{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_35016/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_35016","id":"gutenberg_35016","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/35016","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Cleveland, Grover, 1837-1908","United States -- Politics and government"],"text":"Produced by Curtis Weyant, Ernest Schaal, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                                A LETTER\n\n                                   TO\n\n                            GROVER CLEVELAND,\n\n                                   ON\n\n            HIS FALSE INAUGURAL ADDRESS, THE USURPATIONS AND\n                CRIMES OF LAWMAKERS AND JUDGES, AND THE\n                   CONSEQUENT POVERTY, IGNORANCE, AND\n                        SERVITUDE OF THE PEOPLE.\n\n\n                                   BY\n                           LYSANDER SPOONER.\n\n\n                                BOSTON:\n                      BENJ. R. TUCKER, PUBLISHER.\n                                 1886.\n\n\n\n\n        The author reserves his copyright in this letter.\n        First pamphlet edition published in July, 1886.[1]\n\n    [1] Under a somewhat different title, to wit, \"_A Letter to\n    Grover Cleveland, on his False, Absurd, If-contradictory, and\n    Ridiculous Inaugural Address_,\" this letter was first published,\n    in instalments, \"LIBERTY\" (a paper published in Boston); the\n    instalments commencing June 20, 1885, and continuing to May 22,\n    1886: notice being given, in each paper, of the reservation of\n    copyright.\n\n\n\n\n                     A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND.\n\n                               SECTION I.\n\n_To Grover Cleveland_:\n\nSIR,--Your inaugural address is probably as honest, sensible, and\nconsistent a one as that of any president within the last fifty years,\nor, perhaps, as any since the foundation of the government. If,\ntherefore, it is false, absurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous, it\nis not (as I think) because you are personally less honest, sensible, or\nconsistent than your predecessors, but because the government\nitself--according to your own description of it, and according to the\npractical administration of it for nearly a hundred years--is an utterly\nand palpably false, absurd, and criminal one. Such praises as you bestow\nupon it are, therefore, necessarily false, absurd, and ridiculous.\n\nThus you describe it as \"a government pledged to do equal and exact\njustice to all men.\"\n\nDid you stop to think what that means? Evidently you did not; for\nnearly, or quite, all the rest of your address is in direct\ncontradiction to it.\n\nLet me then remind you that justice is an immutable, natural principle;\nand not anything that can be made, unmade, or altered by any human\npower.\n\nIt is also a subject of science, and is to be learned, like mathematics,\nor any other science. It does not derive its authority from the\ncommands, will, pleasure, or discretion of any possible combination of\nmen, whether calling themselves a government, or by any other name.\n\nIt is also, at all times, and in all places, the supreme law. And being\neverywhere and always the supreme law, it is necessarily everywhere and\nalways the only law.\n\nLawmakers, as they call themselves, can add nothing to it, nor take\nanything from it. Therefore all their laws, as they call them,--that is,\nall the laws of their own making,--have no color of authority or\nobligation. It is a falsehood to call them laws; for there is nothing in\nthem that either creates men's duties or rights, or enlightens them as\nto their duties or rights. There is consequently nothing binding or\nobligatory about them. And nobody is bound to take the least notice of\nthem, unless it be to trample them under foot, as usurpations. If they\ncommand men to do justice, they add nothing to men's obligation to do\nit, or to any man's right to enforce it. They are therefore mere idle\nwind, such as would be commands to consider the day as day, and the\nnight as night. If they command or license any man to do injustice, they\nare criminal on their face. If they command any man to do anything which\njustice does not require him to do, they are simple, naked usurpations\nand tyrannies. If they forbid any man to do anything, which justice\nwould permit him to do, they are criminal invasions of his natural and\nrightful liberty. In whatever light, therefore, they are viewed, they\nare utterly destitute of everything like authority or obligation. They\nare all necessarily either the impudent, fraudulent, and criminal\nusurpations of tyrants, robbers, and murderers, or the senseless work of\nignorant or thoughtless men, who do not know, or certainly do not\nrealize, what they are doing.\n\nThis science of justice, or natural law, is the only science that tells\nus what are, and what are not, each man's natural, inherent,\ninalienable, _individual_ rights, as against any and all other men. And\nto say that any, or all, other men may rightfully compel him to obey any\nor all such other laws as they may see fit to _make_, is to say that he\nhas no rights of his own, but is their subject, their property, and\ntheir slave.\n\nFor the reasons now given, the simple maintenance of justice, or natural\nlaw, is plainly the one only purpose for which any coercive power--or\nanything bearing the name of government--has a right to exist.\n\nIt is intrinsically just as false, absurd, ludicrous, and ridiculous to\nsay that lawmakers, so-called, can invent and make any laws, _of their\nown_, authoritatively fixing, or declaring, the rights of individuals,\nor that shall be in any manner authoritative or obligatory upon\nindividuals, or that individuals may rightfully be compelled to obey, as\nit would be to say that they can invent and make such mathematics,\nchemistry, physiology, or other sciences, as they see fit, and\nrightfully compel individuals to conform all their actions to them,\ninstead of conforming them to the mathematics, chemistry, physiology, or\nother sciences of nature.\n\nLawmakers, as they call themselves, might just as well claim the right\nto abolish, by statute, the natural law of gravitation, the natural laws\nof light, heat, and electricity, and all the other natural laws of\nmatter and mind, and institute laws of their own in the place of them,\nand compel conformity to them, as to claim the right to set aside the\nnatural law of justice, and compel obedience to such other laws as they\nmay see fit to manufacture, and set up in its stead.\n\nLet me now ask you how you imagine that your so-called lawmakers can \"do\nequal and exact justice to all men,\" by any so-called laws of their own\nmaking. If their laws command anything but justice, or forbid anything\nbut injustice, they are themselves unjust and criminal. If they simply\ncommand justice, and forbid injustice, they add nothing to the natural\nauthority of justice, or to men's obligation to obey it. It is,\ntherefore, a simple impertinence, and sheer impudence, on their part, to\nassume that _their_ commands, _as such_, are of any authority whatever.\nIt is also sheer impudence, on their part, to assume that their commands\nare at all necessary to teach other men what is, and what is not,\njustice. The science of justice is as open to be learned by all other\nmen, as by themselves; and it is, in general, so simple and easy to be\nlearned, that there is no need of, and no place for, any man, or body of\nmen, to teach it, declare it, or command it, on their own authority.\n\nFor one, or another, of these reasons, therefore, each and every law,\nso-called, that forty-eight different congresses have presumed to make,\nwithin the last ninety-six years, have been utterly destitute of all\nlegitimate authority. That is to say, they have either been criminal, as\ncommanding or licensing men to do what justice forbade them to do, or as\nforbidding them to do what justice would have permitted them to do; or\nelse they have been superfluous, as adding nothing to men's knowledge of\njustice, or to their obligation to do justice, or abstain from\ninjustice.\n\nWhat excuse, then, have you for attempting to enforce upon the people\nthat great mass of superfluous or criminal laws (so-called) which\nignorant and foolish, or impudent and criminal, men have, for so many\nyears, been manufacturing, and promulgating, and enforcing, in violation\nof justice, and of all men's natural, inherent, and inalienable rights?\n\n\n                              SECTION II.\n\nPerhaps you will say that there is no such science as that of justice.\nIf you do say this, by what right, or on what reason, do you proclaim\nyour intention \"to do equal and exact justice to all men\"? If there is\nno science of justice, how do you know that there is any such principle\nas justice? Or how do you know what is, and what is not, justice? If\nthere is no science of justice,--such as the people can learn and\nunderstand for themselves,--why do you say anything about justice _to\nthem?_ Or why do you promise _them_ any such thing as \"equal and exact\njustice,\" if they do not know, and are incapable of learning, what\njustice is? Do you use this phrase to deceive those whom you look upon\nas being so ignorant, so destitute of reason, as to be deceived by idle,\nunmeaning words? If you do not, you are plainly bound to let us all know\nwhat you do mean, by doing \"equal and exact justice to all men.\"\n\nI can assure you, sir, that a very large portion of the people of this\ncountry do not believe that the government is doing \"equal and exact\njustice to all men.\" And some persons are earnestly promulgating the\nidea that the government is not attempting to do, and has no intention\nof doing, anything like \"equal and exact justice to all men\"; that, on\nthe contrary, it is knowingly, deliberately, and wilfully doing an\nincalculable amount of injustice; that it has always been doing this in\nthe past, and that it has no intention of doing anything else in the\nfuture; that it is a mere tool in the hands of a few ambitious,\nrapacious, and unprincipled men; that its purpose, in doing all this\ninjustice, is to keep--so far as they can without driving the people to\nrebellion--all wealth, and all political power, in as few hands as\npossible; and that this injustice is the direct cause of all the\nwidespread poverty, ignorance, and servitude among the great body of the\npeople.\n\nNow, Sir, I wish I could hope that you would do something to show that\nyou are not a party to any such scheme as that; something to show that\nyou are neither corrupt enough, nor blind enough, nor coward enough, to\nbe made use of for any such purpose as that; something to show that when\nyou profess your intention \"to do equal and exact justice to all men,\"\nyou attach some real and definite meaning to your words. Until you do\nthat, is it not plain that the people have a right to consider you a\ntyrant, and the confederate and tool of tyrants, and to get rid of you\nas unceremoniously as they would of any other tyrant?\n\n\n                              SECTION III.\n\nSir, if any government is to be a rational, consistent, and honest\none, it must evidently be based on some fundamental, immutable,\neternal principle; such as every man may reasonably agree to, and such\nas every man may rightfully be compelled to abide by, and obey. And\nthe whole power of the government must be limited to the maintenance\nof that single principle. And that one principle is justice. There is\nno other principle that any man can rightfully enforce upon others, or\nought to consent to have enforced against himself. Every man claims\nthe protection of this principle for himself, whether he is willing to\naccord it to others, or not. Yet such is the inconsistency of human\nnature, that some men--in fact, many men--who will risk their lives\nfor this principle, when their own liberty or property is at stake,\nwill violate it in the most flagrant manner, if they can thereby\nobtain arbitrary power over the persons or property of others. We have\nseen this fact illustrated in this country, through its whole\nhistory--especially during the last hundred years--and in the case of\nmany of the most conspicuous persons. And their example and influence\nhave been employed to pervert the whole character of the government.\nIt is against such men, that all others, who desire nothing but\njustice for themselves, and are willing to unite to secure it for all\nothers, must combine, if we are ever to have justice established for\nany.\n\n\n                              SECTION IV.\n\nIt is self-evident that no number of men, by conspiring, and calling\nthemselves a government, can acquire any rights whatever over other men,\nor other men's property, which they had not before, as individuals. And\nwhenever any number of men, calling themselves a government, do anything\nto another man, or to his property, which they had no right to do as\nindividuals they thereby declare themselves trespassers, robbers, or\nmurderers, according to the nature of their acts.\n\nMen, _as individuals_, may rightfully _compel_ each other to obey this\none law of justice. And it is the only law which any man can rightfully\nbe compelled, _by his fellow men_, to obey. All other laws, it is\noptional with each man to obey, or not, as he may choose. But this one\nlaw of justice he may rightfully be compelled to obey; and all the force\nthat is reasonably necessary to compel him, may rightfully be used\nagainst him.\n\nBut the right of every man to do anything, and everything, _which\njustice does not forbid him to do_, is a natural, inherent, inalienable\nright. It is his right, as against any and all other men, whether they\nbe many, or few. It is a right indispensable to every man's highest\nhappiness; and to every man's power of judging and determining for\nhimself what will, and what will not, promote his happiness. Any\nrestriction upon the exercise of this right is a restriction upon his\nrightful power of providing for, and accomplishing, his own well-being.\n\nSir, these natural, inherent, inalienable, _individual_ rights are\nsacred things. _They are the only human rights._ They are the only\nrights by which any man can protect his own property, liberty, or life\nagainst any one who may be disposed to take it away. Consequently they\nare not things that any set of either blockheads or villains, calling\nthemselves a government, can rightfully take into their own hands, and\ndispose of at their pleasure, as they have been accustomed to do in\nthis, and in nearly or quite all other countries.\n\n\n                               SECTION V.\n\nSir, I repeat that individual rights are the only human rights.\n_Legally speaking_, there are no such things as \"_public rights_,\" as\ndistinguished from individual rights. _Legally speaking_, there is no\nsuch creature or thing as \"_the public_.\" The term \"the public\" is an\nutterly vague and indefinite one, applied arbitrarily and at random to a\ngreater or less number of individuals, each and every one of whom have\ntheir own separate, individual rights, _and none others_. And the\nprotection of these separate, _individual_ rights is the one only\nlegitimate purpose, for which anything in the nature of a governing, or\ncoercive, power has a right to exist. And these separate, individual\nrights all rest upon, and can be ascertained only by, the one science of\njustice.\n\n_Legally speaking_, the term \"public _rights_\" is as vague and\nindefinite as are the terms \"public _health_,\" \"public _good_,\" \"public\n_welfare_,\" and the like. It has no legal meaning, except when used to\ndescribe the separate, private, _individual_ rights of a greater or less\nnumber of individuals.\n\nIn so far as the separate, private, natural rights of _individuals_ are\nsecured, in just so far, and no farther, are the \"public rights\"\nsecured. In so far as the separate, private, natural rights of\n_individuals_ are disregarded or violated, in just so far are \"public\nrights\" disregarded or violated. Therefore all the pretences of\nso-called lawmakers, that they are protecting \"public rights,\" by\nviolating private rights, are sheer and utter contradictions and frauds.\nThey are just as false and absurd as it would be to say that they are\nprotecting the public _health_, by arbitrarily poisoning and destroying\nthe health of single individuals.\n\nThe pretence of the lawmakers, that they are promoting the \"public\n_good_,\" by violating individual \"_rights_,\" is just as false and absurd\nas is the pretence that they are protecting \"public _rights_\" by\nviolating \"private rights.\" Sir, the greatest \"public _good_,\" of which\nany coercive power, calling itself a government, or by any other name,\nis capable, is the protection of each and every individual in the quiet\nand peaceful enjoyment and exercise of _all_ his own natural, inherent,\ninalienable, _individual_ \"rights.\" This is a \"good\" that comes home to\neach and every individual, of whom \"the public\" is composed. It is also\na \"good,\" which each and every one of these individuals, composing \"the\npublic,\" can appreciate. It is a \"good,\" for the loss of which\ngovernments can make no compensation whatever. _It is a universal and\nimpartial \"good,\"_ of the highest importance to each and every human\nbeing; and not any such vague, false, and criminal thing as the\nlawmakers--when violating private rights--tell us they are trying to\naccomplish, under the name of \"the public good.\" It is also the only\n\"equal and exact justice,\" which you, or anybody else, are capable of\nsecuring, or have any occasion to secure, to any human being. Let but\nthis \"equal and exact justice\" be secured \"to all men,\" and they will\nthen be abundantly able to take care of themselves, and secure their own\nhighest \"good.\" Or if any one should ever chance to need anything more\nthan this, he may safely trust to the voluntary kindness of his fellow\nmen to supply it.\n\nIt is one of those things not easily accounted for, that men who would\nscorn to do an injustice to a fellow man, in a private transaction,--who\nwould scorn to usurp any arbitrary dominion over him, or his\nproperty,--who would be in the highest degree indignant, if charged with\nany private injustice,--and who, at a moment's warning, would take their\nlives in their hands, to defend their own rights, and redress their own\nwrongs,--will, the moment they become members of what they call a\ngovernment, assume that they are absolved from all principles and all\nobligations that were imperative upon them, as individuals; will assume\nthat they are invested with a right of arbitrary and irresponsible\ndominion over other men, and other men's property. Yet they are doing\nthis continually. And all the laws they _make_ are based upon the\nassumption that they have now become invested with rights that are more\nthan human, and that those, on whom their laws are to operate, have lost\neven their human rights. They seem to be utterly blind to the fact, that\nthe only reason there can be for their existence as a government, is\nthat they may protect those very \"rights,\" which they before\nscrupulously respected, but which they now unscrupulously trample upon.\n\n\n                              SECTION VI.\n\nBut you evidently believe nothing of what I have now been saying. You\nevidently believe that justice is no law at all, unless in cases where\nthe lawmakers may chance to prefer it to any law which they themselves\ncan invent.\n\nYou evidently believe that, a certain paper, called the constitution,\nwhich nobody ever signed, which few persons ever read, which the great\nbody of the people never saw, and as to the meaning of which no two\npersons were ever agreed, is the supreme law of this land, anything in\nthe law of nature--anything in the natural, inherent, inalienable,\n_individual_ rights of fifty millions of people--to the contrary not\nwithstanding.\n\nDid folly, falsehood, absurdity, assumption, or criminality ever reach a\nhigher point than that?\n\nYou evidently believe that those great volumes of statutes, which the\npeople at large have never read, nor even seen, and never will read, nor\nsee, but which such men as you and your lawmakers have been\nmanufacturing for nearly a hundred years, to restrain them of their\nliberty, and deprive them of their natural rights, were all made for\ntheir benefit, by men wiser than they--wiser even than justice\nitself--and having only their welfare at heart!\n\nYou evidently believe that the men who made those laws were duly\nauthorized to make them; and that you yourself have been duly authorized\nto enforce them. But in this you are utterly mistaken. You have not so\nmuch as the honest, responsible scratch of one single pen, to justify\nyou in the exercise of the power you have taken upon yourself to\nexercise. For example, you have no such evidence of your right to take\nany man's property for the support of your government, as would be\nrequired of you, if you were to claim pay for a single day's honest\nlabor.\n\nIt was once said, in this country, that taxation without consent was\nrobbery. And a seven years' war was fought to maintain that principle.\nBut if that principle were a true one in behalf of three millions of\nmen, it is an equally true one in behalf of three men, or of one man.\n\nWho are ever taxed? Individuals only. Who have property that can be\ntaxed? Individuals only. Who can give their consent to be taxed?\nIndividuals only. Who are ever taxed without their consent? Individuals\nonly. Who, then, are robbed, if taxed without their consent? Individuals\nonly.\n\nIf taxation without consent is robbery, the United States government has\nnever had, has not now, and is never likely to have, a single honest\ndollar in its treasury.\n\nIf taxation without consent is _not_ robbery, then any band of robbers\nhave only to declare themselves a government, and all their robberies\nare legalized.\n\nIf any man's money can be taken by a so-called government, without his\nown personal consent, all his other rights are taken with it; for with\nhis money the government can, and will, hire soldiers to stand over him,\ncompel him to submit to its arbitrary will, and kill him if he resists.\n\nThat your whole claim of a right to any man's money for the support of\nyour government, without his consent, is the merest farce and fraud, is\nproved by the fact that you have no such evidence of your right to take\nit, as would be required of you, by one of your own courts, to prove a\ndebt of five dollars, that might be honestly due you.\n\nYou and your lawmakers have no such evidence of your right of dominion\nover the people of this country, as would be required to prove your\nright to any material property, that you might have purchased.\n\nWhen a man parts with any considerable amount of such material property\nas he has a natural right to part with,--as, for example, houses, or\nlands, or food, or clothing, or anything else of much value,--he usually\ngives, and the purchaser usually demands, some _written_ acknowledgment,\nreceipt, bill of sale, or other evidence, that will prove that he\nvoluntarily parted with it, and that the purchaser is now the real and\ntrue owner of it. But you hold that fifty millions of people have\nvoluntarily parted, not only with their natural right of dominion over\nall their material property, but also with all their natural right of\ndominion over their own souls and bodies; when not one of them has ever\ngiven you a scrap of writing, or even \"made his mark,\" to that effect.\n\nYou have not so much as the honest signature of a single human being,\ngranting to you or your lawmakers any right of dominion whatever over\nhim or his property.\n\nYou hold your place only by a title, which, on no just principle of law\nor reason, is worth a straw. And all who are associated with you in the\ngovernment--whether they be called senators, representatives, judges,\nexecutive officers, or what not--all hold their places, directly or\nindirectly, only by the same worthless title. That title is nothing more\nnor less than votes given in secret (by secret ballot), by not more than\none-fifth of the whole population. These votes were given in secret\nsolely because those who gave them did not dare to make themselves\npersonally responsible, either for their own acts, or the acts of their\nagents, the lawmakers, judges, etc.\n\nThese voters, having given their votes in secret (by secret ballot),\nhave put it out of your power--and out of the power of all others\nassociated with you in the government--to designate your principals\n_individually_. That is to say, you have no legal knowledge as to who\nvoted for you, or who voted against you. And being unable to designate\nyour principals _individually_, you have no right to say that you have\nany principals. And having no right to say that you have any principals,\nyou are bound, on every just principle of law or reason, to confess that\nyou are mere usurpers, making laws, and enforcing them, upon your own\nauthority alone.\n\nA secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is\nnothing else than a government by conspiracy. And a government by\nconspiracy is the only government we now have.\n\nYou say that \"_every voter exercises a public trust_.\"\n\nWho appointed him to that trust? Nobody. He simply usurped the power; he\nnever accepted the trust. And because he usurped the power, he dares\nexercise it only in secret. Not one of all the ten millions of voters,\nwho helped to place you in power, would have dared to do so, if he had\nknown that he was to be held personally responsible, before any just\ntribunal, for the acts of those for whom he voted.\n\nInasmuch as all the votes, given for you and your lawmakers, were given\nin secret, all that you and they can say, in support of your authority\nas rulers, is that you venture upon your acts as lawmakers, etc., not\nbecause you have any open, authentic, written, legitimate authority\ngranted you by any human being,--for you can show nothing of the\nkind,--but only because, from certain reports made to you of votes given\nin secret, you have reason to believe that you have at your backs a\nsecret association strong enough to sustain you by force, in case your\nauthority should be resisted.\n\nIs there a government on earth that rests upon a more false, absurd, or\ntyrannical basis than that?\n\n\n                              SECTION VII.\n\nBut the falsehood and absurdity of your whole system of government do\nnot result solely from the fact that it rests wholly upon votes given in\nsecret, or by men who take care to avoid all personal responsibility for\ntheir own acts, or the acts of their agents. On the contrary, if every\nman, woman, and child in the United States had openly signed, sealed,\nand delivered to you and your associates, a written document, purporting\nto invest you with all the legislative, judicial, and executive powers\nthat you now exercise, they would not thereby have given you the\nslightest legitimate authority. Such a contract, purporting to surrender\ninto your hands all their natural rights of person and property, to be\ndisposed of at your pleasure or discretion, would have been simply an\nabsurd and void contract, giving you no real authority whatever.\n\nIt is a natural impossibility for any man to make a _binding_ contract,\nby which he shall surrender to others a single one of what are commonly\ncalled his \"natural, inherent, _inalienable_ rights.\"\n\nIt is a natural impossibility for any man to make a _binding_ contract,\nthat shall invest others with any right whatever of arbitrary,\nirresponsible dominion over him.\n\nThe right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion is the right of property;\nand the right of property is the right of arbitrary, irresponsible\ndominion. The two are identical. There is no difference between them.\nNeither can exist without the other. If, therefore, our so-called\nlawmakers really have that right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion\nover us, which they claim to have, and which they habitually exercise,\nit must be because they own us as property. If they own us as property,\nit must be because nature made us their property; for, as no man can\nsell himself as a slave, we could never make a binding contract that\nshould make us their property--or, what is the same thing, give them any\nright of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over us.\n\nAs a lawyer, you certainly ought to know that all this is true.\n\n\n                             SECTION VIII.\n\nSir, consider, for a moment, what an utterly false, absurd, ridiculous,\nand criminal government we now have.\n\nIt all rests upon the false, ridiculous, and utterly groundless\nassumption, that fifty millions of people not only could voluntarily\nsurrender, but actually have voluntarily surrendered, all their natural\nrights, as human beings, into the custody of some four hundred men,\ncalled lawmakers, judges, etc., who are to be held utterly irresponsible\nfor the disposal they may make of them.[2]\n\n    [2] The irresponsibility of the senators and representatives is\n    guaranteed to them in this wise:\n\n        For any speech or debate [or vote] in either house, they\n        [the senators and representatives] shall not be\n        questioned [held to any legal responsibility] in any\n        other place.--_Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 6._\n\n    The judicial and executive officers are all equally guaranteed\n    against all responsibility _to the people_. They are made\n    responsible only to the senators and representatives, whose laws\n    they are to administer and execute. So long as they sanction and\n    execute all these laws, to the satisfaction of the lawmakers,\n    they are safe against all responsibility. _In no case can the\n    people, whose rights they are continually denying and trampling\n    upon, hold them to any accountability whatever._\n\n    Thus it will be seen that all departments of the government,\n    legislative, judicial, and executive, are placed entirely beyond\n    any responsibility _to the people_, whose agents they profess to\n    be, and whose rights they assume to dispose of at pleasure.\n\n    Was a more absolute, irresponsible government than that ever\n    invented?\n\nThe only right, which any individual is supposed to retain, or possess,\nunder the government, _is a purely fictitious one,--one that nature\nnever gave him,_--to wit, his right (so-called), as one of some ten\nmillions of male adults, to give away, by his vote, not only all his own\nnatural, inherent, inalienable, human rights, but also all the natural,\ninherent, inalienable, human rights of forty millions of other human\nbeings--that is, women and children.\n\nTo suppose that any one of all these ten millions of male adults would\nvoluntarily surrender a single one of all his natural, inherent,\ninalienable, human rights into the hands of irresponsible men, is an\nabsurdity; because, first, he has no power to do so, any contract he may\nmake for that purpose being absurd, and necessarily void; and, secondly,\nbecause he can have no rational motive for doing so. To suppose him to\ndo so, is to suppose him to be an idiot, incapable of making any\nrational and obligatory contract. It is to suppose he would voluntarily\ngive away everything in life that was of value to himself, and get\nnothing in return. To suppose that he would attempt to give away all the\nnatural rights _of other persons_--that is, the women and children--as\nwell as his own, is to suppose him to attempt to do something that he\nhas no right, or power, to do. It is to suppose him to be both a villain\nand a fool.\n\nAnd yet this government now rests wholly upon the assumption that some\nten millions of male adults--men supposed to be _compos mentis_--have\nnot only attempted to do, but have actually succeeded in doing, these\nabsurd and impossible things.\n\nIt cannot be said that men put all their rights into the hands of the\ngovernment, in order to have them protected; because there can be no\nsuch thing as a man's being protected in his rights, _any longer than he\nis allowed to retain them in his own possession_. The only possible way,\nin which any man can be protected in his rights, _is to protect him in\nhis own actual possession and exercise of them_. And yet our government\nis absurd enough to assume that a man can be protected in his rights,\nafter he has surrendered them altogether into other hands than his own.\n\nThis is just as absurd as it would be to assume that a man had given\nhimself away as a slave, in order to be protected in the enjoyment of\nhis liberty.\n\nA man wants his rights protected, solely that he himself may possess and\nuse them, and have the full benefit of them. But if he is compelled to\ngive them up to somebody else,--to a government, so-called, or to any\nbody else,--he ceases to have any rights of his own to be protected.\n\nTo say, as the advocates of our government do, that a man must give up\n_some_ of his natural rights, to a government, in order to have the rest\nof them protected--the government being all the while the sole and\nirresponsible judge as to what rights he does give up, and what he\nretains, and what are to be protected--is to say that he gives up all\nthe rights that the government chooses, _at any time_, to assume that he\nhas given up; and that he retains none, and is to be protected in none,\nexcept such as the government shall, _at all times_, see fit to protect,\nand to permit him to retain. This is to suppose that he has retained no\nrights at all, that he can, _at any time_, claim as his own, _as against\nthe government_. It is to say that he has really given up every right,\nand reserved none.\n\nFor a still further reason, it is absurd to say that a man must give up\n_some_ of his rights to a government, in order that government may\nprotect him in the rest. That reason is, that every right he gives up\ndiminishes his own power of self-protection, and makes it so much more\ndifficult for the government to protect him. And yet our government says\na man must give up _all_ his rights, in order that it may protect him.\nIt might just as well be said that a man must consent to be bound hand\nand foot, in order to enable a government, or his friends, to protect\nhim against an enemy. Leave him in full possession of his limbs, and of\nall his powers, and he will do more for his own protection than he\notherwise could, and will have less need of protection from a\ngovernment, or any other source.\n\nFinally, if a man, who is _compos mentis_, wants any outside protection\nfor his rights, he is perfectly competent to make his own bargain for\nsuch as he desires; and other persons have no occasion to thrust their\nprotection upon him, against his will; or to insist, as they now do,\nthat he shall give up all, or any, of his rights to them, in\nconsideration of such protection, and only such protection, as they may\nafterwards _choose_ to give him.\n\nIt is especially noticeable that those persons, who are so impatient to\nprotect other men in their rights that they cannot wait until they are\nrequested to do so, have a somewhat inveterate habit of killing all who\ndo not voluntarily accept their protection; or do not consent to give up\nto them all their rights in exchange for it.\n\nIf A were to go to B, a merchant, and say to him, \"Sir, I am a\nnight-watchman, and I insist upon your employing me as such in\nprotecting your property against burglars; and to enable me to do so\nmore effectually, I insist upon your letting me tie your own hands and\nfeet, so that you cannot interfere with me; and also upon your\ndelivering up to me all your keys to your store, your safe, and to all\nyour valuables; and that you authorize me to act solely and fully\naccording to my own will, pleasure, and discretion in the matter; and\nI demand still further, that you shall give me an absolute guaranty\nthat you will not hold me to any accountability whatever for anything\nI may do, or for anything that may happen to your goods while they are\nunder my protection; and unless you comply with this proposal, I will\nnow kill you on the spot,\"--if A were to say all this to B, B would\nnaturally conclude that A himself was the most impudent and dangerous\nburglar that he (B) had to fear; and that if he (B) wished to secure\nhis property against burglars, his best way would be to kill A in the\nfirst place, and then take his chances against all such other burglars\nas might come afterwards.\n\nOur government constantly acts the part that is here supposed to be\nacted by A. And it is just as impudent a scoundrel as A is here\nsupposed to be. It insists that every man shall give up all his rights\nunreservedly into its custody, and then hold it wholly irresponsible\nfor any disposal it may make of them. And it gives him no alternative\nbut death.\n\nIf by putting a bayonet to a man's breast, and giving him his choice, to\ndie, or be \"protected in his rights,\" it secures his consent to the\nlatter alternative, it then proclaims itself a free government,--a\ngovernment resting on consent!\n\nYou yourself describe such a government as \"the best government ever\nvouchsafed to man.\"\n\nCan you tell me of one that is worse in principle?\n\nBut perhaps you will say that ours is not so bad, in principle, as the\nothers, for the reason that here, once in two, four, or six years, each\nmale adult is permitted to have one vote in ten millions, in choosing\nthe public protectors. Well, if you think that that materially alters\nthe case, I wish you joy of your remarkable discernment.\n\n\n                              SECTION IX.\n\nSir, if a government is to \"do equal and exact justice to all men,\" _it\nmust do simply that, and nothing more_. If it does more than that to\nany,--that is, if it gives monopolies, privileges, exemptions, bounties,\nor favors to any,--it can do so only by doing injustice to more or less\nothers. _It can give to one only what it takes from others; for it has\nnothing of its own to give to any one._ The best that it can do for all,\nand the only honest thing it can do for any, is simply to secure to each\nand every one his own rights,--the rights that nature gave him,--his\nrights of person, and his rights of property; leaving him, then, to\npursue his own interests, and secure his own welfare, by the free and\nfull exercise of his own powers of body and mind; so long as he\ntrespasses upon the equal rights of no other person.\n\nIf he desires any favors from any body, he must, I repeat, depend upon\nthe voluntary kindness of such of his fellow men as may be willing to\ngrant them. No government can have any right to grant them; because no\ngovernment can have a right to take from one man any thing that is his,\nand give it to another.\n\nIf this be the only true idea of an honest government, it is plain that\nit can have nothing to do with men's \"interests,\" \"welfare,\" or\n\"prosperity,\" _as distinguished from their \"rights.\"_ Being secured in\ntheir rights, each and all must take the sole charge of, and have the\nsole responsibility for, their own \"interests,\" \"welfare,\" and\n\"prosperity.\"\n\nBy simply protecting every man in his rights, a government necessarily\nkeeps open to every one the widest possible field, that he honestly can\nhave, for such industry as he may choose to follow. It also insures him\nthe widest possible field for obtaining such capital as he needs for his\nindustry, and the widest possible markets for the products of his labor.\nWith the possession of these rights, he must be content.\n\nNo honest government can go into business with any individuals, be they\nmany, or few. It cannot furnish capital to any, nor prohibit the loaning\nof capital to any. It can give to no one any special aid to competition;\nnor protect any one from competition. It must adhere inflexibly to the\nprinciple of entire freedom for all honest industry, and all honest\ntraffic. It can do to no one any favor, nor render to any one any\nassistance, which it withholds from another. It must hold the scales\nimpartially between them; taking no cognizance of any man's \"interests,\"\n\"welfare,\" or \"prosperity,\" otherwise than by simply protecting him in\nhis \"_rights_.\"\n\nIn opposition to this view, lawmakers profess to have weighty duties\nlaid upon them, to promote men's \"interests,\" \"welfare,\" and\n\"prosperity,\" _as distinguished from their \"rights.\"_ They seldom have\nany thing to say about men's \"_rights_.\" On the contrary, they take it\nfor granted that they are charged with the duty of promoting,\nsuperintending, directing, and controlling the \"business\" of the\ncountry. In the performance of this supposed duty, all ideas of\nindividual \"_rights_\" are cast aside. Not knowing any way--because\nthere is no way--in which they can impartially promote all men's\n\"interests,\" \"welfare,\" and \"prosperity,\" _otherwise than by protecting\nimpartially all men's rights_, they boldly proclaim that \"_individual\nrights must not be permitted to stand in the way of the public good,\nthe public welfare, and the business interests of the country_.\"\n\nSubstantially all their lawmaking proceeds upon this theory; for there\nis no other theory, on which they can find any justification whatever\nfor any lawmaking at all. So they proceed to give monopolies,\nprivileges, bounties, grants, loans, etc., etc., to particular persons,\nor classes of persons; justifying themselves by saying that these\nprivileged persons will \"give employment\" to the unprivileged; and that\nthis employment, given by the privileged to the unprivileged, will\ncompensate the latter for the loss of their \"_rights_.\" And they carry\non their lawmaking of this kind to the greatest extent they think is\npossible, without causing rebellion and revolution, on the part of the\ninjured classes.\n\nSir, I am sorry to see that you adopt this lawmaking theory to its\nfullest extent; that although, for once only, and in a dozen words\nonly,--and then merely incidentally,--you describe the government as \"a\ngovernment pledged to do equal and exact justice to all men,\" you show,\nthroughout the rest of your address, that you have no thought of abiding\nby that principle; that you are either utterly ignorant, or utterly\nregardless, of what that principle requires of you; that the government,\nso far as your influence goes, is to be given up to the business of\nlawmaking,--that is, to the business of abolishing justice, and\nestablishing injustice in its place; that you hold it to be the proper\nduty and function of the government to be constantly looking after men's\n\"interests,\" \"welfare,\" \"prosperity,\" etc., etc., _as distinguished from\ntheir rights_; that it must consider men's \"rights\" as no guide to the\npromotion of their \"interests\"; that it must give favors to some, and\nwithhold the same favors from others; that in order to give these favors\nto some, it must take from others their _rights_; that, in reality, it\nmust traffic in both men's interests and their rights; that it must keep\nopen shop, and sell men's interests and rights to the highest bidders;\nand that this is your only plan for promoting \"the general welfare,\"\n\"the common interest,\" etc., etc.\n\nThat such is your idea of the constitutional duties and functions of the\ngovernment, is shown by different parts of your address: but more fully,\nperhaps, by this:\n\n     The large variety of diverse and _competing interests_ subject\n     to _federal control, persistently seeking recognition of their\n     claims_, need give us no fear that the greatest good of the\n     greatest number will fail to be accomplished, if, _in the\n     halls of national legislation_, that spirit of amity and mutual\n     concession shall prevail, in which the constitution had its\n     birth. If this involves the _surrender_ or _postponement_ of\n     _private interests_, and the _abandonment_ of _local\n     advantages_, compensation will be found in the assurance that\n     thus the _common interest_ is subserved, and _the general\n     welfare_ advanced.\n\nWhat is all this but saying that the government is not at all an\ninstitution for \"doing equal and exact justice to all men,\" or for the\nimpartial protection of all men's _rights_; but that it is its proper\nbusiness to take sides, for and against, a \"large variety of diverse and\n_competing interests_\"; that it has this \"large variety of diverse and\n_competing interests_\" under its arbitrary \"_control_\"; that it can, at\nits pleasure, make such laws as will give success to some of them, and\ninsure the defeat of others; that these \"various, diverse, and\n_competing interests_\" will be \"_persistently seeking recognition of\ntheir claims_ ... in _the halls of national legislation_,\"--that is,\nwill be \"persistently\" clamoring for laws to be made in their favor;\nthat, in fact, \"the halls of national legislation\" are to be mere\narenas, into which the government actually invites the advocates and\nrepresentatives of all the selfish schemes of avarice and ambition that\nunprincipled men can devise; that these schemes will there be free to\n\"_compete_\" with each other in their corrupt offers for government favor\nand support; and that it is to be the proper and ordinary business of\nthe lawmakers to listen to all these schemes; to adopt some of them, and\nsustain them with all the money and power of the government; and to\n\"postpone,\" \"abandon,\" oppose, and defeat all others; it being well\nknown, all the while, that the lawmakers will, _individually_, favor, or\noppose, these various schemes, according to their own irresponsible\nwill, pleasure, and discretion,--that is, according as they can better\nserve their own personal interests and ambitions by doing the one or the\nother.\n\nWas a more thorough scheme of national villainy ever invented?\n\nSir, do you not know that in this conflict, between these \"various,\ndiverse, and _competing interests_,\" all ideas of individual\n\"_rights_\"--all ideas of \"equal and exact justice to all men\"--will be\ncast to the winds; that the boldest, the strongest, the most fraudulent,\nthe most rapacious, and the most corrupt, men will have control of the\ngovernment, and make it a mere instrument for plundering the great body\nof the people?\n\nYour idea of the real character of the government is plainly this: The\nlawmakers are to assume absolute and irresponsible \"_control_\" of all\nthe financial resources, all the legislative, judicial, and executive\npowers, of the government, and employ them all for the promotion of such\nschemes of plunder and ambition as they may select from all those that\nmay be submitted to them for their approval; that they are to keep \"the\nhalls of national legislation\" wide open for the admission of all\npersons having such schemes to offer; and that they are to grant\nmonopolies, privileges, loans, and bounties to all such of these schemes\nas they can make subserve their own individual interests and ambitions,\nand reject or \"postpone\" all others. And that there is to be no limit to\ntheir operations of this kind, except their fear of exciting rebellion\nand resistance on the part of the plundered classes.\n\nAnd you are just fool enough to tell us that such a government as this\nmay be relied on to \"accomplish the greatest good to the greatest\nnumber,\" \"to subserve the common interest,\" and \"advance the general\nwelfare,\" \"if,\" only, \"in the halls of national legislation, that spirit\nof amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in which the constitution\nhad its birth.\"\n\nYou here assume that \"the general welfare\" is to depend, not upon the\nfree and untrammelled enterprise and industry of the whole people,\nacting individually, and each enjoying and exercising all his natural\nrights; but wholly or principally upon the success of such particular\nschemes as the government may take under its special \"control.\" And this\nmeans that \"the general welfare\" is to depend, wholly or principally,\nupon such privileges, monopolies, loans, and bounties as the government\nmay grant to more or less of that \"large variety of diverse and\ncompeting _interests_\"--that is, schemes--that may be \"persistently\"\npressed upon its attention.\n\nBut as you impliedly acknowledge that the government cannot take all\nthese \"interests\" (schemes) under its \"control,\" and bestow its favors\nupon all alike, you concede that some of them must be \"surrendered,\"\n\"postponed,\" or \"abandoned\"; and that, consequently, the government\ncannot get on at all, unless, \"in the halls of national legislation,\nthat spirit of amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in which the\nconstitution had its birth.\"\n\nThis \"spirit of amity and mutual concession in the halls of\nlegislation,\" you explain to mean this: a disposition, on the part of\nthe lawmakers respectively--whose various schemes of plunder cannot all\nbe accomplished, by reason of their being beyond the financial resources\nof the government, or the endurance of the people--to \"surrender\" some\nof them, \"postpone\" others, and \"abandon\" others, in order that the\ngeneral business of robbery may go on to the greatest extent possible,\nand that each one of the lawmakers may succeed with as many of the\nschemes he is specially intrusted with, as he can carry through by means\nof such bargains, for mutual help, as he may be able to make with his\nfellow lawmakers.\n\nSuch is the plan of government, to which you say that you \"consecrate\"\nyourself, and \"engage your every faculty and effort.\"\n\nWas a more shameless avowal ever made?\n\nYou cannot claim to be ignorant of what crimes such a government will\ncommit. You have had abundant opportunity to know--and if you have kept\nyour eyes open, you do know--what these schemes of robbery have been in\nthe past; and from these you can judge what they will be in the future.\n\nYou know that under such a system, every senator and\nrepresentative--probably without an exception--will come to the congress\nas the champion of the dominant scoundrelisms of his own State or\ndistrict; that he will be elected solely to serve those \"interests,\" as\nyou call them; that in offering himself as a candidate, he will announce\nthe robbery, or robberies, to which all his efforts will be directed;\nthat he will call these robberies his \"policy\"; or if he be lost to all\ndecency, he will call them his \"principles\"; that they will always be\nsuch as he thinks will best subserve his own interests, or ambitions;\nthat he will go to \"the halls of national legislation\" with his head\nfull of plans for making bargains with other lawmakers--as corrupt as\nhimself--for mutual help in carrying their respective schemes.\n\nSuch has been the character of our congresses nearly, or quite, from the\nbeginning. It can scarcely be said that there has ever been an honest\nman in one of them. A man has sometimes gained a reputation for honesty,\nin his own State or district, by opposing some one or more of the\nrobberies that were proposed by members from other portions of the\ncountry. But such a man has seldom, or never, deserved his reputation;\nfor he has, generally, if not always, been the advocate of some one or\nmore schemes of robbery, by which more or less of his own constituents\nwere to profit, and which he knew it would be indispensable that he\nshould advocate, in order to give him votes at home.\n\nIf there have ever been any members, who were consistently honest\nthroughout,--who were really in favor of \"doing equal and exact justice\nto all men,\"--and, of course, nothing more than that to any,--their\nnumbers have been few; so few as to have left no mark upon the general\nlegislation. They have but constituted the exceptions that proved the\nrule. If you were now required to name such a lawmaker, I think you\nwould search our history in vain to find him.\n\nThat this is no exaggerated description of our national lawmaking, the\nfollowing facts will prove.\n\nFor the first seventy years of the government, one portion of the\nlawmakers would be satisfied with nothing less than permission to rob\none-sixth, or one-seventh, of the whole population, not only of their\nlabor, but even of their right to their own persons. In 1860, this class\nof lawmakers comprised all the senators and representatives from\nfifteen, of the then thirty-three, States.[3]\n\n    [3] In the Senate they stood thirty to thirty-six, in the house\n    ninety to one hundred and forty-seven, in the two branches\n    united one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty-three,\n    relatively to the non-slaveholding members.\n\n    From the foundation of the government--without a single\n    interval, I think--the lawmakers from the slaveholding States\n    had been, _relatively_, as strong, or stronger, than in 1860.\n\nThis body of lawmakers, standing always firmly together, and capable of\nturning the scale for, or against, any scheme of robbery, in which\nnorthern men were interested, but on which northern men were\ndivided,--such as navigation acts, tariffs, bounties, grants, war,\npeace, etc.,--could purchase immunity for their own crime, by supporting\nsuch, and so many, northern crimes--second only to their own in\natrocity--as could be mutually agreed on.\n\nIn this way the slaveholders bargained for, and secured, protection for\nslavery and the slave trade, by consenting to such navigation acts as\nsome of the northern States desired, and to such tariffs on\nimports--such as iron, coal, wool, woollen goods, etc.,--as should\nenable the home producers of similar articles to make fortunes by\nrobbing everybody else in the prices of their goods.\n\nAnother class of lawmakers have been satisfied with nothing less than\nsuch a monopoly of money, as should enable the holders of it to\nsuppress, as far as possible, all industry and traffic, except such as\nthey themselves should control; such a monopoly of money as would put\nit wholly out of the power of the great body of wealth-producers to\nhire the capital needed for their industries; and thus compel\nthem--especially the mechanical portions of them--by the alternative of\nstarvation--to sell their labor to the monopolists of money, for just\nsuch prices as these latter should choose to pay. This monopoly of money\nhas also given, to the holders of it, a control, so nearly absolute, of\nall industry--agricultural as well as mechanical--and all traffic, as\nhas enabled them to plunder all the producing classes in the prices of\ntheir labor, or the products of their labor.\n\nHave you been blind, all these years, to the existence, or the effects,\nof this monopoly of money?\n\nStill another class of lawmakers have demanded unequal taxation on the\nvarious kinds of home property, that are subject to taxation; such\nunequal taxation as would throw heavy burdens upon some kinds of\nproperty, and very light burdens, or no burdens at all, upon other\nkinds.\n\nAnd yet another class of lawmakers have demanded great appropriations,\nor loans, of money, or grants of lands, to enterprises intended to give\ngreat wealth to a few, at the expense of everybody else.\n\nThese are some of the schemes of downright and outright robbery, which\nyou mildly describe as \"the large variety of diverse and competing\ninterests, _subject to federal control_, persistently seeking\nrecognition of their claims ... in the halls of national legislation\";\nand each having its champions and representatives among the lawmakers.\n\nYou know that all, or very nearly all, the legislation of congress is\ndevoted to these various schemes of robbery; and that little, or no,\nlegislation goes through, except by means of such bargains as these\nlawmakers may enter into with each other, for mutual support of their\nrespective robberies. And yet you have the mendacity, or the stupidity,\nto tell us that so much of this legislation as does go through, may be\nrelied on to \"accomplish the greatest good to the greatest number,\" to\n\"subserve the common interest,\" and \"advance the general welfare.\"\n\nAnd when these schemes of robbery become so numerous, atrocious, and\nunendurable that they can no longer be reconciled \"in the halls of\nnational legislation,\" by \"surrendering\" some of them, \"postponing\"\nothers, and \"abandoning\" others, you assume--for such has been the\nprevailing opinion, and you say nothing to the contrary--that it is the\nright of the strongest party, or parties, to murder a half million of\nmen, if that be necessary,--and as we once did,--not to secure liberty\nor justice to any body,--but to compel the weaker of these would-be\nrobbers to submit to all such robberies as the stronger ones may choose\nto practise upon them.\n\n\n                               SECTION X.\n\nSir, your idea of the true character of our government is plainly this:\nyou assume that all the natural, inherent, inalienable, individual,\n_human_ rights of fifty millions of people--all their individual rights\nto preserve their own lives, and promote their own happiness--have been\nthrown into one common heap,--into hotchpotch, as the lawyers say: and\nthat this hotchpotch has been given into the hands of some four hundred\nchampion robbers, each of whom has pledged himself to carry off as large\na portion of it as possible, to be divided among those men--well known\nto himself, but who--to save themselves from all responsibility for his\nacts--have secretly (by secret ballot) appointed him to be their\nchampion.\n\nSir, if you had assumed that all the people of this country had thrown\nall their wealth, all their rights, all their means of living, into\nhotchpotch; and that this hotchpotch had been given over to four hundred\nferocious hounds; and that each of these hounds had been selected and\ntrained to bring to his masters so much of this common plunder as he, in\nthe general fight, or scramble, could get off with, you would scarcely\nhave drawn a more vivid picture of the true character of the government\nof the United States, than you have done in your inaugural address.\n\nNo wonder that you are obliged to confess that such a government can be\ncarried on only \"amid the din of party strife\"; that it will be\ninfluenced--you should have said _directed_--by \"purely partisan zeal\";\nand that it will be attended by \"the animosities of political strife,\nthe bitterness of partisan defeat, and the exultation of partisan\ntriumph.\"\n\nWhat gang of robbers, quarrelling over the division of their plunder,\ncould exhibit a more shameful picture than you thus acknowledge to be\nshown by the government of the United States?\n\nSir, nothing of all this \"din,\" and \"strife,\" and \"animosity,\" and\n\"bitterness,\" is caused by any attempt, on the part of the government,\nto simply \"do equal and exact justice to all men,\"--to simply protect\nevery man impartially in all his natural rights to life, liberty, and\nproperty. It is all caused simply and solely by the government's\nviolation of some men's \"_rights_,\" to promote other men's \"interests.\"\nIf you do not know this, you are mentally an object of pity.\n\nSir, men's \"_rights_\" are always harmonious. That is to say, each man's\n\"rights\" are always consistent and harmonious with each and every other\nman's \"rights.\" But their \"_interests_\" as you estimate them, constantly\nclash; especially such \"interests\" as depend on government grants of\nmonopolies, privileges, loans, and bounties. And these \"interests,\" like\nthe interests of other gamblers, clash with a fury proportioned to the\namounts at stake. It is these clashing \"_interests_\" and not any\nclashing \"_rights_\" that give rise to all the strife you have here\ndepicted, and to all this necessity for \"that spirit of amity and mutual\nconcession,\" which you hold to be indispensable to the accomplishment of\nsuch legislation as you say is necessary to the welfare of the country.\n\nEach and every man's \"_rights_\" being consistent and harmonious with\neach and every other man's \"_rights_\"; and all men's rights being\nimmutably fixed, and easily ascertained, by a science that is open to be\nlearned and known by all; a government that does nothing but \"equal and\nexact justice to all men\"--that simply gives to every man his own, and\nnothing more to any--has no cause and no occasion for any \"political\n_parties_.\" What are these \"political parties\" but standing armies of\nrobbers, each trying to rob the other, and to prevent being itself\nrobbed by the other? A government that seeks only to \"do equal and exact\njustice to all men,\" has no cause and no occasion to enlist all the\nfighting men in the nation in two hostile ranks; to keep them always in\nbattle array, and burning with hatred towards each other. It has no\ncause and no occasion for any \"political _warfare_\" any \"political\n_hostility_\" any \"political _campaigns_\" any \"political _contests_\" any\n\"political _fights_\" any \"political _defeats_\" or any \"political\n_triumphs_.\" It has no cause and no occasion for any of those \"political\n_leaders_\" so called, whose whole business is to invent new schemes of\nrobbery, and organize the people into opposing bands of robbers; all for\ntheir own aggrandizement alone. It has no cause and no occasion for the\ntoleration, or the existence, of that vile horde of political bullies,\nand swindlers, and blackguards, who enlist on one side or the other, and\nfight for pay; who, year in and year out, employ their lungs and their\nink in spreading lies among ignorant people, to excite their hopes of\ngain, or their fears of loss, and thus obtain their votes. In short, it\nhas no cause and no occasion for all this \"din of party strife,\" for all\nthis \"purely partisan zeal,\" for all \"the bitterness of partisan\ndefeat,\" for all \"the exultation of partisan triumph,\" nor, worst of\nall, for any of \"that spirit of amity and mutual concession [by which\nyou evidently mean that readiness, \"in the halls of national\nlegislation,\" to sacrifice some men's \"rights\" to promote other men's\n\"interests\"] in which [you say] the constitution had its birth.\"\n\nIf the constitution does really, or naturally, give rise to all this\n\"strife,\" and require all this \"spirit of amity and mutual\nconcession,\"--and I do not care now to deny that it does,--so much the\nworse for the constitution. And so much the worse for all those men\nwho, like yourself, swear to \"preserve, protect, and defend it.\"\n\nAnd yet you have the face to make no end of professions, or pretences,\nthat the impelling power, the real motive, in all this robbery and\nstrife, is nothing else than \"the service of the people,\" \"their\ninterests,\" \"the promotion of their welfare,\" \"good government,\"\n\"government by the people,\" \"the popular will,\" \"the general weal,\" \"the\nachievements of our national destiny,\" \"the benefits which our happy\nform of government can bestow,\" \"the lasting welfare of the country,\"\n\"the priceless benefits of the constitution,\" \"the greatest good to the\ngreatest number,\" \"the common interest,\" \"the general welfare,\" \"the\npeople's will,\" \"the mission of the American people,\" \"our civil\npolicy,\" \"the genius of our institutions,\" \"the needs of our people in\ntheir home life,\" \"the settlement and development of the resources of\nour vast territory,\" \"the prosperity of our republic,\" \"the interests\nand prosperity of all the people,\" \"the safety and confidence of\nbusiness interests,\" \"making the wage of labor sure and steady,\" \"a\ndue regard to the interests of capital invested and workingmen\nemployed in American industries,\" \"reform in the administration of the\ngovernment,\" \"the application of business principles to public\naffairs,\" \"the constant and ever varying wants of an active and\nenterprising population,\" \"a firm determination to secure to all the\npeople of the land the full benefits of the best form of government\never vouchsafed to man,\" \"the blessings of our national life,\" etc.,\netc.\n\nSir, what is the use of such a deluge of unmeaning words, unless it be\nto gloss over, and, if possible, hide, the true character of the acts of\nthe government?\n\nSuch \"generalities\" as these do not even \"glitter.\" They are only the\nstale phrases of the demagogue, who wishes to appear to promise\neverything, but commits himself to nothing. Or else they are the\nsenseless talk of a mere political parrot, who repeats words he has been\ntaught to utter, without knowing their meaning. At best, they are the\nmere gibberish of a man destitute of all political ideas, but who\nimagines that \"good government,\" \"the general welfare,\" \"the common\ninterest,\" \"the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man,\" etc.,\netc., must be very good things, if anybody can ever find out what they\nare. There is nothing definite, nothing real, nothing tangible, nothing\nhonest, about them. Yet they constitute your entire stock in trade. In\nresorting to them--in holding them up to public gaze as comprising your\npolitical creed--you assume that they have a meaning; that they are\nmatters of overruling importance; that they require the action of an\nomnipotent, irresponsible, lawmaking government; that all these\n\"interests\" must be represented, and can be secured, only \"in the halls\nof national legislation\"; and by such political hounds as have been\nselected and trained, and sent there, solely that they may bring off, to\ntheir respective masters, as much as possible of the public plunder they\nhold in their hands; that is, as much as possible of the earnings of all\nthe honest wealth-producers of the country.\n\nAnd when these masters count up the spoils that their hounds have thus\nbrought home to them, they set up a corresponding shout that \"the public\nprosperity,\" \"the common interest,\" and \"the general welfare\" have been\n\"advanced.\" And the scoundrels by whom the work has been accomplished,\n\"in the halls of national legislation,\" are trumpeted to the world as\n\"great statesmen.\" And you are just stupid enough to be deceived into\nthe belief, or just knave enough to pretend to be deceived into the\nbelief, that all this is really the truth.\n\nOne would infer from your address that you think the people of this\ncountry incapable of doing anything for themselves, _individually_; that\nthey would all perish, but for the employment given them by that \"large\nvariety of diverse and competing interests\"--that is, such purely\nselfish schemes--as may be \"persistently seeking recognition of their\nclaims ... in the halls of national legislation,\" and secure for\nthemselves such monopolies and advantages as congress may see fit to\ngrant them.\n\nInstead of your recognizing the right of each and every individual to\njudge of, and provide for, his own well-being, according to the dictates\nof his own judgment, and by the free exercise of his own powers of body\nand mind,--so long as he infringes the equal rights of no other\nperson,--you assume that fifty millions of people, who never saw you,\nand never will see you, who know almost nothing about you, and care very\nlittle about you, are all so weak, ignorant, and degraded as to be\nhumbly and beseechingly looking to you--and to a few more lawmakers (so\ncalled) whom they never saw, and never will see, and of whom they know\nalmost nothing--to enlighten, direct, and \"_control_\" them in their\ndaily labors to supply their own wants, and promote their own happiness!\n\nYou thus assume that these fifty millions of people are so debased,\nmentally and morally, that they look upon you and your associate\nlawmakers as their earthly gods, holding their destinies in your hands,\nand anxiously studying their welfare; instead of looking upon you--as\nmost of you certainly ought to be looked upon--as a mere cabal of\nignorant, selfish, ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled men, who know\nvery little, and care to know very little, except how you can get fame,\nand power, and money, by trampling upon other men's rights, and robbing\nthem of the fruits of their labor.\n\nAssuming yourself to be the greatest of these gods, charged with the\n\"welfare\" of fifty millions of people, you enter upon the mighty task\nwith all the mock solemnity, and ridiculous grandiloquence, of a man\nignorant enough to imagine that he is really performing a solemn duty,\nand doing an immense public service, instead of simply making a fool of\nhimself. Thus you say:\n\n     Fellow citizens: In the presence of this vast assemblage of my\n     countrymen, I am about to supplement and seal, by the oath\n     which I shall take, the manifestation of the will of a great\n     and free people. In the exercise of their power and right of\n     self-government, they have committed to one of their fellow\n     citizens a supreme and sacred trust, and he here consecrates\n     himself to their service. This impressive ceremony adds little\n     to the solemn sense of responsibility with which I contemplate\n     the duty I owe to all the people of the land. Nothing can\n     relieve me from anxiety lest by any act of mine their\n     _interests_ [not their _rights_] may suffer, and nothing is\n     needed to strengthen my resolution to engage every faculty and\n     effort in the promotion of their _welfare_. [Not in \"doing\n     equal and exact justice to all men.\" After having once\n     described the government as one \"pledged to do equal and exact\n     justice to all men,\" you drop that subject entirely, and wander\n     off into \"interests,\" and \"welfare,\" and an astonishing number\n     of other equally unmeaning things.]\n\nSir, you would have no occasion to take all this tremendous labor and\nresponsibility upon yourself, if you and your lawmakers would but keep\nyour hands off the \"_rights_\" of your \"countrymen.\" Your \"countrymen\"\nwould be perfectly competent to take care of their own \"_interests_,\"\nand provide for their own \"_welfare_,\" if their hands were not tied, and\ntheir powers crippled, by such fetters as men like you and your\nlawmakers have fastened upon them.\n\nDo you know so little of your \"countrymen,\" that you need to be told\nthat their own strength and skill must be their sole reliance for their\nown well-being? Or that they are abundantly able, and willing, and\nanxious above all other things, to supply their own \"needs in their home\nlife,\" and secure their own \"welfare\"? Or that they would do it, not\nonly without jar or friction, but as their highest duty and pleasure, if\ntheir powers were not manacled by the absurd and villainous laws you\npropose to execute upon them? Are you so stupid as to imagine that\nputting chains on men's hands, and fetters on their feet, and\ninsurmountable obstacles in their paths, is the way to supply their\n\"needs,\" and promote their \"welfare\"? Do you think your \"countrymen\"\nneed to be told, either by yourself, or by any such gang of ignorant or\nunprincipled men as all lawmakers are, what to do, and what not to do,\nto supply their own \"needs in their home life\"? Do they not know how to\ngrow their own food, make their own clothing, build their own houses,\nprint their own books, acquire all the knowledge, and create all the\nwealth, they desire, without being domineered over, and thwarted in all\ntheir efforts, by any set of either fools or villains, who may call\nthemselves their lawmakers? And do you think they will never get their\neyes open to see what blockheads, or impostors, you and your lawmakers\nare? Do they not now--at least so far as you will permit them to do\nit--grow their own food, build their own houses, make their own\nclothing, print their own books? Do they not make all the scientific\ndiscoveries and mechanical inventions, by which all wealth is created?\n_Or are all these things done by \"the government\"?_ Are you an idiot,\nthat you can talk as you do, about what you and your lawmakers are doing\nto provide for the real wants, and promote the real \"welfare,\" of fifty\nmillions of people?\n\n\n                              SECTION XI.\n\nBut perhaps the most brilliant idea in your whole address, is this:\n\n     _Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close\n     scrutiny of its public servants,_ and a fair and reasonable\n     estimate of their fidelity and usefulness. Thus is the people's\n     will impressed upon the whole framework of our civil policy,\n     municipal, State, and federal; _and this is the price of our\n     liberty_, and the inspiration of our faith in the republic.\n\nThe essential parts of this declaration are these:\n\n\"_Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of\nits public servants, ... and this is the price of our liberty._\"\n\nWho are these \"public servants,\" that need all this watching? Evidently\nthey are the lawmakers, and the lawmakers only. They are not only the\n_chief_ \"public servants,\" but they are absolute masters of all the\nother \"public servants.\" These other \"public servants,\" judicial and\nexecutive,--the courts, the army, the navy, the collectors of taxes,\netc., etc.,--have no function whatever, except that of simple obedience\nto the lawmakers. They are appointed, paid, and have their duties\nprescribed to them, by the lawmakers; and are made responsible only to\nthe lawmakers. They are mere puppets in the hands of the lawmakers.\nClearly, then, the lawmakers are the only ones we have any occasion to\nwatch.\n\nYour declaration, therefore, amounts, practically, to this, and this\nonly:\n\n_Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of\nITS LAWMAKERS, ... and this is the price of our liberty._\n\nSir, your declaration is so far true, as that all the danger to \"our\nliberty\" _comes solely from the lawmakers_.\n\nAnd why are the lawmakers dangerous to \"our liberty\"? Because it is a\nnatural impossibility that they can _make_ any law--that is, any law of\ntheir own invention--that does _not_ violate \"our liberty.\"\n\n_The law of justice is the one only law that does not violate \"our\nliberty.\"_ And that is not a law that was made by the lawmakers. It\nexisted before they were born, and will exist after they are dead. It\nderives not one particle of its authority from any commands of theirs.\nIt is, therefore, in no sense, one of _their_ laws. Only laws of their\nown invention are _their_ laws. And as it is naturally impossible that\nthey can invent any law of their own, that shall not conflict with the\nlaw of justice, it is naturally impossible that they can _make_ a\nlaw--that is, a law of their own invention--that shall _not_ violate\n\"our liberty.\"\n\nThe law of justice is the precise measure, and the only precise measure,\nof the rightful \"liberty\" of each and every human being. Any law--made\nby lawmakers--that should give to any man more liberty than is given him\nby the law of justice, would be a license to commit an injustice upon\none or more other persons. On the other hand, any law--made by\nlawmakers--that should take from any human being any \"liberty\" that is\ngiven him by the law of justice, would be taking from him a part of his\nown rightful \"liberty.\"\n\nInasmuch, then, as every possible law, that can be made by lawmakers,\nmust either give to some one or more persons more \"liberty\" than the law\nof nature--or the law of justice--gives them, and more \"liberty\" than is\nconsistent with the natural and equal \"liberty\" of all other persons; or\nelse must take from some one or more persons some portion of that\n\"liberty\" which the law of nature--or the law of justice--gives to every\nhuman being, it is inevitable that every law, that can be made by\nlawmakers, must be a violation of the natural and rightful \"liberty\" of\nsome one or more persons.\n\nTherefore the very idea of a _lawmaking_ government--a government that\nis to make laws of its own invention--is necessarily in direct and\ninevitable conflict with \"our liberty.\" In fact, the whole, sole, and\nonly real purpose of any _lawmaking_ government whatever is to take from\nsome one or more persons their \"liberty.\" Consequently the only way in\nwhich all men can preserve their \"liberty,\" is not to have any\n_lawmaking_ government at all.\n\nWe have been told, time out of mind, that \"_Eternal vigilance is\nthe price of liberty_.\" But this admonition, by reason of its\nindefiniteness, has heretofore fallen dead upon the popular mind. It, in\nreality, tells us nothing that we need to know, to enable us to preserve\n\"our liberty.\" It does not even tell us what \"our liberty\" is, or how,\nor when, or through whom, it is endangered, or destroyed.\n\n1. It does not tell us that _individual_ liberty is the only _human_\nliberty. It does not tell us that \"national liberty,\" \"political\nliberty,\" \"republican liberty,\" \"democratic liberty,\" \"constitutional\nliberty,\" \"liberty under law,\" and all the other kinds of liberty that\nmen have ever invented, and with which tyrants, as well as demagogues,\nhave amused and cheated the ignorant, are not liberty at all, unless in\nso far as they may, under certain circumstances, have chanced to\ncontribute something to, or given some impulse toward, _individual_\nliberty.\n\n2. It does not tell us that _individual_ liberty means freedom from all\ncompulsion to do anything whatever, except what justice requires us to\ndo, and freedom to do everything whatever that justice permits us to do.\nIt does not tell us that individual liberty means freedom from all human\nrestraint or coercion whatsoever, so long as we \"live honestly, hurt\nnobody, and give to every one his due.\"\n\n3. It does not tell us that there is any _science of liberty_; any\nscience, which every man may learn, and by which every man may know,\nwhat is, and what is not, his own, and every other man's, rightful\n\"liberty.\"\n\n4. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty rests upon\nan immutable, natural principle, which no human power can make, unmake,\nor alter; nor that all human authority, that claims to set it aside, or\nmodify it, is nothing but falsehood, absurdity, usurpation, tyranny, and\ncrime.\n\n5. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty is a\n_natural, inherent, inalienable right; that therefore no man can part\nwith it, or delegate it to another, if he would_; and that,\nconsequently, all the claims that have ever been made, by governments,\npriests, or any other powers, that individuals have voluntarily\nsurrendered, or \"delegated,\" their liberty to others, are all impostures\nand frauds.\n\n6. It does not tell us that all human laws, so called, and all human\nlawmaking,--all commands, either by one man, or any number of men,\ncalling themselves a government, or by any other name--requiring any\nindividual to do this, or forbidding him to do that--so long as he\n\"lives honestly, hurts no one, and gives to every one his due\"--are all\nfalse and tyrannical assumptions of a right of authority and dominion\nover him; are all violations of his natural, inherent, inalienable,\nrightful, individual liberty; and, as such, are to be resented and\nresisted to the utmost, by every one who does not choose to be a slave.\n\n7. And, finally, it does not tell us that all _lawmaking_ governments\nwhatsoever--whether called monarchies, aristocracies, republics,\ndemocracies, or by any other name--are all alike violations of men's\nnatural and rightful liberty.\n\nWe can now see why lawmakers are the only enemies, from whom \"our\nliberty\" has anything to fear, or whom we have any occasion to watch.\nThey are to be watched, because they claim the right to abolish justice,\nand establish injustice in its stead; because they claim the right to\ncommand us to do things which justice does not require us to do, and to\nforbid us to do things which justice permits us to do; because they deny\nour right to be, _individually, and absolutely_, our own masters and\nowners, so long as we obey the one law of justice towards all other\npersons; because they claim to be our masters, and that _their_\ncommands, _as such_, are authoritative and binding upon us as law; and\nthat they may rightfully compel us to obey them.\n\n\"Our liberty\" is in danger only from the lawmakers, because it is only\nthrough the agency of lawmakers, that anybody pretends to be able to\ntake away \"our liberty.\" It is only the lawmakers that claim to be above\nall responsibility for taking away \"our liberty.\" Lawmakers are the only\nones who are impudent enough to assert for themselves the right to take\naway \"our liberty.\" They are the only ones who are impudent enough to\ntell us that we have voluntarily surrendered \"our liberty\" into their\nhands. They are the only ones who have the insolent condescension to\ntell us that, in consideration of our having surrendered into their\nhands \"our liberty,\" and all our natural, inherent, inalienable rights\nas human beings, they are disposed to give us, in return, \"good\ngovernment,\" \"the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man\"; to\n\"protect\" us, to provide for our \"welfare,\" to promote our \"interests,\"\netc., etc.\n\nAnd yet you are just blockhead enough to tell us that if \"Every\ncitizen\"--fifty millions and more of them--will but keep \"a vigilant\nwatch and close scrutiny\" upon these lawmakers, \"our liberty\" may be\npreserved!\n\nDon't you think, sir, that you are really the wisest man that ever told\n\"a great and free people\" how they could preserve \"their liberty\"?\n\nTo be entirely candid, don't you think, sir, that a surer way of\npreserving \"our liberty\" would be to have no lawmakers at all?\n\n\n                              SECTION XII.\n\nBut, in spite of all I have said, or, perhaps, can say, you will\nprobably persist in your idea that the world needs a great deal of\nlawmaking; that mankind in general are not entitled to have any will,\nchoice, judgment, or conscience of their own; that, if not very wicked,\nthey are at least very ignorant and stupid; that they know very little\nof what is for their own good, or how to promote their own \"interests,\"\n\"welfare,\" or \"prosperity\"; that it is therefore necessary that they\nshould be put under guardianship to lawmakers; that these lawmakers,\nbeing a very superior race of beings,--wise beyond the rest of their\nspecies,--and entirely free from all those selfish passions which tempt\ncommon mortals to do wrong,--must be intrusted with absolute and\nirresponsible dominion over the less favored of their kind; must\nprescribe to the latter, authoritatively, what they may, and may not,\ndo; and, in general, manage the affairs of this world according to their\ndiscretion, free of all accountability to any human tribunals.\n\nAnd you seem to be perfectly confident that, under this absolute and\nirresponsible dominion of the lawmakers, the affairs of this world will\nbe rightly managed; that the \"interests,\" \"welfare,\" and \"prosperity\" of\n\"a great and free people\" will be properly attended to; that \"the\ngreatest good of the greatest number\" will be accomplished, etc., etc.\n\nAnd yet you hold that all this lawmaking, and all this subjection of the\ngreat body of the people to the arbitrary, irresponsible dominion of the\nlawmakers, will not interfere at all with \"our liberty,\" if only \"every\ncitizen\" will but keep \"a vigilant watch and close scrutiny\" of the\nlawmakers.\n\nWell, perhaps this is all so; although this subjection to the arbitrary\nwill of any man, or body of men, whatever, and under any pretence\nwhatever, seems, on the face of it, to be much more like slavery, than\nit does like \"liberty\".\n\nIf, therefore, you really intend to continue this system of lawmaking,\nit seems indispensable that you should explain to us what you mean by\nthe term \"our liberty.\"\n\nSo far as your address gives us any light on the subject, you evidently\nmean, by the term \"our liberty,\" just such, and only such, \"liberty,\" as\nthe lawmakers may see fit to allow us to have.\n\nYou seem to have no conception of any other \"liberty\" whatever.\n\nYou give us no idea of any other \"liberty\" that we can secure to\nourselves, even though \"every citizen\"--fifty millions and more of\nthem--shall all keep \"a vigilant watch and close scrutiny\" upon the\nlawmakers.\n\nNow, inasmuch as the human race always have had all the \"liberty\" their\nlawmakers have seen fit to permit them to have; and inasmuch as, under\nyour system of lawmaking, they always will have as much \"liberty\" as\ntheir lawmakers shall see fit to give them; and inasmuch as you\napparently concede the right, which the lawmakers have always claimed,\nof killing all those who are not content with so much \"liberty\" as their\nlawmakers have seen fit to allow them,--it seems very plain that you\nhave not added anything to our stock of knowledge on the subject of \"our\nliberty.\"\n\nLeaving us thus, as you do, in as great darkness as we ever were, on\nthis all-important subject of \"our liberty,\" I think you ought to submit\npatiently to a little questioning on the part of those of us, who feel\nthat all this lawmaking--each and every separate particle of it--is a\nviolation of \"our liberty.\"\n\nWill you, therefore, please tell us whether any, and, if any, how much,\nof that _natural_ liberty--of that natural, inherent, inalienable,\n_individual_ right to liberty--with which it has generally been supposed\nthat God, or Nature, has endowed every human being, will be left to us,\nif the lawmakers are to continue, as you would have them do, the\nexercise of their arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over us?\n\nAre you prepared to answer that question?\n\nNo. You appear to have never given a thought to any such question as\nthat.\n\nI will therefore answer it for you.\n\nAnd my answer is, that from the moment it is conceded that any man, or\nbody of men, whatever, under any pretence whatever, have the right to\n_make laws of their own invention_, and compel other men to obey them,\nevery vestige of man's _natural_ and rightful liberty is denied him.\n\nThat this is so is proved by the fact that _all_ a man's _natural_\nrights stand upon one and the same basis, _viz._, that they are the gift\nof God, or Nature, to him, _as an individual_, for his own uses, and for\nhis own happiness. If any one of these natural rights may be arbitrarily\ntaken from him by other men, _all_ of them may be taken from him on the\nsame reason. No one of these rights is any more sacred or inviolable in\nits nature, than are all the others. The denial of any one of these\nrights is therefore equivalent to a denial of all the others. The\nviolation of any one of these rights, by lawmakers, is equivalent to the\nassertion of a right to violate all of them.\n\nPlainly, unless _all_ a man's natural rights are inviolable by\nlawmakers, _none_ of them are. It is an absurdity to say that a man has\nany rights _of his own_, if other men, whether calling themselves a\ngovernment, or by any other name, have the right to take them from him,\nwithout his consent. Therefore the very idea of a lawmaking government\nnecessarily implies a denial of all such things as individual liberty,\nor individual rights.\n\nFrom this statement it does not follow that every lawmaking government\nwill, in practice, take from every man _all_ his natural rights. It will\ndo as it pleases about it. It will take some, leaving him to enjoy\nothers, just as its own pleasure or discretion shall dictate at the\ntime. It would defeat its own ends, if it were wantonly to take away\n_all_ his natural rights,--as, for example, his right to live, and to\nbreathe,--for then he would be dead, and the government could then get\nnothing more out of him. The most tyrannical government will, therefore,\nif it have any sense, leave its victims enough liberty to enable them to\nprovide for their own subsistence, to pay their taxes, and to render\nsuch military or other service as the government may have need of. _But\nit will do this for its own good, and not for theirs._ In allowing them\nthis liberty, it does not at all recognize their right to it, but only\nconsults its own interests.\n\nNow, sir, this is the real character of the government of the United\nStates, as it is of all other _lawmaking_ governments. There is not a\nsingle human right, which the government of the United States recognises\nas inviolable. It tramples upon any and every individual right, whenever\nits own will, pleasure, or discretion shall so dictate. It takes men's\nproperty, liberty, and lives whenever it can serve its own purposes by\ndoing so.\n\nAll these things prove that the government does not exist at all for the\nprotection of men's _rights_; but that it absolutely denies to the\npeople any rights, or any liberty, whatever, except such as it shall see\nfit to permit them to have for the time being. It virtually declares\nthat it does not itself exist at all for the good of the people, but\nthat the people exist solely for the use of the government.\n\nAll these things prove that the government is not one voluntarily\nestablished and sustained by the people, for the protection of their\nnatural, inherent, individual rights, but that it is merely a government\nof usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who claim to own the people as their\nslaves, and claim the right to dispose of them, and their property, at\ntheir (the usurpers') pleasure or discretion.\n\nNow, sir, since you may be disposed to deny that such is the real\ncharacter of the government, I propose to prove it, by evidences so\nnumerous and conclusive that you cannot dispute them.\n\nMy proposition, then, is, that there is not a single _natural_, human\nright, that the government of the United States recognizes as\ninviolable; that there is not a single _natural_, human right, that it\nhesitates to trample under foot, whenever it thinks it can promote its\nown interests by doing so.\n\nThe proofs of this proposition are so numerous, that only a few of the\nmost important can here be enumerated.\n\n1. The government does not even recognize a man's natural right to his\nown life. If it have need of him, for the maintenance of its power, it\ntakes him, against his will (conscripts him), and puts him before the\ncannon's mouth, to be blown in pieces, as if he were a mere senseless\nthing, having no more _rights_ than if he were a shell, a canister, or a\ntorpedo. It considers him simply as so much senseless war material, to\nbe consumed, expended, and destroyed for the maintenance of its power.\nIt no more recognizes his right to have anything to say in the matter,\nthan if he were but so much weight of powder or ball. It does not\nrecognize him at all as a human being, having any rights whatever of his\nown, but only as an instrument, a weapon, or a machine, to be used in\nkilling other men.\n\n2. The government not only denies a man's right, as a moral human being,\nto have any will, any judgment, or any conscience of his own, as to\nwhether he himself will be killed in battle, but it equally denies his\nright to have any will, any judgment, or any conscience of his own, as a\nmoral human being, as to whether he shall be used as a mere weapon for\nkilling other men. If he refuses to kill any, or all, other men, whom it\ncommands him to kill, it takes his own life, as unceremoniously as if he\nwere but a dog.\n\nIs it possible to conceive of a more complete denial of all a man's\n_natural_, _human_ rights, than is the denial of his right to have any\nwill, judgment, or conscience of his own, either as to his being killed\nhimself, or as to his being used as a mere weapon for killing other men?\n\n3. But in still another way, than by its conscriptions, the government\ndenies a man's right to any will, choice, judgment, or conscience of his\nown, in regard either to being killed himself, or used as a weapon in\nits hands for killing other people.\n\nIf, in private life, a man enters into a perfectly voluntary agreement\nto work for another, at some innocent and useful labor, for a day, a\nweek, a month, or a year, he cannot lawfully be compelled to fulfil that\ncontract; because such compulsion would be an acknowledgment of his\nright to sell his own liberty. And this is what no one can do.\n\nThis right of personal liberty is inalienable. No man can sell it, or\ntransfer it to another; or give to another any right of arbitrary\ndominion over him. All contracts for such a purpose are absurd and void\ncontracts, that no man can rightfully be compelled to fulfil.\n\nBut when a deluded or ignorant young man has once been enticed into a\ncontract to kill others, and to take his chances of being killed\nhimself, in the service of the government, for any given number of\nyears, the government holds that such a contract to sell his liberty,\nhis judgment, his conscience, and his life, is a valid and binding\ncontract; and that if he fails to fulfil it, he may rightfully be shot.\n\nAll these things prove that the government recognizes no right of the\nindividual, to his own life, or liberty, or to the exercise of his own\nwill, judgment, or conscience, in regard to his killing his fellow-men,\nor to being killed himself, if the government sees fit to use him as\nmere war material, in maintaining its arbitrary dominion over other\nhuman beings.\n\n4. The government recognizes no such thing as any _natural_ right of\nproperty, on the part of individuals.\n\nThis is proved by the fact that it takes, for its own uses, any and\nevery man's property--when it pleases, and as much of it as it\npleases--without obtaining, or even asking, his consent.\n\nThis taking of a man's property, without his consent, is a denial of his\nright of property; for the right of property is the right of supreme,\nabsolute, and irresponsible dominion over anything that is naturally a\nsubject of property,--that is, of ownership. _It is a right against all\nthe world._ And this right of property--this right of supreme, absolute,\nand irresponsible dominion over anything that is naturally a subject of\nownership--is subject only to this qualification, _viz._, that each man\nmust so use his own, as not to injure another.\n\nIf A uses his own property so as to injure the person or property of B,\nhis own property may rightfully be taken to any extent that is necessary\nto make reparation for the wrong he has done.\n\nThis is the only qualification to which the _natural_ right of property\nis subject.\n\nWhen, therefore, a government takes a man's property, for its own\nsupport, or for its own uses, without his consent, it practically denies\nhis right of property altogether; for it practically asserts that _its_\nright of dominion is superior to his.\n\nNo man can be said to have any right of property at all, in any\nthing--that is, any right of supreme, absolute, and irresponsible\ndominion over any thing--of which any other men may rightfully deprive\nhim at their pleasure.\n\nNow, the government of the United States, in asserting its right to take\nat pleasure the property of individuals, without their consent,\nvirtually denies their right of property altogether, because it asserts\nthat _its_ right of dominion over it, is superior to theirs.\n\n5. The government denies the _natural_ right of human beings to live on\nthis planet. This it does by denying their _natural_ right to those\nthings that are indispensable to the maintenance of life. It says that,\nfor every thing necessary to the maintenance of life, they must have a\nspecial permit from the government; and that the government cannot be\nrequired to grant them any other means of living than it chooses to\ngrant them.\n\nAll this is shown as follows, _viz._:\n\nThe government denies the _natural_ right of individuals to take\npossession of wilderness land, and hold and cultivate it for their own\nsubsistence.\n\nIt asserts that wilderness land is the property of the government; and\nthat individuals have no right to take possession of, or cultivate, it,\nunless by special grant of the government. And if an individual attempts\nto exercise this natural right, the government punishes him as a\ntrespasser and a criminal.\n\nThe government has no more right to claim the ownership of wilderness\nlands, than it has to claim the ownership of the sunshine, the water, or\nthe atmosphere. And it has no more right to punish a man for taking\npossession of wilderness land, and cultivating it, without the consent\nof the government, than it has to punish him for breathing the air,\ndrinking the water, or enjoying the sunshine, without a special grant\nfrom the government.\n\nIn thus asserting the government's right of property in wilderness land,\nand in denying men's right to take possession of and cultivate it,\nexcept on first obtaining a grant from the government,--which grant the\ngovernment may withhold if it pleases,--the government plainly denies\nthe _natural_ right of men to live on this planet, by denying their\n_natural_ right to the means that are indispensable to their procuring\nthe food that is necessary for supporting life.\n\nIn asserting its right of arbitrary dominion over that natural wealth\nthat is indispensable to the support of human life, it asserts its right\nto withhold that wealth from those whose lives are dependent upon it. In\nthis way it denies the _natural_ right of human beings to live on the\nplanet. It asserts that government owns the planet, and that men have no\nright to live on it, except by first getting a permit from the\ngovernment.\n\nThis denial of men's _natural_ right to take possession of and cultivate\nwilderness land is not altered at all by the fact that the government\nconsents to sell as much land as it thinks it expedient or profitable to\nsell; nor by the fact that, in certain cases, it gives outright certain\nlands to certain persons. Notwithstanding these sales and gifts, the\nfact remains that the government claims the original ownership of the\nlands; and thus denies the _natural_ right of individuals to take\npossession of and cultivate them. In denying this _natural_ right of\nindividuals, it denies their _natural_ right to live on the earth; and\nasserts that they have no other right to life than the government, by\nits own mere will, pleasure, and discretion, may see fit to grant them.\n\nIn thus denying man's _natural_ right to life, it of course denies every\nother _natural_ right of human beings; and asserts that they have no\n_natural_ right to anything; but that, for all other things, as well as\nfor life itself, they must depend wholly upon the good pleasure and\ndiscretion of the government.\n\n\n                             SECTION XIII.\n\nIn still another way, the government denies men's _natural_ right to\nlife. And that is by denying their _natural_ right to make any of those\ncontracts with each other, for buying and selling, borrowing and\nlending, giving and receiving, property, which are necessary, if men are\nto exist in any considerable numbers on the earth.\n\nEven the few savages, who contrive to live, mostly or wholly, by\nhunting, fishing, and gathering wild fruits, without cultivating the\nearth, and almost wholly without the use of tools or machinery, are yet,\n_at times_, necessitated to buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and\nreceive, articles of food, if no others, as their only means of\npreserving their lives. But, in civilized life, where but a small\nportion of men's labor is necessary for the production of food, and they\nemploy themselves in an almost infinite variety of industries, and in\nthe production of an almost infinite variety of commodities, it would be\nimpossible for them to live, if they were wholly prohibited from buying\nand selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, the products\nof each other's labor.\n\nYet the government of the United States--either acting separately, or\njointly with the State governments--has heretofore constantly denied,\nand still constantly denies, the _natural_ right of the people, _as\nindividuals_, to make their own contracts, for such buying and selling,\nborrowing and lending, and giving and receiving, such commodities as\nthey produce for each other's uses.\n\nI repeat that both the national and State governments have constantly\ndenied the _natural_ right of individuals to make their own contracts.\nThey have done this, sometimes by arbitrarily forbidding them to make\nparticular contracts, and sometimes by arbitrarily qualifying the\nobligation of particular contracts, when the contracts themselves were\nnaturally and intrinsically as just and lawful as any others that men\never enter into; and were, consequently, such as men have as perfect a\n_natural_ right to make, as they have to make any of those contracts\nwhich they are permitted to make.\n\nThe laws arbitrarily prohibiting, or arbitrarily qualifying, certain\ncontracts, that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful, are so\nnumerous, and so well known, that they need not all be enumerated here.\nBut any and all such prohibitions, or qualifications, are a denial of\nmen's _natural_ right to make their own contracts. They are a denial of\nmen's right to make any contracts whatever, except such as the\ngovernments shall see fit to permit them to make.\n\nIt is the _natural_ right of any and all human beings, who are mentally\ncompetent to make reasonable contracts, to make any and every possible\ncontract, that is naturally and intrinsically just and honest, for\nbuying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, any and\nall possible commodities, that are naturally vendible, loanable, and\ntransferable, and that any two or more individuals may, at any time,\nwithout force or fraud, choose to buy and sell, borrow and lend, give\nand receive, of and to each other.\n\nAnd it is plainly only by the untrammelled exercise of this _natural_\nright, that all the loanable capital, that is required by men's\nindustries, can be lent and borrowed, or that all the money can be\nsupplied for the purchase and sale of that almost infinite diversity and\namount of commodities, that men are capable of producing, and that are\nto be transferred from the hands of the producers to those of the\nconsumers.\n\nBut the government of the United States--and also the governments of the\nStates--utterly deny the _natural_ right of any individuals whatever to\nmake any contracts whatever, for buying and selling, borrowing and\nlending, giving and receiving, any and all such commodities, as are\nnaturally vendible, loanable, and transferable, and as the producers and\nconsumers of such commodities may wish to buy and sell, borrow and lend,\ngive and receive, of and to each other.\n\nThese governments (State and national) deny this _natural_ right of\nbuying and selling, etc., by arbitrarily prohibiting, or qualifying, all\nsuch, and so many, of these contracts, as they choose to prohibit, or\nqualify.\n\nThe prohibition, or qualification, of _any one_ of these contracts--that\nare intrinsically just and lawful--is a denial of all individual\n_natural_ right to make any of them. For the right to make any and all\nof them stands on the same grounds of _natural_ law, natural justice,\nand men's natural rights. If a government has the right to prohibit, or\nqualify, any one of these contracts, it has the same right to prohibit,\nor qualify, all of them. Therefore the assertion, by the government, of\na right to prohibit, or qualify, any one of them, is equivalent to a\ndenial of all _natural_ right, on the part of individuals, to make any\nof them.\n\nThe power that has been thus usurped by governments, to arbitrarily\nprohibit or qualify all contracts that are naturally and intrinsically\njust and lawful, has been the great, perhaps the greatest, of all the\ninstrumentalities, by which, in this, as in other countries, nearly all\nthe wealth, accumulated by the labor of the many, has been, and is now,\ntransferred into the pockets of the few.\n\n_It is by this arbitrary power over contracts, that the monopoly of\nmoney is sustained._ Few people have any real perception of the power,\nwhich this monopoly gives to the holders of it, over the industry and\ntraffic of all other persons. And the one only purpose of the monopoly\nis to enable the holders of it to rob everybody else in the prices of\ntheir labor, and the products of their labor.\n\nThe theory, on which the advocates of this monopoly attempt to justify\nit, is simply this: _That it is not at all necessary that money should\nbe a bona fide equivalent of the labor or property that is to be bought\nwith it;_ that if the government will but specially license a small\namount of money, and prohibit all other money, the holders of the\nlicensed money will then be able to buy with it the labor and property\nof all other persons for a half, a tenth, a hundredth, a thousandth, or\na millionth, of what such labor and property are really and truly worth.\n\nDavid A. Wells, one of the most prominent--perhaps at this time, the\nmost prominent--advocate of the monopoly, in this country, states the\ntheory thus:\n\n     A three-cent piece, if it could be divided into a sufficient\n     number of pieces, with each piece capable of being handled,\n     would undoubtedly suffice for doing all the business of the\n     country in the way of facilitating exchanges, if no other\n     better instrumentality was available.--_New York Herald,\n     February 13, 1875._\n\nHe means here to say, that \"a three-cent piece\" contains _as much real,\ntrue, and natural market value_, as it would be necessary that all the\nmoney of the country should have, _if the government would but prohibit\nall other money_; that is, if the government, by its arbitrary\nlegislative power, would but make all other and better money\nunavailable.\n\nAnd this is the theory, on which John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith,\nDavid Ricardo, J. R. McCulloch, and John Stuart Mill, in England, and\nAmasa Walker, Charles H. Carroll, Hugh McCulloch, in this country, and\nall the other conspicuous advocates of the monopoly, both in this\ncountry and in England, have attempted to justify it. They have all held\nthat it was not necessary that money should be a _bona fide_ equivalent\nof the labor or property to be bought with it; but that, by the\nprohibition of all other money, the holders of a comparatively worthless\namount of licensed money would be enabled to buy, at their own prices,\nthe labor and property of all other men.\n\nAnd this is the theory on which the governments of England and the\nUnited States have always, with immaterial exceptions, acted, in\nprohibiting all but such small amounts of money as they (the\ngovernments) should specially license. _And it is the theory upon which\nthey act now._ And it is so manifestly a theory of pure robbery, that\nscarce a word can be necessary to make it more evidently so than it now\nis.\n\nBut inasmuch as your mind seems to be filled with the wildest visions of\nthe excellency of this government, and to be strangely ignorant of its\nwrongs; and inasmuch as this monopoly of money is, in its practical\noperation, one of the greatest--possibly the greatest--of all these\nwrongs, and the one that is most relied upon for robbing the great body\nof the people, and keeping them in poverty and servitude, it is plainly\nimportant that you should have your eyes opened on the subject. I\ntherefore submit, for your consideration, the following self-evident\npropositions:\n\n1. That to make all traffic just and equal, it is indispensable that, in\neach separate purchase and sale, the money paid should be a _bona fide_\nequivalent of the labor or property bought with it.\n\nDare you, or any other man, of common sense and common honesty, dispute\nthe truth of that proposition? If not, let us consider that principle\nestablished. It will then serve as one of the necessary and infallible\nguides to the true settlement of all the other questions that remain to\nbe settled.\n\n2. That so long as no force or fraud is practised by either party, the\nparties themselves, to each separate contract, have the sole, absolute,\nand unqualified right to decide for themselves, _what money, and how\nmuch of it_, shall be considered a _bona fide_ equivalent of the labor\nor property that is to be exchanged for it. All this is necessarily\nimplied in the _natural_ right of men to make their own contracts, for\nbuying and selling their respective commodities.\n\nWill you dispute the truth of that proposition?\n\n3. That any one man, who has an honest dollar, of any kind whatsoever,\nhas as perfect a right, as any other man can have, to offer it in the\nmarket, in competition with any and all other dollars, in exchange for\nsuch labor or property as may be in the market for sale.\n\nWill you dispute the truth of that proposition?\n\n4. That where no fraud is practised, every person, who is mentally\ncompetent to make reasonable contracts, must be presumed to be as\ncompetent to judge of the value of the money that is offered in the\nmarket, as he is to judge of the value of all the other commodities that\nare bought and sold for money.\n\nWill you dispute the truth of that proposition?\n\n5. That the free and open market, in which all honest money and all\nhonest commodities are free to be given and received in exchange for\neach other, is the true, final, absolute, and only test of the true and\nnatural market value of all money, as of all the other commodities that\nare bought and sold for money.\n\nWill you dispute the truth of that proposition?\n\n6. That any prohibition, by a government, of any such kind or amount of\nmoney--provided it be honest in itself--as the parties to contracts may\nvoluntarily agree to give and receive in exchange for labor or property,\nis a palpable violation of their natural right to make their own\ncontracts, and to buy and sell their labor and property on such terms as\nthey may find to be necessary for the supply of their wants, or may\nthink most beneficial to their interests.\n\nWill you dispute the truth of that proposition?\n\n7. That any government, that licenses a small amount of an article of\nsuch universal necessity as money, and that gives the control of it into\na few hands, selected by itself, and then prohibits any and all other\nmoney--that is intrinsically honest and valuable--palpably violates all\nother men's natural right to make their own contracts, and infallibly\nproves its purpose to be to enable the few holders of the licensed money\nto rob all other persons in the prices of their labor and property.\n\nWill you dispute the truth of that proposition?\n\nAre not all these propositions so self-evident, or so easily\ndemonstrated, that they cannot, with any reason, be disputed?\n\nIf you feel competent to show the falsehood of any one of them, I hope\nyou will attempt the task.\n\n\n                              SECTION XIV.\n\nIf, now, you wish to form some rational opinion of the extent of the\nrobbery practised in this country, by the holders of this monopoly of\nmoney, you have only to look at the following facts.\n\nThere are, in this country, I think, at least twenty-five millions of\npersons, male and female, sixteen years old, and upwards, mentally and\nphysically capable of running machinery, producing wealth, and supplying\ntheir own needs for an independent and comfortable subsistence.\n\nTo make their industry most effective, and to enable them,\n_individually_, to put into their own pockets as large a portion as\npossible of their own earnings, they need, _on an average_, one thousand\ndollars each of _money capital_. Some need one, two, three, or five\nhundred dollars, others one, two, three, or five thousand. These\npersons, then, need, _in the aggregate_, twenty-five thousand millions\nof dollars ($25,000,000,000), of money capital.\n\nThey need all this _money capital_ to enable them to buy the raw\nmaterials upon which to bestow their labor, the implements and machinery\nwith which to labor, and their means of subsistence while producing\ntheir goods for the market.\n\nUnless they can get this capital, they must all either work at a\ndisadvantage, or not work at all. A very large portion of them, to save\nthemselves from starvation, have no alternative but to sell their labor\nto others, at just such prices these others choose to pay. And these\nothers choose to pay only such prices as are far below what the laborers\ncould produce, if they themselves had the necessary capital to work\nwith.\n\nBut this needed capital your lawmakers arbitrarily forbid them to have;\nand for no other reason than to reduce them to the condition of\nservants; and subject them to all such extortions as their\nemployers--the holders of the privileged money--may choose to practise\nupon them.\n\nIf, now, you ask me where these twenty-five thousand millions of dollars\nof money capital, which these laborers need, are to come from, I answer:\n\n_Theoretically_, there are, in this country, fifty thousand millions of\ndollars of money capital ($50,000,000,000)--or twice as much as I have\nsupposed these laborers to need--NOW LYING IDLE! _And it is lying idle,\nsolely because the circulation of it, as money, is prohibited by the\nlawmakers._\n\nIf you ask how this can be, I will tell you.\n\n_Theoretically,_ every dollar's worth of material property, that is\ncapable of being taken by law, and applied to the payment of the owner's\ndebts, is capable of being represented by a promissory note, that shall\ncirculate as money.\n\nBut taking all this material property at _only half_ its actual value,\nit is still capable of supplying the twenty-five thousand millions of\ndollars--or one thousand dollars each--which these laborers need.\n\nNow, we know--because experience has taught us--that _solvent_\npromissory notes, made payable in coin on demand, are the best money\nthat mankind have ever had; (although probably not the best they ever\nwill have).\n\nTo make a note solvent, and suitable for circulation as money, it is\nonly necessary that it should be made payable in coin on demand, and be\nissued by a person, or persons, who are known to have in their hands\nabundant material property, that can be taken by law, and applied to the\npayment of the note, with all costs and damages for non-payment on\ndemand.\n\n_Theoretically,_ I repeat, all the material property in the country,\nthat can be taken by law, and applied to the payment of debt can be used\nas banking capital; and be represented by promissory notes, made payable\nin coin on demand. And, _practically_, so much of it can be used as\nbanking capital as may be required for supplying all the notes that can\nbe kept in circulation as money.\n\nAlthough these notes are made legally payable in coin on demand, it is\nseldom that such payment is demanded, _if only it be publicly known that\nthe notes are solvent_: that is, if it be publicly known that they are\nissued by persons who have so much material property, that can be taken\nby law, and sold, as may be necessary to bring the coin that is needed\nto pay the notes. In such cases, the notes are preferred to the coin,\nbecause they are so much more safe and convenient for handling,\ncounting, and transportation, than is the coin; and also because we can\nhave so many times more of them.\n\nThese notes are also a legal tender, to the banks that issue them, in\npayment of the notes discounted; that is, in payment of the notes given\nby the borrowers to the banks. And, in the ordinary course of things,\n_all_ the notes, issued by the banks for circulation, are wanted, and\ncome back to the banks, in payment of the notes discounted; thus saving\nall necessity for redeeming them with coin, except in rare cases. For\nmeeting these rare cases, the banks find it necessary to keep on hand\nsmall amounts of coin; probably not more than one per cent. of the\namount of notes in circulation.\n\nAs the notes discounted have usually but a short time to run,--say three\nmonths on an average,--the bank notes issued for circulation will _all_\ncome back, _on an average_, once in three months, and be redeemed by the\nbankers, by being accepted in payment of the notes discounted.\n\nThen the bank notes will be re-issued, by discounting new notes, and\nwill go into circulation again; to be again brought back, at the end of\nanother three months, and redeemed, by being accepted in payment of the\nnew notes discounted.\n\nIn this way the bank notes will be continually re-issued, and redeemed,\nin the greatest amounts that can be kept in circulation long enough to\nearn such an amount of interest as will make it an object for the\nbankers to issue them.\n\nEach of these notes, issued for circulation, if known to be solvent,\nwill always have the same value in the market, as the same nominal\namount of coin. And this value is a just one, because the notes are in\nthe nature of a lien, or mortgage, upon so much property of the bankers\nas is necessary to pay the notes, and as can be taken by law, and sold,\nand the proceeds applied to their payment.\n\nThere is no danger that any more of these notes will be issued than will\nbe wanted for buying and selling property at its true and natural market\nvalue, relatively to coin; for as the notes are all made legally payable\nin coin on demand, if they should ever fall below the value of coin in\nthe market, the holders of them will at once return them to the banks,\nand demand coin for them; _and thus take them out of circulation_.\n\nThe bankers, therefore, have no motive for issuing more of them than\nwill remain long enough in circulation, to earn so much interest as will\nmake it an object to issue them; the only motive for issuing them being\nto draw interest on them while they are in circulation.\n\nThe bankers readily find how many are wanted for circulation, by the\ntime those issued remain in circulation, before coming back for\nredemption. If they come back immediately, or very quickly, after being\nissued, the bankers know that they have over-issued, and that they must\ntherefore pay in coin--to their inconvenience and perhaps loss--notes\nthat would otherwise have remained in circulation long enough to earn so\nmuch interest as would have paid for issuing them; and would then have\ncome back to them in payment of notes discounted, instead of coming back\non a demand for redemption in coin.\n\nNow, the best of all possible banking capital is real estate. It is the\nbest, because it is visible, immovable, and indestructible. It cannot,\nlike coin, be removed, concealed, or carried out of the country. And its\naggregate value, in all civilized countries, is probably a hundred times\ngreater than the amount of coin in circulation. It is therefore capable\nof furnishing a hundred times as much money as we can have in coin.\n\nThe owners of this real estate have the greatest inducements to use it\nas banking capital, because all the banking profit, over and above\nexpenses, is a clear profit; inasmuch as the use of the real estate as\nbanking capital does not interfere at all with its use for other\npurposes.\n\nFarmers have a double, and much more than a double, inducement to use\ntheir lands as banking capital; because they not only get a direct\nprofit from the loan of their notes, but, by loaning them, they furnish\nthe necessary capital for the greatest variety of manufacturing\npurposes. They thus induce a much larger portion of the people, than\notherwise would, to leave agriculture, and engage in mechanical\nemployments; and thus become purchasers, instead of producers, of\nagricultural commodities. They thus get much higher prices for their\nagricultural products, and also a much greater variety and amount of\nmanufactured commodities in exchange.\n\nThe amount of money, capable of being furnished by this system, is so\ngreat that every man, woman, and child, who is worthy of credit, could\nget it, and do business for himself, or herself--either singly, or in\npartnerships--and be under no necessity to act as a servant, or sell his\nor her labor to others. All the great establishments, of every kind, now\nin the hands of a few proprietors, but employing a great number of wage\nlaborers, would be broken up; for few, or no persons, who could hire\ncapital, and do business for themselves, would consent to labor for\nwages for another.\n\nThe credit furnished by this system would always be stable; for the\nsystem is probably capable of furnishing, _at all times_, all the\ncredit, and all the money, that can be needed. It would also introduce a\nsubstantially universal system of cash payments. Everybody, who could\nget credit at all, would be able to get it at a bank, _in money_. With\nthe money, he would buy everything he needed for cash. He would also\nsell everything for cash; for when everybody buys for cash, everybody\nsells for cash; since buying for cash, and selling for cash, are\nnecessarily one and the same thing.\n\nWe should, therefore, never have another crisis, panic, revulsion of\ncredit, stagnation of industry, or fall of prices; for these are all\ncaused by the lack of money, and the consequent necessity of buying and\nselling on credit; whereby the amount of indebtedness becomes so great,\nso enormous, in fact, in proportion to the amount of money extant, with\nwhich to meet it, that the whole system of credit breaks down; to the\nruin of everybody, except the few holders of the monopoly of money, who\nreap a harvest in the fall of prices, and the consequent bankruptcy of\neverybody who is dependent on credit for his means of doing business.\n\nIt would be inadmissible for me, in this letter, to occupy the space\nthat would be necessary, to expose all the false, absurd, and ridiculous\npretences, by which the advocates of the monopoly of money have\nattempted to justify it. The only real argument they ever employed has\nbeen that, by means of the monopoly, the few holders of it were enabled\nto rob everybody else in the prices of their labor and property.\n\nAnd our governments, State and national, have hitherto acted together in\nmaintaining this monopoly, in flagrant violation of men's natural right\nto make their own contracts, and in flagrant violation of the\nself-evident truth, that, to make all traffic just and equal, it is\nindispensable that the money paid should be, in all cases, a _bona fide_\nequivalent of the labor or property that is bought with it.\n\nThe holders of this monopoly now rule and rob this nation; and the\ngovernment, in all its branches, is simply their tool. And being their\ntool for this gigantic robbery, it is equally their tool for all the\nlesser robberies, to which it is supposed that the people at large can\nbe made to submit.\n\n\n                              SECTION XV.\n\nBut although the monopoly of money is one of the most glaring violations\nof men's natural right to make their own contracts, and one of the most\neffective--perhaps _the_ most effective--for enabling a few men to rob\neverybody else, and for keeping the great body of the people in poverty\nand servitude, it is not the only one that our government practises, nor\nthe only one that has the same robbery in view.\n\nThe so-called taxes or duties, which the government levies upon imports,\nare a practical violation both of men's natural right of property, and\nof their natural right to make their own contracts.\n\nA man has the same _natural_ right to traffic with another, who lives on\nthe opposite side of the globe, as he has to traffic with his next-door\nneighbor. And any obstruction, price, or penalty, interposed by the\ngovernment, to the exercise of that right, is a practical violation of\nthe right itself.\n\nThe ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. of a man's property, which is taken\nfrom him, for the reason that he purchased it in a foreign country, must\nbe considered either as the price he is required to pay for the\n_privilege_ of buying property in that country, or else as a penalty for\nhaving exercised his _natural right_ of buying it in that country.\nWhether it be considered as a price paid for a privilege, or a penalty\nfor having exercised a natural right, it is a violation both of his\nnatural right of property, and of his natural right to make a contract\nin that country.\n\nIn short, it is nothing but downright robbery.\n\nAnd when a man seeks to avoid this robbery, by evading the government\nrobbers who are lying in wait for him,--that is, the so-called revenue\nofficers,--whom he has as perfect a right to evade, as he has to evade\nany other robbers, who may be lying in wait for him,--the seizure of his\nwhole property,--instead of the ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. that\nwould otherwise have been taken from him,--is not merely adding so much\nto the robbery itself, but is adding insult to the robbery. It is\npunishing a man as a criminal, for simply trying to save his property\nfrom robbers.\n\nBut it will be said that these taxes or duties are laid to raise revenue\nfor the support of the government.\n\nBe it so, for the sake of the argument. All taxes, levied upon a man's\nproperty for the support of government, without his consent, are mere\nrobbery; a violation of his natural right of property. And when a\ngovernment takes ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. of a man's property,\nfor the reason that he bought it in a foreign country, such taking is as\nmuch a violation of his natural right of property, or of his natural\nright to purchase property, as is the taking of property which he has\nhimself produced, or which he has bought in his own village.\n\nA man's natural right of property, in a commodity he has bought in a\nforeign country, is intrinsically as sacred and inviolable as it is in a\ncommodity produced at home. The foreign commodity is bought with the\ncommodity produced at home; and therefore stands on the same footing as\nthe commodity produced at home. And it is a plain violation of one's\nright, for a government to make any distinction between them.\n\nGovernment assumes to exist for the impartial protection of all rights\nof property. If it really exists for that purpose, it is plainly bound\nto make each kind of property pay its proper proportion, and only its\nproper proportion, of the cost of protecting all kinds. To levy upon a\nfew kinds the cost of protecting all, is a naked robbery of the holders\nof those few kinds, for the benefit of the holders of all other kinds.\n\nBut the pretence that heavy taxes are levied upon imports, solely, or\nmainly, for the support of government, while light taxes, or no taxes at\nall, are levied upon property at home, is an utterly false pretence.\nThey are levied upon the imported commodity, mainly, if not solely, for\nthe purpose of enabling the producers of competing home commodities to\nextort from consumers a higher price than the home commodities would\nbring in free and open market. And this additional price is sheer\nrobbery, and is known to be so. And the amount of this robbery--which\ngoes into the pockets of the home producers--is five, ten, twenty, or\nfifty times greater than the amount that goes into the treasury, for the\nsupport of the government, according as the amount of the home\ncommodities is five, ten, twenty, or fifty times greater than the amount\nof the imported competing commodities.\n\nThus the amounts that go to the support of the government, and also the\namounts that go into the pockets of the home producers, in the higher\nprices they get for their goods, are all sheer robberies; and nothing\nelse.\n\nBut it will be said that the heavy taxes are levied upon the foreign\ncommodity, not to put great wealth into a few pockets, but \"_to protect\nthe home laborer against the competition of the pauper labor of other\ncountries_.\"\n\nThis is the great argument that is relied on to justify the robbery.\n\nThis argument must have originated with the employers of home labor, and\nnot with the home laborers themselves.\n\nThe home laborers themselves could never have originated it, because\nthey must have seen that, so far as they were concerned, the object of\nthe \"protection,\" so-called, was, _at best_, only to benefit them, by\nrobbing others who were as poor as themselves, and who had as good a\nright as themselves to live by their labor. That is, they must have seen\nthat the object of the \"protection\" was to rob the foreign laborers, in\nwhole, or in part, of the pittances on which they were already\nnecessitated to live; and, secondly, to rob consumers at home,--in the\nincreased prices of the protected commodities,--when many or most of\nthese home consumers were also laborers as poor as themselves.\n\nEven if any class of laborers would have been so selfish and dishonest\nas to wish to thus benefit themselves by injuring others, as poor as\nthemselves, they could have had no hope of carrying through such a\nscheme, if they alone were to profit by it; because they could have had\nno such influence with governments, as would be necessary to enable them\nto carry it through, in opposition to the rights and interests of\nconsumers, both rich and poor, and much more numerous than themselves.\n\nFor these reasons it is plain that the argument originated with the\nemployers of home labor, and not with the home laborers themselves.\n\nAnd why do the employers of home labor advocate this robbery? Certainly\nnot because they have such an intense compassion for their own laborers,\nthat they are willing to rob everybody else, rich and poor, for their\nbenefit. Nobody will suspect them of being influenced by any such\ncompassion as that. But they advocate it solely because they put into\ntheir own pockets a very large portion certainly--probably\nthree-fourths, I should judge--of the increased prices their commodities\nare thus made to bring in the market. The home laborers themselves\nprobably get not more than one-fourth of these increased prices.\n\nThus the argument for \"protection\" is really an argument for robbing\nforeign laborers--as poor as our own--of their equal and rightful\nchances in our markets; and also for robbing all the home consumers of\nthe protected article--the poor as well as the rich--in the prices they\nare made to pay for it. And all this is done at the instigation, and\nprincipally for the benefit, of the employers of home labor, and not for\nthe benefit of home laborers themselves.\n\nHaving now seen that this argument--of \"protecting our home laborers\nagainst the competition of the pauper labor of other countries\"--is, of\nitself, an utterly dishonest argument; that it is dishonest towards\nforeign laborers and home consumers; that it must have originated with\nthe employers of home labor, and not with the home laborers themselves;\nand that the employers of home labor, and not the home laborers\nthemselves, are to receive the principal profits of the robbery, let us\nnow see how utterly false is the argument itself.\n\n1. The pauper laborers (if there are any such) of other countries have\njust as good a right to live by their labor, and have an equal chance in\nour own markets, and in all the markets of the world, as have the pauper\nlaborers, or any other laborers, of our own country.\n\nEvery human being has the same natural right to buy and sell, of and to,\nany and all other people in the world, as he has to buy and sell, of and\nto, the people of his own country. And none but tyrants and robbers deny\nthat right. And they deny it for their own benefit solely, and not for\nthe benefit of their laborers.\n\nAnd if a man, in our own country--either from motives of profit to\nhimself, or from motives of pity towards the pauper laborers of other\ncountries--_chooses_ to buy the products of the foreign pauper labor,\nrather than the products of the laborers of his own country, he has a\nperfect legal right to do so. And for any government to forbid him to do\nso, or to obstruct his doing so, or to punish him for doing so, is a\nviolation of his natural right of purchasing property of whom he\npleases, and from such motives as he pleases.\n\n2. To forbid our own people to buy in the best markets, is equivalent to\nforbidding them to sell the products of their own labor in the best\nmarkets; for they can buy the products of foreign labor, only by giving\nthe products of their own labor in exchange. Therefore to deny our right\nto buy in foreign markets, is to forbid us to sell in foreign markets.\nAnd this is a plain violation of men's natural rights.\n\nIf, when a producer of cotton, tobacco, grain, beef, pork, butter,\ncheese, or any other commodity, in our own country, has carried it\nabroad, and exchanged it for iron or woolen goods, and has brought these\nlatter home, the government seizes one-half of them, because they were\nmanufactured abroad, the robbery committed upon the owner is the same as\nif the government had seized one-half of his cotton, tobacco, or other\ncommodity, before he exported it; because the iron or woolen goods,\nwhich he purchased abroad with the products of his own home labor, are\nas much his own property, as was the commodity with which he purchased\nthem.\n\nTherefore the tax laid upon foreign commodities, that have been bought\nwith the products of our home labor, is as much a robbery of the home\nlaborer, as the same tax would have been, if laid directly upon the\nproducts of our home labor. It is, at best, only a robbery of one home\nlaborer--the producer of cotton, tobacco, grain, beef, pork, butter, or\ncheese--for the benefit of another home laborer--the producer of iron or\nwoolen goods.\n\n3. But this whole argument is a false one, for the further reason that\nour home laborers do not have to compete with \"_the pauper labor_\" of\nany country on earth; since the _actual paupers_ of no country on earth\nare engaged in producing commodities for export to any other country.\nThey produce few, or no, other commodities than those they themselves\nconsume; and ordinarily not even those.\n\nThere are a great many millions of _actual paupers_ in the world. In\nsome of the large provinces of British India, for example, it is said\nthat nearly half the population are paupers. But I think that the\ncommodities they are producing for export to other countries than their\nown, have never been heard of.\n\nThe term, \"pauper labor,\" is therefore a false one. And when these\nrobbers--the employers of home labor--talk of protecting their laborers\nagainst the competition of \"_the pauper labor_\" of other countries, they\ndo not mean that they are protecting them against the competition of\n_actual paupers_; but only against the competition of that immense body\nof laborers, in all parts of the world, _who are kept constantly on the\nverge of pauperism, or starvation_; who have little, or no, means of\nsubsistence, except such as their employers see fit to give them,--which\nmeans are usually barely enough to keep them in a condition to labor.\n\nThese are the only \"pauper laborers,\" from whose competition our own\nlaborers are sought to be protected. They are quite as badly off as our\nown laborers; and are in equal need of \"protection.\"\n\nWhat, then, is to be done? This policy of excluding foreign commodities\nfrom our markets, is a game that all other governments can play at, as\nwell as our own. And if it is the duty of our government to \"protect\"\nour laborers against the competition of \"the pauper labor,\" so-called,\nof all other countries, it is equally the duty of every other government\nto \"protect\" its laborers against the competition of the so-called\n\"pauper labor\" of all other countries. So that, according to this\ntheory, each nation must either shut out entirely from its markets the\nproducts of all other countries; or, at least, lay such heavy duties\nupon them, as will, _in some measure_, \"protect\" its own laborers from\nthe competition of the \"pauper labor\" of all other countries.\n\nThis theory, then, is that, instead of permitting all mankind to supply\neach other's wants, by freely exchanging their respective products with\neach other, the government of each nation should rob the people of every\nother, by imposing heavy duties upon all commodities imported from them.\n\nThe natural effect of this scheme is to pit the so-called \"pauper labor\"\nof each country against the so-called \"pauper labor\" of every other\ncountry; and all for the benefit of their employers. And as it holds\nthat so-called \"pauper labor\" is cheaper than free labor, it gives the\nemployers in each country a constant motive for reducing their own\nlaborers to the lowest condition of poverty, consistent with their\nability to labor at all. In other words, the theory is, that the smaller\nthe portion of the products of labor, that is given to the laborers, the\nlarger will be the portion that will go into the pockets of the\nemployers.\n\nNow, it is not a very honorable proceeding for any government to pit its\nown so-called \"pauper laborers\"--or laborers that are on the verge of\npauperism--against similar laborers in all other countries: and all for\nthe sake of putting the principal proceeds of their labor into the\npockets of a few employers.\n\nTo set two bodies of \"pauper laborers\"--or of laborers on the verge of\npauperism--to robbing each other, for the profit of their employers, is\nthe next thing, in point of atrocity, to setting them to killing each\nother, as governments have heretofore been in the habit of doing, for\nthe benefit of their rulers.\n\nThe laborers, who are paupers, or on the verge of pauperism--who are\ndestitute, or on the verge of destitution--comprise (with their\nfamilies) doubtless nine-tenths, probably nineteen-twentieths, of all\nthe people on the globe. They are not all wage laborers. Some of them\nare savages, living only as savages do. Others are barbarians, living\nonly as barbarians do. But an immense number are mere wage laborers.\nMuch the larger portion of these have been reduced to the condition of\nwage laborers, by the monopoly of land, which mere bands of robbers have\nsucceeded in securing for themselves by military power. This is the\ncondition of nearly all the Asiatics, and of probably one-half the\nEuropeans. But in those portions of Europe and the United States, where\nmanufactures have been most extensively introduced, and where, by\nscience and machinery, great wealth has been created, the laborers have\nbeen kept in the condition of wage laborers, principally, if not wholly,\nby the monopoly of money. This monopoly, established in all these\nmanufacturing countries, has made it impossible for the manufacturing\nlaborers to hire the money capital that was necessary to enable them to\ndo business for themselves; and has consequently compelled them to sell\ntheir labor to the monopolists of money, for just such prices as these\nlatter should choose to give.\n\nIt is, then, by the monopoly of land, and the monopoly of money, that\nmore than a thousand millions of the earth's inhabitants--as savages,\nbarbarians, and wage laborers--are kept in a state of destitution, or on\nthe verge of destitution. Hundreds of millions of them are receiving,\nfor their labor, not more than three, five, or, at most, ten cents a\nday.\n\nIn western Europe, and in the United States, where, within the last\nhundred and fifty years, machinery has been introduced, and where alone\nany considerable wealth is now created, the wage laborers, although they\nget so small a portion of the wealth they create, are nevertheless in a\nvastly better condition than are the laboring classes in other parts of\nthe world.\n\nIf, now, the employers of wage labor, in this country,--who are also the\nmonopolists of money,--and who are ostensibly so distressed lest their\nown wage laborers should suffer from the competition of the pauper labor\nof other countries,--have really any of that humanity, of which they\nmake such profession, they have before them a much wider field for the\ndisplay of it, than they seem to desire. That is to say, they have it in\ntheir power, not only to elevate immensely the condition of the laboring\nclasses in this country, but also to set an example that will be very\nrapidly followed in all other countries; and the result will be the\nelevation of all oppressed laborers throughout the world. This they can\ndo, by simply abolishing the monopoly of money. The real producers of\nwealth, with few or no exceptions, will then be able to hire all the\ncapital they need for their industries, and will do business for\nthemselves. They will also be able to hire their capital at very low\nrates of interest; and will then put into their own pockets all the\nproceeds of their labor, except what they pay as interest on their\ncapital. And this amount will be too small to obstruct materially their\nrise to independence and wealth.\n\n\n                              SECTION XVI.\n\nBut will the monopolists of money give up their monopoly? Certainly not\nvoluntarily. They will do it only upon compulsion. They will hold on to\nit as long as they own and control governments as they do now. And why\nwill they do so? Because to give up their monopoly would be to give up\ntheir control of those great armies of servants--the wage laborers--from\nwhom all their wealth is derived, and whom they can now coerce by the\nalternative of starvation, to labor for them at just such prices as they\n(the monopolists of money) shall choose to pay.\n\nNow these monopolists of money have no plans whatever for making their\n\"capital,\" as they call it--that is, their money capital--_their\nprivileged money capital_--profitable to themselves, _otherwise than by\nusing it to employ other men's labor_. And they can keep control of\nother men's labor only by depriving the laborers themselves of all other\nmeans of subsistence. And they can deprive them of all other means of\nsubsistence only by putting it out of their power to hire the money that\nis necessary to enable them to do business for themselves. And they can\nput it out of their power to hire money, only by forbidding all other\nmen to lend them their credit, in the shape of promissory notes, to be\ncirculated as money.\n\nIf the twenty-five or fifty thousand millions of loanable\ncapital--promissory notes--which, _in this country_, are now lying idle,\nwere permitted to be loaned, these wage laborers would hire it, and do\nbusiness for themselves, instead of laboring as servants for others; and\nwould of course retain in their own hands all the wealth they should\ncreate, except what they should pay as interest for their capital.\n\nAnd what is true of this country, is true of every other where\ncivilization exists; for wherever civilization exists, land has value,\nand can be used as banking capital, and be made to furnish all the\nmoney that is necessary to enable the producers of wealth to hire the\ncapital necessary for their industries, and thus relieve them from their\npresent servitude to the few holders of privileged money.\n\nThus it is that the monopoly of money is the one great obstacle to the\nliberation of the laboring classes all over the world, and to their\nindefinite progress in wealth.\n\nBut we are now to show, more definitely, what relation this monopoly of\nmoney is made to bear to the freedom of international trade; and why it\nis that the holders of this monopoly, _in this country_, demand heavy\ntariffs on imports, on the lying pretence of protecting our home labor\nagainst the competition of the so-called pauper labor of other\ncountries.\n\nThe explanation of the whole matter is as follows.\n\n1. The holders of the monopoly of money, in each country,--more\nespecially in the manufacturing countries like England, the United\nStates, and some others,--assume that the present condition of poverty,\nfor the great mass of mankind, all over the world, is to be perpetuated\nforever; or at least for an indefinite period. From this assumption they\ninfer that, if free trade between all countries is to be allowed, the\nso-called pauper labor of each country is to be forever pitted against\nthe so-called pauper labor of every other country. Hence they infer that\nit is the duty of each government--or certainly of our government--to\nprotect the so-called pauper labor of our own country--that is, the\nclass of laborers who are constantly on the verge of pauperism--against\nthe competition of the so-called pauper labor of all other countries, by\nsuch duties on imports as will secure to our own laborers a monopoly of\nour own home market.\n\nThis is, on the face of it, the most plausible argument--and almost, if\nnot really, the only argument--by which they now attempt to sustain\ntheir restrictions upon international trade.\n\nIf this argument is a false one, their whole case falls to the ground.\nThat it is a false one, will be shown hereafter.\n\n2. These monopolists of money assume that pauper labor, so-called, is\nthe cheapest labor in the world; and that therefore each nation, in\norder to compete with the pauper labor of all other nations, must itself\nhave \"cheap labor.\" In fact, \"cheap labor\" is, with them, the great\n_sine qua non_ of all national industry. To compete with \"cheap labor,\"\nsay they, we must have \"cheap labor.\" This is, with them, a self-evident\nproposition. And this demand for \"cheap labor\" means, of course, that\nthe laboring classes, in this country, must be kept, as nearly as\npossible, on a level with the so-called pauper labor of all other\ncountries.\n\nThus their whole scheme of national industry is made to depend upon\n\"cheap labor.\" And to secure \"cheap labor,\" they hold it to be\nindispensable that the laborers shall be kept constantly either in\nactual pauperism, or on the verge of pauperism. And, in this country,\nthey know of no way of keeping the laborers on the verge of pauperism,\nbut by retaining in their (the monopolists') own hands such a monopoly\nof money as will put it out of the power of the laborers to hire money,\nand do business for themselves; and thus compel them, by the alternative\nof starvation, to sell their labor to the monopolists of money at such\nprices as will enable them (the monopolists) to manufacture goods in\ncompetition with the so-called pauper laborers of all other countries.\n\nLet it be repeated--as a vital proposition--that the whole industrial\nprogramme of these monopolists rests upon, and implies, such a degree of\npoverty, on the part of the laboring classes, as will put their labor in\ndirect competition with the so-called pauper labor of all other\ncountries. So long as they (the monopolists) can perpetuate this extreme\npoverty of the laboring classes, in this country, they feel safe against\nall foreign competition; for, in all other things than \"cheap labor,\" we\nhave advantages equal to those of any other nation.\n\nFurthermore, this extreme poverty, in which the laborers are to be kept,\nnecessarily implies that they are to receive no larger share of the\nproceeds of their own labor, than is necessary to keep them in a\ncondition to labor. It implies that their industry--which is really the\nnational industry--is not to be carried on at all for their own benefit,\nbut only for the benefit of their employers, the monopolists of money.\nIt implies that the laborers are to be mere tools and machines in the\nhands of their employers; that they are to be kept simply in running\norder, like other machinery; but that, beyond this, they are to have no\nmore rights, and no more interests, in the products of their labor, than\nhave the wheels, spindles, and other machinery, with which the work is\ndone.\n\nIn short, this whole programme implies that the laborers--the real\nproducers of wealth--are not to be considered at all as human beings,\nhaving rights and interests of their own; but only as tools and\nmachines, to be owned, used, and consumed in producing such wealth as\ntheir employers--the monopolists of money--may desire for their own\nsubsistence and pleasure.\n\nWhat, then, is the remedy? Plainly it is to abolish the monopoly of\nmoney. Liberate all this loanable capital--promissory notes--that is now\nlying idle, and we liberate all labor, and furnish to all laborers all\nthe capital they need for their industries. We shall then have no\nlonger, all over the earth, the competition of pauper labor with pauper\nlabor, but only the competition of free labor with free labor. And from\nthis competition of free labor with free labor, no people on earth have\nanything to fear, but all peoples have everything to hope.\n\nAnd why have all peoples everything to hope from the competition of free\nlabor with free labor? Because when every human being, who labors at\nall, has, as nearly as possible, all the fruits of his labor, and all\nthe capital that is necessary to make his labor most effective, he has\nall needed inducements to the best use of both his brains and his\nmuscles, his head and his hands. He applies both his head and his hands\nto his work. He not only acquires, as far as possible, for his own use,\nall the scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions, that are made\nby others, but he himself makes scientific discoveries and mechanical\ninventions. He thus multiplies indefinitely his powers of production.\nAnd the more each one produces of his own particular commodity, the more\nhe can buy of every other man's products, and the more he can pay for\nthem.\n\nWith freedom in money, the scientific discoveries and mechanical\ninventions, made in each country, will not only be used to the utmost in\nthat country, but will be carried into all other countries. And these\ndiscoveries and inventions, given by each country to every other, and\nreceived by each country from every other, will be of infinitely more\nvalue than all the material commodities that will be exchanged between\nthese countries.\n\nIn this way each country contributes to the wealth of every other, and\nthe whole human race are enriched by the increased power and stimulus\ngiven to each man's labor of body and mind.\n\nBut it is to be kept constantly in mind, that there can be no such thing\nas free labor, unless there be freedom in money; that is, unless\neverybody, who can furnish money, shall be at liberty to do so. Plainly\nlabor cannot be free, unless the laborers are free to hire all the money\ncapital that is necessary for their industries. And they cannot be free\nto hire all this money capital, unless all who can lend it to them,\nshall be at liberty to do so.\n\nIn short, labor cannot be free, unless each laborer is free to hire all\nthe capital--money capital, as well as all other capital--that he\nhonestly can hire; free to buy, wherever he can buy, all the raw\nmaterial he needs for his labor; and free to sell, wherever he can sell,\nall the products of his labor. Therefore labor cannot be free, unless we\nhave freedom in money, and free trade with all mankind.\n\nWe can now understand the situation. In the most civilized nations--such\nas Western Europe and the United States--labor is utterly crippled,\nrobbed, and enslaved by the monopoly of money; and also, in some of\nthese countries, by the monopoly of land. In nearly or quite all the\nother countries of the world, labor is not only robbed and enslaved, but\nto a great extent paralyzed, by the monopoly of land, and by what may\nproperly be called the utter absence of money. There is, consequently,\nin these latter countries, almost literally, no diversity of industry,\nno science, no skill, no invention, no machinery, no manufactures, no\nproduction, and no wealth; but everywhere miserable poverty, ignorance,\nservitude, and wretchedness.\n\nIn this country, and in Western Europe, where the uses of money are\nknown, there is no excuse to be offered for the monopoly of money. It is\nmaintained, in each of these countries, by a small knot of tyrants and\nrobbers, who have got control of the governments, and use their power\nprincipally to maintain this monopoly; understanding, as they do, that\nthis one monopoly of money gives them a substantially absolute control\nof all other men's property and labor.\n\nBut not satisfied with this substantially absolute control of all other\nmen's property and labor, the monopolists of money, _in this\ncountry_,--feigning great pity for their laborers, but really seeking\nonly to make their monopoly more profitable to themselves,--cry out for\nprotection against the competition of the pauper labor of all other\ncountries; when they alone, _and such as they_, are the direct cause of\nall the pauper labor in the world. But for them, and others like them,\nthere would be neither poverty, ignorance, nor servitude on the face of\nthe earth.\n\nBut to all that has now been said, the advocates of the monopoly of\nmoney will say that, if all the material property of the country were\npermitted to be represented by promissory notes, and these promissory\nnotes were permitted to be lent, bought, and sold as money, the laborers\nwould not be able to hire them, for the reason that they could not give\nthe necessary security for repayment.\n\nBut let those who would say this, tell us why it is that, in order to\nprevent men from loaning their promissory notes, for circulation as\nmoney, it has always been necessary for governments to prohibit it,\neither by penal enactments, or prohibitory taxation. These penal\nenactments and prohibitory taxation are acknowledgments that, but for\nthem, the notes would be loaned to any extent that would be profitable\nto the lenders. What this extent would be, nothing but experience of\nfreedom can determine. But freedom would doubtless give us ten, twenty,\nmost likely fifty, times as much money as we have now, if so much could\nbe kept in circulation. And laborers would at least have ten, twenty, or\nfifty times better chances for hiring capital, than they have now. And,\nfurthermore, all labor and property would have ten, twenty, or fifty\ntimes better chances of bringing their full value in the market, than\nthey have now.\n\nBut in the space that is allowable in this letter, it is impossible to\nsay all, or nearly all, of what might be said, to show the justice, the\nutility, or the necessity, for perfect freedom in the matters of money\nand international trade. To pursue these topics further would exclude\nother matters of great importance, as showing how the government acts\nthe part of robber and tyrant in all its legislation on contracts; and\nthat the whole purpose of all its acts is that the earnings of the many\nmay be put into the pockets of the few.\n\n\n                             SECTION XVII.\n\nAlthough, as has already been said, the constitution is a paper that\nnobody ever signed, that few persons have ever read, and that the great\nbody of the people never saw; and that has, consequently, no more claim\nto be the supreme law of the land, or to have any authority whatever,\nthan has any other paper, that nobody ever signed, that few persons ever\nread, and that the great body of the people never saw; and although it\npurports to authorize a government, in which the lawmakers, judges, and\nexecutive officers are all to be secured against any responsibility\nwhatever _to the people_, whose liberty and rights are at stake; and\nalthough this government is kept in operation only by votes given in\nsecret (by secret ballot), and in a way to save the voters from all\npersonal responsibility for the acts of their agents--the lawmakers,\njudges, etc.; and although the whole affair is so audacious a fraud and\nusurpation, that no people could be expected to agree to it, or ought to\nsubmit to it, for a moment; yet, inasmuch as the constitution declares\nitself to have been ordained and established by the people of the United\nStates, for the maintenance of liberty and justice for themselves and\ntheir posterity; and inasmuch as all its supporters--that is, the\nvoters, lawmakers, judges, etc.--profess to derive all their authority\nfrom it; and inasmuch as all lawmakers, and all judicial and executive\nofficers, both national and State, swear to support it; and inasmuch as\nthey claim the right to kill, and are evidently determined to kill, and\nesteem it the highest glory to kill, all who do not submit to its\nauthority; we might reasonably expect that, from motives of common\ndecency, if from no other, those who profess to administer it, would pay\nsome deference to its commands, _at least in those particular cases\nwhere it explicitly forbids any violation of the natural rights of the\npeople_.\n\nEspecially might we expect that the judiciary--whose courts claim to be\ncourts of justice--and who profess to be authorized and sworn to expose\nand condemn all such violations of individual rights as the constitution\nitself expressly forbids--would, in spite of all their official\ndependence on, and responsibility to, the lawmakers, have sufficient\nrespect for their personal characters, and the opinions of the world, to\ninduce them to pay some regard to all those parts of the constitution\nthat expressly require any rights of the people to be held inviolable.\n\nIf the judicial tribunals cannot be expected to do justice, even in\nthose cases where the constitution expressly commands them to do it, and\nwhere they have solemnly sworn to do it, it is plain that they have sunk\nto the lowest depths of servility and corruption, and can be expected to\ndo nothing but serve the purposes of robbers and tyrants.\n\nBut how futile have been all expectations of justice from the judiciary,\nmay be seen in the conduct of the courts--and especially in that of the\nso-called Supreme Court of the United States--in regard to men's natural\nright to make their own contracts.\n\nAlthough the State lawmakers have, more frequently than the national\nlawmakers, made laws in violation of men's natural right to make their\nown contracts, yet all laws, State and national, having for their object\nthe destruction of that right, have always, without a single exception,\nI think, received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United\nStates. And having been sanctioned by that court, they have been, as a\nmatter of course, sanctioned by all the other courts, State and\nnational. And this work has gone on, until, if these courts are to be\nbelieved, nothing at all is left of men's natural right to make their\nown contracts.\n\nThat such is the truth, I now propose to prove.\n\nAnd, first, as to the State governments.\n\nThe constitution of the United States (_Art. 1, Sec. 10_) declares that:\n\n     No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of\n     contracts.\n\nThis provision does not designate what contracts have, and what have\nnot, an \"obligation.\" But it clearly presupposes, implies, assumes, and\nasserts that there are contracts that _have_ an \"obligation.\" Any State\nlaw, therefore, which declares that such contracts shall have _no\nobligation_, is plainly in conflict with this provision of the\nconstitution of the United States.\n\nThis provision, also, by implying that there _are_ contracts, that\n_have_ an \"obligation,\" _necessarily implies that men have a right to\nenter into them_; for if men had no right to enter into the contracts,\nthe contracts themselves could have no \"obligation.\"\n\nThis provision, then, of the constitution of the United States, not only\nimplies that there are contracts that _have_ an obligation, _but it also\nimplies that the people have the right to enter into all such contracts,\nand have the benefit of them_. And \"_any_\" State \"_law_,\" conflicting\nwith either of these implications, is necessarily unconstitutional and\nvoid.\n\nFurthermore, the language of this provision of the constitution, to wit,\n\"the obligation [singular] of contracts\" [plural], implies _that there\nis one and the same \"obligation\" to all \"contracts\" whatsoever, that\nhave any legal obligation at all_. And there obviously must be some one\nprinciple, that gives validity to all contracts alike, that have any\nvalidity.\n\nThe law, then, of this whole country, as established by the constitution\nof the United States, is, that all contracts whatsoever, in which this\none principle of validity, or \"obligation,\" is found, shall be held\nvalid; and that the States shall impose no restraint whatever upon the\npeople's entering into all such contracts.\n\nAll, therefore, that courts have to do, in order to determine whether\nany particular contract, or class of contracts, are valid, and _whether\nthe people have a right to enter into them_, is simply to determine\nwhether the contracts themselves have, or have not, this one principle\nof validity, or \"obligation,\" which the constitution of the United\nStates declares shall not be impaired.\n\nState legislation can obviously have nothing to do with the solution of\nthis question. It can neither create, nor destroy, that \"obligation of\ncontracts,\" which the constitution forbids it to impair. It can neither\ngive, nor take away, the right to enter into any contract whatever, that\nhas that \"obligation.\"\n\nOn the supposition, then, that the constitution of the United States is,\nwhat it declares itself to be, _viz._, \"the supreme law of the land, ...\nanything in the constitutions or laws of the States to the contrary\nnotwithstanding,\" this provision against \"any\" State \"law impairing the\nobligation of contracts,\" is so explicit, and so authoritative, that the\nlegislatures and courts of the States have no color of authority for\nviolating it. And the Supreme Court of the United States has had no\ncolor of authority or justification for suffering it to be violated.\n\nThis provision is certainly one of the most important--perhaps the most\nimportant--of all the provisions of the constitution of the United\nStates, _as protective of the natural rights of the people to make their\nown contracts, or provide for their own welfare_.\n\nYet it has been constantly trampled under foot, by the State\nlegislatures, by all manner of laws, declaring who may, and who may not,\nmake certain contracts; and what shall, and what shall not, be \"the\nobligation\" of particular contracts; thus setting at defiance all ideas\nof justice, of natural rights, and equal rights; conferring monopolies\nand privileges upon particular individuals, and imposing the most\narbitrary and destructive restraints and penalties upon others; all with\na view of putting, as far as possible, all wealth into the hands of the\nfew, and imposing poverty and servitude upon the great body of the\npeople.\n\nAnd yet all these enormities have gone on for nearly a hundred years,\nand have been sanctioned, not only by all the State courts, but also by\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.\n\nAnd what color of excuse have any of these courts offered for thus\nupholding all these violations of justice, of men's natural rights, and\neven of that constitution which they had all sworn to support?\n\nThey have offered only this: _They have all said they did not know what\n\"the obligation of contracts\" was_!\n\nWell, suppose, for the sake of the argument, that they have not known\nwhat \"the obligation of contracts\" was, what, then, was their duty?\nPlainly this, to neither enforce, nor annul, any contract whatever,\nuntil they should have discovered what \"the obligation of contracts\"\nwas.\n\nClearly they could have no right to either enforce, or annul, any\ncontract whatever, until they should have ascertained whether it had any\n\"obligation,\" and, if any, what that \"obligation\" was.\n\nIf these courts really do not know--as perhaps they do not--what \"the\nobligation of contracts\" is, they deserve nothing but contempt for their\nignorance. If they _do_ know what \"the obligation of contracts\" is, and\nyet sanction the almost literally innumerable laws that violate it, they\ndeserve nothing but detestation for their villainy.\n\nAnd until they shall suspend all their judgments for either enforcing,\nor annulling, contracts, or, on the other hand, shall ascertain what\n\"the obligation of contracts\" is, and sweep away all State laws that\nimpair it, they will deserve both contempt for their ignorance, and\ndetestation for their crimes.\n\nIndividual Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have, at\nleast in one instance, in 1827 (_Ogden vs. Saunders_, 12 Wheaton 213),\nattempted to give a definition of \"the obligation of contracts.\" But\nthere was great disagreement among them; and no one definition secured\nthe assent of the whole court, _or even of a majority_. Since then, so\nfar as I know, that court has never attempted to give a definition. And,\nso far as the opinion of that court is concerned, the question is as\nunsettled now, as it was sixty years ago. And the opinions of the\nSupreme Courts of the States are equally unsettled with those of the\nSupreme Court of the United States. The consequence is, that \"the\nobligation of contracts\"--the principle on which the real validity, or\ninvalidity, of all contracts whatsoever depends--is practically unknown,\nor at least unrecognized, by a single court, either of the States, or of\nthe United States. And, as a result, every species of absurd, corrupt,\nand robber legislation goes on unrestrained, as it always has done.\n\nWhat, now, is the reason why not one of these courts has ever so far\ngiven its attention to the subject as to have discovered what \"the\nobligation of contracts\" is? What that principle is, I repeat, which\nthey have all sworn to sustain, and on which the real validity, or\ninvalidity, of every contract on which they ever adjudicate, depends?\nWhy is it that they have all gone on sanctioning and enforcing all the\nnakedly iniquitous laws, by which men's natural right to make their own\ncontracts has been trampled under foot?\n\nSurely it is not because they do not know that all men have a natural\nright to make their own contracts; for they know _that_, as well as they\nknow that all men have a natural right to live, to breathe, to move, to\nspeak, to hear, to see, or to do anything whatever for the support of\ntheir lives, or the promotion of their happiness.\n\nWhy, then, is it, that they strike down this right, without ceremony,\nand without compunction, whenever they are commanded to do so by the\nlawmakers? It is because, and solely because, they are so servile,\nslavish, degraded, and corrupt, as to act habitually on the principle,\nthat justice and men's natural rights are matters of no importance, in\ncomparison with the commands of the impudent and tyrannical lawmakers,\non whom they are dependent for their offices and their salaries. It is\nbecause, and solely because, they, like the judges under all other\nirresponsible and tyrannical governments, are part and parcel of a\nconspiracy for robbing and enslaving the great body of the people, to\ngratify the luxury and pride of a few. It is because, and solely\nbecause, they do not recognize our governments, State or national, as\ninstitutions designed simply to maintain justice, or to protect all men\nin the enjoyment of all their natural rights; but only as institutions\ndesigned to accomplish such objects as irresponsible cabals of lawmakers\nmay agree upon.\n\nIn proof of all this, I give the following.\n\nPrevious to 1824, two cases had come up from the State courts, to the\nSupreme Court of the United States, involving the question whether a\nState law, _invalidating some particular contract_, came within the\nconstitutional prohibition of \"any law impairing the obligation of\ncontracts.\"\n\nOne of these cases was that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, (6 _Cranch_ 87), in\nthe year 1810. In this case the court held simply that a grant of land,\nonce made by the legislature of Georgia, could not be rescinded by a\nsubsequent legislature.\n\nBut no general definition of \"the obligation of contracts\" was given.\n\nAgain, in the year 1819, in the case of _Dartmouth College vs. Woodward_\n(4 _Wheaton_ 518), the court held that a charter, granted to Dartmouth\nCollege, by the king of England, before the Revolution, was a contract;\nand that a law of New Hampshire, annulling, or materially altering, the\ncharter, without the consent of the trustees, was a \"law impairing the\nobligation\" of _that_ contract.\n\nBut, in this case, as in that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, the court gave no\ngeneral definition of \"the obligation of contracts.\"\n\nBut in the year 1824, and again in 1827, in the case of _Ogden vs.\nSaunders_ (12 _Wheaton_ 213) the question was, whether an insolvent law\nof the State of New York, which discharged a debtor from a debt,\n_contracted after the passage of the law_, or, as the courts would say,\n\"_contracted under the law_\"--on his giving up his property to be\ndistributed among his creditors--was a \"law impairing the obligation of\ncontracts?\"\n\nTo the correct decision of this case, it seemed indispensable that the\ncourt should give a comprehensive, precise, and _universal_ definition\nof \"the obligation of contracts\"; one by which it might forever after be\nknown what was, and what was not, that \"obligation of contracts,\" which\nthe State governments were forbidden to \"impair\" by \"_any law_\"\nwhatever.\n\nThe cause was heard at two terms, that of 1824, and that of 1827.\n\nIt was argued by Webster, Wheaton, Wirt, Clay, Livingston, Ogden, Jones,\nSampson, and Haines; nine in all. Their arguments were so voluminous\nthat they could not be reported at length. Only summaries of them are\ngiven. But these summaries occupy thirty-eight pages in the reports.\n\nThe judges, at that time, were seven, _viz._, Marshall, Washington,\nJohnson, Duvall, Story, Thompson, and Trimble.\n\nThe judges gave five different opinions; occupying one hundred pages of\nthe reports.\n\nBut no one definition of \"the obligation of contracts\" could be agreed\non; _not even by a majority_.\n\nHere, then, sixteen lawyers and judges--many of them among the most\neminent the country has ever had--were called upon to give their\nopinions upon a question of the highest importance to all men's natural\nrights, to all the interests of civilized society, and to the very\nexistence of civilization itself; a question, upon the answer to which\ndepended the real validity, or invalidity, of every contract that ever\nwas made, or ever will be made, between man and man. And yet, by their\ndisagreements, they all virtually acknowledged that they did not know\nwhat \"the obligation of contracts\" was!\n\nBut this was not all. Although they could not agree as to what \"the\nobligation of contracts\" was, they did all agree that it could be\nnothing which the State lawmakers could not prohibit and abolish, _by\nlaws passed before the contracts were made_. That is to say, they all\nagreed that the State lawmakers had absolute power to prohibit all\ncontracts whatsoever, for buying and selling, borrowing and lending,\ngiving and receiving, property; and that, whenever they did prohibit any\nparticular contract, or class of contracts, _all such contracts,\nthereafter made, could have no \"obligation\"_!\n\nThey said this, be it noted, not of contracts that were naturally and\nintrinsically criminal and void, but of contracts that were naturally\nand intrinsically as just, and lawful, and useful, and necessary, as any\nthat men ever enter into; and that had as perfect a natural, intrinsic,\ninherent \"obligation,\" as any of those contracts, by which the traffic\nof society is carried on, or by which men ever buy and sell, borrow and\nlend, give and receive, property, of and to each other.\n\nNot one of these sixteen lawyers and judges took the ground that the\nconstitution, in forbidding any State to \"pass any law impairing the\nobligation of contracts,\" intended to protect, against the arbitrary\nlegislation of the States, the only true, real, and natural \"obligation\nof contracts,\" or the right of the people to enter into all really just,\nand naturally obligatory contracts.\n\nIs it possible to conceive of a more shameful exhibition, or confession,\nof the servility, the baseness, or the utter degradation, of both bar\nand bench, than their refusal to say one word in favor of justice,\nliberty, men's natural rights, or the natural, and only real,\n\"obligation\" of their contracts?\n\nAnd yet, from that day to this--a period of sixty years, save\none--neither bar nor bench, so far as I know, have ever uttered one\nsyllable in vindication of men's natural right to make their own\ncontracts, or to have the only true, real, natural, inherent, intrinsic\n\"obligation\" of their contracts respected by lawmakers or courts.\n\nCan any further proof be needed that all ideas of justice and men's\nnatural rights are absolutely banished from the minds of lawmakers, and\nfrom so-called courts of justice? Or that absolute and irresponsible\nlawmaking has usurped their place?\n\nOr can any further proof be needed, of the utter worthlessness of all\nthe constitutions, which these lawmakers and judges swear to support,\nand profess to be governed by?\n\n\nSECTION XVIII.\n\nIf, now, it be asked, what is this constitutional \"obligation of\ncontracts,\" which the States are forbidden to impair, the answer is,\nthat it is, and necessarily must be, the _natural_ obligation; or that\nobligation, which contracts have, on principles of natural law, and\nnatural justice, as distinguished from any arbitrary or unjust\nobligation, which lawmakers may assume to create, and attach to\ncontracts.\n\nThis natural obligation is the only _one_ \"obligation\" which _all_\nobligatory contracts can be said to have. It is the only _inherent_\n\"obligation,\" that any contract can be said to have. It is recognized\nall over the world--at least as far as it is known--as the one only\n_true_ obligation, that any, or all, contracts can have. And, so far as\nit is known--it is held valid all over the world, except in those\nexceptional cases, where arbitrary and tyrannical governments have\nassumed to annul it, or substitute some other in its stead.\n\nThe constitution assumes that this _one_ \"obligation of contracts,\"\nwhich it designs to protect, is the natural one, because it assumes that\nit existed, _and was known_, at the time the constitution itself was\nestablished; and certainly no _one_ \"obligation,\" _other than the\nnatural one_, can be said to have been known, as applicable to all\nobligatory contracts, at the time the constitution was established.\nUnless, therefore, the constitution be presumed to have intended the\nnatural \"obligation,\" it cannot be said to have intended any _one_\n\"obligation\" whatever; or, consequently, to have forbidden the violation\nof any _one_ \"obligation\" whatever.\n\nIt cannot be said that \"the obligation,\" which the constitution designed\nto protect was any arbitrary \"obligation,\" that was unknown at the time\nthe constitution was established, but that was to be created, and made\nknown afterward; for then this provision of the constitution could have\nhad no effect, until such arbitrary \"obligation\" should have been\ncreated, and made known. And as it gives us no information as to how, or\nby whom, this arbitrary \"obligation\" was to be created, or what the\nobligation itself was to be, or how it could ever be known to be the one\nthat was intended to be protected, the provision itself becomes a mere\nnullity, having no effect to protect any \"obligation\" at all.\n\nIt would be a manifest and utter absurdity to say that the constitution\nintended to protect any \"obligation\" whatever, unless it be presumed to\nhave intended some particular \"obligation,\" _that was known at the\ntime_; for that would be equivalent to saying that the constitution\nintended to establish a law, of which no man could know the meaning.\n\nBut this is not all.\n\nThe right of property is a natural right. The only real right of\nproperty, that is known to mankind, is the natural right. Men have also\na natural right to convey their natural rights of property from one\nperson to another. And there is no means known to mankind, by which this\n_natural_ right of property can be transferred, or conveyed, by one man\nto another, except by such contracts as are _naturally_ obligatory; that\nis, naturally capable of conveying and binding the right of property.\n\nAll contracts whatsoever, that are naturally capable, competent, and\nsufficient to convey, transfer, and bind the natural right of property,\nare naturally obligatory; and really and truly do convey, transfer, and\nbind such rights of property as they purport to convey, transfer, and\nbind.\n\nAll the other modes, by which one man has ever attempted to acquire the\nproperty of another, have been thefts, robberies, and frauds. But these,\nof course, have never conveyed any real rights of property.\n\nTo make any contract binding, obligatory, and effectual for conveying\nand transferring rights of property, these three conditions only are\nessential, _viz._, 1. That it be entered into by parties, who are\nmentally competent to make reasonable contracts. 2. That the contract be\na purely voluntary one: that is, that it be entered into without either\nforce or fraud on either side. 3. That the right of property, which the\ncontract purports to convey, be such an one as is naturally capable of\nbeing conveyed, or transferred, by one man to another.\n\nSubject to these conditions, all contracts whatsoever, for conveying\nrights of property--that is, for buying and selling, borrowing and\nlending, giving and receiving property--are naturally obligatory, and\nbind such rights of property as they purport to convey.\n\nSubject to these conditions, all contracts, for the conveyance of rights\nof property, are recognized as valid, all over the world, by both\ncivilized and savage man, except in those particular cases where\ngovernments arbitrarily and tyrannically prohibit, alter, or invalidate\nthem.\n\nThis _natural_ \"obligation of contracts\" must necessarily be presumed to\nbe the one, and the only one, which the constitution forbids to be\nimpaired, by any State law whatever, if we are to presume that the\nconstitution was intended for the maintenance of justice, or men's\nnatural rights.\n\nOn the other hand, if the constitution be presumed not to protect this\n_natural_ \"obligation of contracts,\" we know not _what_ other\n\"obligation\" it did intend to protect. It mentions no other, describes\nno other, gives us no hint of any other; and nobody can give us the\nleast information as to what other \"obligation of contracts\" was\nintended.\n\nIt could not have been any \"obligation\" which the _State_ lawmakers\nmight arbitrarily create, and annex to _all_ contracts; for this is what\nno lawmakers have ever attempted to do. And it would be the height of\nabsurdity to suppose they ever will invent any _one_ \"obligation,\" and\nattach it to _all_ contracts. They have only attempted either to annul,\nor impair, the natural \"obligation\" of _particular_ contracts; or, _in\nparticular cases_, to substitute other \"obligations\" of their own\ninvention. And this is the most they will ever attempt to do.\n\n\nSECTION XIX.\n\nAssuming it now to be proved that the \"obligation of contracts,\" which\nthe States are forbidden to \"impair,\" is the _natural_ \"obligation\"; and\nthat, _constitutionally speaking_, this provision secures to all the\npeople of the United States the right to enter into, and have the\nbenefit of, all contracts whatsoever, that have that _one natural_\n\"obligation,\" let us look at some of the more important of those State\nlaws that have either impaired that obligation or prohibited the\nexercise of that right.\n\n1. That law, in all the States, by which any, or all, the contracts of\npersons, under twenty-one years of age, are either invalidated, or\nforbidden to be entered into.\n\nThe mental capacity of a person to make reasonable contracts, is the\nonly criterion, by which to determine his legal capacity to make\nobligatory contracts. And his mental capacity to make reasonable\ncontracts is certainly not to be determined by the fact that he is, or\nis not, twenty-one years of age. There would be just as much sense in\nsaying that it was to be determined by his height or his weight, as\nthere is in saying that it should be determined by his age.\n\nNearly all persons, male and female, are mentally competent to make\nreasonable contracts, long before they are twenty-one years of age. And\nas soon as they are mentally competent to make reasonable contracts,\nthey have the same natural right to make them, that they ever can have.\nAnd their contracts have the same natural \"obligation\" that they ever\ncan have.\n\nIf a person's mental capacity to make reasonable contracts be drawn in\nquestion, that is a question of fact, to be ascertained by the same\ntribunal that is to ascertain all the other facts involved in the case.\nIt certainly is not to be determined by any arbitrary legislation, that\nshall deprive any one of his natural right to make contracts.\n\n2. All the State laws, that do now forbid, or that have heretofore\nforbidden married women to make any or all contracts, that they are, or\nwere, mentally competent to make reasonably, are violations of their\nnatural right to make their own contracts.\n\nA married woman has the same natural right to acquire and hold property,\nand to make all contracts that she is mentally competent to make\nreasonably, as has a married man, or any other man. And any law\ninvalidating her contracts, or forbidding her to enter into contracts,\non the ground of her being married, are not only absurd and outrageous\nin themselves, but are also as plainly violations of that provision of\nthe constitution, which forbids any State to pass any law impairing the\nnatural obligation of contracts, as would be laws invalidating or\nprohibiting similar contracts by married men.\n\n3. All those State laws, commonly called acts of incorporation, by which\na certain number of persons are licensed to contract debts, without\nhaving their individual properties held liable to pay them, are laws\nimpairing the natural obligation of their contracts.\n\nOn natural principles of law and reason, these persons are simply\npartners; and their private properties, like those of any other\npartners, should be held liable for their partnership debts. Like any\nother partners, they take the profits of their business, if there be any\nprofits. And they are naturally bound to take all the risks of their\nbusiness, as in the case of any other business. For a law to say that,\nif they make any profits, they may put them all into their own pockets,\nbut that, if they make a loss, they may throw it upon their creditors,\nis an absurdity and an outrage. Such a law is plainly a law impairing\nthe natural obligation of their contracts.\n\n4. All State insolvent laws, so-called, that distribute a debtor's\nproperty equally among his creditors, are laws impairing the natural\nobligation of his contracts.\n\nIf the natural obligation of contracts were known, and recognized as\nlaw, we should have no need of insolvent or bankrupt laws.\n\nThe only force, function, or effect of a _legal_ contract is to convey\nand bind rights of property. A contract that conveys and binds no right\nof property, has no _legal_ force, effect, or obligation whatever.[4]\n\n    [4] It may have very weighty moral obligation; but it can have\n    no legal obligation.\n\nConsequently, the natural obligation of a contract of debt binds the\ndebtor's property, and nothing more. That is, it gives the creditor a\nmortgage upon the debtor's property, and nothing more.\n\nA first debt is a first mortgage; a second debt is a second mortgage; a\nthird debt is a third mortgage; and so on indefinitely.\n\nThe first mortgage must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the\nsecond. The second must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the\nthird; and so on indefinitely.\n\nWhen the mortgaged property is exhausted, the debt is cancelled; there\nis no other property that the contract binds.\n\nIf, therefore, a debtor, at the time his debt becomes due, pays to the\nextent of his ability, and has been guilty of no fraud, fault, or\nneglect, during the time his debt had to run, he is thenceforth\ndischarged from all legal obligation.\n\nIf this principle were acknowledged, we should have no occasion, and no\nuse, for insolvent or bankrupt laws.\n\nOf course, persons who have never asked themselves what the _natural_\n\"obligation of contracts\" is, will raise numerous objections to the\nprinciple, that a legal contract binds nothing else than rights of\nproperty. But their objections are all shallow and fallacious.\n\nI have not space here to go into all the arguments that may be necessary\nto prove that contracts can have no _legal_ effect, except to bind\nrights of property; or to show the truth of that principle in its\napplication to all contracts whatsoever. To do this would require a\nsomewhat elaborate treatise. Such a treatise I hope sometime to publish.\nFor the present, I only assert the principle; and assert that the\nignorance of this truth is at least one of the reasons why courts and\nlawyers have never been able to agree as to what \"the obligation of\ncontracts\" was.\n\nIn all the cases that have now been mentioned,--that is, of minors\n(so-called), married women, corporations, insolvents, and in all other\nlike cases--the tricks, or pretences, by which the courts attempt to\nuphold the validity of all laws that forbid persons to exercise their\nnatural right to make their own contracts, or that annul, or impair, the\n_natural_ \"obligation\" of their contracts, are these:\n\n1. They say that, if a law forbids any particular contract to be made,\nsuch contract, being then an illegal one, can have no \"obligation.\"\nConsequently, say they, the law cannot be said to impair it; because the\nlaw cannot impair an \"obligation,\" that has never had an existence.\n\nThey say this of all contracts, that are arbitrarily forbidden;\nalthough, naturally and intrinsically, they have as valid an obligation\nas any others that men ever enter into, or as any that courts enforce.\n\nBy such a naked trick as this, these courts not only strike down men's\nnatural right to make their own contracts, but even seek to evade that\nprovision of the constitution, which they are all sworn to support, and\nwhich commands them to hold valid the _natural_ \"obligation\" of all\nmen's contracts; \"anything in the constitutions or laws of the States to\nthe contrary notwithstanding.\"\n\nThey might as well have said that, if the constitution had declared that\n\"no State shall pass any law impairing any man's natural right to life,\nliberty, or property\"--(that is, his _natural_ right to live, and do\nwhat he will with himself and his property, so long as he infringes the\nright of no other person)--this prohibition could be evaded by a State\nlaw declaring that, from and after such a date, no person should have\nany natural right to life, liberty, or property; and that, therefore, a\nlaw arbitrarily taking from a man his life, liberty, and property, could\nnot be said to impair his right to them, because no law could impair a\nright that did not exist.\n\nThe answer to such an argument as this, would be, that it is a natural\ntruth that every man, who ever has been, or ever will be, born into the\nworld, _necessarily has been, and necessarily will be, born with an\ninherent right to life, liberty, and property_; and that, in forbidding\nthis right to be impaired, _the constitution presupposes, implies,\nassumes, and asserts that every man has, and will have, such a right_;\nand that this _natural_ right is the very right, which the constitution\nforbids any State law to impair.\n\nOr the courts might as well have said that, if the constitution had\ndeclared that \"no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of\ncontracts made for the purchase of food,\" that provision could have been\nevaded by a State law forbidding any contract to be made for the\npurchase of food; and then saying that such contract, being illegal,\ncould have no \"obligation,\" that could be impaired.\n\nThe answer to this argument would be that, by forbidding any State law\nimpairing the obligation of contracts made for the purchase of food, the\nconstitution presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that such\ncontracts have, and always will have, a _natural_ \"obligation\"; and\nthat this _natural_ \"obligation\" is the very \"obligation,\" which the\nconstitution forbids any State law to impair.\n\nSo in regard to all other contracts. The constitution presupposes,\nimplies, assumes, and asserts the natural truth, that certain contracts\nhave, _and always necessarily will have_, a _natural_ \"obligation.\" And\nthis _natural_ \"obligation\"--which is the only real obligation that any\ncontract can have--is the very one that the constitution forbids any\nState law to impair, in the case of any contract whatever that has such\nobligation.\n\nAnd yet all the courts hold the direct opposite of this. They hold that,\nif a State law forbids any contract to be made, such a contract can then\nhave no obligation; and that, consequently, no State law can impair an\nobligation that never existed.\n\nBut if, by forbidding a contract to be made, a State law can prevent the\ncontract's having any obligation, State laws, by forbidding any\ncontracts at all to be made, can prevent all contracts, thereafter made,\nfrom having any obligation; and thus utterly destroy all men's natural\nrights to make any obligatory contracts at all.\n\n2. A second pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade that\nprovision of the constitution, which forbids any State to \"pass any law\nimpairing the obligation of contracts,\" is this: They say that the State\nlaw, that requires, or obliges, a man to fulfil his contracts, _is\nitself_ \"_the obligation_,\" which the constitution forbids to be\nimpaired; and that therefore the constitution only prohibits the\nimpairing of any law for enforcing such contracts as shall be made under\nit.\n\nBut this pretence, it will be seen, utterly discards the idea that\ncontracts have any _natural_ obligation. It implies that contracts have\nno obligation, except the laws that are made for enforcing them. But if\ncontracts have no _natural_ obligation, they have no obligation at all,\n_that ought to be enforced_; and the State is a mere usurper, tyrant,\nand robber, in passing any law to enforce them.\n\nPlainly a State cannot rightfully enforce any contracts at all, unless\nthey have a _natural_ obligation.\n\n3. A third pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade this provision\nof the constitution, is this: They say that \"the law is a part of the\ncontract\" itself; and therefore cannot impair its obligation.\n\nBy this they mean that, if a law is standing upon the statute book,\nprescribing what obligation certain contracts shall, or shall not, have,\nit must then be presumed that, whenever such a contract is made, the\nparties intended to make it according to that law; and really to make\nthe law a part of their contract; _although they themselves say nothing\nof the kind_.\n\nThis pretence, that the law is a part of the contract, is a mere trick\nto cheat people out of their natural right to make their own contracts;\nand to compel them to make only such contracts as the lawmakers choose\nto permit them to make.\n\nTo say that it must be presumed that the parties intended to make their\ncontracts according to such laws as may be prescribed to them--or, what\nis the same thing, to make the laws a part of their contracts--is\nequivalent to saying that the parties must be presumed to have given up\nall their natural right to make their own contracts; to have\nacknowledged themselves imbeciles, incompetent to make reasonable\ncontracts, and to have authorized the lawmakers to make their contracts\nfor them; for if the lawmakers can make any part of a man's contract,\nand presume his consent to it, they can make a whole one, and presume\nhis consent to it.\n\nIf the lawmakers can make any part of men's contracts, they can make the\nwhole of them; and can, therefore, buy and sell, borrow and lend, give\nand receive men's property of all kinds, according to their (the\nlawmakers') own will, pleasure, or discretion; without the consent of\nthe real owners of the property, and even without their knowledge, until\nit is too late. In short, they may take any man's property, and give it,\nor sell it, to whom they please, and on such conditions, and at such\nprices, as they please; without any regard to the rights of the owner.\nThey may, in fact, at their pleasure, strip any, or every, man of his\nproperty, and bestow it upon whom they will; and then justify the act\nupon the presumption that the owner consented to have his property thus\ntaken from him and given to others.\n\nThis absurd, contemptible, and detestable trick has had a long lease of\nlife, and has been used as a cover for some of the greatest of crimes.\nBy means of it, the marriage contract has been perverted into a\ncontract, on the part of the woman, to make herself a legal non-entity,\nor _non compos mentis_; to give up, to her husband, all her personal\nproperty, and the control of all her real estate; and to part with her\nnatural, inherent, inalienable right, as a human being, to direct her\nown labor, control her own earnings, make her own contracts, and provide\nfor the subsistence of herself and her children.\n\nThere would be just as much reason in saying that the lawmakers have a\nright to make the entire marriage contract; to marry any man and woman\nagainst their will; dispose of all their personal and property rights;\ndeclare them imbeciles, incapable of making a reasonable marriage\ncontract; then presume the consent of both the parties; and finally\ntreat them as criminals, and their children as outcasts, if they presume\nto make any contract of their own.\n\nThis same trick, of holding that the law is a part of the contract, has\nbeen made to protect the private property of stockholders from liability\nfor the debts of the corporations, of which they were members; and to\nprotect the private property of special partners, so-called, or limited\npartners, from liability for partnership debts.\n\nThis same trick has been employed to justify insolvent and bankrupt\nlaws, so-called, whereby a first creditor's right to a first mortgage on\nthe property of his debtor, has been taken from him, and he has been\ncompelled to take his chances with as many subsequent creditors as the\ndebtor may succeed in becoming indebted to\n\nAll these absurdities and atrocities have been practiced by the\nlawmakers of the States, and sustained by the courts, under the pretence\nthat they (the courts) did not know what the natural \"obligation of\ncontracts\" was; or that, if they did know what it was, the constitution\nof the United States imposed no restraint upon its unlimited violation\nby the State lawmakers.\n\n\nSECTION XX.\n\nBut, not content with having always sanctioned the unlimited power of\nthe _State_ lawmakers to abolish all men's natural right to make their\nown contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States has, within the\nlast twenty years, taken pains to assert that congress also has the\narbitrary power to abolish the same right.\n\n1. It has asserted the arbitrary power of congress to abolish all men's\nright to make their own contracts, by asserting its power _to alter the\nmeaning of all contracts, after they are made_, so as to make them\nwidely, or wholly, different from what the parties had made them.\n\nThus the court has said that, after a man has made a contract to pay a\ncertain number of dollars, at a future time,--_meaning such dollars as\nwere current at the time the contract was made_,--congress has power to\ncoin a dollar of less value than the one agreed on, and authorize the\ndebtor to pay his debt with a dollar of less value than the one he had\npromised.\n\nTo cover up this infamous crime, the court asserts, over and over\nagain,--what no one denies,--that congress has power (constitutionally\nspeaking) to alter, at pleasure, the value of its coins. But it then\nasserts that congress has this additional, and wholly different, power,\nto wit, the power to declare that this alteration in the value of the\ncoins _shall work a corresponding change in all existing contracts for\nthe payment of money_.\n\nIn reality they say that a contract to pay money is not a contract to\npay any particular amount, or value, of such money as was known and\nunderstood by the parties at the time the contract was made, but _only\nsuch, and so much, as congress shall afterwards choose to call by that\nname, when the debt shall become due_.\n\nThey assert that, by simply retaining the name, while altering the\nthing,--_or by simply giving an old name to a new thing_,--congress has\npower to utterly abolish the contract which the parties themselves\nentered into, and substitute for it any such new and different one, as\nthey (congress) may choose to substitute.\n\nHere are their own words:\n\n     _The contract obligation ... was not a duty to pay gold or\n     silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time when\n     the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal\n     intrinsic value in the market.... But the obligation of a\n     contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall\n     recognize as money when the payment is to be made.--Legal\n     Tender Cases, 12 Wallace 548._\n\nThis is saying that the obligation of a contract to pay money is not an\nobligation to pay what both the law and the parties recognize as money,\n_at the time when the contract is made_, but only such substitute as\ncongress shall afterwards prescribe, \"_when the payment is to be made_.\"\n\nThis opinion was given by a majority of the court in the year 1870.\n\nIn another opinion the court says:\n\n     Under the power to coin money, and to regulate its value,\n     congress may issue coins of same denomination [that is, bearing\n     the same name] as those already current by law, but of less\n     intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less\n     weight of the precious metals, _and thereby enable debtors to\n     discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real\n     value_. A contract to pay a certain sum of money, without any\n     stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be made,\n     may always be satisfied by payment of that sum [that is, that\n     _nominal_ amount] in any currency _which is lawful money at the\n     place and time at which payment is to be made_.--_Juilliard vs.\n     Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_, 449.\n\nThis opinion was given by the entire court--save one, Field--at the\nOctober term of 1883.\n\nBoth these opinions are distinct declarations of the power of congress\nto alter men's contracts, _after they are made_, by simply retaining the\nname, while altering the thing, that is agreed to be paid.\n\nIn both these cases, the court means distinctly to say that, _after the\nparties to a contract have agreed upon the number of dollars to be\npaid_, congress has power to reduce the value of the dollar, and\nauthorize all debtors to pay the less valuable dollar, instead of the\none agreed on.\n\nIn other words, the court means to say that, after a contract has been\nmade for the payment of a certain number of dollars, _congress has power\nto alter the meaning of the word dollar_, and thus authorize the debtor\nto pay in something different from, and less valuable than, the thing he\nagreed to pay.\n\nWell, if congress has power to alter men's contracts, _after they are\nmade_, by altering the meaning of the word dollar, and thus reducing the\nvalue of the debt, it has a precisely equal power to _increase_ the\nvalue of the dollar, and thus compel the debtor to pay _more_ than he\nagreed to pay.\n\nCongress has evidently just as much right to _increase_ the value of the\ndollar, after a contract has been made, as it has to _reduce_ its value.\nIt has, therefore, just as much right to cheat debtors, by compelling\nthem to pay _more_ than they agreed to pay, as it has to cheat\ncreditors, by compelling them to accept _less_ than they agreed to\naccept.\n\nAll this talk of the court is equivalent to asserting that congress has\nthe right to alter men's contracts at pleasure, _after they are made_,\nand make them over into something, or anything, wholly different from\nwhat the parties themselves had made them.\n\nAnd this is equivalent to denying all men's right to make their own\ncontracts, or to acquire any contract rights, which congress may not\n_afterward_, at pleasure, alter, or abolish.\n\nIt is equivalent to saying that the words of contracts are not to be\ntaken in the sense in which they are used, by the parties themselves, at\nthe time when the contracts are entered into, but only in such different\nsenses as congress may choose to put upon them at any future time.\n\nIf this is not asserting the right of congress to abolish altogether\nmen's natural right to make their own contracts, what is it?\n\nIncredible as such audacious villainy may seem to those unsophisticated\npersons, who imagine that a court of law should be a court of justice,\nit is nevertheless true, that this court intended to declare the\nunlimited power of congress to alter, at pleasure, the contracts of\nparties, _after they have been made_, by altering the kind and amount of\nmoney by which the contracts may be fulfilled. That they intended all\nthis, is proved, not only by the extracts already given from their\nopinions, but also by the whole tenor of their arguments--too long to be\nrepeated here--and more explicitly by these quotations, _viz._:\n\n     There is no well-founded distinction to be made between the\n     constitutional validity of an act of congress declaring\n     treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts\n     contracted after its passage, and that of an act making them a\n     legal tender for the discharge of _all_ debts, _as well those\n     incurred before, as those made after, its enactment_.--_Legal\n     Tender Cases_, 12 _Wallace_ 530 (1870).\n\n     Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily\n     subject to the constitutional power of the government over the\n     currency, whatever that power may be, _and the obligation of\n     the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that\n     power_.--12 _Wallace_ 549.\n\n     Contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority\n     of congress, _at least so far as relates to the means of\n     payment_.--12 _Wallace_ 549.\n\nThe court means here to say that \"every contract for the payment of\nmoney, simply,\" is necessarily made, by the parties, _subject to the\npower of congress to alter it afterward_--by altering the kind and value\nof the money with which it may be paid--_into anything, into which_ they\n(congress) _may choose to alter it_.\n\nAnd this is equivalent to saying that all such contracts are made, by\nthe parties, with _the implied understanding that the contracts, as\nwritten and signed by themselves, do not bind either of the parties to\nanything_; but that they simply suggest, or initiate, some non-descript\nor other, which congress may afterward convert into a binding contract,\n_of such a sort, and only such a sort, as_ they (congress) _may see fit\nto convert it into_.\n\nEvery one of these judges knew that no two men, having common honesty\nand common sense,--unless first deprived of all power to make their own\ncontracts,--would ever enter into a contract to pay money, with any\nunderstanding that the government had any such arbitrary power as the\ncourt here ascribes to it, to alter their contract after it should be\nmade. Such an absurd contract would, in reality, be no _legal_ contract\nat all. It would be a mere gambling agreement, having, naturally and\nreally, no _legal_ \"obligation\" at all.\n\nBut further. A _solvent_ contract to pay money is in reality--in law,\nand in equity--_a bona fide mortgage upon the debtor's property_. And\nthis mortgage right is as veritable a right of property, as is any right\nof property, that is conveyed by a warranty deed. And congress has no\nmore right to invalidate this mortgage, by a single iota, than it has to\ninvalidate a warranty deed of land. And these judges will sometime find\nout that such is \"the obligation of contracts,\" if they ever find out\nwhat \"the obligation of contracts\" is.\n\nThe justices of that court have had this question--what is \"the\nobligation of contracts\"?--before them for seventy years, and more. But\nthey have never agreed among themselves--even by so many as a\nmajority--as to what it is. And this disagreement is very good evidence\nthat _none_ of them have known what it is; for if any one of them had\nknown what it is, he would doubtless have been able, long ago, to\nenlighten the rest.\n\nConsidering the vital importance of men's contracts, it would evidently\nbe more to the credit of these judges, if they would give their\nattention to this question of \"the obligation of contracts,\" until they\nshall have solved it, than it is to be telling fifty millions of people\nthat they have no right to make any contracts at all, except such as\ncongress has power to invalidate after they shall have been made. Such\nassertions as this, coming from a court that cannot even tell us what\n\"the obligation of contracts\" is, are not entitled to any serious\nconsideration. On the contrary, they show us what farces and impostures\nthese judicial opinions--or decisions, as they call them--are. They show\nthat these judicial oracles, as men call them, are no better than some\nof the other so-called oracles, by whom mankind have been duped.\n\nBut these judges certainly never will find out what \"the obligation of\ncontracts\" is, until they find out that men have the natural right to\nmake their own contracts, and unalterably fix their \"obligation\"; and\nthat governments can have no power whatever to make, unmake, alter, or\ninvalidate that \"obligation.\"\n\nStill further. Congress has the same power over weights and measures\nthat it has over coins. And the court has no more right or reason to say\nthat congress has power to alter existing contracts, by altering the\nvalue of the coins, than it has to say that, after any or all men have,\nfor value received, entered into contracts to deliver so many bushels of\nwheat or other grain, so many pounds of beef, pork, butter, cheese,\ncotton, wool, or iron, so many yards of cloth, or so many feet of\nlumber, congress has power, by altering these weights and measures, to\nalter all these existing contracts, so as to convert them into contracts\nto deliver only half as many, or to deliver twice as many, bushels,\npounds, yards, or feet, as the parties agreed upon.\n\nTo add to the farce, as well as to the iniquity, of these judicial\nopinions, it must be kept in mind, that the court says that, after A has\nsold valuable property to B, and has taken in payment an honest and\nsufficient mortgage on B's property, congress has the power to compel\nhim (A) to give up this mortgage, and to accept, in place of it, not\nanything of any real value whatever, but only the promissory note of a\nso-called government; and that government one which--if taxation without\nconsent is robbery--never had an honest dollar in its treasury, with\nwhich to pay any of its debts, and is never likely to have one; but\nrelies wholly on its future robberies for its means to pay them; and can\ngive no guaranty, but its own interest at the time, that it will even\nmake the payment out of its future robberies.\n\nIf a company of bandits were to seize a man's property for their own\nuses, and give him their note, promising to pay him out of their future\nrobberies, the transaction would not be considered a very legitimate\none. But it would be intrinsically just as legitimate as is the one\nwhich the Supreme Court sanctions on the part of congress.\n\nBanditti have not usually kept supreme courts of their own, to legalize\neither their robberies, or their promises to pay for past robberies, out\nof the proceeds of their future ones. Perhaps they may now take a lesson\nfrom our Supreme Court, and establish courts of their own, that will\nhereafter legalize all their contracts of this kind.\n\n\nSECTION XXI.\n\nTo justify its declaration, that congress has power to alter men's\ncontracts after they are made, the court dwells upon the fact that, at\nthe times when the legal-tender acts were passed, the government was in\nperil of its life; and asserts that it had therefore a right to do\nalmost anything for its self-preservation, without much regard to its\nhonesty, or dishonesty, towards private persons. Thus it says:\n\n     A civil war was then raging, which seriously threatened the\n     overthrow of the government, and the destruction of the\n     constitution itself. It demanded the equipment and support of\n     large armies and navies, and the employment of money to an\n     extent beyond the capacity of all ordinary sources of supply.\n     Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit\n     of the government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had\n     become nearly exhausted. Moneyed institutions had advanced\n     largely of their means, and more could not be expected of them.\n     They had been compelled to suspend specie payments. Taxation\n     was inadequate to pay even the interest on the debt already\n     incurred, and it was impossible to await the income of\n     additional taxes. The necessity was immediate and pressing. The\n     army was unpaid. There was then due to the soldiers in the\n     field nearly a score of millions of dollars. The requisitions\n     from the War and Navy departments for supplies, exceeded fifty\n     millions, and the current expenditure was over one million per\n     day.... Foreign credit we had none. We say nothing of the\n     overhanging paralysis of trade, and business generally, which\n     threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government\n     to maintain its continued existence, and therewith the complete\n     destruction of all remaining national credit.\n\n     It was at such a time, and in such circumstances, that congress\n     was called upon to devise means to maintaining the army and\n     navy, for securing the large supplies of money needed, and\n     indeed for the preservation of the government created by the\n     constitution. It was at such a time, and in such and emergency,\n     that the legal-tender acts were passed.--12 _Wallace_ 540-1.\n\nIn the same case Bradley said:\n\n     Can the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn be thus taken\n     by the government, when the public exigency requires it, and\n     cannot the rich man's bonds and notes be in like manner taken\n     to reach the same end?--_p._ 561.\n\nHe also said:\n\n     It is absolutely essential to independent national existence\n     that government should have a firm hold on the two great\n     instrumentalities of the _sword_ and the _purse, and the right\n     to wield them without restriction, on occasions of national\n     peril_. In certain emergencies government must have at its\n     command, _not only the personal services--the bodies and\n     lives--of its citizens_, but the lesser, though not less\n     essential, power of absolute control over the resources of the\n     country. Its armies must be filled, and its navies manned, by\n     the citizens in person.--_p._ 563.\n\nAlso he said:\n\n     _The conscription may deprive me of liberty, and destroy my\n     life.... All these are fundamental political conditions on\n     which life, property, and money are respectively held and\n     enjoyed under our system of government, nay, under any system\n     of government._ There are times when the exigencies of the\n     State rightly absorb all subordinate considerations of private\n     interest, convenience, and feeling.--_p._ 565.\n\nSuch an attempt as this, to justify one crime, by taking for granted the\njustice of other and greater crimes, is a rather desperate mode of\nreasoning, for a court of law; to say nothing of a court of justice. The\nanswer to it is, that no government, however good in other respects--any\nmore than any other good institution--has any right to live otherwise\nthan on purely voluntary support. It can have no right to take either\n\"the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn,\" or \"the rich man's bonds\nand notes,\" or poor men's \"bodies and lives,\" without their consent. And\nwhen a government resorts to such measures to save its life, we need no\nfurther proof that its time to die has come. A good government, no more\nthan a bad one, has any right to live by robbery, murder, or any other\ncrime.\n\nBut so think not the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.\nOn the contrary, they hold that, in comparison with the preservation of\nthe government, all the rights of the people to property, liberty, and\nlife are worthless things, not to be regarded. So they hold that in such\nan exigency as they describe, congress had the right to commit any crime\nagainst private persons, by which the government could be saved. And\namong these lawful crimes, the court holds that congress had the right\nto issue money that should serve as a license to all holders of it, to\ncheat--or rather openly rob--their creditors.\n\nThe court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve\nthe life of the government, congress had the right to issue such money\nas would authorize all creditors to demand twice the amount of their\nhonest dues from all debtors.\n\nThe court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve\nthe life of the government, congress had the right to sell indulgences\nfor all manner of crimes; for theft, robbery, rape, murder, and all\nother crimes, for which indulgences would bring a price in the market.\n\nCan any one imagine it possible that, if the government had always done\nnothing but that \"equal and exact justice to all men\"--which you say it\nis pledged to do,--but which you must know it has never done,--it could\never have been brought into any such peril of its life, as these judges\ndescribe? Could it ever have been necessitated to take either \"the poor\nman's cattle, and horses, and corn,\" or \"the rich man's bonds and\nnotes,\" or poor men's \"bodies and lives,\" without their consent? Could\nit ever have been necessitated to \"conscript\" the poor man--too poor to\npay a ransom of three hundred dollars--made thus poor by the tyranny of\nthe government itself--\"deprive him of his liberty, and destroy his\nlife\"? Could it ever have been necessitated to sell indulgences for\ncrime to either debtors, or creditors, or anybody else? To preserve \"the\nconstitution\"--a constitution, I repeat, that authorized nothing but\n\"equal and exact justice to all men\"--could it ever have been\nnecessitated to send into the field millions of ignorant young men, to\ncut the throats of other young men as ignorant as themselves--few of\nwhom, on either side, had ever read the constitution, or had any real\nknowledge of its legal meaning; and not one of whom had ever signed it,\nor promised to support it, or was under the least obligation to support\nit?\n\nIt is, I think, perfectly safe to say, that not one in a thousand,\nprobably not one in ten thousand, of these young men, who were sent out\nto butcher others, and be butchered themselves, had any real knowledge\nof the constitution they were professedly sent out to support; or any\nreasonable knowledge of the real character and motives of the congresses\nand courts that profess to administer the constitution. If they had\npossessed this knowledge, how many of them would have ever gone to the\nfield?\n\nBut further. Is it really true that the right of the government to\ncommit all these atrocities:\n\n     _Are the fundamental political conditions on which life,\n     property, and money are respectively held and enjoyed under our\n     system of government?_\n\nIf such is the real character of the constitution, can any further proof\nbe required of the necessity that it be buried out of sight at once and\nforever? The truth was that the government was in peril, _solely because\nit was not fit to exist_. It, and the State governments--all but parts\nof one and the same system--were rotten with tyranny and crime. And\nbeing bound together by no honest tie, and existing for no honest\npurpose, destruction was the only honest doom to which any of them were\nentitled. And if we had spent the same money and blood to destroy them,\nthat we did to preserve them, it would have been ten thousand times more\ncreditable to our intelligence and character as a people.\n\nClearly the court has not strengthened its case at all by this picture\nof the peril in which the government was placed. It has only shown to\nwhat desperate straits a government, founded on usurpation and fraud,\nand devoted to robbery and oppression, may be brought, by the quarrels\nthat are liable to arise between the different factions--that is, the\ndifferent bands of robbers--of which it is composed. When such quarrels\narise, it is not to be expected that either faction--having never had\nany regard to human rights, when acting in concert with the other--will\nhesitate at any new crimes that may be necessary to prolong its\nexistence.\n\nHere was a government that had never had any legitimate existence. It\nprofessedly rested all its authority on a certain paper called a\nconstitution; a paper, I repeat, that nobody had ever signed, that few\npersons had ever read, that the great body of the people had never seen.\nThis government had been imposed, by a few property holders, upon a\npeople too poor, too scattered, and many of them too ignorant, to\nresist. It had been carried on, for some seventy years, by a mere cabal\nof irresponsible men, called lawmakers. In this cabal, the several local\nbands of robbers--the slaveholders of the South, the iron monopolists,\nthe woollen monopolists, and the money monopolists, of the North--were\nrepresented. The whole purpose of its laws was to rob and enslave the\nmany--both North and South--for the benefit of a few. But these robbers\nand tyrants quarreled--as lesser bands of robbers have done--over the\ndivision of their spoils. And hence the war. No such principle as\njustice to anybody--black or white--was the ruling motive on either\nside.\n\nIn this war, each faction--already steeped in crime--plunged into new,\nif not greater, crimes. In its desperation, it resolved to destroy men\nand money, without limit, and without mercy, for the preservation of its\nexistence. The northern faction, having more men, money, and credit than\nthe southern, survived the Kilkenny fight. Neither faction cared\nanything for human rights then, and neither of them has shown any regard\nfor human rights since. \"As a war measure,\" the northern faction found\nit necessary to put an end to the one great crime, from which the\nsouthern faction had drawn its wealth. But all other government crimes\nhave been more rampant since the war, than they were before. Neither the\nconquerors, nor the conquered, have yet learned that no government can\nhave any right to exist for any other purpose than the simple\nmaintenance of justice between man and man.\n\nAnd now, years after the fiendish butchery is over, and after men would\nseem to have had time to come to their senses, the Supreme Court of the\nUnited States, representing the victorious faction, comes forward with\nthe declaration that one of the crimes--the violation of men's private\ncontracts--resorted to by its faction, in the heat of conflict, as a\nmeans of preserving its power over the other, was not only justifiable\nand proper at the time, _but that it is also a legitimate and\nconstitutional power, to be exercised forever hereafter in time of\npeace!_\n\nMark the knavery of these men. They first say that, because the\ngovernment was in peril of its life, it had a right to license great\ncrimes against private persons, if by so doing it could raise money for\nits own preservation. Next they say that, _although the government is no\nlonger in peril of its life_, it may still go on forever licensing the\nsame crimes as it was before necessitated to license!\n\nThey thus virtually say that the government may commit the same crimes\nin time of peace, that it is necessitated to do in time of war; and,\nthat, consequently, it has the same right to \"take the poor man's\ncattle, and horses, and corn,\" and \"the rich man's bonds and notes,\" and\npoor men's \"bodies and lives,\" in time of peace, _when no necessity\nwhatever can be alleged_, as in time of war, when the government is in\nperil of its life.\n\nIn short, they virtually say, that this government exists for itself\nalone; and that all the natural rights of the people, to property,\nliberty, and life, are mere baubles, to be disposed of, at its pleasure,\nwhether in time of peace, or in war.\n\n\nSECTION XXII.\n\nAs if to place beyond controversy the fact, that the court may forever\nhereafter be relied on to sanction every usurpation and crime that\ncongress will ever dare to put into the form of a statute, without the\nslightest color of authority from the constitution, necessity, utility,\njustice, or reason, it has, on three separate occasions, announced its\nsanction of the monopoly of money, as finally established by congress in\n1866, and continued in force ever since.\n\nThis monopoly is established by a prohibitory tax--a tax of ten per\ncent.--on all notes issued for circulation as money, other than the\nnotes of the United States and the national banks.\n\nThis ten per cent. is called a \"tax,\" but is really a penalty, and is\nintended as such, and as nothing else. Its whole purpose is--_not to\nraise revenue_--but solely to establish a monopoly of money, by\nprohibiting the issue of all notes intended for circulation as money,\nexcept those issued, or specially licensed, by the government itself.\n\nThis prohibition upon the issue of all notes, except those issued, or\nspecially licensed, by the government, is a prohibition upon all freedom\nof industry and traffic. It is a prohibition upon the exercise of men's\nnatural right to lend and hire such money capital as all men need to\nenable them to create and distribute wealth, and supply their own\nwants, and provide for their own happiness. Its whole purpose is to\nreduce, as far as possible, the great body of the people to the\ncondition of servants to a few--a condition but a single grade above\nthat of chattel slavery--in which their labor, and the products of their\nlabor, may be extorted from them at such prices only as the holders of\nthe monopoly may choose to give.\n\nThis prohibitory tax--so-called--is therefore really a penalty imposed\nupon the exercise of men's natural right to create and distribute\nwealth, and provide for their own and each other's wants. And it is\nimposed solely for the purpose of establishing a practically omnipotent\nmonopoly in the hands of a few.\n\nCalling this penalty a \"tax\" is one of the dirty tricks, or rather\ndownright lies--that of calling things by false names--to which congress\nand the courts resort, to hide their usurpations and crimes from the\ncommon eye.\n\nEverybody--who believes in the government--says, of course, that\ncongress has power to levy taxes; that it must do so to raise revenue\nfor the support of the government. Therefore this lying congress call\nthis penalty a \"tax,\" instead of calling it by its true name, a penalty.\n\nIt certainly is no tax, because no revenue is raised, or intended to be\nraised, by it. It is not levied upon property, or persons, as such, but\nonly upon a certain act, or upon persons for doing a certain act; an act\nthat if not only perfectly innocent and lawful in itself, but that is\nnaturally and intrinsically useful, and even indispensable for the\nprosperity and welfare of the whole people. Its whole object is simply\nto deter everybody--except those specially licensed--from performing\nthis innocent, useful, and necessary act. And this it has succeeded in\ndoing for the last twenty years; to the destruction of the rights, and\nthe impoverishment and immeasurable injury of all the people, except the\nfew holders of the monopoly.\n\nIf congress had passed an act, in this form, to wit:\n\n     No person, nor any association of persons, incorporated or\n     unincorporated--_unless specially licensed by congress_--shall\n     issue their promissory notes for circulation as money; and a\n     _penalty_ of ten per cent. upon the amount of all such notes\n     shall be imposed upon the persons issuing them,\n\nthe act would have been the same, in effect and intention, as is this\nact, that imposes what it calls a \"tax.\" The penalty would have been\nunderstood by everybody as a punishment for issuing the notes; and would\nhave been applied to, and enforced against, those only who should have\nissued them. And it is the same with this so-called tax. It will never\nbe collected, except for the same cause, and under the same\ncircumstances, as the penalty would have been. It has no more to do with\nraising a revenue, than the penalty would have had. And all these lying\nlawmakers and courts know it.\n\nBut if congress had put this prohibition distinctly in the form of a\n_penalty_, the usurpation would have been so barefaced--so destitute of\nall color of constitutional authority--that congress dared not risk the\nconsequences. And possibly the court might not have dared to sanction\nit; if, indeed, there be any crime or usurpation which the court dare\nnot sanction. So these knavish lawmakers called this penalty a \"tax\";\nand the court says that such a \"tax\" is clearly constitutional. And the\nmonopoly has now been established for twenty years. And substantially\nall the industrial and financial troubles of that period have been the\nnatural consequences of the monopoly.\n\nIf congress had laid a prohibitory tax upon all food--that is, had\nimposed a penalty upon the production and sale of all food--except such\nas it should have itself produced, or specially licensed; and should\nhave reduced the amount of food, thus produced or licensed, to one\ntenth, twentieth, or fiftieth of what was really needed; the motive and\nthe crime would have been the same, in character, if not in degree, as\nthey are in this case, _viz._, to enable the few holders of the licensed\nfood to extort, from everybody else, by the fear of starvation, all\ntheir (the latter's) earnings and property, in exchange for this small\nquantity of privileged food.\n\nSuch a monopoly of food would have been no clearer violation of men's\nnatural rights, than is the present monopoly of money. And yet this\ncolossal crime--like every other crime that congress chooses to\ncommit--is sanctioned by its servile, rotten, and stinking court.\n\nOn what _constitutional_ grounds--that is, on what provisions found in\nthe constitution itself--does the court profess to give its sanction to\nsuch a crime?\n\nOn these three only:\n\n1. On the power of congress to lay and collect taxes, etc.\n\n2. On the power of congress to coin money.\n\n3. On the power of congress to borrow money.\n\nOut of these simple, and apparently harmless provisions, the court\nmanufactures an authority to grant, to a few persons, a monopoly that is\npractically omnipotent over all the industry and traffic of the country;\nthat is fatal to all other men's natural right to lend and hire capital\nfor any or all their legitimate industries; and fatal absolutely to all\ntheir natural right to buy, sell, and exchange any, or all, the products\nof their labor at their true, just, and natural prices.\n\nLet us look at these constitutional provisions, and see how much\nauthority congress can really draw from them.\n\n1. The constitution says:\n\n     The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,\n     imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts, and provide for the\n     common defence and general welfare of the United States_.\n\nThis provision plainly authorizes no taxation whatever, except for the\nraising of revenue to pay the debts and legitimate expenses of the\ngovernment. It no more authorizes taxation for the purpose of\nestablishing monopolies of any kind whatever, than it does for taking\nopenly and boldly all the property of the many, and giving it outright\nto a few. And none but a congress of usurpers, robbers, and swindlers\nwould ever think of using it for that purpose.\n\nThe court says, _in effect_, that this provision gives congress power to\nestablish the present monopoly of money; that the power to tax all other\nmoney, is a power to prohibit all other money; and a power to prohibit\nall other money is a power to give the present money a monopoly.\n\nHow much is such an argument worth? Let us show by a parallel case, as\nfollows.\n\nCongress has the same power to tax all other property, that it has to\ntax money. And if the power to tax money is a power to prohibit money,\nthen it follows that the power of congress to tax all other property\nthan money, is a power to prohibit all other property than money; and a\npower to prohibit all other property than money, is a power to give\nmonopolies to all such other property as congress may not choose to\nprohibit; or may choose to specially license.\n\nOn such reasoning as this, it would follow that the power of congress to\ntax money, and all other property, is a power to prohibit all money, and\nall other property; and thus to establish monopolies in favor of all\nsuch money, and all such other property, as it chooses not to prohibit;\nor chooses to specially license.\n\nThus, this reasoning would give congress power to establish all the\nmonopolies, it may choose to establish, not only in money, but in\nagriculture, manufactures, and commerce; and protect these monopolies\nagainst infringement, by imposing prohibitory taxes upon all money and\nother property, except such as it should choose not to prohibit; or\nshould choose to specially license.\n\nBecause the constitution says that \"congress shall have power to lay and\ncollect taxes,\" etc., to raise the revenue necessary for paying the\ncurrent expenses of the government, the court say that congress have\npower to levy prohibitory taxes--taxes that shall yield no revenue at\nall--but shall operate only as a penalty upon all industries and\ntraffic, and upon the use of all the means of industry and traffic, that\nshall compete with such monopolies as congress shall choose to grant.\n\nThis is no more than an unvarnished statement of the argument, by which\nthe court attempts to justify a prohibitory \"tax\" upon money; for the\nsame reasoning would justify the levying of a prohibitory tax--that is,\npenalty--upon the use of any and all other means of industry and\ntraffic, by which any other monopolies, granted by congress, might be\ninfringed.\n\nThere is plainly no more connection between the \"power to lay and\ncollect taxes,\" etc., for the necessary expenses of the government, and\nthe power to establish this monopoly of money, than there is between\nsuch a power of taxation, and a power to punish, as a crime, any or all\nindustry and traffic whatsoever, except such as the government may\nspecially license.\n\nThis whole cheat lies in the use of the word \"tax,\" to describe what is\nreally a penalty, upon the exercise of any or all men's natural rights\nof providing for their subsistence and well-being. And none but corrupt\nand rotten congresses and courts would ever think of practising such a\ncheat.\n\n2. The second provision of the constitution, relied on by the court to\njustify the monopoly of money, is this:\n\n     The congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value\n     thereof, and of foreign coins.\n\nThe only important part of this provision is that which says that \"the\ncongress shall have power to coin money, [and] regulate the value\nthereof.\"\n\nThat part about regulating the value of foreign coins--if any one can\ntell how congress can regulate it--is of no appreciable importance to\nanybody; for the coins will circulate, or not, as men may, or may not,\nchoose to buy and sell them as money, and at such value as they will\nbear in free and open market,--that is, in competition with all other\ncoins, and all other money. This is their only true and natural market\nvalue; and there is no occasion for congress to do anything in regard to\nthem.\n\nThe only thing, therefore, that we need to look at, is simply the power\nof congress \"to coin money.\"\n\nSo far as congress itself is authorized to coin money, this is simply a\npower to weigh and assay metals,--gold, silver, or any other,--stamp\nupon them marks indicating their weight and fineness, and then sell them\nto whomsoever may choose to buy them; and let them go in the market for\nwhatever they may chance to bring, in competition with all other money\nthat may chance to be offered there.\n\nIt is no power to impose any restrictions whatever upon any or all other\nhonest money, that may be offered in the market, and bought and sold in\ncompetition with the coins weighed and assayed by the government.\n\nThe power itself is a frivolous one, of little or no utility; for the\nweighing and assaying of metals is a thing so easily done, and can be\ndone by so many different persons, that there is certainly no\n_necessity_ for its being done at all by a government. And it would\nundoubtedly have been far better if all coins--whether coined by\ngovernments or individuals--had all been made into pieces bearing simply\nthe names of pounds, ounces, pennyweights, etc., and containing just the\namounts of pure metal described by those weights. The coins would then\nhave been regarded as only so much metal; and as having only the same\nvalue as the same amount of metal in any other form. Men would then have\nknown exactly how much of certain metals they were buying, selling, and\npromising to pay. And all the jugglery, cheating, and robbery that\ngovernments have practised, and licensed individuals to practise--by\ncoining pieces bearing the same names, but having different amounts of\nmetal--would have been avoided.\n\nAnd all excuses for establishing monopolies of money, by prohibiting all\nother money than the coins, would also have been avoided.\n\nAs it is, the constitution imposes no prohibition upon the coining of\nmoney by individuals, but only by State governments. Individuals are\nleft perfectly free to coin it, except that they must not\n\"_counterfeit_ the securities and current coin of the United States.\"\n\nFor quite a number of years after the discovery of gold in\nCalifornia--that is, until the establishment of a government mint\nthere--a large part of the gold that was taken out of the earth, was\ncoined by private persons and companies; and this coinage was perfectly\nlegal. And I do not remember to have ever heard any complaint, or\naccusation, that it was not honest and reliable.\n\nThe true and only value, which the coins have as money, is that value\nwhich they have as metals, for uses in the arts,--that is, for plate,\nwatches, jewelry, and the like. This value they will retain, whether\nthey circulate as money, or not. At this value, they are so utterly\ninadequate to serve as _bona fide_ equivalents for such other property\nas is to be bought and sold for money; and, after being minted, are so\nquickly taken out of circulation, and worked up into articles of\nuse--plate, watches, jewelry, etc.--that they are practically of almost\nno importance at all as money.\n\nBut they can be so easily and cheaply carried from one part of the world\nto another, that they have substantially the same market value all over\nthe world. They are also, in but a small degree, liable to great or\nsudden changes in value. For these reasons, they serve well as\nstandards--are perhaps the best standards we can have--by which to\nmeasure the value of all other money, as well as other property. But to\ngive them any monopoly as money, is to deny the natural right of all men\nto make their own contracts, and buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and\nreceive, all such money as the parties to bargains may mutually agree\nupon; and also to license the few holders of the coins to rob all other\nmen in the prices of the latter's labor and property.\n\n3. The third provision of the constitution, on which the court relies to\njustify the monopoly of money, is this:\n\n     The congress shall have power to borrow money.\n\nCan any one see any connection between the power of congress \"to borrow\nmoney,\" and its power to establish a monopoly of money?\n\nCertainly no such connection is visible to the legal eye. But it is\ndistinctly visible to the political and financial eye; that is, to that\nclass of men, for whom governments exist, and who own congresses and\ncourts, and set in motion armies and navies, whenever they can promote\ntheir own interests by doing so.\n\nTo a government, whose usurpations and crimes have brought it to the\nverge of destruction, these men say:\n\n     Make bonds bearing six per cent. interest; sell them to us at\n     half their face value; then give us a monopoly of money based\n     upon these bonds--such a monopoly as will subject the great\n     body of the people to a dependence upon us for the necessaries\n     of life, and compel them to sell their labor and property to us\n     at our own prices; then, under pretence of raising revenue to\n     pay the interest and principal of the bonds, impose such a\n     tariff upon imported commodities as will enable us to get fifty\n     per cent. more for our own goods than they are worth; in short,\n     pledge to us all the power of the government to extort for us,\n     in the future, everything that can be extorted from the\n     producers of wealth, and we will lend you all the money you\n     need to maintain your power.\n\nAnd the government has no alternative but to comply with this infamous\nproposal, or give up its infamous life.\n\nThis is the only real connection there is between the power of congress\n\"to borrow money,\" and its power to establish a monopoly of money. It\nwas only by an outright sale of the rights of the whole people, for a\nlong series of years, that the government could raise the money\nnecessary to continue its villainous existence.\n\nCongress had just as much constitutional power \"to borrow money,\" by the\nsale of any and all the other natural rights of the people at large, as\nit had \"to borrow money\" by the sale of the people's natural rights to\nlend and hire money.\n\nWhen the Supreme Court of the United States--assuming to be an oracle,\nempowered to define authoritatively the legal rights of every human\nbeing in the country--declares that congress has a constitutional power\nto prohibit the use of all that immense mass of money capital, in the\nshape of promissory notes, which the real property of the country is\ncapable of supplying and sustaining, and which is sufficient to give to\nevery laboring person, man or woman, the means of independence and\nwealth--when that court says that congress has power to prohibit the use\nof all this money capital, and grant to a few men a monopoly of money\nthat shall condemn the great body of wealth-producers to hopeless\npoverty, dependence, and servitude--and when the court has the audacity\nto make these declarations on such nakedly false and senseless grounds\nas those that have now been stated, it is clearly time for the people of\nthis country to inquire what constitutions and governments are good for,\nand whether they (the people) have any natural right, as human beings,\nto live for themselves, or only for a few conspirators, swindlers,\nusurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who employ lawmakers, judges, etc., to\ndo their villainous work upon their fellow-men.\n\nThe court gave their sanction to the monopoly of money in these three\nseparate cases, _viz._: _Veazie Bank vs. Fenno_, 8 _Wallace_, 549\n(1869). _National Bank vs. United States_, 101 _U. S. Reports_, 5 _and_\n6 (1879). _Juilliard vs. Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_ 445-6 (1884).\n\n\nSection XXIII.\n\nIf anything could add to the disgust and detestation which the monstrous\nfalsifications of the constitution, already described, should excite\ntowards the court that resorts to them, it would be the fact that the\ncourt, not content with falsifying to the utmost the constitution\nitself, _goes outside of the constitution, to the tyrannical practices\nof what it_ calls the \"_sovereign_\" governments of \"_other civilized\nnations_,\" to justify the same practices by our own.\n\nIt asserts, over and over again, the idea that our government is a\n\"_sovereign_\" government; that it has the same rights of\n\"_sovereignty_,\" as the governments of \"other civilized nations\";\nespecially those in Europe.\n\nWhat, then, is a \"sovereign\" government? It is a government that is\n\"sovereign\" over all the natural rights of the people. This is the only\n\"sovereignty\" that any government can be said to have. Under it, the\npeople have no _rights_. They are simply \"subjects,\"--that is, slaves.\nThey have but one law, and one duty, _viz._, obedience, submission. They\nare not recognized as having any _rights_. They can claim nothing as\ntheir own. They can only accept what the government chooses to give\nthem. The government owns them and their property; and disposes of them\nand their property, at its pleasure, or discretion; without regard to\nany consent, or dissent, on their part.\n\nSuch was the \"sovereignty\" claimed and exercised by the governments of\nthose, so-called, \"civilized nations of Europe,\" that were in power in\n1787, 1788, and 1789, when our constitution was framed and adopted, and\nthe government put in operation under it. And the court now says,\nvirtually, that the constitution intended to give to our government the\nsame \"sovereignty\" over the natural rights of the people, that those\ngovernments had then.\n\nBut how did the \"civilized governments of Europe\" become possessed of\nsuch \"sovereignty\"? Had the people ever granted it to them? Not at all.\nThe governments spurned the idea that they were dependent on the will or\nconsent of their people for their political power. On the contrary, they\nclaimed to have derived it from the only source, from which such\n\"sovereignty\" could have been derived; that is, from God Himself.\n\nIn 1787, 1788, and 1789, all the great governments of Europe, except\nEngland, claimed to exist by what was called \"Divine Right.\" That is,\nthey claimed to have received authority from God Himself, to rule over\ntheir people. And they taught, and a servile and corrupt priesthood\ntaught, that it was a religious duty of the people to obey them. And\nthey kept great standing armies, and hordes of pimps, spies, and\nruffians, to keep the people in subjection.\n\nAnd when, soon afterwards, the revolutionists of France dethroned the\nking then existing--the Legitimist king, so-called--and asserted the\nright of the people to choose their own government, these other\ngovernments carried on a twenty years' war against her, to reestablish\nthe principle of \"sovereignty\" by \"Divine Right.\" And in this war, the\ngovernment of England, although not itself claiming to exist by Divine\nRight,--but really existing by brute force,--furnished men and money\nwithout limit, to reestablish that principle in France, and to maintain\nit wherever else, in Europe, it was endangered by the idea of popular\nrights.\n\nThe principle, then, of \"Sovereignty by Divine Right\"--sustained by\nbrute force--was the principle on which the governments of Europe then\nrested; and most of them rest on that principle today. And now the\nSupreme Court of the United States virtually says that our constitution\nintended to give to our government the same \"sovereignty\"--the same\nabsolutism--the same supremacy over all the natural rights of the\npeople--as was claimed and exercised by those \"Divine Right\" governments\nof Europe, a hundred years ago!\n\nThat I may not be suspected of misrepresenting these men, I give some of\ntheir own words as follows:\n\n     It is not doubted that the power to establish a standard of\n     value, by which all other values may be measured, or, in other\n     words, to determine what shall be lawful money and a legal\n     tender, is in its nature, and of necessity, a governmental\n     power. _It is in all countries exercised by the\n     government._--_Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wallace 615._\n\nThe court call a power,\n\n     To make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of _all_\n     debts [private as well as public] _a power confessedly\n     possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the\n     United States_.--_Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace, p. 529._\n\nAlso, in the same case, it speaks of:\n\n     That general power over the currency, _which has always been an\n     acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized\n     nation than our own_.--_p. 545._\n\nIn this same case, by way of asserting the power of congress to do any\ndishonest thing that any so-called \"sovereign government\" ever did, the\ncourt say:\n\n     Has any one, in good faith, avowed his belief that even a law\n     debasing the current coin, by increasing the alloy [and then\n     making these debased coins a legal tender in payment of debts\n     previously contracted], would be taking private property? It\n     might be impolitic, and unjust, but could its constitutionality\n     be doubted?--_p. 552._\n\nIn the same case, Bradley said:\n\n     As a government, it [the government of the United States] was\n     invested with _all the attributes of sovereignty_.--_p. 555._\n\nAlso he said:\n\n     Such being the character of the General Government, it seems to\n     be a self-evident proposition _that it is invested with all\n     those inherent and implied powers, which, at the time of\n     adopting the constitution, were generally considered to belong\n     to every government, as such_, and as being essential to the\n     exercise of its functions.--_p. 556._\n\nAlso he said:\n\n     Another proposition equally clear is, _that at the time the\n     constitution was adopted, it was, and for a long time had\n     been, the practice of most, if not all, civilized governments_,\n     to employ the public credit as a means of anticipating the\n     national revenues for the purpose of enabling them to exercise\n     their governmental functions.--_p. 556._\n\nAlso he said:\n\n     It is our duty to construe the instrument [the constitution] by\n     its words, _in the light of history, of the general nature of\n     government, and the incidents of sovereignty_.--_p. 55._\n\nAlso he said:\n\n     The government simply demands that its credit shall be accepted\n     and received by public and private creditors during the pending\n     exigency. _Every government has a right to demand this, when\n     its existence is at stake._--_p. 560._\n\nAlso he said:\n\n     These views are exhibited ... for the purpose of showing that\n     it [the power to make its notes a legal tender in payment of\n     private debts] _is one of those vital and essential powers\n     inhering in every national sovereignty_, and necessary to its\n     self-preservation.--_p. 564._\n\nIn still another legal tender case, the court said:\n\n     The people of the United States, by the constitution,\n     established a national government, _with sovereign powers,\n     legislative, executive_, and judicial.--_Juilliard vs.\n     Greenman, 110 U. S. Reports, p. 438._\n\nAlso it calls the constitution:\n\n     A constitution, establishing a form of government, declaring\n     fundamental principles, _and creating a national sovereignty_,\n     intended to endure for ages.--_p. 439._\n\nAlso the court speaks of the government of the United States:\n\n     _As a sovereign government._--_p. 446._\n\nAlso it said:\n\n     It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary\n     consequence, that congress has the power to issue the\n     obligations of the United States in such form, and to impress\n     upon them such qualities as currency, for the purchase of\n     merchandise and the payment of debts, _as accord with the usage\n     of other sovereign governments_. The power, as incident to the\n     power of borrowing money, and issuing bills or notes of the\n     government for money borrowed, of impressing upon those bills\n     or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of\n     private debts, _was a power universally understood to belong to\n     sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing\n     and adoption of the constitution of the United States_. The\n     governments of Europe, acting through the monarch, or the\n     legislature, according to the distribution of powers _under\n     their respective constitutions_, had, and have, as _sovereign_\n     a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. This power\n     has been distinctly recognized in an important modern case,\n     ably argued and fully considered, in which the Emperor of\n     Austria, as King of Hungary, obtained from the English Court of\n     Chancery an injunction against the issue, in England, without\n     his license, of notes purporting to be public paper money of\n     Hungary.--_p. 447._\n\nAlso it speaks of:\n\n     Congress, as the legislature of a _sovereign_ nation.--_p.\n     449._\n\nAlso it said:\n\n     The power to make the notes of the government a legal tender in\n     payment of private debts, _being one of the powers belonging to\n     sovereignty in other civilized nations_, ... we are\n     irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing\n     upon the treasury notes of the United States the quality of\n     being a legal tender in payment of private debts, is an\n     appropriate means, conducive and plainly adapted to the\n     execution of the undoubted powers of congress, consistent with\n     the letter and spirit of the constitution, etc.----_p._ 450.\n\nOn reading these astonishing ideas about \"sovereignty\"--\"sovereignty\"\nover all the natural rights of mankind--\"sovereignty,\" as it prevailed\nin Europe \"at the time of the framing and adoption of the constitution\nof the United States\"--we are compelled to see that these judges\nobtained their constitutional law, not from the constitution itself, but\nfrom the example of the \"Divine Right\" governments existing in Europe a\nhundred years ago. These judges seem never to have heard of the American\nRevolution, or the French Revolution, or even of the English Revolutions\nof the seventeenth century--revolutions fought and accomplished to\noverthrow these very ideas of \"sovereignty,\" which these judges now\nproclaim, as the supreme law of this country. They seem never to have\nheard of the Declaration of Independence, nor of any other declaration\nof the natural rights of human beings. To their minds, \"the sovereignty\nof governments\" is everything; human rights nothing. They apparently\ncannot conceive of such a thing as a people's establishing a government\nas a means of preserving their personal liberty and rights. They can\nonly see what fearful calamities \"sovereign governments\" would be liable\nto, if they could not compel their \"subjects\"--the people--to support\nthem against their will, and at every cost of their property, liberty,\nand lives. They are utterly blind to the fact, that it is this very\nassumption of \"sovereignty\" over all the natural rights of men, that\nbrings governments into all their difficulties, and all their perils.\nThey do not see that it is this very assumption of \"sovereignty\" over\nall men's natural rights, that makes it necessary for the \"Divine Right\"\ngovernments of Europe to maintain not only great standing armies, but\nalso a vile purchased priesthood, that shall impose upon, and help to\ncrush, the ignorant and superstitious people.\n\nThese judges talk of \"the _constitutions_\" of these \"sovereign\ngovernments\" of Europe, as they existed \"at the time of the framing and\nadoption of the constitution of the United States.\" They apparently do\nnot know that those governments had no constitutions at all, except the\nWill of God, their standing armies, and the judges, lawyers, priests,\npimps, spies, and ruffians they kept in their service.\n\nIf these judges had lived in Russia, a hundred years ago, and had\nchanced to be visited with a momentary spasm of manhood--a fact hardly\nto be supposed of such creatures--and had been sentenced therefor to the\nknout, a dungeon, or Siberia, would we ever afterward have seen them, as\njudges of our Supreme Court, declaring that government to be the model\nafter which ours was formed?\n\nThese judges will probably be surprised when I tell them that the\nconstitution of the United States contains no such word as \"sovereign,\"\nor \"sovereignty\"; that it contains no such word as \"subjects\"; nor any\nword that implies that the government is \"sovereign,\" or that the people\nare \"subjects.\" At most, it contains only the mistaken idea that a power\nof making laws--by lawmakers chosen by the people--was consistent with,\nand necessary to, the maintenance of liberty and justice for the people\nthemselves. This mistaken idea was, in some measure, excusable in that\nday, when reason and experience had not demonstrated, to their minds,\nthe utter incompatibility of all lawmaking whatsoever with men's natural\nrights.\n\nThe only other provision of the constitution, that can be interpreted as\na declaration of \"sovereignty\" in the government, is this:\n\n     This constitution, and the laws of the United States _which\n     shall be made in pursuance thereof_, and all treaties made, or\n     which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,\n     _shall be the supreme law of the land_, and the judges in every\n     State shall be bound thereby, _anything in the constitution or\n     laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding_.--_Art._ VI.\n\nThis provision I interpret to mean simply that the constitution, laws,\nand treaties of the United States, shall be \"the supreme law of the\nland\"--_not anything in the natural rights of the people to liberty and\njustice, to the contrary notwithstanding_--but only that they shall be\n\"the supreme law of the land,\" \"_anything in the constitution or laws of\nany State to the contrary notwithstanding_,\"--that is, whenever the two\nmay chance to conflict with each other.\n\nIf this is its true interpretation, the provision contains no\ndeclaration of \"sovereignty\" over the natural rights of the people.\n\nJustice is \"the supreme law\" of this, and all other lands; anything in\nthe constitutions or laws of any nation to the contrary notwithstanding.\nAnd if the constitution of the United States intended to assert the\ncontrary, it was simply an audacious lie--a lie as foolish as it was\naudacious--that should have covered with infamy every man who helped to\nframe the constitution, or afterward sanctioned it, or that should ever\nattempt to administer it.\n\nInasmuch as the constitution declares itself to have been \"ordained and\nestablished\" by\n\n     We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more\n     perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,\n     provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,\n     and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our\n     posterity,\n\neverybody who attempts to administer it, is bound to give it such an\ninterpretation, and only such an interpretation, as is consistent\nwith, and promotive of, those objects, if its language will admit of\nsuch an interpretation.\n\nTo suppose that \"the people of the United States\" intended to declare\nthat the constitution and laws of the United States should be \"the\nsupreme law of the land,\" _anything in their own natural rights, or in\nthe natural rights of the rest of mankind, to the contrary\nnotwithstanding_, would be to suppose that they intended, not only to\nauthorize every injustice, and arouse universal violence, among\nthemselves, but that they intended also to avow themselves the open\nenemies of the rights of all the rest of mankind. Certainly no such\nfolly, madness, or criminality as this can be attributed to them by any\nrational man--always excepting the justices of the Supreme Court of the\nUnited States, the lawmakers, and the believers in the \"Divine Right\" of\nthe cunning and the strong, to establish governments that shall deceive,\nplunder, enslave, and murder the ignorant and the weak.\n\nMany men, still living, can well remember how, some fifty years ago,\nthose famous champions of \"sovereignty,\" of arbitrary power, Webster and\nCalhoun, debated the question, whether, in this country, \"sovereignty\"\nresided in the general or State governments. But they never settled the\nquestion, for the very good reason that no such thing as \"sovereignty\"\nresided in either.\n\nAnd the question was never settled, until it was settled at the cost of\na million of lives, and some ten thousand millions of money. And then it\nwas settled only as the same question had so often been settled before,\nto wit, that \"the heaviest battalions\" are \"sovereign\" over the lighter.\n\nThe only real \"sovereignty,\" or right of \"sovereignty,\" in this or any\nother country, is that right of sovereignty which each and every human\nbeing has over his or her own person and property, so long as he or she\nobeys the one law of justice towards the person and property of every\nother human being. This is the only _natural_ right of sovereignty, that\nwas ever known among men. All other so-called rights of sovereignty are\nsimply the usurpations of impostors, conspirators, robbers, tyrants, and\nmurderers.\n\nIt is not strange that we are in such high favor with the tyrants of\nEurope, when our Supreme Court tells them that our government, although\na little different in form, stands on the same essential basis as theirs\nof a hundred years ago; that it is as absolute and irresponsible as\ntheirs were then; that it will spend more money, and shed more blood, to\nmaintain its power, than they have ever been able to do; that the people\nhave no more rights here than there; and that the government is doing\nall it can to keep the producing classes as poor here as they are\nthere.\n\n\nSECTION XXIV.\n\nJohn Marshall has the reputation of having been the greatest jurist the\ncountry has ever had. And he unquestionably would have been a great\njurist, if the two fundamental propositions, on which all his legal,\npolitical, and constitutional ideas were based, had been true.\n\nThese propositions were, first, that government has all power; and,\nsecondly, that the people have no rights.\n\nThese two propositions were, with him, cardinal principles, from which,\nI think, he never departed.\n\nFor these reasons he was the oracle of all the rapacious classes, in\nwhose interest the government was administered. And from them he got all\nhis fame.\n\nI think his record does not furnish a single instance, in which he ever\nvindicated men's natural rights, in opposition to the arbitrary\nlegislation of congress.\n\nHe was chief justice thirty-four years: from 1801 to 1835. In all that\ntime, so far as I have known, he never declared a single act of congress\nunconstitutional; and probably never would have done so, if he had lived\nto this time.\n\nAnd, so far as I know, he never declared a single State law\nunconstitutional, on account of its injustice, or its violation of men's\nnatural rights; but only on account of its conflict with the\nconstitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.\n\nHe was considered very profound on questions of \"sovereignty.\" In fact,\nhe never said much in regard to anything else. He held that, in this\ncountry, \"sovereignty\" was divided: that the national government was\n\"sovereign\" over certain things; and that the State governments were\n\"sovereign\" over all other things. He had apparently never heard of any\nnatural, individual, human rights, that had never been delegated to\neither the general or State governments.\n\nAs a practical matter, he seemed to hold that the general government had\n\"sovereignty\" enough to destroy as many of the natural rights of the\npeople as it should please to destroy; and that the State governments\nhad \"sovereignty\" enough to destroy what should be left, if there should\nbe any such. He evidently considered that, to the national government,\nhad been delegated the part of the lion, with the right to devour as\nmuch of his prey as his appetite should crave; and that the State\ngovernments were jackals, with power to devour what the lion should\nleave.\n\nIn his efforts to establish the absolutism of our governments, he made\nhimself an adept in the use of all those false definitions, and false\nassumptions, to which courts are driven, who hold that constitutions and\nstatute books are supreme over all natural principles of justice, and\nover all the natural rights of mankind.\n\nHere is his definition of law. He professes to have borrowed it from\nsome one,--he does not say whom,--but he accepts it as his own.\n\n     Law has been defined by a writer, whose definitions especially\n     have been the theme of _almost_ universal panegyric, \"_To be a\n     rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a\n     State._\" In our system, the legislature of a State is the\n     supreme power, in all cases where its action is not restrained\n     by the constitution of the United States.--_Ogden vs. Saunders,\n     12 Wheaton 347._\n\nThis definition is an utterly false one. It denies all the natural\nrights of the people; and is resorted to only by usurpers and tyrants,\nto justify their crimes.\n\nThe true definition of law is, that it is a fixed, immutable, natural\nprinciple; and not anything that man ever made, or can make, unmake, or\nalter. Thus we speak of the laws of matter, and the laws of mind; of the\nlaw of gravitation, the laws of light, heat, and electricity, the laws\nof chemistry, geology, botany; of physiological laws, of astronomical\nand atmospherical laws, etc., etc.\n\nAll these are natural laws, that man never made, nor can ever unmake, or\nalter.\n\nThe law of justice is just as supreme and universal in the moral world,\nas these others are in the mental or physical world; and is as\nunalterable as are these by any human power. And it is just as false and\nabsurd to talk of anybody's having the power to abolish the law of\njustice, and set up their own will in its stead, as it would be to talk\nof their having the power to abolish the law of gravitation, or any of\nthe other natural laws of the universe, and set up their own will in the\nplace of them.\n\nYet Marshall holds that this natural law of justice is no law at all, in\ncomparison with some \"rule of civil conduct prescribed by [what he\ncalls] the supreme power in a State.\"\n\nAnd he gives this miserable definition, which he picked up\nsomewhere--out of the legal filth in which he wallowed--as his\nsufficient authority for striking down all the natural obligation of\nmen's contracts, and all men's natural rights to make their own\ncontracts; and for upholding the State governments in prohibiting all\nsuch contracts as they, in their avarice and tyranny, may choose to\nprohibit. He does it too, directly in the face of that very\nconstitution, which he professes to uphold, and which declares that \"No\nState shall pass any law impairing the [natural] obligation of\ncontracts.\"\n\nBy the same rule, or on the same definition of law, he would strike down\nany and all the other natural rights of mankind.\n\nThat such a definition of law should suit the purposes of men like\nMarshall, who believe that governments should have all power, and men no\nrights, accounts for the fact that, in this country, men have had no\n\"_rights_\"--but only such permits as lawmakers have seen fit to allow\nthem--since the State and United States governments were\nestablished,--or at least for the last eighty years.\n\nMarshall also said:\n\n     The right [of government] to regulate contracts, to prescribe\n     the rules by which they may be evidenced, _to prohibit such as\n     may be deemed mischievous, is unquestionable_, and has been\n     universally exercised.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 347._\n\nHe here asserts that \"the supreme power in a State\"--that is, the\nlegislature of a State--has \"the _right_\" to \"_deem_ it _mischievous_\"\nto allow men to exercise their natural right to make their own\ncontracts! Contracts that have a natural obligation! And that, if a\nState legislature thinks it \"mischievous\" to allow men to make contracts\nthat are naturally obligatory, \"_its right to prohibit them is\nunquestionable_.\"\n\nIs not this equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and\nthe people no rights?\n\nOn the same principle, and under the same definition of law, the\nlawmakers of a State may, of course, hold it \"mischievous\" to allow men\nto exercise any of their other natural rights, as well as their right to\nmake their own contracts; and may therefore prohibit the exercise of\nany, or all, of them.\n\nAnd this is equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and\nthe people no rights.\n\nIf a government can forbid the free exercise of a single one of man's\nnatural rights, it may, for the same reason, forbid the exercise of any\nand all of them; and thus establish, practically and absolutely,\nMarshall's principle, that the government has all power, and the people\nno rights.\n\n_In the same case, of Ogden vs. Saunders, Marshall's principle was\nagreed to by all the other justices, and all the lawyers!_\n\nThus Thompson, one of the justices, said:\n\n     Would it not be within the legitimate powers of a State\n     legislature to declare _prospectively_ that no one should be\n     made responsible, upon contracts entered into before arriving\n     at the age of _twenty-five_ years? This, I presume, cannot be\n     doubted.--_p. 300._\n\nOn the same principle, he might say that a State legislature may declare\nthat no person, under fifty, or seventy, or a hundred, years of age,\nshall exercise his natural right of making any contract that is\nnaturally obligatory.\n\nIn the same case, Trimble, another of the justices, said:\n\n     If the positive law [that is, the statute law] of the State\n     declares the contract shall have no obligation, _it can have no\n     obligation, whatever may be the principles of natural law in\n     regard to such a contract. This doctrine has been held and\n     maintained by all States and nations. The power of controlling,\n     modifying, and even taking away, all obligation from such\n     contracts as, independently of positive enactions to the\n     contrary, would have been obligatory, has been exercised by all\n     independent sovereigns._--_p. 320._\n\nYes; and why has this power been exercised by \"all States and nations,\"\nand \"all independent sovereigns\"? Solely because these governments have\nall--or at least so many of them as Trimble had in his mind--been\ndespotic and tyrannical; and have claimed for themselves all power, and\ndenied to the people all rights.\n\nThus it seems that Trimble, like all the rest of them, got his\nconstitutional law, not from any natural principles of justice, not from\nman's natural rights, not from the constitution of the United States,\nnor even from any constitution affirming men's natural rights, but from\n\"the doctrine [that] has been held and maintained by all [those] States\nand nations,\" and \"all [those] independent sovereigns,\" who have usurped\nall power, and denied all the natural rights of mankind.\n\nMarshall gives another of his false definitions, when, speaking for the\nwhole court, in regard to the power of congress \"to regulate commerce\nwith foreign nations, and among the several States,\" he asserts the\nright of congress to an arbitrary, absolute dominion over all men's\nnatural rights to carry on such commerce. Thus he says:\n\n     What is this power? It is the power to regulate: _that is, to\n     prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This\n     power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in\n     itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges\n     no limitations, other than are prescribed by the constitution._\n     These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the\n     questions which arise in this case, or which have been\n     discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the\n     sovereignty of congress, though limited to specific objects, is\n     plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with\n     foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in\n     congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government,\n     having in its constitution the same restrictions on the\n     exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the\n     United States. _The wisdom and the discretion of congress,\n     their identity with the people, and the influence which their\n     constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many\n     other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the\n     sole restraints on which they_ [the people] _have relied, to\n     secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which\n     the people must often rely_ SOLELY, _in all representative\n     governments_.--_Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 196._\n\nThis is a general declaration of absolutism over all \"commerce with\nforeign nations and among the several States,\" with certain exceptions\nmentioned in the constitution; such as that \"all duties, imposts, and\nexcises shall be uniform throughout the United States,\" and \"no tax or\nduty shall be laid on articles exported from any State,\" and \"no\npreference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to\nthe ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound\nto, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in\nanother.\"\n\nAccording to this opinion of the court, congress has--subject to the\nexceptions referred to--absolute, irresponsible dominion over \"all\ncommerce with foreign nations, and among the several States\"; and all\nmen's natural rights to trade with each other, among the several States,\nand all over the world, are prostrate under the feet of a contemptible,\ndetestable, and irresponsible cabal of lawmakers; and the people have no\nprotection or redress for any tyranny or robbery that may be practised\nupon them, except _\"the wisdom and the discretion of congress, their\nidentity with the people, and the influence which their constituents\npossess at elections\"!_\n\nIt will be noticed that the court say that _\"all the other powers,\nvested in congress, are complete in themselves, and may be exercised to\ntheir utmost extent, and acknowledge no limitations, other than those\nprescribed by the constitution.\"_\n\nThey say that among \"all the other [practically unlimited] powers,\nvested in congress,\" is the power \"of declaring war\"; and, of course,\nof carrying on war; that congress has power to carry on war, for any\nreason, to any extent, and against any people, it pleases.\n\nThus they say, virtually, that _the natural rights of mankind_ impose no\n_constitutional_ restraints whatever upon congress, in the exercise of\ntheir lawmaking powers.\n\nIs not this asserting that governments have all power, and the people no\nrights?\n\nBut what is to be particularly noticed, is the fact that Marshall gives\nto congress all this practically unlimited power over all \"commerce with\nforeign nations, and among the several States,\" _solely on the strength\nof a false definition of the verb \"to regulate_.\" He says that \"the\npower to regulate commerce\" is the power \"_to prescribe the rule by\nwhich commerce is to be governed_.\"\n\n     This definition is an utterly false, absurd, and atrocious one.\n     It would give congress power arbitrarily to control, obstruct,\n     impede, derange, prohibit, and destroy commerce.\n\n     The verb \"to regulate\" does not, as Marshall asserts, imply the\n     exercise of any arbitrary control whatever over the thing\n     regulated; nor any power \"to prescribe [arbitrarily] the rule,\n     by which\" the thing regulated \"is to be governed.\" On the\n     contrary, it comes from the Latin word, _regula_, a rule; _and\n     implies the pre-existence of a rule, to which the thing\n     regulated is made to conform_.\n\n     To regulate one's diet, for example, is not, on the one hand,\n     to starve one's self to emaciation, nor, on the other, to gorge\n     one's self with all sorts of indigestible and hurtful\n     substances, in disregard of the natural laws of health. But it\n     supposes the pre-existence of the _natural laws of health_, to\n     which the diet is made to conform.\n\n     A clock is not \"regulated,\" when it is made to go, to stop, to\n     go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow, at the\n     mere will or caprice of the person who may have it in hand. It\n     is \"regulated\" only when it is made to conform to, to mark\n     truly, the diurnal revolutions of the earth. These revolutions\n     of the earth constitute the pre-existing rule, by which alone a\n     clock can be regulated.\n\n     A mariner's compass is not \"regulated,\" when the needle is made\n     to move this way and that, at the will of an operator, without\n     reference to the north pole. But it is regulated when it is\n     freed from all disturbing influences, and suffered to point\n     constantly to the north, as it is its nature to do.\n\n     A locomotive is not \"regulated,\" when it is made to go, to\n     stop, to go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow,\n     at the mere will and caprice of the engineer, and without\n     regard to economy, utility, or safety. But it is regulated,\n     when its motions are made to conform to a pre-existing rule,\n     that is made up of economy, utility, and safety combined. What\n     this rule is, in the case of a locomotive, may not be known\n     with such scientific precision, as is the rule in the case of a\n     clock, or a mariner's compass; but it may be approximated with\n     sufficient accuracy for practical purposes.\n\n     The pre-existing rule, by which alone commerce can be\n     \"regulated,\" is a matter of science; and is already known, so\n     far as the natural principle of justice, in relation to\n     contracts, is known. The natural right of all men to make all\n     contracts whatsoever, that are naturally and intrinsically just\n     and lawful, furnishes the pre-existing rule, by which _alone_\n     commerce can be regulated. And it is the only rule, to which\n     congress have any constitutional power to make commerce\n     conform.\n\n     When all commerce, that is intrinsically just and lawful, is\n     secured and protected, and all commerce that is intrinsically\n     unjust and unlawful, is prohibited, then commerce is regulated,\n     and not before.[5]\n\n         [5] The above extracts are from a pamphlet published by\n         me in 1864, entitled \"_Considerations for Bankers_,\"\n         etc., pp. 55, 56, 57.\n\nThis false definition of the verb \"_to regulate_\" has been used, time\nout of mind, by knavish lawmakers and their courts, to hide their\nviolations of men's natural right to do their own businesses in all such\nways--that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful--as they may\nchoose to do them in. These lawmakers and courts dare not always deny,\nutterly and plainly, men's right to do their own businesses in their own\nways; but they will assume \"_to regulate_\" them; and in pretending\nsimply \"to regulate\" them, they contrive \"to regulate\" men out of all\ntheir natural rights to do their own businesses in their own ways.\n\nHow much have we all heard (we who are old enough), within the last\nfifty years, of the power of congress, or of the States, \"_to regulate\nthe currency_.\" And \"to regulate the currency\" has always meant to fix\nthe kind, _and limit the amount_, of currency, that men may be permitted\nto buy and sell, lend and borrow, give and receive, in their dealings\nwith each other. It has also meant to say _who shall have the control of\nthe licensed money_; instead of making it mean the suppression only of\nfalse and dishonest money, and then leaving all men free to exercise\ntheir natural right of buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving\nand receiving, all such, and so much, honest and true money, or\ncurrency, as the parties to any or all contracts may mutually agree\nupon.\n\nMarshall's false _assumptions_ are numerous and tyrannical. They all\nhave the same end in view as his false definitions; that is, to\nestablish the principle that governments have all power, and the people\nno rights. They are so numerous that it would be tedious, if not\nimpossible, to describe them all separately. Many, or most, of them are\nembraced in the following, _viz._:\n\n1. The assumption that, by a certain paper, called the constitution of\nthe United States--a paper (I repeat and reiterate) which nobody ever\nsigned, which but few persons ever read, and which the great body of the\npeople never saw--and also by some forty subsidiary papers, called State\nconstitutions, which also nobody ever signed, which but few persons ever\nread, and which the great body of the people never saw--all making a\nperfect system of the merest nothingness--the assumption, I say, that,\nby these papers, the people have all consented to the abolition of\njustice itself, the highest moral law of the Universe; and that all\ntheir own natural, inherent, inalienable rights to the benefits of that\nlaw, shall be annulled; and that they themselves, and everything that is\ntheirs, shall be given over into the irresponsible custody of some forty\nlittle cabals of blockheads and villains called lawmakers--blockheads,\nwho imagine themselves wiser than justice itself, and villains, who care\nnothing for either wisdom or justice, but only for the gratification of\ntheir own avarice and ambitions; and that these cabals shall be invested\nwith the right to dispose of the property, liberty, and lives of all the\nrest of the people, at their pleasure or discretion; or, as Marshall\nsays, \"their wisdom and discretion!\"\n\nIf such an assumption as that does not embrace nearly, or quite, all the\nother false assumptions that usurpers and tyrants can ever need, to\njustify themselves in robbing, enslaving, and murdering all the rest of\nmankind, it is less comprehensive than it appears to me to be.\n\n2. In the following paragraph may be found another batch of Marshall's\nfalse assumptions.\n\n     The right to contract is the attribute of a free agent, and he\n     may rightfully coerce performance from another free agent, who\n     violates his faith. Contracts have consequently an intrinsic\n     obligation. _[But] When men come into society, they can no\n     longer exercise this original natural right of coercion. It\n     would be incompatible with general peace, and is therefore\n     surrendered._ Society prohibits the use of private individual\n     coercion, _and gives in its place a more safe and more certain\n     remedy_. But the right to contract is not surrendered with the\n     right to coerce performance.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton\n     350._\n\nIn this extract, taken in connection with the rest of his opinion in the\nsame case, Marshall convicts himself of the grossest falsehood. He\nacknowledges that men have a natural right to make their own contracts;\nthat their contracts have an \"intrinsic obligation\"; and that they have\nan \"original and natural right\" to coerce performance of them. And yet\nhe assumes, and virtually asserts, that men _voluntarily \"come into\nsociety_,\" and \"_surrender_\" to \"society\" their natural right to coerce\nthe fulfilment of their contracts. He assumes, and virtually asserts,\nthat they do this, _upon the ground, and for the reason, that \"society\ngives in its place a more safe and more certain remedy_\"; that is, \"a\nmore safe and more certain\" enforcement of all men's contracts that have\n\"an intrinsic obligation.\"\n\nIn thus saying that \"men come into society,\" and \"surrender\" to society,\ntheir \"original and natural right\" of coercing the fulfilment of\ncontracts, and that \"_society gives in its place a more safe and certain\nremedy_,\" he virtually says, and means to say, that, _in consideration\nof such \"surrender\" of their \"original and natural right of coercion,\"\n\"society\" pledges itself to them that it will give them this \"more safe\nand more certain remedy_\"; that is, that it will more safely and more\ncertainly enforce their contracts than they can do it themselves.\n\nAnd yet, in the same opinion--only two and three pages preceding this\nextract--he declares emphatically that \"the right\" of government--or of\nwhat he calls \"society\"--\"_to prohibit such contracts as may be deemed\nmischievous_, is _unquestionable_.\"--_p. 347._\n\nAnd as an illustration of the exercise of this right of \"society\" to\nprohibit such contracts \"as may be deemed mischievous,\" he cites the\nusury laws, thus:\n\n     The acts against usury declare the contract to be void in the\n     beginning. They deny that the instrument ever became a\n     contract. They deny it all original obligation; and cannot\n     impair that which never came into existence.--_p. 348._\n\nAll this is as much as to say that, when a man has voluntarily \"come\ninto society,\" and has \"surrendered\" to society \"his original and\nnatural right of coercing\" the fulfilment of his contracts, and when he\nhas done this in the confidence that society will fulfil its pledge to\n\"give him a more safe and more certain coercion\" than he was capable of\nhimself, \"society\" may then turn around to him, and say:\n\n     We acknowledge that you have a natural right to make your own\n     contracts. We acknowledge that your contracts have \"an\n     intrinsic obligation.\" We acknowledge that you had \"an original\n     and natural right\" to coerce the fulfilment of them. We\n     acknowledge that it was solely in consideration of our pledge\n     to you, that we would give you a more safe and more certain\n     coercion than you were capable of yourself, that you\n     \"surrendered\" to us your right to coerce a fulfilment of them.\n     And we acknowledge that, _according to our pledge_, you have\n     now a right to require of us that we coerce a fulfilment of\n     them. But after you had \"surrendered\" to us your own right of\n     coercion, we took a different view of the pledge we had given\n     you; and concluded that it would be \"mischievous\" to allow you\n     to make such contracts. We therefore \"prohibited\" your making\n     them. And having prohibited the making of them, we cannot now\n     admit that they have any \"obligation.\" We must therefore\n     decline to enforce the fulfilment of them. And we warn you\n     that, if you attempt to enforce them, by virtue of your own\n     \"original and natural right of coercion,\" we shall be obliged\n     to consider your act a breach of \"the general peace,\" and\n     punish you accordingly. We are sorry that you have lost your\n     property, but \"society\" must judge as to what contracts are,\n     and what are not, \"mischievous.\" We can therefore give you no\n     redress. Nor can we suffer you to enforce your own rights, or\n     redress your own wrongs.\n\nSuch is Marshall's theory of the way in which \"society\" got possession\nof all men's \"original and natural right\" to make their own contracts,\nand enforce the fulfilment of them; and of the way in which \"society\"\nnow justifies itself in prohibiting all contracts, though \"intrinsically\nobligatory,\" which it may choose to consider \"mischievous.\" And he\nasserts that, in this way, \"society\" has acquired \"_an unquestionable\nright_\" to cheat men out of all their \"original and natural right\" to\nmake their own contracts, and enforce the fulfilment of them.\n\nA man's \"original and natural right\" to make all contracts that are\n\"intrinsically obligatory,\" and to coerce the fulfilment of them, is one\nof the most valuable and indispensable of all human possessions. But\nMarshall assumes that a man may \"surrender\" this right to \"society,\"\nunder a pledge from \"society,\" that it will secure to him \"a more safe\nand certain\" fulfilment of his contracts, than he is capable of himself;\nand that \"society,\" having thus obtained from him this \"surrender,\" may\nthen turn around to him, and not only refuse to fulfil its pledge to\nhim, but may also prohibit his own exercise of his own \"original and\nnatural right,\" which he has \"surrendered\" to \"society!\"\n\nThis is as much as to say that, if A can but induce B to intrust his\n(B's) property with him (A), for safekeeping, under a pledge that he\n(A) will keep it more safely and certainly than B can do it himself, _A\nthereby acquires an \"unquestionable right\" to keep the property forever,\nand let B whistle for it!_\n\nThis is the kind of assumption on which Marshall based all his ideas of\nthe constitutional law of this country; that _constitutional_ law, which\nhe was so famous for expounding. It is the kind of assumption, by which\nhe expounded the people out of all their \"original and natural rights.\"\n\nHe had just as much right to assume, and practically did assume, that\nthe people had voluntarily \"come into society,\" and had voluntarily\n\"surrendered\" to their governments _all their other natural rights_, as\nwell as their \"original and natural right\" to make and enforce their own\ncontracts.\n\nHe virtually said to all the people of this country:\n\n     You have voluntarily \"come into society,\" and have voluntarily\n     \"surrendered\" to your governments all your natural rights, of\n     every name and nature whatsoever, _for safe keeping;_ and now\n     that these governments have, _by your own consent_, got\n     possession of all your natural rights, they have an\n     \"_unquestionable right_\" to withhold them from you forever.\n\nIf it were not melancholy to see mankind thus cheated, robbed, enslaved,\nand murdered, on the authority of such naked impostures as these, it\nwould be, to the last degree, ludicrous, to see a man like\nMarshall--reputed to be one of the first intellects the country has ever\nhad--solemnly expounding the \"constitutional powers,\" as he called them,\nby which the general and State governments were authorized to rob the\npeople of all their natural rights as human beings.\n\nAnd yet this same Marshall has done more than any other one\nman--certainly more than any other man within the last eighty-five\nyears--to make our governments, State and national, what they are. He\nhas, for more than sixty years, been esteemed an oracle, not only by his\nassociates and successors on the bench of the Supreme Court of the\nUnited States, but by all the other judges, State and national, by all\nthe ignorant, as well as knavish, lawmakers in the country, and by all\nthe sixty to a hundred thousand lawyers, upon whom the people have been,\nand are, obliged to depend for the security of their rights.\n\nThis system of false definitions, false assumptions, and fraud and\nusurpation generally, runs through all the operations of our\ngovernments, State and national. There is nothing genuine, nothing real,\nnothing true, nothing honest, to be found in any of them. They all\nproceed upon the principle, that governments have all power, and the\npeople no rights.\n\n\nSECTION XXV.\n\nBut perhaps the most absolute proof that our national lawmakers and\njudges are as regardless of all constitutional, as they are of all\nnatural, law, and that their statutes and decisions are as destitute of\nall constitutional, as they are of all natural, authority, is to be\nfound in the fact that these lawmakers and judges have trampled upon,\nand utterly ignored, certain amendments to the constitution, which had\nbeen adopted, and (constitutionally speaking) become authoritative, as\nearly as 1791; only two years after the government went into operation.\n\nIf these amendments had been obeyed, they would have compelled all\ncongresses and courts to understand that, if the government had any\nconstitutional powers at all, they were simply powers to protect men's\nnatural rights, and not to destroy any of them.\n\nThese amendments have actually forbidden any lawmaking whatever in\nviolation of men's natural rights. And this is equivalent to a\nprohibition of any lawmaking at all. And if lawmakers and courts had\nbeen as desirous of preserving men's natural rights, as they have been\nof violating them, they would long ago have found out that, since these\namendments, the constitution authorized no lawmaking at all.\n\nThese amendments were ten in number. They were recommended by the first\ncongress, at its first session, in 1789; two-thirds of both houses\nconcurring. And in 1791, they had been ratified by all the States: and\nfrom that time they imposed the restrictions mentioned upon all the\npowers of congress.\n\nThese amendments were proposed, by the first congress, for the reason\nthat, although the constitution, as originally framed, had been adopted,\nits adoption had been procured only with great difficulty, and in spite\nof great objections. _These objections were that, as originally framed\nand adopted, the constitution contained no adequate security for the\nprivate rights of the people._\n\nThese objections were admitted, by very many, if not all, the friends of\nthe constitution themselves, to be very weighty; and such as ought to be\nimmediately removed by amendments. And it was only because these friends\nof the constitution pledged themselves to use their influence to secure\nthese amendments, that the adoption of the constitution itself was\nsecured. And it was in fulfilment of these pledges, and to remove these\nobjections, that the amendments were proposed and adopted.\n\nThe first eight amendments specified particularly various prohibitions\nupon the power of congress; such, for example, as those securing to the\npeople the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech and the\npress, the right to keep and bear arms, etc., etc. Then followed the\nninth amendment, in these words:\n\n     The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights,\n     [retained by the people] shall not be construed to deny or\n     disparage others retained by the people.\n\nHere is an authoritative declaration, that \"the people\" have \"_other\nrights_\" than those specially \"enumerated in the constitution\"; and that\nthese \"_other rights_\" were \"_retained by the people_\"; that is, _that\ncongress should have no power to infringe them_.\n\nWhat, then, were these \"other rights,\" that had not been \"enumerated\";\nbut which were nevertheless \"retained by the people\"?\n\nPlainly they were men's natural \"rights\"; for these are the only\n\"rights\" that \"the people\" ever had, or, consequently, that they could\n\"retain.\"\n\nAnd as no attempt is made to enumerate _all_ these \"other rights,\" or\nany considerable number of them, and as it would be obviously impossible\nto enumerate all, or any considerable number, of them; and as no\nexceptions are made of any of them, the necessary, the legal, the\ninevitable inference is, that they were _all_ \"retained\"; and that\ncongress should have no power to violate any of them.\n\nNow, if congress and the courts had attempted to obey this amendment, as\nthey were constitutionally bound to do, they would soon have found that\nthey had really no lawmaking power whatever left to them; because they\nwould have found that they could make no law at all, _of their own\ninvention_, that would _not_ violate men's natural rights.\n\nAll men's natural rights are co-extensive with natural law, the law of\njustice; or justice as a science. This law is the exact measure, and the\nonly measure, of any and every man's natural rights. No one of these\nnatural rights can be taken from any man, without doing him an\ninjustice; and no more than these rights can be given to any one, unless\nby taking from the natural rights of one or more others.\n\nIn short, every man's natural rights are, first, the right to do, with\nhimself and his property, everything that he pleases to do, and that\njustice towards others does not forbid him to do; and, secondly, to be\nfree from all compulsion, by others, to do anything whatever, except\nwhat justice to others requires him to do.\n\nSuch, then, has been the constitutional law of this country since 1791;\nadmitting, for the sake of the argument--what I do not really admit to\nbe a fact--that the constitution, so called, has ever been a law at all.\n\nThis amendment, from the remarkable circumstances under which it was\nproposed and adopted, must have made an impression upon the minds of all\nthe public men of the time; although they may not have fully\ncomprehended, and doubtless did not fully comprehend, its sweeping\neffects upon all the supposed powers of the government.\n\nBut whatever impression it may have made upon the public men of that\ntime, its authority and power were wholly lost upon their successors;\nand probably, for at least eighty years, it has never been heard of,\neither in congress or the courts.\n\nJohn Marshall was perfectly familiar with all the circumstances, under\nwhich this, and the other nine amendments, were proposed and adopted. He\nwas thirty-two years old (lacking seven days) when the constitution, as\noriginally framed, was published (September 17, 1787); and he was a\nmember of the Virginia convention that ratified it. He knew perfectly\nthe objections that were raised to it, in that convention, on the ground\nof its inadequate guaranty of men's natural rights. He knew with what\nforce these objections were urged by some of the ablest members of the\nconvention. And he knew that, to obviate these objections, the\nconvention, as a body, without a dissenting voice, so far as appears,\nrecommended that very stringent amendments, for securing men's natural\nrights, be made to the constitution. And he knew further, that, but for\nthese amendments being recommended, the constitution would not have been\nadopted by the convention.[6]\n\n    [6] For the amendments recommended by the Virginia convention,\n    see \"Elliot's Debates,\" Vol. 3, pp. 657 to 663. For the debates\n    upon these amendments, see pages 444 to 452, and 460 to 462, and\n    466 to 471, and 579 to 652.\n\nThe amendments proposed were too numerous to be repeated here, although\nthey would be very instructive, as showing how jealous the people were,\nlest their natural rights should be invaded by laws made by congress.\nAnd that the convention might do everything in its power to secure the\nadoption of these amendments, it resolved as follows:\n\n     And the convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of\n     this commonwealth, enjoin it upon their representatives in\n     congress to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable\n     and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the foregoing\n     alterations and provisions, in the manner provided by the 5th\n     article of the said Constitution; and, in all congressional\n     laws to be passed in the meantime, to conform to the spirit of\n     these amendments, as far as the said Constitution will\n     admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 3, p. 661._\n\nIn seven other State conventions, to wit, in those of Massachusetts, New\nHampshire, Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, and South\nCarolina, the inadequate security for men's natural rights, and the\nnecessity for amendments, were admitted, and insisted upon, in very\nsimilar terms to those in Virginia.\n\nIn Massachusetts, the convention proposed nine amendments to the\nconstitution; and resolved as follows:\n\n     And the convention do, in the name and in the behalf of the\n     people of this commonwealth, enjoin it upon their\n     representatives in Congress, at all times, until the\n     alterations and provisions aforesaid have been considered,\n     agreeably to the 5th article of the said Constitution, to exert\n     all their influence, and use all reasonable and legal methods,\n     to obtain a ratification of the said alterations and\n     provisions, in such manner as is provided in the said\n     article.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, p. 178._\n\nThe New Hampshire convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed\ntwelve amendments, and added:\n\n     And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of\n     this State, enjoin it upon their representatives in congress,\n     at all times, until the alterations and provisions aforesaid\n     have been considered agreeably to the fifth article of the said\n     Constitution, to exert all their influence, and use all\n     reasonable and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the\n     said alterations and provisions, in such manner as is provided\n     in the article.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 326._\n\nThe Rhode Island convention, in ratifying the constitution, put forth a\ndeclaration of rights, in eighteen articles, and also proposed\ntwenty-one amendments to the constitution; and prescribed as follows:\n\n     And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of\n     the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, enjoin it\n     upon their senators and representative or representatives,\n     which may be elected to represent this State in congress, to\n     exert all their influence, and use all reasonable means, to\n     obtain a ratification of the following amendments to the said\n     Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in all laws\n     to be passed by the congress in the mean time, to conform to\n     the spirit of the said amendments, as far as the Constitution\n     will admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 335._\n\nThe New York convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed a\ngreat many amendments, and added:\n\n     And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of\n     the State of New York, enjoin it upon their representatives in\n     congress, to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable\n     means, to obtain a ratification of the following amendments to\n     the said Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in\n     all laws to be passed by the congress, in the mean time, to\n     conform to the spirit of the said amendments as far as the\n     Constitution will admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 329._\n\nThe New York convention also addressed a \"CIRCULAR LETTER\" to the\ngovernors of all the other States, the first two paragraphs of which are\nas follows:\n\n                            THE CIRCULAR LETTER,\n\n     _From the Convention of the State of New York to the Governors\n     of the several States in the Union._\n\n                                         POUGHKEEPSIE, JULY 28, 1788.\n\n     Sir, We, the members of the Convention of this State, have\n     deliberately and maturely considered the Constitution proposed\n     for the United States. Several articles in it appear so\n     exceptionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest\n     confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a general\n     convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our\n     sister States, could have prevailed upon a sufficient number to\n     ratify it, without stipulating for previous amendments. We all\n     unite in opinion, that such a revision will be necessary to\n     recommend it to the approbation and support of a numerous body\n     of our constituents.\n\n     We observe that amendments have been proposed, and are\n     anxiously desired, by several of the States, as well as by\n     this; and we think it of great importance that effectual\n     measures be immediately taken for calling a convention, to meet\n     at a period not far remote; for we are convinced that the\n     apprehensions and discontents, which those articles occasion,\n     cannot be removed or allayed, unless an act to provide for it\n     be among the first that shall be passed by the new\n     congress.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, p. 413._\n\nIn the Maryland convention, numerous amendments were proposed, and\nthirteen were agreed to; \"most of them by a unanimous vote, and all by a\ngreat majority.\" Fifteen others were proposed, but there was so much\ndisagreement in regard to them, that none at all were formally\nrecommended to congress. But, says Elliot:\n\n     All the members, who voted for the ratification [of the\n     constitution], declared that they would engage themselves,\n     under every tie of honor, to support the amendments they had\n     agreed to, both in their public and private characters, until\n     they should become a part of the general government.--_Elliot's\n     Debates, Vol. 2, pp. 550, 552-3._\n\nThe first North Carolina convention refused to ratify the constitution,\nand\n\n     _Resolved_, That a declaration of rights, asserting and\n     securing from encroachments the great principles of civil and\n     religious liberty, and the inalienable rights of the people,\n     together with amendments to the most ambiguous and\n     exceptionable parts of the said constitution of government,\n     ought to be laid before congress, and the convention of States\n     that shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the\n     said Constitution, for their consideration, previous to the\n     ratification of the Constitution aforesaid, on the part of the\n     State of North Carolina.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 332._\n\nThe South Carolina convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed\ncertain amendments, and\n\n     _Resolved_, That it be a standing instruction to all such\n     delegates as may hereafter be elected to represent this State\n     in the General Government, to exert their utmost abilities and\n     influence to effect an alteration of the Constitution,\n     conformably to the foregoing resolutions.--_Elliot's Debates,\n     Vol. 1. p. 325._\n\nIn the Pennsylvania convention, numerous objections were made to the\nconstitution, but it does not appear that the convention, as a\nconvention, recommended any specific amendments. But a strong movement,\noutside of the convention, was afterwards made in favor of such\namendments. (\"Elliot's Debates,\" Vol. 2, p. 542.)\n\nOf the debates in the Connecticut convention, Elliot gives only what he\ncalls \"_A Fragment_.\"\n\nOf the debates in the conventions of New Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia,\nElliot gives no accounts at all.\n\nI therefore cannot state the grounds, on which the adoption of the\nconstitution was opposed. They were doubtless very similar to those in\nthe other States. This is rendered morally certain by the fact, that the\namendments, soon afterwards proposed by congress, were immediately\nratified by all the States. Also by the further fact, that these States,\nby reason of the smallness of their representation in the popular branch\nof congress, would naturally be even more jealous of their rights, than\nthe people of the larger States.\n\nIt is especially worthy of notice that, in some, if not in all, the\nconventions that ratified the constitution, although the ratification\nwas accompanied by such urgent recommendations of amendments, and by an\nalmost absolute assurance that they would be made, it was nevertheless\nsecured only by very small majorities.\n\nThus in Virginia, the vote was only 89 ayes to 79 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 3,\np. 654.)\n\nIn Massachusetts, the ratification was secured only by a vote of 187\nyeas to 168 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p. 181.)\n\nIn New York, the vote was only 30 yeas to 27 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p.\n413.)\n\nIn New Hampshire and Rhode Island, neither the yeas nor nays are given.\n(Elliot, Vol. 1, pp. 327-335.)\n\nIn Connecticut, the yeas were 128; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1. p.\n321-2.)\n\nIn New Jersey, the yeas were 38; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p.\n321.)\n\nIn Pennsylvania, the yeas were 46; _the nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol.\n1, p. 320.)\n\nIn Delaware, the yeas were 30; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p.\n319.)\n\nIn Maryland, the vote was 57 yeas; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p.\n325.)\n\nIn North Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1,\np. 333.)\n\nIn South Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1,\np. 325.)\n\nIn Georgia, the yeas were 26; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p.\n324.)\n\nWe can thus see by what meagre votes the constitution was adopted. We\ncan also see that, but for the prospect that important amendments would\nbe made, specially for securing the natural rights of the people, the\nconstitution would have been spurned with contempt, as it deserved to\nbe.\n\nAnd yet now, owing to the usurpations of lawmakers and courts, the\noriginal constitution--with the worst possible construction put upon\nit--has been carried into effect; and the amendments have been simply\ncast into the waste baskets.\n\nMarshall was thirty-six years old, when these amendments became a part\nof the constitution in 1791. Ten years after, in 1801, he became Chief\nJustice. It then became his sworn constitutional duty to scrutinize\nseverely every act of congress, and to condemn, as unconstitutional, all\nthat should violate any of these natural rights. Yet he appears never to\nhave thought of the matter afterwards. Or, rather, this ninth amendment,\nthe most important of all, seems to have been so utterly antagonistic to\nall his ideas of government, that he chose to ignore it altogether, and,\nas far as he could, to bury it out of sight.\n\nInstead of recognizing it as an absolute guaranty of all the natural\nrights of the people, he chose to assume--for it was all a mere\nassumption, a mere making a constitution out of his own head, to suit\nhimself--that the people had all voluntarily \"come into society,\" and\nhad voluntarily \"surrendered\" to \"society\" all their natural rights, of\nevery name and nature--trusting that they would be secured; and that\nnow, \"society,\" having thus got possession of all these natural rights\nof the people, had the \"unquestionable right\" to dispose of them, at the\npleasure--or, as he would say, according to the \"wisdom and\ndiscretion\"--of a few contemptible, detestable, and irresponsible\nlawmakers, whom the constitution (thus amended) had forbidden to dispose\nof any one of them.\n\nIf, now, Marshall did not see, in this amendment, any legal force or\nauthority, what becomes of his reputation as a constitutional lawyer? If\nhe did see this force and authority, but chose to trample them under his\nfeet, he was a perjured tyrant and traitor.\n\nWhat, also, are we to think of all the judges,--forty in all,--his\nassociates and successors, who, for eighty years, have been telling the\npeople that the government has all power, and the people no rights? Have\nthey all been mere blockheads, who never read this amendment, or knew\nnothing of its meaning? Or have they, too, been perjured tyrants and\ntraitors?\n\nWhat, too, becomes of those great constitutional lawyers, as we have\ncalled them, who have been supposed to have won such immortal honors, as\n\"expounders of the constitution,\" but who seem never to have discovered\nin it any security for men's natural rights? Is their apparent\nignorance, on this point, to be accounted for by the fact, that that\nportion of the people, who, by authority of the government, are\nsystematically robbed of all their earnings, beyond a bare subsistence,\nare not able to pay such fees as are the robbers who are authorized to\nplunder them?\n\nIf any one will now look back to the records of congress and the courts,\nfor the last eighty years, I do not think he will find a single mention\nof this amendment. And why has this been so? Solely because the\namendment--if its authority had been recognized--would have stood as an\ninsuperable barrier against all the ambition and rapacity--all the\narbitrary power, all the plunder, and all the tyranny--which the\nambitious and rapacious classes have determined to accomplish through\nthe agency of the government.\n\nThe fact that these classes have been so successful in perverting the\nconstitution (thus amended) from an instrument avowedly securing all\nmen's natural rights, into an authority for utterly destroying them, is\na sufficient proof that no lawmaking power can be safely intrusted to\nany body, for any purpose whatever.\n\nAnd that this perversion of the constitution should have been sanctioned\nby all the judicial tribunals of the country, is also a proof, not only\nof the servility, audacity, and villainy of the judges, but also of the\nutter rottenness of our judicial system. It is a sufficient proof that\njudges, who are dependent upon lawmakers for their offices and salaries,\nand are responsible to them by impeachment, cannot be relied on to put\nthe least restraint upon the acts of their masters, the lawmakers.\n\nSuch, then, would have been the effect of the ninth amendment, if it had\nbeen permitted to have its legitimate authority.\n\n\nSECTION XXVI.\n\nThe tenth amendment is in these words:\n\n     The powers not delegated to the United States by the\n     constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved\n     to the States respectively, _or to the people_.\n\nThis amendment, equally with the ninth, secures to \"the people\" all\ntheir natural rights. And why?\n\nBecause, in truth, no powers at all, neither legislative, judicial, nor\nexecutive, had been \"delegated to the United States by the\nconstitution.\"\n\nBut it will be said that the amendment itself implies that certain\nlawmaking \"powers\" had been \"delegated to the United States by the\nconstitution.\"\n\nNo. It only implies that those who adopted the amendment _believed_ that\nsuch lawmaking \"powers\" had been \"delegated to the United States by the\nconstitution.\"\n\nBut in this belief, they were entirely mistaken. And why?\n\n1. Because it is a natural impossibility that any lawmaking \"powers\"\nwhatever can be delegated by any one man, or any number of men, to any\nother man, or any number of other men.\n\nMen's natural rights are all inherent and inalienable; and therefore\ncannot be parted with, or delegated, by one person to another. And all\ncontracts whatsoever, for such a purpose, are necessarily absurd and\nvoid contracts.\n\nFor example. I cannot delegate to another man any right to _make_\nlaws--that is, laws of his own invention--and compel me to obey them.\n\nSuch a contract, on my part, would be a contract to part with my natural\nliberty; to give myself, or sell myself, to him as a slave. Such a\ncontract would be an absurd and void contract, utterly destitute of all\nlegal or moral obligation.\n\n2. I cannot delegate to another any right to make laws--that is, laws of\nhis own invention--and compel a third person to obey them.\n\nFor example. I cannot delegate to A any right to make laws--that is,\nlaws of his own invention--and compel Z to obey them.\n\nI cannot delegate any such right to A, because I have no such right\nmyself; and I cannot delegate to another what I do not myself possess.\n\nFor these reasons no lawmaking powers ever could be--and therefore no\nlawmaking powers ever were--\"delegated to the United States by the\nconstitution\"; no matter what the people of that day--any or all of\nthem--may have attempted to do, or may have believed they had power to\ndo, in the way of delegating such powers.\n\nBut not only were no lawmaking powers \"delegated to the United States by\nthe constitution,\" but neither were any _judicial_ powers so delegated.\nAnd why? Because it is a natural impossibility that one man can delegate\nhis judicial powers to another.\n\nEvery man has, by nature, certain judicial powers, or rights. That is to\nsay, he has, by nature, the right to judge of, and enforce his own\nrights, and judge of, and redress his own wrongs. But, in so doing, he\nmust act only in accordance with his own judgment and conscience, _and\nsubject to his own personal responsibility, if, through either ignorance\nor design, he commits any error injurious to another_.\n\nNow, inasmuch as no man can delegate, or impart, his own judgment or\nconscience to another, it is naturally impossible that he can delegate\nto another his judicial rights or powers.\n\nSo, too, every man has, by nature, a right to judge of, and enforce, the\nrights, and judge of, and redress the wrongs, of any and all other men.\nThis right is included in his natural right to maintain justice between\nman and man, and to protect the injured party against the wrongdoer.\nBut, in doing this, he must act only in accordance with his own judgment\nand conscience, and subject to his own personal responsibility for any\nerror he may commit, either through ignorance or design.\n\nBut, inasmuch as, in this case, as in the preceding one, he can neither\ndelegate nor impart his own judgment or conscience to another, he cannot\ndelegate his judicial power or right to another.\n\nBut not only were no lawmaking or judicial powers \"delegated to the\nUnited States by the constitution,\" neither were any executive powers so\ndelegated. And why? Because, in a case of justice or injustice, it is\nnaturally impossible that any one man can delegate his executive right\nor power to another.\n\nEvery man has, by nature, the right to maintain justice for himself, and\nfor all other persons, by the use of so much force as may be reasonably\nnecessary for that purpose. But he can use the force only in accordance\nwith his own judgment and conscience, and on his own personal\nresponsibility, if, through ignorance or design, he commits any wrong to\nanother.\n\nBut inasmuch as he cannot delegate, or impart, his own judgment or\nconscience to another, he cannot delegate his executive power or right\nto another.\n\n_The result is, that, in all judicial and executive proceedings, for the\nmaintenance of justice, every man must act only in accordance with his\nown judgment and conscience, and on his own personal responsibility for\nany wrong he may commit; whether such wrong be committed through either\nignorance or design._\n\nThe effect of this principle of personal responsibility, in all judicial\nand executive proceedings, would be--or at least ought to be--that no\none would give any judicial opinions, or do any executive acts, except\nsuch as his own judgment and conscience should approve, _and such as he\nwould be willing to be held personally responsible for_.\n\nNo one could justify, or excuse, his wrong act, by saying that a power,\nor authority, to do it had been delegated to him, by any other men,\nhowever numerous.\n\nFor the reasons that have now been given, neither any legislative,\njudicial, nor executive powers ever were, or ever could have been,\n\"delegated to the United States by the constitution\"; no matter how\nhonestly or innocently the people of that day may have believed, or\nattempted, the contrary.\n\nAnd what is true, in this matter, in regard to the national government,\nis, for the same reasons, equally true in regard to all the State\ngovernments.\n\nBut this principle of personal responsibility, each for his own judicial\nor executive acts, does not stand in the way of men's associating, at\npleasure, for the maintenance of justice; and selecting such persons as\nthey think most suitable, for judicial and executive duties; and\n_requesting_ them to perform those duties; and then paying them for\ntheir labor. But the persons, thus selected, must still perform their\nduties according to their own judgments and consciences alone, and\nsubject to their own personal responsibility for any errors of either\nignorance or design.\n\nTo make it safe and proper for persons to perform judicial duties,\nsubject to their personal responsibility for any errors of either\nignorance or design, two things would seem to be important, if not\nindispensable, _viz._:\n\n1. That, as far as is reasonably practicable, all judicial proceedings\nshould be in writing; that is, that all testimony, and all judicial\nopinions, even to quite minute details, should be in writing, and be\npreserved; so that judges may always have it in their power to show\nfully what their acts, and their reasons for their acts, have been; and\nalso that anybody, and everybody, interested, may forever after have the\nmeans of knowing fully the reasons on which everything has been done;\nand that any errors, ever afterwards discovered, may be corrected.\n\n2. That all judicial tribunals should consist of so many judges--within\nany reasonable number--as either party may desire; or as may be\nnecessary to prevent any wrong doing, by any one or more of the judges,\neither through ignorance or design.\n\nSuch tribunals, consisting of judges, numerous enough, and perfectly\ncompetent to settle justly probably ninety-nine one-hundredths of all\nthe controversies that arise among men, could be obtained in every\nvillage. They could give their immediate attention to every case; and\nthus avoid most of the delay, and most of the expense, now attendant on\njudicial proceedings.\n\nTo make these tribunals satisfactory to all reasonable and honest\npersons, it is important, and probably indispensable, that all judicial\nproceedings should be had, _in the first instance_, at the expense of\nthe association, or associations, to which the parties to the suit\nbelong.\n\nAn association for the maintenance of justice should be a purely\nvoluntary one; and should be formed upon the same principle as a mutual\nfire or marine insurance company; that is, each member should pay his\njust proportion of the expense necessary for protecting all.\n\nA single individual could not reasonably be expected to delay, or\nforego, the exercise of his natural right to enforce his own rights, and\nredress his own wrongs, except upon the condition that there is an\nassociation that will do it promptly, and without expense to him. But\nhaving paid his proper proportion of the expense necessary for the\nprotection of all, he has then a right to demand prompt and complete\nprotection for himself.\n\nInasmuch as it cannot be known which party is in the wrong, until the\ntrial has been had, the expense of both parties must, _in the first\ninstance_, be paid by the association, or associations, to which they\nbelong. But after the trial has been had, and it has been ascertained\nwhich party was in the wrong, and (if such should be the case) so\nclearly in the wrong as to have had no justification for putting the\nassociation to the expense of a trial, he then may properly be compelled\nto pay the cost of all the proceedings.\n\nIf the parties to a suit should belong to different associations, it\nwould be right that the judges should be taken from both associations;\nor from a third association, with which neither party was connected.\n\nIf, with all these safeguards against injustice and expense, a party,\naccused of a wrong, should refuse to appear for trial, he might\nrightfully be proceeded against, in his absence, if the evidence\nproduced against him should be sufficient to justify it.\n\nIt is probably not necessary to go into any further details here, to\nshow how easy and natural a thing it would be, to form as many voluntary\nand mutually protective judicial associations, as might be either\nnecessary or convenient, in order to bring justice home to every man's\ndoor; and to give to every honest and dishonest man, all reasonable\nassurance that he should have justice, and nothing else, done for him,\nor to him.\n\n\nSECTION XXVII.\n\nOf course we can have no courts of justice, under such systems of\nlawmaking, and supreme court decisions, as now prevail.\n\nWe have a population of fifty to sixty millions; _and not a single court\nof justice, State or national!_\n\nBut we have everywhere courts of injustice--open and avowed\ninjustice--claiming sole jurisdiction of all cases affecting men's\nrights of both person and property; and having at their beck brute force\nenough to compel absolute submission to their decrees, whether just or\nunjust.\n\nCan a more decisive or infallible condemnation of our governments be\nconceived of, than the absence of all courts of justice, and the\nabsolute power of their courts of injustice?\n\nYes, they lie under still another condemnation, to wit, that their\ncourts are not only courts of injustice, but they are also secret\ntribunals; adjudicating all causes according to the secret instructions\nof their masters, the lawmakers, and their authorized interpreters,\ntheir supreme courts.\n\nI say _secret tribunals_, and _secret instructions_, because, to the\ngreat body of the people, whose rights are at stake, they are secret to\nall practical intents and purposes. They are secret, because their\nreasons for their decrees are to be found only in great volumes of\nstatutes and supreme court reports, which the mass of the people have\nneither money to buy, nor time to read; and would not understand, if\nthey were to read them.\n\nThese statutes and reports are so far out of reach of the people at\nlarge, that the only knowledge a man can ordinarily get of them, when he\nis summoned before one of the tribunals appointed to execute them, is\nto be obtained by employing an expert--or so-called lawyer--to enlighten\nhim.\n\nThis expert in injustice is one who buys these great volumes of statutes\nand reports, and spends his life in studying them, and trying to keep\nhimself informed of their contents. But even he can give a client very\nlittle information in regard to them; for the statutes and decisions are\nso voluminous, and are so constantly being made and unmade, and are so\ndestitute of all conformity to those natural principles of justice which\nmen readily and intuitively comprehend; and are moreover capable of so\nmany different interpretations, that he is usually in as great\ndoubt--perhaps in even greater doubt--than his client, as to what will\nbe the result of a suit.\n\nThe most he can usually say to his client, is this:\n\n     Every civil suit must finally be given to one of two persons,\n     the plaintiff or defendant. Whether, therefore, your cause is a\n     just, or an unjust, one, you have at least one chance in two,\n     of gaining it. But no matter how just your cause may be, you\n     need have no hope that the tribunal that tries it, will be\n     governed by any such consideration, if the statute book, or the\n     past decisions of the supreme court, are against you. So, also,\n     no matter how unjust your cause may be, you may nevertheless\n     expect to gain it, if the statutes and past decisions are in\n     your favor. If, therefore, you have money to spend in such a\n     lottery as this, I will do my best to gain your cause for you,\n     whether it be a just, or an unjust, one.\n\nIf the charge is a criminal one, this expert says to his client:\n\n     You must either be found guilty, or acquitted. Whether,\n     therefore, you are really innocent or guilty, you have at least\n     one chance in two, of an acquittal. But no matter how innocent\n     you may be of any real crime, you need have no hope of an\n     acquittal, if the statute book, or the past decisions of the\n     supreme court, are against you. If, on the other hand, you have\n     committed a real wrong to another, there may be many laws on\n     the statute book, many precedents, and technicalities, and\n     whimsicalities, through which you may hope to escape. But your\n     reputation, your liberty, or perhaps your life, is at stake. To\n     save these you can afford to risk your money, even though the\n     result is so uncertain. Therefore you had best give me your\n     money, and I will do my best to save you, whether you are\n     innocent or guilty.\n\nBut for the great body of the people,--those who have no money that they\ncan afford to risk in a lawsuit,--no matter what may be their rights in\neither a civil or criminal suit,--their cases are hopeless. They may\nhave been taxed, directly and indirectly, to their last dollars, for the\nsupport of the government; they may even have been compelled to risk\ntheir lives, and to lose their limbs, in its defence; yet when they want\nits protection,--that protection for which their taxes and military\nservices were professedly extorted from them,--they are coolly told that\nthe government offers no justice, nor even any chance or semblance of\njustice, except to those who have more money than they.\n\nBut the point now to be specially noticed is, that in the case of either\nthe civil or criminal suit, the client, whether rich or poor, is nearly\nor quite as much in the dark as to his fate, and as to the grounds on\nwhich his fate will be determined, as though he were to be tried by an\nEnglish Star Chamber court, or one of the secret tribunals of Russia, or\neven the Spanish Inquisition.\n\nThus in the supreme exigencies of a man's life, whether in civil or\ncriminal cases, where his property, his reputation, his liberty, or his\nlife is at stake, he is really to be tried by what is, _to him_, at\nleast, _a secret tribunal_; a tribunal that is governed by what are, _to\nhim_, _the secret instructions_ of lawmakers, and supreme courts;\nneither of whom care anything for his rights of property in a civil\nsuit, or for his guilt or innocence in a criminal one; but only for\ntheir own authority as lawmakers and judges.\n\nThe bystanders, at these trials, look on amazed, but powerless to defend\nthe right, or prevent the wrong. Human nature has no rights, in the\npresence of these infernal tribunals.\n\nIs it any wonder that all men live in constant terror of such a\ngovernment as that? Is it any wonder that so many give up all attempts\nto preserve their natural rights of person and property, in opposition\nto tribunals, to whom justice and injustice are indifferent, and whose\nways are, to common minds, hidden mysteries, and impenetrable secrets.\n\nBut even this is not all. The mode of trial, if not as infamous as the\ntrial itself, is at least so utterly false and absurd, as to add a new\nelement of uncertainty to the result of all judicial proceedings.\n\nA trial in one of these courts of injustice is a trial by battle,\nalmost, if not quite, as really as was a trial by battle, five hundred\nor a thousand years ago.\n\nNow, as then, the adverse parties choose their champions, to fight their\nbattles for them.\n\nThese champions, trained to such contests, and armed, not only with all\nthe weapons their own skill, cunning, and power can supply, but also\nwith all the iniquitous laws, precedents, and technicalities that\nlawmakers and supreme courts can give them, for defeating justice,\nand accomplishing injustice, can--if not always, yet none but\nthemselves know how often--offer their clients such chances of\nvictory--independently of the justice of their causes--as to induce the\ndishonest to go into court to evade justice, or accomplish injustice,\nnot less often perhaps than the honest go there in the hope to get\njustice, or avoid injustice.\n\nWe have now, I think, some sixty thousand of these champions, who make\nit the business of their lives to equip themselves for these conflicts,\nand sell their services for a price.\n\nIs there any one of these men, who studies justice as a science, and\nregards that alone in all his professional exertions? If there are any\nsuch, why do we so seldom, or never, hear of them? Why have they not\ntold us, hundreds of years ago, what are men's natural rights of person\nand property? And why have they not told us how false, absurd, and\ntyrannical are all these lawmaking governments? Why have they not told\nus what impostors and tyrants all these so-called lawmakers, judges,\netc., etc., are? Why are so many of them so ambitious to become\nlawmakers and judges themselves?\n\nIs it too much to hope for mankind, that they may sometime have courts\nof justice, instead of such courts of injustice as these?\n\nIf we ever should have courts of justice, it is easy to see what will\nbecome of statute books, supreme courts, trial by battle, and all the\nother machinery of fraud and tyranny, by which the world is now ruled.\n\nIf the people of this country knew what crimes are constantly committed\nby these courts of injustice, they would squelch them, without mercy, as\nunceremoniously as they would squelch so many gangs of bandits or\npirates. In fact, bandits and pirates are highly respectable and\nhonorable villains, compared with the judges of these courts of\ninjustice. Bandits and pirates do not--like these judges--attempt to\ncheat us out of our common sense, in order to cheat us out of our\nproperty, liberty, or life. They do not profess to be anything but such\nvillains as they really are. They do not claim to have received any\n\"Divine\" authority for robbing, enslaving, or murdering us at their\npleasure. They do not claim immunity for their crimes, upon the ground\nthat they are duly authorized agents of any such invisible, intangible,\nirresponsible, unimaginable thing as \"society,\" or \"the State.\" They do\nnot insult us by telling us that they are only exercising that authority\nto rob, enslave, and murder us, which we ourselves have delegated to\nthem. They do not claim that they are robbing, enslaving, and murdering\nus, solely to secure our happiness and prosperity, and not from any\nselfish motives of their own. They do not claim a wisdom so superior to\nthat of the producers of wealth, as to know, better than they, how their\nwealth should be disposed of. They do not tell us that we are the freest\nand happiest people on earth, inasmuch as each of our male adults is\nallowed one voice in ten millions in the choice of the men, who are to\nrob, enslave, and murder us. They do not tell us that all liberty and\norder would be destroyed, that society itself would go to pieces, and\nman go back to barbarism, if it were not for the care, and supervision,\nand protection, they lavish upon us. They do not tell us of the\nalmshouses, hospitals, schools, churches, etc., which, out of the purest\ncharity and benevolence, they maintain for our benefit, out of the money\nthey take from us. They do not carry their heads high, above all other\nmen, and demand our reverence and admiration, as statesmen, patriots,\nand benefactors. They do not claim that we have voluntarily \"come into\ntheir society,\" and \"surrendered\" to them all our natural rights of\nperson and property; nor all our \"original and natural right\" of\ndefending our own rights, and redressing our own wrongs. They do not\ntell us that they have established infallible supreme courts, to whom\nthey refer all questions as to the legality of their acts, and that they\ndo nothing that is not sanctioned by these courts. They do not attempt\nto deceive us, or mislead us, or reconcile us to their doings, by any\nsuch pretences, impostures, or insults as these. _There is not a single\nJohn Marshall among them._ On the contrary, they acknowledge themselves\nrobbers, murderers, and villains, pure and simple. When they have once\ntaken our money, they have the decency to get out of our sight as soon\nas possible; they do not persist in following us, and robbing us, again\nand again, so long as we produce anything that they can take from us. In\nshort, they acknowledge themselves _hostes humani generis: enemies of\nthe human race_. They acknowledge it to be our unquestioned right and\nduty to kill them, if we can; that they expect nothing else, than that\nwe will kill them, if we can; and that we are only fools and cowards, if\nwe do not kill them, by any and every means in our power. They neither\nask, nor expect, any mercy, if they should ever fall into the hands of\nhonest men.\n\nFor all these reasons, they are not only modest and sensible, but really\nfrank, honest, and honorable villains, contrasted with these courts of\ninjustice, and the lawmakers by whom these courts are established.\n\nSuch, Mr. Cleveland, is the real character of the government, of which\nyou are the nominal head. Such are, and have been, its lawmakers. Such\nare, and have been, its judges. Such have been its executives. Such is\nits present executive. Have you anything to say for any of them?\n\n                 Yours frankly,                     LYSANDER SPOONER.\n\n    BOSTON, MAY 15, 1886.\n\n\n                                THE END.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\nText in italics was enclosed with underscores (_italics_).\n\nText in small caps was replaced with ALL CAPS (SMALL CAPS).\n\nOn page 22, there was the use of double quotation marks within double\nquotation marks. That usage was not changed.\n\nOn page 43, \"at bank\" was replaced \"at a bank\".\n\nOn page 60, \"_viz._, 1,\" was replaced with \"_viz._, 1.\".\n\nOn page 105, \"viz.\" was italized.\n\nOn page 65, a period as added after \"indebted to\".","title":"A Letter to Grover Cleveland: On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, Ignorance, and Servitude Of The People","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":55422}