom? Are these not\nbirthrights, rights that have come down to me from my parents through\n_birth_? You think--no; you think these are only rights improperly so\ncalled, it is just these rights that you aim to abolish through the\n_real birthright_. To give a basis for this you go back to the simplest\nthing and affirm that every one is by birth _equal_ to another,--to wit,\na _man_. I will grant you that every one is born as man, hence the\nnew-born are therein _equal_ to each other. Why are they? Only because\nthey do not yet show and exert themselves as anything but\nbare--_children of men_, naked little human beings. But thereby they are\nat once different from those who have already made something out of\nthemselves, who thus are no longer bare \"children of men,\" but--children\nof their own creation. The latter possess more than bare birthrights:\nthey have _earned_ rights. What an antithesis, what a field of combat!\nThe old combat of the birthrights of man and well-earned rights. Go\nright on appealing to your birthrights; people will not fail to oppose\nto you the well-earned. Both stand on the \"ground of right\"; for each of\nthe two has a \"right\" against the other, the one the birthright or\nnatural right, the other the earned or \"well-earned\" right.\n\nIf you remain on the ground of right, you remain\nin--_Rechthaberei_.[135] The other cannot give you your right; he cannot\n\"mete out right\" to you. He who has might has--right; if you have not\nthe former, neither have you the latter. Is this wisdom so hard to\nattain? Just look at the mighty and their doings! We are talking here\nonly of China and Japan, of course. Just try it once, you Chinese and\nJapanese, to make them out in the wrong, and learn by experience how\nthey throw you into jail. (Only do not confuse with this the\n\"well-meaning counsels\" which--in China and Japan--are permitted,\nbecause they do not hinder the mighty one, but possibly _help him on_.)\nFor him who should want to make them out in the wrong there would stand\nopen only one way thereto, that of might. If he deprives them of their\n_might_, then he has _really_ made them out in the wrong, deprived them\nof their right; in any other case he can do nothing but clench his\nlittle fist in his pocket, or fall a victim as an obtrusive fool.\n\nIn short, if you Chinese and Japanese did not ask after right, and in\nparticular if you did not ask after the rights \"that were born with\nyou,\" then you would not need to ask at all after the well-earned rights\neither.\n\nYou start back in fright before others, because you think you see beside\nthem the _ghost of right_, which, as in the Homeric combats, seems to\nfight as a goddess at their side, helping them. What do you do? Do you\nthrow the spear? No, you creep around to gain the spook over to\nyourselves, that it may fight on your side: you woo for the ghost's\nfavor. Another would simply ask thus: Do I will what my opponent wills?\n\"No!\" Now then, there may fight for him a thousand devils or gods, I go\nat him all the same!\n\nThe \"commonwealth of right,\" as the \"_Vossische Zeitung_\" among others\nstands for it, asks that office-holders be removable only by the\n_judge_, not by the _administration_. Vain illusion! If it were settled\nby law that an office-holder who is once seen drunken shall lose his\noffice, then the judges would have to condemn him on the word of the\nwitnesses, etc. In short, the lawgiver would only have to state\nprecisely all the possible grounds which entail the loss of office,\nhowever laughable they might be (_e. g._ he who laughs in his superiors'\nfaces, who does not go to church every Sunday, who does not take the\ncommunion every four weeks, who runs in debt, who has disreputable\nassociates, who shows no determination, etc., shall be removed. These\nthings the lawgiver might take it into his head to prescribe, _e. g._,\nfor a court of honor); then the judge would solely have to investigate\nwhether the accused had \"become guilty\" of those \"offences,\" and, on\npresentation of the proof, pronounce sentence of removal against him \"in\nthe name of the law.\"\n\nThe judge is lost when he ceases to be _mechanical_, when he \"is\nforsaken by the rules of evidence.\" Then he no longer has anything but\nan opinion like everybody else; and, if he decides according to this\n_opinion_, his action is _no longer an official action_. As judge he\nmust decide only according to the law. Commend me rather to the old\nFrench parliaments, which wanted to examine for themselves what was to\nbe matter of right, and to register it only after their own approval.\nThey at least judged according to a right of their own, and were not\nwilling to give themselves up to be machines of the lawgiver, although\nas judges they must, to be sure, become their own machines.\n\nIt is said that punishment is the criminal's right. But impunity is just\nas much his right. If his undertaking succeeds, it serves him right,\nand, if it does not succeed, it likewise serves him right. You make your\nbed and lie in it. If some one goes foolhardily into dangers and\nperishes in them, we are apt to say, \"It serves him right; he would have\nit so.\" But, if he conquered the dangers, _i. e._ if his _might_ was\nvictorious, then he would be in the _right_ too. If a child plays with\nthe knife and gets cut, it is served right; but, if it doesn't get cut,\nit is served right too. Hence right befalls the criminal, doubtless,\nwhen he suffers what he risked; why, what did he risk it for, since he\nknew the possible consequences? But the punishment that we decree\nagainst him is only our right, not his. Our right reacts against his,\nand he is \"in the wrong at last\" because--we get the upper hand.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBut what is right, what is matter of right in a society, is voiced\ntoo--in the _law_.[136]\n\nWhatever the law may be, it must be respected by the--loyal citizen.\nThus the law-abiding mind of Old England is eulogized. To this that\nEuripidean sentiment (Orestes, 418) entirely corresponds: \"We serve the\ngods, whatever the gods are.\" _Law as such, God as such_, thus far we\nare to-day.\n\nPeople are at pains to distinguish _law_ from arbitrary _orders_, from\nan ordinance: the former comes from a duly entitled authority. But a law\nover human action (ethical law, State law, etc.) is always a\n_declaration of will_, and so an order. Yes, even if I myself gave\nmyself the law, it would yet be only my order, to which in the next\nmoment I can refuse obedience. One may well enough declare what he will\nput up with, and so deprecate the opposite by a law, making known that\nin the contrary case he will treat the transgressor as his enemy; but no\none has any business to command _my_ actions, to say what course I shall\npursue and set up a code to govern it. I must put up with it that he\ntreats me as his _enemy_, but never that he makes free with me as his\n_creature_, and that he makes _his_ reason, or even unreason, my\nplumb-line.\n\nStates last only so long as there is a _ruling will_ and this ruling\nwill is looked upon as tantamount to the own will. The lord's will\nis--law. What do your laws amount to if no one obeys them? what your\norders, if nobody lets himself be ordered? The State cannot forbear the\nclaim to determine the individual's will, to speculate and count on\nthis. For the State it is indispensable that nobody have an _own will_;\nif one had, the State would have to exclude (lock up, banish, etc.) this\none; if all had, they would do away with the State. The State is not\nthinkable without lordship and servitude (subjection); for the State\nmust will to be the lord of all that it embraces, and this will is\ncalled the \"will of the State.\"\n\nHe who, to hold his own, must count on the absence of will in others is\na thing made by these others, as the master is a thing made by the\nservant. If submissiveness ceased, it would be all over with lordship.\n\nThe _own will_ of Me is the State's destroyer; it is therefore branded\nby the State as \"self-will.\" Own will and the State are powers in deadly\nhostility, between which no \"eternal peace\" is possible. As long as the\nState asserts itself, it represents own will, its ever-hostile opponent,\nas unreasonable, evil, etc.; and the latter lets itself be talked into\nbelieving this,--nay, it really is such, for no more reason than this,\nthat it still lets itself be talked into such belief: it has not yet\ncome to itself and to the consciousness of its dignity; hence it is\nstill incomplete, still amenable to fine words, etc.\n\nEvery State is a _despotism_, be the despot one or many, or (as one is\nlikely to imagine about a republic) if all be lords, _i. e._ despotize\none over another. For this is the case when the law given at any time,\nthe expressed volition of (it may be) a popular assembly, is thenceforth\nto be _law_ for the individual, to which _obedience is due_ from him, or\ntoward which he has the _duty_ of obedience. If one were even to\nconceive the case that every individual in the people had expressed the\nsame will, and hereby a complete \"collective will\" had come into being,\nthe matter would still remain the same. Would I not be bound to-day and\nhenceforth to my will of yesterday? My will would in this case be\n_frozen_. Wretched _stability_! My creature--to wit, a particular\nexpression of will--would have become my commander. But I in my will, I\nthe creator, should be hindered in my flow and my dissolution. Because I\nwas a fool yesterday I must remain such my life long. So in the\nState-life I am at best--I might just as well say, at worst--a bondman\nof myself. Because I was a willer yesterday, I am to-day without will:\nyesterday voluntary, to-day involuntary.\n\nHow change it? Only by recognizing no _duty_, _i. e._ not _binding_\nmyself nor letting myself be bound. If I have no duty, then I know no\nlaw either.\n\n\"But they will bind me!\" My will nobody can bind, and my disinclination\nremains free.\n\n\"Why, everything must go topsy-turvy if every one could do what he\nwould!\" Well, who says that every one can do everything? What are you\nthere for, pray, you who do not need to put up with everything? Defend\nyourself, and no one will do anything to you! He who would break your\nwill has to do with you, and is your _enemy_. Deal with him as such. If\nthere stand behind you for your protection some millions more, then you\nare an imposing power and will have an easy victory. But, even if as a\npower you overawe your opponent, still you are not on that account a\nhallowed authority to him, unless he be a simpleton. He does not owe you\nrespect and regard, even though he will have to consider your might.\n\nWe are accustomed to classify States according to the different ways in\nwhich \"the supreme might\" is distributed. If an individual has\nit--monarchy; if all have it--democracy; etc. Supreme might then! Might\nagainst whom? Against the individual and his \"self-will.\" The State\npractises \"violence,\" the individual must not do so. The State's\nbehavior is violence, and it calls its violence \"law\"; that of the\nindividual, \"crime.\" Crime,[137] then,--so the individual's violence is\ncalled; and only by crime does he overcome[138] the State's violence\nwhen he thinks that the State is not above him, but he above the State.\n\nNow, if I wanted to act ridiculously, I might, as a well-meaning person,\nadmonish you not to make laws which impair my self-development,\nself-activity, self-creation. I do not give this advice. For, if you\nshould follow it, you would be unwise, and I should have been cheated of\nmy entire profit. I request nothing at all from you; for, whatever I\nmight demand, you would still be dictatorial lawgivers, and must be so,\nbecause a raven cannot sing, nor a robber live without robbery. Rather\ndo I ask those who would be egoists what they think the more\negoistic,--to let laws be given them by you, and to respect those that\nare given, or to practise _refractoriness_, yes, complete disobedience.\nGood-hearted people think the laws ought to prescribe only what is\naccepted in the people's feeling as right and proper. But what concern\nis it of mine what is accepted in the nation and by the nation? The\nnation will perhaps be against the blasphemer; therefore a law against\nblasphemy. Am I not to blaspheme on that account? Is this law to be more\nthan an \"order\" to me? I put the question.\n\nSolely from the principle that all _right_ and all _authority_ belong to\nthe _collectivity of the people_ do all forms of government arise. For\nnone of them lacks this appeal to the collectivity, and the despot, as\nwell as the president or any aristocracy, etc., acts and commands \"in\nthe name of the State.\" They are in possession of the \"authority of the\nState,\" and it is perfectly indifferent whether, were this possible, the\npeople as a _collectivity_ (all individuals) exercise this\nState-_authority_, or whether it is only the representatives of this\ncollectivity, be there many of them as in aristocracies or one as in\nmonarchies. Always the collectivity is above the individual, and has a\npower which is called _legitimate_, _i. e._ which is _law_.\n\nOver against the sacredness of the State, the individual is only a\nvessel of dishonor, in which \"exuberance, malevolence, mania for\nridicule and slander, frivolity,\" etc., are left as soon as he does not\ndeem that object of veneration, the State, to be worthy of recognition.\nThe spiritual _haughtiness_ of the servants and subjects of the State\nhas fine penalties against unspiritual \"exuberance.\"\n\nWhen the government designates as punishable an play of mind _against_\nthe State, the moderate liberals come and opine that fun, satire, wit,\nhumor, etc., must have free play anyhow, and _genius_ must enjoy\nfreedom. So not the _individual man_ indeed, but still _genius_, is to\nbe free. Here the State, or in its name the government, says with\nperfect right: He who is not for me is against me. Fun, wit, etc.,--in\nshort, the turning of State affairs into a comedy,--have undermined\nStates from of old: they are not \"innocent.\" And, further, what\nboundaries are to be drawn between guilty and innocent wit, etc.? At\nthis question the moderates fall into great perplexity, and everything\nreduces itself to the prayer that the State (government) would please\nnot be so _sensitive_, so _ticklish_; that it would not immediately\nscent malevolence in \"harmless\" things, and would in general be a little\n\"more tolerant.\" Exaggerated sensitiveness is certainly a weakness, its\navoidance may be a praiseworthy virtue; but in time of war one cannot be\nsparing, and what may be allowed under peaceable circumstances ceases to\nbe permitted as soon as a state of siege is declared. Because the\nwell-meaning liberals feel this plainly, they hasten to declare that,\nconsidering \"the devotion of the people,\" there is assuredly no danger\nto be feared. But the government will be wiser, and not let itself be\ntalked into believing anything of that sort. It knows too well how\npeople stuff one with fine words, and will not let itself be satisfied\nwith this Barmecide dish.\n\nBut they are bound to have their play-ground, for they are children, you\nknow, and cannot be so staid as old folks; boys will be boys.\n\nOnly for this play-ground, only for a few hours of jolly running about,\nthey bargain. They ask only that the State should not, like a splenetic\npapa, be too cross. It should permit some Processions of the Ass and\nplays of fools, as the church allowed them in the Middle Ages. But the\ntimes when it could grant this without danger are past. Children that\nnow once come _into the open_, and live through an hour without the rod\nof discipline, are no longer willing to go into the _cell_. For the open\nis now no longer a _supplement_ to the cell, no longer a refreshing\n_recreation_, but its _opposite_, an _aut--aut_. In short, the State\nmust either no longer put up with anything, or put up with everything\nand perish; it must be either sensitive through and through, or, like a\ndead man, insensitive. Tolerance is done with. If the State but gives a\nfinger, they take the whole hand at once. There can be no more\n\"jesting,\" and all jest, such as fun, wit, humor, etc., becomes bitter\nearnest.\n\nThe clamor of the Liberals for freedom of the press runs counter to\ntheir own principle, their proper _will_. They will what they _do not\nwill_, _i. e._ they wish, they would like. Hence it is too that they\nfall away so easily when once so-called freedom of the press appears;\nthen they would like censorship. Quite naturally. The State is sacred\neven to them; likewise morals, etc. They behave toward it only as\nill-bred brats, as tricky children who seek to utilize the weaknesses of\ntheir parents. Papa State is to permit them to say many things that do\nnot please him, but papa has the right, by a stern look, to blue-pencil\ntheir impertinent gabble. If they recognize in him their papa, they must\nin his presence put up with the censorship of speech, like every child.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIf you let yourself be made out in the right by another, you must no\nless let yourself be made out in the wrong by him; if justification and\nreward come to you from him, expect also his arraignment and punishment.\nAlongside right goes wrong, alongside legality _crime_. What are\n_you_?--_You_ are a----_criminal_!\n\n\"The criminal is in the utmost degree the State's own crime!\" says\nBettina.[139] One may let this sentiment pass, even if Bettina herself\ndoes not understand it exactly so. For in the State the unbridled I--I,\nas I belong to myself alone--cannot come to my fulfilment and\nrealization. Every ego is from birth a criminal to begin with against\nthe people, the State. Hence it is that it does really keep watch over\nall; it sees in each one an--egoist, and it is afraid of the egoist. It\npresumes the worst about each one, and takes care, police-care, that \"no\nharm happens to the State,\" _ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat_. The\nunbridled ego--and this we originally are, and in our secret inward\nparts we remain so always--is the never-ceasing criminal in the State.\nThe man whom his boldness, his will, his inconsiderateness and\nfearlessness lead is surrounded with spies by the State, by the people.\nI say, by the people! The people (think it something wonderful, you\ngood-hearted folks, what you have in the people)--the people is full of\npolice sentiments through and through.--Only he who renounces his ego,\nwho practises \"self-renunciation,\" is acceptable to the people.\n\nIn the book cited Bettina is throughout good-natured enough to regard\nthe State as only sick, and to hope for its recovery, a recovery which\nshe would bring about through the \"demagogues\";[140] but it is not sick;\nrather is it in its full strength, when it puts from it the demagogues\nwho want to acquire something for the individuals, for \"all.\" In its\nbelievers it is provided with the best demagogues (leaders of the\npeople). According to Bettina, the State is to[141] \"develop mankind's\ngerm of freedom; otherwise it is a raven-mother[142] and caring for\nraven-fodder!\" It cannot do otherwise, for in its very caring for\n\"mankind\" (which, besides, would have to be the \"humane\" or \"free\" State\nto begin with) the \"individual\" is raven-fodder for it. How rightly\nspeaks the burgomaster, on the other hand:[143] \"What? the State has no\nother duty than to be merely the attendant of incurable invalids?--That\nisn't to the point. From of old the healthy State has relieved itself of\nthe diseased matter, and not mixed itself with it. It does not need to\nbe so economical with its juices. Cut off the robber-branches without\nhesitation, that the others may bloom.--Do not shiver at the State's\nharshness; its morality, its policy and religion, point it to that.\nAccuse it of no want of feeling; its sympathy revolts against this, but\nits experience finds safety only in this severity! There are diseases in\nwhich only drastic remedies will help. The physician who recognizes the\ndisease as such, but timidly turns to palliatives, will never remove the\ndisease, but may well cause the patient to succumb after a shorter or\nlonger sickness!\" Frau Rat's question, \"If you apply death as a drastic\nremedy, how is the cure to be wrought then?\" isn't to the point. Why,\nthe State does not apply death against itself, but against an offensive\nmember; it tears out an eye that offends it, etc.\n\n\"For the invalid State the only way of salvation is to make man flourish\nin it.\"[144] If one here, like Bettina, understands by man the concept\n\"Man,\" she is right; the \"invalid\" State will recover by the\nflourishing of \"Man,\" for, the more infatuated the individuals are with\n\"Man,\" the better it serves the State's turn. But, if one referred it to\nthe individuals, to \"all\" (and the authoress half does this too, because\nabout \"Man\" she is still involved in vagueness), then it would sound\nsomewhat like the following: For an invalid band of robbers the only way\nof salvation is to make the loyal citizen flourish in it! Why, thereby\nthe band of robbers would simply go to ruin as a band of robbers; and,\nbecause it perceives this, it prefers to shoot every one who has a\nleaning toward becoming a \"steady man.\"\n\nIn this book Bettina is a patriot, or, what is little more, a\nphilanthropist, a worker for human happiness. She is discontented with\nthe existing order in quite the same way as is the title-ghost of her\nbook, along with all who would like to bring back the good old faith and\nwhat goes with it. Only she thinks, contrariwise, that the politicians,\nplace-holders, and diplomats ruined the State, while those lay it at the\ndoor of the malevolent, the \"seducers of the people.\"\n\nWhat is the ordinary criminal but one who has committed the fatal\nmistake of endeavoring after what is the people's instead of seeking for\nwhat is his? He has sought despicable _alien_ goods, has done what\nbelievers do who seek after what is God's. What does the priest who\nadmonishes the criminal do? He sets before him the great wrong of having\ndesecrated by his act what was hallowed by the State, its property (in\nwhich, of course, must be included even the life of those who belong to\nthe State); instead of this, he might rather hold up to him the fact\nthat he has befouled _himself_ in not _despising_ the alien thing, but\nthinking it worth stealing; he could, if he were not a parson. Talk with\nthe so-called criminal as with an egoist, and he will be ashamed, not\nthat he transgressed against your laws and goods, but that he considered\nyour laws worth evading, your goods worth desiring; he will be ashamed\nthat he did not--despise you and yours together, that he was too little\nan egoist. But you cannot talk egoistically with him, for you are not so\ngreat as a criminal, you--commit no crime! You do not know that an ego\nwho is his own cannot desist from being a criminal, that crime is his\nlife. And yet you should know it, since you believe that \"we are all\nmiserable sinners\"; but you think surreptitiously to get beyond sin, you\ndo not comprehend--for you are devil-fearing--that guilt is the value of\na man. Oh, if you were guilty! But now you are \"righteous.\"[145]\nWell,--just put every thing nicely to rights[146] for your master!\n\nWhen the Christian consciousness, or the Christian man, draws up a\ncriminal code, what can the concept of _crime_ be there but\nsimply--_heartlessness_? Each severing and wounding of a _heart\nrelation_, each _heartless behavior_ toward a sacred being, is crime.\nThe more heartfelt the relation is supposed to be, the more scandalous\nis the deriding of it, and the more worthy of punishment the crime.\nEvery one who is subject to the lord should love him; to deny this love\nis a high treason worthy of death. Adultery is a heartlessness worthy\nof punishment; one has no heart, no enthusiasm, no pathetic feeling for\nthe sacredness of marriage. So long as the heart or soul dictates laws,\nonly the heartful or soulful man enjoys the protection of the laws. That\nthe man of soul makes laws means properly only that the _moral_ man\nmakes them: what contradicts these men's \"moral feeling,\" this they\npenalize. How, _e. g._, should disloyalty, secession, breach of\noaths,--in short, all _radical breaking off_, all tearing asunder of\nvenerable _ties_,--not be flagitious and criminal in their eyes? He who\nbreaks with these demands of the soul has for enemies all the moral, all\nthe men of soul. Only Krummacher and his mates are the right people to\nset up consistently a penal code of the heart, as a certain bill\nsufficiently proves. The consistent legislation of the Christian State\nmust be placed wholly in the hands of the--_parsons_, and will not\nbecome pure and coherent so long as it is worked out only by--the\n_parson-ridden_, who are always only _half-parsons_. Only then will\nevery lack of soulfulness, every heartlessness, be certified as an\nunpardonable crime, only then will every agitation of the soul become\ncondemnable, every objection of criticism and doubt be anathematized;\nonly then is the own man, before the Christian consciousness, a\nconvicted--_criminal_ to begin with.\n\nThe men of the Revolution often talked of the people's \"just revenge\" as\nits \"right.\" Revenge and right coincide here. Is this an attitude of an\nego to an ego? The people cries that the opposite party has committed\n\"crimes\" against it. Can I assume that one commits a crime against me,\nwithout assuming that he has to act as I see fit? And this action I\ncall the right, the good, etc.; the divergent action, a crime. So I\nthink that the others must aim at the _same_ goal with me; _i. e._, I do\nnot treat them as unique beings[147] who bear their law in themselves\nand live according to it, but as beings who are to obey some \"rational\"\nlaw. I set up what \"Man\" is and what acting in a \"truly human\" way is,\nand I demand of every one that this law become norm and ideal to him;\notherwise he will expose himself as a \"sinner and criminal.\" But upon\nthe \"guilty\" falls the \"penalty of the law\"!\n\nOne sees here how it is \"Man\" again who sets on foot even the concept of\ncrime, of sin, and therewith that of right. A man in whom I do not\nrecognize \"Man\" is \"a sinner, a guilty one.\"\n\nOnly against a sacred thing are there criminals; you against me can\nnever be a criminal, but only an opponent. But not to hate him who\ninjures a sacred thing is in itself a crime, as St. Just cries out\nagainst Danton: \"Are you not a criminal and responsible for not having\nhated the enemies of the fatherland?\"--\n\nIf, as in the Revolution, what \"Man\" is is apprehended as \"good\ncitizen,\" then from this concept of \"Man\" we have the well-known\n\"political offences and crimes.\"\n\nIn all this the individual, the individual man, is regarded as refuse,\nand on the other hand the general man, \"Man,\" is honored. Now, according\nto how this ghost is named,--as Christian, Jew, Mussulman, good\ncitizen, loyal subject, freeman, patriot, etc.,--just so do those who\nwould like to carry through a divergent concept of man, as well as those\nwho want to put _themselves_ through, fall before victorious \"Man.\"\n\nAnd with what unction the butchery goes on here in the name of the law,\nof the sovereign people, of God, etc.!\n\nNow, if the persecuted trickily conceal and protect themselves from the\nstern parsonical judges, people stigmatize them as \"hypocrites,\" as St.\nJust, _e. g._, does those whom he accuses in the speech against\nDanton.[148] One is to be a fool, and deliver himself up to their\nMoloch.\n\nCrimes spring from _fixed ideas_. The sacredness of marriage is a fixed\nidea. From the sacredness it follows that infidelity is a _crime_, and\ntherefore a certain marriage law imposes upon it a shorter or longer\n_penalty_. But by those who proclaim \"freedom as sacred\" this penalty\nmust be regarded as a crime against freedom, and only in this sense has\npublic opinion in fact branded the marriage law.\n\nSociety would have _every one_ come to his right indeed, but yet only to\nthat which is sanctioned by society, to the society-right, not really to\n_his_ right. But _I_ give or take to myself the right out of my own\nplenitude of power, and against every superior power I am the most\nimpenitent criminal. Owner and creator of my right, I recognize no other\nsource of right than--me, neither God nor the State nor nature nor even\nman himself with his \"eternal rights of man,\" neither divine nor human\nright.\n\nRight \"in and for itself.\" Without relation to me, therefore! \"Absolute\nright.\" Separated from me, therefore! A thing that exists in and for\nitself! An absolute! An eternal right, like an eternal truth!\n\nAccording to the liberal way of thinking, right is to be obligatory for\nme because it is thus established by _human reason_, against which _my\nreason_ is \"unreason.\" Formerly people inveighed in the name of divine\nreason against weak human reason; now, in the name of strong human\nreason, against egoistic reason, which is rejected as \"unreason.\" And\nyet none is real but this very \"unreason.\" Neither divine nor human\nreason, but only your and my reason existing at any given time, is real,\nas and because you and I are real.\n\nThe thought of right is originally my thought; or, it has its origin in\nme. But, when it has sprung from me, when the \"Word\" is out, then it has\n\"become flesh,\" it is a _fixed idea_. Now I no longer get rid of the\nthought; however I turn, it stands before me. Thus men have not become\nmasters again of the thought \"right,\" which they themselves created;\ntheir creature is running away with them. This is absolute right, that\nwhich is absolved or unfastened from me. We, revering it as absolute,\ncannot devour it again, and it takes from us the creative power; the\ncreature is more than the creator, it is \"in and for itself.\"\n\nOnce you no longer let right run around free, once you draw it back into\nits origin, into you, it is _your_ right; and that is right which suits\nyou.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nRight has had to suffer an attack within itself, i. e. from the\nstandpoint of right; war being declared on the part of liberalism\nagainst \"privilege.\"[149]\n\n_Privileged_ and _endowed with equal rights_--on these two concepts\nturns a stubborn fight. Excluded or admitted--would mean the same. But\nwhere should there be a power--be it an imaginary one like God, law, or\na real one like I, you--of which it should not be true that before it\nall are \"endowed with equal rights,\" _i. e._ no respect of persons\nholds? Every one is equally dear to God if he adores him, equally\nagreeable to the law if only he is a law-abiding person; whether the\nlover of God and the law is humpbacked and lame, whether poor or rich,\nand the like, that amounts to nothing for God and the law; just so, when\nyou are at the point of drowning, you like a negro as rescuer as well as\nthe most excellent Caucasian,--yes, in this situation you esteem a dog\nnot less than a man. But to whom will not every one be also,\ncontrariwise, a preferred or disregarded person? God punishes the wicked\nwith his wrath, the law chastises the lawless, you let one visit you\nevery moment and show the other the door.\n\nThe \"equality of right\" is a phantom just because right is nothing more\nand nothing less than admission, _i. e._ a _matter of grace_, which, be\nit said, one may also acquire by his desert; for desert and grace are\nnot contradictory, since even grace wishes to be \"deserved\" and our\ngracious smile falls only to him who knows how to force it from us.\n\nSo people dream of \"all citizens of the State having to stand side by\nside, with equal rights.\" As citizens of the State they are certainly\nall equal for the State. But it will divide them, and advance them or\nput them in the rear, according to its special ends, if on no other\naccount; and still more must it distinguish them from one another as\ngood and bad citizens.\n\nBruno Bauer disposes of the Jew question from the standpoint that\n\"privilege\" is not justified. Because Jew and Christian have each some\npoint of advantage over the other, and in having this point of advantage\nare exclusive, therefore before the critic's gaze they crumble into\nnothingness. With them the State lies under the like blame, since it\njustifies their having advantages and stamps it as a \"privilege\" or\nprerogative, but thereby derogates from its calling to become a \"free\nState.\"\n\nBut now every one has something of advantage over another,--_viz._,\nhimself or his individuality; in this everybody remains exclusive.\n\nAnd, again, before a third party every one makes his peculiarity count\nfor as much as possible, and (if he wants to win him at all) tries to\nmake it appear attractive before him.\n\nNow, is the third party to be insensible to the difference of the one\nfrom the other? Do they ask that of the free State or of humanity? Then\nthese would have to be absolutely without self-interest, and incapable\nof taking an interest in any one whatever. Neither God (who divides his\nown from the wicked) nor the State (which knows how to separate good\ncitizens from bad) was thought of as so indifferent.\n\nBut they are looking for this very third party that bestows no more\n\"privilege.\" Then it is called perhaps the free State, or humanity, or\nwhatever else it may be.\n\nAs Christian and Jew are ranked low by Br. Bauer on account of their\nasserting privileges, it must be that they could and should free\nthemselves from their narrow standpoint by self-renunciation or\nunselfishness. If they threw off their \"egoism,\" the mutual wrong would\ncease, and with it Christian and Jewish religiousness in general; it\nwould be necessary only that neither of them should any longer want to\nbe anything peculiar.\n\nBut, if they gave up this exclusiveness, with that the ground on which\ntheir hostilities were waged would in truth not yet be forsaken. In case\nof need they would indeed find a third thing on which they could unite,\na \"general religion,\" a \"religion of humanity,\" and the like; in short,\nan equalization, which need not be better than that which would result\nif all Jews became Christians, by which likewise the \"privilege\" of one\nover the other would have an end. The _tension_[150] would indeed be\ndone away, but in this consisted not the essence of the two, but only\ntheir neighborhood. As being distinguished from each other they must\nnecessarily be mutually resistant,[151] and the disparity will always\nremain. Truly it is not a failing in you that you stiffen[152] yourself\nagainst me and assert your distinctness or peculiarity: you need not\ngive way or renounce yourself.\n\nPeople conceive the significance of the opposition too _formally_ and\nweakly when they want only to \"dissolve\" it in order to make room for a\nthird thing that shall \"unite.\" The opposition deserves rather to be\n_sharpened_. As Jew and Christian you are in too slight an opposition,\nand are contending only about religion, as it were about the emperor's\nbeard, about a fiddlestick's end. Enemies in religion indeed, _in the\nrest_ you still remain good friends, and equal to each other, _e. g_. as\nmen. Nevertheless the rest too is unlike in each; and the time when you\nno longer merely _dissemble_ your opposition will be only when you\nentirely recognize it, and everybody asserts himself from top to toe as\n_unique_.[153] Then the former opposition will assuredly be dissolved,\nbut only because a stronger has taken it up into itself.\n\nOur weakness consists not in this, that we are in opposition to others,\nbut in this, that we are not completely so; _i. e._ that we are not\nentirely _severed_ from them, or that we seek a \"communion,\" a \"bond,\"\nthat in communion we have an ideal. One faith, one God, one idea, one\nhat, for all! If all were brought under one hat, certainly no one would\nany longer need to take off his hat before another.\n\nThe last and most decided opposition, that of unique against unique, is\nat bottom beyond what is called opposition, but without having sunk back\ninto \"unity\" and unison. As unique you have nothing in common with the\nother any longer, and therefore nothing divisive or hostile either; you\nare not seeking to be in the right against him before a _third_ party,\nand are standing with him neither \"on the ground of right\" nor on any\nother common ground. The opposition vanishes in complete--_severance_ or\nsingleness.[154] This might indeed be regarded as the new point in\ncommon or a new parity, but here the parity consists precisely in the\ndisparity, and is itself nothing but disparity, a par of disparity, and\nthat only for him who institutes a \"comparison.\"\n\nThe polemic against privilege forms a characteristic feature of\nliberalism, which fumes against \"privilege\" because it itself appeals to\n\"right.\" Further than to fuming it cannot carry this; for privileges do\nnot fall before right falls, as they are only forms of right. But right\nfalls apart into its nothingness when it is swallowed up by might,\n_i. e._ when one understands what is meant by \"Might goes before right.\"\nAll right explains itself then as privilege, and privilege itself as\npower, as--_superior power_.\n\nBut must not the mighty combat against superior power show quite another\nface than the modest combat against privilege, which is to be fought out\nbefore a first judge, \"Right,\" according to the judge's mind?\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNow, in conclusion, I have still to take back the half-way form of\nexpression of which I was willing to make use only so long as I was\nstill rooting among the entrails of right, and letting the word at least\nstand. But, in fact, with the concept the word too loses its meaning.\nWhat I called \"my right\" is no longer \"right\" at all, because right can\nbe bestowed only by a spirit, be it the spirit of nature or that of the\nspecies, of mankind, the Spirit of God or that of His Holiness or His\nHighness, etc. What I have without an entitling spirit I have without\nright; I have it solely and alone through my _power_.\n\nI do not demand any right, therefore I need not recognize any either.\nWhat I can get by force I get by force, and what I do not get by force I\nhave no right to, nor do I give myself airs, or consolation, with my\nimprescriptible right.\n\nWith absolute right, right itself passes away; the dominion of the\n\"concept of right\" is canceled at the same time. For it is not to be\nforgotten that hitherto concepts, ideas, or principles ruled us, and\nthat among these rulers the concept of right, or of justice, played one\nof the most important parts.\n\nEntitled or unentitled--that does not concern me; if I am only\n_powerful_, I am of myself _empowered_, and need no other empowering or\nentitling.\n\nRight--is a wheel in the head, put there by a spook; power--that am I\nmyself, I am the powerful one and owner of power. Right is above me, is\nabsolute, and exists in one higher, as whose grace it flows to me: right\nis a gift of grace from the judge; power and might exist only in me the\npowerful and mighty.\n\n\nII.--MY INTERCOURSE\n\nIn society the human demand at most can be satisfied, while the egoistic\nmust always come short.\n\nBecause it can hardly escape anybody that the present shows no such\nliving interest in any question as in the \"social,\" one has to direct\nhis gaze especially to society. Nay, if the interest felt in it were\nless passionate and dazzled, people would not so much, in looking at\nsociety, lose sight of the individuals in it, and would recognize that a\nsociety cannot become new so long as those who form and constitute it\nremain the old ones. If, _e. g._, there was to arise in the Jewish\npeople a society which should spread a new faith over the earth, these\napostles could in no case remain Pharisees.\n\nAs you are, so you present yourself, so you behave toward men: a\nhypocrite as a hypocrite, a Christian as a Christian. Therefore the\ncharacter of a society is determined by the character of its members:\nthey are its creators. So much at least one must perceive even if one\nwere not willing to put to the test the concept \"society\" itself.\n\nEver far from letting _themselves_ come to their full development and\nconsequence, men have hitherto not been able to found their societies on\n_themselves_; or rather, they have been able only to found \"societies\"\nand to live in societies. The societies were always persons, powerful\npersons, so-called \"moral persons,\" _i. e._ ghosts, before which the\nindividual had the appropriate wheel in his head, the fear of ghosts. As\nsuch ghosts they may most suitably be designated by the respective names\n\"people\" and \"peoplet\": the people of the patriarchs, the people of the\nHellenes, etc., at last the--people of men, Mankind (Anacharsis Clootz\nwas enthusiastic for the \"nation\" of mankind); then every subdivision\nof this \"people,\" which could and must have its special societies, the\nSpanish, French people, etc.; within it again classes, cities, in short\nall kinds of corporations; lastly, tapering to the finest point, the\nlittle people of the--_family_. Hence, instead of saying that the person\nthat walked as ghost in all societies hitherto has been the people,\nthere might also have been named the two extremes,--to wit, either\n\"mankind\" or the \"family,\" both the most \"natural-born units.\" We choose\nthe word \"people\"[155] because its derivation has been brought into\nconnection with the Greek _polloi_, the \"many\" or \"the masses,\" but\nstill more because \"national efforts\" are at present the order of the\nday, and because even the newest mutineers have not yet shaken off this\ndeceptive person, although on the other hand the latter consideration\nmust give the preference to the expression \"mankind,\" since on all sides\nthey are going in for enthusiasm over \"mankind.\"\n\nThe people, then,--mankind or the family,--have hitherto, as it seems,\nplayed history: no _egoistic_ interest was to come up in these\nsocieties, but solely general ones, national or popular interests, class\ninterests, family interests, and \"general human interests.\" But who has\nbrought to their fall the peoples whose decline history relates? Who but\nthe egoist, who was seeking _his_ satisfaction! If once an egoistic\ninterest crept in, the society was \"corrupted\" and moved toward its\ndissolution, as Rome, _e. g._, proves with its highly developed system\nof private rights, or Christianity with the incessantly-breaking-in\n\"rational self-determination,\" \"self-consciousness,\" the \"autonomy of\nthe spirit,\" etc.\n\nThe Christian people has produced two societies whose duration will keep\nequal measure with the permanence of that people: these are the\nsocieties _State_ and _Church_. Can they be called a union of egoists?\nDo we in them pursue an egoistic, personal, own interest, or do we\npursue a popular (_i. e._ an interest of the Christian _people_), to\nwit, a State and Church interest? Can I and may I be myself in them? May\nI think and act as I will, may I reveal myself, live myself out, busy\nmyself? Must I not leave untouched the majesty of the State, the\nsanctity of the Church?\n\nWell, I may not do as I will. But shall I find in any society such an\nunmeasured freedom of maying? Certainly no! Accordingly we might be\ncontent? Not a bit! It is a different thing whether I rebound from an\nego or from a people, a generalization. There I am my opponent's\nopponent, born his equal; here I am a despised opponent, bound and under\na guardian: there I stand man to man; here I am a schoolboy who can\naccomplish nothing against his comrade because the latter has called\nfather and mother to aid and has crept under the apron, while I am well\nscolded as an ill-bred brat, and I must not \"argue\": there I fight\nagainst a bodily enemy; here against mankind, against a generalization,\nagainst a \"majesty,\" against a spook. But to me no majesty, nothing\nsacred, is a limit; nothing that I know how to overpower. Only that\nwhich I cannot overpower still limits my might; and I of limited might\nam temporarily a limited I, not limited by the might _outside_ me, but\nlimited by my _own_ still deficient might, by my _own impotence_.\nHowever, \"the Guard dies, but does not surrender!\" Above all, only a\nbodily opponent!\n\n          I dare meet every foeman\n  Whom I can see and measure with my eye,\n  Whose mettle fires my mettle for the fight,--etc.\n\nMany privileges have indeed been cancelled with time, but solely for the\nsake of the common weal, of the State and the State's weal, by no means\nfor the strengthening of me. Vassalage, _e. g._, was abrogated only that\na single liege lord, the lord of the people, the monarchical power,\nmight be strengthened: vassalage under the one became yet more rigorous\nthereby. Only in favor of the monarch, be he called \"prince\" or \"law,\"\nhave privileges fallen. In France the citizens are not, indeed, vassals\nof the king, but are instead vassals of the \"law\" (the Charter).\n_Subordination_ was retained, only the Christian State recognized that\nman cannot serve two masters (the lord of the manor and the prince,\netc.); therefore one obtained all the prerogatives; now he can again\n_place_ one above another, he can make \"men in high place.\"\n\nBut of what concern to me is the common weal? The common weal as such is\nnot _my weal_, but only the furthest extremity of _self-renunciation_.\nThe common weal may cheer aloud while I must \"down\";[156] the State may\nshine while I starve. In what lies the folly of the political liberals\nbut in their opposing the people to the government and talking of\npeople's rights? So there is the people going to be of age, etc. As if\none who has no mouth could be _muendig_![157] Only the individual is\nable to be _muendig_. Thus the whole question of the liberty of the\npress is turned upside down when it is laid claim to as a \"right of the\npeople.\" It is only a right, or better the might, of the _individual_.\nIf a people has liberty of the press, then _I_, although in the midst of\nthis people, have it not; a liberty of the people is not _my_ liberty,\nand the liberty of the press as a liberty of the people must have at its\nside a press law directed against _me_.\n\nThis must be insisted on all around against the present-day efforts for\nliberty:\n\nLiberty of the _people_ is not _my_ liberty!\n\nLet us admit these categories, liberty of the people and right of the\npeople: _e. g._ the right of the people that everybody may bear arms.\nDoes one not forfeit such a right? One cannot forfeit his own right, but\nmay well forfeit a right that belongs not to me but to the people. I may\nbe locked, up for the sake of the liberty of the people; I may, under\nsentence, incur the loss of the right to bear arms.\n\nLiberalism appears as the last attempt at a creation of the liberty of\nthe people, a liberty of the commune, of \"society,\" of the general, of\nmankind; the dream of a humanity, a people, a commune, a \"society,\"\nthat shall be of age.\n\nA people cannot be free otherwise than at the individual's expense; for\nit is not the individual that is the main point in this liberty, but the\npeople. The freer the people, the more bound the individual; the\nAthenian people, precisely at its freest time, created ostracism,\nbanished the atheists, poisoned the most honest thinker.\n\nHow they do praise Socrates for his conscientiousness, which makes nun\nresist the advice to get away from the dungeon! He is a fool that he\nconcedes to the Athenians a right to condemn him. Therefore it certainly\nserves him right; why then does he remain standing on an equal footing\nwith the Athenians? Why does he not break with them? Had he known, and\nbeen able to know, what he was, he would have conceded to such judges no\nclaim, no right. That _he did not escape_ was just his weakness, his\ndelusion of still having something in common with the Athenians, or the\nopinion that he was a member, a mere member of this people. But he was\nrather this people itself in person, and could only be his own judge.\nThere was no _judge over him_, as he himself had really pronounced a\npublic sentence on himself and rated himself worthy of the Prytaneum. He\nshould have stuck to that, and, as he had uttered no sentence of death\nagainst himself, should have despised that of the Athenians too and\nescaped. But he subordinated himself and recognized in the _people_ his\n_judge_; he seemed little to himself before the majesty of the people.\nThat he subjected himself to _might_ (to which alone he could succumb)\nas to a \"right\" was treason against himself: it was _virtue_. To\nChrist, who, it is alleged, refrained from using the power over his\nheavenly legions, the same scrupulousness is thereby ascribed by the\nnarrators. Luther did very well and wisely to have the safety of his\njourney to Worms warranted to him in black and white, and Socrates\nshould have known that the Athenians were his _enemies_, he alone his\njudge. The self-deception of a \"reign of law,\" etc., should have given\nway to the perception that the relation was a relation of _might_.\n\nIt was with pettifoggery and intrigues that Greek liberty ended. Why?\nBecause the ordinary Greeks could still less attain that logical\nconclusion which not even their hero of thought, Socrates, was able to\ndraw. What then is pettifoggery but a way of utilizing something\nestablished without doing away with it? I might add \"for one's own\nadvantage,\" but, you see, that lies in \"utilizing.\" Such pettifoggers\nare the theologians who \"wrest\" and \"force\" God's word; what would they\nhave to wrest if it were not for the \"established\" Word of God? So those\nliberals who only shake and wrest the \"established order.\" They are all\nperverters, like those perverters of the law. Socrates recognized law,\nright; the Greeks constantly retained the authority of right and law. If\nwith this recognition they wanted nevertheless to assert their\nadvantage, every one his own, then they had to seek it in perversion of\nthe law, or intrigue. Alcibiades, an intriguer of genius, introduces the\nperiod of Athenian \"decay\"; the Spartan Lysander and others show that\nintrigue had become universally Greek. Greek _law_, on which the Greek\n_States_ rested, had to be perverted and undermined by the egoists\nwithin these States, and the _States_ went down that the _individuals_\nmight become free, the Greek people fell because the individuals cared\nless for this people than for themselves. In general, all States,\nconstitutions, churches, etc., have sunk by the _secession_ of\nindividuals; for the individual is the irreconcilable enemy of every\n_generality_, every _tie_, _i. e._ every fetter. Yet people fancy to\nthis day that man needs \"sacred ties\": he, the deadly enemy of every\n\"tie.\" The history of the world shows that no tie has yet remained\nunrent, shows that man tirelessly defends himself against ties of every\nsort; and yet, blinded, people think up new ties again and again, and\nthink, _e. g._, that they have arrived at the right one if one puts upon\nthem the tie of a so-called free constitution, a beautiful,\nconstitutional tie; decoration ribbons, the ties of confidence between\n\"---- ---- ----,\" do seem gradually to have become somewhat infirm, but\npeople have made no further progress than from apron-strings to garters\nand collars.\n\n_Everything sacred is a tie, a fetter._\n\nEverything sacred is and must be perverted by perverters of the law;\ntherefore our present time has multitudes of such perverters in all\nspheres. They are preparing the way for the break-up of law, for\nlawlessness.\n\nPoor Athenians who are accused of pettifoggery and sophistry! poor\nAlcibiades, of intrigue! Why, that was just your best point, your first\nstep in freedom. Your \u00c6schylus, Herodotus, etc., only wanted to have a\nfree Greek _people_; you were the first to surmise something of _your_\nfreedom.\n\nA people represses those who tower above _its majesty_, by ostracism\nagainst too-powerful citizens, by the Inquisition against the heretics\nof the Church, by the--Inquisition against traitors in the State, etc.\n\nFor the people is concerned only with its self-assertion; it demands\n\"patriotic self-sacrifice\" from everybody. To it, accordingly, every one\n_in himself_ is indifferent, a nothing, and it cannot do, not even\nsuffer, what the individual and he alone must do,--to wit, _turn him to\naccount_. Every people, every State, is unjust toward the _egoist_.\n\nAs long as there still exists even one institution which the individual\nmay not dissolve, the ownness and self-appurtenance of Me is still very\nremote. How can I, _e. g._, be free when I must bind myself by oath to a\nconstitution, a charter, a law, \"vow body and soul\" to my people? How\ncan I be my own when my faculties may develop only so far as they \"do\nnot disturb the harmony of society\" (Weitling)?\n\nThe fall of peoples and mankind will invite _me_ to my rise.\n\nListen, even as I am writing this, the bells begin to sound, that they\nmay jingle in for to-morrow the festival of the thousand years existence\nof our dear Germany. Sound, sound its knell! You do sound solemn enough,\nas if your tongue was moved by the presentiment that it is giving convoy\nto a corpse. The German people and German peoples have behind them a\nhistory of a thousand years: what a long life! O, go to rest, never to\nrise again,--that all may become free whom you so long have held in\nfetters.--The _people_ is dead.--Up with _me_!\n\nO thou my much-tormented German people--what was thy torment? It was the\ntorment of a thought that cannot create itself a body, the torment of a\nwalking spirit that dissolves into nothing at every cock-crow and yet\npines for deliverance and fulfilment. In me too thou hast lived long,\nthou dear--thought, thou dear--spook. Already I almost fancied I had\nfound the word of thy deliverance, discovered flesh and bones for the\nwandering spirit; then I hear them sound, the bells that usher thee into\neternal rest; then the last hope fades out, then the notes of the last\nlove die away, then I depart from the desolate house of those who now\nare dead and enter at the door of the--living one:\n\n  For only he who is alive is in the right.\n\nFarewell, thou dream of so many millions; farewell, thou who hast\ntyrannized over thy children for a thousand years!\n\nTo-morrow they carry thee to the grave; soon thy sisters, the peoples,\nwill follow thee. But, when they have all followed, then----mankind is\nburied, and I am my own, I am the laughing heir!\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe word _Gesellschaft_ (society) has its origin in the word _Sal_\n(hall). If one hall encloses many persons, then the hall causes these\npersons to be in society. They _are_ in society, and at most constitute\na parlor-society by talking in the traditional forms of parlor speech.\nWhen it comes to real _intercourse_, this is to be regarded as\nindependent of society: it may occur or be lacking, without altering\nthe nature of what is named society. Those who are in the hall are a\nsociety even as mute persons, or when they put each other off solely\nwith empty phrases of courtesy. Intercourse is mutuality, it is the\naction, the _commercium_, of individuals; society is only community of\nthe hall, and even the statues of a museum-hall are in society, they are\n\"grouped.\" People are accustomed to say \"they _haben inne_[158] this\nhall in common,\" but the case is rather that the hall has us _inne_ or\nin it. So far the natural signification of the word society. In this it\ncomes out that society is not generated by me and you, but by a third\nfactor which makes associates out of us two, and that it is just this\nthird factor that is the creative one, that which creates society.\n\nJust so a prison society or prison companionship (those who enjoy[159]\nthe same prison). Here we already hit upon a third factor fuller of\nsignificance than was that merely local one, the hall. Prison no longer\nmeans a space only, but a space with express reference to its\ninhabitants: for it is a prison only through being destined for\nprisoners, without whom it would be a mere building. What gives a common\nstamp to those who are gathered in it? Evidently the prison, since it is\nonly by means of the prison that they are prisoners. What, then,\ndetermines the _manner of life_ of the prison society? The prison! What\ndetermines their intercourse? The prison too, perhaps? Certainly they\ncan enter upon intercourse only as prisoners, _i. e._ only so far as\nthe prison laws allow it; but that _they themselves_ hold intercourse, I\nwith you, this the prison cannot bring to pass; on the contrary, it must\nhave an eye to guarding against such egoistic, purely personal\nintercourse (and only as such is it really intercourse between me and\nyou). That we _jointly_ execute a job, run a machine, effectuate\nanything in general,--for this a prison will indeed provide; but that I\nforget that I am a prisoner, and engage in intercourse with you who\nlikewise disregard it, brings danger to the prison, and not only cannot\nbe caused by it, but must not even be permitted. For this reason the\nsaintly and moral-minded French chamber decides to introduce solitary\nconfinement, and other saints will do the like in order to cut off\n\"demoralizing intercourse.\" Imprisonment is the established and--sacred\ncondition, to injure which no attempt must be made. The slightest push\nof that kind is punishable, as is every uprising against a sacred thing\nby which man is to be charmed and chained.\n\nLike the hall, the prison does form a society, a companionship, a\ncommunion (_e. g._ communion of labor), but no _intercourse_, no\nreciprocity, no _union_. On the contrary, every union in the prison\nbears within it the dangerous seed of a \"plot,\" which under favorable\ncircumstances might spring up and bear fruit.\n\nYet one does not usually enter the prison voluntarily, and seldom\nremains in it voluntarily either, but cherishes the egoistic desire for\nliberty. Here, therefore, it sooner becomes manifest that personal\nintercourse is in hostile relations to the prison society and tends to\nthe dissolution of this very society, this joint incarceration.\n\nLet us therefore look about for such communions as, it seems, we remain\nin gladly and voluntarily, without wanting to endanger them by our\negoistic impulses.\n\nAs a communion of the required sort the _family_ offers itself in the\nfirst place. Parents, husband and wife, children, brothers and sisters,\nrepresent a whole or form a family, for the further widening of which\nthe collateral relatives also may be made to serve if taken into\naccount. The family is a true communion only when the law of the family,\npiety[160] or family love, is observed by its members. A son to whom\nparents, brothers, and sisters have become indifferent _has been_ a son;\nfor, as the sonship no longer shows itself efficacious, it has no\ngreater significance than the long-past connection of mother and child\nby the navel-string. That one has once lived in this bodily juncture\ncannot as a fact be undone; and so far one remains irrevocably this\nmother's son and the brother of the rest of her children; but it would\ncome to a lasting connection only by lasting piety, this spirit of the\nfamily. Individuals are members of a family in the full sense only when\nthey make the _persistence_ of the family their task; only as\n_conservative_ do they keep aloof from doubting their basis, the family.\nTo every member of the family one thing must be fixed and\nsacred,--_viz._, the family itself, or, more expressively, piety. That\nthe family is to _persist_ remains to its member, so long as he keeps\nhimself free from that egoism which is hostile to the family, an\nunassailable truth. In a word:--If the family is sacred, then nobody who\nbelongs to it may secede from it; else he becomes a \"criminal\" against\nthe family: he may never pursue an interest hostile to the family,\n_e. g._ form a misalliance. He who does this has \"dishonored the\nfamily,\" \"put it to shame,\" etc.\n\nNow, if in an individual the egoistic impulse has not force enough, he\ncomplies and makes a marriage which suits the claims of the family,\ntakes a rank which harmonizes with its position, and the like; in short,\nhe \"does honor to the family.\"\n\nIf, on the contrary, the egoistic blood flows fierily enough in his\nveins, he prefers to become a \"criminal\" against the family and to throw\noff its laws.\n\nWhich of the two lies nearer my heart, the good of the family or my\ngood? In innumerable cases both go peacefully together; the advantage of\nthe family is at the same time mine, and _vice versa_. Then it is hard\nto decide whether I am thinking _selfishly_ or _for the common benefit_,\nand perhaps I complacently flatter myself with my unselfishness. But\nthere comes the day when a necessity of choice makes me tremble, when I\nhave it in mind to dishonor my family tree, to affront parents,\nbrothers, and kindred. What then? Now it will appear how I am disposed\nat the bottom of my heart; now it will be revealed whether piety ever\nstood above egoism for me, now the selfish one can no longer skulk\nbehind the semblance of unselfishness. A wish rises in my soul, and,\ngrowing from hour to hour, becomes a passion. To whom does it occur at\nfirst blush that the slightest thought which may result adversely to the\nspirit of the family (piety) bears within it a transgression against\nthis? nay, who at once, in the first moment, becomes completely\nconscious of the matter? It happens so with Juliet in \"Romeo and\nJuliet.\" The unruly passion can at last no longer be tamed, and\nundermines the building of piety. You will say, indeed, it is from\nself-will that the family casts out of its bosom those wilful ones that\ngrant more of a hearing to their passion than to piety; the good\nProtestants used the same excuse with much success against the\nCatholics, and believed in it themselves. But it is just a subterfuge to\nroll the fault off oneself, nothing more. The Catholics had regard for\nthe common bond of the church, and thrust those heretics from them only\nbecause these did not have so much regard for the bond of the church as\nto sacrifice their convictions to it; the former, therefore, held the\nbond fast, because the bond, the Catholic (_i. e._ common and united)\nchurch, was sacred to them; the latter, on the contrary, disregarded the\nbond. Just so those who lack piety. They are not thrust out, but thrust\nthemselves out, prizing their passion, their wilfulness, higher than the\nbond of the family.\n\nBut now sometimes a wish glimmers in a less passionate and wilful heart\nthan Juliet's. The pliable girl brings herself as a _sacrifice_ to the\npeace of the family. One might say that here too selfishness prevailed,\nfor the decision came from the feeling that the pliable girl felt\nherself more satisfied by the unity of the family than by the fulfilment\nof her wish. That might be; but what if there remained a sure sign that\negoism had been sacrificed to piety? What if, even after the wish that\nhad been directed against the peace of the family was sacrificed, it\nremained at least as a recollection of a \"sacrifice\" brought to a sacred\ntie? What if the pliable girl were conscious of having left her\nself-will unsatisfied and humbly subjected herself to a higher power?\nSubjected and sacrificed, because the superstition of piety exercised\nits dominion over her!\n\nThere egoism won, here piety wins and the egoistic heart bleeds; there\negoism was strong, here it was--weak. But the weak, as we have long\nknown, are the--unselfish. For them, for these its weak members, the\nfamily cares, because they _belong_ to the family, do not belong to\nthemselves and care for themselves. This weakness Hegel, _e. g._,\npraises when he wants to have match-making left to the choice of the\nparents.\n\nAs a sacred communion to which, among the rest, the individual owes\nobedience, the family has the judicial function too vested in it; such a\n\"family court\" is described _e. g._ in the \"Cabanis\" of Wilibald Alexis.\nThere the father, in the name of the \"family council,\" puts the\nintractable son among the soldiers and thrusts him out of the family, in\norder to cleanse the smirched family again by means of this act of\npunishment.--The most consistent development of family responsibility is\ncontained in Chinese law, according to which the whole family has to\nexpiate the individual's fault.\n\nTo-day, however, the arm of family power seldom reaches far enough to\ntake seriously in hand the punishment of apostates (in most cases the\nState protects even against disinheritance). The criminal against the\nfamily (family-criminal) flees into the domain of the State and is free,\nas the State-criminal who gets away to America is no longer reached by\nthe punishments of his State. He who has shamed his family, the\ngraceless son, is protected against the family's punishment because the\nState, this protecting lord, takes away from family punishment its\n\"sacredness\" and profanes it, decreeing that it is only--\"revenge\": it\nrestrains punishment, this sacred family right, because before its, the\nState's, \"sacredness\" the subordinate sacredness of the family always\npales and loses its sanctity as soon as it comes in conflict with this\nhigher sacredness. Without the conflict, the State lets pass the lesser\nsacredness of the family; but in the opposite case it even commands\ncrime against the family, charging, _e. g._, the son to refuse obedience\nto his parents as soon as they want to beguile him to a crime against\nthe State.\n\nWell, the egoist has broken the ties of the family and found in the\nState a lord to shelter him against the grievously affronted spirit of\nthe family. But where has he run now? Straight into a new _society_, in\nwhich his egoism is awaited by the same snares and nets that it has just\nescaped. For the State is likewise a society, not a union; it is the\nbroadened _family_ (\"Father of the Country--Mother of the\nCountry--children of the country\").\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhat is called a State is a tissue and plexus of dependence and\nadherence; it is a _belonging together_, a holding together, in which\nthose who are placed together fit themselves to each other, or, in\nshort, mutually depend on each other: it is the _order_ of this\n_dependence_. Suppose the king, whose authority lends authority to all\ndown to the beadle, should vanish: still all in whom the will for order\nwas awake would keep order erect against the disorders of bestiality. If\ndisorder were victorious, the State would be at an end.\n\nBut is this thought of love, to fit ourselves to each other, to adhere\nto each other and depend on each other, really capable of winning us?\nAccording to this the State would be _love_ realized, the being for each\nother and living for each other of all. Is not self-will being lost\nwhile we attend to the will for order? Will people not be satisfied when\norder is cared for by authority, _i. e._ when authority sees to it that\nno one \"gets in the way of\" another; when, then, the _herd_ is\njudiciously distributed or ordered? Why, then everything is in \"the best\norder,\" and it is this best order that is called--State!\n\nOur societies and States _are_ without our _making_ them, are united\nwithout our uniting, are predestined and established, or have an\nindependent standing[161] of their own, are the indissolubly established\nagainst us egoists. The fight of the world to-day is, as it is said,\ndirected against the \"established.\" Yet people are wont to misunderstand\nthis as if it were only that what is now established was to be\nexchanged for another, a better, established system. But war might\nrather be declared against establishment itself, _i. e._ the _State_,\nnot a particular State, not any such thing as the mere condition of the\nState at the time; it is not another State (such as a \"people's State\")\nthat men aim at, but their _union_, uniting, this ever-fluid uniting of\neverything standing.--A State exists even without my co-operation: I am\nborn in it, brought up in it, under obligations to it, and must \"do it\nhomage.\"[162] It takes me up into its \"favor,\"[163] and I live by its\n\"grace.\" Thus the independent establishment of the State founds my lack\nof independence; its condition as a \"natural growth,\" its organism,\ndemands that my nature do not grow freely, but be cut to fit it. That\n_it_ may be able to unfold in natural growth, it applies to me the\nshears of \"civilization\"; it gives me an education and culture adapted\nto it, not to me, and teaches me _e. g._ to respect the laws, to refrain\nfrom injury to State property (_i. e._ private property), to reverence\ndivine and earthly highness, etc.; in short, it teaches me to\nbe--_unpunishable_, \"sacrificing\" my ownness to \"sacredness\" (everything\npossible is sacred, _e. g._ property, others' life, etc.). In this\nconsists the sort of civilization and culture that the State is able to\ngive me: it brings me up to be a \"serviceable instrument,\" a\n\"serviceable member of society.\"\n\nThis every State must do, the people's State as well as the absolute or\nconstitutional one. It must do so as long as we rest in the error that\nit is an _I_, as which it then applies to itself the name of a \"moral,\nmystical, or political person.\" I, who really am I, must pull off this\nlion-skin of the I from the stalking thistle-eater. What manifold\nrobbery have I not put up with in the history of the world! There I let\nsun, moon, and stars, cats and crocodiles, receive the honor of ranking\nas I; there Jehovah, Allah, and Our Father came and were invested with\nthe I; there families, tribes, peoples, and at last actually mankind,\ncame and were honored as I's; there the Church, the State, came with the\npretension to be I,--and I gazed calmly on all. What wonder if then\nthere was always a real I too that joined the company and affirmed in my\nface that it was not my _you_ but my real _I_. Why, _the_ Son of Man\n_par excellence_ had done the like; why should not a son of man do it\ntoo? So I saw my I always above me and outside me, and could never\nreally come to myself.\n\nI never believed in myself; I never believed in my present, I saw myself\nonly in the future. The boy believes he will be a proper I, a proper\nfellow, only when he has become a man; the man thinks, only in the other\nworld will he be something proper. And, to enter more closely upon\nreality at once, even the best are to-day still persuading each other\nthat one must have received into himself the State, his people, mankind,\nand what not, in order to be a real I, a \"free burgher,\" a \"citizen,\" a\n\"free or true man\"; they too see the truth and reality of me in the\nreception of an alien I and devotion to it. And what sort of an I? An I\nthat is neither an I nor a you, a _fancied_ I, a spook.\n\nWhile in the Middle Ages the church could well brook many States living\nunited in it, the States learned after the Reformation, especially after\nthe Thirty Years' War, to tolerate many churches (confessions) gathering\nunder one crown. But all States are religious and, as the case may be,\n\"Christian States,\" and make it their task to force the intractable, the\n\"egoists,\" under the bond of the unnatural, _i. e._ Christianize them.\nAll arrangements of the Christian State have the object of\n_Christianizing the people_. Thus the court has the object of forcing\npeople to justice, the school that of forcing them to mental\nculture,--in short, the object of protecting those who act Christianly\nagainst those who act unchristianly, of bringing Christian action to\n_dominion_, of making it _powerful_. Among these means of force the\nState counted the _Church_, too, it demanded a--particular religion from\neverybody. Dupin said lately against the clergy, \"Instruction and\neducation belong to the State.\"\n\nCertainly everything that regards the principle of morality is a State\naffair. Hence it is that the Chinese State meddles so much in family\nconcerns, and one is nothing there if one is not first of all a good\nchild to his parents. Family concerns are altogether State concerns with\nus too, only that our State--puts confidence in the families without\npainful oversight; it holds the family bound by the marriage tie, and\nthis tie cannot be broken without it.\n\nBut that the State makes me responsible for my principles, and demands\ncertain ones from me, might make me ask, what concern has it with the\n\"wheel in my head\" (principle)? Very much, for the State is the--_ruling\nprinciple_. It is supposed that in divorce matters, in marriage law in\ngeneral, the question is of the proportion of rights between Church and\nState. Rather, the question is of whether anything sacred is to rule\nover man, be it called faith or ethical law (morality). The State\nbehaves as the same ruler that the Church was. The latter rests on\ngodliness, the former on morality.\n\nPeople talk of the tolerance, the leaving opposite tendencies free, and\nthe like, by which civilized States are distinguished. Certainly some\nare strong enough to look with complacency on even the most unrestrained\nmeetings, while others charge their catchpolls to go hunting for\ntobacco-pipes. Yet for one State as for another the play of individuals\namong themselves, their buzzing to and fro, their daily life, is an\n_incident_ which it must be content to leave to themselves because it\ncan do nothing with this. Many, indeed, still strain out gnats and\nswallow camels, while others are shrewder. Individuals are \"freer\" in\nthe latter, because less pestered. But _I_ am free in _no_ State. The\nlauded tolerance of States is simply a tolerating of the \"harmless,\" the\n\"not dangerous\"; it is only elevation above pettymindedness, only a more\nestimable, grander, prouder--despotism. A certain State seemed for a\nwhile to mean to be pretty well elevated above _literary_ combats, which\nmight be carried on with all heat; England is elevated above _popular\nturmoil_ and--tobacco-smoking. But woe to the literature that deals\nblows at the State itself, woe to the mobs that \"endanger\" the State.\nIn that certain State they dream of a \"free science,\" in England of a\n\"free popular life.\"\n\nThe State does let individuals _play_ as freely as possible, only they\nmust not be in _earnest_, must not forget _it_. Man must not carry on\nintercourse with man _unconcernedly_, not without \"superior oversight\nand mediation.\" I must not execute all that I am able to, but only so\nmuch as the State allows; I must not turn to account _my_ thoughts, nor\n_my_ work, nor, in general, anything of mine.\n\nThe State always has the sole purpose to limit, tame, subordinate, the\nindividual--to make him subject to some _generality_ or other; it lasts\nonly so long as the individual is not all in all, and it is only the\nclearly-marked _restriction of me_, my limitation, my slavery. Never\ndoes a State aim to bring in the free activity of individuals, but\nalways that which is bound to the _purpose of the State_. Through the\nState nothing _in common_ comes to pass either, as little as one can\ncall a piece of cloth the common work of all the individual parts of a\nmachine; it is rather the work of the whole machine as a unit, _machine\nwork_. In the same style everything is done by the _State machine_ too;\nfor it moves the clockwork of the individual minds, none of which follow\ntheir own impulse. The State seeks to hinder every free activity by its\ncensorship, its supervision, its police, and holds this hindering to be\nits duty, because it is in truth a duty of self-preservation. The State\nwants to make something out of man, therefore there live in it only\n_made_ men; every one who wants to be his own self is its opponent and\nis nothing. \"He is nothing\" means as much as, The State does not make\nuse of him, grants him no position, no office, no trade, and the like.\n\nE. Bauer,[164] in the \"_Liberale Bestrebungen_,\" II, 50, is still\ndreaming of a \"government which, proceeding out of the people, can never\nstand in opposition to it.\" He does indeed (p. 69) himself take back the\nword \"government\": \"In the republic no government at all obtains, but\nonly an executive authority. An authority which proceeds purely and\nalone out of the people; which has not an independent power, independent\nprinciples, independent officers, over against the people; but which has\nits foundation, the fountain of its power and of its principles, in the\nsole, supreme authority of the State, in the people. The concept\ngovernment, therefore, is not at all suitable in the people's State.\"\nBut the thing remains the same. That which has \"proceeded, been founded,\nsprung from the fountain\" becomes something \"independent\" and, like a\nchild delivered from the womb, enters upon opposition at once. The\ngovernment, if it were nothing independent and opposing, would be\nnothing at all.\n\n\"In the free State there is no government,\" etc. (p. 94). This surely\nmeans that the people, when it is the _sovereign_, does not let itself\nbe conducted by a superior authority. Is it perchance different in\nabsolute monarchy? Is there there for the _sovereign_, perchance, a\ngovernment standing over him? _Over_ the sovereign, be he called prince\nor people, there never stands a government: that is understood of\nitself. But over _me_ there will stand a government in every \"State,\" in\nthe absolute as well as in the republican or \"free.\" _I_ am as badly off\nin one as in the other.\n\nThe republic is nothing whatever but--absolute monarchy; for it makes no\ndifference whether the monarch is called prince or people, both being a\n\"majesty.\" Constitutionalism itself proves that nobody is able and\nwilling to be only an instrument. The ministers domineer over their\nmaster the prince, the deputies over their master the people. Here,\nthen, the _parties_ at least are already free,--_videlicet_, the\noffice-holders' party (so-called people's party). The prince must\nconform to the will of the ministers, the people dance to the pipe of\nthe chambers. Constitutionalism is further than the republic, because it\nis the _State_ in incipient _dissolution_.\n\nE. Bauer denies (p. 56) that the people is a \"personality\" in the\nconstitutional State; _per contra_, then, in the republic? Well, in the\nconstitutional State the people is--a _party_, and a party is surely a\n\"personality\" if one is once resolved to talk of a \"political\" (p. 76)\nmoral person anyhow. The fact is that a moral person, be it called\npeople's party or people or even \"the Lord,\" is in no wise a person, but\na spook.\n\nFurther, E. Bauer goes on (p. 69): \"guardianship is the characteristic\nof a government.\" Truly, still more that of a people and \"people's\nState\"; it is the characteristic of all _dominion_. A people's State,\nwhich \"unites in itself all completeness of power,\" the \"absolute\nmaster,\" cannot let me become powerful. And what a chimera, to be no\nlonger willing to call the \"people's officials\" \"servants, instruments,\"\nbecause they \"execute the free, rational law-will of the people!\" (p.\n73). He thinks (p. 74): \"Only by all official circles subordinating\nthemselves to the government's views can unity be brought into the\nState\"; but his \"people's State\" is to have \"unity\" too; how will a lack\nof subordination be allowable there? subordination to the--people's\nwill.\n\n\"In the constitutional State it is the regent and his _disposition_ that\nthe whole structure of government rests on in the end.\" (_Ibid._, p.\n130.) How would that be otherwise in the \"people's State\"? Shall _I_ not\nthere be governed by the people's _disposition_ too, and does it make a\ndifference _for me_ whether I see myself kept in dependence by the\nprince's disposition or by the people's disposition, so-called \"public\nopinion\"? If dependence means as much as \"religious relation,\" as E.\nBauer rightly alleges, then in the people's State the people remains\n_for me_ the superior power, the \"majesty\" (for God and prince have\ntheir proper essence in \"majesty\") to which I stand in religious\nrelations.--Like the sovereign regent, the sovereign people too would be\nreached by no _law_. E. Bauer's whole attempt comes to a _change of\nmasters_. Instead of wanting to make the _people_ free, he should have\nhad his mind on the sole realizable freedom, his own.\n\nIn the constitutional State _absolutism_ itself has at last come in\nconflict with itself, as it has been shattered into a duality; the\ngovernment wants to be absolute, and the people wants to be absolute.\nThese two absolutes will wear out against each other.\n\nE. Bauer inveighs against the determination of the regent by _birth_, by\n_chance_. But, when \"the people\" have become \"the sole power in the\nState\" (p. 132), have _we_ not then in it a master from _chance_? Why,\nwhat is the people? The people has always been only the _body_ of the\ngovernment: it is many under one hat (a prince's hat) or many under one\nconstitution. And the constitution is the--prince. Princes and peoples\nwill persist so long as both do not _col_lapse, _i. e._ fall _together_.\nIf under one constitution there are many \"peoples,\"--_e. g._ in the\nancient Persian monarchy and to-day,--then these \"peoples\" rank only as\n\"provinces.\" For me the people is in any case an--accidental power, a\nforce of nature, an enemy that I must overcome.\n\nWhat is one to think of under the name of an \"organized\" people\n(_ibid._, p. 132)? A people \"that no longer has a government,\" that\ngoverns itself. In which, therefore, no ego stands out prominently; a\npeople organized by ostracism. The banishment of egos, ostracism, makes\nthe people autocrat.\n\nIf you speak of the people, you must speak of the prince; for the\npeople, if it is to be a subject[165] and make history, must, like\neverything that acts, have a _head_, its \"supreme head.\" Weitling sets\nthis forth in the \"Trio,\" and Proudhon declares, \"_une soci\u00e9t\u00e9, pour\nainsi dire ac\u00e9phale, ne peut vivre_.\"[166]\n\nThe _vox populi_ is now always held up to us, and \"public opinion\" is to\nrule our princes. Certainly the _vox populi_ is at the same time _vox\ndei_; but is either of any use, and is not the _vox principis_ also _vox\ndei_?\n\nAt this point the \"Nationals\" may be brought to mind. To demand of the\nthirty-eight States of Germany that they shall act as _one nation_ can\nonly be put alongside the senseless desire that thirty-eight swarms of\nbees, led by thirty-eight queen-bees, shall unite themselves into one\nswarm. _Bees_ they all remain; but it is not the bees as bees that\nbelong together and can join themselves together, it is only that the\n_subject_ bees are connected with the _ruling_ queens. Bees and peoples\nare destitute of will, and the _instinct_ of their queens leads them.\n\nIf one were to point the bees to their beehood, in which at any rate\nthey are all equal to each other, one would be doing the same thing that\nthey are now doing so stormily in pointing the Germans to their\nGermanhood. Why, Germanhood is just like beehood in this very thing,\nthat it bears in itself the necessity of cleavages and separations, yet\nwithout pushing on to the last separation, where, with the complete\ncarrying through of the process of separating, its end appears: I mean,\nto the separation of man from man. Germanhood does indeed divide itself\ninto different peoples and tribes, _i. e._ beehives; but the individual\nwho has the quality of being a German is still as powerless as the\nisolated bee. And yet only individuals can enter into union with each\nother, and all alliances and leagues of peoples are and remain\nmechanical compoundings, because those who come together, at least so\nfar as the \"peoples\" are regarded as the ones that have come together,\nare _destitute of will_. Only with the last separation does separation\nitself end and change to unification.\n\nNow the Nationals are exerting themselves to set up the abstract,\nlifeless unity of beehood; but the self-owned are going to fight for the\nunity willed by their own will, for union. This is the token of all\nreactionary wishes, that they want to set up something _general_,\nabstract, an empty, lifeless _concept_, in distinction from which the\nself-owned aspire to relieve the robust, lively _particular_ from the\ntrashy burden of generalities. The reactionaries would be glad to smite\na _people_, a _nation_, forth from the earth; the self-owned have before\ntheir eyes only themselves. In essentials the two efforts that are just\nnow the order of the day--to wit, the restoration of provincial rights\nand of the old tribal divisions (Franks, Bavarians, etc., Lusatia,\netc.), and the restoration of the entire nationality--coincide in one.\nBut the Germans will come into unison, _i. e._ unite _themselves_, only\nwhen they knock over their beehood as well as all the beehives; in other\nwords, when they are more than--Germans: only then can they form a\n\"German Union.\" They must not want to turn back into their nationality,\ninto the womb, in order to be born again, but let every one turn in _to\nhimself_. How ridiculously sentimental when one German grasps another's\nhand and presses it with sacred awe because \"he too is a German\"! With\nthat he is something great! But this will certainly still be thought\ntouching as long as people are enthusiastic for \"brotherliness,\" _i. e._\nas long as they have a \"_family disposition_.\" From the superstition of\n\"piety,\" from \"brotherliness\" or \"childlikeness\" or however else the\nsoft-hearted piety-phrases run,--from the _family spirit_,--the\nNationals, who want to have a great _family of Germans_, cannot liberate\nthemselves.\n\nAside from this, the so-called Nationals would only have to understand\nthemselves rightly in order to lift themselves out of their juncture\nwith the good-natured Teutomaniacs. For the uniting for material ends\nand interests, which they demand of the Germans, comes to nothing else\nthan a voluntary union. Carriere, inspired, cries out,[167] \"Railroads\nare to the more penetrating eye the way to a _life of the people_ such\nas has not yet anywhere appeared in such significance.\" Quite right, it\nwill be a life of the people that has nowhere appeared, because it is\nnot a--life of the people.--So Carriere then combats himself (p. 10):\n\"Pure humanity or manhood cannot be better represented than by a people\nfulfilling its mission.\" Why, by this nationality only is represented.\n\"Washed-out generality is lower than the form complete in itself, which\nis itself a whole, and lives as a living member of the truly general,\nthe organized.\" Why, the people is this very \"washed-out generality,\"\nand it is only a man that is the \"form complete in itself.\"\n\nThe impersonality of what they call \"people, nation,\" is clear also from\nthis: that a people which wants to bring its I into view to the best of\nits power puts at its head the ruler _without will_. It finds itself in\nthe alternative either to be subjected to a prince who realizes only\n_himself, his individual_ pleasure--then it does not recognize in the\n\"absolute master\" its own will, the so-called will of the people--, or\nto seat on the throne a prince who gives effect to _no_ will of his\n_own_--then it has a prince _without will_, whose place some ingenious\nclockwork would perhaps fill just as well.--Therefore insight need go\nonly a step farther; then it becomes clear of itself that the I of the\npeople is an impersonal, \"spiritual\" power, the--law. The people's I,\ntherefore, is a--spook, not an I. I am I only by this, that I make\nmyself; _i. e._ that it is not another who makes me, but I must be my\nown work. But how is it with this I of the people? _Chance_ plays it\ninto the people's hand, chance gives it this or that born lord,\naccidents procure it the chosen one; he is not its (the \"_sovereign_\"\npeople's) product, as I am _my_ product. Conceive of one wanting to talk\nyou into believing that you were not your I, but Tom or Jack was your I!\nBut so it is with the people, and rightly. For the people has an I as\nlittle as the eleven planets counted together have an _I_, though they\nrevolve around a common _centre_.\n\nBailly's utterance is representative of the slave-disposition that folks\nmanifest before the sovereign people, as before the prince. \"I have,\"\nsays he, \"no longer any extra reason when the general reason has\npronounced itself. My first law was the nation's will; as soon as it had\nassembled I knew nothing beyond its sovereign will.\" He would have no\n\"extra reason,\" and yet this extra reason alone accomplishes everything.\nJust so Mirabeau inveighs in the words, \"No power on earth has the\n_right_ to say to the nation's representatives, It is my will!\"\n\nAs with the Greeks, there is now a wish to make man a _zoon politicon_,\na citizen of the State or political man. So he ranked for a long time as\na \"citizen of heaven.\" But the Greek fell into ignominy along with his\n_State_, the citizen of heaven likewise falls with heaven; we, on the\nother hand, are not willing to go down along with the _people_, the\nnation and nationality, not willing to be merely _political_ men or\npoliticians. Since the Revolution they have striven to \"make the people\nhappy,\" and in making the people happy, great, and the like, they make\nUs unhappy: the people's good hap is--my mishap.\n\nWhat empty talk the political liberals utter with emphatic decorum is\nwell seen again in Nauwerk's \"On Taking Part in the State.\" There\ncomplaint is made of those who are indifferent and do not take part, who\nare not in the full sense citizens, and the author speaks as if one\ncould not be man at all if one did not take a lively part in State\naffairs, _i. e._ if one were not a politician. In this he is right; for,\nif the State ranks as the warder of everything \"human,\" we can have\nnothing human without taking part in it. But what does this make out\nagainst the egoist? Nothing at all, because the egoist is to himself the\nwarder of the human, and has nothing to say to the State except \"Get out\nof my sunshine.\" Only when the State comes in contact with his ownness\ndoes the egoist take an active interest in it. If the condition of the\nState does not bear hard on the closet-philosopher, is he to occupy\nhimself with it because it is his \"most sacred duty\"? So long as the\nState does according to his wish, what need has he to look up from his\nstudies? Let those who from an interest of their own want to have\nconditions otherwise busy themselves with them. Not now, nor evermore,\nwill \"sacred duty\" bring folks to reflect about the State,--as little as\nthey become disciples of science, artists, etc., from \"sacred duty.\"\nEgoism alone can impel them to it, and will as soon as things have\nbecome much worse. If you showed folks that their egoism demanded that\nthey busy themselves with State affairs, you would not have to call on\nthem long; if, on the other hand, you appeal to their love of fatherland\nand the like, you will long preach to deaf hearts in behalf of this\n\"service of love.\" Certainly, in your sense the egoists will not\nparticipate in State affairs at all.\n\nNauwerk utters a genuine liberal phrase on p. 16: \"Man completely\nfulfils his calling only in feeling and knowing himself as a member of\nhumanity, and being active as such. The individual cannot realize the\nidea of _manhood_ if he does not stay himself upon all humanity, if he\ndoes not draw his powers from it like Ant\u00e6us.\"\n\nIn the same place it is said: \"Man's relation to the _res publica_ is\ndegraded to a purely private matter by the theological view; is,\naccordingly, made away with by denial.\" As if the political view did\notherwise with religion! There religion is a \"private matter.\"\n\nIf, instead of \"sacred duty,\" \"man's destiny,\" the \"calling to full\nmanhood,\" and similar commandments, it were held up to people that their\n_self-interest_ was infringed on when they let everything in the State\ngo as it goes, then, without declamations, they would be addressed as\none will have to address them at the decisive moment if he wants to\nattain his end. Instead of this, the theology-hating author says, \"If\nthere has ever been a time when the _State_ laid claim to all that are\n_hers_, such a time is ours.--The thinking man sees in participation in\nthe theory and practice of the State a _duty_, one of the most sacred\nduties that rest upon him\"--and then takes under closer consideration\nthe \"unconditional necessity that everybody participate in the State.\"\n\nHe in whose head or heart or both the _State_ is seated, he who is\npossessed by the State, or the _believer in the State_, is a politician,\nand remains such to all eternity.\n\n\"The State is the most necessary means for the complete development of\nmankind.\" It assuredly has been so as long as we wanted to develop\nmankind; but, if we want to develop ourselves, it can be to us only a\nmeans of hindrance.\n\nCan State and people still be reformed and bettered now? As little as\nthe nobility, the clergy, the church, etc.: they can be abrogated,\nannihilated, done away with, not reformed. Can I change a piece of\nnonsense into sense by reforming it, or must I drop it outright?\n\nHenceforth what is to be done is no longer about the _State_ (the form\nof the State, etc.), but about me. With this all questions about the\nprince's power, the constitution, etc., sink into their true abyss and\ntheir true nothingness. I, this nothing, shall put forth my _creations_\nfrom myself.\n\nTo the chapter of society belongs also \"the party,\" whose praise has of\nlate been sung.\n\nIn the State the _party_ is current. \"Party, party, who should not join\none!\" But the individual is _unique_,[168] not a member of the party. He\nunites freely, and separates freely again. The party is nothing but a\nState in the State, and in this smaller bee-State \"peace\" is also to\nrule just as in the greater. The very people who cry loudest that there\nmust be an _opposition_ in the State inveigh against every discord in\nthe party. A proof that they too want only a--State. All parties are\nshattered not against the State, but against the ego.[169]\n\nOne hears nothing oftener now than the admonition to remain true to his\nparty; party men despise nothing so much as a mugwump. One must run with\nhis party through thick and thin, and unconditionally approve and\nrepresent its chief principles. It does not indeed go quite so badly\nhere as with closed societies, because these bind their members to fixed\nlaws or statutes (_e. g._ the orders, the Society of Jesus, etc.). But\nyet the party ceases to be a union at the same moment at which it makes\ncertain principles _binding_ and wants to have them assured against\nattacks; but this moment is the very birth-act of the party. As party it\nis already a _born society_, a dead union, an idea that has become\nfixed. As party of absolutism it cannot will that its members should\ndoubt the irrefragable truth of this principle; they could cherish this\ndoubt only if they were egoistic enough to want still to be something\noutside their party, _i. e._ non-partisans. Non-partisan they cannot be\nas party-men, but only as egoists. If you are a Protestant and belong to\nthat party, you must only justify Protestantism, at most \"purge\" it, not\nreject it; if you are a Christian and belong among men to the Christian\nparty, you cannot go beyond this as a member of this party, but only\nwhen your egoism, _i. e._ non-partisanship, impels you to it. What\nexertions the Christians, down to Hegel and the Communists, have put\nforth to make their party strong! they stuck to it that Christianity\nmust contain the eternal truth, and that one needs only to get at it,\nmake sure of it, and justify it.\n\nIn short, the party cannot bear non-partisanship, and it is in this that\negoism appears. What matters the party to me? I shall find enough anyhow\nwho _unite_ with me without swearing allegiance to my flag.\n\nHe who passes over from one party to another is at once abused as a\n\"turncoat.\" Certainly _morality_ demands that one stand by his party,\nand to become apostate from it is to spot oneself with the stain of\n\"faithlessness\"; but ownness knows no commandment of \"faithfulness,\nadhesion, etc.,\" ownness permits everything, even apostasy, defection.\nUnconsciously even the moral themselves let themselves be led by this\nprinciple when they have to judge one who passes over to _their_\nparty,--nay, they are likely to be making proselytes; they should only\nat the same time acquire a consciousness of the fact that one must\ncommit _immoral_ actions in order to commit his own,--_i. e._ here, that\none must break faith, yes, even his oath, in order to determine himself\ninstead of being determined by moral considerations. In the eyes of\npeople of strict moral judgment an apostate always shimmers in equivocal\ncolors, and will not easily obtain their confidence; for there sticks to\nhim the taint of \"faithlessness,\" _i. e._ of an immorality. In the lower\nman this view is found almost generally; advanced thinkers fall here\ntoo, as always, into an uncertainty and bewilderment, and the\ncontradiction necessarily founded in the principle of morality does not,\non account of the confusion of their concepts, come clearly to their\nconsciousness. They do not venture to call the apostate immoral\ndownright, because they themselves entice to apostasy, to defection from\none religion to another, etc.; still, they cannot give up the standpoint\nof morality either. And yet here the occasion was to be seized to step\noutside of morality.\n\nAre the Own or Unique[170] perchance a party? How could they be _own_ if\nthey were such as _belonged_ to a party?\n\nOr is one to hold with no party? In the very act of joining them and\nentering their circle one forms a _union_ with them that lasts as long\nas party and I pursue one and the same goal. But to-day I still share\nthe party's tendency, and by to-morrow I can do so no longer and I\nbecome \"untrue\" to it. The party has nothing _binding_ (obligatory) for\nme, and I do not have respect for it; if it no longer pleases me, I\nbecome its foe.\n\nIn every party that cares for itself and its persistence, the members\nare unfree (or better, unown) in that degree, they lack egoism in that\ndegree, in which they serve this desire of the party. The independence\nof the party conditions the lack of independence in the party-members.\n\nA party, of whatever kind it may be, can never do without a _confession\nof faith_. For those who belong to the party must _believe_ in its\nprinciple, it must not be brought in doubt or put in question by them,\nit must be the certain, indubitable thing for the party-member. That is:\nOne must belong to a party body and soul, else one is not truly a\nparty-man, but more or less--an egoist. Harbor a doubt of Christianity,\nand you are already no longer a true Christian, you have lifted yourself\nto the \"effrontery\" of putting a question beyond it and haling\nChristianity before your egoistic judgment-seat. You have--_sinned_\nagainst Christianity, this party cause (for it is surely not _e. g._ a\ncause for the Jews, another party). But well for you if you do not let\nyourself be affrighted: your effrontery helps you to ownness.\n\nSo then an egoist could never embrace a party or take up with a party?\nOh, yes, only he cannot let himself be embraced and taken up by the\nparty. For him the party remains all the time nothing but a _gathering_:\nhe is one of the party, he takes part.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe best State will clearly be that which has the most loyal citizens,\nand the more the devoted mind for _legality_ is lost, so much the more\nwill the State, this system of morality, this moral life itself, be\ndiminished in force and quality. With the \"good citizens\" the good State\ntoo perishes and dissolves into anarchy and lawlessness. \"Respect for\nthe law!\" By this cement the total of the State is held together. \"The\nlaw is _sacred_, and he who affronts it a _criminal_.\" Without crime no\nState: the moral world--and this the State is--is crammed full of\nscamps, cheats, liars, thieves, etc. Since the State is the \"lordship of\nlaw,\" its hierarchy, it follows that the egoist, in all cases where\n_his_ advantage runs against the State's, can satisfy himself only by\ncrime.\n\nThe State cannot give up the claim that its _laws_ and ordinances are\n_sacred_.[171] At this the individual ranks as the _unholy_[172]\n(barbarian, natural man, \"egoist\") over against the State, exactly as he\nwas once regarded by the Church; before the individual the State takes\non the nimbus of a saint.[173] Thus it issues a law against dueling. Two\nmen who are both at one in this, that they are willing to stake their\nlife for a cause (no matter what), are not to be allowed this, because\nthe State will not have it: it imposes a penalty on it. Where is the\nliberty of self-determination then? It is at once quite another\nsituation if, as _e. g._ in North America, society determines to let the\nduelists bear certain evil _consequences_ of their act, _e. g._\nwithdrawal of the credit hitherto enjoyed. To refuse credit is\neverybody's affair, and, if a society wants to withdraw it for this or\nthat reason, the man who is hit cannot therefore complain of\nencroachment on his liberty: the society is simply availing itself of\nits own liberty. That is no penalty for sin, no penalty for a _crime_.\nThe duel is no crime there, but only an act against which the society\nadopts counter-measures, resolves on a _defence_. The State, on the\ncontrary, stamps the duel as a crime, _i. e._ as an injury to its sacred\nlaw: it makes it a _criminal case_. The society leaves it to the\nindividual's decision whether he will draw upon himself evil\nconsequences and inconveniences by his mode of action, and hereby\nrecognizes his free decision; the State behaves in exactly the reverse\nway, denying all right to the individual's decision and, instead,\nascribing the sole right to its own decision, the law of the State, so\nthat he who transgresses the State's commandment is looked upon as if he\nwere acting against God's commandment,--a view which likewise was once\nmaintained by the Church. Here God is the Holy in and of himself, and\nthe commandments of the Church, as of the State, are the commandments of\nthis Holy One, which he transmits to the world through his anointed and\nLords-by-the-Grace-of-God. If the Church had _deadly sins_, the State\nhas _capital crimes_; if the one had _heretics_, the other has\n_traitors_; the one _ecclesiastical penalties_, the other _criminal\npenalties_; the one _inquisitorial_ processes, the other _fiscal_; in\nshort, there sins, here crimes, there sinners, here criminals, there\ninquisition and here--inquisition. Will the sanctity of the State not\nfall like the Church's? The awe of its laws, the reverence for its\nhighness, the humility of its \"subjects,\" will this remain? Will the\n\"saint's\" face not be stripped of its adornment?\n\nWhat a folly, to ask of the State's authority that it should enter into\nan honorable fight with the individual, and, as they express themselves\nin the matter of freedom of the press, share sun and wind equally! If\nthe State, this thought, is to be a _de facto_ power, it simply must be\na superior power against the individual. The State is \"sacred\" and must\nnot expose itself to the \"impudent attacks\" of individuals. If the State\nis _sacred_, there must be censorship. The political liberals admit the\nformer and dispute the inference. But in any case they concede\nrepressive measures to it, for--they stick to this, that State is _more_\nthan the individual and exercises a justified revenge, called\npunishment.\n\n_Punishment_ has a meaning only when it is to afford expiation for the\ninjuring of a _sacred_ thing. If something is sacred to any one, he\ncertainly deserves punishment when he acts as its enemy. A man who lets\na man's life continue in existence _because_ to him it is sacred and he\nhas a _dread_ of touching it is simply a--_religious_ man.\n\nWeitling lays crime at the door of \"social disorder,\" and lives in the\nexpectation that under Communistic arrangements crimes will become\nimpossible, because the temptations to them, _e. g._ money, fall away.\nAs, however, his organized society is also exalted into a sacred and\ninviolable one, he miscalculates in that good-hearted opinion. Such as\nwith their mouth professed allegiance to the Communistic society, but\nworked underhand for its ruin, would not be lacking. Besides, Weitling\nhas to keep on with \"curative means against the natural remainder of\nhuman diseases and weaknesses,\" and \"curative means\" always announce to\nbegin with that individuals will be looked upon as \"called\" to a\nparticular \"salvation\" and hence treated according to the requirements\nof this \"human calling.\" _Curative means_ or _healing_ is only the\nreverse side of _punishment_, the _theory of cure_ runs parallel with\nthe _theory of punishment_; if the latter sees in an action a sin\nagainst right, the former takes it for a sin of the man _against\nhimself_, as a decadence from his health. But the correct thing is that\nI regard it either as an action that _suits me_ or as one that _does not\nsuit me_, as hostile or friendly to _me_, _i. e._ that I treat it as my\n_property_, which I cherish or demolish. \"Crime\" or \"disease\" are not\neither of them an _egoistic_ view of the matter, _i. e._ a judgment\n_starting from me_, but starting from _another_,--to wit, whether it\ninjures _right_, general right, or the _health_ partly of the individual\n(the sick one), partly of the generality (_society_). \"Crime\" is treated\ninexorably, \"disease\" with \"loving gentleness, compassion,\" and the\nlike.\n\nPunishment follows crime. If crime falls because the sacred vanishes,\npunishment must not less be drawn into its fall; for it too has\nsignificance only over against something sacred. Ecclesiastical\npunishments have been abolished. Why? Because how one behaves toward the\n\"holy God\" is his own affair. But, as this one punishment,\n_ecclesiastical punishment_, has fallen, so all _punishments_ must fall.\nAs sin against the so-called God is a man's own affair, so that against\nevery kind of the so-called sacred. According to our theories of penal\nlaw, with whose \"improvement in conformity to the times\" people are\ntormenting themselves in vain, they want to _punish_ men for this or\nthat \"inhumanity\"; and therein they make the silliness of these\ntheories especially plain by their consistency, hanging the little\nthieves and letting the big ones run. For injury to property they have\nthe house of correction, and for \"violence to thought,\" suppression of\n\"natural rights of man,\" only--representations and petitions.\n\nThe criminal code has continued existence only through the sacred, and\nperishes of itself if punishment is given up. Now they want to create\neverywhere a new penal law, without indulging in a misgiving about\npunishment itself. But it is exactly punishment that must make room for\nsatisfaction, which, again, cannot aim at satisfying right or justice,\nbut at procuring _us_ a satisfactory outcome. If one does to us what we\n_will not put up with_, we break his power and bring our own to bear: we\nsatisfy _ourselves_ on him, and do not fall into the folly of wanting to\nsatisfy right (the spook). It is not the _sacred_ that is to defend\nitself against man, but man against man; as _God_ too, you know, no\nlonger defends himself against man, God to whom formerly (and in part,\nindeed, even now) all the \"servants of God\" offered their hands to\npunish the blasphemer, as they still at this very day lend their hands\nto the sacred. This devotion to the sacred brings it to pass also that,\nwithout lively participation of one's own, one only delivers misdoers\ninto the hands of the police and courts: a non-participating making over\nto the authorities, \"who, of course, will best administer sacred\nmatters.\" The people is quite crazy for hounding the police on against\neverything that seems to it to be immoral, often only unseemly, and this\npopular rage for the moral protects the police institution more than\nthe government could in any way protect it.\n\nIn crime the egoist has hitherto asserted himself and mocked at the\nsacred; the break with the sacred, or rather of the sacred, may become\ngeneral. A revolution never returns, but a mighty, reckless, shameless,\nconscienceless, proud--_crime_, does it not rumble in distant thunders,\nand do you not see how the sky grows presciently silent and gloomy?\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHe who refuses to spend his powers for such limited societies as family,\nparty, nation, is still always longing for a worthier society, and\nthinks he has found the true object of love, perhaps, in \"human society\"\nor \"mankind,\" to sacrifice himself to which constitutes his honor; from\nnow on he \"lives for and serves _mankind_.\"\n\n_People_ is the name of the body, _State_ of the spirit, of that _ruling\nperson_ that has hitherto suppressed me. Some have wanted to transfigure\npeoples and States by broadening them out to \"mankind\" and \"general\nreason\"; but servitude would only become still more intense with this\nwidening, and philanthropists and humanitarians are as absolute masters\nas politicians and diplomats.\n\nModern critics inveigh against religion because it sets God, the divine,\nmoral, etc., _outside_ of man, or makes them something objective, in\nopposition to which the critics rather transfer these very subjects\n_into_ man. But those critics none the less fall into the proper error\nof religion, to give man a \"destiny,\" in that they too want to have him\ndivine, human, and the like: morality, freedom and humanity, etc., are\nhis essence. And, like religion, politics too wanted to \"_educate_\" man,\nto bring him to the realization of his \"essence,\" his \"destiny,\" to\n_make_ something out of him,--to wit, a \"true man,\" the one in the form\nof the \"true believer,\" the other in that of the \"true citizen or\nsubject.\" In fact, it comes to the same whether one calls the destiny\nthe divine or human.\n\nUnder religion and politics man finds himself at the standpoint of\n_should_: he _should_ become this and that, should be so and so. With\nthis postulate, this commandment, every one steps not only in front of\nanother but also in front of himself. Those critics say: You should be a\nwhole, free man. Thus they too stand in the temptation to proclaim a new\n_religion_, to set up a new absolute, an ideal,--to wit, freedom. Men\n_should_ be free. Then there might even arise _missionaries_ of freedom,\nas Christianity, in the conviction that all were properly destined to\nbecome Christians, sent out missionaries of the faith. Freedom would\nthen (as have hitherto faith as Church, morality as State) constitute\nitself as a new _community_ and carry on a like \"propaganda\" therefrom.\nCertainly no objection can be raised against a getting together; but so\nmuch the more must one oppose every renewal of the old _care_ for us, of\nculture directed toward an end,--in short, the principle of _making\nsomething_ out of us, no matter whether Christians, subjects, or freemen\nand men.\n\nOne may well say with Feuerbach and others that religion has displaced\nthe human from man, and has transferred it so into another world that,\nunattainable, it went on with its own existence there as something\npersonal in itself, as a \"God\": but the error of religion is by no means\nexhausted with this. One might very well let fall the personality of the\ndisplaced human, might transform God into the divine, and still remain\nreligious. For the religious consists in discontent with the _present_\nman, _i. e._ in the setting up of a \"perfection\" to be striven for, in\n\"man wrestling for his completion.\"[174] (\"Ye therefore _should_ be\nperfect as your father in heaven is perfect.\" Matt. 5. 48): it consists\nin the fixation of an _ideal_, an absolute. Perfection is the \"supreme\ngood,\" the _finis bonorum_; every one's ideal is the perfect man, the\ntrue, the free man, etc.\n\nThe efforts of modern times aim to set up the ideal of the \"free man.\"\nIf one could find it, there would be a new--religion, because a new\nideal; there would be a new longing, a new torment, a new devotion, a\nnew deity, a new contrition.\n\nWith the ideal of \"absolute liberty,\" the same turmoil is made as with\neverything absolute, and according to Hess, _e. g._, it is said to \"be\nrealizable in absolute human society.\"[175] Nay, this realization is\nimmediately afterward styled a \"vocation\"; just so he then defines\nliberty as \"morality\": the kingdom of \"justice\" (_i. e._ equality) and\n\"morality\" (_i. e._ liberty) is to begin, etc.\n\nRidiculous is he who, while fellows of his tribe, family, nation, etc.,\nrank high, is--nothing but \"puffed up\" over the merit of his fellows;\nbut blinded too is he who wants only to be \"man.\" Neither of them puts\nhis worth in _exclusiveness_, but in _connectedness_, or in the \"tie\"\nthat conjoins him with others, in the ties of blood, of nationality, of\nhumanity.\n\nThrough the \"Nationals\" of to-day the conflict has again been stirred up\nbetween those who think themselves to have merely human blood and human\nties of blood, and the others who brag of their special blood and the\nspecial ties of blood.\n\nIf we disregard the fact that pride may mean conceit, and take it for\nconsciousness alone, there is found to be a vast difference between\npride in \"belonging to\" a nation and therefore being its property, and\nthat in calling a nationality one's property. Nationality is my quality,\nbut the nation my owner and mistress. If you have bodily strength, you\ncan apply it at a suitable place and have a self-consciousness or pride\nof it; if, on the contrary, your strong body has you, then it pricks you\neverywhere, and at the most unsuitable place, to show its strength: you\ncan give nobody your hand without squeezing his.\n\nThe perception that one is more than a member of the family, more than a\nfellow of the tribe, more than an individual of the people, etc., has\nfinally led to saying, one is more than all this because one is man, or,\nthe man is more than the Jew, German, etc. \"Therefore be every one\nwholly and solely--man!\" Could one not rather say: Because we are more\nthan what has been stated, therefore we will be this, as well as that\n\"more\" also? Man and German, then, man and Guelph, etc.? The Nationals\nare in the right; one cannot deny his nationality: and the\nhumanitarians are in the right; one must not remain in the narrowness of\nthe national. In _uniqueness_[176] the contradiction is solved; the\nnational is my quality. But I am not swallowed up in my quality,--as the\nhuman too is my quality, but I give to man his existence first through\nmy uniqueness.\n\nHistory seeks for Man: but he is I, you, we. Sought as a mysterious\n_essence_, as the divine, first as _God_, then as _Man_ (humanity,\nhumaneness, and mankind), he is found as the individual, the finite, the\nunique one.\n\nI am owner of humanity, am humanity, and do nothing for the good of\nanother humanity. Fool, you who are a unique humanity, that you make a\nmerit of wanting to live for another than you are.\n\nThe hitherto-considered relation of me to the _world of men_ offers such\na wealth of phenomena that it will have to be taken up again and again\non other occasions, but here, where it was only to have its chief\noutlines made clear to the eye, it must be broken off to make place for\nan apprehension of two other sides toward which it radiates. For, as I\nfind myself in relation not merely to men so far as they present in\nthemselves the concept \"man\" or are children of men (children of _Man_,\nas children of God are spoken of), but also to that which they have of\nman and call their own, and as therefore I relate myself not only to\nthat which they _are_ through man, but also to their human\n_possessions_: so, besides the world of men, the world of the senses\nand of ideas will have to be included in our survey, and somewhat said\nof what men call their own of sensuous goods, and of spiritual as well.\n\nAccording as one had developed and clearly grasped the concept of man,\nhe gave it to us to respect as this or that _person of respect_, and\nfrom the broadest understanding of this concept there proceeded at last\nthe command \"to respect Man in every one.\" But, if I respect Man, my\nrespect must likewise extend to the human, or what is Man's.\n\nMen have somewhat of their _own_, and _I_ am to recognize this own and\nhold it sacred. Their own consists partly in outward, partly in inward\n_possessions_. The former are things, the latter spiritualities,\nthoughts, convictions, noble feelings, etc. But I am always to respect\nonly _rightful_ or _human_ possessions; the wrongful and unhuman I need\nnot spare, for only _Man's_ own is men's real own. An inward possession\nof this sort is, _e. g._, religion; because _religion_ is free, _i. e._\nis Man's, _I_ must not strike at it. Just so _honor_ is an inward\npossession; it is free and must not be struck at by me. (Action for\ninsult, caricatures, etc.) Religion and honor are \"spiritual property.\"\nIn tangible property the person stands foremost: my person is my first\nproperty. Hence freedom of the person; but only the _rightful_ or human\nperson is free, the other is locked up. Your life is your property; but\nit is sacred for men only if it is not that of an inhuman monster.\n\nWhat a man as such cannot defend of bodily goods, we may take from him:\nthis is the meaning of competition, of freedom of occupation. What he\ncannot defend of spiritual goods falls a prey to us likewise: so far\ngoes the liberty of discussion, of science, of criticism.\n\nBut _consecrated_ goods are inviolable. Consecrated and guaranteed by\nwhom? Proximately by the State, society, but properly by man or the\n\"concept,\" the \"concept of the thing\": for the concept of consecrated\ngoods is this, that they are truly human, or rather that the holder\npossesses them as man and not as un-man.[177]\n\nOn the spiritual side man's faith is such goods, his honor, his moral\nfeeling,--yes, his feeling of decency, modesty, etc. Actions (speeches,\nwritings) that touch honor are punishable; attacks on \"the foundation of\nall religion\"; attacks on political faith; in short, attacks on\neverything that a man \"rightly\" has.\n\nHow far critical liberalism would extend, the sanctity of goods,--on\nthis point it has not yet made any pronouncement, and doubtless fancies\nitself to be ill-disposed toward all sanctity; but, as it combats\negoism, it must set limits to it, and must not let the un-man pounce on\nthe human. To its theoretical contempt for the \"masses\" there must\ncorrespond a practical snub if it should get into power.\n\nWhat extension the concept \"man\" receives, and what comes to the\nindividual man through it,--what, therefore, man and the human are,--on\nthis point the various grades of liberalism differ, and the political,\nthe social, the humane man are each always claiming more than the other\nfor \"man.\" He who has best grasped this concept knows best what is\n\"man's.\" The State still grasps this concept in political restriction,\nsociety in social; mankind, so it is said, is the first to comprehend it\nentirely, or \"the history of mankind develops it.\" But, if \"man is\ndiscovered,\" then we know also what pertains to man as his own, man's\nproperty, the human.\n\nBut let the individual man lay claim to ever so many rights because Man\nor the concept man \"entitles\" him to them, _i. e._ because his being man\ndoes it: what do _I_ care for his right and his claim? If he has his\nright only from Man and does not have it from _me_, then for _me_ he has\nno right. His life, _e. g._, counts to _me_ only for what it is _worth\nto me_. I respect neither a so-called right of property (or his claim to\ntangible goods) nor yet his right to the \"sanctuary of his inner nature\"\n(or his right to have the spiritual goods and divinities, his gods,\nremain unaggrieved). His goods, the sensuous as well as the spiritual,\nare _mine_, and I dispose of them as proprietor, in the measure of\nmy--might.\n\nIn the _property question_ lies a broader meaning than the limited\nstatement of the question allows to be brought out. Referred solely to\nwhat men call our possessions, it is capable of no solution; the\ndecision is to be found only in him \"from whom we have everything.\"\nProperty depends on the _owner_.\n\nThe Revolution directed its weapons against everything which came \"from\nthe grace of God,\" _e. g._, against divine right, in whose place the\nhuman was confirmed. To that which is granted by the grace of God,\nthere is opposed that which is derived \"from the essence of man.\"\n\nNow, as men's relation to each other, in opposition to the religious\ndogma which commands a \"Love one another for God's sake,\" had to receive\nits human position by a \"Love each other for man's sake,\" so the\nrevolutionary teaching could not do otherwise than, first as to what\nconcerns the relation of men to the things of this world, settle it that\nthe world, which hitherto was arranged according to God's ordinance,\nhenceforth belongs to \"Man.\"\n\nThe world belongs to \"Man,\" and is to be respected by me as his\nproperty.\n\nProperty is what is mine!\n\nProperty in the civic sense means _sacred_ property, such that I must\n_respect_ your property. \"Respect for property!\" Hence the politicians\nwould like to have every one possess his little bit of property, and\nthey have in part brought about an incredible parcellation by this\neffort. Each must have his bone on which he may find something to bite.\n\nThe position of affairs is different in the egoistic sense. I do not\nstep shyly back from your property, but look upon it always as _my_\nproperty, in which I need to \"respect\" nothing. Pray do the like with\nwhat you call my property!\n\nWith this view we shall most easily come to an understanding with each\nother.\n\nThe political liberals are anxious that, if possible, all servitudes be\ndissolved, and every one be free lord on his ground, even if this ground\nhas only so much area as can have its requirements adequately filled by\nthe manure of one person. (The farmer in the story married even in his\nold age \"that he might profit by his wife's dung.\") Be it ever so\nlittle, if one only has somewhat of his own,--to wit, a _respected_\nproperty! The more such owners, such cotters,[178] the more \"free people\nand good patriots\" has the State.\n\nPolitical liberalism, like everything religious, counts on _respect_,\nhumaneness, the virtues of love. Therefore does it live in incessant\nvexation. For in practice people respect nothing, and every day the\nsmall possessions are bought up again by greater proprietors, and the\n\"free people\" change into day-laborers.\n\nIf, on the contrary, the \"small proprietors\" had reflected that the\ngreat property was also theirs, they would not have respectfully shut\nthemselves out from it, and would not have been shut out.\n\nProperty as the civic liberals understand it deserves the attacks of the\nCommunists and Proudhon: it is untenable, because the civic proprietor\nis in truth nothing but a propertyless man, one who is everywhere _shut\nout_. Instead of owning the world, as he might, he does not own even the\npaltry point on which he turns around.\n\nProudhon wants not the _propri\u00e9taire_ but the _possesseur_ or\n_usufruitier_.[179] What does that mean? He wants no one to own the\nland; but the benefit of it--even though one were allowed only the\nhundredth part of this benefit, this fruit--is at any rate one's\nproperty, which he can dispose of at will. He who has only the benefit\nof a field is assuredly not the proprietor of it; still less he who, as\nProudhon would have it, must give up so much of this benefit as is not\nrequired for his wants; but he is the proprietor of the share that is\nleft him. Proudhon, therefore, denies only such and such property, not\n_property_ itself. If we want no longer to leave the land to the landed\nproprietors, but to appropriate it to _ourselves_, we unite ourselves to\nthis end, form a union, a _soci\u00e9t\u00e9_, that makes _itself_ proprietor; if\nwe have good luck in this, then those persons cease to be landed\nproprietors. And, as from the land, so we can drive them out of many\nanother property yet, in order to make it _our_ property, the property\nof the--_conquerors_. The conquerors form a society which one may\nimagine so great that it by degrees embraces all humanity; but so-called\nhumanity too is as such only a thought (spook); the individuals are its\nreality. And these individuals as a collective mass will treat land and\nearth not less arbitrarily than an isolated individual or so-called\n_propri\u00e9taire_. Even so, therefore, _property_ remains standing, and\nthat as \"exclusive\" too, in that _humanity_, this great society,\nexcludes the _individual_ from its property (perhaps only leases to him,\ngives him as a fief, a piece of it) as it besides excludes everything\nthat is not humanity, _e. g._ does not allow animals to have\nproperty.--So too it will remain, and will grow to be. That in which\n_all_ want to have a _share_ will be withdrawn from that individual who\nwants to have it for himself alone: it is made a _common estate_. As a\n_common estate_ every one has his _share_ in it, and this share is his\n_property_. Why, so in our old relations a house which belongs to five\nheirs is their common estate; but the fifth part of the revenue is each\none's property. Proudhon might spare his prolix pathos if he said:\n\"There are some things that belong only to a few, and to which we others\nwill from now on lay claim or--siege. Let us take them, because one\ncomes to property by taking, and the property of which for the present\nwe are still deprived came to the proprietors likewise only by taking.\nIt can be utilized better if it is in the hands of _us all_ than if the\nfew control it. Let us therefore associate ourselves for the purpose of\nthis robbery (_vol_).\"--Instead of this, he tries to get us to believe\nthat society is the original possessor and the sole proprietor, of\nimprescriptible right; against it the so-called proprietors have become\nthieves (_La propri\u00e9t\u00e9 c'est le vol_); if it now deprives of his\nproperty the present proprietor, it robs him of nothing, as it is only\navailing itself of its imprescriptible right.--So far one comes with the\nspook of society as a _moral person_. On the contrary, what man can\nobtain belongs to him: the world belongs to _me_. Do you say anything\nelse by your opposite proposition, \"The world belongs to _all_\"? All are\nI and again I, etc. But you make out of the \"all\" a spook, and make it\nsacred, so that then the \"all\" become the individual's fearful _master_.\nThen the ghost of \"right\" places itself on their side.\n\nProudhon, like the Communists, fights against _egoism_. Therefore they\nare continuations and consistent carryings-out of the Christian\nprinciple, the principle of love, of sacrifice for something general,\nsomething alien. They complete in property, _e. g._, only what has long\nbeen extant as a matter of fact,--_viz._, the propertylessness of the\nindividual. When the law says, _Ad reges potestas omnium pertinet, ad\nsingulos proprietas; omnia rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio_,\nthis means: The king is proprietor, for he alone can control and\ndispose of \"everything,\" he has _potestas_ and _imperium_ over it.\nThe Communists make this clearer, transferring that _imperium_ to the\n\"society of all.\" Therefore: Because enemies of egoism, they are on\nthat account--Christians, or, more generally speaking, religious men,\nbelievers in ghosts, dependents, servants of some generality (God,\nsociety, etc.). In this too Proudhon is like the Christians, that he\nascribes to God that which he denies to men. He names him (_e. g._, page\n90) the Propri\u00e9taire of the earth. Herewith he proves that he cannot\nthink away the _proprietor as such_; he comes to a proprietor at last,\nbut removes him to the other world.\n\nNeither God nor Man (\"human society\") is proprietor, but the individual.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nProudhon (Weitling too) thinks he is telling the worst about property\nwhen he calls it theft (_vol_). Passing quite over the embarrassing\nquestion, what well-founded objection could be made against theft, we\nonly ask: Is the concept \"theft\" at all possible unless one allows\nvalidity to the concept \"property\"? How can one steal if property is not\nalready extant? What belongs to no one cannot be _stolen_; the water\nthat one draws out of the sea he does _not steal_. Accordingly property\nis not theft, but a theft becomes possible only through property.\nWeitling has to come to this too, as he does regard everything as the\n_property of all_: if something is \"the property of all,\" then indeed\nthe individual who appropriates it to himself steals.\n\nPrivate property lives by grace of the _law_. Only in the law has it its\nwarrant--for possession is not yet property, it becomes \"mine\" only by\nassent of the law--; it is not a fact, not _un fait_ as Proudhon thinks,\nbut a fiction, a thought. This is legal property, legitimate property,\nguaranteed property. It is mine not through _me_ but through the--_law_.\n\nNevertheless, property is the expression for _unlimited dominion_ over\nsomewhat (thing, beast, man) which \"I can judge and dispose of as seems\ngood to me.\" According to Roman law, indeed, _jus utendi et abutendi re\nsua, quatenus juris ratio patitur_, an _exclusive_ and _unlimited\nright_; but property is conditioned by might. What I have in my power,\nthat is my own. So long as I assert myself as holder, I am the\nproprietor of the thing; if it gets away from me again, no matter by\nwhat power, _e. g._ through my recognition of a title of others to the\nthing,--then the property is extinct. Thus property and possession\ncoincide. It is not a right lying outside my might that legitimizes me,\nbut solely my might: if I no longer have this, the thing vanishes away\nfrom me. When the Romans no longer had any might against the Germans,\nthe world-empire of Rome _belonged_ to the latter, and it would sound\nridiculous to insist that the Romans had nevertheless remained properly\nthe proprietors. Whoever knows how to take and to defend the thing, to\nhim it belongs till it is again taken from him, as liberty belongs to\nhim who _takes_ it.--\n\nOnly might decides about property, and, as the State (no matter whether\nState of well-to-do citizens or of ragamuffins or of men in the\nabsolute) is the sole mighty one, it alone is proprietor; I, the\nunique,[180] have nothing, and am only enfeoffed, am vassal and, as\nsuch, servitor. Under the dominion of the State there is no property of\n_mine_.\n\nI want to raise the value of myself, the value of ownness, and should I\ncheapen property? No, as I was not respected hitherto because people,\nmankind, and a thousand other generalities were put higher, so property\ntoo has to this day not yet been recognized in its full value. Property\ntoo was only the property of a ghost, _e. g._ the people's property; my\nwhole existence \"belonged to the fatherland\": _I_ belonged to the\nfatherland, the people, the State, and therefore also everything that I\ncalled _my own_. It is demanded of States that they make away with\npauperism. It seems to me this is asking that the State should cut off\nits own head and lay it at its feet; for so long as the State is the ego\nthe individual ego must remain a poor devil, a non-ego. The State has an\ninterest only in being itself rich; whether Michael is rich and Peter\npoor is alike to it; Peter might also be rich and Michael poor. It looks\non indifferently as one grows poor and the other rich, unruffled by this\nalternation. As _individuals_ they are really equal before its face; in\nthis it is just: before it both of them are--nothing, as we \"are\naltogether sinners before God\"; on the other hand, it has a very great\ninterest in this, that those individuals who make it their ego should\nhave a part in its wealth; it makes them partakers in _its property_.\nThrough property, with which it rewards the individuals, it tames them;\nbut this remains _its_ property, and every one has the usufruct of it\nonly so long as he bears in himself the ego of the State, or is a \"loyal\nmember of society\"; in the opposite case the property is confiscated, or\nmade to melt away by vexatious lawsuits. The property, then, is and\nremains _State property_, not property of the ego. That the State does\nnot arbitrarily deprive the individual of what he has from the State\nmeans simply that the State does not rob itself. He who is a State-ego,\n_i. e._ a good citizen or subject, holds his fief undisturbed as _such\nan ego_, not as being an ego of his own. According to the code, property\nis what I call mine \"by virtue of God and law.\" But it is mine by virtue\nof God and law only so long as--the State has nothing against it.\n\nIn expropriations, disarmaments, and the like (as, _e. g._, the\nexchequer confiscates inheritances if the heirs do not put in an\nappearance early enough) how plainly the else-veiled principle that only\nthe _people_, \"the State,\" is proprietor, while the individual is\nfeoffee, strikes the eye!\n\nThe State, I mean to say, cannot intend that anybody should _for his own\nsake_ have property or actually be rich, nay, even well-to-do; it can\nacknowledge nothing, grant nothing to me as me. The State cannot check\npauperism, because the poverty of possession is a poverty of me. He who\n_is_ nothing but what chance or another--to wit, the State--makes out\nof him also _has_ quite rightly nothing but what another gives him. And\nthis other will give him only what he _deserves_, _i. e._ what he is\nworth by _service_. It is not he that realizes a value from himself; the\nState realizes a value from him.\n\nNational economy busies itself much with this subject. It lies far out\nbeyond the \"national,\" however, and goes beyond the concepts and horizon\nof the State, which knows only State property and can distribute nothing\nelse. For this reason it binds the possession of property to\n_conditions_,--as it binds everything to them, _e. g._ marriage,\nallowing validity only to the marriage sanctioned by it, and wresting\nthis out of my power. But property is _my_ property only when I hold it\n_unconditionally_: only I, as _unconditioned_ ego, have property, enter\na relation of love, carry on free trade.\n\nThe State has no anxiety about me and mine, but about itself and its: I\ncount for something to it only as _its child_, as \"a son of the\ncountry\"; as _ego_ I am nothing at all for it. For the State's\nunderstanding, what befalls me as ego is something accidental, my wealth\nas well as my impoverishment. But, if I with all that is mine am an\naccident in the State's eyes, this proves that it cannot comprehend\n_me_: _I_ go beyond its concepts, or, its understanding is too limited\nto comprehend me. Therefore it cannot do anything for me either.\n\nPauperism is the _valuelessness of me_, the phenomenon that I cannot\nrealize value from myself. For this reason State and pauperism are one\nand the same. The State does not let me come to my value, and continues\nin existence only through my valuelessness: it is forever intent on\n_getting benefit_ from me, _i. e._ exploiting me, turning me to account,\nusing me up, even if the use it gets from me consists only in my\nsupplying a _proles_ (_prol\u00e9tariat_); it wants me to be \"its creature.\"\n\nPauperism can be removed only when I as ego _realize value_ from myself,\nwhen I give my own self value, and make my price myself. I must rise in\nrevolt to rise in the world.\n\nWhat I produce, flour, linen, or iron and coal, which I toilsomely win\nfrom the earth, etc., is _my_ work that I want to realize value from.\nBut then I may long complain that I am not paid for my work according to\nits value: the payer will not listen to me, and the State likewise will\nmaintain an apathetic attitude so long as it does not think it must\n\"appease\" me that _I_ may not break out with my dreaded might. But this\n\"appeasing\" will be all, and, if it comes into my head to ask for more,\nthe State turns against me with all the force of its lion-paws and\neagle-claws: for it is the king of beasts, it is lion and eagle. If I\nrefuse to be content with the price that it fixes for my ware and labor,\nif I rather aspire to determine the price of my ware myself, _i. e._ \"to\npay myself,\" in the first place I come into a conflict with the buyers\nof the ware. If this were stilled by a mutual understanding, the State\nwould not readily make objections; for how individuals get along with\neach other troubles it little, so long as therein they do not get in its\nway. Its damage and its danger begin only when they do not agree, but,\nin the absence of a settlement, take each other by the hair. The State\ncannot endure that man stand in a direct relation to man; it must step\nbetween as--_mediator_, must--_intervene_. What Christ was, what the\nsaints, the Church were, the State has become,--to wit, \"mediator.\" It\ntears man from man to put itself between them as \"spirit.\" The laborers\nwho ask for higher pay are treated as criminals as soon as they want to\n_compel_ it. What are they to do? Without compulsion they don't get it,\nand in compulsion the State sees a self-help, a determination of price\nby the ego, a genuine, free realization of value from his property,\nwhich it cannot admit of. What then are the laborers to do? Look to\nthemselves and ask nothing about the State?-- --\n\nBut, as is the situation with regard to my material work, so it is with\nmy intellectual too. The State allows me to realize value from all my\nthoughts and to find customers for them (I do realize value from them,\n_e. g._, in the very fact that they bring me honor from the listeners,\nand the like); but only so long as my thoughts are--_its_ thoughts. If,\non the other hand, I harbor thoughts that it cannot approve (_i. e._\nmake its own), then it does not allow me at all to realize value from\nthem, to bring them into _exchange_, into _commerce_. _My_ thoughts are\nfree only if they are granted to me by the State's _grace_, _i. e._ if\nthey are the State's thoughts. It lets me philosophize freely only so\nfar as I approve myself a \"philosopher of State\"; _against_ the State I\nmust not philosophize, gladly as it tolerates my helping it out of its\n\"deficiencies,\" \"furthering\" it.--Therefore, as I may behave only as an\nego most graciously permitted by the State, provided with its\ntestimonial of legitimacy and police pass, so too it is not granted me\nto realize value from what is mine, unless this proves to be its, which\nI hold as fief from it. My ways must be its ways, else it distrains me;\nmy thoughts its thoughts, else it stops my mouth.\n\nThe State has nothing to be more afraid of than the value of me, and\nnothing must it more carefully guard against than every occasion that\noffers itself to me for _realizing value_ from myself. _I_ am the deadly\nenemy of the State, which always hovers between the alternatives, it or\nI. Therefore it strictly insists not only on not letting _me_ have a\nstanding, but also on keeping down what is _mine_. In the State there is\nno--property, _i. e._ no property of the individual, but only State\nproperty. Only through the State have I what I have, as I am only\nthrough it what I am. My private property is only that which the State\nleaves to me of _its, cutting off_ others from it (depriving them,\nmaking it private); it is State property.\n\nBut, in opposition to the State, I feel more and more clearly that there\nis still left me a great might, the might over myself, _i. e._ over\neverything that pertains only to me and that _exists_ only in being my\nown.\n\nWhat do I do if my ways are no longer its ways, my thoughts no longer\nits thoughts? I look to myself, and ask nothing about it! In _my_\nthoughts, which I get sanctioned by no assent, grant, or grace, I have\nmy real property, a property with which I can trade. For as mine they\nare my _creatures_, and I am in a position to give them away in return\nfor _other_ thoughts: I give them up and take in exchange for them\nothers, which then are my new purchased property.\n\nWhat then is _my_ property? Nothing but what is in my _power_! To what\nproperty am I entitled? To every property to which I--_empower_\nmyself.[181] I give myself the right of property in taking property to\nmyself, or giving myself the proprietor's _power_, full power,\nempowerment.\n\nEverything over which I have might that cannot be torn from me remains\nmy property; well, then let might decide about property, and I will\nexpect everything from my might! Alien might, might that I leave to\nanother, makes me an owned slave: then let my own might make me an\nowner. Let me then withdraw the might that I have conceded to others out\nof ignorance regarding the strength of my _own_ might! Let me say to\nmyself, what my might reaches to is my property; and let me claim as\nproperty everything that I feel myself strong enough to attain, and let\nme extend my actual property as far as _I_ entitle, _i. e._--empower,\nmyself to take.\n\nHere egoism, selfishness, must decide; not the principle of _love,_ not\nlove-motives like mercy, gentleness, good-nature, or even justice and\nequity (for _justitia_ too is a phenomenon of--love, a product of love):\nlove knows only _sacrifices_ and demands \"self-sacrifice.\"\n\nEgoism does not think of sacrificing anything, giving away anything that\nit wants; it simply decides, What I want I must have and will procure.\n\nAll attempts to enact rational laws about property have put out from the\nbay of _love_ into a desolate sea of regulations. Even Socialism and\nCommunism cannot be excepted from this. Every one is to be provided with\nadequate means, for which it is little to the point whether one\nsocialistically finds them still in a personal property, or\ncommunistically draws them from the community of goods. The individual's\nmind in this remains the same; it remains a mind of dependence. The\ndistributing _board of equity_ lets me have only what the sense of\nequity, its _loving_ care for all, prescribes. For me, the individual,\nthere lies no less of a check in _collective wealth_ than in that of\n_individual others_; neither that is mine, nor this: whether the wealth\nbelongs to the collectivity, which confers part of it on me, or to\nindividual possessors, is for me the same constraint, as I cannot decide\nabout either of the two. On the contrary, Communism, by the abolition of\nall personal property, only presses me back still more into dependence\non another, _viz._, on the generality or collectivity; and, loudly as it\nalways attacks the \"State,\" what it intends is itself again a State, a\n_status_, a condition hindering my free movement, a sovereign power over\nme. Communism rightly revolts against the pressure that I experience\nfrom individual proprietors; but still more horrible is the might that\nit puts in the hands of the collectivity.\n\nEgoism takes another way to root out the non-possessing rabble. It does\nnot say: Wait for what the board of equity will--bestow on you in the\nname of the collectivity (for such bestowal took place in \"States\" from\nthe most ancient times, each receiving \"according to his desert,\" and\ntherefore according to the measure in which each was able to _deserve_\nit, to acquire it by _service_), but: Take hold, and take what you\nrequire! With this the war of all against all is declared. _I_ alone\ndecide what I will have.\n\n\"Now, that is truly no new wisdom, for self-seekers have acted so at all\ntimes!\" Not at all necessary either that the thing be new, if only\n_consciousness_ of it is present. But this latter will not be able to\nclaim great age, unless perhaps one counts in the Egyptian and Spartan\nlaw; for how little current it is appears even from the stricture above,\nwhich speaks with contempt of \"self-seekers.\" One is to know just this,\nthat the procedure of taking hold is not contemptible, but manifests the\npure deed of the egoist at one with himself.\n\nOnly when I expect neither from individuals nor from a collectivity what\nI can give to myself, only then do I slip out of the snares of--love;\nthe rabble ceases to be rabble only when it _takes hold_. Only the dread\nof taking hold, and the corresponding punishment thereof, makes it a\nrabble. Only that taking hold is _sin_, crime,--only this dogma creates\na rabble. For the fact that the rabble remains what it is, it (because\nit allows validity to that dogma) is to blame as well as, more\nespecially, those who \"self-seekingly\" (to give them back their favorite\nword) demand that the dogma be respected. In short, the lack of\n_consciousness_ of that \"new wisdom,\" the old consciousness of sin,\nalone bears the blame.\n\nIf men reach the point of losing respect for property, every one will\nhave property, as all slaves become free men as soon as they no longer\nrespect the master as master. _Unions_ will then, in this matter too,\nmultiply the individual's means and secure his assailed property.\n\nAccording to the Communists' opinion the commune should be proprietor.\nOn the contrary, _I_ am proprietor, and I only come to an understanding\nwith others about my property. If the commune does not do what suits me,\nI rise against it and defend my property. I am proprietor, but property\nis _not sacred_. I should be merely possessor? No, hitherto one was only\npossessor, secured in the possession of a parcel by leaving others also\nin possession of a parcel; but now _everything_ belongs to me, I am\nproprietor of _everything that I require_ and can get possession of. If\nit is said socialistically, society gives me what I require,--then the\negoist says, I take what I require. If the Communists conduct themselves\nas ragamuffins, the egoist behaves as proprietor.\n\nAll swan-fraternities,[182] and attempts at making the rabble happy,\nthat spring from the principle of love, must miscarry. Only from egoism\ncan the rabble get help, and this help it must give to itself and--will\ngive to itself. If it does not let itself be coerced into fear, it is a\npower. \"People would lose all respect if one did not coerce them so into\nfear,\" says bugbear Law in \"_Der gestiefelte Kater_.\"\n\nProperty, therefore, should not and cannot be abolished; it must rather\nbe torn from ghostly hands and become _my_ property; then the erroneous\nconsciousness, that I cannot entitle myself to as much as I require,\nwill vanish.--\n\n\"But what cannot man require!\" Well, whoever requires much, and\nunderstands how to get it, has at all times helped himself to it, as\nNapoleon did with the Continent and France with Algiers. Hence the exact\npoint is that the respectful \"rabble\" should learn at last to help\nitself to what it requires. If it reaches out too far for you, why, then\ndefend yourselves. You have no need at all to good-heartedly--bestow\nanything on it; and, when it learns to know itself, it--or rather:\nwhoever of the rabble learns to know himself, he--casts off the\nrabble-quality in refusing your alms with thanks. But it remains\nridiculous that you declare the rabble \"sinful and criminal\" if it is\nnot pleased to live from your favors because it can do something in its\nown favor. Your bestowals cheat it and put it off. Defend your property,\nthen you will be strong; if, on the other hand, you want to retain your\nability to bestow, and perhaps actually have the more political rights\nthe more alms (poor-rates) you can give, this will work just as long as\nthe recipients let you work it.[183]\n\nIn short, the property question cannot be solved so amicably as the\nSocialists, yes, even the Communists, dream. It is solved only by the\nwar of all against all. The poor become free and proprietors only when\nthey--_rise_. Bestow ever so much on them, they will still always want\nmore; for they want nothing less than that at last--nothing more be\nbestowed.\n\nIt will be asked, But how then will it be when the have-nots take heart?\nOf what sort is the settlement to be? One might as well ask that I cast\na child's nativity. What a slave will do as soon as he has broken his\nfetters, one must--await.\n\nIn Kaiser's pamphlet, worthless for lack of form as well as substance\n(\"_Die Persoenlichkeit des Eigentuemers in Bezug auf den Socialismus und\nCommunismus_,\" etc.), he hopes from the _State_ that it will bring about\na leveling of property. Always the State! Herr Papa! As the Church was\nproclaimed and looked upon as the \"mother\" of believers, so the State\nhas altogether the face of the provident father.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_Competition_ shows itself most strictly connected with the principle of\ncivism. Is it anything else than _equality_ (_\u00e9galit\u00e9_)? And is not\nequality a product of that same Revolution which was brought on by the\ncommonalty, the middle classes? As no one is barred from competing with\nall in the State (except the prince, because he represents the State\nitself) and working himself up to their height, yes, overthrowing or\nexploiting them for his own advantage, soaring above them and by\nstronger exertion depriving them of their favorable circumstances,--this\nserves as a clear proof that before the State's judgment-seat every one\nhas only the value of a \"simple individual\" and may not count on any\nfavoritism. Outrun and outbid each other as much as you like and can;\nthat shall not trouble me, the State! Among yourselves you are free in\ncompeting, you are competitors; that is your _social_ position. But\nbefore me, the State, you are nothing but \"simple individuals\"![184]\n\nWhat in the form of principle or theory was propounded as the equality\nof all has found here in competition its realization and practical\ncarrying out; for _\u00e9galit\u00e9_ is--free competition. All are, before the\nState,--simple individuals; in society, or in relation to each\nother,--competitors.\n\nI need be nothing further than a simple individual to be able to compete\nwith all others aside from the prince and his family: a freedom which\nformerly was made impossible by the fact that only by means of one's\ncorporation, and within it, did one enjoy any freedom of effort.\n\nIn the guild and feudality the State is in an intolerant and fastidious\nattitude, granting _privileges_; in competition and liberalism it is in\na tolerant and indulgent attitude, granting only _patents_ (letters\nassuring the applicant that the business stands open [patent] to him) or\n\"concessions.\" Now, as the State has thus left everything to the\n_applicants_, it must come in conflict with _all_, because each and all\nare entitled to make application. It will be \"stormed,\" and will go down\nin this storm.\n\nIs \"free competition\" then really \"free\"? nay, is it really a\n\"competition,\"--to wit, one of _persons_,--as it gives itself out to be\nbecause on this title it bases its right? It originated, you know, in\npersons becoming free of all personal rule. Is a competition \"free\"\nwhich the State, this ruler in the civic principle, hems in by a\nthousand barriers? There is a rich manufacturer doing a brilliant\nbusiness, and I should like to compete with him. \"Go ahead,\" says the\nState, \"I have no objection to make to your _person_ as competitor.\"\nYes, I reply, but for that I need a space for buildings, I need money!\n\"That's bad; but, if you have no money, you cannot compete. You must not\ntake anything from anybody, for I protect property and grant it\nprivileges.\" Free competition is not \"free,\" because I lack the THINGS\nfor competition. Against my _person_ no objection can be made, but\nbecause I have not the things my person too must step to the rear. And\nwho has the necessary things? Perhaps that manufacturer? Why, from him I\ncould take them away! No, the State has them as property, the\nmanufacturer only as fief, as possession.\n\nBut, since it is no use trying it with the manufacturer, I will compete\nwith that professor of jurisprudence; the man is a booby, and I, who\nknow a hundred times more than he, shall make his class-room empty.\n\"Have you studied and graduated, friend?\" No, but what of that? I\nunderstand abundantly what is necessary for instruction in that\ndepartment. \"Sorry, but competition is not 'free' here. Against your\nperson there is nothing to be said, but the _thing_, the doctor's\ndiploma, is lacking. And this diploma I, the State, demand. Ask me for\nit respectfully first; then we will see what is to be done.\"\n\nThis, therefore, is the \"freedom\" of competition. The State, _my lord_,\nfirst qualifies me to compete.\n\nBut do _persons_ really compete? No, again _things_ only! Moneys in the\nfirst place, etc.\n\nIn the rivalry one will always be left behind another (_e. g._ a\npoetaster behind a poet). But it makes a difference whether the means\nthat the unlucky competitor lacks are personal or material, and likewise\nwhether the material means can be won by _personal energy_ or are to be\nobtained only by _grace_, only as a present; as when, _e. g._, the\npoorer man must leave, _i. e._ present, to the rich man his riches. But,\nif I must all along wait for the _State's approval_ to obtain or to use\n(_e. g._ in the case of graduation) the means, I have the means by the\n_grace of the State_.[185]\n\nFree competition, therefore, has only the following meaning: To the\nState all rank as its equal children, and every one can scud and run to\n_earn the State's goods and largess_. Therefore all do chase after\nhavings, holdings, possessions (be it of money or offices, titles of\nhonor, etc.), after the _things_.\n\nIn the mind of the commonalty every one is possessor or \"owner.\" Now,\nwhence comes it that the most have in fact next to nothing? From this,\nthat the most are already joyful over being possessors at all, even\nthough it be of some rags, as children are joyful in their first\ntrousers or even the first penny that is presented to them. More\nprecisely, however, the matter is to be taken as follows. Liberalism\ncame forward at once with the declaration that it belonged to man's\nessence not to be property, but proprietor. As the consideration here\nwas about \"man,\" not about the individual, the how-much (which formed\nexactly the point of the individual's special interest) was left to him.\nHence the individual's egoism retained room for the freest play in this\nhow-much, and carried on an indefatigable competition.\n\nHowever, the lucky egoism had to become a snag in the way of the less\nfortunate, and the latter, still keeping its feet planted on the\nprinciple of humanity, put forward the question as to the how-much of\npossession, and answered it to the effect that \"man must have as much as\nhe requires.\"\n\nWill it be possible for _my_ egoism to let itself be satisfied with\nthat? What \"man\" requires furnishes by no means a scale for measuring me\nand my needs; for I may have use for less or more. I must rather have so\nmuch as I am competent to appropriate.\n\nCompetition suffers from the unfavorable circumstance that the _means_\nfor competing are not at every one's command, because they are not taken\nfrom personality, but from accident. Most are _without means_, and for\nthis reason _without goods_.\n\nHence the Socialists demand the _means_ for all, and aim at a society\nthat shall offer means. Your money value, say they, we no longer\nrecognize as your \"competence\"; you must show another competence,--to\nwit, your _working force_. In the possession of a property, or as\n\"possessor,\" man does certainly show himself as man; it was for this\nreason that we let the possessor, whom we called \"proprietor,\" keep his\nstanding so long. Yet you possess the things only so long as you are not\n\"put out of this property.\"\n\nThe possessor is competent, but only so far as the others are\nincompetent. Since your ware forms your competence only so long as you\nare competent to defend it (_i. e._, as _we_ are not competent to do\nanything with it), look about you for another competence; for we now, by\nour might, surpass your alleged competence.\n\nIt was an extraordinarily large gain made, when the point of being\nregarded as possessors was put through. Therein bondservice was\nabolished, and every one who till then had been bound to the lord's\nservice, and more or less had been his property, now became a \"lord.\"\nBut henceforth your having, and what you have, are no longer adequate\nand no longer recognized; _per contra_, your working and your work rise\nin value. We now respect your _subduing_ things, as we formerly did your\npossessing them. Your work is your competence! You are lord or possessor\nonly of what comes by _work_, not by _inheritance_. But as at the time\neverything has come by inheritance, and every copper that you possess\nbears not a labor-stamp but an inheritance stamp, everything must be\nmelted over.\n\nBut is my work then really, as the Communists suppose, my sole\ncompetence? or does not this consist rather in everything that I am\ncompetent for? And does not the workers society itself have to concede\nthis, _e. g._ in supporting also the sick, children, old men,--in short,\nthose who are incapable of work? These are still competent for a good\ndeal, _e. g._ to preserve their life instead of taking it. If they are\ncompetent to cause you to desire their continued existence, they have a\npower over you. To him who exercised utterly no power over you, you\nwould vouchsafe nothing; he might perish.\n\nTherefore, what you are _competent_ for is your _competence_! If you are\ncompetent to furnish pleasure to thousands, then thousands will pay you\nan honorarium for it; for it would stand in your power to forbear doing\nit, hence they must purchase your deed. If you are not competent to\n_captivate_ any one, you may simply starve.\n\nNow am I, who am competent for much, perchance to have no advantage over\nthe less competent?\n\nWe are all in the midst of abundance; now shall I not help myself as\nwell as I can, but only wait and see how much is left me in an equal\ndivision?\n\nAgainst competition there rises up the principle of ragamuffin\nsociety,--_partition_.\n\nTo be looked upon as a mere _part_, part of society, the individual\ncannot bear--because he is _more_; his uniqueness puts from it this\nlimited conception.\n\nHence he does not await his competence from the I sharing of others, and\neven in the workers' society there arises the misgiving that in an equal\npartition the strong will be exploited by the weak; he awaits his\ncompetence rather from himself, and says now, What I am competent to\nhave, that is my competence. What competence does not the child possess\nin its smiling, its playing, its screaming! in short, in its mere\nexistence! Are you capable of resisting its desire? or do you not hold\nout to it, as mother, your breast; as father, as much of your\npossessions as it needs? It compels you, therefore it possesses what you\ncall yours.\n\nIf your person is of consequence to me, you pay me with your very\nexistence; if I am concerned only with one of your qualities, then your\ncompliance, perhaps, or your aid, has a value (a money value) for me,\nand I _purchase_ it.\n\nIf you do not know how to give yourself any other than a money value in\nmy estimation, there may arise the case of which history tells us, that\nGermans, sons of the fatherland, were sold to America. Should those who\nlet themselves be traded in be worth more to the seller? He preferred\nthe cash to this living ware that did not understand how to make itself\nprecious to him. That he discovered nothing more valuable in it was\nassuredly a defect of his competence; but it takes a rogue to give more\nthan he has. How should he show respect when he did not have it, nay,\nhardly could have it for such a pack!\n\nYou behave egoistically when you respect each other neither as\npossessors nor as ragamuffins or workers, but as a part of your\ncompetence, as \"_useful bodies_.\" Then you will neither give anything to\nthe possessor (\"proprietor\") for his possessions, nor to him who works,\nbut only to him whom _you require_. The North Americans ask themselves,\nDo we require a king? and answer, Not a farthing are he and his work\nworth to us.\n\nIf it is said that competition throws every thing open to all, the\nexpression is not accurate, and it is better put thus: competition makes\neverything purchasable. In _abandoning_[186] it to them, competition\nleaves it to their appraisal[187] or their estimation, and demands a\nprice[188] for it.\n\nBut the would-be buyers mostly lack the means to make themselves buyers:\nthey have no money. For money, then, the purchasable things are indeed\nto be had (\"For money everything is to be had!\"), but it is exactly\nmoney that is lacking. Where is one to get money, this current or\ncirculating property? Know then, you have as much money[189] as you\nhave--might; for you count[190] for as much as you make yourself count\nfor.\n\nOne pays not with money, of which there may come a lack, but with his\ncompetence, by which alone we are \"competent\";[191] for one is\nproprietor only so far as the arm of our power reaches.\n\nWeitling has thought out a new means of payment,--work. But the true\nmeans of payment remains, as always, _competence_. With what you have\n\"within your competence\" you pay. Therefore think on the enlargement of\nyour competence.\n\nThis being admitted, they are nevertheless right on hand again with the\nmotto, \"To each according to his competence!\" Who is to _give_ to me\naccording to my competence? Society? Then I should have to put up with\nits estimation. Rather, I shall _take_ according to my competence.\n\n\"All belongs to all!\" This proposition springs from the same\nunsubstantial theory. To each belongs only what he is competent for. If\nI say, The world belongs to me, properly that too is empty talk, which\nhas a meaning only in so far as I respect no alien property. But to me\nbelongs only as much as I am competent for, or have within my\ncompetence.\n\nOne is not worthy to have what one, through weakness, lets be taken from\nhim; one is not worthy of it because one is not capable of it.\n\nThey raise a mighty uproar over the \"wrong of a thousand years\" which is\nbeing committed by the rich against the poor. As if the rich were to\nblame for poverty, and the poor were not in like manner responsible for\nriches! Is there another difference between the two than that of\ncompetence and incompetence, of the competent and incompetent? Wherein,\npray, does the crime of the rich consist? \"In their hardheartedness.\"\nBut who then have maintained the poor? who have cared for their\nnourishment? who have given alms, those alms that have even their name\nfrom mercy (_eleemosyne_)? Have not the rich been \"merciful\" at all\ntimes? are they not to this day \"tender-hearted,\" as poor-taxes,\nhospitals, foundations of all sorts, etc., prove?\n\nBut all this does not satisfy you! Doubtless, then, they are to _share_\nwith the poor? Now you are demanding that they shall abolish poverty.\nAside from the point that there might be hardly one among you who would\nact so, and that this one would be a fool for it, do ask yourselves: why\nshould the rich let go their fleeces and give up _themselves_, thereby\npursuing the advantage of the poor rather than their own? You, who have\nyour thaler daily, are rich above thousands who live on four groschen.\nIs it for your interest to share with the thousands, or is it not rather\nfor theirs?-- --\n\nWith competition is connected less the intention to do the thing _best_\nthan the intention to make it as _profitable_, as productive, as\npossible. Hence people study to get into the civil service (pot-boiling\nstudy), study cringing and flattery, routine and \"acquaintance with\nbusiness,\" work \"for appearances.\" Hence, while it is apparently a\nmatter of doing \"good service,\" in truth only a \"good business\" and\nearning of money are looked out for. The job is done only ostensibly for\nthe job's sake, but in fact on account of the gain that it yields. One\nwould indeed prefer not to be censor, but one wants to be--advanced; one\nwould like to judge, administer, etc., according to his best\nconvictions, but one is afraid of transference or even dismissal; one\nmust, above all things,--live.\n\nThus these goings-on are a fight for _dear life_, and, in gradation\nupward, for more or less of a \"good living.\"\n\nAnd yet, withal, their whole round of toil and care brings in for most\nonly \"bitter life\" and \"bitter poverty.\" All the bitter painstaking for\nthis!\n\nRestless acquisition does not let us take breath, take a calm\n_enjoyment_: we do not get the comfort of our possessions.\n\nBut the organization of labor touches only such labors as others can do\nfor us, _e. g._ slaughtering, tillage, etc.; the rest remain egoistic,\nbecause, _e. g._, no one can in your stead elaborate your musical\ncompositions, carry out your projects of painting, etc.; nobody can\nreplace Raphael's labors. The latter are labors of a unique person,[192]\nwhich only he is competent to achieve, while the former deserved to be\ncalled \"human,\" since what is anybody's _own_ in them is of slight\naccount, and almost \"any man\" can be trained to it.\n\nNow, as society can regard only labors for the common benefit, _human_\nlabors, he who does anything _unique_ remains without its care; nay, he\nmay find himself disturbed by its intervention. The unique person will\nwork himself forth out of society all right, but society brings forth no\nunique person.\n\nHence it is at any rate helpful that we come to an agreement about\n_human_ labors, that they may not, as under competition, claim all our\ntime and toil. So far Communism will bear its fruits. For before the\ndominion of the commonalty even that for which all men are qualified, or\ncan be qualified, was tied up to a few and withheld from the rest: it\nwas a privilege. To the commonalty it looked equitable to leave free all\nthat seemed to exist for every \"man.\" But, because left[193] free, it\nwas yet given to no one, but rather left to each to be got hold of by\nhis _human_ power. By this the mind was turned to the acquisition of the\nhuman, which henceforth beckoned to every one; and there arose a\nmovement which one hears so loudly bemoaned under the name of\n\"materialism.\"\n\nCommunism seeks to check its course, spreading the belief that the human\nis not worth so much discomfort, and, with sensible arrangements, could\nbe gained without the great expense of time and powers which has\nhitherto seemed requisite.\n\nBut for whom is time to be gained? For what does man require more time\nthan is necessary to refresh his wearied powers of labor? Here Communism\nis silent.\n\nFor what? To take comfort in himself as the unique, after he has done\nhis part as man!\n\nIn the first joy over being allowed to stretch out their hands toward\neverything human, people forgot to want anything else; and they competed\naway vigorously, as if the possession of the human were the goal of all\nour wishes.\n\nBut they have run themselves tired, and are gradually noticing that\n\"possession does not give happiness.\" Therefore they are thinking of\nobtaining the necessary by an easier bargain, and spending on it only so\nmuch time and toil as its indispensableness exacts. Riches fall in\nprice, and contented poverty, the care-free ragamuffin, becomes the\nseductive ideal.\n\nShould such human activities, that every one is confident of his\ncapacity for, be highly salaried, and sought for with toil and\nexpenditure of all life-forces? Even in the every-day form of speech,\n\"If I were minister, or even the ..., then it should go quite\notherwise,\" that confidence expresses itself,--that one holds himself\ncapable of playing the part of such a dignitary; one does get a\nperception that to things of this sort there belongs not uniqueness, but\nonly a culture which is attainable, even if not exactly by all, at any\nrate by many; _i. e._ that for such a thing one need only be an ordinary\nman.\n\nIf we assume that, as _order_ belongs to the essence of the State, so\n_subordination_ too is founded in its nature, then we see that the\nsubordinates, or those who have received preferment, disproportionately\n_overcharge_ and _overreach_ those who are put in the lower ranks. But\nthe latter take heart (first from the Socialist standpoint, but\ncertainly with egoistic consciousness later, of which we will therefore\nat once give their speech some coloring) for the question, By what then\nis your property secure, you creatures of preferment?--and give\nthemselves the answer, By our refraining from interference! And so by\n_our_ protection! And what do you give us for it? Kicks and disdain you\ngive to the \"common people\"; police supervision, and a catechism with\nthe chief sentence \"Respect what is _not yours_, what belongs to\n_others_! respect others, and especially your superiors!\" But we reply,\n\"If you want our respect, _buy_ it for a price agreeable to us. We will\nleave you your property, if you give a due equivalent for this leaving.\"\nReally, what equivalent does the general in time of peace give for the\nmany thousands of his yearly income? another for the sheer\nhundred-thousands and millions yearly? What equivalent do you give for\nour chewing potatoes and looking calmly on while you swallow oysters?\nOnly buy the oysters of us as dear as we have to buy the potatoes of\nyou, then you may go on eating them. Or do you suppose the oysters do\nnot belong to us as much as to you? You will make an outcry over\n_violence_ if we reach out our hands and help consume them, and you are\nright. Without violence we do not get them, as you no less have them by\ndoing violence to us.\n\nBut take the oysters and have done with it, and let us consider our\nnearer property, labor; for the other is only possession. We distress\nourselves twelve hours in the sweat of our face, and you offer us a few\ngroschen for it. Then take the like for your labor too. Are you not\nwilling? You fancy that our labor is richly repaid with that wage, while\nyours on the other hand is worth a wage of many thousands. But, if you\ndid not rate yours so high, and gave us a better chance to realize value\nfrom ours, then we might well, if the case demanded it, bring to pass\nstill more important things than you do for the many thousand thalers;\nand, if you got only such wages as we, you would soon grow more\nindustrious in order to receive more. But, if you render any service\nthat seems to us worth ten and a hundred times more than our own labor,\nwhy, then you shall get a hundred times more for it too; we, on the\nother hand, think also to produce for you things for which you will\nrequite us more highly than with the ordinary day's wages. We shall be\nwilling to get along with each other all right, if only we have first\nagreed on this,--that neither any longer needs to--_present_ anything to\nthe other. Then we may perhaps actually go so far as to pay even the\ncripples and sick and old an appropriate price for not parting from us\nby hunger and want; for, if we want them to live, it is fitting also\nthat we--purchase the fulfilment of our will. I say \"purchase,\" and\ntherefore do not mean a wretched \"alms.\" For their life is the property\neven of those who cannot work; if we (no matter for what reason) want\nthem not to withdraw this life from us, we can mean to bring this to\npass only by purchase; nay, we shall perhaps (maybe because we like to\nhave friendly faces about us) even want a life of comfort for them. In\nshort, we want nothing presented by you, but neither will we present you\nwith anything. For centuries we have handed alms to you from\ngood-hearted--stupidity, have doled out the mite of the poor and given\nto the masters the things that are--not the masters'; now just open your\nwallet, for henceforth our ware rises in price quite enormously. We do\nnot want to take from you anything, anything at all, only you are to pay\nbetter for what you want to have. What then have you? \"I have an estate\nof a thousand acres.\" And I am your plowman, and will henceforth attend\nto your fields only for one thaler a day wages. \"Then I'll take\nanother.\" You won't find any, for we plowmen are no longer doing\notherwise, and, if one puts in an appearance who takes less, then let\nhim beware of us. There is the housemaid, she too is now demanding as\nmuch, and you will no longer find one below this price. \"Why, then it is\nall over with me.\" Not so fast! You will doubtless take in as much as\nwe; and, if it should not be so, we will take off so much that you shall\nhave wherewith to live like us. \"But I am accustomed to live better.\" We\nhave nothing against that, but it is not our lookout; if you can clear\nmore, go ahead. Are we to hire out under rates, that you may have a good\nliving? The rich man always puts off the poor with the words, \"What\ndoes your want concern me? See to it how you make your way through the\nworld; that is _your affair_, not mine.\" Well, let us let it be our\naffair, then, and let us not let the means that we have to realize value\nfrom ourselves be pilfered from us by the rich. \"But you uncultured\npeople really do not need so much.\" Well, we are taking somewhat more in\norder that for it we may procure the culture that we perhaps need. \"But,\nif you thus bring down the rich, who is then to support the arts and\nsciences hereafter?\" Oh, well, we must make it up by numbers; we club\ntogether, that gives a nice little sum,--besides, you rich men now buy\nonly the most tasteless books and the most lamentable Madonnas or a pair\nof lively dancer's legs. \"O ill-starred equality!\" No, my good old sir,\nnothing of equality. We only want to count for what we are worth, and,\nif you are worth more, you shall count for more right along. We only\nwant to be _worth our price_, and think to show ourselves worth the\nprice that you will pay.\n\nIs the State likely to be able to awaken so secure a temper and so\nforceful a self-consciousness in the menial? Can it make man feel\nhimself? nay, may it even do so much as set this goal for itself? Can it\nwant the individual to recognize his value and realize this value from\nhimself? Let us keep the parts of the double question separate, and see\nfirst whether the State can bring about such a thing. As the unanimity\nof the plowmen is required, only this unanimity can bring it to pass,\nand a State law would be evaded in a thousand ways by competition and in\nsecret. But can the State bear with it? The State cannot possibly bear\nwith people's suffering coercion from another than it; it could not,\ntherefore, admit the self-help of the unanimous plowmen against those\nwho want to engage for lower wages. Suppose, however, that the State\nmade the law, and all the plowmen were in accord with it: could the\nState bear with it then?\n\nIn the isolated case--yes; but the isolated case is more than that, it\nis a case of _principle_. The question therein is of the whole range of\n_the ego's self-realization of value from himself_, and therefore also\nof his self-consciousness _against_ the State. So far the Communists\nkeep company; but, as self-realization of value from self necessarily\ndirects itself against the State, so it does against _society_ too, and\ntherewith reaches out beyond the commune and the communistic--out of\negoism.\n\nCommunism makes the maxim of the commonalty, that every one is a\npossessor (\"proprietor\"), into an irrefragable truth, into a reality,\nsince the anxiety about _obtaining_ now ceases and every one _has_ from\nthe start what he requires. In his labor-force he _has_ his competence,\nand, if he makes no use of it, that is his fault. The grasping and\nhounding is at an end, and no competition is left (as so often now)\nwithout fruit, because with every stroke of labor an adequate supply of\nthe needful is brought into the house. Now for the first time one is a\n_real possessor_, because what one has in his labor-force can no longer\nescape from him as it was continually threatening to do under the system\nof competition. One is a _care-free_ and assured possessor. And one is\nthis precisely by seeking his competence no longer in a ware, but in his\nown labor, his competence for labor; and therefore by being a\n_ragamuffin_, a man of only ideal wealth. _I_, however, cannot content\nmyself with the little that I scrape up by my competence for labor,\nbecause my competence does not consist merely in my labor.\n\nBy labor I can perform the official functions of a president, a\nminister, etc.; these offices demand only a general culture,--to wit,\nsuch a culture as is generally attainable (for general culture is not\nmerely that which every one has attained, but broadly that which every\none can attain, and therefore every special culture, _e. g._ medical,\nmilitary, philological, of which no \"cultivated man\" believes that they\nsurpass his powers), or, broadly, only a skill possible to all.\n\nBut, even if these offices may vest in every one, yet it is only the\nindividual's unique force, peculiar to him alone, that gives them, so to\nspeak, life and significance. That he does not manage his office like an\n\"ordinary man,\" but puts in the competence of his uniqueness, this he is\nnot yet paid for when he is paid only in general as an official or a\nminister. If he has done it so as to earn your thanks, and you wish to\nretain this thankworthy force of the unique one, you must not pay him\nlike a mere man who performed only what was human, but as one who\naccomplishes what is unique. Do the like with your labor, do!\n\nThere cannot be a general schedule-price fixed for my uniqueness as\nthere can for what I do as man. Only for the latter can a schedule-price\nbe set.\n\nGo right on, then, setting up a general appraisal for human labors, but\ndo not deprive your uniqueness of its desert.\n\n_Human_ or _general_ needs can be satisfied through society; for\nsatisfaction of _unique_ needs you must do some seeking. A friend and a\nfriendly service, or even an individual's service, society cannot\nprocure you. And yet you will every moment be in need of such a service,\nand on the slightest occasions require somebody who is helpful to you.\nTherefore do not rely on society, but see to it that you have the\nwherewithal to--purchase the fulfiment of your wishes.\n\nWhether money is to be retained among egoists?--To the old stamp an\ninherited possession adheres. If you no longer let yourselves be paid\nwith it, it is ruined: if you do nothing for this money, it loses all\npower. Cancel the _inheritance_, and you have broken off the executor's\ncourt-seal. For now everything is an inheritance, whether it be already\ninherited or await its heir. If it is yours, wherefore do you let it be\nsealed up from you? why do you respect the seal?\n\nBut why should you not create a new money? Do you then annihilate the\nware in taking from it the hereditary stamp? Now, money is a ware, and\nan essential _means_ or competence. For it protects against the\nossification of resources, keeps them in flux and brings to pass their\nexchange. If you know a better medium of exchange, go ahead; yet it will\nbe a \"money\" again. It is not the money that does you damage, but your\nincompetence to take it. Let your competence take effect, collect\nyourselves, and there will be no lack of money--of your money, the money\nof _your_ stamp. But working I do not call \"letting your competence\ntake effect.\" Those who are only \"looking for work\" and \"willing to work\nhard\" are preparing for their own selves the infallible upshot--to be\nout of work.\n\nGood and bad luck depend on money. It is a power in the _bourgeois_\nperiod for this reason, that it is only wooed on all hands like a girl,\nindissolubly wedded by nobody. All the romance and chivalry of _wooing_\nfor a dear object come to life again in competition. Money, an object of\nlonging, is carried off by the bold \"knights of industry.\"[194]\n\nHe who has luck takes home the bride. The ragamuffin has luck; he takes\nher into his household, \"society,\" and destroys the virgin. In his house\nshe is no longer bride, but wife; and with her virginity her family name\nis also lost. As housewife the maiden Money is called \"Labor,\" for\n\"Labor\" is her husband's name. She is a possession of her husband's.\n\nTo bring this figure to an end, the child of Labor and Money is again a\ngirl, an unwedded one and therefore Money, but with the certain descent\nfrom Labor, her father. The form of the face, the \"effigy,\" bears\nanother stamp.\n\nFinally, as regards competition once more, it has a continued existence\nby this very means, that all do not attend to _their affair_ and come to\nan _understanding_ with each other about it. Bread, _e. g._, is a need\nof all the inhabitants of a city; therefore they might easily agree on\nsetting up a public bakery. Instead of this, they leave the furnishing\nof the needful to the competing bakers. Just so meat to the butchers,\nwine to the wine-dealers, etc.\n\nAbolishing competition is not equivalent to favoring the guild. The\ndifference is this: In the _guild_ baking, etc., is the affair of the\nguild-brothers; in _competition_, the affair of chance competitors; in\nthe _union_, of those who require baked goods, and therefore my affair,\nyours, the affair of neither the guildic nor the concessionary baker,\nbut the affair of the _united_.\n\nIf _I_ do not trouble myself about _my_ affair, I must be _content_ with\nwhat it pleases others to vouchsafe me. To have bread is my affair, my\nwish and desire, and yet people leave that to the bakers and hope at\nmost to obtain through their wrangling, their getting ahead of each\nother, their rivalry,--in short, their competition,--an advantage which\none could not count on in the case of the guild-brothers who were lodged\n_entirely_ and _alone_ in the proprietorship of the baking\nfranchise.--What every one requires, every one should also take a hand\nin procuring and producing; it is _his_ affair, his property, not the\nproperty of the guildic or concessionary master.\n\nLet us look back once more. The world belongs to the children of this\nworld, the children of men; it is no longer God's world, but man's. As\nmuch as every man can procure of it, let him call his; only the true\nman, the State, human society or mankind, will look to it that each\nshall make nothing else his own than what he appropriates as man,\n_i. e._ in human fashion. Unhuman appropriation is that which is not\nconsented to by man, _i. e._ it is a \"criminal\" appropriation, as the\nhuman, _vice versa_, is a \"rightful\" one, one acquired in the \"way of\nlaw.\"\n\nSo they talk since the Revolution.\n\nBut my property is not a thing, since this has an existence independent\nof me; only my might is my own. Not this tree, but my might or control\nover it, is what is mine.\n\nNow, how is this might perversely expressed? They say I have a _right_\nto this tree, or it is my _rightful_ property. So I have _earned_ it by\nmight. That the might must last in order that the tree may also be\n_held_,--or better, that the might is not a thing existing of itself,\nbut has existence solely in the _mighty ego_, in me the mighty,--is\nforgotten. Might, like other of my _qualities_ (_e. g._ humanity,\nmajesty, etc.), is exalted to something existing of itself, so that it\nstill exists long after it has ceased to be _my_ might. Thus transformed\ninto a ghost, might is--_right_. This _eternalized_ might is not\nextinguished even with my death, but is transferred or \"bequeathed.\"\n\nThings now really belong not to me, but to right.\n\nOn the other side, this is nothing but a hallucination of vision. For\nthe individual's might becomes permanent and a right only by others\njoining their might with his. The delusion consists in their believing\nthat they cannot withdraw their might. The same phenomenon over again;\nmight is separated from me. I cannot take back the might that I gave to\nthe possessor. One has \"granted power of attorney,\" has given away his\npower, has renounced coming to a better mind.\n\nThe proprietor can give up his might and his right to a thing by giving\nthe thing away, squandering it, and the like. And _we_ should not be\nable likewise to let go the might that we lend to him?\n\nThe rightful man, the _just_, desires to call nothing his own that he\ndoes not have \"rightly\" or have the right to, and therefore only\n_legitimate property_.\n\nNow, who is to be judge, and adjudge his right to him? At last, surely,\nMan, who imparts to him the rights of man: then he can say, in an\ninfinitely broader sense than Terence, _humani nihil a me alienum puto_,\n_i. e._ the _human is my property_. However he may go about it, so long\nas he occupies this standpoint he cannot get clear of a judge; and in\nour time the multifarious judges that had been selected have set\nthemselves against each other in two persons at deadly enmity,--to wit,\nin God and Man. The one party appeal to divine right, the other to human\nright or the rights of man.\n\nSo much is clear, that in neither case does the individual do the\nentitling himself.\n\nJust pick me out an action to-day that would not be a violation of\nright! Every moment the rights of man are trampled under foot by one\nside, while their opponents cannot open their mouth without uttering a\nblasphemy against divine right. Give an alms, you mock at a right of\nman, because the relation of beggar and benefactor is an inhuman\nrelation; utter a doubt, you sin against a divine right. Eat dry bread\nwith contentment, you violate the right of man by your equanimity; eat\nit with discontent, you revile divine right by your repining. There is\nnot one among you who does not commit a crime at every moment; your\nspeeches are crimes, and every hindrance to your freedom of speech is no\nless a crime. Ye are criminals altogether!\n\nYet you are so only in that you all stand on the _ground of right_;\n_i. e._, in that you do not even know, and understand how to value, the\nfact that you are criminals.\n\nInviolable or _sacred_ property has grown on this very ground: it is a\n_juridical concept_.\n\nA dog sees the bone in another's power, and stands off only if it feels\nitself too weak. But man respects the other's _right_ to his bone. The\nlatter action, therefore, ranks as _human_, the former as _brutal_ or\n\"egoistic.\"\n\nAnd as here, so in general, it is called \"_human_\" when one sees in\neverything something _spiritual_ (here right), _i. e._ makes everything\na ghost and takes his attitude toward it as toward a ghost, which one\ncan indeed scare away at its appearance, but cannot kill. It is human to\nlook at what is individual not as individual, but as a generality.\n\nIn nature as such I no longer respect anything, but know myself to be\nentitled to everything against it; in the tree in that garden, on the\nother hand, I must respect _alienness_ (they say in one-sided fashion\n\"property\"), I must keep my hand off it. This comes to an end only when\nI can indeed leave that tree to another as I leave my stick, etc., to\nanother, but do not in advance regard it as alien to me, _i. e._ sacred.\nRather, I make to myself no _crime_ of felling it if I will, and it\nremains my property, however long I resign it to others: it is and\nremains _mine_. In the banker's fortune I as little see anything alien\nas Napoleon did in the territories of kings: we have no _dread_ of\n\"_conquering_\" it, and we look about us also for the means thereto. We\nstrip off from it, therefore, the _spirit_ of _alienness_, of which we\nhad been afraid.\n\nTherefore it is necessary that I do not lay claim to anything more _as\nman_, but to everything as I, this I; and accordingly to nothing human,\nbut to mine; _i. e._ nothing that pertains to me as man, but--what I\nwill and because I will it.\n\nRightful, or legitimate, property of another will be only that which\n_you_ are content to recognize as such. If your content ceases, then\nthis property has lost legitimacy for you, and you will laugh at\nabsolute right to it.\n\nBesides the hitherto discussed property in the limited sense, there is\nheld up to our reverent heart another property against which we are far\nless \"to sin.\" This property consists in spiritual goods, in the\n\"sanctuary of the inner nature.\" What a man holds sacred, no other is to\ngibe at; because, untrue as it may be, and zealously as one may \"in\nloving and modest wise\" seek to convince of a true sanctity the man who\nadheres to it and believes in it, yet _the sacred_ itself is always to\nbe honored in it: the mistaken man does believe in the sacred, even\nthough in an incorrect essence of it, and so his belief in the sacred\nmust at least be respected.\n\nIn ruder times than ours it was customary to demand a particular faith,\nand devotion to a particular sacred essence, and they did not take the\ngentlest way with those who believed otherwise; since, however,\n\"freedom of belief\" spread itself more and more abroad, the \"jealous God\nand sole Lord\" gradually melted into a pretty general \"supreme being,\"\nand it satisfied humane tolerance if only every one revered \"something\nsacred.\"\n\nReduces to the human expression, this sacred essence is \"man himself\"\nand \"the human.\" With the deceptive semblance as if the human were\naltogether our own, and free from all the otherworldliness with which\nthat divine is tainted,--yes, as if Man were as much as I or you,--there\nmay arise even the proud fancy that the talk is no longer of a \"sacred\nessence\" and that we now feel ourselves everywhere at home and no longer\nin the uncanny,[195] _i. e._ in the sacred and in sacred awe: in the\necstasy over \"Man discovered at last\" the egoistic cry of pain passes\nunheard, and the spook that has become so intimate is taken for our true\nego.\n\nBut \"Humanus is the saint's name\" (see Goethe), and the humane is only\nthe most clarified sanctity.\n\nThe egoist makes the reverse declaration. For this precise reason,\nbecause you hold something sacred, I gibe at you; and, even if I\nrespected everything in you, your sanctuary is precisely what I should\nnot respect.\n\nWith these opposed views there must also be assumed a contradictory\nrelation to spiritual goods: the egoist insults them, the religious man\n(_i. e._ every one who puts his \"essence\" above himself) must\nconsistently--protect them. But what kind of spiritual goods are to be\nprotected, and what left unprotected, depends entirely on the concept\nthat one forms of the \"supreme being\"; and he who fears God, _e. g._,\nhas more to shelter than he (the liberal) who fears Man.\n\nIn spiritual goods we are (in distinction from the sensuous) injured in\na spiritual way, and the sin against them consists in a direct\n_desecration_, while against the sensuous a purloining or alienation\ntakes place; the goods themselves are robbed of value and of\nconsecration, not merely taken away; the sacred is immediately\ncompromised. With the word \"irreverence\" or \"flippancy\" is designated\neverything that can be committed as _crime_ against spiritual goods,\n_i. e._ against everything that is sacred for us; and scoffing,\nreviling, contempt, doubt, and the like, are only different shades of\n_criminal flippancy_.\n\nThat desecration can be practised in the most manifold wise is here to\nbe passed over, and only that desecration is to be preferentially\nmentioned which threatens the sacred with danger through an\n_unrestricted press_.\n\nAs long as respect is demanded even for one spiritual essence, speech\nand the press must be enthralled in the name of this essence; for just\nso long the egoist might \"trespass\" against it by his _utterances_, from\nwhich thing he must be hindered by \"due punishment\" at least, if one\ndoes not prefer to take up the more correct means against it, the\npreventive use of police authority, _e. g._ censorship.\n\nWhat a sighing for liberty of the press! What then is the press to be\nliberated from? Surely from a dependence, a belonging, and a liability\nto service! But to liberate himself from that is every one's affair,\nand it may with safety be assumed that, when you have delivered yourself\nfrom liability to service, that which you compose and write will also\nbelong to you as your _own_ instead of having been thought and indited\n_in the service_ of some power. What can a believer in Christ say and\nhave printed, that should be freer from that belief in Christ than he\nhimself is? If I cannot or may not write something, perhaps the primary\nfault lies with _me_. Little as this seems to hit the point, so near is\nthe application nevertheless to be found. By a press-law I draw a\nboundary for my publications, or let one be drawn, beyond which wrong\nand its _punishment_ follows. I myself _limit_ myself.\n\nIf the press was to be free, nothing would be so important as precisely\nits liberation from every coercion that could be put on it in the _name\nof a law_. And, that it might come to that, I my own self should have to\nhave absolved myself from obedience to the law.\n\nCertainly, the absolute liberty of the press is like every absolute\nliberty, a nonentity. The press can become free from full many a thing,\nbut always only from what I too am free from. If we make ourselves free\nfrom the sacred, if we have become _graceless_ and _lawless_, our words\ntoo will become so.\n\nAs little as _we_ can be declared clear of every coercion in the world,\nso little can our writing be withdrawn from it. But as free as we are,\nso free we can make it too.\n\nIt must therefore become our _own_, instead of, as hitherto, serving a\nspook.\n\nPeople do not yet know what they mean by their cry for liberty of the\npress. What they ostensibly ask is that the State shall set the press\nfree; but what they are really after, without knowing it themselves, is\nthat the press become free from the State, or clear of the State. The\nformer is a _petition_ to the State, the latter an _insurrection\nagainst_ the State. As a \"petition for right,\" even as a serious\ndemanding of the right of liberty of the press, it presupposes the State\nas the _giver_, and can hope only for a _present_, a permission, a\nchartering. Possible, no doubt, that a State acts so senselessly as to\ngrant the demanded present; but you may bet everything that those who\nreceive the present will not know how to use it so long as they regard\nthe State as a truth: they will not trespass against this \"sacred\nthing,\" and will call for a penal press-law against every one who would\nbe willing to dare this.\n\nIn a word, the press does not become free from what I am not free from.\n\nDo I perhaps hereby show myself an opponent of the liberty of the press?\nOn the contrary, I only assert that one will never get it if one wants\nonly it, the liberty of the press; _i. e._ if one sets out only for an\nunrestricted permission. Only beg right along for this permission: you\nmay wait forever for it, for there is no one in the world who could give\nit to you. As long as you want to have yourselves \"entitled\" to the use\nof the press by a permission, _i. e._ liberty of the press, you live in\nvain hope and complaint.\n\n\"Nonsense! Why, you yourself, who harbor such thoughts as stand in your\nbook, can unfortunately bring them to publicity only through a lucky\nchance or by stealth; nevertheless you will inveigh against one's\npressing and importuning his own State till it gives the refused\npermission to print?\" But an author thus addressed would perhaps--for\nthe impudence of such people goes far--give the following reply:\n\"Consider well what you say! What then do I do to procure myself liberty\nof the press for my book? Do I ask for permission, or do I not rather,\nwithout any question of legality, seek a favorable occasion and grasp it\nin complete recklessness of the State and its wishes? I--the terrifying\nword must be uttered--I cheat the State. You unconsciously do the same.\nFrom your tribunes you talk it into the idea that it must give up its\nsanctity and inviolability, it must lay itself bare to the attacks of\nwriters, without needing on that account to fear danger. But you are\nimposing on it; for its existence is done for as soon as it loses its\nunapproachableness. To _you_ indeed it might well accord liberty of\nwriting, as England has done; you are _believers in the State_ and\nincapable of writing against the State, however much you would like to\nreform it and 'remedy its defects.' But what if opponents of the State\navailed themselves of free utterance, and stormed out against Church,\nState, morals, and everything 'sacred' with inexorable reasons? You\nwould then be the first, in terrible agonies, to call into life the\n_September laws_. Too late would you then rue the stupidity that earlier\nmade you so ready to fool and palaver into compliance the State, or the\ngovernment of the State.--But I prove by my act only two things. This\nfor one, that the liberty of the press is always bound to 'favorable\nopportunities,' and accordingly will never be an absolute liberty; but\nsecondly this, that he who would enjoy it must seek out and, if\npossible, create the favorable opportunity, availing himself of his _own\nadvantage_ against the State, and counting himself and his will more\nthan the State and every 'superior' power. Not in the State, but only\nagainst it, can the liberty of the press be carried through; if it is to\nbe established, it is to be obtained not as the consequence of a\n_petition_ but as the work of an _insurrection_. Every petition and\nevery motion for liberty of the press is already an insurrection, be it\nconscious or unconscious: a thing which Philistine halfness alone will\nnot and cannot confess to itself until, with a shrinking shudder, it\nshall see it clearly and irrefutably by the outcome. For the requested\nliberty of the press has indeed a friendly and well-meaning face at the\nbeginning, as it is not in the least minded ever to let the 'insolence\nof the press' come into vogue; but little by little its heart grows more\nhardened, and the inference flatters its way in that really a liberty is\nnot a liberty if it stands in the _service_ of the State, of morals, or\nof the law. A liberty indeed from the coercion of censorship, it is yet\nnot a liberty from the coercion of law. The press, once seized by the\nlust for liberty, always wants to grow freer, till at last the writer\nsays to himself, Really I am not wholly free till I ask about nothing;\nand writing is free only when it is my _own_, dictated to me by no power\nor authority, by no faith, no dread; the press must not be free--that is\ntoo little--it must be _mine_:--_ownness of the press_ or _property in\nthe press_, that is what I will take.\n\n\"Why, liberty of the press is only _permission of the press_, and the\nState never will or can voluntarily permit me to grind it to nothingness\nby the press.\n\n\"Let us now, in conclusion, bettering the above language, which is still\nvague, owing to the phrase 'liberty of the press,' rather put it thus:\n_Liberty of the press_, the liberals' loud demand, is assuredly possible\nin the State; yes, it is possible only _in_ the State, because it is a\n_permission_, and consequently the permitter (the State) must not be\nlacking. But as permission it has its limit in this very State, which\nsurely should not in reason permit more than is compatible with itself\nand its welfare: the State fixes for it this limit as the _law_ of its\nexistence and of its extension. That one State brooks more than another\nis only a quantitative distinction, which alone, nevertheless, lies at\nthe heart of the political liberals: they want in Germany, _e. g._, only\na '_more extended, broader_ accordance of free utterance.' The liberty\nof the press which is sought for is an affair of the _people's_, and\nbefore the people (the State) possesses it I may make no use of it. From\nthe standpoint of property in the press, the situation is different. Let\nmy people, if they will, go without liberty of the press, I will manage\nto print by force or ruse; I get my permission to print only\nfrom--_myself_ and my strength.\n\n\"If the press is _my own_, I as little need a permission of the State\nfor employing it as I seek that permission in order to blow my nose. The\npress is my _property_ from the moment when nothing is more to me than\nmyself; for from this moment State, Church, people, society, and the\nlike, cease, because they have to thank for their existence only the\ndisrespect that I have for myself, and with the vanishing of this\nundervaluation they themselves are extinguished: they exist only when\nthey exist _above me_, exist only as _powers and power-holders_. Or can\nyou imagine a State whose citizens one and all think nothing of it? it\nwould be as certainly a dream, an existence in seeming, as 'united\nGermany.'\n\n\"The press is my own as soon as I myself am my own, a self-owned man: to\nthe egoist belongs the world, because he belongs to no power of the\nworld.\n\n\"With this my press might still be very _unfree_, as _e. g._, at this\nmoment. But the world is large, and one helps himself as well as he can.\nIf I were willing to abate from the _property_ of my press, I could\neasily attain the point where I might everywhere have as much printed as\nmy fingers produced. But, as I want to assert my property, I must\nnecessarily swindle my enemies. 'Would you not accept their permission\nif it were given you?' Certainly, with joy; for their permission would\nbe to me a proof that I had fooled them and started them on the road to\nruin. I am not concerned for their permission, but so much the more for\ntheir folly and their overthrow. I do not sue for their permission as if\nI flattered myself (like the political liberals) that we both, they and\nI, could make out peaceably alongside and with each other, yes, probably\nraise and prop each other; but I sue for it in order to make them bleed\nto death by it, that the permitters themselves may cease at last. I act\nas a conscious enemy, overreaching them and _utilizing_ their\nheedlessness.\n\n\"The press is _mine_ when I recognize outside myself no _judge_ whatever\nover its utilization, _i. e._ when my writing is no longer determined by\nmorality or religion or respect for the State laws or the like, but by\nme and my egoism!\"--\n\nNow, what have you to reply to him who gives you so impudent an\nanswer?--We shall perhaps put the question most strikingly by phrasing\nit as follows: Whose is the press, the people's (State's) or mine? The\npoliticals on their side intend nothing further than to liberate the\npress from personal and arbitrary interferences of the possessors of\npower, without thinking of the point that to be really open for\neverybody it would also have to be free from the laws, _i. e._ from the\npeople's (State's) will. They want to make a \"people's affair\" of it.\n\nBut, having become the people's property, it is still far from being\nmine; rather, it retains for me the subordinate significance of a\n_permission_. The people plays judge over my thoughts; it has the right\nof calling me to account for them, or, I am responsible to it for them.\nJurors, when their fixed ideas are attacked, have just as hard heads and\nhearts as the stiffest despots and their servile officials.\n\nIn the \"_Liberale Bestrebungen_\"[196] E. Bauer asserts that liberty of\nthe press is impossible in the absolutist and the constitutional State,\nwhereas in the \"free State\" it finds its place. \"Here,\" the statement\nis, \"it is recognized that the individual, because he is no longer an\nindividual but a member of a true and rational generality, has the right\nto utter his mind.\" So not the individual, but the \"member,\" has liberty\nof the press. But, if for the purpose of liberty of the press the\nindividual must first give proof of himself regarding his belief in the\ngenerality, the people; if he does not have this liberty _through might\nof his own_,--then it is a _people's liberty_, a liberty that he is\ninvested with for the sake of his faith, his \"membership.\" The reverse\nis the case: it is precisely as an individual that every one has open to\nhim the liberty to utter his mind. But he has not the \"right\": that\nliberty is assuredly not his \"sacred right.\" He has only the _might_;\nbut the might alone makes him owner. I need no concession for the\nliberty of the press, do not need the people's consent to it, do not\nneed the \"right\" to it, nor any \"justification.\" The liberty of the\npress too, like every liberty, I must \"take\"; the people, \"as being the\nsole judge,\" cannot _give_ it to me. It can put up with the liberty that\nI take, or defend itself against it; give, bestow, grant it it cannot. I\nexercise it _despite_ the people, purely as an individual; _i. e._ I get\nit by fighting the people, my--enemy, and obtain it only when I really\nget it by such fighting, _i. e. take_ it. But I take it because it is my\nproperty.\n\nSander, against whom E. Bauer writes, lays claim (page 99) to the\nliberty of the press \"as the right and the liberty of the _citizen in\nthe State_.\" What else does E. Bauer do? To him also it is only a right\nof the free _citizen_.\n\nThe liberty of the press is also demanded under the name of a \"general\nhuman right.\" Against this the objection was well-founded that not every\nman knew how to use it rightly, for not every individual was truly man.\nNever did a government refuse it to _Man_ as such; but _Man_ writes\nnothing, for the reason that he is a ghost. It always refused it to\n_individuals_ only, and gave it to others, _e. g._ its organs. If then\none would have it for all, one must assert outright that it is due to\nthe individual, me, not to man or to the individual so far as he is man.\nBesides, another than a man (_e. g._ a beast) can make no use of it. The\nFrench government, _e. g._, does not dispute the liberty of the press as\na right of man, but demands from the individual a security for his\nreally being man; for it assigns liberty of the press not to the\nindividual, but to man.\n\nUnder the exact pretence that it was _not human_, what was mine was\ntaken from me! what was human was left to me undiminished.\n\nLiberty of the press can bring about only a _responsible_ press; the\n_irresponsible_ proceeds solely from property in the press.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFor intercourse with men an express law (conformity to which one may\nventure at times sinfully to forget, but the absolute value of which one\nat no time ventures to deny) is placed foremost among all who live\nreligiously: this is the law--of _love_, to which not even those who\nseem to fight against its principle, and who hate its name, have as yet\nbecome untrue; for they also still have love, yes, they love with a\ndeeper and more sublimated love, they love \"man and mankind.\"\n\nIf we formulate the sense of this law, it will be about as follows:\nEvery man must have a something that is more to him than himself. You\nare to put your \"private interest\" in the background when it is a\nquestion of the welfare of others, the weal of the fatherland, of\nsociety, the common weal, the weal of mankind, the good cause, and the\nlike! Fatherland, society, mankind, etc., must be more to you than\nyourself, and as against their interest your \"private interest\" must\nstand back; for you must not be an--egoist.\n\nLove is a far-reaching religious demand, which is not, as might be\nsupposed, limited to love to God and man, but stands foremost in every\nregard. Whatever we do, think, will, the ground of it is always to be\nlove. Thus we may indeed judge, but only \"with love.\" The Bible may\nassuredly be criticised, and that very thoroughly, but the critic must\nbefore all things _love_ it and see in it the sacred book. Is this\nanything else than to say he must not criticise it to death, he must\nleave it standing, and that as a sacred thing that cannot be upset?--In\nour criticism on men too, love must remain the unchanged key-note.\nCertainly judgments that hatred inspires are not at all our _own_\njudgments, but judgments of the hatred that rules us, \"rancorous\njudgments.\" But are judgments that love inspires in us any more our\n_own_? They are judgments of the love that rules us, they are \"loving,\nlenient\" judgments, they are not our _own_, and accordingly not real\njudgments at all. He who burns with love for justice cries out, _fiat\njustitia, pereat mundus_! He can doubtless ask and investigate what\njustice properly is or demands, and _in what_ it consists, but not\n_whether_ it is anything.\n\nIt is very true, \"He who abides in love abides in God, and God in him.\"\n(I John 4. 16.) God abides in him, he does not get rid of God, does not\nbecome godless; and he abides in God, does not come to himself and into\nhis own home, abides in love to God and does not become loveless.\n\n\"God is love! All times and all races recognize in this word the central\npoint of Christianity.\" God, who is love, is an officious God: he cannot\nleave the world in peace, but wants to make it _blest_. \"God became man\nto make men divine.\"[197] He has his hand in the game everywhere, and\nnothing happens without it; everywhere he has his \"best purposes,\" his\n\"incomprehensible plans and decrees.\" Reason, which he himself is, is to\nbe forwarded and realized in the whole world. His fatherly care deprives\nus of all independence. We can do nothing sensible without its being\nsaid, God did that! and can bring upon ourselves no misfortune without\nhearing, God ordained that; we have nothing that we have not from him,\nhe \"gave\" everything. But, as God does, so does Man. God wants perforce\nto make the world _blest_, and Man wants to make it _happy_, to make all\nmen happy. Hence every \"man\" wants to awaken in all men the reason which\nhe supposes his own self to have: everything is to be rational\nthroughout. God torments himself with the devil, and the philosopher\ndoes it with unreason and the accidental. God lets no being go _its\nown_ gait, and Man likewise wants to make us walk only in human wise.\n\nBut whoso is full of sacred (religious, moral, humane) love loves only\nthe spook, the \"true man,\" and persecutes with dull mercilessness the\nindividual, the real man, under the phlegmatic legal title of measures\nagainst the \"un-man.\" He finds it praiseworthy and indispensable to\nexercise pitilessness in the harshest measure; for love to the spook or\ngenerality commands him to hate him who is not ghostly, _i. e._ the\negoist or individual; such is the meaning of the renowned\nlove-phenomenon that is called \"justice.\"\n\nThe criminally arraigned man can expect no forbearance, and no one\nspreads a friendly veil over his unhappy nakedness. Without emotion the\nstern judge tears the last rags of excuse from the body of the poor\naccused; without compassion the jailer drags him into his damp abode;\nwithout placability, when the time of punishment has expired, he thrusts\nthe branded man again among men, his good, Christian, loyal brethren!\nwho contemptuously spit on him. Yes, without grace a criminal \"deserving\nof death\" is led to the scaffold, and before the eyes of a jubilating\ncrowd the appeased moral law celebrates its sublime--revenge. For only\none can live, the moral law or the criminal. Where criminals live\nunpunished, the moral law has fallen; and, where this prevails, those\nmust go down. Their enmity is indestructible.\n\nThe Christian age is precisely that of _mercy, love_, solicitude to have\nmen receive what is due them, yes, to bring them to fulfil their human\n(divine) calling. Therefore the principle has been put foremost for\nintercourse, that this and that is man's essence and consequently his\ncalling, to which either God has called him or (according to the\nconcepts of to-day) his being man (the species) calls him. Hence the\nzeal for conversion. That the Communists and the humane expect from man\nmore than the Christians do does not change the standpoint in the least.\nMan shall get what is human! If it was enough for the pious that what\nwas divine became his part, the humane demand that he be not curtailed\nof what is human. Both set themselves against what is egoistic. Of\ncourse; for what is egoistic cannot be accorded to him or vested in him\n(a fief); he must procure it for himself. Love imparts the former, the\nlatter can be given to me by myself alone.\n\nIntercourse hitherto has rested on love, _regardful_ behavior, doing for\neach other. As one owed it to himself to make himself blessed, or owed\nhimself the bliss of taking up into himself the supreme essence and\nbringing it to a _v\u00e9rit\u00e9_ (a truth and reality), so one owed it to\n_others_ to help them realize their essence and their calling: in both\ncases one owed it to the essence of man to contribute to its\nrealization.\n\nBut one owes it neither to himself to make anything out of himself, nor\nto others to make anything out of them; for one owes nothing to his\nessence and that of others. Intercourse resting on essence is an\nintercourse with the spook, not with anything real. If I hold\nintercourse with the supreme essence, I am not holding intercourse with\nmyself, and, if I hold intercourse with the essence of man, I am not\nholding intercourse with men.\n\nThe natural man's love becomes through culture a _commandment_. But as\ncommandment it belongs to _Man_ as such, not to _me_; it is my\n_essence_,[198] about which much ado[199] is made, not my property.\n_Man_, _i. e._ humanity, presents that demand to me; love is _demanded_,\nit is my _duty_. Instead, therefore, of being really won for _me_, it\nhas been won for the generality, _Man_, as his property or peculiarity:\n\"it becomes man, _i. e._ every man, to love; love is the duty and\ncalling of man,\" etc.\n\nConsequently I must again vindicate love for _myself_, and deliver it\nout of the power of Man with the great M.\n\nWhat was originally _mine_, but _accidentally_ mine, instinctively mine,\nI was invested with as the property of Man; I became feoffee in loving,\nI became the retainer of mankind, only a specimen of this species, and\nacted, loving, not as _I_, but as _man_, as a specimen of man, _i. e._\nhumanly. The whole condition of civilization is the _feudal system_, the\nproperty being Man's or mankind's, not _mine_. A monstrous feudal State\nwas founded, the individual robbed of everything, everything left to\n\"man.\" The individual had to appear at last as a \"sinner through and\nthrough.\"\n\nAm I perchance to have no lively interest in the person of another, are\n_his_ joy and _his_ weal not to lie at my heart, is the enjoyment that I\nfurnish him not to be more to me than other enjoyments of my own? On the\ncontrary, I can with joy sacrifice to him numberless enjoyments, I can\ndeny myself numberless things for the enhancement of _his_ pleasure, and\nI can hazard for him what without him was the dearest to me, my life, my\nwelfare, my freedom. Why, it constitutes my pleasure and my happiness to\nrefresh myself with his happiness and his pleasure. But _myself, my own\nself_, I do not sacrifice to him, but remain an egoist and--enjoy him.\nIf I sacrifice to him everything that but for my love to him I should\nkeep, that is very simple, and even more usual in life than it seems to\nbe; but it proves nothing further than that this one passion is more\npowerful in me than all the rest. Christianity too teaches us to\nsacrifice all other passions to this. But, if to one passion I sacrifice\nothers, I do not on that account go so far as to sacrifice _myself_, nor\nsacrifice anything of that whereby I truly am myself; I do not sacrifice\nmy peculiar value, my _ownness_. Where this bad case occurs, love cuts\nno better figure than any other passion that I obey blindly. The\nambitious man, who is carried away by ambition and remains deaf to every\nwarning that a calm moment begets in him, has let this passion grow up\ninto a despot against whom he abandons all power of dissolution: he has\ngiven up himself, because he cannot _dissolve_ himself, and consequently\ncannot absolve himself from the passion: he is possessed.\n\nI love men too,--not merely individuals, but every one. But I love them\nwith the consciousness of egoism; I love them because love makes _me_\nhappy, I love because loving is natural to me, because it pleases me. I\nknow no \"commandment of love.\" I have a _fellow-feeling_ with every\nfeeling being, and their torment torments, their refreshment refreshes\nme too; I can kill them, not torture them. _Per contra_, the\nhigh-souled, virtuous Philistine prince Rudolph in \"The Mysteries of\nParis,\" because the wicked provoke his \"indignation,\" plans their\ntorture. That fellow-feeling proves only that the feeling of those who\nfeel is mine too, my property; in opposition to which the pitiless\ndealing of the \"righteous\" man (_e. g._ against notary Ferrand) is like\nthe unfeelingness of that robber who cut off or stretched his prisoners'\nlegs to the measure of his bedstead: Rudolph's bedstead, which he cuts\nmen to fit, is the concept of the \"good.\" The feeling for right, virtue,\netc., makes people hard-hearted and intolerant. Rudolph does not feel\nlike the notary, but the reverse; he feels that \"it serves the rascal\nright\"; that is no fellow-feeling.\n\nYou love man, therefore you torture the individual man, the egoist; your\nphilanthropy (love of men) is the tormenting of men.\n\nIf I see the loved one suffer, I suffer with him, and I know no rest\ntill I have tried everything to comfort and cheer him; if I see him\nglad, I too become glad over his joy. From this it does not follow that\nsuffering or joy is caused in me by the same thing that brings out this\neffect in him, as is sufficiently proved by every bodily pain which I do\nnot feel as he does; his tooth pains him, but his pain pains me.\n\nBut, because _I_ cannot bear the troubled crease on the beloved\nforehead, for that reason, and therefore for my sake, I kiss it away. If\nI did not love this person, he might go right on making creases, they\nwould not trouble me; I am only driving away _my_ trouble.\n\nHow now, has anybody or anything, whom and which I do not love, a\n_right_ to be loved by me? Is my love first, or is his right first?\nParents, kinsfolk, fatherland, nation, native town, etc., finally\nfellow-men in general (\"brothers, fraternity\"), assert that they have a\nright to my love, and lay claim to it without further ceremony. They\nlook upon it as _their property_, and upon me, if I do not respect this,\nas a robber who takes from them what pertains to them and is theirs. I\n_should_ love. If love is a commandment and law, then I must be educated\ninto it, cultivated up to it, and, if I trespass against it, punished.\nHence people will exercise as strong a \"moral influence\" as possible on\nme to bring me to love. And there is no doubt that one can work up and\nseduce men to love as one can to other passions,--_e. g._, if you like,\nto hate. Hate runs through whole races merely because the ancestors of\nthe one belonged to the Guelphs, those of the other to the Ghibellines.\n\nBut love is not a commandment, but, like each of my feelings, _my\nproperty_. _Acquire_, _i. e._ purchase, my property, and then I will\nmake it over to you. A church, a nation, a fatherland, a family, etc.,\nthat does not know how to acquire my love, I need not love; and I fix\nthe purchase price of my love quite at my pleasure.\n\nSelfish love is far distant from unselfish, mystical, or romantic love.\nOne can love everything possible, not merely men, but an \"object\" in\ngeneral (wine, one's fatherland, etc.). Love becomes blind and crazy by\na _must_ taking it out of my power (infatuation), romantic by a\n_should_ entering into it, _i. e._ the \"object's\" becoming sacred for\nme, or my becoming bound to it by duty, conscience, oath. Now the object\nno longer exists for me, but I for it.\n\nLove is a possessedness, not as my feeling--as such I rather keep it in\nmy possession as property--, but through the alienness of the object.\nFor religious love consists in the commandment to love in the beloved a\n\"holy one,\" or to adhere to a holy one; for unselfish love there are\nobjects _absolutely lovable_ for which my heart is to beat,--_e. g._\nfellow-men, or my wedded mate, kinsfolk, etc. Holy love loves the holy\nin the beloved, and therefore exerts itself also to make of the beloved\nmore and more a holy one (_e. g._ a \"man\").\n\nThe beloved is an object that _should_ be loved by me. He is not an\nobject of my love on account of, because of, or by, my loving him, but\nis an object of love in and of himself. Not I make him an object of\nlove, but he is such to begin with; for it is here irrelevant that he\nhas become so by my choice, if so it be (as with a _fianc\u00e9e_, a spouse,\nand the like), since even so he has in any case, as the person once\nchosen, obtained a \"right of his own to my love,\" and I, because I have\nloved him, am under obligation to love him forever. He is therefore not\nan object of _my_ love, but of love in general: an object that _should_\nbe loved. Love appertains to him, is due to him, or is his _right_,\nwhile I am under _obligation_ to love him. My love, _i. e._ the toll of\nlove that I pay him, is in truth _his_ love, which he only collects from\nme as toll.\n\nEvery love to which there clings but the smallest speck of obligation\nis an unselfish love, and, so far as this speck reaches, a\npossessedness. He who believes that he _owes_ the object of his love\nanything loves romantically or religiously.\n\nFamily love, _e. g._, as it is usually understood as \"piety,\" is a\nreligious love; love of fatherland, preached as \"patriotism,\" likewise.\nAll our romantic love moves in the same pattern: everywhere the\nhypocrisy, or rather self-deception, of an \"unselfish love,\" an interest\nin the object for the object's sake, not for my sake and mine alone.\n\nReligious or romantic love is distinguished from sensual love by the\ndifference of the object indeed, but not by the dependence of the\nrelation to it. In the latter regard both are possessedness; but in the\nformer the one object is profane, the other sacred. The dominion of the\nobject over me is the same in both cases, only that it is one time a\nsensuous one, the other time a spiritual (ghostly) one. My love is my\nown only when it consists altogether in a selfish and egoistic interest,\nand when consequently the object of my love is really _my_ object or my\nproperty. I owe my property nothing, and have no duty to it, as little\nas I might have a duty to my eye; if nevertheless I guard it with the\ngreatest care, I do so on my account.\n\nAntiquity lacked love as little as do Christian times; the god of love\nis older than the God of Love. But the mystical possessedness belongs to\nthe moderns.\n\nThe possessedness of love lies in the alienation of the object, or in my\npowerlessness as against its alienness and superior power. To the egoist\nnothing is high enough for him to humble himself before it, nothing so\nindependent that he would live for love of it, nothing so sacred that he\nwould sacrifice himself to it. The egoist's love rises in selfishness,\nflows in the bed of selfishness, and empties into selfishness again.\n\nWhether this can still be called love? If you know another word for it,\ngo ahead and choose it; then the sweet word love may wither with the\ndeparted world; for the present I at least find none in our _Christian_\nlanguage, and hence stick to the old sound and \"love\" _my_ object,\nmy--property.\n\nOnly as one of my feelings do I harbor love; but as a power above me, as\na divine power (Feuerbach), as a passion that I am not to cast off, as a\nreligious and moral duty, I--scorn it. As my feeling it is _mine_; as a\nprinciple to which I consecrate and \"vow\" my soul it is a dominator and\n_divine_, just as hatred as a principle is _diabolical_; one not better\nthan the other. In short, egoistic love, _i. e._, my love, is neither\nholy nor unholy, neither divine nor diabolical.\n\n\"A love that is limited by faith is an untrue love. The sole limitation\nthat does not contradict the essence of love is the self-limitation of\nlove by reason, intelligence. Love that scorns the rigor, the law, of\nintelligence, is theoretically a false love, practically a ruinous\none.\"[200] So love is in its essence _rational_! So thinks Feuerbach;\nthe believer, on the contrary, thinks, Love is in its essence\n_believing_. The one inveighs against _irrational_, the other against\n_unbelieving_, love. To both it can at most rank as a _splen__didum\nvitium_. Do not both leave love standing, even in the form of unreason\nand unbelief? They do not dare to say, irrational or unbelieving love is\nnonsense, is not love; as little as they are willing to say, irrational\nor unbelieving tears are not tears. But, if even irrational love, etc.,\nmust count as love, and if they are nevertheless to be unworthy of man,\nthere follows simply this: love is not the highest thing, but reason or\nfaith; even the unreasonable and the unbelieving can love; but love has\nvalue only when it is that of a rational or believing person. It is an\nillusion when Feuerbach calls the rationality of love its\n\"self-limitation\"; the believer might with the same right call belief\nits \"self-limitation.\" Irrational love is neither \"false\" nor \"ruinous\";\nit does its service as love.\n\nToward the world, especially toward men, I am to _assume a particular\nfeeling_, and \"meet them with love,\" with the feeling of love, from the\nbeginning. Certainly, in this there is revealed far more free-will and\nself-determination than when I let myself be stormed, by way of the\nworld, by all possible feelings, and remain exposed to the most\ncheckered, most accidental impressions. I go to the world rather with a\npreconceived feeling, as if it were a prejudice and a preconceived\nopinion: I have prescribed to myself in advance my behavior toward it,\nand, despite all its temptations, feel and think about it only as I\nhave once determined to. Against the dominion of the world I secure\nmyself by the principle of love; for, whatever may come, I--love. The\nugly--_e. g._--makes a repulsive impression on me; but, determined to\nlove, I master this impression as I do every antipathy.\n\nBut the feeling to which I have determined and--condemned myself from\nthe start is a _narrow_ feeling, because it is a predestined one, of\nwhich I myself am not able to get clear or to declare myself clear.\nBecause preconceived, it is a _prejudice_. _I_ no longer show myself in\nface of the world, but my love shows itself. The _world_ indeed does not\nrule me, but so much the more inevitably does the spirit of _love_ rule\nme. I have overcome the world to become a slave of this spirit.\n\nIf I first said, I love the world, I now add likewise: I do not love it,\nfor I _annihilate_ it as I annihilate myself; _I dissolve it_. I do not\nlimit myself to one feeling for men, but give free play to all that I am\ncapable of. Why should I not dare speak it out in all its glaringness?\nYes, _I utilize_ the world and men! With this I can keep myself open to\nevery impression without being torn away from myself by one of them. I\ncan love, love with a full heart, and let the most consuming glow of\npassion burn in my heart, without taking the beloved one for anything\nelse than the _nourishment_ of my passion, on which it ever refreshes\nitself anew. All my care for him applies only to the _object of my\nlove_, only to him whom my love _requires_, only to him, the \"warmly\nloved.\" How indifferent would he be to me without this--my love! I feed\nonly my love with him, I _utilize_ him for this only: I _enjoy_ him.\n\nLet us choose another convenient example. I see how men are fretted in\ndark superstition by a swarm of ghosts. If to the extent of my powers I\nlet a bit of daylight fall in on the nocturnal spookery, is it\nperchance because love to you inspires this in me? Do I write out of\nlove to men? No, I write because I want to procure for _my_ thoughts an\nexistence in the world; and, even if I foresaw that these thoughts would\ndeprive you of your rest and your peace, even if I saw the bloodiest\nwars and the fall of many generations springing up from this seed of\nthought,--I would nevertheless scatter it. Do with it what you will and\ncan, that is your affair and does not trouble me. You will perhaps have\nonly trouble, combat, and death from it, very few will draw joy from it.\nIf your weal lay at my heart, I should act as the church did in\nwithholding the Bible from the laity, or Christian governments, which\nmake it a sacred duty for themselves to \"protect the common people from\nbad books.\"\n\nBut not only not for your sake, not even for truth's sake either do I\nspeak out what I think. No--\n\n  I sing as the bird sings\n    That on the bough alights;\n  The song that from me springs\n    Is pay that well requites.\n\nI sing because--I am a singer. But I _use_[201] you for it because\nI--need[202] ears.\n\nWhere the world comes in my way--and it comes in my way everywhere--I\nconsume it to quiet the hunger of my egoism. For me you are nothing\nbut--my food, even as I too am fed upon and turned to use by you. We\nhave only one relation to each other, that of _usableness_, of utility,\nof use. We owe _each other_ nothing, for what I seem to owe you I owe\nat most to myself. If I show you a cheery air in order to cheer you\nlikewise, then your cheeriness is of consequence to _me_, and my air\nserves _my_ wish; to a thousand others, whom I do not aim to cheer, I do\nnot show it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOne has to be educated up to that love which founds itself on the\n\"essence of man,\" or, in the ecclesiastical and moral period, lies upon\nus as a \"commandment.\" In what fashion moral influence, the chief\ningredient of our education, seeks to regulate the intercourse of men\nshall here be looked at with egoistic eyes in one example at least.\n\nThose who educate us make it their concern early to break us of lying\nand to inculcate the principle that one must always tell the truth. If\nselfishness were made the basis for this rule, every one would easily\nunderstand how by lying he fools away that confidence in him which he\nhopes to awaken in others, and how correct the maxim proves, Nobody\nbelieves a liar even when he tells the truth. Yet, at the same time, he\nwould also feel that he had to meet with truth only him whom _he_\nauthorized to hear the truth. If a spy walks in disguise through the\nhostile camp, and is asked who he is, the askers are assuredly entitled\nto inquire after his name, but the disguised man does not give them the\nright to learn the truth from him; he tells them what he likes, only not\nthe fact. And yet morality demands, \"Thou shalt not lie!\" By morality\nthose persons are vested with the right to expect the truth; but by me\nthey are not vested with that right, and I recognize only the right\nthat I impart. In a gathering of revolutionists the police force their\nway in and ask the orator for his name; everybody knows that the police\nhave the right to do so, but they do not have it from the\n_revolutionist_, since he is their enemy; he tells them a false name\nand--cheats them with a lie. The police do not act so foolishly either\nas to count on their enemies' love of truth; on the contrary, they do\nnot believe without further ceremony, but have the questioned individual\n\"identified\" if they can. Nay, the State everywhere proceeds\nincredulously with individuals, because in their egoism it recognizes\nits natural enemy; it invariably demands a \"voucher,\" and he who cannot\nshow vouchers falls a prey to its investigating inquisition. The State\ndoes not believe nor trust the individual, and so of itself places\nitself with him in the _convention of lying_; it trusts me only when it\nhas _convinced_ itself of the truth of my statement, for which there\noften remains to it no other means than the oath. How clearly, too, this\n(the oath) proves that the State does not count on our credibility and\nlove of truth, but on our _interest_, our selfishness: it relies on our\nnot wanting to fall foul of God by a perjury.\n\nNow, let one imagine a French revolutionist in the year 1788, who among\nfriends let fall the now well-known phrase, \"the world will have no rest\ntill the last king is hanged with the guts of the last priest.\" The king\nthen still had all power, and, when the utterance is betrayed by an\naccident, yet without its being possible to produce witnesses,\nconfession is demanded from the accused. Is he to confess or not? If he\ndenies, he lies and--remains unpunished; if he confesses, he is candid\nand--is beheaded. If truth is more than everything else to him, all\nright, let him die. Only a paltry poet could try to make a tragedy out\nof the end of his life; for what interest is there in seeing how a man\nsuccumbs from cowardice? But, if he had the courage not to be a slave of\ntruth and sincerity, he would ask somewhat thus: Why need the judges\nknow what I have spoken among friends? If I had _wished_ them to know, I\nshould have said it to them as I said it to my friends. I will not have\nthem know it. They force themselves into my confidence without my having\ncalled them to it and made them my confidants; they _will_ learn what I\n_will_ keep secret. Come on then, you who wish to break my will by your\nwill, and try your arts. You can torture me by the rack, you can\nthreaten me with hell and eternal damnation, you can make me so\nnerveless that I swear a false oath, but the truth you shall not press\nout of me, for I _will_ lie to you because I have given you no claim and\nno right to my sincerity. Let God, \"who is truth,\" look down ever so\nthreateningly on me, let lying come ever so hard to me, I have\nnevertheless the courage of a lie; and, even if I were weary of my life,\neven if nothing appeared to me more welcome than your executioner's\nsword, you nevertheless should not have the joy of finding in me a slave\nof truth, whom by your priestly arts you make a traitor to his _will_.\nWhen I spoke those treasonable words, I would not have had you know\nanything of them; I now retain the same will, and do not let myself be\nfrightened by the curse of the lie.\n\nSigismund is not a miserable caitiff because he broke his princely word,\nbut he broke the word because he was a caitiff; he might have kept his\nword and would still have been a caitiff, a priest-ridden man. Luther,\ndriven by a higher power, became unfaithful to his monastic vow: he\nbecame so for God's sake. Both broke their oath as possessed persons:\nSigismund, because he wanted to appear as a _sincere_ professor of the\ndivine _truth_, _i. e._ of the true, genuinely Catholic faith; Luther,\nin order to give testimony for the gospel _sincerely_ and with entire\ntruth, with body and soul; both became perjured in order to be sincere\ntoward the \"higher truth.\" Only, the priests absolved the one, the other\nabsolved himself. What else did both observe than what is contained in\nthose apostolic words, \"Thou hast not lied to men, but to God\"? They\nlied to men, broke their oath before the world's eyes, in order not to\nlie to God, but to serve him. Thus they show us a way to deal with truth\nbefore men. For God's glory, and for God's sake, a--breach of oath, a\nlie, a prince's word broken!\n\nHow would it be, now, if we changed the thing a little and wrote, A\nperjury and lie for--_my sake_? Would not that be pleading for every\nbaseness? It seems so assuredly, only in this it is altogether like the\n\"for God's sake.\" For was not every baseness committed for God's sake,\nwere not all the scaffolds filled for his sake and all the _auto-da-fes_\nheld for his sake, was not all stupefaction introduced for his sake? and\ndo they not to-day still for God's sake fetter the mind in tender\nchildren by religious education? Were not sacred vows broken for his\nsake, and do not missionaries and priests still go around every day to\nbring Jews, heathen, Protestants or Catholics, etc., to treason against\nthe faith of their fathers,--for his sake? And that should be worse with\nthe _for my sake_? What then does _on my account_ mean? There people\nimmediately think of \"filthy lucre.\" But he who acts from love of filthy\nlucre does it on his own account indeed, as there is nothing anyhow that\none does not do for his own sake,--among other things, everything that\nis done for God's glory; yet he, for whom he seeks the lucre, is a slave\nof lucre, not raised above lucre; he is one who belongs to lucre, the\nmoney-bag, not to himself; he is not his own. Must not a man whom the\npassion of avarice rules follow the commands of this _master_? and, if a\nweak good-naturedness once beguiles him, does this not appear as simply\nan exceptional case of precisely the same sort as when pious believers\nare sometimes forsaken by their Lord's guidance and ensnared by the arts\nof the \"devil\"? So an avaricious man is not a self-owned man, but a\nservant; and he can do nothing for his own sake without at the same time\ndoing it for his lord's sake,--precisely like the godly man.\n\nFamous is the breach of oath which Francis II committed against Emperor\nCharles V. Not later, when he ripely weighed his promise, but at once,\nwhen he swore the oath, King Francis took it back in thought as well as\nby a secret protestation documentarily subscribed before his\ncouncillors; he uttered a perjury aforethought. Francis did not show\nhimself disinclined to buy his release, but the price that Charles put\non it seemed to him too high and unreasonable. Even though Charles\nbehaved himself in a sordid fashion when he sought to extort as much as\npossible, it was yet shabby of Francis to want to purchase his freedom\nfor a lower ransom; and his later dealings, among which there occurs yet\na second breach of his word, prove sufficiently how the huckster spirit\nheld him enthralled and made him a shabby swindler. However, what shall\nwe say to the reproach of perjury against him? In the first place,\nsurely, this again: that not the perjury, but his sordidness, shamed\nhim; that he did not deserve contempt for his perjury, but made himself\nguilty of perjury because he was a contemptible man. But Francis's\nperjury, regarded in itself, demands another judgment. One might say\nFrancis did not respond to the confidence that Charles put in him in\nsetting him free. But, if Charles had really favored him with\nconfidence, he would have named to him the price that he considered the\nrelease worth, and would then have set him at liberty and expected\nFrancis to pay the redemption-sum. Charles harbored no such trust, but\nonly believed in Francis's impotence and credulity, which would not\nallow him to act against his oath; but Francis deceived only\nthis--credulous calculation. When Charles believed he was assuring\nhimself of his enemy by an oath, right there he was freeing him from\nevery obligation. Charles had given the king credit for a piece of\nstupidity, a narrow conscience, and, without confidence in Francis,\ncounted only on Francis's stupidity, _i. e._ conscientiousness: he let\nhim go from the Madrid prison only to hold him the more securely in the\nprison of conscientiousness, the great jail built about the mind of man\nby religion: he sent him back to France locked fast in invisible chains,\nwhat wonder if Francis sought to escape and sawed the chains apart? No\nman would have taken it amiss of him if he had secretly fled from\nMadrid, for he was in an enemy's power; but every good Christian cries\nout upon him, that he wanted to loose himself from God's bonds too. (It\nwas only later that the pope absolved him from his oath.)\n\nIt is despicable to deceive a confidence that we voluntarily call forth;\nbut it is no shame to egoism to let every one who wants to get us into\nhis power by an oath bleed to death by the unsuccessfulness of his\nuntrustful craft. If you have wanted to bind me, then learn that I know\nhow to burst your bonds.\n\nThe point is whether _I_ give the confider the right to confidence. If\nthe pursuer of my friend asks me where he has fled to, I shall surely\nput him on a false trail. Why does he ask precisely me, the pursued\nman's friend? In order not to be a false, traitorous friend, I prefer to\nbe false to the enemy. I might certainly, in courageous\nconscientiousness, answer \"I will not tell\" (so Fichte decides the\ncase); by that I should salve my love of truth and do for my friend as\nmuch as--nothing, for, if I do not mislead the enemy, he may\naccidentally take the right street, and my love of truth would have\ngiven up my friend as a prey, because it hindered me from the--courage\nfor a lie. He who has in the truth an idol, a sacred thing, must\n_humble_ himself before it, must not defy its demands, not resist\ncourageously; in short, he must renounce the _heroism of the lie_. For\nto the lie belongs not less courage than to the truth: a courage that\nyoung men are most apt to be defective in, who would rather confess the\ntruth and mount the scaffold for it than confound the enemy's power by\nthe impudence of a lie. To them the truth is \"sacred,\" and the sacred at\nall times demands blind reverence, submission, and self-sacrifice. If\nyou are not impudent, not mockers of the sacred, you are tame and its\nservants. Let one but lay a grain of truth in the trap for you, you peck\nat it to a certainty, and the fool is caught. You will not lie? Well,\nthen, fall as sacrifices to the truth and become--martyrs! Martyrs!--for\nwhat? For yourselves, for self-ownership? No, for your goddess,--the\ntruth. You know only two _services_, only two kinds of servants:\nservants of the truth and servants of the lie. Then in God's name serve\nthe truth!\n\nOthers, again, serve the truth also; but they serve it \"in moderation,\"\nand make, _e. g._, a great distinction between a simple lie and a lie\nsworn to. And yet the whole chapter of the oath coincides with that of\nthe lie, since an oath, everybody knows, is only a strongly assured\nstatement. You consider yourselves entitled to lie, if only you do not\nswear to it besides? One who is particular about it must judge and\ncondemn a lie as sharply as a false oath. But now there has been kept up\nin morality an ancient point of controversy, which is customarily\ntreated of under the name of the \"lie of necessity.\" No one who dares\nplead for this can consistently put from him an \"oath of necessity.\" If\nI justify my lie as a lie of necessity, I should not be so pusillanimous\nas to rob the justified lie of the strongest corroboration. Whatever I\ndo, why should I not do it entirely and without reservation\n(_reservatio mentalis_)? If I once lie, why then not lie completely,\nwith entire consciousness and all my might? As a spy I should have to\nswear to each of my false statements at the enemy's demand; determined\nto lie to him, should I suddenly become cowardly and undecided in face\nof an oath? Then I should have been ruined in advance for a liar and\nspy; for, you see, I should be voluntarily putting into the enemy's\nhands a means to catch me.--The State too fears the oath of necessity,\nand for this reason does not give the accused a chance to swear. But you\ndo not justify the State's fear; you lie, but do not swear falsely. If,\n_e. g._, you show some one a kindness, and he is not to know it, but he\nguesses it and tells you so to your face, you deny; if he insists, you\nsay \"honestly, no!\" If it came to swearing, then you would refuse; for,\nfrom fear of the sacred, you always stop half way. _Against_ the sacred\nyou have no _will of your own_. You lie in--moderation, as you are free\n\"in moderation,\" religious \"in moderation\" (the clergy are not to\n\"encroach\"; over this point the most vapid of controversies is now being\ncarried on, on the part of the university against the church),\nmonarchically disposed \"in moderation\" (you want a monarch limited by\nthe constitution, by a fundamental law of the State), everything nicely\n_tempered_, lukewarm, half God's, half the devil's.\n\nThere was a university where the usage was that every word of honor that\nmust be given to the university judge was looked upon by the students as\nnull and void. For the students saw in the demanding of it nothing but\na snare, which they could not escape otherwise than by taking away all\nits significance. He who at that same university broke his word of honor\nto one of the fellows was infamous; he who gave it to the university\njudge derided, in union with these very fellows, the dupe who fancied\nthat a word had the same value among friends and among foes. It was less\na correct theory than the constraint of practice that had there taught\nthe students to act so, as, without that means of getting out, they\nwould have been pitilessly driven to treachery against their comrades.\nBut, as the means approved itself in practice, so it has its theoretical\nprobation too. A word of honor, an oath, is one only for him whom _I_\nentitle to receive it; he who forces me to it obtains only a forced,\n_i. e._ a _hostile_ word, the word of a foe, whom one has no right to\ntrust; for the foe does not give us the right.\n\nAside from this, the courts of the State do not even recognize the\ninviolability of an oath. For, if I had sworn to one who comes under\nexamination that I would not declare anything against him, the court\nwould demand my declaration in spite of the fact that an oath binds me,\nand, in case of refusal, would lock me up till I decided to become--an\noath-breaker. The court \"absolves me from my oath\";--how magnanimous! If\nany power can absolve me from the oath, I myself am surely the very\nfirst power that has a claim to.\n\nAs a curiosity, and to remind us of customary oaths of all sorts, let\nplace be given here to that which Emperor Paul commanded the captured\nPoles (Kosciusko, Potocki, Niemcewicz, etc.) to take when he released\nthem: \"We not merely swear fidelity and obedience to the emperor, but\nalso further promise to pour out our blood for his glory; we obligate\nourselves to discover everything threatening to his person or his empire\nthat we ever learn; we declare finally that, in whatever part of the\nearth we may be, a single word of the emperor shall suffice to make us\nleave everything and repair to him at once.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn one domain the principle of love seems to have been long outsoared by\negoism, and to be still in need only of sure consciousness, as it were\nof victory with a good conscience. This domain is speculation, in its\ndouble manifestation as thinking and as trade. One thinks with a will,\nwhatever may come of it; one speculates, however many may suffer under\nour speculative undertakings. But, when it finally becomes serious, when\neven the last remnant of religiousness, romance, or \"humanity\" is to be\ndone away, then the pulse of religious conscience beats, and one at\nleast _professes_ humanity. The avaricious speculator throws some\ncoppers into the poor-box and \"does good,\" the bold thinker consoles\nhimself with the fact that he is working for the advancement of the\nhuman race and that his devastation \"turns to the good\" of mankind, or,\nin another case, that he is \"serving the idea\"; mankind, the idea, is to\nhim that something of which he must say, It is more to me than myself.\n\nTo this day thinking and trading have been done for--God's sake. Those\nwho for six days were trampling down everything by their selfish aims\nsacrificed on the seventh to the Lord; and those who destroyed a\nhundred \"good causes\" by their reckless thinking still did this in the\nservice of another \"good cause,\" and had yet to think of\nanother--besides themselves--to whose good their self-indulgence should\nturn: of the people, mankind, and the like. But this other thing is a\nbeing above them, a higher or supreme being; and therefore I say, they\nare toiling for God's sake.\n\nHence I can also say that the ultimate basis of their actions\nis--_love_. Not a voluntary love however, not their own, but a tributary\nlove, or the higher being's own (_i. e._ God's, who himself is love); in\nshort, not the egoistic, but the religious; a love that springs from\ntheir fancy that they _must_ discharge a tribute of love, _i. e._ that\nthey must not be \"egoists.\"\n\nIf _we_ want to deliver the world from many kinds of unfreedom, we want\nthis not on its account but on ours; for, as we are not world-liberators\nby profession and out of \"love,\" we only want to win it away from\nothers. We want to make it our own; it is not to be any longer _owned as\nserf_ by God (the church) nor by the law (State), but to be _our own_;\ntherefore we seek to \"win\" it, to \"captivate\" it, and, by meeting it\nhalf-way and \"devoting\" ourselves to it as to ourselves as soon as it\nbelongs to us, to complete and make superfluous the force that it turns\nagainst us. If the world is ours, it no longer attempts any force\n_against_ us, but only _with_ us. My selfishness has an interest in the\nliberation of the world, that it may become--my property.\n\nNot isolation or being alone, but society, is man's original state. Our\nexistence begins with the most intimate conjunction, as we are already\nliving with our mother before we breathe; when we see the light of the\nworld, we at once lie on a human being's breast again, her love cradles\nus in the lap, leads us in the go-cart, and chains us to her person with\na thousand ties. Society is our _state of nature_. And this is why, the\nmore we learn to feel ourselves, the connection that was formerly most\nintimate becomes ever looser and the dissolution of the original society\nmore unmistakable. To have once again for herself the child that once\nlay under her heart, the mother must fetch it from the street and from\nthe midst of its playmates. The child prefers the _intercourse_ that it\nenters into with _its fellows_ to the _society_ that it has not entered\ninto, but only been born in.\n\nBut the dissolution of _society_ is _intercourse_ or _union_. A society\ndoes assuredly arise by union too, but only as a fixed idea arises by a\nthought,--to wit, by the vanishing of the energy of the thought (the\nthinking itself, this restless taking back all thoughts that make\nthemselves fast) from the thought. If a union[203] has crystallized into\na society, it has ceased to be a coalition;[204] for coalition is an\nincessant self-uniting; it has become a unitedness, come to a\nstandstill, degenerated into a fixity; it is--_dead_ as a union, it is\nthe corpse of the union or the coalition, _i. e._ it is--society,\ncommunity. A striking example of this kind is furnished by the _party_.\n\nThat a society (_e. g._ the society of the State) diminishes my\n_liberty_ offends me little. Why, I have to let my liberty be limited by\nall sorts of powers and by every one who is stronger; nay, by every\nfellow-man; and, were I the autocrat of all the R......, I yet should\nnot enjoy absolute liberty. But _ownness_ I will not have taken from me.\nAnd ownness is precisely what every society has designs on, precisely\nwhat is to succumb to its power.\n\nA society which I join does indeed take from me many liberties, but in\nreturn it affords me other liberties; neither does it matter if I myself\ndeprive myself of this and that liberty (_e. g._ by any contract). On\nthe other hand, I want to hold jealously to my ownness. Every community\nhas the propensity, stronger or weaker according to the fulness of its\npower, to become an _authority_ to its members and to set _limits_ for\nthem: it asks, and must ask, for a \"subject's limited understanding\"; it\nasks that those who belong to it be subject to it, be its \"subjects\"; it\nexists only by _subjection_. In this a certain tolerance need by no\nmeans be excluded; on the contrary, the society will welcome\nimprovements, corrections, and blame, so far as such are calculated for\nits gain: but the blame must be \"well-meaning,\" it may not be \"insolent\nand disrespectful,\"--in other words, one must leave uninjured, and hold\nsacred, the substance of the society. The society demands that those who\nbelong to it shall not go _beyond it_ and exalt themselves, but remain\n\"within the bounds of legality,\" _i. e._ allow themselves only so much\nas the society and its law allow them.\n\nThere is a difference whether my liberty or my ownness is limited by a\nsociety. If the former only is the case, it is a _coalition_, an\nagreement, a union; but, if ruin is threatened to ownness, it is a\n_power of itself_, a power _above me_, a thing unattainable by me, which\nI can indeed admire, adore, reverence, respect, but cannot subdue and\nconsume, and that for the reason that I _am resigned_. It exists by my\n_resignation_, my _self-renunciation_, my spiritlessness,[205]\ncalled--HUMILITY.[206] My humility makes its courage,[207] my\nsubmissiveness gives it its dominion.\n\nBut in reference to _liberty_ State and union are subject to no\nessential difference. The latter can just as little come into existence,\nor continue in existence, without liberty's being limited in all sorts\nof ways, as the State is compatible with unmeasured liberty. Limitation\nof liberty is inevitable everywhere, for one cannot get _rid_ of\neverything; one cannot fly like a bird merely because one would like to\nfly so, for one does not get free from his own weight; one cannot live\nunder water as long as he likes, like a fish, because one cannot do\nwithout air and cannot get free from this indispensable necessity; and\nthe like. As religion, and most decidedly Christianity, tormented man\nwith the demand to realize the unnatural and self-contradictory, so it\nis to be looked upon only as the true logical outcome of that religious\noverstraining and overwroughtness that finally _liberty itself, absolute\nliberty_, was exalted into an ideal, and thus the nonsense of the\nimpossible had to come glaringly to the light.--The union will assuredly\noffer a greater measure of liberty, as well as (and especially because\nby it one escapes all the coercion peculiar to State and society life)\nadmit of being considered as \"a new liberty\"; but nevertheless it will\nstill contain enough of unfreedom and involuntariness. For its object is\nnot this--liberty (which on the contrary it sacrifices to ownness), but\nonly _ownness_. Referred to this, the difference between State and union\nis great enough. The former is an enemy and murderer of _ownness_, the\nlatter a son and co-worker of it; the former a spirit that would be\nadored in spirit and in truth, the latter my work, my _product_; the\nState is the lord of my spirit, who demands faith and prescribes to me\narticles of faith, the creed of legality; it exerts moral influence,\ndominates my spirit, drives away my ego to put itself in its place as\n\"my true ego,\"--in short, the State is _sacred_, and as against me, the\nindividual man, it is the true man, the spirit, the ghost; but the union\nis my own creation, my creature, not sacred, not a spiritual power above\nmy spirit, as little as any association of whatever sort. As I am not\nwilling to be a slave of my maxims, but lay them bare to my continual\ncriticism without _any warrant_, and admit no bail at all for their\npersistence, so still less do I obligate myself to the union for my\nfuture and pledge my soul to it, as is said to be done with the devil\nand is really the case with the State and all spiritual authority; but I\nam and remain _more_ to myself than State, Church, God, and the like;\nconsequently infinitely more than the union too.\n\nThat society which Communism wants to found seems to stand nearest to\n_coalition_. For it is to aim at the \"welfare of all,\" oh, yes, of all,\ncries Weitling innumerable times, of all! That does really look as if\nin it no one needed to take a back seat. But what then will this welfare\nbe? Have all one and the same welfare, are all equally well off with one\nand the same thing? If that be so, the question is of the \"true\nwelfare.\" Do we not with this come right to the point where religion\nbegins its dominion of violence? Christianity says, Look not on earthly\ntoys, but seek your true welfare, become--pious Christians; being\nChristians is the true welfare. It is the true welfare of \"all,\" because\nit is the welfare of Man as such (this spook). Now, the welfare of all\nis surely to be _your_ and _my_ welfare too? But, if you and I do not\nlook upon that welfare as _our_ welfare, will care then be taken for\nthat in which _we_ feel well? On the contrary, society has decreed a\nwelfare as the \"true welfare\"; and, if this welfare were called _e. g._\n\"enjoyment honestly worked for,\" but you preferred enjoyable laziness,\nenjoyment without work, then society, which cares for the \"welfare of\nall,\" would wisely avoid caring for that in which you are well off.\nCommunism, in proclaiming the welfare of all, annuls outright the\nwell-being of those who hitherto lived on their income from investments\nand apparently felt better in that than in the prospect of Weitling's\nstrict hours of labor. Hence the latter asserts that with the welfare of\nthousands the welfare of millions cannot exist, and the former must give\nup _their_ special welfare \"for the sake of the general welfare.\" No,\nlet people not be summoned to sacrifice their special welfare for the\ngeneral, for this Christian admonition will not carry you through; they\nwill better understand the opposite admonition, not to let their _own_\nwelfare be snatched from them by anybody, but to put it on a permanent\nfoundation. Then they are of themselves led to the point that they care\nbest for their welfare if they _unite_ with others for this purpose,\n_i. e._ \"sacrifice a part of their liberty,\" yet not to the welfare of\nothers, but to their own. An appeal to men's self-sacrificing\ndisposition and self-renouncing love ought at last to have lost its\nseductive plausibility when, after an activity of thousands of years, it\nhas left nothing behind but the--_mis\u00e8re_ of to-day. Why then still\nfruitlessly expect self-sacrifice to bring us better times? why not\nrather hope for them from _usurpation_? Salvation comes no longer from\nthe giver, the bestower, the loving one, but from the _taker_, the\nappropriater (usurper), the owner. Communism, and, consciously or\nunconsciously, egoism-reviling humanism, still count on _love_.\n\nIf community is once a need of man, and he finds himself furthered by it\nin his aims, then very soon, because it has become his principle, it\nprescribes to him its laws too, the laws of--society. The principle of\nmen exalts itself into a sovereign power over them, becomes their\nsupreme essence, their God, and, as such,--lawgiver. Communism gives\nthis principle the strictest effect, and Christianity is the religion of\nsociety, for, as Feuerbach rightly says although he does not mean it\nrightly, love is the essence of man; _i. e._ the essence of society or\nof societary (Communistic) man. All religion is a cult of society, this\nprinciple by which societary (cultivated) man is dominated; neither is\nany god an ego's exclusive god, but always a society's or community's,\nbe it of the society \"family\" (Lar, Penates) or of a \"people\" (\"national\ngod\") or of \"all men\" (\"he is a Father of all men\").\n\nConsequently one has a prospect of extirpating religion down to the\nground only when one antiquates _society_ and everything that flows from\nthis principle. But it is precisely in Communism that this principle\nseeks to culminate, as in it everything is to become _common_ for the\nestablishment of--\"equality.\" If this \"equality\" is won, \"liberty\" too\nis not lacking. But whose liberty? _Society's!_ Society is then all in\nall, and men are only \"for each other.\" It would be the glory of\nthe--love-State.\n\nBut I would rather be referred to men's selfishness than to their\n\"kindnesses,\"[208] their mercy, pity, etc. The former demands\n_reciprocity_ (as thou to me, so I to thee), does nothing \"gratis,\" and\nmay be won and--_bought_. But with what shall I obtain the kindness? It\nis a matter of chance whether I am at the time having to do with a\n\"loving\" person. The affectionate one's service can be had only\nby--_begging_, be it by my lamentable appearance, by my need of help, my\nmisery, my--_suffering_. What can I offer him for his assistance?\nNothing! I must accept it as a--present. Love is _unpayable_, or rather,\nlove can assuredly be paid for, but only by counter-love (\"One good turn\ndeserves another\"). What paltriness and beggarliness does it not take to\naccept gifts year in and year out without service in return, as they are\nregularly collected _e. g._ from the poor day-laborer? What can the\nreceiver do for him and his donated pennies, in which his wealth\nconsists? The day-laborer would really have more enjoyment if the\nreceiver with his laws, his institutions, etc., all of which the\nday-laborer has to pay for though, did not exist at all. And yet, with\nit all, the poor wight _loves_ his master.\n\nNo, community, as the \"goal\" of history hitherto, is impossible. Let us\nrather renounce every hypocrisy of community, and recognize that, if we\nare equal as men, we are not equal for the very reason that we are not\nmen. We are equal _only in thoughts_, only when \"we\" are _thought_, not\nas we really and bodily are. I am ego, and you are ego: but I am not\nthis thought-of ego; this ego in which we are all equal is only _my\nthought_. I am man, and you are man: but \"man\" is only a thought, a\ngenerality; neither you nor I are speakable, we are _unutterable_,\nbecause only _thoughts_ are speakable and consist in speaking.\n\nLet us therefore not aspire to community, but to _one-sidedness_. Let us\nnot seek the most comprehensive commune, \"human society,\" but let us\nseek in others only means and organs which we may use as our property!\nAs we do not see our equals in the tree, the beast, so the\npresupposition that others are _our equals_ springs from a hypocrisy. No\none is _my equal_, but I regard him, equally with all other beings, as\nmy property. In opposition to this I am told that I should be a man\namong \"fellow-men\" (\"_Judenfrage_,\" p. 60); I should \"respect\" the\nfellow-man in them. For me no one is a person to be respected, not even\nthe fellow-man, but solely, like other beings, an _object_ in which I\ntake an interest or else do not, an interesting or uninteresting\nobject, a usable or unusable person.\n\nAnd, if I can use him, I doubtless come to an understanding and make\nmyself at one with him, in order, by the agreement, to strengthen _my\npower_, and by combined force to accomplish more than individual force\ncould effect. In this combination I see nothing whatever but a\nmultiplication of my force, and I retain it only so long as it is _my_\nmultiplied force. But thus it is a--union.\n\nNeither a natural ligature nor a spiritual one holds the union together,\nand it is not a natural, not a spiritual league. It is not brought about\nby one _blood_, not by one _faith_ (spirit). In a natural league--like a\nfamily, a tribe, a nation, yes, mankind--the individuals have only the\nvalue of _specimens_ of the same species or genus; in a spiritual\nleague--like a commune, a church--the individual signifies only a\n_member_ of the same spirit; what you are in both cases as a unique\nperson must be--suppressed. Only in the union can you assert yourself as\nunique, because the union does not possess you, but you possess it or\nmake it of use to you.\n\nProperty is recognized in the union, and only in the union, because one\nno longer holds what is his as a fief from any being. The Communists are\nonly consistently carrying further what had already been long present\nduring religious evolution, and especially in the State; to wit,\npropertylessness, _i. e._ the feudal system.\n\nThe State exerts itself to tame the desirous man; in other words, it\nseeks to direct his desire to it alone, and to _content_ that desire\nwith what it offers. To sate the desire for the desirous man's sake does\nnot come into its mind: on the contrary, it stigmatizes as an \"egoistic\nman\" the man who breathes out unbridled desire, and the \"egoistic man\"\nis its enemy. He is this for it because the capacity to agree with him\nis wanting to the State; the egoist is precisely what it cannot\n\"comprehend.\" Since the State (as nothing else is possible) has to do\nonly for itself, it does not take care for my needs, but takes care only\nof how it shall make away with me, _i. e._ make out of me another ego, a\ngood citizen. It takes measures for the \"improvement of morals.\"--And\nwith what does it win individuals for itself? With itself, _i. e._ with\nwhat is the State's, with _State property_. It will be unremittingly\nactive in making all participants in its \"goods,\" providing all with the\n\"good things of culture\": it presents them its education, opens to them\nthe access to its institutions of culture, capacitates them to come to\nproperty (_i. e._ to a fief) in the way of industry, etc. For all these\n_fiefs_ it demands only the just rent of continual _thanks_. But the\n\"unthankful\" forget to pay these thanks.--Now, neither can \"society\" do\nessentially otherwise than the State.\n\nYou bring into a union your whole power, your competence, and _make\nyourself count_; in a society you are _employed_, with your working\npower; in the former you live egoistically, in the latter humanly,\n_i. e._ religiously, as a \"member in the body of this Lord\"; to a\nsociety you owe what you have, and are in duty bound to it,\nare--possessed by \"social duties\"; a union you utilize, and give it up\nundutifully and unfaithfully when you see no way to use it further. If\na society is more than you, then it is more to you than yourself; a\nunion is only your instrument, or the sword with which you sharpen and\nincrease your natural force; the union exists for you and through you,\nthe society conversely lays claim to you for itself and exists even\nwithout you; in short, the society is _sacred_, the union your _own_;\nthe society consumes _you_, _you_ consume the union.\n\nNevertheless people will not be backward with the objection that the\nagreement which has been concluded may again become burdensome to us and\nlimit our freedom; they will say, we too would at last come to this,\nthat \"every one must sacrifice a part of his freedom for the sake of the\ngenerality.\" But the sacrifice would not be made for the \"generality's\"\nsake a bit, as little as I concluded the agreement for the\n\"generality's\" or even, for any other man's sake; rather I came into it\nonly for the sake of my own benefit, from _selfishness_.[209] But, as\nregards the sacrificing, surely I \"sacrifice\" only that which does not\nstand in my power, _i. e._ I \"sacrifice\" nothing at all.\n\nTo come back to property, the lord is proprietor. Choose then whether\nyou want to be lord, or whether society shall be! On this depends\nwhether you are to be an _owner_ or a _ragamuffin!_ The egoist is owner,\nthe Socialist a ragamuffin. But ragamuffinism or propertylessness is the\nsense of feudalism, of the feudal system, which since the last century\nhas only changed its overlord, putting \"Man\" in the place of God, and\naccepting as a fief from Man what had before been a fief from the grace\nof God. That the ragamuffinism of Communism is carried out by the humane\nprinciple into the absolute or most ragamuffinly ragamuffinism has been\nshown above; but at the same time also, how ragamuffinism can only thus\nswing around into ownness. The _old_ feudal system was so thoroughly\ntrampled into the ground in the Revolution that since then all\nreactionary craft has remained fruitless, and will always remain\nfruitless, because the dead is--dead; but the resurrection too had to\nprove itself a truth in Christian history, and has so proved itself: for\nin another world feudalism is risen again with a glorified body, the\n_new_ feudalism under the suzerainty of \"Man.\"\n\nChristianity is not annihilated, but the faithful are right in having\nhitherto trustfully assumed of every combat against it that this could\nserve only for the purgation and confirmation of Christianity; for it\nhas really only been glorified, and \"Christianity exposed\" is\nthe--_human Christianity_. We are still living entirely in the Christian\nage, and the very ones who feel worst about it are the most zealously\ncontributing to \"complete\" it. The more human, the dearer has feudalism\nbecome to us; for we the less believe that it still is feudalism, we\ntake it the more confidently for ownness and think we have found what is\n\"most absolutely our own\" when we discover \"the human.\"\n\nLiberalism wants to give me what is mine, but it thinks to procure it\nfor me not under the title of mine, but under that of the \"human.\" As if\nit were attainable under this mask! The rights of man, the precious\nwork of the Revolution, have the meaning that the Man in me\n_entitles_[210] me to this and that; I as individual, _i. e._ as this\nman, am not entitled, but Man has the right and entitles me. Hence as\nman I may well be entitled; but, as I am more than man, to wit, a\n_special_ man, it may be refused to this very me, the special one. If on\nthe other hand you insist on the _value_ of your gifts, keep up their\nprice, do not let yourselves be forced to sell out below price, do not\nlet yourselves be talked into the idea that your ware is not worth its\nprice, do not make yourselves ridiculous by a \"ridiculous price,\" but\nimitate the brave man who says, I will _sell_ my life (property) dear,\nthe enemy shall not have it at a cheap _bargain_; then you have\nrecognized the reverse of Communism as the correct thing, and the word\nthen is not \"Give up your property!\" but \"_Get the value out of_ your\nproperty!\"\n\nOver the portal of our time stands not that \"Know thyself\" of Apollo,\nbut a \"_Get the value out of thyself!_\"\n\nProudhon calls property \"robbery\" (_le vol_). But alien property--and he\nis talking of this alone--is not less existent by renunciation, cession,\nand humility; it is a _present_. Why so sentimentally call for\ncompassion as a poor victim of robbery, when one is just a foolish,\ncowardly giver of presents? Why here again put the fault on others as if\nthey were robbing us, while we ourselves do bear the fault in leaving\nthe others, unrobbed? The poor are to blame for there being rich men.\n\nUniversally, no one grows indignant at _his_, but at _alien_ property.\nThey do not in truth attack property, but the alienation of property.\nThey want to be able to call _more_, not less, _theirs_; they want to\ncall everything _theirs_. They are fighting, therefore, against\n_alienness_, or, to form a word similar to property, against alienty.\nAnd how do they help themselves therein? Instead of transforming the\nalien into own, they play impartial and ask only that all property be\nleft to a third party (_e. g._ human society). They revendicate the\nalien not in their own name but in a third party's. Now the \"egoistic\"\ncoloring is wiped off, and everything is so clean and--human!\n\nPropertylessness or ragamuffinism, this then is the \"essence of\nChristianity,\" as it is the essence of all religiousness (_i. e._\ngodliness, morality, humanity), and only announced itself most clearly,\nand, as glad tidings, became a gospel capable of development, in the\n\"absolute religion.\" We have before us the most striking development in\nthe present fight against property, a fight which is to bring \"Man\" to\nvictory and make propertylessness complete: victorious humanity is the\nvictory of--Christianity. But the \"Christianity exposed\" thus is\nfeudalism completed, the most all-embracing feudal system, _i. e._\nperfect ragamuffinism.\n\nOnce more then, doubtless, a \"revolution\" against the feudal system?--\n\nRevolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The\nformer consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established\ncondition or _status_, the State or society, and is accordingly a\n_political_ or _social_ act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable\nconsequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from\nit but from men's discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising,\nbut a rising of individuals, a getting up, without regard to the\narrangements that spring from it. The Revolution aimed at new\n_arrangements_; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be\narranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on\n\"institutions.\" It is not a fight against the established, since, if it\nprospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working\nforth of me out of the established. If I leave the established, it is\ndead and passes into decay. Now, as my object is not the overthrow of an\nestablished order but my elevation above it, my purpose and deed are not\na political or social but (as directed toward myself and my ownness\nalone) an _egoistic_ purpose and deed.\n\nThe revolution commands one to make _arrangements_, the\ninsurrection[211] demands that he _rise or exalt himself_.[212] What\n_constitution_ was to be chosen, this question busied the revolutionary\nheads, and the whole political period foams with constitutional fights\nand constitutional questions, as the social talents too were uncommonly\ninventive in societary arrangement (phalansteries and the like). The\ninsurgent[213] strives to become constitutionless.\n\nWhile, to get greater clearness, I am thinking up a comparison, the\nfounding of Christianity comes unexpectedly into my mind. On the liberal\nside it is noted as a bad point in the first Christians that they\npreached obedience to the established heathen civil order, enjoined\nrecognition of the heathen authorities, and confidently delivered a\ncommand, \"Give to the emperor that which is the emperor's.\" Yet how much\ndisturbance arose at the same time against the Roman supremacy, how\nmutinous did the Jews and even the Romans show themselves against their\nown temporal government! in short, how popular was \"political\ndiscontent\"! Those Christians would hear nothing of it; would not side\nwith the \"liberal tendencies.\" The time was politically so agitated\nthat, as is said in the gospels, people thought they could not accuse\nthe founder of Christianity more successfully than if they arraigned him\nfor \"political intrigue,\" and yet the same gospels report that he was\nprecisely the one who took least part in these political doings. But why\nwas he not a revolutionist, not a demagogue, as the Jews would gladly\nhave seen him? why was he not a liberal? Because he expected no\nsalvation from a change of _conditions_, and this whole business was\nindifferent to him. He was not a revolutionist like _e. g._ C\u00e6sar, but\nan insurgent; not a State-overturner, but one who straightened _himself_\nup. That was why it was for him only a matter of \"Be ye wise as\nserpents,\" which expresses the same sense as, in the special case, that\n\"Give to the emperor that which is the emperor's\"; for he was not\ncarrying on any liberal or political fight against the established\nauthorities, but wanted to walk his _own_ way, untroubled about, and\nundisturbed by, these authorities. Not less indifferent to him than the\ngovernment were its enemies, for neither understood what he wanted, and\nhe had only to keep them off from him with the wisdom of the serpent.\nBut, even though not a ringleader of popular mutiny, not a demagogue or\nrevolutionist, he (and every one of the ancient Christians) was so much\nthe more an _insurgent_, who lifted himself above everything that seemed\nsublime to the government and its opponents, and absolved himself from\neverything that they remained bound to, and who at the same time cut off\nthe sources of life of the whole heathen world, with which the\nestablished State must wither away as a matter of course; precisely\nbecause he put from him the upsetting of the established, he was its\ndeadly enemy and real annihilator; for he walled it in, confidently and\nrecklessly carrying up the building of _his_ temple over it, without\nheeding the pains of the immured.\n\nNow, as it happened to the heathen order of the world, will the\nChristian order fare likewise? A revolution certainly does not bring on\nthe end if an insurrection is not consummated first!\n\nMy intercourse with the world, what does it aim at? I want to have the\nenjoyment of it, therefore it must be my property, and therefore I want\nto win it. I do not want the liberty of men, nor their equality; I want\nonly _my_ power over them, I want to make them my property, _i. e._\n_material for enjoyment_. And, if I do not succeed in that, well, then I\ncall even the power over life and death, which Church and State\nreserved to themselves,--mine. Brand that officer's widow who, in the\nflight in Russia, after her leg has been shot away, takes the garter\nfrom it, strangles her child therewith, and then bleeds to death\nalongside the corpse,--brand the memory of the--infanticide. Who knows,\nif this child had remained alive, how much it might have \"been of use to\nthe world\"! The mother murdered it because she wanted to die _satisfied_\nand at rest. Perhaps this case still appeals to your sentimentality, and\nyou do not know how to read out of it anything further. Be it so; I on\nmy part use it as an example for this, that _my_ satisfaction decides\nabout my relation to men, and that I do not renounce, from any access of\nhumility, even the power over life and death.\n\nAs regards \"social duties\" in general, another does not give me my\nposition toward others, therefore neither God nor humanity prescribes to\nme my relation to men, but I give myself this position. This is more\nstrikingly said thus: I have no _duty_ to others, as I have a duty even\nto myself (_e. g._ that of self-preservation, and therefore not suicide)\nonly so long as I distinguish myself from myself (my immortal soul from\nmy earthly existence, etc.).\n\nI no longer _humble_ myself before any power, and I recognize that all\npowers are only my power, which I have to subject at once when they\nthreaten to become a power _against_ or _above_ me; each of them must be\nonly one of _my means_ to carry my point, as a hound is our power\nagainst game, but is killed by us if it should fall upon us ourselves.\nAll powers that dominate me I then reduce to serving me. The idols\nexist through me; I need only refrain from creating them anew, then\nthey exist no longer: \"higher powers\" exist only through my exalting\nthem and abasing myself.\n\nConsequently my relation to the world is this: I no longer do anything\nfor it \"for God's sake,\" I do nothing \"for man's sake,\" but what I do I\ndo \"for my sake.\" Thus alone does the world satisfy me, while it is\ncharacteristic of the religious standpoint, in which I include the moral\nand humane also, that from it everything remains a _pious wish_ (_pium\ndesiderium_), _i. e._ an other-world matter, something unattained. Thus\nthe general salvation of men, the moral world of a general love, eternal\npeace, the cessation of egoism, etc. \"Nothing in this world is perfect.\"\nWith this miserable phrase the good part from it, and take flight into\ntheir closet to God, or into their proud \"self-consciousness.\" But we\nremain in this \"imperfect\" world, because even so we can use it for\nour--self-enjoyment.\n\nMy intercourse with the world consists in my enjoying it, and so\nconsuming it for my self-enjoyment. _Intercourse_ is the _enjoyment of\nthe world_, and belongs to my--self-enjoyment.\n\n\nIII.--MY SELF-ENJOYMENT\n\nWe stand at the boundary of a period. The world hitherto took thought\nfor nothing but the gain of life, took care for--_life_. For whether all\nactivity is put on the stretch for the life of this world or of the\nother, for the temporal or for the eternal, whether one hankers for\n\"daily bread\" (\"Give us our daily bread\") or for \"holy bread\" (\"the true\nbread from heaven\"; \"the bread of God, that comes from heaven and _gives\nlife_ to the world\"; \"the bread of life,\" John 6), whether one takes\ncare for \"dear life\" or for \"life to eternity,\"--this does not change\nthe object of the strain and care, which in the one case as in the other\nshows itself to be _life_. Do the modern tendencies announce themselves\notherwise? People now want nobody to be embarrassed for the most\nindispensable necessaries of life, but want every one to feel secure as\nto these; and on the other hand they teach that man has this life to\nattend to and the real world to adapt himself to, without vain care for\nanother.\n\nLet us take up the same thing from another side. When one is anxious\nonly to _live_, he easily, in this solicitude, forgets the _enjoyment_\nof life. If his only concern is for life, and he thinks \"if I only have\nmy dear life,\" he does not apply his full strength to using, _i. e._\nenjoying, life. But how does one use life? In using it up, like the\ncandle, which one uses in burning it up. One uses life, and consequently\nhimself the living one, in _consuming_ it and himself. _Enjoyment of\nlife_ is using life up.\n\nNow--we are in search of the _enjoyment_ of life! And what did the\nreligious world do? It went in search of _life_. \"Wherein consists the\ntrue life, the blessed life, etc.? How is it to be attained? What must\nman do and become in order to become a truly living man? How does he\nfulfil this calling?\" These and similar questions indicate that the\naskers were still seeking for _themselves_,--to wit, themselves in the\ntrue sense, in the sense of true living. \"What I am is foam and shadow;\nwhat I shall be is my true self.\" To chase after this self, to produce\nit, to realize it, constitutes the hard task of mortals, who die only to\n_rise again_, live only to die, live only to find the true life.\n\nNot till I am certain of myself, and no longer seeking for myself, am I\nreally my property; I have myself, therefore I use and enjoy myself. On\nthe other hand, I can never take comfort in myself so long as I think\nthat I have still to find my true self and that it must come to this,\nthat not I but Christ or some other spiritual, _i. e._ ghostly, self\n(_e. g._ the true man, the essence of man, and the like) lives in me.\n\nA vast interval separates the two views. In the old I go toward myself,\nin the new I start from myself; in the former I long for myself, in the\nlatter I have myself and do with myself as one does with any other\nproperty,--I enjoy myself at my pleasure. I am no longer afraid for my\nlife, but \"squander\" it.\n\nHenceforth the question runs, not how one can acquire life, but how one\ncan squander, enjoy it; or, not how one is to produce the true self in\nhimself, but how one is to dissolve himself, to live himself out.\n\nWhat else should the ideal be but the sought-for, ever-distant self? One\nseeks for himself, consequently one does not yet have himself; one\naspires toward what one _ought_ to be, consequently one is not it. One\nlives in _longing_ and has lived thousands of years in it, in _hope_.\nLiving is quite another thing in--_enjoyment_!\n\nDoes this perchance apply only to the so-called pious? No, it applies to\nall who belong to the departing period of history, even to its men of\npleasure. For them too the work-days were followed by a Sunday, and the\nrush of the world by the dream of a better world, of a general happiness\nof humanity; in short, by an ideal. But philosophers especially are\ncontrasted with the pious. Now, have they been thinking of anything else\nthan the ideal, been planning for anything else than the absolute self?\nLonging and hope everywhere, and nothing but these. For me, call it\nromanticism.\n\nIf the _enjoyment of life_ is to triumph over the _longing for life_ or\nhope of life, it must vanquish this in its double significance, which\nSchiller introduces in his \"Ideal and Life\"; it must crush spiritual and\nsecular poverty, exterminate the ideal and--the want of daily bread. He\nwho must expend his life to prolong life cannot enjoy it, and he who is\nstill seeking for his life does not have it and can as little enjoy it:\nboth are poor, but \"blessed are the poor.\"\n\nThose who are hungering for the true life have no power over their\npresent life, but must apply it for the purpose of thereby gaining that\ntrue life, and must sacrifice it entirely to this aspiration and this\ntask. If in the case of those devotees who hope for a life in the other\nworld, and look upon that in this world as merely a preparation for it,\nthe tributariness of their earthly existence, which they put solely into\nthe service of the hoped-for heavenly existence, is pretty distinctly\napparent; one would yet go far wrong if one wanted to consider the most\nrationalistic and enlightened as less self-sacrificing. Oh, there is to\nbe found in the \"true life\" a much more comprehensive significance than\nthe \"heavenly\" is competent to express. Now, is not--to introduce the\nliberal concept of it at once--the \"human\" and \"truly human\" life the\ntrue one? And is every one already leading this truly human life from\nthe start, or must he first raise himself to it with hard toil? Does he\nalready have it as his present life, or must he struggle for it as his\nfuture life, which will become his part only when he \"is no longer\ntainted with any egoism\"? In this view life exists only to gain life,\nand one lives only to make the essence of man alive in oneself, one\nlives for the sake of this essence. One has his life only in order to\nprocure by means of it the \"true\" life cleansed of all egoism. Hence one\nis afraid to make any use he likes of his life: it is to serve only for\nthe \"right use.\"\n\nIn short, one has a _calling in life_, a task in life; one has something\nto realize and produce by his life, a something for which our life is\nonly means and implement, a something that is worth more than this life,\na something to which one _owes_ his life. One has a God who asks a\n_living sacrifice_. Only the rudeness of human sacrifice has been lost\nwith time; human sacrifice itself has remained unabated, and criminals\nhourly fall sacrifices to justice, and we \"poor sinners\" slay our own\nselves as sacrifices for \"the human essence,\" the \"idea of mankind,\"\n\"humanity,\" and whatever the idols or gods are called besides.\n\nBut, because we owe our life to that something, therefore--this is the\nnext point--we have no right to take it from us.\n\nThe conservative tendency of Christianity does not permit thinking of\ndeath otherwise than with the purpose to take its sting from it\nand--live on and preserve oneself nicely. The Christian lets everything\nhappen and come upon him if he--the arch-Jew--can only haggle and\nsmuggle himself into heaven; he must not kill himself, he must\nonly--preserve himself and work at the \"preparation of a future abode.\"\nConservatism or \"conquest of death\" lies at his heart; \"the last enemy\nthat is abolished is death.\"[214] \"Christ has taken the power from death\nand brought life and _imperishable_ being to light by the gospel.\"[215]\n\"Imperishableness,\" stability.\n\nThe moral man wants the good, the right; and, if he takes to the means\nthat lead to this goal, really lead to it, then these means are not\n_his_ means, but those of the good, right, etc., itself. These means are\nnever immoral, because the good end itself mediates itself through them:\nthe end sanctifies the means. They call this maxim jesuitical, but it is\n\"moral\" through and through. The moral man acts _in the service_ of an\nend or an idea: he makes himself the _tool_ of the idea of the good, as\nthe pious man counts it his glory to be a tool or instrument of God. To\nawait death is what the moral commandment postulates as the good; to\ngive it to oneself is immoral and bad: _suicide_ finds no excuse before\nthe judgment-seat of morality. If the religious man forbids it because\n\"you have not given yourself life, but God, who alone can also take it\nfrom you again\" (as if, even talking in this conception, God did not\ntake it from me just as much when I kill myself as when a tile from the\nroof, or a hostile bullet, fells me; for he would have aroused the\nresolution of death in me too!), the moral man forbids it because I owe\nmy life to the fatherland, etc., \"because I do not know whether I may\nnot yet accomplish good by my life.\" Of course, for in me good loses a\ntool, as God does an instrument. If I am immoral, the good is served in\nmy _amendment_; if I am \"ungodly,\" God has joy in my _penitence_.\nSuicide, therefore, is ungodly as well as nefarious. If one whose\nstandpoint is religiousness takes his own life, he acts in forgetfulness\nof God; but, if the suicide's standpoint is morality, he acts in\nforgetfulness of duty, immorally. People worried themselves much with\nthe question whether Emilia Galotti's death can be justified before\nmorality (they take it as if it were suicide, which it is too in\nsubstance). That she is so infatuated with chastity, this moral good, as\nto yield up even her life for it is certainly moral; but, again, that\nshe fears the weakness of her flesh is immoral.[216] Such\ncontradictions form the tragic conflict universally in the moral drama;\nand one must think and feel morally to be able to take an interest in\nit.\n\nWhat holds good of piety and morality will necessarily apply to humanity\nalso, because one owes his life likewise to man, mankind or the species.\nOnly when I am under obligation to no being is the maintaining of\nlife--my affair. \"A leap from this bridge makes me free!\"\n\nBut, if we owe the maintaining of our life to that being that we are to\nmake alive in ourselves, it is not less our duty not to lead this life\naccording to _our_ pleasure, but to shape it in conformity to that\nbeing. All my feeling, thinking, and willing, all my doing and\ndesigning, belongs to--him.\n\nWhat is in conformity to that being is to be inferred from his concept;\nand how differently has this concept been conceived! or how differently\nhas that being been imagined! What demands the Supreme Being makes on\nthe Mohammedan; what different ones the Christian, again, thinks he\nhears from him; how divergent, therefore, must the shaping of the lives\nof the two turn out! Only this do all hold fast, that the Supreme Being\nis to _judge_[217] our life.\n\nBut the pious who have their judge in God, and in his word a book of\ndirections for their life, I everywhere pass by only reminiscently,\nbecause they belong to a period of development that has been lived\nthrough, and as petrifactions they may remain in their fixed place right\nalong; in our time it is no longer the pious, but the liberals, who\nhave the floor, and piety itself cannot keep from reddening its pale\nface with liberal coloring. But the liberals do not adore their judge in\nGod, and do not unfold their life by the directions of the divine word,\nbut regulate[218] themselves by man: they want to be not \"divine\" but\n\"human,\" and to live so.\n\nMan is the liberal's supreme being, man the _judge_ of his life,\nhumanity his _directions_, or catechism. God is spirit, but man is the\n\"most perfect spirit,\" the final result of the long chase after the\nspirit or of the \"searching in the depths of the Godhead,\" _i. e._ in\nthe depths of the spirit.\n\nEvery one of your traits is to be human; you yourself are to be so from\ntop to toe, in the inward as in the outward; for humanity is your\n_calling_.\n\nCalling--destiny--task!--\n\nWhat one can become he does become. A born poet may well be hindered by\nthe disfavor of circumstances from standing on the high level of his\ntime, and, after the great studies that are indispensable for this,\nproducing _consummate_ works of art; but he will make poetry, be he a\nplowman or so lucky as to live at the court of Weimar. A born musician\nwill make music, no matter whether on all instruments or only on an\noaten pipe. A born philosophical head can give proof of itself as\nuniversity philosopher or as village philosopher. Finally, a born dolt,\nwho, as is very well compatible with this, may at the same time be a\nsly-boots, will (as probably every one who has visited schools is in a\nposition to exemplify to himself by many instances of fellow-scholars)\nalways remain a blockhead, let him have been drilled and trained into\nthe chief of a bureau, or let him serve that same chief as bootblack.\nNay, the born shallow-pates indisputably form the most numerous class of\nmen. And why, indeed, should not the same distinctions show themselves\nin the human species that are unmistakable in every species of beasts?\nThe more gifted and the less gifted are to be found everywhere.\n\nOnly a few, however, are so imbecile that one could not get ideas into\nthem. Hence people usually consider all men capable of having religion.\nIn a certain degree they may be trained to other ideas too, _e. g._ to\nsome musical intelligence, even some philosophy, etc. At this point then\nthe priesthood of religion, of morality, of culture, of science, etc.,\ntakes its start, and the Communists, _e. g._, want to make everything\naccessible to all by their \"public school.\" There is heard a common\nassertion that this \"great mass\" cannot get along without religion; the\nCommunists broaden it into the proposition that not only the \"great\nmass,\" but absolutely all, are called to everything.\n\nNot enough that the great mass has been trained to religion, now it is\nactually to have to occupy itself with \"everything human.\" Training is\ngrowing ever more general and more comprehensive.\n\nYou poor beings who could live so happily if you might skip according to\nyour mind, you are to dance to the pipe of schoolmasters and\nbear-leaders, in order to perform tricks that you yourselves would never\nuse yourselves for. And you do not even kick out of the traces at last\nagainst being always taken otherwise than you want to give yourselves.\nNo, you mechanically recite to yourselves the question that is recited\nto you: \"What am I called to? What _ought_ I to do?\" You need only ask\nthus, to have yourselves _told_ what you ought to do and _ordered_ to do\nit, to have your _calling_ marked out for you, or else to order\nyourselves and impose it on yourselves according to the spirit's\nprescription. Then in reference to the will the word is, I will to do\nwhat I _ought_.\n\nA man is \"called\" to nothing, and has no \"calling,\" no \"destiny,\" as\nlittle as a plant or a beast has a \"calling.\" The flower does not follow\nthe calling to complete itself, but it spends all its forces to enjoy\nand consume the world as well as it can,--_i. e._ it sucks in as much of\nthe juices of the earth, as much air of the ether, as much light of the\nsun, as it can get and lodge. The bird lives up to no calling, but it\nuses its forces as much as is practicable; it catches beetles and sings\nto its heart's delight. But the forces of the flower and the bird are\nslight in comparison to those of a man, and a man who applies his forces\nwill affect the world much more powerfully than flower and beast. A\ncalling he has not, but he has forces that manifest themselves where\nthey are because their being consists solely in their manifestation, and\nare as little able to abide inactive as life, which, if it \"stood still\"\nonly a second, would no longer be life. Now, one might call out to the\nman, \"use your force.\" Yet to this imperative would be given the meaning\nthat it was man's task to use his force. It is not so. Rather, each one\nreally uses his force without first looking upon this as his calling: at\nall times every one uses as much force as he possesses. One does say of\na beaten man that he ought to have exerted his force more; but one\nforgets that, if in the moment of succumbing he had had the force to\nexert his forces (_e. g._ bodily forces), he would not have failed to do\nit: even if it was only the discouragement of a minute, this was yet\na--destitution of force, a minute long. Forces may assuredly be\nsharpened and redoubled, especially by hostile resistance or friendly\nassistance; but where one misses their application one may be sure of\ntheir absence too. One can strike fire out of a stone, but without the\nblow none comes out; in like manner a man too needs \"impact.\"\n\nNow, for this reason that forces always of themselves show themselves\noperative, the command to use them would be superfluous and senseless.\nTo use his forces is not man's _calling_ and task, but is his _act_,\nreal and extant at all times. Force is only a simpler word for\nmanifestation of force.\n\nNow, as this rose is a true rose to begin with, this nightingale always\na true nightingale, so I am not for the first time a true man when I\nfulfil my calling, live up to my destiny, but I am a \"true man\" from the\nstart. My first babble is the token of the life of a \"true man,\" the\nstruggles of my life are the outpourings of his force, my last breath is\nthe last exhalation of the force of the \"man.\"\n\nThe true man does not lie in the future, an object of longing, but lies,\nexistent and real, in the present. Whatever and whoever I may be, joyous\nand suffering, a child or a graybeard, in confidence or doubt, in sleep\nor in waking, I am it, I am the true man.\n\nBut, if I am Man, and have really found in myself him whom religious\nhumanity designated as the distant goal, then everything \"truly human\"\nis also _my own_. What was ascribed to the idea of humanity belongs to\nme. That freedom of trade, _e. g._, which humanity has yet to\nattain,--and which, like an enchanting dream, people remove to\nhumanity's golden future,--I take by anticipation as my property, and\ncarry it on for the time in the form of smuggling. There may indeed be\nbut few smugglers who have sufficient understanding to thus account to\nthemselves for their doings, but the instinct of egoism replaces their\nconsciousness. Above I have shown the same thing about freedom of the\npress.\n\nEverything is my own, therefore I bring back to myself what wants to\nwithdraw from me; but above all I always bring myself back when I have\nslipped away from myself to any tributariness. But this too is not my\ncalling, but my natural act.\n\nEnough, there is a mighty difference whether I make myself the\nstarting-point or the goal. As the latter I do not have myself, am\nconsequently still alien to myself, am my _essence_, my \"true essence,\"\nand this \"true essence,\" alien to me, will mock me as a spook of a\nthousand different names. Because I am not yet I, another (like God, the\ntrue man, the truly pious man, the rational man, the freeman, etc.) is\nI, my ego.\n\nStill far from myself, I separate myself into two halves, of which one,\nthe one unattained and to be fulfilled, is the true one. The one, the\nuntrue, must be brought as a sacrifice; to wit, the unspiritual one. The\nother, the true, is to be the whole man; to wit, the spirit. Then it is\nsaid, \"The spirit is man's proper essence,\" or, \"man exists as man only\nspiritually.\" Now there is a greedy rush to catch the spirit, as if one\nwould then have bagged _himself_; and so, in chasing after himself, one\nloses sight of himself, whom he is.\n\nAnd, as one stormily pursues his own self, the never-attained, so one\nalso despises shrewd people's rule to take men as they are, and prefers\nto take them as they should be; and, for this reason, hounds every one\non after his should-be self and \"endeavors to make all into equally\nentitled, equally respectable, equally moral or rational men.\"[219]\n\nYes, \"if men were what they _should_ be, _could_ be, if all men were\nrational, all loved each other as brothers,\" then it would be a\nparadisiacal life.[220]--All right, men are as they should be, can be.\nWhat should they be? Surely not more than they can be! And what can they\nbe? Not more, again, than they--can, _i. e._ than they have the\ncompetence, the force, to be. But this they really are, because what\nthey are not they are _incapable_ of being; for to be capable\nmeans--really to be. One is not capable for anything that one really is\nnot; one is not capable of anything that one does not really do. Could a\nman blinded by cataract see? Oh, yes, if he had his cataract\nsuccessfully removed. But now he cannot see because he does not see.\nPossibility and reality always coincide. One can do nothing that one\ndoes not, as one does nothing that one cannot.\n\nThe singularity of this assertion vanishes when one reflects that the\nwords \"it is possible that ...\" almost never contain another meaning\nthan \"I can imagine that ...,\" _e. g._, It is possible for all men to\nlive rationally, _i. e._ I can imagine that all, etc. Now,--since my\nthinking cannot, and accordingly does not, cause all men to live\nrationally, but this must still be left to the men themselves,--general\nreason is for me only thinkable, a thinkableness, but as such in fact a\n_reality_ that is called a possibility only in reference to what I _can_\nnot bring to pass, to wit, the rationality of others. So far as depends\non you, all men might be rational, for you have nothing against it; nay,\nso far as your thinking reaches, you perhaps cannot discover any\nhindrance either, and accordingly nothing does stand in the way of the\nthing in your thinking; it is thinkable to you.\n\nAs men are not all rational, though, it is probable that they--cannot be\nso.\n\nIf something which one imagines to be easily possible is not, or does\nnot happen, then one may be assured that something stands in the way of\nthe thing, and that it is--impossible. Our time has its art, science,\netc.; the art may be bad in all conscience; but may one say that we\ndeserved to have a better, and \"could\" have it if we only would? We have\njust as much art as we can have. Our art of to-day is the _only art\npossible_, and therefore real, at the time.\n\nEven in the sense to which one might at last still reduce the word\n\"possible,\" that it should mean \"future,\" it retains the full force of\nthe \"real.\" If one says, _e. g._, \"It is possible that the sun will rise\nto-morrow,\"--this means only, \"for to-day to-morrow is the real future\";\nfor I suppose there is hardly need of the suggestion that a future is\nreal \"future\" only when it has not yet appeared.\n\nYet wherefore this dignifying of a word? If the most prolific\nmisunderstanding of thousands of years were not in ambush behind it, if\nthis single concept of the little word \"possible\" were not haunted by\nall the spooks of possessed men, its contemplation should trouble us\nlittle here.\n\nThe thought, it was just now shown, rules the possessed world. Well,\nthen, possibility is nothing but thinkableness, and innumerable\nsacrifices have hitherto been made to hideous _thinkableness_. It was\n_thinkable_ that men might become rational; thinkable, that they might\nknow Christ; thinkable, that they might become moral and enthusiastic\nfor the good; thinkable, that they might all take refuge in the Church's\nlap; thinkable, that they might meditate, speak, and do, nothing\ndangerous to the State; thinkable, that they _might_ be obedient\nsubjects; but, because it was thinkable, it was--so ran the\ninference--possible, and further, because it was possible to men (right\nhere lies the deceptive point: because it is thinkable to me, it is\npossible to _men_), therefore they _ought_ to be so, it was their\n_calling_; and finally--one is to take men only according to this\ncalling, only as _called_ men, \"not as they are, but as they ought to\nbe.\"\n\nAnd the further inference? Man is not the individual, but man is a\n_thought_, an _ideal_, to which the individual is related not even as\nthe child to the man, but as a chalk point to a point thought of, or as\na--finite creature to the eternal Creator, or, according to modern\nviews, as the specimen to the species. Here then comes to light the\nglorification of \"humanity,\" the \"eternal, immortal,\" for whose glory\n(_in majorem humanitatis gloriam_) the individual must devote himself\nand find his \"immortal renown\" in having done something for the \"spirit\nof humanity.\"\n\nThus the _thinkers_ rule in the world as long as the age of priests or\nof schoolmasters lasts, and what they think of is possible, but what is\npossible must be realized. They _think_ an ideal of man, which for the\ntime is real only in their thoughts; but they also think the possibility\nof carrying it out, and there is no chance for dispute, the carrying out\nis really--thinkable, it is an--idea.\n\nBut you and I, we may indeed be people of whom a Krummacher can _think_\nthat we might yet become good Christians; if, however, he wanted to\n\"labor with\" us, we should soon make it palpable to him that our\nChristianity is only _thinkable_, but in other respects _impossible_; if\nhe grinned on and on at us with his obtrusive _thoughts_, his \"good\nbelief,\" he would have to learn that we do not at all _need_ to become\nwhat we do not like to become.\n\nAnd so it goes on, far beyond the most pious of the pious. \"If all men\nwere rational, if all did right, if all were guided by philanthropy,\netc.\"! Reason, right, philanthropy, etc., are put before the eyes of\nmen as their calling, as the goal of their aspiration. And what does\nbeing rational mean? Giving oneself a hearing?[221] No, reason is a book\nfull of laws, which are all enacted against egoism.\n\nHistory hitherto is the history of the _intellectual_ man. After the\nperiod of sensuality, history proper begins; _i. e._, the period of\nintellectuality,[222] spirituality,[223] non-sensuality,\nsupersensuality, nonsensicality. Man now begins to want to be and become\n_something_. What? Good, beautiful, true; more precisely, moral, pious,\nagreeable, etc. He wants to make of himself a \"proper man,\" \"something\nproper.\" _Man_ is his goal, his ought, his destiny, calling, task,\nhis--_ideal_; he is to himself a future, otherworldly he. And _what_\nmakes a \"proper fellow\" of him? Being true, being good, being moral, and\nthe like. Now he looks askance at every one who does not recognize the\nsame \"what,\" seek the same morality, have the same faith; he chases out\n\"separatists, heretics, sects,\" etc.\n\nNo sheep, no dog, exerts itself to become a \"proper sheep, a proper\ndog\"; no beast has its essence appear to it as a task, _i. e._ as a\nconcept that it has to realize. It realizes itself in living itself out,\n_i. e._ dissolving itself, passing away. It does not ask to be or to\nbecome anything _other_ than it is.\n\nDo I mean to advise you to be like the beasts? That you ought to become\nbeasts is an exhortation which I certainly cannot give you, as that\nwould again be a task, an ideal (\"How doth the little busy bee improve\neach shining hour.... In works of labor or of skill I would be busy\ntoo, for Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do\"). It\nwould be the same, too, as if one wished for the beasts that they should\nbecome human beings. Your nature is, once for all, a human one; you are\nhuman natures, _i. e._ human beings. But, just because you already are\nso, you do not still need to become so. Beasts too are \"trained,\" and a\ntrained beast executes many unnatural things. But a trained dog is no\nbetter for itself than a natural one, and has no profit from it, even if\nit is more companionable for us.\n\nExertions to \"form\" all men into moral, rational, pious, human, etc.,\n\"beings\" (_i. e._ training) were in vogue from of yore. They are wrecked\nagainst the indomitable quality of I, against own nature, against\negoism. Those who are trained never attain their ideal, and only profess\nwith their _mouth_ the sublime principles, or make a _profession_, a\nprofession of faith. In face of this profession they must in _life_\n\"acknowledge themselves sinners altogether,\" and they fall short of\ntheir ideal, are \"weak men,\" and bear with them the consciousness of\n\"human weakness.\"\n\nIt is different if you do not chase after an _ideal_ as your \"destiny,\"\nbut dissolve yourself as time dissolves everything. The dissolution is\nnot your \"destiny,\" because it is present time.\n\nYet the _culture_, the religiousness, of men has assuredly made them\nfree, but only free from one lord, to lead them to another. I have\nlearned by religion to tame my appetite, I break the world's resistance\nby the cunning that is put in my hand by _science_; I even serve no man:\n\"I am, no man's lackey.\" But then it comes, You must obey God more than\nman. Just so I am indeed free from irrational determination by my\nimpulses, but obedient to the master _Reason_. I have gained \"spiritual\nfreedom,\" \"freedom of the spirit.\" But with that _I_ have then become\nsubject to that very _spirit_. The spirit gives me orders, reason guides\nme, they are my leaders and commanders. The \"rational,\" the \"servants of\nthe spirit,\" rule. But, if _I_ am not flesh, I am in truth not spirit\neither. Freedom of the spirit is servitude of me, because I am more than\nspirit or flesh.\n\nWithout doubt culture has made me _powerful_. It has given me power over\nall _motives_, over the impulses of my nature as well as over the\nexactions and violences of the world. I know, and have gained the force\nfor it by culture, that I need not let myself be coerced by any of my\nappetites, pleasures, emotions, etc.; I am their--_master_; in like\nmanner I become, through the sciences and arts, the _master_ of the\nrefractory world, whom sea and earth obey, and to whom even the stars\nmust give an account of themselves. The spirit has made me\n_master_.--But I have no power over the spirit itself. From religion\n(culture) I do learn the means for the \"vanquishing of the world,\" but\nnot how I am to subdue _God_ too and become master of him; for God \"is\nthe spirit.\" And this same spirit, of which I am unable to become\nmaster, may have the most manifold shapes: he may be called God or\nNational Spirit, State, Family, Reason, also--Liberty, Humanity, Man.\n\n_I_ receive with thanks what the centuries of culture have acquired for\nme; I am not willing to throw away and give up anything of it: _I_ have\nnot lived in vain. The experience that I have _power_ over my nature,\nand need not be the slave of my appetites, shall not be lost to me; the\nexperience that I can subdue the world by culture's means is too\ndear-bought for me to be able to forget it. But I want still more.\n\nPeople ask, what can man do? what can he accomplish? what goods procure?\nand put down the highest of everything as a calling. As if everything\nwere possible to _me_!\n\nIf one sees somebody going to ruin in a mania, a passion, etc. (_e. g._\nin the huckster-spirit, in jealousy), the desire is stirred to deliver\nhim out of this possession and to help him to \"self-conquest.\" \"We want\nto make a man of him!\" That would be very fine if another possession\nwere not immediately put in the place of the earlier one. But one frees\nfrom the love of money him who is a thrall to it, only to deliver him\nover to piety, humanity, or some principle else, and to transfer him to\na _fixed standpoint_ anew.\n\nThis transference from a narrow standpoint to a sublime one is declared\nin the words that the sense must not be directed to the perishable, but\nto the imperishable alone: not to the temporal, but to the eternal,\nabsolute, divine, purely human, etc.,--to the _spiritual_.\n\nPeople very soon discerned that it was not indifferent what one set his\naffections on, or what one occupied himself with; they recognized the\nimportance of the _object_. An object exalted above the individuality of\nthings is the _essence_ of things; yes, the essence is alone the\nthinkable in them, it is for the _thinking_ man. Therefore direct no\nlonger your _sense_ to the _things_, but your _thoughts_ to the\n_essence_. \"Blessed are they who see not, and yet believe\"; _i. e._,\nblessed are the _thinkers_ for they have to do with the invisible and\nbelieve in it. Yet even an object of thought, that constituted an\nessential point of contention centuries long, comes at last to the point\nof being \"no longer worth speaking of.\" This was discerned, but\nnevertheless people always kept before their eyes again a self-valid\nimportance of the object, an absolute value of it, as if the doll were\nnot the most important thing to the child, the Koran to the Turk. As\nlong as I am not the sole important thing to myself, it is indifferent\nof what object I \"make much,\" and only my greater or lesser\n_delinquency_ against it is of value. The degree of my attachment and\ndevotion marks the standpoint of my liability to service, the degree of\nmy sinning shows the measure of my ownness.\n\nBut finally, and in general, one must know how to \"put everything out of\nhis mind,\" if only so as to be able to--go to sleep. Nothing may occupy\nus with which _we_ do not occupy ourselves: the victim of ambition\ncannot run away from his ambitious plans, nor the God-fearing man from\nthe thought of God; infatuation and possessedness coincide.\n\nTo want to realize his essence or live conformably to his concept (which\nwith believers in God signifies as much as to be \"pious,\" and with\nbelievers in humanity means living \"humanly\") is what only the sensual\nand sinful man can propose to himself, the man so long as he has the\nanxious choice between happiness of sense and peace of soul, so long as\nhe is a \"poor sinner.\" The Christian is nothing but a sensual man who,\nknowing of the sacred and being conscious that he violates it, sees in\nhimself a poor sinner: sensualness, recognized as \"sinfulness,\" is\nChristian consciousness, is the Christian himself. And if \"sin\" and\n\"sinfulness\" are now no longer taken into the mouths of moderns, but,\ninstead of that, \"egoism,\" \"self-seeking,\" \"selfishness,\" and the like,\nengage them; if the devil has been translated into the \"un-man\" or\n\"egoistic man,\"--is the Christian less present then than before? Is not\nthe old discord between good and evil,--is not a judge over us, man,--is\nnot a calling, the calling to make oneself man--left? If they no longer\nname it calling, but \"task\" or, very likely, \"duty,\" the change of name\nis quite correct, because \"man\" is not, like God, a personal being that\ncan \"call\"; but outside the name the thing remains as of old.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEvery one has a relation to objects, and more, every one is differently\nrelated to them. Let us choose as an example that book to which millions\nof men had a relation for two thousand years, the Bible. What is it,\nwhat was it, to each? Absolutely, only what he _made out of it_! For him\nwho makes to himself nothing at all out of it, it is nothing at all; for\nhim who uses it as an amulet, it has solely the value, the significance,\nof a means of sorcery; for him who, like children, plays with it, it is\nnothing but a plaything; etc.\n\nNow, Christianity asks that it shall _be the same for all_: say, the\nsacred book or the \"sacred Scriptures.\" This means as much as that the\nChristian's view shall also be that of other men, and that no one may\nbe otherwise related to that object. And with this the ownness of the\nrelation is destroyed, and one mind, one disposition, is fixed as the\n\"_true_,\" the \"only true\" one. In the limitation of the freedom to make\nof the Bible what I will, the freedom of making in general is limited;\nand the coercion of a view or a judgment is put in its place. He who\nshould pass the judgment that the Bible was a long error of mankind\nwould judge--_criminally_.\n\nIn fact, the child who tears it to pieces or plays with it, the Inca\nAtahualpa who lays his ear to it and throws it away contemptuously when\nit remains dumb, judges just as correctly about the Bible as the priest\nwho praises in it the \"Word of God,\" or the critic who calls it a job of\nmen's hands. For how we toss things about is the affair of our _option_,\nour _free will_: we use them according to our _heart's pleasure_, or,\nmore clearly, we use them just as we _can_. Why, what do the parsons\nscream about when they see how Hegel and the speculative theologians\nmake speculative thoughts out of the contents of the Bible? Precisely\nthis, that they deal with it according to their heart's pleasure, or\n\"proceed arbitrarily with it.\"\n\nBut, because we all show ourselves arbitrary in the handling of objects,\n_i. e._ do with them as we _like_ best, at our _liking_ (the philosopher\nlikes nothing so well as when he can trace out an \"idea\" in everything,\nas the God-fearing man likes to make God his friend by everything, and\nso, _e. g._, by keeping the Bible sacred), therefore we nowhere meet\nsuch grievous arbitrariness, such a frightful tendency to violence,\nsuch stupid coercion, as in this very domain of our--_own free will_. If\n_we_ proceed arbitrarily in taking the sacred objects thus or so, how is\nit then that we want to take it ill of the parson-spirits if they take\nus just as arbitrarily _in their fashion_, and esteem us worthy of the\nheretic's fire or of another punishment, perhaps of the--censorship?\n\nWhat a man is, he makes out of things; \"as you look at the world, so it\nlooks at you again.\" Then the wise advice makes itself heard again at\nonce, You must only look at it \"rightly, unbiasedly,\" etc. As if the\nchild did not look at the Bible \"rightly and unbiasedly\" when it makes\nit a plaything. That shrewd precept is given us, _e. g._, by Feuerbach.\nOne does look at things rightly when one makes of them what one _will_\n(by things objects in general are here understood, such as God, our\nfellow-men, a sweetheart, a book, a beast, etc.). And therefore the\nthings and the looking at them are not first, but I am, my will is. One\n_will_ bring thoughts out of the things, _will_ discover reason in the\nworld, _will_ have sacredness in it: therefore one shall find them.\n\"Seek and ye shall find.\" _What_ I will seek, _I_ determine: I want,\n_e. g._, to get edification from the Bible; it is to be found;\nI want to read and test the Bible thoroughly; my outcome will be\na thorough instruction and criticism--to the extent of my powers.\nI elect for myself what I have a fancy for, and in electing I show\nmyself--arbitrary.\n\nConnected with this is the discernment that every judgment which I pass\nupon an object is the _creature_ of my will; and that discernment again\nleads me to not losing myself in the _creature_, the judgment, but\nremaining the _creator_, the judger, who is ever creating anew. All\npredicates of objects are my statements, my judgments, my--creatures. If\nthey want to tear themselves loose from me and be something for\nthemselves, or actually overawe me, then I have nothing more pressing to\ndo than to take them back into their nothing, _i. e._ into me the\ncreator. God, Christ, trinity, morality, the good, etc., are such\ncreatures, of which I must not merely allow myself to say that they are\ntruths, but also that they are deceptions. As I once willed and decreed\ntheir existence, so I want to have license to will their non-existence\ntoo; I must not let them grow over my head, must not have the weakness\nto let them become something \"absolute,\" whereby they would be\neternalized and withdrawn from my power and decision. With that I should\nfall a prey to the _principle of stability_, the proper life-principle\nof religion, which concerns itself with creating \"sanctuaries that must\nnot be touched,\" \"eternal truths,\"--in short, that which shall be\n\"sacred,\"--and depriving you of what is _yours_.\n\nThe object makes us into possessed men in its sacred form just as in its\nprofane; as a supersensuous object, just as it does as a sensuous one.\nThe appetite or mania refers to both, and avarice and longing for heaven\nstand on a level. When the rationalists wanted to win people for the\nsensuous world, Lavater preached the longing for the invisible. The one\nparty wanted to call forth _emotion_, the other _motion_, activity.\n\nThe conception of objects is altogether diverse, even as God, Christ,\nthe world, etc., were and are conceived of in the most manifold wise. In\nthis every one is a \"dissenter,\" and after bloody combats so much has at\nlast been attained, that opposite views about one and the same object\nare no longer condemned as heresies worthy of death. The \"dissenters\"\nreconcile themselves to each other. But why should I only dissent (think\notherwise) about a thing? why not push the thinking otherwise to its\nlast extremity, _viz._, that of no longer having any regard at all for\nthe thing, and therefore thinking its nothingness, crushing it? Then the\n_conception_ itself has an end, because there is no longer anything to\nconceive of. Why am I to say, let us suppose, \"God is not Allah, not\nBrahma, not Jehovah, but--God\"; but not, \"God is nothing but a\ndeception\"? Why do people brand me if I am an \"atheist\"? Because they\nput the creature above the creator (\"They honor and serve the creature\nmore than the Creator\"[224]) and require a _ruling object_, that the\nsubject may be right _submissive_. I am to bend _beneath_ the absolute,\nI _ought_ to.\n\nBy the \"realm of thoughts\" Christianity has completed itself; the\nthought is that inwardness in which all the world's lights go out, all\nexistence becomes existenceless, the inward man (the heart, the head) is\nall in all. This realm of thoughts awaits its deliverance, awaits, like\nthe Sphinx, Oedipus's key-word to the riddle, that it may enter in at\nlast to its death. I am the annihilator of its continuance, for in the\ncreator's realm it no longer forms a realm of its own, not a State in\nthe State, but a creature of my creative--thoughtlessness. Only together\nand at the same time with the benumbed _thinking_ world can the world of\nChristians, Christianity and religion itself, come to its downfall; only\nwhen thoughts run out are there no more believers. To the thinker his\nthinking is a \"sublime labor, a sacred activity,\" and it rests on a firm\n_faith_, the faith in truth. At first praying is a sacred activity, then\nthis sacred \"devotion\" passes over into a rational and reasoning\n\"thinking,\" which, however, likewise retains in the \"sacred truth\" its\nun-derangeable basis of faith, and is only a marvelous machine that the\nspirit of truth winds up for its service. Free thinking and free science\nbusy _me_--for it is not I that am free, not _I_ that busy myself, but\nthinking is free and busies me--with heaven and the heavenly or\n\"divine\"; that is, properly, with the world and the worldly, not this\nworld but \"another\" world; it is only the reversing and deranging of the\nworld, a busying with the _essence_ of the world, therefore a\n_derangement_. The thinker is blind to the immediateness of things, and\nincapable of mastering them: he does not eat, does not drink, does not\nenjoy; for the eater and drinker is never the thinker, nay, the latter\nforgets eating and drinking, his getting on in life, the cares of\nnourishment, etc., over his thinking; he forgets it as the praying man\ntoo forgets it. This is why he appears to the forceful son of nature as\na queer Dick, a _fool_,--even if he does look upon him as holy, just as\nlunatics appeared so to the ancients. Free thinking is lunacy, because\nit is _pure movement of the inwardness_, of the merely _inward man_,\nwhich guides and regulates the rest of the man. The shaman and the\nspeculative philosopher mark the bottom and top rounds on the ladder of\nthe _inward_ man, the--Mongol. Shaman and philosopher fight with ghosts,\ndemons, _spirits_, gods.\n\nTotally different from this _free_ thinking is _own_ thinking, _my_\nthinking, a thinking which does not guide me, but is guided, continued,\nor broken off, by me at my pleasure. The distinction of this own\nthinking from free thinking is similar to that of own sensuality, which\nI satisfy at pleasure, from free, unruly sensuality to which I succumb.\n\nFeuerbach, in the \"Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,\" is\nalways harping upon _being_. In this he too, with all his antagonism to\nHegel and the absolute philosophy, is stuck fast in abstraction; for\n\"being\" is abstraction, as is even \"the I.\" Only _I am_ not abstraction\nalone: _I am_ all in all, consequently even abstraction or nothing;\nI am all and nothing; I am not a mere thought, but at the same time\nI am full of thoughts, a thought-world. Hegel condemns the own,\nmine,[225]--\"opinion.\"[226] \"Absolute thinking\" is that thinking which\nforgets that it is _my_ thinking, that I think, and that it exists only\nthrough _me_. But I, as I, swallow up again what is mine, am its master;\nit is only my _opinion_, which I can at any moment _change_, _i. e._\nannihilate, take back into myself, and consume. Feuerbach wants to smite\nHegel's \"absolute thinking\" with _unconquered being_. But in me being is\nas much conquered as thinking is. It is _my_ being, as the other is\n_my_ thinking.\n\nWith this, of course, Feuerbach does not get further than to the proof,\ntrivial in itself, that I require the _senses_ for everything, or that I\ncannot entirely do without these organs. Certainly I cannot think if I\ndo not exist sensuously. But for thinking as well as for feeling, and so\nfor the abstract as well as for the sensuous, I need above all things\n_myself_, this quite particular myself, this _unique_ myself. If I were\nnot this one, _e. g._ Hegel, I should not look at the world as I do look\nat it, I should not pick out of it that philosophical system which just\nI as Hegel do, etc. I should indeed have senses, as do other people too,\nbut I should not utilize them as I do.\n\nThus the reproach is brought up against Hegel by Feuerbach[227] that he\nmisuses language, understanding by many words something else than what\nnatural consciousness takes them for; and yet he too commits the same\nfault when he gives the \"sensuous\" a sense of unusual eminence. Thus it\nis said, p. 69, \"the sensuous is not the profane, the destitute of\nthought, the obvious, that which is understood of itself.\" But, if it is\nthe sacred, the full of thought, the recondite, that which can be\nunderstood only through mediation,--well, then it is no longer what\npeople call the sensuous. The sensuous is only that which exists for\n_the senses_; what, on the other hand, is enjoyable only to those who\nenjoy with _more_ than the senses, who go beyond sense-enjoyment or\nsense-reception, is at most mediated or introduced by the senses,\n_i. e._ the senses constitute a _condition_ for obtaining it, but it is\nno longer anything sensuous. The sensuous, whatever it may be, when\ntaken up into me becomes something non-sensuous, which, however, may\nagain have sensuous effects, _e. g._ by the stirring of my emotions and\nmy blood.\n\nIt is well that Feuerbach brings sensuousness to honor, but the only\nthing he is able to do with it is to clothe the materialism of his \"new\nphilosophy\" with what had hitherto been the property of idealism, the\n\"absolute philosophy.\" As little as people let it be talked into them\nthat one can live on the \"spiritual\" alone without bread, so little will\nthey believe his word that as a sensuous being one is already\neverything, and so spiritual, full of thoughts, etc.\n\nNothing at all is justified by _being_. What is thought of _is_ as well\nas what is not thought of; the stone in the street _is_, and my notion\nof it _is_ too. Both are only in different _spaces_, the former in airy\nspace, the latter in my head, in _me_; for I am space like the street.\n\nThe professionals, the privileged, brook no freedom of thought, _i. e._\nno thoughts that do not come from the \"Giver of all good,\" be he called\nGod, pope, church, or whatever else. If anybody has such illegitimate\nthoughts, he must whisper them into his confessor's ear, and have\nhimself chastised by him till the slave-whip becomes unendurable to the\nfree thoughts. In other ways too the professional spirit takes care that\nfree thoughts shall not come at all: first and foremost, by a wise\neducation. He on whom the principles of morality have been duly\ninculcated never becomes free again from moralizing thoughts, and\nrobbery, perjury, overreaching, and the like, remain to him fixed ideas\nagainst which no freedom of thought protects him. He has his thoughts\n\"from above,\" and gets no further.\n\nIt is different with the holders of concessions or patents. Every one\nmust be able to have and form thoughts as he will. If he has the patent,\nor the concession, of a capacity to think, he needs no special\n_privilege_. But, as \"all men are rational,\" it is free to every one to\nput into his head any thoughts whatever, and, to the extent of the\npatent of his natural endowment, to have a greater or less wealth of\nthoughts. Now one hears the admonitions that one \"is to honor all\nopinions and convictions,\" that \"every conviction is authorized,\" that\none must be \"tolerant to the views of others,\" etc.\n\nBut \"your thoughts are not my thoughts, and your ways are not my ways.\"\nOr rather, I mean the reverse: Your thoughts are _my_ thoughts, which I\ndispose of as I will, and which I strike down unmercifully; they are my\nproperty, which I annihilate as I list. I do not wait for authorization\nfrom you first, to decompose and blow away your thoughts. It does not\nmatter to me that you call these thoughts yours too, they remain mine\nnevertheless, and how I will proceed with them is _my affair_, not a\nusurpation. It may please me to leave you in your thoughts; then I keep\nstill. Do you believe thoughts fly around free like birds, so that every\none may get himself some which he may then make good against me as his\ninviolable property? What is flying around is all--_mine_.\n\nDo you believe you have your thoughts for yourselves and need answer to\nno one for them, or, as you do also say, you have to give an account of\nthem to God only? No, your great and small thoughts belong to me, and I\nhandle them at my pleasure.\n\nThe thought is my _own_ only when I have no misgiving about bringing it\nin danger of death every moment, when I do not have to fear its loss as\na _loss for me_, a loss of me. The thought is my own only when I can\nindeed subjugate it, but it never can subjugate me, never fanaticizes\nme, makes me the tool of its realization.\n\nSo freedom of thought exists when I can have all possible thoughts; but\nthe thoughts become property only by not being able to become masters.\nIn the time of freedom of thought, thoughts (ideas) _rule_; but, if I\nattain to property in thought, they stand as my creatures.\n\nIf the hierarchy had not so penetrated men to the innermost as to take\nfrom them all courage to pursue free thoughts, _i. e._ thoughts perhaps\ndispleasing to God, one would have to consider freedom of thought just\nas empty a word as, say, a freedom of digestion.\n\nAccording to the professionals' opinion, the thought is _given_ to me;\naccording to the freethinkers', _I seek_ the thought. There the _truth_\nis already found and extant, only I must--receive it from its Giver by\ngrace; here the truth is to be sought and is my goal, lying in the\nfuture, toward which I have to run.\n\nIn both cases the truth (the true thought) lies outside me, and I aspire\nto _get_ it, be it by presentation (grace), be it by earning (merit of\nmy own). Therefore, (1) The truth is a _privilege_, (2) No, the way to\nit is _patent_ to all, and neither the Bible nor the holy fathers nor\nthe church nor any one else is in possession of the truth; but one can\ncome into possession of it by--speculating.\n\nBoth, one sees, are _propertyless_ in relation to the truth: they have\nit either as a _fief_ (for the \"holy father,\" _e. g._, is not a unique\nperson; as unique he is this Sixtus, Clement, etc., but he does not have\nthe truth as Sixtus, Clement, etc., but as \"holy father,\" _i. e._ as a\nspirit) or as an _ideal_. As a fief, it is only for a few (the\nprivileged); as an ideal, for _all_ (the patentees).\n\nFreedom of thought, then, has the meaning that we do indeed all walk in\nthe dark and in the paths of error, but every one can on this path\napproach _the truth_ and is accordingly on the right path (\"All roads\nlead to Rome, to the world's end, etc.\"). Hence freedom of thought means\nthis much, that the true thought is not my _own_; for, if it were this,\nhow should people want to shut me off from it?\n\nThinking has become entirely free, and has laid down a lot of truths\nwhich _I_ must accommodate myself to. It seeks to complete itself into a\n_system_ and to bring itself to an absolute \"constitution.\" In the State\n_e. g._ it seeks for the idea, say, till it has brought out the\n\"rational State,\" in which I am then obliged to be suited; in man\n(anthropology), till it \"has found man.\"\n\nThe thinker is distinguished from the believer only by believing _much\nmore_ than the latter, who on his part thinks of much less as signified\nby his faith (creed). The thinker has a thousand tenets of faith where\nthe believer gets along with few; but the former brings _coherence_ into\nhis tenets, and takes the coherence in turn for the scale to estimate\ntheir worth by. If one or the other does not fit into his budget, he\nthrows it out.\n\nThe thinkers run parallel to the believers in their pronouncements.\nInstead of \"If it is from God you will not root it out,\" the word is \"If\nit is from the _truth_, is true, etc.\"; instead of \"Give God the\nglory,\"--\"Give truth the glory.\" But it is very much the same to me\nwhether God or the truth wins; first and foremost _I_ want to win.\n\nAside from this, how is an \"unlimited freedom\" to be thinkable inside of\nthe State or society? The State may well protect one against another,\nbut yet it must not let itself be endangered by an unmeasured freedom, a\nso-called unbridledness. Thus in \"freedom of instruction\" the State\ndeclares only this,--that it is suited with every one who instructs as\nthe State (or, speaking more comprehensibly, the political power) would\nhave it. The point for the competitors is this \"as the State would have\nit.\" If the clergy, _e. g._, does not will as the State does, then it\nitself excludes itself from _competition_ (_vid._ France). The limit\nthat is necessarily drawn in the State for any and all competition is\ncalled \"the oversight and superintendence of the State.\" In bidding\nfreedom of instruction keep within the due bounds, the State at the same\ntime fixes the scope of freedom of thought; because, as a rule, people\ndo not think farther than their teachers have thought.\n\nHear Minister Guizot: \"The great difficulty of to-day is the _guiding\nand dominating of the mind_. Formerly the church fulfilled this mission;\nnow it is not adequate to it. It is from the university that this great\nservice must be expected, and the university will not fail to perform\nit. We, the _government_, have the duty of supporting it therein. The\ncharter calls for the freedom of thought and that of conscience.\"[228]\nSo, in favor of freedom of thought and conscience, the minister demands\n\"the guiding and dominating of the mind.\"\n\nCatholicism haled the examinee before the forum of ecclesiasticism,\nProtestantism before that of biblical Christianity. It would be but\nlittle bettered if one haled him before that of reason, as Ruge,\n_e. g._, wants to.[229] Whether the church, the Bible, or reason (to\nwhich, moreover, Luther and Huss already appealed) is the _sacred\nauthority_ makes no difference in essentials.\n\nThe \"question of our time\" does not become soluble even when one puts it\nthus: Is anything general authorized, or only the individual? Is the\ngenerality (such as State, law, custom, morality, etc.) authorized, or\nindividuality? It becomes soluble for the first time when one no longer\nasks after an \"authorization\" at all, and does not carry on a mere fight\nagainst \"privileges.\"--A \"rational\" freedom of teaching, which\n\"recognizes only the conscience of reason,\"[230] does not bring us to\nthe goal; we require an _egoistic_ freedom of teaching rather, a freedom\nof teaching for all ownness, wherein _I_ become _audible_ and can\nannounce myself unchecked. That I make myself \"_audible_,\"[231] this\nalone is \"reason,\"[232] be I ever so irrational; in my making myself\nheard, and so hearing myself, others as well as I myself enjoy me, and\nat the same time consume me.\n\nWhat would be gained if, as formerly the orthodox I, the loyal I, the\nmoral I, etc., was free, now the rational I should become free? Would\nthis be the freedom of me?\n\nIf I am free as \"rational I,\" then the rational in me, or reason, is\nfree; and this freedom of reason, or freedom of the thought, was the\nideal of the Christian world from of old. They wanted to make\nthinking--and, as aforesaid, faith is also thinking, as thinking is\nfaith--free; the thinkers, _i. e._ the believers as well as the\nrational, were to be free; for the rest freedom was impossible. But the\nfreedom of thinkers is the \"freedom of the children of God,\" and at the\nsame time the most merciless--hierarchy or dominion of the thought; for\n_I_ succumb to the thought. If thoughts are free, I am their slave; I\nhave no power over them, and am dominated by them. But I want to have\nthe thought, want to be full of thoughts, but at the same time I want to\nbe thoughtless, and, instead of freedom of thought, I preserve for\nmyself thoughtlessness.\n\nIf the point is to have myself understood and to make communications,\nthen assuredly I can make use only of _human_ means, which are at my\ncommand because I am at the same time man. And really I have thoughts\nonly as _man_; as I, I am at the same time _thoughtless_.[233] He who\ncannot get rid of a thought is so far only man, is a thrall of\n_language_, this human institution, this treasury of _human_ thoughts.\nLanguage or \"the word\" tyrannizes hardest over us, because it brings up\nagainst us a whole army of _fixed ideas_. Just observe yourself in the\nact of reflection, right now, and you will find how you make progress\nonly by becoming thoughtless and speechless every moment. You are not\nthoughtless and speechless merely in (say) sleep, but even in the\ndeepest reflection; yes, precisely then most so. And only by this\nthoughtlessness, this unrecognized \"freedom of thought\" or freedom from\nthe thought, are you your own. Only from it do you arrive at putting\nlanguage to use as your _property_.\n\nIf thinking is not _my_ thinking, it is merely a spun-out thought; it is\nslave work, or the work of a \"servant obeying at the word.\" For not a\nthought, but I, am the beginning for my thinking, and therefore I am its\ngoal too, even as its whole course is only a course of my\nself-enjoyment; for absolute or free thinking, on the other hand,\nthinking itself is the beginning, and it plagues itself with propounding\nthis beginning as the extremest \"abstraction\" (_e. g._ as being). This\nvery abstraction, or this thought, is then spun out further.\n\nAbsolute thinking is the affair of the human spirit, and this is a holy\nspirit. Hence this thinking is an affair of the parsons, who have \"a\nsense for it,\" a sense for the \"highest interests of mankind,\" for \"the\nspirit.\"\n\nTo the believer, truths are a _settled_ thing, a fact; to the\nfreethinker, a thing that is still to be _settled_. Be absolute thinking\never so unbelieving, its incredulity has its limits, and there does\nremain a belief in the truth, in the spirit, in the idea and its final\nvictory: this thinking does not sin against the holy spirit. But all\nthinking that does not sin against the holy spirit is belief in spirits\nor ghosts.\n\nI can as little renounce thinking as feeling, the spirit's activity as\nlittle as the activity of the senses. As feeling is our sense for\nthings, so thinking is our sense for essences (thoughts). Essences have\ntheir existence in everything sensuous, especially in the word. The\npower of words follows that of things: first one is coerced by the rod,\nafterward by conviction. The might of things overcomes our courage, our\nspirit; against the power of a conviction, and so of the word, even the\nrack and the sword lose their overpoweringness and force. The men of\nconviction are the priestly men, who resist every enticement of Satan.\n\nChristianity took away from the things of this world only their\nirresistibleness, made us independent of them. In like manner I raise\nmyself above truths and their power: as I am supersensual, so I am\nsupertrue. _Before me_ truths are as common and as indifferent as\nthings; they do not carry me away, and do not inspire me with\nenthusiasm. There exists not even one truth, not right, not freedom,\nhumanity, etc., that has stability before me, and to which I subject\nmyself. They are _words_, nothing but words, as all things are to the\nChristian nothing but \"vain things.\" In words and truths (every word is\na truth, as Hegel asserts that one cannot _tell_ a lie) there is no\nsalvation for me, as little as there is for the Christian in things and\nvanities. As the riches of this world do not make me happy, so neither\ndo its truths. It is now no longer Satan, but the spirit, that plays the\nstory of the temptation; and he does not seduce by the things of this\nworld, but by its thoughts, by the \"glitter of the idea.\"\n\nAlong with worldly goods, all sacred goods too must be put away as no\nlonger valuable.\n\nTruths are phrases, ways of speaking, words ([Greek: logos]); brought\ninto connection, or into an articulate series, they form logic, science,\nphilosophy.\n\nFor thinking and speaking I need truths and words, as I do foods for\neating; without them I cannot think nor speak. Truths are men's\nthoughts, set down in words and therefore just as extant as other\nthings, although extant only for the mind or for thinking, they are\nhuman institutions and human creatures, and, even if they are given out\nfor divine revelations, there still remains in them the quality of\nalienness for me; yes, as my own creatures they are already alienated\nfrom me after the act of creation.\n\nThe Christian man is the man with faith in thinking, who believes in the\nsupreme dominion of thoughts and wants to bring thoughts, so-called\n\"principles,\" to dominion. Many a one does indeed test the thoughts, and\nchooses none of them for his master without criticism, but in this he is\nlike the dog who sniffs at people to smell out \"his master\": he is\nalways aiming at the _ruling_ thought. The Christian may reform and\nrevolt an infinite deal, may demolish the ruling concepts of centuries;\nhe will always aspire to a new \"principle\" or new master again, always\nset up a higher or \"deeper\" truth again, always call forth a cult again,\nalways proclaim a spirit called to dominion, lay down a _law_ for all.\n\nIf there is even one truth only to which man has to devote his life and\nhis powers because he is man, then he is subjected to a rule, dominion,\nlaw, etc.; he is a servingman. It is supposed that, _e. g._, man,\nhumanity, liberty, etc., are such truths.\n\nOn the other hand, one can say thus: Whether you will further occupy\nyourself with thinking depends on you; only know that, _if_ in your\nthinking you would like to make out anything worthy of notice, many hard\nproblems are to be solved, without vanquishing which you cannot get far.\nThere exists, therefore, no duty and no calling for you to meddle with\nthoughts (ideas, truths); but, if you will do so, you will do well to\nutilize what the forces of others have already achieved toward clearing\nup these difficult subjects.\n\nThus, therefore, he who will think does assuredly have a task, which\n_he_ consciously or unconsciously sets for himself in willing that; but\nno one has the task of thinking or of believing.--In the former case it\nmay be said, You do not go far enough, you have a narrow and biased\ninterest, you do not go to the bottom of the thing; in short, you do not\ncompletely subdue it. But, on the other hand, however far you may come\nat any time, you are still always at the end, you have no call to step\nfarther, and you can have it as you will or as you are able. It stands\nwith this as with any other piece of work, which you can give up when\nthe humor for it wears off. Just so, if you can no longer _believe_ a\nthing, you do not have to force yourself into faith or to busy yourself\nlastingly as if with a sacred truth of the faith, as theologians or\nphilosophers do, but you can tranquilly draw back your interest from it\nand let it run. Priestly spirits will indeed expound this your lack of\ninterest as \"laziness, thoughtlessness, obduracy, self-deception,\" and\nthe like. But do you just let the trumpery lie, notwithstanding. No\nthing,[234] no so-called \"highest interest of mankind,\" no \"sacred\ncause,\"[235] is worth your serving it, and occupying yourself with it\nfor _its sake_; you may seek its worth in this alone, whether it is\nworth anything to _you_ for your sake. Become like children, the\nbiblical saying admonishes us. But children have no sacred interest and\nknow nothing of a \"good cause.\" They know all the more accurately what\nthey have a fancy for; and they think over, to the best of their powers,\nhow they are to arrive at it.\n\nThinking will as little cease as feeling. But the power of thoughts and\nideas, the dominion of theories and principles, the sovereignty of the\nspirit, in short the--_hierarchy_, lasts as long as the parsons, _i. e._\ntheologians, philosophers, statesmen, philistines, liberals,\nschoolmasters, servants, parents, children, married couples, Proudhon,\nGeorge Sand, Bluntschli, etc., etc., have the floor; the hierarchy will\nendure as long as people believe in, think of, or even criticise,\nprinciples; for even the most inexorable criticism, which undermines\nall current principles, still does finally _believe_ in _the principle_.\n\nEvery one criticises, but the criterion is different. People run after\nthe \"right\" criterion. The right criterion is the first presupposition.\nThe critic starts from a proposition, a truth, a belief. This is not a\ncreation of the critic, but of the dogmatist; nay, commonly it is\nactually taken up out of the culture of the time without further\nceremony, like _e. g._ \"liberty,\" \"humanity,\" etc. The critic has not\n\"discovered man,\" but this truth has been established as \"man\" by the\ndogmatist, and the critic (who, besides, may be the same person with\nhim) believes in this truth, this article of faith. In this faith, and\npossessed by this faith, he criticises.\n\nThe secret of criticism is some \"truth\" or other: this remains its\nenergizing mystery.\n\nBut I distinguish between _servile_ and _own_ criticism. If I criticise\nunder the presupposition of a supreme being, my criticism _serves_ the\nbeing and is carried on for its sake: if, _e. g._, I am possessed by the\nbelief in a \"free State,\" then everything that has a bearing on it I\ncriticise from the standpoint of whether it is suitable to this State,\nfor I _love_ this State; if I criticise as a pious man, then for me\neverything falls into the classes of divine and diabolical, and before\nmy criticism nature consists of traces of God or traces of the devil\n(hence names like Godsgift, Godmount, the Devil's Pulpit, etc.), men of\nbelievers and unbelievers, etc.; if I criticise while believing in man\nas the \"true essence,\" then for me everything falls primarily into the\nclasses of man and the un-man, etc.\n\nCriticism has to this day remained a work of love: for at all times we\nexercised it for the love of some being. All servile criticism is a\nproduct of love, a possessedness, and proceeds according to that New\nTestament precept, \"Test everything and hold fast the _good_.\"[236] \"The\ngood\" is the touchstone, the criterion. The good, returning under a\nthousand names and forms, remained always the presupposition, remained\nthe dogmatic fixed point for this criticism, remained the--fixed idea.\n\nThe critic, in setting to work, impartially presupposes the \"truth,\" and\nseeks for the truth in the belief that it is to be found. He wants to\nascertain the true, and has in it that very \"good.\"\n\nPresuppose means nothing else than put a _thought_ in front, or think\nsomething before everything else and think the rest from the\nstarting-point of this that has _been thought_, _i. e._ measure and\ncriticise it by this. In other words, this is as much as to say that\nthinking is to begin with something already thought. If thinking began\nat all, instead of being begun, if thinking were a subject, an acting\npersonality of its own, as even the plant is such, then indeed there\nwould be no abandoning the principle that thinking must begin with\nitself. But it is just the personification of thinking that brings to\npass those innumerable errors. In the Hegelian system they always talk\nas if thinking or \"the thinking spirit\" (_i. e._ personified thinking,\nthinking as a ghost) thought and acted; in critical liberalism it is\nalways said that \"criticism\" does this and that, or else that\n\"self-consciousness\" finds this and that. But, if thinking ranks as the\npersonal actor, thinking itself must be presupposed; if criticism ranks\nas such, a thought must likewise stand in front. Thinking and criticism\ncould be active only starting from themselves, would have to be\nthemselves the presupposition of their activity, as without being they\ncould not be active. But thinking, as a thing presupposed, is a fixed\nthought, a _dogma_; thinking and criticism, therefore, can start only\nfrom a _dogma_, _i. e._ from a thought, a fixed idea, a presupposition.\n\nWith this we come back again to what was enunciated above, that\nChristianity consists in the development of a world of thoughts, or that\nit is the proper \"freedom of thought,\" the \"free thought,\" the \"free\nspirit.\" The \"true\" criticism, which I called \"servile,\" is therefore\njust as much \"free\" criticism, for it is not _my own_.\n\nThe case stands otherwise when what is yours is not made into something\nthat is of itself, not personified, not made independent an a \"spirit\"\nto itself. _Your_ thinking has for a presupposition not \"thinking,\" but\n_you_. But thus you do presuppose yourself after all? Yes, but not for\nmyself, but for my thinking. Before my thinking, there is--I. From this\nit follows that my thinking is not preceded by a _thought_, or that my\nthinking is without a \"presupposition.\" For the presupposition which I\nam for my thinking is not one _made by thinking_, not one _thought of_,\nbut it is _posited_ thinking _itself_, it is the _owner_ of the thought,\nand proves only that thinking is nothing more than--_property_, _i. e._\nthat an \"independent\" thinking, a \"thinking spirit,\" does not exist at\nall.\n\nThis reversal of the usual way of regarding things might so resemble an\nempty playing with abstractions that even those against whom it is\ndirected would acquiesce in the harmless aspect I give it, if practical\nconsequences were not connected with it.\n\nTo bring these into a concise expression, the assertion now made is that\nman is not the measure of all things, but I am this measure. The servile\ncritic has before his eye another being, an idea, which he means to\nserve; therefore he only slays the false idols for his God. What is done\nfor the love of this being, what else should it be but a--work of love?\nBut I, when I criticise, do not even have myself before my eyes, but am\nonly doing myself a pleasure, amusing myself according to my taste;\naccording to my several needs I chew the thing up or only inhale its\nodor.\n\nThe distinction between the two attitudes will come out still more\nstrikingly if one reflects that the servile critic, because love guides\nhim, supposes he is serving the thing [cause] itself.\n\n_The_ truth, or \"truth in general,\" people are bound not to give up, but\nto seek for. What else is it but the _\u00eatre supr\u00eame_, the highest\nessence? Even \"true criticism\" would have to despair if it lost faith in\nthe truth. And yet the truth is only a--_thought_; but it is not merely\n\"a\" thought, but the thought that is above all thoughts, the\nirrefragable thought; it is _the_ thought itself, which gives the first\nhallowing to all others; it is the consecration of thoughts, the\n\"absolute,\" the \"sacred\" thought. The truth wears longer than all the\ngods; for it is only in the truth's service, and for love of it, that\npeople have overthrown the gods and at last God himself. \"The truth\"\noutlasts the downfall of the world of gods, for it is the immortal soul\nof this transitory world of gods, it is Deity itself.\n\nI will answer Pilate's question, What is truth? Truth is the free\nthought, the free idea, the free spirit; truth is what is free from you,\nwhat is not your own, what is not in your power. But truth is also the\ncompletely unindependent, impersonal, unreal, and incorporeal; truth\ncannot step forward as you do, cannot move, change, develop; truth\nawaits and receives everything from you, and itself is only through you;\nfor it exists only--in your head. You concede that the truth is a\nthought, but say that not every thought is a true one, or, as you are\nalso likely to express it, not every thought is truly and really a\nthought. And by what do you measure and recognize the thought? By _your\nimpotence_, to wit, by your being no longer able to make any successful\nassault on it! When it overpowers you, inspires you, and carries you\naway, then you hold it to be the true one. Its dominion over you\ncertifies to you its truth; and, when it possesses you, and you are\npossessed by it, then you feel well with it, for then you have found\nyour--_lord and master_. When you were seeking the truth, what did your\nheart then long for? For your master! You did not aspire to _your_\nmight, but to a Mighty One, and wanted to exalt a Mighty One (\"Exalt ye\nthe Lord our God!\"). The truth, my dear Pilate, is--the Lord, and all\nwho seek the truth are seeking and praising the Lord. Where does the\nLord exist? Where else but in your head? He is only spirit, and,\nwherever you believe you really see him, there he is a--ghost; for the\nLord is merely something that is thought of, and it was only the\nChristian pains and agony to make the invisible visible, the spiritual\ncorporeal, that generated the ghost and was the frightful misery of the\nbelief in ghosts.\n\nAs long as you believe in the truth, you do not believe in yourself, and\nyou are a--_servant_, a--_religious man_. You alone are the truth, or\nrather, you are more than the truth, which is nothing at all before you.\nYou too do assuredly ask about the truth, you too do assuredly\n\"criticise,\" but you do not ask about a \"higher truth,\"--to wit, one\nthat should be higher than you,--nor criticise according to the\ncriterion of such a truth. You address yourself to thoughts and notions,\nas you do to the appearances of things, only for the purpose of making\nthem palatable to you, enjoyable to you, and your _own_: you want only\nto subdue them and become their _owner_, you want to orient yourself and\nfeel at home in them, and you find them true, or see them in their true\nlight, when they can no longer slip away from you, no longer have any\nunseized or uncomprehended place, or when they are _right for you_, when\nthey are your _property_. If afterward they become heavier again, if\nthey wriggle themselves out of your power again, then that is just their\nuntruth,--to wit, your impotence. Your impotence is their power, your\nhumility their exaltation. Their truth, therefore, is you, or is the\nnothing which you are for them and in which they dissolve: their truth\nis their _nothingness_.\n\nOnly as the property of me do the spirits, the truths, get to rest; and\nthey then for the first time really are, when they have been deprived of\ntheir sorry existence and made a property of mine, when it is no longer\nsaid \"the truth develops itself, rules, asserts itself; history (also a\nconcept) wins the victory,\" and the like. The truth never has won a\nvictory, but was always my _means_ to the victory, like the sword (\"the\nsword of truth\"). The truth is dead, a letter, a word, a material that I\ncan use up. All truth by itself is dead, a corpse; it is alive only in\nthe same way as my lungs are alive,--to wit, in the measure of my own\nvitality. Truths are material, like vegetables and weeds; as to whether\nvegetable or weed, the decision lies in me.\n\nObjects are to me only material that I use up. Wherever I put my hand I\ngrasp a truth, which I trim for myself. The truth is certain to me, and\nI do not need to long after it. To do the truth a service is in no case\nmy intent; it is to me only a nourishment for my thinking head, as\npotatoes are for my digesting stomach, or as a friend is for my social\nheart. As long as I have the humor and force for thinking, every truth\nserves me only for me to work it up according to my powers. As reality\nor worldliness is \"vain and a thing of naught\" for Christians, so is the\ntruth for me. It exists, exactly as much as the things of this world go\non existing although the Christian has proved their nothingness; but it\nis vain, because it has its _value_ not _in itself_ but _in me_. _Of\nitself_ it is _valueless_. The truth is a--_creature_.\n\nAs you produce innumerable things by your activity, yes, shape the\nearth's surface anew and set up works of men everywhere, so too you may\nstill ascertain numberless truths by your thinking, and we will gladly\ntake delight in them. Nevertheless, as I do not please to hand myself\nover to serve your newly discovered machines mechanically, but only help\nto set them running for my benefit, so too I will only use your truths,\nwithout letting myself be used for their demands.\n\nAll truths _beneath_ me are to my liking; a truth _above_ me, a truth\nthat I should have to _direct_ myself by, I am not acquainted with. For\nme there is no truth, for nothing is more than I! Not even my essence,\nnot even the essence of man, is more than I! than I, this \"drop in the\nbucket,\" this \"insignificant man!\"\n\nYou believe that you have done the utmost when you boldly assert that,\nbecause every time has its own truth, there is no \"absolute truth.\" Why,\nwith this you nevertheless still leave to each time its truth, and you\nquite genuinely create an \"absolute truth,\" a truth that no time lacks,\nbecause every time, however its truth may be, still has a \"truth.\"\n\nIs it meant only that people have been thinking in every time, and so\nhave had thoughts or truths, and that in the subsequent time these were\nother than they were in the earlier? No, the word is to be that every\ntime had its \"truth of faith\"; and in fact none has yet appeared in\nwhich a \"higher truth\" has not been recognized, a truth that people\nbelieved they must subject themselves to as \"highness and majesty.\"\nEvery truth of a time is its fixed idea, and, if people later found\nanother truth, this always happened only because they sought for\nanother; they only reformed the folly and put a modern dress on it.\nFor they did want--who would dare doubt their justification for\nthis?--they wanted to be \"inspired by an idea.\" They wanted to be\ndominated,--possessed, by a _thought_! The most modern ruler of this\nkind is \"our essence,\" or \"man.\"\n\nFor all free criticism a thought was the criterion; for own criticism I\nam, I the unspeakable, and so not the merely thought-of; for what is\nmerely thought of is always speakable, because word and thought\ncoincide. That is true which is mine, untrue that whose own I am; true,\n_e. g._, the union; untrue, the State and society. \"Free and true\"\ncriticism takes care for the consistent dominion of a thought, an idea,\na spirit; \"own\" criticism, for nothing but my _self-enjoyment_. But in\nthis the latter is in fact--and we will not spare it this\n\"ignominy\"!--like the bestial criticism of instinct. I, like the\ncriticising beast, am concerned only for _myself_, not \"for the cause.\"\n_I_ am the criterion of truth, but I am not an idea, but more than idea,\n_i. e._ unutterable. _My_ criticism is not a \"free\" criticism, not free\nfrom me, and not \"servile,\" not in the service of an idea, but an _own_\ncriticism.\n\nTrue or human criticism makes out only whether something is _suitable_\nto man, to the true man; but by own criticism you ascertain whether it\nis suitable to _you_.\n\nFree criticism busies itself with _ideas_, and therefore is always\ntheoretical. However it may rage against ideas, it still does not get\nclear of them. It pitches into the ghosts, but it can do this only as it\nholds them to be ghosts. The ideas it has to do with do not fully\ndisappear; the morning breeze of a new day does not scare them away.\n\nThe critic may indeed come to ataraxy before ideas, but he never gets\n_rid_ of them, _i. e._ he will never comprehend that above the _bodily\nman_ there does not exist something higher,--to wit, liberty, his\nhumanity, etc. He always has a \"calling\" of man still left, \"humanity.\"\nAnd this idea of humanity remains unrealized, just because it is an\n\"idea\" and is to remain such.\n\nIf, on the other hand, I grasp the idea as _my_ idea, then it is already\nrealized, because _I_ am its reality; its reality consists in the fact\nthat I, the bodily, have it.\n\nThey say, the idea of liberty realizes itself in the history of the\nworld. The reverse is the case; this idea is real as a man thinks it,\nand it is real in the measure in which it is idea, _i. e._ in which I\nthink it or _have_ it. It is not the idea of liberty that develops\nitself, but men develop themselves, and, of course, in this\nself-development develop their thinking too.\n\nIn short, the critic is not yet _owner_; because he still fights with\nideas as with powerful aliens,--as the Christian is not owner of his\n\"bad desires\" so long as he has to combat them; for him who contends\nagainst vice, vice _exists_.\n\nCriticism remains stuck fast in the \"freedom of knowing,\" the freedom of\nthe spirit, and the spirit gains its proper freedom when it fills itself\nwith the pure, true idea; this is the freedom of thinking, which cannot\nbe without thoughts.\n\nCriticism smites one idea only by another, _e. g._ that of privilege by\nthat of manhood, or that of egoism by that of unselfishness.\n\nIn general, the beginning of Christianity comes on the stage again in\nits critical end, egoism being combated here as there. I am not to make\nmyself (the individual) count, but the idea, the general.\n\nWhy, warfare of the priesthood with _egoism_, of the spiritually-minded\nwith the worldly-minded, constitutes the substance of all Christian\nhistory. In the newest criticism this war only becomes all-embracing,\nfanaticism complete. Indeed, neither can it pass away till it passes\nthus, after it has had its life and its rage out.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhether what I think and do is Christian, what do I care? Whether it is\nhuman, liberal, humane, whether unhuman, illiberal, inhuman, what do I\nask about that? If only it accomplishes what I want, if only I satisfy\nmyself in it, then overlay it with predicates as you will; it is all\nalike to me.\n\nPerhaps I too, in the very next moment, defend myself against my former\nthoughts; I too am likely to change suddenly my mode of action; but not\non account of its not corresponding to Christianity, not on account of\nits running counter to the eternal rights of man, not on account of its\naffronting the idea of mankind, humanity, and humanitarianism,\nbut--because I am no longer all in it, because it no longer furnishes me\nany full enjoyment, because I doubt the earlier thought or no longer\nplease myself in the mode of action just now practised.\n\nAs the world as property has become a _material_ with which I undertake\nwhat I will, so the spirit too as property must sink down into a\n_material_ before which I no longer entertain any sacred dread. Then,\nfirstly, I shall shudder no more before a thought, let it appear as\npresumptuous and \"devilish\" as it will, because, if it threatens to\nbecome too inconvenient and unsatisfactory for _me_, its end lies in my\npower; but neither shall I recoil from any deed because there dwells in\nit a spirit of godlessness, immorality, wrongfulness, as little as St.\nBoniface pleased to desist, through religious scrupulousness, from\ncutting down the sacred oak of the heathens. If the _things_ of the\nworld have once become vain, the _thoughts_ of the spirit must also\nbecome vain.\n\nNo thought is sacred, for let no thought rank as \"devotions\";[237] no\nfeeling is sacred (no sacred feeling of friendship, mother's feelings,\netc.), no belief is sacred. They are all _alienable_, my alienable\nproperty, and are annihilated, as they are created, by _me_.\n\nThe Christian can lose all _things_ or objects, the most loved persons,\nthese \"objects\" of his love, without giving up himself (_i. e._, in the\nChristian sense, his spirit, his soul) as lost. The owner can cast from\nhim all the _thoughts_ that were dear to his heart and kindled his zeal,\nand will likewise \"gain a thousandfold again,\" because he, their\ncreator, remains.\n\nUnconsciously and involuntarily we all strive toward ownness, and there\nwill hardly be one among us who has not given up a sacred feeling, a\nsacred thought, a sacred belief; nay, we probably meet no one who could\nnot still deliver himself from one or another of his sacred thoughts.\nAll our contention against convictions starts from the opinion that\nmaybe we are capable of driving our opponent out of his intrenchments of\nthought. But what I do unconsciously I half do, and therefore after\nevery victory over a faith I become again the _prisoner_ (possessed) of\na faith which then takes my whole self anew into its _service_, and\nmakes me an enthusiast for reason after I have ceased to be enthusiastic\nfor the Bible, or an enthusiast for the idea of humanity after I have\nfought long enough for that of Christianity.\n\nDoubtless, as owner of thoughts, I shall cover my property with my\nshield, just as I do not, as owner of things, willingly let everybody\nhelp himself to them; but at the same time I shall look forward\nsmilingly to the outcome of the battle, smilingly lay the shield on the\ncorpses of my thoughts and my faith, smilingly triumph when I am beaten.\nThat is the very humor of the thing. Every one who has \"sublimer\nfeelings\" is able to vent his humor on the pettinesses of men; but to\nlet it play with all \"great thoughts, sublime feelings, noble\ninspiration, and sacred faith\" presupposes that I am the owner of all.\n\nIf religion has set up the proposition that we are sinners altogether, I\nset over against it the other: we are perfect altogether! For we are,\nevery moment, all that we can be; and we never need be more. Since no\ndefect cleaves to us, sin has no meaning either. Show me a sinner in the\nworld still, if no one any longer needs to do what suits a superior! If\nI only need do what suits myself, I am no sinner if I do not do what\nsuits myself, as I do not injure in myself a \"holy one\"; if, on the\nother hand, I am to be pious, then I must do what suits God; if I am to\nact humanly, I must do what suits the essence of man, the idea of\nmankind, etc. What religion calls the \"sinner,\" humanitarianism calls\nthe \"egoist.\" But, once more: if I need not do what suits any other, is\nthe \"egoist,\" in whom humanitarianism has borne to itself a new-fangled\ndevil, anything more than a piece of nonsense? The egoist, before whom\nthe humane shudder, is a spook as much as the devil is: he exists only\nas a bogie and phantasm in their brain. If they were not\nunsophisticatedly drifting back and forth in the antediluvian opposition\nof good and evil, to which they have given the modern names of \"human\"\nand \"egoistic,\" they would not have freshened up the hoary \"sinner\" into\nan \"egoist\" either, and put a new patch on an old garment. But they\ncould not do otherwise, for they hold it for their task to be \"men.\"\nThey are rid of the Good One; good is left![238]\n\nWe are perfect altogether, and on the whole earth there is not one man\nwho is a sinner! There are crazy people who imagine that they are God\nthe Father, God the Son, or the man in the moon, and so too the world\nswarms with fools who seem to themselves to be sinners; but, as the\nformer are not the man in the moon, so the latter are--not sinners.\nTheir sin is imaginary.\n\nYet, it is insidiously objected, their craziness or their possessedness\nis at least their sin. Their possessedness is nothing but what\nthey--could achieve, the result of their development, just as Luther's\nfaith in the Bible was all that he was--competent to make out. The one\nbrings himself into the madhouse with his development, the other brings\nhimself therewith into the Pantheon and to the loss of--Valhalla.\n\nThere is no sinner and no sinful egoism!\n\nGet away from me with your \"philanthropy\"! Creep in, you philanthropist,\ninto the \"dens of vice,\" linger awhile in the throng of the great city:\nwill you not everywhere find sin, and sin, and again sin? Will you not\nwail over corrupt humanity, not lament at the monstrous egoism? Will you\nsee a rich man without finding him pitiless and \"egoistic\"? Perhaps you\nalready call yourself an atheist, but you remain true to the Christian\nfeeling that a camel will sooner go through a needle's eye than a rich\nman not be an \"un-man.\" How many do you see anyhow that you would not\nthrow into the \"egoistic mass\"? What, therefore, has your philanthropy\n[love of man] found? Nothing but unlovable men! And where do they all\ncome from? From you, from your philanthropy! You brought the sinner with\nyou in your head, therefore you found him, therefore you inserted him\neverywhere. Do not call men sinners, and they are not: you alone are the\ncreator of sinners; you, who fancy that you love men, are the very one\nto throw them into the mire of sin, the very one to divide them into\nvicious and virtuous, into men and un-men, the very one to befoul them\nwith the slaver of your possessedness; for you love not _men_, but\n_man_. But I tell you, you have never seen a sinner, you have\nonly--dreamed of him.\n\nSelf-enjoyment is embittered to me by my thinking I must serve another,\nby my fancying myself under obligation to him, by my holding myself\ncalled to \"self-sacrifice,\" \"resignation,\" \"enthusiasm.\" All right: if I\nno longer serve any idea, any \"higher essence,\" then it is clear of\nitself that I no longer serve any man either, but--under all\ncircumstances--_myself_. But thus I am not merely in fact or in being,\nbut also for my consciousness, the--unique.[239]\n\nThere pertains to _you_ more than the divine, the human, etc.; _yours_\npertains to you.\n\nLook upon yourself as more powerful than they give you out for, and you\nhave more power; look upon yourself as more, and you have more.\n\nYou are then not merely _called_ to everything divine, _entitled_ to\neverything human, but _owner_ of what is yours, _i. e._ of all that you\npossess the force to make your own;[240] _i. e._ you are\n_appropriate_[241] and capacitated for everything that is yours.\n\nPeople have always supposed that they must give me a destiny lying\noutside myself, so that at last they demanded that I should lay claim to\nthe human because I am = man. This is the Christian magic circle.\nFichte's ego too is the same essence outside me, for every one is ego;\nand, if only this ego has rights, then it is \"the ego,\" it is not I. But\nI am not an ego along with other egos, but the sole ego: I am unique.\nHence my wants too are unique, and my deeds; in short, everything about\nme is unique. And it is only as this unique I that I take everything for\nmy own, as I set myself to work, and develop myself, only as this. I do\nnot develop man, nor as man, but, as I, I develop--myself.\n\nThis is the meaning of the--_unique one_.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE UNIQUE ONE\n\n\nPre-Christian and Christian times pursue opposite goals; the former\nwants to idealize the real, the latter to realize the ideal; the former\nseeks the \"holy spirit,\" the latter the \"glorified body.\" Hence the\nformer closes with insensitiveness to the real, with \"contempt for the\nworld\"; the latter will end with the casting off of the ideal, with\n\"contempt for the spirit.\"\n\nThe opposition of the real and the ideal is an irreconcilable one, and\nthe one can never become the other: if the ideal became the real, it\nwould no longer be the ideal; and, if the real became the ideal, the\nideal alone would be, but not at all the real. The opposition of the two\nis not to be vanquished otherwise than if _some one_ annihilates both.\nOnly in this \"some one,\" the third party, does the opposition find its\nend; otherwise idea and reality will ever fail to coincide. The idea\ncannot be so realized as to remain idea, but is realized only when it\ndies as idea; and it is the same with the real.\n\nBut now we have before us in the ancients adherents of the idea, in the\nmoderns adherents of reality. Neither can get clear of the opposition,\nand both pine only, the one party for the spirit, and, when this\ncraving of the ancient world seemed to be satisfied and this spirit to\nhave come, the others immediately for the secularization of this spirit\nagain, which must forever remain a \"pious wish.\"\n\nThe pious wish of the ancients was _sanctity_, the pious wish of the\nmoderns is _corporeity_. But, as antiquity had to go down if its longing\nwas to be satisfied (for it consisted only in the longing), so too\ncorporeity can never be attained within the ring of Christianness. As\nthe trait of sanctification or purification goes through the old world\n(the washings, etc.), so that of incorporation goes through the\nChristian world: God plunges down into this world, becomes flesh, and\nwants to redeem it, _i. e._ fill it with himself; but, since he is \"the\nidea\" or \"the spirit,\" people (_e. g._ Hegel) in the end introduce the\nidea into everything, into the world, and prove \"that the idea is, that\nreason is, in everything.\" \"Man\" corresponds in the culture of to-day to\nwhat the heathen Stoics set up as \"the wise man\"; the latter, like the\nformer, a--_fleshless_ being. The unreal \"wise man,\" this bodiless \"holy\none\" of the Stoics, became a real person, a bodily \"Holy One,\" in God\n_made flesh_; the unreal \"man,\" the bodiless ego, will become real in\nthe _corporeal ego_, in me.\n\nThere winds its way through Christianity the question about the\n\"existence of God,\" which, taken up ever and ever again, gives testimony\nthat the craving for existence, corporeity, personality, reality, was\nincessantly busying the heart because it never found a satisfying\nsolution. At last the question about the existence of God fell, but only\nto rise up again in the proposition that the \"divine\" had existence\n(Feuerbach). But this too has no existence, and neither will the last\nrefuge, that the \"purely human\" is realizable, afford shelter much\nlonger. No idea has existence, for none is capable of corporeity. The\nscholastic contention of realism and nominalism has the same content; in\nshort, this spins itself out through all Christian history, and cannot\nend _in_ it.\n\nThe world of Christians is working at _realizing ideas_ in the\nindividual relations of life, the institutions and laws of the Church\nand the State; but they make resistance, and always keep back something\nunembodied (unrealizable). Nevertheless this embodiment is restlessly\nrushed after, no matter in what degree _corporeity_ constantly fails to\nresult.\n\nFor realities matter little to the realizer, but it matters everything\nthat they be realizations of the idea. Hence he is ever examining anew\nwhether the realized does in truth have the idea, its kernel, dwelling\nin it; and in testing the real he at the same time tests the idea,\nwhether it is realizable as he thinks it, or is only thought by him\nincorrectly, and for that reason unfeasibly.\n\nThe Christian is no longer to care for family, State, etc., as\n_existences_; Christians are not to sacrifice themselves for these\n\"divine things\" like the ancients, but these are only to be utilized to\nmake the _spirit alive_ in them. The _real_ family has become\nindifferent, and there is to arise out of it an _ideal_ one which would\nthen be the \"truly real,\" a sacred family, blessed by God, or, according\nto the liberal way of thinking, a \"rational\" family. With the ancients\nfamily, State, fatherland, etc., is divine as a thing _extant_; with\nthe moderns it is still awaiting divinity, as extant it is only sinful,\nearthly, and has still to be \"redeemed,\" _i. e._ to become truly real.\nThis has the following meaning: The family, etc., is not the extant and\nreal, but the divine, the idea, is extant and real; whether _this_\nfamily will make itself real by taking up the truly real, the idea, is\nstill unsettled. It is not the individual's task to serve the family as\nthe divine, but, reversely, to serve the divine and to bring to it the\nstill undivine family, _i. e._ to subject everything in the idea's name,\nto set up the idea's banner everywhere, to bring the idea to real\nefficacy.\n\nBut, since the concern of Christianity, as of antiquity, is for the\n_divine_, they always come out at this again on their opposite ways. At\nthe end of heathenism the divine becomes the _extramundane_, at the end\nof Christianity the _intramundane_. Antiquity does not succeed in\nputting it entirely outside the world, and, when Christianity\naccomplishes this task, the divine instantly longs to get back into the\nworld and wants to \"redeem\" the world. But within Christianity it does\nnot and cannot come to this, that the divine as _intramundane_ should\nreally become the _mundane itself_: there is enough left that does and\nmust maintain itself unpenetrated as the \"bad,\" irrational, accidental,\n\"egoistic,\" the \"mundane\" in the bad sense. Christianity begins with\nGod's becoming man, and carries on its work of conversion and redemption\nthrough all time in order to prepare for God a reception in all men and\nin everything human, and to penetrate everything with the spirit: it\nsticks to preparing a place for the \"spirit.\"\n\nWhen the accent was at last laid on Man or mankind, it was again the\nidea that they \"_pronounced eternal_.\" \"Man does not die!\" They thought\nthey had now found the reality of the idea: _Man_ is the I of history,\nof the world's history; it is he, this _ideal_, that really develops,\n_i. e._ _realizes_, himself. He is the really real and corporeal one,\nfor history is his body, in which individuals are only members. Christ\nis the I of the world's history, even of the pre-Christian; in modern\napprehension it is man, the figure of Christ has developed into the\n_figure of man_: man as such, man absolutely, is the \"central point\" of\nhistory. In \"man\" the imaginary beginning returns again; for \"man\" is as\nimaginary as Christ is. \"Man,\" as the I of the world's history, closes\nthe cycle of Christian apprehensions.\n\nChristianity's magic circle would be broken if the strained relation\nbetween existence and calling, _i. e._ between me as I am and me as I\nshould be, ceased; it persists only as the longing of the idea for its\nbodiliness, and vanishes with the relaxing separation of the two: only\nwhen the idea remains--idea, as man or mankind is indeed a bodiless\nidea, is Christianity still extant. The corporeal idea, the corporeal or\n\"completed\" spirit, floats before the Christian as \"the end of the days\"\nor as the \"goal of history\"; it is not present time to him.\n\nThe individual can only have a part in the founding of the Kingdom of\nGod, or, according to the modern notion of the same thing, in the\ndevelopment and history of humanity; and only so far as he has a part\nin it does a Christian, or according to the modern expression human,\nvalue pertain to him; for the rest he is dust and a worm-bag.\n\nThat the individual is of himself a world's history, and possesses his\nproperty in the rest of the world's history, goes beyond what is\nChristian. To the Christian the world's history is the higher thing,\nbecause it is the history of Christ or \"man\"; to the egoist only _his_\nhistory has value, because he wants to develop only _himself_, not the\nmankind-idea, not God's plan, not the purposes of Providence, not\nliberty, and the like. He does not look upon himself as a tool of the\nidea or a vessel of God, he recognizes no calling, he does not fancy\nthat he exists for the further development of mankind and that he must\ncontribute his mite to it, but he lives himself out, careless of how\nwell or ill humanity may fare thereby. If it were not open to confusion\nwith the idea that a state of nature is to be praised, one might recall\nLenau's \"Three Gypsies.\"--What, am I in the world to realize ideas? To\ndo my part by my citizenship, say, toward the realization of the idea\n\"State,\" or by marriage, as husband and father, to bring the idea of the\nfamily into an existence? What does such a calling concern me! I live\nafter a calling as little as the flower grows and gives fragrance after\na calling.\n\nThe ideal \"Man\" is _realized_ when the Christian apprehension turns\nabout and becomes the proposition, \"I, this unique one, am man.\" The\nconceptual question, \"what is man?\"--has then changed into the personal\nquestion, \"who is man?\" With \"what\" the concept was sought for, in order\nto realize it; with \"who\" it is no longer any question at all, but the\nanswer is personally on hand at once in the asker: the question answers\nitself.\n\nThey say of God, \"Names name thee not.\" That holds good of me: no\n_concept_ expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence\nexhausts me; they are only names. Likewise they say of God that he is\nperfect and has no calling to strive after perfection. That too holds\ngood of me alone.\n\nI am _owner_ of my might, and I am so when I know myself as _unique_. In\nthe _unique one_ the owner himself returns into his creative nothing,\nout of which he is born. Every higher essence above me, be it God, be it\nman, weakens the feeling of my uniqueness, and pales only before the sun\nof this consciousness. If I concern myself for myself,[242] the unique\none, then my concern rests on its transitory, mortal creator, who\nconsumes himself, and I may say:\n\nAll things are nothing to me.[243]\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nThe following index to this translation of \"_Der Einzige und sein\nEigentum_\" is intended to help one, after reading the book, to find a\npassage which he remembers. It is not a concordance to aid in analytical\nstudy. Hence the designations of the matter referred to are in a form\nintended to be recognized by the person who remembers the passage; I\nhave generally preferred, so far as convenience permitted, to use the\nwords of the text itself, being confident that a description of the\nsubject-matter in words more appropriate to the summary form of the\nindex would never help any person to find his passage. If the\ndesignations are recognizable, I have permitted them to be rough.\n\nOf necessity the index has been made hastily, and I hereby confess it to\nbe guilty of all the faults that an index can possess, though I hope\nthat the page numbers will prove to be accurate. The faults that I am\nmost ashamed of are the incompleteness which usually omits the shorter\noccurrences of a given word or idea and the indefiniteness of the \"ff.\"\nwhich does not tell the reader how far the reference extends. It has\nactually not been in my power to avoid either of these faults, and I\nhope they will not prevent the index from being of very considerable use\nto those who pay continued attention to the book. These two faults will\nbe found least noticeable in the references to proper names and\nquotations: therefore the reader who wants to find a passage will do\nbest to remember, if possible, a conspicuous proper name or a quotation\nwhose source is known--perhaps oftenest from the Bible--and look up his\npassage by that. In the indexing of quotations, however, I have omitted\nanonymous proverbs, lines of German hymns, and quotations of whose\nauthorship I was (whether pardonably or unpardonably) ignorant.\n\nThe abbreviations are: ftn., \"footnote\"; f., \"and next page\"; ff., \"and\nfollowing pages.\"\n\n                                                            S. T. B.\n\n\n  Age: coming of age, 220.\n\n  Alcibiades: 282 f.\n\n  Alexis, Wilibald: \"Cabanis,\" 291.\n\n  Algiers: 343.\n\n  Alien: the same in German as \"strange,\" 47 ftn.\n\n  America:\n    citizens presumed respectable, 233.\n    duelists how treated, 314.\n    Germans sold to, 351.\n    kings not valued in, 351.\n\n  Ananias and Sapphira: 102.\n\n  Anarchism: xv ff.\n\n  Ancients: 17 ff.\n    conquered the world, 120 ff.\n\n  Aristippus: 26.\n\n  Aristotle: \"_zoon politicon_,\" 56, 307.\n\n  Arnim: see Bettina.\n\n  Art: support of, 360.\n\n  Atahualpa: 448.\n\n  Athanasius: \"God making men divine,\" 382.\n\n  Athenians: age of their popular freedom, 281 ff.\n\n  Augsburg Confession: Art. 11, 117 f.\n\n  Authorization: limits constitutional legislatures, etc., 146 f.\n\n  Autun and Barr\u00e8re, bishop of: 131.\n\n\n  Babeuf, Babouvism, 245, 248.\n\n  Bacon: \"clear head,\" no philosopher, 111.\n\n  Bailly:\n    \"no extra reason,\" 306.\n    what is my property, 131.\n\n  Bauer, Bruno:\n    \"_Anekdota_\" 2.152, 108.\n    \"_Denkwuerdigkeiten_\" 6.6-7: 96, 102.\n    \"_Die gute Sache der Freiheit_\" pp. 62-63: 178 f.\n    \"_Judenfrage_\"\n      p. 60: 180, 414.\n         61: 229.\n         66: 178.\n         84: 235.\n        114: 185.\n    \"_Lit. Ztg._\"\n       5.18: 164.\n      No. 8: 190 ff.\n       8.22: 321.\n    \"man just discovered,\" 8, 180, 326, 467.\n    treats Jew question as relating to privilege, 271 ff.\n    who he was, 163 ftn.\n\n  Bauer, E.: \"_Liberale Bestrebungen_\"\n       2.50-94: 299 ff.\n      2.95 ff.: 378 f.\n         2.130: 301.\n         2.132: 302.\n\n  Bavaria: its government worth more than a man, 345 ftn.\n\n  Beasts: how they live, 435, 442 f.\n\n  Becker, A.:\n    \"_Volksphilosophie unserer Tage_\" p. 22 f.: 103, 249.\n                                            32: 103.\n\n  Bee:\n    in beehood, 303 ff.\n    little busy, 442.\n\n  Being:\n    in Feuerbach's philosophy, 453 ff.\n    same word in Grennan as \"essence,\" 41 ftn.\n    see also Essence; also Supreme.\n\n  Bettina: \"This book belongs to the King\" pp. 374-385: 261 ff.\n\n  Bible:\n    Gen. 22.1-12: 198.\n    Ex.    20.13: 65.\n    Deut.   5.16: 216, 249.\n            32.3: 459.\n    Ps.     46.3: 121.\n            99.9: 471.\n    Prov.    3.2: 216.\n    Is.     55.8: 338, 456.\n            55.9: 26.\n    Jer.   13.16: 459.\n    Matt. 4.1-11: 464.\n            5.18: 125.\n            5.22: 56.\n            5.48: 321.\n            6.11: 426.\n            6.13: 181.\n            6.24: 279.\n            6.34: 166.\n             7.7: 449.\n            8.22: 19.\n            9.11: 70.\n           10.16: 22, 422.\n           10.35: 114.\n           11.27: 122.\n           12.30: 259.\n           12.45: 102.\n           13.25: 213.\n           16.24: 215.\n           16.26: 36.\n            18.3: 466.\n           19.21: 102.\n           19.24: 481.\n           22.21: 359, 422.\n           23.24: 297.\n           26.53: 282.\n    Mark    2.21: 480.\n            3.29: 240.\n            9.23: 122.\n           10.29: 11, 19.\n    Luke    5.11: 102.\n            6.20: 428.\n            10.7: 157.\n           11.13: 14.\n           14.11: 46, 105.\n            17.6: 122.\n            23.2: 422.\n    John    1.14: 269.\n      1.18 Revised Version margin: 34.\n             2.4: 114.\n             3.4: 304.\n             3.6: 34, 35.\n           4.24a: 14, 23, 33, 39, 40, 60, 112, 140, 433, 444, 472.\n           4.24b: 410.\n         6.32-35: 426.\n            8.44: 240.\n           16.33: 33.\n           18.36: 13.\n           18.38: 13, 28, 471.\n           20.22: 42.\n           20.29: 446.\n    Acts   5.1-2: 102.\n             5.4: 398.\n            5.29: 11, 215, 444.\n            5.39: 459.\n    Rom.    1.25: 451.\n            6.18: 205.\n             8.9: 42.\n        8.14, 16: 226.\n            8.21: 461.\n            9.21: 259.\n            12.1: 429.\n    1 Cor.  2.10: 3, 13, 33, 433.\n            3.16: 42.\n             8.4: 133.\n       15.26, 55: 430.\n    2 Cor.  5.17: 30.\n            6.15: 212.\n    Gal.    2.20: 66, 93, 427.\n            4.26: 19, 205.\n    Phil.    2.9: 170.\n    1 Thess. 5.21: 468.\n    2 Tim.  1.10: 430.\n    Heb.   11.13: 18, 34.\n    James   1.17: 455.\n            2.12: 206.\n    1 Pet. 2.16(?): 205.\n             5.2: 399.\n    1 John  3.10: 226.\n             4.8: 4, 51, 61, 74, 382.\n            4.16: 382.\n    different men's relation to, 447 ff.\n    quotations from, xx.\n\n  Birthright: 248 ff.\n\n  Blanc, Louis: \"_Histoire des Dix Ans_\" I. 138: 139.\n\n  Bluntschli: 466.\n\n  Body recognized in manhood: 14 ff.\n\n  Boniface, St.:\n    cuts down sacred oak, 218, 478.\n    risks life as missionary, 77.\n\n  _Bourgeoisie_: see Commonalty.\n\n  Burns, Robert: 433.\n\n\n  Caitiff: 398.\n\n  Calling:\n    helping men to realize, 383 f.\n    no calling, one does what he can, 433 ff.\n\n  Calvinism: puritanical, 120.\n\n  Capacities:\n    common to all, 434.\n    differ, 433 f., 438 f.\n\n  Carriere:\n    \"_Koelner Dom_,\" 305.\n\n  Catholicism: lets the profane world stand, 116 ff.\n\n  Catholics: had regard for church, 290.\n\n  Cause: mine and others, 3 ff.\n\n  Censorship: more legal than murder, 65.\n\n  Chamisso: \"Valley of Murder,\" 247.\n\n  Charles V: 399 ff.\n\n  Children: 9 ff.\n    competent to get a living, 350 f.\n\n  Chinese: family responsibilty, 291.\n\n  Chinese ways: 86 ff.\n\n  Christ:\n    no revolutionist, 422.\n    would not call legions of angels, 282.\n\n  Christianity:\n    founding of, 422 f.\n    liberalism completes, 226 ff.\n\n  Christianizing: 296.\n\n  Christians:\n    asserting their distinctiveness, 271 ff.\n    trying to conquer the Spirit, 122 ff.\n\n  Cicero: 28.\n\n  Clericalism: 98 ff.\n\n  Clootz, Anacharsis: 276.\n\n  Commonalty:\n    holds that a man's a man, 129 ff.\n    magnifies desert, 136.\n\n  Communism:\n    see Proudhon, Socialism, Weitling.\n    all for society, 412 f.\n    an advanced feudalism, 415 ff.\n    not advantageous to all, 410 ff.\n    runs to regulations, 340.\n    useful, 355 f.\n\n  Competence: 348 ff.\n\n  Competition:\n    characteristic of _bourgeois_ society, 344.\n    how to abolish, 364 f.\n    produces poor work, 354.\n    restricted by control of opportunities, 345 ff.\n\n  Confidence: breach of, 400 ff.\n\n  Conscience in Protestantism, 115.\n\n  Consequences are not penalties, 314 f.\n\n  Constitutional Monarchy: 300 ff.\n\n  Corporeity the modern wish, 485 ff.\n\n  Cotters: 327 f.\n\n  Crime:\n    a man's own affair, 317.\n    results from the recognition of Man and right, 266 ff.\n    the only way to beat the law, 258.\n    treatment as disease, 316 f.\n\n  Criminal:\n    how to make him ashamed, 265.\n    ill treated, 383.\n    made by the State, 261 ff.\n\n  Cripples: wages to, 358 f.\n\n  Crispin, St.: 64 f.\n\n  Critical philosophy: its new morality, 72 ff.\n\n  Criticism:\n    limited by love, 381 f.\n    makes progress, 190 ff.\n    of Bible, 163 ftn, 381, 448 f.\n    servile and own, 467 ff.\n    starts from presuppositions, 467 ff.\n    victorious, 195.\n    what it was, 163 ftn.\n\n  Crito: 72.\n\n  Culture: its results, 443 ff.\n\n  Cultured people: 94 ff.\n\n  Curative means against crime: 316 f.\n\n  Curtius leaps into chasm, 99.\n\n  Custom makes earth a heaven, 87 ff.\n\n\n  Daehnhardt, Marie: xi.\n\n  Descartes: _Cogito, ergo sum_, \"I think, therefore I am,\" 25, 109 f.,\n            112, 173.\n\n  Despicable: 401.\n\n  Desert, watchword of _bourgeoisie_, 136.\n\n  Devil, natural objects named after, 467.\n\n  Diogenes: 26.\n    \"Get out of my sunshine,\" 307.\n\n  Directions for life: 432 f.\n\n  Disgruntlement: 192.\n\n  Dissolving: the price of liberty, 188.\n\n  Divine: ancient and modern times are concerned for the, 486 ff.\n\n  Dogma: 194 f.\n\n  Dueling:\n    boycotted in America, 314 f.\n    prohibited by State, 243.\n\n  Dupin: 296.\n\n\n  Education: 320 f.\n\n  Ego: in title of this book, ix f.\n\n  Egoism:\n    everybody repudiates, 185 ff.\n    exemplified in God, races, States, etc., 3 ff.\n    hypocritical, 216 f.\n    remains under democracy and Socialism, 163 ff.\n    the enemy of liberalism, 185 ff.\n\n  Egoists:\n    all bodies of men are unjust to, 284.\n    have brought peoples to ruin, 277 ff.\n    involuntary, 46.\n\n  _Einzige_ (_der_): translation of the word, ix f.\n\n  Ends: 78 f.\n\n  England:\n    allows free press, 374.\n    disregards popular turmoil, 297 f.\n    law-abiding, 254.\n\n  Enjoyment: rather than life, as object, 426 ff.\n\n  Epicureans: 27 f.\n\n  Equal: who are our equals? 225 ff.\n\n  Equality:\n    of political rights, 133 ff.\n    to result from Communism, 154 ff.\n\n  Essence:\n    essences are spooks, 50 ff.\n    higher and highest essences, 47 ff. See also Supreme Being.\n    of man, as supreme, 40 f.\n    recognized in men, 52 ff.\n    same as \"being,\" 41 ftn.\n\n  Established: 293 f.\n\n  Estates: previous to Revolution, 134 f.\n\n  Euripides: \"Orestes,\" 418: 254.\n\n  Exclusiveness:\n    criticism excludes, 176 ff.\n    in Jew and Christian, 271 ff.\n\n\n  Faith: in morality, 57 ff.\n\n  Family:\n    as court judging son, 291.\n    depends on piety, 288 ff.\n    respect for idea of, 113 f.\n    self must be sacrificed to, 289 ff.\n\n  Fellow-feeling: 386 f.\n\n  Feudalism: ended by Revolution, 132 ff.\n\n  Feuerbach:\n    \"_Anekdota_\" 2.64: 60.\n    \"Essence of Christianity,\" 40 ff.\n        p. 394: 391 f.\n           401: 238.\n           402: 41.\n      402, 403: 74.\n           403: 118.\n           408: 75.\n    \"Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,\" 453 ff.\n    humanizing the divine, 227.\n    insists on \"being,\" 453 ff.\n    look \"rightly and unbiasedly,\" 449.\n    love a divine power, 391.\n    love is the essence of man, 412.\n    \"man the supreme being,\" 8, 189.\n    opposes Hegel, 453 ff.\n    religion displaces the human, 320.\n    the \"divine\" exists, 486.\n    \"theology is anthropology,\" 74.\n    \"the world a truth to the ancients,\" 18, 30.\n\n  Fichte:\n    his ego is not I, 482.\n    on casuistry of lying, 401.\n    \"The ego is all,\" 237.\n\n  Fixed idea: 55 ff.\n\n  Forces: man is to exert, 435 f.\n\n  Fortune: weak point of present society, 158 ff.\n\n  France: laws about education, 459 f.\n\n  Francis II (of France): 399 f.\n\n  Franke: 77.\n\n  Frederick the Great:\n    his cane, 176.\n    tolerant, 230.\n\n  Freedom:\n    all want freedom, but not the same freedom, 208 ff.\n    an ignoble cause, 214.\n    if given, is a sham, 219 ff.\n    is riddance, 203 ff., 214 f.\n    of press, 259 ff.\n    of thought, 455 ff.\n    thirsting for, 203 ff.\n\n  Fun prohibited, 259 ff.\n\n\n  Galotti, Emilia: 70, 431.\n\n  German unity: 303 ff.\n    a dream, 377.\n\n  Germany: millennial anniversary, 284 f.\n\n  God:\n    my God and the God of all, 189 f.\n    natural objects named after, 467.\n\n  God-man: 202, 241.\n\n  Goethe:\n    \"Faust,\" 159:   108.\n      1624-5: 250, 252.\n      2154: 112, 215, 480.\n    \"_Vanitas! vanitatum vanitas!_\" 3, 196, 328, 330, 353, 377, 490.\n    \"Venetian Epigrams,\" 46.\n    \"Humanus the saint's name,\" 370.\n    \"The spirit 'tis that builds itself the body,\" 110.\n    poet of _bourgeoisie_, 137.\n    in lucky circumstances, 433.\n\n  Good intentions: as pavement (proverbially), 96.\n\n  Government: everybody feels competent for, 356 f.\n\n  Grandmother: saw spirits, 42.\n\n  Greeks:\n    intrigue ended their liberty, 282 f.\n    their philosophy, 19 f.\n\n  Guerrillas in Spain: 65.\n\n  Guizot: 460.\n\n  Gustavus Adolphus: 176.\n\n  Gutenberg: served mankind, 164.\n\n\n  Habit: see Custom.\n\n  Half: see Hypocrisy.\n\n  Hartmann, Eduard von: xiii f.\n\n  Heart:\n    cultivated by Socrates, 20 ff.\n    cultivated by the Reformation, 31.\n\n  Heartlessness: is crime, 265 f.\n\n  Heautontimorumenos: 216.\n\n  Heaven-storming: 88 f.\n\n  Hegel:\n    \"absolute philosophy,\" 453 ff.\n    condemns \"opinion\" and what is \"mine,\" 453.\n    finds his own speculations in Bible, 448.\n    in Christian party, 311.\n    insists on reality, \"things,\" 95.\n    it is impossible to tell a lie, 464.\n    personifies thinking, 468.\n    philosopher of _bourgeoisie_, 137.\n    proves philosophy religious, 62.\n    puts the idea into everything, 485.\n    systematizes religion, 125.\n    wants match-making left to parents, 291.\n    wants to remain Lutheran, 120.\n\n  Henry VII, Emperor: 120.\n\n  Hess:\n    \"_Ein und zwanzig Bogen_,\" p. 12:   138.\n      89 ff.:   321.\n    \"_Triarchie_,\" p. 76:   234.\n\n  Hierarchy: 95 ff.\n\n  Higher world: \"introduction of,\" 43, 91.\n\n  Highest: same as \"supreme,\" 41 ftn.\n\n  Hinrichs: \"_Politische Vorlesungen_,\" 1.280: 345 ftn.\n\n  History: as dominant thought, 473, 488 f.\n\n  Holbach: head of \"plot,\" 57.\n\n  Holy: the same in German as \"sacred,\" 50 ftn.\n\n  Holy Spirit: has to be conquered by Christians, 122 ff.\n\n  Horace:\n    \"_impavidum ferient ruinae_\" 121.\n    \"_nil admirari_,\" 121.\n    his philosophy, 28.\n\n  Human:\n    exclusive regard for general human interests, 168 ff.\n    you are more than human being, 166 f.\n    human beings desire democracy, 128.\n\n  Humanism: 30.\n\n  Humanity:\n    labor must relate to, 170 ff.\n    laborers must be allowed to develop, 157 ff.\n\n  Hume: \"clear head,\" 111.\n\n  Huss: 460.\n\n  Hypocrisy: half moral and half egoist, 66 ff.\n\n\n  Idea:\n    accepted as truth, and fixed, 474 ff.\n    as object of respect, 112 ff.\n    see Fixed.\n\n  Ideal:\n    constitutes religion, 321.\n    versus real, 484 ff.\n\n  Immoral: only class known to moralists besides \"moral,\" 69 ff.\n\n  Imparted feelings: 82 ff.\n\n  Inca: 448.\n\n  Individual: \"simple,\" 344 f.\n\n  Inequality: see Equality.\n\n  Infanticide: 424.\n\n  Insurrection: 420 ff.\n\n  Intercourse:\n    not made by a hall, 285 ff.\n    preferred to society, 407.\n\n  Interests: ideal and personal, 98 ff.\n\n  Ireland: suffrage in, 343.\n\n\n  Jesuits:\n    substantially grant indulgences, 116 f.\n    \"the end hallows the means,\" 118 ff., 140, 430.\n\n  Jews:\n    asserting their distinctiveness, 271 ff.\n    emancipated, 220 f.\n    heathen, 29, 123.\n    not altogether egoistic or exclusive, 235 f.\n    unspiritual, 24.\n    whether they are men, 166 ff.\n    will not read this book, 35 f.\n\n  Judge:\n    Supreme Being as, 432 f.\n\n  Judges:\n    mechanical: 253.\n    what makes them unreliable, 223 f.\n\n  Juliet: 290.\n\n  Justice: a hate commanded by love, 383.\n\n\n  Kaiser: worthless pamphlet, 344.\n\n  Kant: 176.\n\n  Klopstock: 83.\n\n  Koerner: 77.\n\n  \"_Kommunisten in der Schweiz_\":\n    report on, p. 3: 245.\n         pp. 24, 63: 438.\n\n  Kosciusko: 404.\n\n  Kotzebue: 64 f.\n\n  Krummacher: 58, 266, 441.\n\n\n  Labor:\n    fundamental in Communist society, 156 ff.\n    human vs. unique, 354 ff.\n    lofty and petty, 174 ff.\n    must be thoroughly human, 170 ff.\n    must not be drudgery, 157 ff.\n    of the right kind develops man, 173 ff.\n    problem, 149 ff.\n    too narrow, 163 ff.\n    wanting higher pay, 336 f.\n\n  Lais: 80.\n\n  Lang, Ritter von: 69.\n\n  Lavater: 450.\n\n  Law:\n    common or general law, same word in German as \"right,\" 242 ftn.\n    particular law, not same word as \"right,\" 254 ftn.\n    how to break, 258.\n    is a declaration of will, 255 f.\n    is impersonal, 141 f.\n    paralyzes will, 256 ff.\n    sacred in the State, 313 ff.\n    to be respected as such, 254 ff.\n\n  Leisure:\n    to be enjoyed humanly, 164 f., 172.\n    to be enjoyed uniquely, 356.\n\n  Lenau: \"Three Gypsies,\" 489.\n\n  Lessing:\n    \"Emilia Galotti,\" 70, 431.\n    \"Nathan der Weise,\" 71.\n\n  Level: rascal and honest man on same, 69 f.\n\n  Liberalism:\n    completes Christianity, 226 ff.\n    has made valuable gains, 188 f.\n    rational, 137 f.\n    sees only Man in me, 225 ff.\n\n  Liberals: the most modern moderns, 127.\n\n  Liberty:\n    individual, does not mean the individual is free, 140 ff.\n    political, means direct subjection State, 138 ff.\n    of the people, is not mine, 280 ff.\n    no objection to its diminution, 408 ff.\n\n  Lie: 395 ff.\n\n  Life:\n    caring for, 425 ff.\n    should conform to the Supreme Being, 432 ff.\n    true, 426 ff.\n\n  \"_Lit. Ztg._\":\n    5.12 ff: 185.\n    5.15, 23: 185.\n    5.24: 173, 186.\n    5.26: 166.\n    No. 8: 190 ff.\n    see also Bauer.\n\n  Love:\n    as law of our intercourse, 380 ff.\n    how it goes wrong, 388 ff.\n    how originated, 388.\n    in egoism, 385 ff.\n\n  Lunatics: see Fixed Idea.\n\n  Lusatia: 304.\n\n  Luther:\n    appealed to reason, 460.\n    broke his vow, 398.\n    demanded safe conduct to Worms, 282.\n    did his best, 481.\n    \"Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise,\" 78.\n    \"He who believes is a God,\" 109.\n    not understood at first, 30.\n    shows the way to truth, 107 ff.\n\n  Lutheranism: goes beyond Puritanism, 120.\n\n\n  Mackay, John Henry: vii f., xi, xiii, 163 ftn.\n\n  Making something out of us: 320 f.\n\n  Man (adult male): 14 ff.\n\n  Man (with capital M):\n    by being man we are equal, 225 ff.\n    cared for to the disregard of men, 100 ff.\n    criticism begins to gibe at, 194.\n    every laborer must be, 170 ff.\n    I am not, 41.\n    I am the real, 233 ff.\n    I am true man, 436 ff.\n    nothing else recognized in me, 225 ff.\n    takes the place of God in the new morality, 72 ff.\n    see also Human, Humanity.\n\n  Manlius: 99.\n\n  Marat: 99.\n\n  Marriage: against will of family, 289 ff.\n\n  Marx: \"_Deutsch-franzoesische Jahrbuecher_\" p. 197: 229.\n\n  Masses:\n    attacked by criticism, 185 ff.\n    attacked as \"a spiritual being by criticism,\" 191 ff.\n\n  Maxim: as fixed idea, 80 f.\n\n  Metternich: \"path of genuine freedom,\" 209.\n\n  Middle class: not idealistic, 96 f., 99, 102.\n\n  Might: stereotyped into right, 366 f.\n\n  Mind:\n    in antiquity, 19 ff.\n    in youth, 11 ff.\n    same German word as \"spirit,\" 10 ftn.\n\n  Mirabeau: 131.\n    the people the source of right and power, 131.\n    no power may command the nation's representatives, 306.\n\n  Misalliance: 289 ff.\n\n  Moderation: 403.\n\n  Moderns: 30 ff.\n\n  Monarchy: Revolution produces an absolute, 132 ff.\n\n  Money: what we shall do about, 363 ff.\n\n  Mongolism. 85 ff.\n\n  Montgelas: 345 ftn.\n\n  Moral influence: 105 ff.\n\n  Morality:\n    a form of faith, and Christian, 57 ff.\n    becomes a religion when critically completed, 73 ff.\n    in critical philosophy, 72 ff.\n    is religious, 59 ff.\n\n\n  Napoleon:\n    did not object to conquering, 369.\n    helped himself, 343.\n\n  Nationality: 322.\n\n  \"Nationals\" of Germany: 303 ff.\n\n  Nauwerk: 307 ff.\n\n  Negroid age of Caucasian history: 86.\n\n  Nero: 68 ff.\n\n  Nietzsche: viii, xiv ff.\n\n  Ninon: 80.\n\n\n  Oath: 399 ff., 402 ff.\n\n  O'Connell: his motives, 77 f.\n\n  Old: wages to, 358 f.\n\n  Opposition ends when completed, 273 f.\n\n  Opposition party: 66 ff.\n\n  Order: in State, 293.\n\n  Orders: must not be given, 141 f.\n\n  Origen: 71.\n\n  Ownness:\n    inalienable, 206 ff.\n    meaning, 203 ftn.\n    must be defended against society, 408 ff.\n    served by union, 410 ff.\n\n\n  Pages cited: xx.\n\n  Parcellation: 327 ff.\n\n  Party: 310 ff.\n\n  Paul, Emperor of Russia: 404.\n\n  Pauperism a consequence of the State, 333 ff.\n\n  Penalty: product of right, 266 ff.\n\n  People:\n    general name for societies, 276 f.\n    German, its thousand years' history, 284 f.\n    hound the police on, 318.\n    its liberty is not mine, 280 ff.\n    peoples have filled history, 276 ff.\n\n  Periclean age: 19 ff., 281 ff.\n\n  Personification: 468 f.\n\n  Pettifoggery: 282 f.\n\n  Philanthropism: 100 f.\n\n  Philanthropy: hates men, 481 f.\n\n  Philosophy:\n    Greek, see Ancients.\n    modern, 109 ff.\n\n  Piety:\n    family depends on, 288 ff.\n    meaning of word, 288 ftn.\n\n  Pilate: 13, 28, 471 f.\n\n  Plowmen: wages for, 359 ff.\n\n  Plumb-line: xvii.\n\n  Poles: oath imposed upon, 404 f.\n\n  Poor-rates: voting by, 343.\n\n  Possession: the how much of, 347 f.\n\n  Possessions:\n    depend on the State, 150 ff.\n    fundamental in _bourgeois_ society, 147 ff.\n    inward or spiritual, 324 ff., 369 ff.\n    to be respected, 126 f., 323 ff.\n\n  Possibility:\n    coincides with reality, 438 ff.\n    means thinkableness, 439 ff.\n\n  Precepts: are Mongoloid, 87 ff.\n\n  Press:\n    why not left free, 259 ff.\n    liberty of, how to get, 371 ff.\n\n  Presupposition: 199 f., 467 ff.\n\n  Principle: as fixed idea, 80 f.\n\n  Prison society and intercourse: 286 ff.\n\n  Private:\n    criticism has to leave the private free, 178 f.\n    the private not recognized by liberalism, 168 ff.\n\n  Privilege: 270 ff.\n\n  _Prol\u00e9tariat_: 147 ff.\n\n  Propaganda: 320.\n\n  Property:\n    civic and egoistic, contrasted, 326 ff.\n    definitions in Roman law, 331 ff.\n    derived from man through Right, 365 ff.\n    individual, opposed by Socialism, 154 ff.\n    is what men really want when they say freedom, 204 ff.\n    mine is what I make my might cover, 338 ff.\n    Proudhon on, 328 ff.\n    recognition of under egoism, 369.\n    see Possessions.\n\n  Proprietors, small: 327 ff.\n\n  Protestantism:\n    conscientious, 115 ff.\n    consecrates everything, 116 ff.\n\n  Proudhon:\n    \"_Cr\u00e9ation de l'Ordre_,\" 60.\n      p. 414: 162.\n         485: 302.\n    \"_Qu'est-ce que la Propri\u00e9t\u00e9?_\"\n      p. 83: 328.\n         90: 391.\n    as parson, 466.\n    property a fact, 332.\n    \"property is robbery,\" 100, 330 ff., 419.\n    substantially agrees with Stirner, xv.\n\n  Provence, Count of: 209.\n\n  Punishment: involves sacredness, 315 ff.\n\n  Pyrrho: 28.\n\n\n  Rabble: 341 ff.\n\n  Ragamuffin: 152 ff.\n    going beyond ragamuffinhood, 184.\n\n  Raphael: 355.\n\n  Rational: etymology of \"rational\" in German, 81 ftn.\n\n  Reality: versus ideality, 484 ff.\n\n  Realizing value from self: 335 ff., 360 f.\n\n  Reason: as supreme, 460 f.\n\n  Reciprocity: 413 f.\n\n  References to pages: xx.\n\n  Reform is Mongoloid, 86 ff.\n\n  Reformation (the Protestant):\n    takes hold of heart, 31.\n    alters hierarchy, 107 ff.\n\n  Regulus: 99.\n\n  Reimarus: \"Most Notable Truths of Natural Religion,\" 62 f.\n\n  Reisach, Count von: 345 ftn.\n\n  Relation: of different persons to objects, 447 ff.\n\n  Religion:\n    is freedom of mind, 62 f.\n    morality is religious, 59 ff.\n    of humanity, 229 f.\n    tolerance in, 229 ff.\n\n  Republic: 299 f.\n\n  Revenge:\n    the people's just, 266 ff.\n\n  Reverence: 92 ff.\n\n  Revolution (the French):\n    began over property, 130.\n    equality of rights, 246.\n    established absolute government, 132 ff.\n    immoral, 72.\n    its true nature, 143 ff.\n    made men citizens, 155 f.\n\n  Revolutionist: is to lie, 396 f.\n\n  Rid: freedom is being rid, 203 ff., 214 f.\n\n  Right:\n    absolute, 269.\n    as basis of property, 366 ff.\n    commonwealth of (_Rechtsstaat_), 244, 253.\n    equality of, 270 ff.\n    is a law foreign to me, 242 ff.\n    my right derived from myself, 245 ff.\n    rights by birth, 248 ff.\n    same word in German as \"law,\" 242 ftn.\n    serves him right, 254.\n    well-earned rights, 248 ff.\n    rights change hands at the Revolution, 132 ff.\n\n  Robespierre: 77.\n    a priest, 99.\n    consistent, 102.\n    devoted to virtue, 77.\n    not serviceable to middle class, 102 f.\n\n  Romans:\n    in philosophy, 28.\n    killed children, 250.\n\n  Romanticists:\n    rehabilitate the idea of spirits, 43.\n\n  Rome: decline and fall of, 277 f.\n\n  Rousseau: hostile to culture, 96 ftn.\n\n  Rudolph (in Sue's story): 387.\n\n  Ruge: \"_Anekdota_\" 1. 120, 127: 460.\n\n  Russia:\n    boundary sentinels, 247.\n    flight of army in, 424.\n\n  Russians: as Mongolian, 86.\n\n\n  Sacred:\n    gibing at, 369 ff.\n    the same in German as \"holy,\" 50 ftn.\n    things are sacred of themselves, 118 ff.\n    wherein the sacred consists, 92 ff.\n\n  Sacred things:\n    their diagnosis and extension, 45 ff.\n\n  Sacrifice: when I sacrifice somebody else's comfort to my principles,\n            etc., 97 f.\n\n  \"_Saechsische Vaterlandsblaetter_\": 57.\n\n  Saint-Just: 99.\n    \"Political Speeches,\" 10, p. 153: 268.\n    \"criminal for not hating,\" 267.\n\n  Sake:\n    acting for one's own sake, 210 ff.\n    immoralities for God's sake and for mine, 398 f.\n\n  Sand, George: 466.\n\n  Sand (murderer of Kotzebue): 64 f.\n\n  Sander: 379.\n\n  Schiller:\n    \"Ideal and Life,\" 428.\n    \"The Maiden from a Foreign Land,\" 35.\n    \"_Worte des Glaubens_,\" 111.\n    complete in his poems, 175.\n    have I a right to my nose? 246.\n    Swabian, 176.\n\n  Schlemihl, Peter: 25.\n\n  Schlosser: \"_Achtzehntes Jahrhundert_,\" 57.\n\n  Scholarships at universities: 347 ftn.\n\n  Seducing young people to morality, 212 f.\n\n  Self:\n    as starting-point or goal, 427 f., 437 f.\n\n  Self-discovery:\n    first, 11.\n    second, 15.\n\n  Selfishness:\n    groundlessly decried, 221 ff.\n    in \"unselfish\" acts, 77 f.\n    the only thing that is really trusted, 223 f.\n\n  Self-renunciation: of holy and unholy men, 75 ff.\n\n  Self-sacrificing:\n    discussion of the implications of the German word, 96 ff.\n    literal force of the German word, 97 ftn.\n\n  Self-seekers always acted so: 341.\n\n  Sensuality: in Protestantism and Catholicism, 116 ff.\n\n  September laws: 374.\n\n  Seriousness: 85.\n\n  Settled life: necessary to respectability, 147 f.\n\n  Shabbiness: 400.\n\n  Shakspere: \"Romeo and Juliet,\" 290.\n\n  Sick: wages to, 358 f.\n\n  Sigismund: 398.\n\n  Simonides: 26.\n\n  Sinner: does not exist, 479 ff.\n\n  Skeptics (Greek): 22, 28.\n\n  Small properties: 327 ff.\n\n  Socialism: 152 ff.\n\n  Society:\n    is to be sole owner, 153 ff.\n    its character depends on its members, 276 f.\n    made by a hall, 285 ff.\n    man's state of nature, 406 ff.\n    may provide consequences where State provides penalties, 314 f.\n\n  Socrates:\n    in history of philosophy, 20 f.\n    should not have respected the sentence of the court, 281 f.\n    too moral to break jail, 72.\n\n  Sophists: 19 ff.\n\n  Sordidness: 400.\n\n  Spartans: killed children, 250.\n\n  Speculation: 405.\n\n  Sphinx: 451.\n\n  Spirit:\n    as the essential part of man, 36 ff.\n    free from the world, 32 ff.\n    has to be conquered by moderns, 122 ff.\n    same German word as \"mind,\" 10 ftn.\n    the seat of equality, 226 ff.\n\n  Spirits: are all around us, 42 ff.\n\n  Spiritual goods: shall we hold them sacred? 369 ff.\n\n  Spook: \"essences\" are spooks, 50 ff.\n\n  Spy: 395, 403.\n\n  Standpoint: as fixed idea, 80 ff.\n\n  State:\n    a fellowship of human beings, 128 ff.\n    cannot exist if I have a will of my own, 255 ff.\n    cares not for me, but for itself, 333 ff.\n    Christianizes people, 296.\n    claims to be a person, 295 f.\n    criticism gives up, 190 f.\n    has to be harsh, 259 ff., 262 ff.\n    holds laws sacred, 313 ff.\n    is the established, 293 f.\n    its relation to property, 333 ff.\n    means order, 293.\n    officials and plutocrats overcharge us, 151 f., 357 f.\n    sick, 262.\n    taking part in, 307 ff.\n\n  Stein: his disloyalty to a \"simple individual,\" 345 ftn.\n\n  Stirner: motives for writing, 393 f., 406.\n\n  Stoics: 27 f.\n    apathy, 121.\n    \"wise man,\" 121, 485.\n\n  Strange: the same in German as \"alien,\" 47 ftn.\n\n  Strike: 359 ff.\n\n  Students:\n    are immature Philistines, 144.\n    custom of, as to word of honor, 403 f.\n\n  Sue: \"Mysteries of Paris,\" 387.\n\n  Suicide: 429 ff.\n\n  Suit: \"it suits me\" expressed in German by \"right,\" 248 ftn.\n\n  Supreme: same as \"highest,\" 41 ftn.\n\n  Supreme Being:\n    according to Feuerbach, 40 ff. (See also Feuerbach.)\n    see also Essence (highest).\n\n  Swan-knights: 342 f.\n\n\n  Tak Kak: vii, xi ff.\n\n  Terence:\n    \"Heautontimorumenos,\" 25, 216.\n    \"_humani nihil alienum puto_,\" 367.\n\n  Theft: 99 f.\n    depends on property, 331 f.\n\n  Things: essential in competition, 346 ff.\n\n  Third: end of opposition, 484.\n\n  Thinkable: real sense of \"possible,\" 122, 439 ff.\n\n  Thinker: characteristics of 452 ff.\n\n  Thought:\n    freedom of, 455 ff.\n    I do not respect your independence of, 456 f.\n    necessary conditions of, 465 ff.\n    optional, 465 f.\n    realm of, 451 ff.\n\n  Thoughts:\n    as owned, 477 ff.\n    combated by disregard, 196 ff.\n    combated by force, 197 ff.\n    combated by thinking, 194 ff.\n    criticism moves only in, 194 ff.\n\n  Tie:\n    everything sacred is, 283.\n    man the enemy of, 283.\n\n  Tieck: \"_Der gestiefelte Kater_,\" 342.\n\n  Timon: 28.\n\n  Title of this book: ix f.\n\n  Tolerance: 229 ff.\n\n  Training: 434 f., 443 ff.\n\n  Truth:\n    telling, 395 ff.\n    to possess truth you must be true, 106 ff.\n    what is, 471 ff.\n    I am above truths, 463 ff.\n\n\n  Understanding: in antiquity, 19 ff.\n\n  Unhuman: an artificial name for the real, 193.\n\n  Union:\n    distinction from society, 407 ff., 415 ff.\n    everything is mine in, 415 ff.\n\n  Uniqueness: constitutes greatness, 175 f.\n\n  Un-man:\n    real man, 230 ff.\n    the \"devil\" of liberalism, 184 ff.\n\n  Unselfishness:\n    literal sense of the German word, 77 ftn.\n    supposed, and real, 77 ff.\n\n\n  Vagabonds: 147 ff.\n\n  Value:\n    of me, 86, 333 ff.\n    to be realized from self, 335 ff., 360 f.\n\n  Von Hartmann: xiii f.\n\n  \"_Vossische Zeitung_\": 244, 253.\n\n\n  Wages:\n    instead of alms, 358 f.\n    of the upper classes and the lower, 151 f., 357 ff.\n\n  Walker, James L.: vii, xi ff.\n\n  War of all against all: 341, 343.\n\n  Weitling:\n    \"Trio,\" on head of people 302.\n    Communism seeks welfare of all, 410.\n    \"harmony of society,\" 284.\n    hours of labor, 411.\n    on crime and \"curative means,\" 316 f.\n    on property, 331 f.\n    preaches \"society,\" 245.\n    substitutes work for money, 352.\n\n  Welcker: on dependence of judges, 223 f.\n\n  Wheels in the head:\n    formal aspects of, 75 ff.\n    what are such, 54 ff.\n\n  Will:\n    incompatible with the State, 255 ff.\n    law is a declaration of, 255 f.\n    law paralyzes, 255 ff.\n    morality commands submission of, 66 ff.\n    the only practical agency of reform, 68 ff.\n\n  Words:\n    power of, 462 ff.\n    Stirner's style of using, xix f.\n\n  Work:\n    for pay's sake, 354.\n    is not the only competence, 349 ff.\n\n  World:\n    among ancients, 18 ff.\n    conquered by the ancients, 120 ff.\n    is haunted, and is itself a ghost, 43 f.\n    spirit free from, 32 ff.\n\n  Writing: Stirner's motives for, 393 f., 406.\n\n\n  Youth: 11 ff.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    [1] [\"_Ich hab' Mein' Sach' auf Nichts gestellt_,\" first\n        line of Goethe's poem, \"_Vanitas! Vanitatum Vanitas!_\"\n        Literal translation: \"I have set my affair on nothing.\"]\n\n    [2] [_Sache_]\n\n    [3] [_Sache_]\n\n    [4] [_der Einzige_]\n\n    [5] [_einzig_]\n\n    [6] [_Geist._ This word will be translated sometimes \"mind\" and\n        sometimes \"spirit\" in the following pages.]\n\n    [7] Luke 11. 13.\n\n    [8] Heb. 11. 13.\n\n    [9] Mark 10. 29.\n\n   [10] Italicized in the original for the sake of its\n        etymology, _Scharfsinn_--\"sharp-sense.\" Compare next\n        paragraph.\n\n   [11] 2 Cor. 5. 17. [The words \"new\" and \"modern\" are the\n        same in German.]\n\n   [12] [Title of a poem by Schiller.]\n\n   [13] [The reader will remember (it is to be hoped he has\n        never forgotten) that \"mind\" and \"spirit\" are one and the\n        same word in German. For several pages back the connection\n        of the discourse has seemed to require the almost exclusive\n        use of the translation \"spirit,\" but to complete the sense\n        it has often been necessary that the reader recall the\n        thought of its identity with \"mind,\" as stated in a previous\n        note.]\n\n   [14] \"Essence of Christianity.\"\n\n   [15] [Or, \"highest essence.\" The word _Wesen_, which means\n        both \"essence\" and \"being,\" will be translated now one way\n        and now the other in the following pages. The reader must\n        bear in mind that these two words are identical in German:\n        and so are \"supreme\" and \"highest.\"]\n\n   [16] Cf. _e. g._ \"Essence of Christianity,\" p. 402.\n\n   [17] [That is, the abstract conception of man, as in the\n        preceding sentence.]\n\n   [18] _E. g._, Rom. 8. 9, 1 Cor. 3. 16, John 20. 22, and\n        innumerable other passages.\n\n   [19] [_Heil_]\n\n   [20] [_heilig_]\n\n   [21]  How the priests tinkle! how important they\n         Would make it out, that men should come their way\n         And babble, just as yesterday, to-day!\n\n         Oh! blame them not! They know man's need, I say;\n         For he takes all his happiness this way,\n         To babble just to-morrow as to-day.\n\n                   --_Translated from Goethe's \"Venetian Epigrams.\"_\n\n   [22] [_fremd_]\n\n   [23] [_fremd_]\n\n   [24] [_einzig_]\n\n   [25] [\"the supreme being.\"]\n\n   [26] [_heilig_]\n\n   [27] [_heilig_]\n\n   [28] [_einzig_]\n\n   [29] [_gefangen und befangen_, literally \"imprisoned and\n        prepossessed.\"]\n\n   [30] [_besessene_]\n\n   [31] [_versessen_]\n\n   [32] \"_Achtzehntes Jahrhundert_,\" II, 519.\n\n   [33] \"_De la Cr\u00e9ation de l'Ordre_\" etc., p. 36.\n\n   [34] \"_Anekdota_,\" II, 64.\n\n   [35] [_dieselbe Phantastin wie die Phantasie_]\n\n   [36] [The same word as \"intellectual\" as \"mind\" and \"spirit\"\n        are the same.]\n\n   [37] \"Essence of Christianity,\" second edition, p. 402.\n\n   [38] P. 403.\n\n   [39] P. 408.\n\n   [40] [Literally \"the man.\"]\n\n   [41] [_Uneigennuetzigkeit_, literally \"un-self-benefitingness.\"]\n\n   [42] [_vernuenftig_, derived from _vernehmen_, to hear.]\n\n   [43] [A German idiom for destructive radicalism.]\n\n   [44] [The same word that has been translated \"custom\"\n        several times in this section.]\n\n   [45] [_Ehrfurcht_]\n\n   [46] [_gefuerchtet_]\n\n   [47] [_geehrt_]\n\n   [48] Rousseau, the Philanthropists, and others were hostile\n        to culture and intelligence, but they overlooked the fact\n        that this is present in _all_ men of the Christian type, and\n        assailed only learned and refined culture.\n\n   [49] [Literally, \"sacrificing\"; the German word has not the\n        prefix \"self.\"]\n\n   [50] \"_Volksphilosophie unserer Tage_,\" p. 22.\n\n   [51] [_Muth_]\n\n   [52] [_Demuth_]\n\n   [53] [Called in English theology \"original sin.\"]\n\n   [54] [Goethe, \"Faust.\"]\n\n   [55] \"_Anekdota_,\" II, 152.\n\n   [56] [Schiller, \"_Die Worte des Glaubens_.\"]\n\n   [57] [Parodied from the words of Mephistopheles in the\n        witch's kitchen in \"Faust.\"]\n\n   [58] John 2. 4.\n\n   [59] Matt. 10. 35.\n\n   [60] [_heilig_]\n\n   [61] [_heilig_]\n\n   [62] [_Geistlicher_, literally \"spiritual man.\"]\n\n   [63] \"Essence of Christianity,\" p. 403.\n\n   [64] Mark 9. 23.\n\n   [65] [_Herrlichkeit_, which, according to its derivation,\n        means \"lordliness.\"]\n\n   [66] [Or \"citizenhood.\" The word (_das Buergertum_) means\n        either the condition of being a citizen, or citizen-like\n        principles, or the body of citizens or of the middle or\n        business class, the _bourgeoisie_.]\n\n   [67] [_Man hatte im Staate \"die ungleiche Person angesehen,\"_\n        there had been \"respect of unequal persons\" in the State.]\n\n   [68] [_Gewalt_, a word which is also commonly used like the\n        English \"violence,\" denoting especially unlawful violence.]\n\n   [69] [_Vorrechte_]\n\n   [70] [_Rechte_]\n\n   [71] 1 Corinthians 8.4.\n\n   [72] \"_Ein und zwanzig Bogen_,\" p. 12.\n\n   [73] Louis Blanc says (\"_Histoire des Dix Ans_,\" I, p. 138)\n        of the time of the Restoration: \"_Le protestantisme devint\n        le fond des id\u00e9es et des moeurs._\"\n\n   [74] [_Sache_, which commonly means _thing_.]\n\n   [75] [_Sache_]\n\n   [76] [Or \"righteous.\" German _rechtlich_.]\n\n   [77] [_gerecht_]\n\n   [78] [_das Geld gibt Geltung._]\n\n   [79] [_ausgebeutet_]\n\n   [80] [_Kriegsbeute_]\n\n   [81] [In German an exact quotation of Luke 10.7.]\n\n   [82] Proudhon (\"_Cr\u00e9ation de l'Ordre_\") cries out, _e. g._,\n        p. 414, \"In industry, as in science, the publication of an\n        invention is the first and _most sacred of duties_!\"\n\n   [83] [In his strictures on \"criticism\" Stirner refers to a\n        special movement known by that name in the early forties of\n        the last century, of which Bruno Bauer was the principal\n        exponent. After his official separation from the faculty of\n        the university of Bonn on account of his views in regard to\n        the Bible, Bruno Bauer in 1843 settled near Berlin and\n        founded the _Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung_, in which he and\n        his friends, at war with their surroundings, championed the\n        \"absolute emancipation\" of the individual within the limits\n        of \"pure humanity\" and fought as their foe \"the mass,\"\n        comprehending in that term the radical aspirations of\n        political liberalism and the communistic demands of the\n        rising Socialist movement of that time. For a brief account\n        of Bruno Bauer's movement of criticism, see John Henry\n        Mackay, \"_Max Stirner_. _Sein Leben und sein Werk._\"]\n\n   [84] Br. Bauer. \"_Lit. Ztg._\" V. 18.\n\n   [85] \"_Lit. Ztg._\" V. 26.\n\n   [86] [_Eigentum_, \"owndom.\"]\n\n   [87] [_Eigenwille_, \"own-will.\"]\n\n   [88] [Referring to minute subdivision of labor, whereby the\n        single workman produces, not a whole, but a part.]\n\n   [89] \"_Lit. Ztg._\" V. 24.\n\n   [90] \"_Lit. Ztg._\" _ibid._\n\n   [91] [\"_einziger_\"]\n\n   [92] [_Einzigkeit_]\n\n   [93] Bruno Bauer, \"_Judenfrage_,\" p. 66.\n\n   [94] Bruno Bauer, \"_Die gute Sache der Freiheit_,\" pp.\n        62-63.\n\n   [95] Bruno Bauer, \"_Judenfrage_,\" p. 60.\n\n   [96] [_Einzige_]\n\n   [97] [_einzig_]\n\n   [98] [It should be remembered that to be an _Unmensch_\n        (\"un-man\") one must be a man. The word means an inhuman or\n        unhuman man, a man who is not man. A tiger, an avalanche, a\n        drought, a cabbage, is not an un-man.]\n\n   [99] \"_Lit. Ztg._\" V. 23; as comment, V. 12 ff.\n\n  [100] \"_Lit. Ztg._\" V. 15.\n\n  [101] [_Rechthaberei_, literally the character of always\n        insisting on making one's self out to be in the right.]\n\n  [102] [_einzig_]\n\n  [103] [_des Einzigen_]\n\n  [104] [This is a literal translation of the German word\n        _Eigenheit_, which, with its primitive _eigen_, \"own,\" is\n        used in this chapter in a way that the German dictionaries\n        do not quite recognize. The author's conception being new,\n        he had to make an innovation in the German language to\n        express it. The translator is under the like necessity. In\n        most passages \"self-ownership,\" or else \"personality,\" would\n        translate the word, but there are some where the thought is\n        so _eigen_, that is, so peculiar or so thoroughly the\n        author's _own_, that no English word I can think of would\n        express it. It will explain itself to one who has read Part\n        First intelligently.]\n\n  [105] [_Eigenheit_]\n\n  [106] Rom. 6. 18.\n\n  [107] 1 Pet. 2. 16.\n\n  [108] James 2. 12.\n\n  [109] [See note, p. 112.]\n\n  [110] [Meaning \"German.\" Written in this form because of the\n        censorship.]\n\n  [111] [_Einzige_].\n\n  [112] [I take _Entbehrung_, \"destitution,\" to be a misprint\n        for _Entehrung_.]\n\n  [113] [_Eigennutz_, literally \"own-use.\"]\n\n  [114] [_Einzigen_]\n\n  [115] Rom. 8. 14.\n\n  [116] Cf. 1 John 3. 10 with Rom. 8. 16.\n\n  [117] [_Eigenschaften_]\n\n  [118] [_Eigentum_]\n\n  [119] _E. g._ Marx in the \"_Deutsch-franzoesische\n        Jahrbuecher_,\" p. 197.\n\n  [120] Br. Bauer, \"_Judenfrage_,\" p. 61.\n\n  [121] Hess, \"_Triarchie_,\" p. 76.\n\n  [122] [_Vorrecht_, literally \"precedent right.\"]\n\n  [123] [_Eigenschaft_]\n\n  [124] [_Eigentum_]\n\n  [125] \"Essence of Christianity,\" 2d ed., p. 401.\n\n  [126] [_bestimmt_]\n\n  [127] [_Bestimmung_]\n\n  [128] Mark 3. 29.\n\n  [129] [This word has also, in German, the meaning of \"common\n        law,\" and will sometimes be translated \"law\" in the\n        following paragraphs.]\n\n  [130] Cf. \"_Die Kommunisten in der Schweiz_,\" committee\n        report, p. 3.\n\n  [131] [_Rechtsstreit_, a word which usually means \"lawsuit.\"]\n\n  [132] [A common German phrase for \"it suits me.\"]\n\n  [133] A. Becker, \"_Volksphilosophie_,\" p. 22 f.\n\n  [134] [Mephistopheles in \"Faust.\"]\n\n  [135] \"I beg you, spare my lungs! He who insists on proving\n        himself right, if he but has one of these things called\n        tongues, can hold his own in all the world's despite!\"\n        [Faust's words to Mephistopheles, slightly misquoted.--For\n        _Rechthaberei_ see note on p. 185.]\n\n  [136] [_Gesetz_, statute; no longer the same German word as\n        \"right.\"]\n\n  [137] [_Verbrechen_]\n\n  [138] [_brechen_]\n\n  [139] \"This Book Belongs to the King,\" p. 376.\n\n  [140] P. 376.\n\n  [141] P. 374.\n\n  [142] [An unnatural mother]\n\n  [143] P. 381.\n\n  [144] P. 385.\n\n  [145] [_Gerechte_]\n\n  [146] [_macht Alles huebsch gerecht_]\n\n  [147] [_Einzige_]\n\n  [148] See \"Political Speeches,\" 10, p. 153.\n\n  [149] [Literally, \"precedent right.\"]\n\n  [150] [_Spannung_]\n\n  [151] [_gespannt_]\n\n  [152] [_spannen_]\n\n  [153] [_einzig_]\n\n  [154] [_Einzigkeit_]\n\n  [155] [_Volk_; but the etymological remark following applies\n        equally to the English word \"people.\" See Liddell & Scott's\n        Greek lexicon, under _pimplemi_.]\n\n  [156] [_kuschen_, a word whose only use is in ordering dogs\n        to keep quiet.]\n\n  [157] [This is the word for \"of age\"; but it is derived from\n        _Mund_, \"mouth,\" and refers properly to the right of\n        speaking through one's own _mouth_, not by a guardian.]\n\n  [158] [\"occupy\"; literally, \"have within\"]\n\n  [159] [The word _Genosse_, \"companion,\" signifies originally\n        a companion in _enjoyment_.]\n\n  [160] [This word in German does not mean religion, but, as\n        in Latin, faithfulness to family ties--as we speak of\n        \"filial piety.\" But the word elsewhere translated \"pious\"\n        (_fromm_) means \"religious,\" as usually in English.]\n\n  [161] [It should be remembered that the words \"establish\"\n        and \"State\" are both derived from the root \"stand.\"]\n\n  [162] [_huldigen_]\n\n  [163] [_Huld_]\n\n  [164] What was said in the concluding remarks after Humane\n        Liberalism holds good of the following,--to wit, that it was\n        likewise written immediately after the appearance of the\n        book cited.\n\n  [165] [In the philosophical sense (a thinking and acting being),\n        not in the political sense.]\n\n  [166] [\"_Cr\u00e9ation de l'Ordre_,\" p. 485.]\n\n  [167] [\"_Koelner Dom_,\" p. 4.]\n\n  [168] [_einzig_]\n\n  [169] [_am Einzigen_]\n\n  [170] [_Einzigen_]\n\n  [171] [_heilig_]\n\n  [172] [_unheilig_]\n\n  [173] [_Heiliger_]\n\n  [174] B. Bauer. \"_Lit. Ztg._\" 8.22.\n\n  [175] \"_E. u. Z. B._,\" p. 89 ff.\n\n  [176] [_Einzigkeit_]\n\n  [177] [See note on p. 184.]\n\n  [178] [The words \"cot\" and \"dung\" are alike in German.]\n\n  [179] _E. g._, \"_Qu'est-ce que la Propri\u00e9t\u00e9?_\" p. 83.\n\n  [180] [_Einzige_]\n\n  [181] [A German idiom for \"take upon myself,\" \"assume.\"]\n\n  [182] [Apparently some benevolent scheme of the day; compare\n        note on p. 343.]\n\n  [183] In a registration bill for Ireland the government made\n        the proposal to let those be electors who pay \u00a35 sterling of\n        poor-rates. He who gives alms, therefore, acquires political\n        rights, or elsewhere becomes a swan-knight. [See p. 342.]\n\n  [184] Minister Stein used this expression about Count von Reisach,\n        when he cold-bloodedly left the latter at the mercy of the\n        Bavarian government because to him, as he said, \"a\n        government like Bavaria must be worth more than a simple\n        individual.\" Reisach had written against Montgelas at\n        Stein's bidding, and Stein later agreed to the giving up of\n        Reisach, which was demanded by Montgelas on account of this\n        very book. See Hinrichs, \"_Politische Vorlesungen_,\" I, 280.\n\n  [185] In colleges and universities, etc., poor men compete\n        with rich. But they are able to do so in most cases only\n        through scholarships, which--a significant point almost all\n        come down to us from a time when free competition was still\n        far from being a controlling principle. The principle of\n        competition founds no scholarship, but says, Help yourself,\n        _i. e._ provide yourself the means. What the State gives for\n        such purposes it pays out from interested motives, to\n        educate \"servants\" for itself.\n\n  [186] [_preisgeben_]\n\n  [187] [_Preis_]\n\n  [188] [_Preis_]\n\n  [189] [_Geld_]\n\n  [190] [_gelten_]\n\n  [191] [Equivalent in ordinary German use to our \"possessed\n        of a competence.\"]\n\n  [192] [_Einzige_]\n\n  [193] [Literally, \"given.\"]\n\n  [194] [A German phrase for sharpers.]\n\n  [195] [Literally, \"unhomely.\"]\n\n  [196] II, p. 91 ff. (See my note above.)\n\n  [197] Athanasius.\n\n  [198] [_Wesen_]\n\n  [199] [_Wesen_]\n\n  [200] Feuerbach, \"Essence of Chr.,\" 394.\n\n  [201] [_gebrauche_]\n\n  [202] [_brauche_]\n\n  [203] [_Verein_]\n\n  [204] [_Vereinigung_]\n\n  [205] [_Muthlosigkeit_]\n\n  [206] [_Demuth_]\n\n  [207] [_Muth_]\n\n  [208] [Literally, \"love-services.\"]\n\n  [209] [Literally, \"own-benefit.\"]\n\n  [210] [Literally, furnishes me with a _right_.]\n\n  [211] [_Empoerung_]\n\n  [212] [_sich auf-oder emporzurichten_]\n\n  [213] To secure myself against a criminal charge I superfluously\n        make the express remark that I choose the word \"insurrection\"\n        on account of its _etymological sense_, and therefore am not\n        using it in the limited sense which is disallowed by the\n        penal code.\n\n  [214] 1 Cor. 15. 26.\n\n  [215] 2 Tim. 1. 10.\n\n  [216] [See the next to the last scene of the tragedy:\n\n        ODOARDO. Under the pretext of a judicial investigation he\n        tears you out of our arms and takes you to Grimaldi....\n\n        EMILIA. Give me that dagger, father, me!...\n\n        ODOARDO. No, no! Reflect--You too have only one life to\n        lose.\n\n        EMILIA. And only one innocence!\n\n        ODOARDO. Which is above the reach of any violence.--\n\n        EMILIA. But not above the reach of any seduction.--Violence!\n        violence! who cannot defy violence? What is called violence\n        is nothing; seduction is the true violence.--I have blood,\n        father; blood as youthful and warm as anybody's. My senses\n        are senses.--I can warrant nothing. I am sure of nothing. I\n        know Grimaldi's house. It is the house of pleasure. An hour\n        there, under my mother's eyes--and there arose in my soul so\n        much tumult as the strictest exercises of religion could\n        hardly quiet in weeks.--Religion! And what religion?--To\n        escape nothing worse, thousands sprang into the water and\n        are saints.--Give me that dagger, father, give it to me....\n\n        EMILIA. Once indeed there was a father who, to save his\n        daughter from shame, drove into her heart whatever steel he\n        could quickest find--gave life to her for the second time.\n        But all such deeds are of the past! Of such fathers there\n        are no more!\n\n        ODOARDO. Yes, daughter, yes! (_Stabs her._)\n\n  [217] [Or, \"_regulate_\" (_richten_)]\n\n  [218] [_richten_]\n\n  [219] \"_Der Kommunismus in der Schweiz_,\" p. 24.\n\n  [220] _Ibid._ p. 63.\n\n  [221] [Cf. note p. 81.]\n\n  [222] [_Geistigkeit_]\n\n  [223] [_Geistlichkeit_]\n\n  [224] Rom. 1. 25.\n\n  [225] [_das Meinige_]\n\n  [226] [_die_--\"_Meinung_\"]\n\n  [227] P. 47 ff.\n\n  [228] Chamber of peers, Apr. 25, 1844.\n\n  [229] \"_Anecdota_,\" 1. 120.\n\n  [230] \"_Anecdota_,\" 1. 127.\n\n  [231] [_vernehmbar_]\n\n  [232] [_Vernunft_]\n\n  [233] [Literally \"thought-rid.\"]\n\n  [234] [_Sache_]\n\n  [235] [_Sache_]\n\n  [236] 1 Thess. 5. 21.\n\n  [237] [_Andacht_, a compound form of the word \"thought.\"]\n\n  [238] [See note on p. 112.]\n\n  [239] [_Einzige_]\n\n  [240] [_eigen_]\n\n  [241] [_geeignet_]\n\n  [242] [_Stell' Ich auf Mich meine Sache._ Literally, \"if I set\n        my affair on myself.\"]\n\n  [243] [\"_Ich hab' Mein' Sach' auf Nichts gestellt._\" Literally,\n        \"I have set my affair on nothing.\" See note on p. 3.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\n\n  Send for\n\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER'S\n  Unique Catalogue of\n  Advanced Literature\n\n  THE LITERATURE\n  THAT MAKES FOR\n\n  EGOISM IN PHILOSOPHY\n  ANARCHISM IN POLITICS\n  ICONOCLASM IN ART\n\n128 pages, representing more than 400 authors and listing nearly 1,000\ntitles, besides being enriched by about 600 pithy and epigrammatic\nquotations, of an Anarchistic and Egoistic character, from some of the\nworks catalogued.\n\nBenj. R. Tucker carries the most complete line of advanced literature in\nthe English language offered for sale at any one place in the entire\nworld.\n\nAll books listed in his catalogue are carried constantly in stock, and\nmay be seen at\n\n  Benj. R. Tucker's Bookstore\n  225 Fourth Avenue, Room 13\n  NEW YORK CITY\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  LIBERTY\n\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER, _Editor_\n\nAn Anarchistic journal, expounding the doctrine that in Equal Liberty is\nto be found the most satisfactory solution of social questions, and that\nmajority rule, or democracy, equally with monarchical rule, is a denial\nof Equal Liberty.\n\n    _APPRECIATIONS_\n\n    G. BERNARD SHAW, _author of_ \"_Man and Superman_\":\n    \"Liberty is a lively paper, in which the usual proportions of a\n    half-pennyworth of discussion to an intolerable deal of\n    balderdash are reversed.\"\n\n    ERNEST H. CROSBY, _author of_ \"_Captain Jinks, Hero_\":\n    \"In these days of running after false gods, it is refreshing to\n    find one American remaining unflinchingly true to Liberty, and\n    using in her defence not his emotions, but a peculiarly keen and\n    vigorous intellect and style.\"\n\n    JOHN COTTON DANA, _Librarian of the Free Public Library, Newark,\n    N.J._:\n    \"Liberty is good for your intellectuals, being full of plain,\n    hard thinking.\"\n\n    HENRY BOOL, _merchant_, _manufacturer_, _farmer_, _dairyman_,\n    _and florist_, _Ithaca, N. Y._:\n    \"Pursuing its policy of equal liberty with consummate ability\n    and unswerving purpose, Liberty is the unrivaled exponent of\n    Absolute Free Trade.\"\n\n    SAMUEL W. COOPER, _counsellor at law, Philadelphia_:\n    \"Liberty is a journal that Thomas Jefferson would have loved.\"\n\n    EDWARD OSGOOD BROWN, _Judge of the Illinois Circuit Court_:\n    \"I have seen much in Liberty that I agreed with, and much that I\n    disagreed with, but I never saw any cant, hypocrisy, or\n    insincerity in it, which makes it an almost unique publication.\"\n\n  _Published Bimonthly. Twelve Issues, $1.00_\n  _Single Copies, 10 Cents_\n\n  ADDRESS:\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER, P. O. Box 1312, NEW YORK CITY\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  MODERN MARRIAGE\n  BY\n  Emile Zola\n\n  TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER\n\nIn this story Zola takes four typical marriages,--one from the nobility,\none from the _bourgeoisie_, one from the _petite bourgeoisie_, and one\nfrom the working people,--and describes, with all the power of his\nwondrous art, how each originates, by what motive each is inspired, how\neach is consummated, and how each results.\n\nA new edition from new plates, and at a reduced price.\n\n  _Price, 10 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  CARLOTTA CORTINA\n  BY\n  FRANCIS DU BOSQUE\n\nA very remarkable story of New York's Italian quarter,--in fact, one of\nthe best short stories ever written in America.\n\n  _Price, 10 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  Here's Luck to Lora\n  AND\n  OTHER POEMS\n\n  BY\n  WILLIAM WALSTEIN GORDAK\n\nMr. Gordak comes entirely unannounced, but his verse speaks well for\nhim. He is a natural poet who writes evenly and melodiously of the\nbeauties of nature and the daintier side of love. Nothing in his little\nbook is cheap. His muse has a lofty flight, and his teachings\nuplift.--_Oregonian_, Portland, Ore.\n\n  _PRICE, ONE DOLLAR_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  The Anarchists\n\n  A Picture of Civilization at the Close\n  of the Nineteenth Century\n\n  BY\n  JOHN HENRY MACKAY\n\n  _Translated from the German by_\n  GEORGE SCHUMM\n\n    PRESS COMMENTS\n\n    _New York Morning Journal._--\"'The Anarchists' is one of the\n    very few books that have a right to live. For insight into life\n    and manners, for dramatic strength, for incisiveness of phrase,\n    and for cold, pitiless logic, no book of this generation equals\n    it.\"\n\n    _St. Louis Republic._--\"The book is a prose poem.\"\n\n  _Cloth, One Dollar; Paper, Fifty cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  JOSIAH WARREN\n  The First American Anarchist\n\n  A Biography, with portrait\n\n  BY\n  WILLIAM BAILIE\n\nThe biography is preceded by an essay on \"The Anarchist Spirit,\" in\nwhich Mr. Bailie defines Anarchist belief in relation to other social\nforces.\n\n  _Price, One Dollar_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  The Philosophy of Egoism\n\n  BY\n  JAMES L. WALKER\n\n  (Tak Kak)\n\n    My nose I've used for smelling, and I've blown it:\n    But how to prove the RIGHT by which I own it?\n                                   SCHILLER, _freely translated_\n\n    \"No more concise exposition of the philosophy of Egoism has ever\n    been given to the world. In this book Duty, Conscience,\n    Moralism, Right, and all the fetiches and superstitions which\n    have infested the human intellect since man ceased to walk on\n    four feet, are annihilated, swept away, relegated to the rubbish\n    heap of the waste of human intelligence that has gone on through\n    the progress of the race from its infancy.\"--_Liberty._\n\n  _Cloth, 75 cents; Paper, 35 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  Slaves to Duty\n\n  BY\n  JOHN BADCOCK, JR.\n\nAssailing the morality superstition as the foundation of the various\nschemes for the exploitation of mankind. Max Stirner himself does not\nexpound the doctrine of Egoism in bolder fashion.\n\n  _Price, 5 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  State Socialism\n  AND\n  Anarchism\n\n  _How Far They Agree and Wherein They Differ_\n\n  BY\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER\n\nThe opening chapter of \"Instead of a Book,\" reprinted separately. The\nbest pamphlet with which to meet the demand for a compact exposition of\nAnarchism.\n\n  _Price, 5 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  The Attitude of Anarchism\n  TOWARD\n  Industrial Combinations\n\n  BY\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER\n\nAn address delivered in Central Music Hall, Chicago, on September 14,\n1899, before the Conference on Trusts held under the auspices of the\nCivic Federation.\n\n    _Chicago Chronicle._--\"The speech which roused the most intense\n    degree of enthusiasm and called forth the greatest applause at\n    yesterday's sessions of the trust conference fell in rounded\n    periods and with polished utterance from the lips of a professed\n    Anarchist.\"\n\n    _Prof. Edward W. Bemis in the New York Journal._--\"Benj. R.\n    Tucker, the famous Anarchist writer, gave the most brilliant\n    literary effort of the conference thus far.\"\n\n    _Prof. John R. Commons in the Chicago Tribune._--\"The most\n    brilliant piece of pure logic that has yet been heard. It\n    probably cannot be equaled. It was a marvel of audacity and\n    cogency. The prolonged applause which followed was a magnificent\n    tribute to pure intellect. That the undiluted doctrines of\n    Anarchism should so transport a great gathering of all classes\n    here in Chicago would not have been predicted.\"\n\n  _Price, 5 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  MUTUAL BANKING\n\n  BY\n  WILLIAM B. GREENE\n\nShowing the radical deficiency of the existing circulating medium, and\nthe advantages of a free currency; a plan whereby to abolish interest,\nnot by State intervention, but by first abolishing State intervention\nitself.\n\nA new edition, _from new plates_, of one of the most important works on\nfinance in the English language, and presenting, for the first time, a\nportrait of the author.\n\n  _Price, 10 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  _CHARLES A. DANA'S_\n  _PLEA FOR ANARCHY_\n\n  Proudhon\n  and\n  His \"Bank of the People\"\n\n  BY\n  CHARLES A. DANA\n\nA defence of the great French Anarchist; showing the evils of a specie\ncurrency, and that interest on capital can and ought to be abolished by\na system of free and mutual banking.\n\nThe series of newspaper articles composing this pamphlet appeared\noriginally in the New York \"Tribune,\" of which Mr. Dana was then\nmanaging editor, and a little later in \"The Spirit of the Age,\" a weekly\npaper published in New York in 1849 by Fowlers & Wells and edited by\nRev. William Henry Channing. Editor Channing accompanied the publication\nof the series by a foot-note, in which he stated that the articles had\nalready appeared in the \"Tribune,\" but that \"Mr. Dana, judging them\nworthy of being preserved in a form convenient for binding, has\nconsented to revise them for our paper.\"\n\n  _Price, 5 cents; in leatherette, 10 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  The Ballad of Reading Gaol\n\n  BY C. 3. 3\n  [OSCAR WILDE]\n\nA poem of more than 600 lines, dedicated to the memory of a trooper of\nthe Horse Guards who was hanged in Reading Gaol during the poet's\nconfinement there. An English classic.\n\n  _Cloth, One Dollar; Paper, Ten Cents_\n\nThe cloth edition has covers of blue and vellum, and is beautifully\nprinted from large type on hand-made antique deckle-edge paper. It is a\nsumptuous book of 96 pages, and should be in every library.\n\n    _PRESS COMMENTS_\n\n    _Albany Press._--\"Strong writing, almost too strong; it is\n    horrible, gruesome, uncanny, and yet most fascinating and\n    highly ethical.... One of the greatest poems of the century, a\n    permanent addition to English literature.... It is the best\n    Lenten and Easter sermon of the year.\"\n\n    _Brooklyn Citizen._--\"Many of the stanzas are cries out of the\n    lowest hell. The poem, indeed, takes rank with the most\n    extraordinary psychological phenomena of this or any time.\"\n\n    _Indianapolis Journal._--\"The work is one of singular power,\n    holding the reader fascinated to the last line. Nothing\n    approaching it in strength has been produced in recent years.\"\n\n    _Philadelphia Conservator._--\"People who imagine themselves\n    superior to the prisoners in jails should read this poem.\n    People who love invasive laws should read this poem. People who\n    think existing governmental methods of meeting social invasion\n    civilized should read this poem. People who do not know that\n    laws may make as well as punish crime should read this poem. In\n    fact, everybody should read this poem. For somewhere it touches\n    everybody, accuses everybody, appeals to everybody.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  God and the State\n\n  BY\n  MICHAEL BAKOUNINE\n\n  TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER\n\n    \"One of the most eloquent pleas for liberty ever written.\n    Paine's 'Age of Reason' and 'Rights of Man' consolidated and\n    improved. It stirs the pulse like a trumpet-call.\"--_The Truth\n    Seeker._\n\n  _Price, 15 Cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  Free Political Institutions\n  _Their Nature, Essence, and Maintenance_\n\n  AN ABRIDGMENT AND REARRANGEMENT OF\n  LYSANDER SPOONER'S \"TRIAL BY JURY\"\n\n  EDITED BY\n  VICTOR YARROS\n\n  _One of the most important works in the propaganda of Anarchism_\n\n    CHAPTERS\n\n    I.--Legitimate Government and Majority Rule. II.--Trial by Jury\n    as a Palladium of Liberty. III.--Trial by Jury as Defined by\n    Magna Carta. IV.--Objections Answered. V.--The Criminal Intent.\n    VI.--Moral Considerations for Jurors. VII.--Free Administration\n    of Justice. VIII.--Juries of the Present Day Illegal.\n\n  _Price, 15 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  A Blow at Trial by Jury\n\n  BY\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER\n\nAn examination of the special jury law passed by the New York\nlegislature in 1896. A speech delivered by the editor of Liberty at a\nmass meeting held in Cooper Union, New York, June 25, 1897, under the\nauspices of the Central Labor Union, Typographical Union No. 6, and\nother labor organizations. Distribution of this pamphlet among lawyers\nand legislators will tend indirectly to interest them in Anarchism.\n\n  _Price, 5 cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  Instead of a Book\n\n  BY A MAN TOO BUSY TO WRITE ONE\n\n  A FRAGMENTARY EXPOSITION OF\n  PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM\n\n  _Culled from the writings of_\n  BENJ. R. TUCKER\n  EDITOR OF LIBERTY\n\n  _With a Full-Page Half-Tone Portrait of the Author_\n\nA large, well-printed, and excessively cheap volume of 524 pages,\nconsisting of articles selected from Liberty and classified under the\nfollowing headings: (1) State Socialism and Anarchism: How Far They\nAgree, and Wherein They Differ; (2) The Individual, Society, and the\nState; (3) Money and Interest; (4) Land and Rent; (5) Socialism; (6)\nCommunism; (7) Methods; (8) Miscellaneous. The whole elaborately\nindexed.\n\n  _Cloth, One Dollar; Paper, Fifty cents_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMAILED, POST-PAID, BY\n\nBENJ. R. TUCKER, P. O. Box 1312, NEW YORK CITY\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:\n\n\n1. Passages in italics are surrounded by _underscores_.\n\n2. The original text includes Greek characters. For this text version\nthese letters have been replaced with transliterations.\n\n3. Certain words use oe ligature in the original text.\n\n4. The following misprints have been corrected:\n    \"p.\" corrected to \"p. 7,\" (page 96)\n    \"aristotocratic\" corrected to \"aristocratic\" (page 143)\n    \"woful\" corrected to \"woeful\" (page 222)\n    \"peoplet\" corrected to \"people\" (page 277)\n    \"heiling\" corrected to \"heilig\" (footnote 20)\n\n5. Other than the corrections listed above, printer's inconsistencies\nin spelling, punctuation, hyphenation, and ligature usage have been\nretained.","title":"The Ego and His Own","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":147123}