{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_34656/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_34656","id":"gutenberg_34656","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/34656","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Evolution"],"text":"\n\n\n\nProduced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Christine Aldridge\nand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttps://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\nThis text uses UTF-8 (unicode) file encoding. If the apostrophes\nand quotation marks in this paragraph appear as garbage, you may\nhave an incompatible browser or unavailable fonts. First, make sure\nthat your browser\u2019s \u201ccharacter set\u201d or \u201cfile encoding\u201d is set to\nUnicode (UTF-8). You may also need to change the default font.\n\nPassages in italics are surrounded by _underscores_.\n \" \" bold are surrounded by =equal signs=.\n \" \" bold Gothic Fonts are surrounded by +plus signs+.\n\nThis volume contains the October 1901 Publisher's Catalogue, however\nthe catalogue is not listed in the regular Table of Contents. The\nCatalogue follows the final Chapter.\n\nOther Transcriber Notes appear at the end of this e-text.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CHURCHMAN'S LIBRARY\n EDITED BY J. H. BURN, B.D.\n\n\n\n\nEVOLUTION\n\n\n\n\n +------------------------------------------------------------------+\n | |\n | THE CHURCHMAN'S LIBRARY |\n | |\n | EDITED BY |\n | JOHN HENRY BURN, B.D. |\n | _Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Aberdeen._ |\n | |\n | THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH CHRISTIANITY. By W. E. COLLINS, |\n | M.A., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, King's |\n | College, London. Crown 8vo, _3s. 6d._ [_Ready._ |\n | |\n | THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS. By E. T. GREEN, M.A., |\n | Professor of Hebrew and Theology at St. David's College, |\n | Lampeter. |\n | |\n | THE CHURCHMAN'S PRIMER. By G. HARFORD-BATTERSBY, M.A. |\n | |\n | THE CHURCHMAN'S DAY BOOK. By J. H. BURN, B.D. |\n | |\n | THE ANGLICAN CHURCH IN THE COLONIES AND MISSION FIELD. By |\n | ALLAN B. WEBB, D.D., Assistant Bishop to the Bishop of |\n | Brechin. |\n | |\n | HISTORY OF THE PAPACY. By J. P. WHITNEY, M.A. |\n | |\n | OUR CONTROVERSY WITH ROME. By J. M. DANSON, D.D. |\n | |\n | THE WORKMANSHIP OF THE PRAYER BOOK. By JOHN DOWDEN, D.D., |\n | Bishop of Edinburgh. Crown 8vo, _3s. 6d._ [_Ready._ |\n | |\n | A POPULAR INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. By ANGUS M. |\n | MACKAY, B.A. |\n | |\n | A POPULAR INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. By J. H. |\n | SHEPHERD, M.A. |\n | |\n | THE HEBREW PROPHET. By L. W. BATTEN, Ph.D. |\n | |\n | AN INTRODUCTION TO TEXTUAL CRITICISM. By A. M. KNIGHT, |\n | M.A., Fellow and Dean of Gonville and Caius College, |\n | Camb. |\n | |\n | SOME OLD TESTAMENT PROBLEMS. By JOHN P. PETERS, D.D., |\n | D.Sc. |\n | |\n | SOME NEW TESTAMENT PROBLEMS. By ARTHUR WRIGHT, M.A., |\n | Fellow and Tutor of Queens' College, Cambridge. Crown |\n | 8vo, _6s._ [_Ready._ |\n | |\n | BIBLE REVISION. By J. J. S. PEROWNE, D.D., Bishop of |\n | Worcester. |\n | |\n | DEVOTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PAULINE EPISTLES. By JOHN GOTT, |\n | D.D., Bishop of Truro. |\n | |\n | PREACHING. By FREDERIC RELTON, A.K.C. |\n | |\n | ENGLISH HYMNS AND HYMN TUNES. By H. C. SHUTTLEWORTH, M.A., |\n | Professor of Pastoral and Liturgical Theology, King's |\n | College, London. |\n | |\n | THE WITNESS OF ARCH\u00c6OLOGY. By C. J. BALL, M.A., Chaplain |\n | of Lincoln's Inn. |\n | |\n | ENGLISH ECCLESIOLOGY. By J. N. COMPER. |\n | |\n | CONFIRMATION. By H. T. KINGDON, D.D., Bishop of |\n | Fredericton. |\n | |\n | INSPIRATION. By Canon BENHAM, D.D. |\n | |\n | MIRACLES. By THOMAS B. STRONG, B.D., Student of Christ |\n | Church, Oxford. |\n | |\n | PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER. By V. H. STANTON, D.D., Ely |\n | Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. |\n | |\n | EVOLUTION. By FRANK B. JEVONS, M.A., D.Litt., Principal of |\n | Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham. Crown 8vo, _3s. 6d._ |\n | |\n | THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN HERE AND HEREAFTER. By Canon |\n | WINTERBOTHAM, M.A., B.Sc., LL.B. Cr. 8vo, _3s. 6d._ |\n | [_Ready._ |\n | |\n | THE GREAT WORLD RELIGIONS FROM A CHRISTIAN STANDPOINT. By |\n | H. E. J. BEVAN, M.A., Gresham Professor of Divinity. |\n | |\n | COMPARATIVE RELIGION. By J. A. MACCULLOCK. |\n | |\n | ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. By W. DIGBY THURNAM. |\n | |\n +------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\n\n\n\nEVOLUTION\n\n\nBY\nFRANK B. JEVONS, M.A., D.LITT.\nPRINCIPAL OF BISHOP HATFIELD'S HALL, DURHAM\n\n\nMETHUEN & CO.\n36 ESSEX STREET, W.C.\nLONDON\n1900\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe object of this volume is to raise the question: if we accept the\nTheory of Evolution as true in science, how should it modify the thought\nand action of a man who wishes to do his best in this world? The\nquestion is necessary because we find that different and inconsistent\nconclusions on the point have been reached by men speaking in the name\nof science and speaking with authority. These differences are due not to\nanything in science, but to certain extra-scientific assumptions. To\ntest the worth of such assumptions is the work of philosophy; and this\nvolume is accordingly an essay in philosophy. Science is but organised\ncommon sense. Science and Religion both claim to deal with realities.\nThe realism of common sense, therefore, the form of philosophy to which\nboth seem to point, is that which is set forth here.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS\n\n PAGE\n\n I. OPTIMISM 1\n\n II. ILLUSION 14\n\n III. PESSIMISM 24\n\n IV. IDEALISM 38\n\n V. THE REAL 60\n\n VI. EVOLUTION AS THE REDISTRIBUTION OF MATTER AND MOTION 72\n\n VII. NECESSITY 100\n\n VIII. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 138\n\n IX. CONSEQUENCES 152\n\n X. THE CHESS-BOARD 163\n\n XI. THE COMMON FAITH OF MANKIND 184\n\n XII. PROGRESS 203\n\n XIII. EVOLUTION AS PURPOSE 238\n\n XIV. CONCLUSION 273\n\n\n APPENDIX. ON BISHOP BERKELEY'S IDEALISM 289\n\n INDEX 297\n\n\n\n\nEVOLUTION\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nOPTIMISM\n\n\nInnumerable writers at the end of the nineteenth century have reviewed\nthe changes which in the last fifty years have come over the civilised\nworld. The record indeed is admitted on all hands to be marvellous.\nSteam, electricity, machinery, and all the practical inventions of\napplied science have added enormously to the material wealth, comfort,\nand luxury of mankind. Intellectually, the bounds of pure science have\nbeen vastly enlarged; and the blessings of education have been extended\nto the poorest members of the community. Philanthropic and religious\nactivity manifests itself in a thousand different organisations. We are\nnever tired of repeating, that changes which in the first half of the\ncentury would have been pronounced impossible and incredible, at the end\nof the century are accomplished facts.\n\nBut amongst all these changes one is almost universally overlooked, and\nthat the most characteristic, the most remarkable, and the most\nimportant: the face of civilisation has come to be illumined by hope.\nGreat as is the progress of the last fifty years, we count it as nothing\ncompared with that which is in store for us. To the discoveries of\nscience it is felt that no bounds can be set; what a day may bring forth\nin the way of the extension of man's control over the forces of Nature,\nwhat secrets of Nature the chemist in his laboratory may light upon at\nany moment, no man can surmise, but everyone is confident that things\nwill be discovered as marvellous to us now as the telegraph and\ntelephone to our predecessors of the pre-scientific age. In the\ntreatment of political and social questions the same deep-seated\nconviction prevails that progress can and will be made: the conditions\nand causes of poverty can be ascertained by patient study, and when\nascertained can be dealt with. The laws of physical health and\ncleanliness have not refused to reveal themselves, nor are moral health\nand cleanliness without their laws. In fine, if the best energy of the\nage is everywhere devoted to the increase of knowledge, the advancement\nof morality, and the diffusion of comfort, it is because everywhere\nthere is hope. In the social as in the individual organism hope raises\nthe tide of life, increases vitality, and stimulates the system. Hence\nthis general discharge throughout the nervous system of society,\nmanifesting itself in the vigour and energy with which all schemes for\nimprovement are taken up and carried out. That discoveries will be made\nand progress effected is as certain as that gold is to be found in a\ngoldfield; the only practical question is, By whom? Who is to be the\nlucky man?\n\nTo us who have witnessed the advance which has given rise to this\nuniversal hope, the hope itself seems so reasonable and so justifiable\nthat we are apt to overlook the fact that it is without parallel in the\nhistory of mankind. Never, of course, has any generation of men imagined\nits own lot perfect; all have had their ideals, and all have believed\ntheir ideals to be true. But whereas we place the realisation of our\nideals in the future, all previous generations have placed it in the\npast: the Golden Age till now has always been regarded as the\nstarting-point of man's history, not its goal. All races have looked\nback with pride upon a heroic past; all mythologies tell of the better\nand brighter lot that was in the beginning man's; all poets sing of the\nbrave days of old; all fairy tales begin with \"once upon a time.\" The\nhistorians of Greece and Rome discovered no progress in the history of\ntheir countries, but only degeneration from the patriotism and\nsimplicity of earlier times, or at best a series of changes making its\nround like the circle of the year's seasons. The philosophers of Greece\nare mainly occupied, when they deal with sociological questions, with\nthe causes of corruption and decay of constitutions; and, if they frame\nideal constitutions, they intend them to be final; they do not imagine\nthem to have any possibility of growth. In modern times the same\ntendency has been equally manifest. Political revolutions have always\naimed, not at introducing a new, but at restoring an old state of\nthings: the actors in the French Revolution even dressed and posed as\nancient Greeks and Romans. In philosophy, civilisation, as being\nartificial, has been regarded as a degeneration from a \"natural\" state\nof man which was at once primitive and perfect.\n\nIn the individual, optimism may be dismissed as a mere mood, or as a\ntendency to cheerfulness not based on any rational estimate either of\nthe future or of the past. But when a whole generation of men, when,\nindeed, the whole civilised world, looks to the future, not with\ncareless levity, but with the calm assurance of confidence in the\nprogress that is and is to be, we cannot dismiss its optimism offhand.\nAstonishing as it is, that the world as it grows older should grow more\nhopeful, there are good reasons for the fact.\n\nThe child's estimates of distance, magnitude, and importance differ from\nthose of the adult. The estimates, however, persist in memory, and we\nhave all discovered, on revisiting familiar scenes of childhood, how\nexaggerated our childish estimates were when compared with the actual\nfacts. It is this exaggeration of memory, this illusion of the mind's\neye, that psychologically is the foundation of the tendency to idealise\nthe past. To us as children the exploits of our elders were marvellous\nin our eyes; and they remain as marvels in the memory, as marvels,\nhowever, which, as all marvels do, belong to the past. The past becomes\nthe wonderland in which were performed the great deeds, not only of our\nfathers' time, but of the old times before them. The past becomes the\npoet's treasury, from which he produces things new and old--the\nabiding-place of all things good and great and beautiful which are not,\nbut ought to be, and therefore once were.\n\nTo measure progress, as indeed to measure any movement and determine its\nrate and direction, some fixed points are necessary. As long, therefore,\nas there is no contemporaneous record of events, fixed in writing, there\nis no possibility of checking the _laudator temporis acti_ and of\nreducing the unconscious exaggerations of his memory to their due\nproportions. But even if there were, in the lowest stages of culture the\nrate of progress is too slow to be perceptible at the time. In the\nbeginning man is at the mercy of his environment: it is only when he has\nlearnt to modify it to his needs that progress begins to move. And by\nthe time that man has passed from savagery to barbarism, and has\nemerged from barbarism to civilisation, the conviction that the present\nand the actual are things of naught as compared with the ideal past, is\ntoo intimately inwrought with his religion, his mythology, his\nphilosophy, and the accepted history of his race and its heroic origin\nto allow him to see facts as they are, or to divine the true trend of\nhuman affairs. Further, there is a very practical reason for his looking\nwith suspicion and not with confidence on social changes. It is only as\nthe result of a long course of slow evolution that society has attained\nto a condition of fairly stable equilibrium. In the beginning society\nmay be compared to a man hanging on for bare life, with a precarious\nfoothold, to the face of a sheer cliff: when the least movement may\nprove fatal, all movement is dreaded. Thus the characteristic of all\nearly societies is that they are impeded by \"the cake of custom\" and\nrigid with the immobility of conservatism.\n\nTo those who hold that experience mechanically impresses itself upon the\nmind and so automatically expresses itself as truth, it must appear\nsomewhat strange that mankind should have advanced for thousands of\nyears without knowing that they had progressed; and still more strange\nthat it was not as an induction from experience, but on _a priori_\ngrounds that they arrived at the conclusion. Yet so it was. The mere\ncontemplation of the rise and fall of empires no more suggested the\npresence and persistence of a constant tendency to progress than the\nmountainous wave which threatens to engulf the ship suggests that the\nsea-level is a scientific truth. But when Darwin established his theory\nthat man was descended from the brute, all was clear: it became certain\n_a priori_ that the long history and \"pre-history\" of man must have been\none of progress and advance. When the descent of man was established,\nhis ascent came to be studied, and human evolution was seen to be\nsynonymous with progress. Savages were seen to be the nearest existing\nrepresentatives of primitive man, and there was an end to the idea that\nthe primitive state was perfection. The comparative method, once applied\nto the study of mankind, was able to set side by side examples of\nsavagery, barbarism, and civilisation, which illustrated every step in\nthe process of the evolution of society, and showed that, though the\nforms of society may fluctuate as do the waves of the sea, society\nitself is steady in its advance and progressive in its evolution. This\nconclusion, which at first was a deduction drawn from the animal descent\nof man, has now the independent support of an enormous amount of\nevidence. The existence of a Stone Age, pal\u00e6olithic and neolithic, of a\nBronze Age and an Iron Age, and the succession of those ages in the\norder named, are established facts of science. That the culture of nomad\npeoples is lower than that of pastoral tribes; that pastoral tribes\nadvance in culture when they become agricultural; that agriculture,\nimplying settled habits and fixed homes, leads to the foundation of\ncities and the formation of civic life; that the city-states of the\nancient world give way to the nation-states of modern times: are all\naccepted facts, bridging the apparent chasm between civilisation and\nsavagery, and demonstrating the action of the law of continuity in the\nevolution of society.\n\nBut, it will be observed, all these facts and arguments taken together\nonly prove what has been--not what will be. They show that from a level\nlittle higher than the brute man has attained to what he is; but is this\nenough to guarantee his continuous rise? In other words, have we reached\nthe real source of that universal hope which, as we have said, is\ncharacteristic of this stage of man's evolution? The bark of man's\ndestiny hitherto has been wafted by a favouring and a steady gale, and\nit is natural enough for the unreflecting to take it for granted that\nthe wind will always set from the same happy quarter. But the question\nwill obtrude itself whether we are justified in the presumption.\n\nIf man shaped his own course, we might at least say that there was no\nreason why he should not continue to steer in the same direction as\nhitherto. But the most remarkable lesson that sociology has to teach us\nis that the course which he has followed so continuously has not been\nof his own steering. As we have already seen, man until this present\ngeneration has uniformly kept his eyes fixed on the quarter from which,\nnot to which, he has imagined himself to be travelling, and, like a\nreluctant emigrant, has lamented the increasing distance between him and\nthe happy shore from which he sailed. Or, to change the metaphor,\nsociety is an organism. Like all organisms, it starts as a relatively\nstructureless mass; then, in accordance with the principle of the\ndivision of labour, different functions come to be performed by\ndifferent parts; thus special organs are developed for the performance\nof special functions; division of labour further implies co-operation of\nthe various organs and the development of the necessary means of\ncommunication and connection. All this is necessary for that evolution\nof society which we call progress; and of all these changes in the\nstructure of society but few were ever intentionally planned by man. Mr.\nHerbert Spencer has familiarised this generation with the idea that the\nforeseen consequences of any intended change are insignificant as\ncompared with the consequences unforeseen and unintended. Hence the\ngeneral rule that the structural developments on which the evolution of\nsociety depends are but rarely the result of the coercive and conscious\nchanges effected by government: in practically all cases they are the\nunintended consequences of the spontaneous actions of individuals\naiming at something else and unconsciously promoting the evolution of\nsociety. So, too, the animal organism is made up of living units, each\nof which unconsciously performs the part necessary to be played by it,\nif the organism is to live; and each unit, unconsciously again, even\nmodifies the part it plays, in order to promote the changes which\nconstitute the evolution and the progress of the organism.\n\nWe must therefore dismiss the idea that the progress of mankind and the\nevolution of society have been planned by man or are due to his design;\nand we must recognise the presence in human affairs of some unseen,\nimpelling power which is continually guiding them to good issues and\nshaping them to ends not even rough-hewn by men. This power, it is\nevident, must be one not limited in its action to the social organism,\nbut manifesting itself in animal organisms also, since there also it\nproduces similar results. That power, we need hardly say, is to be\nsought in \"the struggle for existence\": wherever organisms are in excess\nof the means for supporting them, competition for food, for life, must\nensue; and in this case the battle is to the strong, the race to the\nfleet. But of course strength is a relative term: what in some\ncircumstances is a source of strength, in others may be a cause of\nweakness; and, generally, the very qualities which in some cases are of\nthe highest value may in others be useless to their possessor. It is\ntherefore the creature which possesses the particular kind of\nsuperiority required by the circumstances in which it finds itself,\nwhich is the creature that is likely to fare best, and is most likely to\nsurvive in the struggle for existence. But, further, the circumstances\ntend to produce the very superiority which they require: they ruthlessly\nreject and condemn to destruction every organism which fails to satisfy\ntheir requirements, thus leaving the field in possession of those\norganisms which have the required superiority. The next generation,\ntherefore, is bred not from chance parents, but from parents which have\nbeen selected, by natural causes and the force of circumstances, as\ncarefully as by the breeder who wishes to produce a prize animal. Every\nsuccessive generation thus must be superior to that which preceded it.\nAdvance is the very breath of every organism's being, the condition\nwithout which existence is impossible. To the talents which it has,\nevery being must add other talents, or be cast out into the darkness of\nnon-existence; whereas to the good and faithful servant who exercises\nall the powers entrusted to him even wider rule is given. Neither this\nworld nor the next is for the idle or for the stupid. The intelligence\nmust be alert to detect the slightest element of possible superiority,\nand the will resolute to work it to the utmost of its worth. Man must be\nwise in his generation; and the wise man makes friends even with the\nmammon of unrighteousness, and that quickly.\n\nIf, then, it is by the perpetual and strenuous exercise of all its\npowers that an organism achieves the degree of superiority which is its\ncontribution to the universal work of progress, it follows that \"the\nperformance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obligation,\" and\nthat \"the moral man is one whose functions are all discharged in degrees\nduly adjusted to the conditions of existence.\" Here, as elsewhere, the\nindividual, to exist, must comply with the conditions of existence; and\nprogress consists in more perfect compliance with the conditions. There\nis, however, a difference between the highly evolved organism, man, and\nthe less complex organisms; between animal and human evolution; between\nbiological and moral progress. In the case of the lower and simpler\norganisms, the creature is prompted simply and safely by its emotions to\nthe performance of those functions on which its existence and the\nevolution of its species depend. But the evolution of man has been so\nrapid in its later stages, the social environment which he has himself\ncreated is so different from the circumstances in which he originally\nfound himself, that his adjustment to his environment has become, so to\nspeak, much looser, and consequently it is now no longer the case that\nactions in themselves pleasant are also necessarily beneficial in their\nconsequences to the individual and to society. Moral progress,\ntherefore, will manifest itself in the readjustment of man to his\naltered conditions. The consequence of that adjustment, when complete,\nwill be that actions which are right--that is, are beneficial to the\nindividual and to society--will always be pleasurable, not only in their\nconsequences, but also immediately and in themselves. To this ideal,\nwhen all men will delight always in the thing that is right, and when\nall have attained to a height of morality now reached only by the few,\nman is being slowly but surely urged by the force which is the motive\npower of all evolution, the struggle for existence, regulated by the law\nwhich directs all progress, that of the survival of the fittest.\n\nHere, then, we have the reason of the hope that is characteristic of our\ngeneration; here the foundation of the calm confidence with which we\ncount on the continuance of progress as a thing assured us. It is not\nmerely that progress has been made in the past, that the gale hitherto\nhas steadily blown us on a favourable course. We have learnt that it\nmust of necessity always blow from the same quarter. Man's course is not\ndependent on man's fitful will: the wind and waves obey not him, but the\nPower which directs all evolution, and \"our strength in ages past\" is\nshown by science to be \"our hope in years to come.\"\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nILLUSION\n\n\nIt seems, then, according to the optimistic view set forth in the\nprevious chapter, that Evolution is necessarily Progress, and progress\nis movement in the line of our moral aspirations produced _ad\ninfinitum_. The changes that are and always have been taking place are\nand always have been changes for the better; the forms of existence\nwhich incessantly succeed one another necessarily develop from lower to\nhigher, from good to better. And this conclusion is not a matter of\nreligious faith, but of scientific necessity. The only forces and causes\nthat it presupposes are those which we see and feel at work every day\naround us. For the reconstruction of the past history of the earth's\nsurface, geology only requires to assume the operation during infinite\npast time of those agencies which at this moment may be seen to be\nslowly changing the face of the earth. The cooling of the earth's\nsurface follows the same laws, and can be calculated with the same\ncertainty as the cooling of a red-hot poker. The law of gravitation,\nwhich determines the movements of the heavenly bodies, is equally\nexemplified in the fall of an apple to the ground. In fine, the universe\nconsists of bodies of matter in motion; the movements which occur within\nthe range of human observation are sufficient to enable us from them to\ncalculate the paths which they follow when they pass beyond our ken, and\nthe correctness of our calculations is demonstrated when they reappear\nat the time and place predicted. The chemist recovers on one side of his\nequation every atom which the other side requires him to account for.\nThe stars in their courses confirm the calculations of the astronomer.\nMatter is in perpetual course of redistribution, and the same\neverlasting laws which determine the forms into which it is incessantly\nbeing redistributed necessarily determine that those forms shall\nperpetually improve.\n\nThis optimistic view of evolution has met with general welcome, but on\nvery different grounds in different cases. Believers in Divine\nProvidence have eagerly greeted it as a startling and irresistible\ndemonstration that their belief in a Providence over-ruling all things\nfor good was true. No suspicion here was possible that the argument had\nbeen sophisticated by those with whom the wish was father to the\nthought. By science the testimony of science could hardly be impeached;\nand here was science on independent reasonings of its own, starting from\npurely materialistic ground, compelled by the force of its own\narguments to bear witness to the truth which religion had so long\nproclaimed on the strength of faith alone. To this generation a sign had\nindeed been given.\n\nOn the other hand, the optimistic interpretation of evolution was\nwelcomed with equal ardour by those for whom it removed the last\ndifficulty they had in believing that there was no God. Hitherto the\ndeeply rooted desire to believe that, in spite of all appearances to the\ncontrary, good must triumph ultimately, and right-doing never be\nconfounded, had seemed to necessitate belief in a righteous God. But now\nthe necessity for any such assumption was done away with: the perpetual\ntriumph of the good was a necessary aspect or expression of the\nmechanical action of particles of matter upon one another, as much as\nthe law of gravitation itself, and based on exactly the same kind of\nevidence. From this it followed that religious belief was but a passing\nphase in the process of evolution, useful enough as long as the real\nevidence for our faith in the good was unknown, but destined to dwindle\nto a mere rudiment and survival as fast as men become capable of seeing\nthe truth of the matter, and of realising that religion is superfluous\nbecause it can offer nothing that is not independently assured by\nscience. At the same time and in the same way the hope of future\nblessedness is brought down from the unsubstantial clouds of an\nimaginary heaven to the solid ground of a materialistic science, which\nnever travels beyond the evidence of the senses.\n\nSince, then, minds, which differ otherwise so much, are agreed that the\noptimistic interpretation of evolution is the true one, it seems not\nunreasonable to ask each how far they are prepared to push their\noptimism. We will ask the one side whether the reason why they believe\nin the goodness of God really is that, as a matter of fact, they see\nthat good is incessantly triumphant around them, and triumphant as a\nmatter of absolute necessity. Surely whether we consider what we daily\nsee of life, or whether we consider the struggle with evil in our own\nsouls, it is a mockery to say that good invariably triumphs here and\nnow; and there must be illusion in the argument that would prove that it\ndoes. Could an argument that is based on the assumption that matter and\nmotion are the only realities issue in anything but illusion when\nextended to spiritual experience?\n\nTo the other side we may put the question somewhat differently. It is\nagreed that all the many changes which are incessantly taking place in\nthe universe, and which, added together, constitute what is called the\ncosmic process, are incessantly and inevitably working for good, and\nthemselves are always rising from good to better. But what of the Force,\nor Power, or Cause, or Reality which underlies them and of which they\nare the manifestation? May we infer that because they are good, it is\ngood? That if the fruits are good, the tree must be good also? To this\nthe reply will be that it is the manifestations which we know; they\nalone are known to us; they alone can be known to us. That which\nunderlies them is not manifest; and that which is not manifested to us\nobviously cannot be known to us: it is the Unknowable. Obviously,\ntherefore, it is impossible for us to say whether it is good or not. To\naffirm and to deny that it is good would both equally be to profess\nknowledge of the unknowable. Religion may profess--and, indeed, all\nreligions have professed--to possess this inconceivable and impossible\nknowledge. But religion is not science.\n\nOn this view, then, there are limits to the optimism of evolution: to\napply the term \"good\" to that which manifests itself as the cosmic\nprocess in evolution is mere illusion. But this raises a further\nquestion: If it is unmeaning to call the Unknowable Reality good, what\nprecisely is the meaning and value of the term \"good\" when applied to\nthose forms in which the Unknowable manifests itself to us?\n\nTo begin with, it is clear that if everything has been evolved, then our\nmoral aspirations also are the products of evolution. It is they,\nindeed, that distinguish man from the brute; but even of them the law of\ncontinuity holds good: we can see not only how in man the virtues have\nbeen developed by civilisation, but we can trace the germs of\nconscience in that civilised animal the dog, as we can certainly see\nmaternal affection, devotion, and self-sacrifice in the fiercest of\nundomesticated animals. In other words, the struggle for existence is\nwaged better in co-operation than by individual effort; co-operation\nimplies the subordination of individual impulse to the interests of the\nspecies or society; and such subordination, taking different forms in\ndifferent stages of social development, is what we call virtue.\n\nIn the next place, the theory of evolution is built upon the ancient\ntruth that nothing abideth long in one stay. Matter and motion are in\nperpetual course of redistribution, entering into countless\ncombinations, and assuming innumerable forms, which succeed each other\nlike the waves of the sea, and like them are no sooner formed than they\nare gone. It follows, then, on this showing, that our moral aspirations\nare as transitory as other products of evolution. Indeed, as we look\nback over the pages of history we can see them always changing before\nour eyes--what is approved by savages is disapproved later; the virtues\nof the military stage of social development give way to those fostered,\nby the industrial organisation of society. In a word, our moral\naspirations, being the outcome of evolution, have neither the permanence\nof matter and motion which are everlasting and indestructible, nor the\nreality which is the attribute of the Unknowable alone.\n\nIf any confirmation of this conclusion were required, it would be found\nin the fact that only a living, conscious being can entertain moral\naspirations, or desire the good, or hunger and thirst after\nrighteousness. And life and consciousness are but transitory phases of\nevolution. The earth's crust, the geologic record, testifies to the\nformer existence of fauna now extinct. The science of heat makes it\ncertain that the earth must cease to be habitable for any form of life;\nand with the extinction of consciousness, good and the desire for good,\nright and the striving after right, will be no more: matter and motion,\nbrute matter and blind forces, knowing nothing of good or evil, will\nresume their ancient, desolate domain.\n\nIf, pursuing the same train of thought, we ask what meaning the\noptimistic evolutionist puts upon the word \"good,\" we shall see that,\naccording to him, the distinction between good and bad is one that\napplies, and can only apply, to certain moments in the process of\nevolution, but not to the process as a whole, just as we have already\nseen that according to the optimistic evolutionist the distinction does\nnot apply to the Unknowable Reality of which the process of evolution is\na manifestation. The law of life is laid down to be the struggle for\nexistence, with the consequent survival of the fittest. In the\nstruggle, that is good which is struggled for, viz. existence; and that\nconduct, in man or brute, is good which conduces to success in the\nstruggle and enables the organism to maintain its existence. This can\nonly be done by the adaptation of the organism to its environment, of\nthe constitution to the conditions. It follows, therefore, that \"good\"\nis a purely relative term: it is only applicable with reference to\norganisms, and even in their case only to success and whatever\ncontributes to success in the struggle for existence. But to the cosmos\nbefore the struggle for life begins, and after life and its struggles\nhave relapsed into the insentience of unconscious matter, the term\ncannot be applied. Matter and motion, which exist before and after\nlife's appearance, are everlasting and indestructible. Their existence\nis assured, and implies no struggle. They are eternal, organic life\ncompared with them is momentary. The portion, then, of the cosmic\nprocess which can be spoken of as good is infinitesimal compared with\nthe whole. Save for the brief moment during which organic life exists,\nit is as illusory to speak of the cosmic process as good as it is to\napply the term to the Unknowable.\n\nBut if so much of our optimistic interpretation of evolution has proved\nto be an illusion which consists in the simple fallacy of using the word\n\"good\" in connections in which it has no meaning, can we hope to rescue\nthe very small fragment that remains? Perhaps we may argue, that since\nthat is good which conduces to human existence, the whole of the cosmic\nprocess up to now, having paved the way and prepared the earth for man,\nmust be good. Thus at one stroke we seem to regain half at least of the\nterritory we have lost. But it is only seeming, once more illusion, for\nthe cosmic process which has prepared the earth for man's existence has\nalso prepared it for his destruction: his good, his existence, and his\ndestruction are equally indifferent to it. This conclusion is confirmed\nby the reflection that to regard the cosmic process as giving any\nconsideration to man would be to ascribe purpose, consciousness, a\nknowledge of good and evil, and a preference for good, to the Unknowable\nof which the cosmic process is the continuous manifestation.\n\nIt is therefore mere illusion to imagine that evolution necessarily\ntends to good: it is absolutely indifferent to it. And as we must judge\nof the parts by the whole, we must conclude that human evolution follows\nthe same laws as evolution in general. The steps in human evolution,\nlike those in evolution at large, are not progress, are not changes\nworking to a good end, but merely changes. Evolution is not progress,\nbut mere change, as far as good and evil are concerned, a mere marking\nof time, or at most a series of movements in which advance and retreat\ncancel each other in the long-run.\n\nAt the same time, the evolution theory enables us to see plainly a cause\nat work which would inevitably produce in human minds the illusion that\nexistence is good. Just as any species of animals which found a pleasure\nin actions ultimately entailing the destruction of the species would be\ncondemned to extinction, so too only those varieties of the genus _homo_\ncould survive in whom the conviction of the goodness and desirability of\nexistence was strong enough to call forth the activities on which\nexistence was dependent.\n\nThe optimistic interpretation of evolution is based on the \"struggle for\nlife\" theory that \"existence\" sums up the good for which man struggles;\nand we have sought to show that the optimism which is based on this\nassumption must result in the conclusion that progress is an illusion.\nSome readers, however, may hold that mere existence is not the only good\nthat man is capable of struggling for.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\nPESSIMISM\n\n\n\"The prospect of attaining untroubled happiness, or of a state which\ncan, even remotely, deserve the title of perfection, appears to me to be\nas misleading an illusion as ever was dangled before the eyes of poor\nhumanity. And there have been many of them.\"[1]\n\nThe theory which sees in evolution nothing but the redistribution of\nmatter and motion leads to an optimistic view of things which on\nexamination proves to be a misleading illusion. From illusion to\npessimism is but a step.\n\nThe facts on which the theory of organic evolution is based are two. The\nfirst is that no two individuals of any species are born exactly alike;\nand that of two different individuals one must be superior to the other,\n_i.e._ better fitted to survive under the conditions then and there\nprevailing. The next is that parents transmit their qualities to\noffspring; and the superiority of superior parents is thus transmitted\nand accumulated from generation to generation. Organic evolution,\ntherefore, consists in more and more perfect adaptation of the organism\nto the environment. And this adaptation is effected by the physical\ndestruction of those creatures which are weakly and not adapted to cope\nwith the environment.\n\nAccording to the theory that evolution is progress, the progress or\nevolution of humanity obeys the same laws, is impelled by the same\nforces, and follows the same line as the evolution of organisms in\ngeneral; and consists accordingly in increasing adaptation to the\nenvironment. Imperfect adaptation manifests itself whenever a man's\nimpulses or desires move him to perform acts which are immediately or\neventually prejudicial to his own or to society's existence. Adaptation\nwill be perfect when all acts which are necessary for the existence of\nthe individual and of the society are pleasant in themselves--when not\nonly going to the dentist's will be a duty, but the extraction will be a\npleasure desired for its own sake.\n\nThough Mr. Huxley maintained that it was a misleading illusion to lead\npeople to expect any such state of untroubled happiness, he was far from\ndenying that progress has been made in the past by man, or from\ndespairing of further progress in the future. But progress does not,\naccording to him, consist in adaptation to environment; it is not\neffected by means of the struggle for existence; it neither obeys the\nsame laws, nor is impelled by the same forces, nor follows the same\nlines as organic evolution in general. Nor does it consist in the\nsubstitution of personal pleasure for a sense of duty as the motive of\naction: on the contrary, it consists in a fuller and fuller recognition\nof the claims of others.\n\nThe idea that evolution means progress, and by its very nature\nnecessarily results in perfection, owes much of its popularity to the\nfallacious interpretation given to the phrase \"survival of the fittest.\"\nIn any scientific use of the phrase, \"fittest\" simply means \"fittest to\nsurvive.\" But in popular usage it is supposed to mean \"ideally or\nethically best.\" But the fittest to survive are not necessarily the\nideally best: they are, scientifically speaking, simply those best\nadapted to the circumstances and conditions under which they live. And\nthe circumstances and conditions, the environment, may or may not be\nfavourable to the survival of the ethically or \u00e6sthetically best: they\nmay be favourable to the growth of weeds and to the destruction of\nbeautiful flowers, in which case the cosmic process will wipe out the\nbeautiful flowers, and the movement of evolution will be \u00e6sthetically\nretrogressive, not progressive.\n\nAdaptation to environment, therefore, is no indication or test of\nprogress, or of what is good or right or true or beautiful. Everything\nthat exists is shown, by the mere fact of its existence, to be adapted\nto its environment. If, therefore, such adaptation is evidence that the\nthing is ideally satisfactory, it will follow that whatever is, is\nright. At the same time, our conception of right and good will be\nemptied of all meaning: a \"right\" or \"good\" thing will simply mean a\nthing which exists. The epithets will simply predicate existence, not a\nquality; and consequently we shall have to call the successful villain\nand the prosperous traitor good, and their methods right. They have\nadapted themselves to their conditions, and have flourished in\nconsequence.\n\nAdaptation to environment could only mean progress provided that the\nenvironment was uniformly such as to favour the survival of those alone\nwho were ideally fit to survive. But it is not: instances are not\nuncommon in which organisms, having attained to a certain degree of\ncomplexity and heterogeneity of structure, subsequently, as a\nconsequence of adapting themselves to their environment, lose it and\nrevert to an earlier stage of development, relatively simple,\nhomogeneous, and structureless. Such reversion or regressive\nmetamorphosis is as much a part of the organism's evolution as its\nprevious progressive metamorphosis; and progress and regress both are\nequally the result of adaptation to environment. Further, though\nreversion and regress may now be only occasional, it is certain that as\nthe earth cools down they must become universal: the altered conditions\nof temperature, etc., will allow only the lower forms of life to\nsurvive, and will eventually extinguish even them.\n\nAs regards organic evolution in general, then, the struggle for\nexistence and the action of the environment do not necessarily tend to\nresult in progress. As regards the evolution of man in particular, Mr.\nHuxley went further and maintained that they were absolutely inimical to\nhuman progress, which has been effected, not because, but in spite of\nthem, and is the result not of obeying the cosmic process, but of\ndefying it.\n\nThe qualities which brought success in the struggle for existence to man\nas an animal were rapacity, greed, selfishness, and an absolute and\ncruel indifference to the wants and sufferings of others. On the\ngratification, at all cost to others, of his animal desires, his animal\nexistence depended: it was the \"ape and tiger\" within him that made him\nvictor in the struggle for existence; it was the environment that\nimposed this as the condition of success.\n\nThe qualities which make man a human being are tenderness, pity, mercy,\ncompassion, self-sacrifice, and love. It is in their growth--the\n\"ethical process\"--that human progress consists, and not in the\nruthlessness by which the cosmic process effects the evolution of other\norganisms. These qualities--human and humane--do not make for success\nin the struggle for existence. They are not adapted to the environment\nprovided by Nature. Their owners were not the fittest to survive, and\nconsequently paid the penalty--physical destruction--as far as the\ncosmic process could exact it. If the struggle for existence and the\naction of the environment have not succeeded in keeping man down to the\nlevel of the brute, it is because man has deliberately set himself to\noppose the cosmic process and the blind forces, knowing nothing of right\nand wrong, pity or love, by which it effects the evolution of the brute.\nThe struggle for existence is fatal to the development of the qualities\nwhich are peculiarly characteristic of humanity, and man accordingly has\nsuspended the struggle for existence. In place of warring with his\nfellow-man, he has begun to co-operate with him. He has learnt to some\nextent to postpone the gratification of his own wants to the\nsatisfaction of those of others. He no longer destroys the weakly, the\nsick, the helpless, the useless, or even the criminal; and, if the\nenvironment threaten their destruction, he sets to work to alter the\nenvironment. Man no longer seeks to conquer Nature by obeying her: he\nstudies her forces in order to command them to his will. Adaptation to\nenvironment is the implement by which she shapes human evolution to ends\nthat are not his ends; he wrests the weapon from her hands, and by\nadaptation of the environment undoes her work, fosters the growth of\nthose qualities which tend towards his ideal, and does away with the\nconditions which harbour ignorance and error, selfishness and sin.\n\nHuman progress, then, consists in perpetual approximation to the ideals\nof charity, love, and self-sacrifice. Life is exhibited as a struggle\nagainst evil, against the ape and tiger within us which we inherit from\nour ancestor--the brute. The evil is real, the struggle is hard but\nworthy, and not the less worthy because it is not directed to our\npersonal happiness and gratification. \"The practice of self-restraint\nand renunciation is not happiness, though it may be something much\nbetter.\"[2]\n\nThus far this criticism of life, though stern, is not pessimistic. On\nthe contrary, in it man seems to have recovered the freedom of action\nand the power of independent judgment which, as the mere product of the\ncosmic process, he could not enjoy according to the optimistic theory.\nIf life is a struggle, at any rate man can fight the good fight, if he\nwill; and he can judge for himself which is the higher, the adaptation\nto environment which puts man on a level with the ape and tiger, or the\nadaptation of environment which, for the sake of his ideals, sets him in\nconflict with the cosmic process.\n\nIt is when we proceed to conjecture the issue of the struggle, as thus\nstated, that pessimism begins to invade us. However valiantly man may\nfight, whatever temporary victories he may gain here or there, his\ndefeat in the end is inevitable: the same cosmic forces which, working\nthrough him, have won him his trifling victories have preordained his\nultimate destruction. As far as it is possible for science to forecast\nthe future, it is certain that in the end man will fall a victim to his\nenvironment, and join the other extinct fauna of the earth. With him the\nethical process ceases; with him perish the hopes, the aspirations, and\nthe ideals for which he strove as being of greater worth than aught that\nevolution, the redistribution of matter and motion, could offer or\nproduce.\n\nIf this were all, the picture would be sufficiently gloomy: man alone in\nthe universe, surrounded by forces which act without regard to good or\nevil, without sympathy or heed for right or wrong, indeed, with the\neffect of impartially extinguishing both in the end. But it is not all.\nAs the conditions grow more and more unfavourable to man's existence\nupon earth, as the margin of the means of subsistence contracts, and the\npresence of universal want increases, the ape and tiger in man will\nbegin to assert themselves once more. In the face of starvation, the\ninstinct of self-preservation will become imperious. Once more, as in\nthe earliest days, man will live by rapacity, cruelty, and selfishness\nalone. Before man yields possession of the earth to the brutes, he will\nhimself revert to brutishness. The puny barriers behind which man has\nfor a moment sheltered himself from the action of the cosmic process,\nand nursed the feeble flame of those aspirations after higher things\nwhich distinguish him from the brute, must inevitably be swept away by\nthe restless and relentless tide of insentient matter, perpetually\nredistributed by aimless motion, which constitutes the cosmic process.\n\nThe pity of it is that the process of evolution should require not\nmerely man's physical destruction, but his moral destruction also; that\nthe ruin of his body should be preceded by the ruin of his soul; that in\nhis regressive metamorphosis he should be compelled, by the struggle for\nexistence and the instinct of self-preservation, to play the traitor to\none after another of his ideals of tenderness, of pity, and of love. The\nfittest to survive will be those who are most completely adapted to the\naltered environment, who are resolved to succeed in a struggle for\nexistence in which success can be obtained by brutishness alone. The\nleast fitted to the new conditions, and the first to perish therefore,\nwill be those with whom self does not come first. With their destruction\nthe competition between their less scrupulous survivors will become\nfiercer and still more cruel. And this process will be repeated again\nand again, each generation transmitting cunning and cruelty intensified\nto the next. Our great cities already breed men degraded below the level\nof the lowest savages known to us, but even they can give us but little\nidea of what the struggle for existence will yet produce from the ruins\nof civilisation in the course of the Evolution of Inhumanity.\n\nWhile proclaiming that \"the ethical process is in opposition to the\nprinciple of the cosmic process, and tends to the suppression of the\nqualities best fitted for success in that struggle,\" and that at the\nbest the ethical process can maintain itself only for a relatively short\ntime, \"until the evolution of our globe shall have entered so far upon\nits downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway; and, once\nmore, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of our planet,\" Mr.\nHuxley held that our duty lay \"not in imitating the cosmic process,\nstill less in running away from it, but in combating it.\"[3] \"Cosmic\nnature is no school of virtue, but the headquarters of the enemy of\nethical nature,\" and though we know that the enemy's triumph must be\ncomplete, that the defeat of the good cause is preordained, that we and\nours must be annihilated, we must remain at our posts, fighting to the\nend without hope.\n\nIt seems, then, that man possesses two kinds of knowledge: he knows to\nsome extent what is, and to some extent he knows what ought to be. And\nboth kinds of knowledge are equally valid. He judges that a thing is,\nand he judges also that a thing ought to be. Both judgments are equally\ntrue, but apparently both are not equally final, for if man judges that\nwhat is, ought not to be, he is impelled to alter what is, so that in\nthe end the thing that ought to be is also the thing that is. The\njudgment of what ought to be, the ideal, is thus proved, or rather made,\nto be the finally correct one. On the other hand, if man is defeated in\nhis attempts to adjust the things that are to his judgment of what they\nought to be, he does not acquiesce in his defeat; he refuses to accept\nthe result as final; the end of the matter is not there; things are not\nwhat he strove to make them, but they ought to be. What is has nothing\nto do with what ought to be. But what ought to be may make a good deal\nof difference to what is.\n\nThe ethical process, in its conflict with the cosmic process, may not in\nthe end prove victorious; but that makes no difference to the fact that\nit ought to be victorious. It is this deep-seated conviction which made\nMr. Huxley say that we must declare war to the last against cosmic\nnature, the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature. The victory of\nthe enemy may be certain, but it will none the less be wrong; it may be\npermanent, but as long as it lasts it will be wrong. If matter and\nmotion are eternal and indestructible, morality is equally everlasting\nand immutable. Unless this is so, unless the triumph of the cosmic\nprocess is wrong, once and always, why are we called upon to endure\nsorrow and pain and suffering rather than submit to it? Our judgment\nthat it is wrong is as independent of time as is our judgment that\nparticles of matter gravitate towards one another. We have no reason for\nbelieving that the latter will continue to be true for a longer time\nthan the former. Indeed, if matter and motion, having achieved their\nvictory over the ethical process, were then and there to be annihilated,\ntheir victory would continue to be wrong, though they had ceased to be.\nRight may triumph or wrong may triumph, but right is right and wrong is\nwrong for evermore. It is vain to tell us in the same breath that we\nmust stake our all upon our moral judgments and that our moral judgments\nare not to be relied on. Every impeachment of their validity is an\ninvitation to us to give up the struggle against the enemy of ethical\nnature. And if we are really resolved to fight the good fight and quit\nourselves like men, we thereby affirm that our moral judgments are at\nleast as valid as our judgments on matters of fact, and that, if our\nknowledge of what is is true objectively, our knowledge of what ought to\nbe has in it at least an equal element of objective truth.\n\nIf, then, the cosmic process is real and objective, in so far as it is a\nperpetual manifestation of the Unknown Reality which underlies all\nthings, then the ethical process, having the same reality and\nobjectivity, is also a manifestation of the Unknowable. The perpetual\nredistribution of matter and motion is not the only way in which the\nUnknowable manifests itself to men: it also gives a shape to itself in\nthe form of the highest and purest aspirations of which man is conscious\nwithin himself. It might seem, therefore, at first sight as though a\nmere dispassionate consideration of the actual facts of life, quite\napart from any religious presuppositions or presumptions, forced us at\nlast into the presence of a God, the source and author of all goodness.\nBut, in the first place, those who hold to the dogma of Agnosticism,\nthat what underlies things as they are known to us is the Unknowable,\ncannot admit that we know or can find out whether the Unknowable is good\nor bad. Induction, the logical method to which science owes so many of\nits discoveries, and by which we proceed from the known to the unknown,\ndoes not avail us here. No logical method could discover what is not\nmerely unknown, but absolutely unknowable.\n\nIn the next place it is reasonable enough that those who begin by\nbelieving in a Divine Providence should also believe that right will\ntriumph in the end, if not in the world as it is manifested to us now\nand here, in space and time, then in that real world, that kingdom of\nheaven, of which this world is but an imperfect manifestation, or to\nwhich it is but a distant and slowly moving approximation. For those,\nhowever, who refuse to assume the reality of a Divine Providence the\ncase is different. They base themselves on facts of experience: they\nobserve that to some small extent what ought to be tends to substitute\nitself for what is, thanks to the action of man exclusively, and not to\nany inherent tendency to good in cosmic nature, but rather in spite of\nthe resistance to good caused by the necessary action of the mechanical\nlaws of nature. From their observation of the conditions under which man\nhas succeeded in modifying what is into what ought to be, they forecast\nthe extent to which that process may be carried in the future; and their\nconclusion is that the process is doomed to eventual failure, is doomed\nnot merely to cease, but to give way to a process in the opposite\ndirection, by which what ought to be will be displaced by what ought\nnot, by which ethical nature will succumb to cosmic nature.\n\nNow, if there be no God, or if being Unknowable He must be eliminated\nfrom our words, thoughts, and deeds as a negligible and useless quantity\nfor rational purposes, it is a natural enough conclusion that right must\neventually succumb to wrong. It is but a reassertion of the familiar\nthesis that without religion morality cannot permanently be maintained.\nOn this occasion, however, the thesis is advanced not as a piece of\nreligious prejudice or theological insolence, but as the teaching of\nscience and the inevitable outcome of evolution.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] HUXLEY, _Evolution and Ethics_, p. 44.\n\n[2] HUXLEY, _Evolution and Ethics_, p. 44.\n\n[3] _Evolution and Ethics_, pp. 31, 45, 83.\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\nIDEALISM\n\n\nThe bitterness of Pessimism, or rather of the pessimistic interpretation\nof evolution sketched in our last chapter, lies in the discovery that\nwhat we value most, what we, in our best moments, prize most highly,\nwhat we hold dearest to us, is a matter of indifference to the cosmos.\nThat there should be any power greater than that of Right, that all\ngoodness should in the end for ever be confounded, is incredible in the\nsame way that the greatest losses in life are incredible in the first\nmoment of shock in spite of the undeniable facts that show them to be\nreal. But whereas those losses are but personal, and possibly our\nregrets selfish, this loss is more than personal, and the regret not\nmerely selfish. It is not merely that we personally have held a mistaken\nopinion, or that any self-sacrifice--miserably small and unworthy in the\nretrospect--that we have made has been made for a losing cause. It is\nthat apart from our personal share in the matter, which rated at its\ntrue value is as naught, the thing is wrong; it ought not to be. Of that\nwe are just as certain as that our past life has not been what it ought\nto have been, what it might have been. The past is past beyond recall,\nbut for the future hitherto there has been hope and faith, faith that\nwhat ought to be may be, even for us, hope that it will be so. But now,\nin place of hope and faith, we have the scientific certainty that the\nfuture of humanity is devoted to the triumph of the thing that ought not\nto be. The only consolation left to us is the inextinguishable, the\nunconquerable conviction that right is right even though it should not\nprevail. To this conviction we must hold, though the heavens should\nfall. To it we must hold, though it bring, as bring it must, according\nto Mr. Huxley, sorrow and pain and the renunciation of our own\nhappiness.\n\nThese are hard sayings. But there is a yet harder to be added to them.\nEven though it should involve the renunciation of our intellectual\nsuperiority to other people, we must hold to our conviction. If we are\nin earnest about our moral convictions, we shall reject any suggestion\nthat they are not after all really true, even if that suggestion seems\nto afford the only way of escaping from the conclusion that faith in\nreligion has the same basis in reason as faith in science.\n\nIn proclaiming our conviction that right is right, we affirm and intend\nto affirm that it is so not as a matter of opinion, but as a matter of\nfact. In the same way, an established scientific truth is not one of\nthose matters about which reasonable persons, who are competent to\njudge, may reasonably hold different opinions: it is not a matter of\nopinion, but a matter of fact. Indeed, both kinds of truth, moral truths\nand scientific truths, are quite independent of individual and personal\nopinion. There are people in whose opinion the earth is flat; but the\nearth is not flat, nor can their opinion alter the fact. There was a\ntime when all the laws of nature were unknown to man or misconceived by\nhim; but they operated as usual, quite unaffected by his ideas. So there\nare people who consider successful roguery ideal, and who would make a\nfortune by promoting fraudulent companies, if they could; but honesty\nremains a duty, in spite of their ideas. Right is right, even though\nthere be brutes in human form; and right was right, even when the ape\nand tiger ruled in man, and even though they were fine fellows, in their\nown opinion. Cruelty and selfishness never were right at any time, and\nnever will be. The laws of morality, like the laws of science, are\nobjectively true: they do not vary with the opinions men entertain about\nthem; the earth, for instance, did not move or cease to move round the\nsun according as men imagined Galileo to be right or wrong, nor has\nright ceased to be right even when the world has been most depraved.\n\nA moral judgment, then, like a scientific judgment, is objective, not\nsubjective; it is not the expression of a mere opinion, but the\nstatement of a fact which has an existence independent of man. If now we\nask what sort of an existence it has, it is clear that what is and what\nought to be have not in all cases the same kind of existence: the thing\nwhich is may sometimes also be the thing that ought to be, but often it\nis not. Now, when the latter is the case, when a thing is felt to be a\ncrying evil, a foul injustice that calls for remedy, in what sense does\nthe justice exist on which we call to drive out the injustice? The thing\nwhich ought not to be exists, and is in possession. The thing which\nought to be delays its coming. Shall we say, then, that, while that is\nso, it exists indeed, but exists as an ideal, as something which we know\nought to be and are resolved shall be? That it must present itself to\nsome mind or other as an object of desire, and as a possibility capable\nof fulfilment, is certain. That it does so present itself to man is what\nwe mean when we attribute to him the power of moral judgment and moral\naction. But when we speak of man's moral judgments as being objectively\ntrue, we imply that they exist not merely in his mind, but also\nelsewhere. But ideals can only exist in a mind; judgments can be\npronounced only by a judge. When, therefore, we affirm that in\nobjectivity and validity our moral judgments are on a par with our\nscientific judgments, and that our knowledge of what ought to be is as\nreal and true as our knowledge of what is, that the existence of ethical\nnature, with its demands upon our reason, is a fact as indisputable as\nthe existence of cosmic nature, we are implicitly affirming also the\nexistence of a mind, other than human, from whose moral judgments the\nlaws of morality derive their validity; and as those laws are eternal\nand immutable, as right is right always and from eternity to eternity,\nso must be the mind in which they are and from which they proceed.\n\nTo say that the ideal is real sounds paradoxical. It seems like saying\nthat to have the idea of a shilling is the same thing as possessing a\nshilling. That is a patent absurdity, but no one will maintain that it\nis an absurdity to say that we ought to try to be better than we are. On\nthe contrary, everyone will admit that it is a truth, and a truth of the\nhighest importance, of greater value and greater significance for our\nhighest interests than, say, the law of gravitation, or any statement as\nto the ways in which matter and motion are redistributed. When the\ndesire to amend our life is strong upon us, when we are most conscious\nof the heavy difference between actual amendment and amendment in idea\nalone, then we are most certain of the reality of the moral ideal as a\nfact, both of immediate consciousness at the moment and of permanent\nsignificance for us and for all men. To say that our moral convictions\ncorrespond to no real facts is simply to deny to them any validity at\nall. To say that the facts to which they correspond are real, but are\npurely subjective, being but moods, and often passing moods, of the\nindividual, is merely to say that our moral convictions are illusions\nand right-doing only fancy. Nor do we mend matters if we add that all\nmen are more or less subject to these moods, that right and wrong are\npurely human institutions; for if their value in the individual is\nnaught, their existence in the multitude does but add to ciphers\nciphers. On the other hand, if the moral ideal is no figment of man's\nimagination, if its existence does not come and go with his fitful moral\nstruggles, then its permanent abode, the centre from which it manifests\nitself, must be in some permanent intelligence at the centre of things.\n\nThe Pessimistic interpretation of evolution suggests another way of\nreaching the same conclusion. That form of Pessimism represents cosmic\nnature as indifferent, if not hostile, to ethical nature; the former by\nits law of the struggle for existence favours the survival of the\nstrongest and the most selfish; the latter with its moral laws strives\nto suspend the struggle for existence, and to defeat the selfishness\nwhich the former seeks to perpetuate and extend. Human evolution is in\nits essence the struggle of man as a moral being against nature as\nnon-moral or anti-moral; and the curve traced by human evolution is the\nresultant of the opposition of the two forces--the microcosm, man, and\nthe macrocosm, nature. During the first part of its course the line of\nhuman evolution rises, but during the latter part it is doomed to fall;\nand the curve will be completed when man, having traversed every stage\nof moral degradation, is merged once more in the brute matter to which\noriginally he owed his being. Against this victory of cosmic nature man,\nas a moral being, protests and fights. He protests that it is\nwrong--wrong, not because it brings him more pain than pleasure, for\nright-doing also may have that result, but wrong without regard to his\nfeelings, so that any impartial spectator who witnessed the struggle\nwould condemn and regret the issue. If this is not so, if the\ncondemnation is the expression merely of human prejudice, then there is\nnothing in the defeat of ethical nature or in the victory of its enemy,\ncosmic nature, really to regret; the difference between right and wrong\nis not an absolute or real distinction, corresponding to real facts, and\nthe victory of cosmic nature, even if it runs counter to man's\nprejudices, is not thereby shown to be really wrong, though man\nnaturally is under the illusion that it is.\n\nThe coarse and immoral piece of vulgarity which condones an act of\nwrong-doing on the ground that \"it will be all the same a hundred years\nhence,\" is, with an extension of time, as applicable to the race\ngenerally as to the individual in particular. In a million, or a\nbillion, years hence it will, according to the pessimistic\ninterpretation of evolution, be all the same: matter and motion will\nalone exist, completely indifferent to right and wrong. What does it\nmatter, then, whether we do right or wrong? Ultimately, it will make no\ndifference: the distinction between right and wrong is not one of\npermanent value, or based on any lasting difference in things. Nor is it\nstrange that a cause which is based on an illusion should be doomed to\ndefeat. What is strange is that anyone should invite us to renounce\nhappiness for such an unmeaning struggle.\n\nThe only reply to such loose talk is that it does matter, here and now,\nalways and to all time, that right should triumph over wrong. It will\nnot do to say that it matters now, but will not matter hereafter, for,\nif it is of no importance then, neither is it of any importance now. But\nif right-doing is the most important thing in the world, more important\nthan happiness, more important to all time even than the perpetual\nredistribution of matter and motion, to whom is it important? Not\nexclusively, nor even primarily, to ourselves; for the essence of\nright-doing is the attempt to put self away and forget it, the yearning\nto be lifted above personal considerations and thought of self, the\nconviction that whilst it matters all the world to me, to do the right,\nthe matter does not end with me. The matter is not of merely personal\nimportance to me, nor important simply because I choose to think it so.\nIts value and significance are apprehended--alas! too rarely--by me,\nthey are not created by me. Its significance and importance are real,\nnot fictitious; that reality is not created by man, it is not a human\nprejudice, but exists independent of man and what he thinks. To matter\nand motion, those perpetual manifestations of the Power or Reality which\nunderlies them, nothing can have any meaning or importance: it is only\nto a mind that things can be significant or important. If, then, the\nimportance of right-doing is real, it is because it really matters to\nthe Power, which underlies all things, that we should do right; and that\nPower must be of the nature of an intelligence, for it is only a mind\nwhich can either apprehend values or assign them. If the microcosm, man,\ncan pass a valid sentence of condemnation upon the macrocosm, nature, it\nis only because and so far as his moral nature places him in direct\ncommunication with the heart of things and gives him knowledge of the\nwill of that Power on which microcosm and macrocosm alike depend for\ntheir existence. If the distinction between right and wrong is one by\nwhich man can correctly judge between himself and the cosmos, the\ndistinction and the judgment must proceed from a source superior to\nboth. If it is not, then the Pessimistic interpretation of evolution\nfalls to the ground, because it is based on the assumption that its\ncondemnation of cosmic nature is a correct judgment. Not only does\nPessimism fall, but the element of truth and reality which Pessimism\ncontains must also be abandoned; if the distinction between right and\nwrong is not sufficient for the task put upon it by Pessimism, neither\nis it sufficient for us to build our lives on. In fine, either the\nultimate defeat of the ethical process matters, or it does not. If it\ndoes not, why suffer sorrow and pain in the vain endeavour to stave it\noff? If it does, then to whom? No longer to man, for he will have joined\nthe extinct fauna. Therefore to some moral intelligence to whom the\ntriumph of right is a matter of importance.\n\nFrom this dilemma the only escape seems to be frankly to admit that a\nbillion years hence it will be \"all the same,\" but to deny that, because\nit will be all the same then, it is a matter of indifference now. This\nargument, then, maintains that it will be all the same ultimately, and\nthat it is an illusion to imagine that when man is extinct it can\npossibly matter. Here and now, however, and indeed as long as mankind\ncontinues to exist, right-doing is of the highest conceivable importance\nto man, more important even than happiness. But it is only as long as\nmankind continues to exist that it can continue to be important: its\nimportance only exists in man's mind, and perishes with it. To say,\ntherefore, that the ultimate defeat of the ethical process will, when\nestablished, be regrettable, is only to say that if we, or any other\nmoral judge, were there to see it, we should feel regret about it; but\nwe cannot possibly maintain that, because a moral judge would regret it,\nif he were there, therefore there will be one there to regret it. Of\ncourse, it is possible that the Unknowable may be a moral intelligence\nof this kind, because everything is possible with regard to the\nUnknowable. But we can neither affirm nor deny that or anything else\nabout the Unknowable, for then the Unknowable would cease so far to be\nunknowable.\n\nThe contention of this argument, then, is that for us men, and (as far\nas we have any positive knowledge) for us men alone, the laws of\nmorality are real, intensely real; but their reality begins with man and\nends with man. To this contention the reply is that as regards their\nreality the laws of morality are on exactly the same footing as the laws\nof science. Take the theory of evolution for instance: from scientific\nobservations of what is going on now it infers what has been and what\nwill be, it reconstructs the past and forecasts the future; it frames\npictures of the globe as it was before man was evolved; it forms\nconceptions of the earth as it will be long after man is extinct. These\nconceptions and pictures, however, exist only in the mind of man, for\nthe future does not yet exist and the past has ceased to be. That is to\nsay, evolution is an inference, or rather a mass of inferences, which\nlike all inferences exist in the mind, could not have existed before the\nmind, and cannot exist when the mind has ceased to be. Science, being\nthe work of the mind (for we cannot say that it requires no\nintelligence), is just man's notion of what has been, is, and will be,\nin the same way that morality is man's conception of what ought to be.\nIf we say that what ought to be will cease and become meaningless when\nman is extinct, then we must say the same of what has been, is, and will\nbe. If the good, the noble, the right, are merely human ideas of what\nought to be, matter and motion are merely human conceptions of what is.\nIf the reality of the former is only to be found in the human mind, so\nis the reality of the latter. If the reality of the one is to cease with\nhuman existence, so must the reality of the other. On the other hand, if\neither is to exist when mankind is no more, it is only in some mind that\nit can exist. It is only for a person that anything can be right or\ngood. It is only a person that can see the past summed up or the future\ncontained in the present. If it is legitimate and logical to infer that\nwhat is will continue to be after man's disappearance from the earth, so\nit is to draw the same inference with regard to what ought to be. If\nscience is true really, and does not merely appear so to man, it must be\ntrue for some mind other than human: by an intelligence alone can truth\nbe apprehended, or the right approved. But if truth is limited to the\nhuman mind, and ceases with it, then evolution must cease to be true\nwhen men cease to exist. Nay, in that case it cannot claim to be true at\nall, or rather does not claim to be true, but only seeming. On the other\nhand, if the law of gravity, for instance, was true before man's\nappearance, its truth must have dwelt in some mind. If it was not true\nthen, we have no better reason for believing it to be true now. In fine,\ntruth and right, what is and what ought to be, must either be dismissed\nas mere human imaginings, or be accepted as everlasting facts of an\nEternal Moral Consciousness.\n\nShall we, then, say that the description which science gives of the\nconstitution and working of the universe is indeed consistent and\ncoherent enough with itself, and is a logical deduction from its\npremises, but to assert that it expresses or even corresponds to any\nreality beyond itself is a statement which we have no right to make? To\ntake up this position is simply to maintain that science is consistent\nand logical, but that we have no reason or right to believe that it is\ntrue. If our accounts are based on imaginary figures, they may be kept\nas strictly as you please, but they will never show us our true\nposition. Indeed, if our premises are incorrect to start with, the more\nlogical our inferences are, the more certain our conclusions are to be\nwrong.\n\nShall we, then, say that the account which science gives of the cosmic\nprocess is not only consistent and logical, but expresses or corresponds\nto a reality? Then in that case the cosmic process, so far as it is\ntruly expressed by science, is a logical process. But it is only a mind\nwhich can be logical or can go through a logical process. Once more,\ntherefore, the facts of science as much as the facts of morality imply\nthat the real is an Intelligence. In fine, the truth of science and the\ntruth of morality are bound up together and have the same basis. If the\none is valid for facts beyond the range of human observation, so is the\nother. If the one implies a consciousness other than human, equally so\ndoes the other.\n\nIt may be said that to regard the ruling principle of the cosmos as a\nmoral agent is to commit the anthropomorphic fallacy. What, then, shall\nwe say of science, which is engaged in demonstrating that the cosmic\nprocess is always logical? That science simply describes the facts as\nthey are, and that if they are logical, it is not her fault? Then the\npresence of an intelligence other than human is revealed to science in\nthe facts; and it is false to say that science merely imports her own\nintelligence into them. In the same way, the presence of a moral\npersonality other than our own is revealed to us in the facts of\nconscience, and not imported into them by us. The presence of the\nComforter is one of the facts apprehended by the religious\nconsciousness; it is not merely the religious man's way of interpreting\nsome other fact. From this conclusion the only way of escape is to say\nthat anthropomorphism is a fallacy, and that it is a fallacy to which\nthe human mind, by its very constitution, is always and inevitably\nsubject. This argument gets rid at one blow of all indications of any\nintelligence or morality other than human. But how? Simply by begging\nthe question, by tacitly taking it for granted that there is no other\npersonality than human personality. In that case it is obvious, indeed,\nthat man's perpetual discovery of personal power in the forces of\nnature, of more than human wisdom in nature's laws, and of more than\nhuman goodness in the human heart, is and must be fallacious. But only\non the assumption that there is no wisdom in the world but man's, no\nlove in all the universe but his, can we say that man reads into the\nfacts a wisdom and a love which are not there. Are we, then, prepared to\nsay that, in giving us a logical account of the cosmic process, science\nhas--naturally and necessarily indeed, but none the less\ncompletely--been mistaken? If the scientific account corresponds to the\nfacts, then the facts behave logically. If it is the anthropomorphic\nfallacy to imagine that things can behave logically, then science's\ndescription of the facts must be fallacious.\n\nPerhaps it will be sought to save science by saying that science is\nanthropomorphic, but not fallacious. This, however, gives away the whole\ncase: it is an admission that, in interpreting the cosmic process as a\nlogical process, science is simply recognising, and rightly recognising,\nthe logical character of the facts--the anthropomorphic interpretation\nhappens to be right. But we must note that it is not right because it is\nanthropomorphic, but anthropomorphic because it faithfully describes the\nfacts. Science aims at describing and formulating facts as they are: if\nthe laws of science are rational, it is because she found reason already\nin the facts, and not because she put it there. She does not make the\nlaws of nature, neither does she dictate the behaviour of facts, nor is\ntheir behaviour merely her way of interpreting facts. Man discovers in\nnature wisdom, which is an attribute of personality, not because he\ncannot help being anthropomorphic in his views, but because nature is a\nmanifestation of the power and wisdom of a personality other and greater\nthan man's. So far, then, is this discovery from creating a presumption\nthat man makes nature after his own image, that it constitutes a proof\nthat man is made in the image of that personal will and wisdom which is\nexpressed in nature as well as manifested in man. In discovering\npersonality we discover what is fundamentally real in nature, and for\nus what is fundamentally real is also our highest ideal.\n\nWe have already remarked that paradoxical though it sounds to say that\nthe ideal is real, the seeming paradox does express a fact--the fact at\nonce of our consciousness of the difference between what is and what\nought to be, and of our conviction that what ought to be is no mere\nillusion. Truth and goodness, wisdom and love, are all at the same time\nideal and real. The truth to which it is the ideal of science to\napproximate is no mere chimera. So far as it is truth, it is not merely\nman's way of looking at the facts or an interpretation which he puts\nupon them: it is a statement of the facts, as accurate and precise as\nscience can make it. The ideal, being an ideal, will never be fully\nattained; but that the truth is there to be found out is proved every\ntime science reaches a new truth, that is to say, a truth which before\nits discovery was indeed not apprehended by man, but certainly was not\ntherefore either untrue or non-existent. The truth was in the facts; for\nwhat man knows of nature he has learnt from nature, and what he finds\nthere is not the projection of human wisdom but the revelation of a more\nthan human wisdom. Man's knowledge is real in proportion as it\napproaches the ideal. The ideal is not man's surmise, or vague\nconception, or anticipation of what he may hereafter come to know, for\nsuch surmises are always proved to be more or less erroneous. Neither\nis it man's conviction that the truth exists, if only he could find it\nout. It is actual truth and knowledge which now exist, and, being truth\nand knowledge, must exist in some mind, and certainly do not exist in\nman's mind. Science, so far as it has approached the ideal, has done so\nnot by being anthropomorphic, but by ceasing to be anthropomorphic--that\nis to say, by casting aside presumptions of what according to man's\nnotions ought to be or _a priori_ must be, and substituting for such\npreconceptions a patient, reverent study of the facts as they are.\n\nTo regard the knowledge thus gained as being at once purely human and\nthe only reality is to say that the evolution of the universe exists\nonly in the speculation of human thinkers, and consequently that the\nworld as it was before man existed was created by the speculation of\nminds which were not in existence then and which were only subsequently\nevolved. How can man have been evolved out of his own speculations? How\ncan his speculations have existed before he did? Man owes his origin to\nthe same Power whose wisdom is revealed in nature to science, and\nmanifested to all in all around us. Of the existence of a Power, not\nourselves, we have evidence in everything that affects us. It is a fact\nof consciousness, but it is a fact which from its very nature does not\nexist solely in our consciousness. Therein it resembles ideal wisdom or\ngoodness, which exists in us, so far as our wisdom or goodness is real,\nbut is far from being exhausted by its partial presence in us.\n\nThe ideal in morality, again, is not the mere desire to do good or to be\ngood, just as the ideal in knowledge is not the mere desire to know the\ntruth. And if goodness is the object of moral desire, as truth is the\nobject of intellectual desire, in neither case is the object of desire\npurely imaginary, a mere idea or conception of something which might be,\nbut as a matter of fact is not. We do not desire imaginary pleasures or\nimaginary goodness, we want the reality; and to tell us that that\nreality exists only in idea, only in our own imagination, is a\nmisleading half-truth. True, we must have some idea of it, or else we\ncould not desire it. But neither could we desire it if it were presented\nto us as purely imaginary. In other words, the object of moral desire is\napprehended, at the moment of apprehension, as both actual and possible,\nas existing simultaneously for us and beyond us. The case is the same\nwith ideal truth: we could not desire it, unless we had some conception\nof it, unless it were to some degree or in some way present to our\nconsciousness; yet, at the same time, the knowledge which we desire to\nhave but do not yet possess is certainly, so far as we do not possess\nit, beyond our consciousness. It is because we have not got it that we\nwant it. And the object of desire, what we want, is not imaginary\ntruth, but real truth; just as in our better moments we want to do not\nwhat we imagine to be right, but what is really right. The Real,\ntherefore--real truth, real goodness--is apprehended, at the moment of\napprehension, and desired, at the moment of desire, as existing both for\nus and beyond us.\n\nThe proviso, \"at the moment of apprehension, at the moment of desire,\"\nis important, because it strikes at the root of all forms of subjective\nidealism. They all assume that the only thing directly apprehended is\nwhat exists for us; that consequently the supposed existence of any real\nthing or person beyond us is a mere inference, and an inference the\ntruth of which we have no means of checking, because it is a statement\nabout things of which we have no direct apprehension or knowledge. On\nthis assumption, therefore, the only things man directly apprehends are\nhis own states of consciousness, his own sensations, etc. Are we to call\nthem real or not? If they are not real, his whole life is a dream, his\nspeculations fancies, and his desires illusions. If they are the only\nreality of which he can be certain, then the only truth is that which\nman knows, the only good is that which man does, the only world is that\nwhich man thinks, the only God is that which man makes, the magnified,\nnon-natural shadow of man projected on to the mists of the Unknowable.\n\nIt is important, therefore, to insist that the Real--the reality of\nexistence, of knowledge, of goodness--is not an inference, but a matter\nof direct apprehension. It is certain that goodness or knowledge to be\nan object of desire must be presented to us in idea; but it is equally\ncertain that the mere idea is not what we desire. The object of desire\nis directly apprehended as in our consciousness and beyond it. The\nnatural world around us is also directly apprehended as at once in our\nconsciousness and beyond it: it is presented to our minds, but it is\npresented as real.\n\nIt is important also to note that the real does not forfeit its reality\nto our apprehension when and because it takes up its abode in us:\ngoodness does not cease to be good because we do it, nor truth cease to\nbe truth because we know it. It does not follow that because the ideal\ncannot be fully realised, it cannot be realised at all. On the contrary,\nthe conviction that it cannot be completely attained is itself the\nguarantee that it can be attained partially. Yet it has been assumed\nthat if a thing is apprehended by us it cannot be real, that real\nknowledge begins just where our knowledge ends, that the further we push\nour knowledge forward the further real knowledge recedes from our view.\nOn this assumption is built the theory of the Unknowable, the theory\nthat whatever is known to man is a state of man's consciousness; that\nstates of consciousness are subjective, are merely the appearances of\nthings, not the things themselves; that the real things, the things\nthemselves, are unknowable; their appearances alone can be known to man;\ntherefore the real is for ever unknowable. \"The reality existing behind\nall appearances is, and must ever be, unknown.\"[4] Consequently,\ninferences about the Real are valueless and futile. By way of\ncompensation, however, our knowledge of the unreal is, on this theory,\nvaried and extensive: it includes, for instance, the theory of evolution\nand the whole of science.\n\nBut the assumption which leads to this strange conclusion is opposed to\nthe facts. The fact, as we have contended, is that the real in\nconsciousness is continuous with the real beyond consciousness, and is\napprehended, at the moment of apprehension, as being thus continuous,\nand is not reached by any process of inference. The real is not a matter\nof inference, but of apprehension. Its existence cannot be deduced from\nanything else; it is that from which all conclusions must be deduced. I\ncannot prove that a thing is real any more than I can prove that I have\ntoothache. There is no need.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[4] HERBERT SPENCER, _First Principles_, ch. iv. \u00a7 22, p. 69.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\nTHE REAL\n\n\nWe began, at the beginning of this book, by accepting Evolution as a\nfact, as all ordinarily educated persons in the present state of\nscientific knowledge are practically bound to do. Accepting it as a\nfact, we proceeded to inquire what, if anything, it had to tell us about\nthe moral government of the world; and we found that very different\ninterpretations were put upon the theory of Evolution by different\nauthorities. According to one interpretation the process of Evolution\nwas a continual progress from good to better: good could only give way\nto higher good. According to another interpretation goodness was a\ntransient, evanescent phase in the process of evolution, of no permanent\nvalue: the ethical process was doomed to be defeated by its enemy, the\ncosmic process. According to a third interpretation the notion of good\nwas a pure illusion, necessary indeed, inasmuch as without it there\nwould be no survival for man in the struggle for existence, but none the\nless an illusion.\n\nMuch as these interpretations differ from one another as to the moral\nsignificance of the process of evolution, or indeed as to whether\nevolution has any moral significance at all, they are agreed upon one\npoint. They are agreed that it is impossible to draw any inference from\nthe facts of evolution as to the moral government of the universe. To\naffirm its moral government would be to claim knowledge of the\nUnknowable, which is an obvious absurdity. It would be to attribute\npower, consciousness, wisdom, and goodness to the Real; and the Real is\nand must ever be unknown.\n\nThis identification of the Real with the Unknowable leads us into the\nfollowing ridiculous _impasse_: the vast majority of men look, and must\nalways look, for guidance and information to science and theology; and\ntheology is knowledge of the unknowable; science, knowledge of the\nunreal. Those who are content with this blind alley may remain in it. We\npropose to try to find our way out of it.\n\nIf we analyse our perception of any material object, that is to say, of\nany object which we perceive by means of the senses, we shall find that\nour perception of the object consists of the sensations which we have of\nit. To perceive an orange is to see that it is yellow, to feel that it\nis round, to smell it, taste it, and so on. These various sensations\ntogether constitute our perception of the orange. Now, the subjective\nidealist says that the perception _is_ the orange, and that the orange\nis the perception. To the beginner in philosophy that sounds absurd: he\nknows that his perception is not the orange, and that the orange is\nsomething more than his perception of it. But when he is asked, \"What\nmore? If the orange is not the perception, what is it?\" he does not\ngenerally produce any satisfactory reply; and then he is told that his\nnotion, that there is anything in the orange except his own perception\nor sensations, is obviously not a fact of sensation or a thing directly\nobserved, but merely a belief or inference of his. On the other hand, he\ngenerally puts a very natural question to his instructor: \"If the orange\nis merely my perception, what becomes of the orange when I do not\nperceive it? Granted that it exists whenever I look at it, what becomes\nof it in the intervals when I am not looking at it? Does it exist then,\nor does it not?\"\n\nTo this Bishop Berkeley replies that it does; that it exists then in\nexactly the same way as it does now, that is to say, it exists in idea\n(_i.e._ perception or sensation); but as it does not exist in my\nperception, when I am not looking at it, it must exist in the perception\nof some other mind, to which all things at all times are present.\n\nWith the fact which forms Berkeley's conclusion I have no quarrel. What\nI should like to show is that it does not follow from these premises.\n\nBerkeley's argument is: All men believe, and rightly believe, that the\nthings they see are permanent. The things they see are ideas\n(perceptions, sensations) of a mind. Therefore the permanent world is\nthe idea of a permanent mind.[5]\n\nBut \"the things they see\" is an ambiguous expression. If by \"the things\nthat I see\" is meant \"my sensations of sight,\" then they are not\npermanent, for they only last as long as I look at the object, and\nconsequently any argument based on their supposed permanence falls to\nthe ground. On the other hand, if \"the things that I see\" are permanent,\nthen they are not merely my sensations of sight--in which case\nsubjective idealism is wrong, and my perception of a thing is not the\nwhole account of the thing and does not exhaust its reality. The things\nwhich I perceive are not my sensations: they are things of which I have\nsensations. In fine, they are apprehended, at the moment of\napprehension, as being both within and without consciousness.\n\nTo the question whether a thing exists when I am not looking at it, John\nStuart Mill replies, in effect, that as often as I look at it I shall\nsee it; that if I were looking I should see it. This is true enough; but\nit is no answer to the question. When further pressed, Mill further\nreplies that, if things do not exist when we do not look, we should\nnevertheless necessarily be deluded by the association of ideas into\nimagining that they do exist when not looked at. Here, again, it is\nperfectly true that, if things are not real, it is a delusion to imagine\nthey are. But that is no answer to the question. It is, in fact, a\nquestion which the subjective idealist cannot answer. To say \"No! Things\nout of consciousness are non-existent,\" is to say that effects of which\nthe causes are unobserved are effects produced by non-existent causes.\nTo say \"Yes\" is to admit that things can exist out of consciousness as\nwell as in, which is what subjective idealism is there to deny.\n\nWe submit, then, that the analysis of experience which subjective\nidealism makes is not an exhaustive analysis; and that, when the man of\ncommon sense says that in looking at anything he is aware both of his\nsensations of sight and of something more, he is stating the actual\nfacts as they are given in experience to all of us.\n\nWe apprehend a thing as being both our sensations and something more.\nWhen the idealist says that the latter half of this apprehension is a\nmisapprehension, he rejects an observed fact of experience, not because\nhe does not find it in his experience, but because it seems to him\nimpossible that it should be there. He argues that to say we can be\nconscious of what is not in our consciousness is to say that we can be\nconscious of something of which we are unconscious--a patent nonsense.\nHe might admit, for the sake of argument, that possibly a thing could\nexist both in consciousness and out, and even that we might know that it\nso existed. But he cannot admit that a man is conscious of what he is\nnot conscious of.\n\nHe is not required to admit it. He is required to admit that our\nperceptions are not the only things of which we are conscious; or, to\nput it in other words, that our states of consciousness are not the only\nthings of which we are conscious. And he is required to admit it simply\nand solely on the ground that it is a fact of common observation and\neveryday experience. Thus, for instance, we perform actions, and\n(usually) we are conscious of performing them. But the action is\nsomething more and other than our consciousness of it. Or is someone\ngoing to maintain that doing and knowing are the same thing? Is anyone\nprepared to push the illusion-argument so far as to say that the idea\nthat we do things is a mere delusion? If it is not a delusion, if it is,\non the contrary, a fact, then our actions are not states of\nconsciousness, but things of which we are conscious. We apprehend them,\nin the very act of apprehension, as realities distinct from the\nconsciousness which we have of them. And we have the very same guarantee\nfor their reality as we have for the reality of our perception or\nsensations of them, viz. the fact that we are conscious of them.\n\nIn the same way, when we push a solid object or feel the impact of a\nmoving body, we are as conscious of that body as of our muscular\nsensations: our sensations make up our perception of the object, but are\nnot the object. They constitute the state of consciousness, but that\nstate is not the only thing we are conscious of. The object is\napprehended as being in consciousness and not as merely being our\nconsciousness of it.\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer, at least, is quite clear that our states of\nconsciousness are not the only things of which we are conscious; he\nholds even that we are vaguely conscious of that which transcends our\nconsciousness. Thus, our personality is not a state of consciousness,\nyet we are conscious of it, and \"its existence is to each a fact above\nall others the most certain.\"[6] And, as for the real, \"our firm belief\nin objective reality, a belief which metaphysical criticism cannot\nshake,\" is not merely \"a positive though vague consciousness of that\nwhich transcends consciousness,\" but \"has the highest validity of\nany\"[7] of our beliefs.\n\nBut though Mr. Spencer admits, or rather insists, that we know _that_\nthe Real is, he denies that we know _what_ it is. In other words, he\naccepts the validity of one half of every act of experience and denies\nthe validity of the other half. Our analysis of experience has shown us\nthat we apprehend the real, in the very act of apprehension, as being\nboth a state of our consciousness and something more than that state. To\nsay that one half of the apprehension is a misapprehension is to say\nthat both are invalid. If what is present in consciousness is merely\nappearance and not the real thing, then our states are the only things\nof which we are conscious, and the existence of anything more is not a\nfact of experience and observation--still less can it have the highest\nvalidity of any of our beliefs.\n\nWe may be asked, \"Granted that the Real is more than a state of our\nconsciousness, what more is it?\" and, if no answer is forthcoming, we\nmay be told that after all then, it seems, we know _that_ the Real is,\nbut not _what_ it is. The reply is: So far as the Real is out of\nconsciousness we may not know what it is; as far as it is in, we do. By\n\"being conscious of a thing\" we mean knowing what the thing is--not\nnecessarily complete knowledge, but some.\n\nIf it be said that, on our own showing, a thing and the knowledge of it\nare different, and that consequently however great our knowledge may\nbecome there always remains, and must always remain, something which we\ncannot know, because it is _ex hypothesi_, not knowledge, we must reply\nthat this objection is but a restatement of the inveterate fallacy of\nidealism--the fallacy that states of consciousness are the only things\nwe can be conscious of; that if we know a thing the thing ceases to be\nanything but our knowledge of it; that to be conscious of performing an\naction is proof that no action is really performed, and that the only\ndoing is knowing.\n\nWe act, and we know that we act. Reality must be accorded to both or\ndenied to both; it cannot be accorded to one and denied to the other.\nIndeed, knowledge itself is action, a series of actions. But it is also\nsomething more, just as an action of which we are conscious is something\nmore than our consciousness of it.\n\nBut we are conscious not only of our own actions, but of the reactions\nof things on us, and of the interactions of things on one another. We\napprehend all three--action, reaction, and interaction--as real; we know\nnot only _that_ they are, as being realities, but also _what_ they are\nas states of consciousness. As states of consciousness they are\nsuccessive sensations or perceptions; as more than states of\nconsciousness they are power or force.\n\nThe study which science makes of the interactions of things on one\nanother reveals those interactions as conformable to law and happening\nin such a way that their occurrence can be logically deduced, and even\nforetold, from their laws. In a word, they happen in a way that can be\nreasoned out, and they constitute together a logical process. The\nreality, the power, the activity which is exhibited in this process is\nexhibited therefore as a rational activity, as reason active; and both\nthe reason and the action are apprehended by us as real, and not as mere\nstates of our consciousness.\n\nIf the scientific account of the universe and the theory of evolution,\nso far as they are true, are not mere exercises of the imagination, but\nrepresent events and changes which actually have taken place and are\ntaking place beyond the range of actual observation, it must be because\nthey are logical inferences from real events and real changes which are\nmatters of direct observation. If the observed events have no reality,\nwe have no ground for believing the unobserved or inferred facts to have\nany. Unless the real events follow a logical sequence, our inferences\nmust be fallacious in proportion as they are logical. We believe the\ninferred facts to be real because we believe the observed facts to be\nreal; and the observed facts are presented to us and apprehended by us\nto be not merely our sensations but also realities. On no other ground\ncan we or do we trust science to guide us in life.\n\nNor do we trust morality on any other ground. So far as we trust the\nimpulse to do right, or base any calculations upon it or draw any\ninferences from it, we do so because we apprehend it, in the act of\napprehension, as both a state of our consciousness and something more.\nAs in the impact of a moving body we apprehend not merely our\nsensations, but also the presence of a real power, so in the impulse to\ngood we apprehend not only our consciousness thereof, but the presence\nof a real power, with regard to which we know not only that it is, but\nto some extent what it is--a power which would have us do good and be\ngood.\n\nIf material things are but ideas of ours, so the Right and Good may be.\nIf the latter are mere aspirations and nothing more, the former are mere\nsensations and nothing more. But if in things we are conscious of a\npower not ourselves, so are we in our consciousness of the Right and\nGood: our aspirations are inspirations. We apprehend their reality in\nexactly the same way as we apprehend the reality of material things--by\ndirect observation. And we have exactly the same evidence--the evidence\nof immediate consciousness.\n\n\"Let no man spoil you with philosophy.\" The statements that \"knowledge\nis the only reality,\" \"the only Real is the Unknowable,\" are\ncontradictory not only of each other, but of those facts in the common\nexperience of mankind which afford the only safe foundation for\nphilosophy as well as for science. Both statements logically imply that\nour only knowledge is of the unreal; and from knowledge of the unreal to\nthe unreality of knowledge is a necessary step. But existence is not\nmerely knowledge: existence is also action. A thing is that which it\ndoes, and not merely that which it is known to do. Or rather a thing\nnever does anything: only a person can act. The \"action\" or \"behaviour\"\nof a thing is only a metaphor.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[5] See Appendix on Bishop Berkeley's Idealism.\n\n[6] _First Principles_, ch. iii. \u00a7 20.\n\n[7] _Ibid._, \u00a7 26.\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\nEVOLUTION AS THE REDISTRIBUTION OF MATTER AND MOTION\n\n\nAssuming the process of evolution to be a fact, we have inquired what is\nthe value of that fact, what significance it has for man as a moral\nbeing, anxious to direct his life in accordance with the best lights he\ncan obtain. In our attempts to draw any inference from the facts of\nevolution as to the moral government of the universe, we have always\nfound ourselves ultimately confronted by the notice--The Real is\nUnknowable. Obviously, if \"the ultimate of ultimates,\" the Real Power or\nForce, of which all things and beings are manifestations, is unknowable,\nwe cannot know whether it cares or does not care for what is true or\ngood. But if the Real is Unknowable, then the knowledge which we do\npossess is not knowledge of the real, and consequently all our science\nis unreal knowledge; the theory of evolution is a system of delusive\ninferences from unreal facts. That, however, is a thing which we could\nnot believe. Doubtless our knowledge is small compared with our\nignorance. Doubtless there is much which the human mind could not\nunderstand without becoming more than human. Doubtless, also, every\naddition to our knowledge involves a readjustment and correction of our\nprevious inferences; and a considerable addition, such as the theory of\nevolution was, causes a considerable change in our conception of the\nuniverse and its laws. But all these admissions cannot compel us to\nadmit that science is wholly unreal knowledge, or that evolution is an\nentirely unreal process. We sought, accordingly, to show that we have\nsome, if only partial, knowledge of the real, that that knowledge is not\nwholly inferential, but that so far as it is inferred it is inferred\nfrom real facts, the reality of which is directly apprehended in the\ncommon experience of mankind.\n\nAs a matter of fact, those writers who proclaim the unknowability of the\nReal, when they are writing as philosophers, abandon it when they are\nengaged in science. When they are working out the theory of evolution,\nthey take it for granted that the process of evolution is a reality,\nthat the common experience of mankind is trustworthy to some extent, and\nthat to that extent the Real is knowable and known. They assure us that,\nthough the knowledge we have is not knowledge of the Real, it is just\nthe same for us as if it were--if the Real could enter into our\nconsciousness, we really should not know the difference. \"Thus then we\nmay resume, with entire confidence, those realistic conceptions which\nphilosophy at first sight seems to dissipate.\"[8]\n\nOn examination, however, it turns out that the entire confidence which\nis thus restored to the reality of material things is not extended to\nthe reality of those ideals of the good, the beautiful, and the holy\nwhich play their part in the lives of men and in the evolution of\nmankind--or not to all of those ideals.\n\nNow, it is scarcely to be hoped that a theory which begins by ignoring\ncertain facts in the common experience of mankind, or by denying their\nreality, can end in a satisfactory explanation of them. Either it will\nbe consistent and proclaim them to be illusions, or it will be\ninconsistent and quietly include them from time to time as it goes\non--in which case the explanation it gives of them will be no\nexplanation. Thus, for instance, as we have already argued, the\nOptimistic interpretation of evolution, professing to exhibit the Ideal\nof morality as one of the ultimate consequences of the redistribution of\nmatter and motion, ends by denying any difference between what is and\nwhat ought to be, and thus reduces the moral ideal to a mere illusion.\nThe Pessimist, on the other hand, insisting on the reality, and to some\nextent the supremacy of the moral ideal, confesses his inability to\nexplain its validity as being due to evolution: the fact that it has\nbeen evolved does not account for its validity, because the tendency to\nevil has been also evolved, but is not, therefore, to be yielded to.\n\nThe object of this chapter is to examine the hypothesis that the process\nof evolution is nothing but a perpetual redistribution of matter and\nmotion, and to show that the hypothesis cannot explain, and as a matter\nof fact does not explain, all the facts which it is framed to account\nfor.\n\nThe theory of evolution is an attempt--one of many attempts that men\nhave made--to explain the process by which the totality of things has\ncome to be what it is. It differs from most other attempts in that it\nendeavours to give a scientific explanation of the process, and that\nconsequently it does not profess to go back to the beginning or to\ndiscover the origin of the process.\n\nThe nature of scientific \"explanation\" is well understood by men of\nscience (in England, at least), and has been made familiar to the\nnon-scientific world by John Stuart Mill. An event is scientifically\n\"explained\" when it is shown to be a case of a general law; a law is\n\"explained\" when it is shown to come under some more general law. In\nother words, the business of science is to show that the thing under\nexamination always happens (or tends to happen) under certain\ncircumstances which science can formulate with more or less exactness.\nBut _how_ or _why_ the thing should happen thus, science does not\nundertake to explain: \"what is called explaining one law of nature by\nanother, is but substituting one mystery for another; and does nothing\nto render the general course of nature other than mysterious: we can no\nmore assign a _why_ for the more extensive laws than for the partial\nones.\"[9] It is only \"minds not habituated to accurate thinking\" which\nimagine that the laws are the _causes_ of the events which happen in\naccordance with them, \"that the law of general gravitation, for example,\ncauses the fall of bodies to the earth.\"[10] It may be a law of science,\na perfectly true statement, that the phenomenon B always follows the\nphenomenon A; but that statement, true as it is, is not the cause of B.\n_That_ A is always followed by B is demonstrated by science. _Why_ it\nshould be followed by B is as mysterious as magic--as mysterious as that\nthe waving of the magician's wand should be immediately followed by the\nrising of a palace from the ground. How the one thing _can_ follow the\nother, is no part of science's business to explain.\n\nScience, therefore, is essentially descriptive: with ever-increasing\naccuracy it describes things and the order in which they happen.\nEvolution, then, as a scientific theory, is also purely descriptive: it\ndescribes the way in which things have come to be what we see them to\nbe, the process by which the totality of things has come to be what it\nis. But when the purely scientific and descriptive part of the work is\ndone, when science has formulated the order of the events which have led\nup to the existing state of the universe, when the process of evolution\nhas been described, there still remain the questions which science\nrefused even to try to answer, and there also remain other questions\nmore vital to science. There arises the question, In what sense is\nevolution a real process? do the laws of science exist only in the minds\nof men of science? is the process of evolution merely the description\nwhich is given of it (as according to some thinkers a thing is only the\nsensations which we have of it), or is it something more?\n\nObviously the question whether evolution is a real process, whether\nthere is any reality in science, is one which cannot be answered, either\nin the affirmative or in the negative, without some idea of what\n\"reality\" means, of what the \"real\" is. \"What is the meaning of the word\n_real_? This is the question which underlies every metaphysical inquiry;\nand the neglect of it is the remaining cause of the chronic antagonisms\nof metaphysicians.\"[11] Before we are logically entitled to say that\nevolution is a real process, we must answer the question, \"What is the\nessence, the ultimate reality of things? who or what is the Being that\nis manifested in 'all thinking things, all objects of all thought'?\"[12]\n\nNow, to these questions, as to the Being and Becoming of the universe,\nscience has nothing to say. Science does not even afford the materials\nfor an answer to them, any more than to those other questions as to\n_how_ or _why_ things should happen in the way which science describes.\nScience describes things, but does not undertake to prove that things\nexist. Science is organised common sense, and common sense takes it for\ngranted that things exist. Having made this assumption, science proceeds\nto investigate with scientific exactness the order in which events\nsucceed one another and co-exist with one another, within the range of\ndirect observation; and infers that, even when they are beyond the range\nof direct observation, they continue to occur in the same order of\nsequence and co-existence. But here again science refuses to have\nanything to do with any metaphysical questions as to _how_ or _why_\nthings should thus occur. All sorts of conjectures may be made, and have\nbeen made, to explain why B should follow A, or co-exist with it. But\nscience is not pledged to any of them. The only thing she undertakes to\nshow is the fact of the sequence or co-existence; and this she can do\nwithout assuming the truth of any of these conjectures. Indeed, the\nprogress which science has made is largely due to the fact that she has\nsteadily declined to have anything to do with such conjectures--having\nfound out by experience that they simply distract her from her proper\nbusiness of observing with the utmost exactness what actually does take\nplace. It may be that A in some mysterious and wholly inexplicable way\n\"produces\" B, that is to say in technical phraseology, is \"the efficient\ncause\" or \"mechanical cause\" of B. It may be that the sequence of B upon\nA is a volition of the Being which is manifested in all thinking things,\nin all objects of all thought. Science cannot prove, and will not even\ndiscuss, either suggestion: she confines herself to the assertion that,\nas a matter of careful and exact observation, B does follow A. Whether\nwe call A an efficient cause or not, matters not to science: call it so\nor refuse to call it so, the fact once established by science, that B\nfollows A, remains. The theory of efficient or mechanical causes is\ndoubtless of importance, but not to science. If it is proved to be\nfalse, not a single fact of science is shaken.\n\nThe mechanical theory may be true or may be false, but in either case it\nis a metaphysical theory. If science is descriptive--descriptive of the\nuniform succession and co-existence of facts--then science no more\nproves the mechanical theory to be true than it proves the volitional\ntheory to be true. Both are theories as to _why_ facts should succeed\none another in the order described by science; and science does not\nundertake to prove the truth of such theories, nor does she wait for\nthem to be proved or disproved.\n\nMany men of science, however, are also philosophers, and hold, as they\nare fully entitled to hold, that the mechanical theory is the true\ninterpretation of nature. Now, \"mechanics is the science of motion; we\ncan assign as its object: to describe completely and in the simplest\nmanner the movements which occur in nature.\"[13] On the mechanical\ntheory, therefore, \"the object of all science is to reduce the phenomena\nof nature to forms of motion, and to describe these completely and in\nthe simplest manner ... the only complete description is that afforded\nby a mathematical formula, in which the constants are supplied by\nobservation. This permits us to calculate those features or phases of\nphenomena which are hidden from our observation in space or in\ntime.\"[14] This, we need hardly add, is in agreement with Mr. Herbert\nSpencer's view of the theory of evolution as a description of the\nprocess of the redistribution of matter and motion.\n\nIt seems, then, that according to this particular metaphysical theory,\nwhich maintains the mechanical explanation of nature to be the true one,\nthe object of all science is to describe (with mathematical accuracy,\nwhere possible) the movements of things in space. But science is\nuniversal; evolution extends to the whole cosmic process. Therefore, the\nonly things with which science has to do, or which are factors in the\ncosmic process, are things moving in space.\n\nAs a metaphysical argument this theory seems to us unsatisfactory. It\nconverts, simply and illegitimately, the proposition sanctioned by\ncommon sense, that material things are real, into the proposition\nopposed to common sense, that all real things are material. It assumes,\napparently unconsciously and certainly without proof, that the only\nthings capable of scientific description are movements in space, the\nonly laws in the universe mechanical laws.\n\nHistorically, material things were the first to be studied and\ndescribed with scientific exactness. It is only natural, therefore,\nthat the methods and assumptions which have been employed with\nconspicuous success by the physical sciences should be extended,\ntentatively at least, elsewhere. It is equally natural that protests\nshould be raised, and the extension proclaimed by philosophers to be\nillegitimate--\"impoverishing faith without enriching knowledge.\"[15]\n\"To regard the course of the world as the development of some blind\nforce which works on according to universal laws, devoid of insight\nand freedom, devoid of interest in good and evil, are we to\nconsider this unjustifiable generalisation of a concept, valid in\nits own sphere, as the higher truth?\"[16]\n\nIt is not, however, likely that science will drop a generalisation,\nhowever \"unjustifiable\" in metaphysics, if it works in practice. The\nquestion is whether it does work; and that is plainly a question of\nfact, not a question of metaphysics. We want to know therefore, first,\nwhether things moving in space are the only things with which we are\nacquainted in common experience; and, next, whether all the changes\nwhich take place within the range of scientific observation are or can\nbe explained by the laws of mechanics.\n\nIt is clear that, if the mechanical theory of science and of evolution\nis to be successfully maintained, both these questions must be answered\nin the affirmative. It is equally clear that, if we confine ourselves to\nthe actual facts, both questions must be answered in the negative.\n\nThoughts, ideas, conceptions, sensations, feelings, emotions are things\nof which we have experience at every moment of our waking lives; and\nnone of them are things which occupy space or move in space. A thought\nis not a thing which can be measured by a foot-rule, as things in space\ncan be; the greatness of an idea is not one which measures so many\nyards by so many; a conception has no cubic contents; a toothache cannot\nbe put in a pair of scales, nor can any process of chemical analysis be\napplied to hope or fear. We find ourselves, therefore, in this dilemma:\nif the mechanical theory is true, and science can deal only with things\nmoving in space, then psychology and sociology are not sciences, and\ntheir subject-matter never can be made amenable to scientific treatment.\nOn the other hand, if psychology is a science, then science deals with\nthings which do not move in space.\n\nWe submit that psychology _is_ a science, that our sensations, emotions,\nideas, etc., can be observed, and can be described scientifically, that\nis to say, that their uniform sequences and co-existences can be stated\nwith accuracy and formulated as laws. We submit further that our\ndefinition of science should be based on facts, and not framed to suit a\nmetaphysical theory. A satisfactory definition of science must include\nall the sciences. The definition put forward in the interests of the\nmechanical theory excludes arbitrarily the mental and moral sciences,\nand implies that their subject-matter is beyond the power of science to\ndeal with. The exclusion and the implication are consequent upon the\nsuggested limitation of science to things moving in space, and are of\nthe essence of the mechanical theory. Both the exclusion and the\nimplication are unnecessary if we adhere to the older conception of\nscience, as it occurs in Mill, which claims for science all phenomena\nof which the sequences and co-existences can be observed, described, and\nformulated as laws.\n\nWhat we have said with regard to science applies also of necessity to\nEvolution. If Evolution is simply the continual redistribution of matter\nand motion, if matter and motion are the only things subject to\nevolution, then consciousness and conscience are not subject to\nevolution. On the other hand, if they too have had and are having their\nevolution, then the redistribution of matter and motion does not sum up\nthe process of evolution, and is not a correct statement of the process.\nIf it were an induction drawn from a consideration of all the facts of\nevolution, it would cover them all. But it does not: it excludes a large\nclass of important facts, because their exclusion is demanded in the\ninterests of a particular metaphysical theory--the mechanical theory. It\nimplies that the operation of evolution is confined to a limited set of\nfacts. If the implication is false, then evolution is a bigger thing\nthan the mere redistribution of matter and motion.\n\nThe way in which it is usually attempted to force the mechanical theory\nto square with the facts, or rather to cut the facts to fit the theory,\nis to point to the connection between the mind and the brain, and to\nproclaim the consequent dependence of mind on matter. Now, that there is\na connection between mind and brain is certain. What the connection is\nexactly is as yet uncertain. But the fact that two things co-exist, are\nconnected with one another and vary together, does not prove that the\none thing is the other. On the contrary, it postulates that the two\nthings, though related, are different. The mechanical theory either\ncommits the fallacy of mistaking connected things for identical things,\nor it fails to prove the very thing necessary for its justification,\nviz. that thoughts, emotions, etc., are things occupying space and\nmoving in space. The chemical and physiological changes which take place\nin the brain are movements in space. But it does not follow that the\ncorresponding pains or ideas float about in the air or move from one\npoint in space to another.\n\nFurther, as a metaphysical theory, this identification of matter with\nmind is a double-edged weapon: it cuts both ways: if mind is matter,\nmatter is mind; if mind is thinking matter, then matter is latent\nthought; and thought is consequently exhibited not as being the last\nproduct of evolution, but as a factor in it from the beginning. But this\nidentity of mind and matter is a purely metaphysical speculation: it is\na conjecture to explain _how_ it is that two phenomena can co-exist in\nthe way in which they are observed to do. Such conjectures science does\nnot require: she does not undertake to explain why things are, but to\ndescribe--if possible with mathematical exactness--the order of their\nsequence or co-existence. This function science can discharge equally\nwell whether the changes of consciousness are or are not supposed to be\nmovements in space. Metaphysicians may argue the point; in the meantime\nscience is describing and formulating the laws of mind and endeavouring\nto correlate the changes of consciousness with the physical changes of\nthe brain and the nervous system. The mechanical theory neither helps\nnor hinders science in her work.\n\nBut science does throw some difficulties in the way of the mechanical\ntheory; or, rather, the facts of science refuse to fit into the theory.\nIf the stream of consciousness is nothing but a series of physiological\nand chemical changes, the laws of the one ought to be identical with the\nlaws of the other, and both with the laws of mechanics, on the\nmechanical theory. But they are not. Those concise descriptions of\nmental phenomena which constitute the laws of psychology ought to\ncoincide with those other concise descriptions of fact which constitute\nthe laws of chemistry, if the facts described by the two sciences are\nthe same. But the two sets of laws have, to say the least, more\ndifferences than resemblances.\n\nThis brings us to our second point. Our first point was that if the\nconcise description of evolution, which sums it up as the process by\nwhich matter is continually redistributed in space, is to be proved to\nbe true, it must be shown that movements in space are the only events\nwhich we know to take place. Our second point is that, unless it can be\nshown that mechanical laws are the only laws at work in the universe,\nthis description of evolution does not find room for the whole working\nof the process of evolution.\n\nWhether the only laws in the universe are mechanical laws is primarily a\nquestion of fact; and on the facts, as known to us at present, the\nanswer to the question is a decided negative. The laws of psychology and\nof ethics are neither identical with nor have they been deduced from any\nphysical laws. As a hypothesis designed to explain the way in which the\nworld works, the redistribution of matter and motion neither includes\nnor accounts for those laws which are of most importance to man.\n\nThis appeal to the facts which are actually known is, however, often\nconceived to be in reality an appeal to our ignorance: mental laws have\nnot as yet been shown to be deducible from physical laws, but they may\nbe. So, too, the fact that no attempt to extend the gravitation formula\nfrom astronomy to any other department of science has yet succeeded, is\nno proof that it never will be so extended. Neither, we may remark, does\nit constitute any presumption that it will. Are there, then, any other\ngrounds for presuming that mental law may yet be shown to be merely a\ncase of some physical law? To some minds there seem to be grounds for\npresuming that it not only may, but must. However great our ignorance of\nthe details of the process of evolution, there are certain broad facts\nwhich are beyond dispute. It is indisputable that there was a period in\nthe history of the earth when there was no life upon it; that the\nelements which constitute living matter are themselves lifeless; that\nconsciousness is correlated somehow with those organic compounds, the\nelements of which are inorganic. These facts together constitute an\nirresistible presumption that ultimately mind and matter must obey the\nsame laws.\n\nBut this is not the desired conclusion. The conclusion desired is that\nmind must obey matter's laws. The fact that mind and matter obey the\nsame ultimate laws is a different thing, and rather indicates that even\nthe redistribution of matter and motion requires ultimately some other\nexplanation than merely mechanical laws afford. To the religious mind it\nis quite intelligible that mind and matter should obey the same\nlaws--God's laws.\n\nIt may be said, however, that we have not done full justice to the\npresumption raised by the broad facts of evolution. When there was no\nlife upon the earth, the only laws in operation must have been physical\nlaws, and consequently the laws of life and consciousness must have been\nproduced by the laws of matter.\n\nNow, this argument in effect amounts to a denial of any difference\nbetween the mechanical composition and the chemical combination of\nbodies. Bodies when mechanically compounded continue to follow the same\nlaws as they obey when uncompounded, and their conjoint action can be\ndeduced and foretold from the laws to which they are subject in their\nseparate state: \"Whatever would have happened in consequence of each\ncause taken by itself happens when they are together, and we have only\nto cast up the results.\"[17] With chemical combination the case is quite\ndifferent: the chemical compound exhibits properties and behaves in ways\nwhich are quite different from the properties and behaviour of its\nelements, and could not be foretold from any observation of them. Water,\nwhich is a combination of oxygen and hydrogen, exhibits no trace of the\nproperties of either. \"If this be true of chemical combinations, it is\nstill more true of those far more complex combinations of elements which\nconstitute organised bodies, and in which those extraordinary new\nuniformities arise, which are called the laws of life. All organised\nbodies are composed of parts similar to those composing inorganic\nnature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state;\nbut the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those\nparts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which\nwould be produced by the action of the component substance considered as\nmere physical agents.... The tongue, for instance, is, like all other\nparts of the animal frame, composed of gelatine, fibrin, and other\nproducts of the chemistry of digestion, but from no knowledge of the\nproperties of those substances could we ever predict that it could\ntaste, unless gelatine or fibrin could themselves taste; for no\nelementary fact can be in the conclusion which was not in the\npremises.\"[18]\n\nWhat is thus true of physiology and of those chemical combinations on\nwhich it is based, is true also of sociology and the psychological facts\non which it is based. \"When physiological elements are combined, the\ncombination reveals properties which were not appreciable in the\nseparate elements. The increasingly complex combination or association\nof organic elements may produce an entirely special set of phenomena....\nTheir combination exhibits something more than the mere sum of their\nseparate properties. Thus, no knowledge of man as an individual would\nenable us to forecast all the institutions which result from the\nassociation of men and which can only manifest themselves in social\nlife.\"[19]\n\nIt is clear, then, that the mechanical theory of evolution can only\nmaintain itself by obliterating the distinction between mechanical\njuxtaposition and chemical combination. The obstacles which stand in the\nway of this obliteration, at the outset, are two. First, the behaviour\nof a chemical compound bears no resemblance to the behaviour of its\nconstituents when separate. Next, the laws of the compound cannot be\ndeduced or exhibited as consequences of the laws of the separate\nelements. To these two objections it may be replied, first, that though\nthe compound bears no resemblance to its separate constituents, the\ncharacter of every aggregate must be determined by that of its component\nparts; and, next, that with more knowledge we shall come to see the way\nin which the laws of the separate components generate the law of the\nwhole. Perhaps, by way of illustration, we may employ an analogy. A\nnumber of bricks can be placed on one another to form a cube; a number\nof cannon balls will form a pyramidical pile. The aggregate of bricks\nresembles in shape the separate bricks; the aggregate of balls does not\nresemble a ball in shape. Yet the pyramidical shape of the pile of\ncannon balls is as certainly determined by the shape of the separate\nballs, as the cubical shape of the heap of bricks is determined by that\nof the separate bricks. Now, we do not know the geometrical structure of\nchemical atoms; but, on this analogy, it is reasonable to suppose that,\nif we did, we should see at once that the structure of a chemical\ncompound is dependent on, though different from, that of its elements.\nSo too in sociology, the aggregate, society, is not a human being, but\nthe character of any given society is determined by the character of its\nindividual members.\n\nThis last illustration, however, brings us to a fresh difficulty in the\nway of the mechanical theory. As is observed in the remarks quoted\npreviously from Monsieur Bernard, the peculiar characteristic of those\nmore intimate combinations which form the subject-matter of chemistry,\nphysiology, and sociology is that in them the combining elements reveal\nproperties which were not perceptible in them previous to their\ncombination. It may be true that the character of these more intimate\ncombinations is determined by the properties of their constituents, but\nit is by the properties which they reveal when in combination, not by\nthose which are manifest in them when uncombined. Therein lies the\ndifference between mechanical compounds and chemical combinations; and\nit is that difference which the mechanical theory does not account for.\nThe more intimate, chemical, physiological, and sociological\ncombinations take place in virtue of properties which require the\ncombination to reveal them. In sociology it is not the juxtaposition of\nindividual men, but their co-operation, which makes a society. In\nchemistry, the formation of chemical compounds implies the affinity of\nthe elements.\n\nIt seems, then, that the mechanical theory contains half the truth, but\nnot the whole truth. The half-truth which it insists on is that in both\nmechanical and chemical combinations there is juxtaposition of the\nconstituent elements. The half of the truth which it overlooks is that\nwhen the elements are juxtaposed in one way they develop or manifest new\nqualities, when juxtaposed in the other way they do not. The mechanical\ntheory asserts that the only factors in evolution are matter and the\nforce which moves matter about: it takes into account the external\nfactors, but leaves out the internal force or spontaneity in virtue of\nwhich things in a suitable environment develop new qualities. Doubtless\nthe juxtaposition of the elements is a condition without which they\nwould not manifest their new properties: the redistribution of matter\nand motion is a condition of evolution, but it does not constitute\nevolution. Rather, it is the continual revelation of these new qualities\nwhich constitutes evolution, chemical affinity and all its consequences\nin chemistry, spontaneous variation and all its consequences in the\nevolution of organic life.\n\nFrom this point of view it becomes clear why the laws of a chemical\ncompound neither are nor can be exhibited as consequences of or\ndeductions from the laws of its separate constituents. The properties\nwhich the law of the compound describes are not the properties which the\nseparate elements exhibit. The living matter of biology, the active\natoms of chemistry, are not products of the lifeless, inert matter of\nmechanics; but are different and higher revelations of the same power\nwhich is manifested in different degrees in all. It is this progressive\nmanifestation, and not the mere drifting about of bits of matter, which\nconstitutes evolution. The redistribution of matter and motion may be a\nconcomitant of evolution, but it is not evolution. \"The continuous\nadjustment of internal relations to external relations,\" which Mr.\nHerbert Spencer[20] offers as a definition of life, may be a condition\nof the maintenance of an organism; but life is and means to each one of\nus, and to the humblest thing that breathes, much more than that. Mr.\nSpencer's definition of life leaves, for instance, consciousness out, as\nof no account in life, and would be equally applicable to many\nautomatic, self-adjusting machines. The definition constitutes an\nadmission that life and consciousness cannot be exhibited as a\nconsequence of the redistribution of matter and motion. They appear at a\ncertain (or uncertain) point in the process of redistribution, and they\nhave as concomitants certain further redistributions; but they are\nneither the consequence of nor are they identical with that\nredistribution; nor can their laws be reduced to mere cases of the laws\nof matter and motion.\n\nThe doctrine that evolution consists in nothing but movements in space,\namounts to the assertion that we know nothing about things and men\nexcept that they move. In point of fact, we know a good deal more. We\nknow that men think, and that the movement of thought is not a movement\nin space. We know that the vibrations of the ether are movements in\nspace and that they are also something more: they are known to us also\nas sights, sounds, etc. No explanation or concise statement of the\nprocess of evolution can be satisfactory, or even scientific, which\nbegins by denying the relevance and even the reality of the most\nimportant part of our knowledge. If the \"first principles\" of evolution\nare to be scientific, they must be inductions drawn from observation and\nbased on some similarity in the phenomena observed, in which case, and\nin which case alone, they will apply to both classes of phenomena,\nmental and material. If any \"principle\" is true of one class alone, it\nis shown thereby not to be a \"first principle\": it is not universally\napplicable.\n\nThis raises the question whether there can be any first principles in\nthis sense, whether mind and matter are, to some extent, subject to the\nsame laws; or whether the resemblances which are sometimes drawn are not\nmerely metaphors more or less expanded. Thus we speak of \"weighty\"\nobjections; but will anyone maintain that ideas are subject to, or\nexemplify, the law of gravitation? We speak of ideas as \"coherent\" or\n\"incoherent\"; does anyone suppose that they stick together in the same\nway and from the same causes as material objects cohere?\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer has written a chapter[21] under the title \"Society\nis an Organism,\" in which he points out many resemblances between\nsociety and an organism. But Mr. Spencer himself \"distinctly\nasserts\"[22] that the resemblances imply nothing more than that in both\nsociety and organisms there is \"a mutual dependence of parts.\" That is\nto say, sociology does not herein \"exemplify\" some of the laws of\nbiology, but sociology and biology both exemplify certain laws which\nhold good wherever there is a mutual dependence of parts.\n\nAgain, Mr. Spencer says[23] that \"evolution is definable as a change\nfrom an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying\nthe dissipation of motion and integration of matter\"; and, having shown\nhow and why the homogeneous and the incoherent in the domain of physics\ntend to become coherent and heterogeneous, he proceeds to show that\nthere is a similar process in the evolution of knowledge, and to say\n\"these mental changes exemplify a law of physical transformations that\nare wrought by physical forces.\"[24] Now it doubtless is a fact that\nwith intellectual development there goes a more accurate discrimination\nof differences at first unnoticed, a readier perception of resemblances\nat first undetected, a consequent segregation and classification of\nideas, and a recognition of heterogeneity where homogeneity was at the\nfirst glance supposed to prevail. Doubtless, too, as a result of this\nprocess, there is greater coherency in our ideas. But is all this\nanything more than expanded metaphor? If it is something more, how can\nthese mental changes \"exemplify\" a law of physics when ideas neither\nstick physically to each other nor gravitate to one another like the\nparticles of the original, homogeneous, nebular mass? If mental and\nmaterial phenomena can to some extent obey the same laws, and these laws\nare scientific inductions, there must be some resemblance between the\nphenomena.\n\nThat resemblance cannot be physical or spatial, because mental phenomena\ndo not occupy space, or possess weight, or exist in three dimensions. As\nfar as one can see, it consists in two points: both classes of phenomena\n(1) are objects of thought and (2) are displays of force or power. This\nimplies that movements in space are displays of the same force as is\nmanifested in the non-spatial movements of thought. The force which is\ndisplayed in consciousness as Will appears in space as motion. Both\nclasses of phenomena, however, are not only displays of force, but also\nobjects of thought. The reality of a phenomenon of either class\nconsists in its being the manifestation of Will to or in consciousness.\nThe reality of the two classes is co-extensive with their similarity,\nand is the sole foundation for any true inferences or justifiable\ngeneralisations about them.\n\nIf the law of \"the instability of the homogeneous\" is a first principle,\nand is a scientific induction based upon a real similarity between the\nmental and material phenomena of which it is offered as an explanation,\nit becomes interesting to inquire how far the similarity extends. In the\ncase of mental evolution the essential feature of the process is that\nthe mind gradually comes to perceive resemblances and to discriminate\ndifferences which, though they were present all the time, were not at\nfirst appreciable. In other words, the apparently homogeneous was, from\nthe beginning, really heterogeneous. Now this fact, which is true in the\nsphere of mental evolution, finds its exact parallel in the evolution of\nthe material universe, if the account given above of mechanical\ncompounds and chemical combinations be true. What appears first in the\nprocess of evolution, and is exemplified by mechanics, is matter\napparently inert. But when the particles of this apparently inert matter\nenter into chemical combinations with one another they reveal a fresh\nset of properties, quite different from those exhibited by them previous\nto their combination; and, when they enter into physiological\nrelations, they display yet further additional properties. This\nprogressive manifestation it is, and not the accompanying \"dissipation\nof motion and integration of matter,\" which constitutes evolution in the\nmaterial world, and finds its exact parallel in mental evolution. In\nboth cases we have Will manifested as object of thought; and in both\ncases we judge most truly of that which is manifested when we judge it\nby its most complete manifestation. In both cases the apparent\nhomogeneity is not the ultimate fact underlying everything, but is only\nthe first-fruits of that which is yet to come.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[8] _First Principles_, \u00a7 46.\n\n[9] MILL, _Inductive Logic_, bk. iii. ch. xii. p. 549.\n\n[10] _Ibid._\n\n[11] _First Principles_, ch. iii. \u00a7 46.\n\n[12] SETH, _Chambers's Encyclop\u00e6dia_, _s.v._ \"Philosophy.\"\n\n[13] KIRCHOFF, _Vorlesungen \u00fcber mathematische Physik_, i. p. 1.\n\n[14] MERTZ, _History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century_,\ni. pp. 382, 3, note.\n\n[15] LOTZE, _Microcosmus_, E. T., ii. p. 718.\n\n[16] LOTZE, _Microcosmus_, E. T., ii. p. 718.\n\n[17] MILL, _Inductive Logic_, bk. iii. ch. vi.\n\n[18] MILL, _Inductive Logic_, bk. iii. ch. vi.\n\n[19] CLAUDE BERNARD, quoted in _L'Ann\u00e9e Sociologique, premi\u00e8re\nann\u00e9e_.\n\n[20] _Principles of Biology_, v. \u00a7 30.\n\n[21] _Principles of Sociology_, vol. i. part ii.\n\n[22] _Ibid._, \u00a7 260.\n\n[23] _First Principles_, \u00a7 127.\n\n[24] _Ibid._, \u00a7 153.\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\nNECESSITY\n\n\nWe have seen that if material things can alone be treated of by science,\nif things which can be seen and handled are alone amenable to the\nmethods of science, then there can be no science of mind, and no\nscientific laws to regulate mental phenomena. In the same way, if the\nfield of evolution is completely filled by the redistribution of matter\nand motion, then there is no room left in the theory of evolution in\nwhich to accommodate the history of ideas or of morals, there is no\nevolution of thought or morality, no continuity between higher and lower\nin the intellectual development of man and the brute.\n\nWe may admit that the methods of mental and moral science, of sociology\nand political economy, are not identical with those employed by physics\nor chemistry or astronomy. But we cannot admit that the facts which, if\nnot the proper study of mankind, are at any rate of the greatest\ninterest to man, are not subject to or part of the process of evolution,\nand cannot be reduced to scientific law and order. The methods of the\nphilosophical sciences may not be the same as those of the exact\nsciences; but neither are the methods of chemistry those of\nastronomy--just as the instruments of the astronomer are not those of\nthe chemist. The exactness which is attained by those sciences that can\napply the methods of mathematics to their subject-matter cannot be\nrivalled by philology or psychology. But it is not to all the material\nsciences that the mathematical methods can be applied: meteorology deals\nwith matter in motion, but not yet with exactitude. The intangible and\ninvisible, but none the less real, facts of our mental and moral\nexperience can be measured to some extent by the statistics and averages\nand curves employed by the sociologist, the demographer, and political\neconomist: the intensity of a desire may be estimated roughly and\nrelatively by the \"effective demand\" for its object, the will to live by\nthe number of suicides.\n\nAgain, we may admit that the laws of the exact or material sciences do\nnot extend to mental science, without thereby forfeiting the right to\nsubject mental phenomena to scientific investigation and analysis.\nChemistry does not cease to be a science because chemical affinity\ncannot be exhibited as a case of the gravitation formula. Need\npsychology renounce the claim to be a science because the laws of the\nassociation of ideas cannot be deduced, say, from the laws of motion?\n\nOf course, if science has no other object than to describe with\nmathematical accuracy the exact way in which material things move, if no\nmethod is scientific which does not result in such a formula, and if no\ngeneralisation, however true, is scientific which does not formulate\nmotion in space, then, indeed, it is unscientific to talk of the\nevolution of mind and thought, of man and of society.\n\nOn the other hand, the movements of material things in space are facts\nof which we are aware, phenomena of which we are aware through our\nsenses; in a word, they are sense-phenomena. We are aware of them as\nexisting simultaneously and in combination, or as succeeding one upon\nanother; and no truth, even of the most mathematical and exact of the\nsciences, does, or can do, more than express with mathematical exactness\nthe precise conditions under which these sense-phenomena co-exist or\nfollow one another, or the precise conditions without which such\nco-existence or sequence cannot take place. A mathematical science\ndealing with material things states only and always that certain\nsense-phenomena occur invariably and uniformly under certain conditions.\nThe exact sciences move within the limits of the Uniformity of Nature\nand the law of Universal Causation; and their subject-matter consists of\nsense-phenomena, _i.e._ of things which, as known to science, are\nobjects of perception to some mind.\n\nBut sense-phenomena are not the only mental phenomena of which we are\naware: there are ideas which we do not see or handle, or smell or taste,\nbut of which we are nevertheless distinctly conscious. Thought has its\nmovement, ideas have their co-existence and sequences, the association\nof ideas has its laws. There is a uniformity of human nature as well as\nof external nature; there are conditions under which certain actions are\nalways performed, and without which they would never be done. Whether\nthe body of propositions in which these conditions are formulated be\naccorded or denied the name of science, matters little. But it is\ndifficult to see what are the so great differences between these\nphenomena and sense-phenomena that make the latter amenable and the\nformer insusceptible to scientific treatment. Is it that ideas are\ninvisible? So is weight, yet the gravitation formula is scientific. Is\nit that thought is impalpable? So is colour, so is sound--yet there are\noptics and acoustics.\n\nBe this as it may, what makes things material susceptible to scientific\ntreatment is a quality which is not peculiar to them, but which is\nshared by them in common with things immaterial: it is that they are\nobjects of which the mind is immediately aware, phenomena present to\nsome consciousness, and that they are phenomena which appear in\nconsciousness as co-existent and successive in certain definite uniform\nmodes which can be detected by thought and formulated in general\npropositions, or laws.\n\nIf the theory of evolution comprehends all things, mind and morals as\nwell as matter and motion; if the law of continuity connects all things\ntogether, immaterial as well as material, in a process which moves\nwithout break or interruption; it is because all things agree in the\nfact that they are presented (whether in sense or in idea) to the mind,\nand because they are presented in the continuity of consciousness.\n\nBut the object of the scientific mind is not to observe and record all\nthe phenomena presented to it in the continuity of consciousness. On the\ncontrary, it neglects and rejects many; but always with a purpose, viz.\nthat of ascertaining and describing, as precisely as possible, the\nconditions under which a given co-existence or sequence occurs (and\ntherefore may be expected to recur) and without which it fails to occur.\nIn other words, science assumes that everything has a cause, and that in\naccordance with the uniformity of nature what has happened once will\nhappen again in the same circumstances; that a cause will, in the\nabsence of counteracting causes, produce its effect. Without these\nassumptions science cannot treat of any subject: no department of\nknowledge can be dealt with scientifically if these assumptions are not\nadmitted with regard to that department. On the other hand, if by the\naid of these assumptions we are enabled to reduce any set of phenomena\nto law and order, our success is of itself sufficient ground for\nregarding the assumptions as warrantable and justifiable. For science,\nat any rate, the only question is whether as a matter of fact they do\nenable us to determine under what conditions given co-existences or\nsequences will ensue, or what conditions such a co-existence or sequence\nnecessarily implies.\n\nWith regard to human activity, mental and physical, it is plain matter\nof fact that such uniformities of sequence and co-existence not only can\nbe but are demonstrated to prevail; and the extension of the scientific\nprinciple of cause and effect to the domain of human will and action is\nscientifically justified. The comparative sciences which deal with man\nand his works and words--arch\u00e6ology, anthropology, philology--are\nperpetually engaged in demonstrating, with fresh proofs every day, the\nuniformity of human nature: in similar circumstances men have always\nbehaved in similar ways. To satisfy the same needs, they have\nmanufactured similar instruments at similar stages of development: flint\narrow-heads from Mexico or Japan resemble those taken from British\nbarrows; the pottery of early Greece is hard to distinguish from that of\nPeru; the purpose of many stone implements of unknown antiquity has been\ndiscovered by a comparison of the use to which similar tools are put by\nsavages still existing. That man's words, as well as his works, exhibit\nlaw, order, and uniformity in their growth, as well as in their phonetic\ndecay, is shown by the science of comparative philology. That in the\nface of the same problems similar analogies have been used to produce\nsimilar solutions, is revealed by comparative mythology: the\nimagination, which might have seemed most free to throw off the trammels\nof law and of monotonous uniformity, falls in similar circumstances into\nvery similar grooves.\n\nIf the will of man is not revealed in the things which he makes, in the\nwords which he speaks, and the thoughts which he thinks, it is difficult\nto know where to look for its manifestation. If, on the other hand, it\nis manifested in these ways, then, whether it be free or not, it is\nclearly uniform in its action; and the extension to it of the law of\ncausation seems fully justified by the results.\n\nThe recognition of the universality of the law of causation must not,\nhowever, be supposed to carry with it any implication that there are no\ndifferences between, say, the organic and inorganic, or that the laws of\nthe one are identical with or deducible from those of the other; the\nassociation of ideas may be a scientific and established fact, and yet\nnot obey the same laws as the adhesiveness of material substances. What\nunites all things into a continuous, coherent, and systematic cosmos,\ninto a scientific whole, is first the fact that, whether phenomena in\nsense or phenomena in idea, they are all objects of thought; and next\nthe fact that they all exhibit the universality of causation and the\nuniformity of nature.\n\nWhether this uniformity which binds man and nature into one consistent\nwhole is a uniformity of will or a uniformity of necessity, is quite\nanother question. It is a metaphysical and not a scientific inquiry; and\nthe metaphysical answer, whatever it may be, is one for which science\ndoes not and need not pause. So long as nature is granted to be uniform,\nit matters not to science whether the uniformity is of necessity or is\nfreely willed. In either case the sequences or co-existences described\nby science will continue, under the circumstances described, to happen\nas described.\n\nIt is, however, commonly assumed that actions which are uniform are, by\ntheir very uniformity, proved to be necessitated; and that unless what\nhappens was bound to happen, there can be no uniformity and no science.\nHence on the one hand the recognition of the freedom of the will has\nbeen denounced as fatal to all scientific conceptions of human nature;\nwhile on the other hand the uniformity of human nature and action has\nbeen denied as being inconsistent with the freedom of the will. The one\nside has pointed to one set of facts, which prove irresistibly that men\ndo will the same thing under the same circumstances. The other side has\npointed to the equally undeniable fact of our consciousness of freedom.\n\nThe essential feature in our consciousness of freedom is our conviction\nthat in the present we can do or abstain from doing a contemplated\naction, and in the past, though we did the thing, we might have\nabstained from it or have done something else. Now, whether this\npossibility that what took place might not have taken place is a real\none or only a delusion, matters not to science. If real and true, it is\nindeed fatal to one particular metaphysical theory, viz. that every\nevent which ever occurred was bound to occur and could not have happened\notherwise; but it leaves every truth of science, every one of those\nconcise descriptions of what takes place under given circumstances,\nabsolutely intact. The freedom of the will is anathematised in the name\nbut not in the interests of science.\n\nThat becomes clear when we reflect that the laws of science are, and do\nnot pretend to be more than, hypothetical statements. The gravitation\nformula does not state that bodies do as a matter of fact actually fall\nat the rate of sixteen feet in the first second, and so on. The\nstatement, if made, would be untrue: a feather floats much more slowly\nto the ground. Still less does the formula affirm that all bodies move\ntowards each other--and for a very good reason: many bodies are at rest.\nThe formula makes no definite statement as to what actually does occur:\nit merely states what would or will happen under certain circumstances;\nand it is doubly or trebly hypothetical. First, it asserts conditionally\nthat if, and only if, bodies are free to move, they will tend to move\ntowards each other at the rate of sixteen feet in the first second, and\nso on. Next, even if this condition be fulfilled in a particular case,\nand a given body is free to move, say, towards the earth, the law of\ngravitation does not assert that the body will absolutely, or\nunconditionally, or of necessity fall sixteen feet in the first second:\nit only affirms that the body tends to move at that rate, and the word\n\"tends\" conveys in its meaning a second hypothesis. What is meant by\nsaying that a body tends to fall, or tends to move in a straight line,\nis simply that the body will fall or move in the direction or at the\nrate mentioned, provided that nothing happens to prevent it. The law of\ngravitation then, like every other law of science, from the very terms\nin which it is stated, contains two hypotheses: _if_ bodies are free to\nmove, then they _tend_ to move at a certain rate. Further, like every\nother law of science, it is based on a third hypothesis, which, as it is\nassumed by all scientific laws, is not expressly referred to by any.\nThat third hypothesis is that nature is uniform: if a body is free to\nmove it will, in the future as in the past, tend to move at a certain\nrate, provided that nature is uniform.\n\nNow, throughout all this, it is obvious that science knows nothing about\n\"necessity.\" Indeed, it is obvious that science, by the trebly\nhypothetical form of all its laws, has taken particular pains to avoid\nprejudging the question whether what happens was bound to happen. As we\nhave already said, science takes care to frame its statements in such a\nway that they are quite independent of metaphysical theory, and will\nremain as true within their limits if the theory of necessity prove\nerroneous as they will if it turns out to be correct.\n\nNor can it be said, thus far, that the laws of science lead us to the\ntheory of necessity as their logical conclusion. It may be true that if\nI walk over a precipice I shall fall to the bottom, in accordance with\nthe law of gravitation. But it does not logically follow that therefore\nI must walk over. It may be true that a suspension bridge will fall in\nthe same way, if the supports be removed; but it does not follow that\nthey are therefore bound to give way. It may be true that if nature is\nuniform certain sequences will happen; but it does not therefore follow\nthat nature must be uniform. In other words, the theory of necessity, if\ntrue, cannot be based on science, but must rely on some metaphysical\nconsiderations. Science does not undertake to prove even that nature is\nuniform, much less that it is uniform of necessity. The opposite theory,\nthat the uniformity of nature or of human nature is due to the action\nof a will freely manifesting itself as uniform, may be considered\nsuperfluous from the scientific point of view. But the theory of\nnecessity from the same point of view is equally superfluous. As long as\nevents do happen uniformly, science has all she wants--whether their\nuniformity is of will or of necessity is for her quite a superfluous\nquestion. And if science were all that man wanted, these rival\nmetaphysical theories would be of no interest to him either. But the\npersistency of the attempt to extract some support for the metaphysical\ntheory of necessity out of the facts of science shows that men of\nscience, being men, must have their metaphysics.\n\nAre there, then, other facts of science, or assumptions essential to\nscience, which require the metaphysical theory of necessity as their\npresupposition or entail it as their natural consequence? Probably the\nreply will be that there is one such principle: that of the Universality\nof the Law of Causation. The assumption that everything _must_ have a\ncause may be on the part of science a pure assumption, and one which,\nlike the Uniformity of Nature, cannot be proved by science; but it does,\nit may be said, assume the existence of a necessity in things.\n\nIt does, it may be replied, but whether the necessity which science\nassumes is the same as that maintained by the metaphysical theory in\nquestion, may be doubted. The metaphysical theory is that everything\nwhich happens happens of necessity, and could not have happened\notherwise than it did. The assumptions which science makes with regard\nto causation are that nothing can happen unless the conditions requisite\nto its production are fulfilled, and that when those conditions are\npresent the result necessarily follows. The question is whether this\nscientific necessity is the same as that metaphysical necessity; or, if\nthey are not the same, whether either is a logical consequence from the\nother.\n\nThey are not the same: the scientific assumption is hypothetical, the\nmetaphysical absolute. The former says that things will happen in one\nway, if certain conditions are fulfilled, in another if they are not;\nthe latter that they absolutely must happen in this way, and not in\nthat; and that it is an illusion to imagine that they can happen\n_either_ this way _or_ that. Science allows us the alternative; the\nmetaphysical theory declares that the alternative is an impossibility or\nan illusion. The metaphysical theory may be right, but it is not the\nsame thing as the scientific assumption. Neither can it be exhibited as\na logical presupposition of or consequence from the scientific\nassumption. From a hypothetical \"if\" you cannot logically get an\nabsolute \"must.\" It may be a scientific truth that, if an electric spark\nis passed through two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, a drop of\nwater will be formed. But it does not follow that therefore an electric\nspark must be passed through them.\n\nIt is obvious that the difference between science and metaphysics in the\nmatter of necessity is that, whereas science cautiously says, \"If\ncertain conditions are fulfilled, certain results will ensue,\"\nmetaphysics boldly says, \"The conditions on which the whole future\ndepends are already absolutely fixed.\" Once more, this metaphysical\ntheory may be true; but, if so, it is not from science that it derives\nits truth. The transition from the \"if\" of science to the \"must\" of\nmetaphysics is illogical, though not unnatural, and is facilitated by a\ncertain amount of obscurity, which can be thrown over it by drawing\nillustrations from the past. Thus, if an event has already taken place,\nwe may infer with certainty from the fact of its occurrence that the\nconditions necessary to produce it were realised. And as each of those\nconditions must have had a cause, we can infer again that the conditions\nrequisite to produce them were fulfilled. And so we may travel back _ad\ninfinitum_ along a never-ending chain of cause and effect, always moving\nfrom one fixed and necessitated event to another event equally\nnecessitated and fixed. Thus the whole past history of the universe may\nbe exhibited as a necessary sequence of events; and the inference may be\ndrawn, and for the purposes of the theory of metaphysical necessity must\nbe drawn, that because the occurrence of an event proves that the\nconditions required for its production were realised, therefore they and\nthey alone were bound to be realised. Yet this is simply our old\nfamiliar _non sequitur_ thrown into the past tense. It is true that if I\nwalk over a precipice I shall fall, according to the law of gravitation.\nBut I am not therefore bound to walk over. It is true that the man who\nfell over the cliff obeyed the law of gravity. But we cannot infer\neither from the law of gravitation or from the fact of his falling that\nhe was bound to fall. We can infer that the conditions requisite to\nproduce the fall were present, but we cannot infer from the fall that\nthey were bound to be present. It may be quite true that they were bound\nto be present, but the effect which followed on them cannot be alleged\neither as the cause or the proof of such necessity. We must look for the\nreason of the necessity--if there be any necessity in the\ncase--elsewhere. Shall we, then, say that the conditions of the fall\nwere themselves effects of prior causes, without which they would not\nhave happened? That again is true, but the fact that Z would not have\nhappened had not Y preceded, is not in itself any proof that Y was bound\nto happen. And so we may travel back _ad infinitum_ along the\nnever-ending chain of cause and effect without ever finding ourselves in\na position to infer from the law that everything must have a cause,\nthat this cause was bound to operate rather than that. The occurrence of\nZ is no proof that Y was bound to happen, nor is the fact that Y really\nhappened any proof that its cause X was bound to occur--and so we may\nwork back to the beginning of the alphabet. The fact that B took place\nshows that A actually occurred, but not that A, rather than A\u2081 or A\u2082,\nwas bound to occur. And if A is the beginning, what was the nature of\nthe necessity (prior to the beginning of things) which determined in\nfavour of A rather than A\u2081 or A\u2082?\n\nWe may indeed say, if we like--since no one can prevent us from saying\nthings without proof or probability--that the mere fact that A happened\nshows that it was bound to happen. But then we might just as well have\nsaid it of Z, and saved ourselves the trouble of going through so much\nalphabet to get so little result. We might just as well say that as the\nexplosion or the accident _did_ happen as a matter of fact, it could not\npossibly have been prevented: Z was bound to happen under the\ncircumstances, therefore the circumstances could not have been altered;\nonly one result was possible under the conditions, therefore no other\nconditions were possible.\n\nOr--to go back to the beginning of the alphabet once more--we may say\nwith science that we are content with the fact that A did happen, or,\nsince science does not profess to take us back to an absolute beginning\n(force and matter being eternal and without beginning), let us say we\nmay, like science, be content with the fact that K can be shown to have\nhappened; but whether K, rather than K\u2081 or K\u2082, was bound to occur\nthere is nothing in science to show. If we take up this, the scientific,\nattitude, two consequences follow. First, there is nothing in science to\nrequire or countenance the metaphysical theory of necessity. Next, what\nis true of K is equally true of L or M or Z. The fact that L or M or Z\noccurred proves that the conditions did combine in the way necessary to\nproduce L or M or Z, not that they were bound to combine in that way and\ncould not have combined so as to produce L\u2081 or L\u2082, or Z\u2081 or Z\u2082 or\nZ\u2083.\n\nPerhaps it may be said that the following is the proper way of stating\nthe case: We have reason for believing that, as a matter of scientific\nnecessity, if L is at work it can only produce M, and not M\u2081 or M\u2082\n(the application of a light to a barrel of gunpowder can have only one\nresult). But L was at work, therefore M alone could result. Quite true,\nbut that does not show that the light was bound to be applied, or that\nthe powder might not have been damp. In fine, the moment the conditions\nrequisite for the explosion are combined, the explosion is necessary, M\nis the only possible result; but until then the explosion is not\nnecessary, and the result may be M\u2081, or M\u2082, or M\u2083. A cause (_i.e._\nthe conditions combined) can only have one effect; but until it has\nthat effect it is not the cause, and may never be. Pre-existent causes,\nwhich must inevitably produce predetermined effects, are figments of the\nmetaphysical imagination. Conditions which may, and, subject to the\ntrebly hypothetical laws of science, will combine in certain ways are\nscientific facts.\n\nIn fine, the Uniformity of Nature, in the sense in which Nature is\nassumed, both by science and by common sense, to be uniform, simply\namounts to the assumption that under the same conditions the same\nconsequences will ensue. But this uniformity neither requires nor\nentails necessity. The very form chosen by science for the expression of\nscientific laws proclaims the fact: \"_If_ bodies are free to move,\"\n\"_if_ counteracting causes be absent,\" \"a body _tends_ to move in the\nsame straight line.\" Whatever necessity is introduced into the truths of\nscience thus expressed is obviously imported from without, and is no\npart of science. We may, if we choose, read necessity into science, but\nthere is no warrant in science for doing so. Science is absolutely\nwithout prejudice on this point. If everything that happens happens of\nnecessity, the gravitation formula will receive no accession to its\ntruth. If there be no necessity in the case, each and every truth of\nscience remains valid as long as the same consequences do ensue in the\nsame circumstances.\n\nSince, then, science observes an armed neutrality in this dispute, and\nis concerned only to guard that assumption of the uniformity of nature\nwhich is vital to her existence, we must turn elsewhere for a decision\nof the question.\n\nWe began this chapter with an expression of our full adhesion to the\nview which insists upon the uniformity, not merely of nature, but also\nof human nature. We rejected the idea that there is no science of man,\nand has been no evolution of mind, as a patent absurdity, and a violent\ncontradiction of admitted facts. Any theory of evolution and any\ndefinition of science which fails to comprehend human nature is thereby\ncondemned as inadequate and inaccurate. For those, then, who with us\naccept the continuity and uniformity between nature and man there will\nbe no difficulty in arguing from the one to the other: which of the two\nwe shall start from will depend mainly upon circumstances, upon which is\nthe more accessible in any particular inquiry, and which is likely to\nafford the best \"take-off.\" In the present case the action of inanimate\nobjects upon one another can be accounted for on either hypothesis,\n_i.e._ that such action is willed by some superior power or that it is\nnecessitated by some previous action, which is necessitated by some\nother previous action, and so on for ever, without ever reaching any\noriginal or originating necessity. Both hypotheses will fit all the\nfacts of all the physical sciences; both _are_ hypotheses; and science\ncan do and does do without either one or the other. Nor does our\nobservation of the observed facts of nature enable us to say, with\nregard to any actual fact of this kind, either that it could or that it\ncould not have happened otherwise than it did. In fine, as long as we\nconfine ourselves to the subject-matter of the physical sciences, as\nlong as we start in this case from nature, we cannot find anything to\ndisturb the equal balance of the two hypotheses, which are two\nhypotheses and nothing more. But when we turn from nature to human\nnature, when we consult our own experience of our own actions, the case\nis notoriously different. Our experience in that case is that of two or\nmore suggested and possible actions we are free to choose whichever we\nwill; and our memory of past acts of choice testifies that though we\nactually chose one particular course, we might have abstained from it in\nfavour of some other alternative. Here, too, as in the case of purely\nphysical causation, the fact that a thing happened is proof conclusive\nthat, in accordance with the law of universal causation, the conditions\nnecessary to its occurrence were fulfilled; but it constitutes no proof\nor probability that the conditions were bound to be fulfilled. The fact\nthat we chose to act in a certain way does not in the least convince us\nthat we were bound to choose that action and that action alone. On the\ncontrary, our memory is clear and our conviction is certain that our\nchoice was free. In the physical and the spiritual spheres alike it is\ntrue that, when all the conditions requisite for a given effect are\ncombined, the result must ensue. And in both spheres it is equally true\nthat until the conditions are effectively combined no such necessity\nexists. In the case of our own actions we are directly and immediately\nconscious of the fact that it is our own will which effects this\ncombination. For us, therefore, who hold, with Professor Huxley, that\nthe uniformity and continuity of nature with human nature is essential\nto any rational and scientific view of the universe and to every\ncomprehensive theory of evolution, it is natural to interpret physical\nby spiritual causation. We know from direct and personal experience of\ncertain cases of causation that, though a particular effect necessarily\nensued from a certain combination of conditions, the conditions might\nhave been combined differently and with a different result. There is,\ntherefore, nothing unreasonable in the inference that with regard to the\nevents in nature the conditions which produced them might have combined\ndifferently and with different results; and that the determining factor\nwas a will (not our own) conscious of its own freedom.\n\nThus far, then, the case stands thus, that in the observed facts of\nnature there is nothing to incline the balance in favour either of\nNecessity or Free-will; and that if those facts constituted the whole\nof our experience we should have no reason to believe the one rather\nthan the other. But when we turn to the consideration of events of which\nwe are the cause, we know that our contribution to the sum of conditions\non which the event depends is a free-will offering which we make or\ndecline to make as we like. That consideration would not in itself be\nsufficient to warrant us in inferring a similar absence of necessity in\nthe combination of the conditions which produce natural events. If, for\ninstance, we had reason to believe or evidence to show an absolute chasm\nbetween nature and human nature, an impossibility of their being subject\nto any common laws or conceptions; or if, like primitive man or the\nsavage, we had not the accumulated observations of science to\ndemonstrate the truth of evolution and the law of continuity--then we\nshould have no reason or little reason, as the case might be, for\ninterpreting nature's action and human action by one another.\n\nThe savage, as is well known, does, without any scientific authority\nwhatever, assume straight off an entire uniformity of nature with human\nnature. He jumps at conclusions: he takes it for granted that everything\nwhich moves has a will of its own, like himself. But though the savage\nshares with the savant the impulse to believe in an essential continuity\nbinding together man and nature, that impulse is about all they have in\ncommon. In the savage it expresses itself in an absolute identification,\nentirely ignoring all differences, between the two: the tree or the\nriver has to be a conscious, rational creature, though its behaviour\nbears more difference from than resemblance to that of a human being. In\nthe savant, the same impulse is trained to fertility by being constantly\nsubjected to the guidance of observed facts: man as an animal organism\nis subject to the same physiological laws as other similar organisms; as\nan organic compound, to the same chemical changes; as a body possessing\ninertia, to the same physical laws. The savant's belief, however, in the\ncontinuity of nature and human nature is consistent with or rather\nimplies points of difference between the two; _e.g._ man possesses a\nconsciousness which the river does not, man is, the river is not, a\nconscious cause. Great though these differences be, still they are not\nin the eyes of science and from the point of view of evolution great\nenough to constitute a breach of continuity, for human actions are with\nthe growth of science increasingly seen to be part of the uniformity of\nnature: the human cause only produces its effect provided that all the\nrequisite conditions are forthcoming. Indeed, there is a danger, in some\ntendencies of modern thought, of ignoring the differences and of\nconfounding continuity with identity. The distinction between the\nanimate and the inanimate, which was hardly reached by the savage, is\nin danger of being overlooked by the modern materialist--an error which\nwould be paralleled in religion by a relapse from monotheism into\nnature-worship. And as in the pathology of religion there is a constant\ntendency to substitute for religious faith a trust in the automatic\nefficacy of rites and ceremonies, which is a falling away into mere\nmagic, so in metaphysic there is a tendency, in the name of science\nfalsely invoked, to substitute for the actions of agents consciously\nfree the operation of an automatic and magical necessity. Freedom of the\nwill is constantly taken, or rather mistaken, both by its supporters and\nopponents, to mean the power of acting without a motive, and to imply\nthat from identically the same combination of conditions one result can\nensue at one time and quite a different one at another; and freedom of\nthe will in this sense, and with this implication, is rightly rejected\nas inconsistent with the uniformity of nature. Freedom, however, means\nnot the absence of motive, but the presence of more motives than one,\nfor where there is no alternative there is no freedom, and where there\nis an alternative there is a choice between two things. The fact that\nconscious action is always action with a motive has nothing in it\nrepugnant to the uniformity of nature, unless uniformity of nature is\narbitrarily assumed to be identical with necessity. Nor has the\nuniformity of nature, _i.e._ the fact that the same action issues from\nthe same combination of conditions, anything in it inconsistent with the\nfreedom of the will, unless the occurrence of an event proves that it\nwas bound to occur. The laws of science--whether physical science or\nmental and moral science--are hypothetical statements: if the love of\ngain predominates in men, then all the consequences predicted by the\nscience of Political Economy will ensue. But this proves neither that\nthe love of gain must nor even that it does prevail. The uniformity\nwhich marks the actions of men as often as this motive prevails is\nsufficient for the purposes of science, and is consistent with the\nfreedom of the will; it does not imply that men act without a motive,\nnor that the same conditions produce now one effect and now another.\nUntil the conditions which are necessary for the production of a\nphysical event are effectively combined, physical science knows no\nnecessity to make them combine in that particular way; if they combine\nin some other way, and with some other result, that combination will\nequally illustrate the truth of science (which says, if A then B, if A\u2081\nthen B\u2081), and the result will equally accord with the uniformity of\nnature. The same considerations apply to human nature, and if applied\nwill be found consistent with the freedom of the will. Until the mind is\nmade up, _i.e._ so long as there are alternative courses open to it,\nthe man is free, just in the same way as in physical science, until the\ncombination of conditions is effected, the result may or may not follow.\nIf one alternative is adopted one set of consequences will ensue, if\nanother, another; but whichever is adopted the results will be in\naccordance with the uniformity of nature, the law of cause and effect\nwill not have been violated, the mind will not have acted without a\nmotive, or under the influence of necessity. In fine, the universality\nof the law of causation lies in the fact that, however the conditions\ncombine, each combination can only produce its peculiar effect; and\nwhatever effect occurs can be the result only of its appropriate\nconditions. To say with the necessitarian that, unless at the beginning\nof things the course of events was unalterably fixed once and for ever,\nthere can be no science, is to deny the universality of the laws of\nscience, to maintain that they are true only of one particular\nsuccession of events, and would not be true of any other. In point of\nfact, however, the laws of science, by their hypothetical form, are\nadapted to cope with what is at least as striking as the uniformity of\nnature, that is, the diversity of nature: they apply not merely to one,\nbut to all possible combinations of circumstances. In what way a body\nwill move depends upon the conditions at work; but Science is not such a\nmaimed and crippled thing that she refuses to consider its motion until\nshe has been assured that, of the various conceivable conditions that\nmight be brought to bear on the body, only one can, as a matter of fact,\nbe brought to bear. On the contrary, the universality of her laws lies\nin the fact that they apply to all possible combinations, not merely to\ncombination A producing B, but to A\u2081 producing B\u2081, A\u2082 producing B\u2082,\nand so on. The origin of all terrestrial life may be traced back, let us\nsay, to the fortuitous combination of chemicals which constituted the\nfirst speck of protoplasm; and sundry important consequences can be\nshown by science to have flowed from that fortuitous concurrence. The\norigin of any particular species may be traced back to the accidental\nappearance of a sport or variety which happened to be better adapted to\nthe environment than the parent forms were.\n\nBut, if these accidental and fortuitous occurrences had not taken place,\nthe subsequent course of things upon earth, though there might have been\nno life, would still have been just as much in accordance with the\nuniformity (and the diversity) of nature, and equally amenable to\nscientific explanation. The theory that the first speck of protoplasm or\nthe ancestral variety of a species was bound by a metaphysical necessity\nto occur just when and where it did, is of no use to science: if A had\nnot happened, A\u2081 or A\u2082 or A\u2083 would have done, and the resulting B or\nB\u2081 or B\u2082 or B\u2083 would have been equally in accordance with the\nuniformity of nature and equally explicable by science.\n\nIf, then, in the physical world neither science nor the uniformity of\nnature requires us to believe in necessity, there is no antecedent\npresumption that necessity must be the law of the spiritual world: we\nmay examine the facts of our own inner experience without prejudice.\nWhat the freedom of the will implies is that the mind has present to it\nmore alternatives or motives than one, and that they are real\nalternatives and real motives, _i.e._ motives which may really in this\nparticular case influence action, alternatives any one of which may be\nadopted in this case. The circumstances or conditions in which a man\nmakes up his mind are, until he has made up his mind, so to speak, held\nin solution, and may be precipitated this way or that at his choice, or\nnot precipitated at all, unless he chooses. The fact that in the same\ncircumstances the same result ensues is no argument against the freedom\nof the will, if it be remembered that the will is itself one of the\ncircumstances which contribute to the result, just as the mass of a\nbody, as well as the force applied to it, helps to determine its\nvelocity. The statement of the case then becomes this: if all the\ncircumstances of the case be the same, and the will be the same, the\nconsequences (_i.e._ the determination of the will) also will be the\nsame. But the necessitarian position requires the statement that if all\nthe circumstances be the same, then without any further proviso the will\nis determined by the circumstances; or, to put it another way, that the\nwill does not in any way contribute to the result, which is just as\nthough we were to say that the mass of a body had nothing to do with its\nvelocity. But if the will does contribute to the result, _i.e._ to the\ndetermination of itself, it is in part self-determining.\n\nThat there must be some circumstances present, if there is to be any\nself-determination on the part of the will, we have already admitted;\nthe freedom of the will implies the presence of more alternatives or\nmotives than one--and we always have the alternative of acting or\nabstaining from action. But this admission only limits the powers of the\nwill; it does not lessen its liberty. The mind can only choose between\nthe alternatives offered to it; but as long as it has real alternatives\nit is free. That there must be definite circumstances if there is to be\nany definite determination of the will is in accordance with the fact\nthat a cause is not some one individual thing, but a sum of conditions,\nevery one of which is necessary to the effect, and the absence of any\none of which is enough to prevent the occurrence of the result. It is a\nvulgar error to single out some one of the conditions (_e.g._ the force\nacting on a body) and dub it the cause, to the neglect of all the other\nconditions (_e.g._ the body's mass) which are equally necessary to the\neffect. It is the error committed by the necessitarian who calls the\ncircumstances the cause, in the case of a determination of the will, and\nneglects the part played by the will itself.\n\nThis point of view illustrates the untenability of another objection to\nthe freedom of the will, viz. that it implies that under the same\nconditions different results can ensue, or, to put it in other words,\nthat without any change in the conditions either this or that\nconsequence may issue. Freedom of the will is thus alleged to be\ninconsistent with the uniformity of nature, with the law that a cause\nmust produce its effect. The fallacy here obviously lies in assuming\nthat, in a modification of the will, the circumstances by themselves\nconstitute the cause, whereas in point of fact the cause consists of the\nsum of the conditions, _i.e._, in this case, of the circumstances and\nthe will taken in combination. Alter any one of the conditions, and the\neffect will be changed--whether the condition which is changed be one of\nthe circumstances or be the will, matters not. Conversely, if under the\nsame circumstances a man acts one way one time and another another, the\ninference is not that the uniformity of nature has been violated, and\nthat the same conditions produce different effects, but that one of the\nconditions was different; and as _ex hypothesi_ the circumstances\n(_i.e._ all the conditions except the will) were in this case the same,\nit remains that the condition which was different in this case was the\nwill.\n\nReally, it is the theory of necessity which violates the uniformity of\nnature, for it requires us to believe that provided certain of the\nconditions (viz. all the circumstances except the will) are the same,\nthen the result must be the same, no matter how much the remaining\ncondition (the will) changes. We may, indeed, evade this conclusion by\nsimply denying that the will is one of the conditions of its own\nmodifications, and we may say that the wax contributes nothing to the\nform which it takes on when impressed by the seal. The truth is that if\nthe will or the wax appears in the result, it must have been present and\nactive as one of the conditions: it contributes to its own\ndetermination, and is in part self-determining.\n\nIf it be in accordance with the uniformity of nature and with our\nexperience of what actually happens, that the circumstances should be\nthe same and the will different on two different occasions, then the\ntheory of necessity breaks down: if we can will and act differently\nunder the same circumstances, we have all the freedom we want. But\nif--all the circumstances, save the will, being the same--the resulting\nmodification or determination of the will is different, then the\ndifference of result must be due to some difference in the conditions;\nall the conditions save one were _ex hypothesi_ the same; the remaining\ncondition, therefore, viz. the will, must have changed. What caused the\nchange? Not the circumstances: one attempt to explode a barrel of\ngunpowder may resemble another in all the circumstances save one (the\ndampness of the powder), but the circumstances which remain the same\n(application of the spark, etc.) are not the cause of the difference in\nthe remaining condition.\n\nIf, then, we do as a matter of fact at times under the same\ncircumstances will different things, and if the circumstances are not\nthe cause of the change of will, then the will changes itself, _i.e._ is\nself-determining, self-modifying. And, as we all know from experience,\nit determines itself at the moment of choice, not before. Until all the\nconditions requisite for the effect are combined, neither physical nor\nmental science requires us to assume that they must combine in this\nparticular way--that the light must be applied to the powder because an\nexplosion will take place if it is applied, that the motive of gain must\nbe adopted because it will be gratified if it is obeyed.\n\nWhether the conditions combine so as to produce A, or so as to produce\nB, the uniformity of nature is equally obeyed in either case, the law\nthat a cause must produce its effect is equally fulfilled, and either\nsequence is as amenable to scientific explanation as the other. But\nthough science and the uniformity of nature both require us to believe\nthat when the conditions are combined the result will follow, neither\nrequires us to assume that the combination is fixed before it is\neffected. And this is true equally of purely physical events and of\nhuman actions. This truth, in the case of the latter class of actions,\nis expressed by the statement that alternative courses of action are\nopen to the agent, and that they are real alternatives, alternatives\nsuch that any one of them may in this particular instance be followed.\nFrom the point of view of science and of the uniformity of nature, we do\nnot conceive that there is any difference in this respect between human\nactions and physical events: if science is to include both kinds of\nsequence and to render a rational account of them, we must assume that\nthe principles on which conditions combine or fail to combine are the\nsame in both cases. If physical events and human actions are both\nconstituents in the process of evolution, there must be a continuity\nbetween them. It follows, therefore, that, in the case of physical\nevents as well as of human actions, until the conditions are combined in\nsuch a way as to involve one determinate result to the exclusion of all\nothers, they might combine in other ways with other results--in fine,\nthat before the combination is effected there are always other\nalternatives.\n\nAt this point it becomes necessary to take into account the diversity as\nwell as the uniformity of nature--in this case a diversity which will\nlead us to a higher uniformity. To the human agent alternative courses\nof action are open in the sense that he is conscious of their\npossibility and that after deliberation he adopts one or other of them.\nWith purely physical phenomena and material things the case is\ndifferent: they may be combined in this way _or_ in that; the\nalternative is indeed open, so long as the combination is not effected,\nbut it is not open to them nor is it adopted, when adopted, by them. It\nis adopted for them. In some cases by man. In all cases by that by which\nalone alternative courses of action can be contemplated and adopted--a\nconscious will. The course and form which man imparts to material\nthings--to his implements or his works of art--make them so far the\nexpression of his will; for the rest they are equally an expression of\nwill, though of a will not his.\n\nFor those at the present day who unfeignedly accept the general\nprinciples of evolution and philosophise from them, a dualistic\nphilosophy is impossible. They cannot hold that matter is subject to\nevolution and that mind is not; and the continuity of the process of\nevolution forbids us to suppose that there is any real discontinuity\nbetween that which appears at one stage as matter and at another as\nmind. There is no discontinuity if material things (_i.e._ the things of\nwhich we have sense-perception, but which differ from our sensations in\nbeing permanent) are on the one side the permanent expressions of Will\nand on the other are the transient impressions made on us in the shape\nof sense-phenomena.\n\nWhat is true thus of the content of evolution, of that which is in\nprocess of evolution, is true also of the law of the process. We cannot\nsuppose that it extends only to matter--that the behaviour of matter is\nsusceptible of a rational explanation and the behaviour of mind is not.\nThe continuity of the process excludes the possibility of a dual\ncontrol: either the power which manifests itself in all things is\nintelligent throughout or it is not. If there is no reason in the\nbehaviour of things, but only necessity, then those human actions and\nconceptions which man considers to be the result of his reason are\nreally the result of unintelligent necessity.\n\nIt is the latter hypothesis which is expressed by the necessitarian\ntheory. The ordinary belief of mankind--a belief which it is impossible\nto resist at the moment when you are making up your mind whether you\nwill do this or not--is that you _can_ do the thing or not, that the\nalternatives are real and the motives such that either of them may be\nacted on. The necessitarian hypothesis is that the alternatives are not\nreal, that even before you have made up your mind there is only one\nalternative which you can follow--the other courses are only apparent\nalternatives, because you cannot choose or act on any of them; the\nother motives are not real motives, because by a necessity dating from\nthe beginning of things they cannot possibly influence you on this\noccasion. Your action is as automatic as that of a piano which responds\nto the touch. The difference is that you think about the stimulus\nreceived and the piano does not. Consequently the piano makes no\nmistakes; you make two. You think of various possible consequences of\nthe stimulus--which are all impossible--and you imagine that the one\nwhich you choose is the consequence of your intelligent choice, whereas\nit is the automatic outcome of that iron law of necessity which binds\ntogether the whole process of evolution.\n\nIt will be readily understood that a hypothesis of this kind, which is\napparently in violent conflict with the plainest facts of our daily\npersonal experience, and gives the lie to that consciousness of freedom\nwhich we all possess, would not be held in theory--it cannot be acted on\nin practice--unless it appeared to be the consequence of some\nwell-established facts. It is, of course, held by its supporters to be a\nlogical consequence from the uniformity of nature and the law of\nuniversal causation, and to be a necessary pre-supposition if we are to\ngive any scientific account of human nature and its evolution. If, as we\nhave argued at length in this chapter, that is not the case, if the law\nof universal causation only requires that a thing cannot take place\nunless the requisite conditions combine--and not that conditions, which\ndid or may combine, were or are bound to combine--the question still\nremains, what if any value the hypothesis has on its own intrinsic\nmerits.\n\nIn the first place it is a hypothesis which can never either be proved\nor disproved. The hypothesis is that our supposed consciousness of\nfreedom is an illusion, that if we imagine we are free to choose what we\nwill do, or that we could in the past have chosen otherwise than we did,\nwe are deceived. The hypothesis is not based on any facts of\nconsciousness: it is a suggestion that consciousness may be deceptive.\nIt may: there is no means of proving or disproving the suggestion, for\nany reply must proceed from one consciousness to another, both of which\nare suspected by the maker of the suggestion to be not wholly\ntrustworthy. We cannot ask him to concede to us, in order that we may\nconvince him by argument, the very point which is in dispute.\n\nIn the next place, the hypothesis of necessity does formally account for\nall the facts which it is designed to explain: it accounts for the whole\nprocess of evolution. If everything that happens does so because it\nmust, then the mere occurrence of any step in the process carries its\nown explanation with it: the mere fact that it occurred shows that it\nwas bound to occur. If we ask, \"Why was it bound to occur?\" the answer\nis, \"Because it was.\" Various intermediate reasons may be\ninterpolated--because everything must have a cause, and every cause\nmust have its effect--but if we ask, \"Why must everything have a cause?\nwhy must every cause produce its effect?\" the ultimate answer is always,\n\"It must because it must.\" If we ask, \"What proof is there that it\nmust?\" there is none. As we have already said, the hypothesis is one\nwhich does not admit either of proof or disproof.\n\nThe case is much the same with the opposite theory of freedom. Formally,\nthe hypothesis that the whole process of evolution is throughout the\nexpression of self-determining will is adequate to account for all the\nfacts. But it is a hypothesis which can be neither proved nor disproved\nif the testimony of consciousness to our freedom may not be accepted. We\ncannot prove that the testimony of consciousness is true or to be\ntrusted in this or any other matter. We take it on faith. The questions\narise, therefore, Is it reasonable to take anything on faith? and if so,\nwhat? and why?\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\nINSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE\n\n\nThe theory of Design is singularly tenacious of existence, as many\nerrors and all truths are. Science still speaks of \"organs,\" that is of\n\"tools\" (_\u1f44\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1_), and of organs as performing \"functions\"; for\nthe fact remains that organs are the instruments by means of which the\norganism acts, and that they have each their appropriate work to do,\ntheir function to perform, though science may decline to draw the\ninference that the instruments were designed to perform the work they\ndo.\n\nThe Argument from Design was a comparatively simple affair as long as\nthe organism and the environment were assumed to have been separately\ncreated: you had only to show how marvellously and perfectly they fitted\none another when brought together, and it followed that they must have\nbeen designed to fit--to say they only chanced to fit was obviously\nabsurd. But when science discovered that organism and environment were\nnot thus independent of one another, the marvel vanished: if the\nenvironment shaped the organism, or the organism modified the\nenvironment to suit itself, no wonder that they fitted one another. It\nceases to be remarkable that rivers should always flow by great cities,\nwhen we reflect that men selected sites near rivers. And chance seemed\nto have been established by Evolution where Design once reigned; for, if\nthe only forms of life which can flourish in a given spot are those\nwhich are suited to the place, all we can say is that, if one form is\nfit to survive, it will; and if it is not, some other will. Whatever\nform survives will do so, not because it was designed to do so, but\nbecause it happened to be suited to its surroundings. In fine, organisms\nand their organs are what they are because circumstances and their past\nhistory have made them so: they have been evolved, not designed.\n\nA little reflection, however, is enough to show that the Argument from\nDesign is not completely excluded by evolution: things in general are\nwhat circumstances and their past history have made them; but were not\nthose very circumstances designed to evolve what they did? Nay, are we\nnot compelled to assume that they were so designed, if we believe in a\nDesigner?\n\nIf, however, we ask Natural Science to discuss these questions with us,\nshe declines the invitation on the ground that it is not her business to\ndo so: her business is to find out in what way, not with what purpose,\nanimal life has come to assume the various forms in which we know it;\nand she can do this, her business, quite well--indeed better--without\ndiscussing such questions. If it were proved that the history of animal\nlife upon this earth had been intended from the beginning to follow the\nlines on which it has actually developed, not one of the problems which\nNatural Science has yet to solve would be brought a whit nearer\nsolution; nor would she be any the better off, if it were proved that\nthere was no design. She therefore very properly declines to discuss the\nquestion: there may be a Design and a Designer, or there may not; she\ndoes not know; if it is the business of science to answer the question,\nit must be of some other science, not of Natural Science.\n\nSo too Physical Science, when asked whether the laws of motion and\nmatter were not designed to produce the effects which they actually do\ncause, replies that they may or may not, but that the law of\ngravitation, for instance, is equally true for her purposes, whether\nbodies were or were not designed to fall to the earth at the rate of\nsixteen feet in the first second, and so on. It may be the business of\nsome other science to answer such questions: it is not the business of\nPhysical Science.\n\nAnd so the inquirer may go the round of the whole family of Sciences. It\nis an extraordinarily industrious family. It has an enormous amount of\nwork to do: it has to feed, clothe, and generally provide for all\nmankind. And it can only carry on at all by a very careful division of\nlabour: each science has her allotted task, and can only get the day's\nwork done in the day by strictly confining herself to that task. Each\nscience has her own questions to answer, and can only succeed in doing\nso by refusing to listen to any others.\n\nThe inquirer may think it strange that, in all this vast and active\norganisation for answering questions, no provision should be made for\nanswering what seem to him to be some of the most important questions of\nall; and if he has been brought up really to believe in science, he will\nthink it too strange to be true; he will persist with his questions, and\nwill be eventually rewarded for his faith by discovering that there is a\nscience which undertakes to answer them--Theology. But he will also\ndiscover that Theology is not very cordially esteemed by her sister\nsciences--not that they are jealous of her because she has the\npresumption to profess to answer questions which they acknowledge to be\ntoo high for them, but because there are grave suspicions as to her\nlegitimacy: it is doubted whether she is a Science at all. She is, they\nare afraid it must be admitted, untruthful, immoral, and certainly\naltogether unscientific: she says what she cannot prove, and says she\nbelieves it. But they know she only pretends to believe it: they, of\ncourse, do not believe anything on insufficient evidence; what\nhypocrisy, then, to pretend that anyone can really believe anything\nexcept what is proved by scientific methods! They are thankful to say\nthat they have no \"faith.\" However, she may improve; she is certainly\nvery backward; still, she may grow up into a common-sense science like\nher sisters; and then she will give up the foolish idea that she can\nanswer questions which they cannot.\n\nAnd now what truth is there in the picture thus drawn?\n\nIf there be a God, there is no other fact in the world of such awful or\nsuch blessed import to man. Religion is based on faith that there is a\nGod. To tell the religious mind that there is no scientific proof of the\nexistence of God is to tell it nothing new. Those were not the terms on\nwhich we took up our faith--that we should have scientific proof of\neverything before we did anything. On the contrary, religion begins\nwhen, and only when, a man begins \"to walk humbly with his God,\" to know\nthat he knows nothing except that his soul cleaves to God and humbly\ntrusts in Him. We do not bargain so much belief, and no more, for so\nmuch proof: we give \"ourselves, our souls and bodies.\" The gift is free.\nThe soul shrinks from saying even that it has proof of God's existence;\nit only knows it hopes and longs for Him. \"Faith is the assurance of\nthings hoped for,\" and the strength of our assurance is as the strength\nof our hope. But scientific proof is not the thing hoped for: it is not\nwhat is desired when the soul is conscious of but one thing, that it\nthirsteth, like the hart after the water-brooks, for the living God. The\nhumble confession of our illimitable ignorance is the foundation of our\nfaith and will ever be its sure refuge, its inexpugnable stronghold. It\nis only when, being ignorant, we are tempted to deny our ignorance, that\ntrouble begins. We drop the substance for the shadow when we believe not\nin God, but in some proof of God.\n\nTo the man of science all this talk about faith appears mere folly,\nsheer unreason, a morbid wallowing in ignorance from pure love of\nignorance; and there are others who, whilst admitting that proof is not\nwhat is wanted by some minds, yet are aware, from their own sad\nexperience, that other minds yearn for it, and can know no peace without\nit. And if we ask what kind of proof it is that they require, the answer\nis plain: it is the same kind as science insists on. Then let us go to\nthe man of science and wait at his door: he at any rate is not ignorant,\nand we, if ignorant, at least are willing to learn. That he should\nrather look down upon us is only what might be expected in a man who by\nsheer force of reason has discovered the sole source of truth and built\nup the whole fabric of science. Certainly, when he has taken us over his\npalace and shown us its marvels--the balances he uses to weigh the sun,\nthe plates with which he photographs invisible stars, the\ncinematographic pictures of the earth's past history, his forecasts of\nthe future of the solar system--we are not merely willing but eager to\nlearn how it is all done. And when we come to know him, we find that in\nspite of the marvels, all of his own making, by which he is surrounded,\nhe is not puffed up, as he might have been: indeed he is, he assures us,\nonly an ordinary man. \"Scientific investigation is not, as many people\nseem to suppose, some kind of modern black art.\"[25] It is simply plain,\nordinary common sense, consistently applied; and, above all,\npersistently declining to accept anything without sufficient evidence.\nIn ordinary life, says the man of science, we do not swallow any\nstatement that anybody chooses to make--we ask for some evidence; and if\nscience waxes every day, and religion wanes, it is merely because\nscience has made it the rule of her being never to believe anything\nwithout sufficient evidence, and religion has not.\n\nNaturally, then, we wish to know what is \"sufficient evidence\" in the\neyes of science, since everything, we are told, depends on that. The\nreply is brief: whatever is based on the Uniformity of Nature has\nsufficient evidence. If we are inclined to be puzzled by the \"Uniformity\nof Nature,\" we are soon reassured; it is literally the most ordinary\nthing in the world, there is no difficulty about it. Man is born into a\nworld in which changes are unceasingly taking place. Some things change\neven as the clouds shift--every second, and in a way patent to all\nbeholders. Others change imperceptibly and with great slowness, as\n_e.g._ the level of the dry land or the shape of the coast-line. But all\nthings change, _\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6_. Nothing abideth long in one stay. It\nis these changes which bring all things good to man, and also all things\nill. If, then, man is to survive, he must learn to evade the latter\nchanges, which threaten to crush him, and he must be there in time to\nprofit by the former. Such was the problem presented to primitive man,\nand such it still is for every one of us to-day: the successful man is\nthe one who is beforehand with the world, and, if he is beforehand it is\nbecause he has learned to read the signs of the times and the seasons.\nIn a word, he has learned to recognise that changes are not always mere\nchances, that some changes are uniformly preceded by certain others, and\nmay consequently be foreseen. In the beginning the changes that man can\nforecast are few indeed: his prevision is no greater than the brute's.\nThe child does not foresee that fire will burn; he learns by experience.\nAnd whatever man can forecast, he has learned it all by experience. It\nis a slow way of learning, it has taken man thousands upon thousands of\nyears to learn what he knows now; still he has learned to know the\ncauses of countless things, to control the causes and to anticipate the\neffects of many. But more important, more valuable than all his\nexperience and all his knowledge of what produces what, of what\nuniformly precedes or follows what, is the final and comprehensive truth\nwhich at last he reaches, that nothing happens arbitrarily, that\neverything in nature is uniform. That, the Uniformity of Nature, is the\ngreat truth in which all others are summed up: to its establishment have\ngone the labours of all past generations of mankind, to its support the\nwhole experience of the race contributes. It is the truth of truths, the\ntest of truth: whatsoever is established on it shall not be shaken,\nwhatever contravenes it shall not endure.\n\nThe Uniformity of Nature is the base not only of all science, but of\nevery act of reason in the most commonplace affairs of ordinary life;\nand, though you may not know it, you assume it every moment. Why are you\nsure that the sun will rise to-morrow? Because Nature is uniform. Why do\nyou know that fire will burn? Because Nature is uniform. Why that all\nmen are mortal? Why that a cause will always produce its effect? Because\nof the Uniformity of Nature. For each and all of these beliefs the\nevidence is sufficient; it is the Uniformity of Nature. How different,\nsays the man of science, is the procedure of science, that is of common\nsense, from the unscientific methods of theology! Why do we believe that\nthe earth will bring forth her kindly fruits in due season? Because it\nis God's will? That is a hypothesis; it may be true or it may not; it\ncannot be proved or disproved; there is no evidence against it, but\nthere is no evidence for it. Very different is the answer of science and\ncommon sense: it is that the earth will produce crops in accordance with\ncertain natural causes, mechanical and chemical. That also is a\nhypothesis which may or may not be true. Yes, but it is one for which\nthere is some evidence--the Uniformity of Nature. In the same way, if\nanyone were to say that the result of the next general election depended\nnot on the electors but on the planets, we should decline to believe\nhim, because there is no evidence to show that the planets have anything\nto do with it, and there is good evidence for believing that the votes\nof the electors have. In fine, the teaching of science is: demand\nsufficient evidence for everything, and always remember that by\nsufficient evidence is meant the Uniformity of Nature.\n\nThis sounds so simple and so convincing that we are tempted to try it.\nBut first let us make sure that we have learned our lesson properly. In\nthe course of long ages mankind has slowly accumulated enough experience\nto warrant the confident belief that Nature is uniform. Now, primitive\nman was of course a savage, and knew nothing of the Uniformity of\nNature; he therefore could not have had sufficient evidence for\nbelieving anything in his experience. But it is on the accumulation of\nsuch experiences--every one of which we must reject because they were\nnot based on the Uniformity of Nature--that our belief in the Uniformity\nof Nature is supposed to rest. In other words, it is based on them and\nthey were based on nothing. This result of acting strictly up to the\nprinciple of not suffering anything to pass without sufficient evidence\nseems somewhat discouraging, until the man of science comes to our\nrescue and reminds us that just as we, without knowing it, have acted\nall our lives on the tacit assumption that Nature is uniform, so did\nprimitive man; and that consequently there really was sufficient\nevidence and scientific proof for the savage's experiences, though of\ncourse he could not have framed it in words; and so, the bases of the\nUniformity of Nature are really quite sound. But even now we are not\naltogether out of our difficulties, for granted that the savage, like\nourselves, tacitly assumed Nature to be uniform, was there sufficient\nevidence for the assumption? and if so, what was the evidence? It could\nnot be the Uniformity of Nature, because that is just the question; and,\nif it was anything else, it was not sufficient evidence.\n\nIt really seems rather difficult to get sufficient evidence for the\naxiom, viz. the Uniformity of Nature, on which the whole of science is\nbuilt. And yet we must have sufficient evidence for it, or else we shall\nhave to conclude that Science has no more logical foundation than\nReligion.\n\nBut once more the man of science comes to our assistance and explains\nthat in the beginning, before the Uniformity of Nature is proved, it is\nonly probable that what has once happened will happen again in similar\ncircumstances, and at first perhaps not very probable; but when wider\nand wider experience still shows that what has once happened does\nactually happen again under the same circumstances, the Uniformity of\nNature becomes more and more probable, until at last, if not actually\nproved, it is still the most probable hypothesis that we possess or can\npossess: \"our highest and surest generalisations remain on the level of\njustifiable expectations; that is, very high probabilities.\"[26]\n\nNow, with all respect to logicians like John Stuart Mill, and men of\nscience like Huxley, we must point out that this begs the whole\nquestion. If we assume that Nature is uniform, then it is probable that\nwhat has often happened will happen again. But if we do not assume that\nNature is uniform, then the repeated occurrence of a thing does not make\nit in the least probable that it will occur again. To assume without\nproof that Nature is uniform is to ask us to accept a statement without\nevidence, which, if we have learnt the lesson of science, we can hardly\ndo. On the other hand, if we begin with the admission that Nature may or\nmay not be uniform, but that, to begin with, we no more know whether it\nwill actually prove to be uniform than we know whether a penny, when we\nare about to toss it, will fall head or tail; then, according to the\nmathematical theory of probability, it matters not how many times you\ntoss the penny, the chances next throw are exactly the same as they were\nat the first throw--it matters not how many times Nature has proved\nuniform in the past, she is no more likely to prove uniform to-morrow\nthan she was on the first of days. If it is really an open question at\nthe beginning whether Nature is or is not uniform, it remains an open\nquestion to the end. The man of science need not admit that it is an\nopen question, if he does not want to do so; but if he does admit it,\nthen let him stick to it throughout; and let him reflect that if he\nbegins by admitting it and ends by denying it, he has but gradually\nretracted his own free admission, and unconsciously been betrayed into\ndenying what he began by admitting to be true.\n\nThe fact of the matter is that the axioms of science--the Uniformity\nof Nature and the Law of Universal Causation--not only are not\nproved by what experience we have had of them, but \"cannot be proved\nby any amount of experience.\"[27] Not only can they not be proved by\nany amount of experience, they are incapable of being demonstrated\nat all: \"they are neither self-evident nor are they, strictly\nspeaking, demonstrable.\"[28] If, then, they are not and cannot be\nproved either by experience or in any other way, on what does the\nman of science ground his belief in them? On Faith. \"The ground of\nevery one of our actions, and the validity of all our reasonings,\nrest upon the great act of faith, which leads us to take the\nexperience of the past as a safe guide in our dealings with the\npresent and the future.\"[29]\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[25] HUXLEY, _Darwiniana_, p. 361.\n\n[26] HUXLEY, _Science and Christian Tradition_, p. 205.\n\n[27] HUXLEY, _Evolution and Ethics_, p. 121.\n\n[28] HUXLEY, _Method and Results_, p. 61.\n\n[29] HUXLEY, _Science and Christian Tradition_, p. 243.\n\n\n\n\nIX.\n\nCONSEQUENCES\n\n\nIn the last chapter, impressed by the doctrine that there is no \"source\nof truth save that which is reached by the patient application of\nscientific methods,\"[30] we patiently applied those methods to the\nfoundation of science itself; and we were rewarded by the discovery that\nscientific, like religious, truth has its source in Faith. But the end\nof our difficulties is not yet.\n\nA man may put his faith in science, if he will, \"but let him not delude\nhimself with the notion that his faith is evidence of the objective\nreality of that in which he trusts.\"[31] About that we feel no\ndifficulty: faith begins not merely with ignorance, but with the frank\nconfession that we know we are ignorant, but we wish to believe, in\nspite of the absence of evidence. There is no evidence to show that\nNature is uniform or science true, but we do not mind that: we are quite\ndetermined to believe, evidence or no evidence. That is easy enough for\nus, who are not scientific; but \"scientific men get an awkward\nhabit--no, I won't call it that, for it is a valuable habit--of\nbelieving nothing unless there is evidence for it; and they have a way\nof looking upon belief which is not based upon evidence, not only as\nillogical, but as immoral.\"[32] This is, if not awkward, at least\npuzzling, since science is based on a belief in the Uniformity of\nNature, for which there is no evidence.\n\n\"It is, we are told, the special peculiarity of the devil that he was a\nliar from the beginning. If we set out in life with pretending to know\nthat which we do not know; with professing to accept for proof evidence\nwhich we are well aware is inadequate; with wilfully shutting our eyes\nand our ears to facts which militate against this or that comfortable\nhypothesis; we are assuredly doing our best to deserve the same\ncharacter.\"[33] That also is puzzling. Science sets out in life with\nassuming, by a \"great act of faith,\" that Nature is uniform. She is well\naware that the evidence for this assumption is inadequate, that no\namount of experience could prove it; but, if she is to start at all, she\nmust make the assumption, so she proceeds to act as though it were\nproved, as though she knew what she does not know. These are facts; and\nwe take it for granted that no one will wilfully shut his eyes and his\nears to them, even if he has some comfortable hypothesis against which\nthey seem to militate.\n\nAgain, belief in science is based not on any ground of reason, but upon\n\"the great act of faith\" which leads the man of science to assent to it.\nIt is therefore again puzzling to learn that \"assent without rational\nground for belief is to the man of science merely an immoral pretence,\"\nand that \"scepticism is the highest of duties; blind faith the one\nunpardonable sin.\"[34]\n\nBut the reader has probably already correctly divined the solution of\nthese puzzles: the passages quoted above are not intended to apply to\nscience. The blind faith which is illogical, immoral, a pretence and a\nlie, is, of course, not faith in science, but some other kind, which may\ntherefore be dismissed; and we may start once again with the happy\nfeeling that there is one kind of faith at least which is logical,\nmoral, and real and true.\n\nIt is, then, quite honest and logical to have faith sometimes; and,\nwithout evidence, to believe some things, _e.g._ the Uniformity of\nNature. Here, however, some readers may interpose with the objection\nthat the man of science has not proved that _his_ faith is logical and\nmoral, and real and true--he has simply assumed it. Quite true; but that\n_is_ his faith and we must respect it, as we respect any man who holds\nfast to what he honestly believes to be the real truth. We do not\nimagine he could believe it if he thought it a pretence or a lie. And we\ndo not call upon him to prove it before we believe him--still less to\nprove it before he believes it himself.\n\nIt is, therefore, we repeat, quite reasonable to believe in the\nUniformity of Nature without evidence. The reluctance that is genuinely\nfelt by many minds to take up this position is probably due to a feeling\nthat if we may believe in one thing without evidence, then anyone may\nbelieve in anything he likes. And it would not be quite fair to make the\nrejoinder, What does that matter to you, as long as you are free to\nbelieve what you think right? The tendency to dogmatise, and to be\nintolerant of opinions not our own, is, indeed, strong enough in all of\nus to make us stand somewhat in dismay of a line of argument which seems\nto indicate not merely that other people have a right to differ from our\nopinions, but may quite conceivably be right in so differing. Still,\nthis tendency does not wholly account for our reluctance. That\nreluctance has, in part at least, a nobler origin than narrow-mindedness\nand the ignorance which knows not that it is ignorance. It does matter\nto us what our fellow-men believe. Still more does it matter how and why\nthey choose their beliefs.\n\nThe reluctance to admit that it is permissible to believe without\nevidence even in a truth so undisputed as the Uniformity of Nature, is\nalso in part due to yet another cause. It is felt that to admit belief\nwithout regard to evidence is to invite intellectual anarchy, and to\nleave mankind the helpless prey of ignorance, error, and superstition.\nHence, in many candid souls, a lamentable feeling of distraction and\nhopelessness: to abandon their old faith, even if it has no evidence, is\nalmost more than they can bear; to retain it, knowing that it has no\nevidence, is to open the floodgates of a saturnalia of unreason by which\nthe foundations of civilisation would be swept away. Hence, too, the\nzeal with which other minds call for the destruction of every belief,\nbut especially religious belief, not based on evidence, and with which\nthey denounce faith as the one unpardonable sin.\n\nBut the error into which both classes of mind fall is a simple one. It\nconsists in imagining that if we take one thing on faith, because there\nis no evidence, therefore we may believe anything, even if the evidence\nis conclusive against it--that if we once accept faith, we must for ever\nabjure reason. The error has been clearly exposed by Professor Huxley,\nwho, after pointing out that reason--ratiocination--is based on faith,\nsays, \"But it is surely plain that faith is not necessarily entitled to\ndispense with ratiocination because ratiocination cannot dispense with\nfaith as a starting-point; and that because we are often obliged, by the\npressure of events, to act on very bad evidence, it does not follow\nthat it is proper to act on such evidence when the pressure is\nabsent.\"[35]\n\nIt seems, then, a piece of alarmist exaggeration to say that if we admit\none thing, _e.g._ the Uniformity of Nature, without evidence, we forfeit\nthe right ever again to ask for evidence for any other statement: on the\ncontrary, whenever evidence can be got, we must get it and abide by it.\nBut this only shows that no disastrous consequences will necessarily\nensue, if we frankly admit what in any case is the fact, viz. that there\nis no evidence for the postulate on which all science is built. You will\nnot have committed high treason against the best interests of mankind by\nacting, in this case, on the principle that a man may sometimes believe\na thing on evidence which, he is well aware, is insufficient, or on no\nevidence at all. On the other hand, in another case, to act on the\nprinciple might be, if not high treason, at least mischievous.\n\nIt seems, then, first, that there are some things which a man may\nbelieve without evidence, and some which he may not; and, next, that he\nmay not believe things the consequences of which would be disastrous or\nmischievous. But now what of the things not mischievous or disastrous?\nOn what principle are we to choose amongst them? Let us once more follow\nour guide, the man of science, and ask him on what principle he elected\nto believe that Nature was uniform, rather than that she was not. I\nimagine it was once more on the ground of the consequences: grant that\nNature is uniform, and then all the marvellous discoveries, the\nrevelations of the past and prophecies of the future, which science has\nmade, become things that we can reasonably believe in. Refuse to\nbelieve, withhold your faith, and then you have no reason to believe\nanything whatever, thought and action alike are paralysed. It is between\nthese consequences that we have to choose. Our choice is an act of will;\nand it is on our will that our beliefs and our actions depend.\n\nIn science, then, we are offered the alternatives: either believe\nwithout evidence that Nature is uniform, or renounce all that science\nhas to give. We want to be scientific, so we choose the former. We\nbelieve (in science) because we want to believe, not because we have any\nevidence. To say that we may yield to the impulse to have faith, without\nbeing unscientific, is to understate the case: we cannot be scientific\nwithout faith.\n\nIn logic, whether inductive or deductive, the case is the same. We must\neither believe without evidence in the axioms on which reason is based,\nor forego reason altogether. We want to be reasonable, so we choose to\naccept the axioms. But our choice is not the least evidence or proof\nthat they are true. We believe they are true, because we wish to\nbelieve that they are true. There is no reason except there first be\nfaith.\n\nWith morality the case is not otherwise. We believe in the principles of\nmorality, not because we can prove them, or bring evidence to show that\na man ought to do what is right, but because we wish to believe, and\nbecause we have faith in the right. There is no morality except first\nthere be faith.\n\nWe are nothing, know nothing, can do nothing without faith. And it is\nnot in the dead past, which is what we mean by \"evidence,\" but in the\nliving future that faith has its well-springs. It is because we wish to\ndo right henceforth that we put our faith in right-doing. It is not the\nghosts of our misdeeds, rising from the charnel-house of the past in\nevidence against us, that give us good hope of the future--it is faith,\nnot built on evidence, on a past that cannot be altered, but on hope, on\nthe future, on what shall be as we will it.\n\nThe future is uncertain. But that is no reason why you should be. There\nis no evidence that we shall succeed, that logic can be trusted, or that\nscience is true. But fortunately it is possible to be certain without\nevidence. In commenting on the text \"Faith is the assurance of things\nhoped for, the proving of things unseen,\" Professor Huxley says, \"I\nfancy we shall not be far from the mark if we take the writer to have\nhad in his mind the profound psychological truth, that men constantly\nfeel certain about things for which they strongly hope, but have no\nevidence, in the legal or logical sense of the word; and he calls this\nfeeling 'faith.'\"[36] It is a profound psychological truth, and by the\naid of the theory of evolution we may understand why it is so\ndeep-seated in the mental and moral constitution of man. Primitive man\ncan have had no extensive \"evidence\" of any kind to go upon in\nregulating the conduct of his daily life; and in all probability\nexercised but little power of criticism in judging the value of what\nevidence he had. At the same time, if he was to survive at all in the\nstruggle for existence, he had to act and to act promptly. Fortunately\nfor him it was possible to feel certain about things for which there was\nno evidence, _i.e._ to have faith. And he survived in consequence--in\nvirtue of the law of the survival of the faithful, a law whose operation\nis possibly not confined to this world.\n\nOn the theory of evolution, again, man's wants must have aided him in\nthe struggle for existence; and no evolutionist will doubt that the\ndesire to be rational and to do that which is right has assisted man in\nhis upward struggle. The victory has remained with those who have been\ncontented to feel certain about things for which they had no evidence,\nand to act on faith. It is those who hesitate to do right until\nsacrifice of self is proved to be reasonable, who lose their chance,\nand consequently have been and are being, though slowly, weeded out.\nThose who have yielded to their inner impulse to believe, without\nevidence, have evidently been the better fitted to their environment,\nand the more in harmony with the ruling principle of the cosmos and its\nevolution.\n\nThus far in this chapter there has been no explicit mention of religious\nfaith. We began with the fact that faith is indispensable to science as\nits starting-point. We do not wish to end with the suggestion that\nscientific faith can or ought to be stretched so as to make religious\nfaith its logical or necessary consequence. On the contrary, the man who\nby a great act of faith accepts the Uniformity of Nature without\nevidence, and then resolves never to accept another statement without\nevidence, is quite safe: no one can make him believe in religion as long\nas he holds to his resolve--or in morality either. There is no\nevidence--and therefore he cannot believe--that a man ought to do what\nis right. If he does ever depart from his resolve as regards morality,\nit will be because in his heart--with its reasons which his reason knows\nnot of--he wants to do right, not because there is any evidence.\n\nIn most men the impulse to believe expends but does not exhaust itself\nin reason and morality. There is also the religious belief that all that\nhappens to us is due to a Will not our own, in which we can trust and\nto which we can give our lives. For this belief there is no more\nevidence than there is for science: if a man will receive it, he must\nbelieve in it as he believes in science, that is, without evidence. If a\nman will receive it, he may, on the same condition as he believes in\nmorality or science, viz. that he wants it. Any other condition is of\nhis own making and is an act of his own will: if he says that he fain\nwould believe, but cannot without evidence, that is a condition of his\nown making, imposed upon him by his own will--what science and morality\nboth require cannot be immoral or unscientific, and they each require\nbelief without evidence in order that they may exist at all. What logic\npostulates can hardly be illogical. It can be no necessary law of reason\nto check the impulse which gives to reason its initial impetus. We\nbelieve that science is true for no other reason than that we wish it to\nbe true; and for every man, with regard to religion, the question is,\ndoes he wish it to be true? if it lay with him to decide, would he have\nit true? if he would, then it does lie with him to decide: let him be\nassured it is true. If he would not, let him ask his own heart, Why? Why\ndoes he wish there were no God?\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[30] HUXLEY, _Science and Hebrew Tradition_, p. 233.\n\n[31] HUXLEY, _Science and Christian Tradition_, p. 245.\n\n[32] HUXLEY, _Science and Hebrew Tradition_, p. 65.\n\n[33] HUXLEY, _Science and Christian Tradition_, p. 54.\n\n[34] HUXLEY, _Method and Results_, p. 40.\n\n[35] _Science and Christian Tradition_, p. 243.\n\n[36] _Science and Christian Tradition_, p. 244.\n\n\n\n\nX.\n\nTHE CHESS-BOARD\n\n\nWe began, at the beginning of this book, by accepting evolution as a\nfact, and by asking the question: Granted that it is a fact, what\nfollows? What does it mean for me? What light does it throw on the\nmeaning of life?\n\nThe answers that we may give to these questions together constitute a\nphilosophy of evolution, which is carefully to be distinguished from\nevolution as a scientific theory. As a scientific theory evolution is an\naccount, as exact as science can make it, of what actually did happen in\nthe past, of the precise process by which things have come to be what\nthey are. When this knowledge has been gained, we may ask the question,\nWhat value has this knowledge for the practical purposes of life? And\nthe answer will be a contribution to philosophy, but it will not be one\nof the things described by science as having happened in the past, will\nnot be part of the knowledge from which it is itself inferred, nor, if\nit is a false inference, will it have any right to masquerade as science\nand say that we must accept it as true or else deny the truth of\nscience. Indeed, we found that two answers to the question, two\nphilosophies of evolution, the Optimistic and the Pessimistic, have been\nformulated, which being contradictory cannot both be true, though both\nmay be false.\n\nThe Optimistic theory, that evolution is progress, only established its\nconclusion, that the process of evolution is necessarily from good to\nbetter, by means of arguments which denied the distinction between good\nand bad, and implied that our moral convictions were illusions.\n\nThe Pessimistic theory, on the other hand, assumed the reality of our\nmoral ideals, but was forced by its adoption of the theory of Necessity\nto conclude that it is an illusion to imagine those ideals can be\nfinally realised.\n\nBoth philosophies in theory profess to make no assumptions, to take\nnothing on faith, and to base themselves on nothing but what we actually\nknow to be facts. In practice each of them does unconsciously base\nitself on faith and does tacitly make certain assumptions. But as the\nassumptions made are not precisely the same in both cases, they reach\ntwo very different conclusions--Optimism and Pessimism. Again, if each\nphilosophy treats as illusions certain facts--the freedom of the will\nand the reality of moral distinctions--which the common sense and common\nconsciousness of mankind hold to be real, it is because each philosophy\narbitrarily rejects certain of the assumptions which common sense\nmakes, certain articles of the common faith of mankind. Consequently,\nwhen we find that each philosophy is inconsistent with itself, and ends\nby implying that what it assumed to be real is in fact an illusion, we\nare led to suspect that its assumptions may not have been adequate or\nwell-considered, its faith not great enough to remove mountains or\nexplain the world.\n\nThe conception of a \"positive\" philosophy--that is, a philosophy which\nconfines itself to positive facts, and which is \"agnostic\" in the sense\nthat it does not profess to know what it knows it does not know--is\nborrowed from science. It is an attempt to carry the methods of science\ninto the domain of philosophy, to substitute science for philosophy. The\nattempt is made under the impression that science does not profess to\nknow what it knows it does not know, _i.e._ makes no assumptions and\ntakes nothing on faith. That impression, however, is, as we have argued\nin the last chapter but one, a false impression: the Uniformity of\nNature is a pure--and rational--assumption. If, therefore, a philosophy\nconfined itself strictly within the bounds of science, it would not be\nstrictly positive or agnostic: it would still make some assumptions,\neven if only those made by science, and would still, even if it confined\nitself to the positive facts of science, be taking something on faith. A\nsound philosophy is one, not that makes no assumptions, but which seeks\nto find out what assumptions are made by any department of knowledge or\npractice--science, art, evolution, morality, religion--and how far those\nassumptions will carry us. The bane of philosophy is not making\nassumptions--all thought does--but is thinking you have made none.\n\nCommon sense assumes that the testimony of consciousness, so far as it\ncan be verified by consciousness, can be trusted as evidence of the\nreality of that which is presented to it. Positive or agnostic\nphilosophies, whether of the optimistic or the pessimistic type, on the\nprinciple of making no assumptions, reject this one, either on the\nground that the Real is Unknowable (which is itself an assumption as\nincapable of proof or disproof as the assumption that the Real is\nKnowable) or on the ground that we only know our states of\nconsciousness, and cannot know whether there is or is not any reality\nbeyond them (which again is simply an assumption that consciousness as\nevidence of a reality beyond itself is not to be trusted).\n\nNow, granted that common sense makes an assumption here, as it assuredly\ndoes, it is one such as can only be rejected by making a\ncounter-assumption: to refuse to trust consciousness as evidence of a\nreality beyond itself is to make the assumption that it is not\ntrustworthy--which may or may not be true, but is just as much an\nassumption as the supposition of its trustworthiness is. The positive\nand agnostic philosophies, therefore, do not succeed in avoiding\nassumptions in this matter: they only tacitly add another to that which\nthey have already unconsciously made by assuming that Nature is uniform.\n\nIf, now, they adhered to these assumptions, we might proceed to ask what\nconclusions they deduced from them. We should not, indeed, expect their\nconclusions to be the same as those reached by persons starting from the\nopposite hypothesis, viz. that consciousness is trustworthy. And we\nshould not agree that they were superior to those reached by the common\nsense and drawn from the common faith of mankind. We should only admit\nthat they were different, because drawn from different premises. The\nargument that the teaching of a philosophy which makes no assumptions\nmust be superior to one that does, is an argument which, whatever its\nvalue, we should have to set aside in this case, on the ground that the\nagnostic philosophies are not so ignorant as they modestly profess to\nbe: they do know something--they know that Nature is uniform, and that\nconsciousness as evidence of reality is not to be trusted--or they\nassume they know.\n\nBut the positive philosophies do not adhere to their assumptions. Few\nphilosophers do. The optimistic evolutionist takes back his remark\nabout the untrustworthiness of consciousness, so far as material things\nare concerned: matter and motion at any rate are real, and consciousness\nis good evidence, as good as can be got, of their reality. The\npessimistic evolutionist also repents him, as far as our moral\nconvictions are concerned: they are fundamentally real; our\nconsciousness of the moral ideal is our best evidence for it.\n\nOn the other hand, both the optimistic and the pessimistic evolutionist\nadhere with perfect consistency to their rejection of the evidence given\nby consciousness to the freedom of the will. But here, too, the\nassumption of common sense cannot be rejected without a\ncounter-assumption: if it is a pure assumption to say that things could\nhave happened otherwise than they did, it is equally mere assumption to\nsay they could not.\n\nFinally, there is one other assumption made by the common faith of\nmankind and rejected by positive philosophies. It is that the world,\n_i.e._ everything of which man's consciousness is aware and to the\nreality of which his consciousness is evidence, is the expression of\nself-determining will, human and superhuman, manifesting itself\ndirectly to his consciousness. This assumption, too, has its\ncounter-assumption--that there is no self-determining will, human or\nsuperhuman--and to reject the one assumption is to accept the other.\nTo say that you do not know whether a man's word may be trusted or\nnot is literally agnosticism, and may be the only rational attitude\nto assume, _e.g._ if the man is an absolute stranger, as most\nwitnesses in court are to the judge who tries the case. But on the\nground of your ignorance to refuse to pay any attention to his\nevidence when given is to abandon your agnosticism--if a judge\ndirects the jury to disregard the evidence of the witness, the\npresumption is that he assumes it to be false. So, too, if we\ndisregard the evidence of consciousness on this or any other point,\nwe do not thereby succeed in avoiding assumptions, we only assume\nthat consciousness is not trustworthy.[37]\n\nThe idea that in philosophy it is possible permanently to maintain an\nagnostic attitude with regard to the trustworthiness of consciousness is\nthe outcome of a conscientious attempt to apply scientific methods to\nthe solution of philosophic problems. Science does not find it necessary\nto assume either that there is or that there is not a God: on either\nassumption it is certain that bodies tend towards each other at the\nrates specified in the gravitation-formula. Philosophy must be made\nscientific. Therefore philosophy must carefully avoid making either\nassumption. Why, the very reason why science has progressed and\nphilosophy never moves is that science builds only on demonstrated fact,\nphilosophy only on undemonstrable assumptions. Proof, and therefore\ntruth, is impossible if you start from assumptions which never can be\nproved to be either true or untrue.\n\nThe truth is that it is possible to maintain the agnostic attitude, and\nto avoid making assumptions, just so long as we do not need to form an\nopinion or take action on the matter which the assumption affects.\n\nIf my interests, practical or speculative, are not affected by a certain\ntrial now proceeding in the law courts, I can avoid making any\nassumption as to the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of a witness's\nevidence. I do not know whether he is trustworthy or not, and I can\nrefuse to make any assumption whatever on the subject--there is no\nreason why I should. But the moment circumstances call on me to form an\nopinion, I find myself beginning to make one assumption or the other, or\nperhaps at first one and then the other, though I am just as ignorant\nwhether he really is trustworthy or not as I was when I refused to make\nany assumptions; I know no more about his previous career or his\nantecedent credibility than I did before he entered the box.\n\nSo, too, the truth is not that science makes no assumptions, but that\nshe makes no assumptions except those which are necessary for her\npurposes. The man of science assumes--and it is pure assumption--that he\ncan trust the evidence of his consciousness as to the reality of the\nchemicals he experiments on, the plants he classifies, or the stars he\nobserves. He assumes that they are real. He also assumes without proof\nthat what has produced a certain effect once will produce it again in\nthe same circumstances, that if a thing has occurred the conditions\nessential to its occurrence must also have occurred--in fine, that\nNature is uniform. But so long as he is engaged exclusively in\nscientific work, in finding out what actually does happen or has\nhappened in Nature, he need make no assumptions as to whether a certain\nwitness is trustworthy or not, or whether there is a God or not: he can\nmaintain a perfectly agnostic attitude on both questions. He can say, if\nhe chooses, \"God or no God, two and two make four\"; or, to put it more\nprecisely, whether the evidence which consciousness gives in spiritual\nexperience to the reality of a God can or cannot be trusted, I do trust\nthe evidence which consciousness gives in sense-experience to the\nreality of material things; whether the assumption that every event is\nthe expression of self-determining will is true or not, at any rate I\nbelieve in the assumption that Nature is uniform.\n\nAnd if man had nothing to do but investigate the actual course of\nNature, and had nothing else to form an opinion about except whether\nthis phenomenon is followed by that, it would be possible permanently to\navoid making any assumptions save those required by science. But man has\n(let us suppose) to know, not only what does happen, but what ought to\nhappen, and to decide what shall happen. The ordinary man, in making\nthose forecasts of the future which he must make for the ordinary\nbusiness of daily life, assumes, quite unconsciously, that Nature is\nuniform and that material things are real. In deciding what he ought to\ndo and what he will do, he assumes, without knowing that he is making\nany assumptions at all, that his moral ideals are real, that his will is\nfree to choose this course or that, and that the God with whom he\ncommunes in his heart is real.\n\nLet us now take the question raised by agnosticism as to these\nassumptions, which constitute a large part of the common faith of\nmankind. The question is not whether these assumptions are right: the\nagnostic declines to discuss that question; he does not know whether\nthey are right or wrong, he has no means of deciding, they are too high\nfor him. The question is whether the agnostic himself succeeds in\nmaking, as well as endeavouring to make, no assumptions on these points.\nWe have already argued he fails: he succeeds, not in making no\nassumptions, but only in making the counter-assumptions to those assumed\nby common sense.\n\nThis, let us hasten to add, does not at all amount to saying that his\ncounter-assumptions are wrong: it only amounts to saying that he cannot\nform a resolution to steal or not to steal, to lie or not to lie,\nwithout (consciously or unconsciously) making some assumption as to the\nreality of the moral ideal.\n\nBut there is little need of argument to show that agnostic philosophy\nfails to avoid making assumptions, _i.e._ fails in practice to be\nagnostic. Professor Huxley admitted that the Uniformity of Nature was an\nassumption; he assumed that our moral ideals were real; he took it for\ngranted that the will was not free. We need only point out that the\nattempt to carry on philosophy and explain the universe on purely\nscientific principles breaks down: science makes no assumption about the\nreality of our moral and \u00e6sthetic ideals; philosophy, even an agnostic\nphilosophy, finds it necessary to assume the reality of both. Even if\nphilosophy could be made scientific, it would not get rid of unprovable\nassumptions: it would still be based upon those made by science. And the\nexcellence of philosophy, or of any explanation of the universe,\nconsists, not in agnosticism, not in making no assumptions, but in\nmaking the right ones.\n\nScience, as we have said, makes no assumptions save those which are\nnecessary for her purpose, which is to ascertain and describe what\nactually takes place in Nature. Conversely, it is vain to imagine\nthat from those assumptions anything can be deduced except\nconclusions of the kind which they are framed to cover, viz.\nconclusions as to what actually does take place. To say, therefore,\nthat all knowledge--philosophy and religion--must become scientific\nbefore it can be regarded as trustworthy is simply to say that\nnothing can be regarded as true, except what is deduced from the\nassumptions of science: conclusions drawn from any other assumptions\nhave no scientific truth. The assumptions of science are constructed\nonly to lead to conclusions as to what is: we can therefore have no\nscientific, _i.e._ no real, knowledge of what ought to be. With the\nassumptions she makes, Science can only describe the way in which\nthings happen; why they should so happen it is therefore impossible\nto know. The idea that all things are the expression of\nself-determining will is not one of the assumptions of science; no\nconclusions from it, therefore, can be considered valid.\n\nWithout staying to consider why the unproved and unprovable assumptions\nof science are so superior to all others as to be set up as the sole\nsource of truth, the only fount of genuine knowledge, let us consider\nwhat sort of a picture of the universe they give us. Perhaps a simile\nwill best help us.\n\nLet us imagine a game of chess in course of being played by invisible\nplayers in presence of a scientific philosopher who knows nothing about\nthe game--or who assumes that he knows nothing--except what his senses\ntell him.\n\nWhat he sees will be simply material chess-men moving in space. He may\neither consider them to be merely sense-phenomena, merely affections or\nmodifications of his sense of sight and touch, or he may consider them\nto be real, material things. In either case he makes an assumption. The\nlatter assumption leaves it quite an open question whether the reality\nis something insentient or is the expression of conscious will. The\nformer precludes the question, _i.e._ assumes that there is neither\nconscious will nor insentient matter behind them.\n\nBut in neither assumption is there anything to prevent the philosopher\nin question from studying the movements of the chess-men and the way in\nwhich at every move or moment they are redistributed. At first their\nmovements would probably be rather bewildering; but in course of time he\nwould note, we may assume, that Black never moved unless White had\npreviously moved, and that any movement of White was followed by one on\nthe part of Black. He might therefore be tempted to lay it down as a\nrule that Black never moved unless White moved first--that an effect\nnever occurred without a cause; and that a movement of White was always\nfollowed by a move on the part of Black--that a cause was always\nfollowed by its effect. But if he yielded to this temptation he would be\nmaking an assumption, for--inasmuch as he professes to know nothing to\nbegin with--he does not _know_ that the pieces always will move in this\nway; he only knows (assuming that memory is not a mere delusion, as it\nmay be, for anything he knows) that they have moved thus, not that they\nalways will move thus. He may, however, assume that they will continue\nto move in that way. But with every fresh assumption he becomes less and\nless of an agnostic. He may, indeed, if he likes, further assume, not\nonly that the pieces will move in this way, but that they must. This\nassumption does not, indeed, seem necessary; for if we know (or assume\nthat we know) that they will follow this course, it seems superfluous to\nsay that they must.\n\nIt seems well, therefore, to try to see on what principle we are to make\nour assumptions. It is an ancient rule, and one followed by science, to\nmake as few as possible--that is to say, the fewest that will suffice\nfor the purpose in hand. If, therefore, the purpose of our study of the\nchess-board is merely to find out how and according to what rules the\npieces actually do move, have moved, and will move, it seems sufficient\nto assume that they will move as they have done, not that they must.\nIf, on the other hand, we want to know why they move in the way that we\nassume them to move, then the assumption that they do so because they\nmust is certainly in form legitimate, though it may or may not be the\nright one in fact.\n\nSome people refuse to discuss such questions as \"Why this universe?\"\n\"What is the reason of this unintelligible world?\" on the ground that\nthey cannot be answered except by making assumptions which cannot be\nproved.\n\nBut is that really a good reason for refusing? If it is, then none of\nthe questions which science exists to answer can be discussed, for they\nalso can only be answered by assuming, without proof or possibility of\nproof, that Nature is uniform, that the chess-men will continue to move\nas they have done.\n\nBe this as it may, our philosopher, if he assumes that the course of\nNature is not only uniform, but necessary, is making an assumption which\nis not required for the purposes of science, though it may be for his\nphilosophy. It is, as we have said, quite legitimate for him to make the\nassumption for philosophical purposes, and to adhere to its logical\nconsequences. But in the interests of clearness of thought it should be\nrecognised that those consequences flow from it, and not from any of the\nassumptions necessary for the purposes of science. He will be able to\nshow on this assumption that there is nothing in the history of the\nuniverse, or in the facts of science, to countenance the idea that the\nuniverse is the expression of self-determining will. We only wish to\npoint out that this conclusion, even if true, is not an inference from\nthe facts of science, but from the initial assumption that nothing which\ntakes place in Nature is the result of free will.\n\nTo say, \"Science does not find it necessary to assume the existence of\nself-determining will, neither therefore will I assume it,\" is true, but\nis only half the truth. Science does not find it necessary to assume the\nnon-existence of self-determining will. But the philosopher who explains\nthe facts of Nature on the hypothesis that they happen of necessity,\ndoes assume that self-determining will is non-existent. It is therefore\nquite natural that the history of the universe and the facts of science,\ninterpreted in this way, should lend no countenance to the opposite\ntheory.\n\nThe history of the universe may also be interpreted as a manifestation\nof the Divine will, the process of evolution as a progressive\nrevelation; and if any be tempted to say with a sigh, \"Ah! but it all\nrequires us to believe that there is a God, to begin with,\" let them\nreflect that the other interpretation cannot even begin without the\nassumption that there is no God.\n\nBut to return to our chess-men. A closer study of the game would\nreveal--in addition to the invariable sequence of Black, White,\nBlack--the fact that the various pieces had various properties and moved\nin various ways, some only one square at a time, some the whole length\nof the board; some diagonally, some parallel to the sides of the board.\nFurther, our philosopher would observe that each piece when it moved\ntended to move according to its own laws: in the absence of\ncounteracting causes, _e.g._ unless some other piece blocked the way, a\nbishop tended to move diagonally the whole length of the board. As a man\nof science, he would state these observed uniformities in the\nhypothetical form rightly adopted by science: if a castle moves it tends\nto move in such and such a way. Thus eventually he would be able to\nforetell, whenever any piece began to move, what direction it tended, in\nthe absence of counteracting causes, to take. He might not, indeed, be\nable to say beforehand which of White's pieces would move in reply to\nBlack, but his knowledge of the game would eventually become so\nscientific that he would be prepared for most contingencies, _i.e._ be\nable to say approximately where any piece would move if it did move.\nThat knowledge could be attained without making any assumption as to\nwhether free-will or necessity was the motive force expressed in the\ngame; and it would be equally valid whichever of the two assumptions he\nchose to make. His science would have nothing to hope or fear from\neither assumption.\n\nWith regard to matter and motion, he would note that a piece might be\nremoved and deposited by the side of the board, but was never destroyed,\nand he would infer that matter is indestructible and could never have\nbeen created. As for motion, the condition, the only invariable and\nnecessary condition, of movement is previous movement, Black must move\nbefore White can: the only condition of change in the distribution of\nthe pieces on the board would be some previous change. If the suggestion\nwere made to him that possibly the real condition of all movement and\nevery change was the purpose of an unseen agent, and that real knowledge\nwas impossible without some idea of that purpose, he might as a man of\nscience decline to accept the suggestion. The object of science is not\nto conjecture why things happen, or with what purpose, but to describe\npositively the way in which they actually do happen, or perhaps merely\nto describe the motions of material things in space. It does not matter\nwith what purpose a shot or a mine is fired, or even whether with any or\nnone: the results are just the same, if it is fired in just the same\nway. Science neither assumes nor denies the existence of purpose,\nbecause neither the assumption nor its rejection would in the least help\nher to discover the things that she wants to know. But are the things\nshe wants to know the only things worth knowing? Every man is entitled\nto answer that question for himself. Are they the only things that can\nbe known? They are the only things that can be known--on her\nassumptions. Just as the world can only be explained scientifically on\nthe assumptions of science, so it can only be interpreted morally or\nreligiously on the assumptions made by religion and morality. The only\nend that could be subserved by assuming a Divine purpose would be at\nmost to enable us in some slight degree to argue what the purpose of\nsome things might be--and that is of no interest or value to science.\nShe declines to look for a final cause: her business is with efficient\nand mechanical causes.\n\nThe suggestion, then, that the chess-men may be moved with a purpose is\nnot rejected, but is set aside as useless for a scientific comprehension\nof the game. Invisible agents--and we are all invisible, though our\nbodies are not--moving the chess-men with a purpose, or cross-purposes,\nare hypotheses valueless for science, which aims only at positive facts,\nthe laws according to which the pieces actually do move. By the aid of\nthese laws our philosopher might succeed in reconstructing the past\nhistory of the game which he was watching. From the positions occupied\nby the pieces now he might infer the positions from which they came (or\nthink he could), and so back, step by step, until he reached the order\nin which the pieces are arranged at the beginning of a game. When he\nreviewed the knowledge thus obtained he would see in the process of the\ngame a certain evolution from the relatively simple movements of the\npawns which began the game to the highly complex movements of the queen.\nThen, whatever the order in which the pieces happened to be brought out\nand their qualities developed in the particular game he was watching, he\nmight argue on the theory of necessity that that was the only order in\nwhich those properties could have been evolved. On the principle that\nefficient and mechanical causes were sufficient to provide a scientific\nexplanation of the game it would follow that the higher powers\nmanifested by castles and queens, the latest pieces to come out into the\ngame, were caused by the previous action and movements of the less\nhighly developed pawns--that life and consciousness are due to material\ncauses. The idea that the movements of queens and pawns alike were due\nto the will of an unseen agent acting with purpose is, as we have said,\na suggestion quite valueless to science, because any conclusions it\nmight lead to would not be scientific knowledge. If we assumed the\nexistence of purpose, and even could conjecture dimly its nature, we\nstill should have made no addition to those positive facts which are the\nonly things that science is concerned to establish: it would be neither\nmore nor less true than before that bishops move diagonally, pawns one\nsquare at a time, gravitating bodies at the rate of sixteen feet in the\nfirst second, and so on. It would be neither more nor less true than\nbefore that pawns actually were the first pieces to move in the game,\nthat lifeless matter preceded the evolution of organisms. Above all, it\nwould be neither more nor less true than before that the conclusions of\nscience are the only conclusions that a rational man will accept.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[37] To say that my consciousness offers no such evidence is, if\ntrue, irrelevant. We are concerned with the consciousness of mankind\ngenerally. In astronomy the personal equation is allowed for; and in\nscience generally the observations of one _savant_ are subject to\nconfirmation or correction by others.\n\n\n\n\nXI.\n\nTHE COMMON FAITH OF MANKIND\n\n\nIt is an article of the common faith of mankind that consciousness is\ngood and trustworthy evidence of the reality of that of which we are\nconscious. It is also characteristic of that common faith to believe in\nthe trustworthiness of the Power which manifests itself in that of which\nwe are conscious. The man of science shares in the common faith of\nmankind up to a certain point: he accepts the testimony of consciousness\nto the reality of material things, and he believes that the Power which\nmanifests itself in them can be trusted to behave when it is (in time or\nspace) beyond the range of his observation in exactly the same way as it\ndoes within. But to walk in the common faith further than this point is\nunscientific. It is rational to trust the evidence of consciousness when\nit testifies to the reality of material things, but not when it\ntestifies to the reality of our moral ideals, or the freedom of the will\nor the reality of God. It is scientific to trust the Power which\nmanifests itself in consciousness to behave with the same uniformity in\nthe future as it has done in the past, and rational to formulate our\nscience and stake our material interests on that uniformity. But it is\nnot rational or scientific to trust that Power to will freely the good\nof all things, or to trust our lives to that will.\n\nThe reason of this sharp division between science and faith is the\nmistaken idea that science involves no faith and is a body of knowledge\nbuilt up without any assumption. But even if we got the man of science\nto admit that science would be impossible if things were not real and\nNature not uniform, it would still be open to him to say that he\nconsidered any other assumptions unnecessary; and there is a way in\nwhich he could prove them to be unnecessary. He might show that they\nwere no assumptions at all, but logical consequences from established\nscientific facts. That was in effect the object aimed at, as far as our\nmoral ideals are concerned, by the optimistic philosophy of evolution.\n\nFor the optimistic philosopher, then, who refuses to begin by taking the\ndifference between right and wrong on faith, the problem is, granted the\nreality of material things and the uniformity of Nature, to show that\nthe moral law is simply one particular case of the uniformity of Nature.\n\nThe means by which this demonstration is supposed to be effected is the\nlaw of the survival of the fittest. It is shown that the law of organic\nlife is the survival of the fittest, and that survival is the\nconsequence of adaptation to environment. These two laws are of course\nuniformities of Nature. It follows, then, that there must be a constant\ntendency on the part of the environment to secure better and better\nresults in the way of organic life, for it only permits the survival of\nthe fittest and the increasingly fittest. Man is an organism, and man's\ngood therefore consists in his adapting himself to his environment. Thus\nthe laws of morality are shown to be but one special case of a certain\nuniformity of Nature, viz. the law of adaptation to environment, which\napplies to all organisms and not merely to man's.\n\nThe argument, however, is in the first place circular: \"fittest to\nsurvive\" simply means \"best adapted to the environment.\" Doubtless the\nbest adapted to the environment are best adapted to the environment, but\nit does not in the least follow that they are therefore morally or\n\u00e6sthetically best. There is, therefore, no such constant tendency on the\npart of the environment to secure moral progress as is required by the\nOptimistic Evolutionist.\n\nIn the next place, on its own showing, the argument ends by proving that\nmorality--what ought to be--is nothing more or less than what is. And\nthough that is exactly what the optimist undertook to show--and exactly\nwhat is undertaken by every one who engages to show that faith is\nunnecessary in morality because the laws of morality can be deduced\nfrom the facts of science--still it may be doubted whether the\nconclusion \"whatever is, is right\" is exactly either a law of morality\nor a uniformity of Nature.\n\nThe question at issue between science and faith is, as we have said, not\nwhether it is possible to gain trustworthy knowledge of the world\nwithout faith, without making assumptions, for science itself is built\non faith in the reality of things and the uniformity of Nature, but\nwhether the assumptions of science are the only assumptions that we need\nmake. One way of proving that they need not be assumed would be to show\nthat they can be proved by science. But that way failure lies, as is\nshown by the optimist's ill-success. But there is yet another way of\ncutting down the common faith of mankind to the narrower creed of\nscience, and that is to show that the remaining articles of faith, the\nassumptions not necessary to science, are inconsistent with science.\nThat is the method adopted by the Pessimistic Evolutionist. He does,\nindeed, go further with the common faith than the optimist did.\nImpressed by the failure of the optimist to exhibit the laws of morality\nas the mere outcome of the laws of Nature, and the reality of our moral\nideals as derived from the reality of material things, he accepts the\ncommon faith of mankind in the law of morality as being just as rational\nas his and their faith in the uniformity of Nature. But having taken\nthis one step, having adopted this additional article of faith on\nfaith, he refuses to go any further. He accepts without evidence the\nassumption that there are certain things which we ought to do, just as\nhe accepts without evidence the assumption that Nature is uniform. But\nhe refuses to accept the assumption that will is free, because that is\nopposed to the evidence. He admits that we ought to choose certain\nthings, but denies that we can choose them; and his forecast of the\nfuture is in accordance with the premises from which it is inferred. It\nis a pessimistic picture of man being steadily driven to do the things\nthat he ought not, ending with the triumph of what must be over what\nought to be, of physical necessity over the morally right.\n\nThe object of science is to discover what we ought to believe, to\nsubstitute reasoned knowledge for ignorant conjecture; and the\nfundamental faith of science is that we ought not to believe anything\nthat is contrary to the uniformity of Nature. Nothing ought to shake our\nfaith in that article of our creed: no amount of evidence will convince\na really scientific man, a true believer in the faith, that any alleged\nviolation of the uniformity of Nature can be real. No amount of evidence\nwould be sufficient, for instance, to warrant the belief in miracles.\nEither the alleged violation is only apparent, and will, with further\nknowledge, turn out to be a fresh instance of the truth that Nature is\nuniform; or else the evidence will prove on examination to be\nuntrustworthy. To admit that any evidence could suffice for such a\npurpose would be to admit that the uniformity of Nature is not the\nfundamental reality in the world of science, or the ultimate base of our\nknowledge of what does actually take place in Nature.\n\nA little reflection is enough to show that this is an entirely\nself-consistent line to take up. No amount of evidence can shake what is\nitself built on no evidence. If the belief in the uniformity of Nature\ndepended on evidence in its favour, then evidence against it might\noverthrow it. But, as it rests on faith, it is superior to evidence.\n\nNow, what is true and self-consistent in the case of science in its own\nsphere is equally so in the case of morality. It is the common belief of\nmankind that we can, and are able to, choose what is right; and just as\nno amount of evidence will convince a really scientific mind that a\nviolation of the uniformity of Nature is possible, so there is no\nevidence which will convince a really moral man that he could not have\ndone right when he did do what was wrong. \"We ought, therefore we can,\"\ndoes not exactly express the facts. Rather, it is the other way: we can\nlove, be merciful, tender, compassionate, therefore we ought. Liberty\nitself is a law to the free, the source of moral obligation, the gift of\nHim \"whose service is perfect freedom.\"\n\nThe pessimist, then, who thinks, by producing evidence, to show that\nwhat ought to be cannot be, is adopting in morality a form of argument\nwhich in science, when it is a question of miracles, he condemns as\ninherently vicious and illogical. Further, the evidence which he does\nproduce is not altogether above suspicion. It takes the form of the\nstatement that the uniformity of Nature is a uniformity of necessity and\nnot of a will freely purposing a good end by means of a voluntary\nuniformity.\n\nIf that statement could be proved to be a logical consequence from the\nfacts of science, then it would indeed be proved that one article in the\ncommon creed of mankind was inconsistent with the rest. But, as we have\nargued already, it is not implied either in the admitted uniformity of\nNature or in any of the facts deducible from it. To revert to the simile\nof the chess-board, it is as though one should say that because Black\ncould not have moved his knight unless White had moved his pawn,\ntherefore White was bound to move the pawn.\n\nWe cannot, therefore, consider that the pessimist has succeeded in\nshowing that the articles of the common faith which he accepts require\nin their logical consequences the rejection of the rest. In saying that\nman ought to choose the right, but has no choice between right and\nwrong, he is not formulating a consequence of the facts of science, he\nis simply assuming without evidence the existence of a universal\nnecessity of which the changes in Nature and the actions of man are but\nthe varying though inevitable expression--an assumption which\ninvalidates morality without adding to the truth of science.\n\nThere are those whose belief in demonology furnishes them with a reason\nand an excuse for the misdeeds of man. The belief in necessity exhibits\ndemonology as a doctrine of science: man would fain do right, but the\nuniformity, which is the necessity, of Nature allows him no choice. It\nis Nature, the environment, which is the abode and headquarters of\nnecessity, the enemy of the ethical process, the arch-demon of\nscientific demonology. And the proof that he exists is that he must.\nWhat must be, must be, because it must.\n\nThe attempt to render morality scientific ends in a result fatal to\nmorality; and the reason seems clear. It is that science is not\nmorality, nor are the principles of science those of morality. Science\nis knowledge, morality is action. Knowledge, to be knowledge, has to\npresuppose that Nature is uniform and that the things it deals with are\nreal. So, too, action, to be moral, requires the belief that our moral\nideals are real and that we are free to choose between good and evil.\nThe optimist who would have us believe that science includes all the\nremaining articles of the common faith, and the pessimist who argues\nthat it excludes them, alike fall into the error of imagining that\nscience, the knowledge of what is, is the whole of knowledge, and that\nthe assumptions which are required in order to describe what is will\nenable us to do and to know what ought to be. Science, which is a true\ndescription of part of our experience, becomes a misleading half-truth\nwhen it is offered as an exhaustive account of the whole. If, knowing\nthe rules of chess and having a record of the moves in a solitary (and\nunfinished) game, we refused to inquire why the pieces moved, on the\nground that if we succeeded in the inquiry we should have made no\naddition to our knowledge of the way in which the pieces do move, we\nshould never understand the game. But we should be nearer the truth than\nif we assumed that a piece caused its own movements or those of the\nother pieces; and that will or purpose was quite incompatible with the\nuniformity of their movements.\n\nThe fact is that we have to play the game--we are not merely\nspectators--and as a matter of fact, also, men do assume that they can\nfreely choose what moves they will make and that there are certain moves\nwhich they ought to make. The assumptions which they make, not exactly\nfor the sake of playing the game, but in the act of playing it, are\nneither included in the assumptions of science nor excluded by them. To\nplay the game at all, it is necessary to have some knowledge (or to act\nas though we had some knowledge) of how the pieces move, to know that\nbishops move diagonally, that bodies tend to gravitate at a certain\nrate. Man cannot indeed act or make the slightest movement without\ndeflecting or starting some of the processes of Nature and of his own\npsychological mechanism: it is through them that he operates, and by\nmeans of them that he plays the game. In the beginning he has but little\nknowledge of what the consequences will be if he touches this or that\nspring of the mechanism. Yet the knowledge is necessary for him, if he\nis to play the game as he ought, _i.e._ to attain the moral ideals of\nwhich he is more or less (less at first) conscious. In acquiring this\nknowledge he uses his faculty of abstraction, that is his power of\nconcentrating his attention on one aspect of a thing or problem, to the\nexclusion of the rest, in order to gain a clearer knowledge of it by\ngiving it his undivided and undistracted attention. Thus, in order to\nunderstand how the mechanism of Nature or human nature actually does\nact, he concentrates his attention on the working of that mechanism in\nthe abstract, _i.e._ wholly apart from the fact that it is at times\nstarted, at times interrupted, or redirected for the sake of realising\n(or thwarting) his ideals. The knowledge thus gained is science, and is,\naccording to the agnostic, the optimist, and the pessimist, the only\nknowledge that man can have.\n\nBut it is clear that man can and does reflect, not only on the way in\nwhich the mechanism acts, but also on the use to which he puts it and\nthe relation of that use to his ideals. These reflections may add\nnothing to his science, to his knowledge that rooks when moved must be\nmoved parallel to the sides of the board, but they do add to his\nknowledge of the game. In fine, man gains a more important part of that\nknowledge by or in playing the game than he does by studying the rules.\nThe rules acquaint him with the resources which are at his disposal, the\ncapacities of the various pieces and the powers of the various forces of\nNature or human nature. But it would be absurd to pass this off as a\ncomplete knowledge of the game. We may, by playing the game, add only to\nour knowledge of how the game ought to be played, of how the mechanism\nof Nature and human nature ought to be used, and not add to our\nknowledge of the fact that if and when the mechanism is set agoing it\nacts in the way described by science. But the one kind of knowledge,\nthough not science, is just as true as the other, on the same terms,\nviz. if you accept the assumptions presupposed by it.\n\nScience, then, is from the very terms of its constitution abstract,\n_i.e._ essentially incomplete. The very terms on which alone science is\npossible are that it shall study one aspect only of Nature, the\nmechanical, and shall ascertain what conclusions follow if we confine\nour attention to the mechanical factors and neglect certain other\nfactors--the freedom of the will, final causes, and the moral and\n\u00e6sthetic ideals--which, though voluntarily neglected for the moment, are\nyet known to be important factors in the game of life as it is played by\nus. As often as we act, however, we set those factors, temporarily\nneglected by science, in action; and there is no reason why, when we\nhave acted, we should not reflect upon our action, disengage the\nassumptions which are presupposed by our actions, and then reconsider\nthe world and life in the light of the assumptions on which our actions\nand the actions of all men are based, viz. the freedom of the will and\nthe reality of our ideals. Thus viewed, the world becomes the scene and\nlife the opportunity of using the forces of Nature and our own\npsychological mechanism for the purpose of achieving the ideal.\n\nBut free-will and the moral ideal are not the only factors in the world\nas it is presented to the common consciousness, or in life as it is\ncarried on by humanity, which are neglected by science, and which have\nto be restored by subsequent reflection, if we wish to see life true and\nsee it whole. Science declines to entertain the question why things\nhappen, or whether there is any purpose in events; and moral faith only\nguarantees that there is that which man ought to do, and that he is free\nto do it. But science, in neglecting the action of final causes, omits\na factor which not only must be replaced before we can have any adequate\nunderstanding of the part which man plays in the world, but which, by\nthe testimony of the common consciousness of mankind, manifests itself\nin the phenomena of Nature.\n\nThe description which science gives of the sequences and co-existences\nof material and physical phenomena is consistent with itself, and is all\nthat is required by the assumptions of science. It is only when we\nreflect upon the further assumptions which we make, or rather act upon\nas moral agents, that we find science inadequate or--if it professes to\nbe the whole account of the world and man--misleading. And it is only by\nrestoring those factors for which our moral consciousness is the\nevidence that we can remedy the defect or correct the error. The attempt\nmade by the optimist to dispense with the testimony of consciousness to\nthe reality of the moral law, and the attempt of the pessimist to\ndispense with the freedom of the will, were both failures.\n\nIn the same way, both the scientific and the moral interpretation of the\nworld are judged by the religious consciousness to be abstract, and are\nseen, when viewed in the light of its presuppositions, to be inadequate,\nif not misleading. The inadequacy of the moral assumptions which are\nmade by the common consciousness of mankind is manifest, when we\nreflect that while those assumptions serve to decide the question--left\nopen by science--as to the \"Why?\" of human actions, they do not decide\nthe same question as to the events of Nature, but leave it open as it\nwas left by science, whether final or mechanical causation is the\nultimate explanation of Nature.\n\nThe problem what we are to do and to think in life and of life is\none which for its solution requires that the whole of our experience\nshould be taken into account: if it is to account for the sum total\nof the facts of which we are conscious, it must take for its basis\nthe totality of those facts and nothing less extensive. It is true\nthat the very vastness of the field to be surveyed--the whole of the\ncommon consciousness of mankind--makes a division of labour\nnecessary, and compels us to concentrate ourselves at different\ntimes on different aspects of it, and to treat each of the phases of\nour experience--religious, moral, and scientific experience--for the\nmoment as though it alone existed. But it is equally true that this\nisolation of first one phase and then the other is merely a\ntemporary device, designed and adopted for a purpose; and that that\npurpose is to enable us ultimately to bring the whole of our\nexperience to bear on the problem of what to do and to think.\n\nLegitimate as it is, when we are working at the details of the problem,\nto distinguish the moral consciousness from the scientific, and the\nreligious consciousness from the moral, it is necessary to bear in mind\nthat these distinctions are merely abstractions. In thought we may and\ndo so distinguish, but in fact and experience consciousness is a unity.\nThe same man who is conscious of sense-phenomena is also conscious of\nmoral obligation: the \"I\" which is conscious of moral experience is the\nsame \"I\" that is conscious of spiritual experience.\n\nFurther, the evidence which we have for the three kinds of\nexperience--scientific, moral, and spiritual--is the same: it is the\nevidence of consciousness--the only evidence that we can have of\nanything. That witness, if discredited at all, is discredited for all in\nall. If discredited, it must be by its own testimony, for we have no\nother witness which can give evidence against it. But we hope that it is\ntrue: the man of science is so certain of its truth, in the department\nin which he is most familiar with it and has the best right to speak of\nit, that he lays it down as a rule that there simply can be no evidence\nof an exception to the uniformity of Nature. The moralist is equally\ncertain that no exception to the law of moral obligation is possible;\nthe religious mind that there can be none to the universality of the\nDivine love. To the unity of consciousness corresponds the unity of our\nfaith in its trustworthiness. Scientific and moral faith are not\ndifferent from religious faith; they are but phases of the same. The\ncommon faith of mankind is not a synthesis formed artificially by adding\nthe three together; on the contrary, the three are artificially\ndistinguished by thought--they do not correspond to fact, but are\nabstractions from the facts, and are formed by the suppression of facts.\n\nThe religious consciousness is itself abstract; and as an abstraction,\n_i.e._ if taken to be the whole of what we know and feel and do, is\ncapable of leading to false conclusions: no religious belief can stand\npermanently which runs counter to the facts of science or the moral\nfaith of mankind. No amount of spiritual experience will add to our\nknowledge of chemistry or physics, or be valid evidence against any\ntruth of science. It may serve to prevent the premature acceptance of\nsomething too hastily put forward as a scientific fact, in the same way\nthat science may overthrow a belief erroneously supposed to be\nreligious.\n\nBut though the religious consciousness is an abstraction, in the same\nsense that the scientific and moral consciousness are abstractions, each\nis valid in its own sphere; and the whole evidence of consciousness in\nall its three phases must be taken together, if we are to elicit any\nuniversal principles of thought and action, any unity in our experience,\nany purpose in evolution. From this point of view we shall expect to\nfind a unity of experience corresponding to the unity of consciousness,\nand to discover that there is a fundamental identity underlying the\napparent diversity in that reality of which in consciousness we are\naware. What gives this unity to experience is the permanence which we\nattribute to the real, in whatever way the real is apprehended: the\nreal, whether apprehended in sense-experience or in moral conviction or\nin spiritual experience, is characterised by permanence, as\ndistinguished from the passing feelings with which we view it and from\nthe transient experience we have of it. The reality of the things of\nwhich we are aware through our senses is conceived as something\npermanent, and is implied to be so conceived by all theories of\nevolution which wish to be taken seriously. The permanence of moral\nobligation is not conceived by those who are genuinely convinced of its\nreality to vary or to come and go with the flickering gleams of our\nmoral resolutions. Nor when spiritual light is withdrawn from our hearts\nis it supposed, by those who believe it to be the light of God's\ncountenance, to be quenched for the time.\n\nThe fundamental identity of the real throughout its diversity is what is\npostulated by science when it explains the process of evolution by means\nof the law of continuity. It is equally postulated by the moral\nphilosopher who claims objective validity for the moral law on the\nground that it is the same for all rational minds. It is the faith of\nthe religious mind which not only feels the Divine love in its own\nheart, and finds it every time it obeys the conscience, but also divines\nit in the uniformity of Nature and throughout the process of evolution.\n\nThe identity of the real does not lie in the mere fact that we are\nconscious of it. The real things of which we are conscious have, indeed,\nas one feature common to them all, the fact that we are conscious of\nthem. But the identity of the real is not created by nor a mere\nexpression of the unity of our consciousness. It is not the\nunderstanding which makes Nature--save in the purely psychological way\nin which apperception does; on the contrary, the things of which we are\nconscious in sense-perception are given as independent of us, though\nsense-phenomena are obviously not. In the same way, the reality of the\nmoral law is conceived, in the very act by which we recognise it as\nbinding on us, to be something independent of us; nor is God's love\ntowards us dependent on our merits, or existent only when we recognise\nit.\n\nIf, then, we are to gather up the permanence, the identity, and the\nindependence of the real into the unity of a single principle, if we are\nto interpret the law of continuity in the light of the whole of our\nexperience, we must look to the Divine will. In it we shall find the\nreality which is progressively revealed in the law of continuity; in it\nwe shall find the permanence and the independence without which reality\nhas no meaning; in it the changeless and eternal identity of Him whose\nproperty it is ever to have mercy and always to be the same. Then,\nperhaps, we may extend the principle of scientific method so as to\ninclude the whole of our experience and to make the whole of our\nknowledge truly scientific; for to the uniformity of Nature and of human\nnature we shall add the uniformity of the Divine nature, or, rather, we\nshall see in the former the expression of the latter. But it is not the\nagnostic who will thus enlarge the bounds of science, or open a page of\nknowledge rich with the spoils of faith.\n\n\n\n\nXII.\n\nPROGRESS\n\n\nThe artificial nature of the abstraction which distinguishes the\nscientific from the moral and the religious consciousness, as well as\nthe impossibility of simultaneously exercising faith and repressing it,\nis plainly exhibited in the optimistic interpretation of evolution. The\npremises from which it starts are faith in the uniformity of Nature and\nbelief in the reality of material things. The conclusions which it\nreaches constitute a _non sequitur_ if they are supposed to follow from\nthe avowed premises, and only command assent when we tacitly assume\ncertain moral and religious presuppositions which, if not avowed in the\noptimist's argument, are instinctively supplied by the moral and\nreligious consciousness of the optimist's disciples. That the process of\nevolution on the whole has been and will be a process of progress\nfollows logically enough from the optimist's avowed premises, if by\nprogress we mean the survival of those best fitted to survive--that is,\nif we empty the notion of progress of all moral meaning. But as the\nconclusion that evolution is progress is the conclusion which is\nnecessary for the justification of the common faith of mankind, the\nillogical nature of the optimist's process of inference is apt to be\noverlooked in consideration of the satisfactory termination of his\nargument.\n\nIt is, however, necessary, in the interests of clearness of thought as\nwell as of the moral and religious consciousness, that the conception of\nprogress thus thoughtlessly emptied of meaning by the optimist should\nhave its context restored. This service--a service essential as a\npreliminary to every theory of evolution--was rendered by one in whom\nthe moral consciousness spoke with force--Professor Huxley. To him is\ndue the demonstration that adaptation to environment, so far from being\nthe cause of progress, counteracts it; so far from being man's ideal, it\nis that which resists the realisation of his ideals. Progress is\neffected, according to Professor Huxley, not by adaptation to but\nadaptation of the environment, and consists in approximating to the\nideals of art and morality--which ideals are not accounted for, as\nideals, by the fact that they are the outcome of evolution, because evil\nhas been evolved as well as good. Why approximation to the ideal of\nreligion--love of God as well as of one's neighbour--should not\ncontribute to progress does not appear. If, however, we add it, and also\nadd the ideal of science, viz. truth, then progress will be the\ncontinuous approximation to the ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, and\nholiness; and human evolution, so far as evolution is progress, will be\nthe progressive revelation of the ideal in and to man.\n\nTwo things are implied in this conception of evolution: the first is\nthat evolution may or may not in any given case be progress; the next\nthat we have a means of judging, a canon whereby to determine, whether\nevolution is progress. Both points are illustrated by the argument of\nProfessor Huxley, who uses the moral ideals as a test whereby to judge\nthe process of evolution, and decides that evolution has been\nprogressive in the past and will be regressive in the future. Strange to\nsay, the reason why Professor Huxley maintains that evolution will be\nregressive is exactly the same reason that leads Mr. Herbert Spencer to\nmaintain that it will be progressive. It is that the law of evolution is\nNecessity, that evolution is the outcome of mechanical causes. But in\neffect both arguments lead logically to the same conclusion, for the\nprogress which is the outcome of Mr. Spencer's argument is not progress\nin the moral or any other sense of the word. In fine, progress is\neventually impossible if evolution is due to mechanical causes; progress\nis conceivable only if we interpret the process of evolution\nteleologically and as expressing the operation of a final cause.\nScience, as such, declines to inquire whether there is any purpose in\nevolution, and leaves it an open question. The moral consciousness\naffirms only that the process of evolution ought to make for good. The\nreligious consciousness alone is in a position to say that its spiritual\nexperience requires us to affirm that evolution, in accordance with the\nuniformity of the Divine nature, will be, in years to come as in ages\npast, a continuous movement towards the realisation of all that in its\nbest moments the human heart holds most dear.\n\nThe argument that evolution _must_ be progress commits logical suicide,\nfor in the very act of proving its conclusion it proves that progress is\nnot progress. We are therefore left to face the fact that progress is\nonly a possibility; and that amounts to saying that regress also is\npossible. What is implied therein will become clear if we return to the\nquestion of the nature of progress.\n\nProgress is not the survival of the fittest to survive, but of the\n\u00e6sthetically or ethically fittest; not adaptation to the environment,\nbut approximation to the ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness. Those\nideals are manifested in man, but not equally in all men; and the words\nand works of those men on whom they are most clearly impressed and by\nwhom they are most faithfully expressed become the canon whereby we\njudge whether any tendency in art or morality is progressive or\nretrogressive. We cannot all make beautiful things or do heroic deeds,\nbut we can all appreciate them when made or done. To appreciate them,\nhowever, is to judge that they do come nearer to the ideal than anything\nelse of the kind which we have yet known. Thus the ultimate court of\nappeal for each one of us is not the ideal as manifested by man, but the\nideal as revealed to each of us. True it is that, until we saw that\nparticular work of art or that particular instance of love, we had no\nidea what beauty or love could be. But that makes no difference to the\nfact that we feel for ourselves how much nearer it comes to the ideal\nthan anything we had any idea of before. It may henceforth be the\nstandard by which we shall measure other things, but in adopting it we\nmeasure it ourselves, and measure it not by itself, but in relation to\nthe ideal. And what shall we say of the artist himself? By what does he\nmeasure the work of his predecessors and judge that it is not the best\nthat can yet be done, if he does not measure it by the ideal which is\nrevealed more perfectly to him than to them?\n\nBut the perfect work of art or love, when done, becomes not merely the\ncanon by which to test progress; it becomes itself the cause of\nprogress, both because of its more perfect revelation of the ideal and\nbecause of the emulation which it arouses in others to go and do\nlikewise. They likewise strive after the ideal and labour for its sake:\nit is the final cause of their endeavours, the purpose of their\nattempts; and were there no such final cause there would be no progress.\nThe ideal is a principle both of thought and action, the test of\nknowledge and the source of progress. Truth is the ideal of science:\napproximation to truth is that for which the man of science labours and\nthat in which he conceives that scientific progress lies. The\ngravitation formula not only expresses a wide-reaching truth, but has\nacted as an incentive to many attempts to extend it to the domain of\nchemistry, and serves as an ideal yet to be rivalled in other branches\nof science. But science and progress in science are alike impossible, if\nconsciousness and experience be discredited, or if the ideal of science\nbe not real, _i.e._ if the laws of science have not the permanence, the\nindependence, and the self-identity which are the attributes of the\nreal, but are as transient as the minds that discovered them, exist only\nwhen thought of by man, and are not really the same at different times.\nBut if these ideals, whether of truth, beauty, or goodness, are thus\nreal, then they are \"our\" ideals only in the sense that we are aware of\nthem and adopt them, not in the sense that we make them; they are ours\nbecause they are present in the common consciousness of mankind, but not\nin the sense that they are created by that consciousness. They are\nrevealed to man before they are manifested by man.\n\nProfessor Huxley's definition of progress cuts at the root of two\nmisconceptions as to its nature, which, though mutually inconsistent,\nare both widely spread. One is that the latest products of time, simply\nbecause they are the latest, are superior to all that has preceded. The\nother is that to know the origins of a thing will best enable us to\nassign its value. The tendency of the one is to result in the idea that\nbecause a thing has been evolved it must be superior; of the other to\nlead to the conclusion that because a thing has been evolved out of\ncertain elements it cannot be superior to them. The truth is that the\nmere fact that a thing has been evolved--be it an institution, a mode of\nlife, or a disease--does not in itself prove either that the thing is or\nis not an advance on that out of which it was evolved. Regressive\nmetamorphosis, degeneration, pathological developments--physiological,\nmental, moral, and religious--are all processes of evolution, but are\nnot progress. A society in its decay, or an art in its decline, is\nevolved out of a previous healthier state or more flourishing period,\nbut is not because later therefore better. Nor, on the other hand, does\nit follow, because the earliest manifestations of a tendency are the\nlowest, and can be shown by the theory of evolution to be so, that no\nprogress has been made in the process of evolution. The artistic impulse\nin its earliest manifestations, in children and in savages, is rude\nenough; but it would be absurd to say, therefore, that art in its\nperfection has no more value than in its origins, that the Hermes of\nPraxiteles is on a level with a misshapen idol from the South Sea\nislands.\n\nIf the continuity of evolution does not warrant us in assigning the same\nvalue, \u00e6sthetic or moral, to all the links, highest and lowest, in the\nchain, still less does it authorise or require us to deny all value to\nthe lowest. On the contrary, we should rather see in the lowest what it\nhas of the highest, than look in the highest for the lowest we can find.\nWe should beware lest in reducing everything to its lowest terms we\nprove to have been seeking simply to bring it to our own level, when at\nthe cost of a little more generosity we might have raised ourselves\nsomewhat nearer to the ideal prefigured even in the lowest stage of the\nevolution of love, of beauty, of piety or of goodness. Indeed, as a mere\nmatter of logic, it is impossible to state the nature of a cause\naccurately, quite apart from any question of estimating its value, until\nor unless we know the effect which it produces. It is not only that we\nmay underrate or entirely overlook the importance of a thing, so long as\nwe are ignorant that it is a factor largely influencing some result in\nwhich we are interested; but, until we know what effects it is capable\nof producing, we do not know what the thing is. We could not be said to\nhave knowledge of a drug if we did not know what its effects were. Nor\nis that knowledge to be acquired by analysing the causes which produce\nthe drug. It is not from the mechanical causes which give rise to a\nthing that we can learn what a thing is: no amount of knowledge of the\nproperties of hydrogen and oxygen would enable us to predict _a priori_\nthe nature of the compound which is formed when electricity is passed\nthrough two molecules of the former and one of the latter; nor is the\nleast light thrown upon the properties of water by our knowledge of its\nconstituent elements: on the other hand, our knowledge of them is\nmaterially and serviceably increased when we learn what they are capable\nof producing in combination. We learn most truly what a thing is from\nobserving what it becomes, what use it subserves, what end it answers,\nwhat purpose it fulfils--in a word, when we know not its mechanical but\nits final cause. In biology, knowledge of an organ means knowledge of\nits function--that is, of its purpose; and evolutional biology also\nteaches that function is the cause of the organ.\n\nIt is by observing what a thing becomes that we learn the part it may\nhereafter play in the general scheme of things, and come to know its\nreal nature, and estimate it at its real value. Thus our estimate of the\nvalue of such an institution as \"taboo\" goes up, and our knowledge of it\nis increased, when we recognise in it one of the early manifestations of\nthe sense of moral obligation on its negative side. Again, in tracing\nthe evolution of religion it is impossible to know which of the various\nrites and ceremonies, practised by a savage tribe in its dealings with\nthe supernatural, are religious and which non-religious, without taking\ninto consideration the question, What do such customs tend to develop\ninto? Until we know that, and until we can say whether what is evolved\nout of them is religious or non-religious--a question which we cannot\nanswer unless we know what religion is--we cannot be said to understand\nthe nature of the savage rites that we are studying. But it is not from\nthe origins of art, religion, or morality that we shall gain the answer\nto the question what art, morality, or religion is; for the question\nmust be answered before we can recognise the origins when we see them,\nand can only be answered by reference to the ideal, which is the test\nand final cause not only of progress, but of the real.\n\nThe ideal is a principle both of thought and of action. As a principle\nof thought it is the test by which we determine whether any given\nmovement is progressive or regressive, and whether any given thing is\nwhat it appears or is alleged to be. As a principle of action it is that\nfor which we strive, the purpose with which we act, the cause of any\nprogress that we make. If we are not prepared to maintain that\neverything which takes place is an advance upon what preceded, we\nrequire some test whereby to distinguish what is progress from what is\nnot, and we admit that progress is a possibility which may or may not be\nrealised, and it becomes of interest to inquire on what conditions its\nrealisation depends.\n\nIf, as Professor Huxley maintains, the test of progress is approximation\nto the ideal, then one condition of progress is that man shall be\nconscious, to whatever extent is necessary for the purpose, of the\nideal, shall feel that the ideal of love, tenderness, compassion,\njustice, truth, beauty, etc., is a thing for him to strive for, an end\nfor him to attain. To the chosen few--the great artists, the moral or\nreligious reformer--a sense of the ideal is dealt in a larger measure\nthan to the rest of men. By the chosen few it is manifested to the many.\nBut it does not become the cause of progress, unless it leavens the\nmass, unless they too are inspired by it to do better and be better. In\na word, when, or if, ever the ideal has been manifested in its fulness,\nit is not a fresh revelation which is necessary for progress, but fresh\nconviction in us and renewed determination. Indeed, so long as we do not\nact up to the light that we have, even an imperfect revelation of the\nideal may serve for imperfect beings.\n\nSo far, then, as the genius in art or science, or the reformer in\nreligion or morals, is the cause of the progress that is made by his\nschool, his disciples, and them that follow after, it is clear that he\nis the cause and not the product of evolution. It is his works or words\nwhich inspire his followers with a fresh sense of the reality of the\nideal and a fresh resolve to devote their lives to the pursuit of art or\nthe service of science. But it is only because his perfect work is felt\nby them, judging for themselves, to realise the ideal that it has this\neffect on them; and they could not judge it to approach the ideal more\nclosely than anything known to them before, unless they had some\nsurmise, however vague, of the ideal, with which to compare this work,\nperfect as it seems to them. It is not necessary to suppose that this\nvague surmise existed, or if it existed that it was attended to,\npreviously: it may have been first called into existence or into notice\nby the contemplation of the master's work, but its presence, however\nevoked, is attested by the judgment that his work does come nearest to\nthe ideal. The manifestation of the masterpiece may be the occasion of\nthis fresh revelation of the ideal, but the revelation must be made if\nthe work is to be judged highest and is to inspire the disciple.\n\nIt is, however, one thing to have an ideal, and another to live up to\nit. \"To scorn delights and live laborious days\" in the search for truth\nor in single-minded devotion to the cause of art requires some will.\nGranted that the ideal has been revealed, either to the disciple on the\noccasion of another's teaching or directly as to the master, for\nprogress there is further required will. It requires an act of will to\nprefer the ideal, with its laborious days, and to scorn delights; and it\nrequires many acts of will to make any progress. Yet the will to believe\nand the will to act are the same will. We may, if we choose, define\nbelief as the readiness to act, and take action as the test of belief:\nif a man in a hurry makes a short cut, _i.e._ goes straight from one\npoint to another rather than round a corner, his action is proof that he\nbelieves that a straight line is the shortest distance between two\npoints. From this point of view we may regard the many acts of will\nwhich are necessary to progress, _i.e._ movement in the direction of the\nideal, as so many reaffirmations of the original act of will by which we\naffirmed our belief that the ideal was the goal of progress; and if our\nobject is to show that the behaviour of man, so far as he pursues the\nideal, can be exhibited as a logical and rational behaviour, we are\njustified in thus demonstrating that our renewed resolutions to realise\nthe ideal are but the logical consequences of our original will to\nbelieve in the ideal as the proper goal of action. Our belief in the\nideal is thus shown to be the principle from which our subsequent acts\nof will can be logically deduced, just as Nature's uniformity can be\nshown to be the principle from which the conclusions of science\nlogically flow.\n\nBut it may be doubted whether this logical order of ideas is the\nchronological order of events. As a matter of fact, we go through a\nnumber of struggles and temptations long before we reflect, if ever we\ndo reflect, upon them in such a way as to see what is the general\nprinciple logically implied by our repeated if intermittent resistance\nto temptation, just as a child acts in a way that for its logical\njustification would require a formal recognition of the uniformity of\nNature, though the infant of two years, or less, does not formulate that\nprinciple as a condition precedent of crying for its food or its nurse.\nChronologically, then, the will to act seems to precede the will to\nbelieve in the uniformity of Nature, and in the case of most human\nbeings is never followed by any fully conscious formulation of the\nprinciple on which we act as an abstract principle in which to believe.\nThat fact, however, does not in the least detract from the value which\nthe formulation of the abstract principle has: when formulated it\nbecomes in the hands of science as Ithuriel's spear for the detection of\nlingering superstitions and confusions of thought--\n\n \"for no falsehood can endure\n Touch of celestial temper, but returns\n Of force to its own likeness.\"\n\nAt touch of the question, \"Does it contradict the uniformity of Nature?\"\nerror is seen for what it is, and is exploded sooner thus than in any\nother way.\n\nThe ideal of truth, then, with its \"celestial temper,\" is logically\nimplicit in the earliest acts of will, but chronologically is developed\nin consciousness later, if indeed and when it reaches that later stage\nof its evolution from the potential to the actual. The ideals of\nmorality and religion, again, though equally implicit in the acts of\nwill which form their earliest manifestation, are, as a rule, both in\nthe individual and the race, more slowly evolved from the particulars in\nwhich they are immersed. The period of their gestation is longer, and\nresults in the birth of a higher organism.\n\nThus, when we reach the age of reflection, whenever it may come, we wake\nup to find that we have been acting as though we had beliefs, when, as\nin our infancy, we could have had no beliefs, and as though we willed\nour actions, at a time when we can scarcely be said to have had any will\nin the matter. For years we have been acting as we should have done\nsupposing that we had believed certain things and had willed our action\naccordingly. When we wake up to this state of things the question is,\nAre we bound to go on in this way? are we bound now to believe as well\nas to act as though we believed in God, morality, and Nature's\nuniformity? Does the fact that our physiological and psychological\nmechanism has been started--perhaps by Nature's cosmic forces, perhaps\nby the social environment, certainly not by us--to run in certain\ngrooves, prove either that we ought or that we must continue to run the\nparticular organism we are in charge of on the same lines? The agnostic\nand the atheist exercise their freedom of will to say No. They claim the\nright and exercise the power of free choice. The agnostic, further, is\nfully aware that in choosing to believe the uniformity of Nature his\nchoice is not determined by evidence--it is \"a great act of faith,\" no\namount of evidence could justify it, the only evidence anyone can bring\nto justify his belief in the general abstract principle is the fact that\nhe does believe it in every concrete, particular instance. In a word, he\nbelieves it because he chooses to believe it--and that is exactly what\nis meant by the dictum, which he finds it so hard to understand, that\nhis will is self-determining.\n\nWhen it comes to the question of morality and religion, the agnostic\nagain exercises his freedom of choice: he wills to believe in the former\nand not in the latter--the evidence for and against either being equally\n_nil_. It is not, therefore, the evidence which determines his choice;\nand he shows that it is not his previous history, not the momentum which\nhis psychological mechanism gained during the period when he had no\nconscious or no self-conscious control over it, which determines his\nchoice, for in the first place he denies that it ought or must influence\nhim, and next he shows that it does not, by willing differently in the\ncase of the two principles. In both cases his will is equally\nself-determining, though his will is to believe in the moral principle\nor ideal and not to believe in the religious.\n\nIf we wish either to define progress or to make it, we must choose,\narbitrarily or otherwise, some particular goal and say, definitely and\ndecidedly, any movement which being continued in the same straight line\nleads to that goal is progress, every other movement is regress, being\nnecessarily away from the goal. If we choose, by a great act of faith or\notherwise, to say the ideal is the goal, then we have therein a\nprinciple both of belief and action: we have a standard by which to test\neverything offered for judgment, a general principle to apply to every\nparticular case; and we have an object to aim at, a principle to carry\nout in every act of our lives, an ideal to strive for. But whether we\nchoose the ideal as the goal or something else, our choice is the free\nact of a self-determining will. Progress, on the human side, is--as\nindeed is regress--the expression of the free will of human beings,\nwhose choice, though free, is limited to the alternatives offered to\nthem. Those alternatives reduce themselves ultimately to aiming at the\nideal or at something else.\n\nWhat, then, of the environment, of the cosmos, in which man finds\nhimself, in which he has to act and may act so as to advance or not to\nadvance towards the ideal? To begin with, we may distinguish between\nthose forces in the cosmos which man can to some extent control, and\nthose over which he has no control. The former, from this point of view,\nthe point of view of action, are means whereby man secures his ends: his\nregulation of them effects that adaptation _of_ the environment which,\naccording to Professor Huxley, is essential to ethical progress. Now, as\na matter of observed fact, no one doubts that the advance which\ncivilised man has made in controlling the forces of Nature is due to\nscience and to civilised man's devotion to the scientific ideal of\ntruth. Even the savage made what little progress he did make in this\ndirection by acting fitfully and unconsciously, or at the most\nsemi-consciously, on the principle of the uniformity of Nature: the\nsavage was faithful in little things to the scientific ideal--which was\nrevealed to him but dimly--the _savant_ is fully conscious of the\nprinciple on which he acts, walks in its light, and strives by example\nand precept to save his fellow-men from relapsing into the darkness of\nerror and superstition. It is not merely because of the material\nadvantages, the comforts and luxuries, which science indirectly secures\nto mankind, that the man of science devotes himself to the scientific\nideal and seeks to make it universal: it is for the sacred cause of\ntruth. In a word, what at first sight presents itself merely as a\nprinciple of the scientific reason, proves, in the conception of those\nwho have spent their lives in endeavouring to seek the scientific ideal\nand to ensue it, to be a manifestation of the moral reason, to be not\nmerely in harmony with the moral ideal, but to have been its harbinger,\nmaking the way straight for it. Belief which implies a violation of the\nuniformity of Nature is denounced not because it violates a scientific\nprinciple, but because it is immoral, a pretence, and a lie. The final\ncause of science is thus made out to be to subserve the moral ideal, to\nsecure that adaptation of the environment without which ethical progress\nis impossible. The labour of adapting his environment would have for man\nas a rational being no sufficient reason if it did not tend to realise\nhis moral ideal. Man may use his science and the power of adapting his\nenvironment for other than moral ends; but such use is not, according to\nthis view, progress. In other words, it is not science or the scientific\nideal alone which enables us to lay down the line of progress, but\nscience and morality together: one point cannot give us our direction,\nbut the line which connects two points may.\n\nThus far, then, by taking the environment into consideration, we seem to\nhave introduced no new factor into our conception of progress. It seems\nthat when I wake up from childhood's slumber I find myself surrounded by\nmen who believe that they can do certain things--make rain, send\ntelegraphic messages, etc.; and I am told that if certain\nassumptions--that there is a God, that Nature is uniform, etc.--be\ntrue, then it will be well for me to behave in a certain way. But what\nif the assumptions be not true? My elders tell me that experience--in\nthe individual, in the race, enlarged by science and the theory of\nevolution--shows it is quite safe to assume that they are true, at any\nrate as a provisional hypothesis. Of course, if the future is going to\nresemble the past, then experience of the past is a good guide to the\nfuture: but that is just the question, _is_ the future going to resemble\nthe past? In other words, what attitude am I to assume towards my\nenvironment, the cosmos? Am I to assume that it will work, and for\ncountless ages has worked, in such a way as to make it possible for me,\nwith some co-operation on my part, to do things which my elders tell me\nare desirable and which I feel for myself I should rather like to do?\n\nIf I assume that the cosmic power does work thus, in such a way that I\ncan know the truth and do the right, and love the Power that gives me\nthe chance and makes it possible, even for me, so to do, I am only\nexercising the will to believe in that principle which is logically\nimplied by every act of the scientific or moral life.\n\nIt is the common faith of mankind that experience may be trusted; and it\nis the common experience of mankind that progress is approximation to\nthe ideals of truth, of goodness, and of love. It is not the common\nexperience of mankind that all men or all peoples approximate equally\nto those ideals. The measure of progress is to be found in the clearness\nand consistency with which men have carried out in science the principle\nof the uniformity of Nature, in their dealings with their fellow-men the\nprinciples of morality, in their dealings with the supernatural the\nprinciple of love.\n\nScience, and especially the theory of evolution, has enormously extended\nour inferential experience, but it has done so only by accepting the\ncommon faith that experience may be trusted, that is to say, that the\nenvironment, the cosmos, is trustworthy within our experience of it.\nWhen, then, the optimist alleges that the process of evolution has been,\non the whole, a course of progress, he is but showing that the common\nfaith in the trustworthiness of the reality in which we move and have\nour being justifies itself. But he does not show us, nor does science\nshow us, why the real, the cosmos, is trustworthy: he ends by showing\nthat it is trustworthy because he began, like all of us, by trusting it.\nHe is quite right: it is the only way in which to demonstrate that\neither science, or morality, or religion is trustworthy--by giving our\nfaith, to start with. Only when we are satisfied as to the fact can we\nprofitably inquire the reason; and the reason is to be found only in the\nnature of the real, as revealed to us in the sum total of our\nexperience, scientific, moral, and religious. But the will to believe\nthat experience and to trust the real which it reveals, is free: if a\nman will not accept it as trustworthy, there is for him no reason why.\n\nThe case is different with the man who does accept the testimony of\nconsciousness as evidence of the reality to which it testifies. For him\nthe one reality is Will, and the ideals of science, morality, and\nreligion are the expressions of that Will. In accepting them as the\nprinciples of thought and action he does not learn what is the purpose\nof evolution, the final cause of the cosmos: he chooses to believe that,\nby so accepting them and by striving to realise the ideal, he is\nfulfilling the Divine Will and contributing his share to the realisation\nof the rational purpose to which, he assumes, the process of evolution\nis tending.\n\nBut in so doing he does not renounce his freedom: his resolution to\nbelieve is an exercise of his free will, an act, \"a great act,\" of\nfaith. If carried into effect in his daily life, his resolution, daily\nrenewed and ever free, may in the end become a daily act of love, and\nthen he will understand the reason why the cosmos, or the cosmic power,\nis trustworthy. Only love of man could have given man, as his ideals, to\nknow the truth and do the right. Only if man's ideals are so given is\nthe cosmos trustworthy--if it is trustworthy. If it is not, then there\nis no truth to know, no right to do, no inference can be drawn from the\npast to the future, for the past, even of a minute ago, may be a\ndelusion.\n\nBut though the will to believe that the cosmos is untrustworthy cannot\nin practice be carried out in all its logical (or illogical)\nconclusions, it can be and is acted on intermittently, and such action\nis regress. So far as it is carried out, it is the negation of progress;\nif it could be carried out completely and by all men, there would be an\nend of progress; science, morality, and religion would be extinguished;\nevil would triumph over good. The history of evolution shows that, as a\nmatter of fact, such unfaith in the reality of our ideals has been only\nintermittent; for the course of evolution has been, on the whole,\nprogress. Individual experience shows that there comes a point, soon or\nlate, at which the will, acting freely, refuses to go further with its\nrejection of morality: there are some things which even a bad man will\nnot do--however oddly they may seem chosen. In theory, in philosophy,\nthere is a point at which the will refuses to go further with its\nrejection of the common reason, in which all men share: there are some\nthings which even the sceptic refuses to disbelieve, _e.g._ those which\nare necessary to his conviction that nothing can be believed.\n\nThese considerations may serve to confirm us in the belief that progress\nhas been the law of evolution in the past and will increasingly be in\nthe future. They should so confirm us, for they do but carry out, as\nfar as history, individual experience, and imagination can take us, our\nfundamental faith in the reality of those ideals that are revealed in\nconsciousness to all of us. Belief in the possibility of progress at all\ncarries with it, as its logical postulate, faith in the wisdom and\ngoodness of God. But if wisdom and goodness are the source of all\nreality, and if the final purpose of evolution is the realisation of the\nideal--viz. love of truth, of our fellow-beings, and of God--what are we\nto say of evil? Is it not real? It is real, in the same sense that our\npleasures and pains are real, but not in the same sense that the ideal\nis real. The real things which our sense-experience reveals to us are\nreal in the sense that they are permanent, independent of us, and\nself-identical. The same characteristics attach to the realities\nrevealed to us in our moral and spiritual experience. The laws of\nmorality and the goodness of God do not come and go with our fleeting\nrecognitions of them; they are permanent, independent of us, and are\never the same: God's goodness faileth never. The uniformity of Nature is\nbut one expression of the uniformity of the Divine love for man: it is\nthat which makes it possible for man to know the truth and survive in\nthe struggle for existence. But evil is not independent of us men: it\nexists only so far as we will it to exist. It is not permanent: it comes\nand goes with our passing acts of will. It is not self-identical, but\ntends to self-destruction. It is the will to believe nothing, and\ntherefore, as action involves belief, the will to do nothing--that is,\nto revert to the condition of mere inert matter, as matter is conceived\nby the materialist to exist.\n\nBut though evil be illusive, though it is the fool who says in his own\nheart, \"There is no God,\" or \"Tush! He will not see it,\" the illusion is\nvoluntary. It is we who deceive or sophisticate ourselves, when we will\nto believe that this act is not really wrong, or that our peculiar\ncircumstances constitute a special, a highly special exception, on this\noccasion only, to the rules for ordinary occasions and ordinary men. And\nthough the illusion is subjective, _i.e._ is not generally shared by the\nonlookers, and is consciously subjective (for we avoid onlookers,\nbecause they would spoil the illusion), nevertheless, subjective though\nit be, it is a fact in your particular subjective history, and a damning\nfact. If the evil that you will is confined in its range to your will,\nand if its existence can only be recreated by a fresh act of will in you\nor another, that is an argument to show that there is mercy in the\nscheme of things, but it does not prove that you incur no responsibility\nin offering yourself or another the example and the opportunity of doing\nwrong. We are not, and, if the will be free, we cannot be responsible\nfor what others do; but we are responsible for what we do--for evil, if\nit be evil; for good, if we----but there is no pressing need to\nconsider that contingency.\n\nThe question underlying the previous paragraph is that of our social\nenvironment and its effects. We are apt to forget that _we_ are the\nsocial environment. If we bear the fact in mind, we shall perhaps be\nless inclined to seek the origin of all our misdeeds outside ourselves:\nwe cannot shift the burden of our own wrong-doing on to the shoulders of\nsociety by any process which does not bring back at least an equivalent\nburden. The fact is that neither can we cause others, nor can others\ncause us to do evil. What we can do is to supply them with an\nopportunity, which, but for our action, would not indeed have existed,\nbut which also, so far from necessitating evil action on their part, may\nby their free will be made the occasion for a victory over wrong. The\nfact, however, that they alone are responsible for their evil-doing\nprevents us from taking any credit for their good deeds. It is for our\nown acts of will that we are responsible, and it is by willing evil that\nwe become evil. We create evil, consciously, by every wrong act of will\nthat we perform, and then we talk of the origin of evil as a mystery, so\nthoroughly do we sophisticate ourselves! Why should there be evil? Why,\nindeed? There is no reason, no rational answer can be given, because\nevil is irrational--it is the will to reject the common reason or\ncommon sense or faith of mankind, in this detail or that. It is the\narbitrary element, self-will, and if it could be eliminated we should\nhave a uniformity of human nature and of human love corresponding to the\nuniformity of the Divine. Progress is the process of its elimination.\n\nIf we turn from the human to the pre-human period of evolution, the\nfirst immediate fact which strikes us is that there has been throughout\nthe animal kingdom an evolution of mind, which has resulted in providing\nman with the psychological apparatus necessary for conceiving, and, to\nsome extent, realising the ideal. When we reached the age of reflection,\nwe woke up to find that our psychological mechanism had been running for\nsome years in certain grooves. We now find that its direction can be\ntraced back by evolution to the beginnings of animal consciousness. If,\nhowever, we believe that the evolution of mind, animal and human, has\nbeen a process of progress, we do so not on the ground that mind has\nbeen evolved, but that its evolution has been in the direction of those\nideals, approximation to which is believed by us to be progress.\nSimilarly, if the pre-animal period of the earth's evolution is shown by\nscience to have resulted in fitting the earth to be the home of animal\nlife, we judge that evolution to have been progress, not because it\nprepared the world eventually for man, but because it is seen to have\nbeen part of the process by which the ideal is in course of realisation,\nby which the Divine purpose is in the course of being fulfilled.\n\nThe only value that we can assign to the pre-human period of evolution\nis that which attaches to it as a means to an end; but though we believe\nthat by striving after the ideals revealed to us we are labouring\ntowards that end, and though everything that makes for the ideal\ncontributes to the end, yet we do not know the Divine purpose, and we\ncannot say in what manifold other ways the pre-human period may have\nsubserved that purpose. It is sufficient if we can trace the steps by\nwhich this one portion, the only portion known to us, of the whole\ndesign has been carried forward. This reflection is one which it is\nnecessary to bear in mind when considering the alleged wastefulness of\nthe process of evolution and the price at which progress has been\npurchased.\n\nThe theory of evolution, as a purely scientific theory, _i.e._ as an\nobjective statement of what actually has taken place on the earth in the\npast, shows that the various species of animals which have survived\nwere--so long as they did survive--the only species which could survive\nunder the conditions which then prevailed; given the conditions, their\nsurvival was necessary and inevitable. There the scientific explanation\nof the matter ends: having shown the causes which produced the effect\nin question, science has explained everything that it undertook to\nexplain. Had the conditions been different, the present state of the\nworld, doubtless, would have been different; but being what they were\nthey produced that which is, and there is an end of the matter--as far\nas it is a matter for scientific investigation.\n\nWhat we are to think of the survivors--whether we are to admire them;\nwhether we are to consider their survival an advance and an improvement;\nwhether anything has been gained by their survival, and, if so, from\nwhat point of view the gain is a gain--are questions which science\nexcludes, because, however answered, they do not affect the scientific\nfact that these species did survive, and, under the conditions, alone\ncould survive.\n\nBut we all take it for granted and as self-evident that man is not only\nbetter adapted, under existing conditions, to survive and flourish at\nthe cost and to the extinction of other species, but that he is better\nthan the brute, that his survival is an advance, that his is a higher\ntype, and that his existence realises a higher ideal than that of the\nbrutes. We believe this not merely because we are men, and as such rate\nour own comforts, our own interests, our own skins as the most important\nthings known to us, for there are things for which men sacrifice their\nown interests and for which they have laid down their lives. It is\nprecisely because there are things more important than our own material\nand animal existence, and because they are or may be realised by man and\nnot by the animals, by the ideal man and not by the brute man, that we\nconsider him to be worth more than many sparrows--though they too have\ntheir value in His eyes--and man's existence to be of a higher type than\ntheirs.\n\nThus, then, when science--which, if it is truly scientific, makes no\ndistinction of value, moral or spiritual, between man and the\nsparrow--has explained that a given species which did survive was the\nonly species that could have survived under the conditions, there still\nremains the problem, for those to whom it is a problem, Why should the\nspecies which was bound to survive also happen to be a species of a\nhigher type? Why have the survivors always happened to be both better\nadapted to survive and better adapted to further the ideal which the\ncourse of evolution reveals with increasing clearness?\n\nIn fine, science explains only a part, not the whole of the effect of\nevolution. It concentrates its attention on one part or aspect of the\neffect, on the survival of the fittest, and explains very simply and\nsatisfactorily that the environment kills off the creatures which are\nnot fit to cope with it, while the fittest to contend with it survive.\nThe fact that the survivors not only are best adapted to the\nenvironment, but are also best adapted to bring the whole creation one\nstep nearer to those distant ideals in expectation of which it groaneth\nand travaileth, is that part of the effect which science, for scientific\npurposes, rightly ignores. Science does not undertake to estimate the\nvalue of the effect produced, or even to consider whether when produced\nit has any value.\n\nBut when the question is raised as to the cost at which the process of\nevolution is carried on, it becomes necessary to bring into the account\nthe value of the result attained or to be attained. Possibly, creation\nthat groaned in her travail may rejoice that a man-child has been born.\nBut so much depends on what her child grows into. And he has free will.\nWe have the power now and here to dash her expectations to the ground.\n\nThe value of a thing to me is exactly what I am prepared to give or do\nfor it. I have no other way of estimating the value of the ideals for\nwhich creation has laboured in the past, than by asking myself how far I\nam prepared to go for the love of truth, of fellow-beings, and of God.\nIf I am prepared to give everything, and then count myself the gainer,\nthen indeed I may know that the cost of evolution has not been greater\nthan the value of the ideal: I know the highest price, and I know the\nfeelings of those who pay it. And they are the only persons who can\njudge the value of the article, for they are the only people who get it.\nThe fact, however, that they do get it, that they get it in full, and\nevery man according to the measure with which he metes it, contains the\nanswer to our question. What is true now was true of earlier generations\nand earlier men: the value of the ideal to every man was exactly what he\ngave for it. It is the realisation of the ideal by me that is my reward,\nthough my object may be its realisation by others. But it is absurd to\nsay that their gain is my loss, or that their progress has been made at\nmy expense.\n\nThese considerations apply only of course to those men who have\nsacrificed themselves for the sake of progress and the love of their\nfellow-man. Most men, however, do not sacrifice themselves much; and\ntherefore they can hardly be brought out as martyrs to the cause of\nprogress, as the millions who have perished by the wayside in the march\nof evolution.\n\nIt is not until we introduce the element of material progress that it\nbecomes possible to maintain with any plausibility that there is a\ndivergency of interests between the contributors to it, or that they who\nsowed have been sacrificed to us who reap. It is when we compare the\nshivering savage with our sheltered civilisation, primitive man's\nstruggle for existence with civilised man's enjoyment of existence, that\nwe begin to be anxious about the cost of evolution--that is to say, that\nour little faith in the value of the ideal begins to torment us. In our\nunreadiness to sacrifice ourselves we forget that it is possible for\ncivilised man also to make sacrifices--perhaps the greater because he\nhas the more to forego--and that the savage has his tribal traditions,\nembodying his ideal of a good man, to live up to; his tribal customs,\nwhich he may violate with self-reproach, or fulfil with satisfaction;\nhis conceptions of the truth about man's relations to the past, the\nworld, and the supernatural. The savage also has his ideal, which he\nsets above his pleasure, and for which he faces pain in many a cruel\nrite. Shall we say that its realisation is no reward to him? or that in\nrealising it he does not as faithfully contribute his mite to the\nfulfilment of the Divine purpose as we? We make too much of our\nsuperiority. We make, also, too little of the savage's enjoyment of\nexistence. Take the lowest savages known to us, the native tribes of\nCentral Australia, and turn to the most recent and the best accounts of\ntheir manner of life; and it is certain that their existence is enjoyed\nby them. Is ours without exception enjoyed by us?\n\nIf it is easy to be led by sentimentalism into mistakes about what our\nfellow-man thinks of the question whether life is worth living, it is\nstill easier to be misled with regard to our fellow-creatures lower in\nthe scale. Here all is conjecture, and it is on this uncertain ground\nthat rests the charge brought against Nature of waste and cruelty. There\nis the cruelty with which, in order to secure the survival of the few\nand fittest, the environment kills off the many who are unfit--an\nargument of great force, if the survivors were immortal. There is the\nwaste of bringing into life thousands of creatures unfit, and therefore\ndoomed to a speedy extinction. But death is the common lot; and as for\nwaste and failure, if the short-lived creatures fulfil their purpose,\nthey are not failures; and if their purpose is by competition to force\nthe development of the potentially fit, then they fulfil their purpose.\nA man may be entered for a race for no other purpose than to force the\npace. As for happiness, wild animals, to judge by their usual fit\ncondition and by the evidence of sportsmen, do enjoy existence. But\nthey, at any rate, have no ideals--whatever the savage may have. Yet it\nis conceivable that the bird that builds its nest finds some\nsatisfaction in doing so, and that the animal that lays down her life to\nsave her young ones has some sense of love. What is revealed as the\nideal in man may be inchoately manifested as instinct in the undeveloped\nconsciousness of the animal. If so, then the animal's life has\nindependent value and is not merely valuable as a means to a distant\nfuture end.\n\nTo sum up: science declines to take the teleological view of Nature, or\nto admit final causes or ends. To speak, therefore, of survival in the\nstruggle for existence as an end, may be excellent sense, but it is\nunscientific: it implies an assumption of a kind about which science is\nagnostic. If we do, however, make this one deviation from agnosticism,\nwe have then no difficulty in showing that evolution is a failure, for\nits end is survival, and we all die; and there is no compensation, or,\nif there is, posterity gets it, not we--an aggravation of the original\ninjustice.\n\nIf survival in the struggle for existence is the only end that we\npersonally recognise in the conduct of our own lives, we are quite\nconsistent in judging it to be the only end of other lives, and in\ncondemning the Universe, for then there is neither goodness nor any\nwisdom in it.\n\nOn the other hand, our faith in that wisdom and goodness is not genuine\nso long as we are prepared to stake only our arguments on it, and not\nour lives.\n\n\n\n\nXIII.\n\nEVOLUTION AS PURPOSE\n\n\nEvolution, as a scientific theory, is a description of the process by\nwhich the totality of things has come to be what it is. The method\nemployed is that of science, and proceeds upon the assumption of the\nuniformity of Nature and the universality of the law of causation. The\nexistence of a thing is proof that the conditions necessary to produce\nit preceded it. Thus from what is we infer with certainty what has been:\nthe occurrence of Z is proof that Y preceded, and so from Y we can infer\nX, and so on, to the beginning of the alphabet. Eventually, that is, we\nare carried back, in theory at least, to an initial arrangement of\nthings which not only gave birth to the actual order of evolution, but\nwas such that no other order of events could have followed from it. Were\nit possible, in fact, to get back to this original collocation of causes\nand to formulate it, the formula would explain the universe as it is and\nhas been, the totality of things.\n\nUnfortunately the formula, though it would explain everything else,\nwould not explain itself, and would therefore, so far, fail to explain\nanything. Or, to put it in other words, though certain causes,\ncollocated in the proper way, would, on this view of evolution, explain\neverything which ensued from that collocation, we should still want to\nknow why the causes were collocated in that particular way rather than\nin any other. To say that that collocation was not the outcome of a\nprevious collocation is really to say that there was originally no\nantecedent necessity why this or any other order of evolution should\ntake place at all; that Z hangs on Y, Y on X ... and A on nothing at\nall; that the formula which is to render all things intelligible is\nitself unmeaning. Or, if we say that things had no beginning--matter and\nforce being indestructible--then there is no initial collocation, that\nis to say, no formula, even in theory, to explain all things: we cannot\neven imagine the process of evolution to be intelligible.\n\nThe latter seems to be preferred by science as the final result of\nscientific knowledge: the object of science is to demonstrate, not why,\nbut that things happen in a certain way; and it is admitted, or rather\ninsisted upon, _e.g._ by J. S. Mill, that if scientific knowledge were\ncarried to its utmost conceivable or inconceivable perfection, the\nquestion why anything should happen or does happen would remain as great\na mystery as ever, and must remain so, for the simple reason that it is\na question which science does not even put, much less attempt to\nanswer. Nevertheless, it is said, science does prove what she undertakes\nto show, viz. that things do happen in certain ways, which ways when\nformulated appear as laws of science. That, however, is not strictly the\ncase if science, in order to prove her conclusions, has to postulate\nthat each and every state of things is the outcome of some antecedent\nnecessity. Ultimately the postulate proves untrue; for there can have\nbeen no necessity antecedent to the initial arrangement of things. And\nif the postulate be untrue, the conclusions based on it cannot be\naccepted as certain. If we cannot tell whether it be true or not,\nneither can we tell whether science be true or not. If it is\nunintelligible, no wonder that things, as explained by it, are\nmysterious.\n\nBut let us waive these theoretical objections. Does Science, as a matter\nof fact, prove that things do happen in the ways she describes? In\njustice to her, let us remember that she does not undertake to do even\nthat. Her laws only state the way in which things tend to happen, not\nthe way in which they actually do happen; only what would happen if\nthere were no counteracting causes and if certain conditions, which do\nnot prevail, did prevail--not what does really happen in the world as we\nknow it. Herein the scientific reason behaves in exactly the same way as\nthe moral or religious reason. Science no more alleges that all bodies\nin motion do move for ever in the same straight line, at the same rate,\nthan the moral reason alleges that all men always do what is right or\nthat they always do God's will. The allegation is that the tendency\nexists and can be discerned by those qualified to form an opinion on the\nmatter. That there is friction retarding the movement, and that there\nare obstacles diverting it, is admitted; and, though the admission does\nnot affect the truth (in one way) of the laws of science, it does allow\nthat they convey no exact or faithful picture of what actually happens\nin the world as it is.\n\nBut if the laws of science do not explain what happens--even in the\nlimited sense of scientific explanation--they are the indispensable\npreliminary to that explanation. If they do not represent the world as\nit is, they supply the means by which we may hereafter produce the\npicture. They are ideals not in the sense that science hopes to show\neventually that feathers only appear to float leisurely to the ground,\nand are really all the time falling sixteen feet in a second, but in the\nsense that starting from the gravitation formula we could show that\nevery feather's fall is as rationally comprehensible as the gravitation\nformula itself. They are not the ultimate truth, the final reality, or\nScience's supreme ideal. They are shadows cast by the scientific ideal\nbefore its coming; they are the principles by which science must\nproceed, if she is to make the world of things intelligible. So, too,\nthe reality of the moral ideal does not imply that, in refusing to make\nsacrifices for others, I only appear to be selfish, and shall be found\nin the end really to have been actuated all the time by some high moral\nprinciple. What is implied is that only by the acceptance of the moral\nideal can the world of men be moralised. From the same point of view it\nseems hopeless to try to make out that atheism, though not in\nappearance, will be found in reality to have been a manifestation of\nreligion. It is by accepting, not by denying the religious ideal or\ndoubting its existence, that the ideal of religion is achieved.\n\nNow, in the theory of evolution we have the attempt made to effect this\ntransition from the abstractions of science to the concrete facts, to\nshow that the world as presented to sense is as intelligible and\nrationally comprehensible as the laws of science themselves, and that\nthe hypothetical statements of science were but preliminary, though\nnecessary preliminaries, to a categorical statement of actual facts. In\nevolution, as indeed in all the historical sciences, we abandon the\nelasticity and the uncertainty of conditional conceptions for the\nrigidity and certainty of accomplished fact. We no longer deal with what\nmay happen if given conditions are realised, but with what has been, and\ntherefore is subject to no \"ifs.\" We start from the certainty of what\nis, and thus we argue back positively to what must have been.\n\nThere is, however, one precaution which must be observed, and without\nwhich the whole of the system just described is as uncertain and\nconditional as the rest of science. Before we can argue from what is to\nwhat has been, we must first know for certain what is. Before we can\nconclude that a patient has been healed by faith or cured miraculously\nof an incurable complaint, we must first have medical evidence to show\nthat he had the disease. Or, to take a better and closer illustration\nfrom medicine, it is premature to assign a cause for a patient's\ncondition before his condition has been diagnosed; and physicians who\ndiffer in their diagnosis will naturally differ as to the causes in the\npatient's past history which are responsible for his state.\n\nIf, then, the evolutionist is to attain accuracy in his description of\nthe process by which the totality of things has come to be what it is,\nhe must first know what it is. Before we can trace the evolution of\nmorality, for instance, we must make up our minds as to what it is. If\nwe regard it as an illusion, we shall hold that it is subject to the\nsame laws as other illusions, and we shall have no difficulty in showing\nthat its evolution was a necessary consequence of those laws. Or, again,\nif we hold that religion is mere foolery or hysteria, we shall\nnaturally infer a very different process for its evolution than if we\nfeel it to be a permanent manifestation of the common consciousness in\nthe same sense that morality is. A distinguished German mythologist,\nstarting from the former diagnosis, has no difficulty in evolving\nprimitive religion out of primitive drunkenness.\n\nIn fine, if we regard \"what is\" as giving the data by which we are to\ndetermine what has been, it is clear that to understand what has been we\nmust properly appreciate what is. This is in accordance with the\nconclusion which we have reached previously that it is only by studying\nits effects that we can properly understand a cause. To judge a thing\nproperly we must know the effects it is capable of producing: to know\nwhat a thing is we must observe what it becomes or what it is capable of\nbecoming at its best. We cannot judge the value of the moral character\nor the moral ideal fairly if we take a low specimen to go by; nor if we\nknew nothing more of morality than what we could observe of its\nrudiments in the higher animals, should we know much about it. It is by\nits highest manifestations that we most correctly judge either morality\nor art, and it is only through them that we can be properly said even to\nunderstand what either art or morality is. So, too, taking the religious\nideal as love of God and man, we must judge religion not by its\nimperfect manifestations in imperfect beings, but by its perfect\nrevelation and realisation in Christ.\n\nThe case is not otherwise with science or evolution itself. From\nprimitive times man has always used his knowledge (however imperfect) of\nwhat is as the basis of speculations as to what has been. It would,\nhowever, be absurd to take the puerile and barbarous cosmogonies of the\nsavage as adequate expressions of the scientific ideal, or to imagine\nthat it is from them that we can judge what science is. It is no less\nunreasonable to judge the theory of evolution by its present, passing\nphase. In the first place, there are facts in its history which show\nthat it naturally started with a partial and one-sided view of the\nfacts. In the next place, we must judge it not by what it may be at its\nworst, but by what it is capable of becoming at its best; and it is by\nthe latter that we must decide what evolution truly is, not by the\nformer.\n\nAt its worst the theory of evolution may require us to believe that the\nwhole process of evolution is essentially irrational--being the outcome\nof unintelligent forces operating on reasonless matter--and that the\ntheory of evolution, accordingly, if faithful to the facts, is as\nirrational as they; or, if rational, is a misleading account of the real\nuniverse in which we live and move and have our being.\n\nOn the other hand, the theory at its best may require us to believe that\nit reveals a universe run on rational principles, a real world perfectly\nintelligible to perfect reason, and partially intelligible even to\nbeings who share but partially in the Divine reason that animates the\nwhole.\n\nBoth theories, however, base themselves upon what is, and profess that\ntheir conclusions follow logically from it. If, then, they differ in\ntheir conclusions it is because they differ in their diagnosis of what\nis. Both admit the existence of faith; but one regards faith as a fact\nin the pathology of human reason, the other regards it as the normal\nmode of our common reason's operation. The latter, therefore, requires\nto postulate causes which will account for the correctness of the common\nfaith of mankind; the latter, causes which have resulted in the common\nillusion of mankind.\n\nIt seems, then, that even in evolution we do not escape after all from\nthe indeterminate and conditional knowledge, which science offers, to\nthe absolute certainty of accomplished fact. Every theory of the past\nhistory of the world is just as conditional, just as much dependent on\nan \"if,\" as the hypothetical laws of science, for any such theory is\ndependent on the view it takes of what is, and is correct only if that\nview is correct.\n\nThe theories of evolution which we have called the Optimistic and the\nPessimistic interpretations of evolution are avowedly based on the\nassumption that a large part of the common faith of mankind is a mental\nor moral disease. According to Mr. Herbert Spencer the faith that we can\nknow what is real is an illusion: the Real is the Unknowable. According\nto Professor Huxley the common faith in the freedom of the will is an\nillusion: necessity is the law of the uniformity both of Nature and of\nhuman nature. In thus declining to accept the testimony of the moral and\nreligious consciousness as evidence of what is, both philosophers were\ninfluenced by the belief that it is science alone which is capable of\nascertaining and demonstrating what is and what actually does happen.\nThis belief, however, we have ventured to suggest, overlooks two facts.\nOne is that the abstract sciences do not even profess to state what\nactually does happen: they simply affirm that, if the conditions stated\nin their various laws are the only conditions operative, the only result\nwill be that stated by the particular law in question. Thus science does\nnot concern itself with what is or does happen, but solely with what\nwould be or would happen under certain (usually impossible) conditions.\nThe other point overlooked is that the historical or comparative\nsciences are also only hypothetically true. All that their laws\nundertake to demonstrate is that, if certain consequences constitute the\nwhole of an observed effect, then the only conditions antecedently\noperative were those stated in the law. Here too, then, science does not\neven claim to prove what is or demonstrate what does happen, but assumes\nthat we know it or find it out, in some way with which science does not\nconcern itself. If we do know and can know what is, science can tell us\nwhat were the conditions that produced it.\n\nThe question, then, that we have to put to any theory of evolution--that\nis, to any theory which professes to state the process by which the\ntotality of things has come to be what it is--is, \"Does it account for\nthat totality? do the causes which it assumes to have been at work\naccount for all that is?\" Now, _a priori_ it was not to be expected that\nevolution would in its infancy, and it is still young, succeed in\naccounting for all things; and there were special reasons in the\ncircumstances under which it first took its modern scientific shape\nwhich necessarily limited its earliest attempts to grasp the totality of\nthings. It would, however, be absurd to judge the principle by the first\nattempt to apply it, and to condemn it because it has not done in a\nmoment what with time it assuredly will succeed in effecting. At the\nsame time, it can only effect that wider success by refusing to\nstereotype its first errors and by declining to bind itself to the dogma\nthat what it has succeeded in explaining is all that there is to\nexplain, or that that alone is or happens which its present assumptions\nor laws are capable of accounting for. There lies the danger which\nthreatens to check the further development of the theory of\nevolution--in the dogmatism which pretends to set aside common sense and\nthe common reason, and arrogates to itself the sole right of saying what\nis; and succeeds in doing so by the simple but circular argument that\nthat alone is or happens which can be accounted for by the laws that\nregulate the movements of things in space or that follow from the\nstruggle for animal existence.\n\nHistorically, the theory of evolution in its first manifestation was an\nextension to the historical sciences generally of a purely biological\nconception, that of the origin of species as a consequence of the\nstruggle for existence. It was found that much else in the manifold of\nwhat is, many other differences between related things, besides the\ndifferences which mark off one species of animals from another, might be\naccounted for, historically, by the theory that those differences were\nbut the sum and the accumulation of an infinite number of small\nmodifications which had given the thing an advantage over its rivals in\nthe struggle for existence. Strictly speaking, all that this remarkable\nand wide-reaching discovery implied as a matter of logic was that\nbetween animals and things not animal there existed an analogy or\nresemblance, in virtue of which it was logical to argue from things\nanimal to things not animal just so far as the resemblance between them\nwent, but not further. Very naturally, however, it happened that with\nthis originally biological conception all its biological implications\nwere taken over, and it was (and is) argued not merely that there are\ngreat and fruitful resemblances between, say, society and an animal\norganism, but that societies are animal organisms. In fine, sociology\nwas treated as a department of biology. The fallacy that science\ndemonstrates what is, and that what science does not account for has no\nreal existence, thus made its appearance simultaneously with the birth\nof the evolution theory. The resemblances between the evolution of the\nsocial organism and of animal organisms could be accounted for by the\nbiological theory of the struggle for existence; the differences,\ntherefore, must be denied or laboriously explained away. With the growth\nof sociology, however, it is becoming apparent that the evolution of\nsociety has laws, some of which do indeed coincide with those of animal\nevolution, but others of which are peculiar to sociology in the same\nsense as the laws of chemistry are distinct from those of physics.\nSociology is accordingly revolting from its bondage to biology: the\nplain fact that society is not an animal is beginning to make itself\nfelt. The resemblances between the organisation of society and that of\nan animal are freely admitted, but the differences are beginning to\nclaim consideration also; and the sound doctrine is beginning to assert\nitself that by experience alone, experience of what is, and not by any\n_a priori_ dogmatism as to what in the name of science must be, can we\ntell how far the resemblances extend as a matter of fact and where the\ndifferences begin. That the evolution theory must be the gainer by thus\nadmitting the facts instead of denying their existence is clear; if\nsociology is not a branch of biology, and yet the two sciences have\ncertain laws in common, a great step is at once taken towards\ndemonstrating the existence of certain general principles of evolution\nwhich are higher than the laws of either, or perhaps than of any,\nparticular science.\n\nThe tendency of the scientific theories prevailing for the moment to\ndeny the existence of what they cannot, for the moment, account for, is\nexemplified in another way by the theory of the survival of the fittest.\nIt was shown by Darwin that, granted the tendency to variation in\nanimals, the struggle for existence was enough in its results--as he had\nthe genius to discern them--to account for the origin of species. The\nstruggle for existence is a fact, and thus animal evolution was based on\nwhat is, on positive fact. To apply the same process of argument to\nhuman and social evolution was perfectly scientific and legitimate. What\nis neither scientific nor legitimate is to maintain, explicitly or\nimplicitly, that the totality of human activity is engaged and\nexhausted in the struggle for existence. Self-preservation is\nundoubtedly a powerful instinct, but it is not the only instinct even of\nanimals, and is not always the most powerful in man--or in the brute.\nThat there are resemblances between man and his fellow-creatures, the\nbrutes, and that so far as those resemblances extend, man and the\nanimals have been, and are, subject to the same laws of evolutions, are\nfacts which may be heartily admitted, but which neither authorise us to\ndeny the existence of specifically human peculiarities, nor warrant us\nin trying to deduce the differences from a law which applies only to the\nresemblances. If the evolution theory is to state the process by which\nthe totality of things has come to be what it is, it must begin by\nfacing the whole of the facts--in this case by admitting that not only\nhave the fittest to survive survived, as is natural in a struggle for\nexistence, but that progress, \u00e6sthetic, ethical, and religious, has been\nmade.\n\nThe denial of this fact may either be open and avowed, as, for instance,\nwhen the reality of the religious ideal is formally denounced; or it may\nbe tacit and implied, as, for instance, when moral progress is defined\nas adaptation to environment, _i.e._ as not progress at all, or when the\nfreedom of the will is denied, _i.e._ when approximation to the ethical\nideal is maintained to be a thing not under our control. Tacit or\navowed, this denial proceeds upon the fallacy that the laws of science,\nas understood and formulated at any particular moment, are the sole\ntest and constitute our only knowledge of what is. But the interests\nboth of the common sense of mankind and that specially organised form of\ncommon sense which we know as science require a protest against that\nfallacy: it is opposed to the principle on which scientific knowledge\nrests, and it would be fatal, if acted upon, to all further development\nof that knowledge.\n\nThe principle upon which science rests is that its laws are capable of\nverification, and that they are verified when and if they are confirmed\nby experience. The final appeal of science is to the evidence of\nconsciousness, the only evidence of what is that we possess: the only\nevidence of the truth and accuracy with which an eclipse has been\ncalculated is the evidence of our senses that the eclipse does take\nplace and is visible in the place and at the time predicted. If a\nhypothesis predicts results which as a matter of observation do not take\nplace, the hypothesis is judged so far inaccurate or inadequate: what is\nover-rides our preconceived opinions, even if they be the hypotheses of\nscience, as to what ought to be or will be. It is the ever-open appeal\nto the final court of fact, of what is, that condemns false assumptions,\nguarantees the truth of science, and safeguards the freedom of\nscientific inquiry. To allow any group of men, however eminent, or any\nbody of science, however sound, to deprive us of this right of appeal\nand bid us disbelieve in the evidence of our own senses, if it\ncontradicts their theories, would be to submit to the tyranny of\ndogmatism, and to be faithless to the cause of truth.\n\nFortunately, though the unconscious and therefore ill-considered\nmetaphysics of some men of science have tended in the direction of\nscientific dogmatism, the practice of science has been in the opposite\ndirection. In practice science has owed much of her progress to the\nstudy of \"residual phenomena.\" Phenomena which the laws of science for\nthe moment could not account for have not been denounced as illusions,\nor ruled out of court as non-existent or beneath the notice of science:\nthey have been accepted as facts, as part of the totality of things\nwhich it is the ambition of science to account for; and, accepted as\nsuch, they have led, it may be, to the discovery of a new planet or a\nnew element, but always to the discovery of fresh truths, which never\nwould have enriched the page of science had science refused to take\ncognisance of facts the laws of which it had not at the time discovered.\n\nIn demanding, then, that any theory which professes to account for the\ntotality of things should recognise the fact of ethical and \u00e6sthetic\nprogress, and that all progress is willed and purposed, we are seeking\nnot to cramp science but to enlarge its bounds, not to introduce a new\nscientific method, but to extend the application of existing methods,\nand to carry out the principle on which the truth of science and the\nfreedom of scientific inquiry are based. The laws which enable the\nphysicist to explain the mechanical action and reaction of things do not\nsuffice to explain the reactions studied by the chemist. The laws of\nchemistry are inadequate for the purposes of the biologist. It is but an\nextension of the same principle when the student of the anthropological\nsciences finds it necessary to assume, or rather discovers, that the\nlaws of animal existence do not wholly account for everything that man\ndoes; and it is to these sciences that we must look for the next\nimportant and fruitful modification of the general theory of evolution.\nIt is to them, dealing as they do with the highest product of evolution,\nthat we must look for the truest interpretation of evolution. On the\nprinciple that to understand what a thing is we must not reduce it to\nits lowest terms, but look at it in its highest manifestation, we must\njudge the evolution process by its highest phase, by all that it is\ncapable of, and not by the least we can, by scientific abstraction,\nleave in it. And the sciences which, merely to maintain their scientific\nexistence, have a vital interest in insisting on the reality of will and\npurpose as causes which have influenced the direction of the evolution\nprocess are the sciences which deal with man.\n\nThose who find it easy to believe that a society is an animal, like\nthose who proclaim that the real is unknowable, but that our knowledge\nof it is just as good as if it were not unknowable, will have little\ndifficulty in believing that men's actions are not influenced by their\npurposes; and both will probably subscribe to the doctrine that, first,\napproximation to the ideal is an unintended result of the brute struggle\nfor mere animal existence; and, next, the purpose which appears to mark\nthe evolution process and to be the cause of progress is semblance only,\na mere illusion. Against the first article of this doctrine the final\nand decisive appeal is and always must be to experience. It makes a\ngeneral statement with regard to particular facts of experience: like\nevery other statement made in the form of a scientific law, it affirms\nthat a certain proposition will be found, when tested by experience, to\nbe true of every one of a certain class of facts in our experience. It\nis therefore competent for every man, who chooses to consult his\nexperience, to decide for himself whether the statement is true. In the\npresent case, it is for every man, who has struggled with temptation and\nhas achieved any progress, to say whether he gained the victory without\nan effort of will, without any desire for better things, without any\npurpose or resolution to try once more, without any intention not to\nyield the next time. Are \"secret commissions\" in trade refused, when\nrefused, unintentionally? or is their refusal due solely to the blind\ninstinct of self-preservation in the struggle for commercial existence?\nIf reform is effected, will it be effected by those who declare that the\nseverity of the struggle for existence makes reform impossible? or by\nthose in whom the ideal of honesty has some operative force and who\npurpose approximation to that ideal? When the conviction is expressed\nthat public opinion alone will be able to check this form of dishonesty,\nwhat is that but an appeal to the common sense and common faith that\nthere are other things which man can will and purpose besides success in\nthe struggle for existence?\n\nThe doctrine that the universe presents the mere semblance of purpose,\nthat Nature mimics purpose, having none, is shared by materialistic\nsystems in common with all those which consider that the only\nexplanation that can be rendered of any given state of things is the\nassumption that it is the issue of some antecedent necessity which\nproduced it. As we have already argued, the assumption of necessity as\nthe ultimate explanation of things breaks down when we come to consider\nthe beginning of the universe. If we assume an absolute beginning, then\nthere can have been no necessity antecedent to that, and the beginning\nof things is left without explanation. On the other hand, to say that\nthere never was any beginning is to admit that there never was any\noriginal necessity why things should follow the course of evolution\nwhich they have pursued--the initial collocation of causes was due to\nchance, was a purely fortuitous concurrence of atoms. When it is\nremarked that this is a strange assumption, that really, if the whole\nevolution process had been designed to reach the stage in which we know\nit and to attain the ideal which we surmise it to be capable of, the\nprimeval atoms could not have been arranged better for the purpose, the\nreply is that the appearance of purpose is a delusion: true, as a matter\nof chance, the chances are millions to one against a fortuitous\nconcurrence of atoms producing the evolution process that has taken\nplace, but then the chances were just as great, neither more nor less,\nagainst any other of the millions of evolution processes that might have\nbeen evolved. We know the one that has taken place, and it is marvellous\nin our eyes that precisely this and no other should have occurred; but\nthe wonder vanishes when we reflect that, had any other occurred, we\nshould have been equally convinced, and equally erroneously convinced,\nthat it could not have been produced by chance. The initial arrangement\nof things was, as it happened, such as to produce our evolution process:\nthings might have chanced differently at the beginning; if they had, a\ndifferent evolution process would have taken place, that is all. But it\nwould still have looked like purpose, and would still have been due to\nchance.\n\nBut would it? The whole question is whether the initial collocation was\ndue to chance or to purpose. To say that there might have been many\nother collocations proves nothing: an Almighty Power could collocate\nthings in any of an infinite number of ways. To argue that every\npossible collocation, and therefore the one that produced our evolution\nprocess, must be due to chance, is simply to beg the question: the very\nthing we want to know is whether this or any other process could be due\nto chance. The argument that any and every other process would equally\ntestify to purpose and equally imply design, seems rather to indicate\nthat no conceivable evolution process could conceivably be due to\nchance.\n\nNext, the necessitarian argument lays it down that the marvel of\nevolution vanishes when we reflect that if things had been different at\nthe beginning, the results would have been different. But they were not.\nAnd the fact that they were not is just the marvel which the\nnecessitarian does not even explain away: in order to diminish the\nprobability of purpose, he postulates countless possible alternatives to\nthe original arrangement of atoms, and then he is embarrassed with the\ndifficulty of getting rid of them. Why was this particular collocation\ndetermined on rather than one of the countless alternatives? To say it\nwas chance may be true; but we want to know what reason there is for\nbelieving it to be true. If there is none, then neither is there any\nreason for believing the purpose that makes the evolution process to be\nan illusion.\n\nBut let us grant it was chance: chance, as everyone knows, is merely a\nname for our ignorance as to the real cause; so that to say it was due\nto chance is to say that, for anything we know to the contrary, the\noriginal concurrence of atoms may have been due to purpose. In a word,\nthere is, on the theory of chance, no reason to believe that purpose\neither is or is not an illusion.\n\nIt may, however, be said that not only do we not know, but that we\ncannot know, whether it is an illusion or not. In reply we may either\nadmit that all our knowledge--scientific, moral, and religious--is based\nnot on knowledge, but on faith; or we may ask on what grounds this\nalleged impossibility is based. If we put that question, we shall find\nthat the grounds are not altogether cogent. It is alleged to be equally\nimpossible for the human mind to conceive either the existence or the\nnon-existence of a necessity antecedent to the absolute beginning of\nthings: therefore, in face of this inherent incapacity of the human\nmind, the truth about the beginning of things is unknowable and\ninconceivable. But, we venture to suggest, this alleged incapacity of\nthe human mind rests on a false antithesis: it rests on the assumption\nthat whatever phase of the evolution process we regard as the initial\narrangement must either have been determined by some prior phase (in\nwhich case it was not initial) or not determined at all. But as a mere\nmatter of logic, there remains the possibility that it may have been\nself-determined; and, as regards the evidence of experience, we are\nfamiliar with a cause which operates every day and which is\nself-determined, viz. the free will. There is, therefore, no such\ninherent incapacity in the human mind as is alleged; and the only\ninconceivability is that which is inherent in the theory of antecedent\nnecessity, and not in the facts themselves. It is simply incorrect to\nsay that if things cannot be explained by the theory of antecedent\nnecessity, they are not capable of being explained at all. If the\nevolution process had been designed to follow the course it has\nfollowed, the initial arrangement of things could not have been better\nadapted to produce the result; and, as adaptation of means to end is the\nmark of intelligence, it is neither inconceivable nor irrational to\nsuppose that purpose was immanent in things from the beginning.\n\nBut as it is scientific to argue from the known to the unknown, or from\nthe better known to the less known; and as to know fully what a thing is\nwe must know what it is capable of becoming or producing, let us pass\nfrom the pre-animal to the animal stage of evolution. It is the more\nnecessary to do this because it was Darwin's theory of the origin of\nspecies which impressed upon the modern mind the idea that Nature mimics\npurpose, having none. Man, with the purpose of breeding a certain type\nof animal, selects those animals to breed from which possess, in the\nmost marked degree, the characteristics which he wishes to develop in\nthe offspring. But, as Darwin demonstrated, Nature, or the environment,\nby killing off those creatures which did not possess (or least\npossessed) the qualities necessary to ensure survival, \"selects\" animals\nof a certain type to breed from. Thus \"natural selection\" produces its\nresults in the same way as human selection does; and presents every\nappearance of purpose, though the environment which produced the results\ncould have had no intentions or purpose at all. But just as man does not\ncreate the animals which he first selects to breed from, so the\nenvironment does not create those sports or varieties which it selects\nto breed from: if they did not exist, neither man nor Nature could breed\nfrom them--no results, purposed or unpurposed, could be got from them.\n\nIf now we inquire about these sports, we are told science is content\nwith the fact that they undeniably occur: wherever there are animals\nthere are varieties in their offspring. That those which are adapted to\nsurvive will survive, and those which are not will not, is a\nself-evident, indeed an identical, proposition. It is; and it gives away\nthe whole case against purpose, for it admits that some varieties are\noriginally adapted to survive, that without them neither man nor the\nenvironment would have anything to begin on or work on, and that though\nman and Nature may develop, they do not create the original adaptation.\nThey do but promote, by conscious or unconscious action, the purpose\nimmanent in the sport. Of all the numerous, successive, imperceptible\nincrements by which what was originally a sport is raised to a distinct\nspecies, not one is created by man or by the environment: all are the\n\"gratuitous offerings\" of the organism, manifestations of the organism's\nspontaneity, revelations of its latent capacities, fulfilments of the\npurpose immanent in it from the beginning.\n\nIf it be said that the survival of any or every given species was a\nmatter of chance, because other sports would have developed into other\nspecies, if the environment had been different, the reply again is, But\nit was not; and, on the theory of necessity, could not be. The fact that\nboth conditions--the organism's spontaneity and the environment's\nselective agency--were requisite to the production of the new species,\nand that both conditions were forthcoming, tells rather in favour of\npurpose than against it. The fact that this particular combination of\nconditions was effected, rather than any other, is on exactly the same\nfooting as the initial concurrence of atoms: if the latter cannot be\nascribed to any necessity antecedent to it, neither can the former; the\nreason of the combination is to be sought in the self-determining cause\nimmanent in the conditions. The fact, if it be a fact, that countless\nother combinations were possible, and this alone was chosen, shows that\nthe will immanent in the evolution process is free will.\n\nIn fine, Darwin has shown that the action of the environment is exactly\nwhat it would have been had it been designed for the purpose of\nselecting certain sports for development. All that is further necessary\nin order to show that this apparent purpose is an illusion, is to prove\nthat the environment was not designed to act as it does. Pending the\nproduction of that proof, the argument remains incomplete.\n\nThe larger part of the process of evolution is known to us only from the\noutside: we observe its effects in the animal world and in inorganic\nnature, but its inner workings we have to reach by inference. One part\nof the evolution process, however, we know from the inside--that part\nwhich is carried on through us. We are some of the innumerable channels\nthrough which the motive force of the process is transmitted; and the\nknowledge which its transmission through us gives us is more intimate\nand direct than that which we get from observing the external effects it\nproduces elsewhere. The evolution of society, for instance, is a part of\nthe general process of evolution, and is a process which is carried on\nthrough us and expresses the resultant of the totality of our\nsentiments and actions towards one another. What light, then, if any, is\nthrown by sociology on the general question of purpose?\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer has familiarised us with the lesson that in politics\nand social experiments it is the unforeseen and unintended results of\nlegislation which are far the most important, and that the industrial\norganisation of the country, or we may now say of the world, is not the\nfulfilment of any design preconceived by any governmental agency, but\nthe unintended result of innumerable actions on the part of men who\nnever dreamed that their action would have any such outcome. The reason\nof this is to be sought in the fact that society is an organism and that\nits growth follows the same laws as those which regulate the structural\ndevelopment of an am\u0153ba or a rhizopod. Thus, both society and the\nanimal organism must be fed. To be fed, both must appropriate nutriment\nfrom the environment. That nutriment must be taken up and must be\ndistributed to all parts of the organism, social or animal, if all parts\nare to be fed--and all must be fed, because all are mutually dependent,\nand to neglect one would disorganise the whole. Channels of\ncommunication must be established between all parts, in order that food\nmay be conveyed from the organ which took it from the environment to the\norgans which require it for support. What marks the process of\nevolution in both cases is the increasing division of labour and the\nincreasing interdependence of the parts on one another. The animal\norganism, like the social organism, is made up of a multitude of living\nunits, each one of which is continually adjusting itself to the\nrequirements of all the rest. The increasing complexity in the structure\nof an animal organism is possible only because the living units of one\npart take upon themselves new functions, or devote themselves\nexclusively to one function, in order to benefit the units of a distant\npart. If they purposed or were purposed to produce that result, they\ncould not behave differently or better. But this appearance of purpose\nis mere semblance: the minute cells of an animal organism have no\nintention of producing even a rhizopod or an am\u0153ba. The explanation\nof this mimicry of purpose lies in the fact of the mutual\ninterdependence of the parts: no change can take place in one organ of\nsociety or of the animal without being transmitted through the whole,\njust as you cannot remove one of the undermost of a cartload of bricks\nwithout more or less disturbing all the rest. But what is true of the\nbricks or of the units of the animal organism is true of the units of\nthe social organism: what we discover in their action and reaction on\none another is the operation, not of voluntary purpose, but of\ninvariable laws of cause and effect.\n\nAccording to this argument, then, the living units of the animal\norganism resemble in their action those of the social organism\nsufficiently to warrant us in arguing from the one to the other, and in\nconcluding that there is purpose in the action of neither. But it is\nobvious that, if the resemblance is great enough to justify us in\narguing from the animal to the social organism, it also opens the way\nfor the argument to travel the return journey, from the social organism\nto the animal, and to reach the conclusion that there is purpose in\nboth. Let us therefore consider what each of these two opposite\nconclusions requires us to believe.\n\nOn the one hand, before accepting the argument that there is no purpose\nin the action of the social organism because there is none in that of\nthe animal, we must prove that there is none in that of the animal. But\nthat, as we have already urged, is exactly what has not been proved: the\nutmost that science claims to prove is that the units of the animal\norganism do behave in a certain way. That way is exactly the way in\nwhich they would behave if they were designed to do so; and science\nleaves it, so far, a perfectly open question whether they were or were\nnot so designed. The argument, therefore, that there is no purpose in\nthe action of the social organism, because none in the animal, breaks\ndown at the threshold. Yet it is on the unproved and unprovable\nassertion that the appearance of purpose in the animal organism cannot\npossibly be due to design, and must therefore be a delusion, that we\nare expected to deny the evidence of our own experience and\nconsciousness and to believe that we, the units of the social organism,\nhave no purpose in the daily acts by which we extend trade or discharge\nour social functions.\n\nThus the surmise that Nature mimics purpose, having none, is a\nconjecture which, so far as it is applied to the pre-human stages of the\nevolution process, simply plays upon our ignorance; and which, when\napplied to that part of the evolution process which is carried on\nthrough us, we know to be absurd. On the other hand, if there is such\nsimilarity between the laws of the one part of the process and the laws\nof the other part, it must be as allowable to argue from the part and\nthe laws which we do know to the part and the laws that we do not know,\nas it is to explain the known by what is confessedly unknown. In other\nwords, if the evolution of the social organism is known to be due to\npurpose, then it is a reasonable inference that animal evolution, which,\nwe are told, follows the same line and laws, is due also to purpose--and\nif not to any purpose entertained by the cells of the animal organism,\nthen to that of a Will of which their action is the expression.\n\nIt is, however, maintained that the continuous social changes which\nconstitute the evolution of society, so far from being the result of the\npurpose of any individual or of any government, are frequently the very\nopposite of what was intended by the authors of the changes, and always\nare notoriously beyond our power to forecast. But the fact that my plans\nare modified or diverted by my successors or by my coadjutors does not\nprove that there was no purpose in my plans, or that there was none in\nthe modifications introduced by my successors. And the total result of\nour united action and purposes may be something different from what any\nof us individually intended and yet express a common purpose, which is\nshown by the result to have been more or less present to all of us. A\ncathedral begun in the Norman style may have taken generations to build\nand may end in Gothic; and it will express the ideas common to the\nseveral builders, in much the same way that a composite photograph\nreproduces most distinctly the features in which all the persons\nphotographed coincide, and other features more or less distinctly\naccording to the extent to which they are shared in common by the\ndifferent subjects. Or, to express the effect of the successive actions\nof succeeding generations, we may borrow an illustration from the game\nof chess. It is possible for five players to play, taking it in turns to\nmove, so that every player makes one move out of five, and plays\nalternately for White and Black. The result, with good players, is a\nbrilliant and well-developed game, which is not the game as purposed or\nintended by any one of the five players, but as continually modified\nand improved by each every time that he took it up. When, then, we\nreflect how many players in the game of life there are even in a small\nsociety, we can well understand that, though each has his own way of\nserving the common purpose, none can forecast the result.\n\nPerhaps it will be said that the chess-players have a common purpose,\nand the players in life's game have none. The reply is that science\nassumes they have; science assumes that they play to win in the struggle\nfor existence; and only on the assumption that men have common purposes\nis it possible to frame any scientific account of their actions. The\nscience of Political Economy assumes that it is a common purpose of men\nto acquire wealth, and that their actions are determined by that\npurpose. It then goes on to show that if that is their purpose, then the\nconditions under which it can be and is effected are of a certain kind,\n_e.g._ men must buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. It\nis not necessary to assume, nor does Political Economy assume, that man\ncan only purpose to acquire wealth, or that he must under all\ncircumstances do so. In the same way it is wholly unscientific in\nsociology to assume that success in the struggle for existence is either\na thing that man must aim at, or the only thing that he can aim at: the\nsoldier dies for his country, the martyr for his faith. The\ninstitutions of a nation--legal, political, social, and\nreligious--express the predominant purposes for which successive\ngenerations of the community have laboured; and the evolution of mankind\nis the history of the various degrees of success with which men have\nrealised the ideals which they have purposed to attain. The successive\nreforms by which progress has been effected have all been purposed, and\nhave all been purposed by men who believed, rightly or wrongly, that in\nso doing they were serving God and their fellow-men, and that the ideals\nof truth, justice, equality, fraternity, love, compassion, and mercy\nexpress God's will and the Divine purpose.\n\nIf, then, the outcome of the pre-human period of evolution has been, as\na matter of fact, and amongst other things, such as to prepare the earth\nfor man's habitation and to provide him with a mechanism, physiological\nand psychological, such that he can use it, if he will, to promote what\nhe considers to be progress and advance, it is not unreasonable for him\nto regard past phases of evolution as so many steps leading to the\nrealisation of the ideals which he cherishes, in his best moments, as\nhis highest purposes. The continuity of evolution and the unity of its\nprocess authorise or even compel him to use that part of the process\nwhich is carried on through him as a means to interpret the rest. As, in\nthe game of chess played by five players, each player inherits from his\npredecessor the game as it stands, and carries on, with improvements or\nmodifications, the scheme which he inherits, so in life each player in\nturn becomes conscious of the ideals which he too may, or may not, as he\nwills, carry one step nearer to their goal. It is in the continuity with\nwhich these ideals are transmitted through one consciousness after\nanother that the continuity of human evolution consists. We are, or may\nbe if we choose, particles in the medium by which a purpose not our own\n(save inasmuch as we choose to make it so) is carried onwards to its\ndestination. The medium through which progress has travelled in the past\nis Nature; the medium through which it is now travelling is human\nnature. By us the ideal, as it is transmitted through our consciousness,\nis recognised as implying the presence in us of a purpose higher than\nour own. Whether in the medium of Nature there is any dim consciousness\nof the progress towards which the changes in Nature conspire, we know\nnot. But the uniformity of Nature and human nature requires us to see in\nthose natural changes the operation of the same power travelling in the\nsame direction as it does through us. In its passage through us it is\nmade known to us as the object of our highest aspirations; the ideal of\npurity, of holiness, and love; the God for whom the human heart,\nmistakenly or not, has always sought, and never sought in vain.\n\n\n\n\nXIV.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nThe Pessimistic interpretation of evolution has taught us the lesson\nthat, if we start without belief in the Divine government of the world,\nstudy of the process of evolution will not lead us to discern any Divine\npurpose in the process. Belief in religion cannot begin without faith in\nGod to start with, just as belief in science or in morality is based not\non evidence, but on faith. The question remains whether with faith we\ncan believe that the process of evolution is a revelation of Divine\nlove, and whether man's environment has been evolved in such a way as to\npromote in him that love of his fellow-man and God which is the\nreligious ideal.\n\nIf we look at the structure of society, we see it is based on the fact\nthat man has certain needs--of food, shelter, and clothing, etc.--which\ncan be satisfied more effectually by co-operation and division of labour\nthan by isolated, individual action. The man who earns his own living\ndoes so by rendering services for which he is paid: he cannot benefit\nhimself without benefiting others to some extent. That is the law under\nwhich he lives, a law not of his own making, nor always to his own\nliking, but a law inherent in the nature of things, and part of the\npurpose, if purpose there be, in the scheme of things. As a free agent,\nman may co-operate with his fellows and take his share of the divided\nlabour, or not, as he wills; but those peoples which have carried the\nprinciples of co-operation and organisation furthest have fared best.\nThey have availed themselves of the opportunity offered them, and have\nsurvived. The failure of the rest to do likewise has not impeded the\nfulfilment of the Divine purpose that men should help one another. On\nthe contrary, those who decline to help one another voluntarily place\nthemselves at a disadvantage in the struggle for existence, and are\nslowly, but surely, crowded out by those who fulfil the Divine purpose\nless unsatisfactorily, and in consequence tend to inherit the earth.\n\nWe have already seen that when a man reaches years of discretion he\nfinds that the physiological and psychological mechanism of which he is\nnow in possession, and for the management of which he is henceforth\nresponsible, has a tendency to run in certain grooves: he has, as a\nchild, been taught and has inherited an aptitude to think and act in\ncertain ways. The same remark applies to the social organism. Before or\nwhen the individual awakes to the fact that he is a member of a society,\nhe has already been or is the child of parents to whom he renders\nobedience, and between whom and himself there exist relations of\naffection. The evolution of man as a purely animal organism has been\nsuch that he begins life with a prolonged period of helpless infancy.\nUnlike the lower animals, which very soon after birth are capable of\nproviding for themselves, he is for years dependent on others. His\nprolonged infancy is a prolonged period of plasticity, during which he\nis moulded into a member, first of a family and then and thereby into a\nmember of society. All the higher animals give their offspring some\neducation, an education as good as they received themselves: in the\nhuman race alone do parents give their children a better education than\nthey got themselves. It is, however, not the rising generation alone who\nbenefit by the long period of dependence and plasticity which\ncharacterises childhood. It is, of course, true that labour expended on\nthe perfecting of tools and machinery is peculiarly productive, inasmuch\nas the increased efficiency of the instrument more than repays the\ngreater outlay. But as the workman who produces the tool becomes in\nconsequence of his labour a more skilled mechanic, so the education\ngiven by the parent to the child is an education not only of the child,\nbut of the parent, and makes both better fitted to be members of\nsociety. It not only secures that subordination of the younger men to\nthe elder, which is necessary for the stability of society and the\npermanence of the tribe, but it also tempers power with responsibility,\nresponsibility not to some external authority, but to the higher\nprinciple within the man.\n\nThus even in the earliest stage of society the anti-social forces of\nselfishness and the passions do not operate _in vacuo_ and with nothing\nto impede them. Society at the very beginning is no _tabula rasa_: the\nfield is already largely occupied, and the direction of social evolution\nalready largely determined, by that affection between parents and\nchildren without which neither society as a whole nor the individual as\na unit could come into being or continue to exist. It is an\nunwarrantable libel, even on savage society, to say that in it the ape\nand tiger predominate in man: the lowest forms of society survive only\nso far as there exists more humanity than brutality in the dealings of\ntheir members with one another. It is a false philosophy of evolution,\nnot a true acquaintance with the facts of anthropology, which rashly\nassumes that the morally lowest must have been the only primitive\nelements in the evolution of humanity. The evil and the good in man have\nexisted side by side from the beginning; unselfish affection, as well as\nselfish desires, has always been part of the equipment of human nature,\nthough the evolution of the former may be a longer and more difficult\nprocess, both in the individual and the race, than the evolution of the\nlatter.\n\nIn the race moral progress may be expected with much more confidence\nthan it can in the case of the individual. The mere existence of a\nsociety, however simple in structure, is of itself proof that the\nanti-social forces of selfishness and passion are in it less strong than\nthe instincts of neighbourliness and mutual help. Of competing societies\nthose eventually triumph which are least weakened by internal\ndissension--that is to say, those societies tend to thrive and extend\nmost of which the members are most ready to subordinate their private\nends to the public good. Ultimately it is only by the development of\nthis type of individual character that a society can achieve success;\nand it is this type of character that the competition between nations\ndevelops. But essential as it is to the survival of a society, it is by\nno means so essential to the survival of the individual in his struggle\nfor existence against other individuals. If, then, society were simply a\ncollection of warring atoms, or if the individual's whole activity were\nexpended in struggling with his neighbour and trying to elbow him out,\nthe type of character essential to the survival of society could never\nbe developed, and society itself could neither come into being nor\ncontinue to be. The fact is that men not only compete, but co-operate:\nsociety is, and from the beginning has been, an organisation requiring\nfrom each of its parts some subordination to the interests of the\nwhole.\n\nAs the organisation of society grows more complex, the individual\nbecomes less and less capable of existing independently of society,\nsociety becomes more and more independent of the services of any\nindividual member, and both these facts tend to foster the social and\nweaken the anti-social forces in man. Increasing division and\nsubdivision of labour specialises the function of each member of the\ncommunity more and more, and so deprives him of the general aptitude for\ndoing all kinds of work which is essential to every man who is, as for\ninstance in a new colony, thrown largely on his own resources. Thus the\nsolitary existence which might be just possible for the outcast from a\nsavage tribe becomes a practical impossibility for the average member of\nany community that has risen above that stage of social evolution. At\nthe same time the point is reached when no one man is indispensable to\nthe community. Society is made up of units so similar to one another\nthat any one can be replaced by some other, and, as a matter of fact,\nthe place of everyone is at death filled by some successor.\n\nThe theory of a social contract, as a historical or prehistorical event\nin the development of any community, has long been rightly discredited:\nat no time did a number of men, living solitary lives, have a public\nmeeting and formally contract to live together on certain conditions and\nfor certain ends. Man has been a gregarious, if not social, animal from\nthe beginning. Nevertheless, man has certain needs, desires, and ends\nwhich can only be satisfied by means of social organisation, and which\nare quite as potent in holding society together as if, instead of being\ntacitly at work, they had been proclaimed aloud in a formal social\ncontract. If through any disease the social organism obstructs, or fails\nto assist in realising, those ends, the dissatisfaction of the\nindividual and the danger to the state are just as great as if a formal\ncontract had been violated: the disappointment of the normal and\nreasonable expectations of the members of the community is substantially\ninjustice, and is not altogether erroneously stated to be a violation of\nthe common and tacit understanding on which society is in fact if not\nformally established. Co-operation in labour does imply some sort of\nengagement, expressed or understood, that the joint product shall be\ndivided more or less fairly between the joint producers. Unfairness in\nthe distribution of social benefits may be of slow growth, but must\neventually result in undisguised resentment--appeal is made openly and\nconsciously to justice, which henceforth becomes the ideal of a section\nat least of the community, and is recognised as a condition without\nwhich a healthy social existence is impossible.\n\nIt is thus a monstrous perversion of the plain facts to represent the\nstruggle for existence as having been the sole or the main factor in\nsocial evolution: every member of a community is born into an\natmosphere of co-operation and maintains his existence by the\nco-operation of others. If he must labour to live, he cannot labour for\nhimself without at the same time rendering service to others; the very\nsame conditions which make him desire justice for himself constrain him\nto maintain justice for the community at large. The social environment\nis, and has always been, such as to lead man in the paths of justice and\nto train him for the service of his fellow-man. The units which\nconstitute the social environment are men, beings whose physical,\nmental, and moral structure is the result of a long process of evolution\nstretching back to beyond the beginnings of life upon this earth, a\nprocess which, assuming it to have had purpose, was designed to include\nin its effects a creature capable of justice and of love.\n\nThe full development of the sentiment of justice has been the work of\nmany centuries. At first, when the community is small and nomad, the\nidea that a stranger has a right to justice is incomprehensible. Even\nwhen with the growth of civilisation provision is made for according\nforeign merchants and others some protection from the law, the idea that\nthe stranger has the same right to justice as the citizen is neither\nadmitted by law nor entertained as a speculation. Indeed, the law,\nmodest though it be, may be in advance of public opinion and of the\npractice of officials--witness the extortions practised by Roman\ngovernors on the Roman provinces. Eventually, however, public opinion\noutstrips the law and pronounces that even the colour of a man's skin\ncannot bar his claims to justice, and that the inhabitants of a country,\nthough they be aborigines, have some rights in it. Finally comes\nphilosophy and pronounces justice, absolute and stern, the one thing\nneedful, the one and only duty which it is within the sphere and\nfunction of government to maintain.\n\nUnfortunately for the philosophy which maintains this view, it happens\nthat, just when the authority of justice is admitted by the conscience\nof civilisation to be paramount, justice as an ideal is recognised to be\nneither capable of realisation nor absolutely desirable. It is obvious\nthat in the best-regulated even of free communities the amount of\njustice which can be secured by the action of the law and the\nintervention of the State falls very far short of the ideal; and the\nmultiplication of laws and State inquisitors, which would be necessary\nif every form of injustice and wrong-doing were to be punished by the\nState, would be a remedy, if indeed it were a remedy, worse than the\ndisease. It is impossible to pretend to believe that wealth is\ndistributed according to merit in any existing community, or that any\ngovernmental system, even if designed solely with that end in view,\ncould ever determine what a man's merits were, or what his reward should\nbe. Nor is the ill distribution of wealth the only factor of injustice,\nthough it is the only factor with which the State could make pretence to\ndeal: sickness and sorrow, grief and pain--nay, the very capacity for\nsuffering and for joy--are dealt to different men in very different\nmeasure. It is plain matter of fact that earthly goods and pleasures are\nnot distributed according to merit; and it is just when man's conquest\nof Nature has become most complete, when society is no longer struggling\nfor a bare subsistence, when the demand for justice is most fully and\nunreservedly admitted, that the impossibility of meeting the demand and\nthe danger of failing to meet it become most manifest. The poverty which\naccompanies progress may in one generation be less than it was in the\nprevious generation, but the extremes of poverty and wealth grow daily\nwider apart, and the number of those who are poor increases in a growing\npopulation much more rapidly than the number of the rich. The danger\nwhich this rent in the social fabric threatens to the whole structure of\nsociety may be exaggerated, but cannot be denied. The mere justice of\nindividualism which has hitherto sufficed to hold society together,\nsuffices now no longer. The justice which limits itself to the\nfulfilment of those actions to the non-performance of which a legal\npenalty is attached, is not the one and only thing needful, nor does its\nforce remedy the numerous cases of undeserved misfortune and suffering\nwhich the working of our social and industrial system entails. What\nheals the suffering and saves it from becoming a festering sore that\nmight prove fatal to society, is that love of man for his fellow-man,\nwhich is manifested to the poor by the rich to some extent, but chiefly\nby the poor. The State can only prescribe and enforce external acts of\njustice; and the external acts which it prescribes are not the bond\nwhich holds or can hold society together. The State, in its attempts to\nmodify society through the individual, is as clumsy as the breeder or\nthe gardener in dealing with animals and plants, and must fain be\ncontent if it can modify some of the more prominent external\ncharacteristics. Nature is much more searching, and, if slower, much\nmore thorough: the real nature of her work, the true character of the\nforce on which she has made the cohesion of society to depend, becomes\nobvious at the time when the insufficiency of mere justice for the\npurpose becomes apparent. Imperfect though man's obedience has been to\nthe commandment, \"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,\" it is to\nhis obedience that society owes its maintenance.\n\nAs a matter of fact, then, strict justice is not and cannot be realised\nin this world. Even the forces of the social environment which are, to\na large extent, under man's own control are not and cannot be so\ndirected by him as to secure rewards and punishments in exact proportion\nto merit and demerit; while the action of those natural forces which\ndistribute fortune and misfortune, pain and the susceptibility to pain,\npleasure and the capacity of enjoyment, is still less under his control\nand, as far as we can see, is still less proportionate to desert. The\nfields of the unjust benefit as much as those of the just by the rain\nfrom heaven; the labourers who enter the vineyard of civilisation at a\nlate hour receive as great a reward as their predecessors who bore the\nheat and burden of the day, or even greater; when a tower in our social\nfabric falls, it is not the guilty who are alone or even specially\ninvolved in its ruin. From the time of Theognis, at least, men have\ninquired with despair how the gods could expect worship when they\nsuffered these things to be; and as long as we look upon life as though\nwe were detached spectators, with no care for it save a disinterested\ndesire to see justice done, it is easy for us to declaim upon the\nabsolute indifference of the cosmic process to man and his deserts. But\nthis detached attitude is purely artificial, and we could not make even\nthe semblance of long maintaining it, did we not unconsciously glide\ninto the more natural, but less warrantable, position of tacitly\nassuming that our own personal lot would be improved if strict justice\nwere done. But is not our resentment against the injustice of the world\npartly premature and somewhat shallow and short-sighted? Are we sure we\nwant strict justice? Are we so anxious to have our merits weighed? are\nthey so imposing? Can we pray that we may be rewarded after our\niniquities? If society could by some supernatural power deal strict\njustice to all its members, who _would_, who _could_ live in it? As a\nmatter of fact--to say it once more--it is not by law alone that society\nlives, but by love, by the long-patient love of father or mother, of\nwife or husband, of friend or neighbour, which every one of us has\naccepted and none has fully requited. Our very hospitals are open to all\nwho need them, to those whose suffering is due to their own negligence,\nor even crime, and not merely to those whose pain is undeserved. A\npalpable injustice, worthy of the cosmic process itself! And what\nexcuse, if justice, absolute and relentless, be our highest and\nworthiest aspiration, can there be for appropriating the reward of\nhonest toil to the often fruitless task of offering to those, who have\nby their own vice sunk into the depths, one last chance of life and of\nredemption? The mercy which falleth, like the gentle rain from heaven,\nalike upon the unjust and the just, must be judged by the same standard\nthat we apply to the cosmic process. We may, like the elder brother of\nthe prodigal son, refuse to see anything in man or Nature but a world\ngiven up to gross injustice--persons so superior as to stand in no need\nof forgiveness and no fear of judgment are able doubtless to judge the\nworld and their fellow-man. But the prodigal himself may, perchance,\nbetter understand some of the workings of his father's heart, and trust\nhe sees in the apparent injustice of Nature more instances of that mercy\nwhich would not have showed itself to him had justice measured love.\n\nIt seems, then, that the \"ethical process\" and the \"cosmic process\" are\nnot so absolutely opposed to one another as Professor Huxley endeavoured\nto make out. Both at times act with a calm disregard of justice. In the\none case we know that it is a higher principle which takes the place of\njustice; and it is a reasonable conjecture that the ethical process,\nwhich is one outcome or manifestation of the cosmic process, does but\nreproduce, in this case as in others, the action of the cosmic force\nwhich operates through the heart of man as well as through the rest of\nthe universe. It is at any rate inconsistent to condemn the cosmos for\nexhibiting that quality of mercy which we rank highest amongst the\nattributes of man: if we take credit to our fellow-men for that quality,\nin fairness let us give the cosmos the same credit when it displays the\nsame quality. If, as we assume in this chapter, there is purpose in\nevolution, let us admit that there is some presumption that it is a\npurpose of love and of mercy.\n\nAs it is by faith in science that men of science succeed in solving\nproblems which, for a time, seem beyond the powers of science to deal\nwith, so it is on faith in religion that the religious explanation of\nthe universe depends for its slow but sure extension. With that faith we\nmay succeed in seeing, to some slight extent, that the unequal\ndistribution of pain, as well as of earthly prosperity, is not\nincompatible with a Divine purpose in evolution. For that faith we must\nbelieve that the suffering and sorrow from which none of us is exempt\nare not evil, unless we choose to make them so, but opportunities for\ngood. Indeed, without that faith we seem forced upon the same\nconclusion: the man who devotes himself, his soul, his life to the\nrelief of the needy and the suffering cannot make earthly prosperity his\nchief good, though, as Professor Huxley has said, he may attain\nsomething much better. But if we hold that there is something better\nthan earthly prosperity, can we consistently declaim against sickness\nand sorrow as the worst of evils, or indict a universe because they are\nnot unknown in it? The Stoicism which lent Professor Huxley the strength\nto teach that man must to the end declare defiance and resistance to the\ncosmos--resistance unavailing and defiance doomed to certain failure in\nthe end--might also have taught him that the evil which he calls on us\nto war against is not in the cosmos; that the enemy of the ethical\nprocess has his headquarters not in Nature, but in the heart of man.\nPain and sorrow are evil to the sufferer who allows them to make him\nselfish, and to the spectator who chooses to be callous to his\nsuffering. If our volitions do count for something in the course of\nthings, if we are so far free that we can, in response to Professor\nHuxley's call, doggedly and repeatedly resist the cosmic process, then\nit is of our own free will, also, that we do evil when the opportunity\nof good is offered us. Yet we charge the evil upon the cosmos.\n\n_\u1f66 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03ae \u03bd\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b2\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f14\u03be \u1f21\u03bc\u03ad\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03ac\u03ba' \u1f14\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03c6\u1fc7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u1fc3\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03b3\u03b5' \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd._\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nON BISHOP BERKELEY'S IDEALISM\n\n\nWhen one asserts that a writer is wrong in one of the arguments which he\nuses, it is well to begin by making sure that he really does use the\nargument in question. For this purpose it is useful to quote the\npassages in which the writer uses the argument, and such passages, for\nmy own satisfaction, I will speedily cite from Bishop Berkeley. But\nfirst, in order that the reader may know that the interpretation which I\nput on these extracts is not one peculiar to myself, but is in harmony\nwith the general tenor of Berkeley's metaphysical writings, I will quote\nfrom Professor Fraser, who, in his preface to the _Dialogues between\nHylas and Philonous_, states Berkeley's argument to be as follows: \"As\nthe common reason of men, tested by their actions, demands the\n_permanence_ of sensible things, even though they are not permanently\npresent to the senses of any one embodied mind, it follows that the very\nexistence of the things of sense (apart from any 'marks of design' in\ntheir collocations) implies the permanent existence of Supreme Mind, by\nwhom all real objects are perpetually conceived, and in whom their\norderly appearances, disappearances, and reappearances in finite minds\nmay be said to exist potentially.\"\n\nAnd now for Berkeley's own words, (1) In the _Second Dialogue between\nHylas and Philonous_ (p. 304 of Professor Fraser's edition), he says,\n\"To me it is evident that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in\na mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real\nexistence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an\nexistence distinct from being perceived by me, _there must be some other\nmind wherein they exist_. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world\nreally exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit, who\ncontains and supports it.\"\n\n(2) In the _Third Dialogue_ (p. 325 of Professor Fraser's edition) we\nhave: \"_Hyl._ Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it\npossible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?--_Phil._ I\ncan; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an\nexistence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all\nminds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind;\nsince I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is\ntherefore some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals\nbetween the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my\nbirth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is\ntrue with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily\nfollows there is an _omnipresent Eternal Mind_, which knows and\ncomprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view.\"\n\n(3) The independent, real existence of things is affirmed with emphasis\nin the _Second Dialogue_ (_ibid._, p. 307): \"It is evident that the\nthings I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it\nbe in a mind. Nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me\nperceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of\nmy mind; since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my\npower to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be\naffected with upon opening my eyes or ears. They must therefore exist in\nsome other mind, whose will it is they should be exhibited to me. The\nthings, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them\nwhich you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be\nproduced by, anything but a mind or spirit?\"\n\n(4) Finally, in _The Principles of Human Knowledge_, \u00a7 90, in explaining\nthe two senses of \"external\": \"The things perceived by sense may be\ntermed _external_, with regard to their origin--in that they are not\ngenerated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit\ndistinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise\nbe said to be 'without the mind' in another sense, namely when they\nexist in some other mind; thus when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may\nstill exist, but it must be in another mind.\"\n\nBerkeley's argument in brief, therefore, is that we believe things to be\npermanent, and must therefore believe in a permanent, Divine mind in\nwhich they may exist. The question which I wish to raise is as to this\npermanence of things; for, if things are not permanent, they cannot\ntestify to the permanence of the Divine mind. I will begin my\nquestionings with the concluding words of the last-quoted passage: \"when\nI shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in\nanother mind.\" The expression \"the things I saw\" would seem to be\nambiguous. Are the things I saw the sensations of sight which I had, or\nare they something different? If they are my sensations, they certainly\ndo not exist when my eyes are closed--things are not permanent. If the\nthings I see are something different from my sensations of sight, then\nthe common-sense Realist would seem to be right, and Berkeley's\nIdealism must be given up. Let us examine each alternative.\n\nIt looks, at first, as though Berkeley himself would say that the things\nI saw are identical with my sensations of sight: in the third passage\nquoted above he says, \"the things I perceive are my own ideas ... the\nthings, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them\nwhich you will.\" Let us, therefore, see the consequences of adhering\nstrictly to this interpretation of the ambiguous phrase. It will follow\nin the first place that, unless I can see with my eyes shut, the things\nI see are not permanent, but do cease to exist when I close my eyes.\nNext, my sensations cannot exist in somebody else's mind--the fact that\nyou can see the object when your eyes are open does not enable me to see\nit with my eyes closed. On the other hand, of course, it does not follow\nthat because my eyes are closed nobody else can see anything--only, this\ndoes not make my sensations permanent, or prove that they can exist in\nsomeone else's mind. In fine, if \"the things I saw\" are the sensations\nof sight that I had, then Berkeley's argument from the permanent\nexistence of \"things\" to their existence in a permanent mind breaks down\ndoubly; for, first, my sensations plainly are not permanent; and,\nsecond, my sensations cannot exist in another mind, permanent or\notherwise.\n\nAt this point it is necessary to note that \"existence\" has been used in\nthis connection in a double sense: actual existence has been\ndistinguished from potential. It is on this distinction that Mill bases\nhis definition of matter as \"the permanent possibility of sensation\";\nbut the distinction is derived from Berkeley, who has, as usual, given\nthe most lucid explanation. In his _MS. Common Place Book_ (quoted in\nFraser, i. 325, n. 9), Berkeley says, \"Bodies, taken for powers, do\nexist when not perceived; but this existence is not actual. When I say a\n_power_ exists, no more is meant than that _if_, in the light, I open my\neyes, and look that way, I shall see the body.\" Thus far Mill will go\nwith Berkeley; and thus far both are open to the reproach of not giving\na plain answer to a plain question. The plain question of common sense\nto the Idealist is: Do things exist when unperceived? Does the furniture\nof my room exist when nobody is in the room to perceive it? To which the\nIdealist replies that if I go into the room I shall see the\nfurniture--which is perfectly true, but is no answer to the question.\nThere is, indeed, no particular reason why Mill should not plainly\nanswer \"No,\" if it were not for fear of giving a shock to the man of\ncommon sense who cannot readily comprehend how it is that the coal in\nhis grate has come to be consumed if the process of combustion has been\nsuspended in his absence. But with Berkeley the case is different: for\nhim the permanence of things and the common-sense belief in that\npermanence have a value as furnishing an additional argument in favour\nof a Supreme Mind. But he too evades rather than meets the plain\nquestion of the plain man: \"Do things exist when no one is conscious of\nthem?\" His reply is, \"Yes, for the Divine Mind is conscious of\nthem\"--which again is true, but is not an answer to the question.\n\nHowever, the point of immediate interest for our present purpose is to\nascertain whether the conception of \"potential\" existence can lend to\nthings that permanence which according to Berkeley necessitates the\nassumption of a permanent mind. Now, by the potential existence of a\nbody or thing no more is meant than that _if_ I open my eyes and look in\nthe right direction, I shall see the thing; and the things I see are my\nsensations, ideas, call them what you will. But that I can see with my\neyes shut is beyond possibility of proof--it certainly is not proved by\nthe fact that I can see with my eyes open; and neither is it proved by\nthe fact that other people see things when my eyes are closed. In fine,\nif the things I see are my sensations, then things cannot have a\npermanent existence; and no inference as to the permanence of the Divine\nMind can be drawn.\n\nWe are driven, therefore, to suppose that the things I see are\ndifferent, partially or wholly, from my sensations. And this supposition\nseems to be implied by various passages in Berkeley. For instance, he\nsays (i. p. 307), \"the things I perceive are my own ideas ... the\nthings, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them\nwhich you will,\" where he seems to distinguish what is _immediately_\nperceived (_i.e._ sensations) from something else. And a few lines\nbefore he seems to be inclined to admit the existence of something else\nthan my sensations, for he says \"ideas or things by me perceived, either\nthemselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind.\"\n\nThe permanence of things is undoubtedly an inference. We find by\nexperience that effects which are produced by causes acting before our\nvery eyes are at other times produced by their causes in our absence:\nthe fire burns in my absence as well as in my presence. Obviously,\ntherefore, the thing which produces its effects when I have no\nsensations of it must be different from those sensations; and it must be\nan existing thing, otherwise its effects will be effects produced by a\nnon-existent cause. To say that the unobserved cause in these cases is a\npossibility of sensation does not mend matters. A possible sensation is\na sensation which, as a matter of fact, does not exist and never did. It\nis a piece of pure imagination; and consequently on this theory the\nwhole past history of the universe is imaginary. Neither are matters\nmended by denying that there are such things as \"causes,\" and affirming\nthat we only know \"invariable and unconditional antecedents.\" How can a\npossible sensation, that is, an event which did not take place, precede\none which does take place? How can an imagination of my mind have\npreceded the existence of my mind?\n\nPerhaps it may be said that if Mill's Psychological Theory of Mind and\nMatter is not satisfactory, neither is the theory of the direct\napprehension of reality wholly consistent with itself. It affirms the\ndirect apprehension of reality, yet on examination the direct\napprehension turns out to be an inference. Thus: things must have an\nexistence different from our sensations because they produce their\neffects, and therefore exist, in our absence.\n\nThe reply is simple. Unless we believed the effects, which we do\nperceive, to be real things, we should not infer the causes, which we do\nnot perceive, to be real either. Common sense believes that things\n_continue_ to exist when we turn our eyes away: their existence beyond\nthe range of observation is an inference from their existence in our\nobservation. Their inferred permanence is deduced from their observed\nindependence.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nA\n\nAbstraction: 193, 198, 199, 203, 242, 255\n\nAction: 65, 68, 70\n\nAdaptation: 21, 25-30, 186, 204, 206, 219, 221, 252 (_see_ Environment)\n\nAgnosticism: 36, 165-76, 202, 218, 237\n\nAnthropomorphism: 51, 52, 55\n\nApe and tiger, The: 28, 30, 31, 40, 276\n\nAppearance: 67, 266 (_see_ Purpose)\n\nApprehension: 57, 58, 63-70, 295\n\nApproximation to the ideal: 206, 208, 213, 222, 229, 252, 256 (_see_\n Ideals, Progress, Purpose)\n\nArt, Artist: 207, 209, 244\n\nAssumption: 164-180, 185, 187, 188, 191-6, 221, 222\n\n\nB\n\nBecoming: 78\n\nBeing: 78\n\nBelief: 215, 221 (_see_ Will to believe)\n\nBerkeley, Bp.: 62, 63, 289-95\n\nBernard, Claude: 90\n\nBiology: 94, 96, 249-51\n\n\nC\n\nCausation, Law of: 106 (_see_ Universal causation)\n\nCauses: 79, 117, 181, 194, 196, 197, 208-10, 224, 244\n\nChance: 258, 259, 260\n\nChemical combination: 89, 90, 92, 98\n\nChemistry: 86, 94\n\nChess: 163-83, 268\n\nCommon consciousness of mankind: 164, 196, 197, 208, 244\n\nCommon experience of mankind: 74\n\nCommon faith of mankind: 165-72, 184-202, 204, 222, 223, 229, 246, 247\n\nCommon sense: 78, 81, 164-8, 173, 229, 249, 253, 289\n\nComparative method: 7\n --Sciences: 105\n\nConscience: 52, 84\n\nConsciousness: 63-5, 70, 84, 166, 182, 198, 201, 253 (_see_ States of\n consciousness)\n\nContinuity, The law of: 18, 104, 121, 133, 200, 201, 271\n\nCosmic process: 17, 21, 22, 26, 28-30, 32-5, 51, 53, 60, 81, 222, 224,\n 284-6, 288 (cf. Ethical process)\n\n\nD\n\nDarwin: 7, 261\n\nDemonology: 191\n\nDesign: 138, 140, 264, 267\n\nDiversity of Nature: 125, 126, 132, 133 (cf. Uniformity of Nature)\n\nDivine Providence: 36, 37 (_see_ Purpose, Divine)\n\n\nE\n\nEnvironment: 25, 28, 219, 221, 222, 232, 252, 263 (_see_ Adaptation),\n (social) 228, 280\n\nEthical process, The: 28, 31, 33-5, 47, 48, 60, 191, 219, 221, 286, 287\n (cf. Cosmic process)\n\nEthics: 87\n\nEvidence: 138-62, 188, 189, 190, 191, 198, 199, 218, 253\n\nEvil: 226, 227, 228, 287, 288\n\nExistence, Actual and potential: 292, 293\n\nExperience: 6, 64, 67, 145, 146, 153, 192, 197, 198, 202, 222, 223, 251,\n 253, 256, 261\n --(spiritual): 199, 206, 226\n\nExplanation: 75, 126, 241 (_see also_ Science)\n\n\nF\n\nFaith: 14, 16, 39, 81, 142, 143, 151-65, 185, 186, 187, 198, 203-37,\n 246, 247, 273\n\nFaith of science: 188, 198, 287\n\nFirst principles: 94\n\nFraser, Professor: 289\n\nFreedom: 108, 120-37, 168, 179, 184-96, 218, 224, 227, 247, 252, 261\n (cf. Necessity, Will)\n\nFrench Revolution: 4\n\n\nG\n\nGolden Age: 3\n\n\nH\n\nHappiness: 24, 30\n\nHomogeneous, Instability of: 98\n\nHuman nature (_see_ Uniformity)\n\nHuxley, Professor: 24, 28, 30, 33, 39, 120, 144, 149-59, 173, 204, 205,\n 208, 213, 219, 247, 286-8\n\n\nI\n\nIdealism: 38-59\n --(subjective): 57, 62, 63, 64, 289-95\n\nIdeals: 30-2, 34, 41, 54, 74, 164-84, 194, 195, 204-36, 241-73, 280\n (_see_ Moral ideal, Truth)\n\nIdentity: 201\n\nIllusion: 17, 22, 23-5, 44, 45, 47, 57, 60, 65, 74, 112, 136, 164, 165,\n 227, 243, 246, 247, 256, 260\n\nIndependence: 201\n\nInhumanity: 33\n\nInstinct: 236\n\nInteraction: 68\n\n\nK\n\nKirchoff: 80\n\nKnowledge: 70, 96\n\n\nL\n\nLife: 88, 94, 182\n\nLotze: 82\n\n\nM\n\nMaterialism: 17\n\nMatter and Mind: 85, 88, 94, 133, 134\n (psychological theory of), 295\n\nMatter and Motion: 15, 17, 19-21, 32, 35, 36-49, 100, 140, 168, 180\n --The redistribution of: 72-99\n\nMechanical composition: 89, 92, 98\n\nMechanical theory, The: 79-93, 181, 182, 205, 209, 211\n\nMertz, Dr.: 80\n\nMetaphysics: 79, 82, 83, 84, 107-13, 123, 254 (cf. Philosophy)\n\nMill, J. S.: 63, 75, 76, 84, 89, 90, 149, 239, 292, 293, 295\n\nMind: 84\n --(_see_ Matter)\n\nMiracles: 188, 190\n\nMoral consciousness: 50, 198, 204, 206\n\nMoral ideal: 43, 184, 185, 191, 193, 205, 221, 242, 244 (_see_ Ideals)\n\nMoral judgment: 41\n\nMoral laws: 43, 48, 196, 200, 201, 226\n\nMoral obligation: 189, 198, 200, 209\n\nMorality: 19, 34, 49, 50, 56, 69, 74, 159, 161, 162, 181, 186, 191, 218,\n 221, 223, 225, 243, 244\n\nMythology: 3\n\n\nN\n\nNature: 53\n --Cosmic: 37\n --Ethical: 33, 37\n --Laws of: 76\n --Uniformity of: 102-35, 144-50, 152, 161, 165-77, 187, 202, 215, 220,\n 226, 272\n\nNecessity: 17, 100-137, 164, 178, 179, 182, 190, 191, 240, 247, 259,\n 260, 263\n --Metaphysical: 112, 113, 116, 126, 257\n --Scientific: 112 (_see also_ Freedom, Will)\n\n\nO\n\nObject (of desire): 56, 58\n --(material): 61, 70, 74, 81, 100, 102, 103, 171-5, 184-203\n\nObjective truth: 35, 41, 200\n\nObligation, Moral: 12\n\nOptimism: 1-13, 15-18, 20, 21, 30, 74, 164-8, 185-203, 223, 247\n\nOrganism, Animal: 10, 11, 12\n --Social: 10, 266, 267, 268 (_see_ Society)\n\nOrigin: 209, 212\n\n\nP\n\nPerception: 61, 62, 65 (_see_ Sensations)\n\nPermanence: 63, 200, 289, 291-5\n\nPersonality: 52, 53, 66\n\nPessimism: 24-37, 39, 43-7, 74, 164, 168, 187-96, 247, 273\n\nPhilosophy: 70, 74, 81, 163-70, 173, 174, 177, 225, 276\n\nPolitical economy: 124, 270\n\nPositive philosophy: 165, 168\n\nPhysiology: 90\n\nPre-history: 7\n\nPrimitive man: 7\n\nProgress: 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25-8, 30, 78, 164, 203-37, 222, 252,\n 254, 256, 270 (_see_ Approximation, Ideals)\n\nPsychology: 83, 86, 87, 100\n\nPurpose: 180, 181, 182, 192, 199, 209, 211, 212, 224, 226, 238-72, 280\n --Divine: 181, 230, 235, 270\n --Semblance of: 257, 266, 268\n\n\nR\n\nReaction: 68\n\nReality, The Real: 17, 20, 35, 46-58, 60-71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 98, 165,\n 166, 171, 172, 173, 175, 184, 200, 201, 212, 214, 223, 226, 247, 295\n\nReligion: 16, 18, 123, 142, 144, 148, 161, 162, 174, 181, 218, 223, 242,\n 243, 244, 273\n\nReligious consciousness: 52, 196, 198, 199, 206\n\nRetrogression: 26, 27, 32, 205, 206, 209, 219, 225\n\nRevelation: 93, 94, 207, 213, 214, 245, 246\n --Progressive, 178, 204, 208\n\n\nS\n\nScience: the base of optimism, 15\n --not religion, 18\n --is man's notion of what happens, 49\n --and reality, 50-2, 59, 61, 72, 73\n --finds reason, does not make it, 53, 68, 69\n --ideal of, 54, 55, 220-2\n --based on experience, 70, 223, 253\n --purely descriptive, 75-80, 192\n --imperfectly descriptive, 241\n --mechanical theory of, 79-85\n --assumptions of, 103-5, 169-83, 196\n --describes sequences and co-existences, 105-8\n --and necessity, 110, 113-18, 125, 126, 132\n --and theory of design, 138-42, 267\n --and faith, 143-62, 185, 223\n --and positivism, 165\n --is abstract, 194-6, 242\n --incomplete as explanation, 232, 238-40\n --laws of, 48, 108, 124, 240, 241, 242, 252\n\nSelf-determination: 128, 130, 131, 137, 171, 174, 178, 218, 261, 264\n\nSelf-will: 229\n\nSensations: 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 291, 292, 294 (_see_\n Perception)\n\nSense-phenomena: 102, 103, 107, 134, 175, 198, 201\n\nSeth, Professor: 78\n\nSocial contract: 278\n\nSociety (an organism): 9, 96, 250, 256, 265 (_see_ Organism)\n\nSociology: 8, 83, 90, 92, 96, 250, 251, 265\n\nSpace: 82, 85, 87, 94, 97, 102 (_see_ Matter and motion)\n\nSpencer, Mr. H.: 9, 59, 66, 74, 77, 80, 94, 96, 205, 247, 265\n\nStates of consciousness: 57, 58, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 166 (_see_\n Consciousness)\n\nStruggle for existence: 10, 11, 13, 20, 25, 28, 29, 160, 249, 250, 251,\n 257, 270, 274, 276, 279\n\nSurvival of the fittest: 13, 20, 26, 32, 185, 186, 203, 230, 231, 232,\n 236, 237, 251\n --of the faithful: 160\n\n\nT\n\nTeleology: 205, 236 (_see_ Causes, Purpose)\n\nTheology: 141, 146\n\nThings: _see_ Objects\n\nTruth: 40, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 208, 217, 220 (_see also_ Ideals)\n\n\nU\n\nUnfaith: 225\n\nUniformity of the Divine Nature: 202, 206, 229\n\nUniformity of human nature: 103, 105, 107, 118, 121, 202, 229, 272\n\nUniformity of Nature (_see_ Nature)\n --of necessity: 107, 111\n --of will: 107, 111\n\nUniversal causation: 102, 107, 111, 119, 125, 135, 150 (_see_ Causation,\n Causes)\n\nUnknowable, The: 18, 20-2, 35, 36, 37, 48, 57, 58, 61, 70, 72, 166, 247\n\nUnreal, The: 70\n\n\nV\n\nValue: 233, 244\n\n\nW\n\nWaste: 235\n\nWill: 97-9, 111-34, 158, 161, 162, 168, 172, 175, 182, 188, 190, 192,\n 201, 215-25, 255, 261, 264, 268 (cf. Freedom, Necessity)\n\nWill to believe: 216, 222\n\n\nPLYMOUTH\nWILLIAM BRENDON AND SON\nPRINTERS\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n\n\n A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS\n AND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF\n METHUEN AND COMPANY\n PUBLISHERS: LONDON\n 36 ESSEX STREET\n W.C.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS\n\n PAGE\n\n FORTHCOMING BOOKS, 2\n\n POETRY, 12\n\n BELLES LETTRES, ANTHOLOGIES, ETC. 12\n\n ILLUSTRATED AND GIFT BOOKS, 16\n\n HISTORY, 17\n\n BIOGRAPHY, 19\n\n TRAVEL, ADVENTURE AND TOPOGRAPHY, 21\n\n NAVAL AND MILITARY, 23\n\n GENERAL LITERATURE, 24\n\n PHILOSOPHY, 26\n\n SCIENCE, 27\n\n THEOLOGY, 27\n\n FICTION, 32\n\n BOOKS FOR BOYS AND GIRLS, 42\n\n THE PEACOCK LIBRARY, 42\n\n UNIVERSITY EXTENSION SERIES, 42\n\n SOCIAL QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY, 43\n\n CLASSICAL TRANSLATIONS, 44\n\n EDUCATIONAL BOOKS, 44\n\n\nOCTOBER 1901\n\n\n\n\n OCTOBER 1901\n\nMESSRS. METHUEN'S\nANNOUNCEMENTS\n\n\nBELLES LETTRES\n\nDANTE STUDIES AND RESEARCHES. By PAGET\n TOYNBEE, D.Litt., M.A. _Demy 8vo.\n 10s. 6d._\n\n Among the subjects dealt with are 'Dante's Latin\n Dictionary,' 'Dante and the Lancelot Romance,'\n Dante's references to Pythagoras, Dante's\n obligations to Alfraganus, to Orosius, to\n Albertus Magnus; Dante's theories as to the\n spots on the moon, the seven examples of\n munificence in the Convivio, the Commentary of\n Benvenutoda Imola on the _Divina Commedia_,\n etc., etc.\n\n\n+Methuen's Standard Library+\n\nTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By THOMAS\n CARLYLE. Edited by C. R. L. FLETCHER,\n Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford.\n _Three Volumes. Crown 8vo. 6s. each._\n\n This edition is magnificently equipped with notes\n by a scholar who has given three years to its\n preparation.\n\nTHE LIFE AND LETTERS OF OLIVER\n CROMWELL. By THOMAS CARLYLE. With an\n Introduction by C. H. FIRTH, M.A.,\n and Notes and Appendices by Mrs.\n LOMAS. _Three Volumes. 6s. each._\n\n This edition is brought up to the standard of\n modern scholarship by the addition of numerous\n new letters of Cromwell, and by the correction\n of many errors which recent research has\n discovered.\n\nCRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS. By LORD\n MACAULAY. Edited by F. C. MONTAGUE,\n M.A. _Three Volumes. Crown 8vo. 6s.\n each._\n\n The only edition of this book completely\n annotated.\n\n\n+Little Biographies+\n\n_Fcap. 8vo. Each Volume, cloth, 3s. 6d.; leather, 4s. net._\n\nMessrs. METHUEN are publishing a new series bearing the above title.\nEach book contains the biography of a character famous in war, art,\nliterature or science, and is written by an acknowledged expert. The\nbooks are charmingly produced and well illustrated. They form delightful\ngift books.\n\nTHE LIFE OF JOHN HOWARD. By E. C. S. GIBSON, D.D., Vicar of Leeds.\n With 12 Illustrations.\n\n\n+The Works of Shakespeare+\n\nMessrs. 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Where they are necessary,\nshort notes are added at the foot of the page.\n\nEach book has a portrait or frontispiece in photogravure, and the\nvolumes are produced with great care in a style uniform with that of\n'The Library of Devotion.'\n\nCHRISTMAS BOOKS. By W. M. THACKERAY.\n Edited by S. GWYNN.\n\nESMOND. By W. M. THACKERAY. Edited by S.\n GWYNN. _Two volumes._\n\nCHRISTMAS BOOKS. By CHARLES DICKENS.\n Edited by GEORGE GISSING. _Two\n volumes._\n\nTHE COMPLEAT ANGLER. By ISAAC WALTON.\n Edited by J. BUCHAN.\n\nTHE ESSAYS OF ELIA; First and Second\n Series. By CHARLES LAMB. Edited by E.\n V. LUCAS.\n\nTHE ENGLISH POEMS OF RICHARD CRASHAW.\n Edited by EDWARD HUTTON.\n\nA SENTIMENTAL JOURNEY. By LAURENCE\n STERNE. Edited by H. W. PAUL.\n\nTHE PARADISO OF DANTE. Translated by H.\n F. CARY. Edited by PAGET TOYNBEE.\n\nCALIPH VATHEK. By WILLIAM BECKFORD.\n Edited by E. D. 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BEDFORD. _Small\n 4to. 6s._\n\n This charming book describes the introduction of\n a country child to the delights and sights of\n London. It is the result of a well-known\n partnership between author and artist.\n\n\n+The Little Blue Books for Children+\n\nEdited by E. V. LUCAS\n_Illustrated. Square Fcap, 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\nMessrs. METHUEN have in preparation a series of children's books\nunder the above general title. The aim of the editor is to get\nentertaining or exciting stories about normal children, the moral of\nwhich is implied rather than expressed. The books will be reproduced\nin a somewhat unusual form, which will have a certain charm of its\nown. The first three volumes arranged are:\n\n1. THE CASTAWAYS OF MEADOW BANK. By T.\n COBB.\n\n2. THE BEECHNUT BOOK. By JACOB ABBOTT.\n Edited by E. V. LUCAS.\n\n3. THE AIR GUN: or, How the Mastermans\n and Dobson Major nearly lost their\n Holidays. By T. HILBERT.\n\n . . . . .\n\nHISTORY\n\nCROMWELL'S ARMY: A History of the\n English Soldier during the Civil\n Wars, the Commonwealth, and the\n Protectorate. By C. H. FIRTH, M.A.\n _Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n An elaborate study and description of Cromwell's\n army by which the victory of the Parliament was\n secured. The 'New Model' is described in minute\n detail, and the author, who is one of the most\n distinguished historians of the day, has made\n great use of unpublished MSS.\n\nANNALS OF CHRIST'S HOSPITAL. By E. H.\n PEARCE, M.A. With numerous\n illustrations. _Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\nA HISTORY OF RUSSIA FROM PETER THE GREAT\n TO ALEXANDER II. By W. R. MORFILL,\n Jesus College, Oxford. _Crown 8vo. 7s.\n 6d._\n\n This history, by the most distinguished authority\n in England, is founded on a study of original\n documents, and though necessarily brief, is the\n most comprehensive narrative in existence.\n Considerable attention has been paid to the\n social and literary development of the country,\n and the recent expansion of Russia in Asia.\n\nA HISTORY OF THE POLICE IN ENGLAND. By\n Captain MELVILLE LEE. _Crown 8vo. 7s.\n 6d._\n\n This highly interesting book is the first history\n of the police force from its first beginning to\n its present development. Written as it is by an\n author of competent historical and legal\n qualifications, it will be indispensable to\n every magistrate and to all who are indirectly\n interested in the police force.\n\nA HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE: From\n its Beginning to Tennyson. By L.\n ENGEL. _Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\nA HISTORY OF THE BRITISH IN INDIA. By A.\n D. INNES, M.A. With Maps and Plans.\n _Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n . . . . .\n\nBIOGRAPHY\n\nTHE LIFE OF ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON. By\n GRAHAM BALFOUR. _Two Volumes. Demy\n 8vo. 25s. net._\n\n This highly interesting biography has been\n entrusted by Mr. Stevenson's family to his\n cousin, Mr. Balfour, and all available\n materials have been placed at his disposal. The\n book is rich in unpublished MSS. and letters,\n diaries of travel, reminiscences of friends,\n and a valuable fragment of autobiography. It\n also contains a complete bibliography of all\n Stevenson's work. This biography of one of the\n most attractive and sympathetic personalities\n in English literature should possess a most\n fascinating interest. The book will be uniform\n with The Edinburgh Edition.\n\nTHE LIFE OF FRAN\u00c7OIS DE FENELON. By\n VISCOUNT ST. CYRES. With 8 Portraits.\n _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n This biography has engaged the author for many\n years, and the book is not only the study of an\n interesting personality, but an important\n contribution to the history of the period.\n\nTHE CONVERSATIONS OF JAMES NORTHCOTE,\n R.A. AND JAMES WARD. Edited by ERNEST\n FLETCHER. With many Portraits. _Demy\n 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n This highly interesting, racy, and stimulating\n book, contains hitherto unpublished utterances\n of Northcote during a period of twenty-one\n years. There are many reminiscences of Sir\n Joshua Reynolds, much advice to young painters,\n and many references to the great artists and\n great figures of the day.\n\n . . . . .\n\nTRAVEL, ADVENTURE AND TOPOGRAPHY\n\nHEAD-HUNTERS, BLACK, WHITE, AND BROWN.\n By A. C. HADDON, Sc.D., F.R.S. With\n many Illustrations and a Map. _Demy\n 8vo. 15s._\n\n A narrative of adventure and exploration in\n Northern Borneo. It contains much matter of the\n highest scientific interest.\n\nA BOOK OF BRITTANY. By S. BARING GOULD.\n With numerous Illustrations. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n Uniform in scope and size with Mr. Baring Gould's\n well-known books on Devon, Cornwall, and\n Dartmoor.\n\n . . . . .\n\nGENERAL LITERATURE\n\nWOMEN AND THEIR WORK. By the Hon. Mrs.\n LYTTELTON. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n A discussion of the present position of women in\n view of the various occupations and interests\n which are or may be open to them. There will be\n an introduction dealing with the general\n question, followed by chapters on the family,\n the household, philanthropic work, professions,\n recreation, and friendship.\n\nENGLISH VILLAGES. By P. H. DITCHFIELD,\n M.A., F.S.A. Illustrated. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n A popular and interesting account of the history\n of a typical village, and of village life in\n general in England.\n\nSPORTING MEMORIES. By J. OTHO PAGET.\n _Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d._\n\n This volume of reminiscences by a well-known\n sportsman and Master of Hounds deals chiefly\n with fox-hunting experiences.\n\n . . . . .\n\nSCIENCE\n\nDRAGONS OF THE AIR. By H. G. SEELEY,\n F.R.S., With many Illustrations.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n A popular history of the most remarkable flying\n animals which ever lived. Their relations to\n mammals, birds, and reptiles, living and\n extinct, are shown by an original series of\n illustrations. The scattered remains preserved\n in Europe and the United States have been put\n together accurately to show the varied forms of\n the animals. The book is a natural history of\n these extinct animals, which flew by means of a\n single finger.\n\n . . . . .\n\nTHEOLOGY\n\nREGNUM DEI. THE BAMPTON LECTURES OF\n 1901. By A. ROBERTSON, D.D.,\n Principal of King's College, London.\n _Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net._\n\n This book is an endeavour to ascertain the\n meaning of the 'Kingdom of God' in its original\n prominence in the teaching of Christ. It\n reviews historically the main interpretations\n of this central idea in the successive phases\n of Christian tradition and life. Special\n attention is given to the sense in which St.\n Augustine identified the Church with the\n Kingdom of God. The later lectures follow out\n the alternative ideas of the Church, and of its\n relation to civil society which the Middle Ages\n and more recent types of Christian thought have\n founded upon alternative conceptions of the\n Kingdom of God.\n\nOLD TESTAMENT HISTORY. By G. W. WADE,\n D.D. With Maps. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n This book presents a connected account of the\n Hebrew people during the period covered by the\n Old Testament; and has been drawn up from the\n Scripture records in accordance with the\n methods of historical criticism. The text of\n the Bible has been studied in the light thrown\n upon it by the best modern commentators; but\n the reasons for the conclusions stated are not\n left to be sought for in the commentaries, but\n are discussed in the course of the narrative.\n Much attention has been devoted to tracing the\n progress of religion amongst the Hebrews, and\n the book, which is furnished with maps, is\n further adapted to the needs of theological\n students by the addition of geographical notes,\n tables, and a full index.\n\nTHE AGAPE AND THE EUCHARIST. By J. F.\n KEATING, D.D. _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\nTHE IMITATION OF CHRIST. A Revised\n Translation, with an Introduction, by\n C. BIGG, D.D., Canon of Christ Church.\n With Frontispiece. _Crown 8vo. 3s.\n 6d._\n\n A new edition, carefully revised and set in large\n type, of Dr. Bigg's well-known version.\n\n\n+Oxford Commentaries+\n\nGeneral Editor, WALTER LOCK, D.D., Warden of Keble College, Dean\nIreland's Professor of Exegesis in the University of Oxford.\n\nTHE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES: With\n Introduction and Notes by R. B.\n RACKHAM, M.A. _Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d._\n\n\n+The Churchman's Library+\n\nGeneral Editor, J. H. BURN, B.D., Examining Chaplain to the Bishop\nof Aberdeen.\n\nTHE OLD TESTAMENT AND THE NEW\n SCHOLARSHIP. By J. W. PETERS, D.D.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nCOMPARATIVE RELIGION. By J. A.\n MACCULLOCK. _Crown 8vo._\n\nTHE CHURCH OF CHRIST. By E. T. GREEN.\n _Crown 8vo._\n\nA POPULAR INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD\n TESTAMENT. Edited by A. M. MACKAY.\n _Crown 8vo._\n\n\n+The Churchman's Bible+\n\nGeneral Editor, J. H. BURN, B.D.\n\nMessrs. METHUEN are issuing a series of expositions upon most of the\nbooks of the Bible. The volumes will be practical and devotional,\nand the text of the authorised version is explained in sections,\nwhich will correspond as far as possible with the Church Lectionary.\n\nISAIAH. Edited by W. E. BARNES, D.D.,\n Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge. _Two\n Volumes. 2s. net each._\n\nTHE EPISTLE OF ST. PAUL THE APOSTLE TO\n THE EPHESIANS. Edited by G. H.\n WHITAKER. _1s. 6d. net._\n\n\n+The Library of Devotion+\n\n_Pott 8vo, cloth, 2s.; leather, 2s. 6d. net._\n\n 'This series is excellent.'--THE BISHOP OF LONDON.\n 'Very delightful.'--THE BISHOP OF BATH AND WELLS.\n 'Well worth the attention of the Clergy.'--THE BISHOP OF\n LICHFIELD.\n 'The new \"Library of Devotion\" is excellent.'--THE BISHOP OF\n PETERBOROUGH.\n 'Charming.'--_Record._\n 'Delightful.'--_Church Bells._\n\nTHE THOUGHTS OF PASCAL. Edited with an\n Introduction and Notes by C. S.\n JERRAM, M.A.\n\nON THE LOVE OF GOD. By ST. FRANCIS DE\n SALES. Edited by W. J. KNOX-LITTLE,\n M.A.\n\nA MANUAL OF CONSOLATION FROM THE SAINTS\n AND FATHERS. Edited by J. H. BURN,\n B.D.\n\nTHE SONG OF SONGS. Being Selections from\n ST. BERNARD. Edited by B. BLAXLAND,\n M.A.\n\n\n+Leaders of Religion+\n\nEdited by H. C. Beeching, M.A. _With Portraits, Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\nA series of short biographies of the most prominent leaders of religious\nlife and thought of all ages and countries.\n\nBISHOP BUTLER. By W. A. SPOONER, M.A.,\n Fellow of New College, Oxford.\n\n . . . . .\n\nEDUCATIONAL BOOKS\n\nCOMMERCIAL EDUCATION IN THEORY AND\n PRACTICE. By E. E. WHITFIELD, M.A.\n _Crown 8vo. 5s._\n\n An introduction to Methuen's Commercial Series\n treating the question of Commercial Education\n fully from both the point of view of the\n teacher and of the parent.\n\nEASY GREEK EXERCISES. By C. G. BOTTING,\n M.A. _Crown 8vo. 2s._\n\nGERMAN VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION. By\n SOPHIE WRIGHT. _Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d._\n\nTHE WORLD OUTSIDE THE BRITISH EMPIRE: A\n Commercial Geography. By F. C. BOON.\n _Crown 8vo._\n\nJUNIOR EXAMINATION SERIES.\nEdited by A. M. M. STEDMAN, M.A. _Fcap. 8vo. 1s._\n\n FRENCH EXAMINATION PAPERS. By F. JACOB,\n B.A.\n\n LATIN EXAMINATION PAPERS. By C. G.\n BOTTING, M.A.\n\n ALGEBRA EXAMINATION PAPERS. By AUSTEN S.\n LESTER, M.A.\n\n ENGLISH GRAMMAR EXAMINATION PAPERS. By\n W. WILLIAMSON, B.A.\n\n . . . . .\n\nFICTION\n\nTHE HISTORY OF SIR RICHARD CALMADY: A\n Romance. By LUCAS MALET, Author of\n 'The Wages of Sin.' _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n This is the first long and elaborate book by\n Lucas Malet since 'The Wages of Sin.' It is a\n romance on realistic lines, and will certainly\n be one of the most important novels of the last\n ten years.\n\n This novel, the scene of which is laid in the\n moorland country of the northern part of\n Hampshire, in London, and in Naples, opens in\n the year of grace 1842. The action covers a\n period of about three and thirty years; and\n deals with the experiences and adventures of an\n English country gentleman of an essentially\n normal type of character, subjected--owing to\n somewhat distressing antecedent\n circumstances--to very abnormal conditions of\n life. The book is frankly a romance; but it is\n also frankly a realistic and modern one.\n\nTHE SERIOUS WOOING: A Heart's History.\n By Mrs. CRAIGIE (JOHN OLIVER HOBBES),\n Author of 'Robert Orange.' _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\nLIGHT FREIGHTS. By W. W. JACOBS, Author\n of 'Many Cargoes.' Illustrated. _Crown\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n A volume of stories by Mr. Jacobs uniform in\n character and appearance with 'Many Cargoes.'\n\nCLEMENTINA. By A. E. W. MASON, Author\n of 'The Courtship of Morrice\n Buckler,' 'Miranda of the Balcony,'\n etc. Illustrated. _Crown 8vo 6s._\n\n A spirited romance of the Jacobites somewhat\n after the manner of 'Morrice Buckler.' The Old\n Pretender is introduced as one of the chief\n characters.\n\nA WOMAN ALONE. By Mrs. W. K. CLIFFORD,\n Author of 'Aunt Anne.' _Crown 8vo.\n 3s. 6d._\n\n A volume of stories.\n\nTHE STRIKING HOURS. By EDEN PHILLPOTTS,\n Author of 'Children of the Mist,'\n 'Sons of the Morning,' etc. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n The annals of a Devon village, containing much\n matter of humorous and pathetic interest.\n\nFANCY FREE. By EDEN PHILLPOTTS, Author\n of 'Children of the Mist.'\n Illustrated. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n A humorous book. Uniform with 'The Human Boy.'\n\nTALES OF DUNSTABLE WEIR. By GWENDOLINE\n KEATS (ZACK). Author of 'Life is\n Life.' With Photogravure Frontispiece\n by E. F. HARTRICK. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n A volume of stories after the style of 'Zack's'\n well-known first book 'Life is Life.'\n\nANGEL. By Mrs. B. M. CROKER. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\nTHE PROPHET OF BERKELEY SQUARE. By\n ROBERT HICHENS, Author of 'Flames,'\n 'Tongues of Conscience,' etc. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n A new long novel.\n\nTHE ALIEN. By F. F. MONTRESOR, Author\n of 'Into the Highways and Hedges.'\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nTHE EMBARRASSING ORPHAN. By W. E.\n NORRIS. Illustrated. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nROYAL GEORGIE. By S. BARING GOULD,\n Author of 'Mehalah.' With eight\n Illustrations by D. MURRAY SMITH.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nFORTUNE'S DARLING. By WALTER RAYMOND,\n Author of 'Love and Quiet Life.'\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nTHE MILLION. By DOROTHEA GERARD, Author\n of 'Lady Baby.' _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nFROM THE LAND OF THE SHAMROCK. By JANE\n BARLOW, Author of 'Irish Idylls.'\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nTHE WOOING OF SHEILA. By GRACE RHYS.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nRICKERBY'S FOLLY. By TOM GALLON, Author\n of 'Kiddy.' _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nA GREAT LADY. By ADELINE SERGEANT,\n Author of 'The Story of a Penitent\n Soul.' _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nMARY HAMILTON. By LORD ERNEST HAMILTON.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nMASTER OF MEN. By E. PHILLIPS OPPENHEIM.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nBOTH SIDES OF THE VEIL. By RICHARD\n MARSH, Author of 'The Seen and the\n Unseen.' _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nA GALLANT QUAKER. By Mrs. ROBERTON.\n Illustrated by H. F. BUCKLAND. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\nTHE THIRTEEN EVENINGS. By GEORGE\n BARTRAM, Author of 'The People of\n Clopton.' _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nTHE SKIRTS OF HAPPY CHANCE. By H. B.\n MARRIOTT WATSON. Illustrated. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\nA FOOL'S YEAR. By E. H. COOPER, Author\n of 'Mr. Blake of Newmarket.' _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n This book, like most of Mr. Cooper's novels, is\n chiefly concerned with sport and racing.\n\nTHE YEAR ONE: A Page of the French\n Revolution. By J. BLOUNDELLE BURTON,\n Author of 'The Clash of Arms.'\n Illustrated. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nTHE DEVASTATORS. By ADA CAMBRIDGE,\n Author of 'Path and Goal.' _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\nTHE FORTUNE OF CHRISTINA M'NAB. By S.\n MACNAUGHTON. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\nJOHN TOPP: Pirate. By WEATHERBY CHESNEY.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n\n+The Novelist+\n\nMessrs. METHUEN are issuing under the above general title a Monthly\nSeries of Novels by popular authors at the price of Sixpence. Each\nNumber is as long as the average Six Shilling Novel.\n\nXXIII. THE HUMAN BOY. EDEN PHILLPOTTS.\n\n XXIV. THE CHRONICLES OF COUNT ANTONIO. ANTHONY HOPE.\n\n XXV. BY STROKE OF SWORD. ANDREW BALFOUR.\n\n XXVI. KITTY ALONE. S. BARING GOULD.\n [_October._\n\n\n+Methuen's Sixpenny Library+\n\n_A New Series of Copyright Books._\n\nTHE CONQUEST OF LONDON. DOROTHEA GERARD.\n\nA VOYAGE OF CONSOLATION. SARA J. DUNCAN.\n\nTHE MUTABLE MANY. ROBERT BARR.\n\n\n\n\n A CATALOGUE OF\n MESSRS. METHUEN'S\n PUBLICATIONS\n\n\n\n\nPOETRY\n\n=Rudyard Kipling.= BARRACK-ROOM\n BALLADS. By RUDYARD KIPLING. _68th\n Thousand. Crown 8vo. 6s. Leather, 6s.\n net._\n\n 'Mr. Kipling's verse is strong, vivid, full of\n character.... Unmistakeable genius rings in\n every line.'--_Times._\n\n 'The ballads teem with imagination, they palpitate\n with emotion. We read them with laughter and\n tears; the metres throb in our pulses, the\n cunningly ordered words tingle with life; and if\n this be not poetry, what is?'--_Pall Mall\n Gazette._\n\n=Rudyard Kipling.= THE SEVEN SEAS. By\n RUDYARD KIPLING. _57th Thousand. Cr.\n 8vo. Buckram, gilt top. 6s. Leather,\n 6s. net._\n\n 'The Empire has found a singer; it is no\n depreciation of the songs to say that statesmen\n may have, one way or other, to take account of\n them.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n 'Animated through and through with indubitable\n genius.'--_Daily Telegraph._\n\n=\"Q.\"= POEMS AND BALLADS. By \"Q.\"\n _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=\"Q.\"= GREEN BAYS: Verses and Parodies.\n By \"Q.\" _Second Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 3s. 6d._\n\n=H. Ibsen.= BRAND. A Drama by HENRIK\n IBSEN. Translated by WILLIAM WILSON.\n _Third Edition. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=A. D. Godley.= LYRA FRIVOLA. By A. D.\n GODLEY, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen\n College, Oxford. _Third Edition. Pott\n 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'Combines a pretty wit with remarkably neat\n versification.... Every one will wish there was\n more of it.'--_Times._\n\n=A. D. Godley.= VERSES TO ORDER. By A.\n D. GODLEY. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net._\n\n=J. G. Cordery.= THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER. A\n Translation by J. G. CORDERY. _Crown\n 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n=Herbert Trench.= DEIRDRE WED: and Other\n Poems. By HERBERT TRENCH. _Crown 8vo.\n 5s._\n\n=Edgar Wallace.= WRIT IN BARRACKS. By\n EDGAR WALLACE. _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n\n\n\nBELLES LETTRES, ANTHOLOGIES, ETC.\n\n\n=R. L. Stevenson.= VAILIMA LETTERS. By\n ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON. With an\n Etched Portrait by WILLIAM STRANG.\n _Third Edition. Crown 8vo. Buckram.\n 6s._\n\n 'A fascinating book.'--_Standard._\n\n 'Unique in Literature.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=G. Wyndham.= THE POEMS OF WILLIAM\n SHAKESPEARE. Edited with an\n Introduction and Notes by GEORGE\n WYNDHAM, M.P. _Demy 8vo. Buckram,\n gilt top. 10s. 6d._\n\n This edition contains the 'Venus,' 'Lucrece,' and\n Sonnets, and is prefaced with an elaborate\n introduction of over 140 pp.\n\n 'We have no hesitation in describing Mr. George\n Wyndham's introduction as a masterly piece of\n criticism, and all who love our Elizabethan\n literature will find a very garden of delight in\n it.'--_Spectator._\n\n=Edward FitzGerald.= THE RUBAIYAT OF\n OMAR KHAYYAM. Translated by EDWARD\n FITZGERALD. With a Commentary by H.\n M. BATSON, and a Biography of Omar by\n E. D. ROSS. _6s._ Also an Edition on\n large paper limited to 50 copies.\n\n 'One of the most desirable of the many reprints\n of Omar.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n=W. E. Henley.= ENGLISH LYRICS.\n Selected and Edited by W. E. HENLEY.\n _Crown 8vo. Gilt top. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'It is a body of choice and lovely\n poetry.'--_Birmingham Gazette._\n\n=Henley and Whibley.= A BOOK OF ENGLISH\n PROSE. Collected by W. E. HENLEY and\n CHARLES WHIBLEY. _Crown 8vo. Buckram,\n gilt top. 6s._\n\n=H. C. Beeching.= LYRA SACRA: An\n Anthology of Sacred Verse. Edited by\n H. C. BEECHING, M.A. _Crown 8vo.\n Buckram. 6s._\n\n 'A charming selection, which maintains a lofty\n standard of excellence.'--_Times._\n\n=\"Q.\"= THE GOLDEN POMP. A Procession of\n English Lyrics. Arranged by A. T.\n QUILLER COUCH. _Crown 8vo. Buckram.\n 6s._\n\n=W. B. Yeats.= AN ANTHOLOGY OF IRISH\n VERSE. Edited by W. B. YEATS. _Revised\n and Enlarged Edition. Crown 8vo. 3s.\n 6d._\n\n=W. M. Dixon.= A PRIMER OF TENNYSON. By\n W. M. DIXON, M.A. _Cr. 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'Much sound and well-expressed criticism. The\n bibliography is a boon.'--_Speaker._\n\n=W. A. Craigie.= A PRIMER OF BURNS. By\n W. A. CRAIGIE. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'A valuable addition to the literature of the\n poet.'--_Times._\n\n=G. W. Steevens.= MONOLOGUES OF THE\n DEAD. By G. W. STEEVENS. _Foolscap\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=L. Magnus.= A PRIMER OF WORDSWORTH. By\n LAURIE MAGNUS. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'A valuable contribution to Wordsworthian\n literature.'--_Literature._\n\n=Sterne.= THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF\n TRISTRAM SHANDY. By LAWRENCE STERNE.\n With an Introduction by CHARLES\n WHIBLEY, and a Portrait. _2 vols.\n 7s._\n\n=Congreve.= THE COMEDIES OF WILLIAM\n CONGREVE. With an Introduction by G.\n S. STREET, and a Portrait. _2 vols.\n 7s._\n\n=Morier.= THE ADVENTURES OF HAJJI BABA\n OF ISPAHAN. By JAMES MORIER. With an\n Introduction by E. G. BROWNE, M.A. and\n a Portrait. _2 vols. 7s._\n\n=Walton.= THE LIVES OF DONNE, WOTTON,\n HOOKER, HERBERT AND SANDERSON. By\n IZAAK WALTON. With an Introduction by\n VERNON BLACKBURN, and a Portrait. _3s.\n 6d._\n\n=Johnson.= THE LIVES OF THE ENGLISH\n POETS. By SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. With\n an Introduction by J. H. MILLAR, and a\n Portrait. _3 vols. 10s. 6d._\n\n=Burns.= THE POEMS OF ROBERT BURNS.\n Edited by ANDREW LANG and W. A.\n CRAIGIE. With Portrait. _Second\n Edition. Demy 8vo, gilt top. 6s._\n\n=F. Langbridge.= BALLADS OF THE BRAVE;\n Poems of Chivalry, Enterprise,\n Courage, and Constancy. Edited by Rev.\n F. LANGBRIDGE. _Second Edition. Cr.\n 8vo. 3s. 6d. School Edition, 2s. 6d._\n\n 'The book is full of splendid things.'--_World._\n\n\n+Methuen's Standard Library+\n\n=Gibbon.= MEMOIRS OF MY LIFE AND\n WRITINGS. By EDWARD GIBBON. Edited,\n with an Introduction and Notes, by G.\n BIRKBECK HILL, LL.D. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'An admirable edition of one of the most\n interesting personal records of a literary\n life. Its notes and its numerous appendices are\n a repertory of almost all that can be known\n about Gibbon.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n=Gibbon.= THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE\n ROMAN EMPIRE. By EDWARD GIBBON. A New\n Edition, Edited with Notes,\n Appendices, and Maps, by J. B. BURY,\n LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College,\n Dublin. _In Seven Volumes, Demy 8vo.\n Gilt top. 8s. 6d. each. Also Cr. 8vo.\n 6s. each._\n\n 'At last there is an adequate modern edition of\n Gibbon.... The best edition the nineteenth\n century could produce.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n 'A great piece of editing.'--_Academy._\n\n=Gilbert White.= THE NATURAL HISTORY OF\n SELBORNE. By GILBERT WHITE. Edited by\n L. C. MIALL, F.R.S., assisted by W.\n WARDE FOWLER, M.A. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=C. G. Crump.= THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE\n OF THOMAS ELLWOOD. Edited by C. G.\n CRUMP, M.A. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n This edition is the only one which contains the\n complete book as originally published. It\n contains a long Introduction and many\n Footnotes.\n\n=Dante.= LA COMMEDIA DI DANTE\n ALIGHIERI. The Italian Text edited by\n PAGET TOYNBEE, M.A. _Demy 8vo. Gilt\n top. 8s. 6d. Also Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Tennyson.= THE EARLY POEMS OF ALFRED,\n LORD TENNYSON. Edited, with Notes and\n an Introduction by J. CHURTON COLLINS,\n M.A. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n An elaborate edition of the celebrated volume\n which was published in its final and definitive\n form in 1853. This edition contains a long\n Introduction and copious Notes, textual and\n explanatory. It also contains in an Appendix\n all the Poems which Tennyson afterwards\n omitted.\n\n=Jonathan Swift.= THE JOURNAL TO\n STELLA. By JONATHAN SWIFT. Edited by\n G. A. AITKEN. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Chesterfield.= THE LETTERS OF LORD\n CHESTERFIELD TO HIS SON. Edited, with\n an Introduction by C. STRACHEY, and\n Notes by A. CALTHROP. _Two Volumes.\n Crown 8vo. 6s. each._\n\n\n+The Works of Shakespeare+\n\nGeneral Editor, EDWARD DOWDEN, Litt.D.\n\nMessrs. METHUEN have in preparation an Edition of Shakespeare in single\nPlays. Each play will be edited with a full Introduction, Textual Notes,\nand a Commentary at the foot of the page.\n\nThe first volumes are:\n\nHAMLET. Edited by EDWARD DOWDEN. _Demy\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'Fully up to the level of recent scholarship,\n both English and German.'--_Academy._\n\nROMEO AND JULIET. Edited by EDWARD\n DOWDEN, Litt.D. _Demy 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'No edition of Shakespeare is likely to prove\n more attractive and satisfactory than this one.\n It is beautifully printed and paged and\n handsomely and simply bound.'--_St. James's\n Gazette._\n\n\n+The Novels of Charles Dickens+\n\n_Crown 8vo. Each Volume, cloth 3s. net; leather 4s. 6d. net._\nWith Introductions by Mr. GEORGE GISSING, Notes by Mr. F. G. KITTON,\nand Topographical Illustrations.\n\nTHE PICKWICK PAPERS. With Illustrations\n by E. H. NEW. _Two Volumes._\n\n 'As pleasant a copy as any one could desire. The\n notes add much to the value of the edition, and\n Mr. New's illustrations are also historical.\n The volumes promise well for the success of the\n edition.'--_Scotsman._\n\nNICHOLAS NICKLEBY. With Illustrations\n by R. J. WILLIAMS. _Two Volumes._\n\nBLEAK HOUSE. With Illustrations by\n BEATRICE ALCOCK. _Two Volumes._\n\nOLIVER TWIST. With Illustrations by G.\n H. NEW.\n\nTHE OLD CURIOSITY SHOP. With\n Illustrations by G. M. BRIMELOW. _Two\n Volumes._\n\nBARNABY RUDGE. With Illustrations by\n BEATRICE ALCOCK. _Two Volumes._\n\n\n+Little Biographies+\n\n_Fcap. 8vo. Each volume, cloth, 3s. 6d_.\n\nTHE LIFE OF DANTE ALIGHIERI. By PAGET\n TOYNBEE. With 12 Illustrations.\n _Second Edition._ #\n\n 'This excellent little volume is a clear,\n compact, and convenient summary of the whole\n subject.'--_Academy._\n\nTHE LIFE OF SAVONAROLA. By E. L. S.\n HORSBURGH, M.A. With Portraits and\n Illustrations.\n\n\n+The Little Library+\n\nWith Introductions, Notes, and Photogravure Frontispieces.\n_Pott 8vo. Each Volume, cloth 1s. 6d. net, leather 2s. 6d. net_.\n\n 'Altogether good to look upon, and to handle.'--_Outlook._\n 'In printing, binding, lightness, etc., this is a perfect\n series.'--_Pilot._\n 'It is difficult to conceive more attractive volumes.'--_St.\n James's Gazette._\n 'Very delicious little books.'--_Literature._\n 'Delightful editions.'--_Record._\n 'Exceedingly tastefully produced.'--_Morning Leader._\n\nVANITY FAIR. By W. M. THACKERAY. With\n an Introduction by S. GWYNN. _Three\n Volumes._\n\nTHE PRINCESS. By ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON.\n Edited by ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH.\n\nIN MEMORIAM. By ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON.\n Edited, with an Introduction and\n Notes, by H. C. BEECHING, M.A.\n\nTHE EARLY POEMS OF ALFRED, LORD\n TENNYSON. Edited by J. C. COLLINS,\n M.A.\n\nMAUD. By ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON. Edited\n by ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH.\n\nA LITTLE BOOK OF ENGLISH LYRICS. With\n Notes.\n\nEOTHEN. By A. W. KINGLAKE. With an\n Introduction and Notes.\n\nCRANFORD. By Mrs. GASKELL. Edited by E.\n V. LUCAS.\n\nTHE INFERNO OF DANTE. Translated by H.\n F. CARY. Edited by PAGET TOYNBEE.\n\nTHE PURGATORIO OF DANTE. Translated by\n H. F. CARY. Edited by PAGET TOYNBEE,\n M.A.\n\nJOHN HALIFAX, GENTLEMAN. By Mrs. CRAIK.\n Edited by ANNIE MATHESON. _Two\n Volumes._\n\nA LITTLE BOOK OF SCOTTISH VERSE.\n Arranged and edited by T. F.\n HENDERSON.\n\nA LITTLE BOOK OF ENGLISH PROSE. Arranged\n and edited by Mrs. P. A. BARNETT.\n\nSELECTIONS FROM WORDSWORTH. Edited by\n NOWELL C. SMITH, Fellow of New\n College, Oxford.\n\nSELECTIONS FROM WILLIAM BLAKE. Edited by\n M. PERUGINI.\n\nPRIDE AND PREJUDICE. By JANE AUSTEN.\n Edited by E. V. LUCAS. _Two Volumes._\n\nPENDENNIS. By W. M. THACKERAY. Edited by\n S. GWYNN. _Three Volumes._\n\nLAVENGRO. By GEORGE BORROW. Edited by F.\n HINDES GROOME. _Two Volumes._\n\n\n+The Little Guides+\n\n_Pott 8vo, cloth 3s.; leather, 3s. 6d. net._\n\nOXFORD AND ITS COLLEGES. By J. WELLS,\n M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Wadham\n College. Illustrated by E. H. NEW.\n _Fourth Edition._\n\n 'An admirable and accurate little treatise,\n attractively illustrated.'--_World._\n\nCAMBRIDGE AND ITS COLLEGES. By A.\n HAMILTON THOMPSON. Illustrated by E.\n H. NEW.\n\n 'It is brightly written and learned, and is just\n such a book as a cultured visitor\n needs.'--_Scotsman._\n\nTHE MALVERN COUNTRY. By B. C. A.\n WINDLE, D.Sc., F.R.S. Illustrated by\n E. H. NEW.\n\nSHAKESPEARE'S COUNTRY. By B. C. A.\n WINDLE, F.R.S., M.A. Illustrated by E.\n H. NEW. _Second Edition._\n\n 'One of the most charming guide books. Both for\n the library and as a travelling companion the\n book is equally choice and\n serviceable.'--_Academy._\n\nSUSSEX. By F. G. BRABANT, M.A.\n Illustrated by E. H. NEW.\n\n 'A charming little book; as full of sound\n information as it is practical in\n conception.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n 'Accurate, complete, and agreeably\n written.'--_Literature._\n\nWESTMINSTER ABBEY. By G. E. TROUTBECK.\n Illustrated by F. D. BEDFORD.\n\n 'A delightful miniature hand-book.'--_Glasgow\n Herald._\n\n 'In comeliness, and perhaps in completeness, this\n work must take the first place.'--_Academy._\n\n 'A really first-rate guide-book.'--_Literature._\n\n\n\n\nILLUSTRATED AND GIFT BOOKS\n\n\n=Tennyson.= THE EARLY POEMS OF ALFRED,\n LORD TENNYSON. Edited, with Notes and\n an Introduction by J. CHURTON\n COLLINS, M.A. With 10 Illustrations\n in Photogravure by W. E. F. BRITTEN.\n _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n=Gelett Burgess.= GOOPS AND HOW TO BE\n THEM. By GELETT BURGESS. With numerous\n Illustrations. _Small 4to. 6s._\n\n=Gelett Burgess.= THE LIVELY CITY OF\n LIGG. By GELETT BURGESS. With 53\n Illustrations, 8 of which are\n coloured. _Small 4to. 6s._\n\n=Phil May.= THE PHIL MAY ALBUM. _4to.\n 6s._\n\n 'There is a laugh in each drawing.'--_Standard._\n\n=A. H. Milne.= ULYSSES; OR, DE\n ROUGEMONT OF TROY. Described and\n depicted by A. H. MILNE. _Small\n quarto. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'Clever, droll, smart.'--_Guardian._\n\n=Edmund Selous.= TOMMY SMITH'S ANIMALS.\n By EDMUND SELOUS. Illustrated by G.\n W. ORD. _Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n A little book designed to teach children respect\n and reverence for animals.\n\n 'A quaint, fascinating little book: a nursery\n classic.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= THE CROCK OF GOLD.\n Fairy Stories told by S. BARING\n GOULD. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Twelve delightful fairy tales.'--_Punch._\n\n=M. L. Gwynn.= A BIRTHDAY BOOK.\n Arranged and Edited by M. L. GWYNN.\n _Royal 8vo. 12s._\n\n This is a birthday-book of exceptional dignity,\n and the extracts have been chosen with\n particular care.\n\n=John Bunyan.= THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS.\n By JOHN BUNYAN. Edited, with an\n Introduction, by C. H. FIRTH, M.A.\n With 39 Illustrations by R. ANNING\n BELL. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The best \"Pilgrim's Progress.\"'--_Educational\n Times._\n\n=F. D. Bedford.= NURSERY RHYMES. With\n many Coloured Pictures by F. D.\n BEDFORD. _Super Royal 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= A BOOK OF FAIRY TALES\n retold by S. BARING GOULD. With\n numerous Illustrations and Initial\n Letters by ARTHUR J. GASKIN. _Second\n Edition. Cr. 8vo. Buckram. 6s._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= OLD ENGLISH FAIRY\n TALES. Collected and edited by S.\n BARING GOULD. With Numerous\n Illustrations by F. D. BEDFORD.\n _Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. Buckram.\n 6s._\n\n 'A charming volume.'--_Guardian._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= A BOOK OF NURSERY\n SONGS AND RHYMES. Edited by S. BARING\n GOULD, and Illustrated by the\n Birmingham Art School. _Buckram, gilt\n top. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=H. C. Beeching.= A BOOK OF CHRISTMAS\n VERSE. Edited by H. C. BEECHING, M.A.,\n and Illustrated by WALTER CRANE. _Cr.\n 8vo. gilt top. 3s. 6d._\n\n\n\n\nHISTORY\n\n\n=Flinders Petrie.= A HISTORY OF EGYPT,\n FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE\n PRESENT DAY. Edited by W. M. FLINDERS\n PETRIE, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of\n Egyptology at University College.\n _Fully Illustrated. In Six Volumes.\n Cr. 8vo. 6s. each._\n\n VOL. I. PREHISTORIC TIMES TO XVITH DYNASTY. W. M. F.\n Petrie. _Fourth Edition._\n\n VOL. II. THE XVIITH AND XVIIITH DYNASTIES. W. M. F.\n Petrie. _Third Edition._\n\n VOL. IV. THE EGYPT OF THE PTOLEMIES. J. P. Mahaffy.\n\n VOL. V. ROMAN EGYPT. J. G. Milne.\n\n VOL. VI. EGYPT IN THE MIDDLE AGES. STANLEY LANE-POOLE.\n\n 'A history written in the spirit of scientific\n precision so worthily represented by Dr. Petrie\n and his school cannot but promote sound and\n accurate study, and supply a vacant place in\n the English literature of\n Egyptology.'--_Times._\n\n=Flinders Petrie.= RELIGION AND\n CONSCIENCE IN ANCIENT EGYPT. By W. M.\n FLINDERS PETRIE, D.C.L., LL.D. Fully\n Illustrated. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'The lectures will afford a fund of valuable\n information for students of ancient\n ethics.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n=Flinders Petrie.= SYRIA AND EGYPT,\n FROM THE TELL EL AMARNA TABLETS. By\n W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, D.C.L., LL.D.\n _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'A marvellous record. The addition made to our\n knowledge is nothing short of\n amazing.'--_Times._\n\n=Flinders Petrie.= EGYPTIAN TALES.\n Edited by W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.\n Illustrated by TRISTRAM ELLIS. _In\n Two Volumes. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d. each._\n\n 'Invaluable as a picture of life in Palestine and\n Egypt.'--_Daily News._\n\n=Flinders Petrie.= EGYPTIAN DECORATIVE\n ART. By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE. With\n 120 Illustrations. _Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'In these lectures he displays rare skill in\n elucidating the development of decorative art\n in Egypt.'--_Times._\n\n=C. W. Oman.= A HISTORY OF THE ART OF\n WAR. Vol. II.: The Middle Ages, from\n the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century.\n By C. W. OMAN, M.A., Fellow of All\n Souls', Oxford. Illustrated. _Demy\n 8vo. 21s._\n\n 'The whole art of war in its historic evolution\n has never been treated on such an ample and\n comprehensive scale, and we question if any\n recent contribution to the exact history of the\n world has possessed more enduring\n value.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= THE TRAGEDY OF THE\n C\u00c6SARS. With numerous Illustrations\n from Busts, Gems, Cameos, etc. By S.\n BARING GOULD. _Fifth Edition. Royal\n 8vo. 15s._ #\n\n 'A most splendid and fascinating book on a\n subject of undying interest. The great feature\n of the book is the use the author has made of\n the existing portraits of the Caesars and the\n admirable critical subtlety he has exhibited in\n dealing with this line of research. It is\n brilliantly written, and the illustrations are\n supplied on a scale of profuse\n magnificence.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=F. W. Maitland.= CANON LAW IN ENGLAND.\n By F. W. MAITLAND, LL.D., Downing\n Professor of the Laws of England in\n the University of Cambridge. _Royal\n 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n 'Professor Maitland has put students of English\n law under a fresh debt. These essays are\n landmarks in the study of the history of Canon\n Law.'--_Times._\n\n=John Hackett.= A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH\n OF CYPRUS. By JOHN HACKETT, M.A. With\n Maps and Illustrations. _Demy 8vo.\n 15s. net._\n\n A work which brings together all that is known on\n the subject from the introduction of\n Christianity to the commencement of the British\n occupation. A separate division deals with the\n local Latin Church during the period of the\n Western Supremacy.\n\n=E. L. Taunton.= A HISTORY OF THE\n JESUITS IN ENGLAND. By E. L. TAUNTON.\n With Illustrations. _Demy 8vo. 21s.\n net._\n\n 'A history of permanent value, which covers\n ground never properly investigated before, and\n is replete with the results of original\n research. A most interesting and careful\n book.'--_Literature._\n\n 'A volume which will attract considerable\n attention.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=H. de B. Gibbins.= INDUSTRY IN\n ENGLAND: HISTORICAL OUTLINES. By H.\n DE B. GIBBINS, Litt.D., M.A. With 5\n Maps. _Second Edition. Demy 8vo. 10s.\n 6d._\n\n=H. E. Egerton.= A HISTORY OF BRITISH\n COLONIAL POLICY. By H. E. EGERTON,\n M.A. _Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d._\n\n 'It is a good book, distinguished by accuracy in\n detail, clear arrangement of facts, and a broad\n grasp of principles.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n=Albert Sorel.= THE EASTERN QUESTION IN\n THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By ALBERT\n SOREL. Translated by F. C. BRAMWELL,\n M.A. _Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=C. H. Grinling.= A HISTORY OF THE GREAT\n NORTHERN RAILWAY, 1845-95. By C. H.\n GRINLING. With Illustrations. _Demy\n 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n 'Mr. Grinling has done for a Railway what\n Macaulay did for English History.'--_The\n Engineer._\n\n=Clement Stretton.= A HISTORY OF THE\n MIDLAND RAILWAY. By CLEMENT STRETTON.\n With numerous Illustrations. _Demy\n 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n 'A fine record of railway\n development.'--_Outlook._\n\n 'The volume is as exhaustive as it is\n comprehensive, and is made especially attractive\n by its pictures.'--_Globe._\n\n=W. Sterry.= ANNALS OF ETON COLLEGE. By\n W. STERRY, M.A. With numerous\n Illustrations. _Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n 'A treasury of quaint and interesting reading.\n Mr. Sterry has by his skill and vivacity given\n these records new life.'--_Academy._\n\n=G. W. Fisher.= ANNALS OF SHREWSBURY\n SCHOOL. By G. W. FISHER, M.A. With\n numerous Illustrations. _Demy 8vo.\n 10s. 6d._\n\n 'This careful, erudite book.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n 'A book of which Old Salopians are sure to be\n proud.'--_Globe._\n\n=J. Sargeaunt.= ANNALS OF WESTMINSTER\n SCHOOL. By J. SARGEAUNT, M.A. With\n numerous Illustrations. _Demy 8vo.\n 7s. 6d._\n\n=A. Clark.= THE COLLEGES OF OXFORD:\n Their History and their Traditions.\n Edited by A. CLARK, M.A., Fellow of\n Lincoln College. _8vo. 12s. 6d._\n\n 'A work which will be appealed to for many years\n as the standard book.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=T. M. Taylor.= A CONSTITUTIONAL AND\n POLITICAL HISTORY OF ROME. By T. M.\n TAYLOR, M.A., Fellow of Gonville and\n Caius College, Cambridge. _Crown 8vo.\n 7s. 6d._\n\n 'We fully recognise the value of this carefully\n written work, and admire especially the\n fairness and sobriety of his judgment and the\n human interest with which he has inspired a\n subject which in some hands becomes a mere\n series of cold abstractions. It is a work that\n will be stimulating to the student of Roman\n history.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=J. Wells.= A SHORT HISTORY OF ROME. By\n J. WELLS, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of\n Wadham Coll., Oxford. _Third\n Edition._ With 3 Maps. _Crown 8vo.\n 3s. 6d._\n\n This book is intended for the Middle and Upper\n Forms of Public Schools and for Pass Students\n at the Universities. It contains copious\n Tables, etc.\n\n 'An original work written on an original plan, and\n with uncommon freshness and vigour.'--_Speaker._\n\n=O. Browning.= A SHORT HISTORY OF\n MEDI\u00c6VAL ITALY, A.D. 1250-1530. By\n OSCAR BROWNING, Fellow and Tutor of\n King's College, Cambridge. _In Two\n Volumes. Cr. 8vo. 5s. each._\n\n VOL. I. 1250-1409.--Guelphs and Ghibellines.\n\n VOL. II. 1409-1530.--The Age of the Condottieri.\n\n=O'Grady.= THE STORY OF IRELAND. By\n STANDISH O'GRADY, Author of 'Finn and\n his Companions.' _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n\n+Byzantine Texts+\n\nEdited by J. B. BURY, M.A., Litt.D.\n\nZACHARIAH OF MITYLENE. Translated into\n English by F. J. HAMILTON, D.D., and\n E. W. BROOKS. _Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d.\n net._\n\nEVAGRIUS. Edited by Professor L\u00c9ON\n PARMENTIER and M. BIDEZ. _Demy 8vo.\n 10s. 6d. net._\n\nTHE HISTORY OF PSELLUS. By C. SATHAS.\n _Demy 8vo. 15s. net._\n\n\n\n\nBIOGRAPHY\n\n\n=R. L. Stevenson.= THE LETTERS OF\n ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON TO HIS FAMILY\n AND FRIENDS. Selected and Edited,\n with Notes and Introductions, by\n SIDNEY COLVIN. _Fourth and Cheaper\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 12s._\n\nLIBRARY EDITION. _Demy 8vo. 2 vols. 25s.\n net._\n\n 'Irresistible in their raciness, their variety,\n their animation ... of extraordinary\n fascination. A delightful inheritance, the\n truest record of a \"richly compounded spirit\"\n that the literature of our time has\n preserved.'--_Times._\n\n=J. G. Millais.= THE LIFE AND LETTERS\n OF SIR JOHN EVERETT MILLAIS,\n President of the Royal Academy. By\n his Son, J. G. MILLAIS. With 319\n Illustrations, of which 9 are in\n Photogravure. _Second Edition. 2\n vols. Royal 8vo. 32s. net._\n\n 'This splendid work.'--_World._\n\n 'Of such absorbing interest is it, of such\n completeness in scope and beauty. Special\n tribute must be paid to the extraordinary\n completeness of the illustrations.'--_Graphic._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON\n BONAPARTE. By S. BARING GOULD. With\n over 450 Illustrations in the Text\n and 12 Photogravure Plates. _Large\n quarto. Gilt top. 36s._\n\n 'The main feature of this gorgeous volume is its\n great wealth of beautiful photogravures and\n finely-executed wood engravings, constituting a\n complete pictorial chronicle of Napoleon I.'s\n personal history from the days of his early\n childhood at Ajaccio to the date of his second\n interment.'--_Daily Telegraph._\n\n=W. A. Bettesworth.= THE WALKERS OF\n SOUTHGATE: Being the Chronicles of a\n Cricketing Family. By W. A.\n BETTESWORTH. Illustrated. _Demy 8vo.\n 7s. 6d._\n\n 'A most engaging contribution to cricket\n literature ... a lasting joy.'--_Vanity Fair._\n\n=G. S. Layard.= THE LIFE OF MRS. LYNN\n LINTON. By G. S. LAYARD. With\n Portraits. _Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d._\n\n 'Mrs. Lynn Linton is here presented to us in all\n her moods. She lives in the book; she is\n presented to us so that we really know\n her.'--_Literature._\n\n 'A thoroughly good book, very interesting, and at\n the same time in very good taste.'--_Daily\n Graphic._\n\n 'Mr. Layard may be congratulated on having\n produced an honest and interesting record of a\n notable woman.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=Stanley Lane-Poole.= THE LIFE OF SIR\n HARRY PARKES. By STANLEY LANE-POOLE.\n _A New and Cheaper Edition._ With\n Maps and Portrait. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Helen C. Wetmore.= THE LAST OF THE\n GREAT SCOUTS ('Buffalo Bill'). By his\n Sister, HELEN C. WETMORE. With\n Illustrations. _Demy 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The stirring adventures of Buffalo Bill's career\n are described vigorously and picturesquely, and\n with a directness that inspires the fullest\n confidence.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n=Constance Bache.= BROTHER MUSICIANS.\n Reminiscences of Edward and Walter\n Bache. By CONSTANCE BACHE. With\n Sixteen Illustrations. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s. net._\n\n=P. H. Colomb.= MEMOIRS OF ADMIRAL SIR\n A. COOPER KEY. By Admiral P. H.\n COLOMB. With a Portrait. _Demy 8vo.\n 16s._\n\n=C. Cooper King.= THE STORY OF THE\n BRITISH ARMY. By Colonel COOPER KING.\n Illustrated. _Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n 'An authoritative and accurate story of England's\n military progress.'--_Daily Mail._\n\n=R. Southey.= ENGLISH SEAMEN (Howard,\n Clifford, Hawkins, Drake, Cavendish).\n By ROBERT SOUTHEY. Edited, with an\n Introduction, by DAVID HANNAY.\n _Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A brave, inspiriting book.'--_Black and White._\n\n=W. Clark Russell.= THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL\n LORD COLLINGWOOD. By W. CLARK\n RUSSELL. With Illustrations by F.\n BRANGWYN. _Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'A book which we should like to see in the hands\n of every boy in the country.'--_St. James's\n Gazette._\n\n=Morris Fuller.= THE LIFE AND WRITINGS\n OF JOHN DAVENANT, D.D. (1571-1641),\n Bishop of Salisbury. By MORRIS\n FULLER, B.D. _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n=J. M. Rigg.= ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY:\n A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION.\n By J. M. RIGG. _Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n=F. W. Joyce.= THE LIFE OF SIR FREDERICK\n GORE OUSELEY. By F. W. JOYCE, M.A.\n _7s. 6d._\n\n=W. G. Collingwood.= THE LIFE OF JOHN\n RUSKIN. By W. G. COLLINGWOOD, M.A.\n With Portraits, and 13 Drawings by Mr.\n Ruskin. _Second Edition. 2 vols. 8vo.\n 32s. Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=C. Waldstein.= JOHN RUSKIN. By CHARLES\n WALDSTEIN, M.A. With a Photogravure\n Portrait. _Post 8vo. 5s._\n\n=A. M. F. Darmesteter.= THE LIFE OF\n ERNEST RENAN. By MADAME DARMESTETER.\n With Portrait. _Second Edition. Cr.\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=W. H. Hutton.= THE LIFE OF SIR THOMAS\n MORE. By W. H. HUTTON, M.A. With\n Portraits. _Second Edition. Cr. 8vo.\n 5s._\n\n 'The book lays good claim to high rank among our\n biographies. It is excellently, even lovingly,\n written.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= THE VICAR OF\n MORWENSTOW: A Biography. By S. BARING\n GOULD, M.A. A new and Revised\n Edition. With Portrait. _Crown 8vo.\n 3s. 6d._\n\n A completely new edition of the well known\n biography of R. S. Hawker.\n\n\n\n\nTRAVEL, ADVENTURE AND TOPOGRAPHY\n\n\n=Sven Hedin.= THROUGH ASIA. By SVEN\n HEDIN, Gold Medallist of the Royal\n Geographical Society. With 300\n Illustrations from Sketches and\n Photographs by the Author, and Maps.\n _2 vols. Royal 8vo. 20s. net._\n\n 'One of the greatest books of the kind issued\n during the century. It is impossible to give an\n adequate idea of the richness of the contents\n of this book, nor of its abounding attractions\n as a story of travel unsurpassed in\n geographical and human interest. Much of it is\n a revelation. Altogether the work is one which\n in solidity, novelty, and interest must take a\n first rank among publications of its\n class.'--_Times._\n\n=F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross.= THE\n HEART OF ASIA. By F. H. SKRINE and E.\n D. ROSS. With Maps and many\n Illustrations by VERESTCHAGIN. _Large\n Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. net._\n\n 'This volume will form a landmark in our\n knowledge of Central Asia.... Illuminating and\n convincing.'--_Times._\n\n=R. E. Peary.= NORTHWARD OVER THE GREAT\n ICE. By R. E. PEARY, Gold Medallist\n of the Royal Geographical Society.\n With over 800 Illustrations. _2 vols.\n Royal 8vo. 32s. net._\n\n 'His book will take its place among the permanent\n literature of Arctic exploration.'--_Times._\n\n=T. H. Holdich.= THE INDIAN BORDERLAND:\n being a Personal Record of Twenty\n Years. By Sir T. H. HOLDICH, K.C.I.E.\n Illustrated. _Demy 8vo. 15s. net._\n\n 'Probably the most important work on frontier\n topography that has lately been presented to\n the general public.'--_Literature._\n\n 'Interesting and inspiriting from cover to cover,\n it will assuredly take its place as the\n classical on the history of the Indian\n frontier.'--_Pilot._\n\n 'A work that should long remain the standard\n authority.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=A. B. Wylde.= MODERN ABYSSINIA. By A.\n B. WYLDE. With a Map and a Portrait.\n _Demy 8vo. 15s. net._\n\n 'The most valuable contribution that has yet been\n made to our knowledge of\n Abyssinia.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n 'A book which will rank among the very best of\n African works.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n 'A repertory of information on every branch of the\n subject.'--_Literature._\n\n=Alex. Hosie.= MANCHURIA. By ALEXANDER\n HOSIE. With Illustrations and a Map.\n _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net._\n\n A complete account of this important province by\n the highest living authority on the subject.\n\n 'This book is especially useful at the present\n moment when the future of the country appears\n uncertain.'--_Times._\n\n=E. A. FitzGerald.= THE HIGHEST ANDES.\n By E. A. FITZGERALD. With 2 Maps, 51\n Illustrations, 13 of which are in\n Photogravure, and a Panorama. _Royal\n 8vo, 30s. net._ Also a Small Edition\n on Hand-made Paper, limited to 50\n Copies, _4to, \u00a35, 5s._\n\n 'The record of the first ascent of the highest\n mountain yet conquered by mortal man. A volume\n which will continue to be the classic book of\n travel on this region of the Andes.'--_Daily\n Chronicle._\n\n=F. W. Christian.= THE CAROLINE\n ISLANDS. By F. W. CHRISTIAN. With\n many Illustrations and Maps. _Demy\n 8vo. 12s. 6d. net._\n\n 'A real contribution to our knowledge of the\n peoples and islands of Micronesia, as well as\n fascinating as a narrative of travels and\n adventure.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=H. H. Johnston.= BRITISH CENTRAL\n AFRICA. By Sir H. H. JOHNSTON, K.C.B.\n With nearly Two Hundred\n Illustrations, and Six Maps. _Second\n Edition. Crown 4to. 18s. net._\n\n 'A fascinating book, written with equal skill and\n charm--the work at once of a literary artist\n and of a man of action who is singularly wise,\n brave, and experienced. It abounds in admirable\n sketches.'--_Westminster Gazette._\n\n=L. Decle.= THREE YEARS IN SAVAGE\n AFRICA. By LIONEL DECLE. With 100\n Illustrations and 5 Maps. _Second\n Edition. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net._\n\n=A. Hulme Beaman.= TWENTY YEARS IN THE\n NEAR EAST. By A. HULME BEAMAN. _Demy\n 8vo._ With Portrait. _10s. 6d._\n\n=Henri of Orleans.= FROM TONKIN TO\n INDIA. By PRINCE HENRI OF ORLEANS.\n Translated by HAMLEY BENT, M.A. With\n 100 Illustrations and a Map. _Cr. 4to,\n gilt top. 25s._\n\n=Chester Holcombe.= THE REAL CHINESE\n QUESTION. By CHESTER HOLCOMBE. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'It is an important addition to the materials\n before the public for forming an opinion on a\n most difficult and pressing problem.'--_Times._\n\n 'It is this practical \"note\" in the book, coupled\n with the fairness, moderation, and sincerity of\n the author, that gives it, in our opinion, the\n highest place among books published in recent\n years on the Chinese question.'--_Manchester\n Guardian._\n\n=J. W. Robertson-Scott.= THE PEOPLE OF\n CHINA. By J. W. ROBERTSON-SCOTT. With\n a Map. _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'A vivid impression ... This excellent, brightly\n written epitome.'--_Daily News._\n\n 'Excellently well done.... Enthralling.'--_Weekly\n Dispatch._\n\n=S. L. Hinde.= THE FALL OF THE CONGO\n ARABS. By S. L. HINDE. With Plans,\n etc. _Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d._\n\n=A. St. H. Gibbons.= EXPLORATION AND\n HUNTING IN CENTRAL AFRICA. By Major A.\n ST. H. GIBBONS. With full-page\n Illustrations by C. WHYMPER, and Maps.\n _Demy 8vo. 15s._\n\n=A. H. Norway.= NAPLES: PAST AND\n PRESENT. By A. H. NORWAY, Author of\n 'Highways and Byways in Devon and\n Cornwall.' With 40 Illustrations by A.\n G. FERARD. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n In this book Mr. Norway gives not only a highly\n interesting description of modern Naples, but a\n historical account of its antiquities and\n traditions.\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= DARTMOOR: A\n Descriptive and Historical Sketch. By\n S. BARING GOULD. With Plans and\n Numerous Illustrations. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'A most delightful guide, companion, and\n instructor.'--_Scotsman._\n\n 'Informed with close personal\n knowledge.'--_Saturday Review._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= THE BOOK OF THE\n WEST. By S. BARING GOULD. With\n numerous Illustrations. _Two\n volumes._ Vol. I. Devon. _Second\n Edition._ Vol. II. Cornwall. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s. each_.\n\n 'Bracing as the air of Dartmoor, the legend weird\n as twilight over Dozmare Pool, they give us a\n very good idea of this enchanting and beautiful\n district.'--_Guardian._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= A BOOK OF BRITTANY.\n By S. BARING GOULD. With numerous\n Illustrations. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n Uniform in scope and size with Mr. Baring Gould's\n well-known books on Devon, Cornwall, and\n Dartmoor.\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= THE DESERTS OF\n SOUTHERN FRANCE. By S. BARING GOULD.\n _2 vols. Demy 8vo. 32s._\n\n=J. F. Fraser.= ROUND THE WORLD ON A\n WHEEL. By JOHN FOSTER FRASER. With 100\n Illustrations. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A classic of cycling, graphic and\n witty.'--_Yorkshire Post._\n\n=R. L. Jefferson.= A NEW RIDE TO KHIVA.\n By R. L. JEFFERSON. Illustrated.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=J. K. Trotter.= THE NIGER SOURCES. By\n Colonel J. K. TROTTER, R.A. With a Map\n and Illustrations. _Crown 8vo. 5s._\n\n=W. Crooke.= THE NORTHWESTERN PROVINCES\n OF INDIA: THEIR ETHNOLOGY AND\n ADMINISTRATION. By W. CROOKE. With\n Maps and Illustrations. _Demy 8vo.\n 10s. 6d._\n\n=A. Boisragon.= THE BENIN MASSACRE. By\n CAPTAIN BOISRAGON. _Second Edition.\n Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=H. S. Cowper.= THE HILL OF THE GRACES:\n OR, THE GREAT STONE TEMPLES OF\n TRIPOLI. By H. S. COWPER, F.S.A. With\n Maps, Plans, and 75 Illustrations.\n _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n=W. B. Worsfold.= SOUTH AFRICA. By W. B.\n WORSFOLD, M.A. With a Map. _Second\n Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A monumental work compressed into a very\n moderate compass.'--_World._\n\n=Katherine and Gilbert Macquoid.= IN\n PARIS. By KATHERINE and GILBERT\n MACQUOID. Illustrated by THOMAS R.\n MACQUOID, R.I. With 2 maps. _Crown\n 8vo. 1s._\n\n 'A useful little guide, judiciously supplied with\n information.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=A. H. Keane.= THE BOER STATES: A\n History and Description of the\n Transvaal and the Orange Free State.\n By A. H. KEANE, M.A. With Map. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n\n\n\nNAVAL AND MILITARY\n\n\n=F. H. E. Cunliffe.= THE HISTORY OF THE\n BOER WAR. By F. H. E. CUNLIFFE,\n Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford.\n With many Illustrations, Plans, and\n Portraits. _In 2 vols. Vol. I., 15s._\n\n 'The excellence of the work is double; for the\n narrative is vivid and temperate, and the\n illustrations form a picture gallery of the war\n which is not likely to be rivalled.... An ideal\n gift book.'--_Academy._\n\n=G. S. Robertson.= CHITRAL: The Story\n of a Minor Siege. By Sir G. S.\n ROBERTSON, K.C.S.I. With numerous\n Illustrations, Map and Plans. _Second\n Edition. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n 'A book which the Elizabethans would have thought\n wonderful. More thrilling, more piquant, and\n more human than any novel.'--_Newcastle\n Chronicle._\n\n 'As fascinating as Sir Walter Scott's best\n fiction.'--_Daily Telegraph._\n\n=R. S. S. Baden-Powell.= THE DOWNFALL\n OF PREMPEH. A Diary of Life in\n Ashanti, 1895. By Maj.-Gen.\n BADEN-POWELL. With 21 Illustrations\n and a Map. _Third Edition. Large\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=R. S. S. Baden-Powell.= THE MATABELE\n CAMPAIGN, 1896. By Maj.-Gen.\n BADEN-POWELL. With nearly 100\n Illustrations. _Fourth and Cheaper\n Edition. Large Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=J. B. Atkins.= THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH.\n By JOHN BLACK ATKINS. With 16 Plans\n and Illustrations. _Third Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=H. W. Nevinson.= LADYSMITH: The Diary\n of a Siege. By H. W. NEVINSON. With 16\n Illustrations and a Plan. _Second\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Barclay Lloyd.= A THOUSAND MILES WITH\n THE C.I.V. By Captain BARCLAY LLOYD.\n With an Introduction by Colonel\n MACKINNON, and a Portrait and Map.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Filson Young.= THE RELIEF OF MAFEKING.\n By FILSON YOUNG. With Maps and\n Illustrations. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=J. Angus Hamilton.= THE SIEGE OF\n MAFEKING. By J. ANGUS HAMILTON. With\n many Illustrations. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A thrilling story.'--_Observer._\n\n=H. F. Prevost Battersby.= IN THE WEB\n OF A WAR. By H. F. PREVOST BATTERSBY.\n With Plans, and Portrait of the\n Author. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The pathos, the comedy, the majesty of war are\n all in these pages.'--_Daily Mail._\n\n=Howard C. Hillegas.= WITH THE BOER\n FORCES. By HOWARD C. HILLEGAS. With\n 24 Illustrations. _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A most interesting book. It has many and great\n merits.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n 'Has extreme interest and scarcely less\n value.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n=H. C. J. Biss.= THE RELIEF OF KUMASI.\n By Captain H. C. J. BISS. With Maps\n and Illustrations. _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Pleasantly written and highly interesting. The\n illustrations are admirable.'--_Queen._\n\n 'We should say it will remain the standard work on\n its very interesting subject.'--_Globe._\n\n=E. H. Alderson.= WITH THE MOUNTED\n INFANTRY AND THE MASHONALAND FIELD\n FORCE, 1896. By Lieut.-Colonel\n ALDERSON. With numerous Illustrations\n and Plans. _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n=Seymour Vandeleur.= CAMPAIGNING ON THE\n UPPER NILE AND NIGER. By Lieut.\n SEYMOUR VANDELEUR. With an\n Introduction by Sir G. GOLDIE,\n K.C.M.G. With 4 Maps, Illustrations,\n and Plans. _Large Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n=Lord Fincastle.= A FRONTIER CAMPAIGN.\n By Viscount FINCASTLE, V.C., and\n Lieut. P. C. ELLIOTT-LOCKHART. With a\n Map and 16 Illustrations. _Second\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=E. N. Bennett.= THE DOWNFALL OF THE\n DERVISHES: A Sketch of the Sudan\n Campaign of 1898. By E. N. BENNETT,\n Fellow of Hertford College. With a\n Photogravure Portrait of Lord\n Kitchener. _Third Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 3s. 6d._\n\n=W. Kinnaird Rose.= WITH THE GREEKS IN\n THESSALY. By W. KINNAIRD ROSE. With\n Illustrations. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=G. W. Steevens.= NAVAL POLICY: By G. W.\n STEEVENS. _Demy 8vo. 6s._\n\n=D. Hannay.= A SHORT HISTORY OF THE\n ROYAL NAVY, FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE\n PRESENT DAY. By DAVID HANNAY.\n Illustrated. _2 Vols. Demy 8vo. 7s.\n 6d. each._ Vol. I., 1200-1688.\n\n 'We read it from cover to cover at a sitting, and\n those who go to it for a lively and brisk\n picture of the past, with all its faults and\n its grandeur, will not be disappointed. The\n historian is endowed with literary skill and\n style.'--_Standard._\n\n=E. L. S. Horsburgh.= WATERLOO: A\n Narrative and Criticism. By E. L. S.\n HORSBURGH, M.A. With Plans. _Second\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 5s._\n\n 'A brilliant essay--simple, sound, and\n thorough.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=H. B. George.= BATTLES OF ENGLISH\n HISTORY. By H. B. GEORGE, M.A.,\n Fellow of New College, Oxford. With\n numerous Plans. _Third Edition. Cr.\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Mr. George has undertaken a very useful\n task--that of making military affairs\n intelligible and instructive to non-military\n readers--and has executed it with a large\n measure of success.'--_Times._\n\n\n\n\nGENERAL LITERATURE\n\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= OLD COUNTRY LIFE. By\n S. BARING GOULD. With Sixty-seven\n Illustrations. _Large Cr. 8vo. Fifth\n Edition. 6s._\n\n '\"Old Country Life,\" as healthy wholesome\n reading, full of breezy life and movement, full\n of quaint stories vigorously told, will not be\n excelled by any book to be published throughout\n the year. Sound, hearty, and English to the\n core.'--_World._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= AN OLD ENGLISH HOME.\n By S. BARING GOULD. With numerous\n Plans and Illustrations. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'The chapters are delightfully fresh, very\n informing, and lightened by many a good story.\n A delightful fireside companion.'--_St. James's\n Gazette._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= HISTORIC ODDITIES\n AND STRANGE EVENTS. By S. BARING\n GOULD. _Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= FREAKS OF FANATICISM.\n By S. BARING GOULD. _Third Edition.\n Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= A GARLAND OF COUNTRY\n SONG: English Folk Songs with their\n Traditional Melodies. Collected and\n arranged by S. BARING GOULD and H. F.\n SHEPPARD. _Demy 4to. 6s._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= SONGS OF THE WEST:\n Traditional Ballads and Songs of the\n West of England, with their Melodies.\n Collected by S. BARING GOULD, M.A.,\n and H. F. SHEPPARD, M.A. In 4 Parts.\n _Parts I., II., III., 3s. each. Part\n IV., 5s. In one Vol., French morocco,\n 15s._\n\n 'A rich collection of humour, pathos, grace, and\n poetic fancy.'--_Saturday Review._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= YORKSHIRE ODDITIES\n AND STRANGE EVENTS. By S. BARING\n GOULD. _Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n=S. Baring Gould.= STRANGE SURVIVALS AND\n SUPERSTITIONS. By S. BARING GOULD.\n _Cr. 8vo. Second Edition. 6s._\n\n=Marie Corelli.= THE PASSING OF THE\n GREAT QUEEN: A Tribute to the Noble\n Life of Victoria Regina. By MARIE\n CORELLI. _Small 4to. 1s._\n\n=Cotton Minchin.= OLD HARROW DAYS. By J.\n G. COTTON MINCHIN. _Cr. 8vo. Second\n Edition. 5s._\n\n=W. E. Gladstone.= THE SPEECHES OF THE\n RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. Edited\n by A. W. HUTTON, M.A., and H. J.\n COHEN, M.A. With Portraits. _Demy 8vo.\n Vols. IX. and X., 12s. 6d. each._\n\n=M. N. Oxford.= A HANDBOOK OF NURSING.\n By M. N. OXFORD, of Guy's Hospital.\n _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'The most useful work of the kind that we have\n seen. A most valuable and practical\n manual.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n=E. V. Zenker.= ANARCHISM. By E. V.\n ZENKER. _Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n=Emily Lawless.= A GARDEN DIARY. By the\n Hon. EMILY LAWLESS. _Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.\n net._\n\n=S. J. Duncan.= ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE\n LATCH. By SARA JEANNETTE DUNCAN (Mrs.\n COTES). Author of 'A Voyage of\n Consolation.' _Second Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=W. Williamson.= THE BRITISH GARDENER.\n By W. WILLIAMSON. Illustrated. _Demy\n 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n=Arnold White.= EFFICIENCY AND EMPIRE.\n By ARNOLD WHITE. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Stimulating and entertaining throughout, it\n deserves the attention of every patriotic\n Englishman.'--_Daily Mail._\n\n 'A notable book.'--_Literature._\n\n 'A book of sound work, deep thought, and a sincere\n endeavour to rouse the British to a knowledge of\n the value of their Empire.'--_Bookman._\n\n 'A more vigorous work has not been written for\n many years.'--_Review of the Week._\n\n=A. Silva White.= THE EXPANSION OF\n EGYPT: A Political and Historical\n Survey. By A. SILVA WHITE. With four\n Special Maps. _Demy 8vo. 15s. net._\n\n 'This is emphatically the best account of Egypt\n as it is under English control that has been\n published for many years.'--_Spectator._\n\n=Chas. Richardson.= THE ENGLISH TURF.\n By CHARLES RICHARDSON. With numerous\n Illustrations and Plans. _Demy 8vo.\n 15s._\n\n 'As a record of horses and courses, this work is\n a valuable addition to the literature of the\n Turf. It is crammed with sound information, and\n with reflections and suggestions that are born\n of a thorough knowledge of the\n subject.'--_Scotsman._\n\n 'A book which is sure to find many readers;\n written with consummate knowledge and in an\n easy, agreeable style.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n 'From its sensible introduction to its very\n complex index, this is about the best book that\n we are likely for some time to see upon the\n subject with which it deals.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=Philip Trevor.= THE LIGHTER SIDE OF\n CRICKET. By Captain PHILIP TREVOR\n (DUX). _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n A highly interesting volume, dealing with such\n subjects as county cricket, village cricket,\n cricket for boys and girls, literary cricket,\n and various other subjects which do not require\n a severe and technical treatment.\n\n 'A wholly entertaining book.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n 'The most welcome book on our national game\n published for years.'--_Country Gentleman._\n\n=Peter Beckford.= THOUGHTS ON HUNTING.\n By PETER BECKFORD. Edited by J. OTHO\n PAGET, and Illustrated by G. H.\n JALLAND. _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n 'Beckford's \"Thoughts on Hunting\" has long been a\n classic with sportsmen, and the present edition\n will go far to make it a favourite with lovers\n of literature.'--_Speaker._\n\n=E. B. Michell.= THE ART AND PRACTICE\n OF HAWKING. By E. B. MICHELL. With 3\n Photogravures by G. E. LODGE, and\n other illustrations. _Demy 8vo. 10s.\n 6d._\n\n 'No book is more full and authoritative than this\n handsome treatise.'--_Morning Leader._\n\n=H. G. Hutchinson.= THE GOLFING\n PILGRIM. By HORACE G. HUTCHINSON.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Without this book the golfer's library will be\n incomplete.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n=J. Wells.= OXFORD AND OXFORD LIFE. By\n Members of the University. Edited by\n J. WELLS, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of\n Wadham College. _Third Edition. Cr.\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=C. G. Robertson.= VOCES ACADEMIC\u00c6. By\n C. GRANT ROBERTSON, M.A., Fellow of\n All Souls', Oxford. With a\n Frontispiece. _Pott 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'Decidedly clever and amusing.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=Rosemary Cotes.= DANTE'S GARDEN. By\n ROSEMARY COTES. With a Frontispiece.\n _Second Edition. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d.\n Leather, 3s. 6d. net._\n\n 'A charming collection of legends of the flowers\n mentioned by Dante.'--_Academy._\n\n=Clifford Harrison.= READING AND\n READERS. By CLIFFORD HARRISON. _Fcp.\n 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'An extremely sensible little book.'--_Manchester\n Guardian._\n\n=L. Whibley.= GREEK OLIGARCHIES: THEIR\n ORGANISATION AND CHARACTER. By L.\n WHIBLEY, M.A., Fellow of Pembroke\n College, Cambridge. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=L. L. Price.= ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND\n PRACTICE. By L. L. PRICE, M.A., Fellow\n of Oriel College, Oxford. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n=J. S. Shedlock.= THE PIANOFORTE SONATA:\n Its Origin and Development. By J. S.\n SHEDLOCK. _Crown 8vo. 5s._\n\n 'This work should be in the possession of every\n musician and amateur. A concise and lucid\n history and a very valuable work for\n reference.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=A. Hulme Beaman.= PONS ASINORUM; OR, A\n GUIDE TO BRIDGE. By A. HULME BEAMAN.\n _Second Edition. Fcap 8vo. 2s._\n\n A practical guide, with many specimen games, to\n the new game of Bridge.\n\n=E. M. Bowden.= THE EXAMPLE OF BUDDHA:\n Being Quotations from Buddhist\n Literature for each Day in the Year.\n Compiled by E. M. BOWDEN. _Third\n Edition. 16mo. 2s. 6d._\n\n=F. Ware.= EDUCATIONAL REFORM. By FABIAN\n WARE, M.A. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n=Sidney Peel.= PRACTICAL LICENSING\n REFORM. By the Hon. SIDNEY PEEL, late\n Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, and\n Secretary to the Royal Commission on\n the Licensing Laws. _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d._\n\n\n\n\nPHILOSOPHY\n\n\n=L. T. Hobhouse.= THE THEORY OF\n KNOWLEDGE. By L. T. HOBHOUSE, Fellow\n of C.C.C., Oxford. _Demy 8vo. 21s._\n\n 'The most important contribution to English\n philosophy since the publication of Mr.\n Bradley's \"Appearance and Reality.\"'--_Glasgow\n Herald._\n\n=W. H. Fairbrother.= THE PHILOSOPHY OF\n T. H. GREEN. By W. H. FAIRBROTHER,\n M.A. _Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 3s.\n 6d._\n\n 'In every way an admirable book.'--_Glasgow\n Herald._\n\n=F. W. Bussell.= THE SCHOOL OF PLATO.\n By F. W. BUSSELL, D.D., Fellow of\n Brasenose College, Oxford. _Demy 8vo.\n 10s. 6d._\n\n=F. S. Granger.= THE WORSHIP OF THE\n ROMANS. By F. S. GRANGER, M.A.,\n Litt.D. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n\n\n\nSCIENCE\n\n\n=E. H. Colbeck.= DISEASES OF THE HEART.\n By E. H. COLBECK, M.D. With numerous\n Illustrations. _Demy 8vo. 12s._\n\n=W. C. C. Pakes.= THE SCIENCE OF\n HYGIENE. By W. C. C. PAKES. With\n numerous Illustrations. _Demy 8vo.\n 15s._\n\n 'A thoroughgoing working text-book of its\n subject, practical and\n well-stocked.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=A. T. Hare.= THE CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE\n INDUCTION COILS. By A. T. HARE, M.A.\n With numerous Diagrams. _Demy 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n=J. E. Marr.= THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF\n SCENERY. By J. E. MARR, F.R.S., Fellow\n of St. John's College, Cambridge.\n Illustrated. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A volume, moderate in size and readable in\n style, which will be acceptable alike to the\n student of geology and geography, and to the\n tourist.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=J. Ritzema Bos.= AGRICULTURAL ZOOLOGY.\n By Dr. J. RITZEMA BOS. Translated by\n J. R. AINSWORTH DAVIS, M.A. With an\n Introduction by ELEANOR A. ORMEROD,\n F.E.S. With 155 Illustrations. _Crown\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'The illustrations are exceedingly good, whilst\n the information conveyed is\n invaluable.'--_Country Gentleman._\n\n=Ed. von Freudenreich.= DAIRY\n BACTERIOLOGY. A Short Manual for the\n Use of Students. By Dr. ED. VON\n FREUDENREICH, Translated by J. R.\n AINSWORTH DAVIS, M.A. _Second\n Edition, Revised. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n=Chalmers Mitchell.= OUTLINES OF\n BIOLOGY. By P. CHALMERS MITCHELL, M.A.\n _Illustrated. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n A text-book designed to cover the new Schedule\n issued by the Royal College of Physicians and\n Surgeons.\n\n=George Massee.= A MONOGRAPH OF THE\n MYXOGASTRES. By GEORGE MASSEE. With\n 12 Coloured Plates. _Royal 8vo. 18s.\n net._\n\n 'A work much in advance of any book in the\n language treating of this group of organisms.\n Indispensable to every student of the\n Myxogastres.'--_Nature._\n\n=C. Stephenson and F. Suddards.=\n ORNAMENTAL DESIGN FOR WOVEN FABRICS.\n By C. STEPHENSON, of the Technical\n College, Bradford, and F. SUDDARDS,\n of the Yorkshire College, Leeds. With\n 65 full-page plates. _Demy 8vo.\n Second Edition. 7s. 6d._\n\n 'The book is very ably done, displaying an\n intimate knowledge of principles, good taste,\n and the faculty of clear\n exposition.'--_Yorkshire Post._\n\n=C. C. Channer and M. E. Roberts.=\n LACE-MAKING IN THE MIDLANDS, PAST AND\n PRESENT. By C. C. CHANNER and M. E.\n ROBERTS. With 16 full-page\n Illustrations. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'An interesting book, illustrated by fascinating\n photographs.'--_Speaker._\n\n\n\n\nTHEOLOGY\n\n\n=W. R. Inge.= CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM. The\n Bampton Lectures for 1899. By W. R.\n INGE, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of\n Hertford College, Oxford. _Demy 8vo.\n 12s. 6d. net._\n\n 'It is fully worthy of the best traditions\n connected with the Bampton\n Lectureship.'--_Record._\n\n=Lady Julian of Norwich.= REVELATIONS\n OF DIVINE LOVE. By the LADY JULIAN of\n Norwich. Edited by GRACE WARRACK.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n A partially modernised version, from the MS. in\n the British Museum of a book which Dr.\n Dalgairns terms 'One of the most remarkable\n books of the Middle Ages.' Mr. Inge in his\n Bampton Lectures on Christian Mysticism calls\n it 'The beautiful but little known\n _Revelations_.'\n\n=R. M. Benson.= THE WAY OF HOLINESS: a\n Devotional Commentary on the 119th\n Psalm. By R. M. BENSON, M.A., of the\n Cowley Mission, Oxford. _Crown 8vo.\n 5s._\n\n 'His facility is delightful, and his very sound\n and accurate theological sense saves him from\n many of the obvious dangers of such a gift.\n Give him a word or a number and at once there\n springs forth a fertile stream of thought,\n never commonplace, usually both deep and fresh.\n For devotional purposes we think this book most\n valuable. Readers will find a great wealth of\n thought if they use the book simply as a help\n to meditation.'--_Guardian._\n\n=Jacob Behmen.= THE SUPERSENSUAL LIFE.\n By JACOB BEHMEN. Edited by BERNARD\n HOLLAND. _Fcap 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=S. R. Driver.= SERMONS ON SUBJECTS\n CONNECTED WITH THE OLD TESTAMENT. By\n S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Canon of Christ\n Church, Regius Professor of Hebrew in\n the University of Oxford. _Cr. 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'A welcome companion to the author's famous\n \"Introduction.\"'--_Guardian._\n\n=T. K. Cheyne.= FOUNDERS OF OLD\n TESTAMENT CRITICISM. By T. K. CHEYNE,\n D.D., Oriel Professor at Oxford.\n _Large Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d._\n\n A historical sketch of O. T. Criticism.\n\n=Walter Lock.= ST. PAUL, THE\n MASTER-BUILDER. By WALTER LOCK, D.D.,\n Warden of Keble College. _Crown 8vo.\n 3s. 6d._\n\n 'The essence of the Pauline teaching is condensed\n into little more than a hundred pages, yet no\n point of importance is\n overlooked.'--_Guardian._\n\n=F. S. Granger.= THE SOUL OF A\n CHRISTIAN. By F. S. GRANGER, M.A.,\n Litt.D. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n A book dealing with the evolution of the\n religious life and experiences.\n\n 'A remarkable book.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n 'Both a scholarly and thoughtful\n book.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=H. Rashdall.= DOCTRINE AND\n DEVELOPMENT. By HASTINGS RASHDALL,\n M.A., Fellow and Tutor of New\n College, Oxford. _Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n=H. H. Henson.= APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY:\n As Illustrated by the Epistles of St.\n Paul to the Corinthians. By H. H.\n HENSON, M.A., Fellow of All Souls',\n Oxford, Canon of Westminster. _Cr.\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=H. H. Henson.= DISCIPLINE AND LAW. By\n H. HENSLEY HENSON, M.A., Fellow of All\n Souls', Oxford. _Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n=H. H. Henson.= LIGHT AND LEAVEN:\n HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL SERMONS. By H.\n H. HENSON, M.A. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=J. Houghton Kennedy.= ST. PAUL'S SECOND\n AND THIRD EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.\n With Introduction, Dissertations, and\n Notes, by JAMES HOUGHTON KENNEDY,\n D.D., Assistant Lecturer in Divinity\n in the University of Dublin. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Bennett and Adeney.= A BIBLICAL\n INTRODUCTION. By W. H. BENNETT, M.A.,\n and W. F. ADENEY, M.A. _Crown 8vo. 7s.\n 6d._\n\n 'It makes available to the ordinary reader the\n best scholarship of the day in the field of\n Biblical introduction. We know of no book which\n comes into competition with it.'--_Manchester\n Guardian._\n\n=W. H. Bennett.= A PRIMER OF THE BIBLE.\n By W. H. BENNETT. _Second Edition.\n Cr. 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n 'The work of an honest, fearless, and sound\n critic, and an excellent guide in a small\n compass to the books of the\n Bible.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n=C. F. G. Masterman.= TENNYSON AS A\n RELIGIOUS TEACHER. By C. F. G.\n MASTERMAN. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A thoughtful and penetrating appreciation, full\n of interest and suggestion.'--_World._\n\n=William Harrison.= CLOVELLY SERMONS.\n By WILLIAM HARRISON, M.A., late\n Rector of Clovelly. With a Preface by\n 'LUCAS MALET.' _Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=Cecilia Robinson.= THE MINISTRY OF\n DEACONESSES. By Deaconess CECILIA\n ROBINSON. With an Introduction by the\n Lord Bishop of Winchester. _Cr. 8vo.\n 3s. 6d._\n\n 'A learned and interesting book.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=E. B. Layard.= RELIGION IN BOYHOOD.\n Notes on the Religious Training of\n Boys. By E. B. LAYARD, M.A. _18mo.\n 1s._\n\n=T. Herbert Bindley.= THE OECUMENICAL\n DOCUMENTS OF THE FAITH. Edited with\n Introductions and Notes by T. HERBERT\n BINDLEY, B.D., Merton College, Oxford.\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n A historical account of the Creeds.\n\n=H. M. Barron.= TEXTS FOR SERMONS ON\n VARIOUS OCCASIONS AND SUBJECTS.\n Compiled and Arranged by H. M.\n BARRON, B.A., of Wadham College,\n Oxford, with a Preface by Canon SCOTT\n HOLLAND. _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=W. Yorke Fausset.= THE DE CATECHIZANDIS\n RUDIBUS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Edited, with\n Introduction, Notes, etc., by W. YORKE\n FAUSSET, M.A. _Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=J. H. Burn.= THE SOUL'S PILGRIMAGE:\n Devotional Readings from the published\n and unpublished writings of GEORGE\n BODY, D.D. Selected and arranged by J.\n H. BURN, B.D. _Pott 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n=F. Weston.= THE HOLY SACRIFICE. By F.\n WESTON, M.A., Curate of St. Matthew's,\n Westminster. _Pott 8vo. 6d. net._\n\n=\u00c0 Kempis.= THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. By\n THOMAS \u00c0 KEMPIS. With an Introduction\n by DEAN FARRAR. Illustrated by C. M.\n GERE. _Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 3s.\n 6d. Padded morocco, 5s._\n\n 'Amongst all the innumerable English editions of\n the \"Imitation,\" there can have been few which\n were prettier than this one, printed in strong\n and handsome type, with all the glory of red\n initials.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n=J. Keble.= THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. By JOHN\n KEBLE. With an Introduction and Notes\n by W. LOCK, D.D., Warden of Keble\n College. Illustrated by R. ANNING\n BELL. _Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 3s.\n 6d. Padded morocco. 5s._\n\n 'The present edition is annotated with all the\n care and insight to be expected from Mr.\n Lock.'--_Guardian._\n\n\n+Oxford Commentaries+\n\nGeneral Editor, WALTER LOCK, D.D., Warden of Keble College, Dean.\nIreland's Professor of Exegesis in the University of Oxford.\n\nTHE BOOK OF JOB. Edited, with\n Introduction and Notes, by E. C. S.\n GIBSON, D.D., Vicar of Leeds. _Demy\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The publishers are to be congratulated on the\n start the series has made.'--_Times._\n\n 'Dr. Gibson's work is worthy of a high degree of\n appreciation. To the busy worker and the\n intelligent student the commentary will be a\n real boon; and it will, if we are not mistaken,\n be much in demand. The Introduction is almost a\n model of concise, straightforward, prefatory\n remarks on the subject treated.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n\n+Handbooks of Theology+\n\nGeneral Editor, A. ROBERTSON, D.D., Principal of King's College,\nLondon.\n\nTHE XXXIX. ARTICLES OF THE CHURCH OF\n ENGLAND. Edited with an Introduction\n by E. C. S. GIBSON, D.D., Vicar of\n Leeds, late Principal of Wells\n Theological College. _Second and\n Cheaper Edition in One Volume. Demy\n 8vo. 12s. 6d._\n\n 'We welcome with the utmost satisfaction a new,\n cheaper, and more convenient edition of Dr.\n Gibson's book. It was greatly wanted. Dr.\n Gibson has given theological students just what\n they want, and we should like to think that it\n was in the hands of every candidate for\n orders.'--_Guardian._\n\nAN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF\n RELIGION. By F. B. JEVONS, M.A.,\n Litt.D., Principal of Bishop\n Hatfield's Hall. _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n 'The merit of this book lies in the penetration,\n the singular acuteness and force of the\n author's judgment. He is at once critical and\n luminous, at once just and suggestive. A\n comprehensive and thorough book.'--_Birmingham\n Post._\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION. By R.\n L. OTTLEY, M.A., late fellow of\n Magdalen College, Oxon., and\n Principal of Pusey House. _In Two\n Volumes. Demy 8vo. 15s._\n\n 'A clear and remarkably full account of the main\n currents of speculation. Scholarly precision\n ... genuine tolerance ... intense interest in\n his subject--are Mr. Ottley's\n merits.'--_Guardian._\n\nAN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE\n CREEDS. By A. E. BURN, B.D.,\n Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of\n Lichfield. _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n 'This book may be expected to hold its place as\n an authority on its subject.'--_Spectator._\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN ENGLAND\n AND AMERICA. By ALFRED CALDECOTT,\n D.D., _Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d._\n\n 'Singularly well-informed, comprehensive, and\n fair.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n 'A lucid and informative account, which certainly\n deserves a place in every philosophical\n library.'--_Scotsman._\n\n\n+The Churchman's Library+\n\nGeneral Editor, J. H. BURN, B.D., Examining Chaplain to the Bishop\nof Aberdeen.\n\nTHE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH CHRISTIANITY.\n By W. E. COLLINS, M.A. With Map. _Cr.\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'An excellent example of thorough and fresh\n historical work.'--_Guardian._\n\nSOME NEW TESTAMENT PROBLEMS. By ARTHUR\n WRIGHT, M.A., Fellow of Queen's\n College, Cambridge. _Crown 8vo, 6s._\n\n 'Real students will revel in these reverent,\n acute, and pregnant essays in Biblical\n scholarship.'--_Great Thoughts._\n\nTHE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN HERE AND\n HEREAFTER. By CANON WINTERBOTHAM,\n M.A., B.Sc., LL.B. _Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'A most able book at once exceedingly thoughtful\n and richly suggestive.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\nTHE WORKMANSHIP OF THE PRAYER BOOK: Its\n Literary and Liturgical Aspects. By\n J. DOWDEN, D.D., Lord Bishop of\n Edinburgh. _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'Scholarly and interesting,'--_Manchester\n Guardian._\n\nEVOLUTION. By F. B. JEVONS, M.A.,\n Litt.D., Principal of Hatfield Hall,\n Durham. _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'A well-written book, full of sound thinking\n happily expressed.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n\n+The Churchman's Bible+\n\nGeneral Editor, J. H. BURN, B.D.\n\nMessrs. METHUEN are issuing a series of expositions upon most of the\nbooks of the Bible. The volumes will be practical and devotional, and\nthe text of the authorised version is explained in sections, which will\ncorrespond as far as possible with the Church Lectionary.\n\nTHE EPISTLE OF ST. PAUL TO THE\n GALATIANS. Explained by A. W.\n ROBINSON, Vicar of All Hallows,\n Barking. _Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d. net._\n\n 'The most attractive, sensible, and instructive\n manual for people at large, which we have ever\n seen.'--_Church Gazette._\n\nECCLESIASTES. Explained by A. W.\n STREANE, D.D. _Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.\n net._\n\n 'Scholarly, suggestive, and particularly\n interesting.'--_Bookman._\n\nTHE EPISTLE OF PAUL THE APOSTLE TO THE\n PHILIPPIANS. Explained by C. R. D.\n BIGGS, B.D. _Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d. net._\n\n 'Mr. Biggs' work is very thorough, and he has\n managed to compress a good deal of information\n into a limited space.'--_Guardian._\n\nTHE EPISTLE OF ST. JAMES. Edited by H.\n W. FULFORD, M.A. _Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.\n net._\n\n\n+The Library of Devotion+\n\n_Pott 8vo, cloth, 2s.; leather, 2s. 6d. net._\n\n 'This series is excellent.'--THE BISHOP OF LONDON.\n 'Very delightful.'--THE BISHOP OF BATH AND WELLS.\n 'Well worth the attention of the Clergy.'--THE BISHOP OF\n LICHFIELD.\n 'The new \"Library of Devotion\" is excellent.'--THE BISHOP OF\n PETERBOROUGH.\n 'Charming.'--_Record._ 'Delightful.'--_Church Bells._\n\nTHE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Newly\n Translated, with an Introduction and\n Notes, by C. BIGG, D.D., late Student\n of Christ Church. _Third Edition._\n\n 'The translation is an excellent piece of\n English, and the introduction is a masterly\n exposition. We augur well of a series which\n begins so satisfactorily.'--_Times._\n\nTHE CHRISTIAN YEAR. By JOHN KEBLE. With\n Introduction and Notes by WALTER\n LOCK, D.D., Warden of Keble College,\n Ireland Professor at Oxford.\n\nTHE IMITATION OF CHRIST. A Revised\n Translation, with an Introduction, by\n C. BIGG, D.D., late Student of Christ\n Church. _Second Edition._\n\n A practically new translation of this book, which\n the reader has, almost for the first time,\n exactly in the shape in which it left the hands\n of the author.\n\nA BOOK OF DEVOTIONS. By J. W.\n STANBRIDGE, B.D., Rector of Bainton,\n Canon of York, and sometime Fellow of\n St. John's College, Oxford.\n\n 'It is probably the best book of its kind. It\n deserves high commendation.'--_Church Gazette._\n\nLYRA INNOCENTIUM. By JOHN KEBLE.\n Edited, with Introduction and Notes,\n by WALTER LOCK, D.D., Warden of Keble\n College, Oxford.\n\n 'This sweet and fragrant book has never been\n published more attractively.'--_Academy._\n\nA SERIOUS CALL TO A DEVOUT AND HOLY\n LIFE. By WILLIAM LAW. Edited, with an\n Introduction, by C. BIGG, D.D., late\n Student of Christ Church.\n\n This is a reprint, word for word and line for\n line, of the _Editio Princeps_.\n\nTHE TEMPLE. By GEORGE HERBERT. Edited,\n with an Introduction and Notes, by E.\n C. S. GIBSON, D.D., Vicar of Leeds.\n\n This edition contains Walton's Life of Herbert,\n and the text is that of the first edition.\n\nA GUIDE TO ETERNITY. By Cardinal BONA.\n Edited, with an Introduction and\n Notes, by J. W. STANBRIDGE, B.D.,\n late Fellow of St. John's College,\n Oxford.\n\nTHE PSALMS OF DAVID. With an\n Introduction and Notes by B. W.\n RANDOLPH, D.D., Principal of the\n Theological College, Ely.\n\n A devotional and practical edition of the Prayer\n Book version of the Psalms.\n\nLYRA APOSTOLICA. With an Introduction\n by Canon SCOTT HOLLAND, and Notes by\n H. C. BEECHING, M.A.\n\nTHE INNER WAY. Being Thirty-six Sermons\n for Festivals by JOHN TAULER. Edited,\n with an Introduction, by A. W. HUTTON,\n M.A.\n\n\n+Leaders of Religion+\n\nEdited by H. C. BEECHING, M.A. With Portraits, _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\nA series of short biographies of the most prominent leaders of religious\nlife and thought of all ages and countries.\n\nThe following are ready--\n\nCARDINAL NEWMAN. By R. H. HUTTON.\n\nJOHN WESLEY. By J. H. OVERTON, M.A.\n\nBISHOP WILBERFORCE. By G. W. DANIELL,\n M.A.\n\nCARDINAL MANNING. By A. W. HUTTON, M.A.\n\nCHARLES SIMEON. By H. C. G. MOULE, D.D.\n\nJOHN KEBLE. By WALTER LOCK, D.D.\n\nTHOMAS CHALMERS. By Mrs. OLIPHANT.\n\nLANCELOT ANDREWES. By R. L. OTTLEY, M.A.\n\nAUGUSTINE OF CANTERBURY. By E. L. CUTTS,\n D.D.\n\nWILLIAM LAUD. By W. H. HUTTON, M.A.\n\nJOHN KNOX. By F. MACCUNN.\n\nJOHN HOWE. By R. F. HORTON, D.D.\n\nBISHOP KEN. By F. A. CLARKE, M.A.\n\nGEORGE FOX, THE QUAKER. By T. HODGKIN,\n D.C.L.\n\nJOHN DONNE. By AUGUSTUS JESSOPP, D.D.\n\nTHOMAS CRANMER. By A. J. MASON.\n\nBISHOP LATIMER. By R. M. CARLYLE and A.\n J. CARLYLE, M.A.\n\nOther volumes will be announced in due course.\n\n\n\n\nFICTION\n\n\n=Marie Corelli's Novels=\n\n_Crown 8vo. 6s. each._\n\nA ROMANCE OF TWO WORLDS. _Twenty-Second\n Edition._\n\nVENDETTA. _Seventeenth Edition._\n\nTHELMA. _Twenty-Fifth Edition._\n\nARDATH: THE STORY OF A DEAD SELF.\n _Thirteenth Edition._\n\nTHE SOUL OF LILITH. _Tenth Edition._\n\nWORMWOOD. _Eleventh Edition._\n\nBARABBAS: A DREAM OF THE WORLD'S\n TRAGEDY. _Thirty-sixth Edition._\n\n 'The tender reverence of the treatment and the\n imaginative beauty of the writing have\n reconciled us to the daring of the conception,\n and the conviction is forced on us that even so\n exalted a subject cannot be made too familiar\n to us, provided it be presented in the true\n spirit of Christian faith. The amplifications\n of the Scripture narrative are often conceived\n with high poetic insight, and this \"Dream of\n the World's Tragedy\" is a lofty and not\n inadequate paraphrase of the supreme climax of\n the inspired narrative.'--_Dublin Review._\n\nTHE SORROWS OF SATAN. _Forty-Fourth\n Edition._\n\n 'A very powerful piece of work.... The conception\n is magnificent, and is likely to win an abiding\n place within the memory of man.... The author\n has immense command of language, and a\n limitless audacity.... This interesting and\n remarkable romance will live long after much of\n the ephemeral literature of the day is\n forgotten.... A literary phenomenon ... novel,\n and even sublime.'--W. T. STEAD in the _Review\n of Reviews_.\n\nTHE MASTER CHRISTIAN.\n [_160th Thousand._\n\n 'It cannot be denied that \"The Master Christian\"\n is a powerful book; that it is one likely to\n raise uncomfortable questions in all but the\n most self-satisfied readers, and that it\n strikes at the root of the failure of the\n Churches--the decay of faith--in a manner which\n shows the inevitable disaster heaping up....\n The good Cardinal Bonpr\u00e9 is a beautiful figure,\n fit to stand beside the good Bishop in \"Les\n Mis\u00e9rables\".... The chapter in which the\n Cardinal appears with Manuel before Leo XIII.\n is characterised by extraordinary realism and\n dramatic intensity.... It is a book with a\n serious purpose expressed with absolute\n unconventionality and passion.... And this is\n to say it is a book worth\n reading.'--_Examiner._\n\n\n=Anthony Hope's Novels=\n\n_Crown 8vo. 6s. each._\n\nTHE GOD IN THE CAR. _Ninth Edition._\n\n 'A very remarkable book, deserving of critical\n analysis impossible within our limit;\n brilliant, but not superficial; well\n considered, but not elaborated; constructed\n with the proverbial art that conceals, but yet\n allows itself to be enjoyed by readers to whom\n fine literary method is a keen pleasure.'--_The\n World._\n\nA CHANGE OF AIR. _Sixth Edition._\n\n 'A graceful, vivacious comedy, true to human\n nature. The characters are traced with a\n masterly hand.'--_Times._\n\nA MAN OF MARK. _Fifth Edition._\n\n 'Of all Mr. Hope's books, \"A Man of Mark\" is the\n one which best compares with \"The Prisoner of\n Zenda.\"'--_National Observer._\n\nTHE CHRONICLES OF COUNT ANTONIO. _Fourth\n Edition._\n\n 'It is a perfectly enchanting story of love and\n chivalry, and pure romance. The Count is the\n most constant, desperate, and modest and tender\n of lovers, a peerless gentleman, an intrepid\n fighter, a faithful friend, and a magnanimous\n foe.'--_Guardian._\n\nPHROSO. Illustrated by H. R. MILLAR.\n _Fifth Edition._\n\n 'The tale is thoroughly fresh, quick with\n vitality, stirring the blood.'--_St. James's\n Gazette._\n\nSIMON DALE. Illustrated. _Fifth\n Edition._\n\n 'There is searching analysis of human nature,\n with a most ingeniously constructed plot. Mr.\n Hope has drawn the contrasts of his women with\n marvellous subtlety and delicacy.'--_Times._\n\nTHE KING'S MIRROR. _Third Edition._\n\n 'In elegance, delicacy, and tact it ranks with\n the best of his novels, while in the wide range\n of its portraiture and the subtlety of its\n analysis it surpasses all his earlier\n ventures.'--_Spectator._\n\nQUISANTE. _Third Edition._\n\n 'The book is notable for a very high literary\n quality, and an impress of power and mastery on\n every page.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n\n=Gilbert Parker's Novels=\n\n_Crown 8vo. 6s. each._\n\nPIERRE AND HIS PEOPLE. _Fifth Edition._\n\n 'Stories happily conceived and finely executed.\n There is strength and genius in Mr. Parker's\n style.'--_Daily Telegraph._\n\nMRS. FALCHION. _Fourth Edition._\n\n 'A splendid study of character.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\nTHE TRANSLATION OF A SAVAGE. _Second\n Edition._\n\n 'The plot is original and one difficult to work\n out; but Mr. Parker has done it with great\n skill and delicacy.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\nTHE TRAIL OF THE SWORD. Illustrated.\n _Seventh Edition._\n\n 'A rousing and dramatic tale. A book like this,\n in which swords flash, great surprises are\n undertaken, and daring deeds done, in which men\n and women live and love in the old passionate\n way, is a joy inexpressible.'--_Daily\n Chronicle._\n\nWHEN VALMOND CAME TO PONTIAC: The Story\n of a Lost Napoleon. _Fifth Edition._\n\n 'Here we find romance--real, breathing, living\n romance. The character of Valmond is drawn\n unerringly.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\nAN ADVENTURER OF THE NORTH: The Last\n Adventures of 'Pretty Pierre.'\n _Second Edition._\n\n 'The present book is full of fine and moving\n stories of the great North, and it will add to\n Mr. Parker's already high\n reputation.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\nTHE SEATS OF THE MIGHTY. Illustrated.\n _Eleventh Edition._\n\n 'Mr. Parker has produced a really fine historical\n novel.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n 'A great book.'--_Black and White._\n\nTHE BATTLE OF THE STRONG: a Romance of\n Two Kingdoms. Illustrated. _Fourth\n Edition._\n\n 'Nothing more vigorous or more human has come\n from Mr. Gilbert Parker than this novel. It has\n all the graphic power of his last book, with\n truer feeling for the romance, both of human\n life and wild nature.'--_Literature._\n\nTHE POMP OF THE LAVILETTES. _Second\n Edition. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'Unforced pathos, and a deeper knowledge of human\n nature than Mr. Parker has ever displayed\n before.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n\n=S. Baring Gould's Novels=\n\n_Crown 8vo. 6s. each._\n\nARMINELL. _Fifth Edition._\n\nURITH. _Fifth Edition._\n\nIN THE ROAR OF THE SEA. _Seventh\n Edition._\n\nMRS. CURGENVEN OF CURGENVEN. _Fourth\n Edition._\n\nCHEAP JACK ZITA. _Fourth Edition._\n\nTHE QUEEN OF LOVE. _Fifth Edition._\n\nMARGERY OF QUETHER. _Third Edition._\n\nJACQUETTA. _Third Edition._\n\nKITTY ALONE. _Fifth Edition._\n\nNO\u00c9MI. Illustrated. _Fourth Edition._\n\nTHE BROOM-SQUIRE. Illustrated. _Fourth\n Edition._\n\nTHE PENNYCOMEQUICKS. _Third Edition._\n\nDARTMOOR IDYLLS.\n\nGUAVAS THE TINNER. Illustrated. _Second\n Edition._\n\nBLADYS. Illustrated. _Second Edition._\n\nDOMITIA. Illustrated. _Second Edition._\n\nPABO THE PRIEST.\n\nWINEFRED. Illustrated. _Second Edition._\n\nTHE FROBISHERS.\n\n * * * * *\n\n=Conan Doyle.= ROUND THE RED LAMP. By\n A. CONAN DOYLE. _Seventh Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The book is far and away the best view that has\n been vouchsafed us behind the scenes of the\n consulting-room.'--_Illustrated London News._\n\n=Stanley Weyman.= UNDER THE RED ROBE.\n By STANLEY WEYMAN, Author of 'A\n Gentleman of France.' With\n Illustrations by R. C. WOODVILLE.\n _Sixteenth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Every one who reads books at all must read this\n thrilling romance, from the first page of which\n to the last the breathless reader is haled\n along. An inspiration of manliness and\n courage.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=Lucas Malet.= THE WAGES OF SIN. By\n LUCAS MALET. _Thirteenth Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Lucas Malet.= THE CARISSIMA. By LUCAS\n MALET, Author of 'The Wages of Sin,'\n etc. _Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Lucas Malet.= THE GATELESS BARRIER. By\n LUCAS MALET, Author of 'The Wages of\n Sin.' _Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The story is told with a sense of style and a\n dramatic vigour that makes it a pleasure to\n read. The workmanship arouses\n enthusiasm.'--_Times._\n\n=W. W. Jacobs.= A MASTER OF CRAFT. By\n W. W. JACOBS. Author of 'Many\n Cargoes.' Illustrated. _Fourth\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'Can be unreservedly recommended to all who have\n not lost their appetite for wholesome\n laughter.'--_Spectator._\n\n 'The best humorous book published for many a\n day.'--_Black and White._\n\n=W. W. Jacobs.= MANY CARGOES. By W. W.\n JACOBS. _Twenty-fifth Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=W. W. Jacobs.= SEA URCHINS. By W. W.\n JACOBS. _Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=Edna Lyall.= DERRICK VAUGHAN, NOVELIST.\n _42nd thousand._ By EDNA LYALL. _Crown\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n=George Gissing.= THE TOWN TRAVELLER. By\n GEORGE GISSING, Author of 'Demos,' 'In\n the Year of Jubilee,' etc. _Second\n Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'It is a bright and witty book above all things.\n Polly Sparkes is a splendid bit of\n work.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n 'The spirit of Dickens is in it.'--_Bookman._\n\n=George Gissing.= THE CROWN OF LIFE. By\n GEORGE GISSING, Author of 'Demos,'\n 'The Town Traveller,' etc. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Henry James.= THE SOFT SIDE. By HENRY\n JAMES, Author of 'What Maisie Knew.'\n _Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The amazing cleverness marks the great\n worker.'--_Speaker._\n\n=H. James.= THE SACRED FOUNT. By HENRY\n JAMES, Author of 'What Maisie Knew.'\n _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n '\"The Sacred Fount\" is only for the few, but they\n will prize it highly, for it is worthy of its\n illustrious author.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n=S. R. Crockett.= LOCHINVAR. By S. R.\n CROCKETT, Author of 'The Raiders,'\n etc. Illustrated. _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Full of gallantry and pathos, of the clash of\n arms, and brightened by episodes of humour and\n love.'--_Westminster Gazette._\n\n=S. R. Crockett.= THE STANDARD BEARER.\n By S. R. CROCKETT. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A delightful tale.'--_Speaker._\n\n 'Mr. Crockett at his best.'--_Literature._\n\n=Arthur Morrison.= TALES OF MEAN\n STREETS. By ARTHUR MORRISON. _Fifth\n Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n Told with consummate art and extraordinary\n detail. In the true humanity of the book lies\n its justification, the permanence of its\n interest, and its indubitable\n triumph.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n 'A great book. The author's method is amazingly\n effective, and produces a thrilling sense of\n reality. The writer lays upon us a master hand.\n The book is simply appalling and irresistible in\n its interest. It is humorous also; without\n humour it would not make the mark it is certain\n to make.'--_World._\n\n=Arthur Morrison.= A CHILD OF THE JAGO.\n By ARTHUR MORRISON. _Third Edition.\n Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The book is a masterpiece.'--_Pall Mall\n Gazette._\n\n 'Told with great vigour and powerful\n simplicity.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n=Arthur Morrison.= TO LONDON TOWN. By\n ARTHUR MORRISON, Author of 'Tales of\n Mean Streets,' etc. _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'We have idyllic pictures, woodland scenes full\n of tenderness and grace.... This is the new Mr.\n Arthur Morrison gracious and tender,\n sympathetic and human.'--_Daily Telegraph._\n\n=Arthur Morrison.= CUNNING MURRELL. By\n ARTHUR MORRISON, Author of 'A Child\n of the Jago,' etc. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The plot hangs admirably. The dialogue is\n perfect.'--_Daily Mail._\n\n 'Admirable.... Delightful humorous relief ... a\n most artistic and satisfactory\n achievement.'--_Spectator._\n\n=Max Pemberton.= THE FOOTSTEPS OF A\n THRONE. By MAX PEMBERTON.\n Illustrated. _Second Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A story of pure adventure, with a sensation on\n every page.'--_Daily Mail._\n\n=M. Sutherland.= ONE HOUR AND THE NEXT.\n By THE DUCHESS OF SUTHERLAND. _Third\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Passionate, vivid, dramatic.'--_Literature._\n\n=Mrs. Clifford.= A FLASH OF SUMMER. By\n Mrs. W. K. CLIFFORD, Author of 'Aunt\n Anne,' etc. _Second Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The story is a very beautiful one, exquisitely\n told.'--_Speaker._\n\n=Emily Lawless.= HURRISH. By the\n Honble. EMILY LAWLESS, Author of\n 'Maelcho,' etc. _Fifth Edition. Cr.\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Emily Lawless.= MAELCHO: a Sixteenth\n Century Romance. By the Honble. EMILY\n LAWLESS. _Second Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'A really great book.'--_Spectator._\n\n=Emily Lawless.= TRAITS AND\n CONFIDENCES. By the Honble. EMILY\n LAWLESS. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Eden Phillpotts.= LYING PROPHETS. By\n EDEN PHILLPOTTS. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Eden Phillpotts.= CHILDREN OF THE MIST.\n By EDEN PHILLPOTTS. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Eden Phillpotts.= THE HUMAN BOY. By\n EDEN PHILLPOTTS, Author of 'Children\n of the Mist.' With a Frontispiece.\n _Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Mr. Phillpotts knows exactly what schoolboys do,\n and can lay bare their inmost thoughts;\n likewise he shows an all-pervading sense of\n humour.'--_Academy._\n\n=Eden Phillpotts.= SONS OF THE MORNING.\n By EDEN PHILLPOTTS, Author of 'The\n Children of the Mist.' _Second\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A book of strange power and\n fascination.'--_Morning Post._\n\n 'Inimitable humour.'--_Daily Graphic._\n\n=Jane Barlow.= A CREEL OF IRISH\n STORIES. By JANE BARLOW, Author of\n 'Irish Idylls.' _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Vivid and singularly real.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=Jane Barlow.= FROM THE EAST UNTO THE\n WEST. By JANE BARLOW. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n=J. H. Findlater.= THE GREEN GRAVES OF\n BALGOWRIE. By JANE H. FINDLATER.\n _Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A powerful and vivid story.'--_Standard._\n\n 'A beautiful story, sad and strange as truth\n itself.'--_Vanity Fair._\n\n 'A singularly original, clever, and beautiful\n story.'--_Guardian._\n\n 'Reveals to us a new writer of undoubted faculty\n and reserve force.'--_Spectator._\n\n 'An exquisite idyll, delicate, affecting, and\n beautiful.'--_Black and White._\n\n=J. H. Findlater.= A DAUGHTER OF\n STRIFE. By JANE H. FINDLATER. _Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=J. H. Findlater.= RACHEL. By JANE H.\n FINDLATER. _Second Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'A not unworthy successor to \"The Green Graves of\n Balgowrie.\"'--_Critic._\n\n=J. H. and Mary Findlater.= TALES THAT\n ARE TOLD. By JANE H. FINDLATER, and\n MARY FINDLATER. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Delightful and graceful stories for which we\n have the warmest welcome.'--_Literature._\n\n=Mary Findlater.= A NARROW WAY. By MARY\n FINDLATER, Author of 'Over the\n Hills.' _Third Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'A wholesome, thoughtful, and interesting\n novel.'--_Morning Post._\n\n 'Singularly pleasant, full of quiet humour and\n tender sympathy.'--_Manchester Guardian._\n\n=Mary Findlater.= OVER THE HILLS. By\n MARY FINDLATER. _Second Edition. Cr.\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A strong and wise book of deep insight and\n unflinching truth.'--_Birmingham Post._\n\n=Mary Findlater.= BETTY MUSGRAVE. By\n MARY FINDLATER. _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Handled with dignity and delicacy.... A most\n touching story.'--_Spectator._\n\n=Alfred Ollivant.= OWD BOB, THE GREY\n DOG OF KENMUIR. By ALFRED OLLIVANT.\n _Fifth Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Weird, thrilling, strikingly graphic.'--_Punch._\n\n 'We admire this book.... It is one to read with\n admiration and to praise with\n enthusiasm.'--_Bookman._\n\n 'It is a fine, open-air, blood-stirring book, to\n be enjoyed by every man and woman to whom a dog\n is dear.'--_Literature._\n\n=B. M. Croker.= PEGGY OF THE BARTONS.\n By B. M. CROKER, Author of 'Diana\n Barrington.' _Fifth Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Mrs. Croker excels in the admirably simple,\n easy, and direct flow of her narrative, the\n briskness of her dialogue, and the geniality of\n her portraiture.'--_Spectator._\n\n=B. M. Croker.= A STATE SECRET. By B.\n M. CROKER, Author of 'Peggy of the\n Bartons,' etc. _Second Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 3s. 6d._\n\n 'Full of humour, and always fresh and\n pleasing.'--_Daily Express._\n\n 'Ingenious, humorous, pretty, pathetic.'--_World._\n\n=H. G. Wells.= THE STOLEN BACILLUS, and\n other Stories. By H. G. WELLS.\n _Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The impressions of a very striking\n imagination.'--_Saturday Review._\n\n=H. G. Wells.= THE PLATTNER STORY AND\n OTHERS. By H. G. WELLS. _Second\n Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Weird and mysterious, they seem to hold the\n reader as by a magic spell.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=Sara Jeannette Duncan.= A VOYAGE OF\n CONSOLATION. By SARA JEANNETTE\n DUNCAN, Author of 'An American Girl\n in London.' Illustrated. _Third\n Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The dialogue is full of wit.'--_Globe._\n\n=Sara Jeannette Duncan.= THE PATH OF A\n STAR. By SARA JEANNETTE DUNCAN,\n Author of 'A Voyage of Consolation.'\n Illustrated. _Second Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=C. F. Keary.= THE JOURNALIST. By C. F.\n KEARY. _Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n=W. E. Norris.= MATTHEW AUSTIN. By W. E.\n NORRIS, Author of 'Mademoiselle de\n Mersac,' etc. _Fourth Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'An intellectually satisfactory and morally\n bracing novel.'--_Daily Telegraph._\n\n=W. E. Norris.= HIS GRACE. By W. E.\n NORRIS. _Third Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n=W. E. Norris.= THE DESPOTIC LADY AND\n OTHERS. By W. E. NORRIS. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n=W. E. Norris.= CLARISSA FURIOSA. By W.\n E. NORRIS. _Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'As a story it is admirable, as a _jeu d'esprit_\n it is capital, as a lay sermon studded with\n gems of wit and wisdom it is a model.'--_The\n World._\n\n=W. E. Norris.= GILES INGILBY. By W. E.\n NORRIS. Illustrated. _Second Edition.\n Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Interesting, wholesome, and charmingly\n written.'--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n=W. E. Norris.= AN OCTAVE. By W. E.\n NORRIS. _Second Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n=W. Clark Russell.= MY DANISH\n SWEETHEART. By W. CLARK RUSSELL.\n Illustrated. _Fourth Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=Robert Barr.= IN THE MIDST OF ALARMS.\n By ROBERT BARR. _Third Edition. Cr.\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A book which has abundantly satisfied us by its\n capital humour.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=Robert Barr.= THE MUTABLE MANY. By\n ROBERT BARR. _Second Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Very much the best novel that Mr. Barr has yet\n given us. There is much insight in it, and much\n excellent humour.'--_Daily Chronicle._\n\n=Robert Barr.= THE COUNTESS TEKLA. By\n ROBERT BARR. _Third Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Of these medi\u00e6val romances, which are now\n gaining ground, \"The Countess Tekla\" is the\n very best we have seen. The story is written in\n clear English, and a picturesque, moving\n style.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n=Robert Barr.= THE STRONG ARM. By\n ROBERT BARR, Author of 'The Countess\n Tekla.' Illustrated. _Second Edition.\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n=C. J. Cutcliffe Hyne.= PRINCE RUPERT\n THE BUCCANEER. By C. J. CUTCLIFFE\n HYNE, Author of 'Captain Kettle.' With\n 8 Illustrations by G. GRENVILLE\n MANTON. _Second Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n A narrative of the romantic adventures of the\n famous Prince Rupert, and of his exploits in\n the Spanish Indies after the Cromwellian wars.\n\n=Mrs. Dudeney.= THE THIRD FLOOR. By\n Mrs. DUDENEY, Author of 'Folly\n Corner.' _Second Edition. Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'One of the brightest, wittiest, and most\n entertaining novels published this\n spring.'--_Sketch._\n\n=Andrew Balfour.= BY STROKE OF SWORD.\n By A. BALFOUR. Illustrated. _Fourth\n Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A recital of thrilling interest, told with\n unflagging vigour.'--_Globe._\n\n=Andrew Balfour.= TO ARMS! By ANDREW\n BALFOUR. Illustrated. _Second\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The marvellous perils through which Allan passes\n are told in powerful and lively\n fashion.'--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n=Andrew Balfour.= VENGEANCE IS MINE. By\n ANDREW BALFOUR. Author of 'By Stroke\n of Sword.' Illustrated. _Crown 8vo.\n 6s._\n\n 'A vigorous piece of work, well written, and\n abounding in stirring incidents.'--_Glasgow\n Herald._\n\n=R. Hichens.= BYEWAYS. By ROBERT\n HICHENS. Author of 'Flames,' etc.\n _Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'The work is undeniably that of a man of striking\n imagination.'--_Daily News._\n\n=R. Hichens.= TONGUES OF CONSCIENCE. By\n ROBERT HICHENS, Author of 'Flames.'\n _Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Of a strange, haunting quality.'--_Glasgow\n Herald._\n\n=Stephen Crane.= WOUNDS IN THE RAIN.\n WAR STORIES. By STEPHEN CRANE, Author\n of 'The Red Badge of Courage.'\n _Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'A fascinating volume.'--_Spectator._\n\n=Dorothea Gerard.= THE CONQUEST OF\n LONDON. By DOROTHEA GERARD, Author of\n 'Lady Baby.' _Second Edition. Crown\n 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Bright and entertaining.'--_Spectator._\n\n 'Highly entertaining and enjoyable.'--_Scotsman._\n\n=Dorothea Gerard.= THE SUPREME CRIME.\n By DOROTHEA GERARD. _Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'One of the very best plots we have met with in\n recent fiction, and handled with that quiet\n unerring realism which always distinguishes the\n author's best work.'--_Academy._\n\n=C. F. Goss.= THE REDEMPTION OF DAVID\n CORSON. By C. F. GOSS. _Third\n Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s._\n\n 'Dramatic instinct and a vigorous imagination\n mark this soul history of a Quaker\n mystic.'--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n 'A really fine book.'--_Public Opinion._\n\n 'A powerful and original book, and unusually\n striking.'--_Pilot._\n\n 'Worthy to stand high in the ranks of modern\n fiction.'--_Literature._\n\n\n=OTHER SIX-SHILLING NOVELS=\n\n_Crown 8vo._\n\nA SECRETARY OF LEGATION. By HOPE\n DAWLISH.\n\nTHE SALVATION SEEKERS. By NOEL AINSLIE.\n\nSTRANGE HAPPENINGS. By W. CLARK RUSSELL\n and other Authors.\n\nTHE BLACK WOLF'S BREED. By HARRIS\n DICKSON. Illustrated. _Second\n Edition._\n\nBELINDA FITZWARREN. By the EARL OF\n IDDESLEIGH.\n\nDERWENT'S HORSE. By VICTOR ROUSSEAU.\n\nANNE MAULEVERER. By Mrs. CAFFYN (Iota).\n\nSIREN CITY. By BENJAMIN SWIFT.\n\nAN ENGLISHMAN. By MARY L. PENDERED.\n\nTHE PLUNDERERS. By MORLEY ROBERTS.\n\nTHE HUMAN INTEREST. By VIOLET HUNT.\n\nTHE KING OF ANDAMAN: A Saviour of\n Society. By J. MACLAREN COBBAN.\n\nTHE ANGEL OF THE COVENANT. By J.\n MACLAREN COBBAN.\n\nIN THE DAY OF ADVERSITY. By J.\n BLOUNDELLE-BURTON.\n\nDENOUNCED. By J. BLOUNDELLE-BURTON.\n\nTHE CLASH OF ARMS. By J.\n BLOUNDELLE-BURTON.\n\nACROSS THE SALT SEAS. By J.\n BLOUNDELLE-BURTON.\n\nSERVANTS OF SIN. By J.\n BLOUNDELLE-BURTON.\n\nPATH AND GOAL. _Second Edition._ By ADA\n CAMBRIDGE.\n\nTHE SEEN AND THE UNSEEN. By RICHARD\n MARSH.\n\nMARVELS AND MYSTERIES. By RICHARD MARSH.\n\nELMSLIE'S DRAG-NET. By E. H. STRAIN.\n\nA FOREST OFFICER. By Mrs. PENNY.\n\nTHE WHITE HECATOMB. By W. C. SCULLY.\n\nBETWEEN SUN AND SAND. By W. C. SCULLY.\n\nSIR ROBERT'S FORTUNE. By Mrs. OLIPHANT.\n\nTHE TWO MARYS. By Mrs. OLIPHANT.\n\nTHE LADY'S WALK. By Mrs. OLIPHANT.\n\nMIRRY-ANN. By NORMA LORIMER.\n\nJOSIAH'S WIFE. By NORMA LORIMER.\n\nTHE STRONG GOD CIRCUMSTANCE. By HELEN\n SHIPTON.\n\nCHRISTALLA. By ESM\u00c9 STUART.\n\nTHE DESPATCH RIDER. By ERNEST GLANVILLE.\n\nAN ENEMY TO THE KING. By R. N. STEPHENS.\n\nA GENTLEMAN PLAYER. By R. N. STEPHENS.\n\nTHE PATHS OF THE PRUDENT. By J. S.\n FLETCHER.\n\nTHE BUILDERS. By J. S. FLETCHER.\n\nDANIEL WHYTE. By A. J. DAWSON.\n\nTHE CAPSINA. By E. F. BENSON.\n\nDODO: A DETAIL OF THE DAY. By E. F.\n BENSON.\n\nTHE VINTAGE. By E. F. BENSON.\n Illustrated by G. P. JACOMB-HOOD.\n\nROSE \u00c0 CHARLITTE. By MARSHALL SAUNDERS.\n\nWILLOWBRAKE. By R. MURRAY GILCHRIST.\n\nTHINGS THAT HAVE HAPPENED. By DOROTHEA\n GERARD.\n\nLONE PINE: A ROMANCE OF MEXICAN LIFE. By\n R. B. TOWNSHEND.\n\nWILT THOU HAVE THIS WOMAN? By J.\n MACLAREN COBBAN.\n\nA PASSIONATE PILGRIM. By PERCY WHITE.\n\nSECRETARY TO BAYNE, M.P. By W. PETT\n RIDGE.\n\nADRIAN ROME. By E. DAWSON and A. MOORE.\n\nGALLIA. By M\u00c9NIE MURIEL DOWIE.\n\nTHE CROOK OF THE BOUGH. By M\u00c9NIE MURIEL\n DOWIE.\n\nA BUSINESS IN GREAT WATERS. By JULIAN\n CORBETT.\n\nMISS ERIN. By M. E. FRANCIS.\n\nANANIAS. By the Hon. Mrs. ALAN BRODRICK.\n\nCORRAGEEN IN '98. By Mrs. ORPEN.\n\nTHE PLUNDER PIT. By J. KEIGHLEY SNOWDEN.\n\nCROSS TRAILS. By VICTOR WAITE.\n\nSUCCESSORS TO THE TITLE. By Mrs.\n WALFORD.\n\nKIRKHAM'S FIND. By MARY GAUNT.\n\nDEADMAN'S. By MARY GAUNT.\n\nCAPTAIN JACOBUS: A ROMANCE OF THE ROAD.\n By L. COPE CORNFORD.\n\nSONS OF ADVERSITY. By L. COPE CORNFORD.\n\nTHE KING OF ALBERIA. By LAURA DAINTREY.\n\nTHE DAUGHTER OF ALOUETTE. By MARY A.\n OWEN.\n\nCHILDREN OF THIS WORLD. By ELLEN F.\n PINSENT.\n\nAN ELECTRIC SPARK. By G. MANVILLE FENN.\n\nUNDER SHADOW OF THE MISSION. By L. S.\n MCCHESNEY.\n\nTHE SPECULATORS. By J. F. BREWER.\n\nTHE SPIRIT OF STORM. By RONALD ROSS.\n\nTHE QUEENSBERRY CUP. By CLIVE P. WOLLEY.\n\nA HOME IN INVERESK. By T. L. PATON.\n\nMISS ARMSTRONG'S AND OTHER\n CIRCUMSTANCES. By JOHN DAVIDSON.\n\nDR. CONGALTON'S LEGACY. By HENRY\n JOHNSTON.\n\nTIME AND THE WOMAN. By RICHARD PRYCE.\n\nTHIS MAN'S DOMINION. By the Author of 'A\n High Little World.'\n\nDIOGENES OF LONDON. By H. B. MARRIOTT\n WATSON.\n\nTHE STONE DRAGON. By R. MURRAY\n GILCHRIST.\n\nA VICAR'S WIFE. By EVELYN DICKINSON.\n\nELSA. By E. M'QUEEN GRAY.\n\nTHE SINGER OF MARLY. By I. HOOPER.\n\nTHE FALL OF THE SPARROW. By M. C.\n BALFOUR.\n\nA SERIOUS COMEDY. By HERBERT MORRAH.\n\nTHE FAITHFUL CITY. By HERBERT MORRAH.\n\nIN THE GREAT DEEP. By J. A. BARRY.\n\nBIJLI, THE DANCER. By JAMES BLYTHE\n PATTON.\n\nTHE PHILANTHROPIST. By LUCY MAYNARD.\n\nVAUSSORE. By FRANCIS BRUNE.\n\n\n=THREE-AND-SIXPENNY NOVELS=\n\n_Crown 8vo._\n\nTHE MESS DECK. By W. F. SHANNON.\n\nA SON OF THE STATE. By W. PETT RIDGE.\n\nCEASE FIRE! By J. MACLAREN COBBAN.\n\nTHE KLOOF BRIDE. By ERNEST GLANVILLE.\n\nTHE LOST REGIMENT. By ERNEST GLANVILLE.\n\nBUNTER'S CRUISE. By CHARLES GLEIG.\n Illustrated.\n\nTHE ADVENTURE OF PRINCESS SYLVIA. By\n Mrs. C. N. WILLIAMSON.\n\nA VENDETTA OF THE DESERT. By W. C.\n SCULLY.\n\nSUBJECT TO VANITY. By MARGARET BENSON.\n\nFITZJAMES. By LILIAN STREET.\n\nTHE SIGN OF THE SPIDER. _Fifth Edition._\n By BERTRAM MITFORD.\n\nTHE MOVING FINGER. By MARY GAUNT.\n\nJACO TRELOAR. By J. H. PEARCE.\n\nTHE DANCE OF THE HOURS. By 'VERA.'\n\nA WOMAN OF FORTY. By ESM\u00c9 STUART.\n\nA CUMBERER OF THE GROUND. By CONSTANCE\n SMITH.\n\nTHE SIN OF ANGELS. By EVELYN DICKINSON.\n\nAUT DIABOLUS AUT NIHIL. By X. L.\n\nTHE COMING OF CUCULAIN. By STANDISH\n O'GRADY.\n\nTHE GODS GIVE MY DONKEY WINGS. By ANGUS\n EVAN ABBOTT.\n\nTHE STAR GAZERS. By G. MANVILLE FENN.\n\nTHE POISON OF ASPS. By R. ORTON PROWSE.\n\nTHE QUIET MRS. FLEMING. By R. PRYCE.\n\nDISENCHANTMENT. By F. MABEL ROBINSON.\n\nTHE SQUIRE OF WANDALES. By A. SHIELD.\n\nA REVEREND GENTLEMAN. By J. M. COBBAN.\n\nA DEPLORABLE AFFAIR. By W. E. NORRIS.\n\nA CAVALIER'S LADYE. By Mrs. DICKER.\n\nTHE PRODIGALS. By Mrs. OLIPHANT.\n\nTHE SUPPLANTER. By P. NEUMANN.\n\nA MAN WITH BLACK EYELASHES. By H. A.\n KENNEDY.\n\nA HANDFUL OF EXOTICS. By S. GORDON.\n\nAN ODD EXPERIMENT. By HANNAH LYNCH.\n\nTALES OF NORTHUMBRIA. By HOWARD PEASE.\n\n\n=HALF-CROWN NOVELS=\n\n_Crown 8vo._\n\nHOVENDEN, V.C. By F. MABEL ROBINSON.\n\nTHE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. By F. MABEL\n ROBINSON.\n\nMR. BUTLER'S WARD. By F. MABEL ROBINSON.\n\nELI'S CHILDREN. By G. MANVILLE FENN.\n\nA DOUBLE KNOT. By G. MANVILLE FENN.\n\nDISARMED. By M. BETHAM EDWARDS.\n\nIN TENT AND BUNGALOW. By the Author of\n 'Indian Idylls.'\n\nMY STEWARDSHIP. By E. M'QUEEN GRAY.\n\nJACK'S FATHER. By W. E. NORRIS.\n\nA LOST ILLUSION. By LESLIE KEITH.\n\nTHE TRUE HISTORY OF JOSHUA DAVIDSON,\n Christian and Communist. By E. LYNN\n LYNTON. _Eleventh Edition. Post 8vo.\n 1s._\n\n\n+The Novelist+\n\nMESSRS. METHUEN are making an interesting experiment which constitutes a\nfresh departure in publishing. They are issuing under the above general\ntitle a Monthly Series of Novels by popular authors at the price of\nSixpence. Many of these Novels have never been published before. Each\nNumber is as long as the average Six Shilling Novel. The first numbers\nof 'THE NOVELIST' are as follows:--\n\n I. DEAD MEN TELL NO TALES. E. W. HORNUNG.\n\n II. JENNIE BAXTER, JOURNALIST. ROBERT BARR.\n\n III. THE INCA'S TREASURE. ERNEST GLANVILLE.\n\n IV. _Out of print._\n\n V. FURZE BLOOM. S. BARING GOULD.\n\n VI. BUNTER'S CRUISE. C. GLEIG.\n\n VII. THE GAY DECEIVERS. ARTHUR MOORE.\n\n VIII. PRISONERS OF WAR. A. BOYSON WEEKES.\n\n IX. _Out of print._\n\n X. VELDT AND LAAGER: Tales of the Transvaal.\n E. S. VALENTINE.\n\n XI. THE NIGGER KNIGHTS. F. NORREYS CONNELL.\n\n XII. A MARRIAGE AT SEA. W. CLARK RUSSELL.\n\n XIII. THE POMP OF THE LAVILETTES. GILBERT PARKER.\n\n XIV. A MAN OF MARK. ANTHONY HOPE.\n\n XV. THE CARISSIMA. LUCAS MALET.\n\n XVI. THE LADY'S WALK. Mrs. OLIPHANT.\n\n XVII. DERRICK VAUGHAN. EDNA LYALL.\n\nXVIII. IN THE MIDST OF ALARMS. ROBERT BARR.\n\n XIX. HIS GRACE. W. E. NORRIS.\n\n XX. DODO. E. F. BENSON.\n\n XXI. CHEAP JACK ZITA. S. BARING GOULD.\n\n XXII. WHEN VALMOND CAME TO PONTIAC. GILBERT PARKER.\n\n\n+Methuen's Sixpenny Library+\n\n_A New Series of Copyright Books._\n\n I. THE MATABELE CAMPAIGN. By Major-General\n BADEN-POWELL.\n\n II. THE DOWNFALL OF PREMPEH. By Major-General\n BADEN-POWELL.\n\n III. MY DANISH SWEETHEART. By W. CLARK RUSSELL.\n\n IV. IN THE ROAR OF THE SEA. By S. BARING-GOULD.\n\n V. PEGGY OF THE BARTONS. By B. M. CROKER.\n\n VII. BADEN-POWELL OF MAFEKING: A Biography.\n By J. S. FLETCHER.\n\nVIII. ROBERTS OF PRETORIA. By J. S. FLETCHER.\n\n IX. THE GREEN GRAVES OF BALGOWRIE. By JANE H.\n FINDLATER.\n\n X. THE STOLEN BACILLUS. By H. G. WELLS.\n\n XI. MATTHEW AUSTIN. By W. E. NORRIS.\n\n\n\n\nBOOKS FOR BOYS AND GIRLS\n\n_A Series of Books by well-known Authors, well illustrated._\n\n=THREE-AND-SIXPENCE EACH=\n\n\nTHE ICELANDER'S SWORD. By S. BARING\n GOULD.\n\nTWO LITTLE CHILDREN AND CHING. By EDITH\n E. CUTHELL.\n\nTODDLEBEN'S HERO. By M. M. BLAKE.\n\nONLY A GUARD-ROOM DOG. By EDITH E.\n CUTHELL.\n\nTHE DOCTOR OF THE JULIET. By HARRY\n COLLINGWOOD.\n\nMASTER ROCKAFELLAR'S VOYAGE. By W. CLARK\n RUSSELL.\n\nSYD BELTON: Or, The Boy who would not go\n to Sea. By G. MANVILLE FENN.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PEACOCK LIBRARY\n\n_A Series of Books for Girls by well-known Authors, handsomely\nbound, and well illustrated._\n\n=THREE-AND-SIXPENCE EACH=\n\n\nTHE RED GRANGE. By Mrs. MOLESWORTH.\n\nTHE SECRET OF MADAME DE MONLUC. By the\n Author of 'Mdle. Mori.'\n\nOUT OF THE FASHION. By L. T. MEADE.\n\nDUMPS. By Mrs. PARR.\n\nA GIRL OF THE PEOPLE. By L. T. MEADE.\n\nHEPSY GIPSY. By L. T. MEADE. _2s. 6d._\n\nTHE HONOURABLE MISS. By L. T. MEADE.\n\n\n\n\nUNIVERSITY EXTENSION SERIES\n\nA series of books on historical, literary, and scientific subjects,\nsuitable for extension students and home-reading circles. Each volume is\ncomplete in itself, and the subjects are treated by competent writers in\na broad and philosophic spirit.\n\nEdited by J. E. SYMES, M.A.,\nPrincipal of University College, Nottingham.\n\n_Crown 8vo. Price_ (_with some exceptions_) _2s. 6d._\n\n\n_The following volumes are ready:_--\n\nTHE INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By\n H. DE B. GIBBINS, Litt.D., M.A., late\n Scholar of Wadham College, Oxon.,\n Cobden Prizeman. _Seventh Edition_,\n Revised. With Maps and Plans. _3s._\n\nA HISTORY OF ENGLISH POLITICAL ECONOMY.\n By L. L. PRICE, M.A., Fellow of Oriel\n College, Oxon. _Third Edition._\n\nPROBLEMS OF POVERTY: An Inquiry into the\n Industrial Conditions of the Poor. By\n J. A. HOBSON, M.A. _Fourth Edition._\n\nVICTORIAN POETS. By A. SHARP.\n\nTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By J. E. SYMES,\n M.A.\n\nPSYCHOLOGY. By F. S. GRANGER, M.A.\n _Second Edition._\n\nTHE EVOLUTION OF PLANT LIFE: Lower\n Forms. By G. MASSEE. With\n Illustrations.\n\nAIR AND WATER. By V. B. LEWES, M.A.\n Illustrated.\n\nTHE CHEMISTRY OF LIFE AND HEALTH. By C.\n W. KIMMINS, M.A. Illustrated.\n\nTHE MECHANICS OF DAILY LIFE. By V. P.\n SELLS, M.A. Illustrated.\n\nENGLISH SOCIAL REFORMERS. By H. DE B.\n GIBBINS, Litt.D., M.A.\n\nENGLISH TRADE AND FINANCE IN THE\n SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By W. A. S.\n HEWINS, B.A.\n\nTHE CHEMISTRY OF FIRE. The Elementary\n Principles of Chemistry. By M. M.\n PATTISON MUIR, M.A. Illustrated.\n\nA TEXT-BOOK OF AGRICULTURAL BOTANY. By\n M. C. POTTER, M.A., F.L.S.\n Illustrated. _3s. 6d._\n\nTHE VAULT OF HEAVEN. A Popular\n Introduction to Astronomy. By R. A.\n GREGORY. With numerous Illustrations.\n\nMETEOROLOGY. The Elements of Weather and\n Climate. By H. N. DICKSON, F.R.S.E.,\n F.R. Met. Soc. Illustrated.\n\nA MANUAL OF ELECTRICAL SCIENCE. By\n GEORGE J. BURCH, M.A., F.R.S. With\n numerous Illustrations. _3s._\n\nTHE EARTH. An Introduction to\n Physiography. By EVAN SMALL, M.A.\n Illustrated.\n\nINSECT LIFE. By F. W. THEOBALD, M.A.\n Illustrated.\n\nENGLISH POETRY FROM BLAKE TO BROWNING.\n By W. M. DIXON, M.A.\n\nENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By E. JENKS,\n M.A., Professor of Law at University\n College, Liverpool.\n\nTHE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE. By G. L.\n DICKINSON, Fellow of King's College,\n Cambridge. _Second Edition._\n\n\n\n\nSOCIAL QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY\n\nEdited by H. DE B. GIBBINS, Litt.D., M.A.\n\n_Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n\n_The following Volumes of the Series are ready:_--\n\nTRADE UNIONISM--NEW AND OLD. By G.\n HOWELL. _Third Edition._\n\nTHE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT TO-DAY. By G.\n J. HOLYOAKE. _Second Edition._\n\nMUTUAL THRIFT. By Rev. J. FROME\n WILKINSON, M.A.\n\nPROBLEMS OF POVERTY. By J. A. HOBSON,\n M.A. _Fourth Edition._\n\nTHE COMMERCE OF NATIONS. By C. F.\n BASTABLE, M.A., Professor of Economics\n at Trinity College, Dublin. _Second\n Edition._\n\nTHE ALIEN INVASION. By W. H. WILKINS,\n B.A.\n\nTHE RURAL EXODUS. By P. ANDERSON GRAHAM.\n\nLAND NATIONALIZATION. By HAROLD COX,\n B.A.\n\nA SHORTER WORKING DAY. By H. DE B.\n GIBBINS, D.Litt., M.A., and R. A.\n HADFIELD, of the Hecla Works,\n Sheffield.\n\nBACK TO THE LAND: An Inquiry into the\n Cure for Rural Depopulation. By H. E.\n MOORE.\n\nTRUSTS, POOLS AND CORNERS. By J. STEPHEN\n JEANS.\n\nTHE FACTORY SYSTEM. By R. W.\n COOKE-TAYLOR.\n\nTHE STATE AND ITS CHILDREN. By GERTRUDE\n TUCKWELL.\n\nWOMEN'S WORK. BY LADY DILKE, Miss\n BULLEY, and Miss WHITLEY.\n\nSOCIALISM AND MODERN THOUGHT. By M.\n KAUFMANN.\n\nTHE HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES. By\n E. BOWMAKER.\n\nMODERN CIVILIZATION IN SOME OF ITS\n ECONOMIC ASPECTS. By W. CUNNINGHAM,\n D.D., Fellow of Trinity College,\n Cambridge.\n\nTHE PROBLEM OF THE UNEMPLOYED. By J. A.\n HOBSON, B.A.\n\nLIFE IN WEST LONDON. By ARTHUR SHERWELL,\n M.A. _Third Edition._\n\nRAILWAY NATIONALIZATION. By CLEMENT\n EDWARDS.\n\nWORKHOUSES AND PAUPERISM. By LOUISA\n TWINING.\n\nUNIVERSITY AND SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS. By W.\n REASON, M.A.\n\n\n\n\nCLASSICAL TRANSLATIONS\n\nEdited by H. F. FOX, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College,\nOxford.\n\n\n\u00c6SCHYLUS--Agamemnon, Ch\u00f6ephoroe,\n Eumenides. Translated by LEWIS\n CAMPBELL, LL.D., late Professor of\n Greek at St. Andrews. _5s._\n\nCICERO--De Oratore I. Translated by E.\n N. P. MOOR, M.A. _3s. 6d._\n\nCICERO--Select Orations (Pro Milone, Pro\n Murena, Philippic II., In Catilinam).\n Translated by H. E. D. BLAKISTON,\n M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity\n College, Oxford. _5s._\n\nCICERO--De Natura Deorum. Translated by\n F. BROOKS, M.A., late Scholar of\n Balliol College, Oxford. _3s. 6d._\n\nCICERO DE OFFICIIS. Translated by G. B.\n GARDINER, M.A. _Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\nHORACE: THE ODES AND EPODES. Translated\n by A. GODLEY, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen\n College, Oxford. _2s._\n\nLUCIAN--Six Dialogues (Nigrinus,\n Icaro-Menippus, The Cock, The Ship,\n The Parasite, The Lover of Falsehood).\n Translated by S. T. IRWIN, M.A.,\n Assistant Master at Clifton; late\n Scholar of Exeter College, Oxford.\n _3s. 6d._\n\nSOPHOCLES--Electra and Ajax. Translated\n by E. D. A. MORSHEAD, M.A., Assistant\n Master at Winchester. _2s. 6d._\n\nTACITUS--Agricola and Germania.\n Translated by R. B. 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TAIT PLOWDEN-WARDLAW, B.A.,\n King's College, Cambridge. _Crown\n 8vo. 2s. 6d._\n\n\n * * * * *\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n\nMinor punctuation and typography inconsistencies have been corrected\nwithout comment.\n\n\nSpelling Corrections: (Evolution, Text)\n\n p. 80 FOOTNOTE 14: \"Merz\" to \"Mertz\" (As set out in the Index)\n\n p. 99, \"firstfruits\" to \"first-fruits\" (the first-fruits of)\n\nSpelling Corrections: (Publisher's Catalogue)\n\n p. 25 of CATALOGUE - \"County\" to \"Country\" (--Country Gentleman.)\n\n p. 29, \"Deaconness\" to \"Deaconess\" (2) (Deaconess Cecilia)\n\n p. 33, \"subtilty\" to \"subtlety\" (2) (subtlety of its analysis)\n\n\nIn the Catalogue--\n\n Major Section Headings, originally in large point \"Sentence Text\" have\n been placed in UPPERCASE text, without further comment.\n\n Secondary Headings, originally in Bold Gothic print, have been placed\n within +Plus Signs+.\n\n Other Secondary Headings, (Specifically within the \"Educational Books\"\n section), originally shown in Uppercase Bold Italic print, are shown\n with =_EQUALS AND UNDERSCORES_=.\n\n\nWORD VARIATIONS:\n\n \"D.Litt.\" (4) and \"Litt.D.\" (15)\n \"pre-supposition\" (1) and \"presupposition(s)\" (2)\n \"Sc.D\" (1) and \"D.Sc\" (4)\n\n\n\n\n\n
","title":"Evolution","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":94176}