{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_35354/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_35354","id":"gutenberg_35354","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/35354","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Christian ethics -- Catholic authors"],"text":"MORAL THEOLOGY\n\nA Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern\nAuthorities\n\nBY\nJOHN A. MCHUGH, O.P.\nAND\nCHARLES J. CALLAN, O.P.\n\nREVISED AND ENLARGED BY\nEDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P.\n\nNEW YORK CITY\nJOSEPH F. WAGNER, INC.\nLONDON: B. HERDER\n\nNihil Obstat\nELWOOD FERRER SMITH, O.P., S.T.M.\nBENJAMIN URBAN FAY, O.P., S.T.LR.\n\nImprimi Potest\nVERY REV. WILLIAM D. MARRIN, O.P., P.G., S.T.M.\nProvincial\n\nNihil Obstat\nJOHN A. GOODWINE, J.C.D.\nCensor Librorum\n\nImprimatur\n+ FRANCIS CARDINAL SPELLMAN\nArchbishop of New York\n\nNew York, May 24, 1958\n\nThe nihil obstat and imprimatur are official declarations that a book\nor pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is\ncontained therein that those who have granted the nihil obstat and\nimprimatur agree with the contents, opinions or statements expressed.\n\n[Transcriber\u2019s note: References to the Code of Canon Law in this work\nare to the 1917 version of the Code, later superseded by the 1983\nversion.]\n\nAll Rights Reserved by Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York\nPRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nThe purpose of the present work is to give a complete and comprehensive\ntreatise on Catholic Moral Theology, that is, on that branch of sacred\nlearning which treats of the regulation of human conduct in the light\nof reason and revealed truth. This new work strives to deal with the\nsubject as a systematic and orderly whole, and is based throughout on\nthe principles, teaching and method of St. Thomas Aquinas, while\nsupplementing that great Doctor of the Church from the best modern\nauthorities. Needless to say, there are many questions and problems\nconnected with modern life that did not exist when the great classic\nworks on Moral Theology were written, and to these naturally special\nattention has been given in the treatment that follows.\n\nNowadays, since the appearance of the New Code and of many special\nworks on Canon Law, it would be a mistake to encumber the pages of a\nwork like the present one with canonical questions of interest only to\nthe specialist, and which are ably and abundantly treated in fine\ncommentaries on the Code that are already available. Likewise, it would\nbe an error to treat here matter pertinent only to Dogmatic Theology or\nHistory. All digressions, therefore, into alien fields have been\navoided in this work, with the result that a greater number of useful\nmoral questions have been herein considered.\n\nBut not only is it necessary to avoid irrelevant subjects, but it is\nalso needful not to sacrifice essentials for accidentals in any work of\nthis kind. It is the fault of too many textbooks on Moral Theology to\nstress controversies, cite authors, and quote opinions, at the expense\nof the principles and reasons that govern and explain the teaching\ngiven. This work eschews that method, and is at pains everywhere, first\nof all, to lay the foundations on which the superstructure is to be\nbuilt, namely, the definitions and rules that are presupposed to moral\njudgments and conclusions. Obviously, this is a more logical way of\nproceeding, and it consequently enables the student much more easily to\nunderstand and retain the matter studied, since he can thus reason\nquestions out for himself. Moreover, such a method makes for brevity\nand renders it possible, as said above, to treat more subjects than\ncould otherwise be treated; it makes it possible to condense the matter\nof many pages of larger and less accessible works into brief and terse\nparagraphs. But from this it should not be gathered that the work which\nfollows aims to present Moral Theology in a dryly scientific fashion.\nOn the contrary, it has been our endeavor to treat the matter in a way\nthat is at once clear, solid, comprehensive and interesting. Since the\ngeneral and the abstract do not make the same strong impression as the\nparticular and the concrete, laws and axioms are copiously illustrated\nthroughout with pertinent and practical examples that often amount to\nbrief _casus conscientiae_, thus combining the theory and the practice\nof Moral Theology.\n\nIt would be a mistake to think that, while Moral Theology is a\ntechnical and scientific treatise on human conduct, it deals\nexclusively or primarily with vice and sin, and that it is intended\nonly to enable the priest rightly to administer the Sacrament of\nPenance, distinguishing between the various classes of sins and their\nconsequences. Of course, it does all this, but it should do much more;\nfor it has also a much higher purpose, which is to enable man, not only\nto know what is forbidden and how he may escape from moral disease and\ndeath, but also to understand what are his duties and how he may live\nthe life of grace and virtue. The subject is indeed more positive than\nnegative, and it should be discussed accordingly. Thus, far from being\nuseful merely to confessors as a guide by which they may detect and\ndistinguish mortal and venial sins and the higher and lower degrees of\nculpability, Moral Theology in its broader aspect should be of the\ngreatest service likewise to the individual in forming his own habits\nand character, and in particular to those who have the guidance of\nothers, whether in or out of the confessional, such as pastors,\npreachers, teachers, and the like. Consequently, the present work has\nbeen written with a view to the homiletic and pastoral functions of the\npriest, as well as those that pertain strictly to the administration of\nthe Sacraments.\n\nHeretofore works on Moral Theology in English have been altogether too\nfew or too fragmentary, whereas they have been abundant in the\nvernaculars of Continental Europe--German, French, Spanish, Italian,\netc. This does not mean that the present work is intended to replace\nthe Latin text-books used in our seminaries, but rather that it should\nenable students and priests to get a more thorough and ready knowledge\nof an all-important subject, and to adapt it more easily to the varying\nneeds of the ministry.\n\nThe section of this work on Law has been carefully read by two eminent\ncivil lawyers.\n\nTHE AUTHORS. May 10, 1929.\n\n\n\n\nREVISOR\u2019S NOTE\n\nThis is a revision, not a rewriting. Various deletions and additions\nhave been made with the intent of bringing the work up to date within\nthe scope of the original plan and methods of the authors. In this way\nit has been possible to preserve the features that have made this\nmanual a standard guide for the past thirty years.\n\nEDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P., S.T.LR., S.T.D. Washington, D.C., June 8, 1958\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n[Volume I of print edition, through section 1625]\n\nPREFACE\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nDefinition of Moral Theology (1-3).--The Objects of Moral Theology\n(4-5).--The Sources of Moral Theology (6-12).--The Methods of Moral\nTheology (13-14).--The History of Moral Theology (15-16).--The Division\nof Moral Theology (17-18).\n\nPART I. GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY\n\nQuestion I\n\nTHE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END\n\nArt. 1. THE LAST END OF MAN\n\nThe Existence of the Last End (19).--The Nature of the Last End\n(20).--The Attainment of the Last End (21).\n\nArt. 2. ACTS AS HUMAN\n\nIntroduction (22).--Definition (23).--Knowledge Requisite for a Human\nAct (24-33).--Consent Requisite for a Human Act (34-39).--Obstacles to\nConsent (40-55).--Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts (56-62).\n\nArt. 3. ACTS AS MORAL\n\nIntroduction (63).---Definition (64-69).--The Sources of Morality\n(70-75).--Good Acts (76-78).--Bad Acts (79-81).--Indifferent Acts\n(82-86).--Perfect and Essential Goodness (87-88).--Morality of the\nExternal Act (89-93).--Morality of the Act Indirectly Willed\n(94-95).--Morality of the Consequences of an Act (96).--Imputability\n(97-105).\n\nArt. 4. ACTS AS MERITORIOUS\n\nIntroduction (106).--Definition (107).--Divisions of Merit (108-115).\n\nArt. 5. THE PASSIONS\n\nIntroduction (116).--Definition (117).--Division (118-120).--Moral\nValue of the Passions (121-131).\n\nQuestion II\n\nGOOD AND BAD HABITS\n\nINTRODUCTION (132)\n\nArt. 1. HABITS IN GENERAL\n\nDefinition (133).--Division (134-136).--Strengthening and Weakening of\nHabits (137-139).--Habits and Morality (140-141).\n\nArt. 2. GOOD HABITS, OR VIRTUES\n\nDefinition (142).--Division (143-152).--Properties of the Virtues\n(153-158).--Complements of the Virtues (159-166).\n\nArt. 3. BAD HABITS, OR VICES\n\nDefinition (167).--Divisions (168).--Mortal Sin (169-179).--Venial Sin\n(180-184).--Imperfections (185).--Change in the Gravity of Moral\nDefects (186-196).--The Distinctions of Sins (197-219).--Comparison of\nSins (220-229).--The Subjects of Sins (230-245).--The Causes of Sin\n(246-267).--The Motives of Sin (268-271).--The Results of Sin (272-283).\n\nQuestion III\n\nLAW\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nArt. 1. LAW IN GENERAL\n\nDefinition (285).--Division (286-287).--Collision of Laws\n(288-292).--The Basis of All Laws (293-294).\n\nArt. 2. THE NATURAL LAW\n\nMeaning (295-296).--Division (297-304).--Properties (305-327).\n\nArt. 3. THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW\n\nMeaning (328-330).--Division (331).--The Mosaic Law (332-345).--The Law\nof the New Testament (346-369).\n\nArt. 4. HUMAN LAW\n\nDefinition (370).--Division (371).--Qualities (372-374).--Obligation of\nHuman Laws (375-384).--Interpretation of Law (385-386).--Those Subject\nto Law (387-388).--Change of Law (389-390).--The Law of Custom\n(391-400).--Dispensation (401-410).--Epieikeia (411-417).\n\nArt. 5. ECCLESIASTICAL LAW\n\nIntroduction (418-419).--General Law of the Church (420-422).--\nLawgivers in the Church (423-424).--Subject-Matter of Church Law\n(425-426).--Those Bound by General Laws (427-434).--Those Bound by\nParticular Laws (435-446).--Promulgation (447-449).--Irritant Laws\n(450-458).--Laws Based on Presumption (459-461).--Fulfillment of Law\n(462-482).--Interpretation (433-486).--Cessation of Obligation\n(487-499).--Cessation of Law (500-505).--Custom (506-513).--Laws in a\nWide Sense (514-541).\n\nArt. 6. CIVIL LAW\n\nMeaning (542).--Origin (543-545).--Subject-Matter (546-549).--Those\nSubject to Civil Law (550).--The Obligation of Civil Law (551-556).--\nSpecial Kinds of Laws (557-572).--Other Questions (573).\n\nQuestion IV\n\nCONSCIENCE\n\nINTRODUCTION (574)\n\nArt. 1. THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE\n\nDefinition (575).--Division (576-579).--Obligation of Conscience\n(580-587).--Results of Conscience (588-592).\n\nArt. 2. A GOOD CONSCIENCE\n\nIntroduction (593).--Definitions (594).--Divisions (595-596).--The Lax\nConscience (597-606).--The Scrupulous Conscience (607-613).--\nScrupulosity (614-635).--Practical Conclusions (636-639).\n\nArt. 3. A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE\n\nIntroduction (640).--Necessity of Certitude (641-642).--Kinds of\nCertitude (643-653).--An Uncertain Conscience (654-655).--Doubt and\nSuspicion (656-661).--Opinion (662-671).--The Moral Systems\n(672-675).--Tutiorism (676-679).--Laxism (680-681).--The Other Systems\n(682).-Probabiliorism (683-687).--Equiprobabilism (688-700).--\nProbabilism (701-730).--Compensationism (731-738).--Practical\nConclusions (739-742).\n\nPART II. SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY\n\nINTRODUCTION (743)\n\nQuestion I. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN\n\nTHE INFUSED VIRTUES (744-745)\n\nArt. 1. THE VIRTUE OF FAITH\n\nIntroduction (746-749).--The Meaning of Faith (750-753).--The Object of\nFaith (754-781).--The Acts of Faith (782-796).--The Habit of Faith\n(797-807).--The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge (808-811).\n\nArt. 2. THE SINS AGAINST FAITH\n\nIntroduction (812).--The Sin of Unbelief (813-825).--Heresy\n(826-834).--Apostasy (835-839).--The Sin of Doubt (840-846).--Credulity\nand Rationalism (847).--Dangers to Faith (848).--Dangerous Reading\n(849-866).--Dangerous Schools (867-874).--Dangerous Marriages\n(875-881).--Dangerous Communication (882-888).--The Sin of Blasphemy\n(887-903).--Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness (904-912).\n\nArt. 3. THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH\n\nIntroduction (913).--The Commandment of Knowledge of Faith (914-924).--\nThe Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith (925-937).--The Negative\nCommandment of External Profession of Faith (938-943).--Dangers of\nProfession of Unbelief (944).--Forbidden Societies (945-955).--\nCommunication in Worship (956-975).-Cooperation in Religious Activities\n(976-986).--The Affirmative Commandment of External Profession of Faith\n(987-1008).\n\nArt. 4. THE VIRTUE OF HOPE\n\nDefinition (1009-1017).--The Object of Hope (1018-1026).--The\nExcellence of Hope (1027-1035).--The Subject of Hope (1030-1040).--The\nGift of Fear of the Lord (1041-1058).--The Sins against Hope\n(1059-1091).--The Commandments of Hope and of Fear (1092-1104).\n\nArt. 5. THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY\n\nDefinition (1105-1114).--The Excellence of Charity (1115-1120).--\nProduction of Charity (1121-1132).--The Object of Charity\n(1133-1157).--The Order of Charity (1158-1182).--The Acts of Charity\n(1183-1192).\n\nArt. 6. THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY\n\nInternal Effects of Charity (1193).--Joy (1194).--Peace (1195-1197).--\nReconciliation (1198-1204).--Mercy (1205-1209).--External Effects of\nCharity (1210).--Beneficence (1211-1215).--Almsgiving (1216-1257).--\nFraternal Correction (1258-1294).\n\nArt. 7. THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY\n\nIntroduction (1295).--Hate (1296).--Hatred of God (1297-1303).--Hatred\nof Creatures (1304-1311).--Gravity of the Sin of Hatred (1312-1316).\n--Species of the Sin of Hatred (1317-1319).--The Sin of Sloth\n(1320-1325).--Laziness (1326).--Lukewarmness (1327).--The Sin of Envy\n(1328-1331).--Emulation (1332).--Jealousy (1333).--Fear (1334).--\nIndignation (1335-1336).--Gravity of the Sin of Envy (1337-1344).--\nMeans of Overcoming Envy (1345-1346).\n\nArt. 8. THE SINS AGAINST PEACE\n\nIntroduction (1347).--Discord (1348-1354).--Contention (1355-1362).--\nActs of Sin against Peace (1363).--Schism (1364-1375).--War\n(1376-1427).--Fighting (1428-1434).--Duelling (1435-1439).--Sedition\n(1440-1443).\n\nArt. 9. THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE\n\nIntroduction (1444).--Scandal (1445-1446).--Definition of Scandal\n(1447).--Causes of Scandal (1448-1458).--Results of Scandal\n(1459-1464).--Sinfulness of Scandal (1465-1474).--Persons Scandalized\n(1475-1476).--Duty of Avoiding Scandal (1477-1487).--Duty of Repairing\nScandal (1488-1492).--Denial of Sacraments in Case of Scandal\n(1493-1494).--Seduction (1495-1505).--Cooperation in Sin (1506-1508).--\nKinds of Cooperation (1508-1512).--Sinfulness of Cooperation\n(1513-1514).--Lawfulness of Material Cooperation (1515-1525).--\nLawfulness of Immediate Cooperation (1526-1527).--Special Cases of\nCooperation (1528).-Cooperation in Reading Matter (1529-1530).--In\nDances and Plays (1531-1532).--In Selling (1533-1536).--In Providing\nFood and Drink (1537-1539).--In Renting (1540-1541).--In Service\n(1542-1544).--Duties of the Confessor as Regards Cooperation\n(1545-1546).\n\nArt 10. THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY\n\nIntroduction (1547-1552).--The Commandment of Love of God\n(1553-1560).--The Commandment of Love of Self (1561-1578).--The\nCommandment of Love of Neighbor (1579-1584).--Fulfillment of the\nCommandments of Charity (1585-1608).\n\nArt 11. THE GIFT OF WISDOM\n\nIntroduction (1609).--The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom (1610-1614).--\nThe Persons who Possess Wisdom (1615-1618).--The Beatitude and the\nFruits that Correspond to Wisdom (1619-1620).--The Sins Opposed to\nWisdom (1621-1625).\n\n[Volume II of print edition, section 1626 to end]\n\nQuestion II. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (The Moral Virtues)\n\nArt. 1. THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE\n\nDefinition (1627).--Objects (1628, 1629).--Certainty of Prudence\n(1630).--Excellence (1631, 1632).--Acts (1633).--Qualities (1634).--\nParts (1635, 1636).--Integral Parts (1637, 1638).--Subjective Parts\n(1639-1645).--Potential Parts (1646, 1647).--Persons Who Possess\nPrudence (1648-1656).--Growth and Decay of Prudence (1657).--The\nBeatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Counsel (1662).--The Sins\nAgainst Prudence (1663).--Imprudence (1664-1666).--Haste (1667).--\nThoughtlessness.--Inconstancy (1669).--Causes of These Sins (1670).--\nNegligence (1671-1673).--False Prudence (1674).--The Prudence of the\nFlesh (1675, 1676).--Astuteness, Trickery, Fraud (1677-1680).--\nSolicitude (1681-1685).--Avarice, a Cause of Sins Against Prudence\n(1686).--The Commandments of Prudence (1687).\n\nArt. 2. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE\n\nIntroduction (1688).--The Nature of Justice (1689-1700).--Division\n(1701-1708).--The Object of Justice (1709-1713).--Comparison of Justice\nand Other Virtues (1714-1718).--Injustice (1719-1726).--Judgment\n(1727-1744).\n\nArt. 3. THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF JUSTICE: DISTRIBUTIVE AND COMMUTATIVE\nJUSTICE\n\nSubjective Parts of a Virtue (1745).--Distributive and Commutative\nJustice Compared (1746, 1747).--The Objects of Commutative Justice\n(1748-1750).--Restitution (1751-1761).-The Roots of Restitution\n(1762-1777).--Restitution for Cooperation in Injustice (1778-1785).--\nThe Circumstances of Restitution (1786-1796).--Causes Excusing from\nRestitution (1797-1801).--Some Special Cases of Restitution (1802,\n1803).\n\nArt. 4. THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE\n\nThe Vice against Distributive Justice (1804-1814).-The Vices against\nCommutative Justice (1815).--Homicide (1816-1851).-Suicide\n(1852-1861).--Accidental Homicide (1862-1865).--Bodily Injury\n(1866-1871).--Titles to Property (1872-1876).--Contracts\n(1877-1889).--Theft and Robbery (1890-1919).--Lawful Occupation\n(1920-1926).--Occult Compensation (1927-1938).-Judicial Injustice\n(1939).--In Judges (1940-1963).--In Accusers (1964-1974).--In\nDefendants (1975-1983).--In Witnesses (1984-1994).--In Lawyers\n(1995-2008).--Unjust Words (2009).--Contumely (2010-2027).--Defamation\n(2028-2075).-Cooperation in Defamation (2076-2084).--Restitution for\nDefamation (2085-2102).--Whispering (2103-2105).--Derision\n(2106-2110).--Cursing (2111-2119).--Murmuring (2120).--Fraud in\nContracts (2121, 2122).--In Sales (2123-2133).--Trading (2134,\n2135).--Usury (2136).--Other Frauds (2137, 2138).\n\nArt. 5. THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE\nOF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES\n\nThe Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice (2139, 2140).--The Potential Parts\nof Justice (2141-2144).--The Virtue of Religion (2145-2148).--The\nInternal Acts of Religion (2149).--Devotion (2150-2152).--Prayer\n(2153-2169).--Distractions (2170-2174).--The External Acts of Religion\n(2175).--Adoration (2176, 2177).--Sacrifice (2178-2182).--Offerings\n(2183, 2184).--Contributions (2185-2190).--Vows (2191-2225).--Cessation\nof Vows (2226-2243).--Other External Acts of Religion (2244).--Oaths\n(2245-2262).--Adjuration (2263-2268).--Divine Praises (2269-2272).--The\nSins against Religion (2273).--Superstition (2274-2276).--Idolatry\n(2277-2281).--Divination (2282-2289).--Vain Observance (2290-2298).--\nIrreligiousness (2299).--Temptation of God (2300-2307).--Sacrilege\n(2308-2316).--Simony (2317-2334).--Sinfulness of Simony (2335-2343).\n\nArt. 6. THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE GIFT OF PIETY;\nTHE COMMANDMENTS\n\nPiety (2344-2350).--Reverence (2351-2354).--Obedience (2355-2372).--\nGratitude (2373-2380).--Vengeance (2381-2384).--Truthfulness\n(2385-2388).--Lying (2389-2397).--Mental Reservation (2398-2402).--\nSimulation (2403, 2404).--Hypocrisy (2405).--Braggadocio and Irony\n(2406).--Breach of Promise (2407).--Violation of Secret (2408-2420).--\nAffability (2421-2423).--Liberality (2424-2429).--Equity (2430-2432).--\nThe Gift of Piety (2433).--The Commandments of Justice (2434-2436).\n\nArt. 7. THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE\n\nNature (2437-2441).--Martyrdom (2442-2445).--The Opposite Vices\n(2446).--The Parts of Fortitude (2447).--Greatness of Soul (2448,\n2449).--Presumption, Ambition and Vanity (2450).--Pusillanimity\n(2451).--Greatness of Deed, Meanness and Vulgarity (2452).--Patience\n(2453, 2454).--Stolidity and Impatience (2455).--Steadfastness,\nEffeminacy and Pertinacity (2456).--The Complements of Fortitude\n(2457).--The Commandments of Fortitude (2458-2460).\n\nArt. 8. THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE\n\nNature (2461-2463).--The Opposite Vices (2464).--The Parts of\nTemperance (2465).--Abstemiousness (2466, 2467).--Fasting and\nAbstinence (2468, 2469).--The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness\n(2470).--Gluttony (2471-2473).--Sobriety (2474, 2475).--The Sins\nagainst Sobriety (2476).--Drunkenness (2477-2485).--Purity (2486,\n2487).--Virginity (2488-2491).--Impurity (2492-2496).--Temptations to\nImpurity (2497-2503).--Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity (2504).--Impure\nThoughts (2505, 2506).--Impure Rejoicing (2507).--Impure Desire (2508,\n2509).--Lewdness (2510-2514).--Sinfulness of Lewdness (2515-2518).--\nMoral Species of Lewdness (2519).--The Consummated Sins of Impurity\n(2520-2522).--Fornication (2523-2528).--Defloration and Rape\n(2529).--Adultery (2530).--Incest (2531, 2532).--Carnal Sacrilege\n(2533).--Sins against Nature (2534).--Pollution (2535-2538).--The\nSinfulness of Pollution (2539-2541).--Penalties (2542).--The Potential\nParts of Temperance (2543).--Continence (2544).--Meekness (2545).--\nAnger (2546-2549).--Sinful Indulgence (2550).--Clemency (2551,\n2552).--Humility (2553-2556).--Pride (2557-2560).--Abjectness\n(2561).--Studiousness (2562).--Curiosity and Negligence (2563,\n2564).--Modesty (2565).--Decorum (2566).--Modest Relaxation (2567,\n2568).--Modesty in Style and Dress (2569, 2570).--Complements of\nTemperance (2571).--Commandments of Temperance (2572).\n\nQuestion III\n\nTHE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN\n\nINTRODUCTION (2573)\n\nArt. 1. THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH\n\nGeneral Duties of the Faithful (2574).--First Precept of the Church:\nSanctification of the Lord\u2019s Day (2575).--Hearing Mass (2576-2578).--\nServile Works (2579-2582).--Gravity of the First Precept (2583).--\nExcuses (2584, 2585).--Second Precept: Abstinence (2586, 2587).--\nFasting (2588, 2589).--Third Precept: Yearly Confession (2590,\n2591).--Fourth Precept: Easter Duty (2592, 2593).--Fifth and Sixth\nPrecepts (2594).--Laws on the Index and Cremation (2595).--The Special\nDuties of Clerics (2596).--Vocation (2597, 2598).--Positive Duties of\nClerics (2599).--The Divine Office (2600, 2601).--Celibacy (2602).--\nNegative Duties of Clerics (2603).--Trading (2604).--Stocks and Bonds\n(2605).--Duties of Clerical Superiors (2606).--Duties of Pastors\n(2607).--Charity to the Poor (2608-2610).--Special Duties of Religious\n(2611).--The Vows (2612).\n\nArt. 2. DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY\n\nHusband and Wife (2613).--The conjugal Debt (2614-2617).--Morality in\nMarriage (2618, 2619).--Contraception and Onanism (2620).--\nBirth-Control (2621, 2622).--Cooperation with Contraception (2623).--\nRecapitulation (2624).--Regulae pro Confessariis (2625).--The Duty of\nConjugal Companionship and Assistance (2626).--The Obligation of\nMarrying (2627).--The Duties of Engaged Persons (2628, 2629).--The\nDuties of Parents (2630, 2631).--Sex Education (2632).--The Duties of\nChildren (2633).--The Duties of Other Relatives (2634).--The Duties of\nSuperiors (2635).--The Duties of Subjects (2636).--Taxes (2637-2642).--\nVoting (2643-2645).--The Duties of Employers (2646, 2647).--The Duties\nof Employees (2648).--Labor Disputes (2649).--Employment (2650).--The\nDuties of Certain Professions (2651).\n\nQuestion IV\n\nTHE DUTIES OF MEN IN THE USE OF THE SACRAMENTS\n\nINTRODUCTION (2652, 2653)\n\nArt. 1. THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL: THE SACRAMENTALS\n\nNature of a Sacrament (2654).--Matter and Form (2655-2660).--Necessity\nof the Sacraments (2661-2663).--The Minister of the Sacraments\n(2664).--Requisites for Valid Ministration (2665-2668).--For Lawful\nMinistration (2669, 2670).--The Recipient of the Sacraments; Requisites\nfor Valid Reception (2671-2674).--Requirements for Lawful Reception\n(2675).--Obligations of the Minister in Reference to the Recipient\n(2676-2682).--Obligations of the Recipient in Reference to the Minister\n(2683).--The Sacramentals (2684).\n\nArt. 2. BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS\n\nIntroduction (2685).--The Sacrament of Baptism (2686).--Solemn and\nPrivate Baptism (2687).--Duties of Pastors (2685).--Duties of Parents\nand Guardians (2689).--Duties of Sponsors (2690, 2691).--Duties of\nAdult Recipients (2692).--Duties of the Minister (2693).--The Sacrament\nof Confirmation (2694).--The Minister (2695).--The Recipient (2696).--\nThe Sponsors (2697).--The Pastor (2698).--The Sacrament of the\nEucharist (2699).--Matter and Form of the Eucharist (2700).--The\nMinister of Consecration (2701, 2702).--The Minister of Communion\n(2703).--The Communicant (2704).--Worthy Communion (2705).--Frequent\nCommunion (2706).--Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors (2707).--The\nCustody and Worship of the Eucharist (2708).--The Sacrifice of the\nMass; the Celebrant (2709).--The Obligation of Saying Mass (2710).--\nDispositions for Celebration of Mass (2711).--The Circumstances of Mass\n(2712).--Interruption of Mass (2713).--Application of Mass (2714,\n2715).--Stipends (2716).\n\nArt. 3. REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION\n\nIntroduction (2717).--The Virtue of Repentance (2718-2726).--The\nSacrament of Penance (2727, 2728).--Contrition (2729-2735).--Resolution\nof Amendment (2736).--Confession (2737-2744).--Satisfaction\n(2745-2749).--The Minister (2750).--Jurisdiction (2751, 2752).--\nReserved Cases (2753, 2754).--Absolution without Jurisdiction (2755).--\nDuties of the Confessor before Confession (2756).--Duties of the\nConfessor as Judge (2757-2761).--Duties of the Confessor as Physician\n(2762).--Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide (2763).--Duties\nof the Confessor after Confession (2764).--Reparation of Defects (2765,\n2766).--The Seal of Confession (2767, 2768).--Abuses of Confession\n(2769-2773).--The Sacrament of Extreme Unction (2774).--Duties of the\nRecipient and the Minister of Extreme Unction (2775).\n\nArt. 4. HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY\n\nIntroduction (2776).--The Sacrament of Orders (2777).--Distinctions of\nOrders (2778).--The Hierarchy (2779).--The Matter and Form of Orders\n(2780).--The Minister of Ordination (2781, 2782).--The Recipient of\nOrders (2783-2785).--Registration of Ordinations (2786).--The Sacrament\nof Matrimony (2787, 2788).--The Elements of Matrimony as a Contract\n(2789-2793).--The Elements of the Sacrament (2794).--Duties in\nReference to Marriage (2795).--Engagement (2796-2798).--Duties to\nParents and to Children (2799, 2800).--Pre-Nuptial Investigations\n(2801).--Examination of the Parties by the Pastor (2802, 2803).--\nMatrimonial Impediments (2804, 2805).--Impedient Impediments\n(2806-2809).--Diriment Impediments (2810-2819).--Dispensations and\nBanns (2820).--After the Examination (2821).--Instruction of the Couple\n(2822-2824).--Religious Preparation for Marriage (2825).--The\nCelebration of Marriage (2826-2829).--Validation (2830).--Divorce and\nSeparation (2831).\n\nAPPENDICES [placed at end of Volume I in print edition]\n\nI. SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS\n\nII. THE \u201cECUMENICAL MOVEMENT\u201d\n\nINDEX TO VOLUMES I AND II\n\n\n\n\nMORAL THEOLOGY\n\nA Complete Course\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n1. Definition.--Moral Theology is defined: (a) etymologically, as the\nstudy of God, considered as the beginning and the end of man\u2019s moral\nlife, i.e., of those acts that proceed from reason and will; (b)\nscientifically, as that part of Sacred Theology which treats of God as\nour Last End, and of the means by which we may tend to Him.\n\n2. Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or\nhabits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human\nconduct as directed by reason to man\u2019s natural end, for Moral Theology\nuses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man\u2019s supernatural\nend; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles\nrevealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs\nfrom synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of\nmorality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals\nalso with supernatural truths and with truths that are not\nself-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions\nfor individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general\nconclusions.\n\n3. Relation of Moral Theology to Dogmatic Theology.--(a) They do not\ndiffer as two distinct sciences, for the main object, in the light of\nwhich all else is studied, is the same in both--viz., God. (b) They do\ndiffer as two quasi-integral parts or branches of the same science,\nDogma being concerned more with the speculative, and Moral with the\npractical aspects of theology. Dogmatic Theology is the more important\nof the two, as treating more directly on divine things and as being the\nbasis of Moral Theology.\n\nIn Dogma, God Himself is considered in His own nature and creatures as\nthey proceed from Him as from an exemplary and efficient cause, or\nCreator. Moral Theology continues the pursuit of knowledge of God,\nconcentrating upon Him as He is the Final Cause of things. Creatures\nemanate from God by way of creation, and this is part of the\nsubject-matter of Dogma; but creatures return to Him, each in its own\nproper way by virtue of its nature created by God and directed by His\nProvidence and Government, and this return of creatures to God\nconstitutes the general subject-matter of Moral Theology. As Divine\nProvidence and Government are continuations of His Creation, Moral\nTheology continues to study and to unfold the implications of Dogma\u2019s\nconsideration of God as Creator. God is known to have created as an\nIntelligent Being ordering His handiwork to Himself as end. His special\nmasterpiece, man, special because he is made to the Image of God,\nreturns to God in a special way proper to him as an Image, i.e., by way\nof acts of his intellect and will guided and moved by Divine Providence\nand Predestination. It is of this special way of returning to God by\nman, His image, that Moral Theology treats. Thus it adds to and\nperfects Dogmatic Theology, enriching our knowledge of God by way of\nmaking explicit the implications of Divine Creation and Providence to\nHis image, man.\n\n4. The Objects of Moral Theology.--(a) The central theme or object of\nMoral Theology, which is considered for its own sake and to which all\nelse is secondary (_objectum formale quod_), is God as the supernatural\nEnd or Destiny of man.\n\n(b) The secondary object (_objectum materiale_) is the means by which\none is advanced towards one\u2019s Last End (such as human acts, virtue,\ngrace, the Sacraments), or the obstacles which hinder one from\nattaining that End (such as vice, temptation, etc.).\n\n(c) The medium through which the above objects are known (_objectum\nformale quo_) is the light of natural reason illuminated by faith\nstudying the sources of divine revelation and deducing conclusions from\ndoctrines revealed by God.\n\n5. Hence Moral Theology includes: (a) the revealed doctrines concerning\nman\u2019s destiny and duty that are contained in the written and oral Word\nof God and as interpreted by their custodian, the Catholic Church; (b)\nthe conclusions that are contained in revelation; (c) the duties of man\nto human laws that are based on the divine natural or positive law; (d)\nthe opinions of theologians on matters that are disputed, as in the\ncontroversy about the systems of conscience.\n\n6. The Sources of Moral Theology, therefore, are: (a) Holy scripture;\n(b) tradition; (c) the decisions of Popes, Councils, and Congregations,\nLaws, etc.; (d) the authority of Doctors and theologians; (e) natural\nreason.\n\n7. Holy scripture.--\u201cAll scripture, inspired by God, is profitable to\nteach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice\u201d (II Tim., iii.\n16). (a) Thus, the deeds narrated in scripture contain lessons for our\ninstruction; but not all of them, even though they be concerned with\nholy men, are offered for our imitation. (b) The laws of the Old\nTestament known as ceremonial (such as the rite of circumcision), and\nthose called judicial (such as the prohibition against the taking of\ninterest), are no longer obligatory; but the moral precepts, such as\nthose found in the Decalogue, always remain in force. (c) The\nordinances of the New Testament are of three kinds: the Gospel\ncounsels, which are not laws, but invitations to a higher practice of\nvirtue than is necessary for salvation (e.g., the advice of our Lord\nthat one sell all and give to the poor); the laws of the New Testament,\nwhich are the commands that it imposes for all times (such as the\nprecepts that one believe the Gospel message, receive Baptism, hear the\nChurch, etc.); temporary regulations, which are those dispositions that\nwere made only for passing circumstances (such as the prohibition\nissued by the Apostles against the eating of animals that had been\nsuffocated).\n\n8. Tradition.--Tradition contains those doctrines concerning faith and\nmorals, not found in scripture, that were given orally by Christ or\ninspired by the Holy Spirit, and that have been handed down from one\ngeneration to another in the Catholic Church.\n\nTradition becomes known to us: (a) through the teaching of the Church\nexpressed by her solemn or ordinary magisterium; (b) through the\nwritings of the Fathers of the Church; (c) through the practice of the\nChurch expressed in her universal customs and laws; (d) through the\nworship of the Church expressed in her universal forms of prayer and\nliturgical observance.\n\n9. Decisions.--In addition to divine tradition just spoken of, Moral\nTheology uses: (a) Apostolic tradition, which comes down from the\nApostles, but whose subject-matter is not a teaching revealed to them,\nbut an ordinance which they themselves made as rulers of the Church\n(e.g., the law that Sunday be sanctified as the Lord\u2019s day); (b)\necclesiastical tradition, which contains regulations made by the\nauthorities in the Church and handed down to succeeding times (e.g.,\nthe introduction of certain days of feast or fast).\n\n10. Authority of Doctors and Theologians.--(a) St. Thomas Aquinas has\nbeen recognized by the Church as her highest theological authority, and\nthe Code of Canon Law (Canons 589, Sec. 1, and 1366, Sec. 2) orders\nthat in all seminaries and religious houses of study the courses of\ntheology shall be made according to his method, teaching and principles.\n\n(b) When the theologians agree with unanimity that a certain doctrine\npertaining to faith or morals is divinely revealed, it would be next\nto heresy to hold the opposite; if they agree only that it is certain,\nit would be rash to contradict them, unless new and serious objections\nunknown to them can be offered; if they are divided between schools\nand systems (even though great claims for opinions are made by their\npartisans), it is lawful for competent theologians to use their\nown judgment and decide for the side that seems to have the better\narguments in its favor.\n\n11. Reason.--The uses of natural reason in Moral Theology are: (a) it\ndemonstrates certain preambles to the teachings of Moral Theology, such\nas the existence of God, His omniscience and veracity; (b) it\ncorroborates from philosophy many of the revealed teachings, viz., that\nman\u2019s end is not in things finite, that he has duties to God, to\nsociety, to himself, etc.; (e) it affords analogies in the natural\norder by which we may illustrate the end and duties of man in the\nsupernatural order; (d) it supplies the means by which the teachings on\nmorals may be developed into the conclusions that are contained in\nthem, by which those teachings may be defended against the fallacious\nobjections of adversaries, and by which the whole may be arranged\nscientifically into a body of doctrine.\n\n12. Moral Theology is served not only by the various branches of\nphilosophy (such as Ethics, Theodicy, Psychology, Logic), but also by\nmany of the natural sciences. Thus: (a) Medicine and Physiology are\nuseful for understanding the morality and imputability of acts; (b)\nSociology and Economics may throw light on problems concerning justice;\n(c) Jurisprudence is, of course, closely related to questions\nconcerning duties that arise from human laws; (d) History confirms the\nteachings of Christian morality by the lessons of experience.\n\n13. The Method to Be Followed in Moral Theology.-(a) The positive\nmethod is a simple statement of moral principles and doctrines, with\nlittle attention to argument, except such as is found in the positive\nsources (e.g., scripture, tradition, the decisions of the Church).\n\n(b) The Scholastic method is a scientific statement of moral teaching\nthrough accurate definition of terms, systematic coordination of parts,\nstrict argumentation and defense, attention to controversies, and\nrecourse to philosophy and other natural knowledge.\n\n(c) The casuistic method, or case-system, is the application of moral\nprinciples to the solution of concrete problems of lawfulness or\nunlawfulness.\n\n14. The Scholastic method is the one best suited for the study of Moral\nTheology, because it is more scientific, and fits one better to\nunderstand, retain, and apply what one learns. But it is not exclusive\nof the other methods, since it perfects the positive method, and is the\ngroundwork for the case method. Each method has a special suitability\nfor certain ends. Thus: (a) the positive method is well adapted to\npreaching, and hence was much in favor with the Fathers of the Church,\nas can be seen from their moral homilies and treatises; (b) the\nScholastic method is the best for study, teaching, apologetic, and was\nfollowed by the great classical works of theology in the Middle Ages\nand later; (c) the case method is very helpful to the seminarian and\nthe priest in the exercise of the ministry of the confessional.\n\n15. The History of Moral Theology.--There are three periods in the\nhistory of Moral Theology: the Patristic, the Medieval, and the Modern.\n\n(a) The Patristic Period (1st to 12th century).--The moral writings of\nthe-Fathers are popular, exhortatory, and occasional; and it is not\ntill the Middle Ages that we meet with works of systematic Moral\nTheology. The following are among the most notable moral works of the\nFathers: the _Paedagoga_ of Clement of Alexandria (d. about 217), which\nexplains what the everyday life of the Christian should be; the\n_Catecheses_ of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386); the _De Officiis\nMinistrorum_ of St. Ambrose (d. 397), a Christian counterpart of\nCicero\u2019s work _De Officiis_; the _De Civitate Dei_ of St. Augustine (d.\n430), which contrasts love of God and love of self; the _Expositio in\nJob seu Moralium libri XXV_ of St. Gregory the Great (d. 604), which\nconsists of moral instructions based on the Book of Job.\n\nCelebrated among the ascetical and mystical writings are: the _Ladder\nof Paradise_ of St. John Climacus (6th century), the Conferences of\nCassian (about 416), the _Libri V de Consideratione_ of St. Bernard (d.\n1153). St. Gregory the Great\u2019s _De Cura Pastorali_ is a systematic work\nof pastoral theology, and is regarded as a classic.\n\n(b) The Medieval Period (12th to 16th century).--The method of the\nmoralists of this period differs from that of the Fathers in that the\nformer is systematic and philosophical, and more proximately adapted to\nthe use of confessors. The masterpiece of scientific Moral Theology is\nof course found in the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas Aquinas (d.\n1274). Works of casuistry were composed by St. Raymond of Pennafort\n(about 1235), by John of Freiburg (d. 1314), by John of Asti (about\n1317), by Angelus of Chiavasso (about 1476), by Sylvester Prierias (d.\n1523). The _Summa Theologica_ of St. Antoninus of Florence (d. 1459)\nhas been called an inexhaustible storehouse for manuals of casuistry.\n\nAmong the ascetical writers are: St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor\n(d. 1274), John Gerson (d. 1429), John Tauler (d. 1361), Bl. Henry Suso\n(d. 1366), and Denis the Carthusian (d. 1471).\n\n(c) The Modern Period (16th century to the present).--Characteristic of\nthis period are the commentaries written on St. Thomas, the\ncontroversies over the systems of conscience, the appearance of\nnumerous manuals and special treatises, and the attention given to\nchanged conditions of society and ecclesiastical discipline. Noteworthy\namong modern works are: the Commentary on St. Thomas by Cajetan (d.\n1534); the writings of Bartholomew de Medina (d. 1581), called the\nfather of moderate Probabilism; the _De Paenitentia_ of Lugo (d. 1660),\na handbook that combines speculative and casuistical theology; the\n_Roman Catechism_, which was issued by the authority of the Council of\nTrent in 1566; the _Theologia Moralis_ of St. Alphonsus Liguori (d.\n1787), a work whose authority is universally recognized; the celebrated\ntreatise on the virtues by Lessius (d. 1623); the classic work of\nSuarez (d. 1617), _De Religione_; the _Summa Casuum Conscientiae_ of\nToletus (d. 1596); the commentaries of Francis de Victoria (d. 1546),\nwhich are writings of extraordinary merit. More recent works are so\nnumerous that it is impossible to mention them here.\n\n18. Among the many modern works on Moral Theology which have been\npublished abroad, not a few are in the vernacular--in German, French,\nItalian, Spanish, etc. While they are not intended to replace the Latin\ntext-books used in seminaries, these are nevertheless a very great help\nto a fuller knowledge of the matter treated and to a more ready use of\nit in the work of the ministry.\n\nSo far there has been a dearth of works on Moral Theology in English;\nand it is this want that has occasioned the present work, which aims at\npresenting Moral Theology, not only in its essentials, but even more in\ndetail and with greater fullness than is done by most of the text-books\ncommonly in use. And yet, while pursuing this larger and more\ncomprehensive plan, the authors of this new work have tried to be as\nbrief and compact as possible. It has been their endeavor especially to\navoid digressions into other fields and to sum up pertinent matter in\nas clear and simple a manner as the subjects treated will permit.\n\n17. The Division and Order of Parts in Moral Theology.--The arrangement\nof his matter made by St. Thomas Aquinas in the _Summa Theologica_ is\nadmittedly unsurpassed and unsurpassable in the qualities that good\ndistribution should have, viz., clearness, connection between parts,\ncompleteness. Hence, we cannot do better than follow the order he has\nused in his treatment of moral subjects. His general division is as\nfollows:\n\n(1) The Last End of Man.--From the Last End acts derive their morality,\nthose being good that advance man towards its attainment, and those\nevil that turn him away from its possession. The Last End is\nconsidered; (a) as to its existence; (b) as to its nature (i.e., the\nconstituents of supreme beatitude).\n\n(2) The General Means Tending to the Last End.--God is approached, not\nby the steps of the body, but by the operations of the soul, and thus\nit is human acts that lead one to one\u2019s Last End. These acts are\nconsidered: (a) as they are in themselves or absolutely, and according\nto the twofold division of acts proper to man (human acts) and acts\ncommon to man and beast (passions); (b) as to the internal principles\nfrom which they proceed, i.e., habits, whether good (virtues) or bad\n(vices); (c) as to the external principles by which they are\ninfluenced. The external principle of evil is the demon, who tempts man\nto sin. The external principle of good is God, who instructs us by His\nlaw and the voice of conscience, and assists us by His grace.\n\n(3) The Special Means Tending to the Last End.--These are our own good\nworks; hence, here are considered the virtues incumbent on all classes\nof men, i.e., the theological and moral virtues.\n\n18. Some of the topics just mentioned (e.g., divine grace) are\ndiscussed fully in works on Dogmatic Theology, and hence may be omitted\nhere. Again, since the Last End of man is considered at great length in\ndogmatic works on Eschatology, little need be said about it here.\nHence, it will be convenient to divide this work into two parts as\nfollows: General Moral Theology, in which are treated the more remote\nprinciples on duty, such as the Last End, human acts, good and bad\nhabits, laws and conscience, grace; (b) Special Moral Theology, in\nwhich are treated the more immediate rules concerning duty, i.e., man\u2019s\nobligations as regards the virtues and the Commandments.\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\nGENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY\n\n\n\n\nQuestion I\n\nTHE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END\n\n\n\n\nArt. 1: THE LAST END OF MAN\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 1-5; _Contra Gentes_, IV, cc. 1-63.)\n\n19. Existence of the Last End.--Every deliberate act proceeds from the\nwill, and, since the will pursues good as its goal, it follows that\nevery deliberate act is done for some good or end. But, if this end is\nan imperfect good, it is desired not for itself but as leading up to a\nperfect good, that is, to one which will leave nothing beyond it to be\ndesired; in other words, the intermediate end is willed on account of a\nlast end. Hence, all that a man wills, he wills directly or indirectly\non account of a last end. All men desire their own happiness and\nperfection; but not all understand in what beatitude consists, since\nsome aim ultimately at finite goods.\n\n20. Nature of the Last End.--As man\u2019s Last End is that object which\nwill make him perfectly happy, it cannot consist: (a) in external\ngoods, such as wealth, honors, fame, glory and power, since one might\nhave all these and yet be very unhappy; (b) in goods of the body, such\nas health, beauty, pleasure and strength, since all these things are\npassing, and moreover satisfy only a part, and that the lower part, of\nman; (c) in goods of the soul, such as wisdom or virtue, since man\u2019s\nintellect is never content with particular truth, nor his will with\nparticular good, the former always reaching out for the highest truth,\nthe latter for the highest good. Hence, the Last End of man is the\nInfinite Good, or God \u201cwho satisfieth thy desire\u201d (Psalm cii. 5).\n\n21. Attainment of the Last End.--God being supersensible, the act by\nwhich He is attained cannot be any operation of the senses, but must be\nan act of the higher powers. Man possesses his Last End through the\nvision of God, from which result beatific love and every good that is\ncompatible with the glorified state. For \u201cwe see now through a glass in\na dark manner, but then face to face\u201d (I Cor., xiii. 12); and there\nshall be \u201cglory and honor and peace to everyone that worketh good\u201d\n(Rom, ii. 10).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: ACTS AS HUMAN\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 6-17.)\n\n22. Human acts are a means to man\u2019s Last End, inasmuch as they are\nmeritorious--i.e., labors that deserve a recompense (I Cor., iii. 8),\nstruggles that deserve a crown (II Tim., ii. 5). But works are not\nmeritorious unless they are one\u2019s own (human) and good (moral); and,\nsince the reward is supernatural, they must also be the fruit of grace.\nHence, we shall speak of acts in the following order: (a) acts as human\nand free (Art. 2); (b) acts as morally good (Art. 3); (c) acts as\nsupernaturally meritorious (Art. 4).\n\n23. Definition.--Those acts are called human of which a man is the\nmaster, and he is master of his actions in virtue of his reason and his\nwill, which faculties make him superior to non-human agents that act\nwithout reason and freedom. Hence, the following kinds of acts done by\na human being are not called human: (a) those that are not under the\ncontrol of the mind, because one is permanently or temporarily without\nthe use of reason or without knowledge (e.g., the acts done by the\ninsane; by those who are unconscious or delirious, under the influence\nof hypnotism or drugs, distracted or carried away by vehement fear,\nanger, etc.; by infants and uninstructed persons); (b) those that are\nnot under the control of the will, even though they are known (e.g.,\nautomatic acts, such as the acts of the vegetative powers, growth,\ncirculation of the blood; pathological acts, such as convulsions; acts\ndone under external violence).\n\n24. Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.--An act is human, or\nvoluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be\ndeliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge\nis not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the\nlanguage he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand\nwhat he is saying.\n\n25. The condition of a person without knowledge is ignorance, which is\ndefined as the absence of knowledge in one who is capable of knowing.\nIgnorance is of various kinds. From the viewpoint of that which is not\nknown (i.e., of the object of the ignorance), there is ignorance of the\nsubstance of an act and ignorance of the quality of an act. For\nexample, Titus driving rapidly in the dark runs over and kills a pet\nanimal of his neighbor, but knows nothing of this happening (ignorance\nof the substance of the act); Balbus, a child, fires a pistol at his\nplaymate, not knowing that this causes death (ignorance of the physical\nquality of an act), and that it is the sin of murder (ignorance of the\nmoral quality of an act).\n\n26. With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three\nkinds of ignorance may be distinguished.\n\n(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will),\nwhen it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the\nact that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had\nthere been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a\nhunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally\nwhile shooting at an animal.\n\n(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is\nvoluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is\naffected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about\nhis duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may\nnot be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to\nacquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a\nman, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before\nfiring.\n\n(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is\nnot voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act\nwould not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a\nhunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a\nman whom he mistook for a deer.\n\n27. With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant,\nthere are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it\ncannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily\nprudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus,\na person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in\nvain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant.\n(b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of\nordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance:\nfirst, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised,\nbut not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any\ndiligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person\ndeliberately aims to continue in ignorance.\n\n28. Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of\nActs.--(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality,\nmakes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as\nwill be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that\nis not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may\nsay: \u201cIgnorance excuses.\u201d\n\n(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless\nthe law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as\nwill be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law\nis sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one\u2019s own self, the\npresumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable.\nHence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence:\n\u201cIgnorance does not excuse\u201d (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).\n\n29. Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.--(a)\nConcomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does\nnot cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the\nact that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be\nactually desired.\n\n(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since\nsuch ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect\nmake an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been\ndone save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act\nentirely involuntary.\n\n30. Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.--(a) Invincible\nignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act\ninvoluntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence,\nno matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of\nformal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice\ninvolved.\n\n(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the\nignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It\ndoes not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the\nignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a\nstate of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though\nhe had knowledge.\n\n31. Vincible ignorance makes an act less voluntary and less sinful: (a)\nwhen the ignorance is not affected, for the voluntariness is measured\nby the knowledge, and knowledge here is lacking; (b) when the\nignorance, though affected, was fostered only through fear that\nknowledge might compel a stricter way of life; for such a state of mind\nseems to show that one would not act the same way if one had knowledge.\n\n32. Like to ignorance are the following: (a) error, which is a judgment\nnot in agreement with the facts (e.g., Balbus, a young child, thinks\nstealing is lawful, because older persons are represented as stealing\nin the moving pictures); (b) forgetfulness, which is ignorance of what\nwas once known (e.g., Titus made a study of his duties as a Catholic\nwhen he was young, but at present what he does not know about those\nduties is not inconsiderable); (c) inadvertence, which is a lack of\nattention to what is being done (e.g., Caius, who is absent-minded,\nsometimes gets his hair cut and goes away without paying, or takes\nmoney that does not belong to him).\n\n33. The principles and conclusions given above with regard to ignorance\nwill apply also to error, forgetfulness and inadvertence; for in all\nthese cases the lack of actual knowledge at the moment an act is done,\nis either willed or not willed, and accordingly the act itself is\neither voluntary or not voluntary. In the examples mentioned above,\nBalbus does not will the guilt of theft, since he does not know it; but\nhis elders do will that guilt, because they should know it. Titus is\nresponsible for neglecting his duties, if he has forgotten them through\nhis own neglect of them or other fault; otherwise, he is not\nresponsible. Caius\u2019 inattention is involuntary, if due to mental\nconcentration or distraction, and if it is not desired by him; it is\nvoluntary, if he is aware of it and cultivates it, or if he does not\ntry to be more attentive to his duties.\n\n34. Consent Requisite for a Human Act.--To be human, an act must\nproceed not only from knowledge, but also from inclination; that is, it\nmust be voluntary. Three things are necessary in order that an act be\nvoluntary: (a) it must be agreeable to an internal principle, i.e., in\nmost moral matters to the will. Hence, an act that is done against\none\u2019s will on account of external violence is not voluntary; (b) it\nmust be caused by the will. Hence, a shower of rain is said to be\nagreeable to the gardener, but not voluntary since his will is not its\ncause; (c) it must be performed with a conscious purpose. Hence,\nnatural acts (such as sleeping) and spontaneous acts (such as stroking\none\u2019s beard absent-mindedly) are not voluntary acts.\n\n35. Kinds of Voluntary Acts.-(a) A voluntary act is free or necessary,\naccording as one can or cannot abstain from it. The vision of God in\nheaven is voluntary to the blessed, since they look at Him knowingly\nand gladly; but it is not free, since they cannot avert their gaze from\nthat which makes them blessed. The love of God on earth is voluntary,\nsince chosen; but it is also free, since man is able to turn away from\nGod.\n\n(b) An act is perfectly or imperfectly voluntary, according as the\ndeliberation and consent that precede it are full or only partial.\n\n(c) An act is said to be simply--that is, absolutely--voluntary, when\nit is wished under circumstances that exist here and now, although in\nitself, apart from those circumstances, it is not wished. It is said to\nbe voluntary under a certain aspect, when it is desired for itself, but\nnot under existing conditions. Thus, if an arm needs to be amputated to\nsave life, the amputation is absolutely voluntary, while the\npreservation of the arm is voluntary only in a certain respect. Hence,\nan act is voluntary simply or absolutely when one chooses it, all\nthings considered; it remains involuntary under a certain respect,\ninasmuch as the choice is made with reluctance.\n\n(d) An act is voluntary in itself or directly, when it is desired in\nitself for its own sake (i.e., as an end), or for the sake of something\nelse (i.e., as a means). It is voluntary in its cause or indirectly,\nwhen it is not desired in itself, either as a means or an end, but is\nforeseen as the result of something else that is intended. Examples:\nTitus quarrels with his neighbors, at times because he likes to\nquarrel, and at other times because he wishes to make them fear him;\nhence, his quarrels are directly voluntary. Caius is a peaceful man who\ndislikes quarreling; but he likes to drink too much occasionally,\nalthough he knows that he always quarrels when he is under the\ninfluence of liquor. Thus, his quarrels are indirectly voluntary.\n\n36. An act is voluntary in its cause in two ways: (a) approvingly\n(physically and morally voluntary in cause), when one is able and\nobliged not to perform the act that is its cause (e.g., the quarrels of\nCaius mentioned above are approved implicitly by him, since he could\nand should prevent the intoxication which is their cause); (b)\npermissively (physically voluntary in cause), when one is not able or\nnot obliged to omit the act that is its cause (see 94 sqq.). Examples:\nBalbus, in order to make a living, has to associate with persons of\nquarrelsome character, and as a result often hears shocking disputes.\nTitus, a military commander, orders an enemy fortification to be\nbombarded, although he knows that this will involve the destruction of\nother property and the unavoidable killing of some non-combatants or\nneutrals. Caius writes a book whose purpose and natural result is\nedification, but he foresees that evil-minded persons will\nmisunderstand it and take scandal.\n\n37. Omissions, as well as acts, may be voluntary. (a) Thus, they are\ndirectly voluntary, when they are willed as an end or as a means to\nan end. Example: Titus fails to reprove the disorders of those in\nhis charge because he likes disorder, or because it illustrates his\ntheory that everyone should go through an evolution from roughness to\nrefinement. (b) They are indirectly voluntary, when their cause is\nwilled with approval or permitted with disapproval. Example: Balbus\ndoes not like to miss Mass, but he fails to rise from bed when he hears\nthe church bell ringing, and as a result does not get to church. If\nhis failure to get up was due to laziness, the omission of Mass was\napproved by Balbus; if it was due to illness, the omission was only\npermitted.\n\n38. The effect that follows upon an omission may also be voluntary. (a)\nThus, it is directly voluntary, if the omission is chosen as a means to\nthe effect. Example: Caius hears Titus say that he is going to make a\ncertain business deal, and he knows that Titus will suffer a great loss\nthereby; but he wishes Titus to lose his money, and therefore says\nnothing about the danger. (b) It is indirectly voluntary, if one\nforesees the effect, and approves or permits it. Examples: Balbus sees\nTitus attacked by a hoodlum and realizes that, unless assisted, Titus\nwill be badly beaten up; but he is such an admirer of pugilism that, in\nspite of his sorrow for Titus, he decides not to stop the fight. Caius\nsees his friend Sempronius drowning, and fails to go to his assistance,\nbecause to his regret he is not an expert swimmer.\n\n39. The effect of an omission is indirectly voluntary and approved by\nthe will when one is able and bound to do what one omits. Example:\nBalbus receives some confidential documents with the understanding that\nhe will guard them sacredly; but fearing to lose the good graces of\nTitus, who is curious and loquacious, he omits to put the papers away\nas promised, with the result that Titus finds them and reads them.\n\n40. Obstacles to Consent.--The obstacles to consent are all those\nfactors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus,\nthe actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to\nignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and\nfear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The\nhabitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states.\n\n41. Fear is a disturbance of mind caused by the thought that a future\ndanger is impending. It is an obstacle to consent in various ways: (a)\nit lessens or takes away freedom of judgment, inasmuch as it hinders or\nsuspends the reasoning processes; (b) it lessens the voluntariness of\nchoice, inasmuch as it makes one decide for what is not of itself\nagreeable.\n\n42. An act done under fear that impeded the use of judgment is: (a)\ninvoluntary, if the fear was so great that one was temporarily out of\none\u2019s mind. Example: Titus is so panic-stricken at the thought that a\nwild animal is pursuing him that he fires a revolver in every\ndirection; (b) less voluntary, if the fear prevents one from thinking\nwith calmness and deliberation. Example: Caius is being questioned by a\nstern examiner who demands an immediate reply. Fearing to hesitate,\nCaius gives what he knows is a \u201cbluffing\u201d answer.\n\n43. The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.\n\n(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant--i.e., when\nit is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion\nor would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of\ndeath to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and\nwhich he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a\nlonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought\nof robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces\nBalbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive\nbefore he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by\nair, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some\napprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but\napart from or in spite of their fears.\n\n(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not\notherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or\nconsequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned\nabove, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was\ncaused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow\nfor sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the\npunishment of hell.\n\n44. The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on\nthe voluntariness of acts are as follows.\n\n(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of\nthe fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake,\nnot out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called\nrelatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are\ncomparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger.\nExamples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted\nwith perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or\nnot, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement.\n\n(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the\nact done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and\nnow as most desirable. Examples: Balbus\u2019 surrender of his purse and\nClaudius\u2019 act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as\nbest suited to the circumstances.\n\n(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the\nagent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and\nstill avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary.\nExamples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by\nforce, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although\nvoluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the\nmoney itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no\nliking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the\npurpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell;\nhence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect\ninvoluntary.\n\n45. Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite towards its object\nthrough love, desire, hope, or its repose therein through delight. It\ntends towards good, as fear tends away from evil (see 117 sqq.).\nPassion is an obstacle to consent in the following ways: (a) it takes\naway voluntariness (i.e., the quality of proceeding from an internal\nprinciple with knowledge of the end of the act), whenever it is so\nintense as to prevent knowledge; (b) it diminishes liberty (i.e., the\nquality of being perfectly voluntary, or indifferent as between many\nacts), even when it does not prevent knowledge.\n\n46. Spiritual appetites fortify the reason, but the opposite is true of\nsensible appetites; for these latter draw all the attention to things\nthat are lower and away from those that are higher, and impede the\nexercise of imagination and other senses that serve the reason. In\nextreme and rare cases passion may be so intense as to distract from or\nprevent altogether the exercise of reason, or to produce insanity.\nThus, we sometimes hear of persons losing their minds through affection\nfor money, or of performing irrational deeds under the excitement of\njoy.\n\n47. With reference to the will, passion is twofold. (a) It is\nantecedent, when it precedes the act of the will and causes it. In this\ncase the passion arises not from the will, but from some other cause\n(e.g., the bodily state, as when a sick man longs for food that is\nforbidden). (b) Passion is consequent when it follows the act of the\nwill and results from it. This may happen either without the will\nchoosing the passion (as when the very vehemence with which the will\ndesires some object causes a corresponding sensitive emotion to\nawaken), or because the will has deliberately aroused the emotion in\norder to be able the better to act through its cooperation.\n\n48. Antecedent passion makes an act more voluntary, since it makes the\nwill tend with greater inclination to its object; but it likewise makes\nan act less free, since it impedes deliberation and disturbs the power\nof choice. Example: A man who takes extreme delight in sports, plays\nvoluntarily, but is less free than if he were not so immoderately\ninclined that way.\n\n49. Consequent passion which results naturally from an intense act of\nthe will does not increase the voluntariness of the act, since it is\nnot its cause; but it does show that the act of the will is intense,\nfor it is only that which is willed vehemently that overflows from the\nwill and affects the emotions.\n\n50. Consequent passion which results from the deliberate choice of the\nwill increases the voluntariness of the act that follows, since the act\nis performed with greater intensity on account of the passion that has\nbeen deliberately excited.\n\n51. What has been said about the passions that tend to sensible good\ncan be applied also to the passions that are concerned with sensible\nevils, such as hatred, sadness, aversion, boldness, anger. If they are\nantecedent, they increase the voluntariness of an act, but diminish its\nfreedom; and, if they cause a passing frenzy or insanity, they take\naway all responsibility. If they are consequent, they either increase\nthe willingness of the act, or indicate that it is willed with great\nintensity.\n\n52. Violence, or coercion, is the use of force by an external agent to\ncompel one to do what one does not want to do. Its effects on\nvoluntariness are: (a) it cannot affect the internal act of the will,\nelse we should have the contradiction that the act of the will was both\nvoluntary, as proceeding from the will, and involuntary, as proceeding\nfrom external coercion; (b) it can affect external acts, such as\nwalking, and so make them involuntary. If a boy is driven to school,\nthe violence makes his going involuntary, but it does not make his will\nnot to go to school involuntary.\n\n53. Habits.--Characteristic of habits is a constant inclination,\nresulting from repeated acts, to perform similar acts (see 133 for\ndefinition of habit). Its effect[s] on the voluntariness of acts are:\n\n(a) if the habit is in a sense involuntary, i.e., caused by free acts\nbut retracted by a sincere act of contrition, it diminishes or even\ntakes away voluntariness. If the actual advertence to the act is\nimperfect, the voluntariety is diminished; if advertence is totally\nabsent, all voluntariety is taken away. Thus a drunkard who retracts\nhis habit and makes an act of true contrition may again fall into sin\nbecause of the acquired dispositions to drink. Then the sins are less\nvoluntary or at times, owing to total lack of advertence, may be\nregarded solely as material sins.\n\n(b) if the habit is voluntary, i.e., acquired by free acts and not\nretracted, it increases the voluntariness in respect to the inclination\nto act. Should all advertence and deliberation be taken away, a rare\noccurrence, it diminishes the liberty of the act and consequently its\nmorality as good or bad. Voluntariety, however, is not taken away\nentirely, since the habit itself was freely willed and hence acts\nflowing from it are voluntary in cause (see 35.). If sufficient\nadvertence remains, the habit diminishes the freedom of the act owing\nto the impeding of reason; but this diminution of liberty is in accord\nwith the will of the individual who freely contracted and conserves the\nhabit to have facility in acting. Accordingly, absolutely speaking, a\nvoluntary habit increases the voluntariety of acts caused by that habit\nand consequently increases their goodness or evil. Thus St. Thomas\nasserts that one who sins from habit sins from certain malice, i.e.,\nnot from ignorance or passion, but from the will\u2019s own choice.\n\n54. Natural propensities are inclinations that arise from bodily\nconstitution or physical condition (e.g., a strong native attraction to\ntemperance or to intemperance not acquired by frequent acts). Natural\npropensities have the same kind of influence on the willingness of an\nact as involuntary habits (see 53.).\n\n55. Pathological states are diseases of the brain or nerves that react\nupon the intellect and the will, such as various kinds of neuroses and\npsychoses, hysteria and epilepsy. The influence of pathological states\non the voluntariness of acts seems similar in kind to that ascribed to\nantecedent passion (see 48.). Caution must be observed in applying\nthese principles to particular kinds of mental diseases.[1]\n\n[1] In doubt whether an act associated with a pathological state is\nfree or not, the rule of moralists is lenient. When the act is sinful,\nit is not imputed as gravely sinful, for man is innocent until proven\nguilty. If the act is good, it is presumed voluntary and free and,\nconsequently, meritorious. See Prummer, D.M., O.P., _Manuale Theologiae\nMoralis_ (Barcelona: Herder, 1946), I. n.93.\n\n56. Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.--Having discussed human or voluntary\nacts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are\nof this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those\nelicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.\n\n57. Acts Elicited by the Will.--The first class of acts under the\ncontrol of the will are those that are performed by the will\nitself--i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.\n\n58. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the\nwill has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love\nor inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the\nmeans by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will.\nIntention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end\nthrough certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it\nhas been gained: this is the last act of the will.\n\n59. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and\nthat follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent\nfollows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will\nagreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election\nfollows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means\nconsented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means\nin preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the\nintended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the\nother powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.\n\n60. Acts Commanded by the Will.--The second class of acts that are\nunder the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will\nitself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.\n\n61. Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual\nacts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction\nof the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the\npassions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as\nwalking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by\nthe will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).\n\n62. The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the\nwill: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to\nself-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b)\nsensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily\ndispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative\nlife, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the\ncirculation of the blood and the beating of the heart.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 3: ACTS AS MORAL\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 18-20.)\n\n63. In order that an act be a means by which man may tend to his Last\nEnd, it is not sufficient that it be human (proceeding from knowledge\nand will); it must also be morally good.\n\n64. Definition.--Morality is the agreement or disagreement, of a human\nact with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man\u2019s\nLast End. The act which is in agreement with those norms is morally\ngood; the act which is in disagreement with them is morally bad. An act\nthat neither agrees nor disagrees with the norms of morality, is called\nmorally indifferent.\n\n65. The constitutive norm of morality is that which gives an act its\nmoral quality. (a) Proximately, this is the relation of agreement or\ndisagreement of the act to the rational nature of man considered in its\nentirety and with reference to its true happiness; (b) remotely, this\nnorm is the relation of the act to God, the Last End of man.\n\n66. Hence, that which makes an act morally good is its agreement with\nthe nature of man as a rational being destined for heaven, and its\npromotion of the glory of God, which is the purpose of all creation.\n\n67. The manifestative norm of morality is that through which the moral\nquality of acts is known. (a) Proximately, this is right reason, which\nis the superior faculty and guide of the will; (b) remotely, it is the\ndivine intellect, from which reason receives its light.\n\n68. The preceptive norm of morality is that which points out duty with\nrespect to good and evil. (a) Proximately, it is conscience; (b)\nremotely, it is the law of God.\n\n69. The species of morality are three: (a) an act is morally good when\nit is in harmony with the norms of morality mentioned above (e.g.,\nprayer, works of charity); (b) an act is morally bad when it is out of\nharmony with those norms (e.g., blasphemy, injustice); (c) an act is\nmorally indifferent when, if considered in the abstract, it neither\nagrees nor disagrees with moral norms (e.g., walking, riding, etc.).\n\n70. The Sources of Morality.--The sources from which the morality of an\nact is derived are its own tendencies and modes, in so far as they have\na relation of agreement or disagreement to the standards of morals.\nThese sources are: (a) the object of the act, from which it derives its\nessence (e.g., God is the object of charity); (b) the circumstances of\nthe act, by which it is modified accidentally (e.g., fervor is a\ncircumstance of the act of charity); (c) the purpose or end of the\nagent, which is the chief circumstance (e.g., to please God, as the\npurpose of a work of charity).\n\n71. The object of an action is that to which it primarily and naturally\ntends as to its term and end, and from which it is named. Thus, an alms\nis directed immediately and of its own nature to the relief of the poor\n(end of the act); it is only secondarily and from the direction given\nit by the agent that it tends to generosity and edification, since the\nagent may give stingily, or from a bad motive (end of the agent).\n\n72. The circumstances are all those conditions, different from the\nobject, that affect the morality of the act. The chief moral\ncircumstances are: (a) the time (i.e., the duration, the character of\nthe day, as a holyday, fast-day, etc.); (b) the place (i.e., in public\nor in private, in church or elsewhere, etc.); (c) the manner (i.e., the\nadvertence or inadvertence, the cruelty, etc.); (d) the quantity or\nquality of the thing done (e.g., that an alms is large or small, that\nthe person who is helped is more or less deserving, etc.); (e) the\npurpose of the agent (e.g., that an alms is given to honor God); (f)\nthe quality or condition of the agent (e.g., that the giver of an alms\nis poor himself); (g) the means used (e.g., that a benefactor\u2019s own\nmoney is used against himself).\n\n73. With reference to their influence on the moral character of acts,\ncircumstances are divided as follows: (a) circumstances that change the\nkind of morality, by making what was good to be bad, what was\nindifferent to be good or bad, what was venial to be mortal, what\nbelonged to one class of mortal sins to take on another character,\netc.; (b) circumstances that change the degree of morality, by making a\ngood act more or less good, or by making a bad act more or less bad.\n\n74. The purpose or end of an action is the reason which induces the\nagent to act. It is the chief circumstance of an act, and hence is\ntreated as a separate source of morality.\n\n75. The end or purpose is twofold. (a) It is the total end when it\nalone is intended, so that the action is done with no other aim in\nmind. Thus, if one helps the poor only to practise charity, the total\nmotive is charity. (b) The end is partial when it is intended along\nwith another motive of equal or unequal force. Thus, if a person helps\nthe poor in order to relieve them and also to benefit temporarily by\nhis charity, the assistance of others is only a partial motive of his\nact; and if he would not give alms except in view of the personal\nadvantage he expects, charity becomes the secondary motive.\n\n76. Good Acts.-An act is said to be entirely good when all its\nelements--its object, circumstances and purpose--are in conformity with\nthe standards of morality. Thus, an alms given to one in need, in a\nconsiderate manner, and purely out of love for God, is good in every\nrespect. Furthermore, the fact that the circumstances and purpose of\nthe act are good increases the goodness derived from the object of the\nact.\n\n77. An act is likewise entirely good when at least one of its elements\nis good, the others being indifferent, and none evil; for it is the\ngood alone that is intended (see 85), and this gives the moral color to\nthe whole act. This happens as follows: (a) when the object is\nindifferent and the purpose good, as when one takes a walk for the\npurpose of performing a work of mercy; (b) when the object is\nindifferent and a circumstance good, as when one eats a meal with\nintentional moderation; (c) when the object is good and a circumstance\nindifferent, as when one prays with unintentional stammering.\n\n78. An act is partly good when, while its object is good, there is some\nevil in the circumstances that does not neutralize or transform the\nobject. This happens in the following cases: (a) when the object is\ngood and some minor circumstance, not intended as affecting the\nsubstance of the act, is evil, as when a person prays with\ndistractions; (b) when the object is good and a partial, but not\npredominant motive is slightly evil, as when a person prays in public\nin order to give edification and also incidentally to help his\nreputation. In both these cases the good--i.e., the worship of God--is\ndesired for itself as good, and the evil that is simultaneously desired\ndoes not change this good object.\n\n79. Bad Acts.-An act is called entirely evil when all its elements--its\nobject, circumstances and purpose-are contrary to the moral norms.\nThus, to steal, on a large scale, in order to drive the victim to\ndesperation is an act that is entirely wrong. The wickedness of the\ncircumstance and of the motive increases the wickedness of the object\nof the act.\n\n80. An act is likewise called entirely bad, when one or more of its\nelements are of themselves good or indifferent, but when there is an\nelement which is evil and which neutralizes or transforms the good.\nThis happens in various ways:\n\n(a) when the object is evil, and the purpose is good, as when one\nsteals in order to pay one\u2019s debts. The good end is wished only as\nobtainable through a wicked means, and thus ceases to be good;\n\n(b) when the object is good or indifferent, and the total purpose is\nevil, as when one talks or prays with no other motive than to annoy\nanother person. The good is willed, not as good, but only as a means to\nevil;\n\n(c) when the object is good or indifferent, and a partial but ulterior\npurpose is evil. For example, if a person extinguishes a fire in order\nto save a neighbor\u2019s house and thus be enabled to rob him; if a person\ntakes physical exercises to develop his strength so as to be enabled to\nbully a neighbor. The good act and the immediate end in these cases are\nintended not for the sake of their goodness, but as instruments to the\naccomplishment of the evil ulterior end;\n\n(d) when the object is good or indifferent, and an evil circumstance is\nintended, not as a circumstance, but as forming a unit with the object\nand as affecting the substance of the act--for example, when a person\nintends prayer precisely as distracted, thus converting prayer into a\nsin. The good object is willed in such cases, not as good, but as\nvitiated by an evil circumstance.\n\n81. Although an act is totally evil when the good in it is absorbed by\nthe evil, the presence of what is good in itself can diminish, though\nit cannot take away, the evil. Thus, to lie in order to help a neighbor\nis totally evil; yet, it is not as great an evil as to lie to hurt that\nneighbor.\n\n82. Indifferent Acts.--An act is entirely indifferent if all the\nelements in it--its object, circumstances and purpose--are neither\nharmonious nor discordant with the standards of morality. Such an act\nwould be walking home rapidly in order to eat a meal, if besides these\nfactors, which bear no relation to good morals, there was nothing else\nin the act that did bear such a relation.\n\n83. As to the actual existence of a human or voluntary act that is\nmorally indifferent, we conclude: (a) Considered in the abstract and\nuniversally, some human acts are morally indifferent; for if acts be\nconsidered with reference to their objects alone and apart from the\ncircumstances that accompany them, and as they are classified in the\nmind, it is clear that many of them have no determinate relations to\nmoral norms--e.g., reading, writing, walking, etc. (one can read either\ngood or bad literature); (b) considered in the concrete, and as they\nhappen in individual cases, no human acts are morally indifferent,\nsince the purpose of the agent is either according to right reason or\nagainst it, so that, in spite of the indifferent object, the act\nbecomes either good or bad by reason of the presence or absence of the\ngood purpose.\n\n84. Considered even in the concrete and in individual cases, all acts\nthat are not human, but indeliberate or involuntary (see 23 sqq.), are\nmorally indifferent--or, more correctly, unmoral, as being outside the\ngenus of moral acts on account of the absence in them of will, which is\nthe prerequisite of morality. Thus, absent-minded acts are neither good\nnor bad morally.\n\n85. As to the kind of intention required to make an indifferent act\nmorally good, or which should be had when the act is objectively good,\nwe conclude: (a) The good intended must not be solely a sensible good\n(i.e., the pleasure that the act gives), but also and chiefly a\nrational good (i.e., its conformity to moral standards), since man,\nunlike the animals, was made, not for sensible, but for rational good.\nHence, to eat deliberately with no other end than that of gratifying\nthe palate, is to eat without a moral purpose worthy of a human being,\nand is a bad act.\n\n(b) The moral good of virtue which is intended in acts must not be\nregarded as the supreme good, but should be referred to God, since He\nalone is the Last End (see 20). Hence, to eat and drink with moderation\nsolely because that is reasonable and suitable to human nature, if one\nexcludes the Last End, is to slight the necessary purpose and is\nmorally bad. (c) The intention of moral good or virtue in human acts\nneed not be actual or reflex. Thus, a person who has a previously\nformed intention of living reasonably, or who at the time of eating\nintends to eat moderately for the sake of health, sufficiently intends\na moral end. Likewise, it is not necessary that the reference of an act\nto the Last End be made actually or explicitly. Hence, every person in\nthe friendship of God, in all his deliberate acts that are not evil,\nhas a sufficient reference of them to God contained in the fact that he\nhas chosen God for his Last End, or in that here and now he intends\nsome motive that becomes a rational being.\n\n86. An actual and explicit intention of the moral goodness of an act,\nand an actual and explicit reference of the act to the Last End, though\nnot necessary, increase the moral value of what is done.\n\n87. Axiom of Pseudo-Dionysius: \u201cThat act is good whose causes are\ncomplete; that act is evil in which a single cause is lacking.\u201d\n\n(a) This axiom can be understood as referring to perfect good, and the\nmeaning then is that an act is not perfectly good in the moral sense\nunless all its elements--its object, purpose and circumstances--are\ngood; just as an oration is not called perfect, unless all its\nelements--the speaker, the matter, the style and the delivery--are what\nthey should be. Hence, a single defect is enough to make an act fall\nshort of perfection.\n\n(b) The axiom can be understood of essential goodness, and the meaning\nthen is that an act is not essentially good unless all the causes that\ncontribute to essential goodness--the object of the act and any\ncircumstances that may through the intention of the agent take on the\ncharacter of object--are good; just as a man is not said to be healthy,\nunless his heart, lungs, and all the other chief parts of the body are\nsound. Hence, an act is substantially bad, if either its own end (the\nobject of the act) or the special purpose had in mind by the agent (the\nend of the agent) is bad, as explained above in 79-81.\n\n88. The axiom of Dionysius does not mean: (a) that an act cannot be\nessentially or substantially good and at the same time accidentally bad\n(see 78), for, if even one circumstance not properly attended to could\nchange an act from good into bad, how few good acts would be done even\nby the most saintly persons! Example: Caius who sacrifices himself for\nthe service of God and his neighbor, now and then feels some slight\nvanity over his work. His acts remain substantially good. (b) The axiom\ndoes not mean that an act cannot be substantially bad and yet have good\ncircumstances that diminish its badness (see 81).\n\n89. Morality of the External Act.--Having considered the morality of\nthe internal act, we shall now turn to the external act (such as giving\nan alms, stealing, and the like), and inquire whether it has a morality\nof its own distinct from that of the internal act (see 56 Sqq.).\n\n90. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the object, or\neffect, of the internal act of the will, it does not add any essential\nmorality to the internal act, since, having no freedom of its own, it\nis moral only in so far as it proceeds from the will. In this sense,\nthen, he who gives an alms to the poor, and he who would give it if he\ncould, are equal in goodness of will; and he who wishes to defraud, and\nhe who actually defrauds, are equal in malice of will.\n\n91. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the term\ntowards which the internal act tends, it completes the essential\nmorality of the internal act by extending and communicating it without.\nFor, though this external act cannot add a distinct morality of its\nown, it does carry the internal morality to its natural conclusion and\ndiffuses its good or evil. In this sense, he who actually gives an alms\nis more deserving than he who really desires to give but is unable; and\nhe who really defrauds is more reprehensible than he who wishes to\ndefraud but cannot.\n\n92. If the external act be considered precisely as something added to\nthe internal act, it can increase the accidental morality of the\ninternal act by the reaction of the external circumstances on the will.\nThis can happen in such ways as the following: (a) the performance of\nthe external act, being pleasurable or difficult, increases or\ndecreases the intensity of the will to act; (b) the performance of the\nexternal act, since it requires more time than the internal act,\nprolongs the latter; (c) the external act by reason of repetition may\nalso increase the strength of the internal act.\n\n93. Furthermore, it is through the external act that edification or\nscandal is given, that penalties or rewards for overt action are\ndeserved, etc. Examples: Titus bears murderous hatred towards Balbus,\nbut keeps it concealed. Caius also hates Balbus, and first calumniates\nhim, thus giving scandal, and then kills him, thus making himself\nliable before the law.\n\n94. The Morality of the Act That Is Indirectly Willed.--An act is said\nto be willed indirectly, or in its cause, when it is foreseen as the\nresult of another act which alone is directly intended (see 35 sqq.).\nAccording to the different moral character of the acts, there are four\ncases in which the act is willed indirectly:\n\n(a) when both the act directly willed and the resultant act are bad.\nExamples: Titus is heartily opposed to quarreling and blasphemy; but he\nmakes himself drunk to forget his troubles, foreseeing that he will\nquarrel and blaspheme while in that state. Balbus has a real dislike\nfor uncharitable thoughts; but he chooses the company of a notorious\nscandalmonger in order to be amused, knowing that thoughts against\ncharity will be caused by listening to him;\n\n(b) when the act directly willed is bad and the resultant act is good.\nExample: Caius is very miserly when sober, but liberal when\nintoxicated; to vary the monotony of his life, he decides to become\nintoxicated, but grieves at the thought of the money he may give away\nto some deserving charity before he returns to his senses. Sempronius\ndecides on an act of injustice with sorrow over the unbidden thoughts\nof remorse or repentance that will follow his act;\n\n(c) when both acts are good. Example: Out of charity Titus makes up his\nmind to visit a pious relative who is ill; and he foresees that\nthoughts of improving his own conduct--a thing not pleasing to\nhim--will be occasioned by this visit;\n\n(d) when the act directly willed is good and the resultant act is bad.\nExamples: Balbus takes a drug prescribed for his health, although he\nforesees it will make him unable to go to church. Caius gives alms to\nthe poor, intending only an act of charity, but he knows that thoughts\nof vainglory will arise.\n\n95. The act indirectly willed sometimes gives, sometimes does not give,\na new morality. (a) Thus, if it is good, it adds no internal goodness,\nsince the will only permits, without intending the good act. Example:\nCaius, who does not intend, but regretfully permits his act of charity\nwhich he foresees, does not desire the act of charity. (b) If it is\nbad, the act indirectly willed adds a bad act of the will, if the will\ndesires evil by permitting what it has no right to permit. Example:\nTitus who does not prevent, when he should, what will lead to blasphemy\non his part, implicitly desires the act of blasphemy.\n\n96. The Morality of the Consequences of an Act.--Man\u2019s life receives\nits moral character, not only from his internal and external acts which\nare done in the present and from those which he knows will result from\nthem in the future, but also from the influence his acts exercise now\nand afterwards upon his fellowman. It is this influence upon others\nthat we now speak of as the consequences of an act. According to the\ncase, the consequences sometimes add, sometimes do not add, to the\nmorality of an act. The good men do lives after them, and also the\nevil. There are various kinds of consequences:\n\n(a) foreseen consequences, which, if intended, add to the morality of\nan act, since it is clear that one who wishes the many good or evil\nresults of his act is better or worse in intention than another who has\nno such wish. Thus, one who knows that many will be edified or\nscandalized by his conduct, and wills the result, is better or worse\nthan if he had no such will about those consequences;\n\n(b) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow naturally and\nusually from an act, make the act in itself better or Worse according\nto their character. Thus, the teaching of Christian doctrine is good as\nconveying a knowledge of truth, but it is made better on account of the\nspiritual benefit of others that naturally results from it. Similarly,\nthe teaching of evil is made worse on account of the evil consequences\nit usually produces;\n\n(c) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow only accidentally\nand rarely from an act, do not affect its morality, since an act must\nbe judged by what belongs to its nature, not by what is merely\noccasioned by it. Thus, the fact that an alms is used by the recipient\nas a means to intemperance does not detract from the goodness of the\nalmsgiving done for the sake of charity. Likewise, the fact that an\ninjury is used by the sufferer as an occasion for spiritual profit does\nnot lessen the wickedness of the injurious act.\n\n97. Imputability.--Just as an act may be an act done by man (i.e.,\nhigher than the operations of brutes) and yet not be human (i.e., not\nperformed in the manner that is proper to man as man; e.g., an act of\nreasoning or of decision during a dream, see 23 sqq.), so an act may be\nmoral (i.e., in conformity or disagreement with the standards of right)\nand yet not imputable as good or bad to the agent (e.g., a prayer or\nimprecation said by an infant, or the drunkenness of one who did not\nrealize the power of a liquor).\n\n98. Imputability is that property of an act by which it belongs to its\nagent, not only in its physical nature as something of himself or as an\neffect produced by him or in its human quality of subjection to his\nwill, but in its moral character of goodness or badness. From contact\nwith the moral object, the agent takes as his own something of the\nbrightness or defilement of that object, and so becomes chargeable\nhimself with goodness or badness.\n\n99. The conditions for the imputability of an act are:\n\n(a) the act must be human--i.e., it must be performed knowingly and\nwillingly (see 23 sqq.). One is not chargeable with the quality of the\nact, if not responsible for its very substance. Example: Titus suffers\nsuch intense pain that he does not know what he is saying, and he\nblasphemes. The morality of blasphemy is not unknown to him, but his\npresent act is not voluntary, and hence is not imputable;\n\n(b) the morality of the act must be known, or be something that should\nbe known, at least in a general way, to the agent; for no one is\nresponsible for what he is wholly ignorant of through no fault of his\nown. Example: Titus, Caius, Balbus and Sempronius rob the orchard of\ntheir neighbor. Titus in good faith thinks he is doing an act of\nvirtue, because the owner owes money to his companions. Caius thinks\nthat some kind of sin is being committed, but he does not know whether\nit is theft, or gluttony, or what. Balbus thinks that only a venial sin\nof stealing is being perpetrated. Sempronius, the youngest of the\ncrowd, looks on the whole affair as a part of the day\u2019s sport. All\ncommitted theft, and the act is wrong; but Titus and Sempronius were\nnot guilty of sin, since they were in good faith. Caius and Balbus\ncommitted sin, the species and degree depending on the knowledge they\nhad or should have had (see 588 sqq.);\n\n(c) the morality of the act must be willed. If the act is good, the\ngoodness must be intended, since a person should not get credit for\nwhat he does not wish. Example: Titus does not believe in virtue, and\nCaius is opposed to helping the poor; but both give an alms to a\nbeggar, the former in order to get rid of the beggar, the latter in\norder to get rid of some old clothes. Hence, neither wishes or receives\ncredit for the charity done. If the act is bad, the badness is\nsufficiently intended by the performance of what one knows is forbidden\nand wrong. The will chooses contact with the evil object, and thus\nimplicitly with the evil of the object. Example: Balbus protests that\nhe does not wish to harm anyone, and then proceeds to calumniate his\nneighbors. His disavowal of sinful intent does not make him any the\nless responsible for his calumny.\n\n100. Imputability may be conceived as making one responsible for the\nmoral quality of an act in three ways: (a) generically, if one should\nget the credit or diseredit of goodness or badness only; (b)\nspecifically as to kind, if one gets the credit or discredit of a\nparticular category of goodness or badness; (c) specifically as to\ndegree, if one gets the credit or discredit of higher or lower grades\nof the same virtue or vice, or if one is made guilty of mortal or\nvenial sin. These points will be discussed in the articles on the\nvirtues and vices (see 186 sqq.).\n\n101. Goodness is imputable as follows:\n\n(a) As regards internal acts, a person is credited with all the\ngoodness of the object, end, and circumstances, in so far as it is\nknown and willed by him. Example: Titus purposes to pray in a\npenitential posture, in order to obtain the virtue of humility. Hence,\nhe has the credit of worship, mortification and humility through his\nholy desire. If he thought of the penitential posture, not as a moral\ncircumstance, or if he regretted it, he would have the act, but not the\ncredit of mortification;\n\n(b) As regards external acts, a person is credited with the greater\nreadiness or intensity or duration which, through it, his will gives to\nwhat is good. Example: If Titus prays in the manner above described,\nhis good will is intensified, and he has the credit of this increase in\nthe accidental goodness of his act;\n\n(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is not credited with their\ngoodness, if this is merely permitted. Example: Sempronius, who is\nsorry that thoughts of a better life will go through his mind as a\nconsequence of going to church, has not the credit of those good\nthoughts;\n\n(d) As regards consequences that were foreseen, or that naturally\nresult from an act, one is not credited with their goodness, unless it\nwas wished. Example: Balbus teaches religion to children because he is\npaid to do so; Caius does so because it is a good act. The consequence\nthat these children afterwards live virtuously is not morally\ncreditable to Balbus, since he thought nothing about it; but it is a\ncircumstance that increases the goodness of Caius\u2019 act, since he\nintended his teaching precisely as it is a good work;\n\n(e) As regards consequences that are not natural results of an act, if\nthey were not foreseen or intended, they are not credited to the agent.\nExample: Titus speaks a simple and ordinary word of good advice to\nSempronius, but the impression is so great that Sempronius undertakes\nand accomplishes extraordinary things, which Titus would not have\ndeemed possible or advisable.\n\n102. Evil is imputable as follows:\n\n(a) As regards the internal act, a person is guilty of all the evil of\nthe object, end and circumstances, as far as it is known and willed by\nhim. Example: Balbus wishes he could steal all the possessions of\nCaius, and thereby drive the latter to suicide. Balbus has committed\ntheft and murder in his heart;\n\n(b) As regards the external act, one is guilty of all the circumstances\nof greater willingness, etc., which it adds to the internal act.\nExample: If Balbus actually steals from Caius and causes his death, his\nmalice is shown to be very strong and to extend to the evil\nconsequences of his external acts;\n\n(c) As regards acts indirectly willed, one is guilty of the evil they\nentail, if one could and should have prevented it. Example: Balbus is\nguilty of the blasphemies he foresees will take place when he has taken\ntoo much drink, for he could and should have kept sober.\n\n(d) As regards the evil consequences of acts, foreseen or natural, one\nis responsible for the evil, if one could and should have prevented it.\nExamples: Titus knows that a beggar will use profane language if denied\nan alms, but Titus cannot spare the money and is not responsible for\nwhat happens. Sempronius blasphemes in the company of many, and is\ntherefore guilty of the sin of scandal, since he has no right to\nblaspheme;\n\n(e) As regards the evil consequences of acts that could not have been\nforeseen, they are not imputable. Example: Balbus steals fifty cents\nfrom Caius, and the latter is so heartbroken that he commits suicide.\nBalbus is not responsible for the suicide, since such a thing was far\nfrom his thoughts when he stole.\n\n103. It was just said (102, d) that when two results, one good and one\nevil, follow an act, the evil is imputable if it could and should have\nbeen prevented. It is not always easy, however, to determine at once\nwhen the evil result should be prevented, and, as cases of double\neffect are many, it will be useful to give rules that are more\nparticularized, and that enable one to decide when it is lawful to do\nthat from which will follow an act indirectly willed, or a consequence\nthat is evil.\n\n104. It is lawful to perform an action from which an evil effect is\nforeseen when the following conditions are present:\n\n(a) the action willed itself must be good or at least indifferent; for\nclearly, if the action is bad, it is also unlawful;\n\n(b) a good effect must also follow from the act, and it must not be\ncaused by the evil effect; for the end does not justify the means.\nThus, it is not lawful to take what belongs to others in order to give\nalms, for the evil effect (stealing) results from the act (taking)\nimmediately; whereas the good effect (almsgiving) results only\nmediately through the theft;\n\n(c) the agent must intend only the good effect, since it is unlawful to\nwish evil. Thus, if one foresees that one\u2019s virtuous life will cause\nthe sin of envy in a neighbor, this evil result of one\u2019s virtue must\nnot be entertained by one as something pleasing;\n\n(d) the agent must have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting\nthe evil result that follows his act. Evil should not even be\npermitted, unless there is adequate compensation in the good that is\nintended.\n\n105. To judge whether a reason for permitting an evil effect is\nproportionately grave, the following rules should be kept in mind:\n\n(a) the greater the evil that results, the greater must be the good\nthat is intended. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a robber in order to\nsave a small amount of money: but it is lawful to kill an aggressor, if\nthis is necessary in order to save one\u2019s life;\n\n(b) the greater the dependence of the evil effect on one\u2019s act, the\ngreater must be the reason for performing the act. Example: Titus gives\npermission to his class to play a game against another class,\nforeseeing quarrels and disputes between the teams. Less reason is\nrequired for granting the permission, if Titus knows that higher\nauthority will grant it, should he refuse it;\n\n(c) the more nearly the evil effect follows upon the act, the greater\nmust be the reason for the act, Thus, less reason is required to direct\na person who looks like a heavy drinker to the city than to direct him\nto a bottle of strong drink;\n\n(d) the more certain it is that the evil effect will follow, the\ngreater is the reason required for placing its cause. For example, one\nwho speeds in an automobile on an unfrequented road, does not require\nthe same excusing cause as one who speeds on a thoroughfare where many\nother cars are passing;\n\n(e) the more obligation one has to prevent the evil effect, the graver\nis the reason required for placing its cause. Thus, since\nparish-priests, lawgivers, superiors and policemen are bound by their\noffice to prevent moral disorders, a far greater cause is required in\nthem, than in persons who have no such charge, for doing what will have\nan evil consequence.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 4: ACTS AS MERITORIOUS\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 21.)\n\n106. When the morality of an act is attributable to one as one\u2019s own,\none becomes worthy of praise and reward, if the act is good, but\ndeserving of censure and punishment, if the act is evil.\n\n107. Definitions.--Merit is the right to a reward arising from works\ndone for God. Demerit is the debt of punishment incurred on account of\nworks done against God.\n\n108. Divisions.--According to the difference of the person who confers\nthe reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) human merit, or the claim\nwhich a person has to a reward from his neighbor, or from society, for\nthe benefits he has conferred upon his neighbor or society; (b) divine\nmerit, or the right a person has to receive a reward from God for the\nfidelity wherewith he has exercised stewardship over his acts, of which\nGod is the Last End, or wherewith he has served society, of which God\nis the Supreme Ruler. Only divine merit is here considered.\n\n109. According to the difference of the object of the reward, there are\ntwo kinds of merit: (a) natural merit, which makes one worthy of a\nreward that does not exceed the native powers or exigencies of a\ncreated being, such as success, prosperity, or other goods that do not\nconstitute the Last End of man (see 20). Thus, we read in scripture of\npagans or sinners who were blest with temporal happiness on account of\ntheir natural virtues; (b) supernatural merit, which makes one worthy\nof the beatitude surpassing mere created power that God has prepared\nfor those who serve Him (see 20). It is only this kind of merit that is\nbeing considered here; for, since the Last End of man is a supernatural\nreward (viz, the Beatific Vision of God), it follows that the acts by\nwhich he tends to that End must be not only human and moral, but\nsupernaturally meritorious.\n\n110. There are four kinds of supernatural merit: (a) condign merit in\nthe stricter sense, that is merit which arises from justice, and which\npresupposes no favor on the part of the rewarder. In this sense Christ\nmerited, since even the grace which made His merits supernatural was\ndue to Him as the God-Man; (b) condign merit in the less strict sense,\nthat is merit which arises indeed from justice, but presupposes a favor\non the part of the rewarder. In this way the righteous merit before\nGod, since their works confer a right to their own reward, while the\ngrace which enables them to perform their works is a divine favor; (c)\ncongruous merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises not\nfrom justice (since there is no equality between the work and the\nreward), but from the fitness of things, because the person who merits\nis a friend of God. In this way all who are in the state of grace can\nmerit spiritual goods for others; (d) congruous merit in the wide\nsense, that is merit which arises from the liberality of God, who\nanswers a good work as if it were a prayer. In this way the good works\ndone by sinners can be said to merit conversion for them.\n\n111. The second kind of merit mentioned above--i.e., condign merit in\nthe less strict sense--is that with which we are chiefly concerned\nhere, since it is the kind of merit that must be found in human acts in\norder that they may lead man to a supernatural reward. A fuller\ntreatment of merit is found in Dogmatic Theology in the Question on\nGrace.\n\n112. The conditions requisite for the kind of merit now in question\nare: (a) that the work done be human, that is, free, morally good, and\nsupernatural (i.e., proceeding from sanctifying grace and divine\ncharity); (b) that the one who merits be in the wayfaring state (i.e.,\nthat he have not already passed to final reward or punishment), and\nthat he be in the state of grace; (c) that God has promised a reward\nfor the work done. From the statements made above, it follows that all\nthe human and morally good works of those who are in the state of grace\npossess condign merit.\n\n113. The objects of condign merit--i.e., the rewards promised by God\nfor the good works done for Him in this life--are: (a) an increase of\nsanctifying grace; (b) the right to eternal life; (c) the attainment of\neternal life, if the one who merits dies in grace; (d) an increase of\nglory.\n\n114. The conditions for the merit of strict congruity are the same as\nthose given above (112), except the promise made by God, which is not\nrequired. Examples of this kind of merit are the sanctity of the\nBlessed Virgin, which made her deserve more than others to be the\nMother of God, and the conversion of St. Paul through the merits of St.\nStephen.\n\n115. For the merit of wide congruity it is necessary that the work done\nbe morally good. Examples of this kind of merit are the sighs of the\nancient Patriarchs, as obtaining the coming of the Messiah. The just\nman can merit with the merit of wide congruity the following: (a) his\nown conversion after a future fall; (b) his final perseverance; (c)\ntemporal goods.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 5: THE PASSIONS\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 22-48.)\n\n116. Having discussed the acts proper to man, we shall now speak of the\npassions, which are common to both man and beast.\n\n117. Definition.--The passions--also called the emotions, affections,\nor sentiments--are acts of desire; but, unlike the acts of the will,\nthey are directed, not to good apprehended by the higher knowing power\nof the intellect, but to good apprehended by the lower knowing power of\nsense and imagination. They are defined as: acts or movements of the\nsensitive appetite which arise from the representation of some good in\nthe sense faculties, and which produce some transformation in the body,\nsuch as palpitation of the heart, increased circulation of the blood,\npaleness, blushing, etc.\n\n118. Division.--There are two classes of passions; (a) the\nconcupiscible, which have as their object sensible good considered as\ndelightful, or sensible evil considered as unpleasant, and which are\nlove and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; (b) the\nirascible, which have as their object sensible good or sensible evil\nconsidered as difficult to attain or to avoid, and which are hope and\ndespair, boldness and fear, anger.\n\n119. The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the\nfirst of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to\nsensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or\nabsence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered\nprecisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence;\n(b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away\nfrom sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection\nproduced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of\nthe object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul\non account of the presence of an evil.\n\n120. The irascible passions are explained as follows: (a) hope reaches\nout towards a future good whose attainment is difficult, but not\nimpossible; despair turns away from a good that seems impossible of\nattainment; (b) bravery goes out to attack an evil that seems difficult\nand imminent, but not unconquerable; fear falls back before a future\ndifficulty that seems irresistible; (e) anger is the desire of\nvengeance for an injury received.\n\n121. Moral Value of the Passions.--The Stoics held that all the\npassions are diseases of the soul, and that one is perfect when one\narrives at the condition of being passionless or apathetic. Lucretius,\non the contrary, taught that all the impulses of passion are good. The\ntruth is that the passions are good or evil according to the way they\nare considered. (a) Physically, the passions are good, since they are\nthe acts of natural powers, or the perfection and complement of\nsomething good in itself. (b) Morally, they are indifferent, if they\nare viewed in themselves, as the product of the sensitive appetite. For\nthis appetite is an irrational power of the soul, similar to that of\nthe beasts, and acts are not moral unless rational--i.e., an act is\ngood or evil only from its relation to reason. (c) Morally, the\npassions are good or bad, if commanded by reason and will, for thus\nthey partake of the good or evil that is in the acts from which they\nproceed, just as the acts of the external members of the body are moral\nin so far as they execute the commands of the will. The passions are\nvoluntary if commanded by the will, or not forbidden by it. Examples:\nOur Lord looked about Him with anger, being grieved at the blindness of\nHis enemies who watched Him in the synagogue (Mark, iii. 5); He wept\nover the destruction of Jerusalem (Luke, xix. 41); He was sad at the\napproach of His passion (Mark, xiv. 34).\n\n122. The passions are morally good: (a) if they are directed by the\nwill to a morally good object; for example, shame is a praiseworthy\npassion, because it is fear of what is dishonorable, and pity is also\ngood, because it is according to right reason, being sorrow for the\nmisfortune of another; (b) if they are chosen by the reason for a good\npurpose; for example, it is good to excite the emotion of joy that one\nmay pray with greater fervor, or to arouse the feelings of pity, fear,\nor hope, in order that one may be more earnestly moved to acts of\nmercy, repentance, courage; (c) if the circumstances are moderated\naccording to right reason; for example, to grieve over the death of a\nfriend excessively, so that one is unfitted for duty and suffers in\nhealth, is unreasonable; but to grieve even unto tears, as Christ did\nat the tomb of Lazarus, is an act of piety. Similarly, the slight anger\nof Heli was blamable and the great anger of Moses was laudable, because\nthe evils in both instances called for severity (I Kings, ii, iii;\nExod., iii).\n\n123. The passions can either diminish or increase the goodness of an\nact. (a) They diminish its goodness, if they are antecedent--i.e.,\nprior to the judgment of the reason--for they thus obscure the mind and\nmake the act that follows less voluntary. For example, there is less\ngoodness in an alms given under an impulse of sentimentality than in\none given after serious consideration of the matter and from a motive\nof charity. (b) They increase its goodness if they are\nconsequent--i.e., subsequent to the judgment and the result of the\nvehemence of the will, or of deliberate encouragement by the will (see\n47 sqq.)--for, just as the external act increases the goodness of the\ninternal act, so is it better that man should tend towards good, not\nonly with the will, but also with the emotions. Examples: The spiritual\ngladness of the Psalmist is seen to have been more than ordinarily\ngreat from the fact that it acted upon his feelings, and both heart and\nflesh rejoiced (Ps, lxxxii. 3); to sing a hymn in order to encourage\noneself to greater fervor or devotion adds to the goodness of what is\ndone, through the greater promptness or ease it causes in the act that\nfollows.\n\n124. The passions are morally evil: (a) when they are commanded by the\nwill and directed to an object, a purpose, or circumstances that are\nevil, Thus, envy is an ignoble passion, since it is unreasonable, being\nsorrow at another\u2019s success. Examples; Titus drinks to excess for the\ndelight of intoxication (bad object); Balbus purposely excites his\nimagination, that he may hate more bitterly and act more cruelly (bad\nend); Sempronius loves his children so immoderately that he grows\nmorose and jealous (bad circumstance). (b) The passions are also\nmorally evil when they should be forbidden and are not forbidden by the\nwill. Example; Caius is surprised by a sudden burst of anger, which,\nthough he judges to be unreasonable, he does nothing to check.\n\n125. The passions can remove, diminish or increase the evil of an act.\n(a) Thus, antecedent passions take away all evil, if (a thing that is\nrare) they prevent entirely the use of reason; they diminish malice if\nthey obscure the judgment. Examples: Balbus, fearing that he is about\nto drown, becomes panic-stricken, seizes Titus and almost drowns him.\nCaius, threatened with a black eye if he refuses, calumniates: his\ncalumny would be worse if he acted coldbloodedly. (b) Consequent\npassions increase the evil, for then they manifest a strong intention,\nor are the result of direct purpose. Examples: Sempronius attacks the\nconduct of an opponent, not with dispassionate argument and from a love\nof truth, but with bitter personal feeling and from a desire of\nrevenge. Titia works herself into a rage that she may be the more ready\nfor an encounter with a person of whom she is unjustly jealous.\n\n126. Though the passions are physically good and in their nature\nmorally indifferent, they may have physical reactions or moral\nconsequences that are harmful or evil. These dangers may be physical,\nmental or moral.\n\n(a) Physical Dangers of the Passions.--It is a well-known fact that\nthere is a close connection between the passions and the nerves, heart,\nand bodily organism in general, and that strong or persistent emotion\ncan work great detriment to the health, producing disease,\nunconsciousness, or even death.\n\n(b) Mental Dangers of the Passions.--It is admitted by all that the\npassions disturb the judgment, and can even take away the use of\nreason. For they act upon the body or the senses, and these in turn\naffect the mind in a way similar to what happens in sleep or\nintoxication. Thus, love makes one blind to the defects of the object\nof one\u2019s love; fear makes one magnify the evil of what is dreaded;\nmelancholy unbalances the mind, etc.\n\n(c) Moral Dangers of the Passions.--It is likewise a matter of common\nexperience that the passions are a source of many temptations and sins.\nOften they are antecedent (i.e., not premeditated or willed), as when\nthey arise from bodily states over which one has no control or from\nimaginations strongly fixed in the mind, and at the same time tend to\nthat which is not according to right reason, rebelling against the law\nof the mind. Thus, a person whose health is bad is easily dispirited,\nand this feeling occasions temptations to despair; one whose memory is\nhaunted with the image of a lost parent becomes a prey to sadness,\nwhich makes it difficult to perform duties with zest and diligence.\n\n127. A passion may become morally bad on account of the physical or\nmental evils connected with it. (a) Thus, a person has duties to his\nown well-being, and he indirectly wills (see 35 sqq., 94 sqq.) to\nneglect these duties, if he indulges harmful passions. Example:\nSempronia grieves immoderately over the death of her mother, with the\nresult that her health and mental vigor are impaired. (b) A person also\nhas duties with respect to the life, health, and happiness of his\nneighbor, and he chooses to neglect these duties if he unjustly\nprovokes emotions in others, foreseeing injurious consequences (see 96\nsqq.). Examples: Titus so vexes Balbus by petty annoyances that the\nlatter loses appetite and sleep, and becomes an invalid. Sempronia so\nexasperates her father by long-continued unfilial conduct that the\nlatter becomes insane. Caius appeals to prejudices in order to have\ninjustice done to a rival.\n\n128. As to passions that incite to evil or deter from good, we must\nobserve the following: (a) if the passion is consequent, one is placing\noneself or others in danger of sin, and one\u2019s conduct must be judged\naccording to the principles given in 258 sqq. (Examples: Titus likes to\nbrood over his troubles, although this causes temptations to neglect\nduty; Sempronia makes remarks to a hot-headed acquaintance which are a\nprovocation to great uncharitableness); (b) if the passion is\nantecedent, it constitutes a temptation which one is bound to resist\n(see 252 sqq.). Example: Balbus has a natural dislike for Caius, and\noften feels impelled to judge him rashly or treat him unjustly.\n\n129. Antecedent or involuntary passions, as well as other involuntary\nacts of imagination, thought and will, tending to evil, are sometimes\ncalled \u201cfirst motions of the soul,\u201d as distinguished from consequent or\nvoluntary passions and acts, which are known as \u201csecond motions of the\nsoul.\u201d The first motions are of two kinds: (a) those that precede all\ndeliberation and consent, actual or virtual (_motus primo-primi_), and\nthese are free from all sin; (b) those that precede full deliberation\nand consent, but follow on partial deliberation (_motus\nsecundo-primi_). These latter are venial sins.\n\nMost theologians since the Council of Trent maintain that the\ninordinate movements of passion which precede the advertence of reason,\nsuch as lust, envy, sloth, etc., are not sins. The Council of Trent\ndefined that the _fomes peccati_ has never been understood by the\nChurch to be truly a sin in the baptized, but has been called sin by\nSt. Paul in the sense that it is from sin and inclines to sin (Council\nof Trent, fifth session). On the basis of this text some authors argue\nthat it is of faith that the inordinate motions called _primo-primi_\nare not sins for the baptized. The condemnation of both the fiftieth\nproposition of Baius: _The evil desires to which reason does not\nconsent, and which man endures unwillingly (_invitus_), are prohibited\nby precept_; and his fifty-first: _Lust, or the law of the members, and\nevil desires of it, which men suffer unwillingly, are true disobedience\nof the law_; is interpreted as establishing as certain the\nnon-sinfulness of such movements in infidels. (See Merklebach, O.P.,\n_Summa Theol_. Mor., Vol. I, n. 448).\n\nSt. Thomas taught otherwise that such inordinate movements of passion\nare venial sins (_Summa. Theol_. I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2um; _de Malo_\nq. 7, a. 6. ad 4m; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5). Although they precede\nthe deliberation of reason, they attain to the order of moral acts,\nhowever imperfectly, insofar as sensuality in man by its nature is made\nto be subject to reason. Reason can and ought to control these motions,\nbut fails to do so owing to the great number of them possible to occur.\nHence they are not involuntary, but indirectly voluntary as sins of\nomission (_II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5;\n_Quodlib_. IV, q. 11, a. 1). Since these movements are indirectly\nvoluntary, St. Thomas\u2019 teaching does not conflict with the Council of\nTrent which speaks of the _fomes_ as habitual dispositions and not of\nits acts which St. Thomas considers. Clearly, too, his teaching does\nnot fall under the condemnation of the propositions of Baius; with\nBaius the motions are involuntary, but for St. Thomas indirectly\nvoluntary.\n\nSt. Thomas distinguishes the motions of sensuality differently from\nmodern manualists. For him the motions-_primo-primi_ arise from\ncorporal dispositions which are not under the control of reason and\nhence can not be sins. Motions-_secundo-primi_ arise from some\napprehension of the internal senses proper to the passions and can, at\nleast if taken singly, and ought to be ruled by reason. Thus, they are\nmoral acts (_de Malo_, q. VII, a. 6, ad 8um; _II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2).\n\n130. Bodily suffering or sickness is sometimes called a passion of the\nbody, but, unlike the passions of the soul, it is a physical evil.\nMorally considered, it is indifferent in itself, but it has contacts\nwith morality in various ways. (a) Thus, it may receive morality from\nthe will. Examples: Sufferings endured with resignation are acts of\nvirtue; sickness or pain inflicted upon others is imputable to the\nunjust cause. (b) It may affect the morality of the act of the will.\nExamples: Severe toothache or other exquisite pain is an extenuating\ncircumstance in sins of grumbling, for the suffering draws so much\nattention to itself that deliberation on other things is much\ndiminished; weakness of stomach may be a moral advantage in freeing one\nfrom temptations to over-eating.\n\n131. Though the passions are good in themselves, they are often morally\ndangerous. The regulation of the passions through the virtues of\nfortitude and temperance will be treated later on, but we shall\nindicate here some natural means by which, God helping, their first\nmotions may be controlled. (a) Thus, if a passion is not strong, it may\nbe repressed directly by command of the will. Example: The impulse to\nanger may sometimes be checked by the command of silence. (b) If a\npassion is strong, it may be combated through other activities which\nare its opposites or which, through the amount of energy they call for,\nwill diminish proportionately the force of the passion. Examples: In\ntime of fear one can fall back on thoughts of confidence; in time of\nmourning one can seek joy or alleviation in the society of friends or\nin the repose of sleep. Study or other strenuous occupation is an\nexcellent means to overcome impetuous passion.\n\n(c) If a passion is persistent, it may be diverted to some lawful\nobject vividly represented and held in the imagination and thoughts.\nExamples. Those who are inclined to love immoderately the world or the\nthings that are in the world should direct their love to divine\ngoodness. Those who are inclined to be too fearful of men should think\nhow much more God is to be feared.\n\n\n\n\nQuestion II\n\nGOOD AND BAD HABITS\n\n132. Having considered human acts and the passions, we now pass to a\nconsideration of the principles from which acts proceed proximately.\nThese principles are, first, the faculties, powers or forces of the\nsoul (such as the intellect, will, sense, appetite, and vegetative\npowers); and, secondly, the habits which permanently modify the\nfaculties. For some faculties may be turned in various directions,\neither favorably or unfavorably, as regards their ends, and it is the\nstable bent given to a faculty that is called a habit. Thus, the\nintellect may be directed towards its end, which is truth, by the habit\nof knowledge; or away from that end by the habit of ignorance.\nLikewise, the will may be directed towards or away from its end, which\nis good, by virtue or vice. The faculties are treated in Psychology,\nbut the habits, since they turn the faculties towards good or evil,\nmust be considered in Moral Theology, as well as in philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 1: HABITS IN GENERAL\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 49-54.)\n\n133. Definition.--A habit is a perfect and stable quality by which a\nbeing is well- or ill-affected in itself, or with regard to its\nmotions. It differs from mere disposition or tendency, which is an\nimperfect and transitory quality. Thus, a sallow complexion is a habit;\na blush, a disposition.\n\n134. Division.--Habits are variously divided, as follows:\n\n(a) From the viewpoint of their subject, they are either entitative or\noperative, according as they affect directly the nature or the powers\nof a being. Thus, in the soul there are the entitative habit of\nsanctifying grace and operative habits like science and virtue; while\nin the body are entitative habits of health, beauty, etc.\n\n(b) From the viewpoint of their object, habits are good (i.e., virtues)\nor evil (i.e., vices);\n\n(c) From the viewpoint of their cause, habits are infused or acquired,\naccording as they are supernaturally produced by God, or are naturally\nobtained by man through repeated acts, or result from nature without\nrepeated acts. Faith in a baptized infant is an infused habit;\nknowledge obtained through study is an acquired habit; the perception\nthat the first principles of truth are to be granted is natural.\n\n135. Operative acquired habits are defined as qualities not easily\nchanged, by which a faculty that is able to act in various ways is\ndisposed to act in one way with ease, readiness and pleasure. Thus, by\ntraining a man acquires a correct carriage, and is able to walk\nstraight without difficulty.\n\n136. Operative infused habits are enduring qualities that give to a\nfaculty the power to perform acts that are supernatural. Thus, the\ninfused virtues of faith, hope and charity give to the intellect and\nthe will the ability to elicit acts with reference to supernatural\ntruth and good. Facility and promptitude with respect to these acts\ncome through the use of the infused power.\n\n137. Strengthening and Weakening of Habits.--Habits are increased: (a)\nextensively when they are applied to more objects--thus the habit of\nscience grows as it is applied to more truths; (b) intensively, when\nthey are rooted more firmly in their subject and become easier to\nexercise. This last comes about when intense acts of a habit are\nfrequently repeated. Thus, a habit of virtue or vice becomes a second\nnature, and it is exercised with ever greater delight and resisted with\never-increasing difficulty.\n\n138. The infused habits cannot be diminished, but they can be destroyed\n(see 745). As to the acquired habits, they are weakened and destroyed\nchiefly in two ways: (a) by acts opposed to them, especially if these\nacts are earnest and frequent--thus, evil custom is overcome by good\ncustom, and vice-versa; (b) by long discontinuance or disuse. Thus, a\nperson who has learned a foreign language will forget it, if he fails\nto speak, read or hear it. The knowledge of first principles,\nspeculative or moral, is not lost, however, through forgetfulness, as\nexperience shows.\n\n139. Accidentally, a habit may be corrupted through injury of an organ\nthat is necessary for the exercise of the habit. Thus, right moral\njudgment may be lost if certain areas of the brain are affected.\n\n140. Habits and Morality.--The importance of habits in man\u2019s moral life\nis very great. (a) Habits are an index to a man\u2019s past career, for the\nease and facility he now possesses through them is the result of many\nstruggles and efforts and difficulties overcome, or of defeats and\nsurrenders and neglected opportunities. (b) Habits constitute a man\u2019s\nmoral character. Morally, a person is the sum of his moral habits and\ndispositions grouped around the central interest or idea of his life.\nHe who would know himself, therefore, cannot do better than to examine\nwhat are his habits, and which is the predominant one among them. (e)\nHabits are a prophecy of the future. Habits are not irresistible and do\nnot destroy freedom, but they produce such ease and readiness for\nacting in one particular way that the probabilities are, when habits\nare strong, that a person will continue to follow them in the future as\nhe has done in the past, thus progressing or deteriorating, as the case\nmay be.\n\n141. Duties as regards Habits.--(a) Bad habits should be avoided and\nthose that have been formed should be destroyed (see 138). The means to\naccomplish these victories are divine help obtained through prayer and\nthe other instrumentalities of grace, watchfulness through\nself-examination, and the cultivation of a spirit of self-denial, as\nwell as attack made on the habit that is forming or already formed (see\n255 sqq.)\n\n(b) Good habits should be acquired, and those already possessed should\nbe exercised and put to the best advantage. The means to this end, in\naddition to those that are supernatural, are especially a realization\nof the importance of good habits, a great desire to have them, and\nconstant and regular effort to practise them (see 137).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: GOOD HABITS OR VIRTUES\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 55-70.)\n\n142. Definition.--A virtue is a good habit of the free powers of the\nsoul, that is a principle of good conduct, and never of conduct that is\nevil. Hence, the following are not virtues: (a) an occasional\ninclination to good, for this is not a fixed habit; (b) good habits of\nthe body or of the vegetative powers, etc. (such as beauty and health),\nfor these are not free; (c) knowledge of the right or affection for it\nwithout any reference to practice, for virtue is a principle of right\nliving; (d) habits that can be applied indifferently to good or bad\nconduct, such as human opinion.\n\n143. Division.--The virtues are divided: (a) according to their\ndifferent causes, into infused and acquired virtues (cfr. 134 sqq.);(b)\naccording to their different objects, into intellectual, moral and\ntheological virtues.\n\n144. The intellectual virtues are those habits that perfect the\nintellect with reference to its good--i.e., truth, speculative or\npractical.\n\n145. The speculative virtues are three: understanding, knowledge and\nwisdom.\n\n(a) Understanding or intelligence is the habit of perceiving truths\nthat are not in need of proof, as being self-evident. Axiomatic truths\nor first principles are the object of this virtue.\n\n(b) Knowledge or science is the habit of perceiving truths that are\nlearned from other truths by argumentation, and that are ultimate in\nsome category of being. The object of this virtue embraces the various\nsciences (like astronomy) which are conclusions from principles.\n\n(c) Wisdom is the habit of learning through reasoning the truth that is\nabsolutely ultimate; it is the knowledge of things in their supreme\ncause, God. Examples are theology and philosophy in their highest sense.\n\n146. The practical intellectual virtues are two: prudence and art.\n\n(a) Prudence is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual\ncases what is to be done or what is to be omitted, in order that one\nmay act according to the requirements of good morals.\n\n(b) Art is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases\nhow one must act in order to produce things that are useful or\nbeautiful (e.g., music, painting, building, etc.).\n\n147. The intellectual virtues, except prudence, are not perfect\nvirtues, since, While they make an act good, they do not necessarily\nmake the agent good. A man may have great knowledge about morality, or\nbe able to produce excellent works of art, and at the same time be not\nvirtuous, or have no love for his work.\n\n148. Prudence is an intellectual virtue, since it resides in the\nintellect; but it is also classed among the moral virtues, since its\nobject is the direction of human acts to their right end.\n\n149. The moral virtues are those habits that perfect the will and the\nsensitive appetite with reference to their immediate and respective\nobjects; that is, they are habits concerned with acts as means to the\nLast End. They make the act good, and make good also him who performs\nit; and they are thus superior as virtues to the intellectual habits.\n\n150. There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there\nis prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the\nother moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the\nwill there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions\naccord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is\nfortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw\nfrom good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible\nappetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that\nwould impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.\n\nThese four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the\nother moral virtues hinge on them.\n\n151. The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and\nthe will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object.\nThey are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the\nintellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a\ndivine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will,\nenabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by\nfaith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a\nvirtue infused into the will, uniting man\u2019s affections to the object of\nhis hope and transforming him into its likeness.\n\n152. Causes of Virtues.--The causes of virtue are three: (a) nature,\nwhich is the cause of the inchoative intellectual and moral virtues,\nthat is, of the theoretical and practical principles that are naturally\nknown, and of the inclinations to virtue that arise from an\nindividual\u2019s bodily constitution; (b) practice, which is the cause of\nperfected intellectual and moral virtues, that is, of the good habits\nthat are formed by repeated acts (e.g., knowledge obtained through\nstudy, temperance fixed in the character through continued effort); (c)\ninfusion from on high, which is the cause of the virtues that surpass\nnature (i.e., of the theological virtues and of the moral virtues that\nare concerned with our acts as ordered to the supernatural).\n\n153. Properties of the Virtues.--From the definition of virtue given\nabove certain properties result.\n\n(a) Since a virtue makes conduct agree with a certain fixed standard,\nit does not allow of excess or defect. Hence, virtue follows the golden\nmean.\n\n(b) Since the other moral virtues would go to extremes without the\nguidance of prudence, and since prudence would not judge aright without\nthe right dispositions of the other virtues, it follows that the four\nmoral virtues, at least in their perfect state, must always be\ntogether. And because charity is the fulfillment of the whole law, he\nwho has charity has also all the other infused virtues.\n\n(c) Since the virtues are directed towards objects of varying degrees\nof excellence, and since they are habits, and are capable of increase\nand decrease (137 sqq.), it follows that both virtues of different\nspecies, and those of the same species, are or may be unequal.\n\n(d) Since some of the virtues imply conditions that will not exist in\nthe life to come, it follows that these virtues will be somewhat\nchanged in the blessed. Thus, temperance, which subdues the rebellion\nof the passions, will not be exercised in heaven, where the passions do\nnot rebel.\n\n154. The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.\n\n(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external\nobject that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others,\nneither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean\nis determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these\ntwo virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions\naccording to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt\nof ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor,\nwhether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which\nwould be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for\nhim when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to\nencounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.\n\n(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the\nagreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false\naffirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of\nprudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered\nas directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and\ndefect.\n\n(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is\nconcerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness,\ncannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their\nsubject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for\none to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what\nis not due to one\u2019s condition.\n\n155. Without charity one may possess certain other virtues. (a) Thus,\none may have the natural or acquired moral virtues, as is the case with\nmany pagans, but such virtues are imperfect, since they do not direct\ntheir subject to the Supernatural End of man; (b) one may have the\nsupernatural or infused virtues of faith and hope, as is the case with\nChristians who are not in the state of grace. Even such faith and hope\nare imperfect virtues, and are not meritorious.\n\n156. Considered precisely as virtues (cfr. Article on Hope), the three\ngroups rank as follows: (a) the theological virtues are the most\nexcellent, since they deal directly with man\u2019s supernatural end; (b) By\nreason of their object, universal truth, the intellectual virtues are\nsuperior to the moral virtues, which are concerned with particular\ngoods; (c) the moral virtues, nevertheless, are more perfect as\nvirtues, for, so considered in the order of action, in perfecting the\nappetites, they are more properly principles of action.\n\n157. The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:\n\n(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with\nits objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their\nobject;\n\n(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals\nwith actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as\nto others, while the others deal with the passions and the right\ndisposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is:\nprudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with\nman\u2019s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to\nothers; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death\nare the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of\nless importance;\n\n(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers\nthe supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of\nthe intellect.\n\n158. In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some\nrespects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral\nvirtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to\novercome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged,\nas in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life\nwill remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense\nimages as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place\nto vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.\n\n159. The Complements of the Virtues.--The virtues are habits that\nsupply the soul with an internal guide (prudence), and with\ninclinations to follow its direction (moral virtues). But there is also\na higher Guide who speaks to the soul, and it is necessary that the\ninclinations of virtue be carried out in a suprahuman mode. Hence, the\nvirtues are completed by certain adjuncts. These are: (a) the Gifts of\nthe Holy Ghost, which are habits infused into the soul, making it\nsensitive to the guidance of the Holy Spirit and docile under His\ndirection; (b) the Fruits of the Holy Ghost, which are acts that grow\nout of the virtues and have a special spiritual sweetness attached to\nthem; (c) the Beatitudes, which are activities of special excellence\nhaving a corresponding special reward attached to them, The acts are\nproduced by the infused virtues and the Gifts, especially by the Gifts.\n\n160. There are seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are divided as\nfollows:\n\n(a) There are the Intellectual Gifts, which make the soul more\nresponsive to the light which the Holy Spirit sheds upon truths held by\nfaith. These Gifts assist the intellect, first, in its apprehension of\nthe mysteries of faith, that it may be made to grasp more clearly what\nit believes (Gift of Understanding); secondly, in its judgments, that\nit may be illuminated so as to adhere to the principles of faith and\ndepart from their opposites, whether there be question of judgments\nabout divine things (Gift of Wisdom), or created things (Gift of\nKnowledge), or human actions (Gift of Counsel);\n\n(b) There are the Appetitive Gifts, which make the soul more ready to\nfollow divine motions and inspirations. These Gifts aid the irascible\naffections by giving them a confidence of victory over every peril and\nby assuring safe arrival at the term of life (Gift of Fortitude); they\naid the will in its social relations by leading to a filial love and\ndevotion toward God (Gift of Piety); they assist the concupiscible\naffections by filling them with a reverence of God\u2019s majesty and a\nhorror of offending Him (Gift of Fear of the Lord).\n\n161. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are superior to the moral and\nintellectual virtues, for these virtues perfect the powers of the soul\nthat they may be always ready to follow the guidance of reason, while\nthe Gifts make the powers of the soul docile to the guidance of the\nHoly Ghost.\n\n162. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are inferior to the theological\nvirtues, for these virtues unite the soul to the Holy Ghost, while the\nGifts only make the soul ready to receive His illuminations and\ninspirations.\n\n163. There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul\n(Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling\nSpirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect\nthe agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is\nrightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that\nit is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual\ndelight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows.\nGood will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others;\nmeekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him\ndeceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a\nman\u2019s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as\nmodesty, continency, chastity.\n\n164. There are eight Beatitudes enumerated by our Lord. (a) Some of\nthese are acts that surpass the virtues as regards the use of external\ngoods and the government of the passions. Thus, it is lawful to have\npossessions, but the poor in spirit despise them; it is lawful to\nexercise the irascible passions according to reason, but the meek under\ndivine guidance keep themselves in tranquillity; it is lawful to\nrejoice according to moderation, but the mourners, when this is better,\nrefrain from all rejoicing. (b) Other Beatitudes are acts that surpass\nthe virtues of justice or liberality to one\u2019s neighbor. Thus, those who\nhunger and thirst after justice not only discharge their obligations,\nbut they do so with the greatest willingness; the merciful bestow their\nbounty, not only on their friends and relatives, but on those who are\nmost in need. (c) Still other Beatitudes are concerned with the acts\nthat most fit one for the contemplation of divine things, namely, that\nin oneself one be pure or heart or free from the defilements of\npassion, and that one be peaceful with reference to others. (d) The\nfinal Beatitude is the crown of the others; for one is perfectly\nattached to poverty of spirit, meekness, etc., when he is prepared for\ntheir sake to suffer persecution.\n\n165. The rewards promised to the Beatitudes are conferred, not only in\nthe life to come, but also in the present life. But they are not\nnecessarily temporal or corporal rewards (such as riches, pleasure,\nete.), but spiritual beatitude, which is a foretaste and figure of the\neternal joy to come.\n\n166. All the Beatitudes may be called Fruits of the Holy Ghost, since\nthey are the outgrowth of the indwelling Spirit and are filled with\nspiritual sweetness. But the Beatitudes are really more excellent than\nthe Fruits, since they are works of more than ordinary excellence;\nwhereas every work of virtue that gives delight may be called a Fruit\nof the Holy Spirit.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 3: BAD HABITS OR VICES (_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 71-89.)\n\n167. Definition.--A vice is a habit inclining to moral evil. A sin is\nan act resulting from a vice, or tending to the formation of a vice; or\nit is any thought, word, deed or omission against the law of God.\n\n168. Divisions.--There are various divisions of sins. Thus:\n\n(a) according to the kind of delight that is taken in evil, sins are\neither spiritual (e.g., vainglory) or carnal (e.g., intemperance);\n\n(b) according to the person who is more directly offended by evil, sins\nare either against God (e.g., heresy, despair, blasphemy), or against\none\u2019s neighbor (e.g., theft, calumny), or against oneself (e.g.,\nintemperance, suicide);\n\n(c) according to the greater or less gravity of the evil, sins are\neither mortal (e.g., blasphemy) or venial (e.g., idle thoughts);\n\n(d) according as the evil is done by acting or not acting, sins are\neither of commission (e.g., theft) or of omission (e.g., failure to pay\ndebts);\n\n(e) according to the progress of a sin, there are three stages: first,\nit is a sin of the heart when it exists only in the mind, as when one\nentertains a wish for revenge; secondly, it is a sin of the mouth, when\nit is manifested in words, as when one uses contumelious language;\nthirdly, it is a sin of work when it is carried out in act, as when one\nstrikes another in the face;\n\n(f) according to the manner in which they deviate from the golden mean,\nsins are either of excess (e.g., extravagance) or of defect (e.g.,\nmiserliness);\n\n(g) according to the manner in which its guilt is contracted, sin is\neither original (i.e., the loss of grace inherited from Adam) or actual\n(i.e., the stain derived from one\u2019s own wrongdoing; sec 272 sqq.).\n\n169. Mortal Sin.--A sin is mortal or deadly, when by it a person turns\naway from God, his Last End, and prefers to Him some created good,\nthereby incurring the debt of eternal punishment.\n\n170. The first condition necessary in order that a sin may be judged\nmortal is that the matter of the sin be grave, either in itself or in\nthe opinion of him who commits it; it must include turning away from\nGod and the substitution of some created good as the Last End.\n\n171. The matter of a sin is known to be grave: (a) when the law of God\nor of the Church declares that it is seriously displeasing to God, or\nthat it will separate one from His favor or rewards; (b) when right\nreason shows that it does great injury to the rights of God, of\nsociety, of one\u2019s neighbor, or of oneself.\n\n172. The matter of a sin is grave in two ways. (a) It is grave from the\ncharacter of the act and without exception, when the good which is\ninjured is infinite, or is a finite good of greatest importance and\nindivisible, Thus, heresy, despair, and simony against divine law are\nalways serious, because they offend against an infinite good; while\nmurder, though it injures only a finite good, is nevertheless always\ngrave matter because earthly life is of highest importance among finite\ngoods, and if taken away is taken entirely. (b) The matter of a sin is\ngrave from the character of the act but with exceptions, when the good\nthat is injured is of grave importance, but finite and divisible. Thus,\nthe worship we give to God is finite and admits of more and less; and\nhence a sin against worship, though serious from the nature of the\noffence, may be slight on account of the smallness of the irreverence.\nSimilarly, though theft injures a grave right, it is not grave matter\nwhen the amount stolen is small.\n\n173. The second condition required that a sin be mortal is that there\nbe full advertence to the grave malice of the act, for one cannot be\nsaid to separate oneself from God unless one has made the same amount\nof deliberation that is required for any temporal affair of great\nmoment.\n\n174. Advertence is the act by which the mind gives attention to\nsomething. It is of two kinds: (a) full advertence, when there is\nnothing to impede perfect attention, as when a person is wide awake, in\nfull possession of his faculties, and not distracted; (b) partial\nadvertence, when there is something that, prevents entire attention, as\nwhen a person is only partly awake; or not entirely conscious, or\ndistracted with many things.\n\n175. Hence in the following cases, even though there be serious matter,\na sin is not mortal, on account of lack of full advertence. (a) When\nwithout one\u2019s will there is no full advertence to the act itself, as\nhappens with those who are half-asleep, or who are under the influence\nof drugs, or who are mentally confined by anxiety or physical pain,\netc. (see on Human Acts, 24 sqq.). (b) A sin is not mortal when there\nis no full advertence to the sinfulness or to the gravity of the act.\nThose who through no fault of their own are unaware that an act is\nsinful, or that it is a mortal sin (e.g., children, the half-witted, or\nthe uninstructed), have no full advertence to the malice of the act;\nlikewise, those who, without being responsible for their inadvertence,\ndo not think at the moment of the sinfulness or seriousness of what\nthey do (e.g., those who think out plans for revenge before they have\ntaken second thought on its immorality).\n\n176. Signs that indicate that there was no full advertence are: (a) if\nafterwards one can scarcely recall what happened; (b) if shortly\nafterwards one cannot be sure what was one\u2019s state of mind at the time.\n\n177. Though full advertence is required for a mortal sin, it is not\nrequired that this advertence be the most perfect. (a) It is not\nnecessary that the advertence be preceded by long deliberation, for\nadvertence can be full even when the consideration is only momentary,\n(b) It is not necessary that advertence be continued during the\ncommission of a sin, for what follows is foreseen if adverted to at the\nbeginning. (c) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the\nsin be clear or exact. One who perceives that there is some special\nmalice in robbing a church, even though he does not understand just\nwhat the malice is, has sufficient advertence to become guilty of\nsacrilege. Likewise, one who has doubts as to whether a certain sin is\nmortal, or who suspects that it is mortal, has sufficient advertence\nfor grave guilt if he commits that sin. (d) It is not necessary that\nadvertence to the malice of the sin be reflex (i.e., that one advert to\nthe fact that one is conscious of the gravity of the sin); for to will\nthe malice, it suffices that one be conscious of the malice. (e) It is\nnot necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be explicit\n(i.e., that one have in mind the precise nature of sin as an offense\nagainst God, which produces a stain on the soul and incurs the debt of\npunishment); for to will evil and its gravity, it suffices that one\nperceive the evil and its gravity, even though one does not analyze the\nmeaning or seek out the ultimate reasons.\n\n178. The third condition required that a sin be mortal is that full\nconsent of the will be given it, for no one separates him self from God\nexcept through his own free choice. (a) Consent is not full, when there\nhas not been full advertence, or when an act has been done under\nviolent compulsion; (b) consent is full when there has been full\nadvertence and no forceful compulsion (see above on Violence, 52).\n\n179. Indications that consent was not full are: (a) if before the sin\nthe person was of tender conscience and had habitually a horror of\ngrave sin; (b) if at the time of the sin the person recoiled from the\nsinful suggestion--e.g., if he had a hatred for it as soon as it was\nfully perceived, or if he was saddened at the temptation, or if he kept\nfrom an external act that could have been easily performed; (c) if\nafter the sin the person was conscientious, and yet had doubts as to\nwhether consent was given.\n\n180. Venial Sin.--A sin is venial, or more easily pardonable, when by\nit one turns inordinately towards some created good, not so, however,\nas to forsake God as one\u2019s Last End or to prefer self-will to the\ndivine friendship.\n\n181. The first condition required that a sin be called venial is that\nits matter be light, either in reality, or in the invincible belief of\nhim who commits it. The criteria by which we may know what matter is\nlight are authority and right reason (see above, 171).\n\n182. The matter of a sin is light in two ways. (a) From the character\nof the act, the matter is light when the good which is injured is\nfinite and of minor importance. Thus, truth about trivial things is of\nless importance among finite goods, and consequently a small lie about\nsome unimportant matter, which helps and does not harm the neighbor, is\nlight matter. (b) From the quantity of the matter, the matter is light\nwhen the good injured is of major importance but divisible. An example\nhere is a theft that works only small harm (see above, 172).\n\n183. The second condition for a venial sin is that there be some\nadvertence to the malice of the act. (a) The advertence is not full\nwhen the matter is grave, and the act done without compulsion, for else\nthe sin would not be venial but mortal. (b) The advertence may be full\nor partial when the matter is light.\n\n184. The third condition for a venial sin is that there be some consent\nof the will to the malice of the act. (a) The consent is not full when\nthe matter is grave, for else the sin would be mortal. (b) The consent\nmay be either full or partial when the matter is light.\n\n185. Imperfections.--The description of venial sin just given indicates\nthat it is a voluntary transgression of the law of God in matters of\nlighter importance, and is thus distinguished from the various classes\nof moral imperfections. These latter imperfections are:\n\n(a) natural imperfections, which are the falling short on the part of\ngood acts of the higher degree of goodness they might have possessed.\nSince man is finite by nature, it is inevitable that he be limited in\nthe good he does; and hence this kind of imperfection is not a\ntransgression or a sin;\n\n(b) personal imperfections which are voluntary but not transgressions,\nare acts or omissions whose motive is reasonable, but which are\ncontrary to that which is of counsel. Example: to omit hearing a Mass\nthat is not obligatory, when one is able to assist at it, but has a\ngood reason for staying away;\n\n(c) personal imperfections which are transgressions but not voluntary,\nare acts or omissions done without deliberation, but which are opposed\nto some law of less importance. Example: To pray with involuntary\ndistractions.\n\n186. Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects.-An imperfection becomes a\nsin: (a) if the motive for omitting what is of counsel only is sinful\n(e.g., to neglect a Mass that is not of obligation out of contempt);\n(b) if a slight indeliberate transgression has a cause that was\nvoluntary (e.g., involuntary distractions caused by previous neglect).\n\n187. Venial sins become mortal when that which in itself is a slight\noffense, becomes in the individual agent a grave offense by reason of\nsome change in the object or of some grave malice in the purpose,\ncircumstances, or the foreseen results (see above 97 sqq.).\n\n188. A change in the object makes venial sin mortal: (a) when that\nwhich is light matter objectively is apprehended subjectively as grave\nmatter (e.g., a person tells a small lie or commits a trifling theft,\nthinking these to be mortal sins); (b) when that which is light matter\nby itself becomes knowingly grave matter through the additions that are\nmade to it (e.g., a thief steals small amounts frequently with the\nintention of having a great amount of ill-gotten money after a time).\n\n189. It should be noted that, while the matter of venial sins may\ncoalesce so as to form grave matter and constitute a mortal sin, as\njust explained, venial sins themselves do not, from mere\nmultiplication, ever become mortal, since the difference between mortal\nand venial sin is not one of quantity, but of kind. Hence, when acts\nare slightly sinful but do not coalesce, they multiply venial sins, but\ndo not form mortal sin. Example: Coming a few minutes late for Mass\nevery Sunday.\n\n190. The multiplication of venial sins, especially when they are held\nas of no importance, disposes for the commission of mortal sin: (a)\ndirectly, by forming a habit that calls for ever greater indulgence\n(e.g., petty thefts lead to dishonesty on a large scale); (b)\nindirectly, by familiarizing one with wrongdoing and chilling the love\nfor virtue.\n\n191. The wrong purpose of the agent makes an act that is only venially\nsinful (as far as the object is concerned) to become mortally sinful,\nwhen the purpose contains a grave malice in itself, for the act is then\nintended only as a means to what is seriously wrong (see above 80).\nExample: To tell a small lie in order to break up friendships and sow\nhatreds.\n\n192. The circumstances of an act that is only venially sinful in itself\nalso make the act mortally sinful, when there is grave malice in such\ncircumstances. Cases of this kind are the following:\n\n(a) The circumstance of the person committing the sin sometimes changes\nthe malice from light to grave. Example: Unbecoming levity in one in\nauthority may cause serious disrespect for his office and thus be\ngravely sinful;\n\n(b) The circumstance of the manner in which an act is performed may\nchange it from a venial to a mortal sin, as when the sin is committed\nout of contempt, or is so coveted that it would be preferred to a grave\nobligation. Examples: One who violates a law of lesser moment, not\nbecause he regards it as bad, but because he wishes to show his\ndisregard of all law and authority; or one who is so attached to games\nof chance that he is prepared to steal a large sum rather than give\nthem up.\n\n193. The serious harm that is foreseen as a result of venial sin also\nchanges the malice from slight to serious. Examples: One who jokingly\nannoys another, knowing that this will provoke grave dissensions; or\none who tells small lies to persons who are known for their\nuncharitable distortions and exaggerations; or one who agrees to take\ntoo much strong drink knowing from experience that this invariably\nleads to serious excess.\n\n194. Mortal sins become venial when that which in itself is a grave\noffense, becomes light by reason of some change in he object or lack of\nfull consent in the subject.\n\n195. A change in the object makes a mortal sin venial: (a) when that\nwhich is grave matter objectively, is apprehended through inculpable,\nor only venially culpable ignorance as light matter (e.g., when an\nuninstructed child thinks that a serious calumny is only a venial sin);\n(b) when a sin whose character is serious but whose matter is divisible\nis small as to matter (e.g,, to be absent from a small part of the Mass\non Sunday); (e) when a law whose obligation is grave will cause more\nthan slight inconvenience in a particular case, and thus becomes of\nlight obligation for that case (e.g., to miss Mass on Sunday because of\na difficulty that was not unsurmountable, but yet considerable).\n\n196. Lack of sufficient advertence or of full consent makes a mortal\nsin venial; (a) when without serious fault one does not advert to a\ngravely sinful act (e.g., a desire of revenge); (b) when without\nserious fault one does not know or does not think about the grave\nmalice of what one is doing (e.g., to repeat a story, not knowing or\nnot remembering at the time that it is a serious calumny); (c) when on\naccount of considerable excitement, fear or other disturbance, one\ngives only partial consent to an act that is mortally sinful (e.g.,\nwhen one, on being suddenly insulted, replies with a serious\nimprecation).\n\n197. The Distinction of Sins.--There are three kinds of distinction of\nsins: (a) sins that differ according to theological species, that is,\naccording as they turn or do not turn the sinner away from God as his\nLast End. There are only two theological species of sin, viz., mortal\nand venial; (b) sins that differ according to moral species, that is,\naccording to their essences, or the various kinds of finite good to\nwhich they turn the sinner. There are many moral species of sins, for\nexample, infidelity, uncharitableness, etc.; (c) sins that differ\naccording to number, but agree according to moral species (e.g., two\ndistinct acts of uncharitable hatred).\n\n198. The criteria for the specific distinction of sins are two:\n\n(a) that which makes sins to differ specifically is the difference of\nthe objects to which they tend, inasmuch as these created goods are out\nof harmony in specifically different ways with the standards of\nmorality (e.g., pride and gluttony); (b) that by which we recognize the\nspecific difference of sins is the opposition they have to virtues or\nlaws that are specifically different. Thus, pride is opposed to\nhumility, gluttony to temperance--two different virtues.\n\n199. The following rules assist us in recognizing specific distinctions\nof sins. (a) Those sins are specifically different which are opposed to\nvirtues that are specifically distinct. Thus, infidelity and despair\nare different in species, because opposed to faith and hope, which are\ntwo distinct species of virtue. (b) Those sins are specifically\ndifferent that are opposed to specifically different objects of one and\nthe same virtue--that is, to functions of the virtue, or to laws\nconcerning it that have intrinsically different motives. Thus, sins of\nmurder, theft, and false testimony, though opposed to the same virtue\nof justice, are specifically distinct, since they contravene\nobligations of that virtue whose purposes are morally distinct. (c)\nThose sins are specifically different that are opposed in specifically\ndifferent ways to the same object of the same virtue, one opposing that\nobject by way of excess and the other by way of defect. Thus,\nmiserliness and extravagance are specifically distinct sins, because\none falls short of, while the other goes beyond, the golden mean that\nis found in liberality.\n\n200. Sins are not specifically distinct: (a) when they are opposed to\nthe same virtue in ways that are physically, but not morally, contrary.\nThus, sins of omission and sins of commission are physically opposites,\nbut they are not morally so, unless they offend against different moral\nobjects in the ways explained in the preceding paragraph. Hence, to\nsteal and to refuse to pay debts, to take and to keep what belongs to\nanother, are not specifically different sins; whereas to violate two\ndistinct precepts about the same virtue, one a command and the other a\nprohibition, is to commit two species of sin, one by omission, and the\nother by commission;\n\n(b) when they are opposed to the same virtue with reference to commands\nthat differ in their lawgivers, but not in their motives. Thus, God,\nthe Church, and the State all forbid theft; but he who steals is not\ntherefore guilty of three sins, for each lawgiver forbids theft from\nthe same intrinsic motive, viz., because it is an injury.\n\n201. One and the same act contains in itself many sins, when it has\nmany malices specifically different. Thus, he who kills his parents\nviolates two commandments relative to the virtue of justice; he who\nsteals from a church is guilty of theft and of sacrilege.\n\n202. Sins that are multiplied numerically within the same species are\ncommitted in three ways: (a) by purely internal acts, that is, acts\nthat are completed within the powers of the soul and do not tend to\nexecution in some external act (e.g., unbelief, envy, pride, delight in\nthe thought of sin, etc.); (b) by internal acts that are not completed\nin the will, but tend to execution in some external act (e.g., the\npurpose or desire to injure another, to lie, etc.); (c) by external\nacts that are performed or neglected by the bodily faculties under\ncommand of the will (e.g., theft, quarrels, lies, omissions of duty,\netc.).\n\n203. Acts may be numerically one or many in two ways.\n\n(a) Physically, there is one act when the agent moves or puts into\naction a power of the soul or body only once (e.g., to steal from a\nchurch). Physically, there are many acts when the agent exercises\ndifferent operative faculties, or the same one different times (e.g.,\nto put one\u2019s hand many times into a money box in order to steal the\nentire contents).\n\n(b) Morally, there is one act when a single physical act does not\ncontain more than one species of morality, or when several physical\nacts are united as parts of one whole by reason of the intention of the\nagent, or the nature of the acts themselves. For example, the wish to\nsteal is morally one act. The intention to steal, the decision to use\ncertain means to accomplish this intention, the various attempts made,\nand finally the carrying out of the plan--all these form morally but\none act, since the acts that follow are only the development of the\noriginal intention. Similarly, several curses hurled at another form\nmorally one act, if all are uttered under the influence of the same\npassion of anger. Finally, acts of spying on another, of entering his\nhouse without permission, and of taking his property unlawfully, are\nmorally one act, because the first acts are naturally the preparation\nfor what follows.\n\n204. Morally, there are several acts when a single physical act\ncontains several species of malice (as when one steals from a church),\nor when there are several physical acts not united by any bond of\ncommon purpose or natural subordination (as when one steals on\ndifferent occasions because an opportunity suddenly presented itself,\nor as when one misses Mass on different Sundays).\n\n205. Objects of acts may also be numerically one or many in two ways.\n\n(a) Physically, an object is one when it has its own proper\nindividuality different from that of others. Thus, each coin in a\npocket-book is physically one thing, each member of a family is\nphysically one person. Objects are physically many, when they include\nmore than one distinct thing or person. Thus, physically a pocket-book\ncontains many objects, as does also a family.\n\n(b) Morally, objects that are physically many become one, if they are\nnot such as to require morally distinct acts in their regard, and if\nthey form according to prudent judgment parts of an integral or\ncollective whole. Otherwise, these objects are morally many. Example:\nMissing Mass for a whole year constitutes, morally speaking, many\nobjects, since it implies many independent external omissions, or\nmorally distinct acts. A box of ordinary coins, though it contains many\nindividual pieces of money, is commonly regarded as one integral\nobject; and likewise religious, civil, domestic, and financial bodies,\nthough each is made up of many members, are each, morally speaking, but\none person. The possessions of different proprietors, however, are not\none moral object; neither do the individual, personal rights of the\nmembers of one group constitute a single object.\n\n206. It is clear that two sins specifically different in malice are also\nnumerically different (e.g., a sin of theft and a sin of calumny). The\nrules that follow will pertain only to sins that are of the same\nspecies, but that differ numerically within the species (e.g., two\ndistinct sins of theft, two distinct sins of calumny).\n\n207. The rules for the numerical distinction of sins within the same\nspecies suppose: (a) that the distinction be not taken from the object,\nwhich gives the specific difference, but from the repetition of acts\nwith regard to one object, made either actually (by different acts) or\nequivalently (by what is equal to different acts); (b) that the\ndistinction be not taken from a physical but from a moral consideration\nof the acts.\n\n208. Three rules of numerical distinction will be given, one for each\nof the three following hypotheses: (a) many distinct acts are concerned\nwith morally distinct objects of the same species; (b) many distinct\nacts are concerned with what is morally one object; (c) one act is\nconcerned with what are physically many, but morally one object.\n\n209. First Rule of Numerical Distinction.--Many sinful acts, each of\nwhich is concerned with an object that is distinct in number (morally\nspeaking) from the objects of the other acts, make as many numerically\ndistinct sins as there are acts and objects numerically distinct.\nExample: He who fires distinct shots and unjustly kills three persons\nis guilty of three murders.\n\n210. Second Rule of Numerical Distinction.--Many sinful acts, all of\nwhich are concerned with an object that is (morally speaking) one and\nthe same in number, make as many numerically distinct sins as there are\nacts numerically distinct according to moral estimation.\n\n211. When the acts concerned with the same object are purely internal,\nthey are multiplied numerically, according to moral estimation, in the\nfollowing cases:\n\n(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced by an act of the\nwill. Example: He who hates in the morning, repents at noon, and\nreturns to his hate in the afternoon, commits two sins of hatred;\n\n(b) when they are repeated after having been voluntarily discontinued,\nif the interval between the two acts is so considerable that the second\nact is not a mere continuation of the first. Example: He who in his\nmind reviles an enemy passing by, then turns his attention to his work\nand thinks no more about his anger, and later, seeing his enemy again,\nreviles him mentally a second time, commits two sins;\n\n(c) when they are repeated after having been involuntarily\ndiscontinued, if a notable period (say, three hours) intervenes between\nthe two acts. Example: He who thinks thoughts of hatred until he falls\nasleep, or until he is distracted from them by something unusual going\non about him, or by the entrance of a visitor, commits a second sin of\nhatred, when he returns to the same thoughts, if the interruption was\nso long that there is no moral connection between the two acts.\n\n212. When acts tending to the same object are internal, but directed\ntowards completion in some external act, they are multiplied\nnumerically, in moral estimation, in the following cases:\n\n(a) when they are repeated after having been renounced. Example: He who\ndecides to steal, but repents for his sin, and then again decides to\nsteal, commits two sins;\n\n(b) when they are repeated after voluntary discontinuance, if the\ninterval is not merely momentary. Example: He who thinks over a plan to\nacquire money unjustly, and then deliberately turns his thought away\nand gives all his attention to lawful affairs, but later resumes the\ndishonest planning, commits a new sin;\n\n(c) when they are repeated after involuntary discontinuance, if the\ninterval is notable in view of the external act desired, and nothing\nexternal was done that could serve as a link to unify the two acts.\nExample: A burglar plans a robbery that could easily be carried out at\nonce, but he takes no steps to execute his plan, and soon forgets about\nit. A month later, passing the house he had intended to rob, he\nremembers his plan and carries it out. Two distinct sins were here\ncommitted.\n\n213. Involuntary discontinuance does not, however, separate the acts\ninto two distinct sins: (a) if the interval was brief in view of the\nexternal act that was desired (e.g., if the burglar above mentioned had\nforgotten his plan for a few days only before he renewed it and carried\nit out); (b) if something had already been done by reason of the first\nact (e.g., if the burglar, after resolving to rob the house, had\nprocured keys or tools for the purpose, and had kept them with this in\nmind, although he allowed months and years to pass without making any\nattempt to fulfill his design).\n\n214. When the acts tending to the same object are external, they are\nmultiplied numerically in moral estimation, and make distinct sins as\nfollows: (a) if the internal acts from which they proceed are\nnumerically distinct sins (e.g., if a burglar attempts to rob a house,\nbut leaves his work unfinished because he becomes conscience-stricken\nor is interrupted, and later makes another plan and another attempt,\nthere are two sins); (b) if the external acts are of such a kind that\nno internal intention can make them morally one act, even when one\nfollows directly upon the other (e.g., missing Mass on Sunday and again\non the following day, a holyday, makes one guilty of two distinct\nviolations of the law).\n\n215. In the following cases, however, distinct external acts with\nreference to the same object do not multiply the number of sins: (a)\nwhen these acts form a part of one moral whole, and are intended as\nsuch by the agent (e.g., one who reads a forbidden book, but divides it\ninto parts, reading only so many pages a day); (b) when these acts have\nto one another the relation of means to a common end, and they are\nintended as such by the agent (e.g., various preparations made for\nrobbery).\n\n216. Third Rule of Numerical Distinction.--One sinful act, internal or\nexternal, that is concerned with objects that are physically many, but\nmorally one, makes but one sin in number. Example: He who steals a\npurse that contains ten bills commits one sin; he who calumniates a\nfamily of ten persons commits one sin; he who steals what is the common\nproperty of three proprietors commits one sin.\n\n217. When the objects are not morally one of themselves, they may\nbecome so through the belief of the one who acts, since distinct\nmalices are not incurred except as apprehended (see 588-592). Example:\nHe who tells three different lies against a neighbor (e.g., that he is\na thief, a drunkard and a liar), commits one sin of calumny, if he has\nin mind general injury to reputation, but does not think at the time of\nthe special injuries contained in his calumny. Likewise, he who\ncalumniates before ten persons commits but one sin of calumny, if,\nbeing in a passion, he thinks only of the harm he wishes to cause and\nnot of the number of persons who are present.\n\n218. When the objects are morally one, they may become many through the\nintention of the one who acts. Example: He who calumniates a family of\nthree persons by saying they are all dishonest, commits three sins, if\nhe intends three distinct injuries (e.g., against the business of one,\nthe religious reputation of another, and the friendship of the third).\nSo also he who steals part of the money in a purse, and later on,\nhaving another opportunity, decides to steal the rest, commits two sins.\n\n219. When the objects are not morally one in themselves and cannot be\napprehended as such, distinct sins are committed. Example: He who\nintends to miss Mass all year, foresees at least in a confused way many\ndistinct violations of the law; he who purposes to rob various\nproprietors foresees at least in a vague way many separate and complete\nexternal acts of robbery.\n\n220. Comparison of Sins.--Sins that differ in species differ also in\ngravity, those being more serious that depart further from the norms of\nreason and the law of God.\n\n221. Other things being equal, those sins are worse that offend against\na more noble object or a more noble virtue. Hence, sins that are\ndirectly against God (such as infidelity, despair, and hatred of God)\nare the most serious of all; while sins against human personality (such\nas murder) are more serious than those against human rights (such as\ntheft).\n\n222. Of those sins that are opposed to the same virtue, that one is\nworse which is opposed to the principal inclination of the virtue.\nThus, avarice is more foreign to the virtue of liberality than the\nopposite vice of prodigality; timidity is more contrary to bravery than\nits opposite rashness.\n\n223. The gravity of a sin is increased in the following ways:\n\n(a) by the circumstances, in so far as they give it a new species of\nmalice (e.g., theft from a church) or increase its malice within the\nspecies (e.g., money given prodigally and to those who do not deserve\nit, or money stolen in a large quantity);\n\n(b) by the greater willingness with which the sin is committed. Hence,\nthose who sin through ignorance or under the excitement of passion are\nless guilty than those who sin in cold blood;\n\n(c) by the condition of the person offended. Thus, a sin is made worse\naccording as the person offended is nearer to God by reason of his\npersonal holiness or the sacredness of his state or the dignity of his\noffice, or is nearer to the offender himself. Hence, an injury is\ngreater if done to a priest, a public official or one\u2019s own family,\nthan if done to another who has not the same claim to honor or justice;\n\n(d) by the condition of the person who sins. Those who are better\ninstructed or otherwise better advantaged, or who are supposed to give\ngood example to others, sin more grievously by reason of their greater\ningratitude and of the greater scandal they give, whenever they sin\ndeliberately;\n\n(e) by the evil results that follow from the sin, when these are\nwilled, even indirectly or implicitly, as when one spreads stories that\nare bound to cause enmities, strifes, and a lowering of ideals (see 96).\n\n224. Spiritual and carnal sins, considered precisely as such, and other\nthings being equal, may be compared from two viewpoints, viz., of\nmalice and of reputation. (a) From the viewpoint of malice, spiritual\nsins are worse, since, while a carnal sinner is carried away by strong\npassion and offends directly only his own body, he who commits\nspiritual sins acts with greater freedom and offends directly against\nGod and his neighbor. Hence, the Pharisees, though they despised the\nfallen woman, were worse than she, since in the eyes of God their\npride, envy, detraction, hypocrisy, etc., were more hateful crimes.\n\n(b) From the viewpoint of reputation, carnal sins are worse, since they\nliken man more to the beast, and are thus more infamous.\n\n225. In actual experience, carnal sins are frequently more grave than\nnon-carnal sins.\n\n(a) Many carnal sins are not purely carnal, but also contain other\nmalice, and cause directly more injury to God or the neighbor than a\nnon-carnal sin of the same category. Example: Adultery combines both\nlust and injustice, and is a greater injustice than the non-carnal sin\nof theft. Rape combines lust and injury, and is more injurious than the\nnon-carnal sin of anger resulting in bodily blows. Lascivious\nconversation combines impurity and spiritual damage to another, and is\nmore harmful than the non-carnal sin of detracting that other and\ncausing him some temporal injury.\n\n(b) Many carnal sins are accompanied by greater malice or greater\nscandal, or are followed by greater evils than purely spiritual sins.\nExample: Sins of impurity or drunkenness, committed habitually and\ndeliberately or by adults, are more malicious than sins of pride or\nanger committed rarely or without full deliberation, or by children.\nDrunkenness or licentious language and suspicious intimacies, committed\nby those from whom good example is expected, do more to undermine\nreligion than sins of impatience or uncharitableness in the same\npersons. The results of a man\u2019s pride (such as ambition, arrogance,\nluxurious living and deceitfulness) are often less disastrous than the\nresults of his intemperance (such as detraction, immodesty, fights,\nextravagance, disgrace of family, etc.).\n\n226. Sins different in species rank in the order of gravity, as said\nabove, according to their objects. For, just as diseases are considered\nmore serious when they affect more important vital organs or functions,\nso sins are more grave when they affect more radical principles of\nhuman conduct. The greater the object or end of action that is injured,\ntherefore, the greater is the harm done and the greater the sin\ncommitted. Hence: (a) sins committed directly against God are worse\nthan sins committed against creatures, for God is the end of all\ncreatures; (b) sins committed against persons are greater than sins\ncommitted against things, for persons are the end of things.\n\n227. Of the sins committed against God, the rank according to gravity\nis: (a) sins against the personality of God--that is, against the\ndivine nature--such as hatred of God (the greatest of all sins),\ninfidelity, despair; (b) sins against the peculiar possessions of\nGod--that is, His external honor and glory, and those things that\nbelong to Him in a special way, such as the humanity of Christ\nhypostatically united to the Word, the Sacraments, and things\nconsecrated to God. Such sins are idolatry, superstition, perjury, the\nsins of those who had Christ crucified, simony, sacrilege, unworthy\nreception of the Eucharist or other Sacrament, violation of vows, etc.\n\n228. Sins committed against creatures, other things being equal, rank\nin gravity as follows: (a) Sins against personality are greater than\nsins against possessions. Example: The sin of murder, which is against\npersonality, is worse than the sin of theft, which is against\npossessions. (b) Sins against being are greater than sins against\nwellbeing. Examples: Murder is worse than mutilation, and scandal that\ncauses another to lose his soul is worse than scandal that only\ndiminishes another\u2019s goodness; murder and the irreparable scandal take\naway life, mutilation and the lesser scandal only diminish the\nperfection of the life that is had. (c) Sins against those who have a\ngreater claim are greater than sins against those who have a less\nclaim. Examples: It is a greater sin to neglect one\u2019s own salvation\nthan that of a neighbor; to murder a member of one\u2019s own family, a\nbenefactor, or a person distinguished on account of his position or\nvirtue, is a greater crime than to murder a stranger, an enemy, a\nprivate individual, or one of bad life. (d) Sins against possessions\nthat are dearer are graver offenses. Examples: It is worse to steal\naway the peace of a household than to carry off its material treasures;\nit is worse to rob a man of his good name than to defraud him of his\nwages.\n\n229. The above rating of sins is based on their natures considered in\nthe abstract, that is, according to the essential relations they have\nto their own proper objects. It is impossible to consider any other\nfactor when drawing up general rules of comparison; for the\ncircumstances that enter into concrete cases of sin are innumerable,\nand hence have to be left out of consideration. By reason of these\nfactors other than the object, however, the ranking of sins according\nto gravity given above may be changed or reversed.\n\n(a) In the act of a greater sin there may be extenuating circumstances,\nor in the act of a lesser sin aggravating circumstances that change\ntheir respective order. Example: Detraction is from its nature worse\nthan theft; but, if the detraction does only small harm and the theft\ngreat harm, the theft is worse on account of the circumstances.\n\n(b) In the persons who commit the sins there may be circumstances that\nchange the order of guilt, so that he who commits the greater sin is\nless guilty. Examples: By his careless handling of a revolver, Balbus\nunintentionally causes lasting injury to a bystander. Caius without\nmalice aforethought, but enraged by an unexpected insult, strikes a\nblow that destroys the sight in one eye of his adversary. Titus, angry\nbecause he has been dismissed from his employment, revenges himself by\ndefacing a precious work of art. The bodily injuries caused by the\nfirst two men are more harmful than the injury to property done by\nTitus; but they sinned, the one from ignorance and the other from\npassion, whereas Titus sinned from malice. Hence, while the sins of\nBalbus and Caius are objectively or materially greater, that of Titus\nis greater subjectively or formally (i.e., as to guilt).\n\n230. The Subjects of Sin.--By the subjects of sin we understand the\npowers of the soul in which sin is found. These powers are sometimes\ncalled the material causes of sin, just as the objects to which the\nsins tend are called their formal causes.\n\n231. Just as virtuous habits have their seats in the will (e.g.,\njustice), in the reason (e.g., prudence), and in the sensitive\nappetites (e.g., fortitude and temperance), so also contrary habits of\nvice may be found in these same faculties. (a) From the sensitive\nappetites proceed impulses caused by sense apprehension or bodily\nstates, which, when they are inordinate and voluntary, are sinful\n(e.g., lust, envy; see 129, on Second Motions). (b) From the reason\nproceed false judgments caused by vincible ignorance, wrong direction\ndeliberately given to the passions, pleasurable dwelling on inordinate\nthoughts, etc. (c) From the will proceed consent given to sins of the\nother powers, desires to commit sin, joy over sin already committed,\netc.\n\n232. As was said above (89-93), the external acts of the members of the\nbody have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject\nto the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if\nclassification is made according to the faculties from which the sins\nproceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we\ntreated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of\ndesire and reminiscent approval.\n\n233. Pleasurable dwelling on inordinate thoughts occurs when one\ndeliberately, even though it be only for a moment, turns over in his\nmind some sinful object, delighting in it as if it were actually\npresent, but not desiring that it be actually done. Example; One who\nimagines his neighbor\u2019s house burned down, and rejoices at the mental\npicture, though for interested reasons he does not wish any\nconflagration in the vicinity.\n\n234. The sinful thoughts just described are not to be confused with\nthoughts in which the object of the delight is something else than a\nsinful picture represented in the mind.\n\nThoughts of this latter kind are: (a) those in which one takes delight\nin an external act of sin being committed, as when one destroys one\u2019s\nneighbor\u2019s property with great internal satisfaction; here the thought\nforms one sin with the outer act; (b) those in which one delights in\nthe mental image, not as it represents something morally wrong, but as\nit contains some object of lawful delight. There is a distinction\nbetween bad thoughts and thoughts on things that are bad. Examples: A\nmoralist may think with pleasure about theft, not because he approves\nof it, but because it is a subject he has to know. A person may read\ndetective stories with great interest, not because crime appeals to\nhim, but because the style of the author is good, the details of the\nplot exciting, the manner of the crime mysterious, etc. There is danger\nin thoughts of this kind, however, if one indulges in them from mere\ncuriosity, or immoderately, or if sin itself may take an attraction\nthrough them.\n\n235. The gravity and species of pleasurable dwelling on inordinate\nthoughts vary according to the thing thought on (see on Objects, etc.,\n70 sqq.). (a) If pleasure is taken only in the object represented, the\nsin has the moral character of that object. Example: He who delights at\nthe thought of theft, is guilty of theft; and if he thinks of a great\ntheft, he is guilty of mortal sin. (b) If pleasure is also taken in the\ncircumstances imaged in the mind, the sin takes on the added malice\ncontained in the circumstances. Example: He who delights over the\nthought of the robbery of a church, is guilty of mental theft and\nsacrilege.\n\n236. The following are signs that delight taken in a thought about\nsinful things is about their sinfulness, and not about some other of\ntheir properties: (a) if one thinks about them without any lawful\nnecessity (such as that of study), but through mere curiosity, or\nwithout any good reason; (b) if at the same time one loves to think on\nthem frequently and lingeringly, or shown great satisfaction whenever\nthey are mentioned. Example: One who thinks about injustices for\npastime and admires them as great exploits, who idolizes criminals as\nheroes or martyrs.\n\n237. Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in\nsins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish\nbetween sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.\n\n(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts,\neither because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it\nas the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man\nrejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some\nhelpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy\nthe perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.\n\n(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not\nthat what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were\ngood or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a\ndishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner\nin which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to\nwitness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and\nremarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that\na friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is\nconfined to the second part of the news.\n\n238. The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same\ncharacter as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to\nrejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it\nin will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over\nthe times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those\nsins, with their number and circumstances adverted to.\n\n239. What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to\nboasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the\nsin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one\napproves of sin rather than virtue.\n\n240. To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is\nnot sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive\nof the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry\nthat he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he\ninjured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves\nover this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by\nhis evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it\nleads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.\n\n241. Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately\nintends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz.,\nabsolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those\nin which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come\nwhat may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which\nthe purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or\ncircumstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.\n\n242. Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as\nthat to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the\nobject, end and circumstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large\nsum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and\ndissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of\ningratitude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in\nhis heart.\n\n243. Conditional evil desires, if they are indeliberate and express\nrather the propensity of nature than the considered will of him who\nmakes them, are not formally sinful. Examples: A poor man who\nunthinkingly wishes that stealing were lawful; a sufferer who under the\ninfluence of pain wishes that the Almighty had not forbidden suicide.\n\n244. Conditional desires, if made deliberately, are of two kinds. (a)\nThere are some desires in which the condition willed (e.g., if this\nwere not a sin, if this were lawful, if this were allowed by God, etc.)\ntakes away the malice of the act desired, since some laws may be\ndispensed or changed. Examples: \u201cWould that God had not pronounced\nagainst taking the property of others!\u201d \u201cI would stay away from church,\nif this were not Sunday.\u201d Desires of this kind are not sinful on\naccount of their object, which is not really wished, but on account of\ntheir end, or their lack of useful purpose, and of the danger that the\nconditional may become absolute. (b) There are other desires in which\nthe condition does not take away the malice of what is desired, either\nbecause the condition is not at all concerned with the malice, or\nbecause it wishes something to become lawful which even God cannot make\nlawful. Examples: \u201cI would steal, if this could be done safely.\u201d \u201cI\nwould blaspheme, if God permitted.\u201d These desires partake of the malice\nof the things that are wished.\n\n245. Just as we distinguished above between bad thoughts and thoughts\non things that are bad, so may we distinguish between bad desires and\ndesires of what is bad. For bad desires that are not mere velleities\nare sinful, as we have just seen; whereas the desire of what is\nphysically evil is good, if the evil is wished, not for its own sake,\nbut for the sake of some greater good. Example: To desire out of hatred\nthat a neighbor lose his arm is a bad desire and sinful; but if one\nwished this as a means to save the neighbor\u2019s life, while he still\ndesires something evil, it is not the evil but the benefit that is\nintended, and hence the desire itself is not bad.\n\n246. The Causes of Sin.--The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e.,\nthose which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which\nare without).\n\n247. The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect;\n(b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.\n\n248. Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40\nsqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material\nand formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the\nlaw that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults.\nExamples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized;\nbreaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law;\nimprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b)\nFormal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are\nvoluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the\nlaw, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against\nconscience.\n\n249. Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:\n\n(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision\nas to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only\nafter the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is\nsaid that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every\nsinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, _Nich. Ethics_, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b\n27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a\nfalse notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general).\nelse we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against\nthe faith;\n\n(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is\nculpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the\npains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence\nviolates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not\nsee a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative\nignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable\nand leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child\nshoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots\na comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;\n\n(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will,\nleads one to act against one\u2019s better knowledge and to choose\ninordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory\n(I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is\nformal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of\nreason, the sin caused is material;\n\n(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every\nsin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here\nunderstood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding\nignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the\nsinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious\nhabit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or\npresumption which he entertains.\n\n250. Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see\n40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished\naccording to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:\n\n(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent\nconcupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the\nvoluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is\nespecially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this\nkind are sometimes called sins against the Father;\n\n(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and\nvincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second\nPerson of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the\nSon;\n\n(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free\nwill that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is\nespecially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this\nclass are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One\nwhose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the\nfriendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the\noffense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is\nso jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins\nhabitually without fear or remorse.\n\n251. Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of\nweakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary,\nmore enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and\nsins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously\nwrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not\nseriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is\nvenially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated\nor moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.\n\n252. The external causes of sin are: (a) the devil or other evil\nspirits, who by acting on the imagination or other sensitive powers of\nthe soul attempt to draw mankind to destruction; (b) the world, that\nis, the persons and things about us, which by their seductiveness, or\nby their principles and examples, tend to draw away from the practice\nof virtue.\n\n253. Since free consent is implied in the concept of formal sin, none\nof the internal or external causes of sin just mentioned, the choice of\nthe will alone excepted, can actually effect sin. Hence the distinction\nbetween temptation and sin. The rebellion of the passions, the\nsuggestions of evil spirits, the seductions of the world, are\ntemptations; if the will does not yield to them, there is no sin, but\nrather virtue and merit.\n\n254. In the presence of temptation fully adverted to, it is not lawful\nto remain indifferent (neither consenting nor dissenting), since this\nwithout just cause exposes one to the danger (see 258 sqq.) of being\novercome by sin.\n\n255. Resistance to temptation is made by the act of the will which\ncommands the other powers not to yield and withholds its own consent to\nthe sin suggested. This resistance may be:\n\n(a) implicit or explicit, according as the dissent is expressed in what\ncontains it, or is expressed in itself. Examples: Contempt of a\ntemptation or displeasure over its presence is implicit resistance,\nwhile the resolve never to yield to it is explicit resistance;\n\n(b) internal or external, according as it remains in the will, or is\nalso exercised by the other powers. Examples: Displeasure over an\nuncharitable thought is internal resistance, while the reading of a\nbook to divert the mind from the thought is external resistance;\n\n(c) indirect or direct, according as the means employed to drive away a\ntemptation are flight or attack. Examples: One who is disturbed by\nthoughts of hatred, resists them indirectly if he goes to the opera in\norder to be calmed by music, while he resists them directly, if he\nreads prayerfully I Cor. xiii, in order to become more charitable;\n\n(d) virtual or actual, according as the act of dissent made, and not\nretracted, is adverted to or not. Examples: If a man rejects a\ntemptation of envy as soon as he notices it, and repeats this act of\nrejection until the temptation has disappeared, his resistance is\nactual; if he rejects the temptation once for all as soon as it\nappears, but is not able to think of this purpose at each instant, his\nresistance was actual at the beginning, but virtual afterwards.\n\n256. General rules regarding resistance to temptation: (a) it is a\ngrave sin not to resist temptation, when the sin suggested is grave,\nthe danger of consent serious, and the negligence considerable;\notherwise the sin is venial; (b) negligence is considerable when the\nresistance used is not at all in proportion to the temptation. Example:\nIf a man were suddenly to advert to the fact that a shrewd plan he had\ndecided on was gravely unjust, he would be seriously negligent if he\nput off recalling the decision till he had dwelt more fully on its\nappealing features.\n\n257. The kind of resistance to be opposed to temptation depends on the\ncharacter and urgency of the temptation and the disposition of the\nperson tempted. (a) Generally speaking, the more serious the\ntemptation, the stronger should be the resistance. Example: One who\nknows from experience that temptations to hatred overcome him, if he\nuses only internal resistance, should make use of external resistance\nalso. (b) In those cases in which the violence of the temptation\nincreases in proportion to the strength of the resistance, it is better\nthat the resistance be internal, indirect, etc. Examples: Temptations\nagainst faith are often overcome more readily by turning the mind away\nfrom the doubts suggested to other matters. Temptations that last a\nlong time may be conquered more easily by despising them than by\nworrying about them and renewing protest after protest. The same is\ntrue as regards temptations against purity.\n\n258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in\ncertain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a)\nDanger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given\ncircumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of\nmankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a\nparticular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples:\nAssociating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for\nanyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil\nassociations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate\ndanger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger\nof sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not\nmorally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded\nprobability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote\ndanger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times\nrelapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.\n\n259. Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it\nwill result from a certain set of circumstances. Example: Attention to\nbusiness sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may\ndegenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection\nbetween industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and\ninsincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger,\nbut only accidentally from its possibility.\n\n260. It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of\nsin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss\nwithout cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs\naccording to circumstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the\nproximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become\nproximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to\nwhich he exposes himself--and this even though the sin does not\nactually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is\nto love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote\ndanger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is\nvenially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not\nimply affection for grave sin.\n\n261. It is lawful to expose oneself to the danger of sin, if this can\nbe done according to the laws of prudence, for otherwise absurdities\nwould follow (e.g., that urgent duties should not be performed, if one\nfeared they contained the danger of sin). The requirements of prudence\nreferred to are: (a) that the one who exposes himself to the danger of\nsin be sure that his motive is good (viz., that he firmly intends to\navoid the sin to which he may be tempted and to accomplish only the\ngood he desires); (b) that the action he performs and which involves\nthe danger is necessary, and bears a correspondence in importance to\nthe gravity of the sin and the proximity of the risk; (c) that means be\nemployed (e.g., prayer, pious thoughts, spiritual reading, and the use\nof the Sacraments), which will so reduce the danger that one has\nconfident assurance that the danger will be encountered safely.\n\n262. It is lawful to expose oneself to the possibility of sin, for,\nsince almost every action may be perverted, one who wished to avoid the\npossibility of sin would have to leave this world and become confirmed\nin grace.\n\n263. The Occasions of Sin are external circumstances--persons, places\nor things--which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others\nto defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where\nirreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.\n\n264. The occasions of sin are of various kinds. (a) They are proximate\nor remote, according as it is morally certain, or only likely that they\nwill lead to sin. (b) Occasions are necessary or free, according as one\nis able or not able to abandon them without difficulty. For example,\none who chooses dishonest persons as his associates is in a free\noccasion of sin; one who is imprisoned with criminals is in a necessary\noccasion of sin. An occasion of sin is also necessary when the\nimpossibility of leaving it is not physical, but moral. Examples: A\nwife who is bound to a provoking husband; a person who cannot give up\nan employment that offers many temptations, without suffering great\ntemporal or spiritual injury, or without incurring a worse condition.\n(c) Occasions are present or absent, according as one has the occasion\nwith him or must go to seek it. Examples; Intoxicants kept in his home\nare a present occasion of sin for a drunkard; atheistic lectures are an\nabsent occasion of sin for one who has to go out to hear them.\n\n265. It is not lawful to remain in a free occasion of sin,, whether it\nbe present or absent; for to do so is to expose oneself rashly to the\ndanger of sin (see 258 sqq.).\n\n266. It is not lawful for one who is in a necessary occasion of sin to\nneglect means that are adapted to preserve him from the moral contagion\nby which he is surrounded; for to neglect spiritual safeguards and\nprotections in such a case is to refuse to resist temptation (see 252\nsqq.). The means that should be used depend on circumstances, but\nprayer and firm resolves to avoid sin should be employed in every case.\n\n267. The gravity of the sin committed by one who freely remains in an\noccasion of sin, or who does not use the requisite spiritual helps in a\nnecessary occasion, depends on various factors: (a) if the sin to which\nhe is tempted is light, he does not sin gravely; (b) if the sin to\nwhich he is tempted is serious, and the occasion is proximate, he sins\ngravely; (c) if the occasion is remote, he sins venially.\n\n268. The Motives of Sin.--The purposes that lead men to sin can be\nconsidered as follows: (a) according to the predominant vices of\nindividual men, which are for them motives for committing their other\nsins (particular motives)--e.g., a man whose chief sin is unbelief\nand who is led by it to intolerance, blasphemy, despair, etc.; (b)\naccording to the natural relationship and sequence between sins\nthemselves, by which some are usually the motives for others _in all\nmen (general motives)_.\n\n269. The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as\nthe different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is\nimpossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin,\non the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that\nmost often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows:\n(a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued\n(the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the\nviews of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved\n(the vice of avarice); (d) one\u2019s own good, not sufficiently wished (the\nvice of sloth); (e) the neighbor\u2019s good, not suffiviently desired (the\nvices of envy and anger).\n\n270. The seven vices mentioned above are usually calle the capital, or\nhead vices, since the other sins are directed by them just as the other\nparts of the body are directed by the head.\n\n271. Among the seven capital vices there are two that have principality\nover the others: (a) in the intention of the sinner the motive force\nthat impels to sin is always some inordinate desire of his own personal\nexcellence, and hence pride is the beginning of all sin; (b) in the\nexecution of the sin the opportunity for satisfying every base desire\nis afforded by money, and thus avarice is the root of nourishment of\nall evils.\n\n272. The Results of Sin.--There are two kinds of sins from the\nviewpoint of origin: (a) original sin, which is inherited from Adam by\nall his descendants (except Christ and the Blessed Virgin); (b) actual\nsin, which is committed by the personal will of each sinner.\n\n273. The immediate consequences of original sin were that Adam lost for\nhimself and his posterity the gifts of the state of original innocence.\nThus: (a) the soul in subjection to God was endowed with the beauty\nof holiness, to which succeeded the deformity of enmity against Him;\n(b) the powers of the soul were in harmony, the lower subject to the\nhigher, but to this succeeded a state of disunion and rebellion and\nwhat are called the four wounds of nature, the intellect and will\nbecoming prone to error and sin, and the sensitive appetites tending\ninordinately towards delights or away from difficulties; (c) the body\nwhich had been in subjection to the soul and endowed with freedom from\nsuffering and mortality, became burdensome to the soul and subject to\npain and death.\n\n274. The consequences that are common to all sin, both original and\nactual, are: (a) the sinner loses the spiritual beauty to which sin is\nopposed, and this loss is called the stain of sin, since the soul\ndefiles itself by inordinate contact with what it loves; (b) the sinner\nincurs the debt of punishment, since sin is an injustice against the\ninternal law of reason and against the external law of God and man.\n\n275. The stain of sin is not: (a) a mere privation or absence of grace,\nfor otherwise all sins would be the same; nor (b) a mere passing shadow\nover the soul, since the bad state of the will can remain after the act\nof sin.\n\n276. The stain of sin differs according to the sin. (a) The stain of\noriginal sin is the privation of original justice (i.e., of the\nsubjection of reason and will to God), as being a voluntary privation\nthrough the will of the first parent Adam; (b) the stain of mortal sin\nis the privation of sanctifying grace, as connoting the act of the\nindividual will through which it was incurred; (c) the stain of venial\nsin is the privation of the fervor of charity resulting from the sin,\ninasmuch as it, to some extent, hinders the beauty of interior grace\nfrom appearing in external acts.\n\n277. The stain of grave sin is the disfigurement of death, for (a) it\nremoves the principle of supernatural existence (i.e., grace); (b) it\ntakes away the principles of supernatural activity (i.e., the infused\nhabits), though faith and hope may remain; (c) it deprives the soul of\nthe rights that belong to the spiritually living (i.e., of merits\nalready acquired).\n\n278. The stain of venial sin is the disfigurement of disease, for (a)\nit disposes one for spiritual death (i.e., for mortal sin); (b) it\nlessens spiritual vitality, by setting up habits that make the practice\nof the virtues more difficult.\n\n279. The penalty of sin is threefold according to the threefold offense\nof sin. (a) Inasmuch as sin is against reason, it is punished by\nremorse of conscience; (b) inasmuch as it is against ecclesiastical,\ncivil or other human law, it is punished by man; (c) inasmuch as it is\nagainst divine law, it is punished by God.\n\n280. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its duration. (a)\nGrave sin, since it deprives of spiritual life and turns man away from\nhis Last End, introduces a radical and, of itself, irreparable\ndisorder, and thus incurs an eternal punishment; those who die in grave\nsin will be sentenced to eternal punishment. (b) Venial sin does not\ninflict spiritual death, but is a defect or excess, not as regards the\nLast End, but as regards the means to the Last End. Thus, it incurs,\nnot an eternal, but a temporal punishment.\n\n281. The punishment of sin is twofold according to its quality. (a) Sin\nby which man turns away from his Last End is punished by the pain of\nloss, the deprivation of eternal happiness which was despised. This\npain may be called infinite, inasmuch as it is the loss of Infinite\nGood. (b) Sin, in so far as it is an inordinate turning towards created\nthings, is punished by the pain of sense, which comes through\ncreatures. This pain is finite.\n\n282. Sin may be a punishment of sin: (a) if a later sin results from a\nformer sin (e.g., God may permit those who refuse to serve Him, to\nbecome the servants of their passions); (b) if the commission of sin is\naccompanied by internal or external sufferings (e.g., the jealous\nindulge their vice at the expense of great mental torment).\n\n283. Not all the afflictions that befall mankind are chastisements. In\nthe strict sense, only those evils are punishments which are inflicted\nby the lawgiver against the will of the offender as a vindication of\njustice violated by the personal offense of the latter. Hence we must\ndistinguish punishment from the following: (a) from satisfaction, which\nis compensation willingly endured for one\u2019s own sin, or freely offered\nfor another\u2019s (e.g., David after his repentance performed penance for\nhis sins; Christ on the cross offered His satisfaction for the human\nrace); (b) from medicinal afflictions, which are intended, not as\nreparations to injured justice, but as remedies to preserve men against\nsin or relapse, or to afford them opportunities for progress (e.g., the\ncalamities of Job, the condition of the man born blind, the dolors of\nthe Blessed Virgin, the physical evils Which in this world sometimes\nhappen to subjects as a punishment on their rulers, etc.); (c) from the\nnatural defects of fallen human nature, such as hunger, thirst,\ndisease, etc. These are only indirectly the consequences of original\nsin, the direct punishment, from which they follow, being the infirmity\nand corruption of nature produced by original sin.\n\n\nQuestion III\n\nLAW\n\n284. In the previous Question we considered the internal principles of\nhuman acts--that is, habits, good and bad, from which they proceed. Now\nwe shall turn to the external principles, good and bad, that move one\nto one\u2019s acts. The external principle that moves to evil is the demon,\nwho tempts us to sin; the external principle that moves to good is God,\nwho instructs us by His law and helps us by His grace to fulfill it.\nTemptation has been discussed already, and grace belongs to Dogmatic\nTheology; the next Question to be considered, therefore, is Law.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 1: LAW IN GENERAL\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 90-92.)\n\n285. Definition.--Law is an ordinance of the reason for the common good\npromulgated by him who has authority in the community.\n\n(a) It is an ordinance, that is, a command or prohibition which has\nobligatory and lasting force. Hence, advice is not a law, because not\nobligatory; a rule that binds only during the lifetime of the lawgiver\nor of those who received it is not strictly a law, because not enduring.\n\n(b) It is an ordinance of the reason, since the rule and standard of\nhuman acts is reason (see 64 sqq.). Hence, the arbitrary will of a\nruler commanding what is against reason would not be law, but rather\niniquity.\n\n(c) It is made for the common good, that is, it must tend to promote,\ndirectly or indirectly, general happiness, which is the end of society.\nHence, the commands of a tyrant which benefit a few at the expense of\npublic peace and prosperity are not truly laws.\n\n(d) It is made by him who has authority, that is, by the person or\npersons who have the lawmaking power according to the form of\ngovernment. Hence, the decisions of an advisory body or the decrees of\na usurper are not laws.\n\n(e) It is made by the proper authority in a community, that is, as here\nunderstood, in a self-sufficing community, which has its own means for\nattaining its end and is independent in its own order of other\nsocieties. Hence, the regulations made by parents for their family are\nnot called laws, since the family is not a self-sufficing society.\n\n(f) It is an ordinance that has been promulgated, that is, brought to\nthe notice of those whom it binds. Hence, a law that has been drawn up\nbut not published as such, is not obligatory even for those who know of\nits existence. A law becomes obligatory, however, as soon as it has\nbeen promulgated, and the presumption then is that the law is known;\nbut he who is inculpably ignorant is not guilty of formal sin if he\nbreaks the law.\n\n286. Division.--According as the immediate lawgiver is God or man, laws\nare divine or human. Divine laws are threefold: (a) the eternal law is\nthe ordinance of the divine mind which from eternity has directed the\nmotions and actions of all creatures for the common good of the\nuniverse; (b) the natural law is the light of man\u2019s reason as an\nimpression and reflection of the eternal law; (c) the positive divine\nlaw is that which God of His free will has added to the natural law,\nviz., the Mosaic law under the Old Testament and the law of the Gospel\nunder the New Testament.\n\n287. Human laws are ecclesiastical or civil according to the authority\nfrom which they originate.\n\n288. Collision of Laws.--Not infrequently it happens that opposite laws\nseem to call for fulfillment at the same time, as, when in case of\nunjust attack it seems that one is bound to defend oneself and bound\nnot to injure the other party. Hence arises a conflict of obligations\nand rights. But the difficulty is only apparent; for, since God is a\njust and wise lawgiver, He does not intend either that one should be\nheld to impossibilities, or that a superior obligation should yield to\none that is inferior. Hence, the rule in such cases of apparent\ncollision of laws is:\n\n(a) if a person can recognize which of the two obligations is superior,\nhe is bound to follow that one; (b) if he is unable to discover after\ncareful examination which obligation has the greater claim, and must\ndecide at once, he may decide for the law whose observance seems to him\nsafer; or, if he sees no difference as regards safety, he may decide\nfor either as he wishes. If the decision is wrong, the error is\ninvoluntary, and hence not imputable as sin.\n\n289. When the contending precepts belong to different categories of\nlaw, the higher law must be followed. (a) The natural law has\nprecedence over the positive law, divine or human. For example, the\nnatural law of self-preservation allowed David to eat the loaves of\nproposition, a thing forbidden by the positive divine law. The same law\nof self-preservation allows a starving man to take what does not belong\nto him according to human laws, if it is necessary for his life. The\nsame law of self-preservation excuses one from assisting at Mass, if\none is very ill.\n\n(b) The positive divine law has precedence over human law. Example: The\ncommand of Christ to his Apostles to preach His Name was to be obeyed\nrather than the command of the Sanhedrin to the contrary (Acts, v. 19).\n(c) The ecclesiastical law has precedence over civil law, for the end\nof the Church is higher than that of the State, and the Church\u2019s\njudgment about the means to her end should prevail.\n\n290. The precedence of ecclesiastical over civil law does not mean that\nthe Church has the right to interfere in matters that belong to the\njurisdiction of the State, or that the Church should insist on settling\nevery dispute by its own action alone.\n\n(a) A law on matters purely civil and political made by the Church in\nopposition to a law of the State would not prevail over the latter,\nfor, as the Church admits, \u201cwhatever is to be ranged under the civil\nand political order is rightly subject to the civil authority\u201d (Leo\nXIII).\n\n(b) A law on matters directly or indirectly spiritual, made by the\nChurch but not necessary to her end, can be made the subject of\nnegotiation or even of compromise by the Church in order to avoid a\nconflict of laws; in fact, the Church has shown her willingness to make\nconcessions, where possible, for the common peace and happiness.\n\n291. When contending laws belong to the same category of laws, the more\nimportant, or more urgent, or more necessary law prevails.\n\n(a) The law that defends greater goods (those that are spiritual,\ninternal, or common) has precedence over the law that defends lesser\ngoods (the temporal, external, or private). Examples: The natural law\nthat one must save oneself from persecution and death yields to the\nnatural law that one must not blaspheme or deny God, and hence one must\nprefer to die rather than blaspheme. The law that one may not expose\none\u2019s life to danger yields to the law that the common welfare must be\ndefended; hence, citizens are obliged to go to war when the nation\ncalls, pastors and physicians to remain at their posts in time of\npestilence, disaster, etc.\n\n(b) Obligations of justice have precedence over obligations of charity,\nfor in the former case a stricter right is in question. Example: Titus\nis keeping $5.00 in order to pay a debt to Caius, who needs the money\ntoday; Balbus, who is very poor, asks Titus to give the money to him.\nTitus should pay Caius.\n\n(c) Negative or prohibitory laws have precedence over affirmative or\npreceptive laws (see 371). Example: Titus is asked to write out a\ntestimonial stating that he knows that Balbus is honest, competent,\netc. Balbus has claims on the help of Titus on account of a promise\nmade in the past; but Titus knows very well that Balbus is not\ncompetent, honest, etc. The law forbidding lies prevails here over the\nlaw that one keep a promise made.\n\n292. Since rights and duties are correlative--there being a duty that\ncorresponds to every right, and vice versa--and since both are\nregulated by law, the principles given for the apparent collision of\nlaws can be applied to the apparent collision of rights.\n\n(a) Rights of a higher kind have preference over rights of a lower\nkind. Therefore, the rights that arise from birth itself, or from the\nfact that one is a human being (e.g., the right to life), are superior\nto the rights that are acquired through some condition, such as\ninheritance or contract (e.g., the right to property, etc.). Example:\nTitus must get his child, who is in danger of death, to a hospital\nwithout delay. Balbus is getting ready for a pleasure ride, but Titus\ntakes his car since there is no other ready means of getting to the\nhospital. Titus acts within his natural rights, if the car is returned\nsafely and as soon as possible to the owner. According to civil law his\nact would be technical larceny, but in view of the necessity courts and\njuries would certainly not insist on the letter of the law.\n\n(b) Inalienable rights (i.e., those which one may not renounce, because\nthey are also duties), such as the right to serve God, the right to\nlive, etc., are superior to alienable rights (i.e., those which one may\nrenounce), such as the right to marry, the right to own property, etc.\nExample: One may surrender the right to drink intoxicants in order to\nserve God or preserve one\u2019s life.\n\n293. The Basis of All Laws.--Prior to every other law and the ground\nand principle of all laws is the Eternal Law; for, since this is the\nplan of Divine Wisdom directing from eternity all acts and movements to\ntheir particular ends and to the end of the universe, it follows that\nall other laws are reflections of the eternal plan and realizations of\nthe divine decree. The Eternal Law differs from other laws in various\nways:\n\n(a) as to duration. The Eternal Law existed before anything was made,\nwhereas all other laws begin to exist when they are promulgated;\n\n(b) as to breadth of application. The Eternal Law regulates, not only\ncontingent things (such as actions) but also necessary things (such as\nthat man should have a soul, hands and feet); for all things created,\nwhether they be contingent or necessary, are subject to divine\ngovernment. Human laws, as is evident, cannot regulate what is\nnecessary (e.g., it would be foolish for them to decree that men must\nor must not have souls);\n\n(c) as to subjects. The Eternal Law rules, not only rational creatures\n(i.e., angels and men), but also irrational creatures, such as matter,\nplants, and animals. The former are ruled through commands, which\nrequire that they direct themselves to their End; the latter are ruled\nthrough the inclinations given them by God, which move them to the ends\nHe desires them to attain. Human laws cannot regulate the acts of\nirrational creatures, for these creatures cannot understand a command\nas such, and man cannot give them natural inclinations (e.g., it would\nbe foolish to make a law for cats against the catching of birds).\n\n294. The laws to be considered in the pages that follow are temporal\nand moral. Thus: (a) they are laws promulgated at some particular time,\neither from the beginning of humanity (as is the case with the Natural\nLaw) or later (e.g., the Mosaic Law, the Christian Law, etc,); (b) they\nare laws regulating, not the necessary (as is the case with\nmetaphysical or mathematical laws), but the contingent; (c) they are\nlaws given, not to the irrational creature (as is the case with\nphysical and biological laws), but to the rational, that it may attain\nits end through self-government in accordance with law.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: THE NATURAL LAW\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 93, 94.)\n\n295. Meaning.--The Natural Law is so called for the following reasons:\n(a) it is received by man, not through special promulgation, but along\nwith his rational nature. Hence, St. Paul says that the Gentiles, who\nhad not received the laws specially promulgated, were a law unto\nthemselves, that is, through their rational nature (Rom., ii. 14); (b)\nit includes only such precepts as can be known or deduced from the very\nnature of man, and thus some pagans fulfilled the Law of Moses\nnaturally, i.e., as regards its natural precepts (Rom., ii. 14); (c) it\ncan be known from the natural light of reason without instruction,\nbeing a law written on the heart of man (Rom, ii. 15).\n\nThe Natural Law is defined theologically as a participation of the\nEternal Law in man. Three elements constitute its essence in its\nintegrity: (a) a passive participation of the Eternal Law consisting in\nman\u2019s nature and faculties with their inclinations to their proper acts\nand ends. This man shares with all creatures. (b) an active\nparticipation in the Eternal Law proper to man. This consists in the\nactivity of man\u2019s intellect through which he shares in God\u2019s providence\nand government in a special way as one who can rule himself and others.\nReason, reflecting upon the natural inclinations and ordering them to\ntheir proper acts and ends, formulates (c) a dictate or command of the\npractical reason. This command constitutes the essence of Natural Law.\n\u201cHence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm, IV. 6): _Offer up the\nsacrifice of justice_, as though some one asked what the works of\njustice are, adds: _Many say, Who showeth us good things_, in answer to\nwhich he says: _The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon\nus_. Thus the Psalmist implies that the light of natural reason,\nwhereby we discern what is good and bad, which is the function of the\nNatural Law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light.\nIt is therefore evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the\nrational creature\u2019s participation in the eternal law\u201d (_Summa Theol_.\nI-II, q. 91, a.2).\n\n296. Relation of the Natural Law to Other Laws.-(a) The Natural Law is\ninferior to the Eternal Law; for, while the Eternal Law exists in the\nmind of God, underived from any other law and is regulative of all\ncreated things, the Natural Law exists in the mind of man, as a\nderivation and image of the Eternal Law and a rule for man\u2019s acts only.\n(b) It is superior to Positive Law, for all Positive Law is a deduction\nfrom or a determination of Natural Law.\n\n297. Division.--Since Natural Law is the reflection of the eternal plan\nof Divine Wisdom in the reason of man, we cannot distinguish different\nspecies of it according to difference of lawgivers or subjects. The\nobjects regulated are, however, different; and hence we may distinguish\nvarious precepts of Natural Law.\n\n(a) According to the difference of persons to whom natural duties are\nowed, there are natural laws concerning God (e.g., that God must be\nhonored), natural laws concerning self (e.g., that one must not commit\nsuicide), and natural laws concerning the neighbor (e.g., that\ninjustice must not be done).\n\n(b) According to the difference of natural inclinations in man, there\nare, first, natural laws common to him with all beings (e.g., the law\nof self-preservation, and hence it is a natural duty of man to take\nsleep, food, drink, remedies, etc., as necessary for life); secondly,\nnatural laws common to him with all sentient beings or animals (e.g.,\nthe law of preservation of the species, and hence it is a natural duty\nof man to rear and provide for his children); thirdly, natural laws\nproper to man as a rational being (e.g., the laws that he should\ncultivate his powers of mind and will, and hence it is a natural duty\nof man to further religion and education, and to organize into\nsocieties and to respect the rights of others).\n\n298. According to their necessity for the primary or the secondary end\nof a natural inclination, the laws of nature are divided into primary\nand secondary. (a) The primary end of a natural inclination is the\nconservation of a natural good; and so it is a primary law of nature\nthat man should take the food, drink, sleep and exercise necessary for\nlife, and that he should avoid poison or other things that cause death.\n(b) The secondary end of a natural inclination is the betterment of a\nnatural good, or its easier conservation; thus, it is a secondary law\nof nature that man should use those kinds of food or drink that promote\nhis health, that he should be careful about his diet, practise\nmoderation, etc.\n\n299. Primary and secondary laws of nature are also explained as\nfollows: (a) a primary law is one that expresses the principal purpose\nof a natural inclination (e.g., social good, that is, the begetting and\nrearing of children, is the primary law of the married state); (b) the\nsecondary law is one that expresses a less important purpose of a\nnatural inclination. For example, individual good (i.e., companionship,\nmutual assistance, the practice of virtue and freedom from temptation)\nis the secondary purpose to be promoted in the married state.\n\n300. Precepts of the Natural Law may be divided also on account of the\ndifferent relations they have to one another or to our knowledge.\n\n(a) According to the priority they have among themselves, the laws of\nnature are divided into the first principle and the secondary\nprinciples. The first principle, which is general, which depends on no\nother, and which is the root of all the others, is: \u201cGood must be done,\nevil omitted.\u201d The secondary principles are particular, and they apply\nthis general principle to the natural inclinations of man mentioned\nabove, which reason indicates as ends of action--i.e., as goods to be\nsought.\n\n(b) According to the priority they have with respect to our knowledge\nof them, the laws of nature are divided, first, into axiomatic\nprecepts, which are evident and are granted by all (e.g., that good is\nto be done, that one should follow reason, that one should not do to\nothers what one does not wish done to oneself etc.), and, secondly,\ninto inferred precepts (e.g., that one should not steal from others, as\none does not wish others to steal from oneself).\n\n301. The inferred precepts are also of two kinds, namely, general and\nparticular. (a) The general precepts are those that are deduced\nimmediately from the axioms as universal conclusions (e.g., the\ncommandments of the Decalogue, the principle that one should return\nwhat one borrowed). (b) The particular precepts are those that are\ndeduced only remotely from the axioms as conclusions about cases in\nwhich many particular conditions and circumstances are involved (e.g.,\nmany conclusions about contracts, the conclusion that a loan is to be\npaid in some particular way, at this particular time, etc.).\n\n302. According to the invariability or permanence of their\nsubject-matter, the laws of nature are of two kinds, namely, necessary\nand contingent. (a) The necessary laws are those whose matter always\nbears the same relation of essential conformity to or difformity from\nreason. For example, the command, \u201cThou shalt not take the name of the\nLord in vain,\u201d is necessary, because God remains always worthy of\nhonor, and there is no conceivable or possible case in which it could\nbecome useful to speak of Him with dishonor. (b) The contingent laws of\nnature are those whose matter generally, but not always, bears the same\nessential relation to right reason. For example, the command, \u201cThou\nshalt not kill,\u201d is contingent, because, though man generally remains\nworthy of having his life respected by others, there are cases when it\nmight be injurious to the common welfare, and hence to natural law,\nthat an individual be permitted to live, as when he has committed and\nbeen convicted of a capital crime.\n\n303. According to the manner in which they oblige, the laws of nature\nare twofold, namely, absolute and relative. (a) Absolute laws are those\nthat oblige for every case and condition, because the matter with which\nthey are concerned is intrinsically good or bad in every instance\n(e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between parent and child, the law\nagainst polyandry). (b) Relative laws of nature are those that oblige\nexcept in case of a most grave public necessity, because the matter\nwith which they are concerned is generally and of its very nature\nbecoming or unbecoming (e.g., the laws forbidding marriage between\nbrother and sister, the law forbidding polygamy).\n\n304. According to the manner in which the obligation is contracted,\nlaws of nature are of two kinds, viz., those whose obligatory force\ndepends entirely on the nature of things (e.g., the law that God must\nbe honored), and those whose obligatory force depends upon, an act of\nthe will of man freely undertaking an obligation, which the nature of\nthings then demands that he fulfill (e.g., the laws that those who have\nmade vows, oaths, contracts, etc., should live up to that which they\nhave freely promised).\n\n305. Properties.--Since the Natural Law is the reflection of God\u2019s\nEternal Law impressed on the rational nature of man, it has the\nfollowing properties: (a) it is both declarative and imperative; being\nimmanent in man, it declares to him his duty; being transcendent in its\norigin, it speaks with the voice of authority; (b) it is universal, or\nfor all, for it declares the necessities of nature, which are the same\nin all men; (c) it is unchangeable, that is, it admits of neither\nabrogation, nor dispensation, nor emendatory interpretation, for the\nessences of things, on which it is based, do not change; (d) it is\nrecognizable and indelible, that is, it cannot fail to be known and\ncannot be forgotten by mankind, for it is promulgated through the light\nof reason given to man.\n\n306. The Natural Law is of universal obligation. It is in force in all\nplaces, at all times, and for all persons. (a) Thus, those who have not\nthe use of reason, such as infants and the insane, are subject to the\nNatural Law on account of their human nature which is injured by any\ntransgression of its inclinations. Their ignorance, of course, excuses\nthem from formal sin (see 24 sqq., 97 sqq.). Example: It is sinful to\ninduce or permit children to blaspheme or become intoxicated, not only\nbecause of scandal or of harm done to them, but also because such\nthings are necessarily repugnant to their dignity as human beings. (b)\nthose who have the use of reason are subject to the Natural Law, and\ntheir transgressions are imputable as formal sins and incur the debt of\npunishment.\n\n307. The Natural Law is unchangeable, not as regards additions, but as\nregards subtractions. (a) Additions may be made to the Natural Law,\nfor, in many points not determined by it, it is well that supplementary\nregulations be made to provide for particular situations. These\nadditions, made by Positive Law, divine and human, are amplifications\nrather than changes, for they must not be out of harmony with Natural\nLaw. (b) Subtractions may not be made from the Natural Law--that is,\nthere can be no exception when it declares that a certain thing must\nalways be observed, and there can be no abrogation when it declares\nthat a certain thing must be observed usually.\n\n308. From the foregoing it follows that no precept of the Natural Law\ncan be abrogated--that is, repealed and deprived of all force, so that\nwhat was today a precept of nature should no longer be such tomorrow;\nfor the necessities of nature on which the Natural Law is based do not\nchange.\n\n309. As to the question whether any precepts of the Natural Law may be\ndispensed or not, distinction must be made between two kinds of\ndispensation.\n\n(a) A dispensation in the strict sense is granted when a legislator\nrelaxes for a particular case the obligation of a law, although the\nsubject-matter of the law still remains. Example: Titus is in the class\nof those who are bound by the law of fast, but he is exempted by\ncompetent authority from the obligation of the law.\n\n(b) A dispensation in the wide sense is granted when the subject-matter\nof the law is taken away by the legislator himself or by another, so\nthat it ceases to be comprehended under the law, although the\nobligation of the law still remains. Example: Balbus owed money to\nCaius, but, as Caius forgave him the debt, he is no longer in the class\nof those who are bound by law as debtors to Caius; he is not exempted,\nhowever, from the obligation of the general law that one must pay one\u2019s\ndebts.\n\n310. There are various opinions as to the possibility of a dispensation\nfrom the Natural Law granted by God, but the following doctrine seems\nthe most probable.\n\n(a) God Himself cannot dispense in any way from those precepts whose\nmatter is necessary (see 302), such as axiomatic precepts (viz., those\nthat prohibit malice and those that command duties to be fulfilled at a\nproper time and place). For all the subject-matter of these precepts is\nintrinsically either consonant with or dissonant from right reason.\nExample: God could not by decree abolish the Ten Commandments, for, as\nlong as God is God, He must remain worthy of worship, praise and love;\nand, as long as man is man, it must be against his rational nature to\nmurder, steal, lie. etc.\n\n(b) God cannot grant a dispensation in the strict sense from those\nprecepts of the Natural Law whose matter is contingent, such as the\nprecepts against the taking of human life, against taking possessions\nfrom others against their will, etc. For, as long as the subject-matter\nof these precepts remains what it is supposed to be by the law,\ntransgression of them is necessarily opposed to reason. Example: God\ncannot command the killing of a person who has the right to life, nor\nthe taking of property that rightly belongs to another.\n\n(c) God can grant a dispensation in the wide sense from contingent\nprecepts of the Natural Law--that is, He can make a change as regards\nthe subject-matter, so that it no longer falls under the law. Thus,\nsince God is the supreme Lord of life and property, He can without\ninjury to human rights command that a person be put to death or\ndeprived of his property by another. These acts would not constitute\nmurder (i.e., unjust homicide) or stealing (i.e., unlawful taking); for\nGod has a higher claim on life and possessions than the immediate\nowners have. Examples: The command to Abraham to kill his son was not a\ndispensation from the law against murder any more than the sending of\ndeath to the first-born of Egypt was the commission of murder by God.\nThe command given the Israelites to carry away with them the goods of\nthe Egyptians was not a dispensation from the law against theft, any\nmore than the destruction of the fruits of the Egyptians by plagues was\nthe commission of theft by God.\n\n311. Is God able to make a decree which sets up a most grave public\nnecessity opposed to the observance of a law of nature?\n\n(a) If there is question of absolute laws (see 303), this cannot be\ndone, for God cannot deny Himself by making a disposition contrary to\nHis Eternal Law. Example: We do not read that God ever sanctioned\npolyandry or marriage between parent and child, and it seems that He\ncould never permit such things as lawful.\n\n(b) If there is question of relative laws (see 303), the decree in\nquestion can be made by God; for the unbecomingness of that which is\nforbidden by a relative law passes away in the face of a great need.\nExample: Since God desired the propagation of the human race from one\nman and one woman, marriage between brothers and sisters was not\nagainst the Natural Law at the beginning. Since God desired the speedy\nmultiplication of the chosen people after the patriarchal era, polygamy\nwas not repugnant to nature among the Jews of that period.\n\n312. Is God able to remove a natural obligation in a case of private\nnecessity, that is, when the fulfillment would be harmful to an\nindividual?\n\n(a) Natural obligations that do not depend upon any free consent of the\nwill given to them (see 304) cannot be removed except by a dispensation\nwidely so-called and when their matter is contingent (as explained in\n309-310). Examples: God could not dispense an individual from the duty\nof confessing Him in order to escape death, for the subject-matter of\nthe law here is necessary. God, could dispense an individual from the\nobligation of not taking the property of another, for God is the\nprincipal owner of all things, including those possessed by others.\n\n(b) Natural obligations that depend upon the act or deed of human\nbeings consenting to obligation (see 304) can be removed. For since\nhuman beings cannot know all the circumstances existent, or all the\nconditions that will arise, it can happen that a thing agreed to or\npromised is only seemingly good, or will change from good to bad, so\nthat while the promise or agreement made is in itself good and\nnaturally obligatory, its fulfillment would work harm and evil, or be\nuseless, or would prevent the accomplishment of a greater good. It is\nreasonable, therefore, that God should release from obligation here,\nthus changing the subject-matter of the law, so that it is no longer\ncomprehended under the law (see 309-310). Example: Titus vows or swears\nthat he will give a certain alms or make a certain pilgrimage; but,\nwhen the time for fulfillment arrives, his circumstances have so\nchanged that it would not be advisable for him to keep the promise\nmade. The Church, acting in the name of God, can declare that the\nsubject-matter of this promise has become harmful and is not longer\nsuitable, and hence that the obligation has ceased.\n\n313. Human Authority and Modification of the Natural Law.\n\n(a) Additions to the Natural Law may be made, not only by positive laws\nof God, but also by human laws of Church or State, through the\nintroduction of that which Natural Law permits, or the determination or\nconfirmation of that which Natural Law contains implicitly or\nexplicitly. Examples: Division of property rights introduced by the law\nof nations; conditions for valid contracts determined by particular\ncodes; the laws against theft and murder confirmed by definite\npenalties prescribed for those crimes.\n\n(b) Subtractions from Natural Law cannot be made by any human\nauthority, for God has not delegated His power of dispensing which He\nhas as supreme owner of all things. Examples: No human authority could\nauthorize a father to sacrifice his innocent son, nor permit a servant\nto carry away the effects that belong to his employer.\n\n314. Apparent Cases of Dispensation from Natural Law made by Human\nAuthority. (a) The Church frees from the obligation of vows, contracts\nand promissory oaths, from impediments to marriage, from espousals,\netc. In so doing, however, she does not dispense from the Natural Law\nthat vows, contracts, etc., should be fulfilled, but only declares in\nthe name of God that the subject-matter of an obligation contracted by\nact of man\u2019s will has become unsuitable for vow, contract, etc., and\nhence is no longer comprehended under the law.\n\n(b) Societies or private individuals can free from the obligation of\npaying or returning to them what they have a right to, as when a\ncreditor forgives a debt, or an owner permits a thief to keep what he\nstole. In so doing, however, they do not dispense from the law of\nnature that one should pay one\u2019s debts and not keep ill-gotten goods;\nthey only change the quality of the things in question so that they\ncease to be due another or ill-gotten, and hence no longer fall under\nthe law. This differs, too, from the dispensation that God can grant;\nfor He can transfer rights without the consent of the immediate owner\n(see 310).\n\n315. Interpretation--that is, explanation of the law which indicates\nwhether or not it obliges in a particular case--may be applied to the\nNatural Law as follows:\n\n(a) Interpretation which explains the intention the lawgiver had in\nmaking the law and the sense he gave to the words of the law (verbal\ninterpretation), may be made when either a law itself is not entirely\nclear, or some person is not clever enough to see its meaning. Example:\nThe commandment, \u201cThou shalt not kill,\u201d needs to be interpreted, for it\ndoes not forbid every kind of killing.\n\n(b) Interpretation which explains the intention a lawgiver would have\nhad, had he foreseen a particular case in which his law would be\nharmful, and which therefore sets the will of the lawgiver against the\nwords of the law (emendatory interpretation, _epieikeia_), may not be\napplied to the Natural Law; for God, unlike human legislators, foresees\nthings not only in general, but also in particular, and hence there is\nno room for correction or benign interpretation of natural laws.\nExample: Titus, who was a chronic invalid, committed suicide in order\nthat his family might be freed from distress. He argued that the Fifth\nCommandment did not foresee the difficulties of earning a living under\nmodern conditions, and that his sacrifice would be pleasing to God.\nTitus did not reason well, for suicide is forbidden for motives that\napply universally (e.g., that society, and especially one\u2019s family, are\ninjured by the act of suicide).\n\n316. Verbal interpretation of the Natural Law is made as follows: (a)\nby private authority--that is, by those who are competent, on account\nof learning and prudence, to understand the meaning of the law, such as\nmoral theologians; (b) by public authority--that is, by those who are\nappointed to rule, with the prerogative of declaring the meaning of the\nNatural Law. The Pope, since he must feed the flock of Christ, is\ndivinely constituted to interpret Natural Law, and does so\nauthentically and infallibly. Thus, the Church declares that certain\nmatrimonial impediments are natural, and therefore incapable of being\ndispensed.\n\nOn the competence of the Church to give authoritative interpretations\nof the natural law in the field of morals, Pius XII has spoken clearly\nand forcefully: \u201c... it must openly and firmly be held that the power\nof the Church has never been limited to the boundaries of strictly\nreligious matters\u2019 as they are called; but the whole content of the\nnatural law, its institution, interpretation and application are within\nits power insofar as its moral element is concerned. For the\nobservation of the natural law, by the ordination of God, is the way by\nwhich man must strive to attain his supernatural end. On the road to\nthis supernatural end. it is the Church that is his leader and guide.\nThis is the way the Apostles acted, and from the earliest times the\nChurch held to this way of acting as it does today--and not in the\nmanner of a private leader and counselor, but from the command and\nauthority of God\u201d (AAS 46 [1954] 671-672).\n\n317. From the foregoing it follows that the Natural Law is so\nunchangeable that it cannot be abrogated or properly dispensed, or\ngiven an emendatory interpretation. But, though the law itself remains,\nthere are cases in which non-observance of it is excused from guilt.\nThese cases can be reduced to physical and moral impossibility.\n\n(a) In cases of physical impossibility (i.e., when the powers requisite\nfor observance are wanting), one is manifestly excused; for law is\nreasonable, and it is not reasonable to require impossibilities.\nExamples: Infants are not guilty of sin against the Natural Law, when\nthey do not pray; for they lack the use of reason, which is presupposed\nby the notion of prayer. He who is unable to work is not obliged to\nearn support for relatives.\n\n(b) In cases of moral impossibility (i.e., when a law cannot be kept\nwithout the infringement of a higher law or the loss of a higher good),\none is also excused; for it is unreasonable to prefer the less to the\nmore important. Example: Titus lends a revolver to Balbus. Later he\nasks that it be returned to him, as he wishes to kill himself. Now,\nproperty is less valuable than life, and hence Balbus is unable in this\ncase to observe the law which requires that things borrowed must be\nreturned.\n\n318. Moral impossibility is also defined as the inability to observe\nthe law without serious injury or loss to oneself or a third party.\nSerious injuries are such as deprive some one of great goods, such as\nthe use of reason, life, knowledge, friendship, health, reputation,\nproperty. Serious losses are such as prevent one from obtaining notable\ngoods, The following rules indicate when grave inconvenience excuses,\nand when it does not excuse, from the guilt arising from the\nnon-observance of Natural Law:\n\n(a) when the law is negative (i.e., prohibitory), no inconvenience\nexcuses from sin; for that which is forbidden by the Natural Law is\nalways morally evil, and hence more to be shunned than even the\ngreatest physical evil, or death. Example: One is obliged, under grave\nor light sin, as the case may be, to forfeit all temporal goods rather\nthan blaspheme, murder, lie, etc.;\n\n(b) when the law is affirmative (or mandatory), an inconvenience which,\nall things considered, is really and relatively grave, excuses from\nsin; for that which is commanded by the Natural Law is not always\nmorally obligatory, but only at the right time and in the right\ncircumstances (see 371), and hence its omission is not always morally\nevil. Examples: Sempronius vowed that he would go on foot to a place of\npilgrimage, but when the day came he had a sprained ankle that would be\nbadly injured if he walked. Caius received a jewel stolen from Balbus\nand promised that he would return it at once to the owner, but he finds\nthat he cannot do so now without danger, either of the arrest of\nhimself or of the one who took the jewel. Titus sees a person who has\nbeen seriously injured lying by the roadside, but he is tired, and\nneither gives help himself nor summons aid. In the first two cases the\ninconvenience is grave, and hence Sempronius may ride to the place of\npilgrimage, and Caius may return the jewel to Balbus later; but the\ninconvenience of Titus is slight, and does not excuse him from sin.\n\n319. Just as the Natural Law is unchangeable, because based on the\nunchangeable Eternal Law instituting the nature of man, so is it easily\nknowable, because it is promulgated by the light of reason. Hence: (a)\ninvincible ignorance of the entire Natural Law is impossible in any\nperson who has the use of reason; (b) complete forgetfulness of the\nNatural Law by mankind is impossible.\n\n320. Those who have not the use of reason, either habitually (as\nchildren and the insane) or actually (as the intoxicated), may be\ninvincibly ignorant of the Natural Law--for example, they may be unable\nto perceive even the difference between right and wrong. As to those\nwho have the use of reason, they can be ignorant of the Natural Law\nonly as follows:\n\n(a) they cannot ever be invincibly ignorant of the most general\nprecepts (such as \u201cgood is to be done,\u201d \u201cevil is to be avoided\u201d), for\nsince they know the difference between right and wrong, they must also\nperceive that which is contained in the concepts of right and wrong,\nviz., that the former is something desirable and which ought to be\ndone, the latter something undesirable which must not be done;\n\n(b) one cannot, as a rule, be invincibly ignorant of those precepts\nthat are immediately inferred as necessary conclusions from the most\ngeneral precepts (such as \u201cthat which was borrowed must be returned\u201d),\nfor the conclusion follows so easily from the manifest principle that\nonly in exceptional cases could one be excused for not knowing its\ntruth;\n\n(c) one can, even as a rule, be ignorant of precepts that are inferred\nas necessary but very remote conclusions from the most general\nprecepts, (such as \u201cthat which was borrowed must be returned at such a\ntime or place, or in such a manner or condition\u201d), for this conclusion\nis so far removed from its premise, and there are so many factors to be\nconsidered, that considerable knowledge and skill in reasoning are\nrequired for a correct judgment--things in which many people are\nlacking.\n\n321. The Commandments of the Decalogue follow directly from the most\ngeneral precepts of the Natural Law, and so to them may be applied what\nwas said in the previous paragraph. Hence: (a) generally speaking, no\nperson who has the use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of the\nCommandments. St. Paul blames the pagans as inexcusable in various sins\ncommitted against the Decalogue; (b) in special cases, a person who has\nthe use of reason can be invincibly ignorant of one or more\nCommandments; for while the Commandments may be easily inferred by most\npersons from the common principles of right and wrong, there are\nsometimes involuntary impediments that hinder the right employment of\nreason. Thus, children and older persons whose mentality is\nundeveloped, although they know the difference between right and wrong,\nare frequently unable to draw the conclusion that follows from it\n(e.g., that one should not tell lies).\n\n322. The Commandments regarding which invincible ignorance may most\neasily exist are: (a) those that deal with merely internal acts, for\nthe malice of violating them is less apparent. Hence, many theologians\nadmit that even among Christians the wickedness of sinful thoughts and\ndesires may be inculpably unknown, at least when the wickedness of the\ncorresponding external acts is also not known; (b) those that deal with\nthe control of sensuality, for the impulse to inordinate acts is at\ntimes most vehement. Unde theologi sunt qui affirmant malitiam\npeccatorum externorum contra sextum invincibiliter ignorari posse, non\nsolum apud infideles, sed etiam apud Christianos, ita quod ab\nadolescentibus facile ad tempus ignorari possit malitia mollitiei.\n\n323. If a Commandment be applied to some particular case in which there\nare many circumstances to be considered, or some reason that appears to\nchange the subject-matter of the law, even adults who have the perfect\nuse of reason may be invincibly ignorant; for in such instances we are\nconsidering, not an immediate, but a remote conclusion from the general\nprinciples of Natural Law.\n\n(a) If the case is difficult relatively (i.e., in view of the training\nor lack of education of the person studying it), there can be\ninvincible ignorance, at least for a time. Examples: Jepthe, according\nto St. Jerome, appears to have been invincibly ignorant that it was not\nlawful for him to slay his daughter. Being a soldier and living in a\nrude age, he perhaps did not appreciate the sacredness of human life.\nUnlettered persons might conceivably think in good faith that it is not\nwrong to commit perjury in order to help one in danger, to steal in\norder to pay debts, to think evil if there is no intention to fulfill\nit, to do what the majority do or what is tolerated, etc.\n\n(b) If the case is difficult absolutely (i.e., in view of the matter\nitself, which is complicated and obscure), there can be invincible\nignorance, even for a long time. Thus, it is so difficult to settle\nmany problems pertaining to justice (i.e., to the application of the\nSeventh Commandment) that we find professional theologians who take\nopposite sides, or admit that, speculatively speaking, they do not know\nwhere the truth lies.\n\n324. The Natural Law can never be erased from the hearts of men. (a) In\nabnormal circumstances only, as when the general power of reasoning has\nbeen weakened or lost, can the Natural Law be forgotten. Thus, to a\ndegenerate who becomes violently insane murder and other crimes may\nappear as good acts. But no community could govern itself by the\nstandards of madmen and long survive. (b) In normal circumstances\n(i.e., as long as the general power of reasoning remains unimpaired),\nthe Natural Law cannot be forgotten, as far as its general principles\nor immediate conclusions are concerned, although it may be overlooked\nor lost sight of when it is applied to particular cases, or when remote\nconclusions are deduced from it.\n\n325. As long, therefore, as a body of men remain sane, even though they\nbe uncivilized or addicted to crime, they cannot become oblivious of\nthe Natural Law. (a) The general principles (\u201cgood is to be done,\u201d\n\u201cevil is to be avoided\u201d) cannot vanish from the mind, although, in\nparticular affairs, anger, pleasure, or some other passion may prevent\nmen from thinking about them. Thus, when the mob spirit takes hold of a\ncrowd, it becomes intent only on violence or revenge, and gives no\nthought to conscience. (b) The secondary precepts, such as those\ncontained in the Decalogue, cannot be obliterated from the mind,\nalthough in applying them to concrete situations a people may go astray.\n\nThere are many examples of laws, both ancient and modern, which\npermitted or commanded, for particular cases, things contrary to the\ncurrent application of natural precepts. Thus, the Spartans and the\nRomans ordered the murder of infants who were weakly and of slaves\nwhose master had been killed. Some ancient races encouraged robberies\ncommitted beyond the boundaries of the states, and savage tribes have\nbeen found who had the practice of putting to death parents who were\naged or infirm.\n\n326. The causes of wrong applications of the Natural Law are the\nfollowing:\n\n(a) Some causes are involuntary. Thus, the correct application may be\ndifficult, as when more than one moral principle has to be considered\nand applied; or, if the case is not difficult, the person who makes the\napplication may be mentally undeveloped, or his mind may be blinded on\naccount of his bad education or environment. Examples: The races who\nsaw no infamy in robbery committed against their neighbors, lived in a\nwild age when such acts of violence seemed necessary as measures of\nself-protection. The savage killed his aged parents, because to his\nuntutored mind this seemed an act of mercy.\n\n(b) Some causes are voluntary, such as neglect of the truth, vicious\nhabits, etc. Examples: St. Paul blames the pagans for their idolatry,\nbecause they had darkened their own minds about God. Pirates and\nbandits who came to regard violence as necessary for their own defense\nwere responsible for their state of mind, inasmuch as they had chosen a\nlife of crime.\n\n327. Transgression of Natural Law, therefore, is not imputable as\nformal sin if it is not voluntary. Hence: (a) lack of knowledge\nexcuses, when ignorance is involuntary (e.g., those who have not the\nuse of reason, as infants and the unconscious; children and others\nmentally undeveloped who cannot grasp the meaning of some precept;\neducated persons who are unable to get a right solution of some knotty\nproblem of morals, etc.); (b) lack of consent excuses in whole or in\npart (as when one acts through fear).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 3: THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 98-108.)\n\n328. Meaning.--The Positive Divine Law is the law added by God to the\nNatural Law, in order to direct the actions of man to his supernatural\nEnd, to assist him to a better observance of the Natural Law, and to\nperfect that which is wanting in human law.\n\n(a) The Last End of man is not natural, but supernatural (see 20), and\nhence it was necessary that, in addition to the precepts which guide\nman towards his natural beatitude, there should be added precepts that\nwill guide him towards his supernatural beatitude: \u201cThe Law of the Lord\ngives wisdom to little ones\u201d (Ps. xviii. 8).\n\n(b) The light of natural reason was sufficient to instruct man in the\nNatural Law, but through sin that light had become obscured, with the\nresult that evil customs set in, and very many were at a loss how to\napply the Natural Law, or applied it wrongly. Hence, it was most\nsuitable that the Natural Law should be summed up in brief commandments\nand given externally by the authority of God. This was done through the\nDecalogue, which is a part of the Positive Divine Law of both the\nMosaic and the Christian dispensations: \u201cThe testimony of the Lord is\nfaithful\u201d (Ps. xviii. 8).\n\n(c) Human laws are the product of fallible human judgment; they can\ndirect only such acts as are external, and they are unable to forbid or\npunish many evil deeds. Hence, it was necessary that there should be\npositive divine laws to supply for what is wanting in human law: \u201cThe\nlaw of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls\u201d (Ps. xviii. 8).\n\n329. The Positive Divine Law differs from the Natural Law as to\nsubject-matter, permanence, and manner of promulgation.\n\n(a) The precepts of the Natural Law are necessary, since they follow as\nnecessary consequences from the nature of man, the precepts of the\nPositive Law of God, excluding those that are external promulgations of\nthe Natural Law, are not necessary, since they follow from the free\ndecree of God raising man to that which is above his nature.\n\n(b) The precepts of the Natural Law are unchangeable, since the nature\nof man always remains the same. Of the precepts of the Positive Law of\nGod some were changed, because given only for a time (such as the\nceremonial laws of Judaism); others, absolutely speaking, could be\nchanged, because not necessarily connected with the end God has in view\n(e.g., the laws concerning Sacraments).\n\n(c) The precepts of both kinds of law are immediately from God; but the\nNatural Law is promulgated only in a general way, through the light of\nreason given to man along with his nature, while the Positive Law of\nGod is proclaimed by special commands (e.g., \u201cthou shalt not steal\u201d).\n\n330. The Positive Divine Law contains two kinds of precepts, viz.,\nnatural and supernatural commandments. (a) The natural precepts were\ngiven in order to recall to the minds of men the laws knowable through\nreason which had become obscured through passion, custom or example.\nThe Commandments given to Moses on the tablets of stone renewed the\nnatural precepts which God had written through reason on the hearts of\nmen. (b) The supernatural precepts were given in order to point out to\nmen the duties their supernatural destiny imposed. Example: The\nprecepts of faith, hope, charity.\n\n331. Division.--There are four historical states of man with reference\nto his Last End, and to each of these correspond positive divine laws.\n\n(a) The state of Original Innocence is that which existed in Paradise\nbefore the Fall. Man had been raised to the supernatural state, and\nhence he was obliged to the supernatural acts of faith, hope, charity,\netc.; he was subject to God, both as to body and soul, and hence he was\nobliged to offer some kind of external sacrifice; he was sanctified\nimmediately by God, and hence was not bound to the use of any\nsacraments; but he was still in a state of probation, and was subject\nto various special regulations, such as the commands to avoid the fruit\nof a certain tree, to labor in Eden, etc.\n\n(b) The state of the Law of Nature is that which existed from the Fall\nto the giving of the written law through Moses. It is called the state\nof the Law of Nature, not in the sense that there were no supernatural\nprecepts then in force, but in the sense that there were as yet no\nwritten precepts. In that period man knew the Natural Law, not from\ncommandments written on tablets of stone, but from the law of reason\ninscribed in his heart; he knew the supernatural precepts, not from\nscriptures given him by God, but from tradition or special divine\ninspiration. In addition to the inner acts of supernatural worship and\nfaith in the Messiah to come and the outer sacrifices, there were\nduring this state certain rites of purification, or sacraments, by\nwhich fallen man was purified from sin. A special precept of the\npatriarchial times was the prohibition made to Noe against the eating\nof flesh with blood in it.\n\n(c) The state of the Mosaic Law is that which existed from the giving\nof the law on Sinai until the giving of the New Testament law by Christ.\n\n(d) The state of the Christian Law, or of the New Law, is that which\nbegan with Christ and the Apostles and will continue till the end of\nthe world.\n\n332. The Mosaic Law.--This was the special law of God to the Jews, the\npeople chosen by God as the race from which the Saviour of the world\nwas to come. It has two periods: the period of preparation and the\nperiod of the Law.\n\n(a)The period of preparation for the Law began with the Promise or\nCovenant given to Abraham. A law is not given except to a people (see\n285), and, as the peoples of the world at that time had returned to the\ngeneral corruption that reigned before the Deluge, God chose Abraham to\nbe the father of a new nation in which true religion should be\npreserved until the Redeemer of the world had come. The rite of\ncircumcision was ordered as a mark of the covenant and a sacrament of\nremission.\n\n(b) The period of the Law began with the promulgation of the Decalogue\non Sinai. The descendants of Abraham had grown into a nation and had\nbeen freed from slavery, and they were thus ready to receive a special\nlaw. Their history thereafter shows how God trained them according to\nthe pattern of the Mosaic Law and prepared them for the providential\nmission, which, through the Messiah, should be theirs, of giving to the\nworld the perfect and universal Law of the Gospel.\n\n333. The Excellence of the Mosaic Law.--(a) The Law was good (Rom, vii.\n12): it commanded what was according to reason and forbade what was\nopposed to reason; it had God for its Author and prepared man for the\nLaw of Christ. (b) The Law was imperfect (Heb., vii. 19); it was given\nfor a time when men were spiritually but children and not ready as yet\nfor the teaching and morality of the Gospel; it forbade sin and\nprovided punishments, but the necessary helps for observing it came\nonly from faith in Christ, the Author of the New Law.\n\n334. The Subjects of the Mosaic Law.--(a) The Jewish people were bound\nby the Mosaic Law. God had chosen Abraham by gratuitous election to be\nthe forefather of the Messiah, and it was by gratuitous election that\nHe gave the Jews a Law which would lend them a special holiness\nbefitting the promises made their race. The Jews, therefore, were bound\nto more things than other nations, as being the Chosen People; just as\nclerics are bound to more things than the laity, as being the ministers\nof God.\n\n(b) The Gentiles were not bound by the laws peculiar to the Mosaic\nCode, but only by the common precepts, natural and supernatural, that\nwere in force in the state of the Law of Nature. But it was permitted\nto Gentiles to become proselytes, that by observing Mosaic rites they\nmight more easily and more perfectly work out their salvation.\n\n335. The Duration of the Mosaic Law.--(a) The Law began when experience\nhad proved that knowledge is not sufficient to make man virtuous, that\nis, at a time when, in spite of the Natural Law, the peoples were\nturning to polytheism and vice: \u201cThe Law was given on account of\ntransgression\u201d (Gal, iii. 19).\n\n(b) The Law ended when experience had shown that external observance is\nnot sufficient for holiness, that is, at the time when Judaism was\ndegenerating into formalism, putting the letter before the spirit of\nthe Law: \u201cWhat the Law could not do, God sending His own Son, hath\ncondemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be\nfulfilled in us\u201d (Rom., viii. 3, 4).\n\n336. Deuteronomy, vi. 1, describes the Mosaic Law as precepts,\nceremonies and judgments; and the commandments of the Old Testament can\nbe classified according to this threefold division. (a) The moral\nprecepts defined the duties to God and man that arise from the dictates\nof reason and the Natural Law; (b) the ceremonial prescriptions were\ndeterminations of the religious duties to God contained in the moral\nlaw, and rules concerning the performance of worship based on the\npositive ordinance of God; (c) the judgments were determinations of\nsocial duties contained in the moral law; they were the civil or\npolitical code of the theocratic nation which had its force from the\npositive ordinance of God.\n\n337. The moral precepts are contained in the Decalogue, which is a sum\nof the whole Natural Law, inasmuch as the general principles of the\nNatural Law are implicit therein in their immediate conclusions, while\nthe remote conclusions are virtually found in the Commandments as in\ntheir principles (see 301).\n\n338. The Decalogue expresses man\u2019s duties: (a) towards God, viz.,\nloyalty (First Commandment), reverence (Second), service (Third)--all\nof which are Laws of the First Table; (b) towards parents (Fourth), and\nall fellow-men, viz., that no injustice be done them by sins of deed\n(Fifth, Sixth, Seventh), of mouth (Eighth), or of heart (Ninth,\nTenth)--all of which are Laws of the Second Table.\n\n339. The further moral precepts which were added after the giving of\nthe Decalogue can all be reduced to one or the other of the Ten\nCommandments. Examples: The prohibition against fortune-telling belongs\nto the First; the prohibition against perjury and false teaching, to\nthe Second; the commandment to honor the aged, to the Fourth; the\nprohibition against detraction, to the Eighth.\n\n340. The ceremonial laws, which prescribed the manner of performing the\ndivine worship or of acting as befitted the Chosen People, and which\nprefigured the worship and people of the New Testament, were numerous,\nin order that the Jews might be more easily preserved from pagan rites\nand customs. The ceremonies they regulated were of four kinds: (a) the\nsacrifices through which God was worshipped and through which the\nsacrifice of Christ was prefigured (e.g., the holocausts,\npeace-offerings, sin-offerings); (b) the sacred times and places,\nthings and persons set apart in order to give more dignity to divine\nworship and to foreshadow more distinctly the good things to come; (c)\nthe sacraments by which the people or sacred ministers were consecrated\nto the worship of God and were made to prefigure Christ (e.g.,\ncircumcision and the consecration of Levites); (d) the customs which\nregulated the details of life so that both priests and people might act\nas became their special calling, and might be types and figures of the\nChristian people (e.g., the laws about food, dress, etc.).\n\n341. Unlike the moral laws, which had existed before Moses as the\nNatural Law and which continue under the Christian dispensation, the\nceremonial laws were temporary. Thus: (a) before Moses other ceremonies\nwere observed by the patriarchs (e.g., the sacrifice of Abel, the\naltars of Abraham and Jacob, the priesthood of Melchisedech, etc.); (b)\nafter the coming of Christ, distinctions of food, new moons, sabbaths,\nand other Mosaic ceremonies were abrogated, since the figures of future\nthings had been superseded by rites that commemorated benefits that\nwere present.\n\n342. We may distinguish four periods in the history of the Mosaic\nceremonial law: (a) from Moses until Christ, it was the divinely\nordained manner of worshipping God, and was obligatory for the Chosen\nPeople; (b) at the death of Christ, when the New Testament began, the\nMosaic ceremonial ceased to be obligatory; (c) until the Gospel had\nbeen sufficiently promulgated (i.e., until the destruction of the City\nand the Temple of Jerusalem), the ceremonial law was permitted to\nJewish converts, not as prefiguring Christ, but as a form of divine\nworship; (d) after the Gospel had been sufficiently proclaimed, it was\nno longer lawful to conform to the Mosaic observances.\n\n343. The judgments or judicial laws of the Old Testament were intended;\n(a) to regulate the relations of the people of God to one another and\nto strangers according to justice and equity, and thus to prepare them\nfor the coming of the Messiah; (b) to be, consequently, in some sort a\nfigure of the social constitution of the Christian people.\n\n344. The judicial laws, like the ceremonial, expired with the New\nTestament. But since, unlike the ceremonial laws, they were not\nappointed directly as prefigurative of Christianity, their provisions,\nif not opposed to Christian law, could be used as part of the civil\ncode of a Christian State.\n\n345. There were four kinds of judicial precepts:\n\n(a) those concerning rulers. The government was monarchical and\naristocratic, as being administered by Moses and his successors with\nthe assistance of a body of elders; but it was also democratic,\ninasmuch as the princes were chosen from the people and by the people;\n\n(b) those concerning citizens. Excellent laws concerning sales,\ncontracts, property, and the administration of justice, are laid down\nin the Pentateuch;\n\n(c) those concerning foreigners. The relationship of the Jews to other\nnations, whether in peace or in war, was regulated by wise and humane\nlaws;\n\n(d) those concerning families. The rights and duties of husband and\nwife, parent and child, master and servant, were carefully and\nconsiderately provided for.\n\n346. The Law of the New Testament.--This is the special law given by\nGod through Christ to the whole world, and which endures till the end\nof time. Its character will be understood most readily from a\ncomparison of it with the Law of the Old Testament.\n\n(a) In both Testaments grace and the Holy Spirit are given through\nfaith in Christ (the internal law), and doctrines, commandments and\nceremonies are prescribed (the external law). But, whereas the Old\nTestament is principally a law of works, the New Testament is\nprincipally a law of faith (Rom., iii, 27); the former is concerned\nmostly with the external conduct, the latter regulates, not only\nactions, but also the internal movements of the soul, of which faith is\nthe first.\n\n(b) In both Testaments men are justified and saved through faith and\nworks (Heb, xi., 39; Rom., i. 16), and not through the external written\nlaw or the letter. But it is only through Christ, the author of the New\nLaw, that men are enabled to perform what the law requires: \u201cThe law\nwas given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ\u201d (John, i. 17).\n\n347. Comparison of the Two Testaments from Other Viewpoints.--(a) The\naim of both Laws is to secure obedience to God and holiness for man.\nBut the New Testament, since given to those who were better prepared\nand more perfect, unveils more clearly the mysteries of faith, enjoins\nmore perfect works, and supplements the Commandments with counsels of\nperfection (cfr. the Sermon on the Mount).\n\n(b) Both Laws make use of threats, promises and persuasion in order to\nmove men to obedience. But, as the Old Law was for those who were\nspiritually but children, it dwells especially on the punishments to be\nmeted out to transgressors and the external rewards that will be given\nto the obedient (the law of fear); whereas the New Law, being for those\nwho are spiritually mature, holds out as inducements chiefly the love\nof virtue and rewards that are internal and spiritual (the law of love).\n\n(c) The author of both laws is God. But, while the Old Law was\nannounced through God\u2019s servants as the preparatory dispensation, the\nNew Law was proclaimed by the Son of God Himself as the final economy\nof human salvation: \u201cGod, who at sundry times spoke in times past to\nthe fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to\nus by His Son, whom He hath appointed heir of all things\u201d (Heb, ii. 1).\n\n348. Differences in the Precepts of the Two Laws.--(a) There is no\nopposition between the commandments of the two Laws; for the ceremonial\nand judicial precepts of the Old Law, which contained figure and\nprophecy, are fulfilled in the precepts of Christ, while the moral laws\nof the Old Testament are confirmed and perfected by the moral laws of\nChrist: \u201cI am not come to destroy, but to fulfill\u201d (Matt., v. 17).\n\n(b) There is no substantial difference between the faith and works of\nthe two Testaments. For, that which is now believed explicitly and\nclearly, was believed implicitly and in figure in the Old Testament,\nand the greater things that now are commanded were contained germinally\nin the precepts of the Old Law.\n\n349. The Old and the New Law Compared as to Difficulty.--(a) If we\nconsider the difficulty that arises from the fulfillment of external\nworks, the Old Law was much more difficult. For while the Law of Moses\nimposed numerous and complicated ceremonies and observances, the Law of\nChrist commands but few and simple rites. Of the Old Law St. Peter says\nthat it was a yoke, \u201cwhich neither our fathers nor we have been able to\nbear\u201d (Acts, xv. 10)--that is, it was extremely burdensome; but of His\nown Law Christ says: \u201cMy yoke is sweet, and My burden light\u201d (Matt, xi.\n30). Even the additions made by Christ to the Old Law (e.g., the\nprohibition against divorce) really facilitate that which the Old Law\nitself intended--viz., the perfection of man. Hence, the Old Law is the\nlaw of servitude; the New Law, the law of liberty.\n\n(b) If we consider the difficulty that arises from internal works, or\nthe dispositions and motives with which precepts are to be fulfilled,\nthe New Law is more difficult; for it inculcates a loftier piety and\ngives more attention to the spirit with which God is to be worshipped.\nBut, since love is the all-inclusive commandment of Christ, and since\ngladness and fervor are easy to the lover, the commandments of Christ\n\u201care not heavy\u201d (I John, v. 3).\n\n350. The External Works Commended by Christ.--(a) Since the New Law is\nthe law of grace, it commands only those things by which we are brought\nto grace, or by means of which we make use of grace already received.\nWe receive grace only through Christ, and hence there are commandments\nregarding the Sacraments; we make right use of grace by faith that\nworketh through charity, and hence there are the precepts of the\nDecalogue to be kept.\n\n(b) Since the New Law is the law of liberty, it does not determine the\ndetails of the moral law, nor prescribe minutely how we must worship\nGod and observe justice to others, as was done in the ceremonial and\njudicial laws of the Old Testament. Minor dispositions of this kind\nhave no necessary relation to internal grace, being morally\nindifferent. Hence, Christ left many things free, to be determined\nlater according to conditions, either by the individual (in personal\nmatters) or by the spiritual or temporal authority (in matters of\npublic concern). It is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, however,\nthat mankind should be oppressed with numerous and burdensome\nobservances.\n\n351. The Internal Works Commanded by Christ.--In the Sermon on the\nMount were given the commandments of the New Law that summarize the\nentire duty of the Christian as to his internal acts: \u201cEveryone that\nheareth these My words, and doeth them, shall be likened to a wise man\nthat built his house upon a rock\u201d (Matt., vii. 24). Thus, there are:\n(a) internal acts commanded as regards our own wills and purposes (we\nmust avoid not only external, but also internal sins and the occasions\nof sin; we must not only do good, but we must have a good motive, not\nplacing our end in human applause or riches); (b) internal acts\ncommanded as regards our neighbor (we must not judge him rashly,\nunjustly, presumptuously; nor must we trust him imprudently); (c)\ninterior dispositions with which we must perform our duties (we must\navoid inordinate cares, imploring and expecting the divine assistance;\nbut we must also avoid carelessness, having our minds set on the narrow\nway, and eschewing seductions).\n\n352. The Teaching of Christ on the Three Classes of Precepts: Moral,\nCeremonial and Judicial.--(a) As regards the moral precepts (i.e., the\nDecalogue or Natural Law), not one jot or tittle was to pass away. But\nso little was the soul of these precepts then recognized that Christ\ngave a new commandment of love, by which His followers were to be\nknown; and He reduced the whole law to the two commandments of love of\nGod and love of our neighbor.\n\n(b) As regards the ceremonial precepts (i.e., the forms of Jewish\nworship), these were to be superseded. Christ declared the manner in\nwhich God was to be worshipped, namely, in spirit and in truth. He\ninstituted the Sacrifice of the New Testament, appointed the ritual of\nthe Sacraments (e.g., of Baptism and the Eucharist), and taught a form\nof prayer which was to be used by His disciples. Other things He left\nto be determined by the Church.\n\n(c) As regards the judicial precepts (i.e., the civil laws of the\ntheocratic nation), these ceased to be necessary with the coming of\nChrist, whose Kingdom is spiritual and with whom there is no\ndistinction of Jew or Gentile, since His law is for all. In fact, with\nthe destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, foretold by Christ, both the\nTemple worship and the separate national life of Israel came to an end.\nIn correcting the false interpretations which the Pharisees put upon\nvarious judicial precepts of their law (e.g., in showing them that the\nlaw of retaliation and the law that public enemies should be put to\ndeath did not authorize revenge and hatred), Christ indicated the\nspirit that should animate all civil laws, namely, love of justice. He\nleft it to the wisdom of future lawgivers to apply the rule of justice\nto the relations between man and man, nation and nation, as\ncircumstances would require.\n\n353. The precepts by which Christ established the primacy of the Pope\nand the hierarchy may be called judicial. But the details of this\nconstitution He left the Church to determine.\n\n354. The Duration of the Law of Christ.--(a) The Beginning.--The New\nLaw was given through the revelation made by Christ and the Holy Ghost\nto the Apostles; it was ratified at the Last Supper and in the death of\nChrist, when the New Testament was proclaimed and the Old Testament\ncame to an end; it was promulgated, first at Jerusalem on the day of\nPentecost, and later throughout the world by the preaching of the\nApostles.\n\n(b) The End.--The Law of Christ continues till the end of time; for\nthis generation--that is, this last period of world history under the\nChristian dispensation--shall not end until Christ returns to judge\nmankind; \u201cBehold, I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of\nthe world\u201d (Matt., xxviii. 20).\n\n355. The Subjects of the Law of Christ.--(a) The Law of Christ is for\nall: \u201cGoing, therefore, teach ye all nations. teaching them to observe\nall things whatsoever I have commanded you\u201d (Matt., xxviii. 19).\n\n(b) The Law of Christ does not oblige all in the same way. Those\noutside Christianity are obliged directly by the commands to believe\nand to be baptized. Christians are obliged directly by the laws of\nfaith and works accepted in Baptism.\n\n356. Ignorance of the Law of Christ.-(a) Outsiders may be in invincible\nignorance of the Law of Christ. For many persons through no fault of\ntheir own, in times past or even today, have not heard the Gospel\nmessage: \u201cHow shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard?\u201d\n(Rom, x. 14).\n\n(b) Christians may be in invincible ignorance of the Law of Christ.\nFor, just as want of a preacher causes a pagan to be invincibly\nignorant of the necessity of Baptism, so a lack of instruction in\nChristian doctrine might leave a baptized person inculpably ignorant\n(e.g., of the duty of receiving the Eucharist).\n\n357. Dispensation from the Law of Christ.--(a) Its Possibility.--It\ncannot be denied that Christ could have dispensed from the positive\nprecepts of His law, either directly or through His Church; for those\nprecepts depend on His will, and, like every other legislator, He can\nrelax His law or delegate others to do so.\n\n(b) Its Reality.--Some believe that Christ granted dispensations from\nHis Law (e.g., that He freed the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles from\nthe duty of receiving Baptism, that he authorized the Apostles to give\nBaptism without mentioning the Trinity), but these opinions seem\nunlikely and are not well supported. Some also believe that the power\nof loosing granted the Church (Matt., xvi. 19) includes the power of\ndispensing from the Law of Christ. The contrary, however, seems more\nprobable. For the power of loosing is certainly limited to such matters\nas the good of the Church and of souls requires, and it is more\nadvantageous for the Church and its members that the laws given by\nChrist Himself should be absolutely unchangeable, in order that the\nunity of the Church and its dependence on its Founder may be more\nmanifest.\n\nOn the other hand, the alternate opinion has solid grounds and\narguments, and merits due consideration. Some authors distinguish a\ntwofold law of Christ; (a) absolute, that which obliges immediately and\nof itself independently of any action of man; e.g., the law concerning\nthe necessity of Baptism or determining bread and wine as the matter of\nthe Eucharist; (b) hypothetic, which presupposes some human action;\ne.g., the law of the indissolubility of matrimony which urges after man\nhas freely willed to be bound by the laws of matrimony. Similarly, the\nbinding force of vows presupposes the taking of the vow.\n\nAs to the absolute law, no human authority may dispense from it. As\nalready indicated, the good of the Church, its unity and stability,\nseem to demand an unchangeable law. In regard to the hypothetical law,\nmany of the more modern authors assert that the Holy Pontiff can at\ntimes dispense. The power of loosing implies a power of dispensing in\nthe Church which has been used in particular cases; e.g., _ratum et non\nconsummatum_ matrimony. Moreover, the power to dispense seems extremely\nuseful and almost necessary for the prudent and wise governing of the\nChurch. For, with a change of circumstances an individual might be\nimpeded from doing a greater good because of a preceding act of will;\ne.g., one might be impeded from embracing the religious life because of\na prior vow to remain in the world to assist in Catholic Action (see\nFanfani, O.P., _Theol. Moral. Manuale_, Vol. I, n. 134).\n\n358. Interpretation of the Law of Christ.-(a) Private interpretation\n(_epieikeia_ or equity) is used in extraordinary cases, not foreseen by\nthe lawgiver, and it declares that a particular case does not fall\nunder the Law. This kind of interpretation applies only to human laws,\nsince God foresees things not only universally, but also in particular\n(cfr. on Natural Law, 315). (b) Public interpretation of the Law of\nChrist is made by the Church, in virtue of the commission: \u201cTeach all\nthings whatsoever I have commanded\u201d (Matt, xxviii. 20).\n\n359. Public Interpretation of the Law of Christ--(a) The Church is able\nto give a declarative interpretation of the Positive Divine Law--that\nis, to explain its meaning, to show what cases are comprehended in the\nlaw, what cases are not, when one is obliged, when one is excused, etc.\nExample: The Church interprets the doctrine of Christ on the\nindissolubility of marriage, explaining when the bond is absolutely\nindissoluble, the conditions under which it may sometimes be dissolved,\netc.\n\n(b) The Church is able to give determinative interpretation of the\nPositive Divine Law--that is, to settle in what manner a law must be\nfulfilled. Examples: Christ gave the command that the Eucharist should\nbe received, but it was the Church that determined when and how often\none must receive Communion to comply with the wishes of Christ. Christ\ninstituted only generically the essential rite of some Sacraments,\nleaving it to the Church to determine the rite more specifically.\n\n360. The Law of Christ and Impossibility.--(a) Impossibility does not\nexcuse from a law, in which an act is necessary not because it is\nprescribed, but is prescribed because it is a necessary means without\nwhich, even if one be not guilty of negligence, salvation cannot be had\n(necessity of means). Example: Infants who die without Baptism are not\nheld guilty of neglecting the Sacraments, but lack of it deprives them\nof the supernatural bliss promised by Christ. Only Baptism confers\nregeneration, and only the regenerated are capable of the vision of God.\n\n(b) Impossibility can excuse from a law in which an act is necessary\nbecause it is prescribed, and which therefore makes one guilty of sin,\nif one willfully neglects it (necessity of precept). Example: An adult\nwho dies without the Eucharist cannot be saved if he was guilty of\ngrave negligence; but he can be saved, if it was not his own fault that\nhe did not receive Holy Communion. The Eucharist increases supernatural\nlife, but inculpable lack of it does not exclude from that life.\n\n361. Impossibility--or what is called impossibility--does not always\nexcuse even from those divine laws which have only the necessity of\nprecept.\n\n(a) Physical impossibility is the lack of power to perform an act; for\nexample, it is physically impossible for a blind man to read. This kind\nof impossibility, of course, excuses from guilt and punishment.\nExample: Titus is dying and thinks of the command that he should\nreceive Viaticum. But he is unable to receive Communion without\nvomiting. Hence, in his case the impossibility excuses from the divine\ncommand.\n\n(b) Moral impossibility is the inability to perform an act without\nserious inconvenience; for example, it is morally impossible for one\nwho has weak eyes to read small print. This kind of impossibility does\nnot excuse, if a greater evil will result from the non-observance of\nthe law than the evil of inconvenience that will result from its\nobservance. Examples: Eleazer would not eat the meats forbidden by the\nlaw of Moses, preferring to die rather than give public scandal (II\nMach., vii. 18). The command of Christ that pastors minister to their\nflocks obliges, even if it involves danger of death, when there is a\ngreat public necessity (as in time of pestilence) or an urgent private\nnecessity (as when an infant is about to die without Baptism).\n\n362. Moral impossibility excuses from divine laws that have only\nnecessity of precept, if the inconvenience is serious, even when\ncompared to the evil of violating the law; for God does not wish\ncommands freely instituted by His will to oblige more rigorously than\nthe commands of the Natural Law (see 289, 317). Examples: Christ\nexcused David for eating the loaves of proposition (which was forbidden\nby the law of Moses) on account of urgent necessity. A most grave\nexternal inconvenience excuses from the law of integrity of confession\n(see Vol. II).\n\n363. What is the nature of the Church\u2019s action in dissolving the bond\nof marriages that are not ratified, or not consummated after\nratification (see Vol. II), with reference to Christ\u2019s law of\nindissolubility? (a) Some see in this an application of other divine\nlaws that limit the law of indissolubility, and that were enunciated by\nChrist Himself in His teaching on the supremacy of faith over other\nbonds, the superiority of virginity to marriage, the power of the\nChurch in loosing, etc. (b) Others see in this an interpretation,\ndeclarative or expansive, of the law of indissolubility. (c) Still\nothers regard these dissolutions as a removal of the proper matter of\nthe obligation contracted through the act of the human will (cfr. the\nNatural Law, 312). The power of loosing would apply here as in the case\nof vows. Some authors call this removal of matter \u201cannulment of act,\u201d\n\u201cremission of debt,\u201d \u201cpermission\u201d; while others call it \u201cdispensation\u201d\n(see 314). Those who consider the dissolution of _ratum non\nconsummatum_ matrimony as \u201cdispensation\u201d list the law of\nindissolubility as hypothetical positive law (see 357).\n\n364. Counsels.--In addition to its precepts (which are obligatory), the\nNew Law contains counsels, which are optional, but which are expressly\nrecommended.\n\n365. A counsel is a moral direction by which one who is willing is\nadvised to prefer a higher to a lower good, in order thereby to tend\nmore efficaciously towards perfection and to merit a greater reward.\n\n(a) A counsel is not something commanded. Example: Our Lord\u2019s direction\nto the disciples on their first mission that they should not carry\ntheir sustenance with them was required as a duty that they might learn\nto trust in Providence. Hence, it was not a counsel.\n\n(b) A counsel is not everything good that is not commanded. Example:\nMarriage is not commanded to all, but it is not a counsel, since the\nopposite good, viz., celibacy, is better (I Cor., vii. 38).\n\n366. That which is only counselled as to its actual performance, is\ncommanded as to its acceptance by the will for a case of necessity.\nExample: Our Lord\u2019s direction that good be done to personal enemies\ndoes not command that one actually confer favors on them outside of the\ncase of necessity (this is only counselled), but only that one be so\ncharitably inclined that one is ready to help even a personal enemy who\nis in serious need.\n\n367. The superiority of the counsels may be seen from the attitudes men\ntake to the goods of this world.\n\n(a) Some are taken up entirely with the things of earth, making\ntemporal goods the end of life and the standard of action. These do not\nkeep the Commandments and cannot be saved.\n\n(b) Some use the goods of this world not as ends, but as subordinate to\nthings that are higher. These keep the Commandments and will be saved;\nbut their solicitude about temporal concerns lessens the attention they\ncould give to things of the spirit.\n\n(c) Some renounce entirely the goods of this life, in order to give\nthemselves as completely as possible to the things of God. These\nobserve the counsels, and can more readily attain to holiness and\nsalvation; for, being freed from numerous cares about earthly things,\nthey can devote themselves more easily and earnestly to things that are\nheavenly.\n\n368. The Three Counsels.--There are many counsels given in the Gospels,\nbut all can be reduced to three, according to the three chief earthly\ngoods that may be surrendered, and the three kinds of temptation that\ncome from those goods.\n\n(a) The counsel of poverty requires that one give up entirely external\ngoods or wealth, from which comes the concupiscence of the eyes: \u201cIf\nthou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and\nthou shalt have treasure in heaven\u201d (Matt, Xix. 21).\n\n(b) The counsel of chastity requires that one renounce entirely carnal\ngoods of pleasure, from which arise the concupiscence of the flesh: \u201cHe\nthat giveth his virgin in marriage, doth well; and he that giveth her\nnot, doth better\u201d (I Cor., vii. 38).\n\n(c) The counsel of obedience requires that one deny oneself the good of\nthe soul which is one\u2019s own will, from which comes the pride of life:\n\u201cCome follow Me\u201d (Matt, xix. 21).\n\n369. The counsels can be followed in two ways. (a) They are followed\ncompletely, when one accepts them as a rule for one\u2019s whole life, as is\ndone by those who embrace the state of perfection in the religious\nlife, taking by vow the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity\nand obedience. (b) They are followed partially when one practises them\nin particular instances. Examples: A wealthy man who gives to the poor\nwhen there is no obligation to do so, practises the counsel of poverty\nin that case. A person who renounces his own legitimate wishes in some\nmatter, practises the counsel of obedience in that case, as when he\nconfers some favor on one who has offended him, or pardons a debt.\nMarried persons who practise conjugal abstinence for the sake of\nreligion, follow a counsel of chastity (I Cor., vii. 5).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 4: HUMAN LAW\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 95-97.)\n\n370. Definition.--Since human perversity often needs a check in\nregulations that are not expressly contained in the Natural or in the\nDivine Law, other laws must be made by society, drawn from those higher\nlaws as conclusions or added to them as determinations, in order to\nmeet special circumstances and necessities.\n\n371. Division of Human Laws.-Human laws are variously divided.\n\n(a) According to the difference of legislators, laws are either\necclesiastical or civil.\n\nb) According to their mode of derivation from the Natural Law, laws\nbelong either to the law of nations (_jus gentium_) or to civil law. To\nthe _jus gentium_ belong those laws which are derived from the Natural\nLaw as conclusions from premises, e.g., the right to private property\nwithout which men cannot live peacefully in society. To civil law\nbelongs whatever is derived from Natural Law by way of positive\ndetermination by a legislator; e.g., Natural Law dictates that the\nevil-doer be punished; but that the punishment take a particular form,\nimprisonment, exile, death, is a determination depending upon the will\nof the legislator.\n\nThe _jus gentium_ is not international law which derives its force and\nsanction from the free will of the legislator. The law of nations is\ncommon to all men and derives its force from the conviction of men that\nsuch a law is demanded for the good of mankind. It is not a secondary\nprecept of the Natural Law which is derived from the primary precepts\nnecessarily. Rather it is based upon a contingent set of circumstances;\nit does not spring from man\u2019s nature absolutely considered, but from\nthe way in which man acts and reacts in his society.\n\n(c) According to the difference of their objects, laws are either\naffirmative (i.e., preceptive) or negative (i.e., prohibitive). An\naffirmative law obliges always, but not for every occasion; a negative\nlaw obliges always, and for every occasion. Example: The Third and\nFourth Commandments are always in force, but it is not necessary to\nelicit a positive act of compliance at every instant. The other\nCommandments, which are negative, are not only in force always, but it\nis necessary at every instant to omit what they forbid.\n\n(d) According to the obligation which they impose, laws are either\nmoral, penal, or moral-penal. Moral laws oblige under pain of sin,\npenal laws under pain of punishment, moral-penal laws under pain of\nboth.\n\n(e) According to their inclusiveness, laws are either personal or\nterritorial. The former affect the person for whom the law is made, and\noblige him even when he is outside the territory of the lawgiver. The\nlatter affect the territory, and hence do not oblige a subject when he\nis outside the territory affected by the law.\n\n(f) According to their effect, prohibitive laws are either merely\nprohibitive or irritant. The former make what is forbidden illegal, the\nlatter make it also void.\n\n372. Qualities.--The objects or content of human law must be of such a\ncharacter: (a) that they do not conflict with the Natural or the Divine\nLaw; (b) that they be beneficial to the community for which they are\nmade.\n\n373. Laws fail to be of public benefit in such cases as the following:\n(a) if they are made without a broad view of the public good, which has\nregard for different classes of people and various interests, and which\nprovides for the future as well as for the present; (b) if, losing\nsight of the fact that the majority are not perfect in virtue, the\nlawgivers require so much that the law falls into contempt, and graver\nevils result than would have happened otherwise. Hence, it is advisable\nthat human laws confine their prohibitions to graver misdeeds,\nespecially those that are harmful to others and to society, and\nrestrict their commands to such good acts as promote the common weal.\nMultiplicity of laws, excessive penalties for minor offenses, cruel and\nunusual sanctions, lead to lawlessness.\n\n374. Human laws should not prescribe what is too difficult.\n\n(a) They should not prescribe heroic virtue, unless the common safety\ndemands it, or a subject has voluntarily obliged himself to it.\nExample: Soldiers in war and pastors in time of pestilence must expose\nthemselves to danger of death; but for ordinary occasions the law\nshould not oblige one to risk one\u2019s life or other great good.\n\n(b) They should not prescribe agreement with the mind of the legislator\nor a virtuous performance of what is prescribed, unless the thing\nordered itself demands this. Examples: The law of annual Confession and\nof the Easter Communion requires, not only that these Sacraments be\nreceived, but that they be received worthily, for an unworthy\nConfession is no Sacrament, and an unworthy Communion does not satisfy\nthe command of Christ, of which the Church command is but a\ndetermination. On the other hand, the Lenten fast observed by one who\nis not in the state of grace is an act good in itself and satisfies the\nlaw. He who hears Mass on a holyday, not knowing that it is a holyday,\nsatisfies the obligation, though he had no intention of fulfilling it.\n\n375. Obligation of Human Laws.--All human laws that are just, whether\nthey be ecclesiastical or civil, made by believers in God or\nunbelievers, are obligatory in conscience, (a) From the beginning the\nChurch has made laws and imposed them as obligatory (Acts, xv. 29; I\nCor., vi. 4; I Cor., xi. 5; I Tim., v. 9-12), and has recognized as\nobligatory the laws of the State, without regard to the moral or\nreligious qualifications of the rulers (I Peter, ii. 13-16; Rom., xiii.\n1-7).\n\n(b) Human laws are necessary. The Natural Law does not prescribe\ndefinite penalties, while the Positive Divine Law prescribes only such\nas are remote and invisible; and hence, if there were no human laws\nholding out the threat of determined and present punishments, the\nDivine laws would be contemned. Moreover, since the higher laws are\nsometimes unknown, or prescribe no time, place or manner of\naccomplishment, or do not command things that would be useful for their\nobservance, it is necessary that there be laws made by man to secure\nthe better knowledge and fulfillment of the laws given by God Himself.\n\n376. A human law is unjust in two ways:\n\n(a) if opposed to the rights of God. Examples: The command of Pharaoh\nthat the Hebrew male children be murdered (Exod., i. 17), the command\nof Antiochus that his subjects sacrifice to idols (I Mach., ii. 16-20),\nthe command of the Sanhedrin that the Apostles should cease to preach\n(Acts, v. 29);\n\n(b) if opposed to the rights of man. This happens in three ways: First,\nwhen the purpose of the law is not the common good, as when the\nlawgiver seeks only his own profit or glory; secondly, when the maker\nof the law has not the requisite authority; thirdly, when the law\nitself, although for the common good and made by competent authority,\ndoes not distribute burdens equally or reasonably among the people.\nExamples: Achab and Jezabel, in the affair of the vineyard of Naboth,\nhad in view not the public, but their own private benefit (III Kings,\nxvi). The sentence of death pronounced on our Lord by the Sanhedrin was\nillegal, because, among other reasons, the body was not assembled\naccording to law, and hence had no authority to give sentence. The\ncommands given the Israelites by Pharaoh (Exod., v. 18), and to their\nsubjects by Oriental despots (I Kings, viii), were unjust, because the\nformer discriminated against the Israelites, and the latter bore down\ntoo heavily on all the people. The former civil laws that prescribed\nthe same penalty of hanging for a slight misdemeanor (such as the theft\nof a loaf of bread by a boy) as for the capital crimes of piracy or\nmurder, the Stamp Act of George III, and some modern laws that sentence\nto life imprisonment those who have been four times convicted of slight\noffenses, are more recent examples of unjust laws.\n\n377. Obedience to unjust laws is not obligatory in the following cases.\n(a) If a law is opposed to the rights of God, it is not lawful to do\nwhat that law commands or permits, nor to omit what it forbids.\nExamples: If a law permits one to practise polygamy, or commands one to\nblaspheme religion, one may not use the permission or obey. If a law\nforbids one to give or receive Baptism, it has no force. (b) If a law\nis certainly opposed to the rights of man in any of the three ways\nmentioned in the previous paragraph (376, b), it does not of itself\noblige in conscience, since it lacks some essential condition of a true\nlaw, and even the consent of the majority or of all does not make it\njust. However, it may oblige accidentally, on account of the greater\nevils that would follow on disobedience, such as scandal, civil\ndisturbances, etc. The duty of subjects is to remonstrate against such\na law and to work for its repeal.\n\n378. The obligation of all laws is not the same in kind, or degree. (a)\nMoral laws oblige one to do what is commanded or to omit what is\nforbidden, as a duty owed in conscience; hence, he who violates a law\nof this kind is guilty of moral fault. Penal laws oblige one to follow\nwhat they prescribe, if one would be free from guilt before the law and\nnot liable in conscience to the penalty prescribed; hence, he who\nviolates a penal law is guilty of juridical fault, and, if he further\nillegally resists the penalty, he becomes guilty also of moral fault.\n(b) Moral laws are not all of the same obligatory force, some of them\nobliging under grave sin, others under venial sin.\n\n379. The following human laws are recognized as moral laws: (a)\necclesiastical laws, with few exceptions; (b) civil laws that confirm\nthe Eternal or Divine Law, or that pertain directly to the common\nwelfare, such as the laws that determine the duties of public\nofficials, the rights of inheritance, etc.\n\n380. The following human laws are generally regarded as merely penal:\n(a) ecclesiastical laws which expressly state that their observance is\nnot required under pain of sin (e.g., the statutes of many Religious\nOrders); (b) civil laws of minor importance, or which the legislator\nimposes as a purely civil duty (e.g., some traffic regulations).\n\n381. Moral laws oblige under grave sin if the two following conditions\nare present: (a) if the thing prescribed by the law is of great\nimportance, because of its nature or circumstances; (b) if the lawgiver\nintended to impose a grave obligation.\n\n382. A matter of light moment cannot be made the object of a law that\nbinds under grave sin, for this would impose an intolerable burden, and\nwould thus be contrary to the common good. What is unimportant in\nitself, however, may become important on account of its purpose or\nother circumstance.\n\n383. The intention of the legislator to impose a grave moral obligation\nis recognized either: (a) from his own declaration, as when a church\nlaw is commanded under threat of the divine judgment; or (b) from\ncircumstances that indicate such an intention, such as the gravity of\nthe subject-matter of the law or the kind of penalty it prescribes, the\ngeneral opinion of authorities, or the common practice of the community.\n\n384. By obliging to the observance of what they command and the\navoidance of what they forbid, laws indirectly oblige to what is\nnecessary for such obedience. (a) Hence, the law obliges one to make\nuse of the ordinary means for its fulfillment. Examples: He who has not\nused ordinary diligence to know the law, sins against the law if he\nviolates its prescriptions. He who eats meat on a day of abstinence,\nbecause he neglected to provide himself with other food, is guilty of\nsin. (b) The law obliges one to use sufficient diligence in removing\nimpediments to its fulfillment or dangers of its violation. Examples:\nThe law of hearing Mass on Sunday obliges one not to stay up so late on\nSaturday that fulfillment will be impossible. The law of fasting\nobliges one to avoid dangerous occasions of its violation.\n\n385. Interpretation.--Though laws are carefully framed as to language,\ndoubts about their meaning will often arise--in ordinary cases, because\nof lack of understanding or changes of conditions, and in extraordinary\ncases, because from the circumstances the law seems inapplicable. Hence\nthe need of explaining the law, which is done in ordinary cases by\ninterpretation, in extraordinary cases by _epieikeia_ (see 411 sqq.).\n\n386. Interpretation is a genuine explanation of the law, that is, one\nthat states the meaning of the words of the law according to the\nintention the lawgiver had in mind when he chose them. It is of various\nkinds.\n\n(a) According to the author from whom it proceeds, interpretation is\nauthentic, if it comes from the lawgiver himself or from another\nauthorized by him; it is usual, if it comes from common usage (i.e.,\nfrom the manner in which the law is customarily observed); it is\ndoctrinal, if it is made by learned men according to the rules of\ncorrect exegesis.\n\n(b) According to the effect, interpretation is declarative, if it\nclears up what was obscure in the law; it is supplementary, if it\nextends or limits the law, by adding to or subtracting from the cases\nincluded under it.\n\n(c) According to the manner in which it is made, interpretation is\nstrict or wide, Strict interpretation gives to a word of law that least\ninclusive and most proper signification it bears (e.g., it understands\n\u201cson\u201d to stand for son by birth). Wide interpretation gives to a word a\nmore inclusive and less proper signification (e.g., it understands\n\u201cson\u201d to stand for son by birth or by adoption).\n\n387. Those Subject to Law.--Only those are morally obliged to observe\nhuman law who are subjects of the lawgiver and who have the use of\nreason. (a) Those who are not subjects in any sense are not bound, for\nto obligate by law is an act of authority and jurisdiction; (b) those\nwho have not reached the age of reason, or who are habitually insane,\nare not themselves morally bound, since they are incapable of moral\nobligation. Of course, they may be restrained as to acts, and their\nrights may be determined.\n\n388. The lawgiver himself, even though not subject, is held to observe\nthe laws he makes. Thus: (a) if the lawmaking power resides in a\nlegislative assembly, each legislator is subject to the body and hence\nto its laws; (b) if the lawmaking power is vested in an individual, he\nis not subject to the coactive force of his own laws, since he cannot\npunish himself; but he is subject to their directive force, inasmuch as\nthe higher law of nature requires that the superior show good example\nby observing what he requires of others.\n\n389. Change of Law.--The growth of knowledge and experience, or the\nchange of social circumstances, requires now and then that human laws\nbe improved or adapted to new conditions. But, since laws derive a\ngreat part of their influence from custom, they should not be changed\nunless the break with custom is compensated for by the urgent necessity\nof the new law, by its manifest advantage, or by the evident iniquity\nor harmfulness of the old law, In brief, the common good should be the\nnorm by which to decide whether a law should be retained or changed.\n\n390. Constitutional law, as being fundamental and organic, is more\nimmutable than ordinary law. (a) If given to a society established\naccording to the positive ordinance of a superior, it cannot be\nabrogated or modified by the legislative authority of that society,\nsince this would be contrary to the will of the founder. Hence, the\nChurch has no power to change the fundamental constitution given her by\nChrist, who prescribed the religious society as established by Him to\nbe necessary. (b) If a constitutional law is given to a society which\nis perfect and necessary from the law of nature, such constitution can\nbe modified for extraordinary reasons and in the special ways provided\n(e.g., by amendments approved by the people).\n\n391. The Law of Custom.--Custom (i.e., a long-continued practice that\nhas acquired binding force) is able to establish a new law or to do\naway with an old law. For the will of the lawgiver is manifested not\nonly by words, as happens in the written law, but also and more clearly\nby repeated and continued acts, as happens in the case of the unwritten\nlaw of custom. In a democracy it is the consent of the people who\nfollow the custom as law that imposes the obligation; in a monarchy it\nis the consent of the ruler who permits the custom.\n\n392. With reference to their legal effects, there are three kinds of\ncustoms: (a) customs according to the law, which are those that confirm\nby use an existing law; in this way custom interprets law (see 386);\n(b) customs beside the law, which are those that introduce a new\nobligation that is not prescribed by any written law; in this way\ncustom establishes law; (c) customs contrary to law, which are those\nthat remove the obligation of a previous law; in this way custom\nrepeals, at least in part, the law to which it is opposed.\n\n393. Custom has not the power to establish or repeal a law, unless it\npossesses the requisites of law itself (see 285). Hence arise the\nfollowing conditions:\n\n(a) Since the exercise of the legislative power requires freedom,\ncustoms do not possess legal force unless they have been practised\nfreely. Hence, a custom that has been established by force does not\nsuffice;\n\n(b) Since laws can be made only for perfect societies, customs have not\nthe force of law, unless they are practised by a perfect society, or by\na majority of its members who are representative. Hence, a custom\nobserved by a family or by a minority of the voters in a body that has\nits own jurisprudence has not the status of law;\n\n(c) Since laws must proceed from competent authority, customs do not\nmake or unmake law, unless they have the approval of the ruling power.\nIn a society where the legislative function rests with the people\n(e.g., in the ancient democracy of Athens), the fact that they follow a\ncustom with the purpose of enacting it into law or of using it against\nan existing law is sufficient approval. But if the supreme power is not\nwith the multitude, their customs do not obtain the force of\nlegislative acts, unless approved by the constituted authority;\n\n(d) Since law needs to be promulgated, a custom, to have the effect of\nlaw, must be practised by public acts through which it becomes known to\nthe people as a whole.\n\n394. Customs that have the other requisite conditions begin to be\nobligatory or derogatory as soon as the approval of competent authority\nis had. (a) If the approval is given expressly, the custom has the\nforce of law at once; (b) if it is given tacitly, inasmuch as the\nlawgiver, knowing the custom and being under no restraint, does not\ndisapprove, the custom has the force of law as soon as tacit consent is\nrecognized by the learned and prudent; (c) if it is given by the law\nitself, which explicitly accepts reasonable customs, the custom has the\nforce of law when it has lasted for ten years, or other length of time\nprescribed.\n\n395. If the superior disapproves of a custom or maintains diplomatic\nsilence for fear of greater evils, his consent is withheld, and the\ncustom cannot be deemed as of legal force.\n\n396. There are other conditions necessary that a custom may acquire the\nforce of law. (a) Since a law is an ordinance knowingly imposed by the\nwill of the legislator, a custom does not constitute a law if it is\nfollowed through the erroneous conviction that it is already a law, or\nif there is nothing to indicate a will to make it obligatory. Signs of\nthe intention to raise a custom to the dignity of a law are the\npunishment of transgressors of the custom, the observance of the custom\neven at the cost of great inconvenience, the opinion of the good that\nit should be followed, etc. (b) Since a law cannot prescribe except\nwhat is reasonable and for the common good, a practice opposed to the\nNatural or Divine Law, or expressly reprobated by written law as an\nabuse, or one that is injurious to the welfare of the community, cannot\nbecome unwritten law through custom.\n\n397. There are special conditions in order that a custom may do away\nwith an existing law. (a) A written law is not repealed unless the\nlegislator wills to take away its obligation, and hence desuetude or a\ncustom contrary to law does not abrogate a law unless it manifests a\npurpose not to be obligated by what the law prescribes. This it does if\nthe whole people regard a certain law as a dead letter, or feel that\ncircumstances or the common welfare require the opposite of what the\nlaw requires, and have no scruple in acting uniformly according to this\nconviction.\n\n(b) A written law is not repealed, if it is immutable, or if a change\nwould be prejudicial to the common interest; similarly, therefore, a\ncustom cannot abolish a law, unless this law is one that can be\nabrogated by human acts, and that is not essential to the public good.\nHence, customs contrary to the Commandments or to the Law of Christ,\ncustoms that are expressly condemned in Canon Law as corruptions,\ncustoms that encourage lawlessness or afford occasions of sin, can\nnever do away with a law, no matter how long or by how many they are\npractised.\n\n398. Those who start a custom contrary to law are sometimes in good\nfaith, and hence are not guilty of disobedience. (a) It may be that\nthey are in ignorance of the law, but have the interpretative will not\nto be bound by it; (b) it may be that they know the law, but sincerely\nthink that, on account of conditions, it has ceased of itself.\n\n399. Even when a custom has been started in bad faith, it may continue\nthrough good faith, and so become not a violation, but an abrogation of\nthe law. Changed conditions may make the law useless or harmful; or the\nvery fact that it is no longer observed may make it too difficult to\nenforce.\n\n400. Today customs do not so often attain the force of law. Moreover,\nso difficult is it to know whether any custom has all the qualities\nnecessary for establishing, modifying, or abrogating a law that only an\nexpert is competent to judge in this matter.\n\n401. Dispensation.--Human law has not the immutability of the Divine\nLaw. Hence, not only may it be changed, but it may also be dispensed.\nDispensation is a relaxation of the positive law made for a particular\ncase by him who has the competent authority.\n\n(a) It is a relaxation of the law--that is, it takes away the\nobligation of the law. Thus, it differs from permission, which is\nfulfillment of what is conditionally allowed by the law.\n\n(b) Dispensation is made for a particular case--that is, it is granted\nwhen the provisions of the law, though beneficial to the community as a\nwhole, are not suitable for a particular person or case. Thus, it\ndiffers, first, from abrogation and derogation, which remove the\nobligation of the whole or a part of the law for the entire community;\nand, secondly, from privilege, which is granted permanently as a\nprivate law.\n\n(c) Dispensation is given by competent authority--that is, by the\nlegislator or others who have the lawful power. Thus, it differs from\n_epieikeia_ and private interpretation, which are made by those who\nhave no power to dispense.\n\n(d) Dispensation is a relaxation of the positive law, for since the\nNatural Law is immutable (see 305), no dispensation can be given from\nits requirements. Thus, dispensation differs from the official\ndeclaration or interpretation of the Natural or Divine Law (see 315).\n\n402. Those who have the power to dispense from a law are the lawgiver\nand others duly authorized. (a) The lawgiver himself can dispense as\nfollows: in his own laws, since he was able to make them; in the laws\nof his predecessors, since his authority is equal to theirs; in the\nlaws of his inferiors, since they are his subordinates. (b) Others can\ndispense who have received from the law, from their superior, or from\ncustom the necessary authority to dispense.\n\n403. Those Who May Be Dispensed from a Law.--(a) Since dispensation is\nan act of jurisdiction, only those can be dispensed who are in some way\nsubject to the dispenser. Since, however, the jurisdiction used in\ndispensing does not impose an obligation but grants a favor, it is held\nthat he who has the power to dispense others may also dispense himself,\nif his power is not restricted. (b) Since dispensation is an act of\nauthority, it may be exercised even in favor of one who is absent, or\nignorant of the dispensation or unwilling to accept it. But, since as a\nrule favors should not be forced, the validity of a dispensation\ngenerally depends upon the consent of the one dispensed.\n\n404. The power of dispensing has for its end the common good, and\ntherefore it must be exercised: (a) faith fully, that is, not for\nreasons of private interest or friendship; (b) prudently, that is with\nknowledge of the case and with judgment that there are sufficient\nreasons for dispensation.\n\n405. In order that the reason for a dispensation be sufficient, it is\nnot required that it be so grave as to constitute a physical or moral\nimpossibility of keeping the law, since the obligation of the law\nceases in the face of impossibility (see 317, 487), without the need of\ndispensation. Hence, lesser reasons suffice for dispensation.\n\n406. A dispensation must be granted whenever the law itself or justice\nrequires it. The following cases are usually given: (a) when there\nexists a reason that requires, according to law, that a dispensation be\ngranted; (b) when the common good, or the spiritual good of an\nindividual, or his protection from some considerable evil, demands the\nconcession of a dispensation.\n\n407. A dispensation may be either granted or denied, when the case does\nnot demand it and the superior after careful investigation is not\ncertain whether the reason is sufficient or insufficient; otherwise, a\ngreater responsibility would rest on the superior than the law can be\nthought to impose--viz., that of attaining certainty where it cannot\neasily be had.\n\n408. He who dispenses without a sufficient reason is guilty of the sin\nof favoritism, and is responsible for the discontent and quarrels that\nresult. He is guilty of grave sin thus: (a) if serious scandal or other\ninconvenience is caused, even when the dispenser is the lawgiver\nhimself; (b) if the law obliges under grave sin and the dispensation is\nnot granted by the lawgiver, but by an inferior who usurps the right to\ndispense.\n\n409. The subject of dispensation is guilty of sin: (a) if he asks a\ndispensation when he knows for certain that there is no sufficient\nreason for it; (b) if, having been denied a dispensation, even though\nunjustly, he acts against the law; or if he knowingly makes use of an\ninvalid or expired dispensation.\n\n410. Sufficient reasons for a dispensation can be reduced to two\nclasses: (a) private welfare (e.g., the difficulty of the law for the\npetitioner, a notable benefit he will receive through the dispensation,\netc.); (b) public welfare (e.g., the benefits that are secured to the\ncommunity, or the evils that are avoided through the dispensation).\n\n411. _Epieikeia_.--Since human laws regulate particular and contingent\ncases according to what usually happens, and since they must therefore\nbe expressed in general terms, exceptional cases will occur that fall\nunder the law, if we consider only the general wording of its text, but\nthat do not fall under the law, if we consider the purpose of the\nlawgiver, who never foresaw the exceptional cases and would have made\ndifferent provision for them, had he foreseen them. In such exceptional\ncases legalism insists on blind obedience to the law-books, but the\nhigher justice of _epieikeia_ or equity calls for obedience to the\nlawgiver himself as intending the common welfare and fair treatment of\nthe rights of each person.\n\n412. _Epieikeia_ may be defined, therefore, as a moderation of the\nwords of the law where in an extraordinary case, on account of their\ngenerality, they do not represent the mind of the lawgiver; which\nmoderation must be made in the manner in which the lawgiver himself\nwould have made it, had he thought of the case, or would make it now,\nwere he consulted. Hence, _epieikeia_ differs from the various causes\nthat take away the obligation of a law, for it supposes the\nnon-existence of obligation from the beginning and non-comprehension in\nthe law.\n\nThus: (a) it is not revocation, desuetude, restrictive interpretation,\nor dispensation; (b) it is not cessation on account of impossibility;\n(c) it is not presumed permission or self-dispensation.\n\n413. In its use _epieikeia_ is at once lawful and dangerous.\n\n(a) It is lawful, for it defends the common good, the judgment of\nconscience, the rights of individuals from subjection to a written\ndocument, and from oppression by the abuse of power;\n\n(b) it is dangerous, for it rests on the judgment of the individual,\nwhich is prone to decide in his own favor to the detriment of the\ncommon good as well as of self.\n\n414. _Epieikeia_ by its very nature imposes certain limits on its use.\n\n(a) It is based on the fact that a certain case is not comprehended in\na law, because the legislator did not foresee it.\n\nHence, _epieikeia_ is not applicable to the Divine Law; for the Divine\nLawgiver foresaw all cases that could arise, and so excluded all\nexceptions (see 315). This is clear as regards the Ten Commandments and\nother precepts of the Natural Law, since they deal with what is\nintrinsically good or bad, and are unchangeable (see 307). But it\napplies also to the prescriptions of the Positive Law of God, and\napparent cases of _epieikeia_, such as the eating of the loaves of\nproposition by David (I Kings, xxi. 6), can be explained by the\ncessation of law or divine dispensation. Examples: One may not excuse\ncertain modern forms of cheating on the plea that they were not thought\nof when the Decalogue was given. One may not omit Baptism on the ground\nthat Christ Himself would have excused from it, had He foreseen the\ncircumstances.\n\n(b) _Epieikeia_ is based on the principle that the words of a law must\nbe subordinated to the common good and justice. Hence, it is not\napplicable to those laws whose universal observance is demanded by the\ncommon good--that is, to irritant laws. Any hardship suffered by an\nindividual through the effect of such laws is small in comparison with\nthe injury that would be done to the common welfare if there were any\ncases not comprehended in such laws; for irritant laws are the norms\nfor judging the validity of contracts and other acts, and public;\nsecurity demands that they be uniform and certain. Example: One may not\ncontract marriage with a diriment impediment, on the plea that the\nChurch would not wish the impediments to oblige under the serious\ninconvenience that exists in one\u2019s case.\n\n415. The dangers of _epieikeia_ also place limitations on its use.\n\n(a) There is the danger that one may be wrong in judging that the\nlawgiver did not wish to include a case under his law. If this is not\ncertain, one should investigate to the best of one\u2019s ability, and have\nrecourse, if possible, to the legislator or his representative for a\ndeclaration or dispensation. It is never lawful to use _epieikeia_\nwithout reasonable certainty that the legislator would not wish the law\nto apply here and now.\n\n(b) There is the danger that one may be in bad faith in deciding that\nthe common good or justice requires the use of _epieikeia_; the motive\nin reality may be self-interest or escape from obligation, Hence, a\nperson should not use _epieikeia_ except in necessity, when he is\nthrown on his own resources and must decide for himself; and, even\nthen, he must be sure that he acts from sincerity and disinterestedness.\n\n416. Cases in which the use of _epieikeia_ is lawful are the following:\n\n(a) Epieikeia in a wide sense--that is, a benign interpretation made by\na private individual that a particular case is not comprehended in the\nintention of the lawgiver, because the latter had not the power to\ninclude it--may be used for all cases in which the opposite\ninterpretation would set the law up in opposition to the common welfare\nor would work injustice to individuals. Example: The law that goods\nborrowed must be returned to their owners yields to _epieikeia_, if\nthere is question of putting weapons into the hands of one who would\nuse them against the public security or for the commission of murder;\n\n(b) _Epieikeia_ in a strict sense--that is, the judgment that a\nparticular case is not included in the intention of the lawgiver,\nbecause the latter had not the wish to include it--may be used for all\nthose cases in which the opposite interpretation would suppose in the\nlawgiver a severity that is not likely. \u201cThe rigor of the law may be\nextreme injustice\u201d (Cicero, _De Officiis_, I, 10). Example: Titus has\nthe opportunity to make a notable sum of money on a Sunday morning, but\ncannot make use of the opportunity without missing Mass that day. Caius\non a fast day feels well, but is tired and will be not a little\ninconvenienced if he fasts. Both Titus and Caius may use _epieikeia_,\nfor the Church does not wish to be unkind, nor, generally speaking, to\nhave her laws oblige rigorously and for every case.\n\n417. Though all human law is subject to _epieikeia_, the practice of\nthe civil law does not always allow it. (a) Action on individual\nresponsibility makes one guilty of technical violation. Example:\nBalbus, fearing that his house may be robbed or he himself assaulted,\nborrows a revolver and practises shooting. He had not time to get the\nnecessary permit, but argued that necessity knows no law. But, if he is\narrested, the court may hold him guilty of violating the law. (b)\nAction in a court of equity, however, will give relief for cases not\nprovided for in law. Example: One may obtain an order from the court\nrestraining a neighbor from injury, when the law itself gives only the\nright to recover damages for injury done.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 5: ECCLESIASTICAL LAW\n\n418. The Church, being a perfect and independent society, has the power\nto make laws for its members in order to promote the common spiritual\nwelfare. These laws are not an encroachment on the liberty of the\nGospel, for Christ Himself bestowed on the Church legislative and other\ngovernmental powers suitable to her mission. The charter of the\nlegislative authority of the Church is contained in the words of\nChrist to Peter: \u201cI say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock\nI will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against\nit. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And\nwhatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven;\nand whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in\nheaven\u201d (Matt., xvi. 18, 19; see also Matt., xviii. 17; Luke, x. 16).\n\n419. The character of laws made by the Church is as follows:\n\n(a) their purpose is to guide and assist the individual that he may\nmore easily and perfectly fulfill the laws of Christ, and to protect\nand promote the welfare of the Church as a whole;\n\n(b) their contents generally do not impose what is the height of\nperfection, but what is the minimum necessary for salvation (see 374);\n\n(e) their number, unlike that of the laws of the Synagogue, is few.\nThere are only six precepts of the Church that bind all the faithful;\nthe other laws of the Church do not all oblige each individual, some\nbeing for prelates, some for priests, some for religious, some for\njudges, etc.;\n\n(d) their obligation is not so strict as that of the laws of the Old\nTestament, for they are more easily changed or dispensed.\n\n420. General Law of the Church.--The general law of the Church is found\nin the five books of the Code of Canon Law, promulgated by Benedict XV\non May 27, 1917. It applies only to the Latin Church, except in those\nmatters that of their nature affect the Oriental Church as well, and it\nhas been in force from Pentecost Sunday, May 19, 1918.\n\n421. The effects of the Code on the older legislation are as follows:\n\n(a) it retains in their entirety liturgical laws that are not expressly\ncorrected; agreements of the Holy See with various nations, even if\nthey are opposed to the Code; favors, privileges and indults that are\nnot revoked (Canons 2-4);\n\n(b) disciplinary laws of ecclesiastical origin opposed to the Code are\nto be held as revoked, even if they are particular, unless the contrary\nis provided. Disciplinary laws of ecclesiastical origin omitted by the\nCode are retained in force, if they are particular; they are abrogated,\nif they are general and not contained at least implicitly in the\nCode; if a general law decreed a penalty, it must be expressly\nmentioned in the Code to retain force (Canon 6);\n\n(c) customs, universal or particular, opposed to the Code, when\nexpressly disapproved by it, must be corrected, even if immemorial;\nwhen they are not expressly disapproved by the Code, they may or may\nnot be continued, as a rule, according as they are immemorial--or one\ncentury old--or not (Canon 5).\n\n422. The rules laid down for the interpretation of the Code are as\nfollows: (a) in those parts where the Code agrees with the older\nlegislation, it is to be interpreted by means of the latter; (b) in\nthose parts where it certainly disagrees with the older legislation, it\nis to be interpreted from its own phraseology (Canon 6).\n\n423. Lawgivers in the Church.--The Pope, as Vicar of Christ and Visible\nHead of the Church, has supreme legislative power in the Church (Canon\n218): \u201cThou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church ....\nAnd I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc.\u201d\n(Matt., xvi. 18, 19). Thus, the Pope can legislate: (a) for the whole\nChurch, either alone or with the body of the Episcopate subject to him\nin an Ecumenical Council, either directly or through Congregations; (b)\nfor any part of the Church, either directly or through representatives.\nThus also, by Papal concession, legates may legislate for a place to\nwhich they are sent, _Praelati nullius_ for a territory over which they\nare placed, General Chapters for a Religious Order, and the like.\n\n424. The Bishops, \u201cplaced by the Holy Ghost to rule the Church of God\u201d\n(Acts, xx. 28), have legislative power within their own territory,\ndependently on the Pope (Canon 335). (a) They can make laws, each for\nhis own diocese, either in or out of a synod; (b) when gathered\ntogether in council, provincial or plenary, they can legislate for\necclesiastical provinces, or for all the faithful of their country.\n\n425. Subject-Matter of Church Law.--The end of the Church being the\nglory of God and the salvation of souls, she can legislate concerning\nall matters that are sacred or that refer, directly or indirectly, to\nthe satisfaction of man or the worship of God (see Leo XIII, Const.\n_Immortale Dei_, d. 1 Nov. 1885).\n\n(a) The Church can call to mind those things that are already\nprescribed by the Divine Law, Natural or Positive; and, although she\ncannot dispense in these laws (see 313-814 and exception as to\nhypothetical positive law in 357), she can interpret them\nauthoritatively, and can decide when obligations of the Divine Law,\nthat depend upon an act of the human will, cease (see 315-316).\n\n(b) The Church can determine those things that were left undetermined\nin the Divine Law. Examples: The manner in which the Lord\u2019s Day is to\nbe sanctified, the times and frequency with which the Divine law of\nCommunion is to be fulfilled, the way in which the obligation of\nfasting is to be complied with, etc.\n\n(c) The Church can make laws in matters that were left free by our Lord\nwhenever this will promote the better observance of His law (e.g., many\nchurch laws for the clergy and religious, for the conduct of worship,\nfor administration, etc.).\n\n426. The acts that may be commanded by the Church are of various kinds.\n\n(a) The Church may command acts that are purely external (e.g.,\nfasting) and acts that are partly external and partly internal, that\nis, those external acts to which, from the nature of things or from\nlaw, a special moral act of the intellect or will must be joined (e.g.,\na true oath, a worthy confession or Communion).\n\n(b) The Church may command acts that are purely internal, that is, acts\nof the intellect or will that are not necessarily connected with any\nexternal act (such as meditation, the intention in applying Mass,\nctc.), whenever she is explaining, applying, or determining the Divine\nLaw, or acting in virtue of the power of Christ. Examples: The Pope may\ndefine a dogma to be accepted internally. A confessor may impose as\npenance a pious meditation. The Church prescribes the days when pastors\nmust intend to offer Mass for their people. A religious superior may\ncommand a spiritual retreat.\n\n(c) It is more probable that, apart from instances such as those just\ngiven, the Church cannot legislate regarding acts that are purely\ninternal. For unlike the divine Legislator, who sees the internal acts\nof the soul and who can pass judgment on them, the Church cannot read\nthe heart or judge the conscience. Hence, it would appear useless for\nthe Church to give commandments about acts that elude her knowledge,\nall the more so since the Divine Law has given commands and\nprohibitions regarding internal acts and no one can escape the judgment\nof God.\n\n427. Those Bound by General Laws.--The general laws of the Church\noblige all and only such persons as are at once subjects of the Church\nand capable of receiving a law (Canon 12).\n\n(a) By Baptism one becomes a member of the Church, and hence it is\nthe baptized who are subject to ecclesiastical laws; (b) by her laws,\nthe Church commands only human and deliberate acts or omissions, and\nhence it is only those who can reason that are subject to those laws.\n(c) Moreover, unless the law expressly rules otherwise, those who,\nalthough they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed\ntheir seventh year are not bound by purely ecclesiastical law. Specific\nexceptions are stated in the law. Thus: (1) Canons 854, Sec.2, and\n940, Sec.1, regarding the reception of the sacraments in danger of\ndeath, Canon 859, Sec.1, stating the precepts of Easter Communion,\nand Canon 906, containing the precepts of annual confession, declare\nthat the law in these matters is binding on persons having the use of\nreason, regardless of the actual completion of the seventh year, The\nlaw of fasting in Canon 1254, Sec.2 binds after the completion of the\ntwenty-first year. (2) Canon 1099 explicitly exempts non-Catholics, in\ntheir own marriages, from the ecclesiastical form of marriage; also\nCanon 1070 exempts them from the impediment of disparity of cult. (3)\nThe habitually insane are considered as infants under seven (Canon 88,\nSec.3). Accordingly, although they are bound by the Divine Law during\nlucid moments, they are not usually bound by purely ecclesiastical laws\nduring this period.\n\n428. By the unbaptized are here understood, not only those who have\nnever received Baptism (such as infidels, pagans, Mohammedans, Jews,\ncatechumens), but also those who were baptized invalidly. The divine\nlaw of receiving Baptism and entering the Church applies to these\npersons, but, as long as they are unbaptized, they are not subjects of\nthe Church. Thus: (a) directly they are not obliged by any\necclesiastical law, and hence it is not sinful in itself to ask them to\ndo what is forbidden by such laws (e.g., work on a holyday); (b)\nindirectly they become subject to ecclesiastical law when they enter\ninto law-governed relations with the baptized who are subject to church\nlaw. Example: An unbaptized person who marries a Catholic is married\ninvalidly, unless the law on dispensation has been observed.\n\n429. Baptized non-Catholics include heretics and schismatics. Thus: (a)\nobjectively, these persons are obliged by ecclesiastical laws, unless\nthey are excepted by the law itself, and hence it is not lawful\ndirectly to induce them to transgress a Church law (e.g., to eat meat\non Friday); (b) subjectively, they are generally excused from formal\nsin in the non-observance of Church laws, and it is not a sin to\nco-operate materially in such non-observance (e.g., by giving meat on\nFriday to a Protestant in good faith who requests it or wishes it).\n\n430. It is held that the Church is more lenient as regards those\nbaptized as non-Catholics, that is, those who were born and brought up\nin some non-Catholic sect. Thus: (a) laws that have for their object\nthe sanctification of the individual (such as fasting and abstinence,\nSunday Mass, etc.), are not insisted on for them, since this would hurt\nrather than help their spiritual interests; (b) laws that have for\ntheir object the protection of the public welfare (such as the laws\nregarding mixed marriage), apply also to baptized non-Catholics.\n\nOther authors do not admit this distinction and hold that these\nnon-Catholics are bound by the laws of the Church, since Canon 87\nexpressly states: By Baptism man is constituted a person in the Church\nof Christ with all the rights and duties of Christians.\n\nApostates and excommunicated persons are certainly bound by all\necclesiastical laws.\n\n431. Oriental Catholics are not bound by pontifical laws (Canon 1)\nexcept in the following cases: (a) when the matter is dogmatic; (b)\nwhen the law implicitly extends to them, since it contains a\ndeclaration of natural or divine law; (c) when the law is explicitly\nextended to them. An example of (a) is Canon 218; of (b) Canon 228,2;\nof (c) Canons 622, Sec.4 and 1099, Sec.1, 3.\n\n432. It is a general rule that all persons baptized, as just explained,\nare subject to ecclesiastical laws, if they are habitually able to\nreason; but that they are not subject to those laws, if they are not\nhabitually able to reason.\n\nFirst Rule.--Persons habitually able to reason are all those who in\ntheir normal state are able to understand the difference between right\nand wrong, that is, the majority of those who have completed seven\nyears of age. Such persons are subject to ecclesiastical laws, even\nwhen actually they are unable to reason on account of temporary\nintoxication, delirium, derangement, unconsciousness, etc. Hence, one\nwho would offer meat on Friday to a person momentarily unbalanced on\nthe plea that his condition excused him from the law, would do wrong;\nfor the state of passing irresponsibility excuses from formal sin (see\n249), but not from the law.\n\nSecond Rule.--Persons habitually unable to reason are all those who\nhave not yet learned the difference between right and wrong (e.g.,\ninfants and idiots), or who have permanently lost all knowledge of\nright and wrong (e.g., the hopelessly insane). These persons are not\nbound by ecclesiastical laws, at least not by those that are directive.\nHence, in itself it is not wrong to give meat on days of abstinence to\nsuch persons, even when they are Catholics.\n\n433. Exceptions to the first rule just given are as follows:\n\n(a) According to Canon Law, the age of reason comes legally when one\nhas completed seven years (Canon 12). If a boy or girl is able to\nreason before that age, he or she is not obliged by laws that are\npurely ecclesiastical, although it is advisable that parents accustom\ntheir children to the hearing of Mass, to abstinence, etc., as soon as\nthis can be conveniently done. If a child has passed the seventh year\nand does not appear able to reason, he is not bound by ecclesiastical\nlaws.\n\n(b) According to Canon Law, the age of puberty is fixed for males at\nthe completion of fourteen years of age, for females at the completion\nof twelve years of age (Canon 88, Sec.2). These who have not attained\nthis age are excused from all penal laws, unless a law expressly states\nthe contrary; for on account of the want of mature judgment they\ndeserve leniency (Canon 2230).\n\n(c) The age of majority in Canon (as in Civil) Law is reached when one\nhas completed twenty-one years (Canon 88, Sec.1). Minors in the exercise\nof rights are subject to the power of parents or guardians, except\nwhere the contrary is declared by the law, as is the case for the\nreception of the Sacraments and the choice of a religious life (Canon\n89). They are not obliged by the law of fast (Canon 1254, Sec.2).\n\n434. There are some exceptions to the second rule given in 432. Thus,\nthose laws of the Church that grant favors or that invalidate acts can\napply even to those who are habitually unable to reason (such as\ninfants and the perpetually demented); for laws of this kind are not\ndirective of the acts of subjects.\n\n435. Those Bound by Particular Laws.--The particular laws of the Church\noblige all those who are subject to her general laws, and who become\nsubject to the laws of a locality by reason of domicile or personal\npresence (Canon 13, Sec.2).\n\n436. There are two kinds of domicile. (a) A true domicile or home is\nacquired in a place in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one\u2019s\nabode there, with the intention of remaining permanently or\nindefinitely; finally, after ten years, when one has lived there so\nlong, even though there was no intention of remaining permanently\n(Canon 92, Sec.1). (b) A quasi-domicile or residence is acquired in a\nplace in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one\u2019s abode there\nwith the intention of remaining there for at least the greater part of\nthe year; finally, after the greater part of the year, when one has\nlived there so long (Canon 92, Sec.2).\n\n437. With regard to abode, four classes of persons are distinguished in\nCanon Law (Canon 91): (a) an inhabitant, who is one that has a domicile\nin a place and is present there; (b) a resident, who is one that has\na quasi-domicile in a place and is present there; (c) a stranger, who\nis one that is outside the places of his domicile and quasi-domicile;\n(d) a _vagus_ or homeless person, who is one that has no domicile or\nquasi-domicile anywhere.\n\n438. The rules as regards those who are not strangers are: (a)\ninhabitants and residents are subject to the diocesan, provincial, and\nother particular laws of their territory (Canon 13, Sec. 2); (b) the\nhomeless are subject to the local laws of the territory where they are\npresent (Canon 14, Sec. 2).\n\n439. The rules for strangers with reference to general laws (Canon 14,\nSec. 1, n. 3) are; (a) a stranger is obliged to follow these laws, if\nthey are observed in the place where he is, even though they are not in\nforce in the place of his domicile or quasi-domicile; (b) a stranger\nis not obliged to observe general laws, if they are not in force where\nhe is, even though they are in force in the place of his domicile or\nquasi-domicile. Thus, the general law of abstinence on Friday does\nnot oblige one who is travelling in a place where the law has been\nsuspended, even though he would be obliged by it at home. The traveller\nwould do better, however, to keep to the practice of his home.\n\n440. The rules for strangers with regard to the particular laws of\ntheir own domicile or quasi-domicile (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 1) are;\n(a) they are obliged in two cases--first, when those laws are not\nterritorial but personal and obligatory on them everywhere (as is the\ncase with the statutes of religious superiors), and secondly, when the\nviolation of a territorial law would be harmful in its own territory\n(as when by fiction of law one must be considered as present on account\nof the law of residence); (b) they are not obliged in other cases.\nThus, if one is travelling on a feast-day that is a diocesan holyday\nin one\u2019s home diocese, but not in the diocese where one is, one is not\nobliged to hear Mass.\n\n441. The following are the rules for strangers with regard to the\nparticular laws of the place where they are: (a) they are obliged in\ntwo cases--first, when natural law itself requires that a territorial\nlaw be observed by all, and secondly, when the Church includes\nstrangers among those who are subject to a territorial law; (b) they\nare not obliged in other cases. Thus, if a person is travelling on a\nfeast-day that is observed as a holyday of obligation both in his home\ndiocese and in the diocese where he is, but not as a general holyday\nof the Church, he is not obliged to hear Mass; for the law of his home\ndiocese does not bind him, since he is out of its territory, and the\nlaw of the diocese where he is does not bind him, since he is not a\nsubject of that law.\n\n442. The natural law requires that strangers should conform themselves\nto local laws in the following cases:\n\n(a) when non-observance would be a cause of scandal, which the natural\nlaw commands one to avoid. In this sense we understand the rule of\nSt. Ambrose: \u201cWhen you are at Rome, do as the Romans do.\u201d Hence, if\na stranger would cause real scandal by eating meat on a local day of\nabstinence, he would be obliged to abstain from it;\n\n(b) when a local law deals with the solemnities required for validity\nof contracts (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 2). If strangers were not obliged\nby laws of this kind, they could take advantage of the inhabitants, a\nthing that is contrary to natural justice. Thus, \u201cthe place rules the\nact\u201d;\n\n(c) when the local law has for its object the maintenance of public\norder (Canon 14, Sec. 1, 11. 2); for the natural law demands that\npublic safety be guarded. Hence, a stranger who commits a crime is\nsubject to the penalties of the local law (Canon 1566).\n\n443. Examples of territorial laws that oblige even strangers according\nto the precept of the Church are the laws that require all, even\nstrangers, to follow the Calendar of the Church where they celebrate\nMass, and to say the _collectae imperatae_ prescribed by the bishop of\nthe local diocese.\n\n444. The rules given for strangers can be applied also to those who are\nin places exempt from local jurisdiction (e.g., in the monasteries of\nexempt regulars). The exempt are those who by fiction of law are held\nto be outside the territory of every diocese, and are subject, not to\nthe local bishop, but directly to the Pope (Canon 515).\n\n445. There are various cases, however, in which exempt religious are\nsubject to the territorial laws of the diocese where they are. Thus:\n(a) when they accept parishes in a diocese, they are subject to the\nOrdinary in those matters that pertain to the parishes; (b) when the\ncommon good or the avoidance of scandal requires it, they should\nconform to a diocesan law.\n\n446. Those who have a personal privilege can use it anywhere, for a\npersonal privilege, like a personal precept, follows the person, not\nthe territory.\n\n447. Promulgation.--Church laws are promulgated as follows: (a) the\nlaws of the Holy See are promulgated by publication in the official\nperiodical, _Acta Apostolicae Sedis_. They become effective three\nmonths from the date of publication, unless from the nature of the case\nthey oblige at once, or it is otherwise provided in the law itself\n(Canon 9); (b) the laws of a bishop are promulgated in the manner he\ndecides, generally by publication in the official periodical of the\ndiocese. They become effective as soon as published, unless it is\notherwise provided in the law itself (Canon 335, Sec. 2).\n\n448. When a law has been promulgated and become known, if it begins\nto be observed, it is said to be accepted; if it is not observed, it\nis said to be not accepted. This acceptance is not essential to law.\nHence: (a) the observance of a law by the people is not necessary for\nthe obligatory force of the law, for otherwise the lawgiver would be\nwithout real authority; (b) the approval of ecclesiastical laws by the\nState is not necessary for their validity, since Church and State are\ndistinct and independent societies within the proper sphere of each.\n\n449. A law that has been promulgated may fail to obtain force in the\nfollowing ways: (a) through contrary custom, already existing and\nnot excluded by the law, or then arising to abrogate the law (see\n391 Sqq.); (b) through appeal entered with the lawgiver. Thus, if a\nbishop deems a law of the Pope unsuited to his diocese, he explains the\nreasons to the Holy See, and pending the answer it is considered that\nthe lawgiver does not wish the law to oblige.\n\n450. Irritant Laws. Laws Based on Presumption.--There are two classes\nof human laws that deserve particular mention on account of special\ndifficulties regarding them: (a) irritant laws, which would seem to be\nunjust, since they declare null what according to natural law would\nbe valid; (b) laws based on presumption, which would seem to be of\nuncertain force, since presumptions are often contrary to fact.\n\n451. An irritant or inhabilitating law is one that expressly or\nequivalently declares that certain defects make an act void or\nvoidable, or a person incapable. Such laws are just, even when made by\nhuman authority, since it is the common good that makes them necessary,\nand the natural law itself requires that the common good be promoted.\n\n452. Irritant laws are of various kinds.\n\n(a) They are morally or juridically irritant, according as that which\nis taken from the irritated act is either the natural value it has in\nconscience, or the positive value it derives from the law. Hence, an\nact may be legally null (i.e., have no value that the law recognizes\nor protects) and at the same time morally valid (i.e., of just as much\nforce in conscience as though no irritant law existed).\n\n(b) Irritant laws are merely irritant or irritant and prohibitive,\naccording as they make an act invalid but not illicit, or both invalid\nand illicit. Thus, a law that requires certain formalities for making\na will invalidates the act of writing an informal will, but does not\nmake it an offense; but the church law of diriment impediments makes a\nmarriage contracted with one of these impediments both null and sinful.\n\n(c) Irritant laws are merely irritant or irritant and penal, according\nas the legislator does not or does intend them as punishments. For\nexample, the law of clandestinity is merely irritant; the law regarding\nthe impediment of crime is probably both irritant and penal.\n\n453. Laws that are merely irritant do not oblige one in conscience to\nomit the act, but only to suffer the effect of irritation; but laws\nthat are both irritant and prohibitive oblige one in conscience to omit\nthe act. Example: In itself, it is not unlawful to make an informal\nwill, but it is unlawful to marry with a diriment impediment.\n\n454. As to the time when irritant laws obtain their effect, the\nfollowing points are important.\n\n(a) Ecclesiastical voiding laws oblige at once in conscience,\nalthough like other laws of the Church they are not retroactive,\nunless the contrary is provided, and they do not oblige in case of a\ndoubt concerning the law. Example: If espousals are made without the\ncanonical formalities, there is no duty to live up to them as such,\neither in conscience or before the law.\n\n(b) Civil voiding laws are generally only civilly irritant, for as\na rule external means are sufficient for the purpose of those laws;\nthus, they produce civil irritation at once, but moral irritation only\nafter pronouncement by the courts. Hence, after a judicial sentence\nthe voided act becomes such morally, since the decision is founded on\na presumption of common danger (see below, 459). Examples: One who has\nreceived money through a will which he knows to be informal (i.e.,\nlegally invalid), may retain possession until the civil authority\ndeclares that he has no rights to the money. But, on the other hand,\none who has been disinherited through a will naturally good, but not\nmade in due form, has the right to contest, if we except the case of\npious bequests (see Vol. II).\n\n455. Laws that make an act voidable or rescindable do not irritate\nbefore declaration of nullity by a judge. Hence, an act that is\nrescindable according to law retains its natural force until the\ncourt has decided against it. Example: Acts that were done under the\ninfluence of grave and unjust fear, or that were induced through\ndeception, are held as valid until declared null by a judge.\n\n456. As to the effects of ignorance on acts irritated by law, the Code\nstates that ignorance of irritating (invalidating) and inhabilitating\n(disqualifying) laws does not excuse from their observance, unless the\nlaw expressly states otherwise (Canon 16, Sec. 1). Moralists discuss\nthe influence of ignorance (as well as force or fear) on such acts as\nfollows: (a) if the law is irritant and not penal, it has its effect,\nin spite of ignorance, oversight, etc.; for this the common good\nrequires. Example: One who marries his cousin in good faith, being\ninvincibly ignorant that it is against the law, contracts invalidly;\n(b) if the law is irritant and penal, the irritation being decreed\nsolely as a punishment, ignorance, oversight, etc., sufficient to\nexcuse from fault, excuse also from the penalty of irritation; for\npenalty presupposes fault. Before the law, however, ignorance and\nerror as to law or penalties are not presumed but must be proved.\n(Nevertheless, it must be noted that according to some authors no\npenalty is necessarily or primarily intended in ecclesiastical\nirritating and inhabilitating laws. Though punishment actually results\nfrom the matrimonial impediment of crime, for example, the impediment\nas such primarily is a personal disqualification intended to protect\nthe dignity of the sacrament and good morals. Ignorance, then, does\nnot excuse from it. Some authors maintain that this is true of all\necclesiastical disqualifying laws.)\n\n457. Generally speaking, _epieikeia_ may not be used in the\ninterpretation of irritating and inhabilitating laws. Since they\ntranscend the individual welfare, they demand uniform observance of\nall subject to them. Some authors permit the use of _epieikeia_,\nhowever, in particular cases in which the law itself aims to protect\nthe individual, whereas its observance would tend rather to harm\nthe individual or at times even the interests of the community.\nAccordingly, it seems probable that an irritant law may cease in case\nof impossibility or of a most grave inconvenience that is common.\nExample: If in a pagan country Christians were so few that they could\nmarry only infidels, and if distance or other circumstances made it\nimpossible to seek a dispensation, the diriment impediment of disparity\nof worship would seem to cease for those Christians.\n\n458. Some authors hold that an irritant law may also cease on account\nof impossibility, or of a most grave inconvenience that is only\nprivate; but this opinion cannot be deemed certain. An example of\nprivate inconvenience is the case of an invalidly married person who is\nnear to death and unable to seek the dispensation from the impediment\nthat has made the marriage null.\n\n459. A law based on presumption is one in which the lawgiver rules for\ncertain cases according to what experience shows in their regard--viz.,\nthat such cases are generally dangerous, or indicative of a particular\nfact. These laws are not of uncertain force, for the cases in which\nthey cease to oblige are few and definite.\n\n460. When a law is based on a presumption of common danger and that\ndanger does not exist in a particular instance, the law nevertheless\nobliges (Canon 21); for the end of the law is the common good, and if\nit ceased for an individual whenever its presumption of danger was\nnot true in his case, everyone could persuade himself that the law\ndid not apply to him, and thus the common good would be defeated.\nExamples: The law against the reading of irreligious books is based on\nthe presumption of common danger of sin, the law against clandestine\nmarriages on the presumption of common danger of fraud; hence, they\noblige even in the particular instances where these dangers are absent.\nExamples of laws based on the presumption of common danger can be found\nin Canons 199; 409, Sec. 1; 420; 422; 1022; 1028; 1114; 1116; 1138;\n1396; 1398.\n\n461. When a law is based on the presumption of a particular fact that\nusually happens in the cases with which the law is concerned, and the\nfact in an individual instance did not happen, does the law oblige?\n\n(a) In conscience the law does not oblige of itself, because\npresumptions must yield to the truth; but it may oblige accidentally,\nif non-observance would cause great public or private harm. Example:\nThe law presumes that a person born and brought up among Catholics has\nbeen baptized, and is therefore subject to the church laws. But if, in\nfact, the person was never baptized, he is not subject to those laws,\nas long as he remains unbaptized, unless there be some accidental\nnecessity of keeping them, such as the danger of scandal.\n\n(b) Before the public authority the law in question does oblige until\nthe non-existence of the fact presumed by the law has been proved in\nthe manner required by law. Example: When parties contract marriage\naccording to the form prescribed by the Church, the presumption is\nthat the contract was valid, and, as long as that presumption is not\novercome, the Church will not sanction a new marriage by either of the\nparties. But if it can be proved in court that threats or violence\nproduced lack of consent, the obligation not to contract a new marriage\nwill terminate before the law.\n\n462. Fulfillment of Law.--With reference to the manner of fulfilling\na law there are a number of questions to be considered: (a) as to the\nexternal acts, whether or not one can fulfill the law for another,\nwhether or not the omission of some slight detail renders compliance\ninsufficient, whether or not he who cannot fulfill the whole law is\nbound to fulfill a part of it, whether or not several obligations can\nbe satisfied at the same time or by the same act, etc.; (b) as to the\ninternal acts, whether or not one must have the intention of meeting\nthe wishes of the lawgiver, whether or not one must be in the state of\ngrace, etc.\n\n463. Personal fulfillment is not always necessary; for an affirmative\nlaw requires either that some thing be given, or that some personal act\nbe performed. (a) When the law requires that some thing be given (e.g.,\nthat taxes be paid), the obligation can be satisfied through another,\nsince a thing can be transferred from one person to another, who agrees\nat least interpretatively; (b) when the law requires that a personal\nact be performed (e.g., that Mass be heard on Sunday), the obligation\ncannot be satisfied through another, for actions cannot be transferred\nfrom one to another.\n\n464. Minute fulfillment is not always necessary; for sometimes the\nminor details of the fulfillment of a law are expressly prescribed,\nsometimes they are not.\n\n(a) If these details are required by the law itself or by the nature\nof the case, the law is not satisfied if they are neglected. Example:\nFriday abstinence ends exactly at midnight, and hence to eat meat even\none minute before midnight is to break that abstinence.\n\n(b) If the law does not prescribe minute details, these are not\nrequired for the fulfillment of the obligation; for laws should not be\nunduly burdensome. Example: One who is a few minutes late for Mass does\nnot miss Mass, if he is present for the essential parts of the Mass.\n\n465. Partial fulfillment is required of him who cannot make complete\nfulfillment, only when the part is commanded for its own sake; for that\nwhich is commanded by a law is considered by the lawgiver as either an\nindivisible unit, or as a whole composed of parts that have singly an\nindependent moral value and obligation.\n\n(a) If the thing commanded is morally an indivisible unit (e.g., a\npilgrimage to a shrine), he who is not able to fulfill the whole law is\nbound to nothing. Example: One who has made a vow to go on pilgrimage\nto a distant sanctuary, is not bound to go part of the way, if he is\nunable to make the entire journey.\n\n(b) If the thing commanded has parts that contribute to the end of\nthe law, he who is able to fulfill only one or more such parts is\nobliged according to his ability; if it is certain that he can perform\neven a part, he is bound to that; if it is not certain that he can\nperform even a part, it would seem that generally he is excused from\nall. Examples: A cleric who can say some but not all the Hours of his\nOffice, is obliged to say what he can. A person who can certainly\nabstain, but who cannot fast, is bound during Lent to abstain.\n\n466. Simultaneous fulfillment by one act of several obligations is\nlawful, if the obligations differ only materially. They are said to\ndiffer only materially, if the motive of the legislator in giving\ndifferent commands about the same thing is the same in each instance;\nthey differ formally, if the legislator has a different motive in each\ninstance. The motive is recognized either from the express declaration\nof the lawgiver, or from interpretation given through authority or\ncustom.\n\n(a) When two commands differ only materially, it can be presumed that\nthe legislator is not unwilling that they be fulfilled by one and the\nsame act, unless it is clear that he wishes them to be fulfilled by\ndistinct acts. Example: If one falls sick at Easter time and receives\nthe Viaticum, it is not necessary for him to receive Communion again in\norder to make his Easter duty; for the divine law of Viaticum and the\nchurch law of Easter Communion have the same motive, and hence can be\nfulfilled by one and the same Communion.\n\n(b) When two commands differ formally, it can be presumed, unless the\nopposite is manifest, that the legislator wishes them to be complied\nwith by distinct acts. Example: If a confessor imposes a fast as a\npenance, this penance cannot be performed on a fast day; for the motive\nof the law of fast is general, that of the sacramental penance is\nparticular.\n\n467. Simultaneous fulfillment by several acts of several obligations\nis sometimes possible, sometimes impossible. For the acts prescribed\nby different laws are either capable or incapable of being done at the\nsame time. Thus, it is possible to hear a Mass and to say a penance\nof some Hail Marys at the same time. But it does not seem easy for an\nordinary person to give attention to four or more Masses at the same\ntime.\n\n(a) If the acts do not impede one another and the legislator is not\nunwilling, several laws can be fulfilled at the same time. Example: If\ntwo Masses are being said on adjoining altars, one can hear both--the\none to satisfy the Sunday obligation, the other to perform a penance\nreceived.\n\n(b) If the acts impede one another, or if the legislator wishes his\nlaws to be fulfilled at distinct times, the different obligations\ncannot be satisfied simultaneously. Examples: If a distracted person\nhas received a penance to hear six Masses, he cannot hear them all\nat once, on account of the division of attention necessary. If the\nconfessor told a person to hear Mass \u201cthree times,\u201d the latter cannot\nsatisfy by hearing three Masses at one time.\n\n468. When a law prescribes not only what is to be done, but when it\nis to be done, the time must be observed. But the obligation does not\nalways cease with the expiration of the time.\n\n(a) If the time set by the law is a limit beyond which the obligation\nceases, he who has not complied within that time has no further\nobligation. Examples: He who did not fast on Christmas Eve, would\nnot be obliged to fast on Christmas Day. He who did not hear Mass on\nSunday, would not be obliged to hear Mass on Monday.\n\n(b) If the time set by the law is not a limit to terminate the\nobligation, but a date fixed in order to insist on the obligation, he\nwho has not complied within the prescribed period, is nevertheless\nstill obliged. Examples: He who has not made the Easter duty by Trinity\nSunday, is obliged to receive Communion after Trinity. He who has not\npaid a debt on the day required by law, is bound to pay it after that\nday.\n\n469. It depends on the intention of the lawgiver whether the time he\nprescribes for fulfillment is a limitation of the obligation or not.\nThe intention of the lawgiver is known either from the words or purpose\nof the law, or from custom.\n\n470. If the law declares that some duty must be performed within a\ndetermined period, allowing freedom for earlier or later performance\nwithin the period, the following points must be considered. (a) A\nperson is not obliged to comply early, if he intends to comply before\nthe period has ended. (b) He is obliged to comply early, if he foresees\nthat later he will not be able to do what is required. Examples: If a\nperson who has not made his Easter duty has the opportunity to receive\nCommunion on Easter Sunday, and will not have another such opportunity\ntill Christmas, he is obliged to receive on Easter Sunday. But, if he\ncan communicate any Sunday during the Paschal time, he is not bound to\ndo so on one of the early Sundays. If one can hear an early Mass, but\nnot another Mass, on a holyday, one must hear the early Mass.\n\n471. Just as one may not delay fulfillment until after the time set\nby law, so neither may one anticipate fulfillment before the time\ndetermined, unless the law may be considered to allow this. Examples:\nIf a person has heard Mass on Saturday, he has no right to make this\ncount for the following day. A rosary said before confession cannot be\nconsidered as performance of the penance, if in confession one is given\nthe rosary to say.\n\n472. It is held that a cleric who said the Breviary in the morning,\njust before he was ordained subdeacon and undertook the obligation of\nthe Office, satisfied by that anticipated recitation; likewise, that a\ntraveller who heard Mass in a place where a holyday of obligation of\nthe general law was not in force, has satisfied by anticipation, if\nlater in the morning he reaches as his destination a place where the\nholyday is observed. For in both these cases the law intends that the\nOffice be said, or the Mass be heard within the day.\n\n473. If a person who is now able to do what the law requires, foresees\nthat he will not be able to do this when the time set by the law\narrives, he is not obliged to anticipate fulfillment, even when he has\nthe privilege of anticipation. Examples: A cleric who at 2 p.m. is able\nto anticipate Matins for tomorrow, and who knows that later, on account\nof an operation, he will not be able to say his Office, is not bound to\nanticipate; for no one is obliged to use a privilege. A person who is\nable to hear Mass on Saturday, and who knows that all of Sunday must be\nspent on the train, is not obliged to hear Mass on Saturday, though of\ncourse this is the better thing to do.\n\n474. The internal acts concerned in the fulfillment of a law are: (a)\nthose in the intellect, such as knowledge; (b) those in the will, such\nas consent, motive.\n\n475. Knowledge of what one is doing is sometimes necessary, sometimes\nunnecessary for the fulfillment of a law.\n\n(a) If the law is prohibitive, knowledge is not necessary, since\nnothing more is required by the law than the omission of what is\nforbidden. Example: He who ate no meat on a day of abstinence has\nfulfilled the law, even though he was unconscious all day.\n\n(b) If the law is preceptive of a payment to be made, knowledge is not\nnecessary, since the law requires nothing more than the effect of an\nexternal act. Example: He who pays his taxes while intoxicated fulfills\nhis obligation, even though he does not know what he is doing.\n\n(c) If the law is preceptive of an act to be performed, knowledge\nis required, for it is supposed that the act will be exercised in a\nhuman manner. Example: He who sleeps all during Mass on Sunday does\nnot fulfill his duty, for the law intends that one assist at Mass in a\nhuman way (i.e., with consciousness of what is being done).\n\n476. Fulfillment of a law is not morally good and meritorious, unless\nit is voluntary (see 97 sqq.); but the legal obligation is sometimes\nsatisfied even by an unwilling fulfillment.\n\n(a) When the law commands a payment to be made, one may will the\ncontrary of what is commanded and yet fulfill one\u2019s obligation.\nExample: He who pays his taxes unwillingly and under compulsion\nsatisfies the law, which requires not an act, but its effect.\n\n(b) When the law forbids something, it is possible that one does not\nwill the omission commanded and yet fulfills one\u2019s obligation. Example:\nHe who intends to eat meat on a day of abstinence which he thinks is\na meat day, but, being unable to find what he wants, omits the meat,\nsatisfies the law, which requires only that one omit what is forbidden\nand have no will to violate the law.\n\n(c) When the law commands that an act be performed, one must perform\nthe act willingly, since the law being for humans intends that\nfulfillment be made in a human manner. Examples: He who is dragged\nto church and forcibly detained there during Mass, does not satisfy\nthe law of sanctifying the Sunday, since force makes his assistance\nat Mass involuntary (see 52). A child that goes to church only to\nescape punishment satisfies its duty, if, in spite of reluctance, it\nreally intends to hear Mass, for fear does not necessarily make an act\ninvoluntary (see 41 sqq.).\n\n477. As to the intention required in fulfilling a law, it is to be\nnoted that one must have, at least implicitly, the intention of doing\nwhat the law prescribes, in the case given in the third section (c) of\nthe preceding paragraph. Example: He who goes to church on Sunday while\nMass is being said with no other purpose than that of hearing the music\nor of waiting for a friend, does not satisfy the Sunday duty, since he\ndoes not at all intend to hear Mass.\n\n478. The following kinds of intention, though to be recommended, are\nnot necessary for the fulfillment of a law.\n\n(a) It is not necessary, as a rule, that one intend to satisfy one\u2019s\nobligation, for human lawgivers have not generally the power or the\nintention to command acts that are purely internal (see 374, 426).\nExamples: He who hears Mass on a holyday not intending to perform his\nduty, as he does not know that it is a holyday, has satisfied the law.\nHe who says the rosary out of devotion and then remembers that he has\nan obligation of saying it because of a promise made or of a penance\nreceived, can regard the rosary said as a fulfillment of his obligation.\n\n(b) It is not necessary that one intend that which the lawgiver had in\nmind as the purpose of the law; for \u201cthe end of the law is not a part\nof the law.\u201d Example: A person who takes only one full meal during\nLent, observes the letter of the law; but he misses its spirit if he\neats or drinks greedily, daintily or copiously, in order to avoid the\nmortification intended by the law.\n\n479. If one intends to perform what a law prescribes, but at the\nsame time expressly intends not to satisfy, by that performance,\nthe obligation imposed, one\u2019s act is sufficient or insufficient for\nfulfillment according to the source from which the obligation arises.\n\n(a) If the obligation arises from the will of the lawgiver, the act\nis a sufficient fulfillment, since the human lawgiver, as said in\nthe previous paragraph, does not concern himself with what is purely\ninternal. Example: If a person hears Mass on Sunday out of devotion,\nintending to hear another Mass in satisfaction of the Sunday duty, he\nis not bound to hear a second Mass, as he has already done all that the\nlaw requires.\n\n(b) If the obligation arises from one\u2019s own will, as in the case\nof a promise or a vow, the act above described is not sufficient\nfulfillment; for, as the obligation arose from the will, so also the\nmode of fulfillment is to be determined by the will. Example: One\nwho has vowed to hear Mass, and who now while hearing Mass expressly\ndetermines that not this but another Mass will be in satisfaction of\nhis vow, is bound by his vow to hear another Mass.\n\n480. As to virtuous dispositions in fulfilling a law, it is to be\nobserved that, while a good lawgiver always wishes them, he does not\nalways require them as a duty of obedience. The virtuous dispositions\nreferred to are of two kinds: (a) habitual, that is, the permanent\nspiritual condition of the soul, such as the state of grace, the\nhabit of charity, etc.; (b) actual, that is, the good manner in which\nthe commanded act is done, such as devout attention in hearing Mass,\nheartfelt contrition in making confession, freedom from vain-glory in\nfasting, etc.\n\n481. Virtuous dispositions are or are not commanded according as that\nwhich is prescribed is or is not a mixed, or a purely external act (see\nabove, 426).\n\n(a) When a mixed act is commanded by law, the virtuous disposition that\nthe nature of the case calls for, but nothing further, is strictly\nprescribed. Hence, the law of Easter Communion requires that Communion\nbe received in the state of grace, the law of yearly confession that\nthe penitent be truly contrite, the law of Sunday Mass that there be\nsufficient attention to the Mass; but more perfect dispositions (such\nas freedom from venial sin in the communicant, perfect contrition\nin the penitent, the state of grace in him who hears Mass) are not\nrequired for the fulfillment of the laws we are considering.\n\n(b) When a purely external thing is commanded, the law does not require\ninternal dispositions, and hence one who performs what is required is\nnot obliged to repeat it on account of the imperfect way he obeyed.\nExample: He who fasts while he is not in the state of grace is not\nobliged to fast again to make good what was lacking in his previous\ndisposition.\n\n482. Of course, what was said in the preceding paragraph has to do only\nwith single laws, and with what is strictly needed for the fulfillment\nof the law. Hence: (a) he who sins because of the way in which he\nfulfills one law, violates another law (e.g., one who is willingly,\nthough not entirely, distracted at Mass, obeys the church law of\nassistance at Mass on Sunday, but he disobeys the divine law that he\nworship God devoutly);\n\n(b) he who has less devotion in obeying a law than he might have had,\ndoes not deserve reprehension as a transgressor, but his conduct is\nless praiseworthy.\n\n483. Interpretation.--The meaning of interpretation and its various\nspecies were explained above in 315 sqq.\n\n484. As to the force of interpretation of church laws, the following\npoints must be noted:\n\n(a) Authentic interpretation given in the form of law has the force\nof law; if it is merely declarative of words of the law certain in\nthemselves, it does not need promulgation and is retroactive; if it is\nsupplementary, it needs promulgation and is not retroactive, since it\nis a new law (Canon 17, Sec. 2);\n\n(b) Authentic interpretation given in the form of judicial sentence or\nof rescript in a particular matter has not the force of law; and it\nobliges only the persons and affects only the things concerned (Canon\n17, Sec. 3);\n\n(c) Usual interpretation has the force of law when it is given through\na legitimate custom (see above, 391 sqq.), for \u201ccustom is the best\ninterpreter of law\u201d;\n\n(d) Doctrinal interpretation has not the force of law, since it does\nnot proceed from the lawgiver. Its value depends on the reasons and the\nauthority by which it is supported. When all the doctors agree, their\ninterpretation is morally certain; when they disagree, the various\ninterpretations have more or less probability.\n\n485. Rules for Doctrinal Interpretation.--(a) The words must be\nunderstood in their proper sense according to text and context, unless\nthis be impossible; if doubtful, they must be judged according to\nparallel places in the Code, the circumstances, reason of the law, and\nthe mind of the lawgiver (Canon 18).\n\n(b) Things that are burdensome should be understood in their most\nrestricted sense (Canon 19), things that are favorable in their widest\nsense. Thus, the censure pronounced against simony is understood in the\nnarrow sense of simony against the divine law; a privilege granted to\nthe clergy is understood in the wide sense as given to all the clergy.\n\n(c) Things that remain obscure should be understood in the sense that\nis least burdensome to subjects.\n\n(d) A particular law derogates from a general law; but a general law\ndoes not derogate from a previous particular law, unless derogation\nis expressly mentioned in the general law; for the particular law is\nconsidered an exception to the general law (Canon 22).\n\n486. Authentic interpretations of ecclesiastical laws are given by the\nlegislator, his successor, or one delegated by either (Canon 17, Sec.\n1). (a) The Pope is the authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical\nlaws. A special commission appointed by the Pope interprets the general\nlaw of the Code. (b) The bishop is the authentic interpreter of\ndiocesan laws made by himself or by his predecessors.\n\n487. Cessation of Obligation.--The ordinary ways in which a law ceases\nto be obligatory for an individual are: (a) on the part of the subject,\nthat he ceases to be subject to the law (exemption), or is unable to\nobserve it (excuse); (b) on the part of the lawgiver, that he removes\nthe obligation for the individual (dispensation).\n\n488. As to exemption from Church laws note: (a) he who ceases to\nbe subject to the law (e.g., one who has received a privilege of\nexemption, or who has departed from the place where the law is in\nforce), is of course not obliged by the law; (b) neither is he guilty\nof any fault if he brought about his freedom only just before the law\nbecame effective and with the sole purpose of being exempt; for the law\ndoes not oblige that one remain subject to it.\n\n489. Excuses from the law are reduced to two, namely, ignorance and\nimpossibility.\n\n(a) Ignorance excuses from the guilt of non-observance, if it is\ninculpable (see 24 sqq.). The question now is whether or not and when\nit excuses from legal consequences, such as invalidity, penalty,\nreservation of sin, etc.\n\n(b) Impossibility excuses from both obligation and guilt.\n\n490. Ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of a penalty attached to the\nlaw has the following effects determined in the law: (a) No kind of\nignorance excuses from irritating or inhabilitating laws, unless the\ncontrary is expressly provided for in the law itself (Canon 16, Sec.\n1). Thus a person who contracts marriage, while ignorant that he and\nthe other person are first cousins, is invalidly married.\n\n(b) Affected ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of the penalty alone\ndoes not excuse from any penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229,\nSec.1).\n\n(c) If the law contains the following words: _praesumpserit, ausus\nfuerit, scienter, studiose, temerarie, consulto egerit_, or others\nsimilar to them which require full knowledge and deliberation, any\ndiminution of imputability on the part of either the intellect or the\nwill exempts the delinquent from penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon\n2229, Sec.2). (d) If the law does not contain such words, crass or\nsupine ignorance of the law or even of only the penalty does not exempt\nfrom any penalty _latae sententiae_; ignorance that is not crass or\nsupine exempts from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative\npenalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229, Sec.3, 1).\n\n491. Other specific determinations of the law include: (a) Inculpable\nignorance of the law itself excludes moral imputability (Canon 2202,\nSec.1); actual inculpable inadvertence or error in regard to the law\nhas the same effect (Canon 2202, Sec.3). (b) Culpable ignorance, or\nculpable inadvertence, or error concerning the law or concerning\nthe fact diminish imputability more or less in proportion to the\nculpability of the ignorance (Canon 2202, Sec.1). (c) If the ignorance,\neven inculpable, affects only the fact of the existence of the penalty,\nit does not exclude imputability of the delict, but it does diminish it\n(Canon 2202, Sec.2).\n\n492. Absolute or physical impossibility (i.e., the want of the power\nor of the means of complying with a law), of course, excuses from its\nobservance; for no one is bound to what is impossible. This applies to\ndivine law, and hence much more to human law. Example: He who is unable\nto leave the house is not obliged to go to Mass.\n\n493. Moral impossibility--that is, the inability to comply with the law\nwithout extraordinary labor, or the imminent danger of losing a notable\ngood or of incurring a great evil--does not excuse from the observance\nof ecclesiastical law when this law receives through circumstances\nthe added force of the negative law of nature. This happens when the\nevil that will result through the observance of the law bears no\nproportion to the evil that will result from its violation, the former\nbeing private or temporal or human, the latter public or spiritual or\ndivine; for the law of nature forbids that the common welfare, or the\nsalvation of a soul, or the honor of God be sacrificed for the benefit\nof an individual, or for the life of the body, or for the welfare of a\ncreature. Example: The command to abstain from meat on Friday obliges,\nif one has been ordered to violate it as a sign of contempt of God or\nof religion, even though death is threatened for refusal.\n\n494. Moral impossibility excuses from the observance of a human law in\nthe following cases:\n\n(a) One is excused when a considerable loss in health, reputation,\nspiritual advantage, property, etc., or a grave inconvenience will\nresult from observing a law which is not a prohibition of nature in\nthe sense of the previous paragraph; for the legislator cannot impose\nobligations that are needlessly heavy, and hence positive law does not\noblige in case of such moral impossibility. Example: Our Lord reproved\nthe inhuman rigor of the Pharisees, who insisted that their regulations\nmust be observed, whatever the difficulty or cost.\n\n(b) One is excused when a lower or less urgent law is in conflict\nwith a law that is higher or more urgent. In such a case the greater\nobligation prevails, and the lesser obligation disappears. Examples:\nThe divine laws that one must preserve one\u2019s life or administer Baptism\nto a dying person prevail over the human law of attendance at church.\nThe less urgent law of fasting yields to the more urgent law of\ndevoting oneself to duties required by one\u2019s state of life, if there is\na conflict between the two laws.\n\n495. The loss, evil or inconvenience that constitutes moral\nimpossibility with respect to a law, must bear a proportion to the\nlaw itself; and hence the higher or the more imperative the law, the\ngreater must be the reason that suffices to excuse from it.\n\n496. Only a learned and prudent man can determine whether moral\nimpossibility exists with reference to a particular case, and hence it\nwould be dangerous for those who are not theologians to decide, either\nfor themselves or for others. The points that have to be considered\nin judging are: (a) whether or not the difficulty is of a gravity\nproportionate to the importance of the law (e.g., a graver reason is\nrequired to excuse from a law that obliges under mortal sin than to\nexcuse from a law that binds under light sin); (b) whether or not the\ndifficulty is grave in relation to the person concerned (e.g., an\nobligation that is easy for a healthy person may be very difficult for\none who is infirm).\n\n497. It is never lawful to bring about either physical or moral\nimpossibility of observing a law, if this be done with the sole or\nprincipal purpose of escaping one\u2019s duty. Example: To go away on\nSaturday in order to avoid Mass on Sunday.\n\n498. It is lawful to cause impossibility of observing a law, if there\nbe some sufficient reason for doing this; for it is lawful to do\nsomething from which two effects, one good and the other bad, result,\nif the good effect is the one intended, and there is a sufficient\nreason for permitting the evil effect (102 sqq.). Example: It is\nsometimes lawful to do some extra work that is very useful, even if the\nlabor makes one unable to observe a fast.\n\n499. The sufficient reason spoken of in the last paragraph is one that\nis proportionate to the urgency and importance of the command and to\nthe frequency of the non-observance. Examples: A greater reason is\nrequired to take up some work which will make it impossible to keep the\nfast, if this be done on the fast day itself, than if it be done the\nday before. A far greater reason is required to take up some work that\nmakes the observance of the fast impossible, if this happens frequently\nor habitually, than if it happens only once or twice.\n\n500. Cessation of Law.--A law ceases in two ways.\n\n(a) It ceases from without (i.e., from the act of the legislator),\nwhen he abolishes it, by total or partial revocation (abrogation,\nderogation), or by the institution of a new law directly contrary to it\n(obrogation). In the new Code of Canon Law there are many instances of\nrevocation or obrogation of older legislation (see Canons 22, 23), as\nin the matter of censures and matrimonial impediments. Examples: In the\ndiocese of X a minor feast was made a holyday of obligation. This law\nwas abrogated, if later on it was decreed that neither the prohibition\nagainst servile works nor the precept of hearing Mass was obligatory\nfor that feast; it was derogated from, if later it was decreed that\nservile works were permitted, but Mass was obligatory for that day; it\nwas obrogated, if a later law included the minor feast in a list of\nspecial days of devotion for which the hearing of Mass was recommended.\n\n(b) A law ceases from within (i.e., of itself), when through change of\nconditions the purpose for which it was made no longer exists, or is no\nlonger served by the law.\n\n501. The purpose for which a law was made ceases to be served by the\nlaw in two cases.\n\n(a) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been a benefit,\nit has become a detriment, inasmuch as its observance now would be\nwicked, or impossible, or too burdensome. In this case the law ceases,\nsince it is now contrary to the supreme law that the common welfare be\npromoted. Example: A particular law forbade the use of fat or grease\nin the preparation of food on days of abstinence. Later, it became\nimpossible to procure the substitutes previously used.\n\n(b) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been useful, it\nhas become useless, inasmuch as it is no longer necessary for the end\nintended by the lawgiver. In this case the law ceases, for regulations\nshould not be imposed needlessly. Example: The Council of Jerusalem\nmade a law that the faithful should abstain from using as food animals\nthat had been strangled (Acts, xv. 20). The purpose of the law was to\navoid offense to the Jewish converts, who at that time formed a large\npart of the Christian community and who had a religious abhorrence for\nsuch food. But shortly afterwards, the Gentile element having become\nstronger in the Church, no attention was paid to ceremonial rules of\nJudaism.\n\n502. A law ceases to serve its purpose also as follows:\n\n(a) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the purpose\nof the lawgiver generally and permanently, if the changed conditions\naffect the whole community or the great majority, and are lasting. In\nthis case the law ceases; for, since it is made for the community as\na whole and as a lasting ordinance, it cannot endure, if it becomes\npermanently unserviceable to the community. Examples are given in the\nprevious paragraph.\n\n(b) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the lawgiver\u2019s\npurpose privately or temporarily, if the harm or uselessness affects\nonly individuals, or is not lasting. In this case the law continues to\nbe an instrument of public welfare, or is only momentarily deprived\nof its beneficial character. Hence it endures; but for temporary\ninconvenience to the public a remedy is had in suspension of the\nlaw, for inconvenience to individuals in dispensation. Example: If\nthe use of fats or grease were forbidden on days of abstinence, and\nif for a time only it were impossible to obtain the substitutes for\nthe preparation of the food, the law would not cease, but would be\nsuspended until such time as substitutes could be obtained.\n\n503. The inconvenience caused to individuals from the fact that a law\ndoes not serve its purpose in a case before them, does not always\njustify the use of _epieikeia_.\n\n(a) If the observance of the law would be detrimental to the purpose\nintended by the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ might be used; for the lawgiver\ndoes not intend that his law should be an obstacle to what he has in\nview as its end. Example: Caius needs to read a book placed on the\nIndex in order to defend the Faith against attacks, but he is unable\nto request the general faculty to read forbidden works. Obedience to\nthe law in this case would defeat the purpose of the law, which is the\nprotection of faith, and hence Caius may use epieikeia.\n\n(b) If the observance of the law would be unnecessary, but not\ndetrimental as regards the purpose of the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ may not\nbe used; else the law would lose its force through the judgments of\nindividuals in their own favor, and the common welfare would suffer.\nExamples: Titus has an opportunity to read a book placed on the Index,\nbut has not the time to apply for permission. The work was condemned\nas dangerous to faith; but Titus is strong in faith, and wishes only\nto study the literary qualities of the writer. Sempronius, a parish\npriest, is requested to officiate at a marriage immediately, without\nproclaiming the banns or seeking a dispensation from proclamation. The\npurpose of the law of banns is that impediments may be detected and\ninvalid marriages avoided, and Sempronius is absolutely certain that\nthere is no impediment in the case before him. Titus and Sempronius\nmust observe the law, and the same must be said as regards every actual\ncase in which there is the possibility of self-deception and peril\nto the common good. The theoretical case, in which neither of these\ninconveniences would be present, need not be considered.\n\n504. The purpose of the law ceases to exist as follows:\n\n(a) adequately, when all the reasons on account of which it was made\nare no longer in existence; in such a case the law itself ceases, for\nthe lawgiver is not considered as intending to oblige when the reason\nfor obligation has ceased. Example: If the bishop orders prayers to be\nsaid for rain, the prayers cease to be obligatory when rain has come;\n\n(b) inadequately, when the reason for the law has ceased partially,\nbut not entirely. In such a case the law does not cease, for it still\nremains useful. Example: If the bishop orders prayers for peace and\nrain, the prayers are obligatory until both requests have been obtained.\n\n505. A law ceases, therefore, in greater or less degree, according to\ncircumstances. (a) It ceases entirely or partially, according as it\nis revoked or as it becomes useless as to all its provisions, or only\nas to one or more of them; (b) it ceases permanently or temporarily,\naccording as the revocation or cessation is only for a time, or for\ngood.\n\n506. Custom.--In Canon Law custom can interpret, abrogate or introduce\nlaw, provided: (a) it has the qualities of legitimate custom, and (b)\nits existence is proved juridically, or is notorious.\n\n507. According to their extension, customs are of various kinds.\n(a) Universal customs are those that prevail in the entire Church;\n(b) particular customs are those that are confined to a territorial\nportion of the Church (e.g., a province of the Church or of an\nOrder); (c) special customs are those that are followed in societies\nthat are smaller, but capable of having their own laws (e.g.,\nindependent monasteries); (d) most special customs are those observed\nby individuals, or by communities not capable of having their own\nlegislation (e.g., parishes). At the most, customs of this last class\nhave only the force of privilege (Canon 26).\n\n508. Custom is formed as follows. (a) As to origin, it arises from\nthe practice of the people, when this practice is followed with the\npurpose of making or unmaking a law. Hence, the habitual way of acting\nof an individual, even if he be the superior, does not give rise to a\ncustom. By \u201cpeople\u201d here is meant a community capable of having its own\nlaw (Canon 26). (b) As to legal force, custom arises solely from the\nconsent of the Pope or other prelate, when this consent is expressed by\nthe law or lawgiver, or tacitly admitted by him. Hence, a custom not\napproved by the superior has no legal force (Canon 25).\n\n509. A custom can introduce or abrogate any kind of ecclesiastical law\nor other custom--penal, prohibitive, irritant--if it is reasonable and\nhas lasted the prescribed time (Canons 27, 28). Examples: A law that\nforbids contrary customs can be abrogated, according to the Code, by\nsuch customs when they are immemorial, or a century old (Canon 27, Sec.\n1). The impediment of disparity of worship became diriment through\ncustom; it was custom that introduced the obligation of the Divine\nOffice, and that mitigated the early law of fast.\n\n510. A custom expressly disapproved of in law is not reasonable or\nlegitimate, and cannot derogate from an existing law, nor establish a\nnew law (Canons 27, 28).\n\n511. The time prescribed by the Code of Canon Law for the acquisition\nof legal force by customs that have not the personal consent of the\nlawgiver is as follows: (a) forty continuous and complete years are\nrequired to unmake an ordinary law; one hundred years to unmake a law\nthat forbids future contrary custom (Canon 27, Sec. 1); (b) forty\ncontinuous and complete years are likewise required to make a new law\n(Canon 28).\n\n512. The effect of the Code on customs previously existing was\nconsidered above under 421.\n\n513. Like the written law, custom ceases: (a) from within, when its\npurpose has ceased entirely; (b) from without, when it is abrogated by\ndesuetude, or by a contrary law or custom (Canon 30).\n\n514. Laws in a Wide Sense.--In addition to laws strictly so-called,\nthere are laws in a wide sense, commands or provisions made by\necclesiastical superiors that have not all the conditions given above\n(see 285) for law. Such are: (a) precepts, which differ from law,\nbecause they are given not to the community or permanently, but to\nindividuals or temporarily; (b) rescripts, which are given with regard\nto particular cases and without the solemnity of law; (c) privileges,\nwhich are not obligatory; (d) dispensations, which are relaxations of\nlaw granted to individuals.\n\n515. A precept is a command given to individuals, or for an individual\ncase, by a competent superior.\n\n(a) It is a command obliging in conscience, and so differs from\ncounsel, desire, exhortation.\n\n(b) It is given to individuals, and thus differs from law, which has\nthe character of universality and stability. A precept may be imposed\non a community, but even then it is particular, as being given only for\nan individual case or for a certain length of time--for a month or a\nyear, or during the lifetime of the superior.\n\n(c) It is given by a competent superior. Even here precept differs\nfrom law, since laws can be made only by one who has jurisdictional or\npublic authority (see above, 285), while precepts may be given also\nby those who have only dominative or private authority (as parents,\nheads of families, husbands, employers, abbesses). In canonical matters\nprecepts may be given by religious superiors, parish priests, rectors\nof seminaries, and for the court of conscience by the confessor.\n\n516. Precept is similar to law: (a) as to its object, which must be\njust, good, and possible of observance; (b) as to its binding force,\nsince it can be imposed even on those who are unwilling.\n\n517. Precepts are personal (i.e., they affect the person to whom they\nare given wherever he may be), unless they are given as territorial\n(Canon 24). Hence: (a) a precept given by one who has no territorial\nauthority (e.g., a religious superior) is personal; (b) a precept\ngiven by the Pope, whose authority includes every territory, is also\npersonal; (c) a precept given by the bishop is personal, if given to\nan individual; it is personal or territorial if given to a community,\naccording to the nature of the case or the wording of the precept.\nExample: The precept not to go to theatres during a journey, imposed by\na bishop under pain of suspension, obliges everywhere, both as to fault\nand as to penalty.\n\n518. As to the force of precepts: (a) morally or as to fault, they\noblige, so that the violator is guilty of disobedience and of sin\nagainst any particular virtue the superior willed to impose under\nprecept; (b) juridically or as to the penalty prescribed, they do\nnot oblige, unless the precept was given legally--i.e., by a written\ndocument, or in the presence of two witnesses, etc. (Canon 24).\nExample: If a precept was given under the penalty of loss of office,\nbut without the legal formalities, the canonical process and sentence\nof deprivation could not be resorted to.\n\n519. A precept expires of itself with the expiration of the authority\nthat gave it (e.g., at the death or cessation of office of the\nsuperior), unless the precept was given by document or before witnesses\n(Canon 24).\n\n520. A rescript is a written reply made by the Holy See or the\nOrdinary to a request, statement, or consultation. Replies of this\nkind are employed in reference to the concession of benefices and to\ndispositions to be made concerning litigation and judicial procedure.\nUsually they grant favors, either transitory--e.g., a dispensation--or\npermanent--e.g., a privilege (Canons 36-62).\n\n521. A privilege is a special and permanent right granted by a ruler to\nan individual or community to act contrary to or beyond the law.\n\n(a) It is a permanent right, and so resembles law, which is also stable\nand forbids interference with what it grants.\n\n(b) It is a special right, and so it differs from law, which is general\nand imposes obligation. It is sometimes styled \u201cprivate law.\u201d Moreover,\nlaw requires promulgation, privilege requires only acceptance.\n\n(c) It is granted by the ruler (i.e., by the Pope, bishop, or other\nlegislator), and thus it differs from permission granted by a simple\nsuperior.\n\n(d) It is granted to a person, that is, to an individual (Titus, Caius,\nBalbus, etc.) or to a congregation or community; for, if granted to\nall, it would not be special.\n\n(e) A privilege gives the right to act contrary to the general law\n(e.g., by exempting from a tax) or beyond the general law (e.g., by\ngranting the power to dispense). Thus, a privilege differs also from\nprerogatives that are set down in the Code itself (e.g., the special\nrights and faculties of Cardinals, bishops, regulars, etc.), all of\nwhich are laws and not privileges in the strict sense.\n\n522. The rules for interpretation of privileges are similar to those\nfor the interpretation of law (see 483 sqq.). They should be neither\nextended nor restricted, but should be understood according to the\nmeaning of the words themselves (Canon 67), yet so that the party\nreceiving the privilege will seem to have obtained a favor (Canon 68).\nIf the meaning intended is doubtful, the following rules of the Code\n(Canons 50, 68) should be followed: (a) wide interpretation is to be\ngiven to the privileges that are beyond or outside of the law and that\nare not prejudicial to others, as well as to privileges that were\ngiven as a reward of merit; (b) strict interpretation is to be given\nto privileges that are contrary to law (saving the cases of privileges\ngranted to pious causes or in favor of a community), to privileges\ngranted because of an agreement made, and to privileges that are\nprejudicial to third parties.\n\n523. A privilege is a favor, and hence does not as such impose the duty\nof acceptance or use; but obligations owed to others often make it\nnecessary to avail oneself of a privilege (Canon 69).\n\n(a) Prerogatives granted in the law cannot be renounced by individuals,\nsince their preservation is required by the common good. Example: A\ncleric has no right to abandon an immunity which the law gives to his\nstate.\n\n(b) Privileges granted to a community can be renounced by the\ncommunity, but not by its individual members. An individual member is\nnot bound, however, to use the privilege, unless there be accidental\nreasons, such as the command of a superior, that require him to do so.\n\n(c) Privileges granted to individuals need not be used by them, unless\nthere be accidental reasons that call on one to use a privilege.\nExample: A priest who has the privilege of a private oratory is not\nbound to establish such an oratory; but a priest who has the privilege\nof absolving from reserved cases is bound in charity to use it, if a\npenitent would otherwise suffer.\n\n524. Dispensation differs from privilege: (a) because the former from\nits nature is temporary, the latter permanent; (b) because the former\nis always contrary to the law, whereas the latter may be only beyond\nthe law.\n\n525. The Pope can dispense as follows: (a) in all ecclesiastical laws\nhe can grant a dispensation strictly so-called (Canon 81); (b) in\ndivine laws in which the obligation depends on an act of the human will\n(such as the laws of oaths, vows, contracts, etc.), he can grant a\ndispensation improperly so-called (see above, 313 sqq., 357), In other\ndivine laws, he can interpret or declare, but he cannot dispense.\n\n526. The Ordinary can dispense as follows: (a) in the general law of\nthe Church when he has an explicit or implicit faculty from the Pope or\nfrom the law (Canon 81); (b) in diocesan laws and, in particular cases,\nalso in laws of provincial and plenary councils, when there is just\nreason (Canon 82); (c) in papal laws made for a particular territory,\nwhen faculty has been given explicitly or implicitly, or recourse to\nthe Holy See is difficult (Canon 82); (d) in all ecclesiastical laws\nthat are dispensable, when there is doubt of fact (Canon 15).\n\n527. The pastor can dispense as follows: (a) from the general law\nconcerning feasts of obligation and from the laws of fast and\nabstinence. The dispensation can be granted either to his own subjects\nor to strangers, but only for a just reason, in individual instances\nand for particular individuals or families. The bishop may dispense the\nwhole diocese, but the pastor cannot dispense the whole parish (Canon\n1245). (b) When there is danger of death, the pastor can dispense from\nmatrimonial impediments as provided in Canon 1044.\n\n528. Religious superiors, local superiors included, can dispense in the\nlaws and statutes of their own institutes, except where this is\nforbidden. In clerical and exempt institutes the superiors can also\ndispense the subjects and all who live day and night in the religious\nhouse (such as students, guests and servants) from the general laws of\nthe Church, as follows:\n\n(a) The higher superiors, such as abbots, generals, provincials, have\nthe same authority in this respect as the bishop has with reference to\nhis own diocese. Hence, they can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws\nin which the Pope dispenses, when there is doubt of fact, or recourse\nto the Holy See is difficult (Canons 15, 81); in case of necessity,\nthey can dispense from the laws of abstinence individuals, or an entire\nconvent, or an entire province (Canon 1245, Sec. 2); they can dispense\nin irregularities as provided in Canon 990, Sec. 1.\n\n(b) The other superiors, local superiors included, can dispense their\nsubjects from the laws of fast and abstinence in the same manner as\npastors are able to dispense their parishioners (Canon 1245, Sec. 3),\nReligious superiors are also able to dispense the private non-reserved\nvows of their subjects (Canons 1313, Sec. 2, 1314).\n\n529. Confessors, when delegated, can dispense as follows: (a) with\nordinary faculties, from impediments, irregularities and penalties, as\nprovided in Canons 1044, 1045, 985, 990, 2290; (b) with privileged\nfaculties, from simple vows not reserved to the Pope, if no injury is\ndone to the rights of a third party; and from occult irregularity\nproduced by delinquency, that from homicide excepted. (In the internal\nsacramental forum the confessor can dispense from the impediments\nindicated in Canons 1043-1045.)\n\n530. Priests that assist at marriages can dispense from impediments as\nprovided in Canons 1043-1045.\n\n531. The manner of seeking dispensations is as follows: (a) for the\nusual dispensations (e.g., those from fast, abstinence, observance of\nfeasts, and the vows that may be dispensed by confessors) no particular\nprocedure is required; (b) for the dispensation that must be sought\nfrom the Holy See, if the matter belongs to the internal forum, the\npetition is sent to the Sacred Penitentiary through the Confessor or\nOrdinary; if it belongs to the external forum, it is sent to the\ncompetent Congregation through the parish priest or Ordinary.\nDispensation from public marriage impediments must be sent through the\nOrdinary.\n\n532. The manner of preparing a petition for dispensation is as follows:\n(a) the name of the penitent must not be given in petitions to the\nSacred Penitentiary, but the name and address of the party to whom the\nreply is to be sent should be clearly given; (b) the petition should be\nsent by letter. It may be written in any language, and should state the\ncase with its circumstances, the favor that is asked, and the true\nreason for asking it.\n\n533. A dispensation is invalidated as follows: (a) through defect of\nthe petition, if it contains a substantial error, and the dispensation\nis given on condition of substantial truth (Canon 40); (b) through\ndefect of the petitioner, if he is incapable of receiving the favor\nasked (Canon 46); (c) through defect of the dispensation, as when the\nrequisite signature or seal is omitted; (d) through defect of the\ndispenser, as when he lacks jurisdiction, or grants without a just and\nproportionate reason a dispensation for which he has only delegated\npower (Canon 84).\n\n534. If a dispensation is unjustly refused, note the following: (a)\nordinarily, the subject has not the right to hold himself free from the\nlaw; (b) in extraordinary circumstances, when the law ceases, or no\nlonger obliges (see 487 sqq.), the subject is free.\n\n535. The faculty of dispensing should be interpreted as follows: (a)\nwidely, when it was granted for cases in general (Canon 200, Sec.1); (b)\nstrictly, when it is granted for a particular case (Canon 85).\n\n536. A dispensation itself should be interpreted strictly in the\nfollowing cases: (a) when the dispensation has an odious side, as when\nit is contrary to law and advantageous to private interest or is\ndetrimental to a third party; (b) when wide interpretation is\ndangerous, as favoring injustice, promoting ambition, etc. (Canons 50,\n85).\n\n537. A dispensation ceases intrinsically in the following ways: (a) by\nthe lapse of the period of time for which it was granted; (b) by the\nentire and certain cessation of the motive of the dispensation, if the\neffect of the dispensation is divisible--that is, if the motive for\ndispensation has to be existent each time that the law calls for an act\nor omission (Canon 86). Example: If one is dispensed from the fast or\nOffice on account of ill-health, and later recovers, the dispensation\nceases.\n\n538. A dispensation ceases extrinsically in the following ways: (a) by\nthe act of the one who dispensed, if he validly recalls the\ndispensation, or by his cessation from office, if he limited the\ndispensation to his own term of authority (Canons 86, 73); (b) by the\nact of the one who was dispensed, if he renounces the dispensation\nwithout detriment to any third party, and with the consent of the\nsuperior (Canons 86, 72).\n\n539. A dispensation does not cease in the following cases through the\ncessation of the motive for which it was given:\n\n(a) If the motive ceases only partially or doubtfully, even though the\neffect of the dispensation be divisible--that is, requiring the\nexistence of the motive for the grant each time the dispensation is\nused. For, if the dispensation ceased in such cases, its benefit would\nfrequently be in great part lost on account of the worry and scruple to\nwhich the persons dispensed would be exposed. Example: Balbus has been\ndispensed from fast on account of poor health. Later on he improves,\nbut has not recovered his strength entirely, or at least is not certain\nof his recovery. He may continue still to use the dispensation.\n\n(b) A dispensation does not cease if the motive ceases entirely and\ncertainly, but the effect of the dispensation is indivisible--that is,\nremoving the entire obligation once for all.\n\nExample: Titus is a widower with several young children. He wishes to\nmarry in order to have a home for the children, and this wish is the\nmotive of a dispensation given him from an impediment of affinity to\nthe marriage he contemplates. But before the marriage takes place, the\nchildren die, The dispensation still holds good.\n\n540. A dispensation does not cease by reason of the grantor in the\nfollowing cases:\n\n(a) It does not cease through the grantor\u2019s cessation from authority,\nif it was given independently of his term of office. Example:\nSempronius received a dispensation \u201cvalid until recall,\u201d but never made\nuse of it. Although now the grantor has died, the dispensation\ncontinues in force.\n\n(b) It does not cease, if the grantor invalidly recalls the\ndispensation, as when he dispenses from delegated power and his\nauthority ceases with the act of dispensation. Example: Balbus, a\nconfessor, dispensed Caius from the law of abstinence, but now wishes\nto recall the dispensation. The dispensation remains.\n\n541. A dispensation does not cease on account of the person dispensed\nin the following cases:\n\n(a) It does not cease when he leaves the territory of the dispenser, if\nthe dispensation was personal. Example: A person dispensed from the\ngeneral law of fast by indult granted to his diocese cannot use that\ndispensation outside the diocese; but if he has a personal\ndispensation, he is dispensed everywhere.\n\n(b) It does not cease when the grantee fails to use it, or acts\ncontrary to it, if there is no renunciation on his part. Examples:\nSempronius has been dispensed from the fast of Lent, but he fasts on\nsome days. This non-use of the dispensation on some days does not renew\nthe obligation. Balbus has received a dispensation to marry Sempronia,\nbut he changes his mind and marries Claudia. This act contrary to the\ndispensation does not take away its force, and, if Claudia dies, he\nwill be free to marry Sempronia.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 6: CIVIL LAW\n\n542. Meaning.--Just as the Church has the right and duty to make laws\nwhich will promote the spiritual welfare of her members, so has the\nState the power and obligation to legislate for the temporal happiness\nof its citizens: \u201cThere is no power but from God and those that are,\nare ordained of God. He (the ruler) is God\u2019s minister to thee for good\u201d\n(Rom., xiii. 1, 4).\n\n543. Origin.--The authority to make civil laws resides in that person\nor body to whom according to the constitution of the State the\nlegislative function belongs. (a) In an absolute monarchy, the\nlegislative authority is vested in the prince; (b) in a state that has\nan appointed or hereditary aristocracy, the legislative power may be\nentrusted, at least in part, to a body of nobles; (c) in a limited\nmonarchy or republic the lawmaking function belongs to the people, who\nexercise it either directly or (as is the case in most modern states)\nindirectly through elected representatives.\n\n544. The acceptance of civil law by the people is not necessary for its\nobligation, for obedience to higher powers is commanded (Rom., xiii,\n5), and, if law has no authority, the common welfare is defeated.\nSeveral points must, however, be noted.\n\n(a) The foregoing principle is to be understood of law in itself, for,\nif there is question of the form of government or of him who exercises\nthe powers of sovereignty, acceptance by the people may be said to be\nnecessary in the sense that the multitude may set up the particular\nsystem of rule which it prefers, and may designate the individuals who\nare to wield authority under the constitution adopted.\n\n(b) The principle given above is to be accepted regularly speaking, for\nthere may be cases in which the acceptance of the people is required by\nlaw itself. Example: Under former civil constitutions, if in a certain\nplace a lawful custom was in force, a contrary law which did not\nexpressly abolish the custom did not oblige unless accepted. But this\nexample is theoretical, for modern civil codes do not recognize the\nderogatory force of custom. If the constitution of the state calls for\na referendum or plebiscite (i.e., submission to the electors for\nratification), then the bill passed by the legislature or a measure\nproposed by the initiative body lacks force until accepted. This\nillustrates acceptance of a proposed law, but the acceptance is\nsupplemented by some ministerial act.\n\n(c) The principle given above is to be understood of the taking effect\nof a law, for the continuance of a law may depend on the acceptance of\nthe people in the sense that a contrary custom of the people is able to\nabrogate law, if the superior consents (see 500 sqq.). Few codes of\nmodern states give legal force to popular custom; they suppose that, if\na law is not satisfactory to the people, the way is open to its repeal\nthrough exercise of the suffrage. But, morally speaking, there is no\nobligation to obey a law that has fallen into desuetude.\n\n545. As to laws made by one who has no lawful authority, we should\nnote: (a) of themselves, they have no binding force, since law is an\nact of authority; (b) from the necessities of the case, they are\nobligatory, if, being otherwise just, they are accepted by the great\nbody of the people; for to resist them then would be prejudicial to\npublic order.\n\n546. Subject-Matter.--The objects or classes of temporal goods that\nfall under the regulation of civil law are many:\n\n(a) external goods, or goods of fortune, which should have the\nprotection of the State; and the laws regarding them should promote\nagriculture, commerce, industry, the arts, etc.;\n\n(b) the goods of the body, which are more important still, and hence\nthe law should favor the family and the increase of its members, and\nshould provide for the health and well-being of the citizens by\nsanitary regulations and measures of relief for the needy, the\nunemployed, the orphans, and the aged;\n\n(c) the goods of the mind, which are necessary for progress and\nhappiness, and hence the law should provide the means for instruction\nin the secular arts and sciences and for the general diffusion of\nuseful knowledge;\n\n(d) the goods of the will (i.e., virtue and morality), which are most\nimportant both to the individual and the community, and hence the law\nmust safeguard public decency and sobriety, and restrain and punish the\nopposite crimes and vices;\n\n(e) the social goods of the people, which are promoted by wise\nlegislation concerning the form and administration of government, the\nmutual duties and rights of citizens, the protection of the State and\nof its members, etc.\n\n547. The relation of civil law to natural law is as follows:\n\n(a) The State has no power to make laws that are opposed to nature,\nfor, since law is an ordinance according to reason, any human command\nthat is contrary to nature and therefore to reason is not law, but the\ncorruption of law. No sin, not even a venial sin, can be made\nobligatory by law. Example: The rule of Sparta that sickly infants were\nto be put to death was not law but legalized murder.\n\n(b) The State has the power to declare and enforce by suitable\nsanctions the conclusions that are derived from the general principles\nof the law of nature; for many people might be ignorant of these\nconclusions or inclined to disregard them, unless they were promulgated\nand confirmed by human law. Example: The natural law requires that\nparents provide for their young children, and that children assist\ntheir needy parents; the civil law adopts these natural principles,\ncompels their observance, and punishes transgressors.\n\n(c) The State has the power to make concrete and to determine the\nprovisions of the natural law that are abstract or general. Example:\nThe natural law decrees that some form of government be set up, that\nthe people contribute to the support of the government, that crimes be\npunished, that the general welfare be served, etc.; the civil law\ndetermines the special form of government, the manner in which the\nrevenues are to be obtained, the specific penalties for each crime, the\npublic measures that are best suited to the circumstances, etc.\n\n548. The relation of the civil law to divine and ecclesiastical law is\nas follows:\n\n(a) In matters purely spiritual the State has no power to legislate,\nsince its end and authority are confined to things temporal; and hence\nthe State has no right to interfere with the faith, worship and\ngovernment of the Church. But, since morality promotes the prosperity\nof the State, and since the end of the individual is spiritual, the\ncivil law should respect and favor religion.\n\n(b) In matters that are partly spiritual, partly temporal, the State\nhas the power to legislate on those aspects that are temporal, yet so\nas not to infringe on divine or ecclesiastical right. Example: Civil\nlaws on education have the right to regulate non-religious subjects,\ncourses, standards, etc.; but they have no right to proscribe religious\ntraining, or to prescribe the teaching of irreligion or immorality,\nState laws on marriage may require registration, settle the civil\neffects of marriage, etc., but they have no right to interfere with the\nunity of marriage or the sanctity of the marriage bond.\n\n549. The State is for the individual, and not the individual for the\nState; hence, civil law should not interfere with human liberties,\nexcept where this is necessary for the common peace and safety or the\nlawful opportunity of the people as a whole. Hence:\n\n(a) Human liberties that are not inalienable may be limited by the law,\nwhen the public good or the welfare of individuals requires this (see\n292). Examples: The State has the right to regulate the acts of those\nwho are unable to take care of themselves in matters of importance; to\nforbid what is detrimental to the common interest (such as hunting and\nfishing at certain seasons), to protect the public when it neglects to\nprotect itself, etc. Uncalled-for interference by government with the\npersonal and private affairs of individuals--paternalism in\ngovernment--is of course to be avoided, for restriction of liberty is\nsomething disagreeable and should not be resorted to without necessity.\n\n(b) Human rights that are fundamental (such as the rights to live, to\nmarry, to rear a family, to be free, to pursue happiness) should not be\ntrespassed on by civil law. Thus, the State has no right to forbid\nmarriage to the poor, but on the contrary it has the duty to remove\nconditions that cause poverty. But, when the common welfare demands the\nsacrifice, the State has the right to call on citizens to expose even\nlife and fortune in its defense.\n\n550. Those Subject to Civil Law.--Civil laws oblige all those who are\nin any way subject to their authority.\n\n(a) Citizens, when in the country, are bound by all the laws that\npertain to them; when outside the country, they are bound by some laws,\nsuch as those that regulate their personal status and office, but not\nby others, in particular such as are of a territorial character.\n\n(b) Aliens are bound by the laws of the country that include them, such\nas those that regulate public order and the making of contracts.\n\n551. The Obligation of Civil Law.--Civil law, when it has all the\nconditions of valid law, even if the legislator is non-religious or\nanti-religious, is obligatory not only before the State, but also\nbefore God (i.e., in conscience). This is; (a) by reason of the natural\nlaw, of which it is a derivation (see above, 313); (b) by reason of\ndivine positive law, for it is frequently declared in scripture and in\nthe Church\u2019s teaching and practice that lawful authority represents God\nand must be obeyed for conscience\u2019 sake: \u201cRender to Caesar the things\nthat are Caesar\u2019s\u201d (Matt, xxii 21), \u201cBe subject of necessity, not only\nfor wrath, but also for conscience\u2019 sake\u201d (Rom, xiii. 5).\n\n552. Are subjects obliged to offer themselves for punishment prescribed\nby law?\n\n(a) If the fault committed was merely juridical (i.e., before the law),\nthe penalty is certainly not obligatory before sentence. Example:\nBalbus through sheer accident, and without design or negligence, kills\na man. If involuntary homicide is punished by imprisonment, Balbus is\nnot bound to give himself up. English common law, it should be noted,\npresumes a man innocent until proved guilty, and a man cannot be\nconvicted of any degree of homicide on his own confession alone. But he\nmay plead guilty to minor offenses.\n\n(b) If the fault committed was theological (i.e., before God) and the\npenalty is primitive (i.e., the loss of some right or privilege), the\npenalty is obligatory in conscience. In Canon Law such penalties are\nsometimes _ipso facto_, that is, before sentence (e.g., suspension of a\ncleric); but the civil law, it seems, imposes penalties only after\njudicial declaration. Example: Titus on account of bribery has\nforfeited the right to vote; but he has not been declared guilty by\ncourt, and hence may continue to use the right of suffrage.\n\n(c) If the fault was theological and the penalty incurred is active\n(e.g., exile, imprisonment, fine), the penalty is not obligatory before\nsentence; for it would demand too much of human nature to require that\none deliver oneself up to exile, accept confiscation, etc. The\napprehension and detention of the guilty is imposed by law as a duty on\nthe police and other officers, not on the guilty.\n\n553. The kind of obligation imposed depends on the will of the\nlawgiver: (a) he can oblige under pain of sin, or under pain of nullity\nor punishment; (b) he can oblige under pain of grave sin, or under pain\nof venial sin.\n\n554. Generally speaking, the legislator is held to oblige under pain of\nsin in the following cases: (a) when the law is a just determination of\nthe natural law (e.g., the laws that determine ownership); (b) when the\nlaw is directly concerned with and necessary to the public good (e.g.,\nlaws on national defense in time of war, laws that impose necessary\ntaxation, etc.; see above, 379).\n\n555. The legislator is held not to oblige under sin in the following\ncases: (a) when the law is enacted as penal, or is prudently regarded\nas such--as is the case with laws that are of minor importance or that\ncan be enforced without a moral obligation--laws useful rather than\nnecessary; (b) when the law is merely irritant or inhabilitating, the\nsubject is not obliged to omit the act invalidated, but only to suffer\nthe consequence of nullity before the law.\n\n556. In doubt as to the obligation of a law, what is the duty of the\nsubject? (a) If there is doubt concerning its justice, the subject can\nalways observe it with a safe conscience. One may obey an unjust law,\nuntil it is judicially declared unjust, if it is not manifestly opposed\nto divine or human rights. (b) If there is doubt whether a law obliges\nunder sin or not, the subject does not sin directly by non-observance\n(see 375, 376, 377, 561).\n\n557. Special Kinds of Laws.--Laws that determine ownership are those\nthat define in distinct and explicit terms the rights of citizens as to\nproperty, in such matters as goods lost or found, prescription,\ninheritance, copyright, distribution of property of intestates, rights\nof wives, capacity of minors, contracts, etc. It is commonly held that\nthese laws are obligatory under sin, even before judicial decision: (a)\nbecause they are determinations of the natural law made by the\nauthority that represents God in matters temporal; (b) because they are\nnecessary for the peaceful existence of society.\n\n558. Irritant or voiding laws are those that deprive certain acts of\nlegal value. The common welfare requires that certain acts, even if\nvalid naturally, may be made invalid by the State (e.g., contracts\nentered into by minors, donations made under fear, wills devised\nirregularly), and hence there is no doubt that the effect of\ninvalidation can be imposed under pain of sin.\n\n(a) This holds even before judicial decision, if it is clear that the\nlawgiver ought to intend and does intend to deprive an act of its moral\nvalidity from the beginning. Example: If a lawsuit would put one party\n(e.g., a minor) under great disadvantage, the law can irritate a\ncontract in conscience and before judgment is rendered.\n\n(b) An irritant law does not oblige under sin before declaration of\nnullity, if it is not clear that the legislator intended this; for it\ncan be presumed that the State is content with external means as long\nas these are sufficient for its ends; and, since invalidation of acts\nis odious, it calls for certain expression of his intention by the\nlawgiver. But after sentence has been given, that which is civilly null\nis also null morally. Hence, if the courts declare a will to be of no\neffect, because it was not drawn legally, the decision is binding under\nsin.\n\n559. Civil lawgivers in modern times do not, as a rule, concern\nthemselves with moral or natural obligation as such, but rather\nconsider only what regulations will best promote the peaceful\nintercourse of society. Hence, the question whether a civil irritation\nobliges in conscience ipso facto (i.e., before judicial declaration of\na case) has to be decided generally, not from the words, but from the\npurpose of the law.\n\n(a) An irritant law should be regarded as obligatory _ipso facto_, when\nthe general purpose of law (viz., the common good) or the specific\npurpose of this law requires that there should be obligation in\nconscience even before a court decision. Examples are laws irritating\nagreements to do what is illegal, laws whose purpose is to protect\nminors or others who would be at a disadvantage in case of litigation,\nor to lessen the number of cases before the courts.\n\n(b) An irritant law should be regarded as not obligatory _ipso facto_,\nwhen the end of the law does not clearly demand obligation before\njudicial declaration; for, as remarked above, the invalidation of an\nact is something odious, and hence not to be taken for granted. Thus,\nlaws that void an act, contract or instrument on account of lack of\nsome legal form, do not affect the natural rights or obligations before\nsentence.\n\n560. Though the civil lawgiver has the right to annul certain acts, and\nthus to extinguish moral rights or obligations that would otherwise\nexist, laws seemingly irritant frequently have a different intention.\n\n(a) Laws that make a claim unenforceable in court do not destroy the\nnatural right of the claimant. Example: The Statute of Limitations in\nmodern states generally bars the right to pursue a debtor in court\nafter six years; nevertheless, the moral obligation of the debtor\nremains.\n\n(b) Laws that make an act or contract voidable do not nullify, but only\ngrant to the person concerned the right to attack validity before the\ncourts. Hence, if the conditions for valid contract required by natural\nlaw are present (knowledge, consent, etc.), moral rights and\nobligations are not voided. Example: Under the civil law some contracts\nmade by minors may be retracted by them. But, as long as such a\ncontract is not disavowed, the other party has a moral right to insist\non its execution; if it has been ratified after majority, the former\nminor has no moral right to seek the benefit of the law by asking for\nrescindment.\n\n561. With reference to penalty, four kinds of laws can be distinguished.\n\n(a) Purely preceptive laws are such as oblige under pain of sin, but\nnot under pain of punishment. There are church laws of this kind (such\nas the command to assist at Mass on Sunday), and there are also some\ncivil laws that do not oblige under penalty (e.g., statutes governing\nthe age for legal marriage, for, if a couple misrepresented their age,\nthey might be prosecuted for the misrepresentation, but not for the act\nof marriage).\n\n(b) Purely penal laws are such as oblige under pain of juridical fault\nand punishment, but not under pain of sin (e.g., a law that punishes\nnegligence in driving as defined by itself, even though there be no\nmoral culpability involved).\n\n(c) Mixed laws disjunctively are such as oblige under sin either to\nobey the law or to suffer the penalty (e.g., a law that commands one\neither to get a license before fishing or hunting, or to pay a fine if\ncaught doing these things without a license).\n\n(d) Mixed laws conjunctively are such as oblige under pain of both sin\nand punishment (e.g., the laws that forbid injustice and command the\npunishment of transgressors).\n\n562. There is no question about the existence of laws of the first and\nfourth classes just described, but some authorities argue against the\nexistence of the other two classes, maintaining that a law that does\nnot oblige in conscience is an impossibility. They argue: (a) the\nteaching of scripture and of the Church supposes that all just laws\noblige in conscience; (b) the lawgiver holds the place of God, and\nhence one cannot offend against the law of man without offending God;\n(c) human law, being only a reaffirmation or determination of the\nhigher law, obliges in conscience like the law on which it is based;\n(d) directions of a superior that do not oblige under sin are counsels\nrather than laws.\n\n563. To these and similar arguments the defenders of the existence of\npenal laws reply: (a) such laws do not oblige in conscience, under pain\nof sin and of offense to God, to do or to omit as the law prescribes,\njust as a vow which gives one the option of not playing cards, or else\nof giving each time an alms, does not bind one in conscience not to\nplay cards; (b) but those laws do oblige one in conscience to respect\ntheir juridical value, not to resist their enforcement, and to pay the\npenalty of violation, just as the vow mentioned obliges one in\nconscience to give an alms each time one plays cards. The Church\nrecognizes penal laws (see 450), and there is no reason why civil law\nmay not be penal.\n\n564. Even when the transgression of a purely penal law is not sinful by\nreason of the civil law, it will frequently, if not usually, be sinful\nby reason of repugnance to the law of God. Thus: (a) the transgression\nwill be sinful, if there is a wrong intention (such as contempt for the\nlaw) or wrong circumstances (such as culpable neglect or some\ninordinate passion); (b) the transgression will be sinful, if one\nforesees or should foresee evil consequences, such as scandal (see 96).\n\n565. It is generally admitted that some civil laws are purely penal,\nsince they impose penalties for fault, negligence, or responsibility\nthat is only juridical at times. Examples: A law that imposes a fine on\nall motorists caught driving over a certain speed limit, even though\nthey be free of moral guilt; or that makes the owner of a car pay\ndamages for injuries caused while it was used by his chauffeur.\n\n566. Even these laws oblige under sin to some extent. (a) The\ntransgressor is morally bound to the penalty prescribed by law, after\nsentence has been passed; and such penalties are just, for the common\ngood requires them. Example: The speed violator is held to pay the\nlawful fine when it has been imposed. He may have been guiltless of\nsin, but the fine makes him more careful the next time. (b) The\nofficers of the law are morally bound to apprehend and convict\ntransgressors.\n\n567. Many civil laws are commonly regarded nowadays as disjunctively\npreceptive or penal; and, since the custom of the prudent affords a\ngood norm of interpretation (see above, 484 sqq., 506 sqq.), this\ncommon view is a safe guide, Example: Even conscientious persons do not\nfeel that they have committed a sin if now and then they run a car\nwithout a license, or fish in a government reservation without the\npermit required by law, when there is no danger or damage to anyone.\n\n568. Whether most modern legislatures intend practically all or the\ngreat majority of their laws that are not declarations of natural law\nor provisions essential to public welfare to be purely penal or only\ndisjunctively preceptive, is a disputed question. For the affirmative\nview it is argued:\n\n(a) Moral obligation is not necessary, since the enforcement of the law\nis well taken care of by the judiciary and the police;\n\n(b) Moral obligation would be harmful, for the laws that are put on the\nstatute books every year, along with those already there, are so\nnumerous that, if all these obliged in conscience, an intolerable\nburden would be placed on the people;\n\n(c) Moral obligation is not intended, for legislatures as bodies either\ndespise or disregard religious motives when framing laws; and so many\njurists today believe that the danger of incurring the penalty\nprescribed by the law is the only obligation the lawgiver intends to\nimpose, or that moral obligation must come from conscience (i.e., be\nself-imposed);\n\n(d) Moral obligation is not admitted by custom, the best interpreter of\nlaw, for most citizens today regard civil legislation as not binding\nunder sin.\n\n569. Opponents of the view just explained answer:\n\n(a) The prevalence of crime and the ineffectiveness of the courts in so\nmany places prove the need of moral obligation of civil laws; and, even\nif the laws are well enforced, this will scarcely continue, if respect\nfor them is lowered;\n\n(b) Though there is an excess of legislation, it is not generally true\nthat the individual citizen is burdened in his daily life by a\nmultitude of laws;\n\n(c) Lawmakers today are not more irreligious than the pagan rulers to\nwhom the scriptures commanded obedience; and, even though they do not\nthemselves believe in religion or the obligation of conscience, they do\nintend to give their laws every sanction that the common good requires,\nand thus implicitly they impose a moral obligation wherever the\ncontrary is not manifest;\n\n(d) The statement that the majority of the people in modern states\nregard the civil legislation as a whole as not obligatory in conscience\nmay be passed over, as there is no proof for it. Moreover, the\ncustomary interpretation of the citizens does not make penal the laws\nwhich the elected representatives intended as preceptive, without the\nconsent of the latter (see 394).\n\n570. Signs that a law is merely penal are the following:\n\n(a) The express declaration of the lawgiver that it obliges only under\npenalty. Examples: In the Dominican Constitutions it is declared that\nthey oblige, not under fault, but only under penalty (No. 32). The same\nis true of the Franciscan, Redemptorist and most recent religious\nConstitutions. Some civil laws, it is said, are formulated thus:\n\u201cEither do this, or pay the penalty on conviction.\u201d Other laws define\npunishable negligence in such a way that it does not ultimately suppose\nsin.\n\n(b) Another sign of a penal law is the implicit declaration of the\nlawgiver. If a heavy penalty is prescribed for a transgression regarded\nby all as very slight proportionately, the government implicitly\ndeclares that it imposes no other obligation than that of penalty.\nBlackstone, in his \u201cCommentary on the Laws of England\u201d (1769),\nconsiders as purely penal all those laws in which the penalty inflicted\nis an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to\narise from the offense, such as the statutes for preserving game and\nthose forbidding the exercise of trades without serving an\napprenticeship thereto (Vol. I, Sect. 58).\n\n(c) A third sign is the interpretation of competent authorities.\nExample: Practically all Catholic moralists, and the opinion of the\npeople generally, consider as penal some laws that are merely useful,\nbut not necessary (e.g., prohibitions against smoking or spitting in\ncertain public places, laws on permits for fishing, hunting, etc.).\n\n571. Whatever may be said about legislatures in general, it cannot be\nargued that in the United States they are indifferent or contemptuous\nas regards the moral obligation of law; the public acts and speeches of\nCongress and of the State Assemblies show that the elected\nrepresentatives of the people respect religion, and do not wish to\ndeprive themselves of its help in their deliberations and decisions.\nNevertheless, the opinion is very prevalent among lawyers that purely\npositive law in the United States is not intended to oblige under sin.\n\n572. In practice, the attitude of the citizen to civil law should be\none of respect and loyalty.\n\n(a) If a law is good, even though the legislator did not impose a moral\nobligation, it should be obeyed; for reason and experience show that\ndisregard for law is a source of scandal and of many public and private\nevils.\n\n(b) If a law is not good, every lawful means should be used to have it\nrepealed as soon as possible. But the principle that a bad law is\nalways best overcome by being rigidly enforced, is not borne out by\nhistory, and sometimes the public good demands disregard for\nunreasonable ordinances. The so-called \u201cBlue Laws\u201d are a case in point.\n\n573. Other questions pertaining to civil law that will be found\nelsewhere are: (a) the obligation of customs, taxation and military\nduty; (b) the power of the State to inflict capital punishment.\n\n\nQuestion IV\n\nCONSCIENCE\n\n574. In order that man many tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient\nthat the way be pointed out in a general manner (as is done by the\nnatural and positive laws), but these laws must be applied to each act\nin particular by the practical reason or conscience, as it passes\njudgment on the right or wrong of an action in the light of all the\ncircumstances.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 1: THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I, q. 79, aa. 11-13.)\n\n575. Definition.--Conscience is an act of judgment on the part of the\npractical reason deciding by inference from general principles the\nmoral goodness or malice of a particular act.\n\n(a) It is an act, and as such it differs from moral knowledge and\nintellectual virtues, which are not transitory but enduring. Moral\nunderstanding (synderesis), by which everyone naturally perceives the\ntruth of general and self-evident principles of morality; moral\nscience, by which the theologian or ethician knows the body of\nconclusions drawn from moral principles; prudence, by which the\nvirtuous man is able to make right applications of moral rules to\nindividual cases--all these are permanent states and are preparatory to\nthe act of conscience, in which one makes use of one\u2019s knowledge to\njudge of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action in the concrete,\nas attended by all its circumstances.\n\n(b) Conscience is an act of judgment, and thus it differs from the\nother acts employed by prudence--from counsel about the right means or\nways of action, and from command as to their use. Counsel inquires what\nis the right thing to do, conscience gives the dictate or decision, the\nmoral command moves to action.\n\n(c) Conscience is in the reason--that is, it is a subjective guide, and\nthus it differs from law, which is objective.\n\n(d) Conscience is in the practical reason. Unlike other judgments,\nwhich are speculative and deal not with action or only with theoretical\naspects of action (e.g., the judgment that God is perfect, that the\nactive faculties are distinct from the soul, etc.), conscience is\nconcerned with action from the view-point of its moral exercise.\n\n(e) Conscience is the inference from general principles, and thus it\ndiffers from moral understanding (synderesis). This latter is a habit\nby which everyone who is mentally developed is able to perceive without\nargument that certain more general propositions of morality must be\ntrue, such as the axioms of the natural law (see above, 319 sqq.);\nconscience draws conclusions from those axioms.\n\n(f) Conscience judges concerning the morality of an act. Here lies the\ndifference between consciousness and conscience; consciousness is a\npsychological faculty whose function is to perceive one\u2019s own states\nand acts; conscience is a moral judgment concerning the lawfulness or\nunlawfulness of those states or acts. Thus, consciousness testifies\nthat one is considering the performance of a certain act, conscience\njudges the morality, and permits or forbids; or consciousness testifies\nthat a certain thing was done or not done in the past, conscience\ndeclares the morality--condemning, excusing, or approving what took\nplace.\n\n(g) Conscience judges concerning a particular act--that is, it\nconsiders an act that is to be done here and now (or was done), with\nall the attendant circumstances. Conscience, thus, differs from moral\nscience, which, though it systematizes the body of conclusions drawn\nfrom the natural and positive laws, is not able to make the\napplications for the innumerable cases that arise. Even works\ncontaining moral cases, which give solutions for concrete instances, do\nnot take the place of conscience in such instances, for it is still the\nindividual who judges about those solutions or about their\napplicability to his particular circumstances.\n\n576. Division.-Conscience is variously divided. (a) According as the\nact judged is in the future or in the past, conscience is antecedent or\nconsequent. The antecedent conscience is a monitor which decides that a\nfuture act will be lawful or unlawful; the consequent conscience is a\njudge which causes peace or remorse for what has been done in the past.\n(b) According to the kind of direction or decision it gives, antecedent\nconscience is commanding, forbidding, permitting or counselling; while\nconsequent conscience is excusing, approving, or condemning (Rom., ii.\n15).\n\n577. According as it agrees or disagrees with the external divine or\nhuman law, conscience is true or false. (a) A true conscience judges\nthat to be good and commanded which is really good and commanded.\nExample: According to law, one may use money of which one has the\ndisposal. A sum of money before Balbus is really at his disposal.\nHence, his conscience is true if it decides that he may use this money.\n\n(b) A false conscience judges the lawful to be unlawful, or vice versa:\n\u201cThe hour cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doth a\nservice to God\u201d (John, xvi. 2). Example: Balbus would have a false\nconscience, if he decided that he had no right to use the money before\nhim. This would happen if he was mistaken about the general principle,\nor about the fact that the money was at his disposal, or if he drew a\nwrong inference from the premises.\n\n578. According to its qualities and suitability as a guide of conduct,\nconscience may be viewed either with reference to the will or to the\nintellect. (a) With reference to the will, conscience is either good\n(right) or bad (wrong), according as it does or does not proceed from a\nwell-meaning intention and a right disposition towards one\u2019s end and\nduties. Example: If the Balbus mentioned above decided that the money\nwas at his disposal because he wished to know the truth and had\ninvestigated to the best of his ability, his conscience would be good.\nBut, if he decided this without sufficient investigation and only\nbecause he was prejudiced in his own favor, his conscience would be bad.\n\n(b) With reference to the intellect, conscience is either certain or\nuncertain, according as the mind assents to its judgment without or\nwith fear of error. Examples: If Balbus decides that he has the right\nto use the money, and is so firmly convinced that his judgment is true\nthat he has no fears or doubts, his conscience is certain. But, if\nthere remain solid difficulties or objections against his judgment\nwhich he cannot satisfactorily answer so that he assents to his view\nonly with the fear that he may be wrong, his conscience is uncertain.\n\n579. A conscience may have some and lack others of the qualities just\nmentioned.\n\n(a) The same conscience may be true and bad, or false and good--that\nis, the judgment of the intellect may be in agreement with objective\nfacts, but at the same time it may be directed by a wrong will and\nintention, or vice versa. Examples: Caius, through no fault of his own,\nis convinced that he is bound to tell a lie to help Sempronius, because\nSempronius once helped him by lying. His conscience is false, but good.\nTitus is really not bound to pay a sum of money demanded of him. But\nthe arguments by which he persuades himself that he is not bound are\nnot honest, since he has recourse to what he knows are hair-splitting\ndistinctions, quibbles and sophistical reasonings. His conscience is\ntrue, but bad.\n\n(b) The same conscience may be good and uncertain, or bad and certain.\nExamples: If the Caius above-mentioned believes he is bound to lie, but\nhas some qualms or suspicions that such conduct might not be right\nafter all, his conscience would be good, seeing that he meant to do\nwhat is right; but it would be uncertain, seeing that he is not sure he\nis right. If the Titus above-mentioned had so habituated himself to\ninsincerity and illogical reasoning that he no longer had any fears\nabout his own judgments, and gave firm and unhesitating assent to his\ndecision that he was not bound to pay the money demanded, his\nconscience, though bad, would be certain subjectively.\n\n580. Obligation of Conscience.--Man is bound to be guided by\nconscience, both negatively and positively--that is, he must neither\ndisobey when it forbids, nor refuse to obey when it commands.\n\n(a) It obliges by reason of divine command, since it acts as the voice\nor witness of God making known and promulgating. to us the moral law.\nHence \u201call that is not from conscience is sin\u201d (Rom, xiv. 23).\n\n(b) Conscience obliges from the nature of things, for, since the will\nis a blind faculty, it must be guided by the judgment, of the\nintellect, and must follow the inner light given it about the law.\nApart from revelation, there is no other way of learning what God\nwishes one to do here and now.\n\n581. The authority of conscience is not, however, unlimited.\n\n(a) Conscience is not independent of external law and authority. It is\nnot autonomous morality of the reason or will, nor private inspiration\nor interpretation; for its function is not to establish law or pass\njudgment on it, but to apply the law as expounded by the Church to a\npresent case. Hence, conscience must aim to be true--that is, to agree\nwith and express the objective law.\n\n(b) Conscience is not independent of the righteousness of the will. It\nis not a speculative judgment, whose value depends solely on agreement\nbetween the mind and the facts, as is the case with a conclusion of\npure science. It is a practical judgment, which has to guide all man\u2019s\nconduct, and thus its value depends on the relation of the means it\nselects to the end towards which the means should be directed. Hence,\nconscience must be good--that is, a judgment dictated by a will well\ndisposed towards the true end of life.\n\n(c) Conscience is not independent of the certainty of the intellect. It\nis a judgment formed, not by sentiment, emotion, or one\u2019s own wishes,\nbut by evidence and firm conviction; for its office is to guide man\nreliably in the most important of affairs. Hence, conscience must be\ncertain--that is, a judgment to which the intellect yields its\nunhesitating assent.\n\n582. In order, therefore, that conscience may be the proper rule and\nmoderator of man\u2019s moral life, it must have the following qualities:\n\n(a) It must be good, and practically true--that is, in agreement with\nthe Last End of man and, as far as the efforts of the individual can\nattain to such agreement, with the objective law--for the standard of\nmoral good is not each one\u2019s wish or opinion, but God as the Last End\nand the external natural and positive law as means to that End.\n\n(b) It must be certain--that is, without fear that one is wrong; at\nleast, it must have that degree of certainty which is possible in moral\nmatters. For to act with the fear that one is committing sin, is to be\nwilling to do what may be sin, and is thus consent to sin.\n\n583. Since conscience that has the requisite conditions is our\nimmediate guide in moral matters, it follows: (a) that a conscience\nwhich is true objectively, good, and certain must be followed, whenever\nit commands or forbids; (b) that a conscience which is in invincible\nerror (see 30), but seems to him who has it to be not only true but\ncertain, must also be followed when it forbids or commands. Examples:\nIf a child were told and believed that he was obliged to tell a lie to\nprevent an evil, he would be bound to do this. If a person eats what he\nwrongly thinks to be forbidden food, he is guilty of the violation he\napprehends.\n\n584. Exception.--If invincible error results from lack of sufficient\nintelligence to be capable of sin (see above, 249, 387), then the\nfailure to follow one\u2019s conscience in such error does not make one\nguilty. Example: If a person unable to walk were persuaded that he was\nbound nevertheless to walk to church for Mass, his conscience would not\nmake his omission sinful. Conscience supposes sane judgment, but the\njudgment we are now considering is not sane.\n\n585. A conscience that has not the requisite conditions is not a safe\nguide, and hence it cannot be followed.\n\n(a) An erroneous conscience may not be followed, if the error is\nvincible and there is danger of sin; neither may one act against it if\nthere be danger of sin. To follow such a conscience would be to do what\nis wrong and to act in bad faith (i.e., to have a bad and erroneous\nconscience); not to follow it, would be to act against one\u2019s judgment,\nwrongly formed though it was, and to do insincerely what is right\n(i.e., to have a bad, though true conscience). Example: A person who\nhas made up his mind that dishonesty is necessary in his business, but\nwho realizes that his reasons are not convincing, sins against\nsincerity if he follows his opinion; he sins against conviction, if he\ndoes not follow his opinion. But his predicament is due to his own\nsophistry or bad will, and the escape from it requires only that he be\nhonest enough with himself to inquire about the matter.\n\n(b) A doubtful conscience may not be followed, if the doubt is such\nthat one is not reasonably sure that a certain act is lawful. Example:\nIf a man does not know whether a certain remedy will be helpful or\nseriously harmful to another, his conscience is doubtful as to the\nlawfulness of administering the remedy, and it may not be followed. If\nin spite of this he makes use of the remedy, he is guilty of the harm\nhe foresaw, even though it does not happen.\n\n586. Exception.--It is lawful to follow a vincibly erroneous\nconscience, if there is no danger of sin in this. Example: If a person\nhas neglected inquiry about holydays of obligation, and through his own\nneglect believes that Good Friday is a holyday, he does not sin by\nattending the services that day.\n\n587. The signs of a vincibly erroneous conscience are: (a) that in the\npast one did not use the same diligence to inform oneself about one\u2019s\nreligious duties as is employed by conscientious persons; (b) that in\nthe present one has fears, doubts or suspicions as to one\u2019s own\nsincerity of judgment.\n\n588. Results of Conscience.--The results of following an erroneous\nconscience are as follows:\n\n(a) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or forbidding or\npermitting, is not guilty of sin if his ignorance is invincible.\nExample: A child who thinks he is obliged to lie because he has been\ntold to do this, is excused from sin on account of his ignorance.\n\n(b) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or permitting\nevil, is guilty if his ignorance is vincible. Example: A grown person\nwho has persuaded himself that deception is lawful, obligatory or\nadvisable, or that truthfulness is forbidden, but who ought to know\nbetter, is not excused by the conscience he has formed (see above, 97\nsqq.).\n\n589. The results of disobeying an erroneous conscience are as follows:\n\n(a) He who disobeys an invincibly erroneous conscience, is guilty.\nExample: The child who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to\ndo so because it has been commanded, is guilty of disobedience.\n\n(b) He who disobeys a vincibly erroneous conscience, is also guilty.\nExample: Caius promises to tell a lie to help another party. The doubt\noccurs whether or not this is lawful, and he takes no pains to settle\nit correctly, but decides offhand that a promise must be kept. When the\ntime comes, Caius becomes alarmed and does not keep his promise, lest\nhe get into trouble. He is guilty.\n\n590. If a conscience which was vincibly erroneous in its origin is here\nand now invincibly erroneous, the acts that result from following such\na conscience are to be judged as follows:\n\n(a) They are materially evil in themselves and formally evil in their\ncause. Example: Titus, who intends to take a position in which he will\nhave to advise others, foresees that later on he may make mistakes\ncostly to others, as a result of his present lack of sufficient study.\nHe secures the position, and tries to make up for former neglect of\nstudy, but on one occasion injures a patron by wrong advice which he\nwould not have given, had he worked more faithfully as a younger\nstudent. The wrong advice is objectively sinful in itself, as being an\ninjury; it is subjectively sinful in its cause, as being the result of\nnegligence which foresaw what might happen.\n\n(b) The acts in question are not formally evil in themselves. Example:\nTitus was formally guilty of injury to others at the time he foresaw\nwhat would happen on account of his negligence; he was not formally\nguilty at the time he did the injury, because he had tried meanwhile to\nrepair his negligence and was not conscious of his ignorance.\n\n591. The kinds of sin committed in consequence of an erroneous\nconscience are as follows:\n\n(a) Sin committed by following a vincibly erroneous conscience is of\nthe same gravity and species as the act for which the conscience is\nresponsible, but the ignorance is an extenuating circumstance. Example:\nHe who blinds his conscience so that it decides in favor of grave\ncalumny, is guilty of mortal sin against justice; but he is less guilty\nthan if he had sinned without any permission from conscience.\n\n(b) Sin committed by disobeying an invincibly erroneous conscience is\nof the gravity and species apprehended by the conscience. Example: A\nperson who tells a small lie, thinking it a mortal sin against charity,\nis guilty of the malice he understands to be in his act.\n\n(c) Sin committed by disobeying a vincibly erroneous conscience is of\nthe species that was perceived. Example: Caius who did not live up to\nhis promise of telling a lie, after he had decided that to keep his\nword was the right thing to do, was guilty of a breach of promise. As\nto the gravity of sin against a vincibly erroneous conscience, it is\nalways the same as that apprehended by the conscience, unless what is\nseriously wrong is culpably mistaken for what is only slightly wrong.\nExamples: If Caius, just referred to, thought that his desertion of his\nfriend inflicted a grave injury, he was guilty of grave sin. A person\nwho persuades himself by vain reasonings that complete intoxication\ndoes not differ in gravity from incipient intoxication, is nevertheless\nguilty of the greater malice, if he puts himself in the former state;\nfor his wrong opinion cannot change the fact, and his culpable\nignorance cannot excuse him.\n\n592. An erroneous conscience may apprehend something not wrong as\nwrong, but in an indeterminate manner.\n\n(a) If the species of evil is not determinate before the conscience,\nbut an indifferent act is thought to be sinful without any definite\nspecies of sin being thought of, he who acts against such a conscience\nseems to commit a sin of disobedience. Example: A person who thinks\nthat smoking is a sin, of what kind he does not know, must have at\nleast vaguely the opinion that it is forbidden by the divine law; and\nhence, if he smokes, he is guilty of disobedience.\n\n(b) If the gravity of the putative sin is not determinate before the\nconscience, but an act is thought to be sinful without the degree of\nsinfulness being at all known or thought of, he who acts against such a\nconscience commits a mortal or a venial sin according to his own\ndisposition with respect to sin. If he is so attached to the sin he\napprehends that he intends to commit it, whether it be great or small,\nhe is guilty of mortal sin, at least in so far as he exposes himself to\nit. But if he is habitually resolved not to commit grave sin, it can be\npresumed that he would not do that which he apprehends as sinful, if he\nthought it was a grave offense, Example: If a person erroneously thinks\nthat it is a sin to read a certain book, and then reads it without\nadverting at all to the gravity of the sin he apprehends, his greater\nor less guilt will have to be judged by his character. If he is so\nconscientious that he would stop reading at once if he feared the book\nwas seriously harmful, he sins only venially; but if he knows that he\nis lax and is yet resolved to read the book at all costs, it seems that\nhe is guilty of grave sin.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: A GOOD CONSCIENCE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6.)\n\n593. As was explained in the previous article, conscience is not a\nproper guide unless it is good. In this article we shall speak of the\ngood conscience and of its opposite the various kinds of bad conscience.\n\n594. Definition.--The distinction of good and bad conscience is applied\nboth to consequent and antecedent conscience (see 576).\n\n(a) The consequent conscience is good, and one is said to have a good\nconscience, if it testifies that past acts were rightly performed, that\npast sins were forgiven, that one is in the friendship of God, etc.;\n\u201cThe end of the commandment is charity from a good conscience\u201d (I Tim.,\ni. 5); \u201cWar a good warfare, having faith and a good conscience\u201d (ibid.,\n19). The consequent conscience is bad if it testifies in a contrary\nway: \u201cLet us draw near with a true heart, having our hearts sprinkled\nfrom an evil conscience\u201d (Heb., x. 22).\n\n(b) The antecedent conscience, with which we are now concerned, judges\nabout the morality of an act to be performed here and now, or in the\nfuture. It is called good, if it is made by one who is in good\nfaith--that is, one who sincerely loves goodness and who decides\naccording to the truth as far as he is able to see it. It is called\nbad, if it is the judgment of one who is in bad faith--that is, one who\nis in error through his own fault, or who arrives at the truth by\nreasonings that are not honest or not understood by him. Example:\nSpeaking of those who, though fearing that idol meats were forbidden,\nyet ate of them because they saw others do this, St. Paul says: \u201cThere\nis not knowledge in everyone. For some until this present, with\nconscience of the idol, eat as a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their\nconscience being weak is defiled\u201d (I Cor., viii. 7).\n\n595. Divisions.--By training and care a good conscience is developed\nand becomes better. (a) A vigilant conscience is one that asserts\nitself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. (b) A tender\nconscience is one that inclines to a careful observance of all the\nCommandments and to a purification of the inner workings of the soul. A\npossessor of this kind of conscience is called conscientious. (c) A\ntimorous conscience moves one through filial fear to shun even the\nslightest sins and imperfections, and to use all prudent efforts to\navoid occasions and dangers of sin. The possessor of this kind of\nconscience is called God-fearing.\n\n596. A bad conscience that is in vincible error is divided according to\nits effects into the scrupulous and the lax conscience. (a) The lax\nconscience errs on the side of liberty. It is moved by trivial reasons\nto judge the unlawful to be lawful, the gravely sinful to be only\nslightly evil, that which is commanded to be only counselled, and so on.\n\n(b) The scrupulous conscience errs on the side of obligation. It is\nmoved by trivial reasons to judge that there is sin in something\nlawful, grave sin in something venially wrong, and obligation in\nsomething that is only counselled; it sees inhability or defect where\nthese do not exist, and so on.\n\n597. The Lax Conscience.--According to the more or less control it has\nover one, the lax conscience may be divided into the incipient and the\nhabitual. (a) It is incipient when one is becoming familiar with\ncareless decisions and less responsive to remorse about evil done. In\nthis state the conscience is said to be sleeping. (b) It is habitual\nwhen through long-continued habit one has become enamored of a worldly,\nfrivolous conception of life, and is rarely visited by compunction. In\nits worst state, when there is little hope of cure, a lax conscience is\nsaid to be seared or cauterized (I Tim., iv. 2).\n\n598. According to the greater or less responsibility of the one in\nerror, a lax conscience is either malicious or not malicious. (a) It is\nmalicious when it results from one\u2019s own disregard for religious truth,\nas in the case of the pagans who did not care to know God, and were\nthus led into perverse conceptions of morality. St. Paul calls such a\nconscience a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 28). (b) It is not malicious\nwhen it results from some less blamable reason, as in the case of the\nChristians at Corinth who thought that the eating of idol meats was\nsinful, but that it was to be practised on account of the example of\nothers. St. Paul calls this a weak conscience (I Cor., viii. 10).\n\n599. Laxity of conscience is either partial or entire. (a) A conscience\nentirely lax takes an easy and indulgent view in all things. It is\ncareless both in little and great matters, both in directing self and\nin directing others. (b) A conscience partially lax is too liberal in\nsome things, but not in others. Examples: Titus is very exacting with\nhis girls, and wishes to have them models of virtue; but he is too easy\nwith himself and his boys. Balbus is very loyal to friends, but has no\nsense of justice as regards those who do not agree with him. Sempronius\ntries to serve both God and mammon, being very faithful to church\nduties, but at the same time dishonest in business matters.\n\n600. A conscience partially lax may even combine scrupulosity and\nlaxism (see 610), becoming like a mirror that reflects large objects as\nsmall and vice versa; or like a color-blind eye: \u201cWoe to you that call\nevil good and good evil, that put darkness for light and light for\ndarkness\u201d (Is., V. 20). This kind of conscience is called pharisaical.\n\n(a) One may be lax and scrupulous about the same kind of things.\nExamples: Caius regards great disobedience in himself as a mote which\nhe doesn\u2019t need to worry about, but small disobedience in his children\nas a beam in the eye which he is seriously bound to extract (Matt, vii.\n3-5). Titus is lax about almsgiving to those from whom he can expect\nnothing, but scrupulous about almsgiving to those from whom he expects\na return later on.\n\n(b) One may be scrupulous and lax about different things, straining at\ngnats and swallowing camels. Example: The Pharisees were scrupulous\nabout external observances and minor things of the law, such as tithes;\nbut they were lax about inward justice and the weightier things of the\nlaw, judgment, mercy and faith (Matt, xxiii. 13-31).\n\n601. Causes of a Lax Conscience.--(a) If the laxity is inculpable but\nhabitual, it is caused generally by lack of Christian training in\nchildhood and the influence of evil principles and practices that are\nwidespread. In particular cases a lax decision of conscience may be due\nto want of sufficient consideration or to a sudden storm of passion\nthat obscures the reason, when one has no time for deliberation; and\nthus it is inculpable.\n\n(b) If the laxity is culpable, its usual causes are an easy-going view\nof God\u2019s law and its obligation (Is, xliii. 24); or a self-love that\nsees in one\u2019s vices nothing but virtue or amiable weakness; or a\nlong-continued indulgence of sin that has destroyed all refinement of\nconscience.\n\n602. Special Dangers of a Lax Conscience.--(a) If the laxity is\ninculpable, it is an occasion of demoralization to others and a\npreparation for formal sin in him who has the conscience;\n\n(b) if the laxity is culpable, it is the cause of formal sin; and if it\nis not corrected, it naturally leads to moral blindness, hardness of\nheart and impenitence: \u201cThere is a way that seemeth to man right, and\nthe ends thereof lead to death\u201d (Proverbs, xvi. 25).\n\n603. Since a lax conscience is a species of erroneous conscience, the\nrules given above as to the kind of sins committed in consequence of an\nerroneous conscience, apply also to the lax conscience (see above, 588\nSqq.).\n\n(a) When the laxity is concerned with the existence of sin, the\nconscience taking what is sinful for something lawful, he who follows\nsuch a conscience is guilty or not guilty according as his ignorance is\nculpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a good\nconscience). Examples: The man who practises dishonesty, because he has\ncheated his conscience by sophistry into deciding that dishonesty is\nlawful; the child who uses profane language without realization of sin,\nbecause he hears his elders use it. But if the lax conscience takes\nwhat is sinful for a duty, he who disobeys it is guilty of sin.\nExample: The person who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought\nto lie on account of a promise made.\n\n(b) When the laxity is concerned with the gravity of sin, the\nconscience taking what is mortal for venial sin, he who disobeys such a\nconscience is guilty of mortal or venial sin, according as his\nignorance is culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a\ngood conscience). Examples: A child who thinks that calumny or missing\nMass is only a venial sin, because he sees grown up persons treat these\nthings lightly; a person that, to solace his conscience, advises with\nlax associates who always approve of what he wishes to do or has done.\n\n604. He who knows, or who has good reason to think, that his conscience\nis lax, should guide himself by the following rules: (a) with reference\nto the past, if there is a doubt whether or not sin was consented to or\nwas grave, the presumption is against him, for laxity willingly\ncontracted makes one responsible for what ensues; (b) with reference to\nthe future, a person must make use of the means prescribed for one who\nis in danger of sin (see above, 258 sqq.), for a lax conscience places\none in danger of sin.\n\n605. Remedies Recommended for a Lax Conscience.--(a) The defect of will\nor character should be corrected. Example: The presumptuous should\nreflect on the justice of God, and recall that the broad way leads to\nperdition. Those in whom the wish is father to the lax judgment should\nmake war on the passion that leads them astray. Those who have become\nlax through bad habits, should set about acquiring good habits, like\nthat of going to the Sacraments frequently. (b) The error of the\nintellect should be corrected. Example: If a person\u2019s religious\ntraining has been neglected, he should do what he can to get correct\ninformation and advice as to his duties. If one has been influenced by\nlax ideas or conduct, one should change one\u2019s reading or associations.\n\n606. Is a lax person held responsible, if he does not know that he is\nlax? (a) If his conscience is invincibly erroneous, he cannot know that\nit is lax, and hence he is not responsible; (b) if his conscience is\nvincibly erroneous, he ought to know that he is lax, and hence he is\nresponsible. Examples: The boy Caius keeps whatever he finds, because\nhe thinks he has a right to do this. The man Titus does not like\ncheating, but he cheats habitually, because he thinks he has as much\nright to do so as others. Both the boy and the man are lax, but neither\nconsiders himself lax; the difference is that Titus can and ought to\nknow that he is lax.\n\n607. The scrupulous Conscience.--This is a species of erroneous\njudgment that sees sin where there is no sin, or grave sin where there\nis only light sin, and whose reasons are trivial or absurd. (a) It\ndiffers, therefore, from a strict or tender conscience, which, while it\ndoes not exaggerate sin, judges that one should try to avoid even\nslight sin and imperfection. This is the golden mean between a lax and\na scrupulous conscience. Persons with this sort of conscience are\nsometimes called scrupulous or singular, because they are more exact\nthan the majority. More accurately they are to be called conscientious\nor God-fearing.\n\n(b) The scrupulous conscience differs also from scrupulosity, which is a\nstate of mind in which one whose judgment is not erroneous, is\nnevertheless tormented by fears or doubts about his moral condition.\n\n608. The rules given above (588 sqq.) for the erroneous conscience\napply also to the scrupulous conscience. (a) He who follows a\nscrupulous conscience does not sin by this, even though he is vincibly\nin error; for there is no danger of sin in doing more than is required.\nExample: Caius is too lazy to make inquiries about his religious\nduties, but he has the exaggerated notion that grace at meals obliges\nunder pain of grave sin. He does not sin by following his conscience,\nfor grace at meals is recommended to all. (b) He who disobeys a\nscrupulous conscience commits the sin his conscience apprehends.\nExample: If Caius omits grace, he is guilty of grave sin.\n\n609. Special Dangers of a scrupulous Conscience.--(a) As to himself,\nthe scrupulous person suffers from his conscience; it makes him guilty\nof sin where there should be no sin, and by its exaggerated strictness\nit often drives him to the other extreme of laxity. (b) As to others,\nthe scrupulous person is an annoyance and a detriment; he tries to\nimpose his conscience on them, or at least he makes virtue appear\nforbidding.\n\n610. It is possible for a conscience to be scrupulous and lax at the\nsame time, over-indulgent on some points, over-severe on others (see\n600). (a) It may be scrupulous as regards others, and lax as regards\nself, or vice versa. Example; Parents sometimes are too lenient with\nthemselves, but rule their children with extreme severity; in other\ncases they are meticulous as to their own conduct, but think they must\nallow their children every indulgence.\n\n(b) A conscience may be scrupulous in minor matters and lax in major\nmatters. Example: The Jewish leaders scrupled to take the money from\nJudas or to enter the house of Pilate, but they did not hesitate to\ncondemn our Lord unjustly.\n\n(c) A conscience may be scrupulous as to externals, lax as to\ninternals. Example: The Pharisees made much of bodily purifications,\nbut gave little thought to purity of mind and heart.\n\n611. The Perplexed Conscience.--Like to the scrupulous conscience is\nthe perplexed conscience, which judges that in a particular instance\none cannot escape sin, whether one acts or does not act. Example: Titus\nfears that, if he goes to church, he will sin by endangering his\nhealth, which is feeble; that, if he does not go to church, he will sin\nby disobeying the law. This seems to have been the conscience of Herod,\nwho thought he was confronted with the alternative of perjury or murder\nwhen the head of John the Baptist was asked of him (Matt, xiv. 9).\n\n612. St. Alphonsus gives the following directions to assist one who is\nperplexed in conscience:\n\n(a) If without serious inconvenience decision can be delayed, reliable\nadvice should be obtained (e.g., from the confessor).\n\n(b) If decision cannot be delayed, the alternative that seems the\nlesser evil should be chosen. Example: The natural law requires that\nTitus should not expose his life to danger unnecessarily. The positive\nlaw of the Church requires that he go to Mass on Sunday. It is a less\nevil to omit what is required by the law of the Church than to omit\nwhat is required by the law of God. Hence, Titus should decide that he\nis not obliged in his circumstances to go to church.\n\n(c) If decision cannot be delayed and the party cannot decide where the\nlesser evil lies, he is free to choose either; for he is not bound to\nthe impossible.\n\n613. If, in the supposition last mentioned, the perplexed person acts\nwith the feeling that he is committing sin through necessity, is he\nreally guilty or not?\n\n(a) If by the feeling of guilt is meant, not a judgment of the mind,\nbut a scruple or doubt, he is not guilty, as we shall see below when we\nspeak of scrupulosity.\n\n(b) If by the feeling of guilt is meant a judgment of the mind that he\nhas to sin and an intention to welcome the opportunity, he is guilty;\nbut his guilt is considerably diminished by the error and his difficult\ncircumstances. Example: Titus thinks that he sins whether he obeys or\ndisobeys an order to take a good dose of whiskey. He decides to take\nthe dose, and feels rather pleased at the thought that he will become\nintoxicated.\n\n(c) If by the feeling of guilt is meant a judgment that one has to sin,\naccompanied by sorrow at the necessity, one is not guilty, if one\nthinks the matter over to the best of one\u2019s ability before acting;\nthere is some guilt, if the perplexity arises from previous culpable\nnegligence and no effort whatever is made to remedy this before acting.\nExample: Gaia asks her mother if she may go for a ride. The mother\nfears that, if she refuses, Gaia will become desperate; if she permits,\nGaia will meet unsuitable companions. If the mother\u2019s perplexity is due\nto the fact that she has never taken any interest in Gaia, she is\nresponsible if she carelessly makes a wrong decision; but if the\nperplexity arises only from the difficult character of Gaia, the mother\nis not responsible.\n\n614. Scrupulosity.--Like to the scrupulous conscience is the state of\nscrupulosity, which manifests itself in moral matters especially as a\nvain fear or anxiety concerning the presence or magnitude of sin in\none\u2019s act. A psychopathic state, scrupulosity is usually listed as a\nform of psychasthenia which is characterized by weakness of soul,\ninability to cope with problems, and a lack of psychic energy.\nClinically examined, the psychasthenic presents the following\ncharacteristics: (1) physically, he is listless and always tired; (2)\nintellectually, his tiredness makes it impossible for him to\nconcentrate for long periods of time; (c) psychologically, he is an\nintrovert concerned with himself as the center of his interests and\nactivities.\n\nThe more common manifestations of the psychasthenic\u2019s difficulties\ninclude: self-diffidence, uncertainty, hesitation, obsessions and\nscruples. A species of psychasthenia, scrupulosity may be described as\nan inordinate preoccupation with the moral and religious order, a\nspecial type of worry directed toward the morality of actions.\n\n(a) scrupulosity must be distinguished, however, from the scrupulous\nconscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is not a judgment, but a fear that\naccompanies one\u2019s judgment. Example: A scrupulous person knows very\nwell that it is not a sin to omit grace, nor a grave sin to pray with\nsome voluntary distraction; but he worries over these things as if they\nwere sins, or grave sins.\n\n(b) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the tender conscience,\ninasmuch as scrupulosity is an exaggerated and harmful solicitude. A\nperson of tender conscience is careful even in smaller duties, but in a\nquiet and recollected way, whereas the scrupulous person is all\nexcitement and distraction.\n\n(c) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the anxious or doubtful or\nguilty conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is a baseless fear or\nphobia. Examples: A person who has practised injustice for many years,\nhas good reason to be perturbed in conscience when he reflects that\nrestitution or reparation is a prerequisite to pardon; but a mother who\ndid all she could to train her children well, is scrupulous, if she is\nconstantly reproaching herself that she should have done better. A\nperson who makes a contract while fearing that it may be unlawful,\nbecause good authorities hold its unlawfulness, acts with a doubtful\nconscience; but if he fears that the contract is unlawful, in spite of\nthe fact that others regard it as lawful and that his only reason for\ndoubt is that they may be wrong, he is scrupulous. The Egyptians at the\ntime of the plagues could reasonably forecast grievous chastisements on\naccount of their wickedness (Wis., xvii. 10); but a good person who\nworries constantly over the possibility of being damned must be\nscrupulous.\n\n615. Scruples may be divided in various ways, but the simplest division\nseems to be by virtue of object, extension and duration. By reason of\nobject, scruples may center on only one or, at most, a few moral\nactivities, e.g., duties of charity, or sins against chastity, or they\nmay embrace the whole moral life of the individual. By reason of\nextension, some scruples are limited to interior actions, others extend\nto external manifestations. By reason of duration, scruples may be\nclassified as intermittent, or temporary, and quasi-permanent which is\ncharacteristic of the constitutionally scrupulous person whose physical\nand psychical disposition incline him to scrupulosity.\n\n616. The signs or external manifestations of scrupulosity have been\nvariously divided, but a simplified division into intellectual, or\ncognitive, affective, or volitional, and compulsive suffices for our\npresent purpose.\n\n(a) Intellectual: habitual abulia, i.e., an inability to decide,\ncoupled with and interacting with constant doubt.\n\n(b) Affective: closely allied to the intellectual state is the feeling\nof insufficiency which extends to actions, to the individual\u2019s own\npersonality, to his desire for higher goals, to his abilities, etc.\nThis fosters and strengthens the inability to decide. Inordinate fears,\nanxieties and sadness contribute to the genesis and growth of the sense\nof inadequacy.\n\n(c) Compulsive: numerous compulsion factors are present in more serious\ncases of scrupulosity, e.g., obsessions, phobias, and compulsions\nproperly so called, which concern external actions or rituals.\n\nObsessions include irresistible, persistent and irrational ideas\naccompanied by feelings of tension and fear. These ideas which plague\nthe individual are \u201cdiscordant,\u201d that is, out of harmony with his\nhabitual attitude, and \u201cimpulsive,\u201d tending to reduce themselves\nspontaneously to action. The scrupulous person is frightened and\nflustered by the thought of doing a thing for which he has a positive\nabhorrence and by his inability to get the thought out of his mind.\n\nPhobias refer to habitual, irrational fears of a definite entity\nassociated with a high degree of anxiety and unwarranted by objective\nreality. They are very intense fears, completely out of proportion to\ntheir causes or objects.\n\nFinally, compulsions strictly so called may be defined as irresistible,\nunreasonable urges to perform actions to free the individual from an\nobsessing idea. Tension and anxiety are associated if the act or\nexternal ritual is not performed.\n\nFor the confessor, the recognition of a scrupulous person is not too\ndifficult. The penitent\u2019s own difficulties present the first and most\nobvious sign, e.g., irrational doubts about consent to temptation, as\nto the gravity of a sin, etc., and undue concern about circumstances.\nConcomitant signs confirming the judgment that a person is scrupulous\ninclude:\n\n(a) Obstinacy of judgment; Although the scrupulous person seeks advice,\nfrequently from many confessors, he tends to follow his own judgment.\nHe is inclined to think that the confessor has not understood him, that\nhe has not given a complete picture of his state of soul, etc.\n\n(b) Inconstancy in acting owing to inability to judge rightly and the\nconsequent frequent changes of judgment for light reasons.\n\n(c) Irrelevant accusations of multiple circumstances that tend to lose\nthe sin in the maze of circumstances.\n\n(d) External motions by which the individual tries to do away with the\nfear, sin, or other difficulty.\n\n617. Causes of a scrupulous Conscience.--Although the signs of\nscrupulosity are easily recognizable, the causes are not clearly\ndefined, and authors are not entirely agreed in this matter. A listing\nof probable causes would include internal causes:\n\n(a) physical--the physical causes are virtually unknown. Most authors\nadmit a constitutional disposition to scrupulosity, just as there is\none to its quasi-genus, psychasthenia. Reductively this might involve\ndisorders in the vago-sympathetic nervous system and the\nneuro-endocrine system. (b) psychical--the cause is attributed to too\nlow a psychic tension. The inability to cope with obsessions and the\nattacks of phobias serve to exhaust the individual; (c) moral--perhaps\na suspicious and melancholy character, a disposition that is overly\nimpressionable and changeable, or a self-opinionated nature,\noverconfident of its own ability.\n\n618. The external causes of scrupulosity are: (a) the devil, who\nexcites vain fears in order to diminish devotion, to discourage the use\nof prayer and of the Sacraments, to drive to tepidity and despair; (b)\nthe neighbor, who teaches scrupulosity by his words or example;\nassociation with persons who are scrupulous; the reading of spiritual\nbooks of a rigoristic character; assistance by persons of a timid\ncharacter at terrifying sermons on the divine justice; overly\nprotective and overly rigorous education.\n\n619. Though God cannot be the cause of scrupulosity in the same way as\nthe evil spirits (who use it for man\u2019s destruction), nor in the same\nway as human agencies (which are unable to bring good out of the evil\nthey cause), He does in exceptional cases directly permit even saintly\npersons to be vexed by scrupulosity that they may thereby satisfy for\nsin, or exercise themselves in humility and patience, or shake off\nspiritual torpor.\n\nScrupulosity that is supernatural in origin is much rarer than that\nwhich has a natural source, and it can be usually recognized by certain\nsigns, like the following; (a) when it cannot be accounted for by\nnatural causes, and is generally short in duration; (b) if it is from\nthe evil spirits, it leaves the soul shaken or dismayed, if from God,\nit is followed by light and peace.\n\n620. Dangers of scrupulosity.--The evil results of indulged\nscrupulosity are as follows: (a) temporal evils--the constant fears and\nworries of the scrupulous affect the brain and nerves, break down the\nbodily vigor, and lead to neurasthenia, hysteria, insanity or\nmonomania; (b) spiritual evils--time is wasted in useless regrets and\nanxieties, prayer becomes a torture, confidence in God decreases, and,\nseeing they do not find consolation in virtue, the scrupulous often end\nin vice and despair.\n\n621. Rules to be observed by the scrupulous.--(a) They must not yield\nto their scruples. As was said above, scrupulosity is not a conscience,\nbut only the counterfeit appearance of a conscience; not a help to the\nsoul, but a grave drawback and danger. Hence, the scrupulous must learn\nto despise their foolish fears and imaginations. (b) They must follow\nblindly the commands of a prudent spiritual director. To attempt to\nmake decisions for themselves is a harrowing experience for scrupulous\npersons, and one fraught with great peril. They must protect\nthemselves, therefore, by following the decisions made for them by one\nwho will guide them aright. Gradually, as their condition improves,\nhowever, they must learn to take the initiative and thus prepare\nthemselves to act as responsible persons capable of forming a correct\njudgment.\n\n622. Not to follow their scruples means: (a) that scrupulous persons\nshould recognize their scruples for what they really are (i.e., for a\nspiritual disorder), and that they should firmly resolve to use the\nmeans to get rid of them; (b) that they will prevent scruples from\narising by keeping themselves occupied with external things, or by\ninteresting themselves with matters that will exclude the worrisome\nthoughts; (c) that they will banish scruples at once, as they would a\ntemptation. The two key aims of the scrupulous individual is to\ncounteract his introversion by greater social activity and to re-train\nhis faculty so that he will be in control at all times.\n\n623. Though the scrupulous are obliged not to heed their scruples, they\nrarely sin by heeding them, because their condition is such that they\nare not responsible. For, as was said above (40 sqq.), fear and other\npassions lessen or remove deliberation and the voluntariness of acts.\n\n624. To give absolute obedience to the spiritual director means: (a)\nthat scrupulous persons should recognize that it is wrong for them to\ndepend on their own prudence, whereas they are absolutely safe in\nfollowing the advice and precepts of the spiritual father who holds the\nplace of God; (b) that they should avoid changing directors, and should\nadhere strictly to the rules prescribed for them.\n\n625. Qualities required for a successful direction of the scrupulous\nare:\n\n(a) Knowledge. The spiritual physician must be able to distinguish\nscrupulosity from spiritual diseases or conditions that are similar,\nlest he prescribe what is not suitable for the case. Example: A person\nof tender conscience should continue in that state, a person of\nscrupulous conscience needs instruction that he may put aside his\nerroneous views; a scrupulous person stands in need of special\nguidance. He must also recognize that scrupulosity is a mental illness\nthat at times requires the expert treatment of a psychiatrist. Knowing\nhis own limitations and the need of expert therapy, he should not\nhesitate to send the penitent to a competent doctor.\n\n(b) Prudence. Some persons pretend scrupulosity in order to get a name\nfor holiness, or to make a good impression; needless to say, they must\nbe dealt with cautiously, as they often prove very unscrupulous. With a\nperson who is really scrupulous, the spiritual director must carefully\nobtain all the knowledge necessary to ascertain the true state of soul,\nprudently bring the individual to recognize that he is a sick person,\nhelp to restore his confidence in himself, in his confessor, in God,\netc.\n\n(c) Patience. The scrupulous are almost as troublesome to their\ndirectors as they are to themselves; but they are heavily burdened and\nare unable to help themselves. The law of charity applies. They have\nthe same right to charitable treatment as others who are physically\nsuffering and needy.\n\n(d) Firmness. Disobedience will defeat every effort of a director to\nhelp a scrupulous person. On this point, therefore, there must be no\nleniency: the rules laid down must be insisted on, the reasons should\nnot be given, and no argument or discussion should be allowed. The\ndirector should speak with certainty and authority; he should be brief,\nand, if he must repeat, he will do well to use the same words.\n\n(e) Good judgment. After deciding that a person is scrupulous, the\ndirector must discover what is the particular form of scrupulosity in\nthe case, and must apply remedies that are suitable.\n\n626. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about Past Confessions.--(a)\nFor the first time the confessor may permit a general confession of the\npast life, if the scrupulous penitent has fears about previous\nconfessions and has not already made such a general confession. Let the\nindividual relate his whole story at once, with all its details and\ncomplications. This might perhaps take more than one confession to\ncomplete, but the full recital is necessary if the scrupulous person is\nto have confidence in his director\u2019s knowledge of his exact state of\nsoul. (b) After this general confession, no mention of past confession\nmust be permitted, unless the scrupulous person is ready to swear\nwithout hesitation that he is sure that a sin certainly grave was\ncommitted by him and never rightly confessed.\n\n627. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about Present\nConfessions.--(a) Before confession, the penitent must be content with\na certain brief space of time appointed by the confessor for making his\nexamination of conscience and act of contrition. A longer time spent in\nthese preparations is useful to other penitents, but harmful to the\nscrupulous.\n\n(b) During confession only those sins need be mentioned which are seen\nfrom a brief examen to be both certain and grave, and only those\ncircumstances whose declaration is absolutely necessary. If the\nscrupulous penitent begins to speak of doubtful sins or irrelevant\ndetails, the confessor must forbid him to go on; for though confessions\nmust be complete, whenever possible, doubts and details must not be\npermitted in the case of such scrupulous persons (see Vol. II).\n\n(c) After confession, if the confessor judges that there is not\nsufficient matter for absolution, he must not yield to the penitent\u2019s\nfears, but must assure him that he does not need absolution and that he\nmay go to the Sacraments Without it.\n\n628. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about the Performance of\nDuties.--(a) The scrupulous person should be instructed that positive\nlaws, divine as well as human, do not oblige in case of moral\nimpossibility (i.e., when their observance is too burdensome); that the\nmatter about which he has scruples has become too difficult for him,\nand hence that he is not obliged to it as others are.\n\n(b) The scrupulous person should be commanded to leave undone what his\nvain fear calls on him to do; and, if this does not suffice, he should\nbe told that he is not bound by the duty which causes him such anxiety.\nExample: Titus is scrupulous about the performance of obligatory\nprayers, so much so that he is not satisfied until he has repeated them\nseveral times, lest some syllable may have been omitted or hurried\nover, or the intention or attention may have been lost sight of at some\npart of the prayer, or the devotional posture may not have been\nobserved throughout. If Titus cannot learn to say these prayers without\nmaking senseless repetitions, he should be told that the obligation has\nceased until such time as he is able to fulfill it without torture to\nhimself or others.\n\n629. Of course, if harm is done to another by the incomplete\nperformance of a duty, even a scrupulous person cannot be dispensed\nfrom repetition. Example: If a priest has not pronounced a sacramental\nform correctly, the fact that he is scrupulous does not excuse him from\nrepeating the form correctly.\n\n630. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about the Commission Of\nSin.--(a) The scrupulous person should be told that he is scrupulous,\nthat his scrupulosity is not a conscience that he is obliged to follow,\nbut a vain fear which he is obliged to struggle against by observing\nthe directions given him.\n\n(b) He should be directed not to deliberate long before acting, but to\ndo what seems right to him at first; not to conclude after acting that\nhe has committed sin, unless this appears certain and evident. Since\nthe scrupulous are over-careful, the presumption is in their favor, and\nthey can act and judge prudently by disregarding their fears and\ndoubts. If by deciding offhand they sometimes sin or fail to recognize\nsin in a past act, this will come from invincible ignorance, and they\nwill be excused from responsibility.\n\n631. Since a disease is best cured by removing its cause, the\nconfessor, when he has diagnosed a case of scruples, should prescribe\nremedies that are opposed to the source of the trouble.\n\n(a) If scrupulosity seems to come from God, the penitent should be\nencouraged to regard it as a means of satisfaction for past negligences\nor as an occasion of virtue and progress, to pray incessantly for light\nand assistance, and to follow the guidance which God has provided. (b)\nIf scrupulosity appears to be the result of diabolical obsession, and\nexorcism seems to be called for, the sufferer should not be told this.\n(c) If scrupulosity comes from associations or reading, the sufferer\nshould avoid these occasions, and cultivate the companionship of\npersons or books that are cheerful and that give a hopeful outlook on\none\u2019s duty and destiny.\n\n632. Remedies for Scruples That Are Mental in Origin.--(a) Those who\nsuffer from fixed ideas, phobias, and delusions, should not be reproved\nharshly and told that their fears are insane, but should be treated\nwith kindness and firmness. In ministering to these troubled minds, the\nbest course seems to be kind assurance that they have nothing to fear,\nalong with insistence that they imitate the example of the generality\nof good people, avoid singular practices of piety, discuss their\nanxieties only with their director, and give themselves to some\noccupation that will distract their attention from their manias.\n\n(b) Those whose minds are over-active and given to doubts and\nobjections must avoid introspection and the study of moral problems\nthat are too difficult for them; they must take a proper amount of\nsuitable recreation, think and plan how they may help others who are in\nneed, and avoid idleness.\n\n633. Remedies for Scruples Whose Origin is Moral.--(a) If scruples\narise from a stubbornness of character, the penitent must be told that\nthe confessor is better fitted to judge the case, and that it is the\nheight of rashness and presumption for a scrupulous person to prefer\nhis ideas to those of the priest.\n\n(b) If a melancholy or timid nature accounts for the existence of\nscruples, confidence and cheerfulness should be inculcated, and the\npenitent should be encouraged to meditate frequently on the goodness of\nGod, and to remember always that God is not a harsh taskmaster, but a\nkind Father.\n\n(c) Those who are scrupulous because their character is fickle and\neasily moved by every suggestion or imagination, need to cultivate\nseriousness, and to hold strongly to their judgments and resolves\ndeliberately formed. Obedience to their director will be of more\nlasting benefit to these and other psychical scrupulants than\npsychiatric treatments through hypnotism, mental suggestion, and\npsychoanalysis; observance of the rules prescribed is an excellent\ncultivation of will-power, and it is sustained and perfected by the\nmotives and helps which religion alone can supply.\n\n634. Remedies for scrupulosity Whose Cause Is Physical.--(a) The\nphysician is the proper person to care for bodily ills; hence, a\nscrupulous person who is troubled with headaches, dizziness,\nsleeplessness, loss of appetite, nervousness, hallucinations, etc.,\nshould go to a competent and conscientious specialist in the healing\nart. Removal of the causes of hurry and worry, moderate but sufficient\ndiet, fresh air and exercise, and especially congenial occupation and\nsurroundings are by general consent included among the best natural\ncures.\n\n(b) The confessor, if he perceives that illness is the cause of\nscruples, should forbid any spiritual practices that cause or aggravate\nthe malady. Example: scrupulous penitents should not be permitted to\npractise mortification by depriving themselves of necessary sleep,\nfood, exercise or fresh air, or to use devotions or austerities for\nwhich they are physically unfit.\n\n635. Persons who are scrupulous and lax at the same time need to be\ndirected so as to overcome both spiritual maladies.\n\n(a) If they are more scrupulous than lax, the case is less difficult,\nas they incline rather to the safer side, and it will suffice to apply\nthe remedies indicated above for laxity and scrupulosity, as they are\nneeded. Example: Titus, on account of scrupulosity, spends too much\ntime at his prayers, and thus neglects the exercise and recreation\nwhich are necessary for his health. He should be instructed to limit\nhis devotions, to have a regular time for them each day, and to realize\nthat he has an obligation to take proper care of his health.\n\n(b) If persons are more lax than scrupulous, the case is difficult, as\nthey incline more to evil; indeed, if the trouble is Pharisaism, it is\nwell-nigh incurable, on account of the pride and blindness that oppose\nresistance to every effort to cure. These persons need to be treated\nwith severity, since nothing else will make any impression; they should\nbe told in plain language how they stand and what is in store for them,\nunless they repent. Examples: Caius is extremely careful not to be\nguilty of sins of commission, but he thinks nothing of sins of\nomission; he would not take a postage stamp without express permission\nof the owner, but he neglects from year to year to pay bills, and sees\nnothing wrong in this. Titus thinks himself a saint because he worships\nthe letter of the law, when it is to be applied to others; but he cares\nnothing about its spirit, and, though indulgent to self, is a tyrant\nwith others. Both these men need to be told that, far from being good,\nthey are very bad; that, far from being secure, they are in great\ndanger. If insensible to reproofs, they should be reminded of the woes\nthat await the wilfully blind (Matt., xxiii. 13 sqq.).\n\n636. Practical Conclusions.--An instrument is called good when it\nproduces with sufficient exactness the effects for which it was\nintended; it is bad, if it fails to produce those effects. Thus, a\ntimepiece, a compass, or a thermometer is good if it indicates\naccurately, and bad if it indicates inaccurately. But, as it would be\nharmful to guide oneself by an unreliable instrument (e.g., by a watch\nwith a defective mainspring, or which runs fast or slow), one naturally\ncorrects the defects and regulates the working of the mechanism. Now,\nfrom what has been said above in this article, we see that conscience\ncan be a deceptive indicator, and that its accuracy can be improved.\nHence, the need of correcting a bad conscience and of cultivating a\ngood conscience.\n\n637. Remedies for a bad conscience and means for cultivating a good\nconscience are as follows:\n\n(a) The remote causes of a bad conscience are in the will itself. A\nperson judges wrongly often because he is wrong in himself, wrong in\nhis intentions and purposes with regard to life as a whole, wrong in\nhis attitude towards a particular line of duty, wrong in his lack of\nsincerity with himself. Hence, the correctives needed are a sincere\nlove of God and of virtue, courage to wish the truth, and an honest\nexamination of motives and actions: \u201cThe sensual man perceiveth not the\nthings that are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judgeth all\nthings\u201d (I Cor., ii. 14, 15).\n\n(b) The immediate causes of a bad conscience are in the intellect. One\njudges wrongly because one clings in time of doubt to erroneous ideas\nor principles. The remedy, therefore, is to seek diligently for light\nthrough prayer, to study the lives and conduct of those who are models,\nto consult with the prudent and the conscientious. The bad conscience\nsays to God: \u201cDepart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways\u201d\n(Job, xxi. 14); but the good one says: \u201cTeach me Thy justifications.\nThy testimonies are my delight, and Thy justifications my counsel\u201d (Ps.\ncxviii. 12, 24).\n\n638. Signs of a Good Conscience.--(a) Extraordinary holiness is not\nnecessary before one may consider one\u2019s conscience good, for there are\ndegrees of goodness. If, therefore, a person\u2019s external life is\ndirected by the duties of his state, and his internal life, as far as\nhe can judge, is free from serious guilt and guided by love of God and\nhatred of sin, he may safely regard his will as good. If sometimes he\nsins venially, this is not because he lacks a good conscience, but\nbecause he does not always follow it.\n\n(b) Extraordinary diligence in studying one\u2019s duties is not necessary\nbefore one may regard one\u2019s conscience as good, for otherwise a heavier\nburden would be imposed than we can suppose God to intend. A person who\nis using all the means for obtaining religious instruction that are\nused by others in his position and who are conscientious, may safely\nregard himself as free from voluntary error. If sometimes he judges\nwrongly, the mistake will be involuntary and not due to a bad\nconscience. Of course, one whose conscience is not in vincible error\nmay sin even mortally, not because his conscience is bad, but because\nhe does not follow it.\n\n639. The following are means for preserving and maintaining a good\nconscience: (a) we should judge our motives frequently with the\nseverity with which we judge the motives of another (Rom., ii. 1), and\nas before God (I Cor., ii. 10); (b) we should measure our actions, not\nby the standards of the world, its maxims and examples, but by those of\nChrist (I John, ii. 15-17; III John, 11).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 3: A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 57, a. 5; II-II, q. 47, a. 9.)\n\n640. As was said above, only that conscience is a safe guide which is\nnot only good--that is, in agreement, as far as one\u2019s efforts can\nsecure this, with the external law--but also certain. A certain\nconscience is one which, without any prudent fear of erring, judges\nthat a particular act is obligatory or unlawful, and hence here and now\nto be done or omitted.\n\n641. Necessity of Certitude.--We must be sure we are right before we\nact; otherwise, we expose ourselves to the danger of sinning, and\ntherefore commit sin (see 582). Hence, it is necessary to act with a\ncertain conscience, and unlawful to act with an uncertain conscience.\n\u201cIf the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to\nthe battle?\u201d (I Cor., xiv. 8) may be accommodated to conscience. In\nRom., xiv. 22, 23, the Apostle declares that he who acts with\nconviction is blessed, whereas he who acts in uncertainty is condemned.\nExamples: Sempronia doubts whether it is sinful to sew on Sunday; she\nis not sure, but has grave suspicions that sewing is servile work; if\nshe goes ahead, she will be guilty of violating the law, as being\nwilling to take the risk, and therefore the responsibility. Titus\noffers another a drink, being uncertain whether it has poison in it or\nnot; he is guilty of sin, since he has no right to expose himself to\nsin and his neighbor to the danger of death.\n\n642. Those persons who act with a doubtful conscience, and later\ndiscover that what they feared might be wrong was not wrong, or not so\nbad as they suspected, must bear in mind: (a) that their past conduct\nis not to be judged by their newly acquired knowledge, for that conduct\nmust be judged by the knowledge had at the time. Example: Sempronia\ndoes some work on Sunday, doubting whether she is committing a grave or\na slight sin. Later she discovers that it was really only a venial sin,\nand she congratulates herself that she did not sin seriously. Her\njudgment is wrong, because she did not know at the time of the work\nthat it was not a grave sin; (b) that they must guide themselves in\nfuture acts by their newly acquired knowledge.\n\n643. Kinds of Certitude.--Judgments may be certain in a greater or less\ndegree.\n\n(a) They are metaphysically certain, when error is absolutely\nimpossible, the opposite of what is held by the mind being a\ncontradiction in terms which omnipotence itself could not make true.\nExample: The judgments that the same, identical act cannot be both good\nand bad, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided, that God is to\nbe honored, are metaphysically certain, since they result immediately\nfrom the very concepts of being, of goodness, and of God.\n\n(b) Judgments are physically certain, when error is impossible\naccording to the laws of nature, the opposite of what is held by the\nmind being unrealizable except through intervention of another cause.\nExample: The judgments that he who takes poison will destroy life, that\nhe who applies fire to a house will destroy property, are physically\ncertain. because natural agencies, like poison and fire, act infallibly\nwhen applied to suitable matters and under suitable conditions and left\nto their course, unless they are overruled by superior power.\n\n(c) Judgments are morally certain, when error is impossible according\nto what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the\nmind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it.\nExamples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and\ncompetent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain\nthat a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance\nis correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching\nthe truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and\nfallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have\nthe requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part\nreliable and in practical life have to be considered as such.\n\n644. As to the certainty that is required in the judgment of\nconscience, the following points must be noted:\n\n(a) Metaphysical certainty is not required, since conscience does not\ndeal with primary propositions, but with deductions about particular\nacts. The first moral principles, which are the object of synderesis,\nand at least some of the general conclusions, which are the object of\nmoral science, are metaphysically certain (see above 145, 300), as they\nare based on necessary relations; but the particular conclusions, which\nare the object of conscience, are concerned with the contingent and the\nindividual.\n\n(b) Physical certainty is not required for the judgment of conscience,\nsince conscience is not concerned with the activities of natural\nagents, but with the activities of moral agents that act with freedom\nand responsibility.\n\n(c) Moral certitude, therefore, is sufficient for the conclusions drawn\nby conscience. That a higher kind of certitude is not necessary should\nnot surprise us, for it would be unreasonable to expect that the same\ndegree of assent be given to judgments that are concerned with\nparticular and contingent cases as to those that are concerned with\nuniversal and necessary principles.\n\n645. Moral certitude is of two kinds: (a) certitude in the strict\nsense, which excludes not only the fear of error, but every doubt,\nprudent and imprudent, great and small, Example: Titus thinks of a way\nin which he could easily make money dishonestly; but his conscience\nsees that the thing is manifestly wrong and decides without the\nslightest fear or doubt that it must not be done; (b) certitude in the\nwide sense, which excludes all fear of error and every serious or\nprudent doubt, but not one or other slight and imprudent doubt.\nExample: Caius was baptized by an excellent priest, but the date was\nomitted in the register. The doubt occurs to Caius that perhaps\nsomething essential was also omitted, and that it may be his duty to\nseek another Baptism. His doubt is unreasonable.\n\n646. Moral certitude in the wide sense is sufficient for a safe\nconscience, even in matters of great importance, since it is frequently\nthe only kind of certitude one can have, and he who would strive to be\nfree from every slight and baseless suspicion would be soon involved in\na maze of scruples and perplexities. Example: If the Caius above\nreferred to were to yield to his doubt and be rebaptized, a similar\ndoubt about the second Baptism might easily arise in his mind, and he\nwould be no more contented than before.\n\n647. From the point of view of its object, certitude is twofold. (a)\nSpeculative certitude refers to a judgment considered as a general law,\nabstraction being made from particular circumstances. Example: It is\nspeculatively certain that farm work on a holyday is a forbidden kind\nof work, and that clerics are obliged to say the Divine Office. (b)\nPractical certitude refers to a judgment which is an application of a\ngeneral law to a particular case, consideration being given to all the\npertinent circumstances. Example: It is practically certain that Titus\nmay make hay on a holyday, if otherwise he will suffer great loss; and\nthat a cleric is excused from the Divine Office, if his physician has\nwarned him that he is physically or mentally unable to perform it.\n\n648. Speculative certainty is not sufficient for conscience, but\npractical certitude is required, since conscience refers not to\nabstract laws but to concrete cases--not to what is right if only the\nobject of the act is considered, but to what is right when one\nconsiders the object, the motive, and all the circumstances here and\nnow present.\n\n649. From the point of view of the arguments on which it is based,\ncertitude is of two kinds. (a) Demonstrative certitude is the assent\nthat rests on a conclusion logically drawn from certainly true\npremises. Example: Caius argues that he is obliged to go to Mass on\nSunday, because the law is certain, and it is also certain that the law\napplies to him. (b) Probable certitude, which is the assent that rests\non a conclusion, whose premises, though not certain, seem to be true,\nand against which there is no counter conclusion, or none that cannot\nbe readily answered (see 703). Example: Caius is pretty sure that he is\nseriously ill, because he perceives a number of alarming symptoms; the\npossibility that these may be due to imagination is excluded by the\nfact that they are new and sudden. Caius, therefore, concludes that he\nmay hold himself excused from attendance at Mass.\n\n650. Probable certitude is sufficient for conscience, for in moral\nmatters it is impossible to have at all times reasons that amount to a\ndemonstration, and hence a person acts prudently in following a\ndecision that is solidly probable and unopposed by any contrary serious\nprobability. What is called \u201cprobable certitude\u201d here is very different\nfrom probable opinion, about which there will be question below (662\nsqq.)\n\n651. From the point of view of the manner in which it is obtained,\ncertitude is again twofold. (a) Direct certitude is that which is\nobtained from principles that are intrinsic to the case by applying to\nthe matter the law concerning it. Examples: A judge who decides\naccording to the evidence and proofs given in court that an accused is\nguilty, and a son who concludes from the Fourth Commandment that he is\nbound to help his parents in necessity, have direct certainty in their\njudgments, because they argued from principles that deal with the\nquestion before them. (b) Indirect certitude is that which is obtained\nfrom principles that are extrinsic to the case by applying to the\nmatter in hand reflex principles (i.e., rules that direct how one\nshould act in doubt) or the principle of authority (i.e., the argument\ndrawn from the opinion of those who are acknowledged as competent to\ndecide). Examples; If a judge is not able to form a certain judgment\nfrom intrinsic reasons concerning an accused, because strong arguments\nhave been given both for guilt and for innocence, he has recourse to\nprinciples that have reference to his own state of doubt, and which\ndeclare that he must acquit when he is not certain of guilt. If a man\nis not able to decide whether the Fourth Commandment obliges him to\nkeep his grandparents or mother-in-law in his home, when they upset his\nfamily and are able to take care of themselves, he can have recourse to\nthe external principle of authority by consulting his confessor.\n\n652. Direct certitude is not necessary for the judgment of conscience,\nfor often, as in the cases just mentioned, it is not possible.\nMoreover, indirect certitude suffices to give one who is in doubt such\npractical assurance that one\u2019s fears become unimportant and one is able\nto act prudently in spite of them.\n\n(a) The principle of authority--that \u201cin doubt we can safely follow the\nadvice of those who are experts and truthful\u201d--is reliable, as both the\nconditions required for authority (viz., knowledge and truthfulness)\nand also daily experience show.\n\n(b) Reflex principles likewise, although they do not prove what is\ndeduced from them, are well founded, and point so clearly the side to\nbe taken when judgment is suspended between alternatives that they\nenable one to act with all the certitude that prudence demands.\nExample: The principle that \u201cin doubt decision should be given in favor\nof the accused,\u201d is based on the fact that a man\u2019s right to his life\nand liberty is so certain that he does not forfeit that right unless it\nis proved convincingly that he is guilty.\n\n653. Examples of uncertain and certain consciences are the following:\n\n(a) Uncertain conscience: It is lawful to make a just contract (major\npremise certain); but this contract is just (minor premise a matter of\ndoubt or opinion); therefore, this contract is lawful (conclusion a\nmatter of doubt or opinion).\n\n(b) Conscience directly certain: It is lawful to make a just contract\n(certain); but this contract is just (certain); therefore, I may make\nthis contract (certain).\n\n(c) Conscience indirectly certain: It is lawful to follow competent\nadvice or a moral system approved by the Church (certain); but a\ncompetent spiritual adviser or an approved system of Moral Theology\nholds that this kind of contract is lawful (certain); therefore, it is\nlawful for me to make this contract (certain).\n\n654. An Uncertain Conscience.--Uncertainty of conscience can be\nunderstood in two senses.\n\n(a) Conscience is uncertain in a more strict sense, if the verdict of\nthe moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that\nno decision can be given either way, either because there are no\nreasons of importance on either side (negative doubt), or because the\nopposing reasons balance so perfectly that it is impossible to choose\nbetween them (positive doubt). Examples: Titus, wishing to do some\ndrawing on Sundays, asks himself whether drawing is servile work. Not\nknowing the definition of \u201cservile,\u201d he can only reply to his doubt\nthat he has no reasons either for affirmation or for negation. Caius\nreads moral authors on the same question, and the pros and cons seem to\nhim so equally strong that he cannot pronounce for either side.\n\n(b) Conscience is uncertain in a less strict sense, if the verdict of\nthe moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that\nthe mind inclines to one side more than the other, but cannot decide in\nits favor (suspicion), or that it decides for one side, while\nperceiving that the arguments for the contrary are not to be despised\n(opinion). Example: Titus decides to spend a good part of Sunday taking\nphotographs. Caius argues that this is unlawful; Sempronius, that it is\nlawful. Titus thinks the arguments of both are strong, but is better\npleased with those of Sempronius. If he feels he cannot act on either\nopinion, his state of mind is what we called suspicion; if he feels\nthat the opinion of Sempronius has prevailed, his state of mind is one\nof opinion.\n\n655. From what was said above concerning the certitude requisite for\nconscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind\nis positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person\nwho is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between\nopposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts\nblindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to\nact, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e)\nwhen the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act,\naccording as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for\ncertitude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).\n\n656. Doubt and Suspicion.--The following are the duties of a person\nwhose state of mind about his obligation is one of doubt or suspicion:\n\n(a) If he has no time to resolve his hesitation but must decide at\nonce, he should follow the rules given for a perplexed conscience (see\nabove, 611 sqq.). Example; Sempronius is ordered by his father to go on\nan errand; by his mother, to remain at home. He does not know whom he\nshould obey, but argues that there can be no harm in performing the\nerrand, since he feels that he is forced anyway. Sempronius\u2019 impromptu\ndecision proceeds from a sense of moral responsibility; it is good, and\nas certain as he is able to make it.\n\n(b) If a person has time to resolve his hesitation, he should not trust\nto common sense, but should consult moral theology, if he is competent\nto understand and apply it, or should have recourse to his confessor,\nif he is not a theologian. The attention given to his problem should be\nproportionate to the gravity of the duty in question, its importance\nfor third parties, etc. (see below, 667 Sqq.). Example: If a layman is\nuncertain whether a practice he follows in his business is dishonest,\nhe should consult a priest; if the priest is uncertain, he should refer\nto his theology and study the matter until he is able to give a\nwell-founded, morally certain judgment.\n\n657. Reflex principles by the aid of which a negative doubt may be\nsolved, when the question is about the existence or non-existence of\nsome fact connected with obligation, are the following:\n\n(a) If the fact at issue is one about which presumption may be had from\ngeneral or personal experience, the doubt may be settled by the\nprinciple: \u201cIn uncertainty decide according to what usually happens.\u201d\nExamples: Titus is uncertain whether his boy of seven years has the use\nof reason and is bound to go to Mass. As a rule, children attain\ndiscretion at the age of seven; and hence Titus should take his boy to\nMass. Fr. Caius is uncertain whether he has said Terce. His experience\nis that such uncertainties on his part have always been baseless in the\npast; hence, he may consider that he has said Terce as usual.\n\n(b) If the fact at issue is one about which no presumption is afforded,\neither from general or personal experience, recourse may be had to the\nprinciple: \u201cA fact should not be taken for granted, but must be\nproved.\u201d Examples: Sempronia doubts whether her practice of saying the\nRosary daily was the result of a vow; but, as there is no proof or\ncircumstantial evidence of a vow, it may be held that her practice\noriginated in a resolution. Caius, a stranger, claims that Titus owes\nhim for an unpaid debt of his father. Titus knows nothing of the\nalleged debt, and the only substantiation for its existence is the word\nof the stranger. Titus is not obliged to pay.\n\n658. Presumption of a fact is of three kinds according to Weight:\n\n(a) Violent presumption is based on indications so significant or\nnumerous that it leaves only slight room for evasion. This kind of\npresumption suffices, but is not essential in solving doubts. Example:\nCaius has no direct proof or disproof that he paid Titus in a certain\nbusiness transaction, because all the papers have been lost. But he\nremembers distinctly that he drew the money and went personally to the\noffice of Titus on the day payment was to be made, and that the latter,\nup to the time of his death several months later, always acted as if\nfull settlement had been made.\n\n(b) Strong presumption is based on circumstances or signs so moving\nthat they permit one to infer a fact as being their natural or usual\naccompaniment or result. This kind of presumption suffices in solving\nthe doubts we are considering. Example: If Caius, spoken of above, has\nno individual recollection of any circumstances bearing on the payment\nof his debt to Titus, but knows that it was his invariable custom to\npay all his debts promptly, the presumption that he paid this debt is\nstrong.\n\n(c) Light presumption occurs when the reasons are so slight, that they\nhardly ever suffice to permit us to infer a given fact from them.\nExample: If we suppose that Caius was dilatory in paying debts, and\nthat he has no better indication of payment having been made than the\nfact that Titus gave him a cigar about the time of their business\ntransaction, there is little presumption that the debt was paid.\n\n659. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative doubts about\nthe quality of an act performed are the following:\n\n(a) If there is an individual presumption, the quality of the act may\nbe inferred from what usually happens. Example: Sempronius cannot\nremember whether a certain good work he undertook was prompted by zeal\nor ambition. But, as he usually tried to keep his motives pure, it may\nbe concluded that the work in question proceeded from a right intention.\n\n(b) If there is no individual presumption, the quality of an act may be\nsettled from general presumptions or principles. When the act was\naccording to law, and the doubt concerns its validity or sufficiency,\none may take it that all was rightly done; for it usually happens that\nhe who complies with the substance, also complies with what is\naccessory. Moreover, the welfare of the public and of individuals\nrequire that an act done outwardly according to law should be deemed as\nrightly performed unless the contrary can be proved. Hence the rules:\n\u201cIn doubt decide for the validity of what was done\u201d; \u201cWhat has been\ndone is presumed to have been rightly done.\u201d Examples: Caia cannot\nremember whether she really consented when she married Titus.\nSempronius cannot remember whether he had sufficient attention in\nhearing Mass on Sunday. The presumptions are that Caia married validly\nand that Sempronius heard Mass properly, if they acted in good faith.\n\n660. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative and\ninvincible doubts concerning law or obligation are the following:\n\n(a) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove the\nexistence of a law, or its gravity or application to a present case,\nuse may be made of the principle: \u201cInvincible ignorance of the law\nexcuses from sin.\u201d Example: Titus on an ember day consults all the\nsources of information he has to discover whether it is a fast day; but\nall he can learn is that some vigils are fast days, others are not.\n\n(b) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove that a law\nbears a certain meaning, recourse may be had to such principles as the\nfollowing: \u201cA law obliges only in so far as it is knowable\u201d; \u201cThe\ninterpretation may be made against the legislator who could have spoken\nmore clearly\u201d; \u201cThings burdensome to the subjects of the law should be\nconstrued narrowly; things favorable, broadly.\u201d Example: Caius, who\nsupervises workingmen, has no notion regarding the meaning of the word\n\u201cworkingman\u201d as used in an indult on fasting--viz., whether it applies\nto supervisors of work or exclusively to laborers.\n\n(c) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or directly disprove\nthat a certain law has ceased or been abrogated, the principle to be\nfollowed is: \u201cIn doubt decide for that which has the presumption.\u201d In\nthis case the presumption is for the continuance of the law, since it\nwas certainly made, and there is no probability for its\nnon-continuance. Example: Sempronius learns that certain mitigations\nhave been made in the law of fasting, and wonders whether the same is\ntrue as regards the law of abstinence; but he has no reason to think\nthat any change has been made on this latter point.\n\n661. In the above cases negative doubt was solved generally in favor of\nnon-obligation as against obligation. But there are two cases in which\nnegative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, according to the\nrule: \u201cIn doubt follow that which is safer.\u201d The two cases are:\n\n(a) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, when the\ndoubt is about a matter of such importance that it does not permit the\ntaking of risks in its performance, as when there is question of laws\nthat safeguard the supreme rights of man, or of laws that prescribe the\nessentials to be used in the administration of the Sacraments. Example:\nSempronius adopts a newly-born infant abandoned at his door. As there\nis nothing to indicate whether the baby has been baptized or not,\nSempronius takes the safer course and has it baptized.\n\n(b) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation when it\npersists because no reflex principle is found, or none that seems to be\nsuitable for the case. Example: Titus wavers between uncertainties\nabout the existence of a law; he can discover no reasons pro or con,\nand he knows no principle or presumption to guide himself by in his\ndifficulty. He does not know or even think that he may act as if the\nlaw were non-existent, and hence he must inquire further, or else act\nas if the law did exist.\n\n662. Opinion.--The duty of one whose state of mind is opinion is as\nfollows:\n\n(a) If he is able to remove every objection against his judgment or to\nmake unimportant such objection or objections as remain, his opinion\nhas become moral certainty (see above, 644 Sqq.), and he may follow it\nas a safe guide. Example: Caius promises to marry Sempronia, but his\nparents forbid the marriage. Caius opines that he should keep his\npromise, but to be sure he consults his pastor. The latter shows him\nthat the opposition to his marriage is unreasonable, and thus sets at\nrest the difficulties of Caius.\n\n(b) If a person is not able to remove one or more important objections\nagainst his judgment, his opinion has not become moral certitude, and\nhe may not follow it as a safe guide. Example: If Caius\u2019 pastor holds\nthat the parents are right and Caius wrong in the question of marriage\nwith Scmpronia, so that Caius, while still thinking he should keep his\npromise, has serious fears that it would be a wrong step, the young man\nshould not follow his own view.\n\n663. Those who act when their state of mind is doubt, suspicion, or\nuncertain opinion are: (a) guilty of sin, for they do not act in good\nfaith (Rom, xiv. 22, 23), and they are imprudent and lovers of danger\n(Ecclus., iii. 27); (b) guilty of the species and gravity of sin which\nthey fear may be in their act; for they interpretatively wish that to\nwhich they expose themselves. Example: If Titus takes an oath, fearing\nthat his act is perjury, he is guilty of perjury before God, even\nthough what he says is true.\n\n664. Fears or objections against an opinion are unimportant as follows:\n(a) if they have only a slight probability (e.g., Titus opines that he\nis not obliged to say the second lessons, because he knows that he\nbegan them, and therefore must have said them; but he fears he may be\nobliged to say them, because he cannot remember the details of the\nlessons, and hence has probably not said them); (b) if they are\nimprobable (e.g., Caius fears that he may have omitted Sext, although\nhe recalls going to choir to chant at the regular times.)\n\n665. Fears against an opinion are important, when they are not merely\npossible, but have such an appearance of truth that even a prudent man\nwould consider them as worthy of support.\n\n(a) Intrinsic signs of this solid probability are the good arguments by\nwhich the fear, or contrary of an opinion, is supported. Example: Titus\nafter careful examination of conscience decides that he is not obliged\nto mention a theft in confession, because it happened just before his\nlast confession; yet, he fears that he is obliged, because he does not\nremember having thought of restitution.\n\n(b) Extrinsic signs of solid probability are the good authorities by\nwhom the contrary of the opinion is defended. Example: Caius opines\nthat he is not obliged to confess a calumny, because he is not certain\nthat it is unconfessed; he fears that he is obliged, because St.\nAlphonsus, whose authority is great in Moral Theology, teaches that a\ngrave sin must be confessed unless it is certain that it has been\nconfessed already.\n\n666. He who is moved by unimportant fears or difficulties is\nscrupulous, but not so he who hesitates in the face of an important\ndifficulty. Examples: Balbus fears he may be guilty of murder, because\nhe left a sick person for a moment and the latter unexpectedly died in\nhis absence (scrupulous conscience). Sempronius fears he may be bound\nto restitution, because by his ridicule he made Titus lose his means of\nlivelihood (disturbed conscience).\n\n667. What is to be done by one who holds an opinion as to what he may\nor may not do here and now, but who has a serious fear that his opinion\nis wrong?\n\n(a) If the fear persists as serious, when the means to remove it (such\nas consideration and consultation) have been duly resorted to, he\nshould delay, if this is possible, or follow the safer course, if delay\nis not possible. Example: Titus must go to confession now, but he\ncannot recall whether or not a past theft was ever confessed; he thinks\nhe is not obliged to mention it now, but is far from feeling certain\nabout this, because of a serious doubt which he cannot resolve. The\nthing for him to do is to resolve to confess the theft as one that was\nperhaps unconfessed before.\n\n(b) If the fear is removed or made unimportant, by direct means (such\nas theological argument from moral principles) or by indirect means\n(such as consultation or the use of reflex principles), the opinion may\nbe followed. Example: If Titus, mentioned above, learns from his\nconfessor or deduces from reliable reflex principles that he is not\nobliged to confess the theft, he may act with a safe conscience in\nfollowing this decision.\n\n668. The authority that may be safely followed by a lay person who\nholds an opinion, but fears that the opposite may be true, is that of\nanyone whom he knows to be pious, instructed and prudent; for, as it is\nimpossible for him either to settle the question for himself or to\nremain in perpetual uncertainty, he must acquire certainty here as in\nother important affairs by consulting those who are expert and\nreliable. Hence, if the conscience is merely opinionative, a dependable\nadviser should be conferred with to make it certain.\n\n(a) In the case of an accusing or excusing conscience, it is at least\nadvisable that the doubtful sin be mentioned in confession, and\nespecially by those who are not strict in their lives and who are\ninclined to judge their own acts and motives with leniency.\n\n(b) In case of a forbidding or permitting conscience, it is necessary\nthat one seek reliable information where it can be had, as from parents\nor teachers, and if these cannot give it, from a pastor or confessor or\nother priest. Example: Sempronius thinks he has a right to drink a\nglass of wine now and then to be sociable; but he fears he has no right\nto do so, as the drink occasions excitement or foolish remarks, and\nsometimes makes it difficult for him to get to his home safely.\n\n669. The authority that may be safely followed by confessors and other\npriests in resolving important doubts against a moral judgment is as\nfollows:\n\n(a) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by all or nearly all\nof the approved text-books on moral teaching, it may be followed; for\nsurely there would not be such unanimity, if the objections were really\nformidable.\n\n(b) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by a goodly number\n(say, six or seven) of those who are considered as preeminent in Moral\nTheology, and who independently arrived at the same conclusion, it may\nbe followed; for the judgment of many is better than that of one, and\nthe certainty of authorities should prevail over the doubt of one who\nhas not the same authority.\n\n(c) If the opinion has the support as certain of only one theologian,\nit may be followed without further investigation, if he has received\nspecial mention from the Church as an authority and a safe guide. Thus,\nthe Holy See has expressly declared that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus\nmay be safely followed by confessors, and the approbation given to St.\nThomas Aquinas as Universal Doctor makes his word more convincing than\na contrary argument based on one\u2019s own reasoning. Of course, this does\nnot mean that these or any other private Doctors are infallible in\ntheir judgments, or that one should not depart from their teaching in a\npoint where the Church has decided against them, or where there is a\nmanifest reason for doing so; it simply means that they are so\nconspicuous among moralists for the correctness of their teaching that\none who is in doubt may safely follow them unless the contrary is known\nto him.\n\n670. But one may be unable to settle one\u2019s difficulty by appeal to\nauthority, as such, as in the following instances: (a) when the\nparticular case to be decided is not considered at all in text-books,\nor is not considered under the circumstances that exist; (b) when the\nauthorities speak hesitatingly about the question, and say that the\nopinion in question is at most probable, etc.; (c) when the authorities\nare about equally divided, as when a few great names are opposed to\nmany names of inferior rank, or when those who are equal in knowledge\nso disagree that half are on one side, half on the other. In counting\nauthorities, however, it is not always easy to decide who should be\nincluded, as a writer may himself be arguing from the authority of an\nindividual or of a school, and thus he is not a distinct witness in\nfavor of what he holds.\n\n671. When a priest or other person sufficiently instructed in theology\nis not able to change through recourse to authority an opinionative or\ndoubtful conscience into a certain conscience, he can still obtain\ncertitude: (a) directly, by reexamining the question diligently and\nwith entire impartiality, until he has discovered reasons strong enough\nto settle it convincingly one way or the other; (b) indirectly, by\nsubmitting the question to the arbitrament of a reflex principle that\nreally appears true to him, and permitting it to decide between the\nopinion and the objection, or between the contending doubts.\n\n672. The Moral Systems.--There are two general systems regarding reflex\nmoral principles:\n\n(a) Tutiorism, which teaches that the only principle which can change\nuncertainty into certainty is: \u201cWhen one is undecided between the safer\nand the less safe, he must always choose the safer,\u201d because only what\nis safer excludes the uncertainty of sinning;\n\n(b) Anti-tutiorism, which teaches that the principle given above is\ntrue in a few exceptional cases on account of special reasons, but\nuntrue as a rule. The general principle which it substitutes for that\nof Tutiorism is: \u201cWhen one is undecided between the safer and the less\nsafe, one may choose the less safe if it is morally certain.\u201d\n\n673. Of two moral judgments that are compared, it must be noted:\n\n(a) that one is safer which departs more from the danger of sin by\ndeciding for the stricter side. Example: In doubt whether a law exists,\nwhether it obliges in a present case, whether its obligation is grave,\nthe safer opinion is that which holds for the affirmative;\n\n(b) that moral judgment is more likely which is supported by stronger\narguments. Example: That a law has ceased, or does not apply in a\ncertain case, or does not oblige under sin, is a more likely opinion if\nthe arguments in its favor outweigh those against it.\n\n674. Thus, it may happen that an opinion which is safer is less likely.\nExample: The opinion that the precept of repentance obliges under pain\nof new sin from the moment a sin is committed is safer, but less likely\nthan the opposite opinion.\n\n675. Danger of sin is twofold. (a) Danger of formal sin (see 249, 258)\nis a risk taken which involves, not only that an act may be unlawful,\nbut that the doing of it may be unlawful. Example: Caius eats meat,\ndoubting whether the day is one of abstinence and whether he is obliged\nto abstain or not. (b) Danger of material sin (see 249, 258) is the\ndanger that an act may be unlawful, not in the concrete or as to its\nperformance, but in the abstract as to itself. Example: Titus is unable\nto discover whether this is a day of abstinence, but he is of the\nopinion that it is not. Hence, he takes meat, arguing that, while this\nmay be a violation of the law, he himself is not guilty of sin, since\nhe feels that he has a right to eat meat under the circumstances.\n\n676. Tutiorism.--This system has been condemned by the Church, and with\ngood reason, for the following motives:\n\n(a) If by that which is safer, Tutiorism intends that which is better,\nit contradicts the Gospel, which distinguishes between counsel and\nprecept (see 364 sqq.), commanding what is good, but only recommending\nwhat is better.\n\n(b) If by that which is safer Tutiorism means that which favors law\nagainst liberty, it imposes an intolerable yoke on the consciences of\nmen; for, while law obliges only in so far as it is promulgated and\nknown, Tutiorism would bind one to observe, not only what was not known\nto be obligatory, but what was held to be most probably not obligatory.\n\n677. A modified form of Tutiorism taught: \u201cWhen one is undecided\nbetween the safer and the less safe, one must choose the safer, unless\nthe less safe is most probable.\u201d This system has not been censured by\nthe Church, but Catholic theologians with hardly an exception have\nrejected it, for the following reasons:\n\n(a) Most probable, as understood by the defenders of this system, is\nthat which has such likelihood and such appearance of truth as to\nremove every probable danger of even material sin. Thus, in reality\nthis system requires absolute certitude and agrees with the rigorous\ntenet of Tutiorism that even a most probable opinion against the law\nmay not be followed.\n\n(b) Most probable, as commonly understood, is that side of a question\nwhich so far excels the other side that no answer can be given to any\nof its arguments, while all the arguments of the other side can be\nanswered. To require this in moral difficulties is to require the\nimpossible, for even the greatest theologians have to be content at\ntimes with less.\n\n678. We are obliged always to follow a safe course, that is, not to\nexpose ourselves to the danger of formal sin (see 249, 258); but\nTutiorism errs when it teaches that we are also obliged always to\nfollow the safer or safest course, that is, never to expose ourselves\neven to the danger of material sin. There are cases, however, when we\nare obliged (because some law requires it) to follow a safer course,\nthat is, not to expose ourselves or others to some great harm. Thus, we\nmust follow the safer side in the following cases:\n\n(a) when there is question concerning something essential for the\nsalvation of ourselves or of others, for the law of charity forbids\nthat any risk be taken in this supremely important matter. Example:\nTitus instructs the dying Caius only concerning the existence of God\nand of the future life. He should also instruct him about the Trinity\nand the Incarnation, which is the safer course, since it is more\nprobable that an explicit faith in these two mysteries is a condition\nof salvation;\n\n(b) when there is question of some great spiritual loss or gain for\nourselves or others, for justice or charity forbids that we take\nchances in such affairs. Examples: Sempronia doubts whether she is\nexcused from the law of abstinence, and whether she will be guilty of\nsin if she eats meat. Caius doubts whether attendance at a certain\nschool will do harm to the religion of his son. Balba doubts whether\nshe is bound to inquire about the truth of her sect. As long as their\nserious doubts remain, these persons should follow the safer course;\n\n(c) when there is question of the validity or invalidity of a\nSacrament, for the virtue of religion requires that the Sacraments be\nadministered with fidelity, and be not exposed to the peril of nullity.\nExample: It is not lawful to consecrate matter that has probably been\nsubstantially adulterated;\n\n(d) when there is question of some temporal good or evil to oneself or\nanother, and one is certainly obliged to promote the former or prevent\nthe latter. Examples: Caius suspects that a drink before him is deadly\npoison; Titus suspects that an object at which he is preparing to shoot\nis a human being. Neither may disregard his suspicion, even if its\ncontrary is more probable, because the safer side must here be taken.\nThe Fifth Commandment forbids one needlessly to imperil one\u2019s own or\nanother\u2019s life.\n\n679. In emergency one may expose a Sacrament to nullity by taking a\ncourse that is less safe for the Sacrament, but safer for the subject,\nrelying on the axiom that the Sacraments are for men, and not men for\nthe Sacraments. Example: Titus is called to baptize the dying Caius. No\nwater can be procured except rose water, whose sufficiency is doubtful.\nTitus not only may, but should, use the doubtful matter, since no other\ncan be had.\n\n680. Laxism.--The extreme opposite of Tutiorism is Laxism, whose\nprinciple is: \u201cWhen one is undecided between the safer and the less\nsafe, one may choose the less safe, if it is only slightly or\nuncertainly probable,\u201d because whatever seems at all probable may be\nprudently followed, and so forms a certain conscience. Example:\nAccording to Laxism, one would be justified in following an opinion,\nbecause it was defended by one theologian, even though he was of little\nauthority.\n\n681. This system has been condemned by the Church for the following\nreasons:\n\n(a) It is contrary to the teaching of the Gospels and of the Fathers,\nwhich requires one to observe the laws of God with understanding and\ndiligence;\n\n(b) It leads to corruption of morals. The Laxists of the seventeenth\ncentury were called in derision those \u201cwho take away the sins of the\nworld,\u201d and it was against their loose teachings that Pascal inveighed;\n\n(c) Its argument is of no value, for no prudent person would feel that\nhe should follow what was only slightly above the improbable, or that a\nlaw should be deemed uncertain because an opinion of uncertain\nprobability could be quoted against it.\n\n682. The true system of reflex principles will lie between the extremes\nof Tutiorism and Laxism. As already said, these two doctrines have been\ncensured by the Church; but there are other systems that are moderate,\nand that are permitted by the Church and defended by theologians. These\nsystems are:\n\n(a) Probabiliorism, whose principle is: \u201cWhen one is undecided between\nthe safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safc only when it\nis more probable\u201d;\n\n(b) Equiprobabilism, whose doctrine is: \u201cWhen one is undecided between\nthe safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe only when it\naffirms the non-existence of the law, and is at least equally probable\nwith the opposite\u201d;\n\n(c) Probabilism, whose doctrine is: \u201cWhen one is undecided between the\nsafer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is\ncertainly and solidly probable\u201d;\n\n(d) Compensationism, whose doctrine is: \u201cWhen one is undecided between\nthe safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it\nis certainly and solidly probable, and there is a proportionate reason\nto compensate for the risk taken.\u201d\n\n683. Probabiliorism.--The arguments in favor of Probabiliorism are as\nfollows:\n\n(a) extrinsic or from authority. This system is more ancient, and, when\nthe controversy over systems began in the seventeenth century, this was\nthe one that was most favored by the Church and theologians;\n\n(b) intrinsic and direct. An essential note of certitude is that it\nshould exclude all doubt, for as long as doubt remains there is only\nopinion. But one who is undecided cannot exclude all doubt, unless the\narguments against the doubts not only balance, but outweigh the latter\n(i.e., unless one has greater probability on one\u2019s side). Hence, he who\nacts against the safer, which is always certain enough, when his own\nopinion is not more probable, acts with an uncertain conscience;\n\n(c) intrinsic and indirect. In all other matters a man is not prudent\nif he assents to that which is less safe and less probable. Thus, in\nthings speculative no scholar would think of accepting a theory which\nto his knowledge was further removed from the truth; in things\npractical no man of common sense would prefer a road that seemed less\nlikely to lead to his destination. But we should not be less prudent\nabout the good than we are about the true and the useful. Hence, in\ndoubt we should always decide in favor of the law, unless the arguments\nfor liberty are more convincing.\n\n684. The answers given to the above arguments are:\n\n(a) Probabiliorism is not more ancient as a system, since none of the\nmoral systems were formulated before the sixteenth century; if\nPatristic and medieval authorities can be quoted who decided cases\nprobabilioristically, others who were contemporary can be named who\ndecided according to milder principles. Moreover, the passages cited\nare frequently obscure, and do not necessarily bear a Probabilioristic\nsense. That Probabiliorism enjoyed more favor at the beginning of the\ncontroversy is not wonderful, since other systems were more or less\nidentified with Laxism, and the question at issue had not been studied\nthoroughly. Today Probabiliorism has few defenders.\n\n(b) That which is more probable by far, or most probable, does overcome\nall doubt, and is even speculatively certain; but he who would require\nthe more probable in this sense does not differ from the Tutiorists\nspoken of above. That which is more probable, but not to a notable\nextent, does not exclude all doubt, for the very definition of the more\nprobable is \u201cthat judgment which appears more likely to be true than\nanother, but which does not exclude all fear that the other may be\ntrue.\u201d Hence, if Probabiliorism calls for the notably more probable, it\ndoes not differ from Tutiorism; if it calls for the moderately more\nprobable, it wrongly claims that there is no probability on the\nopposite side.\n\n(c) The true is that which is in harmony with facts, the useful that\nwhich conduces to the obtaining of an end, the good that which is in\nconformity with law. Certainly, a man is not a prudent seeker of truth\nif he arbitrarily prefers the less to the more true-seeming, nor a\nprudent seeker of the useful if he chooses the less safe way of\nobtaining what is a necessary end; but a man can be a prudent seeker of\nthe good, even though he prefers the less safe and less probable, when\nthe law itself, the norm of good, does not demand more from him. Hence,\none who makes a judgment according to the anti-Probabiliorist systems\ndoes not feel that he is yielding assent to what is speculatively less\nprobable; but that he is making a decision that is practically certain;\nnot that he is choosing a perilous way, but one that is absolutely safe.\n\n685. Arguments against Probabiliorism.--(a) Theoretical Objection.--The\nprinciple of Probabiliorism that it is lawful to act against the safer\nside when the less safe side is more probable, cannot be justified\nexcept on the ground that invincible ignorance of obligation exists,\nand hence that the law does not oblige. But the same argument can be\nused in favor of milder systems; for even if the less safe side is only\nprobable, it makes one invincibly ignorant that one is obliged. Hence,\nthe basis of Probabiliorism is fatal to its own claims.\n\n(b) Practical Objection.--A system for the direction of conscience\nshould be so simple that it can be easily applied in the everyday\naffairs of life. Abstract questions may receive attention from\nmoralists for days and months, but concrete cases have to be decided as\na rule without delay. But Probabiliorism is such a complicated system\nthat it is unsuited to everyday life. St. Alphonsus declares that he\nfound by the experience of many years that this system cannot be\nprofitably used in the guidance of souls, for it imposes an intolerable\nburden on both confessors and penitents. And how few are so skilled as\nto be able to decide quickly, without scruples, and correctly about the\nrelative degrees of probability in opposite opinions!\n\n686. Answers of the Probabiliorists.--(a) A probable opinion against\nthe existence of obligation does not create invincible ignorance, but\nonly doubt; nor does a more probable opinion against obligation create\ninvincible ignorance, since it excludes the less probable opinion for\nobligation, and makes one assent unwaveringly and in good faith, even\nthough erroneously, to the judgment that one is not bound.\n\n(b) It is no more difficult to decide what is more probable than to\ndecide what is equally probable, or truly and solidly probable; nor is\nthe same skill and attention expected in all persons and cases, but\neach person must judge according to the best light he has, and each\ncase must receive the measure of attention its importance calls for. If\nProbabiliorists may become scrupulous, may not Probabilists become lax?\n\n687. The debate between Probabiliorism and its adversaries is not often\nheard today, as most modern moralists give their allegiance either to\nEquiprobabilism (a modified Probabiliorism) or to Probabilism.\n\n688. Equiprobabilism.--The doctrine of Equiprobabilism is a middle way\nbetween Probabiliorism and Probabilism. Thus: (a) it agrees with\nProbabiliorism in holding that it is not lawful to follow the less\nsafe, if the safer is more probable, or if the safer is equally\nprobable, and the question is about the cessation of the law; (b) it\nagrees with Probabilism in holding that it is lawful to follow the less\nsafe, if the safer is only equally probable, and the question is about\nthe existence of the law.\n\n689. The principle that \u201cit is not lawful to follow the less safe, if\nthe safer is equally probable and the question is about the cessation\nof the law,\u201d is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:\n\n(a) In real doubt we should decide in favor of that side which is\npossession. But, when doubt is about the cessation of a law, the law is\nin possession; for there is no question that it was made. Therefore, in\nsuch a doubt we should decide for the safer side, that is, that the law\nhas not ceased.\n\n(b) A certain obligation is not complied with by a doubtful\nfulfillment. But doubts about the cessation of the obligation of law\nusually arise from a probability that one has already fulfilled the\nlaw. Therefore in such cases we should decide that the law has not been\nfulfilled--that is, that its obligation has not ceased.\n\n690. The Probabilists reply that: (a) it is not true that, in\nequiprobability about the cessation of law, the law is in possession;\nfor liberty is naturally prior to law, and hence has possession in\ndoubt; (b) nor is it true that an obligation that has probably been\ncomplied with or removed is certain.\n\n691. The Equiprobabilists answer: (a) liberty was in possession, until\nit was dispossessed by the making of the law; (b) an obligation that\ncertainly existed must be held as certainly in existence, until the\ncontrary is proved; whereas a fact, such as dispensation, abrogation,\nor fulfillment, is not proved if it is only probable.\n\n692. The principle that \u201cit is lawful to follow the less safe side, if\nthe safer is only equally probable and the question is about the\nexistence of the law,\u201d is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:\n\n(a) In real doubt we should favor the side that is in possession. But\nwhen doubt is about the existence of a law, liberty is in possession;\nfor liberty is prior to law. Therefore, in such doubt we may decide\nthat there is no obligation.\n\n(b) An uncertain law does not oblige, if one is invincibly ignorant of\nits existence. But, when there are equiprobable reasons against the\nexistence of a law, one is invincibly ignorant of its existence.\nTherefore, in such cases one is not obliged.\n\n693. The principle that \u201cit is not lawful to follow the less safe side\nif the safer side is more probable,\u201d is defended as follows by\nEquiprobabilists:\n\n(a) In doubt improperly so called--that is, in that condition of mind\nin which there is no fluctuation between equal arguments, but only some\nindecision between the more and the less probable--we should decide in\nfavor of the more probable, as being morally certain. Hence, it is not\nlawful to follow what is less safe and less probable.\n\n(b) A law sufficiently promulgated obliges. But, when it is more\nprobable that a law was made or is in force, such law is sufficiently\npromulgated to the conscience. Hence, the safer side must be followed,\nif it is more probable.\n\n694. Probabilist Criticism of the Foregoing Arguments.\n\n(a) If the excess of the more probable over the less probable is so\ngreat that the latter is only slightly or doubtfully probable, the more\nprobable is equivalent to certitude; for certitude is assent without\nfear of the opposite, and the fear of the opposite in such a case would\nbe so slight that it may be considered as non-existent. If the excess\nis not so great, the less probable remains solidly and certainly\nprobable, and the more probable is not certitude, but opinion (that is,\nassent with fear of the opposite). The Equiprobabilists are speaking of\ngreater probability in the second sense, and hence they are wrong when\nthey identify it with certitude (see above, 654).\n\n(b) A law must be so promulgated to the conscience that one knows the\nlaw or could know it with sufficient diligence; it does not suffice\nthat one can get no further than opinion. It would be unreasonable to\noblige one to observe not only what is the law, but also what seems to\nbe the law. Now, he who has only more probable opinion that he is bound\nby some law, does not know that such obligation exists; he only knows\nthat it seems to exist.\n\n695. Reply of the Equiprobabilists.-(a) The more probable always\nremoves the appearance of truth from the less probable. Hence, he who\nrecognizes an opinion as more probable can assent to it without any\nfear of error.\n\n(b) One who holds it as more probable that he is obliged by a certain\nlaw, does not know for certain that he is obliged by reason of that\nlaw; but he does know for certain that he is obliged by reason of a\nhigher law. Superior to every particular law is the general law that\nnothing may be done that will deprive law of its efficacy. But law\nloses its efficacy if each one is free to decide that he is not bound\neven when the greater weight of probability is to the contrary.\n\n696. General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism.--(a) From\nAuthority.--St. Alphonsus Liguori, who holds a unique place in the\nChurch as a moralist, preferred Equiprobabilism to every other moral\nsystem; and his views are followed not only by his own Congregation,\nthe Redemptorists, but by many others.\n\n(b) From Comparison with Other Systems.--Truth lies midway between\nextremes; for truth is lost either by exaggeration or by defect. But\nEquiprobabilism is a happy medium between Probabiliorism inclining to\nRigorism, and Probabilism inclining towards Laxism. Hence, the relation\nof Equiprobabilism to other systems is in its favor.\n\n(c) From the Character of Its Teaching.--According to principles of\njustice universally admitted as true, a judge should pronounce sentence\nin favor of the more probable when there is evidence of unequal weight\nand in favor of that which is in possession when there is evidence of\nequal weight. But these principles ought to be of universal\napplication. Therefore, Equiprobabilism does right in making these the\nguiding principles for the court of conscience.\n\n697. Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments.--(a) St. Alphonsus is\none of the greatest moral theologians of the Church. Whether in his\nlater years (1762-1787) he taught Equiprobabilism, is a matter of\ndispute among those who are familiar with his writings. But there is no\ndoubt that in his mature age (1749-1762), when he wrote his Moral\nTheology, he was a Probabilist.\n\n(b) Probabilism can likewise claim that it stands midway between the\nextremes of Rigorism (represented by Probabiliorism and\nEquiprobabilism), on the one side, and of Laxism, on the other side.\n\n(c) The principle of possession invoked by Equiprobabilism applies to\nmatters of justice, because there is a presumption that he who holds\nproperty has a right to it, and also because human laws must favor him\nwho is in possession, lest property rights be left uncertain and\ndisputes be multiplied. The principle of possession does not apply,\nhowever, to other matters; if the law obliged one yesterday, how can\nthat create a presumption that it obliges one today, if one has good\nreasons for thinking the obligation has ceased? And as for human\nordinances, while they have jurisdiction over external goods and may\naward them in case of doubt to the possessor, they have not, and have\nnever claimed, the right to make the principle of possession a rule for\nsolving all difficulties about duty.\n\nThe principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim\nthe authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal\ncases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not\nto be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges\napply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that\nconscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The\njudge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely\nclaim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger\nevidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is\ncertain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for\nobligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.\n\n698. Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism.--(a) Granted that\nSt. Alphonsus once held Probabilism, he rejected it later emphatically,\nand when dying declared that his former defense of Probabilism was the\nonly thing that gave him anxiety.\n\n(b) Equiprobabilism is further removed from Rigorism than Probabilism\nis from Laxism. It hears both sides of the question--that for liberty\nand that for law--before it decides. Probabilism is satisfied to hear\none side, that for liberty; or at least it does not compare the two\nsides.\n\n(c) The principle of possession is applied more strictly in cases of\njustice; for, since justice implies a more exact equality and a more\nrigorous right than other virtues (see 154), disputes in matters of\njustice demand stronger proofs. But every virtue renders to someone his\ndue, and hence there is no reason why principles applicable to justice\nshould not be applicable to other virtues also. The principle of\nProbabiliorism, likewise, is just as applicable to the court of\nconscience as to the civil court, since in both courts the aim is to\nget the truth as nearly as possible.\n\n699. General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism.--(a) Theoretical\nObjection.--If we judge Equiprobabilism by its arguments, we find it\nunconvincing, for that which is old in it does not agree with that\nwhich is new, and that which is new argues equally well for\nProbabilism. Thus, the old arguments for Probabiliorism mean in the\nlast analysis that the greater probability deprives the opposite side\nof all solid probability; logically, then, one should conclude that\nequal probability deprives both sides of all solid probability, since\none neutralizes the other. The new arguments are drawn from the\nprinciples that in doubt one should decide in favor of the side in\npossession, that a doubtful law does not oblige, etc.--all of which\nprinciples, as we shall see, favor Probabilism.\n\n(b) Practical Objection.--If we judge Equiprobabilism by its\nadaptibility for use, we find it wanting. A moral system should be one\nthat can be easily understood and applied, otherwise it is unworkable\nand useless. But Equiprobabilism is so complicated and abstruse that\neven the professional theologians who hold it are often at a loss how\nto apply it, and are found to give inconsistent decisions. How can it\nbe expected, then, that anyone else will be able to decide whether the\nlaw or liberty is possession, whether the degree of probability on\none side is greater than or equal to that on the other, whether the\nquestion has to do with the existence of the law or its cessation, etc.?\n\n700. Replies of the Equiprobabilists.--(a) The old (i.e.,\nprobabilioristic) principles of Equiprobabilism are not contrary to the\nnew. A more probable opinion not only balances the opposition by its\nequal arguments, and thus puts away doubt, but it also wins assent by\nthe surplus in its favor, and thus certitude is had. When the two\nopposites are equally probable, there is a state of true doubt, but\ncertitude is had by recourse to the principles of possession and\ndoubtful law. These principles proper to Equiprobabilism do not favor\nProbabilism, if one is impartial in one\u2019s use of them, and willing to\nuse them against as well as for liberty.\n\n(b) Equiprobabilism is not more difficult in its application than\nProbabilism. It does not require that one determine minutely and\nexactly the greater or equal probability of the arguments for law and\nfor liberty, or that one devote extraordinary diligence to the solution\nof the problem. All it requires is that one consider the matter\nseriously, weigh the arguments on both sides impartially, and decide to\nthe best of one\u2019s ability which side appears to be more probable or to\nhave the presumption in its favor.\n\n701. Probabilism.--The meaning of Probabilism can be seen from a\ncomparison with the opposite systems. (a) Unlike Probabiliorism and\nEquiprobabilism, Probabilism does not require a greater or equal\nprobability, but permits one to follow what is less probable; (b)\nunlike Laxism, it does not allow one to follow what is only slightly or\nuncertainly probable, or to apply the system to all cases of doubt.\n\n702. A judgment is probable when it is supported by arguments that make\nit seem true, although there may remain reasons for doubt. Examples are\nconclusions based on analogy, on hypothesis, on the opinions of others,\nor on the calculus of probabilities.\n\n703. Probability is of various kinds. (a) It is absolute or relative,\naccording as the supporting reasons are grave, either when considered\nalone, or when compared with the objections. Even the Probabiliorists\nadmit that an opinion that is merely probable may be followed, if it is\nsolidly probable and there is no argument against it (see 649). (b) We\nhave solid or slight probability, according as the supporting motives\nare or are not such as would move, if not convince, a prudent man--that\nis, a man who shows good judgment in most things. (c) We have certain\nor uncertain probability, according as a person is sure or not, after\nreasonable consideration, that the arguments seem valid and the opinion\nlikely. (d) Probability is internal or external, according as the\narguments are drawn from the matter at issue itself (i.e., from its\nnature, properties, causes, effects, etc.) or from the authority of the\ndoctors who have defended an opinion.\n\n704. Relative probability according to logicians remains even when a\nlesser is compared with a greater probability. (a) If the opposing\narguments are drawn from different sources, the more probable does not\nattack the less probable, and hence does not weaken its probability.\nExample: An intrinsic argument has more weight than a mere appeal to\nauthority, but it does not attack the opposite argument, and hence does\nnot diminish its probability. (b) If the opposing arguments are drawn\nfrom the same source, each one weakens the opposite, since there is\ndirect opposition. But the more probable does not destroy the less\nprobable, since, in spite of the greater appearance of truth on the one\nside, there still remains room for the possibility that the other side\nmay be true.\n\n705. A moral judgment is solidly probable when the following conditions\nare present:\n\n(a) For the judgment there must be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument\nthat would be considered weighty by a prudent man. Example: An opinion\nthat has the support of a universally acknowledged authority is\nstrongly probable, whereas, if it has only the support of one obscure\nwriter, it is only slightly probable.\n\n(b) Against the judgment there must be no decisive argument from\nauthority or reason. Example; The judgment that a certain course of\naction is lawful because St. Alphonsus permits it, is ordinarily\nsolidly probable; it is not probable, however, if the opinion of St.\nAlphonsus (e.g., that Catholics may act as sponsors in non-Catholic\nbaptisms) has been disallowed by the Church, or if the argument he uses\n(e.g., that concerning the amount that constitutes grave matter in\ntheft, which reasons from conditions in his day) is not strong.\n\n(c) The arguments for the judgment must retain their probability, if\nthey are set over against the arguments for the opposite. Manifestly,\nif the arguments are all satisfactorily answered by the opposite side,\nthe judgment based on them ceases to retain the appearance of truth.\nProbabilism does not require, however, that one determine the relative\ndegrees of probability in opposite opinions.\n\n706. It is not sufficient according to the Probabilists that another be\ncertain of the probability of an opinion; but the person who follows\nthe opinion must himself be certain that it is solidly probable.\n\n707. Regarding the kind of authority necessary to make an opinion\nsolidly probable from external evidence, Probabilism teaches:\n\n(a) that absolute probability (that is, such a weight of authority as\nwould appear strong even to the most learned) ought to be estimated by\nquality rather than quantity--by the learning, prudence, impartiality,\nand independent study of the authors, rather than by their numbers. If\nfive distinguished moralists arrive by separate study at the same\nconclusion (i.e., that an opinion is probable), or if one of special\nreputation in a matter under question supports the probability of an\nopinion, the argument from authority is strong;\n\n(b) that relative probability (that is, such a weight of authority as\nsuffices for one who is unlearned, such as a child, a halfwit, an\nuneducated person) is had sufficiently through the word of only one\nperson who is looked up to as a guide or instructor, such as a parent,\nconfessor, or teacher.\n\n708. Probabilism supposes that one regards the opinion one follows as\ntruly probable, and that one is convinced that it is lawful to follow\nsuch an opinion. Hence, the system does not apply in certain cases.\n\n(a) It does not apply to cases in which there is no probability on\neither side--that is, to cases of negative doubt (see 656 sqq.),\nwhether the doubt be of law or of fact.\n\n(b) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is only slight\nor uncertain probability for the less safe side. Example: Caius has\nheard that a certain novel opinion is defended by a recent author, but\nhe is uncertain of the author\u2019s standing as a theologian, and he\nrealizes that the fact that a man has written a book does not make his\nideas solidly probable.\n\n(c) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is solid\nprobability for the less safe side, but one doubts whether one can\nlawfully follow it; for it is always sinful to act with a doubtful\nconscience (see 641 sqq.). Example: Caius has read in a reliable work\nof theology that a person in certain circumstances, which are his own,\nis probably excused from Mass. But the word \u201cprobably\u201d makes him\nuncertain whether he can follow this opinion.\n\n709. For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not\napply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see\n656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative\ndoubt:\n\n(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for\nit is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long\nas there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes\nout into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish\npresents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is\nnot a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either\nside is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is\nnot forbidden is lawful.\n\n(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is\ninvolved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that\nlegislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of\nliberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is\neating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As\nhe has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday\nor the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal,\nmaking no undue delays.\n\n(c) If the doubt is one of fact, and a preceptive law is in question,\none must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the\nlawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of\nthe ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see\nabove, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of\nliberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not\nintend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example:\nCaius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the\nobligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age;\nbut, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of\nsixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications\nthat he is of that age.\n\n710. The solutions given above for cases of negative doubt suppose that\nthere is no other or higher law that forbids one to take the risk of\ndeciding in favor of liberty. Hence, in the following instances one\nmust decide against liberty:\n\n(a) in negative doubts when the validity of acts is at stake. Example:\nTitus is uncertain whether the law requires the age of fourteen for a\nvalid contract of marriage; he is also uncertain whether he is fourteen\nyears old. The doubt of law and of fact does not excuse Titus from the\nlaw, if he wishes to marry. He must clear up the doubts, and if\nnecessary he must secure a dispensation.\n\n(b) in negative doubts when reasons of charity or justice forbid one to\ntake risks. Example: Caius is uncertain whether he paid Sempronius for\nwork done for him. He is bound to make inquiries about the matter.\n\n711. Probabilism cannot be applied, therefore, when the mental state of\nthe subject is doubt, weakly founded opinion, or practical uncertainty.\nBut, even when one holds an opinion as solidly and certainly probable,\none may not follow it as a moral guide, if there is something in the\nnature of the object or matter itself which forbids this.\n\n(a) A probability of law favoring liberty may not be followed in those\nmatters in which some natural, divine or human law requires one to\nfollow the safer side (see cases enumerated above, 678, 661). Example:\nThe following opinions are probable; that instruction regarding the\nTrinity and the Incarnation is not indispensable for salvation; that\nrye-bread is valid matter for the Eucharist. But in practice it would\nbe unlawful to take the risk of following these opinions, except in\ncases of extreme necessity, when nothing else can be done.\n\n(b) A probability of fact favoring liberty may not be followed so long\nas there remains nothing more than probability of fact; for, while the\nwill of the lawgiver may on account of probability of non-obligation\nchange one\u2019s relation to the law from obligation to non-obligation, it\ndoes not change facts. Examples: On Friday Titus doubts whether a dish\nbefore him is meat or fish; probably it is meat on account of its\nappearance, probably it is fish on account of its odor. At night Fr.\nCaius is much fatigued, and doubts whether he has said Vespers.\nProbably he did not, because he cannot recall what feast will be\ncelebrated tomorrow; probably he did, because he remembers having said\nCompline.\n\n712. For probabilities of fact, to which as such their system does not\napply, Probabilists offer the following solutions:\n\n(a) In certain cases one may take from the doubt of fact its bearing on\nobligation, by recourse to the manifest will of the legislator as\ndeclared in the law itself or expressed through dispensation. Examples:\nWhile hearing confessions, Sempronius doubts whether his jurisdiction\nhas already expired. He cannot recall the date of expiration, but,\nthinking the matter over, he sees that probably the date has not\narrived. His difficulty is therefore solved, for the Code (Canon 209)\nsupplies jurisdiction in cases of probability of fact. Titus and Caia\nwish to marry. There is a doubt whether or not they are first cousins,\nbut it seems that probably they are not so related. Their difficulty is\nsolved by obtaining a dispensation.\n\n(b) In other cases one may change the probability of fact into a\nprobability of law by recourse to a probable opinion or argument that\nunder the existing doubt of fact the legislator does not wish the law\nto oblige. Examples: Titus, who has what is probably lawful food before\nhim, argues with himself that it is not likely that the Church wills to\nput him to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required to order\nother food. Fr. Titus, who has probably said Vespers, argues that\ntheologians of authority teach that, when there is a serious reason for\nthinking one has performed such an obligation, it may be presumed that\nthe Church does not require more.\n\n713. If a case of probability of fact on which obligation hinges cannot\nbe solved by recourse to the expressed or inferred will of the\nlawgiver, one has no choice but to follow the safer side, for then,\nthough it is probable that a certain thing is a fact, it is not\nprobable that one has a right to act. Example: Sempronius, while\nhunting, sees an object moving in the bushes. The probabilities are\nthat it is not a human being, but it is not probable that Sempronius\nhas the right to risk homicide by firing at it.\n\n714. Not all Probabilists use the principle of the presumptive will of\nthe lawgiver for all cases of negative doubt; some employ different\nprinciples for different kinds of doubt, and sometimes arrive at other\ndecisions than those given in the preceding paragraphs. Thus, they give\nsuch rules as the following:\n\n(a) In negative doubt of law regarding the lawfulness of an act, use\nthe principle that law or liberty should be followed according as one\nor the other is in possession (see 660). Example: He who has only\nslight reasons for thinking that a law exists, or that it is of grave\nobligation, or that it extends to his case, etc., may decide against\nthe law. But he who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law has\nbeen abrogated, or that a dispensation has been granted, etc., must\ndecide for obligation.\n\n(b) In negative doubt of law regarding the validity of a past act, use\nthe principle _that what was done is to be held as rightly done_.\nExample: He who has no reasons, or only trifling ones, for thinking\nthat a Sacrament was not administered validly or received validly,\nshould decide for validity.\n\n(c) In negative doubts of fact, use the principles that one should\njudge according to what usually happens, or that facts must not be\ntaken for granted but must be established, or that presumption favors\nthat which has possession. Examples: If there is no good reason to\nthink that a conscientious person gave consent to a temptation, one may\ndecide for the negative, since that would usually be true. If there is\nno good reason to think that one has made a vow, one may decide for the\nnegative, since the burden of proof is with the other side. If, in a\nquestion about fast and abstinence, it is uncertain whether or not a\nperson has reached twenty-one years, or whether Friday has commenced,\nthe presumption is for the negative, since liberty has been in\npossession; but if it is uncertain whether a person has reached the age\nof sixty or whether Friday has ended, the presumption is for the\nnegative, since the law has been in possession.\n\n715. Having discussed the cases to which Probabilism is not extended,\nwe pass on to the cases to which it is applied. Probabilism is used in\nany and every case where speculative certainty as to what is lawful or\nunlawful is not had, but where there is only speculative probability\nagainst an opposite probability.\n\n(a) Probabilism is used not only in probability of law, but also in\nprobability of fact that can be reduced to probability of law, as was\nexplained above (see 712).\n\n(b) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether or not the\nquestion be about the existence or the cessation of the law. There is\nprobability against existence of law, when one has good reason to think\nthat a law was not made or not promulgated, or that the time when it\ngoes into force has not arrived, or that it does not apply to certain\npersons or circumstances, etc.; there is probability for cessation of\nlaw, when it is certain that a law did exist, but one has good reason\nto think that it ceased or was abrogated, that one is excused or\ndispensed from it.\n\n(c) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether the law in\nquestion be natural, divine or human--that is, in every case of law\nwhere invincible ignorance is possible (see 319 sqq., 356).\n\n716. The claim of Probabilism is that, in all the cases given above, he\nwho follows an opinion excusing him from obligation, may act with a\npractically certain conscience and be free of all moral guilt, if the\nopinion is theoretically and seriously probable. The arguments for this\nthesis are of two kinds: (a) extrinsic proofs, from the approval given\nProbabilism by the Church and the favor it has enjoyed among moralists;\n(b) intrinsic proofs, from the nature of law and obligation, and the\nsuperiority of Probabilism in practice.\n\n717. Extrinsic Arguments.--(a) The Church gave explicit approval to\nProbabilism by praising the theological works of St. Alphonsus in which\nProbabilism is defended; she gave and continues to give implicit\napproval by the freedom she has granted to the teachers of this system\nfrom the days of Bartholomew Medina, its first expounder (1527-1581),\ndown to the present. The Church even makes use of the principles of\nProbabilism in interpreting her own laws, as is evidenced by such rules\nof law as the following in the Decretals: \u201cThings that are odious\nshould be understood strictly, things that are favorable widely\u201d (Rule\n15); \u201cWhere the law is doubtful, follow the minimum\u201d (Rule 30); \u201cWhere\nthe lawgiver could have spoken more clearly, the interpretation should\nbe against him\u201d (Rule 57); \u201cThe kinder interpretation should be given\npenal laws\u201d (Rule 89).\n\n(b) In the Patristic and medieval periods Probabilism had not been\nscientifically formulated, but many of the Fathers and early Doctors\nsolved cases probabilistically, and there are not a few passages in the\ngreat theologians before the sixteenth century which enunciate the same\nprinciples as those advocated by Probabilists. When the system was\nformulated by Medina in 1577, it met with universal favor among\nCatholic moralists, and, though it suffered an eclipse from the middle\nof the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, it has been\ngrowing in influence since the days of St. Alphonsus, and appears today\nto have recovered its former preeminence. Among its adherents are some\nof the greatest names in the history of theology, and it is not\nconfined to any particular school or body.\n\n718. Objections of Equiprobabilists.--(a) The praise given to St.\nAlphonsus by the Church reflects no glory on Probabilism, since the\nSaint rejected Probabilism and professed Equiprobabilism. Further, more\nthan one Pope, and especially Innocent XI (1676-1689), has expressed a\ndislike for Probabilism, while the silence of others does not mean more\nthan toleration. The legal axioms used by canonists apply to the\nexternal forum, and cannot be used equally in the forum of conscience.\n(b) Probabiliorism had the field before Probabilism, having been\nformulated and defended before Medina appeared, and it is that more\nancient system that is represented today in a milder form as\nEquiprobabilism.\n\n719. Answer of the Probabilists.--(a) St. Alphonsus teaches Probabilism\nin his Moral Theology, which is his chief work; if later, in his old\nage, he was an Equiprobabilist, it can be shown that the change was not\nfree, but under compulsion. As to Pope Innocent XI, he is the only Pope\nwho expressed disapproval of Probabilism, and even he refrained from\nany official pronouncement. The fact that hundreds of works written by\nProbabilists since the sixteenth century have not been censured or\nforbidden by the Church authorities, indicates more than mere\ntoleration.\n\n(b) Probabiliorism, as a systematized method, preceded Probabilism as a\nsystematized method only by a brief interval, if at all. Before the\n16th century neither of these systems had been formulated, and neither\ncan make much of the argument of priority in time. As for\nEquiprobabilism, it is first seen in the writings of Christopher\nRassler (about 1713) and of Eusebius Amort (1692-1775).\n\n720. Intrinsic Arguments for Probabilism.--(a) Theoretical\nArgument.--An uncertain law does not oblige. But a law is uncertain if\nthere is a solidly probable opinion against its existence, or for its\ncessation, even though the other side be equally or more probable.\nTherefore, he who follows such an opinion does not violate any\nobligation.\n\n(b) Practical Argument.--Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism impose on\nconfessors and the faithful impossible burdens, since, as was explained\nabove (see 683 sqq.), they require that one compare and weigh\nprobabilities, decide whether or not possession is had by the law or by\nliberty, etc.; whereas Probabilism is simple and easily applied,\nrequiring only that one be convinced that one\u2019s opinion is really\nprobable, and that one use it in good faith.\n\n721. The proposition that an uncertain law does not oblige (saving\ncases of validity, etc., as above, 678), is defended as follows:\n\n(a) If the uncertainty arises from the law itself, because it has not\nbeen clearly worded or sufficiently promulgated, the truth of the\nproposition is manifest, for the very nature of law requires that it be\nbrought to the knowledge of those for whom it is made (see 285).\n\n(b) If the uncertainty arises from the invincible ignorance of one who\nis subject to the law, the proposition is true in the sense that no one\nis a transgressor in the internal forum who fails against a law\nunwittingly (see 327, 489 sqq.). But an act that transgresses no law is\nlawful in conscience, for all that is not forbidden is lawful.\n\n722. The adversaries of Probabilism offer the following criticism:\n\n(a) As to the proposition that \u201can uncertain law does not oblige,\u201d the\nuse of this principle by Probabilism may be considered as a begging of\nthe whole question; for what is in dispute is whether, in case a law is\nuncertain, there is or is not a higher law that requires one to decide\nfor obligation. It can be shown, however, that there is such a higher\nlaw; for the legislator cannot be willing that his ordinances be at the\nmercy of every uncertainty or loophole which subtle minds can devise,\nand God cannot be willing that those who are subject to laws should\nexpose themselves to sin by deciding against a law because it appears\nto them to be of doubtful obligation.\n\n(b) As to the proofs given for that proposition, they proceed from an\nincomplete enumeration, for a law can be doubtful on account of\nvincible ignorance, as well as for the reasons given. And no one will\nmaintain that vincible ignorance excuses.\n\n723. The Probabilists reply: (a) The principle that \u201can uncertain law\ndoes not oblige,\u201d cannot render law nugatory, since there is question\nhere only of honest doubt, not of pretended or responsible ignorance.\nNeither can that principle expose one to the danger of formal sin (see\n249), since it is supposed that he who follows it is convinced that it\nis true, and that he has the right to regulate his conduct by it. It\ndoes expose to the danger of material sin (see 249), since the law\nabout which there is uncertainty may be existent; but we are not\nobliged to avoid every danger of material sin, else we should be under\nthe intolerable necessity of fulfilling not only all certain, but all\nuncertain duties. Moreover, the danger of material sin is not avoided\nby any moral system except Tutiorism, since even equiprobable and more\nprobable opinions may be false.\n\n(b) The enumeration of cases of doubtful law is sufficient; for, as\njust remarked, only those cases are being considered in which one is\njudging about one\u2019s duty in good faith.\n\n724. The second proposition used above as the Minor of the argument for\nProbabilism--that \u201ca law is uncertain whenever there is a solidly\nprobable opinion against its existence or for its cessation\u201d--is\ndefended by the very definition of the term \u201cuncertain.\u201d\n\nA thing is said to be accepted as certain when one yields it firm\nassent and has no serious misgivings that it may be false; hence, the\nuncertain is that which is not assented to firmly (the doubtful), or\nthat which does not exclude serious doubts about its truth (matter of\nopinion). Now, a law whose existence or obligation seems likely, but\nagainst which there militates a solidly probable argument, is not so\nfirmly established as to inhibit every prudent doubt. In other words,\nsuch a law is uncertain.\n\n725. Criticism of the Argument in the Preceding Paragraph.--(a) The\nsupposition on which the argument rests is false. It supposes that the\ninterpretation of the legal axiom that \u201ca doubtful law does not\noblige,\u201d should be drawn from the philosophical definition of the\nterms, whereas it should be drawn from the sense given it by other\nrules of law. Now, there are canonical rules which declare that in\ndoubt one should follow that which has possession, or that which seems\nmore probable. Hence, the axiom quoted by the Probabilists refers only\nto cases of negative doubt; the other two rules refer to cases of doubt\nin the wide sense, or to cases of opinion; otherwise, we should have to\nadmit that these legal maxims are contradictory, one to the other.\nThus, it appears that Probabilism is based on a principle formulated to\nsolve difficulties of an entirely different kind from those which the\nsystem deals with.\n\n(b) The argumentation itself is fallacious. It takes for granted that\nan opinion is certainly and solidly probable, not only when it has no\nopposite or when its opposite is less probable, but also when its\nopposite is equally or more probable. This cannot be. Solid probability\non the other side of a question must create doubt about an opinion\nheld, and so make it at best uncertainly probable or probably probable;\nwhile greater likelihood or presumption on the other side must make\none\u2019s own opinion appear imprudent and unworthy of a rational being,\nand therefore not solidly probable.\n\n726. The Probabilists answer: (a) The two principles with reference to\ndoubtful law are understood and proved by Probabilism by an analysis of\nthe notions of obligation and incertitude (see 285, 654), and hence\nthey apply to every case that is restricted to the question of probable\nlawfulness or unlawfulness.\n\nThe rules quoted against Probabilism--there are some that might also be\nquoted against Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism--are opposed to it\nonly in appearance, since they deal with matters that are outside its\nsphere (see 697). Thus, in civil cases when both ownership and\npossession are doubtful, the decision must be given for the more\nprobable side, since the issue is not what is lawful, but what seems to\nbe true. As to the principle of possession, it is not, as supposed,\nunfavorable, but favorable to Probabilism; since liberty, inasmuch as\nit is presupposed by obligation (for only those who have freedom can\nreceive obligation), has priority and must be given the benefit of the\ndoubt, whenever a strictly probable reason in its favor cannot be\nrefuted.\n\n(b) Solid probability for the law creates doubt of the truth of the\nopinion for liberty, but it does not create doubt of its probability;\nfor truth is the agreement of one\u2019s judgment with the facts,\nprobability the appearance of such agreement on account of the\narguments by which the judgment is supported. Hence, greater\nprobability for law does not make uncertain the probability there is\nfor liberty. Neither is it a sign of imprudence to accept the less\nprobable, if one has sincerely and diligently sought the truth; for\neven the more probable may not be true, and the great majority of\nmoralists hold that one is not obliged to follow it.\n\n727. Criticism of the Pragmatic Test Offered by\nProbabilists.--Probabilism boasts of the ease with which it can be used\n(see 700, 720); but the ease with which it can be misused is greater\nstill.\n\n(a) Persons not inclined to piety must quickly fall into Laxism, if\nthey make use of this system, for they will accustom themselves to find\nevery sort of pretext to escape unwelcome duties by raising doubts and\ndignifying them with the name of probable opinions; they will follow,\nnow one opinion, now its contrary, according as it suits their\ninterests; they will become stubborn in their own views, and unwilling\nto change or accept instruction.\n\n(b) Persons inclined to piety, if guided by Probabilist principles,\nwill soon lose all interest in what is higher and better, and content\nthemselves with the minimum; for in every case of uncertainty\nProbabilism permits one to choose what is less safe and less probable.\n\n728. General Answer of the Probabilists to the Objections of the\nPreceding Paragraph.--(a) The history of Probabilism contradicts these\nobjections. From its beginning to the present day it has been defended\nand followed by men noted for piety, who used kindness towards others,\nbut were severe with themselves. While the principles of stricter\nsystems have proved a torture both to confessors and penitents, no\ndetriment to holiness is observed from the use of Probabilism.\n\n(b) The nature of Probabilism refutes the objections in question. There\nis no system so good that it may not be perverted and turned to evil,\nand stricter systems have been converted into Tutiorism or Rigorism.\nBut the logical and usual results of Probabilism are not a lowering of\nmoral standards. If these evils follow it, they do so only when it is\nnot rightly understood or not rightly applied.\n\n729. The charges of a tendency to Laxism are thus answered:\n\n(a) Probabilism holds that only learned theologians are judges of\ninternal probability. Others must not decide for themselves, but must\nseek instruction from their spiritual guides who have competent\nknowledge. The moralists themselves must not be so wedded to their\nopinions that they are not always ready to change when they find they\nare wrong or learn that the Church does not admit their view.\n\n(b) Probabilism permits one to use contrary probable opinions in\ndifferent instances (e.g., to use for one will or testament the opinion\nthat informality makes it invalid, and for another will the opinion\nthat informality does not make it invalid); but it does not permit\ncontrary opinions to be used in the same case for one\u2019s advantage\n(e.g., to use the opinion that an informal will is valid, in order to\nsecure an inheritance, and at the same time to use the opinion that it\nis invalid, in order to escape the payment of legacies).\n\n(c) Probabilism does not sanction the use of a probable opinion, unless\nit has been examined without prejudice, and has been honestly judged to\nbe of certain and solid value (see 708 sqq.). Neither does it approve\nof the conduct of those who put themselves voluntarily in a state of\ndoubt. On the contrary, it considers such conduct as sinful, and as\ngravely so, if the matter be serious and if this occur frequently.\nExample; Titus is uncertain whether three hours remain before Communion\ntime, and yet he takes some refreshment, and thus makes it doubtful\nwhether he has the right to receive Communion. The principle that a\ndoubtful law does not oblige will enable Titus to receive Communion,\nbut it does not excuse him from venial sin in putting himself without\ncause in a state of doubt and in danger of material sin.\n\n730. The charge of a tendency to minimism in spiritual matters is thus\nanswered: Probabilism deals only with what is lawful, not with what is\nbetter; it aims to show only what one may do without sin, not what one\nought to do in order to become perfect. Hence, it is used when there is\nquestion of imposing obligations, or of deciding whether a certain\ncourse is lawful; for in these matters one must be kind, lest by\nexceeding one\u2019s authority one drive others to sin; but it is not used\nwhen there is question of giving spiritual advice and direction, for\nhere all should be exhorted to seek after progress in holiness.\n\n731. Compensationism.--Between 1850 and 1880 a number of theologians,\nfeeling that there were serious difficulties against all the systems up\nto then considered, developed a reformed or restricted Probabilism,\nwhich would not be open to the criticisms made against ordinary\nProbabilism, and yet would have those good qualities that make it\npreferable to the stricter systems. This new doctrine is called\nCompensationism, because it permits one to follow a probable opinion\nagainst the law only when there is present a sufficient reason to\ncompensate for this course of action.\n\n732. The following rules are, therefore, given as restrictions on the\nuse of Probabilism: (a) the more serious or the more probable the\ndoubtful law, the greater the reason must be to justify one in acting\nagainst it; (b) the higher and greater the good to be obtained from the\nexercise of freedom against a doubtful law, the less the reason that\nsuffices for exercising freedom.\n\n733. Illustrations of the Use of Compensationism.--(a) Titus, a poor\nman, is in uncertainty, through no fault of his own, about two debts.\nHe thinks it more probable that he owes $10 to Sempronius, and 10 cents\nto Caius; but he believes it is really probable that he has paid both\ndebts. He foresees that, if he offers the money to Sempronius, he will\nbe subjected to serious quarrels and vexations, or at least that very\nbad use will be made of the money; while, if he offers to pay Caius,\nthe latter may take some slight offense. He decides that there are\nproportionate reasons in each case to justify his following the less\nprobable opinion.\n\n(b) Fr. Titus thinks that a penitent is more probably bound to ask\npardon of one whom he has offended. But he knows that, if he imposes\nthe obligation, the present good faith of the penitent will be changed\nto bad faith, and he will refuse to do what is imposed. Fr. Titus\ndecides, therefore, that it will be more profitable for the penitent if\nthe less probable opinion--that there is no obligation--be followed.\n\n734. The two chief arguments for Compensationism, which are also the\ntwo chief objections it makes against ordinary Probabilism, are:\n\n(a) The obligation of a law depends on the knowledge one has about it.\nIf one knows that the law exists, there is certain obligation; if one\nknows that the law does not exist, there is no obligation; if one holds\nit as probable that the law exists, there is probable obligation. Now,\nsince one may not be excused from obligation unless there is a reason\nproportionate to the obligation itself (see 495), he who is under\nprobable or more probable obligation must have a graver reason for\nusing freedom than he who is under no obligation (against Probabilism),\nbut he need not have as grave a reason as one who is under a certain\nobligation (against Probabiliorism). Hence, one may not act against a\nprobable law, unless by so doing there is some good secured that\ncompensates for the danger to which the right of the law is exposed.\n\n(b) It is lawful to perform a good act from which an evil effect will\nresult, only if one has a proportionally grave cause for permitting the\nevil effect (see 102 sqq.). But he who follows the opinion for liberty\nagainst a more probable or equally probable opinion for law, performs\nan act from which will probably result the evil of a material\ntransgression of law. Therefore, one may not use Probabilism unless by\nso doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger of\nmaterial sin to which one exposes oneself.\n\n735. Criticisms from the Probabilists.--(a) The dictum that a doubtful\nlaw obliges doubtfully cannot be applied, for in actual life there is\nno middle way between decision for the law and decision for liberty,\nunless it be indecision. The principle of Compensationism must mean,\nthen, that we must always decide for a doubtful law (which is\nTutiorism), or remain in suspense (which is no help to the one in\ndoubt).\n\n(b) The supposition that there must always be some special reason of\ngood to offset the evil of the danger of material sin is not correct.\nFor there always exists a compensation proportionate to the danger,\nnamely, the exercise of liberty, a great gift of God, and the avoidance\nof the burden of fulfilling all uncertain obligations.\n\n736. Reply of the Compensationists.--(a) The principle that a doubtful\nlaw obliges doubtfully means only that the reasons in favor of the law\ndeserve some consideration, and should not be put aside unless one has\nsome better reason than mere arbitrariness, self-will, or the intention\nto take always the easier way. There is no question of either Tutiorism\nor hesitation, but only of a prudent and honest facing of the fact that\nthere are two sides to one\u2019s doubt.\n\n(b) It is not true that the exercise of liberty and the escape from the\nburden of uncertain obligations are always a sufficient compensation\nfor the danger of material sin. For material sin is not only an evil in\nitself, as being a violation of law; it is also the source of many and\ngreat evils both to the individual and society, such as wrong habits\nacquired, scandal given, etc. Liberty is a great gift, but it should\nnot become a cloak for malice. Neither is the foregoing of liberty so\ngreat an evil that one should not be willing to suffer it now and then\nin order to prevent the greater evils spoken of just above.\n\n737. Other Objections Against the System of Compensation.\n\n(a) From Authority.--Compensationism is of very recent origin, and it\ncannot be admitted that the right solution of moral difficulties was\nunknown before this new system appeared.\n\n(b) From Reason.--It runs counter to the principle commonly accepted in\nthe controversies of the systems, namely, that the decisive factor as\nto obligation in doubt is knowledge. For it introduces a new factor,\nthat of sufficient reason or compensation.\n\n(c) From Serviceability.--It is easy to say in the abstract that one\nshould always have a suitable reason for adopting a probable opinion in\nfavor of liberty. But, when one attempts to apply this rule to actual\ncases, difficulties innumerable arise (searchings of motives, comparison\nof probabilities, measuring of consequences, etc.), so that for use\nCompensationism is impossible, or impracticable.\n\n738. Reply of Compensationists.--(a) Compensationism is an example of\ndoctrinal progression from the implicit to the explicit. The principles\non which it is based are found in the teaching and practice of the most\nancient authorities.\n\n(b) Sufficient reason is not a new principle, since it is admitted by\nall moralists for the case of double effect (see above, 102 Sqq.); its\napplication to the solution of doubts of conscience is not an\ninnovation, since the cases of doubt and of double effect are analogous.\n\n(c) Compensationism is not intended as a system to be applied by those\nwho have not sufficient theological training, but as a guide for\nmoralists, directors and confessors. That it is not difficult, is clear\nfrom the fact that it is only an application of the commonly accepted\nprinciple of double effect, and that Probabilists themselves recommend\nit and make very general use of it, as if they instinctively recognized\nits necessity.\n\n739. Practical Conclusions.--From the foregoing discussions one may\ndeduce three rules for the guidance of those who are not expert\ntheologians:\n\n(a) If your state of conscience is certitude (i.e., if you are firmly\nconvinced which way your duty lies), entertain no fears or scrupulous\ndoubts, and, having done your part to understand your obligations, you\nneed not hesitate to follow your conscience.\n\n(b) If your state of conscience is imprudent assent (i.e., the\nacceptance of what you recognize as unlikely), or if it is suspended\nassent (i.e., a wavering between opposites), do not act blindly, but\nseek truth and decision.\n\n(c) If your state of conscience is opinion (i.e., the acceptance of\nwhat you regard as likely though uncertain), consult your confessor or\nanother competent theologian; if there is no time for this, decide for\nany course that seems true and prudent (see on perplexed conscience,\n611 sqq.).\n\n740. Regarding the respective merits and the use of the rival systems\nof conscience, the following conclusions may be drawn:\n\n(a) If there is question of what is to be counselled, one should be a\n\u201cMeliorist,\u201d for the better and more perfect is more advisable than\nwhat is merely good or lawful. All Christians should be directed to\naspire after holiness, but, if one is unwilling to follow a counsel, it\nshould not be imposed on him as a precept. Naturally, of those in\nhigher station higher things are required.\n\n(b) As between doubt and certitude regarding obligations, one must be a\n\u201cCertitudinist,\u201d that is, one must resolve doubts or slight\nprobabilities into direct or indirect certitude (as was explained above\nin 641 sqq.). If a doubt remains, one must for that case be a\nTutiorist, that is, one must follow the safer side (as explained in\n661).\n\n(c) As between the safer and the less safe, one must be a Tutiorist,\nwhen some law requires this, as is the case when validity or supreme\nrights are at stake (as explained in 678, 679).\n\n(d) As between the more likely and the less likely, one must be a\nProbabiliorist, when this is according to law, as is the case in civil\nsuits where the preponderance of evidence must be followed (see 697).\n\n(e) One may not follow either Tutiorism (see above, 676) as a general\nmoral system, nor Laxism (see above, 681).\n\n(f) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by no contrary\nprobable opinion or by none whose arguments cannot be overcome, one is\nfree to follow that opinion, as explained in 649, 703.\n\n(g) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by an opinion that is\nless, equally or more probable, one is free to act according to the\nprinciples of Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism or\nCompensationism, according to conviction.\n\n741. As for the use of moral systems by confessors, the two following\nrules are generally admitted:\n\n(a) If a penitent has formed his conscience according to one moral\nsystem, the confessor has no right to impose on him the opinion of a\ndifferent moral system; for the Church allows liberty.\n\n(b) If a penitent has not formed his conscience according to any moral\nsystem and seeks the answer to a moral doubt, the confessor should\ndecide, not necessarily for what his own system declares lawful, but\nfor what appears, all the circumstances being considered, to be most\nadvantageous spiritually for the penitent. Example: Fr. Titus is a\nProbabilist, and he usually advises questioners to follow opinions that\nare less probable; while Fr. Caius, who is a Probabiliorist, always\nrequires that such persons follow the more probable opinions. Both act\nunwisely. For persons who are better disposed, it will often be more\nprofitable to follow what is more probable or favorable to obligation;\nfor those Whose dispositions are less good, milder opinions may be\nrecommended, lest the smoking flax of goodness that is in them be\nentirely extinguished. Neither is it right to impose as certain an\nobligation which the penitent, if he were acquainted with Moral\nTheology, would see is controverted.\n\n742. In case of disagreement between confessor and penitent as to\nwhether absolution may be given, whose opinion should prevail? (a) If\nthe disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor\nhimself has to judge (e.g., the disposition of the penitent, the\nrequisite matter for absolution, etc.), the opinion of the confessor\nmust prevail; for the act of judging is his own, and he must be guided\ntherefore by his own conviction.\n\n(b) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the\nconfessor is not the judge (such as the controversies of schools and\ntheologians), the confessor may not refuse absolution to a\nwell-disposed penitent, just because the latter will not accept the\nopinion of his school or system. If it be manifest that the penitent\u2019s\nopinion is false or improbable, absolution may be denied him, unless it\nseems more prudent to leave him in good faith.\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\nSPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY\n\n743. In the First Part of this work, the means to man\u2019s Last End were\nspoken of in a general way; the features that are common to all good\nacts--that they be human, morally deserving, directed according to law\nand conscience--were treated. In the present Part the means to the Last\nEnd will be discussed in particular, and we shall consider in turn the\nkinds of duties that are owed by all men and those owed by persons in\nspecial states of life.\n\n\nQuestion I\n\nTHE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN\n\n744. Good habits, specifically different, are all reducible to seven\nmost general virtues (see 150, 151), and hence in studying these seven\nvirtues, we shall at the same time study all the common duties of man.\n\n745. The properties of the seven infused virtues are chiefly four:\n\n(a) In the first place, these virtues may be increased: \u201cThis I pray,\nthat your charity may more and more abound\u201d (Phil, i. 9). The increase\ntakes place _ex opere operato_ through the Sacraments, or _ex opere\noperantis_ through meritorious works--that is, whenever sanctifying\ngrace, their root, is increased.\n\n(b) A second property of the infused virtues is that they may be lost:\n\u201cI have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first\ncharity\u201d (Apoc., ii. 4); \u201cSome have made shipwreck concerning the\nfaith\u201d (I Tim., i. 19). The loss is caused by the contrary of the\nvirtue: faith is lost by disbelief, hope by despair; charity and the\nmoral virtues are lost by any mortal sin, for they are built on\nsanctifying grace, which mortal sin destroys.\n\n(c) A third property of the infused virtues is that they cannot be\ndiminished directly. If we leave out of consideration their opposites\n(which, as just said, remove these virtues entirely), there is nothing\nelse that can act directly upon them. Mere failure to exercise them\ncannot lessen them, since they are caused by divine infusion, not by\nhuman exercise; venial sin cannot lessen them, since it does not lessen\ngrace on which they depend.\n\n(d) A fourth property of the infused virtues is that they are\ndiminished indirectly. Failure to practise them or venial sin does\ndiminish the ease and fervor with which the acts of these virtues are\nexercised; and thus indirectly--that is, by preparing the way for acts\nthat are directly contrary--neglect or venial sin diminishes the habits\nthemselves.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: THE VIRTUE OF FAITH\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 1-9.)\n\n746. The order of the theological virtues here followed is that given\nby St. Paul in I Cor., xiii. 13--viz., faith, hope, charity. The order\nof these virtues is twofold: (a) according to dignity the order is\ncharity, hope, faith; (b) according to time, the order is that of I\nCor., xiii. The habits of these three virtues are infused at the same\ntime (i.e., at the moment when grace is conferred), but their acts are\nnot simultaneous, and one must believe before one can hope or love.\n\n747. Excellence of the Virtue of Faith.--(a) Faith is the beginning of\nthe supernatural life, the foundation and the root of justification,\nwithout which it is impossible to please God and arrive at fellowship\nwith Him. (b) It is an anticipation of the end of the supernatural\nlife, for by faith we believe that which we shall behold in the\nbeatific vision: \u201cAll these died according to faith, not having\nreceived the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them\nand confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth\u201d\n(Heb., xi. 13).\n\n748. Utility of Faith for the Individual.--(a) Through faith the\nintellect receives a new light, which discloses to it a higher\nworld--\u201cthe wisdom of God in a mystery\u201d (I Cor., ii. 7)--and which\nilluminates even this lower world with a heavenly brightness, that man\nmay know more quickly, more surely, and more perfectly the natural\ntruths that pertain to God and duty. (b) The will is strengthened to\nperform duties valiantly through the motives and examples which faith\noffers: the patriarchs of old \u201cby faith conquered kingdoms, wrought\njustice, obtained promises, recovered strength from weakness\u201d (Heb.,\nxi. 33). In adversity faith is a stay and a consolation: \u201cFor what\nthings soever were written, were written for our learning, that through\npatience and the comfort of the scriptures, we might have hope\u201d (Rom.,\nxv. 4).\n\n749. Utility of Faith for Society.--(a) Domestic society is defended in\nits security and happiness by faith, which teaches the sacramental\ncharacter of marriage, which offers the model of the Holy Family to\nChristian homes, which never ceases to declare in the name of God the\nduties of husbands and wives, parents and children. (b) Without faith\nand religion civil society cannot be maintained in strength and\nprosperity. It is faith in God more than laws or armies that gives\nsecurity to life, reputation, and property, with order and peace at\nhome and abroad.\n\n750. The Meaning of Faith.--In Holy Scripture and other religious\nwritings the word _faith_ has various meanings.\n\n(a) Sometimes it stands for a promise, or for the quality of being true\nto one\u2019s promises. Examples: St. Paul condemns widows who remarry\nagainst their word, \u201cbecause they have made void their first faith\n(promise)\u201d (I Tim., v. 12). Speaking of the unbelief of the Jews, he\nsays: \u201cShall their unbelief make the faith (i.e., fidelity to promise\nor faithfulness) of God without effect? God forbid. But God is true\u201d\n(Rom, iii. 3, 4).\n\n(b) Sometimes the term _faith_ stands for good reputation, or for\nconfidence in another. Examples: \u201cHe that discloseth the secret of a\nfriend loseth his faith (credit, reputation), and shall never find a\nfriend to his mind\u201d (Ecclus., xxvii. 17); \u201cO thou of little faith\n(trust, confidence), why didst thou doubt?\u201d (Matt., xiv. 31).\n\n(c) Sometimes _faith_ stands for truths or doctrines offered for one\u2019s\nbelief, or for the assent of the mind to the judgment of conscience or\nto the revelation of God. Examples: \u201cThou has not denied My faith\u201d\n(that is, \u201cthe truths revealed by Me,\u201d Apoc. ii. 13); \u201cAll that is not\nof faith (i.e., from the firm conviction of conscience) is sin\u201d (Rom,\nxiv. 23); \u201cWithout faith (i.e., assent to the unseen on the word of\nGod) it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must\nbelieve\u201d (Heb., xi. 6).\n\n751. It is faith only in the last sense that is known as the\ntheological virtue of faith, and hence with it alone we are here\nconcerned. St. Paul describes this faith as follows: \u201cFaith is the\nsubstance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear\nnot\u201d (Heb., xi. 1). This verse is variously interpreted. (a) According\nto St. Chrysostom, the meaning is: Faith is the subsistence or\nanticipated existence in the soul of future blessings that are hoped\nfor, through the firm confidence it gives; it is the conviction of the\nreality of the unseen. (b) According to St. Thomas, the meaning is:\nFaith is the substance or basis on which is built the hope of\nblessedness, or on which rests as on its foundation the whole work of\njustification; it is an argument producing certainty of that which is\nnot seen. The elements of St. Thomas\u2019 interpretation have been\nincorporated into the Vatican Council\u2019s definition: \u201cThe Catholic\nChurch professes that this faith which is the beginning of human\nsalvation is a supernatural virtue by which we, with the aid and\ninspiration of the grace of God, believe that the things revealed by\nHim are true, not because the intrinsic truth of these things has been\nperceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority\nof God Himself revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived\u201d\n(Sess. 3, chap. 3, Denz. 1789).\n\n752. Thus, faith is an intellectual habit and act, but it differs from\nall other intellectual habits and acts as follows: (a) it differs from\nscience, vision, understanding, for its object is \u201cthe things that\nappear not\u201d; (b) it differs from opinion, doubt, suspicion, for it is a\nfirm \u201csubstance,\u201d a certain \u201cevidence\u201d; (c) it differs from human faith\nor belief resting on man\u2019s word and promises, for it is the pledge,\nbeginning and cornerstone of the happiness promised by God Himself.\n\n753. Faith will now be considered according to two aspects: (a)\nobjectively, as regards the things that are believed by him who has\nfaith; (b) subjectively, as regards the habit and act of the believer\nwhich put him in contact with these truths of the unseen world.\n\n754. The Object of Faith.--There is a twofold object of faith, viz.,\nmaterial and formal.\n\n(a) The material object, or the truth that is believed, includes all\nthat is contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down by\ntradition. The principal material object is God Himself as the Deity,\nor Supreme Truth in Being (_prima veritas in essendo_); the secondary\nmaterial object embraces all other revealed truths.\n\n(b) The formal object of faith, or the motive that prompts one to give\nassent to the material object, is the authority of God, who is Supreme\nTruth in Knowing and Speaking (_prima veritas in cognoscendo et\ndicendo_), and hence He can neither be deceived nor deceive.\n\n755. The material object of faith includes all truths revealed by God;\nbut, since it belongs to the Church to teach those truths, there is a\ndistinction of truths that are revealed by God but not defined by the\nChurch, and truths that are revealed by God and defined by the Church\nas revealed. Thus: (a) divine faith is belief in revealed truth that\nhas not been declared by the Church as revealed; (b) divine and\nCatholic faith is belief in a revealed truth that has been proposed as\nsuch by the Church, either solemnly or ordinarily. Example: Dogmas\ncontained in creeds, definitions of Popes or general councils. The\nVatican Council has determined the object of this faith: By divine and\nCatholic faith all those things must be believed which are contained in\nthe written word of God and in tradition, and which are proposed by the\nChurch, either by a solemn pronouncement or by her ordinary and\nuniversal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed (Ibid., Denz.\n1792).\n\n756. The formal object of faith extends to all truths that have been\nrevealed and to no others. Theologians discuss the status of certain\ntruths connected with revelation concerning which the Church is\nguaranteed infallibility on account of her teaching office. Special\ndifficulties arise in relation to: a) dogmatic facts, that is,\ndefinitions concerning particular facts closely related to dogma (e.g.,\nthat Anglican orders are invalid; that a particular book contains a\nsense contrary to revelation; that this Supreme Pontiff, legitimately\nelected, is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy and consequently\ninfallible); b) theological conclusions, that is, deductions drawn from\nrevealed truth.\n\nMany theologians teach that both dogmatic facts and theological\nconclusions when defined by the Church constitute a special object of\nfaith distinct from divine and Catholic faith, namely, ecclesiastical\nfaith. Accordingly, for them, ecclesiastical faith is the internal\nassent given to truths connected with revelation and defined by the\nChurch as true, the motive of assent being the infallibility of the\nChurch in her teaching office.\n\nOthers deny the existence of such faith and insist a) that dogmatic\nfacts are contained in revealed doctrine implicitly as singulars in\nuniversals and hence are believed before definition by divine faith\nimplicitly, and after definition by divine and Catholic faith, b) that\ntheological conclusions before definition are held by theological\nassent, afterwards by divine and Catholic faith. Some also have\nmaintained that before definition such conclusions belong to divine\nfaith. (For a summary of the various teachings on this problem see\nReginaldo-Maria Schultes, O.P., _Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum_,\npp. 46 ff.; Marin-Sola, O.P., _L\u2019Evolution homogene du Dogme\nCatholique_).\n\n757. Private revelations, even when approved by the Church, are not an\nobject of divine and Catholic faith, for they form no part of the\nrevelation given to the whole human race that was closed with the death\nof the Apostles and committed to the Church. Hence: (a) if they are\nnegatively approved by the Church, the approval means only that such\nrevelations contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, and are\nuseful and edifying; (b) if they are approved positively (as is the\ncase with the revelations of St. Hildegarde, St. Brigit, and St.\nCatherine of Siena), the approval means that they appear to be true\ndivine revelations and may be prudently accepted as such.\n\n758. The assent to be given to private revelations, therefore, is as\nfollows:\n\n(a) Such revelations should receive the assent of divine faith, if it\nis certain that they are genuine. This applies to those to whom and for\nwhom they were given, and probably to others also. It rarely happens,\nhowever, that the genuineness of a private revelation can be critically\nestablished, and the Church does not require that such revelations be\naccepted by all the faithful. To refuse assent, therefore, to a private\nrevelation is not generally an offense against divine faith.\n\n(b) Private revelations cannot receive the assent of Catholic faith,\nsince, even when approved by the Church, they are not proposed as a\npart of the Christian revelation committed to her care. To dissent from\nthem, therefore, is not a sin against Catholic faith, unless in\nrejecting them one would also reject defined dogma (e.g., by denying\nthe possibility of revelation).\n\n(c) Private revelations are not offered for the assent of\necclesiastical faith, since in approving them the Church does not\npropose them as necessarily connected with the exercise of her teaching\noffice or under guarantee of infallibility. To dissent from them,\ntherefore, is not a sin against ecclesiastical faith, unless other\nerrors (e.g., against the authority of the Church in matters connected\nwith revelation) are also involved.\n\n(d) Private revelations are offered for the assent of human faith,\nsince the Church proposes them to the faithful, if approved, as matters\nof pious opinion, which are according to the rules of prudence truly\nprobable on account of traditions in their favor, supported by suitable\ntestimony and documents (Benedict XIV, _De Canonizatione Sanctorum_,\nlib. II, cap. 23; III, cap. ult.; Sacred Cong. Rites, May 12, 1877, n.\n3419, ad 2). The Church permits, but does not exact belief in these\nrevelations. One would not be excused, however, who rejected them\nthrough pride or contempt, or without sufficient reason.\n\n759. Similarly, although the Church offers for human faith alone\ncertain particular facts of history, one who rejects them may easily be\nguilty of contempt or temerity. Such particular facts are: (a)\napparitions of heavenly beings in post-Biblical times, such as the\nappearance of the Archangel Michael in Monte Gargano about 525 and the\nappearance of the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes in 1858, for which the\nChurch has instituted feasts; (b) deeds related in the legends of the\nSaints, such as the victory of St. Catherine of Alexandria over the\npagan philosophers and the carrying of her body to Mt. Sinai by Angels,\nwhich the Church inserts in the Breviary lessons; (c) the authenticity\nof relics. In granting certificates of genuineness, the Church\nguarantees only that there is sufficient historical evidence or\nprobability for the belief that particular bones or other objects\nbelonged to a particular Saint.\n\n760. Many tenets of the Church, indeed, have not the prerogative of\ninfallibility--for example, decrees of the Popes not given _ex\ncathedra_, decisions of Congregations made with Papal approval,\nteachings of Bishops to particular members of the Church, doctrines\ncommonly held by Catholics as theological truths or certain\nconclusions. These decrees, decisions, etc., receive not the assent of\nCatholic faith, but what is called religious assent, which includes two\nthings, viz., external and internal assent.\n\n(a) External assent should be given such teachings--that is, the homage\nof respectful silence due to public authority. This does not forbid the\nsubmission of difficulties to the teaching authority, or the scientific\nexamination of objections that seem very strong.\n\n(b) Internal assent should be given such teaching--that is, the\nsubmission of the judgment of the individual to the judgment of the\nteacher who has the authority from Christ and assistance from the Holy\nSpirit. This internal assent differs, however, from the assent of\nfaith, inasmuch as it excludes fear of error, but not of the\npossibility of error, and it may later on be suspended, called into\ndoubt, or even revoked. Pope Pius X in his _Motu proprio_, \u201cPraestantia\nscripturae Sacrae\u201d (Nov. 18, 1907), indicated the binding force of the\ndecrees both of the Pontifical Biblical Commission and of all doctrinal\ndecrees: All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the\nBiblical Commission which have been given in the past and which shall\nbe given in the future, in the same way as to the decrees which\nappertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved\nby the Supreme Pontiff; nor can they escape the stigma both of\ndisobedience and temerity, nor be free from grave guilt as often as\nthey impugn their decisions either in word or writing; and this over\nand above the scandal which they give and the sins of which they may be\nthe cause before God by making other statements on these matters which\nare very frequently both rash and false. (Reaffirmed by the Biblical\nCommission on Feb. 27, 1934.)\n\n761. The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to\nthe virtue of faith, are as follows:\n\n(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as\ncontained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in\nthe teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit\nand handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in\nexceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.\n\n(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed\nin scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the\nChurch. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those\ngiven in the Creeds, _ex cathedra_ definitions of the Popes, decisions\nof Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the\nuniversal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical\nletters [see _Humani Generis_, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are\nthe condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.\n\n(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its\nobject all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not\nrevealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise\nof the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that\nis, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic\nfacts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of\nthe saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special\nrecognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of\nprivate revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that\nis, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical,\nnear to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account\nof their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious,\nsuspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of\ntheir tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc.\nExamples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book\n_Augustinus_, the suitability of the terms \u201cconsubstantial\u201d and\n\u201ctransubstantiation,\u201d the agreement of the Vulgate with the original\nscriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the _Filioque_.\n\n(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of\nthe Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and\nauthoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations\ngiven by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of\nModern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or\ndefinitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are\ncontrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to\nbe rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets\nare drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses,\nand the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are\nin this class.\n\n(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal\nmatters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her\nposition and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It\nwould be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief\nwhich the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.\n\n762. Though the truths of faiths are many, the duty of believing\nimposes no great burden on the believer. Thus: (a) it is not required\nthat explicit belief be given to all the teachings of faith; (b) it is\nnot required that one distinguish the particular kind of assent in case\nof uncertainty, but it suffices to yield assent according to the mind\nand intention of the Church. Example: When a group of propositions is\ncondemned under various censures, no indication being made of the\ncensure that applies to particular propositions, it suffices to hold\nthat all of them are false, and that to each of them applies one or\nmore of the censures listed.\n\n763. Faith is divided into explicit and implicit, according as the\nobject believed is unfolded or not to the mind.\n\n(a) Faith is explicit regarding any truth, when assent is given to that\ntruth as known in itself and expressed in terms proper to itself.\nExample: He has explicit faith in the Eucharist who has been instructed\nconcerning the meaning of the mystery, and who assents to it according\nto that distinct knowledge.\n\n(b) Faith is implicit regarding any truth, when that truth is not known\nor not accepted in itself, but is accepted in another truth. Example:\nHe has implicit faith in the Eucharist who has not yet heard of it, but\nwho accepts all the teachings of the Church, even those he does not\nknow.\n\n764. Faith is implicit as follows:\n\n(a) Improperly, faith is implicit, if one does not give assent, but is\nprepared to give it, if necessary, or wishes to give it. These pious\ndispositions are not the act of faith itself, but they are its\nbeginnings, or preparations leading up to it; they are good, but not\nsufficient. Example: A pagan who says he would accept the Christian\ncreed, if he thought it were true, or who wishes that he could believe\nit.\n\n(b) Properly, faith is implicit, if one gives assent to a truth by\naccepting another in which it is contained, as a particular is\ncontained in a universal (e.g., he who explicitly accepts all the\ntruths of Christianity, implicitly accepts the Eucharist, even when in\ngood faith he thinks it is not revealed), or as an instrument is\ninvolved in its principal cause (e.g., he who explicitly believes in\nthe Redemption implicity believes in Baptism, which is the instrument\nby which Redemption is applied), or as means are contained in their end\n(e.g., he who explicitly believes that eternal life is a reward,\nimplicitly believes that good works must be performed as a means to\nthat end), or as the reality is expressed in the figure (e.g., those in\nthe Old Testament who explicitly believed in the Paschal Lamb,\nimplicitly believed in the sacrifice of Christ of which the Paschal\nLamb was the figure), or as the assent of the disciple is bound up with\nthe assent of the teacher (e.g., the child who explicitly accepts as\ntrue the doctrines of faith taught by his pastor, implicitly believes\nthe sense and implications contained in the latter\u2019s instructions).\n\n765. The points about which explicit faith is required can be reduced\nto four heads (see Catechism of the Council of Trent). These heads are:\n\n(a) The things to be believed: \u201cPreach the Gospel to every creature. He\nthat believeth shall be saved\u201d (Mark, xvi. 15). The Gospel doctrine is\nsummarized in the Apostles\u2019 Creed;\n\n(b) The things to be done: \u201cTeach them to observe all things whatsoever\nI have commanded you\u201d (Matt., xxviii. 20). The Ten Commandments (see\nVol. II) are called the epitome of the whole law;\n\n(c) The ordinances to be observed; \u201cBaptize them in the name of the\nFather, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost\u201d (Matt, xxviii. 19). The\nSeven Sacraments are the sacred instruments through which the merits of\nthe Passion of Christ are applied to the soul;\n\n(d) The petitions to be made to God: \u201cThus shall you pray: Our Father,\netc.\u201d (Matt., vi. 9). The prayer (see Vol. II) given us by Christ\nteaches us both the manner of prayer and the requests that should be\noffered.\n\n766. Faith in the revelation given by God is necessary for salvation\n(Heb., xi. 6), but in the usual providence of God faith cannot be had or\nsafeguarded without short formulas of its principal doctrines.\n\n(a) Faith cannot be received without such formulas, because, its\ndoctrines being many and frequently difficult and the study of all\nscripture and Tradition being impossible for most persons, a list of\nshort and clear propositions of revealed truths (Creed) is needed that\nthe faith may be proposed and accepted.\n\n(b) Faith cannot be retained without such formulas, because, being\nunchanging in itself and yet for all times and places, its doctrines\nwould be easily corrupted if there were not an official standard\n(Symbol) by which both truth and error could be at once recognized (I\nCor., i. 10; II Tim., i. 13).\n\n767. The formulas of Christian teaching as summarized in the Creeds,\nsince they must be brief and orderly, are divided into short and\nconnected propositions, which are therefore known as articles. Brevity\nbeing the character of Creeds, not all revealed truths are expressed in\nthem as articles, but only those that have the following\ncharacteristics:\n\n(a) An article of the Creed deals with one of the two main objects of\nbelief, namely, the end of man, which is eternal life (Heb., xi. 1), and\nthe means thereto, which is Jesus Christ (John, xvii. 3). Other things,\nwhich are proposed for faith, not for their own sake, but only on\naccount of their relation to these two main objects (e.g., the\nwandering of the Israelites in the desert, the details of the journeys\nof St. Paul, etc.), are not mentioned in the Creeds.\n\n(b) An article of the Creed deals only with those doctrines concerning\neternal life and Christ which are in a special manner unseen or\ndifficult, for faith is \u201cthe evidence of things that appear not\u201d (Heb.,\nxi. 1). Other doctrines which have no special difficulty of their own\nare considered as implicit in those that express the general mysteries,\nand hence they are not mentioned. Thus, the three Persons of the\nTrinity are given distinct articles, because the mysteriousness of the\nTriune God cannot be reduced to any more general mystery, whereas the\nEucharist is not mentioned, as having no mystery that is not implied in\nthe articles on the divine omnipotence and the sanctification of man\nthrough Christ.\n\n768. Has there been an increase in the articles of faith?\n\n(a) If by increase is meant the addition through new revelation of main\nbeliefs not contained in the primitive revelation, there has never been\nan increase in the articles of faith; for from the beginning God made\nknown His own being, which includes the eternal things of God and the\nend or happiness of man, and His providence, which includes the\ntemporal dispensations of God and the means for the salvation of man\n(Heb., xi. 6).\n\n(b) If by increase is meant the addition of new revelations that\nbrought out more clearly and definitely things contained in previous\nrevelation, there was an increase in the articles of faith from the\nbeginning of revelations down to the end of the Apostolic age. Thus,\nthe nature of God and His purpose as regards the redemption of humanity\nwere brought out ever more distinctly by new revelations in Old\nTestament times (Exod., vi. 2), and were given in final and complete\nform by the revelation of Christ (Heb., i. 1; Eph., iii. 5; Heb., xii.\n27, 28; II Tim., i. 13).\n\n(c) If by increase is meant a clearer and fuller explanation of the\nrevelation once delivered to the Saints, there has been and always can\nbe an increase of articles of faith. Thus, in the Council of Nicaea the\nApostles\u2019 Creed was amplified; in the Council of Constantinople the\nCreed of Nicaea was added to, and similarly today or tomorrow the Pope\ncould add new explanations or developments to the Creed, if new\nheresies or necessities required that the true sense of revelation\nalready given should be brought out more clearly or fully.\n\n769. There are three principal Creeds used by the Church:\n\n(a) the Apostles\u2019 Creed, which according to an early tradition was\ncomposed by the Apostles themselves before they separated to preach the\nGospel. It was in use from the first centuries in the Roman Church,\nwhich required that the catechumens learn and recite it before\nreceiving Baptism. It is divided into twelve articles;\n\n(b) the Nicene Creed, which is used in the Mass and was drawn up at the\nCouncil of Nicaea (325) against the Arian denial of the divinity of\nChrist, and was revised by the Council of Constantinople (381) against\nthe Macedonians, who refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Holy\nGhost;\n\n(c) the Athanasian Creed, which is used in the Office of Prime and is a\nresume of the teaching of St. Athanasius on the Trinity and\nIncarnation. It was composed in the West some time after the beginning\nof the fifth century.\n\n770. Summary of the teaching of the First Article of the Creed: \u201cI\nbelieve in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.\u201d--(a)\n\u201cI believe,\u201d i.e., I give unhesitating assent to God revealing His\nmysterious truths; (b) \u201cin God,\u201d i.e., the Supreme Being, one in nature\nand three in persons; (c) \u201cthe Father,\u201d i.e., our Maker and Provider,\nfrom whom also we receive the spirit of adoption of sons; (d)\n\u201calmighty,\u201d i.e., all-powerful, and therefore all-wise and endowed with\nevery other perfection in the highest degree; (e) \u201cCreator,\u201d i.e., who\nfreely produced the world out of nothing, without external model or\neffort of any sort, and who preserves, rules and moves all creatures;\n(f) \u201cof heaven and earth,\u201d i.e., of the world of pure spirits, of\nmatter, and of man, who is at the confines of matter and spirit--in\nother words, of all finite things, visible and invisible.\n\n771. Summary of the Second Article: \u201cAnd in Jesus Christ, His only Son,\nour Lord.\u201d--(a) \u201cJesus,\u201d a name given by command of God and meaning\n\u201cSaviour\u201d; (b) \u201cChrist,\u201d i.e., \u201cthe anointed,\u201d because He was King,\nPriest, and Prophet; (c) \u201cHis only Son,\u201d i.e., born of the Father before\nall ages, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten\nnot made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made;\n(d) \u201cour Lord,\u201d for as God He shares all the perfections of the divine\nnature, as man He has redeemed us and thus deservedly acquired the\ntitle of Lord over us, while as the God-man He is the Lord of all\ncreated things. It should be noted that there is nothing imperfect or\ncarnal in the generation of the Son, or in the procession of the Holy\nGhost, for God is a spirit and all-perfect.\n\n772. Summary of the Third Article: \u201cWho was conceived by the Holy\nGhost, born of the Virgin Mary.\u201d--(a) \u201cWho was conceived.\u201d The\nOnly-begotten Son, the second Person of the Trinity, for us men and for\nour salvation, became incarnate and was made man. Thus, the same Divine\nPerson is in both the divine and human natures, and the union preserves\nthe properties and the actions of both natures. (b) \u201cBy the Holy\nGhost.\u201d At the moment when Mary consented to the announcement of the\nangel, the body of Christ was formed in her womb from her flesh, the\nrational soul was infused, and the divine and human natures were united\nin the Person of the Word. Thus, Mary is truly the Mother of God. This\nconception was miraculous, accomplished without the aid of man, through\nthe sole operation of the three Persons of the Trinity. Being an\nexternal work of God in which love towards us is especially manifested,\nthe Incarnation is attributed to the Holy Ghost, who in the internal\nlife of the Deity proceeds as the mutual love of Father and Son. (c)\n\u201cBorn of the Virgin Mary.\u201d Mary was ever a virgin, before, during, and\nafter childbirth; immaculate and holy in soul; the spiritual Mother of\nwhom Christians are born in holiness.\n\n773. Summary of the Fourth Article: \u201cSuffered under Pontius Pilate, was\ncrucified, dead and buried.\u201d--(a) The effect of that which is contained\nin this article is expressed in the words of the Nicene Creed, \u201cfor\nus.\u201d The passion and death of Christ, willed by Himself, accomplished\nour salvation, as satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption; (b) The\nmanner in which this was brought about is declared in the words above\nquoted. In His human nature Christ suffered agony and pain of body; He\nwas sentenced to death by the Roman governor and nailed to the cross.\nHis soul and body were separated in death, although the Divinity never\ndeparted from either, and His dead body was laid in the tomb.\n\n774. Summary of the Fifth Article: \u201cHe descended into hell; the third\nday He rose again from the dead.\u201d--(a) \u201cHe descended.\u201d After His death\nthe soul of Christ went to the abode of the departed, to liberate those\nwho were there. (b) \u201cInto hell.\u201d The name hell is applied in a wide\nsense to all those secret abodes in which are detained the souls of\nthose who have not obtained the happiness of heaven--viz., the hell of\nthe damned, in which the impenitent suffer eternal pain of loss and\nsense; purgatory, in which the souls of just men are cleansed by\ntemporary punishments; limbo, where the fathers of the Old Testament\nawaited in peaceful repose the coming of Christ. It was this last abode\ninto which the soul of Christ entered. (c) \u201cThe third day\u201d--i.e., on\nSunday morning, the third day after His burial. (d) \u201cHe rose again.\u201d As\nHe had laid down His life by His own power, so He took it up again by\nHis own power. (e) \u201cFrom the dead.\u201d Christ not only returned to life,\nHe also conquered death; He rose to die no more, and thus He is first\nin the final resurrection. (f) \u201cAccording to the scriptures.\u201d These\nwords are added in the Creed of Constantinople, to call attention to\nthe fact that the resurrection is the attestation of the truth of our\nLord\u2019s claims and doctrine (I Cor., xv. 14, 17; Matt., xii. 39, 40).\n\n775. Summary of the Sixth Article: \u201cHe ascended into heaven, sitteth at\nthe right hand of God, the Father almighty.\u201d--(a) \u201cHe ascended.\u201d By His\nown power as God and man Christ ascended into heaven. (b) \u201cInto\nheaven.\u201d As God, He never forsook heaven, the Divinity being\nomnipresent; but as man, body and soul, He ascended to the abode of\nglory forty days after the resurrection. (c) \u201cSitteth at the right hand\nof God the Father Almighty.\u201d Christ is said to stand at the right hand\nof God, inasmuch as He is our Mediator with the Father (Acts, vii. 55;\nHeb., vii. 25; John, xiv. 2); He is said to sit at the right hand of\nthe Father to express the permanent possession of royal and supreme\npower and glory (Eph., i. 20-22; Heb., i. 13).\n\n776. Summary of the Seventh Article: \u201cFrom thence He shall come to\njudge the living and the dead.\u201d--There is a particular judgment at\ndeath; at the end of the World, of which the time is uncertain, there\nwill be a general judgment, both of the living and the dead. Christ\nwill come a second time, and as Judge will pass sentence either of\neternal loss and pain or of eternal happiness.\n\n777. Summary of the Eighth Article: \u201cI believe in the Holy Ghost.\u201d--The\nThird Person of the Trinity is equal to the Father and the Son,\nproceeds from them both as their mutual love, and is spoken of,\ntherefore, by appropriation, as the Author of works of grace and\nsanctification, in which especially the charity of God is manifested:\n\u201cThe Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the\nFather and the Son, who together with the Father and the Son is adored\nand glorified, who spoke by the prophets\u201d (Creed of Constantinople).\n\n778. Summary of the Ninth Article: \u201cI believe the Holy Catholic Church;\nthe Communion of Saints.\u201d--(a) The Church pertains to the material, not\nthe formal object of divine faith (see 754), and hence it is not said:\n\u201cI believe in the Church.\u201d We believe of the Church that she is the\nvisible society made up of the faithful scattered throughout the world,\ncalled also the house of God (I Tim., iii. 15), the flock of Christ,\nthe spouse of Christ (II Cor., xi. 2), the body of Christ (Eph., i. 23;\nCol., i. 24); that besides the Church militant on earth, composed of\nboth the good and the bad, and outside of which are unbelievers and the\nexcommunicated, there is the Church triumphant in heaven and the Church\nsuffering in purgatory; that there are four marks by which the true\nChurch may be recognized--viz., that she is one, holy, Catholic, and\nApostolic; that she is divine in her origin and possesses divinely\ngiven powers. (b) \u201cThe Communion of Saints.\u201d The members of the Church\nhave different offices, but there is among them a community of\nspiritual goods, the Sacraments being a bond of union, and each one\nprofiting according to his condition in the good works done by others,\nThe Church suffering is assisted by our suffrages, while we in turn are\nhelped by the intercessions of the Church triumphant.\n\n779. Summary of the Tenth Article: \u201cThe forgiveness of sins.\u201d--God\nforgives all sins, when they are truly repented of, either through\nBaptism (in case of sins before Baptism) or through the due exercise of\nthe power of the keys given the Church (in case of sins after Baptism).\nVenial sins may be forgiven by private repentance.\n\n780. Summary of the Eleventh Article: \u201cThe resurrection of the\nbody.\u201d--The soul is immortal, the body mortal. But at the end of the\nworld the bodies of all the dead, even though corrupted, shall be\nrestored and reunited with their principle of life--i.e., the soul to\nwhich they belonged. Substantially, the risen body will be identical\nwith the mortal body, but it will have certain new qualities\ncorresponding to its new state.\n\n781. Summary of the Twelfth Article: \u201cLife everlasting.\u201d--Those who die\nin the friendship of God will be received into unending happiness, in\nwhich they will be exempted from all evil and enjoy the beatific vision\nand other divine gifts.\n\n782. The Acts of Faith.--According to St. Paul, there are two acts of\nfaith, one internal, the other external: \u201cWith the heart we believe\nunto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation\u201d\n(Rom., x. 10). (a) The internal act of faith is the firm and constant\njudgment of the intellect assenting to divine revelation (II Cor., x.\n5), but freely and under the command of the will (Mark, xvi. 16), being\nmoved thereto by divine grace (Eph., ii. 5). (b) The external act of\nfaith is the profession before the world by signs, such as words or\ndeeds, of the internal assent given to divine revelation.\n\n783. The internal act of faith is one, but it has a threefold\nrelationship: (a) it believes about God, if we consider the intellect\nas assenting to the material object; (b) it believes God, if we\nconsider the intellect as assenting to the formal object; (c) it\nbelieves in God, if we consider the will as moving the intellect to\nassent, and tending towards God as the Last End.\n\n784. The truths to which the assent of faith is given are either\nsupernatural or natural. (a) Supernatural truths or mysteries (e.g.,\nthe Trinity of Persons in God) are revealed for faith, that man may\nknow, desire and work for the supernatural destiny to which he has been\nraised. (b) Natural truths (e.g., the Oneness of God) are revealed for\nfaith, so that mankind may obtain more quickly, more generally, and\nmore certainly the knowledge of divine things which reason can afford.\nIt is impossible, however, that an act of faith and an act of knowledge\nshould coexist in the same individual about the same truth, for faith\nis of things that appear not.\n\n785. The act of faith is a necessary preliminary to other supernatural\nacts, for we do not tend towards the supernatural, unless we first\naccept it by belief; hence, faith is necessary. But the act of faith\nmay also be made after other supernatural acts, like those of hope and\ncharity; and so it may be meritorious. (a) The act of faith is\nnecessary, both as a means and as a precept (see 360). The necessity of\nmeans will be treated now, the necessity of precept later, when we\nspeak of the commandments of faith (see 913 sqq.). (b) The act of faith\nbefore justification is meritorious congruously and in a wide sense;\nbut after justification it has condign merit (see 110).\n\n786. For all adults the act of faith is necessary for salvation as a\nnecessity of means (see 360), for the Apostle says: \u201cWithout faith it\nis impossible to please God\u201d (Heb., xi. 6). The truths which must be\nbelieved under necessity of means are of two kinds. (a) One must\nbelieve with implicit faith all revealed truths which one does not know\nand is not bound to know. An act of implicit faith is contained in the\nformula: \u201cO my God, I firmly believe all the truths the Catholic Church\nteaches, because Thou hast revealed them.\u201d (b) One must believe with\nexplicit faith all the truths which one is bound to know. An act of\nexplicit faith in all the truths necessary by necessity of means is\ncontained in the Apostles\u2019 Creed. Other truths that must be explicitly\nbelieved on account of a necessity of precept will be discussed in 918,\n920.\n\n787. What specifically are the truths just referred to that all are\nbound to know as a necessary means? (a) Theologians generally agree\nthat it has always been necessary for adults to know and accept two\nbasic mysteries--God\u2019s existence, as the supernatural End or happiness\nof man, and His providence as exercised in supplying the means\nnecessary for supernatural salvation (see 768). Without such belief,\nsupernatural hope and charity, at all times necessary, are impossible.\n(b) A majority of theologians hold, and with greater probability it\nseems, that since the promulgation of the Gospel it is necessary for\nadults to know and accept the two basic mysteries of Chrisitanity--\nviz., that in God, who is our beatitude, there are three persons (the\nTrinity), and that the way to our beatitude is through Christ our\nRedeemer (the Incarnation).\n\n788. Even before the Gospel, it was always necessary as a means that\none believe explicitly in God as our supernatural happiness and as the\nprovider of the means thereto. Thus, the Apostle, speaking of the\nancient patriarchs, says: \u201cHe that cometh to God, must believe that He\nis, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him\u201d (Heb., xi. 6). He that\nwould come to God (i.e., be saved), must believe in God as the Author\nof glory and of grace. Hence, one must believe: (a) that God exists,\nwho is not ashamed to be called our God, and who prepares for us a\nbetter, that is, a heavenly country (Heb., xi. 6); (b) that God is a\nremunerator, from whom must be expected the working out of His promises\nand the helps to attain the reward, as well as the meting out of\njustice. In this faith is included implicitly a faith in Christ, and\nthus in the Old Testament a belief, at least implicit, in the Messiah\nto come was always necessary: \u201cMan is not justified by the works of the\nlaw, but by the faith of Jesus Christ\u201d (Gal., ii. 16).\n\n789. Since the promulgation of the Gospel (see 342, 354), it is also\nnecessary as a means that one believe explicitly in the mysteries of\nthe Trinity and Incarnation. For he who does not accept these, does not\naccept the Gospel, whereas Christ says: \u201cGo ye into the whole world,\nand preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth not shall be\ncondemned\u201d (Mark, xvi. 15, 16).\n\n(a) Theoretically, this opinion seems more probable than the opposite\nopinion; but chiefly on account of the difficulty about negative\ninfidels, which is discussed in dogmatic treatises on Predestination\nand Grace, many theologians either reject it (e.g., those who say that\nbelief in the two great Christian mysteries is necessary only as a\nprecept, or that implicit faith suffices), or modify it (e.g., those\nwho say that belief in these two mysteries is not necessary as a means\nfor justification, but only for glorification, and those who say that\nregularly such faith is a necessary means, but that an exception is\nallowed for invincible ignorance, or for the insufficient promulgation\nof the Gospel in many regions).\n\n(b) Practically, this opinion is safer, and hence all theologians, even\nProbabilists, hold that one must act as if it were true and certain,\nwhenever it is possible to give instruction on the Trinity and\nIncarnation.\n\n790. Knowledge about the mysteries of faith is either substantial (by\nwhich one knows the essentials of a mystery) or scientific (by which\none knows also its circumstances and details, and is able to give a\nmore profound explanation of it). Scientific knowledge is required, on\naccount of their office, in those who are bound to teach the faith, but\nsubstantial knowledge suffices for salvation. Hence, for an adult to be\nsaved, it suffices that he have the following kind of knowledge about\nthe four great mysteries:\n\n(a) There is a God who has spoken to us, promising freely that He will\ntake us to Himself as our reward. It is not necessary that one\nunderstand such theological concepts as the essence of deity, the\ndefinition of supernaturality, the formal and material objects of\nbeatitude, etc.; for many persons are incapable of understanding them.\n\n(b) This God, who will be our reward, is one, but there are three\ndivine Persons--the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, really distinct\nand equal. It is not necessary that one understand the distinction\nbetween nature and person, nor subtle questions about the processions\nand properties.\n\n(c) God provides for us, giving us the helps we need, and also, if we\nserve Him, the reward He has promised. It is not necessary that one\nunderstand the theology of providence, grace, and merit.\n\n(d) Jesus Christ, who is God the Son, became man, suffered and died for\nus, thus saving us from sin and winning back for us the right to\nheaven. It is not necessary that one understand scientifically that in\nChrist there are two natures united hypostatically in the one Person of\nthe Word.\n\n791. Since Baptism is fruitless without due faith in the recipient, it\nis not lawful as a rule to baptize those who lack substantial knowledge\nof the four mysteries just mentioned. (a) Outside of danger of death,\nit is never lawful to baptize a person, adult in mind, who is in\nsubstantial ignorance of any of these four mysteries. Such a person\nmust first receive instruction. (b) In danger of death, when\ninstruction cannot be given, an adult in substantial ignorance about\nthe Trinity and the Incarnation may be baptized conditionally; for it\nis probable that explicit knowledge of those two mysteries is not a\nnecessity of means (see 789; Canon 752, Sec.2).\n\n792. Since absolution is invalid if the person absolved is incapable of\nreceiving grace, and since acts of faith in the four chief mysteries\nare an essential means to justification in adults, absolution given to\none who is in substantial ignorance about one of the four mysteries\nabove mentioned is certainly or probably invalid, as the case may be.\nAbsolution certainly invalid is never lawful, but absolution probably\nvalid may in certain cases be regarded as lawful before administration,\nand as valid after administration. Hence, the following cases must be\ndistinguished:\n\n(a) Outside of danger of death, it is not lawful to absolve one who is\nin substantial ignorance about any of those four mysteries. Such a\nperson should be sent away for further instruction, or given a brief\ninstruction then and there, if there is time.\n\n(b) In danger of death, when instruction cannot be given, an adult in\nsubstantial ignorance about the Trinity and Incarnation may be absolved\nconditionally, for the reason given in the similar case of Baptism.\n\n(c) After the fact, absolution given to one who was in substantial\nignorance of the Trinity and Incarnation, may be regarded as valid,\nsince the opinion that explicit knowledge of these mysteries is not a\nnecessary means, is at least probable. Hence, according to the\nprinciples of Probabilism a penitent who made confessions While\nignorant of those two mysteries is not obliged to repeat his\nconfessions, since he has probably satisfied his obligation.\n\n793. In the following cases (which would be rare, it seems) Baptism or\nabsolution cannot be administered, even to the dying who are unable to\nreceive instruction: (a) when it is certain that the dying person is\nsubstantially ignorant about the existence of God, the Author of grace\nand glory; (b) when it is certain that the dying person is\nsubstantially ignorant of the Trinity and Incarnation through his own\nfault, and is unwilling to hear about them.\n\n794. Practical rules for granting the Sacraments in case of doubt or\nurgency to those who seem to be indisposed on account of substantial\nignorance are the following:\n\n(a) In danger of death, when instruction is out of the question, if\nthere is doubt about his ignorance, the dying person should be given\nthe benefit of the doubt.\n\n(b) In danger of death, and when instruction is impossible, if there is\ndoubt about the mental ability of the dying person and his obligation\nto have explicit faith, he should receive the benefit of the doubt.\n\n(c) In danger of death or other urgent necessity, when instruction is\nneeded and possible, it should be given briefly as follows: \u201cLet us say\nthe act of faith: I believe in one God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost,\nwho has promised to take to Himself after this life all those that love\nHim, and who punishes the wicked. I hope to have the happiness of being\nreceived into His companionship through the help of Jesus Christ, the\nSon of God, who became man and died for my salvation.\u201d This or a\nsimilar instruction should be given by the priest or lay person present\nin baptizing an adult who is about to die. When there is not immediate\ndanger of death, a person who is baptized or absolved after short\ninstruction on account of emergency, should be admonished of the duty\nof receiving fuller instruction later on.\n\n795. Faith is the free exercise of the free assent of the intellect\nto the unseen, an acceptance of obligations and tasks hard to human\nnature. It is, therefore, an act of homage to the authority of God, and\nis meritorious: \u201cBy faith the ancient patriarchs obtained the promises\u201d\n(Heb., xi. 33). Is the freedom and meritoriousness of this act of\nfaith lessened if one seeks for other arguments than the authority of\nGod in giving one\u2019s assent to revelation? (a) The merit of the act of\nfaith is not lessened, when one seeks human arguments for the assent\nof credibility which is prior to the assent of faith; for it is only\nthe part of prudence that one should first assure oneself of the fact\nthat a revelation has been made, before one assents on faith to the\ndoctrines contained in that revelation. Now, the arguments by which\none assures oneself of the fact of a revelation are human arguments,\nsuch as proofs that revelation is possible and suitable, that there are\nmiracles, prophecies and other signs to guarantee the divine mission of\nthose who delivered the revelation, etc.\n\n(b) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened if one seeks human\narguments for the preambles of faith, that is, for those divine truths\nthat can be established by natural reason (such as the existence\nof God, His infinite knowledge and truthfulness). The person who\ndemonstrates these preambles by philosophical proofs, has knowledge,\nnot belief, about them; but the merit of faith is not lost, if,\nwhile knowing these truths, he remains willing to accept them on the\nauthority of revelation.\n\n(c) The merit of faith is not lessened, if one seeks human arguments\nfor the mysteries of faith, that is, for those truths of revelation\nthat are above human reason (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation),\nprovided these arguments are sought not for the demonstration, but for\nthe confirmation or defense of dogma. Nay, a person ought, in so far as\nhe is able, to use his reason in the service of faith, and to do so is\na sign, not of little, but of great faith. \u201cBe ready always,\u201d says St.\nPeter (I Peter, iii. 15), \u201cto satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason\nof that hope which is in you.\u201d And St. Anselm says: \u201cIt appears to me a\nsign of carelessness, if, having been confirmed in the faith, we do not\ntake pains to understand what we believe.\u201d St. Thomas writes: \u201cWhen a\nman is willing to believe, he loves the truth, meditates upon it, and\ntakes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and\nwith regard to this, human reason does not exclude the merit of faith,\nbut is a sign of greater merit.\u201d\n\n(d) The merit of faith is lessened if one seeks human arguments as the\nformal object, that is, as the motive on which faith is grounded; for\nthen one does not wish to believe, or to believe so readily, on the\nword of God alone, but feels one must call in other testimony to\nsupport it.\n\nThe attempt to understand mysteries or to establish them by natural\nreason is opposed to the humble assent of faith: \u201cHe that is a\nsearcher of majesty, shall be overwhelmed by glory\u201d (Prov., xxv. 27);\n\u201cSeek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into\nthings above thy ability\u201d (Ecclus., iii. 22); \u201cFaith loses its merit,\nif it is put to the test of reason\u201d (St. Gregory the Great, Hom. xxvi).\n\n796. Besides the internal act of acceptance of revealed truth, faith\nhas also external acts. (a) It commands the external acts of the other\nvirtues, that is, acts directed to the specific ends of those virtues.\nHence, one who fasts exercises an external act of the virtue of\ntemperance, but it is his faith in the virtue that commands the fast.\n(b) Faith elicits the external act of profession of faith as its own\nproper external act directed to its own specific end: \u201cI believed, for\nwhich cause I have spoken\u201d (Ps. cxv. 10; II Cor., iv. 13). External\nprofession of faith, therefore, is not an act proceeding from faith; it\nis an act of faith. The necessity of this act will be considered below\nin the article about the commandments of faith.\n\n797. The Habit of Faith.--Faith is not only an act that passes, but it\nis also a permanent quality or habit conferred by God, one of the \u201cmost\ngreat and perfect promises\u201d which man must make use of (II Peter, i. 3\nsqq.), a charism that is not for a time but for all this life, just\nlike hope and charity (I Cor., xiii. 13). God, who does all things\nsweetly (Wis., viii. 1), and who has provided for His natural creatures\ninternal powers by which they incline and move themselves towards the\nends of their activities, has not done less for those whom He moves to\na supernatural destiny; and, in justifying the sinner, He infuses along\nwith grace the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity (Council\nof Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 6).\n\n798. The virtue of faith is thus defined by the Council of the Vatican:\n\u201cFaith is a supernatural virtue, by which, with the help of God\u2019s\ngrace, we believe the truths revealed by Him, not on account of an\nintrinsic evidence of the truths themselves, perceived by natural\nreason, but on account of the authority of God who revealed them.\u201d\n\n799. Hence, the virtue of faith has the following properties:\n\n(a) It is supernatural, not only because its object and motive are\nsupernatural, but because it proceeds from a supernatural principle,\ni.e., grace (John, vi, 29; Eph., ii. 8).\n\n(b) It is obscure, because the believer assents to that which has no\nintrinsic evidence for him. He does not see its truth as the blessed\nsee God, for \u201cwe see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then\nface to face\u201d (I Cor., xiii. 12). He does not know its truth as he\nknows evident or naturally demonstrated propositions, for faith is\nabout truths that surpass reason--things \u201cthat appear not.\u201d This, of\ncourse, does not mean that faith is not rightly called a new light\nadded to the mind, and that the motives which call for the acceptance\nof faith are not evidently credible.\n\n(c) It is free, because, although one cannot dissent from that which is\nevident intrinsically (e.g., that two and two make four), one is able\nto dissent from that which is obscure.\n\n(d) It is not a process of reasoning, but a simple act of assent, in\nwhich one accepts at the same time the authority of the Revealer and\nthe truth of His revelation. \u201cJesus said to her (Martha): I am the\nresurrection and the life .... Believest thou this? She saith to Him:\nYea, Lord, I have believed that Thou art the Christ, etc.\u201d (John, xi.\n25-27).\n\n(e) It is firm and unshaken in a far higher degree than the assent of\nunderstanding and science, since it rests on the infallible authority\nof God (I Thess., ii. 13).\n\n800. Before justification, faith exists, it seems, only as an act\nperformed under the influence of actual or transitory grace. After the\ninfusion of habitual grace, faith is a habit or infused virtue. But\nthere are two modes of existence characteristic of this one habit, and\nhence the distinction of living and dead faith (Gal., v. 6; James, ii.\n26).\n\n(a) Living faith is that which is informed or animated by charity. This\nlatter virtue is called the soul of all the other virtues, inasmuch as\nit directs them to their supreme end, divine friendship, and gives\nmeritorious value to their works. All those have living faith who join\nto belief a life in agreement with belief--that is, the state of grace,\nlove of God and good works.\n\n(b) Dead faith is that which is separated from charity. It is a true\nvirtue, because it directs the assent of the intellect to its proper\nend; but it is an imperfect virtue, because its acts are not directed\nto the Last End, and are not meritorious of eternal life. All those who\nbelieve, but who do not live up to their belief in matters of\nimportance, who neglect serious duties to God or others, have dead\nfaith. Examples are those who call themselves Catholics, but neglect\nattendance at church and the reception of the Sacraments.\n\n801. Those who have, or who had faith, are the following:\n\n(a) the Angels in the state of probation and our first parents in\nParadise, for faith is necessary as a means in every condition short of\nthe beatific vision (see 785, 158); (b) those in this life who are in\nthe friendship of God, and also those believers who are not in the\nfriendship of God, the former having living, and the latter dead faith\n(see 800); (c) the souls in purgatory, the ancient patriarchs in limbo.\n\n802. Those who have not faith are the following: (a) those who have\nvision of the truths of faith, that is, the Saints in heaven and Christ\nwhile on earth (I Cor., xiii. 10); (b) those who reject obstinately\neven one doctrine of faith, for, if individual judgment is put above\nthe authority of God even in one point, the motive or keystone of\nfaith, and therefore faith itself, is no longer assented to; (c) the\nlost, for, being cut off entirely from grace, these possess no virtue\ninfused by God. \u201cThe devils believe and tremble\u201d (James, ii. 19), but\ntheir belief is not supernatural or free, but natural and unwilling.\n\n803. Of those who have faith, some have greater, and some less faith.\nThus, our Lord reproved St. Peter for his little faith (Matt., xiv.\n31), and praised the Woman of Canaan for her great faith (Matt., xv.\n28). But since all are obliged to have supreme confidence in God and to\naccept all He teaches, how is there room for different degrees of faith?\n\n(a) Faith must be supreme appreciatively, that is, all must put the\nformal object of faith, the motive of its assent, above every other\nmotive of assent, for the First Truth speaking deserves more adherence\nthan any other authority. In this respect, therefore, and in the\nexclusion of every doubt, the faith of all is equal. But faith need not\nbe supreme intensively, that is, it is not required that the intellect\nshould feel the assent of faith more than the assent given to natural\ntruth, or that the will must experience the highest alacrity, devotion\nand confidence; for the truths that are nearer to us move us more\nvehemently than do higher and invisible truths. Hence, in this respect\nthe faith of one may be more firm or fervent than the faith of another,\naccording as one is more childlike, more loving, more intense in his\nacceptance of God\u2019s Word than another.\n\n(b) Faith must be universal, that is, we must accept the entire\nmaterial object of revelation, and none may pick and choose according\nto his likes or fancies, for all of revelation has God for its Author.\nIn this respect the faith of all is equal, all believers accepting\ntwelve articles, while those who accept eleven or six or one or none,\nare not believers. But faith need not be explicit as to all its\ndoctrines, and hence, while one believer who is not thoroughly\ninstructed may know only the twelve articles of the Creed, another\nbeliever who is better instructed may know the hundreds of other truths\nthat are contained in the articles. In this way the faith of one is\ngreater extensively.\n\n804. Can faith grow or decline in the same person? (a) If there is\nquestion of acts of faith, the later acts can be more or less firm or\nfervent than those that preceded, in the way explained in the previous\nparagraph. In this sense we may understand the Apostles to have asked\nof our Lord a higher degree of faith, that they might work miracles in\nHis name (Luke, xvii. 5). (b) If there is question of the habit of\nfaith, it itself is increased at every increase of sanctifying grace\n(see 745). St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (II Cor., x. 15) that he\nhas hope of their \u201cincreasing faith.\u201d Moreover, by repeated acts of\nfaith the ease and delight with which the habit is exercised increases,\nas is the case with acquired habits. But the habit of faith is not\ndiminished directly as was explained regarding the infused virtues in\ngeneral (see 745).\n\n805. The means of growing in faith are: (a) prayer to the Father of\nlights: \u201cLord, increase our faith\u201d (Luke, xvii. 5); (b) reading of the\nscriptures, the Lives of the Saints and other similar works, and\nattendance at spiritual instructions; (c) frequent acts of faith in the\nworld we see not and its coming rewards; (d) exercise of faith, by\ndirecting our thoughts, words, and actions according to the teaching of\nfaith, rather than according to the maxims of the world; for \u201cthe just\nman liveth by faith\u201d (Heb., x. 38), and \u201cfaith without works is dead\u201d\n(James, ii. 20).\n\n806. The cause of faith is God. (a) It is God who directly through\nrevelation, or indirectly through the Church, the evangelists,\npreachers, etc., \u201cbrings the message before man\u201d (Rom., x. 15); (b) it\nis God who \u201ccauses the mind of man to assent\u201d to His message. No matter\nhow persuasive the teacher or how well disposed or learned the hearer\nmay be, faith will not come unless the light of grace leads the way\n(Eph., ii. 8).\n\n807. The effects of faith are fear of God and purification of the\nheart. (a) Dead faith causes one to fear the penalties of divine\njustice, that is, to have servile fear (James, ii. 19): living faith\ncauses one to fear sin itself, that is, to have filial fear. (b) Faith,\nby elevating man to higher things, purifies his soul from the\ndefilements of lower things (Acts, xv. 9): if faith is dead, it at\nleast purifies the intellect from error; if it is living, it also\npurifies the will from evil.\n\n808. The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.--As was said above (see\n159), the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are intended as means for perfecting\nthe theological virtues. There are two Gifts that serve the virtue of\nfaith, namely, the Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.\n\n(a) Faith, being assent, must have a right idea of what is proposed for\nacceptance; but, as it is obscure (see 799), and as there are things\napart from faith that may corrupt our notion of it, the Gift of\nUnderstanding is conferred, a simple perception and divine intuition\nthrough which one receives a correct notion of the mysteries of faith.\n\n(b) Faith, being the starting point of all supernatural activities,\nmust be the norm by which we judge of what we should think and do in\nthe affairs of life; but, as it is a simple act of assent (see 799) and\nas the creatures of the world are a temptation and a snare (Wis., xiv.\n11), the Gift of Knowledge is given, through which one receives a\ncorrect judgment about the things of this world. These then take on a\nnew and fuller significance in the light of the teachings of faith.\n\n809. The Gift of Understanding must not be confused with the Beatific\nVision. (a) A perfect penetration of the mysteries, which enables one\nto perceive their essence and causes (e.g., the how and the why of the\nTrinity), is given by the Beatific Vision; but such understanding\nremoves all obscurity, and is therefore insociable with faith. (b) An\nimperfect penetration of the teachings of faith, which does not take\naway the obscurity and mysteriousness, is given by the Gift of\nUnderstanding, and is therefore sociable with faith. The effects of\nthis Gift are: it distinguishes the truths of faith from false\ndoctrines; it conveys a clear view of the credibility of the mystery of\nfaith against all difficulties and objections; it gives knowledge of\nthe supernatural import of the secondary truths of faith, that is, of\nthose revealed happenings and facts that are not themselves\nsupernatural (Luke, xxiv. 32); it gives understanding of the practical\naspect of a mystery--for example, that the intratrinitarian relations\nof the Divine Persons are a model for the regulation of the Christian\nlife, in knowledge and love of divine things.\n\n810. The Gift of Knowledge, which like the other Gifts is had by all\nthe just, must not be confused with sacred knowledge or theology, nor\nwith the extraordinary gifts of infused knowledge and the charism of\nknowledge.\n\n(a) The Gift of Knowledge resembles theology in that it reproduces\nobjectively what reason does when it argues from the visible world to\nthe invisible Creator; but, while subjectively theology is the result\nof study in which one passes successively from premise to conclusion.\nKnowledge is the result of a divine light that may be found even in the\nilliterate, and it takes in at a glance all that is contained in a\nprocess of argumentation. Through this Gift the wonders of nature, the\nevents of history, the arguments of philosophy, lead one firmly and\nspontaneously to the Last End and the supernatural realities of faith.\n\n(b) Infused knowledge may have for its object things purely natural\n(such as truths of philosophy and the ability to speak foreign\nlanguages), while the Gift of Knowledge is concerned only with faith,\njudging what is to be believed or done according to faith.\n\n(c) The charism of knowledge (I Cor., xii. 8) is a grace given one for\nthe benefit of others, by which one is able to communicate to them\nsuccessfully the teachings of faith; the Gift of Knowledge, on the\ncontrary, proceeds from the habit of sanctifying grace, and is intended\nfor the benefit of its recipient.\n\n811. To each of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost correspond Beatitudes and\nFruits (see 159).\n\n(a) To the Gift of Understanding corresponds the Sixth Beatitude:\n\u201cBlessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God.\u201d For by\nUnderstanding the mind is pure from wrong ideas of truth, and sees that\nGod is above all that the intellect can comprehend. The two fruits that\nproceed from Understanding are faith (i.e., conviction about revealed\ntruth) and ultimately joy, in union with God through charity. (b) To\nthe Gift of Knowledge corresponds the Third Beatitude: \u201cBlessed are\nthey that mourn, for they shall be comforted.\u201d For by Knowledge one\njudges rightly about created things, grieves over the wrong use made of\nthem, and is comforted when they are turned to their proper end.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: THE SINS AGAINST FAITH\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 10-15.)\n\n812. The sins against faith can all be reduced to four heads: (a) sins\nof unbelief (see 813-886), which are opposed to the internal act of\nfaith; (b) sins of blasphemy (see 887-903), which are opposed to the\nexternal act of faith; (c) sins of ignorance (see 904-911), which are\nopposed to the Gift of Knowledge; (d) sins of blindness and dullness\n(912), which are opposed to the Gift of Understanding.\n\n813. The Sin of Unbelief.--Unbelief in general is a want of faith. It\nis of two kinds, negative and positive.\n\n(a) Negative unbelief is the absence of faith in a person who has never\nheard of it at all, or only insufficiently. Thus, the Indians in\nAmerica before the coming of Christian missionaries were negative\nunbelievers. This kind of unbelief is a punishment, since it results\nfrom original sin; but it is not a sin itself, and those who die in\nnegative unbelief are lost, not on account of this, but on account of\nsins against the natural law (John, xv. 22; Rom., x. 14). With this\nkind of unbelief we are not here concerned.\n\n(b) Positive unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard it\nsufficiently, so that the lack of it is due to his own fault. This kind\nof unbelief is, of course, a sin, for it supposes that one is acting\nagainst the light one has received.\n\n814. Positive unbelief is either a refusal or a renouncement of faith.\n(a) Ordinary unbelief is a refusal of faith, that is, non-acceptance of\nfaith by one who has never had faith; (b) apostasy, or desertion, is\nthe abandonment of faith by one who formerly accepted it. This is not a\ndistinct kind of unbelief, since, like ordinary unbelief, it has for\nits object or term the denial of revealed truth; but it is an\naggravating circumstance of unbelief (II Peter, ii. 21).\n\n815. The sin of unbelief is, committed either directly or indirectly.\n(a) It is committed directly, when one rejects what pertains to faith\n(its acts, objects or motive); (b) it is committed indirectly, when one\nguiltily places oneself or others in the occasion or danger of\nunbelief. The dangers against faith will be considered after the sins\nof unbelief (see 848-886).\n\n816. Direct sins of unbelief are those opposed to the elements that\nbelong to the nature of faith and that are contained in its definition\n(see 751, 798). (a) Opposed to the act of assent are sins of non-assent\nor dissent (see 817-839); (b) opposed to the certitude and firmness of\nassent are sins of doubt (840-846); (c) opposed to the right object of\nfaith are sins of credulity (847); (d) opposed to the motive of faith\nis rationalism (847).\n\n817. Sins of non-assent are those by which one omits to make an act of\nfaith when one should. This kind of sin will be treated when we come to\nthe commandments of faith as to its internal and external acts (see 925\nsqq.)\n\n818. Sins of dissent are sins of commission, and are of two kinds: (a)\nprivative unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard the\nfaith sufficiently and should realize the obligation of embracing it,\nbut who refuses to believe, although he makes no opposition to faith;\n(b) contrary unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard\nthe faith and its motives of credibility sufficiently to know the duty\nof embracing it, and who not only refuses to believe, but even accepts\nthe errors opposed to faith.\n\n819. What is the gravity of sins of dissent, doubt, and rationalism?\n(a) From their nature, these sins are always mortal, for they refuse to\nGod the homage of the intellect and will that is due Him, deprive man\nof the beginning of spiritual life, and lead to eternal condemnation\n(Mark, xvi. 16). (b) From their circumstances, these and other sins\nagainst faith may be venial (see 180-184). Thus, if a man refuses to\nbelieve or accepts error, not having sufficient knowledge of his\nobligation or not fully consenting to the sin, his fault is venial\nsubjectively or formally.\n\n820. Are sins against faith more serious than all other kinds of sin?\n(a) From their nature, sins against faith are worse than sins against\nthe moral virtues, for the former offend directly against God Himself,\nbut not so the latter. Hatred of God, however, is a greater sin than\nsins of unbelief, as will be shown when we treat of sins against\ncharity. (b) From their circumstances, sins against faith may be less\nserious than sins against the moral virtues. Example: A venial sin\nagainst faith is less serious than a mortal sin against justice.\n\n821. With regard to the effect of sins against faith on good acts it\nshould be noted: (a) an unbeliever is able to perform works that are\nethically or naturally good (Rom., ii. 14), and the Church has\ncondemned the opposite teaching of Baius (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n.\n1025). (b) an unbeliever is not able to perform works that are\nsupernaturally good and meritorious (see 112).\n\n822. Contrary unbelief (see 818), which not only refuses to believe but\nalso assents to contrary errors, has three degrees according to the\ngreater or less number of truths denied or errors admitted in these\nthree degrees. Some theologians see different species of unbelief,\nwhile other theologians regard them as only accidental modes or\ncircumstances of the one species of sin.\n\n(a) The most extensive denial of faith is found in infidelity, which\nrejects both Christ and His revelation. To this form of unbelief belong\natheism, agnosticism, pantheism, paganism, polytheism, animism, and\ndenials of Christ and Christianity. The chief religious bodies today\nthat profess such errors are: Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism\n(founded in China and Japan), which are polytheistic and practise\nidolatry and ancestor worship; Brahmanism (founded about 14 centuries\nbefore Christ), which is polytheistic or animistic: Buddhism (founded\n6th century B.C. in India), which is polytheistic and practises\nidolatry; Zoroastrianism (founded in Persia about the 7th century\nB.C.), which is dualistic; Mohammedanism (founded in Arabia in the\n6th century A.D.), which makes Mohammed and his religion superior to\nChrist and Christianity, and rejects the Trinity and the Incarnation.\n(b) A less complete departure from faith is found when Christ and His\nrevelation are accepted as contained in the figures and prophecies of\nthe Old Testament, but rejected in their fulfillment and development in\nJesus and the New Testament. This is the error of Judaism, which today\nhas about 15 million adherents.\n\n(c) A still smaller degree of rejection of faith exists when Christ\nis recognized as leader and teacher, but not all of His revelation\nis accepted. This kind of error is called heresy, and those bodies\nwhich profess it are known as sects. The chief heresies in times past\nwere Gnosticism and Manicheism in the first centuries; Arianism and\nMacedonianism in the fourth century; Nestorianism, Monophysism and\nPelagianism in the fifth century; Monothelism in the seventh century;\nIconoclasm in the eighth century; Photianism in the ninth century;\nAlbigensianism in the eleventh century; Waldensianism in the twelfth\ncentury; Wicliffism in the fourteenth century; Hussism in the fifteenth\ncentury; Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and Modernism in the\ntwentieth century. Today, the erring Christian groups outside the\nChurch are the Orientals, called Orthodox, and the Protestants.\n\n823. Since error is not consistent, false teachings are found that\naccept all the above-mentioned degrees of unbelief, or borrow\nimpartially from all.\n\n(a) Indifferentism or Latitudinarianism holds that all forms of\nreligion are equally true, and that it makes no difference whether\none is Buddhist, Jew or Christian. In a modified form, Indifferentism\nteaches that any form of Christian belief, provided it suits the\ninclinations of the individual concerned, may be followed, and hence it\nis left to each one to decide whether he prefers Catholicism or one of\nthe bodies of the Orthodox Church or of Protestantism. Many who profess\na denominational creed or confession are Indifferentists in belief.\n\n(b) Syncretism holds that there are truths in all separate religions,\nbut that none of them has all the truth, and hence that one must select\nwhat is good from each, rejecting the evil. Thus, the Judaizers of the\nfirst century borrowed from Judaism, the Gnostics and Manicheans from\npaganism, while today Freemasonry, Theosophy, Christian Science and\nSpiritism accept, along with the Gospel, ancient pagan, Buddhistic,\nBrahmanistic and Mohammedan theories; finally, Mormonism endeavors to\nunite characteristics of the Old and the New Testament dispensations.\nIn a restricted form, religious Syncretism teaches the doctrine of\nPan-Christianism--that is, that truth is scattered among the various\nChristian denominations, and that all should confederate as equals on\nthe basis of more important doctrines to be agreed on by all.\n\n824. What is the order of gravity in unbelief, as between infidelity,\nJudaism, heresy?\n\n(a) The gravity of a sin against faith is to be determined primarily\nfrom the subjective resistance made to faith, so that he sins more\nagainst the light to whom greater light was given. The sin of unbelief\nin one who has received the Gospel (heresy), is greater than the same\nsin in one who has accepted only the Old Testament (Judaism); in one\nwho has received the revelation of the Old Testament (Judaism) the\nsin of unbelief is more serious than the same sin in one who has not\nreceived that revelation (infidelity).\n\n(b) The gravity of unbelief is measured secondarily from the objective\nopposition of error to truth, so that he is farther away from faith who\nis farther away from Christ and the Gospel. Thus, a Buddhist denies\nChristian truths more radically than a Jew, and a Jew more radically\nthan a Protestant. Hence, of three apostates, one to Protestantism,\nanother to Judaism and a third to Buddhism, the second sins more\ngrievously than the first, the third more grievously than the second.\n\n825. If we leave out of consideration the radical truth of divine\nrevelation (formal object of faith), it is possible that a heretic,\nin spite of his acceptance of Christ and the scriptures, should be\nfarther away objectively from faith than an infidel--that is, that he\nshould deny more revealed truths (material objects of faith). Thus, the\nManicheans called themselves followers and disciples of Christ, but\ntheir teaching on God contains more errors than does the doctrine of\nmany pagans.\n\n826. Heresy.--Heresy is defined as \u201can error manifestly opposed to\nfaith and assented to obstinately by one who had sincerely embraced the\nfaith of Christ.\u201d\n\n(a) It is called \u201cerror,\u201d that is, positive assent given to error, or\ndissent from truth. Hence, those who merely act or speak as if they do\nnot believe, but who internally do believe, are not heretics, although\nin the external forum they may fall under the presumption of heresy.\nSimilarly, those who have doubts or difficulties in matters of faith,\nbut who do not allow these to sway their judgment, are not guilty of\nheresy, since they give no positive assent to error (see 842 sqq.).\nExamples: Titus is internally convinced of the truth of the Church\u2019s\nteaching; but he attends Protestant services, says he does not believe\nthe Trinity, refuses to make a profession of faith required by the\nChurch, separates himself from obedience to the authorities of the\nChurch, and calls himself an independent. By his former external acts\nhe makes himself guilty of disobedience and falls under the suspicion\nof heresy, and by his last external act he incurs the guilt of schism;\nbut, since internally he does not disbelieve, he is not a heretic.\nBalbus has doubts before his mind from his reading or conversation, but\nhe must immediately give his whole attention to a very pressing matter\nof business, and so gives neither assent nor dissent to the doubts. He\nis not guilty of heresy, since he formed no positive erroneous judgment.\n\n(b) Heresy is \u201copposed to faith.\u201d By faith here is understood divine\nfaith, especially divine and Catholic faith (see 755). Hence, an error\nopposed to what one held to be a genuine private revelation, or to the\npublic revelation, especially when dogmatically defined by the Church,\nis heretical. On the contrary, an error opposed to ecclesiastical faith\nalone, to human faith, or to human science, is not of itself heretical.\nExamples: The Saints who received special private revelations from\nChrist with proofs of their genuineness would have been guilty of\nheresy, had they refused to believe. Sempronius refuses to believe some\nBiblical teachings about things not pertaining to faith and morals and\nnot expressly defined by the Church (e.g., chronological, physical,\ngeographical, statistical data). If he really believes that what he\ndenies is contained in the Bible, he is guilty of heresy. Balbus admits\nthe infallibility and authority of the Church, but he does not believe\nthat a certain Saint solemnly canonized is in heaven, that a certain\nnon-infallible decision of a Roman Congregation is true, that certain\nsecond lessons of the Breviary or certain relics are genuine. He is\nnot a heretic, since, as supposed, he denies no revealed truth; but\nin his first unbelief he sins against ecclesiastical faith; in his\nsecond unbelief, if the contrary of the decision has not been clearly\nestablished, he sins against the duty of religious assent; in his\nthird unbelief, he sins against prudence, if he has no good grounds\nfor his opinion, or against the respect due the Church, if he is moved\nby contempt for its judgment. In a conversation between A, B, C, D\nand E, the following opinions are defended. A thinks that any use of\nnatural knowledge with reference to matters of faith is wrong; B, that\nthe theologian should employ mathematics and physical science, but\navoid reasoning and philosophy; C, that the method and principles of\nScholasticism are not suited to our ago or to all peoples; D, that the\npsychology and cosmology of the Scholastics should be remade entirely;\nE, that many hypotheses of Aristotle in physics have been proved false.\nThe opinion of A contains heresies condemned in the Vatican Council\nregarding the preambles of faith and the motives of credibility. The\nopinions of B and C are at least contrary to the religious assent due\nthe authority of the Church (see Denzinger, Enchiridion, nn. 1652,\n1680, 1713, Code of Canon Law, Canon 1366, Sec.2, _Humani Generis_, n.\n11-14). The opinion of D, as it stands, contains a denial of several\ndoctrines of faith, such as the immortality of the soul and the\ncreation of the world, and is thus implicitly heretical. The opinion of\nE is true and admitted by all.\n\n(c) By \u201copposed\u201d to faith is meant any judgment which, according to the\nlogical rules of opposition between propositions, is irreconcilable\nwith the truth of a formula of dogma or of a censure of heresy.\nExamples: The Council of Trent defined that \u201call sins committed after\nBaptism can be forgiven in the Sacrament of Penance.\u201d It would be\nheretical, therefore, to hold that \u201cno sins committed after Baptism can\nbe pardoned in the Sacrament of Penance\u201d (contrary opposition), or that\n\u201csome sins committed after Baptism cannot be absolved\u201d (contradictory\nopposition), Similarly, the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 7)\nrejected the proposition that \u201call Works done before justification are\nsinful,\u201d and hence according to Logic the contradictory--viz., that\n\u201csome works before justification are not sinful\u201d--is of faith, for two\ncontradictories cannot both be false; the contrary--viz., that \u201cno\nworks before justification are sinful\u201d--is not, however, defined, for\ntwo contraries can both be false.\n\n(d) Heresy is \u201cmanifestly opposed to faith.\u201d He who denies what is\nonly probably a matter of faith, is not guilty of heresy. Example: The\nInstruction of Eugenius IV on the matter of the Sacraments is held by\nsome authorities of note not to be a definition, and hence those who\naccept opposite theories are not on that account heretical.\n\n(e) Heresy is \u201cassented to obstinately,\u201d This is the distinctive note\nof heresy, and hence those who assent to error through ignorance,\nwhether vincible or invincible, are not heretics, if they are willing\nto accept the truth when known. A heretic, therefore, is one who\nknowingly refuses to admit a truth proposed by the Church, whether his\nmotive be pride, desire of contradicting, or any other vice.\n\n(f) Heresy is held \u201cby one who had sincerely embraced the faith of\nChrist.\u201d This includes only catechumens and the baptized, for others\nwho deny the truths of faith are Jews or infidels, not heretics.\n\n827. The sin of heresy (heresy before God), as just defined, differs\nfrom the canonical crime of heresy (heresy before the Church), since\nit is more inclusive. (a) These two differ as regards the error in the\nintellect, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, even\nwithout error--that is, if one denies what is really false, thinking\nit to be defined doctrine; (b) they differ as regards the obstinacy in\nthe will, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one\nis prepared in mind and purpose to deny a truth not yet defined, if it\nis ever defined; (c) they differ as regards the truths rejected, for\none is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one rejects divinely\nrevealed truths not defined as such by the Church; (d) they differ as\nregards the person who denies, for not everyone who merely accepted the\nfaith of Christ can be guilty of the crime of heresy, but only those\nwho after Baptism retain the name of Christian (Canon 1325, Sec.2).\n\n828. Various Kinds of Heresy.--(a) Heresy is positive when error is\naccepted (e.g., the doctrine of consubstantiation); it is negative when\ntruth is denied (e.g., the doctrine of transubstantiation).\n\n(b) Heresy is internal, when it is in the mind alone and not externally\nprofessed. It is external, when expressed in an external way (i.e.,\nby words, signs, acts or circumstances that clearly indicate present\nheresy), if this is done not for a good purpose, such as that of asking\nadvice, but for the purpose of professing error.\n\n(c) External heresy is occult, when it is made known to no one, or only\nto a few; it is public or notorious, when it is made known before a\nlarge number and cannot be concealed. Example: One who calls himself\na Catholic and is known as such, but who in conversation with a few\nintimate friends declares himself a Modernist, is an occult heretic.\nOne who declares in public addresses or articles that he agrees with\nModernism, or who joins openly an heretical sect or has always belonged\nto one, is a public heretic.\n\n(d) Occult and public heresy may be either formal or material,\naccording as one is in good or bad faith. Heresy is formal, if its\nmalice is known and willed by the one in error; if its malice is not\nknown by him, it is material.\n\n829. Heresy is not formal unless one pertinaciously rejects the truth,\nknowing his error and consenting to it.\n\n(a) One must know that one\u2019s belief is opposed to divine revelation\nor to Catholic faith. Hence, those who were born and brought up in\nProtestantism, and who in good faith accept the confession of their\ndenomination, are not formal but material heretics. Even those who\nare ignorant of their errors through grave fault and who hold to them\nfirmly, are guilty, not of formal heresy, but of sinful ignorance (see\n904 sqq.)\n\n(b) One must willingly consent to the error. But for formal heresy it\nis not required that a person give his assent out of malice, or that\nhe continue in obstinate rejection for a long time, or that he refuse\nto heed admonitions given him. Pertinacity here means true consent\nto recognized error, and this can proceed from weakness (e.g., from\nanger or other passion); it can be given in an instant, and does not\npresuppose an admonition disregarded. Hence, if one sees the truth\nof the Catholic Church, but fears that assent will involve many\nobligations and out of weakness turns away from the truth, one then and\nthere pertinaciously consents to error.\n\n830. Examples of material heresy are: (a) Catholics who deny certain\ndogmas of faith, because they have not been well instructed, but who\nare ready to correct their errors, whenever the Church\u2019s teaching is\nbrought home to them; (b) non-Catholics who do not accept the Catholic\nChurch, but who have never had any misgivings about the tenets of their\nown denomination, or who in doubts have searched for the truth to the\nbest of their ability.\n\n831. The sinfulness of heresy is as follows: (a) formal heresy is a\ngrave sin, as was said above regarding unbelief in general (see 819;\nTit., iii. 10); (b) material heresy is no sin at all, if the ignorance\nis invincible; it is a grave or a venial sin, according to the amount\nof negligence, if the ignorance is vincible.\n\n832. Circumstances of the sin of heresy are of various kinds. (a)\nCircumstances that change the species. Most theologians hold that\nthe particular article denied, or the particular sect adhered to,\ndoes not constitute a particular species of heresy, and hence that\nin confession it suffices for one to accuse oneself generically of\nheresy. (b) Circumstances that aggravate the sin. The facts that heresy\nis external, that it is manifested to a large number, that it is\njoined with apostasy and adhesion to an heretical sect, etc., increase\nthe accidental malice of this sin. (c) Circumstances that multiply\nthe number of sins. It seems that when several articles or defined\ntruths are denied at the same time, so many numerically distinct sins\nare committed (see 219). Example: Titus says: \u201cI do not accept the\nResurrection, either of Christ or of the dead.\u201d The act is one, but two\nsins are committed.\n\n833. Various penalties and inhabilities are incurred through heresy,\nfor example, excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Pope\n(Canon 2314), loss of the power of suffrage (Canon 167, Sec.1, n.4),\nirregularity (Canon 984, n. 5; 985), inhability for the office of\nsponsor (Canons 765, 795), deprivation of ecclesiastical burial (Canon\n1240, Sec.1, n. 1). The excommunication which perhaps had been incurred\nby those who now wish to join the Church is absolved according to the\nform for the reception of converts prescribed by the Congregation of\nthe Holy Office, July 20, 1859, and found in rituals. Rituals published\nafter March, 1942, contain the formula of profession of faith and\nabjuration approved by the Holy Office.\n\n834. If a confessor should meet with a case of heresy, his procedure\nwill be as follows: (a) If the heresy was merely internal, no censure\nwas incurred, and every confessor has power to absolve from the sin,\nno matter how serious it was. (b) If the heresy was external, but the\nperson was in good faith, or even in affected ignorance of the sin, or\ninculpably ignorant of the penalty, no censure was incurred; for the\nexcommunication attaches only to formal heresy, and contumacity (Canon\n2242). (c) If the heresy was external and formal, but not notorious\n(i.e., the party did not publicly join an heretical sect), ordinarily\nthe case should be brought before the bishop for absolution in the\nexternal or internal forum. But in urgent cases every confessor has\npower to absolve as prescribed in Canon 2254. (d) If the heresy was\npublic and notorious (i.e., if the party joined officially an heretical\nsect), absolution is regularly to be given in both the external and\ninternal forums. The case should be submitted first to the Ordinary,\nunless there is urgency (Cfr. Canon 2254), or the confessor has special\npowers from Rome. The Ordinary can absolve in the external forum.\nAfterwards, the heretic can be absolved by any confessor in the forum\nof conscience (see Canon 2314, Sec.2.)\n\n835. Apostasy.--Apostasy (etymologically, desertion) has various\nmeanings in theology.\n\n(a) In a special sense, it means the abandonment of the religious or\nclerical state; but in its usual sense it means the abandonment of the\nChristian religion.\n\n(b) Apostasy from faith in a wide sense includes both partial\nabandonment (heresy) and total abandonment; but, in the strict sense,\nit means only total abandonment of Christianity.\n\nExample: A Christian who denies one article of the Creed becomes a\nheretic and an apostate in a wide sense; if he rejects the entire\nCreed, he becomes an infidel and an apostate in the strict sense.\n\n(c) Apostasy which extends to infidelity is also twofold: before God\nand before the Church. The first kind is committed by any person\nwho really had faith, even though unbaptized or not a Catholic; the\nsecond kind is committed only by those who were baptized and were\nCatholics. Examples: A catechumen who accepted Christianity and asked\nfor Baptism, becomes an apostate before God if he abandons his belief\nand purpose and goes back to paganism. Similarly, a person brought up\nas a Lutheran becomes an apostate before God, if he abandons all belief\nin Christianity. But the crime of apostasy of which the Church takes\ncognizance is the desertion of Christianity by a baptized Catholic.\n\n(d) A Catholic apostatizes from Christianity, either privatively (by\nmerely renouncing all belief in Christ), or contrarily (by taking up\nsome form of unbelief, such as indifferentism or free thought, or by\njoining some infidel sect, such as Mohammedanism or Confucianism).\n\n836. What was said above regarding the gravity, divisions, penalties\nand absolution of heresy, can be applied also to apostasy.\n\n887. As to the comparative gravity of sins of apostasy, the following\nshould be noted. (a) Apostasy is not a species of sin distinct from\nheresy, since both are essentially the same in malice, being rejections\nof the authority of divine revelation; but it is a circumstance that\naggravates the malice of unbelief, since it is more sweeping than\nheresy (see 822, 824). (b) Apostasy into one form of infidelity is\nnot specifically different from apostasy into another, but the form\nof infidelity is an aggravating or extenuating circumstance. Example:\nPaganism is further from faith than Mohammedanism; atheism further than\npaganism.\n\n838. Could one ever have a just reason for abandoning the Catholic\nChurch or remaining outside its faith? (a) Objectively speaking, there\ncan never be a just cause for giving up Catholicism or for refusing\nto embrace it. For the Catholic Church is the only true Church, and\nit is the will of Christ that all should join it. (b) Subjectively\nspeaking, there may be a just cause for leaving or not entering the\nChurch, namely, the fact that a person, ignorant in this matter but\nin good faith, believes that the Catholic Church is not the true\nChurch. For one is obliged to follow an erroneous conscience, and,\nif the error is invincible, one is excused from sin (see 581-583).\nExamples: A Protestant taught to believe that the teachings of the\nChurch are idolatrous, superstitious and absurd, is not blamed for not\naccepting them. A Catholic, poorly instructed in religion and thrown\nin with non-Catholic and anti-Catholic associates, might become really\npersuaded, and without sinning against faith itself, that it was his\nduty to become a Protestant.\n\n839. Apostasy is committed not only by those who leave the Church and\njoin some contrary religion (e.g., Mormonism), but also by those who,\nwhile professing to be Catholics, assent to the non-Catholic principles\nof some society that claims to be philosophical, charitable, economic,\npatriotic, etc. Much more are those apostates who join societies that\nopenly conspire against the Church. Such are: (a) Societies that are\nreally non-Catholic sects, because they have an infidel or heretical\ncreed--e.g., Freemasonry (which, according to its own authorities, is\na brotherhood based on Egyptian mysteries and claiming superiority to\nChristianity), Theosophy (which is a conglomeration of nonsensical\nideas about the Deity, Christ and Redemption), the Red International,\nwhose aims are the destruction of property rights, etc; (b) Societies\nthat are anti-Catholic sects, because their creed is hatred of the\nChurch--e.g., the Orangemen\u2019s Society, the Grand Orient, the Ku Klux\nKlan, Junior Order, etc.\n\n840. The Sin of Doubt.--Faith as explained above must be firm assent,\nexcluding doubt (see 752, 799), and hence the saying: \u201cHe who doubts\nis an unbeliever.\u201d The word \u201cdoubt,\u201d however, has many meanings, and\nin some of those meanings it is not opposed to firm assent, or has not\nthe voluntariness or acceptance of error that the unbelief of heresy or\ninfidelity includes. To begin with, doubt is either methodical or real.\n\n(a) Methodical doubt in matters of faith is an inquiry into the motives\nof credibility of religion and the reasons that support dogma, made\nby one who has not the slightest fear that reason or science can ever\ncontradict faith, but who consults them for the purpose of clarifying\nhis knowledge and of strengthening his own faith or that of others.\nThis kind of doubt is employed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who questions\nabout each dogma in turn (e.g., \u201cWhether God is good\u201d), and examines\nthe objections of unbelievers against it; but unlike his namesake, the\ndoubting Apostle, he does not withhold assent until reason has answered\nthe objectors, but answers his own questions by an act of faith: \u201cIn\nspite of all difficulties, God is good, for His Word says: \u2018The Lord is\ngood to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him\u2019 (Lament,\niii. 25).\u201d\n\n(b) Real doubt, on the contrary, entertains fears that the teachings\nof revelation or of the Church may be untrue, or that the opposite\nteachings may be true.\n\n841. Real doubt in matters of faith is always unjustifiable in itself,\nfor there is never any just reason for doubting God\u2019s word; but it\nis not always a sin of heresy or of infidelity. There are two kinds\nof real doubt, viz., the involuntary and the voluntary. (a) Doubt is\ninvoluntary, when it is without or contrary to the inclination of the\nwill, or when it proceeds from lack of knowledge (see 40-55 on the\nImpediments to Voluntariness). Example: Indeliberate doubts, and doubts\nthat persist in spite of one, lack the inclination of the will, while\ndoubts that proceed from invincible ignorance lack knowledge. (b) Doubt\nis voluntary, when it is according to inclination and with sufficient\nknowledge.\n\n842. Involuntary doubt in matters of faith is neither heretical nor\nsinful, for an act is not sinful, unless it is willed (see 99).\n\n(a) Indeliberate doubts arise in the mind before they are adverted to\nand without any responsibility of one\u2019s own for their appearance. From\nwhat was said above on first motions of the soul (see 129), it is clear\nthat such doubts are not sinful.\n\n(b) Unwelcome doubts persist in the mind after they have been adverted\nto, and, since faith is obscure (see 752, 799), it is not possible to\nexclude all conscious doubts, or even to prevent them from occurring\noften or lasting a considerable time. From what was said above on\ntemptation (see 253 sqq.), it is clear that, if the person troubled\nwith unwished doubts makes prompt and sufficient resistance, he not\nonly does not sin, but gains merit. But, if his resistance is not all\nit should be, and there is no danger of consent to the temptation, he\nsins venially.\n\n(c) Ignorant doubts occur in persons who have not received sufficient\nreligious instruction, through no fault of their own, and who therefore\nregard the doctrines of faith as matters of opinion, or at least look\nupon doubts as not sinful. From what was said above on invincible\nignorance (see 30), it is clear that such persons do not sin by their\ndoubts.\n\n843. Voluntary doubt is entertained either in ignorance for which\none is responsible, or in full knowledge; in the former case it is\nindirectly voluntary, in the latter, directly voluntary.\n\n(a) The doubts of one who is responsible for them because he did not\nuse the means to instruct himself in the faith, are a sin of willful\nignorance proportionate to the negligence of which he was guilty; but,\nif he is willing on better knowledge to put aside his doubts and accept\nthe teaching of the Church, he is not pertinacious, and hence not\nguilty of heresy or infidelity.\n\n(b) The doubts of one who is responsible for them, and not uninstructed\nor ignorant in faith, are sometimes positive, sometimes negative.\nNeither of these kinds of doubt is equivalent to heresy or infidelity\nin every case.\n\n844. Negative doubt is the state of mind in which one remains suspended\nbetween the truth contained in an article of faith and its opposite,\nwithout forming any positive judgment either of assent to or dissent\nfrom the article, or its certainty or uncertainty.\n\n(a) If this suspension of decision results from a wrong motive of\nthe will, which directs one not to give assent on the plea that the\nintellect, while not judging, offers such formidable difficulties that\ndeception is possible, then it seems that the doubter is guilty of\nimplicit heresy, or at least puts himself in the immediate danger of\nheresy.\n\n(b) If this suspension of judgment results from some other motive of\nthe will (e.g., from the wish to give attention here and now to other\nmatters), the guilt of heresy is not incurred, for no positive judgment\nis formed. Neither does it seem, apart from the danger of consent\nto positive doubt or from the obligation of an affirmative precept\nof faith then and there (see 925), that any serious sin in matters\nof faith is committed by such a suspension of judgment. Examples:\nTitus, being scandalized by the sinful conduct of certain Catholics,\nis tempted to doubt the divinity of the Church. He does not yield to\nthe temptation by deciding that the divinity of the Church is really\ndoubtful, but the difficulty has so impressed him that he decides to\nhold his judgment in abeyance. It seems that there is here an implicit\njudgment (i.e., one contained in the motive of the doubt) in favor of\nthe uncertainty of the divinity of the Church. Balbus has the same\ndifficulty as Titus, and it prevents him from eliciting an act of\nfaith on various occasions. But the reason for this is that an urgent\nbusiness matter comes up and he turns his attention to it, or that he\ndoes not wish at the time to weary his brain by considering such an\nimportant question as that of faith, or that he thinks he can conquer a\ntemptation more easily by diverting his thoughts to other subjects (see\n257), or that he puts off till a more favorable moment the rejection\nof the difficulty. In these cases there is not heretical doubt,\nsince Balbus forms no positive judgment, even implicitly, but there\nmay be a sin against faith. Thus, Balbus would sin seriously if his\nsuspension of assent should place him in immediate danger of positive\ndoubt; he would sin venially, if that suspension be due to some slight\ncarelessness.\n\n845. Positive doubt is the state of mind in which one decides, on\naccount of some difficulty against faith, that the latter is really\ndoubtful and uncertain, and that assent cannot be given to either\nside. With regard to such a state of mind note: (a) If this judgment\nis formed by a Catholic, it is heretical; for his faith, as he knows\nand admits, is the true faith, revealed and proposed as absolutely\ncertain. Hence, although he does not deny the faith, he does positively\njudge that what is revealed by God and proposed infallibly by the\nChurch as certain, is not certain, and thus in his intellect there is\npertinacious error.\n\n(b) If this judgment is formed by a non-Catholic, it is likewise\nheretical, if the truth doubted belongs to divine or Catholic faith,\nfor we are now considering the formal heretic who belongs to a\nnon-Catholic sect against conviction; but it is not heretical, if the\ndoctrine doubted belongs only to what is wrongly considered in his sect\nas divine faith, or to what may be called Protestant faith (i.e., the\nofficial confession of his religion), for he does not profess to accept\nhis church as an infallible interpreter.\n\n846. The doubts We have been just discussing are the passing doubts\nthat come to those who are believers, or who consider themselves\nbelievers. There are also doubts that are permanent, and that are held\nby those who class themselves, not as believers, but as doubters or\nagnostics. Some of these sceptics doubt all religious creeds, holding\nthat it is works and not beliefs that matter. This doctrine amounts to\ninfidelity, since it rejects Christian faith entirely. Others profess\nFundamentalism, which accepts a few Christian beliefs and considers the\nothers as optional, pretending that the true faith cannot be recognized\namid so much diversity of opinions. This doctrine is heretical, since\nit accepts some and rejects others of the articles of faith.\n\n847. Credulity and Rationalism.--Opposed in special ways to the\nmaterial and formal objects of faith are credulity and errors about the\nexistence and nature of revelation.\n\n(a) Other sins against faith are opposed to its material object (i.e.,\nthe articles of belief), inasmuch as they subtract from it by denying\nthis or that article. Credulity, on the contrary, adds to the material\nobject of faith by accepting a doctrine as revealed when there is no\nprudent reason for so doing, contrary to the teaching of scripture\nthat \u201che who is hasty to believe is light of heart\u201d (Ecclus., xix. 4).\nThis sin is opposed rather to prudence, inasmuch as it causes one to\nneglect the consideration of the reasons on which a prudent judgment\nrests (see Vol. II), and hence it does not destroy the virtue of faith.\nIt is, nevertheless, injurious to faith, since it brings Christianity\ninto contempt, keeps others from embracing the teachings of the Church,\nand leads to superstition, the \u201ctwin-sister of unbelief.\u201d Examples:\nSempronia, who is not well educated, accepts as matters of faith every\npious legend, every marvellous report of miracle no matter from what\nsource it comes or how suspicious may be its appearance. Titus holds\nmany views considered by good authorities as improbable or false, or\nas at best only opinions, but he gives them out as doctrines of the\nChurch that must be accepted, or as infallible or revealed teaching.\nThe credulity of Sempronia is excusable imprudence on account of her\nignorance, if she has not neglected instruction; but that of Titus is\nblameworthy, for he ought to inform himself better before attempting to\ninstruct others.\n\n(b) Other kinds of unbelief are opposed to the formal object of faith\n(i.e., to the authority of revelation as the motive of belief); for\nimplicitly at least they substitute private judgment for authority. The\nvarious systems of Naturalism, such as Deism, go farther and openly\nattack supernatural revelation as the ground of belief. Some of these\nsystems deny the fact of revelation (e.g., Deism), others its character\n(e.g., Modernism, which makes revelation to consist in the internal\nexperience of the believer), others its necessity (e.g., Rationalism).\nThese heterodox teachings pertain, some to infidelity (e.g., Deism),\nsome to heresy (c.g., Modernism). The great majority of Protestants\nnowadays cannot be said to have faith, declares Cardinal Newman, since\nthey deduce from scripture, instead of believing a teacher. What looks\nlike faith is mere hereditary persuasion.\n\n848. Dangers to Faith.--One becomes guilty of heresy, infidelity,\ndoubts against faith, etc., indirectly, by placing oneself in the\ndanger of those sins (see 258 sqq., on the Dangers of Sin). Dangers of\nthis kind are partly internal, partly external.\n\n(a) Internal dangers to faith are especially the following:\nintellectual pride or an excessive spirit of independence, which\nmakes one unwilling to accept authority; love of pleasure, which sets\none at odds with the precepts of faith; neglect of prayer and piety,\nparticularly in time of temptation.\n\n(b) External dangers to faith are especially as follows: literature\nopposed to religion; schools where unbelief is defended; mixed\nmarriages; association with unbelievers in religious matters; certain\nsocieties.\n\n849. Dangerous Reading.--There is a threefold prohibition against the\nreading of literature dangerous to faith.\n\n(a) The natural law forbids one to read or hear read written matter\nof any description which one knows is dangerous to one\u2019s faith, even\nthough it is not dangerous to others and not forbidden by the law of\nthe Church. For a similar reason one may not keep such material in\none\u2019s possession. Example: Titus and Balbus read the letters of a\nfriend on Evolution. Titus finds nothing unsound in the letters, and\nis not troubled by reading them; but they fill the mind of Balbus with\ndoubts and perplexities, as the subject is above him. This reading is\nnaturally dangerous for Balbus, but not for Titus.\n\n(b) The law of the Church forbids the use of certain kinds of writings\nor representations dangerous to faith (Canon 1399), as well as of those\nindividual writings that have been denounced to the Holy See and placed\non the Index, or forbidden by other ecclestiastical authorities. (See\nAppendix I for Summary of Common Law on Prohibition of Books.)\n\n(c) The law of the Church also pronounces ipso facto excommunication\nagainst those who make use of works written by unbelievers in favor of\ntheir errors (Canon 2318).\n\n850. As regards the kind of sin committed by using writings dangerous\nto faith, the following points must be noted:\n\n(a) If a writing is dangerous and forbidden under natural law, the sin\ncommitted is of itself grave whenever the danger itself is serious and\nproximate; it is venial, when the danger is slight or remote. The sin\ncommitted depends, therefore, not on the time spent in reading or the\nnumber of pages covered, but on the danger (see 260-261, on the Dangers\nof Sin). No sin at all is committed, if the danger is slight or remote,\nand there is reason for reading the writing in question (e.g., the\ndefense of truth).\n\n(b) If the writing is forbidden under ecclesiastical law, the sin\ncommitted is of itself grave, even though the danger to an individual\nis not serious or proximate, for the law is based on the presumption\nof a common and great danger (see 460). The sin is not grave, however,\nwhen the prohibition is generally regarded as not binding under grave\nsin, or when the use made of the writing is inconsiderable. No sin at\nall is committed, if one has obtained the necessary permission to read\nforbidden works, and is not exposed to spiritual danger in using the\npermission.\n\n851. There are two cases in which the use of writings forbidden by the\nChurch is only a venial sin. (a) When a writing, which in itself is\nnot dangerous or only slightly dangerous, is forbidden, not on account\nof its contents, but only on account of its lack of ecclesiastical\napproval, it is not ordinarily regarded as forbidden under grave sin\n(e.g., Catholic Translations of scripture that have not received the\nImprimatur). (b) When a writing has been condemned on account of its\ncontents or manner of presentation, one does not sin mortally, if the\nuse one makes of it is only slight.\n\n852. What constitutes notable use of forbidden matter is not determined\nby law, but recent moralists, bearing in mind the character of the law\nand what would prove proximately dangerous to faith for the generality\ntoday, offer the following rules: (a) notable matter in reading a book\nis three or four pages from the more dangerous parts, from thirty to\nsixty pages from the slightly dangerous parts; (b) notable matter in\nreading a paper or periodical is habitual use of it, or even one very\nbitter article; (c) notable matter in retention of forbidden writings\nis a period in excess of the reasonable time (say, a month) for\nsecuring permission or for delivering the writings to those who have a\nright to have them.\n\n853. It is more difficult to decide what is notable matter, when a book\nhas been condemned on account of its general tendency. (a) Under the\nnatural law, of course, even a page or less is notable matter, if it\nplaces an individual in proximate danger; (b) under the positive law,\nperhaps anything in excess of one-tenth of the book would place one in\nproximate danger. But, as we are dealing now with the general tendency\nof a writing, this may have its effect on the reader before he has read\none-tenth, if the book is large, or the treatment is very seductive.\nHence, \u201cone-tenth\u201d is an approximation, rather than a rule.\n\n854. The kinds of printed matter forbidden by the Code (Canon 1399) are\nas follows: (a) the prohibition extends to books, to other published\nmatter (such as magazines and newspapers), and to illustrations that\nattack religion and what are called \u201choly pictures\u201d (i.e., images of\nour Lord and the Saints), if opposed to the mind of the Church; (b)\nthe prohibition extends to published matter dangerous to faith, and\ntherefore to the following; to writings or caricatures that attack the\nexistence of God, miracles or other foundations of natural or revealed\nreligion, Catholic dogma, worship or discipline, the ecclesiastical\nhierarchy as such, or the clerical or religious state; to those that\ndefend heresy, schism, superstition, condemned errors, subversive\nsocieties, or suicide, duelling, divorce; to non-Catholic publications\nof the Bible and to non-Catholic works on religion that are not clearly\nfree from opposition to Catholic faith; to liturgical works that do\nnot agree with the authentic texts; to books that publish apocryphal\nindulgences and to printed images of holy persons that would be the\noccasion of error (e.g., the representation of the Holy Ghost in human\nform).\n\n855. The mere presence, however, of condemned matter in a writing does\nnot cause it to fall under prohibition.\n\n(a) Some works are not forbidden unless the author\u2019s purpose to teach\nerror or attack the truth is known. Hence, books on religion written\nby non-Catholics which contain errors against the Catholic Faith are\nnot forbidden, unless they deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., not\nincidentally or cursorily, but clearly for the purpose of teaching).\nIt is not necessary, however, that religion be the main theme of the\nbook, Similarly, books that attack religion are forbidden, not when\nattacks are casual or by the way, but when they are made purposely;\nand the same is true as regards books that insult the clerical state.\nThe purpose is recognized from the declaration of the author, from the\nnature of the work, from the systematic treatment, length or frequency\nof argumentation or attack, etc.\n\n(b) Other works are not forbidden, unless they contain not only\nagreement with error, but also argument in defense of error. Thus,\nbooks in favor of heresy, schism, suicide, duelling, divorce,\nFreemasonry, etc., are forbidden when they champion wrong causes by\ndisputing in their behalf.\n\n(c) Other works are forbidden, not because they state, but because\nthey approve of error. Such are books that attack or ridicule the\nfoundations of religion or the dogmas of faith, those that disparage\nworship, those that are subversive of discipline, those that defend\nproscribed propositions, those that teach and favor superstition, etc.\n\n856. Books that deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., of set\npurpose), or _obiter_ (i.e., incidentally), are as follows: (a) Books\nthat are _ex professo_ religious are manuals of theology, works of\nsermons, treatises on the Bible, instructions on religious duties,\nworks of piety, text-books of church history. Works of a profane\ncharacter, such as scientific books, may also teach religion _ex\nprofesso_, but it is not easy as a rule to perceive the intention of\nteaching religion in works of this kind. (b) Books that deal with\nreligion only _obiter_ are works of a profane character, in which\nthe subject of religion is introduced only briefly (e.g., by way of\nillustration).\n\n857. Books dealing _ex professo_ with religion and written by\nnon-Catholics are: (a) forbidden, if they contain matter contrary to\nCatholic faith; (b) not forbidden, if it is clear to one (e.g., from a\ncompetent review) that they contain nothing contrary to Catholic faith.\n\n858. How is one to know in a particular case whether a book falls under\none of the foregoing classes forbidden by the Code? (a) If the Holy\nSee has made a declaration, the matter is of course clear; (b) if no\ndeclaration has been made, and one is competent to judge for oneself,\none may read as much as is necessary to decide whether the book is one\nof those proscribed by the Code; but if a person has not received the\neducation that would fit him for judging, he should consult some person\nmore skilled than himself, such as his parish priest or confessor.\n\n859. Is it lawful to read newspapers, magazines, or reference works\n(such as encyclopedias), which contain some articles contrary to faith,\nand others that are good or indifferent, if these papers or books have\nnot been condemned? (a) If the reading or consultation, on account of\none\u2019s individual character, will subject one to grave temptations,\nthen according to natural law it should be avoided. (b) If there is no\nserious danger or temptation, but the policy of the works or journals\nin question is anti-religious or anti-Catholic, as appears from the\nspace given to hostile attack, their frequency or bitterness of spirit,\nthen, according to the law of the Code just mentioned, one should avoid\nsuch reading matter. Examples of this kind of literature are papers\ndevoted to atheistic or bolshevistic propaganda, anti-Catholic sheets,\netc. (c) If there is no danger to the individual, and the editorial\npolicy is not hostile, one may use such matter as is good and useful,\nwhile passing over any elaborate or systematic attack on truth or\ndefense of error.\n\n860. Individual books are forbidden by name to all Catholics by the\nHoly See and to their own subjects by Ordinaries and other local or\nparticular councils (Canon 1395). Books condemned by the Apostolic See\nmust be considered as forbidden everywhere and in whatsoever language\nthey may be translated into (Canon 1396).\n\n(a) If a book is forbidden, one may not read even the harmless parts of\nit, for there is the danger that, if one part is read, the other parts\nwill also be read. But, if the part that occasioned the prohibition be\nremoved, the prohibition ceases as regards the remainder of the book.\n\n(b) If a work is forbidden, one may not read any volume, if all the\nvolumes deal with the same subject. But, if the volumes treat of\ndifferent subjects or of one subject that is divisible (e.g., universal\nhistory), one may read such volumes as do not contain the danger that\noccasioned the prohibition.\n\n(c) If all the works of an author are condemned, the prohibition is\nunderstood to apply only to books (i.e., not to smaller works), and\nonly to books dealing with religion, unless it appears that the other\nkinds of writings are also included; but the prohibition is to be\npresumed to include works that appear after the condemnation, unless\nthe contrary is manifest.\n\n861. Some outstanding works that have been condemned are the following:\n(a) In English: _Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire_ (Gibbons);\n_Myth, Ritual, and Religion_ (Andrew Lang); _History of England_\n(Goldsmith); _The Roman Popes_ (Ranke); _The Life and Pontificate\nof Leo X_ (Roscoe); _Constitutional History of England_ (Hallam);\n_Political Economy_ (Mill); _Happiness in Hell_ (Mivart); _History\nof English Literature_ (Taine); _Reign of Charles V_ (Robertson);\n_Zoonomia_, or The Laws of Organic Life (Darwin).\n\n(b) In French: _Notre Dame de Paris_ (Hugo); _Life of Jesus_ and\neighteen other works of Renan; all the works of Anatole France; _The\nSocial Contract_ and four works of Rousseau; nearly all the works\nof Voltaire; _The Gospel and the Church, Gospel Studies, The Fourth\nGospel, Apropos of a Little Book, The Religion of Israel_ (Loisy); all\nthe works of Jean Paul Sartre; _La Deuxieme Sexe_ and _Les Mandarins_\nby Simone de Beauvoir.\n\n862. What is meant by \u201cuse\u201d of forbidden writings? (a) In the first\nplace, those \u201cuse\u201d a writing who read it--that is, who go over it\nwith their eyes, understanding the meaning therein contained. Hence,\na person does not violate the church law against forbidden books if\nhe merely listens to another read; although he might sin against the\nnatural law, and even against the church law, if he induced the other\nto read to him; neither does a person violate the church law, if he\nmerely glances at the characters, without understanding the sense\nexpressed. Example: Titus, a professor of theology, has permission to\nread forbidden books, and he sometimes reads to his class doctrinal\npassages from works on the Index in order to explain and refute errors.\nBalbus examines very carefully the pages of a beautifully printed copy\nof a forbidden work, but he understands hardly a word of it, since it\nis in a foreign language. Neither Titus\u2019 class nor Balbus are guilty of\nreading as forbidden by the Church, for strict interpretation is given\nto penal laws (see 485).\n\n(b) In the second place, those \u201cuse\u201d a forbidden writing who retain\nit--that is, who keep it in their home as belonging to themselves or\nborrowed from another, or who give it for safekeeping to another,\neven though they are not able to read it. Hence, a librarian who has\nforbidden books on his shelves does not break the law, since the books\nare not his property, nor are they kept in his home. A bookbinder\nalso who receives forbidden books is considered as excused through\n_epieikeia_ for the time the books are in his shop, especially if his\ncustomer has the permission to read those books. Example: Sempronius\nbought an expensive work and then discovered that it is on the Index.\nIs he obliged to destroy it? No, if he does not wish to destroy it, he\nmay, if he does not delay beyond a month, either give it to someone who\nhas permission to keep it, or obtain that permission for himself.\n\n(c) In the third place, those \u201cuse\u201d a forbidden writing who communicate\nit to others--for example, those who make presents of works that are on\nthe Index, who lend such books to others, or place them where others\nwill read them, who read to others passages or write out excerpts for\nthem. It is lawful, however, for professors in theological and other\nclasses of sacred science to read from forbidden works to their student\nbody, if a suitable explanation and refutation exclude all danger.\n\n(d) Lastly, those fall under the law as violators who co-operate in\nthe production or distribution of forbidden literature--for example,\npublishers, owners, authors, translators, booksellers, printers, etc.\n(cfr. 976 sqq., on cooperation in Worship).\n\n863. The church law on forbidden literature affects all Catholics not\nexcepted by law, no matter how learned they may be, what position they\nmay hold, or how immune from danger they may seem, unless they obtain\npermission to read such literature from the Holy See, the Ordinary,\nor their regular Superior (Canon 1402). Those excepted by law and\nwho do not need to seek such permission are certain prelates and\nstudents. (a) Cardinals, Bishops, and other Ordinaries (Canon 1401),\nand likewise major superiors in exempt clerical orders (Canon 198,\nSec. 1) are not bound by the church prohibition of books dangerous to\nfaith; (b) those who are pursuing theological or biblical studies may\nuse forbidden editions of scripture, provided these are correct and\ncomplete as to the text, and contain no attacks on Catholic teaching in\nthe introductions and annotations (Canon 1400). This permission extends\nnot only to seminarians, but also to lay students; not only to those\nwho are at school, but also to those who are really studying outside\nof school, such as professors, writers and those who are preparing\nlectures or dissertations.\n\n864. When the necessity of reading a forbidden book is urgent, and\nthe opportunity of asking permission from the Holy See or Ordinary\nis lacking, a person whose duties call for acquaintance with such a\nbook may consider that the law does not bind in his particular case\n(see 411-417 on _epieikeia_). (a) A professor, editor, critic, etc.,\nwho had not yet received permission might read a forbidden book, if,\nbeing called upon to criticize it, he could not await the permission;\n(b) a confessor, pastor, etc., in similar circumstances could read a\nforbidden book in order to be able to refute it.\n\n865. Those who have received permission to read books forbidden as\ngenerally dangerous to faith, may also read papers and periodicals\nof the same character, and they may use the permission given them\nanywhere, since it is a personal indult (see 446). The following\nrestrictions, however, are understood in the grant of permission:\n\n(a) Permission to read, no matter by whom granted, does not make it\nlawful to read what is really a danger to one\u2019s faith, for this (as\nexplained above in 849-850) is contrary to natural law. Moreover, those\nwho have received an apostolic indult may not read or retain books\nproscribed by their Ordinaries, unless the indult extends even to this.\n\n(b) Permission to retain does not make it lawful to keep forbidden\nbooks in such a way that they will fall into the hands of those\nwho have no right to read them. On the contrary, there is a grave\nobligation arising from the natural law to prevent such a thing from\nhappening. Hence, those who have permission to keep writings dangerous\nto faith should not place them on shelves to which there is general\naccess, or else they should label them as dangerous and forbidden (see\nCanons 1405, Sec.1, and 1403, Sec.2).\n\n866. According to Canon 2318, the following censures are incurred\nthrough the use of forbidden books:\n\n(a) Excommunication specially reserved to the Apostolic See is incurred\n_ipso facto_ by those who offer to the public books, even of a\nnon-religious character, written by apostates, schismatics, or heretics\nin systematic defense of heresy or schism. This censure applies, first,\nto the chief causes of publicity of the work--i.e., to the author who\noffers it for publication, and to the publisher and printer (owner or\nmanager of the press) who accept it for that purpose--not, however,\nto remote cooperators or helpers; secondly, to such chief causes as\nunderstand the character of the book, either from the word of the\nauthor or from the contents. It is not incurred, if the work is not\npublished (i.e., if it remains in manuscript, or is circulated only\nprivately), or if it is published in other than book form (e.g., as a\npamphlet, leaflet or article). Ignorance, if not crass or supine (see\n27), excuses from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.3, n. 1).\n\n(b) The same censure is incurred by those who defend the aforementioned\nbooks, either materially (e.g., by saving them from destruction) or\nmorally (e.g., by defending, praising, or recommending them). Ignorance\nexcuses here as in the case of publishers.\n\n(c) The same censure is incurred by those who defend books of any\nauthor condemned by name through Apostolic letters. Hence, the censure\ndoes not apply to books condemned by a pontifical congregation nor to\nbooks condemned in a Papal Letter, if their title is not mentioned.\nIgnorance excuses here as in the previous case.\n\n(d) The same censure is incurred by those who knowingly keep or read\nany of the forbidden books mentioned so far in this paragraph. The\nsense to be attached to the words \u201ckeep or read\u201d has been given above\n(see 862). Even crass and supine ignorance of law or penalty, provided\nit be not affected, as well as other causes that lessen imputability\n(see 40), excuse from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.Sec.1, 2).\n\n(e) Excommunication not reserved is incurred _ipso facto_ by authors\nand publishers who are responsible for the printing without due\nauthorization of books of Holy Writ, or of notes or commentaries on the\nBible, even though the text be correct and the explanation orthodox.\nThis censure is not incurred by those who are not responsible for the\nprinting done, such as typesetters and readers. Ignorance, if not crass\nand supine, excuses here (Canon 2229, Sec.3).\n\n867. Dangerous Schools.--With reference to their danger to faith,\nschools are of three kinds:\n\n(a) sectarian schools, in which heresy or infidelity is prescribed\nas part of the curriculum, and assistance at non-Catholic rites\nis required. Examples are colleges and universities supported by\nProtestant denominations, sectarian Sunday schools, Bible classes;\n\n(b) neutral schools (i.e., schools in which all religious teaching\nis forbidden and no recognition given to any denomination) whose\nspirit and teaching in secular branches is anti-religious or\nanti-Catholic. Examples are non-sectarian colleges or universities in\nwhich materialism is incidentally taught, or in which the faculty are\nfreethinkers or bigots;\n\n(c) neutral schools in which no positive offense is given to religion\nor the Church. Examples are public schools in which only the profane\nsciences are taught, and care is exercised that neither the text-books\nnor the teachers shall be irreligious or interfere with the religious\nbeliefs of others. Reducible to this category are mixed schools, that\nis, those which are open also to non-Catholics (Canon 1374).\n\n868. The danger of the foregoing kinds of schools to the faith of\npupils is as follows:\n\n(a) in the sectarian schools there is danger of heresy or infidelity,\nsince the pupils are obliged to hear the defense of false doctrine and\nto join in the services of a false religion;\n\n(b) in the neutral schools of an anti-religious spirit the danger\nis the same, for the pupils must attend courses in which the\ninterpretations given to history, science, philosophy, letters, etc.,\nare unfriendly to the faith;\n\n(c) in the neutral schools whose spirit is not anti-religious, there\nis a danger of Indifferentism that arises from the system itself; for\nthe very fact that religion is slighted tends to impress the students\nwith the idea that it is unimportant or unrelated to other matters of\nlife, and this prepares the way for doubt and scepticism. Moreover,\nsince example teaches more effectively than the printed or spoken word,\nthe neglect or contempt of religion by professors and fellow-pupils in\nmixed schools is a danger to faith.\n\n869. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of attending or patronizing schools\ndangerous to faith must be decided according to the principles given\nabove on the occasions of sin (see 263 sqq.).\n\n(a) If the danger to faith is voluntary, the use of such schools is not\nlawful, for those who are able are bound to seek or provide religious\neducation both in elementary and higher schooling (see Canon 1373).\nExample: In the town of X there are good parochial and Catholic high\nschools. Sempronius could easily send his children to these schools,\nbut he thinks that certain select schools offer greater social and\nfinancial advantages, and so he chooses them. His conduct is not lawful.\n\n(b) If the danger to faith is necessary, the use of such schools is\nlawful, provided the needed precautions are duly observed. Example: In\nthe country district of Y there is no school except the public school,\nand therefore Balbus sends his children to that school. His conduct is\nlawful, but he must see that his children receive religious instruction\noutside of school.\n\n870. The danger to faith is necessary when there is no Catholic school,\nor none that is sufficient for the needs of individual students, and\ntheir parents are unable to send them elsewhere. In such a case it\nis lawful to attend a school that is neutral, but means must be used\nto make the proximate danger remote. Such means are the following:\n(a) religious instruction must be taken outside of school, as in\nspecial week-day classes, Sunday school, home study, etc.; (b) special\nattention must be given to the strengthening of faith on those points\nthat are attacked or slighted in the neutral school; (c) parents,\nguardians, or others responsible must see that the reading and the\nassociates of their wards in the neutral schools are good, and that\nthey are faithful to their religious duties.\n\n871. Is attendance at non-Catholic schools sometimes unlawful, even\nwhen there are serious reasons in its favor?\n\n(a) It is unlawful, if the schools are sectarian, and then no\nexcuse can justify such attendance; for, in addition to scandal and\ncooperation in false worship, there is present a proximate danger to\nfaith that is not made remote. Parents or guardians who knowingly send\ntheir children to schools for education in a non-Catholic religion are\nsuspected of heresy and incur excommunication _ipso facto_, reserved\nto the Ordinary (see Canon 2319). Example: Titus sends his daughter to\na sectarian academy because it is nearer and cheaper than the Catholic\nacademy. He claims that she is old enough not to lose her religion,\nthat opposition will make her faith stronger, etc. Titus\u2019 arguments are\nfallacious and his conduct gravely sinful.\n\n(b) Attendance at non-Catholic schools is unlawful, if the schools are\nneutral in theory, but so dangerous in practice that loss of faith is\npractically certain if one attends. Example: Balbus sends his son to an\nundenominational university which is regarded as a hotbed of atheism,\nand whose students practically to a man lose all religion.\n\n872. Absolution should be denied in some cases to those who send their\nchildren to non-Catholic schools, if they refuse to change.\n\n(a) Absolution should be denied on account of lack of faith in the\nparents themselves, if they send their children to non-Catholic schools\non account of their own ideas that are contrary to the teachings of the\nChurch. Example: Sempronius refuses to send his children to parochial\nschools, because he thinks each one should judge about religion for\nhimself, and not receive it from instructors.\n\n(b) Absolution should be denied on account of the danger caused to the\nfaith of the children, when the children are sent to sectarian schools,\nor when they are sent to neutral schools and sufficient efforts are not\nused to counteract the evil influence there felt.\n\n(c) Absolution should be refused on account of scandal or cooperation\nin evil, if, while the parents themselves are sound in faith and\nprevent all danger of perversion of their children, they send them\nto non-Catholic schools without sufficient reason, to the grave\ndisedification of others, or the great assistance of unchristian\neducation.\n\n873. Absolution should not be denied in the following cases: (a) when\nthe parents have a sufficient reason for sending their children to\nnon-Catholic schools (i.e., a reason approved by the local Ordinary\nas sufficient). It belongs only to the Ordinary to decide in what\ncircumstances and with what precautions attendance at such schools is\nallowable (Canon 1374; for application to the United States, see Holy\nOffice, 24 Nov., 1875; Council of Baltimore, III, n. 199, in regard\nto elementary and high schools. As to colleges and universities, see\n_S.C.Prop.Fid_., 7 Apr., 1860; _Fontes_, n. 4649, Vol VII, p. 381;\nn.4868, Vol. VII, p.405; also S.C.Prop.Fid., 6 Aug., 1867); (b) when\nthe parents have no sufficient reason, but there is no lack of faith on\ntheir part, no danger of perversion of the children, no grave scandal\nor sinful co-operation in evil.\n\n874. The presence of Catholics as teachers in non-Catholic schools\nis beneficial, since it lessens to some extent the evil influence of\nsuch schools; but there is also the danger that it may cause scandal\nor create the impression that attendance at Catholic schools is not\nnecessary. Hence, it has been permitted by the Church in certain cases\nbut only when danger of scandal or wrong impression is absent. (a)\nThe secular sciences may be taught by laymen in non-Catholic schools\nof higher or lower education, if there is no scandal, no unlawful\ncooperation, and no immediate danger of perversion. (b) Christian\ndoctrine may be taught by priests to Catholic students of neutral\nschools, either in the school building or elsewhere (as in a church),\nand certain priests may be appointed as chaplains for this work (Sacred\nCongregation of the Holy Office to Bishops of Switzerland, March 26,\n1866).\n\n875. Dangerous Marriages.--The following kinds of marriage are\ndangerous to the faith of Catholics: (a) marriage with non-Catholics,\nunbaptized or bigoted persons (mixed marriages); (b) marriage with\nfallen-away Catholics (that is, with those who have given up the\nCatholic religion, although they have not joined another), or with\nthose who belong to societies forbidden by the Church.\n\n876. The danger to faith in the aforesaid kinds of marriage are serious\nand proximate, and hence such unions are forbidden by divine law, as\nlong as the danger is not removed or made remote through the use of\nprecautions. The dangers are for the Catholic party and the children.\n\n(a) The Catholic party is in serious danger of losing the faith\n(i.e., of joining the religion or sharing the ideas of the other\nparty), or of doubting the truth of the Church, or of taking refuge in\nIndifferentism. For, if domestic life is peaceful, the Catholic may\neasily be led in time to regard with favor the other party\u2019s religion\nor views; if it is not peaceful, the Catholic through fear or annoyance\nmay make compromises or sacrifices in matters of faith, or else suffer\ntemptations that could have been avoided.\n\n(b) The children born are in serious danger of being deprived of the\nfaith (i.e., of not being brought up as Catholics), or of having their\nfaith weakened by the example of parents who do not agree in the matter\nof religion. If the non-Catholic or fallen-away Catholic interferes\nwith the religion of the children, their baptism, religious education,\nattendance at church, etc., will be forbidden or impeded; if that\nparty does not interfere, there will be at least the example during\nimpressionable years of one parent who does not accept the Catholic\nfaith or who disregards its requirements. Statistics indicate that one\nof the chief sources of leakage in the Church today is mixed marriages.\n\n877. Dangerous marriages are also forbidden by the law of the Church.\n(a) Lack of baptism in the non-Catholic party causes the diriment\nimpediment of disparity of worship (Canon 1070); (b) membership of the\nnon-Catholic party in an heretical or schismatical sect causes the\nprohibitive impediment of mixed religion (Canon 1060); (c) unworthiness\nof one of the parties, on account of notorious apostasy or affiliation\nwith forbidden societies (see 945 sqq.), prevents the pastor from\nassisting at the marriage without permission from the Ordinary (Canon\n1065).\n\n878. No one may enter into any of the dangerous marriages here\nconsidered, unless the requirements of the natural and ecclesiastical\nlaws be complied with. (a) The natural law requires under pain of grave\nsin that the danger of perversion be removed, that no non-Catholic\nceremony take place, and that the Catholic spouse work prudently for\nthe conversion of the other party. (b) The ecclesiastical law requires\nunder grave sin that guarantees be given that the requirements of the\nnatural law shall be fulfilled (Canons 1061, 1071); that there be grave\nand urgent reasons for the marriage (ibid.); that dispensations from\nthe impediments be obtained, or permission, in the case of unworthiness\nof one of the parties, to assist at the marriage be granted by the\nOrdinary (Canons 1036, 1065).\n\n879. The canonical consequences of dangerous marriages illegally\ncontracted are as follows: (a) Those who knowingly contract a mixed\nmarriage without dispensation are _ipso facto_ excluded from legitimate\necclesiastical acts, (e.g., the office of godparent), and from the\nuse of sacramentals, until a dispensation has been obtained from the\nOrdinary (Canon 2375). Marriage contracted with the impediment of\ndisparity of worship is invalid, whether the parties are in ignorance\nor not (Canon 1070, Sec.16). (b) Catholics who enter into marriage\nbefore a non-Catholic minister acting in a religious capacity or who\ncontract marriage with the implicit or explicit understanding that\nany or all of the children will be educated outside the Church incur\nexcommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Ordinary (Canon\n2319).\n\n880. The prenuptial guarantees required by church law in case of mixed\nor other dangerous marriages are as follows: (a) According to the\nCode, no dispensation for mixed marriages will be granted unless the\nnon-Catholic party gives a guarantee that the danger of perversion\nfor the Catholic party shall be removed, and both parties promise\nthat all the children shall be baptized and brought up only in the\nCatholic faith. There must be moral certainty that the promises will be\nkept, and as a rule they should be demanded in writing (Canons 1061,\n1071). The permission for marriage with fallen-away Catholics is not\ngranted until the Ordinary has satisfied himself that the danger to the\nCatholic and the children has been removed (Canon 1065, Sec.2). (b) The\npre-Code legislation further required that both parties promise that\nthere would be no non-Catholic ceremony and that the Catholic promise\nto work for the conversion of the other party. Canons 1062-1063 speak\nof these obligations, but do not exact promises.\n\n881. Remedies against mixed and other dangerous marriages are the\nfollowing: (a) Before engagement Catholics should be instructed and\nencouraged to marry those of their own faith. Thus, confessors can\ndiscourage company-keeping with non-Catholics, parents can provide\ntheir children with opportunities for meeting suitable Catholics, and,\nabove all, pastors should frequently speak and preach to old and young\non the evils of mixed marriages. (b) After engagement to a non-Catholic\nhas been made, the non-Catholic should be persuaded to accept the\nCatholic religion, if he or she can do this with sincerity; otherwise,\nthe Catholic should be warned of the danger of the marriage, and the\npastor should refuse to seek a dispensation unless there is a really\nserious cause (see Canon 1064; II Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 336;\nIII Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 133).\n\n882. Dangerous Communication.--Mixed marriages are mentioned specially\namong the communications with non-Catholic that are dangerous to faith,\nbecause marriage is a lifelong and intimate association. But there\nare other communications with unbelievers that can easily corrupt\nfaith, the less dangerous being communication in matters that are not\nreligious, and the more dangerous being communication in religious\nmatters. (a) Non-religious or civil communication is association with\nnon-Catholics in secular affairs, such as business, social life,\neducation, politics. (b) Religious communication is association with\nnon-Catholics in sacred services or divine worship.\n\n883. Non-religious communication is sinful as follows: (a) It is sinful\naccording to natural law, when in a particular case it would be a\nproximate danger of perversion freely chosen, or an involuntary danger\nagainst which one does not employ sufficient precaution. Examples:\nTitus chooses infidels and freethinkers for his friends and intimates,\nunderstanding their character and bad influence. Balba on account of\nher poverty is obliged to work in a place where all her companions are\nunbelievers who scoff at religion and try in every way to win her over\nto their errors; yet she is not concerned to arm herself more strongly\nin faith.\n\n(b) According to ecclesiastical law, civil communication is forbidden\nwith those who have been excommunicated as persons to be avoided (Canon\n2267). Such persons are those who lay violent hands on the Roman\nPontiff (Canon 2343), or who have been excommunicated by individual\nname and as persons to be avoided through public decree or sentence of\nthe Apostolic See (Canon 2258). Exception is made, however, for husband\nand wife, children, servants, subjects, and for others in case of\nnecessity.\n\n884. Religious communication is sinful on account of danger in the\nfollowing cases:\n\n(a) If it is a proximate and voluntary occasion of sin against faith.\nExamples: Sempronius goes to a non-Catholic church to hear a minister\nwho attacks the divinity of Christ and other articles of the Creed.\nThe purpose of Sempronius is to benefit himself as a public speaker,\nbut he knows that his faith suffers, because he admires the orator.\nBalbus chooses to listen over the radio to attacks on religion and\nChristianity, which cause serious temptations to him.\n\n(b) If it is a necessary occasion of sin and one does not employ\nsufficient precautions against it, religious communication becomes\nsinful. Example: Titus, a prisoner, has to listen at times to a jail\nchaplain, who teaches that there are errors in the Bible, that man\nevolved from the ape, etc. Titus feels himself drawn sympathetically to\nthese teachings, but makes no effort to strengthen his faith.\n\n885. Communication with unbelievers that is a remote occasion of sin,\nis not sinful, for \u201cotherwise one must needs go out of this world\u201d (I\nCor., v. 9). On the contrary, reasons of justice or charity frequently\nmake it necessary and commendable to have friendly dealings with\nthose of other or no religious conviction. (a) Reasons of justice.\nIt is necessary to cooperate with non-Catholic fellow-citizens in\nwhat pertains to the welfare of our common country, state, city, and\nneighborhood; to be just and fair in business relations with those\noutside the Church, etc. (b) Reasons of charity. Catholics should be\ncourteous and kind to all (Heb., xii. 14), and be willing to assist,\ntemporarily and spiritually, those outside the Church. Thus, St. Paul,\nwithout sacrificing principle or doctrine, made himself all things to\nall men, in order to gain all (I Cor., ix. 19). Indeed, the mission\nof the Church would suffer, if Catholics today kept aloof from all\nthat goes on about them. The Church must teach, by example as well as\nprecept, must be a salt, a light, a leaven, an example of the Gospel in\npractice; and surely this ministry will be weakened if her children aim\nat complete isolation and exclusivism.\n\n886. Societies that are purely civil or profane--e.g., social clubs,\ncharitable organizations, temperance societies, labor unions, that\nare not identified with any church and are neutral in religion--may\nbe dangerous to faith. (a) There may be danger on account of the\nmembership, even when the nature of the society is purely indifferent\nor good. Example: It would be dangerous to faith to join a convivial\nsociety whose members were mostly aggressive infidels, even though\nthe purpose of the organization was only recreation. (b) There may be\ndanger to faith on account of certain methods or principles of the\nsociety. Example: A Boys\u2019 or Girls\u2019 Club whose purpose is to train\nyoung people for good citizenship is dangerous to faith, if it acts\nas though the natural virtues were sufficient, or as though moral\neducation belonged to itself exclusively or principally.\n\n887. The Sin of Blasphemy.--So far we have spoken of the sins of\nunbelief that are contrary to the internal act of faith. We now come\nto the sins that are contrary to the external act, or profession of\nfaith. These sins are of two kinds: (a) The less serious sin is that of\nordinary denial of the faith, that is, the assertion that some article\nof faith is false, or that some contrary error is true. This sin will\nbe treated below in 913 sqq. on the commandments of faith. (b) The more\nserious sin is blasphemy, that is, the denial to God of something that\nis His; or the ascription to God of what does not belong to Him. Of\nthis sin we shall speak now.\n\n888. Blasphemy etymologically is from the Greek, and signifies damage\ndone to reputation or character; theologically, it is applied only to\ninsults or calumnies offered to God, and is threefold according to\nthe three stages of sin described above (see 168). (a) Blasphemy of\nthe heart is internal, committed only in thought and will. So \u201cthe\nwicked man said in his heart: There is no God\u201d (Ps. xviii. 1), and the\ndemons and lost souls blasphemed God without words (Apoc., xvi. 9).\n(b) Blasphemy of the mouth is external, committed in spoken words, or\nin their written or printed representations. (c) Blasphemy of deeds is\nalso external, committed by acts or gestures. The action of Julian the\nApostate in casting his blood towards heaven was intended as a sign of\ncontempt for Christ.\n\n889. Internal blasphemy does not differ from unbelief or disrespect for\nGod. We are concerned here, therefore, only with external blasphemy,\nwhich is contrary to the external profession of faith. External\nblasphemy is opposed to faith either directly (by denying what is of\nfaith) or indirectly (by showing disrespect to what is of faith), and\nhence it is either heretical or non-heretical.\n\n(a) Heretical blasphemy affirms about God something false, or denies\nabout Him something true. The false affirmation is made directly, when\nsome created imperfection is attributed to God, or indirectly, when\nsome divine perfection is attributed to a creature. Example: It is\nheretical blasphemy to affirm that God is a tyrant or the cause of sin,\nor that man is able to overcome God. It is also heretical blasphemy to\ndeny that God is able to perform miracles, that His testimony is true,\netc.\n\n(b) Non-heretical blasphemy affirms or denies something about God\naccording to truth, but in a mocking or blaming way. This sin is\nopposed, therefore, to reverence rather than to faith, and will be\ntreated later among the sins against the virtue of religion (see Vol.\nII). Example: A person in anger at God says scornfully: \u201cGod is good!\u201d\n\n890. The nature of heretical blasphemy will better appear, if we\ncompare it with other kinds of speech disrespectful to God.\n\n(a) It differs from maledictions or curses, (e.g., \u201cMay God destroy\nyou!\u201d), because the one directly offended in blasphemy is God Himself,\nwhile in a curse it is some creature of God.\n\n(b) It differs from non-heretical blasphemy, from perjury and disregard\nof vow, from vain use of the name of God, because none of these\nnecessarily proceeds from a lack of faith, as does heretical blasphemy.\nNon-heretical blasphemy proceeds from hatred or contempt of God,\nperjury from presumption, disregard of vow from disobedience, vain use\nof the Divine Name from irreverence.\n\n(c) Heretical blasphemy differs from temptation of God (e.g., \u201cGod\nmust help me now if He can,\u201d said by one who exposes himself rashly to\ndanger), for, while temptation of God implies doubt, it is directly an\nact of irreverence by which one presumes to put God Himself to proof,\nwhereas heretical blasphemy is directly an act of denial of truth.\n\n891. Heretical blasphemy calumniates God, either in His own attributes\nand perfections, or in those created persons or things that are\nspecially His by reason of friendship or consecration. Thus, we have:\n(a) blasphemy that attacks the Divine Being Himself, as was explained\nabove; (b) blasphemy that attacks what is especially dear to God, which\nconsists in remarks or acts derogatory to the Blessed Virgin, the\nSaints, the Sacraments, the crucifix, the Bible, etc.\n\n892. Unlike God, creatures are subject to imperfections, moral or\nphysical, and thus it is not always erroneous or blasphemous to\nattribute imperfections to the Saints or sacred things.\n\n(a) If sacred persons or things are spoken ill of precisely on account\nof their relation to God, or in such a way that the evil said of\nthem reverts on God Himself, blasphemy is committed. Example: It is\nblasphemous to say that the Mother of God was not a Virgin, that St.\nPeter was a reprobate, that St. Anthony and St. Simeon Stylites were\nsnobbish or eccentric, that the Sacraments are nonsense, that relics\nare an imposture, etc.\n\n(b) If sacred persons or things are criticized precisely on account\nof their human or finite imperfections, real or alleged, the sin of\nirreverence is committed, when the criticism is prompted by malice\nor levity. No sin at all is committed, if one is stating facts with\ndue respect for the character of the persons or things spoken of.\nExamples: To call a Doctor of the Church an ignoramus out of anger at a\ntheological opinion defended by him, would be of itself a serious sin\nof disrespect. To speak of a Saint as a dirty tramp or idle visionary,\nif the intention is to insult, is also a serious sin of disrespect.\nBut, if one were to say in joke that St. Peter was a baldhead, St.\nCharles Borromeo a big nose, the sin of irreverence would be only\nslight. No sin would be committed, if one, describing a religious\npainting from the artistic standpoint, called it an abomination.\n\n893. Heretical blasphemy is expressed not only by sentences that\nare complete and in the indicative mood, but also by phrases or\ninterjections, by wishes, commands, or even signs.\n\n(a) Blasphemy is expressed optatively, imperatively, or\ninterrogatively. Examples: \u201cAway with God!\u201d is equivalent to the\nassertion that God is not eternal. \u201cCome down from the cross, if Thou\nbe the Son of God\u201d (Matt., xxvii. 40), is equivalent to the statement\nthat Christ is not the Son of God. The question put to the Psalmist,\n\u201cWhere is thy God?\u201d (Ps. xli. 4.), meant in the mouth of the Psalmist\u2019s\nenemies that Jehovah did not exist, or was powerless.\n\n(b) Blasphemy is expressed even by short words, or by a grunt or snort\nof contempt. Example: To utter the name of our Lord in a contumelious\nway signifies that one regards Him as of no account. The word\n\u201chocus-pocus\u201d is sometimes used in derision of the Mass or other sacred\nrites.\n\n(c) Blasphemy is expressed by acts that signify disbelief and dishonor,\nfor example, to spit or shake one\u2019s fist at heaven, to turn up the nose\nor make a wry face at the mention of God, to trample in the dust a\ncrucifix, etc.\n\n894. Rules for Interpreting Cases of Doubtful Blasphemy.--(a)\nCustom or usage is a better guide than etymology or grammar in\ndiscovering whether a blasphemous meaning is contained in certain\ncommon expressions of an ambiguous character. Examples: According to\nsignification the phrase, \u201cSacred Name of God,\u201d is harmless and might\nbe a pious ejaculation, but according to the sense in which it is taken\nin French it curses God and is blasphemous. According to signification,\nthe expression \u201cYe gods\u201d in English, \u201cThousand names of God\u201d in French,\n\u201cThousand Sacraments\u201d in German, are blasphemous; but according to\nthe sense in which they are used by the people they merely express\nsurprise, and are at most a venial sin of irreverence. The English\nlanguage as a whole is singularly free from blasphemous expressions,\njust as English classic literature as a whole is singularly free from\nobscenity.\n\n(b) The dispositions or feelings of the user are a better index of the\npresence or absence of blasphemy than the mere words, if the latter\nare capable of various senses. If doubt persists about the sense of an\nambiguous expression that could be blasphemous, it may be held that\nno blasphemy was intended. Examples: Titus, a good man, is so annoyed\ntrying to correct his children that he exclaims: \u201cWhy did the Lord\never send me such pests?\u201d Balbus, who is a hater of religion, answers\nhim: \u201cWho is to blame if they are pests?\u201d Since Titus is habitually\nreligious and Balbus habitually irreligious, the question of the former\nsounds like irritation, the question of the latter like blasphemy.\nClaudius is a very religious-minded man, but he meets with a series\nof calamities which so stun him that he exclaims: \u201cI must be only a\nstep-child of God. Certainly, He cares little for me. Why did He ever\ncreate me?\u201d The sentiment seems to be one of grief and wonder rather\nthan of insult to God. Balbus is very devoted to his mother, and often\naddresses her in hyperbolic language, saying that he adores her, that\nshe is the goddess at Whose shrine he worships, his supreme beatitude,\netc. Taken literally, these expressions are blasphemous, but as used by\nBalbus they are harmless.\n\n895. The Sinfulness of Blasphemy.--(a) From its very nature (i.e., from\nthe importance of the rights it attacks and the goods it injures),\nblasphemy is a mortal sin, since it outrages the Majesty of God, and\ndestroys the virtues of religion, love of God, and frequently faith\nitself. In the Old Testament it was punished with death (Lev., xxiv. 15\nsqq.), and Canon 2323 of the Code prescribes that blasphemy be punished\nas the Ordinary shall decide. It is also a crime at common law and\ngenerally by statute, as tending to a breach of the peace and being a\npublic nuisance or destructive of the foundations of civil society;\nwhen printed, it is a libel.\n\n(b) Unbelief is the greatest of sins after hatred of God (see 820). But\nblasphemy is the greatest of the sins against faith, since to inner\nunbelief it adds external denial and insult.\n\n(c) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of the smallness\nof the matter involved, for even slight slander or scorn becomes great\nwhen its object is God Himself. Example: It is blasphemous to say\nthat our Lord was not above small or venial imperfections, or to show\ncontempt for even one of the least of the Saints as such.\n\n(d) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of unpremeditation,\nif at the time it is committed one is aware of its character, just as\nmurder does not become a venial sin, because one killed another in a\nsudden fit of anger. Example: Sempronius has the habit when driving his\nrefractory mules of shouting at them: \u201cYou creatures of the devil!\u201d A\npriest on hearing this admonishes Sempronius that the expression is\nblasphemous. But Sempronius continues to use it whenever the mules\nirritate him, making no effort to improve.\n\n896. There are some cases in which blasphemy is only a venial sin or no\nsin on account of the lack of deliberation.\n\n(a) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the act\nitself, the blasphemy pronounced, unless it be voluntary in its cause\n(see 102, 196), is not a mortal sin. In the former case, there is no\nsin at all, for the act is not human (see 33); in the latter case\nthere cannot be mortal sin, for there is no full reflection on the\ndeed (see 175). Example: Balbus now and then catches himself humming\nblasphemous songs that he heard years ago, but he always stops as soon\nas he thinks of what he is saying. Titus, coming out of the ether after\nan operation, makes a few blasphemous remarks, but he is so dazed\nthat he hardly knows who is speaking. Sempronius makes himself drunk,\nforeseeing that he will blaspheme while out of his senses. Balbus\ncommits no sin, Titus may be guilty of venial sin, but Sempronius is\nguilty of mortal sin in blaspheming.\n\n(b) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the malice of\nthe act, the blasphemy pronounced, if it is not voluntary in its cause,\nis not a mortal sin; for one is not responsible for more than one\nknows or should know (see 99-100, on imputability). Examples: Titus, a\nforeigner, has been taught to repeat certain blasphemous phrases, whose\nreal meaning he does not suspect. Balbus has the habit when angry of\nblaspheming at his mules, but he is doing his best to use more suitable\nlanguage. Sempronius unawares gets into a tipsy condition in which he\nrealizes his acts, but is confused about moral distinctions, and hence\nuses blasphemous expressions which he would abhor if he were in his\nnormal state. Caius, a boy, blasphemes, thinking that he is committing\nonly a venial sin of \u201ccussing.\u201d\n\n897. Different kinds of blasphemy must be noted with reference to the\nduty of confession.\n\n[a] There are three distinct species of blasphemy--non-heretical, which\nis opposed to the virtue of religion; heretical, which is opposed to\nreligion and faith; diabolical, which is opposed to religion, faith\nand the precept to love God. These species should be distinguished\nin confession. Examples: Titus, angered because his Patron Saint did\nnot obtain a favor for him, ironically turns the Saint\u2019s picture to\nthe wall, saying: \u201cYou have great influence with God!\u201d (non-heretical\nblasphemy). Balbus in similar circumstances said: \u201cI have lost all\nfaith in Saints\u201d (heretical blasphemy). Sempronia, Whose child has just\ndied, rebels against God and calls Him a cruel monster (diabolical\nblasphemy).\n\n(b) Circumstances may aggravate the malice of blasphemy. Blasphemy that\nis directly against God Himself is worse than blasphemy against the\nSaints; blasphemy against the Blessed Virgin is worse than blasphemy\nagainst other friends of God; blasphemy that ascribes evil to God is\ngreater than blasphemy that denies Him some perfection; blasphemy\nthat excuses itself or boasts is worse than blasphemy that is more\nconcealed; blasphemy that expressly intends to dishonor God is graver\nthan blasphemy that only implicitly intends this. Some authors require\nthat aggravating circumstances be mentioned in confession, but others\nsay this is not necessary (see Vol. II).\n\n898. According to the causes from which they proceed (see 250),\nblasphemies are divided into three kinds: (a) blasphemy against the\nFather, which is contumely spoken against God out of passion or\nweakness, as when one being annoyed uses what he knows to be blasphemy;\n(b) blasphemy against the Son, which is contumely against God spoken\nout of ignorance. Thus, St. Paul said of himself that he had been a\nblasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, but that he obtained\nmercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief (I Tim., i. 12, 13);\n(c) blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which is contumely against\nGod spoken out of sheer malice. Such was the sin of the Jews, who\nattributed the divine works of Christ to the prince of demons (Matt,\nxii. 31).\n\n899. To the Holy Ghost are appropriated the supernatural gifts of\nGod that prevent or remove sin; and, as these can be reduced to six,\nthere are also six sins against the Holy Ghost (i.e., six kinds of\ncontemptuous disregard of spiritual life). The expression of this inner\ncontempt is a blasphemy.\n\n(a) Man is kept from sin by the hope mingled with fear which the\nthought of God, as both merciful and just, excites in him. Hence,\ndespair and presumption which remove these divine preventives of sin\nare blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.\n\n(b) Man is kept from sin, next, by the light God gives him to know the\ntruth and by the grace He diffuses that all may perform good. Hence,\nresistance to the known truth and displeasure at the progress of God\u2019s\nkingdom are also sins against the Spirit of truth and holiness.\n\n(c) Man is kept from sin by the shamefulness of sin itself and the\nnothingness of the passing satisfaction it affords; for the former\ninclines him to be ashamed of sin committed, or to repent, while the\nlatter tends to make him tire of sin and give it up. Hence, the resolve\nnot to grieve over sin and obstinate adherence to such a resolve are\nalso sins against the Holy Ghost.\n\n900. There is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this\nlife. How then does our Lord say that the blasphemy against the Holy\nSpirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to\ncome (Matt., xii. 31)?\n\n(a) The sins against the Holy Ghost are unpardonable according to\ntheir nature, just as some diseases are incurable according to their\nnature, because not only do they set up an evil condition, but they\nalso remove or resist those things that could lead to betterment. Thus,\nif one despairs, or presumes, or resists truth or good, or determines\nnot to abandon error or evil, one shuts out the remedy of repentance,\nwhich is necessary for pardon; whereas, if one sins through passion or\nignorance, faith and hope remain and help one to repentance.\n\n(b) The sins against the Holy Ghost are not unpardonable, if we\nconsider the omnipotence of God. Just as God can cure miraculously\na disease that is humanly incurable, so can He pardon a sin which,\naccording to its nature, is unpardonable; for He is able to bring hope\nand repentance to those who were in despair, for example. Hence, we\nrepeat, there is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in\nthis life.\n\n901. Does one arrive at the state of malicious sin or blasphemy\nsuddenly or gradually? (a) Malice in sin (i.e., the willing choice of\nevil by one who is not weakened by ignorance or passion) is sometimes\ndue to a disorder in the will itself which has a strong inclination\ntowards wrong, as when long-continued habit has made sin attractive. It\nis clear that in such cases one does not arrive at blasphemy suddenly,\nExample: Titus blasphemes with readiness and without remorse. This\nargues that he is an adept and not a beginner, for readiness and strong\nattachment are signs of practice. (b) Malice in sin is sometimes due to\nthe fact that the will has lost certain protections against sin, and\nhence chooses sin readily and gladly, as happens when a sin against the\nHoly Ghost has been committed. Generally, the contempt of God\u2019s gifts\ncontained in sins against the Holy Ghost does not come suddenly, but\nfollows as the climax of a progressive deterioration (Prov., xviii. 3);\nbut, since man is free and sin very alluring, it is not impossible that\none should suddenly become a blasphemer, especially if one had not been\ncareful before in other matters. It is next to impossible, however,\nthat a religious-minded man should all at once become a blasphemer or\nmalicious sinner.\n\n902. Remedies Against Blasphemy.--(a) Those who blaspheme maliciously\nshould be admonished of the enormity of their sin, as well as the\nabsurdity of defying the Almighty (Ps. ii. 1, 4). Prayers and\nejaculations in praise of God are a suitable penance for them. (b)\nThose who blaspheme through habit or out of sudden anger or passion\nshould be told that at least they cause great scandal, and make\nthemselves ridiculous. A good practice for overcoming habit or sudden\noutbursts is that some mortification or almsdeed or litany should be\nperformed each time blasphemy is uttered.\n\n903. Absolution of Blasphemers.--(a) If blasphemy is not heretical, no\ncensure or reservation is incurred under the general law, and every\nconfessor may absolve; (b) if blasphemy is heretical, excommunication\nis incurred under the conditions given above in 834, and absolution may\nbe granted as explained there.\n\n904. Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.--After the sins against\nfaith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that\nserve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin\nof ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of\nblindness of heart and dullness of understanding.\n\n905. Ignorance (as explained in 28 and 249) is a cause of sin--of\nmaterial sin, if the ignorance is antecedent, of formal sin, if the\nignorance is consequent. But ignorance is also a sin itself, in the\nsense now to be explained.\n\n(a) Ignorance may be considered in itself (i.e., precisely as it is the\nabsence of knowledge), and in this sense it is not called a sin, since\nunder this aspect it is not opposed to moral virtue, but to knowledge,\nthe perfection of the intellect.\n\n(b) Ignorance may be considered in relation to the will (i.e.,\nprecisely as it is a voluntary defect), and in this sense it is a sin,\nsince under this aspect it is opposed to the moral virtue of studiosity\n(i.e., the part of temperance which moderates the desire of learning\nand keeps the golden mean between curiosity and negligence). This\nsin of ignorance pertains to neglect, and is twofold; it is called\naffected ignorance, if the will is strongly desirous of the lack of\ndue knowledge, and is called careless ignorance, if the will is remiss\nin desiring due knowledge. Affected ignorance is a sin of commission,\ncareless ignorance a sin of omission.\n\n(c) Ignorance may be considered in relation to obligatory acts (i.e.,\nprecisely as it makes one voluntarily incapable of fulfilling one\u2019s\nduties), and in this sense it partakes of various kinds of sinfulness,\ninasmuch as he who is voluntarily ignorant of his duty is responsible\nfor the mistakes he will make. Thus, he who is sinfully ignorant in\nmatters of faith, will fail against the precepts of that virtue; he who\ndoes not know what his state of life as judge, lawyer, physician, etc.,\nrequires, will fail against justice; he who does not know what charity\ndemands of him, will sin against charity.\n\n906. The malice of the sin of ignorance in matters of faith is as\nfollows: (a) Vincible ignorance of the truths one is obliged to know,\nwhether the obligation be of means or of precept (see 360, 786 sqq.),\nis a grave sin, for faith in these truths is commanded under pain of\nlosing salvation (Mark, xvi. 15, 16). (b) The sin committed is but\none sin, regardless of length of time, and is incurred at the time\none omits due diligence in acquiring knowledge, as is the case with\nother sins of omission. Hence, he who remains in culpable ignorance of\nChristian doctrine for a year commits one sin, but the length of time\nis an aggravating circumstance.\n\n907. Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin,\nis as follows:\n\n(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for\nignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from\nnegligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the\nsins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of\nignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.\n\n(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from\na sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is\nignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that\nmust be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is\nrequired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence,\nignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from\nthe sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not\ntake money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he\nis ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another,\nand takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on\nfasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware\nthat today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed\none sin apiece.\n\n(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth one\nis ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case\none sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing\nsomething which one should know habitually, and also against some other\nvirtue by violating its precepts as a result of one\u2019s sinful ignorance.\nTruths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of\nfaith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church,\nand the duties of one\u2019s own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own\ncarelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a\nresult blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin,\nand therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin\nof ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.\n\n908. Cases in which ignorance in matters of faith is not culpable are\nthe following: (a) if one has used sufficient diligence to acquire\nknowledge, one is not responsible for one\u2019s ignorance; (b) if one\nhas not used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not\nresponsible for one\u2019s ignorance, if the lack of diligence is not one\u2019s\nfault.\n\n909. Sufficient diligence is a broad term and has to be understood with\nrelation to the mental ability of the person and the importance and\ndifficulty of the truth in question. What is sufficient diligence in\nan illiterate person, or with regard to a matter of minor importance,\nwould be insufficient in a learned person, or in a matter of greater\nimportance. However, the following general rules can be given:\n\n(a) To be sufficient, diligence need not be as a rule supreme (i.e.,\nit is not necessary that one employ every possible means to acquire\ninstruction), for even the most conscientious persons feel they have\nused sufficient diligence when they have employed the usual means for\nobtaining religious instruction;\n\n(b) To be sufficient, diligence should equal that which is employed by\ngood people in similar circumstances. Thus, the unlearned who consult\nthe learned or frequent the instructions provided for them, the learned\nwho devote themselves to study as ordered and who seek assistance in\ndoubts, are sufficiently diligent.\n\n910. One who has not used sufficient diligence is sometimes\nresponsible, sometimes not responsible.\n\n(a) A person is not responsible for his ignorance and lack of\nsufficient diligence, if he conscientiously desires to have the proper\namount of instruction, and has not even a suspicion that his studies\nand knowledge are not sufficient. Example: Titus, having gone through\na very small catechism, thought that he understood Christian doctrine\nsufficiently and had done all that was required. But some years later\nhe discovered, when examined, that he was ignorant of many important\nmatters, and had entirely misunderstood others.\n\n(b) A person is responsible for his lack of diligence and knowledge, if\nat heart he does not care to know, even though no fears or doubts about\nhis ignorance disturb him. Examples: Balbus always felt religion a\nbore. At Sunday school he was daydreaming; now during sermons on Sunday\nhe falls asleep. The result is that he has many infidel ideas, but\ndoesn\u2019t know it, and is not much concerned. Caius secured for himself\nan office, for which he is unfitted on account of his ignorance.\nBut he enjoys his position so much, and cares so little about its\nresponsibilities, that he does not even dream of his incompetence, and\nwould not try to change things if he did.\n\n911. Similar to negligence about the truths of faith itself is\nnegligence about truths connected with faith. (a) An unbeliever is\nguilty of negligence when against conscience he fails to pray for light\nand to inquire or inform himself about the credentials of religion,\nrevelation, and the Church; (b) a believer is guilty of negligence if\nhe fails to seek answers to objections against faith, when thrown much\nin the company of objectors.\n\n912. Like to sins of ignorance are the two sins opposed to the Gift\nof Understanding. (a) Dullness of understanding is a weakness of mind\nas regards spiritual things which makes it very difficult for one to\nconsider or understand them. It is sinful inasmuch as it arises from\nover-affection for carnal things, especially the delights of eating\nand drinking. (b) Blindness of mind is a complete lack of knowledge of\ndivine things due to the fact that one refuses to consider them lest\none feel obligated to do good, or to the fact that one is so wedded to\npassion that one gives it all one\u2019s attention (Ps. xxv. 4). Blindness\nis sometimes a punishment (Is., vi. 10; Wis., ii. 21); it is a sin when\nit is voluntary--that is, when carnal delights, especially lust, make\none disgusted or negligent as to the things of faith. Abstinence and\nchastity are two means that greatly aid spiritual understanding, as is\nseen in the example of Daniel and his companions (Dan. i. 17).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 3: THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 16.)\n\n913. Unlike the commandments of justice, which are summed up in the\nDecalogue, the commandments of faith are not given in any one place\nof scripture; but they may be reduced to three: (a) one must acquire\nknowledge and understanding of one\u2019s faith according to one\u2019s state in\nlife and duties; (b) one must believe internally the truths of faith;\n(c) one must profess externally one\u2019s belief.\n\n914. The Commandment of Knowledge.--The first of the foregoing\ncommandments includes three things. (a) The doctrines of faith must be\ntaught and must be listened to--\u201cThese words thou shalt tell to thy\nchildren\u201d (Deut., vi. 6), \u201cTeach ye all nations\u201d (Matt, xxviii. 19),\n\u201cHe that heareth you heareth Me, and he that despiseth you despiseth\nMe\u201d (Luke, x. 16). (b) One must apply oneself to understand what one\nhears--\u201cThou shalt meditate on these words, sitting in thy house, and\nwalking on thy journey, sleeping and rising\u201d (Deut., vi. 7), \u201cMeditate\nupon these things, be wholly in these things. Take heed to thyself\nand doctrine\u201d (I Tim., iv, 15, 16). (c) One must retain what one has\nlearned--\u201cThou shalt bind the words of the law as a sign on thy hand,\nand they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write\nthem in the entry and on the doors of thy house\u201d (Deut., vi. 8, 9);\n\u201cHave in mind in what manner thou hast received and heard\u201d (Apoc., iii.\n3).\n\n915. The means of communicating a knowledge of the faith to unbelievers\nare as follows:\n\n(a) The remote means is to get a hearing from those who have not the\ntrue faith, and this supposes that one secure their good will through\nedifying example and charity towards them: \u201cBe without offense to the\nJews and the Gentiles, and to the church of God; as I also in all\nthings please all men, not seeking that which is profitable to myself,\nbut to many that they may be saved\u201d (I Cor., x. 32, 33); \u201cLet us work\ngood to all men\u201d (Gal., vi. 10).\n\n(b) The proximate means of communicating a knowledge of faith is the\ndeclaration of the faith to non-Catholics who are willing to hear,\nthrough missionaries sent to foreign countries, Catholic literature\ngiven to those who are well-disposed, invitations to Catholic\ninstructions, public lectures on the faith, the question box at\nmissions, etc. (see Canons 1350, 1351). cooperation with Catholic\nschools and publications, foreign and home missions, etc., makes one a\nsharer in the work of the apostles who are bearing the burden of the\nday.\n\n916. The means appointed by the Church for communicating the doctrines\nof faith to Catholics are as follows:\n\n(a) For the Laity.--From childhood religious and moral training\nshould have the first place in education, and should not be confined\nto elementary schools, but continued in secondary and higher schools\n(Canons 1372, 1373). Pastors are obliged to give catechetical\ninstructions, and parents must see that their children attend them\n(Canons 1329-1336).\n\n(b) For the Clergy.--Aspirants to the priesthood must follow the\ncourses prescribed for preparatory and higher seminaries or houses\nof studies (Canons 1352-1371, 587-592), and no one is admitted to\nOrders who has not passed canonical examinations (Canons 996, 997,\n389, Sec.2). The faculties for hearing confessions and preaching\nalso presuppose examinations (Canons 1340, 877), and no one is to be\npromoted to ecclesiastical offices, such as that of parish priest,\nunless he is judged competent in knowledge (Canons 459, 149). The\nclergy are encouraged to take university studies and degrees (Canons\n1380, 1378).\n\n917. A person applies himself sufficiently to the understanding of\nthe teaching of faith when he takes care that, both extensively or in\nquantity and intensively or in quality, his knowledge is all that is\nrequired of him.\n\n(a) Extensively, the knowledge should be such as to include at least\nall those truths that have to be known, because explicit faith in\nthem is necessary; (b) intensively, the knowledge should be more or\nless perfect according to the greater or less intelligence, rank or\nresponsibility of the person.\n\n918. The truths that have to be known by all capable of the knowledge\nare as follows:\n\n(a) All must know, from the necessity of the case (necessity of means),\nthat they have a supernatural destiny and that Christ is the Way that\nleads to it; for one cannot tend to a destination, if one is unaware\nof its existence and of the road that will bring one there. Hence, all\nmust know the four basic truths: God our Last End, the Trinity, the\nIncarnation, God the Remunerator (see 787).\n\n(b) All must know, from the will of Christ (necessity of precept),\nthe other truths to which He wishes them expressly to assent, and the\nduties, general or particular, that He wishes them to fulfill (Mark,\nxvi. 16); that is, they must know the doctrine contained in the Creed,\nthe commandments and ordinances of Christ concerning the Sacraments and\nprayer, and the special obligations of each one\u2019s particular state or\noffice.\n\n919. As to the degree of knowledge that one must possess intensively\n(i.e., as to its quality and perfection), it is clear that knowledge\nought to be more perfect in those who are more intelligent or whose\nduties call for a more excellent learning.\n\n(a) Knowledge of the truths that should be known by all the faithful\nought to be of a more developed kind in those whose minds are more\nmature. A scientific and theological understanding of religion is not\nrequired in any lay person; nor should we expect the same knowledge\nin a child as in an adult, or in a subnormal person as in one who is\nnormal mentally. Examples: No religious instruction is necessary for\nan idiot (i.e., a grown-up person who has the mind of a two-year-old\nchild), for such a one cannot reason. A child of seven or an imbecile\n(i.e., a grown-up person whose mentality is on a par with that of a\nchild of seven) may be received to Communion, after such a child or\nimbecile has learned in a simple way that the God-Man is received in\nthe Eucharist and that it is not common food. A child who is between\nten and twelve and a moron (i.e., a grown-up who is not mentally such a\nchild\u2019s superior) should receive more instruction than an imbecile.\n\n(b) Knowledge of sacred doctrine naturally should be greater in priests\nthan in the laity; for in religious things priests are the teachers,\nthe people their pupils (Mal., ii. 7). A mediocre knowledge of theology\nin a priest is not sufficient, especially in these days when the laity\nare educated, when theological questions are debated on all sides, and\nwhen so many outside the Church as well as in it are looking for help\nand light. A profound knowledge of abstruse questions, however, is\nnot demanded of all priests in an equal degree: more is expected of a\nbishop than of his parish priests, more of a parish priest than of one\nwho has not the care of souls or office of teaching, more of one who\nhas to speak to or write for the better educated than of one who has to\ndo these things for those who are less educated, etc. Knowledge should\ninclude not only learning, but also prudence (i.e., good judgment and\npractical ability to use learning well), for a priest learns, not for\nhis own sake alone, but also for the benefit of others.\n\n920. Scientific or complete knowledge is not required of those who are\nnot theologians, as was said about the four basic truths (see 790). It\nsuffices for lay persons that they know in a simple way, according to\ntheir age and capacity, the substance of the truths they must believe.\nThus, they should know:\n\n(a) The Creed.--One should know about God, that He is but one and that\nthere are three divine Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost; that God is\nthe maker of the world, and that He will reward everyone according to\nhis deeds. One should know about Christ, that He is the Son of God and\nGod Himself; that He was miraculously born of the Blessed Virgin Mary;\nthat He suffered and died for our salvation; that He rose from the dead\nand by His own power ascended into glory and will come again after the\ngeneral resurrection to judge all. One should know about the Church,\nthat it is the one true Church founded by Christ, in which are found\nthe communication of spiritual goods and the forgiveness of sins.\n\n(b) The Decalogue.--One should know the general meaning of the\nCommandments so as to be able to regulate one\u2019s own conduct by them.\nIt is not necessary that a child should know all the kinds of crimes\nand vices that are forbidden by the Commandments. In fact, it is better\nfor such not to know much about evil. Nor is it required that a layman\nshould know how to make correct applications of the Commandments to\ncomplicated situations that require much previous study.\n\n(c) The Virtues.--One should know enough to be able to apply to one\u2019s\nown life, for ordinary cases, what a virtuous life demands. It is not\nnecessary that a child should know the requirements of prudence as well\nas an experienced person, or that a layman should be able to settle\ndoubts of conscience as well as a priest. But each should know enough\nto fulfill what is required of one of his age and condition. Both old\nand young should know in substance the acts of faith, hope, charity and\ncontrition; for to these all are bound. The young should know the laws\nof the Church that apply to them (e.g., the law of abstinence); the\nolder people should understand the law of fasting which they are bound\nto observe, etc.\n\n(d) The Sacraments.--One should know substantially the doctrine of\nthe Sacraments that are necessary for all, namely, Baptism, Penance\nand the Eucharist. Since all the faithful have the duty of baptizing\nin case of necessity, all should know how to administer lay Baptism\nproperly and fruitfully. When the time comes for receiving a Sacrament,\nthe recipient should know enough to receive it validly, licitly, and\ndevoutly, although less knowledge is required in children and in the\ndying who cannot be fully instructed (see Canons 752, 854, 1330, 1331,\n1020).\n\n(e) Special Duties.--One should know the essentials of one\u2019s\ncondition or state of life and the right way to perform its ordinary\nduties. Children should understand the obligations of pupils and\nof subjects; the married, religious and priests should know the\nduties of their respective states; citizens, the loyalty owed to the\ncommunity; officials, judges, lawyers, physicians, teachers, etc., the\nresponsibilities to the public which their own professions imply.\n\n(f) The Lord\u2019s Prayer.--The substance of this form of prayer should be\nknown by all, namely, that God is to be glorified, and that we should\nask of Him with confidence goods of soul and body and deliverance from\nevil. Though Christ is the only necessary Mediator (I Tim., ii. 5),\nit is most suitable that all should know substantially the Hail Mary,\nnamely, that we should ask the intercession of her who is the Mother of\nGod and our Mother (John, xix, 27).\n\n921. Is a person guilty of sin who does not know what to do in some\nmanner that pertains to his state of life? (a) If he is blamably\nignorant of the nature of a state he has undertaken or of the ordinary\nduties that it imposes, he is guilty of sin; for he is, in a sense,\nunjust to himself by obligating himself to what he does not understand,\nand to others by promising what he cannot fulfill. Examples: A young\nperson who marries without understanding the meaning of the contract,\nor becomes a religious without knowing the meaning of the vows, would\nbe ignorant of the nature of the state embraced. A priest occupied\nin the ministry, who does not know how to administer the Sacraments\nvalidly, how to explain the Gospels correctly, how to judge usual\ncases in confession rightly, etc., would be ignorant of the ordinary\nduties of his office. A ruler who habitually acts beyond his authority,\na lawyer who regularly gives wrong advice, and a teacher who makes\nmistakes in the elements of his specialty, would also be ignorant of\ntheir ordinary duties.\n\n(b) If a person understands the nature of his state and his everyday\nduties, but is ignorant of recondite points or extraordinary cases, he\nis not guilty; otherwise, no one could undertake with a safe conscience\nthe office of pastor, physician, judge, etc.; for, even when a person\nhas devoted a lifetime to a calling, he has to admit that he finds\ndifficulties or problems that he cannot solve offhand. Example: Father\nTitus gave an incorrect solution about a case of restitution, because\nhe had to express an opinion at once, and there were so many angles and\ncircumstances that some of them were overlooked.\n\n922. The means appointed by the Church for the retention of knowledge\nin matters of faith are:\n\n(a) For the Laity.--The course of Christian doctrine should not be\ndiscontinued with the parochial school or Sunday school, but should\nbe continued in the higher schools (Canon 1373). Moreover, for adults\ncatechetical instruction is given on Sundays and feast days (Canon\n1332), and the people are exhorted to attend sermons on matters\nof faith and morals that are preached at parochial Masses (Canons\n1337-1348).\n\n(b) For the Clergy.--The clergy are admonished not to give up study\nafter ordination (Canon 129), and the law requires that the junior\nclergy should take examinations annually during the first three or five\nyears after ordination to the priesthood (Canons 130, 590), and that\nall the clergy should take part in theological conferences several\ntimes a year (Canon 131).\n\n923. What has been learned by heart is more easily retained in the\nmemory, and hence the common practice of committing the Catechism to\nmemory is to be recommended. Some believe that it is obligatory to\nmemorize the Creed and other points mentioned above (see 920); but this\nis unlikely, since even the form of the Decalogue and of the Lord\u2019s\nPrayer is not identical in different parts of scripture. In the early\ncenturies the catechumens were obliged to learn the Creed and the\nLord\u2019s Prayer by heart before Baptism, but there is no general law that\nrequires this at the present time.\n\n(a) According to positive law, one is not obliged to memorize the words\nand order of the Creed and other formulas, and it may be considered an\nindication that a person has retained sufficiently what was learned,\nif he is able to reply correctly to questions put to him (e.g., to\nexplain the first article of the Creed by stating the direct and simple\nsignification of its terms, and so on with the rest).\n\n(b) According to natural law, one is obliged to learn by rote ithe\nformulas of faith, if this is possible and there is danger of spiritual\ndetriment when it is not done. There is hardly anyone who cannot by\npractice commit to memory the Our Father, the Apostles\u2019 Creed, and\nshort forms of acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition; and, if\nnone of them is thus known, it is practically certain that the grave\nduty of prayer will be neglected. Hence, it seems that there is a\nserious obligation of memorizing at least the Our Father. Feebleminded\npersons are not obliged to memorize, or even to know, the truths of\nfaith, if they are incapable.\n\n924. Confessors should examine in religion penitents who show signs of\nignorance (e.g., in the manner of making their confession), and should\ngrant or deny absolution according to the case.\n\n(a) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary as a means\nof justification (see 790), the penitents should be dealt with as\nexplained in 792.\n\n(b) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary because\ncommanded and there is urgent need of absolution (e.g., on account of\nmortal sin committed), the penitent may be absolved, if he is truly\ncontrite and promises to repair his negligence by studying his\nreligion, attending Sunday school, instructions, etc.\n\n(c) If the ignorance is about the truths necessary because commanded,\nand there is no urgent necessity of absolution, the penitents may be\nsent away without absolution. Thus, children who have no serious sins\nto confess and who do not know how to say the act of contrition or\nother prayers, or who cannot answer simple questions of the Catechism,\nshould be sent away with a blessing and told to study these things and\nreturn when they know them better.\n\n925. The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith.--The second commandment\nof faith mentioned above (see 913) is both negative and affirmative.\n(a) As negative, it forbids at any time disbelief or doubt concerning\nthat which God proposes for faith. This aspect has been treated above\nin discussing the sins against faith (see 813 sqq., 840 sqq.). (b) As\naffirmative, it commands that one at certain times should give assent\nto the truths revealed by God. This aspect of the commandment will be\nconsidered now.\n\n926. The existence of the command that one should elicit a positive act\nof assent to divine truth is taught in both Testaments. (a) In the Old\nTestament, implicit faith in all scripture was required; for lawgivers,\nprophets, and inspired writers spoke as delivering a message from God.\nMoreover, explicit faith in God and His Providence was commanded (see\n788). (b) In the New Testament, implicit faith in all revealed doctrine\nis required, whether delivered in writing or as tradition (II Thess.,\nii. 15). Moreover, there is a command of explicit faith in the Gospel:\n\u201cThis is His commandment that we should believe in the name of His Son,\nJesus Christ, and love one another, as He hath given commandment unto\nus\u201d (I John, iii. 23).\n\n927. This commandment obliges adults under grave sin as to all revealed\ntruths. (a) The primary truths of revelation, truths of faith and\nmorals to which all are commanded to give assent (i.e., to believe\nexplicitly), are so important that those who refuse to believe them\nmerit condemnation (Mark, xvi. 16). (b) The secondary truths of\nrevelation--i.e., those that were made known by God, not for their own\nsake, but on account of their relation to the primary truths (e.g., the\nnames of the patriarchs, the size of Saul, the complexion of David and\nthousands of similar facts)--need not be known by all, for that is\nimpossible. But all are seriously obliged to believe that everything\ncontained in the Word of God is true, and to be ready to give assent\neven to the truths that are not known. Hence, the minor truths of\nrevelation must be believed under pain of grave sin--implicitly, if\nthey are not known, explicitly, when they become known.\n\n928. The obligation of explicit faith in the primary truths or articles\nof faith is not grave with reference to every detail contained in those\ntruths. (a) Some details, on account of their difficulty, oblige to\nexplicit faith only under venial sin. Such are (in the Creed) the\ndescent into Limbo, the procession of the Holy Ghost, the mode of the\nCommunion of Saints. (b) Other details, on account of less importance,\ndo not oblige to explicit faith under any sin. Such are the facts that\nit was Pilate under whom Christ suffered, that it was the third day\nwhen Christ rose from the dead.\n\n929. An affirmative commandment \u201cobliges at all times, but not for all\ntimes\u201d (see 371). Hence, the question: How often or when must one give\ninternal assent to the teachings of faith, in order to fulfill the law?\nBefore answering this question, let us distinguish three kinds of laws\nthat may oblige one to an act of faith: (a) the divine law expressly\nprescribing an act of faith; (b) the divine law prescribing an act of\nsome other virtue, which presupposes an act of faith; (e) human law\nprescribing something that at least presupposes or includes an act of\nfaith.\n\n930. The divine law expressly prescribing an act of faith (about which\nwe spoke in 925), obliges in the following cases: (a) at the time when\nthe commandment is first presented to one, and one recognizes its\nobligation: \u201cPreach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and\nis baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be condemned\u201d\n(Mark, xvi. 16); (b) it also obliges at other times during life; for\n\u201cthe just man liveth by faith\u201d (Rom, i. 17). The Church has rejected\nthe Jansenistic teaching that an act of faith once in a lifetime\nsuffices (see Denzinger-Banwart, nn. 1101, 1167, 1215).\n\n931. The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the\nfirst time, either of one\u2019s whole life or for the first time after loss\nof faith, as follows:\n\n(a) It is brought before a person for the first time in his life, when\nhe first hears the truths of faith, or first realizes his duty of\naccepting them. Examples: A Catholic child who has just reached the age\nof reason and has been told in Sunday school that he must believe the\nCreed and other truths he has been taught; an adult Catholic who hears\nfor the first time of transubstantiation, or of some other dogma just\ndefined by the Church; a non-Catholic who has just perceived the truth\nof the Catholic Church.\n\n(b) The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the\nfirst time after loss of faith, as soon as the duty of returning to\nbelief occurs to the mind.\n\n932. Does this commandment require that, as soon as the obligation of\nfaith dawns on one, one is obliged without an instant\u2019s delay to make a\nformal and explicit act of faith?\n\n(a) As regards children, on account of the imperfection of their\nunderstanding, it can easily happen that they do not perceive that the\nobligation binds them there and then, or that it binds under sin, and\nthus some time may elapse after the use of reason, or after knowledge\nof the command of faith, before the omission of the act of belief would\nbecome a sin. Practically every child of Catholic education complies\nwith the command when, having learned the truths that must be known, he\nsays devoutly the act of faith, either in his own words or according to\nthe form given in the Catechism.\n\n(b) As regards adults, while the entrance of converts into the Church\nadmits of some delay for necessary preparation, the act of faith itself\nshould not be postponed for an instant, once the necessity of making it\nis perceived as certain.\n\n933. As to its frequency or the times when the act of faith should be\nrenewed, there are various opinions, but in actual life the question\npresents no difficulty.\n\n(a) As to theory, the theologians are divided, some holding that the\nact of faith should be made at least once a year, others holding for\nonce a month, still others for all Sundays and holydays. There is no\nsolid support for any of these opinions, and it seems that the time and\nfrequency of acts of faith are not determined by divine law.\n\n(b) As to practice, the theologians agree that one who fulfills the\nusual religious duties of a Catholic, has also fulfilled the command to\nrenew the act of faith. Thus, those who attend Mass and receive the\nSacraments, as the law of the Church prescribes, make acts of faith in\ndoing so, which satisfy the divine law of faith.\n\n934. Those who omit to make an act of faith in time of temptation\nagainst faith, are also guilty of sin, if the omission is through\nsinful neglect.\n\n(a) If the act of faith is the only means by which the temptation can\nbe overcome (a rare contingency, outside the danger of death), one is\nof course gravely bound to elicit the act. The sin committed by one who\nwould neglect the act of faith in such a circumstance is by some\nconsidered as opposed to the negative command, that one do not dissent;\nby others as opposed to the affirmative command, that one assent to\nfaith. Example: Caius is very much tempted to blasphemy, and finds that\nthe best remedy is an act of faith in the Majesty of God.\n\n(b) If the act of faith would be harmful, as prolonging or intensifying\nthe temptation (a thing that is not infrequent), it is better to\nstruggle against the temptation indirectly by turning the attention to\nother matters (see 257, 844).\n\n935. Other cases in which one is obliged to make an internal act of\nfaith are as follows:\n\n(a) By reason of a divine commandment of some virtue other than faith,\nit is sometimes necessary to make an act of faith also. Examples: When\na sinner is preparing himself for the state of grace, of which faith is\nthe prerequisite; when one is tempted against hope, justice, etc., and\nneeds to call on faith to resist the tempter; when one is near to death\nand must make an act of charity in preparing to meet God. In these\ncases there are divine precepts of repentance, hope, justice, charity,\nand virtually of faith, which is presupposed.\n\n(b) One must at times make an internal act of faith by reason of a\nhuman commandment enjoining some external act or virtue which supposes\nfaith. Examples: The command to swear on the Bible, or by some mystery\nof religion, supposes an act of faith. The commands to receive\nCommunion at Easter (Canon 859), to make meditation and spiritual\nretreats (Canons 125, 126, 595, 1001), to apply the intention of Mass\n(Canons 339, Sec. 1, 466, Sec. 1), all include virtually the command\nof an act of faith, for the things required (Communion, retreat, Mass)\ncannot be rightly performed without such an act.\n\n936. The act of faith is either formal or virtual, according as it is\nmade in itself, or in the act of another virtue that supposes it.\n\n(a) The act of faith is formal, when one mentally accepts the truths\nof revelation on account of divine authority, even though one does\nnot express the assent in words or according to any set formula. This\nkind of act of faith is necessary when one passes from non-belief\nor unbelief to belief, for none of the acts prior to faith contains\nsupernatural assent to revelation. Hence, the commandment of faith\nrequires in children or in converts from unbelief a formal act.\n\n(b) The act of faith is virtual, when one elicits the act of some other\nsupernatural virtue without thinking expressly about faith; for faith\nis presupposed by all other supernatural virtues, since one cannot\nwish what one does not believe. Thus, the acts of hope, charity, and\ncontrition are virtually acts of faith. It seems that commandments of\nother virtues and of the renewal of faith itself do not require that\none make a formal act of faith, although of course this would be the\nbetter thing to do. Thus, to fulfill the Easter precept of yearly\nConfession and Communion well, it is not required that one make a\nformal act of faith before Confession, since faith is included in the\nact of contrition. It is not necessary, then, that the penitent should\nsay: \u201cI believe in the forgiveness of sins, etc.,\u201d for in his purpose\nto receive forgiveness he makes a virtual act of faith in the tenth\narticle of the Creed and in the Sacrament of Penance, as well as in the\nother mysteries of faith.\n\n937. Practically, there is no difficulty for confessors about the\nviolation of the commandment regarding internal acts of faith.\n\n(a) If penitents are instructed and practical Catholics, they have made\nat some time a formal act of faith, even though they do not remember\nthe time, for the act of faith precedes the acts of other virtues they\nare exercising. True, this act of faith may not have been made as soon\nas the age of reason was attained or the duty of faith perceived, but\ninvincible ignorance excuses those who were in good faith about the\nmatter. Regularity in prayer and other duties is an index that the act\nof faith is being renewed in such a way as to comply with the\ncommandment. Hence, there is no necessity of questioning this class of\npenitents about the act of faith.\n\n(b) If penitents are very ignorant Catholics (e.g., young children), it\nis clear that they have not made an act of faith as they should, for no\none believes what he does not know. They should, therefore, be\ninstructed that it is their duty to acquire more knowledge, and to make\nan act of faith along with their other prayers. Regarding absolution,\nsee 924.\n\n(c) If penitents are instructed but not practical, the confession that\nthey have neglected prayer, Mass, and the Sacraments, means that they\nhave also neglected the command of making acts of faith. It is not\nnecessary, therefore, that the confessor interrogate or instruct them\nabout this command, and he may absolve them, if they are resolved to\namend. It is well, however, to recommend daily acts of faith, hope,\ncharity and contrition to careless Catholics, especially to those who\ncannot attend Mass or receive the Sacraments often.\n\n938. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.--The third\ncommandment of faith given above (see 913) is both negative and\naffirmative: (a) as negative, it forbids denial of the faith or\nprofession of error opposed to faith; (b) as affirmative, it commands\nthat one make open profession of one\u2019s faith.\n\n939. The existence of a prohibition against denial of the faith or\nprofession of error is taught in scripture and the sinfulness of such\ndenial is clear from its nature. (a) \u201cHe that shall deny Me before men,\nI will also deny him before My Father who is in Heaven\u201d (Matt., x. 33).\nDenial of Christ is a grievous sin, for it entails denial by Christ.\n(b) He who denies the faith is a heretic or infidel, if he means what\nhe says; he lies, if he does not mean what he says, and his lie is a\ngrave injury to God, whose truth is called into question, and against\nthe neighbor, who is scandalized.\n\n940. With reference to its voluntariness, denial of faith is either\ndirect or indirect. (a) It is direct, when one intends to deny the\nfaith; (b) it is indirect, when one does not intend to deny the faith,\nbut wills to use words, acts, etc., which either from their\nsignification or use, or from the meaning that will or may be given\nthem by others, will in the circumstances express a denial of the\nfaith. Examples: A convert from paganism conceals a crucifix in the\nidol of a temple and then joins the pagans in their customary bows of\nreverence, while intending only adoration to Christ crucified and\ndetesting the idol. Titus takes off his hat when passing any church, as\na mark of respect for the good they do. Balbus, a convert from\nNestorianism, recites the names of Nestorius and Dioscurus at Mass,\nintending only to honor the patron Saints of those two heresiarchs.\n\n941. There are three ways of denying the faith: (a) by words, spoken or\nwritten, as when one says: \u201cI am not a Catholic,\u201d \u201cI do not believe in\nmiracles\u201d; (b) by acts, as when one dissuades persons of good faith\nfrom entering the Church, or moves them to abandon it, or refuses to\ngenuflect before the Blessed Sacrament, or studiously excludes\nscapulars, pictures and all religious symbols; (c) by omission, as when\none fails to answer calumnies against faith, which one could profitably\nanswer, or fails to protest when another speaks of oneself as a\nnon-Catholic.\n\n942. There are various ways in which error opposed to faith is\nprofessed: (a) by words, as when one says that one is a freethinker or\nChristian Scientist; (b) by acts, as when one offers incense to an\nidol, or receives the Lord\u2019s Supper in a Lutheran church, or cheers an\nanti-religious address; (c) by signs, as when one uses the Masonic\ngrip, wears the robes of a Buddhist bonze, takes a Mohammedan or pagan\nname, etc., in order to pass oneself off as a non-Catholic; (d) by\nomission, as when one is silent when introduced as a Rationalist, or\nmakes no protest when Indifferentism is being advocated by one\u2019s\ncompanions.\n\n943. The following are not a denial of faith or profession of error:\n\n(a) Words that deny, not one\u2019s allegiance to religion, but one\u2019s\nacceptance of it as qualified by some calumnious designation. Examples:\nTitus denies that he is a \u201cPapist,\u201d because he wishes his questioner to\nuse a term that is not intended to be an insult. Balbus, entering a\npagan region where the name Christian has the meaning of criminal or\nenemy on account of crimes committed there by white men in past times,\nsays to the tribesmen that he is not a Christian, but a follower of\nJesus and a Catholic.\n\n(b) Words that conceal one\u2019s rank or state in the Church, are not\nagainst faith, because one can hold the faith without being in a\ncertain rank or state in the Church, Thus, St. Peter\u2019s denial that he\nwas a follower of Jesus, that he had ever known Him, etc., was,\naccording to some authorities, not a denial of the Divinity of Jesus or\nof the truth of His teaching. Example: A Catholic who hides or denies\nhis character of priest or religious, his membership in a Catholic\nfamily, organization, race, does not thereby necessarily deny his faith.\n\n(c) Deeds that are contrary to practices of religion, but not to the\nprofession of faith, are not denial of belief; for one may be very much\nattached to one\u2019s religion, even ready to fight for it, but not willing\nto follow its requirements. Example: Caius is careless about church\nduties, misses Mass, eats meat on Fridays, and never goes to the\nSacraments; but he always calls himself a Catholic and wishes to be\nconsidered one.\n\n(d) Signs that have some association with non-Catholic religion, but do\nnot necessarily represent it (since they are indifferent in themselves\nand have other and legitimate uses), do not deny the faith, when not\nused as symbols of false religion. Similarly, the omission of signs\nthat are associated with Catholicity, but which are optional, is not a\ndenial of the faith. Examples: Titus, when travelling in the Orient,\nmakes use of the national salutation of the pagan peoples among whom he\nlives. Balbus builds a church with architectural features borrowed from\npagan temples. Caius wears a fez or turban in Mohammedan regions where\nit is not looked on as a religious headgear. Sempronius practises\ncircumcision as a hygienic measure. Claudius does not say grace at\nmeals when dining in public, and does not wear scapulars when bathing\nat the seashore.\n\n(e) Omission of profession of faith, when it is not obligatory, is not\na denial of faith; for no one is bound to make known his affairs and\nconvictions to every acquaintance. Example: Titus works in an office\nwhere most of the clerks are non-Catholics. But no one ever speaks\nabout religion, and hence it is not known that he is a Catholic.\n\n944. Dangers of Profession of Unbelief.--The principal dangers of\nmaking external profession of false religion, if not of losing faith\nitself, are the following: (a) membership in forbidden societies; (b)\ncommunication in sectarian services; (c) cooperation in activities\nwhose tendency or principles are erroneous.\n\n945. Forbidden Societies.--Societies are forbidden by the Church when\nthey are intrinsically or extrinsically evil. (a) A society is\nintrinsically evil, when it has an evil purpose, or uses evil means to\nobtain even an honest end. Thus, societies or parties that conspire\nagainst Church or State, or that seek to undermine Christian doctrines\nor morals, have an evil purpose; while those that demand absolute\nsecrecy or oaths of blind obedience to unknown persons, that favor\ncremation, use a sectarian ritual, promote evil literature, etc., are\nemploying evil means, no matter what may be the end in view. (b) A\nsociety is extrinsically evil, when its end and means are good, but\nmembership in it is dangerous to faith or morals on account of\ncircumstances (e.g., on account of the bad type of individuals who make\nup the society or control it).\n\n946. The Code (Canon 684) mentions the following kinds of societies as\nbanned for Catholics:\n\n(a) secret societies, that is, those which demand of members that\ncertain things which the society considers secrets be told absolutely\nto no one outside the society, or certain degrees of the society, not\neven to those who may legitimately inquire about them, such as the\nbishop or civil superior in the external forum, parents with regard to\ntheir children not emancipated, pastors and confessors in the internal\nforum. Those societies are also secret which demand blind and absolute\nobedience to unknown leaders;\n\n(b) condemned societies, that is, such as have been censured by the\nChurch, or simply forbidden. Canon 2335 decrees _ipso facto_\nexcommunication reserved to the Holy See against all those who join\nMasonic or similar associations which plot against the Church or lawful\ncivil authority. Among the societies forbidden without censure are:\nvarious Biblical societies, societies for the promotion of cremation,\nthe Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, the Sons of Temperance, the\nIndependent Order of Good Templars, Theosophical societies, the\nY.M.C.A. Female societies affiliated with these are also condemned,\nsince they are branches of the main society--for example, the Rebeccas,\nthe Eastern Star, the Pythian Sisters.\n\nWorthy of detailed consideration is the condemnation of the Communist\nParty and the penalties attached to membership in, or defense, or\npropagation of the Party. The following questions were asked of the\nHoly Office:\n\n1. Whether it is licit to join the Communist Party or to favor it.\n\nReply: In the negative; for Communism is materialistic and\nanti-Christian; and the leaders of the Communists, although they\nsometimes verbally profess that they are not attacking religion, in\nfact, nevertheless, by doctrine and action show themselves to be\nenemies of God and of the true religion and the Church of Christ.\n\n2. Whether it is licit to publish, propagate, or read books,\nperiodicals, daily papers, or sheets which promote the doctrine or\naction of Communists, or to write in them.\n\nReply: In the negative: for they are forbidden _ipso iure_ (see Canon\n1399).\n\n3. Whether the faithful who knowingly and freely do the acts mentioned\nin 1 and 2 can be admitted to the sacraments.\n\nReply: In the negative, according to the ordinary principles governing\nthe refusal of the sacraments to those who are not properly disposed.\n\n4. Whether the faithful who profess the materialistic and\nanti-Christian doctrine of Communists, and especially those who defend\nor propagate it, incur _ipso facto_ as apostates from the Catholic\nfaith the excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See.\n\nReply: In the affirmative (Decree of the Holy Office, July 1, 1949).\n\nThe sanction of excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See was\nimposed also upon those who teach boys and girls in associations set up\nby the Communists to imbue youth with principles and training which are\nmaterialistic and contrary to Christian morality and faith. The\nassociations themselves are subject to the sanctions of the decree of\nJuly 1, 1949. Moreover parents or guardians who send their children to\nsuch associations, and the children themselves, as long as they have\npart in these associations, cannot be admitted to the reception of the\nsacraments (Monitum of the Holy Office, July 28, 1950).\n\n(c) seditious societies, that is, those organizations, even though not\nsecret, which aim at the overthrow of family and property rights;\n\n(d) suspect societies, that is, those whose principles or methods have\nthe appearance of being unsound. On January 11, 1951 the Holy Office in\nresponse to the question: \u201cWhether Catholics may join the \u2018Rotary\nClub\u2019?\u201d issued the following decree: \u201cIt is not licit for clerics to\njoin the Association \u2018Rotary Club\u2019 or to be present at its meetings;\nthe laypeople are to be urged to preserve the prescript of Canon 684.\u201d\nThe decree seems to have taken many English-speaking people by\nsurprise, one paper describing it as \u201ca bewildering document.\u201d The\nsurprise flowed from personal experience of Rotary Clubs as social\nclubs dedicated to bonhomie and community improvement. Nevertheless,\nthe decree was in accord with the general trend of Church policy in\nregard to undenominational societies. They are not approved; they are\nnot condemned as Masonry has been condemned. What is their position?\nThe response that layfolk are to be exhorted to observe Canon 684 is\nindicative of the attitude of the Church in regard to such societies.\nThe canon instructs them to \u201cbeware of secret, condemned, seditious and\nsuspect societies.\u201d Since Rotary Clubs are seldom considered to be\nsecret and never as condemned nor as seditious, the implication is that\nthey are suspect. Such was the interpretation of the decree given in\nthe _Osservatore Romano_ of Jan. 27, 1951.\n\nIn regard to clerics, the effect of the decree was to make illicit what\nwas formerly simply inexpedient; for the Sacred Consistory had replied\non February 4th, 1929, that it was not expedient for Ordinaries to\npermit clerics to join Rotary Clubs, or to take part in their meetings.\nMoreover, as the _Osservatore_ article indicates, the prohibition is\nlimited to meetings of members only and does not extend to meetings at\nwhich non-members may be present, provided the purpose of such meetings\nbefits priestly activity.\n\nThe exhortation to layfolk in regard to \u201cRotary\u201d simply reaffirms the\nChurch\u2019s general attitude to all secular associations. As early as\nNovember 5, 1920 the Holy Office, referring specifically to Y.M.C.A.,\nwarned the Ordinaries that the note of \u201csuspicion\u201d attaches to all\nsecular societies. Their efforts to promote good works and good moral\nstandards independent of religious authority tend to foster the spirit\nof religious indifferentism and moral naturalism. Both the Spanish\nhierarchy (1929) and the Dutch hierarchy (1930) have so judged Rotary.\nHowever, the degree of suspicion to be attached to each Rotary Club is\na question of fact to be determined in specific instances by the proper\nlocal Ordinary. Where evidence of suspicion is available, exhortatious\nnot to join the clubs must be made; in the lack of such evidence, the\nordinaries may maintain discreet silence.\n\n(e) societies that aim to elude the lawful vigilance of religious\nauthority.\n\n947. The following organizations fall under the censure against Masonic\nsocieties:\n\n(a) all varieties and degrees of Freemasonry, for all the Masonic sects\nare included in the Canon. The fact that American, English and Irish\nMasons have many excellent individuals in their ranks, and lack the\nirreligious and revolutionary character of the Masonry of Continental\nEurope or Latin countries, does not exempt them from the censure.\n\n(b) all organizations similar to Masonry, that is, secret societies\nthat conspire against lawful authority. Such are societies like the\nCarbonari, the Fenians, anarchists and nihilists.\n\n948. The sin committed by membership in forbidden societies is grave,\nsince the purpose of the law--viz., the safeguarding of faith against\nserious danger--is itself grave. Such membership is interpreted also as\na profession of false religion, when one joins oneself to a body which\nin its branches or degrees has a false creed of its own. (a) Even\nthough the branch or degree to which one belongs does not require\nassent to such a creed, membership expresses a fellowship with those\nwho do accept it; (b) similarly, participation in the ritual of the\nlodges is a communication in ceremonies expressive of false religion;\nfor, though their externals may appear good or even Christian, the\ninternal meaning known to the adepts is anti-Catholic or anti-Christian.\n\n949. Absolution of Those Who Belong to Forbidden Societies.--(a) The\nsin cannot be absolved unless there is repentance, and hence absolution\ncannot be granted those who without sufficient reason refuse to\nwithdraw from membership, or who refuse to discontinue participation in\nfalse rites.\n\n(b) The excommunication is not incurred by those who joined forbidden\nsocieties in ignorance of the law or of the penalty, provided the\nignorance was not crass or supine. If the censure was actually\nincurred, the mode of absolution will depend on the nature of the case:\nif the case is occult (i.e., if it is not known and not likely to\nbecome known that the penitent belonged to a society forbidden under\npain of excommunication), the Ordinary may absolve or grant faculties\nto absolve (Canon 2237); if the case is a public one, and it would be\nvery inconvenient to await faculties from Rome, absolution is given\nunder the condition of recourse to the proper authority within a month\n(Canon 2254). Many Ordinaries have by Indult faculties to absolve\nmembers of secret societies.\n\n950. Nominal membership and temporary attendance at meetings may be\npermitted as an exception when there are sufficient reasons.\n\n(a) Nominal membership means that one leaves one\u2019s name on the roster\nof the society and continues to pay its assessments, but does not\ncommunicate with the society or attend its meetings. In 1896 the Holy\nOffice replied to the American Bishops that this kind of membership in\nthe Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance and Knights of Pythias might be\npermitted under certain conditions, if there was a sufficient reason\n(viz., that grave material loss would be incurred by withdrawal). (b)\nTemporary attendance at meetings means that for a short time, and not\nfor longer than absolutely necessary, one is present at gatherings of\nthe society, but takes no active part in its false cult.\n\n951. The following conditions were laid down for permission of nominal\nmembership in the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance, etc.: (a) that the\npenitent joined the society in good faith, before knowing that it was\ncondemned; (b) that there be no danger of scandal, or that it be\nremoved by the declaration that membership is only nominal and only for\nthe purpose of avoiding temporal losses; (c) that there be no danger of\nperversion of the party himself or of his family, in case of sickness\nor of death, and no danger of a non-Catholic funeral.\n\n952. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who has incurred\nexcommunication on account of membership in the Masons or other like\nsociety should be as follows: (a) the faculty to absolve must be\nobtained (see 949), (b) the following promises must be exacted from the\npenitent--that he will withdraw entirely from the sect and that he will\nrepair, as well as he can, the scandal he may have caused; (c) the\npenitent must be required to renounce the sect, at least in the\npresence of the confessor, and to deliver over to him the books,\nmanuscripts, insignia, and other objects that are distinctive of it\n(the confessor should give these objects to the Ordinary as soon as he\nprudently can, but, if grave reasons prevent this, he should burn\nthem); (d) a salutary penance should be given and frequent confession\nurged.\n\n953. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to the Odd\nFellows or other society forbidden by name, but without censure, should\nbe as follows: (a) if the penitent is contrite and promises to leave\nthe society, he can be absolved without special faculties; (b) if the\npenitent is contrite but wishes to retain nominal membership, the case\nmust be referred to the Archbishop of the Province or to the Apostolic\nDelegate; (c) if the penitent wishes to retain full membership, he is\nnot repentant and cannot be absolved.\n\n954. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to a\nsociety not condemned by name, but which the confessor himself regards\nas evil should be as follows: (a) if the confessor is certain that the\nsociety is one of those condemned implicitly by the Church, because it\nexacts inviolable secrecy or blind obedience to its leaders, or has\nMasonic characteristics, etc., he should treat it in the same way as\nthe societies condemned by name; (b) if the confessor is certain that\nthe society is condemned by natural law for the penitent before him\n(e.g., on account of the evil associates and moral dangers it\ncontains), he should treat it as any other occasion of sin, but it\nshould be noted that no priest or local Ordinary has authority to\ncondemn publicly and by name any society not condemned by the Church;\n(c) if the confessor is in doubt, he should proceed according to the\nrules for an uncertain conscience (see 678, 679, 742), and for the\nprudent administration of the Sacraments (see Vol. II).\n\n955. As one of the chief remedies against evil societies is the\nformation of Catholic societies, the Code (Canon 684) praises those of\nthe faithful who enroll as members in associations established or\nrecommended by the Church. Catholic societies distinct from religious\nOrders or Congregations are of two kinds.\n\n(a) Distinctly religious societies are those instituted for the purpose\nof promoting a more Christian life among their members, or of fostering\nworks of piety and charity, or of contributing to the solemnity of\npublic worship. Such are the Secular Third Orders, Confraternities of\nthe Blessed Sacrament and of Christian Doctrine, and other pious unions.\n\n(b) Societies that are not distinctly religious, but whose membership\nand spirit are Catholic, are of many kinds. Such are the Knights of\nColumbus, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Catholic Daughters of America,\nVolksverein, Young Men\u2019s Institute, etc.\n\n956. Communication in Worship.--Communication with non-Catholics (as\nwas said above in 882) is either religious or non-religious. It is\nclear that communication in non-religious matters does not contain a\nprofession of error, but the same cannot be said of communication in\nreligious services, since these are not only acts of worship, but also\nexpressions of faith in the creed of a certain religion. We must\ndistinguish, however, between private and public communication.\n\n(a) Communication is private, when a Catholic and non-Catholic offer\ntogether the Lord\u2019s Prayer or other similar prayer as a private\ndevotion, not as an act of official worship. Private devotion is not\nthe expression of a sectarian creed, and, if there is nothing false in\nit and no danger of scandal or perversion from communication between\nCatholic and non-Catholic in such devotion, this kind of communication\nis not unlawful. In the following paragraphs there will be question of\npublic communication.\n\n(b) Communication is public, when the rites performed are the official\nservices of the Catholic Church or of some non-Catholic sect (e.g., the\nMass, the Lord\u2019s Supper of the Lutherans, the Evensong of the\nAnglicans, the prayer-meeting of other sects). Thus, public\ncommunication takes place either when non-Catholics take part in\nCatholic worship, or Catholics take part in non-Catholic worship.\n\n957. Participation of non-Catholics in Catholic services is either by\nmere presence, or by reception or performance of Catholic rites.\n\n(a) Mere presence consists in a purely material attendance at a\nservice, as when non-Catholics assist at Mass and sit, rise and kneel\nwith the congregation or remain seated throughout. There is no\nobjection whatever to this kind of participation; on the contrary,\nnon-Catholics should be invited to Catholic sermons and services, and\nmade to feel welcome, for in what better way can the divine command of\nworking for their conversion be complied with? Only excommunicated\npersons are excluded from the offices of the Church (Canon 2269, Sec.1).\nIt is also allowed that Catholic bishops and clergy accompany a\nnon-Catholic ruler to the church, and assign him and his escort an\nhonorable place therein.\n\n(b) Reception of Catholic rites is had when non-Catholics, without\nperforming any liturgical function, receive some spiritual favor\nthrough the rites of the Church, as when a non-Catholic receives a\npriest\u2019s blessing.\n\n(c) Performance of Catholic rites exists when a non-Catholic exercises\nsome office in a liturgical function of the Catholic Church, as when a\nProtestant acts as sponsor at a Catholic Baptism.\n\n958. Cases of reception of Catholic rites by non-Catholics permitted by\nlaw are the following:\n\n(a) Reception of Sacramentals.--Since the purpose of these rites and\nobjects is to implore graces and temporal favors with a view to the\nillumination and salvation of the recipient, and since our Lord Himself\nblessed and cured even the pagans, the Church permits blessings and\nexorcisms to be conferred on non-Catholics (Canons 1149, 1152).\nSimilarly, blessed candles, palms, ashes and other real sacramentals\nmay be given to them. Examples: The Church has permitted priests to\nvisit the homes of Mohammedans to bless and pray over the sick, and\nalso to bless the houses of schismatics, provided they were summoned\nand avoided all communication in prayer.\n\n(b) Reception of Sacraments.-Since it is possible that the salvation of\na dying person may depend on absolution, good moralists, relying on\ndecisions of Roman Congregations, hold that conditional absolution may\nbe given to a heretic or schismatic who is dying and unconscious, or\neven to one such who is dying and conscious, provided he is in good\nfaith and contrite, and danger of scandal has been removed.\n\n(c) Reception of Fruits of the Mass.--Since Christ died for all, there\nis nothing in the nature of things to prevent the application of Mass\nto any persons who are living or in Purgatory; and from Canon 809 it\nappears that Mass may be offered for any living person, and also for\nany deceased person about whose salvation we may entertain hope. Hence,\nneither the divine nor the ecclesiastical law forbids the application\nof Mass for heretics, schismatics, or infidels. The Church also permits\nMass to be said privately, all scandal removed, for excommunicated\npersons. Under these same conditions, then, Mass may be said for\nnon-Catholics, both living and dead (Canon 2262, Sec.2, n. 2).\n\n(d) Reception of the Suffrages of the Church.--Since God wishes all to\nbe saved and public peace to be maintained (I Tim., ii), and since the\nChurch desires that Ordinaries and pastors should have at heart the\nconversion of non-Catholics (Canon 1350), public prayers for the\nprosperity of non-Catholic rulers and officials--likewise sermons,\nmissions and other works for the conversion of unbelievers--are not\nonly allowed, but recommended and required.\n\n959. Non-Catholics have not the same right as Catholics to receive the\nrites of the Church, and hence when they are admitted to them, there\nare certain restrictions to be observed.\n\n(a) Restrictions as to Sacred Things.--As admission of non-Catholics to\nsacramentals, etc., is a favor, not a right, it should be confined to\ncases allowed by the Church. Thus, it is forbidden to grant indulgences\nor to give the nuptial blessing to non-Catholics, and only in very\nexceptional cases may any ceremonies be permitted at mixed marriages\n(Canons 1102, 1109). Non-Catholics may not receive the Pax; may not be\ninvited to take part in the solemn services of receiving ashes on Ash\nWednesday, palms on Palm Sunday and candles on Candlemas Day; may not\nreceive ecclesiastical burial (Holy Office, June 8, 1859). Children\nsent by their parents to non-Catholic services may not be confirmed\n(Holy Office, August 28, 1780); a Catholic priest is not allowed to\nsupply for a non-Catholic minister, by accompanying the body of a\nnon-Catholic from the home to the graveyard, even though the body be\nnot brought to Church, nor the bell tolled (Holy Office, January 26,\n1886). It is not permissible to lend a Catholic church to non-Catholics\nfor their services.\n\n(b) Restrictions as to Persons.--As superstition and irreverence have\nto be avoided, the sacramentals may not be administered or given at all\nto non-Catholics about whose good faith and purpose there is doubt.\n\n(c) Restrictions as to Mode.--The Church, while she wishes to help and\nbenefit non-Catholics, must avoid anything that would cause scandal or\nhave the appearance of equal recognition of believers and unbelievers.\nThus, when Mass is offered for outsiders, the same publicity and pomp\nis not permitted as when there is question of Catholics.\n\n960. As regards the performance of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, the\nChurch disapproves of every kind of such participation, but does not\nrefuse to tolerate the more remote kind, when there is grave necessity\nand no scandal is caused.\n\n(a) By more remote participation we understand such as scarcely differs\nfrom passive assistance (e.g., to act as witness at a marriage), or\nsuch as carries with it no recognition as an official of the Church\n(e.g., to act as substitute or temporary organist). Hence, the Church\nhas permitted this kind of participation in particular cases, when the\nauthorities decided that there was urgent necessity and no scandal.\nExamples: Moralists hold that, when a heretic or schismatic has been\ndesignated as sponsor at Baptism and cannot be refused without grave\noffense, he may be allowed to act as witness. The Holy Office has also\ndeclared that heretics should not be used as witnesses at marriage, but\nmay be tolerated as such by the Ordinary, when there is a grave reason\nand no scandal (August 18, 1891); that a non-Catholic organist may be\nemployed temporarily, if it is impossible to secure one who is a\nCatholic, and no scandal is caused (February 23, 1820); that in certain\nspecial circumstances girls belonging to a schismatical sect might be\nallowed to sing with the Catholics at church functions, especially at\nExposition and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament (January 25, 1906).\n\n(b) Proximate participation is the exercise of functions connected with\na sacred rite (e.g., to act as server at Mass), or that imply a\nrecognition of the religion of the one who participates (e.g., to act\nas representative of some sect at a funeral and receive liturgical\nhonors). The Church has always refused to tolerate this kind of\nparticipation. Examples: Non-Catholics may not act as sponsors at\nBaptism or Confirmation under pain of invalidity of sponsorship (Canons\n765, 795), nor chant the Office in choir (Holy Office, June 8, 1859),\nnor be employed as singers of the liturgical music (Holy Office, May 1,\n1889), nor carry torches or lights in church ceremonies (Holy Office,\nNovember 20, 1850). Likewise, non-Catholics may not become members of\nCatholic confraternities, nor assist at Catholic services as official\nrepresentatives of some sect or sectarian society.\n\n961. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services may happen\ntoday in so many ways, and it is so difficult at times to draw the line\nbetween lawful and unlawful communication, that it is well before\nconsidering these cases to state the general rules that apply here.\n\n(a) It is lawful to perform an act from which two effects follow, one\ngood and the other bad, if the act in itself is good or indifferent, if\nthere is a sufficiently grave reason for performing it, if the evil\neffect is not intended, and if the evil effect be not prior to the good\neffect (see 104).\n\n(b) Circumstances vary in different localities and countries, and\ncommunication that would signify unity of belief in a place where\nCatholics and non-Catholics are very unequal numerically might be very\nharmless in a place where there is no great numerical difference.\nOffense to non-Catholics should not be given needlessly.\n\n(c) In doubtful cases the decision whether or not a particular kind of\ncommunication is lawful or unlawful pertains to the Ordinary (Canon\n1258).\n\n962. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services is either\nactive or passive. (a) Participation is active when one takes a part or\nfulfills some function in an act that is an official expression of the\nworship and belief of a sect, even though this takes place outside a\nchurch, or is not open to the general public.\n\n(b) Participation is passive, if one merely assists as a spectator, and\nnot as a worshipper, at something pertaining to non-Catholic worship.\n\n963. Sacred things in which communication is possible are of three\nclasses:\n\n(a) the chief acts of divine worship (i.e., Sacrifices, Sacraments,\nsacramentals);\n\n(b) the secondary acts of divine worship (such as prayers, processions,\nvows, oaths, the Divine Office, hymn singing, scripture reading, etc.).\nIn the Protestant denominations some one or other of these is, as a\nrule, the central or distinctive service, although some have other\nproper features of their own, such as the silent meeting of the\nQuakers, the seance of the Spiritualists, the march of the Salvation\nArmy, the charity kiss of the Dunkards;\n\n(c) places (e.g., churches, lodge rooms, cemeteries), times (e.g., days\nof feast or fast), and objects (e.g., images, badges, aprons, banners,\nrobes), pertaining to divine worship.\n\n964. It is unlawful for Catholics in any way to assist actively at or\ntake part in the worship of non-Catholics (Canon 1258). Such assistance\nis intrinsically and gravely evil; for (a) if the worship is\nnon-Catholic in its form (e.g., Mohammedan ablutions, the Jewish\npaschal meal, revivalistic \u201chitting the trail,\u201d the right hand of\nfellowship, etc.), it expresses a belief in the false creed symbolized;\n(b) if the worship is Catholic in form, but is under the auspices of a\nnon-Catholic body (e.g., Baptism as administered by a Protestant\nminister, or Mass as celebrated by a schismatical priest), it expresses\neither faith in a false religious body or rebellion against the true\nChurch.\n\n965. It is unlawful for Catholics to simulate active assistance in the\nworship of non-Catholics, for, while the non-Catholic rite would be\navoided, something which appeared to be that rite would be done, and\nthus profession of faith in it would be given.\n\n(a) Hence, it is not lawful to do an indifferent act which bystanders\nfrom the circumstances will have to conclude is an act of false\nworship. Thus, Eleazar would not eat lawful meat which was put before\nhim in order that he might pretend to eat the meat of sacrifice after\nthe manner of the heathen (II Mach., vi).\n\n(b) It is not lawful to accept a false certificate of participation in\nfalse worship. Hence, the early Church condemned as apostates the\nLibellatics (i.e., those Christians, who, to protect themselves in time\nof persecution, obtained by bribery or otherwise a forged or genuine\nmagistrate\u2019s certificate that they had sacrificed to the heathen gods).\n\n966. It is unlawful for Catholics to assist passively at non-Catholic\nworship, unless there are present the conditions requisite for\nperforming an act that has two results, one good and the other evil\n(see 104); for even passive assistance frequently involves sin.\n\n(a) Hence, the assistance itself must be really indifferent, that is,\nit must be a merely passive presence without any active participation\nin the service. Examples: A person who stands in the rear of a Quaker\nmeeting house as an onlooker assists passively; but one who sits\nquietly among the others present, as if in meditation, assists\nactively. A person who sits in a pew during a revival in order to see\nwhat is going on, assists passively; but, if he joins with the\ncongregation in bowing, groaning, etc., he assists actively.\n\n(b) The evil effect that may result from assistance (such as scandal\nand danger of perversion) must not be prior to the good effect;\notherwise, evil would be done for the sake of good. Examples: Titus, a\nnon-Catholic, goes to Mass as a spectator, with his Catholic friend\nBalbus. He then asks Balbus to assist as a spectator at the services of\nhis denomination, and thus see for himself that the latter is better.\nBalbus, in order to be courteous, consents. Here Balbus aims to show\npoliteness, which is good, but the means he uses--namely, the\nimpression he gives that he is not convinced of the superiority of his\nown religion--is bad.\n\n(c) The evil effect (i.e., remote danger of perversion, unavoidable\nscandal) must not be intended or approved, but only permitted. Example:\nCaius, a Catholic public official, has to attend funerals and weddings\nin Protestant churches as a mark of the public respect for notable\npersons. He knows that a few will take scandal at his action, but he\nwishes only to do his duty as an official, and not to offend anyone\n(see on Scandal).\n\n(d) The cause of assistance must be in proportion to the kind of\nassistance. Hence, a greater reason is required for assistance on\nseveral occasions than on one, for assistance at infidel than at\nheretical services, for assistance at the primary than at the secondary\nact of worship, for assistance by a priest than for assistance by a\nlayman, etc. Example: Graver reason would be necessary to justify\nassistance at a non-Catholic funeral, if there were signs of\nanti-Catholicism manifested (e.g., flower designs and regalia of a\nhostile sect placed on the coffin), than if the service contained\nnothing offensive.\n\n967. Cases of communication in false sacrificial rites are as follows:\n(a) Active participation is had in such acts as the slaying and\noffering of victims, the burning of incense before idols, the eating of\nsacrificial banquets; (b) Passive participation is had when one merely\nwatches the rite of sacrifice without taking any part therein.\n\n968. Cases of communication in the Sacrifice of the Mass are as\nfollows: (a) Active participation is had in such acts as taking the\npart of deacon in a schismatical Mass, assisting at a schismatical Mass\nwith the intention of hearing Mass formally (i.e., of offering it with\nthe priest). If on Sunday, one is where there is only a schismatical\nchurch, one is excused from the obligation of hearing Mass, and may not\nhear Mass in that church (Holy Office, December 5, 1608; August 7,\n1704). (b) Passive participation is had when one is present merely as a\nspectator, kneeling before the Blessed Sacrament, but giving no other\nsigns of religious devotion. This is permissible under the conditions\nmentioned above (see 966), if there is no scandal, or danger of\nperversion (Holy Office, April 24, 1894).\n\n969. Cases of participation in the Sacraments or sacramentals, real or\nreputed, are as follows: (a) Active participation takes place when one\nreceives a Sacrament from a non-Catholic minister, or offers one\u2019s\nchild to receive a Sacrament from such a minister, or contracts\nmarriage in the presence of such a minister, or acts as sponsor at a\nnon-Catholic baptism or confirmation or as the religious witness at a\nnon-Catholic marriage, or answers in public non-Catholic prayers, or\ntakes ashes blessed by schismatics. (b) Passive participation is had\nwhen one merely looks on at the administration of a Sacrament or\nsacramental by a non-Catholic minister, without signs of approval or\nunion in what is being done.\n\n970. There are certain cases that seem to be active participations in\nSacraments with non-Catholics, and yet are permitted by the Code. In\nreality, however, there is no active communication in those cases.\n\n(a) Canons 886 and 905 allow the faithful to receive communion and\nabsolution according to a Rite different from their own, so that one\nwho belongs to the Latin Rite may lawfully receive in Communion a Host\nconsecrated according to the Greek Rite, or go to confession to an\nOriental priest. But in these Canons there is question of different\nRites within the Catholic Church, not of those of non-Catholics.\n\n(b) Canons 742 and 882 allow those who are in danger of death to\nreceive Baptism and absolution from an heretical or schismatical\nminister, and theologians apply the same principle to Extreme Unction\nand the Viaticum. But there is no communication in non-Catholic\nceremonies in these cases, for the Sacraments belong to the Catholic\nChurch, and for the sake of the dying she authorizes non-Catholic\nministers to act as her representatives, provided there is no scandal\nor danger of perversion.\n\n971. Cases of participation in non-sacramental rites are as follows:\n\n(a) Oaths and Vows.--Participation is active when one swears in words\nor by other signs which, according to local usage, manifest belief in\nthe creed of some sect; it is not active, when the manner of the oath\ndoes not signify adherence to a false creed; Example: If one is\nrequired to swear, by touching or kissing the non-Catholic Bible, as a\nsign of approval of Protestantism or Masonry, one may not consent. But,\nif the Government presents a non-Catholic Bible with no thought of\nProtestantism, there is no approval of Protestantism in the one who\nswears on that Bible, although, if the custom is not general, there\nmight be scandal if no protest were made. A Catholic may bring his own\nBible with him, or ask for a copy of the Catholic Bible.\n\n(b) Services--Participation is active when one marches in an Anglican\nprocession, plays the organ or sings at Y.M.C.A. services, joins in the\nprayers or responses offered in a Protestant church, etc. (Holy Office,\nJuly 6, 1889). Participation is passive if one looks on during a rare\nvisit, or listens by radio to the musical program broadcast from\nProtestant services, or if one is obliged to attend non-Catholic\nservices habitually, not as a profession of faith, but as a matter of\ncivil duty or of domestic discipline, as happens with soldiers or with\ninmates of public institutions. Participation is not active if one\nadores the Blessed Sacrament carried in a schismatical procession which\none meets by chance and unavoidably. Examples: Titus belongs to the\nhonorary guard of a state ruler, and has to accompany the latter to\nnon-Catholic services on certain state occasions. Balbus is tutor in a\nnon-Catholic family, and is expected to take his charges to their\nchurch and back home on Sundays. Claudia is a maid in a non-Catholic\nfamily, and is ordered to hold one of the children while it is being\nbaptized by the non-Catholic minister. In all these cases the presence\nat the services is purely passive, since the intention of the Catholic\npresent is not to perform any religious duty, but only some civil or\ndomestic service (see IV Kings, v. 18). But, on the other hand, the\nmartyrs during the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors refused to\nattend the Anglican services, because this was required by law as a\nsign of conformity to the Established Church--that is, an active\npresence was prescribed.\n\n972. Cases of participation in religious places, times and objects are\nas follows:\n\n(a) Places.--Participation is active when one orders one\u2019s body to be\nburied in a sectarian graveyard, when one enters a schismatical or\nheretical church privately in order to visit the Blessed Sacrament or\npray, when one offers up Catholic services in a non-Catholic temple, if\nthese things are looked upon by the public as indications of identity\nof belief between Catholics and non-Catholics. Participation is merely\npassive, if one visits non-Catholic places of worship out of curiosity\nin order to look at the pictures, hear the music or listen to or take\npart in a political lecture or debate. In case of necessity, the Church\npermits Catholic services to be performed in the same building as that\nwherein non-Catholic rites are held, e.g., the Church of the Holy\nSepulchre at Jerusalem which is used by various denominations (Holy\nOffice, 12 April, 1704).\n\n(b) Times.--Participation is active if one observes new moons,\nsabbaths, and days of fast as prescribed in the Old Law.\n\n(c) Objects.--Participation is active if one wears the uniform of a\ncondemned society, the ring or other emblem of Freemasonry, etc., or\nmakes use of other insignia whose sole purpose is to indicate\nmembership in some sect, unless it be evident that these are used for\nsome other purpose (e.g., in order to act a certain part in a play).\n\n973. Cases of participation through attendance at non-Catholic\nreligious instructions are as follows:\n\n(a) Active participation in worship is had when one listens to a\npreacher, Sunday school teacher, etc., and signifies approval by\njoining in \u201cAmens\u201d or other acclamations.\n\n(b) Participation is merely passive, if at church or over the radio,\none listens out of curiosity, or in order to be able to refute errors,\nor for the sake of perfecting oneself in diction or eloquence, or of\nshowing respect to a person whose funeral oration is being delivered,\netc. But, even though there be no active participation, it will usually\nbe unlawful to listen to these sectarian discourses on account of the\ndanger of perversion to the listener or of scandal to others. Catholics\nwho are scientifically trained and staunch in faith may for good\nreasons hear sectarian sermons, but the greater number would be\ndisturbed or unsettled (see the principles given above on dangerous\nbooks and schools, 854-857, 868). Moreover, even those who have a right\nto listen to non-Catholic religious talks have to be on their guard\nagainst scandal, for outsiders may regard their attention as approval\nof doctrine or participation in cult, and Catholics not sufficiently\ninstructed may regard their example as an encouragement to imitate\n(cfr. 979, 981).\n\n974. Participation in non-Catholic assemblages or occasions whose\ncharacter is of a mixed kind (partly religious and partly\nnon-religious) are permitted by the Church, when due regard is had for\navoidance of scandal, perversion, denial of faith, etc.\n\n(a) Some of these occasions are chiefly religious, but are also looked\non as family or civic solemnities, such as christenings, weddings,\nfunerals. Hence, it is allowed to assist at the religious part of the\noccasion in a passive way for the sake of courtesy, or to exercise some\nfunction which is looked upon as belonging to the non-religious part\nof the occasion. Caution must be taken to ensure that the particular\nsect involved does not consider the exercise of the particular function\nas participating in the religious aspect of the ceremony. Likewise,\non condition that the possibility of scandal, perversion, etc., has\nbeen removed, the following functions may be performed. One may act\nas a witness at the christening of a near relative who is not a\nCatholic; however, it is forbidden to be a sponsor, even by proxy,\nat baptisms performed by a heretical minister (Holy Office, decr.,\nMay 10, 1770). To be pallbearer or undertaker at a funeral, to be an\nusher at a wedding, to be an extra bridesmaid, etc., may be permitted.\n(If the function of best man or maid of honor be considered as merely\nattendants to the bride or groom, such participation in itself would\nnot be illicit; but since the danger of scandal might often be present,\nsuch participation is dangerous. It is lawful for a Catholic pastor\nto attend the funeral of a non-Catholic friend or relative, provided\nhe does not wear his sacred garb and takes no part in the ceremonies.\nCanon 1258, Sec.2 establishes the general norm regulative of these\ncases: a passive or merely material presence may be, for a serious\nreason, tolerated as a mark of esteem or social courtesy at funerals,\nweddings, and similar functions, provided there is involved no danger\nof perversion or scandal; in a doubtful case, the serious reason for\nthis presence must be approved by the local Ordinary.\n\n(b) Other occasions are chiefly non-religious in character, but are\nalso partly religious, or have the appearance of being religious. Such\nare, for example, the coronation, birthday, wedding, or funeral of a\nruler, school commencements, political conventions, patriotic meetings,\ncivil marriage before a magistrate who is also a non-Catholic minister.\nWhen these exercises are chiefly non-religious or entirely civil, even\nthough conducted in non-Catholic churches or by non-Catholic ministers,\nthe Church grants permission to participate in them to some extent, if\nthere is sufficient reason.\n\n975. Among the mixed occasions just mentioned are not included such\nas have an anti-Catholic or anti-religious spirit, such as funerals\nfrom which all manifestations of religion are excluded on account of\nhatred of religion, entertainments held by forbidden societies in which\nthe members are present in regalia, picnics under the auspices of the\nOrangemen, etc.\n\n976. Cooperation in Religious Activities.--A third danger of making\nexternal profession of a false religion is cooperation in activities\nwhose tendency or principles are erroneous (see 944). Cooperation in a\nfalse religion is of two kinds, immediate and mediate. (a) Cooperation\nis immediate, when one takes a part in an act of a false religion\nitself (e.g., by worshipping an idol). This kind of cooperation was\ndiscussed above, as participation or communication (see 956-975). (b)\nCooperation is mediate, when one takes part, not in an act of a false\nreligion, but in some other act which is a preparation for a help to\nthe act of a false religion. This is the kind of cooperation we are now\nconsidering.\n\n977. Mediate cooperation is of various kinds. (a) It is proximate\nor remote, according as the preparation or help afforded to false\nreligion is near to or far from the religious act. Thus, to make ready\nthe lights, incense, flowers, etc. in front of an idol is proximate\ncooperation; to give money to an idolatrous priest or bonze is remote\ncooperation. (b) Mediate cooperation is material or formal, according\nas the intention of the cooperator is to share in or help error itself,\nor merely to help those who are in error, while disapproving of their\nerror. Thus, if one prepares a pagan temple for worship or contributes\nmoney towards its maintenance because one\u2019s sympathies are with its\nidolatry, one\u2019s cooperation is formal; if one does these things only in\norder to make a living or to show friendship to an individual pagan,\none\u2019s cooperation is material. It is clear that formal cooperation is a\ngrave sin against faith, and hence we shall speak now only of material\ncooperation.\n\n978. The principles governing the lawfulness of material cooperation\nwill be treated at length below in their proper place among the sins\nopposed to charity. But since, on account of the mixed conditions of\nsociety today, there are innumerable cases of material cooperation\nin religion, it will be useful to state in advance in this place the\nprinciples bearing on material cooperation and their application to\ncases on religion and worship. The principles are the same as those\ngiven for an act that has two effects, one good and the other bad.\nHence, material cooperation is not lawful, except when the following\nconditions are present:\n\n(a) The action of him who cooperates must be good in itself or at least\nindifferent, for of course, if it is evil, it is not lawful. Thus, if\na person were to give to one pagan temple objects he had stolen from\nanother temple, his action would be intrinsically sinful on account of\nthe theft. Similarly, if a person were to contribute to a collection\nlist as \u201csympathizer\u201d with a school for the propagation of atheism\nor as \u201cbeneficiary\u201d from the sacrifices to be offered an idol, his\nact would be intrinsically sinful as being a promotion of error or\nsuperstition, even though he were not really a sympathizer with atheism\nor a believer in idols.\n\n(b) The intention of him who cooperates must be good; for, if he wills\nto help a false religion, he is guilty of formal cooperation; if he\nwills some other wrong end, he is guilty of some other species of\nsin. Thus, if one who does not believe in idolatry contributes to it\non account of sympathy with anti-Christian movements, he is guilty of\nenmity to the truth.\n\n(c) There must be a reason for the cooperation proportionate to the\ngravity of the sin which will be committed by others, to the proximity\nand necessity of the cooperation, and to the obligation which one has\nof preventing the sin of others. Examples: To contribute to a sect\nwhich plots the downfall of legitimate authority is never lawful,\nfor there is no reason of temporal or private good that can be a\ncompensation for the destruction of the public good. To contribute\nto the building of a Mohammedan mosque does not require so serious a\nreason as to contribute to the building of a pagan temple, for mosques\nare not used for idolatry. A graver reason is needed to justify ringing\nthe bell or ushering the people to their seats for a service of false\nworship than to justify sweeping and dusting the temple the day before\nthe service, for in the former case the cooperation is closer. A\ngreater reason is required to build a house of false worship, when\nthere is no one else to build it, than when there are many others who\nwill gladly build it if one refuses, for in the former case one\u2019s\ncooperation is so necessary that without it the false worship cannot\ntake place, but not so in the latter case. A much more serious reason\nwould be required to justify parents conducting their children to a\nplace of false worship than would be required to justify a public\nchauffeur in taking passengers thither; for the parents have a special\nduty to guard the religion of their children.\n\n979. The above principles on mediate cooperation are clear enough, but\nit is frequently very difficult to apply them on account of the\nuncertainty as to whether or not a particular act of cooperation is\nindifferent in itself, or whether a particular reason for cooperation\nis sufficient. But the following rules will help:\n\n(a) An act is indifferent or good, when it does not tend to evil from\nits very nature or the circumstances, but has purposes that are not\nbad. It is bad when either intrinsically (i.e., from its nature) or\nextrinsically (i.e., from circumstances) it tends necessarily to evil.\nExamples: A derisory image of Christ and the manual of an obscene cult\nare intrinsically evil, inasmuch as they necessarily convey error or\nimmorality. To draw up plans for a temple of idolaters in a Christian\ncountry would have the appearance of favoring the propagation of\nidolatry; to work on the construction of a temple in a pagan country\nwhere the lending of one\u2019s labor is regarded as a sign of acceptance of\npaganism, to help build a meeting house for a sect that plots the\noverthrow of government or religion--all these acts are indifferent in\nthemselves (for one may also draw plans and put up walls for good or\nindifferent purposes), but from the circumstances they are evil in the\ncases given.\n\n(b) Reasons for cooperation may be ranked as great, greater and\ngreatest according to the kinds of goods that are at stake, and their\nsufficiency or insufficiency may be determined by measuring them with\nthe gravity of the cooperation that is given. Great reasons are: fear\nof serious suffering, or of the wrath of husband or other superior, or\nof loss of an opportunity to make a considerable profit. Greater\nreasons are: fear of loss of position, or of notable detriment to\nreputation or fortune, or of severe imprisonment. Among the greatest\nreasons for cooperation in the worship of a false religion are the\nfollowing: danger of loss of life or limb, of perpetual imprisonment,\nof great dishonor, of loss of all one\u2019s earthly possessions, of\ndisturbance of the public peace.\n\n980. Cases of cooperation in false religion that occur most frequently\nare: (a) contributions made to schools, churches, institutions; (b)\nlabor given to buildings and objects of worship or instruction; (c)\nlabor given to acts of worship or instruction.\n\n981. Contributions to false worship are unlawful, even apart from\nscandal, danger of perversion, and the bad intention of the cooperator\nin the following cases:\n\n(a) When on account of circumstances the contributions are signs of\nsympathy with religious errors. Examples: Titus gives many stipends for\nMasses to a schismatical priest. Balbus, when asked, contributes\nliberally to a fund for the building of a hall under the auspices of\natheists. Caius, without being asked, gives a small donation towards\nthe erection of a pagan temple. Claudius sends in a subscription to the\ntreasury of a political organization whose purpose is anti-religious,\nand promises to support their ticket.\n\n(b) Contributions, even though they manifest no sympathy with religious\nerror, are unlawful, when there is no reason for the cooperation, or\nonly an insufficient reason. Examples: Caius contributes to a pagan\ntemple for no other reason than that he has not the heart to refuse\nanyone. Titus advertises constantly in an antireligious paper in order\nto help his business (cfr. 1530).\n\n982. If there is no bad intention on the part of the contributor, and\nif the danger of scandal or perversion is excluded, contributions are\npermitted under the following conditions, of which both must be present:\n\n(a) The contribution must not be a mark of sympathy with religious\nerror. This condition will be fulfilled more readily in countries of\nmixed religion, where Catholics and non-Catholics have been long\nassociated together, and where non-Catholic denominations are engaged\nin many things other than the preaching of their doctrines, such as\nworks of benevolence. Example: Balbus contributes at times to the\nbuilding or maintenance of Protestant orphan asylums, hospitals, and\nschools, in a locality where these institutions are open to all and a\ncontribution is not regarded as a sign of agreement with sectarian\npurposes.\n\n(b) There must be a sufficient reason for making the contribution, such\nas the common good or great private necessity. Examples: Claudius\ncontributes to the building of a non-Catholic church, in order that\nCatholics may thus obtain exclusive use of a church till then used by\nCatholics and non-Catholics alike. Titus buys tickets for bazaars, lawn\nfetes, oyster suppers, dances, picnics and other entertainments held\nfor the benefit of non-Catholic churches, since, if he does not do\nthis, he will lose trade and his business will be injured.\n\n983. The building of houses of false worship, the production and sale\nof articles used in false worship, are unlawful also in two cases:\n\n(a) when, on account of circumstances, they are a mark of approval of\nthe false worship. Examples: Christians of Japan were forbidden by the\nChurch to cooperate in the erection of altars or temples to idols, even\nif threatened with death or exile, and the reason of the prohibition\nseems to have been in each instance that such work was looked on and\ndemanded as a profession of faith in paganism. Similarly, the\nconstruction of non-Catholic edifices in a Catholic country, of a pagan\ntemple in a Christian country, or of an atheistic hall, would be signs\nof approbation of error. It is difficult to see how one who sells idols\nto those who request them for purposes of idolatry does not show favor\nto false worship, although he might be excused if, under threat of\ngreat harm, he delivered them with a protest that he was acting under\ncompulsion;\n\n(b) when there is no reason, or no sufficient reason, for cooperation\nwith false worship. Example: Balbus helps to build non-Catholic places\nof worship for no other reason than that he is asked to do so, or that\nhe receives good pay.\n\n984. Building non-Catholic temples or furnishing the appurtenances of\nworship, scandal and other evil being avoided, are lawful under two\nconditions as above:\n\n(a) the work must not be regarded as a sign of approval of false\nworship. Examples: The Church has permitted Christians to assist in the\nconstruction of Mohammedan mosques, when this was done unwillingly by\nthem and under compulsion. The manufacture of statues of Buddha or of\nother idols is not a sign that one approves of idolatry, because these\nobjects have legitimate uses, such as adornment of palaces or art\ngalleries. Similarly, the production and distribution of emblems of a\nnon-Catholic sect or secret society is regarded as being in itself an\nindifferent sect, on account of the various uses to which such objects\nmay be put;\n\n(b) there must be a reason sufficiently grave for doing this kind of\nwork. Hence, a greater reason is needed to build a pagan temple than a\nMohammedan mosque, and graver reason to build a mosque than an\nheretical place of worship; likewise, greater reason is required to\ncooperate as architect than as hirer and supervisor of labor, greater\nreason to cooperate as supervisor of labor than as stonecutter,\nbricklayer, etc.; greater reason is required to justify selling than\nmaking idols; greater reason to justify selling altar cloths and breads\nfor the Lord\u2019s Supper than for selling pews and stained glass windows.\nExamples: Since lights, benches, bells, tables, cloths, etc., are not\nnecessarily intended for direct use in acts of worship, a sufficient\nreason for selling them to non-Catholic churches is the profit that\nwill be made. But, since vestments and chalices pertain directly to\nworship, a more serious reason is required for selling them than\nbusiness gains.\n\n985. Making the preparations for non-Catholic services is unlawful\nin the two cases given above, that is, when there is approval or\ninsufficient reason. (a) If the work manifests an approval of the\nservices, it is unlawful. Such positions as sexton, sacristan, usher,\nbeadle, church-warden, and trustee, imply recognition of the worship\nor membership in the congregation, although the same does not seem to\nbe true of membership in the civil corporation of a church, nor of\nexternal offices such as janitor, caretaker, and attorney. Examples:\nBalba, an Anglican who is sick, wishes her minister to bring her\ncommunion. She asks her nurse, Titia, who is a Catholic, to telephone\nthe minister to bring communion, and also directs Titia to prepare an\naltar and assist the minister on his arrival by lighting the candles,\nmaking responses, etc. Titia may not consent, for such immediate\ncooperation would mean approval of and participation in Anglican rites.\nClaudius, a Catholic, is hired by the minister of a Protestant church\nto take care of the yard and garden about the church and parsonage.\nSometimes the minister asks Claudius to play the chimes in his church\ntower which call the people to the services. The gardening work is\nindifferent, but the playing of the chimes seems at least an unlawful\ncooperation, since it is an invitation to non-Catholic worship.\n\n(b) If there is no sufficient reason for the work, it is unlawful.\nExamples: Gaia, a Catholic, acts as scrubwoman and cleaner in a\nschismatical church for no other reason than friendship for members\nof the altar society. On certain feast days her husband, Caius, a\nCatholic, takes pilgrims to the schismatical church in a bus, only\nbecause he makes considerable profit.\n\n986. Making preparations for non-Catholic services, scandal and other\ndanger being avoided, is lawful when the two conditions given above\nare present. (a) Hence, the preparations must contain no indication\nof approval of the services. Examples: If Titia, the nurse mentioned\nin the previous paragraph, called in an Anglican nurse to receive and\nfulfill the orders of Balba, she would show that she did not herself\napprove of the rites, and her act would be indifferent in itself.\nIf she could not avoid telephoning the minister without serious\nconsequences, it would not be unlawful for her to tell him that Balba\nwished him to call. She might even in great necessity prepare the\ntable herself, but could take no part in the rite. The acts of telling\nthe minister that a visit from him was desired and of preparing the\ntable would not be, in the circumstances, approving of the rite that\nfollowed. If Claudius mentioned in the foregoing paragraph wound up\nthe clock in the church tower, or rang the bell at certain times to\nindicate the hour of the day, his acts would be indifferent, since they\nhave no necessary reference to worship.\n\n(b) There must be a reason sufficiently grave for engaging in the\nwork that prepares for the services. Examples: If Caia mentioned in\nthe preceding paragraph were in great poverty and could find no other\nemployment, this would be a sufficient reason for her cooperation.\nLikewise, if her husband drove a bus that carried passengers to\nwhatever destination they desired, and he could not refuse to let\nthem off at the church without being dismissed or causing other like\ninconveniences, he would have sufficient reason for his cooperation.\n\n987. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.--The third\ncommandment of faith (mentioned in 918) has been considered so far in\nits negative aspect--that is, as a prohibition against the denial of\ntruth or the profession of error. It remains to consider it in its\naffirmative aspect--that is, as a precept of profession of faith or of\ndenial of error.\n\n988. The ways of making profession of faith are various: (a) It is made\nimplicitly, if one performs acts that suppose faith; explicitly, if one\ndeclares in words one\u2019s internal belief. Thus, a Catholic professes his\nfaith implicitly by observing the precepts of the Church; explicitly,\nby reciting before others an act of faith or the Creed.\n\n(b) The declaration of one\u2019s faith in words is made in ordinary ways,\nif one affirms it to others, privately or publicly, or if one teaches\nit or defends it in debate; it is made solemnly, if it is recited\naccording to a prescribed form as a ceremony. Thus, a Catholic who\nanswers to a questioner that he is a Catholic, or who explains the\ntruths of faith to an inquirer, or who replies to the objections of\nan unbeliever, makes an ordinary profession of faith; one who reads\nbefore the bishop or other designated authority a formula prescribed by\nthe Church, makes solemn profession of faith. The solemn profession of\nfaith is usually made before the altar, on which candles are lighted;\nand he who makes profession of faith kneels before the authority who\nreceives it. Sometimes witnesses are present and the profession is\nsigned.\n\n(c) The solemn profession of faith is sometimes an abjuration (i.e.,\na declaration of one\u2019s adherence to the faith of the Church and a\nrecantation of previous errors); sometimes it is a declaration or\noath that one rejects errors or accepts truths. Thus, converts before\nreception into the Church abjure the errors they formerly held;\nofficials in the Church before assuming authority make a profession of\nfaith in which they reprobate Modernism and express their belief in the\nCreed and the teachings of the Church.\n\n989. The existence of a divine precept of profession of faith is proved\nfrom revelation and intrinsic reasons, as follows:\n\n(a) \u201cIf thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in\nthy heart that God hath raised Him up from the dead, thou shalt be\nsaved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth\nconfession is made unto salvation\u201d (Rom., x. 9, 10). This precept\nobliges under grave sin, since it is required for salvation.\n\n(b) The first reason for external profession of faith is the honor of\nGod; for it is a mark of disrespect to God to be ashamed or afraid\nto acknowledge oneself as a believer in His Word or a witness to its\ntruth, on account of what others may think or say or do.\n\n(c) A second reason for the external profession of faith is one\u2019s own\ngood. It is well known that faith is strengthened by external acts, and\nthat it grows weak and decays among Catholics who have no priests or\nchurches or means of practising their faith.\n\n(d) A third reason for profession of faith is the good of others, for\nthe confession of faith is an encouragement to those who are strong in\nfaith, an example to those whose faith is weak, and a light to those\nwho have not the faith.\n\n990. The divine precept of profession of faith, since it is\naffirmative, does not call for fulfillment at every moment. It obliges\nonly at those times when the honor of God, the Revealer of Truth, or\nthe needs of our neighbor, who is called to the truth, demand that one\ndeclare externally one\u2019s internal belief. (a) The honor of God demands\na confession of faith, when a refusal to give it signifies that one\ndoes not accept the truths revealed by God, that revelation contains\nerror, etc. (b) The needs of our neighbor demand a confession of faith,\nwhen a refusal to give it will prevent another from embracing the\nfaith, or will cause him to lose it or give up its practices, etc.\n\n991. The honor of God or the good of the neighbor calls for an external\nprofession of faith at the following times: (a) when a person is\njoining the Church or returning to it, for the Church is a visible\nsociety and membership in it should be visible; (b) when a Catholic is\ninterrogated about his faith, for here the honor of God and the good of\nothers require that he be not ashamed of Christ or His Words (Luke, ix.\n26), and that he should cause his light to shine before men (Matt., v.\n16); (c) when a Catholic is in the company of others who are ridiculing\nor calumniating the faith, and a protest is looked for from him on\naccount of his authority, knowledge, etc.\n\n992. The profession of faith made by one who is joining the Church must\nbe external, but the same publicity is not necessary for every case.\n\n(a) Secret profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert\nis known only to himself and the priest who received him. This is\npermitted only in grave necessity, when the spiritual good of the\nconvert requires it, and no injury is done to the honor of God or the\nWelfare of the neighbor. Example: Titus is dying and wishes to be\nbaptized, but for an important reason he is unwilling to have the fact\nof his conversion disclosed. Father Balbus, therefore, baptizes without\nwitnesses.\n\n(b) Private profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert\nis made before the priest and two witnesses, but the fact of the\nconversion is not made known to others on account of circumstances.\nThis is permitted only for a short time and for serious reasons (see\n932, 993), as the task of concealing one\u2019s faith for a long time is\nmost difficult and is dangerous to faith itself. Example: Caius is a\npagan who wishes to become a Catholic, but is kept back on account of\ndangers from his fellow-pagans, who will persecute him as an apostate.\nHe, therefore, asks to be received as a secret Christian, with liberty\nto profess no religion externally. This may be permitted for a time,\nuntil Caius can move to some other place, but it cannot be permitted\npermanently.\n\n(c) Public profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert\nis made before the priest and two witnesses, and the convert thereafter\nmakes it known that he is a Catholic by attending Mass, receiving\nthe Sacraments, etc. This kind of profession of faith is ordinarily\nrequired, but there is no law making it necessary for a convert to\npublish the news of his conversion.\n\n993. A difficult case occurs when one who wishes to become a convert\nis unable to make public profession of Catholicity without suffering\nvery great detriment, and is unable to make private profession without\ncontinuing in external practices of the non-Catholic religion. An\nexample of this would be a non-Catholic girl who is threatened with\ndestitution by her parents if she becomes a Catholic openly, and who\nknows that she will be forced to go to church with them if she becomes\na Catholic privately. There are three courses in such a case: (a)\npublic profession of Catholicism at once could be advised if the party\nshowed signs of a special divine call and of a heroism equal to the\ndifficulties the public profession would entail; (b) private profession\nof Catholicism could be tolerated for a time, if the party was of such\nage and circumstances as to appear able to cope successfully with the\ntemptations and perplexities that beset this course; (c) delay of\nBaptism until things take a better turn would be the most prudent plan,\nif the deprivation of spiritual advantages would in the long run prove\na lesser evil than the inconveniences of public or private profession\nof Catholicism.\n\n994. Examination about one\u2019s religious status refers either to one\u2019s\nfaith, or to something not necessarily connected with faith. (a) When\na person is examined about his faith (e.g., whether he is a Catholic,\nwhether he believes in the doctrine of the Real Presence, or in Papal\nInfallibility), profession of faith is obligatory, if its omission\nis equivalent to denial. (b) When he is examined about something\nnot necessarily connected with faith, denial or concealment of the\ntruth would not be denial of faith, and concealment might be lawful,\nif the question were unfair. Evasion would be sinful, if the denial\nor concealment contained a lie or caused scandal. Examples: If a\nmissionary in England or Ireland in the sixteenth century had refused\nto admit that he was a priest or religious, or a layman had refused to\nconfess that he had harbored a priest in his house or had assisted at\nMass, these denials would not necessarily contain a denial of the faith.\n\n995. Examination about one\u2019s faith is made either by a private person\nor by public authority.\n\n(a) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by a private\nperson, he is not bound by reason of the question itself to make a\nprofession of his faith, for a private person has no authority to\ncall upon one in the capacity of a solemn and public witness; but he\nis bound to make a profession of faith by reason of circumstances, if\nthe honor of God or the good of his neighbor requires that he declare\nhis belief. Examples: Titius is known as a very iniquisitive and\nmeddlesome character, who is continually asking others about their\npersonal affairs and putting silly questions. Wherefore, those who know\nhim are accustomed to pay no attention to his questions, or to tell\nhim to mind his business, or to give him some humorous reply. One day\nTitius asked Balbus, whom he knew very well to be a Catholic: \u201cWhat\nis your religion?\u201d Balbus retorted: \u201cWhat is yours?\u201d and left him.\nCaius is studying Christianity with a view to embracing it, and asks\nSempronius\u2019 opinion on miracles. Sempronius, fearing the ridicule of\nsome others present if he admits belief in miracles, says that he knows\nnothing about that subject. Balbus had a right to deny an answer to his\nquestioner; but Sempronius should have replied for the edification of\nCaius and the honor of God.\n\n(b) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by public\nauthority, his obligation to make a profession of faith is certain, if\nthe questioner has the right according to law to ask the question, and\nif it is made to one individually and out of hatred of the faith; for\nto this case apply the words of Christ: \u201cYou shall be brought before\ngovernors and kings for My sake, for a testimony to them and to the\nGentiles\u201d (Matt., x. 18).\n\n996. In the following cases, one is not bound to confession of faith on\naccount of the public authority that puts the question, although one\nmay be bound on account of the circumstances:\n\n(a) When the question is not put to an individual, but to a whole\ncommunity, by a law which requires them in time of persecution\nto deliver themselves up as Christians or Catholics, there is no\nobligation to comply with this law, since it is unjust, and neither the\nhonor of God nor the good of others requires one to make the profession\nof faith it demands (see 377, 552).\n\n(b) When the question is put to an individual by one in authority but\ncontrary to the law of the land, there is no obligation to answer.\nThus, if according to civil law the magistrates have no right to\nexamine about matters of conscience and one of them should nevertheless\ndo so, the party questioned could treat the question as out of order\nand deny any answer.\n\n(c) When the question is made according to law, but does not proceed\nfrom hatred of the faith, one is not obliged positively to profess\none\u2019s faith, unless the omission would seem to those present to be a\ndenial of faith. Thus, a person might remain silent, or say that he\ndid not wish to answer, that he did not wish to say what his belief\nwas, etc., and in the circumstances it would seem that he would not be\ndenying his faith, but merely for some reason refusing to discuss it\nwhen he thought there was no necessity.\n\n997. The third case mentioned above (see 991), in which one is obliged\nto profess one\u2019s faith publicly, is when the faith is. being attacked\nin one\u2019s presence. The honor of God and the good of the neighbor then\nrequire one to speak out. (a) Thus, if the doctrines of the faith are\nbeing blasphemed or ridiculed, one should defend them, if one is able.\nOtherwise, one should protest or leave the company, if this will be\nadvantageous to religion. (b) If sacred things are being profaned, one\nshould resist physically, if one is able to prevent what is going on.\n\n998. Debates on religion between Catholics and non-Catholics are not in\nthemselves wrong, but as a rule they are useless and inexpedient.\n\n(a) That such debates are not essentially wrong, is clear from the\nfact that a suitable defender of the faith is able by argumentation\nto show the misconceptions that are entertained about the faith and\nthe fallacious objections that are made against it. This is honorable\nto God and profitable to the neighbor: \u201cSaul confounded the Jews that\ndwelt at Damascus, affirming that this is the Christ .... He spoke also\nto the Gentiles and disputed with the Greeks\u201d (Acts, ix. 22, 29).\n\n(b) That controversy is generally unprofitable is a matter of\nexperience. Religious debates often lead to bitterness, and seldom\neffect conversions. There is, moreover, an ever-present danger that the\nsophistry or eloquence of an adversary may give him the appearance of\nvictory to the discredit of the faith, for even a foolish person can\nraise difficulties which only a wise man can answer.\n\n999. Consequently the rule governing religious disputations is that\nthey should be avoided, unless ecclesiastical authority deems them\nuseful at times. (a) If no provocation is offered, or if no good seems\nlikely to result from a debate, it should be avoided. (b) If one is\nattacked and it seems that the honor of God and the good of souls will\nbe served by a debate, then capable and prudent speakers are permitted\nby the Church to defend the faith, provided permission is secured from\nthe Holy See, or, in case of urgency, from the local Ordinary (Canon\n1325, Sec.3). The prescriptions of this Canon were reaffirmed recently\nby the Holy Office and applied especially to \u201cecumenical\u201d conventions\nconvoked to promote church unity. Catholics, both lay and clerical, may\nin no way be present at such meetings without the previous consent of\nthe Holy See (Holy Office, Monitum, June 5, 1948). See Appendix II.\n\n1000. The divine precept of profession of faith so far considered\nobliges on account of the virtue of faith itself, that is, on account\nof the external honor or service due to the Word of God. There is\nalso a divine precept of profession of faith which obliges on account\nof other virtues that may require such a profession of faith to be\nmade (e.g., on account of charity or justice). The omission of the\nprofession of faith in these cases, however, is not a sin against\nfaith, but against the other virtues, and should be confessed as such.\n\n(a) Justice requires a profession of faith when, by reason of his\noffice, a person has the duty of teaching others in the faith, for to\nteach the faith is to manifest one\u2019s own belief in it. Hence, bishops\nand other pastors are obliged to preach: \u201cWoe is unto me, if I preach\nnot the Gospel\u201d (I Cor., ix. 16); and their teaching is a manifestation\nof faith: \u201cHaving the same spirit of faith, as it is written: I\nbelieved, for which cause I have spoken; we also believe, and therefore\nwe speak also\u201d (II Cor., iv., 13).\n\n(b) Charity requires a profession of faith when a person has not the\noffice of teacher, but has a suitable opportunity to impart instruction\nto one who is in great ignorance about religion. For, as charity\nrequires one to perform corporal works of mercy for the suffering and\ndestitute, so it requires one to perform spiritual works of mercy\nfor the spiritually indigent, such as to instruct the ignorant, to\ncounsel the doubtful. Thus, a lay person who can prudently do so (the\ncircumstances of time, place, person, etc., being duly considered),\nought in charity to instruct in faith and morals the neglected children\naround him.\n\n1001. One is not bound to give instruction about matters of\nfaith or morals when this would lead to more harm than good; but\nmisrepresentation must be avoided.\n\n(a) The purpose of instruction is to fulfill the will of God and\nto benefit others; therefore, if these ends are not obtained but\nrather defeated by an instruction, it should be omitted. The truth\nis always good in itself, but its communication may not be expedient\non account of the recipient, who, being immature, may be harmed by\nthe wrong impression he will receive, or who, being badly disposed,\nmay use knowledge as a means to wrongdoing. Strong meat should not be\ngiven to infants (Heb., vi. 11-14); pearls should not be cast before\nswine (Matt., vii. 6). Examples: The mysteries of the faith (e.g.,\ntransubstantiation), should be explained with caution to those who are\nnot well instructed, lest they be overwhelmed with the brightness and\nmisunderstand. Difficult matters (such as predestination) or dangerous\nsubjects (such as sex duties) should not be discussed indiscriminately\nwith all kinds of persons. It is not right to instruct those who are in\nignorance of their duty, if this is not absolutely necessary and one\nforesees that instruction will not prevent them from continuing in evil\nways but will only add to their guilt. It is wrong to put the Bible\ninto the hands of those who will use it for bad purposes.\n\n(b) Misrepresentation or suppression is a lie, and in matters of\ndoctrine a denial of faith; hence, it is never lawful. The rule to be\nfollowed, therefore, in teaching the faith is that one communicate the\nsame doctrine to all, but according to the capacity of his hearers--to\nsome in outline and to others more fully. This was the method of\nChrist, who \u201cwith many parables spoke to them the word, according as\nthey were able to hear\u201d (Mark, iv. 33).\n\n1002. The Church has the duty not only of keeping the faith untarnished\namong Catholics, but also of spreading it among non-Catholics,\nProtestants, Jews and infidels, as far as circumstances will allow.\nFor God \u201cWill have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge\nof the truth\u201d (I Tim., ii. 4). Those, therefore, who assist missionary\nwork for unbelievers at home or abroad, do a work thrice blest, for\n(a) it is a thanksgiving offering to God, testifying our appreciation\nof the gift of faith which we have received from Him, (b) it is a work\nof charity to ourselves, for by helping others to receive the faith\nwe strengthen our own faith, and (c) it is an act of supreme mercy to\nthose who are sitting in darkness and the shadow of death.\n\n1003, In addition to the divine precepts, there are also ecclesiastical\nlaws prescribing profession of faith.\n\n(a) Ecclesiastical precepts of profession of faith for various\nofficials are contained in Canon 1406 and in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_\nof Pius X (September 1, 1910), and Canon 2403 decrees that those who\ncontumaciously refuse to make the profession of faith of Canon 1406 may\nbe deprived of their office. Converts to the faith who are received\nwithout absolute Baptism make an abjuration (Holy Office, July 20,\n1859), and persons who have incurred excommunication on account of\napostasy, heresy or schism are absolved in the external forum after\njuridical abjuration (Canon 2314).\n\n(b) The purpose of these ecclesiastical laws is to prevent the\nacceptance of spiritual or temporal jurisdiction or authority in the\nChurch, or the commission of teaching or the benefits of membership by\nthose who are unbelievers. Hence, the purpose is grave, and the laws\nthemselves are held to bind under grave sin.\n\n(c) The persons bound by these ecclesiastical laws are both\necclesiastics and laymen, namely, those who are about to be received\ninto or reconciled with the Church, and those who are about to be\nadmitted to some dignity, order, office or function (such as candidates\nfor the ranks of Cardinal, bishop, canon, parish priest, religious\nsuperior, professor, preacher, confessor, doctor, etc).\n\n(d) The form of the profession of faith is the Tridentine or Pian given\nin the Bull of Pius IV, _Injunctum Nobis_, of November 13, 1564, with\nadditions referring to the Vatican Council. The oath against Modernism\nprescribed in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_ of Pius X, of September 1,\n1910, is also obligatory.\n\n(e) The times when these professions of faith must be made are at\nadmission into the Church and at the reception or renewal of an office.\n\n1004. The affirmative precepts of profession of faith, divine and\necclesiastical, oblige only at the proper time and place, and therefore\non other occasions one is not obliged to make profession of faith. (a)\nHence, one may avoid a profession of faith by evading interrogation in\ntime of persecution--for example, through the payment of money to be\nexempted from examination, or through flight. As these acts indicate\nthat the person is unwilling to deny his faith, but has reasons for\nwishing to preserve his life or to avoid the danger of apostasy, they\nare not of themselves unlawful, and may be a duty. (b) One may omit a\nprofession of faith by concealing one\u2019s religion, when prudence calls\nfor concealment rather than publication.\n\n1005. Flight in time of persecution is lawful or unlawful according\nto circumstances, since in itself it is something indifferent, being\nsimply the act of moving from one place to another.\n\n(a) Flight is unlawful, if one\u2019s circumstances are such that one will\ndo an injury to justice or charity by departure. Hence, a pastor would\nsin against justice if he fled in time of persecution, leaving his\nflock who stood in need of his presence: \u201cThe good shepherd giveth his\nlife for his sheep. But the hireling and he that is not the shepherd,\nseeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth\u201d (John, x. 11,\n12). Hence also, one who has no care of souls but whose presence is\nnecessary to a persecuted community should prefer out of charity their\nspiritual good to his own bodily safety: \u201cWe ought to lay down our\nlives for the brethren\u201d (I John, iii. 16).\n\n(b) Flight is necessary, if one\u2019s circumstances are such that one will\ndo an injury to justice or charity by remaining. Hence, if a pastor\u2019s\nlife is necessary for his flock, while his absence can be supplied by\nothers who will take his place, justice to his subjects requires that\nhe save his life for their sake. Thus, for the good of souls St. Peter\nescaped from prison (Acts, xii. 17 sqq.); St. Paul fled from Damascus\n(Acts, ix. 24, 25); our Lord Himself hid when the Jews took up stones\nto cast at Him (John, viii. 59). Similarly, if a person is very fearful\nlest his courage may fail him if he is brought before the persecutors,\ncharity to self requires that he take flight so as to escape the danger\nof apostasy.\n\n(c) Flight is permissible, if there is no duty to remain and no duty to\ndepart: \u201cWhen they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another\u201d\n(Matt., x. 23). Hence, if one\u2019s presence is useful but not necessary\nin time of persecution, it is lawful for one to flee. Some authorities\nhold that the desertion of Jesus by the disciples during the Passion\nwas not sinful flight.\n\n1006. To refuse to flee when flight is permissible, is usually not\nadvisable, for this is dangerous for most persons. It would be\nadvisable, however, if a person had strong and prudent confidence of\nhis victory, had the right intention, and used the means to prepare\nhimself for the struggle.\n\n1007. Concealment of one\u2019s faith is lawful, if the requisite conditions\nare present.\n\n(a) Thus, it is not lawful to conceal one\u2019s faith at times when a\nprofession of it is called for by divine or ecclesiastical law (see\n991, 1003); at other times it is lawful. Example: Titus is travelling\nin a country where there are no Catholic churches, and where no one\never asks him about his religion. He never tells anyone what he is.\n\n(b) It is not lawful to conceal one\u2019s faith from a dishonest motive.\nExample: If Titus conceals his religion in order not to be unjustly\ndiscriminated against, his motive is good; but if he wishes to be taken\nfor a non-Catholic, his motive is evil.\n\n(c) It is not lawful to conceal one\u2019s faith in a sinful way. Example:\nIf the means of concealment employed by Titus imply deception or denial\nof the faith (such as lying about his origin and active participation\nin non-Catholic worship), he is guilty of sinful concealment. But, if\nthe means employed are permissible (such as silence about himself,\nomission of grace before and after meals, eating meat on Fridays in\nvirtue of dispensation, etc.), his method of concealment is not sinful.\n\n1008. Generally speaking, concealment of one\u2019s religion is not\nadvisable. (a) The reasons for concealment are often imaginary, rather\nthan real. We see that Catholics who are not ashamed of their religion,\nor afraid to have it known that they practise it, are respected for\ntheir sincerity and conscientiousness even in bigoted regions, while on\nthe contrary those who are apologetic or who do not live up to their\nreligion are looked down on as cowards or hypocrites. (b) The means\nemployed for concealment will cause endless doubts and scruples, for it\nis often difficult to decide what means are lawful and what unlawful.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 4: THE VIRTUE OF HOPE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 17-22.)\n\n1009. Definition.--The word \u201chope\u201d is variously used. (a) In a wide and\nimproper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil,\nor desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for\nmisfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has\nsucceeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that\nsome unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b)\nIn its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some\ndesired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or\nto recover from illness.\n\n1010. Hope, strictly understood, is of various kinds. (a) It is an\nemotion or an affection, according as it proceeds from the sensitive or\nthe rational appetite. The emotion of hope is an inclination of the\nirascible appetite to possess some object known through the senses and\napprehended as good and attainable, and is found both in man and in the\nbrutes. The affection of hope is a spiritual inclination, tending to\ngood as known through the reason.\n\n(b) Hope is either natural or supernatural, according as it tends\neither to goods that are temporal and within the power of man to\nacquire, or to goods that are eternal and above the unaided powers of\ncreatures. It is in this latter sense that hope is now taken.\n\n1011. Supernatural hope is understood, sometimes in a wide sense,\nsometimes in a strict sense. (a) In a wide sense, it is used\nobjectively to designate the object, material or formal, of hope. Thus,\nSt. Paul is speaking of the material object of hope (i.e., of the\nthings hoped for), when he says: \u201cHope that is seen is not hope\u201d (Rom.,\nviii. 24), \u201cLooking for the blessed hope\u201d (Tit., ii. 13); while the\nPsalmist is speaking of the formal object of hope (i.e., the motive of\nhope), when he says: \u201cThou hast been my hope, a tower of strength\nagainst the face of the enemy\u201d (Ps. lx. 4). (b) In a strict sense, hope\nis used subjectively to designate the act or habit of hope. The act of\nhope is spoken of in the following texts: \u201cWe are saved by hope\u201d (Rom.,\nviii. 24); \u201cRejoicing in hope\u201d (Rom., vii. 12). The habit of hope is\nindicated in these verses from Job and St. Paul: \u201cThis my hope is laid\nup in my bosom\u201d (Job, xix. 27); \u201cThere remain faith, hope, charity,\nthese three\u201d (I Cor., xiii. 13). Hope is now taken in the strict sense,\nas a virtue or infused habit, from which proceed supernatural acts.\n\n1012. The virtue of hope is defined: \u201cAn infused habit, by which we\nconfidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of\neverlasting life.\u201d\n\n(a) It is \u201can infused habit.\u201d These words express the genus to which\nhope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection\nof hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely\nnatural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with\nreference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man,\nfallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded\nvirtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere\nof action.\n\n(b) Hope is a habit \u201cby which we expect, etc.\u201d These words express the\nspecific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul\nin which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.\n\n(c) \u201cThrough the help of God.\u201d These words express the formal object or\nmotive of hope.\n\n(d) \u201cThe rewards of eternal life.\u201d These words express the material\nobject of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.\n\n1013. There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and\nnatural hope as regards their objects and acts.\n\n(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs\nfrom fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of\nhope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).\n\n(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is\ntherefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks\nforward to goods not as yet attained: \u201cWe hope for that which we see\nnot, we wait for it with patience\u201d (Rom, viii. 25).\n\n(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is\nnot certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the\nvirtue of hope demands strength of soul: \u201cDo ye manfully and let your\nheart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord\u201d (Ps. xxx. 25).\n\n(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is\nnot impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object\nof desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The\nvirtue of hope also is confident: \u201cHold fast the glory and confidence\nof hope unto the end\u201d (Heb. iii. 6).\n\n1014. Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a\nsupernatural virtue.\n\n(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it\nthe will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing\nits lofty aspirations: \u201cI have inclined my heart to do Thy\njustifications for ever, for the reward\u201d (Ps. cxviii. 112); \u201cTrust in\nthe Lord, and do good\u201d (Ps, xxxvi. 3).\n\n(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is\nsanctified and saved: \u201cI (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope\u201d (Ecclus.,\nxxiv. 24); God \u201chath regenerated us into a lively hope\u201d (I Pet., i. 3);\n\u201cWe are saved by hope\u201d (Rom., viii. 24); \u201cEveryone that hath this hope\nin Him sanctifieth himself\u201d (I John, iii. 3).\n\n1015. Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary\nor egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and\nself-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things\nof time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just\nman is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all,\nand his neighbor as himself: \u201cI have inclined my heart to do Thy\njustifications forever, for the reward\u201d (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope\nof the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire\ncharity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: \u201cHe that hopeth in the\nLord shall be healed\u201d (Prov., xxviii. 25).\n\n1016. Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is\ndivided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to\nwhich is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby\nperfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we\nhope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more\nperfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not\nso commanded--that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God\nperforms a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some\nother motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that\nto which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which\ntherefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.\n\n1017. The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not\nadmissible:\n\n(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good,\nand which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope\n(which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the\nperfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail\ntowards justification or for merit, it would follow that without\ndisinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could\nan act be meritorious.\n\n(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one\ndisinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone)\nand the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the\nadvantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong\nto charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).\n\n1018. The Object of Hope.--By the object of hope we mean three things:\n(a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end which is\nintended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end for\nwhom); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).\n\n1019. The material object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary\nobject, which is desired for its own sake, and the secondary, which is\ndesired on account of the primary object.\n\n(a) The primary object of hope is God Himself, the infinite good,\nconsidered as our Last End and Beatitude (Ps. lxxii. 25). Connoted in\nthis object is the beatific vision, the finite act by means of which\nthe creature attains to the possession of God. The primary object of\nour hope is the imperishable crown (I Cor., ix. 25), glory (Col., i.\n27), the glory of the children of God (Rom., v. 2), salvation (I\nThess., v. 8), eternal life (Tit., i. 2), entrance into the holy of\nholies (Heli, x. 19, 23), the inheritance incorruptible and undefiled\nthat cannot fade, reserved in heaven (I Pet., i. 4), the vision of God\n(I John, iii. 3). It is this object especially that distinguishes\nsupernatural from natural hope (I Cor., xv. 19). \u201cFrom God,\u201d says St.\nThomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 2), \u201cwe should expect nothing less than God\nHimself.\u201d\n\n(b) The secondary object of hope embraces all those created things that\nassist one to attain one\u2019s Last End. We may hope for all those things\nfor which we may pray, as St. Augustine remarks.\n\n1020. The primary object of hope includes: (a) essential beatitude,\nthat is, the beatific vision; (b) accessory beatitude, that is, all\nresultant joys, such as glory of soul and body, the companionship of\nthe Saints, security from harm, and the like.\n\n1021. The secondary object of hope includes: (a) spiritual goods, such\nas graces; (b) temporal goods, such as health and the means that will\nenable us, at least indirectly, to work for the life to come and\nacquire merit; (c) deliverance from evils that would hinder spiritual\ngoods; (d) all that promotes one\u2019s salvation, such as labors for God.\n\n1022. The person for whom eternal life is hoped may be either oneself\nor one\u2019s neighbor. (a) Absolutely speaking (i.e., apart from the\nsupposition of friendship towards a neighbor), a person can hope only\nfor himself; for the salvation of others is not attained by him, but by\nthem; and thus, if there is no bond of affection, it cannot arouse in\nhim that feeling of courageous confidence which belongs to hope. (b)\nAccidentally (i.e., on the supposition of friendship or charity towards\nothers), one can hope for them; for love makes a person regard the good\nof others as his own. Thus, St. Paul is hopeful for the perseverance of\nthe Philippians (Phil., i. 6), and he labors for the Corinthians that\nhis hope for them may be steadfast (II Cor., i. 7).\n\n1023. The formal object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object,\nwhich is the principal cause that effects our salvation, and the\nsecondary object, which is a secondary or instrumental cause of\nsalvation. (a) The primary motive of hope is God Himself, the Author of\nsalvation, and hence it is said: \u201cCursed be the man that trusteth in\nman\u201d (Jer, xvii. 5). (b) The secondary motive of hope are creatures by\nwhom one is assisted in obtaining the means for salvation (such as the\nSaints, who aid us by their intercessions). Thus, in the _Salve\nRegina_, our Lady is addressed as \u201cour hope.\u201d The merits of Christ and\nour own merits, since they are instruments used by God, are motives of\nhope.\n\n1024. On what divine attribute is the virtue of hope based?\n\n(a) Essentially, hope is based on God\u2019s character of omnipotent helper;\nfor the specific and differentiating note of this virtue is its\ncourageous confidence, and this, in view of the surpassing height one\nexpects to attain and the feebleness of all created efforts, must rely\non the assistance of One who is equal to the task: \u201cThe Lord is my rock\nand my strength. God is my strong One, in Him will I trust\u201d (II Kings,\nxxii. 2, 3); \u201cYou have hoped in the Lord Mighty forever\u201d (Is., xxvi.\n4); \u201cThe name of the Lord is a strong tower; the just runneth to it and\nshall be exalted\u201d (Prov. xviii. 10).\n\n(b) Secondary (i.e., as regards acts that it presupposes, or that are\nconnected with it), hope is concerned with other divine attributes.\nThus, a person does not hope unless he first believes that God has\npromised beatitude and that He is true to His promises, unless he\nregards beatitude as something desirable; and so he who hopes has\nplaced his dependence on the loyalty of God to His given word, and on\nthe desirability of God as the prize of life\u2019s efforts: \u201cLet us hold\nfast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful\nthat hath promised\u201d (Heb., x. 23); \u201cUnto the hope of life everlasting,\nwhich God, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world\u201d\n(Tit., i. 2); \u201cThe Lord is my portion, therefore will I wait for Him\u201d\n(Lam., iii. 24); \u201cFear not, I am thy reward, exceeding great\u201d (Gen.,\nxv. 1). Just as faith presupposes a beginning of belief and a pious\ninclination towards it, so does hope presuppose faith and the love of\nGod, as He is our beatitude.\n\n1025. Omnipotent divine help as the foundation of hope can be\nunderstood in two senses:\n\n(a) It may be taken for some created help, that is, for some gift of\nGod possessed by us (such as habitual or actual grace, merits, virtues,\netc). It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of\nhope; for even a sinner can and should hope, and the just man\u2019s merits,\nwhile they are dispositions for beatitude, are not a principal cause\nthat will conduct him to it.\n\n(b) This divine help may be taken for uncreated help, that is, for the\nact by which God confers His gifts upon us. In this sense only is\ndivine aid the basis of hope. For if a person is asked why he is\nconfident of salvation, he will not answer, \u201cBecause I am in the state\nof grace and do good works,\u201d but \u201cBecause I know that God will help me.\u201d\n\n1026. The divine perfections included in the title of helper now given\nto God are:\n\n(a) essentially, the almighty power of God; for this is the immediate\nand sufficient reason for the confident expectation that one will at\nlast possess the same object of felicity as God Himself. The higher and\nmore difficult the goal one sets before oneself, the greater must be\nthe resources on which one counts for success;\n\n(b) secondarily, these perfections include the infinite kindness of\nGod; for it is the goodness of God that prompts Him to employ His\nomnipotence in assisting creatures to attain their Last End. Man has\nhope, therefore, of attaining supreme felicity, because he relies on\nsupreme power to aid him, while this supreme power aids him, because it\nis directed by infinite goodness and mercy. Thus, the Psalmist says: \u201cI\nhave trusted in Thy mercy\u201d (Ps. xii. 6). Just as faith rests\nproximately on the reliability of God and remotely on His perfection of\nbeing, so hope rests proximately on God\u2019s almighty power and radically\non His goodness and perfection.\n\n1027. The Excellence of Hope.--Hope is a theological virtue, and is\ntherefore superior to the moral virtues.\n\n(a) It is a theological virtue, inasmuch as it tends immediately to God\nHimself. As was said above (see 1019, 1023), we hope for God and we\nhope in God: \u201cIn God is my salvation and my glory. He is the God of my\nhelp, and my hope is in God\u201d (Ps. lxi. 8); \u201cWhat is my hope? Is it not\nthe Lord?\u201d (Ps. xxxviii. 8); \u201cIn Thee, O Lord, have I hoped\u201d (Ps. xxx.\n1). Hence, the Apostle numbers hope along with the other theological\nvirtues (I Cor., xiii. 13). \u201cBy faith the house of God receives its\nfoundations, by hope it is reared, by charity it is completed\u201d (St.\nAugustine, Serm. xxvii., 1).\n\n(b) The two moral virtues that most resemble hope are longsuffering and\nmagnanimity, for the former is the expectation of good that is distant,\nwhile the latter is the readiness to encounter difficulties in the\nquest of high ideals. But these two virtues belong to courage, rather\nthan to hope; for the goods they seek are finite, and the difficulty\nthey encounter is external struggle, whereas the good which hope seeks\nis infinite, and the difficulty lies in the very greatness of that good.\n\n1028. There are various points of view from which virtues may be\ncompared one with another.\n\n(a) One virtue is prior to another in duration, when it precedes the\nlatter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their\nconversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are\nreceived in Baptism.\n\n(b) One virtue is prior to another by nature, or in the order of\ngeneration, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for\nthat other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual\nvirtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give\nothers their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.\n\n(c) One virtue is prior to another virtue in excellence as a habit,\nwhen it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when\nit is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of\ncomparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend,\nand from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus,\nthe habit of philosophizing is in itself more noble than the habit of\naccumulating wealth, for truth is better than money.\n\n(d) One virtue is prior to another in excellence according to the\ngeneral concept of virtue, when it does more to set the will right. For\nthe standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence\nexercised on one\u2019s acts (as the word \u201cvirtue\u201d or \u201cpower\u201d intimates),\nand the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in\nmotion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give\nhis time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of\nscientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.\n\n1029. Comparison of Hope with Faith.--(a) These virtues are not the\nsame, for, while faith makes us cling to God as the giver of truth and\nassent to what is obscure to us, hope makes up turn to Him as the\nauthor of beatitude and strive for that which is difficult for us.\n\n(b) Faith and hope are normally equal in duration, since as a rule they\nare infused at the same time (as in Baptism). Accidentally, however,\nfaith may precede hope, as when one who preserves his faith loses hope\non account of despair, and later recovers it.\n\n(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, faith being prior to\nhope, since both glory and grace--the objects of hope--must be known\nthrough faith (Heb., xi. 6).\n\n(d) They are unequal in their excellence as habits, faith being\nsuperior to hope, as the intellectual habits are superior to the moral;\nfor faith is regulative and directive of hope, and has an object more\nabstract and universal.\n\n(e) They are unequal in their excellence according to the general\nconcept of virtue, hope being superior to faith, as the moral virtues\nare superior to the intellectual (see 156). For hope includes a\nrightness of the will towards God that is not included in the concept\nof faith, which is chiefly intellectual, and it is the will that moves\nthe other powers to action.\n\n1030. Comparison of Hope with Charity.--(a) These virtues are not the\nsame, for, while faith and hope adhere to God as the principle from\nwhich one derives truth or goodness, charity adheres to God for His own\nsake. Hope tends towards God as our good, from whom beatitude and the\nmeans thereto are to be expected; but charity unites us to God so that\nwe live for God rather than for self.\n\n(b) Hope and charity are normally equal as to duration, but\naccidentally hope may precede charity, as when one commits a mortal\nsin, but retains his hope of salvation, and later recovers charity.\nThere is question now only of the habits, because the acts of the\nsinner leading up to charity--faith, fear, hope, contrition, etc.--are\nfor the most part successive, although in a sudden conversion hope may\nbe virtually included in charity.\n\n(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, hope being prior to\ncharity, for, just as fear naturally leads to interested love such as\nis contained in hope, so does this interested love prepare one for a\nhigher love that is disinterested: \u201cThe end of the commandment is\ncharity from a pure heart\u201d (I Tim., i. 5). We speak here of hope\nunanimated by charity; for animated or living hope trusts in God as a\nfriend, and hence presupposes charity.\n\n(d) They are unequal in excellence, for hope proceeds from imperfect\nlove, which desires God for the sake of the one who loves, while\ncharity is perfect love and desires God for His sake.\n\n1031. Hope, as said above (see 1015-1017), is good and virtuous even\nwhen separated from charity, or when exercised without the actual\nmotive of charity. But imperfect or less perfect hope must not be\nconfused with the following acts, which have only the appearance of\nhope: (a) acts that remove the material object of hope, which are such\nas look for all beatitude in something different from God (e.g., in\nsecondary joys of heaven); (b) acts that do injury to the objects of\nhope, such as those that subordinate them to lesser goods (e.g., hope\nwhich puts self above God or delight above virtue).\n\n1082. Three types of the latter kind of pseudo-hope may be\ndistinguished:\n\n(a) Egotistical hope is that which places the end for which beatitude\nis hoped (i.e., self, as was said in 1022) above the end which is\nbeatitude (i.e., God the Last End, as was said in 1019 sqq.), or which\nplaces subjective beatitude (i.e., the act of intuitive vision by which\nbeatitude is attained) above objective beatitude (i.e., God as the\nobject in which beatitude consists). Just as the intellect is in error\nwhen it mistakes the conclusion for the premise, so is the will in\ndisorder when it takes a means for the end. Hence, while there is\nnothing inordinate in a man\u2019s hoping for food on account of eating and\nin his eating on account of health (since in reality health is the\npurpose of eating, and eating the purpose of food), it is extremely\ninordinate to hope for God on account of the beatific vision or on\naccount of self, since God is the End of all, and the beatific vision\nis only the condition for attaining to this Last End, and self merely\nthe subject to whom God and the beatific vision are to be given for its\nperfection through them.\n\n(b) Epicurean hope is that which places pleasure above the other\nelements that pertain to subjective beatitude. The subjective happiness\nof man consists essentially in the act that is highest and distinctly\nhuman--namely, in the act of the intellect seeing God intuitively;\nhence, pleasure--even the chief spiritual pleasures-should be esteemed\nas something secondary and consequent.\n\n(c) Utilitarian hope is that which places reward above virtue, as if\nthe latter were merely a means, as when one says: \u201cIf there were no\nheaven, I would practise no virtue.\u201d There are three kinds of good: (i)\nuseful good, or that which is desirable only because it serves as a\nmeans to something else (e.g., bitter medicine, which is wished, not\nfor its own sake, but for the sake of health); (ii) moral good, or that\nwhich is desired for its own sake, as being agreeable to the rational\nnature of man (such as virtue); (iii) delightful good, that is, the\nrepose or satisfaction of the will in possession of that which is\ndesirable for its own sake. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard\nvirtue as merely a useful good, something that is disagreeable in\nitself and cannot be practised on account of its inherent goodness. It\nis also a mistake to consider heaven as something above and apart from\nvirtue; for eternal life is the perfect flowering and fruitage of the\nmoral life that has been planted and developed here on earth. The\nthings of this world are only means to virtue, and virtue reaches its\nclimax in the beatific vision. The delights of heaven are results of\nthat vision, not its end.\n\n1033. Hope, therefore, must seek God as the chief good; it must not\nprefer the lesser to the greater, and it must not hold virtue as good\nonly in view of the reward. But, on the other hand, hope seeks God as\nits own good, and it need not be joined to disinterested love, in order\nto be a true virtue.\n\n(a) Hence, it is not necessary that one hope with the proviso that, in\nthe impossible hypothesis that God were unwilling to reward virtue, the\nreward would not be expected; for it is not necessary to consider\nchimerical cases.\n\n(b) It is not necessary that hope be elicited by the act of charity\n(i.e., that one always direct one\u2019s desire of salvation to the end that\nGod may be glorified), for thus the motive of hope would cease to be\nactive, and the lesser virtue would be absorbed in charity.\n\n(c) It is not necessary that hope be commanded by the act of charity\n(i.e., that one hope for salvation as one\u2019s own good, only when a\nprevious act of charity has bidden that this be done as a mark of love\ntowards God), for to desire that which God wishes one to desire is in\nitself good and laudable, and stands in need of no other act to justify\nit.\n\n1034. Discouragement and aridity occur even in the lives of great\nSaints, and at such times, when pure love of God seems almost\nimpossible, hope comes to the rescue by offering encouragement and\nspurring on to activity. Hence, the importance of this virtue in the\nspiritual life; for (a) hope is an anchor of the soul in times of\ntempest, since it offers reasons for patience and good cheer (Heb, vi.\n19; Ecclus., iii. 9; Rom., xii. 12, viii 25; I Thess., v. 8); (b) hope\ngives wings to the soul in times of weariness, since the motives it\npresents are inducements to courage and good works (Is., xl. 31, xxx.\n15; Ps. cxviii. 32; Heb., X. xi).\n\n1035. The following means are recommended for growth in hope: (a) to\nask this from God: \u201cGrant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and\ncharity\u201d (Missal, 13th Sunday after Pentecost); (b) to meditate on the\nrewards of heaven and the motives of hope, and to make corresponding\nacts (II Cor., iv. 18; Ecclus., ii. 11-13); (c) to have recourse to God\nin all our needs, casting all our care on Him (I Pet., v. 7); (d) to\nwork courageously for salvation and to preserve purity of conscience\n(Ps. xxvi. 14; I John, iii. 21, 22).\n\n1036. The Subject of Hope.--By the subject of hope we mean the power of\nthe soul to which this virtue belongs and also the persons who are\ncapable of hope. (a) The faculty of the soul in which hope resides is\nthe will, for this virtue seeks the good, not the true. (b) The persons\ncapable of hope are all those who have not yet received their final\nreward or punishment.\n\n1037. The virtue of hope does not remain in the blessed. (a) They\ncannot hope for the principal object of bliss, since they already enjoy\nit: \u201cHope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he\nhope for?\u201d (Rom., viii. 24). (b) The blessed can desire secondary\nobjects, such as the continuance of their state, the glorification of\ntheir bodies, the salvation of those who are still on earth, etc.; but\nthis desire belongs to the virtue of charity, since with the blessed\nthere is no longer the struggle and expectation of the future that is\ncontained in the desire of hope. Moreover, the desire of objects other\nthan God does not constitute the theological virtue of hope, which\ntends directly to God.\n\n1038. As to the departed who are not in heaven, we must distinguish\nbetween those in hell and those in purgatory.\n\n(a) Those who are in hell, whether demons or men, cannot hope; for it\nis part of their punishment that they know their loss is eternal (Matt.,\nxxv. 41; Prov., xi. 7). Dante expresses this truth when he says that on\nthe gates of hell it is written: \u201cHope abandon ye that enter here.\u201d\nOnly in an improper sense can the lost be said to hope, inasmuch as\nthey desire evils, or things other than heaven. Unbaptized infants\neither do not know their loss, or else are not tormented by the thought\nthat heaven is for them unattainable, realizing that its privation has\nresulted from no personal fault of their own.\n\n(b) Those who are in purgatory have hope; for, although they are\ncertain of their salvation, it still remains true that they must ascend\nthrough difficulties to their reward. Hence, in the Mass the Church\nprays for the departed \u201cwho sleep the sleep of peace\u201d--that is, who are\nsecure about their salvation. The Fathers in limbo also had hope before\ntheir introduction into heaven: \u201cAll these died according to faith,\nnot having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and\nsaluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on\nthe earth.... They desire a better, that is to say a heavenly country\u201d\n( Heb., xi. 13, 16).\n\n1039. As to those who have not yet passed from this mortal life, some\nhave hope, others have it not.\n\n(a) Those who have no hope are unbelievers and those believers who have\nrejected hope. Unbelievers have no theological hope, since faith is\n\u201cthe substance (i.e., basis) of things to be hoped for\u201d (Heb., xi. 1).\nHence, even though one accepts the Article of the Creed, \u201cI look for\nthe resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come,\u201d one\u2019s\nhope is not real, if one culpably rejects some other Article; for then\none expects the end without the necessary means (Heb. xi. 6). Believers\nwho despair of salvation, or who do not look to God for it, have not\nthe virtue of hope; for, just as faith is lost if its object or motive\nis not accepted, so also hope perishes if its object is not expected or\nits motive is not relied on.\n\n(b) Those who have hope are all believers not guilty of a sin contrary\nto hope. Sinners cannot expect to be saved if they continue in sin, but\nthey can expect through the grace of God to be freed from sin and to\nmerit eternal life; indeed, they are bound to believe that God wishes\ntheir salvation and to hope for it.\n\n1040. The certainty of hope does not exclude the uncertainty of fear;\non the contrary, man must both hope and fear, as regards his salvation.\n\n(a) If a person looks to the motives of hope (i.e., God\u2019s power and\nmercy), he has the assurance of faith that God can and will help him to\nattain salvation; and thus there arises in him a firm and unshaken\nhope: \u201cI know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to\nkeep that which I have committed unto Him, against that day\u201d (II Tim.,\ni. 12; cfr. Heb., vi. 18; Ps. xxiv. 2; Ps. xxx. 2.; Rom., xiv. 4)\n\n(b) But, if a person looks to his own frailty and remembers that others\nhave hoped and yet have been lost, he is not certain that he will\ncooperate with God and be saved, and hence he must fear (Eccles., ix. 1\nsqq.; I Cor., iv. 4, ix. 27). The Council of Trent declares that no one\ncan promise himself with absolute certainty that he will persevere\n(Sess. VI, Cap. 13). Therefore, it is written: \u201cHe that thinketh\nhimself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall\u201d (I Cor., x. 12);\n\u201cWith fear and trembling, work out your salvation\u201d (Phil., ii. 12).\n\n1041. The Gift of Fear of the Lord.--The Gift of the Holy Ghost that\nperfects the virtue of hope is Fear of the Lord (see 159 sqq.); for (a)\nhope is the root from which the Gift of Fear is derived, since hope\njoins the affections to God, and fear acts upon the soul that is thus\ntending towards its beatitude--we fear to lose what we hope for; (b)\nfear assists hope, since it makes us dread, not the loss of beatitude\nor of divine help, but the lack of cooperation on our own part with the\nassistance given by God.\n\n1042. Not every kind of fear pertains to the Gift called Fear of\nthe Lord. In the first place, we must distinguish between physical\nand moral fear. (a) Fear, physically considered, is the emotion\ntreated above (see 41 sqq., 120), which manifests itself in aversion,\nbashfulness, shame, dismay, alarm, horror, etc. This kind of fear, like\nthe other passions (see 121), is morally indifferent in itself. (b)\nFear, morally considered, is a dread of imminent evil as leading one to\nGod or away from Him. In this sense fear is now discussed.\n\n1043. The object of fear is always some evil, for the good does not\nrepel, but attracts. The motive of fear, however, is something good;\nfor one dreads evil on account of some good one wishes to obtain or\nretain. By reason of the motive, then, fear may be divided into two\nmoral species, namely, fear of the world and fear of God.\n\n(a) Fear of the world is that which dreads creatures more than God,\nbecause it sets more store by the things of time than by those of\neternity. Thus, St. Peter\u2019s denial of Christ was prompted by fear of\nthe world. When the object of this fear is loss of the esteem of men,\nit is called human respect.\n\n(b) Fear of God is that which dreads the Creator more than creatures,\nbecause it prizes Him above all. Thus, St. Peter\u2019s death for Christ\nproceeded from his fear of God.\n\n1044. Fear of the world is always sinful, because it makes one offend,\nor be willing to offend, God for the sake of escaping some temporal\nevil. It is forbidden by our Lord: \u201cFear ye not them that kill the body\nand are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that can destroy\nboth body and soul in hell\u201d (Matt, x. 28). Elias (or Eliseus) is\npraised because of his freedom from fear of the world: \u201cIn his days he\nfeared not the prince\u201d (Ecclus., xlviii. 13). We should note, however,\nthe distinction between habitual fear, on the one hand, and actual or\nvirtual fear, on the other hand.\n\n(a) Habitual worldly fear is a state, not an act--that is, the\ncondition of those who are in mortal sin, and have therefore preferred\nself to God as the supreme end of life. It is a matter of faith that\nnot all the acts of sinners or unbelievers are bad, for they are able\nto seek certain particular or natural goods.\n\n(b) Actual fear of the world is a deliberate choice of sin out of fear\nof some temporal evil; virtual fear is a deliberate act proceeding from\nsuch a choice though without advertence to the choice or fear. In both\nthese kinds of fear there is sin, for actual fear commands evil,\nvirtual fear executes it. Examples: Sempronius internally resolves to\nbe guided by his fear of imprisonment rather than by the law of God\nagainst perjury (actual fear). He then proceeds to perjure himself,\nadverting to what he says, but not thinking about his previous fear\n(virtual fear).\n\n1045. The species of sin to which worldly fear belongs are as follows:\n\n(a) The theological species of this sin depends on the disposition of\nthe person. He sins mortally, if on account of fear he is ready to\noffend God seriously; he sins venially, if on account of fear he is\nprepared to commit only a venial sin. Examples: Titus, in order to\nescape imprisonment or exile, swears falsely. Balbus, having been\nabsent from his office without leave, tells a little lie to escape\nreproof for this misdemeanor. Titus\u2019 fear is a grave sin, that of\nBalbus a venial sin.\n\n(b) The moral species of worldly fear is, as a rule, the same as the\nspecies of the sin to which it leads, so that but one sin is committed\nand need be confessed. The reason is that generally the object of fear\nis something that deserves to be dreaded, and that the aversion from it\nis not wrong except in so far as it is carried to the extreme of using\nsin as a means of escape. Example: Caius is wrongly suspected of theft.\nTo free his reputation he swears falsely about a circumstance that\nappears incriminating. His fear of losing his good name is not a sin in\nitself, and hence he is guilty of the one sin of perjury.\n\n1046. There are exceptional cases when fear is a distinct sin from the\nsin to which it leads.\n\n(a) If the fear of losing some temporal good is so great that one is\nprepared to commit any sin to escape the loss, and if later by reason\nof this fear one swears falsely, two sins are committed--one against\ncharity, because a temporal good was preferred to God, and the other\nagainst religion, because God was called on to witness to falsehood.\n\n(b) If the fear is that one will not be able to commit one kind of sin,\nand this induces one to commit another kind of sin, evidently two sins\nare committed. Example: Balbus wishes to calumniate Caius, but is not\nable to do so himself. Fearing that Caius will escape his vengeance, he\nsteals money and offers it to Sempronius as an inducement to calumniate\nCaius. The two sins, calumny and theft, are committed.\n\n1047. Not every fear of man or of temporal evil falls under worldly and\nsinful fear. (a) To fear or reverence man in those things in which he\nrepresents the authority of God is a duty: \u201cRender to all men their\ndues ... fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor\u201d (Rom., xiii. 7). (b)\nTo fear temporal evils (such as loss of life, reputation, liberty,\nproperty) in a moderate and reasonable manner, is good. Hence, our Lord\nbids us pray for deliverance from evil.\n\n1048. Fear of God is of two specifically distinct kinds, according as\nthe object one dreads is offense of God or punishments from God. (a)\nServile fear, that of a servant with regard to his master, dreads sin\nbecause of the punishment it entails; (b) filial fear, that of a son\nwith regard to his father, dreads sin because of the offense to God\nthat is contained in it.\n\n1049. Servile fear may be considered either as to its substance or as\nto its accidents. (a) The substance or essence of servile fear is\nderived from its object (see 71), that is, from the evil of penalty\nwhich it entails; (b) the accidents of servile fear are its\ncircumstances (see 72), such as the state of the person who has the\nfear, the manner in which he fears, etc.\n\n1050. Servile fear in itself is good and supernatural.\n\n(a) That servile fear is good, is a dogma of faith defined in the\nCouncil of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 8; Sess. XXIV, Can. 5). Our Lord\nrecommends this fear when he says: \u201cI will show you whom ye shall fear.\nFear ye Him who after He hath killed, hath power to cast into hell.\nYea, I say to you, fear Him\u201d (Luke, xii. 5). the object of this fear is\npenalty, which is an evil, and consequently something that ought to be\ndreaded.\n\n(b) That servile fear is supernatural, follows from the fact that its\nacts are supernatural. It comes from the Holy Ghost that man may\nprepare himself for grace; it is \u201cthe beginning of wisdom\u201d (Ps. cx.\n10), because through it the wisdom of faith first becomes effective as\na rule of action, causing man to depart from sin on account of the\njustice of God which it makes known to him. Servile fear is thus far\nsuperior to that natural fear of pain and suffering which all have.\n\n1051. Though servile fear is good, useful and praiseworthy, it is not\nperfect. (a) It is inferior to filial fear; for, while servile fear\nlooks upon God as a powerful master who cannot be offended with\nimpunity, filial fear regards Him as a loving Father whom one does not\nwish to offend. Hence, the Old Law, given amid the thunder of Sinai and\nwith many threats against transgressions, is less perfect than the New\nLaw, which relies more on love than on fear (Rom., viii. 15; Heb., xii.\n18-25; Gal., iv. 22 sqq.). (b) Servile fear, although it is regarded by\nsome theologians as an infused habit, is not a Gift of the Holy Ghost,\nsince it may coexist with mortal sin. It seems that it is not even a\nvirtue, since it turns man away, not from moral, but from physical\nevil; but a number of authorities consider it as a secondary act of the\nvirtue of hope.\n\n1052. Servile fear, as to its circumstances, may be evil. (a) The\ncircumstance of the state of the person who has servile fear is good,\nwhen the person is a friend of God; it is evil, when that person is an\nenemy of God. (b) The circumstance of the manner in which servile fear\nis elic[i]ted is good, if punishment is not feared as the greatest evil;\nit is bad, if punishment is feared as the greatest evil, for then one\nmakes self the principal end of life, and would be disposed to sin\nwithout restraint, were there no punishment.\n\n1053. The effect of evil circumstances on servile fear itself is as\nfollows:\n\n(a) Servile fear is not rendered evil because of the evil state of the\nperson who fears. Just as a person who is habitually foolish may\nactually say or do something wise, so a person who is habitually wicked\nmay perform virtuous acts. Mortal sin is no more a defect of servile\nfear in a sinner than it is a defect of faith or hope in one who has\nfaith or hope without works; neither faith nor hope nor fear is to be\nblamed for the state of mortal sin, but the person who has those gifts\nof God is at fault. True, the sinner, by reason of his lack of love of\nGod, does not put fear of sin above fear of punishment. But from this\nit does not follow that he puts fear of punishment above fear of sin,\nfor he may fear punishment absolutely (i.e., without making any\ncomparison between the evil of sin and the evil of punishment). The\nfear which makes no comparisons is good, or else we must say that only\nfilial fear avails, which, as said above, is not true.\n\n(b) Servile fear is rendered evil as to the manner in which it is\nperformed, when one compares sin and punishment, dislikes only the\nlatter, and avoids sin only to escape punishment. This kind of fear is\nslavish, for it makes one do something good unwillingly, like a slave\nforced to labor against his wishes, whereas God is pleased only with\nservice that comes from a willing spirit (I Par., xxviii. 9).\n\n1054. Hence, we must distinguish the following cases of servile fear:\n\n(a) Fear of punishment is purely servile when it makes a person avoid\nsin, but does not make him put away his love of God.\n\n(b) Fear of punishment is not purely servile, when it causes a sinner\nnot only to cease from sin, but to give up his affection for sin; this\nfear is distinct from charity, but prepares for it: \u201cThe fear of the\nLord driveth out sin\u201d (Ecclus., i. 27).\n\n(c) Still less is the fear of punishment purely servile, when it leads\na just man, who already detests sin as an offense against God, to\ndetest it as involving punishment from God. This fear exists along with\ncharity, for the love of God and the right love of self are not\nexclusive. But, as charity increases, servile fear must decrease; the\nmore a person loves God, the less is he concerned about his own good,\nthe more confidently does he hope in God, and hence the less does he\nfear penalty.\n\n1055. There are two degrees of filial fear to be distinguished:\n\n(a) Initial fear is that of beginners in charity. On account of past\nsins, they fear punishments from God; on account of their present love\nof God, they fear they may be again separated from Him. The second fear\nis stronger with them, and it commands that the first fear be aroused\nto hold the will more firmly against whatever might separate from love.\nOf this fear it is said: \u201cThe fear of God is the beginning of His love\u201d\n(Ecclus., xxv. 16).\n\n(b) Perfected fear is that of those who are established in charity. The\nmore the love of God sways the heart, the more is every other love,\nthat of self included, subjugated to the love of God, and the less is\none troubled by the thoughts of evils that may befall self. Even in\nthis present life some souls are so strong in the love of God that all\nservile fear disappears: \u201cI am sure that neither death nor life ...\nshall be able to separate us from the love of God\u201d (Rom., viii. 38,\n39); \u201cPerfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain, and he\nthat feareth is not perfected in charity\u201d (I John, iv. 18).\n\n1056. The perfected fear of God has two acts:\n\n(a) In the present life, where it is possible that one may offend God\nand lose His friendship, one dreads the commission of offense and the\nloss of friendship. This fear should be always with us: \u201cKeep His fear\nand grow old therein\u201d (Ecclus., ii. 6). With the growth of charity\nthere is a corresponding growth in the fear of separation from God,\nbecause the more ardently God is loved, the more one realizes the\ngreatness of the loss sustained through sin.\n\n(b) In eternal life, where sin and separation from God are impossible,\nthe blessed do not fear these evils: \u201cHe that shall hear Me, shall rest\nwithout terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils\u201d\n(Prov., i. 33). But in the presence of the Divine Majesty the Angels\nand Saints are filled with awe and reverence: \u201cI saw them that had\novercome the beast, singing: Who shall not fear Thee, O Lord, and\nmagnify Thy name?\u201d (Apoc., xv. 3, 4); \u201cThe pillars of heaven tremble\nand dread at His beck\u201d (Job, xxvi. 11); \u201cThrough whom (Christ) the\nAngels praise Thy majesty, the Dominations worship it, the Powers are\nin awe\u201d (Preface of the Mass). This holy fear is unending, for the\ninfinite distance between God and His creatures, His\nincomprehensibility to them, will never cease: \u201cThe fear of the Lord is\nholy, enduring forever and ever\u201d (Ps. xviii. 10).\n\n1057. The filial fear of God is identical with the Gift of fear of the\nLord, spoken of in scripture: \u201cHe shall be filled with the spirit of\nthe fear of the Lord\u201d (Is., xi. 3). The function of the Gifts is to\nmake the soul docile to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and to\nsupplement or serve the habits of virtue, and both these benefits are\nconferred by filial fear.\n\n(a) This fear makes the soul ready to follow impulses prompted by God,\nfor through it we subject ourselves to God as our Father, revering His\nwondrous majesty and fearing to stray from Him. Indeed, this is the\nfirst of the Gifts, for the realization of one\u2019s nothingness before God\nis the starting-point of promptitude in receiving His teaching and\nguidance.\n\n(b) Filial fear is a principle from which proceed acts of all the moral\nvirtues, inasmuch as the reverence for God\u2019s surpassing majesty and\nrespect for His almighty power and justice incline one to lay aside\npride, intemperance, and every vice, and exercise good works that are\npleasing to Him: \u201cThe root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, and the\nbranches thereof are long-lived\u201d (Ecclus., i. 27).\n\n(c) Filial fear is especially and primarily related to the virtue of\nhope, for these two complement each other, as do the emotions of hope\nand fear. Hope aspires to conquer the heights of heaven, and feels that\nGod is on its side; fear reminds one of the greatness of God and of the\ndangers of over-confidence. Each then is necessary to balance the\nother: \u201cThe Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, and in them\nthat hope in His mercy\u201d (Ps. cxlvi. 11).\n\n1058. To the Gift of Fear correspond the first Beatitude and the fruits\nof modesty, continency and chastity. (a) Filial fear makes one realize\nthat all but God is as nothing, and hence that true greatness must be\nsought, not in the self-esteem of pride, nor in the external pomp of\nriches and honors, but in God alone: \u201cSome trust in chariots, and some\nin horses; but we will call upon the name of the Lord our God\u201d (Ps.\nxix. 8). This is the disposition of soul to which is promised the First\nBeatitude: \u201cBlessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom\nof heaven\u201d (Matt, v. 3). To the first of the Gifts, in the order of\npreparation, corresponds the first of the Beatitudes. (b) Filial fear\nmakes one dread the thought of separation from God, and hence it leads\none to use temporal things with moderation, or to abstain from them\nentirely, To it, then, pertain the Fruits of the Spirit, which St. Paul\nnames \u201cmodesty, continency, chastity\u201d (Gal, v. 23).\n\n1059. The Sins Against Hope.--There are two sins contrary to hope: (a)\ndespair, which is the opposite of hope by defect; (b) presumption,\nwhich is the opposite of hope by excess.\n\n1060. Since hope has many elements of which it is composed, despair--or\nthe falling short of hope--may happen in various ways. (a) Hope is a\nturning of the soul towards beatitude, and so the omission of the act\nof hope may be called despair (negative despair). (b) Hope regards\nbeatitude as its good, and so aversion from divine things may be called\ndespair (despair improperly so-called). (c) Hope pursues a good that is\ndifficult of attainment, and so he who is dejected by the difficulty is\nsaid to despair. (d) Hope firmly believes that its goal may be reached,\nand hence one who doubts the possibility of success in the quest of\nheaven is in despair. (e) Hope has the expectation of one day entering\ninto eternal life, and hence he is guilty of despair who admits that\nsalvation will be secured by others, but denies that he himself should\nexpect it.\n\n1061. Definition of Despair.--Leaving out of consideration negative\ndespair and despair improperly so-called, the sin we are now\nconsidering may be defined as follows: \u201cDespair is an act of the will\nby which one turns away from the beatitude one desires, not under the\naspect in which it appears as good, but because one apprehends it as\nimpossible, or too difficult, or never to be realized, and under this\naspect as evil.\u201d\n\n(a) Despair is an \u201cact of the will,\u201d and as such it differs from the\nintellectual sin of unbelief. The Novatians, who rejected the\nforgiveness of sins, and a heretic who denies the future life, are\nguilty by these acts of sin against faith, though of course one who\ndisbelieves must also despair (see 1029, 751).\n\n(b) Despair is a positive \u201cturning away from beatitude.\u201d It differs,\ntherefore, from the mere omission of the act of hope or from an act of\nfeeble hope, as well as from the sins against the moral virtues, which\nconsist primarily in a turning towards some created good.\n\n(c) Despair turns away \u201cfrom God,\u201d and thus it differs from despondency\nabout other things.\n\n(d) Despair turns away from God \u201capprehended as good and desired as the\nbeatitude of man,\u201d for no one is said to despair of what he considers\nevil or undesirable. Hence, despair differs from aversions and fears;\nsuch as hatred of God (which regards Him as evil) or fear of God (which\nthinks of Him, not as a rewarder, but as the author of chastisement).\n\n(e) Despair, however, does not reject God, because He is good and\ndesirable, but because He is apprehended as a \u201cbeatitude that is\nimpossible,\u201d or too difficult for one, or as a good that one will never\nattain to. For a person does not turn away from that which he regards\nas the object of his happiness, unless he considers that there is some\ninconvenience in seeking after it.\n\n1062. Is despondency about things other than God a sin? (a) It is the\nsin of pusillanimity, when it makes a person abandon hope of something\nwhich he is capable of attaining and which he should aim at, as when\nstudents, on account of the labor required, give up hope of learning a\ncertain subject which they have been assigned. This sin will be treated\nin the section on Fortitude.\n\n(b) It is no sin, if a person gives up the expectation of something\nabout which he has no reason to hope, or which he is not obliged to\nhope for. Examples: Caius gives up the hope of getting an education,\nbecause he lacks money to pay the expenses. Balbus ceases to pray for\nhealth, because he thinks it is not God\u2019s will to grant that request.\nTitus abandons the expectation of a long life, and even at times wishes\nfor death.\n\n1063. To wish for death may include despair of salvation or other sin.\n\n(a) If this wish means that one has no desire for any kind of existence\n(as when one desires extinction), manifestly eternal life is not looked\nfor, and hence there is despair. It should be noted, however, that such\nexpressions as, \u201cWould that I had never been born!\u201d \u201cWould that I were\nout of existence!\u201d often signify nothing more than weariness of life on\nearth, or disgust with conditions.\n\n(b)If the wish is not for annihilation, but only that God send death,\nit is not a sin of despair; but if the wish is inordinate, some other\nspecies of sin is committed--for example, if the person wishing to die\nis not resigned or submissive to God\u2019s will in the matter, he is guilty\nof rebellion against Providence, and his sin is grave, if there is\nsufficient reflection and consent.\n\n(c) If the wish is merely for death and is not inordinate, it may be an\nact of virtue, as when, out of a longing for heaven, one deliberately\ndesires to be taken from this world, if this be pleasing to God. Thus,\nSt. Paul said that he desired \u201cto be dissolved and to be with Christ\u201d\n(Philip., i. 23).\n\n1064. Certain acts of fear or sadness must not be mistaken for despair:\n(a) acts that are praiseworthy, like servile and filial fear spoken of\nabove (see 1048 sqq.), grief over sin, etc.; (b) acts that are a trial\nfrom God, such as spiritual desolations in holy persons, scruples about\nforgiveness of sins, anxieties about predestination, perseverance, or\nthe Judgment; (c) acts that are sinful, such as worldly fear, fear of\nGod that is purely servile, timidity (i.e., an excessive dread of death\nor other evils). Those who fear that, on account of their frailty, they\nmay not acquire a good habit or overcome an evil one, are guilty of\npusillanimity. Those who, on account of sadness, neglect prayer are\nguilty of spiritual sloth.\n\n1065. There are two species of despair, namely, the despair of unbelief\nand the despair that is found even in those that have faith.\n\n(a) The despair of unbelief arises from a judgment contrary to faith,\nas when one holds as general principles that salvation is impossible,\nthat God is not merciful to sinners, that all sins or certain sins\ncannot be forgiven. Thus, St. Paul designates the pagans who do not\naccept the Final Resurrection as those \u201cwho have no hope\u201d (I Thess.,\niv. 12).\n\n(b) The despair of believers arises from a judgment formed by them\nwhich is not directly opposed to faith, but which is erroneous, and is\ninduced by some wicked habit or passion. Example: Titus lives a very\ndisorderly life, and so thinks that he is predestined to hell, or that\nhe is too weak to repent and persevere. Since his predestination and\nperseverance are not matters of faith, he is not guilty of unbelief by\nhis judgment about them, but the judgment itself is wrong, and one\nwhich he has no right to form or act on.\n\n1066. Signs which indicate that a penitent suffering depression has not\nbeen guilty of despair are: (a) if he retains the faith and has not\nabandoned the usual practices of religion and piety; (b) if he retains\nthe faith, but has given up some of its practices through\ndiscouragement or weakness, but intends to repent. His sin is sloth or\ncowardice or attachment to some vice.\n\n1067. Hence, the erroneous judgment that precedes despair is similar to\nthat which precedes every act of sin, namely, it is always practically\nerroneous, though not always speculatively so.\n\n(a) Judgment is speculatively erroneous with regard to duty, when one\ndecides that in general something is lawful which is unlawful; or vice\nversa, as when one thinks that lying is pleasing to God. It is clear\nthat this kind of error need not precede sin, or else all sinners would\nerr against the faith.\n\n(b) Judgment is practically erroneous about duty, when a person decides\nthat here and now he should do something which in fact he should not\ndo, as when he knows well that lying is displeasing to God, and yet\nmakes up his mind that, all things considered, he ought to tell a lie.\nIt is clear that this kind of error precedes every sin, for no one\nwills something unless his judgment has first told him that he ought to\nwill it. The sinner first judges in a particular case that he should\nprefer the good of pleasure or of utility to the good of virtue, or he\nfirst neglects to consider the right manner in which he should act:\n\u201cThey err that work evil\u201d (Prov., xiv. 22).\n\n1068. The Malice of Despair.--(a) Despair is a sin, for Holy Scripture\ndeclares woe to the fainthearted, who trust not God and lose patience\n(Ecclus., ii. 15, 16), and it holds up the despair of Cain and Judas\nfor reprehension. The malice of despair appears in this, that it is\nbased on a perverse judgment that one ought not to labor for salvation\nin confident expectation, despite God\u2019s promise and command to the\ncontrary. (b) It is a mortal sin according to its nature, for it\ndestroys the theological virtue of hope, turns man away from God his\nLast End, and leads to irreparable loss.\n\n1069. In the following cases despair is not a mortal sin, nor at times\neven a venial sin. (a) When there is not sufficient reflection, despair\nis not a grave sin. Examples: Those who are ignorant of the sinfulness\nof despair, those who on account of great discouragement or fear do not\nfully advert to their despair of amendment, do not sin gravely. Despair\nis often a result of insanity. (b) When there is not full consent of\nthe will, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who, on account\nof a melancholy disposition, inclination to pessimism, past sins, etc.,\nare tempted to give up the hope of salvation, are not guilty of sin,\nprovided they fight against these suggestions of the mind or\nimagination.\n\n1070. The gravity of despair as compared with other sins is as follows:\n\n(a) Despair is a greater sin than offenses against the moral virtues,\nfor the chief inclination of despair is aversion from God, whereas the\nchief inclination of the latter kind of sins is conversion towards\ncreatures. Thus, a person who drinks excessively does not primarily\nintend offense against God, but his own enjoyment or escape from\ncertain worries.\n\n(b) Despair in itself is less serious than the sins of unbelief and\nhatred of God; for, while despair is opposed to God as He is our good,\nthe other two sins are opposed to God\u2019s own truth and goodness.\n\n(c) Despair is more serious than the sins of unbelief and hatred of God\nwith reference to the danger it contains for the sinner; for it\nparalyzes effort and resists remedies: \u201cWhy is my sorrow become\nperpetual and my wound desperate, so as to refuse to be healed?\u201d (Jer.,\nxv. 18) \u201cIf thou lose hope, being weary in the day of distress, thy\nstrength shall be diminished\u201d (Prov., xxiv. 10). Despair is, therefore,\na sin against the Holy Ghost, a sort of attempt at spiritual suicide.\nBut (see 900) it is not unpardonable and may be overcome by divine\ngrace.\n\n1071. It is important to know the causes of despair, for this knowledge\nenables us to distinguish it from the mystical state known as \u201cthe dark\nnight of the soul,\u201d and to prescribe suitable remedies. Despair comes\nfrom one\u2019s own fault, whereas mystical purgation from God is a\npreparation for a higher state of divine union. The causes of despair\ncan be reduced to two, luxury and sloth.\n\n(a) The secondary characteristic of a hopeful pursuit of heaven is\ncourage, the adventurous spirit which foregoes ease and comfort for the\nsake of higher things, despising the danger and difficulty. Hence, the\nvice of lust, since it makes one love bodily delights and disregard or\nunderestimate those that are spiritual, is a cause of despair, as well\nas of other sins opposed to the spiritual life (Gal., v. 17).\n\n(b) The chief and most distinctive characteristic of hope is its\ncheerful confidence of success. Hence, the vice of sloth, since it is\nsadness weighing down the soul and making it unwilling to think rightly\nor to exert itself, is the principal cause of despair (Prov., xvii. 22).\n\n1072. The apparent despair that is a trial to holy persons can be\ndistinguished, therefore, from the sin of despair, especially by two\nsigns: (a) though they are spiritually desolate and find no joy in\nreligious practices, these persons do not turn to unlawful delights for\nconsolation, but retain their dislike for lower pleasures; (b) though\novercome with dismay at the thought of their own imperfection and of\nGod\u2019s holiness, they do not so lose heart as to give over their\nexercises of piety (cf. St. John of the Cross, _The Dark Night_, Bk. I,\ne. 9 ff.).\n\n1073. Spiritual writers make the following recommendations for cases of\nspiritual desolation: (a) the afflicted persons should understand that\nthe deprivation of former sensible devotion is a sign of God\u2019s love and\nhas been experienced by the Saints, and should, therefore, possess\ntheir souls in peace, leaving to God the time and manner of His\nheavenly visitation; (b) they should not burden themselves with new and\nheavier mortifications, lest they be overcome by too great sorrow, but\nshould go on with their accustomed good works, and realize that, though\nbitter to them, these works are now all the more pleasing to God\n(Ibid., c. 10).\n\n1074. Some Remedies for the Sin of Despair.--(a) If the cause is lust,\none should learn that spiritual joys are nobler and more enduring than\nthe joys of the flesh, and should take the means to sacrifice the lower\nin favor of the higher.\n\n(b) If the cause of despair is spiritual sloth, one should meditate on\nthe greatness of God\u2019s power, mercy and love, and should avoid whatever\nfosters undue sadness, \u201clest he be swallowed up with over-much sorrow\u201d\n(II Cor., ii. 7). Thus, those who are tormented by the thoughts of past\nsins or future temptations must subject their scruples to direction,\nand remember the mercy shown to the good thief, to Magdalene, and other\npenitents; those who have lost courage because they read spiritual\nbooks of a rigorous or terrifying nature, or have been advised to\nattempt that for which they were unsuited, should seek more prudent\ninstruction and counsel; those who are naturally nervous or melancholy,\nshould employ such therapeutical or preventive measures as are useful\nor necessary. All should follow the direction of St. Peter to labor the\nmore, that by good works they may make sure their calling and election\n(II Pet., i. 10).\n\n1075. Presumption is the name given to certain acts of the intellect.\n(a) Sometimes it signifies an arrogant self-esteem, as when an ignorant\nperson thinks he is able to dispute with a learned scholar. (b)\nSometimes it is a judgment about the affairs of others made rashly or\nout of fear: \u201cA troubled conscience always presumeth grievous things\u201d\n(Wis., xvii. 10). (c) Sometimes it is a conclusion based on probable\nevidence, and which by jurists is called violent, strong, or weak\npresumption according to the evidence (see 658).\n\n1076. Presumption is also a name given to various acts of the will. (a)\nIt is used, in a good sense, to signify an excellent confidence or\nhope, which seems rash according to human standards, but is really well\nfounded, since it rests on the immensity of the divine goodness. Thus,\nJudith prayed: \u201cO God of the heavens, Creator of the waters and Lord of\nthe whole creation, hear me a poor wretch, making supplication to Thee,\nand presuming on Thy mercy\u201d (Jud., ix. 17). Thus, too, Abraham hoped\nagainst hope (Rom., iv. 18). (b) Generally, however, the word\n\u201cpresumption\u201d is applied to acts of the will in a bad sense, and\nindicates the purpose to do what exceeds one\u2019s powers.\n\n1077. Here we are concerned only with presumption as it is an act of\nthe will choosing to do what exceeds one\u2019s power. \u201cPower\u201d may he\nunderstood in three ways, and thus there are three kinds of sins all\nbearing the name of presumption.\n\n(a) If a person chooses to overstep his moral power (i.e., his right of\naction), he is guilty of the general sin of presumption, which is not a\nspecial category of sin, but a circumstance common to any kind of sin\nin which one acts with full knowledge, and without subjection to any\nfear or coercion. Hence, in Canon Law it is said in various places: \u201cIf\nanyone shall presume to transgress\u201d (i.e., if anyone shall\ncoldbloodedly transgress).\n\n(b) If a person wishes to accomplish by his own efforts something so\ngreat and difficult that it surpasses his physical powers, he is guilty\nof the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the moral virtue\nof magnanimity or greatness of soul, which attempts great things for\nwhich it is suited. Thus, he is presumptuous who undertakes a\nprofession, when he has no sufficient knowledge of its duties (cf.\nLuke, xiv. 28 sqq.). This may be called the moral sin of presumption.\n\n(c) If one wishes to obtain through divine aid something that surpasses\neven the divine power to confer, one is guilty of the special sin of\npresumption that is opposed to the theological virtue of hope, which\nexpects from God only such things as are worthy of God and as God has\npromised. Thus, he who looks forward to a free admission into eternal\nbliss, without repentance or obedience, does injury both to the\ncharacter of God and to the virtue of hope. It is this special sin of\npresumption that we are now considering. It may be called the\ntheological sin of presumption.\n\n1078. Definition of Presumption.--The theological sin of presumption\nmay be defined as follows: \u201cAn act of the will by which one rashly\nexpects to obtain eternal happiness or the means thereto.\u201d (a) It is an\nact of the will, and hence is distinct from intellectual sins, such as\ndisbelief in the justice of God or the necessity of repentance. (b) It\nis an act of pleasing expectation, and so differs generically from\nfear, which is an act of dreadful expectation. (c) It is a rash\nexpectation, and so is specifically opposed to hope, which is\nwell-founded expectation.\n\n1079. The objects of presumption are material and formal.\n\n(a) The material object is eternal happiness and the means thereto,\nsuch as forgiveness of sin, observance of the Commandments, etc. This\nobject by extension would include also such extraordinary supernatural\ngifts as the hypostatic union, equality in glory with the Mother of\nGod, etc.; for it would be rash to expect against His will what God has\nmade unique privileges.\n\n(b) The formal object, or motive, of presumption is divine mercy not\njoined with justice, or divine power not regulated by wisdom, as when\none hopes for heaven because one reasons that God is too merciful to be\na just judge of sinners. The motive by extension would include also the\nunaided power of human nature relied on as equal to the task of working\nout salvation, as when a man feels so confident of his own virtue and\nhis security against temptation that he thinks he can dispense with\nprayer and all appointed means of grace and yet save his soul.\nSimilarly, a person is presumptuous if he feels that it is absolutely\nimpossible for him to be lost, because he has received Baptism or other\nSacraments.\n\n1080. Presumption is rash, therefore, for the following reasons: (a)\nbecause it leads one to expect what is impossible according to the\nabsolute or ordinary power of God (e.g., to share in some divine\nattribute, to sit at the right hand of Christ in glory), or (b) because\nit makes one expect to obtain supernatural goods in ways other than\nthose ordained by God (e.g., to obtain forgiveness without repentance,\nto obtain glory without merits or grace).\n\n1081. The nature of presumption as compared with temptation of God and\nblasphemous hope is as follows: (a) they are alike, inasmuch as all\nthree wrongly expect something from God; (b) they differ, for\npresumption looks towards salvation and one\u2019s own happiness, whereas\ntemptation of God seeks rashly some sign from God as a proof that He is\nwise, good, powerful, etc., or that the person is innocent, holy, etc.,\nand blasphemous hope expects that God will help one in working revenge\nor committing other sin.\n\n1082. The Malice of Presumption.-(a) It is a sin, because it is an act\nof the will agreeable to false intellectual judgments, namely, that God\nwill pardon the impenitent or grant eternal life to those who have not\nlabored for it. (b) It is a mortal sin, since it does grave injury to\nthe divine attributes. We cannot hope too much in God, but we can\nexpect what a perfect God cannot grant; in this latter respect--that\nis, in its contempt of God\u2019s majesty and justice--consists the offense\nof presumption. (c) It is a sin against the Holy Ghost, because it\nmakes one despise the grace of God, repentance, etc., as if they were\nnot necessary.\n\n1083. The gravity of presumption as compared with other sins, is as\nfollows:\n\n(a) It is graver than sins against the moral virtues, because it is\ndirectly against God. Thus, theological presumption, being injurious to\nthe power of God, is a more serious offense than moral presumption,\nwhich is an exaggeration of the power of man.\n\n(b) It is less grave than despair, for, while presumption is a\ndisregard of God\u2019s vindictive justice, despair is a disregard of His\nmercy, and God\u2019s vindictive justice is due to the sins of man, His\nmercy to His own goodness.\n\n(c) Presumption is less grave, therefore, than unbelief and hatred of\nGod, which, as said above, are more wicked than despair (see 1070).\n\n1084. Presumption and Unbelief.--(a) Presumption is joined with\nunbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about\nmatters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (e.g., Pelagians,\nLutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless\nof the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven\nby his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be\nequal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of\nChrist without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran\npresumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing\nscapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he\nwholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic\npresumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are\npredestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments,\nbeing persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic\npresumption).\n\n(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a\npractical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable\nwithout merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone\nsufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see\n1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to\nconsider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining\nsalvation.\n\n1085. Presumption and Loss of the Virtue of Hope.--(a) Presumption\nproperly so-called (i.e., hope of the impossible) takes away the virtue\nof hope, for it removes the motive and reasonableness of the virtue;\nnow, the essence of true hope is a reasonable expectation, just as the\nessence of faith is assent to divine authority. Hence, he who expects\nfuture blessedness unreasonably (i.e., through his own efforts alone or\nthrough exaggerated mercy exercised by God), is not hopeful, but\npresumptuous.\n\n(b) Presumption improperly so-called (i.e., hope of the uncertain) does\nnot take away the virtue of hope, since it does not remove the motive\nof hope. Thus, one who commits sin, trusting to go to confession and to\nmake restitution after he has enjoyed the benefits of wrongdoing, is\npresumptuous in the sense that he puts himself in a state of sin, for\nit is uncertain whether the time to repent will be granted him.\nHowever, he is relying on the mercy of God, which never abandons man\nduring life, and not on his own efforts, or on pardon given freely. He\nis guilty of a want of charity towards self, and of injustice to his\nneighbor, rather than of a want of hope.\n\n1086. Presumption properly so-called is a sin rarely committed by\nCatholics. For (a) the presumption of unbelief is excluded by their\nfaith in the justice of God and in the necessity of repentance and good\nworks; (b) the presumption that is not the offspring of erroneous\ndoctrines is also unusual, because even those who go on sinning with\nthe expectation of being saved in the end, generally have the purpose\nof repenting at some future date.\n\n1087. Is a sin worse because committed with the hope that later it will\nbe pardoned? (a) If, at the moment of sin, a person has the intention\nto continue in sin, though he hopes for pardon, he is guilty of\npresumption, and his sin is made worse. (b) If he has the intention of\nsinning, but hopes for pardon, and is resolved to repent later on as a\nmeans to pardon, he is not guilty of presumption. The intention not to\ncontinue in sin diminishes the sin, for it shows that one is not so\nstrongly attached to evil.\n\n1088. The intention to sin now and repent later varies in malice\naccording to circumstances.\n\n(a) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is concomitant as regards the\nsin now committed--that is, if one sins with the hope, but not because\nof the hope of pardon-one is less guilty. Example: Titus while on a\ntour indulges in much drunkenness, because he has the opportunity and\nis not known; but he intends to repent on his return home.\n\n(b) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is antecedent as regards the\nsin--that is, if one sins because of the hope of pardon--one is more\nguilty. Example: Balbus stays away from Mass most Sundays, because he\nreasons with himself that God is kind and it will be easy to obtain\npardon. Caius, when urged to repent, always replies that it will be a\nsimple matter to turn over a new leaf at the hour of death. Sempronius\ngoes on multiplying sins from day to day, because he argues that it is\njust as easy to be pardoned late as early, just as easy to repent of a\nhundred sins as of ten.\n\n1089. In the following cases presumption is not a grave sin: (a) no\nmortal sin is committed, if there is not sufficient reflection; for\nexample, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the seriousness of\npresumption, or who on account of immaturity has exaggerated ideas of\nhis own strength, does not sin gravely if he presumes on God\u2019s mercy or\nhis own power; (b) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not full\nconsent of the will. For example, Titus is a self-made man, and hence\nis inclined at times to feel that he can work out even his salvation\nwithout any assistance, but he rids his mind of this presumptuous\nthought as soon as he takes notice of it.\n\n1090. Are there cases in which presumption and despair are transformed\ninto venial sin, not on account of the imperfect knowledge or consent\nof the subject, but on account of the slightness of the matter\ninvolved? (a) If there is question of presumption and despair properly\nso-called, they are never venial on account of the lightness of the\nmatter, for the matter, man\u2019s eternal destiny, must always be an affair\nof the utmost moment. (b) If there is question of presumption and\ndespair in a wider sense, these sins may be venial on account of\nsmallness of matter; for they may be understood with reference to\nthings other than salvation. Examples: Titus despairs of his success in\novercoming a habit of arriving late for his meals or of talking too\nmuch. Balbus imprudently trusts to his own efforts to get up promptly\nin the morning, or to fight against some slight distraction in prayer.\n\n1091. The causes of presumption are as follows: (a) the presumption\nwhich depends too much on one\u2019s own powers arises from vainglory, for,\nthe more one desires glory, the more is one inclined to attempt things\nthat are above one, especially such as are new and will attract\napplause; (b) the presumption that depends rashly on divine assistance\nseems to result from pride, for a person who desires and expects pardon\nwithout repentance, or heaven without merits, must have a very\nexaggerated opinion of his own importance.\n\n1092. The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.--Since hope is a necessary\npreparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the\nsupernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised\nthat scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.\n\n(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor\nhope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already\nbelieved and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments\nfrom God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith\nbeing enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins\nwith the words: \u201cI am the Lord thy God\u201d (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being\nprescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in\nthe First and Fourth Commandments.\n\n(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope,\nin order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also\nthat which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: \u201cHope in Him, all ye\ncongregation of people\u201d (Ps. lxi. 9); \u201cCharge the rich of this world\nnot to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in\nthe living God\u201d (I Tim., vi. 17).\n\n1093. Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life,\nthe Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and\nabsolute holy indifference (Denzinger, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence,\nman can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not\nthought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition\nthat that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure\nlove, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be\nadmitted (Philip., iii. 14; II Tim., iv, 8). (b) Indifference to the\nhappenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be\nindifferent about one\u2019s own salvation, or the means thereto.\nIndifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.\n\n1094. Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the sake of\nanother\u2019s spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself,\nthis is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God\u2019s\nbook (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of\nMessianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolical\nexpressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is\nquestion, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it\n(such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its\npossession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit\nof his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his\nentrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip.,\ni. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain\nuncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain\nof salvation and die at once.\n\n1095. At what times does the commandment of hope oblige? (a) In its\nnegative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times\nand at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even\nwhen things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest.\n(b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges\nfor all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains\nalways in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts\nof hope.\n\n1096. By reason of the virtue of hope itself (i.e., on account of the\nresponse one should make to the promises of God concerning eternal\nlife), an act of hope is obligatory on the following occasions:\n\n(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that\nis, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between\nGod and creatures as the object of one\u2019s happiness. This moment occurs\nfor all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in\nthis connection the words of Christ: \u201cSeek ye first the kingdom of God\nand His justice\u201d (Matt, vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are\nin the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning\nfrom creatures towards God: \u201cDelay not to be converted to the Lord, and\ndefer it not from day to day\u201d (Ecclus, v. 8).\n\n(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to renew the\nact of hope: \u201cThe grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men,\ninstructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in\nthis world, looking for the blessed hope\u201d (Titus, ii. 11, 12), \u201cServing\nthe Lord, rejoicing in hope\u201d (Rom., xii. 11, 12); \u201cHe that plougheth,\nshould plough in hope\u201d (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more\nperfect must have on \u201cthe helmet of hope\u201d (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope\nall are saved (Rom, viii. 25).\n\n(c) It seems that at the end of life one is especially bound to elicit\nan act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi).\nBut, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well\nprepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is\nno manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).\n\n1097. How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About\nthe theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as\nwith regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there\nis agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all\nthose who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the\nvirtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply\nwith the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Mass and the\nreception of the Sacraments.\n\n1098. How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made\nexplicitly, when one expresses one\u2019s confident expectation, the objects\nexpected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according\nto the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: \u201cO my God, relying on\nThy all-powerful assistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to\nobtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life\neverlasting.\u201d This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it\nexpresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is\nmade implicitly, when one offers petitions to God as one ought; for the\nconfidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of\nhope of God and of hope in God. Thus, the words, \u201cThy Kingdom come,\u201d\nutter the soul\u2019s expectation of bliss and its reliance on God. The\nimplicit act of hope satisfies the commandment, and hence those who\ncomply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.\n\n1099. By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also\narises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another\nvirtue will be lost or endangered without the assistance of hope, one\nis bound to make an act of hope. Examples: Titus is so discouraged by\nthe difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he\nstirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of\naridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the\nmotive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another\ncommandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of\nhope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being\ncontained in another virtue. Example: Sempronius is in the state of\nsin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes\nhope of pardon as a means to salvation, Sempronius must not only grieve\nover his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.\n\n1100. Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could\nremain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?\n\n(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego\nheaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope\n(I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that God be the chief object of our\ndesires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019,\n1031).\n\n(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their\nwish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or\nits goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but\nthey are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of\ninordinate love of creatures.\n\n(c) If such persons mean by their wish only that they are very much\nattached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as God\nwill allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated\nor other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live\nforever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.\n\n1101. So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of\nhope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about\nfaith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.\n\n(a) The act of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all\nadults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he\nhopes in God\u2019s mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he\nrelies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven\nby his works and must pray to God in his necessities--things that are\nimpossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).\n\n(b) The habit of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for\nall, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul\nand its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is\nelevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific\nvision.\n\n1102. The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.\n\n(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine\ninfusion, not on human acts (see 745).\n\n(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal\nobject or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues.\nFor it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same\ntime not love God for His own sake, or not regulate one\u2019s conduct\nconformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to\nbelieve and yet not practise one\u2019s belief (see 1016, 1030).\n\n(c) Hope is lost by sins of commission that remove its foundation or\nits formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the\nfoundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they\ntake away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It\nshould be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are\nnamed presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor\nconsequently the virtue of hope. Examples: Titus does not believe in a\nfuture life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a\nfuture life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all\nexpectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is\nliving on stolen property and intends to continue to do so, but he\nhopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Sempronius, who\nis associated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and\nrestitution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by\nreason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an\nexpectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Sempronius is\npresumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is\nnot theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through\ndivine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not\ncontrary to, but beyond theological hope.\n\n1103. Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.--(a) Servile fear was not\ncommanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of\npunishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however,\ncommanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to\ntransgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law\nalready given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear\nwere given. Thus, Job says: \u201cI feared all my works, knowing that Thou\ndidst not spare the offender\u201d (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays:\n\u201cPierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments\u201d\n(Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: \u201cFear Him that can destroy both\nsoul and body in hell\u201d (Matt, x. 28).\n\n(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since\nit is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and\nhomage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first\nlaw was given. \u201cWhat doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that\nthou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and\nserve the Lord thy God?\u201d (Deut., x. 12).\n\n1104. As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and\nconclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 23-27.)\n\n1105. Definition.--The word \u201ccharity\u201d (_carum_, what is held dear,\nhighly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular\nsense.\n\n(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of\na kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in\nthem as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments\nabout others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to\ngratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts\nfor public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes\napplied to friendship: \u201cIt is better to be invited to herbs with\ncharity than to a fatted calf with hatred\u201d (Prov., xv. 17).\n\n(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to\nthe love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are\nconsidering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for\nHis own sake, and others on account of God.\n\n1106. Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or\nwhat is considered as one\u2019s good. It is the root of all appetites of\nthe soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true\ngood.\n\n(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in\na certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love\nmay result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of\nthe giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the\ndesire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish\nfor money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him\ntowards its possession.\n\n(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is\nopposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from\nlove. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A\nbecause he hates A\u2019s enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always\nthe result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or\ndestroy what one loves.\n\n(c) Every satisfaction is due to the possession or presence of\nsomething helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A\nparticular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person\nbecause his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the\nlove one has of being entertained.\n\n1107. The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the\nlover regards the object of love as another self and desires its\npresence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b)\nseparation from other things, for the lover\u2019s thoughts are on the\nobject of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it\nfrom him.\n\n1108. Several degrees of love may be distinguished:\n\n(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results,\nnot from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the\nirrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we\nmay say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own\nexistence;\n\n(b) Sense love (_amor_) is the attraction that follows on knowledge\nobtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as\nin man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a\nspecies of sense love;\n\n(c) Rational love (_dilectio_) arises from the reflection of the mind,\nand is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the\nworth of the beloved object.\n\n1109. Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (_amor\nconcupiscentiae_), which is affection for an object which one desires\nfor oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for\nthe object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else\n(thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one\ndoes not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence\n(_amor benevolentiae_), which is had for an object to which one wishes\ngood (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when\none wishes to give him food or money).\n\n1110. The love of benevolence is called friendship when the following\nconditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who\nis loved does not reciprocate the other party\u2019s affection, they are\nnot considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity\nwhich is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties\nhave common interests and that they delight in each other\u2019s company,\nwhich is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus,\nthere is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen,\nof soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong\nto the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to\nthe similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as\nwhen one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the\nother poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together,\nand Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always\nquarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away\nprofits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to\npersonal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who\nare alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing\nspecial in common.\n\n1111. Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship\nof utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one\u2019s\nfriend, not for the friend\u2019s sake, but for one\u2019s own advantage or\ngratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of\nbenevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of\nthis admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the\ntruest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus,\nbecause the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus,\non his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his\nprices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and\nClaudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the\nonly thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of\neach other\u2019s companionship (a friendship of pleasure).\n\n(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for\nanother, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the\nfriends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the\nhighest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral\ngoodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).\nExample: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the\nother\u2019s virtue.\n\n1112. Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual\ncreature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of God\n(John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of\ntrue friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is\na mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: \u201cI love them\nthat love Me\u201d (Prov., viii. 20); \u201cHe that loveth Me shall be loved\nof My Father, and I will love him\u201d (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a\ncommon bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely\ndistant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir\nto glory in which he will share happiness with God.\n\n1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated\ncharity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as\nIt is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: \u201cGod is charity, and he that\nabideth in charity, abideth in God\u201d (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost\nespecially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as\nlove. Hence, in the _Veni Creator_ He is addressed as \u201cFount of life,\nfire, charity, and spiritual anointing.\u201d (b) Created charity is a\nsupernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of\nlove of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: \u201cThe\ncharity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is\ngiven to us\u201d (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created\ncharity.\n\n1114. Created charity is defined: \u201cA supernatural virtue infused by\nGod, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our\nbeatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account\nof God.\u201d Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it,\ninasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy,\nwhereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.\n\n1115. The Excellence of Charity.--Human friendship of the lower kind\nis not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension\nor result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friendship,\nhowever, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.\n\n(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated\nby their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine\ngoodness.\n\n(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is\ndistinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the\ndivine goodness, all-perfect in itself: \u201cThese three: faith, hope and\ncharity\u201d (I Cor., xiii. 13).\n\n(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as God among the\nobjects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e.,\nthe goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (i.e., the\nbeatific vision to be bestowed by God).\n\n1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which\nGod is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent\namong the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the\nnormal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule\nof reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God\nHimself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it\ntends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is\nthe principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: \u201cThe greatest of\nthese is charity\u201d (I Cor., xiii. 13).\n\n1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.\n\n(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true\nbut imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal\nand last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end.\nNor are they meritorious without charity, for \u201cif I should distribute\nall my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be\nburned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing\u201d (I Cor., xiii.\n3).\n\n(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues.\nExamples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to\ninfidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he\ndislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money\n(false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his\nfamily duties (imperfect justice). Claudius discharges his duties to\nhis family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).\n\n1118. The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by\nvarious titles.\n\n(a) Charity is called the informing principle of the other virtues.\nThis does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues\nare modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are;\notherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of\ncharity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of\nperfect virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the\nLast End.\n\n(b) Charity is called the foundation and root of virtues (Eph., iii.\n17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the\nsense that it supports and nourishes them.\n\n(c) It is also spoken of as the end and the mother of the other\nvirtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and\nproduces their acts by commanding their exercise: \u201cThe end of the\ncommandment is charity\u201d (I Tim., i. 5).\n\n1119. Charity causes the other virtues, negatively by forbidding evil,\naffirmatively by commanding good (I Cor., xiii, 4-7).\n\n(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in\ndeed: \u201cCharity envieth not, dealeth not perversely.\u201d\n\n(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such\nas pride, ambition, greed, anger: \u201cCharity is not puffed up, is not\nambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger.\u201d\n\n(c) It forbids that one harm one\u2019s own soul by thoughts or desires of\nwrong: \u201cCharity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity.\u201d\n\n(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects,\nrejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: \u201cCharity is\npatient, is kind; rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things.\u201d\n\n(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the\ntheological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them:\n\u201cCharity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.\u201d\n\n1120. Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes\nthem perfect and meritorious.\n\n(a) Actual direction--that is, the intention here and now to believe,\nor hope, etc., out of love for God--though more perfect, is not\nrequired for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit\nwould become extremely difficult and rare.\n\n(b) Habitual direction--that is, the mere fact that one has the habit\nof charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope,\netc, now made--does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act\nof faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now\nunconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.\n\n(c) Virtual direction--that is, the influence of an intention, once\nmade and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which\ncontinues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes,\netc.--at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself\ndeserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the\nother virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice,\nhowever, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform\nall his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of\ncharity, actual or virtual.\n\n1121. Production of Charity.--The virtue of charity belongs to the\nappetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its\nexercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which\ncharity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the\nintellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human\nreason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph.,\niii. 19).\n\n1122. The Origin of Charity.--(a) Charity is not caused by nature,\nnor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed,\nis possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship\nbased on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced\nor begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to\nreceive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).\n\n1123. The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul:\n\u201cThe charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,\nwho is given to us\u201d (Rom., v. 5). The measure according to which God\ninfuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.\n\n(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their\nnatural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were\nlower, both in nature and in grace.\n\n(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according\n\u201cto the measure of the giving of Christ\u201d (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii.\n8; I Cor., xii. 2).\n\n(c) Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, \u201ceveryone\naccording to his proper ability\u201d (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according\nto the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the\npreparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).\n\n1124. Charity may be increased: \u201cI pray that your charity may more and\nmore abound\u201d (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the\nincrease is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is\nsupreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity,\nfor even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things\nthat must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the\nmanner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more\ndeeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love\nbecome correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge\ngrows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress\nto higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.\n\n1125. With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of\ntwo kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the\ndegree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those\nthat surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten\ndegrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an\nact of fifteen degrees is more fervent.\n\n1126. Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an\nincrease of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the\nact be elicited by charity (i.e., an act of love of God), or commanded\nby charity (i.e., an act of some other virtue performed out of love for\nGod). Every act of charity merits from God an increase of the habit of\ncharity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold\nwater given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward\n(Matt., X. 42).\n\n1127. As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place,\nthere are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems\nmore probable:\n\n(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act\nis conferred at once, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed\nfor their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of\ncharity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby\nmerits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.\n\n(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts\nis not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory,\nfor there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition\nequal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as\njust said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that\ncorresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an\nincrease then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one\nenters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude\none merited during life. Hence, those who make many--even though less\nfervent--acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree\nof reward for them hereafter.\n\n1128. The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life,\nwhen one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was\npredestined by God (Philip, iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives\nhere below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes\nhim capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further\nparticipation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II\nCor., vi. 11).\n\n1129. Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same\ndegree in which He is lovable--that is, infinitely; but it is clear\nthat so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively\nperfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect\ncharity is possible to man (Matt, v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17);\nbut it has three degrees:\n\n(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life,\nconsists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God\nand loving Him.\n\n(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just,\nconsists in this, that one gives all one\u2019s time to divine things, as\nfar as the necessities of mortal existence allow.\n\n(c) The perfect charity of earth that is common to all the just,\nconsists in this, that habitually one gives one\u2019s whole heart to God,\npermitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.\n\n1130. Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes:\n(a) the beginners, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and\nresistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the proficients, or\nthose who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief\nattention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the\nperfect, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief\ndesire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of\ntheir love (Philip., i. 13).\n\n1131. The Decline of Charity.--(a) Actual charity can decline, in the\nsense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded\n(Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The\nonly causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are\nomission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the\nformer, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being\ninfused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder\nabout the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the\nright order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity\ndiffers from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or\nslights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to\nthe disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when\none commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with\nreference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than\nhe had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical\nhabit decrease.\n\n1132. The Loss of Charity.--(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be\nlost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly occupied in\nloving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less\nperfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man\u2019s\nfree will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23).\n(b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love\nof God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see\nCouncil of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning\naway from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a\nturning to God, the Last End: \u201cHe that hath My commandments and keepeth\nthem, he it is that loveth Me\u201d (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes\nthe fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.\n\n1133. The Object of Charity.--There is a threefold object of charity:\n(a) the formal object, that is, the reason for love, which is the\ninfinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural\nillumination of faith; (b) the primary material object, that is, the\nchief thing which charity loves, which is God (i.e., the divine\nEssence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): \u201cThou shalt love\nthe Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment\u201d\n(Matt, xxii. 37, 38); (c) the secondary material object, that is, the\nthing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: \u201cAnd the\nsecond is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself\u201d (ibid,\n39).\n\n1134. The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of\ncharity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more\nthan God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St.\nJohn says: \u201cLove not the world, nor the things that are in the world\u201d\n(I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves\nthem on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits\none derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity,\neven though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a\nbenefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit,\nand philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from\ncharity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of\ncreatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in\nthem, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made for the glory of\none\u2019s divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for\nin both loves there is the same motive (viz, the amiability of God\nHimself).\n\n1135. Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its\nobjects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109),\nthat is, those things whose good is desired, but for another.\n\n(a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved\nnot as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one\u2019s friends. The\nsame applies to other virtues and to beatitudes.\n\n(b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship\nwith them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is\nimpossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we\ndesire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with\ncharity (e.g., desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or\nthe use of man).\n\n1136. Love of self is of various kinds.\n\n(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according\nto his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or\nrational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others.\nOf those who indulge their passions it is said: \u201cIn the last days shall\ncome dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves\u201d (II Tim., iii.\n1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: \u201cAll seek the\nthings that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ\u2019s\u201d\n(Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.)\nto the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of\nthe neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).\n\n(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for\nhis own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire\nfor reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural\nlove of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it\nimplies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root\nof friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one\nholds him as another self.\n\n(c) Supernatural self-love is that love which one has for God, and\nconsequently for self as a friend of God.\n\n1137. If by \u201cself\u201d we understand the substance and nature of man, as\ncomposed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the\nmeaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by \u201cself\u201d we mean\nprincipally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor.,\niv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true\nlove for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For\nthe five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the\ngood, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for\nthe life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good\ndesire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for\nthe body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the\nwicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to\nconverse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and\nfuture good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract\nthemselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at\npeace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.\n\n1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not\nonly to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its\nnature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for\nHis service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity\nwith the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and\nthe service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the\nbody is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through\nglorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and\nwith the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in\nbeatitude: \u201cWe would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that\nwhich is mortal may be swallowed up by life\u201d (II Cor., v. 4); (e)\naccording to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag\non the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather\ndesire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be\nfreed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints\nhave shown their hatred of the body\u2019s corruption by the mortifications\nto which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).\n\n1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all\nlove that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in\nothers; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some\nexcellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c)\nsupernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another\non account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of\nheavenly calling.\n\n1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and\ndistinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility\nor of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by\nattraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the\nconsequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has\nfor one\u2019s friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in\nhim. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of\npassion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural\nfriendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts\nand graces which evoke them are participations of God\u2019s goodness, which\nis the object of charity.\n\n1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all\nthose who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship,\nthat is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of\nthis love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with\nthem (Heb., xii, 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for\nthey also are called to the heavenly companionship (ibid., 23).\n\n1142. Charity for Sinners.--Should we love with charity those who are\nsinners and enemies of God? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as\nenemies of God, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an\noffense to God and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should\nhate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of\nGod (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures\nof God, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are\ndemons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beatitude\nis out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of\ncharity towards God, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His\nglory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may\nlove them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present\nlife; for we should wish that God may be glorified in them by their\nconversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not\nrestricted to loving the just.\n\n1143. If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of God, is\nit lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate\nthe evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their\nsin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In\nthis way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cxxxviii. 32).\n(b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is\nactuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps.\nlvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the\nsinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may\nbe saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that\nare met in scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a\ncriminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he\nwishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.\n\n1144. The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader\nview not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be\ndesired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to hell,\nfor charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that\na sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He\nwho wishes sin approves of the offense to God; but it does not seem\nunlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means\nto a spiritual awakening.\n\n1145. Association with Sinners.--(a) It is never lawful to associate\nwith sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their\nguilt. Hence, St. Paul says: \u201cGo out from among them and be ye\nseparate\u201d (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to associate with\nsinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to\nbe led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to\nassociate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not\nendangered, and if one aims to convert them to better ways. Thus, our\nLord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance\n(Matt., ix. 10-13).\n\n1146. Friendship with Sinners.-(a) If this means that we like and\ndislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and\nit should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the\nsinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains\nto charity (Jer, xv. 19).\n\n1147. Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend\nwho has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of\nbetterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship.\nIf it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from\nstarvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was\nperishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one\nshould give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party,\nand may prove harmful.\n\n1148. Charity towards Enemies.--Enemies can be considered in two\nsenses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for\nbeatitude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with\ncharity--that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies\nand opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a\nneighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings,\nenemies should be loved with charity--that is, their nature created by\nGod and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us,\nfor love of God should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that\nwhich is not well disposed towards ourselves.\n\n1149. The precept of love of enemies did not originate with the law of\nChrist. (a) It pertains to the natural law, for (i) it follows from the\nnatural principle: \u201cDo unto others as you would have them do unto you,\u201d\nand (ii) it was known by natural reason (e.g., Plato and Cicero knew\nit). (b) Love of enemies was commanded in the Old Law, being the second\ngreat commandment of that law (Matt., xxii. 39), and was taught in\nvarious Old Testament books (Lev., xix. 17, 18; Exod., xxiii 4, 5;\nProv., xxi. 21, 22). (c) It was renewed by Christ, who corrected the\nfalse interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the scribes and\nPharisees, who taught: \u201cThou shalt love thy friend and hate thy enemy.\u201d\nIn the Sermon on the Mount our Lord declares: \u201cI say to you: Love your\nenemies: do good to them that hate you: that you may be the children of\nyour Father who is in heaven\u201d (Matt., v. 44, 45).\n\n1150. The following examples of love of one\u2019s enemies are found in the\nBible: (a) in the Old Testament, Joseph forgave his brethren who had\nsold him into Egypt, David spared the life of his persecutor Saul and\nwept over the ungrateful Absalom, and Moses prayed for the people who\nhad rebelled against him; (b) in the New Testament our Lord mourned\nover Jerusalem which had rejected Him, and on the Cross prayed for His\nenemies.\n\n1151. What kind of love must we entertain for enemies?\n\n(a) A general love of enemies is that which extends to all neighbors\nfor the love of God, no exception being made as regards enemies. This\nkind of love is required. Example: Caius makes an act of love in which\nhe declares his love for his neighbor, but mentions no names. Titus\nmakes this act of love: \u201cI love all except Caius.\u201d The act of love made\nby Caius is sufficient, that of Titus is insufficient.\n\n(b) A special love of enemies is that which extends to them in\nparticular, not as included in the human race or the community, but as\nindividuals, as when one expressly mentions the name of an enemy in his\nact of love. This kind of love of enemies is not required at all times.\n\n1152. Is there an obligation of special love of enemies? (a) In cases\nof necessity (e.g., when the omission of a special love would bring on\nhate), one is bound to special love. (b) Outside of cases of necessity,\none is bound to be willing to love an enemy in particular, if the\nnecessity should arise. (c) Outside of necessity, one is not bound to\nlove an enemy in particular, for it is impossible to give such\nattention even to all those who are not enemies. But to give an enemy\nmore love than is required is a sign of perfect charity.\n\n1153. The principles just given as to internal love of enemies apply\nalso to external love, or to the signs by which internal love is\nmanifested. For St. John says: \u201cLet us not love in word, nor in tongue,\nbut in deed, and in truth\u201d (I John, iii. 18).\n\n(a) Hence, it is not lawful to deny to an enemy the common signs of\ncharity (i.e., such benefits as are bestowed on his community or class\nas a whole), for to do so would be to signify a desire for revenge\n(Lev., xix. 18). Consequently, he who excludes his enemies from prayers\noffered for his neighbor sins against charity.\n\n(b) In cases of necessity, as when an enemy is in great need as to\nlife, fame, fortune or salvation, one is bound to show special signs of\ncharity, such as salutation, conversation, assistance, etc. Thus, we\nare told: \u201cIf thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he be thirsty,\ngive him to drink\u201d (Prov., xxv. 21).\n\n(c) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be ready to assist\nan enemy, should there be need.\n\n(d) Outside of necessity, one is not bound actually to manifest\nparticular love for an enemy, by speaking to him, trading with him,\nvisiting him, etc. Hence, David, although he had pardoned Absalom,\nwould not meet him (II Kings, xiv. 24). To confer special benefits on\nan enemy when there is no obligation is a counsel of perfection: \u201cDo\ngood to those that hate you\u201d (Matt., v. 24). This heaps coals of fire\nupon the head of the enemy, curing him by the salutary pain of\nrepentance, and so overcomes evil by good (Rom., xii. 20, 21).\n\n1154. The common signs of charity are not limited to those that are\nshown to all mankind, but include also such as are usually shown by one\nChristian to another Christian, by one citizen to a fellow-citizen, by\na relative to a relative, etc. Thus, to make a social call, though it\nwould be a sign of special regard in the case of one not a relative,\nmight be only a common sign of charity in the case of a relative.\n\n(a) Hence, it is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that\nare customarily shown to all men. Example: Titus dislikes Balbus, and\ntherefore refuses to sell to him, does not return his salutations,\nspeaks to all others in company, while ignoring Balbus, and will not\neven answer if Balbus addresses him.\n\n(b) It is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are\ncommonly shown to all those to whom one is similarly related. Examples:\nClaudia calls on her other children frequently and makes them presents,\nbut she keeps away from one daughter, even when the latter is sick and\npoor and she is calling next door. Sempronius habitually invites to his\nhouse for family festivities all his relatives except his brother.\n\n(c) It is against charity to deny to an enemy some benefit not commonly\nshown, but which one has bestowed out of liberality on the group to\nwhich the latter belongs. In such a case a special sign of charity\nbecomes common. Example: Titus prepares a banquet for a neighboring\ninstitution, and purposely sends no invitation to two members whom he\ndislikes.\n\n1155. The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not\napply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be\nomitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.\n\n(a) Thus, by reason of charity owed to self or to the better interests\nof an offender, one should at times omit the common signs of charity.\nExamples: Caius avoids Balbus, with whom he has had a quarrel, because\nhe knows well that Balbus is seeking some pretext to get revenge. Titus\nhas a surly way of speaking, and his mother, in order to cure him, does\nnot answer until he has spoken civilly.\n\n(b) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should sometimes be\ndenied as a punishment. Examples: Claudia punishes her children, when\nthey are disobedient, by refusing them for a time privileges given the\nother children. For the same reason she refuses to call on a daughter\nwho ran away from home and married a worthless fellow.\n\n(c) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should be refused, when\nthis is required for the protection of one\u2019s own rights. Example: Titus\ngoes about defaming Sempronius and his family, but appears very affable\nwhen he meets Sempronius; the latter knows all this, and hence is very\ncool with Titus, to show that the injuries are not held as light.\n\n1156. The following are the rules for judging whether (apart from\nscandal to others) sin has been committed through refusal of the signs\nof charity:\n\n(a) If internally there is hatred (i.e., a contempt for one\u2019s neighbor,\nas if he were unworthy of common charity), or malevolence (i.e., a will\nto exercise spite), then one is guilty of grave uncharitableness,\nunless the smallness of the matter makes it only a venial sin.\n\n(b) If externally the denial of charity is such that in the judgment of\na prudent man it indicates real hatred, and the injured party perceives\nthis and is scandalized or hurt thereby, the sin of uncharitableness is\ncommitted, even though there be no internal hatred. The gravity depends\non the scandal or offense caused the other party. Example: Claudius and\nBalbus, once very friendly, have had a disagreement. Now, when Claudius\nsees Balbus coming in his direction, he turns off by a side street, not\nto show hatred, but to avoid a meeting. If Balbus does not know this,\nor does not care, no sin--or at most only a venial sin--is committed;\nbut if Balbus is deeply wounded or scandalized by this conduct,\nClaudius sins seriously against charity.\n\n1157. Refusal of Greetings.--(a) To refuse to exchange a bow or\nsalutation (such as \u201cGood morning\u201d) indicates a want of charity, when\nsuch mutual courtesy is expected according to custom; not, however,\nwhen custom does not require it, Example: In Balba\u2019s office the girls\nemployed usually salute one another on arrival and departure, but Balba\nnever salutes Titia, and hence is regarded as her enemy. On Caius\u2019\nstreet the neighbors are of a very mixed kind, and it is not customary\nto speak to everybody. Hence, the fact that Caius never salutes certain\nneighbors, whom he dislikes, does not signify any uncharitableness on\nhis part.\n\n(b) To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a\nmark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse. Examples:\nClaudius has a grudge against Sempronius, an elderly man who is much\nhis senior, and says he will never salute him as others do. Titus\nrefuses to greet Balbus, his acquaintance, when they meet, because in\nthe past Balbus has treated his greetings with contempt, and shows that\nhe does not care to notice Titus.\n\n(c) To refuse to return a salutation sincerely given indicates a want\nof charity.\n\n1158. The Order of Charity.--Charity not only requires that we love\nGod, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these\nobjects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.\n\n(a) God must be loved above all, more than self (Matt, xvi. 24), more\nthan father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the\ncommon good of all, and the source of all good.\n\n(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one\u2019s\nneighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor\n(Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance\nwith the saying: \u201cCharity begins at home.\u201d\n\n(c) Among neighbors those should be loved more who have more of a claim\non account of their greater nearness to God or to ourselves.\n\n1159. Love can become greater in two ways: (a) objectively, when the\nperson loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more titles to\naffection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) subjectively,\nwhen the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even\nthough the object be not more amiable in itself.\n\n1160. The Character of our Love of God.--(a) It must be supreme\nobjectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all\nclaims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss\nrather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our\ndesire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at\nleast wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need\nnot be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of\nour feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than\nthose that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not\nagainst charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought\nof a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will\nplaces God above all.\n\n1161. Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note:\n(a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve\nGod for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of\none\u2019s service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end\nof our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be\npreferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with\ncharity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same\ntime expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of\nbenevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal\nreward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in\nthe sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things\ntheir end, but in the sense that one hopes one\u2019s service of God will be\nso blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as\nto be enabled to continue and progress in that service.\n\n1162. Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our\nspiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others\nwho are higher in sanctity than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as\nmore worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity\nsuch progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now\nbetter than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may\nperfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer\nthan other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.\n\n1163. Is it lawful to sacrifice one\u2019s own spiritual goods for the\nbenefit of a neighbor?\n\n(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit,\nspiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in\nso doing one inflicts a wound on one\u2019s own soul and prefers the good of\nothers to one\u2019s own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish\nto be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to\nprevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and\nproximate danger of sin for the sake of another\u2019s spiritual progress.\n\n(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual\ngoods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by\ndoing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not\nlessen but rather increases one\u2019s own profit. Thus, a priest should\ninterrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a\ndaughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her\nparents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if\nan invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it\nis laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers\nthe satisfactory value of one\u2019s good works to the souls in purgatory;\none may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a\ngreat service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account\nof irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one\u2019s\nentrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls\n(Philip., i. 23, 24).\n\n1164. The Love of the Body.--(a) One should prefer the spiritual\nwelfare of one\u2019s neighbor to one\u2019s own bodily welfare, for our neighbor\nis called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the\nbody will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one\u2019s\nown bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal,\nfor it has more of a claim on one.\n\n1165. There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor\nmay be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one\u2019s\nbodily welfare for the other\u2019s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a)\nextreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish\neternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die\nwithout baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor\nruns grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a\ndying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is\nscarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary\nspiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of\ndamnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself,\nas is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.\n\n1166. For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk\ndeath (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions\nare present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the\nneedy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation\ndangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if\nit is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is\nno one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no\nreason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one\nin extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid\na large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help\nthe many rather than the one.\n\n1167. For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk\nis not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of\npastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to\nthis. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of\npestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend\nagainst justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying\nperson would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person\ncan help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not\nbound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal\nevil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even\nby those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one\nelse to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to\nvisit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.\n\n1168. For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity\nrequires that something be done (Ecclus, xvii. 12). (a) But it does not\nrequire the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in\ndanger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary\nthat one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger\none\u2019s life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places.\n(b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily\ninconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of\na meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep\nhim away from bad company.\n\n1169. If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is compared\nwith corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should\nprefer one\u2019s own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to\noffer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one\u2019s\nfamily into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if\na neighbor\u2019s corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected\nwith higher goods, then one may sacrifice one\u2019s own good for that of\nanother.\n\n(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a\nlesser corporal good of one\u2019s own. Examples: One may weaken one\u2019s\nhealth to save another\u2019s life. One may give of one\u2019s blood for a\ntransfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.\n\n(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal\ncorporal good of one\u2019s own, if the common good requires this; for the\ngood of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may\nexpose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public\nperson whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and\nfiremen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety\nfor the safety of the public.\n\n(c) One may prefer an equal corporal good of another, who is only a\nprivate individual, to one\u2019s own equal good, if the intention is to\npractise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At\nleast, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue\nis a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy\nmen who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as\nhostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold\nup for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for\nthe other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump\ninto a river and risk one\u2019s life in order to rescue a drowning person,\nfor heroic charity is a hotter adornment to self than mere, ordinary\ncharity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough\nprovisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his\nrations to the other, that both may not be lost.\n\n1170. There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person\nshould not risk his life for another\u2019s life, if he thereby endangers\nhis own salvation (e.g., if he is in a state of sin and cannot\nreconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is\nadmitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life\nwith a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of\ncharity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a\nmultitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one\u2019s life for the life of\nanother, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married\nman, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life\nfor the sake of a friend.\n\n1171. The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows:\n(a) as to good in general (e.g., the attainment of salvation), we\nshould love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for\nall; (b) as to good in particular (e.g., the degree of beatitude), we\nshould love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher\ndegree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.\n\n1172. The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be\nreduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and\nhence more deserving of love--for example, a saintly acquaintance may\nbe nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer\nto ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage,\nfriendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer\nby nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.\n\n1173. The order of charity as between those nearer to God and those\nnearer to self is as follows:\n\n(a) Objectively, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire\nfor them that higher degree of God\u2019s favor which belongs to their\nmerits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will\nfinally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus\nattain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect\n(i.e., that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer\nin many respects (e.g., on account of relationship, friendship,\ngratitude) another who is less holy.\n\n(b) Subjectively, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that\nis, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for those nearer\nto self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere\nnatural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God\u2019s will\nthat more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: \u201cIf any\nman have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he\nhath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel\u201d (I Tim., v. 8).\nHence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one\u2019s own, and\nit supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.\n\n1174. The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will\ncorrespond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom\ngreater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more\nrespect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom\ngreater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have\nshown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given\nspiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between\nhelping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one\nwould have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom\ngreater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as\nvisits) should be given.\n\n1175. Exceptions to the above are the following cases, in which the\ngood of the better person should be preferred:\n\n(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public\ninterest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or\nvoting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or\nprivate friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should\ndecide in favor of the better man;\n\n(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to\npreference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is\na wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of\nstrangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.\n\n1176. The order of charity between various kinds of natural\nrelationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from\nconsanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature\nitself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since\nit arises from one\u2019s own choice, may be more congenial and may be\npreferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and\ncompanionship (Prov., xviii. 24).\n\n1177. In practice, other things being equal, one should manifest more\nlove to a relative in those things that belong to the relationship.\n\n(a) To those who are related by blood, corporal or temporal assistance\nis more due. If one has to choose between helping one\u2019s indigent\nparents or an indigent friend, one should rather help one\u2019s parents.\n\n(b) To those who are spiritually related (e.g., pastor and parishioner,\ndirector and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual\nassistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is\nsupposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than\nhis relatives who belong to another congregation.\n\n(c) To those who are related by some special tie, political, military,\nreligious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious,\netc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer,\nand not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest\nowes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not\nto his parents.\n\n1178. Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship,\nshould have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private\nrelationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as\nregards spiritual matters (e.g., calling a priest to give absolution),\nif a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity,\none\u2019s first duty would be to one\u2019s parent. (b) As regards temporal\nmatters, if one has to choose between assisting one\u2019s needy parents and\nremaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one\nshould give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is\nallowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.\n\n1179. The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of\ncourse to the nearer relatives-parents, children, wife. Between these\nnearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a)\nobjectively (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect\nand honor), the order is: father, mother, wife, children; (b)\nsubjectively (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of\naffection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.\n\n1180. The following should be noted about this order of preference\nbetween the members of one\u2019s family: (a) the basis of preference given\nis only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change\nthe order given (e.g., a pious mother is rightly more respected and\nhonored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no\nnotable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of\nanother, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given\nare not guilty of serious sin.\n\n1181. The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when\nseveral are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need\nthe order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his\nwife (Gen., ii. 24), second, the children, for ordinarily parents must\nprovide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14),\nthird, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other\nrelatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country,\nall others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be\npreferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one\nreceives life from parents.\n\n1182. The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is\nloved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His\namiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b)\nSelf is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more,\nobjectively, than those who are lower in glory: for the state of the\nblessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But,\nsubjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity\nitself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish\nthe same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be\nentirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence\nof one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in\nholiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than\nthose who are nearer by kinship or friendship.\n\n1183. The Acts of Charity.--The principal act of the virtue of charity\nis love. It is sometimes spoken of as benevolence, but in reality the\nlove of charity includes more than mere benevolence. (a) Thus,\nbenevolence wishes well to another according to a right judgment, and\nso it pertains to charity, which rejoices in the perfections of God and\nwishes beatitude to man; but (b) love is a union of affection with\nanother, which makes one regard him as another self, and so it pertains\nto charity, which, as said above, is a supernatural friendship, One can\nbe benevolent towards a stranger and for a passing moment, but love is\nintimate and lasting, from its nature.\n\n1184. Exercise of the Act of Love.--(a) From benevolence proceed\ngladness at the perfections of God (I Pet., i. 8), zeal for His\nexternal glory (I Pet., iv. 11), grief over sin committed against Him\n(Ps. lxxii. 3), obedience to His commandments (John, xiv. 15, 21, 23).\n(b) From the union of affection proceed a warmth of inclination and a\npersonal interest in the things of God, so that one rejoices over the\ndivine perfections, not merely because one knows that this is a duty,\nbut because one feels the attachment of a friend for all that pertains\nto God.\n\n1185. Charity loves God: (a) for His own sake; (b) immediately; (c)\nentirely; (d) without measure.\n\n1186. We love God for His own sake, in the sense that there is nothing\ndistinct from God that causes Him to be loved. (a) Thus, there is no\nulterior end on account of which He is loved, for He is the Last End of\nall; (b) there is no perfection different from His nature that makes\nHim lovable, since He is perfection itself; (c) there is no source of\nHis goodness on account of which He is loved, since He is the Primal\nSource.\n\n1187. We may love God for the sake of reward (see 1161), on account of\nbenefits, and for fear of punishment, in the following senses: (a) the\neternal reward is the proximate end of our love of God: \u201cReceiving the\nend of your faith, even the salvation of your souls\u201d (I Pet., i. 9);\nbut the end of salvation itself, and the Last End of love of God, is\nGod Himself; (b) temporal rewards, benefits received, and the wish to\navoid punishment, are dispositions that lead up to love of God, or to\nprogress in His love; but they are not the end of the act of love.\n\n1188. Charity loves God immediately, and so differs from natural love\nof God. (a) Thus, natural love of God rises from love of neighbor whom\nwe see to love of God whom we do not see, just as natural knowledge\nrises from the creature to the Creator. (b) Charity, on the contrary,\ntends to God first, and by reason of Him includes the neighbor in its\nlove.\n\n1189. Charity loves God entirely. (a) But this does not mean that the\ncreature\u2019s love is adequate to the amiability of God, for God is\ninfinite, whereas love in the most perfect creature must be finite. (b)\nIt means, with reference to the object of love, that charity loves\neverything that pertains to God--each of the Divine Persons, all of the\ndivine perfections. (e) It means, with reference to the person who\nloves, that he loves God to the best of his ability, by subordinating\nall else to God and preferring His love to other loves. On earth,\ncharity gives to God the greatest objective love; in heaven, it also\ngives Him the greatest subjective love (see 1129): \u201cThou shalt love the\nLord, thy God, with thy whole heart\u201d (Deut., vi. 5).\n\n1190. Charity loves God without measure, as St. Bernard says (_De\ndiligendo Deo_, cap. 1). God has fixed a degree of perfection in\ncharity beyond which a soul will not progress, but no one should set a\nlimit for himself, for love has to do with God, who is not measured,\nbut is the measure of all things.\n\n(a) Hence, in the internal act of love, there is no possibility of\nexcess, since the Object is infinitely amiable and the End of all, and\nso the greater the charity, the better it is.\n\n(b) In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a\npossibility of excess, since these acts are a means to an end, and have\nto be measured by charity and reason. Thus, it would be excessive to\ngive more to strangers than to one\u2019s needy parents, for this act would\nnot be according to the rule of charity. It would also be excessive to\nperform works of charity, when one ought to be attending to household\nduties, for reason requires that everything be done at its proper time\nand place.\n\n1191. The love of an enemy may be a better act than the love of a\nfriend, when there are special excellencies in the former love that are\nnot found in the latter. (a) Thus, if the enemy, all things considered,\nis a better person than the friend, and if he is for that reason\nobjectively preferred, this is as it should be (see 1173). (b) If the\nparties are of equal merit, an act of love towards the enemy on account\nof supernatural charity is better than an act of love towards the\nfriend on account of natural affection: \u201cIf you love them that love\nyou, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this?\u201d\n(Matt, v. 46).\n\n1192. If all other things are equal, the love of the friend is\nessentially better, while the love of the enemy is better in some minor\nrespects. (a) Thus, the love of the friend has a better object, for the\nfriend who loves us is better than the enemy who hates us; it has also\nan object that has a greater claim on charity, as being nearer to self.\nHence, it is essentially a better and more meritorious act. (b) The\nlove of the enemy is more difficult, and may thus be a more convincing\nsign that one really loves God. But the fact that an act is more\ndifficult does not suffice to make it more meritorious, or else we\nshould have to say that the love of neighbor is more meritorious than\nthe love of God.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 6: THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 28-33.)\n\n1193. Internal Effects of Charity.--There are three acts of the soul\nthat result from love, viz., joy, peace, mercy. (a) The joy of charity\nis a repose or delight of the soul in the perfections of God and in the\nunion of self and the neighbor with Him: \u201cThe fruit of the Spirit is\ncharity, joy\u201d (Gal., v. 22). (b) The peace of charity is the harmony of\nman with God, self and the neighbor: \u201cThere is much peace to those that\nlove Thy law\u201d (Ps. cxviii. 165). (c) Mercy is an inclination of the\nwill to relieve the misery of another; it follows from charity, for\nlove of the brotherhood \u201cweeps with them that weep\u201d (Rom., xii. 10, 15).\n\n1194. Joy.--The precept of charity includes a precept of joy, and hence\nthe Apostle says: \u201cRejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice\u201d\n(Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties:\n(a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained;\nit rejoices \u201cin the Lord\u201d; (b) it should not be discontinued or\ninterrupted by sin, but should rejoice \u201calways.\u201d It may, however, be\nmixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence\nof God ( Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be\nfilled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as \u201csorrowful, yet\nalways rejoicing\u201d (II Cor., vi. 10).\n\n1195. Peace.--The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace,\nand our Lord commands: \u201cHave peace among yourselves\u201d (Mark, ix. 49).\nPeace, like joy, has two properties: (a) it should be genuine (i.e., it\nshould be a contentment and agreement based on right), for there is a\nfalse peace, of which Christ says: \u201cI am not come to bring peace\u201d\n(Matt, x. 34), which rests in a good that is only apparent, and which\ndoes not exclude great evil and anxiety (Wis., xiv. 22), (b) peace is\nconstant, for, as long as charity remains, there are friendly relations\nwith God and man, and order in the interior of the soul. Perfect\ntranquility, it is true, is found only in heaven. On earth,\ndisturbances may arise in the lower part of the soul, or from without,\nbut the will continues in the peace of God (II Cor., i. 4).\n\n1196. Reconciliation of a sinner to God is effected through an act of\nperfect charity: \u201cHe who loves Me, will be loved by My Father and I\nwill love him\u201d (John, xiv. 21). (a) Thus, sin is washed away, even\nbefore Baptism or absolution, when the sinner makes an act of love of\nGod joined with a desire, at least implicit, of receiving the Sacrament\nof Baptism or Penance. The act of love is not the cause, but the final\ndisposition introducing justification. (b) The punishment of sin is\nforgiven, when one makes an act of love, or performs a good deed out of\nlove of God; but the degree of remission corresponds to the fervor of\nthe charity.\n\n1197. Does the precept of peace demand unanimity of judgments?\n\n(a) In matters of greater importance, there should be agreement in\njudgments; else, there will not be that harmony of wills, desiring the\nsame things and disliking the same things, which constitute peace. In\nnecessary things, therefore, there should be unity of judgments: \u201cI\nbeseech of you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that\nyou all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you,\nbut that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment\u201d (I\nCor., i. 10).\n\n(b) In matters of slight importance, difference of opinion does not\nremove friendship, for each one thinks that his judgment will better\nserve the good that is sought alike by all. We find that even very holy\nmen have disagreed on matters of opinion--for example, Paul and\nBarnabas on the question whether or not Mark should be taken on the\nsecond missionary journey (Acts, xv. 37), Jerome and Augustine on the\nstatus of Mosaic observances after the death of Christ. Disputes may\noffend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too\nheated, as sometimes happens even to minds occupied with heavenly\nthings (e.g., theologians, spiritual writers).\n\n1198. Reconciliation with enemies is necessary, in order that peace may\nbe maintained. It includes: (a) internally, the putting away of\nthoughts and feelings contrary to concord; (b) externally, signs of\nrenewed charity, if there has been an open breach.\n\n1199. The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness\nof every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy--that is, it does not\nalways oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy\u2019s acts.\nThere are three kinds of wrong: (a) offenses, which are such\ncontradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespass on any\nstrict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great\ndistress, asks his friend Titus to secure employment for him. Titus\ncould easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) injuries, which are\nviolations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example:\nClaudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses\nare present; (c) damages, which are the taking from another of what is\nhis, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or\nhis fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, assault and slander.\n\n1200. Whether an offender asks pardon or not, one is obliged to forgive\nthe offense--that is, to put aside all aversion, indignation and\nhatred: \u201cForgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass\nagainst us\u201d (Matt., vi. 12). But, granting that one desires salvation\nfor the offender as for others, shows the common signs of charity, and\nis not prompted by hatred, the following are not required: (a) that one\nso pardon the offense as to take the offender back to the same special\nfriendship as may have existed before; (b) that one overlook an injury\nso as not to require satisfaction (and hence, without acting against\ncharity, Gaia may insist on an apology from Claudia for the\ndisrespectful language used by the latter); and (c) that one renounce\nrestitution or reparation for damage done one. No one is obliged to\ngive to another what is one\u2019s own, and, if there is no other way of\nsecuring one\u2019s rights, one may have recourse to court. If the result of\nprosecution will be punishment of the offender rather than restitution\n(as in case of libel or slander), it is not uncharitable to prosecute\nthe offender, if one\u2019s motive is the fulfillment of justice, the\nprevention of the same wrong to others, or the honor of one\u2019s family\n(Lev., xix. 17).\n\n1201. There are cases, however, in which charity requires one to\nforgive a debt of satisfaction or restitution, namely, when this would\nimpose too heavy a burden on the offender, compared with the benefit\nthat would be derived therefrom. (a) Thus, restitution should not be\ninsisted on, when the offender is repentant and can ill afford to pay\nthe debt, and the party offended can easily get along without the\npayment. (b) Punishment should not be insisted on, if the harm done the\noffender or his family will be out of proportion to any good that may\nresult. (c) Prosecution should not be used, if a wrong can be amicably\nadjusted out of court (I Cor., vi. 1).\n\n1202. Who should make the advances towards reconciliation after a\nrupture of charitable relations? (a) If only one party was the\noffender, he should normally make the first move towards\nreconciliation. It is of counsel, but not of precept, that the innocent\nparty ask for reconciliation, unless the circumstances require that he\nshould do so, as when the offended party can much more easily make the\nadvances, or when great scandal will arise, or when the offender will\nbecome hardened in hate and lose his soul, if the party offended does\nnot make efforts for peace. (b) If both parties were offenders, he who\noffended more seriously should make the advances. (c) If both offended\nequally, he who was first to disturb the peace should also be first to\nwork for its restoration. (d) If it does not appear which of the\nparties was more to blame in any of the foregoing ways, both are\nequally bound.\n\n1203. The manner of seeking reconciliation is as follows: (a)\nReconciliation can be sought either in person, or through an\nintermediary who is a friend to both parties. (b) It can be sought\neither explicitly (by expressing regret and asking pardon), or\nimplicitly (by a friendly conversation or favors shown). Generally\nspeaking, an inferior (e.g., a child) should explicitly request\nreconciliation with a superior (e.g., a parent); but it will suffice\nfor a superior to seek forgiveness from an inferior implicitly.\n\n1204. The time for seeking reconciliation is the earliest possible\nmoment: \u201cIf thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou remember\nthat thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering\nbefore the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother, and\nthen coming thou shalt offer thy gift\u201d (Matt, v. 23, 24). (a) Thus,\ninternal reconciliation (i.e., repentance on the part of the offender\nand forgiveness on the part of the one offended) should not be delayed,\nand should precede any sacred action, such as offering a gift to God,\nif this latter is to be acceptable and meritorious. (b) External\nreconciliation (i.e., asking pardon and making satisfaction) and the\nmanifestation of forgiveness should be attended to as soon as the\ncircumstances of time and place permit. The resolve to be reconciled\nexternally is included in internal reconciliation, but prudence\ndictates that one wait for the suitable occasion, lest precipitation\nmake matters worse.\n\n1205. Mercy.--From charity results mercy, for he who loves his neighbor\nas a friend in God, must grieve over the latter\u2019s sorrows as if they\nwere his own. Our Lord commands: \u201cBe ye merciful, as your Heavenly\nFather is also merciful\u201d (Luke, vi. 36). But not all compassion is true\nmercy or supernatural.\n\n(a) Thus, as regards the object that causes sorrow, true mercy grieves\nover the evils that befall another against his will, such as sickness,\nfailure in an enterprise, or undeserved misfortune. But wilful evil,\nsuch as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation, although one\nmay compassionate sinners on account of the ills their sins bring on\nthem (Matt., ix. 36).\n\n(b) As regards the internal cause of sorrow or sympathy, supernatural\nmercy arises from the love of charity for the one suffering; natural\nmercy, from the fear one has that a similar evil may overtake oneself,\nor that oneself may suffer loss on account of another\u2019s misfortune.\n\n(c) As regards the act of mercy, it is to be noted that it proceeds\nfrom the will, regulates the emotions, and is itself regulated by\nreason. Thus, mercy differs from the sensible distress a refined person\nexperiences at the sight of suffering, which, though good in itself,\nmay never lead to a wish to alleviate sorrow. Thus, also, it differs\nfrom unregulated sympathy, which bestows help or forgiveness\nindiscriminately, without thought of the greater evils that may result;\nit differs from sentimentality, which does not restrain tears and other\nemotional expressions within due bounds. The virtue of mercy has a care\nfor the interests of justice, but mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the\nmind to what is true and right.\n\n1206. The causes of an unmerciful spirit are: (a) lack of charity\ntowards one who is in misery; (b) pride or too much prosperity, which\nmakes one feel that others suffer justly, or that one is above their\ncondition (Prov., xxviii. 4); (c) great misfortunes or fears that have\nhardened one\u2019s disposition, or made one self-centered.\n\n1207. Mercy Compared with the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Mercy, if taken\nfor the emotion of sympathy as regulated by reason, is inferior to\nprudence and justice, which are perfections of the higher powers of the\nsoul (i.e., of the intellect and will). (b) Mercy, if taken for an act\nof the will disliking the misery of another and moving one to remove\nthat misery, surpasses the other moral virtues; indeed, it may be said\nto be something divine, and hence more than a virtue. Certainly, it is\nthe greatest of the virtues that have to do with the neighbor, for of\nits nature it implies freedom from some defect and the relief of that\ndefect in others, which is not the case with other virtues. Thus, while\nprudence directs acts and justice renders to others their due, these do\nnot of themselves remove ignorance or destitution in a neighbor.\n\n1208. Mercy Compared with Charity.--(a) In itself (i.e., considered\nprecisely as to its essential notes of freedom from misery and relief\ngiven to the miserable), mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For,\ncarried to its highest development, freedom from defect means infinite\nperfection; while relief of defect in others means that, out of\ninfinite love for the Supreme Good, relief is poured out by God on His\ncreatures. Thus, in God mercy is an extension of the love God has\ntowards His own goodness, for the benefit of creatures, and is greater\nthan charity: \u201cThe mercy of God is above all His works\u201d (Ps. cxliv. 9).\n\n(b) In its subject (i.e., considered precisely as to the perfection it\nbrings to its possessor), mercy is inferior in creatures to charity.\nFor it is better to be united by love to the Supreme Good than to\nremove evil in a creature: \u201cAbove all these things have charity\u201d (Col,\niii. 14). Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external\nworks are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards\ninternal acts.\n\n1209. The Obligation of Mercy.-(a) The natural law itself inculcates\nmercy, but those not influenced by divine revelation have not highly\nesteemed it or practised it. Thus, Plato wished that all the poor might\nbe sent into exile. Virgil thought that freedom from pity was a sign of\nwisdom; Seneca called mercy a vice of the soul; Nietzsche taught that\ncompassion has no place in the morality of the superman.\n\n(b) The divine law commands mercy, especially in the New Testament.\nAssistance of the poor, the widows, the orphans, the sick, the\ncaptives, the slaves and other unfortunates is everywhere insisted on:\n\u201cI will show thee what the Lord requireth of thee: verily to do\njustice, and to love mercy, and to walk solicitous with thy God\u201d\n(Mich., vi. 8).\n\n1210. External Effects of Charity.--Three external effects of charity\nwill now be considered-beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal\ncorrection. These are not distinct virtues, but only separate acts\npertaining to the virtue of charity and proceeding--like love, joy and\npeace--from the same motive of love of God. (a) Thus, beneficence\nnaturally results from charity, since one of the acts of friendship is\nto do good to one\u2019s friend; (b) almsgiving is one of the special ways\nin which beneficence is exercised; (c) fraternal correction is a\nspecies of spiritual almsgiving.\n\n1211. Beneficence.--Not every act of helping others is virtuous, nor is\nall virtuous assistance called beneficence. (a) Thus, to assist others\nin evil is maleficence, nor is it virtuous to help them with an evil\npurpose. Examples: To give money to criminals to help them defeat the\nlaw is participation in crime. To give presents to others in order to\nreceive a return of favor from them is cupidity (Luke, xiv. 12). (b) To\nassist others or to give to them out of compassion for misery, is\nmercy; to do so out of a sense of obligation, is justice; to do so out\nof love of God, is beneficence.\n\n1212. Beneficence is a duty, and like charity should be universal:\n\u201cWhile we have time, let us work good to all men\u201d (Gal., vi. 10); \u201cDo\ngood to them that hate you\u201d (Matt., v. 44). But this does not mean that\nno discrimination is to be used in beneficence, or that impossibilities\nare required.\n\n(a) Not every kind of activity in which others are engaged is deserving\nof assistance, not every kind of suffering of others may be removed.\nExamples: Criminals or enemies of the State are not to be assisted in\ntheir wrongdoing, but one may attempt to bring them to better conduct;\none who has been justly sentenced to prison may not be aided to escape,\nbut he may be visited and consoled and given religious assistance.\n\n(b) Not all can be helped individually; even the richest and most\ngenerous person can benefit only a small percentage of those who are\ndeserving. Charity requires, however, that one be so disposed that one\nwould help all individually, if it were possible, and that one does\nhelp all generally, by praying for both Catholics and non-Catholics.\n\n1213. Since it is impossible to help all individually, beneficence\nshould be regulated by the order of charity (see 1174 sqq.), and\nparticular good should be done to those with whom on account of\nconditions of time or place one is more closely associated. Hence, the\nfollowing general rules are given:\n\n(a) In benefits that pertain to a particular kind of relationship; one\nshould give the preference, other things being equal, to those with\nwhom one has that relationship. Examples: To make a banquet for another\nis a benefit pertaining to friendship, and hence should be shown to one\nwho is a friend, rather than to one who is a business associate, but\nnot an intimate. To support another person is a benefit pertaining to\nkinship, and hence should be shown to a parent, rather than to a\nstranger.\n\n(b) In benefits given to those with whom one has the same kind of\nrelationship, one should give the preference, other things being equal,\nto those nearer in relationship. Example: In dispensing alms, one\nshould help one\u2019s own family rather than distant relatives.\n\n1214. If other things are not equal, the foregoing rules must sometimes\nbe reversed.\n\n(a) When the common good is involved, preference should be given those\nwho represent it, even though others are nearer to one as regards\nprivate good. Hence, a citizen should help the fortunes of his adopted\ncountry rather than those of his mother country; in a civil war one\nshould aid rather one\u2019s comrades than one\u2019s kinsmen who are on the\nopposite side.\n\n(b) When a supreme good of a private person is at stake, one should\nprefer to help him, even if a stranger, rather than another who is a\nfriend, or relative, but who is not in the same distress. Example: One\nshould give one\u2019s loaf to a man dying of starvation rather than to\none\u2019s own father, who is hungry but not starving.\n\n(c) When the means with which a benefit is bestowable belong to\nanother, one must prefer to give back what belongs to the other, even\nif this person is a stranger, rather than use it for the good of a\nfriend or relative. Thus, if a person has stolen money or has borrowed\nmoney from a stranger, he must return it to the owner, rather than make\na present of it to his own wife. An exception would be the case in\nwhich the wife was in dire necessity, whereas the owner was not; but\nthe duty of restitution would remain for the future.\n\n1215. No general rule can be laid down for all cases in which one party\nis nearer to self and the other party more in need, and many such cases\nhave to be decided according to prudent judgment in view of all the\ncircumstances. It should be noted that, though wife and children are\nnearer to one than parents, the latter have a greater claim on charity\nwhen they are in equally extreme necessity, on account of the supreme\nbenefit of life received from them. But ordinarily one is bound rather\nto provide for one\u2019s children (II Cor., xii. 14).\n\n1216. Almsgiving.--Almsgiving is defined: \u201cAssistance to one who is in\nneed, given out of compassion and for the love of God.\u201d Hence, this act\npertains to various virtues. (a) It is elicited by the virtue of mercy,\nwhich means that compassion for misery is the immediate principle which\nproduces almsgiving. (b) It is commanded by the virtue of charity,\nwhich means that love of God is the remote principle or end of an alms,\nfor, as said above (see 1205), mercy itself is an effect of charity (I\nJohn, iii. 17). (c) Secondarily, it may also be commanded by other\nvirtues. Thus, if a person gives an alms to satisfy for his sins, he\nperforms an act of justice; if he gives in order to honor God, he\nperforms an act of religion; if he gives without undue grief over the\nloss of what he gives, he practises liberality.\n\n1217. Qualities Recommended for Almsgiving.--(a) Alms should not be\ngiven ostentatiously (Matt, vi. 2 sqq.), though it is often edifying\nthat they receive publicity (Matt., v. 16); (b) they should be given\ncheerfully (II Cor., ix. 7).\n\n1218. Forms of Almsgiving.--(a) In the strict sense, an alms is a gift\nmade without any obligation of payment or return; (b) in a wide sense,\nalmsgiving includes selling on credit as a favor to a poor customer, a\nloan granted at a low rate of interest or without interest, help in\nsecuring employment, etc. Thus, if a poor man is sufficiently helped by\nthe use of an article, there is no need of making him a present of it.\n\n1219. Almsgiving is to be distinguished, also, from mere giving. (a)\nThus, assistance given the poor out of a bad motive (e.g., to lead them\naway from their religion, to induce them to crime) is sinful; (b)\nassistance given the poor out of a merely natural good motive (e.g.,\npity for their sufferings) is philanthropy, but not charity (I Cor.,\nxiii. 3), and may coexist with the state of hatred of God.\n\n1220. Corporal alms, in the form of bodily necessaries given freely in\nthemselves or in their money equivalent, are of as many kinds as there\nare bodily needs. (a) Hence, the common necessities of food, drink,\nclothing and shelter should be provided as alms to the starving and to\nthose who lack sufficient clothing, or who are without a home. (b)\nSpecial necessities, whether internal (such as sickness) or external\n(such as persecution or imprisonment), should be relieved or assuaged\nby remedies, visits, protection or relief. (c) The necessity of the\nbody after death is that it be cared for with the honor which the\nmemory of the deceased deserves, and hence burial of the dead is\nnumbered among the corporal alms.\n\n1221. Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that\npertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord\nin Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in\nscripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i,\nii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt, xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57\nsqq.).\n\n1222. Spiritual alms, consisting of assistance given those who suffer\nwant in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is\nasked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These\nacts are also of two kinds, and constitute seven spiritual works of\nmercy.\n\n(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not moral,\ninclude ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment,\nand sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for\nsuch cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.\n\n(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its\nconsequences--that is, the offense given and the burdens that result\nfor the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are\nadmonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in\nbearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err\nthrough infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the\nconsequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).\n\n1223. The giving of spiritual alms may suppose superiority or authority\nin the giver over the receiver, or a certain procedure to be followed;\nhence, in the administration of spiritual benefits, the due order of\ntime, place and persons has to be remembered. (a) Thus, in the\ninstruction of the ignorant, it is not every kind of ignorance that is\na defect, but only the ignorance of things one must know; and it is not\nevery person who is to give the needed instruction. (b) In the\ncorrection of sinners, it is not every kind of reproof that is to be\nused, but gentleness and secret admonition should be employed where\npossible (Prov., xxvii. 6).\n\n1224. Comparison of Corporal and Spiritual Alms.--(a) Spiritual alms\nare better, because their nature is higher and they are of greater\nbenefit to the recipient, even though he appreciates them less. Thus,\nit is better to enjoy peace of mind than to feast sumptuously. (h)\nCorporal alms are sometimes more necessary in a particular case, and\nhence they should be attended to first. Thus, for one suffering from\nhunger food is more necessary than words of comfort (James, ii. 15, 16).\n\n1225. Though corporal alms are not spiritual in the assistance they\ngive, they are spiritual in their effects. (a) Thus, they bless the\nrecipient corporally, by relieving his hunger or other need; (b) they\nbless the giver spiritually, since God will reward his charity\n(Ecclus., xxiv, 13, 14), and the person helped will pray for his\nbenefactor (ibid., 15).\n\n1226. The Duty of Giving Alms.--(a) The natural law requires that we do\nto others as we would be done by, and there is no one who does not wish\nthat help be rendered him if he falls into need. Moreover, the common\nwelfare requires that the rich assist the poor, for otherwise there\nwill be discontent and disorder. Hence, even unbelievers are not exempt\nfrom the obligation of almsgiving. (b) The divine law, in both Old and\nNew Testaments, commands almsgiving: \u201cGive alms out of thy substance,\nand turn not away thy face from any poor person\u201d (Tob., iv. 7); \u201cDepart\nfrom Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, for I was hungry, and you\ngave Me not to eat\u201d (Matt., xxv. 41-42); \u201cLet us love, not in word, nor\nin tongue, but in deed and in truth\u201d (I John, iii. 18). Tobias, Dorcas,\nCornelius, and Zacheus are praised for their charitable gifts.\n\n1227. Almsgiving, being an affirmative commandment, does not oblige for\nevery moment of time, but only when right reason calls for it on\naccount of the state of the giver or of the receiver.\n\n(a) The state of the giver requires him to give alms only when he has a\nsuperfluity of goods, for no one is bound to deprive himself of what is\nnecessary for his own use (see 1164, 1169). John the Baptist said to\nthe people: \u201cHe that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath\nnone; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner\u201d (Luke, iii.\n11). \u201cThat which remaineth,\u201d says our Lord, \u201cgive as alms\u201d (Luke, xi.\n41).\n\n(b) The state of the receiver gives him a claim on charity, when he is\nin necessity and unable to help himself. Temporal goods, according to\nthe will of God, are for the benefit of the whole human race; and,\nwhile the ownership of particular goods belongs to the rightful\npossessor, he should not withhold the use of them from those who are in\nneed, when he has more than he needs for his own use. Neither is it\nnecessary that one be asked for an alms; one is obliged to give it when\none knows that one\u2019s neighbor is in want, though unable or ashamed to\nbeg for help.\n\n1228. It is not a precept, therefore, but only a counsel, that one give\nalms in other cases. (a) Thus, when one is in equal need oneself and\nhas no superfluous goods, one may give to another; (b) when one\u2019s\nneighbor is not in need, or is able to help himself, one may still give\nto him out of charity, if he is deserving (see 1169).\n\n1229. Superfluities are those goods that remain over and above what are\nnecessary for life, or the maintenance of one\u2019s state of life justly\nacquired and socially useful.\n\n(a) Necessaries of life are the goods one must have to provide food,\nclothing and home for oneself and one\u2019s family. Among necessaries of\nlife we may include what one has to set aside for old age, sickness,\nincrease of family, and the future sustenance of dependents who will\nneed it (II Cor., xii. 14). But they should not be extended to include\nimaginary cases, or all the possible cases of personal need that may\narise in the future; otherwise, one is guilty of that exaggerated\nsolicitude for the morrow which our Lord forbids (Matt, vi. 34).\n\n(b) Necessaries of state are the goods a person must have to keep up\nhis position and that of his family according to the standard of living\nof his class. This includes provision for the education and advancement\nof one\u2019s children, for hospitality, adornment of home, and the care and\nimprovement of one\u2019s business; but it does not include provision for\nexcessive pleasures or luxuries, or improbable future opportunities of\nbettering one\u2019s condition; otherwise, even the wealthiest person might\nsay that all his money was tied up and that he had no superfluous goods.\n\n1230. What is necessary for the decency of particular stations in life?\n(a) This does not consist in any fixed amount, for, even when\nconsiderable additions to or subtractions from a person\u2019s wealth have\nbeen made, he may retain and support the same social rank. (b) It\nconsists, therefore, in the amount sufficient for him to maintain,\naccording to the opinion of prudent men, what is becoming in one of his\nclass. Thus, one\u2019s position may require that one do much entertaining\nor keep up an expensive household, or it may require only that one live\nmoderately.\n\n1231. The giving in alms of goods for which the giver himself has need\nis governed by the following rules:\n\n(a) Necessaries of life should be given away to another, as a matter of\nprecept, if the common good is bound up with the life of that other,\nbut not with one\u2019s own life; they may be given away to another, as a\nmatter of counsel, when the common good does not require it, but the\nhigher good of virtue invites one to sacrifice one\u2019s life for one\u2019s\nneighbor (probable opinion). Examples: One should give away one\u2019s last\nloaf to save the life of a leader on whom the salvation of his people\ndepends. One may make the same sacrifice, if one is single and without\ndependents, and another is married and has a dependent family. But one\nmay not give away what is necessary for the life of one\u2019s family (I\nTim., v. 8).\n\n(b) Necessaries of state, at least in part (see 1251), should be given\naway to another, as a matter of precept, if the public good or the life\nof a private individual are at stake, or if that which is given in alms\ncan be easily recovered and will now prevent a very grave calamity;\nthey may be given away, as a matter of counsel, if the higher good of\nvirtue invites one to embrace voluntary poverty: \u201cIf thou wouldst be\nperfect, go sell all that thou hast and give to the poor\u201d (Matt., xix.\n21). Examples: One should offer one\u2019s fortunes in support of one\u2019s\ngovernment, if in some crisis the nation cannot otherwise be saved. One\nmay give up riches and become poor in order to follow Christ in the\nreligious life.\n\n1232. Superfluities of one\u2019s state are the goods from which the precept\nof almsgiving requires that assistance ordinarily be given. But the\nmere fact that one has a superfluity does not oblige one to give alms.\nAs in every virtuous act, so also in almsgiving there must be not only\nan object according to reason, but also circumstances according to\nreason. Hence, one who has a superfluity is bound to give alms only\nwhen the proper conditions of time, place, person, etc., are present.\n(a) As regards time, a person is not obliged to devote to almsgiving\nthe time that is needed for other duties. (b) As to persons, a person\nis not obliged to give alms, if there is no needy person known to him.\n\n1233. As to need, we may distinguish three classes of persons:\n\n(a) Those in apparent need are such as pretend poverty, sickness, or\nmisfortune, in order to get sympathy and financial aid (e.g.,\nprofessional beggars). Alms should not be given persons of this kind,\nsince they take what would be given to the really poor and needy.\nRather they should be exposed and punished.\n\n(b) Those in real need through choice should not be helped, if they\ntake to begging because they are too lazy to work, or find it\nprofitable to live off others; for they have no right to beg, being\nable to help themselves, and it would be wrong to encourage them in\nidleness and an imposition on others (II Thess., iii. 10). But those\nwho are voluntarily poor for Christ\u2019s sake, whether they belong to a\nreligious order or not, are worthy of respect and it is meritorious to\nassist them.\n\n(c) Those who are in real need against their will, should be assisted;\nfor, even though they became destitute through their own fault, they\nare in fact unable to help themselves now.\n\n1234. Regarding money obtained under the false pretense of poverty and\nthe duty of restitution, the following rules may be given: (a) If a\nperson obtains considerable alms by pretending to be blind, disabled,\nin great want, etc., and he is not afflicted or in need, he should give\nback the money to the donors or, if this is impossible, to the poor,\nsince the donors wished to help the poor, not to encourage idlers. (b)\nIf one obtains only a small amount under a false pretense of poverty,\nsome moralists say there is no duty of restitution, since the donor may\nbe presumed to give unconditionally in the case of minute sums;\nlikewise, if a beggar is really poor but exaggerates his need, it does\nnot seem that he is bound to restitution, for those who give alms expect\na certain amount of romancing from tramps and other professional\nbeggars.\n\n1235. What is one\u2019s duty in cases of doubtful need? (a) Minute\ninquiries are inexpedient, since the really deserving are often\nunwilling to publish their needs; (b) refusal of alms except in cases\nwhere one is certain of the need, is not a good general rule to follow,\nsince it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a\nworthy one be refused.\n\n1236. There are three degrees of corporal need (cfr. 1165). (a) A\nperson is said to be in extreme need, when he is in manifest danger of\nlosing his life, if help is not given him at once. This does not mean,\nhowever, that a person is not in extreme need until he is breathing his\nlast breath; for at that moment he is beyond the reach of human aid.\n(b) A person is in grave need, when he is in probable danger of death,\nor is in manifest danger of some very serious misfortune, such as\nsevere sickness, amputation of some member, long and bitter\nimprisonment, insanity, loss of good name, reduction from wealth to\npoverty, destruction of home by fire, etc. (c) A person is in common\nneed, when he suffers the inconvenience of poverty, such as being\nobliged to beg, to deprive himself of many things, to wear poor clothes\nor to eat ordinary victuals, but is not in danger of any serious loss.\n\n1237. Rules on Giving Alms from the Superfluities of One\u2019s State.--(a)\nTo those who are in extreme or grave necessity alms must be given in\neach individual case, for these cases are rare, and the persons in need\nhave a personal claim on one\u2019s charity when this is the sole means of\nsaving them from death or other great evil. Example: Last year Titus\nsaved a mother from death and her child from disease by giving his\nmoney and services free of charge. This would not exempt him from the\nduty of doing a like charity, if a like necessity presents itself now.\n\n(b) To those who are in common necessity alms must be given from time\nto time--now to one, now to another, as prudence dictates--but there is\nno obligation for an individual case. Even the richest man could not\ngive to all who are in common need, and their want is not so pressing\nthat any one of them can be said to have an individual claim.\n\n1238. Gravity of the Obligations to Give Alms.--(a) For cases of\nextreme and grave necessity, the obligation of almsgiving is grave.\nThere is general agreement among theologians on this point, since the\nloss suffered by the neighbor is serious and the withholding of help\nindicates a lack of charity (I John, iii. 17). Example: The priest and\nthe levite who passed by the wounded man on the road to Jericho were\nguilty, from the nature of their act, of mortal sin.\n\n(b) For cases of common necessity, the obligation of almsgiving, as it\nappears, is also grave; for it seldom happens that one is called on to\nassist those who are in extreme or grave necessity, whereas almsgiving\nis inculcated as an ordinary duty, and the reasons given by our Lord in\nMatt., xxv. 41-46, for exclusion from heaven seem to be neglect of alms\nin common necessity. But some theologians hold that the obligation is\nonly light, since the need is light; and, since these authorities are\nnumerous and of repute, a confessor could not refuse absolution to a\nrich man who refused on principle to give anything to those in common\nnecessity. Such a one should be advised, rather than reproved, on this\npoint.\n\n1239. From what was said above, the following conclusions may be drawn\nabout the gravity of the sin of refusing alms: (a) It is certainly a\nmortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably\nalso a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need,\n(b) It is not a mortal sin to refuse an alms in a particular case, if\none is not sure of the obligation (e.g., if there is doubt about one\u2019s\nability to give the alms or the other\u2019s need), or if it seems that\nothers will give assistance, or that the need will disappear, or that\none will suffer some serious inconvenience by giving, etc.\n\n1240. Refusal of Alms and Restitution.--(a) The mere refusal of an alms\ndoes not oblige one to make restitution. For restitution is the giving\nback to another of what strictly belongs to him, and it cannot be said\nthat a poor person has a strict right to a gift from another. A\nviolation of charity may be gravely sinful, and yet not oblige to\nrestitution. (b) The refusal of an alms, if joined with injustice, does\noblige one to make restitution. Thus, if by threats or force one\nprevents a starving man from taking the food that has been denied him,\ninjustice is committed; for in extreme necessity one has the strict\nright to take what is necessary, and reparation should be made if this\nis prevented.\n\n1241. Alms given from ill-gotten goods are sometimes lawful, sometimes\nunlawful.\n\n(a) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because they belong to\nanother and the present possessor has no right to keep them, it is not\nlawful to give them as alms, for they must be returned to the owner. An\nexception would have to be made, however, for the case of extreme\nnecessity, for in such a case the person in danger of death would have\na right prior to that of the owner not in need. Example: It is unlawful\nto give stolen money as an alms to the poor, when one is able to\nrestore it to the rightful owner.\n\n(b) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because both giver and\nreceiver acted against law and forfeited their rights to possession,\nthe former has no claim to restitution, nor the latter to retention,\nand the goods ought to be devoted to alms. Example: If a simoniacal\ntransaction is forbidden under pain of loss of the price paid and\nreceived, the receiver is obliged to give the money to the poor.\n\n(c) If the acquisition was not unlawful, but the manner through which\nit was made was unlawful, the gain is shameful, but still it belongs to\nthe one who has earned it, and may be devoted to alms. Example: Titus\nhired Balbus to work on Sundays. The violation of the Sunday law was a\nsin, but the labor given was serviceable to Titus and difficult to\nBalbus. Hence, the latter is not bound to give back the money, but may\nkeep it and use it for a good purpose.\n\n1242. Though shameful gain may be used for almsgiving, it should not be\ndevoted to sacred purposes, when this will cause scandal or be\nirreverent to religion. Thus, the chief priests would not accept the\n\u201cblood money\u201d of Judas for the use of the temple (Matt., xxvii. 6),\nbecause the law forbade the offering of gifts that were an abomination\nto the Lord (Deut., xxiii. 18; Ecclus., xxxiv. 23).\n\n1243. The Proceeds of Gambling and Almsgiving.--(a) Profits made from\ngambling may not be used for alms, when one is bound to restore them to\nthe loser. Thus, according to natural law he who wins money at cards or\nsimilar games from a minor or other person who has not the right to\ndispose of money, or who wins through fraud, must give back the\nwinnings. Likewise, restitution is due according to some, if the civil\nlaw makes such aleatory contracts null and void; but others deny this.\n(b) Profits made from gambling may be devoted to alms, when according\nto law one has a right to them, as when one has played for recreation,\nwith moderation and with fairness to the loser.\n\n1244. Persons who may give alms are all those who have a right to\ndispose of goods as gifts. Others who have no such general right (e.g.,\nreligious, wives, children and servants), may also give alms as\nfollows: (a) They may give alms from any goods that belong to them, and\nof which they have the control. Thus, a wife may give alms from money\nwhich is her own, by inheritance, earnings, etc. (b) They may give alms\nfrom such goods as are placed in their charge and dispensation. Thus,\nthe procurator of a religious house has the right to give alms with\npermission of his superior and according to his Constitution (Canon\n537). A religious who is a parish priest may administer and dispense\nparish alms (Canon 630, Sec.4). (c) They may give alms with express or\nimplied permission. Thus, children may give articles of food to the\npoor, when their parents consent. (d) They may give alms without\npermission in a case of extreme need. Thus, a wife could make use of\nher husband\u2019s money without his consent, if this should be necessary to\nsave a life.\n\n1245. The right of a wife to give alms from her husband\u2019s earnings is\nas follows: (a) from the money given her for the support of herself and\nthe family, the wife may give reasonable alms; (b) from the common\nmoney of the family she may give alms with her husband\u2019s express or\npresumed consent. But, if he is miserly and unwilling to give alms, she\nmay nevertheless use what is reasonable according to the family\nresources for almsgiving (e.g., in helping her impoverished parents).\n\n1246. The right of servants to give alms from the goods of their\nemployer is as follows: (a) the rule is that servants have no right to\ngive away anything that belongs to their employer without his express\npermission, for, if permission could be presumed, the property of\nemployers would not be safe; (b) an exception to the rule is made for\nsuch things as are to be thrown away (e.g., leavings of the table),\nsince if they are given in alms the proprietor suffers no loss.\n\n1247. Since charity should be universal, no class of persons, such as\nstrangers, unbelievers or sinners, may be excluded from the benefit of\nalmsgiving (Matt, v. 45). However, charity is also well ordered, and\nhence there is a preference to be observed, as follows:\n\n(a) Other things being equal, one should favor those who are nearer to\noneself by bonds of kinship, friendship, etc., since their claim on\none\u2019s charity is greater. Charity begins at home.\n\n(b) If other things (such as worthiness, need or public utility) are on\nthe side of those not related by kinship, friendship, etc., the order\nof preference may be reversed. Thus, if a person had to choose between\nhelping a distant relative for whom he was not specially responsible,\nand who was a worthless fellow, or who was not in great need or who was\nnot of great value to the community, and helping a stranger, who was\nmost deserving, or in dire distress, or of great value to the\ncommunity, the latter should be assisted rather than the former.\n\n(c) In case of two strangers in equal poverty, one should help first\nthe one who is more worthy or who feels his distress more. Thus, a\nperson who is poor through misfortune is more deserving than one who\ngambled his money away; those who were once wealthy feel the sufferings\nof poverty more than those who are inured to a life of privation.\n\n1248. Is it permissible for one appointed to distribute alms to keep\nsome himself, if he is really poor? (a) If the persons are designated\nto whom the alms are to be given, the distributor must give only to\nthem; (b) if it is left to the discretion of the distributor, he may\nkeep a reasonable alms for himself.\n\n1249. The amount that should be given in alms has to be measured\naccording to the income of the giver and the need of the receiver.\n\n(a) As to the income of the giver, he should give in proportion to his\nincome: \u201cAccording to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give\nabundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly\na little\u201d (Tob., iv. 9). A rich man who spends more in the barber shop\non cosmetics, etc., than he gives to the poor, and a poor man who gives\nmore towards alms than to the feeding of his own family, are not giving\naccording to their means.\n\n(b) As to the need of the receiver, a person should give his share\ntowards providing for the case before him. Thus, if there is no one\nelse who can or will give, and a neighbor is in grave necessity, a\ncharitable person will bear the whole expense, as was done by the good\nSamaritan. But if the necessity is ordinary (as in the case of street\nbeggars), or there are others who will help, a smaller alms suffices.\nSteady employment is a better charity than temporary doles, inasmuch as\nit gives permanent assistance.\n\n1250. Hence, in the following cases alms are excessive: (a) When,\noutside the instances given in 1231, one gives away all the necessaries\nof one\u2019s life or station. The poor widow who gave all her living (Luke,\nxxi. 1-4) is praised, but doubtless she was able somehow to obtain\nenough to provide for her own life. (b) Alms are excessive when one\ngives from one\u2019s superfluities so much that the recipients are spoiled\nand encouraged to do nothing for themselves, For the purpose of\nalmsgiving is not that those who have wealth be impoverished and others\nenabled to live in luxury, but that the poor be relieved of suffering\nand the rich gain the merit of charity (II Cor., viii. 13).\n\n1251. Regarding the obligation of giving all the goods of one\u2019s station\nin life or of one\u2019s superfluities, the following points should be noted:\n\n(a) Some theologians hold that, in a case of extreme necessity, one is\nbound to give all the goods necessary to one\u2019s state of life, since a\nneighbor\u2019s life is a more important good than one\u2019s own position in\nlife. Others deny this on the ground that one is not bound, even for\npreserving one\u2019s own life, to have recourse to extraordinary means and\nso lose the rank and style of living one has. Thus, a self-supporting\nworkingman would not be obliged to reduce himself to beggary in order\nto prolong the life of a dying person. A well-to-do person is not\nobliged to sell his office, conveyance, books, and other things needed\nfor his business or profession, in order to rescue a captive held for\nransom by bandits.\n\n(b) There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all\none\u2019s superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases of extreme or\ngrave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is\nnot obligatory, since the needs of the poor will be sufficiently\nrelieved if all who have means give something from their superfluities.\nMoreover, the retention of some superfluous goods is necessary for the\npromotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, and, by increasing\nnational wealth, this policy indirectly benefits the poor.\n\n1252. Ecclesiastical law, however, requires all clerics who enjoy a\nbenefice to give all that remains over and above from the returns of\nthe benefice, after they have provided for their own decent\nmaintenance, to the poor or to pious causes. This obligation is held as\ngrave. It will be treated below when we come to the special duties of\nthe clergy.\n\n1253. Is there any definite amount or percentage, then, which should be\ncontributed to alms?\n\n(a) For a case of extreme or grave necessity, one should contribute\nenough, according to one\u2019s ability, either in conjunction with others\nor alone (if others will not help), to give relief. Thus, if a neighbor\nis about to die of starvation, a charitable man will give food free of\ncharge. If a poor man is about to be treated unjustly, a charitable\nlawyer will give him advice without charge. But it is not necessary\nthat one provide extraordinary remedies or helps--for example, that one\npay the expenses of a trip to Europe for a poor person whose health\nwould be benefitted by the travel.\n\n(b) For cases of common necessity, St. Alphonsus held that one should\ngive two per cent of what remains from the yearly income after the\nnecessities of life and station have been taken care of. But other\nmoralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically,\nand that only the general direction can be given that one should be\ngenerous according to one\u2019s means, and regulate one\u2019s yearly alms\naccording to the prevalence of poverty.\n\n1254. Is it better to give a little to many, or much to one person in\nneed? (a) If the one person is in great need, and others are only in\nslight need, it is better to give to the one in great need. Example: If\none has ten dollars to give in alms, it is better to buy an overcoat\nfor Titus who is shivering from the cold, than to give ten one-dollar\nbills to ten men who need new collars and neckties. (b) If the need is\nequal, it is better to divide the alms, for thus more distress is\nalleviated and the danger of spoiling a recipient with overmuch bounty\nis avoided. Example: Caius has $30,000 to give in charity and there are\nthree deserving institutions of charity known to him, all of which are\nin great need--a hospital, an orphan asylum and a school. He ought to\ndivide his money between the three.\n\n1255. The Time for Giving Alms.-(a) One should give at one time all the\namount of one\u2019s alms for a certain period, if one is able to do this,\nand there is a need that calls for it--\u201cHe gives twice who gives\nquickly\u201d (Prov., iii. 28)--for the poor may perish or may be driven to\nacts of desperation or violence, if help is postponed. (b) One may\ndistribute one\u2019s almsgiving if there is no urgent call for it--that is,\none may make partial contributions at various times, retaining\nmeanwhile money for almsdeeds in order to invest it for future\ncharities, or to await greater needs to which it may be applied, etc.\n\n1256. The Manner of Giving Alms.--(a) One gives alms directly when one\nministers relief personally to the needy, giving food to the starving\nand medicine to the sick, helping to put out a fire, etc. (b) One gives\nalms indirectly when one pays taxes for the support of alms-houses,\npublic hospitals, orphan asylums, homes for the aged, the insane, etc.;\nwhen one contributes to charitable collections or drives or to\norganizations for relief (such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society);\nwhen one assists or promotes movements for the free education of those\nwho cannot pay, for the betterment of living and working condition of\nlaborers, for security against loss of employment, pensions for the\naged, etc.\n\n1257. Public charity done by the State is useful and necessary under\nthe conditions of modern life, but it does not and cannot take the\nplace of charity done by the Church or by private individuals.\n\n(a) State-administered charity does not reach all, or even the most\ndeserving, cases of need. Hence, those who pay their taxes for the\nsupport of state charities are not thereby exempted from the obligation\nof contributing to cases they may meet, especially of extreme or grave\nnecessity. The payment of these taxes, however, diminishes need, and so\nit also diminishes the amount one is bound to give in alms.\n\n(b) State charity provides for the corporal needs of the recipient, and\nit is imposed as compulsory on the giver. Hence, it cannot take the\nplace of alms given by the Church or by individuals that will care for\nboth soul and body, and that are given cheerfully and received\ngratefully.\n\n1258. Fraternal Correction.--Fraternal correction is defined: \u201cAn act\nof charity and mercy by which one uses suitable words or other means in\norder to convert one\u2019s neighbor from sin to virtue.\u201d\n\n(a) Thus, it is an act of charity, for it is a love of our neighbor and\nthe desire of his spiritual welfare that prompts this correction.\nHence, the admonition of a sinner for his own good differs from a\ncorrection administered to a wrongdoer for the good of another or of\nthe public; the former is fraternal correction and is an act of\ncharity, while the latter is judicial correction and is an act of\njustice.\n\n(b) Fraternal correction is an act of mercy, for, just as feeding the\nhungry and other corporal alms remove bodily misery, so does admonition\nof sinners remove spiritual misery.\n\n(c) Fraternal correction uses suitable words or other means, for while\nit proceeds from charity and mercy, it must be regulated by prudence.\nIt is not an easy matter to correct another successfully, and hence the\nneed of good judgment as to the means to be employed, whether they\nshall be words or equivalent signs (e.g., sad looks, a gesture of\ndisapproval, a change of subject of a sinful conversation, or refusal\nof help), and whether one shall use reproof, instruction, counsel, or\nwarning.\n\n(d) Fraternal correction aims at turning a neighbor from sin to virtue.\nIt is the proper remedy for sins of negligence, as judicial correction\nis for sins of malice. It is applied, also, chiefly to the cure of sin\nthat has already been committed; but it should be extended so as to\ninclude the prevention of sin in the future, since there is no less an\nobligation of preventing than of removing sin. Hence, those who are in\ndangerous occasions receive fraternal correction when a charitable\nwarning is given.\n\n(e) Fraternal correction is given to a neighbor (i.e., to an\nindividual), and so it differs from the general censure of vice that is\ngiven by preachers, whose duty it is to correct sins that are\nprevalent, provided this be done prudently, in such a way as to effect\ngood and not harm. Unpopularity or other such handicaps do not excuse a\npreacher from the duty of correction.\n\n1259. Fraternal correction is a grave duty, and more important than\nthat of almsgiving. (a) The natural law requires that a person should\ndo unto others as he would wish them to do unto himself, and everyone\nought to wish that, if he needs correction, it will be given him. Even\nthe pagans proclaimed the need of correction. Seneca desired to have a\nmonitor who, by advice and reproof, would guard him against the dangers\nof evil examples and conversations; and Plautus said that a friend who\nrefuses to chide the faults of his friend is himself worthy of blame.\n\n(b) The divine positive law also commands that one should correct one\u2019s\nbrother in order to save him from another offense (Ecclus., xix. 13,\n14), and to win him back to good (Matt. xviii. 15), that the spiritual\nshould instruct with mildness those who have committed some\ntransgression (Gal, vi. 1), that a sinner should not be treated as an\nenemy, but admonished as a brother (II Thess., iii. 15).\n\n1260. Does the duty of fraternal correction oblige one to go out and\nseek a person who is living a life of sin? (a) If the sinner is under\none\u2019s care, so that one is responsible for him, there is a duty to seek\nhim as long as there is hope of amendment; for the good shepherd goes\nafter the lost sheep (Matt., xviii. 12, 13). Hence, parents, pastors and\nsuperiors must try to win back their subjects from the ways of sin. (b)\nIf the sinner is not under one\u2019s care, there is no duty to seek him\nout; for obligations that are owed to our neighbor in general, but not\nto any determinate person, do not require that we go out to look for\nthe persons to be aided, but only that we aid those whom we meet.\nHence, a private person is not obliged to frequent the haunts of vice\nand crime in order to reform those who are there; but the community at\nlarge has duties regarding such cases.\n\n1261. Since the precept of fraternal correction is affirmative, it does\nnot oblige for every time and place; acts of virtue must be so\nperformed that not only the object and the motive shall be good, but\nthe circumstances also should be suitable. But the object and motive of\ncorrection (viz., the conversion of a sinner) are primary, and the\ncircumstances of time, place, etc., secondary considerations. (a)\nHence, correction is good and a duty when it will serve to convert or\nimprove a sinner, now or later, although it may be imperfect as to some\nof the circumstances. (b) Correction is not good, nor a duty, when it\nwill not serve to convert the sinner, even though other circumstances\nwould seem to call for it (Ecclus., xxxii. 6). Consequently, a person\nought not to correct when either he or the other person is under the\ninfluence of anger, lest matters be made worse. This, of course, is\nsaid of fraternal, not of judicial correction; for a judge or other\nsuperior must condemn even when the culprit will not be made better, in\norder to restrain him from evil and to provide for the common good, the\nprotection of justice, and the avoidance of scandal.\n\n1262. In the following cases fraternal correction defeats its own\npurpose: (a) when the sinner will not be bettered by the correction,\nfor his continuance in sin will become graver by reason of his\nrejection of the admonition; (b) when the sinner will become hardened\nand embittered by correction, and as a result commit more numerous or\nmore serious sins. Thus, if one knows that a blasphemer is only made\nworse by scolding or remonstrances, it is a sin to attempt to correct\nhim as to those ways: \u201cRebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee\u201d (Prov.,\nix. 8).\n\n1263. The duty of fraternal correction depends, therefore, on the\nknowledge or opinion one has about the success it will have. Hence, the\nfollowing cases may occur: (a) If one is certain that the correction\nwill be beneficial, one should give it; if one is certain it will not\nbe beneficial, one should omit it. (b) If it is likely that the\nadmonition will be profitable, and certain that it will not be\npositively harmful, it should be given, for a physician in order to\nhelp a sick person should give a remedy that is harmless, even though\nonly probably beneficial, if there is nothing else that can be done.\n(c) If it is doubtful whether the admonition will do any good, and also\ndoubtful whether it will do harm (e.g., when one is dealing with a\nstranger, whose character one does not know), one should weigh the good\nand the evil and decide accordingly, as will be explained in the next\nparagraph.\n\n1264. Cases of doubt concerning the advantage of a fraternal correction\nmay occur as follows: (a) If the good expected is superior to the evil\nthat is feared, one should give the correction. Example: If it seems\nthat a sinner, if admonished, may suffer great confusion or be for a\ntime estranged, but may also be finally converted, the good result of\nconversion is to be preferred to prevention of confusion or\nestrangement. If it seems doubtful whether correction will help or hurt\na dying man, the good of his salvation should be preferred to the good\nof freedom from a new sin. (b) If the good expected and the evil feared\nare about equal, the correction should be omitted, since the negative\nprecept of not injuring a neighbor outweighs the affirmative precept of\ndoing him a service.\n\n1265. When is sin committed by omitting fraternal correction? (a) If\nthe correction is omitted out of charity, the omission is good and\nmeritorious. Example: Titus omits to correct Sempronius, because he\nthinks the reproof would do harm to the latter or to others, or because\nhe awaits a more favorable occasion. (b) If the correction is omitted\ncontrary to charity (i.e., because a person hates his neighbor or\ndisregards his spiritual welfare), the omission is a mortal sin.\nExample: Caius neglects to correct Sempronius, because he prefers to\nsee Sempronius go to ruin rather than lose his friendship or incur his\nenmity. (c) If the correction is omitted in spite of charity, the\nomission is a venial sin. Example: Balbus, who is not a superior, fails\nto correct Sempronius, because through frailty he fears to give\noffense, or to be considered over-bold, but he prefers the latter\u2019s\nspiritual welfare to his own human fears and interests, and would give\nthe correction, if he felt that it was absolutely necessary.\n\n1266. The sin committed by delaying fraternal correction is to be\njudged according to the rules just given about omission of correction.\nBut is it lawful to put off correction in the hope that the sinner,\nthrough experience of the evil effects of sin, may become more\ntractable? (a) If there is hope of present amendment through\ncorrection, this should not be delayed; otherwise, one is careless\nabout the honor of God, the edification of others, and the possible\nhardening of the sinner or his death in the midst of his sins. (b) If\nthere is no probability of present amendment through correction, one\ncan only wait in the hope that the experience of the evils of sin may\nbring the prodigal back to God.\n\n1267. It is not often necessary for one who is not a superior to make\nfraternal correction, since there are many conditions that must exist\nbefore one is obliged to it. These conditions include the purpose to be\nattained, of which we have just spoken, and the proper circumstances,\nwhich are as follows: (a) the fault to be corrected should be a known\nand serious sin; (b) the person to give the correction should be one\nwho has the right and duty to correct; (c) the manner of giving the\ncorrection should be such as will promote the end in view.\n\n1268. One should not attempt to correct a fault, unless one is morally\nsure that a fault has been committed, or is about to be committed. For\nthis reason the scrupulous, who are inclined to suspect or see evil\nwhere there is none, are generally excused from the duty of making\ncorrections. Reasons why doubt, fear, suspicion or rumor do not\nsuffice, are: (a) correction is not pleasant to the one corrected, and,\nif his guilt is not provable, he will be able to argue with the\ncorrector, and so quarrels and enmities will result; (b) charity bids\nus to give the benefit of the doubt to a neighbor, and, if this is not\ndone, the one who is being corrected will be able to correct the\ncorrector on account of uncharitable suspicions.\n\n1269. Is one obliged, therefore, to make inquiries into the conduct of\nthose whom one suspects of wrongdoing?\n\n(a) If there is question of judicial correction, the public authority\nis bound in justice to examine juridically into matters of doubt before\nacting.\n\n(b) If there is question of fraternal correction, a parent or other\nsuperior is bound in charity to make paternal inquiries into the\nconduct of his subjects; for, as a father does not wait until his\nchildren ask for corporal goods but inquires about their needs, so\nneither should he wait until their spiritual distress is brought to his\nattention. The superior here should avoid the extremes of suspicion, on\nthe one hand, which will lead him to act rashly and win for him the\nhatred of his subjects, and of over-trustfulness, on the other hand,\nwhich will foster all kinds of secret irregularities. Likewise, he\nshould not betray a special watchfulness about one individual that will\nbe harmful to the latter\u2019s reputation.\n\n(c) If there is question of fraternal correction, private individuals\nshould not inquire into the affairs of others. Those who go about\nspying on or shadowing others, even if their purpose is to reform, are\nacting against charity to themselves and to the persons they wish to\nimprove; their own affairs will suffer, since the number who need\nreformation is large, and the person who is being investigated will be\nannoyed or otherwise injured: \u201cLie not in wait, nor seek after\nwickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest\u201d (Prov., xxiv.\n15).\n\n1270. The kinds of faults that call for fraternal correction are as\nfollows: (a) grave sins should be corrected, for otherwise one allows a\nsoul to perish that might have been saved (Matt., xviii. 14, 15), (b)\nslight sins or transgressions of rules should also be corrected, when\nthey are the occasion of grave scandal or disorder in a community, and\nsuperiors who are negligent about this commit mortal sin; (c) slight\nsins or transgressions should not be corrected in ordinary cases, for\nthese faults are so numerous that, if one had to correct them, an\nintolerable burden would be laid on everyone, Persons who scold and\nlecture over every trifling misdeed are regarded as pests and do more\nharm than good.\n\n1271. The purpose of fraternal correction is to save one who is in\ndanger of losing his soul. Hence, it should not be restricted to those\nsins that are an offense to the corrector, but it should extend also to\nsins that are against God, the neighbor, or the offender himself.\n\n1272. Since fraternal correction is given for the purpose of converting\na sinner from the evil of his ways, it is not called for when one\u2019s\nneighbor is not a sinner, strictly speaking, or has already reformed.\nThus, there is no need of this correction in the following cases: (a)\nwhen a person sins through ignorance and is not guilty of formal sin;\n(b) when a person who was a sinner in the past has given up his old\nways.\n\n1273. A person who sins from vincible ignorance should not be corrected\nunless the two following conditions are present: (a) there must be hope\nof amendment, otherwise the admonition would only aggravate the\nsinner\u2019s guilt; (b) there must be no greater evil that will result from\nthe admonition and correction.\n\n1274. A person who sins from invincible ignorance is not guilty of\nformal sin, and hence, as said above, he is not a subject for fraternal\ncorrection. But charity often requires that he be instructed especially\nby superiors, confessors, etc., with a view to the prevention of\nvarious evils. These evils are of the following kinds: (a) injury to\nGod, as when a person unacquainted with the language uses expressions\nthat are blasphemous; (b) injury to self, as when a child not\nunderstanding the power of liquor becomes intoxicated; (c) injury to\nthe neighbor, as when a person who does not know that it is a fast day\ncauses scandal by not keeping the fast.\n\n1275. If there is hope that the instruction will have a good result,\none should instruct the invincibly ignorant in order to prevent injury\nto God, themselves, or their neighbor; but, if it seems that an\ninstruction will do only harm or more harm than good, it should be\nomitted. The duty of instruction rests especially on superiors, such as\nparents, teachers, confessors. These principles are applied to various\ncases as follows:\n\n(a) A material sin may have been committed in the past. Titus through\ninadvertence ate meat on a day of abstinence, but gave no scandal;\nBalbus did the same thing, and this caused considerable scandal. Now,\nthere might be an obligation of telling Balbus what he did in order to\nrepair the scandal, but no such obligation would exist in the case of\nTitus. Sempronius and Caius both married invalidly, but are in good\nfaith. If Sempronius is told about his marriage, matters can be easily\nrectified; but if Caius is informed that his marriage is null, he will\nabandon his putative wife and his family, and there will be serious\ndiscords and scandals. Hence, Sempronius should be told, but not Caius.\n\n(b) Material sin may be about to be committed against the natural or\ndivine law. Titus is about to destroy what he thinks is an abandoned\nand useless picture, but which is in reality a very valuable work of\nart belonging to Balbus. Caius is going to the altar to be married;\nClaudius knows of a diriment impediment to the marriage, but cannot\nmake it known without causing a scene and giving great scandal. Titus\nshould be instructed, but it is a duty to say nothing to Caius.\n\n(c) Material sin may be about to be committed against human law.\nSempronius sees Claudius and others eating meat on a day of abstinence,\nwhich they have forgotten. He also sees Father Balbus, who has\nforgotten to put on an alb or a chasuble, going to the altar to say\nMass. There is no obligation to call the attention of Claudius to the\nday of abstinence, but for the sake of respect to divine worship the\nattention of Father Balbus should be directed to the missing vestments.\n\n1276. Certain past sins do not demand fraternal correction: (a) those\nsins that have been repented of, especially if there is no danger of a\nrelapse (e.g., a wife should not be always reminding her now sober\nhusband that he was addicted to drink before he met her); (b) those\nsins that will in all probability be remedied shortly without one\u2019s\nintervention. Hence, it is not necessary to reprove Titus because he\ndrank too much, if he is not careless about his salvation and will soon\napproach the Sacraments, or if his parents or wife are better fitted to\nmake the correction and will not fail to do so.\n\n1277. To what persons may correction be given? (a) Judicial correction\ncan be given only to one\u2019s subjects, since it supposes authority; (b)\nfraternal correction can be given, not only to inferiors and equals,\nbut also to superiors. For charity should be shown to all those who are\nin need of assistance, and, the higher the office, the greater the\ndanger. Superiors who are giving scandal or doing harm to others should\nbe remonstrated with by their equals, or, if need be, by their\nsubjects. Fraternal correction among the clergy is especially\nadvantageous.\n\n1278. When fraternal correction is given to a superior: (a) the\nsuperior should take a proper correction with gratitude and humility,\nimitating St. Peter when reproved by St. Paul (Gal., ii. 11); (b) the\ninferior should give the correction without boldness or harshness, but\nrespectfully and mildly: \u201cAn elderly man rebuke not, but entreat him as\na father\u201d (I Tim., v. 1). It is better that the person giving the\ncorrection be himself of some standing, lest the act seem to proceed\nfrom contempt, and so only embitter the superior who is at fault.\nExample: Children should plead with parents who steal, get drunk or\nneglect religion, to mend their ways.\n\n1279. What persons may administer correction? (a) Judicial correction\nas just said can be given only by a superior; (b) fraternal correction\nmay be given by any person who is not so unfitted that a correction\nfrom him will necessarily be useless or harmful. It is not required,\nhowever, that one be immaculate, for if immunity from all sin were\nnecessary in a corrector, who could reprove delinquents (I John, i. 8)?\n\n1280. The fact that a person is known to be a sinner, or not in the\nstate of grace, or guilty of the same things he reproves, does not\nunfit him for giving a fraternal correction; because, in spite of his\nown sinfulness, he may retain a right judgment and so be able to\ncorrect wrongdoing. In the following cases, however, correction made by\na sinner is reprehensible, on account of circumstances other than that\nof the person: (a) the motive of the correction is sinful, when the\nsinner corrects only in order to distract attention from himself, to\nconceal bad deeds by good words, to practise revenge, etc.; (b) the\nmode of the correction is sinful when the sinner corrects with pride,\nas if he himself were above correction: \u201cWherein thou judgest another\nthou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou\njudgest\u201d (Rom, ii. 1); (c) the consequences of correction made by a\nsinner are an evil circumstance, as when scandal results. Thus, if a\nperson who is guilty of far greater sins corrects his neighbor, this\nhas a demoralizing effect, when the impression is given that good words\nrather than good deeds are important.\n\n1281. One who prefers his neighbor\u2019s conversion to his own deviates\nfrom the right order of charity, since he should love himself more. But\na person may without any transgression against the precept of fraternal\ncorrection seek to correct his neighbor before he has corrected himself.\n\n(a) Thus, from the nature of correction itself or from the provisions\nof the commandment, there does not seem to be any obligation of\ncorrecting self before correcting others; for a humble correction made\nby a sinner with acknowledgment of his unworthiness to censure others,\nor by a sinner who is thought to be good or to have reformed, may be\njust as efficacious as a correction made by a truly virtuous man. But\nit is of counsel that one correct oneself as a means towards the better\ncorrection of another.\n\n(b) Because of special reasons, a person may be otherwise obliged to\ncorrect himself before he attempts to correct another, as when\nself-correction is the only means towards obtaining some necessary end.\nThus, a superior who cannot enforce discipline because he is\nunobservant himself, the friend of a dying man who cannot convert the\nlatter unless he gives evidence of his own conversion, a person who\ncannot repair the scandal he has given unless he manifests\nrepentance--all these should begin by correcting themselves. One should\ntake the beam out of one\u2019s own eye, if otherwise one cannot remove the\nmote from a neighbor\u2019s eye (Matt, vii. 5).\n\n1282. All suitable persons, then, are bound by the duty of fraternal\ncorrection: \u201cHe gave to every one of them commandment concerning his\nneighbor\u201d (Ecclus., xvii. 12). But the duty rests more heavily on some\nthan on others. (a) Thus, bishops and other pastors are held out of\njustice to fraternal correction, and even at the peril of life. (b)\nOther prelates, confessors, parents, husbands, masters, teachers and\nguardians, are held to fraternal correction from charity and by reason\nof their office; but they are not held to this duty when there is grave\npersonal danger to themselves. (c) Private persons are held out of\ncharity, but their obligation is less than in the case of those whose\noffice requires them to make corrections.\n\n1283. A person is not bound to make a correction for the sole reason\nthat he is able to make it successfully. For he is excused: (a) if\ncorrection by him is not necessary, as when parents or others better\nable than himself will attend to the matter; (b) if his correction will\nbring on himself evils which he is not obliged to incur.\n\n1284. An obligation of making a correction even when this will cause an\ninjury to the corrector, exists in the following cases: (a) If the\ncorrection is necessary to avert extreme spiritual evil (i.e.,\ndamnation), one should be prepared to make a sacrifice, even of life\nitself, to give the correction (see 1165). Example: Titus is dying of a\ncontagious disease, and will lose his soul, if Balbus does not come to\nadvise him. (b) If the correction is necessary to avert grave spiritual\nevil, a pastor should be willing to risk his life, and another person\nshould be willing to risk the loss of money, and even some injury to\nhealth. But a subject is not bound to correct his superior, when this\nwill bring on him persecutions; a scrupulous person is not bound to\ncorrect, for this would cause him worries and suffering.\n\n1285. The manner of making a correction is as follows:\n\n(a) The internal dispositions should include charity towards the one\ncorrected and humility as regards one\u2019s own fitness. For fraternal\ncorrection is not opposed to the commands of bearing with the\nweaknesses of others (Gal, vi. 2), and of not proudly preferring self\nto others (Philip., ii. 3). One should correct inferiors paternally,\nequals kindly, and superiors respectfully. In every correction there\nshould be seriousness mingled with mildness.\n\n(b) The external order to be followed is that given by our Lord in\nMatt., xviii. 15-18, namely, that, when possible, admonition should be\ngiven privately, and that one should not proceed to accusation before\nsuperiors until other means, such as the calling in of witnesses, have\nproved unavailing. The order to be followed in fraternal correction is\nnot only of the positive divine law, but it is also of the natural law.\nFor the natural law requires that we do for others what we wish done\nfor ourselves, and there is no one who does not desire that correction\nbe given him in such a way that the least possible injury be done to\nhis feelings and to his good name.\n\n1286. In what cases should secret admonition be used?\n\n(a) For public sins (i.e., real sins known or soon to be known to the\nlarger part of the community), no secret admonition is required, since\nthe guilt is already publicly known; a public correction, on the\ncontrary, is necessary to remedy the scandal: \u201cThem that sin reprove\nbefore all, that the rest also may have fear\u201d (I Tim., v. 20).\n\n(b) For occult sins that are against the common good or the good of a\nthird person no secret admonition is required, but one should denounce\nthem immediately; for the spiritual or corporal welfare of the\nmultitude or of an innocent private individual is a greater good than\nthe reputation of the guilty person. Exception should be made, however,\nfor the case in which one is certain that by a secret admonition one\ncan correct the sinner and prevent the harm that threatens others.\nExamples: If Titus knows that there is a plot to rob the house of\nBalbus, and that any effort to dissuade the criminals would only bring\nhim into danger, he ought to warn Balbus or the authorities. If\nClaudius knows that in his school a certain student is teaching the\nother boys to steal and become drunk, he should make this known, and\nhence cannot be absolved if he refuses. But the seal of the\nconfessional must be observed.\n\n(c) For occult sins that are not against the common good or that of a\nthird person, one should have recourse to secret admonition before\nmaking the sins known. This will save the sinner from loss of\nreputation and from consequent hardness in sin; it will also save\nothers from a share in his infamy, or from the scandal caused by\npublicity.\n\n1287. What is the obligation of reporting an occult sin that is doing\nharm in a community, when the person who reports will suffer for\ntelling what he knows? (a) If harm to the community will result from\nsilence, one is obliged even at the cost of great inconvenience to\nspeak (see 1284). Example: Claudius knows that a fellow-student has a\nbad influence over his companions, and is leading more and more of them\ninto stealing, with the result that a large number will be corrupted\nand the institution disgraced. But he cannot speak without serious harm\nto himself, because he also has been implicated, or because informers\nare regarded and treated as traitors. (b) If some private harm will\nresult from silence, one is not bound at the cost of great\ninconvenience to speak. Example: If Claudius knows that only one or two\nare being led astray, he is not bound to implicate himself or to incur\nthe ignominy of being regarded as a spy.\n\n1288. There are exceptional cases in which occult faults, not injurious\nto others, are reproved publicly, without previous private admonition.\n(a) God as the supreme ruler has the right to publish hidden sins,\nalthough He admonishes men secretly through the voice of conscience or\nthrough external preaching or other means. St. Peter, in making known\nthe sin of Ananias and Saphira, acted as the instrument of God\u2019s\njustice and in virtue of a revelation given him (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9). (b)\nMembers of a society who are agreed to remind one another publicly of\ntransgressions of their regulations, do not violate the order of\nfraternal correction given by Christ, if there is nothing defamatory in\nthese reminders. Example: The proclamations made in the chapter of\nfaults in religious orders.\n\n1289. May a prelate (e.g., in a visitation) oblige his subjects to\ncarry to him, without a previous secret admonition of the person to be\naccused, information about the secret sins of fellow-subjects that are\nnot harmful to others?\n\n(a) If a sin is entirely secret, and the subjects have not renounced\ntheir right to reputation in the sight of the prelate, the latter has\nno right to give orders that he be informed at once, since the rule\ngiven by Christ requires that a fraternal correction be first given. A\nsubject would be bound, therefore, if such orders were given, to obey\nthe divine injunction, rather than that of the prelate (Acts, v. 3, 4,\n9).\n\n(b) If a sin is entirely secret, but subjects have renounced their\nright to receive first a private admonition, a prelate may require that\ninformation be brought to him at once. This is the rule in certain\nreligious societies; but even in them a sin should not be reported to\nthe prelate if the sinner has already amended, nor should the higher\nsuperior be informed if the immediate superior can take care of the\nmatter sufficiently. These religious have a right to their reputation.\n\n(e) If a sin is not entirely secret, because there are some indications\n(such as ill-repute or grounds for suspicion), a prelate may require\nthat information be brought to him immediately.\n\n1290. If, after several private admonitions have been made, there is no\nhope of success by this method, what should be done? (a) If it appears\nthat the other means prescribed by our Lord will be successful, they\nshould be tried, just as a physician has recourse to new remedies when\nold ones have failed. (b) If it appears that any further efforts will\ndo harm rather than good, the attempt to correct a private sin that\nharms only the sinner should be given up.\n\n1291. The order to be followed in fraternal correction, after personal\nreproof or remonstrance has failed, is as follows:\n\n(a) One should enlist the services of one or two others to assist in\nmaking the brotherly correction. The conversion of the culprit is more\nimportant than his reputation with these others; whereas their\nknowledge of the matter safeguards the corrector from the charge of\nbeing a mischievous talebearer, should things go further, and it should\narouse the culprit to the need of correcting himself, before his case\nis brought before the superior for correction.\n\n(b) When other things have failed, recourse should be had to the\nsuperior of the person at fault, if there is hope that this will prove\nsuccessful. If the superior is imprudent or given to wrath or is known\nto dislike the person to be corrected, or if the latter would only be\nenraged by a reproof from this superior, charity would urge one to say\nnothing about the matter. Example: Titus makes himself intoxicated from\ntime to time. Balbus is the only one who knows this, and he tries to\ncorrect Titus. But, as the latter denies the accusation, Balbus asks\nCaius and Sempronius, friends of Titus, to be witnesses; and all three\nof them make an effort to convert Titus. This correction also has no\neffect, and so Balbus and the other two make the matter known to the\nparents of Titus, that they may watch their son more carefully and keep\nhim away from occasions of drink.\n\n1292. What are the duties of a superior to whom a subject has been\nreported for fraternal correction? (a) He should try to discover the\ntruth of the matter. Means to this end are a consideration of the\ncharacter and motives of the accuser, the reply which the accused makes\nin his own defense, and in case of necessity a confrontation of accuser\nand accused, a cross-examination, etc. (I Cor., i. xi; Dan., xiii. 5).\nThose who make a practice of gladly carrying tales to superiors are\ndisturbers of peace, and they should be given to understand that their\naccusations are not wanted, and that they should mind their own\nbusiness.\n\n(b) If the superior has reason to believe that the accusation in\nquestion is true, he should use moderate remedial measures, while at\nthe same time preserving the good name of the person to be corrected.\nFor the information has been brought before him, not as judge, but as\nfather of the person accused, and hence public punishments or\ncorrections injurious to reputation must be avoided. Removal from an\noffice, a change of place and special vigilance may be used, when this\ncan be done prudently.\n\n1293. Cases in which a subject may be reported to his superior for\nfraternal correction without previous admonitions are not impossible;\nfor the law given by Christ concerning the order to be followed is\naffirmative, and hence obliges only under the proper circumstances. (a)\nThus, if previous admonitions would be harmful, whereas an admonition\nby the superior will be beneficial, recourse should be had at once to\nthe superior. (b) If an admonition by the superior will be more\nadvantageous, the other admonitions may be omitted. Thus, if the\nsuperior is more revered by the person to be corrected and will be\nlistened to more readily, or if there is danger of delay in making\nprevious admonitions, it is better that the matter be brought before\nthe superior at once. What is said of the superior can be applied also\nto some other pious and prudent person from whom a correction would be\nbetter received.\n\n1294. The obligation of fraternal correction by private individuals may\nbe summed up as follows: (a) One is bound to correct when one is\ncertain about a grave sin which will not be corrected except by\noneself, and when one has good reason to hope that the correction will\nbe profitable to the sinner and not unreasonably harmful to the\ncorrector. Those who interfere when these conditions are not present\nare meddlesome or imprudent, rather than charitable. (b) One is bound\nto report to a superior when one is certain about a grave sin which is\nharmful to the community or which cannot be corrected so well by\nprivate admonition, if one believes that it will not be reported except\nby oneself, and that one\u2019s report will be for the good of others and\nnot an undue detriment to oneself. Those who report of their own choice\nwhen these conditions are not existent, are malicious tale-bearers or\nrash news-carriers, rather than charitable accusers.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 7: THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 34-36.)\n\n1295. The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be\nreduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b)\nsloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord\nand schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal,\nwhich is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.\n\n1296. Hate.--Hate is an aversion of the will to something which the\nintellect judges evil, that is, contrary to self. As there are two\nkinds of love, so there are also two kinds of hate. (a) Hatred of\ndislike (_odium abominationis_) is the opposite of love of desire, for,\nas this love inclines to something as suitable and advantageous for\nself, so hatred of dislike turns away from something, as being\nconsidered unsuitable and harmful to self. (b) Hatred of enmity (_odium\ninimicitiae_) is the opposite of love of benevolence, for, as this love\nwishes good to the object of its affection, so hatred of enmity wishes\nevil to the object of its dislike.\n\n1297. Hatred of God.-A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon\nas evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him\nas evil to themselves.\n\n(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (i.e., the blessed), cannot\nhate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the\nblessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God\nobscurely through the things made by Him (i.e., wayfarers on earth),\ncannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way\ndispleasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but\nthey can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will,\nsuch as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has\ngiven him being, for existence of itself is something good and\ndesirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin,\nor for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to\naccompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere\npossibility, the scriptures in many places attest: \u201cThe pride of them\nthat hate Thee ascendeth forever\u201d (Ps, lxiii. 23), \u201cNow they have seen\nand hated both Me and My Father\u201d (John, xv. 24).\n\n1298. It should not be inferred from what has just been said that it is\nnot God in Himself that is hated, but only His works; nor that it is a\nsin against God to dislike evils or even divine punishments.\n\n(a) Thus, God Himself is not the principle or motive cause of the\nhatred directed against Him, for in God there is no evil that can\nproduce dislike; but God is the term or object of the hatred aroused in\nthe sinner by the divine effects that displease him, as the texts given\nabove from scripture indicate. For example, a man hates his neighbor on\naccount of certain defects he perceives or thinks he perceives; the\ndefects are the principle, but the neighbor is the term of the hatred.\n\n(b) Dislike of the evils that are in the world, or of chastisements\nsent by God, is not dislike of God Himself, since God does not ask us\nto love evil, but only to endure such evils as cannot be cured. Even\nmurmurs against Providence are usually manifestations of impatience,\nnot of hatred of Providence. It is only the sinner that dislikes God\nHimself for permitting or inflicting evils, who is guilty of hatred of\nGod.\n\n1299. Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it\nis either interpretative or formal. Interpretative hatred is aversion\nthat is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly\nand by reason of something else whose love is preferred. Formal hatred\nis an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every\nmortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin\nconsists in placing one\u2019s own pleasure or interest above the friendship\nof God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that\nconstitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not\ndirectly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned\nmurderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly\ndislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal\nhatred of God is either dislike or enmity. Dislike of God is the sin of\nthose who do not like some attribute of God; enmity towards God is the\nsin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately\nwishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute\nof justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and\nHis judgment is guilty of enmity to God.\n\n1300. Hatred of God as a Special Sin.--(a) Interpretative hatred of God\nis not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin;\nbut formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is\ncomparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession.\nThis is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the\nother theological virtues (e.g., unbelief, despair), but also from the\nsins against the other objects of charity (e.g., hatred of the\nneighbor).\n\n(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost\n(see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a\ngeneral sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a\ndislike of God\u2019s law which requires that one must attain salvation\nthrough the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known\ntruth is a dislike of God\u2019s revelation.\n\n1301. The Gravity of Hatred of God.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its\nnature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the\ninjury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike\nof even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything\npertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God\nis the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the\nsupreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature),\nwhereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.\n\n1302. The comparison just made between hatred of God and other sins\nsupposes that the other sins do not include hatred of God, for it is\nclear that simple hatred of God existing in the will is less serious\nthan a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest\ninternal hatred of God. (a) Thus, hatred of God without unbelief is\nworse than unbelief without hatred of God; (b) hatred of God without\nhatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without\nhatred of God.\n\n1303. Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.--(a) A new species of sin is\nadded to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against\ncreatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example:\nTitus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and\nalso blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of\nGod when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances\nof person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred\nof God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of\nGod that is concealed.\n\n1304. Hatred of Creatures.--All dislike of God is sinful, because there\nis nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections\nare found as well as perfections.\n\n(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all\nthat is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against\ncharity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike\nanother\u2019s evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate\ndetractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His\nfollowers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their\nprogress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents\n(Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it\nsinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband\u2019s habit of drunkenness so\nmuch that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the\nalcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.\n\n(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor\n(i.e., of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to\ncharity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should\nchildren ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship\nhe holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St.\nAugustine says: \u201cOne should love the sinner, but hate his vices.\u201d\n\n1305. The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one\nshould dislike one\u2019s own imperfections, for they are the enemies of\none\u2019s soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of\none\u2019s vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One\nshould not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is\nassociated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one\u2019s honesty, even\nif by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of\nmoney; but one may regret having married, if one\u2019s choice has been\nunfortunate and has made one\u2019s life miserable.\n\n1306. Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself?\n(a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then\na sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self\nrequires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b)\nIf their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in\nthem and beneficial to himself: \u201cBetter are the wounds of a friend than\nthe deceitful kisses of an enemy\u201d (Prov., xxvii. 6).\n\n1307. Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each\none so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to\nwish evil to himself as evil: \u201cNo one hateth his own flesh\u201d (Ephes., v.\n29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as\nhe wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine,\ncommenting on the words, \u201cHe that loveth his life shall lose it\u201d (John,\nxii, 25), says: \u201cIf you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate\nself rightly, you love it.\u201d This indirect enmity to self happens in two\nways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but\nonly an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge\nrather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses\nwhat is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he\ndecides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.\n\n1308. Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is\nnot lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the\nlost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it\ncontains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish\nthat a criminal be put to death, if one\u2019s wish does not go beyond the\nsufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful\nto wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are\nblessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm,\nif this is necessary to save his life.\n\n1309. One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one\u2019s neighbor\nunder the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true\nintention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions\nmust be present when one wishes evil as good:\n\n(a) On the part of the subject (i.e., of the person who wills the\nevil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a\ndesire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that\na gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss,\nbut his awakening to the need of a new kind of amusement. St. Paul\nrejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their\nsorrow worked repentance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the\ndesire of a neighbor\u2019s good does not confer the right to wrong him, for\nthe end does not justify the means.\n\n(b) On the part of the object (i.e., of the evil which is wished to\nanother), it must be compensated for by the good which is intended. It\nis not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property\none expects to inherit, for the neighbor\u2019s life is more important than\nprivate gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common\nwelfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by\nthe vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal.,\nv. 12).\n\n1310. Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some\nprivate good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a\nspiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in\nthe desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to\nwish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from\nthe temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful\nto wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they\ntake from one\u2019s life, if that life is needed by others as a source of\nedification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one\nbut sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death.\nThus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and\nincurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others,\nif, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of\ndeath; for \u201cdeath is better than a bitter life\u201d (Ecclus., xxx, 17). But\nlack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason\nfor wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to\nothers.\n\n1311. Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual\nevil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or\nvenial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for\ncharity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong,\ntherefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God,\ndiminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we\nare commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The\ngood that God draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are\npermitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more\nhumble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the\npermission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of\nGod\u2019s predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of\ngreater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that\nGod permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if\nGod has permitted sin, good will follow after it.\n\n1312. Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.--(a) Hatred, whether of\ndislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is\ndirectly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the\nsoul.\n\n(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal\nsin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either\nindeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in\nothers. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much\nthat one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance\nin the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to\ninflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of\ncharity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)\n\n(c) Enmity in fact is often only a venial sin, either because one\nwishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or\nbecause one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of\nmortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin,\nhowever, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or\nthe loss of reputation) to one\u2019s neighbor.\n\n1313. Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.--(a) Hatred\nis a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as\nenvy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular\nkind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be\ndirected against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is\ndirected against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while\nhate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed\nto the neighbor\u2019s good relatively, in so far as it is considered an\nobstacle to one\u2019s own glory, but hate detests another\u2019s good\nabsolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived\nfor self, but in his aversion for another\u2019s good, and the harm that is\nwished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood,\nother things being equal, so that hatred of another\u2019s life is\ncontrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the\nsame, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor\u2019s\ntemporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred\nof a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against\nhim, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin\ntakes root: \u201cHe who hates his brother is a murderer\u201d (I John, iii. 15).\nThe external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is\nnot a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less\nharmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example,\ninternal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may\nhappen from a severe blow.\n\n1314. Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said\nabove (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually\nother species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the\nneighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but\nrather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This\nwill appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:\n\n(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of\nman (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations,\nsince rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its\nevil (see 1106).\n\n(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor),\nis naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already\ncorrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that\nthe whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before\nhatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the\nfreedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.\n\n1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of\nthe neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as\nwas remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.\n\n(a) Hence, interpretative hate--i.e., a feeling against another that\nmakes one act in effect as if there were hatred--does precede the other\nsins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged\nagainst him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but\nthis anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of\nBalbus is included in the desire of revenge.\n\n(b) Formal hate--i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not\nmodified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over\none\u2019s own inferiority--does not precede, but rather follows the other\nsins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin\nof formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered\nBalbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the\nthirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.\n\n1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that\ndispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another,\nfor revenge or on account of one\u2019s own glory, prepares the way to\ndesire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes\nto hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes\nevil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred\nlook upon the neighbor\u2019s good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause\nthat induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate\nthat which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable,\nand it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one\u2019s neighbor\u2019s good\nas one\u2019s own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy,\nfor, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor\nbreeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of\nGod.\n\n1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.--(a) Hatred of God and\nhatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be\ndeclared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same\nvirtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin\nagainst God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as\ndifferent species of sin.\n\n(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since\nall its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is\nwished to a neighbor as evil--that is, one wishes another evil in\ngeneral or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils,\nsuch as damnation or death.\n\n(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results\nmay be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his\nneighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he\nwho out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of\nmurder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor\u2019s\nproperty, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his\nparents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on\nanother, adds malediction to hate.\n\n1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a\nsin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful\nat all.\n\n(a) Thus, \u201chatred of God\u201d is sometimes used to signify a want of\nresignation to the divine will.\n\n(b) \u201cDislike of the neighbor\u201d is sometimes used to signify\nuncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive\ndisapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus,\na penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on\naccount of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he\nhimself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose\nmanners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse\nhimself of sinful dislike.\n\n(c) \u201cWishing evil to the neighbor\u201d is sometimes used to signify one\u2019s\ndesire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be\nobserved. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a\ncriminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would\ndefeat others in competition for a prize, may accuse himself that he\nwished harm to the criminal or had luck to the competitors against his\nfriend.\n\n1319. Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as\nfollows: (a) when they add a new species--thus, the person hated (e.g.,\none\u2019s father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of\nreputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when\nthey multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when\none hates a large number of persons (see 219).\n\n1320. The Sin of Sloth.--Sloth is a sadness or dejection of the will\nabout the divine good one possesses, and arises from a want of esteem\nfor one\u2019s Last End and the means thereto.\n\n(a) Sloth is a sadness of the will. Hence, the sin of sloth differs\nfrom the passion of sadness, and also from bodily weariness. The\npassions (as said in 121) are not evil in themselves, but become evil\nwhen exercised immoderately, or turned to an evil object. Weakness or\nweariness of body is not sinful, but it disposes one for the passion of\nsadness, and this in turn may tempt the will to sloth, when duties owed\nto God are to be attended to.\n\n(b) Sloth is a sadness about good, and so it differs from sadness about\nthe smallness of one\u2019s good. Humility demands that one be sensible of\none\u2019s own shortcomings and of the greater merits of those who are\nbetter. But it is not humility but ingratitude and sloth to depreciate\nand grieve over the good which one has received from God, such as the\ngift of faith, membership in the Church, etc.\n\n(c) Sloth is sadness about the divine good, which is loved by charity.\nThus, the sin of sloth differs from the circumstance of sloth, which is\nfound in every sin. There is no sin that does not contain a sadness or\ndisgust about the act of the opposite virtue; the very thought of\nmoderation is depressing to the glutton, and religion is associated\nwith gloom by the irreligious. But what is special to the sin of sloth\nis, that it grieves about that divine good itself over which charity\nrejoices, and which is the end of all the other virtues.\n\n(d) Sloth is a sadness about the divine good as shared by self, that\nis, about the end offered oneself and the means thereto, such as\neternal beatitude, the friendship of God, the Sacraments, the\nCommandments, good works and other divine gifts which should be\nesteemed and received with gladness. Sloth thus differs from hatred of\nGod, which is a sadness over God\u2019s own goodness; and from envy, which\nis a sadness over the good of the neighbor.\n\n(e) Sloth is a sadness over the divine good, which is considered by one\nas an evil. The sin of sloth looks upon the joys of heaven or the\npractice of virtue with contempt; it directly spurns them as unworthy\nof love (cfr. Num., xxi. 4). Hence, sloth differs from laziness or\nidleness, for this latter sin dislikes the exercise of virtue, not\nbecause it considers virtue as evil, but because it has a dread of the\nlabor and exertion which virtue entails, and is overmuch in love with\nrepose and ease.\n\n1321. Sloth is a sin. (a) It is forbidden by God: \u201cBow down thy\nshoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands\u201d (Ecclus.,\nvi. 26). (b) It is an evil sorrow, for it grieves over good. (c) It has\nevil effects, since it keeps man from his duty, swallowing him up with\novermuch sorrow (II Cor., ii. 7).\n\n1322. Qualities of the Sin of Sloth.--(a) Sloth is a special sin,\nsince, as explained above, its individual objects differentiate it from\nthe general slothfulness that is found in every sin, as well as from\nhatred, envy and laziness. But it is a sin, by comparison, rarely\ncommitted. (b) It is a mortal sin, from its nature, since it is a\nhorror and detestation for the divine good. It is implicitly forbidden\nin the Third Commandment, (c) It is a capital sin (i.e., a vice\nnaturally productive of others), for sadness inclines man to many evils\nas means of escape from sorrow or of consolation in sorrow.\n\n1323. In the following cases sloth is not a mortal sin. (a) It is not a\nmortal sin if in the object there is not grave matter. When a person is\ngrieved at the thought that he will be forced to some spiritual good\nwhich is not of precept but of counsel, he does not sin thereby, for\none does not sin by not choosing the counsels. Strictly speaking,\nhowever, this grief is not the sin of sloth, which is a sorrow over the\ndivine good that one is bound to accept with joy. (b) Sloth is not a\nmortal sin, if in the subject there is not sufficient reflection or\nfull consent. Hence, mere bodily weariness in serving God, is no sin at\nall, and a feeling of disgust for spiritual things, not consented to,\nis only a struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and at most a\nvenial sin.\n\n1324. Sins that Spring from Sloth.--(a) To escape his sadness about\ndivine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden\nhim--his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of\ncowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his\ngrief--the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the\nspiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for\nthe want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden\nthings: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not\nconcern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless,\nand he must be continually moving from place to place.\n\n1325. The Conquest of Sloth.--(a) Flight is a suitable form of\nresistance to temptation, whenever the temptation grows stronger by\nthinking over the matter, as is the case with temptations against\npurity (I Cor., vi. 18). (b) Attack is a suitable form of resistance,\nwhen the temptation becomes weaker as one thinks over the matter (see\n257). This is the case with sloth, for, the more one gives oneself to\nthe consideration of spiritual things, the more pleasing do they become.\n\n1326. Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a\ngeneric name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and\nhence it will be treated in several places.\n\n(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be\nperformed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude,\nwhich pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among\nthe sins against prudence.\n\n(b) Sluggishness (_pigritia_) is a tardy performance of duty, and will\nbe considered among the sins opposed to diligence.\n\n(c) Carelessness (_torpor_) is a perfunctory discharge of duties,\nwithout thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given\nabove (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.\n\n(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by\nan inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered\nwhen we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to\nfortitude.\n\n(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one\u2019s duty on account of\nindolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the\nvarious precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice\nwill be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.\n\n1327. The sin of carelessness about the service of God is also known as\ntepidity or lukewarmness. It consists in a want of fervor, and causes\none to live in spiritual languor, wishing on the one hand to live\nholily and avoid sin, but fearing on the other hand the effort and\ngenerosity required for the practice of virtue and the struggle against\nevil. It is, therefore, most dangerous.\n\n(a) Even if it is only internal, it may be more dangerous to the one\nconcerned than grave sin itself, since threats and promises that move a\nsinner are often unavailing with one who is tepid and moving on to\ngrave sin. Thus, we read: \u201cI know thy works, that thou art neither\ncold, nor hot. I would that thou wert cold or hot. But because thou art\nlukewarm, and neither cold, nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of\nmy mouth\u201d (Apoc., iii. 15, 16).\n\n(b) If it is external, this sin is a danger to others who witness the\ndisrespectful way in which one prays or exercises other duties owed to\nGod.\n\n1328. The Sin of Envy.--Envy is a sadness at the good of a neighbor,\nwhich one considers as a detriment to one\u2019s own excellence or glory,\nand therefore as an evil to self.\n\n(a) Envy is a species of sadness, that is, it is a displeasure of the\nwill at the presence of what one regards as an evil. In this way envy\ndiffers from the sin of rejoicing at the evils of others, which, as\nwill be said below (see 1342), is one of the consequences of envy,\nalthough both are of the same species. Thus also, envy differs from\npride and vainglory (which are not aversions but inclinations), and\nfrom covetousness (which is the desire of what belongs to another).\n\n(b) Envy is about some good, especially about those goods from which\nmen obtain the esteem and honor of others, such as virtue, ability,\nrank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs from sorrow about evil or\nthe evil effects of good, such as repentance for one\u2019s sins, regret that\none is not as good as others, displeasure at the bad use that men make\nof health or wealth.\n\n(c) Envy is about the good of a neighbor, for only an insane person\nwould feel chagrin at the superiority of God, and self-envy is a\ncontradiction in terms. Thus, envy differs from sorrow at the good of\nGod (hatred of God), and from sorrow at the good of self (sloth). A\nperson may be said, however, to envy God in the sense that he is\nmortified at the external glory of God, if he feels himself an\nantagonist of that glory. In this way the devil is said to envy the\nattributes of God, because they overcome his efforts to promote\nimpiety, and man is said to envy the Holy Ghost, when he is\ndiscontented at the progress of holiness in the souls of men.\n\n(d) The envious man considers his neighbor\u2019s good as a detriment to his\nown good. This is the distinctive trait of envy which sets it apart\nfrom other forms of repining at another\u2019s good fortune. Thus,\ndispleasure at the excellence or glory of another without reference to\ndetriment to self is not envy, but hatred; with reference to the\nunworthiness of another, it is not envy, but indignation.\n\n(e) Hence, envy looks on the neighbor\u2019s prosperity as a calamity to\nself, as a sort of punishment and the contradiction of one\u2019s own\ndesires. Here envy stands in contrast with mercy, for, while the\nmerciful regard the misfortunes of neighbors as the misfortunes of\nthemselves, the envious regard the prosperity of others as their own\nmisfortune.\n\n1329. The Objects of Envy.--(a) The material objects are many, but they\nare reduced to excellence and glory. Excellence includes every kind of\ndesirable quality. Glory is the honor, fame and praise that follow on\npublic knowledge of one\u2019s excellence. As a rule, envy is concerned with\nthe excellence of glory, but it may also be about internal or objective\nexcellence. Thus, if two disputants are alone, the less able will\nperhaps envy the greater knowledge of the more able; but, if there is\nan audience, the more able will perhaps envy the greater applause\nreceived by his less able opponent.\n\n(b) The formal object of envy is one, namely, the detriment to the\nexcellence or glory of self which the envious person sees in the\nexcellence or glory of another. Detriment must not be understood\nabsolutely here, as if the envious person lost something or failed to\nobtain something on account of the other person. It must be understood\nrelatively, in the sense that the envious person feels that the\nsituation between himself and the other person is no longer the same,\nthat the latter has gained on him or passed him, and has thus lessened\nhis excellence.\n\n1330. The Subjects of Envy.--(a) The persons most inclined to envy are\nof two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the\npusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is\ncorrespondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he\nalready enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his\ndesires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small\nadvancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He\nis, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would\nsee little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who\nrecognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who\nare great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few,\nhowever, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in\nsome form.\n\n(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some\nway or other are one\u2019s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one\nis thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by\nthose who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will\nenvy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those\nacquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate\npersons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his\nbrother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are\nonly apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above\nthem, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a\npoor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons\nare sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but\nit is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what\nthey themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes\nenvious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison\nfrom some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man\nenvies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth,\nor the present promotion that surpasses his own.\n\n1331. It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins\nagainst charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another\u2019s good unqualifiedly,\nwhereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification.\nHence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure.\nIt differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of\nothers, because the qualification in each case is different.\n\n(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor\u2019s\nprosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it\ndislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he\nthinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.\n\n(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on\naccount of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of\nthe evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is\ndispleased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is\nhis enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite\nof his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence\npossessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.\n\n(c) Indignation (_nemesis_) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain\ngood, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because\nTitus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.\n\n(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor\u2019s prosperity, not because it thinks\nthis prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of\nself, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in\nitself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one\u2019s\nrelationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the\nglory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of\nClaudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame\nhim. Caius is grieved at Claudius\u2019 prosperity, because he regards it as\na reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus\nfears, Caius envies.\n\n1332. Is emulation a sin? (a) If emulation is about spiritual things,\nit is not sinful, but praiseworthy. St. Paul encourages a holy rivalry\namong the Corinthians for the higher gifts of God (I Cor., xii. 31).\nSt. Jerome writes to Laeta that her daughter should be associated with\nother girls as fellow-pupils, that the progress of the latter and the\npraises they receive may act as a spur to the daughter not to be\noutdone. One who equals or surpasses the virtue or knowledge of another\ndoes not take away or lessen the other\u2019s good, but improves his own\ngood; and thus emulation is not harmful, but beneficial in spiritual\nmatters. (b) If emulation is about temporal things, it is also lawful\nto be sorry at their absence. But, if the desire is inordinate, then\nemulation is sinful. Example: Sempronius is not inferior in ability to\nTitus, and hence, while not desiring monopoly or disliking\ncompetition, he is sorry that he has not attained an equal success in\nbusiness. Balbus is very deficient in education, in initiative and in\ncharacter, while Caius excels in all these qualities; and yet Balbus is\ndiscontented that he does not hold the responsible position of Caius,\nor one of equal importance. The emulation of Sempronius is reasonable,\nthat of Balbus is unreasonable.\n\n1333. Rivalry is called jealousy, when it proceeds from a love so\nardent that it wishes to have exclusive possession of the object loved.\nThis jealousy is lawful or unlawful, according as the person who loves\nhas or has not exclusive rights.\n\n(a) Jealousy is unlawful in a mother who is vexed because her child\nloves his father as well as herself. The child ought to love both\nparents, and it is an evil jealousy that makes the mother grieve when\nthe child does this.\n\n(b) Jealousy is lawful in a wife who grieves because her husband gives\nto others the affection he promised would be hers alone. Scripture\nspeaks of God Himself as jealous of the fidelity of His creatures, and\ndeclares that He will suffer no rival, but must have sole dominion over\nthe heart (Josue, xxiv. 19 sqq.); and St. Paul tells the Corinthians\nthat he is jealous of them, with the jealousy of God, because they have\nnot been faithful to his preaching, but have been friendly to false\nteachers (II Cor., xi).\n\n1334. Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by\nfear of the harm he will do?\n\n(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act\nagainst justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over\nthe prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the\nmeans of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to\nwish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over\nthe election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute\nthe law-abiding: \u201cWhen just men increase, the people shall rejoice;\nwhen the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn\u201d (Prov., xxix.\n2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to\nrejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be\nsaddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the\noppressed, while his success means injustice to many.\n\n(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other\ngoods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to\nbe sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong\nto deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election\nof an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers.\nIt is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself\nat the prospect of the penalty he will receive.\n\n(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do\ninjury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear and to be on one\u2019s\nguard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the\nprosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive\nthe other of his prosperity.\n\n1335. Is grief at the prosperity of another sinful, when it is caused\nby his unworthiness of prosperity? (a) If the indignation could be\nabout spiritual things, of course it would be sinful; but this is not\npossible, for it is precisely spiritual goods (such as virtues) that\nmake one deserving. Indignation, then, is about temporal goods, which\nare enjoyed by the bad, as well as the good. (b) If the indignation is\nabout temporal things owned by the wicked, and one grieves that they\nhave prosperity, sin is committed. For it is God who distributes to the\nundeserving the goods they have; His purpose is just, namely, that\nthese goods may be for the correction or the punishment of the wicked;\nthose who grieve over the prosperity of the unworthy overlook the fact\nthat eternal goods are a reward to man, temporal goods only a trust to\nbe administered. Hence, the Psalmist says: \u201cBe not emulous of\nevil-doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly\nwither away as grass\u201d (Ps. xxxvi. 1).\n\n1336. Two special cases of sorrow over the prosperity of the wicked\nmust be considered. (a) If one sorrows precisely because the prosperity\nis had by an undeserving person, and is not thinking of the divine\ncause and purpose in human affairs, it does not seem that one sins;\nfor, abstracting from Divine Providence, there does appear an\nunsuitability in the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, and hence it is\nsomething to be sorry about. But such sorrow is at least a preparation\nfor the sin spoken of in the previous paragraph, and so it should be\nshunned: \u201cMy feet were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipped, in\nanger at the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners\u201d (Ps. lxxii. 2,\n3). (b) If one sorrows precisely because the sinner will use his\nprosperity in such a way as to become more wicked and to incur\nchastisement, the sorrow is not uncharitable, but charitable.\n\n1337. Sorrow at being surpassed by another on account of the relative\nloss of glory to self, with the wish that the other had not the good\nthat makes him superior, is envy, as explained above. This sorrow is a\nsin. (a) Thus, it is condemned in scripture: \u201cLet us not be made\ndesirous of vainglory, envying one another\u201d (Gal, v. 26); \u201cThe\npatriarchs through envy sold Joseph into Egypt\u201d (Acts, vii. 9),\n\u201cCharity envieth not\u201d (I Cor., xiii. 4). (b) It is not reasonable to be\ngrieved at the prosperity of others, since prosperity is something good\nand an object of joy rather than of sorrow.\n\n1338. From its nature envy is a mortal sin. (a) Thus, it is directly\nopposed to the principal acts of charity, which are love of the\nneighbor, desire of his good, and joy over his prosperity; and charity\nis the life of the soul (I John, iii. 14). Secondary acts of charity,\nsuch as kissing the sores of a leper, may be omitted without loss of\nlove, but envy destroys love itself. (b) Envy is directly contrary to\nmercy; for, while mercy grieves at the evil of others, envy grieves at\ntheir good. The envious are not merciful, neither are the merciful\nenvious.\n\n1339. Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a\nneighbor\u2019s good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor\u2019s good (even\nif he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good;\n(b) emulation grieves over one\u2019s own deficiency, fear over the\nconsequences of the other\u2019s good, indignation over the prosperity of\none who is unworthy.\n\n1340. Envy is not a mortal sin in the following cases: (a) if the\nobject is not grave, as when one is envious about some trifle (such as\ngood looks); (b) if the subject does not give sufficient reflection or\nfull consent, as when infants are jealous of one another, or adults\nfeel the stirrings of envy. Even holy men are not above the first\nmovements or inclinations towards envy, and very many envious thoughts\nare not mortal, because not fully adverted to.\n\n1341. Degrees of Gravity in Sins of Envy.--(a) There are no different\nspecies of envy of the neighbor, for all acts of envy have the one\nessential trait that they are sorrow over the excellence of another,\nviewed, not absolutely in itself, but relatively as a lessening of\none\u2019s own excellence. We should distinguish, however, the envy which is\na sin against God (viz., envy at another\u2019s spiritual good, or sorrow at\nthe diffusion of grace) from the envy which is a sin against the\nneighbor.\n\n(b) There are different degrees of envy within the species, according\nto the greater or less excellence of the good which is envied. Thus, it\nis a greater sin to be envious about spiritual things (e.g., another\u2019s\ninfluence for good) than about temporal things (e.g., another\u2019s ability\nto get money); it is a greater sin to be envious about the wellbeing of\nthe body than about dress, style, etc.\n\n1342. Envy is one of the capital vices, that is, it is an evil tree\nwhich from its very nature yields the evil fruits of other sins. The\nfruits of envy are progressive in evil.\n\n(a) Thus, in the beginning of envy, one tries to diminish the glory of\nthe person one envies, either secretly (sin of whispering) or openly\n(sin of detraction).\n\n(b) In its progress, envy rejoices at the adversity of the neighbor, if\nits attempt to injure succeeds; or it sorrows over his continued\nprosperity, if its effort at blackening has failed. Rejoicing at a\nneighbor\u2019s adversity is not different specifically from envy; but the\naffliction over the neighbor\u2019s prosperity now spoken of is of the same\nspecies as the vice which sought to undermine the neighbor. Thus, if\nthe envious person resorted in vain to detraction, his grief at the\nfailure of his efforts is in guilt a sin of detraction.\n\n(c) In its consummation, envy becomes hatred, as was said above on the\ncauses of hate (see 1316).\n\n1343. Envy is not the first of the seven capital vices. (a) Thus, it is\ncaused by pride, for one who inordinately desires his own excellence\nwill easily grieve over what he regards as the lessening of that\nexcellence by the excellence of another. (b) It is caused by vainglory,\nfor one who inordinately longs for fame and honors, will easily be\ngrieved over the fame and honors enjoyed by others.\n\n1344. In what way is envy preeminent among sins? (a) Envy is not the\nmost enormous vice, for, as said above (see 1301), hatred of God is\nfrom its nature the worst of all sins. But there is one kind of\nenvy--namely, envy of a brother\u2019s spiritual good--which has a place\namong those gravest offenses called \u201csins against the Holy Ghost\u201d (see\n899).\n\n(b) Envy is most like to the sin that brought all woe into the world,\nfor \u201cby the envy of the devil death entered the world\u201d (Wis., ii. 24).\nIt was sorrow at the gifts bestowed upon our first parents that moved\nthe demon to tempt them, and accordingly his envy led to their fall and\nto the loss of original justice by the Whole race.\n\n1345. Useful Considerations against Envy.--(a) Envy is useless, since\nit does not obtain that on which one\u2019s heart is set, or obtains it only\nby the sacrifice of charity, which is something better. (b) Envy is\nharmful, since it carries its own torment with it (Gen., iv. 5; Wis.,\nvi. 25; Prov., xiv. 30), and brings on many sins against the neighbor.\nThrough envy the first murder was committed (Gen., iv. 8), and it was\nenvy that brought about the crucifixion of Christ (Matt, xxvii. 18).\n\n1346. Useful practices against envy are: (a) the uprooting of its\ncauses, pride and vainglory; (b) the cultivation of an unselfish\ncharity and of emulation of what is best in others: \u201cSo that by all\nmeans, whether by occasion, or by truth, Christ be preached, in this I\nrejoice, yea, and will rejoice\u201d (Philip., i. 18); \u201cLet us consider one\nanother, to provoke unto charity and to good works\u201d (Heb., x. 24).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 8: THE SINS AGAINST PEACE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 37-42.)\n\n1347. The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a)\ndiscord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or\nquarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights\nand sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.\n\n1348. Discord.--As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the\nwills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good,\nor the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that\nthey be in agreement.\n\n(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires.\nHence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is\na disagreement in judgments.\n\n(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in\nwhich the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have\nbut one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about\nmatters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at\nvariance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his\nwife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more\nthan is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but\nnot in the second.\n\n(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor.\nThus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the\ndivine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the\ndivine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who\nis not in harmony with the divine will.\n\n(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for\nagreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g.,\njustice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now\nemployed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a\nsuperior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a\ncreditor is dishonest.\n\n1349. There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is\nthe act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter\nabout which charity requires that he agree;\n\n(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who\nboth intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are\ndivided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.\n\n1350. Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this\nspecies of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity.\nHence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of\nheaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or\nconsent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.\n\n1351. Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this\nkind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the\nconcord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of\nopinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John\nMark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment\nindicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this\nkind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable\nignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.\n\n1352. By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed\nsometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of\nanother who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is\ncommitted at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his\nown good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.\n\n1353. Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one\u2019s purpose and the\nresult will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the\nconcord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: \u201cThere are six\nthings the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of\ndiscord among brethren\u201d (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division\nthat takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus,\nSt. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the\nSadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7).\nBut the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the\ndefense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees\nto a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his\nusing evil means for a good end.\n\n1354. The Origin of Discord.--(a) The disagreement with the will of a\nneighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his\nneighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to\ncontradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as\ngood. (b) The preference of one\u2019s own will and persistence in it are\ndue to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own\nexcellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his\npurposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not\ntake what he regards as a position of inferiority.\n\n1355. Contention.--Contention is discord carried into words or\nequivalent signs, (i.e., a dispute or altercation), in which one denies\nwhat the other affirms. It is divided as follows: (a) by reason of the\nintention, it is either an investigation of the truth, a defense of the\ntruth, or an attack on the truth; (b) by reason of the manner in which\nit is conducted, it is either suitable or unsuitable to the persons and\nthe matter in question.\n\n1356. Contention whose aim is the discovery of the truth is lawful as\nfollows. (a) Such contention is lawful and useful in itself, for it is\na means of acquiring useful knowledge, of seeing both sides of a\nquestion, and of sharpening the mind for the refutation of error.\nHence, a contest in a court of justice, a controversy in a scientific\njournal, a public debate on some important matter, and a theological\ndisputation are according to their nature lawful, and may be necessary.\nEven to argue against the truth, for the sake of practice in discussion\nor to bring out the truth more clearly and forcibly, is, apart from\ndanger, scandal, or prohibition, not unuseful.\n\n(b) Debate is unlawful in its manner when a disputant does not argue\naccording to the rules, appeals to prejudice or ignorance, uses an\ninsulting tone or unparliamentary language, etc.\n\n1357. The Sin of Contention.--Contention is a sin when its aim is the\nconcealment or discomfiture of the truth. (a) From its nature this kind\nof contention is a mortal sin, for it is the external expression of\ninternal discord in matters about which charity requires concord and\nthe same speech. Hence, the Apostle numbers contention among the works\nof the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 20). (b)\nFrom the lightness of the matter or the imperfection of the consent,\nthis kind of contention is very often, if not usually, only a venial\nsin, or no sin at all. Examples: A person argues against what he knows\nis true, but the matter is trivial (e.g., his weight); or he is\ndistracted by the heat of dispute or the tactics of the other party.\n\n1358. Mortal sin is not committed by contention, therefore, unless the\ntruths against which one contends are of a serious kind. Such truths\nare: (a) truths of a religious or moral character, such as the\ndoctrines of faith and the commandments of God; (b) natural truths of a\nuniversal character, the knowledge of which pertains to the perfection\nof the intellect, such as first principles; (c) natural truths of a\nparticular character in which important rights are involved. Example:\nAn historian who writes against some deservedly revered person of the\npast, or a lawyer who attempts to prove against an accused what he\nknows is not a fact, are guilty of the sin of contention.\n\n1359. Hence, one may be defending one kind of truth and contending\nagainst another kind of truth at the same time. St. Paul, accordingly,\nmakes the distinction between announcement of the truth out of charity\nand announcement of the truth out of contention (Philip, i, 15 sqq.).\n(a) The truth is defended out of charity when one does not use truth as\na means for the defense of error; (b) it is defended out of contention\nwhen one makes use of it as a means for the propagation of error. Thus,\nwhile St. Paul was imprisoned at Rome in 61, certain personal enemies\npreached Christ, but at the same time spoke or hinted falsehoods\nagainst St. Paul in order to undermine his authority or add to the\nbitterness of his captivity. Similarly, if one defends the truth to\nmake oneself appear different or better than one is, one speaks from\ncontention.\n\n1360. Ways in which one is guilty of the mortal sin of contention: (a)\nwhen one contends formally against the truth, that is, when one knows\nthe truth and intends to overcome it or suppress it; (b) when one\ncontends virtually against the truth, that is, when one is so bent on\ncarrying one\u2019s point that one does not care whether it is true or\nfalse. Thus, the Sophists aimed to win, right or wrong.\n\n1361. When the aim of contention is the overthrow of error: (a) in\nitself, such contention is good and praiseworthy, and at times\nnecessary; (b) by reason of circumstances, it may be a venial or a\nmortal sin. Examples: A dispute on a matter that is unbecoming, such as\nwhich of the disputants is greater (Luke, xxii. 24); dispute with\ngreater warmth than the case requires; a dispute that leads to scandal\nor other evil consequences, as in religious controversies (I Tim., ii.\n14).\n\n1362. The Causes of Sinful Contention.--(a) The cause of that which is\nprincipal in contention--namely, the departure from the truth held by\nanother and the stand made for error--is envy, pride and vainglory, as\nsaid above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which\nis secondary in contention--namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and\nthe shouts or screams of the contenders--is anger.\n\n1363. The sins in act against the peace of charity are the following:\n(a) schism which is opposed to the peace of the spiritual society, the\nChurch; (b) war, which is opposed to international peace, and sedition,\nwhich is opposed to national peace; (c) fighting, which is opposed to\npeace between individuals.\n\n1364. Schism.--Schism (etymologically, a split, rent) is defined: \u201cA\nvoluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church.\u201d\n\n(a) Schism is a voluntary separation, that is, a separation intended\nfor its own sake. Every sinner in a sense separates himself from unity,\nfor sin divides one from God (Is., lix. 2); but it is only the\nschismatic who expressly intends separation as such. Other sinners\nexpressly intend some inordinate gratification. Moreover, schism is not\nthe same thing as the state of the unbaptized, who have not separated\nthemselves from unity, or of the excommunicated, whom the Church\nherself rejected from her body on account of some sin other than schism.\n\n(b) Schism is a separation from unity, and so it differs from disbelief\nin unity (heresy) and dislike of unity (hatred). One may separate\noneself from unity, although one believes in it. One may hate unity,\nand yet not separate oneself from it. Further, schism does not\nnecessarily include affiliation with some schismatical body or the\nsetting up of such a body.\n\n(c) Schism is a separation of oneself from unity--that is, schism does\nnot deprive the Church of the note of unity, but separates the\nschismatic himself from that unity which is in the Church. The\nschismatic may wish to take away the unity of the Church, but he\naccomplishes only the loss of union of himself with the Church.\n\n(d) Schism is a separation from unity, that is, from fellowship in the\nmystical body of Christ (I Cor., xii). It is a refusal to recognize the\nauthority of the head of the Church, or to communicate with those\nsubject to him. Thus, schism differs from disobedience to the head of\nthe Church or to particular prelates in the Church, for one may disobey\norders and still recognize the authority of him who gives the orders.\n\n(e) Schism is a separation from the unity of the Church, that is, of\nthe spiritual kingdom of Christ on earth. Hence, rebellion in matters\npurely civil against a churchman who has civil authority, is not\nschism, but is unjust war or sedition. Schism is possible only in the\nChurch Militant, for the members of the Church Suffering and the Church\nTriumphant cannot fall away from unity.\n\n1365. The Principal Schismatical Movements.--(a) In Apostolic times\nthere were local factions and dissensions, though not real schisms, at\nCorinth (I Cor., i. 10 sqq.) and in Asia Minor (III John, i. 10). (b)\nIn post-Apostolic times there have been numerous schisms, such as that\nof the Novatians at Rome in the third century, that of the Meletians in\nEgypt in the fourth century, that of the Donatists in Africa in the\nfourth century, that of the Acacians in the East in the fifth century.\nThe most lamentable of all the schisms, because of the number of those\nwhom it led away from unity, was the Eastern Schism, begun by Photius\nin the ninth century and made permanent under Michael Caerularius in the\neleventh century.\n\n1366. Schism is voluntary in two ways: (a) directly, when one intends\nschism itself, wishing to separate oneself from the head or members of\nthe Church; (b) indirectly, when one intends to do that from which\nschism follows. Thus, a person who prefers to act as if he were not a\nmember of the Church rather than desist from his design of calling or\npresiding over an unauthorized Council, is guilty of schism, even\nthough he does not directly intend separation from the Church. His case\nis similar to that of one who does not wish to kill his neighbor, and\nyet is determined to do something from which the neighbor\u2019s death will\nsurely result.\n\n1367. There is a threefold unity of the Church, as follows: (a) unity\nin the theological virtues and in the Sacraments. All the faithful have\nthe same faith, hope, charity, Sacraments, and thus there is a unity of\nsimilarity; (b) unity between head and members. There is but one head\nof the Church, Christ in heaven and the Vicar of Christ an earth. Thus,\nthere is a unity of subordination; (c) unity between the members of the\nChurch. All the faithful form but one society, and all are parts of one\ngreat whole. Thus, there is a collective unity.\n\n1368. The sin of schism is committed in two ways (Canon 1325, n. 2).\n(a) It is committed by separation from the head of the Church on earth\nand the keystone of unity, that is, the Pope (Col., ii. 18, 19). The\nmere fact that a man is in rebellion against his bishop does not make\nhim a schismatic, if he continues to acknowledge subjection to the Holy\nSee. But such rebellion is often the first step towards schism. (b) The\nsin of schism is also committed by separation from the members of the\nChurch. Thus, one who refuses to communicate with Catholics in matters\nof faith or worship, choosing to act as an independent in those things,\nis a schismatic.\n\n1369. Rejection of a decision or command of the Pope can happen in\nthree ways:\n\n(a) The reason for rejecting the decision may be the thing commanded,\nand not the one who gave the command, as when a person refuses to keep\na fast or make a restitution commanded by the Pope, because he\nconsiders it too difficult. In this case the person is guilty of\ndisobedience, but not of schism, even though he persists in his\nrefusal; for he rejects a commandment of the Church, not the head of\nthe Church.\n\n(b) The reason for rejecting the command may be the one who gave the\ncommand, considered as a private individual. As the Pope in his\npersonal relations is not above human weakness, he may be swayed by\nhatred, prejudice or impulsiveness in issuing commands to or forming\njudgments about individual subjects. Hence, if we suppose that it is\nreasonably certain that a Pope is unfavorable to an individual, and\nthat the latter accordingly is unwilling to have a case in which he is\nconcerned fall under the immediate decision of that Pope, neither\nschism nor any other sin is committed; for it is natural that the\nperson should wish to protect his own interests against unfairness.\n\n(c) The reason for rejecting the Pope\u2019s judgment may be the one who\ngave the command considered in his official capacity as Pope. In this\ncase the person is guilty of schism, since he disobeys, not because the\nthing ordered is difficult or because he fears that the individual will\nbe unjust, but because he does not wish to recognize the authority of\nPope in him who issued the judgment.\n\n1370. Comparison of Heresy and Schism.--(a) These sins are not the\nsame, since heresy is opposed to faith, schism to charity. A person who\nreally believes that the Church is one in its head and its body, may\nnevertheless out of pride, hatred, ambition, interest,\nself-sufficiency, etc., decide not to recognize the authority of the\nhead, or not to communicate with the body. (b) There is an intimate\nunion between heresy and schism, since every heretic separates himself\nfrom the unity of faith, while schism is always found to adopt some\nheresy as a justification for its separation (I Tim., i. 6). Thus, the\nEastern Schism soon trumped up charges of heresy against the Church,\nand history shows that schism almost invariably leads to a denial of\npapal primacy.\n\n1371. The Opposition between Schism and Charity.--(a) Charity in itself\nis a spiritual bond of unity between the soul and God, for love is\nunitive. One who sins against this unity by offending God or his\nneighbor, is not thereby a schismatic, since one may hate an\nindividual, for example, without hating the Church. (b) Charity in its\neffect is the communion of all the faithful in one mystical body of\nChrist, for charity inspires the desire to love, not only individuals,\nbut also the spiritual society formed of individuals in the entire\nworld. One who sins against the unity and peace of the Church is a\nschismatic.\n\n1372. The Sinfulness of Schism.--(a) Schism has a special seriousness,\nsince it is opposed to the union and peace of mankind as a whole in the\nuniversal spiritual society which is the Church. It seems to be the\ngreatest sin against the neighbor; for other sins are against the\nindividual or against the multitude in temporal things, while this sin\nis against the multitude and in spiritual things. Scripture (cfr. I\nCor., i. 10) and Tradition (e.g., St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius of\nAntioch, St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine) energetically condemn\nthe sin of schism.\n\n(b) Objectively, it is not as serious as unbelief, since unbelief is\nagainst God, schism against the neighbor; but subjectively, or in its\nconsequences, it may be greater than unbelief, as when a schismatic\nsins with greater contempt than an unbeliever, or is an occasion of\nmore danger to others.\n\n1373. Schism, like heresy, may be either formal or material (see 828).\n(a) Formal schism is that described above, in which one wishes to\nseparate oneself from the unity of the Church, and is in culpable\nrevolt. It is a mortal sin. (b) Material schism is that in which one is\nin fact separated from the unity of the Church, but is in good faith.\nAn example is the Great Schism of the West (1378-1417), when there were\nrival claimants for the Papacy, and invincible ignorance among the\npeople as to who was the true head. This kind of schism is not a mortal\nsin.\n\n1374. The Spiritual Powers of Schismatics.--(a) The power of Orders is\nnot lost through schism, for that power is conferred through a\nconsecration, and the consecrations of the Church are permanent. Hence,\na schismatical priest can perform validly the acts that pertain to the\npower of Orders, such as the celebration of Mass and administration of\nthe Sacraments; but he does not perform those acts lawfully, unless the\nChurch permits, for the power of Orders should not be used by an\ninferior except as permitted by the superior.\n\n(b) The power of jurisdiction may be lost through schism, for that\npower depends on a commission received from a superior, which may be\nwithdrawn by him. Hence, a schismatical priest deprived of jurisdiction\ncould not absolve, excommunicate, grant indulgences, or perform other\nacts that pertain to the power of jurisdiction.\n\n1375. The law of the church on the powers of schismatics is as follows:\n\n(a) All schismatics incur _ipso facto_ excommunication, as well as\nvarious inhabilities and penalties (Canon 2314). It is fitting that\nthose who separate themselves should be declared outside the communion\nof the faithful, and this is what Moses commanded to be done at the\ntime of the schism of Core: \u201cDepart from the tent of these wicked men\nand touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sin\u201d (Num.,\nxvi. 26).\n\n(b) The excommunicated are forbidden the celebration of Mass and the\nactive use and administration of the Sacraments and sacramentals,\nexcept when the faithful apply to them or when there is danger of\ndeath, as declared in Canon 2261.\n\n(c) The excommunicated are denied the power of jurisdiction except in\ncertain cases where the Church grants it for the sake of the common\ngood. Thus, they may give absolution in danger of death (Canon 882), or\nin common error (Canon 209), or at request, if they are not _vitandi_\nor sentenced (Canon 2261). It is the teaching of learned authorities\nthat the Roman Church for the good of souls has allowed ecclesiastical\njurisdiction to remain in the schismatic Oriental Churches for the\nconferring of the Sacraments.\n\n1376. War.--War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more\nsovereign nations carried on by force of arms.\n\n(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts,\nsuch as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only\nthose with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with\nthem, as counsellors, helpers, etc.\n\n(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war,\nsedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation,\nnot against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a\nnation.\n\n(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war,\nrivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of\ndiplomatic relations, etc.\n\n1377. There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when\nundertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation);\n(b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the\nenslavement of a nation).\n\n1378. Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is\nattack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right\n(e.g., invasion of the enemy\u2019s territory to obtain compensation for\ndamages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust\nattack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of\none\u2019s country).\n\n1379. Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict\nsense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly\nattacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or\nbegin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the\nnation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus,\nif the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war\nagainst its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it\ndeclared war.\n\n1380. War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature\nMelchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings\n(Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered\nor approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in\nnumerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged\nthe lawfulness of the soldier\u2019s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion\nwas praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the\nofficer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of\nthe Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34).\nOur Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14\nsqq.).\n\n1381. Certain sayings of our Lord--for example, that those who take the\nsword shall perish by the sword (Matt, xxvi. 52), and that one should\nnot resist evil (Matt, v. 39)--are not an endorsement of extreme\npacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due\nauthority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when\nthis serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor.\nMoreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which\nare responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals.\nThe Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace,\nbut their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot\nbe admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.\n\n1382. War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The Church has\nnever condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion\nof peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be\nprevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the\nFathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by\nnations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval\non some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which\nthe salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the\nChurch; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were\ninstituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar\nsoldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.\n\n1383. War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature\nallows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust\naggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to\ndefensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature\nallows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution\nfor loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when\nanother nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by\nforce. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation\nwould take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus\na premium would be set on iniquity.\n\n1384. Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object,\nits purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not\nlawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:\n\n(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the\ncare of the State against internal and external disturbances has been\ncommitted to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual\nor the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to\nthe higher authority.\n\n(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side\nof the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own\nsubjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against\nthose who are not its subjects.\n\n(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some\ngood or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper\nauthority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part\nin the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the\nexercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war\nbecause one loves excitement or wishes to show one\u2019s skill or get\npromotion, is not a right frame of mind.\n\n1385. What public authority has the right to declare war? (a)\nOrdinarily, only the sovereign power--that is, the person or body in\nwhom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the\nnation--can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the\nauthority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies\nin a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if\ncustom or law allows it.\n\n(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize\nwar, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a\ndeclaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly\ninvaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on\nthe invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province\ncould justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect\nsuch province against aggressions, if the central authority would do\nnothing; for such a war would be really defensive.\n\n1386. In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the\nenemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired\nwithout war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less\nthan that of toleration.\n\n(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another\nnation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes\nwar, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these\nare unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.\n\n(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause\nfor war, because a state has no right to use force against another\nsovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault\nhas already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war\nshould not be declared.\n\n(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of\nwar is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good\nand one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave\nreason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It\nwould be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at\nthe expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern\nwarfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to\nsociety can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb\nmay cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of\na hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to\noutweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with\njustice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless\nnot be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of\nmodern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all\nwarfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to\nworship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed\nso precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property\ninvolved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare.\n\u201cA people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it\ndesires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in\npassive indifference\u201d (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).\n\n1387. In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should\ntake into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but\nalso the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy\nnation will be ruined as the price of one\u2019s obtaining some small right,\ncharity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in\ngeneral or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or\nspiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some\nnon-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of\nwar.\n\n1388. Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed\non both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being,\nthere is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to\naccuse the other of injustice. (b) If the injuries are quite unequal or\none nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less\nguilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself\nof injustice, before it proceeds to chastise injustice in the other.\n\n1389. Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the\nhonor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II\nKings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence,\nself-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a\npeople may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to\nrecover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of\nneutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and\ncommerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law.\nThus, a nation may make war to uphold important international\nagreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.\n\n1390. Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third\nnation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of\njustice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to\nhelp those with whose interests one\u2019s own interests are involved is\nonly self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of\nintervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against\na stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly\nattacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are\ntyrannized over by their government.\n\n1391. Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?\n\n(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another\npeople is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be\nforced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no\none can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without\nconviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority\nto correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be\nright to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or\npolygamous.\n\n(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or\nsinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason\nfor war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the Crusades,\nwhich were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the\nunspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a\nwar to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.\n\n1392. Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to\nit the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation\nlacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity\nfor a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for\nthe benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war\non those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the\nuncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at\npeace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of\nintroducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a\nsufficient reason for war in such circumstances.\n\n1393. The following causes for war are not sufficient:\n\n(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done\nby the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed,\njealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one\u2019s own side. Hence, it is not\nlawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the\nenlargement of one\u2019s territory, for the advantage that may be gained\nover a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power,\nor for the prevention of difficulties at home.\n\n(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by\nanother, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext\nfor war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks\nmade by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one\u2019s\nown citizens.\n\n(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as\nmotives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice,\nbut only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus,\nthe fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the\ntariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a _casus belli_; for\nin matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or\ntitle, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.\n\n1394. Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The\ngovernment may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right\nis on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of\nforce against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one\nshould refrain from hostilities as long as one\u2019s moral right is\nuncertain.\n\n(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a\nbelligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just.\nThey participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves\nthat their choice is correct.\n\n(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even\nif they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the\npresumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean,\nhowever, that one should be willing to fight for one\u2019s country, right\nor wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly\nunjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.\n\n1395. What is the meaning of \u201cmoral certitude\u201d in the previous\nparagraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability\nof the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may\ntake steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however,\nhold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons\nmust be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not\nentertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we\nprefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as\nthere is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to\npass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of\ncitizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for\nsuch a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has\nonly probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have\ncertainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.\n\n1396. Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both\nsides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on\none side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or\nrestitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or\nresist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on\none side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants,\nfor the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes\nit, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause\nof war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the\nwrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even\nthough a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in\ngood faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the\ncontroversy.\n\n1397. It is possible that there should be objective justice and\ninjustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards\nthe cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on\naccount of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of\na hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the\noriginal cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that\nappears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory,\nbut which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the\nlegitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the\nbeginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds\nare justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if\ncauses are traced farther back.\n\n1398. What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to\nnatural law?\n\n(a) Examination of the Cause of War.--It is clear that those charged\nwith the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and\nprayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and\nasking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel,\nnot of a few, but of many--not merely among those who are experts in\nthe diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question,\nbut also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side\nand who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who\nhave to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past\nwould have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.\n\n(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.--It is also clear\nthat those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in\ntheir judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism,\nyellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist\nor the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They\nshould not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful,\nunless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement;\nbut, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive\nwar.\n\n(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.--Prudence demands that, even\nwhen a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it\nshould nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded\nexpectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32).\nStatesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot\nat all foresee, are criminals.\n\n(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.--Even if the cause is just and the\nwar feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last\nmeans. Hence, pacific means--such as direct negotiation, mediation,\narbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes,\nboycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.--should be tried in\nthe first place.\n\n1399. The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International\nLaw.--(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the\nother nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make\napology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one\u2019s territory\nshould be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the\ncountry within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other\nrepresentatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.\n\n1400. In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful.\nBut in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of\ncircumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever\njustifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake\n(such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its\nexistence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can\nstill be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to\nself-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative defense.\n(b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems\nunjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests\nof a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern\nwar and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen\nto secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of\nnational policy, indicates progress for this view.\n\n1401. What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful\nmeans, according to one\u2019s position, to secure victory for one\u2019s\ncountry. Fighting to gain only a \u201cstalemate,\u201d in itself, is immoral.\n(b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or\ninternational law.\n\n1402. It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause\ncannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of\nnations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of\nacts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are\nthe following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of\nchurches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the\nobedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the\ndirect killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses\nquarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing\na flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war,\nmassacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a\ndefenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as\nsoldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels\nfor soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town\nor countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith\nwith the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false\nstories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.\n\n1403. Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same\nmeans are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a)\nThus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in\nthemselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by\nmaking an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any\nmeans that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other\nobligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really\nnecessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to\nkill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of\none\u2019s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or\ndepopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the\nenemy of his weapons.\n\n1404. The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint\nare: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with\nreligion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence\nagainst property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.\n\n1405. Acts of War and Sacred Times.--(a) It is lawful to carry on\nwarfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary,\njust as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of\nnecessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of\nhostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater\nones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at\nthose times.\n\n1406. Acts of War and Sacred Places.--(a) It is lawful to attack a\nchurch building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes.\nIt is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to\nharm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these\nreasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.\n\n1407. Acts of War and Sacred Persons.--(a) It is lawful for clerics to\ncooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers,\nand religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel\nduring battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue\naround the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other\nholy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity\n(as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual\nfighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for\na spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ,\nshed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the\nChurch forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).\n\n1408. The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a)\nCombatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion\nof the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers\nand privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the\nunarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of\nmunition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication\nservice. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters\nnor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of\nthe medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation,\nold men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not\nsubject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in\nthe hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.\n\n1409. The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.--(a) According to\nnatural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to\nstarve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or\nwound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was\nexpressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without\nhastening the decision.\n\n1410. The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.--(a) The indirect\nkilling of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and\nunavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect\n(see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications,\narsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger\nliners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food\nsupplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops,\nalthough these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as\nwell as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be\nmade to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning\nof attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a\nquestion, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or\ncobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities,\nwhere it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or\nseverely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out\nthe lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil\neffect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called\nincidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable\nresults of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly,\nif not as an end, at least as a means.\n\n(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is\nintentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder.\nObliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a\nresidential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of\nthis character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued\nthat such an attack would probably break down the morale of the\ncitizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make\npeace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based\non the principle that a good end justifies evil means.\n\nOccasionally it is argued that modern \u201ctotal\u201d warfare demands that all\ncitizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is\na combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic\ndoctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and\naccidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented\narticle on \u201cThe Morality of Obliteration Bombing,\u201d by John C. Ford,\nS.J. (_Theological Studies_, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the\ndistinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the\ncondition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an\nindustrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the\npopulation belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than\na hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law,\nexclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks\non such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or\nwounding of non-combatants.\n\n1411. The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.--(a) It is lawful to\nsentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those\nwho approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops,\nguerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to\nsentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a\nprivate soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a\nnon-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not\nbe put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel\nor break faith.\n\n1412. Imprisonment and Restraint.--(a) Combatants may be made prisoners\nof war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military\nrules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases\nthey may be transported behind their enemy\u2019s lines. (b) Prisoners of\nwar and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human\nbeings, but not better than the soldiers of one\u2019s own army. They may\nnot be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to\ndeath, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one\u2019s own forces.\n\n1413. The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.--(a) The\nmilitary property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be\nconfiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to\ndestroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may\ndemolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and\nartillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money,\nfood or drink.\n\n(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a\nsuccessful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and\nsome others are excepted by international law), and he may use\nimmovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted\nby law).\n\n(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law\nrequires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be\nseized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and\ncontributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes\nof citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army\nmaintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or\na receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against\nprivate persons, but against the state.\n\n(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant\nships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.\n\n(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is\nnot really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards\nthe ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to\nthe present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval\npowers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and\nfreedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search,\nseize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband\nor attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.\n\n1414. It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the\nprivate soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises:\nAre private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without\nauthorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If\nthey take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against\nmilitary discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to\nrestore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore,\nsince international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if\nneither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of\nrestitution cannot be insisted on as grave.\n\n1415. Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery?\n(a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when\ncompensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In\nmodern times and according to present international law, looting is\nstrictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no\nright to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible,\nand valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the\nrights of the inhabitants to their goods.\n\n1416. Stratagems in War.--(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for\nconcealing one\u2019s plans from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke\nscreens, censored reports of engagements, etc. Thus, Josue by command\nof the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens of Hai (Jos., viii. 2).\n(b) It is lawful also to conceal one\u2019s identity by wearing the uniforms\nof the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord\ncommanded Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num.,\nxiii. 1). While it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is\nlawful to conceal the truth from those who have no right to know it.\n\n1417. Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to\nunlawful aggressions of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against\nhim. Their morality depends on circumstances. (a) Thus, if the act of\nthe enemy is opposed only to international law, it is not unlawful to\nuse the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith, the\ntreaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the\nenemy, contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful\nto use poison gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however,\nwithout authorization from the proper authority. (b) If the act of the\nenemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible to retaliate by\nthe same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But one may\nretaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await\ncompensation at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders\nthe civil population, this does not justify one in murdering enemy\ncitizens who are in one\u2019s power.\n\n1418. Duties of the Nation Victorious in War.--(a) The victorious\nnation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained, or after\nthe enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice. (b) It must\nnot exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.\n\n1419. The Rights of the Victor.--(a) If the cause of the victorious\nnation was unjust, its victory gives it no claim, for might does not\nmake right. On the contrary, it may be obliged to make restitution to\nthe defeated nation for the losses it has suffered. (b) If the cause of\nthe victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim to three things:\n(i) to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which the war\nwas undertaken; (ii) to compensation for damages caused by the enemy\nduring the war, and (iii) to guarantees against a recurrence of the\nformer injury. Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal\nhas much to recommend it, since victors are prone to disregard charity\nand justice when treating with a conquered foe, and to extort from him\nforced agreements.\n\n1420. The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust.--(a) If the\nvictorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived the\ninjustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which\nit has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before\nthe war. (b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory\ndoes not prove that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It\ndoes not make a bad cause good.\n\n1421. The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization,\nor with a Wrong Purpose.--(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy\nagainst the orders of the commanders (e.g., by burning dwellings,\nrobbing private citizens, murdering, etc.), are obliged to restitution\nfor those injuries, for such acts are not war, but brigandage. (b)\nSoldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not\nobliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for\nsimilarly a judge, who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his\nmotive is hate, but he is not held to restitution.\n\n1422. What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?--(a) According\nto justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses one\nhas sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for\nthese. (b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part\nof what is owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a\ndebt, as when the enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay\nat present.\n\n1423. In cases of doubt, as when counter claims are made and neither\nparty is entirely victorious, or when a vanquished nation denies its\nability to pay what is demanded, recourse may be had to other ways of\nsettlement. (a) Thus, in the former case a compromise or mutual\ncondonation of claims, especially if both sides are exhausted by the\nwar, seems the reasonable solution. (b) In the latter case submission\nto an impartial tribunal of arbitration would benefit the victors as\nwell as the vanquished, since in the long run it is not to the\nadvantage of the former that the latter be deprived of its goods and\nproductivity.\n\n1424. Guarantees for the Future.--(a) One may insist on such guarantees\nas will insure against a probable renewal of the offense committed by\nthe conquered nation. Hence, one may require that it destroy or deliver\nover fortifications and munition plants, sink warships, reduce its\nmilitary force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain rulers.\n\n(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal of war\nby the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible. As said\nabove, a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against\naggression, but it has no right to work at destroying equality or\ncompetition on the part of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to\ndemand that the conquered nation surrender its independence or the\nmanagement of its affairs, or that one be allowed to annex all the\nterritory taken during war, if one\u2019s rights or reasonable security does\nnot require these conditions. Subjugation or temporary occupation are\nlawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress or\nsecurities.\n\n1425. Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during\nWar.--(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of\nnon-combatants) may be punished, but the punishment should be visited\non those responsible, not on those who merely executed orders. (b) The\ncrime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers, for\nit is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and\nrulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The\nNurenberg trials held commanders and high officers responsible for\ncrimes against humanity, and not without precedent.\n\n1426. Preparation for Future Wars.--(a) Reasonable preparedness is not\nonly lawful, but a duty of the state to its own people. A nation should\nhave such a military establishment or such alliances as will safeguard\nits right against probable attack. (b) Unreasonable preparedness is\nunlawful since it burdens the people and prepares the way for war.\nExamples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance of an army or navy\nfar in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military\nexpenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too\ndangerous for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.\n\n1427. Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory\nthan preparation for defensive war. Two chief ways of preparing for\npeace: (a) will for peace; (b) work for peace.\n\n(a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their\npeople to a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness\nand folly of a narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has\nnot all the conditions of a just war in its favor. Without the will for\npeace, conferences and treaties will effect little.\n\n(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical\nplans for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world\namity. Among these plans are agreements among nations to substitute\nmoral right for material force, to abolish conscription and armaments,\nto establish international tribunals, associations and world courts, to\nmake arbitration of disputes among themselves compulsory, to codify\ninternational law. History bears witness to the many and great services\nto humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters between\nnations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement\namong governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless\ncontinue to work for peace and by constitutional means make their\nwishes prevail among the governments. With the Church we should pray:\n\u201cFrom pestilence, famine and war, deliver us, O Lord.\u201d\n\n1428. Fighting.--Fighting is an angry conflict between two or more\npersons carried on by means of physical violence.\n\n(a) Thus, it is an angry conflict, and so differs from contests of\nstrength or skill made for the sake of sport, amusement, recreation,\nhealth, exercise and training. Hence, wrestling and boxing matches,\nfootball games, fencing and similar athletic contests, in which fair\nplay and a sportsmanlike spirit prevail, are not fighting as here\nunderstood. Similarly, the tournaments of the medieval knights were\nsports or spectacles, rather than fights.\n\n(b) It is a conflict, and so differs from punishment inflicted by\nlawful authority, as when a police officer uses his club to prevent a\ncrime, a parent or teacher chastises insubordinate children, or a sober\nman scuffles with an inebriate to take away his flask or with a lunatic\nto deprive him of a weapon.\n\n(c) It is a conflict between two or more individuals, and so differs\nfrom war and sedition, which are conflicts between nations or parts of\na multitude.\n\n(d) It is conducted by means of physical violence, that is by the\ninfliction of bodily injuries or harm. Thus, fighting differs from\nquarreling, which is a dispute in words. It makes no difference whether\nthe attack be made by fists, fingernails or teeth, or by weapons or\nmissiles, or whether the bodily harm be direct (e.g., a blackened eye)\nor indirect (e.g., a hat knocked off the head).\n\n1429. Kinds of Fighting.--(a) As to its origin, fighting is provoked or\nunprovoked, according as one who fights is attacking another or\ndefending himself against attack. (b) As to its manner, it is an\nordinary fight or a duel, according as it takes place without or with\nprevious arrangement and stipulated conditions. (c) As to its eject,\nthe civil law distinguishes between assault and battery. Assault is a\nshow of violence against the person of another, as when one lifts one\u2019s\nfist or cane in a threatening manner to put another in fear of bodily\nharm. Battery is the actual infliction of personal violence, as when\none strikes, pushes, scratches, bites, or spits on another.\n\n1430. The Sinfulness of Fighting.--(a) Unprovoked fighting is from its\nnature a mortal sin. It is classed among the works of the flesh that\nexclude from the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 20, 21), and it is\nessentially opposed to the charity owed to a neighbor. It is frequently\nonly a venial sin, either because the act is not entirely deliberate,\nas when one fights in sudden anger, or because the violence is of a\ntrifling kind, as when school-children pull one another\u2019s hair or throw\nsnowballs.\n\n(b) Fighting under provocation is no sin at all, when one intends only\nto defend one\u2019s rights and does not go beyond what is necessary for\nlawful defence, as when one struggles with a burglar who is trying to\nenter one\u2019s house, and pushes him through the door. It is a venial sin,\nwhen the person who is resisting aggression acts with some slight\ndegree of hate or revengefulness, or inflicts a little more injury than\nis really necessary. It is a mortal sin, when the person who was\nattacked fights in a spirit of hate and revenge, or deliberately and\nneedlessly seeks to kill or seriously maim the adversary.\n\n1431. Causes of Fighting.--The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal\nof its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.\n\n(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov.,\nxv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content\nto injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him--that is, to\ninjure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and\nwill feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the\nfoolishness of one\u2019s actions, and so leads one precipitately into\nquarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).\n\n(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal\nthings, such as wealth, power, ease: \u201cWhy are there wars and disputes\namong you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your\nmembers?\u201d (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their\nown interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or\ninsults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at\nonce to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed\nand envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug\nby Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14\nsqq.).\n\n1432. Hatred and Fighting.--(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of\nfighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but\nabsolutely; his passion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable\nthan that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time\npatiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to\nthe one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if\nthe hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling\nand fighting as a means to his purpose.\n\n1433. Occasions that Frequently Bring On Fighting.--(a) Boasting about\nself or depreciation of others in the presence of persons who will take\noffense occasions fights, for \u201che that boasteth and puffeth himself up\nstirreth up quarrels\u201d (Prov., xxviii. 25). Thus, disputes over the\nrespective merits of nations or political parties often bring on bloody\nencounters. (b) Drunkenness occasions fights, for it so stupefies the\nmind that one minimizes one\u2019s danger and exaggerates one\u2019s own\nstrength, and so is emboldened to attack others (Prov., xxiii. 29, 30).\n\n1434. Evil Consequences of Fighting.--(a) Charity is wounded by\nfighting, wherefrom there often result lasting hates, discords,\nscandals. (b) Justice is wounded by fighting, as when a person unjustly\nmaims or kills his neighbor, and is himself imprisoned or executed, to\nthe disgrace and deprivation of his dependents.\n\n1435. Duelling.--A duel is a prearranged combat between two persons\nfought with deadly weapons, for the purpose of settling a private\nquarrel.\n\n(a) Thus, it is a combat, and hence the \u201csuicide duel,\u201d in which the\ncontenders draw lots with the understanding that the loser must kill\nhimself within a specified time, is not properly a duel.\n\n(b) A duel is prearranged, that is, the time, place, and weapons are\ndetermined in advance. Hence, if two feudists meet accidentally and\nproceed at once to shoot, their combat is not strictly a duel. It is\nnot necessary, however, that a formal letter of challenge and a letter\nof acceptance precede the fight.\n\n(c) It is between two persons, that is, a determinate combatant is\nmatched against a determinate opponent. A true duel, however, might be\ncarried on between many couples simultaneously, as in the fight between\nthe twelve soldiers of Abner and the twelve soldiers of Joab (II Kings,\nii. 13-17). The presence of seconds or witnesses is not essential to a\nduel.\n\n(d) A duel is fought with deadly weapons, that is, with such arms as\nare capable of inflicting severe wounds, so that there is serious\ndanger of grave wound or mutilation or death. There is no duel,\ntherefore, if one fights with weapons that cannot do serious harm (such\nas fists, light sticks, mud), or if by agreement one uses dangerous\nweapons in a way that precludes injury (e.g., by padding the edge of\none\u2019s sword, loading one\u2019s revolver with blanks, firing into the air,\nas in sham or mock duels). But academic duels, in which students try to\nstab each other in the face with small daggers, are true duels; for,\nwhile the fighters are well protected in vital parts and serious or\nfatal wounds rarely happen, it remains true that this manner of\nfighting is mortally dangerous. The same remark applies to duels fought\non condition that only one or two rounds of shots shall be fired, or\nthat fighting shall cease as soon as blood has been drawn.\n\n(e) A duel is fought for the purpose of settling a private quarrel. A\nhand-to-hand combat during battle between two soldiers of contending\narmies is not a duel in the proper sense of the word, since there is no\nprivate quarrel between them, but only the public quarrel of their\ncountries.\n\n1436. The Morality of Duelling.--(a) Generally, the duel is mortally\nsinful. Like ordinary fighting, it is against charity, and in addition\nit includes a will to kill or gravely injure another, to expose one\u2019s\nown life or limb to chance, and to usurp the function of the State.\nThis applies to the challenged as well as to the challenger, for one\ncan decline the combat to which one is dared.\n\n(b) Exceptionally, a duel would not be sinful, if it took on the\ncharacter of a war, or of self-defense against an unjust aggressor.\nThus, in order to shorten a war or to lessen the bloodshed, it might be\nlawful to make the whole issue depend on a single combat between the\ncommanders or between champions chosen from opposing armies, as in the\ncase of David and Goliath (I Kings, xvii); but in modern times such a\npractice has been abandoned. Again, if a person had to choose between\ncertain death, if he refused a duel, and possible death, if he\nconsented to a duel, it would seem that he is in the position of one\nattacked by an unjust aggressor; but it is not easy to picture such a\ncase as happening in normal conditions.\n\n1437. The Fallacy of the Arguments for Duelling.--(a) The amusement of\nthe spectators was the purpose of the gladiatorial duels fought in\nancient Rome. But today there is no one who would not grant that the\nbutchering of human beings to make a holiday for the populace is\nsavagery.\n\n(b) The decision of doubtful cases before the courts was the purpose of\nthe judicial duels fought among the Germans and Lombards in the early\nMiddle Ages. But manifestly such duels are a temptation of God, since\nthey rashly call on Him to disclose, through a duel between the\nlitigants, what the evidence in court did not disclose. The outcome of\nthe duel shows which party is stronger or more skilful, not which is in\nthe right.\n\n(c) Training in bravery and the termination of serious differences is\nthe excuse offered for military and university duels. But to kill,\ncripple, or brutalize youth does not make the nation stronger, and the\nsubstitution of violence for law as a means of settling disputes is an\nencouragement to crime.\n\n(d) Satisfaction for insults or other injury, or the avoidance of the\nreputation of being a coward, is the reason given for so-called affairs\nof honor. But is it not a superstition and a relic of barbarism to\nthink that dishonor is wiped out by a dishonorable fight, or that a\nperson shows himself brave because he lacks the moral bravery to act\nagainst the wrong opinions of the multitude?\n\n1438. Penalties against Duelling.--(a) Church law deprives of\necclesiastical burial those who die as the result of a duel, if\nunrepentant (Canon 1240); it also declares excommunication reserved\nsimply to the Holy See and infamy against duellists and their helpers\n(Canon 2351). (b) Civil law in English-speaking countries makes\nduelling a crime. If death results, it is regarded as murder, and the\nseconds are liable to punishment as accessories.\n\n1439. What is the moral duty of restitution on account of injuries\ncaused in a duel? (a) The challenger and his heirs have no right to\nrestitution. (b) The challenged, if he accepted willingly, has no right\nto restitution, for his free acceptance of the fight implies the\ncession of such a right. (c) The challenged, if he accepted under grave\ncompulsion, has the right to restitution. If he is wounded, the\naggressor should pay the medical expense; if he is killed, the heirs\nshould be compensated.\n\n1440. Sedition.--Sedition is a discord between different factions of the\nsame multitude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the\ndestruction of the unity of the State.\n\n(a) It is a discord, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it\nresembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the\npolitical parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity\nof will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good\nand the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a\ndemocratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties\nhas proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest\nof citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.\n\n(b) Sedition is between different factions of the same multitude, that\nis, between different sections or groups of the same body politic.\nThus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting\n(which is between individuals).\n\n(c) Sedition extends to physical conflict, that is, it tends from its\ncharacter to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions\nin fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities,\nit is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection\nor rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is\ncivil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome\nthe other.\n\n(d) It is prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people, that\nis, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to\nthe disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than\nriots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which\nare not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of\nthe whole body of the people. Sedition differs also from the peaceful\nseparation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the\npeople against a tyrannical government.\n\n1441. From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a\nspecial distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord,\nfor unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to\nthe unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal\ndiscord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace\nbetween nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the\nsame civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes\naway peace with fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or\npersons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.\n\n1442. Sedition in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful.\n(a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to\nwhat is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the\nunity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the\nbond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on\nlaw and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c)\nSedition is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral\ncauses of sedition (i.e., those that sow discords or promote\ndisaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry\nout acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on\nthe amount of damage that is due to one\u2019s influence or acts.\n\n1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of\nsedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such\nas the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no\nsedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed\naggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is\nnot guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad\nruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good,\nwhereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus,\nthe rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not\nseditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression\nwill not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of\nsedition.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 9: THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 43.)\n\n1444. Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to\nthe internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to\ntreat of scandal and cooperation which are opposed to the external acts\nof charity--beneficence and brotherly correction.\n\n1445. Scandal.--Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare\nor trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road\nthat he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or\ngeneral sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its wide sense,\nit refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral\nnature, that one brings on others. (b) In its strict sense, it refers\nto a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.\n\n1446. The following are some examples of the word \u201cscandal\u201d as employed\nin its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural\ninjuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the\nplagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the\nPsalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (calamity) against\nhis brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are\ncalled scandal-mongers, and \u201cscandal\u201d often signifies opprobrium or\ndisgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a\nscandal to the crown. (b) The word \u201cscandal\u201d is also used to signify\nmoral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and\noffense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in\ntheir hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent\nanother from following some more perfect course or practice to which\nthere is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at\nmeals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.\n\n1447. Definition of Scandal.--In the strict sense, scandal is defined\nas \u201cany conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that\noffers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.\u201d\n\n(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in\nthe presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is\ncommitted, not only by external acts done before others, but also by\ninternal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.\n\n(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is,\nsinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not\nscandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is\nperceivable as being such.\n\n(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin, great\nor small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the\nwide senses given in the previous paragraph.\n\n(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an\nexample of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that\nthe will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin,\nfor a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion\noffered by scandal.\n\n(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself\nin the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion\nof sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts\nof a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly\nunderstood of an occasion of sin prepared for one\u2019s neighbor.\n\n1448. Causes of Scandal.--There are various divisions of scandal\naccording to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words,\nas profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b)\nThere is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in\na city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are\nthe result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books,\npictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on\ndisplay, such as profane mottoes on one\u2019s wall, obscene advertisements\nor announcements on one\u2019s billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in\nomission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.\n\n1449. The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they\nare unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts,\nsuch as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed\nfrom others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable\nby others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no\nknowledge.\n\n1450. There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to\nthe internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly\nintentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to\nthe guilt of sin (diabolical scandal). Example: Titus blasphemes\nreligion before Caius in order that the latter may become irreligious,\nand thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b)\nScandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer\nis to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others\nto the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action,\nalthough not directly willing the neighbor\u2019s guilt that will result.\nExample: Titus does not like to see his children drunk, but he likes to\nget drunk himself occasionally, knowing all the while that his example\nencourages them to drink.\n\n1451. In the following cases there is no intention of scandal: (a) when\none does an act that has no appearance of evil, and one neither\ndirectly nor indirectly wills that it should be an occasion of sin to\nanyone. Example: Balbus performs his duties faithfully, although he\nknows to his regret that his fidelity occasions envy and hatred in\nClaudius; (b) when one does an act that is evil or apparently evil, but\nis invincibly ignorant of the scandal it may give. Example: Sempronius\nand Titus converse together in a foreign tongue which they confidently\nthink Caius does not understand. The conversation is disedifying, and\nCaius, who does understand, is shocked by what they say.\n\n1452. The act of the scandalizer who intends, directly or indirectly,\nthe spiritual ruin of his neighbor, is called active scandal, while the\nact of the person who takes occasion from the active scandal to incur\nspiritual ruin, is called passive scandal. Active and passive scandal\nare sometimes together, sometimes apart. (a) Thus, there is both active\nand passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his\nneighbor, and the scandalized does fall. (b) There is active but not\npassive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor,\nbut the latter does not fall into the snare. (c) There is passive but\nnot active scandal, when one makes the good action rightly performed by\nanother an occasion of sin. Thus, some made the life and passion of our\nLord a pretext for not accepting Him (Matt., xiii. 57; John, vi. 62; I\nCor., i. 23), and are said to have been scandalized at Him.\n\n1453. As to the act that occasions the spiritual ruin of another, it\nmust be wrong either in reality or in appearance. (a) The scandalous\nact is wrong in reality, when it is forbidden as a sin--for example,\noffering sacrifice in the temple of an idol, or diverting to personal\nuse money collected for the poor. (b) The scandalous act is wrong in\nappearance, when on account of circumstances it seems to be an act\nforbidden as a sin. Thus, to take part in a banquet held in a pagan\ntemple might seem like participation in sacrificial rites (I Cor.,\nviii. 10), to expend secretly the money collected for the poor might\nhave the appearance of improper use of funds (II Cor., viii. 20, 21).\nHence, St. Paul directs; \u201cFrom all appearance of evil refrain\nyourselves\u201d (I Thess., v. 22).\n\n1454. The acts wrong in reality or in appearance that give scandal are\ninnumerable, since the whole world is seated in wickedness (I John, v.\n19). But today there are a number of acts that should be specially\nmentioned, as they occasion sin oftener or for more persons than other\nacts. Among these are: (a) occasions of sin against faith, such as\natheistical literature, as discussed in the section on faith; (b)\noccasions of sin against morals, such as obscenity in dress, pictures,\nplays, writings, and dances. These last-mentioned will be discussed now\nin separate paragraphs.\n\n1455. Obscenity.--Obscenity is a quality of words, acts or objects by\nwhich impure thoughts are conveyed, or impure desires or actions\nsuggested. We may consider it either internally (i.e., in the intention\nof the person who uses the words, acts or objects) or externally (i.e.,\nin the nature of the things themselves which are used).\n\n(a) Thus, internal obscenity, or the will to use what will corrupt the\nminds and morals of others, is of course a mortal sin. If the intention\nis to deprave another, the guilt of direct scandal is incurred; if the\nintention is only to satisfy one\u2019s own wish to use the sinful words,\nacts or objects, the guilt is that of indirect scandal. Thus, a woman\nwho dresses fashionably in order to excite impure love is guilty of\ndirect scandal; if she dresses immodestly, not to excite impure love,\nbut to follow a fashion, she is guilty of indirect scandal.\n\n(b) External obscenity is the tendency of words, acts or objects\nthemselves to call up impure images in the mind, or to excite impure\ndesires or actions in those to whom they are presented. The use of such\nwords, acts, etc., is therefore a mortal sin. For, if the thing said or\ndone is wrong in itself (such as obscene language), it is a scandalous\nsin against purity, if it is wrong on account of those who will be\ninfluenced (such as a talk on sex matters to immature or weak persons),\nit is a sin of scandal. Hence, a good or even religious motive (such as\ninstruction, refutation of error, health, or mysticism) does not excuse\nthe employment of what is clearly obscene, for the end does not justify\nthe means.\n\n1456. It is not always easy to determine in particular cases when a\nthing is obscene from its very nature, but the following general rules\ncan be given:\n\n(a) Pictures, statues and other images are obscene, when they represent\nscenes of immoral or sexual acts, or lascivious attitudes or postures;\nalso, when they represent nude or partly nude human figures, ut quando\ndepinguntur verenda adultorum vel pectora aut partes minus honestae\nmulierum.\n\n(b) Female dress or adornment is lascivious, when there is a notable\ndisplay of the person through abbreviated skirts, necks, and sleeves;\nor a suggestiveness expressed in transparency of material or a\ncloseness of fit that brings out the lines and curves of the figure; or\nin an extremity of fashion whose striking color or design will make the\nwearer conspicuous and direct special attention to her physical charms.\n\n(c) Plays on the stage or moving picture screen are obscene by reason\nof the lesson taught (as when purity is derided or impurity condoned),\nby reason of the thing represented (as when the main theme is impurity,\nor when acts of impurity are represented or suggested, or when sexual\npassion is emphasized), or by reason of the players (as when they are\nnoted for immorality, or when their dress is indecent, or their\nlanguage objectionable).\n\n(d) Dances are obscene in themselves when the postures, movements, or\ncontact of the dancers is indecent; they are obscene by reason of the\ndancers, when these are indecently attired. Public dance halls,\ncabarets, road houses, and night clubs--where there is no supervision\nand young girls come unattended to dance until late hours with men\nunknown to them, and where there is intoxication and\nboisterousness--are the natural haunts of the obscene dance, but it may\nbe found even in more respectable places.\n\n(e) Books or other writings contain obscenity When they inculcate or\nrecommend impure acts, or advise how these may be committed; when they\ntreat sins of impurity or narrate immoral facts or stories in such a\nmanner as to make vice seem alluring or pardonable to the intended\nreader; when an erotic composition by language, allusions, details,\nsympathetic treatment, etc., gives prominence to animal passion.\n\n1457. As is stated elsewhere (see 1461 sqq.), scandal is not given\nunless the persons affected by one\u2019s conduct are susceptible to evil\ninfluence. Hence, there is no obscenity when on account of\ncircumstances there is no suggestion of evil in things which under\nother conditions would be immoral and seductive.\n\n(a) Images of the nude in the studio of an artist, and anatomical\ncharts, figures or illustrations in a book intended for the instruction\nof medical men, are not classed as obscene, since the persons for whom\nthey are made are supposed to be so much under the influence of the\nesthetic or scientific principles of their professions that no harm\nwill be taken.\n\n(b) The obscenity of dress is largely dependent on its novelty, for\nthings that are usual cease to excite special attention. This we can\nsee from the fact that styles that are conservative today would have\nbeen extreme ten years ago. And so the scanty attire of hot countries,\nthe dress of the bathing beach, and the moderate decollete tolerated in\nprivate gatherings are not obscene in their own proper times and places.\n\n(c) Plays which contain gross or unseemly expressions or passages are\nnot therefore obscene, if in the main they uphold decency and morality;\notherwise, we should have to regard as immoral even the classic drama.\nNewman says of Shakespeare: \u201cOften as he may offend against modesty, he\nis clear of a worse charge, sensuality, and hardly a passage can be\ninstanced in all that he has written to seduce the imagination or to\nexcite the passions.\u201d It is a simple matter to omit from plays of this\nkind the word or phrase that is offensive to modern ears or to the\ninnocence of youth.\n\n(d) The fact that some individuals find all dancing a strong stimulus\nto impure passion does not prove that every dance is obscene. Some\ntypes of dance, it is true, might be rightly called \u201cthe devil\u2019s\nmarch\u201d; other dances, named after various animals, may also be\nsuggestive. But there are also standard types of dance in which many\nexperience not temptation, but innocent pastime, and which have also\nphysical, esthetic and social values.\n\n(e) To books and other writings should be applied what was said about\nplays, namely, that they are not to be classed as obscene on account of\nisolated passages unsuited for the reading of children or other\nsusceptible persons, or excitable to prurient or impure minds. Even the\nBible may seem objectionable to a prude, and the indecent will go\nthrough its pages with a fine-tooth comb in the search for indecent\nmatter; but public opinion will rightly class as a lunatic the person\nwho would endeavor to have the Bible rated as obscene.\n\n1458. Persons Who Give Scandal on Account of Obscenity.--(a) In case of\nobscene pictures or statues, scandal is given by the artists, painters,\nsculptors or others who make the images, and by the responsible persons\nwho place them in museums, galleries, parks or other places to which\nthere is general admission.\n\n(b) As regards female dress, the guilty parties are proximately the\nwearers, but remotely and principally the designers and society leaders\nwho impose their will in making the fashions dangerous and in causing\none extreme mode to follow quickly upon another.\n\n(e) With respect to obscene plays, the scandal is given by playwrights,\nmanagers, actors and actresses, and those who patronize or applaud\nthem. The public itself and the civil authorities share in the guilt,\nwhen they supinely tolerate the degradation of the stage and the\ncorruption of morals.\n\n(d) In the case of obscene dances, the givers of scandal are the\nproprietors of resorts where the dances are held, the musicians and\nsingers (especially when the songs themselves are obscene), and the\ndancers, spectators and other patrons.\n\n(e) In the case of salacious publications or writings, authors,\npublishers, printers, vendors, and the reading public share\nresponsibility for the scandal. Government censorship of the press is\nnot desirable, but government suppression of obscenity has always been\nthe policy of countries of English origin. The private citizen, then,\nis not free of guilt if he takes no interest even when he sees piles of\nindecent magazines, pictures, etc., being sold openly on the\nnewsstands. Canon Law (Canon 1404) forbids booksellers to sell, lend,\nor keep books that deal _ex professo_ with obscenity, though there is\nno objection to expurgated editions, as in the case of classical works.\n\n1459. Results of Scandal.--The spiritual ruin occasioned by scandal is\nsin.\n\n(a) Thus, formal or material sin may be the result of scandal. Example:\nTitus blasphemed before a boy who did not understand the meaning of the\nword and before a youth who did understand, with the result that both\nrepeated the same blasphemy. Thus, the scandal given by Titus produced\nmaterial sin in the boy and formal sin in the youth.\n\n(b) Mortal sin or venial sin may be the result of scandal, just as a\nstone in the road may cause either a fall or a stumble.\n\n(c) Sin of the same species or sin of a different species from that\ncommitted by the scandal-giver may be the result of scandal. Thus, a\ncalumny spoken against a neighbor may induce a hearer either to repeat\nthe calumny, or to imitate the act imputed by the calumniator, or to\ngive up religion.\n\n(d) Sin already committed by the person scandalized or sin which is new\nto him, sin he had in mind to commit or sin he had not\ncontemplated--any one of these results suffice for scandal. Example: It\nis scandal to recall to drunkenness by bad example a person who had\nreformed, or by bad example to bring back to another\u2019s mind and desire\na sin on which he was once resolved.\n\n1460. Scandal resembles solicitation and complicity, since like them it\nexercises an evil influence on others; but it is not identical with\nthem.\n\n(a) Thus, solicitation influences another to evil by counsel,\npersuasion, command, or invitation; scandal may influence to evil\neither in these ways or by mere example. Again, solicitation does not\nnecessarily intend the fall of another into guilt, as does scandal.\nThus, one may solicit another to get drunk who had already determined\nto get drunk, or one may persuade another that drunkenness is no sin,\nand then solicit him to drunkenness. But, if one who intends the\ndemoralization and corruption of his neighbor solicits him to\ndrunkenness, solicitation is joined with scandal.\n\n(b) Complicity or cooperation influences another to evil by helping him\nin the commission of sin; scandal influences him to evil by suggesting\nthat he commit sin. Example: Titus, an elderly man, gets drunk or\npraises drunkards in the presence of Balbus, a youth. Influenced by\nthese acts and words, Balbus tells his acquaintance Claudius that he\nintends to get drunk, and Claudius supplies him with the intoxicants.\nTitus is guilty of scandal, Claudius of cooperation.\n\n1461. The persons before whom disedifying words, deeds or omissions are\ndone, are of two classes. (a) Persons apt to be scandalized are those\nwho are not experienced either in vice (especially that to which the\ndisedifying example would lead), or in virtue (especially the opposite\nvirtue); for such persons are readily subject to bad influence. Thus,\nyoung persons Whose character is yet unformed, the ignorant and\nwell-meaning persons who are weak, are peculiarly disposed to be led\nastray by example. (b) Persons not apt to be scandalized are those who\nare habitually so bad or so good that anything disedifying done before\nthem is not calculated to influence their attitude towards evil.\n\n1462. May a person hold himself guiltless of scandal, therefore,\nbecause his wrongdoing was committed before those who are not apt to be\nscandalized?\n\n(a) If he is certain that the witnesses will not be weakened morally on\nhis account, and if he does not intend their fall, he is free of the\nguilt of scandal. Thus, if one blasphemes in the presence of a lady\nrenowned for piety, or of a rough crowd of men whose daily talk is\ninterspersed with blasphemies, it is practically sure that no scandal\nis given.\n\n(b) If a person is not certain that the witnesses will suffer no moral\nharm through his example, he cannot hold himself as not guilty of\nscandal. For, no matter how good or how bad the witnesses may appear to\nhim, they may not be as fixed in character as he thinks, and his\nmisconduct may be the starting point for them of a downward course or\nof a more rapid descent into evil. Generally speaking, there is this\nuncertainty about the influence of bad example, for the reading of\ncharacter is no easy matter, and many sins are internal.\n\n1463. There are two cases especially, when even the very good may\nbecome bad or the very bad become worse through force of evil example:\n(a) when the sin committed is from its nature very alluring. Sic\nauctores censent vix fieri posse quin in materia luxuriae malum exemplum\npeccati motus cieat; (b) the second case is when the authority of the\none who gives scandal is great. For the fact that he sides with or\nseems to side with evil, will demoralize the good and encourage the\nwicked in wrongdoing.\n\n1464. Passive scandal (see 1452), that is, the spiritual fall\nconsequent on the example of another, is of two kinds: (a) scandal\ngiven, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct really\ndisedifying, as when a youth becomes drunk because he has seen his\nelders intoxicated; (b) scandal taken, which is a fall into sin\noccasioned by conduct irreproachable in itself, but wrongly\ninterpreted, either out of malice (Pharisaic scandal), or out of\nignorance or frailty (scandal of little ones). The Pharisees were\nscandalized at our Lord\u2019s dining with sinners, because they themselves\nwere unmerciful (Matt., ix. 11 sqq.), and the weak brethren at Corinth\nwere scandalized at the eating of certain meats, because their\nconsciences were tender (I Cor., xi. 23 sqq.).\n\n1465. Sinfulness of Scandal.--(a) Scandal in the wide sense is not\nnecessarily a sin. Thus, St. Peter acted out of love for his Master\nwhen he wished to dissuade Him from the Passion, but our Lord, in order\nto correct more vigorously the wrong ideas of Peter, called them a\nscandal (Matt., xvi. 23).\n\n(b) Passive scandal is always a sin in the one who falls because of the\nconduct of another; but it does not always suppose that the conduct\nwhich occasioned the fall was a sin, as is clear from the remarks made\nabove on Pharisaic scandal and the scandal of little ones.\n\n(c) Active scandal is always a sin in the one whose conduct occasions\nthe fall of another, since that conduct is either sinful, or has such\nan appearance of sin that it should have been omitted. But it does not\nalways suppose a sin in the person who witnesses the scandal, for he\nmay proceed without a fall in spite of the obstacle placed in his path.\n\n1466. Is scandal a distinct species of sin, or only a circumstance that\nmay happen to any kind of sin?\n\n(a) Passive scandal is not a special kind of sin. For the scandalized\nperson may fall into any and every kind of sin, and the fact that\nexample occasions his fall does not add any special or new opposition\nto the virtue against which he offends. Thus, he who breaks the fast\nbecause he saw others break the fast, is guilty of the same sin of\nintemperance as those who gave him scandal. But passive scandal may be\nan aggravating or an extenuating circumstance, aggravating if the\nscandal was taken, extenuating if the scandal was given.\n\n(b) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional (see 1450) and\nis offered by conduct evil in itself, is not a special sin. The reason\nis that in such scandal one does not specially intend the spiritual\nruin of a neighbor, but only the satisfaction of one\u2019s own desire.\nThus, he who breaks the fast before others to satisfy his own appetite,\ndoes not directly wish the corruption of those others, and hence his\nsin is that of intemperance with the added circumstance of bad example.\n\n(c) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional and is offered\nby conduct not evil but evil-appearing, is reductively the special sin\nof scandal, For, since all active scandal is sinful, and in this case\nthere is no other species of sin, the conduct not being really evil in\nitself, the sin in question must be reduced to scandal. Thus, one who\nis dispensed from the law of abstinence and who eats meat on a day of\nabstinence in the presence of others who know he is a Catholic but do\nnot know he is dispensed, does not sin against temperance, but against\nedification. His sin is that of scandal only reductively, since he does\nnot directly will the fall of others. There is also the circumstance\nthat the law of abstinence may suffer as a result of the scandal.\n\n(d) Active scandal, if it is directly intentional (see 1450), is\ndirectly also the special sin of scandal. For this kind of scandal\ndirectly intends the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, and so is directly\nopposed to a special good of another person and to the special\ncharitable act of fraternal correction. Hence, a person who breaks the\nfast in order to lead his neighbor into a like transgression is guilty\nof both intemperance and scandal; he who to make his neighbor sin\nappears to break the fast, is guilty of scandal, but not of\nintemperance.\n\n1467. Practical Applications of the Preceding Paragraph to\nConfession.--(a) Species of Sins.--In case of passive scandal there is\nonly one species of sin to be confessed, namely, the intemperance\noccasioned by bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly\nintended and offered by evil conduct, there is only one species of sin,\nnamely, intemperance, with the circumstance of publicity or bad\nexample; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by\nevil-seeming conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely,\nscandal; in case of active scandal directly intended, there is only the\nspecies of scandal, if the conduct of the scandalizer is only\nevil-seeming, but there are several species of sin, if his conduct is\nreally evil, namely, his own intemperance and the scandal he gives.\n\n(b) Number of Sins.--As many sins of scandal are committed as there are\npersons present to be scandalized, for scandal is given to those\npresent as individuals, not as parts of a group (see 219). Hence, one\ncommits more scandals by being drunk on a public street than by being\ndrunk with a roomful of companions; and by attacking religion before a\nlarge assembly than by attacking it before a small circle.\n\n(c) Circumstances of Intention and Conduct.--Those who give bad example\nshould confess especially the end and the means employed, for on these\ndepends the important distinction between directly intentional and\nindirectly intentional scandal and the specific character of the sin\ncommitted, as explained in the preceding paragraph.\n\n(d) Circumstance of Condition of the Persons Involved.--This should be\nmentioned in confessing scandal, if it adds a new malice. Thus, the\nfact that scandal is given by a superior bound by his office to give\ngood example, adds to the violation of charity a violation of justice;\nthe fact that the person whose ruin is intended is consecrated to God,\nor married, or a relative, adds to the malice of intentional scandal\nagainst chastity; the fact that a person is scandalized entirely\nagainst his will, makes the sin scandal rather than simple solicitation.\n\n(e) Circumstance of the Result of Scandal.--The results of scandal\nshould be confessed when they add a new malice to the sin or induce an\nobligation of restitution. This subject will be considered in the three\nfollowing paragraphs.\n\n1468. Is the scandalizer guilty of the species of sin to which his\nconduct is calculated to lead the scandalized? (a) If the scandal is\ndirectly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer intends that some\nspecial sin or sins shall be committed by the one scandalized, the\nformer is guilty in desire of that which he intends that the latter\nshall be guilty of in reality (cfr. 96, 102). Hence, if by calumniating\nclerics or religious or church members one intends that one\u2019s listeners\nshall be induced to repeat these calumnies, or to do what the\ncalumniated persons were said to do, or to abandon religion, one is\nguilty in desire of the particular sin or sins that one wills.\n\n(b) If the scandal is only indirectly intentional, that is, if the\nscandalizer foresees but does not expressly will the fall of the\nscandalized (e.g., if he calumniates others to injure the calumniated\nand not those who hear the calumny), the matter is more difficult, and\nauthorities differ in their opinions. Some moralists think that the\nscandalizer is guilty of the result he foresees, because he wills it\ninterpretatively by offering the occasion for it. Others think that he\nis not guilty of the result foreseen, because he does not effect it,\neither in intention (for he does not desire it) or in reality (for he\nis not bound, except by charity, to prevent its accomplishment in\nothers); he permits, but does not approve, the sin of his neighbor.\n\n1469. A practical application of the previous paragraph to confession\nmay be made as follows: (a) those who are guilty of direct scandal must\nconfess not only their own sin, but also the sin to which their conduct\nleads their neighbor; (b) those who are guilty of indirect scandal are\nnot obliged, according to the second opinion given above, to confess\nthe species of sin to which their conduct incited the beholder, and\nhence, if their conduct was only evil-seeming, it suffices for them to\nconfess that they gave scandal.\n\n1470. Is the scandalizer responsible for the injuries to third parties\nresulting from the sins occasioned by his scandal?\n\n(a) According to one opinion, he is bound to make his share of\nrestitution for injustices occasioned by his own bad example, because\nit is admitted that he who counsels injustice is so bound, and example\nis more persuasive than words of counsel. Hence, one who steals from\nhis employer before fellow-employees, and so brings on a custom of\nstealing among them, is bound to restore, not only what he took\nhimself, but also a share of other losses not made good to the employer.\n\n(b) According to the more common opinion, however, the scandalizer in\nthe present case is not held to restitution, except as regards his own\nill-gotten goods, even if there is question of scandal directly\nintended. For, either the scandalizer is not guilty of the injustice\ncommitted by the others, as not desiring it; or, at any rate, he is\nonly the occasion, not the cause or cooperator in that injustice.\n\n1471. If scandal amounts to incitation or cooperation, the guilt of the\nneighbor\u2019s sin and responsibility for injury the neighbor causes are\nincurred by the scandalizer.\n\n(a) Thus, bad example may amount to incitation to sin, as when a person\nknows that others are directed to imitate him, and yet he gives them\nbad example. Even though he does not directly intend their fall into\nsin, he does intend his own conduct, while realizing that there is\nattached to it the circumstance that it is an invitation to sin; and\nhence it would seem that the guilt of this sin is also contracted.\n\n(b) Bad example may amount to cooperation in sin, as when a person by\nhis bad example shows others the way to commit sin, which they could\nnot have learned without his example. Hence, if a person opens a safe\nto steal, knowing that other dishonest persons are observing in order\nto learn the combination and steal, it seems that to some extent he\nshares in the guilt and duty of restitution of the thieves who learn\nfrom him. There is no doubt that a defamer is bound to make reparation,\nnot only before his immediate listeners, but also before others who\nhave listened to them; for, by defaming before talkative persons, he\nvirtually authorized them to spread his words.\n\n1472. The Gravity of the Sin of Scandal.--(a) From its nature all\nactive scandal is a mortal sin. It turns man away from Christ (I Cor.,\nviii. 12); it is spiritual murder, destructive of the souls of others,\nand so contrary to the mercy and brotherly correction required by\ncharity (Rom, xiv. 15); it brings on oneself the wrath of God (Matt.,\nxviii. 6), and on one\u2019s family, friends and profession obloquy and\ndisgrace.\n\n(b) From the indeliberation of the act or from the smallness of the\nmatter, active scandal may be venial, as will be seen in the following\nparagraph.\n\n1473. Mortal and Venial Scandal.--(a) Passive scandal is always a sin,\nmortal or venial according to the fall occasioned by the conduct\nwitnessed. But mortal sin may be occasioned by venial sin, as when an\ninferior takes the liberty to blaspheme, because his superior used\nprofane language; and venial sin may be occasioned by mortal sin, as\nwhen the blasphemy of an infidel provokes his neighbor to use profane\nlanguage against the blasphemer.\n\n(b) Active scandal indirectly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as\nwhen the scandalous conduct is only a venial sin, or is no sin but has\nthe appearance of a slight sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when\nthe scandalous conduct is a mortal sin, or when a person so despises\nthe spiritual welfare of his neighbor that he chooses to do an\nevil-seeming act that will cause the neighbor to fall into serious sin.\n\n(c) Active scandal directly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as when\na person intends by conduct venially sinful to lead a neighbor into\nvenial sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when one intends to lead\none\u2019s neighbor into mortal sin, or commits a mortal sin in order to\nlead one\u2019s neighbor into venial sin.\n\n1474. Increase and decrease in gravity of scandal depends on the\ninternal dispositions of the scandal-giver and the external influence\nhe has on the person scandalized. (a) The internal factors on which the\nquantity of scandal depends are the amount of deliberation and the\ndegree of intention. It is more serious to speak a scandalous word with\npremeditation than to speak it somewhat thoughtlessly; more scandalous\nto speak it when the hearer\u2019s spiritual ruin is directly intended, than\nwhen that ruin is not directly intended. (b) The external factors on\nwhich the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of influence the\nbad example has and the character of the evil to which it leads. It is\nmore serious to corrupt A, who would not otherwise have been corrupted,\nthan to corrupt B, who would have been corrupted even without one\u2019s bad\nexample; it is more serious to cause another to commit mortal sin, than\nto cause him to commit venial sin.\n\n1475. Persons Scandalized.--Is it possible to scandalize people who are\nfirmly rooted in virtue?\n\n(a) If the question be understood of scandal in a wide sense, even the\nperfect may be scandalized. They may be shocked and horrified at the\nevil example they witness; they may be hindered from performing the\nexternal good works they desire to accomplish (I Thess., ii. 18). But\nthese things do not hinder them internally, or separate them from the\nlove of God (Rom., viii. 38, 39).\n\n(b) If the question be understood of possibility in an absolute sense,\neven the perfect may suffer real scandal, that is, they may be\ninfluenced to sin on account of the example witnessed. Since they are\nnot confirmed in grace in this life, it is not repugnant that they\ncommit sin and lose grace.\n\n(c) If the question be understood of possibility in a relative\nsense--that is, if we consider what we should expect in view of the\ncharacter of perfect men, and what does usually happen--the perfect\ncannot be scandalized, since they are so firmly united to God that the\nsayings or doings, no matter of whom, cannot cause them to sin (Ps.\ncxxiv. 1, 2), although they may at times be disturbed thereby (Ps.\nlxxii. 2).\n\n1476. Is it possible that the perfect should give scandal?\n\n(a) If the question be understood of absolute possibility, even the\nperfect may give scandal, since they are not immune from defect (I\nJohn, i. 8). (b) If the question be understood of relative possibility,\nas explained above, the perfect cannot scandalize, for their sins are\nmostly internal acts not entirely deliberate, while the external words\nor acts in which they fall short deviate so slightly from right as to\noffer no occasion of sinning to another. The perfect man is one who is\non his guard, especially that he become not a stumbling-block to\nothers, and it is therefore a rare exception when he causes scandal.\n\n1477. Duty of Avoiding Scandal.--At times it is impossible to avoid\ngiving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good.\nHence, on this point there are two questions to be considered: (a) When\nis one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding\nscandal? (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the\nsake of avoiding scandal?\n\n1478. The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal.--(a)\nSpiritual goods that are so necessary that one cannot give them up\nwithout committing sin may not be surrendered; for, according to the\norder of charity, one must be more solicitous to keep oneself from sin\nthan to preserve others, and moreover a good end does not justify\nsinful means. Hence, it is not lawful to commit mortal or even venial\nsin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may not tone down\nthe doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from\nblasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking\nundeserved offense.\n\n(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be\nneglected on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as\nthere is a good reason which calls for their use; for the person who\ntakes malicious scandal from these spiritual things is in difficulty\nthrough his own fault and can rescue himself, and it is not reasonable\nthat his malice should be permitted to impede the benefit of others.\nThus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be given the scandal\nwhich the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14).\n\n(c) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be\nneglected on account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason\nfor their use; for one should not give another an occasion of sinning,\neven if the other is in bad faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our\nLord declared that the act of teaching truth to others should be\nomitted, if it would only provoke rejection (Matt, vii. 6). Example: A\nwife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer moves her husband to\nmimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery.\n\n(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be\nomitted on account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains\nscandal from weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one\nassist those who are in spiritual need, and persons who are in danger\nof scandal through no fault, or through a slight fault of their own,\nare in spiritual need. Hence, one should conceal or delay the\nperformance of good works that are not necessary, if they would\nscandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the\nrighteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works\nbefore those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await\nsuch a time as will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad\nfaith. Examples: If a person knows that personal acts of piety which he\nperforms seem to some well-meaning persons superstitious and will shake\ntheir faith, he should omit these acts when such persons are present.\nIf parents are scandalized because a child wishes to leave them in\norder to become a priest or a religious, the child should delay for a\nwhile, if there is hope of a change of view on their part.\n\n1479. As was said in the chapter on law (see 288 sqq.), the higher law\nhas the preference in case of a conflict. Now, natural law itself\nrequires that one avoid the scandal of the weak. Hence the following\ncases:\n\n(a) Negative precepts of the natural law may not be contravened in\norder to avoid the scandal of the weak; for such contravention is\nnecessarily sinful. Hence, one may not lie or commit perjury to prevent\nscandal.\n\n(b) Affirmative precepts of the natural law should be contravened in\norder to avoid the scandal of the weak, but only when such scandal is a\ngreater evil than the omission of the thing commanded. Thus, one should\nomit a fraternal correction or a punishment, if the one corrected would\nbe made worse, or the punishment occasion a schism. But one may not\nneglect to help a person in extreme need because of scandal.\n\n(c) Precepts of the divine law should be contravened on account of\nscandal of the weak, unless contravention of the law is a greater evil\nthan permission of the scandal. Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is\ncommanded by divine law, and yet it may be omitted to avoid scandal\n(Matt., vii. 6). Item integritas confessionis de jure divino est, et\ntamen poenitens deberet peccatum silere, si intelligeret confessarium\ncui ex necessitate confiteri deberet grave ex eo scandalum passurum.\nBut it is not lawful to omit Baptism in order to avoid scandal to those\nwho will be provoked to anger or blasphemy.\n\n(d) Precepts of ecclesiastical law should be contravened, when\notherwise there will arise a scandal of the weak which is a graver evil\nthan the contravention of the precepts. Thus, a parish-priest should\nsay Mass on Sunday, even though not fasting, if this is necessary in\norder to avoid great scandal among the people. A wife may omit Mass or\na fast, in order to prevent her ignorant husband from using blasphemies\nor imprecations, or to avoid notable dissensions in the home. Puella\nquae scit juvenem infirmum ex suo aspectu scandalizari debet sacro\nomisso domi manere.\n\n1480. In order that scandal of the weak may be considered a greater\nevil than contravention of a grave precept, it is necessary that the\nfollowing conditions be verified:\n\n(a) The evil of the scandal must be certain and grave, for an uncertain\nor slight scandal is not a greater evil than certain contravention of a\ngrave precept. Thus, if one only has vague fears that scandal may be\ngiven, or if one has no determined person in mind and thinks only that\nsomeone or other will be harmed, there is no excuse for contravention\nof the precept.\n\n(b) The evil of contravening the precept must not impose intolerable\nhardships or lead to greater scandals; for one is not required to\nattempt the impossible, or to give scandal in order to avoid scandal.\nThus, it would be unreasonable to expect that a student should never\nread the classical poets or philosophers of Greece or Rome, lest\nscandal be given some person overstrict in this matter; that a wife\nabsent herself from Mass permanently, lest her ignorant husband be\nprovoked to rage; that a young lady be deprived of fresh air and\nexercise, lest an old relative be disedified. If we have to choose\nbetween occasioning irreligion in one person by attending Mass and\noccasioning irreligion in many persons by staying away from Mass, we\nshould rather permit the scandal of the one. Moralists generally hold\nthat scandal of the weak does not justify absence from obligatory Mass\noftener than once or twice, and some hold that it does not require\nabsence from Mass at all.\n\n1481. Good works that are of counsel only (such as evangelical\npoverty), and those that are obligatory only under certain conditions\n(such as almsdeeds), may be more easily put aside in order to avoid\nscandal of the weak. It should be noted, however, that for some persons\nthese works are of precept, and hence they are to be judged, as regards\nthose persons, according to the rules given for contravention of\nprecepts. (a) Thus, the counsels are obligatory for those who have\nvowed them (e.g., religious).\n\n(b) Corporal and spiritual works of mercy are obligatory for prelates\nand other clerics because of their office.\n\n1482. Spiritual goods, therefore, whether of precept or of counsel, are\nnot to be surrendered entirely on account of any scandal, whether it be\nPharisaic scandal or scandal of the weak. But, out of charity for\nothers, these goods should not be made use of (apart from necessity) in\na way that would occasion spiritual ruin to anyone. Hence, if there is\ndanger of scandal: (a) they should be concealed, as when one goes to\nMass early in the morning or by another way, so as not to occasion\nblasphemy in one\u2019s neighbor; (b) they should be delayed, as when one\nputs off a fraternal correction until the other person is in a frame of\nmind to be corrected with profit; (c) they may be used but should be\nexplained, as when one is called to give Baptism to a person dying in a\nnotorious resort and takes witnesses with him, or tells the bystanders\nthe reason of his visit.\n\n1483. When Should Temporal Goods be Surrendered for the Sake of\nAvoiding Scandal.--(a) Temporal goods of which one is not the owner,\nbut only the custodian or administrator, may not be surrendered at will\non account of scandal; for no one has the right to give away the\nproperty of others. Hence, rulers in Church or State may not\narbitrarily surrender common property; guardians may not give up the\nproperty of their charges.\n\n(b) Temporal goods of which one is owner should be surrendered on\naccount of the scandal of little ones, unless a greater evil results\nfrom such surrender; for, as said above (see 1165 sqq.), one should be\nwilling to suffer some detriment in temporal things to avert from one\u2019s\nneighbor detriment in spiritual things. Hence, one should abstain from\na certain food, if one\u2019s eating of it will cause spiritual ruin to some\ninnocent person (I Cor., viii. 13).\n\n(c) Temporal goods are not to be surrendered on account of Pharisaic\nscandal; for this would be injurious to the common good, since it would\nencourage the wicked to despoil the conscientious, and it would also be\ninjurious to the wicked themselves, since they would continue in sin by\nkeeping what was not their own. Hence, one may demand money owed, even\nif the debtor is greedy and will use profane language.\n\n1484. The surrender of temporal goods spoken of in the previous\nparagraph may be understood in a number of senses.\n\n(a) It can be understood either of the act of giving another what is\nheld by us and is our own property, or of the act of permitting another\nto keep that which is held by him but which belongs to us. Charity may\ncall for either kind of surrender as a means to the avoidance of\nscandal. Example: Rather than have a bitter quarrel or lose a\nfriendship over a few cents of change, it is better to let the other\nman keep what he owes you, or give him what you do not owe, if he is\nalso in good faith.\n\n(b) The surrender of temporal goods can also be understood either of\nthe internal willingness to sacrifice temporal things for things\nspiritual, when necessity requires, or of the actual external\nsacrifice. Charity demands the internal willingness, but it does not\nalways demand the actual sacrifice; for sometimes such a sacrifice\nwould be harmful to the common welfare and the welfare of individuals.\nThus, the saying of our Lord that we should not contend with a neighbor\nwho wishes to take our coat, but should rather let him take our cloak\nas well (Matt, v. 40), and the saying of St. Paul that the Corinthians\nshould prefer to suffer injury and fraud rather than have lawsuits\nagainst fellow-Christians (I Cor., vi. 7), are to be understood of a\nwillingness to sacrifice temporal things in order to avoid scandal,\nwhen a greater good makes this necessary. But those texts do not mean\nthat it is obligatory or advisable to make an actual sacrifice at other\ntimes.\n\n(c) The surrender of temporal goods may be understood either of a\ngiving over to others without protest or remonstrance, or of a yielding\nto them only after one has tried to prevent scandal without incurring\ntemporal loss. Charity does not require, even when there is danger of\nscandal of the weak, that one should surrender one\u2019s goods without any\neffort to save them. Thus, if an ignorant Catholic is shocked because\nhis priest asks for money to support the Church, the latter will do him\na service by explaining the right the Church has to be supported and\nthe duty of the members to contribute.\n\n1485. Temporal goods may be understood here either of things of great\nvalue (e.g., necessaries of life) or of things of minor value (e.g.,\nluxuries). (a) Thus, if scandal will place a neighbor in extreme\nspiritual need, even things of great value should be surrendered, if\nthis is necessary to avoid scandal. (b) If scandal will not place him\nin extreme need, one is not obliged to surrender any except things of\nminor value (see 1165 sqq.). Thus, St. Paul does not ask that his\nconverts give up all food in order to avoid scandalizing the weak, but\nonly such food as they can get along without (Rom, xiv. 15; I Cor.,\nviii. 13).\n\n1486. Should church goods ever be surrendered in order to avoid scandal\nof the weak? (a) On the one hand, goods of the Church have a special\nsacredness, because they have been given and set apart for spiritual\npurposes and the common good of the Church. Hence, he would be an\nunfaithful steward who would devote them to merely temporal ends, such\nas the enrichment or exaltation of himself or of his friends, or who\nwould alienate them without due authority. (b) On the other hand, the\ntemporal goods of the Church are to serve spiritual ends, and the\nspiritual must not be subordinated to the temporal. Hence, one of the\nchief causes of scandal in the Church is the appearance of avarice in\nchurchmen (even as regards goods that are not personal, but common),\nespecially if they seem to put money before the salvation of the\npeople. There are times, therefore, when to avoid scandal a prelate or\npriest ought to forego something really due the Church.\n\n1487. Cases of Scandal and Renouncement of Church Goods.--(a) If there\nis question of Pharisaic scandal alone, one should not renounce the\ngoods of which one is the custodian, but should resist spoliation as\nfar as one is able. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury would not agree to\nthe invasion of church rights by Henry II. So also a pastor should not\nneglect the collection of dues needed for the maintenance of the\nchurch, because some malcontents will take offense at this; neither\nshould he yield to the extortionate demands of some hired person who\nwill be scandalized because more is not paid.\n\n(b) If there is question of the scandal of the weak, concessions should\nbe made, lest spiritual things be made to suffer for the temporal.\nThus, St. Paul would not accept any support for himself from persons\nnewly converted to Christianity, lest this prove a hindrance to the\npreaching of the Gospel (I Cor., ix. 12). For the sake of the ignorant\nor the weak, therefore, the Church does not insist on dues and other\npayments, until these persons have had the opportunity of learning\ntheir duty. The faithful, indeed, are bound to contribute to the\npastors who serve them, but the precept is an affirmative one, and\nobliges therefore not at all times, but when the conditions of time,\nplace, person, etc., make this possible. It would be a real scandal of\nthe weak, if a person were driven from church because he did not\nrealize his duty of contributing, or if a poor person were taxed beyond\nhis means, or if an affluent cleric were always asking for money and\nnever giving to the needy, or if a priest were to talk collections\ninstead of doctrine, or devoted most of his time to money-making\nenterprises. Anything that commercializes religion is also a scandal\nboth to Catholics and non-Catholics.\n\n1488. Duty of Repairing Scandal.-The paragraphs immediately preceding\nhave spoken of the duty of avoiding scandal. There is also a duty of\nrepairing scandal that has been given. (a) Thus, there is a duty of\ncharity to repair the scandal one has given; for, if all are required\nto practise fraternal correction, those especially are bound to this\nwho are responsible for the sins of others. (b) There is sometimes a\nduty of legal justice, as when superiors, who are bound from their\noffice to give good example, give scandal to their subjects. (c) There\nis sometimes a duty of commutative justice, as when the scandalizer has\nemployed unjust means (such as force, fear or traps) in order to lead\nanother into scandal.\n\n1489. Ways of Repairing Scandal.--(a) Scandal is repaired publicly or\nprivately. Reparation is public, when it is made before the community,\nand private, when it is made before individuals. (b) Scandal is\nrepaired explicitly or implicitly. Explicit reparation is made by\nretractation of one\u2019s words, by condemnation of one\u2019s acts, by the\ndestruction of one\u2019s scandalous writings, by efforts to bring back to\nvirtue those whom one has misled, etc. Implicit reparation is made by\nreformation of one\u2019s conduct, the abandonment of that which gave\nscandal, the practice of good example, prayer for the person\nscandalized, etc.\n\n1490. Particular Kinds of Scandal to be Repaired.--(a) Scandal is\npublic or private. Public scandal is given before the community at\nlarge, as when one openly apostatizes so that it is the talk of the\nwhole neighborhood or town, or writes a signed article favoring\natheism, or makes a disedifying speech before a gathering of people.\nScandal is private, when it is given before a few persons, and when it\ndoes not tend to become generally known, as when husband and wife\nquarrel before their domestic circle.\n\n(b) Scandal is ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary scandal is given by\nbad example alone; extraordinary scandal adds to bad example injury or\ninjustice, or the debt of punishment for a crime. Thus, one who becomes\nslightly intoxicated at a party gives ordinary scandal; while one who\nby trickery schemes to get another into a situation in which he will be\neffectually scandalized, or who strikes an inoffensive priest, or who\nspreads disedifying printed matter, is guilty of extraordinary scandal.\n\n1491. It rests with the prudent judgment of the confessor or\necclesiastical authority to decide in particular instances the way in\nwhich scandals are to be repaired. But in general the following rules\nmay be given:\n\n(a) Public scandal should be repaired publicly, even though it has not\nactually seduced those who are aware of it; for otherwise the evil\ninfluence remains. Thus, a drunkard should take the pledge of total\nabstinence, or else give an example of sobriety; an apostate should\nrenounce his errors as openly as he defended them.\n\n(b) Private scandal may be repaired privately, that is, before the few\npersons who were scandalized. Thus, the husband and wife who quarrelled\nbefore their children make reparation when they tell the children not\nto quarrel, and when they strengthen this advice by good example.\n\n(c) Ordinary scandal may be repaired implicitly, that is, by turning\nover a new leaf. Thus, one who has been away from Mass and the\nSacraments for a long time makes reparation when he appears at church,\ngoes to confession, and receives Communion; one who has been keeping\nbad company makes reparation when he separates from his former\nassociates.\n\n(d) Extraordinary scandal is repaired explicitly, that is, by making\nthe restitution or satisfaction which justice demands, or by performing\nthe penalty required by the law. Thus, if through treachery a person\nhas seduced another from virtue, he must either himself or through\nothers endeavor to recall the scandalized person to his former virtue;\nif a person has been guilty of laying violent hands on a cleric, he\nmust perform the penance prescribed; if a person has distributed\nscandalous literature, he must try to stop its circulation, or to\ndistribute contrary literature.\n\n1492. When satisfaction requires public apology or retraction, this can\nbe made in various ways. (a) Thus, one may withdraw through the press\nfalse statements publicly made; (b) one may apologize before a number\nof witnesses authorized to make this known; (c) one may retract before\nthe pastor or confessor, with the understanding that the priest will\nlater declare that all due satisfaction has been made.\n\n1493. Denial of Sacraments in Cases of Scandal.--Is it lawful to\nadminister the Sacraments to one who has not made satisfaction for\npublic scandal?\n\n(a) If the obligation of reparation is not grave, it is lawful to\nadminister the Sacraments, since the person who gave the scandal is not\nsubject to grave sin and unworthy of the Sacraments, and his admission\nto them will not be a new scandal.\n\n(b) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is lawful to admit the\nparty in question to the Sacrament of Penance; for every person rightly\ndisposed has a right to absolution, and the fact that a person who gave\nscandal goes to confession is edifying. But absolution should be given\non condition that reparation for the scandal is seriously promised.\n\n(c) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is not lawful as a\nrule to admit to the other Sacraments, until the reparation has been\nactually performed. Thus, if it is notorious in a parish that a certain\nindividual has been living in a serious occasion of sin or has been\ncirculating impious doctrines, the occasion of sin should be removed or\nthe doctrines should be retracted, before the individual is admitted to\nCommunion, etc.; otherwise, a new scandal would be given the faithful\nfrom the apparent approval given the scandalizer by the minister of the\nSacrament received.\n\n1494. In certain cases, however, the Sacraments other than Penance may\nalso be given before reparation for grave scandal has been made,\nnamely, when the circumstances are such that the administration of the\nSacraments will offer no scandal. (a) Thus, a dying person who is\npenitent but unable to perform some satisfaction for scandal given is\ngranted the Sacraments. (b) A person who is well disposed, but who has\nnot yet made satisfaction for scandal, may sometimes be given Communion\nprivately. (c) A person who is not well disposed, and who will not make\nsatisfaction for scandal, is sometimes permitted to contract marriage\nbefore the priest, namely, when there is a grave reason for marriage\nand scandal is precluded.\n\n1495. Seduction.--Having discussed scandal, which leads others into sin\nby bad example, we shall now consider, first, solicitation or\nseduction, which leads others into sin by moral inducement, and,\nsecondly, cooperation, which assists another to sin (see 1460).\n\n1496. Seduction is some external act (words, writing, signs or gesture)\nby which one directly and explicitly seeks to win the consent of\nanother to sin. There are various modes of solicitation.\n\n(a) There is command to sin, which is an authoritative direction to\ncommit sin imposed by a superior on his subject. Command is given\nexpressly, as when a father tells his son to steal; or implicitly, as\nwhen he tells his son that it will please him if the son steals.\n\n(b) There is counsel to sin, which is direct persuasion to do evil made\nthrough argument that sin is lawful, or through instruction on the ways\nof committing sin, or through advice, request, promises, threats, etc.,\nas when one writes in praise of suicide to a person who is very\ndiscouraged, and recommends it.\n\n(c) There is enticement which is an indirect persuasion to sin made\nthrough flattery, insinuation, calumny, narratives, etc. Thus, Absalom\nworked on the people of Israel and beguiled them into rebellion against\nhis father (II Kings, xv. 1-6). Those who ridicule temperance and so\nlead others to drink excessively, entice to drunkenness. A host who\noffers little except fine meats on a Friday entices to the violation of\nabstinence.\n\n1497. The Malice of Solicitation.--(a) The gravity of this sin\naccording to its nature is mortal, but it may be venial on account of\nimperfect deliberation or smallness of matter (see 1473). Thus, it is a\nmortal sin to command one\u2019s son to commit grand larceny or perjury, a\nvenial sin to command him to commit petty theft or tell a harmless lie.\n(b) The circumstances of the sin that aggravate or extenuate are the\ngreater or less degree of deliberation and malice, the greater or less\nevil of the sin to which one induces one\u2019s neighbors, etc. (see 1473,\n1474). (c) The species of the sin of solicitation is twofold; there is\nthe sin of scandal, opposed to charity, inasmuch as a neighbor is led\nto sin, and there is also the sin which one persuades a neighbor to\ncommit (see 1468 sqq.).\n\n1498. Applications to Confession and Satisfaction.--(a) Since the\nseducer willed the species of sin to which he induced his neighbor, it\ndoes not suffice that he tell in confession that he induced another to\nsin; he must also tell the species of sin (e.g., theft), to which he\ninduced or attempted to induce another. (b) Since the seducer is guilty\nof injustice against the person seduced, if he employed fraud, traps,\nviolence, etc., it does not suffice in such cases merely to confess\nthat he seduced; he must also tell that he used unjust means to seduce.\n(c) Since the seducer is guilty of spiritual damage, he is bound to\nmake reparation for scandal given (see 1488 sqq.). (d) Since the\nseducer is responsible for temporal damages that are due to his\ninfluence (e.g., when he commands A to steal from or calumniate B), he\nis held to restitution for any such damages (see Vol. II on Justice).\n\n1499. In confessing a sin whose nature implies an accomplice (e.g.,\nobscene conversation), is it necessary to mention the circumstance that\none seduced the other party? (a) If the seduction includes a special\nmalice against charity or against justice, it should be mentioned.\nThus, if the party seduced had been innocent and was scandalized, or\nwas trapped into sin, the fact of seduction should be mentioned. (b) If\nthe seduction includes no special malice against charity or justice, it\nseems there is no obligation to mention it. Thus, if the party\nsolicited had been living a life of sin and consented to the\nsolicitation without any detriment to ideals or any unwillingness, no\nscandal is given and no injustice committed by the solicitation, as far\nas that party is concerned, and there seems to be no reason why the\ncircumstance of seduction must be confessed.\n\n1500. Seduction is incitement to sin, and so differs from mere\npermission of sin in another. It is never lawful to incite to sin, but\nit is lawful for a sufficient reason to permit sin in others, as was\nsaid above in reference to Pharisaic scandal (see 1477, 1482, 1483).\nBut, in applying this principle to concrete cases, it is sometimes\ndifficult to draw the line between incitement and mere permission. We\nshall discuss now the following cases in which this difficulty occurs:\n(a) when one requests another to do something which one knows will be a\nsin for him; (b) when one advises another to commit a less rather than\na greater evil; (e) when the opportunity for another to commit sin is\nnot removed, or is prepared.\n\n1501. Is it lawful to ask another to do something, when one knows that\nhe will not consent without sinning?\n\n(a) If the thing requested is sinful in itself, the request is also\nsinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask a thief to sell the goods he has\nstolen, nor is it lawful to request absolution from a priest who lacks\njurisdiction.\n\n(b) If the thing requested is lawful in itself, but there is no\nsufficient reason for the request in view of the fact that the other\nwill sin by granting it, the request is sinful. Hence, it is not lawful\nto ask baptism from a person who is in the state of sin, when one can\neasily obtain it from another person who is in the state of grace.\n\n(c) If the thing requested is lawful, and there is a sufficient reason\nfor the request, one does not sin by making the request. Hence, it is\nlawful for the sake of the common welfare to require that witnesses\ntake an oath, even though one knows that one of them will commit\nperjury.\n\n1502. Is it lawful to advise another to commit a less evil in\npreference to a greater evil?\n\n(a) If the other has not made up his mind to commit either evil, it is\nnot lawful to advise that he do either. Thus, to counsel another to\nsteal, and to make his victims the rich rather than the poor, is a\nspecies of seduction.\n\n(b) If the person has made up his mind to commit the greater evil and\nthe lesser evil is virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to\nadvise that he omit the former for the latter. For in thus acting one\nprevents the greater evil and does not cause the lesser evil, since it\nis virtually contained in the greater evil which the other person had\nalready decided on. Thus, if Titus is bent on stealing $100, Balbus is\nnot guilty of seduction, if he persuades Titus to take only $10. We are\nsupposing, of course, that Titus is so determined to steal that it is\nout of the question to deter him from taking at least a small amount.\n\n(c) If the person in question has decided on the greater sin and the\nlesser is not virtually contained in the greater, it is not lawful to\nrecommend that he commit the smaller instead of the greater sin. For,\nif one does this, one does not save the other from the internal guilt\nof the greater sin intended, while one does add the malice of the\nlesser sin which was not intended. Thus, if Titus plans to kill Caius,\nit is not lawful to advise that he rob him instead, or that he kill\nClaudius instead, for robbery is a specifically distinct sin from\nmurder, and Claudius is a different person from Caius. But, if Titus\nplanned to kill Caius in order to rob him, it would not be unlawful to\npoint out that the robbery could be carried out without murder and to\nadvise accordingly.\n\n1503. Not all theologians accept the last solution just given. (a) Some\nreject it, and hold that, even when the lesser evil is not virtually\ncontained in the greater, it is lawful to advise the lesser. They argue\nthat what one does thereby is not to commit the lesser evil, to induce\nit or approve it, but only to permit it in order to lessen the harm\nthat will be done, and they confirm their argument from scripture\n(Gen., xix. 8). According to this opinion, then, which has some good\nauthorities in its favor, it would be lawful to advise robbery in order\nto dissuade another from the greater evil of murder. (b) Others modify\nthe solution given in the previous paragraph, and hold that it is\nlawful to propose the lesser evil or mention it, provided one does not\nattempt to induce the other person to carry it into effect.\n\n1504. Is it lawful so to prearrange circumstances that an occasion of\nsin will seem to offer itself to another?\n\n(a) If the end and the means used are good, this is lawful; for there\nis no scandal or seduction, but sin or the danger of sin is permitted\nfor a proportionately grave reason. Examples: Sempronius knows that\nsomeone is robbing his desk, and it is important that he discover the\nthief. He leaves the desk open and watches from concealment to see\nwhether a suspected person who is coming to the room will steal.\nClaudius is quite certain that Titus is stealing his chickens, but he\nneeds evidence in order to have Titus convicted and deterred from\nfuture stealing. So, he leaves doors open and hides himself with\nwitnesses that Titus may be caught in the act.\n\n(b) If the end or means is bad, it is not lawful to prepare an\nopportunity for sin, because in either case one intends something\nsinful. Examples: Sempronius knows that his wife Titia has been\nunfaithful and he threatens to leave her. She, wishing to have a\ncountercharge to make or to secure evidence to discredit his word,\nhires various dissolute females to lay traps for him and his friends.\nClaudius out of revenge wishes that Caius be sent to jail, and he\ntherefore employs agents to provoke Caius into something criminal in\nword or deed that will justify incarceration. Balbus knows that\nMercurius is a dangerous character, and he frames a scheme by which\nMercurius will be invited to participate in an act of banditry and be\ncaptured. Titia and Claudius sin, because their purpose is wrong;\nBalbus sins because he uses wrong means. All three are guilty of\nseduction, at least in intention.\n\n1505. Seduction was described above (see 1496) as an inducement to sin\nthrough such manifest means as command, counsel, or enticement. But\nthere is also a more subtle form of seduction, which does not appeal\ndirectly to the intellect or will, but makes a physical approach by\nacting upon the body, senses, or imagination. This is a more cunning,\nbut none the less guilty form of seduction, examples of which are the\nfollowing:\n\n(a) Seduction through bodily states is exemplified in those who\nminister secretly to others drinks or drugs or foods that will produce\nemotional disturbances or mental confusion and make them more\nsusceptible to temptation.\n\n(b) Seduction through the senses is exemplified in those who surround\nothers with pictures, companions, music, examples, etc., that\ncontinually speak of the desirability of vice or the undesirability of\nvirtue.\n\n(c) Seduction through the imagination is seen in hypnotism or\nsuggestion when used to produce a vivid and strong impression of\nsomething dangerous to be thought on. A spirit of bigoted uniformity\nwhich demands that all dress, think and act alike even in matters where\nthere should be liberty, may also be very seductive; for, rather than\ncommit the unpardonable sin of seeming queer, a person may take to\ndrunkenness or whatever vice is popular in his crowd or group.\n\n1506. Cooperation in Sin.--Cooperation or participation in sin,\nstrictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not\nseduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.\n\n(a) Hence, cooperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these\nlead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while cooperation\nsupposes that the other party had already made up his mind to sin. The\nscandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the\ncooperator does not lead into sin but he helps in its commission.\n\n(b) Cooperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as\nregards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who\nhad decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that\nhis conduct receives aid and comfort from Titus, a person of some\nauthority. This cooperation will act as an example or incitement to\nBalbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin\nto others.\n\n1507. Cooperation is also different from complicity as follows: (a) The\ncooperator acts as assistant or subordinate agent to the one who\ncommits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying\nhim with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose\nservices are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen\ngoods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or\nobscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is\na cooperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprincipal or coordinate\nagent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his\nown proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists\nas a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at\nthe time of \u201chold-ups,\u201d or who fights a duel, or who carries on an\nobscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an\naccomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the cooperator may be\nguiltless.\n\n1508. Kinds of Cooperation.--Divisions of Cooperation according to\nDifferent Kinds of Acts.--(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act,\ncooperation is either formal or material, according as one does or does\nnot intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples:\nCaius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a\nsecond-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no\nresistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer\u2019s office.\nCaius is an abettor of crime and a formal cooperator on account of his\nguilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only\na material cooperator, since he does not intend what the criminals\nintend.\n\n(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, cooperation is positive or\nnegative, according as one does something to help the principal agent,\nor does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a\npositive, Claudius a negative cooperator. Positive cooperation is given\nin a moral manner, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or\ncheers a sinful remark; or in a physical manner, as when one helps\nbandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows\nunfastened for the convenience of thieves.\n\n1509. Divisions of Cooperation according to its Degree of\nInfluence.--(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, cooperation is\neither occasional or effective. By occasional cooperation is understood\nthat which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin,\nbut does not assist him to commit sin (e.g., scandalous example,\nfailure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective\ncooperation is understood assistance given another enabling him to\ncarry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had\nresolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506),\nthere is question here only of effective cooperation.\n\n(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the principal\nagent, cooperation is either immediate or mediate, according as one\nshares in the sinful act of the principal agent, or in some act that\npreceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away\nstolen goods is an immediate cooperator, while he who supplied the\nthief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge\nto the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are\nmediate cooperators.\n\n(c) From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done,\ncooperation is either indispensable or not indispensable, according as\nthe principal agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus\nsupplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius, who are intemperate.\nTitus cannot secure intoxicants except from Balbus; Sempronius can\nsecure them elsewhere. Balbus\u2019 cooperation is indispensable for Titus,\nbut not for Sempronius.\n\n1510. Cooperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility\nor of the consequences incurred through it, into unjust cooperation and\nmerely unlawful cooperation.\n\n(a) Unjust cooperation is participation in the guilt of an injury done\nto a third party which involves the duty of restitution or strict\nreparation. Thus, those who act as \u201cfences\u201d or receivers of stolen\ngoods, cooperate in injustice and are bound to restitution to the\nrightful owners.\n\n(b) Unlawful cooperation is participation in a sin that contains no\ninjustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of\nrepentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends\nfor scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission\nto penalty. Thus, those who cooperate by marrying illegally, or by\nproviding obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on\nhaving it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments\nprescribed in law. Cooperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be\ntreated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are\nconcerned with cooperation in general, and as it is a sin against\ncharity.\n\n1511. Formal cooperation is either explicit or implicit. (a) It is\nexplicit, when the end intended by the cooperator (_finis operantis_)\nis the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money\nto an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see\nidolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because\nhe agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.\n\n(b) Formal cooperation is implicit, when the cooperator does not\ndirectly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal\nagent, but the end of the external act (_finis operis_), which for the\nsake of some advantage or interest the cooperator docs intend, includes\nfrom its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the\nprincipal agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to\nshow courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he\nassists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on\nas a sign of worship. Caius joins a freethinking society, not because\nhe likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through\nmembership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot\nobtain in any other way.\n\n1512. Mediate cooperation is also subdivided into proximate and remote.\n(a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the\nact of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of cooperation.\nThus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar cooperates in a remote\npreparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up\ncooperates in a proximate preparation. (b) Mediate cooperation is\nproximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation\npoints clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate\ncooperation is an action which, from its nature or circumstances, is\nregarded as morally connected with the evil action of the principal\nagent, while remote cooperation is an action that has no such moral\nconnection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a\nrevolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder cooperates\nproximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon\ncooperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a \u201cjimmy,\u201d a\ndark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the cooperation is\ndefinite, since the circumstances indicate that robbery is\ncontemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes,\nthe cooperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order\nto give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no\nattention in the homes of others.\n\n1513. The Sinfulness of Cooperation.--The Sinfulness of Formal\nCooperation.--(a) Formal cooperation is always sinful, for it includes\nthe approval of the sin of another and the willing participation in the\nguilt of that sin.\n\n(b) Formal cooperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for\ncharity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them,\nwhile formal cooperation, on the contrary, approves and assists the\nsins of others.\n\n(c) Formal cooperation is also opposed to the virtue violated by the\nsin of the principal agent, in so far as the will of the cooperator\ndelights in or approves of the circumstance of help given to the sin of\nthe other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one\nsuspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with\nthe act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.\n\n(d) Formal cooperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue\nviolated by the cooperator, when the external act has a malice of its\nown. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a\nburglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys\nthe laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of\ndisobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by cooperating with sin,\none is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of\ninjustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that\none has cooperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and\nthe necessary circumstances.\n\n1514. The Sinfulness of Material Cooperation.--(a) Material\ncooperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive\nto prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid\none to help in the sin of another. (b) Material cooperation, in case of\ngreat necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under\nserious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to cooperate\nby an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater\nevil than the evil he has in mind. He who cooperates materially through\nnecessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad\nwill of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).\n\n1515. Lawfulness of Material Cooperation.--The conditions necessary in\norder that material cooperation be lawful are the same as for any other\nact that has a double result (see 104); for from the cooperation follow\ntwo results, one that is bad (viz., the sin of the other person) and\none that is good (viz., the avoidance of loss or the retention of\ngood). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result\nneed not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly\nassured by the very fact that the cooperation is merely material. (a)\nThus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through\nthe evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other\nparty as a means to the good end, cooperation is formal. Hence, if\nBalbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to\nconfession the sooner, the cooperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of\nClaudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not\nintended is also verified; for the very definition of material\ncooperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other\nparty.\n\n1516. Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining\nconditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that\nmaterial cooperation is lawful when and if the act of the cooperator is\nitself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty\nfor permitting the sin of the other party.\n\n1517. The first condition of material cooperation is that the act of\nthe cooperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is\nevil, the cooperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often\ndifficult to determine in particular instances whether cooperation is\nintrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature\nand circumstances of the act.\n\n(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of cooperation is\nintrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is\nindifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is\nnow good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to assist in the\nmanufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs\nor instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only\nuse to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically\nwrong to take part even remotely in pagan superstitions, or to give any\nimmediate assistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the\nSixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to assist in the\nmanufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to\nact as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.\n\n(b) According to its circumstances, an act of cooperation is evil, if\nby reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of\nevil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the\ncooperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the\nnature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian to ride in one\u2019s car;\nbut it is wrong from the circumstances when the pedestrian asks to be\ntaken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong\nintrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the\ncircumstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of\nadherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see\n983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools\nafford other examples of cooperation lawful in one set of\ncircumstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance,\nscandal, danger, etc.\n\n1518. But the circumstance that the cooperator knows for certain that\nthe principal agent will use the cooperation for sinful purposes, or\nwill take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil\ndesigns by reason of the assistance given, does not necessarily make\ncooperation evil.\n\n(a) Thus, the cooperator may know from the declaration of the principal\nagent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur\nin the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to\nhelp in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done,\nbut he certainly does not approve of it.\n\n(b) The cooperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the\ncooperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may\nhave sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if\nthe employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at\nthe funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if\nhe does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to\navoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if\npossible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of\nsome anarchist present who regards his cooperation as a mark of\nsympathy for the principles of the deceased.\n\n1519. The second condition for lawful material cooperation is that the\ncooperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the\nevil connected with his cooperation. The standards for judging whether\na reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on\npermission of an evil effect (see 105).\n\n(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the\nreason required for cooperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for\ncooperation in assault than for cooperation in theft.\n\n(b) The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin, the greater the\nreason required for cooperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the\npublisher of obscene books cooperates remotely; he who sets the type or\nreads the proofs of such books cooperates proximately. A greater reason\nis necessary for the latter than for the former cooperation.\n\n(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one\u2019s cooperation,\nthe greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a more serious\nreason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses\nliquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can\neasily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants\nor other cooperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not\nof itself a sufficient reason for cooperation.\n\n(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for\ncooperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals.\nHence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to\nBalbus.\n\n(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of cooperation or\nto prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for\ncooperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful\ncooperation by those who are bound _ex officio_, from piety or justice,\nto prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen)\nthan on the part of those who are not so bound.\n\n1520. Reasons for cooperation correspond in gravity with the importance\nof the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).\n\n(a) Hence, a grave reason for cooperation exists when, if one refuses\nit, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day\u2019s wages\nor income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain,\ngreat anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on\nnotable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.\n\n(b) A very grave reason for cooperation is the gain or retention of a\nvery great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable\npercentage of the goods of one\u2019s station in life should be considered\nas a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment\non the part of the breadearner of a needy family, serious detriment to\none\u2019s honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very\ngreat evils.\n\n(c) Graver reasons for cooperation are those that surpass the very\ngrave without being supreme, such as the loss of one\u2019s station in life,\nincurable disease, loss of an eye or other principal member, severe or\nperpetual imprisonment.\n\n(d) Most grave reasons for cooperation are the public safety of Church\nor State, loss of all one\u2019s property, death, extreme disgrace, and the\nlike.\n\n1521. When the sin committed by the principal agent is grave, but\ncontains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for cooperation\nneed not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.\n\n(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is justified in order\nto avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from\nan unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more\nquickly.\n\n(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and\nindispensable cooperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to\navoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an\nunworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently.\nOne may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if\nthere is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the\ndrunkard.\n\n(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified even by\navoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday\nto a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the\ncook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go\nelsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.\n\n1522. When the sin committed by the principal agent is a grave\ninjustice to a private party, the reasons for cooperation need not be\nso serious as when the sin is against the public good.\n\n(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is permissible, if\nwithout it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of\na higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that\nwhich will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be\nunreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to\nspare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant\ndeath if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain\npapers, and deliver them to a burglar.\n\n(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and\nindispensable cooperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of\nan equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow\nopen the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to\nthis trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the\npapers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way\nthrough which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by\nsurprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of\npapers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure.\nSempronius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the\nassistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of\nSempronius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Sempronius\nwill give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as\nthe robbery would do to the owner of the house.\n\n(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified by the\navoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party,\nbut in proportion to it, Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today\nhe is going out to \u201cfleece\u201d a number of unsuspecting victims, and he\ngives orders to his servant Titus to get his coat and hat and open the\ndoor, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place.\nTitus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus\u2019 plans, but no proofs. If\nthey disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the\nswindling will not be stopped, but Titus will be demoted, and Caius\nthrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.\n\n1523. When the sin committed by the principal agent is against some\ngood of a public character, though not against the common safety, still\ngreater reasons are necessary for cooperation than those given above.\n(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is allowed to avoid a\ngreater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to\nself; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater\nevil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public\ntranquillity, if the attempt to suppress them would lead to serious\ndisturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm\nto a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the\nfamily and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.\n\n(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and\nindispensable cooperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid\nan equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate\naccording to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor\nwho has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time,\nif the company can easily obtain substitutes but he cannot easily\nobtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of\nthe only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be\nable to refuse it to another company that is worse.\n\n(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation may be allowed when there\nis need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented\nexcept by cooperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no\npresent way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are\nearning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being\nshown is not morally unobjectionable.\n\n1524. When the sin committed by another is directed against the\nnecessary public welfare (i.e., against the common safety of Church or\nState), one may not cooperate, but should resist. In this case: (a)\ncooperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify\nit, and much less can it be justified by private good; (b) resistance\nshould be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to\nsuffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the\nChurch or of the State.\n\n1525. In giving reasons sufficient for cooperation with sins injurious\nto the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm\nor loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to cooperate. But\nthe good of others may also suffice for cooperation.\n\n(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in cooperating, as\nwhen one assists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil.\nIt would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself\ndrunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.\n\n(b) The good of a third party may justify cooperation, as when one\nassists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a\nmajor injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being\nrobbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.\n\n(c) The common good will often be a justifying reason. Thus, in\npolitical affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to\ncompromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve,\nin order to secure the election of good citizens or the passing of good\nlaws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is\nlawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to\navoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.\n\n1526. Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation.--(a) If one cannot cooperate\nimmediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see\n1517), immediate cooperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one\nhelped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to\ndeath the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted\na decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an\naccomplice in false worship. (b) If one can cooperate immediately\nwithout performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate cooperation is\nheld lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all\nimmediate cooperation is sinful.\n\n1527. Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate\nCooperation.--(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate\ncooperation argue that immediate cooperation does not differ from\ncomplicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft\nis the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the\nowner, what shall we call the act of a servant who assists a thief by\ncarrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that\nthe servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot\nchange the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that\nthe end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said\nlikewise of other species of sin.\n\n(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate cooperation in certain\ncases argue that circumstances may take away evil from an act of\nassistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or\ngood. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against\nthe reasonable will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable\nif he were unwilling that one should cooperate in removing his goods,\nif one had to do so in order to protect one\u2019s life, at least if one had\nnot engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one\u2019s life\nin preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a\nloaf of bread without the owner\u2019s consent, why may not one save one\u2019s\nlife by assisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it\nis commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a\nSacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by\nconferring it; that is, one may cooperate immediately with the unworthy\nadministration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of\nthe circumstances.\n\n1528. Special Cases of Cooperation.--The cases of cooperation, like\nthose involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases\nwhich occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of\ncooperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of\nthe cooperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and\nworkingmen. Cooperation in sins against faith and sins against justice\nare treated in their proper places, but it will be useful here to speak\nof these other special kinds of cooperation, since they offer many\ndifficulties and a consideration of them now will illustrate the\ngeneral principles on cooperation just given. However, the following\npoints should be noted:\n\n(a) The application of the definitions and rules about cooperation to\nparticular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology,\nand hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among\ntheologians on particular points. Space forbids a discussion here of\nthe opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some\nof the illustrations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but\nwhose opposites are also likely.\n\n(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of\ncooperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors\nto be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to\nothers. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of\nmaterial cooperation is here said to be lawful, this must be understood\nas abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be\ncircumstances of danger or disedification which would make it\nunlawful--a thing that often happens.\n\n1529. Formal Cooperation with Evil Reading Matter.--(a) Cases of formal\ncooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of\nthe managers, editors, ordinary collaborators and authors of\nperiodicals, newspapers, books, etc., which are opposed _ex professo_\nto faith and good morals; for these persons are the brains which direct\nand select what is to be written and published, and the matter they are\ncreating or putting on paper is evil, and has no direct purpose except\nevil.\n\n(b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention to do\nharm are those of the responsible heads of printing or publishing firms\nand their printers, who agree to publish such objectionable written\nmatter; of booksellers, owners of newsstands, etc., who agree to sell\nit; for, as we suppose, these persons understand that the matter in\nquestion is intrinsically harmful and gravely forbidden.\n\n1530. Cooperation with evil newspapers and other reading matter is\nmaterial and lawful if the matter itself is not entirely evil, that is,\nif it has good uses as well as bad, and one has a reason for\ncooperation that is just and proportionate to the kind of cooperation.\nThe following are examples of cooperation that may be merely material\nand lawful:\n\n(a) Moral cooperation is given by writers of good matter who assist as\ncollaborators; by those who offer small notices or advertisements; by\nreaders who use a book, periodical, newspaper, etc., for the good\nmatter it contains and skip the rest. For all these persons contribute\nin a greater or less degree, according to their influence, reputation,\nand ability, to the prestige and success of the journal, magazine or\nvolume, with which their names are connected or which they patronize.\nReasons sufficient to excuse in these cases, given by some authors, are\nthe following: for a permanent contributor, a very grave reason, such\nas the need of support for his family which he cannot earn in any other\nway; for an occasional contributor, a rather grave reason, such as the\nopportunity of refuting error or of setting forth true principles (see\nCanon 1386, Sec. 2); for the habitual reader, a reason somewhat grave,\nsuch as the advantage of reports useful for his business which cannot\nbe found elsewhere; for the occasional reader, a slight reason, such as\nentertainment to be derived from reading a good story; for the small\nadvertiser, a slight reason, such as profit in business. Those who by\nlaudatory descriptions in advertisements or book reviews urge others to\nbuy and read evil books are guilty of seduction, rather than\ncooperation (see 1495).\n\n(b) Financial cooperation is given by those who endow or subsidize a\npublication, by shareholders, by large advertisers, by subscribers,\netc. Reasons considered sufficient in these cases are as follows: for\nthe original providers of capital, only a most grave reason; for the\nbuyers of much stock or advertising space, only a very grave reason;\nfor subscribers, a grave reason such as would suffice for habitual\nreading.\n\n(c) Material assistance is given by those who produce or distribute a\npublication and by those who furnish necessary material. Among the\nproducers, the proximate cooperators are, first, the managers of the\nprinting company, and, secondly, the printers, the \u201creaders\u201d and the\ncorrectors; the remote cooperators are the typesetters, arrangers of\nink and paper, binders, and machine operators. For proximate\ncooperation it is held that a most grave reason suffices, as when a\nprinter cannot otherwise support himself and his family; for remote\ncooperation a grave reason is needed. Among the distributors, there are\ndegrees of proximity in cooperation as follows: first, those who put\nthe reading matter into the hands of others (e.g., by keeping it on the\ntables in their waiting rooms or offices); next, those who keep it for\npurchasers who may ask for it; finally, those who are employed as\nkeepers of newsstands, newsboys, etc. We cannot think of any reason\nsufficient to excuse the first kind of cooperation, since there is no\nlack of good reading matter which doctors, lawyers, barbers, etc,, can\nprovide for those who are waiting in their rooms; for the second kind\nof cooperation, a very grave reason suffices, such as loss of trade by\na poor bookseller, if he would not supply his patrons with popular\nbooks or periodicals of a less elevated kind; for the third kind of\ncooperation, a grave reason suffices.\n\nAmong the suppliers are those who sell to the printer his ink, type,\nmachinery, etc. These cooperate only remotely, and it is held that\nprofit is a sufficient reason for their cooperation. This we admit, if\nthe cooperation is not indispensable, but we do not think that profit\nalone would uniformly justify voluntary cooperation upon which depended\nthe publication of pernicious matter.\n\n1531. Formal Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--(a) Cases of\nformal cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are\nthose of the originators of sinful dances and the writers of indecent\nplays. (b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention\nto do harm are those of the managements that produce bad shows,\norganize bad dances, or make the arrangements or issue the invitations\nfor these affairs.\n\n1532. Material Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--Material\ncooperation is lawful, if the cooperation is not itself intrinsically\nwrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.\n\n(a) Cases of immediate material cooperation are those of players and\ndancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave\nreason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse\nhere, at least for a time.\n\n(b) Cases of proximate material cooperation are those of musicians or\nsingers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show\nno approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do\nnot attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the\ndance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the\ndance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more\nserious reason is required when one attends often, or when one\u2019s\npatronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one\nattends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one\u2019s\npresence or patronage.\n\n(c) Cases of remote material cooperation are those of the owners who\nrent their theatres or dance-halls or cabarets, of ushers, guards,\nbox-office employees, stage hands, etc. It is held that profit is a\nsufficient reason to justify the owners in renting their places, if the\ntheatrical company or dance management can readily find other places in\ncase they are sent away. The ushers, guards, and the like are excused,\nif they cannot easily find other employment; but this does not justify\ngazing on immodest spectacles or laughing at or applauding obscene\njokes.\n\n1533. Formal Cooperation by the Manufacture or Sale of Objects Whose\nSole Purpose is Gravely or Venially Sinful.--(a) Cases of explicit\ncooperation are those of the inventor of contraceptives or of\ninstruments that frustrate generation, of the designers of blasphemous\nrepresentations or of tablets in honor of false deities, the authors of\nsomewhat profane or irreverent cards, and the like. (b) Cases of\nimplicit cooperation are those of persons who, for profit only, make or\nsell objects such as those just mentioned, while knowing that the\npurpose to which they naturally tend is the commission of sin.\n\n1534. Material cooperation by the manufacture or sale of objects that\nare used for gravely or venially sinful purposes, is lawful under the\nconditions given in 1515. Hence, in the first place, the cooperation\nitself must not be intrinsically sinful, that is, the object made or\nsold must have good as well as evil uses. There are two classes of\nobjects of this kind: (a) there are some objects which may have good\nuses, but which in fact are nearly always made to serve bad ends (e.g.,\nidols, insignia of forbidden societies, pictures of the nude,\nultra-fashionable dress, certain drugs or poisons, blackjacks, and\npistol silencers); (b) there are other objects which are indifferent in\nthemselves, although often employed for sinful uses (e.g., dice,\nplaying cards and chips, rouge, lipsticks, necklaces and other feminine\nadornments, imitation jewelry, adulterated articles, and the like).\n\n1535. The rules about proportionate cause for cooperation by the\nmanufacture or sale of things that are employed in committing sin are\nthose given above in 1519.\n\n(a) Hence, the greater the sin that will be committed or the more\nharmful the consequences that will ensue from the use of an object, the\ngreater the reason required for making, repairing or selling it. In\nsome instances only a most grave reason will excuse, such as peril of\ninstant death for refusal. Thus, one may not sell poison or drugs to a\nperson who contemplates suicide, murder, or abortion. One may not sell\nnarcotics to a person who asks for them in good faith and who cannot\nobtain them elsewhere, but who will become a drug-fiend if they are\ngiven him. One may not sell morphine, heroin, etc., to a person who is\nalready a drug-addict and who will abuse the drugs, unless there is a\nvery grave reason for not refusing, such as danger that refusal will\nlead him to set fire to the building. If one has all the playing cards\nin some remote hamlet, one should not sell them without grave reason to\na customer who will spend a great part of the time at games to the\nneglect of serious duties, nor without a very grave reason to a\ncustomer who is a card sharper and who will swindle many innocent\nvictims, or to a gambler who will waste the money due to his wife and\nfamily.\n\n(b) The more closely related an object is with sinful uses, the graver\nmust be the excuse for having part in its manufacture or sale. Thus, an\nordinary reason (e.g., profit) might suffice for selling a lamb to a\npagan or attractive ornaments of dress to a woman, where only a very\ngrave or most grave reason would suffice for selling incense to a pagan\nor ornaments that are frequently used as amulets or charms. Generally\nspeaking, it is seriously wrong and gravely sinful to make or sell\narticles whose ordinary use is gravely sinful.\n\n(c) The more a customer depends on a determinate manufacturer or\nmerchant to obtain such an object, the more serious must be the reason\nfor making or selling it. Thus, a grave reason, such as a notable loss,\nis sufficient reason for selling a special fancy apparel to a notorious\n\u201cvampire\u201d (i.e., a woman who carries on scandalous flirtations in order\nto get presents), if the adornments can be obtained from other\ndressmakers or modistes or stores; but a much graver reason would be\nrequired, if the apparel could not be purchased except at one place. In\nthe former case, refusal to sell would not prevent the activities of\nthis woman; in the latter case, it would at least hinder her to some\nextent.\n\n(d) The more certain it is that an object will be employed sinfully,\nthe greater must be the reason for making, repairing or selling it.\nExamples: Sempronius, a curio dealer, is asked by three men for a\nstatue of Joss along with joss-sticks and papers. The first customer\nsays he intends to use these articles for religious rites; the second\nwill not tell what his purpose is; the third wishes to present the\narticles to a museum. Sempronius may not sell to the first customer\nexcept for a most grave reason, such as fear of death if he refuses; he\nmay not sell to the second customer without a very great reason, such\nas a very considerable loss to himself; he may sell to the third\ncustomer for an ordinary reason, such as the profit he makes from the\nsale. Titus, who sells firearms, knows that some of his customers,\nthough he has no particular individuals in mind, will use these weapons\nunlawfully in poaching or shooting out of season. Since evil is not to\nbe presumed of any particular individual, Titus has the right to sell to\nall for the usual reason of business profit.\n\n1536. Is a merchant bound to inquire the use which a customer will make\nof an article that is often employed for sin?\n\n(a) If the positive law requires that the merchant inform himself, he\nis bound to make inquiries necessary for obtaining the information.\nThus, if the civil law forbids the sale of weapons without a permit or\nof poisons without a prescription, the merchant has to ask for the\ncustomer\u2019s authorization to buy.\n\n(b) If the positive law has no such regulation, we should distinguish\nbetween articles that are frequently used for sin and articles that are\ngenerally used for sin. When an article of the former class is\nrequested, there is no obligation to make inquiries, for such an\nobligation would be unduly burdensome; but, if an article of the latter\nclass is desired, one should make inquiries, unless one is morally\ncertain that the intention of the customer is good, or there is a very\ngrave reason for seeking no information. Thus, one may sell a deck of\ncards to a stranger without asking for proofs that he is not a\nconfidence man in disguise; but one may not sell deadly poison to an\nentire stranger merely on the strength of his word that he needs it for\nmedical or other lawful purposes.\n\n1537. Sinful Cooperation in Providers of Food and Drink.--(a) There is\nexplicit formal cooperation with sins of gluttony, drunkenness,\nviolation of fast or abstinence, whenever one gladly supplies the means\nfor these sins to those who are about to commit them. Thus, if a host\nsupplies a guest who is overdrinking with all the intoxicants the\nlatter desires, and secretly wishes that the guest may make himself\ndrunk, there is explicit cooperation. There is implicit formal\ncooperation when he who supplies the food or drink does not directly\nintend evil, but when the act of giving the food or drink is from the\ncircumstances of the case an evil act, as when a person is given a meal\nwhich will not agree with him and will make him sick or aggravate a\nmalady, or when a person who wishes to violate a fast ostentatiously to\nshow contempt is furnished with the eatables he asks for. (b) There is\nunlawful material cooperation when one does not approve of the sin that\nwill be committed, but nevertheless without sufficient reason supplies\nthe food or drink. Thus, there is sinful cooperation when a restaurant\nowner gives meat on Friday to one not dispensed, for no other reason\nthan the profit he himself will make.\n\n1538. Material cooperation in providing food or drink to those who ask\nit, but have no right to take it, is lawful when one has the right to\nprovide the food or drink, and there is a sufficient reason for\ncooperation. The sufficiency of the reason depends on circumstances, as\nexplained in 1519.\n\n(a) Hence, a greater reason is required when the sin that the other\nperson will commit will be greater. Thus, a grave reason, such as\nindignation of a customer, might suffice for cooperation with a venial\nviolation of temperance or abstinence; but a graver reason, such as a\nserious quarrel, is required if the violation will be mortally sinful.\nA graver reason is also necessary when the consequences will be more\nharmful (e.g., the fights of the drunkard, or the serious illness of\none who has neglected his diet) than when they are less harmful (e.g.,\nthe foolish talk of the drunkard, or the stupefaction of the glutton).\n\n(b) A greater reason is required when the cooperation is closer. Thus,\nin supplying meat the butcher cooperates only remotely, while the cook\nwho prepares it and the waiter who serves it cooperate proximately.\n\n(c) A greater reason is necessary when one\u2019s cooperation is essential\nto the commission of the sin. Thus, in a large town where there are\nmany restaurants, the fact that a customer would quarrel if denied meat\non a day of abstinence would excuse cooperation, whereas in a small\nvillage which has only one eating place, it seems there should be a\nmore serious reason, such as blasphemies or boycott or strike against\none\u2019s business which the refusal of meat might evoke.\n\n(d) A greater reason is called for when the sin of the other person is\nmore certain to follow. Thus, a restaurant-keeper who is patronized by\nstrangers of all kinds, temperate and intemperate, Catholic and\nnon-Catholic, may serve wine at meals, where this is allowed, and\nprovide meat on days of abstinence for all comers; for the diners are\nnot known to him, and it would not be possible for him to inform\nhimself whether they are sober in their habits or exempted from the law\nof abstinence. But in a boarding house the landlady should not consent\nto have strong beverages on the table, when she knows that some of\nthose present will thereby become intoxicated; neither should she agree\nto provide meat on Fridays for a Catholic who is not excused from\nabstinence, unless there is a serious reason, such as the loss of this\nboarder which she cannot afford on account of her poverty. Moreover,\nsince dispensation is given from the laws of fast and abstinence but\nnot from the law of temperance, there is less certainty about the\nintent to sin when one asks for meat on Friday than when one asks for a\ngreat quantity of liquor to be brought to one\u2019s table. Drunkenness is\nalso more certain when a person who asks for drink is already somewhat\nunder its influence.\n\n1539. The sins with which one cooperates by supplying food or drink to\nothers who have no right to it are more or less serious according as\nthey violate the natural law or only positive human law.\n\n(a) Thus, violation of fast and abstinence is opposed to the natural\nlaw when it is intended as a manifestation of hatred of religion. One\nmay not cooperate with a violation of fast and abstinence which is\nmanifestly of this character.\n\n(b) Violation of temperance is also opposed to natural law, and doubly\nso when it leads to such evils as quarrels, fights, murders,\nblasphemies, etc. It is not lawful to cooperate with intemperance,\nunless this is necessary in order to prevent the commission of a\ngreater sin by the other person, or a serious loss to oneself. Thus, it\nis not unlawful to supply whisky to a burglar who wishes to get drunk,\nif this is the only way one can prevent the robbery of a third party or\nserious injury to oneself.\n\n(c) Violation of a fast or abstinence in itself is opposed only to\npositive law; and, since fasting is more difficult than abstinence, one\nis more easily excused from the observance of the former than from that\nof the latter. Hence, if there is a doubt whether a customer has a\nright to receive the food or drink he asks for, a restaurant-keeper can\ndecide more readily in the customer\u2019s favor if there is question of\nfast or abstinence than if there is question of intemperance, and more\nreadily still if there is question of fast than if there is question of\nabstinence. Generally speaking, a restaurant-keeper may supply meat on\nFriday to all who ask it, provided he has other substantial food\nindicated on his bill of fare and shows himself willing to serve that\nas well as meat.\n\n1540. Renting of Houses or Rooms and cooperation in Sin.--(a) He who\nrents to persons who wish to carry on disorderly, immoral, idolatrous,\nunlawful, or other sinful occupations or practices, is guilty of formal\nor unlawful material cooperation, if he approves of the conduct of the\nrenters or has no sufficient reason for renting to them. The same is\ntrue if in a similar way one permits persons bent on evil (e.g.,\npickpockets) to lounge in one\u2019s offices, hotels, etc.\n\n(b) He who gives the use of his house, room, hall, field, etc., to\npersons who will employ them for evil, is only a material and not a\nguilty cooperator, if there is no prohibition of his act, and he has a\nsufficient reason for it.\n\n1541. Examples of reasons sufficient for cooperation in renting are as\nfollows:\n\n(a) A very grave reason.--In civitatibus in quibus majoris mali vitandi\ncausa permissum est, licet locare domum meretricibus, dummodo non\nsequatur grave nocumentum vicinis honestis vel major ansa peccandi ob\ndomus situm, et adsit ratio proportionate gravis, utputa quod alii\nlocatorii non adsint, dominus notabile damnum patiatur si domus non\noccupetur, et meretrices facile alium locatarium obtinere possint.\nHodie vero quum constet meretrices plerasque invite vitam turpem\nexercere (white slavery) et morbis pessimis morteque praematura affligi,\nmeretricium vero nocumentum multigenum bono publico (the social evil)\ninferre, omnis vir probus abhorrebit a pretio locario ab\nadministratoribus lupanarium oblato.\n\n(b) A more grave reason.--Meetings whose purpose is contrary to the\ncommon good (e.g., anti-religious gatherings), even though permitted by\ncivil law, should not be given the use of one\u2019s premises except in a\nrare case of the greatest necessity.\n\n1542. Unlawful Cooperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.--(a)\nCooperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with\nwhich they cooperate, or if the act of cooperation is itself\nintrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does no wrong in merely keeping\na record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of\ngreat frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in\norder that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a\nformal cooperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records\nin order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement\nof its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his\nmotive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal cooperation are\nthose of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains\nblasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his\npassengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get\naway by driving him through dark streets.\n\n(b) Cooperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the\nact itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the\ncooperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent\nXI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: \u201cFamulus qui submissis humeris\nscienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam\nvirginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo\njanuam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat\nmetu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis\noculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur\u201d (Denzinger, n. 1201). Though the\nacts of cooperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically\nevil, the cooperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the\nwrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of\ndeath, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.\n\n1543. Lawful Cooperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.--(a) If\ncooperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be\ncommitted, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause\nwill excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer\nabout the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the\nintentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned\nto himself. Hence, the following kinds of cooperation are held\npermissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor\nor food to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the\nfast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read,\ngiving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out\nto attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress\nof the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his\npatrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if\nhe is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval\nof it, and they can go just as well without him.\n\n(b) If cooperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is\nnot sufficient as an excuse for cooperation; there must be some other\nreason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin\nand the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one\u2019s employer to the place\nwhere he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under\nthreat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius\nevitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam\ncum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiae\nnuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called\non habitually to cooperate in these ways should secure another\nposition, if possible.\n\n1544. The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to\nother persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the\ndifference of circumstances.\n\n(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in\ncooperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position\nto remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the\nhouse who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his\ndemijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order\nwas given the wife.\n\n(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike\nthe servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to\nwork at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer\nunderstand that they will not see or hear many things, or who\nhabitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called\n\u201cdirty work\u201d), are guilty of formal cooperation, at least when they can\nsecure good employment elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so\ndependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse cooperation\nwithout serious consequences to themselves.\n\n1545. Duties of Confessors.--Instruction should be given to penitents\nwho are guilty of sinful cooperation. (a) The confessor should instruct\nignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation, when there\nis a duty of justice to do this, as when the penitents ask to be\ninstructed; or when there is a duty of charity, as when the sinfulness\nof the cooperation in question is known to many persons, or the\npenitents by reason of cooperation are giving great scandal or are in\nserious danger. (b) The confessor should not instruct ignorant\npenitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation--at least, not for a\ntime--if they are in good faith and if graver evils would result from\nthe instruction than from silence.\n\n1546. Obligations to be Imposed on Penitents on Account of Sinful\ncooperation.--(a) Some cases of cooperation cause the culprit to fall\nunder ecclesiastical penalties, for example, those who act as seconds\nor spectators at duels (Canon 2351). (b) Some cases entail a duty of\nreparation for scandal given, as when one has aided the diffusion of\nirreligious or obscene literature or whisperings among the people. (c)\nSome kinds of cooperation include dangerous occasions of sin which one\nis bound to avoid, as when one works for a man who produces adulterated\nwares or gets money under false pretenses.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 10: THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 44.)\n\n1547. There is no commandment concerning charity in the Decalogue, but\ncharity is implicitly contained in all the commandments of other\nvirtues; for charity is the end of every commandment (I Tim., i. 5).\nThus, the commandments of the first table of the Law tend to the love\nof God; the commandments of the second table to the love of neighbor.\nOn account of its supreme importance, however, charity was made the\nobject of special commandments in both the Old and the New Testament.\n\n(a) In the Old Testament, at the second giving of the tables of the\nLaw, it is declared: \u201cNow, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require\nof thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in his ways, and\nlove him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart and with all\nthy soul?\u201d (Deut., x. 12).\n\n(b) In the New Testament, our Lord, being asked which is the great\ncommandment in the law, replied: \u201cThou shalt love the Lord, thy God,\nwith thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.\nThis is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like\nto this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two\ncommandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets\u201d (Matt, xxii.\n37-40).\n\n1548. Charity must come \u201cfrom a pure heart, and a good conscience and\nfaith unfeigned\u201d (I Tim., i. 5), and these words may be used to\nindicate how all other commandments have charity for their purpose.\n\n(a) \u201cA pure heart\u201d is had by the observance of the negative\ncommandments of the natural law, which forbid evil, or of the\ncommandments about the virtues regulative of the passions; and it is a\ndisposition preparatory for the love of God, since an impure heart will\nbe taken up with evil or with earthly things, and so turned away from\nthe goodness of God.\n\n(b) \u201cA good conscience\u201d is had by the observance of the affirmative\ncommandments of the natural law, or of the commandments regulative of\nactions; and it too tends to charity as its goal, for a bad conscience\nfills one with dread and horror of the justice of God.\n\n(c) \u201cFaith unfeigned\u201d is had by the observance of the supernatural law,\nor of the commandments about worship of the true God; and it leads up\nto charity, for a feigned faith, or false worship, separates one from\nthe truth of God.\n\n1549. Though charity is but one virtue (see 1115), it has two acts: one\nabout love of God, which is the end, and another about love of\nneighbor, which is a means to that end.\n\n(a) If all understood that the end includes the means and the means\nsupposes the end, there would be no necessity for two distinct\ncommandments; for there is no love of God without love of neighbor (I\nJohn, iv. 20), and he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law\n(Rom., xiii. 8).\n\n(b) But since many would not perceive that one of the commandments of\ncharity contains the other, it was necessary to propose these\ncommandments separately: \u201cWe have this command from God that he who\nloves God love also his brother\u201d (I John, iv. 21).\n\n1550. Charity extends to other objects than God and the neighbor,\nnamely, to self and one\u2019s own body (see 1133 sqq.); it also has other\nacts than that of love, such as the acts of joy, peace, beneficence\n(see 1193 sqq.), and the suppression of uncharitable hatred, sloth,\nenvy (see 1295 sqq.), etc. Nevertheless, on the two commandments of\nlove of God and love of neighbor depend the whole law and the prophets\n(Matt., xxii. 40), and other commandments about charity are not\nnecessary.\n\n(a) Thus, the objects of love are either the end or the means to the\nend, and, as the two commandments of charity refer to both of these,\nthey omit nothing that is to be loved. It was not necessary to make\nexpress command of love of self, for nature inclines to that\nsufficiently, and the duty of keeping love of self within bounds is\nprovided for in the commandments that God be loved above all and the\nneighbor as oneself.\n\n(b) The acts of charity distinct from love result from love, and the\nacts opposed to charity are virtually forbidden in the commandments of\ntheir opposites. Hence, there was no need of explicit precepts about\nthe secondary acts of charity or of explicit prohibitions of the sins\nagainst charity. But for the sake of those who might not perceive that\nthe minor functions of charity are commanded and acts of\nuncharitableness forbidden in the two great commandments, special and\nexplicit laws were given which enjoin peace, joy, etc., and forbid\nhatred, envy, etc.\n\n1551. The precepts of the secondary acts of charity are: (a) joy:\n\u201cRejoice in the Lord always\u201d (Phillip., iv. 4); (b) peace: \u201cFollow\npeace with all men\u201d (Heb., xii. 14); and (c) beneficence: \u201cWhile we\nhave time, let us do good to all\u201d (Gal., vi. 10).\n\n1552. The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against\nhatred: \u201cThou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart\u201d (Lev, xix. IT);\n(b) against sloth: \u201cBow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be\nnot grieved with her bands\u201d (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: \u201cLet us\nnot be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one\nanother\u201d (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: \u201cSpeak the same things and\nlet there be no schisms among you\u201d (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against\nscandal: \u201cPut not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother\u2019s way\u201d\n(Rom., xiv. 13).\n\n1553. The Commandment of Love of God.--In the commandment of love of\nGod two things are expressed: (a) the matter of the commandment is God,\nthe object of love; (b) the manner of the commandment is that God be\nloved as the Last End, to whose love all other love is to be\nsubordinated.\n\n1554. There is a twofold manner or mode of performing a virtuous act:\n\n(a) The intrinsic mode is that which comes from the nature of the\nvirtue commanded. Thus, in the Fourth Commandment is included not only\nthe substance of an act (viz., that honor be shown), but also the mode\nof the act (i.e., that such honor and so much honor be shown as is owed\nto a parent by his child). The intrinsic mode is always included in a\ncommandment along with the substance of the act prescribed (cfr. 480\nsqq.).\n\n(b) The extrinsic mode is that which belongs to some virtue different\nfrom the one commanded. This mode is not included in a commandment.\nThus, if honor be shown to parents out of love of God, the mode of love\nof God is extrinsic to the commandment, for the commandment is\nconcerned with the virtue of filial piety, and the mode of the act\npertains to charity, which is a virtue distinct from filial piety.\n\n1555. The intrinsic mode of performing an act of virtue is also twofold:\n\n(a) The essential mode is that without which an act is not virtuous.\nThus, he who gives to his indigent parents according to his means and\ntheir needs fulfills the essential mode of the Fourth Commandment, for,\nif he gave them less than he could afford and they needed, his act\nwould not come up to the requirements of the commandment.\n\n(b) The ideal mode of the performance of virtue is that which adds to\nthe virtue greater goodness and value, and which is intended by a\nlawgiver as the end, but not as the object of his command. Thus, he who\ngives to his indigent parents not only sufficiently, but also with a\ngreat willingness and cheerfulness, fulfills the Fourth Commandment\nwith greater perfection than another who supports his parents with less\nalacrity.\n\n1556. The mode of the love of God prescribed in the first and great\ncommandment is that God be loved with the whole heart, etc. But \u201cto\nlove with the whole heart, etc.,\u201d can be understood in various senses.\n\n(a) Thus, it may be understood to mean a love that is subjectively or\nintensively great, as when one loves God with much fervor and\naffection. This mode of love is ideal, since the measure of loving God\nis to love Him without measure, but it is not essential. The end of the\ncommandment is that we love God ever more and more, and perform what is\nrequired with ever greater promptitude and gladness; but the\ncommandment does not fix any certain degree of intensity, although it\nwould be inordinate to choose to love God less intensely than we love\ncreatures (see 1160).\n\n(b) \u201cTo love with the whole heart\u201d may be understood to mean a love\nthat is objectively or appreciatively great, as when one esteems and\nloves God as the Supreme Good. This mode of love is essential, and\nhence without it the commandment is not observed. However much one\nloves God, if one does not love Him as the Supreme Good, one does not\nlove Him aright, and does not practise the virtue of charity that is\ncommanded.\n\n1557. Love of God from the whole heart, objectively or appreciatively\nunderstood, is either actual or habitual.\n\n(a) Actually, one loves God with one\u2019s whole heart when there is never\nany interruption or distraction to one\u2019s love, and one is continually\nengaged in an act of loving God above all else. This is the ideal mode\nof fulfilling the commandment of love, and it is also the end to which\nthe commandment is intended to lead. But it is only in heaven, where\nGod will be all in all (I Cor., xv. 28), that this ideal fulfillment\nwill take place.\n\n(b) Habitually, one loves God with one\u2019s whole heart when one is in the\nstate of grace, preferring the love of God to every contrary love,\nalthough it is only at intervals that one is able to make acts of love.\nThis is the essential mode of fulfilling the command of love here on\nearth. The whole heart must be given to God to the exclusion of love\nfor any mortal sin, for mortal sin separates from God.\n\n1558. The mode of loving God is expressed in various places in\nscripture (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., xxii. 37; Mark, xii. 30; Luke, x. 27),\nand there are slightly different interpretations given to the words by\nwhich it is conveyed. Thus, some exegetes see in the expressions\n\u201cheart,\u201d \u201csoul,\u201d \u201cmind,\u201d \u201cstrength,\u201d synonymous significations of the\none thought that God should be loved over all, and they think that\ndifferent words are used only in order to give greater clearness and\nenergy to the thought. But the following seems also a reliable\nexplanation: (a) God must be loved with one\u2019s whole heart, that is, the\nwill must not intend any Last End other than God; (b) God must be loved\nwith one\u2019s whole mind, soul and strength, that is, the powers moved by\nthe will--intellect, appetites and executive faculties--must be subject\nto God, must be regulated according to His will, and must carry out His\ncommandments.\n\n1559. Love of God with one\u2019s whole heart excludes, then, opposite\nloves, but it does not exclude other loves that are not opposite or\nother dispositions that are less perfect. (a) Thus, love of God with\none\u2019s whole heart does not exclude love of self or of neighbor. (b)\nLove of God with one\u2019s whole heart does not exclude the use of acts in\nreference to God that do not reach the height of disinterested love,\nsuch as acts of hope, gratitude, or fear (see 1033, 1054, 1093).\n\n1560. There are various degrees of perfection in the fulfillment of the\ncommandment of love of God.\n\n(a) The most perfect fulfillment is found in heaven, where there is no\nturning from the love of God by grave sin, no impediment to its\nexercise by venial sin, and no interruption of its act by other\noccupations.\n\n(b) The more perfect fulfillment of this commandment found on earth is\nmodelled on the love of God exercised by the Saints in heaven, and the\nnearer one approaches to the model, the better does one fulfill the\ncommandment. Thus, he who avoids not only what is against charity\n(i.e., mortal sin), but also, as far as possible, what is aside from\ncharity (i.e., venial sin), loves God more perfectly than one who is\ncareless about venial sin; and he who shuns, not only things unlawful\nthat are harmful to charity, but also things lawful that interrupt the\nexercise of charity, loves God more, other things being equal, than\nanother who avoids the unlawful, but whose mind is greatly occupied\nwith lawful temporal matters.\n\n(c) The ordinarily perfect fulfillment of the commandment is found in\nall those who, both in their internal and in their external acts, avoid\nall that is contrary to the love of God, although they fall into venial\nsin and are mostly occupied with temporal affairs. Thus is charity the\nbond of perfection (Col, iii. 14), the tie that binds man to his\nhighest good; those who keep the commandments for its sake are\nfollowers after perfection, those who embrace counsels for its sake are\nin the state of perfection.\n\n1561. The Commandment of Love of Self.--Love of self is understood in\nmany senses. (a) According to its moral character, love of self is\neither sinful or virtuous, and virtuous self-love is either natural or\nsupernatural (as was explained in 1136). (b) According to its physical\ncharacter, love of self is either innate or elicited. Innate love of\nself is the tendency of nature to desire what pertains to the\nperfection of self, such as existence and its preservation (see 1108).\nElicited love of self is the choice on the part of the reason and will\nof an ultimate happiness for self and of the means thereto.\n\n1562. Charity obliges each one capable of precept to an elicited\nsupernatural love of self. The obligation is grave for the following\nreasons: (a) the love of God includes love of self, for we cannot love\nGod truly unless we also love those things that are His, especially His\nrational creatures made to His image and destined for His society; (b)\nthe love of neighbor supposes love of self, for the commandment of love\n(Matt., xxii. 39) offers love of self as the model for love of others.\n\n1563. The goods which the law of charity to self requires one to desire\nand seek after, are all those things that are necessary for the\nattainment of one\u2019s happiness and due perfection.\n\n(a) Thus, as to supernatural goods, one is bound to obtain for oneself\nthings necessary for salvation. One is obliged, then, to acquire a\nsufficient knowledge of the faith; to enter into a state of life for\nwhich one is suited (e.g., matrimony or religion); to avoid sin and the\noccasions of sin; not to delay conversion for a notable length of time;\nto put oneself in the state of grace, especially at the hour of death.\nBut one is not obliged to perform these duties with the motive of\ncharity in mind, nor to elect for self works of supererogation or\ncounsels of perfection.\n\n(b) As to intellectual goods, one is bound to seek what is necessary\nfor a proper fulfillment of the duties of one\u2019s station in life. Thus,\none owes it in charity to oneself to seek the education and training\nthat are presupposed in one\u2019s profession or occupation, and to bestow\nthe necessary study and attention. See above, on the intellectual\nvirtues (144 sqq.) and on the sin of ignorance (904 sqq.).\n\n(c) As to corporal goods, one is obliged to use the ordinary means for\npreserving life and health (on the desire of death, see 1063). Hence,\nin matters of food, drink, clothing, and recreation, each one is in\nduty bound to follow the laws of hygiene.\n\n(d) As to the external goods of person (i.e., honor and reputation),\nthere is a strict duty of guarding them or of recovering them, as far\nas possible.\n\n(e) As to external goods of fortune (i.e., wealth and possessions), one\nmust aim to acquire as much as is necessary for one\u2019s subsistence and\nthe fulfillment of duties to others. Hence the duty of labor for those\nwho do not possess the necessary means. But charity to self does not\ndemand that one aspire to reach the top of the ladder in the financial\nworld or to accumulate a very large surplus. One may indeed lawfully\nseek to become a millionaire, or to become so wealthy as to be able to\nretire with leisure, if one goes about this lawfully; but there is no\nobligation to strive after more than is reasonably necessary.\n\n1564. Man owes it to himself to put to good use the talents God has\nbestowed upon him for his self-improvement and self-development. It is\na sin, therefore, greater or less according to circumstances, to\nneglect the care of the mind or of the mental culture one should\npossess.\n\n(a) Thus, reason is the faculty that elevates man above the irrational\nworld, and knowledge is the perfection and excellence of that faculty.\nWhat life or health is to the body, reason or knowledge is to the mind;\nand so, just as it is a sin against the body to neglect life or health,\nit is also a sin against the mind to neglect reason or knowledge.\nPersons predisposed to insanity who expose themselves to alienation of\nmind by the use of drugs or strong spirits or by practices or\noccupations that expose them to shocks (such as gambling), and others\nwho value ignorance, scepticism, and error as if these infirmities were\ngoods, sin against the mind, at least materially.\n\n(b) Reason and knowledge are also necessary in numberless ways to man\u2019s\nbodily, social, cultural, and religious life. Without the elements of a\ngeneral education in reading, writing and arithmetic, one is very\nseriously handicapped in making a bare living; and without the\neducation of the high school, college or university, one is frequently\nunder a disadvantage in seeking to better oneself or improve one\u2019s\nposition. Besides these utilities for practical affairs, education has\nadvantages of a loftier kind: it makes its possessor a more capable\ncitizen, a more pleasant companion and friend, a more influential\nexponent of good causes, and a greater credit to the religion he\npractises; it gives enjoyment to leisure, comfort to rest, and dignity\nto success; the labor of acquiring it is a discipline of the will; the\ntaste for higher things it imparts is a natural protection against much\nthat is evil; the mental power and knowledge that are its gifts enable\none to expose error and fallacy and to uphold the truth and the right.\nIt is of precept, therefore, that one acquire the moral and mental\ntraining which one\u2019s salvation and calling in life make necessary; it\nis of counsel--and the counsel is one that should be much urged in our\ntimes--that one who has the opportunity of attaining to a higher\nproficiency, to the advantage of self and society, should avail himself\nof that opportunity.\n\n1565. Examples of Sins Committed by Neglect of Necessary Education--(a)\nDirectly, one sins against the duty of cultivation of the mind when\nthrough laziness or malice one slights the means of acquiring necessary\nknowledge--as when pupils absent themselves from school, or give no\nattention to the teacher or no preparation to their lessons; or when\ncollegians sacrifice study to athletics and amusements.\n\n(b) Indirectly one sins against the duty of knowledge, when one is\nresponsible for habits that impede or prevent necessary concentration\nof mind, as when one goes about so much socially that the mind is\nalways in a whirl, or reads so much light literature that everything\nserious becomes a bore, or overeats so much that the brain becomes\nsluggish, or pays no attention to the wise rule that a sound mind needs\na sound body.\n\n1566. The proper care of the body and of health is not merely a thing\nnext to godliness; it is a moral duty, and so a part of godliness. God\nHimself on Sinai gave to the Chosen People of old a sanitary code, and\nthe faithful observance by orthodox Jews of those regulations has had\nmuch to do with the superior health and longevity of their race. Moral\nTheology, therefore, is not digressing from its proper subject-matter,\nif it gives some attention to rules of health. The duties owed to\nphysical well-being can be reduced to the following: (a) to secure for\nthe body the things needed for the maintenance and replenishment of its\nsubstance and vigor, such as food, air, sleep and exercise; (b) to ward\noff or remove those things that are injurious to or destructive of\nhealth, such as excessive heat or cold, waste matter, poisons, and\ndisease; (c) to assist these physical means by psychical or spiritual\nones, such as cheerfulness and the will to keep well and fit.\n\n1567. Food and drink are naturally a prime requisite for life, since\nthey furnish the material from which the body is built and renewed.\nThey should be used, however, in such a way as to serve their purpose.\n\n(a) Thus, the quantity and quality have to be regulated according to\nthe needs of the individual and circumstances, and so will vary with\nclimate, age, health, and occupation. The distinction of clean and\nunclean foods does not exist in the New Law (Rom., xiv. 14; Matt., xv.\n17-20), but it is clear that the same kinds or amounts of food and\ndrink do not agree with all constitutions; that overeating,\nundereating, and want of variety in diet are not conducive to good\nhealth. Physicians recommend that something raw be eaten every day and\nsomething indigestible at every meal, and that a person watch his\nweight, keeping a little overweight up to middle life and a little\nunderweight after that age.\n\n(b) The manner of eating is of first-rate importance, since the\ndigestion is harmed if one eats without appetite or with mental\npreoccupation on deep subjects, or bolts the food, or makes excessive\nuse of relishes or condiments.\n\n1568. Fresh air, on which the production of pure blood and the\ncontinuance of vitality depend, is another necessity of life. Hence, we\nmay well heed the following rules which hygienists lay down on this\npoint: (a) let in fresh air and sunshine to the places where you live\nand work, and exclude dust and smoke; (b) wear light, loose and porous\nclothing, so that the skin may have air; (c) get out of doors in the\nopen air part of the time every day, even though the weather is\nuninviting, for sunshine or natural light is also a requisite of good\nhealth; (d) breathe through the nose, and not through the mouth.\nBreathing should be deep, slow and regular, and one should take\ndeep-breathing exercises several times a day; (e) sleep in a\nwell-ventilated room, or out-of-doors if possible.\n\n1569. Rest and relaxation are needful for body and mind alike, that the\nburdens of life may not bear too heavily, and nature may be allowed to\nexercise her ministries of renewal and restoration. But here, as in\nother things, the guiding rule must be moderation.\n\n(a) Through excess, some harm their health by indulging in too much\nrepose. A strong, healthy individual who remains in bed from midnight\ntill noon, or who gives most of the afternoon to a prolonged nap, is\nstoring up more energy than he or she needs, and will feel the worse\nfor it. Similarly, persons whose life is one round of vacations or\ndiversions pay for their aimless existence in various kinds of mental\nor nervous disorders, to say nothing of the moral dangers to which they\nare exposed (Ecclus., xxxiii. 29).\n\n(b) Through defect, on the other hand, some injure their health by\ndepriving themselves of the sleep or rest they ought to take. The time\nthat should be given to repose differs with the individual. The young,\nbrain-workers and the feeble are in greater need than others; but there\nis no one who can dispense with his proper share of rest. It is sinful,\ntherefore, to reduce needed sleep by late retiring or early rising, or\nto work unremittingly to such an extent that the bodily powers and\nresistance become unequal to the demands made on them and unfitted for\nduties. According to physicians, seven hours out of every twenty-four\nshould be spent in bed, and the hours before midnight are much more\nprecious for rest than the early morning hours. Some holidays and\nvacations are a necessity in these days of rapid and strenuous life.\n\n1570. Physical exercise is a factor of good health, for it stirs up the\ncirculation of the blood, assists digestion, and rids the body of\nsurplus weight. Moreover, it has great value for the mind (to which it\ngives diversion and refreshment) and for the soul (since it promotes\ntemperance and chastity). If taken in the form of sports, physical\nexercise is a training in cooperation with others, in loyalty,\ndiscipline, and fairness. But health is impaired by excess as well as\nby defect in exercise.\n\n(a) Examples of over-exercise are athletes who carry on endurance tests\nto the point of exhaustion, devotees of violent forms of contests or\nmatches that overtax the heart, etc.\n\n(b) Examples of under-exercise are ablebodied persons who prefer to\nlounge about the house all day rather than bestir themselves; also\nthose who work indoors all day and who from choice ride rather than\nwalk, no matter how short the distance they have to go, etc. Persons of\nsedentary life who can do so, should exercise every day, preferably\nout-of-doors, playing at some game like golf, taking a brisk walk of\nabout five miles, or doing some manual labor, such as gardening or\nsawing wood. Regular gymnastics or setting-up exercises, and the habit\nof sitting, standing, and walking erect at all times are prescribed by\nexperts on health as very important.\n\n1571. Under the head of preventive or curative measures that ought to\nbe attended to for the sake of bodily well-being are the following:\n\n(a) In time of health sickness has to be guarded against. Suitable\nclothing and shelter must be used as protection against injurious\neffects of heat or cold; cleanliness must be cultivated by such means\nas daily baths, frequent ablutions, washing of teeth, tongue and gums;\ninfections must be avoided; drugs or stimulants hurtful to one\u2019s health\nmust not be indulged in, and attention must be given to daily, regular\nand natural elimination and to the exclusion of poisons from the\nsystem. According to authorities, one should drink at least six glasses\nof water a day, but warm water is often preferable to cold or hot.\n\n(b) In time of sickness efforts must be made at restoration of health,\nif this is possible. It is of obligation to use the ordinary means to\nrecover physical fitness, that is, to take remedies and medicines that\nare suitable, not on the advice of acquaintances or advertisements, but\non the recommendation of a competent physician in whose knowledge and\nskill one has perfect confidence (Ecclus., xxxviii. 1 sqq.). But there\nis no obligation to have recourse to extraordinary means of recovery,\nsuch as a trip to a more balmy climate when one\u2019s purse cannot afford\nit. Similarly, a very painful and uncertain operation or mutilation is\nnot obligatory, unless one has dependents, and the danger to life from\nthe operation is slight. In time of sickness, as well as in health, we\nshould not omit to implore the divine aid.\n\n1572. The state of mind has very much to do with good or bad health. It\nis well known, for instance, that a happy, cheerful attitude helps\ndigestion and sleep; whereas worry, fear, anger or other emotional\nstress will bring on dyspepsia, insomnia, disease, and perhaps\ninsanity. We should not overlook, therefore, the importance of the\nmental factor in our efforts to maintain good health.\n\n(a) Natural means of cultivating an even temper and a buoyant\ndisposition are: some kind of labor or occupation, avoidance of hurry\nand worry in one\u2019s affairs, cultivation of some interesting hobby or\navocation that will vary the monotony of business or work, use of\ncongenial recreations, whether of a more refined (e.g., conversation\nwith friends, literature, music, art, the drama, travel to historic or\nbeautiful scenes, etc.) or of a more material kind (e.g., reading tales\nof mystery or adventure, raising pet animals, witnessing baseball\ngames, races, etc., playing billiards, cards, etc., smoking, attending\nbanquets, picnics, etc.). A sense of humor and laughter in moderation\nare good for the health and not opposed to spirituality.\n\n(b) Religious practices are all-important for cheerfulness of spirit.\nChristian Science, indeed, is in error when it holds that faith thinks\nor wills sorrow and disease and death out of existence, for evil is a\nreality; but virtue and a good conscience rid one of many enemies to\npeace, and there exist in the Church many supernatural and miraculous\nmeans that benefit body, mind and spirit.\n\n1573. Persons who give exaggerated attention to their health cannot\njustify themselves by the commandment of charity to self; for this\ncommandment has to be interpreted according to the order of charity as\nexplained above (see 1164 sqq.). The bodily good has to be cared for,\nbut with due subordination to higher goods (Matt, vi. 25; Rom., xiv.\n16).\n\n(a) Thus, spiritual goods are more important than those of the body,\nand it is lawful to practise mortifications by fastings, vigils,\nhair-shirts, and the like, which, though afflictive to the flesh, are\nrefreshing to the spirit, provided all be done according to holy\nprudence.\n\n(b) Intellectual goods are better than those of the body, and it is not\nsinful to devote oneself to studies, researches and other mental\noccupations in preference to manual labor or athletic exercises which\nwould improve one\u2019s physique, but not one\u2019s mind. It is even lawful for\nthe sake of mental improvement to suffer some slight detriment to\nhealth.\n\n(c) Public good is greater than private good, and hence it is not only\nlawful but laudable to expose health, or even life, for the advancement\nof science or the welfare of the community. Many men and women in daily\nlife do this as part of the day\u2019s work.\n\n1574. Does charity to self oblige one to desire honors, such as\ndignities, titles, positions or rank, precedence, testimonials,\neulogies, medals, decorations, monuments, and the like?\n\n(a) Charity to self demands that one strive to acquire the excellence\nthat is expected of one, and so to be deserving of honor. For we must\nlet our light shine before men (Matt., v. 16; Rom., xii. 17; II Cor.,\nvii. 21).\n\n(b) Charity to self does not require that one actually secure honors.\nFor one cannot force another to declare one\u2019s praises, since he may be\nprejudiced or ignorant, and it is not seemly to sing one\u2019s own\ngreatness or merit (II Cor., x. 18), except in self-defense (II Cor.,\nxii. 11).\n\n(c) Charity to self would require one to seek after an honor, if the\nhonor were necessary and the manner of seeking it honorable. Thus, it\nis a duty to self to seek to obtain a diploma or certificate of good\ncharacter or proficiency, if this document is needed to exercise the\nprofession for which one has trained.\n\n(d) Charity to self would forbid one to seek after an honor, if the\nhonor would prove harmful, or if it could not be obtained in a\nrespectable way. Thus, if an honor rightfully belonged to another, or\nif it were bestowed in recognition of evil done, or if it would impose\nobligations for which one knows oneself to be unsuited, or if it could\nnot be attained except by dishonesty, charity to self would urge one to\nfly from the honor.\n\n(e) Charity to self in other cases would permit one either to seek an\nhonor (as when a dignity will be useful and will be employed for good,\nand is not sought out of vainglory or hypocrisy) or to forego it (as\nwhen it is not necessary and one is moved to shun it, not out of\ncontempt, but out of some virtuous motive).\n\n1575. Does charity to self require one to desire a good name?\n\n(a) Charity to self does require that one desire to be worthy of a good\nname, for one owes it to oneself as well as to others to be blameless\n(Phil., ii. 14-16) and to provide good things in the sight of men\n(Rom., xii. 17).\n\n(b) Charity to self does require that one desire to have a good name.\nSpiritually, a good name is an advantage, for many a one is encouraged\nto continue in virtue by the good opinion which others have of him,\nwhile many another is discouraged from attempting or continuing a good\nlife because he has a bad reputation. Temporally also, a good name is\nuseful or necessary, for, if others do not trust us or respect us, we\nshall find it difficult to secure employment or position, or to\nexercise our office fruitfully. Hence, scripture admonishes: \u201cTake care\nof a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand\ntreasures precious and great\u201d (Ecclus., xli. 15).\n\n(c) Charity to self does not require that one actually have a good\nname, since reputation may be lost through the work of detractors or\nthrough one\u2019s own unintentional imprudence, or through circumstances\nover which one has no control.\n\n(d) Charity to self ordinarily requires that one seek to acquire a good\nname, if it has not yet been earned, also to preserve it, when gained,\nto recover it, when lost; for, as a rule, there is no greater good for\nwhich the good of reputation should be sacrificed. The means to be\nemployed, however, should not be evil, as when one uses hypocritical\npretense in order to pass as a man of piety, or has recourse to lying\nor duelling, to undermining or attacking another in order to recover\none\u2019s reputation. A good name is built up by fidelity to the duties of\none\u2019s calling and the avoidance of what may be offensive or scandalous\nto others; it is preserved or rebuilt by good deeds, especially those\none is known or supposed to have lacked, and in case of need by words\nof self-defense, vindicating one\u2019s conduct, or refuting aspersions or\nfalse charges.\n\n(e) Charity does not require one to seek after a good name, when this\nshould or may be sacrificed for the sake of some higher good. St. Paul\nfaithfully practised what he preached, that no dishonor might be\nreflected on the Gospel; and yet his enemies looked on him as a seducer\nand a nobody, as a melancholy and avaricious man. But the Apostle\nanswered his traducers that neither honor nor dishonor, neither evil\nreport nor good report, would move him from the exercise of his\nministry (II Cor., vi. 4 sqq).\n\n1576. Sacrifice of reputation is not lawful, however, unless there is a\nproportionately grave reason and the means are good.\n\n(a) The end must be good and relatively important, not only if compared\nwith the good of personal reputation, but also if compared with the\npublic good and the rights of third parties. Examples: It would not be\nright to allow oneself to be defamed in order to cover up the tracks of\na rascal who deserved punishment, or to distract attention from an evil\nthat is being done; for the purpose would then be the defeat of justice\nor the success of some sinful plan. In such cases the end would not be\ngood. Neither would it be right to allow the sacrifice of a good name\nfor the notoriety and money profits to be gained in stage or book\nroyalties. The practice of many young men of accepting imputed faults,\nof which they are not guilty, in order to be popular, or interesting,\nor attractive, is also sinful. Money cannot buy back a lost reputation,\nand popularity with the thoughtless is no compensation for disgrace\nbefore the judicious and loss of self-respect. In these cases the end\nis not important, if compared with the advantage of a good name. And\neven when an end is good and more important than one\u2019s fame, there will\nfrequently be rights of others involved that forbid a sacrifice of\nreputation, as when a passive attitude in the face of calumny would\ngive scandal or cast discredit on one\u2019s profession, office, work,\nreligion, family, or friends.\n\n(b) The means must be good. Examples: Even if the ambition to be \u201ca\ngood fellow\u201d is praiseworthy, drunkenness and profanity are not\nsuitable ways of winning esteem, and the same applies to pretending\nwickedness or accusing oneself of imaginary escapades and vices to\nplease a circle which admires wildness in youth. The means used in\nthese cases (drunkenness, profanity, lying) are evil in themselves.\nAgain, the wish to cultivate humility does not justify one in giving\nscandal by consorting with evildoers as intimates, or by conducting\noneself in such a way as to lower the esteem or respect that is\nentertained for one\u2019s position. The means used in those cases are at\nleast evil-seeming and disedifying.\n\n1577. Is self-detraction, that is, the revelation of some real fault or\ndefect, lawful?\n\n(a) If there is question of faults or defects that are of a public\nnature and generally known, a disclosure made in a good spirit and in a\nproper manner, and from which beneficial and not harmful results can be\nforeseen, is lawful, and sometimes obligatory. Example: Balbus has\ncalumniated his neighbors, and he now admits the fact, not to boast\nabout or excuse it, but to make satisfaction; he does not repeat the\ndetails of his defamatory remarks, but merely states that he wishes to\nretract what he had no right to say; he has every reason to think that\nhis present course will undo the harm caused by the defamation. Balbus\ndoes right in thus acknowledging his mistake.\n\n(b) If there is question of faults or defects not generally known, the\nreasons for mentioning them should be more serious, unless the sins are\nof a trifling nature. Examples: Caius once served a term in jail for\ndishonesty, but he is now a decent citizen. His family would be\nscandalized and would feel disgraced, if they knew this. But Caius\nthinks it would be a suitable reparation to tell them of his former\nguilt. Caius is wrong. To speak of his past experience would only add\nthe sin of scandal to the old one, and there are other ways in which he\ncan do penance in further expiation of dishonesty. Claudius wishes to\nmarry Sempronia, but the latter insists that there must be no secrets\nbetween husband and wife, and that he must give her complete and\naccurate answers on certain questions about his past career--for\nexample, whether he has ever been drunk, whether he has ever wished to\nbe drunk, whether he has ever had questionable relations with other\nwomen, etc. Claudius should not deceive Sempronia, nor leave her in\nignorance of any serious objection to the marriage, even if she forgot\nto mention it in her questions; but he owes it to himself not to put\nhimself in her power by giving her information which she would probably\nuse against him then or later. Titus has stolen a considerable sum,\nand, for the sake of getting advice and direction on how to make\nrestitution, he consults a prudent friend who will regard his\ncommunication as confidential, just as if he were a confessor. Titus\ndoes not act against his own reputation by telling his case to this\nfriend.\n\n1578. Confession of Sins against Charity Owed to Self.--(a) It is not\nnecessary to declare in confession that one has acted against the\ncharity due to self, if there is question only of sins in which\ntransgression of that charity was not directly intended; for to say\nthat one has sinned against God by blasphemy, or against self by\nintemperance, or against the neighbor by injustice, is equivalent to\nsaying that one has hurt one\u2019s own soul by sin. (b) It is necessary to\ndeclare a want of charity to self, if one has expressly intended such a\nsin. Thus, if a person who has been admonished to have care for his own\nsoul is so enraged thereat that he vows to deliver his soul over to\nevil, and thereupon proceeds to commit various kinds of sin, he does\nnot declare his true state of conscience by merely mentioning these\nlatter sins. A case of this kind, however, is not usual (see 1307).\n\n1579. The Commandment of Love of Neighbor.--Charity to\nfellow-creatures, especially to members of the chosen nation, was\ncommanded in the Old Law. (a) Thus, internal love was made obligatory.\nThe Lord forbade hatred, revenge, remembrance of injuries (Lev., xix.\n17), and commanded love of fellow-citizens (ibid.) and kindness to\nforeigners dwelling in the land (Lev., xix. 33). (b) External love was\nalso obligatory. Alms and help were to be given the needy (Deut., xxii.\n1, 2, xv. 11), loans were to be made without interest (Deut., xxiii.\n19), kindness was to be shown to widows, orphans, the blind, the\ncrippled (Exod., xxii. 22, 23; Lev., xix. 14), part of each harvest was\nto be left for the poor, and in the third, seventh and fiftieth years\nspecial assistance was to be rendered the needy (Lev., xix. 9, xxv.\n2-12; Deut., xiv. 28, 29).\n\n1580. In the New Testament, which is the law of love, the precept of\ncharity to neighbors is given with greater clearness and perfection.\n(a) Thus, internal love must be universal and modelled on the love\nwhich Christ had for humanity. Enemies are to be loved as well as\nfriends, the bad as well as the good (Matt., v. 43-45), Gentiles as well\nas Jews, since there is one Lord of all (Rom., x. 12). The new\ncommandment, whose observance will mark the faithful follower, is an\nimitation of the charity of Christ (John, xiii. 34, 35). (b) External\ncharity must be practised, even at the cost of self-sacrifice (I John,\niii. 16), for it will be regarded by Christ as done to Himself (Matt.,\nxxv. 40), and will be the subject of interrogation and eulogy at the\njudgment (Matt., xxv. 34-46).\n\n1581. In giving the commandment of love towards fellow-creatures, our\nLord indicated both the reason for the love and the mode in which the\nlove should be exercised: \u201cThou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself\u201d\n(Matt, xxii. 39).\n\n(a) The reason for this love is that a fellow-creature is our neighbor,\nor, as it is elsewhere expressed, our brother (I John, iv. 20, 21), our\nfriend (Lev., xix. 18). He, like ourselves, is made to the image of God\nand is destined for the same beatitude.\n\n(b) The mode of this love is that it should be similar, though not\nequal, to the love one has for oneself. Hence, the end of loving our\nneighbor should be God, that it may be a holy love; the rule to be\nfollowed in loving him should be that we agree with his wishes in good,\nbut not in evil, that the love may be just; the manner of loving him\nshould be that one wishes him well, not that one only seeks pleasure or\nadvantage from him, and so the love will be sincere. For, as love of\nself must be holy, just and sincere, the same qualities are required in\nlove of the neighbor.\n\n1582. The following conditions must, therefore, be met in the love of\nneighbor which charity commands:\n\n(a) Love must not be of a covetous or selfish or superficial kind, but\nmust be sincerely benevolent and beneficent (see 1109). Those who wish\nto retain the companionship or association of a neighbor because this\nredounds to their own gain, on account of his wealth, influence, etc.,\nwhile harming the neighbor, love themselves rather than the neighbor.\nNor is love of neighbor genuine if it exists only in the emotions, or\nif it is manifested only in expressions of good will; for true love\nincludes benevolence and will be translated into beneficence when the\noccasion presents itself (James, ii. 14 sqq.; I John, i. 22). Persons\nwho are most ready to shed tears at the distress of others, or who are\nmost profuse in compliments or good wishes, are frequently most\nunwilling to assist others, especially if some sacrifice is necessary.\n\n(b) The love of the neighbor must not be a sinful benevolence or\nbeneficence, but must desire for him and confer on him what are real,\nand not merely apparent goods, such as we ought to desire for ourselves\n(Matt., vii. 12). Those who secure for others lower and unnecessary\ngoods at the sacrifice of those that are higher and necessary, putting\nwealth, pleasure, or position above virtue and a good conscience, have\nnot the love of charity, for \u201cwhat does it profit a man to gain the\nwhole world, and lose his soul?\u201d (Matt., viii. 36).\n\n(c) The love of the neighbor must not be purely natural, but must wish\nfor him and confer on him real goods out of a supernatural motive. This\nmotive is the friendship one has for God, so that the neighbor is loved\nbecause God loves him and desires to communicate to him a share in the\ndivine life through grace and glory. The motive of charity is absent,\ntherefore, when one loves only one\u2019s friends, when one is kind to\nothers out of pity, or generosity, or admiration for their good\nqualities, if there is no thought of God in this philanthropy or\nhumanitarianism.\n\n1583. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with\nas to its acts by all those who are leading a good Christian life. (a)\nThus, the internal acts of sincere affection, peace, joy, and mercy are\nexercised by prayer for the living and the dead, or a devout recitation\nof the Lord\u2019s Prayer. (b) The external acts of spiritual and corporal\nmercy are performed by those who are giving according to their means\nand the necessities they meet.\n\n1584. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with\nas to its motive, even though the supernatural motive is not actually\npresent before the mind, or other and natural motives are also present.\n(a) Thus, the supernatural motive directs our love of neighbor, if it\nis present virtually, as will be explained in 1590. (b) Natural motives\nof love that are good in themselves (such as ties of relationship or\nnationality, common intellectual or other interests, the virtue or\nability of a neighbor) do not detract from the supernaturality of love,\nprovided their influence is subordinated to the divine friendship and\nthe desire of beatitude for the neighbor. Even a certain amount of\nnatural repugnance is not inconsistent with charity; on the contrary,\ncharity is seen to be great, if for love of God one does good to\nimplacable enemies, or waits on persons suffering from a loathsome\ndisease.\n\n1585. Fulfillment of the Commandments of Charity.--We speak now only of\nthe commandment of love, in which the other commandments of charity are\ncontained (see 1550 b). The love which is commanded must have the\nfollowing qualities: (a) on the side of the subject who loves, it must\nbe internal and made at the proper times--that is, one must love from\nthe heart and affection, as well as in works and manifestations, and\nmust make and renew the act of love as the law requires; (b) on the\nside of the object loved, it must be both universal and well-ordered;\none must not only love all to whom charity is due (see 1133 sqq.), but\none must also bestow love according to the rank of precedence in which\ncharity is due (see 1158 sqq.).\n\n1586. The act of charity can be made in various ways.\n\n(a) It is made in itself, when one elicits or expresses love; it is\nmade in its manifestations, when one performs an act of virtue distinct\nfrom charity. One who sincerely loves God with his whole heart will\nkeep the commandments (John, xiv. 21), and hence acts of temperance,\njustice, fortitude, etc., may be called acts of love, in the sense that\nthey are indications of love.\n\n(b) The act of charity may be made internally or externally. Thus,\naffection for another as a friend in God, and a sincere desire of his\ngood, are internal acts of love; while spiritual or temporal alms\nbestowed upon him, such as instruction or aid in time of sickness, are\nexternal acts of love.\n\n(c) The act of charity may be made explicitly or implicitly. Charity is\ncalled explicit with reference to a person or object which is loved in\nitself, and not as included in another; it is called implicit with\nreference to a person or object loved as included in another, as when\nmeans and end involve each other, or a part is contained in the whole.\nThus, he who loves God above all things loves God explicitly and his\nneighbor implicitly; he who loves his neighbor as a future co-sharer in\nbliss loves his neighbor explicitly and God implicitly (see 1549); he\nwho includes all mankind in a common act of love, gives explicit love\nto the race collectively, and implicit love to individual members of\nthe race not mentioned (e.g., enemies or strangers).\n\n1587. For the fulfillment of the commandment of charity other acts of\nvirtue are not enough. There must also be love. (a) Thus, as to charity\ntowards God, our Lord declares that love of God is the great\ncommandment on which the others depend, and St. Paul makes salvation\ndepend on love: \u201cIf any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be\nanathema\u201d (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) As to charity towards the neighbor,\nthe fulfillment of other commandments in his regard is inferior to the\nfulfillment of the commandment of fraternal love, and thus the\ncommandments of justice to others are distinct from the commandment of\nlove. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that we are not obliged to\nlove our neighbor by a formal act of love (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n.\n1160).\n\n1588. For the fulfillment of the law of charity, external acts of love\nare not enough; there must also be internal love or affection.\n\n(a) With regard to charity towards God, there can be no question of\nexternal charity through acts of beneficence, as is clear; but one is\nobliged to signify one\u2019s love of God, if silence would cause scandal or\nconvey an expression of hatred of God. Mere lip-service, however, will\nnot do, for God must be loved and served from the heart (Matt., xxii.\n37; Eph., vi, 6; II Thess. iii., 5; etc.).\n\n(b) With regard to charity towards the neighbor, external charity is\ncommanded (see 1210 sqq. and 1551). But there must also be internal\ncharity, for we are bidden to love our neighbor as we love ourselves\n(Matt, xxii. 39), as Christ loved us (John, xv. 12), from the heart (I\nPet., i. 22). If a man distributed his goods to feed the poor, not out\nof love, but out of vanity or other sinful motives, his act would not\nbe an exercise of charity. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that\nwe may satisfy through external acts alone the precept of loving our\nneighbor (Denzinger, n. 1161).\n\n1589. Must the internal act of love be explicit? (a) Love of God should\nbe explicit, for the commandment of charity is that God be loved as the\nLast End, and the other commandments are to be observed as means to\nthat End (see 1120, 1547). The Last End is that which is loved for its\nown sake, and hence distinctly, while the means are loved for the sake\nof the Last End. (b) Love of the neighbor is required to be explicit as\nregards all neighbors in general, when this is necessary for the\npreservation of charity towards God, or the fulfillment of obligations\nof charity towards man; it should be explicit as regards an individual,\nwhen this is necessary for the proper discharge of external works or\nother duties of charity, as when one will not be able to overcome a\ntemptation to hatred unless one makes an act of charity which expressly\nincludes the person one is tempted to hate. But one who loves his\nneighbor implicitly through an act of supernatural love of God, and\nneglects no external duty of charity towards others, is considered to\nhave sufficiently complied with the law in ordinary circumstances.\n\n1590. The Intention of Performing All Good Works out of Love for\nGod.--(a) This intention is actual, when one expressly wills God as the\nLast End of one\u2019s actions. The commandment of loving God above all\nthings does not require an actual reference of each good work to His\nlove (see 1120, 85, 86).\n\n(b) This intention is virtual but explicit, when previously a person\nhad the actual intention and never retracted it, and now acts under the\ninfluence of that explicit and unretracted intention, though he does\nnot advert to the Last End as he now acts. Thus, if an act of love of\nGod above all things is made supernaturally by a Christian or naturally\nby a non-Christian, and later on by reason of the acts of love these\npersons give alms to the poor and do not think of God as they give the\nalms, their works are not actually, but virtually and explicitly done\nfor His love. The commandment of love of God, as we shall see (1593\nsqq.), obliges one at certain times to elicit an act of love of God as\nthe Last End, loved above all things else (in unbelievers it must be an\nact of natural benevolence, and in believers an act of supernatural\ncharity); and, since such an act includes a consecration of one\u2019s works\nto God, the commandment requires likewise at certain times a virtual\nand explicit reference of good works to the love of God.\n\n(c) The intention is virtual and implicit, when there is no previous\nact of love of God influencing a present act, but this act itself is\ngood, tending from its character and object to the Last End, and it is\nprecisely its character and object that cause it to be chosen by the\nagent. Thus, if an infidel, who has made no offering of his works to\nGod, gives an alms out of love of mercy, or honors his parents out of\nlove of piety, or pays his debts out of love of justice, he has\nexplicit love for virtue and implicit love for the Author and End of\nvirtue. The commandment of love of God, being affirmative, does not\noblige one at all times to elicit acts of love of God as the Supreme\nGood, and hence, apart from the occasions when that affirmative\ncommandment calls for exercise, a virtual and implicit intention of\nacting for the sake of God suffices to excuse from sin.\n\n1591. Applications of the Preceding Paragraph.--(a) A Christian who\nmakes acts of love of God at the necessary times fulfills the\ncommandment of loving God with his whole heart and the precepts of\ndoing all things for the glory of God (I Cor., x. 31), and in charity\n(I Cor., xvi. 14), and in the name of Christ (Col., iii. 17).\n\n(b) An infidel invincibly ignorant of the supernatural law, who makes\nacts of natural benevolence with reference to God when he should, does\nnot sin against the precept of charity, and observes the law of natural\nlove.\n\n(c) A person who in no way refers a deliberate act to love of God,\nnatural or supernatural, sins in that act. His sin is venial, if the\nevil intended is small (e.g., an alms given purely out of vainglory);\nit is mortal, if the evil is grave (e.g., an alms given for the purpose\nof seduction into serious sin).\n\n1592. It should not be inferred from what has been said on the\nqualities which charity must have, or the influence it must exercise,\nthat the duty of love of God is only for the perfect, or that it is\nwith difficulty accomplished. (a) On the contrary, charity is a\nuniversal obligation, for it is the first commandment (Matt., xxii. 38),\nand he who does not love is accursed (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) Neither is\nthe commandment hard (I John, v. 3), for nature itself inclines one to\nlove the Supreme Good, and grace helps one to remove the impediments to\na love of friendship that will cling to God above all. The observance\nof the commandments indicates that one is guided habitually by love,\nwhile a devout recitation of the Lord\u2019s Prayer is an actual expression\nof that love; and hence conscientious persons should not worry lest\nthey may have been wanting in God\u2019s love.\n\n1593. With reference to the times when the precepts of charity oblige,\nwe should distinguish three kinds of precepts: (a) the negative\nprecepts forbid sins against charity (such as hatred, envy, scandal,\netc.), and they oblige at all times; (b) the positive precepts of\nexternal beneficence oblige when occasion requires, as was said above\n(see 1210 sqq.); (c) the positive precepts of internal love oblige at\ncertain special times, as will now be explained.\n\n1594. The precept of love of God obliges directly--that is, by reason\nof the virtue of charity itself--at the following times: (a) at the\nbeginning of the moral life, that is, of the use of reason; (b) during\nlife; (c) at the close of life, or when one is about to die (Denzinger,\nnn. 1101, 1289).\n\n1595. The Obligation of an Act of Love of God at the Beginning of the\nMoral Life.--(a) The beginning of the moral life here signifies the\nmoment when a child arrives at a full use of reason, and is able to\ndeliberate on things of grave importance, such as the duty of having a\nsupreme purpose in life and of doing good and avoiding evil. This\nmoment does not coincide necessarily with any fixed period of the\nchild\u2019s age (e.g., the seventh year), but depends on the gradual\ndevelopment of the moral conscience and may be earlier or later\naccording to intelligence, surroundings, education, etc, (see 932).\n\n(b) The act of love of God here signifies the turning to God as one\u2019s\nLast End, but it may be made either formally or virtually, according to\nthe knowledge had. A formal act of love of God is made, when one has\nexplicit knowledge, either through faith or through natural reason,\nconcerning God as the Supreme Good and Last End, and when one loves Him\nas such. A virtual act of love of God consists in a resolution to\ndirect one\u2019s life according to reason, or in a love of the goodness of\nvirtue; for in such an act there is implied a love of the Author and\nEnd of moral good. The faithful who cannot remember having made this\nfirst act of charity when they came to the use of reason, should not\ndisturb themselves at this, for the commandment was fulfilled by any\nservice they freely offered to God.\n\n(c) The reason for requiring an act of love at the beginning of the\nmoral life is, that in that moment one has the choice placed before one\nof good or evil, and that faith, hope and charity, being fundamental\nprecepts, should precede the other virtues of the law.\n\n1596. Ignorance as Excusing from the Act of Love of God.--(a) Ignorance\nof God as the Author of the supernatural order excuses from the precept\nof supernatural love or charity, if it is invincible ignorance. Thus, a\npagan who knows nothing of revelation does not sin by omitting an act\nof charity towards God.\n\n(b) Ignorance of God as the Author of the order of nature does not\nexcuse from a natural act of benevolence towards God, if the person in\nignorance, though an infidel, has sufficient use of reason, for\nignorance of God is then inexcusable (Rom., i. 20).\n\n1597. The Obligation of the Act of Love of God throughout Life.--(a)\nThe existence of an obligation to make frequent acts of love of God\nduring life is a consequence of the preponderant part played by charity\namong the virtues (see 1115 sqq.), for how is one to regulate one\u2019s\nlife according to the virtues, if one does not frequently renew that\nvirtue which is the inspiration and direction of all the others? The\nOld Testament requires that one have the commandment of love of God\nfrequently in one\u2019s thoughts (Deut., vi. 5-7), and in the New Testament\nit is called the commandment on which all the others depend (Matt.,\nxxii. 37-40). The Church has condemned propositions that made\ninfrequent performance of the act of love--such as once in a lifetime,\nonce in five years--sufficient (Denzinger, nn. 1155-1157).\n\n(b) The details of this obligation--that is, the frequency with which\nand the times at which the act of love of God must be made under pain\nof grave sin--is a matter of dispute among authorities. Some think once\nin three years sufficient; others, guided perhaps by the analogy of the\nprecept of yearly Communion, regard once a year as sufficient; others,\nwith St. Alphonsus, hold for once a month, basing their opinion on the\ndifficulty of overcoming temptations if acts of love of God are omitted\nfor more than a month; others, with Scotus, think the act of love of\nGod should be made once a week, for, since the Sundays are set aside\nfor the worship of God, the Church seems to have thereby determined\nwith regard to the act of divine charity that which the law of God had\nleft undetermined; finally, some teach that an act of love of God must\nbe made daily, arguing that Christ commanded the Lord\u2019s Prayer to be\nsaid daily, and that its first petitions contain formal acts of love of\nGod.\n\n1598. None of the opposed opinions just given can be considered as\ndemonstrated and theoretically certain. But in actual life this offers\nno difficulty, and the following are accepted as practical rules that\nmay be acted on:\n\n(a) Those who live habitually in the state of grace may be regarded as\nhaving fulfilled sufficiently the commandment of love of God, for \u201cif\nany man love Me, he will keep My word\u201d (John, xiv. 23).\n\n(b) Those who live habitually in an occasion of sin or in sin itself,\nno doubt neglect the commandment of love of God; but it is not\nnecessary that they accuse themselves of the omission to their\nconfessor, since it is understood in the mention of the occasion of sin\nor bad habit. The confessor, however, ought to admonish careless\npenitents about the obligation of love of God, of recitation of the Our\nFather, etc. Mortal sin revokes the direction of one\u2019s works towards\nGod, and, though one is not obliged to renew that direction immediately\nafter repentance, a delay beyond four or five months according to some\nauthors would be notable.\n\n1599. Obligation of the Act of Love of God at the Close of Life.--The\nduty of making an act of love of God when one is at the point of death\nis admitted by all for the following cases: (a) the dying person is\ndirectly obliged to make an act of love of God when this is the only\nway in which he can secure justification, as when he is not in the\nstate of grace and cannot receive the Sacraments; (b) the dying person\nis indirectly obliged to make an act of love of God when otherwise he\ncannot securely struggle against temptations to despair, doubt, etc.\n\n1600. The duty of making an act of love of God at the time when death\nis near is considered as doubtful by some authorities when the\nfollowing points are morally certain: (a) when the dying person has\nalready sufficiently complied with the duty of making an act of love\n(e.g., when he made such an act just before he fell into danger of\ndeath), or is now in the state of grace (e.g., when he has received\nabsolution with attrition just before or after the danger); and also\n(b) when the dying person will not expose himself on account of\nomission of the act of charity to the violation of any serious\ncommandment.\n\n1601. In practice, the priest who is attending the dying person should\nact as follows:\n\n(a) He should remind the dying person of the obligation, if it appears\ncertain, and should suggest to him the motives and assist him in\npronouncing the form. In many manuals of the Ritual exhortations and\naspirations suitable for this purpose are given.\n\n(b) The priest should recommend the act of love of God, even though the\nobligation does not appear certain, if no harm will result from his\ndoing so. For this will better prepare the dying person for entrance\ninto eternity.\n\n(c) He should not speak of the act of love of God, if the obligation is\nuncertain and harm would result from his doing so (e.g., if the dying\nperson is in good faith, and would be much disturbed if told about the\nact of love to be made).\n\n1602. Thus far we have spoken of the obligation which the precept of\nlove of God imposes directly, or by reason of charity itself. There is\nalso an obligation that is indirect, or by reason of some virtue or\ncommandment distinct from charity.\n\n(a) Thus, by reason of a virtue distinct from charity, one is bound to\nmake an act of love of God, if this act is the only means of avoiding\nsin against that virtue. Example: Titus suffers severe temptations to\ninjustice, and finds that only the love of God keeps him from\ninjustice. In temptation, therefore, he should make an act of love of\nGod.\n\n(b) By reason of a commandment distinct from that of charity, one is\nbound to make an act of love of God, if otherwise one cannot fulfill\nrightly the commandment in question. Thus, if a person has to receive\nor administer a Sacrament of the living, or solemnly to administer a\nSacrament, when he is not in the state of grace and has not the\nopportunity of receiving absolution, he is obliged to make an act of\nperfect contrition, which includes an act of love of God.\n\n1603. An implicit love of neighbor is contained in every true act of\nlove of God (see 1549, 1586). But in some cases love of neighbor must\nbe explicit (see 1589).\n\n(a) Thus, one is bound to explicit love directly (or by reason of\ncharity itself), when the law of charity requires this. _Per accidens_,\ncharity requires an internal act of love, when without this act some\ngood commanded by charity (e.g., reconciliation with an enemy, alms to\none in distress) will not be done, or some evil forbidden by charity\n(e.g., hatred, revenge) will not be overcome. _Per se_, it does not seem\nthat charity requires explicit acts of love towards the neighbor, but\nonly those implicit acts contained in the love of God; in practice,\nhowever, conscientious persons frequently make explicit acts of\nfraternal charity, as when they pray for the living and the dead, or\nsay the Our Father with due attention and devotion.\n\n(b) One is bound to explicit love indirectly (or by reason of some\nother virtue than charity), when apart from such explicit love that\nother virtue cannot be exercised as commanded. Example: Balbus is often\ntempted to defraud Caius, and does not resist the temptation\nsuccessfully, unless he puts himself into a charitable disposition\ntowards Caius.\n\n1604. The Necessity of Charity.--(a) The habit of charity is necessary\nas a means (see 360, 785) for all persons, infants included, so that\nwithout it no one can be saved. For it is only with this virtue that\none possesses the divine indwelling (I John, iv. 16), and is made a\nfriend of God. Those who have not the wedding garment of charity are\ncast into the outer darkness (Matt., xxii. 13).\n\n(b) The act of charity is also necessary as a means of salvation to all\nadults, for it is only by actual charity that they turn towards their\nLast End, and without actual charity they are in death (I John, iii.\n14). A person who is justified through attrition joined with a\nSacrament receives grace and the habit of charity, and by his voluntary\nacceptance he consents to the divine friendship and thus makes an act\nof charity.\n\n(c) The act of charity is obligatory under grave precept at the\nbeginning of the moral life, frequently during life, and at the hour of\ndeath (see 1594 sqq.).\n\n1605. Is it possible that a sin against the love of God be only venial?\n(a) The imperfection of the act makes such a sin only venial, as when\nwithout full deliberation one wishes to omit an obligatory act of love.\n(b) The slightness of the matter makes such a sin venial, when it is\naside from, but not contrary to, the love of God, as when one makes an\nact of love of God with culpable lukewarmness. Venial sin is not,\nstrictly speaking, opposed to the commandment of love, since it does\nnot destroy love.\n\n1606. As the order of charity is commanded as a part of the law of\ncharity, one is obliged not only to love those to whom love is\ncommanded, but also to give greater love to those to whom greater love\nis due.\n\n(a) God must be loved above all creatures, since He is to be loved with\nthe whole heart (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., x. 37).\n\n(b) Self must be loved more than the neighbor, for love of neighbor is\ncommanded only as like to that of self (Matt., xxii. 9).\n\n(c) One should love one\u2019s neighbor more than one\u2019s own body, since we\nought to lay down our lives for the brethren (I John, iii. 16). The\nclaims of self and of the neighbor to love are in the following order:\nthe spiritual goods of self, the spiritual goods of the neighbor, the\nbodily goods of self, the bodily goods of the neighbor, the external\ngoods of self, the external goods of the neighbor.\n\n(d) Among neighbors, those who are better or more nearly related to\nself should be given the preference in love; for we should do good to\nall, but especially to those who are of the household of the faith\n(Gal, vi. 10), and those persons are specially blamed who have no care\nfor their own and for those of their own house (I Tim., v. 8). The\nclaims of neighbors on our help (as was explained in 1176 sqq.) rank in\nthe following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters,\nother relatives, friends, domestics, citizens of the same town, state,\nand country, and, finally, all others.\n\n1607. The order of charity is commanded, because it is a mode intrinsic\nto the performance of the act of charity (see 1554); it is a\ncircumstance without which the act of love is not in proportion to the\nperson to whom it is shown. Thus, love given to God is not in\nproportion to His lovableness, if it is exceeded by the love given to a\ncreature; love given to the members of one\u2019s family is not in\nproportion to their claims, if it is less than the love given to\nstrangers.\n\n(a) Hence, outside cases of a neighbor\u2019s need, the law of charity\nrequires that one give him the amount of internal love that corresponds\nwith the external charity due to him. Thus, love for a father should be\nin proportion to the external honor one is bound to show one\u2019s parent;\nlove for a brother in proportion to the external marks of friendship\nthat are due a brother. He who has no filial love for his parents, or\nfraternal love for his brethren, does not fulfill the law of charity.\n\n(b) In cases of a neighbor\u2019s need, the law of charity requires that the\ninternal love be in proportion to the external charitable assistance\none should give. Thus, if a parent and a stranger are in equal\nnecessity, more help and more love are due the parent; but if a\nstranger is in need, and a parent is not in need, more help and more\ncorresponding love, as to that particular case, are due the stranger.\n\n1608. It should be noted, however, that there is a twofold love of the\nneighbor.\n\n(a) Obligatory love is that which is commanded, and which is due another\nas a debt, such as love for God, for a parent, for all neighbors in\ngeneral, etc. The amount of love for fellow-creatures that is\nobligatory is, of course, not infinite, for no creature is infinitely\nlovable; neither is it mathematically fixed, for, as said above, it may\nbe greater or less according to circumstances; but it is comparative or\nrelative--that is, it should agree with the higher or lower claim to\nexternal charity that a neighbor has on one.\n\n(b) Optional love, or love of supererogation, is that which is not\ncommanded, but which may be given lawfully, such as special friendship\noutside a case of need for an enemy or stranger. As there is no precept\nregarding this kind of love, neither is there any precept regarding the\norder of love as between those to whom it is given, and one may invert\nthe order that is obligatory as regards commanded love. Thus, if a\nbrother and a cousin are both well-to-do, and one has property to\nbequeath to which neither of them has any right, it is not against\ncharity to leave more to the cousin and less to the brother, or some to\nthe cousin and none to the brother. This supposes, however, that in the\nmatter of obligatory love the preference in order of charity has been\nshown the brother (as explained in 1158-1182).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 11: THE GIFT OF WISDOM\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 45, 46.)\n\n1609. Wisdom is the Gift of the Holy Ghost which corresponds with and\nserves the virtue of charity (see 159 sqq., 808 sqq., 1041 sqq.), and\nhence it is discussed in this place.\n\nThe following points concerning Wisdom will be treated: (a) the Nature\nof the Gift of Wisdom; (b) the Persons who Possess the Gift of Wisdom;\n(c) the Beatitude of the Peacemakers, which pertains especially to\nWisdom; (d) the Sin of Foolishness, which is opposed to Wisdom.\n\nSo far is it from being improper to give some space in Moral Theology\nto the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (as if they pertained only to higher\nmysticism), that it is even necessary to emphasize them. The Gifts are\nessential to salvation, and play a most important part in the daily\nspiritual life, whether in correcting or reinforcing the virtues, or in\ngiving immediate direction from the Holy Spirit. Man, it is true, does\nnot set them into action, but it is man\u2019s part to value them, to hold\nhimself in readiness for them, and to hearken to their whispered\nenlightenment and counsel. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are the very\nsoul of Theology and of the Christian life.\n\n1610. The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom.--Wisdom is defined as \u201ca habit\nfor judging things in the light of their First Cause, the Supreme Good,\nwhich is infused into the soul along with sanctifying grace.\u201d\n\n(a) Wisdom is a habit, and so it differs from passing acts. Thus, a man\nin the state of sin who avoids idolatry, judges in the light of the\nhighest cause that worship is not to be given to creatures; but he\nlacks the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and therefore does not judge in\nvirtue of that special instinct or power which originates from the\nabiding presence of the Holy Ghost.\n\n(b) Wisdom judges, and this sets it apart from habits that belong to\nthe will (e.g., the Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear), as well as\nfrom habits whose chief act is assent (e.g., the virtue of Faith) or\npenetration (e.g., the Gift of Understanding).\n\n(c) The standard by which Wisdom judges things is the First Cause of\nall, or the Supreme Good, as when our Lord explained that the condition\nof the man born blind was due to the purpose of God to be glorified\nthrough that blindness (John, ix. 3). The wise man is he who goes back\nto first principles, to the origins of things, to ultimate purposes;\nbut it is not every wisdom that estimates things according to the\nSupreme Good, and there is a false wisdom (see 1623) whose canon of\nexcellence is the imperfect good opposed to Supreme Good. The Gift of\nWisdom, therefore, is distinct from sinful wisdom, which is wise at\ndoing evil (Jer., iv. 22); from particular wisdom, which understands\nwell the theory and practice of some science, art, or profession, and\nis able therefore to decide correctly and to arrange successfully such\nmatters as fall under a special kind of activity, as in medicine or\narchitecture or strategy (I Cor., iii. 10).\n\n(d) The things that make up the object of Wisdom are, in the first\nplace, divine things (e.g., the attributes, plans, government,\noperations of God); and, in the second place, created things, whether\nin the speculative order (e.g., mind and matter, good and evil,\nscience, religion, history), or in the practical order (i.e., human\nactions). Wisdom contemplates the divine as known from faith or the\nbeatific vision, and then, with the things of God as its rule, it\njudges the things of earth and directs the conduct of men: \u201cThe\nspiritual man judgeth all things\u201d (I Cor, ii, 15). Thus does Wisdom\ndiffer from the Gifts of Knowledge and of Counsel; for Knowledge is\nconcerned directly with secondary causes and rises from the creature to\nthe Creator, While Counsel is not a speculative but a practical Gift,\nand is a response to direction given by the Holy Spirit for the\nguidance of conduct.\n\n(e) The Gift of Wisdom is an infused perfection of the intellect, \u201ca\nwisdom descending from on high\u201d (James, iii. 15). Hence, while it\nresembles the virtue of Wisdom, which also judges human and divine\nthings through first causes (see 145), it differs from that virtue,\neven with reference to the same objects, on account of its different\nway of approach. Theology and philosophy judge correctly because they\nemploy study and the investigation of reason; but the Gift of Wisdom\nhas a right judgment because it depends, not on analysis or\nargumentation, but on a supernatural knowledge had through faith (or\nvision in case of the blessed) and a supernatural experience of God\nthrough charity. Wisdom may express itself, indeed, in the concepts and\nlanguage of philosophy or theology, but it is not through scientific\nprocesses that it knows and judges.\n\n(f) The Gift of Wisdom is infused into the soul along with sanctifying\ngrace; for, like the other Gifts of the Holy Ghost, it is intended to\nsupplement through the action of the Holy Spirit the control exercised\nby grace, which is imperfect on account of the limitations of the\nvirtues. The Gift of Wisdom, therefore, is an ordinary and normal fact\nin the spiritual life, and must not be confused with rare and\nextraordinary phenomena--with the \u201cword of wisdom\u201d (I Cor., xii. 8),\nwhich was granted to the Apostles and at times to other preachers of\nthe faith, nor with the clear contemplation of God bestowed in the\nstate of innocence, nor with the infused knowledge or light of glory\nenjoyed by Christ and some of the Saints while on earth. Thus, while\nall who are in the state of grace possess the Gift of Wisdom,\ncomparatively only a few have received the \u201cword of wisdom\u201d--that is,\nthe ability to instruct others in the higher mysteries of faith and to\nexplain to them with ease and in suitable language the meaning of these\nmysteries and their relation to supreme causes. Both these graces are\nsupernatural, but, while the Gift of Wisdom is needed by each\nindividual for his own sanctification, the word of wisdom is needed\nonly in certain cases for the sanctification of others.\n\n1611. From the foregoing definition it is seen that Wisdom belongs both\nto the will and to the intellect.\n\n(a) In its cause, Wisdom belongs to the will. The cause of right\njudgment by means of divine things is either the suitability of the\nintellect, which knows well how to judge, or the suitability of the\nwill, which is inclined towards divine things. Thus, he who is well\nversed in moral science will give a correct decision about a case of\nchastity as it falls under the inquiry of reason, and he who is chaste\nwill judge correctly about the same case, even without moral science,\nbut from the sympathy he has for the virtue. The intellectual virtue of\nWisdom, then, judges aright because the intellect is sound in its\nprocedures; but the Gift of Wisdom is right in its judgments, because\nthe will has been united to God through charity, so that there has\nresulted in one a suitability for judging about the things of God:\n\u201cGive me one who loves, and he will understand what I say\u201d (Augustine,\n_Tract. xxvi. in Joan_.).\n\n(b) In its essence, Wisdom belongs to the intellect, for it consists in\njudgment, and this is an act that is exercised, not by the affections,\nbut by the reason. Through love the soul becomes one spirit with God (I\nCor., vi. 17), and the will experiences the sweetness of this union\n(Ps. xxxiii. 9); the intellect then judges concerning the divine which\nhas been the object of its mystical communion. The Gift of Wisdom,\nbuilt as it is on faith and charity, differs utterly from private\ninterpretation of revelation (which is subversive of faith) and from\nthe Modernistic experience of the divine (which is explained as a\nnatural intuition had by a special religious sense of a reality that is\ndivine and yet only subjective and unknowable).\n\n1612. From the definition and explanation of the Gift of Wisdom it also\nfollows that this Gift is practical as well as speculative.\n\n(a) Primarily, Wisdom is speculative, for one must consider divine\nthings in themselves before one applies them to other things; and,\nmoreover, the object of Wisdom is God, who is the first truth in the\norder of knowledge or speculation. It is by Wisdom, then, as well as by\nthe other intellectual Gifts or extraordinary graces, that the act of\nsupernatural contemplation is exercised; but Wisdom, more perfect than\nthe other Gifts, ascends at once to things that are heavenly, divine\nand eternal, and thinks of God as transcending in perfection every\nknown or knowable degree of created excellence, and as being most true,\nmost beautiful, most lovable (Eph., iii. 17-19).\n\n(b) Secondarily, Wisdom is practical, for God whom it contemplates is\nthe supreme rule of action, as well as the first truth. Thus does the\nhigher Gift of Wisdom unite in itself what are found separate in lower\nvirtues--the speculative quality of the virtue of Wisdom and the\npractical quality of Prudence (see 1620).\n\n1613. The practical uses of the Gift of Wisdom are indicated in\nColoss., iii. 16-17, iv. 6: \u201cLet the word of Christ dwell in you\nabundantly, in all Wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another in\npsalms, hymns and spiritual canticles, singing in grace in your hearts\nto God. All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of\nthe Lord Jesus Christ.... Walk with Wisdom towards them that are\nwithout, redeeming the time. Let your speech be always with grace,\nseasoned with salt.\u201d\n\n(a) The contemplation of divine things is useful for instruction in the\ntruths of faith and the duties of religion (\u201cteaching and admonishing\none another\u201d); for the mind becomes in a way divine, like the things on\nwhich it dwells, filled with knowledge of God and of Christ and of the\nmeans of holiness.\n\n(b) Wisdom helps one to fulfill the duty of praying to God with\nreverence and interior devotion (\u201csinging in your hearts to God\u201d); for\nWisdom makes one perceive and feel the sweetness and attraction of the\nthings of God.\n\n(c) It directs one in both words and works (\u201cdo all in the name of\nChrist\u201d); for the intellect which judges things in the light of\neternity and with the fervor of divine charity will not mislead in\nmatters of salvation.\n\n(d) It enables one to profit by opportunities of edification\n(\u201credeeming the time\u201d); for the example of a life directed by tender\nlove of God and by kindness and courtesy to all is a recommendation of\nvirtue and religion in the sight of the world.\n\n1614. Wisdom is a Gift of the Holy Ghost, and is numbered with the\nother six communications of the Spirit: \u201cAnd the Spirit of the Lord\nshall rest upon him, the Spirit of Wisdom, etc.\u201d (Is., xi. 2).\n\n(a) Likeness to the Other Gifts.--The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are\nenergies diffused in the powers of the soul as instruments of the\nsupernatural governance of the indwelling Spirit, just as the moral\nvirtues are the instruments of the natural governance of reason. The\ninfused virtues (e.g., faith or charity), unlike the acquired virtues\n(e.g., temperance or fortitude), do not suffice for the government of\nthe soul; for, while these latter are according to nature, the former\nsurpass nature, and are received by it imperfectly. Hence the need of\nthe Gifts, which on earth supplement the infused virtues, strengthening\nthem against contrary vices, developing secondary acts of the virtues\nwhich the virtues only initiate, and in heaven perfecting the blessed\nin good.\n\n(b) Unlikeness to the Other Gifts.--Wisdom, which is enumerated by\nIsaias in the first place, is also given the highest rank among the\nGifts by theologians, on account of its greater elevation, more\nuniversal scope, and the directive power it exercises. Fittingly, then,\nis Wisdom assigned as the Gift that serves Charity, the queen of the\nvirtues: Charity loves God above all things; Wisdom dwells with delight\nupon the object of this love (Wis., viii. 16), looks upon life with the\neyes of love, and in directing its human actions communicates to them\nsomething of the savor and sweetness of divine charity.\n\n1615. The Persons Who Possess Wisdom.--The Gift of Wisdom, as said\nabove (see 1610), is given with sanctifying grace, and hence only those\nand all those who are in God\u2019s friendship have this supernatural\nendowment.\n\n(a) Only those in the state of grace have divine Wisdom, for without\nlove of God it is impossible to have that right judgment of things that\nis consequent on the relish for and connaturality with divine things.\nHence, it is said: \u201cWisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor\ndwell in a body subject to sins\u201d (Wis., i. 4).\n\n(b) All those who are in the state of grace have the Gift of Wisdom,\nfor man is so weak and the supernatural virtues are so far above him\nthat, even when he has received these virtues, he is unable to make\nproper use of them or to preserve them in time of temptation, unless he\nhas received the supplementary forces that will enable him to obey more\neasily and promptly the voice and impulse of the Holy Ghost. Thus,\nCharity destines man to beatitude, but, unless he has Wisdom to value\nthis virtue and privilege, to spurn the false wisdom of the world, to\nthink on the love of God with delight and to make it the norm of his\njudgments and decisions, he will not progress in Charity, nor retain\nit, nor arrive at the beatitude to which it destines him.\n\n1616. Though all who are in the state of grace possess all the Gifts of\nthe Holy Ghost, these Gifts are not had in the same way by all their\npossessors. Thus, the following points should be noted with reference\nto the Gift of Wisdom:\n\n(a) The Gifts, like the infused virtues, are possessed habitually by\nbaptized children and insane persons, and actually by adults. Just as\ninfants have the possession but not the use of certain natural gifts\n(such as reason and responsibility), so likewise supernatural life and\npowers are granted them through baptismal regeneration, but the\nexercise of this life and of these powers is prevented by their\ninability to realize what they possess and to make use of it. The lack\nof bodily development, which impedes the use of natural reason, also\nimpedes the use of supernatural Wisdom.\n\n(b) The Gift of Wisdom is had in itself by all who are in the state of\ngrace; but in its extension, which is the \u201cword of Wisdom,\u201d it is\npossessed only by highly gifted souls who have a special mission from\nGod (see above, 1610 sqq.). With sanctifying grace, each one receives\nthe supernatural Gift of judging rightly about heavenly things and of\nregulating his conduct by them in so far as is necessary for the\nattainment of salvation; otherwise, we should have to say that grace is\ninferior to nature, and does not provide what is necessary for its end.\nBut the ability to explain heavenly things so as to draw others to the\ntruth, and to apply heavenly doctrines to the guidance of others so as\nto lead them to good, is one of the gifts freely given, which the\nSpirit divides according as He wills (I Cor., xii. 11): \u201cTo one by the\nSpirit is given the word of Wisdom, to another the word of Knowledge,\netc.\u201d (ibid, 8).\n\n1617. The Gift of Wisdom in itself (i.e., as intended directly for the\nbenefit of the recipient and not for the benefit of others) is also had\nin varying degrees. (a) Thus, different persons do not possess this\nGift in equal measure; for to some is granted the contemplation of\nloftier mysteries not granted to others, and suprahuman Wisdom plays a\ngreater part in the direction of some lives than in that of others. (b)\nThe same persons do not possess Wisdom in an equal degree at all times.\nThus, in Baptism all the Seven Gifts are received, but in Confirmation\nthey are in some way perfected, either in themselves by a greater\nrefinement or sensibility to the action of the Holy Spirit, or as\nregards their possession by their subject through a firmer hold of them.\n\n1618. The Exercise of the Gift of Wisdom.--(a) The external magisterium\n(i.e., revelation and the teaching Church) conveys the truths of faith\nto the mind of the believer. (b) The internal Teacher, the Holy Ghost,\nilluminates the soul with Wisdom, so that it ponders on the first\nprinciples of faith and makes the love of them control its judgments,\nWords, and actions: \u201cYou have the unction from the Holy One and know\nall things\u201d (I John, ii. 20), that is, all that is needed for salvation.\n\n1619. The Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom.--The\nGifts of the Holy Ghost, by supplying for what is imperfect in the\nhabits of virtue (e.g., by protecting faith against dullness of\nperception, hope against presumption, charity against distaste for\ndivine things), give to these virtues a perfectionment like to that\nwhich they will have in the state of beatitude, and to their exercise a\ncorresponding enjoyment. Hence, to the Gifts, which are most excellent\nhabits, correspond those most perfect or most delightful acts of virtue\nknown as Beatitudes and Fruits (see 159 sqq.).\n\n(a) There appears a special correspondence of the seventh beatitude\n(\u201cBlessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of\nGod,\u201d Matt., v. 9) with Wisdom, both as regards their merit, and as\nregards their reward. The work of Wisdom is to reduce all things to\nunity, to see life and the world as a whole, to look upon creatures as\nparts of one great divine plan. Similarly, the work of the peacemakers\nis to put an end to dissension and division and to reconcile the\nwarring powers of the soul, or to introduce harmony between those that\nare at enmity: \u201cThe Wisdom that is from above is peaceable\u201d (James,\niii. 17). Again, the reward promised the peacemakers is that they shall\nbe called the sons of God, and of Wisdom it may be said that it makes\none the image of the Son of God, who is Eternal Wisdom.\n\n(b) The Fruits of the Holy Ghost that are assigned to Wisdom are, with\nregard to God: charity, or a tender love of God (\u201cThe charity of God is\npoured out in our hearts,\u201d Rom., v. 5.), joy, or delight at union with\nGod (\u201cRejoice in the Lord always,\u201d Phillip., iv. 4), peace, or security\nin the enjoyment of God (\u201cThere is much peace to them that love Thy\nlaw,\u201d Ps. cxviii. 165). The Fruits that have reference to the love of\nneighbor are: goodness, or an internal benevolence characterized by\nsweetness (\u201cThe fruit of the light is in all goodness,\u201d Eph., v. 9),\nand kindness, or a beneficence accompanied by cheerfulness (\u201cThe Lord\nloves the cheerful giver,\u201d II Cor., ix. 7).\n\n1620. St. James (iii. 17, 18) describes the direction which Wisdom\ngives to human actions (see 1612, 1613) and the fruit of peace to which\nit conducts them, as follows: \u201cThe Wisdom that is from above, first\nindeed is chaste, then peaceable; modest, easy to be persuaded;\nconsenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging,\nwithout dissimulation. And the fruit of justice is sown in peace to\nthem that make peace.\u201d\n\n(a) Thus, first, Wisdom directs one to be free from sin (\u201cchaste\u201d), for\nthe fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom (Ps. cx. 110).\n\n(b) Next, Wisdom directs one to work for peace within one\u2019s own soul,\nby following moderation where one can decide for oneself (\u201cmodest\u201d), by\nseeking advice where one is in doubt (\u201ceasy to be persuaded\u201d).\n\n(c) Further, Wisdom directs one to be peaceful towards others, to be\nwell disposed towards their good or benefit (\u201cconsenting to the good\u201d),\ncompassionate and helpful in their distress (\u201cfull of mercy and good\nfruits\u201d), not partial or hypocritical in criticizing their defects\n(\u201cwithout judging, without dissimulation\u201d).\n\n(d) Finally, Wisdom, having sown in peace, reaps the peace of\nrighteousness. False wisdom leads to wrangling and disorder, true\nWisdom to concord and harmony.\n\n1621. The Sins Opposed to Wisdom.--Just as blindness and dullness-that\nis, the want of all or of sufficient perceptiveness in spiritual\nthings--are opposed to the Gift of Understanding (see 912), so\nstupidity and foolishness--that is, the want of all or of sufficient\ngood judgment about spiritual things--are opposed to the Gift of Wisdom.\n\n1622. Foolishness is defined as \u201ca slowness and darkness of mind that\nis due to some moral defect, and that makes it difficult for one to\njudge rightly about the Last End of things and the Chief Good.\u201d\n\n(a) Foolishness is slow and darksome, and thus the contrary of Wisdom,\nwhich is alert and discerning.\n\n(b) It is a defect of judgment, and so differs from the sins of\nblindness and dullness of heart.\n\n(c) It is an error of judgment about the chief concern of life and the\nthings of greatest value, and thus it is different from the innocent\nsimplicity of many good persons, whose judgment is not sound in affairs\nof this world.\n\n(d) It is brought on by moral fault, and is therefore not to be\nidentified with invincible ignorance, which is a physical imperfection\ncaused by nature, as in the weak-minded and the insane.\n\n1623. Just as true Wisdom seems foolishness to the world, so does true\nfoolishness seem wisdom to the world (I Cor., iii. 18 sqq.). There is a\ncounterfeit wisdom, which places its last end in some created good, and\nwhich is therefore foolishness before God. St. James (iii. 15)\ndescribes false wisdom as \u201cearthly, sensual, devilish\u201d; and these words\nexpress very well three chief classes of worldly wisdom. (a) Some of\nthe worldly-wise aim above all things at amassing and increasing wealth\nor other external possessions (earthly wisdom). (b) Others seek chiefly\npleasure, health, comfort, or other bodily goods (animal wisdom). (c)\nOthers imitating Lucifer, who is king over all the sons of pride (Job,\nxli. 25), devote their whole lives solely to the pursuit of inordinate\nexcellence of some kind--that is, of selfish domination or honors or\nglory, etc. (devilish wisdom).\n\n1624. The foolishness we are now considering is sinful, for it is a\nvoluntary choice of evil, a violation of commandments, and the\nruination of man. In scripture the term \u201cfool\u201d is applied to the\nwicked, the impious, the objects of divine anger (Ps. xiii. 1), and\nhence it was that our Lord declared severe penalty against those who\ncall another a fool (Matt., v. 22).\n\n(a) Foolishness is a voluntary choice of evil, for it consists in a\nturning away from spiritual things or an entire absorption in the\nthings of this world, with the result that one becomes unfitted to\njudge aright concerning the values of human existence: \u201cThe animal man\ndoes not perceive the things of the Spirit of God\u201d (I Cor., ii. 14).\nBut the fact that his taste is perverted, and that he has no relish for\nthe spiritual, is due to his own deliberate rejection of good and the\ncultivation of evil.\n\n(b) Foolishness is a violation of commandments about the knowledge and\nemployment of truth (see 914 sqq.): \u201cSee how you walk, not as unwise,\nbut as wise\u201d (Eph., v. 15, 16).\n\n(c) Foolishness leads to perdition, for, being defective in its\njudgment, it barters away the future for present satisfaction and sells\nits birthright for a mess of pottage: \u201cThe prosperity of fools destroys\nthem\u201d (Prov., i. 32); \u201cThou fool, this night shall thy soul be required\nof thee\u201d (Luke, xii. 20).\n\n1625. The causes of the sin of foolishness, as was said above (see\n1623), are the wrong and sinful views taken of life, which make men\njudge all things by the standards of gain or pleasure or power, rather\nthan by the standard of the First Cause, in comparison with whom all\nthese lower goods are but trivial. But, among all the vices that lead\nmankind astray from Wisdom, the preeminence is held by lust, for its\nattraction is greater and its hold on the soul more complete. As\nchastity especially disposes for heavenly contemplation and Wisdom (see\n912) by the refinement and elevation and spirituality it gives the\nmind, so does sensuality especially indispose for these goods by the\ncoarseness and degradation and materialism that follow in its wake.\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\nSPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued)\n\n\n\n\nQuestion II\n\nTHE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (THE MORAL VIRTUES)\n\n1626. After the theological virtues, which offer to God the services of\nfaith, hope and charity, and which direct man to his Last End, follow\nthe cardinal or moral virtues, which perfect the actions and passions\nof man, and make of them means for tending to the Last End. Of these\nfour virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), prudence is\nranked first, as being the director of the others.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 1: THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 47-56.)\n\n1627. Definition.--All the definitions of prudence are in substantial\nagreement, and from them we may formulate a detailed definition as\nfollows: \u201cPrudence is the virtue that consults well about the means to\nbe used for leading a good life and applies the knowledge acquired\nthrough consultation to particular contingencies as they arise.\u201d\n\n(a) Thus, prudence consults well, for its office is to study ways and\nmeans to right conduct, and to arrive at a sound judgment in spite of\nvarious uncertainties or unknown factors. Of the two practical virtues\nof the intellect, namely, art and prudence, the former deals with the\napplication of right reason to cases in which there are, for the most\npart, certain and determinate ways of arriving at the end in view\n(e.g., the rules of logic or grammar, the methods of music or\nsculpture); while the latter has to do with the application of right\nreason to cases in which the ways of obtaining the end in view are not\ncertain or determinate (i.e., the infinitely varied questions of\nlawfulness or unlawfulness that present themselves in concrete and\nparticular situations).\n\n(b) Prudence studies the means to a good life; and hence we do not\nconsider a man as generally prudent, if he consults well for this or\nthat particular good end, but not for the general end of leading a good\nlife. Nevertheless, prudence falls short of the Gift of Wisdom, for\nprudence is concerned with human good, wisdom with divine good.\n\n(c) Prudence applies knowledge to the direction of conduct, for the\npurpose of the practical virtues of the intellect is to guide the\nactivities and productions of man according to the light of right\nreason. It should be noted, however, that whereas the application of\nknowledge is intrinsic to prudence, it is extrinsic to art; for\nprudence includes in its very essence a determination of the will to\ngoodness, but not so art. Hence, a painter is not the less skilled in\nhis profession if he voluntarily fails to exercise it or exercises it\nbadly, but a person skilled in moral science is imprudent if\nvoluntarily he fails to use his knowledge or uses it amiss. The sin\nagainst art is not to know; the sin against prudence is either not to\nknow what one should know or not to apply rightly what one does know.\n\n1628. The Objects of the Act of Prudence.--(a) Prudence is concerned,\nnot with speculative truth (i.e., with those things that are known for\nthe sake of knowledge), but with practical truth (i.e., with those\nthings that are known for the sake of use). It aims, not to investigate\nand discover what is the nature of virtue, but to guide man so that he\nmay become virtuous and practise virtue. It should be noted, however,\nthat the acts of the speculative reason, although they do not belong to\nprudence itself, are like other acts subject to the direction of\nprudence; for in pursuing speculative studies one should use good\njudgment as to the subjects to be considered, the time, place, manner,\netc., of study.\n\n(b) Prudence is not concerned with necessary truths and first\nprinciples of morality, but with their application to contingent and\nparticular cases, just as a physician is called on to cure, not a\nuniversal or abstract man, but the particular and individual man before\nhim. But since one cannot well apply that of which one is ignorant, the\nprudent man must be acquainted both with the general rules of right\nliving and with the particular things to which his knowledge is to be\napplied. He lacks prudence, therefore, who from vincible ignorance does\nnot know a general principle (e.g., that too much drink is bad), or a\ncase to which that principle should be applied (e.g., that the quantity\nof drink before one is too much).\n\n1629. It is customary to distinguish a twofold object of a virtue,\nnamely, the material object (i.e., the kind of activity the virtue\nperfects, whether in the field of knowledge, or of action, or of\nproduction) and the formal object (i.e., the special viewpoint of\ngoodness from which the material object is considered).\n\n(a) The material object of prudence embraces individual human actions\nperformed under choice and freely (_agibilia_). (b) The formal object\nof prudence is the right deliberation, decision, and direction (_recta\nratio_) to be given to human actions, with a view to the observance of\nthe golden mean.\n\n1630. Necessity of Certitude.--Prudence, being an intellectual virtue,\nmust have certainty (see on the Certain Conscience, 640 sqq.). But with\nregard to particular contingencies (e.g., whether Balbus ought to marry\nCaia) there are various kinds of certainty.\n\n(a) There is the certainty of knowledge based on a generalization from\nexperience of what happens in the majority of cases (e.g., that persons\nwell mated by reason of birth, age, dispositions, etc., marry\nsuccessfully). This kind of certainty belongs to moral science.\n\n(b) There is also a certainty of knowledge based on the indications in\na particular case (e.g., that Balbus and Caia appear to have congenial\ndispositions and a mutual affection that will make their marriage a\nsuccess). This is the certainty of opinion, and while it may suffice as\na rule for conscience (see the Systems of Conscience, 672 sqq.), events\ndo not always verify its predictions. Hence it is said: \u201cThe thoughts\nof mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain\u201d (Wis., ix. 14).\n\n(c) There is finally the certainty of practical truth, which consists\nin harmony with a good will. This is the certainty that is proper to\nprudence, for this virtue is not a matter of reason alone. Hence, even\nthough a matter properly decided on should not take place or should\nfail of the purpose intended (e.g., if the marriage of Balbus and Caia\nis prevented or turns out badly), it remains that prudence was not\ndeceived in its decision, for that decision when made was according to\nright reason and a good will (see 578).\n\n1631. Relation of Prudence to the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Prudence\ndoes not direct the moral virtues to their own proper ends; for the\nknowledge of those ends comes from synteresis, or moral understanding\n(i.e., the natural perception of the first principles of right and\nwrong), while the inclination to those ends is from the moral virtues\nthemselves. Prudence does not deal with first principles, nor is it an\ninclination towards particular ends. Hence, it is the intellectual\nvirtue of synteresis that directs the moral virtues through the dictate\nthat right reason must be followed, that moderation must be observed,\nthat the passions of anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., must be so\nregulated that both extremes of excess and defect will be avoided.\n\n(b) Prudence directs the moral virtues to the ways and means by which\ntheir ends are to be attained; for the regulation of things particular\nand variable, such as ways and means, pertains to prudence. Synteresis\nis concerned with necessary principles, and the moral virtues give a\nuniform and steady inclination to follow the mean of right reason, but\nneither the one nor the other can indicate how principles are to be\napplied or how inclinations are to be put in practice. Hence, it is the\nwork of moral science to determine what or how much anger, pleasure,\nsorrow, etc., is moderate for the average case; but prudence has to\ndecide this for a particular case here and now (see on Conscience,\n575). Without prudence bravery becomes foolhardiness, temperance\ndegenerates into fanaticism, and mercy changes to weakness.\n\n1632. Prudence, indeed, directs the acts of all the virtues, ruling the\nvirtues inferior to it (i.e., art and the moral virtues), and serving\nthe virtues that are its superiors (i.e., the speculative intellectual\nvirtues and the theological virtues).\n\n(a) Thus, in exercising the intellectual virtues through study,\ncontemplation, art, etc., one would go sadly astray if one did not\nconsult prudence as to the time, manner, and method of performing these\nacts. Hence, a housewife who spent too much time in meditation would\nneglect her domestic duties.\n\n(b) In exercising the theological virtues, through acts of faith, hope,\nand charity, there is also need of prudence, for it is not possible to\ncontinue in these acts without interruption, since there are times when\nother acts of virtue have to be attended to, and also times for repose.\nThus, a person who goes about giving alms to the poor at hours when he\nis supposed to be at work for which he receives pay, is not prudent in\nhis charity, since he does not choose the right time to exercise it.\n\n1633. The Exercise of Prudence.--The acts that belong to prudence are\nthose that one needs in order to direct one\u2019s conduct to that\nmoderation which is the end of virtue. They are three: deliberation,\ndecision, direction.\n\n(a) Hence, in the first place, prudence takes counsel on, and\ndeliberates about, the ways and means; (b) after ways and means have\nbeen discovered, it passes judgment (see 575) on their suitability\n(e.g., that restitution should be made at such a time, in such a way,\nin such an amount, etc., or that moderation in eating and drinking\nrequires that this or that amount be taken, that this or that kind of\nfood be avoided, etc.); (c) finally, but chiefly, prudence gives the\ncommand that what has been decided on be carried out, whether this be\nthe quest of certain things that are advantageous or the avoidance of\ncertain things that are dangerous.\n\n1634. Qualities of Prudence.--The qualities that should characterize\nprudence are carefulness and confidence.\n\n(a) Carefulness is a watchful attention given to deliberation and\njudgment enabling one to act with readiness and decision when the\nmoment for action has arrived. Its necessity for prudence is clear, for\none does not counsel or judge well unless one has a matter at heart, is\nanxious about its success, and devotes to it serious study and\nvigilance; nor does one direct well if there is hesitation and delay\ninstead of promptness in performing what has been decided on. In a\nword, one should be quick in execution, but slow in deliberation. Hence\nthe admonition of St. Peter to be prudent, and to be attentive to\nprayer as a preparation for a good life and for the judgment (I Peter,\niv. 7). An example of carefulness is St. Paul, who was solicitous about\nall his churches (I Cor., xi. 28), ever inquiring about their\ncondition, their progress, their needs, etc.\n\n(b) Confidence, as a quality of prudence, is a reliance on judgments\ncarefully formed which excludes worries and undue hesitations. This is\nnecessary as a balance to carefulness; for while it is true that\nabsolute certainty is not to be expected in forming decisions about\ncourses of action (the future event and also many present things\nbearing on it being unknown to us), it is also true that\novercarefulness blinds the judgment and paralyzes decision. In the\ncharacter of Hamlet Shakespeare pictures the man who is imprudent\nthrough excess of caution.\n\n1635. The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.--As the divisions of parts\ncorrespond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are\nthree kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative\nwhole.\n\n(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence\nand all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in\nthe genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and\nenergy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and\nof acting expressed by the term \u201canimal\u201d is found fully in dogs, cats,\nhorses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.\n\n(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness\neither of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole\nis found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such\nas a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other\nsingle portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses\nof a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral\nor complete.\n\n(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but\nnot in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is\nexemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse\nfaculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives,\naccomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul\nis present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple\nsubstance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different\npower, in none of them all its powers.\n\n1636. It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and\npotestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts\nof a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly\nperformed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts\nare the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The\nquasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which\nhave to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having\nthe full efficacy of the latter.\n\n1637. Integral Parts of Prudence.--The integral parts of prudence,\nconsidered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are\nthose acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge.\n(a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways\nand means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the\npresent situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new\nknowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness\nof perception, by which one discovers for oneself.\n\n1638. The integral parts of prudence, considered as an operative or a\npreceptive virtue--that is, as the counsellor and director of life and\nbehavior--are the acts without which one cannot make good use of\nknowledge as applied to conduct.\n\n(a) Thus, knowledge of general principles must be applied to particular\naffairs, and this supposes that one knows how to reason correctly, how\nto infer the particular from the general, how to put facts together.\nEven those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of\nnatural logic, and are able to make good use of data or premises in\ndrawing conclusions about their obligations, and thus to make a prudent\napplication of what they know.\n\n(b) Knowledge gained through deliberation has to be effectually made\nuse of; that is, the reason must impose its judgment carefully formed,\nmust determine the line of action to be followed, must properly dispose\nthe means in view of the end. This requires that a person should so\ndirect his future acts as means to the end he has in view that they\nwill be good in themselves (foresight or providence) and in their\ncircumstances (circumspection), and that he will be guarded against\nexternal impediments that might hinder him, steering clear of both\nScylla and Charybdis (caution): \u201cThe prudent man considereth his steps\u201d\n(Prov., xiv. 15). Examples: Titus wishes to help the poor, and decides\non certain methods of raising the money that are dishonest and\ndisedifying. Balbus wishes to induce Caius to go to church, and\ntherefore shows him marks of friendship, not reflecting that these acts\nof friendship, on account of the character of Caius, will arouse only\nhaughtiness or suspicion. Claudius, in order to practise mortification,\nresolves on a fast, but also makes up his mind to visit certain friends\nwho will try to make him break his resolution. Sempronius resolves to\nprovide well for his family and also for certain deserving charities,\nbut he fails to insure his property, to invest his money well and to\nmake a will, with the result that neither his family nor the poor are\nprovided for as he had intended. Titus lacked foresight, Balbus was not\ncircumspect, Claudius and Sempronius were incautious.\n\n1639. The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.--Prudence in general\nis the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there\nwill be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different\nkinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into\nthe particular good of the individual and the common good of the\nmultitude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal\nprudence and social prudence.\n\n(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the\nindividual, with a view to his personal uprightness.\n\n(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of\nself, with a view to the general welfare of a society.\n\n1640. Social prudence in turn is subdivided in accordance with the two\nclasses of society, the perfect and the imperfect, into political and\ndomestic prudence. (a) Political prudence is the right administration\nof the affairs of a larger multitude, such as the State. (b) Domestic\nprudence is the right administration of the affairs of the family.\n\n1641. Political prudence, according to usage, often has or may bear an\nunfavorable and evil signification. Hence, as we are considering now\nthe virtue of prudence, we should remark that political prudence here\nis something very different from political methods or practices that\nare wise in evil, but not in good, though often called prudent (see\n1651, 1674 sqq.). Examples: (a) Evil forms of government, such as\ntyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule, cannot be said to have the virtue of\npolitical prudence, no matter how successful they may seem, for they do\nnot rule in the interests of the people at large, and this interest is\nthe very beginning and end of true social prudence. (b) Evil practices\nin the regulation of government or of political parties--such as\nemployment of foul means to maintain the interests of the State,\ncorruption, bribery, intimidation, used for the purpose of winning the\nelection of a ticket or candidate--cannot be honored with the name of\nprudence, but should rather be called Machiavellism and dishonest\npolitics.\n\n1642. Prudence exercised for the benefit of the nation as a whole\nshould be found, not only in rulers, but also in private citizens. We\nmay distinguish, then, the following kinds of prudence:\n\n(a) in those who conduct the affairs of the nation there should be\ngovernmental prudence or statesmanship. Of rulers prudence in the\nhighest degree is expected; for the chief function of prudence is to\ndirect actions, and the heads of States must direct not only their own\nactions but those of great bodies of men. Scripture speaks of prudence\nand justice as the two virtues that are especially needed in a prince\n(Jer., xxiii. 5);\n\n(b) in those who direct the defense of the nation against its enemies\nthere should be military prudence, for bravery has to be guided by\nwisdom: \u201cA wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant,\nbecause war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where\nthere are many counsels\u201d (Prov., xxiv. 5, 6);\n\n(c) in subjects there should also be political prudence, for, as they\nare rational beings and members of society, they should willingly rule\ntheir acts according to the law and should fulfill their own particular\noffices with a view, not only to their own individual good, but to the\ngood of the whole community.\n\n1643. Utility of Prudence for Society.--Hence, we see that none of the\nvirtues is selfish or concerned exclusively with the good of\nindividuals. (a) Thus, prudence, as just said, is political and\ndomestic as well as individual; (b) justice is legal (i.e., towards\nsociety) as well as commutative (i.e., towards individuals); (c) even\ntemperance (e.g., avoidance of drunkenness) and courage (e.g., defense\nof public safety) pertain to the common good and are commanded in laws\nof the State.\n\n1644. Prudence attends chiefly to good morals, but it attends also to\nother goods that benefit human life.\n\n(a) Thus, personal prudence directs one, not only to seek after virtue,\nbut also to seek after lawful conveniences and to shun such things as\nare embarrassing or undesirable. Hence, the prudent man acts so as to\navoid offense and to gain the good will of others; he studies the\ndispositions of those with whom he lives, so as to live peaceably,\netc.; he protects himself against the attacks and snares of the\nunfriendly (cfr. Acts, xxiii. 6; Matt., xxii. 17).\n\n(b) Domestic prudence provides not only for the virtuous lives of the\nmembers of the household, but also for their health and happiness, food\nand clothing, and other necessities and lawful pleasures (Luke, xii.\n42).\n\n(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the\nconduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of\ntheir welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.\n\n(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by\nappointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises,\ninsisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks\nafter the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all\nbranches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.\n\n1645. Neither should practical prudence or practicality (i.e., the\nknowing what to do and how to do it) be identified with merely material\npursuits, since it is a quality that pervades all human activity, from\nthe lowest to the highest, from the manual to the intellectual, from\nthe temporal to the spiritual. Just as there are unpractical mechanics\nand business men who are not skilled at their work, so also there are\npractical students and church people who do their own work well and get\ngood results.\n\n1646. The Potential Parts of Prudence.--As was explained in 1636, the\npotential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually\ninferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to\nwhich they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is\ndirection, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633).\nHence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:\n\n(a) wise deliberation (_eubulia_), which is a habit of debating with\noneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for\nvirtuous choice;\n\n(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes\nit ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for\nvirtuous conduct.\n\n1647. Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which\nis wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are\nsubject to a commander. But is it possible for these three virtues to\nexist apart?\n\n(a) If there is question only of natural dispositions to these virtues,\nthey may exist apart. Thus, we find that certain persons have an\nimagination ready to discover ways and means; that others are not so\ninventive, but are remarkable for common sense in choosing the most\nsuitable means; and that still others are so inclined to some virtue\nthat they will promptly make use of means that tend to it. The first\nclass are readily listened to in deliberations, the second in\ndecisions, while the third are usefully employed in executing matters\nthat suit their natural bent (e.g., the naturally generous in\ndispensing alms).\n\n(b) If there is question of the virtues themselves, they do not exist\napart; for a man is not prudent if he does not deliberate as he should\n(e.g., if he searches for evil means to effect his good purpose), or if\nhe does not decide as he should (e.g., if he concludes to prefer evil\nmeans to the good ones his deliberation had shown him), or if he does\nnot direct his actions as he should (e.g., if he neglects to carry out\nwhat he had decided on as a necessary duty or performs it in a careless\nor improper way). True prudence, then, is wise in deliberation, in\ndecision, in direction. A good man may be excused if he is not\nresourceful, or if he lacks sound judgment in worldly matters, but one\nwho is imprudent in the matter of a virtuous life is not a good man.\n\n1648. The Persons Who Possess Prudence.--Political prudence, if\nunderstood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons,\nnot even in all the good.\n\n(a) Thus, those who are imprudent in their own affairs are not fitted\nto rule, and hence a man who is unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly,\nlacks political prudence: \u201cIf one knows not how to govern his own\nhouse, how will he be able to take care of the Church of God?\u201d said St.\nPaul in discussing the qualifications of prelates (I Tim., iii. 5). He\nwho does not know how to obey well does not know how to rule well.\n\n(b) Those who have infused prudence on account of the state of grace\nare not necessarily fitted to govern, for even children have the grace\nof prudence through Baptism and there are many grown-up persons of\nsaintly lives who are not a success in office and administration. Thus,\nPope Celestine V, though a most holy man, resigned from the Papacy,\nbecause he felt himself unequal to the task of ruling in troublous\ntimes.\n\n(c) Those who have acquired prudence through reason and experience, and\nwho are therefore just, temperate and strong, are morally well fitted\nin natural endowments to rule. He who has learned to obey well is\nprepared to learn to rule well.\n\n1649. Political prudence pertains to subjects as well as to rulers,\nalthough not in the same manner.\n\n(a) Thus, rulers in the civil community should have political prudence\nin a supreme degree, or statesmanship, so that they may be able to\ndischarge well the function of sovereignty entrusted to them, whether\nas legislators by deliberating wisely and choosing suitable laws, or as\njudges by correctly interpreting and applying the law, or as executives\nby maintaining the government and enforcing its laws.\n\n(b) The citizens who exercise the power of suffrage should be gifted\nwith no small degree of political prudence: they should be loyal to the\ninstitutions, laws, and welfare of the country, able to form a good\njudgment about men and measures that are the issues in a campaign, and\nready to vote according to conviction rather than prejudice or personal\ninterest.\n\n(c) The people can also exercise political prudence when obeying the\nlaws, as when they act from a sense of duty and as rational beings, not\nunwillingly or blindly; for thus they rule themselves as freemen and\nenlightened beings, deliberating and deciding with themselves how they\nmay cooperate for the common good and directing their acts according to\nlaw.\n\n1650. The principles just given concerning political prudence will\napply also, due proportion being observed, to domestic prudence.\n\n(a) Hence, it is the duty of those who have authority over a family or\na similar community to cultivate domestic prudence, without which they\ncannot discharge rightly the duties of their position of parent,\nrector, superior, manager, etc. Confessors and directors of souls need\nespecially to be prudent; for even though a priest is thoroughly\ngrounded in the principles of a moral system of conscience and in the\nteachings of ascetical theology, he will have to be guided by prudence\nin making use of his knowledge, so as to apply it well in the great\nvariety of cases that will come before him, and to decide what will be\nmost useful for the spiritual welfare of each individual subject.\n\n(b) It is the duty of those who elect or appoint others to positions of\nauthority (such as the positions of guardian, teacher, superintendent,\netc.) to be assured beforehand of the fitness of the person chosen as\nregards prudence, namely, that he is devoted to the welfare of those\nwhom he will rule, that he has acquired sufficient knowledge and\nexperience, and that his habits are temperate, resolute, just.\n\n1651. Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues.--In the preceding\nparagraphs the possession of prudence has been joined with the moral\nvirtues. Hence the question presents itself: Can one who lacks the\nmoral virtues possess prudence?\n\n(a) Evil prudence, which chooses ways and means well adapted to some\nnefarious scheme, and imperfect prudence, which means and judges well\nbut does not strongly resolve, are of course found in sinners. Evil\nprudence is called after the virtue, because it is a counterfeit of the\nlatter\u2019s goodness, but it is more properly named astuteness or cunning.\nIts sinfulness is strongly expressed in Rom., viii. 6, which declares\nthat the prudence of the flesh is death. Imperfect prudence is also\nsinful, for it permits a right judgment to remain ineffectual and is\nthus recreant to conscience. Examples of evil prudence are the unjust\nsteward mentioned in the Gospel (Luke, xvi. 1), who was wise enough to\ncheat his master and serve his own interests, and artful swindlers who\nknow how to lure their victims and then escape without detection.\nInstances of imperfect prudence are persons who deliberate well on the\nmeans to overcome assaults of temptation or to escape occasions of sin,\nbut whose resolutions never last.\n\n(b) Indifferent prudence is resourceful in finding ways to accomplish\npurposes that are good, but that are not necessarily referred to moral\naims. Thus, certain men seem to have an uncanny instinct in business or\nindustry of hitting on the methods that lead to success and of acting\nat the right time, and a similar fact is observed in the fields of\nscience, medicine, art, etc. This kind of ability of knowing and doing\nthe right thing is variously described as insight, discrimination,\ntact, and is variously explained as luck, genius, industry, etc. But,\nmorally speaking, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, since we find, for\nexample, that men endowed with business acumen or a practical sense of\nthe uses of some art or science devote their talents sometimes to good,\nsometimes to evil, according to the difference of their characters.\n\n(c) Good prudence is that which in thought and in act functions well\nwith regard to the means for leading a good life. It is only this\nprudence that receives the name of virtue; and, since it is clear from\nits concept that it supposes a good life, we must conclude that the\nvirtue of prudence is not found in sinners. It may happen, therefore,\nthat a man is most sagacious in managing temporal affairs, or most\nskillful in administering the spiritual interests of others, and withal\nmost imprudent, because he neglects his own salvation.\n\n1652. Sins that Cause One to Forfeit the Virtue of Prudence.--(a)\nInfused prudence is lost by any and every act of mortal sin, whether\nthe sin be against the knowledge had through faith or the knowledge had\nthrough reason. (b) Acquired prudence is lost by repeated acts of\nmortal sin opposed to the knowledge had through reason, but not by one\nsole act. Thus, a person who through experience and practice has become\nprudent in overcoming past vices, loses this prudence if he disregards\nthe lessons of the past and exposes himself to the old dangers of\nmortal sin (see 138).\n\n1653. We may sum up as follows regarding sinners and the possession of\nthe virtue of prudence:\n\n(a) sinners guilty of venial sin only have infused prudence, and also\nthe habit of natural prudence, if they have acquired it by their own\nefforts;\n\n(b) sinners guilty of mortal sin against supernatural light (e.g.,\nthose who sin against faith or hope) have not the infused virtue of\nprudence, though they may have the acquired virtue;\n\n(c) sinners guilty of habitual mortal sin against natural light (e.g.,\nthose who are accustomed to sin against temperance or justice) have\nneither the infused nor the acquired virtue of prudence. Even one\nmortal sin, though it will not take away the inclination of the habit\nof prudence, will deprive one of the perfection of the virtue of\nprudence, for which it is required that in every act there be a\njudgment agreeable to a good will.\n\n1654. The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of\nGrace.--(a) Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this\nvirtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner--that is, on account\nof their sanctification they have the power, but on account of their\nwant of reason they have not the use of the power.\n\n(b) All adults in the state of grace have this virtue both habitually\nand actually, as far as the need of salvation requires its exercise.\nGrace enables them either to perceive what they should do to live well,\nor to seek counsel from the better instructed and to distinguish\nbetween good and bad advice.\n\n(c) Some adults in the state of grace have good judgment in a superior\ndegree and are able to direct not only themselves but others, and to\ndeliberate and decide rightly, not only in matters necessary for\nsalvation, but in all kinds of affairs pertaining to the direction of\nhuman life.\n\n1655. Can the Acquired Virtue of Prudence Exist in Young People?--(a)\nIf there is question of a formed habit of prudence, the virtue is not\nin the young, but in those who are advanced in years. Acquired prudence\nis originated by deliberation on particular cases and by habit, and\nthese are not had without experience and time. Hence, this virtue is to\nbe looked for in the elderly, both because the passions that disturb\ncalm deliberation are no longer so impetuous in them, and because their\nyears have taught them many lessons and given them the opportunity to\nacquire fixed ways of acting: \u201cIn the ancient is wisdom, and in length\nof days prudence\u201d (Job, xii. 12; cfr. III Kings, xii).\n\n(b) If there is question of a formative prudence, this is found in the\nyoung, for they deliberate and decide at times with judgment and\nfirmness, and, if such acts are frequently repeated, they will\neventually proceed from a settled moral inclination. It is necessary,\ntherefore, that the moral training of the young begin early, that\ninstruction, counsel and direction be given them by parents and other\nguides, so that the way of virtue may be made more easy. The young are\nin duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the\nadmonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to\nact as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.\n\n1656. Is There Such a Thing as an Instinctive or Native Prudence?--(a)\nIf we speak of the knowledge of universal principles of right and wrong\nwhich are applied by prudence, those principles that are most general\nare known naturally (i.e., even without instruction or inference), but\nnot so the less general principles that follow from them (see 320\nsqq.). Broadly speaking, therefore, one might say that prudence is\nnatural, for in respect of its first principles it has a natural\nevidence; but it is more correct to say that knowledge of first\nprinciples belongs to intuitive reason or understanding, which is also\ncalled synteresis in reference to practical truths (see 145), and which\nis a gift of nature.\n\n(b) If we speak of the particular knowledge of virtuous aims that is\npresupposed to prudence, one may possess naturally a right judgment\nabout those aims, inasmuch as the right objectives of human life are\nnot variable but determinate, and accordingly may be the centers of\nattraction to nature, which is drawn to the invariable and determinate,\nas is seen in irrational creatures. In fact, certain persons are by\nnature disposed to certain virtues (e.g., temperance), and readily form\naccurate judgments as to what concerns these virtues. Broadly speaking\nagain, we may say that prudence is natural in the sense that nature\ndisposes some persons to judge rightly about moral ends.\n\n(c) If we speak of the particular knowledge concerning ways and means\nto fulfill virtuous purposes, there is no natural knowledge of this\nkind, for the ways and means to moderation are infinitely varied\naccording to the differences of affairs, persons, and circumstances.\nAnd since prudence strictly understood is concerned, not with universal\nprinciples or the ends of virtues, but with individual cases and the\nparticular means to be employed, it follows that in the strict sense\nprudence is not natural. But just as we find that some men are better\nfitted by nature to judge correctly in speculative matters, so also\nsome persons are superior to others in the ability to reason about\npractical cases and the means conducive to morality.\n\n1657. The Growth and Decay of Prudence.--(a) As repeated acts form a\nhabit of prudence, so do repeated acts strengthen prudence already\nformed, especially when the chief act of prudence (i.e., the command\nthat things wisely deliberated on be performed) is often brought into\nplay. Even infused prudence is augmented and perfected by use and\npractice: \u201cStrong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have\ntheir senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil\u201d (Heb., v.\n14).\n\n(b) As prudence consists primarily in a dictate which applies the\nreason\u2019s knowledge to the control of will and conduct, this virtue is\ncorrupted chiefly by passion. We see that those who are swayed by\npleasure or pain lose sight of the true motive of choice and action,\nand do not issue to themselves the order which prudence and their\nbetter judgment inspire. Thus, lust deceived even the elders of the\npeople (Dan., xiii. 56), and bribes blind even the prudent (Exod.,\nxxiii. 8). Nature enables a man to judge rightly about the universal\nprinciples of right and wrong; but, when judgment is to be given about\nparticular lines of action, \u201cas a man is, so he judges,\u201d the licentious\nman judging for pleasure, the cowardly man for neglect of duty. Hence,\nthe moral virtues must be united with prudence, else it perishes.\n\n(c) As prudence presupposes a fund of general moral principles,\nforgetfulness is an impediment to this virtue; yet not so that every\nloss of memory which deprives one of arts and sciences will also take\naway prudence. For, while art and science consist entirely of\nknowledge, prudence has also a moral element derived from a right\ninclination of the will towards goodness, and its chief office is the\nutilization of principles in practice. The virtuous man will continue\nto follow prudence, even though he has forgotten its theory or rules,\nguiding himself by good habits formed or by the counsel of those wiser\nthan himself.\n\n1658. The Gift of Counsel.--The Gifts of the Holy Ghost supplement the\ntheological virtues by ministering to them; but they supplement the\nmoral virtues, of which prudence is the first, by aiding and perfecting\nthem. The Gift that corresponds directly to prudence is Counsel, for\nboth are concerned with the direction of human acts, prudence directing\nby the standard of human reason and counsel by the Holy Ghost Himself.\n\n1659. Definition.--Counsel is defined as \u201can infused habit which makes\nthe soul prompt to receive and act upon the enlightenment offered by\nthe Holy Ghost about the means to be chosen with a view to its own\neternal salvation.\u201d\n\n(a) Counsel is different from the virtue of wise deliberation spoken of\nin 1646; for, while the virtue enables one to do good in a human manner\nand from one\u2019s own motion (e.g., by seeking advice, by making\ninquiries, etc.), the Gift enables one to do good in a superhuman\nmanner and under the motion of the Holy Ghost (i.e., by hearkening to\nthe advice offered by God).\n\n(b) Counsel is different also from the charism of good counsel, which\nmakes certain persons remarkable as advisors or directors. Thus,\nMathathias when dying said to his sons: \u201cI know that your brother Simon\nis a man of counsel; give ear to him always, and he shall be a father\nto you\u201d (I Mach., ii. 65). St. Antoninus of Florence was so successful\nin guiding those who came to him with their difficulties that he was\ncalled \u201cAntoninus of the Counsels.\u201d The Gift is intended to benefit its\npossessor, and it is therefore had by all the just; but the charism is\nfor the benefit of others, and is freely bestowed according to the will\nof God only on certain individuals who have a special mission of\ndirecting or assisting their neighbors.\n\n1660. Subject-Matter of Counsel.--The subject-matter of the Gift of\nCounsel embraces all that pertains to salvation, both the things that\nare necessary and are commanded and the things that are not necessary\nand are only counselled.\n\n1661. The Gift of Counsel may direct one at times to courses that are\nsingular and extraordinary. But, since the Apostolic rule is that one\nshould not believe every spirit but should prove the spirits whether\nthey are from God (I John, iv. 1; I Thess., v. 21), persons who feel\ncalled to unusual kinds of life should submit their ideas to the\njudgment of the Church: \u201cArise and go into the city, and there it shall\nbe told thee what thou must do\u201d (Acts, ix. 7).\n\n1662. The Beatitude and Fruits that Correspond to the Gift of\nCounsel.--(a) Counsel directs one to all the means that are useful for\nthe attainment of life eternal, but especially to acts of mercy, for,\nas St. Augustine remarks, without mercy shown to others we cannot be\nfreed from our own evils. Cognate to Counsel, therefore, is the Fifth\nBeatitude: \u201cBlessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy\u201d\n(Matt., v. 7).\n\n(b) Counsel is practical, and hence its ultimate result will be action\nof some kind. The acts which its farseeing view puts especially into\nexercise are acts of mercy, and acts of mercy have sweetness and\nagreeableness when accompanied by a sympathetic love of the afflicted\nand a cheerful and generous service of their needs. There belong to\nmercy, then, the two delightful acts or fruits of the Spirit mentioned\nin Gal., v, 22, and called goodness (i.e., internal benevolence) and\nkindness (i.e., external beneficence).\n\n1663. The Sins Against Prudence.--There are two classes of sins opposed\nto prudence. (a) Manifestly opposed to it are those sins that consist\nin a want of the acts or conditions requisite for prudence. These may\nbe called sins of imprudence or sins that offend prudence by way of\nnon-use. (b) Seemingly allied with prudence are those sins that consist\nin a wrong application of the acts or conditions of the virtue. These\nmay be called sins of pseudo-prudence, or sins that offend against\nprudence by way of abuse. We shall speak first of imprudence and then\nof pseudo-prudence.\n\n1664. Kinds of Imprudence.--There are three kinds of imprudence. (a)\nNegatively considered, imprudence is nothing more than the absence of\nprudence, and it is not necessarily a sin. Thus, children and young\npeople through no fault of their own are negatively imprudent, though\nof course their lack of prudence may be traced back to original sin.\n\n(b) Privatively considered, imprudence is the failure to have the\nhabitual prudence that one is bound and able to possess. This failure\nis due to the fact that one has taken no pains to educate oneself\nthrough study, sermons, instructions, etc., so as to be able to act\nprudently when the occasion arises. Privative imprudence is therefore\nreducible to the sin of negligence, although negligence itself, as\nbeing opposed to carefulness (1634), is also against prudence, as we\nshall see.\n\n(c) Contrarily considered, imprudence is the voluntary omission of some\nact or condition demanded by prudence (as when one is so taken up with\namusements that one makes no effort to deliberate on an important\nmatter or deliberates with undue haste), or the voluntary commission of\nan act exclusive of an act or condition of prudence (as when one\nexpressly contemns deliberations or decides to act against the rules of\nprudence). This kind of imprudence is a mortal sin when it leads away\nfrom things necessary for salvation; otherwise it is a venial sin.\n\n1665. Sinfulness of Imprudence.--Is imprudence a general sin, that is,\na sin which is included in every kind of sin?\n\n(a) Imprudence is not included in every kind of sin in the sense that\nit forms a part of the very nature of every kind of sin; for, just as\nprudence has its own special acts (i.e., to direct according to\nreason), distinct from those of other virtues, so has imprudence its\nown special defects that do not belong to other kinds of sin.\n\n(b) Imprudence is included in every kind of sin in the sense that\neveryone who sins acts imprudently in sinning; for, just as one does\nnot act virtuously unless prudence directs one, so one does not act\nsinfully unless there is some defect in the deliberation, or decision,\nor direction given by reason.\n\n1666. It should be noted that, while the defects against deliberation,\ndecision, and direction are so many different kinds of imprudence, they\ndo not form species of sin distinct from the motivating sin if they are\nall directed to one evil purpose. Hence, if a person has deliberated\nbadly, decided badly, and directed badly in the matter of striking a\npriest, he needs to confess but one sin, namely, that of laying\nsacrilegious hands on a cleric.\n\n1667. The Sin of Haste.--The sin of haste or precipitancy passes over\nor hurries over the processes of deliberation that ought to precede\naction; it devotes little or no attention to memory of past\nexperiences, understanding of present conditions, or conjecture of\nfuture possibilities; it does not give to a question the proper amount\nof study or of consultation. It is of two kinds, ordinary and rash.\n\n(a) Ordinary precipitancy results from a strong inclination of the will\nor of the passions, as when a person speaks in anger before he has\nthought of the serious consequences of his words, or marries without\nreflection, or purchases an article the worth of which he does not\nknow, or agrees to something about which he is in the dark, etc. Both\nHoly Writ and popular proverbs strongly condemn this sin.\n\n(b) Rash precipitancy results from contempt of the law, as when one so\ndespises an ordinance as to violate it without the slightest hesitation\nor reflection. This sin pertains to pride as well as to imprudence. In\nvarious censures the word \u201crashness\u201d or \u201ctemerity\u201d is used as here\ngiven, as when excommunication is pronounced against rash violators of\nthe law.\n\n1668. The Sin of Thoughtlessness.--The sin of thoughtlessness or\ninconsideration is a neglect or contempt of the means of arriving at a\nwise decision. It is a failure, therefore, to make use of right\nunderstanding, which looks well at the particular case before it and\nstudies and measures it in the light of first principles.\n\n(a) He is guilty of thoughtlessness, then, who fails to do what he can\nto judge rightly about his duty; nor is he excused if he leaves the\nwhole matter to God, for it is temptation of God to expect that He will\nprovide when man does not do his own part (Prov., iv. 25).\n\n(b) He is not guilty of thoughtlessness who has not the opportunity of\njudging, or who lacks sufficient knowledge, or who is taken unawares;\nnor is he guilty of temptation of God, if in such difficulties he\ncommits all to Providence. Thus, when various nations were gathered\ntogether to fight against Juda, King Josaphat prayed: \u201cAs we know not\nwhat to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee\u201d (II Par., xx. 12). And\nOur Lord promised special help to the disciples for cases of need when\nthey were unable to help themselves (Matt., x. 19).\n\n1669. The Sin of Inconstancy.--The sin of changeableness or inconstancy\nis committed when, owing to anger, jealousy or other inordinate\npassion, the reason repudiates things that had been rightly decided on\nand fails to act on judgments that had been rightly made (Is., xxxvii.\n3). From inconstancy result incontinence (i.e., instability in the face\nof pleasure) and effeminacy (i.e., instability in the face of sadness).\n\n1670. Causes of the Sins of Haste, Thoughtlessness, and\nInconstancy.--(a) Every inordinate desire brings on these sins by\ndiverting the mind from a good to an evil object. Experience shows that\nthe avaricious, the ambitious, the angry, the jealous, etc., do not\nlisten to reason, but act imprudently: \u201cWhere envying and contention\nis, there is inconstancy\u201d (James, iii. 16).\n\n(b) Desire of pleasure, especially of venereal pleasure, is most fatal\nto prudence by extinguishing the judgment of reason. The intellect is\nimmaterial and is occupied with abstract truth, whereas sensual\ndelights are immersed in the material and sensible. Hence, carnal sins\nare more injurious to prudence than spiritual sins. The sensual man not\nmerely does not listen to reason, but he does not even hear it. Venus\nsteals away the reason, said Aristotle, and this truth is well\nexemplified in King Solomon.\n\n1671. The Sin of Negligence.--The sin of negligence is opposed to\ncarefulness or diligence, and consists in the failure of the reason to\ndirect properly an act, or some circumstance of an act, to which one is\nobliged.\n\n(a) Negligence is a general sin in the sense that it has no special\nmatter of its own, such as a passion to be moderated (as is the case\nwith temperance and fortitude) or an action to be regulated (as is the\ncase with justice). The acts of reason should extend to every kind of\nmatter, and hence a person may be negligent (and likewise inconstant,\nthoughtless, hasty) with reference to any kind of action or passion.\n\n(b) It is properly a special sin, as being the opposite of carefulness,\nwhich is a special act of prudence.\n\n1672. Negligence is distinct from the following sins: (a) from laziness\nand lukewarmness, which are defects of the external act, while\nnegligence is a defect of the internal act (see 1326, 1327); (b) from\nsins of omission, which pertain to external acts and are results of\nnegligence, and are opposed to some other virtue than prudence (e.g.,\nnegligence in paying debts is against justice); (c) from inconstancy,\nwhich fails to command an act to which one is bound, as though one were\nimpeded, while negligence fails because there is a want of promptness\nin the will. The inconstant man is easily diverted from his course; the\nnegligent man is slow in getting under way.\n\n1673. The Sinfulness of Negligence.--(a) It is a mortal sin when some\nact or circumstance necessary for salvation is omitted on its account\n(e.g., when a debtor puts off from day to day the payment of a bill,\nand in consequence causes a great injury), or when it proceeds from\ncontempt or preference of the creature to God. (b) It is a venial sin\nwhen the act or circumstance omitted is not necessary for salvation\n(e.g., when a judge causes a slight injustice by reason of his\nprocrastination), or when it proceeds from a want of fervor.\n\n1674. False Prudence.--So far we have considered the sins of\nimprudence; now we shall speak of the sins of false prudence, which\nturn to wrong objects the acts that prudence employs for good, or which\nuse inordinately the care that prudence employs in moderation. Thus,\nthere are several kinds of imitation-prudence.\n\n(a) Prudence is in love with the good of virtue as the end of life; the\nprudence of the flesh is in love with some pleasure or utility, and\nmakes this good the center of attraction for all its acts.\n\n(b) Prudence deliberates and judges about good and lawful means for its\nend; astuteness deliberates and judges how it may make use of evil\nmeans, and it employs trickery and fraud to perform what it decides on.\n\n(c) Prudence is chiefly concerned about the spiritual, but its concern\nis not excessive; solicitude for temporal things or for the morrow is\nmore anxious about the things of this world, or is unduly anxious about\nspiritual things.\n\n1675. The prudence whose end is bad is the sin of those Who counsel,\njudge, and direct well as to the means for securing temporal goods\nwhich they have made the supreme purpose of their lives. This sin is\ngiven the one general name, \u201cprudence of the flesh,\u201d from Rom., viii.\n6, where the aspirations of the flesh are contrasted with the\naspirations of the spirit. But it is also sometimes distinguished\naccording to the different kinds of created things in which false\nprudence puts its desire, or according to the different kinds of\nallurements to such created goods.\n\n(a) Thus, those who aim chiefly at internal goods (i.e., bodily\npleasures, health, etc.) are said to have the prudence of the flesh,\nwhile those who long mostly after externals (such as fine clothes,\njewelry, estates, etc.) are said to have the prudence of this world:\n\u201cThe children of this world are more prudent in their generation than\nthe children of light\u201d (Luke, xvi. 8).\n\n(b) We may also divide prudence about a wrong end into earthly, animal\nand devilish, according to the threefold source of temptation, as was\nexplained above in 1623.\n\n1676. Sinfulness of the Prudence of the Flesh.--(a) If prudence of the\nfiesh be understood in its stricter meaning as designating the\ncondition of those who make the things of this world the be-all and the\nend-all of existence, it is a mortal sin; for it is impossible that one\nshould have two last ends or serve two masters whose interests are\nopposite: \u201cThe wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not\nsubject to the law of God, neither can it be\u201d (Rom., viii. 7).\n\n(b) If prudence of the flesh be taken in a less strict sense as\nsignifying the behavior of those who make God the supreme end of their\nlives, but who in some affair plan shrewdly for a particular end that\ndoes not entirely square with right reason, it is then a venial sin. An\nexample is a host who is very practical in buying supplies and making\nall the arrangements for a banquet at which the guests will conduct\nthemselves with too much hilarity.\n\n(c) If prudence of the flesh be used in a wide or improper sense as\nsignifying the care of the body and other temporal things for the sake\nof a good end, it is not sinful, but virtuous. Thus, a person who is\ncareful about his diet in order that he may conserve his health and be\nenabled to work more efficiently and fruitfully, is virtuously prudent.\nThe use of the term \u201cprudence of the flesh,\u201d for these last two cases\nis inaccurate and misleading.\n\n1677. Astuteness, Trickery and Fraud.--The prudence whose means are bad\nis the sin of those who skillfully plan and carry out wicked ways and\nmethods of securing some desired end, even though it be a good end.\n\n(a) The planning of wicked means through which some design can be\nsuccessfully achieved is the sin of astuteness, and the persons who are\nwell-fitted for such things are known as schemers and plotters. The\ncounsel of the Jews against Christ (Matt., xxvi. 3-5) and the bribery\nof the sepulchre guards (Matt., xxviii. 12-14) are examples of\nastuteness.\n\n(b) The carrying out of astute plans may be done either by violence or\nby stealth; but, as evil loves to hide itself and to pose as good lest\nits success be endangered, schemers usually resort to trickery and\nfraud. Lord Bacon\u2019s essay on \u201cDissimulation\u201d is a good description of\nthe method of worldly policy.\n\n1678. Trickery in general is the secret employment of sinful means with\nthe view to impose on others and thus gain some advantage one has in\nmind. Hence, it has a wide application and includes fraud as well as\nother uses of unlawful means. But trickery may be distinguished from\nfraud as follows:\n\n(a) trickery is the execution of an astute plan by words calculated to\ndeceive or circumvent another person. Words are the chief means of\ncommunication between men, and hence trickery is more usual than fraud.\nExamples of trickery are the artful traps prepared for Our Lord by the\nPharisees when with apparent respect they asked His views about the\ncondemnation of the adulteress (John, viii. 3 sqq.) and the payment of\ntribute (Matt., xxii. 17), their purpose being to obtain evidence that\nHe spoke against the Law;\n\n(b) fraud is the execution of astute plans by means of dishonest\nactions, as when a person cheats by not observing the rules of a game,\nor defrauds by selling inferior goods, or imposes on others by passing\nhimself off as their friend, etc.\n\n1679. Trickery may be used for good as well as evil ends, and thus St.\nPaul disowns the practice of persuading men to embrace the Faith by\nappealing to their prejudices or by toning down the Gospel: \u201cWe\nrenounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness,\nnor adulterating the word of God; but by manifestation of the truth\ncommending ourselves to every man\u2019s consciousness in the sight of God\u201d\n(II Cor., iv. 2).\n\n1680. The gravity of the sins of astuteness, trickery and fraud depends\non the character of the object, end and circumstances. (a) Thus, on\naccount of the object the sin is grave when the means chosen are very\nbad (e.g., serious calumnies), venial when the means are slightly evil\n(e.g., lies about unimportant matters); (b) on account of the end the\nsin is mortal when one intends to perpetrate a serious offense (e.g.,\nclever ruses to get into a house in order to rob it), venial when the\npurpose is not so bad (e.g., cheating at cards in order to win a small\nsum); (c) on account of the circumstances the sin is made mortal by\nsome grave defect or disorder in the act resulting from the condition\nof time, place, person, etc. Thus, there might easily be great scandal\nif a person of authority were known to lie habitually, as it suited his\ninterests.\n\n1681. Solicitude.--Another form of spurious prudence is solicitude,\nthat is, an inordinate carefulness about temporal things or about the\nfuture. Its sinfulness appears from the following considerations.\n\n(a) Our Lord condemns solicitude: \u201cBe not solicitous therefore saying:\n\u2018What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be\nclothed?\u2019 ... Be not solicitous for the morrow, for the morrow will\nbe solicitous for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof\u201d\n(Matt, vi. 31, 34).\n\n(b) Solicitude seeks temporal things without the moderation that reason\nrequires, does not duly esteem the spiritual, and does not confide in\nDivine Providence. Without any human care God bestows upon man the gift\nof life itself, provides for the animals and plants, directs the whole\ninanimate creation, and it is therefore unreasonable to fret and fume\nover the temporal things of one individual as if God were unable or\nunwilling to see to them (Matt, vi. 25 sqq.).\n\n1682. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about Temporalities.--(a) Solicitude\nis sinful on account of the things sought if one makes temporal things\nthe end of life, as when a person follows religion purely as a business\nmatter, for the sake of the living and worldly advantages this secures.\n\n(b) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate desire of\nobtaining some good, when one pursues the temporal with such avidity\nthat the spiritual is made to suffer, as when a person devotes so much\ntime and thought to business, politics, society or science that\nreligion is more and more set aside in his life: \u201cThe cares of this\nworld choked up the word\u201d (Matt., xiii. 22).\n\n(c) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate fear of losing a\ntemporal good, when one is deterred from religion by the thought that\nfidelity to virtue means the sacrifice of the necessaries of life.\nExamples of this immoderate solicitude are persons who never attend\nchurch or contribute to religion, lest they lose time or money, or who\npractise race-suicide to escape the burden of supporting a family.\n\n1683. Cases of Lawful Solicitude.--(a) When the end is a genuine\ntemporal good, moderate solicitude is not only lawful but is a duty\ndictated by prudence. Thus, a man who labors industriously and who\nsaves, spending economically for the support of himself and his\ndependents and the upkeep of his home and business, is prudent in the\ntrue sense of the word, provided he is not too much absorbed in\nmoney-making or too anxious about financial affairs: \u201cWork must be\nattended to, but worry must be banished\u201d (St. Jerome).\n\n(b) When the end is a spiritual one, moderate solicitude is also a\nduty. Thus, St. Paul was solicitous for his Churches (II Cor., xi. 28),\nTimothy for the Philippians (Phil., ii. 20); those who have charge as\nalmoners should be solicitous for the goods given for the poor, etc.\n\n1684. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) Solicitude is\nunlawful on account of the end that is intended, when one makes\ntemporal things one\u2019s god, and is therefore perturbed about the future,\nas when a person has set his heart upon obtaining some honor by fair\nmeans or foul, and is restless and disturbed in mind lest it escape him.\n\n(b) Solicitude is unlawful on account of immoderate desire, when one\nseeks for more than one should, as when a person who has sufficient\nmeans busies himself about too many things and deprives himself of\npeace and health in order to be wealthier in the future.\n\n(c) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the unsuitability of the time,\nwhen one anticipates the season for care, as when a farmer worries\nduring planting season about the harvest, and during harvest time about\nthe next planting. Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves\nwith forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the\nimminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented\n(e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.\n\n1685. Cases of Lawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) When the end is\na lawul temporal good, moderate solicitude about the future is good,\nfor providence for the future is a part of prudence (see 1654).\nScripture praises the ant which gathers its food in the summer against\nthe winter (Prov., vi. 6). Joseph stored up a reserve of grain (Gen.,\nxii. 34 sqq.); Our Lord appointed Judas to act as treasurer for Himself\nand His followers (John, xii. 6); the Apostles kept for future expenses\nofferings made from the sale of fields (Acts, iv. 34, 35). (b) When the\nend is spiritual, reasonable solicitude is also good, and this is seen\nin the conduct of the early Christians who gathered alms in advance\nthat they might have the means to bestow assistance during a famine\nwhich had been predicted (Acts, xi. 27 sqq.).\n\n1686. False Prudence and Avarice.--The sins of false prudence are\ncaused chiefly by avarice. (a) They are sins in which reason plays a\ngreat part, though it is not put to a good use; and hence they do not\nnaturally spring from carnal vices or cowardice, which obscure reason.\nAvarice, on the contrary, reasons much on how it may get and keep; it\nis shrewd, cunning, deliberate, foresighted. (b) They are sins that\nhave recourse to stealth and secrecy, and thus are unlike pride,\nvainglory, and anger, which incline to display and openness. But\navarice puts utility above considerations of glory or revenge, and\nprefers to be without fame or to bear with slights rather than lose\nprofits.\n\n1687. Commandments of Prudence.--Prudence is not expressly commanded in\nthe Decalogue, but there are precepts concerning this virtue in other\nparts of Scripture.\n\n(a) Prudence is not enjoined in the Decalogue, because the ten\ncommandments are concerned with those ends of virtue that are manifest\nto all, whereas prudence is about the means to practise virtue.\n\n(b) Prudence is commanded in many places of Scripture: \u201cGet wisdom and\nwith all thy possession purchase prudence\u201d (Prov., iv. 7); \u201cWalk in the\nways of prudence\u201d (ibid, ix. 6); \u201cPurchase prudence, for it is more\nprecious than silver\u201d (ibid, xvi. 16); \u201cBe ye prudent as serpents\u201d\n(Matt., x, 16); \u201cSpeak the things that become sound doctrine, that the\naged men be sober, chaste, prudent\u201d (Tit., ii. 1, 2); \u201cBe prudent and\nWatch in prayers\u201d (I Peter, iv. 7).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 57-60.)\n\n1688. After prudence follows justice. This virtue regulates human\nactions and renders to others their due, and so it has preeminence over\nfortitude and temperance, which govern the passions and make man\nvirtuous as regards his own acts only and not as regards his neighbor.\nThe logical order, then, is that justice should precede fortitude and\ntemperance.\n\n1689. Nature of Justice.--In God justice is an attribute in virtue of\nwhich He so treats His creatures that they can have no well-founded\ncomplaint against Him: \u201cHis own justice supported Him. He put on\njustice as a breastplate\u201d (Is, lix. 16, 17). In man it is goodness\ntowards God or towards neighbors; and it is called in Scripture by\nvarious names, such as \u201cjustice,\u201d \u201cequity,\u201d \u201ctruth,\u201d \u201crighteousness.\u201d\n\n(a) In a wide sense, justice signifies the general virtue of holiness,\nor the collection of all the virtues, as when Our Lord says: \u201cBlessed\nare they that hunger and thirst after justice (i.e., holiness)\u201d (Matt.,\nv. 6). Holiness, as a supernatural life communicated to the soul, is\nalso called justice or justification: \u201cThe justice of God by faith of\nJesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in Him\u201d (Rom.,\niii. 22).\n\n(b) In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that\nconsists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or\nright: \u201cLove justice, you that are judges of the earth\u201d (Wis., i. 1);\n\u201cIf in every deed you speak justice\u201d (Ps. lvii. 2). In its strict sense\nthe word \u201cjustice\u201d is hereafter used.\n\n1690. Definition of Right.--Right signifies originally that which\nfollows a straight course or does not deviate from the true standard,\nas in the expressions \u201cright ahead,\u201d \u201cto be in the right.\u201d But in moral\nmatters right has the derived meaning of that which is good, proper,\nsuitable; and in general it is of two kinds, objective and subjective,\nthe former being the foundation of the latter.\n\n(a) Objective right is that which is prescribed by law, or it is the\nlaw itself as the rule and standard of what ought to be done,\nespecially in the relations of men towards one another. In this sense\nthere is a twofold right, natural and positive, according as reason\nitself or free will imposes a law (see 286, 296).\n\n(b) Subjective right is that relationship introduced between men by\nreason of the laws governing their conduct one to another, which gives\nto one an authority to exercise certain capabilities (active right,\nright properly so-called), and imposes on another the necessity of\nrespecting that authority (passive right, duty).\n\n1691. Right properly so called is defined as the moral power of doing\nor possessing something.\n\n(a) It is a moral power, that is, a power created by the moral law\ngiving one a true title and forbidding others to interfere with its\nenjoyment and use. It is not a physical power, for might does not make\nright; on the contrary, he who has moral power is sometimes hindered\nfrom exercising it by another who has physical power. Nor is it a mere\nlegal power, or capacity to act validly and within human law, but an\nethical power that enables one to act licitly before God and conscience.\n\n(b) It is a power to do (e.g., to labor) or to have (e.g., to own\nland). The former includes also the moral power to forbear action\n(e.g., to rest on Sunday), to require that another act (e.g., pay what\nhe owes me), or that he forbear action (e.g., keep off my property);\nwhile the latter includes also the power to acquire, to use, to\ntransfer, etc.\n\n1692. Divisions of Right.--(a) By reason of its source, or of the law\nfrom which it springs, a right is either natural (e.g. the right to\nlife, liberty, pursuit of happiness), positive-divine (e.g., the right\nto receive the Sacraments), positive-human (e.g., the right of\nparishioners that Mass be said for them by their pastor, the right of\ncitizens to vote and to be voted for). (b) By reason of its term, or of\nthe power which it confers, a right is strict (legal) or non-strict\n(moral). One has a strict right when something is due one, because it\nis one\u2019s own by a proper and exclusive title (e.g., the right to life\nand property). One has a non-strict right when something is due one,\nonly because it is something common that is to be distributed and one\nis a deserving member of the community (e.g., the right to receive an\nappointment from the government), or because virtue (e.g., the right to\nreceive gratitude for benefits shown) or the perfection of virtue\n(e.g., the right to be treated with liberality or affability or\nfriendship by others) requires it.\n\n1693. Natural rights are subdivided as follows:\n\n(a) in respect of their object, some rights are absolute, as being\nbased on nature alone (e.g., the right of a child to support from its\nparent arises from natural origin); or they are relative, as being\nbased on nature in its relation to concrete and contingent facts (e.g.,\nthe right of an owner to private possession of his land arises from the\nnature of land, which was made to serve man, and from the contingent\nfact that it cannot serve man as a rule without private ownership);\n\n(b) in respect of their source, some rights are innate, that is, they\nare had from birth by the very fact of human nature (e.g., the right of\nlife in the newborn child); others are acquired, that is, obtained in\ncourse of time through some contingent fact. Thus, titles to goods of\nfortune which the owner is the first to possess (original titles) are\nobtained by occupation and accession; titles to goods obtained from\nothers (derivative titles) are obtained through prescription,\ninheritance, contract;\n\n(c) in respect to their firmness, some rights are alienable, that is,\nthey are such as may be renounced or superseded lawfully, since they\nare not obligatory (e.g., the right to marry, the right to drink\nalcohol); while others are inalienable, that is, not subject to\nrenunciation or deprivation, as being obligatory (e.g., the right to\nrepel temptation, the right to serve God).\n\n1694. Signs by which Strict and Non-Strict Rights May Be\nDistinguished.--(a) That to which one has a strict right belongs to one\nas one\u2019s own, and hence it must be determinate or determinable. The\nright of a beggar to receive some assistance from someone is not a\nstrict right, since it cannot be urged against any particular thing or\nany individual person; but the right of a creditor is a strict right,\nsince it can be urged against the debtor for a definite amount.\n\n(b) That to which one has a strict right is owed in justice, and hence\nit may be enforced by legal means, or in case of need by physical\nforce. The right of a child not to be slighted in the distribution of\npresents made by its parents, the right of a person who has had a\nfalling out with another that the latter shall accept advances for a\nreconciliation, and the right of a benefactor that the beneficiaries\nshow signs of gratitude, are not strict rights, because they cannot be\nenforced in courts of justice, but the right of a laborer against his\nemployer is a strict right, since it can be vindicated by legal means.\nIt should be noted that a strict right is one that is granted as a\nproper, exclusive and enforceable power by any law, whether natural or\npositive, and hence the fact that human law will not vindicate a right\n(e.g., the right arising from a contract naturally good, but legally\nnot defensible, the right of a parent to his child\u2019s respect) does not\nprove that the right is not strict.\n\n1695. A strict right to have or to own is either _in re_ or _ad rem_.\n(a) A right _in re_ (real or complete right) is the right to that which\none already lawfully has as one\u2019s own (e.g., the right that Caius has\nto the wages paid him by Balbus). (b) A right _ad rem_ (personal or\ninchoate right) is the right to that which one is entitled to obtain as\none\u2019s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to receive the wages promised\nhim by Balbus).\n\n1696. Legal Enforcement of Strict Rights.--(a) The right _in re_\nauthorizes recourse to a real action (_actio in rem_), that is, to a\nsuit against the thing itself, no matter where it be or by whom it be\nheld, as when one sues to recover one\u2019s property through the ejectment\nof a wrongful possessor; for the thing is immediately and juridically\nbound to him who has the right, as being his own.\n\n(b) The right _ad rem_ enables one to enforce one\u2019s claim by a personal\naction (_actio in personam_), that is, to bring a suit against a\ndefinite person on whom one has a claim by reason of contract, domestic\nrelationship, fiduciary position, etc., as when one sues for recovery\non account of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of a compact.\n\n1697. The right _in re_ to property is either perfect or imperfect.\n\n(a) A perfect right (right of full dominion) is that which enables one\nto exercise all the prerogatives of ownership, that is, to dispose at\nwill of an object (e.g., to sell, lend, give away, etc.), to use it\n(e.g., to occupy a house, to make alterations in it, to tear it down,\netc.), and to exclude others (e.g., to put a fence about one\u2019s property\nto exclude the public).\n\n(b) An imperfect right (right of partial dominion) is had when one is\nrestricted as to the right of the disposition of one\u2019s goods, for\nexample, when one is forbidden to sell; or when one has the right of\ndisposition without the right of use, for example, when one is\nforbidden on account of the vows of religion to use property one owns\n(radical dominion); or when one has the right of use without the right\nof disposition, for example, when one is forbidden to make permanent\nalterations in a house one occupies as tenant (indirect or useful\ndominion); or when one has the other rights of ownership but lacks the\nright of exclusion, for example, when one may not exclude a neighbor\u2019s\nflock from grazing in one\u2019s pasture (ownership subject to servitude).\n\n1698. The Subject of Justice, or the Faculty of the Soul in Which It\nExists.--(a) Justice is not in the intellect, for we are not called\njust because we know a thing rightly, but because we act rightly; (b)\nnor is it in the sensitive appetite, since a sense faculty does not\napprehend the relations between rights and duties; (c) hence, justice\nis in the rational appetite or will.\n\n1699. The Objects or Subject-Matter of Justice.--(a) The material\nobject of justice (i.e., all those things with which it deals) is\nremotely the external things which are the objects of exchange and\ndistribution among men, and proximately the actions by which they are\nexchanged or distributed.\n\n(b) The formal object of justice (i.e., that which it principally\nintends in dealing with its material object) is that the rights of\nothers, or their inviolable moral power of doing, having or acquiring,\nmay be respected. Justice thus differs from charity. For charity is\nowed also to self, justice only to the neighbor; charity considers the\nneighbor as he is one with self and gives him what belongs to self,\nwhile justice considers the neighbor as he is distinct from self and\ngives him what belongs to him.\n\n1700. Since justice is shown not to self but to another, it is not so\nfully-realized when two persons are in some sense one.\n\n(a) Parent and child are especially one, since the child is from the\nparent and a part of the parent, and hence the natural obligations that\nspring from their special relationship pertain to the virtue of filial\nand paternal piety, which is not strictly justice, but obliges more\nstrictly on account of the greater rights involved. But obligations\nthat spring from relationships that are common (e.g., from a contract\nbetween a father and his son) pertain to strict justice; for in these\nrelationships they treat with one another, not as father and son, but\nas man and man. Employer and employee may also be considered as one,\ninasmuch as the latter is the agent or instrument of the former, and\nthe same conclusions may therefore be applied to them.\n\n(b) Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and\nthan master and servant, for neither is descended from the other, and\nneither is servant to the other. But since they form one conjugal\nsociety and the husband is head of the wife, they owe one another\nstricter obligations than if they were strangers to one another,\nalthough those obligations partake less rigorously of the character of\njustice.\n\n1701. Division of Justice.--Justice is divided according to the rights\nit respects into legal and particular. (a) Legal justice (observance of\nlaw) is that which is owed by the individual, whether he be ruler or\nsubordinate, to the community of which he forms a part, or to the law\nand the common good of the entire body. (b) Particular justice\n(fairness) is that which is owed to the private good of an individual.\n\n1702. Is legal justice a distinct and separate virtue, or only a\ngeneral condition found in all virtues?\n\n(a) Practically speaking, legal justice is a general virtue, inasmuch\nas its desire of promoting the common good will impel a man to observe\nall the laws and to practise other virtues than justice, such as\nfortitude and temperance. The law commands us to perform the actions of\nthe courageous man, of the temperate man, of the gentle man, and hence,\nas Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), legal justice is often\nregarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all virtue, more\nglorious than the star of eve or dawn.\n\n(b) Essentially, it is a distinct virtue, for it alone moves a man\nprimarily and directly to respect the rights of the common good as\nbeing that greater whole of which the individual is but a part. It\ndiffers even from patriotism and filial piety (for these are moved by\none\u2019s own debt to the source of one\u2019s life) and from obedience (for\nlegal justice seeks the welfare of the community even in things that\nare not commanded).\n\n1703. Comparison of Legal and Particular Justice.--(a) Particular\njustice partakes more of the nature of justice, for there is a greater\ndistinction or separation between the party who has an obligation and\nthe party who has a right, when the latter is an individual, than when\nthe latter is a whole of which the former is a part. A distinctive\ncharacteristic of justice, as said just above, is that it takes account\nof the independence or \u201cotherness\u201d of those between whom it exists, so\nmuch so that only in a metaphorical sense can we speak of justice when\nonly one person and nature is in question (e.g., justice between man\nand his soul, body, powers).\n\n(b) Legal justice is a more perfect virtue than particular justice or\nfilial piety, since it seeks a higher object (that is, the common good\nas such) and is more voluntary.\n\n1704. Is the right which the community has to receive from the goods of\nits members one of legal or one of particular justice?\n\n(a) The right of eminent domain (i.e., the right which the State has\nover the goods of private persons when they are necessary for the\ncommon good) is a right of legal justice, for even without compulsion\nthe citizen should be willing to contribute what is necessary for the\ncommunity of which he is part.\n\n(b) The right of the members of a government to receive compensation\nfor their services is a right of particular justice, for there is an\nimplicit contract between the rulers and the State that the former will\nserve the interests of the latter and that the later will pay the\nexpenses of the former, as if both parties were private individuals\n(see 1708).\n\n1705. Distributive and Commutative Justice.--On account of the\ninequality or equality of the individuals between whom it exists,\nparticular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative,\nwhich are distinct species of justice.\n\n(a) That the distinction is well-founded is proved by the fact that\nthis justice--that is, relations towards particular persons--is either\nthe relation of whole to part or of part to part. The former relations\nare governed by distributive justice, which is defined as the virtue\nthat inclines the ruler, as the representative of the community, to\nportion out the public goods (e.g., money, honors, offices) and burdens\n(e.g., taxes), not according to favoritism or personal likes, but\naccording to merits and abilities; the latter relations are governed by\ncommutative justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the\nindividual to pay to other individuals what is their due, whether the\nrights be personal (e.g., the right to reputation) or real (e.g., the\nright to wages or price). Commutative justice receives its name from\nthe fact that it is oftenest called for in commutations (i.e., in\nexchanges, such as buying and selling).\n\n(b) That the distinction of particular justice into distributive and\ncommutative is specific appears from the fact that the main\ncharacteristics of justice (viz., debt owed another and equality\nbetween payment and debt) are found in each of these kinds of justice\nin a way proper to itself. There is a debt in commutative justice when\na thing is owed another because he has an individual right to it and it\nis already under his dominion; there is a debt of distributive justice,\nwhen a thing is owed another because he has a community interest in it\nand a right that it be entrusted to him in view of his merits or\nabilities.\n\n1706. Thus, the equality observed in commutative justice is\narithmetical, or of quantity (e.g., if a horse is worth $100, it is\njust to pay $100 for it); the equality observed in distributive justice\nis geometrical, or of proportion (e.g., if one who had an average of\n90% in a civil service examination receives a position that pays $90,\nit is just to give another whose average was 80% a position that pays\n$80). An indication of the specific difference between distributive and\ncommutative justice is that the same individual may be just in private\nmatters and unjust in public matters. Example: Titus, an office-holder,\npays his personal debts faithfully, but he appoints only his friends,\nwhether they be worthy or unworthy, to important honors.\n\n1707. Corrective Justice.--Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive)\njustice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a\nruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties\nadequate to their faults. It is not to be confused with just vengeance\nor retaliation, which is the virtue that moderates in a private person\nthe desire for punishment of an offense against self, and which is not\njustice strictly speaking, either commutative or distributive, but only\na potential part of justice (as stated below in Article 6).\n\n(a) Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice, for a\npunishment is inflicted by a judge in order that there may be equality\nbetween the satisfaction made by the evil-doer and the debt owed to\nanother on account of the offense. It aims at redressing an unfairness\nby taking away so much from the offender and adding so much to the\nparty offended, that both will stand in the same position as before. If\nthe person punished accepts the penalty in the same spirit, he also\npractises commutative justice.\n\n(b) Corrective justice may be commanded by legal justice, for the judge\nmay intend the punishment for the sake of the common good, as well as\nof the individual who has been injured.\n\n1708. Different Species of Justice in One Act.--Different species of\njustice may be present in one and the same act. (a) The same act may be\nelicited by one kind of justice and commanded by another kind of\njustice (see 56 sqq.), as in the examples given just above of\nvindicative justice. (b) The same act may be elicited by two kinds of\njustice, as when a debt is owed both in virtue of commutative and of\ndistributive justice. Some think an example of this is found in the\npayment of government employees, for payment is made by distribution\nfrom common funds (distributive justice), and it is owed for services\ncontracted for (commutative justice). But it seems more correct to say\nthat wages for services given the community are due in commutative\njustice rather than in distributive justice; for in the former justice\nequality is between what is given and what is received, in the latter\nbetween the proportion received by one and the proportion received by\nanother, and government salaries should be paid on the basis of value\nreceived in service (see 1704, 1755, 1767).\n\n1709. The Object of Justice.--The function of a moral virtue is to\ndirect according to moderation all those things that are subject to the\nfree will of man, and can be regulated by reason, namely, the actions\nof man and the external things of which he makes use.\n\n(a) The actions of man can be understood either in a wide sense, so as\nto include both those internal affections that are accompanied by\nnotable bodily changes (the passions, such as anger, sadness), and\nthose actions that do not so strongly act upon the body (operations).\nEvery virtue has for its object action in the wide sense, for virtue is\ndefined as a habit that makes the agent good and his action good; but\nnot every virtue has action in the strict sense for its object, since\nthe virtues of fortitude and temperance regulate, not the operations,\nbut the passions.\n\n(b) Operations are of two kinds, namely, internal, by which men do not\ncommunicate with one another (such as thoughts and desires), and\nexternal, by which men communicate with one another. These latter\neither have to do with external things (such as land, houses, money,\nproduce, etc.), and we then have such operations as loan, sale, lease\nand other contracts, or no external thing is introduced, and we have\nsuch operations as honor, praise, calumny, etc. All the moral virtues\nhave to do with the internal operation of choice, for virtue is a good\nelection of the will; but there is this difference between justice and\nthe other moral virtues, that fortitude and temperance merely dispose\nthe intellectual appetite for a good choice by the regulation they give\nto the sensitive appetite, while justice has for its proper act to\nchoose well the means for moderating external operations. As for\nexternal operations themselves, these are the objects of justice, but\nnot of the other two moral virtues.\n\n1710. The purpose of the other moral virtues is to regulate man in\nhimself; for the passions that are moderated by fortitude and\ntemperance (such as fear and desire) affect primarily their subject and\nnot other persons. The purpose of justice, on the contrary, is to\nregulate man in his relations to others; for external operations and\nthings directly affect others, either helping or injuring them, But\nboth the passions and external operations have effects and consequent\nends that give them new relationships, and hence we may distinguish\nbetween the primary object to which a virtue tends directly, and the\nsecondary object to which it tends only indirectly on account of the\neffects of the primary object.\n\n(a) The primary object of justice is external operations and external\nthings; the primary object of fortitude and temperance is the passions,\nfor justice seeks the good of others, whereas fortitude and temperance\nseek the good of the agent.\n\n(b) The secondary object of justice is the passions, whenever its\nprincipal object cannot be easily regulated without regulation of the\npassions. Thus, when lust urges to the injustice of adultery or avarice\nto the injustice of denial of payment due, justice calls on the virtue\nof temperance or liberality, as the case may be, to moderate the\npassion opposed to it. Similarly, the secondary object of fortitude and\ntemperance may be external operations, whenever the effect on the\nsubject of the principal object (i.e., the passions) has reactions in\nreference to other persons. Thus, if fear is moderated by fortitude and\ndesire by temperance, these virtues have external consequences such as\ncombat against evil, abstinence from food or drink that belongs to\nothers; but if anger is immoderate, it may lead to unjust attack, and\nif desire is immoderate, it may lead to the injustice of theft of food\nor drink.\n\n1711. The Golden Mean of Virtue.--The golden mean of virtue is not the\nsame in all the moral virtues (see 154).\n\n(a) Thus, fortitude and temperance regulate the passions for the\nbenefit of their subject, that he may avoid in them the extremes of\nexcess and defect. Hence, the middle way they follow must be determined\nby reason from a consideration of the subject and his circumstances\n(the mean of reason), and so will vary with different subjects and with\nindividual cases. Thus, in the matter of temperance it is an old saying\nthat what is one man\u2019s meat is another man\u2019s poison. It would be absurd\nto say, therefore, that there is only one middle way of temperance, and\nthat all persons must conform to the same rule as to quality and\nquantity of food and the time and manner of eating and drinking. On the\ncontrary, the rule here must suit the subject, and that will be\nmoderate which agrees with the health, appetite, duties, manner of\nlife, etc., of the person.\n\n(b) Justice, on the contrary, regulates external operations for the\nbenefit, not of the subject, but of other persons whom they affect, in\norder that the subject in dealing with others may avoid inequality,\nwhich means excess on one side and defect on the other side. Hence, the\nmiddle way of justice is discovered by reason from a consideration of\nexternal things or acts owed to other persons (the mean of reason and\nof the thing), and so it does not vary with the circumstances of the\nsubject. If the real value of a horse is $100--it makes no difference\nwhether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich\nor poor--the just payment will be $100. Excess will be unfair to the\nbuyer, deficiency to the seller.\n\n1712. Though the mean of justice is determined, not by reference to the\nperson who acts, but by reference to some external thing, it may be\nthat this external thing cannot be evaluated without consideration of\nthe person to whom justice is owed.\n\n(a) In distributive justice this is always the case, for the mean of\nthe thing in distributions consists in equality between relative\nproportions of distributions and relative merits or abilities of\npersons to whom distributions are made. Hence, distributive justice\nmust consider the conditions of the person to whom it is owed as\ncompared with the conditions of other persons, in order to observe\nequality by giving proper shares to all.\n\n(b) In commutative justice, this is sometimes the case, namely, when\nthe condition of a person who has been offended (e.g., that he is a\nruler) increases the debt of satisfaction that is owed him; for the\nmean of the thing in commutative justice is equality between the\npayment and the debt.\n\n1713. Is observance of the mean of the thing sufficient to make an act\njust, no matter what may be the dispositions of the subject?\n\n(a) If there is question of material justice, the reply is in the\naffirmative, for a virtue is said to be exercised materially when its\nmean is observed. The mean of fortitude and temperance cannot be\nobserved without reference to the condition of the subject (e.g., he is\nnot brave who undertakes a difficult task that is beyond his strength);\nbut the same is not true of justice (e.g., he is just who pays the last\npenny of a debt though the payment was beyond his means and required a\nsacrifice).\n\n(b) If there is question of formal justice, the reply is in the\nnegative, for a virtue is said to be exercised formally (i.e., from a\nvirtuous habit) when the motive of the subject and the circumstances\nare agreeable to reason. Thus, he who performs deeds of valor purely\nout of vainglory exercises fortitude materially, not formally; and\nlikewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the\npenalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally.\n\n1714. Comparison of Justice and the Other Virtues.--The differences\nbetween particular justice and the other moral virtues are, therefore,\nthe following:\n\n(a) justice is for the good of another, the other virtues for the good\nof the agent himself;\n\n(b) justice deals with external actions and things, the others with the\npassions;\n\n(c) justice follows a mean of the thing, the others a mean of reason;\n\n(d) justice is had materially without any suitability to the\ncircumstances of the agent, not so the other virtues.\n\n1715. While justice is inferior to the theological and intellectual\nvirtues (see 156, 157, 1028), it is superior to most of the moral\nvirtues that perfect the sensitive or the intellectual appetite. The\nsuperiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed\nvirtues, such as mercy (see 1207), is seen from the following reasons.\n\n(a) Legal justice is greater than those other virtues, for, while they\npursue the private good of their subject, it seeks the public good.\n\u201cGreat is the splendor of justice,\u201d says St. Ambrose (_De Officiis_,\nlib. I, cap. 28), \u201cwhich is born for others rather than for itself, and\nwhich aids society and the community. It holds high position, that all\nmay be subject to its judgment, that it may bestow assistance, not\nrefuse responsibility, take upon itself the dangers of others.\u201d\nMoreover, since the law commands us to perform the actions of the\ncourageous man, of the gentle man and of the temperate man, legal\njustice, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), is often\nregarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all the virtues, more\nglorious than the star of eve or dawn.\n\n(b) Private justice is also greater than those other virtues, since it\nperfects a nobler power of the soul (viz., the will), and seeks the\ngood, not only of its own possessor, but also of others. Justice too is\nimpartial or blind as between persons, demanding satisfaction, even\nthough a debtor be a monarch, and granting redress, even though an\ninjured party be the humblest or most undeserving of mankind. An\nindication that justice is nobler than regulation of the passions is\nseen by Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 4) in the fact that it is\nmore difficult and rarer: \u201cMany people are capable of exhibiting virtue\nat home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbor.\nAccordingly, there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias, that\n\u2018office will reveal a man,\u2019 for one who is in office is at once brought\ninto relation and association with others. As then the worst of men is\nhe who exhibits his depravity both in his own life and in relation to\nhis friends, the best of men is he who exhibits his virtue, not in his\nown life only, but in relation to others; for this is a difficult task.\u201d\n\n1716. Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent\nthan justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is\nnobler than they.\n\n(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to\nthe common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more\nuseful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war,\nit is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and\npromotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.\n\n(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more\nthan is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other\nhand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity\nliberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few,\nwhile justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all;\njustice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be\nliberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless\nhe first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives\nmore than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice\nwithout liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than\nliberality without justice.\n\n1717. Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more\nimportant than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.\n\n(a) The virtue of religion has a nobler object, since it regulates the\nworship owed to God, while justice regulates the things owed to man;\nand its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.\n\n(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to\nrelieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater\nthan justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an\nindividual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due\nto another.\n\n1718. Virtues may be compared, not only from the viewpoint of the\nobjective excellence which they have from their own natures (whereby\nthey are unequal and rank according to the greatness of their objects),\nbut also from the viewpoint of the subjective participation of them in\nthe souls of their possessors.\n\n(a) In a certain sense, all the virtues are equal in their possessor,\nsince all of them alike are related to charity as their perfection (see\n1118), and all of them increase or diminish in like proportions with\nthe growth or decline of grace, which is their root (see 745).\n\n(b) In a certain sense, too, the rank of the virtues may depart from\nthe order of the dignity of their objects. For the facility and\npromptitude of exercise of an infused virtue does not depend formally\non the infused virtue itself, but on subjective conditions, such as\nnatural inclination or custom, or on a special gift of God (see 135,\n136); and hence it may happen that a saint shows greater excellence and\nenjoys greater renown in an inferior than in a superior virtue. Thus,\nAbraham was singular in faith, Moses in meekness, Josue in bravery,\nDavid in fervor and devotion (Ecclus., xlv-xlviii), and St. Joseph is\npraised as \u201ca just man\u201d (Matt., i. 19).\n\n1719. Injustice.--Just as the word \u201cjustice\u201d is taken in a wide sense\nfor holiness or the collection of all the virtues, and in a strict\nsense for a special cardinal virtue, so likewise the word \u201cinjustice\u201d\nis taken widely as a synonym for any transgression, iniquity, or sin\n(\u201cHe sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust,\u201d Matt., v. 45), but\nstrictly for violation of the special virtue of justice (\u201cHear what the\nunjust judge saith,\u201d Luke, xviii. 6). It is of this latter injustice\nthat we now speak.\n\n1720. Species of Injustice.--Injustice is of two kinds. (a) Legal\ninjustice is a special vice that moves one to despise the common good\nor to act against it intentionally. Thus, if one steals or overeats\nmerely to gratify a passion for money or for food, there is a certain\ncondition of legal injustice, inasmuch as one violates a law; but if\none does these things also or solely to injure the common good, there\nis a special sin of legal injustice, to be declared in confession. (b)\nParticular injustice is a special vice against the private good of\nothers that moves one to seek for more than is one\u2019s share, or to\ndesire more of the benefits and less of the burdens than equality\nappoints. Examples: To sell above the just price or buy below the just\nprice (commutative injustice); to show favoritism in the distribution\nof public offices or burdens, as when a person in authority showers\npublic benefits on his unworthy relatives or friends, and overburdens\nwith taxes those who are not his friends (distributive injustice).\n\n1721. The Theological Species of Legal and Particular Injustice.--(a)\nFrom its nature injustice is a mortal sin, for it is an attack on a\nvery great good, namely, the peace and security of society; the very\nfoundations of orderly community life are shaken when injustice is done\neither to common or to private rights. Moreover, acts of injustice\n(unlike sins of mere passion), if the matter is serious, offend against\ncharity, the life of the soul; for charity \u201cenvieth not, dealeth not\nperversely\u201d (I Cor., xiii. 4); while injustice injures the neighbor and\nleads to hatred, quarrels, and separations. Hence, the Apostle says of\ninjustice: \u201cDo not err: neither adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous,\nnor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God\u201d (I Cor., vi. 10);\nand Our Lord, speaking of justice, says: \u201cIf you would enter into life,\nkeep the commandments\u201d (Matt, xix. 18).\n\n(b) From want of sufficient advertence in the subject (see 173 sqq.),\nor from smallness of matter in the object (see 172), a sin of injustice\nmay be only venial. Thus, if one takes money that belongs to another on\naccount of vincible ignorance due to slight negligence, or if one takes\nonly a small amount that does no serious injury, the injustice is\nvenial.\n\n1722. Rule for Determining the Gravity of Sins of Injustice.--The rule\nfor judging whether the matter of a sin of injustice is great or small,\nis the quantity of injury it inflicts, or the degree of reasonable\nunwillingness of the offended person to suffer the injustice; for sins\nagainst the neighbor are culpable precisely on account of and in\nproportion to the harm they do to others. Hence, since every injustice\noffends either the public or private good, or both, the following acts\nof injustice are gravely sinful:\n\n(a) mortal sin is committed when injury is done to a private right in a\nmatter of such great moment that the person offended is reasonably and\ngravely unwilling to sanction the injustice (e.g., cases of calumny,\nadultery, incendiarism). But if the injury itself is small and the\nparty offended is nevertheless gravely unwilling to suffer it, only\nvenial sin is committed against justice, but there may be a mortal sin\ndone against charity, as when one steals a worthless trinket, knowing\nthat the owner is so unreasonably attached to it that the loss will\nalmost break his heart or will provoke in him violent anger, profanity,\netc.;\n\n(b) mortal sin is also committed when injury is done to a public right\nin a matter so important that the community is with good reason gravely\naverse to the commission of the injury. This happens when the common\ngood is directly attacked, as when a citizen rebels against lawful\ngovernment, or when the peace and security of the community is\nimperilled because of injury done to a private person, as when one\nsteals a sum that is considerable from a wealthy person, even though\nthe latter will not seriously feel the loss. Hence, an injury to a\nprivate person that does not seriously harm him may seriously harm the\ncommunity, and be gravely sinful on account of the disastrous\nconsequences to social order that would follow if such an injury were\nnot gravely forbidden.\n\n1723. Moral Species of Legal and of Particular Injustice.--These are\ndistinguished according to the main classes of objects or rights that\nare injured or offended (see 199). Hence, there are the following four\nkinds of injustice:\n\n(a) injuries to spiritual rights or goods, whether natural or\nsupernatural (e.g., superstition, idolatry, simony);\n\n(b) injuries to internal goods of soul (e.g., lies) or of body (e.g.,\nmurder, mutilation);\n\n(c) injuries to external goods, whether incorporeal (e.g., calumny) or\ncorporeal (e.g., theft, fraud).\n\n1724. Accidental Forms of Injustice.--There are also many accidental\nforms of injustice, that is, variations that do not of themselves\nchange the moral species (see 200).\n\n(a) Thus, as to its manner, injustice is done either positively, by\naction (e.g., by stealing from an employer), or negatively, by omission\n(e.g., by allowing another to steal from one\u2019s employer). In both cases\nthe same kind of injustice is committed; for example, he who permits\ntheft is just as much a thief as if he had stolen himself.\n\n(b) As to its consequences for the injured person, injustice is either\nmerely injurious or injurious and damaging, according as a strict right\nis violated without loss (e.g., adultery from which no child is born),\nor with loss to the injured party (e.g., adultery from which a child is\nborn). The character of the sin is the same in both cases, but in the\nlatter case restitution is due (cfr. 1199, 1200). The loss (_damnum_)\nthat results from violation of a strict right (_injuria_) may be in\ninternal goods (such as salvation, life, health, sanity of mind) or in\nexternal goods (such as reputation, money, property).\n\n(c) As to its consequences for the party who does the injury, injustice\nis either profitable to him (as in the case of unjust taking) or\nunprofitable (as in the case of unjust damage). The moral species is\nthe same in either case, for the fact that the unjust person gains by\nhis injustice does not make the injury greater, and the fact that he\ndoes not gain does not make the injury less.\n\n1725. Injury is not suffered by one who knows and wills an act that is\ndone contrary to his right (Rule 27 of the Decretals), for such a one\ncedes his right. Hence, if a man looks out with a smile while\nneighborhood boys take apples from his orchard and the latter take this\nas permission, no injustice, material or formal, is done. But the legal\nmaxim needs interpretation, for the following two conditions are\nnecessary in order that there be a surrender of right:\n\n(a) the party who consents must be able to surrender his right, since,\nif he is not able to do so, his cession is invalid. Hence, one who\nkills a person asking for death is unjust to God and to the State; one\nwho commits adultery with a woman whose husband gives permission is\nunjust to the marriage state and the lawful children; one who strikes a\ncleric who waived his privilege of canon (_privilegium canonis_) is\nunjust to the clerical state; one who takes property from a ward with\nthe latter\u2019s consent, is unjust to the estate, since the ward has no\nauthority to alienate it. Many of the martyrs, it is true, wished to\nlose their lives at the hands of persecutors, but this meant only that\nthey consented to the will of God, not that they consented to their own\nmurder by the tyrants, for they had not the right to give the latter\ndominion over their lives;\n\n(b) the party who consents must really will to yield his right, and\nhence, if there is error, fraud, fear or violence, the cession is of no\neffect. Thus, a buyer who through ignorance takes a defective article\nor pays an exorbitant price, a workman who through necessity accepts\nless than a living wage, or a man who yields his purse to a burglar at\nthe point of the revolver, does not surrender his rights, since true\nconsent is wanting. Similarly, when one follows the counsel of Christ\nnot to resist spoliation (Matt., v. 40) or when a saintly person\nrejoices over injury done him (Heb., x. 34), the intention is not to\nsurrender rights to the unjust, nor to approve their conduct, but to\npractise heroic virtue by patience, humility, forgiveness, etc.\n\n1726. Internal Injustice.--Does internal injustice (i.e., the intention\nof injuring another) make an external action unjust?\n\n(a) If the intention makes the external act to be a violation of a\nstrict right, it also makes the external act unjust. Thus, to take a\nbook from another\u2019s room is of itself an indifferent action, for there\nmay be, no violation of right (e.g., when the intention is to borrow),\nor there may be such violation (e.g., when the intention is to steal).\n\n(b) If the intention does not make the external act a violation of\nstrict right, even though that act be harmful to the other party, it\ndoes not make the external act unjust. Hence, if the other party has no\nstrict right against the external act (e.g., Titus sees the house of\nBalbus on fire, but he is not hired to take care of Balbus\u2019 property,\nand he gives no alarm in order that the house may burn down) or if the\nagent has a strict right to perform the external act (e.g., Claudius, a\njudge, condemns Sempronius, according to law, but his chief intention\nis the harm he will inflict on the latter), the unjust intention does\nnot make the external act unjust. But in these cases sin, and even\ngrave sin, is committed against charity.\n\n1727. Judgment.--Judgment, or the right determination of what is just\nand due to others, is the proper act of the virtue of justice, and\nhence Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 7) declares that people take\ntheir disputes to a judge as to justice personified. Judgment is either\npublic or private. (a) Public judgment is passed by a judge who has the\nauthority to compel disputing parties to abide by his decisions. (b)\nPrivate judgment is passed by individuals without public authority\nconcerning the morals or conduct of others.\n\n1728. Since judgment is an act of virtue, it is lawful, and we find\nthat both in the Old and the New Testament men have been appointed with\nauthority to judge others. Thus, God ordered that judges be chosen in\nall the cities of Israel (Deut., xvi. 18); St. Paul declares that the\njudge is the minister of God (Rom., xiii. 4), and from Apostolic times\ntribunals have been set up in the Church. But certain conditions are\nrequired for moral goodness, both in those who ask for judgment and in\nthose who pass judgment.\n\n(a) Thus, those who seek judgment must be actuated by proper motives\nand must conduct themselves in a virtuous manner. Our Lord in Matt., v,\nteaches that it is better to suffer temporal loss rather than to\ncontend in judgment from a motive of revenge to the prejudice of one\u2019s\nspiritual good, and St. Paul condemns the Corinthians because they gave\nscandal by reason of their lawsuits before heathen tribunals and had\nrecourse to frauds and injuries in their litigation (I Cor., vi. 1\nsqq.).\n\n(b) Those who pass judgment must have a good intention, must proceed\naccording to law, and must decide according to prudence. If the first\ncondition is wanting, judgment is unjust or otherwise sinful, according\nas the judge chooses against the right or is merely prompted by some\nhuman motive (such as hatred, anger, vainglory, avarice); if the second\ncondition is lacking, judgment, if public, is usurped or illegal, if\nthe third condition is not had, judgment is rash. But it should be\nnoted that the Church has condemned the teaching of Wicliff that office\nand authority are forfeited by sinners (Denzinger, 595, 597).\n\n1729. First Condition of Righteous Judgment.--The first condition of\nrighteous judgment is that the purpose of the judge be just and\nsincere. But is it possible for judgment to be righteous if the judge\nis a bad man--that is, if he is in the state of mortal sin?\n\n(a) If the sin of the judge is public, and judgment is given against a\nsin of the same character (e.g., if a notorious thief passes sentence\non another thief), serious scandal is given; for justice is discredited\nand an occasion offered for criticism of authority and for lawlessness.\nBut if the sin is not of the same character as the one condemned (e.g.,\nif a notorious thief passes sentence on a murderer), the scandal is not\ngrave in so far as justice is concerned.\n\n(b) If the sin is not public, it is clear that no scandal is given; and\nif the judge is moved by the duty of his office and by zeal for justice\nto condemn even the same kind of sin of which he himself is guilty, he\ncommits no sin whatsoever in so doing (cfr. 1280). But he is guilty of\nhypocrisy if he uses the opportunity to pretend a personal\nrighteousness which he does not possess. It is this that Our Lord\nreprobated in the Pharisees, who, although guilty of many and grave\ncrimes, wished to put to death an adulteress in order that they\nthemselves might thus shine as immaculate. The words, \u201cLet him that is\nwithout sin among you cast the first stone\u201d (John, viii. 7), condemn\nhypocrisy in judges, though they do not require that a judge be free\nfrom all sin. But though sinners may act against sin as lawmakers,\nprosecutors, judges, jurymen, police, etc., they should be admonished\nby their office to reform themselves according to the words of St.\nPaul: \u201cIn judging another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the\nsame things which thou judgest\u201d (Rom., ii. 1).\n\n1730. Second Condition.-The second condition of righteous judgment is\nlegality, if there is question of judgment in court.\n\n(a) Thus, the judge must have public authority, for, just as laws\ncannot be made except by public authority, neither can they be\ninterpreted except by the same authority (Rom., xiv. 4). Hence,\nproceedings that are not held in the proper place, at the proper time,\nor in the manner prescribed by law are void, and the same is true if a\ncourt has not jurisdiction over the parties or over the subject-matter\nin controversy.\n\n(b) The judge must administer justice according to the law and the\nusual method observed in courts, since his office is to interpret, not\nto make law or custom (_jus dicere, non facere_). His opinions as\nprecedents may affect the development and growth of law, and hence he\nis especially bound to be faithful to general principles that are\nbinding on him. If a statute in its operation is found to impede the\njust disposition of controversies, judges perform a public service by\nindicating this to those who have authority to regulate procedure. If\nthe application of a law would work injustice, no judge can in\nconscience pronounce sentence according to that law; but there are many\ncases recognized in jurisprudence in which courts of equity afford\nrelief to rights that cannot be defended or protected in courts of law,\nand in cases of this kind the judge should be guided by recognized\nprinciples of natural justice and the rules of his court.\n\n1731. Third Condition.--The third condition of righteous judgment is\nthat the sentence or decision be prudent or well-founded. Thus, in a\njudicial process the facts of a case must be examined and the rules of\nevidence be observed in judging the meaning of the facts. Since rash\njudgment is a sin committed, not only externally and in public, but\nalso and especially internally and in private conclusions formed about\nthe character or deeds of others, and since it is one of the commonest\nof sins, it will be well to explain its nature somewhat fully.\n\n(a) It is an internal sin, and so it differs from external acts against\nthe neighbor; but calumny, detraction, and unjust sentence are its\noutward expressions.\n\n(b) Rash judgment is an internal sin of decision in which something is\naffirmed or denied mentally about a neighbor, and so it differs from a\nmere representation or thought. This distinction is important for\nscrupulous persons who think that mere suggestions against others that\nflash through their minds are rash judgments. These suggestions are a\nvery common temptation, and, if repelled, are an occasion of merit;\nthey become sinful only when entertained with pleasure.\n\n(c) Rash judgment is a decision unfavorable to another in matters of\ncharacter or honor. Thus, it differs from favorable decisions (as when\nwithout reason one holds that another is virtuous or has extraordinary\nmerit), and from unfavorable decisions on matters other than character\nor honor (as when one concludes that a neighbor is mentally or\nphysically deficient, and these defects are not connected with\ndepravity nor considered as ignominious), and from unfavorable\ndecisions that relate to sin but are not personal (as when one thinks\nthat an expression used by an ignorant man is blasphemous, but passes\nno judgment on the state of conscience of the man).\n\n(d) Rash judgment is a decision that expresses conviction, and not mere\nsupposition. Thus, it differs from the prudential attitude by which one\nassumes for the sake of security that a stranger is to be distrusted,\nsince he may be dishonest.\n\n(e) Rash judgment is a certain conviction or judgment, that is, one\nwhich holds its own view as true and certain and does not consider the\nopposite of its view as worthy of consideration. Thus, it differs from\ndoubt (that is, a state in which the mind is suspended between the\nunfavorable view and its opposite, and does not incline to one more\nthan the other), from suspicion (that is, a state in which the mind\ninclines to the unfavorable view, but does not assent to it as being\neither probable or certain), and from opinion (that is, a state in\nwhich the mind assents to the unfavorable view as being probably true,\nbut admits that it may be untrue). These various forms of mental\nreaction were treated in 654 sqq.\n\n(f) Rash judgment is rash, that is, a belief based on insufficient\nauthority, or an inference that is really groundless or not well drawn\nfrom premises. Thus, if one judges that one\u2019s neighbor is a thief,\nbecause this was told one by an honest and well-informed person, the\njudgment is prudent; but, if one judges this on the word of a person\nwho is unreliable or who has no knowledge of the facts, the judgment is\nimprudent. Again, if one judges that it is certain that one\u2019s neighbor\nis a thief, because one has evidence that removes all doubt, the\njudgment is prudent; but if the evidence is merely probable, an opinion\nbased on it is prudent, but a judgment based on it is imprudent. It is\nnot rash to hold that the majority of mankind are lost, or that the\npresent generation is not as good as the generation that preceded, if\none has good reasons for such beliefs; but a sweeping and all-inclusive\npessimism in such matters is unwarranted.\n\n1732. The reasons for a judgment may be sufficient for something else,\nbut insufficient for the judgment actually formed.\n\n(a) Thus, they may be reasons sufficient for judging that one kind or\ndegree of sin has been committed, but insufficient as regards another\nkind or degree of sin. For example, if one breaks the lock of another\u2019s\ndesk, there is an argument for willful trespass, but this alone does\nnot prove larceny or the intent to steal.\n\n(b) They may be sufficient for doubt and insufficient for suspicion,\nsufficient for suspicion and insufficient for opinion, or sufficient\nfor opinion and insufficient for judgment.\n\n1733. Rash Judgment.--Opinion, suspicion, and doubt are also rash, if\nthere is no sufficient reason to warrant them.\n\n(a) Thus, if there are no probable reasons for an unfavorable opinion,\nit is rash to form such an opinion. For example, the mere fact that two\nmen have frequent and whispered conference together does not make it\nlikely that they are plotting evil.\n\n(b) If there are no sufficient reasons for inclining towards an\nunfavorable opinion or for suspending all assent, suspicion and doubt\nare rash. For example, the mere fact that a man enters a house when the\nowners are absent is no reason to suspect him of dishonest purposes, or\neven to have doubts, if he is of good reputation and enters the house\nin daylight and in a usual way.\n\n1734. Sinfulness of Rash Judgment.--Rash judgment strictly understood,\nthen, is a firm assent of the mind, based on insufficient data, and\ngiven to the view that a neighbor is or has been guilty of sin.\n\n(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, for it consists in a contempt\nfor, and an injury to, what is regarded as one of the chief goods of\nman, namely, the favorable opinion of him that is entertained by\nothers. It is denounced in Scripture as an injury to the law itself\n(\u201cHe that judgeth his brother judgeth the law,\u201d James, iv. 11), and as\nmeriting condemnation (\u201cJudge not, and you will not be judged, condemn\nnot and you will not be condemned,\u201d Luke, vi. 37).\n\n(b) From the imperfection of the act or from the lightness of the\nmatter rash judgment may be only a venial sin, as when unfounded\nsuspicions arise in the mind without advertence to their sinfulness, or\nwhen one rashly judges in some small matter (e.g., that another person\nstole a pin or a cent).\n\n1735. Rash judgment is not mortally sinful in an individual case unless\nthe following conditions are present:\n\n(a) there must be perfect deliberation, that is, full advertence to the\njudgment itself and to its sinfulness and gravity (see 175). There is\nno full advertence to the sinfulness and gravity of the judgment,\nhowever, if one does not perceive at least in a confused manner that\none is deciding in one\u2019s mind without sufficient reason that one\u2019s\nneighbor is guilty of serious sin, and is thereby doing the latter a\ngreat injury. But it is not necessary that the rash judgment continue\nfor a considerable time, for the malice depends on the evil done, not\non the length of time it has lasted;\n\n(b) there must be serious rashness, for the sinfulness of the judgment\nrests on its rashness. Hence, if one judges a sin to be certain which\nis very probable or almost certain, there is no great imprudence and\ntherefore no serious sin;\n\n(c) there must be grave injury and contempt, for in these the malice of\nrash judgment consists. Hence, if one judges that another is a drunkard\nand neither the latter person nor others in the same place regard\ndrunkenness as very dishonorable, there is no great harm done.\nSimilarly, if one judges that some indeterminate individual of a\nmultitude or group is a rascal, or that a stranger whom one sees on the\nstreet late at night is out on an evil errand, or that an unknown party\nseen from a distance is on his way to a disreputable meeting, it does\nnot seem that there is great injury done; for one does not greatly\nresent lack of esteem in others to whom one is not known.\n\n1736. Rules on Perfect Advertence to Rashness of Judgment.--(a) There\nis perfect advertence when one actually perceives that the reasons for\none\u2019s unfavorable judgment are very insufficient; (b) there is perfect\nadvertence when one virtually perceives the serious insufficiency of\nthe reasons, that is, when one could and should perceive it, but is\nvincibly blind to it (see 30, 31) on account of some passion wilfully\nindulged, such as hatred or envy of the person judged. In these cases\none judges with negligence and precipitancy in a serious matter (see\nImprudence).\n\n1737. Rules on Insufficiency of Reasons for Unfavorable Judgments.--(a)\nThose authorities for sin are not sufficiently trustworthy whose\nreliability is of inferior worth (e.g., because they are enemies of the\nperson against whom they speak, or calumniators, or gossipers, or of\nbad reputation, etc.), or whose story does not merit the credence they\nclaim for it (e.g., because the person against whom they speak is known\nas upright). If both the authorities for a story and the person against\nwhom they speak are equal in good qualities, there is sufficient reason\nfor doubts, but nothing more.\n\n(b) Those arguments for sin are not sufficient which create for what is\nconcluded only a slight presumption (see 658), that is, which offer\nfacts that are never, or seldom, or not necessarily causes or effects\nor indications of sin. Thus, it is rash to judge that a mature man and\nwoman conversing together in a dignified manner and in a public and\nopen place are discussing obscene matters; or that a respectable person\nwhose face is flushed, or whose hand trembles, or who slips on the\nstreet, has been imbibing too freely; or that a man climbing into a\nsecond story on a frequented highway and in broad daylight is a\nburglar. This rule may be expressed in other words by saying that\nreasons for drawing unfavorable conclusions are insufficient when in\nview of the circumstances and time, place, persons, deed, etc., no\nprudent person would consider the conclusions as warranted.\n\n1738. Rules on Gravity of Matter in Rash Judgments.--(a) From the\nnature of the thing ascribed to the other person, only judgments that\nmortal sin has been committed are grave matter; for only mortal sin is\nin itself a grave reproach.\n\n(b) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgment of mortal\nsin may be only venial; for it sometimes happens that certain kinds of\nserious sins are not considered very ignominious in certain persons or\nconditions. Thus, in some places it is considered honorable for\nsoldiers or students to have wounded adversaries in duels; some persons\nof a rough kind are proud of their proficiency in blasphemy or\nobscenity; where drunkenness is common, it is not considered as very\ndisgraceful.\n\n(c) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgments of venial\nsin or of what is not sin at all may be mortal; for to those from whom\nmuch is expected slighter defects may be causes of great disgrace.\nThus, it is very dishonoring to the parties concerned to think that a\nprelate is an habitual liar, that a nun visits too often, that a public\nofficial is illegitimate or stupid or afflicted with syphilis, and\ntherefore unworthy of his position.\n\n1739. The Moral Species of the Sin of Rash Judgment.--(a) It is a sin\nagainst justice, because it infringes the strict right of the neighbor\nthat he be not judged guilty of evil without sufficient reason, and\nthat he be not held worthy of contempt until he has clearly forfeited\nthe right to respect. It is true that judgment as here taken is an\ninternal act, and that it was said above that only external acts form\nthe subject-matter of justice; but internal acts that are referred\nimmediately to external acts, as concupiscence tends to lust and anger\nto injury, may be classed with these external acts. Hence, internal\njudgment naturally leads up to external judgment, and so it pertains to\njustice, just as the desire to steal is unjust and the desire to make\nrestitution is just.\n\n(b) It is a sin against charity, because it does not practise\nbenevolence (\u201cCharity thinketh no evil,\u201d I Cor., xiii. 5), and is\nusually associated with ill-will or envy. He who judges rashly does not\nlove his neighbor as himself, for he does not observe the rule not to\ndo to others what he would not have done to himself.\n\n1740. The moral species of rash judgment is not changed according to\nthe species of sin attributed to another (such as heresy, dishonesty,\nimpurity), and these circumstances of the rash judgment need not be\nmentioned in confession.\n\n1741. The Moral Species of Rash Opinion, Suspicion and Doubt.--Do the\nconclusions given above on the theological species of rash judgment\napply also to rash opinion, suspicion, and doubt?\n\n(a) Some theologians answer in the affirmative, and argue that the same\ngrave injury and contempt of the neighbor is found in these sins as in\nrash judgment, and that Scripture makes no distinction between the one\nand the other. On the contrary, they say, murmurings, detractions, and\nhatreds are caused oftener by doubts, suspicions, and opinions, since\nfirm and certain judgments are not so often formed; and moreover there\nis no one who would not prefer to be judged certainly guilty of\nfornication than to be doubted or suspected of more heinous crimes,\nsuch as incest or sodomy.\n\n(b) Other theologians answer in the negative, and argue that suspicion\nand doubt do not inflict a severe harm, since they stop short of firm\ndecision of the mind and so are incomplete injuries which diminish\nrather than take away the esteem due to another. But the defenders of\nthe affirmative reply that, while opinion, suspicion and doubt are\nincomplete as regards assent, they are not incomplete as regards\ndeliberation and consent, and so can be mortally sinful, as is seen in\nthe case of doubts against faith (see 840 sqq.).\n\n(c) Still other theologians hold that rash opinions, suspicions and\ndoubts are from their nature mortal sins on account of the arguments\nfor the first opinion, but that in actual experience they are usually\nvenial on account of the imperfection of the act (since on account of\nhuman frailty doubts, suspicions, or evil opinions of others can easily\narise before they are noticed), or the lightness of the matter (for\nthere is rarely one of these mental states without some reason that\nseems to be at least approximately a justification). But it seems\nlikely that rash judgments themselves are seldom mortal sins, since the\nconditions for mortal sin are not often realized in them.\n\n1742. The Chief Reasons for Rash Conclusions about the Character of\nOthers.--(a) A first reason is that the person who draws the conclusion\nis bad himself. Evil-doers are very prone to suspect others of evil,\nfor sin seems so delightful to them that they think others must find\nthe same pleasure in it: \u201cThe fool when he walketh in the way, since he\nhimself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools\u201d (Eccles., x. 3).\n\n(b) A second reason is that the wish is often father to the thought.\nThus, if one hates or envies another or is angered against him, even\ntrifles light as air will suffice to make one judge him guilty of sin.\nJust as love blinds an infatuated lover to the sins or crimes of the\nobject of his affection, so does prejudice give a distorted vision that\ncan see nothing but evil in the object of its dislike.\n\n(c) A third reason for rash views unfavorable to others is long\nexperience in dealing with human nature. Thus, old men sometimes become\nnot merely cautious, which is reasonable, but unduly suspicious.\nSimilarly, those who have encountered many trials or disappointments in\nlife often become cynical and misanthropic, and to them the actions of\nall their fellowmen appear either evil or at least spoiled by an evil\npurpose.\n\n1743. Rash Doubts.--Doubt about the probity of others is sinful, when\nthere are no sufficient reason for it; for example, it would be\nunreasonable to suspend judgment about a man of excellent reputation\nbecause a well-known calumniator had spoken against him. But a doubt\nmay be reasonable, as when a person has had a good reputation for\nhonesty but a reliable witness declares that he is dishonest. In such a\ncase should one decide for the innocence or for the guilt of the party\ncalled into doubt, or should one suspend judgment on the matter?\n\n(a) It is not lawful to interpret reasonable doubts in a sense\nunfavorable to another person, for this would amount to rash judgment,\nsince the reasons are sufficient for doubt but not for decision. Hence,\nit would be wrong to believe that a person of good repute was a thief,\nbecause another person of good repute said so.\n\n(b) It is lawful to suspend judgment in case of reasonable doubts, if\nthere is no obligation of deciding one way or the other, for in so\ndoing one does no injury either to one\u2019s own intelligence (since the\ndoubt is reasonable) or to the honor of another person (since, as\nsupposed, there is no obligation of judging positively in his favor).\nJust as there is no duty of making acts of love of our neighbor on\nevery occasion, neither is there a duty of deciding doubts to his\nadvantage on every occasion, or of having any opinion about him\nwhatever. Some authors do not admit this, but the common teaching is\nagainst them.\n\n(c) It is not lawful to suspend judgment, but the reasonable doubt must\nbe resolved in a favorable sense, if there is an obligation or a wish\nto decide one way or the other; otherwise one would decide in an\nunfavorable sense and be guilty of rash judgment. This is what is meant\nby the well-known maxim that doubts about the character of a neighbor\nshould be settled in favor of the neighbor. Hence, if one were in\nserious danger of forming a rash judgment and could not otherwise\novercome the temptation, a suspension of judgment should give place to\nfavorable judgment. It is true that one may be frequently in error by\nthus judging well of mankind, since man is inclined to evil from his\nyouth (Gen., viii. 21) and the number of fools is infinite (Eccles., i.\n15). But it is a less evil to fall into the speculative error of taking\na bad man for good than by adopting another course to fall into the\npractical error of becoming bad oneself by violating a law of prudence,\njustice and charity; and it is less harmful that many sinners should\nreceive more credit than they deserve, than that one just man should be\ndeprived of the good opinion that belongs to him. Pseudo-Ambrose (Apol.\nii, David, c. 2, n. 5) says that those who judge others rashly often\nbecome worse by this act than the persons they judge; and St. Thomas\nremarks that favorable opinions of others harm no one, whereas\nunfavorable opinions are a wrong to innocent persons.\n\n1744. The interpretation of doubts in a favorable sense does not mean\nthat one may not take into consideration the possibility of danger or\ndeception and use remedies or precautions. This course is not rash\njudgment, for even when one judges that another person is good, one\nknows that the judgment is possibly wrong, and therefore cannot be\nentirely relied on for external guidance.\n\n(a) It is lawful, therefore, to act as if one did have a bad opinion of\nanother when there is a possibility of harm that must be guarded\nagainst. Thus, a father may forbid his children to keep company with\nother children, for these latter may be corrupt; an employer may keep\nhis money under lock and key, because servants may be dishonest; a\ntraveller may carry weapons, because the inhabitants among whom he\ntravels may be treacherous. Even though appearances are favorable, one\nmay be on one\u2019s guard, for appearances are often deceptive.\n\n(b) It is not lawful, however, to protect oneself or others in such a\nneedlessly conspicuous or offensive manner as to sadden or defame the\nother party against whom one takes the precautions. Thus, it would be\nunjust and uncharitable to go about ostentatiously locking safes and\ndrawers whenever a certain person appeared, for this would be\nequivalent to saying that he was a thief.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 3: THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF JUSTICE: COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE\nJUSTICE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 61, 62.)\n\n1745. The Three Species of Justice.--The subjective parts of a virtue\nare those that partake of its essence and that are the subordinate\nspecies into which it may be distinguished, as prudence is divided into\nindividual, domestic and political (see 1639). There are three species\nof justice, and their division is taken from the threefold relation\nthat exists in a whole.\n\n(a) Thus, legal justice directs the parts to respect the rights of the\nwhole, and it is exercised by all those who promote the common good of\na society by fulfilling well the duties which pertain to their position\nand rank in the society.\n\n(b) Distributive justice regulates the whole in reference to the parts,\nand it is exercised by all those who seek for such a distribution of\nthe common things of a society as accords with the inequalities of\nmerit and ability of the members. Hence, distributive justice is found\nnot only in the heads of a state, or family, or other body, but also in\nthe subordinates who are content with the fair distributions made by\nthe heads.\n\n(c) Commutative justice orders the relations between the parts, and it\nis exercised by all who practise fair dealing with their equals, that\nis, by states with states, families with families, societies with like\nsocieties, individuals with individuals; or with those who act as their\nequals, as when a society acting as a moral person makes a contract\nwith one of its members as another moral person.\n\n1746. Resemblance between Distributive and Commutative Justice.--The\ngeneral likeness between distributive and commutative justice may be\nsummed up as follows:\n\n(a) they have the same remote matter, since both alike are concerned\nwith external things, persons or works. Thus, things such as goods of\nfortune may be distributed by the community to its members, or may be\nexchanged by individuals between them; labors to be performed may be\nassigned by the community or may be agreed on by private persons\nthrough contract;\n\n(b) they have the same general form, since both alike seek to impress\nequality on the matter with which they deal, by rendering in these\nthings to every one his due, and by making man\u2019s actions towards his\nneighbor to follow the mean of reason and of the thing (see 1711).\n\n1747. The Special Differences between Distributive and Commutative\nJustice.--(a) They differ in their proximate matter, that is, in the\noperations by which use is made of external things, persons or works;\nfor while distributive justice acts through distribution (or division),\nappointment, or assignment among many, commutative justice acts through\nexchange, or transfer from one to another between two persons.\n\n(b) They differ in their special form; for distributive justice seeks\nequality and the golden mean, according to proportion, while\ncommutative justice seeks the same according to quantity (see 1712).\nDistributive justice does not treat parties as equals, but gives to\neach one according to his personal worth--to the more deserving the\nsuperior positions and high salaries, to the less deserving the\ninferior positions and lower salaries. Commutative justice, on the\nother hand, treats the parties as equal, and decrees that debts must be\npaid and injuries repaired, even though payment or reparation must be\nmade by a good man to a bad man, and that the recompense must equal the\ndifference created between the parties by the debt or the injury.\n\n1748. Commutations of Commutative Justice.--There are various kinds of\ncommutations or exchanges used by commutative justice, but they do not\ncreate new species of justice, since they are only accidental modes of\nthe act of giving the equivalent of what one receives. They are\nclassified as follows:\n\n(a) involuntary commutations, which are those in which reparation is\nmade for the use against the will of another of the things, persons, or\nworks that pertain to him. Thus, the property of another is used\nunlawfully by secret theft and by open robbery; the person of another\nis injured by murder and wounds; the honor of another by secret calumny\nand detraction, by open false testimony and contumely; the rights of\nanother to persons are used unlawfully by adultery with his wife, by\nseduction of his servant, and the like;\n\n(b) voluntary commutations, which are those in which compensation is\nmade for a benefit that one derived with the owner\u2019s consent from\nsomething that was his, or in which one gives or returns to another\nwhat is his. They include the various forms of contracts, or agreements\nbetween two parties in which the consent of both to the same proposal\nis externally manifested and obligation is produced to abide by the\nterms of agreement.\n\n1749. Forms of Contract.--The chief forms of contract are the following:\n\n(a) gratuitous contracts, which are those that confer advantage on only\none of the contractants, or those in which no payment or compensation\nfor his acts or goods is made to one party by the other party. They\ninclude unilateral contracts, which produce obligation on one side only\n(e.g., a promise, gift, testament), and bilateral contracts, which\nproduce obligation on both sides. The bilateral contracts are also\nknown as bailments, or understandings whereby a thing or business is\ntransferred from one person to another in trust, on condition that a\nreturn will be made to the owner, They include the following contracts:\nloans, in which return must be made of the identical things borrowed\n(_commodatum_), or of a thing similar in kind (_mutuum_); deposit, in\nwhich a thing must be returned after safekeeping (_depositum_); an\nagency, in which one conducts the business of another with the\nobligation of making returns, either from express contract (_mandatum_)\nor from imputed agreement (_negotiorum gestio_). In _commodatum_ and\n_mutuum_ the advantage is had by the bailee, in the other three by the\nbailor;\n\n(b) onerous contracts of certain event, which are those that confer an\nadvantage on both parties, and in which the thing agreed on is certain\nand definite. They include contracts in which one party transfers\nownership to the other (e.g., buying and selling, barter, loan at\ninterest, contracts for annuities, stocks and bonds) or useful dominion\n(e.g., lease of property, contractor\u2019s agreement, hire of labor), and\ncontracts in which both parties transfer rights to a moral person of\nwhich they are the members (partnership);\n\n(c) onerous contracts of uncertain event, which are those that confer\nadvantage on both parties, but in which the thing agreed on is\ncontingent and uncertain. Examples are insurance, wager, gaming\ncontracts, lottery, and stock market speculation;\n\n(d) subsidiary contracts, which are those that are made in order to\ngive security to principal contracts to which they are annexed or for\nwhose sake they are made. Such are guaranty and surety, pledge and\npawn, and mortgage.\n\n1750. The Equality Sought by Commutative Justice.--The equality in\nquantity sought by commutative justice means that in involuntary\ntransactions the offender must suffer a punishment equal to the injury\nhe offered or must pay a recompense equal to the damage he caused, and\nthat in voluntary transactions one must give the equal of what one\nreceives. But this can be understood in two ways.\n\n(a) Thus, equality may be taken for identity in species, in the sense\nthat the same kind of thing must be taken or returned (e.g., a life for\na life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth). This kind of equality\nwill do in some instances, as in cases of exchange of goods, but as a\nrule it would not be fair to both parties. Thus, if a subject strikes a\nruler, he is not sufficiently punished if he receives the same kind of\nblow, for the injury to the ruler is greater on account of his office;\nwhen a man steals a cow or a sheep, he is not sufficiently punished if\nhe restores what he took, for he would suffer no loss and the community\nwhose peace he had offended would go without satisfaction (Exod., xxii.\n1); if one gives one\u2019s cow for another\u2019s cow, or if a shoemaker trades\nhis products for the clothes made by a tailor, the exchange may be\nunfair, since the thing given on one side may be better than that given\non the other side.\n\n(b) Equality may be understood as identity in value, in the sense that\nthe thing taken or returned has the same quantity of goodness or\nexcellence as the thing received, no matter how they differ in species.\nThis kind of equality must be observed as a rule both in involuntary\nand voluntary transactions. Thus, for injury done to merchandise\npayment is made in money, or vice versa. If equality in value is not\npossible, because the good for which one owes is on a higher plane than\nthe good which one is able to give, it seems that justice requires one\nto approximate equality as far as possible, and hence mayhem or\ndefamation should be compensated for by the goods of fortune (see 1802\nand 2090).\n\n1751. Restitution.--Justice not only commands that one pay or give back\nwhat is due in voluntary transactions, but also that one repair injury\nwhich one has caused in involuntary transactions. But the four acts of\npayment, restoration, satisfaction, and restitution must not be\nconfused.\n\n(a) Thus, payment is the lawful bestowal by one person on another\nperson of something of value in return for some other thing of value.\nIt is clear that payment differs from satisfaction and restitution,\nsince it supposes no act of injustice done.\n\n(b) Restoration is the return to another of his property of which one\nhad just possession, as when a borrower gives back to the lender, or a\ndepositee to the depositor. This also differs from satisfaction and\nrestitution, since it is a voluntary transaction (see 1792, 1796).\n\n1752. Differences between Satisfaction and Restitution.--(a) They\ndiffer as to their principle or cause, since satisfaction is due for\ninjury to honor, restitution for injury to goods by unjust detention or\nunjust damage. Hence, a person who has dishonored another (e.g., by\ndisrespect) is bound to satisfaction; a person who has injured another\n(e.g., by destroying his goods) is bound to restitution; a person who\nhas both injured and dishonored another (e.g., by adding insults to\nrobbery) is bound to restitution and satisfaction.\n\n(b) Satisfaction and restitution differ as to their term or object,\nsince satisfaction is chiefly concerned with the person to whom amends\nmust be made (as by apology), while restitution is chiefly concerned\nwith the thing which must be given back in itself or in its equivalent.\n\n1753. When Restitution Is Due.--Restitution is the act by which one\nplaces another in renewed possession or ownership or chance of\nownership of that which is owed to him because it is his by reason of a\nstrict right _in re_ or _ad rem_; in other words, it restores the\nequality that existed before an injury was done to the goods of another.\n\n(a) Thus, restitution is not due for violation of virtues other than\njustice, because these virtues are not concerned with strict\nobligations and rights. Repentance and satisfaction are due for all\nsins, but they are not the same thing as restitution. Hence, one is not\nbound to restitution if one refused to help with alms a person in\nextreme need, or if, not being obliged to it by office, one neglected\nto extinguish a fire or to prevent a robbery. These are sins against\ncharity, not against justice.\n\n(b) Restitution is not due for violations of virtues that pertain to\njustice but do not confer strict rights, and hence it is only a\nviolation of commutative justice that entails the obligation of\nrestitution. Thus, if one has been surly or ungrateful, no legal right\nhas been violated and no restitution is due.\n\n1754. Does Distributive Injustice Oblige to Restitution?--(a) If only\ndistributive injustice is committed (e. g., if a parent gives his\nchildren all necessaries but shows special favor to those that are less\ndeserving), there is no duty of restitution, for there is no strict\nclaim to special favors. (b) If commutative injustice accompanies the\ndistributive injustice (e.g., if a ruler acts against his agreement to\ngive the best position to the person who passes the best examination),\nthere is a duty of restitution, for there is a strict claim to rights\nunder contract.\n\n1755. Distributive Justice and the Violation of Strict\nRights.--Injustice in distribution is frequently accompanied by\ninjustice in transaction on account of some strict right violated, and\nhence by reason of the latter injustice there will be a duty of\nrestitution (see 1708, 1808).\n\n(a) Thus, distributive injustice is accompanied by violation of a\nstrict right of society when an unfair distribution is contrary to\nagreement made with the community (e.g., when one is appointed or paid\nespecially to make fair distributions, or the law or contract expressly\nimposes this obligation), or when it causes harm to the community which\none is bound _ex officio_ to prevent (e.g., when one appoints as public\nphysician or surgeon a person who is entirely unfitted for the post).\n\n(b) Distributive injustice is accompanied by violation of a strict\nright of an individual when it is against contract (e.g., when a person\nundertakes to select the best statue or portrait presented in a\ncontest, but chooses one that is inferior), or when it inflicts loss on\na private person (e.g., when a tax assessor requires more than is due\nfrom some persons, or an examiner admits to a school which receives\nonly a limited number an unworthy candidate and thus excludes a worthy\none, or a board rejects a worthy candidate as unworthy).\n\n1756. Commutative Justice and Unfair Awards of Prizes.--Unfair awards\nof prizes in competitions are not violations of commutative justice\nunless the following conditions are present:\n\n(a) the promise of award must be given as a contract binding in\njustice, for if the promisor intends only to bind himself in fidelity,\nthe promisee obtains no strict right. Hence, an unfair distribution is\nnot against commutative justice if a competition has not the character\nof a real contest or of an onerous compact to reward the person who\nsurpasses his rivals, but is rather an opportunity to compete for the\nfree bounty of the promisor (e.g., if the organizer of an entertainment\noffers a prize for the prettiest baby), or an encouragement to useful\nindustry (e.g., a first prize for the best garden in a neighborhood).\nOn the contrary, if the promise is part of an onerous contract, the\npromisor is bound in justice and the promisee obtains a strict right.\nThis is the case when the competition has the character of a real\ncontest, in which the contestants must undergo special labor,\npreparation, expense or trouble, etc., in order that the award be given\nto the most meritorious;\n\n(b) the thing promised as subject of award must be the prize, and not\nmerely a claim or right to be considered for the prize. Hence, if an\nexamination is held in order that a number of worthy persons may be\nlisted for future vacancies in offices or dignities, the person who\npasses as most worthy has no strict right to be given an office or\ndignity, but only to be considered for it.\n\n1757. Has a person who passes as most worthy in an examination held in\norder to fill a vacant post a strict right to receive the post?\n\n(a) According to the common opinion he has a strict right, because\nthere is at least an implicit contract to the effect that the position\nwill be given to the most worthy, since the examination is competitive.\n\n(b) According to some authorities he has no strict right, because\npublic positions are not to be regarded as rewards of merit, and the\nexamination is not part of a contract but is only a means used by a\nsuperior to assist him in acting according to distributive justice.\nNevertheless, even in this opinion an unjust award is a sin, and at\ntimes a grave sin, against distributive justice, and may accidentally\nbe joined with commutative injustice (see 1755).\n\n(c) Under the civil service method, or merit system, of appointment,\nthe appointing official is bound by law to observe the rules of the\ncivil service commission. The usual procedure is for the commission to\nsubmit the names of the three persons highest on the examination list.\nPosition on the list is determined by competitive examination plus\npreferential points for veterans, experience in jobs, etc. (On the\nwhole the preferential system does not seem to involve any injustice to\nthose who do not receive the preference.) One of the three must be\nchosen for the first vacancy; for the second vacancy the remaining two,\ntogether with the next highest eligible, are proposed. Grave injustice\nagainst distributive justice would be done in not proceeding according\nto the legal method, and some degree of injustice might be done to an\neligible who is illegally removed from a list, passed over, etc. Of the\nthree highest eligibles no one has a strict right to the vacant post,\nbut solely the right to be seriously considered.\n\n1758. What should be said of a superior who would promote undeserving\npersons to ecclesiastical benefices?\n\n(a) As regards guilt, it is a mortal sin to confer a benefice on one\nwho is unworthy, or even (when there is question of a benefice to which\nthe care of souls is attached) on one who is less worthy (see Canon\n459, Sec. 1).\n\n(b) As regards restitution, there is an obligation of reparation to the\ncommunity, when it is made to suffer loss, and of compensation to an\nindividual who is passed over in spite of his strict right (see three\npreceding paragraphs).\n\n1759. The Obligation of Restitution.--(a) The obligation is both of\nnatural and divine law. Reason itself dictates that everyone should\nreceive his due, and revelation expressly commands restitution, as when\nit declares that he who has injured his neighbor\u2019s field or vineyard\nmust restore according to the damage done (Exod., xxii. 5).\n\n(b) The obligation is both of means and of precept, for without\nrestitution the offender does not obtain pardon from God (Ezech.,\nxxxiii. 13 sqq,; Tob., ii. 20 sqq.). Hence, one who has seriously\ninjured his neighbor cannot be saved unless he actually makes\nrestitution, if he is able, or intends to make restitution when\npossible, if here and now he is not able to do so. A debtor who makes\nno effort to make restitution (e.g., one who refuses to deny himself\nluxuries, to curtail his expenses, to leave restitution money in his\nwill), cannot be said to have a sincere intention of fulfilling his\nduty. But it is not true that a person who dies in venial sin on\naccount of restitution neglected must remain in Purgatory till all the\nrestitution is made; for this would make the punishment depend on the\nnegligence of the heirs or on accident.\n\n(c) The obligation is grave if the damage (absolute or relative) and\nthe fault were both grave, for restitution is an obligation of strict\njustice (see 1753); the obligation is light if both the damage and the\nfault were light, for the injury then is light.\n\n1760. Duties of Confessors about the Obligation of Restitution.--(a) As\nto confession, the penitent is obliged to mention the number of sins\ncommitted against the duty of restitution, if there have been many acts\nof intention not to pay (see 202 sqq.); but as a rule those who have\nfor a long time continued in sinful neglect of the duty of restitution\nhave committed only one sin thereby, or else they do not apprehend\ntheir duty of mentioning the distinct internal acts, and hence\nconfessors are advised not to question overmuch about this.\n\n(b) As to absolution, the penitent lacks true contrition if he is under\na serious obligation to make restitution and is wilfully opposed to the\nperformance of this duty at all or at the proper time. Such a one may\nnot be absolved. But the confessor should not admonish a penitent of\nthe duty of restitution, if the penitent is in good faith and the\nadmonition would only do harm. If the obligation of restitution is only\nlight, absolution may not be refused, and prudence will often advise\nthat no admonition about the obligation be given.\n\n1761. There are a number of situations possible when damage done is\ngrave and culpability slight.\n\n(a) Thus, the damage may be entirely involuntary, as when the offender\ncould not foresee it and did not wish it (e.g., Sempronius commits a\nvenial sin by speaking harshly to Claudius, whom he likes, but the\nlatter is so depressed at this that he commits suicide). In this case\nthere is clearly no obligation of restitution.\n\n(b) The damage may be voluntary only interpretatively, as when the\noffender could not foresee it, but would have willed it had he foreseen\nit (e.g., Sempronius is glad when he learns that Claudius committed\nsuicide, but would be much surprised if he knew that a harsh word of\nhis caused it). In this case according to some there is a grave duty of\nrestitution, because internal guilt and external damage are present;\nbut others, with greater probability, deny the duty of restitution, for\nthe damage was not caused by the internal sin of hate, which is not\neffective of itself, nor by the external harsh word, which was an\noccasion rather than a cause (see 1447, 1763).\n\n(c) The damage may be voluntary directly, as when the offender wills it\nin itself (e.g., Titus steals a considerable sum from Balbus, but he is\ninvincibly ignorant and thinks that the wealth of Balbus makes the sin\nonly venial), or the damage done is voluntary indirectly (e.g., Caius\nis guilty of slight carelessness in guarding his cattle, and they get\ninto a neighbor\u2019s garden and cause great damage to crops; Caius foresaw\nsome damage, but he could not have foreseen the actual grave damage\nthat was done). About these cases there are various opinions, which\nwill be given in 1765.\n\n1762. The Roots of Restitution.--The roots or sources of restitution\nare usually reduced to two, according to the following two general\nkinds of injury inflicted on others:\n\n(a) unjust damage, which is the loss inflicted, on the goods of\nanother, without advantage to the offender, as in murder or\nincendiarism;\n\n(b) unjust possession, which is the loss inflicted on another by the\npossession of his goods without his consent or against his will, to the\nadvantage of the offender, as when a murderer steals from his victim,\nor an incendiary gets the insurance from the house he destroyed.\n\n1763. Unjust damage that obliges to restitution is only an act (or\nomission) that is both injurious (being a guilty violation of another\u2019s\nstrict right) and productive of loss. Hence the following conditions:\n\n(a) the act must be objectively unjust, a contravention of a strict\nright _in re_ or _ad rem_ (see 1695 sqq.), for example, stealing or\nkeeping back the wages due an employee. But it is objectively unjust to\ndeprive another of a non-strict right (e.g., the right of a beggar to\nan alms) by unjust means, such as force, fraud, calumny, etc. If a\nneighbor is not hindered from his strict right and unfair means are not\nemployed, there is no objective injustice (e.g., when a merchant\nimproves his place of business and thus draws away customers from a\nrival merchant);\n\n(b) the act must be efficaciously unjust or the true cause of the loss\nwhich another suffers, for one is not responsible for what does not\nproceed from one\u2019s act. An act is not efficaciously unjust, therefore,\nif it is only the occasion of damage (e.g., Titus steals and Balbus\nimitates him; Claudius steals, and on account of circumstantial\nevidence not arranged by Claudius, Sempronius is arrested and sentenced\nto prison), or if it is only a _conditio sine qua non_ (e.g., Caius\ngives whisky to Julius, who needs its stimulation to nerve himself for\na crime), or if it is only an accidental cause (e.g., Titus steals a\nsmall sum of money from a miser, and the latter, to the great surprise\nof Titus, becomes insane);\n\n(c) the act must be subjectively unjust, that is, culpable and\nimputable; for one is not bound to satisfy for acts that are inculpable\nor not imputable (see 97 sqq.). There must be either theological\nculpability, that is, the intention to harm another, which is sinful\nbefore God (e.g., he who purposely sets fire to his neighbor\u2019s barn),\nor juridical culpability, that is, carelessness which causes injury to\nthe legal right of another (e.g., he who lights a fire near his\nneighbor\u2019s buildings and by his absent-mindedness permits the buildings\nto catch fire).\n\n1764. Some Causes That Remove or Diminish Theological Culpability.--(a)\nMental derangement or passion (e.g., great fear or anger) may make an\ninjurious act unintentional and so take away natural liability for\nrestitution (see 40 sqq.), but the civil law does not always admit the\nexcuse, and after sentence the offender is bound to pay.\n\n(b) According to some authorities, error about the extent of the harm\nthat is being done, if invincible, excuses from restitution for damage\nthat was not apprehended, as when a thief throws a gem into the ocean,\nthinking that it is only an imitation gem. But the offender would be\nheld for the entire loss, if sentenced.\n\n(e) Error about the person injured, even though invincible, probably\ndoes not excuse from restitution, if the intention was to harm a class\n(e.g., Sempronius intends to kill Balbus, because the latter is a\npoliceman, but by accident he kills another policeman) or an individual\n(e.g., Caius intends to kill Titus and by mistake kills Claudius, the\ntwin-brother of Titus).\n\n(d) Error about the thing injured, even though invincible, probably\ndoes not excuse from restitution, if the intention was to do damage\n(e.g., Julius puts poison in a plate in order to kill his neighbor\u2019s\ndog, but the cat takes the poison and is killed).\n\n1765. Restitution for Damages That Are Only Venially Sinful but\nSeriously Harmful.--(a) When one injurious act is committed (as when\nthrough slight carelessness one sets fire to one\u2019s neighbor\u2019s chicken\ncoop), some deny, but others affirm, the duty of restitution, while\nstill others distinguish according to the full or only partial\nadvertence to the sinfulness of what is done. Of those who hold for\nrestitution, some think that all the damage should be repaired, since\nall was caused; but others think that it suffices to repair part, since\nthe culpability was limited.\n\n(b) If several injurious acts, which taken singly are slight but taken\ntogether are serious, were done to the same person (e.g., a waiter\nbreaking dishes at various times while working for the same\nproprietor), restitution is due as soon as the sinner realizes the\namount of harm he has caused; but it is disputed whether the obligation\nis grave or light. If the injuries were done to different persons\n(e.g., a boy breaking windows in many houses in the neighborhood),\nthere is more probably only a light obligation.\n\n1766. Restitution on Account of Law for Damages That Are Only\nJuridically Culpable.--(a) Before sentence of court there is no\nobligation of restitution, for it would be too heavy a burden to impose\nthis in view of the absentmindedness of so many persons and the\nnumerous distractions one encounters.\n\n(b) After sentence of court there is an obligation of restitution, for\nthe law which gives the court a right to impose it is reasonable, since\njuridical fault is often accompanied by theological fault, and moreover\nmen will thus be led to a greater prudence in the care of their own\ngoods and in respect for those of others.\n\n1767. Restitution on Account of Contract for Damages That Are Only\nJuridically Culpable.--(a) Express contract obliges to restitution even\nfor light fault (i.e., the omission of precautions taken by the more\nprudent), or most light fault (i.e., the omission of precautions taken\nby the most prudent only), or, if so stipulated, for no fault at all.\n\n(b) Implied contract perhaps also obliges to restitution for juridical\nfault, for it seems that equity requires one to make good the losses\ncaused by the absence of a care which the contract took for granted.\nThus, if the advantage is with the bailor alone (e.g., gratuitous\ndeposit), ordinary care is expected and the bailee is not held in\ndanger to prefer the bailor\u2019s goods to his own; if the advantage is\nwith both parties (e.g., onerous deposit or loan), it seems that more\nthan ordinary care is demanded and that usually the obligor may give\npreference to his own goods.\n\n1768. Restitution for Careless Discharge of Fiduciary Duties, as in the\nCase of Physicians, Lawyers, Spiritual Advisers.--(a) If there was\ntheological fault, restitution is due, unless the injured party took\nthe risk upon himself. (b) If there was only juridical fault, it seems\nthere is no natural duty of restitution, since no injustice was done;\nbut a court may oblige to damages.\n\n1769. Two Cases in Which Culpability Seems Doubtful.--(a) When one has\ninculpably done or omitted something from which damage to another can\nbe foreseen, and one has now become aware of the danger (as when Balbus\nlights a fire on his own property and sees that a change of the wind\nmakes this fire dangerous for his neighbor\u2019s barn), one must prevent\nthe damage, if this can be done without equal or greater damage to\noneself; otherwise one must make restitution.\n\n(b) When one has culpably done or omitted something from which damage\nto another was foreseen, but has tried, though in vain, to prevent the\ndamage after the cause was placed, restitution is due if the cause was\nphysical (e.g., Claudius gave poison to Titus, and then moved by\nremorse gave an antidote, but Titus died), since the party who set the\ncause in operation is responsible; but if the cause was moral (e.g.,\nBalbus ordered a gunman to beat up Caius, but withdrew the order, and\nthe gunman on his own responsibility then assaulted Caius), restitution\nis not due when the revocation ends one\u2019s influence upon the damage\nthat ensues.\n\n1770. Three Kinds of Unlawful Possessors.--The second root of\nrestitution mentioned above (1762) is unjust possession, which includes\nthe acceptance or the retention of another person\u2019s goods against the\nlatter\u2019s will. There are three kinds of unlawful possessors:\n\n(a) the possessor in good faith, who is one that has been invincibly\nignorant of the unlawfulness of his possession, but now learns his\nerror (e.g., a buyer who discovers that the horse he purchased did not\nbelong to the seller but was stolen property);\n\n(b) the possessor in doubtful faith, who is one that has serious\nreasons for fearing his possession is unlawful (e.g., the buyer of a\nhorse learns that the seller is known to have sold some stolen\nproperty, or that the price he charged for the horse was remarkably\nsmall);\n\n(c) the possessor in bad faith, who is one that knows his possession is\nunjust (e.g., a buyer who purchases a horse which he knew had been\nstolen by the seller).\n\n1771. Obligations of the Possessor in Good Faith in Reference to the\nProperty Itself.--(a) If the property is still in his keeping, he is\ngenerally obliged to return it to the owner, for a thing calls for its\nowner. An exception would be the case in which the possessor can not\nreturn the property to the owner without a greater loss to his own\nproperty.\n\n(b) If the property has perished, the possessor is generally obliged or\nnot to restitution according as he has been enriched or not by the\nproperty; for one person should not be enriched at the expense of\nanother, but property perishes to its owner.\n\n(c) If the property is in possession of a third party to whom the\npossessor transferred it, he is generally obliged or not to restitution\nto the third party, on the latter\u2019s dispossession, according as he has\nbeen enriched or not by the third party\u2019s goods; for if he received\nnothing for the goods, he is clearly bound to nothing, but if he\nreceived payment, he must indemnify the buyer who is evicted for lack\nof title.\n\n1772. Obligations of the Possessor in Good Faith in Reference to the\nFruits of the Property.--(a) He must restore the fruits of the thing\nitself that are in existence, for the thing fructifies to its owner.\nHence, he should restore to the owner the natural fruits (e.g., the\nfruit on the owner\u2019s trees) and the civil fruits (e.g., the money\nreceived from hire of the owner\u2019s horse).\n\n(b) He must restore the fruits of the thing itself which are not in\nexistence, but from which he has been enriched (e.g., the net profit\nfrom last year\u2019s crops which the possessor has in the bank).\n\n(c) He is not obliged to restore the fruits of his own labor or\nindustrial fruits (e.g., the extraordinary interest derived from the\nowner\u2019s money through the good judgment and energy of the possessor),\nnor the fruits that he consumed without enrichment (e.g., the\nvegetables he gave away or wasted).\n\n1773. Rights of the Possessor in Good Faith in Deducting Expenses.--(a)\nHe may deduct for all expenses that have benefited the owner, that is,\nfor all the money he spent in necessary or useful ways in preserving or\ncaring for the property. (b) He may not deduct for expenses that have\nnot benefited the owner, or which the owner would not have reasonably\nauthorized, such as special beautification of the property. But he may\ntake away such adornments added by him as can be removed without injury\nto the property.\n\n1774. Obligations of the Possessor in Bad Faith in Reference to the\nProperty Itself.--(a) If the property is still in his keeping, he must\nreturn it to the owner, for a thing calls for its owner. But if the\nactual possessor had the property from the thief and could not restore\nit to the owner without serious loss to himself, it is held by some\nthat he could return it to the thief in order to recover his money.\n\n(b) If the property has perished or restitution of it has become\nimpossible, he must compensate the owner, even though he has not been\nenriched, unless the goods would have perished equally with the owner;\nfor he is then the efficacious cause of the loss. The same principle\nmay be applied to damages through deterioration. The civil law often\nholds the thief responsible, no matter how the goods perished in his\nhands.\n\n(c) If the property is in possession of a third party who bought it in\nbad faith from the possessor in bad faith, the seller is not bound to\nrestitution to his purchaser on the purchaser\u2019s eviction, unless there\nwas agreement to that effect; for he who buys, knowing that there is no\ngood title, buys at his own risk.\n\n1775. Obligation of the Possessor in Bad Faith in Reference to the\nFruits of the Property.--(a) He must restore the natural and civil\nfruits, even though the owner would not have obtained them from the\nthing, but he may keep the industrial fruits.\n\n(b) He must make restitution for the profits lost and the losses\nsuffered by the owner through the unjust deprivation of his property,\nfor these are damages of which the possessor was the unjust and\nefficacious cause.\n\n1776. Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began\nPossession in Good Faith (Supervening Doubt).--(a) If he does not\nculpably neglect attempts to settle his doubt, he becomes a possessor\nin good faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must restore\n(1771); if the doubt continues, he may retain possession and prescribe\n(i.e., acquire ownership through long exercise of ownership rights),\nfor presumption favors the possessor, but he must he willing to\nrestore, should another appear as the rightful owner.\n\n(b) If he culpably neglects attempts to settle the doubt, he becomes a\npossessor in bad faith. If the doubt is settled against him, he must\nrestore (1800), at least for the time during which his culpability was\ngrave; if the doubt continues and its settlement is impossible through\nhis fault, it seems that he should share ratably with another claimant\naccording to the strength of the respective claims; if the doubt\ncontinues and there is no other claimant, it seems that he may act on\nthe principle that presumption favors the possessor.\n\n1777. Obligations of the Possessor in Doubtful Faith Who Began in Bad\nFaith (Antecedent Doubt).--(a) If the property came to the possessor in\ndoubtful faith without legal title (e.g., by violence), he has the\nobligations of one in bad faith, for presumption favors the former\npossessor.\n\n(b) If the property came to him by legal title (e.g., by gift or sale),\nbut from a former possessor of doubtful or suspected faith (e.g., one\nwho seemed to have the property through theft), he must attempt to\nsettle the doubt. Should the doubt nevertheless continue, some think he\nshould divide it with another probable claimant, but others believe he\nmay retain all.\n\n(e) If the property came to him by legal title and from a former\npossessor in good faith, he must attempt to settle the doubt; but if\nthe doubt remains in spite of his inquiries, he may retain the property\nin good faith, as long as matters continue in the same state.\n\n1778. Cooperators and Restitution.--Restitution is owed for cooperation\nin injustice when the cooperator becomes at least partially an unjust\nand efficacious cause of damage to another. It should be noted that\nthis cooperation may be of a limited kind, as when it extends only to\nthe mode of the damage, or when it is not indispensable to the\ncommission of the injury.\n\n(a) Thus, he who cooperates only as to the mode of injury is probably\nliable only for that damage which he added to the substantial damage.\nThus, if Balbus intended to steal $10, and Claudius persuaded him to\nsteal $20, it seems that the influence of Claudius extended only to the\namount of $10.\n\n(b) He who cooperates, but whose assistance is not necessary, is bound\nto restitution as a cooperator, since he is an unjust and efficacious\ncause of damage. Thus, if Caius steals for Sempronius, knowing that,\nshould he refuse, Mercurius would carry out the orders of Sempronius,\nthe readiness to steal on the part of Mercurius does not excuse Caius\nor make his act any less harmful.\n\n1779. Positive cooperators in injury are bound to restitution when\ntheir act is the unjust and efficacious cause of the damage. The\nprincipal cases of positive cooperation are the following:\n\n(a) a mandator is a superior who explicitly or implicitly commands an\ninferior subject to commit an act of injustice, as when a father bids\nhis son to steal. The mandator bids another to act in his name, and\ntherefore he is the principal and not the accessory or secondary cause\nof injury. He must indemnify both the victim and the agent for losses\nhe caused them; but he is not liable if he effectively recalled his\nmandate before the damage was done;\n\n(b) an advisor is one who through instruction or persuasion induces\nanother person to commit an injury which is not done in the name of or\nfor the benefit of the advisor himself. He must make restitution both\nto the person whose injury he recommended and to the person to whom he\ngave the advice for the damages he brought upon them. Those who give\nwrong advice in good faith, or who recall their advice before the\ndamage is done, are generally excused from responsibility. Bad example\ndoes not seem to be equivalent to bad advice, and he who recommends a\nlesser evil only because he wishes to prevent a greater one is not an\nefficacious cause of the lesser evil (see 1502, 1503);\n\n(c) an implicit advisor (_palpo_) is one who by flattery, excuse,\nblame, ridicule or other such indirect means leads another to commit\ninjustice against a third party. The implicit advisor is bound to\nrestitution for damages caused or reparation denied through his fault;\n\n(d) a protector or encourager (_receptans_) is one who knowingly and\nwillingly bestows upon a malefactor, as such, security or comfort, in\norder that the latter may do injury with greater confidence or omit\nrestitution for evil already done. He is bound to restitution for the\nunjust damage or retention of property caused by him;\n\n(e) a consenter is one who gives his vote, decision, or approval to\ninjustice, or denies it to justice. He must recall his consent to\niniquity before evil results from it, and he must make restitution for\ndamages that depend on his conduct;\n\n(f) a partaker in injustice is one who gives assistance in the\ncommission of injustice, positively and physically, by sharing in the\ninjury or in some previous or subsequent act naturally connected with\nit. If he is a cooperator in unjust damage, he must indemnify the\ninjured party; if he is a cooperator in unjust retention of property,\nhe must give back to the owner the stolen goods received by him (1774).\n\n1780. Negative cooperators are those who by their silence or inaction\npermit an injury to be done or to go unrepaired. They are bound to\nrestitution for the damages caused by them; but it seems that _per se_\nat least they are not bound to restitution for bribes taken by them or\nfines lost through their fault. Their responsibility for damages\nsupposes the usual conditions, namely: (a) they must be the efficacious\ncauses of damage, and hence if their silence or inaction is\ninvoluntary, or if outcry or resistance would be useless they are not\nresponsible; (b) they must be unjust causes, that is, there must be an\nobligation to act owed by reason of strict right, contract, or implied\ncontract. Examples are confessors who culpably neglect to give\npenitents needed spiritual advice, parents who permit damage to be done\nby their children who have not the use of reason, voters who absent\nthemselves and thus cause damage they were bound by contract to\nprevent, owners of animals who sinfully permit their beasts to ravage\nthe fields of another person, doorkeepers who allow thieves to enter a\nhouse under their charge, collectors who permit bills to go unpaid. But\nif the obligation is owed by reason of some other virtue than\ncommutative justice (e.g., one is bound only in charity to turn in a\nfire alarm when one notices a fire, if one is not the custodian of the\nhouse), one sins, and at times gravely, by inaction; but there is no\nduty of restitution.\n\n1781. The Circumstances of Restitution.--By the circumstances of\nrestitution are understood the persons by whom and to whom compensation\nis to be made, the things to be restored, the manner, time and place of\nrestitution.\n\n1782. The persons bound to make restitution are all those who singly or\ncooperatively commit injustice. But when several commit injustice\ntogether, the following kinds of causes of the injustice must be\ndistinguished:\n\n(a) the causes are equal when there is no subordination among the\ncooperators; they are unequal when one is a principal upon whom the\nothers depend as secondary causes or instruments (e.g., when one hires\nthieves to steal for one);\n\n(b) the causes are considered as total causes of the injury when they\nare principal causes, or equal but indispensable cooperators, or\nconspirators; and perhaps also if they are sufficient causes (e.g.,\nCaius and Sempronius each fire at a neighbor\u2019s cow and each inflicts a\nmortal wound), or if the thing damaged is either not divided (such as a\nvineyard) or indivisible (such as a painting). In other causes\ncooperators are considered as partial causes of the injury.\n\n1783. Cooperators in damage are bound to restitution either _in\nsolidum_ or _pro rata_.\n\n(a) Thus, they are bound _in solidum_ (i.e., jointly and severally) for\nall the loss when they are total causes of the damage, But the\nprincipal cause is bound absolutely, the secondary or equal cause only\nconditionally, that is, the principal must pay all the restitution\nhimself, the others must pay all only when the principal or other\nassociates fail to do their duty.\n\n(b) They are bound _pro rata_ (i.e., each one according to his share)\nwhen they are only partial causes of the damage. The obligation of\nrestitution _in solidum_ should not be imposed, if it is uncertain, or\nif the cooperator is in good faith and the admonition would only\nproduce harm.\n\n1784. The order of restitution among cooperators in injury is according\nto the priority of the obligation of one to that of another, in the\nsense that one is obliged to pay all and the other is obliged only in\nthe former\u2019s default. This order of priority in obligation is in force\nwhen many cooperators are bound _in solidum_ and when they cooperated\nin different ways (e.g., one as possessor, another as advisor, another\nas performer, etc.). The order generally given by moralists is as\nfollows:\n\n(a) the possessor is bound first of all, since he has the goods of\nanother and the goods call for their owner;\n\n(b) the cooperators are bound next in the following order: the\noriginator (such as a perpetrator acting in his own name, or a\nmandator); the perpetrator acting in the name of another; the others\nwho aided the commission of the act (such as advisors, flatterers,\netc.); those who did not prevent or resist injustice.\n\n1785. The obligations of cooperators when restitution in full is made\nby one of their number, or when condonation of debt is made to one of\ntheir number, are as follows: (a) if restitution was due _pro rata_,\nthe other cooperators must indemnify their associate who paid all, or\nmust pay their shares to the injured party who gave condonation only to\none of their group;\n\n(b) if restitution was due _in solidum_, payment by or condonation to a\nprincipal cause frees the secondary causes; but payment by or\ncondonation to a secondary cause does not exempt a principal cause, and\nthe latter is still held either to the secondary cause or to the\ninjured party, as the case may be; payment by or condonation to an\nequal cause does not exempt the other equal causes.\n\n1786. The person to whom restitution must be made is the person whose\nstrict right has been violated, or, in his absence, it is society. But\nthe following cases should be distinguished:\n\n(a) when the injured person is known for certain and his right is\ncertain, restitution should be made to the injured person or his\nrepresentatives or successors, or, if this is not possible, to\ncharitable or pious causes;\n\n(b) when the injured person is entirely unknown, if the one who is the\ncause of the loss is in good faith, his obligations are those of a\npossessor in good faith; but if he is in bad faith, the common opinion\nis that he is bound, at least from customary law, to make restitution\nby giving to the poor or to religion;\n\n(c) when the injured person is partly unknown, the person who is the\ncause of the loss should make restitution to the best of his ability.\nIf the doubt extends to only a few persons (say four or five), any one\nof whom may be the injured person, restitution should be divided in the\nbest way possible among these persons; if the doubt extends to many,\nbut the injured persons were only a few, it seems that restitution may\nbe made by giving to charity or religion either in the place of the\ninjury or elsewhere; if the doubt extends to many, and the injured\npersons were many inhabitants of the locality, restitution must be made\nif possible to the injured parties themselves, otherwise to some public\ncause of the local community.\n\n1787. Order of Preference Among Creditors.--The natural order of\npreference is to be shown to creditors when the debtor is unable to pay\nthem all.\n\n(a) Those who have a right _in re_ (e.g., those whose property is held\nby the debtor) have precedence over those who have only a right _ad\nrem_ (e.g., those who are creditors from contract).\n\n(b) Creditors from onerous contract or delinquency, it is generally\nadmitted, have priority over creditors from gratuitous contract.\n\n(c) Creditors from delinquency and creditors from onerous contract,\naccording to what seems to be the common opinion, are equal in rights\nand should be settled with _pro rata_.\n\n(d) Debts that are certain have priority over debts that are uncertain,\naccording to some; others deny this, but admit that the uncertain debts\nneed be paid only in proportion to their probability.\n\n(e) Creditors who are certain are by some preferred to creditors who\nare uncertain; but others think that payment to the poor, in place of\nthe unknown creditor, is the latter\u2019s presumed will, and that it has an\nequal standing with debts owed to known creditors.\n\n(f) Poor creditors have no just claim to preference over rich\ncreditors; but charity dictates that, when the poor creditor is in\ndistress, he should be given the preference.\n\n(g) Earlier creditors have a preference over later creditors in a real\nclaim, but it is disputed whether this holds also in a personal claim.\n\n(h) The creditor who asks for a settlement sooner has a preference, if\nthe petition is made juridically, and perhaps also if it is made\nprivately.\n\n1788. The order of preference among creditors according to civil law is\ngenerally as follows: (a) proprietary creditors (i.e., those whose\nproperty is held by the debtor); (b) privileged creditors (i.e., those\nwhose debts have a special urgency, such as judicial expenses, doctors\u2019\nbills, wages for hired help, living costs, etc.); (c) hypothecatory\ncreditors (i.e., those who have claims against the property of the\ndebtor, in the form of liens, mortgages, etc.); (d) common creditors\n(i.e., all those who are paid after the previous creditors have been\nsatisfied). American law contains provisions in regard to dispositions\nof property made during the four months before bankruptcy is tiled, so\nas to protect the creditors of a person who is insolvent. The property\nof a bankrupt is placed in the hands of an assignee and allowance is\nmade for the debtor\u2019s needs and perfected liens (i.e., charges legally\nmade upon property for debt). The property is then subject to levy by\nthe creditors as follows: maintenance expenses, legal fees, costs of\nadministration, wages of workmen, taxes, debts having priority under\nFederal or State law.\n\n1789. The \u201cThing\u201d to Be Restored.--(a) In case of unjust possession,\nthe identical object must be restored, if it has an individual value;\notherwise it may be restored in its equivalent. (b) In case of\ncontract, the identical object must be restored, if that is the\nagreement (e.g., in loan of a chattel, or deposit), otherwise it may be\nrestored in its equivalent (e.g., in loan of money).\n\n1790. The \u201cAmount\u201d of Restitution in Certain Cases.--(a) When an Object\nHad Various Values During the Time of Its Possession in Bad Faith.--If\nthe change was from an internal cause and was for the better (e.g., the\ncalf stolen by a thief has become a cow), the return must be made in\nthe improved state; if the change was from an internal cause, and was\nfor the worse but would have happened in any case (e.g., the cow taken\nby the thief has become old), return must be made in the actual state;\nif the change was from an internal cause and for the worse, which would\nnot have happened had the object remained with the owner (e.g., a cow\ntaken by a thief has become lame on account of the thief\u2019s\ncarelessness), return must be made also for the deterioration. If the\nchange was from an external cause (e.g., the wine taken by a thief has\nrisen and declined in value several times), it seems that practically\nnothing more can be imposed by way of restitution than the value the\nobject had when taken.\n\n(b) When Unjust Damage has been Done.--If the damage was caused\npositively, the injured person must be indemnified entirely, if the\ndamage was caused negatively, the injured party should be indemnified\nmore or less according to the reasonable expectation he had of the gain\nof which he was deprived.\n\n1791. The \u201cManner\u201d of Making Restitution.--The general rule is that it\nshould be made in such a way that the injury will be repaired and the\ninjured person indemnified for his loss. Generally speaking, there is\nfreedom of choice as to various forms in the modes of restitution.\nThus, it may be made publicly or secretly, directly or through an\nintermediary, positively (by payment) or negatively (by cancellation of\na debt). It may even be made without the knowledge and intention of the\nparties. (a) Thus, the injured party may be compensated, even though he\nis unaware that he was cheated or that he is being paid back; (b) the\noffender may restore, even though he does not know he is doing so\n(e.g., if he pays while intoxicated), and probably even though he has\nno express intention of doing so (e.g., if he makes a present of $10,\nand then remembers that he owed damages to the amount of $10).\n\n1792. Second Restitution.--Natural law must be applied to certain cases\nin which restitution sent through an intermediary perishes on the way\nthrough no fault of the debtor. (a) If the debt is owed on account of\npossession in good faith, the debtor is not bound to a second\nrestitution. (b) If the debt is owed on account of contract, the goods\nperish to the owner. Thus, if the contract was one of loan, the loss\nmust be borne by the lender; if it was one of sale, by the seller. (e)\nIf the debt is owed on account of delinquency, there is an obligation\nto a second restitution, unless the injured party assumed the risk of\ntransmission. It is held as probable that the choice of the confessor\nas intermediary for restitution has the consent of the injured party,\nand hence that, if the restitution perishes on the way through chance\nor the fault of a third party, there is no duty of second restitution.\n\n1793. The \u201cTime\u201d When Restitution Must Be Made.--(a) Internal\nrestitution, or the purpose of restoring, must be made at once, that\nis, as soon as one adverts to the necessity of this resolve. (b)\nExternal restitution, or the fulfillment of the resolution, must be\nmade at the first suitable opportunity.\n\n1794. Unjust Refusal to Make Restitution or Pay Bills.--(a) Those who\nunjustly refuse to make restitution or to pay their bills at the proper\ntime are guilty of mortal or venial sin according to the damage their\nrefusal causes to the creditor. (b) They are not worthy of absolution\nif there is serious bad faith on their part, as when they have many\ntimes broken their promises, or when they refuse to pay even the part\nor installment which is within their power. (c) They are bound to\nadditional damages for the losses caused by the unjustifiable delay.\n\n1795. The \u201cPlace\u201d Where Restitution Must Be Made.--(a) He who is a\ndebtor on account of injury must make restitution at the place where\nthe thing would be were it not for the injury. (b) He who is a debtor\non account of possession in good faith should notify the owner where\nthe property is, but he is not obliged to bring it to the owner. (c) He\nwho is a debtor on account of contract must abide by the agreement, or\nby the statutes that regulate the contract. Thus, in this country the\nplace of delivery in sales is according to law the seller\u2019s place of\nbusiness or his residence.\n\n1796. Burden of Expense or Loss When Restitution Is Sent to the Place\nof the Creditor.--(a) If the obligation of restitution arises from\ninjury, the debtor is generally bound to pay the transportation and to\nstand the loss when the goods perish in transit. (b) If the obligation\narises from contract, the expenses and losses must be borne according\nto the agreement.\n\nIf nothing was stipulated, it seems equitable that the expenses of\ntransportation be borne by the party who benefits or who requested the\ncontract. According to the Sales Act in the United States, the seller\nis the loser when goods perish in transit, if a place of delivery had\nbeen agreed on; but the buyer is the loser when in pursuance of the\ncontract the goods had been delivered to a carrier for transmission to\nthe buyer (see 1888 d).\n\n1797. The Causes That Excuse Temporarily from Restitution.--These\ncauses can be reduced to two, namely, physical and moral impossibility.\n(a) Physical impossibility exists when the debtor has not the means to\npay and cannot secure them; and it excuses as long as it continues. One\nwho is bankrupt is excused from restitution during the continuance of\nhis insolvency; if he later becomes able to pay, it seems to some that\nthe civil declaration of bankruptcy according to the law of the country\nreleases him from further payment, unless his bankruptcy was fraudulent\nor due to culpable neglect. (b) Moral impossibility exists when the\ndebtor has the means, but cannot pay immediately without incurring a\nloss of a higher order (e.g., if he pays the small sum of money, he\nwill lose his own excellent reputation), or without suffering a greater\nloss in his own goods of the same order (e.g., if he pays the money, he\nwill be reduced to starvation), or without surely bringing on a far\ngreater evil than delay of restitution to the creditor or a third party\n(e.g., if a stolen weapon is returned to its owner, he will commit\nsuicide or murder).\n\n1798. The Causes That Excuse Permanently from Restitution.--These\ncauses can also be reduced to two general ones, namely, the cessation\nof the object and the termination of the obligation through the act of\nthe creditor, or of the debtor, or of authority.\n\n(a) Thus, the cessation of the object releases from the duty of\nrestitution whenever the object perishes to its owner, as when it is\nlost by a possessor in good faith who has not been enriched by it, or\neven by a possessor in bad faith, if it would have been lost equally by\nthe owner (see 1771, 1774).\n\n(b) The termination of obligation through the act of the creditor\noccurs when the creditor freely and lawfully excused the debtor from\npayment. In some cases condonation may ordinarily be presumed, either\non account of the affection of the creditor for the debtor (e.g., in\ncase of debts owed by children to their parents) or on account of the\nfamiliar relationship between the parties and the smallness of the debt\n(e.g., in case of appropriation by servants or employees of some\nunimportant articles not kept under lock and key), or on account of the\nindigence of the debtor and the smallness of the damage (e.g., in case\nof trifling harm to goods of a wealthy person, if there was no great\nmalice and the debtor is very poor).\n\n(c) The termination of obligation is also effected by equivalent\npayment, which in certain cases is made by payment of the creditor\u2019s\ncreditor, or the cancellation of an equal debt owed the debtor by the\ncreditor, and perhaps also by a gift made the creditor by the debtor\nand equal in value to the debt. Occult compensation by the creditor is\nthe secret taking by him of what he is entitled to when the debtor will\nnot give it of his own accord. This is lawful when the debt is certain,\nother means of recovery impossible, and the compensation not injurious;\nbut it covers restitution, and hence the creditor cannot accept another\npayment from the debtor.\n\n(d) The termination of obligation is also effected by the act of\ncompetent authority. Thus, judicial declaration frees from the duty of\nrestitution a person who has lawfully and in good faith received\ncertain goods as damages or award; prescription (see 1875) gives a\nclear title to property held by adverse possession over a certain\nnumber of years, and it frees from the duty of payment, at least in\ncertain cases (though not in the United States); papal composition for\ngood reasons exempts from their obligation those who owe restitution to\npious causes or to church property injured by them.\n\n1799. Condonation of the domestic thefts of wives and children of the\nfamily cannot be presumed in all cases (see 1903).\n\n(a) Thus, if the things stolen are articles of food and drink (or\ntobacco), and were consumed by the members of the family, there is no\nduty of restitution, since the father or husband is then unwilling, not\nso much that these things should be taken, as that they should be taken\nfurtively.\n\n(b) If the things taken do not fall under the class of eatables and are\nstill in the possession of the thief, they should be restored. Hence,\nif a son steals money from his father in order to have the means for\ndebauchery, he must give back that money.\n\n(c) If the things taken were not eatables, but were of great value and\nhave been consumed or alienated, it will depend on circumstances\nwhether restitution is obligatory or not. Thus, if the father thinks\nmuch of the son who took the money and the family does not miss it\nmuch, condonation may perhaps be taken for granted; but if the son is\nnot on good terms with his father, or if the theft is very harmful to\nthe family, restitution may be due.\n\n1800. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Doubtfulness of\nObligation.--(a) One who doubts positively and in good faith whether or\nnot he did damage to another is excused from restitution if the doubt\nis about the fact of the damage (e.g., whether his competitor lost\nbusiness) or about his own culpability (e.g., whether he circulated a\ncalumny about his competitor); he is probably held to restitution _pro\nrata_ of the doubt, if the doubt is about the responsibility of his\nculpable act for the damage that followed (e.g., whether his calumny or\nthe poorness of the competitor\u2019s wares caused the falling off in\nbusiness); he is probably held to only his share, if the doubt is\nwhether his culpable act was responsible for the whole or only a part\nof the damage (e.g., whether his calumny caused all the damage, in view\nof the fact that others were also spreading calumnies).\n\n(b) One who doubts positively and in good faith whether the restitution\nowed by him has been paid (e.g., whether his fellows in calumny have\npaid their portions of restitution, whether he has paid a bill for\ngoods or services received) is held to full payment by some, to part\n(_pro rata_) payment by others, to nothing by others. Some moralists\nthink the presumption favors the creditor, others that it favors the\ndebtor, others that it favors neither and that a compromise is the\nright solution.\n\n1801. Doubt does not excuse restitution in the following cases: (a)\nwhen it is merely negative and the presumption is against the doubter\n(e.g., when a person knows that he purchased and received goods, but\ndoes not know whether or not he paid for them, and has no reason to\nthink he did pay); (b) when it is in bad faith, that is, knowingly or\nintentionally produced (e.g., when two men simultaneously fire at a\nneighbor\u2019s cow, knowing that it will thus become impossible to\ndetermine the author of the damage).\n\n1802. Special Cases.--There are some special cases of restitution for\nnegative injury in thwarting another\u2019s prospects, or for positive\ninjury to goods of fortune, of body, of soul, or of spirit.\n\n(a) For Frustration of Another\u2019s Good.--Restitution is due for keeping\nanother from a good to which he has a strict right (e.g., an office to\nwhich he has been chosen, property for which he has paid), or for using\nforce, fraud, bribes, or other unjust means to keep another from a good\nto which he has a non-strict right (e.g., a position for which he has\nmade application, a gift which another contemplates bestowing on him).\nThe amount of restitution should be calculated according to the\nprevious probability of success on the part of the injured party and\nthe permanent results of the injury.\n\n(b) For Injury Done to Goods of Fortune.--Private injuries are spoken\nof elsewhere (see 1762 sqq.), and now we consider only injuries that\nare in some way public. Commutative injustice entailing restitution to\nthe community is committed by damage to public property, breach of\ncontract made with the community, unjust means employed to prevent the\ngovernment from obtaining its dues, unjust cooperation in any of the\naforementioned acts; commutative injustice entailing reparation to\nindividuals is committed when the transgression of a law places an\nundue burden on a fellow-citizen (e.g., when one unjustly escapes\nmilitary or jury service and causes a substitute to be called who would\nnot have been called otherwise, or when one unjustly evades one\u2019s taxes\nand thereby certainly causes the taxes of others to be raised). If a\ntax law is just, it obliges in conscience, but whether as penal or\npreceptive, whether in virtue of legal or commutative justice, is a\nmuch debated question; and hence the question of sin and of restitution\ndue is not easily settled. Impossibility or a general and admitted\ncustom excuse from restitution (see 2637 sqq.).\n\n(c) For Injury Done to Goods of Body or Personal Goods.--According to\none view no restitution is due for merely personal injuries, since the\ndamage cannot be repaired by a good of the same kind as that which was\ntaken away (e.g., the murderer cannot give back life to his victim);\nbut according to another view restitution is due for these injuries,\nsince justice requires that every kind of damage be repaired as far as\npossible (see 1751 and 2090).\n\n1803. Restitution for Various Kinds of Damage Done to Persons.--(a) For\nBodily Injury by Unjust Homicide or Mutilation.--The offender (or his\nheirs) is obliged to restitution to the victim (or his heirs or\ndependents) for spiritual loss (such as death without the Sacraments),\nprobably for personal loss (such as pain, facial disfigurement), and\nfor real losses due to the injury (such as hospital expenses, loss of\nsupport by the widow and orphans). The spiritual loss is compensated by\nspiritual goods, such as suffrages for the departed, the personal loss\nby compensation suited to the circumstances (e.g., money employment),\nthe real loss by payment of medical expenses, loss of time, support\nlost by dependents, etc. The offender is not liable for damages of\nwhich he is not the unjust cause (e.g., the alms that will be lost by\npoor persons on account of homicide, since they have no strict right to\nthe alms), or the efficacious cause (e.g., the pay that will be lost by\ncreditors on account of homicide, for as a rule the slayer cannot\nforesee this), nor for damages which the injured person clearly\ncondones.\n\n(b) For Bodily Injuries by Fornication or Adultery.--In case of\nfornication the offender owes restitution to the person seduced and\nalso at times to the latter\u2019s parents, and both sinners are bound to\nsupport their illegitimate child. The form of the compensation will\ndepend much on circumstances, but in general it should be either\nmarriage with the person seduced or some kind of pecuniary\ncompensation. It should be noted that a promise to marry, even though\nit is canonically valid, gives no action to enforce marriage, but even\nan invalid engagement gives rise to action for unjust material damages,\nsuch as loss of chance to marry or loss of money spent in view of the\nmarriage (see Canon 1017). In case of adultery the guilty party or\nparties are bound to make restitution to the injured husband if an\nillegitimate child is being reared at his expense, and also to the\nlegitimate children for injuries to their strict rights, as in the\ndiminished inheritance received from their parents on account of the\nillegitimate child. A child is not obliged to accept the word of his\nmother that he is illegitimate, but if he is certain about his\nillegitimacy, he may not take that to which he is not entitled. In\nrestitution for fornication or adultery, care must be taken to preserve\nthe good names of all the parties concerned.\n\n(c) For Injuries of Soul.--In case of unjust and efficacious damage to\nphysical goods (e.g., when one by fraud or force administers to another\ndrugs or intoxicants that take away the use of reason or self-control,\nwhen a professor neglects his office of teaching or teaches error),\nrestitution is certainly due for any material damages that result, and\nprobably for the personal injury alone. In case of damage to spiritual\ngoods, by inducement to commit sin or by dissuasion from good,\nrestitution is due when the influence exerted was unjust (e.g., by\nfraud, force, threats), not when it was merely uncharitable (e.g., by\nadvice, persuasion, request, example). Restitution for spiritual damage\nmay be made negatively, that is, by removal of the unjust influence;\nbut if a person who was seduced has in consequence become a hardened\nsinner, it seems that restitution should be made positively, that is,\nby counsels, requests, prayers to God, and other prudent means\ncalculated to recall the injured party to a life of virtue.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 4: THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 63-78.)\n\n1804. The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice.--Favoritism (i.e.,\nacceptance of persons, partiality) is defined as \u201ca species of\ninjustice which moves one to distribute the common goods or burdens of\nsociety, not according to merit or fitness, but according to some other\nand impertinent standard.\u201d\n\n(a) The common goods include offices, honors, functions, while the\ncommon burdens include taxes, contributions, and penalties.\n\n(b) The common goods of which we now speak are those that belong to\nsociety and that must be portioned out to its members justly. Hence,\nthere is no question of goods that belong to private persons, which the\nowners are not obliged to give to others unless it be in virtue of\ncharity or liberality. A rich man is not guilty of acceptance of\npersons, if he bestows his largesses on those who are less in need or\nless deserving, but more acceptable to himself; and God is not unjust\nwhen he gives unequal graces to those who are equally sinners (Matt.,\nxx. 14, 15).\n\n(c) The right standard of just distribution is merit or fitness, as\nwhen an applicant is appointed to the post of teacher or superior on\naccount of good character and knowledge. Any other standard which\nleaves merit and fitness out of consideration is unjust, as when a\npublic official selects for offices or honors, not those who have\nworked the hardest or who give the most promise, but those who have\nmore money or who are related to himself.\n\n1805. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Revelation.--In Holy Scripture\nfavoritism is reproved (\u201cHow long will you judge unjustly and accept\nthe persons of the wicked?\u201d Psalm lxxi. 2), and impartiality is praised\n(\u201cThou art a true speaker and teachest the way of God in truth, neither\ncarest Thou for any man, for Thou dost not regard the person of man,\u201d\nMatt., xxii. 16; \u201cMasters, know that the Lord both of servants and you\nis in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him,\u201d Eph., vi.\n9). Distributive justice is commanded in many passages of Holy Writ\n(\u201cConsider not the person of the poor, nor honor the countenance of the\nmighty; but judge thy neighbor according to justice,\u201d Levit. xix. 15;\n\u201cThere shall be no difference of persons, you shall hear the little as\nwell as the great, neither shall you respect any man\u2019s person,\u201d Deut.,\ni. 17; \u201cThou shalt not accept persons nor gifts,\u201d Deut., xvi. 19; cfr.\nJames, ii. 1 sqq.).\n\n1806. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Reason.--Favoritism\ntransgresses a divine command and substitutes personal will for right\nin the treatment of subjects by superiors. Hence, it is morally evil,\nfor disobedience is sinful in the high as well as in the low, and\nviolation of rights is unjust whether the rights be of the community or\nof the individual.\n\n1807. The Gravity of the Sin of Favoritism.--(a) From its nature,\nfavoritism is a mortal sin; for it is a form of injustice (see 1746),\nand indeed it is no less damaging than commutative injustice (e.g.,\ntheft) and is often accompanied by the latter. (b) From its matter and\nfrom the lack of deliberation or consent it may be venial. Thus, if\nfavoritism is shown in a trifling matter (e.g., in conferring a post\nthat is unremunerative and unimportant) or in a small degree (e.g., in\npreferring an applicant who is only slightly less worthy), there is\nonly venial injustice.\n\n1808. Distributive injustice is also frequently accompanied by\ncommutative injustice.\n\n(a) Thus, a first class of common goods that are distributed are those\nintended primarily for the common good, and only indirectly and\nsecondarily for the good of individuals, such as public offices,\ndignities, and benefices. He who distributes these offices unfairly, by\nappointing unworthy persons, or by appointing the less worthy when he\nis under contract to appoint the more worthy, violates commutative\njustice and is held to restitution to the community; but the worthy or\nmore worthy persons slighted had no strict right, and hence no\nrestitution is due them, unless there was a compact with them or unjust\nmeans were used to exclude them (see 1755).\n\n(b) A second class of common goods are those that are intended\nprimarily for the benefit of individuals, such as a fund created for\nthe relief of the destitute or afflicted or pensions set aside for\nthose who have deserved well of society. He who distributes these goods\nunfairly is guilty of commutative injustice against private persons,\nsince the goods were destined for them, and they had a right _ad rem_\nto the goods, and hence to these persons restitution is owed.\n\n1809. Favoritism in Spiritual Matters.--(a) Partiality in granting\nfavors is sinful, and gravely so when the matter is serious. Examples\nare the grant to the unworthy of the power of Orders or of\njurisdiction, the concession of permissions and dispensations to one\u2019s\nfriends that are denied to others. (b) Partiality in imposing burdens\nis also sinful, as when a prelate issues an onerous command, and grants\nexemption to his friends. But if the thing commanded is obligatory\nalready by reason of law, it should be observed in spite of the\nfavoritism of the prelate.\n\n1810. Who is to be considered as more worthy for appointments in\nspiritual matters?\n\n(a) The more worthy person is the one who will better serve the common\ngood in the office. Hence, the more pious or the more learned man is\nnot necessarily the more worthy, for another may have greater industry,\ninfluence, executive ability, initiative, prudence, experience, etc.,\nand so be better suited to fill the position. But no person should be\nconsidered as worthy of spiritual offices unless his moral character is\ngood, and excellence in temporal things does not compensate for\nnegligence in spiritual matters.\n\n(b) The more worthy person is the one who is more available when the\nappointment has to be made. Hence, the one who is better gifted for the\noffice is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may be better\nknown and it may be impossible to make investigations and comparisons\nat the moment.\n\n1811. Opinion of the Applicant or Appointee about His Own Fitness.--(a)\nThe applicant need not think that he is worthy or the most worthy;\nindeed, according to St. Thomas, it would be presumptuous for him to\nthink so highly of himself, and he would thus become unworthy. It\nsuffices, then, that the applicant have in mind only to try for the\noffice, leaving the decision about fitness to the examiner or appointer.\n\n(b) The acceptor who feels that he is unworthy or less worthy is not\nguilty of injustice; for he is not the judge of his own abilities and\nmay rely on the judgment of those who appoint him. Moreover, he can\ntrust to divine grace and his own efforts to make up for any deficiency\nor inferiority of which he is conscious. But it seems that, if the\nappointee were absolutely certain that his appointment was unjust, he\nwould be bound to surrender his office, if this were possible.\n\n1812. Favoritism in Secular Matters.--Do the conclusions in reference\nto ecclesiastical offices apply also to secular offices?\n\n(a) In both cases distributive justice is violated by favoritism, for\nthe standard followed is not merit or fitness, and thus the more worthy\npersons are injured. The opinion that civil society has dominion of\npublic offices and therefore the right to distribute them at will,\nwithout regard to the merits or fitness of persons selected, is not\nprobable; for civil rulers, like spiritual rulers, should consider\nthemselves as ministers and dispensers only (I Cor., iv. 1), and even\nif they had dominion over offices, they would be bound to use that\npower for the benefit of the public for whom they rule.\n\n(b) In both cases also commutative justice is violated in some\ninstances, the offense being either against society or against\nindividuals (see 1755, 1808). Thus, an official who appoints a\nsubordinate knowing that he will oppress and rob, is responsible and\nbound to restitution to the victims as being a cooperator in injustice.\n\n1813. Favoritism in Marks of Esteem or Honor Shown to Others.--(a)\nThere is no favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who\ndeserve it on account of their virtue or position. Hence, it is not\nunjust but just to show special marks of veneration to holy persons,\nand even to those who are not holy, but whose authority or age deserves\nrespect (such as rulers and prelates, parents and aged men).\n\n(b) There is favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who have\nno genuine claim to it on account of goodness or rank. Thus, wealthy\nmen are worthy of special respect on account of goodness when they\nemploy their riches in useful ways, or on account of preeminence in the\ncommunity in rank, ability, influence, etc., and he who shows special\ncourtesy or attention to the wealthy for reasons such as these is not a\nrespector of persons. But if mere wealth is worshipped, sinful\nfavoritism is shown, as when a villainous rich man is honored and a\nworthy poor man is despised, or well-dressed persons are conducted\nhonorably to comfortable seats in church and good persons whose attire\nis poor are treated with contempt (James, ii).\n\n1814. Favoritism in Judges (Umpires, Arbitrators) and the Like.--(a) In\nthe course of a trial there may be favoritism in matters left to the\njudge\u2019s discretion. This does not happen, however, when the\ndiscretionary power is intended for the judge\u2019s own benefit (e.g., when\non a free day he decides to hear one side rather than the other), but\nwhen it is meant for the benefit of the litigants (e.g., when he grants\nto one side a longer time for preparation of its case than to the other\nside and for no reason pertinent to the matter at issue).\n\n(b) In the sentence pronounced there is favoritism, if the decision is\nnot based on the merits of the litigants, but on extraneous\nconsiderations, such as the fact that one of the parties is a friend or\nrelative of the judge or arbitrator, or belongs to the same political\nparty or business, etc.: \u201cIt is not good to accept the person of the\nwicked, to decline from the truth of judgment\u201d (Prov., xviii. 5). If\nthe arguments are about evenly balanced on both sides, it would be\nfavoritism to decide in favor of one against the other. Alexander VII\ncondemned the proposition that a judge may take money in such a case of\ndoubt to decide for one party (Denzinger, n. 1126).\n\n1815. The Vices against Commutative Justice.--These vices can be\nclassified under two general heads: (a) the vices committed in\ninvoluntary commutations (see 1748), which include deeds against the\nperson (such as homicide, mutilation, imprisonment) and against\nproperty (such as theft and rapine), and unjust words, whether spoken\nduring judicial process (by judges, advocates, witnesses, etc.), or\noutside of judicial process (such as contumely, detraction, etc); (b)\nvices committed in voluntary commutations (see 1748), which include\nfraud and usury.\n\n1816. Homicide.--Life destroyed is either that of an irrational being\n(i.e., of a plant or beast) or of a rational being. In the latter case\nwe have homicide, which is defined as follows: \u201can act or omission of a\nhuman being that is the efficacious cause (see 1763) of the death of a\nhuman being.\u201d A parent who denies his child the food, remedies or\nclimate which it needs and which he can afford commits homicide by\nomission; a physician who practises abortion commits homicide by act.\nThe following distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its\nsubstantial morality (i.e., its lawfulness or unlawfulness):\n\n(a) in reference to the intention, homicide is either voluntary or\ninvoluntary, and voluntary homicide is intended either as a punishment\nor as a defense;\n\n(b) in reference to the slayer, homicide is either the act of a public\nor of a private person, of a cleric or of a layman;\n\n(c) in reference to the person slain, homicide is either the killing of\none who is guilty or of one who is innocent, either the killing of a\nneighbor or of self (suicide);\n\n(d) in reference to the manner, homicide is either direct or indirect,\naccording as the action from which death results is from its nature\n(_finis operis_) productive of death or of some other effect. Thus, it\nis directly homicidal to practise embryotomy (i.e., the destruction of\nthe vital organs of a fetus) or abortion (i.e., the ejection of a fetus\nat a stage of development when it is unable to live outside the\nmother), but it is not directly homicidal to give a pregnant woman\nremedies necessary for her life, although harmful to the fetus; for the\nobject or purpose of the former is to kill, of the latter to cure.\n\n1817. Other distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its added or\naccidental malice.\n\n(a) A new species of sin is added to that of injustice when other\nvirtues are offended against. Thus, the virtue of piety is violated\nwhen the victim is a person to whom the slayer owed special respect and\ndevotedness, as in parricide, regicide, fratricide, uxoricide; the\nvirtue of religion is offended when murder is committed in a church.\n\n(b) An aggravating circumstance is added by the greater deliberation\nwith which the homicide is planned, or the greater treachery or cruelty\nwith which it is executed (e.g., assassination, death by starvation).\nSome circumstances, however, may be morally indifferent, such as the\nfact that the victim is killed by one kind of poison rather than\nanother.\n\n1818. The Killing of Animals (or Vegetation).--(a) In itself, the\nkilling of animals is not sinful; for animals are made for the use of\nman. Hence, it is lawful to kill, not only harmful animals, such as\nthose that prey on human beings or breed pestilence or destroy\nproperty, etc., but also other animals, when their death is necessary\nfor some good purpose, such as the provision of food, clothing or\nmedicine for man.\n\n(b) In its circumstances, the killing of animals may be sinful, and\neven gravely sinful, as when one kills the animals of one\u2019s neighbor\n(Exod, xxii. 10, 11), or hunts against the law, or injures society by\nprodigal destruction of animal or plant life, or kills animals in cruel\nways. The skinning of animals alive, in order to secure finer-looking\nfurs to satisfy the vanity of women, is an inhuman barbarism of the\nworst type that should be reprobated by everybody.\n\n1819. When Homicide Is Lawful.--Killing of human beings is lawful in\ntwo cases. (a) It is lawful when the common safety requires that the\nState inflict death for a crime (capital punishment); for just as it is\nlawful to amputate a gangrenous member which threatens to destroy the\nbody, so is it lawful to remove from human society by death an\nindividual who menaces the safety of the community. (b) It is lawful\nwhen the safety of an individual demands that he kill an unjust\naggressor (self-defense); for a man owes his first duty to his own life\nin such a case, and the aggressor in making a deadly attack voluntarily\nassumes the risk of being killed. It is more correct, however, to say\nhere that it is lawful to defend one\u2019s life with resultant death to the\noffender (as will be explained below, in 1826, 1828, 1834).\n\n1820. Arguments for the Lawfulness of Capital Punishment.--(a)\nScripture.--In the Old Testament the death sentence was prescribed for\ncertain more serious crimes, such as murder (\u201cwhosoever shall shed\nman\u2019s blood, his blood shall be shed,\u201d Gen., ix. 6); in the New\nTestament Our Lord recognizes that the power of a judge to sentence to\ndeath comes from above (John, xix. 10), and St. Paul declares that\nprinces do not wield the sword without reason, but act as ministers of\nGod when they punish evil-doers (Rom., xiii. 4).\n\n(b) Tradition.--The Church has always taught the lawfulness of capital\npunishment and rejected contrary errors, as in the case of the\nWaldensians condemned by Innocent III.\n\n(c) Reason.--The State has both the duty and the right to promote the\ncommon good and to defend it against its enemies, whether by war\nagainst external foes or by coercive measures against internal\ndisturbers of the peace. Now, the experience of all the centuries and\nof all countries has shown that, generally speaking, the lives of\nlaw-abiding persons and the general peace are not sufficiently\nprotected unless the supreme penalty be appointed for certain crimes.\n\n1821. Though lawful, capital punishment is not always necessary; for it\nis a means to an end, and it may be omitted, therefore, when the end\ncan be obtained by the use of other and less severe means.\n\n(a) Thus, a general suspension of the capital punishment is lawful in a\ncommunity whose members are peaceful and not inclined to violence or\nother crimes subversive of law and order. Whether such ideal conditions\nexist today may be doubted, and indeed some countries that abolished\nthe death penalty have found that this proved an incentive to crime and\nthey were forced to restore the former laws.\n\n(b) A particular exemption from capital punishment is lawful, when\nthere are good reasons recognized by law for commutation or clemency.\nThis has been the practice of governments throughout history, and is\njustified when it furthers the common welfare, or at least shows mercy\nto a deserving individual without harm to society. But a judge has to\ncondemn when the law and the facts call for condemnation, and the\nauthority in whom the pardoning power is vested has to use his power\nprudently, lest he encourage lawlessness.\n\n1822. It is not morally lawful to put criminals to death unless the\nfollowing conditions are present:\n\n(a) the crime must be external and of such a character that the public\nwelfare requires the supreme punishment, either on account of the\nenormity of the act (e.g., murder), or on account of its danger (e.g.,\nsleeping at one\u2019s post in time of war). Further, the crime must be\ncertain and sufficiently established, for, since the punishment should\nfit the offense and the law presumes innocence until guilt is proved,\nno one should be sentenced to death except for a serious and certain\ncrime. The Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution declares that\nno person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due\nprocess of law;\n\n(b) the sentence of death and its execution should be performed by\nthose who have public authority for these acts and in the manner\nrequired by law. For capital punishment is a means of self-defense used\nby society, and its use pertains there fore to the representatives of\nsociety. Moreover, if private individuals exercised this function,\naccused persons would not receive the consideration of their rights or\nthe opportunity of defense due them, and the public peace would be\noverthrown by murders of revenge committed in the name of justice.\n\n(c) the penalty should be carried out in a humane and Christian manner,\nas is manifest. The convicted man should be allowed time and\nopportunity to make his peace with God and, if possible, to say\nfarewell to relatives. Slow and agonizing forms of killing are of\ncourse entirely wrong, no matter how wicked the criminal who is being\nexecuted. The American law and other laws do not permit a pregnant\nwoman to be executed until she has delivered her child.\n\n1823. Unlawful Killing of Offenders.--The killing of offenders is,\ntherefore, unlawful in the following cases:\n\n(a) when the offense is not serious or fully deliberate (e.g.,\ninvoluntary manslaughter), or when it has not been sufficiently\nestablished (e.g., if it is not certain that the supposed victim of\nmurder is dead or that he died from a homicidal act). In civilized\ncountries today the law inflicts capital punishment only for the most\nserious crimes, and the State has to prove its case beyond reasonable\ndoubt before the punishment can be decreed. But in the past death was\noften the penalty for horse- or sheep-stealing, or even smaller\noffenses, and in times of excitement men have sometimes been sentenced\nto death without a fair trial;\n\n(b) when the sentence of death is not pronounced or executed legally.\nThose who lynch the perpetrators of heinous crimes are often in good\nfaith, especially if the processes of the law are too slow or\nuncertain, but since they act without authority, their deed is really\nmurder. The same is true of a husband who kills his wife taken in\nadultery, of the relative of a seduced girl who kills the seducer, of\nan officer of the law who unnecessarily or without authorization kills\na man sentenced to death when the latter is trying to escape. The State\nhas the right, though, to declare a notorious malefactor outlawed, and\nthus to give to private citizens the right to take him dead or alive,\nor to kill him on sight; but it is clear that the exercise of this\nright is a dangerous remedy and one to be used sparingly;\n\n(c) when the mode of killing or the circumstances are repugnant to\nChristian feeling. Today capital punishment is generally inflicted in a\nhumane manner, but history records many cruel forms of execution, as\nwhen men were hanged, drawn and quartered, or burned at the stake, or\nput to death amid the jeers and curses of the populace.\n\n1824. Is Tyrannicide Lawful?--(a) If the ruler is a tyrant in act (that\nis, one who has a lawful title to rule but who abuses his authority),\nit is not lawful to kill him on account of his misdeeds or crimes,\nsince the subject has not the authority to act in the name of the\nnation (Rom., xiii. 1 sqq.; I Peter, ii. 18). In case of self-defense,\nhowever, as when the tyrant unjustly makes a personal attempt on the\nlife of a citizen, the latter has the right to kill. The Council of\nConstance condemned the doctrine of Wycliff that every subject has the\nright to assassinate a tyrannical prince, a doctrine that would make\nthe position of every ruler unsafe, since there are always persons who\nthink they are victims of persecution. The nation, however, has the\nright to depose or even to execute a wicked ruler, for government is\ngiven to rulers for the benefit, not for the destruction, of the common\ngood.\n\n(b) If the ruler is a tyrant in title (that is, a usurper), it is not\nlawful to kill him, when he has already obtained peaceful possession;\nfor here again it cannot be said that the killer would have the\nauthorization of the nation. If, however, the tyrant has not obtained\npossession but is struggling for it, his status will not be that of\nruler but of public enemy, and it will be lawful to kill him as an act\nof war, provided the conditions of a just war are present (see 1384).\n\n1825. Judges and Executioners in Canon Law.--According to the law of\nthe Church (Canon 984, nn. 6, 7), those who pass the death sentence as\njudges and the executioners and their immediate and voluntary helpers\nbecome irregular (i.e., incapable of lawfully receiving Orders or of\nexercising their powers). The reasons for this ancient discipline are\nchiefly two:\n\n(a) clerics are the ministers of Christ, and therefore they should be\nlike their High Priest, whose sacrifice they offer at the altar. Now\nChrist \u201cwhen He was reviled, did not revile, when He suffered, He\nthreatened not, but delivered Himself to him that judged Him unjustly\u201d\n(I Peter, ii. 23). Hence, it is unbecoming that clerics should condemn\nto death or kill their fellow-men, even criminals;\n\n(b) clerics are the ministers of the New Testament, and therefore they\nshould conform themselves to its spirit of mildness. The divine law\nitself declares that a bishop should not have private quarrels or\ninflict blows (I Tim., iii. 3), but the church law goes further and\ndeclares that a cleric should not even act as public judge or\nexecutioner in capital cases. The Old Testament inflicted corporal\npunishments and death, and hence we read that its priests and levites\nput sinners to death with their own hands (Exod., xxxii. 28; Num., xxv.\n7, 8; I Kings, xv. 33; III Kings, xviii. 40; I Mach., ii. 24), but the\nlaw of Christ contains no sentences of death or of bodily chastisement.\n\n1826. The Right of Self-Defense.--The second case of lawful homicide\nmentioned above (1819) is the killing of an unjust aggressor, not\nintended by the slayer, but consequent on his defense of his life\nagainst the aggressor. This right of self-defense is granted by natural\nlaw itself, and has been denied by but few moralists.\n\n(a) Thus, nature inclines man to prefer his own life to that of\nanother, other things being equal, and therefore it authorizes him to\ndefend his life even at the cost of an aggressor\u2019s life. Even the brute\nanimals are armed by nature to defend themselves against attack.\n\n(b) The natural law also permits one to perform an act from which two\neffects will follow, one good and the other bad, provided the good\neffect alone is intended and there is a sufficient reason for\npermitting the evil effect (see 104). In the present case the killing\nof the aggressor is an evil, while the protection of the innocent party\nis a good; but it is only the protection that is intended, and the\nkilling is not an extreme measure in view of the greatness of the good\nthat is at stake.\n\n1827. The right of self-defense is also sanctioned by human laws. (a)\nThus, church law recognizes this right in the words of Innocent III:\n\u201cAll laws permit one to repel force by force, but the defense must not\nbe immoderate, nor exercised from desire of revenge.\u201d According to the\nCode (Canon 985, n. 4) irregularity arises from voluntary homicide, but\nthis does not include the case of lawful self-defense, although a\nprovisional dispensation must be asked for. A cleric has the right of\nself-defense, as well as a layman. (b) Civil law also has always\nadmitted the right of a person assailed by another to defend himself,\neven by killing the assailant, if there is no other alternative.\n\n1828. Conditions for the Exercise of This Right.--(a) The assault must\nbe a true aggression (i.e., an act of violence threatening the life of\nthe person assaulted) and unjust (i.e., an attack made without public\nauthority); (b) the resistance must be true self-defense (i.e., an act\nused to ward off attack or to make the assailant powerless) and\nmoderate (i.e., the person attacked must not use more force than\nnecessary and he must not intend to kill the assailant).\n\n1829. The person who is killed must be a true aggressor, for otherwise\nthe slayer is himself the aggressor and guilty of unjustifiable\nhomicide. Killing is therefore unjust in the following cases:\n\n(a) when the opponent is not using true violence, as when he merely\nprays and hopes that you may die or be killed;\n\n(b) when he is not using actual violence, as when he is disarmed or\nhelpless, or when he has only threatened to kill you in the future, or\nto bring you to the gallows by his testimony or vote.\n\n1830. Must one wait, then, until the aggressor has actually attacked,\nbefore using self-defense? (a) One need not wait until physical\naggression has started (e.g., until the adversary has fired a shot or\nstruck a blow); otherwise self-defense would very often be futile. (b)\nOne should wait until moral aggression has been shown before proceeding\nto defense; that is, the other party must perform some external act\nwhich according to the judgment of a prudent person at the time and\nplace is one with the act of physical aggression, as when an angry man\nreaches for a gun or knife, or a desperado advances in a threatening\nmanner.\n\n1831. The aggression must also be unjust or contrary to the right of\nthe person attacked. (a) Thus, if the aggression is just, it is not\nlawful to kill the aggressor. Hence, it is not lawful to kill an\nofficer of the law who is making an arrest, or guarding a prisoner, or\nleading him to execution. (b) If the aggression is not just,\nself-defense is lawful. It makes no difference whether the aggression\nis formally unjust (e.g., when the aggressor attacks you because he\nwishes to wreak revenge, or because he fears you), or only materially\nunjust (e.g., when you are a stranger to the aggressor, but he is\ndrunk, or a dope fiend, or a maniac). Similarly, a son may defend\nhimself against his parent, a subject against his superior, a layman\nagainst a cleric, an adulterer against the injured husband, a\ncalumniator against the person calumniated; for authority or personal\ninjury suffered does not give these persons the right to inflict by\nprivate authority the punishment of death.\n\n1832. Self-defense must be merely a protection of self against future\nevil and not a punishment of the aggressor for past attacks, for\ncapital punishment belongs to society, not to private persons. Hence,\nif an aggressor has taken to flight, or has been disarmed, or knocked\nsenseless, or has begged for mercy, it is not permissible to kill him.\n\n1833. Self-defense must be moderate, for injury or the death of a human\nbeing is a thing that should be avoided when possible. (a) Thus, the\nperson attacked must not reply with force at all, if this is possible.\nHe should escape, or call a policeman, or throw the weapon out of the\nwindow, etc., if these means will suffice. Some authors excuse from\nflight those who would suffer disgrace if they ran away from danger,\nsuch as those who are pugilists or professional fighting men. (b) The\nperson attacked should use only such force as is necessary, if force\nmust be employed. Thus, if the aggressor can be made helpless by the\nuse of gas, permanent bodily harm should not be done him; if he can be\nsubdued with the fists, knife or pistol wounds should not be resorted\nto; if wounds will suffice to hold him at bay (e.g., by blackjacking),\nkilling should not be resorted to. In the heat of a fight, however, the\nperson assailed sometimes unintentionally goes beyond what moderation\nrequires.\n\n1834. The intention of the person who uses force to repel an unjust\naggressor must be good. (a) Thus, as his end he must intend only the\npreservation of his own life and look upon the death of his neighbor as\na misfortune. (b) As the means to this end he must intend only to stop\nthe attack that is being made, not to bring on the death of the\naggrcssor. Those who are commissioned by public authority to put a\nhuman being to death (e.g., the public executioner or soldiers in time\nof war) may intend these homicides, since they are means to the common\ngood; but the death of one private person is not a means to the good of\nanother private person, and hence it should not be directly aimed at.\n\n1835. The mind of the person who defends himself against the unjust\naggressor must also be free from sinful dispositions, such as hatred\nand revenge; otherwise he sins against charity. Our Lord reprobated the\nteaching of the Scribes that it is lawful to return injury for injury\nin a revengeful spirit, and declared that one should prefer to receive\na second blow rather than return a blow for the sake of revenge (Matt.,\nv. 38 sqq.; cfr. also Rom., xii. 19).\n\n1836. When Self-Defense Is Obligatory.--Self-defense is sometimes an\nobligation. (a) Thus, it is an obligation, if the only factors\nconsidered are the life of the guilty aggressor and the life of the\ninnocent person who is assailed; for the life of the innocent should\nnot be sacrificed for the guilty, and charity indicates that the first\nduty of the person attacked is to himself. (b) It is an obligation, if,\non account of circumstances, the person attacked owes it to others to\npreserve his life--for example, if he is the father of a dependent\nfamily, or a public official whose life is very necessary for the\nwelfare of the community, or whose office it is to resist those who\nmenace public security. This is true from the viewpoint of society\nalso, for the world needs the good men it has, while there are too many\nwicked men already.\n\n1837. Sometimes self-defense is not obligatory. (a) Thus, it is merely\noptional, when no duty to others commands self-defense and a divine\ncounsel invites one to omit it (see 1169). Hence, if the assailant is\ncertainly in mortal sin, while the person assailed is certainly in the\nstate of grace, it would be very commendable to die rather than kill\nthe assailant, in order to grant him time for repentance. But a case of\nthis kind is rather theoretical than practical, for how could one be\nsure that the assailant would profit by the opportunity allowed him of\ndoing penance? At any rate, the sacrifice is optional, for the\naggressor is either formally unjust, and hence not in extreme spiritual\nneed, or only materially unjust, and it will be uncertain whether he is\nin spiritual need or whether, if he is in such need, the respite will\nbe used by him (see 1165 sqq.). (b) Self-defense is unlawful according\nto some, if the life of the assailant is necessary for the common good,\nand the life of the person assailed is not necessary. But this would be\na very rare case.\n\n1838. Defense of Neighbor\u2019s Life.--The principles on defense of one\u2019s\nown life against an unjust aggressor, even at cost of the latter\u2019s\nlife, may be applied to the life of an innocent third party.\n\n(a) Thus, it is necessary to defend the innocent person, even if the\naggressor has to be killed, when one is bound to give this protection\nby natural duty (e.g., because the innocent person is one\u2019s child or\nfather and the aggressor is not a relative), or by contract (e.g.,\nbecause one is a hired bodyguard or policeman).\n\n(b) It is lawful to defend the innocent person, even if the aggressor\nhas to be killed, and even though there is no duty of nature or\ncontract to give this protection (Exod., ii, 12). But it is disputed\nwhether it is also necessary to do this. The affirmative opinion calls\nattention to the extreme bodily need of the innocent party, the\nnegative to the extreme spiritual need of the aggressor. It is not\nnecessary to risk one\u2019s life in order to protect the life of the\ninnocent party, unless the public safety is in peril, or one has\nundertaken this obligation (see 1169).\n\n1839. A private individual may defend life at the cost of the life of\nan unjust aggressor, because he is obliged or permitted to protect the\nlife that has more of a claim on him. He may also defend certain other\nmost important goods that belong to him or to his neighbor, even if\nneed be at the cost of the unjust aggressor\u2019s life, because the common\ngood is more valuable than the life of the aggressor, and the defense\nof those goods is bound up with the common good. Thus, if it were not\npermissible to defend valuable property even to the extent of killing a\nburglar, criminals would be encouraged, peaceful citizens would be at a\ndisadvantage, and the public security would greatly suffer. Among the\ngoods now spoken of are goods of fortune and goods of body. It is not\nalways obligatory, however, to exercise the right of extreme\nself-defense (e.g., in case of violation, provided no consent is given\nthe deed).\n\n1840. Defense of Goods of Fortune Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If\nthe attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., the aggressor\nwishes to take the last loaf from a starving man or the plank from a\ndrowning man), or if it seems to be an attack on life (e.g., the\nburglar enters a room as if he meant to kill), the killing of the\nunjust aggressor is not unlawful, as is clear from the previous\nparagraphs.\n\n(b) If the attack is made on goods of fortune only, but they are of\ngreat value and actually possessed, the question is disputed. According\nto some, killing in this case is unlawful, because life is more\nvaluable than property; but the common opinion is that killing is\nlawful, both because Scripture excuses the person who kills the\nnocturnal robber (Exod., xxii. 2), and because the public safety is at\nstake and therefore justifies extreme measures.\n\n(c) If the attack is made only on goods of fortune, and they are not\nyet possessed (e.g., a legacy one hopes to obtain) or have only a small\nvalue (e.g., one gold piece), killing is unlawful; for there is no\nproportion between external goods that are only hoped for or that are\nof minor importance and the life of a human being. Pope Innocent XI\ncondemned the teaching that one may use homicidal defense to protect a\ncoin or the prospect of receiving an office.\n\n1841. Defense of Bodily Purity Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If the\nattack is equivalent to an attack on life, or seems to be an attack on\nlife, self-defense even by killing is lawful, and hence it may be\npermissible to kill one who is attempting rape.\n\n(b) If the attack is on bodily purity only, but _per actum consummatum\nluxuriae_, the question is controverted. One opinion is that killing may\nnot be resorted to, for the aggressor cannot take away purity of soul,\nand the purity of body that he violates is less good than life. The\nopposite opinion holds that killing may be employed in self-defense,\nsince bodily purity has a higher value than even notable goods of\nfortune, especially as violation is usually accompanied by spiritual\ndamage or disgrace of family, etc.; and the public interest demands\nthat such outrages be sternly suppressed on account of the strong\ninclination of many persons to commit them.\n\n(c) If the attack is on bodily purity only, and _per actum\nnon-consummatum luxuriae_ (e.g., _per osculum vel amplexum_), killing is\nnot justified, but other means of defense, such as blows or wounds, may\nbe used.\n\n1842. Defense of Bodily Integrity Against an Unjust Aggressor.--(a) If\nthe attack is equivalent to an attack on life (e.g., if the aggressor\nintends to mutilate or wound, but there is danger that he will kill),\ndefense even with resultant killing is lawful.\n\n(b) If the attack is not equivalent to an attack on life, but is very\nnotable (as when a principal member will be lost or the person horribly\ndisfigured), some authorities claim that defense which would cause the\naggressor\u2019s death is unlawful, because death is too heavy a price to\npay for wounds. But against this it may be argued that the loss of\nlimbs or organs is more serious than the loss of money, and, in some\nrespects, is more damaging than violation. The civil law gives a person\nthe right to protect himself in body and limbs, even by killing the\nassailant when absolutely necessary.\n\n(c) If the attack menaces only a minor detriment (e.g., a black eye or\nbloody nose), certainly killing is unjustified. But the person attacked\nmay hit harder and oftener than the assailant, if he is able, so that\nthe latter may beware of him another time.\n\n1843. Defense of Honor or Reputation.--When honor or reputation is\nunjustly attacked, the more perfect course is to bear the injury\npatiently and to pardon the offense, according to the teaching of\nChrist. But it is not sinful to defend honor and reputation, just as it\nis not sinful to defend life, limbs and property. How far may one go in\ndefense of honor or reputation against an unjust aggressor?\n\n(a) If the aggression is merely in words (as when the offender calls\nthe other party a liar, or says that he is illegitimate), it is not\nlawful to use violence, at least such as would cause death; for there\nare other and less drastic means of defense that suffice (e.g., to\nanswer the allegations, or even to retort the same epithets against the\naggressor), and, unless the violence of even justifiable resentment\nwere restrained, the world would be filled with disorder and homicidal\nviolence. Innocent XI and Alexander VII condemned the doctrine that one\nmay kill in order to prevent the spread of calumny.\n\n(b) If the aggression is in deeds (as when the offender slaps the other\nperson or throws mud or rotten eggs at him), it is not lawful to kill;\nfor here also defense can be made in other ways (e.g., by bringing the\naggressor before the court for punishment, or, if this cannot be done,\nby returning slap for slap, etc.). Innocent XI rejected the proposition\nthat it is lawful to kill the aggressor who gave one a blow and then\nfled. It is only when the aggressor is continuing his attack, and\nimperilling the innocent party in life or limb, that the latter may\nrepel the extreme force by extreme force.\n\n1844. Killing of the Innocent.--So far we have spoken of the killing of\nmalefactors and unjust aggressors, which under certain conditions is\nnot sinful. The next subject is the killing of the innocent, that is,\nof those who are neither malefactors nor unjust aggressors worthy of\ndeath.\n\n(a) The killing of the innocent by human authority, if it is done\ndirectly and intentionally, is always sinful, whether the cause be a\nprivate individual or society. But since God is the Master of life and\ndeath, He could command the death of an innocent person, as was done\nwhen he bade Abraham to sacrifice his son (Gen., xxii. 12).\n\n(b) The killing of the innocent, if it is indirect and unintentional,\nis not sinful when there is a serious reason for performing an act from\nwhich the killing results; for it is lawful to perform an act from\nwhich two effects follow, if the good is intended but the evil only\npermitted, and there is a sufficient justifying reason (see 103 sqq.).\n\n1845. Unlawful killing of the innocent is a most heinous crime.\n\n(a) It is an injury to the rights of God over human life, and is\nforbidden in the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: \u201cThou shalt not\nkill\u201d (Exod., xx. 13). To judges the special command was given: \u201cThe\ninnocent and just person thou shalt not put to death\u201d (Exod., xxiii.\n7). The man-slayer destroys the image of God, a crime so detestable\nthat in Scripture God declares that He will revenge the blood of man,\neven though shed by a beast (Gen., ix. 5; Exod., xxi. 28).\n\n(b) It is a most grave sin against the individual, for it deprives him\nof his chief natural good and the means of securing and enjoying many\ngreat spiritual goods. If the person killed desired or asked for death,\nno injustice is done to him, since he waived his right, but\nuncharitableness is committed, since the neighbor\u2019s life should be\nloved, and the uncharitableness is greater according as the person is\nmore worthy of love. Scripture numbers murder among the sins that cry\nto heaven for vengeance (Gen., iv. 10, ix. 5).\n\n(c) It is an outrage against society, for such killing unduly deprives\nthe community of one of its members, causes scandal and disturbs the\npeace. Hence, the law has always inflicted the severest punishment on\nslayers of the innocent.\n\n1846. Since the end does not justify the means, the following ends do\nnot justify the direct and intentional killing of innocent persons:\n\n(a) the public good does not excuse, for example, if an enemy were to\nthreaten destruction against a city unless it put to death an innocent\nperson who dwelt in its borders. The criminal on account of his\nlawlessness is an obstacle to the common good, but the law-abiding\ncitizen promotes the common good and it would be harmful to the public\npeace if he could be put to death without any fault of his own. The\nState is for the citizen, not the citizen for the State. But if the\ncommon safety depended on the sacrifice of one man\u2019s life, charity and\npatriotism would require this man to make the sacrifice spontaneously\n(see 1169); that is, he should deliver himself to the enemy, and were\nhe to refuse, it seems the community would have the right to deliver\nhim. Similarly, it is not lawful to kill hostages, even though the\nenemy has broken faith, or killed one\u2019s subjects;\n\n(b) the private good of other individuals does not excuse; for example,\nit is not lawful to kill a maniac lest he do harm to those around him,\nat least unless the conditions of unjust aggression are fulfilled.\nSimilarly, it is not lawful to kill a woman with child, in order to\nbaptize the child;\n\n(c) the private good of the individual himself does not excuse; for\nexample, it is not lawful to shoot or poison those who are mortally\nwounded or suffering from an incurable disease, or who are old and\nhelpless, in order to spare them suffering. But one may give a person\nat the point of death a medicine that may hasten the end, if there is\ngood hope that it will cure him and other remedies are futile, for the\npurpose is not to kill but to cure (see 2485). It is lawful also for\nembalmers to puncture the heart or sever an artery of a person who\nseems to be dead, if there are certain signs of his death, for the\npurpose is not to kill this person, but to free his friends from fear\nthat he is buried alive.\n\n1847. Indirect or Unintentional Killing of the Innocent.--Indirect and\nunintentional killing of the innocent is lawful (1872) only when there\nis a reason of sufficient gravity (i.e., one of a value proportionate\nto the life of the innocent person).\n\n(a) The public safety is such a sufficient reason. Thus, in time of war\nit is lawful to attack a city, even though the death of many\nnon-combatants will result, or to charge the enemy, even though\ninnocent persons have been placed by the latter as a shield to his\nfront ranks.\n\n(b) Private safety from death is not a sufficient reason, if it does\nnot compensate for the loss, or if it is secured unlawfully (see 104).\nThus, if Balbus cannot escape from an unjust aggressor without running\ndown and killing an unbaptized infant or a man whose life is very\nnecessary for the community, the temporal life of Balbus does not\ncompensate for eternal life lost by the infant in the first instance,\nand the mere private good of Balbus does not compensate for the public\ngood sacrificed in the second instance. Again, if Caius cannot escape\nfrom drowning without pushing a shipwrecked companion from the only\nplank which is insufficient for both, or if Sempronius who has been\nsentenced to death for crime cannot escape execution unless he kills\nhis guard, the means of securing safety are unlawful.\n\n(c) Private safety from death is a sufficient reason, if it compensates\nfor the loss and is secured lawfully. Hence, if the life of the\ninnocent person is only of equal importance, self-defense against an\nunjust aggressor by means of flight that will involve the innocent\nperson\u2019s death does not make one guilty of homicide (e.g., Titus is\nspeeding in his car in order to escape a pursuer bent on murder and he\ncannot avoid hitting and killing a cripple who crosses the road). If\nself-defense is conducted by means of attack, one may use violence\nagainst the aggressor (e.g., one may shoot at him, although an innocent\nperson whom he is using as a shield will be killed), but not against\nthe innocent person (e.g., one may not shoot at the innocent person in\norder to deprive the aggressor of his shield, nor may one hold the\ninnocent person before one in order that he receive the assailant\u2019s\nbullet).\n\n1848. Destruction of the Unborn.--(a) Direct and intentional\ndestruction of this kind is unlawful and is known as feticide, when the\nfetus is killed within the womb, or abortion, when a non-viable fetus\nis expelled from the womb. It is not abortion to hasten the birth of a\nviable fetus (i.e., one which is about six or seven months old and can\nlive outside the womb), since the child can be kept alive, but grave\nreasons are required to make it licit, since it presents a risk to the\nchild\u2019s life. But to deliver or expel a non-viable fetus is abortion.\nEvery direct abortion is regarded by the Catholic Church as murder and\nis penalized with the censure of excommuuication (Canon 2550, Sec. 1).\nIt might be argued that the direct killing of what is surely a human\nbeing is murder, but when does the fetus become a human being? The\nancient theory of Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas and most medieval\nauthors, maintains that the embryo did not become human until some\ntime after conception, an opinion that still has great probability\nphysically. Others maintain that animation is simultaneous with\nconception. Since we do not know the exact moment of animation, the\nmoment of conception must be accepted in practice as the beginning of\nhuman life. Probabilism is ruled out in this instance, for there is no\ndoubt about the law and its application: we must not directly kill what\nis probably a human being. Accordingly, abortion is considered to be\nmurder. Hence, even in the case of a girl who has been raped--although\nit is a probable opinion that measures may be taken to remove the semen\nfrom-her body--it would be gravely sinful to give any treatment which\nwould abort an impregnated ovum.\n\n(b) Indirect and unintentional killing, or rather permission of death,\nis not unlawful in such a case, when there is a proportionately grave\nreason, such as the life of the mother. Thus, it is permissible to\ngive the mother a remedy necessary to cure a mortal disease (e.g.,\nmedicinal drugs, baths, injections, or operations on the uterus), even\nthough this will bring on abortion or the death of the fetus; for the\nmother is not obliged to prefer the temporal life of the child to\nher own life. But the baptism of the child must be attended to, for\nits salvation depends on the Sacrament, and the eternal life of the\nchild is to be preferred to the temporal life of the mother, if the\nconditions of 1166 are verified.\n\n(c) Contemporary moral opinion considers that in tubal pregnancies\n(ectopic gestation) the tube itself is in a pathological condition long\nbefore rupture of the tube, as experts in obstetrics teach, and hence\ncan be excised as a diseased organ of the human body. As such, the\nexcision of such a tube would be in itself a morally indifferent act\nand, granting verification of the other conditions for the principle\nof double effect, could be licitly performed. (For a history of the\nmoral question, medical testimony and full argumentation see Chapter X\nof _Medical Ethics_ by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A.) Some theologians,\nhowever, believe that the tube cannot be removed unless it can be\nproved in each case that a pathological condition, placing the woman\nin danger of death, exists. The first view is accepted as sufficiently\nsafe to be followed in practice. (See Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.,\n_Morals in Politics and Professions_, p. 118.)\n\n1849. It is unlawful positively to kill the mother in order that the\nunborn child may be saved or baptized. When a caesarean section offers\nthe sole chance of saving the mother\u2019s life, it is permitted. It is\nseriously doubtful whether a mother is morally obliged to undergo the\noperation in situations where a threat to her life exists. In this\ncase, if baptism in the uterus is possible without increasing the\ndanger to the mother\u2019s life, it should be attempted. When a caesarean\nsection does not offer any chance of saving the mother\u2019s life, but will\ndirectly contribute to her death, the operation should not be\nperformed. One must await the death of the mother and then observe the\nnorm of Canon 746; \u201cImmediately after the death of a pregnant woman, a\ncaesarean section should be done in order that the fetus may be\nbaptized.\u201d The procedure to be followed is outlined in medical-ethics\nbooks. (See McFadden op. cit., pp. 244 ff.)\n\n1850. Direction in Cases of Doubt, Ignorance, or Error.--(a) In case of\ndoubt, if there are positive and solid reasons for believing that an\noperation performed to save a woman\u2019s life will not be destructive of\nthe life of a fetus, the operation seems lawful; for in doubt, the\nwoman, as the certain possessor of life, has the presumption.\n\n(b) In case of ignorance or error (e.g., when a penitent asks whether a\ncertain operation is permissible, or a surgeon in good faith performs\nan operation that is not lawful), either a truthful answer should be\ngiven to questions, or silence should be observed when an admonition\nwould only be harmful (e.g., if to require the Caesarean operation from\na dying mother would have no other result than to make her die in bad\nfaith instead of good faith).\n\n1851. Canonical Penalties for Homicide and Abortion.--(a) Homicide, if\nvoluntary, produces irregularity (Canon 985, n. 4) and subjects the\nguilty party to exclusion from legitimate ecclesiastical acts or to\ndegradation from the ecclesiastical state (Canon 2354). Moreover, a\nchurch is violated by the crime of homicide (Canon 1172). (b) Abortion\nof a human fetus, when the effect is produced, brings irregularity on\nthose who procure it and also on the cooperators (Canon 985, n. 4).\nMoreover, those who procure abortion effectively, the mother not\nexcepted, incur excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the\nOrdinary, and, if clerics, they are to be deposed (Canon 2350).\n\n1852. Suicide.--Suicide, or the killing of oneself, is, like homicide\nin general, of various kinds.\n\n(a) Thus, in reference to the intention, it is voluntary or\ninvoluntary, according as it proceeds from knowledge and choice, or as\nit is committed without realization of what is done or without the\nintention to produce death. Examples of involuntary suicide are a\nperson who is temporarily insane on account of impending calamity and\ndrowns himself, and a person who, attempting to frighten another by\npretending to hang himself, actually strangles to death. It would be a\nmistake to say that no person who commits suicide is free, but no doubt\na large percentage of those who kill themselves are not responsible for\ntheir act.\n\n(b) In reference to the mode, suicide is direct, if that which is done\ntends from its nature to the death of the person who does it (e.g.,\nfiring a pistol into one\u2019s brain); it is indirect, if that which is\ndone tends from its nature to another end (e.g., to struggle with a\ncriminal who is firing a revolver). Direct suicide is committed in many\nways, all of which can be reduced to positive (e.g., the eating or\ndrinking of deadly poison) and negative (e.g., the refusal to eat or\ndrink anything).\n\n1853. The difference between direct and indirect suicide is also\nexplained as follows: (a) direct suicide is an act or omission that has\nbut one effect, namely, death (e.g., taking deadly poison); (b)\nindirect suicide is an act or omission that has two effects, one of\nwhich is the peril of death. This peril of death is certain, if death\nalways follows (e.g., jumping from the roof of a skyscraper);\nproximate, if death usually follows (e.g., jumping from a third- or\nfourth-story window); remote, if death now and then follows (e.g.,\njumping from a second-story window).\n\n1854. Sinfulness of Suicide.--Voluntary and direct suicide is always a\nmost grave sin, if committed without due authority (i.e., the command\nof God).\n\n(a) It is a grave injury against the rights of God, for it usurps His\nauthority, refuses Him the service He desires, spurns the gift He has\nbestowed, dishonors the image of God (Gen., ix. 6), and destroys the\nproperty of God: \u201cThou, O Lord, hast the power of life and death\u201d\n(Wis., xvi. 13).\n\n(b) It is an offense against society, for the community has a right to\nbe benefited by the lives of its members, and to receive a return for\nthe protection and assistance it affords them. Moreover, death by\nsuicide is usually felt as a great sorrow and disgrace by the relatives\nof the departed, and it has a demoralizing effect on many persons of\nsuggestible minds. The fact that the death of this or that man is not\nfelt as a loss by a family or the State, but rather as a relief, is no\nargument; for if suicide were left to human decision, how many fatal\nmistakes would be made (see 460)! Persons valuable to society would\nrashly kill themselves, fearing in a mood of depression that they were\nworthless; others who could contribute nothing in material ways would\ndestroy themselves and deprive their fellow-men of an example of\nfortitude, or at least of the opportunity of showing charity and mercy\nto the needy.\n\n(c) Direct and voluntary suicide is a sin against the deepest natural\ninclination, for self-preservation is called the first law of nature\n(see 298), and also against that love of self which charity requires\n(see 1136 sqq.). Since charity to self is more obligatory than charity\nto the neighbor, suicide is a more serious sin than other forms of\nhomicide. Nor is it excused by the desire of some good for self. The\nsuicide does not better himself by his act, for, since he has not\nfulfilled his trust in this life, what can he expect in the next life?\nHe escapes the lesser evils of physical miseries or moral temptations,\nbut he incurs the greater evils of physical death and of moral\ncowardice and defeat, to say nothing of his punishment in the hereafter.\n\n1855. Cooperation in Suicide.--Cooperation in suicide has the guilt of\nunlawful homicide. (a) Thus, those who incite, advise, command, or\nassist another to commit suicide are guilty of moral murder. (b) Those\nwho carry out together a suicide pact are guilty both of suicide and of\nmoral murder.\n\n1856. Permission or Authorization to Commit Suicide.--(a) Divine\nauthority could command or permit suicide, since God has the power over\nlife and death. But whether God has ever done this is uncertain. Some\nargue for the affirmative from the death of Sampson, who pulled down\nthe house upon himself saying: \u201cLet me die with the Philistines\u201d\n(Judges, xvi. 30), and of Razias who killed himself to escape ill-usage\n(II Mach., xiv. 37 sqq.), and from the acts of certain female martyrs\nwho from love of God or from the desire to preserve chastity rushed to\ntheir deaths. But others think that invincible ignorance may explain\nthese cases. The act of Sampson may also be understood as indirect\nsuicide lawfully committed for the public good of his country.\n\n(b) Human authority, according to some authors, could authorize a\ncondemned malefactor really guilty of a capital crime to execute\nhimself; for, they argue, there is little difference between opening\none\u2019s mouth to swallow poison administered by an executioner and taking\nit with one\u2019s own hands, as was done by Socrates. Others deny that God\nhas given the State the authority to order suicide, and they declare\nthat it is both unnecessary and inhuman to force a condemned man to be\nhis own executioner. Still others believe that the State could command\nself-execution, at least in necessity, but that such a punishment is so\nstrange, cruel and unnatural that it should be avoided; for, if it is\nshocking to ask a father to execute his child, much more shocking would\nit be to ask a man to kill himself. The argument is inconclusive which\nsays that because it is lawful to perform an act preparatory for death,\nbut which is indifferent and would never cause death (such as opening\nthe mouth for poison), it is also lawful to perform the act which\ninflicts death (such as taking the poison).\n\n1857. Indirect Suicide.--Indirect suicide is committed when one is the\ncause of an act or omission, indifferent in itself, but from which one\nforesees as a result that one\u2019s life will be lost or notably shortened,\nThis kind of \u201csuicide\u201d is lawful when and if the conditions for a case\nof double effect are present--in other words, if there is a\nproportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect (see 103\nsqq.). The following reasons are considered sufficient:\n\n(a) the public good, for the welfare of society is a greater good than\nthe life of an individual. Eleazar is praised because he exposed\nhimself to death in order to deliver his people (I Mach., vi. 43 sqq.).\nIt is not sinful, then, but rather obligatory for a soldier to advance\nagainst the enemy or to blow up an enemy fortification, though it be\ncertain that his own death will result; nor is it wrong for a pastor to\ngo about ministering to his flock during a pestilence, though it be\ncertain that he will fall a victim to the plague. Explorers and\nexperimenters may also risk their lives for the advancement of science;\n\n(b) the good of another suffices for indirect suicide, when he is in\nextreme spiritual need. Indeed, there may be an obligation of charity\nto risk one\u2019s life for the salvation of a soul (see 1166). Hence, it is\nlawful to go as a missionary to a country whose climate is so trying\nthat strangers die there after a few years;\n\n(c) the higher good of self (i.e., the good of virtue) justifies\nindirect suicide, when there is an urgent reason for exercising a\nvirtue in spite of the peril of death. Thus, for the sake of charity a\nshipwrecked passenger may yield his place in the life-boat to his\nparent, wife, friend, or neighbor; for the sake of faith, one may\nrefuse to flee in time of persecution (see 1006), or may refuse and\nshould refuse to take food or drink offered as a mark of idolatry; for\nthe sake of chastity a virgin, at the peril of her life, may jump from\na high window or resist the assailant, although it does not seem that\nthis is obligatory if no internal consent will be given to the rape;\nfor the sake of justice, a criminal in the death house who has an\nopportunity to escape from prison, may decide to remain and be\nexecuted, or a malefactor condemned to die by starvation may refuse to\ntake food secretly brought him; for the sake of mortification, one may\npractise moderate austerities, as by fastings, watchings, scourgings,\nhair-shirts, etc., which sometimes shorten life, though generally they\nlengthen it;\n\n(d) the preferable temporal good of self suffices, that is, one may\nrisk the danger of death to escape another danger that is more likely\nto happen or more terrible. Thus, a man in a burning building may leap\nfrom a high window, even though death from the fall is almost certain,\nfor death by burning is more terrible; a prisoner who is about to be\ntortured to death may make a break for liberty if he sees a chance of\nescape, for death is more certain if he remains. On the same principle,\none may engage in hazardous but useful occupations, such as working on\nhigh buildings, or as a diver or miner, for it is better to live a\nshorter time with employment and the necessities of life, and to be of\nservice to the public, than to live a longer time without these\nadvantages. But a worker should not undertake dangerous tasks for which\nhe is unfitted or unprepared, and the employer is bound to safeguard\nthe lives of the workers.\n\n1858. The same reasons are not sufficient in all cases. (a) Thus, the\ngreater the risk of death, the more serious the reason required. Hence,\nto save the money one has it might be lawful to jump from a\nsecond-story window, but not from a higher window when the fall would\nmost likely kill one. (b) The more immediate the danger of death, the\nmore serious the reason required. Thus, to save money one might\nlawfully enter a quarantined house, but the risk would not be permitted\nif the house were tottering in an earthquake. (c) The more notable the\nshortening of life, the greater the reason needed to permit it. Thus,\nif the practice of a certain mortification or labor reduces the\nexpectancy of life for a few years, a lesser reason suffices than if it\nreduces the expectancy for ten or more years.\n\n1859. Indirect suicide is unlawful and has the guilt of self-murder\nwhen the reason for risking death is frivolous or insufficient or\nsinful.\n\n(a) Examples of insufficient reasons are found in the cases of persons\nwho engage in occupations or actions that are very dangerous to life or\nlimb but of little public or private value, as when for the sake of\nperforming a feat a man walks a tight-rope, pricks himself with pins\nand needles, or puts his head into a lion\u2019s mouth. But if the performer\nis very skillful and has no other means of livelihood, it seems that he\nmay exercise his art for the sake of entertainment.\n\n(b) Examples of sinful reasons for risking death are found in persons\nwho abbreviate their lives by over-eating, drunkenness, habitual\nindulgence in strong spirits, or immoderate passion of any kind; and\nalso in those who refuse to make use of the ordinary means for the\npreservation of health (see 1566 sqq.) or of the ordinary remedies\nagainst disease (see 1571). It is not necessary that one be anxious to\nlive long (see 1063), but it is obligatory to use the normal means for\nthe preservation of life, and those who notably neglect these means are\nguilty of indirect suicide.\n\n1860. Is it suicidal to refuse a surgical operation pronounced\nnecessary for life?\n\n(a) If the operation is likely to be successful and there is no good\nreason for refusing it, it seems that one may not refuse it without the\nguilt of indirect suicide, although one might be excused on account of\ngood faith.\n\n(b) If the success of the operation is doubtful, or if there is a good\nreason for refusing, one who refuses is not guilty of suicide. Among\nthe good reasons are spiritual ones (e.g., modesty, the fear of falling\ninto blasphemy or despair under the pain are given by some writers)\nand temporal ones (e.g., the poverty that would be brought upon the\npatient\u2019s family or the hardship that would result for the patient\nhimself).\n\n1861. Canonical Penalties for Suicide.--(a) Those who attempt suicide\nare irregular _ex delicto_ (Canon 985, n. 5). (b) If they die, they are\nnot given ecclesiastical burial unless they gave signs of repentance\nbefore death (Canon 1240, n, 3), and, if they recover, they are subject\nto various penalties (Canon 2350, Sec. 2). (c) If it is doubtful\nwhether a person committed suicide, or was responsible, the doubt is\ndecided in his favor, provided no scandal is likely.\n\n1862. Accidental Homicide.--Accidental homicide is that which happens\nwithout any direct purpose to kill. But the following cases should be\ndistinguished:\n\n(a) when the homicide is not voluntary, either in itself or in its\ncause (see 35, 94), that is, when the slayer had no intention to kill\nand could not foresee that death would result from his act or omission;\n\n(b) when the homicide is voluntary only in its cause, inasmuch as the\nperson who kills is guilty of negligence in a lawful thing, or of\nsomething unlawful, and death results from the negligence or from that\nwhich is unlawful, although there was no direct wish to kill.\n\n1863. The Case of One From Whose Lawful Act or Omission Homicide\nAccidentally Results.--(a) If this person was not guilty of negligence,\nhe is not responsible for the resultant homicide, since it was not\nvoluntary, either directly or indirectly. Thus, if a man who was said\nto be dead, but who knows nothing about the report, calls at his home\nand his wife drops dead on seeing him, he is not responsible for her\ndeath.\n\n(b) If the person in question was negligent, he is guilty of homicide\nin a greater or less degree according to the seriousness of his\nneglect. Thus, a sane man who flourishes a loaded revolver in a crowded\nroom is responsible if the revolver goes off and kills someone present;\nbut a nurse who leaves a sick room for just a moment with the result\nthat her patient falls out of bed and is killed, is only slightly\nresponsible at the most, if there was little reason to expect what\nhappened.\n\n1864. The Case of One From Whose Unlawful Act or Omission Homicide\nAccidentally Results.--(a) If this person was not negligent and his\nconduct was not dangerous to the lives of others, he is not guilty of\nhomicide; for the death that ensued was not voluntary, either directly\nor indirectly. Thus, if a thief is driving away carefully with a stolen\nautomobile and a reckless pedestrian gets in front of the car and is\nkilled, the driver is guilty of theft, but not of homicide.\n\n(b) If the person in question was not negligent but his conduct was\nnevertheless dangerous to the lives of others, he is guilty of\nhomicide; for the death that followed was voluntary indirectly, since\nhe could have foreseen the homicide and should have avoided the\nconduct. Thus, if a person strikes lightly a pregnant woman and she\nsuffers an abortion, or if one who is not a surgeon tries to mutilate\nan innocent person and kills him, he is responsible for the death,\nsince the acts committed remained dangerous to life, no matter how\ncareful the offender may have been to avoid killing.\n\n1865. Moral and Legal Guilt.--The law may hold one responsible for\nhomicide, even though there is no theological guilt (see 1766 sqq.).\n(a) Thus, one may be held responsible for the consequence of acts only\njuridically negligent, as when an automobilist while driving at a speed\nunreasonable in law, but not in fact, kills a pedestrian. (b) One may\nbe held responsible for acts committed by those subject to one\u2019s care\nor control, as when a man keeps a dog loose not knowing that it is\nvicious and it kills a neighbor\u2019s child, or when he illegally lends his\ncar to a minor, thinking the latter is a good driver, and the minor\ncarelessly runs down a person in the road.\n\n1866. Bodily Injuries.-Injustice is done not only by destroying the\nlife of a human being, but also by harming him in his rights to bodily\nintegrity or well-being. The chief bodily injuries are the following:\n\n(a) mutilation, which deprives a person of limbs or members, without\ninflicting death;\n\n(b) wounding, which by an act of violence (such as a stab or blow)\nbreaks the continuity of the body, or impairs its strength or beauty;\n\n(c) enfeeblement, which impairs or destroys the health, strength, or\ncomfort of the body in unlawful ways (e.g., by deprivation of necessary\nfood, sleep, fresh air, by communication of infection, by beating,\nhazing, etc.);\n\n(d) restraint, which hinders the lawful exercise of the bodily powers\n(e.g., by holding a person against his will, by chaining him to a post,\nby locking him in a room).\n\n1867. Mutilation. In general, any kind of act which injures or impairs\nbodily integrity is called mutilation. In the strict sense, mutilation\nis any cutting off, or some equivalent action, through which an organic\nfunction or a distinct use of a member is suppressed or directly\ndiminished. Accordingly, three distinct types of mutilation are\npossible: (a) when a part of the body with a distinct function is\nexcised; (b) when a distinct organic function is totally suppressed,\nwithout excision of the organ; (c) when the function is directly\nlessened or partially suppressed.\n\n1868. Morality. (a) Liceity. The basic principle governing the morality\nof mutilation is: Man is not the master of his own life, but only the\ncustodian. Accordingly, neither is he master of his own body. Thus,\nPope Pius XII, speaking of the \u201cSurgeon\u2019s Noble Vocation\u201d (_The\nCatholic Mind_, Aug. 1948, pp. 490 ff.), declared: \u201cGod alone is Lord\nof the life and integrity of man, Lord of his members, his organs, his\npotencies, particularly of those which make him an associate in the\nwork of creation. Neither parents, nor spouse, nor the individual in\nquestion may dispose of them at will.\u201d\n\nAs steward, man has duties toward his body, its health and welfare,\naccording to the norms of reason and the divine law, so that it may be\na means of his attaining life with God. Acting in accord with these\nnorms and the end of life, it may become necessary and licit for man to\nmutilate his body in order to safeguard health or to save his life. The\nprinciple expressing the morality of mutilation, known as the principle\nof totality (Pius XII, _Nous vous saluons_, AAS 45-674), may be\nformulated: Man may licitly mutilate his body only insofar as this is\nexpedient for the good of the whole. In fact, such mutilation is often\nobligatory, since one must use ordinary means to protect his life and\nhealth, and since the part is for the whole. Thus, one would be bound\nto undergo an operation for appendicitis in order to save one\u2019s life.\n\nAlthough an organ be not diseased, it may under certain circumstances\nbe removed. Thus, a surgeon operating for hernia may remove a healthy\nappendix, should the danger of adhesions be foreseen that would require\na later operation. Nor is it necessary that there be a \u201cpresent\u201d\ndanger. The words of Pope Pius XII, that mutilations are permissible\nwhen required \u201cto avoid ... serious and lasting damage\u201d (AAS 44-782),\nare suggestive of the liceity of prophylactic operations. (See\nmedical-ethics texts for special cases, such as lobotomy, thalamotomy,\nexperimentation, etc.)\n\nThe problem of mutilation involved in organic transplantation for the\nbenefit of a neighbor is highly controverted at the present time, Pope\nPius XII discussed the legality of corneal transplants from the dead to\nthe living (_The Pope Speaks_, Autumn, 1956, pp. 198 ff.), but he did\nnot touch the matter of transplants from living bodies. In this\ncontroversial matter, the following principles seem to be clear:\n\n1) Mutilation for the good of the neighbor cannot be justified by the\nprinciple of totality, for the subordination implied in the principle\nis characteristic of a physical, not a moral, not even the Mystical,\nbody.\n\n2) Minor mutilations, such as skin grafts or blood transfusions, are\ncertainly permissible. The speculative basis is still a matter of\ndispute.\n\n3) It is solidly probable extrinsically that organic transplantations\nmay be permitted, possibly out of charity and for a proportionate\nreason. Some contend, however, that the act of mutilation involved is\nintrinsically evil and can not be justified by the extrinsic motive of\ncharity.\n\nMutilation is lawful by public authority in punishment of a criminal;\nfor if the state has the right to inflict death for serious crime, much\nmore has it the right to indict the lesser punishment of mutilation.\nThe expediency, however, of exercising the right must be judged in\nterms not only of punishment, but also of prevention of crime.\nMutilation has no necessary connection (apart from special\ncircumstances) with deterring criminals from further crime.\n\n(b) In other cases mutilation is unlawful; for just as man is not the\nmaster of his life, neither is he the master of his limbs, and he\ncommits a wrong against God, society, and the individual if he destroys\nparts of his body when neither public good nor private safety demands\nthat this can be done. Thus, mutilation of a criminal performed by\nprivate authority is unlawful. Hence, a husband may not mutilate a man\nwho has broken up his home.\n\nMutilation of an innocent person that it not necessary for his bodily\nsafety is unlawful. Even spiritual good is not a sufficient reason; for\nexample, one may not castrate oneself in order to escape temptation,\nfor this operation does not take away passion, and, moreover, there are\nspiritual means which suffice against temptation. When Our Lord says\nthat one should cut off a hand or foot that causes scandal (Matt.,\nxviii. 8), He is speaking metaphorically of the avoidance of the\noccasions of sin. Much less is temporal good a sufficient reason for\nmutilation. Hence, a youth may not have his teeth pulled in order to\nescape military service; a pauper may not have his arm amputated in\norder to get larger alms; a boy may not be castrated in order to give\nhim a better singing voice; a woman may not have the hysterectomy or\nother similar operations performed merely to prevent conception; a man\nmay not have the operation of vasectomy performed on him in order to\nprevent generation.\n\n1869. Morality of Sterilization. Mutilations which frustrate the power\nof procreation in men and women are called sterilization. Two kinds are\ndistinguished; indirect, to remove diseased organs; direct, to prevent\nconception.\n\n(a) Indirect sterilization (also called by many therapeutic) is lawful\nwhen it is necessary to save life or health. The ethical principle\ninvolved is the indirect voluntary or the principle of double effect.\nHence, vasectomy may be used to prevent idiocy or death, or to remove\nor allay physiological abnormalities that bring on certain sexual\nperversities or disturbances, if it is likely that these evils are\nimminent or present and that the operation will be beneficial.\n\n(b) Direct sterilization by public authority includes both punitive and\neugenical sterilization. The latter was condemned by Pope Pius XI in\n_Casti Connubii_. In context the Holy Father was dealing with the false\nclaims made in the name of eugenics that the State might legitimately\nsterilize those who by reason of hereditary defect might be considered\nlikely to generate defective offspring. This position is vehemently\nrejected: \u201cPublic magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of\ntheir subjects. Therefore where no crime has taken place and there is\nno cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or\ntamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of\neugenics or for any other reason. St. Thomas teaches this when,\ninquiring whether human judges for the sake of preventing future evils\ncan inflict punishment, he admits that the power indeed exists as\nregards certain other forms of punishment, but justly and properly\ndenies it as regards the maiming of the body.\u201d\n\nIn the same context, punitive sterilization, whether as punishment for\ncrime or as deterrent, was also declared to be unlawful. However,\nfasciole 14 of the AAS for 1930 emended the text and seems to have\nwithdrawn the formal condemnation of punitive sterilization. a subject\nof theological discussion at the time. The matter had not been closed\nand the emendation had the force of reopening the question.\n\nTheological opinion is still divided as to the liceity of punitive\nsterilization. Some still maintain that since the state can inflict the\nsuperior penalty of death for serious crime, _a fortiori_ also the\nlesser punishment of sterilization. Others deny the liceity, for\nsterilization does not achieve the essential purposes of punishment; it\nis not corrective, preventive, retributive, or emendatory. Accordingly\npunitive sterilization is unreasonable and inconvenient. This latter\nview prevails among most modern moral theologians. Confirmation for the\nview is sought in the response of the Holy Office (AAS 32-73) that\ndirect sterilization is prohibited by the law of nature. Since punitive\nsterilization has as its immediate effect, whether as an end or as a\nmeans, sterility of the generative potency, it may well fall under the\ncategory of direct and hence also under condemnation of the Holy Office.\n\n1870. Other Bodily Punishments.--Other bodily harms (wounds, blows,\nrestraint) may not be inflicted except under the following conditions:\n\n(a) there must be sufficient authority. The State, being a perfect\nsociety, has greater coercive power, and may inflict penalties that are\nof a permanent character, such as death or mutilation or wounds (e.g.,\nby branding); and it may impose restraint, not only from unlawful, but\nalso from lawful acts. The family, being an imperfect society, has a\nlimited coercive power, and hence the father, or those who hold his\nplace (e.g., teachers), may administer corporal chastisements that are\nnot of an irreparable kind to his children (such as beatings,\nwhippings). Other persons may punish or restrain only in case of urgent\nnecessity (e.g., one may hold a stranger who is about to commit murder;\none may chastize a neighboring boy who cannot be kept from depredations\non one\u2019s property in any other way). It is not wrong, however, to\ninflict moderate bodily hurts, if the other person is not unwilling and\nthere is a reasonable purpose, such as exercise, training in the art of\nboxing or wrestling, recreation, or mortification;\n\n(b) there must be a sufficient reason for the harm done. The good of\nthe public is a sufficient reason; for example, when a criminal is\nincorrigible and it is dangerous for him to be at large, it is not\nunreasonable to give him a life sentence. The good of the individual is\nalso sufficient; for example, when a surgeon has to wound in order to\ncure, when a father has to use the rod in order to improve the child or\nto uphold discipline (Prov., xiii. 24, xxiii. 13);\n\n(c) there must be moderation in the harm or pain inflicted. Thus, while\nchildren should not be spoiled, nor prisoners pampered, the other\nextreme of maltreatment or torture must be avoided. It is cruel to box\nchildren soundly on the ears, or to push them roughly about, or to tie\nthem up in the dark, as they may suffer permanent injury from such\nmethods. Likewise, it is barbarous to send convicts to a place or\nprison so horrible that they lose their minds or fall victims to\nlingering disease, or to inflict excruciating punishments by rack,\nthumb-screw, prolonged scourgings, etc.\n\n1871. Injury to Health.--Harm unjustly done to the health of others is\nsinful, and, if the harm is great, the sin is mortal. Examples: (a)\nHarm to health is done negatively by omission of duty, as when a\nmedical man or physical director does not use sufficient care and a\npatient thereby suffers detriment to health, or an employer does not\nsee that his factory or place of business is sanitary, or that the work\nis not too exhausting with the result that employees lose their vigor.\n(b) Harm to health is done positively by acts or objects that tend to\ndeprive another of the means to physical well-being (e.g., annoyances,\nnoises that prevent sleep, adulterated food, maintenance of a nuisance\nwhich creates suffocating smells or harmful vapors, etc.), or that\nbring to another the infection of disease (e.g., when a well person is\nmade to live or room with one who has tuberculosis).\n\n1872. Theft and Robbery.--Having considered the injuries to person\ncommitted by homicide, mutilation, imprisonment, etc., we shall now\ntake up the injuries to property committed by theft and robbery.\nPrivate ownership of property is allowed by natural and divine law, and\nit is necessary when, as at present, human affairs cannot be well\nmanaged under another system. It has its limits, however, since it is\nsubordinate to the public good, and charity requires that those who\nhave the goods of this world share them with those who are in need (see\n1210 sqq.). The chief titles to private ownership are the following:\n\n(a) original titles, which are those by which one takes possession and\ndominion of goods that have never had or have not now an owner, and\nthese are reduced to two, namely, occupation (i.e., the taking\npossession of a material thing) and accession (i.e., the union of a\nmaterial thing with one\u2019s property);\n\n(b) derivative titles, which are those by which one obtains dominion,\nthrough transfer of right, of the goods that belong to another. These\ntitles are produced by the law itself (as in prescription), or by the\nlaw and the free will of man (as in inheritance from testament or from\nintestate), or by the free will of man (as in contracts).\n\n1873. The Chief Kinds or Ways of Occupation.--(a) Animals.--Domestic\nanimals (e.g., dogs, cats) may not be occupied, even though they have\nstrayed from their owner; tamed animals (e.g., bees, pigeons,\nsongbirds) may be occupied only when they have recovered their liberty;\nwild animals (e.g., birds, foxes, fishes, hares, etc., at large) may\nnot be occupied, unless they are kept in a small enclosure from which\nthey cannot escape.\n\n(b) Land and Plants. These may be occupied only when they have no\npresent owner.\n\n(c) Treasure-trove.--This is a deposit of precious movables hidden away\nso long ago that it is impossible to discover the owner. According to\nnatural law it may be occupied by the finder, but the civil law\nsometimes decides that the find must be divided with the owner of the\nplace or with the government.\n\n(d) Lost Property.--This embraces those movables which an owner has\nrecently parted with, through accident or forgetfulness, without any\nintention of giving up his ownership of them, and which are now easily\nfindable, although their owner is not known. The finder is obliged to\nmake reasonable efforts to find the owner. If he neglects to make these\nefforts, proportionate to the worth of the found article, and is\nconvinced that he might have found the owner, he is considered by some\ntheologians to be a possessor in bad faith and bound to reserve the\narticle for the owner or turn it over to the poor or to pious causes.\nHaving made the effort unsuccessfully, according to natural law, he may\nuse the article as his own. The prescriptions of civil law as to the\ntime interval before he may begin to use the article must be observed.\n\n(e) Abandoned Goods.--According to natural law one may occupy goods\nvoluntarily relinquished by the owner (e.g., an old automobile left by\nthe roadside), but the civil law sometimes awards certain classes of\ngoods (e.g., immovables) to the State.\n\n(f) Vacant Goods.--According to natural law the goods of one who died\nwithout heirs may be occupied; but under the civil law they usually\ndevolve to the State, whether they be movables or immovables.\n\n1874. Principles on Accession.--(a) According to natural law, if the\ntwo things united are separable, then each owner should be given his\nown property; but if the things are inseparable and one is more\nvaluable, the owner of the more valuable part keeps all, but\ncompensates the owner of the less valuable part; if the things are\ninseparable and of equal value, there is joint ownership.\n\n(b) According to positive law, these natural principles are applied to\nvarious cases of accession, whether it be natural (as through growth of\nplants or deposit of land by rivers) or artificial (as through change\nmade in a material by labor, or addition of one substance to another).\nThese details are treated in books on law.\n\n1875. Prescription.--Prescription laws (see 1798) are valid in\nconscience, since they are determinations about property rights made in\nthe interest of the common welfare. But the following conditions are\nrequired for acquisition of property through prescription:\n\n(a) the object of prescription must be a thing prescriptible according\nto natural and positive law. Thus, natural rights and public property\nmay not be prescribed against;\n\n(b) the subject of prescription must be a person capable of possessing,\nand he must be honestly convinced that he has a right to what he\npossesses;\n\n(c) the claim of the subject to the object must rest on possession, on\napparent title to the property, and on the lapse of the legal time\nduring which possession has been held or ownership has remained\nundisputed.\n\n1876. Wills.--A will is a declaration made in legal form (i.e., with\nthe solemnities required by law) of the disposal to be made of one\u2019s\nproperty after one\u2019s death. Defects in a will or legacy sometimes\noperate to take away the moral obligations of observing it.\n\n(a) Thus, if the defect is one of natural law (e.g., a will made under\nduress), there is no moral right or obligation produced by reason of\nthe gift.\n\n(b) If the defect is of positive law only and makes the will\nrescindable (e.g., a will not subscribed, as by law required, in\npresence of the testator), the gift is good in conscience until adverse\ndecision of court.\n\n(c) If the defect is of positive law only and makes the will _ipso\nfacto_ invalid (e.g., a legatee acts as witness to a will), the gift is\ngood in conscience, if there is question of pious causes, since\nproperty donated to God may not be alienated by human laws. But the\nChurch desires civil formalities to be observed in the making of wills\n(Canon 1513).\n\n(d) If the defect is positive and _ipso facto_ invalidating, and there\nis question of profane causes, the will is not good in conscience, even\nbefore declaration of court.\n\n1877. Contracts.--A contract may be deined as a mutual agreement\nconcerning the transfer of a right.\n\n1. A contract is a mutual agreement, i.e., there must be consent of at\nleast two parties to the same object. An offer made but not accepted is\nnot a contract, for only one party consents.\n\n2. The contractants transfer a right which produces in most instances\nunder justice a corresponding obligation of doing or omitting\nsomething. Promises, pledges, pacts, etc., while they impose\nobligations based on truthfulness, loyalty, etc., are not contracts.\nSee 1888 (a).\n\n3. The obligation in justice may be on both sides (bilateral) or only\non one side (unilateral), but consent must be on both sides.\n\nThe elements of a contract are made up of essentials and accidentals.\n(a) The essentials include the subject-matter, the parties contractant,\ntheir agreement, and the external form that manifests the agreement.\n(b) The accidentals include bonds, oaths, conditions and modes.\n\n1878. The subject-matter of a contract--that is, the thing or action or\nforbearance with which the agreement is concerned--must have the\nfollowing qualities:\n\n(a) it must be something possible, for one may not undertake what one\ncannot perform. Thus, one cannot bind oneself by an accessory contract\n(such as suretyship), if the principal contract itself is _ipso facto_\ninvalid. But if the impossibility is only moral (i.e., great\ndifficulty), one who knowingly undertakes the arduous is bound to\nfulfill his promise; if it is only partial, one is held to the part\nthat is possible; if it is culpable, one is bound to repair damage\ncaused the other party through non-fulfillment;\n\n(b) it must be something disposable, for one may not transfer that over\nwhich one has no right of control or transfer. Thus, one may not\ncontract to sell public property that is _extra commercium_, or\nproperty of which one has only the possession, or goods over which\nothers have a claim (e.g., a debtor may not bestow gifts to the\ndetriment of creditors\u2019 rights), or goods not transferable for pay\n(e.g., payment for a favorable decision by a judge, or property owed to\na third party) or for money (e.g., academic degrees, public offices,\nSacraments, indulgences);\n\n(c) it must be something existent and determinable, for no one wishes\nto contract for a right that is valueless and illusory. Thus, one may\nnot sell shares of a stock company that has no assets, or an indefinite\nhouse or lot or chattel;\n\n(d) it must be something good and lawful, for one may not bind oneself\nto iniquity. If it is sinful (e.g., a contract to sell a house in order\nto spite a third party), the agreement is _per se_ valid. But if the\nsubstance is evil (e.g., a contract for fornication made with a\nprostitute), the agreement is null before the performance of the\npromised sin; but it seems to many that after performance of the sin\nthe promisor is obliged to pay the money promised, unless the law makes\nthe contract void (see 1886 c). If the law merely denies protection to\na sinful engagement, or forbids it under penalty, it would seem that\nafter performance of the sin one may follow, as far as strict justice\nis concerned, the rule that right is with the possessor. In the United\nStates immoral and illegal contracts and those that are opposed to\npublic policy are generally regarded as null, but in some cases the law\ndeclares immoral conditions _de futuro_ non-existent and considers the\nagreement to which they are added as valid (e.g., wills and gifts\n_inter vivos_ in some codes).\n\n1879. Sinful Contracts.--There is no form of contract that may not be\nmade sinful as to its substance on account of the wicked offer or\nconsideration (e.g., sale may deal with immoral objects, labor may be\ngiven to criminal projects), but there are certain forms of contract\nthat are particularly open to abuse and hence are frequently associated\nwith evil circumstances or results. Some contracts are often illicit\naccording to natural law.\n\n(a) Thus, a gift is sinful, on the part of the donor, when it is made\nby an employer for the purpose of seducing a servant, and on the part\nof the servant, when it is accepted for the purpose of encouraging the\nunlawful attentions of the employer; but if the gift is unconditional,\nthere is no obligation in justice to return it.\n\n(b) Borrowing is sinful, when the lender is in greater need, or when\none becomes unduly obligated to the lender; lending is sinful when the\nlender cannot afford to part with the thing loaned, or when the\nborrower is encouraged in thriftlessness, or when he will make evil use\nof the thing borrowed, etc.\n\n(c) Wagers are frequently sinful, since many of them are incitements to\nsin (e.g., a bet that another is afraid to get drunk), or results of\nsinful motives (e.g., bets made in order to deceive, or to satisfy\navarice, or to live without work), or causes of great evils (e.g.,\ndestitution of families, frauds, scandal, and corruption).\n\n(d) Gaming is sinful when the form of the sport is objectionable (e.g.,\nthe ancient gladiatorial fights in which the combatants killed each\nother), or when the motives or circumstances are wrong (e.g., to play\nas a professional gambler so as to avoid work, to play cards all day\nSunday, to play for higher stakes than one can afford, to spend time in\n\u201cgambling hells\u201d).\n\n(e) Lottery is sinful when the object is bad (e.g., the raffle of an\nimportant office with the risk that incompetent persons may be chosen),\nor when the circumstances are bad (e.g., if persons are led into\nsuperstition or idleness and prodigality).\n\n(f) Speculation is sinful in many instances, since it often brings on a\ngambling fever that makes the speculator useless to himself and his\ndependents, and causes poverty and crime.\n\n(g) Pawning of property is often unjustifiable, since it makes persons\ndeprive themselves of necessary property in order to indulge in some\nuseless or extravagant whim with borrowed money.\n\n1880. Illegal Contracts.--For reasons of public policy the positive law\nputs its disapproval on many of the above-mentioned contracts, at least\nin certain instances.\n\n(a) Thus, sometimes the law makes a contract unenforceable in court,\nthough the natural obligation is not affected. Hence, if a wager is\nonly denied a hearing before a judge, the winner may keep his gains,\nand the loser should pay.\n\n(b) If the law merely declares that a contract is illegal, the effect\nseems to be that the contract retains its natural validity unless the\nparty who has suffered by it wishes to disavow it. As to the sinfulness\nof such a contract, that depends on whether or not the law is penal or\npreceptive in intent. Thus, many regard laws that make betting illegal\nas preceptive under venial sin, while others regard them as punitive\nonly. Other examples of illegal contracts are: gifts made to a judge in\nconnection with a trial; lottery, in Great Britain and the United\nStates; certain games of chance, in some States; and in Canon Law, as\nregards the clergy, alcatory games for money, speculation and trading\n(Canons 138, 142).\n\n(c) If the law makes a contract voidable, the effect is that the\ncontract possesses its natural force until adverse decision is given by\ncourt. Hence, if a wager is voidable in law, the winner may keep his\ngains until obliged by a judge to give them up, but the loser is not\nbound to pay, unless he confirms the wager.\n\n(d) If the law makes the contract ipso facto void, the agreement loses\nits natural force (see 558-560). In most of our States, wagering\ncontracts are illegal and void whether by statute or by judicial\ndecision. In many of these States the statute permits the recovery of\nthe money from the winner or the stakeholder. Gifts offered as bribes\nare invalid, and those who give or take such gifts are guilty of\nserious sin and of a criminal offense. In some of our States, certain\ngaming contracts are also null.\n\n1881. Qualities Necessary in the Parties Contractant.--The parties\ncontractant must have the following qualities:\n\n(a) from natural law it is necessary that they have the use of reason\nsufficient to understand what they are doing. Incompetent are babies\nand the insane, and also those who are totally drunk or otherwise\ntemporarily deranged. Less competent are the half-witted and those who\nneed a guardian in important matters;\n\n(b) from positive law it is necessary that they be not legally\nexcluded. In Canon Law administrators of church property and solemnly\nprofessed religious are unable to make certain contracts (Canons 1527,\n536). In civil law there are restrictions on the contractual powers of\nminors, wives, aliens, guardians and corporations. Persons not yet\nconceived are not capable in civil law of receiving a donation, and\nthere are many prohibitions against the tender or acceptance of gifts\nby those who can reasonably be suspected of exercising undue influence\nor of being subject to undue influence.\n\n1882. Legal Privileges of Minors.--The law grants certain benefits to\nminors and the like; for example, in some cases they are not bound by a\nnon-executed agreement, while the other party is bound, or in an\nexecuted contract they may recover property without restoring or\noffering to restore the consideration, if they have nothing with which\nto replace it.\n\n(a) Minors and other persons who are legally incompetent to contract,\nmay avail themselves of the benefits of the law with a good conscience,\nif they are in good faith; for it is just that the law should protect\nthose who are unable to protect themselves, and those who make\ncontracts with such persons should know that they (the competent\nparties) act at their own risk.\n\n(b) Minors and other persons legally incompetent may not avail\nthemselves of the benefit of the law if they have acted in bad faith\n(e.g., if a minor by deceit induced the other party to sell to him).\n\n1883. Qualities Necessary for Valid Consent.--The agreement or consent\nof the contracting parties must have the following qualities:\n\n(a) it must be internal, that is, one must accept in will and not\nmerely in words the proposal or consideration offered by the other\nparty. If one consents only to the form of the contract, the contract\nis null, and the same is probably true if one does not accept\ninternally the obligations of the contract; if one consents to the\nobligations, but does not intend to fulfill them, the contract is\nvalid, but unlawful. One who contracts invalidly sins, and is bound in\nthe external forum to keep the contract seriously made, and in the\ninternal forum to repair the damage to the other party by giving true\nconsent or making restitution. One who contracts unlawfully also sins,\nand is bound to the engagement;\n\n(b) it must be external, that is, one must manifest in some sensible\nway one\u2019s agreement to the proposition contained in an offered\ncontract. Silence gives consent only when the contract is favorable to\nthe party who is silent, or when that party should and easily could\nmanifest his lack of consent, if the proposal did not please him. In\nthe case of contracts between parties who are not in each other\u2019s\npresence, the intimation to the offerer of the offeree\u2019s acceptance\nis not necessary for validity, if the contract is gratuitous; but\nthe contrary seems to be true, at least _per se_, if the contract is\nonerous. We shall speak later (1885) on the legal formalities required\nin contracts;\n\n(c) it must be mutual, that is, there must be a meeting of minds in the\nsame sense, or agreement of both parties to the same thing. Mutuality\nrequires that consent be contemporaneous, that is, that the acceptance\nof one be given while the offer of the other still holds good. But\nit does not require that the parties be in each other\u2019s presence, or\nthat they contract through direct personal communication, or (at least\naccording to natural law) that the knowledge of the accomplishment\nof mutual agreement be known to the offerer. The law in the United\nStates generally is that an offer may be withdrawn immediately or after\na reasonable time, unless it was made on time for a consideration;\nand that a contract between the absent begins only on receipt by the\nofferer of the acceptance of the offeree, if the former stipulated for\nthis, or if the offerer uses one means of communication as his agency\nand the offeree another. In other cases it begins the moment that\nacceptance is entrusted to the agent of the offerer;\n\n(d) it must be free, that is, it must have the advertence and\nvoluntariness necessary for a human act. If the contract is of grave\nimport, there should be the same kind of deliberation as is necessary\nfor commission of a mortal sin (see 173 sqq.); if it is of lesser\nimport, the deliberation should correspond with the seriousness of\nthe case. But some authors think there should be perfect deliberation\nin every contract, since the contractants are assuming obligations of\njustice.\n\n1884. Defects that Invalidate Consent.--The defects that vitiate\nconsent by taking away knowledge or choice render contracts either void\nor voidable (see 40-55). These impediments are the following:\n\n(a) error, which is a judgment of fact or of law in reference to the\ncontract, not in harmony with the truth, but not maliciously caused\nby other persons. If error is substantial (that is, about the nature\nof the contract or the nature of the subject-matter of the contract),\nthe agreement is naturally void; if error is only accidental (that is,\nabout features of the contract, subject-matter or co-contractant, that\nare only incidentally intended), an onerous agreement is naturally\nvalid, but positive law in the interest of freedom will often grant the\nprivilege of rescindment (see Canon 1684, n. 2). But if error cannot be\nproved, courts will stand for the validity of a contract;\n\n(b) fraud, which is error or mistake about a contract caused in one\nof the parties by the dishonest representations of the other party or\nof a third person (e.g., when an insurance agent deceives about the\nbenefits, or a policy-taker deceives about his age or health). Fraud\nexists, then, when there is intention, at least indirect, to mislead,\nand statements, acts or omissions calculated to mislead; but the usual\nboasts of vendors and advertisers about the wonderful excellence of\ntheir wares are not fraudulent, since the public understands that such\ntalk must be taken _cum grano salis_. The effects of fraud on the value\nof contracts are the same as those produced by error; but it should be\nnoted that the person guilty of the fraud is bound to make good the\nlosses of the injured party, even though the contract be valid and not\nrescindable, or though the guilty person be not a party to the contract;\n\n(c) fear, which is a disturbance of mind caused by the belief that some\ndanger is impending on oneself or others (see 41 sqq.). It makes a\ncontract invalid in natural law, when it takes away all consent (e.g.,\nwhen it overpowers the reason, or makes one dissent internally from\nwhat is agreed to externally), and probably also when it takes away\nperfect freedom in a gratuitous contract, or makes one enter into a\ncontract for immunity from an unjust vexation; it renders an act or\nengagement invalid according to positive law in many special cases\n(e.g., the Canons declare null elections, resignations, marriages,\nvows, etc., which are made under the influence of fear). Contracts are\nconsidered naturally voidable if one of the parties unjustly extorts\nthe consent of the other by grave fear, or if a third party intimidates\na person into bestowing something through gratuitous contract; and the\npositive law generally treats agreements entered into under grave fear\nas rescindible (see Canon 103, n. 2). Fear unjustly caused, even though\nit does not make a contract void or voidable, is at times a reason for\nthe duty of restitution, as when a third party by his unjust threats\nforces an innocent person to make expensive contracts as a measure of\nprotection, and probably also when a third party directly constrains\none to make an onerous contract with a person who knows nothing about\nthe coercion. Fear, no matter how great, does not in any way weaken\na contract, if there is consent and the fear is induced by a natural\ncause (e.g., a storm), or by a human cause acting justly (e.g., an\ninjured man threatening a lawsuit);\n\n(d) violence or coercion, which is like to fear, the latter being moral\nforce and the former physical force (see 52). According to natural\nlaw, violence invalidates a contract, unless we suppose that it is\nonly concomitant, as when Sempronius uses coercion to make Balbus sign\na contract which Balbus is really willing to sign. Positive law does\nnot recognize, or will set aside, agreements made under overpowering\nconstraint (see Canon 103, n. 1).\n\n1885. Form of Contract.--The form of a contract is the external manner\nin which, according to the positive law, the internal consent of the\nparties must be expressed and manifested.\n\n(a) Thus, Canon Law in certain contracts (e.g., engagement of marriage,\nmarriage, alienation of church property) requires specified solemnities\nunder pain of nullity of act.\n\n(b) Civil law in the United States designates various formalities to\nbe used in transfers of property (e.g., that a deed for real estate be\nwritten, signed, sealed and attested; that a gift be made by delivery\nor equivalent act; that certain contracts be in writing; that no\ncontract be of worth unless it be for a consideration, or else be on\npaper with seal attached). The law has the right to annul informal\ncontracts _ipso facto_, but whether this is the intention in modern\ncodes is a matter of dispute. The practical rule to be followed,\nthen, is that the possessor is to be favored, unless there has been a\ncourt decision against his claim. It should be noted, too, that some\nlegal conditions, such as valuable consideration in simple contracts,\nare required for enforceability, not for validity, and hence a good\ncontract wanting some such condition, though indefensible before the\ncourts, is obligatory in conscience.\n\n1886. The Accidentals of a Contract.--(a) Bond is the agreement by the\nobligor of a contract to pay a certain forfeit to the obligee, if the\nformer does not perform his contract or does not perform it before a\ncertain date. This agreement obliges in conscience, if the promise was\nseriously made, if the penalty is not excessive, and if the breach of\nagreement is culpable.\n\n(b) Oaths added to contracts have moral effects on the contracts\nthemselves and also on acts contrary to them. As regards the contract,\nan oath adds the obligation of religion to that of justice, if the\ncontract is valid and irrescindable; and the common opinion is that\nit strengthens a contract extrinsically, that is, it induces an\nobligation of religion to keep the promise, if the oath is invalid or\nrescindable by positive law only and in favor of a private privilege;\nbut an oath in no way strengthens a contract that is naturally invalid\nor rescindable positively on account of the public good. As regards\nacts that are contrary to an invalid or rescindable contract that was\nconfirmed by a valid oath, they are sinful, as being irreligious, but\nnot invalid nor unjust (see 2260).\n\n(c) Conditions are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract\nthat the consent or dissent is made dependent upon their existence\nor fulfillment. An immoral condition, if unfulfilled, takes from the\ncontract all obligation, exception being made for separable parts that\nare not affected by the immoral clause; but if it has been fulfilled,\nit seems that there is a moral obligation to pay the consideration\npromised (see 1878 d).\n\n(d) Modes are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract as\nto qualify the rights or duties of the contractants, or the purpose,\nmatter or time of the contract, but not so as to make the consent\ndependent on the fulfillment of the thing designated. Thus, if Titus\nleaves money to Balbus, chiefly because Balbus is his nephew, and\nsecondarily because he imposes on Balbus the obligation of using the\nmoney for his education, Balbus in accepting the money accepts also\nthe obligation, but the gift does not lapse if the obligation is not\ncomplied with. If a donor adds an immoral mode to his gift (e.g.,\nthat the donee use in immoral ways the money left him), this purpose\nis regarded as non-existent and the gift stands in spite of it. If an\nagent violates a mode (e.g., he pays $1001 when he was directed to\npay $1000) but not a condition (e.g., that he purchase land and not a\nhouse), the contract stands.\n\n1887. The Moral Obligation of Entering into a Contract.--(a) There is\na duty of justice when one is under public or private engagement to\nmake a contract. Examples are a merchant who opens a store for public\npatronage, or an auctioneer who holds a sale before invited patrons, or\nan owner who makes with another person a contract to sell, or a man and\nwoman who make solemn espousals.\n\n(b) There is a duty of charity when a neighbor is in such need that he\ndeserves to be helped, for example, by a loan or by assistance to make\na loan: \u201cFrom him that would borrow of thee turn not away\u201d (Matt., v.\n42); \u201cA good man is surety for his neighbor\u201d (Ecclus., xxix. 18).\n\n1888. Every valid contract obliges to faithful performance as a duty\nof conscience, even though it be unenforceable and without civil\nobligation. We shall discuss the properties of this obligation.\n\n(a) Quality of the Obligation.--Onerous contracts oblige in virtue of\ncommutative justice and under pain of restitution; gratuitous contracts\noblige according to some from justice, according to others from\nfidelity, according to others from fidelity or justice as the obligor\nintends (see 1692, 1753). In practice one may follow the rule that a\nliberal promise or wager or other gratuitous contract obliges only\nfrom fidelity with no duty of restitution, unless it be certain that\nthe promisor intended to bind himself in justice. One is responsible,\nhowever, for damages resultant on breach of promise. The obligation\nseems to be one of legal justice only when the thing promised is\nsomething on which a pecuniary value cannot be set and consists in\ncompliance with law (e.g., in suretyship or bail for keeping the peace\nor appearing in court).\n\n(b) Quantity of Obligation.--In onerous contracts the degree of\nobligation depends on the importance of the subject matter, and hence\nit is a mortal sin to violate a contract in which a grave right is\nconcerned; in gratuitous contracts the degree of obligation depends\nentirely, according to some, on the will of the person who liberally\nbinds himself, but others hold that it depends on the importance of the\nsubject-matter.\n\n(c) Subjects of Obligation.--The parties to the contracts and those\nwho take their place (e.g., heirs, executors) or who are responsible\nfor the contract (e.g., those who commanded the agreement) are morally\nbound to fulfill the agreement, while others are bound not to interfere\nwith the fulfillment.\n\n(d) Objects of Obligation.--Directly, there is the duty of observing\nwhat is contained explicitly or implicitly in the agreement, and\nindirectly of making good any losses caused by breach of contract. A\nrescindable contract obliges until it is lawfully disaffirmed by the\nparty who has the right to break it; a quasi-contract imposes on the\nparty who has benefited by the services or expenses of another a moral\nobligation of making compensation. If a contract transfers ownership\n(e.g., contract of sale passing title to buyer, _mutuum_), the\ntransferee must bear the risks and expenses of the thing transferred;\nbut if it does not transfer ownership (e.g., contract to sell,\n_commodatum_) or has not yet done so (e.g., contract of sale in which\ntitle will pass later, on delivery or payment), the transferer has the\nrisk and expense (see 1796).\n\n1889. Cessation of Obligation.--The obligation of a contract ceases in\nvarious ways: (a) by action of the contractants, as when a promisee\nrenounces his right, or each of the parties to a promise has made a\ngratuitous promise in favor of the other and one refuses to keep his\nword; (b) by action of law, for example, by prescription, by annulment;\n(c) by impossibility, as when a thing freely promised has become\nunlawful or useless, or when the donee of a gift _mortis causae_ dies\nbefore the donor.\n\n1890. Theft.--Theft is the secret taking of what belongs to another,\nwith the intention of appropriating it to oneself, against the\nreasonable wishes of the owner.\n\n(a) It is a taking, that is, a carrying away of goods. But theft also\nincludes the receiving or keeping of property, since the harm done is\nthe same as when the goods are carried away. Hence, he who does not\nrestore borrowed or deposited or found objects, or who does not pay\nback a loan, when he could and should, is a thief.\n\n(b) It is a secret taking, that is, the property is taken away without\nthe knowledge of the owner or lawful possessor, even though he be\npresent. In this respect theft differs from robbery.\n\n(c) It is the taking of property. This includes not only corporeal\nthings (e.g., books, money, jewelry, clothing), but also incorporeal\nthings (e.g., patents, trademarks, copyrights), and even persons if\nthey are looked on as possessions. Hence, plagiarism or infringement\nof copyright or man-stealing or kidnapping (i.e., the carrying off of\nanother\u2019s slave or child) are forms of theft.\n\n(d) It is the taking of property that belongs to another, that is, of\ngoods of which another person is the owner, or lawful possessor as\nusufructuary, guardian, depositary, etc. Hence, one can steal from\noneself by taking one\u2019s goods by stealth from the bailee with the\ndesign of charging him for their value or of depriving him of their use\nto which he has a right.\n\n(e) It is the taking away of goods with the intention of appropriating\nthem to one\u2019s own possession, use or enjoyment to the exclusion of the\nrightful owner. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not theft to carry away\nproperty with the intention of borrowing it for a time or of destroying\nit; but these are acts of unlawful possession or of unlawful damage. It\nis obligatory to take an object from another, if this is necessary to\nprevent the commission of a crime (e.g., to take away and hide the gun\nwith which another intends to kill).\n\n(f) It is against the wishes of the owner. This refers to the substance\n(that is, the conversion of the property to one\u2019s use), not to the\nmode (that is, secrecy with which it is done). Hence, if the owner is\nunwilling that the property be taken, he who takes it is guilty of\ntheft; if the owner is not unwilling that it be taken, but is unwilling\nthat it be taken without his knowledge, he who takes it in this way\nsins at least venially, but is not guilty of theft in the strict sense.\n\n(g) It is against the reasonable wishes of the owner or possessor; for\nno injury is done if he does or should consent to the loss. The owner\ndoes consent if the person who takes the goods is acting according to a\ngeneral and recognized custom (e.g., when a servant takes things left\nover from her employer\u2019s table, which it is certain the latter does\nnot wish to keep); the owner should consent, if justice forbids that\nhe prevent the taking (e.g., when a starving man is taking food from\none who has plenty), or if domestic duty commands that he should give\nthe thing taken (e.g., when a wife takes from her husband\u2019s pockets\nthe needed money he denies his family, for a wife and family have\nthe right to receive from the head of the house support according to\ntheir station and means). But the owner is not bound to consent to the\nloss of his goods from the mere fact that he misuses them to his own\nspiritual disadvantage, or owes them in charity to the taker. Hence, it\nis theft to take a flask from the pocket of one who drinks too much, or\nto steal a book from one who is harmed by reading it, or to filch money\nfrom a rich man because one is poor and he will not give an alms.\n\n1891. Unauthorized Use of Another\u2019s Funds.--What is the guilt of one\nwho uses for his own purposes the money of another entrusted to him for\nother purposes?\n\n(a) There is no theft, for it is supposed that the purpose of the user\nis to make only a temporary loan of the money.\n\n(b) There is an act of injustice, if the permission of the owner cannot\nbe presumed; for the rights of an owner are violated when one converts\nhis property to uses displeasing to him. Thus, if the prospect is that\nthe owner may never get his money back or that he will lose profits by\nthe use made of it, the guilt of unjust damage is incurred, at least in\nintention (e.g., a depositary uses a deposit to buy stocks on margin,\nor a company official makes an unauthorized loan instead of investing\nthe amount for the company\u2019s benefit).\n\n(c) There is no sin, if the permission of the owner can be reasonably\npresumed; for to him who willingly consents no injury is done. Thus,\nif one who is managing the funds of another has the chance to make a\nlarge amount of money today by using those funds for himself but cannot\nget in touch with the owner, the latter\u2019s consent can be presumed, if\nhe will suffer no present loss and it is absolutely certain that his\nfunds will be returned tomorrow. But on account of the risk that is\nordinarily present, this case would be rare.\n\n1892. Comparison of Theft and Robbery.--(a) They differ in species,\nfor theft contains injustice to an owner in his property, but robbery,\nwhich is an unjust and violent taking of what belongs to another,\ncontains injustice both to property and to person. The unwillingness of\nthe owner in the case of theft is due to his ignorance of his loss; in\nthe case of robbery it is due to intimidation or force. (b) They differ\nin gravity, robbery being according to its nature the more serious kind\nof stealing; for the robber does a twofold injury, and the owner\u2019s\nunwillingness to be robbed is greater.\n\n1893. Kinds of Theft and Robbery.--(a) There are many varieties of\ntheft, the differences arising from the circumstances in which the\nstealing is done. Thus, he who steals from the Church is guilty of\nsacrilegious theft; he who uses the public goods for his private ends\ncommits peculation; he who takes from his parents practises domestic\nthievery.\n\n(b) There are also many ways in which robbery or rapine is committed.\nThe following persons are guilty of robbery: pirates, bandits,\nhighwaymen, burglars, usurers, profiteers, venal judges, unmerciful\ncreditors who deprive debtors of necessaries, debtors who escape\npayment by fraudulent bankruptcy, profiteers, laborers who extort\nunjust wages, those who force subordinates to contribute graft, and\nblackmailers. Two forms of robbery are described in Scripture as\nsins that cry to heaven for justice, namely, defrauding laborers of\ntheir wages (James, v. 4) and oppression of the poor, which happens\nespecially when one denies their rights to those who are unable to\ndefend them. The following persons are also classed as thieves:\npickpockets, spongers, smugglers, forgers, counterfeiters, embezzlers,\nand those who misappropriate funds entrusted to them.\n\nIn the civil law theft is also known as larceny, and is defined as the\nunlawful severance of personal property from the possession of its\nowner. The following kinds of larceny are distinguished:\n\n(a) in respect to the manner of perpetration, a theft is larceny when\nthe property is taken from the possession of the owner by one who had\nno possession, whether the latter be a stranger or a custodian; it is\nembezzlement when committed by one upon whom the owner had conferred\ntemporary possession on account of a fiduciary relationship between\nthem; it is false pretence when committed by one who procures permanent\npossession or ownership through fraudulent representations;\n\n(b) In respect to the matter or quantity stolen, theft is called petit\nlarceny when it falls below a certain sum fixed by the law, grand\nlarceny when it exceeds that sum.\n\n1894. The Sinfulness of Theft.--(a) From its nature theft--and, much\nmore, robbery--is a grave sin; for it is opposed to the virtues\nof charity and justice, it is expressly forbidden in the Seventh\nCommandment (\u201cThou shalt not steal,\u201d Exod., xx. 15), and it excludes\nfrom eternal life (\u201cNeither thieves nor extortioners shall possess the\nkingdom of God,\u201d I Cor., vi. 10). The thief attacks the sacred right of\nthe individual to his property, and imperils the peace and stability\nof society itself. Theft is a grave sin, even when it is committed\nby little and little, as happens when a merchant gives underweight\nhabitually: \u201cA deceitful balance is an abomination to the Lord\u201d (Prov.,\nxi. 1). The proposition that restitution for a large sum taken in parts\nat different times is not a grave duty was condemned by Innocent XI\n(Denzinger, 1188). Canonical penalties for theft include exclusion from\nacts and offices, censures, and deposition (Canon 2354).\n\n(b) From the imperfection of the act theft may be only a venial sin,\nfor example, when the thief is a kleptomaniac and steals without\nadvertence, or when he is invincibly ignorant that the thing taken is\nnot his own or is of great value, or from the smallness of the matter\ninvolved (e.g., when the thing taken has little value, or the owner is\nopposed rather to the stealthy manner of taking than to the taking, or\nis only slightly unwilling to lose the goods).\n\n1895. Theft of a small amount may be a mortal sin (see 187). This may\nhappen: (a) on account of the internal or subjective circumstances, as\nwhen the thief intends to steal as much as he can or a large amount\nhere and now, or when he intends to steal a small amount here and\nnew but to keep this up every day until he has stolen a considerable\namount, or when a child steals a small sum from its parents and falsely\nthinks that the theft is gravely sinful in itself; (b) on account of\nexternal or objective circumstances, as when the amount taken today is\nsmall but constitutes, with amounts previously taken, a large sum, or\nwhen the thief foresees serious consequences from his act (e.g., that\nthe person from whom the goods are taken will fall under suspicion\nand be discharged or arrested). It should be noted, however, that\nthe consequences of the theft do not necessarily make the sin grave\nprecisely as it is a sin of theft (e.g., in the case just given the\ntheft was a venial sin, but the unjust damage was a mortal sin), or\neven precisely as it is a sin of injustice (e.g., if one steals a\npicture of small value, foreseeing that the owner will be afflicted\nbeyond measure at the loss, the sin against justice is small, but the\nsin against charity is mortal).\n\n1896. The determination of the amount that constitutes grave matter\nin theft or robbery (or in unjust damage) is a very difficult task,\nbecause the factors upon which the injury depends are to some extent\ndoubtful and vary in particular cases. Hence, there is a great\ndiversity of opinion among moralists on this subject, and it will\nfrequently be uncertain in an individual case whether a theft is\nmortally or only venially sinful in itself. But on account of the\nspiritual and temporal interests that are concerned it is necessary\nto give at least general rules for direction that will enable one to\ndistinguish between grave and venial theft, and to know when the duty\nof restitution is serious, when light.\n\n1897. Moralists are in agreement on the following points:\n\n(a) the standard for measuring gravity of matter is not an invariable\none, but will differ according to circumstances of times and places.\nThus, money has much less purchasing power today than it had before the\nCivil War, and the same amount will not go so far nor last so long in\nthe United States as in some countries of Europe. Hence, other things\nbeing equal, it is less harmful to steal the sum of $10 in 1958 than it\nwas to steal the same sum in 1858, less harmful to steal that amount\nfrom an American than to steal its equivalent from a European;\n\n(b) the standard for a particular country and period is to be\ninterpreted morally, not mathematically; for it depends on the opinions\nor estimates of the prudent, which after all are only approximations\nand subject to revisions. Hence, it would be absurd to draw such a hard\nand fast distinction between grave and venial theft--for example, to\ndecide from the amounts alone that he who stole $50 is certainly guilty\nof mortal sin and fit for hell, while he who stole $49.99 is guilty of\nvenial sin only and not fit for hell. The figures given by moralists\nfor grave matter are averages, and hence they cannot be expected to\nsuit each individual locality or moment or injured person. But, being\nbased on actual conditions, they are serviceable. If a sum stolen is\nmuch above or below them, they indicate truly the theological species\nof the sin; if it is only a little above or below them, they afford a\nbasis for probability, or at least show that there is room for doubt.\n\n1898. Moralists are also at one in measuring the injury of theft by the\nfollowing considerations:\n\n(a) it should be estimated by the property loss, that is, that theft\nshould be deemed a grave sin which in view of all the circumstances and\nthe common opinion indicts a notable loss on the owner in his property\nrights. This is a matter of common sense, for every one can see that it\nis a very different thing to steal a cent and to steal $100.\n\n(b) it should be estimated by the personal injury, that is, by the\nunwillingness of the proprietor to suffer the loss. This is also clear,\nsince the unwillingness of the proprietor is one of the ingredients\nof theft, as was explained above in the definition, and everyone will\nreadily grant that an amount which would be notable if stolen from a\nstranger, would not be notable if stolen from an indulgent parent.\n\n1899. There are two opinions about the estimation of the property loss.\n\n(a) Thus, an older opinion held that the standard should be an absolute\none, that is, that the loss should be determined independently of the\nwealth or poverty of the person injured, since the financial situation\nof this person is a purely extrinsic circumstance of the theft. The\nrich man has just as much right to his $10 as the poor man has to his\n$10, and it is therefore just as injurious to deprive the former of the\nsum as it is to deprive the latter. What is a mortal theft in one case\nis a mortal theft in every case.\n\n(b) A later opinion, which seems to be the common one today,\ndistinguishes two standards: an absolute one, which fixes one highest\namount that is always grave matter on account of its magnitude, however\nwealthy the loser may be, and a relative one, which proposes a scale\nof lower amounts that are grave matter on account of the economic\ncondition of the persons stolen from. It is argued that a relative\nstandard should be set up, since the injury of theft is certainly felt\nmore by those who have less means to fall back on; and that an absolute\nstandard is also necessary, since without it the property of the rich\nwould not be sufficiently safeguarded and the peace and order of\nsociety would be endangered.\n\n1900. Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter.--(a) The older\nopinion, according to which there is only one invariable standard\nfor all classes and conditions, regards as grave matter the amount\nnecessary to support for a day, according to his state and obligations,\na man whose financial condition is midway between wealth and poverty;\nfor the loss of a day\u2019s support is usually looked on as a serious\nloss, and a standard for all should be taken from the average. This\ndaily support amount may be reckoned from the amount of daily wages\nor income. In the United States in 1955 the average daily wage was\nbetween $14 and $15, but, if only skilled laborers or those who are in\nmoderately prosperous circumstances are considered, the average would\nbe considerable higher. Perhaps it would range between $25 and $30. Or\nif we strike a medium between the highest and the lowest figures given\nby the advocates of two standards, we should arrive at approximately\n$30 or $35.\n\n(b) The common opinion today fixes the absolute amount, which is grave\nmatter even when theft is from the wealthiest person or society as the\nequivalent of a week\u2019s wages for the head of a family living in fairly\ngood circumstances but dependent upon his work for its support. As\nto the actual amount, authors differ. Thus, Father Francis Connell,\nC.SS.R., wrote in 1945 in _American Ecclesiastical Review_ (p. 69):\n\u201cTo lay down a general norm in view of actual conditions and value of\nmoney, it would seem that the actual sum for grave theft would be about\n$40.\u201d In 1946, writing in the _Homiletic and Pastoral Review_ (p. 694),\nFather Joseph Donovan, C.M., stated: \u201cIt is hard to see how less than\n$100 could be absolutely grave with the chances of a higher amount\nbeing probably so.\u201d[*] This sum was criticized as being excessive and\ndid not meet with ready acceptance by all moral theologians. On page\n127 of the third printing of his _Outlines of Moral Theology_ (1955),\nFather Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., suggested $75 as a reasonable\nabsolute sum considering the value of money at the time, and, as a\npractical norm, the sum has been acceptable to most confessors and\nauthors. Relatively grave matter corresponds with the amount needed to\nsupport a worker and his family for a day or, according to some, the\namount required for the support of the worker alone. Relatively grave\nmatter would range from about $5 from a poor person on relief, through\n$20-$35 from skilled laborers and persons in comfortable circumstances,\nto $75 from the wealthy. The latter sum constitutes the absolute\nstandard. For a general norm to establish relatively grave matter,\nthen, an acceptable procedure is to take the daily earning power or\nexpenses of those who do not belong to the wealthiest classes, but who\njust barely make a living by reason of their work or charity.\n\n[*] This is not to suggest that the authors cited hold to the \u201cweek\u2019s\npay norm\u201d as the standard. Father Connell, for example, defines the\nabsolute as \u201ca sum which is so large that society would suffer much if\nit could be stolen without grave sin even from the richest or from a\nwealthy corporation\u201d (op. cit., pp. 127-128). The interest in citing\nthe authors is to show the precise sums suggested by them at various\ntimes regardless of the norm used in arriving at the particular amount\nsuggested.\n\n1901. What is grave matter in theft of sacred objects? (a) If these\nobjects have a value that may be measured by money (e.g., the gold or\njewels that enter into a reliquary), grave matter is estimated by the\nmaterial value, just as in profane objects. (b) If these objects have\nno monetary value (e.g., sacred relics), grave matter is judged from\nthe dignity or rarity of the object. Thus, it would be a serious sin to\nsteal even the smallest splinter from the True Cross.\n\n1902. It was said above (1898) that the gravity of theft is estimated,\nnot only by the property loss, but also by the personal loss, that is,\nthe reluctance, unwillingness or sorrow of the owner at the deprivation\nof his goods. This does not mean that a greater unwillingness on the\npart of the owner increases the gravity of the theft, if the owner\u2019s\nunwillingness is excessive or unreasonable (e.g., it is not a mortal\nsin of theft to steal a dollar from a miser, if the miser on account\nof his love of money feels the loss as keenly as another person in his\nplace would feel the loss of $40). But a less unwillingness of the\nowner diminishes the injury, and hence increases the amount necessary\nfor grave matter. There are three reasons especially that diminish the\nunwillingess of the owner at the loss of his property.\n\n(a) Thus, by reason of the persons who steal, the owner is less\nunwilling when these persons have a greater claim on his affection\n(e.g., his children or wife), or when custom permits them to some\nextent a greater freedom than is granted to others (e.g., servants,\nemployees).\n\n(b) By reason of the things stolen, the owner is less unwilling when\nthese are things of less value, like crops, that are produced mostly by\nnature and are left exposed, such as fruits growing by the wayside,\nbranches and pieces of fallen timber lying on uncultivated land.\n\n(c) By reason of the manner of the theft, the owner is usually less\nunwilling when goods are taken gradually and on several occasions, or\npiecemeal, than when they are taken all at once.\n\n1903. The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter.--(a) In\ntheft from one\u2019s parents about double the usual quantity is required.\nBut in an individual case the parents may be just as unwilling, and\nwith good reason, to be despoiled by members of the family as by\noutsiders, and in such a case the rule would not apply. Hence, in\nconsidering thefts by children one must bear in mind the ability of the\nfamily to suffer the loss, the number of the children, the uses to\nwhich the stolen goods are put, the liberality or thrift of the\nparents, the affection or dislike which the parents have for the child\nwho steals, etc. Thus, if poor parents are denying themselves in every\nway in order to rear and educate a large family, thefts from them are a\nserious matter.\n\n(b) In theft from one\u2019s husband even a greater amount is required. But\nthere are exceptions, as when the husband is especially unwilling to\nhave his property stolen by his wife, for example, when the money she\ntakes is devoted, not to the benefit of the family or other useful\npurposes, but to vanity or sin, or to the great detriment of the\nhusband or family (see 1799).\n\n1904. Theft from One\u2019s Wife or Minor Child.--(a) According to the\nlaw in the United States, a wife cannot steal from her husband nor\nthe husband from the wife, but this principle has reference to the\ncommon property of which husband and wife are joint tenants (Robinson,\n_Elementary Law_, Sec. 563). Both husband and wife may have also their\nown separate property, and in that case either of them is guilty of\ninjustice if he or she damages or takes without leave the goods of the\nother.\n\n(b) According to American law, the father has the right to the earnings\nof his minor children who live with him and receive their maintenance\nfrom him; but the law gives the father no right over the separate real\nor personal estate of these children. Hence, a parent would be guilty\nof theft if he unlawfully took or used the individual property of his\nchild.\n\n1905. The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees.--(a) If\nthe things stolen are small articles which the employer customarily\nsupplies for his help (e.g., food and drink for domestic servants,\npencils and paper for his clerks), the theft is not serious as a rule.\nBut there are exceptions, as when the employee gives or sells to others\nthese articles, or when he uses or wastes them to such a degree that\nthe employer suffers a considerable loss. And one should also consider\nsuch circumstances as the great or small value of the services given by\nthe employee, his good or bad standing with the employer, etc.\n\n(b) If the thing stolen is not meant for consumption (e.g., furnishings\nof the home or office, merchandise of the store, tools or machinery\nof the factory) or is of a very precious kind (e.g., rare wines or\nexpensive brands of tobacco), grave matter is of the same amount as\nwhen an outside person does the stealing. In fact, the guilt of the\nemployee is more serious on account of his abuse of confidence or\nviolation of contract. The property of employers would be subject to\nconstant risk, if employees were permitted greater liberties than\noutsiders.\n\n1906. Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less\nConcerned.--(a) Vegetation that Belongs to the Public and Is Left\nUnprotected.--If these things are of minor importance (e.g., wild\nfruits or berries, broken twigs, branches, etc., in public lands),\nit seems that it is not theft to take them, at least when one is\npoor and a member of the community; for laws against such acts are\ngenerally regarded as penal. But one sins, and may even sin gravely,\nwhen extensive damage is done to public property (e.g., by cutting down\ntrees, carrying away flowers and plants, injuring shrubs, etc.).\n\n(b) Vegetation that Belongs to Private Parties and Is Left\nUnprotected.--If only a small quantity is taken (e.g., an apple or a\nbunch of grapes hanging over a public highway taken by a passerby), it\nseems no theft is done, unless the owner or law expressly forbids. But\nit seems to be a venial sin to take more (e.g., as much as a hungry\nperson can eat), and a mortal sin to take a quantity whose market value\nis equal to grave matter.\n\n1907. Travelling Without Paying Fare.--Is it theft to ride in public\nconveyances without paying the fare?\n\n(a) If one rides without payment or ticket, it seems that theft is\ncommitted, unless the company is willing to give a free ride. It may be\nsaid that the company suffers no loss on account of one passenger who\nhas not paid for his transportation, since the same number of cars and\nthe same expenses would be required even without that passenger. But\nsince the owners are unwilling to furnish their service gratis, he who\ntakes it without pay is guilty of theft.\n\n(b) If one rides without payment, but uses the ticket of another, there\nis no injustice if the rules of the company permit this (e.g., A buys\na round-trip ticket, but gives the return ticket to B), but there is\nfraud if the rules of the company and the agreement of the purchaser\nmake the ticket non-transferable (e.g., B uses the half-rate ticket\nwhich A had received as a personal privilege from the railroad company).\n\n1908. Small Thefts Which Amount to a Large Sum.--Small amounts stolen\nmay accumulate into a large amount. This happens in the following\nways: (a) the thief takes small sums on different occasions from the\nsame person or from different persons, and continues at this until he\nhas stolen a considerable amount; (b) the thief conspires with other\nthieves to steal on the same occasion from one person or several\npersons, and, though the sum he steals is small, the sum taken by the\nwhole group is considerable. Similarly, petty damages or vexations\nmay accumulate into a mortal injustice. Thus, if Claudius, aiming to\nbreak down the health, sanity, success, reputation, business, etc., of\nBalbus, plans and carries out a systematic campaign of small injuries\ndaily repeated for years, Claudius is guilty at least in purpose of\nserious damage.\n\n1909. Small thefts that grow into a large theft are mortally sinful in\nthe following cases:\n\n(a) they are mortally sinful by reason of the previous intention when\none steals a little now and a little again, but has it in mind from\nthe outset to steal a total sum that will be grave matter, or when one\nconspires with others to steal a notable sum although one\u2019s own share\nwill not be a notable amount. In these cases the purpose is to commit\na grave injustice, either against an individual (if all is taken from\none person) or against society (if portions are taken from various\npersons), and hence one is internally guilty of grave sin, even though\none has not yet performed it externally. Examples are merchants who use\nfalse weights and measures, or who adulterate their commodities with\nsmall portions of water, etc., and thus make large profits by minute\ncheating;\n\n(b) they are mortally sinful by reason of the subsequent intention when\none had no purpose to steal a large amount, but adverts to the fact\nthat a small theft here and now committed will constitute grave matter\nif added to previous petty thefts, or that the amount of stolen goods\nnow possessed is large, and nevertheless resolves to go ahead with the\ntheft or to retain the stolen goods. This does not mean that a number\nof venial sins coalesce into a mortal sin (see 189), but only that the\nobject of a sin which is slight in itself becomes serious on account\nof the circumstance that it is morally connected with previous sins.\nThe last act in a connected series must not be taken singly, but in\nconnection with the acts that precede, as is seen in the violation of a\nfast or in omission of parts of an hour. In the cases now considered,\ntherefore, grave injustice is actually and purposely done, and mortal\nsin is committed, even though there was no thought of this in advance.\n\n1910. The case of young men who are educated free of charge in the\nexpectation that they will go on to the priesthood and who do not\npersevere.--(a) If they act in bad faith (i.e., if they enter the\ncollege or seminary merely to get their education, or to avoid work,\nor if they remain after they have abandoned thought of the clerical\nstate), they are guilty of theft and bound to restitution.\n\n(b) If they are not in bad faith (i.e., if they wish to try out their\nvocation, or if they begin with the intention to persevere), they are\nnot guilty of injustice. This is true, even though they are rejected on\naccount of idleness or other faults, provided there was no intention to\ndefraud.\n\n1911. In the following cases small thefts which added to others make\na large sum seem not to be the cause of grave loss, and hence not\nmortally sinful:\n\n(a) the small theft of one person following on the small thefts of\nothers, when there is no bond of example, advice, conspiracy, etc.,\nto unite the various thefts; for none of the thieves can be held\nresponsible for the part of the loss caused by the others. Example:\nTitus, knowing that Balbus has been cheated by various persons to the\namount of $9 and that $10 will be a serious loss to Balbus, proceeds to\nsteal $1 from Balbus:\n\n(b) the small thefts of several persons who steal together, and who\ninfluence one another only by example; for example is an occasion,\nnot a true cause of the imitator\u2019s act (see 1447, 1763). Example:\nSempronius and Claudius go into a store together and find that there\nis no one around. Sempronius thereupon steals a number of articles and\nleaves. Claudius notices this and steals other things, which will make\nthe total loss serious.\n\n1912. Moral Connection between Repeated Acts of Theft.--The moral\nconnection between repeated acts of theft by one person is necessary,\nas was said, in order that these acts unite into one grave sin. This\nmoral connection does not exist, however, if the series is broken by\ninterruption or revocation.\n\n(a) Thus, the connection is broken by interruption when there is a\nlong interval between small thefts, because thefts that are small and\ninfrequent do not inflict severe loss on individuals or society. This\nsupposes, of course, that there is no intention to practise small\nthievery habitually in order to become enriched by it, but that one\nsteals now and then as opportunity or necessity occurs, or (according\nto some) that one intends to steal only small amounts and at long\nintervals.\n\n(b) The connection is also broken by restitution or revocation. It is\nclear that, if the thief has given back his former thefts, they should\nnot be computed with later thefts; and it seems also--though some do\nnot admit this--that, if he has sincerely resolved to give back things\ntaken before (e.g., things which are useless for him), there is no\nmoral connection between the past thefts and a theft he is committing\nnow.\n\n1913. Interval of Time between Acts of Theft.--The interval of time\nthat breaks the connection between small thefts cannot be determined\nwith mathematical exactness, but the following rule seems to be\naccurate enough: thefts combine to form a great theft only when\nconsiderable property is taken by degrees, but within such a brief\nperiod of time as to be of notable advantage to the thief and of\nnotable disadvantage to the loser. Some moralists think that six\nmonths is a long space, sufficient to prevent union between thefts,\nbut that two months is too short a space to prevent the union; others,\non the contrary, believe that the amounts stolen should be taken into\nconsideration; and hence that the following intervals between thefts\nseparate them into distinct venial sins without coalescence:\n\n(a) a period of one year between thefts, each of which almost amounts\nto grave matter, when the property is kept (e.g., when a dressmaker who\nhas kept not a little of her patron\u2019s material of a twelvemonth ago\ndoes the same thing again this year);\n\n(b) a period of two months, when the matters are almost grave, but the\nproperty is not kept (e.g., when a thief who beat a restaurant out of\nthe price of a very elaborate meal at the beginning of January does the\nsame thing at the beginning of March). But it is hard to see how one\ncould have the habit of stealing in this way and not have the intention\nof stealing a large amount, for a person who steals what is almost\ngrave matter every two months or so must realize that he will shortly\nbe enriched to a considerable extent by his dishonesty. Moreover,\nthe interval of two months might be needed by the thief for avoiding\nsuspicion;\n\n(c) a period of one month, when the thing stolen falls far short of\ngrave matter (e.g., a meal of simple fare plainly cooked and served);\n\n(d) a period of about two weeks, when the matters are very small (e.g.,\nwhen a thief takes a few secret sips from a wine bottle on each of his\nfortnightly visits to a certain house, or carries away some trifling\nobject as a souvenir). These thefts would not surpass five or ten cents\na month;\n\n(e) some authors think that one week or perhaps even one day will\nprevent coalescence between extremely small thefts; and surely there\nare some paltry objects (e.g., a pin or needle, a match, a small lump\nof coal, a piece of string) which would not total a large value even\nafter many years have passed.\n\n1914. Species and Number of Petty Thefts that Coalesce into Grave\nMatter.--(a) If the thefts proceed from a previously formed purpose of\nstealing by installments a large sum, each of them is a mortal sin,\nbut they do not form numerically distinct sins, unless there was a\nrevocation of the intent (see 214, 215).\n\n(b) If the thefts did not proceed from a previously formed plan, those\nthat preceded the culminating theft (i.e., the one whose addition makes\nthe quantity grave) are so many separate venial sins of theft. The\nculminating theft is a mortal sin, if the thief adverts to the fact\nthat he has now stolen a notable sum; otherwise it is a venial sin. The\nact, after the gravity of the matter has been noticed, is the initial\nmortal sin, if it means consent to the grave injustice done (e.g.,\nretention of the ill-gotten goods, intention not to make restitution);\nit is an additional mortal sin, if it means a renewal of consent to the\ngrave injustice previously done (e.g., the theft of a new small amount\nwith the purpose of keeping it as well as the rest).\n\n1915. Sum Required for Grave Matter in Petty Thefts that Coalesce.--(a)\nAccording to one opinion, it is always larger than the sum required for\ngrave matter in a theft of the same amount on a single occasion; for\nthe owner does not feel the loss so much when his goods are stolen in\nsmall amounts and at different times. Thus, a man is less unwilling to\nhave $100 stolen from him through pilferings of cents and dollars over\na period of a year or two than to have it all stolen from him on one\nday.\n\n(b) According to another opinion, grave matter for petty thefts is not\nlarger than grave matter for large thefts of the same amount, if the\npetty thief had the intention all along to accumulate a notable sum.\nBut some who are of this opinion make an exception for the case when\nthe petty thief steals not from one but from several owners, for in\nthis way the loss is distributed and less harm done. Grave matter in\nthis case, they say, is the same as absolutely grave matter.\n\n1916. There are various opinions on the amounts required for grave\nmatter in the case of petty thefts that coalesce. (a) If all the thefts\nare against the same person, the usual opinion fixes grave matter at\none and one-half times or twice the amount fixed for large thefts.\nSome authors limit this to cases wherein the thief had not the purpose\nfrom the beginning to steal a great amount (see 1915), and some state\nthat the amount for large thefts which is considered is the relative,\nnot the absolute sum. (b) If the thefts are against different persons,\nsome think that grave matter is the same as the absolute matter of one\nlarge theft, while others make it one and one-half times or twice that\namount. Here again some moralists limit these increases in the sum for\ngrave matter to cases wherein there was no purpose from the beginning\nto steal a notable amount.\n\n1917. Theft from Joint Owners.--Is it a grave sin to steal a\nconsiderable amount of property that belongs to joint owners? (a)\nIf the amount taken is absolutely grave, the sin is serious for the\nreasons given in 1898 sqq.; (b) if the amount taken is relatively grave\n(e.g., because a community is very poor, or because the owners are only\ntwo or three and the individual loss is heavy), the sin is serious;\n(c) if the amount taken is not relatively grave, as happens when an\norganization is not poor and has many members or when the loss will\nbe so distributed among the joint owners as to be little felt by them\nindividually, the sin is not serious.\n\n1918. Restitution in Cases of Theft.--(a) Restitution is owed for the\nproperty stolen. He who stole a serious amount but gave back part,\nretaining only what is light matter, is bound under venial sin to\nrestore the rest. Confessors should urge restitution even of small\namounts, when possible, in order to deter men from theft, and it may\nsometimes be useful to require children to seek a condonation from\ntheir parents for a similar reason. (b) Restitution is owed also for\ndamage caused by the theft (see 1895). Thus, if one steals the tool of\na poor farmer, which is of little value in itself but which brings on\nhim a serious loss, one is responsible for the loss as well as for the\ntool.\n\n1919. Cases of Doubt.--(a) Doubts of Law.--The rules given by moralists\non grave matter in thefts are not to be regarded as certain and\nauthentic, since they are only the opinions of theologians, and have\nno obligatory sanction from the Church. They are reasonable and well\nfounded, indeed, but in spite of them there will occur cases wherein\nit is doubtful whether a theft is mortal or venial (see 1896). It is\nno disgrace to be ignorant in such difficult cases, for St. Augustine\nhimself admitted that he did not always know where to draw the line.\nHence, confessors should not feel obliged to decide with finality in\nevery instance whether the sin committed was in itself grave or light;\non the contrary, it will sometimes be necessary to avoid a definite\nanswer, while calling attention to the sinfulness of all theft and the\nduty of restitution. But the obligation of restitution should not be\nimposed as certain, where the doctors disagree.\n\n(b) Doubts of Fact.--The application of the rules for grave matter\nwill also be at times very difficult on account of uncertainties\nabout circumstances of time, person, etc. In such cases one must have\nrecourse to the systems for decision in the presence of a doubtful\nconscience. If a thief does not know from whom he stole, it may be\ndoubtful whether the matter is relatively grave or only light; but the\npresumption then will be that the loser was a person of average means.\nAgain, when there is a strong likelihood that an owner was not greatly\nunwilling, one must insist that the thefts cease for the future, but\none cannot always impose restitution. If a petty thief does not know\nhow much he stole, or whether all the thefts were from the same person,\nor whether the intervals between the thefts were great or small, or\nwhether he had the intention from the outset to take a large sum, the\nconfessor will have to form an opinion by questioning the penitent on\nthe time of his last confession, the amounts he generally took, the\ngeneral frequency of the thefts, etc.\n\n1920. Conversion of Others\u2019 Property.--The conversion of property owned\nby others or held by them may be permitted, or at least tolerated, when\nthe owner or possessor would be unreasonable if he objected as in the\nfollowing cases:\n\n(a) in extreme necessity, for according to natural law each one has the\nright to preserve his life by using the temporal things of the earth\n(see 1571). In danger of death things necessary for escaping the danger\nbecome common property, and no injury is done by the person in danger\nif he uses the goods of another person to save his own life;\n\n(b) in certain cases when occult compensation is the only way in which\none can defend or secure one\u2019s right to property, for it is not wrong\nto take what is one\u2019s due, if this is done without harm to the rights\nof others.\n\n1921. Conditions for Lawful Occupation of the Goods of Others in\nExtreme Need.--(a) The occupation must be necessary for securing one\u2019s\nown or another\u2019s natural right to some supreme good, such as life\nor what is almost the equivalent of life (e.g., freedom from cruel\nrestraint, escape from fearful disease). A supreme good is at stake,\nthen, when one is in extreme, quasi-extreme, or most grave need (see\n1236), that is, exposed to the certain or very probable peril of losing\nlife, limbs, liberty, sight, chastity, etc.; occupation is necessary\nwhen there is no other way (e.g., by begging) to avert the danger.\n\n(b) The occupation must be made without detriment to the rights of\nothers. Hence, one may not occupy more than is really necessary to\nescape the danger; one may not occupy at all if the owner is situated\nin an equal danger (e.g., one may not take the plank from a man in\ndanger of drowning in order to save oneself); one may not retain the\nthing taken, if the danger has passed (e.g., one who commandeered his\nneighbor\u2019s car in order to escape from a thug must return the car). The\nneglect to ask permission, however, does not exceed a venial sin and\ndoes not impose the duty of restitution, if there is a real reason for\noccupation. One may not take the goods without permission, if this can\nbe obtained without too much difficulty; nor forcibly, if possession\ncan be had peaceably.\n\n1922. Restitution for Occupied Goods.--Is the occupier bound to\nrestitution for occupied goods that were consumed (e.g., food and\ndrink), if he afterwards becomes able to pay for them?\n\n(a) If the occupier had no prospect at the time of ever being able\nto pay for what he took, he is not bound to restitution--not because\nof possession, since the thing has perished, nor because of the\ntaking, since there was no onerous contract, nor because of injury,\nsince he acted within his rights. The owner cannot complain at this,\nsince charity obliges him to give of his own free will to one who is\nin supreme need and not to expect that the alms be paid back, while\njustice forbids that he impede the appropriation of what is needed\nby the person in distress. It seems, however, that a case of this\ncharacter would rarely happen, and, if it did happen, the more decent\nthing would be to pay for what was used. Some moralists think that more\nprobably there would be an obligation of justice to do this, since\noccupation is lawful only in so far as it is necessary.\n\n(b) If the occupier had the prospect at the time of being able to\npay for what he took, he is bound to restitution; for one should not\noccupy more than is necessary, and, if a loan suffices to tide one over\na difficulty, it is not right to expect a gift. Hence, men who raid\nbakery shops in times of food shortage, are bound to make restitution\nto the bakers when able.\n\n1923. Occupation in the Case of Merely Grave Necessity.--Is it lawful\nto occupy in merely grave or ordinary necessity?\n\n(a) This is not lawful, for otherwise the doors would be opened to\nthefts without number, and both the security of property and the peace\nof the public would be at an end. Innocent XI condemned the proposition\nthat it is permissible to steal in great need (Denzinger, n. 1186). (b)\nSuch occupation is less sinful than to occupy without necessity, and\nindeed the theft may be only venial if one is in grave need and has\nvainly sought work or charity to relieve the difficulty, as when a poor\nman who is not able to give his children all the food they need steals\nprovisions now and then.\n\n1924. Occupation of a Large Sum by One in Dire Need.--(a) One opinion\nholds that even for the sake of avoiding death this is not permissible,\nfor one has no right to extraordinary means for the protection of one\u2019s\nlife.\n\n(b) A second opinion maintains that this occupation is lawful, under\nthe conditions given in 1921; for life is more precious than even a\nlarge sum of money, and in such extreme need property right yields to\nthe right to life.\n\n(c) A third opinion distinguishes between the case in which extreme\nnecessity is proximate or urgent (e.g., an unarmed Watchman is\nthreatened with instant death if he does not hand over at once the\nmoney he has in charge) and the case in which it is only remote (e.g.,\nthe doctor tells a poor man that he will die shortly from tuberculosis\nunless he goes to a more healthy altitude, but the patient is too poor\nto follow these instructions). In the former case the person in need\nmay take what is necessary (on account of the reasons for the second\nopinion and also because the civil laws allow this), but he is not\nbound to do so (on account of the reasons for the first opinion); in\nthe latter case, more probably he has no right to occupation, for this\nwould be prejudicial to the public welfare and is moreover strictly\nforbidden by civil laws (see 1571, 1253).\n\n1925. Duty of the Owner towards One in Dire Need.--(a) In charity\nthe owner is bound to come to the aid of the needy person; but, if\nhe neglects this duty, he does not offend justice and is not held to\nrestitution (see 1240, 1753). (b) In justice the owner is bound not\nto prevent the needy person from taking or using what he is entitled\nto; but should the owner do this and the necessity cease, there is no\nduty of restitution, for the right of the needy person ends with the\nnecessity.\n\n1926. Lawfulness of Receiving Support from a Thief.--Is it lawful for\nthe wife and family to receive support from the head of the family,\nwhen he is a thief?\n\n(a) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are not thus deprived of\ntheir goods or of the prospect of restitution. This happens when the\nactual support does not come from the stolen property, and the thief is\nable to make restitution from other property that belongs to him, or\nthe wife and children earn as much for the family by their work as they\nreceive in support. In this case the family may take from the thief\neven things that are not necessary for their support.\n\n(b) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of\nrestitution, but the obligation of restitution has ceased on account\nof grave necessity (see 1797). This happens when the support does not\nactually come from the stolen property, but the thief is unable to make\nrestitution from his own property without depriving his own family who\nare in grave need. In this case the family may take from the thief only\nsuch things as are necessary for them according to their station in\nlife.\n\n(c) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of their\ngoods, but the right to occupy these goods has arisen on account of the\nextreme necessity of the family (see 1920 sqq.). This happens when the\nsupport comes from the stolen property itself. But the family may use\nonly what is really necessary for the relief of their dire distress.\n\n1927. Compensation.-Compensation is of two kinds, strict or legal and\nwide or extra-legal.\n\n(a) In a strict sense, compensation is counterclaim, or the comparison\nof the debts of two persons to one another with a view to the\ncancellation of one or of both debts. This method of extinction of\ndebt is allowed by law in order to reduce the amount and expenses of\nlitigation. It is known as recoupment or offset when a defendant brings\na cross-action against a plaintiff for non-fulfillment by the latter\nof some part of the contract in controversy, and as set-off when the\ndefendant introduces the debt owed to him over against the debts sued\nfor by the plaintiff. Counterclaim is just when no injury is done to\none party (e.g., it would be unjust to keep the horse of Titus which\nyou had borrowed, simply because Titus owed you a debt equal to the\nvalue of the horse, for the horse might be worth more to Titus); it is\nlegal when recognized by the law (cfr. 1797, 1798).\n\n(b) In a wide sense, compensation is the summary recovery by a creditor\nof the thing or the debt owed him by the debtor. The recovery is\nsummary in the sense that the creditor does not go to law, or proceed\naccording to law, but takes from the debtor either openly (open\ncompensation) or secretly (occult compensation) what is owed.\n\n1928. Lawfulness of Occult Compensation.--(a) Ordinarily, or _per\nse_, it is not lawful; for it contains such evils as disregard of due\nprocess of law, scandal, infamy, public disturbance, the menace that\nthe common good will be harmed by frequent abuse, the danger that the\ndebtor will suffer loss through a second payment of the same debt,\netc. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that domestic servants may\npractise occult compensation when they decide that their services are\nworth more than the salary they are receiving (Denzinger, n. 1187).\n(b) Exceptionally, or _per accidens_, it is lawful; for under certain\nconditions it offends neither public nor private welfare and it is\nnecessary for the vindication of a right. Just as the natural law gives\nauthority to occupy the goods of another in case of extreme need, so\ndoes it justify occult compensation in the special cases just mentioned.\n\n1929. Unlawful Occult Compensation and Restitution.--Does unlawful\noccult compensation oblige one to restitution?\n\n(a) If the compensation is not only unlawful but also injurious\n(e.g., a servant takes what is not due her under the pretext of\ncompensation), it is not rightly called compensation, but is really\ntheft, and restitution is due. (b) If the compensation is unlawful but\nnot injurious (e.g., a servant takes what is really due her, but she\ncould have obtained it by asking for it), there is no theft or duty of\nrestitution, since the property of another was not stolen.\n\n1930. Conditions Required by Commutative Justice for Occult\nCompensation.--(a) Before the Compensation.--There must be a strict\nright to the thing taken; for, if there is no such right, one takes\nwhat belongs to another against his will, or commits theft. Hence, if\nan employer has freely promised to make a gift to his servant and then\nfails to keep the promise, the servant has no right to take what was\npromised, since it is owed from liberality or fidelity or gratitude,\nbut not from commutative justice. The same applies to a non-necessary\nheir who has been left nothing in a will, since he had no strict right.\nIt is also unjust to take secret compensation for a debt that has not\nyet fallen due.\n\n(b) During the Compensation.--No wrong must be done to the debtor\n(e.g., by taking more than is due, by taking an article which the\ndebtor needs for earning his living) or to third parties (e.g.,\nby taking goods deposited by them with the debtor). If possible,\ncompensation should be made from goods of the same nature and kind as\nthose that were taken or damaged, for the debtor should not be forced\nto part with things he wishes to retain and which are not necessary for\nthe creditor\u2019s satisfaction.\n\n(c) After the Compensation.--One must avoid injury to the debtor (e.g.,\nthe keeping of a payment which is now not owed by him and which one can\nrefuse or return to him) and to third parties (e.g., the casting of\nsuspicion on a servant in order to divert attention from one\u2019s act of\noccult compensation).\n\n1931. Must the strictness of the right be morally certain, or, in other\nwords, must reasonable doubt of fact and of law be excluded?\n\n(a) As to doubt of fact, it must be excluded; for in such doubt the\npresumption is with the possessor, or at least it is certainly wrong\nto perform an act that will probably be injurious to another person\n(see 713). Moreover, everyone can see that the public good would suffer\ngreatly, if occult compensation were permissible when the existence of\na debt is uncertain. Hence, if it is only probable that one sold goods\nto another person or that another person has not yet paid for services\nreceived by him, occult compensation must be avoided.\n\n(b) As to pure doubt of law, the question is controverted. Some think\nthat it also must be excluded, since the possessor should not be\ndeprived of possession unless it is certain that there is a right\nto do this. Others think that occult compensation may be used in\nspite of a mere doubt of law, if the doubt concerns only the mode\nof making the compensation, or if the probability in favor of the\ncreditor is so strong that a judge could conscientiously decide for\nhim against the possessor. Examples of doubts of law here are three\ncases that are in dispute among authors, namely, whether one may take\nmoney as compensation for defamation that will not be repaired by\nrestoration of fame (see 1802, 1803), whether one may deny reparation\nfor defamation when one has been defamed by the other party and has\nnot received restitution, whether one has rights to a legacy of which\none is deprived on account of a mere informality in the document. In\nthese cases the right is held by some authorities to be probable,\nbut the decision in a particular instance should be made only on the\nadvice of a learned and conscientious person, since the matter is very\ncomplicated and there is great danger of self-deception.\n\n1932. Some Cases in Which There Is a Strict Right to Compensation.--(a)\nEmployees (i.e., servants, workingmen, artisans, officials, etc.) have\na strict right when they are injured by the employer\u2019s non-observance\nof the contract (e.g., the stipulated salary is not paid; unjust\nsubtractions are made from the salary, as by fines for the inadvertent\nand infrequent breaking of tools, etc., about which there was no\nagreement in the contract; labors not contracted for are exacted), or\nwhen an unjust contract is imposed on them (e.g., they are induced by\nforce or threats to accept less than a living wage; advantage is taken\nof their grave necessity to wring from them agreement to such a wage).\n\n(b) Merchants have a strict right when a debt which they cannot collect\nis certainly owed them, or when they sold below the minimum just price,\nbecause forced to this unjustly, or because they made a mistake in\ncharging. They may compensate themselves by diminishing weights or\nmeasurements.\n\n(c) One has a right to compensation who has been condemned under a\nsentence manifestly unjust, because the law is certainly unjust or\nbecause the judge clearly gave a wrong decision in a matter of fact\n(e.g., he erroneously presumed that a debt had been contracted, or that\nit had not been paid).\n\n1933. Some Cases in Which There Is No Right to Compensation.--(a)\nEmployees have no right to compensation for subtractions from their\nsalary, if they culpably injure the property of their employer, or\nif they agreed to such subtractions; nor for the smallness of their\nwage, if they freely accepted it (e.g., if they regarded it as a favor\nto be employed, and the employer did not really need them), or if it\nis made up for by presents, board or lodging, opportunity for good\ntips, etc.; nor for unusual labors, if they hired themselves out for\ngeneral service (unless they are asked to perform work of an entirely\nunforeseen kind, such as a very perilous mission), or if they undertook\nthese labors freely without the knowledge or wish (express or tacit) of\nthe employer.\n\n(b) Merchants have no right to compensation for goods sold by them\nbelow the minimum just price, if they freely agreed to sell at that\nprice.\n\n1934. Children and Employees and Compensation.--Some special questions\narise for consideration in case of parents who employ their own\nchildren, and of employers who are forced to underpay on account of the\ndishonesty of their help.\n\n(a) Children who work for their parents and who are entitled to a\nsalary, by agreement or from the law, have the same rights as other\nemployees, but injustice against them would be less frequent. In\nthis country the father has a right to the services and wages of his\nunemancipated child, but the child becomes independent of the father\nwhen it reaches the age of majority or when the father relinquishes his\nright.\n\n(b) Employees who are underpaid because the employer is cheated by his\nhelp have the right to occult compensation, if they are forced to take\nless than a living wage (1932); otherwise this is not permissible,\nunless it be certain that the employer is not unwilling that the honest\nemployees receive more than their pay. In practice, on account of the\ngreat peril of injustice, it is advisable that such workers seek better\npay through their organizations or else look for employment elsewhere.\n\n1935. Conditions Required by Legal Justice for Occult\nCompensation.--(a) Occult compensation must not be used if payment can\neasily be obtained through suit at law or agreement; for the order of\nlaw and the public welfare require that one should not have recourse\nto the extraordinary means of occult compensation if ordinary means\nwill suffice and not cause notable difficulties. But as a rule it seems\nthis obliges only under venial sin, since ordinarily the departure from\nnormal procedure in this matter is not seriously detrimental to public\nmorals or order; and it does not impose a duty of restitution, since he\nwho takes only what belongs to him does not offend against commutative\njustice. Indeed, if it is certain that other means will be futile\n(e.g., because one has not sufficient evidence to win or because the\ndecision would he biased) or harmful (e.g., because great dissensions\nwill be aroused, or heavy expenses incurred in litigation), occult\ncompensation is not even venially unlawful.\n\n(b) Occult compensation, according to law, should not be used by a\nbailee, for he has a lien for his services and proper expenditures in\ncaring for the object bailed, but not for any other debt the bailor may\nowe him (Bolles, _Handy Law Book_). This is obligatory at least for the\nexternal forum.\n\n1936. Some Conditions Required by Charity for Occult Compensation (see\n1165, 1236, 1483).--(a) Charity towards the Debtor.--The creditor\nshould see, when possible, that the debtor suffers no loss by occasion\nof the compensation. Hence, in order to spare the debtor the evils of a\nbad conscience in reference to the debt or of a second payment of the\ndebt, the creditor should, if possible, inform the debtor that the debt\nis cancelled or that payment is not expected.\n\n(b) Charity towards Third Parties.-The creditor should, if possible,\nprevent any trouble or loss to others that might be occasioned by the\ncompensation, such as suspicion of theft that might fall on servants.\n\n1937. The Lawfulness of Open Compensation.--(a) If one\u2019s property is\nbeing stolen or carried away, it is lawful to protect or recover it by\nforce; for this is only just defense.\n\n(b) If one\u2019s property has already been carried away but is still in\nbeing and in a safe place, legal justice requires that one seek redress\nfrom the courts. But it does not seem a serious fault if one recovers\ngoods by using moderate force, since the property is one\u2019s own and the\npublic manner of seizing it enables the law to take cognizance of the\ncase. American law recognizes with certain restrictions the rights of\nrecaption and of entry whereby a person takes possession without legal\nprocess of goods unlawfully taken or withheld from him (Robinson,\n_Elementary Law_, Sec.239, 240).\n\n(c) If a debt owed to one is denied by the debtor, it is not lawful\nto take payment from him by force, since this is against the law and\nproductive of scandal and disturbance, and moreover one is not the\nowner of the goods which one thus takes by force.\n\n1938. Notanda pro Confessariis.--(a) Ante factum, rarissime consulenda\nest occulta compensatio, tum quia ut plurimum illicita est (1928)\nutpote periculo injustitiae, scandali, perturbationis plena, tum quia\nlex civilis non solet eam ut remedium agnoscere sed potius ut furtum\nhabet. Publice de occulta compensatione non expedit loqui, et praestat\nut qui privatim de ea interrogentur, etiam datis conditionibus ad\nliceitatem necessariis, per modum tolerationis tantum annuant.\n\n(b) Post factum, facilius in favorem utentis compensatione judicari\npotest, in ordine ad restitutionem, sed prudenter, et quasi evasive\nloquendum, ne praxis ita agendi ut per se et generaliter licita\napprobari videatur.\n\n1939. Judicial Injustice.--We pass now from injustices committed by\ndeed to those committed by words, and shall consider first unjust\nwords spoken in courts of law and next unjust words spoken in private\nor outside of legal processes. Judicial injustice will be treated\nunder the following heads: (a) injustice in judges; (b) injustice in\nplaintiffs or accusers; (c) injustice in defendants; (d) injustice in\nwitnesses; (e) injustice in lawyers.\n\n1940. The Office of Judge.--Judgment is the proper act of justice\n(1727) and therefore when exercised under due conditions it is not\nonly lawful, but virtuous. The exercise of public judgment belongs to\nthe judge, who is a person vested with authority to decide litigated\nquestions in civil or criminal cases.\n\n(a) Thus, in the strict sense, a judge is the official who has public\nauthority to preside over tribunals of justice, in which major matters\nare tried and a formal procedure is followed, and whose function it is\nto direct the course of the proceedings and to settle questions of fact\nor of law that arise.\n\n(b) In the wide sense, a judge is any person who has lawful authority\nto pass an obligatory sentence in criminal or civil matters. The\nname may be applied, then, to those who preside over a tribunal in\nwhich minor or urgent questions are considered and treated summarily\n(justices of the peace, police magistrates, etc.); to those who do\nnot preside over a tribunal, but who are attorneys at law appointed\nas officers of a court to pass on some issue of a pending proceeding\nor suit (referees); to those who act as assistants of the presiding\njudge, by determining the truth of alleged facts in civil cases,\nor the innocence or guilt of an accused in criminal cases (trial\njurymen); to those who are chosen, by the parties to the dispute or by\na court, as substitutes for the ordinary courts provided by law, to\nhear and settle, without legal formalities, the matter in controversy\n(arbitrators).\n\n1941. Classes of Courts.--There are various classes of courts and\ntherefore various kinds of judges.\n\n(a) Thus, according to their relative dignity and jurisdiction there\nare higher and lower courts, courts of the first, second and last\ninstance.\n\n(b) According to the cases they try, courts are either civil (in which\nredress of private injuries is sought) or criminal (in which the\ncommunity prosecutes public wrongs).\n\n(c) According to the law which they use courts are ecclesiastical or\nsecular.\n\n(d) According to the form of procedure used and the remedies applied,\ncourts in the United States are divided into courts of common law,\ncourts of equity, probate, admiralty, and military courts.\n\n1942. Jurisdiction.--Authority is necessary in a judge, for judgment\nis a binding decision that may be executed by force, and this supposes\nthat he who pronounces the judgment is the superior of the person on\nwhom the judgment is passed, Hence, he who acts as judge when he lacks\njurisdiction acts invalidly (unless jurisdiction is supplied, as in\ncommon error for an ecclesiastical judge, in Canon 209), and offends\nagainst the rights of another judge and of the person on whom he passes\nsentence. Examples would be secular judges acting in ecclesiastical\ncases or ecclesiastical judges acting in temporal cases.\n\n1943. The Qualifications of a Judge.--(a) Mentally, he must be endowed\nwith knowledge of the law and with prudence, so as to be competent\nto pronounce correctly on the questions that are brought to him for\ndecision; for, as being the authorized interpreter and custodian of the\nlaw, he is bound by quasi-contract with the community and with those\nwho appear before him to be competent for these offices. If a judge\nrealizes that he is incompetent in these ways, he must either resign\nhis office, or make up for his deficiency by study or consultation with\nthose who are more learned than himself. A juryman, being a layman to\nthe law, is not expected to have the mental equipment of a lawyer; but\nit is his duty to give his attention to the statements, arguments and\ntestimony and to the instructions of the judge.\n\n(b) Morally, the judge must be a lover of justice, whether commutative,\ndistributive or legal; for the proper office of the judge is to apply\nthe law to particular cases and to declare officially the mutual\nrights and obligations of litigants who are before him. He must not\nbe a respecter of persons, one who is moved for or against a man on\naccount of rank, position or wealth, nor one who is swayed by fear or\nfavor, by popular outcry or personal ambition. Not only legal but also\ncommutative justice obliges him to perform his duties conscientiously;\nfor in taking his office he enters into a quasi-contract with the\ncommunity to execute his functions faithfully and well, and similarly\nby trying a case he engages that those before him will receive\nevenhanded justice. A juror should be a conscientious person who is\nopenminded and free from prejudice for or against those on whom he has\nto vote.\n\n1944. Conduct of a Judge.--A judge must be above suspicion, since\nrespect for the courts is the very life of the State. But there is good\nreason to suspect a judge who judges in his own case, or in a case in\nwhich he will be naturally inclined to favor one side. Hence the duty\nof abstaining from certain things.\n\n(a) Thus, he should avoid business, social and political activities\nthat will give ground for belief that he uses his office for the\npromotion of private interests.\n\n(b) He should not act in a case in which his own advantage or the\nadvantage of his friends might appear to conflict with the duty of\nstrict impartiality, as when he has personal litigation in the court,\nor when a near relative of his is party in a controversy, or when one\nof the contestants is his personal or political friend or enemy, etc.\nCanon 1613 of the Code forbids a church judge to act in the case of a\nperson related by blood or marriage in the direct line or in the first\nand second degrees of the collateral line, or of a person for whom he\nis guardian or administrator, or in cases in which he had previously\nacted as advocate or proxy, or from which he stands to profit or lose.\n\n(c) He should refrain from conduct that would tend to arouse doubts of\nhis impartial attitude, such as incivility to counsel or witnesses,\nunexplained rulings that have the appearance of arbitrariness, private\ninterviews or dealings with one of the parties before him in ways\ncalculated to influence his action.\n\n1945. Accepting Gifts from Litigants or Others.--May a judge take money\nor other goods from those whose interests are submitted to him, such as\nlitigants or lawyers in his court or their friends?\n\n(a) If the goods are extorted by threats or pressure or unjust\nvexation, the judge is guilty of robbery, since he forcibly takes that\nto which he has no right.\n\n(b) If the goods are given as payment for the judge\u2019s services during\nthe trial, the judge sins against commutative justice in receiving\npayment for services already due, since his salary comes from the\ncommunity and obliges him to administer justice without charge to\nthose who seek it. Neither is it lawful to take money as compensation\nfor trying one case before another, or for hastening a case, or for\ngiving unusual diligence to a complicated case, or for deciding for\none side when the evidence is equal on both sides. But the law could\npermit a judge to collect his expenses from both parties if the trial\nnecessitated a personal outlay of money (e.g., for travel or hire of\nassistants) and there was no public fund to defray these costs.\n\n(c) If the goods are offered as bribes, in order that the judge may be\ninfluenced to act against justice, it is clear that grave injustice is\ndone both to the community and to the party who is injured.\n\n(d) If the goods are given as free gifts, with no condition attached,\nsome think they may be lawfully accepted, if there is little\nprobability that they will influence the judge (e.g., because they\nare small or given after the trial has ended). But others hold, and\nit seems more correctly, that both natural and positive law forbids\nthis. Natural law forbids because of the danger (\u201cPresents and gifts\nblind the eyes of judges, and make them dumb in the mouth, so that they\ncannot correct,\u201d Ecclus., xx. 31), and because of the mistrust and\nscandal that will result. It is incorrect to suppose that small gifts\nand gifts offered after sentence would not have influence, for the\ncontending parties would soon come to vie with one another in making\ngifts, while judges would begin to think about the gratuities that\nmight be looked for at the conclusion of a trial. Canon Law forbids all\necclesiastical judges and all who assist in court to accept any gifts\nwhatever that are offered in connection with the trial (Canon 1624),\nand the civil law provides severe penalties for bribes offered as gifts.\n\n(e) If goods are given as a mere alms or from civility or hospitality\n(e.g., food and drink such as is usually offered to a guest or\nvisitor), it does not seem unlawful in itself to accept them, but,\nsince there is a danger of suspicion and scandal, even this should be\navoided.\n\n1946. Obligation of a Judge to Restore Goods Received in the\nAbove-Mentioned Ways.--(a) If retention of the goods is contrary to\nthe reasonable wishes of the person who gave them, restitution is\nnecessary. Hence, the judge must give back money that was extorted and\nthe payments made by private parties for the exercise of his official\nduties.\n\n(b) If retention of the goods is contrary to law, restitution is also\nnecessary. Hence, if a judge has taken a bribe, he must give it back,\nbecause the agreement is null, and he cannot lawfully keep his part of\nthe compact by acting contrary to justice. The same is true when the\nlaw voids the contract whereby he received the goods, or when a court\ndecree obliges him to return a free gift bestowed upon him.\n\n(c) If retention of the goods is not contrary to the will of the giver\nnor to the law, restitution is not necessary. Hence, if a judge has\nreceived a pure gift and no corruption was intended or practised,\nhe sinned in taking it, but the donation was valid and there is no\nobligation to return it. And even though he has taken a bribe, and in\nconsideration of it has acted against justice, it seems there is no\nnatural obligation to make restitution to the party who gave the bribe,\nsince the latter has received a consideration for his payment, but the\njudge is held to indemnify the injured party.\n\n1947. Duties of a Judge in the Course of a Trial.--(a) The purpose of\nthe investigation is to discover the truth in the matter before the\ncourt, and consequently it is the duty of a judge to give a case the\nstudy and attention it deserves.\n\n(b) The method of procedure is intended to secure a fair hearing for\nboth parties and so to expedite business that the litigants will not\nbe harmed by needless delays. The judge should therefore observe the\nnecessary and customary forms of law, while avoiding waste of time\nand unnecessary interruptions. \u201cIt is not the custom of the Romans,\u201d\nsaid Festus to the Jews who asked him to condemn Paul, \u201cto condemn any\nman, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have\nliberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the things laid to his\ncharge\u201d (Acts, xxv. 15).\n\n1948. Duties of a Judge at the Conclusion of a Trial.--(a) The sentence\nmust be just, that is, it must be based on the law and the evidence.\nEven though a judge does not personally approve of a law, thinking it\nunwise or unnecessary or over-severe, he should nevertheless enforce\nit; for he is appointed, not to change or reform, but to apply the law,\nyet so, however, that the spirit is not sacrificed.\n\n(b) Sentence must not be relaxed as a rule, for otherwise the rights of\nthe State or of the party winning the case will be harmed. But there\nare times when the public good or some other sufficient reason calls\nfor relaxation, and in such cases judges have the power to refrain from\npassing sentence or to suspend or respite a sentence already announced.\nThe defeated party should be allowed the opportunity which the law\ngrants him for seeking a reversal of the judgment.\n\n1949. Sentence Passed under a Law Manifestly Unjust.--(a) If the law is\nmanifestly opposed to divine or natural law and sentence under it would\ncommand the commission of an act intrinsically evil (e.g., cohabitation\nof those who are not really married, \u201cmercy killing\u201d of the physically\nor mentally incapacitated, eugenic sterilization of defectives or\ncriminals), the judge should resign rather than give such a sentence.\n\n(b) If the law is manifestly opposed to divine or natural law and\nsentence under it would inflict a grievous penalty (e.g., death or\nlong imprisonment) on the transgressor of the law, sentence would be\nunlawful. But if only a light penalty would be inflicted (e.g., a small\nfine or short confinement), it seems that sentence might be tolerated;\nfor the person condemned might be considered to yield his rights in\nsuch a case for the sake of the public good, which suffers from the\nloss of conscientious officials. The act of the judge in giving the\nsentence would be only material cooperation, which is lawful for grave\nreasons (see 1515 sqq.).\n\n(c) If the law is manifestly opposed to ecclesiastical law, sentence\nmay be given lawfully, if scandal is avoided and the Church yields her\nright in the case, as is sometimes done in favor of Catholic judges,\nlest they be deprived of their positions.\n\n1950. May a Catholic Judge Grant a Decree of Divorce?---Apart from\nscandal or a positive ecclesiastical prohibition:\n\n(a) The judge may grant a divorce to a couple not married validly\nalthough they have had a marriage ceremony recognized by civil law.\nThis would occur in the case of Catholics married before a civil\nmagistrate or non-Catholic minister. Also, when the Church has\npronounced a marriage invalid, civil divorce may be granted for the\nsake of civil effects.\n\n(b) Divorce may be granted if the judge knows that one of the parties\nwill invoke the Pauline privilege.\n\n(c) If the judge is morally certain that neither party will attempt\nremarriage and that the divorce is being sought merely for the sake of\ncivil effects, he may grant the divorce. In the case of Catholics the\nconsent of Church authorities would be required for this procedure.\n\n(d) If the marriage is valid and it is known that the parties will\nattempt a new marriage, some consider that a decree of divorce is\nintrinsically evil, since it but applies a law that attempts, contrary\nto divine right, to dissolve the marriage bond. Others (and this is\nthe more common view today) distinguish and think that the decree of\ndivorce does not concern the religious obligation of the petitioners,\nbut is simply an official declaration that the state regards the\ncivil effects of the marriage as no longer existing. Under certain\ncircumstances, (e. g., loss of office for refusal to accept a divorce\ncase, loss of prestige, antagonism, etc.), such a decree, in itself\nmorally indifferent, may be permitted.\n\n(e) If there is question of partial divorce (i.e., separation from\nbed and board) of Catholic spouses, a decree is lawful, the Church\nconsenting, for a reason recognized by ecclesiastical authority, such\nas adultery.\n\n1951. When Evidence Is Contrary to Personal Knowledge of Judge.--(a)\nIn a civil case, the judge should follow the public evidence rather\nthan his private knowledge; for he acts as a public, not as a private,\nperson. Moreover, the State has the power to transfer property from one\nto another, when the common good requires this, and the common good\nrequires that civil decisions be based on public evidence rather than\non private information. Some moralists deny this conclusion on the\nground that it is intrinsically wrong to force a person to pay who does\nnot owe, even though the evidence is against him.\n\n(b) In a criminal case, the judge should follow the evidence rather\nthan his own knowledge, if the evidence calls for acquittal of the\naccused; for it is better for the public welfare that a guilty man\nescape than that the judicial order be neglected and a rule admitted\nthat might convict the innocent as well as the guilty.\n\n(c) In a criminal case in which the evidence points to guilt while the\njudge\u2019s private knowledge assures him of the innocence of the accused,\nthe judge must not condemn, if there is any legal way to avoid it. But\nif the evidence stands and the judge has to pronounce sentence, it is\nnot easy to determine the course that should be followed. According to\nSt. Thomas, the judge should condemn, since he is a public official and\nmust therefore be guided by the allegations and proofs offered during\nthe trial, especially since public order and respect for law depend on\nthe good reputation of the courts. If judges could disregard at will\nthe evidence offered on account of private knowledge they claimed to\nhave, the confidence of the public in the integrity of courts would\nbe shaken, men would take the law into their own hands, and peace and\norder on which the happiness of the community depend would be at an\nend. Moreover, the judge is not guilty in sentencing in this case,\nsince he does not intend evil and acts according to the principle of\ndouble effect (see 103 sqq.). According to a second opinion attributed\nto St. Bonaventure, the judge should acquit, since it is intrinsically\nwrong to condemn to death a person about whose innocence one is\ncertain. According to a third opinion, which St. Alphonsus considers\nas probable, the judge should condemn in minor criminal cases in which\nonly pecuniary penalties are imposed (for the State has the right to\nexercise eminent domain in order to safeguard an important public good\nlike that of respect for the law and the courts); but he should acquit\nin major cases in which personal punishments are inflicted, for society\nhas no right to deprive an innocent person of life or liberty.\n\n1952. When the Judge Is the Unjust Cause of Damaging Evidence.--In some\ncases the judge may be the unjust cause of the evidence that convicts\nan innocent man, as when the judge has committed a crime and thrown\nsuspicion on the accused (Dan, xiii), or when the judge has moved\nothers to testify falsely against a man he knows to be innocent.\n\n(a) One opinion holds that the judge would be obliged to condemn, on\naccount of the reasons just given for the opinion of St. Thomas, if the\njudge were unable to overcome the evidence. But those who hold this add\nthat this is purely speculative, for in a concrete case there would\nbe many ways by which the judge could extricate both himself and the\naccused from the difficulty.\n\n(b) Another opinion says that in no case could the judge of the present\nhypothesis condemn. Those who favor this opinion declare that St.\nThomas is to be understood only of the case in which the judge is not\nthe cause of the unjust accusation; for one who has culpably placed\na cause of damage is bound to remove that cause before it acts, if\nthis is possible, and in the present instance it is possible for the\njudge, if all other things have failed, to free the innocent person by\ntestifying for him, or even by acknowledging his own guilt.\n\n1953. Practical Conclusions about the Three Controverted Opinions Given\nAbove in 1951.--(a) In a case tried according to Canon Law, it seems\nthat the opinion of St. Thomas should be followed, since Canon 1869, n.\n2, declares that the ecclesiastical judge must not give sentence unless\nhe is certain about the matter of the sentence, and that his certainty\nmust be derived from the acts and proofs of the trial.\n\n(b) In a case tried according to civil law, it seems that the whole\ncontroversy is today very often of little practical importance; for\ncourt decisions are now frequently left to jurymen, and these men\nmust either have no private certainty before they are admitted to\ntheir office (as is the case in the United States), or they have the\nobligation of using private knowledge in casting their vote and of\ncommunicating it to fellow-jurors during the deliberations (as is\nthe case in some other countries). Hence, the moral question whether\nit is lawful to decide according to private knowledge against the\npublic evidence largely disappears. But when a case of the kind now\nconsidered does occur, the position of the civil law also agrees, it\nseems, with that of St. Thomas: \u201cNeither the judge nor the jury can\nconsider a private fact of which they have a merely personal knowledge,\nhowever important may be its bearing on the issue, unless it has been\nbrought to their attention by evidence properly produced in open\ncourt\u201d (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 334). But the lightest penalty\nallowed by the law should be imposed in such a case. If a judge were\nprivately certain that a jury verdict was unjust, he could offer his\nown testimony or appeal to the pardoning power.\n\n1954. The principle that a judge must be guided only by his public\nknowledge applies also to other officials who are required to follow\nthe results of a public investigation, but not to those who are\nrequired to act according to their best knowledge, whether public or\nprivate.\n\n(a) Thus, public knowledge must be the guide of those who are ministers\nof a court and on whom it falls to execute its decrees; for they are\nthe instruments and subjects of the president of the court. If they\nhave private information of a material and relevant kind, they should\ndisclose it as witnesses.\n\n(b) Private knowledge that is opposed to and more reliable than public\nknowledge must be the guide of those who are supposed to act according\nto the most trustworthy knowledge they have. Hence, a superior who has\nthe power to make appointments to office should disregard the votes of\nhis advisors, if he can prove that they are wrong in their opinions\nabout a nominee for office. He may confirm or annul their choice\naccording to his honest conscience.\n\n1955. When Guilt Is Doubtful in Criminal Cases.--In a criminal case or\na case in which punishment is inflicted, if the guilt of the accused is\ndoubtful, the sentence should be for acquittal; for no one should be\ncondemned unless his guilt is morally certain (see 1728 sqq.).\n\n(a) Thus, according to Canon Law, an ecclesiastical judge who is not\ncertain that sentence for the plaintiff will be just, must declare that\nthe latter has not established his case and must dismiss the defendant,\nthough exception is made for cases that have the favor of law (such\nas marriage, liberty, testaments, Canon 1869, n. 4). Canon Law places\nthe burden of proof on him who makes an assertion, and it rules that\nthe defendant is to be acquitted if the plaintiff or accuser fails to\nprove, even though the person on trial says nothing (Canon 1748).\n\n(b) According to the civil law the rules on evidence also favor the\naccused in cases of doubt. He must not be held guilty unless the State\nhas proved affirmatively and beyond reasonable doubt every material\nallegation in the indictment. In capital cases the evidence of guilt\nmust be equivalent in weight and conclusiveness to the direct testimony\nof two competent and reliable witnesses. A reasonable doubt in the\nmind of a juryman is one for which he can give himself an adequate and\nsatisfactory reason (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 608).\n\n1956. Doubt in Civil Cases.--In civil cases, if it is uncertain after\nthe investigation for whom the decision should be given, the following\nrules seem to be just:\n\n(a) if the parties are unequal in claim, the decision should be for the\none whose claim is more weighty; for the judge is appointed by society\nto investigate the truth of a controversy and to decide according to\nthe merits of the case. Thus, decision should be for the party Whose\narguments are of at least equal strength--but who has legitimate\npossession (for \u201cpossession is nine points in law\u201d), or whose case\nenjoys the favor of the law (e.g., in Canon Law, the cases of widows,\nwards, minors), or for the party whose case is stronger and more\nprobable. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that a judge may decide\nfor the side whose arguments are less probable (Denzinger, n. 1152);\n\n(b) if the parties are equal in their claims, some think that property\nin dispute should be equally divided between the contestants, others\nthat the parties should be persuaded to compromise, or, if this is\nimpossible, that the decision may be given for either one of them. But\nif positive law regulates the manner of proceeding in such a case, its\nprovisions should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law, if a judge is in\ndoubt as to which one of two competitors has possession, he may grant\nit to both of them indivisibly, or he may command them to deposit it\nwith a sequester, pending the settlement of the dispute (Canon 1697).\n\n1957. What should be decided when the defendant has possession with\nprobable title and the plaintiff has more probable title?--(a) If the\npossession is not certain, or not certainly legitimate, decision should\nbe for the plaintiff, for uncertain possession does not create any\npresumption of right and hence the more probable case prevails.\n\n(b) If the possession is certainly legitimate, the common opinion is\nthat decision should be for the defendant; for certain possession is\nnot overcome by more probable, but only by certain arguments for the\nplaintiff. Some authors, however, believe that the judge should decide\nfor the plaintiff, since possession prevails only when the arguments\nare of equal strength on both sides; or at least that he could decide\nfor him, since it is probable that the plaintiff by presenting a more\nconvincing case has sufficiently established his right to eject the\ndefendant.\n\n1958. The Standard by Which a Judge Should Weigh the Evidence.--(a)\nWhen the proving force of an argument is settled by the law itself,\nthe legal rule should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law certain kinds\nof proofs are expressly declared to be demonstrative (e.g., a public\ninstrument not contested, Canon 1816), while other proofs are held\nto be insufficient or only of partial value (e.g., certain kinds of\ntestimony, Canon 1756). Likewise in civil law public documents are\nprima facie evidence, oral interpretation of a written document which\ncontradicts its language is not admitted, etc.\n\n(b) When the proving force of an argument is left to the discretion of\nthe judge, he must follow his conscience, that is, he must sincerely\nand impartially decide to the best of his ability the value of the\nargument, whether it is decisive, or likely, or Weak. Thus, in judging\ncircumstantial evidence a juryman must use his own common sense and\nintelligence in determining whether the premises are doubtful or the\ninference illogical; in estimating testimony a judge must bear in mind\nthe quality of the witnesses and the character of their testimony.\n\n1959. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly\nJust.--(a) It is binding in conscience; for it is merely the\napplication of law to a particular case, and law obliges (see 377). (b)\nIt obliges in virtue of legal justice when the case is only penal, and\nhence he who is fined by court is held as a duty of obedience to pay\nthe fine; it obliges in virtue of commutative justice when the case is\nabout a strict right, and hence if the court requires an heir to pay a\nlegacy, the latter must make restitution for neglect of this duty (see\n1728).\n\n1960. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly\nUnjust.--(a) If the sentence is unjust because it is the application\nof an unjust law, it produces no obligation in those cases in which\nthe judge cannot lawfully apply the law (see 1949); for an unjust law\ndoes not oblige in conscience _per se_, but only _per accidens_ (see\n377, 461). (b) If the sentence is unjust because it is not based on the\nlaw or the evidence, or because the trial was not conducted fairly, it\nproduces no obligation _per se_, but there may be an obligation _per\naccidens_, as when scandal or great public disturbance will otherwise\nresult. Hence, one who through plain injustice is deprived of an\ninheritance has the right to occult compensation (see 1928), while the\nother party is bound to restitution of the inheritance (unless he is in\ngood faith or has prescribed) and also to damages, if he went to law in\nbad faith.\n\n1961. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence in Case of\nDoubt.--(a) If the doubt is about fact or law, not about the right\nof the judge to give sentence (see 1955 sqq.), the sentence may be\nsafely followed; for it is the office of the judge to settle doubtful\nmatters, and to promote the common welfare by ending litigation. Thus,\nin doubtful criminal cases the judge sometimes acquits a guilty man,\nand in doubtful civil cases he sometimes awards property to one who\nhas no right to it; but these sentences are not unjust, since they are\nbased on rules which long experience has shown to be necessary for the\npublic welfare. (b) If the doubt is about the justice of the sentence,\nthere is an obligation of conscience to observe the judgment, since\nthe presumption favors the judge. Were this not so, the authority of\ntribunals of justice would be at an end, for almost everyone who loses\na case thinks that he has been treated unjustly. But one may enter an\nappeal, where this is allowed by law.\n\n1962. When a Judge Is Bound to Restitution.--A judge is bound to\nrestitution when he causes unjust damage to the community or to\nlitigants (see 1762 sqq.), and hence he must either recall his unjust\nact, or repair to the best of his ability the harm done. But the\nconditions for unjust damage must be verified (see 1763).\n\n(a) Thus, the judge\u2019s act must be objectively unjust, that is, in\nviolation of a strict right under commutative justice. This happens\nwhen he conducts the trial unjustly (e.g., when he neglects the\nessential procedure, tries without an accuser, and the like) or when\nhe passes unjust sentence (e.g., condemns without proof of fact or\ncrime, or in spite of evidence for innocence, votes for acquittal when\nthere is no reasonable doubt of guilt, imposes penalties that are\ninsufficient or excessively severe, or awards property to one who to\nhis knowledge has no right to it).\n\n(b) The judge\u2019s act must be efficaciously unjust, that is, it must be\nthe real cause of the loss sustained by the other person. Hence, there\nis no duty of restitution if loss does not result (e.g., if the party\nwho is in the right wins in spite of unfairness on the part of the\njudge), or if loss cannot be traced to the judge\u2019s action (e.g., when\na judge is not entirely impartial in his charge to the jury, but his\nwords do not influence them, as they would have given an unfair verdict\nanyway).\n\n(c) The judge\u2019s act must be subjectively unjust, that is, the judge\nmust be seriously responsible for the damage on account of his\nculpable ignorance, negligence, or malice. Even though he has made\nmistakes through excusable inadvertence or error, he becomes seriously\nresponsible for damage, if, foreseeing it, he does not do what is in\nhis power to avert it (see 1769).\n\n1963. When a Judge Is Not Bound to Restitution. A judge is not bound to\nrestitution, however, for violations of virtues other than commutative\njustice.\n\n(a) Thus, charity is offended, but not justice, if the judge has\npersonal hatred against a person before him, but does not permit this\nto influence his conduct or decisions.\n\n(b) Legal, but not commutative, justice is offended, if the judge is\nnegligent about exemplary damages, provided the common good does not\nsuffer; for there does not seem to be any strict right to the fine\nbefore sentence has been given. This is disputed, however, by some\nmoralists, who hold that the judge is under contract with the community\nin this matter, and hence that he offends commutative justice, if he is\nhabitually and to notable amounts indulgent about fines.\n\n1964. Kinds of Accusation.--From injustice committed by judges we pass\nnow to that committed by accusers. It should be noted that there are\ntwo kinds of accusation: (a) extrajudicial accusation is that which is\nbrought before a superior in order that he may correct or restrain,\nwithout recourse to judicial process, a subject who is delinquent. This\nis evangelical or canonical correction, which was discussed in 1293,\n1289; (b) judicial accusation, with which we are now concerned, is that\nwhich is brought before a judge, in order that redress may be obtained\nthrough judicial process against an accused person.\n\n1965. Judicial accusation is also made in two ways. (a) The accuser\nsometimes does not act as one of the two antagonistic parties, and does\nnot assume the burden of proving his accusation. He makes an official\ncomplaint or denunciation, and then drops out of the case, leaving it\nto the magistrate or other officer to examine whether a process should\nbe instituted and the informer summoned as a witness. (b) The accuser\nis sometimes one of the two antagonistic parties during the process,\nand he then assumes the burden of proving his accusation. In Canon Law\nthere are two kinds of processual accusers, the actor in civil cases\nand the accuser (an official known as the _promotor justitiae_) in\ncriminal cases. In American law, the accuser in cases of private wrong\nis known as the plaintiff; in cases of public wrong he is the District\nAttorney or public prosecutor.\n\n1966. The Duty of Judicial Accusation or Denunciation.--(a) If a wrong\nhas been committed which is directly prejudicial to the common welfare\n(e.g., treason, counterfeiting, banditry), there is an obligation to\nmake accusation, for each member of society is held to come to its\nassistance when its peace and order are endangered, and this is done by\ncooperating with the tribunals of justice. Duty to one\u2019s family also\nrequires that one prosecute, when this is necessary in order to protect\nits members against some great evil.\n\n(b) If a wrong has been committed which is not immediately prejudicial\nto the common welfare, there is not _per se_ an obligation of\naccusation; for the purpose of accusation is to obtain punishment or\nthe correction of a wrong--an end that should not be waived when the\ncommon good is at stake, but which may be waived when private interests\nare concerned. But _per accidens_, or by reason of circumstances, there\nis often an obligation of denouncing or accusing private wrongs.\n\n1967. Cases in Which There Is a Duty of Making Complaint about Private\nWrongs.--(a) Such complaint is obligatory in virtue of commutative\njustice, when by reason of his office, oath, or function a person\nis under contract to accuse violators of the law; and hence serious\nnegligence in such a person entails the duty of restitution for any\ndamage caused through his fault. Examples here would be a watchman who\nfails to report thefts, a man serving on the grand jury who does not\nvote for an indictment when he should, a prosecutor who is careless.\nThe obligation is grave when the danger or injury to the common good is\nserious.\n\n(b) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of legal justice, when there\nis a positive precept of the law which requires that accusation be\nmade. The civil law rarely obliges to this as a duty of conscience,\nbut there are a number of cases in Canon Law in which it is a duty of\nconscience to denounce (e.g., when there has been a _sollicitatio ad\nturpia_).\n\n(c) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of charity, when without\nserious inconvenience one can thereby save a neighbor from a grave\nevil, such as unjust sentence of death or infamy: \u201cDeliver them that\nare led to death\u201d (Prov., xxiv. 11); \u201cRescue the poor, and deliver the\nneedy out of the hand of the sinner\u201d (Psalm lxxxi. 4).\n\n1968. Is a Malefactor Bound to Accuse Himself?--(a) As a rule, he is\nnot bound to confess guilt, either explicitly or implicitly, for this\nis too much opposed to natural inclination, and hence is not demanded\nby law (see 552). This seems to be true even though an accused has\nunjustly declared himself innocent, and has not been questioned further\nor has been acquitted; for legal justice obliges the accused to give a\ntrue answer only when he is being questioned (see 1978). In Canon Law\nthose who would sustain damage from their own testimony are not bound\nto take the witness stand, and hence persons who reasonably fear that\ntheir evidence will subject themselves or their relatives to infamy,\nvexation or other disadvantage cannot be forced to testify (Canon 1755,\nn. 2). In civil law one may not be convicted on one\u2019s own testimony\nalone, unless the confession was voluntary, that is, made neither under\nfear, nor with the hope of favor, nor as the result of any species of\ncoercion (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.608).\n\n(b) In exceptional cases, one would be bound to accuse oneself, namely,\nif there were a grave and urgent necessity of the community which\noutweighed the loss that would follow from self-accusation (see 1576,\n1577). Self-accusation is also a duty when one is the gravely culpable\ncause of the punishment of an innocent person, if there is no other\nlawful way of freeing him, and the self-accusation will not bring\non one a much more serious evil than that which the innocent person\nsuffers.\n\n1969. Ethical Conditions for Lawful Accusation or Denunciation.--(a)\nThere must be no injury to the common welfare. Hence, if the order and\npeace of society would be disturbed by the accusation of a crime which\nwas private and from which no further damage could be anticipated, it\nwould be better to leave this occult crime unpunished rather than bring\non greater evils to the public.\n\n(b) There must be no injury to private welfare. Hence, if the accuser\ndoes not believe that his accusation is just, or if he knows that\nthere is no suitable evidence for his charges, or if he is excluded\nby law from making an accusation (e.g., when his knowledge has been\nderived from the confessional or in other confidential ways), it would\nbe unjust to accuse; if the offender offers to make full satisfaction\nfor a private wrong and has already amended, or was not accustomed\nto commit such wrongs, or if the loss he will suffer from the\naccusation will be far in excess of the wrong he has done, it would be\nuncharitable to make formal accusation (see 1200, 1201).\n\n1970. Persons Who May Not Act as Accusers.--Generally speaking, the\nfollowing persons are naturally incapable of acting as accusers: (a)\nthose who are guilty of greater misdeeds or who are infamous, since\nit is unbecoming for them to accuse; (b) those who are enemies of the\nother party, since they are swayed by spite or revengefulness; (c)\nthose who are near relatives of the other party, since it is unnatural\nfor them to attack their own flesh and blood.\n\n1971. In Whose Favor May One Denounce a Private Wrong?--(a) One may\ndenounce it in one\u2019s own favor, for one is not obliged to sacrifice\none\u2019s right to redress, and hence accusation is permissible (see 1199).\nThose who are considered as one person with the injured party may\naccuse for him, such as parents, husband, wife, children.\n\n(b) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of an innocent third\nparty, as when an innocent person is being harassed by oppression, even\nthough one can defend him only with notable inconvenience to oneself\n(see 1967).\n\n(c) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of the guilty party\nhimself, as when he is guilty of offenses that are harmful only to\nhimself (e.g., drunkenness, impurities), if he has a bad reputation\nalready or his delinquencies are manifest.\n\n1972. Accusation and Fraternal Correction.--Whether obligatory or\npermissible accusation should be preceded by a fraternal correction is\ncontroverted among moralists. But perhaps the two opposite views may be\nreconciled as follows:\n\n(a) _per se_, that is, in view of the purpose of accusation\n(punishment, vindication of justice, example), there is no duty of\nprevious fraternal admonition, since the purpose of the admonition is\nthe amendment of the wrongdoer (see above, 1289, 1293);\n\n(b) _per accidens_, that is, in view of the circumstance that there\nmay be hope of correcting the wrongdoer and of averting evil, and that\npunishment may not be very necessary to the public welfare, previous\nfraternal correction for secret delinquencies may sometimes be a duty\nof charity.\n\n1973. Unjust Accusation.--Injustice in accusation is committed in\nthe following ways: (a) injury is done the accused when a crime is\nfalsely imputed to him through malice (calumny), or through a too\ngreat readiness to believe rumors (rashness); (b) injury is done the\ncommunity if one whose duty it is to conduct a prosecution makes only a\nsham attack or colludes with the defense (prevarication), or if without\ngood reason he abandons the prosecution (tergiversation).\n\n1974. Cessation of Duty of Accusation.--The duty of accusation ceases:\n(a) when accusation is found to be unjust, for example, when the\nprosecutor discovers the accused is really innocent, etc. (see 1969);\n(b) when accusation is found to be useless, for example, when one\ndiscovers that the authorities are already aware of the fact about\nwhich one intended to give information, or when one perceives that the\ncharge cannot be substantiated.\n\n1975. The Defendant.--The party who is required to make answer to the\ncharges of the plaintiff or prosecutor is known as the defendant or the\naccused. We shall now speak of the ways in which he may be guilty of\ninjustice, and shall consider the following cases: (a) the defendant in\ncivil cases; (b) the accused in criminal cases who is innocent; (c) the\naccused in criminal cases who is guilty.\n\n1976. The Duties of the Defendant in Civil Cases.--(a) Before\nSentence.--If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just, the defendant\nas a matter of justice should recognize the claim and withdraw from the\ncase. But a defendant may take exception to arguments offered by the\nplaintiff which, though actually valid, are not juridically made.\n\n(b) After Sentence.--If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just\nbut loses in court, the defendant is obliged in conscience to pay the\nclaim, even though the plaintiff does not appeal the case; he is also\nobliged in conscience to indemnify the plaintiff for the expenses of\nlitigation, if the latter lost the case on account of unjust means\nemployed by the defendant.\n\n1977. The Duties of One Who Has Been Arrested on a Criminal\nCharge.--(a) If the accused person is innocent, he may take to flight\nor even offer positive resistance, provided he does no injury to those\nwho attack him, and public scandal or disorder does not result from\nthe resistance. This is according to natural law, which permits one\nto use self-defense against unjust aggression; but since the positive\nlaw requires the accused to submit to arrest that is not manifestly\nunlawful and empowers the officers to employ force against those who\nresist, it seems that generally the accused should permit himself to be\ntaken under protest, if he cannot escape.\n\n(b) If the accused person is guilty, he may take to flight, since he\nhas not yet been sentenced as guilty nor officially deprived of his\nliberty; but he may not offer resistance to those who are sent to\napprehend him, since their aggression against him is not unjust. The\naccused person, if not yet convicted, may even use indifferent means to\nescape from prison, such as sawing his way out or eluding the vigilance\nof the guards; but he may not employ sinful means, such as bribery of\nofficials.\n\n1978. Duty of the Accused to Plead Guilty, if Questioned by the\nJudge.--(a) If the accused is innocent, he may not plead guilty,\nas is clear. If to escape most grave evils he did plead guilty, he\nwould be guilty of lying (if under oath, of perjury), but not of\nself-defamation; for, as the owner of his reputation, he has the right\nto sacrifice it in order to escape greater evils. Neither would he be\nguilty of suicide, according to some, if the death penalty were the\nconsequence of the confession; for his purpose would be to avoid what\nhe dreaded more than death.\n\n(b) If the accused is guilty, he must reply truthfully, if the judge\nhas the right to ask the question; for if the judge has the right\nto question, the accused has the obligation to answer, even though\nunpleasant things will befall him in consequence.\n\n(c) If the accused is guilty, but the judge has no right to ask about\nhis guilt (that is, if the judge does not question juridically or\naccording to law, or if he questions from a false presumption of\nguilt), or if the accusation cannot be proved juridically, the accused\nis not obliged to answer. He may keep silence or evade the truth, but\nit is not lawful to lie.\n\n1979. Legal Right of a Judge to Question a Prisoner about His\nGuilt.--(a) According to older legislation a judge had this right, and\ncould enforce it by torture, when the common good was involved and\nthe guilt of the prisoner was likely on account of infamy or manifest\nindications of crime or half-proof of guilt. In itself, this practice\nwas not opposed to natural law and had some good results; but it was\nopen also to many abuses. Some moralists teach that a judge cannot\nimpose a grave obligation of confessing guilt in capital or similar\ncases, if the accused has otherwise a hope of escape and no great evil\nis likely to befall the common interests by reason of an acquittal.\nThey argue that human law cannot oblige so rigorously as a rule.\n\n(b) According to modern civil legislation the right of exacting a\nconfession is denied to a judge. Thus, according to American law no\nperson may be compelled \u201cin any criminal case to be a witness against\nhimself\u201d (Constitution, Article V). In American law the plea of not\nguilty is not a lie, even though the accused knows that he is guilty,\nfor, as everyone understands, the plea means either that one is\ninnocent or that one is using the privilege of not confessing. Neither\nis it considered a lie to say that an unprovable charge is a calumny,\nfor an accusation that cannot be proved juridically is juridically a\ncalumny.\n\n(c) The general law of the Church rules for ecclesiastical processes\nthat, when the judge questions the parties-litigant, they are obliged\nto answer and to confess the truth, unless the question is not\nlegitimate (e.g., questions about irrelevant or privileged matters,\nor questions made in a captious or leading manner), or the answer\nwould incriminate the parties themselves (Canon 1743). Neither is\nan ecclesiastical judge permitted to put an accused in a criminal\ncase under oath to tell the truth (Canon 1744). An instruction of\nthe Holy Office of 1866 required that the guilty party in a case of\nsolicitation should confess, but the instruction was directive rather\nthan preceptive. Particular law (e.g., the statutes of a Religious\nInstitute) might perhaps prescribe confession by an accused, but most\nConstitutions of Religious Institutes bind only under penalty, and,\nas for the rest, an ecclesiastical superior could at most advise, but\ncould not impose, confession by an accused.\n\n1980. Rights and Duties of Accused in Conducting His Own Defense.--(a)\nIn Reference to Judge or Attorneys.--The accused, if questioned, may\nnot conceal the truth by lies, ambiguities, or half-truths, since these\nare evil means, nor may he use evasion if he is lawfully interrogated.\nBut if the question put to him is unlawful, he may evade an answer. It\nis commonly held that lies told in giving testimony or evidence are\nnot necessarily mortal sins, as there may be no perjury committed or\ngrave harm done another by reason of them (e.g., when an innocent man\n\u201cdoctors\u201d a paper and thereby without harming anyone escapes from an\nunjust sentence).\n\n(b) In Reference to the Opponent or His Witnesses.--The accused has the\nright to disclose secret but real crimes of the accusers, when this is\nan exercise of his legal right of taking exception to the witnesses\nas incompetent, or of his natural right of clearing himself of the\ncharge against him. It makes no difference whether the evidence of the\naccusers is true or false, whether given according to the order of law\nor not. But he must not go beyond the limits of moderate self-defense\n(see 1826). Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is probable\nthat calumny may be used without mortal sin as a defense of one\u2019s\njustice or honor (Denzinger, n. 1194).\n\n1981. If the accused objects secret crimes of the opposition, he must\nbeware of injustice or uncharitableness. (a) Thus, it is unjust to\ndisclose crimes that cannot be proved, or that are irrelevant (e.g.,\nit may be irrelevant to prove that the person who testifies that the\naccused committed murder is himself a fornicator, but it would be\nrelevant to show that this witness is a liar, or dishonest, or an enemy\nof the accused), or that need not be revealed (e.g., if the witness\u2019s\ntestimony can be overcome by showing that the witness is weak-minded or\nunder obligations to the opposition, it is not necessary to defame him).\n\n(b) It is uncharitable to disclose a crime, if the witness will suffer\nfar more from this defamation than the accused would suffer from the\ntestimony. If, however, the witnesses are giving false evidence of\ntheir own accord, they take the risk of revelations by the defense.\n\n1982. Rights and Duties of an Accused Who Has Been Found Guilty.--(a)\nAppeals.--It is lawful to appeal from a sentence that is unjust\n(whether because of the innocence of the accused, or of the illegality\nof the process), because appeal is a means of self-defense granted\nto the innocent. It is not lawful to appeal from a sentence that\nis certainly just, merely in order to cause delay or to defeat an\nadversary; but one may make an appeal when there are just reasons\n(e.g., in criminal cases the hope of getting an easier sentence or of\nprolonging life, in civil cases the discovery of new proofs, or of\nprobable arguments against the sentence given). But one who has pledged\nhis word not to appeal from the decision of an arbitrator should abide\nby his promise, and there is no appeal from the final decision of the\nhighest court, which in the Church is the Roman Pontiff (Canon 1880),\nand in the State the Supreme Court.\n\n(b) Escape from Prison.--If the sentence was unjust, it is lawful to\nescape, unless the means employed are intrinsically evil (e.g., killing\nof guards), or the results will be more harmful than continuance in\nprison (e.g., the overthrow of public order, the too great risk of\nthe attempt to escape). If the sentence was just, there are various\nopinions on the lawfulness of flight. Some think it is never lawful,\nbecause a just sentence is a precept of authority and should be obeyed;\nothers think that flight is lawful in grave cases (e.g., when the\nprisoner has been sentenced to death or to life imprisonment, or when\nthe conditions of prison life are unbearable, because human law cannot\nimpose as a normal regulation what is too difficult for human nature);\nstill others think that flight is always lawful, because the court\nsentence is that the prisoner be forcibly confined, not that he remain\nin prison voluntarily. But one is not necessarily bound to escape (see\n1857).\n\n(c) Resistance to Sentence.--If the sentence is unjust, resistance\nis not unlawful _per se_, because one has the right of self-defense\nagainst unjust aggression (Ezech. xxii. 27). Hence, if one were\ncondemned to execute oneself (e.g., by taking poison), the common\nopinion is that the sentence would be unjust (see 1856), and therefore\nnot obligatory. If the sentence is just, even though it be a capital\nsentence, resistance is not lawful, for the judge who duly pronounces\nsentence on a guilty man has the right to obedience (Rom., xiii. 1-5).\n\n1983. Jail-Breaking and Restitution.--If one does not sin by\njail-breaking, is one bound to restitution for the damages connected\nwith the escape?\n\n(a) If the damages are not caused by, but only follow accidentally on\nthe flight (e.g., escape of other prisoners, dismissal of guards),\nthere is no obligation to make restitution for them; for the flight\nwould not be the efficacious or the unjust cause of such damages.\n\n(b) If the damages result from the flight as from their efficacious and\nunjust cause, there is an obligation of restitution (see 1763), as when\na prisoner, in order to escape, does needless damage, or damage out of\nall proportion to the evil from which he seeks to escape. But ordinary\nproperty damage, such as a hole cut in a wall, does not seem unjust, if\nthere is no other way to get out.\n\n1984. Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony.--A witness in court is\na person who declares during a judicial proceeding that he knows some\nstatement, deed or omission in reference to the matters at issue.\nThe testimony of witnesses has proving force only in so far as these\npersons appear to have knowledge of the matters on which they testify\nand appear to be truthful. Hence, certain kinds of witnesses and\ncertain kinds of testimony are unreliable.\n\n(a) Thus, a witness is unreliable either through his own fault\n(e.g., if he is regarded in his community as below the standard in\ntruthfulness, or has the reputation of being a calumniator) or without\nhis own fault (e.g., if his powers of observation or his memory are\nsubnormal, or he is devoted or hostile to or dependent on one of the\ncontending parties). It is a duty, indeed, to presume good of a person\nin whom the opposite does not appear, if he is the only one whose\ninterests are concerned; but when there is danger to a third party, one\nmust be on one\u2019s guard (see 1744). Hence, St. John admonishes not to\nbelieve every spirit (I John, iv. 1).\n\n(b) Testimony is unreliable because of the number of the witnesses\n(e.g., one witness is often legally insufficient to prove, especially\nin graver matters), or the quality of their evidence (e.g., because in\nsubstantial points a witness contradicts himself or is contradicted\nby his co-witnesses, or because there are signs of collusion or\nconspiracy), or the counter-evidence of the opposition.\n\n1985. Obligation of Freely Appearing as a Witness.--(a) There is an\nobligation of commutative justice to offer testimony, if one is under\ncontract to do this, as when one is hired as a detective or agent to\ngather evidence against lawbreakers.\n\n(b) There is an obligation of legal justice to testify, even at the\ncost of serious inconvenience, if the testimony is necessary for\naverting a serious evil that threatens the common welfare. A person who\nknows of a plot against the peace of the State should bring this to the\nnotice of the authorities, even at the risk of his life. But a person\nwho knows that a crime has been committed, is not bound to give witness\nabout it, if the escape of its author will not be a serious detriment\nto public or private welfare (e.g., if one knows that an apparent case\nof suicide was really a homicide committed by accident).\n\n(c) There is an obligation of charity to testify (but not at the cost\nof serious inconvenience), if the testimony is necessary for averting a\nserious evil that threatens a private person. A person who can prove\nthat the evidence which is about to hang an innocent man is false\nshould testify for the accused, unless the testimony will bring an\nequal evil upon himself.\n\n1986. Obligation of Appearing under Lawful Citation to Give\nTestimony.--(a) He who avoids citation (e.g., by flight into another\njurisdiction, by concealment of his person when the subpoena is being\nserved), more probably does not violate legal justice by this act,\nsince a precept that has not been received cannot be violated. (b) He\nwho disregards citation offends legal justice, since the summons to\nappear has a claim on his obedience. But it does not seem that he\nviolates commutative justice, unless the party for whom he could\ntestify has a strict right to the testimony.\n\n1987. Obligation of Witness to Answer Truthfully.--A witness who is\nquestioned legitimately (i.e., by one who has the authority to question\nhim) and juridically (i.e., according to the form and order prescribed\nin law) is obliged _per se_ to answer according to the truth as he\nknows it, for one is bound to obey a superior when he gives a lawful\ncommand. But there are exceptions to this rule _per accidens_, that\nis, when a higher law exempts one from the necessity of divulging a\ncertain matter, or when the question asked refers only to what one\nknows juridically. In all these cases the witness may answer that he\ndoes not know, for he has no knowledge that he may, or should, or must\nuse.\n\n(a) Thus, the natural law permits reticence when a revelation would\nwork notable damage to the witness or those closely related to him, for\nthe command of a superior does not oblige under such great\ninconvenience. This supposes, of course, that the revelation is not\nrequired in order to prevent a great harm to the commonwealth or a far\ngreater harm to a private person than that which threatens the witness.\nA person who knows that he will be assassinated if he testifies against\na powerful criminal is not ordinarily bound to make the sacrifice.\nCanon and civil law excuse witnesses from making disclosures that would\nexpose them to prosecution or penalties (see Canon 1755, Sec. 2, n. 2).\n\n(b) The natural law commands reticence when a revelation would be\ninjurious to divine, public or private rights.\n\n1988. Matters Regarding Which a Witness Should Not Testify.--There are\ncertain cases in which natural law forbids a witness to make known a\nfact about which he is questioned.\n\n(a) A witness may never testify to matters known to him only from\nSacramental Confession, for to break the seal of confession is an\ninjury to the rights of God. In an ecclesiastical process a priest may\nnot testify from Sacramental knowledge, even though he has the\npenitent\u2019s permission (Canon 1757, Sec. 3, n. 2).\n\n(b) A witness may not testify as a rule to matters that are known to\nhim only in a confidential way, such as the communications between\nlawyer and client, physician and patient; for the public interest as\nwell as the interest of individuals requires that generally there\nbe security against defamation for those who give their confidence\nto others, especially if they are in great need of professional\nassistance. Privileged communications are recognized both in Canon\nLaw (Canon 1755, Sec. 2) and in civil law. But knowledge obtained as\na secret may be used when this is necessary in order to avert a great\nevil that threatens the public welfare or the welfare of an innocent\nperson, whether this person be the giver of the secret, or a third\nparty, or oneself; for to oblige to secrecy in these cases would be to\nthrow protection around crime. Thus, a lawyer may make disclosures of\nconfidential knowledge, if this is necessary in order to defend himself\nagainst the false accusations of a client, or to prevent a crime which\nthe client intends to commit.\n\n(c) A witness may not testify to matters about which he has unjust\nknowledge (e.g., by wire-tapping, by unjust coercion, by intoxicating\nanother person, by reading private papers without permission), for,\nas the knowledge was unjustly acquired, it cannot be justly used (see\n2420).\n\n1989. There are also certain cases in which a question refers only to\nwhat the witness knows juridically, or in which he is called upon to\nanswer according to the mind of the questioner.\n\n(a) If the witness is asked to state what he knows about a case, he is\nnot obliged to mention what he merely thinks or what he is uncertain\nabout; and if he is asked what he has heard, he is not obliged to state\nwhat was told him by persons of poor authority.\n\n(b) If he is asked whether the accused was to his knowledge guilty of\na crime, he is not obliged to mention an act of the accused that was\nunlawful but done in good faith. But in a civil case, in which inquiry\nis made about juridical faults, the witness should testify even to the\nexistence of delinquencies in which there was no element of theological\nfault.\n\n(c) If he is the only one who has knowledge of a delinquency and it\nwill be certainly useless for him to testify about the matter without\ncorroboratory evidence, it seems that he may keep silence about what he\nknows. But if the testimony of one witness is sufficient according to\nlaw, then the witness should speak of the facts known to him.\n\n1990. Sinfulness of False Testimony.--When we speak of false testimony,\nwe mean testimony which the witness knows to be false.\n\n(a) By reason of his false oath, the witness is guilty of perjury,\nwhich is a grave sin against the virtue of religion.\n\n(b) By reason of the injury done by the testimony, the witness is\nguilty of injustice, which from its nature is a grave sin. In the\nDecalogue (Exod., xx. 16) false testimony is forbidden among the sins\nagainst justice: \u201cThou shalt not bear false testimony against thy\nneighbor.\u201d Legal justice is offended, since false testimony is an act\nof disobedience to lawful authority, and usually commutative justice is\nalso violated, since by false testimony one of the litigants as a rule\nsuffers loss.\n\n(c) By reason of the deliberate falsehood, the witness is guilty of\nlying, which, however, is not always a grave sin.\n\n1991. It may happen then, though rarely, that false testimony is only\na venial sin, for example, when the witness is not under oath and he\ngives false testimony in a matter of small importance, or without full\ndeliberation on what he is saying, or when he forges or corrupts a\ndocument to supply for another that has been lost and from which his\ncertain right could be proved.\n\n1992. Obligation of Witness to Make Restitution.--The obligations of\nrestitution by a witness on account of failure to perform his duties\nproperly are as follows:\n\n(a) if the witness has not sinned against commutative justice, there\nis no obligation of restitution (see 1753). Hence, if he has evaded\ntestimony to which he was bound in legal justice or charity alone, he\nis guilty of sin, but he is not held to restitution. Similarly, if he\nhas given false testimony and thereby deprived the State of a fine\nunder a penal law, or saved a guilty party from punishment, he has\nsinned against legal justice, but is not obliged to make good the fine\nor pay damages;\n\n(b) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice, materially\nbut not formally, he is not the gravely guilty cause of damage, and\nhence is not obliged from justice (but there may be an obligation\nfrom charity) to make restitution (see 1764). But if he perceives\nthat his testimony was materially or venially unjust and will cause\nserious damage, he is obliged to recall his testimony, or in some other\nsuitable way prevent the damage, if this is possible (see 1769);\n\n(c) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice formally, he\nis the efficacious and culpable cause of the damage that results, and\nhence is bound to restitution, unless there is an excusing cause (see\n1797 sqq.). Thus, if false testimony, or testimony about matters which\nthe witness had no right to disclose, has led to the death sentence\nfor an innocent man, the witness who gave that testimony must retract,\neven at the risk of his own life; for in equal danger the rights of the\ninnocent have the preference. Again, if Titus by false testimony has\nsaved Balbus from paying damages for injury done to public property,\nTitus must make restitution for the loss caused, if Balbus will not\nmake reparation.\n\n1993. Is a witness guilty against commutative justice when he\nunlawfully conceals facts and damage results thereby to another person?\n(a) If by concealment is meant the destruction of evidence (e.g., the\nburning of a will or letter or forging), the witness or other person\nresponsible is guilty of a positive act of commutative injustice and\nis bound to restitution. (b) If by concealment is meant silence about\nmaterial facts that the witness is lawfully called on to disclose,\ndistinction has to be made between the witness who is not obliged from\ncontract to give evidence and the witness who is so bound. The former\nwitness is a negative cooperator and sins against legal justice and\ncharity; the latter witness is a negative cooperator and sins against\ncommutative justice (see 1780).\n\n1994. Payment of Witnesses.--Is a witness permitted to accept pay for\ngiving true and lawful testimony?\n\n(a) For the testimony itself a witness may not accept pay, for he is\nbound to tell the truth freely, just as the judge is bound to dispense\njustice freely.\n\n(b) For the expenses he incurs and the time he loses by reason of his\nassistance in court, he may accept pay; since, as St. Paul says, he\nwho does a service for another is not required to meet the expenses of\nthe service (I Cor., ix. 7). Both Canon and civil law make allowances\nfor suitable compensation to be granted to witnesses (see Canons 1787,\n1788). But if a witness receives compensation in excess of what is\nallowed by law, the court and the adverse party have a right to be\ninformed of this.\n\n1995. Lawyers.--Lawyer is the general term used to designate all those\nwho are versed in the law and who give assistance to others in legal\nways during lawsuits or apart from them.\n\n(a) Thus, apart from lawsuits a lawyer may act as legal adviser, giving\ninstruction, information or direction on rights and duties under the\nlaw.\n\n(b) During a lawsuit he advises about the case (jurisconsult) or\ncarries on for clients the prosecution or defense in a court of\njustice. The lawyers who attend to only the more mechanical parts of a\nsuit are sometimes called attorneys, in distinction from counsellors\nor counsel, who argue and plead in the courtroom, but generally\n\u201cattorney-at-law\u201d and \u201clawyer\u201d are synonymous terms. The counsellors\nare known in England as barristers when they conduct cases in superior\ncourts; they are called solicitors in chancery, and advocates in Roman\nlaw. Canon Law distinguishes between the advocate who defends, and\nthe procurator who represents, a litigant; the former argues for his\nclient by invoking the law in his favor; the latter acts merely as the\nrepresentative of his client and is restricted by his commission.\n\n1996. The Qualifications of Lawyers.--(a) The mental and moral\nrequisites are competency in the knowledge of their profession and\ndevotion to justice, morality, the constitution, and law (see 1943). A\nlawyer should be zealous for the dignity and reputation of the bar and\nloyal to associates, but not afraid to take action against practices\nthat are detrimental to his honorable profession.\n\n(b) The legal requisites for practising as a lawyer vary with the place\nor government. In Canon Law, it is necessary that an advocate be a\ndoctor or expert in ecclesiastical jurisprudence, that he be twenty-one\nyears of age, duly approved, etc. (see Canons 1657 sqq.).\n\n1997. The Duties of a Lawyer in Introducing Cases.--(a) He may not stir\nup litigation, as a means of bringing himself occupation and gain. The\nCatechism of the Council of Trent, Translated into English with Notes\n(Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York City, 1923), p. 475, denounces this\npractice as among the chief violations of the Tenth Commandment. Among\nlawyers it is regarded as unprofessional, and at common law it is an\nindictable offense.\n\n(b) A lawyer may not take or assist an unjust cause--one, namely, that\nis in opposition to moral or positive law, as when a party comes to\nhim with the request that he conduct a spite case whose purpose is to\nharass or oppress an innocent person. He who defends injustice is a\ncooperator, and is therefore guilty (see 1779). But if a case has a\ngood foundation in law, the lawyer is not bound to inquire into the\nsubjective dispositions or the conscience of the client in the matter,\nand he may take the case even though he does not know that the client\nis in good faith.\n\n(c) A lawyer should not refuse a just cause, merely because the person\nhe is asked to assist is indigent or not in favor. Commutative justice\ndoes not oblige him to offer his services to one in need of them; but\nthere is a duty of legal justice to give his best efforts if he is\nappointed as counsel for a poor person, and also at times a duty of\ncharity to do this if he is asked for legal help by one who is in need.\n\n1998. The precept about works of mercy, being affirmative, does not\noblige for every instance, but only when the due circumstances of time,\nplace, opportunity, etc., are present. Hence, a lawyer is not obliged\nby charity to devote himself to every deserving case that is presented\nto him (see 1227). (a) Thus, as to place, charity does not require that\none go about looking for the needy, but that one help those who are\nat hand. (b) As to time, charity does not require that one take care\nof future needs, but that one help those who are in present distress.\n(c) As to persons, charity does not require that help be given to all\nalike, for some have a greater claim on one\u2019s charity than others (I\nTim., v. 8). (d) As to need, charity does not command that help be\ngiven those who can easily help themselves, or who can obtain it from\nthird parties who are better fitted to bestow it.\n\n1999. Charity does not oblige to works of almsgiving, if the\ninconvenience to the donor is out of proportion to the distress\nfrom which the donee is rescued (see 1158). The inconveniences that\ncorrespond with the various degrees of distress are thus explained by\ntheologians:\n\n(a) if distress is extreme (e.g., a prisoner is about to be sentenced\nto death unjustly), a proportionate inconvenience is, according to\nsome, a grave loss, or, according to others, the loss of at least a\npart of the necessaries of one\u2019s state (see 1231, 1251);\n\n(b) if distress is very grave or grave (e.g., an accused man will be\nsentenced unjustly to a long and harsh imprisonment), the loss of goods\nwithout which one\u2019s state of life cannot be maintained so becomingly\nis, according to one opinion, not excessive; but, according to another\nview, any notable loss or inconvenience is excessive;\n\n(c) if distress is ordinary (e.g., an accused will be unjustly\nsentenced to a small fine), the loss of goods that are purely\nsuperfluous is, according to some, a proportionate inconvenience, but\nothers think that only such assistance need be given as will cause no\ninconvenience whatever, such as advice or other service given during\nspare times.\n\n2000. When Is a Cause to Be Regarded as Unjust?--(a) In civil cases\nthe suit or defense is unjust when it clearly has no moral right. A\nlawyer who recommends litigation in a case of this kind is unjust to\nthe adverse party, if that party loses; he is unjust to his client,\nif the client loses and is thus put to unnecessary expense. Generally\nspeaking, a Catholic lawyer ought not to accept a divorce case. The\nlawyer\u2019s position is different from that of a judge. Occasionally a\njudge cannot refuse a case without serious inconvenience to himself\n(see 1949, 1997); the lawyer, however, is free to accept or refuse\nthese cases. The general prohibition is founded on the fact that in\nthis country most divorce cases are means to an invalid remarriage.\nSome theologians argue that since it is the remarriage, not the\ndivorce, that is intrinsically evil, a lawyer might accept a divorce\ncase for a very grave reason, e.g., to relieve desperate financial\nconditions. In practice, however, owing to the danger of scandal,\nthe exception would be rare. Exceptions which are possible include\ncases where divorce is sought for a marriage that is invalid _coram\necclesiam_, e.g., civil marriage of Catholics, or simply for the\nsettlement of civil effects Where no danger of remarriage is involved.\nIn all cases involving Catholics, the lawyer should bear in mind the\nnecessity imposed upon Catholics by the Third Council of Baltimore to\nconsult ecclesiastical authorities before seeking civil separation from\nbed [and board.]\n\n(b) In criminal cases the prosecution is unjust if the accused is\nclearly innocent. But the defense is not unjust, even though the\naccused is known to be guilty, for both natural and positive law give\nthe accused a right of defense, and hence he may choose or may be given\nan advocate, in spite of his guilt.\n\n2001. Duty of a Lawyer When the Justice of a Cause Is Doubtful.--(a) In\na civil cause, the lawyer may act, whether for the plaintiff or for the\ndefendant. He may even take a case whose justice seems less probable,\nfor the purpose of the trial is to settle the doubt, and not\ninfrequently the cause that seemed doubtful or less probable at the\noutset is vindicated by the examination. Some moralists distinguish for\ncases in which the doubt is one of fact between the defendant and the\nplaintiff: if the former\u2019s case is less or equally probable, they say,\none may take it, but not so if this is true of the latter\u2019s case.\n\n(b) In a criminal case, when life, reputation or other grave issue is\ninvolved, the common opinion is that a lawyer may not prosecute if the\ncase of the people is doubtful or less probable, but he may defend, as\nwas just said, even though he is certain that the accused is guilty.\nThe office of the prosecutor is not necessarily to secure a conviction,\nbut to see that justice is upheld, while the office of the defender is\nto take care that an accused person is deprived of no right or\nprotection that he should have under the law.\n\n2002. If a lawyer through ignorance takes an unjust case, thinking it\njust, he is excused or not excused according to the character of his\nignorance (see 28, 249). (a) Thus, antecedent ignorance excuses from\nsin and restitution; (b) concomitant ignorance excuses from\nrestitution, but not from sin; (e) consequent ignorance excuses from\nneither sin nor restitution, if it is crass or affected, but it\ndiminishes responsibility, if it is only slightly sinful.\n\n2003. Duty of a Lawyer Who Discovers that a Case Is Really Unjust.--(a)\nA lawyer who took a case in the belief that it was just, but discovers\nthat it is really unjust, owes it to himself to abandon the case, for\nhe cannot honorably cooperate with iniquity. The same principle\napplies, if a client insists upon unjust courses in the support of his\ncase, even though the cause itself be just.\n\n(b) The lawyer owes it to his client in the hypothesis we are\nconsidering to preserve the latter\u2019s confidence inviolate (see 1988).\nHe should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon the case; but\nsince the client\u2019s case is unjust, he may not recommend a compromise,\nexcept perhaps in reference to expenses.\n\n2004. Lawyer\u2019s Duties towards Client.--Since every contract depends on\nthe mutual consent of the contractants, and since the purpose of the\nperson who retains a lawyer is to receive honest advice and assistance\nand to give in return a fair compensation, it follows that the lawyer\u2019s\nduty to a client is to give what is thus expected and not to exact more\nthan this deserves.\n\n(a) Before the case the lawyer should be perfectly candid with the\nclient as to the advisability of litigation or of the employment of\nhimself as counsel in the case. If there is a reason why he would be a\nless desirable advocate in the case, he should speak of this, so that\nhis consultant may have freedom of choice. He should also study the\nquestion presented to him, and give his honest opinion on the strength\nof the case. If a fair and amicable adjustment outside of court can be\nmade, the lawyer should recommend that this be done, and if it is not\nclear which party is right, he should advise a compromise.\n\n(b) During the case the lawyer should be faithful to the interests of\nhis client and diligent in the affairs for which he is engaged. Loyalty\ndemands that the advocate give his undivided devotion to his client\n(e.g., he may not give assistance to the adverse party, he may not\nreceive gifts or compensations from that party; see Code, Canons 1666,\n2407), and that he respect the client\u2019s confidences (e.g., he may not\nuse to the client\u2019s disadvantage the information given him). Diligence\nrequires that the lawyer use his best ability and efforts to the end\nthat the client, no matter how poor or unpopular or persecuted, may\nreceive all the remedies or defenses that the law grants him, and that\nhis case may be terminated with all possible speed.\n\n(c) After the case he should be honest in his charges and true to the\nconfidence that was reposed in him. The compensation for the lawyer\u2019s\nservices should be just, that is, a fair return for what he gave. The\namount of the fee should be fixed, therefore, by such standards as the\nlaw or custom, or by the value of that which the lawyer devotes to the\ncase (e.g., his time and labor, his loss of other employment or\nprospects, the risk he takes in undertaking the case), or of that which\nthe client receives (e.g., the amount which he gains, the benefit he\nreceives). The wealth of a client does not justify an excessive charge,\nbut the poverty of the client makes it a duty of charity at times to\nlessen the charges or to make no charges at all (see 1236-1239). It is\nclear that a lawyer should not compensate himself from the client\u2019s\nbusiness contrary to the latter\u2019s just wishes.\n\n2005. Lawyer\u2019s Duties towards Other Parties.--The duties of the lawyer\nto his client do not exempt him from certain duties to other persons\nwho have a part in the trial; for he is responsible to his own\nconscience and cannot act on the principle that he must win at any\ncost, or that the client takes all the blame for anything dishonorable\nthat is done.\n\n(a) Thus, respect is due to the judge and politeness to the opposite\nparty, his lawyers and witnesses. Abusive language and improper\npersonalities, therefore, should not be resorted to, and customary\ncourtesies should be shown.\n\n(b) Truth and fair dealing are due to those to whom or against whom the\npleading is directed. It is contrary to truthfulness to cite statutes\nor decisions that are no longer in force, to misquote laws, testimony\nor the language of opponents, to assert as a fact what has not been\nproved, to introduce false witnesses or documents, to coach clients or\nwitnesses in untrue stories, to resort to quibbles or sophistry, etc.;\nit is unfair to attempt to gain special favor from a judge or a jury,\nto make improper statements or remarks with a view to influencing the\njury or the bystanders or the public; to conceal the arguments upon\nwhich one relies until the opposition has no opportunity to reply; in a\nword, to practise any of the tricks of pettifoggery.\n\n2006. Concealment of Truth in Presenting a Case.--Is concealment of the\ntruth in the presentation or defense of a case sinful?\n\n(a) If concealment is not unjust or mendacious, it is lawful. Indeed, a\nlawyer should conceal such facts as would be harmful to his own case\n(e.g., incidents that are really of no moment, but that would create\nprejudice against his client), or as he has learned in confidence. This\nis not unjust, since the opposite party has no right to the knowledge,\nand it is not deception, since it does not cause but merely permits\nothers to draw erroneous conclusions. Neither is an advocate bound in\njustice to point out to the opposition matters favorable to their case,\nof which they are ignorant or which they do not notice.\n\n(b) If concealment is unjust or mendacious, it is unlawful. Thus, if a\nlawyer discovers that serious fraud has been practised or that the\ncourt or the opposition has been harmfully imposed upon, he is unjust\nif he takes advantage of this through silence. Similarly, a prosecutor\nis unjust if he suppresses facts or testimony or papers that would\nestablish the innocence of an accused person.\n\n2007. The Sinfulness of Introducing False or Corrupted Documents.--(a)\nTruthfulness is sinned against by this practice, whether the document\nbe entirely fictitious or a copy substituted for an original that has\nbeen lost, or an authentic instrument has been changed or interpolated\n(see 1980 a, 1991).\n\n(b) This practice is also against legal justice, since the law requires\nthat no misrepresentations be made about the evidence produced. Indeed,\nthis is a very serious matter, for, if it were ever permissible to\ntamper with documentary evidence, a way would be opened to frauds\ninnumerable to the great detriment of the public.\n\n(c) Commutative justice is offended by this form of dishonesty, if the\ncause defended is not certainly just; for the opposite party, since\njustice is perhaps on his side, has the right that he be not defeated\nby untruthful means. But if the cause defended is certainly just, there\nis not _per se_ any violation of commutative justice, since the adverse\nparty is not deprived of anything that is his, but is rather prevented\nfrom doing injustice; _per accidens_, though, there might be\ncommutative injustice (e.g., if the use of a forged exhibit was known\nto be risky and did actually lose the case for a client).\n\n(d) Charity to self is violated by this deception, since a lawyer\nshould not value his client\u2019s interests above his own conscience,\nreputation and prospects.\n\n2008. When a Lawyer Is Bound to Restitution.--(a) Unjust damage obliges\nto restitution (see 1763), and hence a lawyer must indemnify his client\nor the opposite party for the losses either one suffers through his\nunjust conduct. The client has a right to restitution if he was put to\nunnecessary expense because his lawyer did not tell him the case was\nhopeless or too risky, or if he lost a case because the lawyer was very\nincompetent or negligent or helped the opposite party, or if he was\ninjured in his reputation or prospects by the violation of his\nconfidences. The opposite party is entitled to restitution if he lost a\nright or was condemned because the lawyer unjustly took the case\nagainst him, or if he suffered other injuries because the lawyer\nemployed foul means to his disadvantage. If a lawyer acts as the\nmandatary of his client in the use of injustice, the duty of\nrestitution rests primarily on the client and secondarily on the lawyer\n(see 1783); if the lawyer alone is guilty, he is responsible for all\nthe damage done. There is no duty of restitution if only legal justice\nis violated (e.g., if some deception is practised in order to win for\nthe side that is in the right), or if charity is wronged (e.g., if one\nrefuses to take the case of a person who is in need).\n\n(b) Unjust possession also obliges to restitution (see 1770), and hence\na lawyer who appropriates goods of his client against the latter\u2019s\nright, or who charges exorbitant rates for his services, or who drags\nout a case for lucre\u2019s sake, or who has not refunded when he withdrew\nfrom a case, should restore his ill-gotten goods. If the amount of a\nfee is settled by law, an attorney who takes more than the legal sum\ndoes not necessarily incur the duty of restitution. All will depend on\nthe character of the law, whether it is penal or preceptive, and if\npreceptive, whether it obliges in virtue of legal or of commutative\njustice.\n\n2009. Unjust Words.--We shall now take up the injustice that is done\nthrough words spoken outside of a judicial process, or the classes of\nverbal injustice that are not peculiar to courts, but are committed on\nall sorts of occasions, public and private. The principal sins here are\ndistinguished according to the different injuries intended by the\nsinful speaker, and are as follows:\n\n(a) sinful words that signify or effect in another person the evil of\nguilt, thereby depriving him of benefits that are connected with\nvirtue. Some evil speakers deprive their neighbor of tributes that are\npaid to virtue by others, such as honor (injury by contumely), fame\n(injury by defamation), friendship (injury by whispering); while other\nevil speakers deprive a person of the tribute of virtue paid by his own\nconscience, namely, self-respect and peace of mind (injury by\nderision);\n\n(b) sinful words that signify or effect against another person the evil\nof punishment. The words are known under the general name of cursing.\n\n2010. Contumely.--Contumely is unjust dishonor shown to a person in his\npresence.\n\n(a) It is unjust, and hence those are not guilty of contumely who speak\nwords that are not honorable to persons deserving of reproof (e.g., in\nLuke, xxiv. 25, Our Lord calls the two disciples \u201cfoolish and slow of\nheart\u201d; in Gal., iii. 1, St. Paul addresses the Galatians as\n\u201csenseless\u201d). Similarly, it is not contumelious to call another person\nby a name that sounds somewhat disrespectful, if this is done in banter\nor pleasantry and will be taken in good part by the other and do no\nharm. Thus, to send a comic valentine or good-naturedly to ridicule\nsome of the spectators at a farce is not contumelious as a rule, since\nmost persons are not galled by these gibes, nor are the jokes taken\nseriously as a rule by the public. But care must be exercised both in\nserious and playful rebukes to keep within moderation. St. Augustine\ndeclares that even in corrections one should use reproachful terms\nsparingly and only in case of great necessity.\n\n(b) Contumely is dishonor, and so it is distinguished from injurious\nwords that offend some other right (e.g., detraction offends\nreputation). Honor is an external manifestation of the respect felt for\nanother\u2019s excellence or superiority in some natural or supernatural\nperfection given by God, such as virtue, authority, nobility, rank,\nwealth, etc. Contumely, therefore, is either negative, as when one\nostentatiously refuses to show another the honor due him (e.g., the\nsalute or title or deference which custom allows him), or positive, as\nwhen one manifests signs of disrespect (e.g., names derogatory to\nvirtue or intelligence, or which mean that the person addressed is vile\nand contemptible).\n\n(c) Contumely is shown to another in his presence, that is, it is an\naffront directed to his person immediately (e.g., the mockery of\nEliseus by the little boys near Bethel, in IV Kings, ii, 23), or\nmediately (e.g., the dishonor of David\u2019s ambassadors by the Ammonites,\nin II Kings, x), or at least to his knowledge (e.g., the enemies of St.\nPaul in Phil., i. 17, who spoke of him insultingly in the expectation\nthat their words would be carried to him).\n\n2011. Are all persons deserving of honor? (a) If honor be taken in its\nstrictest sense for reverence shown to a person who is one\u2019s superior\nin some good quality, or for veneration for the proper excellence of\nmankind (viz., virtue), then honor cannot be shown except to those who\nare more exalted than oneself or to those who are virtuous. (b) If\nhonor be taken in its wider and more usual sense for respect for a good\nquality, natural, moral or supernatural, in which a neighbor is more\nworthy at least than some others, then honor can be shown to every\nrational creature (except the damned, who are irretrievably wicked and\noutside the pale of friendship); for there is no one, however bad or\nlowly, in whom there is not something that deserves respect. St. Paul\nexhorts Christians to be beforehand in honoring one another (Rom., xii.\n10), and he urges that each esteem the other as better than himself\n(Philip., ii. 3).\n\n2012. Various Forms of Contumely.--(a) By reason of the signs used or\nthe external form it takes, contumely is either in words (e.g., the\nnames \u201cthief,\u201d \u201clunatic,\u201d \u201cbastard\u201d) or in deeds that are equivalent to\nword (e.g., offensive cartoons or caricatures, insulting valentines or\npostcards, \u201cpoisoned pen\u201d letters, lampoons, scurrilous or opprobrious\ngestures or acts, sardonic grins, mimicry).\n\n(b) By reason of the thing signified or the contemptible quality that\nit ascribes to another contumely is also distinguished into reproach,\nwhich accuses another of sin (e.g., of drunkenness), revilement\n(_convicium_), which ascribes to another either a fault or its\nconsequences (e.g., drunkenness or imprisonment, or diseases of\nalcoholism), taunting (_improperium_), which twits another with\nmisfortunes or inferiority (e.g., his lowly origin or poverty or the\nfavors one formerly showed him).\n\n2013. Manner of Confessing Contumely in the Sacrament of Penance.--(a)\nCircumstances that are of an essential kind, that is, those that change\nthe species or add a new species, must be mentioned (e.g., the fact\nthat contumely was blasphemous or calumnious or scandalous or directed\nagainst a cleric or parents). (b) Circumstances that are merely\naccidental, such as those given in the previous paragraph, need not be\nmentioned, for they are merely various ways of committing the same sin\nof contumely.\n\n2014. The Sinfulness of Contumely.--(a) From its nature contumely is a\ngrave sin of injustice, for it robs one of honor, which is more prized\nthan any other external possession, since it is a testimony to virtue\nand to the esteem of fellowmen honestly earned. Hence, men will often\nsacrifice health or wealth or life itself to save honor. He who calls\nhis brother a fool is deserving of hell (Matt., v. 22), and the\ncontumelious are classed with those who are delivered over to a\nreprobate sense (Rom., i. 30). But, as sins of the tongue are imputable\nonly in so far as they express the mind of the speaker, contumelious\nwords are gravely sinful only when they proceed from a direct purpose\nto inflict serious disgrace (e.g., Titus applies to Balbus an epithet\nthat is not regarded as very abusive, but his purpose is to manifest\nhis supreme contempt), or from an indirect intention to effect this\n(e.g., Claudius jokingly addresses Sempronius by a very disgraceful\ntitle, not meaning any great harm, but knowing that Sempronius will\nfeel this deeply or that in the eyes of the bystanders he will be\ngreatly dishonored).\n\n(b) From the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter,\ncontumely is made a venial sin. Thus, if one who is suddenly carried\naway by anger or who is not thinking of what he says calls another\nperson a very vile name, there is not sufficient advertence for a grave\noffense; and if one who is acting with full deliberation addresses\nanother in language that is only slightly disrespectful, there is not\nsufficient harm done to constitute a mortal sin.\n\n2015. The gravity of the matter in contumely depends, not only on the\ncharacter of the signs of disrespect, but also on the persons concerned.\n\n(a) Thus, the less the respect which the offender owes the offended\nparty, the less the offense. Hence, for a subordinate to call his\nsuperior a liar or an ass is a more grievous fault than for a superior\nto give the name to his subordinate.\n\n(b) The less authoritative the word of the person who utters contumely,\nor the less evil animus that attaches to his speech, the less the\ndishonor and the sin. Thus, fishwomen were once notorious for\nvituperation, but little attention or weight was given to their words.\nA person of that character, then, might commit only a venial sin by a\nvery abusive word, whereas a person of more respectable character would\nsin mortally by using the same expression. Similarly, when parents or\nteachers berate their subjects as fools, blockheads, dunces, etc.,\nthere is generally no bad spirit behind these exclamations, and hence\nthe use of such expressions is not very sinful, even when correction is\nnot being made.\n\n2016. Is the gravity of contumely lessened by the fact that the\noffended person feels the injury less?\n\n(a) If the contumely is felt less because the dishonor itself is less,\nthe gravity of the sin is of course lessened, for example, if the\nperson offended is less deserving, or the person who offends is not\ntaken seriously (see 2015).\n\n(b) If the contumely is felt less only because the person dishonored is\nvery meek and patient, the gravity is not lessened, but is rather\nincreased (see 1725). If the person offended does not feel the injury\nat all (e.g., because he is very thick-skinned or is very fortunate),\nless damage is done, but the wrong remains, otherwise, theft from the\nrich could be excused on the plea that they will not miss what is\nstolen.\n\n2017. The Causes of Contumely.--(a) Pride is sometimes a cause,\ninasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick\nto express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this\nwill add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will\njust as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.\n\n(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the\nfoolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what\ndamage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak\nabusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the\nbystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse\nthemselves on the plea that it was all a joke.\n\n(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to\nshow his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier\nor more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words.\nHence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The\nsubject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the\nsuperior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin,\non account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on\naccount of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).\n\n2018. The Duty of Bearing with Contumely.--(a) As to the internal\ndisposition, one should be ready and willing to suffer insults without\nmaking any answer to them, if this is necessary. For the precept of\npatience requires that one be prepared in mind to tolerate injuries and\nto give place to wrath, should the circumstances at any time call for\nsuch restraint. In this sense Our Lord spoke when He commanded that one\nturn the other cheek to the striker (Matt, v. 39), and He practised His\nteaching by making no reply to the insolence of those who were\nimplacable or who only sought material for accusations.\n\n(b) As to external conduct, one should repel contumely when there are\ngood and sufficient reasons for this course, and hence Our Lord\nprotested against the unlawful blow given Him in the court room, and\nwhich the judge should have reprimanded (John, xviii. 23). He also\nrefuted those who decried Him as a blasphemer, or glutton, or demoniac,\nor political disturber. But if no good end will be served by\nself-defense, or if greater evils will follow from it, no answer should\nbe made. One should be more desirous to possess the right to honor and\nfame--viz., virtue and a worthy life--than to possess honor and fame\nthemselves, for goodness is always a blessing, but prosperity is not\nunfrequently a real misfortune. Indeed, Our Lord says that to be\npersecuted, reviled and calumniated places one in the same class as the\ngood men of the past (Matt., v. 11).\n\n2019. The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.--(a)\nThe good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and\nthat he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient\nreason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a\nfool, lest he think himself wise.\n\n(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not\ndemoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as\nan example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of\nweakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that\npreachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without\nfruit.\n\n(c) The good of self is a third reason for replying to contumely, for\nto enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to\nact worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many\na sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is\nguilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good\nname, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.\n\n2020. The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.--(a) The\nspirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or\nof unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame;\notherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person\nwould sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit\nbehind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage\nthe other party the more by disregarding the attack).\n\n(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should\nnot go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is\nlawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the\nassailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to\nchallenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).\n\n2021. The Duty of Making Restitution for Contumely.--(a) If contumely\nis not contrary to commutative justice, there is no duty of\nrestitution. Hence, dishonor that is purely negative, such as the\nrefusal to uncover on meeting a clergyman, does not oblige one to make\nrestitution, for the omission is contrary to the virtue of observance\nor reverence but not to commutative justice. The case would be\ndifferent, however, if negative dishonor were so marked or noticeable\nas to be equivalent to positive disrespect, as when at the entrance of\na distinguished personage all in the room arise except one man who\nremains seated and gives a bitter look at the newcomer.\n\n(b) If contumely is contrary to commutative justice, restitution is\ndue. All agree that commutative justice is violated when contumely\nbecomes vilification, or when an insult is committed in the presence of\nonlookers with the purpose of making the offended person seem\ncontemptible in their eyes. But there are two opinions about the case\nwhen contumely is merely revilement, or an insult offered when there\nare no others present and the purpose is to make the offended person\nappear vile in his own eyes.\n\n2022. Opinions on the Duty of Restitution for Revilement.--(a) One\nopinion holds that injury is done, not damage, and hence that\nsatisfaction is owed rather than restitution. Further, it is held that\nsatisfaction is penal and so not obligatory (except out of charity)\nbefore judicial sentence.\n\n(b) Another opinion says that damage is done as well as injury, since\nmen regard an insult, even though offered in private, as an unjust\ndeprivation of a great good. Satisfaction of a very humiliating kind,\nsuch as the begging of pardon on bended knees, as being penal, can\nawait an order from authority, but the ordinary forms of reparation,\nsuch as expression of regret or request for forgiveness, should be made\nwithout any such order (Matt., v. 24).\n\n2023. What Kind of Reparation Should Be Made for Contumely?--(a) In\ngeneral, the rule is that contumely should be repaired by a bestowal of\nthe same kind of goods as those of which the offended party was\ndeprived; and hence dishonor is repaired by honor, disrespect by\nrespect. The injured party should be aware that reparation is being\nmade, or at least that honor is being shown him. If by reason of\ncontumely one is responsible for other damages that followed (e.g., if\none foresaw that one\u2019s affront would lead to money losses, enmities,\nquarrels, bloodshed, etc.), one is duty bound to make good these losses\nalso.\n\n(b) In particular, the honor that should be offered in atonement is\ngenerally an apology, for this is both satisfaction for the wrong done\nand a token of esteem. At times, according to some, more is required,\nfor if the insult was very gross, a mere request for pardon is perhaps\nnot sufficient; on the other hand, less may suffice, as when the\nindignity was slight. Many authors hold that a respectful apology is\nsufficient reparation for any contumely. Among the lesser forms of\nrestitution for dishonor are signs of friendship, courteous greetings,\na pleasant chat, an invitation to call at one\u2019s home, a dinner or\ntoast, a eulogistic speech, etc.\n\n2024. The Manner of Making Apologies.--(a) They should be made with at\nleast as much formality as accompanied the insult. Hence, if the injury\nwas public, the acknowledgment of error should also be public. (b) They\nmay be made either personally or by intermediary. If the guilty person\ncannot very well appear before the offended person, he may send his\nregrets by letter or through a representative.\n\n2025. Since the gravity of contumely depends on the relations between\nthe parties and other circumstances, an apology is not always necessary.\n\n(a) Thus, if the offender is an inferior or an equal, an apology should\nbe made for a serious insult, at least when the offended person insists\non it. Thus, a cheerful salutation by a child does not atone for a vile\nname applied to his father. If an inferior dishonors a superior through\nignorance, he makes amends by acknowledging his ignorance and showing\nrespect, as was done by St. Paul (Acts, xxiii. 5).\n\n(b) If the offender is a superior, an apology is never necessary, lest\nby abasing himself he lose the prestige which his office should have.\nHence, if a father has used harsh language to his child, it would not\nbe seemly for him to ask the child\u2019s pardon, but he should show some\nmark of kindness to heal the wound.\n\n2026. Cessation of Obligation of Restitution.--The obligation of\nrestitution for contumely ceases in certain cases (see 1797, 1798). (a)\nThus, impossibility excuses, as when one cannot make reparation without\nrenewing an old feud that has been buried and forgotten. (b)\nForgiveness by the offended person excuses. The offended party forgives\nthe debt expressly when he says or shows that he does not care to have\nan apology; he forgives implicitly, when he retaliates by an equally\ninjurious action, defends himself by retorting equal contumely on his\nadversary, or obtains equivalent satisfaction from a court of justice.\n\n2027. A confessor should not impose the duty of an apology in certain\ncases.\n\n(a) Thus, if this command would be harmful, it should be omitted, as\nwhen a penitent is in good faith and would be put in bad faith by the\nadmonition. (b) If this command is not necessary, it should be omitted,\nas when the duty of an apology has ceased for one reason or another. In\nthe case of children who speak or act disrespectfully to their elders,\nit may at times be taken for granted that the elders, especially the\nparents, do not expect an apology for trifling cases of disrespect.\nBut, on the other hand, it may often be advisable to require such\nchildren to apologize for their rudeness, in order to cure them of it.\n\n2028. Defamation.--Defamation (backbiting) is the unjust blackening of\nthe reputation of another person by secret words.\n\n(a) It is unjust, that is, it has no reasonable motive to justify it.\nDefamation differs from just revelation of secret faults.\n\n(b) It is a blackening or besmirching, that is, a taking away or\nlessening of fame. Defamation casts a shadow over or totally obscures\nthe brilliance of a good reputation.\n\n(c) It is against reputation, that is, against the favorable opinion\nand report of the public on the virtue and character or other good\nqualities of a person, Thus, it is defamation to say that an individual\nis a drunkard, or that a professional man is incompetent, if these\npersons are not known to have such defects. If a person has no\nreputation here and now, except a bad one (e.g., a criminal who has\njust been convicted and sentenced to prison, a loafer who is often seen\nintoxicated on the streets, a woman who is often heard peddling\nscandals), it is not defamation to speak about the true and public\nfaults of this person; nor is it sinful to speak thus if there is some\nsuitable reason (e.g., to discuss a murder trial that is being reported\nin the papers, or to tell a humorous incident that will do no harm).\nBut those who uselessly or harmfully discuss the known weaknesses of\ntheir neighbors are sinners called gossipers or fault-finders.\n\n(d) It is against the reputation of a person, that is, of an individual\npossessed of right. The party offended by defamation can be a natural\nperson (i.e., a rational being, whether infant or adult, high or low,\nrich or poor) or an artificial person (i.e., a society, group or\ncollection of individuals endowed with reason); he can be either a\nliving or a deceased person, for death does not destroy the soul nor\ntake away the right to reputation.\n\n(e) It is against the reputation of another, that is, defamation as now\nused is a sin of injustice, and one cannot be strictly unjust to\noneself; but \u201cself-defamation\u201d may be used in a wider sense to\ndesignate a sin opposed to charity (see 1575 sqq.).\n\n(f) It is accomplished by means of words, that is, by oral\ncommunication or its equivalent. One can defame, therefore, by word of\nmouth, by deaf and dumb language, by writing, by a gesture, by silence,\nor by a look.\n\n(g) It is done by words or signs that are secret, that is, by words or\nsigns expressed before others but in the absence of the person who is\ndefamed, or at least when he is thought to be absent (backbiting). The\ndefamer is like the thief who wishes to do harm but does not wish the\nvictim to know the author of the harm.\n\n2029. The Differences between Defamation and Contumely.--(a) They\ndiffer in their purposes, for the defamer intends to hurt another in\nhis reputation before the public, while the contumelious man intends to\nhurt another in his honor, either in his own eyes or in those of\nothers. (b) They differ in their manner of procedure, for defamation is\nbehind the back, contumely before the face, of the party who is\ninjured. The defamer has some respect for his enemy, for he fears to\nface him and resorts to undermining, but the contumelious sinner\ndespises his enemy and shows it by insulting him to his face.\n\n2030. Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.--(a) By reason of the\nintention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things\nare said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when\nderogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence,\nthere can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the\nsecret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be\ncontumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus\nas a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already\nthat he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation\n(e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he\nwas a sober man).\n\n(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or\nimplicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the\nblackening of his neighbor\u2019s reputation; in the latter case he intends\nsomething unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or\ntalkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen.\nExplicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation\na venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the\nformer sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.\n\n(c) By reason of the injury done defamation is either detraction or\ncalumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or\ndefects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories\nthat are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and\nfalsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to\nreal crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of\nhalf-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a\nhistorian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not\ngive the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation,\nchallenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his\nsubject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his\namendment).\n\n(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or\nindirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect\ndefamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the\ndistinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or\nprinted). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not\nfound in spoken words.\n\n2031. Examples of Indirect Defamation.--(a) Faint praise is a subtle\nmode of defamation, as when one says of an absent person that he has\nnot committed murder yet, or that like everyone he has some good\npoints, for to the listeners this indicates that the speaker does no\nhold a high opinion of the person discussed.\n\n(b) Silence is also at times a hidden form of defamation, as when Titus\nsays to Balbus that the absent Caius is good and Balbus out of malice\nanswers: \u201cLet\u2019s talk about something else; we must be charitable\u201d, or\nwhen Sempronius falsely declares in company that the absent Claudius is\nto the knowledge of Julius a depraved character and Julius, who is\npresent, makes no protest against the misrepresentation.\n\n(c) Depreciation is defamatory, as when one says that a person who is\nbeing discussed is not as pious or reliable as is commonly believed, or\nthat there is great room for improvement, or that he is much better now\nthan in times past, or that there is another side to the picture, or\nthat he is good, but....\n\n(d) Denial of good qualities is defamatory, when it lessens the esteem\nin which a person is held. The good qualities here referred to are\nthose that render a person distinguished or commendable among his\nfellows: chiefly these are moral qualities (viz., virtuous habits,\ndispositions and acts); secondarily, natural and internal qualities\n(such as learning, quickness of mind, experience, strength and health\nof body, and in women, beauty); finally, natural and external goods\n(such as wealth, famous ancestry, able assistants in business, or the\nexcellent merchandise supplied, etc.).\n\n2032. Examples of Direct Defamation.--The following are examples of\ndirect defamation:\n\n(a) sinister interpretation, as when one states that words or acts of a\nneighbor that were good or at least open to a good interpretation, were\ndictated by greed, ambition, pride, etc.;\n\n(b) unjust revelation (detraction), as when one reveals secret faults\nor crimes;\n\n(c) exaggeration, as when one magnifies a venial into a mortal sin, an\nexceptional or indeliberate fault into an habitual or deliberate sin;\nor when one distorts a sin of one species into a sin of another and far\nmore heinous species, or accuses a whole class or body of men because\none of their number has fallen. Those who add their own little detail\nor circumstance to a defamatory tale as they pass it along are\nproverbial examples of exaggeration: \u201c_Fama crescit eundo_\u201d;\n\n(d) false accusation (calumny) is the worst kind of defamation.\nInnocent XI condemned the proposition that one may probably use calumny\nwithout serious sin as a defense of one\u2019s own justice and honor (see\nDenzinger, n. 1194).\n\n2033. Direct defamation is committed either by plain words or by\ninsinuation. (a) Examples of defamation by innuendo are those ambiguous\nexpressions or half-veiled accusations that arouse suspicion and often\ndo more injury than plain accusations. Thus, to say with a laugh or in\nan ironical tone that a certain person is human, or broadminded, or\nprudent may be equal to volumes of abuse, since the words can have a\nbad meaning as well as a good one. Similarly, such expressions as,\n\u201cWhat I know about him is not to be told,\u201d \u201cI know what no one would\nbelieve,\u201d etc., may be taken for slurs on character.\n\n(b) Examples of defamation by plain speech are all those innumerable\nstatements which, either in general terms (e.g., that another person is\na scoundrel, a villain, a reprobate) or in specific ones (e.g., that\nanother person is a blasphemer, a thief, a liar), tend to blacken the\ngood name of a neighbor.\n\n2034. Good Repute or Fame.--Good repute or fame is of various kinds.\n(a) Thus, by reason of its object, good reputation is either negative\nor positive. A negatively good reputation consists in the absence of\nany unfavorable opinion or belief about a person, while a positively\ngood reputation is the common judgment in favor of a person\u2019s worth.\n(b) By reason of its relation to the real character of a person, it is\neither true or false. Thus, if a man is regarded by the community as\nhonest, his reputation is true when he is really honest, but it is\nfalse when he is in fact dishonest. (c) By reason of its degree, it is\neither ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary good repute is that which\nevery person needs, and it consists in the public belief that an\nindividual is trustworthy and competent in the affairs and duties that\npertain to his state or occupation. Extraordinary fame is that which is\nnot necessary, such as the celebrity which a person enjoys for unusual\nability as a statesman, orator, financial expert, mathematician, or for\nvirtue that is far above the average.\n\n2035. The Right to Good Reputation.--(a) Those who are absolutely\nunknown (i.e., both as to their identity and their character) have no\nright to reputation, since reputation attaches to one who can be named\nor described, and hence it is not defamation (though it might be rash\njudgment) to say that a stranger who passed on the street and was lost\nin the darkness must have been a criminal.\n\n(b) Those who are known by sight or name, but who have not as yet shown\nwhat they are, have a right to a negatively good reputation, for a man\nshould not be considered evil until his conduct has given ground for\nunfavorable judgment (see 1727 sqq.). It is not defamation to say about\nan unknown family that has moved into a locality that we do not know\nwhat kind of people they are, but it is defamation to say that they are\nlikely undesirable.\n\n(c) Those who are known in a place and who have already acquired a good\nname there have a right to a positively good reputation; for, if the\nreputation is true, it is a good which they have honestly acquired; if\nit is false, it is a good of which they are in possession, and\npossession itself is entitled to respect.\n\n2036. Sinfulness of Detraction.--The civil law does not generally\npunish slander if the slanderer can prove that his statements are true,\nbut this does not make veracious defamation morally lawful. God detests\nand punishes crimes (e.g., fornication) of which human law sometimes\ntakes no account. The harmfulness of veracious defamation is both\npublic and private.\n\n(a) Defamation Does Public Harm.--The peace and order of the community\nwould be seriously disturbed, if it were lawful to attack reputations\nsimply because one was persuaded that they were unfounded: the person\ndetracted would be hampered in his official business and social\nrelations, innocent persons would be blackened as well as the guilty,\nand the friends and relatives would suffer with the person detracted.\n\n(b) Defamation Does Private Harm.--The peace and security of the\nindividual would be uselessly assailed. Reputation is profitable both\nin spiritual and temporal ways, and it is therefore a ruthless act to\nrob a person of it, when he has done nothing in public to forfeit it\nand its possession by him is harmful to no one.\n\n2037. Right to True and False Reputation. There is, nevertheless, a\ndifference between the right to a true and the right to a false\nreputation.\n\n(a) Thus, the right to a true reputation is an absolute and universal\nright, one which does not cease in any case, for truth and justice\ndemand that one should not represent as evil a person who is really\ngood. This right applies to an extraordinary, as well as to an ordinary\nreputation.\n\n(b) The right to a false reputation is a relative and limited right,\none which ceases when the common good on which it rests no longer\nsupports it (e.g., when it cannot be maintained without injustice).\nMoreover, there is no right to an extraordinary reputation, if it is\nbased on false premises, for the common good does not require such a\nright, and hence it is not detraction to show that the renown of an\nindividual for superior skill or success is built up on advertising\nalone or merely on uninformed rumor.\n\n2038. Sinfulness of Gossip or Criticism about Real and Known\nDefects.--(a) It is not unjust, _per se_, since it does not take away\nfame, that being non-existent. (b) It is sinful, if there is no\nsufficient reason for it, but not mortally sinful _per se_, since grave\nharm is not done to the reputation of one whose reputation is already\nbad. The sin committed is usually that of idle talk or of\nuncharitableness, by reason of the disedification offered the\nlisteners, or the malice that prompts the speaker, or the sadness that\nis caused to the person gossiped about. Gossip is dangerous, since it\nprepares the way for detraction, as detraction prepares the way for\ncalumny.\n\n2039. Moral Species of Defamation.--(a) Moralists agree that wrongful\ndefamation is a sin against justice and charity. It violates justice,\nsince it infringes a right which is not less strict than that of\nproprietorship over goods of fortune; it violates charity, since it is\nopposed to friendship and love of neighbor. They also agree that other\nspecies of sin can be added to defamation (e.g., infidelity, as when\none denies that Christ was sinless, or blasphemy, as when one defames a\nSaint).\n\n(b) Moralists disagree on the question whether certain forms of\ndefamation are distinct sub-species or only degrees of one lowest\nspecies. Some hold that detraction and calumny are distinct species,\nbecause calumny adds mendacity to defamation; others say that\ndetractions about specifically different sins are distinct kinds of\ndetraction (e.g., that it is one species of sin to say that a neighbor\nis a drunkard, and another species to say that he is a thief, and the\nreason is that the reputation for temperance is a different thing from\nthe reputation for honesty, etc.); still others hold that defamation of\nparents and other immediate relations is a special form of defamation,\nas being contrary to piety. There are, on the contrary, theologians who\nreject all these distinctions and hold that the difference between\ndefamations is only one of more or less, since all of them have the\ncharacteristic note of attack on reputation, which is one right. Hence,\njust as the stealing of a cow and the stealing of a cat are only\ngreater and lesser forms of the sin of theft, so likewise calumny and\ndetraction, etc., are only major and minor degrees of the sin of\ndefamation (see 2012, 2013, 2115).\n\n2040. Species of Sins of Defamation.--Since the species of sins must be\nparticularized in confessions, the question of the distinction between\ndefamations has practical importance. The common opinion on the line of\naction to be observed seems to be as follows:\n\n(a) the penitent is obliged as a rule in serious matters to tell\nwhether his defamation was simple detraction or calumny. The reason for\nthis, according to some, is the specific difference between these two\nsins; according to others, the reason is that otherwise the confessor\ncannot know whether the sin was mortal or venial, or what restitution\nis to be imposed. As to detraction of parents or superiors, it seems\nthat the quality of the person detracted should be mentioned, if there\nwas any incitement to disrespect or disobedience;\n\n(b) the penitent is not obliged to mention the sins or defects he\nascribed to the person he defamed. Nor should the confessor inquire\nabout this unless it is necessary in order to know what was the gravity\nof the sin or what kind of reparation should be enjoined (cfr. 2013).\nMoreover, questions about what was said might easily lead to a\ndisclosure of the name of the person defamed, and thus the confessional\nwould be turned into a place of defamation.\n\n2041. The Numerical Multiplication of Defamations.--(a) They are\nmultiplied when there are many sinful acts about distinct objects; for\nexample, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a thief and Claudius\ntomorrow as another thief, there are two calumnies (see 209).\n\n(b) Defamations are multiplied when there are many sinful acts about\nthe same object; for example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a\nthief and repeats the same calumny tomorrow, there are two calumnies.\nBut if Balbus begins his story today and does not finish it till\ntomorrow, there is one calumny (see 214, 215).\n\n(c) Defamations are multiplied when there is one sinful act about many\ndistinct objects; for example, when Balbus calumniates by saying that\nthe two worst thieves he knows are Caius and Claudius, there are two\nsins. But if Caius and Claudius are regarded as a unit (e.g., if they\nare the firm of Caius and Claudius), there is one sin. A like calumny\nwould be that Caius came from a dishonest family (see 216-219). If\nBalbus calumniates Caius before ten persons, he does not commit ten\ndefamations, it seems, but ten scandals, since the ten form a body in\nthe matter of fame, but are individuals in the matter of example. If\nBalbus calumniates by saying that Caius has broken all of the ten\ncommandments, there may be ten calumnies or but one calumny, according\nto the intention and the effect (see 217, 218).\n\n2042. The Theological Species of Defamation.--(a) From its nature\ndefamation is a mortal sin, and hence the Apostle declares (Rom, i. 29,\n30) that detractors are hateful to God. In the first place, it inflicts\nan atrocious injury on the public welfare, sowing everywhere hatreds,\ndissensions and disorders--so much so that detractors are rightly\ncalled an abomination to mankind (Prov., xxiv. 9).\n\n(b) From the smallness of the matter or the imperfection of the act\ndefamation may be only a venial sin. Criticism of others is a vice so\nwidespread that almost all mankind (even pious persons) would be\ninvolved in continual mortal sins, were it not for the fact that sins\nof speech are frequently the result of ignorance, thoughtlessness, or\nsudden passion (James, iii. 2 sqq.), and that the things said are\nfrequently of no great harm to the person criticized.\n\n2043. The gravity of the harm done by defamation is well expressed by\nSt. Bernard when he says that defamation at one blow inflicts a mortal\nWound on the person defamed, on the defamer himself, and on the\nlistener.\n\n(a) Thus, the person defamed is robbed and often irreparably of a good\nname, one of the most esteemed of possessions; he is deprived of many\nspiritual and temporal opportunities, and is frequently dragged down to\nsocial and moral ruin, and even to suicide. Scripture says that the\ntongue of the detractor has the sharpness of a razor, and it compares\nhim to an arrow dipped in poison, and to a biting serpent.\n\n(b) The defamer destroys his own good name, at least in the sight of\nGod, for he defiles his own soul with guilt; he disgraces himself\nbefore others, since it is well known that defamation is the vice of\nthose who feel themselves inferior or guilty. And, worst of all, his\nsin is seldom repented of or repaired by satisfaction, since the\ndefamer is generally too proud, hateful, jealous or revengeful to\nacknowledge his error, or is so blind that the thought of the harm he\nhas done and of the grave obligation of satisfaction never crosses his\nmind.\n\n(c) The listener is scandalized and contaminated by what he hears, his\nideals are shattered, his respect for virtue or religion is destroyed,\nand he is encouraged to continue the work of the defamer.\n\n2044. Comparison of Defamation with Other Injuries against the\nNeighbor.--(a) Defamation is less sinful than injuries to internal\ngoods, and hence homicide and adultery, which are opposed to the good\nof the body and of life itself, are graver sins than defamation.\n\n(b) Defamation is less sinful than injury to higher external goods\nperpetrated in a contemptuous manner, for defamation being secret does\nnot add insult to injury. Hence, just as robbery is more offensive than\ntheft, so is contumely more sinful than defamation.\n\n(c) Defamation is more sinful than injury to lower external goods, such\nas lands and money, for fame along with honor approaches spiritual\nthings on account of their relation to virtue, whereas wealth is of the\norder of corporeal things. Hence, the Scriptures teach that a good name\nis more important than great riches (Prov., xxii. 1), more enduring\nthan thousands of vast and precious treasures (Ecclus., xli, 15).\n\n2045. It should be noted that the foregoing comparison is based on the\nnature of the sins compared, for by reason of circumstances the order\ngiven may be reversed; for example, a slight indignity is less serious\nthan an outrageous calumny, the theft of thousands of dollars is far\nmore sinful than the circulation of a ludicrous story that is harmful,\nbut only in a slight degree, to the reputation of a neighbor (cfr. 220\nsqq.).\n\n2046. Rule for Determining the Seriousness of Defamation.--The rule for\ndetermining whether the matter of defamation is serious or not is the\namount of harm done by the defamation, and hence not one but several\nfactors have to be considered.\n\n(a) Thus, the defect ascribed to the neighbor has to be considered, for\nsome kinds of defects (e.g., littleness of body or prodigality) are\nless disgraceful than others (e.g., dwarfishness of mind or soul or\nniggardliness), and it is more harmful to reveal one mortal sin than to\nreveal a hundred venial sins.\n\n(b) The person defamed is to be considered, for imputed defects that\nare not harmful to one person may be harmful to another (e.g., the\ncharge of being a toper might be considered praise among persons of gay\nor rough habits, but it would be regarded as disgraceful among serious\nand refined persons).\n\n(c) The person who defames is also to be considered, for little\nattention is paid to the talk of some, but much weight is given to the\nslightest words of others. Indeed, some persons\u2019 condemnation is\nequivalent to praise.\n\n(d) Finally, the persons before whom the defamation is spoken are to be\nconsidered, for everyone knows that it is much more harmful and\ndangerous to speak ill of others before certain ones than before others\n(cfr. 1461, 1462).\n\n2047. The Harm Done by Reason of the Defects Revealed.--(a) If the\ndefects are natural imperfections of soul or body that do not connote\nmoral stain or turpitude, and if no great detriment is caused by\nrevelation (e.g., to say that another person is deaf, hunchbacked, a\nbeggar, or dense), disclosure is not in itself serious, or even sinful;\nfor little or no harm is done, and the defects are of such a character\nthat they can be readily discovered by observation. But if the defects\nare very ignominious or harmful, defamation is a grave sin (e.g., to\nsay that a very distinguished person is illegitimate, or of a mixed\nrace, or that his immediate relative was a criminal).\n\n(b) If the defects are related to moral stain, but do not imply it,\nrevelation of them is not a grave sin, provided no great loss is caused\nby it (e.g., to say that a person is scrupulous about himself, or has\ncertain peccadillos or human imperfections). If a shortcoming is\nusually understood as a propensity rather than as a fault (e.g., quick\ntemper, high-strung disposition, pride, closeness with money), there is\nlittle if any harm done by speaking of it. But if the defects mentioned\nare such as imply or insinuate actual moral lapses (e.g., to say that a\nperson has a venereal disease and the cause is unknown, or that he has\ndelirium tremens or morphinism, or is of a very passionate nature), the\nrevelation is defamatory and more or less sinful.\n\n(c) If the defects are moral, he who reveals them is guilty of sinful\ndefamation. But the harm done by the imputation of moral guilt is\ngreater in some cases and less in others. Some sins are more\ndisgraceful from their degradation (e.g., carnal sins, see 224), and\nfrom this point of view it is worse to accuse a neighbor of gluttony or\nsexual irregularity than of pride. Some sins (e.g., solicitation,\nsodomy) are especially heinous in the eyes of the law and produce legal\ninfamy, because they are more harmful to the public or more subject to\npublic contempt (see Canons 2320, 2328, 2343, 2351, 2356, 2357). There\nare also some defamations that are less harmful to reputation, but more\ndamaging to material prosperity (e.g., it is usually more hurtful to\nthe prospects of a person in business to be charged with incompetency,\ndishonesty, or carelessness than to be charged with religious\nindifference or impurity). Finally, there are gradations in the malice\nof the same kinds of sin (see 197), as in the angry thought, the angry\nword, the angry deed, in tipsiness and drunkenness, in occasional and\nhabitual lying, etc.\n\n2048. Is it sinful to narrate the secret faults of another, if at the\nsame time one tells of his repentance and amendment?\n\n(a) If the infamy remains in spite of the remarks about a change of\nlife for the better (as is generally the case), the narrator is guilty\nof sinful detraction. Thus, it is very harmful to one in an exalted\nposition if it is given out that he was at one time bibacious, but\nsucceeded in thoroughly curing his appetite. The same principle applies\nto those who praise in one matter and detract in another (e.g., by\nstating that a person is very learned, but also very dishonest).\n\n(b) If the infamy does not remain, because the atonement is so\nextraordinary as to make the hearers think little or nothing about the\nfault, the narrator is not guilty of sinful detraction. Thus, it is not\ndetraction to narrate that a saint was so grieved over a lie he told\nthat he did lifelong penance for it, or that a person who was once\nlukewarm--a thing that is quite common--has in later years become\nfervent in an uncommon degree. But the stigma that attaches to uncommon\nsins or carnal sins is hardly overcome by the mention of repentance,\nunless the person spoken of is already long dead or is one from whom\nvery little is expected.\n\n2049. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person Defamed.--(a) Serious\nfaults are sometimes attributed to certain persons without serious sin,\nbecause, on account of the life led by these persons or the notoriety\nthey have already achieved, they suffer no serious detriment when\ndefects like to those already known are charged against them. Thus, if\nit is well known that a person keeps company with a fast set or\nconsorts with a tough gang, he suffers little if one reveals that he\nuses profanity, gambles, drinks to excess, etc.; and if it is known\nthat a person has these vices, he is not harmed much by mention of a\nparticular instance or by the additional report that he has been\narrested for cheating and disorderly conduct. But the case is different\nif defects unlike those already known are charged (e.g., if one says of\na person known as a liar that he is also a thief), unless the person\nspoken of has so black a name as an all-around cheat that no new crime\ncharged to his account can give a deeper dye to his reputation.\n\n(b) Light faults or acts that are not sinful in themselves are\nsometimes matter of grave defamation when spoken of certain persons,\nnamely, when so much is expected from these persons that even minor\ndefects are serious blots on their fame. Thus, to say that a layman is\na confirmed liar or loves the opposite sex might be only a venial sin\nor no sin at all, but the same statements about a grave cleric would be\nseriously defamatory.\n\n2050. Defamation supposes that the party who is injured is in\npossession of a good name. But it is possible that the same individual\nwho enjoys a good name in one place or time, has a bad name in another\nplace or time. Hence, a number of special cases on defamation present\nthemselves for consideration.\n\n(a) Thus, there is the case in which a person who has a good name here\nis juridically infamous elsewhere; that is, he has lost his good name\nelsewhere through a final and valid sentence, conviction, or confession\nmade in a public trial (see Canon 2197).\n\n(b) There is the case in which a person who has a good name here is\nactually infamous elsewhere, that is, his crime is known to so many\npersons there that it is morally impossible to keep it secret or excuse\nit.\n\n(c) There is the case in which a person who has a good name now was in\nbad repute formerly; that is, his bad name of the past has been\nforgotten or has been obliterated by many years of good living.\n\n2051. Meaning of the Expression \u201cInfamous in a Certain Place.\u201d--(a) The\nplace referred to is either a closed community (e.g., a monastery, a\ncollege, a family) or an open community (e.g., a village, a\nneighborhood, a parish, a town, a city); (b) the notoriety referred to\nis either universal (i.e. known to all the community), or general\n(i.e., known to the greater part of the community), or sufficient\n(i.e., known to so many and such talkative persons that the whole\ncommunity will shortly be made to share in it). A crime known only to\none or two, or to a small circle of Christian-living persons, is not\nnotorious.\n\n2052. Number of Persons Who Are Required for Sufficient Notoriety.--(a)\nSome authors assign certain definite figures for this purpose--for\nexample, in a closed community of thirty or a hundred members a fact is\nnotorious if known to seven or fifteen; in a neighborhood of forty\npersons, if it is known to eight individuals from different families;\nin a village whose population is one thousand, if it is known to twenty\nhere and there; in a town of five thousand people, if it is known to\nforty here and there.\n\n(b) Other authors hold that no invariable rule can be given, but that\nin each case the matter has to be determined by a prudent judgment\nbased on the character of the crime, the quality of the guilty person\nand of the persons present at the time, the publicity of the place,\netc. Thus, if the crime was committed in some central spot from which\nnews was quickly disseminated, a smaller number of spectators would\nmake a deed notorious in the surrounding territory.\n\n2053. Publicity of Commission or Report.-Actual infamy or disrepute is\nproduced either by the publicity of the crime or by the publicity of\nthe report.\n\n(a) Thus, a crime has publicity in its commission when it was done in a\npublic place (e.g., on the street, in a public room) or in a private\nplace but before a considerable number of persons, or when its\nindications were publicly given (e.g., by a confession, by maintenance\nof a suspected woman in one\u2019s home), or when it was submitted to public\nnotice or judgment (e.g., the acts of one in public office, the words\nof one who delivers a public address, the deeds of one who boasts about\nthem).\n\n(b) A crime has publicity in its report, when it is widely known,\nwhether due to the talk of the people, or to presumptions or suspicions.\n\n2054. Revelation about a Person Who Is Juridically in Disrepute\nElsewhere.--(a) This exposure is not contrary to commutative justice,\naccording to the common opinion, for the condemnation deprives the\ncriminal of his right to fame (as regards the matter in which he is\nfound guilty) in all places, and it is often to the interest of the\npublic to know who has been convicted of crime elsewhere. Exception\nshould be made for the case in which a trial is conducted secretly in\norder to spare the reputation of the condemned, as when a corporation\nexpels one of its members after a hearing and an unfavorable vote (see\n2057).\n\n(b) This revelation is contrary to charity when it deprives a person\nwithout reason of the good fame which he possesses and which he would\nnot otherwise have lost; for we should love our neighbor as ourselves.\nExample: Balbus served a term in jail in the town of A, on account of\ndrunkenness. He then moved to the distant town of B and by his good\nconduct built up an excellent reputation. Claudius from A arrives and\nmaliciously spreads around the news that Balbus had been once in jail\nfor drunkenness. Claudius sins gravely against charity.\n\n2055. Revelation about a Person Who Is Actually in Disrepute\nElsewhere.--If the person in question will in all likelihood soon lose\nthe reputation he has here, the following cases must be considered:\n\n(a) if the disrepute is based on the publicity of a misdeed, the\nrevelation is not opposed to commutative justice; for he who sins\npublicly thereby resigns his right to reputation as regards all those\npersons and places to which knowledge of his delinquency is likely to\narrive. The revelation is against charity, however, if there is no\nsufficient reason for it; but since the news would be soon brought\nhither from other sources, no great harm is done and no serious sin\ncommitted by the revelation;\n\n(b) if the disrepute is based on public rumor and the rumor is unjust,\nrevelation, according to some, is opposed to commutative justice, since\nit is nothing but a continuation and extension of the original injury.\nOthers hold that, unless one knows the rumor to be false, revelation is\nnot unjust in this case, since, as is supposed, the revealer was not\nthe author of the rumor, and those to whom he spoke would have learned\nit shortly even without him. Of course, if the person about whom the\nrevelation is made suffers some considerable damage by reason of the\nearly loss of his good name, the person who makes the revelation\nunnecessarily is guilty of serious sin. And rumor should never be\nrepresented as an established fact.\n\n2056. If the revelation is made about one who is actually in disrepute\nelsewhere, but who is in little danger on that account of losing the\ngood name which he has here, opinions differ regarding the extent of\nthe guilt.\n\n(a) Some hold that revelation in this case is a grave sin against\ncharity, since in a serious matter it saddens a neighbor, and thus\nviolates the rule of love to do unto others as we would have them do\nunto us; and others add that it is also a grave sin against justice, if\nthe party spoken against is solicitous about his fame, since it\ndeprives him without reason of a great good to which he is entitled on\naccount of undisturbed possession.\n\n(b) Others hold that this revelation is not a grave sin, either against\njustice (since the right of the community to know about crimes that\nwere committed elsewhere prevails over the right of the individual) or\nagainst charity (since charity does not oblige under grave\ninconvenience).\n\n(c) Others again distinguish between different cases, Thus, some say\nthat, if the crime in question is one that is very detrimental to the\npublic (e.g., murder, treason, white slave traffic, scandalous\nimpurity), the opinion under (b) is true; whereas, if it is one that is\nnot of that character (e.g., drunkenness in a private person), the\nopinions under (a) are true. Some also distinguish in the case of\nnon-pernicious delinquencies between those that are notorious elsewhere\nby reason of the public way in which sin was committed and those that\nare notorious only on account of rumor; in the former case, they say,\nthe manifestation is not unjust, for, although public good does not\ncall for it, the guilty person himself has forfeited his right by the\npublic manner in which he sinned; but in the latter case it may easily\nbe unjust (see previous paragraph). The mere fact, however, that a\nfault which contains no threat to the public welfare was committed in a\npublic manner does not seem to be a sufficient reason for manifestation\n(e.g., when it will injure a man in earning a living or in supporting\nhis family), and we believe that one who speaks of such a fault without\nnecessity sins against charity, if not against justice, and that the\nsin is often mortal.\n\n2057. Notoriety in a Closed Community.--Notoriety in a closed community\nis not absolute publicity, and hence the conclusions just given on\nabsolute publicity do not apply to closed communities.\n\n(a) Thus, if a fault is actually notorious in a closed community, the\nmembers may speak about it to one another, if there is any sufficient\nreason for this. Hence, if the majority of the members of a religious\nhouse know about a fault that has been committed there, it may be\ndivulged to one who is in ignorance about it for his instruction or\nwarning. Similarly, servants in a house may tell other domestics about\nfaults which are commonly known in the house.\n\n(b) If a fault is notorious in a closed community but not outside, the\nmembers as a rule may not speak or write about it to outsiders without\ninjustice, for generally speaking there is no reason arising from\nnecessity or utility for such a revelation. Moreover, the community\nitself suffers in repute from such disclosures, since outsiders will be\nimpressed with the thought that the community has wicked members or is\nlax, and that there is a lack of unity among them. To carry stories\nfrom one monastery or house to another (even of the same Order) is a\nform of detraction to outsiders, according to St. Alphonsus.\n\n2058. Revelation about a Person Formerly in Disrepute.--When the\nrevelation concerns one who was in disrepute formerly, but who has a\ngood name now, either because his crime has been forgotten or because\nhe has lived it down, a distinction must be made between juridical and\nactual notoriety.\n\n(a) If the former disrepute was juridical notoriety, the revelation of\nit is not unjust, since condemnation pronounced in a court of law gives\nthe right to others to make the sentence known in any place or at any\ntime; but more probably it is mortally uncharitable, if made without\nnecessity, since it harms the other person or his family in the\nreputation which he has honestly recovered, thus depriving him of a\ngood most useful to him and hurtful to no one else.\n\n(b) If the former disrepute was actual notoriety only, the revelation\nis uncharitable, according to all, since it does not observe the golden\nrule of doing to others as we would be done by. Many hold that it is\nalso unjust, since an obliterated crime is the same as an occult crime,\nwhich cannot be divulged without injustice (see 2067). Moreover, the\nperson who has built up for himself a new reputation has a right to it,\nand by the revelation of the old reputation this right is infringed,\ninasmuch as his present good name is also lost or made useless. It\nshould be noted that the common good sometimes makes exceptions, and\nthus it is not forbidden to historians to make revelations about\nhappenings that throw a new and unfavorable light on the youth or\nearlier years of persons no longer living (see 2072 Sqq.).\n\n2059. Case in Which the Name of the Person Defamed Is Not Given.--(a)\nIf there is nothing to indicate the individual and no reflection is\ncast on a body to which he belongs, _per se_ no sin is committed.\nHence, if one says, \u201cA certain person whom we shall call Balbus stole a\nsheep,\u201d there is no defamation in the narrative, even though a real\nhappening is described. Similarly, if one says that in the city where\nhe is speaking there are many criminals, or that even among his\nnumerous auditors there are doubtless some who are living in mortal\nsin, there is no defamation.\n\n(b) If there is something to indicate the individual meant, or if\nreflection is cast on a body to which the individual belongs, sin is\ncommitted by the remarks. Hence, if the narrative about Balbus and the\nstolen sheep went on to describe incidents so that the hearers could\neasily perceive that Balbus was a person known to them, this person\nwould be injured in his fame. Again, if one states that in a certain\ncity which one names 90% of the married people are addicted to\ndrunkenness, or that the party who was guilty of some scandalous act\nwas a member of a Religious Institute, harm is brought directly upon\nindividuals or damage is done to societies. It is true that an\norganization is not really discredited by the misdeeds of one of its\nmembers, but in popular opinion very often the disgrace of one is the\ndisgrace of all.\n\n2060. Defamation of Deceased and Legal Persons.--(a) Defamation of the\ndead, whether they be long or only recently dead, is sinful _per se_,\nsince the departed are capable of a glorious or inglorious memory, and\nit is reasonable that one should wish one\u2019s good name to be respected\nafter one\u2019s death, both for one\u2019s own sake and for the sake of others.\nHence the saying, \u201c_De mortuis nil nisi bonum_.\u201d But _per accidens_ it\nis not sinful to make revelations about the dead when this is necessary\nfor historical truth (see 2072 sqq.). Defamation of the dead in itself\nis less sinful than defamation of the living, since the dead have less\nneed of a good reputation; but circumstances may be such that one who\ndefames a dead person does serious harm and commits a mortal sin.\n\n(b) Defamation of legal persons is also sinful _per se_, since these\nbodies possess along with other rights of natural persons the right to\na good name. Public esteem is very necessary for them, and they are\nprotected in their enjoyment of it by the laws. Thus, it is injurious\nto state that a certain Religious Order or monastery or diocese is\nrelaxed, or that a certain business corporation is not well managed.\nBut _per accidens_ it is not sinful to make revelations about\norganizations, when there is a sufficient reason for the revelation\n(see 2067). For example, if a political party is preying on the\ncitizens, or if a mercantile house is practising frauds, the common\ngood would require one to make these facts known. Neither is it sinful\nto mention faults or defects that are notorious, for example, that a\ncertain government is warlike, that a certain people is backward, that\na certain group is devoted to erroneous principles or practices (Tit.,\ni. 12).\n\n2061. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person of the Defamer.--(a) The\nperson of the defamer increases the harm when his authority is greater.\nA person who is supposed to be better informed (e.g., one who reports\nthat he was an eyewitness of the event he narrates), or who enjoys a\nbetter reputation for truth (e.g., one who is in an official position,\nor who is thought to be honest and disinterested), does more harm by\ndefamation than another whose authority is weak.\n\n(b) The person of the defamer decreases the harm when his authority is\nless. Hence, those who give out unfavorable reports about others with\nreservations (such as \u201cperhaps,\u201d \u201cit is not impossible,\u201d \u201cit seems so,\nbut I would not swear to it,\u201d etc.), and also those whose weight as\nauthorities is light (such as talkative, lightminded, envious, gossipy,\nor untruthful persons), do less harm than persons who are held in\nhigher repute. The confessor should not let these defamers off easily,\nhowever, since many of them act on the principle that if enough mud is\nthrown, no matter how foolish the charges, some of the mud will stick.\n\n2062. One of the commonest forms of defamation is the narration of some\ncrime or defect at second hand, as when the defamer introduces his\nremarks as follows: \u201cThey say,\u201d or, \u201cIt is reported,\u201d or, \u201cI hear,\u201d etc.\n\n(a) The mode of defamation here lessens the sin when it weakens the\neffect of the story upon the hearers. Hence, if one says that the talk\nof the town is that Claudius is a heavy drinker, and the listeners\ngather from this only that there is a vague rumor which cannot be\ntraced to any source or be confirmed by any fact and which is therefore\nunreliable, the harm is less.\n\n(b) The mode of defamation here does not lessen the sin when it does\nnot weaken the impression of the story; on the contrary, it increases\nthe sin when it adds strength to the story. Hence, if one says that\nClaudius is said to be an excessive drinker, and if from the phrasing\nthe listeners will understand that the report originated with very good\nauthorities, or that it is based on general knowledge of the public,\nthe harm is greater. Justice is violated if the narrative itself\ninclines the hearers to sinister thoughts or suspicions, for then the\nnarrator causes the harm; charity alone may be violated if it is only\nthe character of the listeners (e.g., their suspicious or frivolous\nminds or their own guilt) that engenders in them evil opinion, for then\nthe narrator only occasions the harm (cfr. 1447, 1464).\n\n2063. The Harm Done by Reason of the Listeners.--(a) The quality of the\nlisteners makes a difference, since it may cause the person defamed to\nsuffer more or less readily in their eyes (e.g., if they are\nsuspicious, or prejudiced, or credulous, or guilty themselves, they\nwill more easily believe evil about others) or in the eyes of others\n(e.g., if the listeners are newsmongers or enemies of the person\ndefamed, the spread of the defamatory story is more certain). The loss\nitself may be greater or less on account of the character or position\nof the listener (e.g., loss of reputation with a friend or a virtuous\nperson is felt more, loss of reputation with customers or employers is\nmore damaging, etc.).\n\n(b) The quantity of the listeners also makes a difference, since it is\nmore harmful, other things being equal, to be defamed before several\nthan before one. Hence, the fact that many persons are present when the\ndefamation is uttered is an aggravating circumstance of the sin.\nWhether it multiplies the sin numerically, so that one commits as many\nsins of defamation as there are persons who hear and are impressed, is\na disputed point. Those who hold for multiplication argue that the\ndefamed person has a distinct right to his reputation with each person\npresent; those who deny multiplication contend that the right to\nreputation is a single object, since reputation is the opinion of\nothers, whether they be many or few. This latter view seems to be more\ncommon, and its practical bearing is that a penitent need not mention\nthe number of persons before whom he defamed his neighbor (see 217).\n\n2064. Is the malice of defamation aggravated by the fact that the\nlisteners are peculiar and think the defect mentioned is far more\nserious than it really is?\n\n(a) If only the harm to reputation is considered, it does not seem that\nthe over-strict notions of the listeners increase the sinfulness of\ndefamation; for the harm to reputation is to be measured by the common\nopinion, not by the singular ideas of certain persons. Example:\nSempronius tells that Balbus wastes a little time in telling humorous\nincidents and reading detective stories. The small group of auditors\nthink that this is one of the blackest of crimes.\n\n(b) If other harms are taken into account, the peculiar ideas of the\nlistener may add to the sinfulness of defamation. Thus, if a young\nperson of delicate conscience will be scandalized at hearing that Caius\nplays cards, or if older listeners will be led by this remark to take\ntheir trade away from Caius, the sins of scandal and of unjust damage\nare added to defamation. Defamation often destroys in the listener all\nfaith in humanity, or all belief in religion.\n\n2065. Detraction to One Discreet Person.--Is detraction a mortal sin,\nif the revelation of a serious sin is made without sufficient reason\nbut to only one prudent and discreet person, who will neither divulge\nthe information, nor be influenced by it to the harm of the party\nspoken against?\n\n(a) If the purpose of the speaker is to inflict serious injury on his\nneighbor, mortal sin is committed, since the gravity of the sin is\nmeasured by the malevolence of the will.\n\n(b) If the purpose of the speaker is not to inflict serious injury, but\nonly to indulge his love of talk, levity of mind, etc., the gravity of\nthe sin depends on the actual harm that is done; for one wills\nindirectly the harm connected with one\u2019s acts, even when one does not\ndesire it directly (see 102). Hence, if the harm is in fact serious,\nmortal sin is incurred by the detractor, unless he is excused from it\nby the imperfection of his deliberation or consent. How much harm,\nthen, is done in this case? Most moralists, it seems, think grave harm\nis done, since the loss of good name with one prudent man is generally\nmore distasteful than its loss with many light-minded persons. Some\nmoralists, however, dissent from this view, and hold that the harm done\nis small. They argue that the loss of good name with one prudent person\n(exception being made for the cases when he is the one person whose\nesteem is prized above that of all others, or when the crime revealed\nis an enormous or very degrading one) is not a great blow to\nreputation, since reputation consists in the opinion of many persons,\nand since a prudent man will be inclined to help rather than harm one\nwho has been defamed in his presence. The advocates of the first\nopinion appeal also to the analogy of contumely and rash judgment, for\nthese two sins are grave, even when the loss of honor or good opinion\nis in respect to one person only. But their adversaries deny the\nassumed parity: for, while contumely includes the purpose to injure and\nrash judgment includes the imputation to another of a defect of which\nhe is not guilty or not known to be guilty, the detraction now\nconsidered is innocent both of design to injure and of calumny. Both\nopinions are probable, but the former seems to be more common and more\nlikely.\n\n2066. Belittling a Person to Himself.--It is not impossible to belittle\na person to himself, for example, to make him believe that lie is\nillegitimate, that he is regarded with contempt by others, that his\nability is mediocre or his character defective, etc. Is this\ndefamation, or is it sinful?\n\n(a) To lower a person in his own estimation is not defamation in the\nstrict sense of the word, since defamation is properly an injury to the\nreputation that one has with one\u2019s neighbors or with the public, not to\nthe opinion one has of oneself. This sin belongs rather to derision\n(see 2106).\n\n(b) To lower a person in his own eyes is sinful or not sinful according\nto the purpose intended or the means employed. Thus, if a parent,\nwishing to correct the pride or presumption of his son, gives the\nlatter a true picture of his failings or limitations, the act is one of\nvirtuous correction. But if an envious person, wishing to produce a\nsense of inferiority in another, deprives the latter of rightful peace\nof mind and of reasonable confidence in self, charity and justice are\nviolated and there is a duty of restitution.\n\n2067. Disclosing Matters Detrimental to Third Party.--In what cases is\nit lawful to disclose to others matters that will be detrimental to the\nreputation of a third party?\n\n(a) If the communication is false, it is never lawful, no matter how\nimportant the reason; for the end does not justify the means. It is\nsinful, therefore, to resort to calumny as a defense of one\u2019s own\nreputation or dignity (see 2035, 2036).\n\n(b) If the communication is truthful and the matter is already well\nknown to the persons addressed, there is no defamation, unless the\ncommunication makes these persons strongly convinced, whereas they had\nbeen rather uncertain before, or reveals to them some important detail\nabout which they had been in ignorance.\n\n(c) If the communication is truthful, but the defects are secret and\nunknown to the parties addressed, there is defamation, unless the\nperson whose defects are revealed has lost his right to good name on\naccount of the right of another person which has precedence and cannot\notherwise be upheld (cfr. 2035). In this latter case there is no\nobligation to maintain silence, neither from justice (since the lesser\nright must yield to the greater right) nor from charity (since this\nvirtue does not oblige at the cost of great inconvenience). Thus, Our\nLord made known to the Apostles that the Pharisees were hypocrites\n(Luke, xii, 1; Matt., xvi. 6), and St. Paul told Timothy that Alexander\nand Hymeneus had neither faith nor a good conscience (I Tim., i. 20).\n\n2068. Rights that Have Precedence over a False Reputation.--(a) The\npublic good is to be preferred to a false reputation, for the public\nwelfare is the ground for the right to such reputation, the subject\nhimself being unworthy of the good name he bears (see 2037). It is\nright, therefore, to denounce criminals or conspirators to the proper\nauthorities, or to testify against them. Employers have the duty to\ndiscuss together the failings or imperfections of their employees that\ninterfere with the business; subjects should manifest abuses about\nwhich they are asked in a canonical visitation; students in a college\nshould give information about companions who are depraving the morals\nof the student body or exercising an evil influence on the other\nresidents, etc.\n\n(b) The private good of innocent parties may be preferred to the fame\nof one who enjoys a false reputation. One may reveal secret defects for\none\u2019s own defense; for example, a person whose life, honor or property\nis being unjustly attacked may reveal sins of the guilty in order to\ndeter them or weaken their authority; a person who has been injured by\nhis superior or another party may speak of this to a friend for the\nsake of obtaining consolation, or to a confessor, a lawyer or other\nadviser for the sake of obtaining counsel or assistance. One may also\nreveal secret defects for the protection of others; for example, one\nshould put unsuspecting persons on their guard against seducers,\nimpostors, quacks; one should reveal impediments that stand in the way\nof a marriage, or should warn a young woman that the man to whom she is\nengaged is a criminal or diseased; one should make known the true\nauthor of a crime for which an innocent person is about to suffer; one\nshould tell the truth to inquirers about the incompetency of servants\nor other persons whom one has employed.\n\n(c) The higher good of the person whose faults are revealed may also be\npreferred to the lower good of his false reputation; for it is to his\ninterest that his higher good be promoted, even at the expense of an\ninferior good. It is lawful to tell parents about the misdeeds of their\nchildren (e.g., that a daughter is involved in a scandalous liaison),\nin order that the latter may be corrected; or to speak to the friends\nof wayward persons about the misconduct of the latter in order that\nprayers may be said for their conversion.\n\n2069. Unlawful Attack on Another\u2019s False Reputation.--If the false\nreputation of another is not the unjust cause of a loss that is feared,\nit is not right to deprive him of his good name. Examples: (a) It is\nnot lawful to accuse a person who is about to be promoted to some\noffice or dignity of which he is worthy, if the motive of the\naccusation is to secure the honor for oneself or one\u2019s friend;\notherwise ambitious persons would be encouraged to practise spying,\nmanufacturing of evidence, etc., and the public peace would be greatly\ndisturbed. (b) It is not lawful to accuse a person who is giving one no\noffense, if the motive of the accusation is to distract attention from\noneself or to make oneself shine by the comparison.\n\n2070. Conditions that Justify Revelation of Another\u2019s Defects.--In\nrevealing defects on account of some necessary good, one must observe\nthe conditions for an act of double result (see 103).\n\n(a) Thus, the action itself must not be evil, and hence one may not\nbreak the seal of secrecy to which one is bound (as will be said in the\nnext Article in discussing violations of secrets), nor make use of\nknowledge unjustly acquired, nor reveal more or to more persons than\nthe case demands, nor reveal anything, if a warning to the offender\nwill suffice (see 1286).\n\n(b) The good result must be intended, and the evil result of detriment\nto fame must be only permitted. Those who assign pious motives (pity,\nzeal, sincerity) for talk against a neighbor, but who are really\nactuated by hatred, revenge, ambition to defeat a rival, or other like\npassion, sin on account of their wrong intention. A hypocritical form\nof defamation is practised by some persons exteriorly devout, who under\nthe pretext of asking prayers for their neighbor\u2019s conversion spread\nstories about those whom they dislike.\n\n(c) The reason for permitting the evil must be sufficiently weighty.\nHence, the good result intended must be one that is likely to follow on\nthe revelation, and it must be of some importance; for it would be\ncruel to throw away a neighbor\u2019s good name on the mere possibility that\na considerable good would be secured, or on the certainty that only a\nslight benefit would be obtained. It does seem, however, that the good\nwhich is hoped for must be of an equal dignity with the good of fame,\nsince the innocent and the guilty party are not on the same footing,\nand furthermore all admit, for example, that the fame of an employee\nwho is stealing from his employer is not to be preferred to the goods\nof the employer. In doubt about the seriousness of the evil following\non revelation, the innocent party is to be favored.\n\n2071. Revelations about Public Officials or Candidates for Public\nOffice.--(a) These are lawful when the public good calls for them\n(e.g., when a man has used corrupt practices in order to be elected, or\nwhen he is incompetent, or when he has been guilty of malfeasance in\noffice), and the conditions of the previous paragraph are observed.\n\n(b) These revelations are unlawful when the public good suffers from\nthem (e.g., when the safety or dignity of society itself would be\ninjured by attacks on the head of government), or when the due\nconditions are not observed (e.g., when one resorts to personalities\nabout a deserving public official, or practises muckraking because of\nmere prejudice or partisanship). The law permits fair comment on public\npersons or works, but it also grants an action for criticism that\ncontains unfair aspersions of personal character or unjust accusations\nabout public conduct.\n\n2072. Revelations about Historical Personages.--(a) These revelations\nare not lawful unless there is a proportionate reason that justifies\nthem. For historians there are sufficient reasons to narrate\nimpartially the crimes as well as the virtues of those who appear in\ntheir pages. These reasons are: the nature of history as a record of\nfacts and causes (\u201cthe first law of history is that it dare not tell\nany untruth, that it fear not to tell any truth,\u201d Leo XIII); the rights\nof the persons who are treated in the annals (e.g., it is often\nimpossible to understand the deeds of one character in history or to do\nhim justice unless the secret crime of another character is revealed);\nthe rights of the readers (e.g., the reader has the right to know that\nthe persecutors of religion have been wicked in their personal lives).\nThe historian, therefore, may search for material bearing on the lives\nand deeds of historical personages of the past, he may collect similar\nmaterial relating to current events, he may narrate defects or\ndelinquencies of the past that were unknown or forgotten. But matters\nof a purely private character that have no bearing on public events do\nnot belong, according to some moralists, to the legitimate province of\nthe historian; for otherwise there would be an end to the rights of the\ndead over their fame. Moreover, there is the risk of calumny and of\nviolation of elementary justice, since the historian is a\nself-appointed judge and the person condemned is not able to defend\nhimself.\n\n(b) These historical revelations are not lawful unless the conditions\nmentioned in 2070 are observed. Thus, a historian should not write down\ndetails that were told him in confidence by a person long since dead;\nhe should not be swayed either by unreasonable likes or unreasonable\ndislikes in the expression of his views; he should not publish what\nwill cause harm rather than good, such as circumstances in the lives of\npersons recently deceased which, if revealed, will be detrimental to\nliving persons.\n\n2073. It is not always easy to determine whether more harm is likely to\nresult if the persons whose glory is dimmed are high in public esteem\non account of the prestige of their office or their great exploits.\nMuch will depend on circumstances and on the author\u2019s manner of\ntreatment.\n\n(a) Thus, _per se_, or from the nature of things, it does not cause\ngreater harm to narrate truth about the imperfections of great men, for\nonly error or prejudice or evil has reason to fear the truth. The\ninspired Scriptures themselves deal candidly with the public failings\nof personages who were high in religious or civil position, for\nexample, the hesitation of Moses, the infidelity of Aaron, the fall of\nKing David, the disobedience of the prophet Jonas, the denials of\nPeter, the doubts of Thomas, the treason of Judas. These histories are\nnot harmful, but, on the contrary, contain most useful lessons of\ninstruction, warning and direction.\n\n(b) _Per accidens_, or on account of special conditions, it may be more\nharmful to write of the failings of the great (cfr. 1001). Thus, the\nclass of persons for whom one is writing may be immature (e.g., a\ntextbook of history for children would give scandal if it spoke openly\nof sexual crimes), the conditions of the time may be unfavorable (e.g.,\na new historical production might lead to injury to some class of\npersons at a time of great prejudice against them), the total effect of\na book may be bad (e.g., chronicles of scandals, historical biographies\nor novels or plays written in a seductive manner). The class of modern\nwriters known as \u201cdebunkers,\u201d whose aim it is to destroy all\nhero-worship, offend against truth and ideals by the prominence they\ngive to evil, while the so-called psychological historians are\nfrequently purely subjective as well as immoral.\n\n2074. Revelations about Persons Who Figure in the News of the Day.--(a)\nIf the matters revealed are of a public nature, the lawfulness or\nunlawfulness of the revelation will depend on the reasons for it and\nthe manner in which it is given. In discussing political affairs, a\nnewspaper has the right to call attention to mistakes and faults of\npublic men, since the freedom of the press in this respect is a\nprotection to liberty and to progress, and those who enter public life\nimplicitly consent to criticism of their conduct; in reporting the\nnews, a newspaper has the right to speak of murders, robberies and\nother public crimes that have been committed, since the common good\nrequires that the authors of public offenses be known as such. But if\nthis kind of news is disserviceable in any instance to the order,\npeace or dignity of the community, or if the news is obtained in\nunjust or dishonorable ways, or if the motive is merely to gratify\ncuriosity, to indulge prejudice, or to make money, the newspaper\nmanagement is morally guilty, even though it may be legally within its\nright. Yellow journalism and \u201ctabloidism\u201d are reprehensible because\nthey are injurious to the minds and morals of their readers on account\nof the undue prominence given to crime, even of the most disgusting\nsort, and the appeal made to sense and emotion rather than to thought.\n\n(b) It the matters revealed are of a private nature, the morality of\nthe revelation has to be judged by the principles given in 2067 sqq. It\nwould be wrong to make a practice of spying into the private life and\naffairs even of public persons merely to add interest to one\u2019s columns;\nbut if there is some really important advantage to the public or to a\nprivate person that will be served, and if the other conditions are\nobserved (see 2070), one may publish even private defects that are real\nand certain.\n\n2075. Injustice in Professional Critics.--(a) Injustice is done by\nprofessional critics (such as book reviewers, dramatic and art critics,\nand the like) to the persons who rely upon their opinion, if there is a\ncompact with them to give a competent and unbiased judgment and the\ncompact is not lived up to by the critic with resultant damage to the\nclient (see 1793). If there is no compact, the critic is nevertheless\nguilty of deception and uncharitableness, if he performs his office\ncarelessly (e.g., by eulogizing a worthless book or play or picture).\n\n(b) Injustice is done the person criticized, if his work is undervalued\npurposely (e.g., because the critic is jealous, or in an ill humor or\nis hired by others to dispraise), or if uncalled-for personalities are\nindulged in at the expense of the person\u2019s fame. A carping critic may\nby the stroke of the pen spoil the work of years, and hence ignorance\ndoes not excuse those censors who practise wholesale and unfair\ndenunciations (see 905).\n\n2076. Cooperation in Defamation.--Not only the defamer sins, but also\nthose who cooperate with him. Among the cooperators with defamation are\nthose who give orders for defamation, those who show how it can be\ndone, those who protect defamers, and those who participate in\ndefamation by directing the conversation to a certain subject or by\njoining in the criticisms. The most ordinary form of participation in\ndefamation is that of the listener, for no one defames successfully\nunless he has a sympathetic listener. Those who listen to detraction in\nsuch a way as to consent to what is said share in the guilt of the\ndetraction. This happens as follows:\n\n(a) the listener consents directly to defamation when he spurs the\nspeaker on (e.g., by saying, \u201cTell us about So-and-So,\u201d by insincerely\npraising an absent person in order to excite dispraise, by nodding\napprovingly, cheering, or smiling, by showing great marks of favor to\nthose who bring him news against others or of disfavor to those who\nrefuse to do this), or when he rejoices internally at the defamation he\nhears, because he hates the victim:\n\n(b) the listener consents indirectly to defamation when he does not\nspur the speaker on nor approve of what is said, but omits to stop the\ndefamation or to protest against it, when he could and should do one or\nthe other of these things.\n\n2077. Sinfulness of Direct Consent to Defamation.--The listener who\nconsents directly shares in the guilt of the defamer according to the\nwords of St. Paul: \u201cThey who do such things (detractors, etc.) are\nworthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that\nconsent to them that do them\u201d (Rom., i. 32), Indeed, St. Bernard says\nthat it is not easy to say which is more deserving of condemnation, to\ndefame or to listen to defamation. But we may distinguish as follows:\n\n(a) he who spurs the defamer on is more guilty than the defamer. This\nlistener sins against the detractor whom he scandalizes by inducing to\nsin, against the detracted whom he deprives of his good name. Thus, he\nis both uncharitable to the detractor and unjust to the detracted, and\nis the moving cause of all the harm that is done (cfr. 2065);\n\n(b) he who hears the defamer willingly may be more guilty internally\nthan the defamer, since his hatred of his neighbor and his love of\ninjustice may be more intense; but externally his sin is less, since,\nas is supposed, he is not bound to resist the defamation and he does\nnot give any cooperation to the external injustice. He sins against\njustice affectively (i.e., in wish), but not effectively (i.e., in word\nor deed).\n\n2078. Persons Who Listen from Curiosity.--What of those listeners who\nhear defamation willingly, not because they approve of the harm or evil\nthat is being done, but because they are unusually curious or the\nspeaker is unusually interesting?\n\n(a) If these listeners could and should stop the defamation, they\nconsent to it indirectly by their silence and thus are guilty (cfr.\n2079).\n\n(b) If these listeners are not able or are not bound to stop the\ndefamation, some would nevertheless hold them guilty of grave sin,\nsince they wish to hear something only because the knowledge will give\nthem pleasure, knowing all the while that this knowledge cannot be had\nexcept at the expense of the good opinion they have of a neighbor. But\nthe general view is that in this case there is no grave sin; for the\nlistener does not approve of the moral evil (he is interested only in\nthe graceful or eloquent or witty manner of the speaker, or the\nstrangeness of the things related, or he is only concerned to hear the\nlatest news, cfr. 234), and what he hears does not cause the lowering\nof his neighbor in his own opinion. But here it is supposed that the\nlistener in no way encourages the defamation and that he is not bound\nto stop it. Curiosity about things that do not concern one is, however,\na venial sin.\n\n2079. Sinfulness of Indirect Consent to Defamation.--The listener who\nconsents indirectly to defamation by not impeding it as he should is\nalso guilty of sin, and in Scripture his conduct is strongly forbidden:\n\u201cHave nothing to do with detractors\u201d (Prov., xxiv. 21); \u201cHedge in thy\nears with thorns, hear not a wicked tongue\u201d (Ecclus., xxviii. 28).\n\n(a) It is commonly admitted that the listener in question sins doubly\nagainst charity, and grievously if the defamation is seriously harmful;\nfor he sins against the detractor by refusing to give a brotherly\ncorrection (see 1258 sqq.), and he sins also against the one detracted\nby refusing to raise his voice in behalf of the absent who cannot\ndefend himself.\n\n(b) It is also commonly admitted that, if the listener is the superior\nof the defamer or of the person defamed, he sins more gravely, since he\nis specially bound to correct his subject who is detracting in his\npresence, or to defend his absent subject who is being defamed. If the\nlistener is a private person not responsible for the defamed person\u2019s\nreputation, he does not sin against justice by his indirect consent to\nthe defamation. Indeed, the inferiors or equals of the defamer rarely\nsin gravely by their neglecting to oppose his defamatory remarks.\n\n2080. Guilt of Superior Who Consents to Defamation.--Is the superior\nwho indirectly consents to defamation of a non-subject by a subject\nguilty thereby of injustice?\n\n(a) As regards the spiritual injury (i.e., the guilt of sin incurred by\nthe defamer), the superior is guilty of injustice towards his subject,\nif by reason of his office or contract he is bound to correct faults\nand neglects to do so. Thus, a bishop or pastor is supported by his\npeople, and there is at least an implied agreement that he will direct\nthem in spiritual matters and reprove their faults. Hence, it seems\nthat a spiritual superior of this kind is unjust, if he fails to\ncorrect a subordinate who carries defamatory tales to his ears.\n\n(b) As regards the temporary injury (i.e., the detriment to fame\nincurred by the person maligned), all depends on whether the superior\nis bound by reason of his office or contract to prevent injury to\nnon-subjects by those who are his subjects. If the superior exercises\nhis authority in the temporal order and has an agreement with those not\nsubject to him to protect them against defamation by his subjects, he\nis bound in justice to abide by his agreement. But the common opinion\nis that a superior in the spiritual order is not responsible _ex\nofficio_ for the fame or other temporal welfare of those not subject to\nhim.\n\n2081. Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a\nsubject guilty thereby of injustice?\n\n(a) If the superior has authority in the temporal order, he is unjust\nby his inaction, in so far as law, custom or agreement hold him to\nprevent the defamation of his subject. Thus, a guardian entrusted with\nthe care of his ward\u2019s reputation is unjust if he makes no effort to\nprevent defamation of the latter.\n\n(b) If the superior is in the spiritual order, some believe that he is\nunjust by inaction, since fame is closely connected with spiritual\ngoods, being necessary for moral influence over others and useful for\npersonal perseverance in virtue. But others--and it seems more\ncommonly--deny this, and state that the relation between fame and\nspiritual goods is only accidental.\n\n2082. Circumstances Which Lessen Guilt of Indirect Consent.--Indirect\nconsent to defamation is often only a venial sin. (a) Thus, by reason\nof the lightness of the matter, as when only trivial defects are\nmentioned by the defamer; (b) by reason of insufficient reflection, as\nwhen the listener is distracted in mind and does not clearly advert to\nthe sinfulness of the words he hears; (c) by reason of insufficient\nconsent, as when the failure to stop or protest against the defamation\nis due to slight laziness, to bashfulness, or to fear of the speaker,\nat least when the defamation is not extremely harmful to fame or other\ngood, or gravely slanderous.\n\n2083. Inaction in the Face of Defamation.--Inaction in the face of\ndefamation of a third party is sometimes no sin at all.\n\n(a) Thus, there is no sin when one is unable to act (e.g., when a\nslanderous speech is being delivered by a person in authority who will\nnot suffer any interruption to be made), or is unable to act with any\nsuccess (e.g., when the attempt to correct would provoke worse\ndefamation, when the listener is too unskilled to refute or\nremonstrate). Scrupulous persons should not attempt to correct, since\nthey are not suited for this. Their attempts to defend an absent person\nwould generally make them ridiculous, and would often be unjust to the\nperson whom they suspected of defamation.\n\n(b) There is no sin when one is not obliged to act (e.g., when\ninterference will expose one to very serious evils, when the defamation\nis not grave or is not taken very seriously, when the listener is\nuncertain whether the speaker is really guilty of defamation or whether\nhe himself is bound to intervene). It is sometimes unwise to interrupt\na defamatory story, for many such story seems to promise dire\ndisclosures at its beginning, but when heard to the end is seen to be\nan affair of no importance or to contain little that is new or\nstartling or credible.\n\n2084. Ways of Opposing Defamation Made in One\u2019s Presence.--(a) Positive\nresistance is made by a command to the defamer to be silent, or by\nrefutation of his words if they are false, or by a rebuke if his words\nare true. This mode of correction is generally required if the listener\nis the superior of the defamer, and is sometimes suitable if he is the\nlatter\u2019s equal.\n\n(b) Negative resistance is made by leaving the company, by having no\nshare in the conversation, by changing the subject, by showing\ndispleasure or at least gravity in one\u2019s looks or acts: \u201cThe north wind\ndriveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue\u201d\n(Prov., xxv. 23). This mode of resistance is usually the proper one for\nan inferior, and as a rule is found more satisfactory even between\nequals (see 1267).\n\n2085. Restitution for Defamation.--Restitution for injuries committed\nis necessary (see 1759), and hence it is required of the defamer. In\nthe language of Scripture (Prov., xiii. 13), he that speaks ill of his\nneighbor obliges himself for the future. The two injuries to be\nrepaired are: (a) the unjust taking, that is, the fame of which he has\ndeprived his neighbor; (b) the unjust damage, that is, the detriment to\nfame or the losses that resulted from the defamation (such as failure\nto obtain or keep a position, decline of business, etc., which were\nforeseen at least in a confused manner). It is clear there is no duty\nof restitution, if in spite of talk against a neighbor he suffered no\nloss (e.g., if the listeners gave no heed or credence to the talk).\n\n2086. Gravity of Obligation of Restitution.--The obligation of\nrestitution for defamation is grave or light according to the degree of\ninjury done, and the grave obligation binds even at the expense of\nserious inconvenience, the light obligation at the cost of small\ninconvenience. But the following points should be noted:\n\n(a) the injury is not necessarily grave if the defect imputed to\nanother is grave, for many circumstances have to be considered (e.g.,\nblasphemy is a serious charge, but it would not be very harmful to a\nman publicly known as very impious, see 2053 sqq.);\n\n(b) the injury is not necessarily slight if the defect imputed is\nslight, for circumstances may make the injury considerable (e.g., it is\nnot very defamatory to say that a woman is very talkative, or unable to\nspeak or spell correctly, but this would be very damaging if it lost\nthe woman a very lucrative position as secretary).\n\n2087. Conditions Which Entail Duty of Restitution.--Restitution is not\nobligatory unless one is the unjust and efficacious author of the\ndamage (see 1763). Hence, disclosures unfavorable to the reputation of\nothers entail the duty of restitution only when the following\nconditions are present:\n\n(a) the detriment to fame or other loss must be unjust objectively, and\nhence those who have a just reason for exposing the vices of others are\nnot held to restitution;\n\n(b) the detriment must be unjust subjectively, and hence one who in\ngood faith speaks of a neighbors sin, thinking that it is true and\npublic, whereas it is false or secret, is not bound to restitution, if\nhe discovers his error after the results of the defamation have been\nremoved (see, however, 2102). But if he discovers his mistake while the\nneighbor is still under a cloud because of the report, he becomes from\nthat moment responsible and subjectively unjust, if he does not take\nsteps as far as he conveniently can to correct the error (see 1769);\n\n(c) the detriment must be due to oue\u2019s act as to its efficacious\ncause, and hence one is not bound to restitution if a listener\nunderstands one to disparage when in fact one has not disparaged.\n\n2088. Cooperators and Restitution.--Those who cooperate in injustice\nare also held to restitution (see 1778 sqq.), and hence the following\nare bound to indemnify a defamed person:\n\n(a) positive cooperators are held to restitution, such as those who\ncommand, counsel, or encourage defamation. The same is true of those\nwho share in a defamatory conversation or who merely listen, but by\ntheir questions, or show of interest or approval, induce the defamer to\ncontinue, or to speak with more assurance;\n\n(b) negative cooperators are also held to restitution, if they were\nbound in justice to resist or impede defamation. This will apply\nchiefly to a superior who does not prevent, as he should, the\ndefamation of his subject or community, whether by a subject or a\nnon-subject (see 2080 sqq.).\n\n2089. Circumstances of Restitution.--We shall now speak of the\ncircumstances of restitution for defamation: (a) the persons bound to\nrestitution besides the defamer, namely, his heirs, the listeners,\netc.; (b) the persons to whom restitution is to be made; (c) the manner\nof making restitution; (d) the time for making restitution (see 1781\nsqq.).\n\n2090. Restitution for Defamation to Be Made by an Heir of the\nDefamer.--(a) For the injury to fame, it seems that the heir is not\nbound, since the duty of restitution of fame is a personal one, that\nis, an obligation to perform an act of retraction or apology, not an\nobligation to pay compensation (see 463). But some hold that defamation\nmay be satisfied for by pecuniary compensation (1750, 1802), and that,\nif the injured party should insist on this kind of compensation for the\ninfamy suffered, the heirs would be obliged to pay it.\n\n(b) For the damages resulting from injury to fame the heir is bound,\nsince restitution for losses is a real one and rests upon the property\nor estate of the deceased. But those who are in good faith are\nsometimes to be left undisturbed, lest they become guilty of formal sin.\n\n2091. The Persons to Whom Restitution for Defamation Is to Be\nMade.--(a) To the person defamed restitution of fame is owed, and this\nis true even when the person is already dead. Just as one who dishonors\nthe dead by desecrating their tombs or their remains owes it to their\nmemory to make reparation, so one who defames the dead owes it to their\nreputation to make restitution. In fact, the heirs may be bound in\nconscience to insist upon this restitution, and it seems they cannot\ncondone it, since it is not their own fame that has been hurt.\n\n(b) To the listeners restitution is not owed, since no injustice was\ndone them, but reparation for scandal given them may be obligatory.\nAnd, since justice to the person defamed requires retraction or other\nreparation, the defamer must recall his words before the persons to\nwhom he addressed them. Hence, if defamation appeared in a journal, the\nhonorable reparation should also appear in the same journal and with\nthe same prominence given it as was given the offensive remarks.\n\n2092. Responsibility of Defamer for Spread of Defamation.--Is the\ndefamer bound to recall his words to the wider audience that learned\nthem from his first listeners?\n\n(a) If the defamer is not responsible for the spread of his talk beyond\nthe circle which he addressed (e.g., if he imposed strict silence upon\nhis listeners or had good reason to think that they would keep his\nremarks to themselves, and his words nevertheless leaked out), the\ncommon opinion is that he is not held to reparation before the\nsubsequent listeners.\n\n(b) If the defamer is responsible for the spread of his talk (e.g., if\nhe gave his listeners permission to quote or repeat, or if he knew well\nthat they would carry his words far and wide), he is bound to\nreparation before the later listeners, in so far as this is possible,\nespecially if he was guilty of calumny. Whether he or his listeners\nhave the first duty of restitution will depend on the relationship in\ntheir cooperation (see 1784). If he can do nothing better, he should\nadmonish his listeners to retract before their listeners.\n\n2093. The First Way of Making Restitution for Defamation.--(a) If the\ndefamation was by calumny, the defamer (and also the propagator) must\ntake back his words, admitting that what he said was untrue. If\nnecessary, he should also make affidavit to this effect, or even admit\nthat he lied. The reason is that the innocent party has a greater right\nto his fame than the guilty party. But the defamer is not obliged to\nconfess his own malice, when this is not necessary, and it may suffice\nto say merely that his former statement was not correct.\n\n(b) If the defamation was by detraction, the defamer cannot truthfully\nsay that his words were false, and he must counteract directly or\nindirectly the effect of his defamation by something favorable to the\nperson he has injured. If the listeners will not be confirmed in their\nbelief by his explanation, the defamer should explain to them that his\nstatements were unjust, that he had no right to make them, that he\nwishes them to regard as unsaid all that he said, etc. (direct\nrevocation). If this cure would be worse than the sickness by\nstrengthening the belief of the listeners that the defamation was true,\nthe defamer should be silent about his former statements. But he should\nso honor or praise the person defamed that others will be led to\nbelieve, not that restitution is being made, but that the former good\nopinion they had of the person defamed was correct (indirect\nrevocation). Thus, if the defamer knows that the injured person has\nreformed, he may call attention to and emphasize the virtues he now\nhas; if the defamed person has still the same failing, he may be\nexcused, when possible, or praised for the good qualities he does\npossess, or he may be spoken of in general terms of esteem; if the\nlisteners have been led to dishonor the person who was detracted, the\ndefamer may show special signs of esteem or confidence to the latter,\netc.\n\n2094. Other Methods of Making Restitution.--If the listeners will not\nbe impressed by any of the methods of satisfaction just indicated, what\nshould be done?\n\n(a) If, in the case of calumny, the listeners are unwilling to accept\nthe formal statement that the defamation was untrue, the defamer is\nobliged to nothing more. For the slanderer has done all that is\npossible to change the erroneous view of the listeners, and the bad\nopinion they have of their neighbor must now be attributed, not to the\ndefamer, but to their own wickedness or stubbornness.\n\n(b) If the listeners cannot be properly impressed by the direct or\nindirect revocation of detraction, the defamer, being unable to make\nhonorable compensation by restoration of fame, should make a profitable\ncompensation by the bestowal of a benefit that will in some way be\ncommensurate with the good of reputation and be acceptable to the other\nparty. Thus, if the person defamed is satisfied with money or something\nmeasurable in terms of money, he should be given damages; if this kind\nof compensation is of little use or is not esteemed (few persons of\nhonor would take money alone as pay for a lost reputation), he should\nbe given some other good which in his own judgment and that of a\nprudent man is more nearly an equivalent for the good of which he has\nbeen deprived. An apology is not sufficient, since the begging of\npardon does not restore what was taken; neither is it generally\nadvisable, because the admission to another that one has been secretly\ndefaming him and is now sorry for this may lead to quarrels and hatreds\nrather than to forgiveness and peace.\n\n2095. Legal Reparation for Defamation.--One who has been sentenced by a\nlawful judgment of court to reparation and penalty for defamation is\nobliged to obedience, but if the satisfaction decided on by a jury is\nexcessive or meager, it can be set aside by the court. In Canon Law\n(Canon 2355) one who has been convicted of defamation may be sentenced:\n(a) to satisfaction; (b) to damages; (c) to suitable penalties, even to\nsuspension or removal from office or benefice.\n\n2096. The Time When Restitution for Defamation Is to Be Made.--(a) It\nshould be made as soon as possible, for the longer it is delayed the\ngreater the injury that is suffered, since defamation becomes harder to\ncorrect as it progresses, or at least has a longer life when it is not\ncorrected early. But prudence will sometimes dictate that one await a\npsychological or favorable moment for a retractation. (b) Restitution\nshould be promised before absolution is given, and, if there is a\nwell-founded doubt about the sincerity of a promise, the confessor may\ndelay absolution until restitution has been made.\n\n2097. Cessation of Duty of Restitution.--The duty of restitution\nceases, at least temporarily, in certain cases (see 1797 sqq.), and\nhence one who has been guilty of injustice through defamation is\nsometimes excused from reparation. (a) Thus, one is excused temporarily\non account of impossibility; (b) one is excused permanently on account\nof the cessation of the other party\u2019s good name or the termination of\none\u2019s own obligation.\n\n2098. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Impossibility.--(a)\nPhysical impossibility excuses, for example, when one does not know who\nthe persons were before whom one detracted, or cannot recall who the\nperson was whom one defamed. But in this case the defamer should at\nleast make satisfaction by praying for the person whom he defamed, or\nby having Masses offered for him.\n\n(b) Moral impossibility excuses from restitution, as when the defamer\nwill suffer a far greater loss than he inflicted on the person defamed\n(e.g., if the defamer cannot retract without losing his life, or a\nreputation which is far more valuable than that of the obscure person\nwho was defamed). But if the defamer has subjected the injured party to\nthe peril of death, or if he has calumniated an innocent man, he must\nmake satisfaction even at the peril of his own life or at the cost of\nhis own fame; for the right of the innocent prevails over that of the\nguilty defamer.\n\n2099. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Cessation of Other Party\u2019s\nGood Name.--The defamer may also be excused from restitution on account\nof cessation of the other party\u2019s good name through another cause, as\nwhen the secret defect first made known by the defamer becomes public\nfrom another source.\n\n(a) The detractor is excused from the duty of restoring reputation,\nsince the person he defamed has now independently of the first\ndefamation lost his right to reputation (see 2053 sqq.).\n\n(b) The detractor is not excused, however, from payment for damages\nwhich the defamed person suffered from the first defamation or for\nexpenses which it caused him. Some moralists hold him obligated also\nfor some compensation for the infamy suffered before the crime became\npublic through others.\n\n2100. Excuse from Restitution on Account of the Termination of\nObligation.--(a) The act of the defamed person ends the obligation,\nwhen, without injury to others, he expressly or tacitly condones the\noffense; for he has dominion over his own fame, as he has over his own\nmoney or lands. Thus, it may often be presumed that parents overlook\nthe restitution owed them by their children for criticisms made by the\nlatter.\n\n(b) The act of the defamed person also ends the obligation, according\nto the common opinion, when he has inflicted an equal injury by defaming\nhis defamer and is unwilling to make satisfaction for the injury; for\nthough it is unlawful to repay evil with evil, and though one damage\ndoes not cure another damage, he who will not pay a creditor cannot\ninsist that the creditor pay him an equal debt. Thus, if Titus has\nburned the barn of Claudius and Claudius then burns the barn of Titus,\nand neither will pay damages, the debts neutralize each other, if the\nlosses are equal. The same principle applies in defamatory\nrecriminations.\n\n2101. Right of Defamed Person to Condone Injury.--The person defamed\nhas the right to condone the injury, if it is only personal to himself,\nbut he has not always the right to condone the injury when the\ndefamation causes harm to others.\n\n(a) Thus, the defamed person would sin against justice and his act\nwould be invalid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the\nfact that his own fame was necessary for the fame of others (e.g., when\na monk loses his good name, the monastery is also disgraced), or was\nnecessary for the fulfillment of duties owed by him in justice to\nothers (e.g., when a prelate, priest or public official loses his good\nname, the good influence he should exercise over his subjects is\nended). This conclusion is probable.\n\n(b) The defamed person would sin against charity, but his act would be\nvalid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the fact that his\nfame was necessary for the fulfillment of charitable duties owed to\nothers, or that his silence in the face of defamation would cause great\nscandal (e.g., when a preacher loses his reputation, his words do not\nmove, and thus he is unable fruitfully to accomplish works of charity\nby instructing the ignorant, etc.).\n\n2102. Excuse from Restitution When Reputation Has Been Recovered.--The\nobligation of restitution for defamation also ceases when reputation\nhas been recovered without any act on the part of the defamer; for it\nis clear that one is not bound to give back that which is already had.\nBut restitution may be due, nevertheless, for damages incurred, and\nsome think that compensation (e.g., apology, honor, praise) should be\nmade for the injury of infamy that existed before the good name was\nregained.\n\nThe usual ways in which reputation is recovered without the act of the\ndefamer are: (a) by overthrow of the defamation, as when the facts\nagainst it become manifest, or when witnesses prove its falsity, or\nwhen a tribunal declares it a criminal libel; (b) by oblivion, as when\na misdeed of years ago has faded entirely out of the public memory. If\nthe defamer is uncertain whether his past defamations have been\nforgotten, he has to act with great prudence; for, if he makes\ninquiries the memory of the defamations may be awakened, while if he\nsays nothing, the defamations, because never corrected or retracted,\nmay break out anew. He should consider the circumstances, therefore,\nand treat the defamed person as he would wish himself to be treated in\na like case.\n\n2103. Whispering or Tale-Bearing.--Whispering (_susurratio_), also\ncalled mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to\nanother person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous\nfriendship.\n\n(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to\nhis listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about.\nThe thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil\nor something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be\nsomething displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not\nnecessarily include defamation.\n\n(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually\nin the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress.\nOften, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another,\nspeaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly\neffective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: \u201cThe\nwhisperer and the double-tongued is accursed\u201d (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).\n\n(c) It is aimed at the breaking up of a friendship, that is, the\nwhisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which\nhis listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the\nlistener\u2019s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent\nperson. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship,\nand complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and\nsows discords and quarrels: \u201cA passionate man kindleth strife, and a\nsinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst\nof them that are at peace\u201d (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); \u201cWhen the tale-bearer\nis taken away, contentions shall cease\u201d (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering,\nthen, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away\nfame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.\n\n(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin\nbut rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful\nfriendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a\nwicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a\ndisorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).\n\n2104. The Sinfulness of Whispering.--(a) Theological\nSpecies.--Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is\nhateful to God (the soul of the Lord detesteth \u201chim that soweth discord\namong brethren,\u201d Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a\nvirtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. \u201cA faithful friend\nis a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure.\nNothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and\nsilver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful\nfriend is the medicine of life and immortality\u201d (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).\nWhispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor\nis less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to\nfriendship.\n\n(b) Moral Species.--Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on\naccount of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to\nwhich it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity,\nfor the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a\nfree relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the\nparties.\n\n2105. Circumstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.--Is the\nspecies of whispering changed by circumstances?\n\n(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect\nin malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil\nthat would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g.,\nwhen no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong\nor important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to\ndestroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship\nbetween husband and wife, between parent and child.\n\n(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are\ndifferent kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed\nagainst the special features, but against the general character common\nto all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the\nwhisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the\nfriendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It\nis clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus,\nhe who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for\nhimself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man\nand his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty\nalso of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering,\nis also guilty of sedition, etc.\n\n2106. Derision.--Derision is a jest that reproaches another with some\ndefect or evil in order to put him to confusion.\n\n(a) It is a jest, that is, it is spoken in fun and consists in making\nthe defects of another person the object of laughter or amusement.\nThus, it differs in manner from contumely, detraction and whispering,\nwhich are spoken seriously.\n\n(b) Its purpose is the confusion of the person ridiculed, that is, it\nintends to take from him the good opinion that he is entitled to have\nof himself and the peace of conscience that he enjoys. Thus, it differs\nin object and purpose from the other injurious words hitherto\nconsidered (see 2009). The intention to put another person out of\ncountenance by ridicule is either formal or material, according as the\npurpose before the mind is to disconcert that person, or only to have\none\u2019s joke, though one sees that this will mean shame and suffering for\nthe victim of the joke.\n\n2107. Distinction between Derision and Jesting.--Moderate jesting at\nanother\u2019s expense is not derision, nor sinful, if it is justified by a\nreasonable motive. (a) Thus, a serious motive for jesting at another is\nfraternal correction. To ridicule a person who is making a fool of\nhimself is often the best way to correct him, for many persons are less\nmoved at being called wicked than at being called absurd. Similarly, a\nsatirical rebuke sometimes serves to abash a person who has an exalted\nopinion of himself. In such cases a truth spoken in jest is an act of\ncharity to a sinner. (b) A playful motive for jesting at another is\nrecreation. The good-natured exchange of banter about trivial defects\nbetween persons who enjoy this give and take is a reasonable form of\namusement in itself; indeed, it pertains to the virtue known as\n_eutrapelia_. But some persons who enjoy a jest at the expense of\nanother are extremely sensitive to ridicule and fly into a rage if fun\nis poked at themselves, or even if they suspect that someone is\nlaughing at them.\n\n2108. Even jesting whose purpose is good may be sinful on account of\nthe offensive or immoderate way in which it is conducted (see 2010).\nThere are three general forms of jest, but they do not constitute\ndistinct species of sin when jest is unlawful, since the difference\nbetween them is accidental as far as morality is concerned.\n\n(a) Thus, jest of the mouth is one that is made by words or laughter.\n\n(b) A jest of the face is made by the expression of the countenance\n(e.g., by wrinkling up the nose, sticking out the tongue).\n\n(c) A jest of act, or practical joke, is some trick played on another,\nhorseplay, and the like.\n\n2109. The Sinfulness of Derision.--(a) When the derider makes light of\na grave evil, he commits a mortal sin, for he shows grave contempt\ntowards the person derided, treating the latter as if he were entirely\nworthless--one whose misfortunes were matters for joke. Indeed,\nderision is a more serious injury than contumely, for the contumelious\nperson treats the evil of his neighbor as something serious, whereas\nthe derider makes sport of it and is thus more insulting. In Scripture\ngrave punishment is threatened to deriders: \u201cGod shall scorn the\nscorners\u201d (Prov., iii. 34). But if an evil grave in itself is commonly\nlooked upon as light on account of the inferior condition of the person\nwho has the defect (viz., because he is an infant or an idiot), there\nis no grave sin of contempt.\n\n(b) When the derider makes light of an evil that is really light, there\nis no contempt shown, but there may be serious embarrassment caused to\nthe person derided. For the peace of a good conscience is a great\nblessing (\u201cOur glory is this, the testimony of our conscience,\u201d II\nCor., i. 12; \u201cA secure mind is like a continual feast,\u201d Prov., xv. 15),\nand that which disturbs it can be a serious distress and harm. If the\nbutt of the joke does not take the matter much to heart, the sin is\nvenial. But should he suffer great mental pain or disturbance on\naccount of the ridicule, the quality of the sin is disputed. Some think\nthat mortal sin is committed, if the derider foresees the serious evil\nthat will ensue; but others hold that the sin is venial, since it is\nthe over-sensitiveness of the person derided that accounts for his\ngreat discomfiture of mind.\n\n2110. The gravity of the sin of derision is increased by the object\nagainst whom it is directed; for the greater the reverence due a\nperson, the greater the injury shown by making a mockery of him.\n\n(a) Thus, the worst form of derision is that which is directed against\nGod, and it is not distinct from blasphemy. Hence, Isaias (IV Kings,\nxix. 6) calls the deriders of the God of Israel blasphemers, and St.\nLuke (xxii. 64, 65) says that the soldiers who gave Our Lord a mock\ncoronation spoke in blasphemy.\n\n(b) Next in gravity is derision of parents, and Scripture declares the\nspecial horror of this sin: \u201cThe eye that mocketh at his father, let\nthe ravens of the brooks pick it out and the young eagles eat it\u201d\n(Prov., xxx, 17).\n\n(c) Finally, there is a special enormity in derision of saintly\npersons, for virtue deserves honor, and those who dishonor it deter\nmen, as far as in them lies, from cultivating or esteeming it.\n\n2111. Cursing.--Cursing in general is the speaking of evil for some\nperson or thing, that is, in order that the evil spoken may befall him\nor it. Thus, it differs from contumely and derision, which are the\nspeaking of evil to another, and from defamation and whispering, which\nare the speaking of evil against another. Cursing is also different\nfrom prediction of evil, and some passages in the Imprecatory Psalms,\nthough couched in terms of malediction, are prophecies of the future,\nrather than curses. An example is Psalm cviii, which foretells the fate\nof the traitor Judas. Cursing is expressed in two ways:\n\n(a) imperatively, when one pronounces with authority that punishment is\nto be inflicted or evil visited upon some person or object. In this way\nGod decrees eternal or temporal penalties against sinners, judges\nsentence criminals, and the Church anathematize the contumacious;\n\n(b) optatively, when one who has not the power or authority to command\npunishment, expresses the wish that misfortune or evil of some kind may\novertake a person or thing. Examples are: \u201cBad luck to you,\u201d \u201cMay you\nbreak your leg,\u201d \u201cThe devil take you,\u201d \u201cGod damn you.\u201d A curse made in\nthe form of a prayer is called an imprecation.\n\n2112. When Cursing Is Not Sinful.--Cursing a person is not sinful when\nthe evil which is ordered or wished is not intended as to the evil that\nis in it, but as to some good; for so the intention is directed to\ngood, not to evil.\n\n(a) Thus, evil may be ordered on account of the good of justice that is\nin it, as when a judge decrees capital punishment, which in its\nphysical being is an evil, but morally is the vindication of justice\nand therefore a good. Some of the curses made by holy men in the Bible\nare of this character: they proclaim the just sentence of God, as when\nElias called down fire from heaven upon his persecutors (IV Kings, i),\nand Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (IV Kings, ii. 24); or they\nexpress the submission of the human will to the just decree of God:\n\u201cAnd the Levites shall pronounce with a loud voice, \u2018Cursed be he that\nabideth not in the words of this law,\u2019 and all the people shall say,\n\u2018Amen\u2019\u201d (Deut., xxvii. 14, 26).\n\n(b) Evil may be desired, if the intention takes in only the good of\npublic or of private utility that is contained in it, as when one hopes\na jury will find a dangerous criminal guilty, if one has in view, not\nthe sufferings or death of the criminal, but the safety of the\ncommunity. It is right, therefore, to wish confusion and defeat to the\nenemies of religion, of the Church, or of one\u2019s country; it is lawful\nto pray God to visit a sinner with sickness that he may thereby be\nreformed or prevented from harming others. But in wishing evils one\nmust remember that it is not always lawful to do what one wishes may\nhappen in some lawful manner, nor is it lawful to wish a greater evil\nas a means of escape from a lesser evil (see 1308 sqq.).\n\n2113. Sinfulness of Cursing.--Cursing a person is sinful when the evil\nordered or wished is intended precisely as it is the hurt or loss of\nthis person.\n\n(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, since it shuts out the curser\nfrom heaven (\u201cNeither cursers nor extortioners shall possess the\nkingdom of God,\u201d I Cor., vi. 10), and it is essentially opposed to\ncharity, being the natural expression of hatred (see 1296). But, other\nthings being equal, optative cursing is less serious than defamation,\nfor it is less harm to another to wish him evil (e.g., that he be\ndefamed) than to inflict that evil on him.\n\n(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter,\ncursing becomes at times a venial sin. The act is imperfectly\ndeliberate when one curses in a sudden fit of temper; it is imperfectly\nintentional, when one curses in fun or from habit and does not really\nwish that the evils pronounced should be fulfilled. The curses, \u201cGo to\nhell,\u201d \u201cGod damn you,\u201d are usually not meant or understood to express a\nwish that the person addressed be consigned to eternal punishment.\nHence, they are generally in themselves venial sins only. But it should\nbe remembered that venial curses of this kind may become mortal by\nreason of scandal (e.g., when parents habitually address such curses to\ntheir children, or other superiors to their subordinates), or by reason\nof irreverence (e.g., when children curse their parents). The matter of\na curse is light when the evil spoken is harmful only in a small degree\n(e.g., to wish that a person may lose a small sum of money).\n\n2114. Rules for Deciding as to Gravity of the Sin.--Persons who have\nexpressed a grave curse against a neighbor are sometimes in doubt\nwhether there was enough ill-will in the curse to make it a mortal sin.\nFor such doubts theologians give the following rules:\n\n(a) if the reason for doubting is that after the curse one cooled off\nand hoped that no evil would happen to one\u2019s neighbor, mortal sin was\ncommitted during the curse, but the bad disposition quickly passed away;\n\n(b) if the reason for doubting is that one is not sure about the state\nof mind one was in during the curse, a good index of that state of mind\nwill be the feeling one has towards the person who was cursed. Thus, if\none is well disposed towards that person, the presumption is that the\ncurse was not meant except as an expression of anger; but if one is\nhostile to that person, the presumption is rather that the evil in the\ncurse was really intended. If one is indifferent as regards the person\nwhom one cursed, the presumption will follow what one is accustomed to\ndesire in one\u2019s curses, whether that be to give forceful expression to\ndispleasure or to manifest a malevolent hatred.\n\n2115. Circumstances Which Change the Moral Species of Cursing.--There\nare certain circumstances of person and objects which change the moral\nspecies of cursing, and which must therefore be mentioned in confession.\n\n(a) Thus, by reason of difference in the persons cursed the species is\nchanged, for where special love or reverence is owed a special sin is\ncommitted by hatred or irreverence. The gravest curse is that against\nGod, which is the sin of blasphemy (see 887 sqq.). Next in wickedness\nis the curse against one\u2019s parents, which is a sin of impiety.\n\n(b) By reason of difference in the evils that are desired, the species\nis also changed, since the essential malices of the will and of the\ndeed are the same (see 90, 242). In this respect cursing differs from\ncontumely and detraction, for in these sins the evils spoken are not\npleasing, but rather displeasing to the speaker (see 2103). Hence, he\nwho wishes death to his neighbor commits murder in his heart, he who\nwishes loss of property is a thief at heart, etc. But if one curses a\nneighbor in a general way, without mentioning any particular evil, one\nsins by hatred.\n\n2116. Numerical Multiplication in Sins of Cursing.--(a) By reason of\nthe specific difference in the evils wished (e.g., death, disgrace,\npoverty), one is guilty of several sins by one and the same act; for,\nthough the act is physically one, it is morally many, as was said in\nthe previous paragraph. But some authors add that only one sin is\ncommitted if all the evils wished are united in the mind as expressions\nof the one sin of hate or as means of the one purpose of injury (see\n217).\n\n(b) By reason of the different persons cursed, one is also guilty of\nseveral sins by one and the same act, or at least is guilty of one sin\nthat is equivalent to many; for he who curses a whole family or group,\nformally and expressly intends evil to each member, and thus he differs\nfrom a thief who steals from many persons, but does not will individual\ninjuries (see 218).\n\n2117. The Cursing of Evil.--(a) It is not sinful to curse evil as such,\nthat is, to wish that sin or wrong may be defeated. Hence, it is lawful\nto pray against the evil spirits, the enemies of God and man. But it is\nsinful to curse any creature of God, even though he is among the lost,\nfor the nature of every creature is good, since it comes from God.\n\n(b) It is not sinful to curse evil tropologically, that is, to curse a\ncreature of God that is taken to represent evil, as being its cause\n(e.g., Job cursed the day of his birth, the beginning of many evils),\nor location (e.g., David cursed Mount Gelboe, the spot where Saul and\nJonathan were slain), etc. But it would be a sin to curse these\ncreatures of God in themselves.\n\n2118. It is not sinful to curse an irrational creature on account of\nits relation to man, if there is a sufficient reason to curse man\nhimself (see 2112), either on account of the good of justice (e.g.,\nwhen God cursed the earth as a punishment on Adam, when Christ cursed\nthe fig-tree as a sign of the curse on Judea), or on account of the\ngood of utility (e.g., when one wishes that the liquor ordered by a\ndrunkard may be lost).\n\n2119. Unlawful Cursing of an Irrational Creature.--(a) It is unlawful\nto curse an irrational creature, considered precisely as a creature of\nGod, for in so doing one reflects on God Himself, and incurs the guilt\nof blasphemy.\n\n(b) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered\nprecisely in relation to man, if there is no just cause to curse man.\nThus, if one wishes that a neighbor\u2019s cattle may die, intending only\nthe harm that will be done the neighbor, one is guilty of sinful\ncursing (see 2113).\n\n(c) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered\nprecisely in itself, for such an act is vain and useless. Those who\ncurse the inclemency of the weather, the infertility of the soil, the\nstubbornness of mules or other animals, the uselessness of a tool,\netc., do not generally speaking commit a grave sin, since they intend\nonly to voice their impatience with conditions that are displeasing.\n\n2120. Murmuring.--Murmuring is the expression of unjust discontent or\ncomplaint by inarticulate sounds or by secret words.\n\n(a) It is unjust, and so it does not differ essentially from the sins\nof speech given above. If it is an injustice to honor, it is reducible\nto contumely; if it is an injury to fame, it pertains to defamation,\netc. The injustice of murmuring results either from the thing\ncomplained of (e.g., a child murmurs against the just orders of its\nparents), or from the manner of the complaint (e.g., a subordinate\ncomplains against an unjust order, but angrily, contemptuously, or\nuselessly).\n\n(b) It is made by inarticulate sounds (e.g., by whistling, grunting),\nor by secret words (e.g., in whispered, inaudible manner). This is an\naccidental difference between murmuring and other vocal sins.\n\n2121. Fraud.--Having discussed the various kinds of injustice that are\ncommitted in involuntary commutations, we now pass on to the study of\nthose injustices that are done in voluntary transactions (see 1748).\nThese vices can be reduced to the following:\n\n(a) injustices perpetrated against a person who is entirely unwilling\n(viz., theft and robbery), as when one steals an object that had been\nentrusted to one as a pledge or loan, or compels another, by fear or\nviolence, to sign a contract unfavorable to himself and which he does\nnot wish to agree to. It is unnecessary to speak of theft and robbery\nin contracts, since the same principles apply to them as to theft and\nrobbery outside of contracts (see 1890 sqq.);\n\n(b) injustices perpetrated against a person who is partly willing,\nsince he consents to a contract, but is also partly unwilling, since\nunfairness or fraud is used against him. These injuries are of two\ngeneral kinds: fraud, a sin committed in buying and selling and other\ncontracts in which payment is made for some valuable consideration;\nusury, a sin committed in the loan of money in which payment is made\nfor something that is nonexistent.\n\n2122. Definition of Fraud.--By fraud (see 1677-1679) we here understand\nany unlawful conduct on the part of one party to a contract that puts\nthe other party under a disadvantage in agreeing to the contract (e.g.,\nmisrepresentations about the excellence of merchandise), or that takes\naway the equality that should exist between the parties (e.g., an\nexcessive price charged for merchandise; see 1750). The contract of\nsale is the type of all onerous contracts (see 1749), and to it all the\nothers, whether certain or aleatory, can be reduced, for in every one\nof them there is a thing that is purchased (e.g., in aleatory contracts\nthe hope of securing some prize), and a price that is paid for the\nobject of purchase. Hence, it will suffice to speak of the frauds that\nare committed in sales, and the same principles that govern these can\nbe applied to other kinds of contract.\n\n2123. Two Kinds of Injustices in Sales.--Equality between the buyer and\nthe seller requires that each give the other a good equivalent for what\nhe receives. Hence, the injustices committed in sales are reducible to\ntwo kinds: (a) injustices in the prices charged or paid; (b) injustices\nas to the goods furnished or taken.\n\n2124. Injustice Regarding the Price.--Sin is committed in reference to\nthe price charged as follows:\n\n(a) by fraud, when one of the parties uses deception against the other\nparty in order to charge more or pay less than is fair; for one who is\nparty to a contract has the right that no lying or trickery be used\nagainst him, a contract being an agreement to which knowledge and\nconsent are requisite;\n\n(b) by overcharge or underpayment; for sale has for its purpose the\nmutual advantage of the buyer and seller, and hence one of them should\nnot be overburdened for the advantage of the other, but the burdens and\nbenefits should be equally distributed. Hence, it is unjust to sell an\nobject for more than it is worth, or to buy it for less than it is\nworth.\n\n2125. The Criteria of a Just Price.--(a) The constitutive norm of a\njust price is not merely subjective, that is, the fairness does not\ndepend on the arbitrary wishes or on the special needs of the\ncontractants, or on some monopoly which controls the prices; it is\nobjective, that is, founded on the value of the thing sold, its\ncapacity to be of benefit and satisfaction to its possessor, its\nrarity, the amount of labor put into its production and care, etc.\n\n(b) The manifestative norm for commodities that are in common use (such\nas the necessities of life and the more usual luxuries) is the common\njudgment expressed either in law (legal price) or in the free custom of\nbuyers and sellers at a particular place and time (market price); for\nobjects that are not in common use and that have no settled price\n(e.g., rare archeological finds, ancient documents or paintings) the\nnorm is the prudent and free judgment of the parties, or the decision\nof an expert chosen by them.\n\n2126. The Obligation of Observing Prices Settled by Law Or Custom.--(a)\nThe legal price (e.g., in some countries the prices on government\nmonopolies, such as tobacco and salt), which in modern times is rare,\nis ordinarily obligatory in virtue of commutative justice, since its\ndisregard harms one of the parties to the sale. But in exceptional\ncases the price may for reasons of equity be no longer obligatory\n(e.g., when the lawgiver does not insist on its observance).\n\n(b) The market price is ordinarily of like obligation, and for the same\nreason. But it should be noted that the current price allows of some\nlatitude, since the common estimate does not agree on exactly the same\nfigure, and hence there is a highest, a lowest, and an average price.\nInjustice is done when one sells above the highest market price, that\nis, when one charges a sum notably in excess of that charged by others\nat the same place and time; or when one buys below the lowest market\nprice, that is, when one pays a sum notably less than that paid by\nother buyers. St. Alphonsus gives as a rule that when a commodity is\nvalued at 5, it may be sold for 6 or bought for 4; when valued at 10,\nit may be transferred or acquired for 12 or 8; when valued at 100, it\nmay be exchanged for 105 or 95.\n\n2127. When the Market Price May Be Disregarded Without Injustice.--In\nsome exceptional cases one may disregard the market price without\ninjustice, if there are reasons that justify this.\n\n(a) Reasons that rest on the matter of the contract are that the thing\non sale has increased or decreased in value (e.g., the merchandise is\nof extraordinary excellence or rarity), or that the contractant would\nlose or risk loss from the sale itself by keeping to the market price\n(e.g., the buyer would by his purchase deprive himself of money that\ncould be used more profitably in another transaction; the article if\nsold would have to be replaced by the seller at a higher price; the\nvendor by waiting can make a better sale later; the object which a\nperson wishes to purchase is especially prized by the owner and cannot\nbe duplicated). In these cases, however, the vendor should give notice\nto the buyer that for special reasons a higher price is being asked, so\nthat the latter may have the choice of going elsewhere, if he prefers.\n\n(b) Reasons that rest on the manner of the contract are that certain\nexceptional forms of sales are justified by law or custom and do not\nviolate basic justice. Auction sales are of this kind, and, if the\nconditions of aleatory contracts are observed so that the risk will be\nequal on both sides, it is not unfair to take a price above the highest\ncurrent price or to bid and buy below the minimum price.\n\n2128. If the reason for the increase is the accommodation of the sale\nitself to the purchaser, because he specially prizes the article, does\nit justify an increase above the market price?\n\n(a) If the article has become of greater value to many because of its\nown worth, the market value has also risen, and one may raise one\u2019s\nprice; but if its greater value to many is due only to public distress,\nas in time of war, it would be a cruel form of injustice known as\nprofiteering to raise the price exorbitantly.\n\n(b) If the article has become of greater value to one person only, the\nseller may not raise his price for that reason, since the special worth\nthe article has is not inherent in it, and hence it may not be sold by\nthe owner as if it were his own possession. If, however, the purchaser\nwished to add something as a free gift, there would be no objection to\nhis doing so. The same principles apply to the purchase of an article\nat less than its value, for the sole reason that ready money has\nspecial value for the seller.\n\n2129. Unjust Sales Based on Ignorance of Real Value.--There are also\ncases in which an object is purchased at an unjust price because its\ntrue value was unknown to the contractants or was hidden.\n\n(a) If the value was unknown on account of substantial error (e.g., a\nwoman buys paste ornaments, thinking they are genuine diamonds), the\ncontract is invalid; if it was unknown on account of the individual\nerror of a contractant (e.g., a woman buys a diamond of great value for\na few dollars, because the seller did not know the value of the jewel),\nthe contract is unjust; if it was unknown on account of public error\nreflected in the current price (e.g., an art dealer buys at a low price\na masterly painting, because his superior judgment enables him to\nrecognize in it qualities which others did not perceive), the contract\nis both valid and just. It is also lawful to buy at the present prices\nwhen one knows from sources that one can honorably use that the objects\npurchased will soon rise greatly in value, for one is not bound to\nshare with others one\u2019s personal knowledge.\n\n(b) If the hidden value is no man\u2019s property or is abandoned (e.g., a\nman buys a field in which he, but not the owner, knows that a treasure\nis concealed, or he buys a goose and finds gold pieces in its stomach\nand cannot discover how they got there), the buyer is entitled to\nacquisition; but if it has an owner who can be discovered (e.g., a man\nbuys a coat in a second-hand store and discovers a large quantity of\nmoney in bills sewed inside the lining, and is able to trace back the\ncoat to its former wearer, if he tries), the buyer is bound to\nrestitution.\n\n2130. Obligation of Restitution on Account of Unjust Prices.--(a)\nUnjust Possession.--If there was bad faith without fraud, the seller\nshould restore the difference between what he received and the highest\ncurrent price, the buyer the difference between what he paid and the\nlowest current price. Overcharges or underpayments in conventional\nprices should be compensated for according to a reasonable standard,\nsuch as the decision of the experts.\n\n(b) Unjust Damage.--If there was bad faith and fraud with resultant\ndamages to one of the parties, the losses should be made good, even\nthough the just price itself was not violated by excess or defect (see\n1762).\n\n(c) Nullity.--If there was good faith on both sides, there is no\nobligation of restoration, unless we suppose substantial error, lack of\nproper consent, conditional agreement, etc., which make the sale null\nor rescindable (see 1725).\n\n2131. Injustice Regarding the Thing Sold.--Having spoken of the\ninjustices committed in reference to the price, we shall now treat of\nthe injustices committed in reference to the thing sold. The contract\nsupposes that the thing sold be of a certain character, and hence\ninjustice is done if one of the parties wilfully misleads the other\nabout that character.\n\n(a) Thus, the species of the thing sold enters into the contract, and\nso it is unjust to deceive another person about the nature of the thing\nthat is being sold (e.g., if the seller gives inferior substitutes or\nadulterated goods to those who desire the genuine and pure article, or\nif the buyer deceives an inexperienced merchant into thinking that the\nhigh-grade clothing material he has for sale is low grade).\n\n(b) The quantity of the thing sold is also a part of the contract, and\nit is unjust to take advantage by giving less or taking more than is\nagreed on: \u201cThou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater\nand a less, neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel and a\nless\u201d (Deut., xxv. 13, 14).\n\n(c) The quality of the thing sold belongs to the contract, and hence\nthere is fraud if one of the parties deceives the other about it (e.g.,\nif the horse sold is sickly or slow, when he is supposed to be healthy\nand speedy).\n\n2132. Defects in the Thing Sold.--If there are defects in an article\nsold, but a fair reduction in the price is made on account of the\nimperfection of the article, there is no injustice in the price. But\nthe seller is unjust, nevertheless, if he conceals the defects in spite\nof a contrary condition in the contract, for he injures the buyer by\nleading him into an agreement against his will.\n\n(a) There is an indicated condition when the buyer inquires whether\nthere are defects in the article, having the intention to take nothing\nthat has any considerable defect. In such a case if the seller conceals\neven an accidental defect (i.e., one that makes the article less\nsuitable for the buyer), the contract is null on account of lack of\nconsent, or at least, as others think, it is rescindable on account of\nthe fraud practised. But if a defect is inconsiderable, the contract,\nunless it is expressly stipulated to the contrary, is good and lawful,\nfor there is hardly anything that has not some small defects.\n\n(b) There is an implied condition when the buyer makes no inquiry, but\nthere is a substantial defect (i.e., one that makes the article\ndangerous or unsuitable for the purchaser), and this defect is hidden,\neither because it is of a kind that would escape most persons, or\nbecause the purchaser is inexperienced or unable to perceive it for\nhimself. Since every person who buys intends to get something useful,\nthere is no consent and the contract is invalid, if one is given\nsomething harmful (e.g., corrupted or poisonous food instead of good\nfood), or something entirely useless to him either for service or for\nsale (e.g., a lame horse instead of a sound horse for one who deals in\nrace-horses).\n\n2133. Circumstances in Which Defects Need Not Be Revealed.--Fairness of\nprice being supposed, the seller is not unjust in not calling attention\nto defects in the thing he sells, if the buyer does not ask about\ndefects and there is no implied condition that the seller should\nvolunteer the information. This happens as follows:\n\n(a) if the defect is hidden, but only accidental, there is no condition\nthat the seller shall point out the defect, for the understanding is\nonly that the buyer shall receive something serviceable at a fair\nreturn for his money, Nevertheless, most merchants wish to please the\npublic and will take back or exchange an article that is not\nsatisfactory;\n\n(b) if the defect is open, but accidental, there is no condition that\nthe seller shall instruct the buyer about things that the latter can\nand should observe for himself; for it is supposed that the buyer will\nexercise ordinary care and prudence in making purchases, nor is the\nseller paid for supplying this, nor for assisting the buyer to make\ngood bargains. Thus, if a man were to buy a one-eyed horse, because he\nhad not examined the horse, he should blame his own negligence, not the\nsilence of the seller, for his bad bargain.\n\n2134. Definition of Trading.--Trading (_negotiatio_) in the strict\nsense is the purchase of an object with the intention of selling it\nunchanged at a profit. If any one of the conditions mentioned in this\ndefinition are lacking, there is trading in a wide sense. (a) Thus,\ntrading includes purchase, and hence he who sells the produce of his\nown farm or vineyard is not strictly a trader; (b) there must be an\nintention of reselling the thing bought, and hence there is trading\nonly in a wide sense if one buys an article for one\u2019s own use but,\nfinding it unsuitable to that use, sells it to another person; (c) the\nobject must be sold unchanged, that is, in the same form in which it\nwas received, otherwise there is not strict negotiation, as when one\nbuys colors and canvas and makes them into a picture; (d) the object\nmust be sold at a higher price than was paid for it, and hence it is\nnot trading in the strict sense to let a customer have an article for\njust what it has cost oneself.\n\n2135. The Morality of Trading in the Strict Sense.--(a) In itself,\ntrading has the appearance of evil, inasmuch as money-making may be an\nencouragement to avarice. But in reality profit as an end is morally\nindifferent, neither good nor bad, and all will depend on the ultimate\nreason for which one engages in business. He who makes the whole\npurpose of his existence the acquisition of gain is a materialist, but\nhe who has some higher end, such as public benefit or private\nmaintenance, is virtuous in his aims. (b) For clerics, trading is\nforbidden by Canon Law (Canon 142), and the reason is that clerics\nshould be free from the distractions and dangers of commerce, so as to\ndevote themselves entirely to their own spiritual duties (II Tim., ii.\n4).\n\n2136. Usury.--The sin of usury is committed in two ways.\n\n(a) Usury in the strict sense is the taking of interest by reason of\nintrinsic title (i.e., on account of the use) for money or other\nfungible loaned on condition that it be restored in kind (_mutuum_).\nThis is unjust since it exacts payment for that which is nonexistent,\nthat is, for use, as a distinct value, of a fungible whose only value\nis in its use (see Aristotle, _Politics_, Bk. I, Ch. 10, 1258b 2-8; St.\nThomas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 78, a. 1). This was the opinion of\nmost medieval theologians based on the fact that money was solely a\nmedium of exchange. Interest was permitted, however, on the grounds of\nextrinsic titles, e.g., compensation for the expense of a transaction\n(_damnum emergens_), the loss of opportunity to make good bargains\n(_lucrum cessans_).\n\n(b) Usury in the wide sense, which is all too common, is the taking of\ninterest for a fungible loaned at _mutuum_, where there is an extrinsic\ntitle (e.g., the loss or inconvenience suffered by the lender) for the\ninterest, but the rate charged is unjust, exceeding that fixed by law\nor that which is fair and reasonable (see Canon 1543). This is unjust\nwhen the lender takes more than his loan is worth; it is uncharitable\nwhen the lender does not demand more than the worth of his loan, but\ndoes exact what is due in a heartless manner. Examples of usury in the\nwide sense are the acts of loan sharks who take advantage of the\ndistress of the poor to make them pay enormous interest for small\nloans, or who hold the debtor to the strict letter of the agreement at\na great loss to him.\n\nIn recent years a new concept of usury in the wide sense has emerged.\nIt is based upon the fact that in modern times the function of money\nhas changed. In ancient times it was solely a medium or measure of\nexchange that could not be turned easily into capital. With the\nemergence of the capitalistic system, opportunities for investment\nincreased, and money assumed the role of a factor of production. Money\nassumed a new value and function: it became virtually productive, and\nso today money does fructify. To place money, then, at the disposal of\nanother to be employed in profitable ventures constitutes an economic\nservice and, as such, is worth its price as any other service. This\nprice of money constitutes modern interest, which seems to differ\nradically from the old contract of interest and to be more one of hire\nor lease. So viewed, interest, or the price of money, is determined in\nthe same way as the price of any other service; the unjust price, or\nusury, is an excessive price. This is the modern concept of usury.\n\n2137. Principles Obligatory in All Forms of Contract.--The principles\nof equality and honesty that are morally obligatory in sales and loans\nat interest are also obligatory in other forms of contract. The\nfollowing are examples of equality.\n\n(a) Gratuitous Contracts.--Obviously these contracts do not require\nequality in respect to recompense, since their nature is that no\nrecompense is given for what is received. But in other ways equality\nmust be observed. Thus, there must be mutual consent, offer on one side\nand acceptance on the other; there must be mutual respect, for each\nmust honor the gratuitous promises made to the other; there must be a\nreturn of the same thing in quality and quantity as was borrowed,\nunless this would mean (as in _mutuum_) a loss to the borrower, etc.\nMoreover, the fact that all the advantage is received by one party is\nbalanced by the fact that this party must bear the ordinary expenses\nand is held to special care himself, but cannot exact special care in\nthe other party. Thus, a borrower has all the advantage from a loan,\nand he is obliged to use extreme care in using the lender\u2019s property,\nwhile a depositor has all the advantage from the contract of deposit\nand cannot demand more than ordinary diligence of the depositary in\nguarding the goods left with him.\n\n(b) Aleatory Contracts.--Aleatory contracts, or contracts of chance,\nare concerned with some uncertain event whose outcome depends upon luck\nor skill or a combination of both. The chief forms are betting, lottery\nand gaming (all are considered as gambling), to which must be added\ninsurance and market speculations. All of these are indifferent in\nthemselves and obtain their morality from circumstances. However,\ngambling, besides conforming to the requirements of contracts in\ngeneral, must observe some special conditions to guarantee its\nlawfulness:\n\n1) The outcome should be objectively uncertain and not a \u201csure thing\u201d\nto be truly a contract of chance. While the contractants may be\nsubjectively certain of winning, neither may so manipulate the matter\nas to exclude the other\u2019s chance of winning. Should one insist upon\nbetting against another\u2019s assurance of a certain outcome, he is making\na gift, hardly a bet.\n\n2) Each must stake what belongs to himself and is not needed for\nsatisfying other obligations, e.g., supporting one\u2019s family, paying\ncreditors, etc. Failure to observe this condition leads to many sins of\ntheft or negligence. Should a person gamble with money belonging to\nanother, _per se_ he has a right to the winnings under the title of\nindustrial fruits. However, if it would be impossible for him to\nrestore in the event of a loss, the wager is void and the winnings must\nbe restored to the other player, since the amount bet could not be\nlawfully won by the other contestant.\n\n3) A reasonable proportion should be observed between what is bet and\nthe probable winnings, and all betting should offer a fair chance of\nwinning. Equality is not necessary, but odds and handicaps should be\noffered by the favored side. However, the odds may be waived by other\nbettors.\n\n4) Honesty must prevail to exclude fixing the outcome or an unlawful\nstyle of play. The conventions of each bet or game establish the norms\nof cheating. Thus, hidden cards, marked cards, false dice void a bet.\nBut running a horse solely to \u201ctighten him\u201d or \u201cround him into shape\u201d\nwithout full effort to win is expected in horse racing. Winnings\nthrough cheating must be refunded.\n\n5) The loser must pay. Since civil law forbids many forms of organized\ngambling, the question arises whether a wager that has been outlawed\nconstitutes matter for a valid contract that must be fulfilled. If the\nlaw is purely penal, the contract is valid and the obligations ensue;\nif it is a law that binds morally, then the contract is invalid, and\nthe loser probably need not pay, but has acted sinfully in gambling.\n\nAlthough not sinful in itself, gambling is so open to serious abuse\nthat it has been strictly regulated by civil laws which bind in\nconscience.\n\nInsurance is reduced to the category of contracts of chance, although\nits purpose is different from gambling, for it is concerned not with an\nuncertain good, i.e., to make money quickly, but with an uncertain evil,\ni.e., to avoid loss. In many instances an individual who does not take\nout insurance gambles more than one who does.\n\nConditions Requisite for Validity. The special conditions requisite for\nthe validity of an insurance contract are founded upon its aleatory\nnature. This involves especially that the matter of the contract is in\nsome way outside the control of both insured and insurer and beyond\ntheir power, both legal and moral, to govern beforehand. From this\nfollows the second essential condition, that there be some risk for\nboth parties. Some moralists today maintain that many insurance\ncontracts are unjust to the insured by reason of defect of\nproportionate risk on the part of the insurer. They argue that the\ninsurer avoids all risks and makes increasing profits annually whenever\ninsurance is on such a large scale that the use of statistical tables\nfavors the insurer. The fact that insurance companies are listed among\nthe most wealthy corporations lends credence to the argument and\nexplains why some moralists favor the insured in cases of restitution\nnot involving fraud on the part of the beneficiary. Other moralists\ninsist that such injustice can not be proved, that high profits are\nowing to increased efficiency and better service, that premiums are\nadjusted when it becomes apparent that they are out of proportion to\nthe risks involved by the insurers.\n\nOn the part of the insurer is required the ability to pay indemnities\noccurring at the normal rate, but not to cover all at once. His right\nto the premiums is correlative to the obligation to pay the stipulated\nindemnities, while his liabilities are based upon probable losses\noccurring successively. In regard to the insured, his basic obligation\nis to make an honest and complete disclosure of the risk involved.\nMoral cases, for the most part, are concerned with error, innocent\nmisrepresentation, and fraud on the part of the insured. Both the\nnatural and civil law indicate the effect of these elements on an\ninsurance contract.\n\nThe natural law invalidates a contract in which consent of one or both\nparties arises from substantial error concerning the nature or the\nmatter of the contract--in insurance, the risk involved. In general,\nthen, whenever the error of the insured is such that he would not have\ncontracted had he known the facts, the contract is invalid, even if the\nerror was due to innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation on the\npart of the insured. In such cases, the innocent insured has no right\nto the indemnity owing to the invalidity of the contract; he has,\nhowever, a natural right to all premiums paid out, since no contract is\ninvolved and the insurer has no claim to them. In case of fraud, at\nleast after judicial decision, the insured would have no right to the\npremiums and must also recompense the insurer for expenses sustained.\n\nError is considered accidental and as not invalidating in natural law\nwhen the insurer, knowing the facts, would have issued a policy, but at\na higher premium. In this case the beneficiary may accept the\nindemnity, but must return the difference in the amount owed in\npremiums.\n\nA special case of substantial error involving a disease unknown to the\ninsured and undiscovered or undiscoverable by the insurance company\ndoctors is considered by moralists as not invalidating a contract in\nnatural law. It is argued that the insurer must assume such risks and\nthat the insured intends to cover such unknown conditions. Moreover, an\ninvalidating clause concerning such a contingency may be considered\npenal in nature and obligatory only after the sentence of a judge.\n\nInsurance contracts and the civil laws governing them are so\ncomplicated that expert legal knowledge is required to understand the\nlegal status of many insurance cases. However, a few dispositions of\nthe civil law which differ from the tenets of the natural law should be\nkept in mind by the priest or confessor in dealing with the matters.\nTwo favor the insurance companies over the insured:\n\n1) when fraud or misrepresentation lead to accidental error, the\ncontract is declared void or voidable;\n\n2) innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation in good faith leading\nto accidental error also render the insurance contract voidable or\nperhaps even void. It is probable that the beneficiary in such cases\nmight be permitted to claim the benefits due him according to the\nnaturally valid contract, since these civil law dispositions are\ncontrary to the conclusions of the natural law. He would be obliged,\nhowever, to restitution for damages caused by his fraud or\nmisrepresentation committed with grave theological fault.\n\nOne prescription recognized by civil law and in some places made\nmandatory favors the insured, the convalidating or incontestability\nclause. The insurance company recognizes the validity of the policy\nafter a specified period of time has elapsed, even in cases involving\nfraud on the part of the insured. If the contract prior to the time was\nvoidable, the company loses its right to contest its validity; if the\ncontract was void, it becomes convalidated. By terms of this clause,\nthe natural-law obligation to restore by reason of fraud ceases and the\nbeneficiary may lawfully keep the insurance money.\n\nObligations Arising after the Policy Is Issued. 1) The insured must pay\nthe premiums at the times and according to the terms stated in the\npolicy.\n\n2) The insured must not increase the risk assumed by the company.\nConcretely, in cases of property insured, the insured is bound in\ncommutative justice not to deliberately destroy or damage the property\ncovered by the policy under penalty of losing all rights to\ncompensation. Compensation could be claimed, however, if the damaging\nor destructive action was only theologically right.\n\n3) He must not claim or accept indemnity for articles not damaged; he\nmust not submit a claim beyond a just estimate of the real damage. Some\nmoralists maintain that a claim may be made for a higher amount with\nthe intention of getting a just value after the insurance adjustor has\nmade his investigation and lowered the estimated value. The adjustor\u2019s\nestimate, even if higher than the insured estimate, may be accepted\nprovided no means have been taken to prevent a full and free\nexamination of damage.\n\nOperations on the stock market and similar markets are primarily\ncontracts of buying and selling; they become contracts of chance when\nthey assume the quality of speculation, i.e., gambling on future\nchanges of prices. It is generally conceded that such contracts are not\nmorally wrong in themselves and follow the laws of betting. Additional\njustification is added on the ground that such transactions in many\ninstances supply the capital required for large-scale operations,\nfuture deliveries, etc. Occasional dissenting voices insist that\ncertain aspects of such transactions, e.g., dealing in future values of\nwheat, rye, and other commodities, are immoral since they tend to\ndetermine prices independent of the real value of the products, the\nlaws of supply and demand, etc. However, the arguments seem to involve\nmore abuses controllable, if not actually controlled, by marketing laws\nand civil laws rather than any immorality in the operations themselves.\n\n(c) Onerous Contracts.--These contracts require that there be equality\nbetween the recompense and the thing received. Thus, in a lease the\nlessor must not charge excessive rent, and the lessee must pay the rent\nfaithfully; in a contract of labor, the employer must pay a fair wage\n(that is, one that at the minimum will meet the primary needs of the\nworker and his family to live in frugal comfort, and which will\nmoreover equal the special value of the service given; for a complete\ntreatment of the theology of the just wage, see Fr. Jeremiah Newman,\n\u201cThe Just Wage,\u201d _Theology Digest_, Vol. 2, Spring 1957, pp. 120-126,\nand \u201cA Note on the Living Wage,\u201d by Edward Dui, S.J., in the same\nissue), and the laborer on his part must give a fair day\u2019s work as to\nquantity and quality; in partnership, the members must divide the\nprofits and loss according to a reasonable distribution; in guaranty,\npledge, and mortgage, justice requires that the burden assumed be not\nout of proportion to the benefit that is received.\n\n2138. Fraudulent Contracts.--Examples of fraud in contracts are the\nfollowing:\n\n(a) in gratuitous contracts, a donee who by false representations\nobtains a gift, a lender who fails to make known to the borrower\ndefects or dangers in the thing loaned;\n\n(b) in onerous contracts, a landlord who conceals defects from one who\nis renting a house, members of a business concern who keep back\ninformation from partners or who give out false statements in order to\nentice investors, creditors who conceal their knowledge about the\nunreliability of a man for whom surety is given them;\n\n(c) in aleatory contracts, in a pure wager, a person who bets on a\nthing supposed to be uncertain but about which he has certain\ninformation, or who knows that he will be unable to pay should he lose,\nor who will allow no odds though he knows that the probabilities are in\nhis favor; in gaming, a player who pretends to be ignorant in order to\ninveigle another person into a game of skill, or who does not observe\nthe rules of the game, or who fixes the cards or dice for himself in a\ngame of chance; in lottery, a drawer who manipulates the lots so as to\nfavor some of the players, etc.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 5: THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE\nOF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 79-100.)\n\n2139. The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice.--The integral parts of a\nvirtue are certain functions necessary for the perfect use of the\nvirtue; for example, memory, perception, docility and quickness are\nneeded for the fullest exercise of prudence (see 1648 sqq.). These\nparts are called here \u201cquasi-integral,\u201d so as not to be confused with\nthe properly integral parts, or divisions of quantity, in a material\ncomposite. In its first use \u201cintegral part\u201d is spoken of bodily things;\nin its derived use of incorporeal things (such as virtues). The two\nprevious articles treated the subjective parts of justice; the present\narticle will begin with a consideration of the integral parts and the\nopposite sins.\n\n2140. The integral parts of justice are expressed in the words of Psalm\nxxxiii. 15--\u201cTurn away from evil, and do good\u201d--for the perfectly just\nman will both establish the equality of justice by giving others their\ndues, and will preserve that equality by refraining from injuries.\n\n(a) Thus, these integral parts are acts of virtue, and hence the\navoidance of evil here is not a purely negative attitude; it includes a\npositive repudiation by the will of all wish to harm others, and it is\nexercised especially when one is attacked and yet refuses to resort to\ninjustice.\n\n(b) These integral parts of justice are also distinct, one from the\nother. The other moral virtues regulate the passions by bringing them\nto the moderation that lies midway between two evil extremes, and hence\nin respect to those virtues to turn away from evil is the same thing as\nto do good. But justice regulates human operations and external things\nboth by reducing them to due equality and also by avoiding that which\nupsets the equality, and thus in the matter of justice it is one thing\nto do good, another thing to avoid evil.\n\n(c) These integral parts of justice are also special, that is, they are\ndistinct from other virtues. For, while every virtue turns away from\nevil and does good, the two acts we are now considering do these things\nwith the express purpose of fulfilling justice. Thus, he who observes\nthe commands and prohibitions of the law in order to render to God and\nthe common good their dues, is perfect in general or legal justice; he\nwho gives to other individuals what is owed them and also avoids doing\nthem injury, is perfect in particular justice. To the two integral\nparts of justice are opposed the two sins of transgression and omission\n(see 35-39).\n\n2141. The Potential Parts of Justice.--The potential parts of justice,\nthat is, its annexed virtues, are those good habits that are subsidiary\nto justice, partaking in some degree, but not entirely, of its nature\nor activity. We saw above (1664 sqq.) that wise deliberation and wise\ndecision belong to prudence, inasmuch as they are concerned with the\ngovernment of conduct by reason, but that they fall short of its\nprincipal act, which is wise direction, and hence they are counted as\npotential parts. In like manner, there are a number of virtues which\nmust be assigned to justice, since they regulate man\u2019s will towards\nothers, but which must be considered as its potential parts, because\nthey do not share in one or the other of the two remaining essential\nnotes of strict justice, namely, that a return is given which is equal\nto a debt, and that the debt is owed on account of a strict or legal\nright (see 1692).\n\n2142. In the following enumeration are given the chief potential parts\nof justice in which there is a strict debt, but not an equal repayment.\n\n(a) Thus, to God man owes whatever honor and veneration he manifests,\nbut with all his efforts man can never pay to God a worship that is\nequal to the debt. Thus, man cannot sufficiently thank God for His\nbenefits: \u201cWhat return can I make to the Lord for all that He has done\nfor me?\u201d (Psalm cxv. 12). The virtue of religion, therefore, is a\npotential part of justice.\n\n(b) To parents children cannot make a full return for the benefits of\nlife and upbringing, and the same may be said of one\u2019s country: \u201cA due\nreturn is out of the question in honors paid to the gods and to parents\n... but a person is considered to be virtuous if he pays such regard\nas lies within his power\u201d (Aristotle, _Ethics_, lib. VIII, cap. 16).\nHence, the virtue of piety is also a potential part of justice. In\nexceptional cases, however, a child may make an equal or even a greater\nreturn to his parents for the benefits received from them; for example,\nby saving his father from death he makes an equal return for the\nbenefit of life, and by converting his parents to the faith he gives\nthem spiritual life, which is more valuable than the natural life he\nreceived from them.\n\n(c) To men of virtue we are unable to make a sufficient return for the\ngood they do us by their instruction and example, and hence the honor\nwe show them is less than the benefit we receive from them. The virtue\nof reverence (_observantia_) is then a potential part of justice.\n\n2143. Degrees of Moral Debt.--The remaining potential parts of justice\nare those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some\nlaw, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the\ngreater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.\n\n(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one\ncannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the\ncharacter of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from\nthe side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and\ndeeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue\nof truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor\nto whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him\nfor his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of\ngratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are\nreadily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular\njustice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on\nthe witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions\nhas a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social\nintercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral\nobligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation\nfor services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the\ndebtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other\nbenefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account\nof ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an\nact of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private\nperson in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but\nlawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.\n\n(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can\npreserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of\nvirtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or\naffability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and\nto make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because\nof any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better\nfor this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all.\nLikewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to\nmoney and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to\nothers willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the\npeace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with\nthem it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and\ndistinction.\n\n2144. Epieikeia.--The above-mentioned potential parts of justice are\nadjuncts of particular justice. There remains one more virtue to be\nnoted, that of epieikeia or equity, which pertains to legal justice.\nThis is a subjective part of justice, since it is the superior function\nof legal justice, guiding it to follow what is substantial right, and\npreserving it from the danger of mere legalism or over-strict\ninterpretation or application of Written law (see 358). With this, the\ncrowning virtue of justice, the enumeration of its parts is brought to\na close.\n\n2145. The Virtue of Religion.--We shall now proceed to treat of the\nvarious parts of justice in the order in which they were given above\n(2142-2144), beginning with the virtue that renders to God His due.\nReligion (holiness) is defined as \u201ca moral virtue that disposes us to\noffer to God the worship and honor that belong to Him as the supreme\nAuthor of all things.\u201d\n\n(a) Thus, religion is a moral virtue, for, though it tends towards God,\nit is not numbered among the theological virtues, but among the moral\nvirtues, being one of the potential parts of justice.\n\n(b) It is an inclination, that is, it is a habit of the soul or the\nexercise of that habit in some act. The acts of religion are either\nelicited by it or commanded by it, according as they are its own proper\nactivities and proceed directly from it and are directed immediately to\nGod (e.g., acts of adoration, sacrifice, prayer), or belong to some\nother virtue employed by religion for the honor of God; for example, to\nvisit the widows and orphans in their tribulation is an act of mercy,\nto keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of temperance, but\nwhen used for the honor and glory of God these acts are also acts of\nreligion (James, i. 27).\n\n(e) It is paid to God, that is, being an act of justice, it renders to\nanother what is His due. Religious honor given the saints or sacred\nimages refers to God, for whose sake they are venerated.\n\n(d) It is paid to God as the Supreme Being, that is, just as we are\nbound to tend to God and to serve Him, because He is our Last End, so\nare we bound to honor Him, because He is our Maker and Ruler.\n\n(e) It offers to God the tribute of worship, that is, some internal or\nexternal work done in acknowledgment of God\u2019s Majesty and with the\npurpose of impressing the worshipper or others with the sense of His\ngreatness, or it is the sense of that greatness.\n\n2146. Religion as a Moral Virtue.--(a) Religion takes its rank among\nthe moral, not among the theological, virtues. A theological virtue has\nthe Last End for its immediate object or subject-matter (e.g., faith is\nconcerned directly with God, since it believes Him and in Him), and has\nno mean of virtue (e.g., faith cannot go to extremes by believing God\ntoo much); whereas a moral virtue has the means to God for its\nimmediate object (e.g., justice is concerned directly with the actions\nwe owe to others) and it must observe the golden mean (e.g., justice\nmust pay the just price, neither more nor less, and at the proper time,\nplace, and to the proper person, etc.). Now, it is clear that religion\nhas for its immediate object the due performance of worship, although\nGod is the person for whose sake it is offered and His excellence the\nfoundation of its necessity; and also that one must observe moderation\nin worship as to circumstances of place, time, etc., although it is\nimpossible to be extreme in the quantity or fervor one gives to\nworship, since even the best efforts will fall short of the honor God\ndeserves (Ecclus., xliii. 33).\n\n(b) Religion is the greatest of the moral virtues, since the person in\nwhose favor it is exercised is God Himself, and its obligation is\ncorrespondingly stricter than that of the other virtues. General and\nparticular justice are owed to creatures, but the claim of a creature\nis much less than that of God. There is no contradiction in making\nreligion a part of justice and then preferring it to justice, for it is\nmore correct to speak of the integral and potential parts of virtues as\nquasi-parts, since they are called parts only from analogy to parts\nthat are found in material or living things, though they are not\nsimilar to those parts in all respects (see 1647, 1648, 2139). Neither\ndoes the fact that religion cannot pay in full make it inferior to\njustice, since in matters of virtue good will take precedence over the\nability to pay. Since religion is the supreme moral virtue, irreligion\nis the chief offense against the moral virtues (e.g., malicious\nblasphemy is worse than injustice or intemperance).\n\n2147. Superiority of Religion as a Virtue.--Religion, therefore, is\nsuperior to the following virtues: (a) it is superior to legal justice,\nthe chief of the moral virtues that deal with human and natural good;\n(b) it is superior to humility, the chief of the moral virtues\nmoderative of the passions; (c) it is superior to mercy, the greatest\nof the virtues that relieve distress, for religion is offered to God,\nnot for His utility, but for His external glory and our benefit; (d) it\nis greater than repentance, for it honors God, while repentance only\ndisposes or prepares for satisfaction to His honor; (e) it is greater\nthan large external offerings made to God without spirit, for\n\u201cobedience is better than victims\u201d (I Kings, xv. 22); that is, the\ninternal acts of religion (reverence and devotion) are of more\nimportance than external acts of worship conducted with great pomp or\nmagnificence but without the inner reverence, the obedience or other\ndispositions pleasing to God.\n\n2148. Necessity of the Acts of Religion.--(a) The internal acts\n(devotion and prayer) are chiefly necessary, for these are exercised by\nthe soul, and it is through them that the external acts are made\ntruthful: \u201cGod is a spirit and those who adore Him must adore in spirit\nand in truth\u201d (John, iv. 24).\n\n(b) The external acts (adoration, sacrifice, etc.) are also necessary\nto man. God does not need these acts (Psalm xlix. 13), it is true, for\nno creature can add to the glory God has from Himself. But man needs\nthe elevation and perfection which he receives from communication with\nthe Supreme Being, and, as he is not all spirit, he must employ symbols\nand ceremonies to arouse, hold and strengthen the affections of his\nsoul. Hence, although the ceremonial law of the Old Testament was\nabolished by Christ (see 342), the Christian religion recognizes the\nneed of ceremonies, as is plain both from the Scriptures and the\nteaching and practice of the Church at all times. In the New Testament\nwe read that Our Lord used vocal prayer, prayed on His knees, and made\nuse of sacred hymns; and like external acts of religion are ascribed to\nSts. Peter, Paul, and Stephen (Luke, xxii. 31; Matt., xxvi. 39; Acts,\nii. 42, vii. 59, ix. 40). Public worship is also a necessity on account\nof the nature of the Church as a visible society.\n\n2149. The Internal Acts of Religion.--These internal acts are offerings\nmade to God of the worship of the soul itself, and they may be reduced\nchiefly to two: (a) devotion, which is the offering of the will and the\nhighest act of religion, since from the will the other acts arise; (b)\nprayer, which is the offering of the intellect; for in prayer the\nthoughts of the mind rise to God as an oblation made to Him.\n\n2150. Definition of Devotion.--Devotion is defined as \u201cthe will to give\noneself readily to those things that pertain to the divine service.\u201d We\nfind an example of it in Exod., xxxv. 21, where it is said that the\nmultitude offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout\nmind. One who is devoted to another is strongly attached to that\nother\u2019s interests, and so one who is devout is zealous for the service\nof God.\n\n(a) Thus, devotion is an act of the will, that is, an offering of\noneself to the service of God, the Last End. But devotion will be found\nin other acts in so far as they are done under the will\u2019s impulse, such\nas prayer, adoration, sacrifice. The looks, gestures, and voice of\nthose who pray or take part in services of divine worship are\ninfluenced by internal devotion, and so become fitting expressions of\nhonor shown to God and an inspiration to beholders.\n\n(b) Devotion contains a ready willingness, that is, the devout person\nis quick to choose the divine honor as a purpose, quick also to select\nand to employ suitable means for this purpose. The great model of this\nis Our Lord, who declared that His very food was to serve His Father\n(John, iv. 34).\n\n(c) Devotion is exercised in things that pertain to the divine service,\nthat is, to the worship or honor of God. Thus, he who offers himself to\nGod intending the offering as an act of spiritual union or friendship\nexercises the virtue of charity, while he who forms the intention of\ndoing good in order to glorify God exercises devotion. But devotion and\ncharity are not separated, for charity inspires devotion and devotion\nnourishes charity.\n\n2151. Devotion should not be confused with emotion, spiritual\nconsolation, or pious exercises known as devotions.\n\n(a) Thus, emotion or pleasure of a non-religious kind is not devotion,\nthough sometimes mistaken for it when the emotion or pleasure is of an\nelevating kind and occasioned by religious exercises. Neither esthetic\njoy (e.g., over the music, the ceremonies, the architecture of the\nchurch), nor literary pleasure (e.g. over a sublime passage of Holy\nWrit or a charming liturgical composition), nor intellectual\nsatisfaction (e.g., over the refinement and culture imparted by\nreligious truths), is necessarily joined with that strong attachment to\nGod and inclination to do His will which is the soul of devotion.\n\n(b) Spiritual consolations are sometimes called devotion, but they are\nnot the same thing as the devotion we now speak of. Substantial\ndevotion with which we are now concerned is in the will and consists in\nthe strong inclination to praise and honor God, whereas accidental\ndevotion is rather in the sensible appetite and consists in a feeling\nof sweetness or elevation in exercises of piety which sometimes reacts\nupon the body, as when a devout person weeps for joy at the thought of\nGod. Substantial devotion is essential and should be maintained, even\nthough there is no feeling of attraction or fervor. An example of this\nis furnished by Our Lord, who prayed earnestly during the agony in the\ngarden and the desolation on the cross. Accidental devotion is not of\nitself evil, nor useless, and it may be desired and prayed for; but it\nis dangerous for those persons who are puffed up by it, or who become\ninordinately attached to it, or who are disposed to mistake it for\nsubstantial devotion, for, like the consoling vision of Thabor, it is\npassing and is not an end in itself.\n\n(c) Devotions are various forms of external cult shown to God, Christ,\nthe Blessed Virgin, the Saints, celebrated shrines, etc., whether of a\nliturgical or a popular, of a public or a private kind. Examples are\nthe Forty Hours\u2019 Devotion, novenas, consecrated days and months, the\nuse of scapulars, medals, etc., pilgrimages, and the like. All these\ndevotions that have the approval of the Church are good and useful in\nthemselves. But devotees often made a bad use of them, substituting\ndevotions for devotion and the non-essential for the essential, as when\nreligion is made to center in pictures or music or a sentimental\nattachment for some favorite Saint. Persons who multiply external\nobservances may be without the least degree of real devotion.\n\n2152. External and Internal Cause of Devotion.--The external cause of\ndevotion is God, who by grace bestows the will of serving Him gladly,\nand therefore the Church prays God to bestow upon us the disposition of\npiety and devotion, and to increase in us devotion unto salvation. But\nthere is also an internal cause, namely, mental prayer or consideration\nof divine things, for the will follows on the intellect. Hence, it is\nimpossible to animate external acts of worship with true devotion,\nunless one practises daily or frequent mental prayer. The subjects of\nmental prayer that promote devotion are reducible to two:\n\n(a) one should think on one\u2019s own weakness (sins, dangers, temptations,\netc.) and one\u2019s need of God, for this serves to remove the impediments\nto devotion. Those who would be devoted to God must free themselves\nfrom presumption and self-confidence in the spirit of the pilgrim going\nup to the Temple who said; \u201cI will raise my eyes to the mountains from\nwhich help cometh to me\u201d (Psalm cxx, 1);\n\n(b) one should think on points that will excite the love of God, such\nas the thought of His goodness, the memory of His benefits, the\nmysteries of the life of Christ; for these considerations by inspiring\ncharity will thereby indirectly introduce devotion to God. \u201cIt is good\nfor me to cling fast to God and to place my hope in the Lord,\u201d said the\nPsalmist, after he had thought over the blessings received from\nProvidence (Psalm lxxii. 28).\n\n2153. Prayer.--Prayer can be taken in various senses. (a) Thus, in the\nwidest sense prayer is any act of religion or a holy life. St.\nAugustine says that a good life is the best of all prayers, and the\ncommand of Christ that we pray always has been understood to mean that\nwe should always follow good. (b) In a less wide sense, prayer is the\nraising of the mind to God, in order to praise, adore, thank Him, etc.\nThe motive of veneration here present distinguishes prayer from mere\nthoughts about God as when one studies or discusses theological\nsubjects to satisfy curiosity or to impart information.\n\n(c) In its strict sense, prayer is the asking for suitable things from\nGod. By suitable things are meant such as are lawful and becoming, and\nhence it would not be a prayer, but a mockery, to ask God for help to\naccomplish sin or for miracles in trivial matters. We are now\nconsidering prayer in its strict and less wide senses.\n\n2154. The Psychology of Prayer.--(a) Prayer in its nature is an act of\nthe reason, for it is a conversation or communication with God. It\nbelongs, however, not to the speculative, but to the practical reason,\nsince it is not a mere process of apprehension, judgment or reasoning,\nbut the arrangement and presentation of requests, plans, etc., before\nGod with a view to their acceptance by Him. By prayer, then, we do not\nunderstand thinking on God, as in meditation and contemplation (though\nthese are known as mental prayer), but speaking to God.\n\n(b) Prayer in its origin is an act of the will, for the practical\nreason presents before God only such things as are desired by him who\nprays. Prayer is the interpreter of desire. Indeed, God may take the\nwill for the request and grant what has not yet been asked: \u201cThe Lord\nheard the desire of the poor\u201d (Ps. ix. 17); \u201cBefore they cry I shall\nhear them\u201d (Is., lxv. 24). Moreover, prayer should spring out of an\ninclination towards God Himself and a desire for union with Him (Ps.\nxli. 1. 2; Ps. xxvi. 4).\n\n2155. The Necessity of Prayer.--(a) Prayer is not necessary on God\u2019s\naccount, as though He needed to be informed of our wants, or could not\nbe happy without our homage, or might be induced to change His plans;\n(b) it is necessary for our own sakes, for, although God could and\nsometimes does grant favors unasked, He wishes that ordinarily we\nshould have the double benefit of the prayer and of the favor given in\nanswer to the prayer. God could grant the crops of the fields without\nhuman cultivation, or even tools and finished articles without human\ninvention or labor, but man would then lose the fruits that belong to\nlabor of mind and body. Prayer is most beneficial, even when\nunanswered: it attracts man to perform his basic duty of honoring his\nCreator, to keep in use his spiritual powers, and to exercise the\nnecessary virtues of faith, hope and charity; it gives him the\nprivilege of speaking directly with God and with Christ and of asking\nfor what he desires--an intimacy that must in time correct and elevate\nman\u2019s whole spiritual life; then prayer is a pouring out of the heart\nto God the Heavenly Father, and this will afford relief in times of\nmisfortune or peril.\n\n2156. The Duty of Prayer for all Adults.--(a) Prayer is necessary from\ndivine precept, as is declared in many passages of Scripture. Thus, we\nare commanded to watch and pray (Matt, xxvi. 41), to pray always and\nnot to faint (Luke, xviii. 1), to ask and to knock (Matt., vii. 7\nsqq.), to pray without ceasing (I Thess., v. 17), to watch in prayers\n(I Peter, iv. 7). In the Mass the Lord\u2019s Prayer is prefaced with the\nwords: \u201cCommanded by salutary precepts and admonished by divine\ninstructions, we make bold to say: Our Father, etc.\u201d There is, however,\nno divine precept of vocal prayer or as to the use of the form of words\ngiven by Christ, but one must pray at least mentally and in the manner\nindicated by Christ.\n\n(b) Prayer is also necessary as a means (see 360), at least generally\nspeaking; not that God could not save man without prayer, but that He\nhas made it an indispensable condition, as is true also of Baptism,\nwithout which salvation is not conferred. This is the common opinion\nand it rests on strong arguments. Thus, there are certain necessary\ngoods (such as perseverance) that cannot be had except through prayer,\nand there are certain necessary duties (such as the acts of faith,\ncharity, and religion) that are not exercised apart from prayer. Then,\nthere is the teaching of the Church and of the Fathers and Doctors that\nprayer is needed in order to observe the Commandments (Council of\nTrent), that no one is assisted who does not pray (Gennadius), that\nprayer is to the soul what breath is to the body (St. Benedict), that\nhe who prays will certainly be saved, while he who prays not will\nsurely be lost (St. Alphonsus).\n\n2157. Times and Frequency of Prayer.--As to the times and frequency of\nprayer, in fulfillment of the obligation, there are the same opinions\nand conclusions as for the acts of faith, hope, and charity (see 929\nsqq., 1095-1097, 1593 sqq.). On this point we may conclude as follows:\n\n(a) directly, or by reason of the precept of prayer itself, there is a\nduty to pray at the beginning of the moral life, frequently during life\n(whether daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc. cannot be precisely\ndetermined; but there is no practical difficulty, since those who\ndevoutly hear Mass at the times commanded comply with the duty of\nprayer), and also in danger of death. At the outset of the moral life\nthe reason and will should turn to God, and this is prayer at least in\nthe widest sense; during life prayer should be frequent and continuous\naccording to the words of Scripture; at the hour of death, prayer is\nnecessary, since we are specially bidden to ask for perseverance till\nthe end;\n\n(b) indirectly, or by reason of some precept distinct from that of\nprayer, prayer is necessary whenever one needs to have recourse to God\nto fulfill some command or avoid something prohibited. Thus, one should\npray at Mass, for according to church law Mass must be heard devoutly;\none should pray when a dangerous temptation assails one, or when there\nare great calamities, especially of a public character, for according\nto the precept of charity one must help oneself and others in\ndifficulties.\n\n2158. Practical Corollaries about Prayer with Reference to\nConfession.--(a) Practical Catholics, that is, those who comply with\nthe precepts of the Church, but who accuse themselves of neglecting\nmorning and evening prayers or grace at meals, cannot be judged guilty\nof sin, even of venial sin, on account of this neglect; for there is no\ncommon precept directly obliging to such prayers. But there may often\nbe a venial sin for other reasons, as when the omission is due to a\nspirit of lukewarmness, or when indirectly there is a duty to pray at\nthose times for special reasons, such as daily needs or temptations. We\ndo not agree, then, with the opinion that omission of morning and\nevening prayers, especially when it is habitual, is never sufficient\nmatter for absolution.\n\n(b) Unpractical Catholics, that is, those who have been away from Mass\nor the Sacraments contrary to the laws of the Church as habitual\ntransgressors, and who say nothing about their neglect of prayer,\nshould be questioned whether in all the years of absence from their\nduties they have also omitted all prayers. For, if this be the case,\nthey have sinned against the duty of prayer. Morning and evening prayer\nand grace at table should be earnestly recommended to all, because\nthese are customs that have come down from the earliest times, and also\nbecause those who disregard them often come to neglect all prayer, or\nat least expose themselves to dangers or to the loss of precious graces.\n\n2159. To Whom May Prayer Be Offered?--Only God may be addressed as the\nBestower of favors (\u201cThe Lord giveth grace and glory,\u201d Ps. lxxxiii.\n12), but the Saints may be prayed to as intercessors before God (\u201cThe\nsmoke of incense of the prayers of the saints ascended up before God\nfrom the hands of the angel,\u201d Apoc., viii. 4). Hence, the Church asks\nGod to have mercy on us; it asks the Saints to pray for us. It is\nlawful privately to invoke the prayers of an infant who died after\nbaptism, of a soul in Purgatory, and one may ask the prayers of those\nwho are still alive, as St. Paul frequently does in his Epistles. There\nis no command that we pray to the saints, and hence one who did not\npray to them would not be guilty of grave sin _per se_; but there would\nbe grave sin, if their intercession was neglected on account of\ncontempt, and venial sin, if one failed to call on them (especially on\nthe Blessed Virgin, the Mediatrix of all graces) on account of\nnegligence about one\u2019s own spiritual good.\n\n2160. The Persons for Whom Prayer Is Offered.--There is an obligation\nof charity to pray for ourselves and also for others, for we should ask\nfor the things that we are obliged to desire (see 2161). This duty is\ntaught in Holy Scripture (e.g., Our Lord prayed for Peter; St. Paul\nasks for the prayers of his Churches; St. James, in v. 16, admonishes\nus to pray for one another that we may be saved); also in the creed and\nliturgy of the Church, for we profess belief in the communion of\nsaints, and offer Masses and suffrages for the living and the dead. One\nshould pray for enemies in common prayers that are offered for all, and\nin special prayers for them in particular, when there is a special\nreason, such as their grave necessity or the scandal that would be\ngiven if one refused to join in a special prayer for one\u2019s enemy\n(Matt., v. 44); but one may not pray for the success of the evil\nprojects of an enemy, and one is not obliged to make special prayers\nfor him apart from necessity (see 1151). For the excommunicated one\nshould pray in private prayers and also in public prayers, when this is\npermitted by the law, as in the services of Good Friday and under\ncertain conditions in Masses (Canon 2262). For sinners prayers should\nbe said, unless they are already lost. The souls in Purgatory are also\nto be prayed for, although the obligation does not seem grave, since it\nis not certain as to any particular soul that it is in need of our\nprayers. As to the blessed, one may pray for their canonization or\naccidental glory, not for their essential glory, which they already\npossess.\n\n2161. Things that May Be Prayed for.--(a) Evils.--One may never pray\nfor moral evil, even of the slightest kind, and it would be a grave\nirreverence to beseech God to become our helper in the commission of\nsin. As to physical evils, one may not ask them as evils or for their\nown sake; but it is lawful to pray for them in the larger sense in\nwhich they are goods. Thus, for oneself one may ask from God sickness,\npoverty or death, in so far as these ills are means of correction,\nimprovement, merit, penance, or escape from sin; for an enemy one may\nask that God restrain him, even by the use of temporal misfortunes, if\nthis be necessary to keep him from sin.\n\n(b) Indifferent Things.--One may not desire an indifferent thing, if\nthere is no moral purpose to justify it (see 83). Hence, one may not\nask God for the gratification of idle wishes (e.g., that one win a game\nin which the only purpose in gain), but it does not seem that there is\ngrave irreverence in so doing.\n\n(c) Temporal Goods.--These may not be asked for from a primary\nintention, since we must seek first the kingdom of God and His justice\n(Matt., vi. 33), which are more important; neither may we ask for any\ndeterminate temporal thing unconditionally, since we are uncertain\nwhether it will prove beneficial or harmful. But temporal things may be\nasked for from a secondary intention (that is, in so far as they are\nmeans that assist us to attain spiritual goods) and conditionally (that\nis, under the proviso that they will prove spiritually beneficial).\nThus, the Church prays for protection against storms and disturbances,\nand asks for good weather, abundant harvests, peace, etc.\n\n(d) Spiritual Goods.--Eternal salvation and the means thereto we should\npray for as the principal objects of our desire and should ask for them\nunconditionally; for God is our true End, and the things that lead to\nHim cannot be harmful to us. Miracles may be asked for, but it is wrong\nto beg God for privileges that are reserved for others (e.g., to sit at\nthe right hand of Christ in glory).\n\n2162. The Qualities of Prayer.--(a) As to its manner, prayer is either\nunaccompanied or accompanied by external acts of worship, such as\nbodily gestures or speech. But not infrequently the thoughts are voiced\nin words, and we then have what is known as vocal prayer. Prayer made\nby a private person for himself or others may be internal; but public\nprayer that is offered by the ministers of the Church in the name of\nthe Church should be vocal, since it should be manifested to the people\nfor whom it is being offered. But the use of words or other external\nsigns is advantageous even in private prayer, since it excites greater\ndevotion in a person and is a help to attention.\n\n(b) As to persistence, prayer is continuous or interrupted. Prayer\nshould be continuous if there is question of its cause, which is\nprayerfulness of spirit, or desire of salvation; and in this sense may\nbe understood the words of Scripture that command us to pray always\n(Luke, xviii. 1; Eph., vi. 18; I Thess., v. 17 ), But if we speak of\nprayer itself, it is impossible to pray unceasingly in this life, as\nthere are many other things that have to be done and rest is a\nnecessity.\n\n(c) As to quantity, prayers are lengthy or brief. Our Lord rejected the\nbelief of the pagans that the efficacy of prayer depends on many words\n(Matt, vi. 7), but He did not forbid long prayers, since He often spent\nnights in prayer. The rule about the length of private prayers is that\none should pray for such a space of time as is favorable to devotion,\nand should cease from prayer as soon as it becomes tedious; similarly,\npublic devotions should not be so lengthened out that those present\nbecome wearied and inattentive. The Fathers of the Desert were wont to\noffer many brief but ardent ejaculatory prayers, fearing that prayer\nlong drawn out would fall away from the fervor of intention with which\nit began. But, if devotion continues, prayer should not easily be\nbroken off.\n\n2163. The Confidence Requisite for Successful Prayer.--(a) Confidence\nmust exclude doubt or distrust in reference to God or prayer itself:\n\u201cHow shall they call on Him whom they have not believed?\u201d (Rom., X.\n14); \u201cLet not that man (that wavereth) think that he shall receive\nanything of the Lord\u201d (James, i. 6, 7).\n\n(b) Confidence does not exclude doubt about one\u2019s own dispositions (\u201cIt\nis not for our justice that we present our prayers before Thee, but for\nthe multitude of Thy tender mercies\u201d); on the contrary, the prayer of\nthe Pharisee was not heard, because he trusted in himself (Luke, xviii.\n9). Neither does confidence in prayer mean that one may ask\nunconditionally for temporal things (see 2161 c).\n\n2164. Intention and Attention.--Attention is the voluntary application\nof the mind to that which is done, or the consideration or advertence\nof the mind given to an act. It differs from intention, which is an\nact, not of the reason, but of the will, consisting in the purpose to\nperform an act. Prayer requires both intention and attention.\n\n(a) There must be intention, for prayer in its origin is an act of the\nwill and it pertains to religion only because of the devotion by means\nof which it is elicited. A man who, while reading aloud from a novel,\nrecites the words of a prayer contained in the novel, does not pray,\nfor his intention is pleasure or instruction, not worship. And even one\nwho says or answers prayers attentively during services does not really\npray if his motive is not one of religion. (b) There must be attention,\nfor prayer is of its nature an act of the mind (see 2154). A parrot or\na phonograph is not said to pray when it repeats the words of the Our\nFather or Hail Mary.\n\n2165. The Intention Required in Prayer.--(a) An actual intention is had\nwhen one either expressly or implicitly wills to offer a prayer, as\nwhen one says internally; \u201cI will now say a prayer,\u201d or when without\nsuch express act one deliberately performs that which is a prayer,\nmaking internal acts of faith, reciting the Rosary, reading from a\nprayer-book, etc. This kind of intention is necessary at the beginning\nof prayer, and is the best that may be had during the course of prayer.\n\n(b) A virtual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer on\naccount of an actual intention previously formed and not retracted, but\nhere and now, on account of human weakness, one is thinking of\nindifferent things impertinent to the prayer and its purpose. This kind\nof intention continues unless withdrawn directly by contrary intention\nor indirectly by the performance of acts inconsistent with prayer.\nVirtual intention suffices during the course of prayer, for a\ncontinuous and uninterrupted actual intention is humanly impossible.\nThe more the mind struggles to keep the thought fixed on one object\nalone, the more do other thoughts arise to distract, as experience\nproves.\n\n(c) An habitual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer, not on\naccount of any actual intention previously formed, but on account of a\npropensity or inclination resulting from previous acts. This is not\nproperly an intention and it does not suffice for prayer, since with it\nthe acts performed do not proceed actually or virtually from any\ndetermination of the will. Thus, a person who is asleep or intoxicated\nis not said to pray when he mechanically repeats well-known words of\nprayer, for his will has no part in those words, any more than the will\nof the somnambulist has part in the dangerous walks he takes.\n\n2166. The Attention in Prayer.--(a) By reason of its object, attention\nis external or internal, according as the mind is taken up only with\nthe externals of prayer (i.e., the exclusion of external acts\ninconsistent with prayer and the proper bodily posture) or with the\nthings internal to prayer (i.e., the words, sense and purpose of the\nprayer). Internal attention is called verbal or superficial when it is\ndirected only to the words, as when a person who does not understand\nthe meaning of a prayer says it carefully so as not to mispronounce the\nwords; it is literal, when it is directed only to the sense, as when a\nperson who says a very obscure prayer pays close attention so as to\nfollow its meaning; it is spiritual, when it is directed to the purpose\nof prayer (i.e., the worship of God by an act of religion), or to the\nobjects of prayer (i.e., eternal salvation or the means thereto, such\nas grace and the virtues, the mysteries of religion, etc.).\n\n(b) By reason of its subject, attention is either perfect or imperfect.\nPerfect attention excludes every distracting thought, even such as are\ninvoluntary; imperfect attention excludes voluntary but not involuntary\ndistractions.\n\n2167. Acts that Exclude External Attention.--What external actions are\ninconsistent with external prayer and exclusive of external attention?\n\n(a) Those acts exclude external attention which either from their\nnature (on account of the great mental application they demand) or from\nthe weakness of a person\u2019s mind (for it is not everyone who can like\nJulius Caesar think on several things at the same time) make it\nimpossible to have recollection in prayer when those acts are being\nperformed. Acts of this kind are reading about other matters, painting,\nwriting, carrying on conversation with those around, boisterous\nlaughing, etc. But if the one who prays engages in these acts\ninadvertently (e.g., if a person reciting the Breviary does not notice\nthat he is giving considerable attention to an inscription or\nadvertisement on an adjacent wall), the distraction is merely\ninvoluntary and inculpable.\n\n(b) Those acts do not exclude external attention that either not at all\nor only in slight measure interfere with internal recollection in\nprayer. Such acts are slow walking, riding, looking about at the\nscenery, picking a flower now and then, dressing, undressing, bathing,\ncombing the hair, etc, The Church prescribes certain prayers to be said\nwhile the priest vests for Mass, and it was an old rule among the monks\nto join labor and prayer.\n\n2168. When External Attention Is Sufficient.--Is external attention\nsufficient in prayer when internal attention is voluntarily excluded?\n\n(a) In public prayers external attention is sufficient as to a number\nof effects. Thus, in the administration of the Sacraments the want of\ninternal attention in the minister does not make the Sacrament invalid,\nsince the Sacraments produce grace _ex opere operato_; in public\nsuffrages the indevotion and distraction of the priest do not deprive\nthe beneficiary of the impetratory fruit, since the public prayers are\noffered in the name of the Church itself; in the Divine Office merely\nexternal attention suffices to fulfill the positive obligation,\naccording to many, because it is not certain that the Church requires\nmore.\n\n(b) In all prayers mere external attention is insufficient for the\npersonal effects of impetration, merit and satisfaction. For to pray\nwith willful indevotion is not an act deserving of remission, reward\nand a favorable answer, but rather of punishment (\u201cBefore prayer\nprepare thy soul and be not as a man that tempteth God,\u201d Eeclus.,\nxviii. 23); it is disrespectful to God and therefore cannot claim the\nbenefits of an act of worship.\n\n2169. The Kind of Internal Attention Required in Prayer.--(a) The\nminimum that suffices for the personal benefits of merit and\nimpetration is the verbal or the literal attention, and the imperfect\nattention that is mixed with some unwilled distractions or mind\nwanderings. Indeed, a person who intends to pray well, but whose whole\nprayer is a continual distraction in spite of his efforts to be\nrecollected, does not lose, but rather by reason of his good will and\neffort increases, his merit. But for spiritual refreshment there must\nbe freedom from distraction; for, just as a student gets no mental\nnourishment from a lesson if his mind is many miles away, and a\nlistener gets no instruction from a discourse spoken in a foreign\nlanguage (I Cor., xiv. 4), so one who prays with an absent mind loses\nthe devotion and joy that are afforded by actual communion with\nheavenly thoughts.\n\n(b) The maximum that should be aimed at in prayer for the greater\nblessing it brings is the spiritual attention fixed on the presence of\nGod and the perfect attention that keeps away as far as possible the\ninterruption from any vain, perverse or extraneous thoughts.\n\n2170. Distractions.--Just as certain external acts exclude external\nattention, so also certain internal states exclude internal attention.\nThese latter are known as distractions, and may be defined as internal\nacts or omissions opposed to the nature or purpose of prayer, but\nperformed during prayer.\n\n(a) Distractions are either acts or omissions. Thus, a person who\nslumbers lightly or is partly asleep during prayer is inattentive or\nwanting by omission; while the person who thinks out plots for stories\nor plays during prayer time is distracted or wanting by commission.\n\n(b) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the nature of prayer. To the\nnature of vocal prayer belong the words and the sense, and hence, even\nthough one is rapt in meditation, there is no vocal prayer if words are\nmispronounced or left out or so changed or transposed as to make\nnonsense or no sense, though negligence about a word here and there\ndoes not necessarily exclude superficial attention. Those who from long\nfamiliarity with forms of prayer are able to repeat them automatically,\nwith no thought about the words or their meaning, direct or mystical,\nare not distracted if their thoughts are on the motive of prayer. But\nit would not be fitting to observe no order in these matters, for\nexample, to dwell always on the glorious mysteries during passiontide\nprayer and on the sorrowful mysteries during paschal prayers.\n\n(c) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the purpose of prayer. The\npurpose of prayer itself is the union of the mind with God, while the\npurpose of the one who prays is the special good to which he directs\nhis prayer. Union with God is necessary above all in prayer, and though\nit need not be expressly thought on, as was said above (2169), yet\nthere must be no thought in the mind contrary to it. Thoughts, desires\nand imaginations are contrary to the end of prayer when they are not\nmeans to that end (e.g., sinful thoughts, idle thoughts, thoughts on\nlawful occupations or affections that have nothing to do with the\nprayer), or when they are means to that end but are perverted to a\npurely natural use (e.g., when verbal attention is made an exercise in\nvoice culture, or literal attention a grammatical study, or attention\nto the purpose of prayer means that one is speculating on foolish\nquestions about divinity or thinking on the money, food, or clothing,\nfor which one is praying as if they were the ends of prayer).\nScrupulous persons make attention itself a distraction, for they worry\nall during prayer lest their thoughts be wandering, and so they are\nthinking about themselves rather than about the words, meaning or\npurpose of prayer.\n\n(d) Distractions occur during prayer. Hence, an interruption is not a\ndistraction, as when one who is praying is called to attend to some\nbusiness or leaves off prayer for the moment to make a note of some\nimportant thought that came to mind. Neither is the breaking off of\nprayer a distraction, as when one starts to pray but feels so\ndistracted or unwell as to give over for the time being the attempt to\npray.\n\n2171. Voluntary and Involuntary Distractions.--(a) Voluntary\ndistractions result in the first place from purpose, as when one who is\npraying deliberately dozes at intervals when he feels drowsy, or\ndeliberately turns over in his mind the points of an address he intends\nto give; they result in the second place from negligence, as when the\nperson who is praying does not expressly wish to be inattentive, but\nhurries through his words with no pains to keep his thoughts on what he\nis doing or why he is doing it. Those who rarely speak or read about\ndivine things, but give themselves much to foolish reading or talk,\nprepare for themselves many distractions, unless they counteract this\nby special aids to recollection, such as pictures or prayer books.\n\n(b) Involuntary distractions are those that result neither from purpose\nnor from carelessness, but from human weakness. Thus, a person who is\ntroubled with scruples or with a severe headache or nervous strain, who\nis worn out bodily or much worried mentally, or who is surrounded by\nnoise or disturbance, is often physically unable to concentrate his\nmind for any length of time, no matter how much he may desire to do so.\nIndeed, St. Thomas says that it is hardly possible for anyone to say an\nOur Father without some distraction, and many persons are distracted\nagainst their will by every slight sound or movement that falls under\ntheir notice.\n\n2772. Sinfulness of Distraction in Prayer.--(a) Involuntary\ndistractions are not sinful, since one is not bound to the impossible.\nHence, a penitent who has nothing except these distractions to confess\nmay not be absolved, since there is no matter for absolution in his\nconfession.\n\n(b) Voluntary distractions are sinful, since, though one is free to\naddress God at any time, one is bound to do this in a respectful manner\nand in spirit and in truth, as God requires. Communion with God is by\nmeans of the mind, and it is disrespectful to turn the mind away to\nother things when the communion has been sought. Besides, lip service\nis displeasing to God, just as burnt offerings were not acceptable when\nmade without love. But the sin is of its nature only venial; for the\nintention to pray, together with the essential moral goodness of the\nact, is retained, and the defect consists in the circumstance that the\nintention is executed remissly (see 78).\n\n2173. When is voluntary distraction a grave and when a venial sin? (a)\nIt is a venial sin when one says a non-obligatory prayer, even with the\nexpress will to be inattentive, and also when one says an obligatory\nprayer (such as the Divine Office) with distractions due to\ncarelessness, but without abandonment of the intention to pray. (b) It\nis a mortal sin when one indulges in distractions from contempt, and\nalso when one says an obligatory prayer with distractions that last\nduring a notable part of the prayer and that are deliberately\nentertained.\n\n2174. Distractions during Divine Office are the absence of the\nattention which the Church requires under grave sin for satisfaction of\nthe canonical obligation. There are two opinions about the kind of\ndistractions that make recitation insufficient and gravely sinful.\n\n(a) According to the older opinion, internal attention is required, but\nit seems that generally those who maintain this view do not hold that\ninternal distractions alone deprive the Office of its sufficiency.\nThus, they state that one who has had voluntary distractions may\nconsider that he has fulfilled his duty, unless he is certain that he\nalso adverted to his state of distraction and did nothing to end it.\n\n(b) According to the opinion of many modern authors, external attention\nsuffices. Hence, in this view mortal sin is incurred by notable defect\nin external, but not in internal attention.\n\n2175. The External Acts of Religion.--We proceed now to those acts of\nreligion which are performed in an outward manner. But it should be\nnoted that just as devotion and prayer find external expression (as in\nvocal prayer), so the external acts of religion should proceed from\ninternal devotion. The outward religious acts may be classified under\nthree groups: (a) the acts in which one offers one\u2019s body as a mark of\nveneration to God (adoration); (b) the acts in which one offers\nexternal goods, whether given (sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits,\ntithes) or promised (vows); (c) the acts in which one makes use of\ndivine things to honor God (Sacraments, oaths, adjuration, praises).\n\n2176. Definition of Adoration.--Adoration or worship is honor shown to\nGod through bodily acts offered in acknowledgment of His supreme\nexcellence and of our dependence on Him.\n\n(a) Thus, it is acknowledgment of dependence on God, and as such it\ndiffers from mere honor, which may be shown even to an equal.\n\n(b) It is an acknowledgment of supreme excellence, and so it differs\nfrom veneration shown to creatures who are above us. Adoration\n(_latria_), therefore, is not the same thing as the sacred cult or\nveneration shown the Blessed Virgin (_hyperdulia_) and the Saints\n(_dulia_) on account of their supernatural grace and glory; much less\nis it the same thing as the civil cult shown to persons illustrious for\nnatural qualities, such as acquired knowledge, political dignity or\npower, etc.: \u201cThe Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou\nserve\u201d (Matt, iv. 10).\n\n2177. Unity and Variety of Adoration.--Adoration is but one, though it\nhas various expressions. (a) The unity of adoration depends on the\nunity of its object. There is but one God to whom belong the various\ndivine attributes, and the three Divine Persons share the same majesty.\nHence, there is but one adoration. (b) The variety in adoration is in\nthe expression. The higher expression of adoration is internal: it does\nnot depend on bodily acts or places, and it is offered by Angels as\nwell as by man. The lower expression of adoration is made through\nbodily acts, such as genuflections, prostrations, prayer with face to\nthe east, and the use of sacred places for worship, all of which\nexternals are employed as aids to devotion and symbols of the divine\nglory (Matt., xviii, 20; Luke, xix. 46). Some of the actions here\nmentioned are sometimes used in the religious or civil cult shown to\ncreatures, but internal adoration belongs to God alone.\n\n2178. Definition of Sacrifice.--Sacrifice is the offering to God and a\nreal changing of a sensible thing, made by a lawful minister, in\nacknowledgment of God\u2019s supreme dominion and of our subjection to Him.\n\n(a) It is an offering or oblation; that is, one makes a gift directly\nto God Himself. Thus, sacrifice differs from contributions of the\npeople made for the clergy or the church.\n\n(b) It offers a sensible thing, that is, some object perceptible by the\nsenses or hidden under sensible species; for sacrifice is an outward\nsign of the inner offering, by which the soul itself is subjected to\nGod.\n\n(c) It is made by a lawful minister, for sacrifice is a public act\nperformed in the name of the community, and hence it may be offered\nonly by those who represent the community. St. Paul declares that a\nhigh-priest is chosen from men to offer sacrifice, and that no one may\ntake the honor to himself unless he is called as Aaron was (Heb., v. 4).\n\n(d) It is made to God alone, since God alone is our First Beginning and\nLast End: \u201cHe who sacrifices to other gods besides the Lord shall be\nput to death\u201d (Exod., xxii. 20). Mass in honor of the Blessed Virgin or\nthe Saints means that sacrifice is offered God in thanksgiving for\ntheir merits or in petition that we may imitate their virtues.\nOblations may be made to men, but sacrifice may be offered only to God.\n\n(e) It is through a real change of the thing offered, which thus\nbecomes the victim of sacrifice; for the supreme act of worship\nreserved to God acts upon the substance itself of an external thing to\nsignify that the worshipper offers his own being to God. The change in\nthe thing sacrificed consists in its being made sacred, or set apart as\nthe central object in the supreme act of worship.\n\n(f) It is made in acknowledgment of God\u2019s supreme dominion and of our\nsubjection to Him; that is, it is an act whose direct and proper end is\nthe exercise of the virtue of religion. Thus, sacrifice differs from\nacts of self-sacrifice such as continence, abstinence, martyrdom, even\nwhen they are offered in honor of God, for the direct and proper end of\nthese acts is some other virtue than that of religion. The act of\nsacrifice may have no purpose except worship, but other virtuous acts\nhave their own ends to make them praiseworthy, even when they are used\nas acts of worship.\n\n2179. The Essentials of Sacrifice.--(a) The outward sign may be said to\nconsist of matter and form. The matter is some sensible thing used as\nvictim, whether it be inanimate (e.g., the bread and wine of\nMelchisedech), or animate (e.g., the paschal lamb), or human (e.g., Our\nLord in His passion). The form is some sensible action that makes the\nvictim sacred by dedicating it to sacrificial oblation (e.g., the\nbreaking of bread, the libation of wine, the offering of the slain\nlamb, the voluntary and visible acceptance of death by Our Lord). In\nthe Mass Christ is sacrificed, not as existing under His own\nappearances, but as present under the sacramental species and offered\nthrough His representatives; and hence in the Mass the Victim is\nsensible by means of the species that signify and contain Him, while\nthe dedication by the Supreme Priest is made sensible through the words\nof the ministering priest who acts for Christ.\n\n(b) The inner thing that is signified in sacrifice is primarily the\noffering of self to God, in recognition that from Him we have our being\nand in Him is our happiness. But secondarily it signifies the fruits we\nderive from union with God (e.g., the benefits of redemption and\nsalvation). Thus, the sacrificial death of Christ is also a symbol of\nman\u2019s death to sin and life in God (I Peter, iv. 1).\n\n2180. The Obligation of Sacrifice.--(a) The internal or spiritual\nsacrifice is obligatory for all, since all are bound to offer God\ndevotion of will, communion of mind, recognition of His supremacy. (b)\nThe external sacrifice improperly so called, which consists in the\npractice of works of virtue, is obligatory for all in so far as\ncommanded acts are concerned, but not when virtuous deeds are of\nsupererogation. (c) The external sacrifice properly so called, which\nconsists in an outward sign indicative of internal worship of God, is\nby natural law necessary, for reason itself shows to man that he is an\ninferior and dependent being, and so should acknowledge the superiority\nof God and his own submission by acts suitable to his nature as a being\ncomposed of body and soul, and for whom sensible things are signs of\nspiritual truths.\n\n2181. Exemptions Based on the Natural Law.--Though the external\nsacrifice strictly so called is obligatory from natural law, it is not\na primary precept of nature, nor does nature determine its details.\n\n(a) Hence, the fact of the obligation may be unknown to an individual,\nsince (though reason indicates it) it is not evident and rests upon a\nnumber of premises from which it has to be reasoned out. Unlike the\nduty of honoring parents, which is immediately inferred from natural\nprinciples, the duty of offering sacrifice is only remotely inferred,\nand hence admits of invincible ignorance (see 320).\n\n(b) The manner of fulfilling the obligation, since not defined by\nnatural law, has to be determined by positive laws, or, in the absence\nof these, by suitability to the circumstances in which one lives.\nBefore the positive divine law was given, there was no obligatory rite\nfor sacrifice and the oblation was not entrusted to any special body of\nmen, and hence we read that in the times of the patriarchs there was\ngreat freedom as to the ceremonies and the ministry employed in\nsacrifice. But under the Mosaic Law the manner of sacrificing was\nminutely prescribed and its office entrusted to the sons of Aaron, even\nto the exclusion of monarchs; while under the law of Christ there is\nbut the one sacrifice of the Cross perpetuated in the Mass in an\nunbloody manner, and the ministers who have power to offer sacrifice\nare only the bishops and priests.\n\n2182. Is Sacrifice Superior to All the Other Acts of Religion?--(a)\nSacrifice is not superior to the internal act of religion, for devotion\nor the internal sacrifice is the soul that animates and moves the\nexternal rites (see 2149): \u201cThe multitude offered victims and praises\nand holocausts with a devout mind\u201d (II Par., xxix. 31); \u201cObedience is\nbetter than sacrifice\u201d (I Kings, xv. 22).\n\n(b) Sacrifice is preeminent among the external acts of religion. Some\nacts of religion are optional (e.g., vows, oaths, adjurations), but\nsacrifice is a natural obligation. Some acts of religion are\nobligatory, but marks of respect similar to them may also be shown to\ncreatures (e.g., customary offerings, praises), whereas no kind of\nsacrifice may be offered to a creature. Some acts of religion are\nreserved to God, but they have no rite that is peculiar to the worship\nof God and that may not be exercised by all (e.g., acts of adoration),\nwhereas sacrifice has a service reserved to God and which only priests\ncan perform. Sacraments are primarily for the welfare of man; sacrifice\nis primarily for the honor of God. Non-sacrificial acts of religion may\nbe performed in the name of an individual (e.g., adoration), whereas\nsacrifice is in the name of the community; other acts of religion may\nsignify dependence on God for temporal and corporal things (e.g.,\noffering of first-fruits), but sacrifice signifies the dependence of\nthe soul itself on God for existence and beatitude.\n\n2183. Offerings.--Offerings are gifts made immediately to God, to be\nemployed without change for divine worship or for the needs of the\nministers of divine worship, the purpose being to worship God by the\ntribute paid.\n\n(a) Thus, offerings are gifts; that is, they are offered to God without\nthe compulsion of any law, or at least without any determination by law\nof the amount to be given. Natural reason teaches man that he should\nbestow something from his goods in this manner as a thank offering for\nthe divine bounty, when there are representatives of God to whom the\ngift may be given. The gift should be a free-will offering (Exod., xxv,\n2), unless there are special circumstances that render it a debt, such\nas contract, promise, custom, or the need of the ministers of the\nChurch.\n\n(b) They are made immediately to God Himself, and so they differ from\ntithes or other dues that are paid to the clergy for their support.\n\n(c) They are not changed at all in the act of worship (e.g., an\noffering of sacred vessels or altar furnishings), or at least they are\nnot changed into the sacred condition of a sacrificial victim (e.g.,\nofferings of candles, incense, etc., that are consumed during Mass).\nThus, simple oblation differs from sacrificial oblation.\n\n(d) They are devoted to the service of God, since they are gifts made\nto Him. Hence, they are used in divine worship and, if consecrated\n(e.g., chalices, vestments), may not be used for other purposes; or\nthey are used for the needs of the ministers of divine worship or of\nthe poor, since those who serve the altar should live by the altar (I\nCor., ix. 14), and Our Lord shared His purse with the poor (Matt.,\nxxvi. 9, 11).\n\n(e) They are given as a mark of honor to God, especially in recognition\nof favors received from Him. Thus, in the Old Law the people were\nobliged to give the first-fruits of their fields and crops to God, in\nthanksgiving for the gift of the promised land and of its fruits\n(Deut., xxvi. 10).\n\n2184. Goods Unsuitable as Offerings to God.--There are certain goods,\nhowever, that should not be used as offerings to God.\n\n(a) Thus, those goods that are forbidden by positive law may not be\noffered to God. In the Old Law certain animals could not be offered to\nGod, either because they were legally unclean (e.g., dogs were\nassociated with pagan rites and were regarded as symbols of rapacity),\nor because they were of inferior quality (e.g., a blind or lame sheep\nor other animal worthless to its owner).\n\n(b) Those goods that the offerer has no right to give away or that are\nunsuitable on account of circumstances may never be given as offerings\nto God. Thus, one may not make an offering to God of money that belongs\nto another (Ecclus., xxxiv. 21); a son may not give as a gift to God\nthe money he should spend on his needy parents (Matt., xv. 3-6).\nNeither may one offer corrupted wine for the Mass, nor the wages of\nprostitution to the church if there will be scandal, nor gifts that are\nmean and contemptible, etc.\n\n2185. Contributions.--Contributions to the support of the clergy and\nchurch causes are neither sacrifices nor offerings in the strict sense\nof these words, since they are given not directly to God but to the\nministers of God. The manner of making contributions to the Church has\nvaried with time.\n\n(a) Thus, in the first ages of the Church clerics having the care of\nsouls were supported by the voluntary gifts of the people. These gifts\nwere made especially during Mass. Bread and wine and other things\nnecessary for divine worship and the support of the clergy were brought\nat the Offertory (the origin of the present Offertory collection),\nwhile food for the agapae or for the poor was presented for a blessing\ntowards the end of the Canon, or before Mass.\n\n(b) After peace had been given to the Church and the number of the\nfaithful and of the clergy had greatly increased, it was found\nnecessary to devise means for a more regular and certain supply of\nincome. As early as the sixth century the ancient customs of\nfirst-fruits and tithes were made the subjects of conciliar enactments\nand imposed as specific taxes on crops or revenues. A more permanent\nsystem of church support was that of endowments or benefices which,\nowing to the increasing difficulties of older methods, sprang up about\nthe sixth century and became universal in the eleventh. Fees in\nconnection with the administration of sacred rites and stipends for\nMasses were in use in the seventh century.\n\n(c) Today the system of benefices is the rule, while first-fruits and\ntithes are rare, though recognized by Canon Law. In some countries\nwhere benefices have been confiscated, part compensation is made in the\nform of pensions; in other countries (e.g., in the United States) the\nfree-will offerings of the faithful is the usual system.\n\n2186. Obligation of Contributing to the Support of the Clergy.--(a)\nNatural Law.--Those who serve the common welfare, whether in spiritual\nor in temporal matters, should be supported by those whom they serve;\nfor, as their time and labor is given to others, it is a duty of\njustice that these latter make a return for the benefits received.\nHence, just as citizens are naturally bound to contribute to public\nofficials, so are the faithful naturally bound to contribute according\nto their means to the ministers of religion.\n\n(b) Divine Law.--Our Lord commanded His disciples to depend for their\nmaintenance on those to whom they preached (\u201cFor the laborer is worthy\nof his meat,\u201d Matt., x. 10); and hence St. Paul says (I Cor., ix. 13,\n14): \u201cThey who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the\nholy place, and they that serve the altar partake with the altar. So\nalso the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by\nthe Gospel.\u201d\n\n(c) Church Law.--The Canons reaffirm what is of natural and divine law,\nnamely, that the faithful are obliged to support the clergy (Canon\n1496); and as to the manner of making contributions they sanction local\ncustoms, such as parish payments (Canon 463) and tithes and\nfirst-fruits (Canon 1502), command the payment of _cathedraticum_\n(Canon 1504), etc.\n\n2187. The Church, the Apostolic See, individual churches and moral\npersons of ecclesiastical law have the right to the temporal means\nrequisite for their mission; and hence the faithful have the duty to\ncontribute to necessary church causes, such as divine worship, the\nspread of the Gospel, and charity (Canons 1495 sqq.).\n\n2188. Quality of the Obligation of Contributing to the Church.--(a) The\nobligation is one of justice as well as of religion, for there is a\nquasi-contract between the faithful on the one side and the Church and\nits ministers on the other side, the latter being obliged to give\nspiritual ministries and benefits, the former to supply the temporal\nsustenance and means. Hence, St. Paul compares the salaries given to\nthe clergy to the wages or fruits paid to the laborer. It is not\nstrange that those who sow spiritual things for others, should reap\nfrom the temporal things of the latter: for a soldier does not serve at\nhis own expense; a planter, a shepherd, a plowman, and a thresher\nexpect a share from their labors; indeed, even the animal that serves\nman is worth its keep (cfr. I Cor., ix. 4 sqq.).\n\n(b) The obligation is grave, because it arises both from justice and\nfrom religion (see 1748, 2148). He who refuses to contribute to the\nChurch evades payment for services given him and also denies to divine\nworship his share of support.\n\n2189. Attitude Towards Persons Refusing to Contribute.--The duties of\nthe priest towards those who refuse to contribute their share to the\nsupport of the Church may be defined as follows:\n\n(a) as to absolution, it should not be denied unless there is certainty\nthat the penitent is in grave sin. Hence, according to Kenrick and the\ncommon opinion, unless there is a law fixing a tax or the delinquent\nchurch member is inflicting severe privation on the church or heavy\nburdens on others who have to contribute more than their share, the\nconfessor should not enjoin payment under pain of denial of absolution.\nApart from these cases, the Church, for the sake of souls, does not\ninsist upon her right, as we see in the dealings of St. Paul with the\nCorinthians who neglected to give towards his support. The Apostle did\nnot correct these men, although he would have done so had he considered\nthem guilty of mortal sin;\n\n(b) as to restitution, it seems it should not be insisted on. One who\nhas guiltily refused to pay his church dues has offended justice, it is\ntrue, but the Church is concerned more with spiritual than with\ntemporal things, and rather than place an obstacle to the conversion of\na sinner or occasion scandal to the weak, she prefers to forego what is\nreally her due (see 1487);\n\n(c) as to administration of the Sacraments or sacramentals, it should\nnot be denied to those who are unable or unwilling to pay the customary\nfees. The recipient of the rites disgraces himself by unwillingness to\ndo what others do, but religion itself would be degraded if the rites\nwere refused for reasons of money.\n\n2190. Those to Whom Religious Contributions Are Due.--(a) The entire\nChurch should contribute to the support of the Pope, the Pastor of the\nwhole flock of Christ, who is charged with the welfare of all. In the\nOld Law the Levites themselves were obliged to pay tithes to the\nhigh-priest (Num, xviii. 26 sqq.); but the amount to be given to\nPeter\u2019s Pence is left to the generosity and religious devotion of the\ncontributors. (b) Each individual church or body in the Church should\ncontribute to its own bishop or superior a just amount for necessary\nuses, as determined by law or lawful custom.\n\n2191. Vows.--A vow is a promise made to God to perform that which is\nbetter.\n\n(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself\nunder obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4),\nThus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose\nto do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the\ndecree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of\nperforming one\u2019s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or\nwho promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses\n(e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do\nnot sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise\nor resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one\nwho swears to observe chastity may be freed from the obligation by an\necclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow\nof chastity (see 2234, 2262).\n\n(b) A vow is a promise made to God; that is, the person who takes the\nvow intends to honor God and to bind himself to God. A vow may be made\nin honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one\nvows to God what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the\nSaint to witness or to assist the vow, or that one offers the vow\nprincipally to God and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to\nmake a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity\nto the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about God or no thought of\nobliging oneself before God, the act would be a promise pertaining to\nthe virtue of veneration (_dulia_), but it would not be an act of\nreligion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn\ncircumstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are\nsacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.\n\n(c) A vow is a promise to perform that which is better; that is, since\na vow is a free promise made to God, to whom only good is pleasing and\nto whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise God\nwhat is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would\ndishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not\nhonor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him\nspecial honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence,\nit would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one\u2019s\nsteps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn\npromises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage\nvows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood,\nfor they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no\nintention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.\n\n2192. The Various Kinds of Vows.--(a) By reason of its object, a vow is\neither personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a\nfast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise\nof some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the\npromise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine\nwith an offering).\n\n(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a\nphysical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).\n\n(c) By reason of its duration, a vow is either temporary (e.g., a vow\ntaken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).\n\n(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an\nunconditional vow of chastity) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on\npilgrimage, if one recovers one\u2019s health; a vow to enter religion, if\nparents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the\nexample just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall\nundergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary\nevery time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes\nintoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).\n\n(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally\nmanifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally assumed\nby reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the\nsubdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of\ncelibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider\ncelibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from\necclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is\nexplicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow,\nas when the vower mentions poverty and chastity) or implicit (i.e.,\nmanifested by signs that express another vow which includes the\nimplicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to\nthe rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and\nchastity). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which\nthe thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a\npilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to\nperform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as\nwhen he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).\n\n(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either\nprivate (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the\nChurch, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his\nsafety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its\nname by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in\napproved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or\nsolemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious\ninstitutes.\n\n2193. Vows in Canon Law.--The canonical dispositions in reference to\nvows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows\nare treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the\neffects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A\nfuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given\nhere will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.\n\n2194. Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.--Is the distinction\nbetween a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of\necclesiastical law?\n\n(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place,\nage, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for\nthere is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these\nmatters as circumstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint\nconditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change\nthese conditions as she sees fit.\n\n(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic\nthat distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends,\nnot on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike\nother vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving\nover to God of one\u2019s person itself and an internal spiritual\nconsecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied,\nhowever, by some authorities, who place the difference between the\nsolemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they\nproduce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid\nand the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see\nCanon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense\neven in solemn vows.\n\n2195. Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the\nintellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and\ndeliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he\nwho takes a vow assumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given\nby many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin\nsuffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a\nmortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of\nthe gravity of the sin (see 177).\n\n(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g.,\nTitus, thinking his gold watch is brass, vows to give it as an alms;\nBalbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to\nmake a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his\nfather is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father\u2019s\nrecovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental\n(e.g., Sempronius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away\nis only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he\nwould have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance;\nCaius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily\nto visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being\naware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion,\naccording to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of\nignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not\nhave been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good\ndemands that the religious state, like the married state, have\nstability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the\nobligations that go with it.\n\n(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g.,\nvows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by\npersons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring\nunder a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the\nimpulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of\nthe vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation\n(e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and\nobligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without\nreflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its\npronouncement).\n\n2196. Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the will of the\nperson who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence\nof such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.\n\n(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or\nunder such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to\nthe vow.\n\n(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under\nfear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is\nproduced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow.\nThe reason for this opinion is that God cannot accept a promise to\nHimself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made\nunder unjust pressure.\n\n(c) The positive law (see Canon 1307, Sec.3) invalidates a vow given\nunder grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as\nmeaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to\nforce one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take\nthe vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.\n\n2197. Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.--(a) All admit\nthat fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause\n(e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g.,\nvows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin\nwithout the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a\nlesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is\ninvoluntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).\n\n(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it\nproceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were\nthreatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the\noffense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than\nexternal, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his\nwish to evade punishment.\n\n2198. Vows of Doubtful Validity.--In the following cases it is disputed\nwhether fear invalidates a vow.\n\n(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the\nforum of conscience when it is light (e.g., Titia constantly importuned\nby her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes).\nSome answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in\nitself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the\nreal cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light\nreasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable\nto think that God will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light,\nfear.\n\n(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates,\nwhen the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to\nthe vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius\nunless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the\nmoney to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the\naffirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for\nthe negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the\naggressor, but to honor God and benefit self. This is the\ninterpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others\ndistinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the\ncause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only\nthe occasion of the vow.\n\n2199. The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.--As was said in the\nexplanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind\noneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.\n\n(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its\nfulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige\nhimself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless\nthe intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded.\nOn the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows\nvalidly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but\nhe sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).\n\n(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the\nvow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be\npreserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to\ntake a vow on the morrow pronounces the words of promise while asleep)\ndoes not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not\ndeliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba\nforced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only\nthe external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Sempronius,\nforeseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by\nvow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not\nsufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation.\nOn the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit\nintention (e.g., Titus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations\nannexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by\nsubdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make\nreligious profession, but at the moment of pronouncing the vows he is\ndistracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case\nthere is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).\n\n2200. The Matter of a Vow.--(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its\nmatter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to God, and\nhence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.\n\n2201. Vows that Promise Something Necessary.--(a) If the necessity is\nabsolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is\ninvalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to\navoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is\nimpossible without a special privilege from God to keep such a vow; a\nvow that one\u2019s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has\nno power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made\nby communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but\nonly as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to\nwhich agreement is given, etc.\n\n(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be\ndone or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the\nvow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment\n(e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the\nexistent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable\nmatter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of\nprecept, for example, to practise celibacy.\n\n2202. When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.--(a) If the\nvower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to\nfulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment\nas intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place\nof pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or\nvowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there\nwould be no obligation.\n\n(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the\ndifficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the\nmatter is severable but the principal part impossible (e.g., if he\nvowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound\nto go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes\nimpossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really\nseverable and was intended as the principal part of the vow (e.g., if\nhe vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to\ngo barefooted).\n\n(c) If the intention of the vow-maker is uncertain, it seems he is held\nto perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the\nerection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of\nthe expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended\nan entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become\nimpossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption\n(cfr. 465).\n\n2203. Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to God.--(a) Vows that\npromise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on\naccount of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin\npromised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out\neither evil or good (e.g., Jepthe\u2019s vow to immolate the first living\nbeing that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to\nthe part that is sinful.\n\n2204. What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that\nhave an evil end or other evil circumstances?\n\n(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circumstance affects the\nthing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be\nsinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to\nseduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify\npride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain\nsomething evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in\na robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done\n(e.g., the vow to give God half the booty taken in robbery); for such\nvows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that God is\nthe author of sin.\n\n(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circumstance affects only\nthe act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be\nperformed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from\nsin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil\ncircumstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial\ngoodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole\nmotive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is\nsubstantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the\nvow is substantially licit.\n\n(c) The vow is valid and licit if the evil circumstance affects neither\nthe act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus,\nit is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful\nhabit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to God if one escapes\nunhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask God to bless the duel\nbut to protect one\u2019s life.\n\n2205. Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.--(a) These vows are\ninvalid if there is no circumstance to make the promise honorable to\nGod (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one\u2019s\nearnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary,\nimpossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault\n_per se_, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and\ndispleasing to God, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The\nsin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.\n\n(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circumstance that\nmakes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to God (e.g., if one\nvows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or\nto set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).\n\n2206. Meaning of a Better Good.--It is also necessary for validity of a\nvow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of\nGod, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to God.\n\n(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to\nit, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not\ntrue.\n\n(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to\nits contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which\nis absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it\nis better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep\nthe law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or\nsubjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry\nthan to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or\nleave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable\nto vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have\nlittle advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let\nhim take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.\n\n2207. Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.--(a) The vow to do\nwhat is less pleasing to God (e.g., never to make a vow, never to\nembrace a counsel) is invalid _per se_. There may be cases, however, in\nwhich a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g.,\nwhen a person who is prone to making vows is bidden by the confessor to\nmake no other vows without advice).\n\n(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to God also\nseems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more\ngames in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the\nvow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more\npleasing to God to take recreation than to abstain from it.\n\n2208. Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.--(a) If the vows\nare equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first\nprevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the\nsecond is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige,\nbeing impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage\nand next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the\npilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of\ncaring for those in distress.\n\n2209. The Obligation of a Vow.--Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment,\nfor it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture\ndeclares that one must pay one\u2019s vows, and that it is better not to vow\nthan to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that God will hold as sin\nthe neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise\ndispleases Him (Eccles., V. 3).\n\n(a) The Quality of the Obligation.--A vow is an act of religion, since\nit promises to God a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised\n(e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to worship but to some other\nvirtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and\nalso against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by\nsins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing\ndedicated to God; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would\nnot be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chastity is\na sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same\nspecies, namely, sins against religion.\n\n(b) The Quantity of the Obligation.--A vow, as being a duty of religion\n(see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case\nthe sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter\nor imperfection of the act.\n\n2210. Gravity of the Obligation of a Vow.--A vow has the nature of a\nprivate law, since it is an obligation which the vow-maker voluntarily\nimposes on himself. But a law obliges under grave sin when the\nsubject-matter itself and the intention of the lawgiver require strict\nobligation (see 381 sqq.). Hence, gravity of matter in a vow depends on\nthe great importance of the thing vowed and on the will of the vower to\nassume a grave obligation.\n\n(a) Thus, the thing vowed must be of great importance, either in itself\n(e.g., chastity) or from its relation to divine worship (e.g., a fast,\na communion). One cannot oblige oneself to a grave obligation under a\nvow whose matter is absolutely and relatively of minor importance\n(e.g., a daily Hail Mary, an alms of twenty-five cents; see 382).\n\n(b) The intention of the vower must be to bind himself under grave sin.\nHe is free not to oblige himself by vow at all, and hence, should he\nelect to vow, he may bind himself, even though the matter of the vow is\nof great importance, either under grave or under light sin (or only to\npenalty), as he wishes. Exception must be made, however, for public\nvows taken in religious institutes and for the vow of chastity and\ncelibacy taken in the reception of subdeaconship, for the law of the\nChurch on account of the public good decrees that these vows oblige\nunder grave sin.\n\n2211. Rules for Determining What Is Important Matter in a Vow.--(a) In\npersonal vows, an act of omission may be made the subject of grave\nobligation, if it may be made the subject of grave precept by the\nChurch (e.g., the hearing of Mass, Confession, Communion, a fast or\nabstinence, a Rosary).\n\n(b) In real vows, some fix grave matter according to the standards for\ncommutative justice (see 1896 sqq.). But such a rule seems unsuitable.\nThe amounts absolutely and relatively grave in theft are determined by\nthe wealth of the person stolen from, but, since God is owner of all\nthings, we do not see how those amounts could be fixed in reference to\nHim. On the other hand, the duty of religion obliges more strictly than\nthat of commutative justice, and hence it does not seem that grave\nmatter should be the same for both. In practice, the matter is not\ngrave when it is quite inconsiderable (say less than a dollar), or when\nthe vower intends only a light obligation. If the matter is not\ninconsiderable and the intent of the vower is uncertain, one may decide\nas to the obligation of the vow from presumptions based on custom, the\ncircumstances of the vow, or the rule that grave obligation is not to\nbe taken for granted (see 709, 714, 659).\n\n2212. Coalescence of Light into Grave Matter.--(a) If the vower has\ndetermined the relation of the items of the vow one to another,\ncoalescence can be judged from his intention. Thus, if the vower\nintends that the items shall be parts of one whole, there is\ncoalescence (e.g., if he vows to give fifty cents in alms daily and\nneglects this for a year, there is grave sin); but if he intends the\nitems as separate promises, there is no coalescence (e.g., if he vows\nto say a Hail Mary every day and neglects this for a year, there are\nmany venial sins). If some of the items have been performed, others\nomitted, and the omissions coalesce, there is grave sin according to\nsome as soon as a notable quantity is reached, but others believe that\nthere is grave sin only when a notable percentage (say one-third or\none-fourth) of the matter vowed has been neglected.\n\n(b) If the vower has not determined the relation between the items of\nthe vow, the presumption as a rule favors coalescence in real vows,\nnon-coalescence in personal vows (as in the examples of a vow to give\nfifty cents daily and of a vow to say a Hail Mary every day). But there\nare exceptions, as when one vows to give a small alms every Saturday in\nhonor of the Blessed Virgin, for the chief intention in this case may\nbe to show respect to the Mother of God and not to give a certain\namount to the poor.\n\n2213. The Time When a Vow Obliges.--(a) A negative vow (e.g., not to\ndrink certain intoxicants) obliges at once and always (see 371).\n\n(b) An affirmative vow to which the vower has annexed a time for\nfulfillment obliges at the time determined. If the time was intended as\na principal circumstance (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary on the Feast of\nthe Assumption), the vow ceases with that time, even though performance\nwas culpably neglected; but if the time was intended only as a\nsecondary circumstance (e.g., a vow to go to confession next week made\nby one who needs it badly), the vow continues in force even after the\ntime set has elapsed without fulfillment (see 468 sqq.). Anticipation\nof fulfillment on account of inability to fulfill at the time appointed\nin the vow, is not necessary, unless the vow was attached to a certain\nspace and cannot be fulfilled in the latter part of this space; for\nexample, if one has vowed to say the Rosary today and foresees that the\nwhole afternoon will be occupied, one should say the Rosary in the\nforenoon (see 470, 471).\n\n(c) An affirmative vow for which the vower has fixed no special time\nshould be accomplished as soon as this can be conveniently done, for\nsuch is the rule in every absolute promise, and, moreover, no better\ntime for fulfillment can be assigned; \u201cWhen thou hast made a vow to the\nLord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God\nwill require it. And if thou delay it shall be imputed to thee for a\nsin\u201d (Deut., xxiii. 21).\n\n2214. Delay in Fulfilling Vow.--Sin may be committed by delaying to\nkeep a gravely obligatory vow for which no date was set.\n\n(a) There is no sin if the delay is reasonable in view of the\nsubject-matter of the vow (e.g., to put off a Rosary or fast for two or\nthree days, a pilgrimage of 50 miles for a week, a pilgrimage of 1000\nmiles for several months, etc.) or of the circumstances (e.g., if one\nhas to delay entrance into religion until one has better health or has\nclosed up a business).\n\n(b) There is venial sin if the delay is unreasonable but does not\nnotably diminish what is promised or endanger its fulfillment. Thus, a\nRosary, a fast, or a pilgrimage is as good next year as this year, and,\napart from danger of forgetting or omitting, no lapse of time seems to\nconstitute a notable delay in respect to such obligations.\n\n(e) There is mortal sin if the delay is unreasonable and notably\ndepreciates what is promised or notably endangers performance of the\nvow. Thus, to put off the fulfillment of a vow to enter religion\nlessens the value of the thing promised, if one waits until old age; it\nimperils the promise, if one remains in the world for several years\nexposed to the danger of losing vocation. Moralists hold that three or\nfour years would be a considerable delay in reference to a vow to enter\nreligion.\n\n2215. The Person Obliged to Fulfill a Vow.--(a) A personal vow obliges\nonly the vower, because by its nature a vow is a law which one imposes\non oneself (see 463, 1696, 188). But vows taken by a city or community\nmay be obligatory on the subjects in virtue of law, and vows taken by\nancestors may oblige posterity in virtue of lawful and obligatory\ncustom. (b) A real vow (and a mixed vow as to the part that is real)\nobliges also the heirs, for this kind of vow is a debt of the vower\u2019s\nestate (see Canon 1310). The obligation of the heirs is one, not of\nreligion, but of justice, and they are not held beyond the resources of\nthe estate.\n\n2216. The Manner of Fulfilling a Vow.--(a) As to Internal\nDisposition.--It is not necessary that one have at the time of\nfulfillment the purpose of fulfillment, provided there is no intention\nexclusive of that purpose, for the vow binds one only to do what was\npromised (cfr. 477). Hence, if one has vowed to hear Mass and then\nhears a Mass out of devotion, not thinking of the vow, one may take\nthis assistance at Mass as a satisfaction of the vow.\n\n(b) As to External Performance.--If a vow is personal, one must perform\nit personally, for one\u2019s own act was promised, and hence, if personal\nperformance becomes impossible, it is not necessary or valid to use a\nproxy; if a vow is real, one may use goods given by others, but one is\nnot obliged in case of poverty to seek the goods of another, since\none\u2019s own goods were promised.\n\n2217. The Obligation of Certain Kinds of Vows.--(a) Conditional\nVow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow unless the condition is\nfulfilled, and this is probably true even when the condition is\nequivalently, but not formally, fulfilled (e.g., Titus, who has to\nsupport his mother, vows to enter religion as soon as she contracts\nmarriage, but the mother unexpectedly dies and Titus is thus freed of\nher support). The vower is not guilty of sin against the vow if he\nprevents the fulfillment of the condition, unless he uses unlawful\nmeans. Such means are not employed if one is not obliged to fulfill the\ncondition (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $10 if one gets drunk), or if\nnon-fulfillment is due to weakness, not to the purpose to defeat the\nvow (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $100, if one remains sober for a\nyear, when the vower becomes intoxicated accidentally or through\nfrailty before the year is up), or if non-fulfillment is due to the\nexercise of one\u2019s right (e.g., a vow to enter religion if one\u2019s parents\nconsent, when the vower in lawful ways persuades his parents not to\nconsent). The vower is guilty of sin against the vow, if he uses\nunlawful means to prevent the condition\u2019s fulfillment (e.g., if he gets\ndrunk purposely in order to evade the alms promised for sobriety, or if\nhe uses fraud or force to keep his parents from consenting to a vow\nwhich he has made dependent on their consent).\n\n(b) Penal Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow if the act against\nwhich the vow is made is committed by him but is not sinful (e.g.,\nClaudius vowed not to play cards, but on a certain occasion did play\nafter having received a dispensation), or is only materially sinful\n(e.g., Balbus vowed not to use profane language, but on a certain\noccasion did use such language inadvertently), or is not sinful against\nthe vow, at least if the penalty is for violation of the vow (e.g.,\nCaius vowed not to quarrel under penalty of an alms for breaking the\npromise, but on a certain occasion did quarrel, adverting to the sin\nagainst charity, but not to the vow), or is venially sinful on account\nof the imperfection of the act, at least if the penalty is grave. If\nthe vower has not determined the number of times the penalty is to be\npaid, it seems that it should be paid only after the first fault, if\nthe penalty is grave and one that is not customarily repeated (e.g., a\ndistant pilgrimage, a large alms), but should be repeated after every\nfault if the penalty is slight and one that is customarily repeated\n(e.g., a decade of the Rosary, a small alms).\n\n(c) Disjunctive Vow.--The vow is null if one of the objects to be\nchosen from is evil, vain or impossible (e.g., a vow either to earn or\nto steal the money for an alms). The vower is held to nothing if before\nhis choice one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible\n(e.g., Claudius vows to give one or the other of two chalices he owns,\nbut before he makes his choice one of the chalices is stolen), or if\nafter his choice the thing chosen becomes impossible (e.g., Claudius\ndecided to give the larger of two chalices, but before he could give\nit, it was stolen). The vower is held, however, if one of the things to\nbe chosen from has become impossible before choice through the vower\u2019s\nown fault (e.g., Claudius\u2019 chalice was stolen before his choice because\nhe had culpably delayed to make a choice), or if the thing not chosen\nhas become impossible after the choice (e.g., Claudius decided to give\nthe large chalice and the small one was stolen afterwards).\n\n(d) Doubtful Vow.--Doubts about the essentials, that is, whether a vow\nwas really made (e.g., whether it was a vow or only a resolution,\nwhether there was the requisite intention or deliberation, whether the\nvow was invalid on account of fear, etc.), or whether a vow certainly\nmade was fulfilled, must be settled according to the principles for\ndirecting a doubtful conscience (see 672 sqq.). Thus, if it is more\nprobable that a vow was made or that a vow was not fulfilled, the\ndecision must be for obligation according to the Probabiliorists; but\nif there remains a positive doubt whether only a resolution was made,\nor whether a vow was fulfilled, there is no obligation according to the\nProbabilists. Doubts about accidentals, that is, whether a vow was of\nthis kind or that (e.g., the circumstances of quality, quantity,\nnumber, etc.), must be settled according to reasonable rules of\ninterpretation of the mind of the vower.\n\n2218. General Rules of Interpretation of Doubtful Vows.--(a) Private\nvows must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumptive\nintention of the vower, for a vow is a private law, and the vower the\nlawmaker. (b) Public vows must be interpreted according to the sound\ndoctrine of approved authorities on theology and Canon Law.\n\n2219. Special Rules for Interpreting the Mind of the Vower.--(a) A\ndoubtful vow should be interpreted from internal evidence, that is,\nfrom the language of the vow itself and the significance usually\nattached to the terms used, for the presumption is that the vower meant\nto express himself in the ordinary speech used for vows. Thus, a vow of\n\u201cvirginity\u201d usually means the same as a vow of \u201cchastity,\u201d and should\nbe so understood unless there is reason for a stricter interpretation.\nThe language of a vow is to be understood in the light of the purpose\nof the vower (e.g., a vow to give a chalice to a church does not mean a\nglass chalice, since the Church employs only chalices of precious\nmetal); a vow to hear Mass daily does not mean that one must hear two\nMasses on Sunday, since the purpose of the vow is to let no day pass\nwithout assistance at Mass.\n\n(b) A doubtful vow that cannot be sufficiently construed from internal\nevidence should be judged from general presumptions, that is, from the\ncustom as regards the vow taken (e.g., one who vows an alms is\nunderstood to promise the amount that others in his condition promise),\nfrom the custom or law as regards the matter of the vow (e.g., one who\nvows a perpetual fast is understood to promise a fast on days other\nthan Sundays and holydays, for the church law distinguishes between\nfast days and feast days), from the rules governing the interpretation\nof laws (e.g., since things odious are to be of strict interpretation,\nhe who vows to give something may himself determine what he wishes to\ngive, provided it is not ridiculously small), from the conditions that\nare implied in every vow as to possibility, the rights of others,\nchange in circumstances, etc. (e.g., he who promises to become a\nreligious means that he will do so, if a Religious Order will accept\nand keep him; he who promises a gift means that he will give without\nprejudice to the claims of third parties, etc.).\n\n2220. The Advantages of Vows to the Vowers.--(a) A first advantage is\nthat a vow strengthens the will of the vower to do good and avoid evil.\nThis is an important advantage, since human nature is so weak and\ninconstant and so much in need of helps that will add resolution and\nperseverance to its efforts. The vow is a promise binding not only in\nhonor but also as a religious duty, and an act that has a special claim\non divine assistance and a favorable answer, and hence it is a powerful\nally to a virtuous life. True, he who takes a vow is subject to greater\nsin if he is unfaithful. But there is no good that has not some risk\nattached to it, and the risk here is due, not to the vow itself, but to\nthe weakness of the will which may use it improperly. The person who\nthinks only of the dangers of storms will neither sow nor reap\n(Eccles., xi. 4).\n\n(b) A second advantage is that a vow makes the good done more\nmeritorious and praiseworthy. It adds to the virtue practised (e.g.,\nabstinence) the virtue that directs (viz, divine worship or religion,\nthe most excellent among the moral virtues); it offers God a more\nperfect subjection, since it presents to Him, not only a single act\nhere and now, but the power itself of the will to do the opposite; it\nacts from a greater resolution and firmness, a circumstance that gives\nperfection to virtue. All this should be understood _per se_, or with\nthe qualification \u201cother things being equal\u201d; for if we suppose that a\nperson who has no vow serves God with great charity and fervor, there\nis no doubt that he is better before God than one who has vows and\nperforms them carelessly and reluctantly.\n\n2221. When a Good Vow May Be Sinful.--A vow good in itself may be\nsinful or the occasion of sin on account of the dispositions of the\nvower.\n\n(a) Thus, in taking vows one commits sin if one acts imprudently in not\ntaking into consideration the circumstances. Hence, before making a vow\none should consider carefully and consult one\u2019s confessor or director\nor some other prudent man.\n\n(b) After taking vows one commits sin by regrets, if these regrets\ninclude the desire not to comply with obligations (e.g., when one\nregrets having lived up to a vow in the past or intends not to live up\nto it in the future, or when one keeps the vow only from human motives\nand wishes one could violate it), or if they manifest ingratitude\ntowards God (e.g., when one regrets without good reason that one ever\ntook the vow). The sin committed by desire not to comply with\nobligation is mortal or venial according to the nature of the\nobligation; the sin of ingratitude is venial. There is no sin at all,\nit seems, if for a reasonable cause one regrets having made a vow or\nwishes there were no obligation to perform something of supererogation\nthat one vowed, unless by such wishes one is exposed to temptations and\nthe danger of sinning against the vow.\n\n2222. Merit of Fulfilling a Vow that One Regrets.--If one regrets\nhaving made a vow but intends to keep it, is the good work performed\nbetter by reason of the vow?\n\n(a) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a religious motive\n(e.g., the desire to please God or the fear to offend Him), the good\nwork is more meritorious than if there were no vow, for it has the\ndouble value of an act of religion and of an act of some other virtue,\nof a good work done and of a vow to do it.\n\n(b) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a human motive\n(e.g., the desire to please some human person or to secure some\ntemporal benefit), the good work is not made more meritorious, but\nindeed is not meritorious at all, since not done for God\u2019s sake.\n\n2223. Who Can Make a Vow?--Every person living in the state of mortal\nexistence, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, is able to take a vow,\nunless there is an impediment of natural or positive law.\n\n(a) Natural law excludes vows made by those who are not masters of\ntheir own acts or who have not the use of reason; for, since a vow is a\nlaw which one knowingly places on oneself, it cannot be made by those\nwho have not the right of disposition over their acts or who do not\nunderstand the meaning of the obligation. Hence, religious and other\nsubject persons are restricted as to the right of making vows, while\ninfants and insane persons are utterly incapable of making a vow.\n\n(b) Positive law of the Church has laid down certain conditions for the\nvalidity of public vows (e.g., age, performance of the novitiate,\netc.), and hence those persons in whom the conditions are not found are\nincapable of taking these vows. The power of binding and loosing has\nbeen given the Church, and the regulations on public vows exercise this\npower for the benefit of the Church as a whole and of the persons who\ntake vows, As to private vows, it is a matter of dispute whether the\nChurch has the power to appoint conditions for them, since they are\ninternal acts (see 426), but it seems that no such conditions have ever\nbeen made.\n\n2224. Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.--Those who are not\nmasters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their\nsubjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold\ndependence of this kind.\n\n(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of\nreligious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in\nthe case of those who have not attained the age of puberty and who must\nbe guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means,\nnot that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for\nevery act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the\njust will of the superior.\n\n(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject\nto the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who\nhave obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chastity\nwithout the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon\nconjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting\nchurches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents\nand is not emancipated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he\nowes them to his family.\n\n2225. The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.--(a) If the vow is against\nthe rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus,\nif a wife makes a vow of chastity without her husband\u2019s consent, the\nvow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses\nhis consent.\n\n(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if\nhe denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which\naccording to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual\nforce until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good\nin itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice\nbound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow\nis null, since it is better to keep the rule.\n\n(c) If the vow is neither against the right of another nor against the\nsubjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge\nand consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do\nwhat is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by\nhis superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid\nuntil annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous\nparagraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his\nsuperior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is\nnot detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.\n\n2226. Cessation of Vows.--Since a vow is a private law, it may cease,\njust as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are,\ntherefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.\n\n(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the\nmatter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or\nthe purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature\nof a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God.\nIt is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed\nto it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition\nis not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one\u2019s\nmother recovers from sickness, but she dies).\n\n(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is\nremoved or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made\n(dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will\nof the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the\nauthority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to\nsubstitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).\n\n2227. Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be\nproductive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those\nwho take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for\ninternal reasons are as follows:\n\n(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then\nthe subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial\nchange if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., Titus vowed\nan alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to\nbecome drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to\nvisit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but\nthe guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an\nobstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage,\nbut an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home\nand care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g.,\nSempronius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford\nto keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change\nwhen circumstances are so different that, had the vower been able to\nforesee them, he would not have taken the vow.\n\n(b) They cease on the disappearance of the principal reason that\ninduced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of\nmoney to an institution solely because it is poor and it becomes\nwealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end\n(see Canon 1311).\n\n2228. Annulment of Vows.--The annulment of a vow is made in two ways,\ndirectly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found\nin commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.\n\n(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the\nvower which, by affecting immediately the vower\u2019s act, recalls the vow\nand makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be\nexercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of\nthe vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts.\nPrivate authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal\npower of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the\nhusband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious\nsuperior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to\nannul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached\npuberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for\nthemselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private\nvows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects\nhave made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic\npower of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the\npost-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to\ndirect herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of\nsubjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law\n(Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The\npaternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also\nby those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the\ngoverning power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and\nother regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt\ncommunities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.\n\n(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the\nvower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the\nobligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be\nexercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow,\nwhen and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the\nPope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his\nrights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of\ntheir children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere\nwith family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices\nthat are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul\neach other\u2019s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul\na vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due\nthe master.\n\n2229. Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.--Is a just reason\nnecessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary\nthat there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit\ncondition in a vow: \u201cunless the superior or other person whose consent\nis necessary refuses.\u201d (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be\na just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised\nHim, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the\nsin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without\nsufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.\n\n2230. Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.--(a) Direct\nannulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing\nitself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not\nreached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect\nannulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only\nthe matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power\nof him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to\nhear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service\nelsewhere.\n\n(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even\nthough he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it,\nor gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject\nand may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of\nannulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission\nor ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the\nvow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no\nlonger under his control.\n\n2231. Dispensation.--A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted\nin the name of God by one who has competent jurisdiction.\n\n(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401).\nThus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation\nthat a law is not binding.\n\n(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least\nin modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow\nitself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total\nremoval of the vow.\n\n(c) It is granted in the name of God; that is, the dispenser acting for\nGod remits the promise that was made to God. Thus, a dispensation\ndiffers from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in\nhis own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the\nvower or over the matter of the vow.\n\n(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public\nspiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a\nvow is an obligation to God, it cannot be removed without the act of\nthose whom God has appointed as His representatives in spiritual\nmatters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the\nlatter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or\ndomestic power.\n\n2232. Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.--A dispensation is granted\nin the name of God, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a\njust reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise\ncannot be satisfactory to God, unless there exists a justifying reason.\nA dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even\nthough all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the\npresumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient\nfor a dispensation can be reduced to two classes: (a) the public good\nof the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads\na dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of\nthe vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult,\nif he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is\ninsufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).\n\n2233. Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.--(a) The\nsuperior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that\nthere is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is\nany reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is\ncertain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether\nthe reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been\nasked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give\nit, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has\nbecome harmful or useless.\n\n(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing\nthat he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that\nthere was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt\nwhether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the\njudgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to\nthe superior.\n\n2234. Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.--The Church has the\npower to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this\npower when He said: \u201cWhatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be\nloosed in heaven\u201d (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been\nexercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of\ndispensation are the following:\n\n(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of\ndispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn\nvows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may\ndispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all\npublic vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity\nand of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter\nvows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect\nfreedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;\n\n(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction,\nsuch as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In\ncertain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can\nalso dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These\nmatters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection\nwith Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular\nconfessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either\nin confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not\nmade principally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by\nhim. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of\nchastity discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been\nmade for marriage (see Canon 1045).\n\n2235. Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity.--Does the Church\ndispense from the vow of chastity taken in religious profession or in\nthe reception of Sacred Orders?\n\n(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly\ncelibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are\ngranted from the religious vow of chastity.\n\n(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were\npermitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of\na nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at\nthe time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the\nclerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical\npowers.\n\n2236. Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third\nParty.--(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the\nthird party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only\nobligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense\nfrom vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Masses said for the soul of a\ndeceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any\nparticular persons, the vows can be dispensed.\n\n(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but\nis made chiefly in honor of God and only secondarily for the benefit of\nthe third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For\nthat which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is\nprimary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is\ndispensable.\n\n(c) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted, but the purpose to\nbenefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a\nvow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be\ngiven. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of\na vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to God but also\nof an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party\nto a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of\nstability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed\nwithout the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a\ncontract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions,\nhowever, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope,\nin virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his\ndominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just\nand sufficient reasons.\n\n2237. Persons Who May Be Dispensed from Vows.--(a) Dispensation may be\ngranted to subjects and, in certain cases, even to non-subjects. Thus,\na superior whose faculty is not restricted may dispense himself (see\n403); but it is advisable that dispensation be always sought from\nanother person on account of the danger of self-deception. A local\nOrdinary also has the power to dispense, not only his own subjects, but\nalso outsiders who are in his territory (see Canon 1313).\n\n(b) Dispensation may be given either in the confessional or outside of\nthe confessional, unless the contrary is stipulated in the faculty. It\nis more suitable, however, that it be given in the confessional.\n\n(e) Dispensation may not be granted except to those who are willing to\naccept it, and in this respect it differs from an annulment, which may\nbe made even against the will of the vower. The reason for this is that\nthe vower placed the obligation on himself freely (see 403). This holds\nat least as regards the dispensation of a private vow.\n\n2238. Commutation of Vows.--The commutation of a vow is the\nsubstitution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the\ntransfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation\ndiffers from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the\nobligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of\nthe vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is\ncommuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage,\nbut one is bound under vow to say the substituted prayers. The power of\nthe Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the\npower of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do\nwhat is less.\n\n2239. Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows.--(a) The\ngood work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which,\nif not more difficult, is more pleasing to God and more spiritually\nadvantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a\npoor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not\naccepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in\nfavor of one\u2019s father who is also poor.\n\n(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which\nmorally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one\nprayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for\nanother of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance.\nBut equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and\nhence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow\nfor another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the\nsame worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is\nsubjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.\n\n(c) The good work may be a work less good, that is, one which is\nclearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Mass is commuted into\na Rosary.\n\n2240. Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.--(a) The commutation\nof a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made\nby the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid\nthis. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of God and the\nspiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally\nserved. But ordinarily one should not commute one\u2019s own vows, since for\nmost persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an\nequal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And\neven if one does know, for example, that religion is better than\ntemperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal\nor a better substitute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his\nvow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.\n\n(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted\nonly by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation\npartakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to\nsome extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing\n(e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have\nalso the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of\ncommuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less\nvalue. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is\nthat more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the substitute\nordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of\nthird parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.\n\n2241. The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.--(a) For commutation\ninto something better no cause is required, since the new work is its\nown justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value,\nsome cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore\ndispleasing to God to give over one\u2019s promises without good reason. But\na light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger\nof violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value,\na proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also\nmore probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial\ndispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for\na full dispensation.\n\n2242. Reversion to Original Vow.--The return to the original vow by one\nwhose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may\nbe obligatory.\n\n(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something\nbetter; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of\nusing a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this\ndoctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into\nsomething better, but the common opinion is that the principle of\nprivilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between\ndifferent works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who\nmake vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and\nneedless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.\n\n(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when\nthe vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter\nhas become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to\nextinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its\nplace, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must\nbe performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is\nextinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is\nimmediately held under vow to the substituted work. All agree, however,\nthat if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is\nextinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the substituted\nwork becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the\nvower\u2019s own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and\nthe vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast,\nthere is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It\nshould be noted, though, that private vows made before religious\nprofession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the\ninstitute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the\nvows revive (Canon 1315).\n\n2243. Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.--(a) A\nconfessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows,\nsince a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation.\nA vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of\n(see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow,\nthe confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be\nadvisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a\nyear or other fixed period.\n\n(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of\nprivate vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make\ncontinual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a\nchange (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater\ndevotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way\nof a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have\nrecourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations,\nand the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment\n(e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).\n\n2244. External Acts of Religion in Honor of God.--We now pass on to\nconsider those external acts of religion in which the worshipper makes\nuse of divine things in order to show honor to God (see 2175). These\nsacred things are of two classes, namely, objects whose use is the\nsanctification of man (Sacraments and sacramentals) and words whose use\nis the power they have on others or the manifestation of reverence\ntowards God (the Divine Name). Sacraments and sacramentals will be\ndealt with later. For the present we shall speak of the honor shown to\nGod by the use of His Name, and hence we shall take up in turn the\nfollowing subjects: (a) use of the divine name to confirm before others\none\u2019s declarations or promises (oaths); (b) use of the divine name to\nmove others to do or omit something (adjuration); (c) use of the divine\nname to express praise and invocation.\n\n2245. Oaths.--An oath is the calling upon God to witness the truth of\nwhat we say.\n\n(a) It is a calling upon God; that is, it is the selection of God as\nthe witness of what is said. The oath is not merely an address made to\nothers or a declaration that a fact is known to God (e.g., \u201cGod knows\nshe has been a good woman\u201d); it is an address or invocation made to God\nHimself. Neither is it a mere prayer that God will in some way bring\nout the truthfulness of what is said; it is an appeal to Him to\ncorroborate that truthfulness by His own testimony. Neither does it\nappeal to testimony already given (e.g., the words of God found in\nSacred Scripture), but to testimony to be given about the present\nmatter. A prayer to God to prove one\u2019s innocence or the proof of a\ntheological proposition from the Word of God is not, therefore, an oath.\n\n(b) It is a calling on God, and hence if appeal is made to some\ncreature (e.g., in the expression, \u201cupon my word of honor\u201d) or to some\nfalse deity (e.g., \u201cBy Jove, I\u2019ll do that\u201d), there is no oath.\n\n(c) It calls on God to bear witness; that is, it confirms the truth of\none\u2019s words by God Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. He\nwho swears does not ask that God intervene here and now by some visible\nor miraculous sign, but that God confirm, where and when it pleases\nHim, what is said, at least on that day when He will clear up the\nhidden things of darkness and reveal the secrets of hearts (I Cor., iv.\n5). The proving force of the oath is that one who believes in God will\nnot be so wicked or rash as to call upon the All-Holy to defend\niniquity and falsehood.\n\n2246. The Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a) By reason of the matter, an oath\nis either assertory or promissory. An assertory oath refers to the past\nor present (e.g,, \u201cI swear that I saw the accident,\u201d \u201cI swear that I am\ninsolvent\u201d), a promissory oath to the future (e.g., \u201cI swear that I\nwill execute my office faithfully\u201d). The promissory oath is either\nwithout a pact made with another (e.g., in the comminatory oath, \u201cI\nswear that I will prosecute, if you do that\u201d) or with a pact. This\nlatter oath is called confirmatory, and, according as the pact is with\nGod or with man or with both, it is either a sworn vow, or a sworn\ncontract, or a sworn vow and contract.\n\n(b) By reason of its mode, an oath is either contestatory (invocatory)\nor execratory. The contestatory oath simply calls on God as a witness\n(e.g., \u201cGod is my witness that this is true,\u201d \u201cI swear by God, etc.\u201d).\nThe execratory oath asks God, even though the Divine Name is not\nexpressly mentioned, to punish the swearer in his own person or in the\npersons or goods that pertain to him, if the statement made is not true\n(e.g., \u201cMay God strike me dead, if this is not true!\u201d \u201cMay the devil\ntake my children, if I swear falsely!\u201d). The form commonly used, \u201cSo\nhelp me God and these holy Gospels!\u201d has an execratory sense, the\nmeaning being \u201cMay God help me if I speak truly, may He deny me help if\nI speak falsely!\u201d\n\n(c) By reason of the person invoked, an oath is either explicit or\nimplicit. The former calls on God by name (e.g., \u201cGod is my witness,\u201d\n\u201cI speak the truth in Christ\u201d); the latter calls on some creature as\nthe reflection of a divine attribute, or in some other way the\nrepresentative of God (e.g., the oath of Moses in Deut., xxx. 19: \u201cI\ncall upon heaven and earth this day to witness that I have offered you\nlife and death\u201d).\n\n(d) By reason of its legal form, an oath is either solemn or simple,\njudicial or extra-judicial. The solemn oath is taken with ceremony\n(e.g., before the altar, with hand placed on the Bible, with upraised\nhand, etc.); the simple oath is taken privately, without special form\nof words or ceremony. The judicial oath is taken in court or in\nreference to the public decision of questions of right, fact or\ndelinquency (e.g., in Canon Law the oaths of calumny, malice, etc.,\nwhich are treated in canonical works); the extra-judicial oath, solemn\nor simple, is taken on other occasions (e.g., when two contractants\nstrengthen their compact by oath). Examples of solemn oaths in the\nBible are found in Gen., xiv. 22, xxiv. 2, 3; Jeremias, xxxiv. 18.\n\n2247. Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a)\nEssentially, there is no difference, since all the kinds agree in the\nprincipal features mentioned in the definition. (b) Accidentally, there\nis a difference in circumstances of form, solemnity, etc. Moreover, one\nkind of oath may be more obligatory (e.g., the solemn oath on account\nof the special deliberation given it and the scandal caused by its\nnon-observance is more sacred than the simple oath), or it may have\nother species of obligation besides that of religion (e.g., the oath to\nkeep a compact binds in justice as well as religion).\n\n2248. Lawfulness of Oaths.--(a) It is lawful to take an oath that has\nthe necessary qualities, for in Scripture God Himself is represented as\nswearing (Gen, xxii. 16; Psalm cix. 4, Heb., vi. 13, vii. 21), holy men\nswear and are praised for swearing as they should (II Cor., i. 23;\nPsalm xiv. 4), and the Church has always made use of oaths. The origin\nof oaths is man\u2019s faith in God, and their purpose is the useful one of\nlending authority to important assertions. Indeed, an oath is an act of\nreligion, for men swear only by one who is greater (Heb., vi. 13), and\nhence an oath is a profession of reverence for God\u2019s superior\nknowledge, truth, and justice.\n\n(b) It is not lawful to take an oath that lacks a necessary quality.\nHere we should note an important difference between an oath and other\nacts of religion, such as vows. An oath is not desirable for its own\nsake, since it is occasioned by human weakness and unreliability;\nhence, like medicine and other necessities occasioned by evil, it\nshould be used only in serious need and sparingly. A vow or other act\nof religion, on the contrary, originates from the desire to honor God,\neven apart from necessity, and hence it may be used oftener. This\nexplains why Scripture forbids the habit of swearing (Ecclus., xxiii.\n9; Matt., v. 33; James, v. 12); but it is a wrong interpretation of\nthese texts that sees in them an absolute prohibition of oaths. From\nthe context and other passages it is clear that the Scriptures just\ncited reprove the Pharisees who taught that promiscuous swearing was\nlawful, provided only the matter was true or the Divine Name was not\nused, and also those persons who delighted to swear on all occasions.\n\n2249. Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath.--The necessary qualities\nthat should accompany an oath are expressed in Jeremias, iv. 2: \u201cAnd\nthou shalt swear, \u2018As the Lord liveth,\u2019 in truth, and in judgment and\nin justice.\u201d Judgment refers to the good dispositions of the person who\nswears, truth and justice to the righteousness of the cause for which\nhe swears.\n\n(a) Thus, an oath should have judgment; that is, the person who swears\nshould do so only from serious necessity, with faith and devotion, and\nin a manner respectful to God whom he invokes. An oath that lacks\njudgment is called incautious or disrespectful, as when one swears\nabout a trivial matter or swears jokingly.\n\n(b) An oath should have truth; that is, one should not swear except to\nthat which one believes to be true, after reasonable diligence has been\nused in seeking for the truth. An oath that lacks truth is called false\nor perjured, as when one swears to what one knows or believes to be\nfalse, or promises what one does not intend to fulfill, or swears that\none is certain when one has only opinion, or swears with a purely\nmental reservation, or swears after insufficient investigation of a\nmatter.\n\n(c) An oath should have justice; that is, one should not promise what\none has no right to promise (e.g., to tell a lie), and one should not\nsay what one has no right to say (e.g., what is defamatory). The matter\nof the oath, then, both as to its object and its circumstances, must be\ngood, even though one is swearing truthfully and respectfully. An oath\nthat lacks justice is called a wicked oath, as when one promises under\noath to commit murder, or not to follow what is of counsel, or swears\nabout a real fact in such a way as to do unnecessary harm to another\nperson or to boast about one\u2019s own crimes.\n\n2250. Sinful Oaths.--(a) An incautious or disrespectful oath is from\nits nature only a venial sin, since its malice consists, not in any\ndirect injury to the divine truth or other attribute, but only in\nlevity of mind; and, moreover, it is not opposed to the purpose of an\noath, which is to confirm the truth. But accidentally it may be a\nserious sin on account of the scandal it gives (e.g., when a person of\nstanding swears without necessity), or on account of the danger to\nwhich it exposes the swearer (e.g., when one swears habitually and is\nthereby put in the occasion of swearing falsely or unjustly). On\naccount of the evils of familiarity, etc., to which habitual swearing\nleads, Our Lord warn us to be content as a rule to support the truth\nwith simple assertion or denial (Matt., v. 2). At least for ordinary,\ndaily communications the word of a Christian or honest man ought to be\nsufficient without his oath.\n\n(b) A lying or perjured oath is from the nature of the act always (see\n172) a mortal sin, since it consists essentially in contempt for God\nand disrespect for His attributes. The perjurer dares to ask God to be\nan accomplice in a lie, or else supposes that God can be deceived.\nHence, only by reason of the imperfection of the act can perjury ever\nescape the guilt of mortal sin, as when one commits perjury without\nsufficient reflection on or full consent to the oath or to its falsity.\nPope Innocent XI condemned the doctrine that perjury is only a light\nsin (Denzinger, n. 1174). In Canon Law those who perjure themselves are\ndebarred from acting as witnesses or giving expert testimony, and are\nsubject to penalties at the discretion of the Ordinary (see Canons\n1757, 1795, 2323). In American civil law perjury is a false oath given\nbefore a tribunal and is a crime against public justice, while\nsubornation of perjury and false oaths given on private occasions are\nalso crimes or punishable offenses.\n\n(c) A wicked oath, even though the thing sworn to be true and the oath\nbe given only after consideration and in a respectful manner, is a sin\nagainst religion and any other virtue it offends. The sin committed by\nreason of the oath is from its nature mortal according to some, since\nthe swearer gravely insults God by asking Him to become a partaker in\nsin and by turning into an instrument of sin what should be an act of\nreligion; others hold that the sin is only venial, since it is not\nserious disrespect to ask God to witness the truth of what is true;\nothers again make the gravity of the sin depend on the wickedness of\nthe matter or circumstances. This wickedness committed by reason of the\nstatement or promise is venial or mortal according to the case. Thus,\nthere is grave injustice in revealing a fact seriously detrimental to\nanother and which one is bound to keep as confidential; there is venial\nscandal in swearing in order to lead another person into a slight fault\nof detraction; there is a grave sin of impurity in promising to commit\nadultery; there is a light sin of theft in promising to steal a small\nsum of money. Finally, others hold that the oath is mortally sinful\nwhen it furthers a grave sin (e.g., an oath confirming serious\ndetraction), and that it is venial in other cases (e.g., an oath\nconfirming a boast about past mortal sins).\n\n2251. Mental Reservation in an Oath.-(a) Strict mental reservation\n(i.e., the internal restriction of one\u2019s words so that the listener\ncannot gather the true meaning, as when one says one has seen Rome,\nmeaning a picture of Rome) is a lie, and hence cannot be used in an\noath without perjury. See propositions condemned by Innocent XI\n(Denzinger, n. 1176).\n\n(b) Wide mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one\u2019s\nwords that may be gathered by the listener from circumstances, as when\na servant says his master is not at home, meaning that he cannot be\nseen) is lawful only when there is some reason of justice or charity\nthat demands it. Hence, it is a mortal sin to swear with this kind of\nreservation when the questioner has the right to know the truth; it is\nno sin at all when the questioner has no right to question and mental\nreservation is the only escape from a serious evil. If the questioner\nhas no right to demand an oath and the deponent has no right to use\nmental reservation (e.g., when the oath is only private and not\nconcerned with contract or other important matter), the sinfulness of a\nmental reservation is a matter of dispute. Some think the oath is\nmortally sinful, because it is gravely irreverent to God to call on Him\nto witness testimony meant to deceive. Others think the oath is only\nvenially sinful, because the offense is not against truth or justice,\nbut only against judgment or discretion.\n\n2252. Cooperation in Sinful Oaths.--(a) Formal cooperation is never\nlawful, because it makes the cooperator will the guilt of what is done.\nThus, he who by command, counsel, promise, etc., induces another to\nswear falsely is guilty as the principal or accessory to the crime (see\n1513, 1778).\n\n(b) Material cooperation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason\nfor it, as when a public official demands the oath according to law\nfrom a person who, as he knows, will swear falsely. For the public good\ndemands that in certain cases oaths be administered, notwithstanding\nthat for some persons this will prove an occasion of perjury. But the\nlawgiver should not multiply temptations by demanding sworn statements\nunnecessarily; otherwise the oath becomes a mere formality deprived of\nproving value, and the crime of perjury is made common.\n\n2253. Sinful Oaths Demanded or Accepted by Private Persons.--(a)\nIncautious or Disrespectful Oaths.--It is not lawful to ask or receive\nan oath, when there is no great public or private need for it;\notherwise one makes a sacred act cheap and common. Neither is it lawful\nto ask or receive an oath from those who do not believe in oaths (e.g.,\nthe Mennonites, some Quakers); otherwise one compels another to swear\nagainst his conscience and indevoutly. Those who believe that oaths are\nsinful may be required, nevertheless, to bind themselves on their\nsolemn word of honor, and may be punished in the same manner as\nperjurers if they speak falsely.\n\n(b) Perjured Oaths.--It is not lawful for a private person to ask or\nreceive an oath from another, if he is sure that the latter will commit\nperjury; but one may ask and receive an oath, even though one does not\nknow whether the other person will swear truly or not, if one has a\nsufficient reason.\n\n(c) Wicked Oaths.--It is clearly unlawful to ask or receive a wicked\noath, in which something sinful is promised or stated; for the thing\nitself is then desired and there is formal cooperation. But it is not\nnecessarily sinful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which the\nsinfulness is found, not in the matter of the oath, but in the\ndispositions of the swearer, for there may be only material\ncooperation. Thus, he who exacts a sworn promise of murder agrees to\nmurder, but he who demands a sworn statement against a third party for\nwhich there is necessity does not necessarily agree to hatred, if the\nperson taking the oath swears out of hate or revenge.\n\n2254. Fictitious Oaths.--A fictitious oath is one in which a person\nswearing externally has no intention internally to call on God as a\nwitness.\n\n(a) This kind of oath is invalid, for, as was just said, without a real\nintention to swear there is no oath. Hence, a fictitious oath produces\nno obligation of religion, but there may be an obligation of justice,\nas when the oath is the unjust cause of damage to another.\n\n(b) This kind of oath is sinful, for, if it testifies to error, it\nincludes the grave sin of external dishonor to God; if it testifies to\ntruth, it includes the venial sin of taking God\u2019s name in vain. The\nfictitious oath is a grave sin if the circumstances are such that a\nsincere oath is gravely obligatory, as when a superior or judge\nlawfully imposes an oath in a serious matter, or the parties to an\nimportant onerous contract bind themselves by oath in order to\nstrengthen their pact.\n\n2255. Expressions Confused with Oaths.--Expressions that are sometimes\nmistakenly confused with sinful swearing are the following: (a) profane\nor vulgar talk, such as \u201cHell,\u201d \u201cThe devil,\u201d \u201cDoggone it\u201d; (b) cursing,\nsuch as \u201cGo to hell,\u201d \u201cGod damn you,\u201d \u201cDamn it\u201d, (e) contumely, such as\n\u201cbastard,\u201d \u201cson of a bitch\u201d; (d) vain use of the name of God, such as\n\u201cby God,\u201d \u201cChrist,\u201d etc., when used as common exclamations; (e)\ntemptation of God, such as: \u201cIf there is a God, may He strike me\ndead!\u201d; (f) blasphemy, such as: \u201cMay God perish, if this is not true!\u201d\n\nThe expressions, \u201cThis is as true as the Gospel,\u201d \u201cGod\u2019s own word is\nnot more truthful,\u201d \u201cI am as innocent as the Blessed Virgin,\u201d etc., if\nused to confirm the truth, are not meant to assert the speaker\u2019s\nequality to God and the Saints, and hence they are venial sins of\ntaking the Lord\u2019s name in vain. But, if they are used to confirm error,\nthey are mortal sins of blasphemy.\n\n2256. Obligation Imposed by Promissory Oath.--An assertory oath imposes\nthe obligation of telling the truth and of repairing any damage that\nresults from the falsity or injustice of the declaration. In addition,\na promissory oath binds one in virtue of religion to perform one\u2019s\npromise; for, as said above (2249), an oath must have truth. Hence,\nScripture bids those who have sworn to fulfill the promise (Matt., v.\n33) not to make the word of no effect (Num, xxxi. 3). But the thing\npromised must be possible and lawful, or otherwise the oath lacks\njudgment or justice. (a) Thus, an impossible promise is not binding,\nfor no one can oblige himself to perform what he cannot perform (cfr.\n2201); (b) an unlawful promise is not binding, for no one can oblige\nhimself to perform what he is bound not to do. Thus, an oath to revenge\nmurder by murder is null, and sin is committed both in taking and in\nkeeping it.\n\n2257. Obligation Imposed by Negative Oaths.--The obligation of a sworn\npromise not to do what is better (e.g., not to take a vow), or to do\nwhat is vain and useless (e.g., an oath to count the steps one takes),\ndepends on the circumstances. (a) If there are no rights of a third\nparty involved, these oaths do not hold (e.g., he who swears not to vow\nacts laudably in disregarding the oath). For one may not call God to\nwitness or be guarantee for that which is less pleasing to Him, or\nwhich in no way honors Him, and for which there is no claim on the part\nof a third person. (b) If there are rights of a third party involved,\nthese oaths oblige one to give the third party what he is entitled to\nfrom the promise (e.g., a nurse who swears to remain with a sick person\nmay not violate the oath by entering religion).\n\n2258. Obligation of Oath Is Personal.--An oath added to a promise made\nto man and obligatory in justice is personal, and hence it binds the\none who makes the oath, but not his heirs (see 2216).\n\n2259. Interpretation of Promissory Oaths.--(a) An oath should be\ninterpreted strictly, for the presumption is that the promisor intended\nto place upon himself the least possible burden. Thus, if a person\nswears to observe the statutes of a certain Congregation, it should be\nunderstood that he pledges himself to present, not to future statutes;\nif he swears not to gamble, the oath does not forbid games in which\nmoney is not played for. But if the promisor acts deceitfully, the oath\nis to be interpreted according to the intention of him who receives the\npromise (Canon 1321).\n\n(b) An oath is always subject to the limitations and reservations which\nthe nature of the case, law, or custom demands. Hence, even though an\noath is made unconditionally, the following conditions are understood:\n\u201cIf fulfillment will be physically and morally possible,\u201d \u201csaving the\nrights of superiors,\u201d \u201cunless the other party renounces his right,\u201d\n\u201cunless the other party fails to keep his part of the agreement,\u201d\n\u201cunless there comes a notable change in conditions.\u201d If the promisor\nexplains beforehand to the promisee what he understands by the oath, he\nswears only in the sense thus set forth by him.\n\n(c) An oath follows the nature and conditions of the act (e.g.,\nresolution, promise, vow, contract) that it confirms, for the accessory\nfollows the principal. Hence, if the act to which the oath is attached\ncannot be obligatory (e.g., an act detrimental to eternal salvation, or\nthe public good, or the rights of a third party), the oath gives no\nstrength to this act (Canon 1318); if the act is naturally invalid\n(e.g., a promise obtained through substantial fraud), the oath is also\ninvalid; if the act does not become effective (e.g., a promise not\naccepted), neither does the oath become effective; if the act ceases to\noblige (e.g., a promise of secrecy made for a time), the oath also\nceases to oblige; if the act is not obligatory under grave sin, the\noath is not obligatory under grave sin (e.g., if one swears to observe\nthe statutes of a university, one is not bound to observe those that\nare commonly neglected, one commits no sin by transgressing those that\nare merely penal or optional, and one commits no grave sin by violating\nthose that oblige under venial sin).\n\n2260. Kind of Obligation Produced by a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The\nobligation is one of religion, because the significance of the oath is\nthat it adds the duty of respect owed to God to the duty of fidelity\nowed to the promise. Men swear in order to make their promises more\ntrustworthy through the sacredness of the oath. The violation of a\npromissory oath is, therefore, always a sin against religion. There are\nother sins added in some species of oath, namely, a second sin against\nreligion in case of a sworn vow, a sin against justice and fidelity in\ncase of a sworn contract, a second sin against religion and a sin\nagainst justice and fidelity in case of a sworn vow and contract (see\n2246 a).\n\n(b) The obligation, other things being equal, is less than that\nproduced by a vow, because the vow binds in virtue of fidelity to God,\nbut the oath only in virtue of respect. The obligation of fidelity\nseems to be stronger, because unfaithfulness always contains\ndisrespect, but not vice versa. Moreover, in the case of a vow not only\nthe fulfillment of the promise, but the thing promised itself is\nsacred, which is not true in the case of an oath. An assertory oath,\nhowever, seems to be more binding than a vow, because it is a greater\ninjury to God to make Him the witness for falsehood than to break a\npromise made to Him.\n\n2261. Degree of the Obligation of a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The\nobligation is grave, from the nature of an oath, because the virtue of\nreligion is preeminent among the moral virtues (see 2146). There is no\ndoubt that mortal sin is committed when one gives a sworn promise and\nhas no intention to fulfill it, for this is perjury (see 2250 b); and\nalso when one unjustly refuses to live up to an important engagement\nmade under oath, for this is irreligion and injustice in a serious\nmatter. The remarks on grave matter in vows (2211) apply here, but,\nsince the vow obliges more strictly, a somewhat greater amount is\nneeded for serious matter in violation of an oath.\n\n(b) The obligation may be light on account of the smallness of the\nmatter involved. Even a vow, which is more binding than an oath, may be\nof venial obligation in this way (see 2211). A person who makes a\npromise under oath, fully intending to keep the promise, but who later\nchanges his mind without sufficient reason, does not show disrespect to\nGod, since when the oath was made he intended to abide by it, and does\nnot seriously injure his neighbor, since, as we suppose, the matter of\nthe oath is small. The sin, therefore, is one of inconstancy or levity,\nand, if there is disrespect, it is slight. Thus, if a person who had\nsworn to drink no more wine took a drop now and then, these\ntransgressions would be only venial. Some authors, however, believe\nthat every unfaithfulness to a promissory oath, no matter how small the\nsubject-matter, is a grave sin, because perjury is committed by the\nbreach of promise. This is commonly denied, because the meaning of a\npromissory oath is that God is called on to witness the truth of a\npresent intention and the obligation (great or small) of a future\nperformance.\n\n2262. Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath.--The obligation of a\npromissory oath, like that of a vow (see 2226), ceases intrinsically or\nextrinsically.\n\n(a) Intrinsically, an oath ceases when there is a substantial change in\nthe matter (e.g., it is or has become impossible or unlawful, as in\nHerod\u2019s oath to Salome), when the principal reason for the oath has\nceased (e.g., Titus swore to give an alms to Sempronius because the\nlatter was poor, but before the alms was given Sempronius became rich),\nor when the time or condition by which the oath was limited terminates\nthe obligation.\n\n(b) Extrinsically, an oath ceases by condonation (e.g., when the State\nor a private person to whom a sworn promise has been made yields the\nright and remits the obligation), by annulment (e.g., when a father\nnullifies the oath of his minor child), by dispensation (e.g., when the\nChurch absolves from an oath taken under grave compulsion), by\ncommutation (e.g., when the Church changes the matter of a sworn vow\ninto something more suitable). Those who can annul, dispense or commute\nvows have the same power over oaths; but if the dispensation of an oath\nis detrimental to others who are unwilling to forego the promise, only\nthe Apostolic See can dispense, and then on account of a necessary\nreason (see Canon 1320).\n\n2263. Adjuration.--Adjuration is the invocation of the name of God used\nin a request or command to another person in order to move that person\nto do or omit something.\n\n(a) It is an invocation, and in this respect it is like an oath, for\nboth an oath and an adjuration call upon the name of God.\n\n(b) It calls upon the name of God either explicitly (e.g., \u201cI command\nyou in the name of God\u201d) or implicitly (e.g., \u201cI beseech you for the\nsake of the passion of Christ\u201d). If command or request is made in the\nname of a creature and without reference to God\u2019s attributes reflected\nin them, there is not, properly speaking, an adjuration, as when one\nimplores a favor from another person in the name of a Patron Saint, or\nof one\u2019s country, parents, friendship, etc.\n\n(c) It is used in a command or a request, and thus it differs from\nprayer, which cannot be made in the form of a command. But adjuration\nmay be used in prayers to God Himself or to the Saints, as is done in\nobsecrations.\n\n(d) Its purpose is to move another to an act or omission, and thus it\nis different from an oath. The end of an oath is to confirm one\u2019s words\nby the testimony of God; the end of an adjuration is to influence\nanother to a certain course through an appeal to his respect, fear or\nlove of God.\n\n2264. The Species of Adjuration.--(a) Adjuration is solemn or simple\n(private). The solemn adjuration is made in the name of the Church by\nher ministers and in the ritual form prescribed by her, as in the\nexorcisms of Baptism. The simple adjuration is made by private persons\nand without ritual ceremony.\n\n(b) Adjuration is imperative or deprecative. The imperative is given in\nthe form of a command to inferiors or demons, as when St. Paul writes\nto the Thessalonians: \u201cI charge you by the Lord that this epistle be\nread\u201d (I Thess., v. 27). The deprecative is given in the form of a\nrequest made to God or to any creature not damned, as when St. Paul\nwrites to the Romans: \u201cI beseech you, brethren, by the love of God that\nyou present your bodies a living sacrifice\u201d (Rom., xii. 1).\n\n2265. Qualities of Lawful Adjuration.--Adjuration is lawful and an act\nof the virtue of religion, since it professes reverence for the divine\nattributes in using them as the most efficacious motives of appeal.\nBut, like an oath, adjuration must be accompanied by qualities that\nmake it lawful.\n\n(a) Thus, there must be judgment, and hence those persons are guilty of\nsin who employ adjuration without necessity (e.g., those who constantly\nurge the love of God and other religious motives when asking for any\nfavor), or without devotion (e.g., those who in anger are wont to\ncommand \u201cfor God\u2019s sake,\u201d etc.). The sin committed does not seem grave,\nsince there is no great disrespect and the malice consists in taking\nGod\u2019s name in vain, not in insult.\n\n(b) There must be truth, and hence an adjuration is sinful when used\nfor a lying cause, as when a well-to-do person pretends to be indigent\nand begs that alms be given him for the love of God. The sin committed\ndoes not seem grave, since the act to which the other person is invited\nis good, and the act of adjuration itself does not ask God to testify\nto the lie, but only uses His name without reason. If the deception is\nmortally sinful, however, some authorities think that the adjuration\nadded to it is a grave sin against religion.\n\n(c) There must be justice, and therefore an adjuration is sinful when\nused to obtain something unlawful, as when one demands in the name of\nGod that another person tell a lie or commit murder. The adjuration is\ngravely irreverent to God if the thing sought (e.g., murder) is a\nmortal sin; it is lightly irreverent, according to the common opinion,\nif the thing sought (e.g., a harmless lie) is only a venial sin.\n\n2266. Persons Who May Be Adjured.--God may be adjured, but only in a\ndeprecative manner, as is done in the obsecrations, \u201cthrough Jesus\nChrist,\u201d \u201cthrough Thy Passion and Death,\u201d etc. The purpose of\nadjurations addressed to God is not to change the divine decrees, but\nto obtain through His goodness what He intended from eternity that we\nshould obtain by prayer. But the same form of adjuration cannot be used\nfor all creatures.\n\n(a) Thus, deprecative adjuration may be used in reference to those who\nare in some way one\u2019s superiors. Hence, we may pray the Angels and\nSaints to grant a prayer for the love of God, and a beggar may ask in\nOur Lord\u2019s name that a wealthy man give him an alms.\n\n(b) Imperative adjuration may be used in addressing subjects or\ninferiors. Adjuration of demons must not be made in friendly words, nor\nwith a view to obtaining services or knowledge from them, but in words\nof reproach and only as a means to end their nefarious activities.\n\n(e) No kind of adjuration may be used in regard to irrational\ncreatures, since they are without knowledge sufficient for receiving a\ncommand or a request. The adjurations of animals, the elements,\ninanimate objects, etc., that are contained in the Ritual, must be\nunderstood as deprecative adjurations addressed to God, or imperative\nadjurations addressed to evil spirits, that the creatures prayed over\nmay be to our benefit and not to our hurt. Examples are the exorcisms\nof water, salt, mice, locusts, houses, or storms.\n\n2267. The Use of Exorcisms.--(a) As to their effect, exorcisms are of\ntwo kinds, exorcisms in the strict sense (i.e., the expulsion of demons\nfrom possessed persons) and exorcisms in the wide sense (i.e., the\ndiminution of demonic influence). Examples of the former are found in\nthe Gospels, where Our Lord drives out many evil spirits from afflicted\npersons; examples of the latter are found in the exorcisms administered\nin Baptism and in the exorcisms of salt, water and other inanimate or\nirrational creatures.\n\n(b) As to their manner, exorcisms are also of two kinds, the solemn and\nthe private. The former are made in the name of the Church in the\nmanner prescribed by the Ritual, and their administration is reserved\nto clerics who have a special and express permission from the Ordinary\n(Canon 1151, Sec. 1). The latter kind may be made even by members of the\nlaity, and we read that certain Saints, like St. Anthony and St.\nCatherine of Siena, had great power over evil spirits. It is\nrecommended that priests frequently use private exorcisms, at least\nsecretly, for persons who are vexed by temptations or scruples, and for\nwhich they may use the form: \u201cIn the name of Jesus Christ, unholy\nspirit, I command you to depart from this creature of God.\u201d\n\n2268. The Effects of Adjurations.--(a) Adjurations addressed to one\u2019s\nfellow-men upon earth impose no obligation of religion upon the persons\naddressed. Hence, if a rich man turns a deaf ear to an appeal for\ncharity made in the name of God, he violates charity but not religion;\nif a child disregards a command urged upon him for the love of God, he\nviolates obedience but not religion.\n\n(b) Adjurations addressed to demons are not of infallible efficacy, at\nleast as to the entire effect intended, for power over the spirits of\ndarkness is given only in such measure as is needed for the propagation\nof the Gospel. But we believe that an exorcism pronounced lawfully by\none who has the Order of Exorcist acts _ex opere operato_, at least to\nrestrain the wickedness of the demons: \u201cIn My name they shall cast out\ndemons\u201d (Mark, xvi. 17).\n\n2269. Praise of God.--Having discussed oaths and adjurations, in which\nhonor is shown the name of God, and the immediate end of which is or\nmay be some human advantage, we come now to the honor shown the name of\nGod by praise in which the immediate end is some spiritual advantage.\nPraise is defined as \u201cthe declaration of another\u2019s greatness with\napproval.\u201d The divine praises include the prayers of wonder, of honor,\nof thanksgiving; but they differ from prayer properly so called or\npetition (see 2153).\n\n2270. Internal and External Praise of God.--(a) Internal praise is\nexpressed by the thoughts and affections of the soul. This is the most\nimportant part of praise, and without it external praise loses much of\nits value. Our Lord reproved the Pharisees for honoring God with their\nlips, while their hearts were far from Him (Matt., xv. 8), and St. Paul\nadmonishes the Ephesians to sing and make melody to the Lord in their\nhearts (Ephes, v, 19).\n\n(b) External praise is expressed in words (\u201cI will bless the Lord at\nall times, His praise is always in my mouth,\u201d Psalm xxxiii. 1), or in\nsong (\u201cAdmonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual\ncanticles, singing in grace in your hearts to God,\u201d Col., iii. 16), or\nby music (\u201cPraise Him with sound of trumpet, with psaltery and harp,\nwith timbrel and choir, with strings and organs, with high-sounding\ncymbals,\u201d Psalm cl).\n\n2271. Excellence of Praise of God.--(a) Praise Is Due to God.--His\nessence and attributes are ineffable and above all praise (Ecclus.,\nxliii. 33), and they must be honored by the superior acts of worship\nand reverence. But the effects of His goodness shown to us should be\ndeclared and glorified: \u201cI will remember the tender mercies of the\nLord, the praise of the Lord for all the things the Lord hath bestowed\nupon us\u201d (Is., lxiii. 7).\n\n(b) Praise of God Is Advantageous to Man.--Internal praise lifts the\nsoul on high and prepares it to receive benefits from God, while\nexternal praise helps the mind to keep its attention fixed on God,\nexcludes those things that are contrary to Him, and offers edification\nto others. St. Augustine narrates in his _Confessions_ how profoundly\nhe was moved in spirit, even to tears, on hearing the hymns and\ncanticles of the Church.\n\n2272. Qualities that Should Be Present in the Divine Praises.--(a)\nInternally, there should be devotion. It is useful that those who\nperform or assist at the praises of God understand what is said, but it\nsuffices for devotion that they know His greatness and goodness is\nbeing proclaimed. The intention should be to honor God, and hence there\nis no act of personal religion if in reciting or hearing God\u2019s praises\none intends only ostentation or pleasure; attention should also be\ngiven to what is said, and hence St. Augustine says that it is a sin to\nthink rather of the music than of the praise of God proclaimed by the\nmusic (see 2164 sqq.).\n\n(b) Externally, the divine praises should be respectful to God and\nhelpful to recollection and devotion. Hence, the law of the Church\nexcludes from her services all that is of a disturbing, profane or\nsinful character, such as theatrical displays, musical instruments that\ndistract the mind from religious thoughts, lascivious airs or those\nsuggestive of the dance. The Code prescribes that impure music of every\nkind must be eliminated from churches (Canon 1264), and Pius X in his\nMotu Proprio of 1903 lays down the rule that there must be nothing in\nthe services of the Church that is calculated to diminish piety, give\nreasonable scandal or disgust, or offend the decorum of sacred\nfunctions or the sacredness of the place (see also Instruction on\nSacred Art [Holy Office, 30 June, 1952], AAS 44-542). The sin committed\nby misbehavior or levity during divine services depends on the\nseriousness of the disrespect shown to God or the scandal given the\nbeholders.\n\n2273. The Sins against Religion.--Inasmuch as religion is a moral\nvirtue and therefore consists in the observance of a golden mean, the\nsins opposed to it are the extremes of excess or defect. (a) The sins\nof excess offend, not because they offer too much worship to God (a\nthing that is impossible), but because they exceed by giving worship\nwhere it is not due or in a manner that is not due (superstition). (b)\nThe sins of defect offend by denying due religious reverence to God\nHimself (temptation of God, perjury) or to sacred things (sacrilege,\nsimony).\n\n2274. Superstition.--Superstition is false religion, or a vice that\noffers improper worship to the true God or divine worship to a false\ngod. Improper worship of the true God is either false or superfluous.\n\n(a) False worship is opposed to the truth of religion (e.g., Old\nTestament rites which signify that Christ is still to come), or of\nrites (e.g., Mass by a layman, Mass according to a form disapproved by\nthe Church), or of facts (e.g., fictitious revelations, ecstasies,\nmysticism, miracles, relies), or of morals (e.g., human sacrifice,\npraises of God to the accompaniment of lascivious words or music, etc.).\n\n(b) Superfluous worship is offered when an external observance in no\nway serves the purposes of religion (viz., the glory of God, the\nelevation of the soul to Him, the repression of the passions), or is\nopposed to law or common custom. The purposes of religion are not\nserved by actions foolish in themselves (e.g., the repeated mumbling of\nmeaningless sounds) or in their intent (e.g., undue emphasis given to\nminor details of a religious act, such as color of the candles on the\naltar, the stature of the celebrant, the hour or condition of the\nweather, etc., as if weighty consequences depended on them). The chain\nprayer is another example of a superstition that places all the virtue\nof an act of worship in some small external circumstance. The law and\ncustom are not followed in such superstitions as additional crosses,\nalleluias, credos, etc., made in violation of Mass rubrics, or a\ndevotion consisting of fasts on Sundays, or new forms of piety that\nlack ecclesiastical approval. There is no superstition, however, in\nmodes of worship approved by the Church (such as novenas, tridua,\nGregorian Masses, and the like), for the Church recognizes no devotion\nor ceremony unless it is true and useful as an expression of religion.\n\n2275. The Sinfulness of Improper Worship of God.--(a) False worship is\nfrom its nature a grave sin; it is seriously insulting to God because\nit offers Him dishonor as honor, and it is also seriously harmful to\nman because it casts discredit by its falsity on the name of religion.\n(b) Superfluous worship is from its nature a venial sin, since it\ncontains no notable irreverence towards God and, being outlawed, does\nnot reflect on religion. Accidentally, however, it may be a mortal sin,\nas when it is performed in such a way as to cause great scandal.\n\n2276. Worship of False Deity.--Worship of a false deity is performed by\noffering a creature an act of homage due to God alone. Hence, there are\nthree species of this superstition: (a) a creature is recognized as\nGod, when it is offered a service (such as sacrifice) that testifies to\nsupreme and infinite excellence (idolatry); (b) a creature is given the\ncredit of divine knowledge, when instruction about hidden matters which\nonly God could bestow is asked from it (divination), (c) a creature is\ntreated as the supreme ruler, when assistance which only God can grant\nis sought from it (vain observance).\n\n2277. Definition of Idolatry.--Idolatry is the supreme worship of\n_latria_ offered to a creature.\n\n(a) It is supreme worship, and hence the inferior reverence of\n_hyperdulia, dulia_, or civil honor, offered respectively to the\nBlessed Mother, angels, saints, superiors, etc., is not idolatry. The\nexternal signs of worship that belong to God alone (such as sacrifice,\ntemples, priesthood, altars, etc.), may never be used in the veneration\nof creatures; nor the signs that are common to God and creatures (such\nas genuflexions, prostrations, prayers, etc.), if the intention is to\nadore.\n\n(b) Idolatry is offered, that is, by it an act of worship is intended\nor is at least performed in a serious manner. Hence, it would not be\nidolatry so to enact a pagan ceremony that the onlookers could\nunderstand that no religious rite was being performed (e.g., if it were\ndone on the stage, or in a joking manner).\n\n(c) Idolatry is offered to a creature, and hence the relative honor\nthat is shown the images of the Trinity or of Christ on account of the\npersons represented by them is not idolatry. The creature to whom\nidolatry is shown is either a person (e.g., an Angel, the soul of a\ndeparted person, a living human being), or an irrational creature\n(e.g., the bull Apis, a sacred plant), or an inanimate substance (e.g.,\nstatues or pictures, the elements, the heavenly bodies), or a\nfictitious being (e.g., Jupiter and the other gods of mythology).\n\n2278. The Kinds of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is either internal or\nexternal. Internal idolatry has the intention to adore a creature, as\nwhen a Satanist offers sacrifice to demons. External idolatry performs\nan outward rite that signifies adoration of a creature, although there\nis no will to give adoration, as when a Christian out of fear of death\nreluctantly burns incense before an idol. (b) Internal idolatry is\neither perfect or imperfect. Perfect idolatry includes belief in a\nfalse god, as when an ignorant pagan prays to the sun and moon.\nImperfect idolatry is committed when, without belief in a false god,\nthere is the will to offer it divine worship on account of hatred of\nGod, wish to obtain favors from demons, or the like.\n\n2279. The Sinfulness of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is a most grievous\ncrime. It entails rebellion against the majesty of God, attack on the\nvirtue of religion, unbelief or denial of faith, and scandal; and hence\nit is forbidden in the first commandment: \u201cThou shalt not have strange\ngods before Me. Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them\u201d (Exod., xx.\n3 sqq.).\n\n(b) Idolatry in itself and in its highest degree is the most grievous\nof sins, for it includes both hatred of God (since it would deprive Him\nof His unique excellence by giving His honors to creatures) and\nblasphemous unbelief (since the idolater publicly professes that God is\nnot above all). Now, it was said above that unbelief, hatred of God and\nblasphemy are the most enormous of sins (see 820, 895, 1301, 1302), and\nso it follows that the worst form of idolatry is graver than other sins.\n\n(c) Idolatry, by reason of the dispositions of the person who commits\nit, may be less grievous than other sins. Thus, it is worse to hate or\ndeny God internally than to worship an idol externally only; it is\nworse to blaspheme with great hatred and contempt than to practise\nidolatry with less malice. Imperfection of the act, as in cases of\nignorance or want of consent, makes the sin venial, or no formal sin at\nall.\n\n2280. Comparison of Different Sins of Idolatry.--(a) Internal idolatry\nis worse than external idolatry, because the former, though not the\nlatter, includes approval of the superstition committed. (b) Imperfect\nidolatry is worse than perfect idolatry, if both be considered\nprecisely as idolatry, since the former proceeds from malice, and the\nlatter from greater or less ignorance. (c) External idolatry is\naggravated when its motive is more sinful or makes the act more\nvoluntary (e.g., it is worse to pretend sacrifice to an idol if the\nmotive is to ingratiate oneself with the idolaters or to spite the\nChristians, than if the motive is to escape death at the hands of the\npagans).\n\n2281. Idolatry Possible in Christian Worship.--The guilt of idolatry\nmay be incurred even by Christians offering worship to God. (a) Thus,\nin the adoration of the Eucharist there would be idolatry, at least\nmaterial, if an unconsecrated host were exposed for veneration or given\nin communion. (b) In the veneration of the Saints there would be\nidolatry, if they were honored or invoked as if they possessed divine\nattributes.\n\n2282. Definition of Divination.--Divination (soothsaying,\nfortune-telling) is a form of superstition in which the evil spirits\nare invoked explicitly or implicitly with a view to the discovery of\nwhat is future or occult.\n\n(a) It is a form of superstition, because it seeks to obtain through\nnatural means knowledge that cannot be had except from God, or\nsubstitutes other teachers for God.\n\n(b) It contains the invocation of evil spirits, for the information\nsought surpasses the powers of nature and, being illicit, cannot be\nexpected from supernatural powers that are good (such as God, the\nAngels, the Saints).\n\n(c) The invocation is explicit or implicit. There is explicit calling\non the evil spirits when one prays to the demon or makes an agreement\nwith him; there is implicit invocation when one does not address an\nevil spirit, but does employ means for the discovery of knowledge which\nare not adequate, either from their nature or from the will of God, for\nthe desired effect.\n\n(d) The knowledge desired is of future or occult things, that is, of\nsuch things as cannot be foreseen in their causes or discovered by\nnatural means (such as the future acts of free beings, the secret\nthoughts of the heart).\n\n2283. Distinction between the Fact and Sin of Divination.--(a) The fact\nof divination--that is, the actual manifestation by evil spirits of\nthings humanly unknowable--is not impossible, since the demons are far\nsuperior to man in intelligence and knowledge, and it is the teaching\nof revelation that they use their powers to mislead and seduce mankind.\nTheir knowledge, however, does not extend to future contingencies, nor\nto the secrets of hearts, and their word cannot be relied on. A case of\nreal communication by an evil spirit is that of the girl of Philippi\npossessed by a pythonical spirit (Acts, xiv. 16-18), and some think\nthat the same can be said of the Witch of Endor (I Kings, xxvii. 7-25);\nbut no doubt there have been many instances of divination in which the\nintervention of demons was only imaginary.\n\n(b) The sin of divination is committed when one has the will to receive\noccult knowledge from forbidden sources, or uses the means to obtain\nknowledge from those sources, even though there be no communication or\nresponse on the part of the spirits of evil.\n\n2284. Forms of Explicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is\nexplicit invocation of the demon is of various kinds according to the\nmedium through which instruction is given or expected.\n\n(a) Thus, the medium is direct if it is an external sensible appearance\nrepresenting the demon (_praestigium_) or an internal picture in the\nimagination or a dream containing his answer (oneiromancy).\n\n(b) The medium is indirect and rational when it is a human being, dead\nor living. Divination through the evocation of the departed is known as\nnecromancy, while that which is given through living possessed persons\nis called pythonism. Modern Spiritism partakes of the character of both\nnecromancy (since the spirits of the departed are consulted) and\npythonism (since persons supposed to be under the control of familiar\nspirits act as mediums).\n\n(c) The medium is indirect and irrational when it is some solid body\n(such as iron, stone or crystal) in which figures or signs appear;\nidols from which oracles are received; tables or ouija boards from\nwhich answers are given by raps or writing; divining rods supposed to\nlead the way to any hidden person or thing, etc. (geomancy); or some\nliquid body (hydromancy), or air (aeromancy), or fire (pyromancy), or\nthe entrails of sacrificial victims or natural prodigies, such as\nlightning (haruspicy). Here also may be mentioned the superstition of\nordeal by fire, boiling water, combat, etc., once used to determine the\nguilt or innocence of an accused person.\n\n2285. Forms of Implicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is only\nimplicit invocation of evil spirits is manifold, just as the natural\ncauses from which preternatural knowledge is expected are manifold.\nAmong the principal forms are the following:\n\n(a) that which is made from the human mind, when clairvoyance or\nclair-audience is employed. It is supposed that certain persons have\nthe natural gift, at least when in a trance or hypnotic state, of\nperceiving what is done or said at a distance without any of the normal\nmeans of communication, and even of reading minds. This supposed inborn\ngift is sometimes called second sight or telepathy. Some authorities\nhold that there is sufficient evidence for vision at a distance as a\nsixth sense in certain individuals, especially among primitive peoples\nand persons bound by a tie of blood or intimate friendship. Moreover,\nmany facts learned through telepathy seem to have been verified\nsufficiently to render telepathy probable. Accordingly, to believe\ntelepathy or to practice it, excluding all superstition and invocation\nof demons, is not illicit.\n\n(b) divination that is made from the human body in physiognomy,\nphrenology, and chiromancy. The physiognomist pretends that he is able\nto discover the hidden character, latent abilities or defects, secret\nthoughts, etc., by a study of the features or expression of the\ncountenance. The phrenologist claims that he can read the mental and\nmoral traits of a person from the bumps or prominences of the skull.\nThe chiromantist, or palmist, promises to foretell the future, read the\npast, discover the present secret character and aptitudes of an\nindividual from an inspection of the shape, lines and configuration of\nhis hand and of the character of the lines and marks of his palms;\n\n(c) divination that is made from non-human and necessary events in\nastrology. This pseudo-science gives predictions about the fortunes of\nan individual drawn from a study of his horoscope (i.e., the aspect of\nthe heavenly bodies at the moment of his birth) and of certain rules of\ninterpretation;\n\n(d) divination that is made from non-human and contingent events in\naugury and auspice, which divine from the voices or manner of flight of\nbirds; in omen or portent, which divine the future from some chance\nhappening (such as meeting with a red-haired woman or a hunchback, a\nsneeze, etc.), in sortilege, which divines by lots or signs arbitrarily\nchosen (such as the letters that appear on opening a book at random,\nthe numbers or figures that appear when cards are drawn or dice\nthrown). Superstitions about omens are of two kinds, some happenings\nbeing regarded as signs of good luck (e.g., to find a pin), others as\nsigns of bad luck (e.g., to meet a black cat, to spill the salt, to\nbreak a mirror, to raise an umbrella in the house).\n\n2286. The Malice of the Sin of Divination.--(a) The Theological\nSpecies.--If there is explicit invocation of evil spirits, divination\nis of its nature a mortal sin that admits of no lightness of matter,\nfor it gives divine worship to a creature, acts on friendly terms with\nthe enemy of God, and prepares one for apostasy and eternal damnation.\nIf there is no explicit invocation of the spirits of evil, the sin is\nof its nature mortal on account of the implicit commerce with the\ndevil; but generally the sin will be light on account of the\ndispositions of the offender (e.g., because he is ignorant, or consults\ndivination as a joke or from curiosity, or has no faith in it). Hence,\nthe faithful should be warned not to go to fortune-tellers or put faith\nin dreams, but, apart from such cases as serious scandal, habitual\ndirection of one\u2019s life by superstition, cooperation in serious sin of\na diviner, etc., the sin will usually be venial, at least in young\npeople. Persons who occasionally act or omit to act in some indifferent\nmatter on account of dreams they have had are often excused from all\nsin on account of the fear or hope which the dreams excited.\n\n(b) The Moral Species.--All forms of divination, it is commonly held,\nbelong to the same species of worship of a false god (Deut., xviii.\n10-12). Yet, the confessor should be told about an explicit pact with\nevil spirits, if there was one, since thus he will be able to decide\nthe gravity of the sin and to make inquiries about other sins that\nusually accompany such a pact (e.g., blasphemy, promise to serve the\ndevil, sacrileges, etc.).\n\n2287. When Knowledge Is Obtained from God.--There is no sin of\ndivination when knowledge is obtained from God.\n\n(a) Thus, God can communicate directly in a vision or dream, and there\nare examples of this in Scripture, But generally one should not be\nguided by dreams as if they were means for supernatural knowledge,\nsince nearly all dreams are produced by natural causes. It is not\nsinful to believe that a dream of an extraordinary kind (e.g., one in\nwhich the future is wonderfully foretold or a warning given, or which\nproduces great spiritual good) was sent by God.\n\n(b) God can communicate through other human beings, and hence it is not\nsuperstitious to put faith in the private visions or revelations that\nhave been recognized by the Church, or that have the marks of\ngenuineness required by the Church.\n\n(c) God has sometimes communicated through the instrumentality of\nirrational beings or by means of portents. Thus, Gedeon took the words\nof enemy soldiers as a premonition of victory (Judges, vii. 15);\nEliezer chose a sign by which to recognize the woman who should be the\nwife of Isaac (Gen, xxiv. 14); the ordeal of bitter waters was\nprescribed in Numbers, v. 11 sqq.; Josue discovered the guilt of Achan\nby lots (Josue, vii. 14), and St. Matthias was elected to the\nApostolate by lots (Acts, i. 23-26). But these were exceptional cases\nin which men were inspired to consult God as they did, and it would be\nsuperstitious to seek knowledge in these ways against the will of God.\nThose who desire light and guidance should have recourse to the\nteachers God has provided on earth and should pray to God, leaving to\nHim the ways and means of His answer. Hence, the Church has declared it\nunlawful, even in private, to call upon the good spirits to give\nanswers through automatic writing (_Collect. de Prop. Fide_, 1894), or\nto interrogate the dead at spiritistic seances (AAS, 1917, IX, 268). It\nis not superstitious, however, in a grave matter when there is no\nordinary means of instruction at hand, to offer a prayer to God and\nthen have recourse to lots to decide what course shall be followed\n(Prov., xvi. 33).\n\n2288. When Knowledge Is Obtained Through Natural Causes.--There is no\nsin of divination when knowledge of the future or of hidden things is\nobtained through proportionate natural causes or indications.\n\n(a) Thus, knowledge of future happenings is naturally deducible from\ntheir necessary causes, when these causes are known. The effect may be\npredicted with certainty if the cause is so determined to one course\nthat its result is invariable (e.g., the revolution of the earth around\nthe sun always brings on the four seasons of the year); it may be\npredicted with the greatest probability if the cause is so constituted\nthat almost always it has a certain consequence (e.g., a seed properly\nplanted usually grows into a tree). Hence, there is no superstition in\nastronomical predictions, weather forecasts by meteorologists, tables\nof life expectancy drawn up by insurance experts, etc., since these are\ninferences from known scientific laws.\n\n(b) Knowledge of hidden things is naturally deducible with more or less\ncertainty from the presence of their known causes, or effects, or\nindications. Hence, a physician is not accused of superstition if he\nreasons out the character or phase of an internal disease from the\nsymptoms that exhibit themselves. Moralists today generally agree that\nthe use of the magic wand (divining rod, dipping rod, dowser) for the\ndiscovery of subterranean springs, mineral deposits, oil wells, etc.,\nis not superstitious, although there is some difference of opinion and\nuncertainty about the cause of the phenomenon. It is true that many\nmeans of detection or discovery, supposedly scientific, are due to\nmisunderstanding of scientific principles or of logic; but their\nauthors, since they rely on natural causes, are guilty of ignorance or\nquackery rather than superstition.\n\n2289. Use of Lots.--Is it lawful to use lots in settlement of some\nbusiness, when there is no intention to seek preternatural oracle?\n\n(a) It is lawful to do this, if there is some reason of necessity or\nutility or amusement to justify the lots, and no injustice or\nprohibition of law. Hence, if there is no other convenient method of\ndecision, one may use the drawing of straws or cards to decide how\nlands or goods shall be divided between claimants, or which of several\ncompetitors shall receive a reward or office.\n\n(b) It is not lawful to do this, if there is a prohibition of law\n(e.g., ecclesiastical elections may not be made by lot), or if there is\nno necessity for the lots (e.g., it is at least foolish to use the\nGospels for deciding by lot matters that could be decided by\nreflection), or if injury is done another person (e.g., to decide by\nlot when the merits of two contestants are unequal, to practise\nunfairness in the drawing).\n\n2290. Vain Observance.--Vain observance is a superstition that ascribes\nto certain things effects for which they have no natural or\ncommunicated power.\n\n(a) It ascribes the effects to natural things, but it supposes that in\nsome way supernatural forces, not of religion, are at work in or\nthrough these things. Thus, just as in divination, there is in vain\nobservance either an express or an implied invocation of the spirits of\nevil. The alchemists, who thought there was a philosopher\u2019s stone able\nto transmute base metals into gold or an elixir that could greatly\nprolong life, looked to natural causes, and hence to that extent seem\nto be guilty of false science, rather than of superstition. Scientific\nmaterialism, though, is a crasser form of ignorance than any\nsuperstition that trusts in super-material powers.\n\n(b) The things which vain observance makes use of are persons, acts,\nobjects, circumstances, happenings, etc. Even sacred things may be\nemployed as the material for vain observance, as happens when some\naccidental and unnecessary circumstance of a sacred rite (e.g., the\nsize or color of candles) is given the credit of the sacred results.\nHere again vain observance and divination are alike, since the same\nmeans are employed by both.\n\n(c) The effects looked for in vain observance, or the purpose had in\nview, is some fact or event. It is this characteristic that\ndistinguishes vain observance from divination: the latter aims at\noccult knowledge, the former at supranatural results. The expected fact\nor event is something that surpasses the natural powers of physical or\nhuman agencies (e.g., sensation without sense excitants, mind-reading\nwithout external indications, scientific knowledge without study,\nbodily feats without corresponding bodily powers, detection of secret\nand hidden things without human means for detection), or even of the\ninvisible world of spirits (e.g., creation, generation of new\nsubstances, evocation of the dead, internal motion of man\u2019s will).\n\n(d) There is no natural power in the things used for producing the\nsubstance or mode of the desired effects, that is, no inherent and\nsufficient force or activity. Hence, vain observance is not to be\nconfused with scientific marvels or natural wonders whose explanation\nis unknown to the general public, or which cannot be fully explained by\nscientists themselves. Thus, the baffling tricks of white magic are due\nto legerdemain, ventriloquism, ocular delusions, and the like; the\nphysiological changes (e.g., convulsions, hysteria, somnambulism,\nbodily cures) produced in mesmerism, hypnotism, thought healing, etc.,\nare explained by suggestion and the motor power of images excited to\nproduce bodily motions, passions, or changes; the mental phenomena\n(e.g., hyperaesthesia, wondrous visions, increased vigor of mind) of\ncertain drugs such as hashish, mescal and opium, are caused by\nproperties of these drugs.\n\n(e) There is no communicated power in the things employed, that is, no\ninstrumental virtue bestowed by a higher cause. Hence, since\nSacraments, sacramentals, and miracle-working relics have from God in a\ngreater or less degree an efficacy for results above nature, there is\nno superstition in their proper use, But, as was noted just above,\nsacred things themselves may be used superstitiously, as happens when\nthey are regarded as principal agents, or when, contrary to fact, they\nare deemed to act infallibly or independently of any human cooperation\nor disposition.\n\n2291. Forms of Vain Observance.--Among the forms of vain observance are\nthe following:\n\n(a) those by which one puts into use vain ceremonies or objects in the\nexpectation that they will secure certain desired effects, or puts an\nexaggerated confidence in lawful rites or sacred objects;\n\n(b) those by which one directs one\u2019s life through fortuitous and\nimpertinent happenings in the belief that they have the power to\ninfluence one\u2019s fortunes favorably or adversely. This form of\nsuperstition is like divination by omens; the difference is that in\nusing omens one chiefly seeks for knowledge of the future, while in\nobserving chance events one chiefly intends the direction of one\u2019s\nconduct. Examples are found in persons who fear to make a journey on\nFriday or to begin any important affair during the dark of the moon.\n\n2292. Vain Observances from which Desired Effects Are Expected.--(a)\nUseful results are sometimes expected, such as knowledge for the mind\n(notorious art) or health for the body (healing observances). The\nnotorious art consisted in the repeating of certain formulas or the\ngazing upon certain figures, prayers and fasts at times being added,\nand it was supposed that these practices would obtain infused knowledge\nwithout the necessity of labor or study. Healing observances are\nremedies used for man or beast that manifestly have no natural curative\nproperties (e.g., a buckeye or rabbit\u2019s foot carried in the pocket to\nward off rheumatism).\n\n(b) Wondrous results are sometimes expected, such as the power to bring\non storms, telekinesis, materialization, and levitation, through the\nuse of incantations, theurgic sacraments, spiritistic rites, etc. This\nis known as the black art or black magic.\n\n(c) Evil effects are sometimes expected, such as the power to blight\nanother by a glance (evil eye or fascination), the power to cast a\nspell over another person by certain spoken words, to bring disease or\nmisfortune on a person by piercing or striking his effigy, to excite\nimpure love for a determinate person by the administration of love\nphiltres or charms, etc. (sorcery, witchcraft).\n\n2293. Distinction between the Fact and the Sin of Vain Observance.--(a)\nThe Fact.--The demons have naturally powers over our world that surpass\nthose of human or physical agents, and it is not impossible for them to\nproduce prodigies or seeming miracles. The magicians of Egypt by\nenchantments and certain secrets changed rods into serpents, etc.\n(Exod., vii. 12, viii. 7); the New Testament narrates that Simon the\nMagician bewitched the Samaritans by his magic (Acts, viii. 11), and it\nclearly foretells the lying wonders of Satan and Antichrist (Matt.,\nxxiv. 24; II Thess., ii. 9). But there are limits to the power of the\nfallen spirits; for example, they cannot infuse knowledge, and\noccultism has contributed nothing to the advancement of science or\ncivilization. Moreover, many effects that have been attributed to\ndemonic intervention were due to natural causes or to fraud (e.g., a\nlarge proportion of spiritistic phenomena), or they were supposed to\nexist only because the popular mind was carried away by excitement or\nwas bent on persecution (e.g., most of the witchcraft accusations of a\nfew centuries ago).\n\n(b) The Sin.--Vain observance in which there is no express invocation\nof evil spirits is common enough; even religious, educated and\npractical persons are found to act on superstitious hopes or fears or\nto put confidence in charms or amulets. But vain observance that\nincludes an express invocation of demons is a comparatively rare sin.\nIt is not impossible, however, that a person should come to such a pass\nof despair or malice as to wish to have dealings with Satan, or should\nbe so carried away by curiosity, desire of wealth, power, fame, or\nhonor as to be willing to barter his soul in exchange for them. That\nthere were professional wizards from ancient times is a matter of\nhistory, and Scripture contains severe prohibitions against dealings\nwith them (Levit., xix. 31, xx. 27; Deut., xviii. 10).\n\n2294. Superstition in Religious Observances.--Superstition is sometimes\nfound even in religious observances. (a) Thus, there is superstition in\nthe observance itself when vain additions are made to an approved usage\n(e.g., the addition to a prayer against sickness of gestures,\nbreathings, gibberish, etc., that have no significance of reverence for\nGod). (b) There is superstition in the manner of the observance when\none attributes the virtue of a sacred rite or object to some\nunimportant circumstance (e.g., the shape of the reliquary in which a\nrelic is carried, the \u201cpropitious\u201d day on which a sacramental was\nreceived), or expects from a sacred thing an effect which it has no\npower to produce (e.g., infallible certainty of salvation from the\nperformance of a certain devotion or the presence of a holy picture or\nblessed object). It is not superstition, however, to attach\nsignificance to circumstances that have a sacred meaning (e.g.,\nholydays, figures that have a religious symbolism), or to put a\nconfidence in sacred things that is based on their character or\napproved usage (e.g., the hope and trust that blessings will be\nimpetrated and salvation itself through fidelity to an authorized\ndevotion).\n\n2295. Sinfulness of Vain Observance.--The malice of vain observance is\nessentially the same as that of divination, for in both superstitions\nthe same virtue of religion is offended by the sinful cult that is\nperformed.\n\n(a) Thus, there is mortal sin from the nature of the act, when vain\nobservance is exercised with invocation of evil spirits or with false\nreligious rites (for a serious injury is done to the honor due to God),\nor when a vain observance is meant to bring a curse or grave misfortune\non a neighbor (for a serious injustice is willed).\n\n(b) There is regularly only a venial sin, when a vain observance is of\na non-religious kind, consisting in foolish heed given to chance\nhappenings (such as a rabbit running across the road, the mention of\ndeath, the presence of a person regarded as a Jonah), or the use of\nimproportionate means (e.g., to change one\u2019s place at a card table in\norder to change the luck). For usually there is no irreverence in such\npractices, and at the worst they are foolish and idle acts. Often there\nis no sin at all, the vain observance being due to ignorance or the\nwish to joke.\n\n(c) There is no sin at all, but rather subjective virtue, in religious\npractices to which on account of simplicity or invincible ignorance too\nmuch power is attributed, as when one who is faithful to the essential\nduties of religion has greater confidence in some personal devotion of\nhis own than in them. But superstition of this kind, though in itself\nit is the least reprehensible form of superstition, may be very harmful\nand disedifying.\n\n2296. Cooperation in Divination or Other Form of Superstition.--(a)\nFormal cooperation is of course never lawful (e.g., to act as the\nmedium or one of the deceivers at a spiritistic meeting). (b) Material\ncooperation is lawful only when there is a proportionately grave\nreason, no danger of sin, and no scandal. Thus, it seems that no sin is\ncommitted by a scientist who assists at a spiritistic seance in order\nto discover the frauds that are resorted to, or who makes experiments\nwith table turning or planchette movements in order to examine into the\ntheory that the phenomena are due to the action of the persons present.\n\n2297. Doubtful Cases of Vain Observance.--Cases in which it is a matter\nof doubt or dispute whether divination or vain observance is present.\n\n(a) There is sometimes uncertainty whether an extraordinary fact is due\nto natural or supranatural causes, Thus, authorities commonly take the\nposition, it seems, that certain phenomena of Spiritism (e.g., the\napparently automatic movement of tables on which a group of persons\nrest their finger tips, the answers to questions that are rapped out by\nsuch tables), and of mental healing (e.g., the cure of bodily ailment\nby sympathy or moral influence), are accomplished through natural\npowers of matter or mind. But other authorities incline to a\nsupranaturalistic explanation.\n\n(b) There is also at times uncertainty whether a fact or practice has a\nreligious or an irreligious character. As to facts, they sometimes\nappear to be so marvellous as to pass the natural, and yet it is\ndifficult to determine whether their source is good or evil (e.g., when\nan ignorant person not noted for piety seems to have a remarkable\nability for treating and curing all kinds of diseases). As to\npractices, they are sometimes susceptible of a religious or a\nsuperstitious interpretation. Thus, one who says, \u201cGod bless us,\u201d at a\nsneeze may intend a prayer against sickness; one who knocks on wood\nafter boasting may intend a prayer to Him who died on the wood of the\ncross, lest he be punished for boasting.\n\n2298. Licitness of Using Doubtfully Superstitious Means.--It is lawful\nto use means that are only doubtfully superstitious if the following\nconditions are present:\n\n(a) internally or subjectively, there must be a good conscience about\nthe use of the means. The rule can be followed that what is not\ncertainly of a supranatural character may be regarded as natural, but\nthat what seems to be supranatural is not to be ascribed to God unless\nit has the marks and fruits of a divine work. When lawfully using means\nof a dubious character, it is advisable to make an inner protestation\nthat one acts from reasonable necessity, and has no wish to take part\nin superstition;\n\n(b) externally or objectively, there must be nothing in the object or\ncircumstances or results to make the use of the means illicit. Thus,\neven though a practice be not superstitious, it may be unlawful because\nof the immorality of its object or tendency (e.g., frauds used by\npsychical researchers, obscene messages given by laboratory\ntelepathists), or of its purpose (e.g., table-rapping used as the\ninstrument of pretended religious revelations), or because of the evil\nconsequences for body or soul (e.g., devotees of the ouija board give\nscandal to others and often end in insanity or suicide).\n\n2299. Irreligiousness.--We now proceed to the four sins that offend\nreligion by defect, namely, temptation of God and perjury, which show\ndisrespect to God Himself, and sacrilege and simony, which show\ndisrespect to holy things (see 2273). Perjury has been treated above\n(see 2249), and hence we shall consider now only the other three forms\nof irreligiousness.\n\n2300. Temptation of God.--Temptation of God is a word or deed that puts\nGod to the test to discover whether He possesses or will exercise some\nperfection.\n\n(a) It is a word or deed, such as a prayer whose purpose is to discover\nwhether God is possessed of knowledge, power or goodness, or an act of\ndefiance performed in order to prove that there is no God.\n\n(b) It puts God to the test, that is, the temptation is not seductive\n(since it is impossible to influence God to sin), but experimental. He\nwho tempts God desires that God give some proof of His attributes.\n\n(c) It is concerned with God, hence there is no temptation of God if\none legitimately tests out the character of a human being. God Himself\ntempted by trial holy men like Abraham, Job, and Tobias in order that\ntheir virtue might be manifested and an example given to others. And of\nspirits St. John says: \u201cBelieve not every spirit, but try the spirits\nif they be of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the\nworld\u201d (I John, iv. 1).\n\n(d) The purpose is to discover, without regard to the ordinary means of\ninstruction and guidance appointed by God, whether God possesses or\nwill exercise an attribute; that is, temptation of God is due to\nunbelief or to presumption.\n\n2301. Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God.--(a) To seek a proof\nof divine perfections is not temptation of God, if the purpose is only\nto find new reasons for what one already accepts, or to experience in\nan affective way what one already admits speculatively. Hence, a\ntheologian may study the attributes of God with a view to further\nillumination; hence also, one may prove the sweetness of God or the\ngoodness of His will from the spiritual taste or relish for divine\nthings (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom., xii. 2).\n\n(b) To seek a sign of God\u2019s will or a manifestation of His perfections\nis not temptation of God, if this is done, not from curiosity,\nostentation or other vain motive, but from some reason of necessity or\ngreat utility, as when Gedeon prayed for a sign that the Lord had\nspoken to him or was with him (Judges, vi. 17, 37), or when Elias\ncalled on Jehovah to show His power before the worshippers of Baal (III\nKings, xviii. 37). Hence, he does not tempt God who, when ordinary\nmeans of direction fail him in some critical affair, asks humbly for a\nsign of God\u2019s will; or who in a matter of great moment asks for\nmiraculous help if it be pleasing to God to grant it; or who exposes\nhimself to serious danger for some priceless good that cannot otherwise\nbe had, in the trust that God will be with him.\n\n2302. Kinds of Temptation of God.--(a) In relation to its source,\ntemptation of God arises either from unbelief or from presumption. The\nformer, which is temptation of God in the strict sense, exists when one\ndisbelieves or doubts some attribute of God and seeks to put it to the\nproof, as when the Israelites in the desert called into question the\nprovidence and power of Jehovah (Exod., xvii. 7, Psalm lxxvii. 18, 19),\nor when a person doubting the Real Presence asks for a miraculous sight\nof Christ in the Eucharist. The latter sin, which is temptation of God\nin the wide sense, is committed when a believing person asks without a\njust cause for a miraculous manifestation of God\u2019s will, or powers, or\nof some other thing, as when a lazy man asks that his work be done in\nsome miraculous way, or a rash man neglects the ordinary care of his\nhealth, asking that God supply for his carelessness. But temptation of\nGod is not to be identified with the theological sin of presumption\n(see 1081).\n\n(b) In relation to its manner, temptation of God is either express or\ninterpretative. It is express when one intends by one\u2019s word or act to\nput God to the proof in respect to knowledge, power, reliability, or\nother perfection (as when the Jews demanded that Christ come down from\nthe Cross, if He were the Son of God) or to satisfy a vain curiosity or\nboldness (as when Herod asked Christ to work some miracles for his\namusement). Temptation of God is interpretative when one does not\nintend to discover God\u2019s perfections or make presumptuous requests, but\nnevertheless so acts or omits to act that one\u2019s conduct is useful for\nnothing except temptation of God, as when a believer rashly promises a\nmiracle to convince an unbeliever, a sick man refuses to use any\nmedical care (Ecclus., xxxviii. 4), a lecturer goes entirely unprepared\nto his lecture, etc. Prayer made without the proper dispositions is a\nquasi-temptation of God (Ecclus., xviii. 23), because it is\ndisrespectful and presumptuous; but it is not real temptation of God,\nnor of its nature mortally sinful, the direct end of the act being\nlaziness or some other state of soul unsuitable to prayer.\n\n2303. Causes that Exclude the Interpretative Temptation of God.--There\nis no interpretative temptation of God strictly speaking if one acts\nrashly or encounters danger, but does not at all expect miraculous or\nspecial intervention from God. This happens as follows:\n\n(a) when one is unconcerned whether evil results or not, or desires\nthat it may result (e.g., when a person who is tired of life seeks a\ndangerous occupation for the diversion and excitement it affords, or\nwhen a person practises abstinence from certain remedies as an act of\nmoderate mortification);\n\n(b) when one does not wish the evil result, but is so stupid or rash as\nto believe that an imprudent risk can be taken and evil escaped through\nchance or good luck, as when a student goes up for a difficult\nexamination with slight preparation, trusting that only the things he\nknows will be asked.\n\n2304. Refusal of Medicine or Hygienic Care.--(a) If there is a\nsufficient reason for this conduct, no sin is committed. There may be\nsufficient reasons of a natural kind (e.g., that the remedies are\nharmful or useless or too expensive), or of a supernatural kind (e.g.,\nSt. Agatha refused all medicines because God Himself was her physician,\ncertain Saints were divinely inspired to make no effort to remove\nbodily maladies on account of the spiritual profit derived from them).\n\n(b) If there is no sufficient reason for this conduct, it is sinful.\nThus, one sins against faith, if the reason for the conduct is\ndisbelief in the existence of evil (e.g., Christian Science or Eddyism\nattributes sickness and pain to imagination, and says that the only\ncure is \u201cfaith\u201d); one sins by temptation of God, if the reason for the\nconduct is vain expectation of miracles; one is guilty of suicide or\nhomicide, if the purpose is to end life, etc.\n\n2305. The Sinfulness of Temptation of God.--(a) To doubt the\nperfections of God, or to call upon the extraordinary Providence of God\nin disregard of the ordinary Providence He has established is the\nessence of temptation of God. It is sinful, because it includes either\nunjustifiable doubt or vincible ignorance in the intellect or\npresumption in the will. Hence the command given in Deuteronomy (vi.\n16): \u201cThou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.\u201d But invincible ignorance\nexcuses from sin, and hence many of those who in times past resorted to\nordeals by painful or dangerous tests (e.g., walking on burning coals,\nrisking death in deep waters), in order that God might settle a\ndoubtful matter, were, on account of their good faith, guiltless of\ntemptation of God. The practice was condemned by the Church in the\nninth century.\n\n(b) To doubt about the positive and unknown will of God, or to call\nupon the extraordinary Providence of God (i.e., the direct intervention\nof the First Cause), without disregard of the ordinary Providence\n(i.e., of second causes appointed by God), is not sinful, if it is\njustified by necessity. Thus, being unable to resist the nations\nleagued against him, Josaphat prayed: \u201cAs we know not what to do, we\ncan only turn our eyes to Thee\u201d (II Paral., xx. 12). And Our Lord\npromised the disciples that, when they should be unable to prepare\ntheir defense on account of the persecutions to which they were\nsubjected, the Spirit Himself would speak through them (Matt., X. 19),\nand that He would enable them to do things as difficult as moving\nmountains when real necessity called for it (Matt., xvii. 19). It is\nnot unbelief to doubt about matters pertaining to God that are really\ndoubtful (i.e., not His perfections, but His positive and unknown\nwill), and hence one does not tempt God who asks for divine guarantees\nof a religion proposed as divinely revealed (see 795); it is not\npresumption to ask God for a sign or proof, if God directs one to do\nthis (e.g., Abraham in Gen., xv. 8, was inspired to seek a sign that\nthe promised land would be given his posterity; Achaz in Isaias, vii.\n11, was bidden for the sake of others to ask for a sign), or if, when a\nsign from God seems necessary or very useful, one prays for it\nprudently and on condition that the request is pleasing to God (e.g.,\nthe Apostles in Acts, iv. 30, prayed for signs and wonders in\nconfirmation of their preaching).\n\n2306. The Malice of Temptation of God.--(a) It is a sin directly\nagainst religion, for one shows contempt to God when one demands that\nHe prove His perfections, or when one takes the liberty to disregard\nthe ordinary means He has established and to call for others. The sin\nis less, however, than that of superstition, since temptation of God\nprofesses doubt, while superstition professes positive error.\nTemptation of God offends also against other virtues, such as faith\n(e.g., when one doubts the perfections of God), hope (e.g., when one\npresumes that God will do all without one\u2019s cooperation), charity\n(e.g., when a person exposes his own life to risk or his neighbor to\nscandal in a vain confidence that the danger will be miraculously\naverted).\n\n(b) It is a mortal sin from its nature, since it offends religion. But\nit may be venial on account of the imperfection of the act, as when\nfrom weakness of faith or without reflection one asks unnecessarily for\na sign (Luke, i. 11-20). It may be venial also from the lightness of\nthe matter, if the temptation is interpretative, as when one presumes\non the divine aid in a slight sickness, an unimportant talk, or other\nsmall affair.\n\n2307. As a rule temptation of God is only a venial sin, and in an\nindividual case it is rarely mortal, except in the following instances:\n\n(a) when one intends a grave offense against God, as by doubting His\ngoodness, demanding or attempting a miracle to satisfy curiosity;\n\n(b) when one exposes oneself to grave peril, as by leaping from the\nroof of a high building, refusing all remedies or means of preserving\nhealth, neglecting to provide for one\u2019s sustenance, etc., in the\nexpectation that God will miraculously provide;\n\n(c) when one causes grave harm to others, as when a person rashly\nasking for signs exposes faith to the derision of unbelievers or\nscandalizes believers.\n\n2308. Sacrilege.--Sacrilege in the wide sense is any sin against the\nvirtue of religion. But in the strict sense, in which it is now taken,\nit is defined as \u201cthe violation of a sacred thing.\u201d\n\n(a) Sacrilege is against a thing, that is, against some person, place\nor object dedicated to divine worship as a possession of God. Sacrilege\ndiffers from the two previous sins of irreligiosity (namely, temptation\nof God and perjury); for they are against the reverence due to God\nHimself, while sacrilege is against the reverence due to things on\naccount of their use in the worship of God.\n\n(b) It is against a sacred thing, that is, against the sanctity which a\nthing acquires from its dedication to God (e.g., when a church or a\nchalice is consecrated to divine worship, when a virgin is dedicated to\nGod by vow), or from the immunity or privilege conferred on it by the\nChurch on account of its dedication to God (e.g., the clerical\nprivileges of forum and of canon in Church Law). But sacrilege is\npresent only when a sacred thing is attacked in that special quality or\nrelation in which it is sacred. Hence, he who violates the chastity of\na virgin consecrated to God is guilty of sacrilege, since it is her\nchastity that was vowed to God; he who strikes her is also guilty of\nsacrilege, since he attacks the sacred immunity which the law confers\non her; he who calumniates her or steals from her is not guilty of\nsacrilege, since her name and goods are not consecrated to divine\nworship nor protected by its special sacredness in law.\n\n(c) Sacrilege is a violation, that is, an action or omission physically\nor morally injurious to the sacred character of a person, place or\nthing. The difference between the injury done in sacrilege and that\ndone in simony is that the former injustice belongs to the class of\nwrongs inflicted in involuntary commutations, such as theft or robbery\n(see 1748, 1815), whereas the latter injustice pertains to the category\nof wrongs perpetrated in voluntary commutations, such as buying,\nselling, or lending. In both cases there is an injury to the property\nor possession of God, but the difference is that in sacrilege the\nparties involved are the sacrilegious person acting as aggressor\nagainst God, in simony the parties are two men bargaining together to\nbuy and sell the sacred things of God.\n\n2309. What Kind of Consecration Must Be Violated to Constitute\nSacrilege?--There are various opinions about the kind of assignment to\nworship necessary for the sacredness which is injured by sacrilege.\n\n(a) The opinion that seems to be common today holds that the assignment\nmust be made through some public rite or consecration on the part of\nthe Church. Hence, according to this view, the violation of a private\nvow or resolution is not sacrilegious, but rather perfidious or\ndisloyal. The argument for this opinion is that the public acceptance\nof the Church, which has control over divine worship, is a necessary\nfactor in making anything sacred to that worship; and that many\nabsurdities would follow from the principle that each individual has\nthe power to give the sacredness in question to his own person, acts or\npossessions.\n\n(b) According to a stricter opinion, no public assignment is necessary\nif the consecration is a personal one; and hence the violation of even\na private vow of chastity would be sacrilegious. The argument is that\neven a private vow affecting the person sets it apart as a sacred thing.\n\n(c) According to a still stricter view, no public assignment to worship\nis necessary, whether the consecration be personal or non-personal, and\nhence even the violation of a vow to fast would be sacrilegious. The\nargument is that anything set apart for God\u2019s honor, either publicly or\nprivately, becomes sacred to Him.\n\n2310. Is Sacrilege a Special Sin?--(a) As regards its matter or subject\nsacrilege may be called, though improperly, a general sin, in the sense\nthat many different classes of sins may be sacrilegious (e.g., murder\nis sacrilegious when a sacred person is killed, lust is sacrilegious\nwhen a person vowed to God is violated; theft is sacrilegious when\nobjects consecrated to divine worship are stolen, etc.).\n\n(b) As regards its form or essence, and hence properly speaking,\nsacrilege is a special sin, because there is a peculiar deformity\ncontained in the very nature of sacrilege that is not in other sins,\nnamely, the disrespect shown to God through contempt for things that\nare sacred to Him. Moreover, there may be a sin of sacrilege that is\nseparate from other sins, such as murder, lust, and theft, for example,\nwhen the right of asylum is violated.\n\n2311. The Species of Sacrilege.--(a) Personal sacrilege is committed\nwhen the sacredness of a person is violated. This happens in the first\nplace when bodily or real harm (e.g., gravely sinful striking, citing\nbefore a secular tribunal, subjecting to civil duties or burdens, such\nas military service) is done to a cleric; and in the second place when\na grave sin of unchastity is committed by or with a person dedicated to\nGod by a vow (at least by a public vow) of chastity. Sacrilege\ncommitted through bodily or real harm is treated by canonists under the\nquestions of the privileges of canon (Canon 119), forum (Canon 120),\nimmunity (Canon 121). Sacrilegious impurity committed with a person\nvowed to chastity and sacrilegious impurity committed by a person vowed\nto chastity are grave sins of lust, even though they be only of thought\nor desire.\n\n(b) Local sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of a place is\ninjured. A place is considered sacred or religious when it possesses\nsanctity as being consecrated or blessed for divine worship or for\nburial of the faithful, namely, churches, public or semi-public\noratories, and consecrated cemeteries. Injury is done to the holiness\nof the place by desecration or profanation. Desecration is the\nperformance in a sacred place of a notorious act of irreverence which\nso spiritually contaminates it that the divine offices may not be\nlawfully celebrated therein until the rite of reconciliation has been\nperformed. Canon 1172 enumerates four causes of desecration: the crime\nof homicide; the injurious and serious shedding of human blood; impious\nor sordid uses (e.g., if a church were turned into a brothel or\ngambling den, a dump, or cattle stable), and burial of an infidel or\nperson excommunicated by condemnatory or declaratory sentence.\nProfanation of a sacred place is a disregard for the religious respect\nor immunity due to it which in some way materially contaminates it\n(e.g., if a church is not kept nice and clean; if markets and fairs are\nheld in its precincts; if it is used for shows, plays, moving pictures,\nbanquets, court proceedings; if the right of asylum is violated; if the\nchurch is broken into, seriously defaced, burned). These matters are\ntreated more fully in commentaries on Canons 1172 sqq.\n\n(c) Real sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of an object is\nviolated. An object is sacred when it contains the Author of holiness\nor confers holiness (viz., the Eucharist and the other Sacraments),\nwhen it is naturally related to the Sacraments or sacred persons (e.g.,\nthe sacred vessels, images and relics of the Saints), when it is set\naside for the uses of worship (e.g., holy water and other sacramentals,\ncandles for the altar) or the maintenance of the Church or its\nministers (viz., movables and immovables of a parish, money left for\nthe support of the clergy, seminarians, etc.). Injury is done to the\nholiness of an object by unworthy treatment or by unjust damage or\nconversion. Examples of unworthy treatment are the following: the\ninvalid or sinful administration or reception of a Sacrament, parodies\nof Sacred Scripture, scandalous manner of enacting sacred rites or\nsaying prayers, use of sacred chalices or other sacred vessels or of\nblessed articles for profane purposes, use of unblessed holy articles\nfor sordid or ignoble purposes, handling of chalices, etc., by those\nwho have no right to touch sacred vessels (Canon 1306). Examples of\nunjust damage or conversion are: contemptuous breaking or burning of\nrelics, oils, pictures used for worship; theft of moneys or goods\nbelonging to the Church.\n\n2312. Special Cases Regarding Local Sacrilege.--Local sacrilege is not\ncommitted by every sin, even though grave, that is done in a holy\nplace, for the character of this sacrilege is that it be such an injury\nto the sacredness of the place as to make what should be hallowed seem\nhorrible, or contemptible, or common. Hence, there is no sacrilege in\ndetractions, lies, perjuries, blasphemies, or in most internal sins,\nwhen committed in a church or cemetery. But there are two kinds of sins\nwhich are sacrilegious profanations of holy places, namely, theft and\nimpurity.\n\n(a) Theft in a holy place is certainly sacrilegious when the thing\ntaken is sacred (e.g., a chalice, money in the votive stands). It is\nprobably not sacrilegious when the thing taken is not sacred (e.g., the\npocketbook of a person kneeling in the church), and if the thing taken\nwas not left in the custody of the place. This matter, however, is\ndisputed.\n\n(b) Impurity, if external and perfect (_voluntaria effusio seminis_),\nis sacrilegious, though under the Code it does not seem to be a\ndesecration. The same is probably true of external but imperfect sins\n(such as touches, looks, words, gestures). Internal acts of impurity\nare not sacrilegious, unless they include a desire to sin externally in\na holy place.\n\n2313. Cases Wherein There Is No Sacrilege.--In the following cases no\nsacrilege is committed:\n\n(a) when the thing violated is not sacred. There is no personal\nsacrilege in an act of unchastity committed by a person privately vowed\nto chastity (common opinon). While some authors teach that personal\nsacrilege is committed by the violation of poverty and obedience (see\nMerkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II, n.804, 4), it seems better\nto hold the opposite opinion and restrict personal sacrilege to\nviolations of chastity by persons with religious vows or admitted to\nthe religious state. There is no local sacrilege in the profane use of\na place devoted to works of piety but not specially set apart for them\nby Church authority (such as a private oratory, or a hospital conducted\nby the laity), nor in the burial of infidels in an unblessed graveyard.\nThere is no real sacrilege in profane use of things which are not set\napart exclusively for sacred use (e.g., to use the candelabra and\ncandles of the altar to read by in one\u2019s room), or which have not been\nmade sacred (e.g., to steal money promised but not delivered to the\nChurch or the personal belongings of a cleric);\n\n(b) when the thing injured is sacred, but the action or omission is not\nopposed to the attribute in which it is holy, or to a law made to\nensure respect for it. Thus, a person who has the vow of chastity does\nnot commit sacrilege if he becomes intoxicated or uses profane\nlanguage, for he was not consecrated against those sins; a sacred place\nis not sacrilegiously violated by an act not opposed to its holiness or\nthe respect demanded for it by the law (e.g., organ recitals or awards\nfor Christian Doctrine in church, sale of candles in the vestibule,\nphysical violence against a disturber of divine service). Sacrilege is\nnot done in reverently destroying an old and tattered vestment, in\nrespectfully handling agnus deis, relics, unused palls, and other\nobjects that may be touched by all.\n\n2314. Sacredness as Aggravating Circumstance of Sin.--But a sin that is\nnot sacrilegious is often made worse by reason of the sacredness of\nsome thing with which the sin is connected. (a) Thus, the sin is\naggravated by such circumstances as person and place. In this way it is\nworse for a person vowed to God to blaspheme or lie than for one who\nhas no vow; it is worse to carry on frivolous or calumnious\nconversations in church than on the street. (b) The sin receives the\nadditional malice of sacrilege if the sinner expressly intends the\ncircumstance of time, place, etc., in order to show contempt. Thus, it\nis not sacrilege to get drunk on a Sunday or holyday, unless one wishes\nby the sin to show dishonor to the sacred time; it is not sacrilege to\nconduct oneself with levity in church, unless one wishes by the levity\nto show contempt for the place.\n\n2315. The Malice of Sacrilege.--(a) The moral malice of sacrilege is\nthat of irreligiousness (see 2299). The three kinds of sacrilege\n(personal, local and real) are commonly regarded as three distinct\nspecies of sin; for, just as injuries done to a man\u2019s person, to his\nimmovable property, and to his movable goods are looked upon in law as\ndifferent kinds of offenses, so are injuries offered to the ministers\nof God, the house of God, and the objects used in the service of God\nunequal in the dishonor which they give to God before the public. More\nprobably there are no sub-species of these three classes of sacrilege.\nHence, in so far as the disrespect to God is concerned, there seems no\nessential difference between the sin of violating and that of striking\na consecrated virgin.\n\n(b) The theological malice of sacrilege is mortal from the nature of\nthe sin. Just as it is gravely insulting to a man to treat his\nrepresentatives or his home or chattels with contempt, likewise\ndisrespect for the things of God is disrespect for God Himself. The\nseriousness of sacrilege is seen from the punishments visited on Core,\nDathan and Abiron (Num., xvi), on the sons of Heli (I Kings, ii. 17,\niv. 11), on King Balthasar (Dan., v. 2 sqq.), and on the sellers in the\ntemple (John, ii. 14). Sacrilege may be venial, however, on account of\nthe imperfection of the act (e.g., when one strikes a priest without\nreflecting that he is a clergyman) or the smallness of the matter\n(e.g., to quote Scripture in a decent joke, to use altar linen that is\nonly slightly soiled or torn, to touch the chalice without permission,\nto steal a few pennies from a church).\n\n2316. Conditions that Govern Gravity of Sacrilege.--To decide in a\nconcrete case whether a sacrilege is gravely or lightly sinful, one\nshould consider the internal state of mind of the offender and the\nexternal character of the offense. (a) Thus, if the purpose is directly\nand formally to dishonor God, the sin is grave, but, if there is some\nother purpose, it may be light. (b) If the thing dishonored is more\nclosely related to God, or if the act of dishonor is in public\nestimation more insulting, the sin is more serious. Unworthy treatment\nof the Eucharist is the worst of sacrileges; ill-usage of a sacred\nperson is worse than disrespect for a sacred place; treading the Sacred\nSpecies under foot is more contemptuous than an unworthy Communion, etc.\n\n2317. Simony.--Simony derives its name from Simon Magus, the first\nperson in New Testament times, as far as we know, who committed this\ncrime. For it is written of Simon (Acts, viii. 18 sqq.) that he\nattempted to buy from St. Peter the power of imposition of hands. But\nthe sin was not unknown in the Old Testament, as we see from the\nexamples of Baalam (Numb., xxii. 7), Giezi (IV Kings, v. 20 sqq.), and\nJason (II Mach., iv. 7 sqq.).\n\n2318. Definition of Simony.--Simony is defined as \u201cthe studied will to\nbuy or sell for a temporal price or consideration something that is\nspiritual either intrinsically or extrinsically.\u201d\n\n(a) Simony is in the will, for it is an act of injustice pretending to\nhave or to receive the right of dominion over spiritual things that\nbelong to God alone, and injustice is a vice of the will. Hence, simony\nis not an internal sin of the intellect; for, though one who practises\nsimony externally makes to some extent a profession of belief in the\nheresy that man is the owner of spirituals and gives grounds for the\nsuspicion that he holds that the sale of spirituals is lawful, yet he\nmay know well that the things of God are priceless and still wish to\ngive or receive a price for them. Again, simony is not to be identified\nwith the external act of bargaining for spirituals; for, though the law\npunishes only external or completed simony, the guilt and malice of the\nsin is present even when one has the desire to traffic in spiritual\nthings, but makes no overtures or compact.\n\n(b) Simony is a studied will; that is, it is an act of free and\ndeliberate choice selecting some form of internal or external simony as\na desirable means. Hence, it is not sufficient for the sin of simony\nthat there be an internal wish not fully voluntary on account of\ninculpable ignorance or imperfect consent; nor, on the other hand, is\nit necessary for incurring the guilt of simony that there be a mutual\npact, but it suffices that one party alone have the will to make the\npact or to obligate another party to simony.\n\n(c) It is a wish to buy or sell, that is, to give or receive a temporal\nthing in exchange for a spiritual thing. There is question here, then,\nnot only of the contract of sale, but of any other form of onerous\ncontract, such as hire, rent, loan, exchange, _do ut des_, _facio ut\nfacias_, etc. To be simoniacal, however, a contract need not be\nfulfilled or explicitly manifested; it suffices that it be unfulfilled\nor tacitly made, if the sinful intent can be gathered from the\ncircumstances of the case. Hence, from the present part of the\ndefinition it follows that there is no simony in a gratuitous contract\n(e.g., when one gives a gift to another hoping and expecting that the\nlater from gratitude will give in return something spiritual which it\nis lawful to bestow from gratitude; when a poor person offers to make a\nnovena for benefactors who give him an alms). It is simony, however, to\nmake an onerous contract under the guise of a gratuitous contract, for\nexample: \u201cI give you this money as a pure gift on condition that you\nwill not be ungrateful but will give me this spiritual favor as a pure\ngift.\u201d\n\n(d) The price or consideration in simony is some thing, action or\nforbearance which in some way is of advantage to the recipient. Simony\nin the strictest sense is committed when a temporal thing is offered\nfor a spiritual thing (e.g., money paid for a Sacrament); simony in the\nwide sense is committed when, contrary to the law on simony, things\nlike in character are exchanged (2323 a). Thus, if the Church forbids\nMass to be exchanged for Mass, or benefice for benefice, or the office\nof sacristan for that of sexton, transgressors are guilty of the second\nform of simony.\n\n(e) The matter of simony is something intrinsically or extrinsically\nspiritual. In general, the spiritual is that which proceeds from God or\ntends to Him as the Author or End of eternal salvation (viz., the\ndestiny, law, means, works, etc., proposed to us in Christian\nrevelation and religion). Among these things those are intrinsically\nspiritual that pertain to the supernatural order on account of some\ninherent character of their own (e.g., grace, Sacraments, Mass,\nmiracles) or some intimate union with things spiritual (e.g., benefices\nattached to spiritual offices, consecration to be given a chalice);\nthose are extrinsically spiritual that are in themselves temporal, but\nin church law are treated as spiritual for the sake of reverence to the\nintrinsically spiritual (e.g., chrism in regard to the material itself\nof the oil and other ingredients). If the matter of a contract is\nneither intrinsically nor extrinsically spiritual, there is no simony\nin buying or selling it (e.g., devotional books, household furnishings\nof a rectory, personal effects of a cleric).\n\n2319. Temporal Price in Simony.--The temporal price in simony is some\ntemporal good or advantage. St. Gregory the Great distinguishes three\nkinds of simoniacal prices as follows:\n\n(a) the price from the hand (_munus a manu_) is either money or things\nthat have a money value, such as movable or immovable property,\ncorporeal or incorporeal rights. It would be simony to give a benefice\nin exchange for a sum of money, for a loan, for real estate;\n\n(b) the price from the tongue (_munus a lingua_) is any kind of\npatronage, such as praise, recommendation, protection, defense,\nopposition to competitors, etc. It would be simony to confer a benefice\nin exchange for the influence in one\u2019s favor which the recipient of the\nbenefice would exercise with some powerful person, for his vote in an\nelection, etc.;\n\n(c) the price in service (_munus ab obsequio_) is any kind of temporal\nlabor or assistance given for another\u2019s benefit, such as the management\nof his business or the instruction of his children. It would be simony\nto grant a benefice in exchange for work done as secretary, treasurer,\nor advisor.\n\n2320. The Spiritual Thing in Simony.--The thing inherently spiritual in\nsimony is also of three kinds. (a) That which is spiritual from its\nnature is a thing that is supernatural in itself, such as sanctifying\ngrace, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the power of orders or of\njurisdiction. (b) That which is supernatural from its cause is a thing\nproduced by a supernatural agency or power, such as health obtained\nthrough miracle. (c) That which is supernatural from its effect is a\nthing having the virtue of producing supernatural results, _ex opere\noperato_, or _ex opere operantis_, or as an occasion (e.g., Sacraments,\nprayers, sermons).\n\n2321. Temporal Thing United with Spiritual.--In the two following ways\nthings are made spiritual in reference to simony through intimate union\nwith spirituals: (a) by necessary connection, when a temporal thing is\nso annexed with a spiritual thing that it cannot exist without it. This\nincludes the things annexed consequently, and perhaps also those\nannexed concomitantly and intrinsically (see 2322); (b) by contractual\nconnection, when a spiritual and a temporal are the partial objects of\na contract, as when in the sale of a consecrated chalice the price is\nraised on account of the consecration.\n\n2322. Temporal Thing Annexed to Spiritual.--In three ways a temporal\nthing is annexed to a spiritual thing.\n\n(a) The temporal thing is annexed antecedently if it precedes the\nspiritual thing as its prepared or appointed or presupposed matter or\nsubject. Thus, all things that receive a consecration or blessing\n(e.g., chalices, rosaries) or a property to which a right of patronage\nis attached are of this kind. Relics are properly of this category,\nbut, since they have usually no material value, it is customary to\ninclude them amongst spirituals.\n\n(b) The temporal thing is annexed concomitantly if it is simultaneous\nwith the spiritual thing as being the action or labor that produces it.\nIf the union is essential and inseparable, the temporal thing is said\nto be annexed intrinsically (e.g., the work performed in saying Mass,\npreaching, making a sick call); if the union is not essential, the\ntemporal thing is said to be annexed extrinsically (e.g., the special\nwork performed in saying Mass, if it has to be sung, or said in a\ndistant church, or at a determined hour).\n\n(c) The temporal thing is annexed consequently when it presupposes the\nspiritual thing as the cause on which it depends. Thus, the revenues of\na parish are a temporal thing, but they follow on the pastoral office\nwhich is a spiritual thing.\n\n2323. The Various Kinds of Simony.--(a) In reference to its matter or\nthe law violated, simony is either against natural and divine law or\nagainst positive ecclesiastical law. Simony against divine law consists\nin the exchange for temporalities of things that are spiritual or\nintimately annexed to the spiritual (see 2321), such as Sacraments,\nindulgences, or jurisdiction. Simony against church law consists in an\nexchange that has the appearance of simony against divine law, or that\neasily leads to simony against the divine law, and is consequently\nforbidden by the Church in order to safeguard religious respect for\nsacred things, as when one violates the law by taking money for holy\noils. In the former kind of simony, things of different orders\n(spirituals and temporals) are exchanged one for the other; in the\nlatter kind of simony, things of the same sort (spirituals for\nspirituals, temporals for temporals, etc.) are exchanged where the law\nforbids (Canon 727).\n\n(b) In reference to its manner, or the way in which it is committed,\nsimony is internal or external. Internal simony is the will, without\nthe external agreement, to exchange spirituals for temporals; it is\npurely mental if nothing external is done by reason of the internal\nwill; it is not purely mental if something external is done by reason\nof the internal will (e.g., if the person who desires to commit simony\nmakes a money present to another in the hope that the latter will feel\nmorally bound to give something spiritual in return, or if one gives\nsomething spiritual looking for a substantial gift of money as\ncompensation). External simony is an outward pact freely entered into\nbetween two parties to exchange spirituals for temporals. It is called\npurely conventional, if neither party has as yet performed his part of\nthe agreement; it is semi-real or mixed, if one of the parties has\nexecuted his part; it is real if both parties have performed, at least\nin part, what they agreed to. A simoniacal compact is explicit, if\nexpressed by clear words or signs (e.g., \u201cI will pay $100 for your\nvote\u201d); it is tacit, if circumstances indicate the evil intention\n(e.g., very unusual presents given before an election).\n\n2324. Confidential Simony.--Simony committed in reference to benefices\nis called confidential because the contract is illegal, giving no\njudicial protection, and there is only the confidence or reliance on\nanother\u2019s word to give assurance that the agreement will be kept.\nCanonists discuss at length the following contracts in which it is\ncommitted:\n\n(a) the contract _per accessum_ grants a benefice with the agreement\nthat the grantee will later resign, so that access to it may be had by\nthe grantor or a third party at present incapable;\n\n(b) the contract _per ingressum_ resigns a benefice not yet taken\npossession of with the understanding that the person who now enters\ninto possession will leave the place open for his predecessor if he\nhimself resigns or is promoted;\n\n(e) the contract _per regressum_ resigns a benefice already possessed\nwith the understanding that it may be recovered by the person now\nresigning or by a third party;\n\n(d) the contract _per reservationem partis_ obtains a benefice for\nanother with the stipulation that he will pay a certain percentage of\nits revenues to the person who obtains it for him or to a third party\n(see Canon 1441).\n\n2325. Simony Against Divine Law.--Simony against divine law is\ncommitted in reference to spiritual things when a temporal price is\nformally or virtually given or received for them.\n\n(a) Thus, the temporal thing is formally set up as the price, when it\nis regarded or treated as the end of the spiritual thing or action\nitself (_finis operis_), one of the things exchanged being used as the\nmeasure of value of the other. This happens when a person wills to buy\nor sell a spiritual thing, either because he thinks that its value may\nbe expressed in terms of money or other temporal thing, or because he\njudges that he should treat it as though money were its equivalent, as\nwhen one fulfills a spiritual office and excludes every other motive\nthan that of lucre (Denzinger, n. 1196).\n\n(b) The temporal thing is virtually set up as the price, when it is\nintended as the sole proximate end of the agent himself (_finis\noperantis_), though there is no explicit thought about values or prices\nor comparisons. This happens when one gives a temporal thing and has no\nother immediate personal purpose in this act than the acquisition of a\nspiritual thing, or performs a pretendedly gratuitous service,\nintending thereby to obligate the beneficiary to the grant of some\nspiritual benefit, or bestows a \u201cgratuitous\u201d temporal favor as\ncompensation for a spiritual benefit or vice versa (Denzinger, n.\n1195). This is simony, for he who explicitly intends only an exchange,\nimplicitly intends a price; and if it were not simony, then simony\nwould be almost entirely an entity of the mind, since it is a very\nsimple matter to will that the temporal thing exchanged shall be not\nthe price, but only the motive of the contract or gratuitous\ncompensation.\n\n2326. The temporal thing is not made the virtual price of the spiritual\nthing, if there is a lawful proximate motive (i.e., one recognized by\nthe Canons or legitimate custom) for giving the temporal thing and the\ndesire of receiving the spiritual thing is only the remote reason or\noccasion of the act. For in such a case the temporal thing is given for\na lawful purpose and is not the price of a spiritual thing.\n\nExamples: (a) If the recipient of the temporal thing has a right to it,\nthere is no simony. Thus, the ministers of the altar have a right to\ntheir support (see 2186), and it is not simoniacal, when asking\nspiritual things from them (e.g., the application of Mass to one\u2019s\nintention, the performance of Sacraments and sacred functions), to\noffer a stipend or fee; (b) if the bestower of the temporal thing gives\nit freely out of pure friendship, liberality, charity, gratitude or\ngood will, so that it is an absolute gift, there is no simony, even\nthough he hopes or expects that he will receive something spiritual as\na mark of appreciation. But \u201ca charitable or friendly gift\u201d may easily\nbe palliated simony; that is, there may be a pretense of liberality to\nconceal the real purpose of purchasing spirituals with temporals.\n\n2327. Rules of Alexander III for Determining Simony.--Alexander III\ngave several rules for determining whether a gift is made from\nliberality or with simoniacal intent.\n\n(a) The following are marks of simoniacal intent: the quality of the\ngiver (e.g., that he is poor, or in great need, or not customarily\ngenerous), the quantity of the gift (e.g., that it corresponds with the\nvalue of a vacant benefice, that it is surprisingly large), the time of\nthe gift (e.g., that it is made when the donee is not in any special\nneed, or when he is about to confer an office, or after hints have been\nmade). If a gift is bestowed in connection with a spiritual thing\nreceived, the presumption is for simoniacal intent, unless there was a\nsincere and reasonable motive for the gift.\n\n(b) The following, on the contrary, are marks of a liberal intent: the\nquality of the giver (e.g., that he is wealthy, noted for kindness and\ncompassion, or liberal to all, or is a relative of the donee); the\nquantity of the gift (e.g., that it is small or normal in size), the\ntime of the gift (e.g., if it is made when necessity, festal occasion,\nor the like calls for it).\n\n2328. Simony against Divine Law in Reference to Things Annexed to\nSpirituals.--(a) It is simony against divine law to buy or sell things\nannexed to spirituals consequently (e.g., the revenues of a benefice)\nor concomitantly and intrinsically (e.g., the ordinary labor and\nfatigue connected with preaching, saying Mass); for in the former case\nthe temporal grows out of a spiritual and is morally one with it, while\nin the latter case the temporal has no value except in so far as it is\njoined with the spiritual.\n\n(b) It is not simony against divine law to buy or sell things annexed\nto spirituals antecedently (e.g., blessed candles, sacred vestments),\nif the price is not raised on account of the spiritual thing, or things\nannexed concomitantly and extrinsically (e.g., the extraordinary labor\nand fatigue caused by saying Mass in a distant place or at a late\nhour); for in both cases the temporal has its own proper value and is\nnot considered as inseparable from the spiritual. There is simony\nagainst divine law, however, if the price is raised on account of the\nspiritual part (e.g., if something is added for the blessing given a\ncandle), and simony against church law if the transaction is forbidden\nas simoniacal (e.g., deductions and payments made in the act of\npreferment to a benefice are contrary to Canon 1441).\n\n2329. Conditions Necessary for Simony against Ecclesiastical Law.--(a)\nThere must be an exchange through some kind of onerous contract, but it\nsuffices that the understanding be tacit and non-executed, as was\nexplained above (see 2323).\n\n(b) There must be a law of the Church which, from a motive of respect\nfor sacred things, forbids the exchange.\n\n(c) The simoniacal exchange is made, whether a temporal annexed to a\nspiritual is given for another temporal annexed to a spiritual (e.g.,\nbenefice for benefice), or a spiritual for a spiritual, or a temporal\nfor a temporal. Canonists enumerate the following as examples of simony\nof ecclesiastical law: gifts made in connection with a competitive\nexamination for a parochial benefice, with ordination or grant of\ncertain testimonial letters (Canon 545), with erection of\nconfraternities; sale of blessed oil or chrism, or of the right of\npatronage (Canon 1470); remuneration for collection of stipends or for\nexpenses of Mass (Canons 840, 1303).\n\n2330. Certain and Uncertain Simony.--(a) Cases in which simony is\ncertain are the administration of Sacraments or sacramentals to the\nunworthy for the sake of the fee or favors, the sale of indulgences,\ntaxes or charges made contrary to law (e.g., for a Mass of bination).\nOther examples are given in 2323 sqq. The Church demands that certain\nministrations (e.g., Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction,\nOrders) be gratis, but there may be local customs or conditions that\njustify exceptions. Some moralists teach that there is no simony when a\nstipend is exacted for an obligatory ministry, if the simoniacal motive\nis absent.\n\n(b) Cases in which simony is controverted are those in which a tax or\nstipend in excess of what is just or lawful is exacted (e.g., a Mass\nstipend higher than custom permits). Some claim there is simony,\nbecause the excess must be for the spiritual thing; others hold that\nthere is no simony, but only an unjust increase in the stipend allowed\nfor support; others say that there is no simony in the internal forum\nif the intent is not simoniacal, but that there is simony in the\nexternal forum on account of the presumption of simoniacal intent.\n\n2331. Doubtful Cases of Simony.--In some gifts and payments the\npresence or absence of simony depends on the object for which they are\ngiven.\n\n(a) Thus, when they are given for omission of a spiritual act, there is\nsimony if the omission includes the exercise of spiritual power (e.g.,\nto omit absolution is to retain sins or censures); there is no simony\nif the omission is the mere exercise of free will (e.g., to omit Mass,\nconfession).\n\n(b) When they are given for omission of opposition or annoyance, so\nthat one may be able to obtain some office or benefice, there is simony\nif the temporal thing is thereby given for the benefice itself or for\nthe way to it (i.e., if one has no strict right to the spiritual thing,\nor if the opposition is just), as when the candidate for a benefice\npays a competitor to withdraw, or pays an accuser to keep silence;\nthere is no simony if the temporal thing is given for freedom from\nunjust vexation (i.e., if one has a strict right to the spiritual thing\nand the opposition is clearly unjust, as when one who has acquired a\nright to an office pays an enemy to desist from placing impediments).\nThe payment made by Jacob to Esau for the birthright, to which Jacob\nwas entitled by divine disposition, may be regarded as having had for\nits end, not the paternal blessing and other spiritual rights of the\nfirst-born, but immunity from persecution by Esau.\n\n(e) When they are given for instruction, there is simony if the\ninstruction has for its direct purpose the spiritual benefit of the\ndisciple (e.g., catechetical instructions, sermons, spiritual\ndirection); there is no simony if the instruction has for its direct\npurpose the improvement of the mind or the utility or advantage which\nthe disciple will derive from it (e.g., instruction in theology,\npreparation for examinations).\n\n(d) When they are given for admission to religious life, there is\nsimony if the money is paid for the religious state itself, the vows,\nor other spirituals; there is no simony if the money is paid for the\ntemporal support of the religious institute, that it may be able to\nmeet its expenses.\n\n2332. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Lawful.--(a)\nThere is no simony when a temporal is given on the occasion of but not\nfor a spiritual. This happens when there is a just title for bestowal\nof the temporal, such as right of support (e.g., pastors\u2019 salaries,\nMass stipends, fees), extrinsic values in a work or object (e.g., the\nspecial labor in saying Mass under certain conditions, and, according\nto some, the special affection one has for a relic, the _lucrum\ncessans_ on account of some function performed).\n\n(b) There is no simony when something of value is given in exchange,\nbut not for a spiritual, nor in contravention of an anti-simony law.\nThis happens whether like be exchanged for like (e.g., Mass for Mass),\nor a temporal for a thing associated with a spiritual as the latter\u2019s\nsubject (e.g., money for a rosary or cemetery plot which has been\nblessed). In the former case there is no prohibition; in the latter,\nthe temporalities have their own distinct values which may be paid for,\nif the price is not raised on account of the spiritual (see Canons 730,\n1539).\n\n2333. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Is\nSinful.--(a) Sins against God.--One who performs functions of religion\nprimarily and principally, as far as his personal motive (_finis\noperantis_) is concerned, for the salary, stipend or fee, is not guilty\nof simony, since he does not regard the temporal even virtually as the\nprice of the spiritual. But he does sin by indevotion, and the sin may\neven be mortal (e.g., a canon goes to choir chiefly because this yields\nhim a living). Offenses committed in the matter of Mass stipends are\nnot called simony in the Code, but the penal law classes them with\noffenses against religion, as may be seen from Canon 2324. Nepotism,\nfavoritism in giving offices, and political and dishonest maneuvers to\nobtain church dignities are not in themselves simoniacal; but they are\nan unworthy and scandalous treatment of sacred things.\n\n(b) Sins against Others.--It is not simony but injustice to deny the\nSacraments to parishioners who do not contribute, to overcharge in\nlawful fees, and also, according to some, to take money for the\nomission of a spiritual act owed in justice (e.g., for refusal to hear\nthe confession of a parishioner), or to demand money as the stipend for\nthe performance of such a spiritual act (e.g., for hearing a\nconfession). It is disobedience to take money in ways forbidden (e.g.,\nto take Mass stipends in the confessional, to earn money by gambling or\ntrading forbidden in the Canons). Again, it is not strictly simony to\nput up as the stakes in a game a spiritual thing (e.g., the recitation\nof the Rosary) against a temporal thing (e.g., ten dollars), for there\nis no intention to value the spiritual thing by the temporal; but such\na practice is scandalous. Greed about getting or keeping money pertains\nto avarice, not necessarily to simony.\n\n2334. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but\nVirtuous.--(a) Some acts done in God\u2019s honor (e.g., to purchase a\nspiritual object, such as a sacred vessel or relic, from a person who\nwould misuse it), when the purchaser intends the prevention of\nprofanation. It is certainly not irreverence to a sacred thing to use\nmeans necessary to rescue it from such irreverence.\n\n(b) Some acts done for the good of others (e.g., to give prizes to\nchildren who frequent the Sacraments or Sunday school, dowries to young\ngirls that they may be able to enter religion, free education to worthy\nyoung men as an inducement to embrace the ecclesiastical state). In all\nthese cases there is no purchase of a spiritual thing, because the\ntemporal is a pure gift, and the spiritual is received, not by the\ngiver of the temporal, but by another. There is no simony in the fees\nimposed for dispensations or in the alms sometimes prescribed for\nindulgences; for the temporal is not a price paid for the spiritual,\nbut in the one case either a penance or a charge for expenses, and in\nthe other a spiritual good work and duty prescribed as a condition for\na spiritual benefit.\n\n(e) Some acts done for the spiritual good of self (e.g., if one were in\ndanger of death and could be baptized only by a person Who demanded\nmoney for the service, it would not be simony to pay the money, since\nthe price would be offered, not for the Sacrament, but for the removal\nof an unjust annoyance).\n\n2335. Theological Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony against the\ndivine law is a mortal sin from its nature and in every instance. No\nmatter how small the spiritual thing that is sold, it is priceless, and\na grave injury is done by putting a price on it. Simony is a serious\ninjury to God, since it usurps His place as the only Lord of spiritual\nthings (I Cor., iv, 1), to the spiritual things themselves, since it\nestimates their worth by vile material gain (Prov., iii. 15; Acts,\nviii. 20), and to the recipients, who should receive the gifts of God\nfreely (Matt, x, 8). Hence, St. Peter denounced Simon Magus as\ndeserving of perdition (Acts, viii. 20), and in law simony is spoken of\nas the worst of pests, a cancer, leprosy, a scourge.\n\n(b) Simony against ecclesiastical law is a mortal sin from its nature,\nsince it is forbidden as a protection to religion and under grave sin;\nbut in particular cases it may be only a venial sin, since the church\nlaws do not bind under grave sin, when the matter or the danger is not\nserious, as was said in 382.\n\n2336. Moral Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony is reducible to\nreal sacrilege (see 2311 c). It is treated separately for the sake of\nconvenience, on account of the large number of questions that pertain\nto it, and also because there is reason to consider it as a distinct\nspecies of sin (2308 c). Hence, the moral malice of simony is that of\nirreligiousness.\n\n(b) Simony of divine law and simony of ecclesiastical law, according to\nthe more common and likely opinion, are alike in moral malice. For\nalthough the mere prohibition of the Church does not make a non-sacred\nthing sacred, it does make the non-sacred thing unsaleable precisely\nbecause related to things that are sacred. In other words, the motive\nof the law is the protection of sacred things against the appearance or\ndanger of simony, and the motive of the law is the factor that\ndetermines the moral character of precepts and prohibitions of human\nlaw. Thus, to miss Mass on Sunday is a sin against religion, because\nthe Church commands in virtue of religion that Mass be heard on Sunday;\nto eat meat on Friday is a sin against temperance, because the Church\nforbids the use of meat on Friday in virtue of temperance. Hence, it is\nnot merely disobedience, but simony, to violate a law which forbids a\ncertain contract because of its nearness to the sale of spirituals for\ntemporals. Moreover, he who willfully exposes himself to the immediate\ndanger of some sin wills the malice of that sin.\n\n2337. Invalidity and Penalties of Simoniacal Contracts.--(a) Every\nsimoniacal contract is invalid and of no force either in the external\nor in the internal forum, because it sells what is unsaleable under\ndivine or ecclesiastical law. If the contract has to do with benefices,\noffices or dignities (e.g., \u201cYou vote as I wish and I will give you\nsuch and such favors,\u201d \u201cYou obtain for me such a dignity and I will pay\nyou well\u201d), the appointment to them is rendered null and void, even\nthough the simoniacal act be done by a third party without the\nknowledge of the beneficiary, unless it be done by that third party to\ninjure the beneficiary or against his protest (Canon 729). Invalidity\nis also produced in case of simoniacal resignations (Canon 185),\ncommissions (Canon 1441), presentations (Canon 1465, Sec. 2), and\nprescription does not operate for one who holds a benefice obtained\nthrough simony (Canon 1446).\n\n(b) Certain simoniacal contracts subject the guilty parties to special\npunishments. Thus, the penalty for simony in appointments, elections or\npromotions to office and dignities is excommunication _latae\nsententiae_ reserved simply to the Holy See, and deprivation forever of\nall right of nominating, voting, presenting, and suspension (Canon\n2392); the penalty for simony in elevation to Orders or in use of other\nsacraments is suspicion of heresy and suspension reserved to the Holy\nSee (Canon 2371).\n\n2338. When the Canonical Penalties for Simony Do Not Apply.--(a) Purely\nmental simony is not subject to ecclesiastical penalties, since the\nChurch does not pronounce on internal acts. But this does not take away\nthe serious guilt in the sight of God. (b) External simony is subject\nto ecclesiastical penalties, but canonists dispute about the meaning of\ncertain Canons, for example, whether only real simony falls under the\npunishments _latae sententiae_, whether the penalties of Canons 729 and\n2392 apply only to simony of divine law, or to simony of ecclesiastical\nlaw as well.\n\n2339. Influence of Simony on Spiritual Effects.--(a) On Effects of the\nPower of Orders.--Sacraments administered simoniacally are valid, for\nthe law nullifies only the contract made about the Sacrament, not the\nSacrament itself. It seems also that in the case of sacramentals (such\nas simple blessings imposed on articles) the blessing is not lost by\nsale of the article, provided the price is asked only for the object\nand not for the blessing. A blessed or consecrated object loses its\nblessing or consecration when it is put up for public sale (Canon 1305).\n\n(b) On Effects of the Power of Jurisdiction.--Acts of jurisdiction are\nvalid in spite of simony, unless there is special provision to the\ncontrary. Indulgences are lost _ipso facto_, if anything temporal is\ntaken for the indulgenced object (Canon 924). Religious profession, it\nseems, is valid, even though simoniacal.\n\n2340. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for a Spiritual\nThing.--(a) If the simoniacal contract is semi-real (that is, if the\nspiritual consideration has not been received), the price must be\nrestored; for we have then the case of an immoral and unexecuted\ncontract (see 1878 d). (b) If the simoniacal contract is real (that is,\nif the spiritual consideration has been received), the price should be\ngiven back; for the case then is one of commutative justice, a temporal\nprice being taken for a thing (e.g., a blessing) that has no temporal\nprice, or for a service that one was bound to give gratis (e.g.,\nparochial sermon by the pastor). But if a service was not obligatory,\nit is held by some that there is no certain duty of restitution, if the\nspiritual thing cannot be restored (e.g., when one received a stipend\nfor a Mass of bination or demanded an excessive fee for a sacred\nfunction).\n\n2341. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for Temporal Things\nAnnexed to Spirituals.--Restitution is obligatory as follows: (a) when\ncommutative justice is violated, as when one charges for a blessed\ncandle or rosary in excess of its market value or just price, or when\nby fear or force one compels another to exchange a chalice for a\nciborium; (b) when law or judicial sentence imposes restitution as a\npenalty for an offense, as when for money one has resigned one\u2019s\nbenefice in favor of another person.\n\n2342. Circumstances of Restitution for Simony.--(a) The Time for\nRestitution.--If simony is against natural law, restitution is due\nbefore sentence; if against ecclesiastical law only, restitution is due\nonly after sentence.\n\n(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Is to Be Made.--Satisfaction should\nbe given to the owner, or injured party (e.g., to the person who was\ncharged for a blessing), or, if this is impossible, to the poor or\npious causes. The revenues derived from a benefice simoniacally\nobtained should be restored to the church to which the benefice\nbelongs, unless this is advantageous to the guilty parties, or probably\nto charity, or religion, or the successor in the benefice.\n\n(c) Excuses from Restitution.--Impossibility, condonation or the\npermission of the Church, express or presumed, excuses from the duty of\nrestitution.\n\n2343. Restitution of Spiritual Thing Simoniacally Received.--The\nspiritual thing simoniacally received must be restored even before the\nsentence of the judge (Canon 729, Sec.1). (a) Thus, if it is a benefice,\noffice or dignity that was obtained or conferred through simony, it\nmust be resigned; nor may the guilty party keep the fruits, unless he\nwas in good faith and permission is given. (b) If the spiritual thing\nis something other than a benefice, it should likewise be given up,\nprovided it is of a kind that can be restored (e.g., it is impossible\nto restore a Sacrament received or a consecration given to a church)\nand restitution will not cause irreverence (e.g., it would be\nirreverent to restore blessed objects or relics to the seller if he\nmeant to profane them).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 6: THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE OF PIETY;\nTHE COMMANDMENTS\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 101-122.)\n\n2344. Having treated of religion, the chief potential part of justice,\nwe shall new consider the remaining subsidiary virtues of the present\ngroup, namely, piety, reverence, truthfulness, gratitude, vindication,\nfriendship, liberality, equity (see 2141-2143).\n\n2345. The Virtue of Piety.--In general, piety is the virtue that\ninclines one to show due recognition of indebtedness to those from whom\none has received life and existence. There are three senses of the word:\n\n(a) in its strictest meaning, it refers to the dutifulness owed to the\nimmediate or secondary causes of our being, namely, parents and country;\n\n(b) in a derived meaning, it is applied to the religious duties owed to\nGod, who is our Heavenly Father and the First Author of our being.\nHence, those who are faithful to the worship of God are called pious\nand the divine services are known as works of piety;\n\n(c) in its widest meaning, piety is applied to works of mercy, since\nthey are most pleasing to God as a tribute of filial devotion. The\nmerciful man has pity (piety), because his kindness to the unfortunate\nhonors God more than victims or sacrifices. Hence, since God is\nmerciful, He Himself is sometimes called pious: \u201cThe Lord is\ncompassionate (_pius_) and merciful\u201d (Ecclus., ii. 13).\n\n2346. Definition of Piety.--Piety in the strictest sense is defined as\n\u201ca moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the\nduty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and\nsustainers of our being.\u201d\n\n(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it\ndiffers from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country\n(see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love\nfor God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of\nthe benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.\n\n(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion\ngives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our\ndependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold\nthe place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the\nmother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other\nrelatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one\u2019s\nparents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and\nsisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one\u2019s native land or\nthe country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and\nit should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and\nallies of one\u2019s country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country\nshould love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed\nto the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.\n\n(c) Piety offers respect and assistance. The first duty is owed to\nparents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the\nsecond is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or\notherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated\nonly when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of\nparents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to\nfraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of\nthe community of goods that exists between parents and children, real\ninjuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require\nmore than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).\n\n(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers\nof our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty\nowed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one\nis a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is\nobligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty\nis then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this\nnobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very\nlike to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.\n\n2347. The Reverence Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be honored\ninternally by the esteem in which their parental dignity and merits\n(not their personal failings) are held; externally, by the marks of\nrespect customarily shown to parents.\n\n(b) Relatives should receive a lower degree of respect commensurate\nwith the nearness and quality of the kinship. Thus, parents should\ntreat their children with the consideration owed to members of the\nfamily, and not as servants or strangers, brothers and sisters and\nrelatives of remoter degree should give one another that courtesy and\nregard which respect for common parents or ancestors calls for. Lineal\nrelatives are nearer than collaterals, and elder relatives (such as\ngrandparents, uncles and aunts) are more entitled to respect than\nyounger relatives (such as grandchildren, nephews and nieces).\n\n(e) Country should be honored, not merely by the admiration one feels\nfor its greatness in the past or present, but also and primarily by the\ntender feeling of veneration one has for the land that has given one\nbirth, nurture and education. Even though a country be poor and humble,\nit should be patriotically revered (Ps. cxxxvi). External\nmanifestations of piety towards country are the honors given its flag\nand symbols, marks of appreciation of its citizenship (Acts, xxi. 39),\nand efforts to promote its true glory at home and abroad.\n\n2348. The Assistance Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be helped\nin their needs, spiritual or temporal. If they are sick, they should be\nvisited; if they are poor, they should be assisted; if they are in need\nof the Sacraments or prayers or suffrages, these spiritual means should\nbe provided. But a son is not bound to pay the debts of his deceased\nfather who left him nothing, since the debt was a personal one.\n\n(b) Relatives should also be assisted in their needs, especially if the\nnecessity is urgent and the relationship close (as in the case of\nbrothers and sisters). But this duty is not as strict as that owed to\nparents, and, if the relationship is distant, there is no special\nobligation of piety.\n\n(c) Country is helped by the aid given to fellow-countrymen who are in\nmoral, mental or corporal need. The noblest patriots are those who\ndevote their lives, labors or substance to the promotion of religion,\neducation and contentment among their people, to the correction of real\nevils that threaten decay or disaster to the national life, and to the\npreservation of those special ideals and institutions that constitute\nwhat is characteristic and best in the nation.\n\n2349. Sins against Piety.--(a) By Excess.--Exaggerated respect for\nrelatives or country is a sin, since it is not according to order or\nreason. Thus, while children should not dishonor their parents under\nthe pretext of religion (Matt., xv. 3-9), neither should they be more\ndevoted to their parents than to God (Luke, xiv. 26; Matt., viii. 22),\nnor neglect God\u2019s call when their parents do not need them (Matt., iv.\n22). Thus also, patriotism should not degenerate into patriolatry, in\nwhich country is enshrined as a god, all-perfect and all-powerful, nor\ninto jingoism or chauvinism, with their boastfulness or contempt for\nother nations and their disregard for international justice or charity.\n\n(b) By Defect.--Disrespect for parents is felt when they are despised\non account of their poverty, ignorance, or feebleness; it is shown by\nword (e.g., when they are addressed in bitter, reproachful, or\ncontemptuous speech; or when they are ill spoken of to others), by\nsigns (e.g., when mocking gestures or mimicry are used to ridicule\nthem), by deeds (e.g., when they are threatened or struck), and by\nomissions (e.g., when their children are too proud to recognize them or\nto give them tokens of honor). Disrespect for one\u2019s country is felt\nwhen one is imbued with anti-nationalistic doctrines (e.g., the\nprinciples of Internationalism which hold that loyalty is due to a\nclass, namely, the workers of the world or a capitalistic group, and\nthat country should be sacrificed to selfish interests; the principle\nof Humanitarianism, which holds that patriotism is incompatible with\nlove of the race; the principle of Egoism which holds that the\nindividual has no obligations to society); it is practised when one\nspeaks contemptuously about country, disregards its good name or\nprestige, subordinates its rightful pre-eminence to a class, section,\nparty, personal ambition, or greed, etc.\n\n2350. Malice of Sins against Piety.--(a) The moral malice is distinct\nfrom that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt\nowed to the human principle of existence has a special character of\nwrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and\nmatricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity\namong sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother\nare greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to\nhonor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the\ncircumstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circumstance\nthat changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth\ncousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though\nan aggravating circumstance, does not give the injury the character of\nimpiety.\n\n(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin\u2019s nature,\nsince piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special\ncommandment and promise from God. But the sin may be venial on account\nof lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or\nspeak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of\nthe lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother\nslaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes\nhis parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their\nparents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation\nregularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only\nlead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents\nmay generally be presumed when there is amendment.\n\n2351. The Virtue of Reverence.--This virtue is known in Latin as\n_observantia_, because its object is persons of authority, whom it\ncarefully observes in order to revere their dignity and to learn their\ncommands. It is defined as \u201ca moral virtue which inclines one to render\nto persons of higher position the tribute of honor and obedience that\nis due their authority.\u201d\n\n(a) It is a moral virtue, that is, one concerned immediately with the\ndirection of human acts. Reverence belongs to justice because it\nrenders to others what is due them.\n\n(b) The persons to whom it does justice are those of higher position,\nthat is, superiors who rule over us or over others, and men\ndistinguished for virtue, knowledge or other excellent qualities that\nmake them fit to govern. Superior here does not mean that the person\nwho receives reverence must be in every way better than the person who\nshows reverence (e.g., he who is superior in jurisdiction owes some\nreverence to a subject who is more learned or virtuous than himself),\nor that there must be inequality between the one who gives and the one\nwho receives reverence (e.g., two distinguished persons of equal rank\nand merit owe mutual reverence to each other on account of the\nsuperiority which each has to many others).\n\n(c) The reason for reverence is the authority vested in these persons,\nthat is, the excellence of their state, which gives them a higher\ndignity than others, and their office of ruling, which empowers them to\ndirect a subject to his proper end. Here we see that reverence is a\ndistinct virtue, for, while piety and reverence are both forms of\nveneration, the motive of each is different. Thus, a child owes to his\nfather piety, because from the father was received the beginning of his\nlife, and reverence, because from the father is received direction to\nhis end. Again, a subject owes the rulers of his country both piety and\nreverence: piety, as regards their relation to the common good and the\nnation (e.g., when the ruler is given his special salute), reverence,\nas regards their personal rank and glory (e.g., when assistance is\ngiven the ruler to lessen the burden of his office).\n\n(d) The first tribute paid by reverence is honor, which is a testimony\ngiven to worth, and is offered to the dignity or rank of the superior.\nHonor differs from reverence as the effect differs from the cause, or\nthe means from the end; for it is reverence that prompts one to show\nhonor, and honor is meant to excite in others reverence for the person\nhonored. The debt of honor is due those who are superior in\njurisdiction, from legal justice; it is due to those who are superiors,\nbut not in jurisdiction, not from legal justice, since the law does not\nenforce it, but from moral obligation, since it is decent and becoming.\n\n(e) The second tribute of reverence is obedience, which is submission\nto law, and is offered to the ruling power of the superior. This\ntribute of reverence is paid only to one\u2019s own ruling superior, since\nothers have no power to impose upon one their will or precept.\n\n2352. Species of Honor.--(a) As to kinds, there is common honor which\nis shown to all and by all (e.g., God honors the Saints, and Tobias and\nMardochaeus were honored by their sovereigns), and the special honor of\nhomage which includes submission and is shown only by inferiors or\nservants to their superiors or masters.\n\n(b) As to modes, there is honor in general and praise, which is a\nspecial form of honor; Praise is given in speech or writing; honor is\nshown not only by words, but also by deeds (e.g., by salutations,\nprostrations) and things (e.g., by monuments, presents, banquets,\ntitles).\n\n(c) As to motives, there is civil honor (i.e., the respect shown to the\ntemporal authority of rulers, teachers, employers, etc.), religious\nhonor (i.e., the respect shown to the spiritual authority of the Pope,\nbishops, priests, etc.), and supernatural honor (i.e., the respect\ngiven to the virtue of holy men). This last honor is known as _dulia_\n(service) when offered to the Saints who reign with Christ in heaven,\nas _hyperdulia_ (superior service) when offered to the Mother of God.\n\n2353. Obligation of Showing Honor to Deserving Excellence.--(a) Common\nhonor should be given to all who are not irrevocably evil and\nmalignant, that is, it should be shown to all creatures, the damned\nexcepted. For, as was said above, there is no one who is not possessed\nof superiority in some respect, and it is even reasonable to believe\nthat the most unpromising person is better than oneself in some quality\nor other. Hence, the Scriptures admonish us to honor all (I Peter, ii.\n17), to be beforehand in giving honor to one another (Rom., xii. 10),\nand humbly to believe that others are superior (Phil., ii. 3). But in\nbestowing honor, while one should have at least in general an honorable\nopinion of others, the duty of external honor does not oblige at all\ntimes or in all circumstances; and the same kind of honor is not to be\ngiven by or to all persons. Those who show the ordinary signs of\ncharity (as they should) in greetings, salutations, courtesies, and the\nlike, comply sufficiently with the duty of common honor.\n\n(b) Special honor should be given all those who have a right to it:\n\u201cTribute to whom tribute is due, honor to whom honor is due\u201d (Rom.,\nxiii. 7). Thus, rulers and prelates should be given the respect due\ntheir station, even though personally they are wicked, for in the honor\ngiven their rank reverence is shown to God, whose ministers they are,\nand to the community which they represent. There is a moral, though not\na legal, obligation to honor men distinguished for holiness for their\nown sakes since, while honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue, it\nis a distinguished mark of recognition, and for the sake of others,\nsince virtue in honor is like a lamp placed upon a stand and shining\nfor many (Matt., v. 15).\n\n2354. Obligation of the Religious Cult of Dulia.--(a) There is no\nstrict duty of giving veneration to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels,\nSaints, images, or relics, for absolutely speaking it suffices for\nsalvation to adore God. But it is of faith that the cult of these holy\npersons and things is lawful and useful; hence he who should neglect it\nwould not merely disregard the earnest advice of the Church, but he\nwould also deny to God\u2019s friends and heroes the honors they deserve\n(Ecclus., xliv. 1; Heb., xi), and would deprive himself of precious\nhelps of intercession and inspiration. Some believe it is at least\nvenially sinful never to invoke the Blessed Virgin, and surely there\nwould be sin--and perhaps even grave sin, _per accidens_--if the\nneglect was scandalous or perilous to salvation.\n\n(b) There is an obligation in performing acts of cult to make the\nveneration suitable to the dignity of the object (e.g., to the Mother\nof God belongs _hyperdulia_, to the Saints of God _dulia_; to holy\npersons is given absolute cult, to holy objects relative cult) and\nconformable to the laws of the Church (e.g., the titles of Venerable,\nBlessed, Saint are conferred only by the Church; public cult may be\nperformed only by those authorized to act in the name of the Church and\nonly by such rites as have been approved). It is lawful privately to\npray to infants who died after Baptism, and, according to many, to the\nsouls in Purgatory; but it would be superstitious to give to the damned\nor false saints the cult that belongs only to the canonized Saints.\n\n2355. Obedience.--Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which\ninclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one\u2019s\nsuperior, because it is a command and obligatory.\n\n(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or\nunwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience\n(which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these\nlack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note\nalso that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in\nthis, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command,\nwhile the virtue includes also internal submission.\n\n(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in\nthe strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship\nyield to what the other desires.\n\n(c) It is compliance with a command, that is, with a law or precept\nimposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of\nobedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has\nnot been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment,\nnot obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a\nson knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has\nreceived no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission\naccording to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the\nsecond it is a want of the spirit of obedience.\n\n(d) It obeys precisely because the superior\u2019s will has been expressed\nas a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other\nacts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience\nwhich is a circumstance of other virtues and may be called a general\nvirtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for God,\nthere is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of\nhonesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak\nis a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply\nbecause it is law and as such should be kept.\n\n2356. Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.--There are two kinds\nof power that confer moral authority to impose a command--the power of\njurisdiction and dominative power.\n\n(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect\nsociety (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to\nimpose laws.\n\n(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society,\nwhich has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only.\nThis power arises either from the very nature of society as a body\ncomposed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are\nnecessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the\nparties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her\nhusband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the\nemployer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience\nbecomes subject to the superior).\n\n2357. Degrees of Obedience.--Ascetical authors distinguish three\ndegrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with\nexactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness\nin its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external\nsubmission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith\nof the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself\nto the superior\u2019s judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not\nclearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).\n\n2358. Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.--(a) Obedience,\nas was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on\naccount of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes\njoined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep\nthe law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if\nactuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as\nhomage to God); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as\nwhen a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to\ntry a subject\u2019s obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has\nbeen commanded is an act of obedience only).\n\n(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it\nbelongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with God\nHimself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among\nthose moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things,\nobedience which serves God in all things has a certain preeminence,\ninasmuch as it contemns for God\u2019s sake the noblest human good, one\u2019s\nown will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the\nbody and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to\nreligion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law,\nreligion consists in veneration of God Himself. But acts of worship\nperformed without devotion or without regard for God\u2019s will are not to\nbe compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and\nthe latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that\nobedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that\ninternal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship.\nSpiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues\nand the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).\n\n2359. Comparison of Acts of Obedience.--(a) All acts of obedience are\nof the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of\nlaws there is always in obedience the same essential character on\naccount of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be\nthe law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands\nand the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys God, or the\nChurch, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.\n\n(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for\ncircumstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add\nto the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by\nperforming what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey\nby performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something\nhard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing\nobedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and\nmay be performed with less willingness.\n\n2360. The Duty of Obedience.--Since obedience is obligatory because a\nsuperior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on\nthe extent of the superior\u2019s authority.\n\n(a) Thus, God must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is\nLord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: \u201cLet us do all that\nthe Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient\u201d (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is\nnot bound, however, to wish all that God wishes in particular, since\nGod wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the\ncreature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it\nis not lawful for man to wish the damnation or the misfortune of those\nwhom God will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish\nthat which God desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be\nlost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to\nperform what God proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances\n(Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that God\ncommanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret\nthe facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle\nwrought by God is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him,\nbut to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred\nto were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of\nvirtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.\n\n(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful\nauthority to command, first, because God Himself requires this and he\nwho resists resists God (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience\nthe peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the\nsuperior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given\nhim, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2,\n3). The Scriptures command obedience to all classes of lawful\nsuperiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (Titus, iii.\n1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).\n\n2361. When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.--Obedience to a human\nsuperior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the\nsuperior has no authority to command.\n\n(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is\nclearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore\nunlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin,\neven a venial sin, for we must obey God rather than man (Acts, v. 29;\nRom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands\nsomething clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own\nsuperior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in\njudgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a\ncommand is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.\n\n(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command\nexceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no\ncontrol. Thus, God alone has authority over the internal action of the\nsoul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these\nthings all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or\nbodily than another, but none being subject to another in these\nmatters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to\nbelieve, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to\nexternal acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature\nof the body (e.g., God could command an individual to marry, or to\nobserve virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is\nconcerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot\ntake away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on\nInalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and\nthings, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its\nnature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command\nspiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot\ncommand for others, a constitutional body cannot make laws beyond the\npowers conferred by its constitution, ecclesiastical laws or customs\nrejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no\nsuperior may command the execution of what is physically or morally\nimpossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise\nheroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a\ncommand is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable\nmotive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be\na sin to disregard it.\n\n2362. Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.--If a\nsuperior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter\nis lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is\neven obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he\nwould not have authority. Such cases are the following:\n\n(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is\nheld to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body\n(e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose\nvirginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the\nconditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be\nordered so to do;\n\n(b) on account of circumstances, such as scandal or danger of great\nevils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that\nis not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).\n\n2363. Internal Actions and Human Superiors.--Internal actions in\nthemselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle\nsays: \u201cJudge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make\nmanifest the counsels of the heart\u201d (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways\nthese actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.\n\n(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts\nthemselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and\nacts there, not as man, but as the representative of God, and hence he\nmay pass on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as God may\npass on them and prescribe them.\n\n(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so\nfar as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its\ngoodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or\npronounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This\nquestion was treated above in 426.\n\n2364. Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.--(a) The vow obliges a\nreligious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according\nto the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no\nobligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not\nauthorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered\nreligious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless\notherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or\nconstitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is\nobligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225,\n2237).\n\n(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave\nmatter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The\nintention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other\ncircumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the\nimposition of a grave precept.\n\n2365. Sins against Obedience.--Since obedience is a moral virtue and\ntherefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it\navoids.\n\n(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quantity of obedience,\nfor the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It\nis found, therefore, in other circumstances of the act of submission,\nas when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey.\nSinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superstition is to\nreligion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should\nthink and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.\n\n(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command.\nThis sin may also be said to include both excess and defect--the former\nbecause the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and\nthe latter because the superior does not receive what he is entitled to\n(see 1711 sqq.).\n\n2366. Definition of Disobedience.--Disobedience is the transgression of\nthe lawful command of a superior.\n\n(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to\nperform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or\nomit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no\ndisobedience if fulfillment is impossible--for example, if a subject\nwho is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive\nthe notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to\ngive what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or\nregulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt\nto observe them.\n\n(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is\nmorally good and issues from competent authority. It is not\ndisobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or\nsteal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest\nblindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).\n\n(c) It is violation of a command, that is, of a law or precept. Hence,\nit is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests\nmade by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory\n(e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband\npicked out for her by her parents).\n\n(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is\nopposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher\nsuperior prevails (288 sqq.).\n\n2367. The Kinds of Disobedience.--(a) By reason of the subject,\ndisobedience is either material or formal, according as the\ntransgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against\nsome other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself.\nMaterial disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a\ntransgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is\ncalled disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special\nsin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in\norder not to submit.\n\n(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for\nthe law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor\ndespises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in\ndisobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the\nauthority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the\nprecept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or\nenvies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If\ncontempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it\nextends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.\n\n2368. It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if\nthe subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions,\nor approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his\nview and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and\nlaw.\n\n2369. Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.--(a) From its\nnature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to\ncharity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of\nGod demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His\nrepresentatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2;\nLuke, X. 16). Disobedience is classed by St. Paul with the worst sins\nof the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days\n(II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).\n\n(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes\nonly a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his\nsuperiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.\n\n(c) From the lightness of the matter, formal disobedience is only a\nvenial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against God,\nand the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if\none gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a\nprotest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not\nserious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the\ncontempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of\nanarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor\nregulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed\nagainst a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth\ncommandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the\nformer case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.\n\n2370. Moral Species of Disobedience.--(a) In formal disobedience, if\nthe command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely,\nthat against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the\nlawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third\ncommandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience\nonly, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out\nof stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed\nby parents or teachers).\n\n(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of\nsome special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as\nwhen one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy passion; but\nif the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is\nbut the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between\nmeals against the command given by his mother.\n\n2371. Circumstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.--One act of\nformal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:\n\n(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it\nis more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to\ndisobey a higher than a lower superior;\n\n(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the\nintention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious\nto transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God\nalways prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more\nserious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the\nlawgiver has more at heart.\n\n2372. Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.--(a)\nDisobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than\nsins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true\nwhen these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God,\nfor, _per se_ and other things being equal, a sin against God is more\nserious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins\nagainst creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a\nless important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the\nother theft.\n\n(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than\ncontempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of\ngreater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God\nthan to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in\ncontempt than to disregard his precept.\n\n2373. The Virtue of Gratitude.--Religion, piety, reverence and\nobedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the\nvirtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice\non account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as \u201ca\nmoral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to\nrepay with gladness the favors one has received.\u201d\n\n(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good\nuseful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus,\ngratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the\ncommission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony)\nor useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get\nrid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents\nmade with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are\ndue for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed),\nthough courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives,\neven when it is not a favor.\n\n(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The\nformer consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of\nbenefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter\nconsists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and\ngifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).\n\n2374. Two Kinds of Gratitude.--(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the\nrecognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from\nreligion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to\nGod as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause\nof life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or\nguidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense,\ngratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from\nthose mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and\nfollows in order after reverence.\n\n2375. Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for\nthe gift of repentance?\n\n(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has\nbeen preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, _per se_ and\nother things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin\nthan to be rescued from it.\n\n(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has\nreceived the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for God is\nmore generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.\n\n2376. Circumstances of Gratitude.--(a) To Whom Gratitude Should Be\nShown.--Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind\nremembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible\n(e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings\nwith him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less\nbenevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or\nonly with a view to self-advertisement), for the gift is esteemed\nchiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened\nif the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is\nwealthy or famous).\n\n(b) By Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.--Every person who is favored\nshould be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his\nbenefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it\nbeneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither\nis there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some\nextent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his\nbenefactors.\n\n(c) The Time for Gratitude.--Internal gratitude should be immediate,\nand should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received;\nbut external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced\nor unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.\n\n(d) The Degree of Gratitude Owed.--If the favor was bestowed by reason\nof a friendship of utility, the gratitude should correspond with the\nbenefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friendship or\nliberality, the gratitude should be measured by the benevolence that\nprompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, gratitude is sometimes\nmore due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and\nwillingness and disinterestedness.\n\n[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.--It is suitable that one repay\nbenefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is\npossible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of\nwhat was received. But in gratitude, as in benefits, the good will\ncounts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpass\nthe favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can\nat least surpass in desire and internal benevolence.\n\n2377. The Sins against Gratitude.--(a) Since gratitude is a moral\nvirtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is\ngrateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by\ningratitude). Since gratitude inclines to surpass favors received, it\nis more offended by lack of thanks or ingratitude than by excessive\nthanks.\n\n(b) As to its motive, ingratitude is twofold, material and formal.\nFormal ingratitude consists in contempt for the benefit or the\nbenefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for\nhim, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against\nthe benefactor. Material ingratitude is any injury done a benefactor\nwithout contempt for him or his favor.\n\n(c) As to its mode, formal ingratitude is also twofold, that by\nomission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of\nthe grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of\nthanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with\naffection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem.,\nxviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in\ncontempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.\n\n2378. The Moral Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Material ingratitude is\nnot a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed\nagainst a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is\nan act of ingratitude to God, and every injury done a human benefactor\nis an act of ingratitude to man. But material ingratitude is an\naggravating circumstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we\nowe thanks than to harm others.\n\n(b) Formal ingratitude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a\nspecial debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one\nto pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingratitude with other special\nclasses of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).\n\n2379. The Theological Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Formal ingratitude\nfrom its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity,\nwhich bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on\naccount of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter.\nThus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be\nmortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.\n\n(b) Material ingratitude is venial or mortal according to the nature of\nthe injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one\ngives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a\nvaluable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin\nis venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a\nbenefactor, and the sin is then mortal.\n\n2380. Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?--(a) If the\nfavors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the\ningratitude with which they are received. It is not always certain that\nthe beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his\nimprovement (Luke, vi. 35).\n\n(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made\nworse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.\n\n2381. The Virtue of Vengeance.--Just as gratitude returns good for\nevil, so does vengeance (_vindicatio_) return evil for evil, that is,\nthe evil of punishment for the evil of sin. Vengeance is defined as \u201ca\nmoral virtue that inclines a private person to use lawful means for the\npunishment of wrongdoing, with a view to the satisfaction of public or\nprivate justice.\u201d\n\n(a) Vengeance is a virtue of private persons; that is, it belongs to\nthose who are not charged officially with the punishment of offenses.\nThe duty of public persons, such as judges, is a much stricter one and\npertains to the virtue of vindictive justice, which is a form of\ncommutative justice; whereas vengeance is only a virtue annexed to\njustice (see above, 2141 sqq.). Vindictive justice attends to the\nequality between fault and punishment, vengeance to the protection of\nthe person who has been injured.\n\n(b) Vengeance is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing, or the\ninfliction of some painful retribution upon one who has already\ncommitted an injury. Thus, this virtue is not strictly identical with\nlawful self-defense, which is directed against an evil that is not past\nbut present, though self-defense may be rated as a secondary act of the\nvirtue of vengeance.\n\n(c) Vengeance uses only lawful means; that is, it seeks redress or\nreparation from the authorities who have the right to give it and\nfollows due process of law. This virtue differs, then, from private\nrevenge, vendetta, lynch law, exercise of the \u201cunwritten law,\u201d etc.,\nwhich are acts of sinful violence, though sometimes subjectively\nexcusable on account of ignorance. The virtue of vengeance is also\nexercised by those who desire that justice may be done against\nmalefactors, or who visit upon them with moderation such punishments as\nare not forbidden to private persons (e.g., denial of friendship).\nParents also exercise this virtue whenever they properly correct and\nchastise their children.\n\n(d) Vengeance has for its ends public and private justice, that is, the\nvindication of the right order of society or the compensation or\nsatisfaction of an injured person. If some other good motive causes one\nto desire requital of evil deeds, the act will pertain to another\nvirtue: thus, if one aims at the amendment of the evil-doer, one\u2019s act\npertains to charity; if one desires by the deterrent of punishment to\nsecure the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, the act is one of\nlegal justice; if one seeks the honor of God, the act is one of\nreligion, etc. If an evil motive prompts the desire of punishment, the\nwish is not virtuous at all, but sinful. Thus, he who labors to have a\ncriminal captured, sentenced and executed, and whose intention is not\nthe vindication of justice but the gratification of jealousy, hatred,\ncruelty or other like passion, sins grievously and perhaps makes\nhimself worse than the criminal. To return evil for evil in this way is\nto be overcome by evil (Rom., xii. 17-21).\n\n2382. The Morality of Vengeance.--(a) Vengeance is lawful, since it\npertains to justice, and Our Lord declares that it is found in the just\nand is approved by God (Luke, xviii. 7). It is, moreover, a special\nvirtue, for it regulates the special natural inclination which moves\nman to attack what is harmful and injurious and has its own distinctive\nends (see 2381). It is closely related to fortitude and zeal, which\nprepare the way for it; zeal, being a fervent love of God and man,\ninspires indignation against injustice, while fortitude removes the\nfear that might keep one back from attack on injustice. Accidentally,\nhowever, on account of greater evils, vengeance is sometimes unlawful,\nas when it would involve the innocent with the guilty, or fall more\nheavily upon the less guilty (Matt., xiii. 29, 30).\n\n(b) Vengeance is obligatory when an injury to oneself is also an injury\nto a public or other necessary good (e.g., to the rights of God or of\nthe Church). Hence it was that Elias and Eliseus punished those who\nmaltreated them (IV Kings, i. 9 sqq., ii. 23, 24), that inspired\nwriters pray God to punish the wicked (Psalms xviii, xxxiv, lxviii,\ncviii, lxxviii, cxxxvi; Jeremias, xi. 20, xvii, 18, xviii. 21, xx. 12),\nand Pope Sylvester excommunicated those who sent him into exile. If an\ninjury to oneself is merely personal, one should be willing to forego\npunishment of the guilty person, and should actually do so when this\ncourse is expedient, as Our Lord teaches in Matthew, vi. 14, 15 (see\n1198 sqq.). When no necessity requires one to vindicate a personal\nwrong, the more perfect course is to pardon the wrong for the sake of\nGod; for in avenging injuries to self there is always the danger of\nsuch evils as selfish motive, arrogance, hatred, scandal, and the loss\nof such goods as peace of mind, conversion of the other party,\nedification, and greater claim on God\u2019s forgiveness of self. Hence,\nvengeance is called \u201ca little virtue,\u201d since it is so often the less\nperfect way.\n\n2383. Excess and Defect.--Punitive justice is a moral virtue and hence\nshould be characterized by moderation as to all its circumstances. It\nshould avoid the extremes of excess and defect.\n\n(a) The sin of excess here is cruelty, which in the quality or the\nquantity of the punishment offends human rights or surpasses the\nmeasure of the crime or the custom of the law. Thus, it is immoral to\nassociate young prisoners with hardened criminals, to deprive an\noffender of religious opportunities; it is inhuman to treat a human\nbeing as if he were a brute or less than a brute (e.g., by confinement\nin a loathsome dungeon, by overwork with starvation, by torture); it is\nunfair to use severe punishments unknown to law or custom, or whose\nrigor far surpasses the degree of offense. There is excess even in\nmedicinal or reformatory penalties, if a higher good is sacrificed for\na lower (e.g., the spiritual for the temporal, a major for a minor good\nquality), for then the remedy is worse than the disease.\n\n(b) The sin of defect in punishments is laxity, which rewards crime, or\nallows it to go unpunished, or imposes penalties which are agreeable to\noffenders, or not a deterrent, or not at all equal to the offense.\nScripture condemns this lenity when it declares that the parent who\nspares the rod spoils the child (Prov., xiii. 24). In weighing the\ngravity of a delinquency account should be taken of the fault itself,\nof the injury done and the scandal given. In the fault consideration\nmust be had of the objective element (i.e., the nature and importance\nof the law violated), of the subjective element (i.e., the age,\ninstruction, education, sex, and state of mind of the offender), of the\ncircumstances (e.g., the time, the place, the persons involved, and the\nfrequency). See Canon 2218.\n\n2384. Circumstances of Punitive Justice.--(a) Punishments that May Be\nUsed.--Punishment is virtuous only in so far as it restrains from evil\nthose who cannot be restrained by love of virtue, but only by fear of\npenalty. Hence, penalties should consist in the deprivation of goods\nthat are more prized than the satisfactions obtained through\ndelinquencies. Both divine and human laws, therefore, have established\nas punishments the loss of a bodily good (e.g., by death, flogging,\nimprisonment) or of an external good (e.g., by exile, fine, infamy),\nthe chief inducements to crime being found in bodily or external\nthings. The extreme penalty of death should be reserved for extreme\ncases, and the other penalties should be suited to the crime, so as to\nremove the incentive or means (e.g., dishonesty should be punished by\nloss of goods, calumny by infamy, lust by pain, etc.).\n\n(b) Persons Who May Be Punished.--Punishment again is virtuous only\nbecause it pertains to justice and rights the inequality caused by sin.\nAccordingly, no one should be punished unless he has sinned or\nvoluntarily transgressed. It is unlawful to punish the innocent for the\nguilty, or to punish an innocent person in order to keep him from\nfuture sins. It should be noted, however, that God inflicts temporal\nevils on the just for the sake of spiritual goods (e.g., that they may\nnot become attached to this world, may have opportunities of merit, and\nmay give good example); that one person may be punished for the sin of\nanother when he associates himself with or approves of that sin, as\nwhen careless parents have bad children or careless subjects bad rulers\n(Job, xxxiv. 30; Exod, xx. 5); that for a sufficient reason an innocent\nperson may be deprived of a good for which he is unfitted (e.g.,\nordination when one is irregular by defect) or to which he has no\npersonal or absolute claim (e.g., the family property when it is lost\nto the children because the father is fined).\n\n2385. The Virtue of Truthfulness.--Having treated the virtues of\ngratitude and vengeance, which deal with moral obligations caused by an\nact of the one owed, we now pass on to truthfulness, which is a moral\nobligation arising from the acts of the one owing in which he\ncommunicates with others. For he who speaks, writes, or otherwise\nmanifests his mind to others puts himself under a duty of not\ndeceiving. Truthfulness or veracity is defined as \u201ca moral virtue that\ninclines one duly and faithfully to express what is in one\u2019s mind.\u201d\n\n(a) It is a virtue, that is, a good habit, and so it differs from\ntruth, which is the object of intellectual habits. Thus, the First\nTruth or God is the object of faith. Truthfulness is not the object of\na virtue, but it is a virtue.\n\n(b) It is a moral virtue. It deals with external things (viz., the\nwords or signs by which we express our thoughts), and so it is not a\ntheological virtue; moreover, though the knowledge of truth belongs to\nthe intellect, the right manifestation of truth depends on a good will,\nand so truthfulness is not an intellectual virtue: the truthful man may\nbe unlearned, but he loves honesty.\n\n(c) It regulates the expression of the mind, that is, the words,\nwriting, gestures, conduct, and other external signs, so as to make\nthem conformable to the mind which they stand for. Truthfulness deals\nwith internal things (e.g., when the speaker says that he has good\nhealth or is well disposed towards another) and with external things as\nthey appear to the speaker (e.g., when he says that he is certain or\nbelieves that a report is accurate).\n\n(d) It is a faithful expression of what is in the mind or belief.\nHence, one may be truthful while making statements contrary to fact, or\nuntruthful while making statements agreeable to facts, for truthfulness\nis sincerity, not correctness.\n\n(e) It is a due expression of one\u2019s mind or belief; that is, it is\ngiven when and where and as it should be given. A person who speaks out\nhis mind on all occasions, with no regard for results, is not a liar,\nbut he is at least imprudent, and he cannot be said to possess the\nvirtue of truthfulness, for every virtue is prudent. Examples of this\nare persons who unnecessarily indulge self-praise by telling their true\nvirtues or perfections (Prov., xxvii. 2), or who vaingloriously or\notherwise foolishly publish their true sins or imperfections (Is. iii.\n9).\n\n2386. The Excellence of Truthfulness.--(a) Truthfulness is a virtue,\nsince it makes right use of language and other signs by employing them\nfor the truth, and also serves society, which rests on the trust that\nmen have in the words and promises of their fellow-men. St. Paul\nadmonishes the Ephesians (iv. 25) that each one speak the truth to his\nneighbor, since all are members of the other.\n\n(b) It is a moral virtue, preserving moderation in conversations and\nother interchanges of thought. This virtue sees that facts are neither\nexaggerated nor understated, that truth is not manifested when it\nshould be concealed, nor concealed when it should be spoken.\n\n(c) It is a special virtue, for, while the other moral virtues regulate\nactions and external things, none of them except truthfulness regulates\nthose objects precisely in their character of media or instruments for\nsignifying and conveying thoughts, opinions, and decisions. And since a\ngreat part of human life is occupied in conference or correspondence\nwith others, truthfulness is one of the most useful of the virtues and\none whose exercise is most frequently called for.\n\n(d) It is a virtue annexed to justice. On the one hand, it is like\njustice, since it pays a debt which one social being owes another of\nspeaking the truth; on the other hand, it falls short of justice, since\nthe debt is moral, not legal. This is said of truthfulness in ordinary\nintercourse, for in judicial process and in contracts there is also a\nlegal obligation of justice to tell the truth.\n\n2387. Sincerity and Fidelity.--Two virtues that pertain to truthfulness\nare sincerity and fidelity.\n\n(a) Sincerity (simplicity) is the virtue of one who is consistent with\nhimself, avoiding duplicity and double dealing of every kind, such as\nlies, equivocations, sophistries, specious excuses, quibbles, dishonest\nshifts, distractions, concealments, and the like.\n\n(b) Fidelity (loyalty) is the virtue of one who fulfills promises that\nare obligatory only in virtue of his word freely given. It differs from\nconstancy, which is concerned not with promises but resolutions, and\nfrom virtues concerned with promises that are obligatory in virtue of\nlegal debt, such as contracts, promissory oaths (see 1692, 1749, 1753,\n1888). Fidelity makes an honest man\u2019s word as good as his bond, and it\nis therefore one of the most appreciated of virtues (Matt., xxv. 21;\nPsalm xiv). Horace calls it the sister of justice.\n\n2388. Vices Opposed to Truthfulness.--(a) By defect one sins against\ntruth through lying and breach of promise; (b) by excess one sins\nagainst truthfulness in violation of secret or other unjustifiable\ndisclosures.\n\n2389. Lying.--A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what\nis not true.\n\n(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign\nconsisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by\nlanguage, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by\nexpressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).\n\n(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is\nfound in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of\nmendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.\n\n(c) A lie is told with purpose; that is, there is a comparison by the\nintellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice\nof the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious\nperson, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie.\nMoreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear\nunderstanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his\nefforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who\ndo not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or\ninaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of\nindirect lying.\n\n(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the\npretense that what is not in one\u2019s mind is in one\u2019s mind. Just as\ntruth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the\ndisagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely\nfalse, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as\na half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give\nsupport to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to\nthrow dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.\n\n2390. Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.--A\nword that sufficiently expresses one\u2019s idea is not a lie or a\ndeception, even though another idea will be taken from it by a listener\nor is conveyed by its mere letter.\n\n(a) Thus, misunderstanding due to defect, not of the speaker, but of\nthe listener, does not make one\u2019s words untruthful, any more than it\nmakes them scandalous (see 1462), as when the listener has not given\nattention to what was said (John, xxi. 23). Even a speech worded\nobscurely because the matter is obscure, or because the listener would\nbe harmed by plainer speech (see 1001), is not mendacious but prudent.\n\n(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its\nwording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or\ncircumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words.\nExamples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words\nspoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as \u201cyour most\nobedient servant\u201d, statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g.,\nwhen a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to\ndiscover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or\nof fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of\ndisputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in\nargumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak\naccording to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v.\n18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to\nB: \u201cHave you seen your father?\u201d meaning, \u201cDo you know where he is?\u201d and\nB replies: \u201cI have not seen him,\u201d meaning \u201cI do not know where he is.\u201d\nLying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one\nanother to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are\nnot in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example,\nscandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.\n\n2391. Divisions of Lies.--(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its\nnature as a departure from the speaker\u2019s mind, every lie is either an\nexaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which\ntells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not\nbelieve, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain,\nexaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful\nwhat he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.\n\n(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are\nof many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former\nbeing a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its\nimmediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or\nto deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit\n(e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard\nthe calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there\nis misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only\nsuspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior\npurpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for\nevil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to\nits result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a\nstatement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes\ndoes not deceive the auditors.\n\n2392. Classification of Lies.--Every lie is harmful from its nature,\nsince it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of\nsociety. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil,\nand hence we have the following classes of lies.\n\n(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to\nplease (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies\ninclude all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and\ndescriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by\none who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way\n(e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors\nhave a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken\nseriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are\ntold with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may\nreceive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to\ngood conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a\ndespondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his\nspirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various\nstatements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi.\n2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).\n\n(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to\nindulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying\n(lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person\n(pernicious lies).\n\n2393. Motives for Lying.--The motives for lying are not always simple,\nand it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several\nmotives of different character.\n\n(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence.\nIt may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of\nanother in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when\nthe liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g.,\nwhen the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).\n\n(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may\naffect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius\ncalumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of\nCaius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the\ntruth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards\nBalbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.\n\n2394. Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.--(a) Lies of\nexaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in\nboth cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to\noverstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration\nis worse.\n\n(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the\nharm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is\nthat which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and\nthe lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that\nharms in temporal things only.\n\n(c) Lies are mitigated by the purpose to help, and the greater the good\nintended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious\nare not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than\njocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are\nnot so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a\nless evil to lie in order to save a man\u2019s life than to lie in order to\ntake his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the\nshock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it\nis a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie\nin order to prevent a financial loss.\n\n2395. Sinfulness of All Lies.--But though lies are unequal in\nsinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are\ncalled fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest\ngood (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does\nnot justify the means.\n\n(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs\ngiven by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an\nunfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly\nrelations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the\nproper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have\nregarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and\neven those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called\nliars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7;\nLevit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and\nSt. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point:\n\u201cPutting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor,\nfor we are members one of another.\u201d The Fathers and the theologians are\ngenerally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death,\nexcuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could\napprove of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith\nin His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who\nhelps to deceive us even in a small matter.\n\n(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be\nonly a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one\u2019s mind\nis not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is\nnot necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be\ndenied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not\nregard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose\nand officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and\nas the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial;\nbut some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one\nlies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render\nthem mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of\nuntruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.\n\n2396. When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.--Lies are sometimes free from\nall formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or\nuninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great\ndifficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of\ncertain defectives who seem to be born liars).\n\n2397. Pernicious Lies.--Pernicious lies are mortal sins from their\nnature, but may become venial from the imperfection of the act or the\nlightness of the matter. For a pernicious lie sins not against truth\nonly, but also against justice or charity. Hence, it is said that the\nliar destroys his own soul (Wis., i. 11), that a lie is abominated and\nhated by the Lord (Prov., vi. 17, xii. 22), that it has the devil for\nits father (John, viii. 44), that it brings down divine vengeance (Ps.\nv. 7) and will receive its portion in the pool of fire and brimstone\n(Apoc., xxi. 8). This sin is committed in two ways, as follows:\n\n(a) a lie is pernicious when its matter is harmful, as being contrary\nto sound doctrine, good morals or true science. Hence, a preacher sins\ngravely if the substance of his pulpit teaching is mendacious (e.g., if\nin a sermon he enunciates or defends erroneous principles of conduct),\nvenially if he lies about accidentals (e.g., if he gives the wrong\nchapter or verse for a text); a scientist, a physician, a jurist, or\nthe like is similarly guilty of a pernicious lie when he misleads the\npublic by unreliable information. A penitent in the confessional and a\nwitness in court lie perniciously if their statements about relevant\nmatters are untrue, for the one injures the Sacrament and the other\ninjures public justice; but if the lie is about some matter of slight\nimportance, the sin is venial, unless there is no other matter in the\nconfession, or the testimony is under oath;\n\n(b) a lie is also pernicious when the intention of the liar is to\ninjure God or his neighbor, even though the matter itself is not\nopposed to true doctrine or is not official testimony. Examples are\nfound in those who lie in a humorous way in order to injure or sadden\nothers.\n\n2398. Concealment of the Truth.--Truthfulness is offended not only by\nthe declaration of falsity (i.e., of what is not in the mind), but also\nby the unlawful concealment of the truth (i.e., of what is in the\nmind). The truth is concealed either negatively or positively.\n\n(a) There is negative concealment of the truth, when one has recourse\nto silence or evasion. Everyone admits that this kind of concealment is\nlawful when there is no obligation to give information, or when there\nis an obligation not to give it. Thus, a person who is besieged by\nnewspaper reporters does not feel obligated to answer all their\nquestions; a person who is interrogated by curious individuals about\nhis business or financial affairs, does not feel guilty if he evades\ntheir questions by changing the subject, or by asking them similar\nquestions, or by putting them off till a more convenient time, etc.\n\n(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply\nin language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If\nthe listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him\nin words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific\nterms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence\nor dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is\nobscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental\nreservation.\n\n2399. Mental Reservation.--Mental reservation is an act of the mind by\nwhich a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they\ndo not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification\nof an external speech delivered without any or without clear external\nmodification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.\n\n(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal\nmodification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural\nsense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them)\nnor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from\ntheir context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person\nwho questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who\nstruck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was\nthe club which hit Balbus directly.\n\n(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification\ncan be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural\nsense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different\nmeanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the\nwords are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius\naccidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks\nthat someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck\nSempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows\nnothing about the matter.\n\n2400. Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.--(a) Strict mental reservation\nis unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn.\n1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs\nwords that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his\nmental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess;\nsecondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily\nescape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to\nScripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but\nthe just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).\n\n(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that\nforbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its\nuse. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an\nanswer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions\nparties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be\ninducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications,\nwhen a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can\ntestify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary\nknowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by\nconcealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is\nnecessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether\nspiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end\ncompensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused.\nApart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a\ndeparture from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which\npertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth\nfrom others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37).\nMoreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it\nwere lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are\ndiscussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.\n\n(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient\nreason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of\nstate secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the\nprevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the\nprevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the\nprevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being\nthe only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not\nuse reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should\nnot be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be\nemployed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The\nreason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double\nresult (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation\nis not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and\ncauses no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because\nthe words correspond with the thought, either from their natural\nsignification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their\naccidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by\nthe context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a\ntruth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener\nor questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own\nheedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury\nto society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest\nmeans of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets.\nOur Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or\ninsincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared\n(John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the\ndaughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other\ncases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV\nKings, vi. 19).\n\n2401. When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?--There is general\nagreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following\ncases:\n\n(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth\nfrom the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about\nsecrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to\ndisclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and\nsecretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the\nfacts. The answer, \u201cI do not know\u201d or \u201cNo,\u201d in these cases simply\nmeans: \u201cI have no personal or communicable knowledge.\u201d In war time a\ngovernment has the right to censor the news in order to keep\ninformation from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it\nobligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a\nclear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a\nslender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a\ngunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);\n\n(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold\nthe truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right\nto plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a\nperson who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he\nis not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a\nperson who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently\ngrant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which\nmeans that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).\n\n2402. Ambiguous Answers.--Are ambiguous answers which are not given\naccording to the questioner\u2019s mind, and for which there are no\nreasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?\n\n(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its\nambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly\nspeaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the\nspeaker\u2019s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation\nor quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying.\nThe pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of\nevents and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite\nsides at the same time are examples of equivocation.\n\n(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is\ncontextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express\nthe speaker\u2019s mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically\nor mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is\ngood, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or\nother Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good\nand restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the\nquestion propounded referred to moral goodness.\n\n2403. Simulation or Pretence.--A special form of untruthfulness is\nsimulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify\nthe contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.\n\n(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an\naccidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being\nuntruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678\nsqq.).\n\n(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and\nthings were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct\nat variance with one\u2019s ideas is simulation. One may act without any\nthought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps\nsober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done\nwith the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not\nto signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops\nof Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.;\nDavid feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11.\nsqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth\nfrom those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally\nrecognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems,\nambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and\nconcealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.\n\n(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who\nis sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is\nwell apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one\nwho hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form\nof simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does\nnot possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation\nif the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at\nEmmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but\nHe meant not to stop without an invitation.\n\n2404. The Sinfulness of Simulation.--(a) In general, simulation is a\nsin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the\nfew exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their\nnature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more\nindeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy\nto decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie.\nThus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or\nfalse jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no\nintention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to\nwear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state,\nand not necessarily his personal moral character.\n\n(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable;\nfor hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of\napplause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks\nof friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our\nLord were given the hypocritical Pharisees (\u201cBlind guides, whited\nsepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers,\u201d Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.),\nand among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas\n(\u201cDost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?\u201d Luke, xxii. 48).\nAgainst the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were\nbetter if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).\n\n2405. Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.--(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is\nthe simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This\nsin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external\npretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly\ndenounced in Scripture.\n\n(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in\nmortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a\ndouble life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for\nexample, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal\nsin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should\nbe noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one\u2019s sin\nby dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize\nothers by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).\n\n(c) Hypocrisy in the widest sense assumes the appearance of a high\ndegree of sanctity above that requisite for salvation, as when a person\nof ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or\nto pass as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This\nsin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of\nsome motive, some means, or some other circumstance. There is no\nhypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really\nhas; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not\ngood, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.\n\n2406. Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.--Two forms of lying\nabout self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.\n\n(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends\nto be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one\u2019s\nmeans, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or\ntries by bluff to make one\u2019s defects seem perfections. This sin is\nmortal when the lie is seriously injurious to God or others (Ezech.,\nxxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such\nas grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.\n\n(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as\nwhen one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an\nexcessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to\nhim, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad\nquality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor\naccuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is\nusually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid\noffense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some\ncircumstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or\nseduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed\nbraggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to\nacquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25;\nMatt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).\n\n2407. Infidelity and Violation of a Secret.--It remains to speak of the\nvices of infidelity and violation of secret (see 2388 a). As to the\nformer, since it has been discussed elsewhere (1877 sqq., 1888, 1889;\nsee also the matter on Promissory Oaths), it will suffice here to ask\nthe question: Is the breach of a promise freely given a sin?\n\n(a) If observance of the promise is due from fidelity only, there is no\nlegal fault, but there is moral fault, and hence the breach of the\npromise is a sin. The malice is essentially the same as that of\nuntruthfulness (see 2395), for both the liar and the promise-breaker\nshow themselves unreliable, the former because his words do not square\nwith his mind and the latter because his deeds do not live up to his\nplighted word. Breach of promise, then, seems _per se_ to be a venial\nsin, though there are often circumstances (such as damage done) that\nmake it mortal.\n\n(b) If observance of the promise is not due even from fidelity, on\naccount of the presence of some defect, there is no moral obligation to\nkeep the promise and no sin is committed by not keeping it. The defects\nreferred to are such as make the promise lack force from the beginning\n(e.g., if it was immoral or extorted by force), or deprive it of the\nforce it had (i.e., inability on the part of the promisor or loss of\nright on the part of the promisee). The promisor is unable to keep the\npromise, if the thing promised has become physically impossible (e.g.,\nhe no longer has the strength or the means to perform what he\npromised), or morally impossible (e.g., the thing promised has become\nunlawful, or a notable change has taken place which, could it have been\nforeseen, would have prevented the promise). The promisee loses his\nright if the sole or principal reason that dictated the promise has\nceased, or if the promise has become useless to the promisee, or if the\npromisor has been released, or if the promisee forfeits his claim by\nhis own perfidy towards the promisor (see 2256 sqq., 1889).\n\n2408. Definition of a Secret.--A secret is a matter (e.g., an\ninvention, valuable information, concealed virtues, the fact that a\ncrime has been committed) known privately by only one person or by so\nfew that it is neither public property nor notorious. Moralists\ndistinguish the following kinds of secrets:\n\n(a) a natural secret, which is one that cannot be revealed without\ncausing injury or annoyance to another, as when the revelation will\nharm a person in his reputation, honor, influence property. It is\ncalled natural for it arises from the very nature of the matter of the\nsecret and not from any promise or contract.\n\n(b) a promised secret, which is one that a person has promised, but\nonly after he had already learned it, to guard inviolate. It makes no\ndifference whether the promisor learned the secret from the promisee or\nfrom some other source;\n\n(c) an entrusted or committed secret, which is one that a person\npromised (and before he learned it) to keep from others. The promise\nhere is either implicit or explicit. An implicit promise of secrecy is\none that is demanded by the confidential nature of communications\nbetween two parties (professional secret), as when physicians, lawyers,\npriests, parents, or friends are told of private matters on account of\ntheir position or relationship. An explicit promise is one that is\ngiven in express terms, as when A says to B: \u201cI have a matter of great\nimportance to tell you, but you must first promise that you will keep\nit secret\u201d; and on B promising, A confides to him the secret.\n\n2409. Sinfulness of Violating a. Secret.--A secret is the property of\nits owner, and to it he has a strict right; for if it is a good secret\n(such as an original idea or discovery), it is the product of his labor\nor at least a possession which he has lawfully come by; if it is an\nevil secret (such as a crime of which he has been guilty), it may not\nbe made known without infringing on his right of reputation. It is no\nmore lawful to violate the right to a secret than to violate the right\nto property, and, as there are three kinds of injuries to property, so\nthere are three kinds of injuries to a secret.\n\n(a) Thus, the right of possession is injured by those who by fraud or\nforce or other illegal means deprive another of his secret (e.g., by\nsecretly intercepting private letters, by making a person drunk in\norder to learn a secret).\n\n(b) The right of use is injured by those who on acquiring knowledge of\na secret guide themselves or others by it to the detriment of the\nowner\u2019s rights.\n\n(c) The right of disposition is injured by those who reveal a secret\nwhich they were obliged not to reveal.\n\n2410. Prying Into Others\u2019 Secrets.--To seek to discover the secrets of\nothers is not lawful unless the following conditions are present:\n\n(a) one must have a right to the knowledge. Hence, if there is question\nabout a crime that has been committed or that is about to be committed,\none has a right to investigate in order to prevent harm to public or\nprivate good; in war one may try to discover the plans of the enemy.\nBut it is not lawful to pry into purely personal matters, to fish from\nothers natural or confidential secrets which they are bound to keep, to\nsteal from another the thoughts, plans, inventions, etc, which are his\nown;\n\n(b) one must use only honest means to discover secrets to which one has\na right (1504). Thus, it does not seem lawful generally to inebriate\nanother in order to learn his secret, and it is certainly sinful to\nresort to lies or simulation or immorality.\n\n2411. Reading Another\u2019s Letters or Papers.--When is it lawful to read\nthe letters or other papers of another person?\n\n(a) This is lawful when the writings are not intended to be secret to\nanyone, as when a circular is meant for public use, when greetings are\nwritten on a postcard which all may read, and when a letter is left\nopen and thrown away or otherwise abandoned. But a sealed letter, or\none left open in a private room, or one lost in a public place, is\nsecret. If a letter or manuscript has been torn up by its owner and\nthrown away on the street or other public place, it does not seem\nlawful to piece the fragments together and read the writing, for,\nthough the paper has been abandoned, the owner by destroying it has\nindicated his will to keep the contents secret.\n\n(b) It is also lawful to read the writing of others that are not secret\nas regards oneself, as when one has received a just permission from the\nwriter to peruse a letter written by him, or when one may presume such\npermission on account of friendship with the writer, or when rule or\nlawful custom gives the superior of an institution the right to inspect\nthe correspondence of his subjects. Exception must be made for exempted\nmatter for which there is no permission, such as letters containing\nconscience matters and letters directed to higher religious superiors\n(see Canon 611).\n\n(c) It is also lawful to read the writings of others that are meant to\nbe secret, if one has a right to know what is in them: for in such a\ncase the owner would be unreasonable if he wished to exclude one from\nthe knowledge. Thus, the public authority (e.g., in time of war) has\nthe right to open and read letters and private papers, when this is\nnecessary for the common good; parents and heads of boarding schools\nmay examine the correspondence of their subjects, though parents should\nrespect conscience matter and others should not read family secrets;\nprivate individuals have the natural right, as a measure of\nself-defense, to read another\u2019s letter, when there is a prudent reason\nfor thinking that it contains something gravely and unjustly harmful to\nthemselves (such as conspiracy, a trap, calumny).\n\n2412. Lawfulness of Utilizing Knowledge of Secret.--One is said to use\nthe knowledge obtained from a secret when one guides one\u2019s conduct by\nthe knowledge, doing or omitting what one would not otherwise do or\nomit. Is this use of a secret lawful?\n\n(a) If there was a promise not to use the secret, such use is unlawful\n(see 2414). Breach of promise is then, in case of a merely promised\nsecret, an act of infidelity at least, and in case of an entrusted\nsecret an act of injustice. Thus, when one consults a professional\nperson, there is a tacit understanding that the knowledge communicated\nwill not be used against one\u2019s interests or without one\u2019s consent, and\nhence a lawyer would be unjust if, on learning in the course of work\nfor a client that the latter\u2019s business was not prosperous, he gave\nword of this to one of the client\u2019s creditors.\n\n(b) If there was no promise not to use the secret, the use of it is\nnevertheless unjust, if it infringes a strict right (e.g., to make\nmoney from a secret process on which another has a patent, to get\nknowledge of another\u2019s information and plans through reading his\nletters and thereby to prevent him from securing a vacant position), or\nif it is equivalent to unjust revelation of a secret. The use is\nuneharitable if it harms another person without necessity (e.g., to\ntake away one\u2019s trade from a deserving merchant solely because one has\nlearned that on one occasion he was accidentally intoxicated).\n\n(c) If there was no promise to avoid use and no harm will be done by\nuse, it is lawful to use a secret for a non-necessary good (e.g., to\nraise the price on one\u2019s property when one accidentally learns through\noverhearing a secret conversation that the property is worth the higher\nprice), and it is obligatory to use it for a necessary good (e.g., to\nassist a neighbor when one is told under secret that he is in dire need\nof one\u2019s charitable help). Even though harm will result to another by\nuse of the secret, use is not sinful if it infringes no right and could\nbe sacrificed only at great inconvenience to oneself, as when one has\ndiscovered by one\u2019s own industry some important truth in an art or\nscience which another had previously discovered but had neglected to\nmake his own by exclusive right, or when one learns under secret that\nanother person is one\u2019s enemy and has to be watched and avoided.\n\n2413. The Sin Committed by Stealing or Unduly Using the Secret of\nAnother.--(a) From its nature (cases of mere fidelity excepted) the sin\nis mortal, as being a violation of commutative justice or of charity.\nInjury to property rights, whether in goods or in knowledge, is\nviolation of a strict right (see 1890, 1894). The sin is aggravated by\nthe greater import of the secret or by the greater damages or\ndispleasure caused.\n\n(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter the\nsin may become venial, as when one thoughtlessly reads another person\u2019s\nletters, or opens correspondence without authority, feeling morally\nsure that there is nothing confidential in it, or makes use of an\nunimportant secret without permission.\n\n2414. The Obligation of Keeping a Secret.--(a) The natural secret\nobliges _per se_ under grave sin; for violation of it offends charity\nand justice by saddening and harming a neighbor. The sin may become\nvenial on account of lightness of matter, as when little sadness or\nharm is caused.\n\n(b) The promised secret obliges ordinarily under light sin only; for as\na rule the promisor intends to obligate himself in virtue of fidelity\nalone (1888), and the obligation of fidelity, as said above (see 2407),\nis not grave. But exceptionally the obligation may be grave, as when\nthe promisor intended to bind himself in virtue of justice and under\ngrave sin, or when the secret is natural as well as promised.\n\n(c) The entrusted secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for there is\na duty of commutative and of legal justice to keep it, on account of\nthe rights of contract and of the common good that are involved. The\nviolator of an entrusted secret injures private good by disregard for\ncontract, and he injures public good by weakening confidence in\nofficials or professional persons to whom others must go for advice or\nassistance. Violation of a committed secret may be only a venial sin on\naccount of the lightness of the matter. Thus, some think it is not a\nserious injustice to reveal a secret to one very discreet person, if\nthe person whose secret is made known is not very much opposed to this\nand no other damage will result (see 2065).\n\n2415. Comparison of Secrets as Regards Binding Force.--(a) The promised\nsecret obliges less than the natural or the entrusted, as was said in\nthe previous paragraph. (b) The natural secret obliges less _per se_\nthan the entrusted secret, for the safeguarding of the latter is agreed\nto in an onerous contract, while no engagement is made to keep the\nformer. (c) Some entrusted secrets are more sacred than others. Thus, a\nsecret confided from necessity is more binding than one confided\nwithout necessity; a secret one has sworn to keep is more obligatory\nthan a secret one has given one\u2019s word of honor to keep; a professional\nsecret is more imperious than a private secret; a state secret is far\nmore important than any secret of private individuals. The most\ninviolable of all secrets is that of the confessional, because its\nviolation is always a sacrilege.\n\n2416. Cases Wherein It Is Not Necessary to Keep a Secret.--(a) If there\nhas been no obligation from the time the secret was learned, it is not\nnecessary to keep it. Thus, if a merely promised secret was accepted\nunder compulsion and revelation will be advantageous and not harmful,\nit does not seem necessary to keep the secret.\n\n(b) If the obligation of the secret has ceased, it is not necessary to\nbe silent. Examples are cases in which secrecy was promised only for a\ncertain space of time, or in which a matter formerly secret has become\npublic, or in which the owner of the secret wishes it to be divulged,\nor in which he has not kept faith with the possessor of the secret,\nprovided of course that in these cases no injury or unnecessary harm is\ndone by making known the secret. Similarly, if the recipient of the\nsecret cannot keep it without grave harm (e.g., death) to himself, he\nis not bound by it, unless charity (see 1165, 1236) or justice calls\nfor the contrary. Commutative justice would demand silence (though many\nmake exception for a most grave reason, regarding a promise to the\ncontrary as prodigal) if there had been an express contract to guard\nthe secret at all risks; legal justice would demand it, if the safety\nof the republic were involved.\n\n2417. Cases Wherein It Is Not Lawful to Keep a Secret.--(a) If a secret\ncannot be kept without greater harm to the common good, it may not be\nkept, for legal justice requires that private good be subordinated to\npublic safety. The violation of secrets is a harm to the public good\nand a greater harm than ordinary evils against the community (such as\nthe escape of a guilty person); but it is a less harm than serious\nevils against the people (such as menace to public health, sedition, or\ntreason). The possessor of a natural or promised secret must make it\nknown at the command of lawful authority, as in court; but the superior\nhas no right to question about entrusted secrets of a necessary kind,\nand this is usually recognized by positive law in the protection\nextended to professional communications.\n\n(b) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good\nof the owner of the secret, distinction is made between a non-entrusted\nand an entrusted secret. In the former case the secret may not be kept,\nfor charity bids one to help a neighbor escape a greater evil, and the\nowner of the secret would be unreasonable if he were opposed to its\nrevelation (see 501 sqq.). In the latter case, some are of the opinion\nthat the secret should be kept, if it is professional (since the public\ngood then takes precedence over the private good of the owner of the\nsecret), but this is denied by others. Example: Titus knows that Balbus\nis about to marry with a secret impediment that will nullify the\nmarriage, but he cannot persuade Balbus to disclose this impediment to\nthe pastor.\n\n(c) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good\nof a third party (i.e., one other than the owner of the secret),\ndistinction is made between cases, according as injury is or is not\ndone by the owner of the secret to the third party. If no injury is\ndone the third party, the secret should be kept (e.g., if one knows in\nconfidence that Sempronius has made an invention which will supersede\nan invention made by Claudius, one is not at liberty to make this known\nto the latter, for Sempronius has done no injury to Claudius). If,\nhowever, injury is done the third party by the owner of the secret when\nthe secret is kept, one should not keep the secret; for charity\nrequires that one help an innocent person to escape from harm, even if\nthis has to be done at the expense of harm to the guilty cause of the\nharm. Examples: If one knows as a secret that A, B and C have conspired\nto murder D tomorrow night, and one cannot otherwise prevent the\nmurder, one should if possible break the secret, at least by sending\nwarning to D that his life is in danger tomorrow night. If a doctor\nknows that a man who is about to contract marriage is syphilitic and\npretends that he is sound, and if the doctor cannot persuade this man\nto make the facts known to the intended wife, the doctor himself should\ngive notice to the woman, according to some authorities, unless the\nlaws of the country forbid such use of professional knowledge.\n\n2418. What should the possessor of an entrusted secret do, if from the\nsecret he knows that the one who entrusted it is guilty of a crime for\nwhich an innocent third person is about to be convicted and sentenced?\n\n(a) If the guilty party is responsible for the plight of the innocent\nparty (e.g., because he falsely accused him or threw suspicion on him),\nnatural law would require the possessor of the secret to make known the\ntrue state of affairs; for the guilty party is then the unjust cause of\ndamage and is bound to accuse himself (see 1763). Revelation of the\ntrue culprit would not be necessary, however, if there was some other\nway of saving the innocent person.\n\n(b) If the guilty person is not responsible for the difficulty in which\nthe innocent person finds himself, not having used any means to bring\nthe latter into suspicion, some believe that the secret should be kept,\nsince the guilty person has then the right to keep his secret and\ntherefore has also the right that his confidants keep it (see 1968).\nBut others, while granting that the guilty person is not obliged to\naccuse himself, deny that the confidant is not obliged to accuse him;\nfor the right of the guilty that his secret be kept and the right of\nthe innocent that he be not deprived of life or liberty are in conflict\nand unequal, and he who prefers the former right does an injury to the\ninnocent person (see 288).\n\n2419. The previous question was concerned with an innocent third party.\nIf the holder of the secret is also the accused, it seems he is not\nobliged, unless perhaps when he agreed to it, to prefer the\ninviolability of the secret to his own justification; for the\nacceptance of a secret does not mean that one binds oneself to grave\nhardship for its preservation (see 2418). The thing to do would be to\nwarn the guilty person to escape in time, and then to exculpate oneself\nby making known the truth.\n\n2420. Lawfulness of Revealing a Secret Learned by Stealth or Force.--Is\nit lawful, in order to avert some great evil, to use or reveal against\nthe interests or wishes of its owner a secret which one has learned by\nstealth (e.g., by spying, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unauthorized\ninspection of papers) or by force? Various answers are given to this\nquestion, but to us the following seems the best:\n\n(a) if the stealth or force would not be unjust here and now, because\nthe owner of the secret has a duty to disclose it (e.g., on account of\nthe public good, on account of the extreme need of a private person),\nor the other party has a right to seek after it (e.g., because he\ncannot otherwise defend himself against the unjust vexation of the\nowner of the secret), the answer is in the affirmative; for in such a\ncase there is only applied the principle of lawful occupation or of\nlawful self-defense (see 1920 sqq., 1819). But if the stealth or force\nis excessive in its manner or productive of unnecessary harm, it is\nsinful and induces the duty of restitution, nor is there any right to\nmake such use or such revelation of a secret as is sinful in itself\n(e.g., on account of calumnies, scandals, disorders);\n\n(b) if the stealth or force would be unjust here and now, the answer is\nin the negative; for in such a case there is real theft of a secret, a\nperson\u2019s most intimate possession, and a continuation of the original\ninjury by the use of the stolen property against its owner, or at least\nan unlawful conversion of property. Hence, if there is no grave or\nproportionate reason for the use of the secret, or if other and simpler\nmethods can be employed, the secret may not be used. Those who play the\ndetective ostensibly for other reasons but really for purposes of\nblackmail or other personal advantage, are therefore in the same class\nas thieves and are bound to restitution; their sin is _per se_ mortal,\nfor secrets are usually esteemed more highly than money, and it would\nbe seriously detrimental to the public weal if the practice of using\nsecrets unlawfully obtained (e.g., by secretly taking down privileged\ncommunications or state secrets) were permissible.\n\n2421. The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.--These two virtues,\nthough they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most\nuseful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness)\nis a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters\nproperly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.\n\n(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is,\nin looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and\nconsideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than\nmere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary\nproprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman,\naccording to Cardinal Newman (\u201cIdea of a University,\u201d Discourse viii,\n10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to\nmake others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is\nconsiderate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions\nor topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome,\nmakes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when\ncompelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is\nindulgent towards opponents.\n\n(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it\nobserves the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances,\nsuiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and\nobserving the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official,\nbusiness, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are\ntimes when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to\ndisplay severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the\nsake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).\n\n(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the\nways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and\ntherefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each\none should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the\ndispleasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less\nthan friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special\nbenevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than\npolish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly\nin an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to\nits requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by\nfriendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied\nby sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse\ncompliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or\nlittle affection.\n\n(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation\nof amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under\ntemperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of\ngames _eutrapelia_, which may also be called reasonable relaxation,\nurbanity, or pleasantness.\n\n2422. Offices of Affability.--All, and especially the clergy, should\npractise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all\nmen, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his\nadvice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of God\n(I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the\nnegative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the\navoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the\npositive offices are the observance on special occasions of the\nappropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a\ngentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.\n\n2423. The Sins against Affability.--(a) Adulation is the vice of those\nwho in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the\ncomplaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or\nextravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors\nfor himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by\nexaggerated debasement of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as\nby exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is\nnot grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but\ncircumstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when\none compliments another\u2019s sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the\nperson flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the\nflatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to\nadulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display\nof friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.\n\n(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners,\nnot because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant\nand to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready\nto contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in\nvisage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence.\nSurliness is _per se_ worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it\nis farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not\nnecessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer\nis usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5).\nLike to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or\nlaziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at\ntable. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can\nbe reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that\nseriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.\n\n2424. Liberality.--Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of\nriches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one\u2019s own goods\nupon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.\n\n(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and\nesteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least\nimproperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a passion.\nLiberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These\nvirtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in\nneed or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity\nand its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who\nare not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does\nnot prize external things excessively.\n\n(b) It inclines one to bestow one\u2019s own possessions, or freely to\ncommunicate them. In this respect liberality is assigned to justice,\nsince its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to\nothers. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination,\neven the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being\nless wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.\n\n(c) It functions in ordinary affairs, for there is a special virtue of\nmagnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise\nof the greatest moment.\n\n(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is\nneeded to make one use money freely for one\u2019s own needs or comfort.\n\n(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there\nis no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed\nunsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quantity, quality, etc.\nLiberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal\naffairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income,\nwith thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality\nwhich spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of\nluxuries (see 1681 sqq.).\n\n2425. The Importance of Liberality.--(a) Liberality is not the greatest\nvirtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the\npassions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in\nreference to externals; it is less than fortitude and justice, which\nserve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is\nless than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for\nliberality has to do directly with temporals.\n\n(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes\none to use money well in the service of God and humanity, and gives one\nan influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., xxxi. 28).\nAccording to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first\nbravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of\ngenerosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and\ncharity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence\n(see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards God\nand man.\n\n2426. Vice of Avarice.--The vice which is opposed to liberality by\ndefect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as\ndistinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or\ndelight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as\nlands or money.\n\n(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.--This sin is _per se_ venial, since\nit is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself\nindifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for\nmoney is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations\nfor its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to\nreligion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not\nconcerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are\nnot a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and\ncarnal vices.\n\n(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.--In regard to deformity, avarice\nis not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the\ngood to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the\nvice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is\nopposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that\navarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard\nto shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less\nvaluable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the\nvice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things,\nwhich are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and\nof soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is\nrightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of\navarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons\navarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own\nnecessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by\nan unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, niggardliness), or a\nwillingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the\nmost disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to\npart with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake\nof others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness).\nIn regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that\ncauses it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice\nis one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other\nsins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most\nprolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure\nthe requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for\nthe sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii.\n14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and\nrestless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse\nto deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv.\n26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.),\nand of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of\nthe most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own\nsoul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and\none of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., xxx.\n15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence\nor some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).\n\n2427. Vice of Prodigality.--The vice opposed to liberality by excess in\ngiving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal\nthings and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.\n\n(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the\nmiser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as\nthe miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is\ncareless about earning or saving.\n\n(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the\nprodigal gives more than he should, or else the circumstances do not\ncall for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should\nnot give.\n\n2428. The Sinfulness of Prodigality.--(a) From its nature it is venial.\nThe prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who\nis held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not\ngrave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he\ndeprives himself are of the lowest kind.\n\n(b) From its circumstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on\naccount of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to\nseduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which\nmakes one unable to pay debts or assist a relative who is in grave\nneed), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity,\nas when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).\n\n2429. Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.--(a) They are associable,\nfor the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in\ndifferent respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money\naway, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to\nobtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice.\nProdigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed\nfrom liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to\ncure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the\nvice of old age.\n\n2430. The Virtue of Equity.--The virtues that have been so far treated\nin the present Article are forms of particular justice, and they have\nthe status of adjuncts or potential parts. We shall conclude the list\nof virtues grouped with justice by discussing equity, which belongs to\ngeneral (legal) justice and has the rank of a subjective part (see\nabove, 1635, 1636, 1745, 1701, 1704).\n\n2431. Definition of Equity.--In law, equity is any court system of\nextraordinary justice in which the standard is natural honesty as\ndeclared by the conscience of the judge or by a body of rules and\nprocedures that supplement or override the usual rules and procedures\nwhere these are too narrow or limited. Thus, in England and in the\nUnited States courts of equity are those that take care of defined\nspecial cases for which there is no remedy in the usual or common\nlaw courts (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.348). But as here taken\nequity is a moral virtue, and is of two kinds, particular equity which\npertains to particular justice (natural equity) and general equity\nwhich belongs to legal justice (legal equity).\n\n(a) Natural equity is a moral virtue that inclines one not to insist\nunnecessarily on one\u2019s strict or legal rights when to do so will be\nunpleasant or burdensome to others. It is exemplified in the acts of an\nemployer who freely grants a bonus to deserving employees in addition\nto the wage promised, and of a creditor who grants an extension of\ntime to a hard-pressed debtor. This virtue partakes of both charity\nand justice; of charity, since it tempers justice with mercy; of\njustice, since it is really identical with the virtue of affability\nor friendliness mentioned above (2421). Its obligation as an act of\njustice is not grave, since the debt is not of a rigorous kind.\n\n(b) Legal equity is a moral virtue that inclines one to justice beyond\nthe common laws, or it is a correction of the law in that wherein the\nlaw by reason of its universality is manifestly deficient. The law is\nsaid to be deficient here when its application in a particular case\nwould be prejudicial to the supreme purpose of law (i.e., to the common\ngood or to equal justice). Some precepts of the natural law (e.g., the\nprohibitions against lying and adultery) cannot be deficient in this\nway and need no supervising equity. But other precepts of natural law,\naccording to some (e.g., the command that a deposit be returned to the\ndepositor), and also precepts of positive law are found to be\nunsuitable in exceptional cases. The reason for this defect in a good\nlaw lies in the nature of the case; for these laws must be made in view\nof what happens in the majority of cases, and accordingly they are\ncouched in general terms and permit of exceptions which the lawgiver\nhimself would allow (see on Epieikeia, 411 sqq).\n\n2432. The Greatness of Legal Equity.--(a) It is a distinct virtue,\nsince it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of\nspecial difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds\nthe spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the\nlawgiver\u2019s intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver\u2019s\nwords.\n\n(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is\ncontained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs\nfrom the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in\nArticles 5 and 6.\n\n(c) It pertains to the species, not of particular, but of general or\nlegal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned\nwith the debt owed to the common good. Thus, _per se_ its obligation is\ngrave (see 1721).\n\n(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two\nparts--good judgment (_synesis_), which settles ordinary cases of\nmorals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment\n(_gnome_), which passes on moral problems that are out of the ordinary\nrun--so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to\nusual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles\n(viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where\nthe immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a\nmadman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to\ncommit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but\nequity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and\none cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city,\nthe law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity\nwould command one to transgress it.\n\n(e) Equity is, therefore, the noblest act of strict justice. For legal\njustice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is\nthe superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common\ngood and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all\ntimes; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in\nextraordinary cases, by obedience to law.\n\n2433. The Complements of Justice.--To each of the various virtues\ncorrespond certain complements, namely, Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fruits\nof the Holy Ghost, and Beatitudes (see 159).\n\n(a) The Gift that corresponds to justice is piety, for, like justice,\npiety is exercised towards another, and moreover piety is the\ncompletion of the virtue of religion, the highest development of\njustice. This Gift is defined as \u201can infused habit that renders the\nsoul well disposed towards God as its kind Father, and makes it quickly\nresponsive to the Holy Spirit when He moves it to acts of filial\naffection towards God.\u201d As the virtue of piety is shown to earthly\nfathers, so the Gift of Piety is shown to the Father in heaven: \u201cYou\nhave received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba,\nFather\u201d (Rom., viii. 15). Religion honors God as Lord, piety as Father;\nfilial fear reveres His majesty, piety His lovingkindness. And as a\nchild tenderly loves all that belongs to a good father, so piety makes\nthe soul rejoice and be glad in the things of God, in the Saints, the\nScriptures, the practices of religion, and the like.\n\n(b) The Beatitudes assigned here are the fourth (Blessed are they that\nhunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill), which\nagrees with justice, and the fifth (Blessed are the merciful, for they\nshall obtain mercy), which is suitable for piety inasmuch as one who\nfinds his love and joy in God as Father will be compassionate to the\nsuffering creatures of God. Like justice, both of these Beatitudes are\nexercised in reference to the neighbor (see 164).\n\n(c) The Fruits that seem most appropriate here are good will and\nkindness, which find a sweet joy in purposing and performing services\nfor others. Like justice, these acts have reference to others (163);\nlike piety, they see in their neighbors the children of the same\nheavenly Father. Thus, justice when alone is guided by prudence; it\npays what is due to God as Lord, to man as neighbor; it acts perhaps\nwith pain, but from a sense of duty. But when justice is supernaturally\nperfected, it is the Spirit of Piety which guides, and which makes one\nto see in God one\u2019s Father and in man the child of God; even that which\nis not owed is given from mercy, and there is a hunger and thirst for\njustice; and in the payment of duty to others there is at last a joy\nfound in the very difficulty itself.\n\n2434. The Commandments of Justice.--The various precepts regarding\njustice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the\nfulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals\nor inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the\nfirst three prescribe the duties owed to God, the fourth the duties\nowed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man\nhas to his equals or to all fellowmen.\n\n2435. The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their\npurpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which\nconsists in the love of God and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and\nthey therefore outline first the service that is owed to God\n(Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to\nman (Commandments of the Second Table).\n\n(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the\nedifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render\nto God the things that are God\u2019s. We must avoid, therefore, the excess\nof superstition (Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me) and the\ndefect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy\nGod in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou\nkeep holy the Sabbath Day).\n\n(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to\nthose to whom we are most bound after God, namely, parents, country,\nsuperiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions\nagainst injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the\nharm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one\nperson with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor\u2019s\nexternal corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external\nincorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness\nagainst thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts\nor desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of\nthose internal sins that are most common on account of the utility\n(Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor\u2019s goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt\nnot covet thy neighbor\u2019s wife) they afford.\n\n2436. We shall not give here any special treatment of the Decalogue.\nRather we refer the reader to the excellent explanations that are\ncontained in Part III of The Catechism of the Council of Trent.\nMoreover, each of the Commandments has been treated in the present\nwork, chiefly in the Articles on justice, and supplementary matter can\nbe drawn from some others of its articles. For the sake of convenience,\nhowever, we give here a list of references, showing the passages of\nthis Moral Theology in which the Commandments of the Decalogue are\nexplained.\n\n(a) Thus, for the First Commandment read on superstition (2274 sqq.)\nfor the prohibitory part, on faith, hope and charity (746 sqq.) for the\nperceptive part.\n\n(b) For the Second Commandment read on irreligiousness (2299) for the\nprohibitory part; on oaths, adjuration and praise (2245 sqq.) for the\npreceptive part.\n\n(c) For the Third Commandment as to its natural precept, read on the\nvirtue of religion (2145 sqq.); as to its positive precept, read on\npositive laws (340 sqq., 352, 425) and on the first Commandment of the\nChurch (see 2575 sqq.).\n\n(d) For the Fourth Commandment read on the virtues of piety, reverence,\nobedience and gratitude (2344 sqq.). Other matter will be found under\ncharity (1158 sqq., 1211 sqq.) and under the duties of particular\nstates.\n\n(e) For the Fifth Commandment read on homicide, suicide, and bodily\ninjury (1816-1871). Other matter will be found in the Articles on\ncharity (1579 sqq., 1193 sqq.) and on affability (2421 sqq.).\n\n(f) For the Sixth Commandment read on injustice (1719 sqq.), on\nrestitution (1803), and on the virtue of temperance (2461 sqq.).\n\n(g) For the Seventh Commandment read on commutative and distributive\njustice (1745 sqq.), on restitution (1751 sqq.), on injuries to\nproperty (1872-1938), on fraud (2121 sqq.), on liberality (2424 sqq.).\n\n(h) For the Eighth Commandment read on judicial injustice (1939 sqq.),\non unjust words (2009 Sqq.), and on truthfulness (2385 sqq.).\n\n(i) For the Ninth and Tenth Commandments read on internal sins (230\nsqq.), and on the malice of the internal act of sin (89-93).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 7: THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 123-140.)\n\n2437. The Virtue of Fortitude.--This virtue ranks next after justice\nand before temperance. Prudence has the greatest amount of goodness\nsince it deals directly with reason, the essential good of man; justice\nis next because it realizes the dictates of reason in human affairs;\nthe other virtues uphold the reign of reason against the rebellion of\npassion, fortitude repressing fear, the most powerful foe of reason,\nand temperance subduing pleasure, which is after fear the strongest of\nreason\u2019s enemies (cfr. 157, 1627, 1688). Fortitude is nobler than\ntemperance because more closely related to reason; it is the more\ndifficult virtue, because it is harder to bear pain than to abstain\nfrom pleasure.\n\n2438. Fortitude in General.--Fortitude (etymologically, strength,\nvigor, firmness) in general is a moral quality which makes a person\nunshaken from the right by danger or difficulty. It has various senses.\n\n(a) It is used for a seeming virtue, which has the act but not the\nrequisites (i.e., the knowledge and the free choice) of a moral virtue.\nThus, some are brave from ignorance or want of reflection, because they\ndo not realize the danger (e.g., intoxicated persons) or because habit\nmakes them act without thought, or because many successes have rendered\nthem over-sanguine; others are brave from compulsion, because cowardice\nis severely punished, or from passion, because they are beside\nthemselves with pain, anger, desire, etc.\n\n(b) It is used for an inchoate virtue or a natural fitness to withstand\nattack or encounter danger. Thus, some persons are so constituted\nphysically that the thought of risk, pain, or death does not affect\nthem strongly (fearlessness, intrepidity), or even attracts them\n(adventurousness). This kind of bodily bravery is a preparation or\npredisposition for moral courage.\n\n(c) Fortitude is also the name of a general virtue or rather of a\ngeneral condition which must be found in every virtue. For there is no\nvirtue without firmness and persistence in good, as the name virtue\n(i.e., strength) indicates. Thus, a person who is weakly inclined to\ntemperance and opposes no strong resistance to temptation cannot be\nsaid to possess the virtue of temperance.\n\n(d) Finally, fortitude is the name of a special virtue which confers\nvigor and steadfastness in a special kind of trial, such as perils and\npains which threaten or inflict severe evils. It is of this fortitude\nthat we now speak.\n\n2439. Definition of Fortitude.--Fortitude is defined as \u201ca virtue which\nin the face of the greatest evils moderates the passions of fear and\nconfidence within the bounds dictated by right reason.\u201d\n\n(a) The primary object of fortitude is the passions, or motions of the\nsensuous appetite through which the appetite is attracted or repelled\nby an object brought before it as good or evil, agreeable or\ndisagreeable. Justice is concerned with operations, fortitude and\ntemperance with passions (see 1709).\n\n(b) The passions that chiefly fall within the scope of fortitude are\nfear and confidence; and thus it is set apart from temperance, which\ndeals with the passions of pleasure. Fortitude has to do with that\nwhich is disagreeable to sense, temperance with that which is\nagreeable. Fear is a disturbance of soul produced by the imminence of\nan external evil that cannot be easily escaped; confidence is a feeling\nof self-reliance impelling one to face or attack a threatening evil.\n\n(c) The function of fortitude is to moderate fear and confidence, or to\nkeep them to the happy mean between excess and defect. The passions in\nthemselves are not evil, but they need regulation (see 121, 122); and\nhence without fortitude one falls either into cowardice or rashness.\n\n(d) Fortitude acts in the face of the greatest evils, that is, even\nwhen death itself, the greatest of corporal evils and the king of\nterrors, is at hand. Virtue is the act of a perfect man, and hence we\ndo not ascribe fortitude to a man who is not brave except in reference\nto things that are fearful only slightly or not at all (such as having\na tooth pulled or a finger lanced). The right regulation of fear\nsprings, therefore, from different good qualities, according to the\nkinds of objects that inspire alarm: to fortitude in the strictest\nsense, if there is question of supreme natural evil (that is, death or\nits equivalent in deadly disease, mortal wound or torture); to\nfortitude in a wider sense, if there is question of lesser corporal\nevils (e.g., blows, wounds or mutilation that do not cause death); to\nsome other virtue, if there is question of other kinds of evils (e.g.,\nliberality regulates the fear of losing money).\n\n(e) The motive of fortitude is conformity with right reason. The\ncourageous person despises dangers because he wishes to hold fast to\nvirtue and has for his last aim God and true beatitude. Fortitude is\nexercised, then, only when one is courageous in a good cause; the end\nof the work (_finis operis_), or at least the end of the agent (_finis\noperantis_), must be virtuous. The aim of bravery itself is virtuous\nwhen it is the common good (e.g., soldiers fighting in defense of\ncountry) or the good of a particular virtue (e.g., a judge contending\nfor justice, a virgin for purity, a martyr for religion); the aim of\nthe brave man is good when he performs an indifferent act for virtue\u2019s\nsake (e.g., waits on another during pestilence because of friendship,\ngoes on a perilous journey because of a pilgrimage). On the contrary,\nfortitude is not exercised if bravery has nothing to do with virtue\n(e.g., the imperturbability during sickness or shipwreck of a person\nwho had resolved on suicide), or if it is opposed to virtue (e.g., the\ndaring and coolness of a pirate, bandit, gunman or dueller); to risk\nignoble death with bravado is not a virtue.\n\n2440. The Two Acts of Fortitude.--(a) The moderation of fear is\nfollowed by endurance or firmness in the midst of danger, as in the\ncase of the martyrs. This act in common speech is more especially\ndesignated \u201cfortitude.\u201d It is not accurate to speak of it as passive\nresistance or passive courage. By it, indeed, no external act is\nperformed, but this is due to a most firm internal resolution and\nself-control, such as a refusal to accept defeat, surrender principles\nor make peace with wrong. Endurance to undergo is not the same thing,\nthen, as stoical indifference or apathy.\n\n(b) The moderation of confidence is followed, where circumstances call\nfor it, by prudent attack or even, when discretion is the better part\nof valor, by retreat as in warriors. A truly brave man does not fear to\nbe called a coward, and hence he will not advance when reason forbids\nnor hesitate to retire when reason commands. Brave endurance is a\nnobler act of fortitude than brave attack; for endurance struggles\nagainst superior strength, it feels the evil already present, and its\nfight is long and continuous, whereas attack is borne on by a sense of\npower, the object of dread is still in the distance, and its rush is\nquick and passing (Prov., xvi. 32). Hence, not all who are courageous\nin attack are courageous under attack. But both acts are noble, and\neach is necessary at its proper time.\n\n2441. The Excellence of Fortitude.--(a) Its Rank.--Fortitude is one of\nthe four principal or cardinal virtues. A principal virtue is one that\nexercises in the most difficult circumstances one of the four qualities\nthat every moral virtue must have. These qualities are firmness (for\nevery virtue is a habit or strongly rooted quality), rectitude (since a\nvirtue inclines to the good as the right or obligatory), moderation\n(since a virtue is moral, or measured according to reason), and\ndiscretion (since good inclinations must be guided by true direction).\nNow, just as rectitude is most difficult, on account of self-love, in\ndealing with others, and moderation in governing the appetites, and\ndiscretion in ruling one\u2019s own actions, so firmness is most difficult\nin the presence of the greatest dangers; and therefore with justice,\ntemperance, and prudence must also be associated fortitude as one of\nthe chief of all virtues. These four principal virtues are also called\ncardinal virtues (from _cardo_, a hinge), because the whole moral life\nof man hinges on them. Thus, though perils of death are comparatively\nrare, the occasions of such perils are common and one is constantly\ncalled on to exercise fortitude (e.g., to be prepared to incur mortal\nenmities rather than forsake justice, or purity, or religion).\n\n(b) Its Utility.--Fortitude has a certain general utility, for it is\nfound to be of advantage everywhere. Thus, brave men and just men are\nadmired in peace as well as in war, whereas liberal men are serviceable\nonly in certain matters (Aristotle). Fortitude is like a strong tower,\nor like an army that protects the other virtues, and there are\ncontinual demands for its exercise. The life of man is a warfare (Job,\nvii. 1), and a manly spirit is needed to struggle against the\ntemptations, injuries, infirmities, and trials that threaten virtue.\nWithout fortitude, then, no one can be saved, for the kingdom of heaven\nis captured only by the aggressive (Matt., xi. 12), and only those who\nfight shall receive the crown (II Tim., ii. 5).\n\n2442. Martyrdom.--As judgment is the chief act of justice (see 1727),\nso martyrdom is the chief act of fortitude, and in a sense the most\nperfect of all acts. For martyrdom is defined as \u201cthe voluntary\nacceptance for the sake of God of a violent death inflicted out of\nhatred of virtue.\u201d Martyrdom belongs to fortitude which produces it, to\nlove of God which commands it (I Cor., xiii. 13), and to faith which\nattracts it. Merely as an act of courage, it is inferior to some other\nacts, since fortitude is not the highest virtue, and the goods for\nwhich martyrdom is undergone must be preferable to martyrdom itself.\nBut in two ways martyrdom is the greatest act of virtue.\n\n(a) Thus, internally it has charity for its end, and \u201cgreater love than\nthis no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends\u201d (John,\nxv. 13); it is the greatest sign of love of God.\n\n(b) Externally it is a profession of faith in the superiority of the\ninvisible and future to the visible and present goods, and no more\nefficacious proof of this faith can be given than martyrdom (Job, ii.\n4; II Cor., iv. 11).\n\n2443. Kinds of Martyrdom.--The word martyrdom is sometimes used loosely\nor less accurately, and hence we distinguish the following kinds of\nmartyrdom:\n\n(a) false martyrdom is death suffered in an evil cause, as when one\ndies for erroneous principles or doctrines (e.g., for anarchy),\nMartyrdom is testimony of blood given to the truth, not to error, and\nhence it is not the suffering but the cause that makes the martyr.\nImproper martyrdom is death suffered for some purely natural good, as\nwhen a person dies for the cause of science or of a political party, or\nin defense of natural truths about God but without a religious motive;\n\n(b) true and proper martyrdom, which is not the virtue but the crown of\nmartyrdom, is death inflicted on an infant out of hatred for Christ, as\nin the case of the Holy Innocents. This is baptism of blood for\ninfants, as the virtue is for adults, supplying the place of baptism of\nwater (Matt., x. 39);\n\n(c) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of God (theological martyrdom)\nis either in desire or in act. Martyrdom of desire, which is the wish\nto die for God, may have the same essential glory as martyrdom in act,\nbut it lacks the accidental glory, since it does not really suffer the\ntrial (see 89-93). Martyrdom in act, which is external suffering for\njustice\u2019s sake, has three degrees: the lowest degree is suffering that\nlacks one or other of the essential conditions (see 2444) for supreme\nself-sacrifice (imperfect martyrdom), the higher degree has all the\nessential conditions (perfect martyrdom), while the highest degree has\nalso the accidentals that are most suitable for martyrdom (complete\nmartyrdom);\n\n(d) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of the Church (canonical\nmartyrdom) is that which, in addition to the conditions for perfect\nmartyrdom, possesses also external indications sufficient to prove\ntheir existence and character.\n\n2444. Conditions for Martyrdom.--Since martyrdom is a virtue and the\nsupreme testimony, it must have the following conditions:\n\n(a) the cause of the martyrdom must be faith (e.g., persecution because\nthe martyr is a Catholic), or some virtue containing a profession of\nfaith, inasmuch as a divine good (e.g., chastity) or a human good\n(e.g., the truth of a science, the safety of one\u2019s country) is defended\nfor the sake of God;\n\n(b) the persecutor must act from hatred of virtue, but it is not\nnecessary that he be an unbeliever, or that he avow his hatred of\nvirtue as the motive of persecution, or that he pronounce or execute\nthe sentence of death himself;\n\n(c) the martyr must accept martyrdom willingly (actual or virtual\nintention suffices, and perhaps also habitual); he must be free from\nguilt that provoked the sentence, and must be in the state of grace or\nat least repentant; he must die from a virtuous motive, not from\nvainglory, despair, or other sinful reason. Some make non-resistance a\ncondition for what we called perfect martyrdom, while others make it a\ncondition for what we called complete martyrdom; according to the\nformer opinion the crusaders or other soldiers dying in a just war\ncannot be called martyrs of religion, but according to the second\nopinion they may be ranked with the martyrs;\n\n(d) the punishment inflicted on the martyr must be death, either\ninstant (as in decapitation) or delayed (as in gradual starvation,\ndeath by slow poisoning, mortal wounds, imprisonment or other\nhardship), Hence, those who are not put to death, but who are tortured,\nmutilated or imprisoned (e.g., St. John the Evangelist), are confessors\nof the faith, but only in an imperfect sense are they martyrs. Some\nbelieve that suffering is necessary for perfect martyrdom, and hence\nthat those who are put to death painlessly are not, strictly speaking,\nmartyrs; but others--and with better reason, it seems--deny this. Those\nwho are not killed (e.g., persons who die from disease contracted while\nattending the sick or from austerities), or who are killed by\nthemselves (e.g., the Circumcellions who thought to win martyrdom by\nsuicide), are not martyrs (on the cases of Sts. Apollonia and Pelagia,\nsee 1856).\n\n2445. Practical Questions about Martyrdom.--(a) The Desire of\nMartyrdom.--A general desire for or the willingness to suffer martyrdom\nif the necessity should arise is required for salvation (I John, iii.\n16; Rom., x. 10). Apart from necessity, a special desire of martyrdom\nis not of precept, since martyrdom is an act of perfection; but such a\ndesire is of counsel, since it is encouraged by Christ (I Peter, ii.\n21), and many Saints have prayed for martyrdom.\n\n(b) The Choice of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to offer\noneself freely for martyrdom, for to do so gives the tyrant an occasion\nof committing injustice, and as a rule there are not sufficient reasons\nof public or private good for permitting his sin (see 103 sqq.).\nExceptionally it is lawful, when there is no danger that one will be\novercome and there are urgent reasons for the act, such as the glory of\nGod or the peace of the faithful.\n\n(c) Provocation of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to bring on a\npersecution by aggression (e.g., by destroying idols), since generally\nthis will make one guilty of complicity and presumption. But there are\nexceptional cases, when the good of souls demands attack on evils\n(Dan., xiv. 26; Matt., xiv. 3, 4). It is not provocation of\npersecution, however, to live virtuously (Tob., ii. 8, 9), or to\nreprove a persecutor after one has been apprehended (II Mach., viii.\n15-17; Acts, vii. 51-54).\n\n(d) Flight from Martyrdom.--Flight is sometimes sinful, sometimes\nobligatory, sometimes optional, according to circumstances, as was\nexplained in 1005, 1006.\n\n2446. Sins Opposed to Fortitude.--(a) Number.--The vices opposed to\nfortitude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear\nand confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other\ncircumstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he\nshould not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears\nthe hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect);\nhe who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who\nexposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who\ndoes not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who\ndoes not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not,\nis foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of\na good result).\n\n(b) Malice.--These sins _per se_ are venial, since excess or defect in\nemotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious\ndisorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if\nfrom fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger\n(e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or\nmutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or\nvainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity\nand cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.\n\n2447. The Parts of Fortitude.--As has been said above, the parts of a\nvirtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).\n\n(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very\nspecialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no\nroom for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree\n(e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death\nthan to face death amid applause or with little suffering).\n\n(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for\nthe perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers\n(i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack,\nrequires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and\ndespise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes\none perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of\nfortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not\nthrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul\nbe not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued\nopposition).\n\n(c) The potential parts of fortitude are the four just named, but as\nexercised in reference to minor dangers.\n\n2448. Greatness of Soul.--Greatness of soul or nobility (Latin,\n_magnanimitas_) is a virtue that inclines one to aspire after\nexcellence in things most honorable, but to esteem and use honors\nthemselves with moderation.\n\n(a) The first act of this virtue is aspiration. It desires the higher\nmanifestations of every virtue--the things that are more difficult and\nthat befit a generous and elevated spirit, such as great austerity,\ngreat labor, great sacrifice, etc. Thus, it resembles fortitude, for\nboth virtues are exercised in difficult circumstances.\n\n(b) The second act of this virtue is moderation. It esteems honors at\ntheir true worth, for it is greatly concerned to possess the higher\nhonors (i.e., good repute before God and godly men), knowing that these\nare solid and lasting, but it is less concerned about lower honors\n(i.e., the esteem and applause of the world), knowing that these are\nfrail, fleeting, and common to good and bad alike. Hence, the great of\nsoul are not elated in prosperity or dejected in adversity. This virtue\nhere differs from fortitude, since fortitude is concerned with dangers,\nwhich are unpleasant, while greatness of soul is occupied with honors\nwhich are pleasant.\n\n2449. Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.--Greatness of\nsoul and humility are different, but not contrary.\n\n(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great\nthings, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed\nby God (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the\nprofitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things,\nthey are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in\ngenerosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are\nfamiliar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they\nare also humble, knowing that the good is from God, and that of\nthemselves they are weak and sinful.\n\n(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower\nthings, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the\ngifts one has received from God. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the noble\ncharacter does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places\nor offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is\nnot haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in\nmanner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much\ngiven either to praise or to blame others. But though the noble person\ndespises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the\ngood that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to\nhimself.\n\n2450. Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.--The vices opposed\nto greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or\nhonors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.\n\n(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to\ndo greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This\nhappens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities,\ntaking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or\nexercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar\npersons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or\ninfluence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal\nsin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its\neffects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to\nteach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to\nenter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in\ngood faith and from inculpable ignorance.\n\n(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or\nan inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of\nsoul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is\na just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the\nneighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary,\nseek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man\nlongs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account\nof his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in\ntemporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he\nwill be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or\nthey seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who\nloved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the\nsynagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by\nmen Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25).\nThis sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not _per\nse_ mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously\nsinful (e.g., if one\u2019s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments)\nor by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is\nready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted\ndignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not\nambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).\n\n(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269).\nThe great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575\nsqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded,\nand their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man.\nThe vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for\nwhich there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for\nvirtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who\nfish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good\nlooks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or\nwho crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g.,\nthose who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity,\nlike ambition, is _per se_ only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on\naccount of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that\nare planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes\none boast of one\u2019s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others,\nor neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain\nabout a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the\ncapital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that\nchiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in\nconsequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to\naction. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors\nbring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks\nunlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not\ninferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are\nthe publication by word or deed of one\u2019s own true or pretended exploits\n(boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities\ndesigned to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in\npronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of\nintellect which make one hold obstinately to one\u2019s views\n(stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others\n(discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention),\nsins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).\n\n2451. Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.--The sin opposed to\ngreatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul),\nwhich does not desire great things when one should desire them.\n\n(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes nobility of soul,\nsprings from a lazy ignorance of one\u2019s own ability and worth and from a\nfalse fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could\nbe done for God and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled\nfrom the great task set for him by God (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the\nfearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.).\nPusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for\nhumility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence,\nwhereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is\nreasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be associated\nwith pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is\ncommanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility\nby their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they\nwould have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held\nout against God\u2019s charge to them.\n\n(b) Pusillanimity is _per se_ a venial sin (see 2450), but it may\nbecome mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is\nso self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting\nabuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one\naway from things and pursuits that are noble, and is thus more opposed\nto greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it\nsprings from pride (Ecclus., xxxvii. 3). The dread of attempting great\ndeeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to\ninculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a\nfear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense\nof inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit\n(Col., iii. 21).\n\n2452. Greatness of Deed.--Greatness of deed is the execution of the\ngreat things to which one is inclined by greatness of soul.\n\n(a) The virtue is a general one, if it includes every kind of noble\nperformance; it is a special one, if restricted to princely generosity\nin the expenditure of large sums for great works (virtue of\nmagnificence or munificence). The munificent person spends large sums\nfrom his purse in behalf of the worship of God (e.g., in building\nchurches, monasteries, etc.), and for the common good (e.g., in\nfounding schools, in endowing educational institutions, hospitals,\netc.). This virtue resembles fortitude by the grandeur of its\naccomplishment; it falls short of fortitude, since it deals not with\nsacrifice of self but with sacrifice of goods. The Maecenases and the\ngenerous patrons of religion are among the greatest benefactors of\nhumanity, for without them the best things would often languish for\nwant of support.\n\n(b) The vices opposed to this virtue are meanness by deficiency and\nvulgarity by excess. The mean man is unable to do things on a great\nscale, and prefers to ruin a noble work rather than make the proper\noutlay (e.g., after planning a beautiful church, he will spoil it by\nusing cheap materials). The vulgar man, on the contrary, is avid for\nostentation, or heavy expenditure when there is no call for it. He is\nliberal to works of less importance (e.g., his own usual personal needs\nor comforts), but penurious with works of great importance (e.g.,\ncharitable causes); or he lavishes money needlessly on great works, as\nwhen his residence is over-ornamented and offensive to good taste, or\nwhen his wedding breakfast is served with profuse extravagance and\nwaste in order to make a display of wealth. _Per se_, these sins are\nvenial, but they may be mortal on account of circumstances. Munificence\nis the virtue of the rich, but even the poor may have the merit of this\nvirtue, by a good intention, especially when they show liberality to\ngreat enterprises according to their means.\n\n2453. Patience.--Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation\nso controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this passion\nneither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor\nproduces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs\nfrom the following:\n\n(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness,\nthe sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while\nthat with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils,\nespecially of those brought on by annoyances from others;\n\n(b) from the endurance of fortitude, for fortitude regulates fear of\ndeath, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever\nnature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;\n\n(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues\nis a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good\nwhich must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is\nan evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a\ndesired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in\ngood is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are\nincluded under patience.\n\n2454. The Greatness of Patience.--(a) Its Rank.--Patience is less than\nthe theological virtues, and also is inferior to prudence and justice,\nwhich perfect one in goodness; it is also less than fortitude and\ntemperance, which preserve from the greatest impediments to goodness;\nfor the office of patience is only to preserve one from lesser\nimpediments, namely, the common adversities of life. But, on the other\nhand, patience is a part of fortitude--a potential part, because it\ndoes not connote the supreme heroism of fortitude, and an integral\npart, because courage in the face of death is bettered by the serenity\nwhich patience imparts.\n\n(b) Its Necessity.--Patience is a most useful virtue. Without it one\ncannot long continue in the way of virtue on account of the many trials\nman encounters (Heb., x. 36), whereas with it the enemies of other\nvirtues are destroyed; and hence it is called the root and guardian of\nvirtue (cfr. Rom., v. 3, 4; James, i. 2-4; Luke, xxi. 19). But there\nare degrees of patience: the lowest is equanimity, which offends God\nneither in thought, word nor deed even though sorely tried (Job, ii.\n7-10); a higher degree is submission, which prefers adversity to\nprosperity (Ps. cxviii. 71); the highest degree is joyful resignation,\nwhich smiles at grief and rejoices in tribulation (II Cor., xii. 10,\nvii. 4).\n\n2455. The Vices Opposed to Patience.--(a) The sin of deficiency in\nsorrow is stolidity, which is a brutal insensibility that is moved\nneither by one\u2019s own nor by others\u2019 misfortunes. This is not a virtue,\nbut an inhuman and unnatural way of life, which takes no account of man\nas a feeling as well as a reasoning being.\n\n(b) The sin of excess in sorrow is impatience, which mourns excessively\nunder afflictions, or in looks, words or deeds expresses a complaining\nand rebellious spirit (Prov. xiv. 17; Judith, viii. 24, 25). Stolidity\nand impatience are _per se_ venial sins, but they become mortal _per\naccidens_ on account of some circumstance, as when the unfeeling man\ngives great scandal by his hardhearted acts, or the impatient man\nblasphemes (see 2450, 2451).\n\n2456. Steadfastness.--Steadfastness is a virtue which is so devoted to\nthe goodness of continuing in the right that it is not fatigued by the\nlength of time or the repeated effort required for a good work (virtue\nof persistence or perseverance), nor disheartened by the opposition\nwhich a good work encounters (virtue of manliness or constancy), but\ngoes on unmoved until the conclusion which right reason calls for has\nbeen arrived at.\n\n(a) The Virtue.--Steadfastness belongs to fortitude, since the essence\nof both is a struggle against difficulty; but steadfastness is the\ninferior, since it is nobler and more heroic to be undismayed by the\nperil of death than to be unconquered by strain of monotony or\nopposition. Steadfastness is a most important virtue, for it avails one\nlittle to begin a work well if it is not carried to a successful\nconclusion. Without it one puts hand to the plow but looks back (Luke,\nix. 62), or begins to build but does not finish (Like, xiv. 30); with\nit the work begun is crowned, the harvest will be reaped (Gal., vi. 9,\n10), and salvation secured (Matt., x. 22). Scripture abounds with\nexhortations to steadfastness (I Cor., xv. 58; Phil., iv. i; II Tim.,\niii. 13; Ecclus., xi. 21, 22, v. 12; John, viii. 31; Heb., xii. 7); but\nfinal perseverance is a special gift of God (I Peter, v. 10).\n\n(b) The Opposite Vices.--Opposed to steadfastness by deficiency is the\nvice of effeminacy or weakness, by excess the vice of pertinacity. The\neffeminate person, lacking stamina to go on in a necessary good,\nsurrenders to weariness or opposition by abandoning the undertaking or\nby taking up with evil (Matt., xi. 7, 8). The pertinacious person\ncontinues in the course he has begun when right reason bids him to\ndiscontinue, as when one has taken a vow and does not wish to accept\nthe dispensation which a change of circumstances necessitates. These\nsins are venial unless they go counter to a grave duty, as when an\neffeminate person gives up the resolution to avoid a very dangerous\noccasion of sin, or the headstrong person determines to fast during the\nremainder of Lent when this will seriously injure his health.\n\n2457. The Complements of Fortitude.--We shall now speak of the Gift,\nthe Beatitude, and the Fruits that correspond to fortitude (see 159 and\n2433).\n\n(a) The Gift of Fortitude is an infused habit which makes the\nappetitive powers readily responsive to the encouragement of the Holy\nSpirit and filled with a courage that is more than human. Thus, the\nGift of Fortitude supplies for what is wanting in the virtue of\nfortitude. The virtue is regulated by the rules and measure of human\nprudence, but the Gift is inspired by the presence and command of the\nHoly Spirit Himself (Ps. xliii. 4, xvii. 2, 3); the virtue strengthens\nthe soul, but the Gift supports even the weakness of the flesh, for the\nSpirit helpeth our infirmity (Rom., viii. 26; cfr. Luke, xxii. 43); the\nvirtue aids one against the perils of death, but the Gift strengthens\nin difficulties both of life and death, reinforcing not only courage\nbut also the allied virtues, greatness of soul, munificence, patience\nand perseverance, for we can do all things in Him that strengthens us\n(Phil., iv. 13); the virtue gives firm resolution to adhere to the\nright in spite of death itself, but the Gift adds the unshaken\nconfidence that one shall surmount every difficulty and win the crown\nof victory (Rom., viii. 31 sqq.).\n\n(b) The Beatitude which is the special exercise of the Gift of\nFortitude is the eighth: \u201cBlessed are they that suffer persecution for\njustice\u2019s sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven\u201d (Matt, v 10). The\nGift of Fortitude makes the persecuted feel a great confidence and\nsecurity in the midst of the struggle, and this is a foretaste of the\ncopious, exceeding and eternal reward that follows this Gift (Gen., xv.\n1; Rom., viii. 18; II Cor., iv. 17; Ps. xciii. 19; II Cor., i, 1).\nOthers assign to this Gift the Beatitudes of the meek and of those who\nhunger and thirst for holiness.\n\n(c) The Fruits that are most appropriate here are patience in bearing\nevil and longsuffering in awaiting or performing good; for these are\nacts that add a finish of maturity to fortitude (see 2447, 2454, 2456),\nand in their most excellent state (see 2454) the performance of them is\nno longer bitter but sweet.\n\n2458. The Commandments of Fortitude.--(a) Fortitude itself is commanded\nboth in the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament are found\nprecepts of bravery in bodily warfare, as in Deut. xx. 3: \u201cHear, O\nIsrael, you join battle this day against your enemies. Let not your\nheart be dismayed, be not afraid, do not give back, fear ye them not.\u201d\nThe New Law commands courage before spiritual foes; \u201cYour adversary the\ndevil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, whom\nresist ye strong in faith\u201d (I Peter, v. 8); \u201cResist the devil and he\nwill fly from you\u201d (James, iv. 7); \u201cFight the good fight\u201d (I Tim., vi.\n12). It also commands fortitude in the presence of corporal dangers:\n\u201cFear not them that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul\u201d (Matt., x.\n28).\n\n(b) The annexed virtues are counselled when (as is the case with\ngreatness of soul and munificence) they incline to the excellent and\nsuperabundant; they are commanded when (as in the case of patience and\nperseverance) they are necessitated by normal conditions of earthly\nexistence. Greatness of soul is recommended in the invitations to be\nperfect (Matt., v. 48), to love God more ardently (see 1560) and to\nfollow the counsels (see 364 sqq.), and in the praise bestowed on the\nexcellent virtue of Noe (Gen., vi. 9), of John the Baptist (Matt., xi.\n11), and of Mary Magdalene (Luke x. 42). Munificence is recommended in\nthe eulogies of Solomon (Ecclus., xlvii. 20), of Magdalene (Mark, xiv.\n9) and of Joseph of Arimathea (Luke, xxiii. 50 ff.). Patience is\ncommanded in Luke, xxi. 19 (In patience possess your souls), and in\nRom., xxii. 12 (Be patient in tribulation); perseverance in Ecclus.,\nii. 4 (In sorrow endure), in Matt., x. 22 (He that perseveres to the\nend shall be saved), in I Cor., xv. 58 (Be steadfast and unmovable) and\nin Heb. xxi. 7 (Persevere under discipline).\n\n2459. Obligation of the Precepts of Fortitude and Annexed Virtues.--(a)\nThe precepts of fortitude are negative or prohibitory, and therefore it\nis obligatory at all times to omit what they forbid (see 371). It is\nnever lawful to be timorous, insensible, cowardly, or foolhardy--to do\nanything intrinsically wrong, even to escape death (see 317, 318). But\nit is not necessary to sacrifice life for the fulfillment of an\naffirmative precept, unless injury to God or the common safety, or an\nextreme spiritual loss to self will otherwise result (see 317, 818,\n361).\n\n(b) The precepts of patience and perseverance are also negative, and\nhence it is never lawful to be guilty of stolidity, impatience,\neffeminacy or stubbornness. But since patience and perseverance are not\nso difficult as fortitude, they have also affirmative precepts. These\nlatter laws oblige always, but not for every occasion (see 371). Thus,\none must be always willing to exercise patience, but one who is spared\ntrials has not the occasion to exercise the virtue. Patience itself\nnever ceases to be a virtue, but there is a pseudo-patience which\nconsists in toleration of evils that should not be tolerated, and which\nis not a virtue but a kind of supineness or spinelessness that pertains\nto effeminacy rather than to patience.\n\n2460. Subjects of Fortitude.--(a) Laws have universal extension, and\nhence it would not be true to say that active fortitude is a masculine,\npassive fortitude or patience a feminine virtue. But greater courage is\nexpected in some than in others on account of greater strength (e.g.,\nthe adult, the physically well) or greater necessity (as in soldiers,\npolicemen, firemen, pastors, physicians, rulers).\n\n(b) The counsel of munificence, however, is only for the rich as\nregards exercise, since others have not the means wherewith to exercise\nthis virtue.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 8: THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 141-170.)\n\n2461. Definition of Temperance.--Temperance is a moral virtue which\nregulates according to reason the gratification of the lower pleasures\nand desires of sense.\n\n(a) It moderates pleasure and desire, and in consequence also the\nsadness caused by the absence of pleasure. Just as a special virtue\n(fortitude) is needed to check the strongest of the repelled emotions\n(fear of death), so likewise a special virtue (temperance) is necessary\nto bridle the most vehement of the attracted emotions (pleasure and\ndesire).\n\n(b) It moderates sensible pleasure, that is, satisfactions derived from\nthe use of the external senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, and\ntouch. Spiritual pleasures, which are derived from the loftier powers\nof intellect, will and imagination (e.g., from the study of theology,\nthe reading of classical literature, the meeting of mother and child or\nof friend and friend), have no opposition to reason, except\naccidentally when a still higher activity which should be exercised is\nimpeded by them. Some of these (such as the pleasures of the intellect)\nmay be called purely spiritual, since they make little or no impression\non the sensible appetite; others, on the contrary (such as the\npleasures of the will), may be called mixed pleasures, since at times\nthey vehemently excite the sensitive appetite and powerfully affect the\nbody (e.g., mothers have been known to die of joy at the return of a\nchild who was thought to be dead).\n\n(c) Temperance moderates the lower sensible pleasures, that is, the\nsatisfactions caused primarily by touch and taste, and secondarily by\nother senses, in the activities necessary for preservation of the\nindividual (eating and drinking) and of the race (sexual intercourse).\nThese passions are called the lower, animal, or carnal pleasures, since\nthey are common to man and beast, and are strongly rebellious against\nreason. The special virtue of temperance is necessary, then, to make\nman follow reason, not Bacchus or Venus. The higher sensible pleasures,\non the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of\nany relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a\nperfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the\nenjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant\nroses, or downy or velvety cloth). The esthete or the connoisseur\nobtains from these agreeable sensations a pleasure unknown to the\nanimals, and one that is not from its nature refractory to reason nor\nseductive to carnal excess. Hence, these higher sensual pleasures are\nnot gross, but refined; they should be moderated by prudence, but they\nare not so dangerous as to demand a special virtue, like temperance,\nfor their regulation. Neither should we class with carnal pleasures the\njoys of physical well-being, such as the refreshment of sleep, the\nexhilaration of a sea bath or of a massage, the comfort of a balmy\nbreeze, the ease of strength, or the relaxation of exercise.\n\n2462. The Rule of Moderation.--The rule of moderation which temperance\nimposes on the carnal appetites is this: \u201cIndulge only as necessity\nrequires and duty allows.\u201d For pleasure is a means whose end is some\nreasonable need of life, and it is therefore a perversion to make\npleasure an end by indulging it apart from need and duty (see 85). But\nnecessity is to be understood broadly, so as to include not only the\nessentials, but also the conveniences of life (e.g., seasonings and\ndesserts with food).\n\n(a) As to venereal pleasures, then, the rule means that they should not\nbe used outside matrimony, nor in matrimony except for the procreation\nof children and the other lawful ends of marriage.\n\n(b) As to the pleasures of the table, they should not be indulged\nexcept for the benefit of mind and body, and in such manner, quantity,\nquality, etc., as this purpose requires. But one may regulate one\u2019s\nfood or drink by the higher purpose of mortification, and partake of\nless than the body demands here and now.\n\n2463. The Excellence of Temperance.--(a) Temperance is among the four\nprincipal or cardinal virtues. It keeps in order one of the passions\nthat is most natural and most necessary for the present life, and among\nthe virtues it excels in the quality of moderation, since it chastens\nthe inclination that is hardest to hold within bounds, and guards the\nsenses, the gateways of the soul (see 2441). \u201cWisdom teaches\ntemperance, prudence, justice and fortitude, than which there is\nnothing more useful in life\u201d (Wis., viii. 7).\n\n(b) In its nature temperance is not the chief but the least of the\nmoral virtues. For justice and bravery are of greater service to the\ncommon welfare, and the good of the multitude, as Aristotle remarks, is\nmore divine than the good of the individual. But in accidental respects\ntemperance has a superiority; for it is more tender and graceful than\nfortitude, more arduous than justice, and there is perhaps no other\nvirtue whose exercise is so constantly called for.\n\n2464. The Vices Opposed to Temperance.--(a) The vice of deficiency has\nbeen called insensibility, and consists in an unreasonable dislike of\nthe inferior sensible pleasures, which makes one unwilling to use them\nwhen and as reason commands. Thus, the Stoics and Manichees believed\nthat material joys are intrinsically evil, and there have been\nfanatical advocates of teetotalism (e.g., the Aquarians) and of purity\n(e.g., the Puritans who would not permit a man to kiss his wife on\nSunday, the prudish and censorious who fear or suspect evil without\nreason, the Pharisees who think they are defiled if a sinner speaks to\nthem, the misogynists who disapprove of marriage). The sin is venial\n_per se_, since it does not submit to passion; but it may be mortal on\naccount of some circumstance, as when the marriage debt is unjustly\nrefused or necessary nourishment is not taken. This vice is rarer than\nits opposite, and it must not be confused with austerity, which for the\nsake of a spiritual good foregoes some lawful but unnecessary sensible\nenjoyment.\n\n(b) The vice of excess is immoderation, which includes gluttony and\nimpurity. This is the most disgraceful of sins, because the most\nunworthy of a rational being; it enslaves man to pleasures of which the\nlower animals are capable; unlike other vices, it contains in itself\nnothing of intelligence, industry, generosity, and nothing that would\nat all liken it to virtue. The lowest depths of degradation are reached\nwhen immoderation is brutish even in its manner, as when one is\ngluttonous of human flesh or desirous of sodomitic pleasure.\nImmoderation is called by Aristotle a \u201cchildish sin,\u201d because, as a\nchild is eager for pleasures and will follow them unduly unless\ninstructed and trained, so also an immoderate person thinks only of his\nappetite, and will go from bad to worse unless he accepts the\ndiscipline of reason. But the child is excusable, while the immoderate\nman should know better. Immoderation is worse than timidity; for, while\nthe former seeks selfish delight and acts with willing unrestraint, the\nlatter seeks self-preservation and is under some external menace.\n\n2465. The Parts of Temperance.--(a) The subjective parts or species of\ntemperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue.\nThese objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the\nvirtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those\nassociated with the generative function. The first subjective part of\ntemperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink;\nthe second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act\n(copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts\n(kisses, touches, embraces, etc).\n\n(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for\nthe perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and\navoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy)\nand the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement).\nShamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a\ndisposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a\npreparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and\nis ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things\ndisgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an\nattraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a\nhabit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful\nto the good, the carnal to the spiritual.\n\n(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues.\nThey resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in\nmoderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is\nmoderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory\nappetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of\nmoderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than\nordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will\nagitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion\nof anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of\nmoderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in\norder matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second\ngroup are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four:\nhumility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of\nexcellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty\nof living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body\nand the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.\n\n2466. Abstemiousness.--Abstemiousness is a virtue that moderates\naccording to reason the desire and enjoyment of the pleasures of the\ntable.\n\n(a) It is a special virtue, because the appetite it curbs is very\npowerful, and on account of the body\u2019s need of nourishment is often\ntempted.\n\n(b) It moderates by avoiding both defect and excess in meals as to\ntime, place, quantity, quality, etc. There is not, then, one standard\namount of food for all, since the needs and duties of all are not the\nsame, and hence he who takes more or less than is normal or usual\ncannot from that alone be accused of being unabstemious. Neither is the\nmean for an individual so rigidly fixed as not to permit some latitude\nwithin certain limits. It should be noted here too that abstemiousness\nis not the same thing as abstinence. Thus, a person who is immoderately\nabstinent, denying himself the food necessary for life or for duty or\nfor optional works better than his abstinence, is not abstemious, since\nhe is not guided by prudence or obligation.\n\n(c) It moderates according to reason; that is, it decides what is\nproper for an individual, not merely from the viewpoint of bodily\nhealth, vigor, and longevity, as is done by the arts of medicine and\nhygiene, but also and chiefly from the viewpoints of higher goods, such\nas mental power, control of passion, austerity.\n\n(d) It moderates the pleasures of the table, that is, the desire for\nand actual enjoyment of food and non-intoxicating beverages. Moderation\nin intoxicants is the special virtue of sobriety, which will be\ndiscussed later. Hence, a person who drinks too much ginger ale or\nwater, tea or coffee, sins against abstemiousness; he who drinks too\nmuch whisky, beer, or wine sins against sobriety.\n\n2467. Degrees of Abstemiousness.--(a) The lower degree practises\ntemperance, taking sufficient food and drink for the preservation, not\nonly of life and health, but also of the very pink of physical\ncondition, yet so as to avoid all excess.\n\n(b) The higher degree practises austerity, taking less than is\nnecessary for the best condition, or strength or comfort of the body,\nbut sufficient for life and health. The austere person eats less than\nhe could reasonably take, but not less than his health and work demand.\nThe subtraction he makes in his food will more likely benefit his\nhealth in the long run and promote longevity, for, in the wise words of\nold Galen, \u201cabstemiousness is the best medicine.\u201d But even though this\nausterity be slightly detrimental to health, or may slightly abbreviate\nlife, it is still lawful, since the higher goods of the mind and of\nvirtue may always be secured at such reasonable sacrifice of corporal\ngoods (see 1164 sqq., 1561 sqq.).\n\n2468. Austerity.--The two chief forms of austerity in food and drink\nare fasting and abstinence.\n\n(a) Nature.--The natural fast is the omission of all eating and\ndrinking, or the omission to receive into the stomach anything whatever\nthat has the nature of food, drink or medicine. The moral fast is the\nomission to take a certain quantity of food that could be taken without\nintemperance. Abstinence is the omission to take a certain quality of\nfood, such as meat or eggs.\n\n(b) Kinds.--Fast and abstinence are in respect to duration either\nperpetual (e.g., the abstinence from meat of the Carthusians) or\ntemporary (e.g., the abstinence for Fridays and other appointed days of\nthe faithful generally); either voluntary (e.g., a fast which one\nassumes under private vow) or obligatory (e.g., the fasts and\nabstinences prescribed in the general or particular laws of the\nChurch). The ecclesiastical fast and abstinence will be spoken of later\nwhen we treat of the precepts of the Church and Holy Communion.\n\n2469. The Excellence of Fasting and Abstinence.--(a)\nLawfulness.--Fasting and abstinence are acts of virtue, for they subdue\nthe unruly flesh, fit the mind for divine contemplation (Dan, x. 3\nsqq.), satisfy for sins (Joel, ii. 12), and add weight to prayers\n(Tob., xii. 8; Judith, iv. 11; Matt., xvii. 20). The greatest men of\nthe Old and New Testaments practised fasting--Moses, Samson, Elias,\nJohn the Baptist, and St. Paul. Our Lord Himself fasted forty days and\nforty nights (Matt, iv. 2). St. Paul, therefore, numbers fasting with\nother virtues: \u201cIn fastings, in knowledge, in chastity\u201d (II Cor., vi.\n5). Examples of abstinence are Daniel avoiding meat (Dan, i. 8 sqq.)\nand Eleazar who died rather than eat forbidden swine flesh (II Mach.,\nvi. 18 sqq.). Abstention from solid or liquid nourishment is not a\nvirtue, however, if practised from purely indifferent or evil motives,\nfor example, merely in order to recover health through diet, or to\ntrain for an athletic contest, or to preserve shape and beauty, or to\ncommit suicide, or to simulate virtue, or to profess false doctrines or\nif carried to extremes. The forty-day fasts of Moses, Elias and of Our\nLord are for our admiration, but very few are able to imitate these\nexamples.\n\n(b) Obligation.--Fasting and abstinence in general are obligatory under\nnatural law, because without them certain necessary ends cannot be\nobtained. They are remedies for past sins and preservatives against\nfuture sins; and, as sin is the common state of man (James, iii. 2;\nGal., v. 17), it would be presumptuous to neglect these antidotes.\nUnder the positive law fasting and abstinence have been prescribed in\ndetail, and this was necessary since it is the duty of the Church to\ndetermine the time, manner and other circumstances of natural duties of\nreligion which the natural law itself has not determined.\n\n2470. The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness.--(a) The sin of deficiency in\nthe matter of food is self-starvation. This is the sin of those who are\nmartyrs to fashion, who in order to have a frail figure follow a diet\n(e.g., denying oneself all substantial food to reduce obesity) that\nundermines their constitutions and leaves them a prey to disease. It is\nalso the sin of those who from unwise zeal for rigorous fasting deprive\nthemselves of the necessaries of life, or eat what their stomachs rebel\nagainst. This sin does not differ from suicide or bodily injury treated\nabove (see 1566 sqq., 1857 sqq.). \u201cIt is the same thing to kill\nyourself by slow degrees as to kill yourself in a moment. And he who\nkills himself by fasting is like one who offers God a sacrifice from\nstolen property\u201d (St. Jerome).\n\n(b) The sin of excess in food is gluttony. There is no sin in desiring\nfood or in taking food with satisfaction, for the Author of nature has\nwilled that such an essential act as eating should be pleasurable, and\nit is a fact that digestion and health suffer when food is taken\nwithout appetite or a peaceful frame of mind. But the glutton goes to\nexcess by the inordinate and unreasonable enjoyment he takes in feeding\nhimself.\n\n2471. Ways of Committing Gluttony.--There are many ways of committing\ngluttony, but they can all be reduced to two heads.\n\n(a) Gluttony in food is excess in the substance, quantity, or quality\nof the things eaten. The gourmet is extremely fastidious about the\nsubstance of his food; he must have the most dainty or costly or rare\nviands, and nothing else will satisfy him. Cannibalism seems to be\nlawful in extreme necessity, but it is not lawful to kill human beings\nin order to eat them. The gorger or gourmand may not be particular\nabout the kind of food that is given him, but he desires a large\nquantity, more than is good for him. The epicure is too hard to please\nas to quality; even when there is no festal occasion, he must have a\ngreat variety of foods and they must be most carefully prepared, so\nthat he may get the utmost joy of the palate. We should not class among\ngluttons, however, those who require special foods or special cooking\nfor a good reason, as when health or hard work forces one to observe a\nstrict diet.\n\n(b) Gluttony in eating is excess as to the time or manner of taking\nfood. There is excess about the time when a person is over-eager about\nthe dinner bell, eats before or oftener than he should, or lingers too\nlong at table. There is excess about the manner when a person eats\ngreedily, hurriedly, or selfishly, rushing at his food like a tiger,\nbolting it like a dog, or depriving others like a pig.\n\n2472. The Sinfulness of Gluttony.--(a) Gluttony is a mortal sin when it\nis so serious as to turn man away from his end itself, making him\nprefer his appetite to God. Thus, those sin gravely who are such high\nlivers that they are unable to pay their debts, to the serious\ndetriment of creditors; or who gormandize so much that they can do\nlittle work and have to spend most of their time in exercising or\ntaking cures; or whose heavy eating is the occasion of serious sins of\nanger, impurity, or neglect of religious or other duties. To all these\napply the words of St. Paul (Phil., iii. 19): \u201cWhose god is their\nbelly.\u201d To eat until one vomits seems to be a mortal sin, if the vomit\nis caused by the enormous quantity of food consumed, for such an act\nseems to be gravely opposed to reason; but there is no grave sin if the\nvomit is due to the quality of the food or the weakness of the stomach.\n\n(b) Gluttony in itself is a venial sin since it is a disorder about the\nmeans, and not a turning away from the end. This happens when one is\ninordinately fond of gastronomic joys, but is not prepared to sacrifice\ngrave duties for their sakes. Thus, a person who gives too much\nindulgence to a sweet tooth, or who likes to stuff himself now and\nthen, but who doesn\u2019t disable himself or give scandal by his weakness,\nsins venially.\n\n2473. Gluttony as a Capital Sin.--(a) The first condition of a capital\nsin is that it be one of the main sources of evil attraction. This\ncondition is verified of gluttony, for all seek happiness, and gluttony\ncontains one of the ingredients of happiness, namely, pleasure in an\nunusual degree. Among all sensual delights those of the palate and\nstomach are admitted to be, along with those of sexual love, the most\nintense. The first of the three temptations with which Satan assailed\nChrist was that of gluttony (Matt., iv. 1-4).\n\n(b) The second condition of a capital vice is that it be the final or\nmotive cause of a large crop of sins. This condition is also verified\nin gluttony, since the greedy man is so in love with his pet vice that\nin order to pamper it he is ready to suffer various kinds of evils\nwhich he should not permit. Evils of soul that are caused by gluttony\nare: heaviness in the mind, for an overloaded stomach unfits the mind\nto reflect on higher things or to consider the duty of moderation in\nrejoicing, in words or in acts (Ecclus., ii. 3); absurd mirth in the\nwill, a feeling of security and gladness and unrestraint, for the\nglutton thinks only of his present contentment and does not consider\nthe evils of his sin; loquacity in word, for his mental faculties being\ndulled and his will hilarious the glutton gives free rein to his\ntongue, often sinning by detraction, betrayal of secrets, contumely,\nand blasphemy (Prov., X. 19); levity in act, for the glutton wishes to\ngive vent to his animal spirits, and he does so by unbecoming jokes and\nclownishness. Evils of body due to gluttony are dirtiness and disease:\nthe glutton is often filthy in his manner of eating, his breath is\nfetid, he is much occupied with natural necessities, excretion and\nexgurgitation, and he suffers from gout or indigestion or one of the\nnumerous other maladies that are the price of overindulgence.\n\n2474. Sobriety.--Sobriety in its strictest sense is a virtue that keeps\none to the moderation of temperance in the liking for intoxicating\nliquors and in their use.\n\n(a) Thus, sobriety is concerned with intoxicants, that is, with\nsubstances that produce a poisonous effect upon the nerves and brain.\nIt is, therefore, a different virtue from abstemiousness, since it has\nto subdue a vice far more alluring and deleterious than gluttony.\nAlcohol has the same effect as a narcotic drug, for it benumbs both\nmind and body, sometimes to the point of insensibility, so that those\nwho are under its influence are unable to think, speak or regulate\ntheir movements properly; but it gives a feeling of exhilaration and\nelevation and leaves behind it an insatiable craving, so that those who\nhave once taken too much are very likely to repeat the act. Habitual\nintoxication breaks down both morals and health, and the toper goes to\na disgraceful and early grave.\n\n(b) Sobriety is concerned with liquors, that is, with beverages and\nmedicines. But secondarily it also controls the appetite for narcotics,\nsuch as opium, chloroform, tobacco, and the desire to inhale strong\nliquors or vapors or gases which may produce intoxication.\n\n2475. Obligation to Practise Sobriety.--Sobriety should be cultivated\nby all, but certain ones are more bound to it than others.\n\n(a) Thus, on account of the greater physical evils of insobriety in\ntheir regard, the virtue should be especially cultivated by the young,\nthe old, women, and persons of sedentary life. Young people are greatly\nharmed by too much alcohol, because it stunts their growth and affects\nthem more seriously in mind and body than adults. The old have not the\nstrength to throw off the poison of too much stimulation and are\naccordingly more injured. Women, being more excitable than men, are\nmore easily affected by strong drink, and hence among the ancient\nRomans females abstained from wine. Finally, those who lead a sedentary\nor indoor life do not so easily get the poison out of their systems,\nand they feel the evil effects more than those who live out of doors or\nwho engage in manual work. But there is no constitution, however iron\nit may be, that is not conquered in the end by alcoholism.\n\n(b) On account of the greater spiritual ills that result from their\ninsobriety, the virtue of soberness is more imperative in certain\nindividuals. Thus, there are some who do greater spiritual harm to\nthemselves by intoxication, for example, the young, whose passions are\nmore easily inflamed, and females, who are more readily taken advantage\nof; and hence St. Paul recommends sobriety to women and young men\nparticularly (I Tim., iii. 11; Tit., ii. 6). There are also some who do\ngreater harm to others by intoxication, such as those who should\ninstruct others (Tit., ii. 2), or who should give good example (I\nTim., iii. 2), or who are rulers over the people (Prov., xxxi. 4).\n\n2476. The Sins against Sobriety.--(a) The sin of excess may be called,\nfor want of a special name, over-sobriety. It is committed by those who\ncondemn all liking for or enjoyment of intoxicants as intrinsically\nevil (e.g., the Manichees, who said that wine was the gall of the\ndevil); also by those who deny to themselves or others intoxicants when\nthe use of them is necessary (e.g., the Encratites, who would allow\nonly water for the Eucharist, or a fanatical teetotaler who would see a\nman die rather than give him a necessary dose of whisky).\n\n(b) The sin of deficiency against sobriety is drunkenness, which is a\nvoluntary and unjustified loss of the use of reason brought on by the\nconsumption of too much intoxicating liquor. Drunkenness as a sin\n(active drunkenness), therefore, is to be distinguished from\ndrunkenness as a condition (passive drunkenness). There is active\ndrunkenness or the sin of drunkenness when intoxication is both\nvoluntary and inexcusable; there is passive drunkenness or the mere\nstate of drunkenness when one or the other of these two conditions is\nlacking. Usually those who sin by drunkenness seek the pleasure or\nforgetfulness which potations bring, but this is not essential, it\nseems, to the sin of inebriety; the malice of drunkenness is found not\nmerely in the excessive pleasure, but especially in the subordination\nof spirit to the flesh and in the damage done to mind and body. Hence,\na person who yields to the insistence of a banquet companion that he\ndrink wine which is disgusting to him, is guilty of drunkenness if he\ntakes too much.\n\n2477. Cases of Mere Passive Drunkenness.--(a) Involuntary\nDrunkenness.--This occurs when there is invincible ignorance of fact\n(e.g., when an adult becomes intoxicated in good faith, because he had\nno reason to suspect that a cocktail or eggnog was very strong, or that\nhis stomach was very weak), or of law (e.g., when a child gets drunk\nbecause he does not know that it is wrong to do so), or when there is\nlack of intention (e.g., when drink is forced on a person who does not\nwant it).\n\n(b) Excusable Drunkenness.--This occurs according to most theologians\nwhen there is a proportionately grave reason which justifies the evil\nof intoxication (see 103 sqq.). Such grave reasons are the saving of\nlife (e.g., to escape death from snake bite), the cure of serious\ndisease (e.g., cholera or influenza), the avoidance or mitigation of\nsevere suffering (e.g., before a surgical operation, or after a very\npainful accident, or when there is no other means of helping a grave\ncase of insomnia). In all these cases it is generally admitted that one\nmay bring on unconsciousness by the use of anesthetics and sedatives\n(such as chloroform, ether, morphine, opium); and there is no reason\nwhy we should not view intoxicants also in the light of remedies which\nmay be taken on the advice of physicians or other competent persons if\nother remedies cannot be had. Some theologians, however, refuse to\nexcuse intoxication for any reason, since they regard drunkenness as\nintrinsically evil. In addition to the excuses just mentioned some also\ngive that of escape from violent death, as when a burglar threatens to\nkill unless those present make themselves helpless by intoxication. But\nall agree that intoxication is not excused by ordinary advantages, such\nas escape from slight physical pain (e.g., toothache, seasickness), nor\nby the desire to avoid what can be avoided by other and more suitable\nmeans (e.g., worry about one\u2019s troubles, an unpleasant meeting or\nconversation).\n\n2478. The Morality of Total Abstinence.--(a) Obligation.--_Per se_,\nthere is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of\nintoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and\ndrink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of\nintoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is\nfound by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an\nexcellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water\ninto wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of\nthe elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not\nsinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the\nBible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36),\nrecommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23),\nand declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt.,\nxv. 2).\n\nBut, _per accidens_, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a\ngreater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good\nbe of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one\u2019s health\nor morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them)\nor of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal,\nRom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through\ndrunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the\nmost reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection\nto prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that\nparticular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by\nimpartial study.\n\n(b) Lawfulness.--_Per se_, it is also permissible to abstain freely\nfrom all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order\nthe better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence\ncalumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example.\nBut, _per accidens_, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the\ncelebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who\ncannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits.\nExamples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson\n(Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist\n(Luke, i. 15).\n\n2479. Degrees of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) The sin of perfect or\ncomplete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so\nfar that one loses temporarily the use of reason. This does not mean\nthat one must become insensible or fall in a stupor or be unable to\nwalk or have delirium tremens (dead drunk), but only that one loses the\nmental power to direct oneself morally, even though one still retains\nenough judgment to direct oneself physically (e.g., to cross the street\nor ascend the stairs safely, or to find one\u2019s own quarters without\nhelp). The indications of perfect drunkenness are that the intoxicated\nperson no longer distinguishes between right and wrong, perpetrates\nevils he would abhor in his right senses (e.g., beats his wife, runs\ndown a pedestrian, blasphemes, or provokes quarrels), and cannot\nremember on sobering up the chief things he said or did while drunk.\n\n(b) The sin of imperfect or incomplete drunkenness is a voluntary\nexcess in intoxicants carried so far that one is somewhat confused in\nmind, but does not lose the use of reason. Hence, a person who is\nphysically impeded though not mentally incapable on account of drink,\nwho staggers, speaks incoherently, or sees uncertainly, but who knows\nthat he should not beat his wife, or kill, or blaspheme, or quarrel,\netc., is imperfectly drunk. There are also circumstances that aggravate\nthe evil of perfect or imperfect drunkenness. Thus, it is worse to be a\ntoper or habitual drunkard than to be an occasional drunkard, and worse\nto go on a long spree than to be drunk only for an evening.\n\n2480. Malice of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) Perfect drunkenness is a\nmortal sin, because it is a grave disorder to deprive oneself of moral\njudgment and thus expose oneself to the danger of perpetrating serious\ncrimes and injuries. Moreover, it is a monstrous thing to despoil\noneself unnecessarily of reason, the greatest natural good of man, and\nto make oneself for the time being a maniac, more like a beast than a\nhuman being. St. Paul declares that those who would put on Christ must\nput away drunkenness with other works of darkness (Rom., xiii. 13), and\nthat drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 21). The\nopinion that perfect drunkenness is only venial if not habitual is now\nobsolete, and the opinion that perfect drunkenness is not mortal unless\nit lasts a considerable time (say, more than an hour) is commonly\nrejected; for the essential malice of drunkenness depends on its\nnature, not on its frequency or duration. A person who takes enough to\nmake himself completely drunk and then escapes the consequences by\nartificial means (e.g., by using a drug or bringing on a vomit), does\nnot sin mortally by drunkenness; but it seems that such a swinish\nperson must sin mortally by reason of gluttony, injury to health, or\nscandal.\n\n(b) Imperfect drunkenness is a venial sin, because the harm done is not\nconsiderable, for a tipsy man usually suffers nothing more than a\nslightly fuddled brain and some unsteadiness of body. Indeed, if wine\nor beer produces nothing more than a spirit of moderate hilarity and\ntalkativeness, there is no sin.\n\nAccidentally, imperfect drunkenness may be a mortal sin by reason of\ncircumstances, as when the person who is intoxicated gives great\nscandal on account of his position or office, or when the motive is to\ninflame passion or to commit other serious sin, or when the drunkenness\nis constantly repeated, or when the drunkard seriously neglects his\nbusiness, family, or religious duties, or does other grave harm in\nconsequence of his love of the bottle. In fact, there may be grave sin\nwhen one is not intoxicated at all, but is only a tippler. For the\nhabit of drinking alcoholic beverages frequently (e.g., a nip or dram\nof whisky several times a day) is, according to medical authority, more\nharmful to the system (alcoholism) than intoxication at long intervals,\nespecially if the portion is generous and the drinker is young.\n\n2481. Drunkenness Compared with Other Sins.--(a) It is not the worst of\nsins. Sins against the theological virtues are more wicked, since they\noffend against divine good, whereas drunkenness is against human good.\nMany sins against the moral virtues are worse, since they injure a\ngreater human good; for example, it is more harmful to take away life\nthan to suspend the use of reason.\n\n(b) It is one of the most ruinous of sins in its consequences (see\n2472, 2473): first, for society, since a large percentage of crime,\ninsanity, destitution, and misery is due to intemperance; secondly, to\nreligion, since indulgence in one sensual pleasure sharpens the\nappetite for others, while creating a distaste for spiritual things,\nfor effort and self-sacrifice; thirdly, to the intellect, for strong\ndrink steals away the mind and memory; fourthly, to the body, for\ndrunkenness not only prostrates the nervous system at the moment and\nhas most painful after-effects in bursting headaches and disabled\nstomach, but it also causes permanent disasters (to brain, heart,\nnerves, kidneys, and liver), weakens the resistance to disease and\nbrings on an early death; fifthly, to goods of fortune, since drunkards\nsquander their all for drink; sixthly, to posterity, since intemperate\nparents transmit constitutional weakness to their children.\n\n2482. Responsibility of Drunkard for Sins Committed While\nIntoxicated.--(a) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable,\nhe is responsible for all the sins he foresaw or should have foreseen;\nfor then these sins are willed in their cause (see 94 sqq.). Hence one\nwho is accustomed while under the influence of liquor to blaspheme,\nbetray secrets, quarrel, etc., should confess that he committed them\nwhile drunk, or that he was prepared to commit them in getting drunk.\nUnder similar conditions one who misses Mass because he was drunk is\nresponsible for the omission; one who is too drunk to attend to a\nbusiness appointment and thereby causes loss to another is held to\nrestitution. But, if grave sins are foreseen only in a very confused\nway, generally they will be imputable only as venial in themselves.\n\n(b) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, but the sins\nthat ensued were not foreseen and could not humanly have been foreseen,\nthe drunkard is excused at least in part from the guilt of these sins.\nHence, a person who gets drunk for the first time or who usually sleeps\nafter getting drunk is not responsible for the bad language he uses, if\nthe thought of profanity was farthest from his mind when he became\ndrunk. But if this person was not completely drunk and had some\nrealization of the malice and scandal of bad language, he is at least\nvenially guilty of profanity and scandal.\n\n(c) If the drunkenness was involuntary, the drunken person is excused\nentirely in case of complete drunkenness; he is excused partially in\ncase of incomplete drunkenness that did not exclude some realization\nof the sinfulness of what he said or did while intoxicated (see Canon\n2201, Sec.3). In the civil law drunkenness is not held to be an excuse\nfor a criminal act, but it may negative a specific intent (Robinson,\n_Elements of Law_, Sec.Sec.471, 525, 531).\n\n2483. Material Cooperation in the Sin of Drunkenness--(a) If there is\nno grave reason for the cooperation, it is illicit. Mere hospitality is\nnot a sufficient reason for furnishing a table with a great supply of\nstrong drinks when some of the guests are dipsomaniacs, and mere good\nfellowship does not justify one who has been treated to order another\nround of treats if some of the drinkers are already inebriated. Parents\nor others in authority who get drunk before their subjects are guilty\nof scandal; those who encourage drunkenness are guilty of seduction;\nthose who supply others with drink in order that these may become\ndrunkards are guilty of formal cooperation.\n\n(b) If there is a grave reason for cooperation, it is not illicit (1515\nsqq., 1538 sqq.). Whether it is lawful to persuade another to get\nsinfully drunk in order to keep him from the commission of a greater\nevil (e.g., homicide or sacrilege), is a disputed question (see 1502).\n\n2484. Is it lawful to make another person drunk when he will be\nguiltless of sin, and there is a grave reason?\n\n(a) According to one opinion this is not lawful, because drunkenness,\nlike impurity, is intrinsically evil and never permissible, since the\nend does not justify the means. Hence, just as it would be wrong to\ninduce a drunken person to impurity, so it would also be wrong to\nintoxicate a child or an insane person (see 306).\n\n(b) According to the common opinion, it is lawful to intoxicate oneself\nfor a grave reason (see 2477 b), and hence also it is lawful to\nintoxicate another for a similar reason. Thus, if a criminal were about\nto blow up a building and destroy many lives, it would be permissible\nor even obligatory to put powerful intoxicants into his drink so as to\nmake him helpless. If one were about to be roasted by cannibals and\ncould escape by making the cannibals drunk, it would not be sinful to\nmake them drunk.\n\n2485. Licit Use of Narcotics.--There are a great many substances that\nproduce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors,\nnamely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform,\nether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given\nabove in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to\nmake oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just\nreason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when\nhaving a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to\nrelieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of\nthe Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (_The Pope Speaks_, Summer,\n1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the\nuse of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions\nsubmitted to him for consideration were the following:\n\n1) Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to\naccept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in\ncertain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of\nserious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with\nthe spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and\ndoes prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may\nlicitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted\nin fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior\npurification.\n\n2) Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to\nmake use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The\nPope responded; \u201cYes--provided that no other means exist, and if, in\nthe given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out\nof other moral and religious duties.\u201d The duties referred to include\nsettling important business, making a will, or going to confession.\n(Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist\nin asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without\nrendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed,\nwhich results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the\npatient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the\nlicit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: \u201cif\nthe dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons\nclearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the\npermitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the\ntreatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents\nto it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally\npermissible.\u201d\n\n3) Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be\naccompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that \u201cevery\nform of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in\norder to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one\npresumes to dispose directly of life ... If between the narcotics and\nthe shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed\neither by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of\nthings (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be\nattained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the\nadministration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the\nrelief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is\nlawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable\nproportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the\none effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is\nimportant also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does\nnot make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means.\nFinally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the\nlimits which are actually necessary.\u201d\n\n2486. The Virtue of Purity.--As abstemiousness and sobriety preside\nover the pleasures of the self-preservative instinct, so purity governs\nthose that pertain to the species-preservative instinct. Purity is an\ninclusive name for the virtues of chastity and decency or pudicity, and\nits office is to regulate proximately the internal movements of the\nsoul (thoughts and desires) and remotely the external words and acts\nthat have to do with sexual delights.\n\n(a) Chastity in its strictest sense is a virtue that moderates or\nchastens through reason venereal pleasure, chiefly as to its principal\nor consummated act (i.e., intercourse, semination) or as to its\nprincipal bodily centers (i.e., the genital organs). Hence, there is a\ntwofold chastity, conjugal and celibate: conjugal chastity abstains\nfrom unnatural pleasure, and uses the natural reasonably in marriage;\ncelibate chastity abstains from all venereal pleasure, as being\nunlawful in the single state.\n\n(b) Decency (_pudicitia_) in its strictest sense is a virtue that\nmoderates by the sense of shame venereal pleasure chiefly in its\nsecondary or non-consummated external acts (e.g., looks, conversations,\ntouches, embraces, kisses), which are related to the principal act as\nbeing an enticement to it, its preparation, or its external sign and\naccompaniment. The conjugal act, though lawful, occasions a feeling of\nshame, and the same is true of the non-consummated acts; but decency is\nespecially concerned with these latter, because they are usually more\nopenly performed than the consummated act. Decency means, then, that\nmanifestations of carnal desire should be conducted with a sense that\nthis desire arises from a lower and rebellious passion, removed in\nitself farthest from reason, and not more suited for unrestrained\nexpression or public exhibition than other lower animal acts. The sense\nof shame and decency is a protection to the virtue of the unmarried and\nthe married, restraining the former from the unlawful and holding the\nlatter to moderation in the use of the lawful.\n\n2487. Chastity and decency are not separate virtues; rather decency is\na circumstance of chastity. (a) Thus, chastity moderates also the\nsecondary acts, for reason must chastise the pleasure that is taken in\nthese acts, if this passion is to be kept in due bounds, (b) Decency\nmoderates also the primary act, for in the use of marriage there should\nbe nothing unworthy, nothing to bring a blush of confusion.\n\n2488. Virginity.--The highest form of chastity is virginity, which is a\npurity unblemished that retains the bloom of its original innocence.\nConjugal chastity uses venereal pleasures moderately and virtuously;\nvirginity abstains from them entirely and virtuously. Virginity is\nthreefold.\n\n(a) Virginity of body is freedom from corruption in the genitals, which\nmeans that a male has never had sexual intercourse, that the hymen of a\nfemale is inviolate. This physical purity belongs to the virtue of\nvirginity accidentally, seeing that it is the result or indication of\nthe virtue; but it does not belong to the virtue essentially, since\nvirtue is in the soul, not in the body. Hence, one may be virginal in\nbody without the virtue of virginity (e.g., a new-born infant), or vice\nversa (e.g., a woman vowed to virginity who has been raped).\n\n(b) Virginity of the lower part of the soul (the passions) is freedom\nfrom venereal pleasure voluntarily experienced. Primarily, this refers\nto pleasure in consummated acts, secondarily to pleasure in\nnon-consummated acts and internal acts of thought and desire. This kind\nof purity belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, since sexual\npleasures are the material element or subject-matter of virginity,\nwhose office it is to exclude all indulgence of them. Hence, a person\nwho has had even one voluntary experience of these satisfactions,\nlawful or gravely unlawful, has lost virginity permanently, though the\nvirtue of chastity may remain or may be recovered. For virginity cannot\ncontinue when its subject-matter has been removed. It should be noted\nthat involuntary pleasures, as in nocturnal pollution or in rape or in\npassive spermic discharges, are not detrimental to the virtue of\nvirginity.\n\n(c) Virginity of the higher part of the soul (the mind) is the\nintention to abstain from every venereal act in the future. This purity\nof soul also belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, being its\nformal element, since acts of the sensitive appetites are made moral\nand virtuous only from the direction and influence of reason and will.\nHence, one who has had no experience of voluntary carnal pleasure, but\nwho intends to marry and use its rights or to act unchastely, has not\nin the first case the virtue of virginity, or in the second case the\nvirtue of chastity.\n\n2489. Loss of Virginity.--Physical or bodily virginity once lost can\nnever be recovered, for this virginity means that a certain bodily\naction or passion has not occurred, whereas the loss means that such\naction or passion has occurred. Of course, a miracle could restore\nbodily integrity. But a more important question is this: is moral\nvirginity, or the virtue of virginity, also irrecoverable?\n\n(a) If the virtue has been lost as to its chief material element, it\ncannot be recovered. This material element (i.e., the absence of all\nvoluntary seminal experience) cannot be restored, for even God cannot\nmake what has been experienced a non-actuality. However, it should be\nnoted once for all that loss of virginity does not necessarily imply\nloss of conjugal chastity, and that lost chastity may be recovered by\nrepentance.\n\n(b) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element, and the\nintention not to abstain was unlawful and naturally, though not\nactually, productive of semination (e.g., copulation of a completely\naspermatic adult, or internal and intense libidinous sin from which\naccidentally pollution does not result), it seems that the virtue\ncannot be recovered. For in these cases the sinner wills, at least\nindirectly, the loss of the chief material element of virginity, and it\nseems repugnant to reason to ascribe the glory of virginity to one who\nhas sinned in this way. Non expedit regulariter monere poenitentes de\neorum virginitate irreparabiliter amissa, sed praestat quaerentibus\nrespondere omnia peccata remitti de quibus contritio habeatur.\n\n(c) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element and the\nintention not to abstain was lawful (e.g., a maid not under vow decided\nto marry and have children, but changed her mind and decided to remain\nsingle), or was unlawful but neither naturally nor actually productive\nof semination (e.g., external unchastity of a child incapable through\nimpuberty of emissions, or internal and only mildly exciting\nunchastity of an adult), the virtue may be recovered, certainly in the\nfirst case and probably also in the second case. For the matter of\nvirginity is certainly not taken away by the mere intention to have\nlawful venereal pleasure, nor probably even by pleasures that do not\ntend to semination. Recovery of virginity is made in the one case by\nthe retractation of contrary intention and in the other case by\nrepentance and renewal of good purpose.\n\n2490. Conditions Necessary for the Virtue of Virginity.--(a) As to its\nmanner, it seems more probable that this purpose must be expressed as a\nvow. The reason for this according to some is that virginity is a\nspecial virtue only because of the sacred character which religion\ngives it, and according to others also because of the unshakable\nrenunciation which is conferred by a vow. But it is also held as\nprobable that unvowed virginity may be called a lesser degree of the\nspecial virtue of virginity, At least, it is a higher degree of the\nvirtue of chastity.\n\n(b) As to its motive, virginity must be justified by an extrinsic\nreason. Chastity is justified by its own end, which is reasonable\nmoderation. Virginity, on the contrary, is not self-justificatory,\nsince in itself it is unfruitful and without advantage. Hence, it is\nnot praiseworthy unless it serves some higher good than that of\npropagation, such as a good of the mind (e.g., Plato remained single\nfor the sake of philosophy) or of the will (e.g., the New Testament\nrecommends virginity for the sake of greater devotion to the things of\nGod). Virginity that results from mere contempt for sensible pleasure\nwould be an excess, and continence embraced merely to escape the\nburdens of marriage and to lead an easy, self-indulgent, irresponsible\nlife would be selfishness; but virginity followed from an ideal of\nself-sacrifice which reason approves observes the golden mean (see Pius\nXII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954).\n\n2491. The Excellence of Virginity.-(a) Virginity has the highest rank\namong the various forms of chastity. Every kind of chastity\n(pre-nuptial, conjugal, vidual) is of great importance, because to this\nvirtue is entrusted the right propagation of the entire race and the\nmoral and physical health of the individual in the most insistent of\npassions. The material reproduction of the race is indeed a more urgent\nneed than virginity, since without it the human species would die out;\nand if there were danger of race extinction, it would be more\nimperative to marry than to remain continent. But if we confine our\nattention to the ordinary course of things and compare virginity and\nnon-virginal chastity from the viewpoint of nobility, it must be said\nvirginity is more valuable both to the community and to the individual\nthan the other kinds of chastity. It is more valuable to the community,\nsince the example of its excellence is a protection to public morals,\nand its permanence gives the opportunity for a more general and ready\nservice of society. It is more valuable to the individual, since to be\noccupied with the things of God is better than to be engrossed in the\nthings of the world, and the unmarried have the opportunity to devote\nmore time with less distraction to higher things. Scripture affirms the\nsuperiority of virginity to marriage by its teaching (e.g., Our Lord in\nMatt., xix. 12, counsels virginity; St. Paul in I Cor., vii. 7 sqq.,\nsays that it is the better and more blessed state), by its examples\n(Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, St. John the Baptist, St. John the\nEvangelist, and in the Old Dispensation Josue, Elias, Eliseus,\nJeremias), and by its promised rewards (Apoc., xiv. 4). A popular\nphilosophy of materialism today makes repressed sex-urges responsible\nfor hysteria and other emotional disturbances, but experience proves\nthat continence benefits both psychical and physical health.\n\n(b) Virginity does not rank first among all the virtues. The\ntheological virtues surpass it, being its goal; martyrdom and religious\nobedience are greater, because they sacrifice the superior goods of\nlife and of the will. It may happen, then, that a person in the married\nstate or a penitent (Luke, vii. 36 sqq.) is personally more holy than\none dedicated to continence; a married person or penitent may surpass a\nvirgin in faith, hope and charity, and may be therefore, simply\nspeaking, more perfect.\n\n2492. The Sin of Impurity.--This sin, which is also known as lust, is\nan inordinate desire of sexual pleasure.\n\n(a) Its object is sexual pleasure, that is, the sense of physical\nenjoyment in the bodily organs or of psychical satisfaction in the\nlower appetites of the soul derived from acts related to generation.\nHence, we should distinguish impurity from sensuality (which is an\ninordinate attachment to esthetic pleasure or other higher\nsense-pleasure), from luxury (which is an excessive desire of health\nand comfort), and from the vice called curiosity (which is an\nover-fondness for intellectual delights, see 2461). But it should be\nnoted that sensual pleasure easily leads to venereal delight, and that\nintellectual curiosity about sex matters is dangerous, and hence this\nsensuality and curiosity may be, and frequently are, a temptation to\nimpurity (see below on Temptations to Impurity).\n\n(b) Impurity is in desire, for the passions in themselves are\nindifferent (see 121), and they become sinful only when their abuse is\nconsented to by the will.\n\n(c) Impurity is inordinate; that is, it takes pleasure against lhe\ndictate of reason. This happens when sexual gratifications are indulged\nby the unmarried, or by the married in unnatural ways. It is a\nperversion and a sin to cheat the stomach in order to gratify the\npalate, because God willed that the pleasure of eating should serve the\nnourishment of the body, or, as the proverb has it, because man does\nnot live to eat, but eats to live. Now, sex pleasure has been ordained\nby God as an inducement to perform an act which has for its purpose the\npropagation and education of children, duties that cannot be rightly\nattended to except in the married state. Hence, those who seek venereal\npleasure outside of matrimony, or outside the way intended by nature,\nact unreasonably, for they sacrifice the end for the means. Instinct\nguides the animal aright in these matters, but man is a nobler creature\nand must guide himself by religion and reason.\n\n2493. Kinds of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is consummated when the act is\ncontinued to its natural conclusion and complete venereal satisfaction\nis had. This occurs in semination, which is the termination of the\nprocess set up by the impure thought and desire and the realization of\nits full pleasure. Semination occurs either in the process of coition,\nor in extracoitional issues known as \u201cpollution.\u201d Equivalent to\nsemination, morally speaking, are other emissions or secretions that\naccompany complete or almost complete gratification, but in which the\nfluid is not prolific (e.g., the urethral emissions in boys who have\nnot attained puberty or in eunuchs, the vaginal flow in women, urethral\ndistillations). Consummated impurity is either natural (that is,\nsuitable for reproduction, the end intended by nature), as in\nfornication or adultery, or unnatural (that is, not suited for\nreproduction), as in sodomy or pollution.\n\n(b) Impurity is non-consummated when not carried to its natural\nconclusion of complete satisfaction and semination. There are two\nclasses of the non-consummated sins, namely, the internal (as in\nthoughts and desires) and the external or lewdness (as in words, looks,\nkisses). This happens without carnal commotion (e.g., when a frigid old\nman thinks with mental pleasure only on the wild deeds of his youth),\nor with carnal commotion, that is, with an excitement and stimulation\nin the genital organs that prepares the way for semination.\n\n2494. Gravity of the Sin of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is a mortal sin,\nbecause it is a disorder that affects a good of the highest importance\n(viz, the propagation of the race), and brings in its train public and\nprivate, moral and physical, evils of the most serious kind. Man has no\nmore right to degrade his body by lust than he has to kill it by\nsuicide, for God is the absolute Lord over the body and He severely\nforbids impurity of every kind. Those who do the works of the flesh,\nwhether according to nature (e.g., fornicators and adulterers) or\nagainst nature (e.g., sodomites) or by unconsummated sin (e.g., the\nunclean, the impure), shall not obtain the kingdom of God (Gal., v. 19;\nI Cor., vi. 9 sqq.), nor have any inheritance with Christ (Eph., v. 5).\n\n(b) Impurity is not the worst of sins, because sins against God (e.g.,\nhatred of God, sacrilege) are more heinous than sins against created\ngoods, and sins of malice are more inexcusable than sins of passion or\nfrailty. But carnal sins are peculiarly disgraceful on account of their\nanimality (see 2464 b, 224), and in a Christian they are a kind of\nprofanation, since his body has been given to Christ in Baptism and the\nother Sacraments (I Cor., vi. 11-19).\n\n(c) Impurity is one of the seven capital vices. The capital sins have a\npreeminence in evil, as the cardinal virtues have a superiority in\ngood. The preeminence in evil is due, first, to some special\nattractiveness of a vice that makes it an end for the commission of\nother sins, which are used as means to it or are incurred for its sake;\nor, secondly, to a power and influence that is so strong as to hurry\nthose under its sway into various kinds of sin. Now, impurity is a\nmoral disease that ravages every part of the soul, its deadly effects\nappearing in the reason, the will and external speech; for the more one\nsubjects oneself to the dominion of passion, the less fitted does one\nbecome for the higher and nobler things of life; and the more ignoble\nthe inner life, the more vulgar, cheap and degrading will be the\nconversation.\n\nHence, the Fathers trace back to impurity the following sins of\nimprudence in the mind: wrong apprehension, about the end or purpose of\nlife, and precipitancy in deliberation, thoughtlessness in decision,\ninconstancy in direction, in reference to the means to the end (see\n1693 sqq.). They also trace to impurity the following sins in the will:\nas to the end, voluptuarism (which subordinates all to fleshly\npleasure) and hatred of God (which abhors the Supreme Lawgiver who\nforbids and punishes lust); as to the means, love of the present and\nhorror of the future life (since the carnal man revels in bodily\npleasures and dreads the thought of death and judgment). Finally, they\ntrace the following sins of the tongue to the vice of impurity: the\nsubject of the lewd man\u2019s talk is filthy, for out of the heart the\nmouth speaketh (Matt., xii. 34), the expression itself is foolish,\nsince passion clouds his mind, the origin of his talk is emptiness of\nmind which shows itself in frivolous words, and his purpose is\nunsuitable amusement, which leads to farcical or vulgar jokes.\n\n2495. Evil Fruits of Impurity.--In addition to these moral\nconsequences, impurity is also prolific of many other evil fruits.\n\n(a) Thus, for the sinner himself it is like a cruel goad that\nconstantly annoys him and takes away his peace (St. Ambrose), like a\nsword that kills the nobler instincts (St. Gregory the Great), like a\ndescent from human dignity to a condition below the beasts (St.\nEusebius of Caesarea).\n\n(b) For society it is disastrous in many ways, since it propagates\ndread mental and physical diseases, disrupts the peace of families,\nbrings disgrace and destitution on innocent children, eats away\nfortunes and leads up to innumerable crimes of injustice and violence.\n\n2496. Is Impurity Ever a Venial Sin?--(a) By reason of the imperfection\nof the act, impurity is venial when there is no sufficient deliberation\nor consent. Invincible ignorance in reference to the sixth commandment\nitself sometimes happens, especially in reference to internal sins of\nthought, to external sins of pollution if the person is young, and to\nother external sins when there is some complication of circumstances\n(e.g., kissing and other intimacy by engaged persons, onanism when\nmarried persons are poor or the woman sickly); and more frequently\nthere is invincible ignorance about details of the sixth commandment\n(e.g., about the precise theological or moral malice of what is known\nto be sinful).\n\n(b) By reason of the matter, impurity according to the common teaching\nis always mortal if directly willed, but sometimes venial if only\nindirectly willed. Impurity is directly willed when one posits an act\nintending to obtain from it unlawful venereal delectation, or perceives\nthat such delectation is already present and consents to it. No matter\nhow brief this voluntary assent, no matter how slight the commotion of\nthe animal nature, no matter how far from the consummated is the impure\nact in question, there is always a serious injury done to a great good\nor at least (exception is made for the case of married persons) the\nproximate danger of such injury, and hence mortal sin (see 260). That\neven slight yielding to impurity is a serious peril is the teaching of\nScripture (which declares that lust has killed even the strongest,\nProv., vii. 26), of the Church (which condemns the opinion that\nlibidinous kisses are not dangerous, see Denzinger, Enchiridion, n.\n1140), of theology (which reminds us that by original sin reason has\nbeen darkened, the will enfeebled and the passions strengthened), and\nof experience (which shows that those who expose themselves to\npassion\u2019s flame will be burnt). A small spark of fire is not trivial in\nthe vicinity of a powder magazine, a minute flaw in a machine is not\nunimportant if it may bring on disaster, a first step is not safe if it\nis made on a slippery downward declivity.\n\n(c) Impurity is indirectly willed when deliberately and without\nsufficient reason one posits an act which is not venereal pleasure\n(whether the act be good, such as a prayer made with great sensible\nfervor, or bad, such as gluttony, or indifferent, such as reading a\nbook, looking at a picture, taking a bath), but which produces foreseen\nvenereal pleasure (consummated or non-consummated) that one neither\nintends nor directly consents to. Impurity thus indirectly willed is\nsinful, because the pleasure is foreseen and permitted without\nsufficient reason (see 102), or in other words because one exposes\noneself to danger of internal defilement (consent), or external\npollution without justification (see 260). Indirect impurity is mortal\nwhen there is proximate danger of grave sin in the act done, that is,\nwhen the posited act _per se_ or from its nature strongly incites the\nagent to sexual passion, as when one gazes long and fixedly at obscene\npictures, knowing that always or nearly always this arouses impure\nemotions. The sin is venial when there is only remote danger of grave\nsin. This happens when the posited act is not of a venereal kind (an\nunnecessary conversation on indifferent topics) or is only mildly\nexciting (e.g., a passing glance at an obscene object), or when the\nagent himself is not greatly affected by it (e.g., when an old man, or\none who is of very cold disposition, or an artist whose only thought is\nthe esthetic excellence, carefully studies a picture of the nude).\n\n2497. Temptations to Impurity.--Before treating the various kinds of\nimpurity, we shall speak briefly of temptations that occasion this sin\nand of the duties of the person tempted.\n\n(a) External temptation comes from the devil or the world, and the duty\nof struggling against it has been treated elsewhere (see 252, 1455\nsqq., 1495 sqq.). Thus, he who finds that certain persons, places or\nthings are for him a temptation to impurity must be guided by the\nprinciples given for occasions of sin (263 sqq.); he who finds that\nanother wishes to seduce him into impurity must refuse all internal\nconsent (see 254 sqq.), and must also resist violence when there is\nhope of success, or when this is necessary to avoid giving scandal or\nyielding consent (see on self-defense, 1841).\n\n(b) Internal temptation comes from the flesh. It consists in inchoative\ndisturbances or excitements of the organs or fluids that serve\ngeneration (e.g., erections, clitoral movements). Sometimes it is\nproduced involuntarily, without any intention or consent of the will,\nby physiological states (e.g., conditions of the blood, nerves, etc.,\ndue solely to the weather, to disease, to aphrodisiac properties of\nailment, to clothing, or position) or by psychical states (e.g.,\nspontaneous images or appetites of the soul mentioned in 129), and in\nthese cases the temptation is manifestly free from all sin. St. Pius V\ncondemned the teaching of Baius that those who suffer motions of\nconcupiscence against their will are transgressors of the command:\n\u201cThou shalt not covet\u201d (see Denziger, Enchiridion, nn. 1050, 1051,\n1075). Sometimes the temptation is directly voluntary, as when the\npassion is deliberately awakened for the purpose of sin, and then there\nis grave guilt (see 2496 b). Sometimes the temptation is indirectly\nvoluntary, as when with the foresight of the passion but without desire\nof it an action is performed that arouses it. In this last case, if\nthere is a just reason for the excitatory action (e.g., a physician\nsees and hears things that are calculated to be a temptation, but his\nreason is the exercise of his profession), no sin is committed; but if\nthere is no just reason for the action (e.g., a person reads an erotic\nbook, and curiosity is his only motive), sin is committed, and its\ngravity depends on the amount of danger to which one exposes oneself\n(see 2496 c).\n\n2498. Resistance to Internal Temptations.--The fight against internal\ntemptations is of various kinds.\n\n(a) By reason of its subject, the conflict is chiefly in the will, to\nwhich it belongs to give or withhold consent; secondarily, in the other\npowers of the soul and the body, which under command from the will\nperform acts designed to overcome temptation.\n\n(b) By reason of its manner, the conflict is either removal of the\ntemptation (i.e., cessation from an act which produces the temptation)\nor resistance, passive or active. Passive resistance is the suspension\nof activity relative to the temptation till it ends of itself, as when\ninternally the will neither consents nor dissents, or externally\nnothing is done for or against the temptation. Active resistance is\npositive opposition offered to temptation. It is made in two ways:\nfirst, by way of flight, as when internally the mind turns away to\nother thoughts (e.g., absorbing studies, meditation on the passion of\nChrist), or the will devotes itself to other subjects of resolve (e.g.,\nacts of love of God or of purity), or externally the body is removed or\nfreed from conditions that excite temptation; secondly, by way of\nattack, as when internally the mind turns against the temptation (e.g.,\nthinking of its dangers, calling on God to drive it away), or the will\nrejects the temptation (e.g., by despising it, by expressing dislike,\ndisapproval and unwillingness, by firmly resolving not to yield, by\ndeciding on measures against the passion), or when externally the body\nis subjected to pain or mortification.\n\n(c) By reason of its circumstances, resistance to temptation is either\nprolonged, as when the act by which the will resists is of considerable\nduration or is renewed at frequent intervals, or is brief, as when the\nact of rejection is momentary and is not repeated.\n\n2499. What Opposition to Temptation Is Sufficient?--Opposition to\ntemptations of the flesh must be sufficient to remove the temptation,\nwhen the temptation is due to the continuance of one\u2019s own sinful or\nunjustified act; for one is obliged to cease from sin or the\nunreasonable. This happens (a) when the temptation is directly\nvoluntary--for example, one who wished to experience temptation and\ntherefore reads a very seductive book must give over this reading; or\n(b) when the temptation is not directly voluntary and is without\nsufficient reason--for example, one who experiences carnal temptation\ndue to a book which he reads from idle curiosity must desist from the\nbook. But one is not bound to omit or interrupt necessary or useful\nacts, such as rest and sleep, prayer and charity; consent should be\ndenied the evil, but the good should be continued.\n\n2500. Insufficient, Harmful and Unnecessary Opposition.--In other cases\nopposition to temptations of the flesh must be such as is sufficient to\nkeep one from consent, that is, to protect one against the proximate\ndanger of sin.\n\n(a) Hence, that resistance is insufficient which does not strengthen\nthe will. It seems that passive will-resistance is of this kind, since\nit is most difficult for the will to remain inactive in the presence of\ncarnal stimulation or motions of the sensible appetites without being\nmoved by the evil suggestion. In external resistance, however, passive\nopposition suffices when it alone is feasible, as when temptation grows\nout of necessary work, or rest that cannot be discontinued or\ninterrupted by active resistance, provided the will registers\ninternally its displeasure or disapproval; but external passivity is\nnot permissible when the will needs the help of external resistance, as\nin the case of vehement and prolonged temptations.\n\n(b) That resistance is harmful which strengthens the temptation. Hence,\nresistance by direct attack or by formal rejection is oftentimes to be\nomitted in favor of resistance by flight or by contempt; for it is a\ncommon teaching of the Fathers and Doctors confirmed by experience that\ndwelling on reasons and means of repelling passion often adds to its\nstrength, and that resolving mightily and expressly to crush a weak and\npassing temptation often serves only to give it a longer life. It is\nbetter to brush a mosquito away than to risk one\u2019s neck by chasing it\nup and down stairs.\n\n(c) That resistance is unnecessary which demands a physical or moral\nimpossibility. Thus, a prolonged act of resistance or one repeated at\nintervals of a few minutes, or a resistance that includes extreme\ncorporal austerities, is not required in ordinary cases at least. When\na temptation is unusually vehement or is due to one\u2019s own fault, there\nshould be proportionately greater resistance to offset the greater\ndanger; but when a temptation is only moderately dangerous, it suffices\nto reject it firmly but briefly and to repeat this when there arises a\nnew crisis or danger and the renewal of resistance is useful.\n\n2501. Weapons against Carnal Temptations.--The most powerful weapons\nagainst carnal temptations are spiritual ones, and of these the most\nnecessary is grace, which should be asked in prayer (Wis., viii. 21),\nespecially through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary (see\nPius XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954). But corporal means,\nchiefly of a preventive kind, should not be neglected.\n\n(a) Physical measures are the observance of what are now often spoken\nof as sex hygiene for normal and sex therapeutics for abnormal cases.\nSpecial health rules whose observance conduces to good morals are\nespecially the cultivation of habits of bodily cleanliness, of hard\nmental and physical work, of vigorous exercise and the avoidance of\nunhealthful habits (such as constipation, drug or spirit stimulation),\nunsuitable clothing or sleeping conditions. Surgical or medical\ntreatment for structural abnormalities or for mental or bodily diseases\nthat react unfavorably on sex life requires the service of a\nconscientious and competent physician.\n\n(b) Religious measures are various forms of corporal mortification,\nsuch as custody of the eyes and other senses, deprivation in food\n(fasting and abstinence) and sleep (vigils, night watches), afflictive\npenances through the use of hairshirts, painful girdles, scourges or\ndisciplines. But austerities must be suited to the health, age,\ncondition, duties and other circumstances of the person who practises\nthem, and should not be used without the consent of one\u2019s confessor or\nspiritual director.\n\n2502. Sinfulness of Negligence in Resisting Temptations.--It is sinful\nnot to struggle against temptation, since he who in no way resists, not\neven passively, surrenders or yields to sin. Hence, the Church\ncondemned the quietistic indifference to temptation of Molinos\n(Denzinger, nn. 1237, 1257, 1267). It is also sinful to resist, but\nonly insufficiently, as regards promptness, vigor, manner, etc.\n\n(a) The Theological Malice.--It is mortally or venially sinful to be\nnegligent against temptation, according to the greatness or smallness\nof the danger to which the negligence exposes one (see 256-262). Thus,\nit is not a serious sin to omit all resistance to a weak and dying\ntemptation, or to neglect from indolence or other venial fault all\nexternal resistance when the danger is made remote by the internal\ndispleasure or resolution; but it is a serious sin to trifle with any\nvery attractive temptation or to put off resistance until a progressing\ntemptation has grown formidable and made self-control difficult, and\nthis is true even though consent is not finally given to the impure\nsuggestion.\n\n(b) The Moral Malice.--Negligences in reference to carnal temptations\ndo not differ specifically but only in degree, according to the\napproach the stimuli make towards complete lust. Even when there is an\nobject (e.g., fornication, adultery) before the mind, the difference in\nspecies of the object, it seems, does not induce a difference in\nspecies of the sin, since the sin is the general one of carelessness in\npresence of temptation. Hence, it suffices to confess that one has been\nremiss in banishing impure emotions or thoughts.\n\n2503. Applications.--(a) The principles here given in reference to\nemotions of the sensible appetite and rebellions of the flesh should be\napplied to other involuntary acts in the imagination, reason and will\n(see 129). Thus, thoughts or images of impure scenes that pass through\nthe mind should be treated in the same way as temptations of the flesh.\n\n(b) The principles here given about the person who suffers temptation\nshould also be applied to the person who causes temptation. Since it is\na mortal sin to commit impurity, it is also a mortal sin to solicit\nimpurity; since it is a mortal sin of lust to make oneself drunk in\norder to experience carnal emotions, it is also a mortal sin of lust to\nmake another person drunk that he may become likewise inflamed; since\nit is a mortal sin to expose oneself to extreme danger by reading a\npornographic work, it is also a mortal sin to wish to expose another to\na like danger. And this is true even though the temptation is\nunsuccessful. Physicians who minimize the wrong of masturbation, or who\ncounsel fornication to young men on the absurd plea that continence is\nunhealthy or productive of impotency, share in the guilt of pollution\nor fornication which they counsel; and young persons who seek to win\nthe sinful love of others by nourishing their hair, painting their\nfaces, exposing their bodies, etc., have the guilt, if not the gain, of\nseduction.\n\n2504. Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity.--These include all those\npreparatory sins in which unlawful sex pleasure is not carried to\ncompletion by coition or pollution. We shall speak first of the\ninternal sins of thought, delight, and desire (see 232 sqq.), and next\nof the external sins of unlawful looks, words, kisses, and embraces.\n\n2505. Impure Thoughts.--Impure thoughts (_delectatio morosa_) are\nrepresentations in the mind or imagination of impure venereal objects\nin which deliberate pleasure is taken.\n\n(a) They are representations, that is, mental pictures or images of\nthings absent from the senses, but thought of or imagined as present.\nThus, impure thoughts differ from desires, which consist in attraction\nwith will to accomplish, and also from sense contact of various kinds\nwith objects present to the eyes, ears, or touch.\n\n(b) They are joined with deliberate pleasure of the will, that is, one\nintends them or consents even momentarily to them after perceiving\ntheir presence and malice, even though carnal pleasure is not felt or\ndoes not threaten. Thus, impure thoughts differ from tempting thoughts,\nwhich are transient and unwished forms that appear in the mind, and are\nthought on before their true character is adverted to, or which gain a\nlodging in spite of efforts to eject them. A tempting thought is not\nsinful, but an occasion of merit when resisted, no matter how long it\nendures (see 2497 b).\n\n(c) The pleasure is taken in a venereal object, that is, in the thought\nof fornication, adultery or other carnal sin, committed by oneself or\nby another. Hence, impure thoughts are not to be confused with the\npleasure taken in knowledge about impurity (e.g., a professor of\nmedicine or morality is not impure when he rejoices at the sexual\nknowledge he possesses and which is necessary for his duties, or\nwillingly thinks about sex matters when it is necessary or useful for\nhim to do so), or with pleasure taken in the morally indifferent manner\nof the venereal sin. For example, amusement over a ridiculous feature\nof a sin which one detests is not an impure thought (see 233-236).\n\n2506. The Malice of Impure Thoughts.--(a) The Theological\nMalice.--Impure thoughts are mortal sins: for he who deliberately\nrejoices at the thought of sin, loves sin and is therefore guilty of\nit. They are venial sins when there is imperfect advertence, and also\nwhen there is lightness of matter on account of the remoteness of the\ndanger of a thought only indirectly voluntary. They are mortal when\nthere is full deliberation and the impure thought is directly voluntary\nor gravely dangerous (see 2496).\n\n(b) The Moral Malice.--Impure thoughts have the same specific malice as\nthe representation of the object which is entertained as a welcome\nguest in the mind; for not only is impurity given the hospitality of\nthe mind, but a particular kind of impurity (see 90, 235). Hence it\nfollows, first, that a specifically different object (as is the case\nwith different consummated sins) makes a specifically different sin\n(e.g., to think pleasurably of unlawful intercourse is mental\nfornication if the persons in mind are unmarried, and is mental\nadultery if the person in mind is married); secondly, that objects not\nspecifically different--as is the case with different non-consummated\nsins of lewdness--do not make specifically different sins (e.g., to\nthink pleasurably of a sinful kiss and to think sinfully of a sinful\ntouch are both mental lewdness or impure thoughts); thirdly, that\nspecial malices of the object from which the mind can prescind--viz.,\nthose which in the external act do not change the species or do not\nexplain the venereal pleasure--and from which it does prescind, are not\nincurred (e.g., to think pleasurably of sin with a woman who is married\nand a relative, if the thought that she is married or one\u2019s relative is\nnot pleasing or is displeasing, is mental fornication, not mental\nadultery or mental incest). In praxi vero consulitur confessariis ut\nregulariter abstineant a quaestionibus de specie morali delectationis\nmorosae; nam fideles plerumque nesciunt faciliter distinguere inter\nspecies morales cogitationum, et sic interrogatio evaderet vel\ninutilis, vel etiam ratione materiae perieulosa. Ad haec quum casus\ncrebriores sint, maximo esset incommodo, tum confessariis, tum\npoenitentibus, si sacerdos exquireret quae vix cognosci possunt.\nSufficit igitur ordinarie sciscitari de specie theologica (utrum\nvoluntas complacuerit), vel de specie morali generali (utrum actus\ninternus delectatio morosa vel potius desiderium fuerit). See Canon\n888, Sec.2; Norms for Confessors in Dealing with the Sixth Commandment,\nHoly Office, May 16, 1943.\n\n2507. Impure Rejoicing.--Impure rejoicing is a deliberate pleasure of\nthe mind yielded to the recollection of a past sin of impurity. Hence,\nthis sin of rejoicing is committed when one thinks with approval of a\nfornication of former days, but the sin of rejoicing is not committed\nwhen one confines one\u2019s pleasure to some good consequence of a\nfornication (e.g., the excellent child that was born), or to a lawful\npleasure of the past, as when a widower thinks without present carnal\ncommotion or danger of his former married life. The circumstances are\nmore readily willed here than in impure thoughts, for here the mind is\npicturing an actual, not an imaginary case of sin, and the mental\nrepresentation will therefore be more distinct; nevertheless, in the\ncase of impure rejoicing the moral sub-species--at times even the\ndistinction between impure rejoicing and impure thoughts--is usually\nnot perceived. The principles of the previous paragraph apply to impure\nrejoicing.\n\n2508. Impure Desires.--Impure desire is a deliberate intention to\ncommit impurity in the future.\n\n(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which\nconsent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same\nthing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that\nhe would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only\nthat he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as\na mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances\nthat would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were\nlawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both\nhe and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these\nvelleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of\ndanger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will\nconsents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to\nfornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take\naway the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were\nit not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to\npractise fornication).\n\n(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure\ndesire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual,\nmental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or\nwhat is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but\nwithout carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future\nmarried relationship).\n\n2509. Malice of Impure Desires.--Impure desires are mortal sins and\nhave the malice of the object and of the circumstances that one has in\nmind; that is, one commits the same kind of sin in desiring as in\nperforming impurity. Hence, Our Lord declares that he who looks upon a\nwoman to desire her unlawfully has already committed adultery in his\nheart (Matt., v. 28), and hence also the ninth commandment forbids sins\nof impure desire. The principles given in 2506, 2507, apply also to\nimpure desires with this difference that the mind when it wills\nexternal performance considers the object as it is in itself, not as it\nis mentally represented, and hence is less likely to prescind from\nactual circumstances known to it, But even here confessional\ninvestigation is sometimes not necessary on account of its moral\nimpossibility.\n\n2510. Lewdness.--After the internal sins follow the external sins of\nlewdness or indecency (_impudicitia_). These may be defined as\n\u201cexternal acts which are performed from or with deliberate venereal\npleasure that is not consummated, and which are not directed to the\nconjugal act.\u201d\n\n(a) They are external acts of the body, such as the looks of the eye,\nthe speech of the tongue, kisses of the lips, touches, fondling,\nembraces, pressure of the hand, etc. Those also are guilty of lewdness\nwho permit themselves to be petted, kissed or otherwise impurely\nhandled, unless it is morally impossible to resist, as when a woman who\ngives no internal consent cannot defend herself against a forced kiss\nwithout being killed, or cannot without great scandal refuse to shake\nhands with one whose motive is impure love. Lewdness (e.g., an impure\nlook) may also be directed to one\u2019s own person, or to an animal, or to\nan artificial object, such as a statue or book.\n\n(b) They are performed from or with pleasure; that is, passion either\ncauses or accompanies the impure look or other act. These\nnon-consummated acts are indifferent in themselves and may be licitly\nperformed for a just cause; they become sinful by reason of the evil\npassion that animates them. The carnal motive appears either from the\nend of the act (e.g., an indecent kiss naturally tends to impurity or\ngrave danger thereof, no matter what good purpose the kisser may have),\nor from the end of the one acting (e.g., a decent kiss becomes an\nimpure act if the one who kisses is moved by carnal desire). Hence,\nthere is no sin of lewdness when one of the acts now considered is\nperformed becomingly as to externals and innocently as to the internal\nmotive and quality (e.g., from a sense of duty, not from pleasure).\n\n(c) The pleasure intended or consented to is venereal; that is, such as\nis consummated in copulation or pollution. Hence, there is no sin of\nlewdness when the acts in question are performed becomingly and with\nand for pleasure of a spiritual kind (as when members of a family give\none another the customary kiss or embrace of affection), or of a merely\nsensual kind (e.g., when a nurse kisses the tender skin of an infant).\nOn the distinction of intellectual, sensual and venereal pleasures see\nabove (2461).\n\n(d) The external act is not consummated by copulation or pollution.\nThese are often its result but they are a different degree of sin, and\nlewdness is committed even without them (see 2486).\n\n(e) Lewdness is an action not directed to the conjugal act. Coition\nitself is lawful in the married state, and this legitimatizes all the\npreparatory or accessory endearments. Hence, the rule as to married\npersons is that venereal kisses and other such acts are lawful when\ngiven with a view to the exercise of the lawful marriage act and kept\nwithin the bounds of decency and moderation; that they are sinful,\ngravely or lightly according to the case, when unbecoming or\nimmoderate; that they are venially sinful, on account of the inordinate\nuse of a thing lawful in itself (85 a), when only pleasure is intended;\nthat they are mortally sinful, when they tend to pollution, whether\nsolitary or not solitary, for then they are acts of lewdness. The\nrights and duties during courtship and engagement will be treated below\nin Question III.\n\n2511. Cases Wherein No Sin Is Committed.--Since lewdness proceeds from\nor is accompanied by culpable venereal pleasure, it does not exist in\nthe following cases:\n\n(a) in children who have not attained puberty and the capacity for sex\npleasure, and hence there is no sin by reason of proximate danger in\nlooks or touches exercised by them, which would be gravely sinful in\nthose who have reached the age of puberty. These children may, however,\nsin against modesty or obedience, at least venially. They should be\ntrained from their earliest years to reserve and decency, and it is a\nmost serious sin to scandalize their innocence. The question of sex\ninstruction for the young will be dealt with in the Question on the\nDuties of Particular States. If an adult person were as unmoved as a\nchild by the stimulus of passion, such a one would incur no personal\nguilt of lewdness by kissing and the like acts, but such an adult\nperson is very rare;\n\n(b) in adult persons when a dangerous act is exercised by them, without\nconsent or proximate danger, and with a sufficient reason for the\nexercise. Thus, a student of literature may read an erotic story from\nthe classics, if he is proof against the danger and intends only\nimprovement in style, though for the young such books should be\nexpurgated; a professor of medicine or moral theology may discourse\nprudently to his students on venereal diseases or sins; an artist may\nuse naked models in painting, if and as far as this is necessary; farm\nhands may attend to the service of female by male animals; looks and\ntouches that would otherwise be immodest are lawful for proportionate\nreasons of utility, as in bathing oneself, in performing the services\nof nurse or physician for others, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).\n\n2512. Conditions Governing Propriety of External Acts.--The\nbecomingness of the external acts spoken of in 2510 b includes two\nconditions.\n\n(a) On the side of its object, the act must not be directed\nunnecessarily to the parts of the body that are shameful and private\n(i.e., the genitals and immediately adjacent parts). It is customary to\ndistinguish the remaining or non-shameful parts of the body into\nbecoming, which are uncovered (e.g., face, hands, feet), and less\nbecoming, which are covered (e.g., legs, breast, back). But as to less\ndecent parts much depends on local usage. For example, at a bathing\nbeach it is not unbecoming to appear in a mixed crowd with uncovered\nlegs or arms, and in very warm countries it is not improper to go about\nin public with less clothing than is worn in colder climates.\n\n(b) On the side of its subject, the act must be performed with\nmoderation and respect for reasonable custom. Thus, columbine\n(popularly called \u201cFrench\u201d) kissing and the ardent or prolonged\nembraces known as \u201cnecking\u201d or \u201cpetting\u201d are admittedly indecent, even\nwhen not accompanied by sexual excitement. Oral abuse committed by or\nwith either sex is indecent both as to the object, i.e., the part of\nthe body involved, and as to the subject, i.e., the mode of action. It\nis the filthiest form of lewdness and is usually joined with pollution\n(irrumation).\n\n2513. Morality of Kissing and Similar Acts.--(a) _Per se_, or from\ntheir nature, these acts are indifferent, since they can be employed,\nnot only for evil (Job, xxxi. 27; Luke, xxii. 48), but also for good,\nas we see from the examples of the kiss of peace (I Thess., v. 26), the\nkiss of fraternal greeting (Gen., xxvii. 26, 27), and the kiss of\nrespectful homage (Luke, vii. 38, 45).\n\n(b) _Per accidens_, or from their circumstances, these acts are often\nvenially or mortally sinful against purity or against some other\nvirtue, or against both. Thus, justice is offended by injuries or\nviolence (e.g., stolen kisses, unhygienic kisses that transmit venereal\nor other disease); charity is offended by scandal given the object of\naffection or the onlookers (e.g., kisses given by way of greeting to a\nmember of the opposite sex by an ecclesiastic or religious, kisses\nforced upon children by grown-ups and which are harmful to the youthful\nsense of modest reserve); purity itself is offended by familiarities\nwhich, though not impure in themselves, constitute a peril for the\nvirtue of one or both parties, as is true especially in demonstrations\nof sensual affection or pleasure. But even though there be some carnal\ncommotion, it is not unlawful to give with a pure intention the decent\nsalutation customary in one\u2019s country (e.g., to shake hands with a\nlady, to kiss one\u2019s stepmother or sister-in-law).\n\n2514. Morality of Sensual Gratification.--Sensual gratification, or the\npleasure experienced from the perfection in the sensible order of some\nobject, is indifferent and lawful in itself (see 2461, 2492). When it\nis aroused by objects not venereally exciting (e.g., the beauty of the\nheavens or scenery, the harmony of music, the tender softness of the\nrose), it does not tempt to impurity; but when it is aroused by objects\nthat are venereally exciting (e.g., the beautiful face or eyes or sweet\nvoice or soft skin of a person much admired), it approaches so closely\nto the confines of venereal gratification as to seem almost the same\nthing. Hence arises the question; is deliberate sensual gratification\nabout objects sexually exciting always a mortal sin?\n\n(a) Many theologians answer in the affirmative, and give as their\nreason that in the state of fallen nature there is no one who can be\nassured that such gratification is not for him or her a proximate\noccasion of pollution, or of what is morally the same thing, of\ninchoate pollution. This opinion does not include gratifications not\ndeliberately sought or yielded to, nor those in which experience has\nshown that the venereal attraction of the object, at least for the\nsubject concerned, is nil or practically nil (e.g., sensual kisses of\nan infant by a nurse.)\n\n(b) Other theologians dissent from the rigorous view, and argue that,\nsince sensual and venereal attraction are really distinct, there is\nalways the possibility of intending the former and excluding consent to\nthe latter.\n\n(c) To the present authors it seems that there is room for a middle way\nbetween these two extreme views. As was said above (2497), it is\nsometimes sinful and sometimes not sinful to encounter temptation,\naccording to the intention and reason one has, and a temptation willed\nunjustifiably but only indirectly is a grave or a light sin according\nto the great or small danger that is risked. Now, it seems that certain\nforms of sensual gratification (e.g., those derived from beautiful but\nmodest music or paintings) have only a very slight sexual allurement\nfor even the passionate; whereas other forms (e.g., those derived from\nthe warm kiss or caress of a handsome adult person of the opposite sex)\nare vehemently alluring. Hence, if sensual pleasure of the first kind\nis sought inordinately, or if it is dangerous to purity, there is a\nvenial sin; if sensual pleasure of the second kind is sought, there is\nvery likely mortal sin.\n\n2515. The Theological Species of the Sin of Lewdness.--(a) _Per se_, or\nfrom its nature, this sin is mortal, even though the external act\n(kiss, etc.) be decent (see 2512) and of the briefest duration; for\nlewdness is consent to unlawful venereal pleasure, which from the\nnature of the case is a serious matter, tending either to illicit\ncopulation or to pollution (see 2496). Hence, even a shake of the hand\nmade with lustful intent is a mortal sin. If the guilt of adultery is\nfound even in libidinous thoughts (Deut., v. 21) and glances (Matt., v.\n28), much more is it found in lewd kisses, embraces, and conversations.\nScripture strongly condemns every form of lewdness: impure speech\n(\u201cUncleanness let it not so much as be named among you, or obscenity,\nor foolish talking,\u201d Eph., v. 3, 4), impure reading (\u201cEvil\ncommunications corrupt good morals,\u201d I Cor., xv. 33), impure looks\n(\u201cWhosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already\ncommitted adultery with her in his heart,\u201d Matt., v, 28), impure kisses\nand other touches (\u201cIt is good for a man not to touch a woman, but for\nfear of fornication let every man have his own wife,\u201d I Cor., vii. 1).\n\n(b) _Per accidens_, this sin may be venial as follows: first, on\naccount of the imperfection of deliberation, as when a person under the\ninfluence of liquor, drugs or sleep acts with only a partial\nrealization of what he is doing, especially if the lewd offense has not\noccurred before; secondly, on account of the lightness of the matter,\nwhen the lewd act is indirectly voluntary and the danger remote (see\n2496), as when slight danger is risked in gratifying the sensual desire\nto gaze at a famous painting, or in yielding to an impulse of\ncuriosity, levity, or playfulness, to indulge in suitable recreations\nor even unnecessary conversations in which occur glances or touches\nthat arouse some small degree of sexual emotion. Were mortal guilt of\nimpurity incurred in these instances, very few could remain free from\nit unless there was a general retirement into isolation. But even in\nthe _per accidens_ cases there may be other mortal sins (e.g., that of\ndrunkenness or of scandal).\n\n2516. A large proportion of the sins of lewdness are only indirectly\nvoluntary, and hence they are mortal or venial according to the amount\nof danger to which one exposes oneself. No ironclad rules, however, can\nbe given to determine universally what things are gravely and what\nslightly dangerous, since the force and direction of concupiscence are\nnot the same in all persons. Some persons are oversexed or passionate,\nothers are undersexed or cold; some have normal, others abnormal\ninclinations (e.g., homosexuality, sadism, masochism, sexual fetishism)\nin matters venereal. Hypersexuality and abnormal sexuality are not in\nthemselves sinful, but are manifestations of that inordinate\nconcupiscence that is the effect of original sin and, if yielded to,\nbecomes the cause of actual sin. Proximately they may be due to\ndisease. But since these subjective differences do exist, what we shall\nset down in the following paragraphs about gravity and lightness of\ndanger is to be understood of the average or normal person and in the\nabstract, for it is impossible to consider every individual case.\n\n2517. Circumstances That Increase or Lessen the Danger of Sin.--(a) The\nPerson Acting.--There is less danger before and after than during\npuberty, less for an invalid than for a person full of health, less for\nan inhabitant of a cold region than for a dweller in the tropics, less\nfor one habituated to suppress venereal passion (e.g., a bachelor) than\nfor one who has been accustomed to indulge it (e.g., a widower), less\nin some cases for the married who can lawfully enjoy sexual intercourse\nthan for the single who cannot. Familiarity also can give a certain\namount of immunity (e.g., where naked bathing or naked statuary in\npublic places is according to custom, the natives are less disturbed by\nthese things than outsiders). Those who know (without self-deception)\nfrom their experience that certain things excite them very little do\nnot run grave danger in encountering such things.\n\n(b) The Person or Being Who Is the Object of the Act.--There is less\nallurement in an animal than in a human, less in a small than in a\nlarge animal, less in a representation than in the original, less in\nyoung children than in adults, less in one\u2019s own person or sex than in\nanother person or the opposite sex, less in an elderly or homely person\nthan in one who is young and attractive.\n\n(c) The Sense Used.--Hearing (and, for a similar reason, reading) is\nless dangerous than sight, for hearing is nearer to the immanent\nactivities of thought and desire, while sight has more of an emanant\ncharacter (e.g., to hear or read about an obscene act is farther\nremoved from it, and hence less seductive, than to see it in picture or\nreality). Sight in turn is less dangerous than touch, for sight is a\nmore elevated and less material kind of perception, being exercised by\na cognitional, not by a physical contact with its object, as is the\ncase with touch (e.g., to behold others embrace is not so moving as to\ngive or receive an embrace). Thus, impure touches (kisses, embraces,\nhandling) are the most dangerous form of lewdness.\n\n(d) The Sense-Object Acted Upon.--The degree of danger corresponds with\nthe approach made to the act of generation (e.g., smutty stories are\nworse when they deal with consummated than with non-consummated acts)\nor to the genitals (e.g., impure touches are worse when directed to the\norgans of reproduction than to the non-shameful regions).\n\n(e) The Manner.--There is greater danger when the act is prolonged than\nwhen it is momentary, when it is ardent than when it is calm (e.g., a\npassing glance or peep at an obscene picture is not as dangerous as a\nleisurely inspection, a loose linking of arms not as dangerous as a\nhug). The more exposed the object of attraction and the more secluded\nthe parties themselves, the greater the danger (e.g., love-making\nbetween parties who are not fully clothed or who are alone in the dark\nor in a closed and curtained room is more dangerous than love-making\nbetween those who are properly dressed and seated among a crowd of\npeople).\n\n2518. Cases Wherein the Danger of Sin Is Grave or Slight.--A physician\nmust know the difference between mortal and non-mortal diseases, and\nlikewise a priest must know the distinction between various kinds of\nspiritual leprosies. But when certain cases are listed as less\ndangerous, this does not mean that they are not dangerous at all and\nthat no account should be taken of them. Especially in the matter of\nimpurity should the warning of Scripture be remembered: \u201cHe that\ncontemneth small things shall fall by little and little\u201d (Ecclus., xix.\n1). With this in mind, we now subjoin some examples of grave and slight\ndanger for cases in which a lewd act is indirectly voluntary, but is\nprompted only by curiosity, joke, levity or other such insufficient\nreason.\n\n(a) Speech.--Dirty or suggestive stories, conversations, songs, music,\nor radio entertainments are a grave danger when the persons present are\nvery impressionable (e.g., on account of age or character), or if the\ntopic is utterly vile (e.g., descriptions of filthy or unnatural sex\nacts), or if the manner is very seductive (e.g., the terms used are\nunfit for polite society, or the story is very detailed, or sin is\nboasted about, or the conversation is prolonged). On the other hand,\nthe danger is light when the persons present are of mature age and not\nstrongly inclined to impurity, especially if the topic and the language\nare not very disgusting; but there may be serious sin on account of\ncircumstances, as when the speaker or approving listener is a person\nfrom whom good example is expected. Obscene talk is generally not a\nserious sin when the persons are husband and wife, or a group of\nmarried men or of married women; on the contrary, it is generally a\nserious matter when the persons are a group of young people of the same\nsex, more serious when they are a mixed group, and still more serious\nwhen they are a boy and a girl or a young man and a young woman. The\nfact that those of the younger generation often do not admit this, does\nnot change its abiding truth.\n\n(b) Reading.--The remarks made on speech apply also to reading, which\nis a kind of silent speech. A noteworthy difference between the two in\nthe present matter, however, is that reading is often more dangerous\nthan conversation, since it is usually more protracted. Love letters\nand romances were once the chief temptation in this line, but today\nthey seem mild in comparison with the supply of pornography that is\neasily accessible to all (e.,g., the magazines and papers that pander to\ndepraved tastes, the stories and pseudo-scientific books that corrupt\nthe youth of every land). Even without grave danger to self, one may\nstill be guilty of grave sin in reading obscene books on account of the\ncooperation with the vendors of immorality, or the scandal, or the\ndisobedience thereby shown to the Church (see 1455 sqq., 1529, 1530).\n\n(c) Looks.--There is generally no danger in a look at the full nudity\nof a small infant, or at the less becoming parts of a person of the\nsame sex; there is generally only slight danger when the object is the\nprivates of self or of another of the same sex, or the coition of\nanimals, unless the gaze be fixed, prolonged and the object near; there\nis grave danger in beholding a completely non-infant naked person of\nthe opposite sex, or the coition or other grave external sex acts of\nhuman beings (unless the glance be brief or not attentive), or even at\ntimes the less becoming parts of the opposite sex, if the look is very\nintent and continuous. Representations of the bodily parts or acts just\nmentioned (pictures, drawings, diagrams, etc.) have generally the same\ndangers as the originals, though the allurement in itself is less\nvivid; circumstances may even make the representations equally or more\ndangerous (e.g., on account of a thin veil of concealment in paintings\nor sculpture that only increases the attraction; or on account of the\nsuggestive music, the voluptuous dance, the crowd atmosphere that\naccompanies an immoral scene on the stage or screen). The saying of\nOscar Wilde that esthetics are above ethics is opposed both to morality\n(since all conduct should be guided by reason) and to art (for the\nhighest beauty is that of virtue and the spirit and purity).\n\n(d) Touches.--Kisses are seriously dangerous to purity when warmly or\nlingeringly exchanged between adults of different sex who are attracted\nto one another as male and female; in other cases, kisses, if impressed\non decent parts of the body and in a decent manner, may be only\nslightly dangerous. Holding or grasping between such adults is also a\nserious danger when it is vehement (e.g., the tight squeeze or hug of\ncertain dances) or long (e.g., the repeated or hour-long fondling of\nlove-makers); it is of slight or no danger in other cases, as in the\ncustomary handclasp of greeting, Handling or feeling, if passing,\nhurried or light, is generally not dangerous, when it has to do with\nthe becoming parts of another person, or with the less becoming parts\nof a person of the same sex, or with personal private parts; it is only\nslightly dangerous, under the same conditions, in reference to the\nverenda of animals or small infants; it is gravely dangerous when\ndirected to the privates of another person who has passed infancy, or\nto the less becoming parts of a person of opposite sex, or to the\nbreasts of a woman, unless it be entirely casual, passing, or light.\nTactile contact made under the clothing is of course more dangerous\nthan that which is external.\n\n2519. The Moral Species of Lewdness.--(a) Theoretically, it is more\nprobable that the imperfect sins of impurity do not differ from the\nperfect sins to which they tend; for the natural circumstances or\nantecedents of an act have really the same morality as the act itself\n(see 2486). In the physical order, the fetus, the infant, and the child\ndo not differ essentially from the full-grown man; and likewise, in the\nmoral order, the thought, the purpose and the external beginning do not\ndiffer essentially from completed murder, even though for some reason\nthe act be not finished. Hence, immodest words, reading, looks and\ntouches belong to fornication, or adultery, or incest, or sodomy,\naccording to their tendency (e.g., to read an immodest love story with\nanother man\u2019s wife and to kiss her is incipient adultery, and, if the\nguilty person has a vow of chastity, it is also sacrilege). But the\nspecies is taken only from the object, not from the purely accidental\ncircumstances, such as the elicitive faculty (e.g., an immodest look at\nanother does not differ essentially from an immodest touch) or the\nintensity (e.g., incomplete pleasure in touches by one who has not\nattained puberty does not differ essentially, according to some, from\nthe completed pleasure of which he is capable). Moreover, it seems\nthat, in regard to looks if not as regards touch, abstraction (see\n2506) is easily made by the guilty person from various circumstances;\nfor example, one who looks immodestly on a person consecrated to God,\nmay be thinking only of his unlawful love for a person of the other\nsex, and so may be guilty of incipient fornication, but not of\nsacrilege, or he may be thinking, without any affection for the other\nperson, only of his own pleasure, and so may perhaps be guilty only of\nincipient pollution. A less probable opinion makes lewdness a species\nof sin distinct from pollution and the other consummated sins.\n\n(b) Practically, penitents should confess that their sin was indecent\nand not completed lust (such as pollution), and they should also\nconfess whether the lewdness was committed by speech, reading, looks,\nkisses, embraces, or touches; and also the object of the sin, whether\nmale or female, whether married or single, relative or non-relative,\netc. Otherwise, since few penitents know how to distinguish the moral\nspecies of sins, there will be great danger of incomplete confessions;\nand, moreover, the additional sins usually committed in cases of\nlewdness (e.g., scandals, injustices, and bad company keeping) will not\nbe disclosed. If a consummated sin of fornication, pollution, etc.,\nfollowed the indecency, this consummated sin should be confessed\ndistinctly. Similarly, those who expose, incite or tempt others to\nimpure thoughts or to lewdness in word, reading, looks, kisses or\ntouches, should confess the kind of sin they intended (see 1497), even\nthough their purpose failed, whether it was incipient fornication,\nsacrilege, sodomy, etc. But some authors admit a generic confession (in\nwhich the penitent merely states that he sinned mortally or venially,\nas the case was, by indecency), if the lewdness was solitary, or was\ncommitted with another but certainly without scandal or lustful desire\nof the other person.\n\n2520. The Consummated Sins of Impurity.--There are in all seven species\nof completed acts of impurity. (a) Thus, some sins of impurity are\nagainst reason because they do not observe the ends of sexual\nintercourse. These ends are, first, the begetting of children (to which\nis opposed unnatural impurity), and, secondly, the rearing of children\n(to which is opposed fornication).\n\n(b) Other sins of impurity are against reason because they violate a\nright of the person with whom intercourse is had (incest), or of a\nthird party to whom that person belongs. If the third party is injured\nin conjugal rights, there is adultery; if in parental rights, there is\ndefloration or rape, according as the injury is done without or with\nforce; if in religious rights, there is sacrilege. This second category\nof sins is classed under impurity rather than under injustice, because\nthe purpose of the guilty person and his act belong to venereal sin.\n\n2521. Comparative Malice of the Sins of Consummated Lust.--(a) In the\nabuse of an act, the worst evil is the disregard of what nature itself\ndetermines as the fundamentals upon which all else depends, just as in\nspeculative matters the worst error is that which goes astray about\nfirst principles. Now, the prime dictates of nature as to sexual\nintercourse are that it serve the race and the family. Hence, the sin\nof unnatural lust (which injures the race by defeating its propagation)\nand the sin of incest (which injures the family by offending piety) are\nthe worst of carnal vices.\n\n(b) In the abuse of an act a lesser evil is that which observes the\nnatural fundamentals, but disregards what right reason teaches about\nthings secondary, in the manner of performing the act. But reason\nrequires that in sexual intercourse the rights of the individual be\nrespected. A most serious violation of individual right is adultery,\nwhich usurps the right of intercourse belonging to another; next in\ngravity is rape, which violently seizes for lust a person under the\ncare of another or undefiled; next is defloration, which trespasses on\nthe right of guardianship, or removes bodily virginity, but without\nviolence; last among these sins is fornication, which is an injury done\nnot to the living, but to the unborn.\n\n2522. Multiplication of Sins of Lust.--The various kinds of lust may be\ncombined in one and the same act, as when unnatural vice (e.g., sodomy)\nis practised with a relative (incest). Sacrilege, of course, aggravates\nevery other kind of carnal sin, and thus there is sacrilegious sodomy,\nsacrilegious adultery, sacrilegious incest, etc.\n\n2523. Fornication.--Fornication is the copulation of an unmarried man\nwith an unmarried woman who is not a virgin.\n\n(a) It is copulation, or sexual intercourse suited for generation of\nchildren. Thus, it differs from lewdness, which consists in\nunconsummated acts, and from sodomitic intercourse, which is\nconsummated but unsuited for generation. Onanism is an aggravating\ncircumstance of fornication, or rather a new sin of unnatural\nintercourse. (b) It is committed by unmarried persons, and thus it\ndiffers from adultery. (c) It is committed with a woman, and is thus\ndistinguished from sodomy. (d) It is committed with a woman who is not\na virgin, and thus differs from defloration.\n\n2524. Sinfulness of Fornication.--It is of faith that fornication is a\nmortal sin.\n\n(a) Thus, it is gravely forbidden by the divine positive law. Hence,\nwhores and whoremongers are an abomination to the Lord (Deut., xxiii.\n17); fornicators are worthy of death (Rom., i. 29-32), they shall not\nenter the kingdom of God (Gal., V. 19-21; Eph., v. 5; Heb., xiii. 4;\nApoc., xxi. 8). The Fathers teach that fornication is a grave crime\n(St. Fulgentius), and that it brings condemnation on the guilty person\n(St. Chrysostom). The declarations of the Church on the evil of this\nsin are found in the Council of Vienne and in the censures of Alexander\nVII and Innocent XI (Denzinger, nn. 477, 1125, 1198).\n\n(b) Fornication is gravely forbidden by the natural law. For it is\nseriously against reason to cause an injury to the entire life of\nanother human being; but fornication does this very thing by depriving\nthe unborn child of its natural rights to legitimacy, to the protection\nof both parents, and to education in the home circle. True, in some\ncases there may be no prospect of a child, or there may be provision\nfor its proper rearing; but these cases are the exception, since\nfornication from its nature tends to the neglect of the child, and the\nmorality of acts must be judged, not by the exceptional and accidental,\nbut by the usual and natural. Those who commit fornication are thinking\nof their own pleasure rather than of duty, and will generally shirk the\ndifficult burdens of parenthood. Society also would be gravely wounded\nif unmarried intercourse were at any time lawful. Hence, St. Paul\nreproves the pagans, though ignorant of Scripture, for their sins of\nfornication (I Cor., vi. 9-11; Eph., v. 1-6), since reason itself\nshould have taught them the unlawfulness of this practice. It seems,\nthough, that invincible ignorance of the wrong of fornication is\npossible among very rude or barbarous people, since the injury to the\nneighbor does not show itself so clearly in this sin as in many others.\n\n2525. Fornication Compared with Other Sins.--(a) It is less serious\nthan those that offend a divine good (e.g., unbelief, despair, hatred\nof God, irreligion), or human life (e.g., abortion), or the human goods\nof those already in being (e.g., adultery). (b) It is more serious than\nsins that offend only an external good (e.g., theft), or that are\nopposed only to decency in the marriage state (e.g., unbecoming kisses\nof husband and wife).\n\n2526. Circumstances of Fornication.--(a) Circumstances that aggravate\nthe malice are the condition of the person with whom the sin is\ncommitted (e.g., that the female is a widow, or the employee of the\nman, or his ward, or a minor).\n\n(b) Circumstances that add a new malice to fornication are of various\nkinds. Thus, previous circumstances are the distinct desires of the sin\nentertained beforehand, the solicitation and scandal of the other party\nor parties with whom the sin was committed; concomitant circumstances\nare the quality of the persons (e.g., fornication is sacrilegious if\none of the parties is consecrated to God, and also, according to some,\nif one party is a Christian and the other an infidel; it is unjust if\none of the couple is betrothed to a third party), or the quality of the\nact itself (e.g., if it is performed onanistically, though pollution\nmay be excused if it results accidentally from the good purpose to\ndiscontinue the sinful act); subsequent circumstances are injury done\nto the partner in sin (e.g., by refusal to pay the support or\nrestitution due) or to the offspring (e.g., by exposure, abortion,\nneglect).\n\nWhether the fornication of an engaged person with a third party is a\ndistinct species of sin is disputed. (a) According to some, it is a\ndistinct species, or at least a form of adultery on account of the\ninfidelity. (b) According to others, it is a distinct species if the\nguilty party is the woman, but not if it is the man, for the infidelity\nof the former is a far more serious matter than the infidelity of the\nlatter. (c) According to still others, it is never a distinct species,\nsince engagement to marry is a dissoluble agreement and the injury to\nthe contract is therefore not a notable one. In this last opinion the\nmanner of the sin is an aggravating circumstance, not a distinct\nspecies that has to be declared in confession.\n\n2527. Forms of Fornication.--There are three special forms of\nfornication, which are all the same essentially, but which differ\naccidentally in malice or in results.\n\n(a) Thus, ordinary fornication is that which is committed with a woman\nwho is neither a harlot nor a concubine. This sin is in itself the\nleast grave of the three, since it is not so harmful as whoremongering,\nnor so enduring as concubinage. Ordinary fornication also has its\ndegrees of bad and worse: thus, engaged persons who sin together\nhabitually are worse than those who sin only occasionally, and\ncircumstances such as artificial onanism and abortion add to the guilt.\n\n(b) Whoremongering is fornication committed with a harlot, that is,\nwith a woman who makes a business of illicit intercourse and hires\nherself out for pay to all comers. Rarely does a harlot choose her life\nfrom passion or love, but is dragged in by white slavers, or enters\nfrom poverty, or after disgrace, or the like. This sin is worse than\nordinary fornication from the viewpoint of propagation, since few\nharlots become mothers. But its most dire consequences are visited on\nthe guilty persons themselves and on society: for the life of a\nprostitute is a most degrading slavery; to her patrons she communicates\nthe most terrible diseases, which are then carried to innocent wives\nand children, and to the innocent she often becomes a cause of ruin,\nseeking her trade in the streets and public places. Today, according to\nreliable newspaper reports, many men and women have become rich in the\nterrible business known as the white-slave traffic. This horrible abuse\nhas grown into a vast international machine which is efficiently\norganized, and which profits not only from prostitution, but from many\nother kinds of crime. The patrons of brothels, therefore, cooperate\nwith the crying injustice that is often done the fallen woman, and with\nthe criminals who destroy souls and bodies for their own advantage.\n\n(c) Free love is fornication committed with one\u2019s concubine, that is,\nwith a woman who is not a public harlot but who has contracted with one\nman for habitual sexual intercourse as if they were man and wife.\nAccording to reports, this is quite common in Europe, where lawful\nmarriage is very often preceded by free unions. The trial marriage\nadvocated by some in this country, in which paramours agree to live\ntogether as husband and wife for a certain term of years or at\npleasure, also falls under the category of concubinage. This sin is\nworse than mere whoremongering in one respect, namely, that it includes\nthe purpose to continue in the state of sin, at least for a certain\nlength of time. Moreover, there is often the public scandal and\ncontempt for public opinion which other kinds of fornication may be\nfree from. One who practises concubinage is living in a proximate\noccasion of sin, and hence he cannot be absolved unless he dismisses\nthe concubine, if they cohabit, or agrees to keep away from her, if\nthey do not cohabit.\n\n2528. The State and Places of Prostitution.--It is clear that civil\ngovernment has no right to support or provide places of prostitution,\nor to give permission for its practice, since fornication is\nintrinsically evil. But what should be said of toleration or license\ngiven to prostitutes by the public authority?\n\n(a) Theoretically, the civil power has the right to give toleration or\nlicense; for, if the common welfare will suffer from a greater evil\nunless a lesser evil is suffered to go on, the lesser evil should be\nendured, and it is certain that there are greater evils than\nprostitution (such as rape and unnatural crimes of lust).\n\n(b) Practically, the question is open to dispute. Older moralists held\nthat toleration was actually more beneficial to the common good than\nsuppression. But under the conditions of the present time many\nmoralists think it is a mistake to give any recognition to prostitutes,\nand much less to houses of prostitution. Even in large cities, where\nalone the license could be beneficial, the purposes of toleration are\nnot fulfilled; for the moral evil seems to be greater, since an\nappearance of legality is given to prostitution, its practice is\nfacilitated, its habitats become dens of every kind of iniquity, and\nthe purpose of segregation is not realized; the physical evils also are\nnot lessened, but perhaps increased, for even with medical inspection\nof prostitutes, syphilis and gonorrhea cannot be prevented.\n\n2529. Defloration and Rape.--Defloration and rape are distinct species\nof lust, for each of them in its very concept includes a special and\nnotable deformity not found in other species of impurity.\n\n(a) Defloration is unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman who is virginal\nin body (1488 a). It has the special deformity of depriving the woman\nof the physical integrity that is most highly prized among all the\nunmarried of her sex, or at least of her own self-respect, and of\nsetting her on the way to become a strumpet rather than an honorable\nwife or spinster. Some authors do not consider defloration a special\nsin unless it is done by violence, or unless injury is done the\nparental right over the virgin; and even the authors who consider\nunforced defloration a special sin hold that the new or additional\nmalice in it is slight and venial, and therefore not a necessary matter\nof confession. The first sin of fornication by a male is not a special\nsin, because the consequences are not so serious for the man as for the\nwoman, but of course seduction is always a special sin, whether the\ninjured party be male or female.\n\n(b) Rape is physical or moral coercion (i.e., force or fear) employed\nagainst any person (male or female, married or single, pure or\ncorrupt), or against his or her guardians, to compel him or her to an\nact of lust. It has the special deformity of inflicting bodily injury\non the person ravished. The sin of rape should not be confused with the\ncanonical crime of rape, which consists in abduction, and which is an\nimpediment to marriage (Canon 1074); nor with seduction, as when an\ninnocent person is deceived into believing that an act of impurity is\nlawful, or is tricked into sin by false promises of marriage.\nEquivalent to rape is the carnal knowledge of a person drugged,\nhypnotized, or otherwise unconscious, or the seduction of an infant. A\nperson who is ravished is obliged to deny all consent internally, and\nto resist or make outcry when this is possible (see 2497 a).\n\n2530. Adultery.--Adultery is also a distinct species of lust.--(a)\nDefinition.--Adultery is sexual intercourse with the husband or wife of\nanother. If the sin is committed only in desire, there is mental\nadultery; if the paramours allow themselves unlawful familiarities\nwithout intercourse, or if a married person is guilty of solitary lust,\nthere is imperfect adultery.\n\n(b) Sinfulness of Adultery.--Adultery is a grave sin, since it is an\nact of impurity and is expressly forbidden in the sixth commandment\n(Exod., xx. 14), and is classed among the sins that exclude from the\nkingdom of heaven (I Cor., vi. 9, 10). It is a special sin, because it\nis a violation of the faith pledged in the contract and Sacrament of\nMatrimony, and an injury to the right of one\u2019s spouse and of the\nconjugal state (Matt., xix. 5; Rom., vii. 3; I Cor., vii. 39). Even\nthough a husband gives his wife permission to commit adultery or vice\nversa, the injustice remains, for though the individual is not formally\ninjured, the married state is injured, since no married person has the\nright to give a permission opposed to the sacredness of the marriage\nvows (Denzinger, n. 1200).\n\n(c) Degrees of Malice.--There are three degrees of malice in adultery.\nThe first is that in which a married man sins with a single woman; the\nsecond that in which a married woman sins with a single man; the third\nthat in which a married man sins with another man\u2019s wife. The second is\nworse than the first, on account of its consequences (e.g., sterility,\nuncertainty of paternity, rearing of an illegitimate child in the\nfamily); the third is worse than the second, because in addition to the\nconsequences just mentioned, it contains a double injustice (viz.,\nunfaithfulness to an innocent wife and unfaithfulness to an innocent\nhusband), and it multiplies the sin. If an adulterer\u2019s husband or wife\nis also unfaithful, the injustice is lessened, but not removed; for not\nmerely the two married persons are to be considered, but also the\nchildren, the family, society, and God; and the wrong done by one of\nthe parties does not take away the right to fidelity pledged absolutely\nto all of these in marriage.\n\n(d) Effects.--The party whose marriage rights have been injured by\nadultery was permitted under some former civil codes to kill a wife\ntaken in adultery. But such laws were against justice and charity:\nagainst justice since no guilty person should be put to death unheard,\nand no injured person should be judge and accuser in his own case;\nagainst charity, since by such summary vengeance the adulteress would\nbe sent to death in the midst of sin and without opportunity for\nrepentance. The remedies of Canon Law for the innocent spouse will be\nnoted below (2542).\n\n2531. Incest.--Incest is impurity committed with a person related to\none within the degrees in which marriage is forbidden.\n\n(a) It is impurity, internal or external. Internal desires are mental\nincest, while external unconsummated (e.g., kisses) or consummated\n(e.g., intercourse) acts are actual incest.\n\n(b) It is committed with a relative, that is, with a person, male or\nfemale, who is near to one by the tie of common ancestry (blood\nrelationship, kinship, consanguinity), or of marriage to one\u2019s kin\n(marriage relationship, affinity), or of sacramental administration\n(spiritual relationship), or of adoption (legal relationship). Alias\nspecies cognationis non pertinent ad incestum, sed novam aliquam\nmalitiam possunt tribuere; v.g., si partes sunt parochus et parochiana,\nconfessarius et poenitens, habetur scandalum, seductio.\n\n(c) The relationship is within the canonical degrees. Thus, marriage\nbetween blood relatives is forbidden in all degrees of the direct line\n(e.g., as to all female ancestry and posterity of a man) and in the\nfirst three degrees of the collateral line, which includes, for a man,\nhis sisters, nieces, grandnieces, aunts, first and second cousins,\ngrand aunts and their daughters and granddaughters. Marriage between\nthose who are relatives-in-law is forbidden in all degrees of the\ndirect line (e.g., as to wife\u2019s mother, daughter, etc.) and in the\nfirst two degrees of the collateral line (e.g., wife\u2019s sister, first\ncousin, aunt or niece). Spiritual relationship which is impedient of\nmarriage exists between a person baptized and his baptizer, and also\nbetween the god-child and the god-parent in baptism. Legal relationship\nexists between the adopter and the adopted, when and as the civil law\nmakes it a bar to marriage.\n\n(d) Incest is committed within the forbidden degrees, and hence if a\ndispensation from an impediment of relationship had been granted to\nparties about to marry, a sin between them would not be incestuous.\n\n2532. Incest as a Distinct Species of Sin.--(a) There is a specific\ndistinction between incest and other forms of lust, since incest\nviolates not only purity, but also the piety and respect due each other\nby those who are so closely related as to be unable to contract a\nlawful marriage. Nature itself abhors this sin; for, apart from the\nexceptional cases in which a dispensation is given, even lawful\nmarriage with near relatives would be an incentive to many sins before\nmarriage and would prevent the widening circle of friendships between\nmankind which marriage with non-relatives produces, and would cause a\nphysical and mental enfeeblement of the race. In Scripture incest is\nspoken of with peculiar horror as a nefarious deed deserving of death\n(Lev., xx. 11 sqq.), and as an act unworthy even of pagans (I Cor., v.\n1 sqq.).\n\n(b) There are three distinct sub-species of incest, namely, natural\nincest (between kin by blood or marriage), spiritual incest (between\nthe baptized and his baptizer or god-parent), and legal incest (between\npersons who are kin in virtue of 8, marriage-impeding adoption). The\nfirst violates piety due to natural origin, the second that due to\nspiritual origin, and the third that due to legal origin. And in each\nspecies the nearer the relationship, the greater the sin (e.g., incest\nwith a sister-in-law is less than that with a sister, incest with a\nsister is less than that with a mother).\n\n2533. Carnal Sacrilege.--Carnal sacrilege is the violation by an act of\nimpurity of the sacredness of a person, place or thing.\n\n(a) It is a violation of sacredness, and thus it is a special sin,\nadding irreligion to lust (see 2308 sqq.).\n\n(b) It is an act of impurity, internal or external, consummated or\nnon-consummated. The impurity, however, must be so related to that\nwhich is sacred as to treat its sanctity with injury or contempt\n(formal disrespect), and there is no sacrilege if the impurity is\nassociated with something holy in such a way as not to show any notable\nirreverence (material disrespect).\n\n(c) Its first species is personal sacrilege, and it is committed by a\nsacred person (see 2309) when he is impure internally or externally, or\nby a non-sacred person when in desire or act he commits impurity with a\nsacred person. If two sacred persons sin together, there is a double\nsacrilege, which multiplies the sin.\n\n(d) Its second species is local sacrilege, and is committed when an\nimpure act is done in a sacred place (2311) in such a way as to show\nformal disrespect. Hence, consummated acts done in a church are\nsacrilegious, and the same is probably true of non-consummated acts, at\nleast if they are of an enormous kind (e.g., a lascivious dance), and\neven of internal desires to sin in the sacred place. But impure\nthoughts or passing glances of prurient curiosity in a church are not\nsacrilegious.\n\n(e) Its third species is real sacrilege, and it occurs when impurity is\ncommitted in such a way as to show formal disrespect to a sacred object\n(2311). Hence, there is sacrilege of this kind when one commits\nimpurity immediately after Communion, or when one uses the Sacrament of\nPenance as a means to solicit impurity. But the fact that a person\ncommits impurity while wearing a scapular is not sacrilegious, unless\ncontempt for the scapular was intended.\n\n2534. Unnatural Lust.--Worst among the sins of impurity, as such, are\ncrimes of unnatural lust, for they exercise the sexual act, not only\nillicitly, but also in a manner that defeats its purpose of\nreproduction. In some non-venereal respects, however, natural sins of\nimpurity may be worse than the unnatural; for example, adultery is\nworse as regards injustice, sacrilegious lust as regards irreligion,\netc. There are four distinct species of unnatural impurities--\npollution, unnatural coition, sodomy, bestiality (see Denzinger, n.\n1124).\n\n(a) For procreation nature requires copulation, and hence pollution is\nunnatural, for it exercises semination without copulation, either alone\n(self-abuse, solitary vice, masturbation) or with another (softness).\n\n(b) For procreation nature requires proper copulation, that is, one\nthat will permit of a fertile union between the two life elements, the\nsperma and the ovum. Hence, unnatural coition does not comply with this\nnecessity, for it does not employ the proper organ of sexual union,\nsubstituting rectal for vaginal intercourse, or else by some form of\nnatural or artificial onanism it frustrates the act of its destined\nconclusion. This sin is worse than pollution, since pollution omits to\nuse intercourse, whereas unnatural coition positively abuses it.\n\n(c) For procreation nature requires heterosexual intercourse, a\ncondition disregarded by sodomy, which is the lustful commerce of male\nwith male (pederasty, uranism), or of female with female (tribadism,\nsapphism, Lesbian love). This sin is worse than unnatural coition, for\nit is a greater perversity to neglect one of the two needed life\nelements than to neglect the right process for their union (see Gen.,\nxix. 24, 25; Lev., xx. 13; Rom., i. 26, 27).\n\n(d) Finally, for procreation nature requires homogeneous intercourse, a\nlaw violated by bestiality, which is coition of a human being, male or\nfemale, with a brute animal. This is the worst of unnatural impurities,\nsince it sins against the most fundamental condition for the sexual\nact, namely, that the participants be of the same nature (see Lev., xx.\n15, 16). Similar to bestiality is the crime of necrophilism\n(intercourse with a corpse).\n\n2535. Pollution.--Pollution is the voluntary emission of semen apart\nfrom coition.\n\n(a) It is an emission, that is an external discharge. The internal\nsecretion in the so-called female semination is also included by many\nunder the head of pollution. The carnal motions spoken of in 2497 b are\na preparation for pollution.\n\n(b) It is a discharge of semen, that is, of the male fluid that\nfertilizes the female ovum. But equivalent pollution, from the moral\nviewpoint, is found in the discharge of certain non-prolific fluids\nthat are accessory to generation or that produce in their movement a\nvenereal satisfaction, such as the vaginal fluid in females (female\nsemination), the urethral fluid in males capable or incapable of\nprocreation (distillation). There is no pollution, however, in natural\ndischarges such as menstruation and urination.\n\n(c) It is apart from coition, and thus it differs from other\nconsummated sins. But pollution may be committed either alone (solitary\nvice), or with another, and in the latter case it pertains reductively\nto adultery, fornication, sodomy, etc., as the case may be.\n\n(d) It is voluntary directly or indirectly: directly, when one intends\nit as an end (e.g., for the sake of the pleasure) or as a means (e.g.,\nas a relief from temptation or bodily itching, to obtain a specimen of\nsemen for medical diagnosis); indirectly, when one unjustifiably does\nsomething from which one foresees that pollution will result. In all\nthese cases pollution is formal or sinful, and it is not to be confused\nwith material or natural pollution, which is a discharge of semen or\ndistillation that is involuntary or unimputable.\n\n2536. Cases of Material or Non-Sinful Pollution.--(a) Involuntary\npollution is passive or active. The former happens even when one is\nawake. It is evoked by such slight causes as physical movement and\nexertion, and is unaccompanied by pleasure; when habitual, it is a\ndisease due to organic debility The latter happens during sleep, and\nmay be caused by a superfluity of fluid. It is accompanied by pleasure\nand often by libidinous dreams. It is a means used by nature to relieve\nthe system, and is therefore healthful and beneficial, unless the\ndischarges are too frequent (e.g., nightly). There is no obligation of\nrepressing the continuance of a pollution that began involuntarily\nduring sleep, since it may be regarded as an act of nature; but consent\nmust be withheld (2498 sqq.). Moreover, if merely natural pollution be\nconsidered, not as to its venereal gratification but solely as to its\ngood effects (e.g., that it ends a temptation, that it benefits the\nmind or the health), there is no sin in rejoicing at its accomplishment\nor in desiring its fulfillment, provided nothing is done to produce it\nand the intention is good; for then the object of the will is\nindifferent and the end is good.\n\n(b) Unimputable pollution is caused by a lawful act from which one\nforesees that pollution will ensue, there being no proximate danger of\nconsent to sin, and the pollution being only permitted, and that for a\nproportionately grave reason.\n\n2537. Unimputable Pollution.--In reference to unimputable pollution the\nfollowing distinctions should be noted:\n\n(a) the danger risked by an act may be either of formal pollution\n(i.e., with consent to sin) or of material pollution (i.e., without\nconsent to sin);\n\n(b) the danger of pollution is either proximate or remote, the former\nbeing that from which pollution naturally and usually results and the\nlatter that from which it does not naturally or usually result.\nRemotely dangerous are acts of a non-venereal kind, such as horseback\nriding, gymnastics, drinking alcoholic beverages, and also acts of a\nsexual kind that are only mildly exciting, such as conversations or\nbooks that are slightly \u201coff color\u201d when the parties are of mature age\n(see 2517, 2518). Proximately dangerous are acts of a venereal kind\nthat notably inflame passion, such as warm and lingering kisses between\npersons of opposite sexes (see 2517, 2518);\n\n(c) the reason for running the danger of pollution is either grave,\nserious, or slight. A grave reason is real necessity (e.g., the removal\nof disease or pain or of a very painful or troublesome itch due to the\nblood or disease) or great utility (e.g., the preservation of health,\ncleanliness of body); a serious reason is an important convenience of\nsoul or body (e.g., the exercise of common politeness, the enjoyment of\nreasonable comfort); a slight reason is one in which none of the\nmentioned motives is found (e.g., the satisfaction of an idle\ncuriosity, the removal of a trifling irritation or itch).\n\n2538. Proximate and Remote Occasions of Pollution.--It is never lawful\nto expose oneself to the immediate danger of sin, for he who loves the\ndanger loves the sin (see 258, 260); but if one uses means to make the\ndanger remote, one may lawfully encounter it for a good reason (see\n258, 260, 261). It is lawful to permit an evil effect when there is\nsufficient justification according to the principle of double effect\n(see 103 sqq.).\n\n(a) Hence, if there is proximate danger of formal pollution (that is,\nof consent to sin), no reason excuses an act even of a non-sexual kind,\nsuch as horseback riding. But if the act is necessary, the danger must\nbe made remote by the use of special means, such as prayer, firm\nresolves, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).\n\n(b) If there is proximate danger of material pollution, a grave reason\nsuffices (e.g., the care of patients by physicians and nurses,\nassistance of bathers by attendants, warm soporific drinks taken for\nthe sake of sleep).\n\n(c) If there is remote danger of material pollution, a serious reason\nsuffices (e.g., customary salutations of the country, physical\nexercises, moderate comfort in posture, seasoning in food.). A slight\nreason may excuse at times from mortal sin (e.g., unnecessary curiosity\nabout the sciences of anatomy or sexology).\n\n2539. The Theological Malice of Sinful Pollution.--(a) From its nature\npollution is a mortal sin, because it is an act of impurity (1494) and\na perversion of nature (2534). Moreover, its consequences are most\ninjurious to society (it tends to self-indulgence and the avoidance of\nthe burdens of marriage) and to the individual (when habitual, it\nweakens mental and will power and often brings on a breakdown of bodily\nvigor especially among young people), In Scripture it is represented as\ngravely illicit (I Cor., vi. 10; Gal., v. 19; Eph., v. 3). Hence,\npollution is always a mortal sin when directly willed (e.g., when\npractised deliberately in order to be rid of a temptation or of bodily\nirritation or itch certainly due to superfluity of semen or to\npassion), and also when indirectly willed if there is proximate danger\nof consent to sin (e.g., when one who has always committed formal\npollution in certain company goes into that company without necessity,\nor without use of means to prevent a fall) or grave danger of pollution\nand no sufficient reason for permitting it (e.g., undue familiarities\nfrom which nocturnal pollution is foreseen as most probable).\n\n(b) From the imperfection of the internal act, pollution is sometimes\nonly a venial sin. This happens in case of invincible ignorance (e.g.,\nyoung children who do not understand the evil of masturbation, students\nwho have been taught by instructors or physical directors that it is\nnecessary for health or that it is unsanitary but not sinful), or of\nincomplete consent (e.g., when the person is only half awake and does\nnot ordinarily desire pollution, when he is a psychopathic and not\nfully responsible for his acts).\n\n(c) From the lightness of the matter pollution is venial when willed\nindirectly and permitted without sufficient reason, if there is only\nslight danger of it from the nature of the action performed (see 2496).\nExamples are the reading for pastime of love stories before falling\nasleep with the prevision that this may possibly bring on pollution\nduring sleep.\n\n2540. If the action productive of pollution is gravely illicit, as\nbeing seriously opposed to chastity (e.g., lewdness) or to some other\nvirtue (e.g., extreme intemperance in drugs or alcohol), is one thereby\nguilty of the grave sin of pollution?\n\n(a) If the case be considered in the abstract, the answer is in the\nnegative. For if the action in question is only remotely dangerous as\nregards pollution (e.g., an action of a non-venereal kind such as\nintemperance does not necessarily tend to impurity, an act of a\nvenereal kind that is momentary, such as a desire, does not strongly\naffect the passions), the sin is only venial in so far as pollution is\nconcerned (see 2517, 2518).\n\n(b) If the case be considered in the concrete, the answer is in the\naffirmative as a rule when there is question of a habit. For generally\nthose who act habitually in this way yield consent to the pollution as\nwell as to the sin that precedes. Authorities note, however, that he\nwho repents of the cause of pollution before the pollution results is\nnot guilty of the actual pollution.\n\n2541. The Moral Species of Sinful Pollution.--(a) The general species\nof pollution is distinct from other consummated sins of impurity, since\nit is unnatural, and this in a special way (see 2534, and Denzinger, n.\n1124), But some authors regard equivalent pollution (see 2493, 2535) as\nnot a consummated sin, since it is without true semination, and hence\naccording to them it may be confessed simply as impure pleasure (see\n2519 b).\n\n(b) The particular species of pollution is derived from circumstances\nthat give it a new essential malice. If it is solitary, and committed\nby one who is under no bond of marriage or vow, and accompanied by no\nthought or desire except in reference to self or self-gratification\n(autoerotism, narcissism), there is the single sin of pollution. But\nthere are other sins if it is committed by one under special obligation\n(i.e., adultery or sacrilege), or if committed with another person\n(e.g., seduction, cooperation, rape), or if committed with impure\nthoughts or desires about others (e.g., mental adultery, fornication,\nsodomy, bestiality). The manner in which pollution is performed (e.g.,\nwhether cooperative pollution is active or passive, by irrumation or\nconcubitus or touch, with or without an instrument) is _per se_ an\naccidental circumstance. According to some authors, cooperative\npollution brought on by touch alone is not diversified in species, if\nthere is no special affection for the other person, but only the desire\nof carnal gratification, and hence it may be declared simply as\npollution from touch.\n\n2542. Penalties for Immorality Decreed in Canons 2357-2359.--(a) Laymen\nwho are guilty of certain offenses against the sixth commandment become\ninfamous on conviction and are excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical\nacts. In case of adultery, the injured spouse may obtain a separation,\ntemporary or perpetual, from the offending spouse (Canon 1129). (b)\nClerics in minor orders are subject to special punishments, and may\neven be dismissed from the clerical state. (c) Clerics in major orders\nare subject to penalties named in law (e.g., suspension, infamy,\ndeposition) for graver crimes such as concubinage, adultery, and to\npenalties decreed by the lawful superior for other delinquencies.\n\n2543. The Potential Parts of Temperance.--The appetites of pleasure are\nthe most difficult to restrain, and there is need of a perfect virtue\nlike temperance to rule over them and keep them within the bounds of\nreason. The analogous or potential virtues of temperance are that one\nwhich is able to check, though it does not tame, the animal appetites\n(continency), and those that preside and rule over the less violent\nappetites for vengeance, exercise of authority, superior excellence,\nknowledge, amusement and display (meekness, etc.). See above, 2465 c.\n\n2544. Continence.--(a) Its Nature.--This quality, as here taken, is the\nstate of one who has not gained mastery over the passions sufficient to\nkeep down strong, frequent and persistent rebellions, but whose will is\nfirmly disposed to resist their attacks. It is less than a moral\nvirtue, then, since it does not tranquillize the lower appetites. The\ntemperate man has already subdued his passions, and hence he is less\ndisturbed by them, or at least he has less trouble in rejecting their\nonsets.\n\n(b) Its Relation to Temperance.--Greater difficulty increases merit, if\nit is due to the presence of a corporal or external impediment (e.g., a\nman of sickly constitution or one who suffers great opposition deserves\nmore credit for his work than a man of vigorous constitution or one who\nenjoys great favors and opportunities); not, however, if it is due to\nthe absence of a spiritual excellence (e.g., a man who finds work hard\nbecause he is lazy does not deserve more credit than another who finds\nit easy because he is industrious). Hence, temperance is more deserving\nthan continence, for it controls passion with greater ease simply\nbecause it has subjected not only the higher but also the lower\nappetite to the dictates of reason.\n\n(c) Its Opposite.--The vice opposed to continence is incontinence,\nwhich does not follow the dictate of reason to resist the onslaughts of\npassion; it sees and approves the higher things, but it follows the\nlower. This sin is less grievous than intemperance, just as a passing\nindisposition is less harmful than a settled malady. For passion comes\nand goes, and the incontinent man quickly regrets his weakness; but a\nsinful habit of gluttony or impurity is permanent, and is so like a\nsecond nature that its votaries rejoice when they have satisfied their\ndesires (Prov., ii. 14). Incontinence in pleasure is more disgraceful\nthan incontinence in anger, for anger is less distant from reason; but\non the other hand the irascible man usually sins more grievously by the\ngreater harm he does to others. It is more difficult to contain oneself\nfrom wrath than from intemperance in the sense that wrath storms the\nsoul by a more vehement and compelling attack; yet, it is harder to be\nunconquered by pleasure, because it lays persistent siege to the soul\nand demands a more unwearied vigilance.\n\n2545. Meekness.--Meekness or mildness is the virtue that moderates\nanger.\n\n(a) It is a virtue, since it consists in moderation according to right\nreason. Our Lord proclaims it blessed (Matt., v. 4). and St. Paul\nnumbers it among the Fruits of the Spirit (Gal., v. 23). Illustrious\nmodels of mildness are Joseph (Gen., l. 20), Moses (Num., xii. 3),\nDavid (I Kings, xxiv), Christ (Luke, xv; John, i. 29, viii. 11), St.\nPaul (Acts, xx. 31).\n\n(b) Its office is moderation, and hence in its manner, though not in\nits matter, it is like temperance. It follows the middle way between\nthe extremes of sinful indignation and sinful indulgence.\n\n(c) Its matter is the passion of anger, that is, the sensitive appetite\nthat inclines one to avenge an evil by punishing its author. Like other\npassions (121), anger is indifferent in itself, but it is made good or\nevil by its reasonableness or unreasonableness. The meek man is angry\nat times, but only when and where and as he should be (Ps. iv. 5); his\nanger is not a blind impulse, but a righteous zeal that attacks a wrong\nonly after reason has shown that this is the proper course.\n\n2546. Anger.--Anger is sinful when it deviates from reason, as to its\nmatter or its manner.\n\n(a) Thus, it is unreasonable as to its matter (i.e., its vengeance)\nwhen it punishes unjustifiably (e.g., when the person punished is\ninnocent, when the penalty is excessive, when the legal order is not\nfollowed, when the motive is not justice or correction, but hatred,\netc).\n\n(b) It is unreasonable as to its manner (i.e., the degree of excitement\nfelt or shown) when temper goes beyond measure. Great anger is not\nsinful when a great evil calls for it (e.g., the anger of Our Lord\nagainst the money-changers in John, vi. 14 sqq.; that of Mathathias\nagainst the idolatrous Jew in I Mach., ii. 24); but to fly into a rage\nat nothings or trifles is sinful.\n\n2547. Gravity of the Sin of Anger.--(a) If anger is sinful on account\nof its matter, it is mortal from its nature as being opposed to charity\nand justice. He that is angry against his brother is worthy of hell\nfire (Matt., v. 21, 22). It may be venial, however, on account of\nimperfection of the act (e.g., the sudden impulse to strike down those\nwho do not agree with one\u2019s opinions) or the lightness of the matter\n(e.g., a slap or push or box on the ears given a naughty child when a\nword of reproof would have sufficed).\n\n(b) If anger is sinful on account of its manner, it is venial from its\nnature; for excess in an otherwise indifferent passion is not a serious\ndisorder (see 2450). But the sin may be mortal by reason of\ncircumstances, as when an angry person acts like a wild man, curses and\nswears, breaks the furniture, gives serious scandal on account of his\nposition, or the time or place, or injures his health by the violence\nof his paroxysm.\n\n2548. Is Anger a Graver Sin than Hatred and Envy?--(a) As to its\nmatter, anger is less grave than hatred and envy, for it pursues evil\nunder the guise of spiritual good, pretending at least that the harm it\nintends is just, whereas hatred and envy pursue evil precisely as it is\ninjurious to another, or as it is a means to one\u2019s own temporal and\nexternal good or glory. Likewise, anger is less grave objectively than\nconcupiscence, for the voluptuous man aims at utility or pleasure,\nwhereas the revengeful man aims at what he makes believe is just.\n\n(b) As to its manner, anger surpasses the vices mentioned in certain of\nits violent manifestations. The infuriated man, when crossed, creates a\nscene and makes a fool of himself; his blood boils, his face is\nflushed, his eyes dart fire, he froths at the mouth and trembles, he\npounds, stamps and bellows like an enraged bull.\n\n2549. Anger as One of the Seven Capital Vices.--(a) It has a certain\npreeminence in evil. Its matter is quite attractive, for revenge is\nsweet and the cloak of just retaliation makes it seem good; its manner\nis powerful, for it drives one on to dare even the most shocking crimes.\n\n(b) It is the spring of many sins. In the heart anger produces\nindignation against the object of displeasure, whom the angry man looks\nupon as base and unworthy, and soreness about the treatment of self,\nwhich fills the mind with plans of revenge. Sins of the mouth due to\nanger are incoherent cries of rage, words of contumely and blasphemy\n(Matt., v. 22), while its sinful deeds include quarrels and every kind\nof injury.\n\n2550. Sinful Indulgence.--Sinful indulgence, which is opposed to\nmeekness by excess, is often a mortal sin on account of the grave harm\nit inflicts upon the common welfare and the protection it affords to\ncrime. Thus, Heli was seriously reproved and punished because he winked\nat grave disorders, or at least was too easy-going in his corrections\n(I Kings, ii, iii).\n\n2551. Clemency.--Clemency is a virtue that inclines one, from a spirit\nof kindness and moderation, to be as easy in inflicting punishments as\nthe claims of justice will allow.\n\n(a) Clemency is a virtue, because it is reasonable, does good to\nothers, and makes the doer good. It is beneficial to public as well as\nprivate interest: \u201cMercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is\nstrengthened by clemency\u201d (Prov., xx. 28).\n\n(b) It inclines one to be easy, that is, to temper or relax the\nseverity of the law. Thus, it differs from the virtues of legal justice\nand of charitable forgiveness, the former of which, when necessary,\ninsists on the full rigor of the law (see 2381 sqq.), whereas the\nlatter, when permissible, grants an enemy a full pardon (see 1198).\n\n(c) Its matter is punishment, that is, the external evil of\nchastisement visited on wrongdoers. Hence, it differs from meekness,\nwhich deals with the internal emotion of anger, and from mercy, which\ndeals with external goods bestowed upon the suffering.\n\n(d) It is easy only in so far as the claims of justice will allow; that\nis, it acts from a sense of responsibility to the rights and claims of\nthe common good and of all the interests involved, and decides\naccording to an impartial and enlightened judgment that circumstances\nof person, deed, cause, etc., call for a departure from the strict\nrequirements of law or custom. Clemency is not the same thing, then, as\narbitrary laxity or sentimentalism.\n\n(e) It is moved in the first place by kindness to the offender, and\nthus it differs both from the virtue of equity (which acts from the\nsense of higher justice) and from the vices of favoritism, extortion,\nand cowardice (which extend forbearance only to friends or to those who\noffer bribes or who bring pressure to bear).\n\n(f) It is moved secondly by a spirit of moderation. Many persons are\nspoiled by authority: feeling their own importance, they desire to\nexercise their powers to the limit and to keep others down as much as\npossible. The clement man, on the contrary, keeps his poise and uses\nhis authority with moderation. Meekness should be practised by all, but\nclemency is the proper virtue of superiors.\n\n2552. The Vices Opposed to Clemency.--(a) The extreme of defect is\ncruelty, which is a hardness of heart, not moved by the sufferings of\nothers, that disposes one to inflict excessive punishments. The worst\nform of cruelty is savagery, which takes inhuman delight in the\nsufferings of others and inflicts pain without regard for guilt or\ninnocence.\n\n(b) The extreme of excess is undue leniency, which spares the rod when\nit should be used. There are times when severity is necessary, as when\na crime was malicious and cold-blooded, when an offender is stubborn\nand irreformable, and when mildness will harm the public welfare or\ninvite the sinner to repeat his offense. In such cases it would be\nunwise and harmful to mitigate the sentence which wise statutes or\ncustoms provide for the offense.\n\n2553. Humility.--Humility is the virtue that makes one modest in the\ndesire of greatness.\n\n(a) It is a virtue, that is, a moral excellence and a voluntary\ndisposition. Hence, it is not the same as physical humility (e.g., the\nhumble or lowly circumstances in which a person was born) or as\ninvoluntary humility (e.g., the humiliation which comes upon those who\nexalt themselves).\n\n(b) It is concerned with greatness, that is, with the higher things\nthat pertain to greatness of soul (see 2448 sqq.). There is no\nopposition between these two virtues, for greatness of soul makes one\nset such a value upon the gifts one has received from God as to aspire\nto the betterment for which they prepare one, while humility makes one\nrealize one\u2019s own shortcomings so sincerely that it keeps one from the\ndesire of those excellences for which one is unsuited.\n\n(c) It is modest; that is, it regulates according to the standard of\nreason the passion for greatness, so that one may avoid the extremes of\npride and of abjectness or littleness of soul (see 2465 c).\n\n2554. The Three Acts of Humility.--(a) Its regulatory act is in the\nintellect, and consists in the knowledge and acknowledgment of one\u2019s\ninfirmity and inferiority, not only in comparison with God, but also in\ncomparison with men.\n\n(b) Its essential act is in the appetite and consists in a regulation\nof the hope for greatness so that, recognizing one\u2019s limitations, one\ndoes not strive for that for which one is unfitted. Higher degrees of\nhumility are those which do not desire honor, or which are pained by\nit, or which desire dishonor.\n\n(c) Its expressive act is in the external conduct. St. Benedict says\nthat the humble person avoids singularity in deed, is sparing in his\nwords and not given to loudness, and bears himself modestly, not\nstaring about or laughing immoderately. But there is also a false\nhumility, which is only in externals, and this is really proud\nhypocrisy (Ecclus., xix. 23).\n\n2555. Two Requirements of Humility.--Humility is chiefly an abasement\nof self before God (Gen., xviii. 27), and it is not opposed to truth or\nto good order. Hence, the two following rules on the lowering of self\nbefore fellow-creatures:\n\n(a) in the internal act, humility requires that each one acknowledge\nhis neighbor as his better, if comparison is made between what the\nformer has from himself and what the latter has from God (Phil., ii. 3;\nOsee, xiii. 9). But it is not against humility to believe that one has\nmore of divine grace or less of human imperfection than another, if\nthere are good reasons for the belief (Eph., iii. 5; Gal., ii. 15);\n\n(b) in the external act, humility requires that one show proper signs\nof respect to one\u2019s betters. But of persons who are in authority St.\nAugustine says that, while before God they should prostrate themselves\nat the feet of all, before man they should not so demean themselves to\ninferiors as to detract from their dignity or authority. Like the other\nvirtues, humility must be guided in its manifestations by prudence as\nto place, time, and other circumstances.\n\n2556. The Excellence of Humility.--(a) Humility is inferior to the\ntheological virtues, which tend immediately to the end itself, and also\nto the intellectual virtues and legal justice, which rightly dispose\nmind and will about the means to that end. Humility and the remaining\nvirtues incline one to follow the direction of mind and will, but with\nthis difference that, while humility makes one ready for submission in\nall that is right, temperance, fortitude and the rest prepare one for\nsubmission only in some one or other particular matter. To these latter\nvirtues, then, humility is superior.\n\n(b) Humility is the groundwork of the spiritual edifice negatively or\nindirectly; for, since God resists the proud and gives grace to the\nhumble (James, iv. 6), the obstacles to the other virtues are removed\nby humility. But it is faith which positively and directly places the\ncornerstone of the spiritual life, for faith is the first approach\ntowards God: \u201cHe who would come to God must believe\u201d (Heb., xi. 6).\n\n2557. Pride.--Pride is an inordinate desire of one\u2019s own personal\nexcellence.\n\n(a) It is a desire, for the object of pride is that which is pleasing\nand yet not easy of attainment.\n\n(b) The desire is concerned with excellence, that is, with a high\ndegree of some perfection (such as virtue, knowledge, beauty, fame,\nhonor) or with superiority to others in perfection.\n\n(c) The excellence sought is personal; that is, the object of pride is\nself as exalted on high or raised above others. Ambition seeks\ngreatness in honors and dignities, presumption greatness in\naccomplishment, and vanity greatness in reputation and glory; pride,\nfrom which these other vices spring, seeks the greatness of the ego or\nof those things with which the ego is identified, such as one\u2019s own\nchildren, one\u2019s own family, or one\u2019s own race.\n\n(d) The desire is inordinate, either as to the matter, when one desires\nan excellence or superiority of which one is unworthy (e.g., equality\nwith Our Lord), or as to the manner, when one expressly desires to have\nexcellence or superiority without due subjection (e.g., to possess\none\u2019s virtue without dependence on God or from one\u2019s own unaided\nmerits). In the former case pride is opposed to greatness of soul, in\nthe latter case to humility. The contempt which is proper to pride is a\ndisdain for subjection, and the contempt which belongs to disobedience\nis a disgust for a precept; but pride naturally leads to contempt for\nlaw and for God and the neighbor (see 2367).\n\n2558. The Acts of Pride.--(a) In his intellect, the proud man has an\nexaggerated opinion of his own worth, and this causes his inordinate\ndesire of praise and exaltation. But pride may also be the cause of\nconceited ideas, for those who are too much in admiration of themselves\noften come to think that they are really as great as they wish to be.\n\n(b) The will of the proud man worships his own greatness, and longs for\nits recognition and glorification by others.\n\n(c) In his external words and works, the proud man betrays himself by\nboasting, self-glorification, self-justification, by his haughty\nappearance and gestures and luxurious style, by arrogance, insolence,\nperfidy, disregard of the rights and feelings of others, etc.\n\n2559. The Sinfulness of Pride.--(a) Complete pride, which turns away\nfrom God because it considers subjection detrimental to one\u2019s own\nexcellence, is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is a manifest\nrebellion against the Supreme Being (Ecclus., x. 14). Such was the\npride of Lucifer, but it is rare in human beings. Complete pride may be\nvenial from the imperfection of the act, when it is only a\nsemideliberate wish.\n\n(b) Incomplete pride, which turns inordinately to the love of created\nexcellence but without disaffection to superiors, is in itself a venial\nsin, for there is no serious disorder in the excess of an otherwise\nindifferent passion. But circumstances may make this pride mortal\n(e.g., when it is productive of serious harm to others).\n\n2560. Pride Compared with Other Sins.--(a) Gravity.--Complete pride is\nless than hatred of God, for the former has as its object personal\nexcellence, the latter separation from God. But after hatred of God\ncomplete pride is worse disloyalty than any other mortal sin; it\nseparates from God directly, since it abjures allegiance to the Supreme\nBeing, while other sins separate from God only indirectly, since they\noffend, not from contempt, but from ignorance, or passion or excessive\ndesire.\n\n(b) Origin.--Pride was the first sin, because by it the angels and our\nfirst parents fell, the angels desiring likeness to God in beatitude,\nAdam and Eve likeness in knowledge (Ecclus., x. 15; Prov., xviii. 11;\nTob., iv. 14).\n\n(c) Influence.--Pride is called the queen and mother of the seven\ncapital vices--namely, vainglory (2450), gluttony (2473), lust (2494),\navarice (2426), sloth (1322), envy (1342), and anger (2549)--not in the\nsense that every sin is the result of pride (for many persons sin from\nignorance, passion, etc.), but in the sense that the inordinate desire\nof personal excellence is a motive that can impel one to any kind of\nsin, just as covetousness offers a means that is useful for every\ntemporal end (I Tim., vi. 10). Pride is also most dangerous, since it\nsteals away the reward of virtue itself (Matt., vi. 2); and, as\nhumility is the first step towards heaven, pride is the first step\ntowards hell.\n\n2561. Abjection.--The other extreme of pride is abjection. (a) As a\nturning away from these higher things to which one should aspire, this\nsin is the same as littleness of soul, and it is opposed to greatness\nof soul (see 2451). (b) As a turning to lower things or to a submission\nto others which is unreasonable, this vice is directly opposed to\nhumility. Examples are persons of knowledge who waste their time on\nmenial labor when they should be more usefully employed in other\npursuits, or who permit themselves to be corrected and guided by the\nerrors and false principles of the ignorant.\n\n2562. Studiousness.--Studiousness (_studiositas_) is the virtue that\nmakes one modest in the desire of knowledge.\n\n(a) Its object is the desire of knowledge; for man is gifted with\npowers of sensation and understanding, and nature inclines him to\ndesire the exercise of these powers to see, hear, picture, apprehend,\njudge, reason, etc.\n\n(b) Its function is to make one modest in this desire (see 2465 c);\nthat is, it regulates the inclination of nature according to reason, so\nthat one may avoid both excess and defect in the pursuit of knowledge.\nOn the one hand, the soul has the urge to discover and learn, but just\nas bodily hunger leads to gluttony, if not restrained, so does mental\nhunger become a vice (curiosity), if it is not moderated. On the other\nhand, the body has a disinclination for the labor, weariness and\nhardship which study demands, and, if this reluctance is not overcome,\none becomes guilty of the sin of negligence or ignorance (see 904,\n1326, 1671).\n\n(c) Its character, therefore, is that of a virtue, since it holds a\nnatural appetite within moderation, avoiding the extremes of excess and\ndefect, and keeping custody over senses and mind. This virtue is\npraised in Prov., xxvii. 11: \u201cStudy wisdom, my son, and make my heart\njoyful\u201d; and in I Tim., iv. 13: \u201cAttend to reading.\u201d Essentially, it is\na potential part of temperance, for its chief characteristic is\nmoderation of an eager desire; but secondarily, it belongs to\nfortitude, for great courage, persistence, and self-sacrifice are\nnecessary for a student.\n\n2563. The Vices Opposed to Studiousness.--(a) The vice of excess is\ncalled curiosity. It is a desire of knowledge that is inordinate on\naccount of the motive (e.g., when one is curious about the doings of\nothers because one wishes to injure them, when one gazes about to\nsatisfy impure desire) or on account of its circumstances (e.g., a\ncuriosity about the latest news or rumors that keeps one from duty or\nmore important matters, a curiosity that consults fortune-tellers, a\ncuriosity that tries to peer into the inscrutable mysteries of God,\nEcclus., iii. 22).\n\n(b) The vice opposed to studiousness by defect is negligence, which is\na voluntary omission of study of those matters one is bound to know, as\nwhen a schoolboy wastes his time in play and idleness. Curiosity and\nnegligence are usually found in the same person (e.g., those who pry\ninto the affairs of others without reason, do not, as a rule, mind\ntheir own business well).\n\n2564. The Malice of the Sins against Studiousness.--(a) Curiosity in\nitself is venial, for it does not seem a serious offense to busy\noneself with things superfluous. But circumstances sometimes make it\nmortal. Thus, the subject-matter may make it serious, as when one is\ncurious about obscene books, or has a prurient desire to gaze on\nunbecoming pictures or plays, or tries to fish out of others\nsacramental or other confidential secrets; or the purpose may make it\nserious as when one is inquisitive or spying because one wishes to\nblacken a neighbor (Prov., xxiv. 15), or the means may make it mortal\nas when recourse is had to calumny, fraud, reading private papers,\netc., in order to get information.\n\n(b) Negligence is mortal or venial according to the gravity of the duty\nof knowledge. Thus, if a lawyer gave no study at all to a case and\nthereby inflicted a grave loss on his client, the negligence would be a\nmortal sin.\n\n2565. Modesty.--Modesty should control not only the internal passions\nfor excellence and learning, but also the external movements of the\nbody (modesty of bearing) and the external use of corporal things\n(modesty of living). (a) Thus, modesty of bearing moderates the bodily\nactions, both in serious things (modest behavior) and in things playful\n(modest relaxation).\n\n(b) Modesty of living makes one temperate in the use of the externals\nthat serve life (modesty in style) and of the clothing one wears\n(modesty in dress).\n\n2566. Modest Behavior or Decorum.--(a) The Virtue.--The movements and\ngestures of the body should be regulated by reason, both because they\nare indications of one\u2019s own character and disposition, and because\nthey express one\u2019s disposition towards those with whom one lives.\nHence, they are not a matter of indifference, but reason demands that\nthey be suitable both to oneself (i.e., to one\u2019s sex, age, position,\netc.) and to one\u2019s neighbor (i.e., to the requirements of good social\nusage in each business or affair of life). Thus, virtuous decorum\nemploys both sincerity, which makes one honestly respectful in act\n(2403), and affability, which makes one agreeable in the company of\nothers (2421). That this is an important virtue for individuals and\nsociety is declared both by sacred and human authority. Ecclesiasticus\n(xix. 26, 27) calls attention to the importance for himself of a man\u2019s\nlooks, laughter and gait; St. Augustine says that there should be\nnothing offensive to others in one\u2019s movements; and Aristotle mentions\namong the qualities of the high-minded man that he is sedate and\ndignified in demeanor.\n\n(b) The Opposite Vices.--Modest behavior is offended by various vices\nof excess and defect. Thus, sincerity is offended by bluntness and\naffectation, self-respect by stiffness and servility, and consideration\nfor others by flattery and rudeness.\n\n2567. Modest Relaxation.--(a) The Virtue.--Just as the body fatigued by\nmanual labor demands the refreshment of sleep and the recuperation\nafforded by vacations or by intermissions of work, so also the mind\ncannot be healthy or active unless from time to time it is relieved by\nsome kind of amusement or diversion. The desire for recreation is,\ntherefore, one of the chief inclinations of man, and there is special\nneed of its temperate management by right reason. The person who\nprudently provides for pastimes and pleasures as a part of his life has\nthe virtue which Aristotle called eutrapelia (good wit, urbanity), and\nwhich St. Thomas named gaiety or pleasantness.\n\n(b) The Sin of Excess.--Relaxation is excessive in various ways.\nSometimes the entertainment itself is improper (e.g., obscene comedies,\nscandalous dances, unjust games of chance). Sometimes the disposition\nof the person himself is sinful (e.g., those who make recreation the\nchief occupation of life, Wis., xv. 12; those who recreate only for\npleasure, or who enjoy themselves uproariously). Sometimes the\ncircumstances make an amusement unsuitable, such as the person (e.g.,\nwhen a man of dignity belittles himself by acting as clown, when a\nfemale takes part in sports unsuited to her sex), or the time (e.g.,\nwhen the hours that should be given to divine services, or to study or\nother Work, are spent in golfing or fishing; when Good Friday or a day\nof bereavement or penance is chosen for a ball or picnic), or the place\n(eg, when a church is used for sports or farces), or the quality (e.g.,\nwhen the Scriptures or other sacred things are caricatured or\nparodied), or the quantity (e.g., when one spends so much on theatres,\nautomobiles, trips and other enjoyments that one has nothing left for\nduties of justice, charity or religion; when health is injured by\nviolent games).\n\n(b) The Sin of Defect.--Those persons offend here who deprive\nthemselves of necessary relaxation (e.g., misers who fear to take a\nholiday or go on an outing lest they lose some money), or who interfere\nwith the recreation of others (e.g., killjoys who wish to see others\nmiserable, fanatics who believe that all fun is of the devil). Those\nwho have little sense of humor or who suffer much may be excused to\nsome extent if they never laugh, but at least they should try to look\npleasant at times, or at least not frown on innocent happiness.\n\n2568. Gravity of the Sins Opposed to Moderate Enjoyment.--(a) The\nAbsolute Gravity.--The sins just mentioned are mortal or venial\naccording to the character of what is done and the circumstances. Thus,\nit is a mortal sin to find recreation in wild revelry and debauchery,\nor to drive one\u2019s children to the devil by forbidding them necessary\ndiversion; it is a venial sin to spend a little too much time at the\ncard table or to work rather too hard.\n\n(b) The Comparative Gravity.--It is worse to relax too much than too\nlittle, for amusement is not taken for its own sake, but is\nsubordinated to serious things. Just as it is more senseless to take\ntoo much salt or other relish in food than to take too little, because\nthe salt is secondary, so it is more foolish to play too much than too\nlittle.\n\n2569. Modesty in Style of Living and Dress.-(a) The Virtue.--External\ngoods, such as dwellings and clothing, are necessary for body and soul,\nas a protection to health and decency; others, such as furnishings,\ndecorations, ornaments, cars, radios, entertainments for guests, etc.,\nare useful for convenience, beauty and the maintenance of one\u2019s\nstation. But one may be immoderate in the use of these goods, and hence\nthere is need of a virtue to regulate their use, so that it may\ntruthfully be in keeping with one\u2019s position and be not offensive to\nothers.\n\n(b) The Sin of Excess.--This is committed when one\u2019s style is\nextravagant according to the standards of the community, or when like\nDives, clothed in purple and fine linen, one aims only at display or\nsensual gratification, or when one is too much preoccupied with\nexternals (e.g., when too much time is spent before the mirror or too\nmuch money at the dressmaker\u2019s). Dignitaries and the ministers of the\naltar are not guilty of excess in the pomp and splendor which the\nChurch sanctions, since the honor is intended for their station and the\ndivine worship they perform.\n\n(c) The Sin of Defect.--This is committed when one\u2019s mode of life is\nnot up to the reasonable standard of one\u2019s community, especially if\nthis is due to negligence or itch for notoriety or disregard for\ndecency. Examples are those who through carelessness go about unwashed\nor unshaven, who keep their quarters in a filthy and disorderly state,\nor who wear their clothing untidily; also females who dress in male\nattire, nudists who appear undressed in public places, and cynics who\nscorn the conventions of refined society. It is not sinful, however,\nbut a virtuous act of temperance, to wear simpler and poorer garments\nfrom the spirit of mortification and humility (Heb., xi. 37). The\nclergy and religious, since they should be models of the penitential\nspirit, are to be praised, therefore, when they give an example of\nplainness and simplicity in personal style and dress.\n\n2570. Morality of Self-Beautification.--Is it wrong to beautify oneself\nin order to improve one\u2019s looks or to win admiration?\n\n(a) In itself there is no harm, especially for females, in using means\nto improve one\u2019s looks, such as remedies for deformities, facial\npaints, powders and cosmetics, hair waves and dyes, and the like. But\naccidentally there could be sin (e.g., deception). A poor man would be\na deceiver if he lived in great style to make a woman believe he was\nwealthy, and likewise a woman would be a deceiver if she used an\nartificial beauty to deceive a man about her age (see 2404).\n\n(b) In itself also it is not sinful to desire that others approve one\u2019s\nappearance and dress. Thus, a wife should strive to be attractive to\nher husband (I Cor., vii. 34), and modest ornamentation may be used to\nwin a suitor (I Tim., ii. 9). It is mortally sinful, however, to attire\noneself with the purpose or in a manner to arouse carnal temptation or\nto awaken sinful desire in others--for example, if one wishes to\ncapture the sex love of others without marriage (Prov., vii. 10); it is\nvenially sinful to groom oneself well from mere vanity, that is, from a\nsilly ambition to be regarded as handsome and fashionable. By a Decree\nof the Sacred Congregation of the Council (January 12, 1930),\nparish-priests, parents, and teachers are admonished to oppose indecent\nfemale dress; and it is ordered that women and girls improperly dressed\nshall be excluded from Communion or even from church, and special\nservices and sermons on decency are prescribed for December 8 of each\nyear (see 1456, 1457).\n\n2571. Complements of the Virtue of Temperance.--(a) The Gift of the\nHoly Ghost that perfects temperance is fear of the Lord. The virtue of\ntemperance makes one abstain from unlawful pleasures because to do so\nis reasonable; fear of the Lord inclines one to the same abstinence\nfrom reverence. The Gift of Fear looks first to the greatness of the\nHeavenly Father, before whom the nations are as a drop in the bucket\nand are counted as the smallest grain of the balance and the islands as\nbut a little dust (Is., xl. 15); and in this respect it represses\npresumption and serves the virtue of hope (see 1041 sqq.). But\nsecondarily it looks to the insignificance of every delight that is\napart from God, and sees that these inferior joys are passing, insipid\nand bitter, like dust blown away by the wind, like a thin froth\ndispersed by the storm, like smoke scattered by the breeze (Wis., v.\n15), like a sweet poison that turns to gall and destroys (Job, xx. 12\nsqq.); and in this respect fear of God sustains temperance, which must\nregulate the cravings of the flesh and lower appetites. Fear of God,\nthen, makes one fly from those things which chiefly allure one to\noffend Him, and hence the Psalmist (Ps. cxviii. 120) prays: \u201cPierce\nThou my flesh with Thy fear.\u201d\n\n(b) The Beatitude that corresponds to the present Gift is the second:\n\u201cBlessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.\u201d Those who\nhave the fear of God perceive the true nature of illicit joys and the\nevil end that awaits those who chase after them. They prefer, then, to\nbe sorrowful, that is, to deprive themselves of every wicked pleasure\nand love for the sake of the love of God in this life and the enjoyment\nof God in the life to come: \u201cYour sorrow shall be changed into joy\u201d\n(John, xx. 16).\n\n(c) The fruits of fear of the Lord are modesty, continency and\nchastity. Like a good tree that produces a rich harvest of delightful\nfruits, filial reverence for God brings forth acts of virtue that have\nin them a delicious savor more enjoyable and more lasting than the\nfruits of the flesh. These goodly and pleasant fruits of the spirit of\nfear of God are modesty in words, deeds and external things, continency\nof the single and chastity of the married in thoughts and desires.\n\n2572. The Commandments of Temperance.--(a) Negative Precepts.--In the\nDecalogue the vices of intemperance that are most directly opposed to\nthe love of God and the neighbor (I Tim., i. 5) are expressly\nforbidden, namely, adultery in act and adultery in desire. Elsewhere\nother sins are forbidden. Thus, drunkenness (\u201cDrunkards shall not\npossess the kingdom,\u201d I Cor., vi. 10), every kind of lust (\u201cThe works\nof the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury ...\nthose who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom,\u201d Gal., v. 19,\n21), anger (\u201cLet all bitterness and anger and indignation be put away\nfrom you,\u201d Eph., iv. 31), pride (\u201cGod resisteth the proud,\u201d James, iv.\n6), etc.\n\n(b) Affirmative Precepts.--The positive modes of observing temperance\n(i.e., rules on fasting) are not prescribed in the Decalogue. For the\nlaw confines itself to general principles that, are of universal\napplication, whereas the manner of practising fasts and abstinences has\nto be suited to conditions of time and place. Hence, it pertains to the\nChurch to settle by her legislation the details of mortification in\neating and drinking, so that they may be suited to the ever-changing\nconditions of human life (2469).\n\n\n\n\nQuestion III\n\nTHE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN\n\n2573. The theological and moral virtues treated in the previous\nQuestion are obligatory upon all states and conditions, for all men\nhave the same supernatural destiny, and all alike are bound to govern\ntheir acts and their passions by the rule of reason. But not all have\nthe same calling or office, or consequently the same particular ends to\nbe striven for or the same special means to be used; wherefore, there\nare moral duties proper to particular classes and particular ways of\nlife. Those special obligations, however, do not constitute new\nvirtues, but are applications of the seven general virtues to the\nstates of man diversified in reference to the acts and habits of the\nsoul. The diversities now spoken of may be reduced to the three\nmentioned by St. Paul (I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.), namely, diversities of\ngraces (i.e., some are gifted to edify the Church in marvellous ways by\nknowledge, speech or miracles), diversities of operations (i.e., some\nare called to the life of contemplation, others to active life), and\ndiversities of ministries (i.e., there are various stations, ranks,\noccupations, both in ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical life). The\nhigher graces and ways of the spiritual life of man are treated in\nworks of ascetical and mystical theology, and we shall confine\nourselves here to two subjects: (a) the duties of men as members of the\nChurch, that is, the general duties of the faithful and the special\nduties of clerics and religious; (b) the duties of men as members of\ndomestic and civil society.\n\nBefore proceeding any further, a word is in order regarding the role of\nthe laity in the Church.\n\n\u201cWe desire that all who claim the Church as their mother should\nseriously consider that not only the sacred ministers and those who\nhave consecrated themselves to God in religious life, but the other\nmembers as well of the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, have the\nobligation of working hard and constantly for the upbuilding and\nincrease of this Body\u201d (Pius XII, _Mystici Corporis_).\n\nThe Catholic layman, long a silent partner in the Church\u2019s apostolate,\nhas assumed a more active part in recent years. His role, his\napostolate, his milieu, his special claims to divine graces, his\nspiritual prerogatives--all have been made subjects of theological\ninvestigation particularly by European writers. Controversy,\nuncertainty, at times even error have characterized their efforts as\nthey grope their way in a new area of theology. Their efforts\nultimately will lead to the elaboration of a developed theology of the\nlaity, an extremely important and equally necessary body of knowledge,\nfor \u201cthe laity are in the front line of the Church\u2019s life; through them\nthe Church is the vital principle of human society. Accordingly they\nespecially must have an ever clearer consciousness not only of\nbelonging to the Church, but of being the Church....\u201d (Pius XII,\n_Allocution to the Sacred College, AAS_, 38-149).[1]\n\n[1] To detail the advances made in this new area of theology would\ndemand a volume for itself. We shall have to be content with indicating\na select bibliography of the outstanding works available.\n\nFrancis M. Keating, S.J., \u201cTheology of the Laity,\u201d _Proceedings of the\nCatholic Theological Society of America_, 1956, pp. 196 ff.; Ives M. J.\nCongar, O.P., _Jalons pour une theologie du laicat_, (Paris, Cerf,\n1953); translated as _Lay People in the Church_, (The Newman Press,\nWestminster, Md., 1957); G. Philips, _Le role du laicat dans l\u2019Eglise,\n(Casterman, Tournai-Paris, 1954); translated as _The Role of the Laity\nin the Church_. (Mercier, Cork, 1955); Karl Rahner, \u201cThe Apostolate of\nLaymen,\u201d _Theology Digest_, (Spring 1957), pp. 73 ff.; Jacques\nLeclercq, \u201cCan a Layman be a Saint?\u201d _Theology Digest_, (Winter 1956),\npp. 3 ff. (This same issue contains a select bibliography on\nspirituality of the laity, p. 8.); Paul Dabin, S.J., _Le sacerdoce\nroyal des fideles dans les livres saints_, (Blond et Gay, 1941); _Le\nsacerdoce royal des fideles dans la tradition ancienne et moderne_,\n(Les Editions Universelles, Brussels, 1950): Gustave Weigel, S.J., \u201cThe\nBody of Christ and the City of God,\u201d _Social Order_, (Vol. 5, 1955, p.\n275 ff.).\n\n\n\n\nArt. 1: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH\n\n2574. The General Duties of the Faithful.--The Church has the power to\nmake laws which will promote the common good of the whole body and the\nindividual good of the members (see 418). Chief among the laws that\nbind the faithful in general are the six known as the Precepts of the\nChurch, namely, the laws on the observance of Sundays and holydays, on\nfasting and abstinence, on yearly confession, on Easter Communion, on\nthe support of pastors, and on marriage.\n\n2575. The First Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that on\nSundays and holydays of obligation Mass be heard and servile and other\nlike works be omitted (Canons 1247-1249) by the subjects of church laws\n(427 sqq.).\n\n(a) This precept is of natural and divine law as to its purpose and\nsubstance, for reason teaches and the Third Commandment of the\nDecalogue prescribes that man set aside some time for the external\nworship of God, and avoid those things that distract him from worship\n(Catechism of the Council of Trent, pp. 396 sqq,). Hence, even\nnon-Catholics, though they do not sin by missing Mass (429, 430), are\nguilty of sin if they do not from time to time worship God externally.\n\n(b) This precept is of ecclesiastical law only as to its details (i.e.,\nthe time set apart and the manner of worship and sanctification\ndecreed). The Old Testament Law observed the Sabbath or last day of the\nWeek in memory of the creation of the World, and it abstained most\nrigorously from work on the Sabbath, because there was a divine\nprohibition and because this rest was a figure of things to come. But\nin the New Law the ceremonial precepts of Judaism no longer have force,\nand the Christian precepts substituted for them were not instituted by\nChrist Himself but arose from the custom of the Church. During the\nlifetime of the Apostles themselves Sunday (or the first day of the\nweek) came to be venerated as the Lord\u2019s Day in memory of the\nResurrection, which completed the work of Redemption (Acts, ii. 46,\niii. 1, v. 12, xxi. 26); and from early times various special holydays\nwere appointed and made days of obligatory worship, as had been the\ncase with certain feasts in the Old Testament. As early as the third\nand fourth centuries laws were made confirming the primitive customs of\nassisting at Mass and resting on Sundays and holydays.\n\n2576. The Affirmative and Negative Parts of the First Precept.--The\nfirst precept of the Church has two parts, an affirmative (preceptive)\npart which commands the hearing of Mass, and a negative (prohibitive)\npart which forbids the doing of servile works. The law is therefore\nmost salutary and simple, requiring that one take part in the greatest\nact of worship, the sacrifice which is a commemoration of Christ, and\nthat one rest from the labors and cares of the week and be spiritually\nrefreshed. In reference to the Mass, the precept requires that Mass\nitself be heard, and that it be an entire Mass and the same Mass.\n\n(a) Thus, Mass itself must be heard, and hence one does not satisfy the\nSunday obligation by attending other services that precede (e.g., the\nAsperges, blessing of palm), accompany (e.g., sermon), or follow (e.g.,\nVespers, Benediction) the celebration of Mass. Neither does this\nprecept oblige one to attend other services on Sunday, although it is\nmost suitable to do this, also to make internal acts of faith, hope and\ncharity, and to read pious books and perform works of charity, and it\nis sometimes necessary as a natural obligation to attend the sermon or\ncatechetical instruction (see 914 sqq.).\n\n(b) A whole Mass must be heard, that is, all the ceremonies from the\nprayers at the foot of the altar until the blessing at the end, and it\nis irreverent to leave church without necessity before the priest has\nleft the altar. He who can assist at only the essential and integral\nparts of the sacrifice (i.e., from the Consecration to the Communion),\nis obliged to so much; but he who arrives after the Consecration and\ncannot hear another Mass is not obliged according to one opinion to\nremain for the present Mass, since the Consecration, the essential\npart, is already past.\n\n(c) The same Mass must be heard, and hence one cannot satisfy the\nobligation by hearing the first half of one Mass being said on one\naltar and the second half of another Mass being said simultaneously on\nanother altar (see Denzinger, n. 1203), nor by hearing the Consecration\nin one Mass and the Communion in a previous or subsequent Mass, thus\ndividing the sacrifice. But if one may have heard from the Consecration\nto the end in one Mass, one may hear the omitted pre-Consecration\nparts, it seems, in another Mass that follows, and one should do this\nif possible.\n\n2577. How Mass Must Be Heard.--In reference to the person who hears\nMass, the positive part of the precept calls for external assistance\nand internal devotion.\n\n(a) Thus, the external or bodily assistance must be such that one can\nbe said to take part in the divine worship. This happens when one is\nphysically present, that is, when one is in the same building or place\nas the celebrant and can either see or hear him, or is morally present,\nthat is, not in the same building but able to see or hear him naturally\n(e.g., by looking from the window of a neighboring house), or is unable\nto see or hear him but joined with the congregation (e.g., those who\nare outside the closed doors of the church but who can follow the bells\nand choir to some extent, those who are inside with the congregation\nbut behind a pillar that shuts off the view). In a field Mass\namplifiers can carry the voice far out to the edge of a vast crowd. But\nthere does not seem to be a sufficient moral presence when Mass is\n\u201cseen\u201d by television or \u201cheard\u201d over the radio, since in these cases\none is not present to the consecrated species or united to the\nworshippers.\n\n(b) Internal or mental assistance requires the actual or virtual\nintention of the will to perform what the Church requires (see 2165),\nand the attention of the mind, external according to some, internal\naccording to others (see 2166 sqq.). Thus, he who goes to church merely\nto hear the music or look at the pictures does not hear Mass for lack\nof intention; he who sleeps soundly all through the service does not\nhear Mass for lack of attention. One who knows what is going on before\nhim, but whose thoughts are not on any religious matter, complies with\nthe precept of the Church according to some, but he sins by irreverence\nand voluntary distraction. It suffices during Mass to think either on\nthe Mass itself (which is the best attention), or to think on other\npious subjects (e.g., to make an examination of conscience, to say the\nRosary). Certain actions (e.g., those that are related to the Mass,\nsuch as ringing the bell, taking up the collection, playing the organ)\ndo not exclude external attention, but others certainly exclude it\n(e.g., writing a letter), and others are doubtful (e.g., going to\nConfession).\n\n2578. Time and Place of Mass.--In reference to circumstances, the\nprecept requires that Mass be heard at the proper place and the proper\ntime.\n\n(a) Place.--The precept may be complied with by attending Mass in any\nCatholic rite (Latin, Greek, etc.), and it makes no difference whether\nMass is celebrated in the open air, in a church, or in a public or\nsemi-public oratory (Canon 1249). But private chapels are for the\nbenefit of the grantee alone.\n\n(b) Time.--The precept must be complied with on the feast itself, that\nis, during the period of twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight.\nSunday Mass cannot be anticipated on Saturday or put off till Monday.\nLikewise servile works are unlawful from midnight to midnight.\n\n2579. Servile Works.--The prohibitory part of the precept is concerned\nwith servile works, that is, labor of a kind that tends to make one\nunfit for devotion or that shows disrespect for the sacredness of the\nday, even though the labor be done gratis, or for recreation, or out of\ndevotion. Hence, the law forbids:\n\n(a) works given to the service of the devil, that is, sins that deprive\none of holiness, such as riotous recreations, gambling, drunkenness,\nreading improper matter, and attendance at evil movie performances. But\nthese works are opposed to the end, not to the text, of the law; and\nhence the circumstance of time aggravates their malice but does not\ngive them a new species (see 2314);\n\n(b) works given to the service of the body (servile works properly so\ncalled) or to the service of external goods (forensic and commercial\nworks). Servile works in the strict sense cause bodily fatigue and are\ntaken up with material things, and hence they distract the mind from\nreligious thoughts. Such are manual labors (e.g., plowing, digging,\nhousecleaning) and mechanical or industrial labors (e.g., printing,\nbuilding, plastering, shoemaking). Forensic and commercial labors\n(e.g., arguing in court, auctioneering) are also of a very worldly kind\nand unsuitable for the quiet and recollection of Sundays and holydays.\n\n2580. The prohibitory part of the Sunday precept does not affect works\nwhich are no impediment to devotion and which cast no dishonor on the\nday. Such are:\n\n(a) works devoted immediately to the service of God. The purpose of the\nlaw is to allow leisure for these works, and hence manifestly their\nperformance is not forbidden. Such works are saying Mass, preaching,\nadministering the Sacraments, singing in church, and visiting the poor\nand sick (John, vii. 23; Matt., xii. 5). But works that are only\nremotely related to divine worship (e.g., cleaning the church, painting\nthe altar, repairing the vestments, decorating the shrines) should not\nbe done on Sunday without necessity;\n\n(b) works devoted to the service of the mind (liberal works). These\nworks are of a more elevated kind, do not require great bodily\nexertion, and are not looked upon as unsuitable to the Sabbath. Such\nare intellectual works (e.g., teaching, reading, writing, studying),\nartistic works (e.g., playing the organ, singing, drawing, painting a\npicture, embroidering), and works of recreation (moderate sports or\ndiversions such as baseball, tennis, and chess).\n\n2581. Other Kinds of Works and Sunday Observance.--(a) Common works are\nthose that stand between the liberal and the servile, since they are\nexercised equally by mind and body, such as walking, riding, hunting,\nand fishing that is not very laborious. These are lawful.\n\n(b) Doubtful works are those that are now non-servile, now servile,\naccording to the manner in which they are conducted, such as the work\nof painters, sculptors, typists, seamstresses, and photographers. Thus,\nit is a liberal work to paint a portrait, a servile work to paint the\nwalls of a house. In settling the character of various kinds of work,\none must be guided by the prudent opinion of one\u2019s locality, and in\ncase of doubt and need must seek a dispensation. (For a history of the\ntheology of servile works see Franz X. Pettirsch, S.J., \u201cA Theology of\nSunday Rest,\u201d _Theology Digest_, Vol. VI, no. 2, Spring 1958, pp. 114\nff.; for a survey of modern studies on the problem see _Proceedings of\nthe Catholic Theological Society of America_, 1957).\n\n2582. Is it lawful without necessity to hire the servile work of\nnon-Catholics on Sunday, if these persons are not thereby impeded from\nthe natural duty of worshipping God and no scandal is given? (a) If the\nnon-Catholics are infidels and not bound by church laws, this is\nlawful. The same would be true of those who lack the use of reason (see\n427 sqq.). (b) If the non-Catholics are heretics, it is not lawful in\nthe case given to make them work on Sunday.\n\n2583. Obligation of First Precept.--The first precept of the Church\nobliges under pain of grave sin, because it determines a necessary act\nof religion (2148), and experience shows that where the Sabbath is\nneglected the social, spiritual and physical interests of man are\nseriously harmed (see Denzinger, n. 1202). There is always hope for\nCatholics who attend Mass, whereas those who miss Mass soon become\nCatholics only in name. But since neglect of worship may be only\nslightly disrespectful, and since the end of the precept may be\nsubstantially obtained without complete fulfillment, a transgression\nmay be only venial by reason of lightness of matter.\n\n(a) Preceptive Part.--Grave matter is a part of the Mass that is\nnotable on account of dignity (i.e., the essential and integral parts\nof the Mass, for example, the Consecration and Communion), or on\naccount of its duration (i.e., a third of the whole Mass, e.g., from\nthe beginning to the Offertory inclusively, from the beginning to the\nGospel and from the Communion to the end, from the Preface to the\nConsecration, from the Consecration to the Agnus Dei, etc.). Hence, he\nwho is culpably absent or asleep during a notable part of the Mass sins\ngravely, but he who is absent or asleep during an inconsiderable part\nof the Mass (e.g., one who arrives just at the Offertory or who leaves\nafter the Communion) sins venially, unless he is so disposed that he\ndoes not care how much he misses.\n\n(b) Prohibitive Part.--Grave matter is labor that is notable on account\nof its quality (e.g., forensic proceedings even for a brief space on\nSunday would be a serious distraction and scandal), or its quantity\n(e.g., two and a half hours given to very exhausting manual work, such\nas digging a ditch, three hours given to less arduous labor, such as\nsowing). He who commands ten laborers to work an hour each on Sunday\ncooperates in ten venial sins (see 219), but he may be guilty of mortal\nsin on account of scandal.\n\n2584. Excuses from Observance of First Precept.--These reasons may be\nreduced to two classes, namely, external reasons (i.e., a dispensation\nor a lawful custom) and internal reasons (i.e., one\u2019s own inability or\nnecessity).\n\n(a) External Reasons.--Dispensations may be given under certain\nconditions by local Ordinaries, by parish-priests, and by superiors of\nexempt clerical institutes (Canon 1245). Custom in certain places\nexcuses from Mass for a month women who have just given birth to a\nchild or who have lost their husband by death, and also--from the Mass\nin which their banns are to be proclaimed--those women who are about to\nmarry. Custom further permits necessary labors, such as cooking,\nordinary housecleaning, barbering, the work of railroad and garage men,\netc.\n\n(b) Internal Reasons.--Impossibility or serious inconvenience excuses\nfrom hearing Mass (e.g., those who have to walk an hour\u2019s journey to\nchurch or ride a two hours\u2019 journey, regarding which, in terms of\ndistance travelled, it has been suggested that the figures should be\nmore than three miles each way if one must walk, more than thirty miles\nif a car is available and the roads are good; those who will suffer\ngreat detriment to health, honor, fortune, etc., if they go; those who\nare kept away by duties of charity or employment or office that cannot\nbe omitted). Necessity or duty to others permits one to work on Sunday\nat least to some extent (e.g., those who must labor on a Sunday in\norder to live, or to keep out of serious trouble, or to perform\nservices or works of charity that cannot easily be done at another\ntime). To avoid self-deception the faithful should consult their pastor\nor other prudent person if there is doubt about the sufficiency of the\nexcuse.\n\n2585. Though the Church does not impose excessive Sabbatarianism,\nneither does she admit laxity in the important matter of the Lord\u2019s Day.\n\n(a) Hence, not every reason excuses from the church precept. Thus,\nthose are guilty who unnecessarily place themselves in the\nimpossibility of observing the law (e.g., by moving to a place where\nthere is no church, by taking a position that requires work all Sunday\nmorning, by starting on a vacation or auto trip to a churchless\nregion), or whose excuses are frivolous (e.g., those who stay away from\nMass because they dislike the priest, or who work on Sunday merely to\nkeep busy).\n\n(b) Reasons that excuse from part of the ecclesiastical precept do not\nexcuse from all of it. Thus, those who are unable to hear Mass are not\nthereby justified in doing servile work, those who can hear the\nessential part of Mass (Consecration and Communion), but not the other\nparts, should hear the essential part; those who can hear Mass only on\none Sunday a year are not excused on that Sunday.\n\n(c) Reasons that excuse from the ecclesiastical precept do not excuse\nfrom the divine precept (see 2575) of worshipping God. Hence, those who\nare really obliged to work every Sunday should sanctify the Lord\u2019s Day\nby whatever private prayer or devotion they can substitute. Some\nauthors very rightly believe that those who can never go to Mass on\nSunday are held by divine law to hear Mass on weekdays three or four\ntimes a year at least, when this is possible (see 2148, 2180).\n\n2586. The Second Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that on\nall Fridays of the year and certain other specified days (unless they\nfall on a holyday outside of Lent) every baptized person who has\ncompleted the age of seven and has attained the use of reason shall\nabstain from eating flesh meat and from drinking the broth or soup made\nfrom flesh meat (Canons 1250-1254).\n\n(a) Under the name flesh are included all land and warm-blooded animals\n(i.e., mammals and birds). The law does not include aquatic animals\n(i.e., fishes, clams, oysters and other shellfish, lobsters, shrimps,\ncrabs and other crustaceans), nor cold-blooded animals (i.e., reptiles,\nsnails and amphibians, such as frogs, tortoises). Some authors include\nunder aquatic animals otters, beavers, seals, walruses, loons, and\ncoots, though generally the birds are regarded as flesh. In doubt\nwhether a food is fish or flesh, it may be judged to be fish, for in\ndoubts laws are to be interpreted benignly.\n\n(b) Under the name meat are included all the parts of an animal (i.e.,\nits flesh, blood, marrow, brains, lard, meat extracts, mince-pie,\npepsin) but not its fruit (e.g., eggs, milk, and things made from milk,\nsuch as butter, cheese).\n\n(c) Under the name broth is included any liquid made from the juice of\nmeat, such as beef tea, chicken broth, mutton soup, gravy, etc. But the\nlaw does not forbid condiments made from animal fats (e.g., margarin).\n\n2587. Obligation of the Second Precept of the Church.--(a) Origin of\nthe Obligation.--In substance this precept is of the natural law, but\nin details (time, manner, etc.) it is of ecclesiastical law (2468 b)\nand has come down from customs that began in the first ages of\nChristianity. The church regulation on abstinence is most wise and\nmoderate: the foods forbidden are those whose deprivation is a\nmortification to most persons, and at the same time a great benefit to\nspiritual and bodily health; the times appointed are few but\nappropriate (viz., days of sorrow, special prayer, penance,\npreparation, such as Fridays, Ember Days, Lent, vigils), and they are\nso distributed as to sanctify by mortification each week and each\nseason of the year. True, no food is evil in itself (Matt., xv. 11; I\nCor., viii, 8; I Tim., iv. 3; Col., ii. 16), but just as the physician\ncan forbid certain foods to his patient for the sake of temporal good,\nso for the sake of spiritual good God forbade to Adam the fruit of one\ntree and to the Jews the flesh of certain animals; and the Church from\nthe days of the Apostles (Acts, xv. 29) has exercised the same right.\n\n(b) Gravity of the Obligation.--The abstinence required by the Second\nPrecept is a grave duty, because the Church makes it the necessary act\nof the necessary virtue of abstemiousness and a serious duty of\nobedience. But not every transgression is a serious injury to the\nspirit of this law, and hence some sins against it are venial. Grave\nmatter is such a quantity of forbidden food as gives considerable\nnourishment, and hence for practical purposes the rule may be given\nthat flesh meat which weighs two ounces (or, according to others, what\nwould be the size of a walnut or of a small hen\u2019s egg) is grave matter.\nSome hold for a more liberal interpretation when the food is not\nstrictly flesh meat, and believe that liquid from meat is not grave\nmatter at any time, or at least when it weighs less than four ounces.\nVegetables cooked or seasoned with meat or meat juice are also\nconsidered light matter. He who eats meat twice on a Friday or other\nabstinence day commits two sins, just as he who works twice on a Sunday\nor holyday commits two sins. It is commonly held that many venial sins\nagainst abstinence committed on the same day coalesce to form grave\nmatter, but on account of the separation between the eatings a larger\namount is necessary for grave matter.\n\n(c) Exceptions to the Obligation.--Those are not bound to observe a day\nof abstinence who have been exempted by indult (Canon 1253), who have\nbeen dispensed by the Ordinary, pastor or superior (Canon 1245), or who\nare excused on account of real impossibility (e.g., the poor, the sick,\nthose obliged to perform very hard work, those who are morally forced\nto eat meat but not as a sign of contempt of the law). Persons\ndispensed from abstinence may not eat meat oftener than once a day on\nfast days, unless they have a special grant. The faithful should be\nguided by the Lenten regulations of their dioceses, and in doubt they\nshould consult their pastors.\n\n2588. The Obligation of Fasting.--The Second Precept also commands that\non the weekdays of Lent and certain other specified days (holydays\noutside Lent excepted) every baptized person between the ages of\ntwenty-one years completed and sixty years begun shall eat not more\nthan one full meal a day (Canon 1251).\n\n(a) The law speaks of eating, that is, of solid food, and hence the\nLenten and other similar fasts are not broken by liquids which are\nbeverages rather than foods, or which are used to allay thirst, or\ncarry food or assist digestion, and not chiefly to nourish (e.g.,\nwater, teas, coffee, light cocoa, wine, beer, lemonade, fruit juice).\nLikewise, sirups taken as medicines are not considered foods, even\nthough they contain nourishment, unless one drinks a large quantity for\nits food content. Light ices may be considered drink, but ice-cream is\nfood. On the contrary, liquids that are chiefly nourishing are regarded\nas food (e.g., soup, oil, honey). Finally, some liquors vary between\nfood and drink, according to their richness or weakness, their great or\nsmall quantity. Thus, hot chocolate as made in the United States\ncontains only a small amount of solid and may be considered as a drink,\nbut as made in Europe it is stronger and rather food than drink.\n\n(b) The law admits as an indulgence on fast days, in addition to the\none meal, a small breakfast in the morning and a light collation to be\ntaken either around noon (lunch) or in the evening (supper). The\nquality and quantity of these two repasts are left to local custom. The\nUniform Norm for Fast and Abstinence in the United States adopted by\nthe Hierarchy, Nov. 14, 1951, establishes the following norm for these\ntwo meatless meals. They are to be \u201csufficient to maintain strength,\nmay be taken according to each one\u2019s needs; but together they should\nnot equal another full meal.\u201d This norm, called the relative standard,\nwas adopted by many Bishops of the United States, beginning with Lent\nof 1952. Thus, the amount of food is dependent to some degree on a\nperson\u2019s own needs and appetite. The relative standard is distinguished\nfrom the absolute norm which allows about two ounces for the morning\ncollation and eight ounces for the evening.\n\n(c) The law permits one to eat but once in the day (exception being\nmade for breakfast and collation), but it places no limits as to the\nquality of the food at the principal meal (unless the day be also a day\nof abstinence, when meat is forbidden), or as to its quantity, though\ntemperance bids one to eat at all times in moderation. On fast days,\ntherefore, one may not eat between meals, nor so divide or prolong the\ndinner that it really becomes several meals. A notable interruption\n(two or three hours) made without good reason divides a dinner into two\nmeals, and over two hours of uninterrupted eating, under ordinary\ncircumstances, seems to be more than the one full meal which the law\nallows.\n\n2589. The Obligation of the Precept of Fasting.--(a) Origin.--The\nnatural law commands fasting in general, since without some kind of\nausterity above common temperance certain desirable ends (such as\natonement for past transgressions, conquest of unruly passions, and\nelevation of the soul) cannot be attained; and as these ends are\nnecessary it is also necessary to use the means as far as one needs\nthem. The particularization of this natural law has been made by the\npositive law of the Church, and with such wisdom as to promote the good\nof both soul and body. The times appointed are most appropriate (e.g.,\nthe season when the Passion is commemorated, Luke, v. 35); the duration\nof the long fast is modelled on that of Christ (Matt., iv. 1); the\ncurtailment of food required is not only beneficial (as an exercise of\nself-control and a rest and change to the metabolism), but is moderate,\nsince it permits sufficient food for the day, and even in the fast of\nLent the Sundays occur to give a respite.\n\n(b) Gravity.--The precept of fasting is grave, both from the purpose of\nthe law (see 2469), and from the express declaration of the lawgiver\n(Denzinger, n. 1123). But the spirit of the precept is not notably\ndeviated from by every transgression, and hence even in reference to\nmatter there are minor or venial violations; and moreover the precept\nis probably (unlike that of abstinence) an indivisible one, since it\nconsists in the limitation to one meal, and hence it cannot be violated\nmore than once a day. Grave matter, when the absolute norm is used,\nseems to be about four ounces added to the collations or taken between\nmeals, either all at once or at different times during the day\n(Denzinger, n.1129), But if the relative norm is used, a greater\nquantity is needed to establish grave matter, e.g., one fourth of a\nfull meal. But he who has broken his fast (e.g., by a second full meal)\ndoes not break it again by a third or fourth full meal on the same day,\nfor after the second full meal the fast has become impossible for that\nday. He who accidentally takes too much at breakfast can still keep the\nfast by proportionately diminishing his evening repast.\n\n(c) Exceptions.--Physical or moral impossibility excuses from the fast,\nand gives the right to eat meat as often as moderation allows on days\nthat are not meatless days. The chief persons who labor under\nimpossibility are those who are too weak to fast (e.g., the sick, the\nconvalescent, pregnant and nursing mothers, the nervous), those who are\ntoo poor to get one square meal a day (e.g., street beggars who have\nnothing may eat as often as they are given an alms, if it does not buy\nthem a dinner), and those who cannot do their necessary or customary\nhard work if they fast. Hard work is such as is exercised for many\nhours continuously, or for a less time if it is very intense, and which\nis greatly fatiguing to the mind (e.g., daily teaching, lecturing,\nstudying, hearing confessions, preaching, etc.) or to the body (e.g.,\nheavy manual labor, the difficult jobs in offices or stores, work that\nrequires one to be on one\u2019s feet for hours at a time, necessary\njourneys made under hardship). The confessor or physician can decide\nabout cases of impossibility that are not manifest, but dispensation\nshould be had from the pastor (Canon 1245). Those who are dispensed\nfrom the ecclesiastical fast or abstinence should remember that they\nare not dispensed from the natural law of temperance, and they should\npractise some abstemiousness according to their ability (e.g., by\nself-denial in alcoholic beverages, tobacco, sweets, etc., or\nmortification in the quantity or quality of food).\n\n2590. The Third Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that all\nthe faithful, male and female, who have reached the age of discretion\ngo to confession at least once a year (Canon 906).\n\n(a) The subject of this precept is every baptized person who has\nentered the Church through valid Baptism and who has the use of reason,\nwhich begins usually at the age of seven. Infants are incapable of\ncommitting sin, and the unbaptized are incapable of receiving the\nSacrament of Penance.\n\n(b) The matter of the precept is a good sacramental confession of the\ngrave sins not yet confessed, made with the purpose of obtaining\nabsolution to any duly authorized priest. Hence, those who have only\nvenial sins on their conscience are not bound according to the common\nopinion by this precept, and, on the other hand, those who make a\nsacrilegious or voluntarily null confession do not fulfill the law\n(Denzinger, n. 1114; Code, Canon 907). It seems that one who, after a\nconfession of venial sins at Easter, falls into grave sin is not bound\nfrom this precept to confess again before the end of the year.\n\n(c) The time for fulfillment of the precept is once during the year.\nThe law leaves one free to confess on any day during the twelvemonth,\nand to count the year either civilly (i.e., from January 1 to December\n31), or ecclesiastically (e.g., from Easter time to Easter time, as is\ncommonly done), or from the date of the last confession. The limit is\nset, however, not to terminate but to insist upon obligation, and hence\nit seems that he who has not made his 1957 confession must make it as\nsoon as possible in 1958, but the 1957 confession made in 1958 will\nsatisfy for the 1958 obligation also (see 468 sqq.).\n\n2591. The Obligation of the Third Precept.--(a) Origin.--From divine\nlaw sacramental confession is necessary for all who have fallen into\nserious sin after Baptism, since Christ has given His Church the keys\nof heaven and appointed His bishops and priests the physicians and\njudges to cure and pardon (Matt., xviii. 18; John, xx. 23). But Our\nLord did not fix the frequency of confession, and it is this which the\npresent precept determines. The law of annual confession goes back to\nthe Fourth Lateran Council (1215).\n\n(b) Gravity.--The precept of annual confession obliges under pain of\nmortal sin, for its purpose is of vital importance and the Church has\nalways regarded it as a grave obligation. The purpose of the law is to\nensure the use of the Sacrament instituted by Christ for forgiveness\nand to keep sinners from delaying their repentance too long. If a good\nbusiness man takes stock of his assets and liabilities at least once a\nyear, and those who are careful of their health have medical attention\nor examination at least yearly, it is most reasonable that the faithful\nshould settle their spiritual accounts and attend to the well-being of\ntheir souls within an equal period of time. In the early centuries when\nfervor was greater and conditions different, no general church law on\nthe frequency of confession was needed; but there is no doubt that the\nLateran Decree met well the need that began after the change from the\nearly penitential discipline, The penalties for violation of this\nprecept were excommunication and exclusion from ecclesiastical burial,\nand, though they are not enforced today, they show the intention of the\nChurch to impose a grave duty.\n\n2592. The Fourth Precept of the Church.--This precept commands that all\nthe faithful, male and female, who have attained the use of reason, go\nto Holy Communion at least once a year, and that during Easter time\n(Canon 859).\n\n(a) The subjects of this precept are the same as those of the previous\nprecept, and consequently children of seven years or thereabout, who\nare able to understand, must make the Easter duty.\n\n(b) The matter of the precept is a worthy Communion (Viaticum or\nordinary Communion) received in any parish, but preferably in one\u2019s own\nparish. Persons living in community (e.g., religious, soldiers, college\nboarders) may make the Easter duty in their own chapels, strangers and\nvagi in any church or chapel, and priests in the place where they say\nMass.\n\n(c) The time of the precept is the Paschal Season (i.e., from Palm\nSunday to Low Sunday, but in the United States, by privilege, from the\nFirst Sunday of Lent to Trinity Sunday). The Easter time may be\nprolonged for an individual by his pastor or confessor for a just\nreason. The year within which the Easter duty is to be made begins, it\nseems, with the opening of one Paschal Season and ends with the opening\nof the Paschal Season of the following calendar year. Since the law\nrequires that the Easter duty be made, not only within the Paschal\nSeason, but also once a year, it follows that he who neglects Communion\nduring the Easter period is still bound by the law to go to Communion\nbefore the opening of the next Paschal Season, but probably he is not\nbound to go at the first opportunity. As a rule, we believe those who\ndo not make their Easter duty during a year are guilty of but one sin,\nsince they do not think of distinct violations.\n\n2593. The Obligation of the Fourth Precept.--(a) Origin.--There is a\ndivine precept of receiving Communion some time during life, since Our\nLord willed the Eucharist to be the necessary nourishment of the soul\u2019s\njourney (John, vi. 54) and the perpetual memorial of Himself (I Cor.,\nxi. 24). The Church in the present precept has prescribed both the\nfrequency and the time for complying with the will of Christ. Since the\nEucharist is a daily bread, the law does not permit it to be abstained\nfrom by anyone beyond a year; and, since the Paschal Season brings the\nanniversary of Christ\u2019s sacrifice and of the institution of the Blessed\nSacrament, it is the time most fitly chosen for the obligatory\nCommunion.\n\n(b) Gravity.--The precept obliges under pain of grave sin, for it\ndetermines a law given by Our Lord Himself and regulates the minimum in\nthe use of the Eucharist, the greatest of the Sacraments and the end of\nall the others. The doctrine of theologians is that it is a grave sin\nto delay culpably the Easter Communion for even a day beyond the\nPaschal Season as prescribed.\n\n2594. The Fifth and Sixth Precepts of the Church.--The Fifth Precept\ncommands the proper maintenance of the clergy by the laity. The manner\nof giving the support is left to the special statutes and customs of\neach country (Canons 1496, 1502). This ecclesiastical law is but a\ndetermination of the natural law of justice and religion, and also of\nthe divine law; for even in the Old Testament the Levites were\nsupported by the people. The duty is, therefore, grave (see 2185 sqq.).\nRespect and obedience in spiritual matters are owed the clergy, and it\nis sinful to usurp their functions (see 2351, 2355 sqq., and Canons\n119, 683, 1931, 166).\n\nThe Sixth Precept commands the proper solemnization of marriage and\nprohibits the solemn blessing of marriages at stated times. Canon 1108,\nSec.2 specifies these times as \u201cfrom the first Sunday of Advent until\nthe day of the Nativity of Our Lord inclusive, and from Ash Wednesday\nuntil Easter Sunday inclusive.\u201d It is to be noted that the forbidden\ntime excludes only the solemn blessing, and even this may be permitted\nby the Ordinary for just cause, subject to liturgical laws (Canon 1108,\nSec.3).\n\n2595. Two Other Important General Laws of the Church.--(a) The\nprohibition of wicked and dangerous writings (Canons 1384 sqq.)\nis based on the natural law, which requires one to avoid what is\nproximately dangerous to faith or morals. This subject is treated above\nin 1456, 849 sqq., 1529.\n\n(b) The prohibition of the cremation of corpses (Canon 1203) is not\nbased on natural law or on any dogma, as though the burning of dead\nbodies were intrinsically evil or repugnant to our faith in immortality\nand resurrection. On the contrary, in exceptional cases (e.g., in time\nof war or epidemic) cremation is permitted, if a real public necessity\nrequires it. The reasons for the anti-cremation law are: the tradition\nof the Old and New Testaments (Gen., iii, 19; I Cor., xv. 42), and\nespecially the example of Christ whose body was consigned to the tomb;\nthe association of burial throughout the history of the Church with\nsacred rites and the doctrine of the future life, and the contrary\nassociation of cremation both in times past and today with paganism and\ndespair; the sacred dignity of the human body (Gen., i. 25; I Cor.,\niii. 16, vi. 5), and the feeling of affection for parents, relatives,\nfriends, which is outraged when their bodies are consigned to the\nfurnace. The practical arguments offered for cremation are chiefly\nhygienic and economic; but it is certain that proper burial at sea or\nin the grave is no menace to public health, and is not more expensive\nor difficult than cremation. A most serious objection to cremation is\nthat it makes exhumation impossible, and is therefore a means of\nconcealing murder by poison. It is not lawful for a Catholic to\ncooperate (except materially in case of necessity) with cremation, or\nto belong to any society that promotes the incineration of corpses; it\nis not lawful for a priest to give the last Sacraments or funeral rites\nto those who ordered the cremation of their bodies.\n\n2596. The Special Duties of Clerics.--From the duties of Catholics in\ngeneral we pass now to the special duties of clerics; for the clergy,\non account of their position as the salt of the earth and the light of\nthe world (Matt., v. 16), are bound to a greater internal and external\nholiness and edification than the laity. The word \u201ccleric\u201d is\nunderstood in a wide or in a strict sense. In the wide sense, a cleric\nis any Christian specially set apart for the service of God, whether by\nordination or religious profession (e.g., lay brothers, nuns); in the\nstrict sense, a cleric (clergyman) is one who has been admitted to\nOrders, or at least to their preparation through tonsure (Canon 108).\n\n(a) Duties Before Entering the Clerical State.--The person who would\nenter the clerical state must have a vocation and a right intention. As\nto the latter, since the clerical state has for its ends the glory of\nGod and the salvation of souls, it would be a serious sin to choose it\nprincipally for temporal ends, such as wealth, dignity or pleasure; but\nit is not a sin to desire secondarily and moderately the necessary\nsupport of the clerical state (I Cor., ix, 3).\n\n(b) Duties After Entering the Clerical State.--The privileges of\nclerics are treated in canonical works. Here we speak only of duties.\nThe obligations of a cleric are of two kinds--the positive, such as\ncelibacy, and the negative, such as the avoidance of unbecoming\namusements or occupations.\n\n2597. Vocation to the Clerical State.--(a) Internal Vocation.--No one\nshould enter the religious or clerical state unless called thereto by\nGod (John, xv. 16; Acts, xiii. 2; Heb., v. 4, 5; I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.).\nThe foundation of the entire religious, priestly and apostolic life,\nnamely divine vocation, consists of two essential elements, the one\ndivine, the other ecclesiastical. As to the first element, God\u2019s call\nto embrace the priestly or religious life must be considered so\nnecessary that in its absence the foundation upon which the whole\nstructure is to rest is absent (Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_). The\nsigns of a divine call do not necessarily or even ordinarily include a\nfeeling of inspiration or invitation from the Holy Spirit, but it\nsuffices that one may have a liking, a right intention, and fitness\n(physical, mental, moral) for the life; for, where God gives a call, He\ngives the means to fulfill the duties. Thus, those who will not be able\nto say Mass, or who cannot master Latin or theology, or who cannot\nobserve celibacy, or who are vicious (e.g., mischief-makers, drunkards)\nor unspiritual (e.g., the lazy, those who dislike exercises of piety),\ndo not show the signs of a priestly vocation.\n\n(b) External Vocation.--No one should be admitted to the religious life\nor to Orders unless he has given sufficient signs of a call from God.\nThus, a Bishop would sin most gravely and be a sharer in the sins of\nothers if he conferred Major Orders on anyone about whose unworthiness\nhe was morally certain on positive grounds (Canon 973); nor may a\nReligious Superior receive to profession any novice about whom he is\ndoubtful (Canon 571). Scarcity of vocations is no excuse for laxity,\nsince it is better to have a few creditable clerics than a multitude of\nunworthy ones (Benedict XIV). What St. Paul said of deacons (\u201cLet these\nfirst be proved, and so let them minister, having no crime,\u201d I Tim.,\niii. 10), is therefore to be applied to all candidates for the clerical\nlife. A vocation is tested by the years of probation which the church\nlaw provides for seminarians, novices and other aspirants to the\necclesiastical state. No cleric has a right to ordination before he\nreceives the free call from a bishop, but on the other hand it is\ncriminal to prevent a suitable candidate from embracing the clerical\nstate (Canon 971). \u201cBy a divine vocation to the religious and clerical\nstate a person undertakes publicly to lead a life of holiness in the\nChurch, a visible and hierarchical society, and to exercise this\nhierarchical ministry. Such a person, therefore, ought to be\nauthoritatively tested, approved and directed by the hierarchical\nrulers to whom God has entrusted the administration of the Church\u201d\n(Pius XII, _Sedes Sapientiae_).\n\n2598. Sinfulness of Disregarding Vocation.--(a) He who enters the\nclerical state, not knowing that he has a vocation, is guilty of sin,\nas is clear from the previous paragraph. According to some, anyone who\nreceives Major Orders, even with serious doubt about his vocation,\ncommits a mortal sin, since he inflicts a serious injury on the rights\nof God, the Church, himself and his neighbor. According to others, the\nsin is only venial when one enters the clerical state conscious of the\nabsence of vocation, but determined with the help of God to live up to\nall the duties; for, though the act is rash, there is good will and\ngood intention, and grace will not be wanting.\n\n(b) He who refuses to enter the clerical state, though knowing for\ncertain that he has a vocation, is also guilty of sin, for only\nnegligence or improper motives such as laziness, sensuality, or too\ngreat love of liberty can produce such reluctance. The sin is grave or\nlight according to the circumstances. There is grave sin, if the\nresistance to the call constitutes serious disobedience, pride or\nuncharitableness (e.g., if there were a great scarcity of priests and\nthe bishop commanded a worthy layman to take Orders); there is venial\nsin in other cases when the rejection is only dissent to an invitation\nand exposes neither self nor other to grave peril of losing salvation.\nFinally, if the signs of vocation do not produce certainty, there may\nbe no sin at all, but rather virtue, in refusal to ascend to the\nclerical state, for no one is bound to take up grave obligations when\nuncertain of his duties, and many holy persons from humility or fear of\nunworthiness have decided, against the advice or invitation of others,\nnot to become clerics.\n\n2599. The Positive Duties of Clerics.--(a) Duties to God.--All clerics\nare held to frequent reception of the Sacrament of Penance, to daily\ndevotions (i.e., mental prayer, visit to the Blessed Sacrament, a third\npart of the Rosary, examen), and to triennial spiritual retreats\n(Canons 125, 126). Moreover, clerics in Sacred Orders, benefice\nholders, and solemnly professed religious bound to the choir are\nobliged to the daily recitation of the Canonical Hours, each one\naccording to his own rite and calendar (Canons 135, 213 sqq., 1475,\n610). This obligation is grave, because its purpose is the important\none of consecrating each hour of the day by the public prayer of the\nChurch according to the usage that goes back to the earliest centuries.\nBut the choral obligation of simply professed religious is light,\nunless the choir is impossible without their presence.\n\n(b) Duties to Superiors.--Clerics are especially obliged to show\nrespect to their Ordinaries and to give them the obedience promised in\nordination (Canon 127).\n\n(c) Duties to the Clerical State.--Clerics are required to cultivate\ntheir minds by sacred and sound studies, and to this end examinations\nand conferences are also prescribed (Canons 129-131); to keep\nthemselves pure in soul and body by the observance of celibate chastity\n(Canons 132, 133); to conduct themselves in externals (dwelling, dress,\netc.) in a manner befitting their position (Canons 134, 136). The\nclerical garb in this country is the cassock or habit in the house and\nchurch, and dark clothes and the Roman collar, or other distinctive\nsign for priests and brothers elsewhere. The dress of the clergy should\navoid the extremes of dudishness and slovenliness (Second Council of\nBaltimore, 148; Third Council, 77). The duty of wearing clerical dress\nat least away from home and regularly is of serious importance, since\nits purpose is the honor of the clerical state and the protection of\nits members. It is also forbidden to clerics to cultivate their hair\n(e.g., to grow long locks, to use curling irons, to oil or perfume\ntheir head in dandyish fashion), since this is unbecoming in the\nfollowers of a thorn-crowned Leader. The use of the beard is a thing\nindifferent in itself, and hence it is forbidden in some places\n(generally in the Latin Church) and required in others (as in the\nOrient), according to tradition and local usage.\n\n2600. The Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) Matter.--A cleric is\ngravely obliged to recite the Office according to his own rite and in\nthe language of his rite, and not to make any notable change in the\nOffice prescribed by the Ordo, either as to quantity (e.g., by omission\nof a Little Hour or of parts equally long) or as to quality (e.g., by\nsubstitution of a minor office for that of one of the great\nsolemnities.) The omission of the Vespers of Holy Saturday, of\nPretiosa, or of the Rogation Litanies seems to be only a venial sin,\nbecause in the first two cases the prayer is short, while in the third\ncase the precept seems to be _sub levi_. There is also lightness of\nmatter in the omission of an inconsiderable part of the day\u2019s Office,\nor in the substitution without good reason of an equal part for a\nprescribed part.\n\n(b) Manner.--Since the Office is a prayer, of a public and daily kind,\nit must be said: mentally, that is, there must be at least virtual\nintention (which is present from the fact that one takes up the\nBreviary to fulfill the obligation) and at least external attention\n(see 2166 sqq.); vocally, that is, the words must be consciously formed\nby the lips, mouth, or tongue, but it is not necessary that they be\naudible, unless two or more are saying the Office together; within the\nlimits of the day, that is, Matins and Lauds may be anticipated from 2\np.m. of the previous day, but the whole Office must be finished before\nmidnight of the current day. These are substantial requisites and bind\n_sub gravi_, but there may be only venial sin when they are deviated\nfrom inconsiderably. Next, since the Office has a continuity of\nthought, an order of precedence among its hours and their subdivisions,\nand a special dignity, it must be said uninterruptedly (i.e., without\nbreak between the parts of an hour), in order (i.e., according to the\nsuccession of Matins, Lauds, Prime, etc.), with external respect as to\nplace and posture (i.e., he who is bound to choral Office should say it\nin choir and with the rubrical postures, while he who is bound only to\nprivate Office should say it in church or some other becoming place,\nand should observe the rubrical or at least a respectful posture).\nThese are accidental requisites and bind _sub levi_. For a good reason\none may interrupt the Office even for a notable part of the day (e.g.,\none may discontinue in the midst of a Psalm to pay a duty of politeness\nor to attend to business), and for convenience one may invert the order\nof hours or of parts of hours, or may say the evening hours in the\nmorning.\n\n2601. Excuses from the Obligation of the Divine Office.--(a) For\nSubstitution.--A sufficient reason makes it permissible to substitute\nanother office not notably different in quantity or quality, as when\none lacks a new office, or has greater devotion for another office.\nWhen substitution has been made unintentionally, the following rules\nmay be observed, though the last two are not admitted by all: office\ncounts for office, (e.g., he who through mistake has said the office of\nanother day may let that office stand for today\u2019s office, but should\nadd enough to make up for any notable shortness in the office said);\nhour does not count for hour (e.g., he who through mistake said Tierce\ntwice cannot count the second Tierce for Sext); an error should be\ncorrected when noticed (e.g., he who notices at Sext that he is not\nsaying the right office should change from Sext); an error is not\ncorrected by another error (e.g., he who said today\u2019s office yesterday\nshould not say yesterday\u2019s office today).\n\n(b) For Omission.--The causes that excuse, in whole or in part, from\nrecitation of the Office are physical inability (e.g., loss of the\nbreviary, blindness of one who does not know the hours by heart,\nsickness or convalescence which makes the recitation a grave hardship),\nmoral impossibility (e.g., when an urgent duty of charity or justice so\ntakes up one\u2019s time that one cannot get in all the Office), just\ndispensation or commutation given by the Pope or, for temporary\nrelease, by the Ordinary.\n\n2602. The Precept of Clerical Celibacy.--(a) Origin.--This law is not\ndivine but ecclesiastical, since it arose, not from any command of\nChrist, but from a custom of the Church that goes back to the first\ncenturies. Nevertheless, celibacy of the clergy is an imitation of\nChrist and the Apostles, a following of the counsel given by the Lord,\nan honor to the sacrifice of the altar, and an example that single\nchastity is possible. Moreover, by means of it the priest is freed from\ndomestic relations and better enabled to minister as the father,\npastor, confessor and counsellor of his people. The celibate is\nunencumbered by family responsibilities and expenses, and is therefore\nbetter able to respond to difficult and dangerous tasks, such as\nmission work in pagan lands and ministrations to the dying in fire,\nwreck, or plague, The Church does not denounce or condemn the married\nclergy of non-Catholic bodies; on the contrary, she permits to some\nextent a married clergy among the Oriental Catholics, who for many\ncenturies have been accustomed to a married priesthood. But the law of\ncelibacy for the Catholic clergy has not only proved itself more\nsuitable for their work, but it has also justified itself by the\ngeneral fidelity with which it has been observed and the attachment to\nit of clergy and laity alike.\n\n(b) Obligation.--The law commands chastity as a grave duty of religion\n(Canon 132); it forbids the contract or use of marriage (Canon 1072).\nIt forbids, where there is danger to chastity or scandal, cohabitation\nand companionship with women (Canon 133). Cohabitation refers to\ndwelling in the same house, even though it be only during the day, and\nthe woman be a servant; companionship refers to visits, conversations,\nsigns of friendship, and the like. The danger to good name or virtue\ndepends on circumstances, such as age, beauty, levity, and privacy of\nassociation; and the law presumes that a relationship is suspicious\nunless a woman is a near relative by blood or by marriage (i.e., in the\nfirst or second degree), or is mature in age (about forty years old)\nand proved in virtue and of good repute.\n\n2603. Negative Duties of Clerics.--The negative duties of clerics are\nthe avoidance of certain acts, occupations, or amusements forbidden as\nworldly, undignified, dangerous, distracting or scandalous (I Thess.,\nv. 22; II Tim., ii. 4).\n\n(a) Forbidden Acts.--A cleric may not go surety without permission,\nlest he or his church be involved in scandalous embarrassments (Canon\n137); nor engage in trade, lest he be distracted from his spiritual\nduties and exposed to the danger or suspicion of injustice or greed\n(Canon 142; for penalty attached see Decree of the Sacred Congregation\nof the Council, AAS, 42-33D).\n\n(b) Forbidden Occupations.--These include, first, employments and\npursuits unbecoming to clerics (such as those of butcher, actor,\ninnkeeper); next, those that are incompatible with the ministry (such\nas the practice for profit of the medical profession, public\nmagistracies, government jobs, civil court functions, legislative\noffices, Canon 139); finally, those that are contrary to the mildness\nthat should distinguish clerics (viz, the occupation of fighting man or\nsoldier, Canon 141; see also Canon 984 on executioners). But exceptions\nmay be made for a just cause.\n\n(c) Forbidden Amusements.--Clerics should not take part in undignified\ndiversions or cruel sports, such as the hunting of big game with great\nuproar of dogs and guns (Canon 138) or in gambling, and they should not\nenter saloons or similar places (Canon 138). Clerics are also forbidden\nto assist at unbecoming shows, performances, dances, or at any\ntheatrical entertainment where their presence gives scandal (Canon\n140). To gamble much (say, several times a week and for a considerable\ntime at each game) is considered a serious matter; but it is not sinful\nto indulge in a game of chance now and then, if the stakes are moderate\nand there is no scandal.\n\n2604. The Prohibition against Trading.--(a) Meaning.--Trading as here\nunderstood is purely gainful merchandizing (i.e., buying an article at\na lower price in order to sell it unchanged at a higher price) or\nindustrial merchandizing (i.e., buying an article in order to sell it\nat a profit after it has been changed by hired labor). Hence, there is\nno canonical trading in commerce which lacks one of the conditions\nmentioned, for example, if one buys goods for one\u2019s household or\ncommunity and, on discovering that a superfluity has been purchased,\nsells at a profit what is left over (see 2134, 2135). Trading includes\nnot only a business conducted personally or for personal profit, but\nalso one conducted through agents or for the benefit of others, such as\nthe poor or pious causes.\n\n(b) Obligation.--The violation of this law is grave in itself, but a\nserious sin demands on the part of the subject that there be real\ntrading (i.e., a number of acts morally united and proceeding from a\npurpose to continue in lucrative merchandizing), and on the side of the\nobject that there be a large amount involved. Hence, it would be venial\nto engage in lucrative trading with a large profit once, and with a\nsmall profit twice or thrice.\n\n(c) Excuses.--Necessity (e.g., if a cleric needs the money to live or\nto maintain his state, or if a business has fallen to him by\ninheritance and cannot be given up without loss) justifies trading, if\nthere is permission.\n\n2605. Is It Lawful for Clerics to Purchase and Sell Stocks and\nBonds?--(a) If this conduct has the character of gambling or trading\nfor profit, it is forbidden by Canon 138 or 142, as the case may be,\nand is gravely or venially sinful according to the circumstances. Thus,\npure speculation or mere betting on the market is a game of chance, and\nthe frequent purchase of stocks with the thought of quick sales and\nhuge profits from sudden changes of the market is lucrative trading.\n\n(b) If the gambling or trading element is absent, the conduct in\nquestion is not forbidden by Canon Law. It is generally admitted that\nbond investments are permissible, since they are only a loan of one\u2019s\nmoney at interest. There are two views about stock dealings: the\nstricter view regards them as always containing the character of\nforbidden trading (since all the notes of strict negotiation are found\nin them), or at least as being a game of chance; the milder view, which\nis common, holds that they are no more an affair of chance than many\nother business undertakings, and that there is no strict negotiation,\nif the stockholder is not a member or director of the corporation,\nsince the buying and selling is done neither directly nor indirectly by\nhim. Buying of stocks, then, may be nothing more than a prudent\ninvestment of money in a deserving enterprise with the hope of a\nreasonable return, and selling out the stocks at a large profit may be\nnothing more than the disposal of superfluous goods which it would be\ninconvenient to retain. It must be remembered, though, that it is\nunlawful to cooperate with a company whose purpose is evil or suspect,\nor to have part in frauds, or to give disedification.\n\n2606. Special Duties of Clerical Superiors from Divine Law.--(a) As\nindividuals, they should strive to be personally more perfect than\ntheir subjects, for they are supposed to give an example in faith,\nreligion, zeal, labor, and self-denial, \u201cbeing made a pattern of the\nflock from the heart\u201d (I Peter, v. 3).\n\n(b) As rulers, they must have the virtues of good superiors, such as\nlegal justice or firm devotion to the common good, distributive justice\nor avoidance of partiality and prejudice, prudence or knowledge of how\nto direct men and means successfully to the glory of God and the\nsalvation of souls, and commutative justice or respect for the rights\nof subjects.\n\n(c) As pastors, they must avoid the qualities of the wolf and of the\nhireling, and cultivate those of the good shepherd, being kind and\namiable to Catholic and non-Catholic, and practising the spiritual and\ncorporal works of mercy.\n\n2607. Special Duties from Canon Law of Those Who Have Care of\nSouls.--(a) Bishops have grave obligations of residing in their see or\ndiocese (Canon 338), of attending to the instruction of their flock\n(Canons 1327, 336), of applying the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 339), of\nmaking a diocesan report (Canon 340), of confirming and of ordaining\nworthy candidates (Canon 785), of visiting their dioceses (Canon 343),\nof making the _ad limina_ visit (Canons 340, 342), and of calling a\ndiocesan synod at least every tenth year (Canon 356).\n\n(b) Pastors must reside generally in their parish (Canon 465), and, if\nlawfully absent, they must make provision for the sick calls and other\nspiritual necessities of their flocks. They must preach the word of God\non Sundays and holydays, and it would be a serious matter to neglect\nthis duty for a considerable time (e.g., a whole month) without good\nreason (Canon 1344). It is also a serious obligation to attend to the\nnecessary catechetical instruction of young and old (Canons 1330,\n1332), to apply the Mass _pro populo_ (Canon 466), and to administer\nthe Sacraments (at least Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction) to those in\ngrave spiritual need (see 1167). Pastors are also obliged to know their\nflock, to visit the sick and dying, to correct abuses, to see that the\ncustomary administration of the Sacraments and the usual church\nfunctions are attended to, to watch over the schooling of the children,\nand to direct the temporalities and attend to the reports and records\nof the parish. The duties of chaplains of hospitals, institutions,\nsoldiers, etc., are similar to those of pastors, but in particular\ncases the former are subject to special prescriptions or to local usage\nor to rules made by the Ordinary.\n\n(c) Assistant pastors are subject in the care of souls to the\ninstruction and direction of the parish-priest. Their particular duties\nare known from the diocesan statutes, the letters of the Ordinary, and\nthe commission of the pastor. Regularly, they are bound to reside in\nthe parish rectory and to assist the pastor or supply for him in all\nthe parish work, the Mass _pro populo_ excepted (Canon 476).\n\n2608. The Duty of Charity to the Poor.--(a) According to Canon Law all\nbeneficed clergy (Cardinals excepted) must give all the superfluous\nfruits of their benefice to charitable or pious causes (Canon 1473).\nBut it is an extremely strict view which holds that all the secular\nclergy are beneficed.\n\n(b) According to the divine law of charity (see 1226, 1252) even the\nunbeneficed clergy have the duty of giving alms from their surplus\nwealth. Thus, it would be unmerciful if a clergyman spent on himself\nall the fortune he had inherited from his relatives without thought of\nthe poor; it would be often a source of scandal if a priest enriched\nhis relatives with money received in ministerial ways, but left nothing\nto pious causes.\n\n2609. Canon 1473 on the Disposition of Superfluous Wealth by Beneficed\nClergy.--(a) The Money to be Spent.--The Canon does not refer to the\nproperty of the Church (i.e., the foundation or endowment of the\nbenefice), for of this the beneficed clergyman is only the\nadministrator, and he would be unjust if he alienated its funds to\nother purposes; nor does it refer to the clergyman\u2019s own property, such\nas goods received by inheritance or other profane title\n(_patrimonialia_), or by title of personal ministerial service, such as\nstipends and fees (_quasi-patrimonialia_). It refers, then, to the\nrevenues of the benefice (e.g., the bishop\u2019s or pastor\u2019s salary) and to\nthe amount that is left over after the deduction of all reasonable and\ncustomary expenses that have been made, or could have been made for\ndecent personal support.\n\n(b) The Use of Surplus Money.--The alms should be given to any pious or\ncharitable cause, such as the promotion of divine worship, the\nassistance of needy missions, the spiritual or corporal works of mercy.\nThe cleric is free to bestow his gift either during his lifetime (which\nis better) or to leave it in his will.\n\n2610. The Obligation of Canon 1473.--(a) The obligation is most\nprobably not one of justice, since the holder of the benefice owns the\nsuperfluous fruits, but one of obedience to the Church. Some authors\nalso consider this precept as binding in virtue of religion and\ncharity, and regard its violation as a sacrilege or sin against\ncharity. The holder of the benefice is not held to restitution,\nhowever, since neglect of the precept is not an injustice. As to his\nsuccessors through gift inter vivos or testament, they are not bound to\ngive the superfluities as an alms, since the church precept was for the\ncleric himself. Successors to an intestate should observe the wishes of\nthe deceased, but, if the character of the goods they inherit is\ndoubtful, they may usually be left in good faith.\n\n(b) The obligation is grave, since it is commanded as an act of\nreligion, or at least as an act of obedience in a very important\nmatter. From the time of the Apostles it was customary to distribute to\nthe poor what was left over of the goods of the Church, and the clergy\nwere regarded as the fathers and protectors of the needy. Again, since\nthe goods of a benefice originated in gifts offered to God Himself, it\nis most becoming that their superfluities be devoted to the causes most\npleasing to God. Grave matter would be three times the amount required\nin theft, because a violation of this precept is not the taking of what\nis not one\u2019s own, but the using in a forbidden way of what is one\u2019s own.\n\n2611. The Special Duties of Religious.--The particular obligations of\nreligious are declared in the proper rules of the various institutes,\njust as the particular obligations of the secular clergy are set forth\nin the statutes of local synods and councils. We shall outline here\nonly the general obligations of religious, to which they are held by\nthe common law of the Church.\n\n(a) By reason of his profession, a religious is obliged to strive after\nthe perfection of charity (see 1560, 367) through the religious life,\nthat is, by means of the rules and constitutions of his own institute\n(Canon 593). All religious, superiors and subjects, are bound to\nobserve their laws, but _per se_ these laws oblige under penalty, not\nunder sin (see 570). _Per accidens_, however, the transgression of rule\nor constitutions may be sinful, as when the matter belongs also to\ndivine or church law or to the observance of a vow, or when the\ntransgression includes contempt, scandal, or demoralization of\ndiscipline.\n\n(b) By reason of the vows, a religious is obliged to follow the three\nevangelical counsels (see 2191 sqq.) and any other vows of his\ninstitute according to his rule (e.g., poverty is a renunciation of\neven community possession in some rules and of individual possession in\nothers). The vows oblige _per se_ under grave sin, on account of the\nduty of religion (see 2209) and the intention of the religious to bind\nhimself gravely; but there may be venial sin on account of imperfection\nof act or lightness of matter.\n\n2612. The Obligation of the Three Principal Vows.--(a) Poverty is a\nrenunciation of the independent use of external corporal goods, such as\nmoney and lands and chattels (simple vow), or also of the radical\ndominion (see 1697) or right of ownership of such goods (solemn vow).\nGrave matter in the unjust violation of poverty seems to be the same as\nin other acts of unjust damage or acquisition, and hence in thefts from\noutsiders a less amount is grave matter, in domestic thefts from the\nmonastery a greater sum is required (see 1900, 1903). Grave matter in\nthe violation of poverty that is not unjust (e.g., in use of money\nwithout permission) seems to be the same as absolutely grave matter for\nthefts, unless the constitutions rule otherwise; but grave matter here\ndoes not coalesce from many small violations. The virtue, but not the\nvow, of poverty is offended by purely internal acts (e.g., attachment\nto wealth), and there is no offense at all in dominion over spirituals\n(such as fame, good reputation) which are not renounced by the vow of\npoverty, and in certain acts of disposition (e.,g., acceptance of\ndeposit, distribution of alms) or proprietorship (e.g., of manuscripts)\npermitted by rule.\n\n(b) Chastity is a renunciation of all venereal pleasure, internal and\nexternal, lawful and unlawful. Grave matter is the same as for the\nvirtue of chastity, but the vow could be violated without the violation\nof the virtue (e.g., in the use of marriage by one simply professed).\nFor the protection of this vow the Church has made the law of cloister,\nwhich forbids under certain conditions the entrance of outsiders into a\nreligious house or the egress of the religious (Canons 547, 598,\n600-604, 679, 2342).\n\n(c) Obedience is the renunciation of one\u2019s own will with the duty of\nsubmission to commands of a Superior given according to the rules and\nconstitutions. There is grave matter against the vow if one disobeys in\nan important matter imposed by the Superior in the name of obedience\nand according to the rite prescribed by the rule or constitutions (see\n2364). The virtue, but not the vow, is offended by internal\ninsubordination (see 2357); neither virtue nor vow is offended when a\nSuperior commands what is above the rule (e.g., the accomplishment of\nthe impossible, heroic acts that do not pertain to the nature of the\ninstitute), or against the rule, unless he has power to dispense, or\nprobably what is beneath the rule (such as things manifestly ridiculous\nand useless). Since obedience is vowed to the precepts of the Superior,\nthe vow is not broken by transgression of points of the rule not\nexpressly included under the vow, nor by transgressions of the general\nprecepts of God and the Church.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY\n\n2613. The Duties of Husbands and Wives.--Conjugal obligations may be\nclassed under three heads according to the three ends of marriage.\n\n(a) Thus, the first blessing of marriage is offspring, and this imposes\nupon parents the obligation of providing for their children and of\ntraining them in mind and will (see 2630 sqq.).\n\n(b) The second blessing of marriage is fidelity to the engagement made\nby husband and wife to deliver to each other exclusive power over their\nbodies for procreation (conjugal debt) and to love each other with a\nspecial but pure affection: \u201cThe wife hath not power of her own body,\nbut the husband; and in like manner the husband hath not power of his\nown body but the wife\u201d (I Cor., vii. 4); \u201cHusbands, love your wives as\nChrist also loved the Church\u201d (Eph., v. 25). Conjugal love admits no\nrivals; the husband must prefer his wife to every other woman, and the\nwife likewise must think more of her husband than of any other man (see\n1179).\n\n(c) The third blessing of marriage is the Sacrament or the unbreakable\nbond of marriage: \u201cThe Lord commanded that the wife depart not from the\nhusband, and if she depart that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled\nto her husband. And let not the husband put away his wife\u201d (I Cor.,\nvii. 10). This imposes the duties of a permanent domestic society in\nwhich the spouses dwell together permanently and each has certain\nspecial functions of assistance to the other.\n\n2614. The Obligation of Paying the Conjugal Debt.--(a) The duty is one\nof justice, since it arises from the contract of marriage, in which the\nparties freely and solemnly bind themselves to it as the subject-matter\nof their pact.\n\n(b) The obligation is grave, since the marriage contract is one of the\nmost momentous of human agreements, its direct end being the\npropagation of the race, while the denial of its essential right is\nproductive of most serious evils, such as incontinence, scandals and\nthe disruption of families. There is light matter, however, as when the\nrequest is not imperative, or the denial is infrequent and without\ndanger of incontinence.\n\n2615. Absence of Obligation.--The obligation of paying the conjugal\ndebt does not exist, however, when the right to make the request has\nbeen lost or when the request is unreasonable.\n\n(a) Thus, the right to make the request is lost when one party has\nbroken faith by committing adultery and has not been forgiven by the\ninnocent party, and also when one party is incapable (e.g., on account\nof insanity or drunkenness) of asking in a rational manner.\n\n(b) The request is unreasonable, first, when it is immoderate (e.g.,\nwhen it cannot be granted without serious and unusual detriment to\nhealth, or without danger of death, or without likelihood of abortion\nor other great harm to a child conceived or to be conceived); secondly,\nwhen it is seductive (e.g., when it is an invitation to commit onanism).\n\n2616. Suspension of Obligation.--The obligation of granting and the\nright of requesting conjugal relations are suspended when the marriage\nis discovered to be null or uncertain.\n\n(a) Thus, if the marriage is certainly null, abstinence is necessary\nuntil the marriage is made valid; otherwise the parties are guilty of\nfornication. But if nullity is due to a merely ecclesiastical\nimpediment, the impediment probably ceases in cases of most grave\ninconvenience when the nullity is known to only one spouse and the\ndispensation cannot be obtained at once.\n\n(b) If the marriage is only doubtfully null, abstinence is not\nnecessary unless both parties have a serious doubt and no examination\nhas yet been made. Light doubts should not be considered, nor doubts\nthat have not been corroborated by investigation; while, if only one\nparty doubts, he or she cannot refuse the debt lest injustice be done\nthe other.\n\n2617. Is There an Obligation of Requesting Conjugal Intercourse?--(a)\n_Per se_, there is no obligation, since one may lawfully decide not to\nenjoy one\u2019s right, and not to use what belongs to one. As man and wife\nwere free to marry or not to marry, so are they free to agree either to\nconsummate or not consummate marriage. It is even lawful for married\npeople to contract together to abstain temporarily or permanently from\nmarriage relations (e.g., for the sake of health, or of economy, or of\nmortification). By mutual consent one or both may make a vow of\nchastity, as was done by St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin, or the\nhusband may enter the priesthood and the wife become a nun.\n\n(b) _Per accidens_, there is often an obligation of requesting\nintercourse, for experience shows that continual non-use of marriage\noften leads to incontinence or to loss of affection (see 2228).\n\n2618. The Morality of Venereal Acts of Marriage.--(a) Non-consummated\nActs.--These acts, whether internal or external, are lawful _per se_\nwhen they are used only as accessories to the act of marriage or as\nmeans to foster or preserve conjugal love, for the acts are meant by\nGod to serve the purposes mentioned (2510). But _per accidens_ there\nmay be venial sin, on account of inordinateness in the motive (i.e.,\nwhen only pleasure is intended), or in the manner (i.e., when due\ndecency is not observed). There is mortal sin when these acts are not\nreferred to the lawful conjugal act, but either directly or indirectly\nto pollution, namely, when there is foreseen proximate danger of\npollution and the acts are either solitary or cooperative but performed\nwithout sufficient reason (such as expressions of special affection),\nfor pollution is gravely sinful in the married, as well as in the\nsingle state (see 2539 sqq.).\n\n(b) Natural Consummated Act.--This act in itself is not only lawful,\nbut meritorious, because it exercises such virtues as obedience (Gen.,\ni. 28), justice (I Cor., vii. 3 sqq.), and love of the common good and\nreligion (Tob., viii. 9). Since marriage intercourse has for its ends\nnot only reproduction, but also the expression of mutual love and the\nallaying of concupiscence, it is lawful even when conception is\nimpossible or less probable, as when the parties are sterile, or the\nwoman is pregnant, or during the so-called agenesic period, or at the\ntime of lactation. It is a venial sin to exercise the conjugal act when\none excludes every motive except that of pleasure (Denziger, n. 1159);\nand there may be even mortal sin on account of circumstances, such as\nplace (e.g., scandal to others present), manner (e.g., external\nimmoderation, internal desire of another person), evil consequences\n(e.g., when one of the parties has a contagious or veneral disease,\nwhen abortion will likely result, etc.).\n\n(c) Unnatural Consummated Acts.--Pollution is mortally sinful (2535\nsqq.), and is worse in married than in single persons, as being an\ninjury to the faith pledged in marriage; and hence it is not lawful to\npractise it even for the purpose of artificial fecundation. Rectal\ncopulation is also gravely sinful, being unnatural lust (see 2534) and\na violation of conjugal faith. The usual forms of unnatural vaginal\ncoition, which are very much practised today, are contraceptive in\npurpose, and are of two general kinds in the procedure--the\nphysiological or preventive, which uses instruments to keep the semen\nfrom the uterus (such as sponges or pessaries for the female, condoms\nor protectors for the male), or which employs douches or syringes to\nremove semen from the vagina, or uses chemicals to devitalize it.\n\n2619. Nota.--(a) Non habetur onanismus, nec peccatum, si copula\nabrumpitur, ex necessitate (v.g., ad vitandum scandalum persona\ninopinate supervenientis), vel ex utilitate, mutuo dato consensu et\npericulo pollutionis excluso; nam seminatio extra vas, aut involuntaria\nest, aut nulla.\n\n(b) Non habetur contraceptio nec peccatum, sed potius actus honestus,\nsi, ob defectum physicum viri vel mulieris, naturae adjuvetur mediis\nartificialibus ut copula fiat, vel ut semen introducatur in uterum; nam\nfini matrimonii non obstat, sed obsecundat iste modus agendi.\n\n(c) Artificial Insemination. The subject-matter of the latter part of\nthe preceding paragraph is distinguished from several unlawful\npractices considered by moralists under the heading of artificial\ninsemination. Pope Pius XII on several occasions has given a clear,\naccurate and complete statement of Catholic teaching on the subject. We\nappend here his texts:\n\n1) The practice of artificial insemination, when it refers to man,\ncannot be considered, either exclusively or principally, from the\nbiological and medical point of view, ignoring the moral and legal one.\n\nArtificial insemination, outside of marriage, must be condemned as\nessentially and strictly immoral.\n\nNatural law and divine positive law establish, in fact, that the\nprocreation of a new life cannot but be the fruit of marriage. Only\nmarriage safeguards the dignity of the spouses (principally of the wife\nin the present case) and their personal good. It alone provides for the\nwell-being and education of the child.\n\nIt follows that no divergence of opinion among Catholics is admitted on\nthe condemnation of artificial insemination outside of marriage. The\nchild conceived in those conditions would be, by that very fact,\nillegitimate.\n\nArtificial insemination produced in a marriage by the active element of\na third party is equally immoral and consequently to be condemned\nwithout appeal.\n\nOnly the spouses have a reciprocal right upon each other\u2019s body to\ngenerate a new life: an exclusive, inalienable right, which cannot be\nceded. And so it must be, even out of consideration for the child. On\nwhoever gives life to a small being, nature imposes, by the very\nstrength of that tie, the duty to keep and educate it. But no ties of\norigin, no moral or legal bonds of conjugal procreation, exist between\nthe legitimate husband and the child who is the fruit of the active\nelement of a third party (even if the husband has given his consent).\n\nAs far as the legitimacy of artificial insemination in marriage is\nconcerned, it suffices, for the moment, to recall these principles of\nnatural law: the simple fact that the result desired is obtained by\nthis means does not justify the use of the means itself; nor does the\ndesire of the husband and wife, in itself perfectly legitimate, to have\na child, suffice to establish the legitimacy of resorting to the\nartificial insemination which would satisfy this desire.\n\nIt would be erroneous, therefore, to think that the possibility of\nresorting to this means might render valid a marriage between persons\nunable to contract it because of the _impedimentum impotentiae_.\n\nOn the other hand, it is superfluous to mention that the active element\ncan never be obtained legitimately by means of acts against nature.\n\nAlthough new methods cannot be ruled out a priori for the sole reason\nof their novelty, nonetheless, as far as artificial impregnation is\nconcerned, extreme caution is not enough; it must be absolutely\nexcluded. Saying this does not necessarily proscribe the use of certain\nartificial means destined only to facilitate the natural act, or to\nassure the accomplishment of the end of the natural act regularly\nperformed.\n\nLet it never be forgotten that only the procreation of a new life\naccording to the will and the designs of the Creator brings with it, to\na marvelous degree of perfection, the accomplishment of the proposed\nends. It is at the same time in conformity with corporeal and spiritual\nnature and the dignity of the married couple, as well as with the\nhealthy, normal development of the child (Address to Physicians, Sept.\n29, 1949, _Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi, pp. 221 ff).\n\n2) We also believe that it is of capital importance for you, gentlemen,\nnot to neglect this perspective when you consider the methods of\nartificial fecundation. The means by which one tends toward the\nproduction of a new life take on an essential human significance\ninseparable from the desired end and susceptible of causing grave harm\nto this very end if these means are not conformable to reality and to\nthe laws inscribed in the nature of beings.\n\nWe have been asked to give some directives on this point also. On the\nsubject of the experiments in artificial human fecundation \u201cin vitro,\u201d\nlet it suffice for Us to observe that they must be rejected as immoral\nand absolutely illicit. With regard to the various moral problems which\nare posed by artificial fecundation, in the ordinary meaning of the\nexpression, or \u201cartificial insemination,\u201d We have already expressed Our\nthought in a discourse addressed to physicians on September 29, 1949\n(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_, vol. xi. pp. 221 ff.). For the details We\nrefer you to what We said then and We confine Ourself here to repeating\nthe concluding judgment given there: \u201cWith regard to artificial\nfecundation, not only is there reason to be extremely reserved, but it\nmust be absolutely rejected. In speaking thus, one is not necessarily\nforbidding the use of certain artificial means destined solely to\nfacilitate the natural act or to achieve the attainment of the natural\nact normally performed.\u201d But since artificial fecundation is being more\nand more widely used, and in order to correct some erroneous opinions\nwhich are being spread concerning what We have taught, We have the\nfollowing to add:\n\nArtificial fecundation exceeds the limits of the right which spouses\nhave acquired by the matrimonial contract, namely, that of fully\nexercising their natural sexual capacity in the natural accomplishment\nof the marital act. The contract in question does not confer on them a\nright to artificial fecundation, for such a right is not in any way\nexpressed in the right to the natural conjugal act and cannot be\ndeduced from it. Still less can one derive it from the right to the\n\u201cchild,\u201d the primary \u201cend\u201d of marriage. The matrimonial contract does\nnot give this right, because it has for its object not the \u201cchild,\u201d but\nthe \u201cnatural acts\u201d which are capable of engendering a new life and are\ndestined to this end. It must likewise be said that artificial\nfecundation violates the natural law and is contrary to justice and\nmorality [1] (_Marriage and Parenthood_, May 19, 1956). See _The Pope\nSpeaks_, Vol, III, No. 2, Autumn of 1956, pp. 194 ff.\n\n[1] The Holy Father here spoke for several minutes in Latin as follows:\n\nAlia nunc occurrit quaestio, ad quam pertractandam magis addecet\nlatinam linguam adhibere.\n\nQuemadmodum rationalis animus noster artificiali inseminationi\nadversatur, ita eadem ethica ratio, a qua agendi normo sumenda est,\npariter vetat, quominus humanum semen, peritorum examini subiciendum,\nmasturbatiouis ope procuretur.\n\nHanc agendi rationem attigimus Nostra quoque allocutione coram\nUrologiae doctoribus coetum participantibus, die VIII mensis Octobris\nanno MDCCCCLIII prolata, in qua haec habuimus, verba: \u201cDu reste le\nSt-Office a decide deja le 2 aout 1929 (_Acta Ap. Sedis_, vol. XXI a.\n1929, p. 490, II) qu\u2019une \u201c\u2018masturbatio directe procurata ut obtineatur\nsperma\u2019 n\u2019est pas licite, ceci quel que soit le but de l\u2019examen\u201d\n(_Discorsi e Radiomessaggi_ vol. XV, pag. 378). Cum vero Nobis allatum\nsit, pravam huiusmodi consuetudinem pluribus in locis invalescere,\nopportunum ducimus nunc etiam, quae tunc monuimus, commemorare atque\niterum inculcare.\n\nSi actus huiusmodi ad explendam libidinem ponantur, eos vel ipse\nnaturalis hominis sensus sua sponte respuit, ac multo magis mentis\niudicium, quotiescumque rem mature recteque considerat. Iidem actus\ntamen tunc quoque respuendi sunt, cum graves rationes eos a culpa\neximere videntur, uti sunt: remedia iis praestanda qui nimia nervorum\nintentione vel abnormibus animi spasmis laborant; medicis peragenda,\nope microscopii, spermatis inspectio, quod venerei vel alius generis\nmorbi bacteriis infectum sit; diversarum partium examen, ex quibus\nsemen ordinarie constat, ut vitalium spermatis elementorum praesentia,\nnumerus, quantitus, forma, vis, habitus aliaque id genus dignoscuntur.\n\nEiusmodi procuratio humani seminis, per masturbationem effecta, ad\nnihil aliud directe spectat, nisi ad naturalem in homine generandi\nfacultatem plene exercendam; quod quidem plenum exercitium, extra\nconjugalem copulam peractum, secum fert directum et indebite usurpatum\neiusdem facultatis usum. In hoc eiusmodi indebito facultatis usu\nproprie sita est intrinseca regulae morum violatio. Haudquaquam enim\nhomo ius ullum exercendi facultatem sexualem iam inde habet, quod\nfacultatem eandem a natura recepit. Homini nempe (secus ac in ceteris\nanimantibus rationis expertibus contingit) ius et potestas utendi atque\nexercendi eandem facultatem tantummodo in nuptiis valide initis\ntribuitut, atque in iure matrimoniali continetur, quod ipsis nuptiis\ntraditur et acceptatur. Inde elucet hominem, ob solam hanc causam quod\nfacultatem sexualem a natura recepit, non habere nisi potentiam et ius\nad matrimonium ineundum. Hoc ius tamen, ad objectum et ambitum quod\nattinet, naturae lege, non hominum voluntate discribitur; vi huius\nlegis naturae, homini non competit ius et potestas ad plenum facultatis\nsexualis exercitium, directe intentum, nisi cum coniugalem copulam\nexercet ad normam a natura ipsa imperatam atque definitam. Extra hunc\nnaturalem actum, ne in ipso quidem matrimonio ius datur ad sexuali hac\nfacultate plene fruendum. Hi sunt limites, quibus ius, de quo diximus,\neiusque exercitium a natura circumscribuntur. Ex eo quod plenum\nsexualis facultatis exercitium hoc absolute copulae coniugalis limite\ncircumscribitur, eadem facultas intrinsece apta efficitur ad plenum\nmatrimonii naturalem finem assequendum (qui non modo est generatio, sed\netiam prolis educatio), atque eius exercitum cum dicto fine colligatur.\nQuae cum ita sint, masturbatio omnino est extra memoratam pleni\nfacultatis sexualis exercitii naturalem habilitatem, ideoque etiam\nextra eius colligationem cum fine a natura ordinato; quamobrem eadem\nomni iuris titulo caret atque naturae et ethices legibus contraria est,\netiamsi inservire intendat utilitati per se iustae nec improbandae.\n\nQuae hactenus dicta sunt de intrinseca malitia cuiuslibet pleni usus\npotentiae generandi extra naturalem coniugalem copulam, valent eodem\nmodo cum agitur de matrimonio iunctis vel de matrimonio solutis, sive\nplenum exercitium apparatus genitalis fit a viro sive a muliere, sive\nab utraque parte simul agente; sive fit tactibus manualibus sive\nconiugalis copulae interruptione; haec enim semper est actus naturae\ncontrarius atque intrinsece malus.\n\n2620. Contraception.--Contraception in all its forms (onanism,\ncondonism, vaginal irrigation, spermatocide) is a grave crime.\n\n(a) It is an Injury to God.--Marriage was instituted by God to\npropagate the human race (Gen., i. 27, 28) and to bless homes with\nchildren (Ps., cxxvi, cxxvii), and He has made it a sacred institution\nand a Sacrament. Contraception defeats the ends of marriage and\ndegrades it to the level of a mere instrument of carnal gratification.\nThe hatred of God for this sin appears in general from the horror with\nwhich Scripture speaks of unnatural lust, and in particular from the\ncase of Onan, whose sin is called detestable and whom God slew in\npunishment (Gen., xxxviii. 10).\n\n(b) It is an Injury to Society.--The perpetuation of the human race is\nendangered as soon as marriage is abused as to its natural end. Hence,\nafter the crime of homicide which destroys human life already in\nexistence, contraception seems to rank next in enormity, since it\nprevents human life from coming into existence. This vice spreads moral\ndegeneracy and decay from the home itself, and is rightly called\nrace-suicide, since it depopulates and destroys the nation by the act\nof its own people.\n\n(c) It is an Injury to the Family.--The happiness and success of the\nhome depend chiefly on the respect which its members have one for the\nother and on the cultivation of the sturdy virtues that strengthen\ncharacter. The husband and wife who practise onanism or other similar\ncarnal vices cannot have the mutual respect they should have; the wife\nis deprived of the treasure of her modesty and is treated as a\nprostitute rather than as an honored wife and mother, and the husband\nis brutalized by the removal of the natural restraint to his sex\npassion. Such self-indulgent persons will either selfishly neglect the\none or two children they may have, or will spoil them for life by the\nluxury and laziness in which they are reared.\n\n(d) It is an Injury to the Individual.--As concerns the body, there is\na perversion of the sex act from its definite use and specific end, and\nhence contraception has been described as \u201creciprocal masturbation.\u201d As\nregards the soul, its higher goods of will and intellect are\nsubordinated by the contraceptionist to the delight of passion, the\nlower impulses are greatly strengthened and self-control made more and\nmore difficult, and the spiritual objectives that should prompt a\nrational creature are sacrificed for the passing gratification that\nmoves the beasts.\n\n2621. Some Arguments of Neo-Malthusians and Other Advocates of\nContraception.--(a) Necessity for the Individual.--\u201cThis practice is\ndemanded by comfort (e.g., in order to have a good and easy time, to\nhave more opportunity for pleasures and occupations outside the home,\nto preserve form and beauty, to escape the troubles of child-bearing\nand child-rearing), or by utility (e.g., in order that suffering wives\nbe freed from the slavery of excessive child-bearing, in order that\nchildren receive more attention and care than is possible in large\nfamilies).\u201d This argument from comfort is unworthy of any but a pagan\nor materialist, for the end of existence is something higher than\npleasure or escape from all hardship. But even if happiness alone be\nconsidered, the childless home is not the most cheerful, and it often\nhappens that parents who have sinfully limited their parenthood will\nlose an only child and be left sterile and desolate. The argument from\nutility proves only that sometimes (not often) it is inadvisable for a\ncouple to have any or many children, but it does not prove that family\nlimitation through means forbidden by the laws of God and of nature is\npermissible. The normal woman is not harmed but helped by\nchild-bearing, whereas onanism and other unnatural vices are fearfully\ndamaging both to mental and physical health. Experience too shows that\nmothers of five or more children live longer, and that children from\nlarge families are very often superior in qualities and achievements\nand stand a better chance in life. Exceptions only emphasize the rule.\n\n(b) Necessity for the Family.--\u201cLarge families are impossible to many\npersons because the high cost of children today (expenses for clothing,\nfood, medical care, schooling, etc.) is beyond their means.\u201d The\ninability to support many children is often due to extravagance or to\ninsufficient wages, and the remedy lies in prudent economy or in\nimprovement of the economic condition of workers, not in the abuse of\nmarriage. The weakness of the objection is shown from the fact that\nrace-suicide is more common among the well-to-do than among the poorer\nclasses. However, in a genuine case of inability to maintain a large\nfamily, limitation of children is a duty, but not by means of the sin\nof contraception or onanism.\n\n(c) Necessity for the Community.--\u201cThe cause of unemployment,\ndestitution, famine and war is the overpopulation of the world.\nMoreover, if the poorer classes would practise contraception and the\nbetter-to-do classes have larger families, the standard of living of\nthe former would be raised, the culture of the latter would be\npreserved, and the quality of the whole race be greatly improved.\u201d The\nresources of the earth are easily adequate to support many times the\npresent population, and the misfortunes referred to are due, not to the\nnumber of people who inhabit the earth, but to accident or to human\ngreed or imprudence. The eugenic argument is a vain dream, for the\nhistory of nations and modern facts show that the ideal of race\nimprovement makes little appeal when the easier way of indulgence has\nbeen learned. As said above, it is the wealthy and educated classes who\nhave the fewest children.\n\n(d) Necessity of a Moral Kind.--\u201cContraception is a useful control of\nnature similar to that employed by physicians, surgeons and other\nscientists; it is not a contradiction of nature, since it preserves the\nend of the sexual faculty in expressing physical love. The motives of\nthose who use it are not necessarily carnal, but may be of a very\nChristian kind (e.g., the need of limitation of family in order the\nbetter to practise one\u2019s vocation, or in order to spare one\u2019s wife, or\nto keep her from abortion), and they may sincerely believe it to be\nlawful.\u201d Contraception does not control, but defeats nature, by\nvoluntarily frustrating the primary end which nature has in view, and,\nif permitted, it logically leads to every kind of sensual indulgence.\nThe motives or conscience of those who use it cannot change its\ncharacter, for the end does not justify the means and a wrong\nconscience does not change the law. Those who have not been spoiled or\nmisled by contraceptive propaganda or advice, instinctively regard\nartificial birth-control as well as onanism with disgust.\n\n2622. Is Birth-Control Ever Lawful?--(a) If this refers to an end\n(viz., the limitation of the number of children or the spacing of their\narrival), it is not unlawful in itself (see 2617); and it is sometimes\na duty, as when the wife is in very poor health or the family is unable\nto take care of more. But in view of the decline and deterioration in\npopulations today, it seems that couples who are able to bring up\nchildren well should consider it a duty to the common welfare to have\nat least four children, and it should be easy for many to have at least\na dozen children. The example of those married persons of means who are\nunable to have a number of children of their own, but who adopt or\nraise orphaned little ones, is very commendable.\n\n(b) If birth control refers to a means of family limitation, it is\nlawful when that means is continence or abstinence from marital\nrelations, not if it is onanism or the use of mechanical or chemical\nmeans to prevent conception. The objection that husbands cannot\nrestrain themselves is really an insult to God\u2019s grace and is\ncontradicted by numerous facts. A man of manly character should be\nashamed to admit that he is the slave of passion, and the fact that God\ncommands chastity and that millions obey Him both in the wedded and\nsingle state is sufficient proof that, even though hard, sexual\nabstinence is not impossible, if there is a real resolve and the right\nmeans are employed, such as rooming apart and concentration on other\nand higher things.\n\nContinence or abstinence is counselled by the Church should conditions\nmake the conception of children inadvisable. It is counselled, not\ncommanded, since it involves heroic sacrifice which makes it all the\nmore meritorious and praiseworthy: \u201cIt is wronging men and women of our\ntimes to deem them incapable of continuous heroism. Today, for many\nreasons--perhaps with the goad of hard necessity and even sometimes in\nthe service of injustice--heroism is exercised to a degree and to an\nextent which would have been thought impossible in days gone by. Why.\nthen, should this heroism, if the circumstances really demand it, stop\nat the borders established by the passions and inclinations of nature?\nThe answer is clear. The man who does not want to dominate himself is\nincapable of so doing. He who believes he can do so, counting merely on\nhis own strength without seeking sincerely and perseveringly help from\nGod, will remain miserably disillusioned\u201d (Pope Pius XII, _Allocution\nto the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives_, Oct. 29, 1951).\n\nAnother lawful means of family limitation is \u201cperiodic continence\u201d or\n\u201crhythm,\u201d the deliberate avoidance of conception by restricting\nintercourse, temporarily or permanently, to the days of natural\nsterility on the part of the wife. Many of the faithful are under the\nimpression that the system has received the unqualified approval of the\nChurch, that it constitutes a form of \u201cCatholic Birth-Control.\u201d This is\nnot completely true.\n\nAll theologians agree that the use of marriage during the sterile\nperiod is not _per se_ illicit. The act is performed in the natural\nway; nothing has been done positively to avoid conception; and the\nsecondary ends of matrimony, mutual love and the quieting of\ntemptation, have been fostered. \u201cIf the carrying out of this theory\nmeans nothing more than that the couple can make use of their\nmatrimonial rights on the days of natural sterility, too, there is\nnothing against it, for by so doing they neither hinder nor injure in\nany way the consummation of the natural act and its further natural\nconsequences\u201d (Pope Pius XII, ibid.).\n\n\u201cIf, however, there is further question--that is, of permitting the\nconjugal act on those days exclusively--then the conduct of the married\ncouple must be examined more closely\u201d (ibid).\n\nThe following points summarize papal teaching on this aspect:\n\n1) A premarital agreement to restrict the marital right and not merely\nthe use to sterile periods, implies an essential defect in matrimonial\nconsent and renders the marriage invalid. 2) The practice is not\nmorally justified simply because the nature of the marital act is not\nviolated and the couple are prepared to accept and rear children born\ndespite their precautions. 3) Serious motives, (medical, eugenic,\neconomic and social), must be present to justify this practice. When\npresent, they can exempt for a long time, perhaps even for the duration\nof the marriage, from the positive obligations of the married state. 4)\nThe married state imposes on those who perform the marital act the\npositive obligation of helping to conserve the human race. Accordingly,\nto make use of the marital act continuously and without serious reason\nto withdraw from its primary obligation would be a sin against the very\nmeaning of conjugal life (ibid.).\n\nPope Pius explicitly confirmed the common teaching of theologians: 1)\nRhythm, by mutual consent, for proportionate reasons, and with due\nsafeguards against dangers would be licit. 2) Without a good reason,\nthe practice would involve some degree of culpability. Not expressly\nconfirmed, but simply an expression of common moral principles is the\ncommon agreement: 3) That the sin could be mortal by reason of\ninjustice, grave danger of incontinence, serious family discord, etc.\n\nSince the Allocution, the more common opinion in this country asserts\nthat the Holy Father taught: 1) that married people who use their\nmarital right have a duty to procreate; 2) that this duty is binding\nunder pain of sin; 3) there are, however, reasons that excuse the\ncouples from this obligation and, should they exist for the whole of\nmarried life, the obligation does not bind them at all; 4) the sin does\nnot consist in the exercise of marital rights during the sterile\nperiods; but in abstention from intercourse during the fertile periods\nprecisely to avoid conception, when the couple could have and should\nhave made its positive contribution to society. Sin is present when the\npractice is unjustifiedly undertaken; 5) the formal malice of illicit\nperiodic continence is not against the sixth commandment; i.e., against\nthe procreation of children or the use of the generative faculty, but\nagainst the seventh commandment, i.e., against social justice. The\ncouple is not making its contribution to the common good of society; 6)\nfrom 4 and 5 above, it follows that the individual acts of intercourse\nduring a period of unjust practice of rhythm do not constitute\nnumerically distinct sins. Rather, granting the continuance of a single\nwill act to practice rhythm, there is one sin for the whole period of\nillicit abstention during the fertile periods.\n\nSince the Pope abstained from an explicit statement on the gravity of\nthe sin, the controversy of whether the practice intrinsically is a\nmortal sin or not continued. The opinion in this country which holds\nthe greatest authority states that mortal sin is involved in the case\nof continued practice with a total exclusion of children and frequent\nuse of marital rights during the sterile period.\n\nDiversity of opinion has arisen as to the means of estimating when a\nserious sin has been committed. Some have used a temporal norm, e.g.,\nunjustified use of rhythm for five or six years would constitute a\nserious matter. Undoubtedly most of the proponents of this norm would\nnot accuse a couple of certain mortal sin if they already have one or\nmore children; after that, indefinite use of the practice without\nexcusing causes would not be a mortal sin. (This is admitted by most\ntheologians.) Others have proposed a numerical norm as a basis to\ndetermine whether or not a couple has made its contribution to the\nconservation of the race. Concretely the proponents of this theory\nregard four or five children as sufficient to satisfy the obligation in\nsuch a way;\n\na) that the use of rhythm to limit the family to this number is licit\nprovided the couple is willing and morally able to practice it;\n\nb) that the limitation through rhythm to less than four requires a\nserious justifying cause. The intention involved to prevent conception\nwould be seriously sinful in itself, since it causes great harm to the\ncommon good and involves in practice subordination of the primary to\nthe secondary end or ends of matrimony. At the present time this\nopinion seems to be more favored in America than the first which places\nthe gravity of the sin in the unjustified practice of rhythm for five\nyears. (For a survey of recent opinion, see the _Conference Bulletin of\nthe Archdiocese of New York_, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, pp. 36 ff.)\n\nOn the other hand, some European theologians have denied that the\npractice constitutes a mortal sin in itself, independently of\ncircumstances such as injustice and danger of incontinence.\n\nThe present state of opinion, then, is definitely undecided and calls\nfor caution both in dealing too severely with penitents or too readily\nrecommending the practice. The response of the Sacred Penitentiary of\nJune 16, 1880, affords a safe guide in practice: \u201cMarried couples who\nuse their marriage rights in the aforesaid manner are not to be\ndisturbed, and the confessor may suggest the opinion in question,\ncautiously, however, to those married people whom he has tried in vain\nto dissuade from the detestable crime of onanism.\u201d\n\nAs to the theological censure to be attached to \u201crhythm,\u201d it is not\napproved, nor recommended, but seems to be tolerated for sufficiently\ngrave reasons. \u201cInstead of being freely taught and commended, it is\nrather to be tolerated as an extreme remedy or means of preventing sin\u201d\n(Official Monitum, Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Sept. 8, 1936, _Conference\nBulletin of Archdiocese of New York_, Volume XIV, No. 2, p. 78).\n\n2623. Cooperatio Uxoris ad Onanismum vel Contraceptionem.--(a)\nCooperatio formalis graviter illicita est, quum includat approbationem\nipsius peccati. Unde graviter peccat uxor quae suis quaeremoniis de\nmolestiis graviditatis virum cogit ad congressum onanisticum, vel quae\nnec interdum conatur eum avertere ab iniquo consilio onanistice\ncongrediendi, vel quae active adjuvat abruptionem copulae, vel quae\ninterne gaudet de ipso peccato (1513).\n\n(b) Cooperatio materialis ad onanismum ex gravi causa (e.g., ex metu\nfundato rixarum, molestae cohabitationis, adulterii viri) licet; nam\nactio mulieris, scil. copulam habere naturalem, honesta est, atque\ncausa sufficiens adest permittendi abusum factum a comparte (1515\nsqq.). Imo uxor debitum petere potest a suo viro onanistico, si secus\ndiu abstinere cogeretur ab omni usu conjugii cum periculo\nincontinentiae, quia caritas erga virum non obligat ad abstinentiam cum\ntanto incommodo.\n\n(c) Cooperatio mere materialis ad contraceptionem, non videtur\npossibilis; nam copula contraceptiva est intrinsece et ab initio mala\n(1517, 1527). Unde uxori nec petere debitum licet, nec passive se\nhabere. Sed qualibet vice tenetur positive pro viribus resistere. Sin\nautem gravissima causa sit actum permittendi, ut puta periculum mortis,\neam tantum resistentiam opponere debet ad quam obligatur virgo oppressa\n(2497), consensu ut patet denegato (See _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_,\nJune, 1940, pp. 634 ff., and March, 1948, pp. 244 ff.)\n\n2624. Recapitulatio de Licitis et Illicitis in Conjugio.--(a) Illicita\ngraviter sunt extra matrimonium facta, v.g., moechia, mollities\nsolitaria, alienae conjugis concupiscentia; sed probabiliter actus\nimperfecti et solitarii in proprium corpus exerciti leve non excedunt,\ncitra periculum pollutionis, siquidem in delectationem veneream quae in\nconjugio licita est natura sua ordinentur, sicque minus indecentes\nfiant.\n\n(b) Illicita graviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed contra finem,\ni.e., naturae matrimonii seu generationi prolis repugnantia, ut sunt\npollutio mutua, onanismus, impudicitia quae non in copulam sed in\npollutionem tendit.\n\n(c) Illicita leviter sunt intra matrimonium facta sed praeter finem,\ni.e., qum generationi nec prosunt, nec obsunt, sed in circumstantiis\naliquam prae se ferunt inordinationem (e.g., copula ob solam voluptatem\nhabita), imprudentiam (e.g., copula tempore parum apto habita),\nimmoderantiam (e.g., impudicitia pudori nociva, situs innaturalis, ut\nsi stent vel vir succubet, ex levitate electus).\n\n(d) Licita sunt intra matrimonium facta, quae tum ex parte objecti\n(scil., quia actus ordinatur ad finem matrimonii), tum ex parte\ncircumstantiarum (scil., quia debito tempore, loco, modo, etc., ut\nprudentia exigit, exercentur) rationi rectae concordant. Unde non\npeccant conjuges sibi licita concupiscendo vel de iis gaudendo. Immo\nmulier onanistae licite cooperata non est peccati arguenda si gavisa\nsit de ipsa copula vel de bonis ejus effectibus, vel (saltem quando\nprobabile videtur se semen excipisse) si ad completam voluptatem se\nexcitaverit.\n\n2625. Regulae pro Confessariis.--(a) Interrogationes.--Si nulla ratio\nest suspicandi copulam modo innaturali exerceri, praestat ut plurimum\nde circumstantiis (v.g., de motivo copulae) non quaerere, ne conjuges\ntaedio afficiantur vel bona fide inutiliter priventur. Si tamen fundata\nsuspicio est abusum matrimonii celari, hac de re confessarius inquirere\ndebet, sed prudenter, ne scandalo sit poenitentibus verbis indiscretis.\n\n(b) Monitiones.--Si deprehenditur poenitentem onanistam esse, per\nse severe reprehendendus est (quod de viro praesertim dicitur) nec\nabsolvendus nisi signa contritionis prius dederit; per accidens autem,\nsi datur ignorantia invincibilis et monitio nullatenus profutura\npraevidetur, poenitens in bona fide relinquatur.\n\n2626. Marriage as a Sacrament.--The third benefit of marriage is that\nof the Sacrament. The union of man and wife is not merely a physical\nunion, but also a social one, and it should be modelled on the union\nof Christ and the Church: \u201cThis is a great sacrament; but I speak in\nChrist and the Church\u201d (Eph., v. 32).\n\n(a) Christ abides with the Church, and so the husband should dwell with\nhis wife (Matt., xix. 5). The cohabitation of the parties is demanded\nby the very nature of the promises made in marriage, and hence it is\nwrong for the husband to be absent from the home for notable periods of\ntime, or, what is worse, to drive his wife from home--or vice versa.\nGrave reasons and mutual consent justify long absences, as when the\nhusband is called away on distant business; but, if he goes away for a\nconsiderable part of the year, he should, if possible, take his wife\nwith him, or visit or write to her frequently. Very grave reasons\nsuffice for obtaining a separation, either permanent, on account of\nadultery, or during the continuance of the reason, as when there is\nserious unhappiness (Canons 1128 sqq.).\n\n(b) Christ is the head of the Church, and so also the husband is\nsuperior to the wife in authority (Eph., v. 23). Ordinarily man\nexcels in the qualities suited for rule of the home (such as physical\nstrength, decision, courage), and hence as every society, no matter how\nsmall, must have a head, the husband is the natural head of the home.\nBut obedience is due a husband in domestic matters in which he is head\nof the house--for example, the choice of the place of residence, the\nmanagement of the family income, the discipline of the children, but\nnot in the wife\u2019s personal affairs (e.g., her conscience, her politics,\nher property)--and only in commands that do not exceed his authority,\nfor he has no power to command if he is irrational, and he has no\nclaim to obedience if he orders something sinful or foolish. Moreover,\nsince the wife is a partner and not a servant, and since she usually\nexcels as sympathetic and wise adviser and careful household manager\nand is naturally more virtuous, the husband should consult with her on\nimportant family questions and decide them as far as possible by mutual\nconsent, and should gladly leave to her sole control and direction the\nmany things in which she is more competent than himself.\n\n(c) Christ gave Himself for the Church (Eph., v. 25), and so also\nthe husband has the duty of providing for his wife, spiritually and\ntemporally. Usually the man should attend to the external affairs of\nthe family (such as its support and protection), while the wife should\ntake care of the internal affairs (such as the housekeeping and the\ntraining of the children). It is to be regretted that the smallness\nof the husband\u2019s salary often compels the wife to work outside her\nhome. Women should not be compelled to take up occupations unsuited\nto their sex, much less those that interfere with the supreme duty of\nmotherhood. Injury done the common personal goods of husband and wife\nby one of them is unjust, if due to illegal action; it is at least\nuncharitable, if due to carelessness. The family goods are usually\nunder the control of the head of the family. The wife has no right to\nuse the earnings of her husband without his consent, unless he fails to\nprovide suitably for his family, or uses his money extravagantly.\n\n2627. The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.--We shall speak first of\nthe duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties\nwhich engagement imposes.\n\n(a) _Per se_, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for\nthe need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social\nduties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must\ntake necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating\nis thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier,\nor farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that\nthese offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another.\nIndeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the\ncommon welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married\nlife), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the\nwish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage\nor called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.\n\n(b) _Per accidens_, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account\nof public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated\nby race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to\nmarry in order to assist the birth rate; for, if those are considered\nslackers who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation\nis threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who\nwill not assist a community threatened with extinction from within?\nMarriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to\nlive continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9).\nIn case of seduction, marriage is a form of restitution to the injured\ngirl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should\nbe atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the\ngirl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).\n\n2628. The Duties Imposed by Engagement to Marry.--(a) Before\nEngagement.--Courtship is lawful for those who intend to marry, for\nwithout it the mutual knowledge which is requisite for a prudent choice\nis impossible. But courtship should be employed, not as a period of\npleasure and extravagance, but as an opportunity for learning the\nsuitability of the parties, one for the other, and their desirability\nin virtue, religion, sanity, intelligence, health, wealth, position,\nlove of children, sobriety, steadiness, etc. Visits are lawful during\ncourtship, but not the same familiarity as is permissible after\nengagement. The time of wooing should not be protracted, and as a rule\nafter a year the parties should either become engaged or decide they\nare not well matched.\n\n(b) At the Time of the Engagement.--The parties are gravely bound\nto make known to each other all personal defects which cannot be\nconcealed without serious injustice, such as the lack of virginity or\nother quality which one party makes a _conditio sine qua non_, or the\npresence of a diriment impediment or of a very harmful or displeasing\ncharacteristic (such as venereal disease, sterility, disgrace, race,\nthe fact that one is a widow, etc.). There is no duty of justice to\nmanifest defects whose concealment will not be detrimental (such as\npoverty, lowly origin), but there may be a duty of charity to reveal\nthem, as when their concealment now will lead to an unhappy marriage.\nAs to fornication, the man is not obliged to confess it, unless\nperhaps when he has an illegitimate child; nor the woman, unless she\nis actually pregnant, or cannot keep the matter hidden afterwards and\ncan make it known without serious harm to herself (see Self-defamation,\n1577; cfr. 1978, 2132). But those who have been guilty of these\nmistakes should undergo a test on the question of physical health.\n\n(c) During the Engagement.--Fidelity requires that an engaged person\nbe true to the other party, avoid paying court to a third person\n(see 2526), and give the signs of affection that are usual between\nengaged persons. The relationship between the engaged parties does not\ngive them the right to what is intrinsically evil (e.g., voluntary\npollution, proximate danger of consent to sin, continuance in a\nfamiliarity which is a proximate occasion of sin), or to what is lawful\nonly to married persons (e.g., intercourse and the liberties pertinent\nto it). But it does give them the right to manifest their affection by\nacts indifferent in themselves (e.g., visits which are not private,\ntoo frequent, or too prolonged; the decent kisses usual between\nbetrothed lovers on meeting and parting), even though unintentionally\npollution may follow (2538). Persons who intend to marry soon should\nacquaint themselves before marriage and from reliable sources with the\nfundamental physiological facts of sex, so as to avoid the mistakes\nwhich often wreck conjugal happiness, beginning with the honeymoon\nitself; they should have some money or the prospect of being able to\nsupport themselves, and the woman should know how to take care of a\nhome.\n\n(d) At the End of the Engagement.--A formal promise to marry (Canon\n1017) imposes the duty of marriage within a reasonable time (i.e.,\nat the appointed date, or, if no date was fixed, at the time when\none of the parties reasonably requests it), unless the engagement\nbe broken (e.g., by mutual consent, by a circumstance that makes\nmarriage impossible, such as marriage to a third party or choice\nof the clerical state; or unnecessary, such as the fulfillment of\na resolutory condition, supervening impediment, Papal dispensation\ngiven for a just cause); or unless one of the parties has a right\nnot to keep the engagement on account of a notable change in the\ncircumstances, or a breach of faith, or opposition of parents that will\nmake the marriage inadvisable, etc. The obligation to marry is one of\njustice, and is grave when the contract was bilateral; it is one of\nfidelity or justice, and grave or light according to the intention of\nthe promisor, when the contract was unilateral (see 1888). There is\nno action to enforce an engagement, for forced marriages are unwise\n(Canon 1017, n. 3); and in practice confessors and pastors should not\ninsist on fulfillment of the promise. But damages can be sued for, and\nthe confessor should deny absolution to one who refuses to make just\nrestitution in a case of breach of promise (see 1803). An informal\npromise to marry (i.e., one invalid naturally or positively) produces\nno obligation to marry in either forum (see 454); but it does produce a\nduty of restitution in breach of promise, if there was force, fraud, or\ndeceit.\n\n2629. Conditions for the Signs of Affection between Engaged\nPersons.--(a) Objectively, these signs must be suited to the condition\nof merely engaged, not of married persons. Brief and modest kisses are\nproper for lovers, but greater intimacy, such as long and lone\nconversations in secluded spots, are wrong.\n\nThe chaster the relations between the betrothed, the less occasion for\nfuture regrets and recriminations. \u201cPetting\u201d purchases a cheap physical\nthrill or excitement at the cost of present moral danger for two\npersons, of the degradation of love to its lowest expression, and of\nloss of self-respect, with the probable risk of a future ill-fated\nmarital career ending speedily in disillusionment and divorce. It is\nessentially selfish and unwise.\n\n(b) Subjectively, the signs of affection must not be a proximate\noccasion of sin; nor may they be accompanied by consent to sin, or be\nused for the sake of venereal pleasure. Joy at the thought of future\nmarriage intercourse and sensual pleasure in present kisses (2514) are\nin themselves not sinful, but in practice they are as a rule gravely\ndangerous. _Motiones carnales, quales sunt erectiones, signa sunt\ndelectationis venereae quando conjuguntur eum pollutione vel proxime\npraeviis ad eam; sunt signa delectationis mere sensualis, quando amorem\nsensibilem sequuntur ex motu sanguinis, quin in resolutionem seminis ex\nse tendant_ (2497 b).\n\n2630. The Duties of Parents and Children.--In addition to the duties\nthat belong to all superiors and subjects (see 2635 sqq.) there are\nspecial obligations incumbent on parents and children by reason of the\nspecial relationship between them. The duties of the parents are of two\nkinds.\n\n(a) Duties of Charity.--Parents should give their children special love\nand special signs of affection, as the order of charity requires (see\n1158 sqq.). Hence, those parents sin grievously who hate or curse their\nchildren, even the illegitimate or wayward, or who drive the children\nfrom home by unkindness.\n\n(b) Duties of Piety.--Parents should, as far as they are able, give\ntheir children the honor and help that belongs to members of the family\n(see 2346 sqq.), though illegitimate children have not the right to\ndwell in the home of the legitimate children or to share in the family\ninheritance (see 1803 b). The help owed to children is spiritual and\nmaterial, and the obligation, which is natural and divine, is most\ngrave (Canon 1113). Spiritual help includes religious and moral\ntraining and example (see 867 sqq.); material help includes food,\nclothing, lodging, medical care, means to learn a necessary trade, art\nor profession or to enter marriage or take up a suitable state in life,\nprotection and defense. Parents are bound to help their children, at\nleast in necessities, as long as the latter are in need. Sins are\ncommitted also against the unborn (e.g., when the pregnant mother does\nnot take care of her health, or when she is ill-treated by her husband)\nand young infants (e.g., when the child is unnecessarily suckled by\nstrangers and thus exposed to danger, or is placed in a foundling\nasylum or other institution because the parents are unwilling to be\nbothered). On the other hand, those parents sin through excess who\nspoil or \u201csissify\u201d their children by luxury and idleness, or who are\ntoo indulgent to give needed correction and even moderate chastisement.\n\n2631. Compensation of Children.--A child, even though subject to\nparental authority, seems to have a right to compensation for\nextraordinary services given his parents, and also to at least a fair\ncommission for gains made in the course of extraordinary services for\nwhich he is receiving no compensation. In their wills, after satisfying\njust debts and expenses, parents should leave their offspring who need\nit enough to maintain their state in life.\n\n2632. Sex Education of Children.--(a) Necessity.--Some moralists\nbelieve that sex education of the young should be indirect. They hold\nthat it is dangerous to speak of venereal matters to the young; that\nsilence itself is to them a lesson of modesty; that the practice of\npiety and mortification, along with parental watchfulness, will keep\nthem pure; that sufficient knowledge will come at the proper time as\nGod will provide. Others reject this theory as opposed to the tradition\nof the Church as well as to experience. The defenders of direct sexual\neducation point to the evil of silence: the bad habits contracted and\ngrown strong before their sinfulness is understood, or the scruples and\nmisery into which ignorance will plunge young people entering the\ncrisis of puberty, the false and corrupt ideas with which unavoidably\nthe minds of the innocent will be indoctrinated by immoral companions\nor physicians, the loss of confidence in parents who have refused\nimportant knowledge and advice, and the ruin of innocent lives by\nseducers which a timely word of warning would have prevented. Hence,\nthere is an invincible ignorance which cannot be removed without direct\neducation, and which is more harmful at least to well-reared children\nthan any evil that may be caused by the education.\n\n(b) Preparation for Direct Education.--Training for purity should be\ndirected both to will and intellect, for knowledge without character is\npowerless against temptation. Children should be trained from the\nbeginning morally (i.e., they should be kept as far as possible from\nsources of contamination; should be taught to have implicit confidence\nin parents and to bring to them their questions and difficulties;\nshould be trained to practise continual mortification and restraint and\nto struggle against evil tendencies until the habit of self-control\nbecomes a second nature) and religiously (i.e., to use prayer, the\nSacraments and other means of grace until they are well formed in\npiety). This previous moral education and religious conviction will\nstand on guard as a protection against the suggestions of indulgence\nwhich initiation into sex matters may suggest.\n\n(c) The Subject-Matter of Sex Education.--The fundamentals of sex\ninstruction include such points as the diversity of sex, its origin\nfrom God and its dignity, the beginning of life in plants and animals,\nthe organs of reproduction, the functions of maternity and paternity,\nthe grave reasons that demand sexual morality, respect for womankind,\nthe great sinfulness of masturbation and fornication, the meaning of\npuberty and its accompaniments in male and female, the possibility and\nhealthfulness of continence, the moral dangers of the world and the\nsocial diseases to be guarded against, and the hygienic aids to\nchastity.\n\n(d) The Method of Instruction.--It is clear that not all the details\njust mentioned can be imparted at one time, for young children would\nnot understand or there would be scandal of little ones; but, while\nfiction and exaggeration should be avoided, a strictly scientific and\ntechnical instruction is not necessary or generally advisable. It is\nclear also that parents, and especially mothers, are naturally suited\nfor the delicate task of early guardians of chastity, though the later\ninstruction should be supplemented in catechism class, sermon, school,\nand an individual advice given in confession. It would be impossible in\nbrief space to outline sufficiently a program of sex instruction, but\nparents and persons who are about to marry should read, study and apply\nsome of the excellent books prepared for their guidance.\n\n2633. Duties of Children.--The duties of children to their parents can\nalso be classed under those of charity and piety.\n\n(a) Duties of Charity.--Children owe their parents a special internal\nand external love (see 1176 sqq.). Those children sin gravely who hate\ntheir parents or wish them serious evil, or who treat them with great\nunkindness or neglect, or bring them great sorrow or worry, or who\nnever visit or write to them.\n\n(b) Duties of Piety.--Children must respect and assist their parents\n(see 2347, 2348). It is a serious sin to have contempt for one\u2019s\nparents, or to show them serious dishonor in words (e.g., by injurious\nor mocking names), in signs (e.g., by laughing at them, mimicking\nthem), in deeds (e.g., by striking them, speaking against them), in\nomission (e.g., by refusing to acknowledge them or show them the usual\nmarks of courtesy). It is not disrespect, however, for a child to\ndislike or protest against evils done by his parents. The assistance\nowed to parents is both spiritual and corporal, and children sin when\nthey neglect the religious welfare of their parents (e.g., by not\nrespectfully admonishing them when the parents do not lead a good life,\nby not obtaining for them the Sacraments, prayers and suffrages they\nneed), or deny them bodily aid (e.g., by refusing them help or comfort\nwhen they are poor, persecuted, or suffering). Children who live at\nhome with their parents should contribute from their earnings or\nindividual property to the maintenance of the home, unless the parents\ndo not need this pay and do not wish it. See Catechism of the Council\nof Trent, on the Fourth Commandment (pages 408 sqq.).\n\n2634. Duties of Near Relatives.--There are similar duties of charity\nand piety between other near relatives, for example, between brothers\nand sisters, grandparents and grandchildren uncles and aunts and their\nnephews and nieces, and between first cousins. The obligation seems, to\nsome authors, to be a grave one as far as the second degree of kinship,\nbut is light in the other degrees. The relationship and duty to kin by\nmarriage is not so strong.\n\n2635. The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of\nSuperiors.--Superiors both in domestic and civil society need\nespecially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special\nduties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).\n\n(a) Prudence.--If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision\nand direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether\nof the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the\nprudent servant who is placed over his master\u2019s household (Matt., xxiv.\n45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community\n(Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and\nmagistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent\nknowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what\nconstitutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should\nbe promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common\nsense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of\nlarge organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a\ngreat multitude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or\nunusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will\nsafeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and\nprosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).\n\n(b) Justice.--In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common\ngood; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice\nand the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided\nby fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every\nform of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously\nenforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their\nsubjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but\napproachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive,\nill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to\npleasure and display.\n\n2636. Duties of Subjects.--The general duties of subjects to superiors\nare chiefly honor and obedience (see 2351 sqq.).\n\n(a) Honor.--Honor is owed to superiors on account of their position of\nauthority, which is derived from God, not on account of their personal\ncharacter, for personally they may be wicked. It is disrespectful even\nin a democracy to deny them the honorable address, salutation or\ncourtesy which is customary, or to treat them insultingly by word,\nmanner or writing. But it is not disrespectful to disagree with the\npersonal views of a superior or to seek legitimately his removal from\noffice if he is unfit or less fit.\n\n(b) Obedience.--Obedience is owed to superiors and their laws when they\nstrictly command what is not sinful or illegal or outside their\nauthority (see 375 sqq.). Unemancipated children are obliged to obey\ntheir parents in all that falls under the parental authority, namely,\nin what pertains to good morals (e.g., attendance at religious duties,\navoidance of bad companions) or the good order of the home (e.g., the\nhours for meals, the time of retiring, the visitors to be received).\nBut parents have no authority to command fraud or other sin; nor are\nchildren under subjection in the matter of taking up a state of life,\nfor this demands liking and fitness, and the command of a superior\ncannot give liking and fitness. It is a serious sin for parents to\nforce a child to take up religious life or the priesthood, or to marry\na certain individual; but a child should yield when his parents are\nreasonably opposed to his choice of a vocation, as when they need his\nsupport, or wish him to test his vocation a little, or know that the\nperson selected for wife will disgrace the family.\n\n2637. Taxes.--Citizens owe the government particularly the tribute of\ntaxation, and in war that of military service. Taxes are contributions\nexacted by the public authority from subjects for the purpose of\ndefraying public expenses or promoting the public welfare.\n\n(a) Thus, they are contributions, and hence a tax is not to be confused\nwith a payment (e.g., fares for passage on government railroads), or\nwith a fine (e.g., pecuniary penalty for evasion of customs).\n\n(b) They are exacted from subjects (i.e., from citizens), who are\nsubject on account of their persons as being members of the State, and\nfrom aliens, who are subject on account of their goods, as receiving\nprivileges of residence, commerce, passage, etc.\n\n2638. Kinds of Taxes.--There are many kinds of taxes, but they can all\nbe reduced to two general categories.\n\n(a) Direct taxes are those collected from the person on whom the burden\nis ultimately to fall. Examples are poll or personal taxes and property\ntaxes (such as those on general property, incomes or inheritances), for\nthese charges remain an expense of the taxpayer himself.\n\n(b) Indirect taxes are those collected from a person other than the one\non whom the burden is ultimately to fall. Examples are duties imposed\non outsiders (such as customs or tariffs, duties raised for revenues,\nprotection, etc.), external revenue taxes imposed on certain acts (such\nas the manufacture or sale of commodities) or occupations (e.g.,\nlicenses for trades, sports, etc.). In these the charge falls\nimmediately on the taxpayer, but ultimately on a consumer.\n\n2639. Just Taxes.--Tax laws, like other laws, must be just; that is,\nthey must be made by lawful authority and must promote the common good\n(see 285). The common good requires that taxes be not imposed except\nfor just reasons, and that there be a fair distribution of the burden.\n\n(a) Just reasons are those of public utility or necessity. A tax would\nbe unjust, if it were levied for unjust or unnecessary purposes.\n\n(b) Fair distribution requires that citizens be assessed according to\ntheir ability to pay (sacrifices for the public good, special benefits\nfrom the use of a tax fund, etc.).\n\n2640. Obligation to Pay Taxes.--The obligation in conscience of just\ntax laws is admitted by all Catholic authorities.\n\n(a) The teaching of Scripture is quite clear, since Our Lord, in answer\nto the question whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Caesar,\nreplied: \u201cRender to Caesar the things that are Caesar\u2019s\u201d (Matt., xxii.\n17-21); and St. Paul teaches: \u201cBe subject of necessity, not only for\nwrath, but also for conscience\u2019 sake. Render therefore to all men their\ndue, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom\u201d (Rom.,\nxiii. 5, 6).\n\n(b) Reason too shows the need of obligation in conscience, for, unless\nthese laws oblige thus, the common good will suffer through lack of\nmoney needed for public purposes, and some individuals will be unjustly\nburdened and others unjustly favored.\n\n2641. Quality of the Obligation.--There are various opinions about the\nquality of the obligation in conscience of taxation laws.\n\n(a) Thus, according to one opinion they oblige in conscience and under\nsin, that is, as preceptive laws (see 561 sqq.). For the natural law\nand justice require that the members of society contribute the\nnecessaries to the social body organized for their benefit, or that the\npeople live up to their implicit contract with their government by\ngiving compensation for the services they receive.\n\n(b) According to another opinion tax laws oblige in conscience only\nunder penalty, that is, as penal laws. The arguments for this view are,\nfirst, the sufficiency of the penal obligation (i.e., the heavy fines\nimposed) for the attainment of the laws\u2019 purpose, and, secondly, the\ncommon opinion of citizens that they commit no sin by merely evading\npayment of taxes. Furthermore, it is added that, if these laws were\npreceptive, conscientious citizens would be under a great disadvantage,\nfor they would be placed in the dilemma of either acting against their\nconscience and committing sin or of paying more than their due on\naccount of the neglect of tax dues by citizens who are not\nconscientious.\n\n(c) According to a third opinion distinction has to be made between\ndifferent cases. Thus, some held that laws on direct taxes are\npreceptive and laws on indirect taxes merely penal, while others say\nthat the kind of obligation depends on the will of the lawgiver, and\nthat tax laws that are preceptive in one country may be only penal in\nanother. If tax laws are merely penal, there is no obligation of\nrestitution, but there is an obligation of payment and of penalty after\nsentence.\n\n2642. Obedience to Tax Laws.--Obedience to just laws is owed either\nfrom legal justice alone, or also from commutative justice with the\nburden of restitution. There are various opinions about the case of tax\nlaws.\n\n(a) According to the traditional opinion, the obligation is one of\ncommutative justice, because there is an implicit contract between the\ngovernment and the people, in virtue of which the former is bound to\nprovide for the safety of the people at home and abroad and to secure\nthose things that are necessary for the common welfare (such as roads,\npostal service, etc.), while the latter are bound in return to pay the\nexpenses of the government.\n\n(b) According to a recent opinion, the obligation is one of legal\njustice only, because the imposition of taxes is an exercise of\nauthority by the government, and taxes themselves have the character of\na tribute from the part to the whole rather than of a wage or payment.\nHence, though he who evades taxes is not held to restitution, he sins\nagainst justice, and sins gravely if the matter is considerable.\n\n(c) According to other opinions, tax laws oblige sometimes from legal,\nsometimes from commutative justice. Thus, some admit that in feudal\ntimes there was a contract between the governed and the ruler, and\ntherefore an obligation of commutative justice to give services and\ntaxes; but in modern times they say there is no such contract, and the\nduties of ruler and subjects rest on natural law and legal justice, not\non any compact. Others again distinguish between the obligation before\nthe quota has been determined, which is the duty of legal justice to\ndeclare properly the value of one\u2019s property, and the obligation after\nassessment, which is a duty of commutative justice to pay just tax\nbills.\n\n2643. The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.--(a) There is a\ngrave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in\npublic elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the\ncommunity and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals\ndepend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on\nthe ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote\ncooperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at\nleast with public unconcern about public matters--for example, those\nwho neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote.\nA grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution),\nbut not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble,\nridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has\nexceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is\na mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.\n\n(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either\na privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to\nwhich the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The\nobligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact\nthat the common weal is everybody\u2019s business and responsibility,\nespecially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by\nabstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound _ex\nofficio_ to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held\nto restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and\nperhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of\nrestitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general\nelection the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence,\nand citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of\ntheir representatives.\n\n2644. Manner of Voting.--(a) Object.--It is not necessary to vote for\nthe best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by\ncharacter, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives\nindications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community\nwell. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath\nbeforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the\nperson whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In\nminor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the\ncandidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as\nPresident, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party\nprinciples for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. _Per\naccidens_, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is\nnecessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is\nmuch worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy\ncandidates are included.\n\n(b) Purpose.--The end which the voter should have in mind is the good\nof the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely\nor chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one\u2019s own\nrace, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or\nescape enmity.\n\n(c) Circumstances.--The voter must avoid all that is contrary to\nnatural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes)\nor positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a\nperiod of previous residence, but also other conditions such as\nregistration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The\nopinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that\nhelps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for\necclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.\n\n2645. Obligation to Seek Office.--A worthy man should run for office in\nthe following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy\n(e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and\nthere is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave\nimpediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private\naffairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).\n\n2646. Duties of Employers and Employees.--Between employers and their\ndomestic servants or workingmen there are general mutual duties as\nbetween superiors and subjects, and special mutual duties as between\nparties to an explicit and implicit contract. Of these latter duties we\nshall now speak.\n\n2647. Duties of Employers.--(a) Justice.--The labor assigned must not\nbe excessive (e.g., unduly perilous, exhausting, protracted) or\ninjurious (e.g., harmful to religion or morals, an unreasonable\nimpediment to marriage, to cultural opportunity or amusement); the wage\npaid must be just (i.e., one that will enable the worker to support\nhimself and his family in reasonable comfort) and equitable (i.e., one\nthat rewards special merit and service by pensions or additional\ncompensation); the terms of the contract must be observed (e.g.,\narbitrary lowering of wages or dismissal are unjust).\n\n(b) Charity.--Liberality should be shown by preference to employees,\nsince they have a special claim on the employ good will. The employer\nshould consider that he is responsible for the spiritual betterment and\nmaterial improvement of his workers, and should have them in mind when\nmaking contributions to religious, educational or special causes, so\nthat his own employees will benefit in particular by his gifts to these\nworthy causes. Trade schools and insurance against sickness and\nunemployment are especially deserving of his assistance.\n\n2648. Duties of Employees.--(a) Justice.--Workers are bound to give a\nfair return in quantity and quality of labor for the pay they receive,\nand to be loyal to their employer as regards his person, reputation,\nand property. Hence, it is unjust to loaf or come late or leave early,\nto turn out work too slowly or of an inferior grade, to damage\nmachinery or property, to waste food or provisions, to act as a\nhousehold spy or informer, to try to extort what is not due. (For a\nconsideration of the worker\u2019s obligation to join unions see \u201cCatholics\nin Labor Unions\u201d by Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., _American\nEcclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXVI, no. 6 June, 1947, pp. 422 ff.)\n\n(b) Charity.--Workers should be willing even at the expense of some\nright or of some slight loss to help an employer who is in grave\nnecessity; for example, it would be uncharitable for farm hands to stop\nwork promptly on time when this will cause a serious damage to the\nfarmer\u2019s crop, or for a cook to leave on her free day when her mistress\nis very sick and will be left alone.\n\n2649. Labor Disputes between Employers and Employees.--(a) In\nthemselves these disputes are indifferent, as they are a species of\nindustrial war (see 1380 sqq.) or of industrial self-defense (1826\nsqq.). If the end, the means and the circumstances are not against\nright reason, the disputes are lawful or even laudable.\n\n(b) In the concrete, the strike is labor\u2019s chief means for enforcing\ndemands. Since organized labor seeks to equalize the bargaining power\nbetween employer and employee, the way to counteract refusal to pay\nfairly is by a concerted refusal to work, i.e., a strike. A strike may\nbe defined as an organized cessation from work by a group of workers to\nobtain advantages from an employer. Since an organized strike is a kind\nof war, moral theologians apply the principles of a just war to\ndetermine concretely the morality of a strike.\n\n1) There must be a just reason for the strike. Too little pay, too long\nhours, brutal treatment, unsafe or unsanitary conditions constitute\ngenuine grievances for what may be called a defensive strike, which\npresupposes injustice in the part of the employer. On the other hand an\nameliorative strike does not presuppose an employer\u2019s injustice, but\nconsists essentially in the worker\u2019s attempt to better conditions,\ne.g., a better salary, shorter working hours, etc. Such a strike seems\nto be unlawful if it violates a just work contract in effect at the\ntime of the strike. If no such contract has been made, the ameliorative\nstrike can be lawful, granting a proportionately grave cause; but it is\nnever given unqualified approval owing to the fact that such a strike\ninvolves many and grave losses both material and moral to the workers,\nemployer, and community. (See Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II,\nn.556.)\n\n2) The strike must be the last means. Owing to the fact that a strike\nis a kind of warfare, all other peaceful means should be tried, e.g.,\narbitration, governmental inquiry boards, injunctions, fact-finding\nboards etc. The moral principle involved is; if an evil is avoidable\nbut not avoided, it cannot be considered as merely incidental to a good\nend.\n\n3) The strike would be called by proper authority. The decision to\nstrike should be made by the men themselves freely and Without\nintimidation. Organized labor must have the backing of a responsible\nunion in its strike, for this is the channel of bargaining or\narbitration that the employer must use, and it should be used by the\nworkers also. Accordingly, \u201cwildcat\u201d strikes are unlawful unless the\nunions have ceased to represent the men and have been repudiated by\nthem.\n\n4) The benefits expected from the strike must compensate for the evils\ninseparable from it. In this matter not only the worker\u2019s personal\ngains are to be considered, but also the welfare of others, namely the\nemployers and the public. Thus, in a long-drawn-out strike the economic\nadvantage gained in a small salary increase for the worker can never be\nproportionate to the financial losses inflicted on the workers\nthemselves in loss of income, on the employers, and particularly on a\ncommunity which suffers the loss of purchasing power of a number of its\nmembers. Many strikes in which the products or services of the workers\nare necessary to the public (transportation, food distribution, etc.)\nseem to be more a strike against the community than against an\nemployer; and the harm inflicted on the innocent public is not\nincidental as it must be in order to be justified. Only extraordinarily\ngrave reasons can justify such strikes.\n\n5) The means employed must be just. The common means are work stoppage,\npersuasion of other workers to keep the work stopped until the demands\nare met, and picketing in a peaceful manner. Sabotage and violence\nagainst an employer\u2019s person or property constitute unjust means.\n\u201cScabs,\u201d or professional strike-breakers, may be prevented from\ndepriving the workers of their jobs to which the workers keep their\nrights; but violence in defense of this right seems illicit, unless\nviolence is begun by the strike-breakers and the workers are forced to\ndefend themselves.\n\n(c) Kinds of Strike. Thus far the analysis has been concerned with a\ndirect strike. Other kinds of strike demand special consideration.\n\n1) Slow-down strike. Since it does not involve cessation from work, but\nsimply a reduction in production or services while the worker is\nreceiving full pay under contract, the strike seems to be immoral. The\nstriker is not giving the work paid for.\n\n2) Sit-down strikes. Some authors justify these strikes by analogy with\nan act of self-defense in which the person attacked seizes the weapon\nfrom the attacker. The analogy seems defective since the place of work\nis hardly a weapon. This strike seems to be immoral since it involves\nan unjust invasion of property rights by way of excluding an owner from\nthe use of his property.\n\n3) Sympathy strikes. There is a great diversity of opinion in this kind\nof strike. A moderate view distinguishes between strikes of several\ngroups against the same employer and one or several groups against\ndifferent and unassociated employers. The first kind seems justified,\nfor it is directed against the same unjust employer, and the workers\nare cooperators to defend the rights of one group against him. In the\nsecond case of striking against different employers, the \u201csympathizers\u201d\nare striking against a just employer and are violating their work\ncontract which binds in commutative justice. Hence this type of strike\nseems to be essentially unjust.\n\n(d) The lockout is the employer\u2019s strike. Unwilling to grant the\nworker\u2019s demand, the employer shuts down his plant, thus terminating\nemployment of both strikers and non-strikers. The same conditions and\nrestrictions that apply to the strike are applicable to lockouts. That\nthe lockout itself is not unjust, but at least morally indifferent,\nappears to be evident in this, that as workers are not bound to submit\nto injustice, neither is the employer. He cannot be expected to pay\nwages when essential employers have quit or stalled production.\n\n(e) A boycott is a mass refusal to patronize a certain business with\nthe effort to persuade others to join in the refusal. Historically it\nhas been used by labor to gain support from the public against an\nemployer or by elements of the public itself to protest some evil\npractice of a business establishment, e.g., Legion of Decency boycotts\nof indecent pictures, NODL boycotts of literature, etc. In itself, a\nboycott is not immoral, since no one is obliged to trade in one place\nin preference to another and may refuse to trade with persons who are\nunjust or otherwise immoral. There seems to be no reason also to\nprevent a person from lawfully persuading others to follow his cause.\nThe principles of a just strike are applicable to the justification of\nboycotts, and the conditions of a sympathy strike are to be applied to\nsecondary boycotts, i.e., against other firms doing business with a\nboycotted firm. These other firms are not themselves unjust and should\nnot be made to suffer for the injustice of another. Hence, a very grave\ncause, co-operation in injustice, for example would be necessary to\nbring pressure against them.\n\n2650. Is There Any Obligation of Giving Employment?--(a) The State\ncertainly has an obligation in legal justice of offering opportunities\nof work to those who cannot find it, if the public welfare is\ncompromised by widespread unemployment. Even if only one worker were\nwithout work through no fault of his own, the duty of helping him would\nseem to devolve on the State, since the laborer has a right to work and\nthe State has the duty of promoting the temporal welfare of its\nsubjects when they are unable to provide for themselves.\n\n(b) Employers have a duty of commutative justice to give work to men\nwith whom they have made a contract of labor and not to keep work from\nmen unfairly; hence, arbitrary dismissal or blacklisting is a crime\nagainst justice. They should also try to secure other employment for\ngood workers whom they are unable to keep, so as to tide over for the\nmen the slack seasons when some have to be laid off. Industry,\norganized labor and individuals should interest themselves practically\nin private movements and plans to remedy unemployment situations, for\nthese are matters that should not be left entirely to the State and\ncharity. Employment and honest wages are in the long run to the\nadvantage of employers as well as of employees, and are therefore good\nbusiness as well as good morals.\n\n2651. Duties of Certain Professions.--(a) Judges and Lawyers.--The\nduties of men of the law were discussed already in 1940 sqq. Clients on\ntheir part owe their lawyers fair treatment and just compensation for\nservices, while those who have part in a judicial process must give\nrespect to the judge and other officials of the court and due obedience\nto their directions.\n\n(b) Teachers and Students.--Teachers must make themselves proficient in\ntheir matter and in the art of pedagogy; must take care that their\nteaching is accurate and beneficial; must be steady, punctual, orderly;\nmust give no example or advice but what is good; must be neither too\nlenient nor too exacting; must preserve discipline in their classes by\ncorrecting, punishing, or expelling as need requires; must be just,\nneither petting nor bullying, and must award honors and averages\naccording to merit. There may be grave harm and sin in denying\nimportant academic degrees (such as S.T.M., S.T.D., J.D.C., M.D.) to\nthe worthy or in conferring them on the unworthy. Students on their\npart owe to their teachers respect and obedience in class matters, to\ntheir parents and themselves diligence in study, and to their school\navoidance of cheating and of disorderly conduct. In athletics they\nshould not aim at winning for winning\u2019s sake, or playing for playing\u2019s\nsake, but at the true goal of a sound mind in a sound body. In the\nselection of preferred studies they should remember that nothing worth\nwhile is won without hard work, and that the true objectives of\nlearning are not mere utility, or gain or diversion, but the culture of\nmind and of spirit.\n\n(c) Physicians, Surgeons, Nurses, and Druggists.--These persons must\nhave sufficient knowledge and skill, and must keep up with the progress\nof medical science; they must not deny their services or delay to come\nwhen there is urgent need; they must give a case diligence\nproportionate to its seriousness; they must consult in case of doubt,\nfollow the safer opinions, and use the more likely remedies. In his\nrelations with his patient a doctor must be chaste (e.g., avoiding\nimmoral advice or operations, unnecessary psychoanalytic conversations,\nor bodily exposures); loyal to the confidences received; honest and\ncharitable, not prescribing useless remedies, or overcharging, or\nrefusing service to the poor; mindful of the religious needs of his\npatients, being not too ready to exempt them from church duties nor\nslow to remind them when they should send for the priest. Patients on\ntheir part should honor the physician, call him in need, obey his\ndirections, and properly compensate him for his services. What is here\nsaid of physicians and surgeons is true also of nurses in their duties\nand capacities. Pharmacists are bound to exercise great care in filling\nprescriptions; they should not cooperate with abortion or contraception\nby selling medicines, instruments or appliances to be used for those\npurposes; they should not sell drugs, dopes, poisons, liquors, etc.,\nforbidden by law.\n\n\n\n\nQuestion IV\n\nTHE SACRAMENTS\n\n2652. In the three Questions that preceded we spoke of the means by\nwhich man is sanctified and is enabled to secure supernatural rewards\nthrough the merits of his own works; for the virtues make their\npossessor as well as his acts morally righteous, while through God\u2019s\ngrace the good deeds done for His sake entitle the doer to the crown of\neternal life. In the present Question we pass on to consider certain\nmeans by which God is honored by man and man is sanctified through the\napplication to his soul of the merits and passion of Christ; for the\nSacraments were instituted by Christ both as external acts of religion\n(2175, 2244) and as most powerful agencies to begin, restore, and\nincrease the life of holiness.\n\n2653. It should be observed, first, that the present work is concerned\nwith Moral Theology; and, secondly, that it must be confined within the\nlimited number of pages which a two-volume production of convenient\nsize necessitates. Hence the reader will understand why in the Question\nnow beginning we speak only of man\u2019s duties in reference to the\nSacraments, and omit other points that do not so strictly pertain to\nMoral. (a) Thus, the nature, institution, number and effects of the\nSacraments belong to Dogma, which the authors hope to treat later in a\nsimilar work. (b) The administration of the Sacraments, their rites,\nrubrics, ceremonies are set forth in ritual books and works on liturgy.\n(c) The legal rights of ministers, canonical requirements on\nregistration, penal and processual legislation in reference to the\nSacraments, and like juridical questions are treated fully in\ncommentaries on pertinent sections of the Code.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 1: THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL; THE SACRAMENTALS\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 60-65.)\n\n2654. Nature of a Sacrament.--In the New Law a Sacrament is an outward\nsign instituted permanently by Christ to signify and convey grace.\n\n(a) The internal cause or essence of a Sacrament is the outward sign,\nwhich has two parts. The indeterminate part or matter is a visible\nobject (e.g., the water of Baptism, the chrism of Confirmation, the\nbread and wine of the Eucharist, the oil of Extreme Unction, the\nimposition of hands in Orders) or a perceptible act that looks to\nanother act for its perfectionment (e.g., the confession, etc., of the\npenitent in penance; the giving of oneself as spouse in Matrimony).\nThe determining part, or form, is either the sacred formula spoken over\nthe material element (e.g., in Baptism the words \u201cI baptize thee,\netc.\u201d) or an act that completes another act (e.g., the acceptance of\nanother as spouse in Matrimony). As the matter must be visible or\notherwise sense-perceptible, so the form must be audible or at least\n(in Matrimony) equivalently audible; for a Sacrament is a sensible\nsign. The words are audible when they are heard or are capable of being\nheard at least by the minister.\n\n(b) The external efficient cause or instituter of the Sacraments is\nChrist, the founder of the New Testament religion and the productive\nand meritorious author of grace as our God and Saviour.\n\n(c) The external final cause or purpose of the Sacraments is to\nsymbolize outwardly by their rite and to work inwardly by their\ninstrumental virtue the application of Christ\u2019s redemption in the soul\nof properly disposed recipients. It is the nature of Baptism and\nPenance (Sacraments of the Dead) to produce first grace or forgiveness,\nof the others to produce second grace or increase of holiness\n(Sacraments of the Living). Furthermore, three of the Sacraments\n(Baptism, Confirmation, Orders) have a second effect, since they sign\nthe soul with the indelible character of member or soldier or minister\nof Christ, and hence these Sacraments cannot be repeated.\n\n2655. Rules on the Invalid Use of the Matter and Form of the\nSacraments.--(a) Since the matter and form are essential constituents\nwithout which the Sacraments are not had, it is sacrilegious to\ninvalidate a Sacrament by substantial changes in either of these parts.\nThe matter is changed substantially when it is so modified as currently\nto be considered and called something different from the element\nappointed by Christ. Thus, wine is unfit for the Eucharist if corrupted\ninto vinegar, or made unsuitable as a drink (e.g., probably as long as\nit remains frozen), or notably adulterated (e.g., when it is mixed half\nand half with water). The form is changed substantially when it is so\nmodified that to a listener it no longer conveys the sense intended by\nChrist. This happens when the changed form does not express the chief\nideas of the correct form, as when it does not determine who is the\nminister of Penance (e.g., \u201cYou are absolved\u201d), or who is the subject\nof Baptism (e.g., \u201cEgo baptizo in nomine, etc.\u201d), or what is the effect\nof the Eucharist (e.g., \u201cHoc non est corpus meum,\u201d \u201cHoc est corpus,\u201d\n\u201cHic meum est corpus\u201d), or the action of the minister of Penance (e.g.,\n\u201cEgo abluo te a peccatis\u201d), or the profession in Baptism of faith in\nthe Trinity (e.g., \u201cEgo te baptizo, Amen\u201d).\n\n(b) Since the matter and form are parts of a single composite sign, it\nis sacrilegious to invalidate a Sacrament by substantial separations,\nwhich destroy the continuity or unity of signification. There is a\nsubstantial separation within the form when such long intervals occur\nbetween the pronunciation of its syllables or words that it is not in\ncommon estimation a united sentence or proposition; for example, if the\ncelebrant says, \u201cHoc est cor-,\u201d then sneezes two or three times, and\n(instead of repeating the words) concludes \u201c-pus meum,\u201d or says \u201cHoc\nest corpus\u201d and after an interruption of several minutes (instead of\nrepeating) finishes with: \u201cmeum.\u201d There is substantial separation\nbetween the matter and form, if the former is applied by one minister\nand the latter is spoken by another, although the form declares that\nthe matter is applied by the speaker of the form: for example, if Titus\npours the water while Claudius says: \u201cI baptize thee, etc.\u201d Even when\nthe same minister applies both matter and form, there is a substantial\nseparation between these parts when the form is not spoken at the same\ntime or for the same time that the matter is posited, and thereby, from\nthe special character of the Sacrament, leaves the signification of the\nsacramental matter unsettled. This happens when the form is spoken too\nlong before or too long after the presence or application of the\nmatter, or when the form is limited by a future condition which will\nnot be verified during the continuance of the matter (see 2668).\n\n2656. Simultaneity of Matter and Form.--The simultaneity of matter and\nform which validity requires must be either moral or physical according\nto the character of the Sacrament.\n\n(a) There is physical simultaneity when matter and form are present in\nthe same instants of time. This kind of union is demanded in the\nEucharist, for it has the character of a transubstantiation of bread\nand Wine present at the moments the words of consecration are said over\nthem. There would be no Sacrament if the bread were absent even during\na part of the consecration.\n\n(b) There is a moral simultaneity like to the physical\ncontemporaneousness when the matter and form are partly present in the\nsame instants of time, and perhaps also (as some hold) when one follows\nthe other with such close succession that not more than a Pater or Ave\ncould be said between them. This kind of union is the maximum in\nPenance and Matrimony, for absolution must follow after confession, and\nconjugal acceptance must follow after conjugal offer. It suffices in\nBaptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders; for these four\nSacraments do not consecrate the matter (and hence some little\nseparation is allowed), but they do signify in the present tense the\nbestowal of grace through the application of the matter (and hence any\nseparation must be of the slightest).\n\n(c) There is a purely moral simultaneity when the form follows the\nmatter after a somewhat considerable interval of time has elapsed, but\nwith a connection between the two based on human usage which carries\nthe matter on in human estimation over to the time the form is\nemployed. This suffices in Penance and Matrimony. Penance has the\ncharacter of a judicial process, whose unity is not destroyed by some\nlittle delay between the discussion and the sentence; and hence it\nseems that absolution could be given validly an hour after confession.\nMatrimony has the character of a contract, whose unity is preserved\neven in spite of a long interval between the date of consent of the\nfirst party and the date of consent of the second party.\n\n2657. Lawfulness of Moral Simultaneity in the Sacraments Other than the\nEucharist.--(a) In Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Orders,\nit would seem on account of the danger of nullity to be a serious sin\nto exclude all physical simultaneity between matter and form (e.g., to\npour all the water and then to begin the words: \u201cI baptize thee, etc.,\u201d\nor vice versa). In practice the Rubrics should be followed.\n\n(b) In Penance and Matrimony it is more or less sinful to make\nneedless, though not invalidating, delays. In ordinary practice the\nconfessor should absolve as soon as the confession has been heard and\nthe penance accepted, and the bride should express her consent\nimmediately after the bridegroom has expressed his.\n\n2658. Accidental Changes or Separations as to Matter and Form.--(a)\nThese administrations are not invalid, for they preserve the essence of\nthe elements or the sense of the words appointed by Christ. Examples of\naccidental change of matter are baptismal water to which a relatively\nvery small quantity of wine has been added, or wine for the Eucharist\nto which a relatively trifling amount of water has been added. The form\nis accidentally modified if translated into the vernacular or rendered\nby synonymous words (e.g., \u201cEgo abluo te, etc.\u201d), or if an unimportant\nword (e.g., \u201cenim\u201d) is added or subtracted, or if the words are\ntransposed or partially repeated or unintentionally mispronounced\nwithout detriment to sense (e.g., \u201cHoc est meum corpus,\u201d \u201cHoc, hoc,\nest, est, etc.,\u201d \u201cHoc est copus meum\u201d). There is accidental separation\nwhen slight pauses are made between words, or when an interval not\ndestructive of the sense falls between the use of the matter and the\nuse of the form (see 2655, 2656).\n\n(b) These administrations are unlawful and from their nature mortally\nsinful, since they are transgressions of a precept of the Church meant\nto safeguard respect for the Sacraments of Christ, and they are\ntherefore opposed to the virtue of religion (2147). But the sin may be\nvenial by reason of lightness of matter (e.g., omission of the word\n\u201cenim\u201d), or of imperfection of the act. Scandal, danger of invalidity,\ncontempt, and bad intention would make even a small change a serious\nsin. In practice the rule to follow is to observe exactly the\nprescribed matter and form and entire rite, to pronounce the words\nclearly and slowly, to repeat the form when any involuntary\ninterruption happens between its essential parts, and to unite the\nmatter and form as closely as possible.\n\n2659. Substantial Changes or Separations.--Substantial changes or\nseparations _a fortiori_ are grave sins. They offend against religion\n(since they make a mockery of the sacred signs appointed by Christ),\nagainst obedience (since they disregard a most serious precept of the\nChurch), against charity (since they deprive the recipient of\nsacramental grace), and against justice (at least when the minister is\nbound _ex officio_ to confer the Sacrament, since there is then a\nquasi-contract with the recipient to administer the Sacrament\ncorrectly).\n\n2660. Doubtful Matter.--It is sometimes probable but not certain that\nan element suffices for the matter of a Sacrament (e.g., coffee or tea\nfor Baptism, chrism for Extreme Unction). Hence the question: \u201cIs it\nlawful to use probable matter in the administration of a Sacrament?\u201d\n\n(a) If certain matter cannot be had and the Sacrament is urgently\nnecessary or very useful, probable matter may be used. For the\nSacraments were instituted by Christ to benefit man (\u201cThe Sacraments\nare for men\u201d), and hence it is not irreverent to give to one in need a\nprobably valid Sacrament when a certainly valid Sacrament is\nimpossible. Thus, a dying infant may and should be baptized with\ncoffee, if no pure water can be procured in time; the last anointing\nmay be conferred with chrism, if the oil of the sick cannot be had\nbefore a dying man will have expired.\n\n(b) If certain matter can be had, or if the Sacrament is not urgently\nnecessary or useful, probable matter may not be used without grave sin;\nfor there is then no reason of necessity to justify the risk to which\nthe Sacrament and perhaps also the recipient are exposed, Thus, it is\nnot lawful to baptize with coffee when pure water can be secured, or to\nconfirm with chrism not blessed by a bishop a dying man who had just\nreceived the last Sacraments, even though other chrism is unobtainable\n(see 661, 678, 711, and Denziger, n. 1151).\n\n2661. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Means (see 360, 786,\n2156)?--(a) Those Sacraments have a necessity of means without which\nsanctifying grace and salvation cannot be had. Hence the necessity for\nindividuals of Baptism (without which there is no regeneration), of\nPenance (without which there is no reconciliation), of the Eucharist\u2019s\neffect (without which there is no incorporation with Christ), and for\nthe Church the necessity of Orders (without which there are no\nministers and dispensers of grace, Prov., xi, 14).\n\n(b) Those Sacraments have no necessity of means without which\nsanctifying grace and salvation can be had; but they have a necessity\nof convenience, inasmuch as they perfect grace already had and make\nsalvation more easy. In this sense, then, Confirmation and Extreme\nUnction may be called necessary for the individual, since the former\nperfects the grace of Baptism and the latter the grace of Penance; and\nMatrimony may be called necessary for the Church, since it perfects\nwith a sacramental grace the propagation of the children of the Church.\n\n2662. Reception of Sacraments _in re_ or _in voto_.--The Sacraments\nthat have a necessity of means must be received either in themselves\n(_in re_) or in desire (_in voto_).\n\n(a) Thus, Baptism _in re_ is necessary for all infants (John, iii. 5),\nBaptism _in re_ or _in voto_ for all adults (John, xiv. 21-23). Baptism\nof desire consists in an act of perfect charity or contrition made by\nan unbaptized person, which includes the will to do all that God has\ncommanded, and consequently at least an implicit or virtual desire of\nBaptism of water. As is proved in Dogmatic Theology, Baptism may be\nsupplied for, as regards grace, by martyrdom in an infant and by\nmartyrdom joined with attrition in an adult.\n\n(b) Penance _in re_ or _in voto_ is necessary for all who have\ncommitted grave sin after Baptism. The desire of the Sacrament is an\nact of perfect charity or contrition, which includes at least\nimplicitly the wish to receive absolution. Martyrdom joined with\nattrition also suffices.\n\n(c) The Sacrament of the Eucharist is not a necessary means for anyone,\neither _in re_ or _in voto_; for the essential grace of justification\ncan be obtained through Baptism and Penance. But the proper result\n(_res_) of the Eucharist, which consists in incorporation with Christ,\nperseverance, and life eternal, is a necessary means _in voto_, tacitly\nor interpretatively; for Baptism, as was said, is absolutely necessary\nfor salvation, and Baptism itself is a tacit or interpretative desire\nof the result of the Eucharist, inasmuch as Baptism is but a means to\nthat result and the beginning of its accomplishment.\n\n2663. What Sacraments Have a Necessity of Precept?--An act is said to\nfall under precept _per se_, when it is directly commanded in a law\nthat mentions it specifically; it is said to fall under precept _per\naccidens_, when it becomes obligatory in virtue of a law that does not\ncommand it directly or specifically (cfr. 935, 1099, 1602).\n\n(a) There is a divine precept obliging _per se_ and _sub gravi_ in\nreference to Baptism (\u201cPreach the Gospel to all nations, baptizing\nthem, etc.,\u201d Matt., xxviii. 19), Penance (\u201cWhose sins you shall\nforgive, they are forgiven them, etc.\u201d, John, xx. 23), and the\nEucharist (\u201cUnless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, you shall not\nhave life in you,\u201d John, vi. 54). According to some authorities there\nis also a divine precept obliging at least _sub levi_ to receive\nConfirmation (\u201cHe commanded them to await the promise of the Father,\u201d\nActs, i. 4) and Extreme Unction (\u201cIs there any man sick among you? Let\nhim bring in the priests of the Church,\u201d James, v. 14).\n\n(b) There is a divine precept obliging _per accidens_ and _sub gravi_\nin reference to Confirmation and Extreme Unction, when they cannot be\nomitted without peril to salvation, scandal to neighbors, or other such\ninconvenience which one is seriously bound to prevent. Similarly, there\nmight be a _per accidens_ obligation of receiving Matrimony or Orders\n(see 2627).\n\n(c) There are ecclesiastical precepts determining the circumstances of\nthe reception of Penance and the Eucharist (see 2590-2593) and\nprescribing Confirmation for candidates to Orders (Canon 974).\nMoreover, the Code reminds us that no one may lawfully neglect\nConfirmation when he has an opportunity to receive it (Canon 787), and\nlikewise that it is not lawful to neglect Extreme Unction (Canon 944).\n\n2664. Twofold Ministry of the Sacraments.--(a) The ministry of\nproduction (_confectio_) is the application of form to matter that\nmakes the Sacrament (e.g., the consecration of bread and wine); (b) the\nministry of bestowal (_administratio_) is the application of the\nSacrament to the human recipient (e.g., the Communion). The Eucharist\nis a permanent object, whereas Baptism and the rest are transitory\nactions. Hence it is that in the Eucharist, but not in the other\nSacraments, the two ministries are separated, and hence it is also that\nthe Eucharist may be validly given or validly received by those who\ncannot validly consecrate.\n\n2665. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Performance of a\nSacrament.--(a) The Person of the Minister.--As the minister represents\nChrist, only those may perform a Sacrament to whom Christ has given\nauthority. Hence, ordinarily only mortals and human beings--not the\nAngels or departed Saints--can administer a Sacrament. Further, as the\nministry of a Sacrament may include an act of power and authority,\nthere are various ranks of ministers. Thus, the ministry of Matrimony\nsupposes no power or orders or spiritual authority, and the ministers\nare the parties themselves; that of Solemn Baptism, Eucharist, Penance,\nand Extreme Unction supposes orders and lower authority, and the\nminister is the priest; that of Confirmation and Orders supposes higher\nauthority, and the minister is the bishop.\n\n(b) The Acts of the Minister.--As the minister acts as Christ\u2019s\nresponsible agent to whose wise discretion the dispensation of the\nSacraments is committed, he must have at least the external attention\nof mind sufficient to perform all that the rite demands and the\ninternal intention of will sufficient to make his ministry an act that\nis human, sacred, and definitely symbolical of the sacramental effects.\n\n2666. The Necessary Intention.--The intention or purpose of the\nminister therefore must have the following qualities:\n\n(a) objectively, there must be an intention of doing what the Church\ndoes (i.e., of performing a sacred rite instituted by Christ, for the\nminister acts in the name and authority of Christ). Hence a mock\nsacrament--or even, more probably, a purely external performance with\nno purpose to enact a sacred rite--does not suffice. But, on the other\nhand, an unbeliever can administer validly if he really intends to do\nwhat Christians do or what Christ commanded to be done. The intention\nnot to do what the Church does was the chief cause of the nullity of\nAnglican Orders;\n\n(b) subjectively, the intention must be at least virtual, so as to\nensure a deliberate act. An actual intention is not necessary, because\nit is often impossible on account of its difficulty; while an habitual\nintention is not sufficient, because it does not influence the act so\nas to make it human (see 2165). The interpretative intention (i.e., a\npurpose that never existed, but that would presumably have existed, had\nattention been given the matter) is with greater reason insufficient;\n\n(c) modally, the intention must be such as to make precise the\ncharacter of the action as a special sacred rite; for just as the\nmatter awaits the form or word to receive the imprint of a sacred\nsignificance, so do the ceremonial words themselves look to the\ninternal purpose of the minister for their fixed meaning. Hence, the\nSacrament is invalid if the minister\u2019s purpose is indeterminate (e.g.,\nif a priest wills to consecrate ten undesignated hosts out of the\nhundred contained in a ciborium, or to absolve one undesignated person\nof a multitude); or if the purpose is self-exclusive (e.g., if a\nbridegroom has two mutually incompatible intentions, namely, to marry\nthe bride and also to marry her only for a time); or if the purpose is\nleft in suspense (e.g., if a priest makes his absolution depend on\nfuture restitution or any other non-existent condition, and most\nprobably also if the minister makes the Sacrament depend on the\nrecipient\u2019s predestination or other such condition known only to God).\n\n2667. Rules on Plurality of Intentions.--(a) When opposite intentions\nare simultaneous, if one of them is predominant in the minister\u2019s will\nand not insociable with the Sacrament, that one prevails and the\nSacrament is valid; otherwise the Sacrament is null. (b) When opposite\nintentions are successive, the later prevails over the earlier, unless\nthe earlier was stronger and meant to endure in spite of other\nintentions, and it has not been recalled expressly by the will.\n\n2668. Requisites for Use of Conditional Intention.--(a) The use must be\nvalid or non-suspensive (2666 e), and hence (Matrimony excepted on\naccount of its special character as a contract) the minister may not\nconfer a Sacrament under a condition _de futuro_. But conditions _de\npraesenti_ (e.g., \u201cI absolve you, if you are repentant\u201d) or _de\npraeterito_ (e.g., \u201cI baptize you, if you have not received Baptism\u201d)\nare valid.\n\n(b) The use of a conditional intention must be lawful, or justified by\na sufficient reason. Normally the minister should intend absolutely to\ngive a Sacrament, as the forms of the Sacraments are unconditional. But\nif the absolute intention would be disrespectful, because there is\ndoubt whether all the requisites for the Sacrament are present, while\non the other hand denial of the Sacrament would be harmful because the\nsubject needs it, both disrespect to the Sacrament and harm to the\nsubject are avoided by conditional administration. The doubt spoken of\nmay refer to the recipient (e.g., whether he is living or otherwise\ncapable, whether he is contrite or otherwise disposed) or to the\nSacrament (e.g., whether it has been received or received validly,\nwhether the form has been rightly spoken, whether the present matter is\nvalid).\n\n(c) The use of the conditional intention must be legal according to the\nrules prescribed by the Church. Thus, according to the Ritual the\nconditional intention in Baptism and Extreme Unction (\u201c_Si non es\nbaptizatus_,\u201d \u201c_Si vivis_\u201d) must be expressed vocally. Moreover,\nconditional marriages are not permitted as a rule except there be a\ngrave reason and the bishop consents.\n\n2669. Lawful Administration of Sacraments.--Lawful administration of a\nSacrament demands, in addition to the conditions for validity\n(2665-2668), that the minister and his ministry be worthy, for even in\nthe Old Law it was strictly commanded that holy things be treated in a\nholy manner (Isa., lii. 11; Lev., xxi. xxii). Hence, a person who\nfulfilled the conditions for validity but who lacked one or other of\nthe qualities mentioned below would perform and confer a true\nSacrament, but he would sin more or less seriously on account of the\nunworthy administration, unless good faith excused him.\n\n(a) The Minister\u2019s Worthiness before God.--The state of grace is\nrequired in consecrated ministers when they minister solemnly and _ex\nofficio_ in performing a Sacrament; for they act then as\nrepresentatives of Christ, who is holy, and exercise most sacred\nfunctions which He appointed as means of holiness and which they were\nordained to perform holily. The sin of unworthiness is a grave\nsacrilege. It seems there is _per se_ no grave sin, if the minister is\nnot consecrated (e.g., in lay Baptism), or if the ministry is not _ex\nofficio_ (e.g., in a Baptism of necessity given by a priest but without\nthe solemn ceremonies), or if a Sacrament is not made or performed\n(e.g., when confession is heard but absolution not given, when\nCommunion is administered, when the Blessed Sacrament is carried). It\nis generally admitted that there is no grave sin even in a solemn and\nofficial performance of a Sacrament, if the Sacrament is urgently\nnecessary and the state of grace cannot be recovered in time; also in\nthe exercise of a function which is not itself a Sacrament (e.g., to be\nofficial witness at a marriage or deacon at Mass, to preach, bless,\ngive Minor Orders, chant or say the Office). When the state of grace is\nnecessary for his ministry, one who is in sin must to the best of his\nability recover that state by going to confession or at least by making\nan act of contrition.\n\n(b) The Minister\u2019s Worthiness Before the Church.--Since the Church is\nthe custodian of the Sacraments, these cannot be lawfully performed or\nadministered by those who are under her censure or who have not\nreceived her license. The excommunicated and the irregular sin gravely\nif they administer Sacraments, unless the faithful lawfully request\nadministration from them (see 2683). Only priests are licensed to act\nas ministers of Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction and the Eucharist,\nand the pastor of a place is the authorized minister for that\nterritory; but in case of need even the laity may administer Baptism, a\npriest other than the pastor may give the Last Sacraments, and the sick\nmay confess to any confessor with due faculties.\n\n(c) Worthiness of the Ministration.--Internally the ministry should be\ndevout and attentive; for, if private worship should be religiously\nmade, much more the worship contained in the Sacraments (see 2150,\n2244). Voluntary distractions, however, do not seem to be gravely\nsinful, unless the validity of the rite is imperilled by them.\nExternally the ministry should be dignified and rubrical. Canon 733\nrequires that each one observe the accidental ceremonies of his own\nRite and liturgical books. Since ceremonies were instituted by the\nChurch from the earliest ages and are prescribed in virtue of religion\n(Catechism of the Council of Trent, page 152), it is sinful to neglect\nthem unless a rubric is merely directive or optional, such as the rules\nbefore and after Mass. The preceptive rubrics oblige _sub gravi_ as to\nnotable matter (e.g., the anointing in Baptism), _sub levi_ as to\ninconsiderable matter (e.g., words, bows, crosses, etc. of minor\nimportance); but one may be excused from guilt, or grave guilt, on\naccount of imperfection of act (e.g., inadvertence caused by external\ndistractions) or impossibility (e.g., ceremonies curtailed because of\napproaching death, scandal or wonder of the people). The Roman Ritual\n(Title I, n. 10) advises the explanation of the ceremonies for the\nbenefit of those who assist at the administration of the Sacraments,\nand recommends the Catechism of the Council of Trent for this purpose.\n\n2670. Multiplication of Sins of Unworthy Administration.--How many sins\nare committed by the minister when Sacraments are unworthily\nadministered to many recipients at one time, as when several children\nare baptized together, or a large gathering of penitents are heard one\nafter the other, etc.?\n\n(a) According to the strict view, there are as many distinct sins as\nthere are distinct administrations, for each Sacrament is separate from\nthe other. But in case of Communion, since the separate Communions are\nparts of the one Eucharistic banquet, there is but one sin, mortal or\nvenial, according to the view taken of an administration that is not\nalso performance of a Sacrament.\n\n(b) According to the mild view, there is but one sin, since sins are\nnot multiplied numerically when they form morally but one act on\naccount of the unity given them by the purpose of the agent and the\ncircumstances.\n\n2671. Requirements for a Valid Sacrament in Reference to the\nRecipient.--(a) The Person of the Recipient.--Since the Sacraments were\ninstituted as means of salvation, they can be given only to those who\nare still wayfarers in the present mortal existence, and hence a\nSacrament administered to a brute animal or a corpse would be invalid,\nor, in the case of Communion, would not be received sacramentally. As\nBaptism is the preparation for the other Sacraments, but need not\npresuppose personal sinfulness, its subject is any and every unbaptized\nperson, infant or adult, male or female. The other six Sacraments\npresuppose Baptism, and only those who have been initiated into the\nChurch by Baptism can receive them validly. As to these six Sacraments\nonly males are capable of Orders, which is for the rulers of the\nChurch; only adults are capable of Penance, Extreme Unction and\nMatrimony, which suppose personal sin or personal contract. Further,\nthe impotent and impeded are incapable of Matrimony, and those who are\nnot in danger of death from sickness are incapable of Extreme Unction.\nFinally, those who have been baptized, confirmed, or ordained, cannot\nbe rebaptized, reconfirmed, or reordained, since these three Sacraments\ncan be given but once; he who is married cannot marry again while his\nwife lives and the bond endures; he who has been anointed cannot be\nreanointed during the same danger.\n\n(b) The Acts of the Recipient.--If the recipient is an infant, no\ndisposition on his part is necessary, since he does not understand. If\nthe recipient is an adult, it is necessary in the performance of every\nSacrament (on the Eucharist see 2664) that he have some intention or\nwillingness to receive the Sacrament, since Christ does not wish to\nconfer benefits or impose certain grave burdens on those who are\nunwilling. A forced Sacrament to which the subject yielded no internal\nconsent would be a null Sacrament. Further, since an essential part\n(namely, the matter, or according to others a _conditio sine qua non_)\nof Penance is the faith and repentance of the recipient, these\ndispositions are necessary in that Sacrament.\n\n2672. Qualities of the Recipient\u2019s Intention.--(a) Objectively, the\nrecipient should intend to receive what the Church confers, and hence\nintentions that are not serious, or are mistaken or external (e.g.,\nBaptism received for the sake of rehearsal, or in the belief that it is\na profane ablution, or accepted as a pure formality), do not seem\nsufficient (see 2666).\n\n(b) Subjectively.--The recipient must positively will the Sacrament,\nfor it seems that the so-called neutral intention--in which the subject\nneither consents nor dissents internally, but is passive and\nindifferent, and acquiesces externally only to please another--is not a\ntrue desire. But the strength or influence of the recipient\u2019s intention\nneed not be so great as the minister\u2019s, since the role of the minister\nis to perform the rite, that of the subject only to receive the rite\n(see 2665).\n\n2673. When a Virtual Intention Is Necessary.--It is generally agreed,\ntherefore, that while the interpretative intention does not suffice,\nthe actual intention and even, for the most part, the virtual intention\nare not necessary. But about the virtual intention the following should\nbe noted; (a) a virtual and explicit intention is necessary in\nMatrimony if a party be considered, not precisely as recipient, but as\nminister of the Sacrament (see 2666) and as maker of the contract (see\n1883); (b) a virtual and at least implicit intention is necessary in\nPenance, if a penitent is considered precisely as positing the\nrequisite matter or condition of the Sacrament, since this consists in\nrepentance, and repentance includes either an express or an implied\ndesire of sacramental absolution.\n\n2674. When an Habitual Intention Suffices.--The habitual intention is\nfound in those who are not conscious (see 2165), but it suffices for\nthe reception of a Sacrament, since the recipient does not affect the\nSacrament, and it is enough that he had the good will to accept it and\nhas not retracted that will.\n\n(a) An habitual and explicit intention suffices for the three\nSacraments that impose special obligations, namely, Baptism, Orders,\nand Matrimony. Hence, he who has asked for Baptism is validly baptized\nafter he becomes delirious; he who has asked for Orders is validly\nordained even when unconscious; he who has sent his consent to a\nmarriage by proxy receives the Sacrament during his sleep, if the other\nparty\u2019s consent closing the contract is given at that time.\n\n(b) An habitual and implicit intention included in a particular will to\ndo a good act on which the Sacrament follows in natural course,\nsuffices for the other three Sacraments which do not impose special\nobligations. Hence, a person who purposed to live as a Catholic is\nvalidly confirmed while unconscious; a person who intended to die as a\nCatholic is validly absolved and anointed, as far as intention is\nconcerned, at the moment of death, even though he be out of his mind.\nFurther, if an unbaptized person has resolved to become a Catholic but\nhas no knowledge of Baptism itself, he is validly baptized in virtue of\nhis implicit desire, even though he be unconscious.\n\n(c) An habitual and implicit intention included in a general will to do\nall that is necessary for salvation or a good life is taught by some\nauthors, and is by them considered sufficient for Baptism, since it is\nthe most necessary Sacrament, and the Sacraments are for men. An\nunbaptized person of good will who has supernatural contrition or\ncharity is justified through Baptism of desire, but if he has only\nsupernatural attrition the Sacrament itself is necessary for him.\nHence, in case of urgent need conditional Baptism should be given a\ndying and unconscious infidel who was well disposed; but, as the\nintention is not certain, the Baptism should be repeated in case of\nrecovery. The same principle is extended by some moralists to the\nadministration of Penance and Extreme Unction to schismatics and\nheretics who are in danger of death.\n\n2675. Requirements for Lawful or Fruitful Reception of a Sacrament by\nan Adult.--(a) Worthiness of the Recipient from Divine Law.--The two\nSacraments of the Dead, Baptism and Penance, were intended by Christ to\nbe means of forgiveness to the repentant, and hence they require at\nleast that the recipient believe himself attrite. The five Sacraments\nof the Living were meant by Christ to strengthen grace and life already\nhad, and consequently he who approaches them must have no serious fault\non his conscience. Conscious unworthiness is a sacrilege, and only\nextreme necessity can excuse reception in such a state (e.g., when a\nsinner takes Communion to save the Host from profanation).\n\n(b) Worthiness from Church Law.--The recipient must be free from church\ncensures (Canon 2260) or impediments, and must possess the preparation\nor qualification which the church law prescribes (e.g., a certain age\nis required for Confirmation; the Eucharist must be received fasting;\nthe candidate for Orders must be approved, etc.).\n\n(c) Worthiness of Reception.--The Sacraments should be received\ndevoutly, with proper preparation, attention, and thanksgiving. In the\ncase of the Eucharist, though intention is not necessary for validity,\nit is required for a sacramental or fruitful Communion; an habitual and\nimplicit intention suffices for the Viaticum (and Easter Communion), an\nhabitual explicit intention for Communion of devotion.\n\n2676. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Give Them?--(a) A\npastor is obliged to give a Sacrament to one of his own subjects who\nreasonably requests it, and to do so willingly, freely (Canon 736),\nand, if he has no substitute, in person; for a spiritual shepherd has a\ngrave duty of justice and charity to feed his flock. A request is not\nreasonable, however, if compliance will put the pastor to an\ninconvenience greater than that which the parishioner will suffer from\na refusal, for example, when Baptisms, Confessions, or Communions are\nneedlessly asked for outside the appointed hours, or when sick calls\nthat can be attended during the day are sent in at night. The\nSacraments necessary for salvation (Baptism and Penance) should be\ngiven even at the risk of life, if the subject is in grave need and\nthere is assured hope of success (see 1167), and doubtless this should\nbe applied also to Extreme Unction or even the Viaticum.\n\n(b) One who is not a pastor is obliged from charity to give the\nSacraments to those who reasonably ask. He would be obliged even to\nrisk his life to save a soul, if there were no one else to administer a\nnecessary Sacrament to a person in extreme spiritual peril who could be\nsaved by his ministry.\n\n2677. When Is the Minister of the Sacraments Bound to Deny Them?--(a)\nHe must always deny them to those who are incapable, for otherwise he\ninsults the Sacrament. Under no circumstances, then, may a priest\nbaptize one who is already baptized, or absolve one who is unrepentant;\nand he may not assist at the attempted marriage of a divorcee.\nLikewise, as is manifest, he must always deny the Sacraments to those\nwho ask for them out of hatred or contempt for religion, for to grant\nthem in such circumstances would be an act intrinsically evil.\n\n(b) He must deny them, as a rule, to those who to his knowledge are\ncertainly unworthy (e.g., on account of lack of requisite instruction\nor moral disposition); otherwise, he casts pearls before swine,\ncooperates in the sacrilege of others, and scandalizes the people.\nHence, a public sinner--that is, one whose unworthiness is notorious\n(see 2053)--should not be given the Sacraments publicly, until he has\nrepaired the scandal he gave; and no unworthy person, even though he be\na hidden sinner whose guilt is known only to the minister, should be\ngiven a Sacrament in private until he has shown signs of repentance.\nGenerally the minister is bound to assure himself beforehand of the\ngood disposition of the one who asks for a Sacrament, though in case of\nCommunion this is often impossible, and it suffices to presume that all\nwho approach the altar becomingly are in the state of grace.\n\n2678. Administration to Unworthy Persons.--Since material cooperation\nwith sin is lawful for a sufficient reason (see 1515 sqq.), one may\nadminister a Sacrament to an unworthy person when refusal would cause a\ngreater evil than ministration. This happens in the following cases:\n\n(a) when refusal will necessitate a more wicked sacrilege (viz., injury\nto a Sacrament by the minister himself). This case occurs when the\nminister knows the subject\u2019s unworthiness only from the latter\u2019s\nsacramental confession, and hence cannot exclude him without violation\nof the seal;\n\n(b) when the refusal will bring on more widespread evils (viz.,\ndiscouragement of the use of the Sacraments). This happens when the\nsubject who asks the Sacrament is not publicly known as a sinner, but\nhis request is public, so that a refusal will amount to a defamation of\nhim by the minister. If priests had the right to inflict public\ndisgrace on those who approached the Sacraments, it is easily seen what\ngrave scandals and disorders would follow, and that a ready excuse\nwould present itself for personal spite and neglect of religion. Our\nLord administered Communion to Judas rather than betray his secret\nguilt to the other Apostles.\n\n2679. Is the fear of bodily harm or of death a sufficient reason for\nadministering a Sacrament to an unworthy person? (a) If a greater evil\nwill be caused by bestowal of the Sacrament, it should not be bestowed.\nThis happens when the Sacrament is asked out of hatred or contempt of\nreligion, and when great scandal will result if the priest yields. (b)\nIf a greater evil will be caused by refusal of the Sacrament, it should\nnot be refused. Examples are those of the previous paragraph. The mere\nprivate good of the minister is not preferable to the good of the\nSacrament.\n\n2680. Simulation and Dissimulation of a Sacrament?--Is it lawful in\ncase of difficulty to give a Sacrament only in appearance? (a) If this\nmeans simulation of a Sacrament, or the use of its externals in such a\nway as to make it null (i.e., by withholding internal intention or\nusing invalid matter or form), the answer is in the negative; for\nsimulation is always an acted lie (see 2403, 2404), and when applied to\nSacraments it produces a sacrilegious mutilation and also, in the case\nof the Eucharist (e.g., when an unconsecrated host is given to a\ncommunicant), an occasion of idolatry. (b) If this means dissimulation\nof a Sacrament, or the use of some nonsacramental act to conceal the\ndenial of a Sacrament, the answer is in the affirmative, for it is\nlawful to keep from others knowledge to which they have no right. Thus,\na priest who wishes to conceal from onlookers that he has refused\nabsolution to a penitent, can lawfully say a prayer and make a sign of\nthe cross over this person.\n\n2681. Administration of Penance and Extreme Unction to Heretics and\nSchismatics.--(a) Regularly this is unlawful, even though these persons\nare in good faith and ask for the Sacraments. They must first renounce\ntheir errors and become reconciled with the Church (Canon 731).\n\n(b) Exceptionally, according to some moralists, this is lawful when\nthere is extreme need. Hence, according to this view a priest may\nsecretly give conditional absolution to an unconscious heretic or\nschismatic in danger of death who has given signs of repentance; he may\nabsolve and anoint a dying heretic or schismatic, even though\nconscious, if this person appears to be in good faith and repentant and\nwilling to do all that God requires of him. But the priest should first\ntry to convert the dying person, if this is possible and the latter\u2019s\ngood faith will not be disturbed; and he must also avoid giving scandal.\n\n2682. Repetition of a Sacrament on Account of Invalid\nAdministration.--(a) This is unlawful when the fear of invalidity is\ngroundless and foolish; for it is seriously disrespectful to a\nSacrament and disedifying to others to repeat the rite without reason.\nBut scrupulous persons are sometimes free of grave sin, since they mean\nwell in repeating and are not accountable for their fears.\n\n(b) This is lawful but not obligatory when there is a prudent misgiving\nabout a useful Sacrament (Confirmation, Matrimony, anointing of one who\nis conscious); also when there is a slight reason of law or fact for\nfear about a necessary or more important Sacrament (Baptism, Orders,\nabsolution of a dying person, anointing of an unconscious person,\nconsecration of the Eucharist). For the Sacraments are for men. But if\nonly a small loss or an unlikely loss will be caused by their\nnon-repetition, the duty of repeating them cannot be insisted on.\n\n(c) This is gravely obligatory when there is a prudent fear about a\nnecessary or more important Sacrament; it is gravely or lightly\nobligatory (to be determined in each case) when there is a well-founded\nfear about a useful Sacrament, if charity, justice or religion calls\nfor repetition and the inconvenience will not be too great. In\nMatrimony the alternate methods of convalidation or sanation may be\nused as the case demands. Again, the Sacraments are for men, and hence,\nif man will likely be subjected to a notable loss by the minister\u2019s\nneglect of repetition, the duty of repetition is clear.\n\n2683. Reception of a Sacrament from an Unworthy Minister.--May a\nSacrament be received from a minister who, to one\u2019s certain knowledge,\ncannot give it without sin on account of unworthiness (such as a state\nof sin or censure)?\n\n(a) _Per se_, this is unlawful, for it is cooperation with sacrilege\nand is often attended by scandal and danger of perversion to self.\n\n(b) _Per accidens_, this is lawful, for material cooperation is\njustified when a proportionately grave reason exists (1515 sqq.).\nMoreover, often the minister can put himself in the state of grace\nbefore he gives the Sacrament, or can be excused from sacrilege on\naccount of the necessity. The less the irreverence or danger of\nscandal, the less need be the reason for asking or taking a Sacrament\nfrom an unworthy person. If the minister is a sinner or is under\nordinary suspension or other censure, a serious reason of spiritual\nadvantage suffices (e.g., the opportunity to make the Easter duty); if\nthe minister is under sentence (Canon 2261 n. 3), only danger of death\nsuffices; if the minister is a heretic or schismatic, only extreme need\nsuffices, and the danger of scandal and perversion must be avoided.\n\n2684. Sacramentals.--The sacramentals are the sacred things (e.g.,\nrosaries, scapulars, agnus deis) and actions (e.g., consecrations,\nblessings, exorcisms) used by the Church in imitation of the Sacraments\nto obtain through her intercession blessings chiefly of a spiritual\nsort (Canon 1144).\n\n(a) Necessity.--Our Lord gave to the Church the power of instituting\nsacramentals, and certain of those used by the Church are but\ndevelopments of the blessings and exorcisms that He used. Some of the\nsacramentals are commanded by the Church (viz, those that are used in\nthe administration of the Sacraments or in other sacred services);\nothers are recommended, but not commanded.\n\n(b) Use.--The virtue of religion requires that the sacramentals be\nadministered, received and treated with devotion and respect, the\nextremes of irreligion and superstition being avoided (see 2244). The\nlaws of the Church on the ministers, recipients, and rites of the\nsacramentals are treated in works on Canon Law and liturgy.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 2: BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 66-83.)\n\n2685. The general duties of the ministers and recipients of the\nSacraments have been outlined in the previous Article. The principles\ntherein given are the basis of the special duties that pertain to each\nof the seven Sacraments. In this and the remaining Articles, therefore,\nit will suffice to apply without explaining anew the rules already\ngiven and to add the special details proper to each Sacrament.\n\n2686. The Sacrament of Baptism.--The first and most essential Sacrament\nis Baptism (Greek, washing), which may be defined: \u201cThe Sacrament of\nregeneration by water in the word\u201d (Catechism of the Council of Trent,\npage 163). The internal grace of the Sacrament is expressed by\nregeneration, the external sign by water and the word.\n\n(a) The effect of Baptism is regeneration, for it cleanses from sin and\npenalty, and makes him who was a child of wrath to be a child of God\nand a co-heir of Christ. Baptism also christens, since it seals one\nwith the indelible character of Christian, or member of the Church. As\nall are under the original curse by birth from Adam, so all who would\ninherit blessing are in need of this new birth through Christ (see\n2661): \u201cUnless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he\ncannot enter into the kingdom of God\u201d (John, iii. 5).\n\n(b) The material element (remote matter) of Baptism is water, that is,\nany and every form of liquid which in common estimation is pure and\nunchanged water (e.g., water taken from the ocean, from streams,\nfountains, or wells; water melted from snow, ice or hail; water\ngathered from steam, dew, or mist; chemical and mineral water). But\nanimal and plant fluids, though they contain water, are looked upon as\ndistinct substances, and hence Baptism cannot be administered with\nmilk, blood, spittle, sweat, oil, flower or fruit juices (e.g., wine,\ncider), or extracts of barks or roots. Doubtful matter are liquids\nthat, while in large part composed of water, seem to be generally\nregarded as not water (e.g., thin soup, tea or coffee, light beer); and\nhence only in necessity can these be lawfully used for Baptism.\n\n(c) The formal element of Baptism is the word or the formula appointed\nby Christ. In the Latin Church the words are: \u201cI baptize thee in the\nname of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,\u201d Almost\nevery word in this form is necessary for the sense given by Christ, and\nhence almost any omission makes it necessary, or at least lawful, to\nrepeat Baptism (see 2655, 2682). The declaration of the form demands\nthat the application of the water (proximate matter) be made in the\nmanner of an ablution (i.e., by sprinkling, pouring or immersion). If\nsprinkling or pouring is used, the body of the recipient (i.e., the\nskin of his head) must be washed (i.e., the water must touch the head\nand flow thereon) by the baptizer (i.e., the person who pronounces the\nwords must pour or sprinkle the water). But in case of necessity one\nmay use the opinion that Baptism is valid when the water touches only\nthe hair or some part distinct from the head, or even the afterbirth of\na fetus.\n\n2687. Solemn and Private Baptism.--Though in essentials Baptism is but\none, it is distinguished in reference to accidental ceremony into\nsolemn and private.\n\n(a) Solemn Baptism is that which is administered with all the rites\nprescribed by the Liturgy. It requires consecrated water, sponsors and\nspecial ceremonies; its minister is a clergyman (ordinarily the\nparish-priest or Ordinary, extraordinarily a delegated deacon); its\nplace is the baptistery or church. In the Baptism of adults even\ngreater solemnity may be used, for there is a special rite of\nadministration, and the Church recommends that this Baptism be\nperformed when possible by the Ordinary, or at least in cathedral\nchurches, and on the vigil of Easter or Pentecost.\n\n(b) Private Baptism is given in danger of death, or when an adult\nconvert is rebaptized conditionally (Canon 759). It requires only true\nand natural water, though the water should be as clean and decent as\npossible, and baptismal or blessed water is preferable; generally the\nsimple form without other rite suffices; sponsors are not necessary,\nunless they can be had without difficulty, but if possible at least one\nor two witnesses should be present; the Baptism may be given in the\nprivate home or the hospital or other place where the candidate is\nstaying; anyone who has the use of reason and is able to perform the\nrite may act as minister. When several persons suitable to minister\nprivate Baptism are present, the order of preference to be followed is:\npriest, deacon, subdeacon, cleric, layman, woman; but a woman should be\npreferred to a man if modesty calls for this, or if the woman is better\nacquainted with the manner of baptizing. It is considered a serious sin\nneedlessly to prefer a non-priest to a worthy priest, a non-Catholic to\na Catholic, an outsider to the parish-priest. If possible, parents\nshould not baptize their own children, since it is more becoming that\nthe spiritual parent and the carnal parent be different persons.\n\n2688. Duties of Parish-Priests as to Baptism.--(a) Before\nBaptism.--Baptismal water should be blessed, added to or renewed, as\nthe ritual regulations of one\u2019s place require; the faithful should be\nfrequently admonished in sermons of the serious duty of having their\ninfants baptized as soon as possible (Canon 770); the people should\nalso be told (especially midwives, physicians and surgeons) how lay\nBaptism is to be given validly (Canon 743).\n\n(b) At the Time of Baptism.--Converts preparing for Baptism should be\nwell instructed in the principal religious truths (viz, those contained\nin the Creed), and precepts (viz., the laws of the Decalogue and of the\nChurch, see 914 sqq.), and prayers (viz, the Our Father, the acts of\nfaith, hope, charity, and contrition); and they should learn the nature\nand effects of Baptism. The parish-priest may delegate a deacon to\nbaptize solemnly in his place, if there is a sufficient reason, as when\nhe himself is impeded by sickness, absence, or occupation (Canon 741).\n\n(c) After Baptism.--The pastor in virtue of his office has the\nresponsibility of attending to the registration of baptisms in the\nproper book (Canon 777). The registration should be made without\ndelay--that is, before the sponsors have departed, or immediately after\nthe ceremony, or at least on the same day, if possible; the entry\nshould be made accurately and legibly. The duty of keeping proper\nbaptismal records is considered grave, since important evils would\nfollow on their neglect.\n\n2689. Duties of Parents and Guardians in Reference to Baptism.--(a) As\nto Administration of Baptism.--Parents are obliged under grave sin not\nto expose their children to the loss of salvation by undue delay of\nBaptism (see 2344, 2630). If there is danger of death, a child must be\nbaptized at once; if there is no immediate danger of death, the child\nmust nevertheless, on account of the absolute necessity of Baptism, be\nbaptized as soon as possible. Some moralists consider a needless delay\ngravely sinful if it exceeds three or four days; others, if it exceeds\nten or eleven days. Since infants can be baptized in the womb, a mother\nis not obliged to undergo the Caesarean operation to ensure Baptism;\nbut she may permit the operation for the sake of a more certain\nBaptism, unless her obligations to husband or other children will\nsuffer on account of the danger to her life. If a mother dies in\npregnancy, the fetus should be extracted and baptized. The duty here\nrests with the relatives and the physician (Canon 746).\n\n(b) As to Details of Baptism.--Parents should choose suitable names for\ntheir children, avoiding such as are obscene, ridiculous, or impious.\nIt is advisable that the name of a Saint or of some other person\ndistinguished for holiness be chosen, for this will be of a spiritual\nadvantage to the child and an edification to others. Parents have the\nright to appoint the sponsors of their infant children, and should\nchoose only those who are canonically admissible. If Baptism has been\nadministered at home, the parents should, if the child survives, bring\nit as soon as possible to the church for conditional Baptism, or for\nthe baptismal ceremonies (Canons 759, 760).\n\n2690. Sponsors.--From early times the Church has required in Baptism\nthe use of sponsors, and the reasons for this usage will appear from\nthe duties of these god-parents. The present law (Canons 762 sqq.)\nretains the ancient tradition, and prescribes as a serious duty that in\nSolemn Baptism (even of adults, whenever possible) there shall be at\nleast one sponsor (male or female), and that not more than two be used,\none a male and the other a female.\n\n(a) Requirements for Validity--Since the sponsor takes obligations, he\nmust have the use of reason and give consent to the office; since he is\ncharged with the duty of spiritual guidance, he must be baptized and\nnot be a member of a heretical or schismatic sect; since he exercises\nan office of honor, he must not be under the displeasure of the Church\nby sentence of excommunication or the like; since he is to act as\nspiritual father, he must not be the parent or spouse of the baptized;\nsince he is to stand for the baptized person, he must be designated by\nthe latter or his parents or by the minister. The sponsor must also\nindicate (in person or by proxy) his acceptance of the care of the\nbaptized person by physically touching him at the moment of Baptism\n(either by holding the infant over the font, or by placing a hand on\nthe candidate), or immediately after the Baptism (by raising from the\nwaters or receiving from the hands of the minister the one who has been\nimmersed, or by taking from the font one who has been baptized by\npouring). Non-Catholics, therefore, may not be sponsors, but to avoid\ngreat offense or other serious evil they may sometimes be admitted as\nwitnesses or honorary sponsors (see 956 sqq.).\n\n(b) Requirements for Lawfulness.--The sponsor should have reached his\nfourteenth year (unless the minister sees fit for a just cause to admit\na younger person), and should know the rudiments of faith; he must be a\nperson of respectability among Catholics, and hence one who is\nnotorious on account of certain penalties or on account of crime or of\nmembership in the Freemasons is not acceptable; he must be free to act\nas sponsor, and hence religious and clerics in Major Orders must have\npermission of the superior qualified in each instance to grant this\npermission.\n\n2691. Duties of Sponsors.--(a) They are obliged to look upon their\nspiritual children as their perpetual charges, to see to their\nChristian education and to the fulfillment of the baptismal promises\nfor which they stood surety (Canon 769).\n\n(b) These obligations are grave, since the matter is grave; but, as the\ncare of children falls principally upon the parents, it is only when\nthe parents neglect their duty that the sponsors are held to do what\nthey can for the instruction and correction of their god-children\n(Catechism of Council of Trent, page 175).\n\n2692. Duties of Adult Recipients of Baptism or of Those Who Have the\nUse of Reason.--(a) Before Baptism.--An unbaptized person who has faith\nand who sees the necessity of Baptism, is gravely obliged to ask for\nBaptism at once, if he is in danger of death, or as soon as he\nconveniently can, if he is not in danger of death; for since Baptism is\nthe divinely appointed means of entering the Church and of sharing in\nits privileges, he who would delay it unduly would disobey an important\ncommand of God and would be seriously neglectful of his own salvation.\nFor a sufficient reason, however (e.g., for the sake of instruction or\nprobation, or to avoid persecution), Baptism may be delayed even for\nyears; but the catechumen should then make at once an act of contrition\nor charity so as to obtain the benefit of Baptism of desire. Converts\nshould prepare for Baptism by taking a course of instructions, or, when\nthere is danger of death, a summary instruction (791 sqq.).\n\n(b) At Baptism.--The internal dispositions include, besides intention,\nfaith and repentance: \u201cHe that believeth and is baptized shall be\nsaved\u201d (Mark, xvi. 16); \u201cDo penance and be baptized\u201d (Acts, ii. 38).\nThere must be an explicit faith in the four chief mysteries (see 789).\nIn this country converts who are being baptized conditionally make an\nabjuration and profession of faith before Baptism, and go to confession\nand receive conditional absolution after Baptism. The Code recommends\nthat those who are well receive Baptism fasting; and that, unless grave\nreason excuses, the neophyte assist at Mass and receive Communion after\nhis Baptism (Canon 753).\n\n(c) After Baptism.--Since Baptism makes one a member of the Church,\nthose who receive it are subject to church laws. The promises made in\nBaptism are not strictly vows, but an engagement of loyalty to the\nfaith and the commandments (see 2191).\n\n2693. Duties of the Minister of Baptism.--(a) In Reference to the\nParents.--If the parents insist on giving an unsuitable name to their\nchild, the pastor should silently add a suitable name of some Saint\nchosen by himself, and should inscribe both names in the register\n(Canon 761). A child of non-Catholic parents should not be baptized by\nCatholics, unless this can be done without injury to the natural right\nof the parents of training their own children and without danger to the\nfuture perseverance of the child. Hence these children, if infants,\nshould not be baptized against the will of their parents unless they\nare in danger of death and can be baptized without too great\ninconvenience; but if a child is able to judge for himself, or if there\nis no parental opposition (at least not of both parents), and there are\ngood reasons to believe that the child will be brought up as a\nCatholic, he may be baptized (Canons 750, 751).\n\n(b) In Reference to the Sponsors.--If a sponsor cannot be admitted, the\npastor must use great kindness and prudence, so as not to give offense.\nIf a non-Catholic has been appointed as sponsor, the difficulty may\nsometimes be overcome by naming a sacristan or servant as sponsor and\npermitting the non-Catholic to act as witness.\n\n(c) In Reference to the Capacity of the Recipient.--The minister must\ngive the Sacrament only to those who are capable. Hence, he cannot\nbaptize what is not human (e.g., uterine growths which do not pertain\nto a fetus), or not living (e.g., a stillborn infant), or not\nunbaptized (e.g., a convert or an infant about whose valid Baptism\nthere is no reasonable doubt). Speculatively there is some difficulty\nabout Baptism of unborn fetuses, of abortive fetuses, and of\nmonstrosities (e.g., an infant with two heads or two hearts). For, as\nto the first, it seems that the physically unborn are incapable of\nspiritual rebirth; as to the second, it seems that the soul of an\nundeveloped fetus may be sub-human; and, as to the third, it may be\ndoubtful whether a monstrosity is one individual or several\nindividuals. Practically, however, one should proceed on the principle\nthat the Sacraments are for men, and give the benefit of a doubt to the\ninfants by conditional Baptism. Intra-uterine Baptism should not be\nused except in case of urgent necessity, and it is then permissible to\nemploy a mixture of one part of chloride of mercury with two parts of\nwater to avoid infection. Midwives, nurses, mothers, and physicians\nshould be especially careful to baptize abortive fetuses, and should\nknow how this can be done (see Commentaries on Canons 746-748).\n\n(d) In Reference to the Willingness of the Recipient.--An infant is not\nrequired to will the Sacrament, and hence the perpetually insane, who\nare unable to distinguish between right and wrong, may be baptized\nwithout any desire on their part. But an adult must intend to be\nbaptized (see 2671 b). Hence, the minister must inquire about the\nwishes of an adult candidate, If an unbaptized person is now out of his\nmind (insane, afflicted with lethargy or sleeping sickness, delirious),\nbut formerly had the use of reason, he is classed with adults, and his\nintention has to be considered. He should not be baptized, therefore,\nuntil he comes to himself, unless there is danger of death and signs of\na desire to receive Baptism were given before (Canons 745, 754).\n\n(e) In Reference to the Worthiness of the Recipient.--The minister\nshould remind the candidate of the duty of attrition. If the person who\nasks for Baptism wishes to retain certain habits (e.g., superstition,\nconcubinage, or unlawful business) which cannot be reconciled with\nChristianity, he cannot be regarded as suited for Baptism. But in\ndanger of death good faith should not be uselessly disturbed.\n\n(f) In Reference to the Pastor.--Solemn Baptism either in or out of\none\u2019s territory may not be given without permission from the proper\npastor who has jurisdiction (Canons 738-740). And a minister who is not\nthe pastor of the baptized person must send notice of the Baptism to\nthe pastor, as soon as possible, if the latter was not present (Canon\n778).\n\n(g) In Reference to Himself and the Sacrament.--The minister should\ninform himself, if necessary, about the existence or validity of a\nprevious Baptism, and he should observe the ceremonies, essential and\naccidental, of his Rite. Foundlings should be baptized conditionally,\nunless it is certain that they have been already baptized validly\n(Canon 749). The internal dispositions of intention and state of grace\nare necessary, while for baptism of adults fasting is advisable (Canon\n753).\n\n2694. The Sacrament of Confirmation.--Next to Baptism, not in necessity\nor dignity but in likeness and in time, is Confirmation; for\nConfirmation completes the work begun in Baptism, and it is also\nfrequently received immediately or next after Baptism. It may be\ndefined as \u201cthe Sacrament in which through the anointing with chrism\nand the prayer of the bishop a baptized person is perfected and\nstrengthened in the grace received and signed indelibly with the\ncharacter of soldier of Jesus Christ.\u201d\n\n(a) The element of the Sacrament (remote matter) is chrism, that is, a\nmixture of olive oil and balsam specially blessed by the bishop and\napplied (proximate matter) by an anointing and the imposition of hands\non the forehead of the recipient. The law of the Church requires that\nthe chrism be new (i.e., made at the last previous consecration of\noils), and that the anointing be made with the right thumb in the form\nof a cross.\n\n(b) The form of Confirmation in the Latin Church is as follows: \u201cI sign\nthee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of\nsalvation in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy\nGhost.\u201d\n\n2695. The Minister of Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The ordinary\nminister of this Sacrament is only the bishop; but a priest may act as\nextraordinary minister, either from the common law (viz., Cardinals,\nAbbots, etc.), or from special indult (Canon 782). The bishop may\nconfirm outsiders in his own diocese, unless their own Ordinary\nforbids, and with permission he may confirm outside his diocese (Canon\n783). Since January 1, 1947, by force of the decree of the Congregation\nof the Discipline of the Sacraments (_Spiritus Sanctus_) the following\nwere established as extraordinary ministers within the limits of their\nterritories and for subjects in danger of death.\n\n1) \u201cpastors having their own territories, therefore excluding personal\nand family pastors, unless they have also their own territory.\u201d Under\nthis heading are included secular and religious pastors. It is to be\nnoted that, since national parishes in the United States are assigned a\ndefinite territory, pastors of such parishes enjoy the privilege of\nthis decree. Pastors of Negro and Indian parishes, even if they are\nconsidered to be personal pastors, may be included, for the\njurisdiction is both personal and territorial. Military chaplains can\nnot confirm in virtue of this decree.\n\n2) \u201cthe vicars spoken of in Canon 471, and also parochial\nadministrators (_vicarii oeconomi_).\u201d The first group are canonically\ninnominate and authors adopt various titles for the personages\ninvolved. However, the reference is always to the priests placed in\nactual charge of _cura animarum_ in parishes which have been fully\nincorporated. The second group mentioned are the _vicarii oeconomi_,\npriests appointed canonically as administrators of vacant parishes (see\nCanons 472, n.1; 473,1). All other vicars lack the power, namely, the\nDiocesan Administrator (_vicarius capitularis_), Vicar General,\n_Vicarius Substitutus_ (priest who takes place of absent pastor),\n_Vicarius Adjutor_ (assists a disabled pastor), _Vicarius Cooperator_\n(curate), those who according to Canon 472, n.2, take temporary charge\nof a vacant parish prior to appointment of a true administrator,\nchaplains of schools, hospitals, and other charitable institutions (by\nrescript of Nov. 18, 1948, the faculty was extended also to chaplains\nof maternity hospitals and foundling homes in the United States, and\nthis faculty is renewable), the seminary rector, religious superiors\neven in exempt communities.\n\n3) \u201cpriests to whom is entrusted exclusively and permanently within a\ndefinite territory, and with a definite church, the complete care of\nsouls together with the rights and duties of pastors.\u201d Such territorial\narrangements are not common in the United States. The reference may\nbe to priests established as quasi-pastors in Canon 216, Sec.3 (hence\npastors in missionary territory and prefectures), episcopal delegates\nto the territories later to be erected as parishes or to maintain\nthe status of a perpetual vicarage. Perhaps the reference is only to\nspecial arrangements made by particular diocesan laws.\n\n(b) Duties.--The ordinary minister of this Sacrament should confer\nit when his subjects reasonably request it, and the Ordinary should\nsee that the Sacrament is administered to his people, if possible, at\nleast every five years (Canon 785). It would be unreasonable, however,\nto expect a bishop to go to every sick or dying person who desires\nConfirmation, as the Sacrament is not necessary for salvation and the\ntask would be morally impossible, The Sacrament should be performed\nvalidly, worthily, and rubrically. When Confirmation is given, fasting\nis of counsel, not of precept. The use of a sponsor in Confirmation\nseems to be a grave obligation, when possible. A recipient can have but\none sponsor, and a sponsor can act for only one or two confirmandi,\nunless it appear to the minister that there is sufficient reason to\nhave a sponsor act for more (Canon 794). The pastor of the recipient,\nif he is unaware of the Confirmation, should be notified as soon as\npossible (Canon 799).\n\n(c) Various prescriptions, some of them subjects of special study,\nare attendant upon the grant of power to confirm to pastors and\n\u201cequivalent pastors.\u201d The major ones are summarily stated here. The\npastor obtains this power when he acquires the office. It lasts as\nlong as he holds office. The exercise of his power becomes unlawful if\nhe falls under censure; in certain cases it may then even be invalid.\nTheologians disagree as to the precise nature of the power, whether\nit be of orders, of jurisdiction, of both, an intrinsic or extrinsic\nmodification of orders, etc. The common opinion holds that it is solely\na power of orders. Hence, Canon 209 may not be safely used here, and\nan ordinary assistant who attempts to confirm would not fall under any\nirregularity; a pastor, however, might, by misuse of his power, be not\nonly deprived of it, but be placed under an irregularity. Use of the\npower is not dependent on the permission of the local Ordinary. It may\nbe necessary to inquire however, whether the bishop wishes to confirm\nin particular cases. Episcopal instructions on this matter must be\ncomplied with.\n\n(d) Subjects of the Extraordinary Minister. The decree, _Spiritus\nSanctus_, in its second rule lays down a condition for the valid\nadministration of Confirmation by the extraordinary minister and\ndetermines the proper subject. The new faculty is strictly personal\n(hence it may not be delegated to others) and strictly territorial\n(hence the administration must take place within the confines of the\nminister\u2019s district and therein extends even to exempt places). The\nrecipient must be \u201cin real danger of death because of a serious illness\nfrom which it is foreseen that he will die.\u201d\n\nBefore treating the illness established as a condition for validity,\nother conditions of the subject must be considered. The decree\ndescribes the proper recipient as _fidelis_ in two places. The question\nhas been discussed whether this limits the subjects to Catholics and\nexcludes validly baptized Protestants. Authors are not agreed. Perhaps,\nsince the extraordinary minister can act only within the powers given\nhim in the decree, he would have to interpret _fidelis_ as extending\nsolely to Catholics. On May 1, 1948, the Congregation for the Oriental\nChurch issued a grant of powers to the Latin extraordinary ministers\nto confer Confirmation under the same conditions to Catholics of the\nOriental rite who live under the jurisdiction of a Latin Ordinary,\nwho are in the territory of the Latin pastor and whose rite has no\nestablished parish or mission in the locality. (This grant of power\nwas previously impossible by virtue of Canon 782, Sec.4.) In emergency\ncases there would be no need to await the arrival of the proper pastor.\nSince Ruthenian Catholics are not under the Latin Ordinaries in this\ncountry, it seems that the decree might not extend to them. The point\nis disputed, but it would be imprudent to act on the opinion that the\nRuthenians are included until the question is officially settled. The\nrecipient need not be a permanent resident in the territory by reason\nof domicile or quasi-domicile; physical presence suffices.\n\nThe final condition of dangerous sickness is similar to the one in\nExtreme Unction; it must arise from an intrinsic cause, not from an\nextrinsic cause. and includes not only sickness, but also wounds and\naccident cases. The decree speaks of the subject in \u201c_vero mortis\npericulo_.\u201d Some thought that the wording distinguished the sickness\nfrom mere \u201c_periculo\u201d mortis_, and hence must be certain, not doubtful\nor probable. In response to the Cardinal of Palermo, on March 6,\n1947, the Congregation of the Sacraments favored the opinion that the\nnorms for \u201c_urgente mortis periculo_\u201d (Canons 1043, 1044, 1046) are\napplicable. As a rule of thumb, many authors propose: if the sickness\npermits the administration of Extreme Unction, it also justifies the\ngiving of Confirmation in accordance with the terms of the decree.\n\n2696. The Recipient of Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The subject\nof this Sacrament is only a baptized person, and in adults intention\nis necessary. The general custom in the Latin Church is not to confirm\nbefore the seventh year, or thereabout, has been attained; but the\nSacrament may be given even earlier, if an infant is in danger of\ndeath, or if there seems to the minister to be a just and grave\nreason for confirming one under seven years of age (Canon 788). Those\nwho have the use of reason should not be admitted to Confirmation\nwithout previous instruction on the nature of the Sacrament and the\nrequirements for its proper reception.\n\n(b) Duties.--There is an obligation to receive this Sacrament when one\nhas the opportunity (Canon 787); but apart from scandal, contempt,\nor danger to salvation the obligation seems light. Hence, if a\nperson advanced in years is ashamed to receive Confirmation with the\nchildren, he should be advised but not reproved; nor should he be\ndenied absolution as if he were certainly guilty of serious fault. The\nrecipient should be in the state of grace, and it is advisable that he\ngo to confession beforehand if he have serious sin on his conscience.\nThough not necessary, it is more suitable that the recipient be\nfasting. A new name may be taken in Confirmation, and it is proper that\nthose whose baptismal name is unsuitable should either have it changed\nat this time or add the name of a Saint. Those who are being confirmed\nshould be present for the entire ceremony (Canon 789).\n\n2697. The Sponsors in Confirmation.--(a) Qualifications.--The\nrequirements for validity are, _mutatis mutandis_, practically the same\nas for baptismal sponsorship. Thus, the sponsor must be designated by\nthe parents or the candidate, or, in default of them, by the pastor or\nminister; he must not be the parent or spouse of the confirmandus; he\nmust physically touch the confirmandus at the moment of Confirmation.\nFurther, it is required that the sponsor be already confirmed himself.\nThe requirements for licitness are the same as for Baptism, and\nmoreover, as a rule, the sponsor at Confirmation should be of the\nsame sex as the recipient and be different from the baptismal sponsor\n(Canons 795, 796).\n\n(b) Duties.--The godfather at Confirmation contracts a lifelong\nspiritual relationship with his godchild (which does not constitute a\nmatrimonial impediment). The latter should have a special place in his\nprayers according to the order of charity, and, if necessity arises,\nshould receive his protection and assistance in spiritual matters\n(Canon 797).\n\n2698. Duties of the Pastor in Reference to Confirmation.--(a) The\npastor should instruct his people on the nature and advantages of\nConfirmation and should see to it that they receive the Sacrament in\ndue time (Canon 787). He should also instruct his parishioners about\nthe terms of _Spiritus Sanctus_. His power as extraordinary minister\nimposes an obligation _per se_ grave to use it when the cases arise;\nexcusing causes, however, are possible, and neglect in a single case\nwould be only venial. At appointed times each year he should hold a\ncontinuous course of instructions over a period of several days in\norder to prepare the classes of children for the proper reception of\nConfirmation (Canon 1300).\n\n(b) The pastor should see that the Confirmations of his parishioners\nare entered in a special book of record, and should also note in the\nbaptismal register the fact of Confirmation (Canons 798, 470, n. 2).\n\n2699. The Sacrament of the Eucharist.--This is the chief Sacrament,\nfor, while the other Sacraments produce the grace or the grace and the\ncharacter of Christ, this one contains Christ Himself; and, while the\nother Sacraments are means that prepare man to consecrate or to receive\nthe Eucharist or at least symbolize it, the Eucharist is the end of\nthem all. The Eucharist may be defined as follows: \u201cThe body and blood\nof our Lord Jesus Christ present through the words of consecration\nunder the appearances of bread and wine to be offered to God and to\nbe received by man.\u201d Thus, we may distinguish various aspects of the\nEucharist.\n\n(a) It is a sacrifice, since the Mass is the supreme act of worship and\nis one with the sacrifice of the cross (see 2178 sqq.).\n\n(b) It is a permanent Sacrament, since unlike the other Sacraments\nit does not consist in the passing application of a sacred sign to a\nrecipient, but in the abiding presence of a thing absolutely sacred\ncontained under sensible forms.\n\n(c) It may be considered in its passing phases of beginning, in which\nit is consecrated by the priest (performance of the Sacrament), and\ntermination, in which it is received by the communicant (application,\ndispensation of the Sacrament).\n\n2700. The Matter and Form of the Eucharist.--Since the essence of a\nSacrament is found in the outward sign, it is commonly held that the\nSacrament of the Eucharist consists in the species of bread and wine as\nsignifying the body and blood of the Saviour, which is really, truly\nand substantially contained under them.\n\n(a) The matter of the first consecration is that which Christ used,\nnamely, bread. The bread must be true bread in the strict and usual\nScriptural sense of the word. Hence, for validity it is necessary that\nit be made from wheat flour (bread made from beans, peas or other\nlegumes, bread made from non-wheaten cereals such as corn, oats,\nand probably also rye and barley, is not valid matter); that the\nflour be mixed with water (bread made from a notable quantity, i.e.,\nabout one-third of other liquid, such as milk, oil, wine, is invalid\nmatter); further, that the mixture be sufficiently baked (dough or\nhalf-baked cakes are invalid matter). The bread must be entire and\nnot substantially adulterated or changed; hence, bread from which all\nthe gluten has been abstracted, bread to which a notable amount of\nforeign substance (such as sugar or non-wheaten flour) has been added,\nbread so old that it has corrupted, cannot be consecrated. Accidental\nqualities do not affect validity, and hence any kind of wheat may be\nused (hard, soft, red, or white). But the church law strictly requires\nthat a priest observe the tradition of his own Church (i.e., among\nLatins the bread must be unleavened and the host round), and that all\nconsecrated matter be new (i.e., not baked more than fourteen days, or,\naccording to others, twenty or forty days), clean, and unbroken. The\nsmall particles for the laity should be about one inch in diameter, the\nlarge hosts about two or three inches; and all altar breads should be\nof moderate thickness.\n\n(b) The matter of the second consecration is likewise that appointed by\nChrist at the Last Supper, namely, wine. Only wine strictly so called\naccording to Scriptural and common usage is valid matter. Hence, the\nEucharistic wine must be made from grapes, and consequently cherry\nwine, currant wine, peach wine, blackberry wine, cider, wild grape\nwine, artificial wine, etc., are insufficient; the grapes must be\nripe, and verjuice is therefore invalid matter. The wine must also be\nentire, unadulterated, and uncorrupted; and hence wine from which all\nthe alcohol has been removed, brandy or cognac (i.e., spirits distilled\nfrom wine), wine to which a notable quantity of water, tartaric acid,\nsugar, alcohol or other substance has been added, and wine which has\nbecome vinegar, are not fit matter for the Sacrament. Accidental\nqualities are of no importance to validity, and hence the wine may be\nred or white, dry or sweet; it may be made either from ripe or dry\ngrapes (raisin wine); and the Church permits the fortification of weak\nwine by a process of heating that does not prevent fermentation, or\nby the addition when fermentation has begun to subside of grape or\nwine alcohol on condition that the final alcoholic strength does not\nexceed 12%, or in some cases, if the wine possessed so much, 17% or\n18%. But the church law strictly requires for licit matter that wine be\nfermented, though must or new wine is permissible in case of necessity,\nif it have about 5% alcohol; that it be neither souring nor frozen, nor\nmixed with substances added for the sake of aroma, color or sweetness,\nnor with water poured in before Mass. The tradition and law of the\nChurch, based on the example of Christ, make it a grave obligation that\na few drops of water be added to the wine at the altar, but, if the\nwater equals a third part of the wine, the matter becomes of doubtful\nsufficiency.\n\n(c) The form is contained essentially in the words of consecration\nused by Christ at the institution of the Eucharist, namely, \u201c_Hoc est\ncorpus meum_\u201d over the bread, and \u201c_Hic est calix sanguinis mei_\u201d over\nthe wine. But a grave precept of the Church requires that all the other\nprincipal words of the consecration be pronounced (i.e., the \u201c_novi et\naeterni testamenti_, etc.,\u201d the \u201c_Haec quotiescumque_, etc.,\u201d the \u201c_Qui\npridie_,\u201d the \u201c_Simili modo_\u201d). The omission of the particle \u201c_enim_\u201d\nwould be only venially sinful.\n\n2701. The Minister of Consecration.--(a) Qualifications.--Every priest\nand only a priest can consecrate validly, for only to the Apostles and\ntheir successors in the priesthood were spoken the words of Christ: \u201cDo\nthis in commemoration of Me.\u201d But only those priests can consecrate\nlawfully who have the faculty of celebrating Mass (see 2709).\n\n(b) Duties as regards Valid Consecration.--Internally, there must be\nthe intention (actual or virtual) of acting in the name of Christ,\nand of effecting what the words of consecration signify; and hence a\nmerely narrative recitation of the form is insufficient. This actual\nor virtual intention must also determine the individual matter to be\nconsecrated, and hence a host placed on the corporal is not consecrated\nif the priest neither saw it nor took it up for consecration. Small\ncrumbs in the ciborium and small drops of wine on the inner side of the\nchalice are consecrated, unless excluded by the priest\u2019s intention;\nbut drops of wine on the outside of the chalice should be considered\nunconsecrated, since it is unlawful to consecrate what is not contained\nin the chalice.\n\nExternally, bread and wine must be physically present to the priest,\nthat is, so within his reach or range that according to human usage\nthey can be correctly designated by the demonstrative pronoun \u201cthis\u201d\nused in the form. Accordingly, they must be near the minister; how\nnear cannot be mathematically defined, and authors variously assign\nabout ten, twenty, thirty, forty and fifty paces as the extreme limit.\nAgain, the bread and wine must not be separated from the minister by\nany dividing partition, such as a wall, or the altar, or perhaps even\nthe closed door of the tabernacle, though a closed container (such as\na covered ciborium or chalice) would not put the matter away from the\nminister\u2019s presence. Finally, they must not be behind the minister\u2019s\nback, and, even if they are before him but hidden (e.g., hosts under\nthe corporal or chalice), the consecration is doubtful.\n\n(c) Duties as regards Lawful Consecration.--Internally, there must be\nthe state of grace, which the divine law prescribes, Further, one who\nis conscious of grave sin certainly committed and certainly unconfessed\n(unless inculpably omitted in confession) must go to confession\nbeforehand, unless there be need to celebrate at once (e.g., because\notherwise there will be no parochial Mass on a day of precept, or\nbecause grave scandal or defamation will result, or a dying person will\nbe deprived of the Viaticum) and confession is impossible (i.e., there\nis no confessor present who has jurisdiction, or who can be resorted to\nwithout a serious inconvenience extrinsic to confession, and moreover\nit is very difficult on account of distance, health, weather, or other\nlike reasons to go elsewhere to confession). Under these circumstances,\nhe may make an act of perfect contrition and then proceed to celebrate.\nBut one who has consecrated without confession because of such\nnecessity must go to confession as soon as possible--i.e., within three\ndays, or, if circumstances so require, earlier than that (e.g., if a\nconfessor can be had the same day, but not again for a week) or later\n(e.g., if a confessor cannot be had for a week). These rules about\nconfession are of grave obligation, from Church law at least (Canon\n807). On account of disrespect, it seems that grave sin is committed\nwhen the celebrant is voluntarily and advertently distracted during\nconsecration, but he should not repeat the form unless it is certain or\nvery probable that something essential has been omitted. Externally,\nconsecration must be made only during Mass, both species must be\nconsecrated, a larger quantity must not be consecrated than can be\nconveniently used, the matter at the moment of consecration must rest\non the corporal and above the stone of the altar, and a ciborium must\nbe uncovered while its bread is being consecrated.\n\n2702. Inadvertent Neglect of Grave Liturgical Precept.--Is the\nconsecration valid when the minister inadvertently neglects some grave\nliturgical precept as to the matter or manner of consecration?\n\n(a) Some authors reply in the negative, because they feel that\nno priest has the will to consecrate in a way forbidden by the\nChurch under pain of grave sin. According to this opinion, then, if\naccidentally no water were placed in the chalice, or if the chalice\nwere unconsecrated, or if the ciborium were left off the corporal, the\nconsecration would be invalid.\n\n(b) Other authors distinguish as follows: if the celebrant intended not\nto consecrate with a material breach of grave liturgical prescription,\nthe consecration would be null; if the celebrant had only the intention\nto consecrate all valid matter before him, the consecration would be\nvalid. This latter intention, it seems, should be formed by all priests\nonce for all, since it ensures the validity of their consecrations and\nis not sinful, as it does not aim to violate the rubrics, but only to\nprovide for exceptional cases when a rubric is unintentionally violated.\n\n2703. The Minister of Communion.--(a) Qualifications.--The ordinary\nminister of Communion is a priest, the extraordinary minister a deacon.\nPastors and other priests to whose custody the Blessed Sacrament\nis entrusted have the right to give Communion, and others also who\nhave express or presumed permission. The celebrant of Mass may give\nCommunion during his Mass, and, if Mass is private, just before and\njust after it. A sick priest who is unable to say Mass may communicate\nhimself, at least when there is no other minister at hand; and even\na layman may, in the absence of a major cleric, give himself the\nViaticum, or consume the Host to save it from profanation (Canons\n845-850).\n\n(b) Duties.--Internally, the minister is bound _sub levi_ to be in\nthe state of grace, and _sub gravi_ to be free from censures (such as\nsuspension) which forbid him the exercise of the ministry. Externally,\nhe must observe the church laws on the manner, time and place for\ndistribution of the Sacrament (Canons 851, 852, 867-869), and also\nthe liturgical rules for Communion during and outside of Mass, for\nCommunion of the sick and the dying, and for the avoidance of defects\nin giving Communion (Rituale Rom., Tit. IV; Missale Rom., de defectibus\nMissae).\n\n2704. The Recipient of the Eucharist.--(a) Those Who May Receive\nCommunion.--According to divine law, every living person who has\nreceived Baptism of water is capable of receiving the Eucharist,\ninfants and the insane not excluded. Ecclesiastical law requires other\nconditions, which are justified by considerations of respect for the\nBlessed Sacrament or other good reason. Communion may not be given,\nfirst, to those who have not the use of reason (i.e., to infants and\nthe perpetually insane), nor to those who are unable to understand the\nessential truths of religion and morality (i.e., to those who have\nalways been deaf and dumb or blind, and who are uninstructed); for, on\nthe one hand, the Sacrament is not necessary for these persons, and,\non the other hand, there is great danger of irreverence if it be given\nthem. Secondly, Communion may not be given to those who cannot receive\nwithout grave peril of unbecoming treatment of the Sacrament, as in\nthe case of those who cough or vomit continually or frequently, or of\nthose who are delirious, or unconscious, or insane, But if the danger\nis certainly slight (e.g., if the person can swallow an unconsecrated\nhost without spitting it out), Communion may be given, at least the\nViaticum or Easter Communion. Next those persons are denied Communion\nwho cannot receive without scandal (e.g., those who are infamous, such\nas prostitutes or defamers, persons intoxicated or insufficiently\ndressed). Finally, no one may receive Communion who has already\nreceived it that day, lest the Sacrament become common and be taken\nwithout due preparation; but exception is made when it is necessary\nto communicate a second time in order to comply with the divine law\nof receiving Viaticum or of saving the Host from profanation (Canons\n853-858).\n\n(b) Those Who Must Receive Communion.--There is a divine precept that\nadults receive the Eucharist worthily (John, vi. 54). It obliges _per\nse_, when one is certainly or almost certainly in proximate danger of\ndeath, unless one has recently (that is, according to some, within a\nweek\u2019s time) received Communion; for this Sacrament is the wayfarer\u2019s\nprovision for his journey to eternity. It obliges also now and then\nduring life, since the Eucharist is man\u2019s spiritual nourishment for\nthe journey of life. It obliges _per accidens_, when Communion is\nnecessary to avoid grave sin, for charity to self obliges one to use\nthe means without which serious spiritual harm cannot be escaped. The\nchurch law determines the details for the fulfillment of the divine\nprecept. All the faithful who have reached the age of reason, even\nthough they be under seven years, must fulfill the yearly Easter duty\n(see 2592, 2593). In reference to First Communion, the Church requires\nthat children who are not in danger of death must have a mental and\nmoral fitness, consisting in a knowledge of the chief mysteries of\nfaith and a devotion towards the Eucharist such as is possible at their\ntime of life. In reference to the last Communion, or Viaticum, the Code\ndeclares that it is obligatory, no matter what be the cause of the\ndanger of death; it reminds us that the duty should not be put off too\nlong; it recommends that the Viaticum be administered even to those who\nhad communicated the same day before the danger of death arose, and\nthat it be given on distinct days during the danger. For children who\nare in danger of death it suffices that they are able to distinguish\nthe Eucharist from ordinary food and to adore it reverently (Canons\n859-865, 854).\n\n2705. Dispositions for Worthy Communion.--(a) Dispositions of\nSoul.--The divine law requires the state of grace (I Cor., xi. 27\nsqq.), and probably also the previous sacramental confession which the\nChurch prescribes _sub gravi_ for one who is conscious of serious sin\nnot yet remitted through absolution. But he is excused from the duty\nof previous confession who cannot omit Communion now (e.g., because\nwhile at the rails he remembers a grave sin and cannot leave without\nbeing disgraced) and who is unable to go to confession (see 2701 c).\nThe recipient must also have a knowledge of the Sacrament suited to\nhis mental capacity, and he must desire it, at least habitually. Since\nthe Sacraments are fruitful in proportion to the cooperation given\nthem, and since the presence and visit of Christ deserves honor and\nrecognition, Communion should be received devoutly, and should be\npreceded by a preparation and followed by a thanksgiving (Canons 856,\n731). The faithful may receive in any Rite, but their own Rite is\nadvised for Easter Communion and strongly urged for the Viaticum (Canon\n866).\n\n(b) Dispositions of Body.--The communicant must observe the Eucharistic\nfast and must conduct himself with external reverence.\n\nBy ecclesiastical law a person is bound to the fasting from midnight\nto receive the Holy Eucharist lawfully (Canons 808, 858). Despite the\nchanges made by the Apostolic Constitution, _Christus Dominus_ (Jan.\n16, 1953) and the _Motu Proprio, \u201cSacram Communionem_\u201d (Mar. 19, 1957),\npriests and the faithful who are able to do so are exhorted to observe\nthis venerable and ancient form of Eucharistic fast before Mass or\nHoly Communion. The legislation of these two papal documents, intended\nto increase devotion to the Blessed Sacrament by fostering frequent\nCommunion, decrees:\n\n1) that natural water does not break the fast;\n\n2) that the period for observing the Eucharist fast before Mass,\nat whatever hour it may be said (morning, afternoon, midnight), is\nthree hours from solid food and alcoholic beverages, and one hour\nfrom non-alcoholic beverages. The priest who is to celebrate computes\nhis time from the beginning of Mass; the faithful, from the time of\nCommunion;\n\n3) that the sick, although not confined to bed, may consume\nnon-alcoholic beverages and real and appropriate medicines, liquid or\nsolid, without any restriction of time.\n\nThe Eucharistic fast is based on primitive tradition and is enjoined by\nthe Church as a grave obligation that admits of no lightness of matter.\nThe fast is violated by the smallest portion of food or alcoholic\ndrink. Food is any solid which the physician considers digestible or\nalterable by the stomach, and hence the fast is not broken if wood,\nstring, paper, hairs or fingernails are swallowed. But the food or\ndrink must be eaten or drunk, that is, it must come from outside the\nmouth and be taken into the stomach in the way of consumption, and\nhence the fast is not broken by what comes from within the mouth (e.g.,\nblood from the gums, food remaining in the teeth from the previous day)\nor by what is taken into the stomach in the way of saliva (e.g., the\naccidental remnants of a mouth wash or of a throat gargle, or spray,\nor of a chew of tobacco or gum, when one has spit out the contents as\nmuch as possible), or in the way of breathing (e.g., snuff, tobacco\nsmoke inhaled, an insect or a raindrop blown into the mouth). A solid,\nlike a caramel, however, which is dissolved in the mouth before it is\nswallowed, can not be considered as a liquid. The liquid of the _Sacram\nCommunionem_ must be a liquid before it enters the mouth. (See \u201cSome\nFurther Elucidations on Sacram Communionem\u201d by Cardinal Ottaviani,\n_American Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXXXXVII, No, 2, August 1957, p.\n74.)\n\nThe reasons that excuse from the Eucharist fast, in regard to solids or\nalcoholic beverages, in lay Communion, are, in case of the well, the\ngood of the Sacrament (i.e., its preservation from profanation), or the\ngood of self (e.g., avoidance of serious disgrace, as when one who is\nat the altar rail remembers only then that he is not fasting); in the\ncase of the ill, the danger of death (the Viaticum may be received even\ndaily after nourishment). The salt taken in Baptism does not break the\nfast, and one who has a papal indult, which is granted for sufficient\nreasons, may receive Communion when not fasting.\n\nExternal reverence means that one should approach Communion with\ncleanliness of body, respectability of dress, and modesty of behavior.\nNo one is unfitted for Communion because of inculpable unsightliness\n(e.g., a sick man who has irremovable scars or deformities, a poor man\nwho cannot afford any but the simplest garb, a crippled person whose\ngait is awkward). But unwashed hands and face, dirty mouth or teeth,\nworn or torn dress, and the like, which one avoids elsewhere as\nunsuited for human company, should be avoided when receiving the\nEucharist. Women immodestly dressed should be refused Communion, if\notherwise scandal will result (Canon 858).\n\n2706. Frequent Communion.--What dispositions are required for frequent\nCommunion (i.e., Communion made several times a week) and daily\ncommunion?\n\n(a) The necessary dispositions are the same as for rare Communion,\nnamely, the state of grace and a right intention. Right intention means\npositively that one have in view the ends that Christ intended when He\ninstituted the Sacrament, namely, that by means of Communion one may\nplease Him, may be more closely united to Him, and may receive a remedy\nfor one\u2019s defects and infirmities. Those who receive devoutly have\nthese purposes at least implicitly, which suffices; but it would be a\nserious sin wilfully to exclude all these ends. Right intention means\nnegatively that one must not frequent Communion merely from routine, or\nfrom vanity, or from purely human motives, such as pecuniary profit or\nadvantage. If the true ends are not excluded, these improper motives do\nnot exceed a venial sin.\n\n(b) Useful, but not necessary, dispositions are freedom from venial\nsins, especially such as are deliberate, and freedom from affection for\nvenial sins.\n\n2707. Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors in Reference to\nCommunion.--(a) Parents.--The obligation of the Easter duty for boys\nunder fourteen and for girls under twelve rests morally and juridically\nupon the consciences of those who are charged with their care, namely,\nparents, guardians, pastors, and confessors (see 2630, 2631). The\nparents are the best judges of the mental development, moral\ndisposition and instruction of their children, and therefore of their\nfitness for First Communion (Canons 860, 854, n. 4).\n\n(b) Confessors.--The decision or counsel about the fitness of children\nfor First Communion, of penitents for frequent or daily Communion,\nabout the frequency of the Viaticum, is left by the Church to the\nprudence of the confessor (Canons 860, 863, 864, 858, n.2).\n\n(c) Pastors.--The Code prescribes that pastors be especially zealous in\nthe matter of holding Lenten classes for the instruction of children in\norder that they may receive their First Communion worthily; it vests in\nthe pastor the duty of seeing that no child approaches First Communion\nwho has not the use of reason or proper dispositions, as well as of\nseeing that those children who are fit receive Communion without delay;\nit also requires that he provide for the fuller instruction in\nChristian doctrine of children who have made their First Communion\n(Canons 1330, 854, n. 5, 1331). Pastors should recommend to their\npeople the practices of frequent Communion and of worthy Communion at\nevery Mass they hear, and should take care that the dying receive the\nViaticum while they are in possession of their mental faculties (Canons\n863, 865). On the duty of administering Communion see 2676.\n\n2708. Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament.--Having considered the\nduties owed to the consecration and communion of the Eucharist, we\nshall conclude by mentioning those that are owed to the Sacrament in\nits permanency or to Christ dwelling in the tabernacle.\n\n(a) The Duty of Custody.--The Blessed Sacrament must be reserved in\ncathedral, abbatial, parochial, and religious churches; and it may be\nreserved with due permission of the Ordinary in collegiate churches and\nin certain public oratories; but there must be someone in charge, and\nit is not allowed to reserve the Eucharist in private homes or to carry\nit about when travelling. Churches which have the Blessed Sacrament\nshould be open at least a few hours daily to the faithful. It is not\nlawful to reserve the Sacrament habitually on more than one altar of\nthe church, and that altar should be the one that is most honorable or\nmost suited for worship, and it should be suitably decorated. The\ntabernacle should be as precious as possible and be carefully guarded,\nand the Hosts should be reserved inside in a solid pyx or ciborium.\nBefore the tabernacle should burn day and night a sanctuary lamp fed by\nolive or other oil (Canons 1265-1271).\n\n(b) The Duty of Renewal of the Hosts.--The consecrated species kept for\nCommunion and adoration should be frequently renewed, lest they be\ncorrupted. It would be a serious sin of irreverence to neglect this\nduty for over one or two months, or even for a shorter time if the\ndanger of corruption is great on account of local conditions, such as\ndampness (Canon 1272).\n\n(c) The Duty of Worship.--Pastors and others in charge of religious\ninstruction should encourage devotion to the Eucharist, and especially\nthe practice of assistance at Mass even on weekdays and of visits to\nthe Blessed Sacrament. Benediction may be given frequently, and at\nleast once a year there should be held in every parish church the\nDevotion of the Forty Hours, or at least some more solemn exposition of\nthe Blessed Sacrament for a number of hours (Canons 1273-1275).\n\n2709. The Sacrifice of the Mass.--In the Eucharist is contained not\nonly a Sacrament which confers the grace of spiritual nutrition on its\nrecipients, but also a sacrifice which offers to God Christ\u2019s oblation\nas an act of adoration, thanksgiving, satisfaction and intercession. It\nis this sacrifice--which is one with the sacrifice of the cross, though\noffered unbloodily--that is known as the Mass. The chief persons who\nhave duties in reference to the Mass are the celebrant and the\nassistants.\n\n(a) The celebrant is the priest, who acts in the name and person of\nChrist. To say Mass validly one must have the power of Orders conferred\nin the presbyterate or priesthood, and must intend to consecrate (see\n2701 b); to say Mass licitly one must be free from impediments which\ndebar from Mass, such as suspension or irregularity. Strange priests\nwho wish to say Mass are required to present a celebret or testimonial\nletter to the rector of the church (Canon 804), without prejudice,\nhowever, to their right to say Mass once or twice when they present\nthemselves in clerical garb and sign the visiting priest\u2019s book.\n\n(b) The assistants are all those who hear Mass. Their duties were\nalready explained in the question on the first precept of the Church\n(2576 sqq.). We shall confine ourselves here, therefore, to the duties\nof the celebrant.\n\n2710. The Obligation of Saying Mass.--(a) The Obligation by reason of\nOrders or Priesthood.--Divine law imposes on priests as a body a grave\nobligation of celebrating Mass with such frequency that the memory of\nChrist\u2019s passion be kept alive, which is the purpose of the priesthood,\naccording to the words: \u201cDo this in commemoration of Me.\u201d Divine law\nalso imposes on each individual priest the obligation of saying Mass at\nfrequent intervals (i.e., at least, it would seem, on the greater\nfeasts and at dates not more than six months apart); for a priest is\nordained primarily to give glory to God and to impart blessings to man\nby the Sacrifice of the Mass (Heb., v. 1). It seems, therefore, that a\npriest receives grace in vain or neglects the sacrifice (II Cor., vi.\n1, II Mach., iv. 14) if he omits Mass on the most solemn occasions of\nthe year when nearly all the faithful are accustomed to receive\nCommunion, or if he omits it for such a notable period as more than six\nmonths. It seems that the sin is _per se_ venial, as being opposed to\nfervor rather than to charity; but it may be mortal _per accidens_, as\nwhen serious scandal is given. There is no sin, however, if a priest\nhas no opportunity to celebrate, or is lawfully impeded (e.g., on\naccount of humility, scrupulosity, illness, or censure). The law of the\nChurch recalls this obligation in Canon 805, and calls on bishops and\nreligious superiors to exhort their subjects to say Mass at least on\nall Sundays and holydays. Daily Mass is quite customary today, and\nthere might be serious scandal if without reason Mass were said only\nexceptionally.\n\n(b) The Obligation by Reason of Special Offices or Duties.--Pastors are\nbound to say or provide Mass for their people on days of obligation as\na duty of justice, and it seems on other days also as a duty of charity\nif there is a great need or demand and no reasonable impediment. There\nis an obligation of justice to celebrate Mass, if one has contracted to\ndo so; an obligation of fidelity, if one has freely promised; an\nobligation of religion, if one has vowed; an obligation of obedience,\nif one has been lawfully commanded by one\u2019s superior.\n\n2711. Dispositions for the Celebration of Mass.--(a) Dispositions of\nSoul.--The celebrant must be in the state of grace, and must go to\nconfession before Mass if he has a serious sin on his conscience (see\n2701 c). He must have the intention and attention which the validity of\nthe consecration requires (2701 b), and the reverence and devotion\nwhich is due the prayers of the Mass (2153 sqq.), Voluntary and fully\ndeliberate distractions entertained for a considerable time during the\nCanon seem to be seriously sinful. It is most suitable, though\napparently not commanded by the Church, that Matins and Lauds be said\nbefore Mass. There is, however, a duty of religion and of charity to\nself to make a suitable preparation and thanksgiving; but negligence\nhere is a light sin, unless there be contempt or serious scandal.\nFifteen minutes or a half-hour is recommended by ascetical writers, and\nthe prayers may be taken from those given in the Breviary and Missal,\nInternal prayer, however, is more important than external recitation\n(Canon 810).\n\n(b) Dispositions of Body.--The Eucharistic or natural fast is of grave\nobligation for the celebration of Mass (Canon 808). The only excuses\nare necessity according to divine law or exemption by ecclesiastical\nlaw. Necessity occurs when one must complete the sacrifice (e.g., when\nafter the Communion the priest notices that he consecrated one species\ninvalidly), or must avoid scandal (e.g., when a priest remembers after\ngoing to the altar that he is not fasting), or must consecrate for the\nViaticum (e.g., when there is no consecrated host for a dying person).\nSince the law is ecclesiastical, the Church could dispense for a grave\nreason (e.g., to enable a sickly priest to say Masses on Sunday at\nwidely separated points of his missions). It is clear that the\ncelebration of Mass calls for cleanness of body, suitableness of dress,\nneatness and rubrical correctness of vestments (Canon 811). The\nomission of a principal vestment (i.e., blessed alb, stole or chasuble)\nis a serious sin, except in grave necessity; the omission of minor\nvestments (e.g., amice) is a venial sin, unless there is a just reason.\nThe color of the day is not gravely obligatory, except by reason of\nscandal, and a good reason makes it lawful to use another color.\n\n2712. Gravity of Regulations Concerning Circumstances of Mass.--Serious\ndisrespect or serious scandal is caused by disregard of important\nregulations concerning the circumstances of the Mass. Hence, the\nfollowing rules oblige under grave sin, though exceptions are permitted\nfor cases of grave or very grave necessity.\n\n(a) The Time of Mass.--Mass may not be said on Good Friday, nor private\nMasses on Holy Thursday and Holy Saturday. Only one Mass may be said a\nday, except on Christmas Day and All Souls\u2019 Day, and on other days when\nthere is reason for bination or trination allowed by the Church.\nOrdinarily the hour for beginning Mass should not be earlier than one\nhour before dawn (i.e., in the latitude of New York from about 1:27\na.m. to 5:00 a.m., according to the season), nor later than one hour\nafter noon. But the time is to be understood morally, and it is not a\ngrave sin in being earlier or later than the times fixed, unless there\nis a difference of an entire hour (e.g., if one began Mass at 2:00\np.m.) and not just excuse or dispensation. The Holy See has extended to\nlocal Ordinaries the power to permit the daily celebration of Mass\nafter noon, if the spiritual good of a considerable number of the\nfaithful demands it (_Sacram Communionem_). The Holy See has also\ngranted permission to Ordinaries to allow the celebration of an evening\nMass on Palm Sunday accompanied by the blessing of palms and\nprocession. On Holy Thursday the Mass of the Lord\u2019s Supper must be\ncelebrated at the most convenient hour, but not before 4:00 p.m. and\nnot after 9:00 p.m.; Ordinaries may grant permission for one or even\ntwo low Masses (besides the principal Mass) to be celebrated in\nchurches and public oratories, and for one in semi-public oratories\nwithin the same hours, 4:00-9:00 p.m. The proper hour for the Easter\nVigil is that which permits the Mass of the Easter Vigil to be started\naround midnight. Permission may be granted to conduct the vigil at a\ntime not before sunset (Dispositions and Regulations concerning the\nHoly Week Liturgy, Feb. 1, 1957, Sacred Congregation of Rites). One\nChristmas may be said at midnight. It is a serious sin to say Mass in\nless than a quarter of an hour, and a private Mass should not be\nprolonged beyond a half-hour.\n\n(b) Place.--Mass may not be celebrated regularly except in a church or\noratory that is at least blessed and is not polluted, execrated or\ninterdicted. It must be said on an altar, and it would be a serious\nsin, except in grave or very grave necessity, to celebrate without at\nleast one altar cloth or one lighted wax candle, or without a rubrical\nchalice, paten, or corporal (Canons 822, 823).\n\n(c) Rites.--The principal rubrics of the Mass are gravely obligatory,\nfor example, to use an acolyte unless excused by dispensation or\nnecessity, to say each prayer of the Canon, and each part outside the\nCanon that occurs in every Mass (e.g., the prayers at the foot of the\naltar, the Gospel), to perform the main liturgical actions (e.g., the\nOffertory, the breaking of the host, the purification of the chalice).\nThe secondary rubrics oblige under venial sin (see Canons 803, 812-819).\n\n2713. Is it Lawful to Discontinue a Mass?--(a) To terminate Mass before\nthe end has been reached is unlawful unless there be a serious reason;\notherwise, disrespect is shown the Holy Sacrifice. A grave reason\n(e.g., sudden sickness) suffices if Mass be discontinued before the\nConsecration; a most grave reason (i.e., danger of death or of\nprofanation of the Sacrament) if Mass be discontinued between the\nConsecration and the Communion. But a Mass that is broken off after the\nConsecration and before the Communion must be completed by the\ncelebrant or another, at least if this can be done within an hour from\nthe time of cessation; else the sacrifice is mutilated.\n\n(b) To interrupt Mass is also unlawful without serious cause. Thus, a\ngrave reason excuses an interruption outside the Canon, for example, to\npreach a sermon after the Gospel or Communion; but only a very grave\nreason excuses an interruption during the Canon, for example, a sick\ncall to give a necessary Sacrament (Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction,\nor Viaticum) to a dying person.\n\n2714. Application of the Mass.--All the faithful, especially those who\nare present and also the celebrant himself, benefit by the Mass, but\nthere is a special fruit reserved to those for whose intention the Mass\nis offered by the priest; for the Mass is a sacrifice of intercession,\npropitiation, and satisfaction, and since the priest acts in the person\nof Christ he may apply its benefits specially to some particular person\nor persons. In the following cases the celebrant is bound to make this\napplication of the ministerial fruit of the Mass.\n\n(a) In virtue of their office, pastors are seriously obliged to say\nMass for their flocks. There is a natural obligation on account of the\nrelationship between the pastor and the people, and there is also a\ndivine obligation, inasmuch as the priest is appointed to offer gifts\nand sacrifices for sin (Heb., v, 1). The details of this duty, as to\nthe time, place and person, are prescribed in Canons 306, 339, 466.\nThere is a grave duty of saying for the people the number of Masses\nwhich the Church orders; but the non-observance of the circumstances is\nnot a mortal sin, unless it happens frequently and without reason.\n\n(b) In virtue of justice, a priest who has received a stipend is bound\nto apply the Mass for the intention of the donor, and to observe the\nconditions of the agreement (i.e., the time, place, and kind of Mass\nspecified by the donor). The duty of application is a grave one,\nbecause the loss inflicted on the donor by non-application of the Mass\nto his intention is serious; the duty of observance of the accidental\nconditions, however, is not generally grave, but it becomes grave if\nits neglect inflicts serious harm (e.g., if the donor makes the date of\nthe Mass a _conditio sine qua non_, or if the Mass must be said at once\non account of an urgent and immediate necessity). Restitution is\nobligatory if the Mass is not applied, or if essential conditions are\nnot complied with; it is obligatory _sub gravi_, if the stipend equals\nwhat is relatively grave matter in theft.\n\n(c) In virtue of obedience, subjects are held to apply Masses for the\nintention of their prelates, secular or religious, though bishops are\ncounselled to exact this most rarely. The obligation is grave or light\naccording to the intention of the superior, but if the application is\nalso due in justice to the giver of the stipend, there is a serious\nduty.\n\n(d) In virtue of religion or fidelity, there is an obligation of\napplication when a priest has vowed this to God, or freely promised it\nto man. The duty is grave or light according to the intention of the\nvower or promisor (see 2210, 2407). But if there is an onerous promise\n(e.g., in a society of priests whose members agree to say Mass for\nfellow-members who have died), the duty is one of justice. One Mass\nsatisfies several free promises, if distinct Masses were not promised.\n\n2715. Duties of the Priest as to the Application of Mass.--(a) For Whom\nMay Mass Be Applied?--Mass may be offered for all objects not\nforbidden. From the divine law it is forbidden to offer Mass for those\nwho are incapable of receiving its benefits (e.g., the demons, infants\nwho died without Baptism, the Saints), or for intentions that are\ndispleasing to God (e.g., for success in evil). From the ecclesiastical\nlaw certain restrictions are made on the application of Mass in order\nto safeguard reverence and prevent scandal. Thus, Mass may be said only\nprivately (that is, without publicity or special liturgical solemnity)\nand prudently (that is, with avoidance of scandal, for example, by the\ndeclaration that Mass is said for the faithful departed with the\npurpose of aiding also a departed unbeliever, if this is pleasing to\nGod) for the living and dead outside the Church, such as infidels,\nheretics, schismatics, and the excommunicated. Moreover, for a\n_vitandus_ Mass may be applied only when the intention is his\nconversion (Canon 809).\n\n(b) How Mass Must Be Applied.--The intention must be formed by the\npriest, since he represents Christ. But since his application does not\nproduce but only bestows the fruits, it suffices that his applicatory\nintention be habitual and implicit, as when the celebrant has forgotten\nthe intention formed before Mass, or applies according to the mind of\nhis superior. The person or purpose to which Mass is applied must be at\nleast implicitly determined, and the application must be made at least\nbefore the second consecration. If there are two conflicting\nintentions, the stronger prevails (2667), and, if it is doubtful which\none was stronger, Mass should be next offered for the intention which\nGod knows was not satisfied. It is unlawful to apply Mass by\nanticipation for the next person who will offer a stipend.\n\n2716. Mass Stipends.--It is not unlawful to receive a stipend for the\napplication of Mass, but irreligion, injustice, avarice, scandal and\ndisobedience must be avoided. (a) Irreligion is committed if the\nstipend is offered or taken as the price of the Mass, or if Mass is\nsaid only because of the stipend, or is requested only for the sake of\nhuman favor (see 2333); (b) injustice is committed, if an excessive\nstipend is exacted; (c) avarice is committed when one is over-anxious\nabout large stipends; (d) scandal is given when there is commercialism\nor the appearance of it in dealing with stipends; (e) disobedience is\nincurred when the laws of the Church on the amount of a stipend, the\nnumber of stipends that may be taken, their distribution, satisfaction,\netc., are violated (see Canons 824-844). It is forbidden to require two\nstipends for one Mass, or one stipend for mere celebration and another\nfor application.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 3: REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, III, qq. 84-90; Supplement, qq. 1-33.)\n\n2717. Penance is the name both of a virtue and of a Sacrament of the\nNew Law. The virtue was at all times necessary; the Sacrament is\nnecessary since its institution by Christ. Having considered in the\nprevious Article how the spiritual life is begotten, matured and\npreserved through the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and\nEucharist, we shall consider in the present Article how spiritual death\nand infirmity are overcome by the remedies of Penance and Extreme\nUnction. But first we shall speak of the virtue of penance or\nrepentance which is a requisite for the fruitful reception of the\nSacrament of Penance and of its complement, Extreme Unction.\n\n2718. The Virtue of Repentance.--This virtue is a gift of God and a\npermanent habit of the soul, but there are certain acts by which man\ncooperates with God and prepares himself for the gift. Sometimes a\nsinner is converted through consideration of God\u2019s goodness or of the\nrewards of heaven; but usually those who have been drawn by sinful\ndelights are first deterred from them by the thought of God\u2019s justice,\nand amendment begins from fear. Faith, hope, fear and love, at least\nvirtually, are always found in the process of turning to God, and\nusually they follow one another in that process in the order here\ngiven. (a) The beginning of conversion is with God who draws the heart:\n\u201cConvert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted\u201d (Lament, v.\n21). (b) Then follows the movement of faith, for he that would come to\nGod must first believe that He is (Heb., xi. 6). (c) Next follow\nservile fear, which removes one from sin, and hope, which leads one to\nGod, for faith holds out both threats of punishment and promises of\nmercy. (d) Then come the movements of love, which detests sin for its\nown sake, and of filial fear, which offers satisfaction to God out of\nreverence.\n\n2719. Repentance.--Repentance may be defined as \u201ca moral virtue that\ninclines the will of one who is subject to sin to grieve over it and to\nmake reparation to God for the injury it does to His rights.\u201d\n\n(a) Thus, repentance has its remote subject in one who is subject to\nsin, that is, in a person who has sinned or who is able to sin. Hence,\nit is not in Christ, who is impeccable, nor in the holy Angels, whose\nwills are fixed in good; but it is found in the Saints, inasmuch as\ntheir former sin is displeasing to them and their former contrition and\nsatisfaction pleasing.\n\n(b) The proximate subject of repentance is the will, for its acts of\nregret, resolution, and reparation belong to the higher appetitive\nfaculty, Hence, repentance does not consist in emotional sorrow, and it\ndoes not need to be sensibly felt or joined with tears.\n\n(c) The formal object or motive of repentance is reparation to Goal for\nthe injury done Him by one\u2019s own personal sin. Sin may be considered as\nopposed to the divine goodness, and in this respect it is detested by\ncharity; or as opposed to the good of man himself, and so hope detests\nit; or as opposed to the moral goodness of some particular virtue, and\nin this respect it is hated by that virtue, as temperance shuns\nintemperance; or as opposed to the right which belongs to God, the Last\nEnd, that all actions be done for Him, and in this respect sin is\nconsidered by repentance. One may regret original sin or sins done by\nothers, but one is not properly said to repent of them.\n\n(d) The material object or subject-matter of repentance is the acts by\nwhich reparation is made to God, namely, grief over sin and its\naccompaniments, hatred of moral wickedness in the present, regrets for\nthe past, and good resolutions for the future. Thus, repentance differs\nfrom religion, for religion looks upon God as Lord and Benefactor and\noffers Him worship, while repentance considers Him as the Last End who\nhas been offended and offers Him satisfaction. The difference between\nfilial fear and repentance is seen in this, that the former falls back\nupon its own littleness, whereas the latter throws itself at the feet\nof God.\n\n2720. The Character of Repentance.--(a) It is a virtue, since it is\ncommanded (\u201cDo penance,\u201d Matt., iii. 2), and also since it moderates\naccording to reason the sorrow felt for sin, keeping it from the\nextreme of despair, lest it become the remorse of a Cain or a Judas.\n\n(b) It is a moral virtue, since its direct object is the human acts by\nwhich reparation is made to God, and its office the regulation of those\nacts within the bounds of moderation.\n\n(c) It belongs to justice, being a compensation offered for injury to\nanother\u2019s right; but it is only a potential part of justice, as there\nis not perfect justice between an inferior and the superior to whose\npower the former is subject (2142). It is classed under commutative\njustice on account of the return that is offered for the offense;\n\n2721. The Excellence of Repentance.--(a) Its Dignity.--Repentance ranks\nbelow other virtues, for, while they are naturally advantageous to man,\nrepentance is beneficial only hypothetically, namely, in the\nsupposition of sin. In one respect, however, it holds a certain\npreeminence, for the infused virtues are bestowed only in\njustification, whereas the acts of repentance that prepare for\njustification come before those virtues.\n\n(b) Its Necessity.--In the actual providence of God no mortal sin is\nremitted unless it be first repented of, and hence it is said: \u201cUnless\nyou do penance, you shall all likewise perish\u201d (Luke, xiii. 5). This is\nreasonable, since it is fitting that he who has turned away from God by\nhis own act, should also return to God by his own act. As to venial\nsin, since it consists in an inordinate cleaving to created things and\nmust be removed by its contrary, there is need of an actual rejection\nof the exaggerated attachment, and hence need of repentance; moreover,\nsince one should be restored to God\u2019s friendship before being restored\nto His familiarity, penitence in regard to a venial sin does not avail,\nunless the penitent is in the state of grace. The act of repentance\nneed not be formal (i.e., one in which a person expressly thinks of his\nsins and expressly detests them), but a virtual act suffices, that is,\nan act of love of God which implicitly includes repentance, though the\nlatter is not expressly taken into consideration.\n\n2722. Is Repentance Necessary as a Means or as a Precept?--(a) It is\nnecessary as a means of salvation because, if it be omitted, salvation\ncannot be attained. God desires that the sinner assist in and consent\nto his own forgiveness, and repentance, as we saw, is the most suitable\nway in which the sinner can do this. (b) It is also necessary as a\nprecept. The natural law requires that those who have done an injury,\nmake reparation; the divine law calls on sinners to repent and be\nconverted to God (Acts, ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22), and the church law\nprescribes annual confession.\n\n2723. How Soon Does the Precept of Repentance Oblige?--(a) It obliges\nat once (i.e., without any delay), when there is immediate necessity\nfor it. This happens _per se_, when one is in grave danger of death,\nfor at that moment one is bound to prepare immediately to meet God,\nwhich supposes repentance. It happens _per accidens_, when by reason of\nsome urgent precept distinct from that of repentance one is obligated\nhere and now to rid oneself of sin (e.g., when one is called on to\nadminister a Sacrament and must have a pure conscience, or when one is\ngravely tempted and will surely fall unless one repents of the past).\n\n(b) It obliges soon (i.e., without any unreasonable delay), when there\nis no immediate necessity. It is not a new sin to put off repentance\nuntil tomorrow or next week in such a case; for the commandment of\nrepentance, being affirmative, does not bind for each instant, but only\nfor a reasonable time. But the common opinion is that a new sin is\ncommitted when repentance is delayed for a considerable time, since\nthis exposes the sinner to further sins, impenitence, and damnation.\nPractically, it seems that those who comply with the church law of\nyearly confession commit no sin of unrepentance, though some consider\nit a mortal sin to delay repentance beyond a month.\n\n2724. Accompaniments of Repentance as to Mortal Sin.--(a) When one\nmortal sin is forgiven, every other mortal sin is forgiven at the same\ntime. For no one can be truly repentant unless he grieves over his\nseparation from God, and this means that he grieves over each\nindividual mortal sin. But, since venial sin does not separate from\nGod, it is possible to be sorry for one venial sin without being sorry\nfor another.\n\n(b) When mortal sin is forgiven, the eternal punishment is also\nforgiven, for forgiveness makes man a friend of God and an heir to\nheaven. But the temporal punishment may remain due, as is proved by the\nexamples of Adam (Gen., iii. 23; Wisd., x. 2), of Mary, the sister of\nMoses (Num., xii.), of Moses (Num., xx. 12), of David (II Kings, xii.\n13, 14), and of others. God is not only a merciful Father, but also a\njust Ruler, and it is fitting that He should exact satisfaction even\nfor sin forgiven. But if repentance is very perfect like that of\nMagdalen and St. Paul, even the temporal punishment is forgiven.\n\n2725. The Fruits of Repentance.--(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous,\nis removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room\nfor forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always\nready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is\nrefusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even\nimpenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).\n\n(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His\ngifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is\ndestroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins\nafter pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.\n\n(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin\nand also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii.\n12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not\nrecovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and\nfreedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part,\nwhich is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid\nall sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not\nnecessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with\nthe greater or less excellence of repentance.\n\n2726. Forgiveness of Sin through the Use of the Sacraments.--(a) Mortal\nsins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself (_ex\nopere operato_) and immediately; that is, the Sacraments either _per\nse_ or _per accidens_ (according as they are Sacraments of the Dead or\nSacraments of the Living) produce in the soul first grace or\njustification, which is the opposite of mortal sin.\n\n(b) Venial sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite\nitself but not immediately; that is, the Sacraments produce directly\neither first or second grace, and indirectly through this grace they\nmay awaken fervor, which is the opposite of venial sin. The\nsacramentals, on the contrary, remit venial sins, not in virtue of the\nrite itself but in virtue of the intercession of the Church attached to\nthe rite (_ex opere operantis Ecclesiae_); for the prayers of the Church\nare acceptable to God and can obtain from Him a grace of repentance\nthat will remove venial sin.\n\n2727. The Sacrament of Penance.--For those who lose grace after Baptism\nthe Sacrament of Penance is necessary as a part of repentance and a\nmeans of forgiveness. This Sacrament may be defined as \u201ca Sacrament of\nthe New Law instituted by Christ in the form of a judicial process, in\nwhich, through the absolution of the priest, sins committed after\nBaptism are forgiven to penitents who confess them with sorrow.\u201d\n\n(a) The remote matter of this Sacrament is the personal sins committed\nafter Baptism, for Baptism washes away all sins committed before its\nreception. Of this remote matter, some is necessary (i.e., sins that\nmust be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins not yet declared\nor directly absolved in confession; some is free (i.e., sins that may,\nbut need not be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins already\nforgiven in confession, and post-baptismal venial sins, whether already\nremitted or not (Canon 902). Imperfections which are not sins, or whose\nsinfulness is doubtful, are not sufficient matter for absolution; and\nif they alone are confessed, absolution may not be given, unless there\nis necessity, and then it may be granted conditionally (see 185, 186).\n\n(b) The proximate matter of this Sacrament, according to the view\ncommonly held, is the three acts of the penitent--contrition in the\nheart, confession in words, and satisfaction in work. Contrition must\nexist actually, but the other two acts in case of necessity need not\nexist actually, but are included implicitly in the act of contrition.\n\n(c) The form of the Sacrament is contained in the words of absolution\nspoken by the priest. Certainly the words, \u201c_Ego te absolvo a peccatis\ntuis_,\u201d are sufficient for validity. But lawfulness requires that one\nuse the entire form and the other accompanying prayers as given in\none\u2019s approved Ritual. In case of necessity, as in shipwreck or sudden\ndanger of death, an abbreviated form is permitted. Absolution must be\nspoken or vocal, for the Church has never recognized absolution by\nsigns or in writing. It must be given to one who is present, that is,\none who is in the same place and not too far away to hear and be heard.\nThose who are in different rooms that do not open on each other are not\nin the same place; those who are more than twenty feet apart are too\nfar away for presence, according to the common opinion; but in great\nneed a more liberal view may be followed, and even absolution by\nspeaking tube or telephone may be resorted to.\n\n(d) The subject of the Sacrament of Penance is every baptized person\nwho has committed venial or mortal sin after Baptism. If there is doubt\nabout the Baptism or about the sin, absolution may be given\nconditionally. Besides the conditions given for the Sacraments in\ngeneral, the recipient of Penance must exercise the three acts of\ncontrition, confession and satisfaction. The first is essential in\nevery case, and the second when possible; and without the third the\nSacrament is not integral or complete.\n\n2728. Probabilism in Administration of the Sacrament.--In the\nadministration and reception of the Sacrament of Penance it is lawful\nto follow opinions that are truly probable except in the following\ncases: (a) when the validity of the Sacrament is at stake (678), unless\nthere is a case of emergency (679). Hence, as the law of material\nintegrity pertains to the lawful, not to the valid use of Penance, one\nmay use probable opinions in its regard (see 2740); (b) when the seal\nof the Sacrament is involved, lest confession become odious.\n\n2729. Contrition.--The first act of the penitent is contrition. It is\ndefined by the Council of Trent as a sorrow and hatred for sin\ncommitted, with a resolution of sinning no more and a desire of doing\nwhat is necessary for the proper reception of the Sacrament of Penance.\n\n(a) Thus, it presupposes a hatred of personal past transgressions, for\none grieves only about that which displeases one, and the acts of the\nwill begin with likes and dislikes.\n\n(b) It consists essentially in sorrow or affliction of spirit, for\ncontrition, being the chief act of repentance, looks to reparation to\nGod for the injury done Him, and it therefore punishes the sinner by\nsadness for his misdeeds.\n\n(c) It includes as a property or consequence the resolution to avoid\nfuture sin and to do what God requires for forgiveness; for no one is\nsincerely sorry for the past unless this sorrow makes him decide not to\nrepeat the offense, and makes him desire to fulfill the conditions that\nGod lays down for reconciliation.\n\n2730. The Two Kinds of Contrition.--(a) Perfect contrition is that\nwhich is caused by charity, or the love of benevolence or of friendship\n(1109, 1110) towards God. This love is had, whether the object of one\u2019s\naffection is the divine being or persons, the divine and infinite\nperfections, or a single attribute; for all of these are really God\nHimself. This contrition justifies the sinner at once, for it includes\ncharity and the will (at least implicit) to do what God wishes, and God\ntakes up His abode with those who love Him (John, xiv. 23). Perfect\ncontrition is necessary, both as a means and as a divine precept,\nwhenever the duty of repentance or of the Sacrament of Penance obliges\nwith a like necessity, and there is no opportunity of receiving the\nSacrament; for it is then the only way of recovering grace.\n\n(b) Imperfect contrition, or attrition, is contrition caused by a\nsupernatural motive inferior to that of charity, i.e., by a less\nperfect motive suggested by faith that leads one to grieve over sin\ncommitted, for example, the heinousness of sin in itself, its eternal\npunishment by God (i.e., the pain of loss or the pain of sense), or its\ntemporal punishment by God in this life or in Purgatory. This\ncontrition does not justify the sinner without the Sacrament, for it\ndoes not rectify or retract the disorder introduced by sin as far as\nlies within the sinner\u2019s power (that is, _ex opere operantis_). By his\nsin the sinner preferred the creature to God; by his attrition he does\nnot go so far as to prefer God positively to every created good, else\nhis contrition would be perfect. But attrition suffices for\njustification of the sinner with the Sacrament of Penance, for it\nincludes the essentials of contrition in general, and thus removes the\nimpediments to the activity of the Sacrament (that is, the production\nof grace _ex opere operato_). The same holds good also of the\nsufficient disposition for Baptism, and more probably of that for the\nSacraments of the Living received in good faith by one who is not in\ngrace.\n\n2731. Is Attrition Based Solely on Fear of Punishment Laudable?--(a)\nFear of the world is sinful, because it offends God to escape evil\n(1044); slavish fear of God is sinful also, because it makes self the\nlast end, avoiding sin solely because of the harm it will bring on self\n(1053). Sorrow for sin caused by slavish fear is not attrition, and is\nnot laudable.\n\n(b) Servile fear of God in itself is good and supernatural (1050), and\nthe sorrow for sin or attrition based on such fear is also good; and if\nit includes a resolution of amendment, it suffices for justification\nwith the Sacraments. The end (i.e., to escape punishment) is good\n(Matt., x. 28); the means (i.e., sorrow for sin) is good; and the use\nof the means for the end is good, for desertion of sin is the way to\nescape unhappiness (Luke, iii. 7, 8). Nor is it wrong to make a nobler\ngood (such as avoidance of sin) a means to a lesser good (such as\nescape from punishment) when the lesser good is not made the last end,\nbut only the immediate end, of the greater good. Thus, when we pray for\ntemporal goods, we make a spiritual thing a means to a material end,\nbut the Last End of the prayer is God Himself. Servile fear, unlike\nslavish fear (_timor serviliter servilis_), does not make self the last\nend (Denzinger, 818, 1146, 1525).\n\n2732. Attrition in the Sacrament of Penance.--Must attrition based on\nfear of punishment be joined with love of God to justify in the\nSacrament?\n\n(a) Some form of love is required, for all contrition is detestation of\nsin, and sin is not hated unless its opposite is loved. Hence, just as\nattrition must be accompanied by faith and hope, so it must also be\naccompanied by some form of love of God (2718).\n\n(b) Disinterested love is not required. This is certain as regards love\nof friendship, for even the smallest degree of that love is charity and\njustifies even without the Sacrament (1112, 2730). This is commonly\nheld in reference to love of benevolence, which seems practically to be\nalways united with love of friendship or charity. A love that inclines\nto God for His own sake but that does not predominate over other loves\nis held by some to be necessary, but it is difficult to understand such\na love or to see its possibility.\n\n(c) Interested love (the love of concupiscence or of hope) is therefore\nnecessary. The common opinion today seems to be that it also suffices,\nand that it need be only virtual or implicit. In other words, the\nprevalent view is that every attrition prompted by fear of punishment\ncontains an initial love of God which suffices to turn the sinner to\nGod and to remove any obstacle to the action of the Sacrament. For \u201cthe\nfear of God is the beginning of His love\u201d (Ecclus., xxv. 16), the hope\nof pardon is a beginning of love of the Author of pardon and justice,\nthe resolve to amend is an inclination to keep the great command of\nlove of God (1556).\n\n2733. The Conditions for Valid Contrition and Attrition.--(a) It must\nbe internal, for contrition is an act of repentance and must be in the\nheart. Merely pretended sorrow, and sorrow which one mistakenly thinks\none has, are insufficient.\n\n(b) It must be supernatural, for contrition is a disposition for the\nreception of the supernatural habit of grace. Sorrow for sin induced by\nnatural motives, such as the punishments inflicted by human agencies,\nif these are not viewed in the light of faith, is not sufficient.\n\n(c) It must be universal, that is, there must be sorrow for all mortal\nsins not yet forgiven, for it is impossible to be really sorry for one\nserious sin while retaining affection for another. But it is not\nnecessary to repent of all venial sins before one is forgiven (see\n2724).\n\n(d) It must be sovereign, that is, if the contrition is perfect, God\nmust be loved above every other good; if it is imperfect, sin must be\nhated above every evil that could lead to sin. If the sinner does not\ndetest his dishonesty more than the privation he will suffer by being\nhonest, he is not really contrite. It is, however, not necessary that\ncontrition be sensibly felt, or be of supreme intensity, or that its\nact be of long duration; and it is rash to call to mind the kinds of\nevils or torments one would prefer to suffer rather than commit sin\n(see 1556).\n\n2734. Valid and Fruitful Reception of the Sacrament.--Some theologians,\ndistinguishing between contrition as matter of the Sacrament and\ncontrition as a disposition of the penitent, hold that it is possible\nto have a valid but unfruitful reception of the Sacrament, and that\nrevival of its grace is possible. They explain thus:\n\n(a) the contrition required for the matter and the validity of the\nSacrament must be such as can be known with moral certainty by the\nconfessor from external indications, and hence it suffices for validity\nthat the sorrow be true and sincere and supernatural;\n\n(b) the contrition required for the disposition of the penitent and the\nfruitfulness of the Sacrament must be such as excludes all affection\nfor every grave sin and includes the resolution to avoid all mortal sin\nin the future, and hence it is required for fruitfulness that sorrow be\nalso universal and sovereign. (This opinion has very few, if any at\nall, adherents among modern theologians. It is retained here solely as\na matter of record.)\n\n2735. Properties of Contrition.--Since contrition belongs to the matter\nof Penance, it must have the properties of sacramental matter (2655\nsqq.).\n\n(a) Thus, the matter must be sensible, and hence contrition must be\nshown in some external way, as by a sorrowful confession, devout\nrequest for absolution, or, in the case of those who are unconscious,\nby a call for a priest or the practices or prayers of a Christian life.\n\n(b) The matter must be united with the form, and hence contrition must\nbe elicited at the moment of absolution, or a short time before (not\nmore than a few hours before, according to some, or even a few days\nbefore, according to others). But if a penitent recalls immediately\nafter absolution a forgotten mortal sin, and is then absolved from it\nalso, more probably he is not obliged to renew his act of contrition,\nbecause the act just made virtually continues; in practice, however, he\nmight be told to make another act of contrition and a new penance or\nthe same penance may be imposed before the second absolution. Moreover,\nfor absolution when one is unconscious and in danger of death, since an\nhabitual intention suffices (2674), it seems that contrition made long\nago, but not retracted, is sufficient.\n\n(c) The matter must have at least a moral unity of its own parts, and\nhence the contrition must in some way be directed to the confession;\nthat is, either before or during or after the act of contrition there\nmust be an intention to confess with the sorrow for sin contained in\nthat act of contrition, or to apply that sorrow to the confession just\nmade. Otherwise it does not appear that one has the purpose to make a\nsacramental confession. But there is no practical difficulty, as every\nact of contrition contains implicitly the will to confess, or every\nsincere confession includes the will to use the contrition one has\nexercised or will exercise.\n\n2736. Resolution of Amendment.--The resolution of amendment which true\ncontrition calls for is at least implicit in the hatred of sin, but it\nis advisable that the penitent expressly resolve to avoid sin in the\nfuture. This determination should have the following qualities:\n\n(a) it should be firm, that is, the penitent should make up his mind\nnot to relapse into deliberate sin. Yet, it is not necessary that he\nfeel certain of his perseverance, and his resolve does not cease to be\nfirm, if he foresees that he will fall again, provided he is decided to\ndo the best he can;\n\n(b) it should be efficacious, that is, the penitent must decide to use\nsuitable means to fulfill his good intentions as to reparation for\nscandal, calumny, and injustice, as to the avoidance of sinful\noccasions, etc.;\n\n(c) it should be universal, that is, the penitent must resolve at least\ngenerically to avoid each and every grave sin in the future. If only\nfree matter (2727) is confessed, the penitent may direct his resolution\nof amendment to all past mortal sins confessed, or to one of the\npresent venial sins declared, or he may resolve to do better in\nreference to a certain class of sins (e.g., deliberate sins, faults of\nspeech), or he may resolve to diminish the frequency of his venial sins.\n\n2737. Confession.--The second act of the penitent is confession, that\nis, the declaration of one\u2019s sins made to a duly authorized priest with\nthe purpose of obtaining absolution. Confession is obligatory both from\ndivine and ecclesiastical law.\n\n(a) According to divine law, the forgiveness of grave post-baptismal\nsins is subject to the power of the keys, which is exercised in the\nform of a judgment and requires confession (Matt., xviii, 18; John, xx.\n23). This law obliges _per se_ in danger of death, and occasionally\nduring life; _per accidens_, when one in sin intends to receive\nCommunion, when one is unable without confession to recover the\nnecessary state of grace or overcome a serious temptation or bad habit.\n\n(b) According to church law, the faithful must go to confession once a\nyear (2590), and confession is also prescribed at times for those who\nwish to receive Communion (2705) or celebrate Mass (2701 c, 2711).\n\n2738. The Qualities of Confession.--(a) Confession is an act of virtue\nand should have the conditions of a virtue; that is, it should be\ndiscreet (e.g., the penitent should not reveal the names or sins of\nothers), willing, and pure in motive (e.g., the penitent should not\nconfess for temporal ends, such as the good opinion of the confessor),\nand courageous (i.e., the penitent should not be deterred by shame).\n\n(b) Confession is an act of penitence, and, as penitence includes\nhatred and regret for sin and abasement of self, confession should not\nbe boastful, jocular or proud, but shamefaced, sorrowful and humble.\n\n(c) Confession is essentially a declaration of fact, and hence it\nshould avoid the defects that make a declaration valueless or\nimperfect, namely, falsehood, obscurity, digression, or concealment.\nConfession, then, should be truthful, clear, to the point, and entire.\n\n(d) Confession belongs to the Sacrament of Penance, which is the forum\nof conscience, and hence the penitent accuses himself, submits to the\njudgment of the father confessor, and is heard in secret. Public\nconfession is valid but not obligatory. Hence, one who does not speak\nthe language of the confessor is not bound to use an interpreter.\nRegularly confession should be vocal, but for grave reasons (e.g., if\nthe penitent is dumb, or the confessor is deaf, or there is danger of\nbeing heard by those nearby) it may be made by signs or in writing. In\ncase of a written confession the penitent should declare orally, if\npossible, that the writing contains his confession (see Canon 903).\n\n2739. Is it a Grave Sin to Lie to the Confessor?--(a) There is a grave\nsin when the lie deceives the confessor about necessary matter (e.g.,\nwhen a circumstance changing the theological species of a sin is\ndenied), or about free matter which is the only sin confessed (e.g.,\nwhen a penitent lyingly accuses himself of only one sin and that a\nvenial one), or about free matter which the confessor asks about and\nneeds to know (e.g., about habits or occasions of sin). He who falsely\naccuses himself of a grave sin, or who exaggerates the number of his\ngrave sins, _per se_ sins mortally; but he is excused if he is ignorant\nor is under a momentary excitement or delusion. Not only is there grave\nsin in the cited cases, but the confession is made invalid by the\ndefect in essential matter which the lie produces; for the confessor\ndoes not understand the true state of the penitent\u2019s soul.\n\n(b) There is mortal sin when the lie deceives the confessor about\nmatter that is impertinent to the confession, but is grave in itself,\nas when the penitent seriously calumniates a neighbor to the priest. In\nthis case the confession is made invalid by the want of disposition on\nthe part of the penitent.\n\n(c) There is light sin when the lie deceives the confessor about free\nmatter which is not the only sin confessed, or which the confessor does\nnot need to know in order substantially to pass judgment and give\ndirection; also when the lie is not serious and is impertinent to the\nconfession. In these cases the Sacrament is not made invalid, for the\ninsincerity does not change the confessor\u2019s decision.\n\n2740. Integral Confession.--The completeness or integrity of confession\nis twofold.\n\n(a) Material completeness consists in the declaration of all mortal\nsins committed and not yet confessed and absolved. This kind of\ncompleteness is sometimes impossible, and therefore unnecessary. For\ncompleteness is obligatory in virtue of a positive law of Christ, and\npositive laws do not bind in case of impossibility (361).\n\n(b) Formal completeness consists in the declaration of all the mortal\nsins which here and now, all things considered, one can and should\nmention. This kind of completeness is necessary for a valid and\nfruitful confession, because the law of Christ calls for a complete\nconfession, as far as possible, and formal completeness is possible.\nSince he who is obliged by a law is also obliged to use the means to\nkeep the law, those who are going to confession should examine their\nconsciences beforehand, unless this is impossible or unnecessary. The\ntime and diligence to be given this examination depends on the person\nand his circumstances; but all should be careful about it, while\navoiding scrupulosity, and should also remember that contrition is even\nmore important than confession.\n\n2741. Manner of Confession.--Completeness of confession as regards\nmortal sins extends to the following points:\n\n(a) the theological and the lowest moral species of a sin (197 sqq.)\nmust be given, for otherwise the confessor does not understand the case\nbefore him. He who has committed a mortal theft does not satisfy by\nconfessing a venial theft; he who is guilty of the specific sin of\ncalumny does not satisfy by the generic accusation of sins of the\ntongue. But impossibility excuses, as when the penitent has only a\ngeneral recollection about a sin;\n\n(b) the number of the sins must be given exactly or, if this is\nimpossible, approximately. He who unintentionally exaggerates the\nnumber or tells a sin of which he is not guilty, is not bound to\ncorrect this, but he who unintentionally lowers the number to a notable\nextent should tell in his next confession what was omitted (see 202\nsqq.);\n\n(c) the circumstances that change the species of a sin must be\ndeclared, for example, the fact that the person who was scandalized was\none\u2019s subject, that the person who was treated disrespectfully was\none\u2019s superior, that the amount stolen was large (see 72);\n\n(d) the external act that completed an internal sin must be declared,\nand hence he who committed impurity does not confess properly by saying\nthat he gave consent to impure desires (see 89-93).\n\n2742. Disputed Cases.--(a) Circumstances that Notably Aggravate a Sin\nwithout Changing Its Species.--For the obligation of confessing these\ncircumstances, it is argued that, if the confessor does not know them,\nhe is unable to guide the penitent properly. Against obligation, it is\nargued that the species of the sin gives the confessor sufficient\nknowledge, and that the obligation of confessing aggravating\ncircumstances would make the burden too heavy for the penitent. But all\nadmit that _per accidens_ there may be a duty of confessing a\ncircumstance of this kind, as when it makes a sin reserved, or consists\nin an occasion of sin or evil habit, or when it produces a great change\nin reference to satisfaction (e.g., the theft of $10,000 is quite\ndifferent from the theft of $1000).\n\n(b) As to the Imputable External Effects of a Sin.--One opinion is that\nthese must be confessed, since they are willed in their cause (96,\n102); another opinion is that they need not be confessed since they are\nnot sins, but results that followed on a sin; a third opinion answers\nthat they must be confessed if the evil will was not retracted before\nthey happened, but otherwise not. All agree, however, that the sinner\nin this case should confess that he sinned with foresight of the\nconsequence, and that he should confess the consequence itself if there\nis attached to it something that should be known to the confessor\n(e.g., censure, irregularity, etc.).\n\n(c) Sins Whose Commission, or Gravity, or Remission is Uncertain.--If\nthe uncertainty is about the fact or gravity of the sin, there is no\nobligation to confess the sin, even though its commission or its\ngravity be probable; for the obligation cannot be proved. But if it is\ncertain that grave sin has been committed and uncertain whether the sin\nhas been confessed, a mere doubt or suspicion in favor of confession\ndoes not exempt from obligation; a probable opinion in favor of\nconfession excuses according to Probabilism, but it does not excuse\naccording to Equiprobabilism, unless the doubt is about a confession\nmade long ago by one who was careful in making his confessions, or\nunless there is question of a scrupulous person (655 sqq., 708, 709).\n\n2743. When Material Integrity Is Not Necessary.--Material integrity is\nnot due because of real impossibility in the following cases:\n\n(a) when there is physical impossibility, as when one is at the point\nof death and too weak to make confession, or is deaf and dumb, or\ncannot speak the confessor\u2019s language correctly, or cannot finish\nconfession on account of shipwreck or other great peril;\n\n(b) when there is moral impossibility, as when material integrity\ncannot be had except at the expense of a great temporal or spiritual\nevil distinct from the inconvenience intrinsic to the confession\nitself, and there is some serious reason that makes it necessary to go\nto confession here and now (e.g., the desire of not remaining long in\nthe state of sin). Examples are: great spiritual harm, as when a\npenitent is scrupulous; great temporal harm, as when the penitent has\nto flee to escape assassination. Some affirm, while others deny, the\nduty of mentioning a sin that will defame an accomplice with the\nconfessor, and in practice it seems the duty cannot be insisted on\n(cfr. 2065).\n\n2744. Completion or Repetition of Past Incomplete Confessions.--(a)\nCompletion of past confessions must be made when they lacked material\nintegrity, if the impossibility has ceased.\n\n(b) Particular repetition is necessary when a confession lacked formal\nintegrity or other essential; that is, if a sin was unlawfully\nconcealed or unrepented of in confession, the sacrilege must be\nconfessed and the previous confession made over, since it was invalid.\nBut if the new confession is made to the same confessor and he has a\ngeneral remembrance of it, the new confession may be made summarily.\n\n(c) General repetition is necessary when several past confessions were\ncertainly invalid on account of lack of formal integrity or other\ndefect. Thus, he who has made bad confessions for three months must\nmake a general confession of that period of time. General confession is\nadvisable when there is a prudent doubt about the worth of past\nconfessions; it is permissible when it will help a penitent to be more\ncontrite and lead a better life; it is not lawful when it will do harm,\nas when a scrupulous penitent will be harrowed and maddened by the\nthought of his past sins.\n\n2745. Satisfaction.--The third act of the penitent is satisfaction,\nwhich is defined as \u201ca compensation for the injury done to God by sin,\nappointed by God\u2019s minister in the Sacrament of Penance and accepted\nand performed by the penitent.\u201d\n\n(a) This act is a compensation or payment made to God as an act of\nreparation and justice.\n\n(b) The compensation is appointed by the confessor, for its chief\npurpose is restoration of friendship between God and the sinner, and\nhence equality is not sought, but the good will to do what God\u2019s\nminister imposes.\n\n(c) The compensation is accepted and performed. This is required for\nthe completeness, not for the essence, of the Sacrament. He who is\nreally contrite desires to satisfy, he who confesses offers to satisfy;\nand hence, if for any reason he does not actually satisfy, his\nsatisfaction of desire suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, but\nhis omission to perform the satisfaction makes the Sacrament incomplete.\n\n2746. The Effects of Actual Satisfaction.--(a) There is a remissive\neffect, consisting in the _ex opere operato_ release of a portion or of\nall the temporal punishment due to sin forgiven.\n\n(b) There is a medicinal effect, consisting in the appreciation of the\nevil of sin, the caution and vigilance against future relapse, and the\nremoval of evil tendencies, which the penitential works inculcate and\npromote.\n\n2747. The Conditions for Effective Satisfaction.--(a) For validity\n(that is, for discharge of the obligation) the penitent must perform\nthe penance as to essentials in the way prescribed by the confessor,\nand he must perform it personally, unless the confessor permits or\nenjoins fulfillment by proxy (Canon 887). A penance performed during\nthe actual commission of or with actual affection for sin, is not a\nsatisfaction, but a new offense.\n\n(b) For fruitfulness it is necessary that the penitent be in the state\nof grace when he fulfills the penance, for the works of His enemies are\nnot supernaturally pleasing to God. Or, more exactly, a penance done in\nthe state of sin, but without affection for sin and under the influence\nof actual grace, has no strict right either of justice or of friendship\nto divine acceptance; but it seems fitting that such penance be\naccepted by the divine liberality in part satisfaction for sins\nforgiven.\n\n2748. The Obligation of Accepting and Performing a Penance.--(a) _Per\nse_, the obligation is grave, since the penance belongs to the\nintegrity of the Sacrament, and hence its refusal or neglect is an\ninjury to a sacred thing. (b) _Per accidens_, the obligation may be\nlight, and this is held to be the case when the penance was imposed for\nfree matter, or when the satisfaction prescribed is a light work (such\nas one or two Hail Marys). A penitent is not bound to accept an\nunreasonable penance, and he may seek a commutation if such a penance\nis imposed. As a rule, negligence about the circumstances of a penance\n(e.g., the time, or posture) is not a grave sin, but exceptionally it\nmay be serious (e.g., if one delays a gravely obligatory penance six\nmonths, or so long as to be in danger of forgetting it; if one omits to\nsay a prayer on bended knees when this was chiefly intended by the\nconfessor).\n\n2749. Causes That Excuse from a Penance Imposed.--(a) Commutation.--If\nthere is a just reason (e.g., the over-severity of the penance), the\npenitent may have his penance changed to something lighter. The\nconfessor who imposed the penance may be asked to change it, even\nprobably after and outside of confession, and after a long time, and\nthough he does not remember the confession. Another confessor may\nlessen the penance, but only in confession and after he has heard at\nleast a summary repetition of the sins for which the penance was given.\n\n(b) Cessation.--There is no obligation to fulfill a penance in case of\nimpossibility, whether physical (e.g., if the penitent is dying and can\nneither say the prayers ordered nor ask for a commutation), or moral\n(e.g., if the penitent has forgotten the penance and cannot\nconveniently ask the confessor about it).\n\n2750. Requirements in the Minister for Valid Absolution.--(a) The\ndivine law requires the power of Orders, for only priests were\nappointed by Christ as the ministers of Penance, (b) The natural law\nrequires the power of jurisdiction, since the Sacrament of Penance is\nexercised in the form of a judicial process, which supposes authority\nto judge. (c) The law of the Church requires the approval of the\nBishop, or his decision that the priest is a fit person to hear\nconfessions. Approbation is always given along with jurisdiction.\n\n2751. Power of Jurisdiction.--The power of jurisdiction is so necessary\nthat without it absolution is null.\n\n(a) Jurisdiction in general is treated in Canons 872 sqq. of the Code.\nOrdinary jurisdiction is had by the Pope for the whole Church, and by\nOrdinaries, parish-priests, exempt religious superiors, etc., for their\nown subjects. Delegated jurisdiction comes from the law itself in favor\nof penitents who are dying (Canon 882), or who are making a sea voyage\n(Canon 883), a privilege extended recently also to those who are making\nair journeys, or who are outside their domicile (Canon 881), etc.;\nwhile delegated jurisdiction from man is had by those priests who have\nobtained faculties orally or in writing from the competent superior\n(Canon 879).\n\n(b) Jurisdiction in special cases is treated in Canons 874, 875, 876,\n519 sqq. Religious women living in community should have for each house\none ordinary confessor and one extraordinary confessor who comes four\ntimes a year. Further, the bishop should appoint supplementary\nconfessors to whom the Religious may freely make their confessions, and\nspecial confessors for individual Sisters when spiritual progress is\naided by such an arrangement.\n\n2752. When the Church Supplies Jurisdiction.--In certain cases the\nChurch, for the good of souls, supplies jurisdiction for the time being\nto priests who lack it:\n\n(a) in case of common error, that is, when all or many of the faithful\nin a place think that a priest has jurisdiction, as when he is seated\nin the confessional of a public church hearing or waiting to hear those\nwho are going to confession. The common error is not of law, but of\nfact;\n\n(b) in case of uncertainty of law (e.g., whether a certain sin is\nreserved) or of fact (e.g., whether the confessor\u2019s jurisdiction has\nexpired) about the confessor\u2019s jurisdiction, if the confessor has a\npositive or probable reason in favor of his right to absolve. The\nChurch supplies jurisdiction in the absolution of a reserved censure\nwhose reservation was not known to the priest, unless it be _ab homine_\nor most specially reserved to the Holy See (Canon 2247, n. 3);\n\n(c) in case of danger of death, when full jurisdiction is granted to\nevery priest (Canon 882).\n\n2753. Limitation of jurisdiction.--(a) Reserved Sins or Cases.--For the\nsake of discipline and the good of souls the absolution of certain more\natrocious or pernicious crimes is reserved to higher superiors, namely,\nto the Pope or the Ordinary. Reservation is not incurred in a case\nreserved on account of censure, if the penitent\u2019s act was not gravely\nimputable; nor probably in a case reserved for its own sake (unless the\nreserving authority willed otherwise), if the penitent was ignorant\n(though not crassly or supinely) of the reservation (Canon 2229). To\nfall under reservation, a sin must be mortal, consummated (i.e. not\nmerely attempted) certain and formal (i.e., perpetrated with knowledge\nof the special malice that caused reservation). Reservation ceases when\nconfession is made by the sick who are unable to leave the house or by\nthose who are about to be married; when the Superior has refused the\nrequest for faculties to absolve a reserved case, or the confessor\nprudently decides that the request for faculties cannot be made without\ngrave detriment to the penitent or danger to the seal; when confession\nis made outside the territory of the Superior who reserves the sin\n(Canon 900).\n\n(b) Reserved Persons.--Those who have not special faculties cannot\nvalidly hear the confessions of nuns (Canon 876), for the director of\nconsciences of these Religious should be endowed with special virtue,\nknowledge and prudence. Religious Superiors, novice-masters, and\nrectors of seminaries or colleges should not act habitually as\nconfessors of their subjects (Canons 518, n. 2, 891), lest the\ndistinction between the internal and the external forum be forgotten.\nFinally, to prevent abuse of the Sacrament and occasions of relapse, a\nconfessor cannot validly absolve his accomplice in a sin against the\nSixth Commandment, consummated or unconsummated, or from the sin of\ncomplicity itself, as necessary matter of the Sacrament, if the sin was\non both sides external, certain, and both internally and externally\ngrave (Canons 884, 2367).\n\n2754. Absolution from Reserved Cases.--(a) In danger of death, any\npriest can absolve every reserved sin and censure, but, should the\npenitent recover, there is a duty in certain specified cases of having\nrecourse to the lawful superior (Canons 882, 2252). The latter Canon\nspecifies two cases in which recourse is necessary after the person\nrecovers, namely, a censure _ab homine_ and one most specially reserved\nto the Holy See. A third case has been added by the Sacred\nPenitentiary, namely, when a priest who has attempted marriage and is\nunable to separate asks for absolution from the censure of Canon 2388,\nSec.1, in danger of death.\n\n(b) In urgent cases, namely, if censures _latae sententiae_ cannot be\nobserved externally without grave danger of scandal or infamy, or if it\nis hard for the penitent to remain in the state of grave sin for such\ntime as may be necessary in order that the competent superior may\nprovide, then any confessor can, in the sacramental forum, absolve from\nthese censures, no matter how they are reserved, imposing, under pain\nof falling back into the censure, the obligation of having recourse\nwithin a month (at least by letter and through the confessor, if it can\nbe done without grave inconvenience), without mentioning the name, to\nthe Sacred Penitentiary or to a Bishop or other superior who has the\nfaculty. The confessor imposes also the obligation of fulfilling his\ninjunctions (Canon 2254, Sec.1). It is to be noted:\n\n1) the circumstances constituting an urgent case are the two specified\nin the Canon: the difficulty of observing the censure; the hardship of\nremaining in sin.\n\n2) the object of the absolution is all censures _latae sententiae_,\nhowever reserved, with one exception, namely, the censure incurred\nunder Canon 2388, Sec.1, the case of a priest who, after an attempted\nmarriage, is unable to separate. No absolution as an urgent case under\nthis Canon can be given. The censure _latae sententiae_ for false\ndenunciation can be absolved under this Canon only if the conditions of\nCanon 2363 have been fulfilled (actual formal retraction and\nreparation; imposition of a grave and long penance; and the sin itself\nremains reserved _ratione sui_ to the Holy See).\n\n3) Sufficient extrinsic authority is available to make safe in practice\nthe extension of the grant of power of this Canon to censures _ab\nhomine_ which are _ferendae sententiae_.\n\n4) Sections 2 and 3 of this Canon indicate the right of the penitent to\ngo afterwards to a privileged confessor without making the recourse to\nthe superior enjoined upon him or observing the _mandata_ from the\nsuperior in case he has already made recourse, and the procedure to be\nfollowed when recourse is morally impossible.\n\n(c) Outside of necessity, only those can absolve who have ordinary or\ndelegated faculties. The law itself grants to pastors the power to\nabsolve during the whole of paschal time from all sins which the\nOrdinary has reserved to himself, and missionaries have the same power\nduring the time they are giving a mission (Canon 899, n. 3). This does\nnot apply to censures nor to cases reserved to the Ordinary by the\nApostolic See or by law, such as the excommunication _latae sententiae_\nwhich Canon 2350 declares against the procurers of abortion.\n\n2755. Absolution Given by One Not Possessed of Jurisdiction.--(a)\nEffect.--Absolution of mortal sins given without jurisdiction is\ninvalid; and of venial sins, is unlawful and probably invalid. In some\ncases, however, the Church supplies jurisdiction, as was said above\n(2752).\n\n(b) Guilt.--There is no sin if the absolution is given in good faith,\nas when a confessor is inculpably ignorant of a reservation. If\nabsolution is given in bad faith and the confessor knows that the\nChurch does not supply, there is a grave sin on account of the\nirreverence to the Sacrament and the harm to the penitent. If the\nconfessor knows that he lacks jurisdiction, but that the Church\nsupplies on account of common error, it seems that no sin is committed\nif there is a good reason for giving absolution (e.g., the absence of\nother priests); but otherwise there is mortal or venial sin according\nto circumstances.\n\n(c) Penalty.--He who with presumption hears confessions without\njurisdiction or absolves from a reserved case for which he has no\nfaculties, incurs in the former case _ipso facto_ suspension from the\npower of Orders, and in the latter case _ipso facto_ suspension from\nhearing confessions (Canon 2366).\n\n2756. Duties of the Confessor before Confession.--(a) Fitness to Hear\nConfessions.--The confessor should have sufficient knowledge to be able\nreadily to solve the usual cases and to work out or find the solution\nof the more difficult cases; sufficient prudence to be able to apply\nhis knowledge well and to avoid what is dangerous or suspicious;\nsufficient goodness to be sincerely desirous of the spiritual advantage\nof the penitent, and to be patient in hearing him and firm in\ncorrecting him.\n\n(b) Willingness to H ear Confessions.-The confessor is obliged either\nfrom justice or charity (2676) to hear the confessions of those who\nreasonably request it. He should observe the rules of the Ritual and of\nthe Code as to the manner and place of confession (Canons 908-910).\n\n2757. Duties of the Confessor as Judge in Hearing the Case.--(a) Since\nconfession should be entire, the confessor is gravely bound to question\nthe penitent, when there is reason to think that the confession is not\nentire. With pious and well-instructed persons, of course, there is no\nneed of questioning, and, since the duty of integrity rests primarily\non the penitent, the confessor\u2019s negligence may be regarded as venial\nwhen he is burdened by a great multitude of confessions.\n\n(b) Since confession must not be made onerous or harmful to penitents,\nthe confessor is bound to be very discreet in the questions he asks,\nand to follow the rule that it is far better to say too little than to\nsay too much. He must avoid any word or remark that might teach sin to\nthe young or scandalize the old; he must be very reserved when speaking\nof matters that pertain to the Sixth Commandment, and, if there is need\nto question about them, should begin with very general queries. Neither\ndirectly nor indirectly may he inquire the name of an accomplice of the\npenitent (Canon 888); but he is allowed to investigate matters which he\nhas a right to know, even though the accomplice thereby becomes known\nto him. If the common good requires that a complaint be lodged against\nthe accomplice, the confessor may oblige the penitent to make this\ncomplaint to the proper superior; but it is seldom advisable that the\nconfessor agree to perform this duty himself, and then he should\nrequire that the penitent speak to him about the affair outside of\nconfession, if this can be done (see 1287).\n\n(c) Since the penitent acts as the accuser in confession, he should be\nbelieved both for and against himself. But should it happen that the\nconfessor knows for certain that his penitent is lying, his procedure\nwill depend on the source of his knowledge. If the knowledge is not of\nsacramental origin but comes from the confessor\u2019s own reliable\nexperience (e.g., because he saw the penitent commit a sin and is sure\nthat the silence about the sin is not due to forgetfulness, ignorance\nor previous confession of it), he should try to induce the penitent to\nconfess, and, if the latter refuses, should deny absolution. If the\nconfessor is morally certain on account of the word of a third person\nthat the penitent is now concealing a sin, it seems to some authorities\nthat absolution may be either granted or refused, to others that it\nmust be refused. Finally, if the confessor\u2019s knowledge comes from a\nprevious sacramental confession or other obligatory secret, he is held\nto respect the secret; he may not ask any questions which he would not\nhave asked otherwise, and, if the penitent will not confess, he must\neither grant absolution, as some hold, or dissimulate its denial, as\nothers think.\n\n2758. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Deciding about the Case.--(a)\nThe confessor should pass judgment on the past state of the penitent\u2019s\nsoul as declared to him, but defect or mistake here would not make the\nSacrament null. The objective malice of the sins (i.e., their\ntheological and moral malice) will be recognized by the priest from his\nknowledge of theology, and the subjective malice from the declarations\nor replies of the penitent. At times the confessor will have to rest\nsatisfied with the decision that the sin or its character is uncertain.\n\n(b) The confessor should pass judgment on the present dispositions of\nthe penitent, or the sincerity of his sorrow and resolution; but it\nsuffices that the judgment be probable, and there be no strong\nsuspicion against it. The penitent\u2019s devout confession, or his promise\nof amendment, the trouble he took to make his confession, etc., are\nindexes of good faith, just as boastful confession, disregard for\nformer promises, and unwillingness or carelessness about coming to\nconfession are signs of bad faith.\n\n2759. Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Passing Sentence.--(a) The Duty\nof Binding.--The confessor must impose upon the penitent such duties as\nare necessitated by the essence of the Sacrament (e.g., there is no\ntrue contrition without willingness to make due restitution,\nreparation, or satisfaction, and to avoid sinful occasions and to\nstruggle against bad habits), or such penalties as are required for its\nintegrity (i.e., the priest must impose a suitable penance). To\nsafeguard morals, the law of the Church gravely obliges a confessor to\nrequire his penitent _sub gravi_ to denounce another confessor\ncertainly guilty of the crime of solicitation, unless there be a grave\nreason that excuses the penitent; and, if the penitent refuses,\nabsolution must be denied. On the details of this law and on the\npenalties for solicitation, refusal to denounce, and false accusation,\nsee Commentaries on Canons 904, 2368 and 2363 of the Code.\n\n(b) The Duty of Loosing.--The confessor is bound _sub gravi_ to give\nabsolution at once to one who is properly disposed, for there is a\ntacit contract between the penitent and the confessor that absolution\nwill be granted if the penitent is worthy; the penitent puts himself to\nconsiderable trouble to obtain forgiveness, and he is deprived of a\ngreat good if absolution is refused (Canon 886). If only free matter is\nconfessed, it is a venial sin now and then to deny absolution without\nreason, but no sin to deny it for a good reason if the penitent\nconsents.\n\n(c) The Duty of Retaining.--The confessor should always refuse\nabsolution to those who are certainly not contrite and in whom he\ncannot awaken true repentance, for absolution would be of no benefit to\nsuch persons and would make the confessor an encourager of sin.\nLikewise, absolution should be denied those who are incapable (e.g.,\nthose who have not as yet committed sin or who confess only\nimperfections). If there is doubt about the fitness or capacity of the\npenitent, absolution should generally be delayed; but it may be granted\nconditionally for a serious reason (e.g., if the penitent is in a state\nof sin and cannot return to confession for a long time), and it should\nbe granted conditionally for a very serious reason (e.g., if the\npenitent will probably not return, or if he is confessing in\npreparation for marriage).\n\n2760. Penitents to Whom Absolution Should Be Denied.--There are three\nclasses of penitents especially to whom absolution should be frequently\ndenied on account of their lack of repentance:\n\n(a) those who refuse to abandon a proximate and voluntary occasion of\ngrave sin, for these are impenitent and unworthy of absolution. But\nabsolution may be given those who promise to abandon a proximate and\nvoluntary occasion, or to use the proper means of safety if they are in\na proximate and necessary occasion of sin (see 263 sqq.);\n\n(b) those who have contracted the habit of some grave sin, if they are\nunwilling to use the proper means to overcome it; but if they seriously\npromise to use means prescribed by the confessor, they should be\nconsidered as well disposed. A sin is habitual when it is committed\noften--that is, for an external sin about five times a month, and for\nan internal sin about five times a week-and when the sinner acts for\nthe proper motive of the vice, e.g., in injustice for disorder, in\nintemperance for pleasure of the sense, in sins against charity out of\nhatred, etc. But consideration should be taken also of the character of\nthe person (i.e., a weak-willed person is enslaved by habit more\nreadily than a strong-willed person) and of the vice (i.e., an alluring\nsin like impurity becomes a habit more quickly than other sins);\n\n(c) those backsliders or recidivists who have confessed the same grave\nsin in three or four previous confessions and have relapsed into it\nagain without any improvement. These persons should be absolved if they\nare sincere now and give some special indication as proof of sincerity\n(e.g., some effort made to conquer their habit); otherwise (except in\ngreat necessity, when they may be given the benefit of the doubt and be\ngranted conditional absolution) they should not be absolved but should\nbe put off kindly for a short space, since there is no reason to\nbelieve that the present sorrow is any better than that of the past.\n\n2761. The Sacramental Penance.--(a) Obligation.--The confessor is bound\nto impose a penance in order to provide for the integrity of the\nSacrament and the good of the penitent. Exceptions to this rule are the\ncases when the penitent cannot perform any penance, as when he is at\nthe point of death, and when the penitent after the imposition of a\npenance and absolution remembers new and necessary matter. It is at\nleast a venial sin to delay the giving of a penance till after the\nabsolution, and it is a grave sin to give no penance at all, unless (as\nsome hold) only a light penance was due.\n\n(b) Quantity.--The amount of the penance should be suited as a\npunishment to the degree of the penitent\u2019s guilt, that is, a heavier\npenance should be given for necessary matter and a lighter penance for\nfree matter. The penance should also take into consideration the moral\nmalice and the frequency of the sins. Works that the Church may order\nunder pain of serious sin suffice for necessary matter (such as a Mass,\na fast, five decades of the Rosary, or the Litany of the Saints). Light\npenances are the _De Profundis_, the Litany of St. Joseph, five Paters\nand five Aves. For a sufficient reason (e.g., the sickness of the\npenitent, the probability that a grave penance will keep him from\nfuture confession, the fact that his sorrow is very great or that he\nhas gained a plenary indulgence, the performance of satisfaction for\nhim by the confessor himself) the quantity of a penance may be\nlessened. A grave penance may be lightened by joining it with some duty\nalready owed (e.g., by requiring the penitent to say the Rosary while\nhearing Sunday Mass, by obliging him to hear Mass on Sunday and also to\nsay a few prayers after the Mass).\n\n(c) Quality.--The character of the penance should make it suitable as a\nremedy for the spiritual disease of the penitent; that is, as far as\npossible he should be required to perform works that tend to correct\nhis chief failings. Thus, for those who are uncharitable or avaricious\nan alms or other work of mercy is a good penance; for those who are\ngiven to pleasures of sense, a fast or other corporal austerity; for\nthose who are lax or irreligious, a prayer, a visit to the Blessed\nSacrament, a meditation, or frequentation of the Sacraments. Ordinarily\nit suffices to impose prayers as penances, since prayer is a universal\nremedy. Penances unsuitable to the penitent (e.g., fasts for one who\nneeds nourishment on account of labors), those that are too difficult\n(e.g., perpetual or long-continued practices), those that are harmful\n(e.g., penances that will bring the penitent into suspicion or\nridicule), must be avoided.\n\n2762. The Duties of the Confessor as Spiritual Physician.--(a) General\nRemedies.--The confessor should give much attention to the study of\nmoral and ascetical works, so as to be able to suggest suitable means\nto his penitents for overcoming their spiritual infirmities and\navoiding future relapses. Thus, if a penitent desires to know or ought\nto be told how to struggle against anger, drunkenness or impurity, the\nconfessor should know how to advise him and what measures to recommend\nto him.\n\n(b) Special Remedies.--Certain classes of penitents need special\nattention. Thus, the tempted and afflicted should be told the means of\nfighting temptation and sadness; the scrupulous should be forbidden to\nexamine their consciences too carefully, or to accuse themselves\nminutely, or to spend too much time at devotions; the sick and the\ndying should be encouraged to dispose themselves well and to put aside\nthoughts of fear and discouragement; pious persons often need\nassistance when they suffer temptations to tepidity or spiritual\ndesolation. The careless, lazy, malicious, and hardened should be\nreproved, but sternness should not be unmingled with kindness, lest the\npenitent be driven away from his duty altogether.\n\n2763. The Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide.--(a)\nInstruction.--The confessor should teach children and other ignorant\npersons if he finds that they do not know truths necessary to be known\nfor a fruitful reception of the Sacrament--that is, the mysteries of\nfaith that must be believed explicitly and the dispositions for\nreceiving absolution (924). He should instruct about duties when this\nwill be for the penitent\u2019s good--that is, when the penitent falsely\nbelieves something to be sinful which is not sinful, or to be gravely\nsinful that is only lightly sinful, or when the penitent\u2019s ignorance of\nan obligation is gravely culpable, or when he is invincibly ignorant\nbut will be kept from a sin without graver evil if he is instructed\nnow. If an instruction will probably do no good, a confessor should not\ninstruct an invincibly ignorant penitent about his duties, unless\nsilence will be productive of greater evils than instruction. Thus, if\nthe confessor foresees that the penitent will only be put in bad faith\nif he is told about a duty of restitution, it would be useless and\nwrong to speak to him about it; but if he should foresee that, if he\ndoes not speak, the penitent will do worse things with great injury or\nscandal to others, it would be necessary to instruct him.\n\n(b) Direction.--In spiritual matters a confessor should be willing and\nable to counsel and advise, for example, about the choice of a state of\nlife (marriage, clerical state, religious life), about voluntary rules\nor practices (vows, austerities), and about the performance of duties\n(e.g., training of children). For advice on temporal matters a priest\nshould either direct his penitents to lawyers, physicians or other\nprofessional advisers, or, if he can give prudent direction himself\n(e.g., on artistic, educational, or business questions), he should\npreferably discuss the matter elsewhere than in the confessional.\n\n2764. The Duties of the Confessor After Confession.--(a) _Per se_, or\nby reason of his office itself, the confessor is held to guard\ninviolate the secret of the confessional--that is, he may not disclose,\nor use to the penitent\u2019s disadvantage, any information received from\nsacramental confession. This duty is a grave one imposed by natural law\n(since there is a quasi-contract that the confessor will treat the\npenitent\u2019s confession as confidential), by divine law (since Christ, in\nwilling that confession be used, implicitly willed that it be so\nconducted as not to become a thing odious, scandalous and harmful), and\nby church law (for Canons 889, 890, 1757, 2369 strictly forbid\nrevelations or use of sacramental knowledge and decree severe penalties\nagainst transgressors). Since God wipes out from remembrance the sins\nHe has pardoned, the confessor, being God\u2019s representative, must treat\nwhat he has heard as not known to him. The obligation of the seal is so\nstrict that no one may dispense from it, that neither Probabilism nor\nepieikeia may be applied to it, and that no exception is allowed unless\nthe penitent himself freely, unmistakably and for a serious reason\ngives permission for it to the confessor.\n\n(b) _Per accidens_, or by reason of a mistake committed by him (e.g.,\nabsolution mistakenly refused or invalidly given, erroneous notion\nabout the gravity of a sin imparted or not corrected, restitution\nimposed where not due or not imposed where due), a confessor is held to\nsee that the mistake is corrected and that the penitent or a third\nparty is spared or rescued from the harm which will follow from the\nmistake. The obligation is one of justice in those cases where there is\na violation of implicit agreement (e.g., absolution unreasonably\nwithheld), or damage positively and culpably caused (e.g., erroneous\nadvice about the gravity of a sin or about the duty of restitution); it\nis one of charity in other cases where the confessor can without undue\ninconvenience assist the spiritual or temporal need of the penitent or\nof another (e.g., penitent\u2019s misunderstanding about his duty of\nrestitution which the confessor failed to clear up). The duty of\nrepairing mistakes is grave when there is grave damage (e.g., invalid\nabsolution of mortal sins) and grave guilt was contracted by the\nmistake (e.g., if the invalidity was voluntary) or will be contracted\nby refusal to prevent the consequences of the mistake (e.g., if the\ninvalidity has been discovered, and one knows that the penitent will\ndie unabsolved, if one does not rectify the error). The duty is light\nif there is light damage (e.g., invalid absolution of free matter, or\nof necessary matter confessed by a person who will go to the Sacraments\nsoon again), or light culpability (e.g., failure to question about the\nspecies or number of sins, or to impose a penance, when the failure is\ndue to distraction or forgetfulness).\n\n2765. Manner of Repairing Defects Made in Hearing a Confession.--(a)\nThe Reparation to be Made.--If the penitent has been deprived of\nabsolution, he should be absolved; if he has been wrongly instructed,\nhe should be set right; if temporal loss has been caused, temporal\nrestitution should be made.\n\n(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Should Be Made.--The injured person\nshould be compensated. Hence if restitution was mistakenly imposed on\nthe penitent and he cannot recover his property, the confessor should\nreimburse him; if the penitent was mistakenly excused from restitution,\npayment is due the third party who loses by the advice.\n\n(e) The Manner of Making Reparation.--If possible, the reparation\nshould be made in the penitent\u2019s next confession, as this is less\ntroublesome to all concerned. But if the confessor has wrongly\ninstructed the penitent in an important matter, he is bound more\nprobably (after obtaining the penitent\u2019s permission to speak about\nconfession matter) to retract, even outside of the confessional, if\nthis can be done without scandal or other serious evil, which would be\nrare.\n\n2766. Excuses from the Duty of Repairing Mistakes.--(a) Physical\nImpossibility.--If the confessor does not know who the penitent is or\ncannot find him, there is nothing to do but to repent over the mistake\nand to pray for the penitent that God may provide for him.\n\n(b) Moral Impossibility.--Grave inconvenience excuses, unless the\nconfessor has been seriously at fault against justice (e.g., by\nomitting absolution, by giving incorrect instruction in an important\nmatter, by neglecting to warn against an occasion of serious sin, by\nwrongly advising on restitution of a large sum), or the salvation of a\nsoul is at stake, as when an unabsolved penitent is dying (see 1797\nsqq.)\n\n2767. The Obligation of the Seal of Confession.--(a) Its\nSubject.--Primarily the duty of the seal obliges the confessor,\nsecondarily all others to whom the matter of sacramental confession in\nany way becomes known, such as bystanders, interpreters, or those who\nhave spied into a confession. The penitent on his part is bound to keep\nas a natural secret the words of the confessor which the latter would\nrightly wish to be kept confidential (e.g., it would not be fair to\nexcuse oneself in making necessary corrections, by saying that one was\nacting under advice of one\u2019s confessor, especially since the confessor\ncannot defend himself).\n\n(b) Its Object.--Primarily, the seal extends to all sins confessed,\nwhether they be light or grave, private or public; and a confessor may\nnot confirm from his knowledge as confessor what he also knows from\nother knowledge. Secondarily, it extends to all that is declared for a\nfuller explanation of the sins, such as circumstances, purpose,\noccasion, cooperation, and to all those things whose revelation would\nendanger the seal or make the Sacrament odious, such as the denial of\nabsolution, the penance given, the insincerity, impatience or\nscrupulosity shown in confessing, the fact that a confession was long\nor a general review. Other matters not generally known and which the\npenitent reasonably wishes to be confidential (e.g., the fact that he\nmade his confession, his natural defects of illegitimacy or deafness)\nshould be kept as natural secrets. But there is no duty of sacramental\nor natural silence about matters which the confessor knows from other\nsources and which he is free to mention (e.g., facts learned from a\nnon-sacramental confession made to the priest and others with a view to\nits use, or from the confessor\u2019s own perception of a theft committed by\nthe penitent in the act of confession).\n\n2768. Sins against the Seal of Confession.--(a) Direct violation\nhappens if a confessor declares, either to the penitent himself or to\nanother, matter protected by the seal, and with such clearness that\nboth the penitent and his sin can be recognized. This occurs even\nthough no names are mentioned, or the penitent is unknown to the\nlisteners, or is no longer living, or when the listeners do not\nperceive that sacramental knowledge is being used. The sin is grave,\nand, since the injury to religion and the public is always serious, it\nadmits of no lightness of matter. The penalty is excommunication most\nspecially reserved to the Pope (Canon 2369).\n\n(b) Indirect violation happens if a confessor so speaks or acts as to\ncreate a danger of direct violation (e.g., if he speaks so loud in the\nconfessional that those outside can hear, or if he is suspiciously\nsilent when the penitent is being commended, or if he warns the parents\nof a penitent to be specially watchful of him, or if he refuses to hear\na confession because he knows from a previous confession that the\nperson is very scrupulous, or if he shows less confidence or regard for\nthe penitent). The sin admits of lightness of matter, since the danger\nof direct violation may be remote; but if there is grave culpability,\nsuspension or even severer penalties may be inflicted (Canons 2369,\n2368).\n\n(c) Unlawful use of sacramental knowledge happens if there is no direct\nor indirect violation of the seal, but the confessor\u2019s conduct is such\nas to make confession distasteful either to the penitent or to others,\nas when a superior is guided in giving his vote or directing his\nsubject by information gathered from confession. This is forbidden in\nCanon 890.\n\n(d) Apparent violation of the seal happens if there is really no direct\nor indirect violation of the seal, or unlawful use of confessional\nknowledge, but a priest\u2019s language is calculated to arouse a reasonable\nsuspicion that some such sin is being committed (e.g., if a preacher or\nretreat master or writer of moral cases uses illustrations from\nconfessions heard by him which will excite distrust in his own or other\npenitents). Serious scandal and defamation may also be caused by public\nstatements unfavorable to the morals of a certain city or community or\nclass.\n\n2769. Special Abuses.--Two abuses to which confession is especially\nexposed are defamation and impurity, and hence the law of the Church\nprovides special safeguards against these dangers (see 2753, 2757,\n2759).\n\n(a) Defamation.--The fame of third parties is protected by the law\nwhich forbids the confessor to inquire about the penitent\u2019s accomplice,\nthe fame of the penitent by the law of the sacramental seal, and the\nfame of the confessor by the law which subjects those who bring a false\naccusation of solicitation against a confessor to excommunication\nspecially reserved to the Pope, to retractation, reparation, and severe\npenance (Canons 888, n. 2, 889 sqq., 2363).\n\n(b) Impurity.--The danger that a confessor will be tempted to\nsolicitation by his knowledge of the frailty of a penitent is provided\nfor by the law which severely commands formal denunciation of those\nguilty of solicitation (Canon 904); the danger that a penitent may be\ninduced to yield to solicitation by a promise to absolve the sin is met\nby the law which invalidates absolution of an accomplice (Canon 884).\n\n2770. Absolutio Complicis.--Absolutio complicis in peccato turpi\ninvalida est praeterquam in mortis periculo (Canon 884).\n\n(a) Objectum legis est peccatum turpe, i.e., quodvis peccatum contra\nsextum, consummatum vel non consummatum, colloquiis, aspectibus vel\nfactis patratum. Necesse est autem quod peccatum sit utrinque certum\n(quoad factum et jus), externum, et grave (qua internum et qua\nexternum). Unde non agitur de peccatis contra alias virtutes, neque de\npeccatis luxuriae mere internis vel levibus.\n\n(b) Subjectum de quo in lege est complex seu socius immediatus et\nformalis in ipso actu peccati; et sic non sufficit ad complicitatem\ncooperatio etiam proxima (1507), nec peccatum mere materiale, quale fit\nab amente, dormiente, ebrio, infante, renitente. Non requiritur tamen\nquod compar sit puber vel alius sexus, neque quod confessarius tempore\ncomplicitatis jam inter clericos adscriptus sit.\n\n2771. Effectus Legis de Absolutione Complicis.--(a) Quoad\nAbsalutionem.--Invalida et illicita est absolutio directa peccati\nnondum remissi si extra periculum mortis datur. Est valida sed\nillicita: absolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis\ndata, quando alius sacerdos confessionem recipere potest; necnon\nabsolutio indirecta peccati nondum remissi, extra periculum mortis\ndata, quando poenitens bona fide peccatum reticet. Est valida et licita\nabsolutio directa peccati nondum remissi, in periculo mortis vel in\ngravissima necessitate (utputa urgente praecepto ecclesiastico et divino\nconfessionis et communionis annuae) data, quando alius sacerdos aut\nnullimode aut nonnisi cum gravi incommodo (scil. infamiae, scandali,\npericuli confessionis sacrilegae) haberi potest; necnon absolutio\ndirecta peccati jam remissi, etiam extra hoc periculum et hanc\nnecessitatem facta. Non una tamen est sententia auctorum in\ninterpretandis dubiis hujus legis, nec omnes conveniunt cum placitis\nhic positis, nam de dubiis alii strictius, alii mitius judicant.\n\n(b) Quoad Censuram.--Excommunicatio specialissime reservata S. Sedi\nipso facto incurritur a confessario qui illicite absolvit vel fingit\nabsolvere, sive directe, sive (quando poenitens ad tacendum inductus\nest a confessario ipso) indirecte. Censura non incurritur igitur si\nconfessio tantum auditur, si poenitens propria sponte peccatum reticet,\nsi sacerdos dubitat num poenitens complex sit (Canon 2367).\n\n2772. Sacerdos reus delicti sollicitationis in confessione intra mensem\ndenuntiandus est a poenitente loci Ordinario vel S.C.S. Officii (Canon\n904).\n\n(a) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio, etiam inefficax,\npoenitentis eujuscumque ut actum quemcumque gravem contra castitatem\ncommittat. Provocatio fit vel per verba (e.g., declarationes amoris,\ninvitationes, laudes), per facta (e.g., dona), per sermones (e.g.,\ncolloquia de turpibus a poenitente confessis), per tractatus (scil.\ncolloquia de re turpi agenda), per consensum internum-externum\nsollicitationi poenitentis datum.\n\n(b) Delictum sollicitationis est provocatio quae ordinem habet ad\nconfessionem, i.e., quae fit tempore factae confessionis (i.e., inter,\nimmediate ante, immediate post confessionem), vel tempore confessionis\nfaciendae (i.e., occasione confessionis petitae a poenitente, praetextu\nconfessionis falso allegatae a confessario, in loco confessionis cum\nconfessionis simulatione).\n\n2773. Confessarius debet, graviter onerata ejus conscientia, de onere\ndenuntiationis poenitentem monere.\n\n(a) Obligatio confessarii gravis est. Sed antequam moneat, serio\nconsideret utrum poenitens persona fide digna sit, utrum certo constet\nde facto, de turpitudine, de gravitate, de ordine ad confessionem,\nutrum detur causa excusans (e.g., mors sollicitantis; probabiliter,\nejus plena emendatio per plures annos manifestata; grave damnum\npoenitentis quoad vitam, famam, fortunam, nisi gravius damnum simul\nimmineat bono communi). Si de delicto sollicitationis et de obligatione\npoenitentis nullum dubium est, confessarius moneat, etiamsi poenitens\nin bona fide sit et praevideatur certo non obtemperaturus, mortis\npericulo autem excepto. Si poenitens irrationabiliter renuat\ndenuntiare, absolvi non potest, sed confessarius de casu consulere\ndebet Ordinarium.\n\n(b) Obligatio poenitentis etiam gravis est. Denuntiatio facienda est\nintra mensem a cognita obligatione., Ordinario sollicitantis, vel loci\ndelicti, vel poenitentis, personaliter et judicialiter. Poenitens qui\nnec comparere nec scribere potest, interea excusatur; sed ille qui\njusta causa exemptionis carens scienter omittit denuntiare intra\nterminum unius mensis incurrit in excommunicationem latae sententiae\nnemini reservatum, non absolvendus nisi postquam obligationi\nsatisfecerit aut se satisfacturum serio promiserit (Canon 2368, n. 2).\nConfessarius non tenetur in se suscipere onus denuntiationis, nisi\nsecus gravissimum damnum bono publico inferretur.\n\n2774. The Sacrament of Extreme Unction.--As Confirmation perfects\nBaptism by bringing to maturity the new life of grace, so Extreme\nUnction perfects Penance by strengthening against the spiritual\ndebility that remains after sin itself has been wiped away.\nConfirmation makes ready for the battle of life, Extreme Unction\nassists during the struggle of death. The fifth Sacrament is defined:\n\u201cA Sacrament of the New Law in which through the anointing with oil and\nthe prayer of the priest adult persons who are in danger of death\nreceive health of soul, and also at times health of body.\u201d\n\n(a) The remote matter or element of the Sacrament is oil (James, v, 14,\n15). For validity it is required that this be olive oil, blessed by a\nbishop or by a priest having special papal delegation, with the special\nblessing for the oil of the sick (O. I.); for lawfulness, _sub gravi_\nthat it be oil blessed the previous Holy Thursday (Canon 734), _sub\nlevi_ at least that it be blessed by the bishop of the diocese, or, in\ncase of vacancy, by the neighboring bishop. In necessity the old oils\nmay be lawfully used, while chrism and the oil of the catechumens may\nbe used as doubtful matter. Unblessed oils and oils blessed by an\nunauthorized priest do not suffice for validity.\n\n(b) The proximate matter is the anointing of the sick man with blessed\noil. In urgent necessity it suffices to anoint one sense, or rather the\nforehead; in other cases the various senses should be anointed in the\norder given in the Ritual. Each anointing of a double sense should\nbegin with the right organ (e.g., the right eye) and should be given\nwith the right thumb in the form of a cross. If one organ is missing\n(e.g., a hand amputated), the anointing should be made, if possible,\nnear to its place (e.g., on the wrist); if there is danger of\ncontagion, the anointing may be made by means of an instrument, such as\na brush or small stick. The anointing of the reins should always be\nomitted and the anointing of the feet may be omitted for any good\nreason, such as inconvenience to the dying person.\n\n(c) The form of the Sacrament is the prayer used by the priest. In the\nLatin Church the ordinary form is contained in the words: \u201c_Per istam\nsanctam unctionem_, etc. By this holy anointing and His most tender\nmercy may the Lord forgive thee whatever sin thou hast committed by\nsight (by hearing, by smell, by taste and speech, by touch, by thy\nsteps). Amen.\u201d The extraordinary rite for use when there is not time to\ngive all the anointings is bestowed on the forehead in the words: \u201cPer\nistam sanctam unctionem et suam piissimam misericordiam indulgeat tibi\nDominus quidquid deliquisti. Amen.\u201d The essential words of the form\nare: \u201cPer istam unctionem indulgeat tibi Dominus quidquid deliquisti,\u201d\nbecause they express the intercession and the effect of the rite. It\nwould probably be a grave sin to omit the reference to the senses in\nthe ordinary form, as that seems to be a notable part of the form; but\nit would be a light sin, apart from contempt or scandal, to omit an\nunimportant word such as \u201cAmen.\u201d If there is doubt about the\nrecipient\u2019s capacity (i.e., whether he has reached the use of reason,\nwhether he is in danger of death, whether he is already dead, whether\nhe is impenitent and unwilling to receive the Sacrament), the form\nshould be conditional. The condition should be \u201c_si es capax_,\u201d not\n\u201c_si es dispositus_,\u201d even in the last-mentioned case. For the\nSacrament is given validly even to one who is not well disposed (i.e.,\nwho lacks repentance) and there is thus the possibility, when validity\nis not made dependent on the condition of good disposition, that\nsacramental fruitfulness will follow later when impenitence, the\nobstacle to the Sacrament\u2019s activity, shall have been removed.\n\n(d) The recipient of the Sacrament is a Catholic who after attaining\nthe use of reason has come into the danger of death through sickness or\nold age. No one is capable of receiving this Sacrament unless he is\nbaptized, for Baptism is the gateway of the Sacraments (2671); unless\nhe has reached the use of reason, for the Sacrament is a remedy against\npersonal sin and supposes that the recipient can or formerly could\ndistinguish between right and wrong; unless he is in danger of death\nthrough the infirmity of disease or of decrepitude, for St. James\nteaches that the anointing is for those who are enfeebled by illness\ndangerous unto death. Hence Extreme Unction cannot be administered\nvalidly to the unbaptized, to young children who have not come to the\nuse of reason, to the perpetually insane, to those who are sick but not\nin danger of death, to those who are in danger of death but not sick\n(e.g., a strong man going to the gallows or to battle). But the\nSacrament may be administered to children who have not yet made their\nfirst confession, if they are capable of sin, and to the insane who\nonce had the use of reason. The danger of death need not be immediate,\nand hence Extreme Unction may be given when the disease is mortal but\nthe patient will last for several months or even a year, as in\ntuberculosis. Illness includes not only chronic sickness, but also\nfatal disorders caused by wounds, accidents, poison. The rule about the\nold is that those who have reached sixty years and show some signs of\napproaching death, such as great feebleness or fainting spells, even\nthough they have no special malady, may be anointed; for their old age\nitself is a disease.\n\n(e) The minister of Extreme Unction is the priest, since St. James\ndirects that the presbyters (i.e., the priests) of the Church be called\nto anoint the sick. Extreme Unction, unlike Penance, is not exercised\nin the form of a judicial process, and hence the power of Orders\nsuffices for its valid administration, and any priest, even one who\nlacks jurisdiction, gives it validly. But for lawful administration\nchurch law prescribes that the minister regularly be the ecclesiastical\nsuperior or spiritual director (i.e., the pastor for his parish, the\nhead of a clerical religious institute for his house, the parish-priest\nor chaplain for a lay religious body, the confessor for nuns), and that\nthe minister extraordinarily (i.e., in necessity) be any other priest\nwho has permission, or reasonably presumed permission.\n\n(f) The effects of Extreme Unction are _per se_ an increase of\nsanctifying grace, since this is a Sacrament of the Living; _per\naccidens_ (i.e., when the recipient is not in the state of grace, but\nis in good faith and has attrition) the forgiveness of sins and first\ngrace. Extreme Unction produces first grace more surely than does\nabsolution, if the penitent is unconscious, since it does not call for\nany external manifestation of contrition; hence the importance of\nanointing those who are dying but unconscious. The special benefit of\nExtreme Unction is immediate preparation of the soul for entrance to\nheaven, though restoration of the health of the body is sometimes\nvouchsafed when this is for the spiritual good of the sick person.\nVenial sins and the remains of past sins (i.e., the debility left by\nthem) are removed and the soul is strengthened with confidence as to\nthings past and future and with peace and resignation as to present\nsuffering. Since the Sacrament is given for the period of danger of\ndeath, it cannot be repeated during the same danger; but should the\npatient recover and relapse into a distinct danger through the same or\nanother sickness, there arises a new need and the Sacrament may then be\nrepeated.\n\n2775. Special Duties.--In addition to the duties that are common in all\nthe Sacraments, the following duties should be noted in reference to\nExtreme Unction.\n\n(a) The Recipient.--_Per se_, Extreme Unction is not necessary as a\nmeans to salvation, for sanctifying grace may be had or recovered\nwithout it; but _per accidens_ it would be necessary as a means, if a\ndying person were in mortal sin and could not recover grace except\nthrough it. He who omits Extreme Unction unwillingly or for a good\nreason (e.g., because he is well prepared for death and cannot get a\npriest without very grave inconvenience) does not sin. He who omits the\nSacrament voluntarily and without good reason, is guilty of grave sin\nif he acts from contempt, or gives scandal, or exposes himself to\neternal damnation; but if there is no contempt, scandal or danger to\nsalvation, sin is indeed committed by the neglect at such a crisis of\nso important a spiritual aid, but only venial sin, since there is no\ngrave precept to receive this Sacrament. The recipient of Extreme\nUnction should be in the state of grace; and hence, if he has mortal\nsin on his conscience, he must beforehand make an act of contrition or\nreceive absolution with attrition, or, if neither is possible, he must\nmake an act of attrition. The custom of the Church calls for confession\nbefore Extreme Unction, and divine law commands confession if one is in\nmortal sin and in danger of death.\n\n(b) The Minister.--The pastor is gravely bound in justice to give or\nhave given the Sacrament of Extreme Unction to all his subjects who\nreasonably request it; other priests not charged with the spiritual\ncare of the dying person are held in charity to anoint him, if he has\nnot received the last rites and cannot otherwise be anointed. It is\nclear that sick calls should be attended to promptly, and it would be a\nserious matter to delay so long as to put the sick person in danger of\ndying without Extreme Unction or of receiving it when he had become\nunconscious and could not dispose himself properly. If the person has\nbeen pronounced dead before the priest\u2019s arrival, he should\nnevertheless be absolved and anointed conditionally if the last breath\nwas not long before; because physicians teach that death takes\npossession gradually, life lingering in the body for some time after\nits external signs have ceased, for about a half hour when the end has\ncome after long illness, for one or two hours when death is sudden or\naccidental. The ceremonies are obligatory under pain of sin, and it is\nconsidered a serious matter to neglect the more notable parts, that is,\nwithout reason to omit all or nearly all the prayers, or to give the\nSacrament without any sacred vestment.\n\n(c) The Pastor.--The oil of the sick should be kept in a neat and\nproperly decorated place, and should be contained in a vessel of silver\nor white metal. Only in exceptional cases is it lawful to keep it in\nthe rectory (Canon 946). The Catechism of the Council of Trent (page\n307) declares that Extreme Unction should form a subject of frequent\ninstruction. It is important to exhort the people not to delay in\nsending for the priest till the sick person has become insensible, nor\nto omit to send for him in case of sudden death, since, as already\nsaid, life remains for some time in the body after apparent death.\n\n(d) The People.--All those who are responsible for the good of the\ndying person, such as members of the family, physicians, nurses,\nrelatives, friends, or neighbors, should beware of deceiving him about\nhis condition and his need of preparation for death; on the contrary,\nthey should see to it as far as they can, that he receives the last\nSacraments in good time and while he has the full use of his senses,\nwhen the spiritual benefit and the comfort of mind will be of greater\nassistance and the bodily cure more likely.\n\n\n\n\nArt. 4: HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY\n\n(_Summa Theologica_, Supplement, qq. 34-68.)\n\n2776. The first five Sacraments arc necessary for the spiritual welfare\nof individuals, the remaining two, which are the subject of this\nArticle, are needful, not for each person, but for the Church as a\nbody. A member of the Church may save his soul though he remains\noutside the priesthood and the married state, but the spiritual good of\nthe Church itself requires both Orders and Matrimony. Without Orders\nthe Church would be deprived of her rulers, teachers and ministers of\ndivine things; without Matrimony the family would lack that sacramental\nprotection which is so important for the Christian home and the right\nrearing of members of society.\n\n2777. The Sacrament of Orders.--The spiritual office and power of a\nmember of the clergy is called Orders on account of the order or rank\nof superiority which it gives in the Church. The rite or Sacrament by\nwhich an Order is conferred is strictly called Ordination, and hence it\nis more correct to speak of the Sacrament of Ordination than of the\nSacrament of Orders. Ordination may be defined as \u201ca Sacrament of the\nNew Law in which a member of the clergy receives spiritual power in\nreference to the Eucharist and the grace to exercise properly the\nduties of his office.\u201d\n\n(a) Orders is conferred only on a member of the clergy. Just as Baptism\nis preceded by catechumenate and Matrimony by espousals or engagement,\nso is Ordination preceded by tonsure, a ceremony instituted by the\nChurch whereby a man is separated from the laity and enrolled among\nclerics with a view to prepare him for Holy Orders. The candidate for\ntonsure must be a male who has received Baptism and Confirmation (_sub\nlevi_), and who has begun his course of theology; he sins if he\napproaches without a divine vocation or with the purpose not to go on\nfor the priesthood. The privileges of clerics are those of forum and\ncanon, and they are capable of receiving Orders, jurisdiction and\nbenefice (Canons 108 sqq). In the reception of tonsure the cleric is\nadmonished to make his life agree with the garb which he then assumes,\nor, in other words, to cultivate the special virtues of his state (see\n2596 sqq.).\n\n(b) Ordination confers spiritual power in reference to the Eucharist,\nthe Sacrament of Sacraments. Just as the sacred vessels of the altar\nreceive a permanent consecration, so likewise the ministers of the\naltar are set apart by Ordination, which confers upon them an indelible\ncharacter with the power to exercise higher or lower offices in\nreference to the supreme Sacrament and the sole Sacrifice of the New\nLaw. Hence, an Order once conferred is eternal and the Ordination\ncannot be repeated.\n\n(c) Ordination confers grace, which is _per se_ second grace, or an\nincrease of holiness. The special feature of the grace of Orders is its\nsuitability for the duties of the person ordained, for, where God\nimposes a special obligation, He confers also a special grace. It is\nclear that the duties of the ordained in reference to the real Body of\nChrist (i.e., duties as to the Eucharist and divine worship) and the\nmystical Body of Christ (i.e., duties to the faithful who receive the\nEucharist and the other Sacraments) call for a high degree of virtue\nand a life edifying to all. Hence the need of a special grace in\nOrdination.\n\n2778. Distinction of the Orders.--The following distinctions of the\norders or ranks of the clergy should be noted:\n\n(a) an Order is either sacramental or non-sacramental, according as it\nwas instituted by Christ Himself or by the Church. It is the teaching\nof St. Thomas that all of the Orders are sacramental in character, but\nthere is not the same degree of certainty in each case. As to the\npriesthood, there is the certainty of defined dogma; as to the\ndiaconate (and also episcopal consecration according to many) there is\ntheological certainty, but no definition of faith; as to the\nsubdiaconate, and the lower Orders, there is probability;\n\n(b) an Order is Major (sacred) or Minor (non-sacred) according as its\nfunctions are concerned with consecrated or non-consecrated matter in\nthe celebration of the Eucharist. The Major Orders, therefore, are the\npriesthood (whose office is to consecrate the Body and Blood of\nChrist), diaconate (whose office is to dispense Communion to the\nfaithful), and sub-diaconate (whose office is to prepare the bread and\nwine of the sacrifice in the consecrated vessels, that is, the chalice\nand paten). The Minor Orders are those that prepare the matter of the\nEucharist in non-consecrated vessels (acolythate), or that dispose the\npeople for the Eucharist by freeing them from the impediments of\ndemonic influence (exorcistate) or of ignorance (lectorate), or that\nexclude unbelievers from participation in the sacred rites\n(portership). To the Sacred Orders, on account of their closer approach\nto the Eucharist, are annexed the duties of celibacy and of the Divine\nOffice.\n\n2779. The Hierarchy of Orders and Jurisdiction.--The Orders of the\nclergy may be considered, not only in reference to power over the real\nBody of Christ (i.e., the Eucharist), but also in reference to power\nover the mystical Body of Christ (i.e., the Church). Those who have\npower over the members of the Church belong to the hierarchy, and this\nis understood in two senses:\n\n(a) the hierarchy of Orders is composed of those who receive in\nOrdination a permanent superiority over others in reference to the\nworship of God and the sanctification of souls by the ministry of the\nSacraments. From divine institution this hierarchy is composed of the\nthree ranks of bishops, priests, and deacons; and from ecclesiastical\ninstitution of the lower clergy in Orders. Thus, the deacon is able to\nbaptize and administer Communion as extraordinary minister; the priest\nis the ordinary minister of Baptism and the Eucharist, and only a\npriest can act as minister of Penance and Extreme Unction; the bishop\nis the minister, not only of the Sacraments mentioned, but also of\nConfirmation and Orders;\n\n(b) the hierarchy of jurisdiction is composed of those members of the\nChurch who receive in their accepted election or canonical commission a\npower over the faithful which can be lost or resigned, and which\nrelates to the instruction and government of subjects in matters of\nfaith and morals. From divine law this hierarchy is composed of the\nSupreme Pontificate and the subordinate Episcopate; from ecclesiastical\nlaw there are other ranks of authority, such as those of parish-priest,\nprelate, abbot, archbishop, primate, patriarch and cardinal.\n\n2780. The Matter and Form of the Various Orders in the Latin\nChurch.--(a) In the Minor Orders the matter consists in the bestowal of\nthe symbols of office, and the form in the words of ordination that\naccompany this bestowal. The porter is ordained when he touches with\nhis right hand the keys of the church which the bishop presents to him\nwith the words: \u201cConduct yourself as one who must give an accounting\nfor the things that are under those keys\u201d, the reader, when he touches\nthe lectionary (i.e., Missal, Breviary, Bible) offered him by the\nbishop with the form: \u201cReceive this book and announce well the Word of\nGod, knowing that, if you perform your office faithfully and usefully,\nyou shall receive a portion with those who from the beginning have been\ngood ministers of God\u2019s word\u201d; the exorcist, when he touches the book\nof exorcisms (e.g., the Ritual, Pontifical or Missal) presented to him\nwith the words: \u201cReceive and commit to memory and have power to impose\nhands on the possessed, whether baptized or catechumens\u201d, the acolyte,\nwhen he touches the symbols of his office (i.e., first the candle and\ncandlestick, next the empty cruet), while the words are said: \u201cReceive\nthis candlestick and candle and know that you are deputed to light the\nlamps of the church, in the name of the Lord\u201d; \u201cReceive this cruet to\nfurnish the wine and water for the Eucharist of the blood of Christ, in\nthe name of the Lord.\u201d \u201cAmen\u201d should be added by the acolyte after each\nform.\n\n(b) In the subdiaconate, ordination is given when the candidate touches\nthe empty chalice and the paten (the Bishop saying: \u201cSee what a\nministry is committed to you; I admonish you, therefore, so to conduct\nyourselves that you may be pleasing to God\u201d) and the Book of Epistles,\nsuch as Missal or Bible (the Bishop saying: \u201cReceive the Book of\nEpistles and have power to read them in the holy Church of God, both\nfor the living and for the dead. In the name of the Father, and of the\nSon, and of the Holy Ghost\u201d).\n\n(c) Pope Pius XII in an official decree, an Apostolic Constitution of\nNov. 30, 1947 (see AAS, 40-5), determined the essential elements of\nordination to diaconate, priesthood and episcopate. Formerly this had\nbeen a matter of discussion among theologians. In the diaconate\nordination is given by the single imposition of the hands of the Bishop\nthat occurs in the rite with the words of the \u201cPreface,\u201d of which these\nare the essential: \u201cSend into him, We ask, O Lord, the Holy Spirit, by\nwhich he shall be strengthened by the gift of Thy sevenfold grace for\nthe faithful performance of the work of the ministry.\u201d\n\n(d) The matter of the priesthood is the first imposition of hands of\nthe Bishop which is made in silence. The form consists in the words of\nthe \u201cPreface\u201d of which these are the essential and required for\nvalidity: \u201cGive, we ask Thee, omnipotent Father, to this Thy servant\nthe dignity of the priesthood ...\u201d\n\n(e) In episcopal consecration the matter is the imposition of the\nhands of the consecrating Bishop; the form is the \u201cPreface,\u201d the\nessential words being: \u201cFill out in Thy priest the fullness of the\nministry....\u201d\n\nIt is a disputed matter whether the episcopacy is a distinct Order from\nthe priesthood or simply an extension of it. The common opinion favors\nthe negative side and consequently maintains that the consecration of a\nBishop is not sacramental. Accordingly, the supreme Order of Priesthood\nincludes the simple priests or presbyters and the high priests or\nbishops. The episcopacy confers no new power in reference to the\nEucharist, but it extends the character of the priesthood to new powers\nin reference to Christ\u2019s Mystical Body, the Church.\n\n2781. The Minister of Ordination.--(a) For validity it is necessary\nthat the minister be a consecrated bishop; but the Orders of\necclesiastical institution (i.e., subdiaconate and Minor Orders) may be\ngiven by a priest authorized by law, or by special indult of the\nApostolic See. Thus, Cardinals, Vicars and Prefects Apostolic, and\nAbbots have the power of conferring tonsure and Minor Orders from Canon\n239.\n\n(b) For lawfulness it is necessary that the consecrator of a bishop be\nthe Pope or a bishop designated by him; that the ordainer to other\nranks of the clergy be the proper bishop of the candidate (i.e., the\nbishop of his place of origin and residence or of his place of\ndomicile), or a delegated bishop (i.e., the bishop who has received\ndimissorial letters from the proper bishop or religious superior). See\nCanons 951-967.\n\n2782. The Special Duties of the Minister.-(a) As to the ordinandus, the\nordaining prelate must be morally certain from positive arguments that\nthe candidate is suitable according to the Canons; otherwise he would\nbe guilty of a very grievous sin and would expose himself to the danger\nof sharing in the sins of others (I Tim., v. 22; Canon 973, n. 3).\n\n(b) As to the ordination, the minister is bound to observe the law on\ntime and place, and to follow carefully and exactly the ceremonies of\nhis own Rite. If anything essential is omitted, it has to be supplied,\nabsolutely or conditionally, according as there is certain or only\ndoubtful lack. The omission of an accidental but notable ceremony\n(e.g., the anointing of hands) would be seriously culpable (Canons\n1002-1009).\n\n2783. The Recipient of Orders.--(a) For validity it is necessary that\nthe recipient be of the male sex, for the divine law has reserved\nsacerdotal and ministerial functions to men, and the church law has\nproperly followed this example in regard to the Orders that are of\nchurch institution; the recipient must be baptized, for without Baptism\none has no capacity for other Sacraments; if he is an adult, he must\nhave at least an habitual intention freely formed of receiving the\nOrder to which he is raised.\n\n(b) For lawfulness it is not sufficient that the recipient be in the\nstate of grace, since Ordination is not merely a personal matter, but\nalso a matter of great consequence to the whole Church. The recipient\nof Orders takes his place among the representatives and ministers of\nthe Church, and therefore he should have the special qualities that fit\nhim for his dignity and office. Intellectually, the ordinandus must be\ncompetent in theological and profane knowledge, and must have made a\nsatisfactory course of studies (Canons 972, 1364 sqq., 589-591).\nAccording to the Code, first tonsure should not be given before the\nstudy of theology has begun, Minor Orders may be given during the first\nand second years of theology, subdeaconship only towards the end of the\nthird year, deaconship only after the beginning of the fourth year, and\npriesthood only after the first half of the fourth year (Canon 976).\nMorally, the ordinandus should be of commendable life and have the\ninternal and external excellence which is supposed by the Order he is\nto receive. Virtues to which the Pontifical especially exhorts clerics\nat their ordination are love and labor given to the Church and the\nthings of God\u2019s house (porter), devotion to the Scriptures and sacred\nstudy (lector), conquest of passion (exorcist), the light of good\nexample and the self-sacrifice of good works (acolyte), temperance,\nvigilance, prayerfulness (subdeacon), liberality to the poor, chastity,\nfortitude, zeal for preaching the word of God (deacon), elderliness in\ndignity, leadership in virtue, and justice in stewardship (priesthood).\nNo one should be admitted to a Sacred Order who is unable to overcome a\nserious habit of sin (especially _in materia turpi_), even though\nsecret; and if there is doubt about amendment, a test during a suitable\nperiod of time should be made.\n\n2784. Canonical Requirements for Ordination.--(a) Positive requirements\nare: proper age (that is, the twenty-first, twenty-second, and\ntwenty-fourth years completed are necessary for subdeaconship,\ndeaconship, priesthood, respectively); Confirmation should have been\nreceived before Ordination, for it is suitable that those who are to\nstrengthen others in the faith should have the character of soldier of\nChrist; promotion from Order to Order should be from lower to higher in\nproper succession, that fitness may be shown in lesser offices before\nthe greater are received; an interval must elapse between certain\nOrders, which will give to clerics the opportunity to exercise the\npowers they have received (e.g., between acolythate and subdiaconate a\nyear, between subdiaconate and diaconate three months); the candidate\nfor sacred ordination must have a title or some canonical means of\nsupport (i.e., for secular clergy the title of benefice, or patrimony\nor ministerial service; for religious the title of profession, common\nlife, etc.). The law allows certain dispensations from some of these\nrequirements (Canons 974 sqq.).\n\n(b) Negative requirements are freedom from certain disabilities\nintroduced by the Church for the sake of the honor and dignity of the\nsacred ministry. Some of these disqualifications are of their nature\npermanent, and they are removed only by dispensation or by disposition\nof the law (e.g., in certain cases by cessation of the cause, or by\nbaptism, or by religious profession), and these are known as\nirregularities; other disqualifications, which are of their nature\ntemporary and cease with lapse of time or changes in circumstances, are\nknown as simple impediments. The effect of disqualification is to make\nit unlawful to receive an Order, or to exercise an Order already\nreceived. Irregularities are produced either by deficiency or by\ndelinquency, but the cause in either case must be certain; and, in case\nof delinquency, it must be a personal sin committed after Baptism,\nwhich is mortal, external, and consummated in act. The irregularities\nfrom defect are: illegitimate birth; mental imperfection (such as\nepilepsy, insanity, possession); bodily imperfection that makes one\nunsuited for the service of the altar, on account of mutilation (e.g.,\nthose who have lost hand or foot, or thumb or index finger), or of\nunsoundness (e.g., the blind, the deaf, the dumb, cripples,\nparalytics), or of very noticeable deformity that excites ridicule or\nhorror (e.g., dwarfs, giants, noseless persons, those who are\nhunchbacked); successive bigamy, that is, the fact that one has been\ntwice validly married, for St. Paul ruled that a cleric should be a man\nof not more than one wife (I Tim., iii. 2, 12; Tit., i. 5, 6); infamy\nof law, that is, the commission of certain crimes which the law\ndeclares infamous _ipso facto_ or after sentence (such as profanation\nof the Eucharist or of graves, violence done to the Pope or a Cardinal,\nduelling, simultaneous bigamy, and certain sexual sins); participation\nin capital punishment by pronouncing (i.e., as judge or juryman) or\nexecuting the sentence of death. The irregularities from delinquency\nare: apostasy, heresy, schism; reception of Baptism from a\nnon-Catholic; attempt at adulterous or sacrilegious marriage; voluntary\nhomicide, cooperation in an abortion, mutilation of self or of another,\nattempt to commit suicide; unlawful exercise of medicine or surgery by\na cleric with fatal results; unlawful exercise of the powers of Major\nOrders by a cleric or layman. The simple impediments are found in the\nfollowing: in those who may be weak in faith, namely, persons whose\nparents are non-Catholics, or who are themselves converts (I Tim., iii.\n6); in those who are prevented by other occupations, namely, persons\nheld by marriage, business forbidden to clerics, slavery, military\nservice (II Tim., ii. 4); in those who are actually in bad repute\nbefore the community on account of misconduct (I Tim., iii. 7). See\nCanons 983-991.\n\n2785. Duties of Ordinandi According to Canon Law.--(a) Before\nOrdination.--Application to the bishop must be made beforehand at an\nopportune time, and testimonials of Baptism, Confirmation, Orders\nalready received, certificates of good character and studies, and\nletters from superiors testifying to freedom from impediments and\ngeneral fitness must be presented. The candidate must undergo a special\nexamination and make a spiritual retreat before the day of his\nordination. The profession of faith is made before subdeaconship.\n\n(b) During Ordination.--All the ceremonies should be observed, and\nespecially the physical touching of the instruments (chalice and paten,\netc.), which seems to be essential in Minor Orders and the\nSubdiaconate. In the imposition of the hands in the other Major Orders,\nthe head of the subject should be touched physically, although even\nmoral touch is sufficient for validity of the Sacrament (Pius XII,\nApostolic Constitution already cited). The law requires that the\nrecipients of Major Orders receive Communion, and the obligations seems\nto be grave for the new priests, since they celebrate with the bishop.\n\n(c) After Ordination.--The nocturn (three Psalms and their antiphons)\nwhich the ordaining prelate imposes on the newly ordained subdeacons\nand deacons should be taken from the first nocturn of the day, whether\nit be feria, feast or Sunday, unless the bishop appoints otherwise. The\nthree Masses of the Holy Ghost, Blessed Virgin, and for the dead,\nimposed on the newly ordained priests, need not be applied for the\nbishop\u2019s intention, and a stipend may be taken when they are said; but\nit is fitting that they be applied in thanksgiving and for the benefit\nof the bishop as well as of the whole Church on earth and in Purgatory.\nThese prayers and Masses do not seem to oblige under sin, though some\nhold them to bind _sub gravi_. On the life duties of the clergy, see\nabove (2596 sqq.).\n\n2786. Registration of Ordinations.--As in the case of marriage,\nordinations should be registered in a special book and notice of them\n(if subdiaconate was received) should be sent to the pastor of the\nparish of Baptism. A certificate of ordination is also to be given to\nthe cleric ordained (Canons 1010, 1011).\n\n2787. The Sacrament of Matrimony.--Marriage in general is defined as\n\u201cthe conjugal union of man and woman, contracted between two qualified\npersons, which obliges them to one another for life.\u201d\n\n(a) The word union may be taken actively for the passing act of\ninternal and external consent, and then it refers to marriage in its\nstate of becoming, as it is a contract and (among Christians) a\nSacrament; or it may be taken, as it were passively, for the bond that\nresults from the mutual consent pledged by the parties, and then it\nrefers to marriage as a permanent state of life.\n\n(b) The marriage union is conjugal; that is, its end is the procreation\nand rearing of children, or the making of a family, and it therefore\ngives the right to the natural acts of generation. A contract which has\nother ends (e.g., a business agreement of labor or of partnership), or\nwhich excludes procreation (e.g., an agreement of onanistic\nconcubinage), is not a marriage.\n\n(c) Marriage is between qualified persons, for certain individuals are\nexcluded by natural, divine or human law from making a valid contract\nof marriage.\n\n(d) Marriage is between two, one man and one woman. This unity of\nmarriage is its first property, resulting from its nature as a\nrelationship intended primarily for the propagation of the race and its\nproper upbringing, and secondarily for the peace and contentment of the\nmarried couple, their mutual assistance to one another, and their\nprotection against carnal temptations (299). For polyandry is opposed\nto both these ends, and therefore to natural law, while polygamy does\nnot accord well with the secondary ends of matrimony and is forbidden\nfor all by the law of Christ (\u201cThey shall be two in one flesh,\u201d Matt.,\nxix. 3 sqq.). On the permission of polygamy in the later Old Testament\nages, see 303, 311.\n\n(e) Marriage obliges the parties to one another for life. This\nindissolubility of marriage is its second property, and also follows\nfrom the natural ends of marriage. For the right propagation of the\nhuman race is a matter that concerns not merely the married couple or\nhuman society, but also God Himself, who is matrimony\u2019s immediate\nauthor and lawgiver, and God has decreed that marriage be unbreakable\nexcept in the few instances allowed by Himself: \u201cWhat God hath joined\ntogether let no man put asunder\u201d (Matt., xix. 6). Since the good of\nmarriage is inferior to the good of faith, the divine law permits a\ndissolution of the bond in the case known as the Pauline Privilege (I\nCor., vii. 12-15); similarly, in a very few instances where there is a\nserious good more important than the preservation of the bond (the\nfaith of a convert from infidelity, the observance of the counsel of\nchastity, the public welfare), and where the bond itself has not the\nstrength of sacramentality (i.e., in a non-Christian marriage), or has\nnot been consummated in a Christian marriage, the divine law authorizes\nthe Church, the representative of God, to decree a dissolution (see\n363, 314). Not only are these cases few, but the conditions are strict\n(see Canons 1120-1127), and hence these exceptions are no menace to the\nends of marriage. But once consummation has been added to consent in a\nChristian marriage, thereby perfecting the natural contract and\nextending the sacramental signification from the mystical and severable\nunion of Christ with the soul by grace to the physical and perpetual\nunion of Christ with the Church by the Incarnation, the indissolubility\nbecomes complete and admits of no exception. The bill of divorce under\nthe Mosaic Law seems to have been a true and complete dissolution of\nthe marriage tie, but there is good reason to think that it was a\ntoleration of the Jewish civil code, not a permission given by God. The\nvalid marriages of infidels as such are not subject to the judgment of\nthe Church; and the civil authority has no power to dissolve them (even\nwhen they are childless), otherwise individuals and the family and the\nState will suffer, as experience proves.\n\n2788. Distinctions.--(a) In reference to validity, marriage may be true\n(i.e., validly contracted), or presumed (i.e., taken by the law to be\nvalidly contracted on account of some fact, as when the validity of a\nmarriage was not attacked during the lifetime of the parties), putative\n(i.e., really invalid, but contracted in good faith by at least one of\nthe spouses and not yet known by both to be certainly null), attempted\n(i.e., contracted invalidly in bad faith, at least one of the parties\nbeing aware of an invalidating impediment).\n\n(b) In reference to perfection, marriage is legitimate (when it is\nvalidly contracted between non-baptized persons), ratified or\nsacramental (when it is celebrated between baptized persons),\nconsummated (when the consent given in the contract is subsequently\ncompleted by the conjugal act). It seems that marriage lawfully\ncontracted between a baptized and a non-baptized person is not ratified\nor sacramental, for, as the consent must be mutual, so should the\nSacrament be mutual. But a marriage free from substantial defects is\nalways a Sacrament, even though the contractants do not wish this, when\nit is contracted between Christians, whether they be Catholics or\nnon-Catholics; and a marriage contracted between non-Christians becomes\na Sacrament on the Baptism of the parties.\n\n(c) In reference to its manner, marriage may be clandestine (i.e., not\ncelebrated before the pastor and two witnesses), or secret (i.e.,\ncelebrated before the pastor and two witnesses pledged to secrecy, and\nwithout the publicity the Church ordinarily requires), public (i.e.,\ncelebrated before pastor and witnesses and with publicity such as\nannouncement to the people and registration in the usual marriage\nbook). The secret marriage is also known as a marriage of conscience\n(Canons 1104-1107).\n\n(d) In reference to the law under which it is performed, marriage is\neither canonical or civil. A purely civil marriage between Catholics is\ninvalid, as far as the bond is concerned, since their contract, as\nbeing a Sacrament, is subject to the Church. But the civil marriage, as\nfar as the purely civil consequences are concerned, is a lawful\nceremony, and is obligatory if required by law. A morganatic marriage\nis made between two persons of unequal condition (e.g., between a king\nand a plebeian woman) on condition that the inferior spouse and progeny\nshall not share entirely in the titles and property of the superior\nspouse.\n\n2789. The Elements of the Contract of Marriage.--(a) The subject-matter\nof the contract is the conjugal right or the lawful power of exercising\nwith the other party acts suitable for generation.\n\n(b) The ends of the contract are, primarily, the good of the race and\nof the children, and secondarily the good of the couple through mutual\nassistance and protection in spiritual and temporal matters. To these\ngeneral ends may be added others which a particular person has in view,\nsuch as dignity, wealth, honor, lawful pleasure.\n\n(c) The essence of the contract is the consent, for every pact consists\nin mutual agreement. But if marriage be regarded as a permanent state,\nits essence is the bond of union, and consent is the efficient cause\nproductive of the bond. Marriage consent must have the qualities\n(internal, external, mutual, free) that are necessary in every\ncontract, as explained in 1883.\n\n2790. Requirements for Valid Marriage Consent.--(a) Internal\nConsent.--If both or one of the parties internally and positively wills\nto exclude marriage, or the right to the conjugal act, or an essential\nproperty of marriage, the contract is null, since there is no purpose\nto contract a real marriage. Similarly, if both or one of the parties\nnegatively (or by lack of all intention) excludes consent, there is no\nmarriage. It should be noted that he who intends to get a divorce later\non does not intend a permanent union or marriage, whereas he who\nintends to be unfaithful or to practise onanism may nevertheless intend\nto oblige himself to the duties of fidelity and of the lawful use of\nmarriage, and therefore to a true marriage. Fictitious consent, unless\na serious reason excuses (e.g., when one is forced under grave fear to\nmarry, when one becomes aware of a diriment impediment at the altar and\ncannot retire without great scandal), is a mortal sin, as being a lie\nin a very important matter and an injustice. If the other party was\ndeceived, the party guilty of feigned consent is bound to make\nreparation for the damage done, and, unless the marriage has become\nimpossible or inadvisable, the means of reparation should be a genuine\nconsent revalidating the marriage. This is especially true when there\nis a conflict between the internal and the external forums on account\nof the inability to establish juridically the nullity of the invalid\nmarriage.\n\n(b) External Consent.--Both as contract and as Sacrament, matrimony\nrequires some sensible manifestation of the internal consent. Since the\ncontract of marriage between Christians falls under the jurisdiction of\nthe Church, the manner of expressing the consent is regulated by Canon\nLaw. The solemnities required for valid and lawful marriage will be\ntreated below in 2826, 2827.\n\n(c) Mutual Consent.--Both parties must agree to the marriage, since no\none is obliged by a contract without his consent. But mutuality does\nnot imply simultaneity, for, if the previous consent given by one party\ncontinues, the subsequent consent given by the other is joined to it\nand the consent becomes mutual.\n\n(d) Free Consent.--If every contract must be deliberate and voluntary,\nthis is especially true in the case of marriage, since it entails very\nheavy duties and its obligations are lifelong (cfr. 2195). In marriage\nthere must be full and perfect consent, though it is not necessary that\none think expressly on the essentials of the contract when assenting to\nit.\n\n2791. Defects in Consent.--Consent supposes sufficient knowledge, and\nhence it may be vitiated by a defect as to knowledge.\n\n(a) Mental Derangement.--Those who are not in possession of their\nmental faculties cannot marry, whether the derangement be habitual\n(e.g., idiots, the completely insane, monomaniacs on the subject of\nmarriage) or actual (e.g., infants, those who are completely drunk or\ndoped, the hypnotized or delirious, somnambulists). But defectives who\nare not unbalanced all the time or on all subjects, may be able now and\nthen to realize the meaning of marriage and to give deliberate consent,\nthough the presumption is against them. Those whose mentality is of a\nlow grade, but who are able to judge and reason correctly (e.g., stupid\npersons, the deaf and dumb, or blind), and those who have some little\nfanaticism or eccentricity are not excluded; otherwise very few of\neither sex could marry.\n\n(b) Ignorance.--Substantial ignorance, or the absence of knowledge\nabout the essentials of marriage (viz., that it is a permanent\nassociation of man and woman for the purpose of raising children of\ntheir own), makes the contract null, for one does not consent to what\none does not know. Accidental ignorance, on the contrary, does not\nnullify, for he who understands the main facts about marriage can\nintend to contract it as others do, even though he does not know its\ndetails or secondary features. Ignorance invalidates marriage,\ntherefore, if one of the parties does not know that marriage is meant\nfor the procreation of children or that children are procreated by\ncarnal intercourse; but it does not invalidate if the parties are\nignorant about physiology or scientific explanations. Substantial\nignorance in persons of marriageable age (especially young women) is\nnot uncommon even in these days, but it is not presumed after puberty\n(Canon 1082, Sec.2).\n\n(c) Error.--Error which excludes consent to the essential object of\nthe contract nullifies, and hence a substantial error about the person\nwith whom one is contracting makes marriage of no effect (e.g., if\nTitus thinks he is marrying Claudia, but is really marrying her twin\nsister, Sempronia; if Balbus intends to marry Caia only on condition\nthat she is a virgin and she is not a virgin; if Julius intends to\nmarry the woman who is present solely as differentiated by a personal\nor individual characteristic which he mistakenly believes her to\nhave, such as seniority among her sisters). Error which does not\nprevent essential consent does not nullify the contract. Hence, a mere\naccidental error about the other party (e.g., Titus marries Claudia,\nthinking she is rich, whereas she is poor, and he would never have\nmarried her had he known her poverty) does not make marriage null,\nthough the Church makes the marriage of no effect when a slave is\nmarried in the belief that he or she is free (Canon 1083, Sec.2, n, 2).\nA mere speculative error about the properties of marriage (e.g., if one\nbelieves that marriage may be lawfully dissolved for adultery) or about\nthe validity of one\u2019s own marriage (e.g., if the bride erroneously\nbelieves that the marriage she is contracting is null) does not deprive\nthe contract of its force, if there is really a purpose to marry as\nbest one may; for such an error does not act upon the will or take away\nconsent.\n\n2792. Forced Consent.--Consent also supposes self-determination, and\nhence in certain cases force or fear makes a marriage null and unlawful.\n\n(a) Effect on Validity.--Coercion nullifies marriage from natural law,\nwhen overpowering physical might extorts an external assent, or when\nmoral violence so terrifies as to unsettle the reason; from church law\nat least, when being grave, external and unjustly caused, it compels\none to marry in order to escape the evil it inflicts or threatens. In\nother cases fear does not void marriage, even though it be the cause of\nthe contract, as when the fear is slight, or when it is induced by\nshipwreck or by the fear of sin, or when a seducer marries only because\nhe is threatened with prosecution unless he marries the girl whom he\nseduced.\n\n(b) Effect on Lawfulness.--He who by intimidation impels another to\nmarry, sins gravely if the fear is unjust and grave, or unjust and\nproductive of serious evils; he sins venially if the fear, though\nunjust, is light and not productive of serious evils; he sins not at\nall; if the fear is justly caused, unless he offends charity by his\nmanner of acting; revengeful spirit, etc. He who marries knowing that\nthe other party is forced into the contract, is guilty of serious\ninjustice; and he who marries unwillingly, but with the purpose to live\nas if he were validly married, sins gravely by his will to live in\nimpurity.\n\n2793. Conditional Consent.--Conditional consent is that in which the\nagreement to marriage is made dependent on some fact or event.\n\n(a) A condition makes marriage invalid if it neutralizes consent (e.g.,\nif the condition is _de praesenti_ but unfulfilled; if it is _de\nfuturo_ and against the substance of marriage; if it is impossible but\nseriously added); it suspends marriage if it is _de futuro_, possible,\nand not against the substance of marriage; it neither nullifies nor\nsuspends if it is _de praesenti_ or _de praeterito_ and fulfilled.\nIn law the presumption is that _de futuro_ necessary or impossible\nconditions and shameful conditions are not serious, or are modes\nrather than conditions (see 1886), and of course in the external forum\ninvalidity on account of a condition has to be proved. Conditions\nagainst the substance of marriage are such as deny essential conjugal\nrights or duties (i.e., the right to have conjugal intercourse,\nthe duty of fidelity to the consort, of loyalty to the bond); but\nthey should not be confused with the purpose to violate marriage\nengagements, or with a resolution, or a vow, or a pact in the form of a\nmode, not to make use of the right to conjugal intercourse.\n\n(b) A condition added to marriage consent is gravely sinful, unless\nthere is a very urgent reason for it; otherwise most serious evils\nwould result. Moreover, there is responsibility in justice for culpable\ndamages, as when one party gives consent conditionally without the\nknowledge or against the will of the other party. A suspensive\ncondition (e.g., \u201cif my parents will consent\u201d) is regularly unlawful\nwithout the bishop\u2019s permission, and marriage rights may not be used in\na marriage dependent on a condition whose fulfillment is not known to\nthe parties. It is unlawful to make a vow or promise of chastity in the\nmarried life unless there is moral certainty that it will be kept.\n\n2794. The Elements of Marriage as a Sacrament.--(a) The matter and form\nof marriage are found in the contract, for the Sacrament is the natural\npact elevated to the dignity of a sacred sign productive of grace. The\nremote matter is, therefore, the bodies of the spouses, or the bodily\nrights which they give one another (I Cor., vii. 4). Since the\nindeterminate part of a contract is the offer or bestowal, and the\ndeterminate part the approval, the proximate matter of Matrimony is\nfound in the grant of mutual conjugal rights externally manifested, and\nthe form in the acceptance of that right externally manifested.\n\n(b) The ministers and the recipients of Matrimony are the parties\nthemselves, since it is they alone who make and receive the contract.\nIn order to be a recipient of the Sacrament it is necessary that a\nperson be baptized and be free from all natural, divine and human\nimpediments that make one incapable of the contract of marriage.\n\n(c) The effects of Matrimony are _per se_ second grace, which increases\nsanctity and is of help especially for the due performance throughout\nlife of the duties of the conjugal state and for domestic blessedness\nand happiness.\n\n2795. Duties in Connection with Marriage.--The duties in reference to\nmarriage as a permanent state of life were treated already in 2613\nsqq., and we shall consider here only the duties that have to do with\nmarriage as a contract and a Sacrament. These duties can be arranged\nunder three heads: (a) before marriage, there are obligations in\nreference to the preparation for marriage, which consists remotely in\nengagement or espousals, and proximately in compliance with duties owed\nto divine, ecclesiastical, and civil law (e.g., license from the State,\nestablishment of freedom to marry, proclamation of banns,\ndispensations, confession); (b) during marriage, in addition to the\ncommon obligations of intention and a state of grace, there are special\nduties in reference to the external form or rite of marriage; (c) after\nmarriage, there is a duty of making canonical records and of validating\ndefective marriages.\n\n2796. Betrothal or Engagement.--Engagement is a promise of their future\nmarriage made by competent persons.\n\n(a) It is a promise, either unilateral or bilateral, the latter being\nespousals or betrothal in the strict sense of the word (1749). Like\nevery promise, engagement is not binding unless it be made with\nrequisite deliberation and freedom from force and fear. But a valid\nengagement to marry has not the same strength, either from divine or\nfrom human law, as a contract of marriage, and hence fraud or light\nfear unjustly produced and which induces one to become engaged leaves\nthe engagement rescindable at the will of the innocent party. Canon Law\nrequires certain formalities for a valid engagement, and without them\nthere is no obligation in either forum. The law is that the contract of\nbetrothal be in writing, and be signed by the parties and also by the\npastor or local Ordinary or two witnesses, and that, if one or both of\nthe parties be unable to write, this be noted in the document and an\nextra witness be added (Canon 1017).\n\n(b) It is a promise made by competent persons. Hence, there is no valid\nengagement if a party is incapable either naturally (e.g., one who has\nnot the use of reason) or canonically (e.g., one who has not attained\nthe age of seven years). It is against good morals to be engaged to two\npersons at the same time, with the understanding that one will marry\nthe second after the expected death of the first; and much more is it\nimmoral for a married person to become engaged to marry another, the\nmarriage to take place after the death of the present consort. Some\ncanonists hold that engagements are not valid before the age of\npuberty, on account of the lack of sufficient discretion.\n\n(c) It is a promise of future marriage, that is, a contract to marry,\nnot a contract of marriage. A nuptial engagement is invalid if the\nmarriage promised is invalid or unlawful, for no one can bind himself\nto sin. An invalid marriage is promised if there is a diriment and not\ndispensable impediment in the way, or if in spite of a removable\nimpediment the engagement is unconditional, unless the mind of the\nparties is to marry after the impediment has ceased. The Church seems\nto regard as null an engagement made on the condition that the Pope\nwill dispense an impediment. An unlawful marriage is promised when the\nparties cannot marry without sin (e.g., when the marriage will bring\ngreat sorrow or disgrace on parents), or when they promise to marry in\na sinful way (e.g., with the understanding that they will abuse\nmarriage). But an unlawful promise of a lawful marriage is not\nnecessarily invalid, and hence an engagement dependent on an immoral\ncondition not opposed to the substance of marriage would become\nobligatory on fulfillment of the condition (see 1878 d, 1886).\n\n2797. It should be noted that the former diriment and impedient\nimpediments produced by espousals are no longer in force, and even a\nvalid engagement gives no right to an action for the celebration of\nmarriage.\n\n2798. Is an Engagement Necessary before Marriage?--(a) An engagement is\nnot strictly necessary. Neither the validity nor the lawfulness of\nmarriage depends on espousals, for there is no law that requires this.\nHence, if for a reasonable cause a man and woman married without any\nprevious binding pledge on either side, the marriage would be good and\nlawful. The formal engagements of Canon Law are not common in this\ncountry, but an informal engagement usually precedes matrimony.\n\n(b) Engagement is most suitable and useful. Men are accustomed to fit\nthemselves by long and serious study for the business of a profession\nor calling, and to enter into preliminary agreements about contracts of\nmajor importance (as in contracts to sell), and certainly marriage, a\ncontract and vocation that binds until death and upon which the\nspiritual and temporal welfare of society and individuals rests, is\namong the most momentous of human agreements. The special advantage of\nengagement is that it affords a means of preventing hasty and\nill-advised unions, of discovering impediments, of securing the consent\nof parents, and of preparing oneself in knowledge and virtue for the\nduties of the married state. If engagements were regarded and treated\nas a period of training for serious and sacred duties, not as a time\nfor frivolity or enjoyment, there would be fewer divorces and less talk\nabout trial marriages. On the duties of engaged persons to one another,\nsee 2628, 2629.\n\n2799. Duties to Parents or Guardians in Reference to Marriage.--(a)\nThere is, _per se_, a duty of consulting with one\u2019s parents about one\u2019s\nmarriage; for he who marries without their knowledge, generally exposes\nhimself to the danger of making a serious mistake, and moreover as a\nrule the interests of parents themselves are bound up intimately with\nthe marriages of their children. Hence, unless a very serious reason\nexcuses, he who marries without advising with his parents sins\ngrievously by his rashness or want of filial affection. The same is\ntrue, if a child wilfully disregards the wishes of his parents by\nstubbornly marrying when for a good reason they disapprove. If their\nopposition is imperative and emphatic, or if they are grief-stricken at\nthought of the imprudent marriage, the sin is serious; but if their\nopposition is mild and the match not a very bad one, the sin is venial.\nThe consent or counsel of parents is not necessary for validity,\nhowever, since it is not they who are getting married, and no law makes\ntheir consent or counsel an essential part of the compact. _Per\naccidens_, their consent or counsel is not even necessary for\nlawfulness, as when the children live far away from their parents, or\nwhen marriage has to be contracted without delay, or when the parents\nare unreasonable in their opposition.\n\n(b) There is, _per se_, no duty of obeying one\u2019s parents in the matter\nof marriage: first, because marriage supposes choice, admiration, and\nlove, and these do not submit to dictation, even from parents; next,\nbecause in things that pertain to nature, such as self-preservation and\nprocreation, children are not subject to their parents; finally,\nbecause the authority of parents does not extend to the whole lifetime\nof their children and marriage is a lifelong union. Hence, parents may\nnot compel their children to marry or to remain single; they may not\nmake the match for their children against the latters\u2019 will, they may\nnot force a child to marry a person whom he or she detests, they may\nnot veto a marriage that does not appeal to them if the son or daughter\nhas good reasons for it. Those parents sin, then, who refuse their\nblessing to a marriage out of selfishness, and those parents sin\ngravely who force their children into loveless unions and so make them\nunhappy in this world and endanger their salvation for the world to\ncome. _Per accidens_, there is a duty of obeying parents in reference\nto marriage when one is obliged even apart from their command to do\nwhat they prescribe, when the marriage which they forbid is also\nforbidden by law (e.g., if the child is needed at home to support his\nindigent parents, if the mate selected will bring disgrace upon the\nfamily and the match can easily be broken off), or when the marriage\nwhich they require is also demanded by duty (e.g., if a son will surely\nenter upon a wild and reckless life unless he marries). See above,\n2228, 2627, 2633, 2636, 2347, 2348, 2361 sqq.\n\n2800. Duties of Parents in Reference to Marriage.--(a) If there is\nquestion of the marriage of a child, parents should guide themselves by\nthe rule of St. Paul: \u201cLet her marry whom she will, only in the Lord\u201d\n(I Cor., vii. 39). Undue pressure should be avoided, but bad marriages\nshould be opposed, and parents should assist their children to marry\nwell. (b) If there is question of a parent\u2019s second marriage, the\nchildren\u2019s interests should be considered in making the choice of the\nstep-father or step-mother, and, if the children are grown up, they\nshould be consulted, or at least they should not be unreasonably\nsaddened or harmed by the new marriage.\n\n2801. Obstacles to Marriage.--Since marriage is a most important\ncontract and a Sacrament, it is necessary to ascertain beforehand with\nmoral certainty that there is no obstacle to its valid and lawful\ncelebration. This imposes duties on the pastor, the couple themselves,\nand the faithful who know them.\n\n(a) The pastor in virtue of his office is gravely obliged to make\ninquiries about the competency and fitness of the prospective husband\nand wife, and even in a death-bed marriage the obligation does not\ncease. Church law prescribes the method of inquiry, which should\ninclude an examination and instruction of the couple and a publication\nof the marriage. Of course, there is an obligation of confidential\nsecrecy.\n\n(b) The couple are bound to present themselves to the pastor within a\nreasonable time before the marriage in order to make these\narrangements, and should bring with them the necessary papers (for\nexample, their baptismal certificates, license to marry, testimonials).\nThey are gravely obliged to make known either to the pastor or to the\nconfessor any impediment, even though it be of a secret and culpable\nnature, in order that their marriage may be valid and lawful, unless\nthey wish to give up the marriage or seek a dispensation in some other\nway.\n\n(c) The people who know of an impediment to a marriage are bound under\npain of mortal sin to make it known in time to the pastor or Ordinary;\nfor the natural and divine laws, as well as the law of the Church, hold\none to speak when this will prevent irreverence to the Sacrament of\nMatrimony, sin and other serious evils to the neighbor. The obligation\nceases, however, when the revelation is either impossible or useless.\nCases of impossibility are those in which revelation will cause great\nspiritual harm (e.g., public scandal), or great temporal harm of a\npublic kind (e.g., violation of professional secret), or a great\ntemporal harm of a private kind (e.g., persecution), unless a more\nserious evil will result from concealment. Revelation is useless when\nthe marriage can be stopped or made legal in some other way (e.g., by\npersuading the couple to break their engagement or get a dispensation),\nor when one foresees that the revelation will have no effect.\n\n2802. Duties of the Pastor in the Examination of Engaged Persons.--(a)\nHe should question both the man and the woman separately and prudently\nabout their freedom to marry, even though he is certain that there are\nno impediments. He should inquire especially whether there has been a\nprevious marriage, and should also ask specifically about any\nimpediment that seems likely. About impediments of a defamatory kind he\nshould not interrogate before others, leaving that matter if necessary\nto his doctrinal instruction or to the confessor. (b) He should ask\nboth of them, and especially the woman, whether they have decided on\nmarriage freely, without force or pressure from any person. But\nchildren who live with their parents should be asked whether or not\nthey have obtained their parents\u2019 consent to the proposed marriage.\n\n2803. Special Proofs of Freedom to Marry.--(a) Proof of Baptism.--A\nbaptismal certificate should be presented by the parties (if baptized\nin another parish), even by one who is a baptized non-Catholic. If a\ncertificate cannot be had, other proofs are necessary. In danger of\ndeath, the sworn testimony of the parties suffices; outside danger of\ndeath, the testimony of a reliable witness, or of the person himself,\nif he can remember his Baptism, or, it seems, a certificate of\nConfirmation or First Communion will do. If Baptism cannot be proved\nand there is a prudent doubt, it should be administered conditionally.\n\n(b) Proof of Single State.--If it is manifest that a previous civil\nmarriage was null and was dissolved by divorce, the proof of the facts\nsuffices. If the husband or wife of a previous marriage has died, but\nthe pastor has no personal knowledge of this, positive proof of the\ndecease in the form of a public document or of sworn testimony of two\nor at least one reliable witness is necessary, and if the pastor cannot\nobtain these he must have recourse to the Ordinary.\n\n2804. Matrimonial Impediments.--(a) Definition.--An impediment is a\ncircumstance directly affecting the contract of marriage and rendering\nit illicit or invalid. Thus, an impediment differs from an unfitness\nthat refers immediately to marriage as a sacred rite or Sacrament (such\nas lack of proper intention or a state of mortal sin), or that does not\ndirectly affect the parties (such as forbidden time).\n\n(b) Division.--In reference to effects, an impediment is either\nimpedient (i.e., one that forbids marriage under pain of grave sin but\ndoes not render it null and void) or diriment (i.e., one that not only\nforbids marriage, but also makes it null and void).\n\n2805. Sinfulness of Marrying with an Impediment.--(a) If the impediment\nis certain, grave sin is committed; for deception and disobedience are\ncommitted in a grave and sacred matter, and, if the impediment is\ndiriment, the marriage contract is made null. Great necessity, however,\nwould sometimes excuse.\n\n(b) If the impediment is uncertain, no sin is committed when the\nimpediment is one of ecclesiastical law and the doubt is one of law,\nfor in such a case the legislator removes the obligation (Canon 15);\nnor when the impediment is impotency (Canon 1068), in view of the fact\nthat the general law of propagation of the race leaves a natural\npresumption against impotency, which can be overcome only by a certain\nimpediment. It would be an intolerable hardship if marriage were made\nimpossible by a doubt where proof is so difficult. There is a serious\nsin, however, in other cases, because one is either exposing the\nSacrament to nullity or is refusing, contrary to a serious command of\nthe Church, to seek a dispensation.\n\n2806. The Impedient or Prohibitive Impediments (Canons 1058-1066).--(a)\nVow.--The following simple vows make marriage illicit: the vow of\nvirginity, that of perfect chastity, the vow not to marry, the vow to\nreceive Sacred Orders, the vow to enter religious life, the simple vows\nof religion. A vow to abstain from the use of marriage is not against\nthe substance of marriage, but it is difficult to keep in the married\nstate; the vows to enter religion, or take Sacred Orders, or not to\nwed, are incompatible with marriage. Hence, the Church forbids one who\nhas these vows to marry, unless the vow be first dispensed. Those who\nmarry while bound by one of these vows sin gravely, and are held to\nkeep the vow if this is possible or the other party\u2019s rights do not\nprevent.\n\n(b) Legal Relationship.--In those countries where relationship from\nadoption makes marriage illicit, there is also an impedient impediment\nof Canon Law. The Church wishes, in so far as possible, to preserve\nharmony between her own law and that of the State. Hence, she includes\nin her Code the civil law regulations that forbid marriage to certain\npersons on account of the intimate relation that exists between them\nthrough civil law adoption. The law of some European (e.g., France,\nGermany, Switzerland) and South American countries have a prohibitive\nimpediment of adoption, but in the United States, the British Empire,\nand many other countries adoption is no such hindrance to marriage.\n\n(c) Mixed Religion.--Marriage between two baptized persons, one a\nCatholic and the other a member of an heretical or schismatical sect,\nis severely forbidden by the Church. Mixed marriages in themselves are\nopposed to divine and natural law, inasmuch as they offer an occasion\nfor communication in false worship and a danger of perversion; and\nhence they have been disapproved from the very beginning of the Church\n(II John, X. 11; I Cor., v. 10; Tit., iii. 10). But the divine\nprohibition ceases if appropriate measures are used to safeguard the\nfaith of the Catholic and the children, and the Church will grant a\ndispensation, though reluctantly and only for just and grave causes.\n\n2807. Duties in Reference to Mixed Marriages.--(a) The Pastor.--A\ndispensation should not be sought unless there is first a sufficient\nreason, all things considered, and generally the reason should be the\npublic good (such as the relative fewness of Catholics in a district,\nhope of conversion of the non-Catholic, avoidance of scandal).\nSecondly, there must be guarantees given by the non-Catholic that the\nfaith of the Catholic will not be interfered with, and both parties\nmust promise that all the children will receive Catholic and no other\nbaptism and education. Finally, these promises must be such as to\nproduce moral certainty of fulfillment, and as a rule it should be\nrequired that they be given in writing. After the marriage has been\ncelebrated the pastor is held both in charity and in justice to do what\nhe can to have the promises faithfully lived up to.\n\n(b) The Parties.--Neither before nor after the marriage in the Catholic\nChurch is it lawful to have any non-Catholic religious ceremony (see\n956 sqq.); and if the pastor knows that this has been done or will be\ndone, he may not assist at the marriage without permission from the\nOrdinary, which is granted for a most grave reason (scandal being\navoided). After the marriage the parties are bound in justice to keep\nthe promises made, and the Catholic is held in charity to seek\nprudently, by good example and advice, to convert the non-Catholic.\n\n2808. Marriages with Bad Catholics.--(a) If the bad Catholic is\nunworthy in the matter of faith, because he has notoriously given up\nthe Church (even though he has not joined any other religion), or\nbecause he is a member of a forbidden society, there is a danger of\nperversion. In such a case the pastor may not assist at the marriage\nunless the Ordinary decides that there is a sufficient reason, that the\ndanger of perversion is made remote, and that the Catholic education of\nthe children is provided for.\n\n(b) If the bad Catholic is unworthy in the matter of morals, because he\nis a public sinner (e.g., one who neglects the Easter duty), or\nnotoriously under censure and therefore a person to whom the Sacraments\nmust be denied, the pastor is confronted with the law that one may not\ncooperate formally, even by assistance, in the profanation of a\nSacrament. As the guilt of the unworthy person is public in these\ncases, there must be public reparation before the marriage can be\nsanctioned by the presence of the Church\u2019s representative. The\nreparation is to be made either by the sinner going to confession or by\nthe censured person obtaining absolution. But since the priest\u2019s\npresence can be only a material cooperation, it may be permitted by the\nOrdinary for a grave reason when the unworthy person refuses to comply\nwith the conditions.\n\n2809. Other Obstacles to Marriage.--Other obstacles which forbid\nmarriage, though they are not strictly canonical impediments, are the\nfollowing:\n\n(a) valid engagement gravely forbids marriage with a third party. This\nis a natural obstacle which results from the very nature of a binding\npromise;\n\n(b) special prohibition of the Church at times gravely forbids a\nparticular marriage, as when the Holy See in granting a dispensation\nfor a present marriage forbids a future marriage. If an irritant clause\nis added, the prohibition has the force of a diriment impediment. The\nOrdinary also may forbid a particular marriage for a time, as when\nthere is suspicion of a secret impediment, or when great damage will\nlikely ensue from a marriage. This prohibition is for a special case or\ntime or person, and thus it differs from the impediments of the law;\n\n(c) closed times (Lent and Advent) are the seasons when, on account of\nthe penitential and mournful character of the liturgy then in use, the\nsolemn blessing of marriage is not regularly permitted. This is not\nreally an impediment, since marriage itself may be contracted at any\ntime of the year, according to the general law.\n\n2810. Diriment Impediments to Marriage.--The diriment or nullifying\nimpediments to marriage are personal incapacities in a person which\nrender him or her incapable, from divine or ecclesiastical law, of\ncontracting marriage with anyone (absolute impediments), or of\ncontracting marriage with a certain individual (relative impediments).\n\n2811. The absolute diriment impediments are the following: (a) those\nthat are due to a personal defect making one unable to promise with\nsufficient discretion (impediment of age) or to perform what is\npromised (impediment of impotency); (b) those that are due to a\nvoluntary act which consecrates one to God with the obligation of\nperpetual celibacy (the impediments of Orders and vows).\n\n2812. The relative impediments are the following: (a) that one which is\ndue to an obligation to one\u2019s present husband or wife (the impediment\nof bond); (b) that one which is due to too great a difference between\ntwo parties (impediment of disparity of cult); those that are due to\ntoo close a kinship between two parties, whether natural (impediments\nof consanguinity and affinity) or like to the natural (impediments of\npublic decency, spiritual kinship, legal kinship); (d) those that are\ndue to a relationship caused by a crime that makes it unsuitable for\ntwo parties to marry. If one party is perpetrator and the other the\nvictim, there is the impediment of abduction; if the two parties are\naccomplices, there is the impediment of crime.\n\n2813. The Impediment of Age.--(a) Nature.--This impediment exists in\nmales who have not completed their sixteenth year, and in females who\nhave not completed their fourteenth year. These ages are set by the\ngeneral law, because all parts of the world have to be considered and\nsufficient discretion may be presumed at those ages everywhere. But\nsubstantial ignorance even after those years invalidates consent, and\nmoreover, in colder countries where development is slower, marriage is\ngenerally inadvisable before the parties are 18 and 16 respectively.\nThe marriageable ages according to the statute law in most of our\nStates are 18 and 16 with parental consent, and 21 and 18 without it.\n\n(b) Effect.--This impediment is of ecclesiastical law in so far as the\nprecise determination of age is concerned, but of natural law in so far\nas the use of reason is demanded. Hence, the Church may dispense, and\nhence also the impediment as ecclesiastical does not bind the\nunbaptized, even when being underaged they marry Christians.\n\n2814. The Impediment of Impotency.--(a) Nature.--Impotency is the\ninability to exercise the sexual act in a way suitable for procreation.\nThe requisites for this act are _immissio membri virilis in vaginam\nmulieris cum seminis effusione_, and hence those are impotent who lack\nsexual organs (such as the emasculated or spayed), or who on account of\npsychical or physical abnormalities are unable to have complete\nintercourse (e.g., anaphrodisiacs, some hermaphrodites, those who\nsuffer from hypospadias, vaginism, etc.). Sterility, or the mere\ninability to procreate from sexual intercourse (as in old persons), is\nnot the same thing as impotency, and is not an impediment to marriage.\nAuthorities are not agreed whether or not the operations of male\nvasectomy and evariotomy produce impotency or sterility. But many\nregard the former operation as unlawful except for a most grave cause\n(such as the saving of life), since it takes away a power given by\nnature for the benefit of society, exposes the individual to very\nserious temptations, and opens the way to terrible abuses.\n\n(b) Effect.--Impotency anterior to marriage and perpetual, whether in\nthe man or in the woman, whether known to the other party or not, voids\nmarriage from the law of nature itself, and hence is not dispensable.\nBut impotency that arises after marriage or that is only temporary does\nnot invalidate, and impotency that is relative (i.e., in reference to\none person only) does not nullify marriage except in reference to a\ndeterminate person. In justice to the other spouse, married persons who\nhave an easily curable impotency should have this defect removed.\n\n2815. The Impediments of Orders and Vows.--(a) Orders.--Those who are\nin Sacred Orders (priesthood, deaconship and, in the Latin Church,\nsubdeaconship) cannot marry validly. The impediment is decreed by\necclesiastical law alone, and hence the Church has the power to\ndispense. One who was ordained through compulsion or in ignorance of\nthe duty of celibacy, is permitted to marry, if he does not wish to\nratify his ordination; but he then loses all right to exercise his\nOrder (2235).\n\n(b) Vows.--Professed religious with solemn vows or simple vows that\nannul marriage cannot marry validly. It is more probable that this\nimpediment, in so far as solemn vows are concerned, is of divine right;\nbut the Pope, as the Vicar of Christ, is able to dispense (see 2194,\n2234, 2235, 1787 e).\n\n2816. The Impediment of Bond.--(a) A person who is already validly\nmarried cannot marry again until the bond of the existing marriage is\nremoved by the death of the other spouse or by dissolution. An\nexception is the case of the Pauline Privilege; but even then the bond\nof the first marriage remains till the second is contracted (see 2787\ne).\n\n(b) This impediment is of natural and divine law, and it binds all men,\nthe unbaptized as well as the baptized. No dispensation can be granted\nfrom the impediment as long as it continues; and moreover those who\nwould contract a second marriage must offer proof that the bond of the\nfirst marriage was non-existent, or that it has ceased. Nullity of a\nprevious marriage must be established by canonical process (Canons 1986\nsqq.); dissolution of an unconsummated marriage through vow or Papal\ndispensation is proved sufficiently by an authentic document; cessation\nof bond through death of consort must be demonstrated with moral\ncertainty, if it is not manifest (see 2803). The procedure to be\nobserved in cases of the Pauline Privilege is explained by commentaries\non Canons 1120 sqq. of the Code.\n\n2817. The Impediment of Disparity of Cult.--(a) A marriage of a\nCatholic (i.e., of a person baptized in or converted to the Catholic\nChurch) with an unbaptized person is null and void. This impediment\nbars the marriage of a professed ex-Catholic with an infidel, but not\nthe marriage of a non-Catholic with an infidel; and by infidel is\nunderstood here not only a non-Christian (such as a Jew), but also a\nChristian unbaptized or invalidly baptized. A person accidentally\nbaptized by a Catholic is not considered a Catholic if born of\nheretical or schismatical parents and reared by them in their sect.\n\n(b) This impediment as prohibitive is of divine ordinance, for the same\nreasons as in the case of mixed marriages (see 2806 c): \u201cBear not the\nyoke with unbelievers\u201d (II Cor., vi. 14). But neither natural nor\ndivine law nullifies such a marriage with unbelievers; for the\nsubstantial ends of marriage (i.e., procreation and education of\nchildren) can be had even in such unions, and very holy personages have\ncontracted marriage even with pagans (e.g., Jacob with the daughters of\nLaban, Joseph with the daughter of Putiphar, Moses with the daughter of\nJethro, Esther with Assuerus, St. Cecilia with Valerian, St. Monica\nwith Patricius, St. Clotilda with Clovis, etc.). The Church, however,\nhas made disparity of cult a diriment impediment on account of the\nspecial danger, and it grants no dispensation unless the precautions\ndecreed for mixed marriages be observed (see 824, 2807).\n\n2818. The Impediments of Kinship.--(a) Consanguinity.--Marriage is null\nwhen contracted between blood relatives, that is, persons descended\nfrom one another or from one common ancestor within certain limits. In\nthe direct line consanguinity invalidates marriage between all\nascendants and descendants, legitimate or natural, that is, between a\nman and all his female ancestry (mother, grandmother, etc.) and\nposterity (daughter, etc.), and between a woman and all her male\nancestors and posterity. In the collateral line it invalidates to the\nthird degree inclusively, that is, between a man and a woman whose\nparents are related as first cousins or even more closely. The degree\nof consanguinity between this man and woman is first, second or third,\naccording as one, two or three generations separate them (i.e., both or\nthe one farthest removed) from the nearest ancestor of both (see Canons\n96 and 1076). Consanguinity is multiplied when two parties are\ndescended from several common stocks. This impediment is of the natural\nlaw as regards the first, and probably all the other degrees of the\ndirect line; for reverence due to parents forbids one to marry them.\nMarriage between brother and sister is not opposed to the absolute or\nprimary law of nature, but to the relative or secondary law (see 303);\nfor natural inclination teaches that it is unbecoming for members of\nthe same family to intermarry, and further the children of their unions\nare very apt to be weakly or defective. In other degrees consanguinity\nis an impediment of church law only, and may be dispensed for a good\nreason, but a more serious reason is necessary for nearer relationship.\n\n(b) Affinity.--Marriage is null when contracted between\nrelatives-in-law, or those who are kin by valid, even though\nunconsummated, marriage. But the impediment exists only between the\nhusband and his wife\u2019s blood relatives, and vice versa. In the direct\nline it includes all degrees; in the collateral line it extends to the\nsecond degree inclusive. Hence, a widower is impeded from marrying all\nthe lineal relatives of his deceased wife (her mother, grandmother,\ndaughter, granddaughter, etc.), and the following of her collateral\nrelatives: her sisters, her aunts, her nieces, her first cousins.\nAffinity is multiplied by multiplication of the consanguinity on which\nit is based (e.g., when a woman is doubly related to one\u2019s deceased\nwife), and by successive marriages (e.g., when a woman is the sister of\na man\u2019s two deceased wives). The impediment of affinity is justified by\nmoral reasons--by the mutual reverence that should exist between those\nwho are closely related by marriage, by the dangers to which their\nrelationship would be exposed if they were able to marry, and by the\ngood of society, which is promoted when marriage is not confined within\nto narrow a circle. But the impediment is entirely ecclesiastical, for\nthe Church can dispense in all degrees, and the relationship is only an\nimperfect copy of consanguinity.\n\n(c) Public Decency.--This impediment, also known as quasi-affinity,\narises from an invalid, even though unconsummated, marriage, and from\npublic or notorious concubinage; and it annuls marriage in the first\nand second degrees of the direct line between the man and the blood\nrelatives of the woman, and vice versa. The reason for the impediment\nis the unbecomingness of marriage with the near relatives (i.e., the\nmother, daughter, grandmother, granddaughter of the woman, and the\nfather, son, grandfather, grandson of the man) of a person with whom\none has lived in putative marriage or concubinage. The impediment is\nless strict than that of affinity, and is of ecclesiastical law only.\n\n(d) Spiritual Relationship.--This impediment nullifies marriage between\na baptized person and the person who baptized him or her or who stood\nfor him or her in Baptism. The minister and the sponsor contract a\nrelationship of spiritual parenthood to the baptized person, since\nBaptism is a supernatural birth and the godparents are charged with the\nreligious welfare of the godchild. Reasons of respect and of intimate\nrelationship make marriage between such persons unbecoming, and hence\nthe Church from early times has ruled against it.\n\n(e) Legal Relationship.--Persons who in civil law are unable to marry\none another on account of the relationship arising from legal adoption\nare also barred from marriage in Canon Law. The relations between an\nadopted person and the members of the family into which he is adopted\nare so close that human lawmakers have often felt it necessary to\ndeclare adoption an impediment to marriage.\n\n2819. Matrimonial Impediments Produced through Misdeeds.--(a)\nAbduction.--There can be no valid marriage between a man who holds a\nwoman under restraint in order to compel her to marry him, if she has\nbeen abducted by him or is violently detained by him in her residence\nor elsewhere. If the woman who has been carried away or who is held\nagainst her will marries unwillingly, the marriage is invalid according\nto natural law; if she marries willingly, the marriage is invalid from\nchurch law. Hence the impediment of abduction is of positive law only\nand does not oblige infidels (see Canon 1064).\n\n(b) Crime.--There can be no valid marriage between the following: those\nwho during a legitimate marriage have consummated adultery together and\nhave mutually promised future marriage or have attempted marriage, even\nthough only civilly (Canon 1075); those who during the same lawful\nmarriage have consummated adultery together, and of whom one has\ncommitted conjugicide; those who have cooperated physically or morally,\neven though they are not adulterers, to murder the spouse of one of\nthem. The purpose of this impediment is to safeguard the fidelity and\nrights of married persons, and to punish those who resort to adultery\nor murder in the hope of a new marriage. The impediment is\necclesiastical and does not affect infidels.\n\n2820. Duties of the Pastor After the Inquiry about Impediments.--(a)\nDispensation.--If the pastor finds an impediment of natural or divine\nlaw (e.g., the bond of an existing marriage), or an impediment which is\nnever dispensed (e.g., consanguinity in the first degree of the\ncollateral line, notorious conjugicide, when there is no danger of\ndeath), he cannot proceed with the marriage. If he discovers another\nimpediment, he must inquire whether or not there is sufficient reason\nfor dispensation. For the impediments of occult crime, disparity of\ncult outside of mission countries, age, Sacred Orders and religious\nprofession (also for neglecting the form of marriage), a grave reason\nis necessary to permit marriage; but for the remaining impediments, a\nless grave reason is required. The usual or grave reasons for\ndispensation include the public good (e.g., peace between peoples,\nprevention of serious litigations), a great private good (e.g., a\nsuitable marriage offered to a woman who on account of age or locality\ncan hardly find another such chance), great spiritual good (e.g.,\nprevention of a mixed or civil marriage or great scandal, termination\nof open concubinage), great temporal good (e.g., means to support the\nfamily of a poor widow); but other and lesser reasons sometimes\nsuffice, as when the woman is illegitimate, an orphan, deflowered,\nsickly, or homely, or the man needs someone to take care of him or of\nhis small children from a previous marriage, or when the marriage has\nalready been announced or will be of great advantage to the parents of\none of the parties. In case of urgent necessity or of danger of death,\nthe pastor and also the confessor or priest who assists at the marriage\nare empowered to grant certain dispensations; in other cases\ndispensation can be granted only by the local Ordinary or by the Holy\nSee. The petition for a dispensation must state the facts truthfully,\nbut must conceal the identity of the petitioner when the impediment is\noccult. In executing a dispensation one must observe the conditions\nlaid down by the superior who granted it (see commentaries on Canons\n1043 sqq.).\n\n(b) Publication.--Even though it is morally certain that there is no\nimpediment, the banns of marriage should be proclaimed beforehand and\nin the place where the parties have their domicile or quasi-domicile\n(or residence, if they are _vagi_), and also, if necessary, in other\nplaces where they have lived. This is a grave duty, since its purpose\nis to ensure the validity and lawfulness of marriages. If it is morally\ncertain that there is no impediment, the Ordinary may dispense for a\ngood reason (see commentaries on Canons 1022 sqq.).\n\n2821. After the Examination and Proclamation.--(a) If it is certain\nthat there is an impediment, the procedure will be that given in 2820\na; (b) if it is doubtful whether there is a diriment impediment, the\nmatter should be investigated more fully, but without defamation of the\nparties, and if the doubt remains, the question should be submitted to\nthe Ordinary (see above, 2805 b); (c) if no impediment, certain or\ndoubtful, has been discovered, the pastor should approve the parties\nfor marriage.\n\n2822. Duties of the Pastor as Regards the Religious Instruction of the\nEngaged Couple.--(a) The pastor should require those who are not\nconfirmed to receive Confirmation before their marriage, if they can do\nthis without serious inconvenience.\n\n(b) He should instruct the parties in the essentials of Christian\ndoctrine, if they are ignorant in these matters (see 920 sqq.), and he\nshould point out to them the nature of marriage as a contract and as a\nSacrament, its purposes and properties, the grace it confers and the\nconjugal and parental duties it imposes, the necessity of preparing for\nthe Sacrament and of receiving it in the state of grace. He should also\nspeak about the impediments, so that the couple may understand the\ndisqualifications for a valid and lawful marriage; but this should be\ndone prudently, so as not to shock the innocent or to help others to\nevade the law. But ignorance of the Catechism is not strictly an\nimpediment; and if the parties are unwilling to take instruction, they\nshould be married without it. In a mixed marriage it is often very\nuseful to give the non-Catholic a short course in Catholic teaching,\nand all couples who are preparing for marriage would do well to read\nsome of the good works prepared especially for the use of engaged or\nnewly married people. The Code requires of pastors that in their\nsermons they instruct the people on marriage and exhort them to avoid\nmixed marriages and marriages with the unworthy (Canons 1018, 1064,\n1065).\n\n2823. The Pastor and the Duties of Engaged Couple.--The pastor should\nalso inquire about duties owed by the couple to others.\n\n(a) Duties to Parents.--He should seriously admonish minors subject to\nparental authority not to marry without the knowledge or against the\nreasonable wishes of their parents. If the parents are opposed to the\nmarriage, the pastor should decide from the circumstances whether the\nopposition is justified or not; if one parent only is unwilling, the\nwishes of the father _per se_ have preference over those of the mother,\nas he is the head of the family. If the engaged couple will not heed\nthe pastor, he is seriously bound to refuse to marry them until the\ncase has been presented to the Ordinary for decision (Canon 1034).\n\n(b) Duties to Civil Law.--The State has no power over the Sacrament of\nMatrimony, its bond, or its inseparable temporal effects (such as the\nrights and duties of spouses, legitimacy of children and the like), but\nit is competent in reference to merely civil effects and conditions,\nwhich are temporal circumstances separable from the substance of\nmarriage. Hence, those who are getting married should comply with civil\nformalities that do not trespass on church rights, such as registration\nor marriage license.\n\n2824. Opposition of Parents to Marriage.--In deciding whether the\nparental opposition to a marriage is reasonable or not, the pastor\nshould take into consideration both the motives for the opposition and\nthe reasons in favor of the marriage.\n\n(a) The motives for the opposition are reasonable, if the parents\nobject because of the undesirability of one of the couple, or their\nincompatibility, or the evil consequences that will follow the\nmarriage. A person is undesirable on account of defects of soul (e.g.,\nan atheist, a drunkard, a libertine, a man or woman of ill-fame, a\ncruel man, an ill-tempered woman), or of body (e.g., a person who is\ndeformed, or malodorous, or afflicted with syphilis or other serious\ndisease), or of mind (e.g., a half-witted person), or of economical\nability (e.g., a man who is a gambler or spendthrift, or who is unable\nto earn a living; a woman who is loaded with debts or who cannot take\ncare of a home). There is incompatibility when the ages of the couple\nor their rank in life, their race, their education, their tastes, or\ntheir dispositions are utterly different. There are evil consequences\nwhen scandals, hatreds, disgrace, or loss of temporal goods will ensue.\n\n(b) The reason for the marriage, however, may suffice to prevail over\nthe parental objections. Thus, if the strong disapproval of relatives\nis the only reason against a marriage and its abandonment will make the\ncouple unhappy for life, charity does not oblige to such a sacrifice.\nAnd the temporal advantage of a family should not be preferred to the\nspiritual benefit, if their son who is wild wishes to marry a poor girl\nwho has a good influence over him rather than a wealthy girl whom he\ndoes not admire.\n\n2825. Religious Duties before Marriage.--(a) Confession.--A public\nsinner (e.g., one who has been living in concubinage) is obliged to go\nto confession before marriage in order to repair his scandal. A sinner\nwhose guilt is not public must repent before receiving the Sacrament of\nMatrimony, since it is a Sacrament of the Living and supposes the state\nof grace; but an act of contrition strictly suffices. It is\nrecommended, however, that all persons go to confession as a\npreparation and that they make a general confession. The confessor\nshould be told of any occult or incriminating impediment that was not\ndisclosed to the pastor, and it is therefore advisable that the\nconfession precede the ceremony by several days, so as to allow time\nfor possible dispensations.\n\n(b) Communion.--It is better that Communion be received on the day of\none\u2019s marriage, but, if this is not convenient, it may be received\nseveral days before or several days after. There is no command as to\nthis, but the Church\u2019s counsel is most earnest.\n\n2826. The Celebration of Marriage.--(a) Requisites for Validity.--In\norder to be valid, a Catholic\u2019s marriage must be celebrated in the\npresence of the parish-priest or Ordinary, or of a priest delegated by\neither, and of at least two witnesses. There are two exceptions to this\nlaw, namely, in danger of death when the priest cannot be had and in\nthe case of inability to appear before a priest within a month. This\nlaw is most suitable, since marriage is not a mere profane contract,\nbut a Sacrament subject to the Church; the law is also necessary, since\nsecret or clandestine marriages would be impossible of proof, and\nsociety and the family would be seriously harmed if they were permitted\nexcept in very extraordinary cases.\n\n(b) Requisites for Lawfulness.--The pastor assists lawfully at a\nmarriage if he has assured himself of the freedom of the parties to\nmarry and of his own right to assist officially at their marriage. The\npastor has the right to witness a marriage when the parties are his\nsubjects by reason of their location in his parish, or when he has\npermission from their pastor or Ordinary to assist at the nuptials.\nWhen the bride is from one parish and the groom from another, the rule\nis that the marriage should be held before the bride\u2019s pastor (Canons\n1094 sqq.)\n\n2827. The Rite of Marriage.--(a) The essential rite consists in the\nwords of consent spoken by the bride and groom. The assisting priest\nasks for this consent, and then (except in a mixed marriage) blesses\nthe newly married pair and the ring. Marriage by sign language or\nthrough an interpreter or proxy is not lawful without special\npermission, and marriage by letter is not recognized (Canons 1088 sqq.).\n\n(b) The accidental rite is the nuptial blessing bestowed during the\nNuptial Mass that follows on the marriage. This is omitted in mixed\nmarriages, and also as a rule during Advent and Lent. The place for\nmarriage is regularly in the parish church, if it is a Catholic\nmarriage, but outside the church if it is a mixed marriage (see Canons\n1100 sqq.). The Ordinary may dispense from the requirements of place\n(Canon 1109).\n\n2828. Cooperation in an Unworthy Marriage.--(a) The Priest.--The\nclergyman acts as the official representative of the Church, and hence\nonly a serious reason will permit his assistance when the unworthiness\nof one of the parties is known to him in an extra-confessional way. A\nserious reason would be a threat of bodily harm to the priest or great\nspiritual detriment to the parties, such as their continuance in the\nstate of sin. A more serious reason is required if one of the parties\nis an _excommunicatus vitandus_. Finally, at times only passive\nassistance is permitted, as in certain mixed marriages in which the\nnon-Catholic refuses to give guarantees, but there is greater danger of\nperversion without than with the assistance (see 2677 sqq.).\n\n(b) The Spouses.--The bride and groom are the ministers as well as the\nrecipients of Matrimony, and hence, if one of the parties knows that\nthe other is not in the state of grace, there is an administration of a\nSacrament to an unworthy recipient. But only charity would bid one to\ndeny the Sacrament to that other party, if one could not induce him to\ndispose himself, and charity does not oblige with great inconvenience.\nHence the worthy party, if he or she has a suitable reason for\nmarrying, does not sin by reason of the other party\u2019s unworthiness.\n\n(c) The Witnesses.--The cooperation of the witnesses is less than that\nof the priest and of the worthy party, and hence only in an\nextraordinary case do the witnesses sin by assisting at a marriage\ncontracted before the Church. They may presume that all is well, if the\npastor has agreed to the marriage; and even though they are certain\nthat the bride or groom is in mortal sin, the fear of incurring\ndispleasure or harm will ordinarily excuse the best man or bridesmaid\nfrom all sin, or at least from grave sin.\n\n2829. Registration of Marriages.--The Code requires that marriages be\nrecorded in the matrimonial and baptismal registers, and that\nnotification be sent to the pastors of the parishes where the bride and\nthe groom were baptized. This duty seems to be grave, since its end is\nto provide for stable conditions and secure proof of freedom to marry.\nThe entries should be made without delay (i.e., within three days at\nleast), lest they be overlooked or be made incorrectly (Canon 1103).\n\n2830. When an Impediment Is Discovered after Marriage.--A diriment\nimpediment or other invalidating defect is sometimes discovered after\nthe celebration of marriage. There are various solutions of this\ndifficulty.\n\n(a) If the marriage can be validated (or made valid), this should be\ndone. The manner of simple validation of marriages null on account of\ndiriment impediment, defective consent or lack of form, is declared in\nCanons 1133-1137.\n\n(b) If the marriage cannot be validated simply, it may be made valid in\ncertain cases by the special validation known as a _sanatio in radice_.\nThis supposes that a consent naturally sufficient, but juridically\ninsufficient, was given, and that a renewal of consent cannot be\nobtained (see Canons 1138-1141).\n\n(c) If marriage cannot be validated in any way (as in the case of an\nindispensable impediment), the parties should be separated, or\npermitted to live together as brother and sister, or left in good\nfaith. Thus, if the nullity of the marriage is public, the parties\nshould be separated after a declaration of nullity; if the nullity is\nsecret and unprovable, the parties may be permitted to live together as\nbrother and sister, if they know the marriage is null, but are not\nexposed to the danger of incontinence; if the parties are in good faith\nabout their marriage and it is foreseen that serious evils would result\nwere they told the truth (such as bad faith, or misfortunes for the\nchildren), they may be left as they are.\n\n2831. The Lawfulness of Divorce and Separation.--(a) Complete divorce,\nor dissolution of the bond with the right to remarry during the\nlifetime of the other spouse, is never lawful, except in the cases\nmentioned in 2787 e. Moreover, the civil lawgiver has no right ever to\ndissolve the marriage tie, for the marriage bond of Christians is\nsacramental and not subject to the State, while the marriage bond of\nnon-Christians is indissoluble by human authority. On the death of one\nspouse, however, the survivor is free to marry again, though chaste\nwidowhood is more honorable.\n\n(b) Incomplete divorce, or separation from bed and board, is allowed\npermanently to the innocent spouse in case of adultery, and temporarily\nwhen there are other good reasons. Thus, if one of the parties becomes\nan apostate, or gives non-Catholic education to the children, or leads\na criminal or disgraceful life, or makes common life too hard by his\ncruelty, or endangers the other party in soul or body, the innocent\nspouse may separate after appealing to the Ordinary, or may depart on\nhis or her own authority, if the facts are certain and there is danger\nin delay (Canons 1118 sqq.). With permission one may even seek a civil\ndivorce, if it is a separation only, in order to be free as regards\ncivil effects of marriage (1950).\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I\n\nSUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS\n(Holy Office, 17 Apr., 1943)\n[placed at end of Volume I, after section 1625, in print edition]\n\nSeeing that delays and omissions in denouncing the books frequently\noccur, and that many of the faithful are in a state of deplorable\nignorance regarding the denunciation and prohibition of harmful books,\nthe Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office deems it appropriate\nto call to mind the principal provisions of the sacred canons on this\nsubject; for it is beyond doubt that bad or harmful writings expose\npurity of faith, integrity of morals, and the very salvation of souls\nto the greatest dangers.\n\nCertainly the Holy See cannot by itself, with adequate care and in due\ntime, prohibit the numberless writings against faith and morals which,\nespecially in our time, are being published almost daily in various\nlanguages all over the world. Hence it is necessary that the Ordinaries\nof places, whose business it is to preserve sound and orthodox doctrine\nand to protect good morals (C, 343, Sec.1), should, either personally\nor through suitable priests, be watchful as to the books which are\npublished or sold in their territory (C. 1397, Sec.4), and forbid to\ntheir subjects those which they judge should be condemned (C. 1395,\nASec.1). The right and duty to forbid books for just cause belongs also\nto an Abbot of an independent monastery and to the Superior General of\na clerical exempt Institute acting with his Chapter or Council; nay,\nin case of urgency, it belongs also to the other Major Superiors with\ntheir proper Council, it being understood, however, that these must as\nsoon as possible report the matter to the Superior General (C. 1395,\nSec.3). Nevertheless, books which require a more expert scrutiny, or\nin regard to which, for salutary results, the judgment of the supreme\nauthority seems to be required, should be referred by the Ordinaries to\nthe judgment of the Holy See (C. 1397, Sec.5).\n\nIt is, of course, the duty of all the faithful, and especially of\nclerics, to denounce pernicious books to the proper authority; but this\nduty is especially incumbent on clerics who have some ecclesiastical\ndignity, such as the Legates of the Holy See and the Ordinaries of\nplaces, and on those who are eminent in doctrine, as for example the\nRectors and Professors of Catholic Universities.\n\nThe denunciation is to be made either to this Congregation of the Holy\nOffice or to the Ordinary of the place, giving by all means the reason\nwhy it is thought the book should be forbidden. The persons to whom\nsuch a report is made have a strict duty to keep secret the names of\nthose who make it (C. 1397, Sec.1, 2, 3).\n\nFinally, Ordinaries of places and others who have the care of souls\nshould duly inform the faithful of the following:\n\na) The prohibition of books has the effect that, unless due permission\nis obtained, the forbidden book may not be published, nor republished\n(without making the corrections and obtaining due approbation), nor\nread, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor\nin any way communicated to other persons (C. 1398, Sec.1, 2);\n\nb) Books condemned by the Holy See are considered as forbidden\neverywhere and in whatever language they may be translated (C. 1396);\n\nc) The positive ecclesiastical law forbids not only those books which\nare individually condemned by a special decree of the Holy See and\nplaced on the Index of Forbidden Books, or which are proscribed by\nparticular Councils or Ordinaries for their subjects, but also the\nbooks which are forbidden by the common law itself, that is, in virtue\nof the rules contained in Canon 1399, which forbids in a general manner\nnearly all books which are bad and harmful in themselves;\n\nd) The natural law forbids the reading of any book which occasions\nproximate spiritual danger, since it forbids anyone to place himself in\ndanger of losing the true faith or good morals; accordingly, permission\nto use forbidden books, from whomsoever it be obtained, in no way\nexempts from this prohibition of the natural law (C. 1405, Sec.1).\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX II\n\nThe \u201cEcumenical Movement\u201d\n[placed at end of Volume I, after the preceding Appendix, in print\nedition]\n\nOn December 20, 1949 the Holy Office issued an instruction on the\n\u201cEcumenical Movement\u201d addressed to all local Ordinaries. In its\nprefatory remarks the Instruction insisted upon the Church\u2019s intense\ninterest to attain to the full and perfect unity of the Church. It\nnoted as an occasion of joy the desire of many separated from the\nChurch to return to the unity of Christ\u2019s fold, a good intention,\nindeed, which, however, in being put into practice has not been\nregulated by right principles. Accordingly the Holy Office prescribed\nthat local Ordinaries maintain due vigilance over the associations\nseeking Church Unity, that they designate well-qualified priests to\npay close attention to everything which concerns the \u201cMovement,\u201d and\nthat they supervise publications on this matter by Catholics or by\nnon-Catholics, in as far as these are published, or read, or sold by\nCatholics. The manner and method of proceeding in this work is to be\nregulated by the Ordinaries, who are cautioned to prevent the growth of\nindifference to Catholic truth and fallacious hopes of unity based upon\nfalse or impossible foundations. With regard to mixed assemblies of\nCatholics and non-Catholics, when there seems to be hope of spreading\nknowledge of Catholic doctrine, the Ordinary is instructed to designate\nwell-qualified priests, to explain and defend the Church\u2019s teaching.\nSpecial permission, however, must be obtained from Ecclesiastical\nAuthority if Catholic laymen are to attend. Where no hope of good\nresults exists, the meetings are to be ended or gradually suppressed.\n\nThe following specific instructions are given for the conduct of\n\u201cEcumenical meetings.\u201d\n\nAll the aforesaid conferences and meetings, public and non-public,\nlarge and small, which are called for the purpose of affording an\nopportunity for the Catholic and the non-Catholic party, for the\nsake of discussion, to treat of matters of faith and morals, each\npresenting on even terms the doctrine of his own faith, are subject\nto the prescriptions of the Church which were recalled to mind in the\n_Monitum, \u201cCum compertum_\u201d of this Congregation under date of 5 June,\n1948. Hence, mixed congresses are not absolutely forbidden; but they\nare not to be held without the previous permission of the competent\nEcclesiastical Authority. The _Monitum_, however, does not apply to\ncatechetical instructions, even when given to many together, nor to\nconferences in which Catholic doctrine is explained to non-Catholics\nwho are prospective converts, even though the opportunity is afforded\nfor the non-Catholics to explain also the doctrine of their church so\nthat they may understand clearly and thoroughly in what respect it\nagrees with the Catholic doctrine and in what it differs therefrom.\n\nNeither does the said _Monitum_ apply to those mixed meetings of\nCatholics and non-Catholics in which the discussion does not turn upon\nfaith and morals, but upon ways and means of defending the fundamental\nprinciples of the natural law or of the Christian religion against the\nenemies of God who are now leagued together, or where the question is\nhow to restore social order, or other topics of that nature. Even in\nthese meetings, as is evident, Catholics may not approve or concede\nanything which is in conflict with divine revelation or with the\ndoctrine of the Church even on social questions.\n\nAs to local conferences and conventions which are within the scope of\nthe _Monitum_ as above explained, the Ordinaries of places are given,\nfor three years from the publication of this Instruction, the faculty\nof granting the required previous permission of the Holy See on the\nfollowing conditions:\n\n1. That _communicatio in sacris_ be entirely avoided;\n\n2, That the presentations of the matter be duly inspected and directed;\n\n3. That at the close of each year a report be made to this Supreme\nSacred Congregation, stating where such meetings were held and what\nexperience was gathered from them.\n\n4. As regards the colloquies of theologians above mentioned, the same\nfaculty for the same length of time is granted to the Ordinary of the\nplace where such colloquies are held, or to the Ordinary delegated for\nthis work by the common consent of the other Ordinaries, under the same\nconditions as above, but with the further requirement that the report\nto this Sacred Congregation state also what questions were treated, who\nwere present, and who the speakers were for either side.\n\nAs for the interdiocesan conferences and congresses, either national\nor international, the previous permission of the Holy See, special for\neach case, is always required; and, in the petition asking for it,\nmust also be stated what are the questions to be treated and who the\nspeakers are to be. And it is not allowed, before this permission has\nbeen obtained, to begin the external preparation of such meetings or to\ncollaborate with non-Catholics who begin such preparation.\n\n5. Although in all these meetings and conferences any communication\nwhatsoever in worship must be avoided, yet the recitation in common of\nthe Lord\u2019s Prayer or of some prayer approved by the Catholic Church, is\nnot forbidden for opening or closing the said meetings.\n\n6. Although each Ordinary has the right and duty to conduct, promote,\nand preside over this work in his own diocese, yet the cooperation of\nseveral Bishops will be appropriate or even necessary in establishing\noffices and works to observe, study, and control this work as a\nwhole. Accordingly it will rest with the Ordinaries themselves to\nconfer together and consider how a proper uniformity of action and\ncoordination can be obtained.\n\n7. Religious Superiors are bound to watch and to see to it that their\nsubjects adhere strictly and faithfully to the prescriptions laid down\nby the Holy See or by the local Ordinaries in this matter.\n\nIn order that so noble a work as the \u201cunion\u201d of all Christians in one\ntrue faith and Church may daily grow into a more conspicuous part of\nthe entire care of souls, and that the whole Catholic people may more\nearnestly implore this \u201cunion\u201d from Almighty God, it will certainly\nbe of assistance that in some appropriate way, for example through\nPastoral Letters, the faithful be instructed regarding these questions\nand projects, the prescriptions of the Church in the matter, and the\nreasons on which they are based. All, especially priests and religious,\nshould be exhorted and warmly encouraged to be zealous by their prayers\nand sacrifices to ripen and promote this work, and all should be\nreminded that nothing more effectively paves the way for the erring to\nfind the truth and to embrace the Church than the faith of Catholics,\nwhen it is confirmed by the example of upright living.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX TO VOLUMES I-II\n\nThe numbers refer to the sections in the text. Nos. 1-1625 are\ncontained in Volume I [of the print edition].\n\nAbjectedness, definition, 2561.\n\nAbnormal Mental States, as obstacles to voluntariness of acts, 40, 55;\neffect on voluntariness of acts, 55.\n\nAbortion, canonical penalties for, 1851 a.\n\nAbsolute Standard, in grave matter, 1899.\n\nAbstemiousness, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition,\n2466; degrees of abstemiousness, 2467 a; austerity, 2468; excellence of\nfasting and abstinence, 2469 a; sins opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a.\nSee also Gluttony; Sobriety.\n\nAbstinence, excellence of, 2469 a.\n\nAbstinence, Total, see Sobriety.\n\nAccession, title to private ownership, 1872 a; principles of accession,\n1874.\n\nAccusation, Judicial, obligation, 1966; when a malefactor is bound to\naccuse himself, 1968; ethical conditions for lawful accusation or\ndenunciation, 1969; persons who may not act as accusers, 1970; judicial\naccusation and fraternal correction, 1972; unjust accusation, 1973;\ncessation of duty of accusation, 1794. See also Complaint.\n\nAccused, see Defendant.\n\nAct, Virtuous, intrinsic and extrinsic modes of performing, 1554;\nessential and ideal modes, 1555.\n\nActs, Human, 22-62; definition, 23; knowledge requisite for, 24;\nignorance renders them involuntary, 28; effect of error, forgetfulness\nand inadvertence on, 32-33; consent requisite for, 34; free and\nnecessary, 35 a; perfectly and imperfectly voluntary, 35 b; voluntary\nabsolutely and under a certain aspect, 35 c; voluntary in themselves or\ndirectly and in their cause or indirectly, 35 d; voluntary, approvingly\nand permissively, 36; omissions, 37-39; obstacles which destroy or\nlessen voluntariness, 40 sqq.; voluntary acts either elicited or\ncommanded by the will, 56-62; intellectual, 61-62; sensible, 61-62;\nexternal corporal, 61-62; morality of, 63 sqq.; acts forbidden to\nclerics, 2603 a.\n\nActs, Meritorious, 106 sqq.\n\nActs, Moral, 63 sqq.; good, 76-78; bad, 79-80; indifferent, 82 sqq.;\nmorality of external act, 89 sqq.; morality of act indirectly willed,\n94-95; morality of consequences of act, 96, imputability, 97 sqq,;\nimputability in cases of double result, 103 sqq.; acts that are\nobjectively efficaciously and subjectively unjust, 1763 a, b, c. See\nalso Acts, Meritorious.\n\nActs of Charity, see Charity.\n\nActs of Faith, see Faith.\n\nActs of Hope, see Hope.\n\nActs, Voluntary, 35-39. See also Acts, Human.\n\nAdjuration, definition, 2263; species of adjuration, 2264; solemn or\nsimple adjuration, 2264 a; imperative or deprecative adjuration, 2264\nb; qualities of lawful adjuration, 2265; persons who may be adjured,\n2266; use of exorcisms, 2267; effects of adjurations, 2268.\n\nAdoration, see Religion.\n\nAdornment, when lascivious, 1456 b.\n\nAdulation, sin against affability, 2423 a.\n\nAdultery, definition, 2530; sinfulness of adultery, 2530 b; degrees of\nmalice, 2530 c.\n\nAdvertence, full and partial, 174 sqq., 153, 196.\n\nAdvisor, implicit, 1779 c.\n\nAeromancy, form of divination, 2284 G.\n\nAffability, virtue of, 2143 b; definition, 2421; offices of affability,\n2422; sins against affability, 2423.\n\nAffectation, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.\n\nAfflictions, Medicinal, as remedies against sin, 283.\n\n_Agapae_, in Early Church, 2185 a.\n\nAge of Reason, Puberty and Majority, 433.\n\nAgency, 1749 a.\n\nAggression, Unjust, 1831.\n\nAlbigensianism, 822 c.\n\nAlmsgiving, external effect of charity, 1210; definition, 1216; manner\nof giving, 1217; forms of almsgiving, 1218; seven corporal works of\nmercy, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222; comparison of corporal and\nspiritual alms, 1224; duty of almsgiving, 1226 sqq.; three classes of\nneedy persons distinguished, 1233; three degrees of corporal need,\n1236; rules on giving alms, 1237; gravity of the obligation, 1238;\nrefusal of alms and restitution, 1240; alms from ill-gotten goods, 1241\nsqq.; almsgiving from the goods of another, 1244-1246; order of charity\nin almsgiving, 1247; amount to be given, 1249, 1253; employment as\nalms, 1249 b; when alms are excessive, 1250; clerics and almsgiving,\n1252; time for almsgiving, 1255; manner, 1256; public charity cannot\ntake the place of almsgiving, 1257.\n\nAlphonsus Liguori, Saint, preference for Equiprobabilism, 696, 697,\n698; on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to his personal\nknowledge, 1951 c.\n\nAmbiguous Answers, lawfulness of, 2402.\n\nAmbition, as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness of soul,\n2450 b.\n\nAmendment, Resolution of, 2736.\n\nAmerican Law on Bankruptcy, 1788.\n\nAmusements, forbidden to Clerics, 2603 c.\n\nAnarchists, condemned by Church, 947 b.\n\nAnger, 269; immediate cause of fighting, 1431; a cause of contumely,\n2017 c; definition, 2546; gravity of the sin of anger, 2547; anger\ncompared with hatred and envy, 2548; one of the seven capital vices,\n2549.\n\nAnnuities, 1749 b.\n\nAnti-Nationalism, sin against piety, 2349 b.\n\nAnti-Tutiorism, 672 b.\n\nApology, as reparation for contumely, 2023 b; manner of apologizing,\n2024.\n\nApostasy, definition, 835; comparative gravity of sins of apostasy,\n837; objectively speaking, no reason can justify apostasy, 838;\napostasy to non-Catholic and anti-Catholic sects, 839.\n\nAppeal, right of accused, 1982.\n\nAppetites, Sensible, 46.\n\nAppetites, Sensitive, as subject of sin, 231.\n\nAppetites, Spiritual, 46.\n\nArianism, 822 c.\n\nArt, intellectual virtue, 146 b; one of the two practical virtues of\nintellect, 1627 a.\n\nAssent, External and Internal, 760 a, b; objects, 761 d.\n\nAssistant Priest, special duties of, 2607 c.\n\nAstrology, a form of divination, 2285 c.\n\nAstuteness, a form of evil prudence, 1651 a.\n\nAttrition, see Contrition.\n\nAugury, a form of divination, 2285 d.\n\nAuspice, a form of divination, 2285 d.\n\nAusterity, nature and kinds, 2468.\n\nAuthority, can supply indirect certitude, 652; kind necessary to make\nopinion solidly probable, 707.\n\nAvarice, 269; opposed to liberality, 2426; comparison of avarice and\nprodigality, 2429.\n\nBackbiting, see Defamation.\n\nBailments, 1749.\n\nBankruptcy in American Law, 1788.\n\nBaptism, Sacrament of, faith necessary for adult candidate, 791;\nthe most necessary Sacrament, 2686; effect is regeneration, 2686 a;\nmaterial element of Baptism, 2686 b; formal element, 2686 c; Solemn\nBaptism, 2637 a; Private Baptism, 2687 b; duties of pastors, 2688;\nduties of parents and guardians, 2689; sponsors required by Church\nfrom very early times, 2690; requirements for validity and lawfulness\nof sponsors, 2690 a, b; duties of sponsors, 2691; duties of adult\nrecipients of Baptism, 2692; duties of minister of Baptism, 2693.\n\nBarter, 1749 c.\n\nBeatitudes, 159 c, 164, 1662; rewards promised, 165; Third, 811; First,\n1058; Seventh, 1619; Sixth, 1662; Fourth and Fifth, 2433; Eighth, 2457;\nSecond, 2571.\n\nBeneficence, external effect of charity, 1211 sqq.; regulated by\nthe order of charity, 1213-15; sins against, 1444 sqq. See Scandal;\nObscenity; Seduction; Cooperation.\n\nBenefices, Ecclesiastical, 1758; institution of benefices, 2185 h.\n\nBestiality, form of impurity, 2534 d.\n\nBetrothal, duties of persons engaged to marry, 2627; duties imposed by\nengagement to marry, 2628; courtship, 2628; duty to manifest defects,\n2628 b; fidelity during the engagement, 2628 c; right to manifest\naffection, 2628 c; formal promise to marry imposes duty of marriage\nwithin a reasonable time, 2628 d; breaking of engagement, 2628 d; duty\nof restitution in breach of promise, 2628 d; signs of affection between\nengaged persons, 2629.\n\nBills, unjust refusal to pay, 1794.\n\nBirth-Control, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.\n\nBishop, interpreter of diocesan laws, 486; special duties, 2607 a.\n\nBlackstone, on purely penal character of civil laws, 570 b.\n\nBlasphemy, Sin of, 887 sqq.; heretical and non-heretical, 889;\ninterpreting cases of doubtful blasphemy, 894; sinfulness of blasphemy,\n895; the greatest sin against faith, 895 b; species of blasphemy, 897;\ncircumstances which aggravate, 897 d; blasphemies against the Three\nDivine Persons, 898; despair and presumption as blasphemy, 899 a; sin\nagainst Holy Ghost, 900; state of malicious sin, 901; remedies against\nblasphemy, 902; absolution, 903.\n\nBlessed Sacrament, Confraternities of, 955 a.\n\nBluntness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.\n\nBonaventure, Saint, on obligation of judge when evidence is contrary to\nhis personal knowledge, 1951 c.\n\nBond, definition of, 1886 a.\n\nBonds, purchase by clerics, 2605 e.\n\nBooks, when obscene, 1456 e; forbidden, see Writings, Forbidden.\n\nBooty, obligation to make restitution, 1414.\n\nBorrowing, Sinful, 1879 b.\n\nBrahmanism, 822 a.\n\nBreach of Promise, damages resultant on, 1888 a.\n\nBribery, Judicial, see Judge.\n\nBroth, use forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.\n\nBuddhism, 822 a.\n\nBuying and Selling, 1749 b.\n\nCalumny, definition, 2030 e; worst kind of defamation, 2032 d. See also\nDefamation.\n\nCandidates for Public Office, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.\n\nCapital Vices, Seven, 269 sqq.\n\nCarbonari, forbidden by Church, 947 h.\n\nCardinal Virtues, 150. See also Prudence; Justice; Fortitude;\nTemperance.\n\nCarelessness, caused by sloth, 1324, 1326 c, 1327.\n\nCasuistic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.\n\nCatholic Daughters of America, 955 b.\n\nCaution, integral part of prudence, 108 b.\n\nCelibacy, origin and obligation, 2602 a.\n\nCensorship, Government, not desirable, 1458 e.\n\nCensures, by the Church, 761 c.\n\nCeremonial Law, see Law, Mosaic.\n\nCertainty, of knowledge, 1630; certainty of practical truth, 1630.\n\nCertitude, necessary for prudence, 1630.\n\nCertitude of Conscience, necessity, 641-642; kinds, 643 sqq.;\nmetaphysical, physical and moral, 644 sqq.; speculative and practical,\n647; demonstrative and probable, 649; direct and indirect, 651;\nprinciple of authority and reflex principles supply indirect certitude,\n652.\n\nCharity, theological virtue of, 151; compared with faith and hope,\n157; remains in the blessed, 158; Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163;\ndefinition, 1105; charity and natural love, 1106 sqq.; true friendship\nwith God, 1112; uncreated and created charity, 1113-1114; excellence\nof, 1115; charity and beatific vision, 1116; production of charity,\n1121; origin, 1122; may be increased, 1124; perfect charity, 1129;\nthree degrees, 1130; decline of charity, 1131; loss of, 1132; object\nof, 1133; love of creatures not always charity, 1134; sinful, natural\nand supernatural self-love, 1136; friendship and charity, 1137-1141;\nlove of neighbor, 1139; charity for sinners, 1142-1147; for enemies,\n1148 sqq.; common signs of charity, 1154; refusal of greeting a lack\nof charity, 1157; general order of charity, 1158; character of love of\nGod, 1160 sqq.; sacrifice of spiritual goods for neighbor\u2019s sake, 1163;\nlove of the body, 1164; order of charity between neighbors, 1171 sqq.;\norder of charity between relations, 1176 sqq.; acts of, 1183 sqq.;\nexercise of act, 1184; internal effects of charity, 1103; joy, 1194;\npeace, 1195 sqq.; reconciliation with God effected by charity, 1196;\nwhat reconciliation with enemies demands, 1198; manner and time of\nseeking reconciliation, 1202 sqq.; external effects of charity, 1210;\nbeneficence (q.v.), 1211; almsgiving (q.v.), 1216; fraternal correction\n(q.v.), 1258 sqq.; hate (q.v.), 1295 sqq.; sins against peace, 1347\nsqq.; opposition between schism and charity, 1371; schism greatest sin\nagainst neighbor, 1372; duty of owner towards one in dire need, 1925 a.\n\nCharity, Commandments of, in Old Testament, 1547 a; in New Testament,\n1547 b; precepts of secondary acts of charity, 1551; prohibitions of\nuncharitableness, 1552; commandment of love of God, 1553 sqq.; modes\nof performing act of love of God, 1554-1555; must be subjectively\nand objectively great, 1556; actual and habitual, 1557; degrees of\nperfection of this act, 1560; commandment of love of self, 1561;\npursuit of supernatural, intellectual and corporal goods, 1563-1564;\ncare of the mind, 1564; commandment of love of neighbor, 1579 sqq.;\nconditions, 1582; fulfillment of the commandments of charity, 1585\nsqq.; various ways of fulfillment, 1586; external acts must be\naccompanied by internal love, 1588; internal act must be explicit,\n1589; proper intention, 1590; obligation is universal, 1592; times\nwhen the precepts of charity oblige, 1593 sqq.; ignorance as excuse\nfor omission, 1596; cases when love of neighbor must be explicit,\n1603; necessity of habit of charity, 1604; order of charity is also\ncommanded, 1606.\n\nChastity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; subjective part of temperance,\n2465 a; definition of chastity, 2486; fruit of Fear of the Lord, 2571\nc; vow and virtue of chastity, 2612 b.\n\nChauvinism, sin against piety, 2349 a.\n\nChildren, compensation of, 2631; sex education of children, 2632;\nduties of children, charity and piety, 2633; special love of parents,\n2633 a; respect and assistance owed to parents, 2633 b.\n\nChiromancy, form of divination, 2285 b.\n\nChristian Doctrine, Confraternities of, 955 a.\n\nChristian Science, 823 b; refusal of medicine or hygienic care, 2304.\n\nCircumspection, 1638 b.\n\nClairvoyance, form of divination, 2285 a.\n\nClemency, definition, 2551; vices opposed to clemency, 2552 a.\n\nClergy, duty of charity to the poor, 2608 a; disposition of superfluous\nwealth by beneficed clergy, 2609 a. See also Clerics.\n\nClerics, special duties of, 2596; duties before entering clerical\nstate, 2596 a; duties after entering clerical state, 2596 b; internal\nvocation, 2597 a; external vocation, 2597 b; sinfulness of disregarding\nvocation, 2598 a; positive duties of clerics, 2599 a; obligation of\nDivine Office, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of Divine Office,\n2601 a; precept of clerical celibacy, 2602 a; negative duties of\nclerics, 2603; forbidden acts, 2603 a; forbidden occupations, 2603 b;\nforbidden amusements, 2603 c; prohibition against trading, 2604 a;\nclerics and purchase and sale of stocks and bonds, 2605 a; duties of\nclerical superiors, 2606 a; special duties of those who have care of\nsouls, 2607 a.\n\nClients, duties to lawyers, 2651 b.\n\nCoercion, as obstacle to consent, 40; effect on voluntariness of acts,\n52.\n\nCoition, Unnatural, form of impurity, 2534 b.\n\nCommandments, natural and supernatural, 330; of faith, 913 sqq.; hope,\n1092 sqq.; charity, 1547 sqq.; prudence, 1657; justice, 2434-2436;\nfortitude, 2458-2460; temperance, 2572.\n\nCommandments, Ten, 2436 sqq.\n\n_Commodatum_, 1749 a.\n\nCommunication, Dangerous, 882 sqq.; civil and religious communication,\n882; when non-religious communication is sinful, 883; when religious\ncommunication is sinful, 884; communication in worship, 956 sqq.;\nprivate and public, 956; participation of non-Catholics in Catholic\nworship, 957-958; restriction of this participation, 959; performance\nof Catholic rites by non-Catholics, 960.\n\nCommunion, Holy, minister, 2703; recipient of the Eucharist, 2704;\npersons who may receive Communion, 2704 a; persons who must receive\nCommunion, 2704 b; requirements in candidates for First Communion, 2704\nb; dispositions for worthy Communion, 2705; confession, preparation and\nthanksgiving, 2705 a; Rite in which Communion may be received, 2705\na; dispositions of body (Eucharistic fast and external reverence),\n2705 b; necessary dispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 a; useful\ndispositions for frequent Communion, 2706 b; duties of parents, pastors\nand confessors in reference to Communion, 2707. See also Eucharist,\nHoly.\n\nCommutations, involuntary, 1748 a; voluntary, 1748 b.\n\nCommutative Justice, see Justice.\n\nCompensation, various kinds of, 1927; lawfulness of occult\ncompensation, 1928; unlawful occult compensation and restitution,\n1929; conditions required by commutative justice for occult\ncompensation, 1930; occult compensation in doubt of law, 1931 b;\nwhere there is strict right to compensation, 1932; where there is no\nright to compensation, 1933; compensation of children and employees,\n1934; conditions required by legal justice for occult compensation,\n1935; conditions required by charity for occult compensation, 1936;\nlawfulness of open compensation, 1937.\n\nCompensationism, 731 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.\n\nComplaint, duty of making complaint about private wrongs, 1967; persons\nin whose favor one may denounce a private wrong, 1971. See also\nAccusation, Judicial.\n\nComplicity, see Cooperation.\n\nConcupiscible Passions, 118-119. See also Passions.\n\nCondemnations, of error by the Church, 761 b.\n\nCondign Merit, see Merit.\n\nCondiments, not forbidden on Friday, 2586 c.\n\nConfession, see Penance, Sacrament of.\n\nConfessors, duties of, regarding obligation of restitution, 1760; need\nof prudence, 1650 a. See also Penance, Sacrament of.\n\nConfirmation, Sacrament of, 2694; remote and proximate matter,\n2694 a; form, 2694 b; minister of Confirmation, 2695; recipient of\nConfirmation, 2696; sponsors in Confirmation, 2697; qualifications\nand duties of sponsors, 2697 a, b; duties of pastor in reference to\nConfirmation, 2698.\n\nConfucianism, 822 a.\n\nCongruous Merit, see Merit.\n\nConscience, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 575; variously divided,\n576; true or false, 577; good (right) or bad (wrong), 578 a; certain\nor uncertain, 578 b; obligation of, 580; authority not unlimited, 581;\nno autonomous morality, 581 a; when conscience must be followed, 582;\nerroneous and doubtful conscience, 585; results of following erroneous\nconscience, 588; results of disobeying erroneous conscience, 589-591;\na good conscience, 593 sqq.; antecedent and consequent conscience,\n594; vigilant, tender and timorous conscience, 595; scrupulous\nconscience, 596; lax conscience, 596 sqq.; malicious or non-malicious\nlaxity (reprobate or weak conscience), 598; partial or entire laxity,\n599-600; Pharisaic conscience, 600; inculpable and culpable laxity,\n601; causes of a lax conscience, 601; dangers of lax conscience, 602;\nrules regarding sins due to lax conscience, 603-604; opinion as state\nof conscience, 662 sqq.; remedies for lax conscience, 605; scrupulous\ndiffers from strict (tender) conscience, 607 a; scrupulous conscience\ndiffers from scrupulosity, 607 b; rules regarding scrupulous conscience\nand sins, 608; dangers of scrupulous conscience, 609; perplexed\nconscience, 611 sqq.; directions of St. Alphonsus regarding perplexed\nconscience, 612; scrupulosity, 614 sqq.; distinct from scrupulous\nconscience, 614 a; from a tender conscience, 614 b; from anxious,\ndoubtful or guilty conscience, 614 c; chief subjects of scruples, 615;\nsigns of scrupulosity, 616; internal causes of scrupulous conscience,\n617; external causes, 618; sometimes tolerated by God, 619; dangers of\nscrupulosity, 620; rules for the scrupulous, 621; qualities necessary\nfor successful direction of scrupulous, 625; scrupulous and past\nconfessions, 626; scrupulous and present confessions, 627; scrupulous\nand performance of duties, 628; scrupulous and commission of sin,\n630; remedies for scruples, 632 sqq.; signs of a good conscience,\n638; certain conscience, 640 sqq.; kinds of certitude, 643 sqq.;\nuncertain conscience, 654-655; doubt and suspicion, 656; presumption,\n658; reflex principles to settle doubts, 657 sqq.; opinion, 662\nsqq.; accusing or excusing, 668 a; forbidding or permitting, 668 b;\nthe moral systems, 672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 676 sqq.; Laxism, 680 sqq.;\nProbabiliorism, 683 sqq.; Equiprobabilism, 688 sqq.; Probabilism, 701\nsqq.; Compensationism, 731 sqq.; respective merits and use of the rival\nsystems of conscience, 740 sqq.; use by confessors, 741.\n\nConscience, Systems of, see Systems, Moral, and Conscience.\n\nConsent, act of will, 59; consent of the will, condition of mortal\nsin, 178, 184, 196; obstacles to, see Obstacles to Consent; qualities\nnecessary for valid consent, 1883; defects that invalidate consent,\n1884.\n\nConsolations, Spiritual, differ from devotion, 2151 b.\n\nContention, definition, 1355; sinfulness, 1357; causes, 1362.\n\nContinence, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; nature of, 2544.\n\nContinency, fruit of Fear of the Lord, 163, 2571 c.\n\nContraception, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.\n\nContract, forms of, 1749; gratuitous contracts, 1749 a; contract\nas title to private ownership, 1892 b; elements of contract, 1877;\nsubject-matter of contract, 1878; when contracts are immoral, 1878\na; sinful contracts, 1879; qualities necessary for valid consent,\n1833; defects that invalidate consent, 1884; when fear invalidates\nconsent to contract, 1884 c; form of contract, 1885; accidentals\nof a contract, 1886; conditions added to contract, 1886 c; modes\nof contract, 1886 d; obligation of entering into contract, 1887 a;\nobligation of valid contract, 1888; quality of obligation in onerous\nand gratuitous contracts, 1588 a; quantity of obligation in onerous and\ngratuitous contracts, 1888 b; objects of obligation of contract, 1888\nd; obligation of quasi-contract, 1888 d; cessation of obligation, 1889;\nunilateral and bilateral contracts, 1749 a; onerous contracts, 1749\nb, c; subsidiary contracts, 1749 d; immoral contracts, 1878 d; sinful\ncontracts, 1879; illegal contracts, 1880; unenforceable contracts, 1880\na; voidable contracts, 1880 c; contracts _ipso facto_ void, 1880 d;\nqualities necessary in the parties contractant, 1881; legal privileges\nof minors in connection with contracts, 1882; principles obligatory in\nall forms of contracts, 2137; gratuitous contracts, 2137 a; onerous\ncontracts, 2137 b; aleatory contracts, 2137 c; fraudulent contracts,\n2138.\n\nContractor\u2019s Agreement, 1749 b.\n\nContrition, the first act of the penitent, 2729; perfect contrition,\n2730 a; imperfect contrition or attrition, 2730 b; attrition based\nsolely on fear of punishment, 2731; servile fear of God, 2731 b;\nslavish fear, 2731 b; attrition in the Sacrament of Penance, 2732;\ndisinterested love not required in Penance, 2732 b; interested love\nnecessary in Penance, 2732 e; conditions for valid contrition and\nattrition, 2733; internal sorrow; 2733 a; supernatural sorrow, 2733\nb; universal sorrow, 2733 c; sovereign sorrow, 2733 d; properties of\ncontrition, 2735.\n\nContumely, definition, 2010; various forms of, 2012; manner of\nconfessing contumely in Sacrament of Penance, 2013; sinfuless of\ncontumely, 2014; gravity of matter in contumely, 2015; causes of\ncontumely, 2017; duty of bearing with contumely, 2018; reasons for\nresistance to contumely or detraction, 2019; duty of one who answers\ncontumely or detraction, 2020; duty of restitution for contumely, 2021;\nwhat kind of reparation should be made, 2023; method of apologizing\nfor contumely, 2024; cessation of obligation of restitution, 2026; the\ndifferences between defamation and contumely, 2029.\n\nCooperation, and restitution, 1775; positive cooperators in injury,\n1779; negative cooperators, 1780; distinction between cooperators\nas equal or unequal causes of injury, 1782; cooperation in suicide,\n1855; cooperation in defamation, 2076 sqq.; cooperation in sinful\noaths, 2252; cooperation in divination or other form of superstition,\n2296; cooperation in the sin of drunkenness, 2483 a; cooperation and\nrestitution, see Restitution. See also Cooperation in Sin.\n\nCooperation in Religious Activities, 976 sqq.; immediate and mediate,\n976 sqq.; lawfulness of material cooperation, 978; most usual cases\nof cooperation, 980; contributions to false worship, 981; building of\nhouses of false worship, 983-984; preparing for non-Catholic services,\n985-986; resemblance to scandal, 1460 b.\n\nCooperation in Sin, definition, 1506; how it differs from complicity,\n1507; formal or material, 1508 a; positive or negative, 1508 b;\noccasional or effective, 1509 a; immediate or mediate, 1509 b;\nindispensable or not indispensable, 1509 c; unjust or unlawful, 1510;\nexplicit or implicit, 1511; proximate or remote, 1512; sinfulness,\n1513; lawfulness of material cooperation, 1515; gravity of reasons\nnecessary for cooperation, 1520 sqq.; lawfulness of immediate\ncooperation, 1526; special cases, 1528; formal cooperation with evil\nreading matter, 1529; with evil dances or plays, 1531; material\ncooperation with evil dances or plays, 1532; cooperation by manufacture\nof sinful objects, 1533 sqq.; cooperation in supplying food and\ndrink, 1537-1539; in renting houses, rooms, etc., 1540-1541; lawful\nand unlawful cooperation of employees, 1542; duties of confessors,\n1545-1546.\n\nCorrection, Fraternal, definition, 1258; distinct from judicial\ncorrection and censure of vice, 1258 a, e; includes prevention of sin,\n1258 d; duty, 1259-1261, 1282, 1284; when advisable and inadvisable,\n1262-1263; doubtful cases, 1264; sin committed by omission or delay,\n1265-1266; when person not a superior should make correction, 1267;\nobligation of inquiring into suspected wrongdoing, 1269; private spying\nuncharitable, 1269 c; faults that call for correction, 1270 sqq.;\ncorrection of vincibly and invincibly ignorant, 1273 sqq.; past sins do\nnot demand correction, 1276; persons to be corrected, 1277; correction\nof superior, 1278; persons to administer correction, 1279; persons\nexcused from duty, 1283; manner of correction, 1285-1291; secret and\npublic corrections, 1286; obligation of reporting an occult sin, 1287;\nduties of superior when subject is reported for fraternal correction,\n1292-1293; obligations for private individuals summarized, 1294.\n\nCouncil of Trent, Catechism of the, points about which explicit faith\nis required, 765.\n\nCounsel, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a.\n\nCounsels of New Testament, 7, 364 sqq.; the three chief, 368;\nsuperiority of, 366.\n\nCounterclaim, definition, 1927 a.\n\nCourage, inferior to justice, 1716 a.\n\nCourtship, see Betrothal.\n\nCowardice, caused by sloth, 1324; sin against fortitude, 2446 b.\n\nCreditors, order of preference among, 1787.\n\nCredulity, 847.\n\nCreed, knowledge of necessary, 920.\n\nCreeds, summarize formulas of Christian teaching, 767; what articles\ndeal with, 767; Apostles\u2019, Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; Summary\nof teaching of Apostles\u2019 Creed, 770 sqq.\n\nCremation, societies for the promotion of, forbidden by Code, 946 b;\ncremation of corpses, 2595 b.\n\nCriticism, when sinful, 2038; when injustice is committed by\nprofessional critics, 2075.\n\nCruelty, vice opposed to clemency, 2552 a.\n\nCulpability, see Guilt.\n\nCunning, 1651 a.\n\nCuriosity, compared with impurity, 2492 a.\n\nCursing, definition, 2111; when cursing is not sinful, 2112; sinfulness\nof cursing, 2113; gravity of sin of cursing, 2114; circumstances that\nchange moral species of cursing, 2115; numerical multiplication in\nsins of cursing, 2116; cursing of evil, 2117; unlawful cursing of an\nirrational creature, 2119.\n\nCustom, effect on law, 391 sqq.; kinds of, 392. See also Customs in\nCanon Law.\n\nCustoms in Canon Law, 506 sqq.; may interpret, abrogate or introduce\nlaw, 506; kinds of, 507; origin of, 508 a; legal force of, 508 b; time\nrequired for acquisition of legal force, 511; cessation of, 513.\n\n_Damnum_, definition, 1724 b.\n\nDances, when obscene, 1456 d; evil, formal cooperation with, 1531;\nevil, material cooperation with, 1532.\n\nDanger, of formal sin, 675 a, 678; of material sin, 675 b.\n\nDangerous Reading, see Reading, Dangerous.\n\nDebates on Religion, generally inexpedient, 998.\n\nDebt, moral and legal debt, 1692, 2141-43; moral degrees of, 2143.\n\nDebt, Conjugal, 2614-17.\n\nDecalogue, invincible ignorance of generally impossible, 321; Laws\nof the First and Second Tables, 338; the precepts contained in the\nDecalogue, 2436.\n\nDeceit, form of lying, 2391 b.\n\nDecency, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition of decency,\n2486 b.\n\nDecision, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 b.\n\nDefamation, definition, 2028; self-defamation, 2028 e; different forms\nof defamation, 2030; differences between defamation and contumely,\n2029; implicit and explicit defamation, 2030 b; direct and indirect\ndefamation, 2030 d; examples of indirect defamation, 2031; examples of\ndirect defamation, 2032; defamation by innuendo, 2033 a; defamation by\nplain speech, 2033 b; sinfulness of detraction, 2036; right to true and\nfalse reputation, 2037; sinfulness of gossip or criticism about real\nand known defects, 2038; moral species of defamation, 2039; species\nof sins of defamation, 2040; numerical multiplication of defamations,\n2041; theological species of defamation, 2042; harm done by defamation,\n2043; comparison of defamation with other injuries against neighbor,\n2044; rule for determining seriousness of defamation, 2046; harm done\nby reason of defects revealed, 2047; revelation of secret faults,\n2048; harm done by reason of person defamed, 2049; meaning of the\nexpression \u201cinfamous in a certain place,\u201d 2051 sqq.; revelation about\na person juridically in disrepute elsewhere, 2054; revelation about a\nperson actually in disrepute elsewhere, 2055; notoriety in a closed\ncommunity, 2057; revelation about a person formerly in disrepute,\n2058; when the name of person defamed is not given, 2059; defamation\nof deceased and legal persons, 2060; harm done by reason of person of\ndefamer, 2061; defamation at second hand, 2062; harm done by reason of\nlisteners, 2063; detraction to one discreet person, 2065; belittling\na person to himself, 2066; disclosing matters detrimental to third\nparty, 2067; rights that have precedence over false reputation, 2068;\nunlawful attack on another\u2019s false reputation, 2069; conditions that\njustify revelation of another\u2019s defects, 2070; revelations about\npublic officials or candidates for public office, 2071; revelations\nabout historical personages, 2072; revelations about persons who\nfigure in news of day, 2074; injustice in professional critics, 2075;\ncooperation in defamation, 2076; direct consent to defamation, 2077;\npersons who listen to defamation from curiosity, 2078; sinfulness of\nindirect consent to defamation, 2079; guilt of superior who consents to\ndefamation, 2080; circumstances which lessen guilt of indirect consent,\n2082; inaction in face of defamation, 2083; ways of opposing defamation\nmade in one\u2019s presence, 2084; restitution for defamation, 2085; gravity\nof obligation of restitution, 2086; conditions which entail duty of\nrestitution, 2087; cooperators and restitution, 2088; circumstances\nof restitution, 2089; persons by whom restitution must be made, 2089,\n2090; persons to whom restitution must be made, 2001; responsibility\nof defamer for spread of defamation, 2092; first way of making\nrestitution, 2093; other methods of making restitution, 2094; legal\nreparation for defamation, 2095; time when restitution for defamation\nis to be made, 2096; cessation of duty of restitution, 2097; excuses\nfrom restitution, 2098 sqq.; right of defamed person to condone injury,\n2101. See also Derision; Tale-Bearing; Reputation.\n\nDefects, Natural, of fallen man, 283.\n\nDefendant, definition, 1975; duties of defendant in civil cases, 1976;\nduties in criminal cases, 1977; duty of accused to plead guilty, 1978;\nrights and duties of accused in conducting own defense, 1980; rights\nand duties of accused who has been found guilty, 1982.\n\nDefense of Self, see Self-Defense.\n\nDefinitions of the Church, solemn and ordinary, 761 b; by the Church,\n761 c.\n\nDefloration, definition, 2529.\n\nDeism, 847 b.\n\nDeliberation, Wise, potential part of prudence, 1646 a.\n\nDelight, 119.\n\nDemerit, definition, 107.\n\nDemon, The, 284.\n\nDenunciation, see Accusation, Judicial; Complaint.\n\nDeposit, 1749 a.\n\nDerision, definition, 2106; distinction between derision and jesting,\n2107; sinfulness of derision, 2109.\n\nDesire, 119; sinful, 237 sqq.\n\nDesires, Evil, 232, 240 sqq.\n\nDesires, Impure, see Impurity.\n\nDespair, definition, 1061; despondency, 1062; pusillanimity and\nspiritual sloth, 1064; despair of unbelief, 1065; signs indicating\ndespair, 1057; malice of despair, 1068; despair compared with other\nsins, 1070; causes of despair, 1071; remedies for, 1074; caused by\nsloth, 1324.\n\nDetraction, reasons for resistance to contumely or detraction, 2019;\nduty of one who answers contumely or detraction, 2020; definition, 2030\nc. See also Defamation.\n\nDevotion, definition of, 2150; differs from emotion, 2151 e; from\nspiritual consolations, 2151 b; external and internal cause of\ndevotion, 2152.\n\nDevotions, different forms of, 2151 c.\n\nDiscord, 1347 sqq.; definition, 1348; sinfulness of intentional and\nunintentional, 1350-1351; origin, 1354; prohibition against, 1552.\n\nDisobedience, see Obedience.\n\nDispensation from Law, 401; who may be dispensed? 403.\n\nDispensations, in the strict or wide sense, 309, 524 sqq.; differ from\nprivileges, 524; persons who can grant dispensations, 525-530; manner\nof seeking, 531; how invalidated, 533; when dispensation is refused,\n534; interpretation of faculty of dispensing, 536-537; cessation of,\n537-541.\n\nSee also Matrimony, Sacrament of; Vows.\n\nDistractions, see Prayer.\n\nDistributive Justice, see Justice.\n\nDivination, see Religion, Sins against.\n\nDivining Rods, and divination, 2284 c.\n\nDivorce, books in favor of divorce forbidden, 855 b. See also\nMatrimony, Sacrament of.\n\nDocility, integral part of prudence, 1637 b.\n\nDoctors, as source of Moral Theology, 10.\n\nDomicile, true and quasi-domicile, 436.\n\nDouble Result, effect on imputability of acts, 103 sqq.\n\nDoubt, 655 sqq.; positive or negative, 655; as state of conscience,\n656 sqq.; reflex principles for solution of doubt, 657 sqq.; cases of\nnegative doubt to be settled in favor of obligation, 661; negative\ndoubt of law, 709 a; of fact, 709 b-c; rash doubts, 1743; supervening\ndoubt of possessor in doubtful faith, 1776; antecedent doubt of\npossessor in doubtful faith, 1777.\n\nDoubt, Sin of, 840 sqq.; methodical and real, 840-841; involuntary,\nindeliberate, unwelcome and ignorant, 842; negative, 844; positive,\n845; passing and permanent, 846.\n\nDress, when lascivious, 1456 b; modesty in, 2569 a.\n\nDruggists, duties of, 2651 c.\n\nDrunkenness, sin against sobriety, 2476 b; passive drunkenness, 2477\na; degrees of the sin of drunkenness, 2479 a; malice of the sin, 2480\na; drunkenness compared with other sins, 2481 a; responsibility of\ndrunkard for sins committed while intoxicated, 2482 a; cooperation in\nthe sin of drunkenness, 2483.\n\nDuelling, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1435;\nmorality of, 1436; fallacy of arguments for, 1437; penalties against,\n1438.\n\nDulia, species of reverence, 2325 c; obligation of religious cult of\ndulia, 2354.\n\nDuties, with regard to habits, 140; of man, 744 sqq.\n\nEaster Communion, obligation of, 2592 sqq.\n\nEastern Star, among societies forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nEducation, neglect a sin against self, 1565.\n\nEffects of Omissions, may be directly and indirectly voluntary, 38-39.\n\nEgoism, sin against piety, 2349 b.\n\nElection, act of will, 59.\n\nEmbezzlement, definition, 1893 a.\n\nEmotion, differs from devotion, 2151 a.\n\nEmployees, duties in justice and charity, 2648. See also Employers.\n\nEmployers, duties in justice and charity, 2647; duties of, 2648; labor\ndisputes, 2649; obligation of giving employment, 2650.\n\nEmulation, distinct from envy, 1331 a, 1339; when it is a sin, 1332.\n\nEnemies, charity towards, 1148; general and special love of, 1151.\n\nEnfeeblement, definition, 1866 c.\n\nEngagement to Marry, see Betrothal.\n\nEnjoyment, see Relaxation.\n\nEnvy, 269; sin against charity, 1328 sqq.; definition, 1328; objects\nof, 1329; subjects of, 1330; distinct from emulation, fear and\nindignation, 1331; lawful and unlawful emulation, 1332; lawful and\nunlawful jealousy, 1333; lawful and unlawful grief at another\u2019s\nprosperity, 1334-1337; envy by nature a mortal sin, 1338; degrees of\ngravity, 1341; one of capital vices, 1342; how preeminent among sins,\n1344; useful considerations and practices against envy, 1345-1346;\nas origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; prohibition\nagainst, 1552.\n\nEpieikeia, 358; in human laws, 385, 411 sqq.; definition, 412; limits\non use, 414 sqq.; use in determining obligation of ecclesiastical laws,\n503; a. subjective part of justice, 2144. See also Equity.\n\nEquiprobabilism 688 sqq. See also Systems, Moral.\n\nEquity, subjective part of justice, 2430; greatness of legal equity,\n2432; definition of equity, 2431.\n\nError, resembles ignorance, 32; practical and speculative, effect on\ngravity of sin, 249; may diminish theological guilt, 1764 b.\n\nEscape from Prison, when licit, 1982 b.\n\nEspousals, see Betrothal.\n\nEthics, and Moral Theology, 2.\n\nEucharist, Holy, 2699; the chief Sacrament of the Church, 2699;\nmatter and form of the Eucharist, 2700; qualities of the bread, 2700\na; qualities of the wine, 2700 b; grave precept of Church regarding\nthe form, 2700 c; minister of consecration, 2701; duties of minister\nas regards valid consecration, 2701 b; confession as preparation for\nconsecration, 2701 c; effect on consecration of inadvertent neglect of\ngrave liturgical precept, 2702; reservation of the Blessed Sacrament,\n2708; duty of custody, 2708 a; duty of renewal of hosts, 2708 b; duty\nof worship, 2708 c; visits to the Blessed Sacrament, 2708 c; Forty\nHours\u2019 Devotion, 2708 c. See also Communion, Holy; Mass, Sacrifice of\nthe.\n\nEugenical Sterilization, 1869 c.\n\nEuthanasia, definition, 2485.\n\nEutrapelia, virtue, 2421 e, 2567.\n\nExaggeration, form of defamation, 2032 c.\n\nExecutioners, become irregular by Canon Law, 1825.\n\nExorcisms, use of, 2267.\n\nExtreme Unction, see Unction, Extreme.\n\nFaith, Theological Virtue of, and Moral Theology, 2; definition, 151;\ncompared with charity, 157; ceases in the blessed, 158; excellence,\n747; utility, 748-749; meaning, 750; St. Paul\u2019s definition, 751;\nSt. Chrysostom\u2019s definition, 751 a; St. Thomas\u2019 definition, 751 b;\ndefinition by Vatican Council, 798; material and formal objects, 754;\ndivine and Catholic faith, 755; divine and ecclesiastical faith,\n756; private revelations, 757; human faith, 758 d; external and\ninternal assent, 760; solemn and ordinary definitions of Church, 761\nb; condemnations of error, 761 b; definitions and censures, 761 c;\nreligious assent, 761 d; explicit and implicit, 763 sqq.; obligation of\nexplicit faith, 928; points about which explicit faith is required by\nCatechism of Council of Trent, 765; faith is necessary for salvation,\n766; formulas summarized in Creeds, 767; increase in articles of faith,\n768; Apostles/ Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, 769; summary of teaching\nof Apostles\u2019 Creed, 770 sqq.; internal and external acts of faith, 782\nsqq.; supernatural and natural truths to which assent must be given,\n784; act of faith necessary, 785 sqq.; what must be believed with\nimplicit and explicit faith, 786; mysteries that must be believed, 787\nsqq., 918, 920; substantial and scientific knowledge of mysteries, 790;\nfaith necessary for absolution, 792; merit of the act of faith; assent\nof credibility, 795 a; preambles of faith, 795 b; habit of faith, 797;\nproperties of faith, 799; living and dead faith, 800; persons who have\nor had faith, 801; persons who have not faith, 802; how faith must be\nsupreme, 803 a; faith must be universal but not necessarily explicit,\n803 b; growth and decline of faith, 804-805; cause of faith, 806;\neffects, 807; internal and external dangers to, 848; dangerous reading,\n849 sqq.; dullness of understanding as sin, 912; blindness of mind as\nsin, 912; Commandments of, 913 sqq.; commandment of knowledge, 914;\nmeans of communicating knowledge, 915; degree of knowledge necessary,\n919; knowledge of Creed, Decalogue, virtues, Sacraments, duties of\none\u2019s state, Lord\u2019s Prayer, 920; means for retention of knowledge, 922;\nmemorizing of Catechism, 923; commandment of internal acts of faith,\n925; primary and secondary truths of revelation, 927; obligation of\naffirmative commandment, 929; when and how often act of faith should\nbe made, 933-935; formal and virtual act of faith, 936; commandment of\nexternal profession, 938 sqq.; denial of faith, 939; ways of denying\nfaith, 941; commandment of external profession, 987 sqq.; divine\nprecept of profession, 989; secret, private and public profession, 992\nsqq,; obligation to give instruction on matters of faith and morals,\n1001; ecclesiastical precept of profession, 1003; flight to avoid\nprofession, 1005; when concealment of one\u2019s faith is lawful, 1007; sins\nof unbelief, see Unbelief, Sin of. See also Unbelief; Heresy; Apostasy;\nDoubt; Credulity; Rationalism.\n\nFame, see Reputation.\n\nFare, travelling without paying, 1907.\n\nFasting, excellence of, 2409 a. See also Abstemiousness.\n\nFavoritism, sinfulness declared by Revelation, 1805; sinfulness\ndeclared by reason, 1806; gravity of sin of favoritism, 1807;\nfavoritism in spiritual matters, 1809; favoritism in secular matters,\n1812; favoritism in marks of esteem or honor, 1813; favoritism in\njudges, umpires, arbitrators and the like, 1814 a.\n\nFear, as obstacle to consent, 40, 44; acts done with and through fear,\n43; two moral species (fear of the world and of God), 1043; habitual\nand actual fear, 1044; worldly fear as sin, 1045; servile and filial\nfear of God, 1048 sqq.; initial and perfected fear, 1055; divine\ncommandments concerning fear, 1103; compared with envy, 1331 b, 1339.\n\nFear of the Lord, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; perfects hope, 1041;\ndistinct from other kinds of fear, 1042; corresponds to First Beatitude\nand Fruits of modesty, continency and chastity, 1058; complement of\ntemperance, 2571 a.\n\nFecundation, Artificial, 2618 c.\n\nFees, in connection with administration of sacred rites, 2185 b.\n\nFeigning of Defects, form of lying, 2406 b.\n\nFenians, Society forbidden by Church, 947 b.\n\nFidelity, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163. See also Truthfulness.\n\nFighting, definition, 1428; kinds, 1429; sinfulness, 1430; causes,\n1431; hatred as cause of fighting, 1432; frequent occasions, 1433; evil\nconsequences, 1434.\n\nFirst-Fruits, and tithes, 2185 b.\n\nFitness, the right standard for distributive justice, 1804 c.\n\nFlattery, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.\n\nFlesh Meat, 2586 sqq.\n\nFoolhardiness, sin against fortitude, 2466 b.\n\nFoolishness, sin of, opposed to Gift of Wisdom, 1621; description of\nsin, 1624; causes, 1625; cause of contumely, 2017 b.\n\nForesight, 1638 b.\n\nForgetfulness, resembles ignorance, 32.\n\nForm, Sacramental, see Sacrament. Formal Sin, 248.\n\nFornication, definition, 2543; sinfulness of fornication, 2534;\nfornication compared with other sins, 2525 a; circumstances of\nfornication, 2526 a; fornication of engaged person, 2526 b; forms of\nfornication, 2527; the State and places of prostitution, 2528.\n\nFortitude, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; Gift of the Holy Ghost,\n160 b; rank among moral virtues, 2437; definition of fortitude,\n2439; two acts of fortitude, 2440; excellence, 2441; sins opposed to\nfortitude, 2446; integral and potential parts of fortitude, 2447;\ndiffers from patience, 2453 b; complements of fortitude, 2457; Gift\nof Fortitude, 2457 a; fortitude and the Eighth Beatitude, 2457 b;\nfortitude and the Fruits of Patience and Longsuffering, 2457 c;\ncommandments of fortitude, 2458; subjects of fortitude, 2460. See also\nMartyrdom.\n\nFranchise, Electoral, see Voting.\n\nFraternal Correction, see Correction, fraternal.\n\nFraud, invalidates consent of contract, 1884 b; injustice in voluntary\ncommutations, 2121; definition of fraud, 2122; two kinds of injustice\nin sales, 2123; injustice regarding price, 2124; criteria of a just\nprice, 2125; obligation of observing prices settled by law or custom,\n2126; when market price may be disregarded without injustice, 2127;\nunjust sales based on ignorance of real value, 2129; obligation of\nrestitution on account of unjust price, 2130; injustice regarding thing\nsold, 2131; defects in the thing sold, 2132.\n\nFree Love, definition, 2527 c.\n\nFreemasonry, 823 b; books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; Society\nforbidden by Code, 947 a.\n\nFriday Abstinence, 2586 c.\n\nFriendship, 1110; friendship of utility, pleasure and virtue, 1111;\nfive marks of true friendship, 1137; human friendship not a distinct\nvirtue, 1140; virtue of friendship, 2143 b.\n\nFruition, as act of will, 58.\n\nFruits of the Holy Ghost, 159 b; twelve in number, 163, 811, 1058,\n1619, 1662, 2433, 2457, 2571.\n\nGambling, sinful, 1879 d; gambling forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.\n\nGeomancy, form of divination, 2284 c.\n\nGift, sinful, 1879 a; when are free gifts to judges permissible? 1945 d.\n\nGifts of the Holy Ghost, 159 a; intellectual, 160 a; appetitive, 159,\n160, 160 b; Understanding and Knowledge, 808-810; Fear of the Lord,\n1041-1057; Wisdom, 1609 sqq.; Counsel, 1662; Piety, 2433; Fortitude,\n2457; Fear of the Lord, 2571.\n\nGluttony, 269; sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 b; ways of\ncommitting gluttony, 2471; sinfulness of gluttony, 2472 a; gluttony as\ncapital sin, 2473 11.\n\nGnome, part of judgment, 2432 d.\n\nGnosticism, 822 c.\n\nGnostics, 823 b.\n\nGod, belief in His existence and providence necessary for salvation,\n787.\n\nGolden Mean, in virtues, 153-154.\n\nGood, Common. 285 c.\n\nGoods, external, not last end of man, 20; of the body, not last end\nof man, 20; of the soul, not last end of man, 20; when temporal goods\nshould be surrendered to avoid scandal, 1483.\n\nGoods, Abandoned, when they may be occupied, 1873 e; when vacant goods\nmay be occupied, 1873 f.\n\nGood Templars, Independent Order of, forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nGood Will, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.\n\nGossip, sinfulness of, 2038.\n\nGrace, 284.\n\nGratitude, virtue of, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2373; two kinds\nof gratitude, 2374; circumstances of gratitude, 2376; sins against\ngratitude, 2377; moral species of ingratitude, 2378; theological\nspecies of ingratitude, 2379; is it right to confer favors on the\nungrateful? 2380.\n\nGrave Matter, absolute and relative standards, 1899; opinions on the\namounts that are grave matter, 1900 a.\n\nGreatness of Deed, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of\nvirtue, 2452.\n\nGreatness of Soul, integral part of fortitude, 2447 b; definition of\nvirtue, 2448; greatness of soul and humility, 2449; vices opposed to,\n2450 sqq.\n\nGrief, at another\u2019s prosperity, when lawful and unlawful, 1334-1337.\n\nGuaranty, 1749 d.\n\nGuilt, formal guilt, 248; material guilt, 248; causes that remove or\ndiminish theological guilt, 1764 a.\n\nHabits, as obstacle to voluntariness of acts, 40, 53; definition, 53;\nantecedent and consequent, 53; in general, 132 sqq.; definition, 133;\nentitative and operative, 134 a; good and evil, 134 b; infused and\nacquired, 134 c, 135-136; strengthening and weakening of, 137 sqq.;\nexercise great influence on morality, 140; our duties regarding, 141.\nSee also Virtue; Vice.\n\nHalf-Truths, form of lying, 2030 c.\n\nHaruspicy, form of divination, 2284 c.\n\nHate, 119 (see also Passions, concupiscible); sin against charity,\n1295; definition and kinds, 1296; hatred of God, 1297; interpretative\nand formal hatred, 1299, 1315; hatred of God as a special sin,\n1300; gravity of this sin, 1301; degrees of malice, 1303; hatred of\ncreatures, 1304; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to\nself or others? 1308; wish for death or spiritual evil, 1310-1311;\ngravity of sin of hatred of neighbor, 1312; comparison with other sins,\n1313; hatred not a capital vice, 1314; species of sin, 1317; manner\nof confessing sin, 1318-1319; as cause of fighting, 1432; prohibition\nagainst, 1552.\n\nHealth, Injury to, a form of injustice, 1871.\n\nHeresy, 822 c, 826 sqq.; as a sin and canonical crime, 827; positive\nand negative, 828 a; internal and external, 828 b; occult and public,\n828 c; material and formal, 828 d, 829-830; sinfulness of, 831;\ncircumstances that modify guilt, 832; penalties, 833; books in favor\nof, forbidden, 855 b; heresy compared with schism, 1370.\n\nHibernians, Ancient Order of, 955 b.\n\nHire of Labor, form of onerous contract, 1 749 b.\n\nHistorical Personages, lawfulness of revelations about, 2072.\n\nHoly Ghost, Fruits of, see Fruits of the Holy Ghost.\n\nHoly Ghost, Gifts of, see Gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nHomicide, definition, 1816; when homicide is lawful, 1819; unlawful\nkilling of offenders, 1823; lawfulness of tyrannicide, 1824 a;\nhomicide in self-defense, 1826; killing of the innocent, 1844 sqq.;\nunintentional killing of the innocent, 1847; destruction of the unborn,\n1848 sqq.; canonical penalties for, 1851 a; accidental homicide, 1862;\nmoral and legal guilt of homicide, 1865. See also Punishment, Capital,\n1820.\n\nHonor, definition, 2010 b; persons who are deserving of honor, 2011;\nspecies of honor, 2352; obligation of showing honor, 2353; honor due to\nsuperiors, 2636 a.\n\nHonors, Pursuit of, sometimes demanded by charity to self, 1574.\n\nHope, Theological Virtue of, 151, 157, 158, 1009 sqq.; definition,\n1009-1012; supernatural and natural hope, 1013; animated and inanimated\nhope, 1016; disinterested and interested hope, 1017 b, 1033; object of,\n1018; excellence of, 1027; comparison with faith, 1029; with charity,\n1030; pseudo-hope (egotistical, Epicurean, and utilitarian), 1032; hope\novercomes spiritual discouragement and aridity, 1034; means for growth\nin hope, 1035; subject of hope, 1036; certainty of, 1040; perfected by\nFear of the Lord (q.v.), 1041; sins against hope, 1059 sqq.; despair\n(q.v.), 1061 sqq.; spiritual desolations, 1064; pusillanimity and\nspiritual sloth, 1064; presumption (q.v.), 1075 sqq,; commandments\nof hope, 1092; acts of hope obligatory, 1093; unlawful to surrender\nbeatitude, 1094; when the commandment of hope obliges, 1095 sqq.\n\nHorror, 119. See also Passions, concupiscible.\n\nHouses of Study, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.\n\nHuman Acts, see Acts, Human.\n\nHumanitarianism, sin against piety, 2349 b.\n\nHumility, greatness of soul and humility, 2449; potential part of\ntemperance, 2465 c; definition, 2553; the three acts of humility, 2554\na; two requirements of humility, 2555; excellence of humility, 2556 a.\n\nHunting, forbidden to clerics, 2603 c.\n\nHusbands, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.\n\nHussism, 822 c.\n\nHydromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.\n\nHyperdulia, species of reverence, 2352 c.\n\nHypocrisy, form of lying, 2391 b; sinfulness of hypocrisy, 2405.\n\nIconoclasm, 822 c.\n\nIdleness, 1326 e.\n\nIdolatry, see Religion, Sins against.\n\nIgnorance, various kinds, 24 sqq.; concomitant, consequent and\nantecedent, 26, 29; vincible and invincible, 27, 30; influence on\nvoluntariness of acts, 28; effect on sin, 249; sins of ignorance, see\nIgnorance, Sin of; invincible, in relation to Natural Law, 320; of\nChristian Law, possibility of, 356; confessors should examine penitents\nwho show signs of ignorance, 924.\n\nIgnorance, Sin of, 250 b, 904 sqq,; culpable ignorance as distinct sin,\n907. See also Ignorance.\n\nImages, when obscene, 1456 a.\n\nImmoderation, vice opposed to temperance, 2464 b.\n\nImmorality, see Impurity.\n\nImpatience, vice opposed to patience, 2455 b.\n\nImpediments, simple impediments to reception of Holy Orders, 2784 b;\nmatrimonial impediments, 2804 sqq.\n\nImperfections, Moral, 185; when they become sin, 186.\n\nImpossibility, Physical, 361 a; moral, 361 b.\n\nImpurity, definition, 2492; sensuality, luxury and curiosity, 2492 n;\nkinds of impurity, 2493 a; gravity of sin, 2494 a; one of the capital\nvices, 2494 c; evil fruits of impurity, 2495; when venial and mortal,\n2496 a; when directly willed, 2496 b; when indirectly willed, 2496 c;\ntemptations to impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations,\n2498; what opposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient,\nharmful and unnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal\ntemptations, 2501; sinfulness of negligence in resisting temptations,\n2502; non-consummated sins of impurity, 2504; impure thoughts, 2505;\nmalice of impure thoughts, 2506 a; impure rejoicing, 2507; impure\ndesires, 2508; malice of impure desires, 2509; sins of lewdness, 2510;\nconsummated sins of impurity, 2520; comparative malice of the sins\nof consummated lust, 2521 a; multiplication of sins of lust, 2522;\nfornication, 2523; incest, 2532; carnal sacrilege, 2533; unnatural\nlust, 2534; pollution, 2535; non-sinful pollution, 2536; unimputable\npollution, 2537; proximate and remote occasions of pollution, 2538;\ntheological malice of sinful pollution, 2539; moral species of sinful\npollution, 2541; canonical penalties for immorality, 2542. See also\nLewdness; Fornication.\n\nImputability of Acts, 97 sqq.\n\nInadvertence, resembles ignorance, 32.\n\nIncest, definition, 2531.\n\nInconvenience, degrees of, 1520.\n\nIndex of Forbidden Books, 862 c.\n\nIndifferentism, 823 a.\n\nIndignation, differs from envy, 1331 c, 1339.\n\nIndolence, 1326 d.\n\nInfamy, 2051 sqq.\n\nInfidelity, 822 ff.\n\nIngratitude, see Gratitude.\n\nInhabitant, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.\n\nInheritance, title of private ownership, 1872 b.\n\nInhibition, of passions, 131.\n\n_Injuria_, definition, 1724 b.\n\nInjuries, Bodily, a form of injustice, 1866.\n\nInjustice, definition, 1719; species of legal and particular injustice,\n1720; theological species of legal and particular injustice, 1721;\nwhen injury to private or public right is mortal sin, 1722 a, b; moral\nspecies of injustice, 1723; profitable and unprofitable injustice,\n1724 c; when injury is no injustice, 1725; internal injustice, 1726;\ndistributive injustice alone does not oblige to restitution, 1754;\ncooperators in injustice and restitution, 1778 sqq.; mandator of act\nof injustice, 1779 a; advisor of act of injustice, 1779 b; protector\nin act of injustice, 1779 d; consenter in act of injustice, 1779 e;\npartaker in injustice, 1779 f; sin of injustice, 1866 s; judicial\ninjustice, 1939; principal sins of verbal injustice, 2009.\n\nInjustice in Buying and Selling, see Fraud.\n\nInnocent, unintentional killing of, 1847.\n\nInsensibility, sin against fortitude, 2446 b; vice opposed to\ntemperance, 2464.\n\nInsurance, 1749 c.\n\nIntellect, art and prudence the two practical virtues of, 1627.\n\nIntention, as act of will, 58. See also Prayer.\n\nInternationalism, False, sin against piety, 2349 b.\n\nInterpretation, of law, 315 sqq.; verbal or emendatory, 315; by private\nor public authority, 316; of ecclesiastical laws, 483 sqq.; rules for\ndoctrinal interpretation, 485.\n\nInvocation, of a demon, 2284; invocation of spirits, see Religion, Sins\nagainst.\n\nIrascible Passions, 118, 120.\n\nIrregularities, as disqualifications for reception of Holy Orders, 2784\nb.\n\nIrreligiousness, see Religion, Sins against.\n\nJail-breaking, and restitution, 1983.\n\nJealousy, lawful and unlawful, 1333.\n\nJesting, distinction between derision and jesting, 2107.\n\nJingoism, sin against piety, 2349 a.\n\nJoy, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; sinful, 237; as effect of charity,\n1193-1194.\n\nJudaism, 822 b.\n\nJudaizers, 823 b.\n\nJudge, office of, 1940; qualifications, 1943; conduct, 1944; accepting\ngifts from litigants, 1945; obligation to restore bribes, etc., 1946;\nduties during a trial, 1947; duties on conclusion of a trial, 1948;\nobligation in connection with a law manifestly unjust, 1949; Catholic\njudge and degrees of divorce, 1950; obligation when evidence is\ncontrary to his personal knowledge, 1951; when judge is unjust cause of\ndamaging evidence, 1952; obligation in doubtful criminal cases, 1955;\nobligation in doubtful civil cases, 1956; standard by which he should\nweigh evidence, 1958; when a judge is bound to restitution, 1962; when\nhe is not bound to restitution, 1963; right to question prisoner about\nhis guilt, 1979; judges who pass death sentence become irregular by\nCanon Law, 1825. See also Witness.\n\nJudgment, virtue of, 1727; public and private judgment, 1727 a; three\nconditions of righteous judgment, 1729-1731; necessary quality of\nlawful oath, 2249 e.\n\nJudgment, Rash, 1731 b; sinfulness of rash judgment, 1734; rules\non perfect advertence to rashness of judgment, 1736; rules on\ninsufficiency of reasons for unfavorable judgments, 1737; rules on\ngravity of matter in rash judgments, 1738; moral species of the sin of\nrash judgment, 1739; chief reasons for rash conclusions about character\nof others, 1742; rash doubts, 1743.\n\nJudgments, Moral, 672 sqq.; the safer and more likely, 673.\n\nJurisdiction, of a judge, 1942.\n\nJustice, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; precedence over charity,\n291 b; compared with other virtues, 1714; private justice, 1715 b;\nlegal justice, 1715 a; justice superior to courage, 1716 a; superior to\nliberality, 1716 b; regarded by some as inferior to virtue of religion\nand mercy, 1718 a, b; justice demands proper motives in those who seek\nor pass judgment, 1728 a; legal justice distinct from distributive\nand commutative, 1745 a; distributive justice, 1745 b; commutative\njustice, 1745 c; resemblance between distributive and commutative\njustice, 1746; special differences between distributive and commutative\njustice, 1747; commutations of commutative justice, 1748; equality\nsought by commutative justice, 1750; distributive justice and violation\nof individual rights, 1755; commutative justice and violation of\nindividual rights, 1756; vice opposed to distributive justice, 1804;\ndistributive injustice frequently accompanied by commutative injustice,\n1808; vices against commutative justice, 1815; legal justice, classes\nof courts, 1941; jurisdiction of 9, judge, 1942; quasi-integral parts\nof justice, 2139; potential parts of justice, 2141; degrees of moral\ndebt, 2143; necessary qualities of lawful oath, 2249 c; complements of\njustice, 2433; Beatitudes that correspond to justice, 2433 b; Fruits\nof the Holy Ghost that correspond to justice, 2433 c; commandments of\njustice, 2434; justice, a duty of superior, 2635 b. See also Equity;\nRestitution.\n\nKilling, of animals, 1818 a; of human beings, see Homicide.\n\nKindness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.\n\nKinsfolk, order of charity between, 1176 sqq.\n\nKissing, morality of kissing and similar acts, 2513.\n\nKnights of Columbus, 955 b.\n\nKnights of Pythias, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nKnowledge, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 a; given to perfect theological\nvirtues, 808.\n\nLands, how they may be occupied, 1873 b.\n\nLarceny, definition of, 1893 b; petit and grand larceny, 1893 b.\n\nLast End of Man, existence of, 19; nature of, 20; how attained, 21.\n\nLatitudinarianism, 823 a.\n\nLaw, 284 sqq.; definition, 285; eternal, natural and positive divine,\n286; collision of laws, 288; precedence, 289 sqq,; basis of all laws,\n293; customs may interpret, abrogate or introduce law, 506.\n\nLaw, Christian, comparison with Mosaic Law, 346 sqq.; as regards their\naims, 347; as regards their precepts, 348; as regards their difficulty\nof observance, 349; as regards external and internal works, 350-351;\nmoral, ceremonial and judicial precepts of New Testament, 352; duration\nof, 354; subjects of, 355; ignorance of, 356; dispensation from, 357;\ninterpretation of, 358-359; when observance of law is impossible,\n360-361; Counsels of (q.v.), 364 sqq.; the three chief Counsels, 369.\nSee also Law, Mosaic.\n\nLaw, Civil, 542 sqq.; persons in whom legislative authority is vested,\n543; acceptance by people not necessary for obligation of law in\nitself, 544; obligation of laws made by one without authority, 545;\nsubject-matter, 546; relation to natural law, 547; relation to divine\nand ecclesiastical law, 548; and human rights and liberties, 549;\npersons subject to, 550; obligation of, 551; when penalty is incurred\nbefore sentence, 552; special kinds, 557 sqq.; laws that determine\nownership, 557; irritant or voiding laws, 558; four kinds of laws with\nreference to penalty, 561; moral obligation, 561 sqq. See also Laws,\nHuman.\n\nLaw, Ecclesiastical, precedence over civil, 290, 418 sqq.; charter\nof, 418; character of, 419; general law of Church, 420; effects of\nCode on liturgical and disciplinary laws and customs, 421; rules\ngoverning interpretation of Code, 422; lawgivers in Church, 423-429;\nsubject-matter of Church Law, 425; kinds of acts governed by Church\nLaw, 426; persons bound by general laws, 427 sqq.; persons bound by\nparticular laws, 435; promulgation, 447; acceptance of, 448; irritant\nlaws, 450 sqq.; effects of ignorance, force or fear on acts irritated\nby law, 456; when an irritant law ceases to bind, 457; obligation\nof law based on presumption of common danger, 460; obligation of\nlaw based on presumption of particular fact, 461; personal, minute,\npartial and simultaneous fulfillment of laws, 462 sqq.; time of\nfulfillment, 468 sqq.; unwilling fulfillment, 476; intention required\nin fulfillment, 477 sqq.; virtuous dispositions in fulfillment, 480\nsqq.; interpretation of, 483; cessation of obligation, 487; exemption\nfrom, 488; ignorance and impossibility as excuses for non-observance,\n489 sqq.; cessation of, 500 sqq.; use of epieikeia in determining\nobligation, 503.\n\nLaw, Eternal, The, basis of all laws, 293.\n\nLaw, Mosaic, began with promise to Abraham, 332 a; promulgation, 332\nb; excellence, 333; subjects of, 334; duration of obligation, 335;\nprecepts, ceremonies and judgments, 336 sqq.; ceremonial laws, 340;\nsacred times and places, sacraments and customs, 340; four periods of\nceremonial law, 342; four kinds of judgments or judicial laws, 343-345;\ncomparison with Christian Law, 346 sqq.\n\nLaw, Natural, precedence over positive, 289; definition, 295; relation\nto other laws, 296; division, 297; common and proper, 297 b; primary\nand secondary, 298; first principle and secondary principles, 300 a;\nprecepts (axiomatic and inferred, general and particular), 300-301;\nnecessary and contingent laws, 302; absolute and relative laws, 303;\nproperties of, 305; of universal obligation, 306; unchangeable, 307\nsqq,; possibility of dispensation from, 309, 314 sqq.; possibility of\nmodification, 313; when observance is physically or morally impossible,\n317-318; promulgated by light of reason, 319; ineradicable from human\nheart, 324; wrong applications of, 326.\n\nLaw, Positive Divine, definition, 328; necessity, 328 c; differs\nfrom Natural Law in certain respects, 329; natural and supernatural\ncommandments, 330; division of, 331; in state of original innocence,\n331 a; in law of nature, 331 b; Mosaic Law, 332 sqq.; Christian Law,\n346 sqq.\n\nLawgivers, in the Church, 423-424.\n\nLaws, Administration of, see Judge.\n\nLaws, Ceremonial, of Old Testament, 340 sqq., See also Law. Mosaic.\n\nLaws, Ecclesiastical, in a wide sense, 514 sqq.; precepts, 519;\nrescripts, 520; privileges, 521-523; dispensations, 524.\n\nLaws, Human, 370 sqq.; definition, 370; divisions, 371; qualities,\n372; should not prescribe what is too difficult, 372; obligation,\n375; necessity, 375; when unjust, 376; obedience to unjust laws not\nobligatory, 377; degrees of obligation, 373 sqq.; interpretation,\n385-386; epieikeia, 385; those subject to law, 387-388; change of, 389;\nconstitutional law, 390; effects of custom on law, 391; dispensation\nfrom, 401 sqq. See also Law, Civil.\n\nLaws of New Testament, 7.\n\nLaws of the First and Second Tables, 338. See also Decalogue.\n\nLawyer, general duties, 1995; qualifications, 1996; duties in\nintroducing case, 1997, obligation in charity towards persons in\ndistress, 1998-99; duty when cause is unjust, 2000; duties when justice\nof cause is doubtful, 2001; duty when he discovers case is really\nunjust, 2003; duties towards client, 2004; duties toward other parties,\n2005; concealment of truth in presenting case, 2006; sinfulness\nof introducing false or corrupted documents, 2007; when bound to\nrestitution, 2008.\n\nLaxism, see Systems, Moral.\n\nLaziness, as distinct from sloth, 1326; various forms, 1326 a-e.\n\nLease, 1749 b.\n\nLeniency, Undue, vice, 2552 b.\n\nLenten Fast, 2588.\n\nLesbian Love, form of impurity, 2534 c.\n\nLewdness, definition, 2510; propriety of external acts, 2512; morality\nof kissing and similar acts, 2513; morality of sensual gratification,\n2514; theological species of the sin of lewdness, 2515; circumstances\nthat increase or lessen the danger of sin, 2517; cases wherein the\ndanger of sin is grave or slight, 2518; lewd books, 2518 b; lewdness in\nspeech, 2518 a; in reading, 2518 b; in looks, 2518 c; in touches, 2518\nd; moral species of lewdness, 2519 a.\n\nLibel, definition, 2030 d.\n\nLiberality, inferior to justice, 1716 b; virtue of liberality, 2143 b;\ndefinition of virtue, 2424; importance of liberality, 2425. See also\nAvarice; Prodigality.\n\nLies, see Lying.\n\nLipstick, morality of use, 2570.\n\nLiquids, may or may not break fast, 2588.\n\nLoans, 1749 a; loan at interest, 1749 b.\n\nLongsuffering, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163.\n\nLooting, forbidden by modern international law, 1415.\n\nLoss, definition, 1724 b.\n\nLots, Use of, when lawful, 2289.\n\nLottery, when lawful, 1879 e.\n\nLove, definition, 119; root of all appetites of soul, 1106; effects,\n1107; degrees, 1108; love of desire and love of benevolence, 1109; love\nof creatures not always charity, 1134; kinds of self-love (q.v.), 1136;\nobligatory, 1608 a; of supererogation, 1608 b.\n\nLove of God, see Charity.\n\nLove of Neighbor, see Neighbor, Love of.\n\nLove of Self, see Self-Love.\n\nLukewarmness, 1327.\n\nLust, 269. See also Impurity.\n\nLuxury, compared with impurity, 2492 a; modesty in luxury, 2569 a.\n\nLying, definition, 2389; misunderstanding a form of lying, 2390 a;\nmisinterpretation a form of lying, 2390 b; divisions of lies, 2391;\nhypocrisy, 2391 b; simulation, 2301 b; misrepresentation and deceit,\n2391 b; classification of lies, 2392; lies of inclination, 2392 b;\npernicious lies, 2392 b; motives for lying 2393; jocose lie, 2392\na; officious lie, 2392 a; comparison of gravity of various lies,\n2394; sinfulness of all lies, 2395; when lying entails no formal\nsin, 2396; pernicious lies, 2397; concealment of the truth, 2398;\nmental reservation, 2399; morality of strict mental reservation,\n2400; morality of broad mental reservation, 2400 b; when broad mental\nreservation is lawful, 2401; ambiguous answers, 2402; simulation or\npretence, 2403; sinfulness of simulation, 2404.\n\nMacedonianism, 822 c.\n\nMagnanimity, see Greatness of Soul.\n\nMajority, Age of, 433.\n\nMalefactor, when bound to accuse himself, 1968.\n\nMalice, sins of, 250 e; caused by sloth, 1324.\n\n_Mandatum_, 1749 a.\n\nManicheans, 823 b.\n\nManicheism, 822 c.\n\nMarriage, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.\n\nMarriage, Trial, definition, 2527 c.\n\nMarriages, Dangerous, 875; canonical consequences, 879; prenuptial\nguarantees, 880; remedies against mixed and dangerous marriages, 881.\n\nMartyrdom, definition, 2442; kinds of martyrdom, 2443; conditions for\nmartyrdom, 2444; practical questions about martyrdom, 2445.\n\nMass, Sacrifice of the, 2709; obligation of saying Mass, 2710;\ndispositions for the celebration of Mass, 2711; confession before\nMass, 2711 a; distractions during the Canon, 2711 b; preparation and\nthanksgiving before Mass, 2711 a; Eucharistic or natural fast, 2711\nb; rubrical vestments, 2711 b; time of Mass, 2712 a; place, 2712 b;\nrites, 2712 c; when it is lawful to discontinue Mass, 2713; application\nof the Mass, 2714; obligation of pastors to say Mass for flocks, 2714\na; obligation of Mass stipends, 2714 b; persons for whom Mass may be\napplied, 2715; how Mass must be applied, 2715 b; lawfulness of Mass\nstipends, 2716.\n\nMasturbation, form of impurity, 2534 a.\n\nMaterial Sin, 248.\n\nMatrimony, Sacrament of, first blessing of marriage (offspring), 2613\na; second blessing of marriage (fidelity), 2613 b; third blessing\nof marriage (sacrament), 2613 c; obligation of paying the conjugal\ndebt, 2614; absence of obligation, 2615; suspension of obligation,\n2616; obligation of requesting conjugal intercourse, 2617; morality\nof venereal acts of marriage, 2618; unnatural consummated acts,\n2618 c; artificial fecundation, 2618 c; rectal copulation, 2618 c;\ncontraception, 2620; contraception an injury to God, 2620 a; an injury\nto society, 2620 b; an injury to the family, 2620 c; an injury to the\nindividual, 2620 d; arguments of Neo-Malthusians and other advocates of\ncontraception, 2621; is birth-control ever lawful? 2622; _cooperatio\nuxoris ad onanismum vel contraceptionem_, 2623; _recapitulatio de\nlicitis et illicitis in conjugio_, 2624; marriage as a Sacrament,\n2626; reasons that justify separation, 2626 a; husband superior to\nwife in authority, 2626 b; husband has duty of providing for wife,\n2626 c; no obligation for individual to marry, 2627 a; unity of\nmarriage its first property, 2787 d; indissolubility of marriage its\nsecond property, 2787 e; Pauline Privilege, 2787 e; dissolution, 2787\ne; divorce under Mosaic Law, 2787 e; marriages of infidels, 2787 e;\ntrue, presumed, putative and attempted marriage, 2788 a; legitimate,\nratified, consummated marriage, 2788 b; clandestine, secret, public\nmarriage, 2788 c; marriage of conscience, 2788 c; marriage is canonical\nor civil, 2788 d; elements of contract of marriage, 2789 a; ends of\ncontract, 2789 b; essence of contract is the consent, 2789 c; valid\nconsent, 2790; defects in consent, 2791; mental derangement as defect,\n2791 a; ignorance as defect, 2791 b; error as defect, 2791 c; effect\nof forced consent on validity, 2792 a; effect of forced consent on\nlawfulness, 2792 b; conditional consent, 2793; elements of marriage\nas Sacrament, 2794; ministers and recipients of Matrimony, 2794 b;\neffects of Matrimony, 2794 c; duties in connection with marriage, 2795;\nobligation of betrothal or engagement, 2796; is engagement necessary\nbefore marriage? 2798; duties to parents or guardians in reference\nto marriage, 2799; duties of parents in reference to marriage,\n2800; obstacles to marriage, 2801; duty to make known impediment to\nmarriage, 2801 c; duties of pastor in examination of engaged persons,\n2802; special proofs of freedom to marry, 2803; proof of Baptism,\n2803 a; proof of single state, 2803 b; matrimonial impediments,\n2804; sinfulness of marrying with an impediment, 2805; impedient or\nprohibitive impediments, 2806; vow as impediment, 2806 a; impediment\nof legal relationship, 2806 b; impediment of mixed religion, 2806\ne; duties of pastor and parties in connection with mixed marriages,\n2807; valid engagement forbids marriage with third party, 2809 a;\nspecial prohibition of particular marriage by the Church, 2809 b;\nclosed times, 2809 e; diriment impediments to marriage, 2810; absolute\ndiriment impediments, 2811; impediment of age, 2813; impediment of\nimpotency, 2814; impediment of bond, 2816; impediment of difference\nof religion, 2817; impediment of kinship, 2818; consanguinity, 2818\na; affinity, 2818 b; public decency, 2818 c; spiritual relationship,\n2818 d; legal relationship, 2818 e; matrimonial impediments produced\nthrough misdeeds, 2819; impediment of abduction, 2819 a; impediment\nof crime, 2819 b; duties of pastor after inquiry about impediments,\n2820; dispensation, 2820 a; publications of banns of marriage, 2820\nb; duties of pastor after examination and proclamation, 2821; duties\nof pastor as regards religious instruction of engaged couple, 2822;\npastor and duties of engaged couple, 2823; pastor\u2019s duties to parents,\n2823 a; pastor\u2019s duties to civil law, 2823 b; opposition of parents\nto marriage, 2824; religious duties of parties before marriage, 2825;\nconfession, 2825 a; Communion, 2825 b; celebration of marriage, 2826;\nrequisites for validity, 2826 a; requisites for lawfulness, 2826 b;\nrite of Matrimony, 2827; Nuptial Blessing and Nuptial Mass, 2827 b;\ncooperation in unworthy marriage, 2828; registration of marriages,\n2829; when impediment is discovered after marriage, 2830; lawfulness of\ndivorce and separation, 2831. See also Betrothal.\n\nMatter of Sin, grave, 171-172; light, 182.\n\nMatter, Sacramental, see Sacrament.\n\nMeanness, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.\n\nMedicinal Afflictions, as remedies against sin, 283.\n\nMeekness, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; potential part of temperance,\n2465 c; definition, 2545.\n\nMemory, 1637 a.\n\nMental Derangement, removes theological guilt, 1764 a.\n\nMercy, result of charity, 1193; definition, 1193 c; natural and\nsupernatural, 1205; causes of unmerciful spirit, 1206; mercy compared\nwith other moral virtues, 1207; compared with charity, 1208;\nobligation, 1209; seven corporal works of mercy, 1221; seven spiritual\nworks, 1222-1223; regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717 b.\n\nMerit, definition, 107; human and divine, 108; natural and\nsupernatural, 109; condign and congruous, 110; the right standard for\ndistributive justice, 1804 c.\n\nMerits, former merits recovered by repentance, 2725 c.\n\nMethods in Moral Theology, Casuistic, Positive and Scholastic, 13.\n\nMinors, legal privileges in connection with contracts, 1882.\n\nMisrepresentation, form of lying, 2391 b.\n\nModeration, see Temperance.\n\nModernism, 822 c, 841 b.\n\nModesty, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; of bearing and living potential\npart of temperance, 2465 e; definition of modesty, 2565; modest\nbehavior or decorum, 2566 a; vices opposed to modesty, 2566 b; modesty\nin style of living and dress, 2569 a; morality of self-beautification,\n2570; fruit of the Fear of the Lord, 2571 c.\n\nMohammedanism, 822 a.\n\nMonophysitism, 822 c.\n\nMorality, definition, 64; constitutive norm, 65; manifestative norm,\n67; perceptive norm, 68; three species of, 69; three sources, the\nobject, circumstances, and end, 70 sqq.; moral value of passions, 121\nsqq.; important influence of habits on, 140.\n\nMoral Science, office of, 1631 b.\n\nMoral Systems, see Systems, Moral.\n\nMoral Theology, objects, 4; medium, 4; sources, 6; use of natural\nreason, philosophy and natural sciences in, 11-12; Positive, Scholastic\nand Casuistic Methods, 13; history of, 15; Patristic Period, 15 a;\nMedieval Period, 15 b; Modern, 15 c; division and order of parts, 17;\nGeneral and Special, 18.\n\nMormonism, 823 b.\n\nMortgage, 1749 d.\n\nMotions of the Soul, First and Second, 129.\n\nMotives of Sin, 268 sqq.\n\nMunificence, virtue, 2452 e.\n\nMurder, see Homicide.\n\nMurmuring, definition and sinfulness of, 2120.\n\nMutilation, definition, 1866 a; when lawful, 1867.\n\n_Mutuum_, definition, 1749 a.\n\nMysteries, that must be believed, 787 sqq., 918, 920; substantial and\nscientific knowledge of, 790.\n\nNarcotics, licit use, 2485.\n\nNaturalism, 847 b.\n\nNecessity, Spiritual, degrees of, 1165.\n\nNecessity, Temporal, degrees of, 1236; extreme necessity justifies\nconversion of others\u2019 property, 1921 a.\n\nNecromancy, form of divination, 2284 b.\n\nNecrophilism, form of impurity, 2534 d.\n\nNegligence, 1326 a.\n\n_Negotiorum gestio_, definition, 1749 a.\n\nNeighbor, Love of, three kinds, 1139 sqq.; sacrifice of spiritual goods\nor bodily welfare for neighbor\u2019s sake, 1163 sqq.; order of charity\nbetween neighbors, 1171 sqq. See Charity; Friendship; Emulation;\nJealousy; Hate; Correction, Fraternal.\n\nNeo-Malthusians, arguments in favor of contraception, 2821.\n\nNestorianism, 822 c.\n\nNew Testament, ordinances, 7; counsels, 7; laws, 7; temporary\nregulations, 7; law of, see Law, Christian.\n\nNihilists, society forbidden by Church, 947 b.\n\nNon-Catholics, participation in Catholic rites, 957 sqq.\n\nNon-Combatants, treatment during war, 1412.\n\nNurses, duties of, 2651 c.\n\nOaths, moral effects of accidentals added to contracts, 1886 b;\ndefinition of an oath, 2245; assertory or promissory oaths, 2246 a;\ncomminatory or confirmatory oaths, 2246 a; contestatory or execratory\noaths, 2246 b; explicit or implicit oaths, 2246 b; solemn or simple,\njudicial or extrajudicial oaths, 2246 d; moral difference between\nvarious kinds of oaths, 2247; lawfulness of oaths, 2248; necessary\nqualities of a lawful oath, 2249; sinful oaths, 2250; incautious\noath, 2250 a; perjured oaths, 2250 b; wicked oaths, 2250 c; mental\nreservation in oaths, 2251; cooperation in sinful oaths, 2252; sinful\noaths demanded or accepted by private persons, 2253; fictitious oaths,\n2254; expressions confused with oaths; obligation imposed by promissory\noath, 2256; obligation imposed by negative oath, 2257; obligation of\noath is personal, 2258; interpretation of promissory oath, 2259; kind\nof obligation produced by a valid promissory oath, 2260; cessation of\nobligation of promissory oath, 2262. See also Adjuration.\n\nObedience, definition of virtue, 2355; power of jurisdiction and\ndominative power, 2356; degrees of obedience, 2357; comparison of\nobedience with other virtues, 2358; comparison of acts of obedience,\n2359; duty of obedience, 2360; when obedience is not lawful or\nobligatory, 2361; internal actions and human superiors, 2363;\nobligation of vow of obedience, 2364; sins against obedience, 2365;\ndefinition of disobedience, 2366; kinds of disobedience, 2367;\ntheological sinfulness of formal disobedience, 2369; moral species of\ndisobedience, 2370; circumstances that aggravate formal disobedience,\n2371; comparison of formal disobedience with other sins, 2372; vow and\nvirtue of obedience, 2612 c; obedience due to superiors, 2636 b.\n\nObjects, Sinful, formal cooperation by manufacture of, 1533; material\ncooperation, 1534 sqq.\n\nObscenity, definition, 1455; internal and external, 1455 a-b; general\nrules for determining what is obscene, 1456; persons who give scandal\nthrough obscenity, 1458; government suppression of obscenity aim of\nLeague of Nations, 1458 e.\n\nObstacles to Consent, 40 sqq.; fear, 41; ignorance, 40, 24 sqq.\n\nOccasions of Sin, 263 sqq.\n\nOccult Heresy, 828 c.\n\nOccult Sin, 1287.\n\nOccupation, title to private ownership, 1872 a; chief ways of\noccupation, 1873; when occupation of others\u2019 goods is lawful, 1921 sqq.\nSee also Theft.\n\nOccupations, forbidden to clerics, 2603 b.\n\nOdd Fellows, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nOfferings, act of religion, 2183.\n\nOffice, Divine, distractions during, 2174; obligation of matter and\nmanner, 2600 a; excuses from the obligation of the Divine Office, 2601\na.\n\nOfficials, Public, lawfulness of revelations about, 2071.\n\nOffset, definition of, 1927 a. Old Testament, moral precepts still\nbinding, 7; ceremonial laws no longer obligatory, 7.\n\nOmen, form of divination, 2285 d.\n\nOmissions, voluntary, 37; effect of may be voluntary, 38.\n\nOneiromancy, form of divination, 2284 a.\n\nOpinion, as state of conscience, 662 sqq.\n\nOrdeal by Fire, sin against religion, 2284 c.\n\nOrder of Charity, 1158; between neighbors, 1171 sqq.; in almsgiving,\n1247.\n\nOrders, Holy, Sacrament of, 2777; distinction of the Orders, 2778;\nMajor and Minor Orders, 2778 b; hierarchy of Orders, 2779 a; hierarchy\nof jurisdiction, 2779 b; matter and form of the various Orders in\nthe Latin Church, 2780; episcopal consecration, 2780 a; minister of\nordination, 2781; special duties of minister, 2782; recipient of\nOrders, 2783; conditions for validity of reception, 2783 a; conditions\nfor lawfulness of reception, 2783 b; canonical requirements for\nordination, 2784; irregularities, 2784 b; simple impediments, 2784\nb; irregularities from defect or delinquency, 2784 b; duties of\nordinandi according to Canon Law, 2785 a; registration of ordinations,\n2786; ordination of acolyte, 2780 a; ordination of exorcist, 2780 a;\nordination of porter, 2780 a; ordination of reader, 2780 a; ordination\nof subdeacon, 2780 b; ordination of deacon, 2780 c; ordination of\npriest, 2780 d.\n\nOrdinances, of the New Testament, 7.\n\nOrientals, 822 c.\n\nOriginal Sin, 272 sqq.\n\nOuija Boards, form of divination, 2284 c.\n\nOwnership, Private, allowed by natural and divine law, 1872; chief\ntitles to private ownership, 1872.\n\nPacifism, Extreme, not inculcated by Christ, 1381.\n\nPain, of loss, 281 a; of sense, 281 b.\n\n_Palpo_, definition, 1779 e.\n\nPan-Christianism, 823 b.\n\nParents, duties of charity and piety, 2630; compensation of children,\n2631; sex education of children, 2632.\n\nParticipation of Catholics in Non-Catholic Services, 961; active\nand passive participation, 962-973; things wherein communication is\npossible; 963; simulated active assistance, 965; cases of communication\nin false worship, 967 sqq.; cases where a communication in another\nCatholic Rite is allowed, 970; participation in non-sacramental rites,\n971; participation in religious places, times and objects, 972.\n\nPartnership, 1749 b.\n\nPassion, as obstacle to consent, 40, 45; antecedent, makes act less\nfree, 48; consequent, does not affect voluntariness of acts, 49; when\nit removes or diminishes theological guilt, 1764 a.\n\nPassions, definition, 45, 116 sqq.; definition, 117; concupiscible,\n118-119; irascible, 118, 120; moral value of, 121 sqq.; physical,\nmental and moral dangers of, 126; antecedent or involuntary (first\nmotions of the soul), 129; consequent or voluntary (second motions of\nthe soul), 129; inhibition of, 131; important influence of habits on,\n140.\n\nPastor, duty to give Sacraments, 2676 a; duties in reference to\nBaptism, 2688; to Confirmation, 2698; to Communion, 2707 c; to worship,\n2708 c; to celebration of Mass, 2710 b; to application of Mass _pro\npopulo_, 2714 a; jurisdiction for confession, 2751 a; on reserved\ncases, 2754 b; duty to hear confessions, 2756 b; to give Extreme\nUnction, 2775 c; rank among the clergy, 2779 b; duties in reference to\nmarriage, 2802, 2807, 2808, 2820 sqq., 2826, 2829.\n\nPathological States, see Abnormal Mental States.\n\nPatience, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; act of fortitude, 2447 b;\ndefinition, 2453; patience differs from temperance, 2453 a; differs\nfrom longsuffering and constancy, 2453 c; greatness of patience, 2454;\nvices opposed to patience, 2455; virtue of steadfastness, 2456.\n\nPatriolatry, sin against piety, 2349 a.\n\nPatriotism, very like to religion, 2346 d.\n\nPawn, 1749 d.\n\nPawning, unjustifiable, 1879 g.\n\nPeace, Fruit of the Holy Ghost, 163; as effect of charity, 1195 sqq.;\nreconciliation with God, 1196; reconciliation with enemies, 1196;\nreconciliation with enemies demanded by charity, 1198; what duty of\nreconciliation demands, 1199; what this duty necessitates, 1199 sqq.;\nperson who should make the first advances, 1202; manner and time of\nseeking reconciliation, 1203-04; sins against peace, 1347 sqq. See\nDiscord; Contention; Schism; War; Fighting; Duelling; Sedition.\n\nPederasty, kind of impurity, 2534 c.\n\nPelagianism, 822 c.\n\nPenance, Sacrament of, 2727; remote matter, 2727 a; proximate\nmatter, 2727 b; form of, 2727 c; subject of, 2727 d; Probabilism in\nadministration of Sacrament, 2728; contrition the first act of the\npenitent, 2729; valid and fruitful reception of the Sacrament of\nPenance, 2734; resolution of amendment, 2736; confession, second act\nof penitent, 2737; qualities of confession, 2738; gravity of lying\nto confessor, 2739; integral confession, 2740; material and formal\ncompleteness, 2740 a, b; moral species of sin must be confessed, 2741\na; number of sins must be given, 2741 b; circumstances that change\nthe species must be declared, 2741 c; external act that completed an\ninternal sin must be declared, 2741 d; circumstances that notably\naggravate a sin without changing its species, 2742 a; external effects\nof a sin must be confessed, 2742 b; uncertain sins must be confessed,\n2742 c; when material integrity is not necessary, 2743; completion\nor repetition of past incomplete Confessions, 2744; when a general\nConfession should be made, 2744 c; satisfaction, the third act of the\npenitent, 2745; effects of actual satisfaction, 2746; conditions for\neffective satisfaction, 2747; obligation of accepting and performing\na penance, 2748; causes that excuse from a penance imposed, 2749;\nrequirements in the minister for valid absolution, 2750; power of\njurisdiction, 2751; when the Church supplies jurisdiction (cases of\ncommon error and of uncertainty of law or fact), 2752; limitation\nof jurisdiction, 2753; reserved sins, 2753 a; reserved persons,\n2753 b; absolution from reserved cases, 2754; absolution given by\none not possessed of jurisdiction, 2755; duties of confessor before\nconfession, 2756; duties of confessor as judge in hearing the case,\n2757; duties of confessor in deciding about cases, 2758; duties of\nconfessor in passing sentence, 2759; penitents to whom absolution\nshould be denied, 2760; backsliders (recidivists), 2760 c; obligation,\nquality and quantity of sacramental penance, 2761; duties of the\nconfessor as spiritual physician, 2762; duties of the confessor as\nteacher and guide, 2763; spiritual direction, 2764 b; duties of the\nconfessor after confession, 2764; Probabilism or epieikeia may not be\napplied to sacramental seal, 2764 a; attitude of confessor to tempted\nand afflicted, 2762 b; attitude to scrupulous, 2762 b; treatment of\nsick and dying, 2762 b; attitude towards the pious, 2762 b; attitude\ntowards the hardened sinner, 2762 b; manner of repairing defects made\nin hearing a confession, 2765; excuses from duty of repairing mistakes,\n2766; obligation of seal of confession, 2767; sins against the seal of\nconfession, 2768; special abuses to which confession is exposed, 2769;\ndanger of defamation, 2769 a; danger of impurity, 2769 b; _absolutio\ncomplicis_, 2770; _effectus legis de absolutione complicis_, 2771;\n_sollicitatio in confessione_, 2772; _denuntiatio sollicitantis_, 2773.\n\nPerception, 1637 b.\n\nPessimism, defective judgment, 1731 f.\n\nPhilanthropy, as distinguished from almsgiving, 1219.\n\nPhilosophy, use in Moral Theology. 11, 12.\n\nPhrenology, form of divination, 2285 b.\n\nPhysicians, duties of, 2651 c.\n\nPhysiognomy, divination by, 2285 b.\n\nPictures, when obscene, 1456 a.\n\nPiety, Gift of the Holy Ghost, 160 b; a potential part of justice,\n2142 b; various senses of, 2345; definition of virtue of piety, 2346;\nreverence required by piety, 2347; assistance required by piety, 2348;\nsins against piety, 2349; malice of sins against piety, 2350; Gift of\nPiety directed to Our Father in Heaven, 2433 a.\n\nPlants, when they may be occupied, 1873 b.\n\nPlays, when obscene, 1456 c; formal cooperation with evil plays, 1531;\nmaterial cooperation with, 1532.\n\nPleasures, Sensible, and temperance, 2461 b.\n\nPleasures, Spiritual, and temperance, 2461 b.\n\nPledge, 1749 d.\n\nPollution, see Impurity.\n\nPope, authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical laws, 486; three ways\nof rejecting papal decisions, 1369.\n\nPositive Method, in Moral Theology, 13.\n\nPossessors, Unlawful, three kinds of, 1770 sqq.; obligations in\nreference to the property and its fruits, 1771 sqq.\n\nPoverty, vow and virtue, 2612 a.\n\nPower of Jurisdiction, and dominative power, 2356.\n\nPracticality, 1645.\n\nPraise of God, 2269; internal and external praise of God, 2270;\nexcellence of praise of God, 2271; qualities that should be present in\nthe divine praises, 2272.\n\nPrayer, definition, 2153; the psychology of prayer, 2154; the necessity\nof prayer, 2155; a duty for all adults, 2156; times and frequency\nof prayer, 2157; corollaries about prayer and confession, 2158; to\nwhom prayer may be offered, 2159; persons for whom prayer is offered,\n2160; things that may be prayed for, 2161; qualities of prayer, 2162;\nconfidence requisite for successful prayer, 2163; attention and\nintention in prayer, 2164; actual, virtual and habitual intention in\nprayer, 2165 a, b, c; internal or external, verbal or superficial,\nliteral, spiritual, perfect or imperfect attention in prayer, 2166;\nacts that exclude external attention, 2167; when external attention is\nsufficient, 2168; kind of internal attention required in prayer, 2169;\ndistractions in prayer, 2170; voluntary and involuntary distractions,\n2171; sinfulness of distraction in prayer, 2172; distractions during\nDivine Office, 2174.\n\nPrecepts, axiomatic and inferred, 300; general and particular, 301;\necclesiastical, 515-519.\n\nPrecepts of the Church, First derived from natural and divine as well\nas ecclesiastical law, 2575 a; affirmative and negative parts of First\nPrecept, 2576; how Mass must be heard, 2577; external and bodily\nassistance, 2577 a; internal or mental assistance requires actual\nor virtual intention of will, 2577 b; the necessary attention, 2577\nb; time and place of Mass, 2578; servile works, 2579; forensic and\ncommercial labors forbidden, 2579 b; liberal works tolerated, 2580 b;\ndefinition of common works, 2581 a; doubtful works, 2581 b; lawfulness\nof hiring non-Catholics to do servile work, 2582; obligation of First\nPrecept, 2583; excuses from observance of First Precept, 2584; scope\nof Second Precept, 2586; definition of flesh meat, 2586 a; broth and\ncondiments, 2586 c; obligation of Second Precept, 2587 21; exceptions\nto the obligation, 2587 c; the obligation of fasting, 2588 sqq.; scope\nof Third Precept, 2590; subject and matter of Third Precept, 2590 a;\ntime for fulfillment of Third Precept, 2590; origin and gravity of\nThird Precept, 2591; scope of Fourth Precept, 2592; origin and gravity\nof Fourth Precept, 2593 a; Fifth Precept, 2594; Sixth Precept of the\nChurch, 2594.\n\nPrescription, title to private ownership, 1872 b; conditions for valid\nprescription, 1875; may terminate the obligation of contract, 1889 b.\n\nPresumption, sin of, 1075 sqq.; definition, 1078; objects of, 1079;\ncomparison with temptation of God and blasphemous hope, 1081; malice\nof, 1082; gravity compared with other sins, 1083; presumption and\nunbelief, 1084; presumption takes away virtue of hope, 1085; causes of,\n1091; vice against greatness of soul, 2450 a.\n\nPresumption of a Pact, 652.\n\nPretence, see Simulation.\n\nPrice, just and unjust, see Fraud.\n\nPride, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362; cause of\ncontumely, 2017 a; definition of pride, 2557; acts of pride, 2558 a;\nsinfulness of pride, 2559 a; pride compared with other sins, 2560 n;\npride mother of the seven capital sins, 2560 c.\n\nPrinciples, first and secondary, 300 a; reflex, see Reflex Principles.\n\nPrison, escape from, lawfulness, 1982 b.\n\nPrisoners, treatment during war, 1412, 1417.\n\nPrivilege, Pauline, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.\n\nPrivileges, 521 sqq.; definition, 521; wide and strict interpretation\nof, 522; obligation to accept and use, 523.\n\nProbabiliorism, see Systems, Moral.\n\nProbability, intrinsic signs of, 665 a; extrinsic signs of, 665 b;\nkinds of, 703; of law, 711 a; of fact, 711 b, 712.\n\nProbabilism, see Systems, Moral.\n\nProdigality, a vice opposed to liberality, 2427; sinfulness, 2428;\ncomparison of avarice and prodigality, 2429.\n\nPromotion of Undeserving Candidates, 1758.\n\nProfession of Faith, commandment of, 938 sqq. See Faith.\n\nPropensities, Natural, effect on voluntariness of acts, 54.\n\nProperty, Private, chief ways in which it may be occupied, 1873; when\nlost property may be occupied, 1873 d; conversion of property against\nthe wishes of owner, 1891 b; conversion of property, 1891.\n\nPropriety, integral part of temperance, 2405 b; propriety of external\nacts, 2512.\n\nProtestantism, 822 e.\n\nProvidence, 1638 b.\n\nPrudence, 146, 150; ranked first among cardinal virtues, 1626;\ndefinition of prudence, 1627; one of the two practical virtues of\nintellect, 1627 a; inferior to the Gift of Wisdom, 1627 b; objects of\nact of prudence, 1628 a; prudence concerned with application of truths\nand first principles of morality to contingent and particular cases,\n1628 b; formal object of prudence, 1629 a; material object, 1629 a;\nprudence needs certitude, 1630; relation of prudence to the other moral\nvirtues, 1631 a; prudence rules the inferior virtues and serves the\nsuperior, 1632; prudence and the intellectual virtues, 1632 a; prudence\nand the theological virtues, 1632 b; the exercise of prudence, 1633;\nthe three acts of prudence, deliberation, decision, direction, 1633;\nqualities of prudence, 1634; moral, integral, subjective, potestative\nparts of prudence, 1635, 1636; integral parts of prudence, 1637;\nprudence knows how to reason correctly, 1638 a; subjective parts of\nprudence, 1639; individual prudence, 1639 a, 1644 a; social prudence,\n1639 b; political prudence, 1640 a, 1644 c, 1648; domestic prudence,\n1640 b, 1644 b, 1650; governmental prudence, 1642 a; military prudence,\n1642 b, 1644 d; utility of prudence for society, 1643; potential parts\nof prudence, 1646; persons who possess prudence, 1648; evil prudence,\n1651 a; imperfect prudence, 1651; indifferent prudence, 1651 b; good\nprudence, 1651 c; infused prudence, 1654 a; prudence in young people,\n1655 a; formed habit of prudence, 1655 a; prudence a duty of superior,\n2635 a; formative prudence, 1655 b.\n\nPuberty, Age of, 433.\n\nPunishment, eternal and temporal, 280.\n\nPunishment, Capital, lawfulness of, 1820; when it should not be\nimposed, 1821; unlawful killing of offenders, 1823 a.\n\nPunishments, Bodily, 1870.\n\nPunitive Sterilization, 1869 b.\n\nPurity, Virtue of, 2486; definition, 2486; definition of chastity, 2486\na; definition of decency, 2486 b. See also Virginity; Impurity.\n\nPurpose, Wrong, may make venial sin mortal, 191; or mortal venial, 195.\n\nPusillanimity, 1084; as incentive to envy, 1330; vice against greatness\nof soul, 2451 a.\n\nPyromancy, form of divination, 2284 c.\n\nPythian Sisters, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nPythonism, form of divination, 2284 b.\n\nQuickness, 1637 b.\n\nRancor, caused by sloth, 1324.\n\nRape, 2529.\n\nRash Opinion, 1733. See also Judgment, Rash.\n\nRationalism, 847.\n\nReason, Age of, 433.\n\nReason, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 11; as subject of sin, 231.\n\nReading, Dangerous, 849 sqq.; forbidden by natural and ecclesiastical\nlaw, 850.\n\nRebeccas, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nRebellion, not schism, 1364.\n\nRecoupment, definition of, 1927 a.\n\nReflex Principles, for solution of doubts, 657 sqq.; may supply\nindirect certitude, 652 b.\n\n_Regulae pro confessariis de licitis et illicitis, in conjugio_, 2625.\n\nRelationships, various kinds, 1175.\n\nRelatives, order of charity among, 1176 sqq.; duties of near, 2634.\n\nRelaxation, as virtue, 2567 a, b; sins opposed to moderate enjoyment,\n2568 a.\n\nReligion, Virtue of, regarded by some as superior to justice, 1717\na; a potential part of justice, 2142 a; definition of the virtue,\n2145; religion as a moral virtue, 2146; superiority of religion as a\nvirtue, 2147; necessity of the acts of religion, 2148; internal acts\nof religion, 2149; definition of devotion, 2150; external and internal\ncauses of devotion, 2152; external acts of religion, 2175; definition\nof adoration, 2176; difference between _latria_ and _hyperdulia_ and\n_dulia_, 2671 b; difference between _latria_ and civil homage, 2176\nb; unity and variety of adoration, 2177; definition of sacrifice,\n2178; essentials of sacrifice, 2179; obligation of sacrifice, 2180;\nexemptions from sacrifice based on the natural law, 2181; sacrifice\ncompared with the other acts of religion, 2182; goods unsuitable as\nofferings to God, 2184; contributions to religion, 2185; obligation\nof contributing to the support of the clergy, 2186; quality of the\nobligation of contributing to the Church, 2188; priest\u2019s attitude\ntowards persons refusing to contribute, 2189; those to whom religious\ncontributions are due, 2190; external acts of religion in honor of God,\n2244.\n\nReligion, Sins against, 2273; superstition, 2274; false worship, 2274\na; superfluous worship, 2274 b; sinfulness of improper worship of God,\n2275; worship of false deity, 2276; definition of idolatry, 2277;\nkinds of idolatry, 2278; sinfulness of idolatry, 2279; comparison\nof different sins of idolatry, 2280; idolatry possible in Christian\nworship, 2281; definition of divination, 2282; distinction between the\nfact and sin of divination, 2283; forms of explicit invocation, 2284;\nforms of implicit invocation, 2285; malice of the sin of divination,\n2286; when knowledge is obtained from God, 2287; when knowledge\nis obtained through natural causes, 2288; use of lots, 2289; vain\nobservance, 2290; forms of vain observance, 2291; distinction between\nfact and sin of vain observance, 2293; superstition in religious\nobservances, 2294; sinfulness of vain observance, 2295; cooperation in\ndivination or other form of superstition, 2296; doubtful cases of vain\nobservance, 2297; licitness of using doubtfully superstitious means,\n2298; irreligiousness, 2299; temptation of God, 2300; cases wherein\nthere is no temptation of God, 2301; kinds of temptation of God, 2302;\ncauses that exclude the interpretative temptation of God, 2303; refusal\nof medicine or hygienic care, 2304; sinfulness of temptation of God,\n2305; malice of temptation of God, 2306. See also Sacrilege; Simony.\n\nReligious, special duties of, 2611; perfection of charity, 2611 a;\nevangelical counsels, 2611 b; obligation of the three principal vows,\n2612 a.\n\nRemorse of Conscience, penalty of sin, 279.\n\nRepentance, Virtue of, 2718; character of repentance, 2720; excellence,\n2721; dignity, 2721 a; necessity, 2721 b; repentance as a means and as\na precept, 2722; accompaniments of repentance, 2724; fruits of, 2725;\nrestores infused virtues and former merits, 2725 c; removes every sin,\n2725 a.\n\nReproach, definition, 2012 b.\n\nReprisals, in war, 1417.\n\nReputation, when charity requires one to seek good reputation, 1575;\nwhen sacrifice of reputation is lawful and unlawful, 1576; when\nself-detraction is lawful, 1577; definition of good, true, false,\nordinary and extraordinary reputation, 2034 a-c; right to good\nreputation, 2035; right to true and false reputation, 2037; meaning of\nthe expression \u201cinfamous in a certain place,\u201d 2051; rights that have\nprecedence over a false reputation, 2068; unlawful attack on another\u2019s\nfalse reputation, 2069; conditions that justify revelation of another\u2019s\ndefects, 2070; revelations about public officials or candidates for\npublic office, 2071. See also Defamation.\n\nRescripts, 520.\n\nReservation, strict and broad mental reservation in an oath, 2251. See\nalso Lying.\n\nResident, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.\n\nRestitution, distinct from payment, restoration and satisfaction,\n1751; difference between satisfaction and restitution, 1752; when\nrestitution is due, 1753; confessor\u2019s duties regarding the obligation\nof restitution, 1760; roots of restitution, 1762; when unjust damage\nobliges to restitution, 1763; restitution for damages that are\nonly venially sinful but seriously harmful, 1765; for damages only\njuridically culpable, 1766; for careless discharge of fiduciary\nduties, 1768; restitution when culpability seems doubtful, 1769;\ncooperators and restitution, 1778; circumstances of restitution, 1781;\nrestitution _in solidum_ or _pro rata_, 1783; order of restitution\namong cooperators, 1784; person to whom restitution must be made, 1786;\ncreditors with right _in re_ have preference over creditors with right\n_ad rem_, 1787; \u201cthing\u201d to be restored, 1789; \u201camount\u201d of restitution\nin certain cases, 1790; \u201cmanner\u201d of making restitution, 1791; second\nrestitution, 1792; \u201ctime\u201d when restitution must be made, 1793; unjust\nrefusal to make restitution, 1794; \u201cplace\u201d where restitution must be\nmade, 1795, 1796; causes that excuse temporarily from restitution,\n1797; causes that excuse permanently from restitution, 1798; excuse\nfrom restitution on account of doubtfulness of obligation, 1800;\nrestitution for frustration of another\u2019s good, 1802 a; restitution for\ninjury done to goods of fortune, 1802 b; restitution for injury done\nto goods of body or personal goods, 1802 c; restitution for unjust\nhomicide or mutilation, 1803; restitution for fornication or adultery,\n1803 b; restitution for injuries of soul, 1803 c; restitution for\noccupied goods, 1922; restitution of bribes, etc., 1946 c; restitution\nfor jail-breaking, 1983; obligation of witness to make restitution,\n1992; when a lawyer is bound to restitution, 2008; restitution for\ncontumely, 2021 sqq.; cessation of obligation of restitution for\ncontumely, 2026; restitution for defamation, 2085 sqq.; restitution\nof temporal price received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of\ntemporal price received for temporal things annexed to spirituals,\n2341; circumstances of restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of\nspiritual thing simoniacally received, 2343; restitution necessitated\nby breach of promise to marry, 2628 d; restitution for theft. See also\nCompensation.\n\nRestraint, definition, 1866 d.\n\nRevelations, private, 757.\n\nReverence, potential part of justice, 2142 c; definition of virtue,\n2351; species of honor, 2352; obligation of religious cult of _dulia_,\n2354.\n\nRevilement, definition, 2012 b.\n\nRights, precedence in case of collision, 292.\n\nRobbery, comparison with theft, 1892 a; kinds of theft and robbery,\n1893 a; what constitutes grave matter in robbery, 1896. See also Theft;\nInjustice.\n\nRubrics, directive and preceptive, in administration of the Sacraments,\n2669 c.\n\nRudeness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.\n\nSacraments, of Old Testament, 339; denial of Christian Sacraments in\ncases of scandal, 1493; nature of Sacrament, 2654; outward sign, 2654\na; instituter of Sacraments, 2654 b; purpose of Sacraments, 2654 c;\nSacraments of the Dead and of the Living, 2654 c; indelible character\nof some Sacraments, 2654 c; matter and form of the Sacraments, 2655;\nsubstantial changes in matter or form, 2655 a; substantial separations\nof matter and form, 2655 b; simultaneity of matter and form, 2656;\naccidental changes or separations of matter and form, 2658; substantial\nchanges or separations, 2659; doubtful matter, 2660; Sacraments that\nhave a necessity of means, 2661; reception of Sacraments _in re_ or\n_in voto_, 2662; Sacraments that have a necessity of precept, 2663;\ntwofold ministry of the Sacraments (production and bestowal), 2664;\nrequirements in the minister for valid performance of Sacrament, 2665;\nnecessary intention, 2666; virtual, actual, habitual and interpretative\nintention, 2666 b; rules on plurality of intentions, 2667; requisites\nfor use of conditional intention, 2668; lawful administration of\nSacraments, 2669; minister\u2019s worthiness before God, 2669 a; minister\u2019s\nworthiness before Church, 2669 b; worthiness of ministration, 2669 c;\ndirective and preceptive rubrics, 2669 c; explanation of ceremonies\nadvised, 2669 c; multiplication of sins by unworthy administration,\n2670; requirements for valid Sacrament in recipient, 2671; qualities of\nrecipient\u2019s intention, 2672; neutral intention, 2672 b; when virtual\nintention is necessary, 2673; when habitual and explicit intention\nsuffices, 2674 b; when habitual and implicit intention suffices, 2674\nb; requirements for lawful or fruitful reception of Sacrament by adult,\n2675; obligation of minister to confer Sacraments, 2676; obligation of\npastor to confer Sacraments, 2676 a; when minister is bound to deny\nthem, 2677; administration to unworthy persons, 2678; simulation and\ndissimulation of Sacrament, 2680; administration of Penance and Extreme\nUnction to heretics and schismatics, 2681; repetition of Sacrament on\naccount of invalid administration, 2682; reception of Sacrament from\nunworthy minister, 2683; forgiveness of sin through use of Sacraments,\n2726.\n\nSacrament, Blessed, see Eucharist, Holy.\n\nSacramentals, definition, 2684; necessity and use, 2684 a, b.\n\nSacrifice, see Religion, Virtue of.\n\nSacrilege, definition, 2308; violation of what kind of consecration\ninvolves sacrilege? 2309; is sacrilege a special sin? 2310; species\nof sacrilege, 2311; personal sacrilege, 2311 a; local sacrilege,\n2311 b; desecration, a form of sacrilege, 2311 b; profanation, a\nform of sacrilege, 2311 b; real sacrilege, 2311 c; special cases\nregarding local sacrilege, 2312; cases wherein there is no sacrilege,\n2313; sacredness as aggravating circumstance of sin, 2314; malice of\nsacrilege, 2315; conditions that govern gravity of sacrilege, 2316;\ncarnal sacrilege, 2533; personal sacrilege, 2533 c; local sacrilege,\n2533 d; real sacrilege, 2533 e.\n\nSadness, concupiscible passion, 119.\n\nSapphism, form of impurity, 2534 c.\n\nSatisfaction, for sin, 283. See also Penance, Sacrament of.\n\nScandal, various uses of word, 1445-46; definition, 1447; causes of,\n1448; directly intentional (diabolical) and indirectly intentional,\n1450; active and passive, 1453; acts that give scandal, 1454; obscenity\n(q.v.), 1455 sqq.; results of scandal, 1459; scandal resembles\nsolicitation and complicity, 1460; persons apt to be scandalized,\n1461; scandal given and scandal taken, 1464; Pharisaic scandal and\n\u201cscandal of little ones,\u201d 1464 b; sinfulness, 1465; is scandal a\ndistinct species of sin? 1466; how scandal should be confessed, 1467;\nresponsibility of scandalizer for injuries to third parties, 1470-71;\ngravity of sin, 1472; is any person immune from scandal? 1475; duty of\navoiding, 1477; scandal of the weak forbidden by the natural law, 1479;\nsurrender of temporal goods to avoid scandal, 1483; surrender of Church\ngoods to avoid scandal, 1486-87; duty of repairing scandal, 1488; ways\nof repairing, 1489; public and private scandal, 1490 a; ordinary and\nextraordinary, 1490 b; denial of Sacraments in cases of scandal, 1493;\nprohibition against, 1552.\n\nSchism, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; definition, 1364;\nprincipal schismatic movements, 1365; directly and indirectly voluntary\nschism, 1366; schism committed in two ways, 1368; three ways of\nrejecting decisions of Pope, 1369; schism compared with heresy, 1370;\nopposition between schism and charity, 1371; greatest sin against\nneighbor, 1372 a; not so serious as unbelief, 1372 b; formal and\nmaterial schism, 1373.\n\nSchismatics, spiritual powers of, 1374.\n\nScholastic Method, in Moral Theology, 13.\n\nSchools, Dangerous, 867 sqq.; sectarian and neutral, 867; absolution of\nparents of children attending, 872; Catholic teachers in non-Catholic\nschools, 874.\n\nSciences, Natural, use in Moral Theology, 12.\n\nScripture, as Source of Moral Theology, 7.\n\nScrupulous, see Conscience.\n\nSeal of Confession, see Penance, Sacrament of.\n\nSecond Sight, 2285 a.\n\nSecret, violation of (infidelity), 2407; definition of a secret, 2408;\nnatural, promised, entrusted or committed secret, 2408; sinfulness of\nviolating secret, 2409; prying into others\u2019 secrets, 2410; reading\nanother\u2019s letters or papers, 2411; lawfulness of utilizing knowledge\nof secret, 2412; sin committed by stealing or unduly using secret\nof another, 2413; obligation of keeping secret, 2414; comparison\nof secrets as regards binding force, 2415; cases wherein it is not\nnecessary to keep secret, 2416; cases wherein it is not lawful to keep\nsecret, 2417; lawfulness of revealing secret learned by stealth or\nforce, 2420.\n\nSedition, definition, 1440; distinct species of sin, 1441; resistance\nto tyrannical government not sinful, 1443.\n\nSeduction, 1495 sqq.; definition, 1496; malice, 1497; differs from mere\npermission to sin, 1500; sinful request, 1501; advice to commit evil,\n1502; prearrangement of circumstances that lead to sin, 1504.\n\nSelf-Abuse, form of impurity, 2534 a.\n\nSelf-Beautification, morality of, 2570.\n\nSelf-Defamation, sin opposed to charity, 2028 e.\n\nSelf-Defense, Right of, 1826; conditions for exercise of this right,\n1826 a; self-defense must be moderate, 1833; when it is obligatory,\n1836; when it is not obligatory, 1837; defense of neighbor\u2019s life\nagainst unjust aggressor, 1838; defense of material goods against\nunjust aggressor, 1840; defense of bodily purity against an unjust\naggressor, 1841; defense of bodily integrity against an unjust\naggrossor, 1842; defense of honor or reputation, 1843.\n\nSelf-Depreciation, form of lying, 2406.\n\nSelf-Glorification, form of lying, 2406.\n\nSelf-Love, commandment of, 1561; understood in many senses, 1561;\nsinful, natural and supernatural, 1136; charity demands an elicited\nsupernatural self-love, 1562; demands pursuit of all goods necessary\nfor attainment of happiness, 1563; care of the mind, 1564; neglect of\neducation sinful, 1565; care of the body and health, 1566; care as to\nfood and drink, 1567; fresh air, rest, physical exercise, 1568-1573;\npursuit of honors and good name, 1574-1575; when self-detraction is\nlawful, 1577; dislike of self, 1305, 1307; may one wish evil to self?\n1308.\n\nSelf-Starvation, sin opposed to abstemiousness, 2470 a.\n\nSeminaries, courses of theology must follow St. Thomas Aquinas, 10.\n\nSensuality, 232, 117 sqq.; compared with impurity, 2492 a.\n\nSentence, Judicial, when it may be resisted, 1982 c; moral obligation\nwhen this is certainly just, 1959; moral obligation when this is\ncertainly unjust, 1960.\n\nSeparation, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.\n\nServility, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.\n\nSet-off, definition, 1927 a.\n\nShamefacedness, integral part of temperance, 2465 b.\n\nShintoism, 822 a.\n\nSimony, origin of name, 2317; definition, 2318; temporal price in\nsimony, 2319; spiritual thing in simony, 2320; temporal thing united\nwith spiritual, 2321; temporal thing annexed to spiritual, 2322;\nvarious kinds of simony, 2323; confidential simony, 2324; simony\nagainst divine law, 2325; rules of Alexander III for determining\nsimony, 2327; simony against divine law in reference to things annexed\nto spirituals, 2328; simony against ecclesiastical law, 2329; certain\nand uncertain simony, 2330; doubtful cases of simony, 2331; cases\nin which transaction is not simoniacal, 2332; theological malice of\nsimony; 2335; moral malice of simony, 2336; invalidity and penalties\nof simoniacal contracts, 2337; canonical penalties for simony, 2338;\ninfluence of simony on spiritual effects, 2339; restitution of temporal\nprice received for spiritual thing, 2340; restitution of temporal price\nreceived for temporal things annexed to spirituals, 2341; circumstances\nof restitution for simony, 2342; restitution of spiritual thing\nsimoniacally received, 2343.\n\nSimulation, form of lying, 2391 b; definition, 2403; sinfulness of\nsimulation, 2404. See also Hypocrisy.\n\nSin, definition, 167; spiritual and carnal, 168 a, 224 sqq.; against\nGod, neighbor or self, 168 h; mortal and venial, 168 c, 169; of\ncommission or omission, 168 d; stages of (heart, mouth, work), 168 e;\nby excess or defect, 168 f; original and actual, 168 g; when matter\nof sin is grave, 171-172; advertence and consent conditions of mortal\nsin, 174 sqq.; mortal, condition of, 169 sqq.; venial, definition, 180;\nconditions, 181 sqq.; when imperfections become a sin, 186; when venial\nsin becomes mortal, 187-189; coalescence of, 189; multiplication of,\n190; possible effect of wrong purpose, circumstances and harm foreseen,\n191 sqq,; when mortal sin becomes venial, 194 sqq,; causes of sin,\n246; effect of ignorance, passion and malice on, 249; external causes\nof, 252; distinct from temptation, 253; proximate and remote danger\nof, 258; possibility of, 259; guilt of one who exposes himself to sin,\n2150; occasions of (proximate or remote, necessary or free, present or\nabsent), 263 sqq.; motives of, 268 sqq.; results and penalties of, 272\nsqq.; original and actual, 272 sqq.; stain of, 276; every sin removed\nby repentance, 2725 a; forgiveness of sin through the use of the\nSacraments, 2726. See also Sins.\n\nSincerity, see Truthfulness.\n\nSinners, charity for, 1142; association with, 1145; friendship with,\n1146.\n\nSins, theological and moral species, 197; specific distinction,\n198; numerical multiplication, 197, 202 sqq.; rules of numerical\ndistinction, 207 sqq.; comparison of, 220; sins against God, 227;\nagainst creatures, 228; subjects of (sensitive appetites, reason,\nwill), 230 sqq,; sins of sensuality, 232; sins of thought, 233 sqq.;\nsins of desire, 237 sqq.; material (or objective) and formal (or\nsubjective), 248; sins of weakness, ignorance and malice, 250. See also\nSin.\n\nSlander, definition, 2030 d. See also Defamation.\n\nSloth, 269; spiritual, 1064, capital sin, 1320 sqq.; definition, 1320;\nsinfulness, 1321; qualities of sin, 1322; sins that spring from sloth,\n1324; conquest of sloth, 1325; prohibition against, 1552.\n\nSluggishness, sin opposed to diligence, 1326 b.\n\nSobriety, subjective part of temperance, 2465 a; definition, 2474;\nobligation to practise sobriety, 2475; sins against sobriety, 2476 a;\nmorality of total abstinence, 2478 a; licit use of narcotics, 2485. See\nalso Drunkenness.\n\nSocieties, Forbidden, 945 sqq.; forbidden by Code, 946; absolution of\nmembers, 949.\n\nSodomy, form of impurity, 2534 c.\n\nSoftness, 2534 a.\n\nSolicitation, resemblance to scandal, 1460 a. See Seduction.\n\nSons of Temperance, Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nSoul, First and Second Motions of the, 129.\n\nSortilege, form of divination, 2285 d.\n\nSpeculation, Sinful, 1879 f.\n\nSpiritism, 823 b; sin against religion, 2284 b.\n\nSponsors, see Baptism, Sacrament of; Confirmation, Sacrament of.\n\nStain of Sin, 276.\n\nState of Life, Duties of, knowledge of obligatory, 920.\n\nStatesmanship, 1642 a, 1649 a.\n\nStates of Man, Four Historical, 331.\n\nSteadfastness, act of fortitude, 2447 b.\n\nSterilization, morality of, 1869 a.\n\nStiffness, vice opposite to modesty, 2566 b.\n\nStipends, Mass, institution of, 2185 b. See also Mass, Sacrifice of the.\n\nStocks, purchase by clerics, 2605 a.\n\nStocks and Bonds, 1749 b.\n\nStolidity, vice opposed to patience, 2455.\n\nStranger, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 439-446.\n\nStudents, duties of, 2651 b.\n\nStudiosity, potential part of temperance, 2465 c; definition of\nstudiousness, 2562; vices opposed to studiousness, 2563 a; malice\nof the sins against studiousness, 2564 a; negligence, a sin against\nstudiousness, 2564 b.\n\nSubjects, duties to domestic and civil superiors, 2636.\n\nSuffrage, Power of, 1649 b. See also Voting.\n\nSuicide, books in favor of, forbidden, 855 b; voluntary and\ninvoluntary, direct and indirect, 1852 a; sinfulness of suicide, 1854;\ncooperation in suicide, 1855; authorization to commit suicide, 1856;\nwhen indirect suicide is lawful, 1857, 1858; when indirect suicide\nis unlawful, 1859; is it suicidal to refuse s necessary surgical\noperation? 1860; canonical penalties for suicide, 1861 a.\n\nSunday, Sanctification of, see Precepts of the Church.\n\nSuperfluities, from which alms must be given, 1227-1229.\n\nSuperior, Clerical, duties of, 2606 a; special duties to flock, 2607 a.\n\nSuperiors, Domestic and Civil, duties of, 2635. See also Employers;\nSubjects.\n\nSuperstition, see Religion, Sins against.\n\nSurety, 1749 d.\n\nSurgeons, duties of, 2651 c.\n\nSurliness, sin against affability, 2423 b.\n\nSyncretism, 823 b.\n\nSynesis, part of judgment, 2432 d.\n\nSynteresis, and Moral Theology, 2; directs the moral virtues, 1631 a.\n\nSystems, Moral, 672 sqq.; Tutiorism, 672 a, 676 sqq.; Anti-tutiorism,\n672 b; condemned by Church, 676; Laxism, 680 sqq.; condemned by Church,\n681; Probabiliorism, 683 sqq.; Equiprobabilisrn, 688; Probabilism, 701\nsqq.; Compensationism, 731 sqq.; practical conclusions, 739; respective\nmerits and use of the rival systems, 740; use by confessors, 741.\n\nTale-Bearing, definition, 2103; sinfulness, 2104; circumstances which\naffect the species of tale-bearing, 2105.\n\nTaoism, 822 a.\n\nTaunting, form of contumely, definition, 2012 b.\n\nTaxes, definition, 2637; kinds of taxes, 2638; just taxes, 2639;\nobligation to pay taxes, 2640 sqq.; obedience to tax laws, 2642.\n\nTeachers, duties of, 2651 b.\n\nTelepathy, and the virtue of religion, 2285 a.\n\nTemperance, 150; golden mean in, 154 a, 157 b; differs from patience,\n2453 a; definition of temperance, 2461; temperance and sensible\npleasures, 2461 b; temperance and spiritual pleasures, 2461 b; rule\nof moderation, 2462; excellence of temperance, 2463; vices opposed to\ntemperance, 2464; subjective parts of temperance, 2465 a; potential\nparts of temperance, 2465 c; integral parts of temperance, 2465 b;\nsobriety, 2476 sqq.; continence, 2544; incontinence, 2544 c; sinful\nindulgence, 2550; complements of the virtue of temperance, 2571 a;\ncommandments of temperance, 2572 a.\n\nTemptation, not a sin, 253; implicit or explicit, internal or\nexternal, direct or indirect, virtual or actual resistance to, 255;\nrules regarding resistance to, 256; exterior and interior temptations\nto impurity, 2497; resistance to internal temptations, 2498; what\nopposition to temptation is sufficient, 2499; insufficient, harmful and\nunnecessary opposition, 2500; weapons against carnal temptations, 2501;\nnegligence in resisting temptations, 2508.\n\nTemptation of God, see Religion, Sins against.\n\nTepidity, consequence of sloth, 1327.\n\nTestament, New, see New Testament.\n\nTestament, Old, see Old Testament.\n\nTestimony, see Witness.\n\nTheft, sin of injustice, 1872; definition of theft, 1890; plagiarism\nis form of theft, 1890 c; copyright infringement, a form of theft,\n1890 c; kidnapping, a form of theft, 1890 c; comparison of theft and\nrobbery, 1892 a; kinds of theft, 1893 a; sinfulness of theft, 1894\na; grave matter in theft of sacred objects, 1901; grave matter in\ndomestic theft, 1903 a; theft by wife or minor child, 1904 a; theft\nby employees, 1905 a; theft of things about whose loss owner is less\nconcerned, 1906 a; travelling without paying fare, 1907; when small\nthefts amount to grave matter, 1908 sqq.; moral connection between\nrepeated acts of theft, 1912; interval of time between acts of theft,\n1913; theft from joint owners, 1917; restitution in cases of theft,\n1918 a; cases of doubt as to grave matter, 1919 a; occult compensation,\n1920 b; when conversion of others\u2019 property is permissible, 1920;\nconditions for lawful occupation of others\u2019 goods, 1921 a; restitution\nfor occupied goods, 1922; occupation in case of merely grave necessity,\n1923; occupation of large sum by one in dire need, 1924 a; lawfulness\nof receiving support from thief, 1926; compensation for theft, see\nCompensation; condonation of domestic thefts, 1799.\n\nTheologians, as source of Moral Theology, 10.\n\nTheological Virtues, 151; golden mean in, 154 c; rank among virtues,\n156. See Faith, Hope and Charity.\n\nTheology, Ascetical and Mystical, 2573.\n\nTheology, Moral, definition, 1; relation to Dogmatic Theology, 3.\n\nTheosophical Societies, forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nTheosophy, 823 b.\n\nThird Orders, Secular, 955 a.\n\nThomas Aquinas, Saint, as source of Moral Theology, 10; arrangement of\nMoral Theology, 17; opinion on obligation of judge when evidence is\ncontrary to his personal knowledge, 1951 c.\n\nThought, Sins of, 233 sqq.\n\nThoughts, Impure, see Impurity.\n\nThoughts, Sinful, 234.\n\nTimidity, sin against fortitude, 2446 b.\n\nTrading, definition, 2134; morality of trading in the strict sense,\n2135; trading forbidden to clerics, 2604 a.\n\nTradition, 8; divine, Apostolic, ecclesiastical, 9.\n\nTreasure Trove, when it may be occupied, 1873 c.\n\nTribadism, form of impurity, 2534 c.\n\nTruth, necessary quality of lawful oath, 2249 b. See also Truthfulness;\nLying.\n\nTruthfulness, 2143 a; definition of virtue, 2385; excellence, 2386;\nsincerity and fidelity, 2387; vices opposed to truthfulness, 2388. See\nalso Lying.\n\nTruths, Natural and Supernatural, to which assent must be given, 784.\n\nTutiorism, see Systems, Moral.\n\nTyrannicide, lawfulness of, 1824 a.\n\nUnbelief, Sin of, negative and positive, 813; ordinary and apostasy,\n814; direct and indirect, 815-816; non-assent, 817; dissent (private\nand contrary unbelief), 818; infidelity, 822 a; order of gravity in\nunbelief, 824; dangers which lead to external expression of unbelief,\n944 sqq. See also Heresy; Apostasy.\n\nUnction, Extreme, Sacrament of, 2774; remote matter, 2774 a; proximate\nmatter, 2774 b; form, 2774 c; recipient, 2774 d; minister, 2774 e;\neffects of, 2774 f; special duties of recipient, 2775 a; special duties\nof minister, 2775 b; special duties of pastor, 2775 c; special duties\nof faithful, 2775 d.\n\nUnderstanding, integral part of prudence, 1637 a.\n\nUnderstanding, Gift of, 160 a; given to perfect theological virtues,\n808.\n\nUnity of the Church, threefold, 1367.\n\nUranism, form of impurity, 2534 c.\n\nUse, act of will, 59.\n\nUsury, definition, 2136.\n\n_Vagus_, definition, 437; when subject to laws, 438.\n\nVainglory, as origin of discord, 1354; origin of contention, 1362.\n\nVanity, vice against greatness of soul, 2450 c.\n\nVengeance, definition, 2381; morality of vengeance, 2382; excess and\ndefect in vengeance, 2383; circumstances of vengeance, 2384.\n\nViaticum, see Communion, Holy.\n\nVice, definition, 167; and sin, see Sin.\n\nVices, Capital, Seven, 269 sqq.\n\nVindication, virtue, 2143 a. See also Vengeance.\n\nViolence, invalidates consent to contract, 1884 d. See also Coercion.\n\nVirginity, definition, 2488; loss of virginity, 2489; conditions\nnecessary for virtue of virginity, 2490 a; excellence of virginity,\n2491 a.\n\nVirtue, subjective parts, 1639 h, 1745; integral parts, 1637, 2139;\npotential parts, 1646, 2141; parts, 1635, 1636, 2447, 2465.\n\nVirtues, definition, 142; division, 143; practical intellectual,\n146-148; moral, definition, 149; four cardinal virtues, 150;\ntheological, 151; three causes of virtues (nature, practice and\ninfusion), 152; inchoative and perfected, 152; properties of, 153;\ngolden mean in, 154 b; rank among virtues, 156-157; in the blessed,\n158; complements of, 159; properties of seven infused virtues, 745;\norder of theological virtues, 746; priority of a virtue in duration,\nby nature, and in excellence, 1028. See also Faith; Hope; Charity;\nCardinal Virtues; Act, virtuous.\n\nVision, Beatific, relation to charity, 1116.\n\nVocation, internal, 2597; external, 2597 b; vocation to the clerical\nstate, 2597 a; sinfulness of disregarding vocation, 2598 a.\n\nVolksverein, 955 b.\n\nVoting, duty of exercising the electoral franchise, 2643; manner of\nvoting, 2644; obligation to seek office, 2645.\n\nVow, definition, 2191; personal, real and mixed vows, 2192; singular\nand common vows, 2192 b; temporary and perpetual vows, 2192 c; absolute\nand conditional vows, 2192 d; penal and non-penal vows, 2192 d;\nexplicit and implicit vows, 2192 e; determinate and disjunctive vows,\n2192 e; private and public vows, 2192 f; simple and solemn vows, 2192\nf; vows in Canon Law, 2193; distinction between solemn and simple\nvows, 2194; knowledge and deliberation necessary for valid vow, 2195;\nfreedom of will necessary for valid vow, 2196; cases in which fear does\nnot invalidate vow, 2197; vows of doubtful validity, 2198; intention\nnecessary for valid vow, 2199; matter of vow, 2200; vows that promise\nsomething necessary, 2201; when fulfillment of vow is only partly\npossible, 2202; vows that promise something displeasing to God, 2203;\nvows that promise something indifferent, 2205; meaning of better good\nin vow, 2206; vows invalidated by promise of lesser good, 2207; when\none has taken two opposite vows, 2208; obligation of vow, 2209; gravity\nof obligation, 2210; rules for determining what is important matter in\nvow, 2211; coalescence of light into grave matter in vow, 2212; delay\nin fulfilling vow, 2214; time when vow obliges, 2213; person obliged\nto fulfill a vow, 2215; manner of fulfilling vow, 2216; obligation of\ncertain kinds of vows, 2217; interpretation of doubtful vows, 2218;\nadvantages of vows to vowers, 2220; when good vow may be sinful, 2221;\nmerit of fulfilling vow that one regrets, 2222; persons who can make\nvow, 2223; dependence of vower on will of another, 2224; validity of\nvows made by subjects, 2225; cessation of vows, 2226; annulment of\nvows, 2228; reason necessary for annulment of vow, 2229; differences\nbetween direct and indirect annulment of vow, 2230; dispensation of\nvow, 2231; reasons sufficient for dispensation, 2232; sinfulness of\nunnecessary dispensation, 2233; persons who have power of dispensation,\n2234; dispensation from religious vow of chastity, 2235; dispensation\nfrom vow made for benefit of third party, 2236; commutation of vows,\n2238; good works that may be substituted for vows, 2239; persons who\nhave authority to commute vow, 2240; cause required for commutation of\nvow, 2241; reversion to original vow, 2242; duties of confessors in\nreference to private vows, 2243; obligation of vow of obedience, 2364;\nreligious vows, obligation of the three principal vows, 2612 a.\n\nVulgarity, vice against greatness of deed, 2452 b.\n\nWagers, Sinful, 1879 c.\n\nWaldensianism, 822 c.\n\nWar, definition, 1376; just and unjust, 1377; offensive and defensive,\n1378; not against law of God, 1380; nor against law of nature, 1383;\nthree conditions for lawfulness, 1384; who may declare war? 1385; what\nis just cause of war? 1386; sufficient causes, 1389 sqq.; insufficient\ncauses, 1393; when justice of cause is doubtful, 1394; can there be\njustice on both sides? 1396; duties before beginning war, 1398-99;\nduties during war, 1401 sqq.; lawful means of warfare, 1403; acts\nof war and sacred times, 1405; and sacred places, 1406; and sacred\npersons, 1407; combatants, non-combatants and neutrals, 1408; killing\nor wounding of combatants, 1409; of non-combatants, 1410; punishment of\nmilitary crimes, 1411; imprisonment and restraint of enemy subjects,\n1412; destruction and seizure of property, 1413; booty and looting,\n1414-1415; lawfulness of stratagems, 1416; of reprisals, 1417; duties\nof victor, 1418; rights, 1419; obligation of victor whose cause was\nunjust, 1420-21; indemnities, 1422; guarantees for future, 1424;\npunishment for crimes committed during war, 1425; preparation for\nfuture wars, 1426; preparation for peace, 1427.\n\nWeakness, Sins of, 250 a.\n\nWhispering, form of defamation, 2103 sqq.\n\nWhoremongering, definition, 2526 b.\n\nWicliffism, 822 c.\n\nWill, acts elicited or commanded by, 56-62; three acts of, 58; consent\nof, condition of mortal sin, 174, 184, 196; as subject of sin, 231.\n\nWill (Testament), definition, 1876; defects of a will, 1876.\n\nWisdom, intellectual virtue, 157 c.\n\nWisdom, Gift of, 160 a; corresponds with and serves charity, 1609;\nnature of Gift, 1610; object of, 1610 d; in its cause, Wisdom belongs\nto the will, 1611 a; in its essence, to the intellect, 1611 b; Wisdom\nis both speculative and practical, 1612; practical uses of, 1613;\nlikeness to the other Gifts, 1614 a; difference from, 1614 b; persons\nwho possess Wisdom, 1615; differs from the \u201cword of wisdom,\u201d 1616 b;\nvarying degrees, 1617; exercise of Gift, 1618; corresponds to Seventh\nBeatitude, 1619 a; and to certain Fruits, 1619 b; direction given by\nWisdom to human actions, 1620; sins opposed to Wisdom, 1621; false\nwisdom, 1623.\n\nWish, as act of will, 58.\n\nWitness, reliability of, 1984; obligation of freely appearing as\nwitness, 1985; obligation of appearing under lawful citation, 1986;\nobligation to answer truthfully, 1987; witness and concealment of\nfacts, 1993; payment of witnesses, 1994; matters regarding which\nwitness should not testify, 1988; sinfulness of false testimony, 1990;\nobligation of witness to make restitution, 1992; concealment of truth\nin presenting case, 2006; sinfulness of introducing false or corrupted\ndocuments, 2007.\n\nWives, see Matrimony, Sacrament of.\n\n\u201cWord of Wisdom,\u201d 1616 b.\n\nWords, Unjust, see Injustice.\n\nWorks of Mercy, seven corporal, 1221; seven spiritual, 1222.\n\nWorship, False, communication in, 956 sqq.; cooperation in, 976 sqq.;\ncontributions to, 981; building of houses of false worship, 983. See\nalso Religion, Sins against.\n\nWounding, definition, 1866 b.\n\nWritings, Forbidden, 861; when use allowed, 862; permission to read,\n865; censures incurred through use, 866; formal cooperation with, 1529.\nSee Books and Reading, Dangerous.\n\nY.M.C.A., Society forbidden by Church, 946 b.\n\nYoung Men\u2019s Institute. 955 b.\n\nZoroastrianism, 822 a.","title":"Moral theology : $b a complete course based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the best modern authorities","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":571841}