{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_34649/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_34649","id":"gutenberg_34649","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/34649","summary":null,"tags":["Anarchism","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Individualism","State, The"],"text":"Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Keith Edkins and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\nFreedom Pamphlet.\n\nPRICE ONE PENNY.\n\nTHE RIGHT TO IGNORE THE STATE.\n\nBY\n\nHERBERT SPENCER.\n\n(_Reprinted from \"Social Statics,\" 1850 Edition._)\n\nLONDON.\n\nFREEDOM PRESS, 127 OSSULSTON STREET, N. W.\n\n1913.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n[It is only fair to the memory of Mr. Herbert Spencer that we should warn\nthe reader of the following chapter from the original edition of Mr.\nSpencer's \"Social Statics,\" written in 1850, that it was omitted by the\nauthor from the revised edition, published in 1892. We may legitimately\ninfer that this omission indicates a change of view. But to repudiate is\nnot to answer, and Mr. Spencer never answered his arguments for the right\nto ignore the State. It is the belief of the Anarchists that these\narguments are unanswerable.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nThe Right to Ignore the State.\n\ns. 1. As a corollary to the proposition that all institutions must be\nsubordinated to the law of equal freedom, we cannot choose but admit the\nright of the citizen to adopt a condition of voluntary outlawry. If every\nman has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the\nequal freedom of any other man, then he is free to drop connection with the\nState,--to relinquish its protection and to refuse paying towards its\nsupport. It is self-evident that in so behaving he in no way trenches upon\nthe liberty of others; for his position is a passive one, and, whilst\npassive, he cannot become an aggressor. It is equally self-evident that he\ncannot be compelled to continue one of a political corporation without a\nbreach of the moral law, seeing that citizenship involves payment of taxes;\nand the taking away of a man's property against his will is an infringement\nof his rights. Government being simply an agent employed in common by a\nnumber of individuals to secure to them certain advantages, the very nature\nof the connection implies that it is for each to say whether he will employ\nsuch an agent or not. If any one of them determines to ignore this\nmutual-safety confederation, nothing can be said, except that he loses all\nclaim to its good offices, and exposes himself to the danger of\nmaltreatment,--a thing he is quite at liberty to do if he likes. He cannot\nbe coerced into political combination without a breach of the law of equal\nfreedom; he _can_ withdraw from it without committing any such breach; and\nhe has therefore a right so to withdraw.\n\ns. 2. \"No human laws are of any validity if contrary to the law of nature:\nand such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their\nauthority mediately or immediately from this original.\" Thus writes\nBlackstone, to whom let all honour be given for having so far outseen the\nideas of his time,--and, indeed, we may say of our time. A good antidote,\nthis, for those political superstitions which so widely prevail. A good\ncheck upon that sentiment of power-worship which still misleads us by\nmagnifying the prerogatives of constitutional governments as it once did\nthose of monarchs. Let men learn that a legislature is _not_ \"our God upon\nearth,\" though, by the authority they ascribe to it and the things they\nexpect from it, they would seem to think it is. Let them learn rather that\nit is an institution serving a purely temporary purpose, whose power, when\nnot stolen, is, at the best, borrowed.\n\nNay, indeed, have we not seen that government is essentially immoral? Is it\nnot the offspring of evil, bearing about it all the marks of its parentage?\nDoes it not exist because crime exists? Is it not strong, or, as we say,\ndespotic, when crime is great? Is there not more liberty--that is, less\ngovernment--as crime diminishes? And must not government cease when crime\nceases, for very lack of objects on which to perform its function? Not only\ndoes magisterial power exist _because_ of evil, but it exists _by_ evil.\nViolence is employed to maintain it; and all violence involves criminality.\nSoldiers, policemen, and gaolers; swords, batons, and fetters,--are\ninstruments for inflicting pain; and all infliction of pain is, in the\nabstract, wrong. The State employs evil weapons to subjugate evil, and is\nalike contaminated by the objects with which it deals and the means by\nwhich it works. Morality cannot recognise it; for morality, being simply a\nstatement of the perfect law, can give no countenance to anything growing\nout of, and living by, breaches of that law. Wherefore legislative\nauthority can never be ethical--must always be conventional merely.\n\nHence there is a certain inconsistency in the attempt to determine the\nright position, structure, and conduct of a government by appeal to the\nfirst principles of rectitude. For, as just pointed out, the acts of an\ninstitution which is, in both nature and origin, imperfect cannot be made\nto square with the perfect law. All that we can do is to ascertain,\nfirstly, in what attitude a legislature must stand to the community to\navoid being by its mere existence an embodied wrong; secondly, in what\nmanner it must be constituted so as to exhibit the least incongruity with\nthe moral law; and, thirdly, to what sphere its actions must be limited to\nprevent it from multiplying those breaches of equity it is set up to\nprevent.\n\nThe first condition to be conformed to before a legislature can be\nestablished without violating the law of equal freedom is the\nacknowledgment of the right now under discussion--the right to ignore the\nState.\n\ns. 3. Upholders of pure despotism may fitly believe State-control to be\nunlimited and unconditional. They who assert that men are made for\ngovernments and not governments for men may consistently hold that no one\ncan remove himself beyond the pale of political organisation. But they who\nmaintain that the people are the only legitimate source of power--that\nlegislative authority is not original, but deputed--cannot deny the right\nto ignore the State without entangling themselves in an absurdity.\n\nFor, if legislative authority is deputed, it follows that those from whom\nit proceeds are the masters of those on whom it is conferred: it follows\nfurther that as masters they confer the said authority voluntarily: and\nthis implies that they may give or withhold it as they please. To call that\ndeputed which is wrenched from men whether they will or not is nonsense.\nBut what is here true of all collectively is equally true of each\nseparately. As a government can rightly act for the people only when\nempowered by them, so also can it rightly act for the individual only when\nempowered by him. If A, B, and C debate whether they shall employ an agent\nto perform for them a certain service, and if, whilst A and B agree to do\nso, C dissents, C cannot equitably be made a party to the agreement in\nspite of himself. And this must be equally true of thirty as of three: and,\nif of thirty, why not of three hundred, or three thousand, or three\nmillions?\n\ns. 4. Of the political superstitions lately alluded to, none is so\nuniversally diffused as the notion that majorities are omnipotent. Under\nthe impression that the preservation of order will ever require power to be\nwielded by some party, the moral sense of our time feels that such power\ncannot rightly be conferred on any but the largest moiety of society. It\ninterprets literally the saying that \"the voice of the people is the voice\nof God,\" and, transferring to the one the sacredness attached to the other,\nit concludes that from the will of the people--that is, of the\nmajority--there can be no appeal. Yet is this belief entirely erroneous.\n\n\n\nSuppose, for the sake of argument, that, struck by some Malthusian panic, a\nlegislature duly representing public opinion were to enact that all\nchildren born during the next ten years should be drowned. Does any one\nthink such an enactment would be warrantable? If not, there is evidently a\nlimit to the power of a majority. Suppose, again, that of two races living\ntogether--Celts and Saxons, for example--the most numerous determined to\nmake the others their slaves. Would the authority of the greatest number be\nin such case valid? If not, there is something to which its authority must\nbe subordinate. Suppose, once more, that all men having incomes under L50 a\nyear were to resolve upon reducing every income above that amount to their\nown standard, and appropriating the excess for public purposes. Could their\nresolution be justified? If not, it must be a third time confessed that\nthere is a law to which the popular voice must defer. What, then, is that\nlaw, if not the law of pure equity--the law of equal freedom? These\nrestraints, which all would put to the will of the majority, are exactly\nthe restraints set up by that law. We deny the right of a majority to\nmurder, to enslave, or to rob, simply because murder, enslaving, and\nrobbery are violations of that law--violations too gross to be overlooked.\nBut, if great violations of it are wrong, so also are smaller ones. If the\nwill of the many cannot supersede the first principle of morality in these\ncases, neither can it in any. So that, however insignificant the minority,\nand however trifling the proposed trespass against their rights, no such\ntrespass is permissible.\n\nWhen we have made our constitution purely democratic, thinks to himself the\nearnest reformer, we shall have brought government into harmony with\nabsolute justice. Such a faith, though perhaps needful for the age, is a\nvery erroneous one. By no process can coercion be made equitable. The\nfreest form of government is only the least objectionable form. The rule of\nthe many by the few we call tyranny: the rule of the few by the many is\ntyranny also, only of a less intense kind. \"You shall do as we will, and\nnot as you will,\" is in either case the declaration; and, if the hundred\nmake it to ninety-nine, instead of the ninety-nine to the hundred, it is\nonly a fraction less immoral. Of two such parties, whichever fulfils this\ndeclaration necessarily breaks the law of equal freedom: the only\ndifference being that by the one it is broken in the persons of\nninety-nine, whilst by the other it is broken in the persons of a hundred.\nAnd the merit of the democratic form of government consists solely in\nthis,--that it trespasses against the smallest number.\n\nThe very existence of majorities and minorities is indicative of an immoral\nstate. The man whose character harmonises with the moral law, we found to\nbe one who can obtain complete happiness without diminishing the happiness\nof his fellows. But the enactment of public arrangements by vote implies a\nsociety consisting of men otherwise constituted--implies that the desires\nof some cannot be satisfied without sacrificing the desires of\nothers--implies that in the pursuit of their happiness the majority inflict\na certain amount of _un_happiness on the minority--implies, therefore,\norganic immorality. Thus, from another point of view, we again perceive\nthat even in its most equitable form it is impossible for government to\ndissociate itself from evil; and further, that, unless the right to ignore\nthe State is recognised, its acts must be essentially criminal.\n\ns. 5. That a man is free to abandon the benefits and throw off the burdens\nof citizenship, may indeed be inferred from the admissions of existing\nauthorities and of current opinion. Unprepared as they probably are for so\nextreme a doctrine as the one here maintained, the Radicals of our day yet\nunwittingly profess their belief in a maxim which obviously embodies this\ndoctrine. Do we not continually hear them quote Blackstone's assertion that\n\"no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes even for\nthe defence of the realm or the support of government, but such as are\nimposed by his own consent, or that of his representative in Parliament\"?\nAnd what does this mean? It means, say they, that every man should have a\nvote. True: but it means much more. If there is any sense in words, it is a\ndistinct enunciation of the very right now contended for. In affirming that\na man may not be taxed unless he has directly or indirectly given his\nconsent, it affirms that he may refuse to be so taxed; and to refuse to be\ntaxed is to cut all connection with the State. Perhaps it will be said that\nthis consent is not a specific, but a general, one, and that the citizen is\nunderstood to have assented to every thing his representative may do, when\nhe voted for him. But suppose he did not vote for him; and on the contrary\ndid all in his power to get elected some one holding opposite views--what\nthen? The reply will probably be that by taking part in such an election,\nhe tacitly agreed to abide by the decision of the majority. And how if he\ndid not vote at all? Why then he cannot justly complain of any tax, seeing\nthat he made no protest against its imposition. So, curiously enough, it\nseems that he gave his consent in whatever way he acted--whether he said\n\"Yes,\" whether he said \"No,\" or whether he remained neuter! A rather\nawkward doctrine, this. Here stands an unfortunate citizen who is asked if\nhe will pay money for a certain proffered advantage; and, whether he\nemploys the only means of expressing his refusal or does not employ it, we\nare told that he practically agrees, if only the number of others who agree\nis greater than the number of those who dissent. And thus we are introduced\nto the novel principle that A's consent to a thing is not determined by\nwhat A says, but by what B may happen to say!\n\nIt is for those who quote Blackstone to choose between this absurdity and\nthe doctrine above set forth. Either his maxim implies the right to ignore\nthe State, or it is sheer nonsense.\n\ns. 6. There is a strange heterogeneity in our political faiths. Systems\nthat have had their day, and are beginning here and there to let the\ndaylight through, are patched with modern notions utterly unlike in quality\nand colour; and men gravely display these systems, wear them, and walk\nabout in them, quite unconscious of their grotesqueness. This transition\nstate of ours, partaking as it does equally of the past and the future,\nbreeds hybrid theories exhibiting the oddest union of bygone despotism and\ncoming freedom. Here are types of the old organisation curiously disguised\nby germs of the new--peculiarities showing adaptation to a preceding state\nmodified by rudiments that prophesy of something to come--making altogether\nso chaotic a mixture of relationships that there is no saying to what class\nthese births of the age should be referred.\n\nAs ideas must of necessity bear the stamp of the time, it is useless to\nlament the contentment with which these incongruous beliefs are held.\nOtherwise it would seem unfortunate that men do not pursue to the end the\ntrains of reasoning which have led to these partial modifications. In the\npresent case, for example, consistency would force them to admit that, on\nother points besides the one just noticed, they hold opinions and use\narguments in which the right to ignore the State is involved.\n\nFor what is the meaning of Dissent? The time was when a man's faith and his\nmode of worship were as much determinable by law as his secular acts; and,\naccording to provisions extant in our statute-book, are so still. Thanks to\nthe growth of a Protestant spirit, however, we have ignored the State in\nthis matter--wholly in theory, and partly in practice. But how have we done\nso? By assuming an attitude which, if consistently maintained, implies a\nright to ignore the State entirely. Observe the positions of the two\nparties. \"This is your creed,\" says the legislator; \"you must believe and\nopenly profess what is here set down for you.\" \"I shall not do anything of\nthe kind,\" answers the Nonconformist; \"I will go to prison rather.\" \"Your\nreligious ordinances,\" pursues the legislator, \"shall be such as we have\nprescribed. You shall attend the churches we have endowed, and adopt the\nceremonies used in them.\" \"Nothing shall induce me to do so,\" is the reply;\n\"I altogether deny your power to dictate to me in such matters, and mean to\nresist to the uttermost.\" \"Lastly,\" adds the legislator, \"we shall require\nyou to pay such sums of money toward the support of these religious\ninstitutions as we may see fit to ask.\" \"Not a farthing will you have from\nme,\" exclaims our sturdy Independent; \"even did I believe in the doctrines\nof your church (which I do not), I should still rebel against your\ninterference; and, if you take my property, it shall be by force and under\nprotest.\"\n\nWhat now does this proceeding amount to when regarded in the abstract? It\namounts to an assertion by the individual of the right to exercise one of\nhis faculties--the religious sentiment--without let or hindrance, and with\nno limit save that set up by the equal claims of others. And what is meant\nby ignoring the State? Simply an assertion of the right similarly to\nexercise _all_ the faculties. The one is just an expansion of the\nother--rests on the same footing with the other--must stand or fall with\nthe other. Men do indeed speak of civil and religious liberty as different\nthings: but the distinction is quite arbitrary. They are parts of the same\nwhole, and cannot philosophically be separated.\n\n\"Yes they can,\" interposes an objector; \"assertion of the one is imperative\nas being a religious duty. The liberty to worship God in the way that seems\nto him right, is a liberty without which a man cannot fulfil what he\nbelieves to be divine commands, and therefore conscience requires him to\nmaintain it.\" True enough; but how if the same can be asserted of all other\nliberty? How if maintenance of this also turns out to be a matter of\nconscience? Have we not seen that human happiness is the divine will--that\nonly by exercising our faculties is this happiness obtainable--and that it\nis impossible to exercise them without freedom? And, if this freedom for\nthe exercise of faculties is a condition without which the divine will\ncannot be fulfilled, the preservation of it is, by our objector's own\nshowing, a duty. Or, in other words, it appears not only that the\nmaintenance of liberty of action _may_ be a point of conscience, but that\nit _ought_ to be one. And thus we are clearly shown that the claims to\nignore the State in religious and in secular matters are in essence\nidentical.\n\nThe other reason commonly assigned for nonconformity admits of similar\ntreatment. Besides resisting State dictation in the abstract, the Dissenter\nresists it from disapprobation of the doctrines taught. No legislative\ninjunction will make him adopt what he considers an erroneous belief; and,\nbearing in mind his duty toward his fellow-men, he refuses to help through\nthe medium of his purse in disseminating this erroneous belief. The\nposition is perfectly intelligible. But it is one which either commits its\nadherents to civil nonconformity also, or leaves them in a dilemma. For why\ndo they refuse to be instrumental in spreading error? Because error is\nadverse to human happiness. And on what ground is any piece of secular\nlegislation disapproved? For the same reason--because thought adverse to\nhuman happiness. How then can it be shown that the State ought to be\nresisted in the one case and not in the other? Will any one deliberately\nassert that, if a government demands money from us to aid in _teaching_\nwhat we think will produce evil, we ought to refuse it, but that, if the\nmoney is for the purpose of _doing_ what we think will produce evil, we\nought not to refuse it? Yet such is the hopeful proposition which those\nhave to maintain who recognise the right to ignore the State in religious\nmatters, but deny it in civil matters.\n\ns. 7. The substance of this chapter once more reminds us of the incongruity\nbetween a perfect law and an imperfect State. The practicability of the\nprinciple here laid down varies directly as social morality. In a\nthoroughly vicious community its admission would be productive of\nanarchy.[1] In a completely virtuous one its admission will be both\ninnocuous and inevitable. Progress toward a condition of social health--a\ncondition, that is, in which the remedial measures of legislation will no\nlonger be needed--is progress toward a condition in which those remedial\nmeasures will be cast aside, and the authority prescribing them\ndisregarded. The two changes are of necessity co-ordinate. That moral sense\nwhose supremacy will make society harmonious and government unnecessary is\nthe same moral sense which will then make each man assert his freedom even\nto the extent of ignoring the State--is the same moral sense which, by\ndeterring the majority from coercing the minority, will eventually render\ngovernment impossible. And, as what are merely different manifestations of\nthe same sentiment must bear a constant ratio to each other, the tendency\nto repudiate governments will increase only at the same rate that\ngovernments become needless.\n\nLet not any be alarmed, therefore, at the promulgation of the foregoing\ndoctrine. There are many changes yet to be passed through before it can\nbegin to exercise much influence. Probably a long time will elapse before\nthe right to ignore the State will be generally admitted, even in theory.\nIt will be still longer before it receives legislative recognition. And\neven then there will be plenty of checks upon the premature exercise of it.\nA sharp experience will sufficiently instruct those who may too soon\nabandon legal protection. Whilst, in the majority of men, there is such a\nlove of tried arrangements, and so great a dread of experiments, that they\nwill probably not act upon this right until long after it is safe to do so.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nAnarchist Communism.[2]\n\nITS AIMS AND PRINCIPLES.\n\nAnarchism may be briefly defined as the negation of all government and all\nauthority of man over man; Communism as the recognition of the just claim\nof each to the fullest satisfaction of all his needs--physical, moral, and\nintellectual. The Anarchist, therefore, whilst resisting as far as possible\nall forms of coercion and authority, repudiates just as firmly even the\nsuggestion that he should impose himself upon others, realising as he does\nthat this fatal propensity in the majority of mankind has been the cause of\nnearly all the misery and bloodshed in the world. He understands just as\nclearly that to satisfy his needs without contributing, to the best of his\nability, his share of labour in maintaining the general well-being, would\nbe to live at the expense of others--to become an exploiter and live as the\nrich drones live to-day. Obviously, then, government on the one hand and\nprivate ownership of the means of production on the other, complete the\nvicious circle--the present social system--which keeps mankind degraded and\nenslaved.\n\nThere will be no need to justify the Anarchist's attack upon _all_ forms of\ngovernment: history teaches the lesson he has learned on every page. But\nthat lesson being concealed from the mass of the people by interested\nadvocates of \"law and order,\" and even by many Social Democrats, the\nAnarchist deals his hardest blows at the sophisms that uphold the State,\nand urges workers in striving for their emancipation to confine their\nefforts to the economic field.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that politically and economically his attitude is\npurely revolutionary; and hence arises the vilification and\nmisrepresentation that Anarchism, which denounces all forms of social\ninjustice, meets with in the press and from public speakers.\n\nRightly conceived, Anarchism is no mere abstract ideal theory of human\nsociety. It views life and social relations with eyes disillusioned. Making\nan end of all superstitions, prejudices, and false sentiments, it tries to\nsee things as they really are; and without building castles in the air, it\nfinds by the simple correlation of established facts that the grandest\npossibilities of a full and free life can be placed within the reach of\nall, once that monstrous bulwark of all our social iniquities--the\nState--has been destroyed, and common property declared.\n\nBy education, by free organisation, by individual and associated resistance\nto political and economic tyranny, the Anarchist hopes to achieve his aim.\nThe task may seem impossible to many, but it should be remembered that in\nscience, in literature, in art, the highest minds are with the Anarchists\nor are imbued with distinct Anarchist tendencies. Even our bitterest\nopponents admit the beauty of our \"dream,\" and reluctantly confess that it\nwould be well for humanity if it were \"possible.\" Anarchist Communist\npropaganda is the intelligent, organised, determined effort to realise the\n\"dream,\" and to ensure that freedom and well-being for all _shall_ be\npossible.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nModern Science and Anarchism.\n\nBy PETER KROPOTKIN.\n\nA New and Revised Translation, with three additional chapters, and a useful\nand interesting Glossary.\n\n112 pages; Paper Covers, 6d. net; also in Art Cambric, 1s. 6d. net.\nPostage, paper 1-1/2d., cloth 3d.\n\n    \"As a survey of modern science in relation to society ... this book\n    would be hard to beat.... The glossary of about 16 crowded pages is\n    alone worth the price of the volume.\"--_Maoriland Worker._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Conquest of Bread.\n\nBy PETER KROPOTKIN.\n\nA New and Cheaper Edition. Cloth, 1s. net; postage 2-1/2d.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nGod and the State.\n\nBy MICHAEL BAKUNIN.\n\n_A new edition, revised from the original Manuscript._\nWith a new Portrait.\n\nPaper cover, 6d. net; cloth, 1s. net. Postage 1d. and 2d.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLIBERTY AND THE GREAT LIBERTARIANS.\n\nAn Anthology on Liberty.\n\nEdited and Compiled, with Preface, Introduction, and Index, by\nCHARLES T. SPRADING.\n\n    Presenting quickly and succinctly the best utterances of the greatest\n    thinkers on every phase of human freedom. Many valuable quotations from\n    suppressed, ignored, and hitherto inaccessible sources.\n\nPrice 6s. 6d. net, postage 4d.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFREEDOM PRESS, 127 OSSULSTON STREET, LONDON, N.W.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n_Transcriber's note: on the image used for this edition, this page was\npartly obscured by binding tape. Unrealisable sections are marked ..._\n\nFREEDOM.\n\nA JOURNAL OF ANARCHIST COMMUNISM.\n\n(_Established 1886._)\n\n_Monthly, 1d. Annual Subscription, 1s. 6d. post free_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nPAMPHLET AND BOOK LIST.\n\n    ANARCHIST COMMUNISM. By PETER KROPOTKIN. 1d.\n\n    ANARCHISM. By PETER KROPOTKIN. 1d.\n\n    ANARCHIST MORALITY. By PETER KROPOTKIN. 1d.\n\n    THE WAGE SYSTEM. By PETER KROPOTKIN. 1d.\n\n    A TALK ABOUT ANARCHIST COMMUNISM BETWEEN TWO WORKERS. By E. MALATESTA.\n    1d.\n\n    THE STATE: ITS HISTORIC ROLE. By PETER KROPOTKIN. ...\n\n    EXPROPRIATION. By PETER KROPOTKIN. 1d.\n\n    LAW AND AUTHORITY. By PETER KROPOTKIN. 2d.\n\n    THE PYRAMID OF TYRANNY. By D. NIEUWENHUIS. ...\n\n    THE PLACE OF ANARCHISM IN SOCIALISTIC EVOLUTION. By PETER KROPOTKIN.\n    1d.\n\n    AN APPEAL TO THE YOUNG. By PETER KROPOTKIN ...\n\n    THE COMMUNE OF PARIS. By PETER KROPOTKIN ...\n\n    EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION. BY ELISEE RECLUS ...\n\n    THE SOCIAL GENERAL STRIKE. By A. ROLLER ...\n\n    THE CHICAGO MARTYRS. With Portraits. 1d.\n\n    DIRECT ACTION _v._ LEGISLATION. By J. BLAIR SMITH. ...\n\n    WARS AND CAPITALISM. By P. KROPOTKIN. 1d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n    THE GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789-1793 By PETER KROPOTKIN. 6s. net;\n    postage 4d.\n\n    MUTUAL AID. By PETER KROPOTKIN. 3s. 6d. postage ...\n\n    FIELDS, FACTORIES, AND WORKSHOPS. By PETER KROPOTKIN. Cloth, 1s. net,\n    postage 3d.\n\n    ANARCHISM. By Dr. PAUL ELTZBACHER. With ... 6s. 6d. net, postage 4d.\n\n    NEWS FROM NOWHERE. By WM. MORRIS. Cloth ... paper 1s.; postage 2d.\n\n    FAMOUS SPEECHES OF THE EIGHT CHICAGO ANARCHISTS. 1s. 3d., postage 2d.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOrders, with cash (postage 1/2d. each pamphlet), to FREEDOM PRESS, 127\nOSSULSTON STREET, LONDON, N.W.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nNotes\n\n[1] Mr. Spencer here uses the word \"anarchy\" in the sense of disorder.\n\n[2] It would be only fair to state that the Individualist school of\nAnarchism, which includes many eminent writers and thinkers, differs from\nus mainly on the question of Communism--_i.e._, on the holding of property,\nthe remuneration of labour, etc. Anarchism, however, affords the\nopportunity for experiment in all these matters, and in that sense there is\nno dispute between us.","title":"The Right to Ignore the State","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":4794}