{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_35722/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_35722","id":"gutenberg_35722","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/35722","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ontology","Philosophy"],"text":"</pre>\n\n\n\n\n                                 Ontology\n\n                                  Or the\n\n                             Theory of Being\n\n                                    By\n\n                      Peter Coffey, Ph.D. (Louvain)\n\n      Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Waynooth College, Ireland\n\n                         Longmans, Green and Co.\n\n              London, New York, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras\n\n                                   1918\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nPreface.\nGeneral Introduction.\nChapter I. Being And Its Primary Determinations.\nChapter II. Becoming And Its Implications.\nChapter III. Existence And Essence.\nChapter IV. Reality As One And Manifold.\nChapter V. Reality And The True.\nChapter VI. Reality And The Good.\nChapter VII. Reality And The Beautiful.\nChapter VIII. The Categories Of Being. Substance And Accident.\nChapter IX. Nature And Person.\nChapter X. Some Accident-Modes Of Being: Quality.\nChapter XI. Quantity, Space And Time.\nChapter XII. Relation; The Relative And The Absolute.\nChapter XIII. Causality; Classification Of Causes.\nChapter XIV. Efficient Causality; Phenomenism And Occasionalism.\nChapter XV. Final Causes; Universal Order.\nIndex.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTo\nThe Students\nPast And Present\nOf\nMaynooth College\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nIt is hoped that the present volume will supply a want that is really felt\nby students of philosophy in our universities\u2014the want of an English\ntext-book on General Metaphysics from the Scholastic standpoint. It is the\nauthor\u2019s intention to supplement his _Science of Logic_(1) and the present\ntreatise on Ontology, by a volume on the Theory of Knowledge. Hence no\ndisquisitions on the latter subject will be found in these pages: the\nModerate Realism of Aristotle and the Schoolmen is assumed throughout.\n\nIn the domain of Ontology there are many scholastic theories and\ndiscussions which are commonly regarded by non-scholastic writers as\npossessing nowadays for the student of philosophy an interest that is\nmerely historical. This mistaken notion is probably due to the fact that\nfew if any serious attempts have yet been made to transpose these\nquestions from their medieval setting into the language and context of\ncontemporary philosophy. Perhaps not a single one of these problems is\nreally and in substance alien to present-day speculations. The author has\nendeavoured, by his treatment of such characteristically \u201cmedieval\u201d\ndiscussions as those on _Potentia_ and _Actus_, Essence and Existence,\nIndividuation, the Theory of Distinctions, Substance and Accident, Nature\nand Person, Logical and Real Relations, Efficient and Final Causes, to\nshow that the issues involved are in every instance as fully and keenly\ndebated\u2014in an altered setting and a new terminology\u2014by recent and living\nphilosophers of every school of thought as they were by St. Thomas and his\ncontemporaries in the golden age of medieval scholasticism. And, as the\npurposes of a text-book demanded, attention has been devoted to stating\nthe problems clearly, to showing the significance and bearings of\ndiscussions and solutions, rather than to detailed analyses of arguments.\nAt the same time it is hoped that the treatment is sufficiently full to be\nhelpful even to advanced students and to all who are interested in the\n\u201cMetaphysics of the Schools\u201d. For the convenience of the reader the more\nadvanced portions are printed in smaller type.\n\nThe teaching of St. Thomas and the other great Schoolmen of the Middle\nAges forms the groundwork of the book. This _corpus_ of doctrine is\nscarcely yet accessible outside its Latin sources. As typical of the\nfuller scholastic text-books the excellent treatise of the Spanish author,\nUrraburu,(2) has been most frequently consulted. Much assistance has also\nbeen derived from Kleutgen\u2019s _Philosophie der Vorzeit_,(3) a monumental\nwork which ought to have been long since translated into English. And\nfinally, the excellent treatise in the Louvain _Cours de Philosophie_, by\nthe present Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin,(4) has been consulted with\nprofit and largely followed in many places. The writer freely and\ngratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to these and other authors quoted\nand referred to in the course of the present volume.\n\n\n\n\n\nGENERAL INTRODUCTION.\n\n\nI. REASON OF INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.\u2014It is desirable that at some stage in\nthe course of his investigations the student of philosophy should be\ninvited to take a brief general survey of the work in which he is engaged.\nThis purpose will be served by a chapter on _the general aim and scope of\nphilosophy_, its distinctive characteristics as compared with other lines\nof human thought, and its relations to these latter. Such considerations\nwill at the same time help to define _Ontology_, thus introducing the\nreader to the subject-matter of the present volume.\n\nII. PHILOSOPHY: THE NAME AND THE THING.\u2014In the fifth book of Cicero\u2019s\n_Tusculan Disputations_ we read that the terms _philosophus_ and\n_philosophia_ were first employed by Pythagoras who flourished in the\nsixth century before Christ, that this ancient sage was modest enough to\ncall himself not a \u201cwise man\u201d but a \u201clover of wisdom\u201d (\u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1), and\nhis calling not a profession of wisdom but a search for wisdom. However,\ndespite the disclaimer, the term _philosophy_ soon came to signify\n_wisdom_ simply, meaning by this the highest and most precious kind of\nknowledge.\n\nNow human knowledge has for its object everything that falls in any way\nwithin human experience. It has _extensively_ a great variety in its\nsubject-matter, and _intensively_ a great variety in its degrees of depth\nand clearness and perfection. _Individual facts_ of the past, communicated\nby human testimony, form the raw materials of _historical_ knowledge. Then\nthere are all the individual things and events that fall within one\u2019s own\npersonal experience. Moreover, by the study of human language (or\nlanguages), of works of the human mind and products of human genius and\nskill, we gain a knowledge of _literature_, and of the _arts_\u2014the fine\narts and the mechanical arts. But not merely do we use our senses and\nmemory thus to accumulate an unassorted stock of informations about\nisolated facts: a miscellaneous mass of mental furniture which constitutes\nthe bulk of human knowledge in its _least developed_ form\u2014_cognitio\n____vulgaris,___ the knowledge of the comparatively uneducated and\nunreflecting classes of mankind. We also use our reasoning faculty to\nreflect, compare, classify these informations, to interpret them, to\nreason about them, to infer from them _general truths_ that embrace\nindividual things and events _beyond our personal experience_; we try to\nexplain them by seeking out their _reasons_ and _causes_. This mental\nactivity gradually converts our knowledge into _scientific_ knowledge, and\nthus gives rise to those great groups of systematized truths called the\n_sciences_: as, for example, the physical and mathematical sciences, the\nelements of which usually form part of our early education. These sciences\nteach us a great deal about ourselves and the universe in which we live.\nThere is no need to dwell on the precious services conferred upon mankind\nby discoveries due to the progress of the various _special_ sciences:\nmathematics as applied to engineering of all sorts; astronomy; the\nphysical sciences of light, heat, sound, electricity, magnetism, etc.;\nchemistry in all its branches; physiology and anatomy as applied in\nmedicine and surgery. All these undoubtedly contribute much to man\u2019s\n_bodily_ well-being. But man has a _mind_ as well as a body, and he is\nmoreover a _social_ being: there are, therefore, other special\nsciences\u2014\u201chuman\u201d as distinct from \u201cphysical\u201d sciences\u2014in which man himself\nis studied in his mental activities and social relations with his\nfellow-men: the sciences of social and political economy, constitutional\nand civil law, government, statesmanship, etc. Furthermore, man is a\n_moral_ being, recognizing distinctions of good and bad, right and wrong,\npleasure and happiness, duty and responsibility, in his own conduct; and\nfinally he is a _religious_ being, face to face with the fact that men\nuniversally entertain views, beliefs, convictions of some sort or other,\nregarding man\u2019s subjection to, and dependence on, some higher power or\npowers dwelling somehow or somewhere within or above the whole universe of\nhis direct and immediate experience: there are therefore also sciences\nwhich deal with these domains, morality and religion. Here, however, the\ndomains are so extensive, and the problems raised by their phenomena are\nof such far-reaching importance, that the sciences which deal with them\ncan hardly be called special sciences, but rather constituent portions of\nthe one wider and deeper _general_ science which is what men commonly\nunderstand nowadays by philosophy.\n\nThe distinction between the special sciences on the one hand and\nphilosophy, the general science, on the other, will help us to realize\nmore clearly the nature and scope of the latter. The special sciences are\nconcerned with discovering the _proximate_ reasons and causes of this,\nthat, and the other definite department in the whole universe of our\nexperience. The subject-matter of some of them is totally different from\nthat of others: physiology studies the functions of living organisms;\ngeology studies the formation of the earth\u2019s crust. Or if two or more of\nthem investigate the same subject-matter they do so from different\nstandpoints, as when the zoologist and the physiologist study the same\ntype or specimen in the animal kingdom. But the common feature of all is\nthis, that each seeks only the reasons, causes, and laws which give a\n_proximate_ and _partial_ explanation of the facts which it investigates,\nleaving untouched and unsolved a number of deeper and wider questions\nwhich may be raised about the _whence_ and _whither_ and _why_, not only\nof the facts themselves, but of the reasons, causes and laws assigned by\nthe particular science in explanation of these facts.\n\nNow it is those deeper and wider questions, which can be answered only by\nthe discovery of the _more remote_ and _ultimate_ reasons and causes of\nthings, that philosophy undertakes to investigate, and\u2014as far as lies\nwithin man\u2019s power\u2014to answer. No one has ever disputed the supreme\nimportance of such inquiries into the ultimate reasons and causes of\nthings\u2014into such questions as these, for instance: What is the nature of\nman himself? Has he in him a principle of life which is spiritual and\nimmortal? What was his first origin on the earth? Whence did he come? Has\nhis existence any purpose, and if so, what? Whither does he tend? What is\nhis destiny? Why does he distinguish between a right and a wrong in human\nconduct? What is the ultimate reason or ground of this distinction? Why\nhave men generally some form or other of religion? Why do men generally\nbelieve in God? Is there really a God? What is the origin of the whole\nuniverse of man\u2019s experience? Of life in all its manifestations? Has the\nuniverse any intelligible or intelligent purpose, and if so, what? Can the\nhuman mind give a certain answer to any of these or similar questions?\nWhat about the nature and value of human _knowledge_ itself? What is its\nscope and what are its limitations? And since vast multitudes of men\n_believe_ that the human race has been specially enlightened by God\nHimself, by Divine Revelation, to know for certain what man\u2019s destiny is,\nand is specially aided by God Himself, by Divine Grace, to work out this\ndestiny\u2014the question immediately arises: What are the real relations\nbetween reason alone on the one hand and reason enlightened by such\nRevelation on the other, in other words between natural knowledge and\nsupernatural faith?\n\nNow it will be admitted that the special sciences take us some distance\nalong the road towards an answer to such questions, inasmuch as the truths\nestablished by these sciences, and even the wider hypotheses conceived\nthough not strictly verified in them, furnish us with most valuable data\nin our investigation of those questions. Similarly the alleged fact of a\nDivine Revelation cannot be ignored by any man desirous of using all the\ndata available as helps towards their solution. The Revelation embodied in\nChristianity claims not merely to enlighten us in regard to many ultimate\nquestions which mankind would be able to answer without its assistance,\nbut also to tell us about our destiny some truths of supreme import, which\nof ourselves we should never have been able to discover. It is obvious,\nthen, that whether a man has been brought up from his infancy to believe\nin the Christian Revelation or not, his whole outlook on life will be\ndetermined very largely by his belief or disbelief in its authenticity and\nits contents. Similarly, if he be a Confucian, or a Buddhist, or a\nMohammedan, his outlook will be in part determined by what he believes of\ntheir teachings. Man\u2019s conduct in life has undoubtedly many determining\ninfluences, but it will hardly be denied that among them the predominant\ninfluence is exerted by the views that he holds, the things he believes to\nbe true, concerning his own origin, nature and destiny, as well as the\norigin, nature and destiny of the universe in which he finds himself. The\nGermans have an expressive term for that which, in the absence of a more\nappropriate term, we may translate as a man\u2019s _world-outlook_; they call\nit his _Weltanschauung_. Now this world-outlook is formed by each\nindividual for himself from his interpretation of _his experience as a\nwhole_. It is not unusual to call this world-outlook a man\u2019s _philosophy\nof life_. If we use the term _philosophy_ in this wide sense it obviously\nincludes whatever light a man may gather from the _special sciences_, and\nwhatever light he may gather from a divinely revealed _religion_ if he\nbelieves in such, as well as the light his own reason may shed upon a\nspecial and direct study of those ultimate questions themselves, to which\nwe have just referred. But we mention this wide sense of the term\n_philosophy_ merely to put it aside; and to state that we use the term in\nthe sense more commonly accepted nowadays, the sense in which it is\nunderstood to be distinct from the _special sciences_ on the one side and\nfrom _supernatural theology_ or the systematic study of divinely revealed\nreligion on the other. Philosophy is distinct from the special sciences\nbecause while the latter seek the proximate, the former seeks the ultimate\ngrounds, reasons and causes of all the facts of human experience.\nPhilosophy is distinct from supernatural theology because while the former\nuses _the unaided power of human reason_ to study the ultimate questions\nraised by human experience, the latter uses _reason enlightened by Divine\nRevelation_ to study the contents of this Revelation in all their bearings\non man\u2019s life and destiny.\n\nHence we arrive at this simple and widely accepted definition of\nphilosophy: _the science of all things through their ultimate reasons and\ncauses as discovered by the unaided light of human reason_.(5) The first\npart of this definition marks off philosophy from the special sciences,\nthe second part marks it off from supernatural theology.\n\n\n    We must remember, however, that these three departments of\n    knowledge\u2014scientific, philosophical, and revealed\u2014are not isolated\n    from one another in any man\u2019s mind; they overlap in their\n    subject-matter, and though differing in their respective\n    standpoints they permeate one another through and through. The\n    separation of the special sciences from philosophy, though\n    adumbrated in the speculations of ancient times and made more\n    definite in the middle ages, was completed only in modern times\n    through the growth and progress of the special sciences\n    themselves. The line of demarcation between philosophy and\n    supernatural theology must be determined by the proper relations\n    between Reason and Faith: and naturally these relations are a\n    subject of debate between philosophers who believe in the\n    existence of an authentic Divine Revelation and philosophers who\n    do not. It is the duty of the philosopher as such to determine by\n    the light of reason whether a Supreme Being exists and whether a\n    Divine Revelation to man is possible. If he convinces himself of\n    the existence of God he will have little difficulty in inferring\n    the _possibility_ of a Divine Revelation. The _fact_ of a Divine\n    Revelation is a matter not for philosophical but for historical\n    research. Now when a man has convinced himself of the existence of\n    God and the fact of a Divine Revelation\u2014the _preambula fidei_ or\n    prerequisite conditions of Faith, as they are called\u2014he must see\n    that it is eminently reasonable for him to believe in the contents\n    of such Divine Revelation; he must see that the truths revealed by\n    God cannot possibly trammel the freedom of his own reason in its\n    philosophical inquiries into ultimate problems concerning man and\n    the universe; he must see that these truths may possibly act as\n    beacons which will keep him from going astray in his own\n    investigations: knowing that truth cannot contradict truth he\n    knows that if he reaches a conclusion really incompatible with any\n    certainly revealed truth, such conclusion must be erroneous; and\n    so he is obliged to reconsider the reasoning processes that led\n    him to such a conclusion.(6) Thus, the position of the Christian\n    philosopher, aided in this negative way by the truths of an\n    authentic Divine Revelation, has a distinct advantage over that of\n    the philosopher who does not believe in such revelation and who\n    tries to solve all ultimate questions independently of any light\n    such revelation may shed upon them. Yet the latter philosopher as\n    a rule not only regards the \u201cindependent\u201d position, which he\n    himself takes up in the name of \u201cfreedom of thought\u201d and \u201cfreedom\n    of research,\u201d as the superior position, but as the only one\n    consistent with the dignity of human reason; and he commonly\n    accuses the Christian philosopher of allowing reason to be\n    \u201censlaved\u201d in \u201cthe shackles of dogma\u201d. We can see at once the\n    unfairness of such a charge when we remember that the Christian\n    philosopher has convinced himself _on grounds of reason alone_\n    that God exists and has made a revelation to man. His belief in a\n    Divine Revelation is a _reasoned_ belief, a _rationabile\n    obsequium_ (Rom. XII. 1); and only if it were a blind belief,\n    unjustifiable on grounds of reason, would the accusation referred\n    to be a fair one. The Christian philosopher might retort that it\n    is the unbelieving philosopher himself who really destroys\n    \u201cfreedom of thought and research,\u201d by claiming for the latter what\n    is really an abuse of freedom, namely _license_ to believe what\n    reason shows to be erroneous. But this counter-charge would be\n    equally unfair, for the unbelieving philosopher does not claim any\n    such undue license to believe what he knows to be false or to\n    disbelieve what he knows to be true. If he denies the fact or the\n    possibility of a Divine Revelation, and therefore pursues his\n    philosophical investigations without any regard to the contents of\n    such revelation, it is because he has convinced himself on grounds\n    of reason that such revelation is neither a fact nor a\n    possibility. He and the Christian philosopher cannot both be\n    right; one of them must be wrong; but as reasonable men they\n    should agree to differ rather than hurl unjustifiable charges and\n    counter-charges at each other.\n\n    All philosophers who believe in the Christian Revelation and allow\n    its authentic teachings to guide and supplement their own rational\n    investigation into ultimate questions, are keenly conscious of the\n    consequent superior depth and fulness and certitude of Christian\n    philosophy as compared with all the other conflicting and\n    fragmentary philosophies that mark the progress of human\n    speculation on the ultimate problems of man and the universe down\n    through the centuries. They feel secure in the possession of a\n    _philosophia __ perennis_,(7) and none more secure than those of\n    them who complete and confirm that philosophy by the only full and\n    authentic deposit of Divinely Revealed Truth, which is to be found\n    in the teaching of the Catholic Church.\n\n\nThe history of philosophical investigation yields no one universally\nreceived conception of what philosophy is, nor would the definition given\nabove be unreservedly accepted. Windelband, in his _History of\nPhilosophy_(8) instances the following predominant conceptions of\nphilosophy according to the chronological order in which they prevailed:\n(_a_) the systematic investigation of the problems raised by man and the\nuniverse (early Grecian philosophy: absence of differentiation of\nphilosophy from the special sciences); (_b_) the practical art of human\nconduct, based on rational speculation (later Grecian philosophy: distrust\nin the value of knowledge, and emphasis on practical guidance of conduct);\n(_c_) the helper and handmaid of the Science of Revealed Truth, _i.e._\nsupernatural theology, in the solution of ultimate problems (the Christian\nphilosophy of the Fathers of the Church and of the Medieval Schools down\nto the sixteenth century: universal recognition of the value of the\nChristian Revelation as an aid to rational investigation); (_d_) a purely\nrational investigation of those problems, going beyond the investigations\nof the special sciences, and either abstracting from, or denying the value\nof, any light or aid from Revelation (differentiation of the domains of\nscience, philosophy and theology; modern philosophies from the sixteenth\nto the nineteenth century; excessive individualism and rationalism of\nthese as unnaturally divorced from recognition of, and belief in, Divine\nRevelation, and unduly isolated from the progressing positive sciences);\n(_e_) a critical analysis of the significance and scope and limitations of\nhuman knowledge itself (recent philosophies, mainly concerned with\ntheories of knowledge and speculations on the nature of the cognitive\nprocess and the reliability of its products).\n\nThese various conceptions are interesting and suggestive; much might be\nsaid about them, but not to any useful purpose in a brief introductory\nchapter. Let us rather, adopting the definition already set forth, try\nnext to map out into its leading departments the whole philosophical\ndomain.\n\nIII. DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY: SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.\u2014The\ngeneral problem of classifying all the sciences built up by human thought\nis a logical problem of no little complexity when one tries to work it out\nin detail. We refer to this general problem only to mention a widely\naccepted principle on which it is usually approached, and because the\ndivision of philosophy itself is a section of the general problem. The\nprinciple in question is that sciences may be distinguished indeed by\npartial or total _diversity of subject-matter_, but that such diversity is\nnot essential, that _diversity of standpoint_ is necessary and sufficient\nto constitute distinct sciences even when these deal with one and the same\nsubject-matter. Now applying this principle to philosophy we see firstly\nthat it has the same subject-matter as all the special sciences taken\ncollectively, but that it is distinct from all of them inasmuch as it\nstudies their data not from the standpoint of the proximate causes, but\nfrom the higher standpoint of the ultimate causes of these data. And we\nsee secondly that philosophy, having this one higher standpoint throughout\nall its departments, is _one_ science; that its divisions are only\nmaterial divisions; that there is not a plurality of philosophies as there\nis a plurality of sciences, though there is a plurality of departments in\nphilosophy.(9) Let us now see what these departments are.\n\nIf we ask why people seek knowledge at all, in any department, we shall\ndetect two main impelling motives. The first of these is simply the desire\nto know: _trahimur omnes cupiditate sciendi_. The natural feeling of\nwonder, astonishment, \u201c_admiratio_,\u201d which accompanies our perception of\nthings and events, prompts us to seek their causes, to discover the\nreasons which will make them _intelligible_ to us and enable us to\n_understand_ them. But while the possession of knowledge for its own sake\nis thus a motive of research it is not the only motive. We seek knowledge\n_in order to use it_ for the guidance of our conduct in life, for the\norientation of our activities, for the improvement of our condition;\nknowing that knowledge is power, we seek it in order to make it minister\nto our needs. Now in the degree in which it fulfils such ulterior\npurposes, or is sought for these purposes, knowledge may be described as\n_practical_; in the degree in which it serves no ulterior end, or is\nsought for no ulterior end, other than that of perfecting our minds, it\nmay be described as _speculative_. Of course this latter purpose is in\nitself a highly practical purpose; nor indeed is there any knowledge,\nhowever speculative, but has, or at least is capable of having, some\ninfluence or bearing on the actual tenor and conduct of our lives; and in\nthis sense all knowledge is practical. Still we can distinguish broadly\nbetween knowledge which has no direct, immediate bearing on our acts, and\nknowledge that has.(10) Hence the possibility of distinguishing between\ntwo great domains of philosophical knowledge\u2014_Theoretical_ or _Speculative\nPhilosophy_, and _Practical Philosophy_. There are, in fact, two great\ndomains into which the data of all human experience may be divided; and\nfor each distinct domain submitted to philosophical investigation there\nwill be a distinct department of philosophy. A first domain is the order\n_realized_ in the universe independently of man; a second is the order\nwhich man himself _realizes_: _things_, therefore, and _acts_. The order\nof the external universe, the order of nature as it is called, exists\nindependently of us: we merely study it (_speculari_, \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03ad\u03c9), we do not\ncreate it. The other or _practical_ order is established by our acts of\n_intelligence_ and _will_, and by our _bodily action_ on external things\nunder the direction of those faculties in the arts. Hence we have a\n_speculative_ or _theoretical_ philosophy and a _practical_\nphilosophy.(11)\n\nIV. DEPARTMENTS OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOGIC, ETHICS AND ESTHETICS.\u2014In\nthe domain of human activities, to the right regulation of which practical\nphilosophy is directed, we may distinguish two departments of mental\nactivity, namely _intellectual_ and _volitional_, and besides these the\nwhole department of _external_, executive or bodily activity. In general\nthe right regulation of acts may be said to consist in directing them to\nthe realization of some ideal; for all cognitive acts this ideal is the\n_true_, for all appetitive or volitional acts it is the _good_, while for\nall external operations it may be either the _beautiful_ or the\n_useful_\u2014the respective objects of the fine arts and the mechanical arts\nor crafts.\n\n_Logic_, as a practical science, studies the mental acts and processes\ninvolved in discovering and proving truths and systematizing these into\nsciences, with a view to directing these acts and processes aright in the\naccomplishment of this complex task. Hence it has for its subject-matter,\nin a certain sense, _all_ the data of human experience, or whatever can be\nan object of human thought. But it studies these data not directly or in\nthemselves or for their own sake, but only in so far as our acts of\nreason, which form its direct object, are brought to bear upon them. In\nall the other sciences we employ thought to study the various objects of\nthought as things, events, realities; and hence these may be called \u201creal\u201d\nsciences, _scientiae reales_; while in Logic we study thought itself, and\neven here not speculatively for its own sake or as a reality (as we study\nit for instance in Psychology), but practically, as a process capable of\nbeing directed towards the discovery and proof of truth; and hence in\ncontradistinction to the other sciences as \u201creal,\u201d we call Logic _the_\n\u201crational\u201d science, _scientia rationalis_. Scholastic philosophers express\nthis distinction by saying that while Speculative Philosophy studies\n_real_ being (_Ens Reale_), or the objects of direct thought (_objecta\nprimae intentionis mentis_), Logic studies the being which is the _product\nof thought_ (_Ens Rationis_), or objects of reflex thought (_objecta\nsecundae intentionis mentis_).(12) The mental processes involved in the\nattainment of scientific truth are conception, judgment and inference;\nmoreover these processes have to be exercised methodically by the combined\napplication of analysis and synthesis, or induction and deduction, to the\nvarious domains of human experience. All these processes, therefore, and\nthe methods of their application, constitute the proper subject-matter of\nLogic. It has been more or less a matter of debate since the days of\nAristotle whether Logic should be regarded as a department of\nphilosophical science proper, or rather as a preparatory discipline, an\ninstrument or _organon_ of reasoning\u2014as the collection of Aristotle\u2019s own\nlogical treatises was called,\u2014and so as a vestibule or introduction to\nphilosophy. And there is a similar difference of opinion as to whether or\nnot it is advisable to set down Logic as the first department to be\nstudied in the philosophical curriculum. Such doubts arise from\ndifferences of view as to the questions to be investigated in Logic, and\nthe point to which such investigations should be carried therein. It is\npossible to distinguish between a more elementary treatment of\nthought-processes with the avowedly practical aim of setting forth canons\nof inference and method which would help and train the mind to reason and\ninvestigate correctly; and a more philosophical treatment of those\nprocesses with the speculative aim of determining their ultimate\nsignificance and validity as factors of knowledge, as attaining to truth,\nas productive of science and certitude. It is only the former field of\ninvestigation that is usually accorded to Logic nowadays; and thus\nunderstood Logic ought to come first in the curriculum as a preparatory\ntraining for philosophical studies, accompanied, however, by certain\nelementary truths from Psychology regarding the nature and functions of\nthe human mind. The other domain of deeper and more speculative\ninvestigation was formerly explored in what was regarded as a second\nportion of logical science, under the title of \u201cCritical\u201d Logic\u2014_Logica\nCritica_. In modern times this is regarded as a distinct department of\nSpeculative Philosophy, under the various titles of _Epistemology_,\n_Criteriology_, or the _Theory of Knowledge_.\n\n_Ethics or Moral Philosophy_ (\u1f24\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, _mos_, _mores_, morals, conduct) is\nthat department of practical philosophy which has for its subject-matter\nall human acts, _i.e._ all acts elicited or commanded by the will of man\nconsidered as a free, rational and responsible agent. And it studies human\nconduct with the practical purpose of discovering the ultimate end or\nobject of this conduct, and the principles whereby it must be regulated in\norder to attain to this end. Ethics must therefore analyse and account for\nthe distinction of _right_ and _wrong_ or _good_ and _bad_ in human\nconduct, for its feature of _morality_. It must examine the motives that\ninfluence conduct: pleasure, well-being, happiness, duty, obligation,\nmoral law, etc. The supreme determining factor in all such considerations\nwill obviously be _the ultimate end of man_, whatever this may be: his\ndestiny as revealed by a study of his nature and place in the universe.\nNow the nature of man is studied in Psychology, as are also the nature,\nconditions and effects of his free acts, and the facilities, dispositions\nand forms of character consequent on these. Furthermore, not only from the\nstudy of man in Psychology, but from the study of the external universe in\nCosmology, we amass data from which in Natural Theology we establish the\nexistence of a Supreme Being. We then prove in Ethics that the last end of\nman, his highest perfection, consists in knowing, loving, serving, and\nthus glorifying God, both in this life and in the next. Hence we can see\nhow these branches of speculative philosophy subserve the practical\nscience of morals. And since a man\u2019s interpretation of the moral\ndistinctions\u2014as of right or wrong, meritorious or blameworthy, autonomous\nor of obligation\u2014which he recognizes as pertaining to his own\nactions\u2014since his interpretation of these distinctions is so intimately\nbound up with his religious outlook and beliefs, it is at once apparent\nthat the science of Ethics will be largely influenced and determined by\nthe system of speculative philosophy which inspires it, whether this be\nTheism, Monism, Agnosticism, etc. No doubt the science of Ethics must take\nas its data all sorts of moral beliefs, customs and practices prevalent at\nany time among men; but it is not a speculative science which would merely\naim at _a posteriori_ inferences or inductive generalizations from these\ndata; it is a practical, _normative_ science which aims at discovering the\ntruth as to what is the right and the wrong in human conduct, and at\npointing out the right application of the principles arising out of this\ntruth. Hence it is of supreme importance for the philosopher of morals to\ndetermine whether the human race has really been vouchsafed a Divine\nRevelation, and, convincing himself that Christianity contains such a\nrevelation, to recognize the possibility of supplementing and perfecting\nwhat his own natural reason can discover by what the Christian religion\nteaches about the end of man as the supreme determining principle of human\nconduct. Not that he is to take the revealed truths of Christianity as\nprinciples of moral _philosophy_; for these are the principles of the\n_supernatural __ Christian Theology_ of human morals; but that as a\nChristian philosopher, _i.e._ a philosopher who recognizes the truth of\nthe Christian Revelation, he should reason out philosophically a science\nof Ethics which, so far as it goes, will be in harmony with the moral\nteachings of the Christian Religion, and will admit of being perfected by\nthese. This recognition, as already remarked, will not be a hindrance but\na help to him in exploring the wide domains of the individual, domestic,\nsocial and religious conduct of man; in determining, on the basis of\ntheism established by natural reason, the right moral conditions and\nrelations of man\u2019s conduct as an individual, as a member of the family, as\na member of the state, and as a creature of God. The nature, source and\nsanction of authority, domestic, social and religious; of the dictate of\nconscience; of the natural moral law and of all positive law; of the moral\nvirtues and vices\u2014these are all questions which the philosopher of Ethics\nhas to explore by the use of natural reason, and for the investigation of\nwhich the Christian philosopher of Ethics is incomparably better equipped\nthan the philosopher who, though possessing the compass of natural reason,\nignores the beacon lights of Divinely Revealed Truths.\n\n_Esthetics_, or the _Philosophy of the Fine Arts_, is that department of\nphilosophy which studies the conception of the _beautiful_ and its\nexternal expression in the works of nature and of man. The arts\nthemselves, of course, whether concerned with the realization of the\nuseful or of the beautiful, are distinct from sciences, even from\npractical sciences.(13) The _technique_ itself consists in a skill\nacquired by practice\u2014by practice guided, however, by a set of practical\ncanons or rules which are the ripe fruit of experience.(14) But behind\nevery art there is always some background of more or less speculative\ntruth. The conception of the _useful_, however which underlies the\nmechanical arts and crafts, is not an ultimate conception calling for any\nfurther analysis than it receives in the various special sciences and in\nmetaphysics. But the conception of the _beautiful_ does seem to demand a\nspecial philosophical consideration. On the subjective or mental side the\nesthetic sense, artistic taste, the sentiment of the beautiful, the\ncomplex emotions accompanying such experience; on the objective side the\nelements or factors requisite to produce this experience; the relation of\nthe esthetic to the moral, of the beautiful to the good and the true\u2014these\nare all distinctly philosophical questions. Up to the present time,\nhowever, their treatment has been divided between the other departments of\nphilosophy\u2014psychology, cosmology, natural theology, general metaphysics,\nethics\u2014rather than grouped together to form an additional distinct\ndepartment.\n\nV. DEPARTMENTS OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY: METAPHYSICS.\u2014The philosophy\nwhich studies the order realized in things apart from our activity,\nspeculative philosophy, has been variously divided up into separate\ndepartments from the first origins of philosophical speculation.\n\nWhen we remember that all intellectual knowledge of things involves the\napprehension of _general_ truths or laws about these things, and that this\napprehension of intelligible aspects common to a more or less extensive\ngroup of things involves the exercise of _abstraction_, we can understand\nhow the whole domain of speculative knowledge, whether scientific or\nphilosophical, can be differentiated into certain layers or levels, so to\nspeak, according to various degrees of abstractness and universality in\nthe intelligible aspects under which the data of our experience may be\nconsidered. On this principle Aristotle and the scholastics divided all\nspeculative knowledge into three great domains, _Physics_, _Mathematics_\nand _Metaphysics_, with their respective proper objects, _Change_,\n_Quantity_ and _Being_, objects which are successively apprehended in\nthree great stages of abstraction traversed by the human mind in its\neffort to understand and explain the Universal Order of things.\n\nAnd as a matter of fact perhaps the first great common and most obvious\nfeature which strikes the mind reflecting on the visible universe is the\nfeature of all-pervading change (\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), movement, evolution, progress\nand regress, growth and decay; we see it everywhere in a variety of forms,\nmechanical or local change, quantitative change, qualitative change, vital\nchange. Now the knowledge acquired by the study of things under this\ncommon aspect is called _Physics_. Here the mind abstracts merely from the\nindividualizing differences of this change in individual things, and fixes\nits attention on the great, common, sensible aspect itself of visible\nchange.\n\nBut the mind can abstract even from the sensible changes that take place\nin the physical universe and fix its attention on a _static_ feature in\nthe changing things. This static element (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd), which the\nintellect apprehends in _material_ things as naturally inseparable from\nthem (\u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd), is their _quantity_, their extension in\nspace. When the mind strips a material object of all its visible, sensible\nproperties\u2014on which its mechanical, physical and chemical changes\ndepend\u2014there still remains as an object of thought a something formed of\nparts outside parts in three dimensions of space. This _abstract_\nquantity, _quantitas intelligibilis_\u2014whether as continuous or\ndiscontinuous, as _magnitude_ or _multitude_\u2014is the proper object of\n_Mathematics_.\n\nBut the mind can penetrate farther still into the reality of the material\ndata which it finds endowed with the attributes of change and quantity: it\ncan eliminate from the object of its thought even this latter or\nmathematical attribute, and seize on something still more fundamental. The\nvery essence, substance, nature, being itself, of the thing, the\nunderlying subject and root principle of all the thing\u2019s operations and\nattributes, is something deeper than any of these attributes, something at\nleast mentally distinct from these latter (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd): and\nthis something is the proper object of man\u2019s highest speculative\nknowledge, which Aristotle called \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1, _philosophia prima_,\nthe _first_ or _fundamental_ or _deepest_ philosophy.(15)\n\nBut he gave this latter order of knowledge another very significant title:\nhe called it _theology_ or _theological science_, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03ba\u03ae, by a\ndenomination derived _a potiori parte_, from its nobler part, its\nculmination in the knowledge of God. Let us see how. For Aristotle _first\nphilosophy_ is the science of _being and its essential attributes_.(16)\nHere the mind apprehends its object as _static_ or abstracted from change,\nand as _immaterial_ or abstracted from quantity, the fundamental attribute\nof material reality\u2014as \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd. Now it is the substance,\nnature, or essence of _the things of our direct and immediate experience_,\nthat forms the proper object of this highest science. But in these things\nthe substance, nature, or essence, is not found in _real and actual_\nseparation from the material attributes of change and quantity; it is\n_considered_ separately from these only by an effort of mental\nabstraction. Even the nature of man himself is not wholly immaterial; nor\nis the spiritual principle in man, his soul, entirely exempt from material\nconditions. Hence in so far as first philosophy studies the being of the\nthings of our direct experience, its object is immaterial only\n_negatively_ or _by mental abstraction_. But does this study bring within\nthe scope of our experience any being or reality that is _positively and\nactually_ exempt from all change and all material conditions? If so the\nstudy of this being, the Divine Being, will be the highest effort, the\ncrowning perfection, of _first philosophy_; which we may therefore call\nthe _theological_ science. \u201cIf,\u201d writes Aristotle,(17) \u201cthere really\nexists a substance absolutely immutable and immaterial, in a word, a\nDivine Being\u2014as we hope to prove\u2014then such Being must be the absolutely\nfirst and supreme principle, and the science that attains to such Being\nwill be theological.\u201d\n\nIn this triple division of speculative philosophy into Physics,\nMathematics, and Metaphysics, it will naturally occur to one to ask: Did\nAristotle distinguish between what he called Physics and what we nowadays\ncall the special physical sciences? He did. These special _analytic_\nstudies of the various departments of the physical universe, animate and\ninanimate, Aristotle described indiscriminately as \u201cpartial\u201d sciences: \u03b1\u1f31\n\u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03b9\u2014\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. These descriptive,\ninductive, comparative studies, proceeding _a posteriori_ from effects to\ncauses, he conceived rather as a preparation for scientific knowledge\nproper; this latter he conceived to be a _synthetic_, deductive\nexplanation of things, in the light of some common aspect detected in them\nas principle or cause of all their concrete characteristics.(18) Such\nsynthetic knowledge of things, in the light of some such common aspect as\nchange, is what he regarded as scientific knowledge, meaning thereby what\nwe mean by philosophical knowledge.(19) What he called _Physics_,\ntherefore, is what we nowadays understand as _Cosmology_ and\n_Psychology_.(20)\n\nMathematical science Aristotle likewise regarded as science in the full\nand perfect sense, _i.e._ as philosophical. But just as we distinguish\nnowadays between the special physical and human sciences on the one hand,\nand the philosophy of external nature and man on the other, so we may\ndistinguish between the special mathematical sciences and a Philosophy of\nMathematics: with this difference, that while the former groups of special\nsciences are mainly inductive the mathematical group is mainly deductive.\nFurthermore, the Philosophy of Mathematics\u2014which investigates questions\nregarding the ultimate significance of mathematical concepts, axioms and\nassumptions: unity, multitude, magnitude, quantity, space, time, etc.\u2014does\nnot usually form a separate department in the philosophical curriculum:\nits problems are dealt with as they arise in the other departments of\nMetaphysics.\n\nBefore outlining the modern divisions of Metaphysics we may note that this\nlatter term was not used by Aristotle. We owe it probably to Andronicus of\nRhodes (\u2020 40 B.C.), who, when arranging a complete edition of Aristotle\u2019s\nworks, placed next in order after the _Physics_, or physical treatises,\nall the parts and fragments of the master\u2019s works bearing upon the\nimmutable and immaterial object of the _philosophia prima_; these he\nlabelled \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 (\u03b2\u03b9\u03b2\u03bb\u03af\u03b1) \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1, _post physica_, the books _after the\nphysics_: hence the name _metaphysics_,(21) applied to this highest\nsection of speculative philosophy. It was soon noticed that the term, thus\nfortuitously applied to such investigations, conveyed a very appropriate\ndescription of their scope and character if interpreted in the sense of\n\u201c_supra_-physica,\u201d or \u201c_trans_-physica\u201d: inasmuch as the object of these\ninvestigations is a _hyperphysical_ object, an object that is either\npositively and really, or negatively and by abstraction, beyond the\nmaterial conditions of quantity and change. St. Thomas combines both\nmeanings of the term when he says that the study of its subject-matter\ncomes naturally _after_ the study of physics, and that we naturally pass\nfrom the study of the sensible to that of the suprasensible.(22)\n\nThe term _philosophia prima_ has now only an historical interest; and the\nterm _theology_, used without qualification, is now generally understood\nto signify _supernatural_ theology.\n\nVI. DEPARTMENTS OF METAPHYSICS: COSMOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND NATURAL\nTHEOLOGY.\u2014Nowadays the term _Metaphysics_ is understood as synonymous with\nspeculative philosophy: the investigation of the being, nature, or\nessence, and essential attributes of the realities which are also studied\nin the various special sciences: the search for the _ultimate_ grounds,\nreasons and causes of these realities, of which the proximate explanations\nare sought in the special sciences. We have seen that it has for its\nspecial object that most abstract aspect of reality whereby the latter is\nconceived as changeless and immaterial; and we have seen that a being may\nhave these attributes either by mental abstraction merely, or in actual\nreality. In other words the philosophical study of things that are really\nmaterial not only suggests the possibility, but establishes the actual\nexistence, of a Being that is really changeless and immaterial: so that\nmetaphysics in all its amplitude would be _the philosophical science of\nthings that are negatively_ (by abstraction) _or positively_ (in reality)\n_immaterial_. This distinction suggests a division of metaphysics into\n_general_ and _special_ metaphysics. The former would be the philosophical\nstudy of _all_ being, considered by mental abstraction as immaterial; the\nlatter would be the philosophical study of the really and positively\nchangeless and immaterial Being,\u2014God. The former would naturally fall into\ntwo great branches: the study of _inanimate_ nature and the study of\n_living_ things, _Cosmology_ and _Psychology_; while special metaphysics,\nthe philosophical study of the _Divine_ Being, would constitute _Natural\nTheology_. These three departments, one of special metaphysics and two of\ngeneral metaphysics, would not be three distinct philosophical sciences,\nbut three departments of the one speculative philosophical science. The\nstandpoint would be the same in all three sections, _viz._ _being_\nconsidered as _static and immaterial_ by _mental abstraction_: for\nwhatever _positive_ knowledge we can reach about being that is really\nimmaterial can be reached only through concepts derived from material\nbeing and applied analogically to immaterial being.\n\n_Cosmology_ and _Psychology_ divide between them the whole domain of man\u2019s\nimmediate experience. Cosmology, utilizing not only the data of direct\nexperience, but also the conclusions established by the analytic study of\nthese data in the physical sciences, explores the origin, nature, and\ndestiny of the material universe. Some philosophers include among the data\nof Cosmology all the phenomena of vegetative life, reserving sentient and\nrational life for Psychology; others include even sentient life in\nCosmology, reserving the study of human life for Psychology, or, as they\nwould call it, Anthropology.(23) The mere matter of location is of\nsecondary importance. Seeing, however, that man embodies in himself all\nthree forms of life, vegetative, sentient, and rational, all three would\nperhaps more naturally belong to Psychology, which would be the\nphilosophical study of life in all its manifestations (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae, the vital\nprinciple, the soul). Just as the conclusions of the physical sciences are\nthe data of Cosmology, so the conclusions of the natural or biological\nsciences\u2014Zoology, Botany, Physiology, Morphology, Cellular Biology,\netc.\u2014are the data of Psychology. Indeed in Psychology itself\u2014especially in\nmore recent years\u2014it is possible to distinguish a positive, analytic,\nempirical study of the phenomena of consciousness, a study which would\nrank rather as a special than as an ultimate or philosophical science; and\na synthetic, rational study of the results of this analysis, a study which\nwould be strictly philosophical in character. This would have for its\nobject to determine the origin, nature and destiny of living things in\ngeneral and of man himself in particular. It would inquire into the nature\nand essential properties of living matter, into the nature of the subject\nof conscious states, into the operations and faculties of the human mind,\ninto the nature of the human soul and its mode of union with the body,\ninto the rationality of the human intellect and the freedom of the human\nwill, the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, etc.\n\nBut since the human mind itself is the natural instrument whereby man\nacquires _all_ his knowledge, it will be at once apparent that the study\nof the phenomenon of _knowledge_ itself, of the _cognitive_ activity of\nthe mind, can be studied, and must be studied, not merely as a natural\nphenomenon of the mind, but from the point of view of _its special\nsignificance as representative_ of objects other than itself, from the\npoint of view of _its validity or invalidity_, _its truth or falsity_, and\nwith the special aim of determining the scope and limitations and\nconditions of its objective validity. We have already referred to the\nstudy of human knowledge from this standpoint, in connexion with what was\nsaid above concerning Logic. It has a close kinship with Logic on the one\nhand, and with Psychology on the other; and nowadays it forms a distinct\nbranch of speculative Philosophy under the title of _Criteriology_,\n_Epistemology_, or the _Theory of Knowledge_.\n\nArising out of the data of our direct experience, external and internal,\nas studied in the philosophical departments just outlined, we find a\nvariety of evidences all pointing beyond the domain of this direct\nexperience to the supreme conclusion that there exists of necessity,\ndistinct from this directly experienced universe, as its Creator,\nConserver, and Ruler, its First Beginning and its Last End, its _Alpha_\nand _Omega_, One Divine and Infinite Being, the Deity. The existence and\nattributes of the Deity, and the relations of man and the universe to the\nDeity, form the subject-matter of _Natural Theology_.\n\nVII. DEPARTMENTS OF METAPHYSICS: ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY.\u2014According to\nthe Aristotelian and scholastic conception speculative philosophy would\nutilize as data the conclusions of the special sciences\u2014physical,\nbiological, and human. It would try to reach a deeper explanation of their\ndata by synthesizing these under the wider aspects of change, quantity,\nand being, thus bringing to light the ultimate causes, reasons, and\nexplanatory principles of things. This whole study would naturally fall\ninto two great branches: General Metaphysics (_Cosmology_ and\n_Psychology_), which would study things exempt from quantity and change\nnot really but only by mental abstraction; and Special Metaphysics\n(_Natural Theology_), which would study the positively immaterial and\nimmutable Being of the Deity.\n\nThis division of Metaphysics, thoroughly sound in principle, and based on\na sane and rational view of the relation between the special sciences and\nphilosophy, has been almost entirely(24) supplanted in modern times by a\ndivision which, abstracting from the erroneous attitude that prompted it\nin the first instance, has much to recommend it from the standpoint of\npractical convenience of treatment. The modern division was introduced by\nWolff (1679-1755), a German philosopher,\u2014a disciple of Leibniz (1646-1716)\nand forerunner of Kant (1724-1804).(25) Influenced by the excessively\ndeductive method of Leibniz\u2019 philosophy, which he sought to systematize\nand to popularize, he wrongly conceived the metaphysical study of reality\nas something wholly apart and separate from the inductive investigation of\nthis same reality in the positive sciences. It comprised the study of the\nmost fundamental and essential principles of being, considered in\nthemselves; and the deductive application of these principles to the three\ngreat domains of actual reality, the corporeal universe, the human soul,\nand God. The study of the first principles of being in themselves would\nconstitute _General Metaphysics_, or _Ontology_ (\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2-\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2). Their\napplications would constitute three great departments of _Special\nMetaphysics_: _Cosmology_, which he described as \u201ctranscendental\u201d in\nopposition to the experimental physical sciences; _Psychology_, which he\ntermed \u201crational\u201d in opposition to the empirical biological sciences; and\nfinally Natural Theology, which he entitled _Theodicy_\n(\u0398\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2-\u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b7-\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c9), using a term invented by Leibniz for his essays in\nvindication of the wisdom and justice of Divine Providence notwithstanding\nthe evils of the universe.\n\n\n    \u201cThe spirit that animated this arrangement of the departments of\n    metaphysics,\u201d writes Mercier, \u201cwas unsound in theory and\n    unfortunate in tendency. It stereotyped for centuries a disastrous\n    divorce between philosophy and the sciences, a divorce that had\n    its origin in circumstances peculiar to the intellectual\n    atmosphere of the early eighteenth century. As a result of it\n    there was soon no common language or understanding between\n    scientists and philosophers. The terms which expressed the most\n    fundamental ideas\u2014matter, substance, movement, cause, force,\n    energy, and such like\u2014were taken in different senses in science\n    and in philosophy. Hence misunderstandings, aggravated by a\n    growing mutual distrust and hostility, until finally people came\n    to believe that scientific and metaphysical preoccupations were\n    incompatible if not positively opposed to each other.\u201d(26)\n\n    How very different from the disintegrating conception here\n    criticized is the traditional Aristotelian and scholastic\n    conception of the complementary functions of philosophy and the\n    sciences in unifying human knowledge: a conception thus eloquently\n    expressed by NEWMAN in his _Idea of a University_:\u2014(27)\n\n    \u201cAll that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one\n    large system or complex fact.... Now, it is not wonderful that,\n    with all its capabilities, the human mind cannot take in this\n    whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at\n    once. Like a short-sighted reader, its eye pores closely, and\n    travels slowly, over the awful volume which lies open for its\n    inspection. Or again, as we deal with some huge structure of many\n    parts and sides, the mind goes round about it, noting down, first\n    one thing, then another, as best it may, and viewing it under\n    different aspects, by way of making progress towards mastering the\n    whole.... These various partial views or abstractions ... are\n    called sciences ... they proceed on the principle of a division of\n    labour.... As they all belong to one and the same circle of\n    objects, they are one and all connected together; as they are but\n    aspects of things, they are severally incomplete in their relation\n    to the things themselves, though complete in their own idea and\n    for their own respective purposes; on both accounts they at once\n    need and subserve each other. And further, the comprehension of\n    the bearings of one science on another, and the use of each to\n    each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and due\n    appreciation of them all, one with another, this belongs, I\n    conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of them, and in\n    some sense, a science of sciences, which is my own conception of\n    what is meant by Philosophy....\u201d\n\n\nWithout in any way countenancing such an isolation of metaphysics from the\npositive sciences, we may, nevertheless, adopt the modern division in\nsubstance and in practice. While recognizing the intimate connexion\nbetween the special sciences and metaphysics in all its branches, we may\nregard as _General Metaphysics_ all inquiries into the fundamental\nprinciples of _being_ and of _knowing_, of _reality_ and of _knowledge_;\nand as _Special Metaphysics_ the philosophical study of physical nature,\nof human nature, and of God, the Author and Supreme Cause of all finite\nreality. Thus, while special metaphysics would embrace Cosmology,\nPsychology, and Natural Theology, general metaphysics would embrace\nOntology and Epistemology. These two latter disciplines must no doubt\ninvestigate what is in a certain sense one and the same subject-matter,\ninasmuch as _knowledge_ is knowledge of reality, nor can the _knowing\nmind_ (the _subjectum cognoscens_) and the known reality (the _objectum\ncognitum_) be wholly separated or studied in complete isolation from each\nother. Yet the whole content of human experience, which forms their common\nsubject-matter, can be regarded by mental abstraction from the two\ndistinct standpoints of the knowing mind and the known reality, and can\nthus give rise to two distinct sets of problems. Epistemology is thus\nconcerned with the truth and certitude of human knowledge; with the\nsubjective conditions and the scope and limits of its validity; with the\nsubjective or mental factors involved in knowing.(28) Ontology is\nconcerned with the objects of knowledge, with reality considered in the\nwidest, deepest, and most fundamental aspects under which it is conceived\nby the human mind: with the being and becoming of reality, its possibility\nand its actuality, its essence and its existence, its unity and plurality;\nwith the aspects of truth, goodness, perfection, beauty, which it assumes\nin relation with our minds; with the contingency of finite reality and the\ngrounds and implications both of its actual existence and of its\nintelligibility; with the modes of its concrete existence and behaviour,\nthe supreme categories of reality as they are called: substance,\nindividual nature, and personality; quantity, space and time, quality and\nrelation, causality and purpose. These are the principal topics\ninvestigated in the present volume. The investigation is confined to\nfundamental concepts and principles, leaving their applications to be\nfollowed out in special metaphysics. Furthermore, the theory of knowledge\nknown as _Moderate Realism_,(29) the Realism of Aristotle and the\nScholastics, in regard to the validity of knowledge both sensual and\nintellectual, is assumed throughout: because not alone is this the true\ntheory, but\u2014as a natural consequence\u2014it is the only theory which renders\nthe individual things and events of human experience really intelligible,\nand at the same time keeps the highest and most abstract intellectual\nspeculations of metaphysics in constant and wholesome contact with the\nconcrete, actual world in which we live, move, and have our being.\n\nVIII. REMARKS ON SOME MISGIVINGS AND PREJUDICES.\u2014The student, especially\nthe beginner, will find the investigations in this volume rather abstract;\nbut if he remembers that the content of our intellectual concepts, be they\never so abstract and universal, is really embodied in the individual\nthings and events of his daily experience, he will not be disposed to\ndenounce all ultimate analysis of these concepts as \u201cunprofitable\u201d or\n\u201cunreal\u201d. He will recognize that the reproach of \u201ctalking in the air,\u201d\nwhich was levelled by an eminent medieval scholastic(30) at certain\nphilosophers of his time, tells against the metaphysical speculations of\nConceptualism, but not against those of Moderate Realism. The reproach is\ncommonly cast at _all_ systematic metaphysics nowadays\u2014from prejudices too\nnumerous and varied to admit of investigation here.(31) The modern\nprejudice which denies the very possibility of metaphysics, a prejudice\narising from Phenomenism, Positivism, and Agnosticism\u2014systems which are\nthemselves no less metaphysical than erroneous\u2014will be examined in due\ncourse.(32)\n\nBut really in order to dispel all such misgivings one has only to remember\nthat metaphysics, systematic or otherwise, is nothing more than a man\u2019s\nreasoned outlook on the world and life. Whatever his conscious opinions\nand convictions may be regarding the nature and purpose of himself, and\nother men, and the world at large\u2014and if he use his reason at all he must\nhave some sort of opinions and convictions, whether positive or negative,\non these matters\u2014those opinions and convictions are precisely that man\u2019s\nmetaphysics. \u201cBreaking free for the moment from all historical and\ntechnical definition, let us affirm: _To get at reality_\u2014this is the aim\nof metaphysics.\u201d So writes Professor Ladd in the opening chapter of his\n_Theory of Reality_.(33) But if this is so, surely a systematic attempt to\n\u201cget at reality,\u201d no matter how deep and wide, no matter how abstract and\nuniversal be the conceptions and speculations to which it leads us, cannot\nnevertheless always and of necessity have the effect of involving us in a\nmirage of illusion and unreality.\n\n\n    Systematic metaphysics\u2014to quote again the author just referred\n    to\u2014(34) is ... the necessary result of a patient, orderly,\n    well-informed, and prolonged study of those ultimate problems\n    which are proposed to every reflective mind by the real existences\n    and actual transactions of selves and of things. Thus considered\n    it appears as the least abstract and foreign to concrete realities\n    of all the higher pursuits of reason. Mathematics is abstract;\n    logic is abstract; mathematical and so-called \u201cpure\u201d physics are\n    abstract. But metaphysics is bound by its very nature and calling\n    always to keep near to the actual and to the concrete. Dive into\n    the depths of speculation indeed it may; and its ocean is\n    boundless in expanse and deep beyond all reach of human plummets.\n    But it finds its place of standing, for every new turn of daring\n    explanation, on some bit of solid ground. For it is actuality\n    which it wishes to understand\u2014although in reflective and\n    interpretative way. To quote from Professor Royce: \u201cThe basis of\n    our whole theory is the bare, brute fact of experience which you\n    have always with you, namely, the fact: _Something is real._ Our\n    question is: What is this reality? or, again, What is the\n    ultimately real?\u201d(35)\n\n\nThe wonderful progress of the positive sciences during the last few\ncenturies has been the occasion of prejudice against metaphysics in a\nvariety of ways. It is objected, for instance, that metaphysics has no\ncorresponding progress to boast of; and from this there is but a small\nstep to the conclusion that all metaphysical speculation is sterile. The\ncomparison is unfair for many reasons. Research into the ultimate grounds\nand causes of things is manifestly more difficult than research into their\nproximate grounds and causes. Again, while the positive sciences have\nincreased our knowledge mainly in extent rather than in depth, it is\nmetaphysics and only metaphysics that can increase this knowledge in its\nunity, comprehensiveness, and significance.\n\nA positive increase in our knowledge of the manifold data of human\nexperience is not the aim of metaphysics; its aim is to give an ultimate\nmeaning and interpretation to this knowledge. It is not utilitarian in the\nnarrower sense in which the positive and special sciences are utilitarian\nby ministering to our material needs; but in the higher and nobler sense\nof pointing out to us the bearing of all human knowledge and achievement\non our real nature and destiny. True, indeed, individual leaders and\nschools of metaphysics have strayed from the truth and spoken with\nconflicting and uncertain voices, especially when they have failed to\navail themselves of Truth Divinely Revealed. This, however, is not a\nfailure of metaphysics but of individual metaphysicians. And furthermore,\nit is undeniable withal, that the metaphysical labours of the great\nphilosophers in all ages have contributed richly to the enlightenment and\ncivilization of mankind\u2014particularly when these labours have been in\nconcord and co-operation with the elevating and purifying influences of\nthe Christian religion. Of no metaphysical system is this so entirely true\nas of that embodied in Scholastic Philosophy. The greatest intellect of\nthe Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas, gave to this philosophy an expression\nwhich is rightly regarded by the modern scholastic as his intellectual\ncharter and the most worthy starting-point of his philosophical\ninvestigations. The following passage from an eminent representative of\nmodern scholastic thought(36) is sufficiently suggestive to admit of\nquotation:\u2014\n\n\n    Amid the almost uninterrupted disintegration of systems during the\n    last three centuries, the philosophy of St. Thomas has alone been\n    able to stand the shock of criticism; it alone has proved\n    sufficiently solid and comprehensive to serve as an intellectual\n    basis and unifying principle for all the new facts and phenomena\n    brought to light by the modern sciences. And unless we are much\n    mistaken, those who take up and follow this philosophy will come\n    to think, as we do, that on the analysis of mental acts and\n    processes, on the inner nature of corporeal things, of living\n    things, and of man, on the existence and nature of God, on the\n    foundations of speculative and moral science, none have thought or\n    written more wisely than St. Thomas Aquinas. But though we place\n    our programme and teaching under the patronage of the illustrious\n    name of this prince of scholastics, we do not regard the Thomistic\n    philosophy as an ideal beyond possibility of amelioration, or as a\n    boundary to the activity of the human mind. We do think, however,\n    on mature reflection, that we are acting no less wisely than\n    modestly in taking it as our starting-point and constant standard\n    of reference. This we say in answer to those of our friends and\n    enemies who are occasionally pleased to ask us if we really do\n    mean to lead back the modern mind into the Middle Ages, and to\n    identify philosophy _simply_ with the thought of any _one_\n    philosopher. Manifestly, we mean nothing of the kind. Has not Leo\n    XIII., the great initiator of the new scholastic movement,\n    expressly warned us(37) to be mindful of the present: \u201cEdicimus\n    libenti gratoque animo recipiendum esse quidquid sapienter dictum,\n    quidquid utiliter fuerit a quopiam inventum atque excogitatum\u201d?\n\n    St. Thomas himself would be the first to rebuke those who would\n    follow his own philosophical opinions in all things against their\n    own better judgment, and to remind them of what he wrote at the\n    head of his _Summa_: that in philosophy, of all arguments that\n    based on human authority is the weakest, \u201clocus ab auctoritate qu\u00e6\n    fundatur super ratione humana, est infirmissimus.\u201d(38)\n\n    Again, therefore, let us assert that respect for tradition is not\n    servility but mere elementary prudence. Respect for a doctrine of\n    whose soundness and worth we are personally convinced is not\n    fetishism; it is but a rational and rightful tribute to the\n    dominion of Truth over Mind.\n\n    Modern scholastics will know how to take to heart and profit by\n    the lessons of the seventeenth and eighteenth century\n    controversies; they will avoid the mistakes of their predecessors;\n    they will keep in close contact with the special sciences\n    subsidiary to philosophy and with the views and teachings of\n    modern and contemporary thinkers.(39)\n\n\nAn overweening confidence in the power of the special sciences to solve\nultimate questions, or at least to tell us all that can be known for\ncertain about these problems, a confidence based on the astonishing\nprogress of those sciences in modern times, is the source of yet another\nprejudice against metaphysics. It is a prejudice of the half-educated\nmind, of the camp-followers of science, not of its leaders. These latter\nare keenly conscious that the solution of ultimate questions lies entirely\nbeyond the methods of the special sciences. Not that even the most eminent\nscientists do not indulge in speculations about ultimate problems\u2014as they\nhave a perfect right to do. But though they may be themselves quite aware\nthat such speculations are distinctly metaphysical, there are multitudes\nwho seem to think that a theory ceases to be metaphysical and becomes\nscientific provided only it is broached by a scientific expert as distinct\nfrom a metaphysician.(40) But all sincere thinkers will recognize that no\nultimate question about the totality of human experience can be solved by\nany science which explores merely a portion of this experience. Nay, the\nmore rapid and extensive is the progress of the various special sciences,\nthe more imperative and insistent becomes the need to collect and collate\ntheir separate findings, to interrogate them one and all as to whether and\nhow far these findings fit in with the facts and conditions of human life\nand existence, to determine what light and aid they contribute to the\nsolution of the great and ever recurring questions of the _whence_? and\n_whither_? and _why_? of man and the universe. One who is a sincere\nscientist as well as an earnest philosopher has written _\u00e0 propos_ of this\nnecessity in the following terms:\u2014\n\n\n    The farther science has pushed back the limits of the discernible\n    universe, the more insistently do we feel the demand within us for\n    some satisfactory explanation of the whole. The old, eternal\n    problems rise up before us and clamour loudly and ever more loudly\n    for some newer and better solution. The solution offered by a\n    bygone age was soothing at least, if it was not final. In the\n    present age, however, the problems reappear with an acuteness that\n    is almost painful: the deep secret of our own human nature, the\n    questions of our origin and destiny, the intermeddling of blind\n    necessity and chance and pain in the strange, tangled drama of our\n    existence, the foibles and oddities of the human soul, and all the\n    mystifying problems of social relations: are not these all so many\n    enigmas which torment and trouble us whithersoever we turn? And\n    all seem to circle around the one essential question: Has human\n    nature a real meaning and value, or is it so utterly amiss that\n    truth and peace will never be its portion?(41)\n\n\nA final difficulty against philosophical research is suggested by the\nthought that if the philosopher has to take cognizance of all the\nconclusions of all the special sciences his task is an impossible one,\ninasmuch as nowadays at all events it would take a lifetime to become\nproficient in a few of these sciences not to speak of all of them.\n\nThere is no question, however, of becoming proficient in them; the\nphilosopher need not be a specialist in any positive science; his\nacquaintance with the contents of these sciences need extend no farther\nthan such established conclusions and such current though unverified\nhypotheses as have an immediate bearing on ultimate or philosophical\nproblems.\n\nMoreover, while it would be injurious both to philosophy and to science,\nas is proved by the history of both alike, to separate synthetic from\nanalytic speculation by a divorce between philosophy and science; while it\nwould be unwise to ignore the conclusions of the special sciences and to\nbase philosophical research _exclusively_ on the data of the plain man\u2019s\ncommon and unanalysed experience, it must be remembered on the other hand\nthat the most fundamental truths of speculative and practical philosophy,\nthe truths that are most important for the right and proper orientation of\nhuman life, can be established and defended independently of the special\nresearches of the positive sciences. The human mind had not to await the\ndiscovery of radium in order to prove the existence of God. Such supreme\ntruths as the existence of God, the immortality of the human soul, the\nfreedom of the human will, the existence of a moral law, the distinction\nbetween right and wrong, etc., have been _always_ in possession of the\nhuman race. It has been, moreover, confirmed in its possession of them by\nDivine Revelation. And it has not needed either the rise or the progress\nof modern science to defend them. These fundamental rational truths\nconstitute a _philosophia perennis_: a fund of truth which is, like all\ntruth, _immutable_, though our human insight into it may develop in depth\nand clearness.\n\nBut while this is so it is none the less true that philosophy, to be\nprogressive in its own order, must take account of every new fact and\nconclusion brought to light in every department of scientific\u2014and\nhistorical, and artistic, and literary, and every other sort of\u2014research.\nAnd this for the simple reason that every such accession, whether of fact\nor of theory, is an enlargement of human experience; as such it clamours\non the one hand for philosophical interpretation, for explanation in the\nlight of what we know already about the ultimate grounds and causes of\nthings, for admission into our world-outlook, for adjustment and\nco-ordination with the previous contents of the latter; while, on the\nother hand, by its very appearance on the horizon of human experience it\nmay enrich or illumine, rectify or otherwise influence, this outlook or\nsome aspect of it.(42)\n\nIf, then, philosophy has to take account of advances in every other\ndepartment of human research, it is clear that its mastery at the present\nday is a more laborious task than ever it was in the past. In order to get\nan intelligent grasp of its principles in their applications to the\nproblems raised by the progress of the sciences, to newly discovered facts\nand newly propounded hypotheses, the student must be familiar with these\nfacts and hypotheses; and all the more so because through the medium of a\nsensational newspaper press that has more regard for novelty than truth,\nthese facts and hypotheses are no sooner brought to light by scientists\nthan what are often garbled and distorted versions of them are circulated\namong the masses.(43)\n\nSimilarly, in order that a sound system of speculative and practical\nphilosophy be expounded, developed, and defended at the present time, a\nsystem that will embrace and co-ordinate the achieved results of modern\nscientific research, a system that will offer the most satisfactory\nsolutions of old difficulties in new forms and give the most reasonable\nand reliable answers to the ever recurring questionings of man concerning\nhis own nature and destiny\u2014it is clear that the insufficiency of\nindividual effort must be supplemented by the co-operation of numbers. It\nis the absence of fulness, completeness, adequacy, in most modern systems\nof philosophy, their fragmentary character, the unequal development of\ntheir parts, that accounts very largely for the despairing attitude of the\nmany who nowadays despise and turn away from philosophical speculation.\nAdd to this the uncertain voice with which these philosophies speak in\nconsequence of their advocates ignoring the implications of the most\nstupendous fact in human experience,\u2014the Christian Revelation. But there\nis one philosophy which is free from these defects, a philosophy which is\nin complete harmony with Revealed Truth, and which forms with the latter\nthe only true _Philosophy of Life_; and that one philosophy is the system\nwhich, assimilating the wisdom of Plato, Aristotle and all the other\ngreatest thinkers of the world, has been traditionally expounded in the\nChristian schools\u2014the _Scholastic_ system of philosophy. It has been\nelaborated by no one man, and is the original fruit of no one mind. Unlike\nthe philosophies of Kant or Hegel or Spencer or James or Comte or Bergson,\nit is not a \u201cone-man\u201d philosophy. It cannot boast of the novelty or\noriginality of the many eccentric and ephemeral \u201csystems\u201d which have\nsucceeded one another so rapidly in recent times in the world of\nintellectual fashion; but it has ever possessed the enduring novelty of\nthe _truth_, which is ever ancient and ever new. Now although this\nphilosophy may have been mastered in its broad outlines and applications\nby specially gifted individuals in past ages, its progressive exposition\nand development, and its application to the vastly extended and\never-growing domains of experience that are being constantly explored by\nthe special sciences, can never be the work of any individual: it can be\naccomplished only by the earnest co-operation of Christian philosophers in\nevery part of the civilized world.(44)\n\nIn carrying on this work we have not to build from the beginning. \u201cIt has\nsometimes been remarked,\u201d as Newman observes,(45) \u201cwhen men have boasted\nof the knowledge of modern times, that no wonder we see more than the\nancients because we are mounted upon their shoulders.\u201d Yes; the\nintellectual toilers of to-day are heirs to the intellectual wealth of\ntheir ancestors. We have tradition: not to despise but to use, critically,\njudiciously, reverently, if we are to use it profitably. Thomas Davis has\nsomewhere said that they who demolish the past do not build up for the\nfuture. And we have the Christian Revelation, as a _lamp_ to our _feet_\nand a _light_ to our _paths_(46) in all those rational investigations\nwhich form the appointed task of the philosopher. Hence,\n\n\n    Let knowledge grow from more to more,\n      But more of reverence in us dwell;\n      That mind and soul, according well,\n    May make one music as before,\n    But vaster.(47)\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I. BEING AND ITS PRIMARY DETERMINATIONS.\n\n\n1. OUR CONCEPT OF BEING: ITS EXPRESSION AND FEATURES.\u2014The term \u201c_Being_\u201d\n(Lat. _ens_; Gr. \u1f64\u03bd; Ger. _Seiend_; Fr. _\u00e9tant_) as present participle of\nthe verb _to be_ (Lat. _esse_; Gr. \u1f14\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9; Ger. _Sein_; Fr. _\u00eatre_) means\n_existing_ (_existens_, _existere_). But the participle has come to be\nused as a noun; and as such it does not necessarily imply actual existence\n_hic et nunc_. It does indeed imply some relation to actual existence; for\nwe designate as \u201cbeing\u201d (in the substantive sense) only whatever we\nconceive as actually existing or at least as capable of existing; and it\nis from the participial sense, which implies actual existence, that the\nsubstantive sense has been derived. Moreover, the intelligible use of the\nword \u201cbeing\u201d as a term implies a reference to some actually existing\nsphere of reality.(48) It is in the substantive meaning the term will be\nmost frequently used in these pages, as the context will show. When we\nspeak of \u201ca being\u201d in the concrete, the word has the same meaning as\n\u201cthing\u201d (_res_) used in the wide sense in which this latter includes\npersons, places, events, facts and phenomena of whatsoever kind. In the\nsame sense we speak of \u201ca reality,\u201d this term having taken on a concrete,\nin addition to its original abstract, meaning. \u201cBeing\u201d has also this\nabstract sense when we speak of \u201cthe being or reality of things\u201d. Finally\nit may be used in a collective sense to indicate the sum-total of all that\nis or can be\u2014all reality.\n\n(_a_) The notion of being, spontaneously reached by the human mind, is\nfound on reflection to be the _simplest_ of all notions, defying every\nattempt at analysis into simpler notions. It is involved in every other\nconcept which we form of any object of thought whatsoever. Without it we\ncould have no concept of anything.\n\n(_b_) It is thus the first of all notions _in the logical order_, _i.e._\nin the process of rational thought.\n\n(_c_) It is also the _first_ of all notions _in the chronological order_,\nthe first which the human mind forms in the order of time. Not, of course,\nthat we remember having formed it before any other more determinate\nnotions. But the child\u2019s awakening intellectual activity must have\nproceeded from the simplest, easiest, most superficial of all concepts, to\nfuller, clearer, and more determinate concepts, _i.e._ from the vague and\nconfused notion of \u201cbeing\u201d or \u201cthing\u201d to notions of definite modes of\nbeing, or kinds of thing.\n\n(_d_) This direct notion of being is likewise the _most indeterminate_ of\nall notions; though not of course entirely indeterminate. An object of\nthought, to be conceivable or intelligible at all by our finite minds,\nmust be rendered definite in some manner and degree; and even this widest\nnotion of \u201cbeing\u201d is rendered intelligible only by being conceived as\npositive and as contrasting with absolute non-being or nothingness.(49)\n\n\n    According to the Hegelian philosophy \u201cpure thought\u201d can apparently\n    think \u201cpure being,\u201d _i.e._ being in absolute indeterminateness,\n    being as not even differentiated from \u201cpure not-being\u201d or absolute\n    nothingness. And this absolutely indeterminate confusion (we may\n    not call it a \u201csynthesis\u201d or \u201cunity\u201d) of something and nothing, of\n    being and not-being, of positive and negative, of affirmation and\n    denial, would be conceived by our finite minds as the objective\n    correlative of, and at the same time as absolutely identical with,\n    its subjective correlative which is \u201cpure thought\u201d. Well, it is\n    with the human mind and its objects, and how it thinks those\n    objects, that we are concerned at present; not with speculations\n    involving the gratuitous assumption of a Being that would\n    transcend all duality of subject and object, all determinateness\n    of knowing and being, all distinction of thought and thing. We\n    believe that the human mind can establish the existence of a\n    Supreme Being whose mode of Thought and Existence transcends all\n    human comprehension, but it can do so only as the culminating\n    achievement of all its speculation; and the transcendent Being it\n    thus reaches has nothing in common with the monistic ideal-real\n    being of Hegel\u2019s philosophy. In endeavouring to set out from the\n    high _a priori_ ground of such an intangible conception, the\n    Hegelian philosophy starts at the wrong end.\n\n\n(_e_) Further, the notion of being is the _most abstract_ of all notions,\npoorest in intension as it is widest in extension. We derive it from the\ndata of our experience, and the process by which we reach it is a process\nof abstraction. We lay aside all the differences whereby things are\ndistinguished from one another; we do not consider these differences; we\nprescind or abstract from them mentally, and retain for consideration only\nwhat is common to all of them. This common element forms the explicit\ncontent of our notion of being.\n\nIt must be noted, however, that we do not _positively exclude_ the\ndifferences from the _object_ of our concept; we cannot do this, for the\nsimple reason that the differences too are \u201cbeing,\u201d inasmuch as they too\nare modes of being. Our attitude towards them is _negative_; we merely\nabstain from considering them explicitly, though they remain in our\nconcept implicitly. The separation effected is only mental, subjective,\nnotional, formal, negative; not objective, not real, not positive. Hence\nthe process by which we narrow down the concept of being to the more\ncomprehensive concept of this or that generic or specific mode of being,\ndoes not add to the former concept anything really new, or distinct from,\nor extraneous to it; but rather brings out explicitly something that was\nimplicit in the latter. The composition of being with its modes is,\ntherefore, only _logical_ composition, not real.\n\nOn the other hand, it would seem that when we abstract a generic mode of\nbeing from the specific modes subordinate to the former, we _positively\nexclude_ the differentiating characteristics of these species; and that,\nconversely, when we narrow down the genus to a subordinate species we do\nso by _adding on_ a differentiating mode which was not contained even\nimplicitly in the generic concept. Thus, for example, the differentiating\nconcept \u201crational\u201d is not contained even implicitly in the generic concept\n\u201canimal\u201d: it is added on _ab extra_ to the latter(50) in order to reach\nthe specific concept of \u201crational animal\u201d or \u201cman\u201d; so that in abstracting\nthe generic from the subordinate specific concept we prescind\n_objectively_ and _really_ from the differentiating concept, by positively\nexcluding this latter. This kind of abstraction is called objective, real,\npositive; and the composition of such generic and differentiating modes of\nbeing is technically known as _metaphysical_ composition. The different\nmodes of being, which the mind can distinguish at different levels of\nabstraction in any specific concept\u2014such as \u201crational,\u201d \u201csentient,\u201d\n\u201cliving,\u201d \u201ccorporeal,\u201d in the concept of \u201cman\u201d\u2014are likewise known as\n\u201cmetaphysical grades\u201d of being.\n\n\n    It has been questioned whether this latter kind of abstraction is\n    always used in relating generic, specific, and differential modes\n    of being. At first sight it would not appear to be a quite\n    satisfactory account of the process in cases where the generic\n    notion exhibits a mode of being which can be embodied only in one\n    or other of a number of alternative specific modes by means of\n    _differentiae_ not found in any things lying outside the genus\n    itself. The generic notion of \u201cplane rectilinear figure\u201d does not,\n    of course, include explicitly its species \u201ctriangle,\u201d\n    \u201cquadrilateral,\u201d \u201cpentagon,\u201d etc.; nor does it include even\n    implicitly any definite one of them. But the concept of each of\n    the differentiating characters, _e.g._ the _differentia_\n    \u201cthree-sidedness,\u201d is unintelligible except as a mode of a \u201cplane\n    rectilinear figure\u201d.(51) This, however, is only accidental, _i.e._\n    due to the special objects considered;(52) and even here there\n    persists this difference that whereas what differentiates the\n    species of plane rectilinear figures is not explicitly and\n    formally plane-rectilinearity, that which differentiates finite\n    from infinite being, or substantial from accidental being, is\n    itself also formally and explicitly _being_. But there are other\n    cases in which the abstraction is manifestly objective. Thus, for\n    example, the differentiating concept \u201crational\u201d does not even\n    implicitly include the generic concept \u201canimal,\u201d for the former\n    concept may be found realized in beings other than animals; and\n    the differentiating concept \u201cliving\u201d does not even implicitly\n    include the concept \u201ccorporeal,\u201d for it may be found realized in\n    incorporeal beings.\n\n\n(_f_) Since the notion of being is so simple that it cannot be analysed\ninto simpler notions which might serve as its _genus_ and _differentia_,\nit _cannot_ strictly speaking _be defined_. We can only describe it by\nconsidering it from various points of view and comparing it with the\nvarious modes in which we find it realized. This is what we have been\nattempting so far. Considering its fundamental relation to existence we\nmight say that \u201cBeing is that which exists or is at least capable of\nexisting\u201d: _Ens est id quod existit vel saltem existere potest._ Or,\nconsidering its relation to its opposite we might say that \u201cBeing is that\nwhich is not absolute nothingness\u201d: _Ens est id quod non est nihil\nabsolutum._ Or, considering its relation to our minds, we might say that\n\u201cBeing is whatever is thinkable, whatever can be an object of thought\u201d.\n\n(_g_) The notion of being is so universal that it transcends all actual\nand conceivable determinate modes of being: it embraces infinite being and\nall modes of finite being. In other words it is _not itself a generic, but\na transcendental notion_. Wider than all, even the widest and highest\ngenera, it is not itself a genus. A genus is determinable into its species\nby the addition of differences which lie outside the concept of the genus\nitself; being, as we have seen, is not in this way determinable into its\nmodes.\n\n2. IN WHAT SENSE ARE ALL THINGS THAT EXIST OR CAN EXIST SAID TO BE \u201cREAL\u201d\nOR TO HAVE \u201cBEING\u201d?\u2014A generic concept can be predicated _univocally_,\n_i.e._ in the same sense, of its subordinate species. These latter differ\nfrom one another by characteristics which lie outside the concept of the\ngenus, while they all agree in realizing the generic concept itself: they\ndo not of course realize it in the same way,(53) but as such it is really\nand truly in each of them and is predicated in the same sense of each. But\nthe characteristics which differentiate all genera and species from one\nanother, and from the common notion of being, in which they all agree, are\nlikewise _being_. That in which they differ is being, as well as that in\nwhich they agree. _Hence we do not predicate _\u201cbeing\u201d_ univocally of its\nvarious modes._ When we say of the various classes of things which make up\nour experience that they are \u201creal\u201d (or \u201crealities,\u201d or \u201cbeings\u201d), we do\nnot apply this predicate in altogether the same sense to the several\nclasses; for as applied to each class it connotes the whole content of\neach, not merely the part in which this agrees with, but also the part in\nwhich it differs from, the others. Nor yet do we apply the concept of\n\u201cbeing\u201d in a totally different sense to each separate determinate mode of\nbeing. When we predicate \u201cbeing\u201d of its modes _the predication is not\nmerely equivocal_. The concept expressed by the predicate-term \u201cbeing\u201d is\nnot totally different as applied to each subject-mode; for in all cases\nalike it implies either actual existence or some relation thereto. It only\nremains, therefore, that we must regard the notion of being, when\npredicated of its several modes, _as partly the same and partly\ndifferent_; and this is what we mean when we say that _the concept of\nbeing is analogical, that being is predicated analogically of its various\nmodes_.\n\nAnalogical predication is of two kinds: a term or concept may be affirmed\nof a variety of subjects either by analogy _of attribution_ or by analogy\n_of proportion_. We may, for instance, speak not only of a man as\n\u201chealthy,\u201d but also of his food, his countenance, his occupation, his\ncompanionship, etc., as \u201chealthy\u201d. Now health is found really only in the\nman, but it is _attributed_ to the other things owing to some extrinsic\nbut real connexion which they have with his health, whether as cause, or\neffect, or indication, of the latter. This is analogy of attribution; the\nsubject of which the predicate is properly and primarily affirmed being\nknown as the primary analogue or _analogum princeps_, those to which it is\ntransferred being called the _analogata_. It underlies the figures of\nspeech known as metynomy and synechdoche. Now on account of the various\nrelations that exist between the different modes of being, relations of\ncause and effect, whole and part, means and end, ground and consequence,\netc.\u2014relations which constitute the _orders_ of existing and possible\nthings, the _physical_ and the _metaphysical_ orders\u2014being is of course\npredicated of its modes by _analogy of attribution_; and in such\npredication infinite being is the primary analogue for finite beings, and\nthe substance-mode of being for all accident-modes of being.\n\nInasmuch, however, as being is not merely attributed to these modes\nextrinsically, but belongs to all of them intrinsically, it is also\npredicated of them by _analogy of proportion_. This latter sort of analogy\nis based on similarity of relations. For example, the act of understanding\nbears a relation to the mind similar to that which the act of seeing bears\nto the eye, and hence we say of the mind that it \u201csees\u201d things when it\nunderstands them. Or, again, we speak of a verdant valley in the sunshine\nas \u201csmiling,\u201d because its appearance bears a relation to the valley\nsimilar to that which a smile bears to the human countenance. Or again, we\nspeak of the parched earth as \u201cthirsting\u201d for the rains, or of the devout\nsoul as \u201cthirsting\u201d for God, because these relations are recognized as\nsimilar to that of a thirsty person towards the drink for which he\nthirsts. In all such cases the analogical concept implies not indeed the\nsame attribute (differently realized) in all the analogues (as in univocal\npredication) but rather a similarity in the relation or proportion in\nwhich each analogue embodies or realizes some attribute or attributes\npeculiar to itself. Seeing is to the eye as understanding is to the mind;\nsmiling is to the countenance as the pleasing appearance of its natural\nfeatures is to the valley. Rain is to the parched earth, and God is to the\ndevout soul, as drink is to the thirsty person. It will be noted that in\nall such cases the analogical concept is affirmed primarily and properly\nof some one thing (the _analogum princeps_), and of the other only\nsecondarily, and relatively to the former.\n\nNow, if we reflect on the manner in which being is affirmed of its various\nmodes (_e.g._ of the infinite and the finite; or of substance and\naccident; or of spiritual and corporeal substances; or of quantities, or\nqualities, or causes, etc.) we can see _firstly_ that although these\ndiffer from one another _by all that each of them is, by the whole being\nof each_, yet there is an all-pervading similarity between the relations\nwhich these modes bear each to its own existence. All have, or can have,\nactual existence: each according to the grade of perfection of its own\nreality. If we conceive infinite being as the cause of all finite beings,\nthen the former exists in a manner appropriate to its all-perfect reality,\nand finite beings in a manner proportionate to their limited realities;\nand so of the various modes of finite being among themselves. Moreover, we\ncan see _secondly_, as will be explained more fully below,(54) that being\nis affirmed of the finite by virtue of its dependence on the infinite, and\nof accident by virtue of its dependence on substance.(55) Being or reality\nis therefore predicated of its modes by _analogy of proportion_.(56)\n\nIs a concept, when applied in this way, one, or is it really manifold? It\nis not simply one, for this would yield univocal predication; nor is it\nsimply manifold, for this would give equivocal predication. Being,\nconsidered in its vague, imperfect, inadequate sense, as involving some\ncommon or similar proportion or relation to existence in all its\nanalogues, is one; considered as representing clearly and adequately what\nis thus similarly related to each of the analogues, it is manifold.\n\nAnalogy of proportion is the basis of the figure of speech known as\nmetaphor. It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this that what is\nthus analogically predicated of a number of things belongs intrinsically\nand properly only to one of them, being transferred by a mere extrinsic\ndenomination to the others; and that therefore it does not express any\ngenuine knowledge on our part about the nature of these other things. It\ndoes give us real knowledge about them. Metaphor is not equivocation; but\nperhaps more usually it is understood not to give us real knowledge\nbecause it is understood to be based on resemblances that are merely\n_fanciful_, not real. Still, no matter how slender and remote be the\nproportional resemblance on which the analogical use of language is based,\nin so far forth as it has such a _real_ basis it gives us real insight\ninto the nature of the analogues. And if we hesitate to describe such a\nuse of language as \u201cmetaphorical,\u201d this is only because \u201cmetaphor\u201d perhaps\ntoo commonly connotes a certain transferred and improper extension of the\nmeaning of terms, based upon a _purely fanciful_ resemblance.\n\nAll our language is primarily and _properly_ expressive of concepts\nderived from the sensible appearances of material realities. As applied to\nthe suprasensible, intelligible aspects of these realities, such as\nsubstance and cause, or to spiritual realities, such as the human soul and\nGod, it is analogical in another sense; not as opposed to univocal, but as\nopposed to _proper_. That is, it expresses concepts which are not formed\ndirectly from the presence of the things which they signify, but are\ngathered from other things to which the latter are necessarily related in\na variety of ways.(57) Considering the origin of our knowledge, the\nmaterial, the sensible, the phenomenal, comes first in order, and moulds\nour concepts and language primarily to its own proper representation and\nexpression; while the spiritual, the intelligible, the substantial, comes\nlater, and must make use of the concepts and language thus already\nmoulded.\n\nIf we consider, however, not the order in which we get our knowledge, but\nthe order of _reality_ in the objects of our knowledge, being or reality\nis primarily and more properly predicated of the infinite than of the\nfinite, of the Creator than of the creature, of the spiritual than of the\nmaterial, of substances than of their accidents and sensible\nmanifestations or phenomena. Yet we do not predicate being or reality of\nthe finite, or of creatures, in a mere transferred, extrinsic, improper\nsense, as if these were mere manifestations of the infinite, or mere\neffects of the First Cause, to which alone reality would properly belong.\nFor creatures, finite things, are in a true and proper sense also real.\n\n\n    Duns Scotus and those who think with him contend that the concept\n    of being, derived as it is from our experience of finite being, if\n    applied only analogically to infinite being would give us no\n    genuine knowledge about the latter. They maintain that whenever a\n    universal concept is applied to the objects in which it is\n    _realized intrinsically_, it is affirmed of these objects\n    _univocally_. The notion of being, in its most imperfect,\n    inadequate, indeterminate sense, is, they say, _one and the same_\n    in so far forth as it is applicable to the infinite and the\n    finite, and to all the modes of the finite; and it is therefore\n    predicated of all univocally.(58) But although they apply the\n    concept of being univocally to the infinite and the finite, _i.e._\n    to God and creatures, they admit that the _reality_ corresponding\n    to this univocal concept is _totally different_ in God and in\n    creatures: that God differs by _all that He is_ from creatures,\n    and they by _all that they are_ from Him. While, however, Scotists\n    emphasize the formal oneness or identity of the indeterminate\n    common concept, followers of St. Thomas emphasize the fact that\n    the various modes of being differ totally, by all that each of\n    them is, from one another; and, from this radical diversity in the\n    modes of being, they infer that the common concept should not be\n    regarded as _simply_ the same, but only as _proportionally_ the\n    same, as expressive of a _similar relation_ of each intrinsically\n    different mode of reality to actual existence.\n\n    Thomists lay still greater stress, perhaps, upon the second\n    consideration referred to above, as a reason for regarding being\n    as an analogical concept when affirmed of Creator and creature, or\n    of substance and accident: the consideration that the finite is\n    _dependent_ on the infinite, and accident on substance. If being\n    is realized in a true and proper sense, and intrinsically, as it\n    undoubtedly is, in whatever is distinguishable from nothingness,\n    why not say that we should affirm being or reality of all things\n    \u201ceither as a genus in the strict sense, or else in some sense not\n    analogical but proper, after the manner in which we predicate a\n    genus of its species and individuals?... Since the object of our\n    universal idea of being is admitted to be really in all things, we\n    can evidently abstract from what is proper to substance and to\n    accident, just as we abstract from what is proper to plants and to\n    animals when we affirm of these that they are living things.\u201d(59)\n\n    \u201cIn reply to this difficulty,\u201d Father Kleutgen continues,(60) \u201cwe\n    say in the first place that the idea of being is in truth less\n    analogical and more proper than any belonging to the first sort of\n    analogy [_i.e._ of attribution], and that therefore it approaches\n    more closely to generic concepts properly so called. At the same\n    time the difference which separates both from the latter concepts\n    remains. For a name applied to many things is analogical if what\n    it signifies is realized _par excellence_ in one, and in the\n    others only subordinately and dependently on that. Hence it is\n    that Aristotle regards predication as analogical when something is\n    affirmed of many things (1) either because these have a certain\n    relation to some one thing, (2) or because they depend on some one\n    thing. In the former case the thing signified by the name is\n    really and properly found only in one single thing, and is\n    affirmed of all the others only in virtue of some real relation of\n    these to the former, whether this be (_a_) that these things\n    merely resemble that single thing [metaphor], or (_b_) bear some\n    other relation to it, such as that of effect to cause, etc.\n    [metonymy]. In the latter case the thing signified by the name is\n    really in each of the things of which it is affirmed; but it is in\n    one alone _par excellence_, and in the others only by depending,\n    for its very existence in them, on that one. Now the object of the\n    term _being_ is found indeed in accidents, _e.g._ in quantity,\n    colour, shape; but certainly it must be applied primarily to\n    substance, and to accidents only dependently on the latter: for\n    quantity, colour, shape can have being only because the corporeal\n    substance possesses these determinations. But this is not at all\n    the case with a genus and its species. These differ from the\n    genus, not by any such dependence, but by the addition of some\n    special perfection to the constituents of the genus; for example,\n    in the brute beast sensibility is added to vegetative life, and in\n    man intelligence is added to sensibility. Here there is no\n    relation of dependence for existence. Even if we considered human\n    life as that of which life is principally asserted, we could not\n    say that plants and brute beasts so depended for their life on the\n    life of man that we could not affirm life of them except as\n    dependent on the life of man: as we cannot attribute being to\n    accidents except by reason of their dependence on substance. Hence\n    it is that we can consider apart, and in itself, life in general,\n    and attribute this to all living things without relating it to any\n    other being.\u201d(61)\n\n    \u201cIt might still be objected that the one single being of which we\n    may affirm life primarily and principally, ought to be not human\n    life, but absolute life. And between this divine life and the life\n    of all other beings there is a relation of dependence, which\n    reaches even to the very existence of life in these other beings.\n    In fact all life depends on the absolute life, not indeed in the\n    way accident depends on substance, but in a manner no less real\n    and far more excellent. This is entirely true; but what are we to\n    conclude from it if not precisely this, which scholasticism\n    teaches: that the perfections found in the various species of\n    creatures can be affirmed of these in the same sense (_univoc\u00e9_),\n    but that they can be affirmed of God and creatures only\n    analogically?\u201d\n\n    \u201cFrom all of which we can understand why it is that in regard to\n    genera and species the analogy is in the things but not in our\n    thoughts, while in regard to substance and accidents it is both in\n    the things and in our thoughts: a difference which rests not\n    solely on our manner of conceiving things, nor _a fortiori_ on\n    mere caprice or fancy, but which has its basis in the very nature\n    of the things themselves. For though in the former case there is a\n    certain analogy in the things themselves, inasmuch as the same\n    nature, that of the genus, is realized in the species in different\n    ways, still, as we have seen, that is not sufficient, without the\n    relation of dependence, to yield a basis for analogy in our\n    thoughts. For it is precisely because accident, as a determination\n    of substance, presupposes this latter, that being cannot be\n    affirmed of accident except as dependent on substance.\u201d\n\n    These paragraphs will have shown with sufficient clearness why we\n    should regard being not as an univocal but as an analogical\n    concept, when referred to God and creatures, or to substance and\n    accident. For the rest, the divergence between the Scotist and the\n    Thomist views is not very important, because Scotists also will\n    deny that being is a genus of which the infinite and the finite\n    would be species; finite and infinite are not _differentiae_\n    superadded to being, inasmuch as each of these differs _by its\n    whole reality_, and not merely by a determining portion, from the\n    other; it is owing to the limitations of our abstractive way of\n    understanding reality that we have to conceive the infinite by\n    first conceiving being in the abstract, and then mentally\n    determining this concept by another, namely, by the concept of\n    \u201cinfinite mode of being\u201d(62); the infinite, and whatever\n    perfections we predicate formally of the infinite, transcend all\n    _genera_, _species_ and _differentiae_, because the distinction of\n    being into infinite and finite is prior to the distinction into\n    genera, species and differentiae; this latter distinction applying\n    only to finite, not to infinite being.(63)\n\n\nThe observations we have just been making in regard to the analogy of\nbeing are of greater importance than the beginner can be expected to\nrealize. A proper appreciation of the way in which being or reality is\nconceived by the mind to appertain to the data of our experience, is\nindispensable to the defence of Theism as against Agnosticism and\nPantheism.\n\n3. REAL BEING AND LOGICAL BEING.\u2014We may next illustrate the notion of\nbeing by approaching it from another standpoint\u2014by examining a fundamental\ndistinction which may be drawn between _real being_ (_ens reale_) and\n_logical being_ (_ens rationis_).\n\nWe derive all our knowledge, through external and internal sense\nperception, from the domain of actually existing things, these things\nincluding our own selves and our own minds. We form, from the data of\nsense-consciousness, by an intellectual process proper, mental\nrepresentations of an abstract and universal character, which reveal to us\npartial aspects and phases of the natures of things. We have no intuitive\nintellectual insight into these natures. It is only by abstracting their\nvarious aspects, by comparing these in judgments, and reaching still\nfurther aspects by inferences, that we progress in our knowledge of\nthings\u2014gradually, step by step, _discursiv\u00e9_, _discurrendo_. All this\nimplies reflection on, and comparison of, our own ideas, our mental views\nof things. It involves the processes of defining and classifying,\naffirming and denying, abstracting and generalizing, analysing and\nsynthesizing, comparing and relating in a variety of ways the objects\ngrasped by our thought. Now in all these complex functions, by which alone\nthe mind can _interpret rationally_ what is given to it, by which alone,\nin other words, it can know reality, the mind necessarily and inevitably\nforms for itself (and expresses in intelligible language) a series of\nconcepts which have for their objects only the _modes_ in which, and the\n_relations_ by means of which, it makes such gradual progress in its\ninterpretation of what is given to it, in its knowledge of the real. These\nconcepts are called _secundae intentiones mentis_\u2014concepts of the second\norder, so to speak. And their objects, the modes and mutual relations of\nour _primae intentiones_ or direct concepts, are called _entia\nrationis_\u2014logical entities. For example, _abstractness_ is a mode which\naffects not the reality which we apprehend intellectually, but the concept\nby which we apprehend it. So, too, is the _universality_ of a concept, its\ncommunicability or applicability to an indefinite multitude of similar\nrealities\u2014the \u201c_intentio universalitatis_,\u201d as it is called\u2014a mode of\nconcept, not of the realities represented by the latter. So, likewise, is\nthe _absence_ of other reality than that represented by the concept, the\n_relative nothingness or non-being_ by contrast with which the concept is\nrealized as positive; and the _absolute nothingness or non-being_ which is\nthe logical correlative of the concept of being; and the static,\nunchanging self-identity of the object as conceived in the abstract.(64)\nThese are not modes of reality _as it is_ but _as it is conceived_. Again,\nthe manifold logical relations which we establish between our\nconcepts\u2014relations of (extensive or intensive) identity or distinction,\ninclusion or inherence, etc.\u2014are logical entities, _entia rationis_:\nrelations of genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens; the\naffirmative or negative relation between predicate and subject in\njudgment;(65) the mutual relations of antecedent and consequent in\ninference. Now all these logical entities, or _objecta secundae\nintentionis mentis_, are relations established by the mind itself between\nits own thoughts; they have, no doubt, a foundation in the real objects of\nthose thoughts as well as in the constitution and limitations of the mind\nitself; but they have themselves, and can have, no other being than that\nwhich they have as products of thought. Their sole being consists in\n_being thought of_. They are necessary creations or products of the\nthought-process as this goes on in the human mind. We see that it is only\nby means of these relations we can progress in understanding things. In\nthe thought-process we cannot help bringing them to light\u2014and thinking\nthem after the manner of realities, _per modum entis_. Whatever we think\nwe must think through the concept of \u201cbeing\u201d; whatever we conceive we must\nconceive as \u201cbeing\u201d; but on reflection we easily see that such entities as\n\u201cnothingness,\u201d \u201cnegation or absence or privation of being,\u201d\n\u201cuniversality,\u201d \u201cpredicate\u201d\u2014and, in general, all relations established by\nour own thought between our own ideas representative of reality\u2014can have\nthemselves no reality proper, no actual or possible existence, other than\nthat which they get from the mind in virtue of its making them objects of\nits own thought. Hence the scholastic definition of a logical entity or\n_ens rationis_ as \u201cthat which has objective being merely in the\nintellect\u201d: \u201c_illud quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu, seu\n... id quod a ratione excogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non\nhabeat_\u201d.(66) Of course the mental process by which we think such\nentities, the mental state in which they are held in consciousness, is\njust as real as any other mental process or state. But the entity which is\nthus held in consciousness has and can have no other reality than what it\nhas by being an object of thought. And this precisely is what\ndistinguishes it from _real being_, from _reality_; for the latter,\nbesides the ideal existence it has in the mind which thinks of it, has, or\nat least can have, a real existence of its own, independently altogether\nof our thinking about it. We assume here, of course\u2014what is established\nelsewhere, as against the subjective idealism of phenomenists and the\nobjective idealism of Berkeley\u2014that the _reality_ of _actual_ things does\nnot consist in their being perceived or thought of, that their \u201c_esse_\u201d is\nnot \u201c_percipi_,\u201d that they have a reality other than and independent of\ntheir actual presence to the thought of any human mind. And even purely\npossible things, even the creatures of our own fancy, the fictions of\nfable and romance, _could_, absolutely speaking and without any\ncontradiction, have an existence in the actual order, in addition to the\nmental existence they receive from those who fancy them. Such entities,\ntherefore, differ from _entia rationis_; they, too, are _real_ beings.\n\n\n    What the reality of purely possible things is we shall discuss\n    later on. Actually existing things at all events we assume to be\n    _given_ to the knowing mind, not to be _created_ by the latter.\n    Even in regard to these, however, we must remember that the mind\n    in knowing them, in interpreting them, in seeking to penetrate the\n    nature of them, is not purely passive; that reality as known to\n    us\u2014or, in other words, our knowledge of reality\u2014is the product of\n    a twofold factor: the subjective which is the mind, and the\n    objective which is the extramental reality acting on, and thus\n    revealing itself to, the mind. Hence it is that when we come to\n    analyse in detail our knowledge of the nature of things\u2014or, in\n    other words, the natures of things as revealed to our minds\u2014it\n    will not be always easy to distinguish in each particular case the\n    properties, aspects, relations, distinctions, etc., which are\n    _real_ (in the sense of being there in the reality independently\n    of the consideration of the mind) from those that are merely\n    _logical_ (in the sense of being produced and superadded to the\n    reality by the mental process itself).(67) Yet it is obviously a\n    matter of the very first importance to determine, as far as may be\n    possible, to what extent our knowledge of reality is not merely a\n    mental _interpretation_, but a mental _construction_, of the\n    latter; and whether, if there be a constructive or constitutive\n    factor in thought, this should be regarded as interfering with the\n    validity of thought as representative of reality. This problem\u2014of\n    the relation of the _ens rationis_ to the _ens reale_ in the\n    process of cognition\u2014has given rise to discussions which, in\n    modern times, have largely contributed to the formation of that\n    special branch of philosophical enquiry which is called\n    Epistemology. But it must not be imagined that this very problem\n    was not discussed, and very widely discussed, by philosophers long\n    before the problem of the validity of knowledge assumed the\n    prominent place it has won for itself in modern philosophy. Even a\n    moderate familiarity with scholastic philosophy will enable the\n    student to recognize this problem, in a variety of phases, in the\n    discussions of the medieval schoolmen concerning the concepts of\n    matter and form, the simplicity and composition of beings, and the\n    nature of the various distinctions\u2014whether logical, virtual,\n    formal, or real\u2014which the mind either invents or detects in the\n    realities it endeavours to understand and explain.\n\n\n4. REAL BEING AND IDEAL BEING.\u2014The latter of these expressions has a\nmultiplicity of kindred meanings. We use it here in the sense of \u201cbeing\n_known_,\u201d _i.e._ to signify the \u201cesse _intentionale_,\u201d the mental\npresence, which, in the scholastic theory of knowledge, an entity of\nwhatsoever kind, whether real or logical, must have in the mind of the\nknower in order that he be aware of that entity. A mere logical entity, as\nwe have seen, has and can have no other mode of being than this which\nconsists in being an object of the mind\u2019s awareness. All real being, too,\nwhen it becomes an object of any kind of human cognition whatsoever\u2014of\nintellectual thought, whether direct or reflex; of sense perception,\nwhether external or internal\u2014must obtain this sort of mental presence or\nmental existence: thereby alone can it become an \u201cobjectum _cognitum_\u201d.\nOnly by such mental mirroring, or reproduction, or reconstruction, can\nreality become so related and connected with mind as to reveal itself to\nmind. Under this peculiar relation which we call cognition, the mind, as\nwe know from psychology and epistemology, is not passive: if reality\nrevealed itself immediately, as it is, to a purely passive mind (were such\nconceivable), the existence of error would be unaccountable; but the mind\nis not passive: under the influence of the reality it forms the\nintellectual concept (the _verbum mentale_), or the sense percept (the\n_species sensibilis expressa_), in and through which, and by means of\nwhich, it attains to its knowledge of the real.\n\nBut prior (ontologically) to this _mental_ existence, and as partial cause\nof the latter, there is the _real_ existence or being, which reality has\nindependently of its being known by any individual human mind. Real being,\nthen, as distinguished here from ideal being, is that which exists or can\nexist extramentally, whether it is known by the human mind or not, _i.e._\nwhether it exists also mentally or not.\n\n\n    That there is such real being, apart from the \u201cthought\u201d-being\n    whereby the mind is constituted formally knowing, is proved\n    elsewhere; as also that this _esse intentionale_ has modes which\n    cannot be attributed to the _esse reale_. We merely note these\n    points here in order to indicate the errors involved in the\n    opposite contentions. Our concepts are characterized by\n    abstractness, by a consequent static immutability, by a plurality\n    often resulting from purely mental distinctions, by a universality\n    which transcends those distinctions and unifies the variety of all\n    subordinate concepts in the widest concept of _being_. Now if, for\n    example, we attribute the unifying mental mode of universality to\n    real being, we must draw the pantheistic conclusion that all real\n    being is one: the logical outcome of extreme realism. If, again,\n    we transfer purely mental distinctions to the unity of the\n    Absolute or Supreme Being, thus making them real, we thereby deny\n    infinite perfection to the most perfect being conceivable: an\n    error of which some catholic philosophers of the later middle ages\n    have been accused with some foundation. If, finally, we identify\n    the _esse reale_ with the _esse intentionale_, and this with the\n    thought-process itself, we find ourselves at the starting-point of\n    Hegelian monism.(68)\n\n\n5. FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS IN REAL BEING.\u2014Leaving logical and ideal being\naside, and fixing our attention exclusively on real being, we may indicate\nhere a few of the most fundamental distinctions which experience enables\nus to recognize in our study of the universal order of things.\n\n(_a_) _Possible or Potential Being and Actual Being._\u2014The first of these\ndistinctions is that between possibility and actuality, between that which\ncan be and that which actually is. For a proper understanding of this\ndistinction, which will be dealt with presently, it is necessary to note\nhere the following divisions of _actual_ being, which will be studied in\ndetail later on.\n\n(_b_) _Infinite Being and Finite Beings._\u2014All people have a sufficiently\nclear notion of Infinite Being, or Infinitely Perfect Being: though not\nall philosophers are agreed as to how precisely we get this notion, or\nwhether there actually exists such a being, or whether if such being does\nexist we can attain to a certain knowledge of such existence. By infinite\nbeing we mean a being possessing all conceivable perfections in the most\nperfect conceivable manner; and by finite beings all such beings as have\nactually any conceivable limitation to their perfection. About these\nnominal definitions there is no dispute; and scholasticism identifies\ntheir respective objects with _God_ and _creatures_.\n\n(_c_) _Necessary Being and Contingent Beings._\u2014Necessary being we conceive\nas that being which exists of necessity: being which if conceived at all\ncannot be conceived as non-existent: being in the very concept of which is\nessentially involved the concept of actual existence: so that the attempt\nto conceive such being as non-existent would be an attempt to conceive\nwhat would be self-contradictory. Contingent being, on the other hand, is\nbeing which is conceived not to exist of necessity: being which may be\nconceived as not actually existent: being in the concept of which is not\ninvolved the concept of actual existence. The same observations apply to\nthis distinction as to the preceding one. It is obvious that any being\nwhich we regard as actual we must regard either as necessary or as\ncontingent; and, secondly, that necessary being must be considered as\nabsolutely independent, as having its actual existence _from itself_, by\nits own nature; while contingent being must be considered as dependent for\nits actual existence on some being _other_ than itself. Hence necessary\nbeing is termed _Ens a se_, contingent being _Ens ab alio_.\n\n(_d_) _Absolute Being and Relative Beings._\u2014In modern philosophy the terms\n\u201cabsolute\u201d and \u201crelative,\u201d as applied to being, correspond roughly with\nthe terms \u201cGod\u201d and \u201ccreatures\u201d in the usage of theistic philosophers. But\nthe former pair of terms is really of wider application than the latter.\nThe term _absolute_ means, etymologically, that which is loosed,\nunfettered, disengaged or free from bonds (_absolutum_, _ab-solvere_,\n_solvo_ = _se-luo_, from \u03bb\u03cd\u03c9): that, therefore, which is not bound up with\nanything else, which is in some sense self-sufficing, independent; while\nthe _relative_ is that which is in some way bound up with something else,\nand which is so far not self-sufficing or independent. That, therefore, is\n_ontologically_ absolute which is in some sense self-sufficing,\nindependent of other things, _in its existence_; while the ontologically\nrelative is that which depends in some real way for its existence on\nsomething else. Again, that is _logically_ absolute which _can be\nconceived and known by us without reference to anything else_; while the\nlogically relative is that which we can conceive and know only through our\nknowledge of something else. And since we usually name things according to\nthe way in which we conceive them, we regard as absolute any being which\nis _by itself_ and _of itself_ that which we conceive it to be, or that\nwhich its name implies; and as relative any being which is what its name\nimplies only _in virtue of some relation_ to something else.(69) Thus, a\nman is a _man_ absolutely, while he is a _friend_ only relatively to\nothers.\n\nIt is obvious that the primary and general meaning of the terms \u201cabsolute\u201d\nand \u201crelative\u201d can be applied and extended in a variety of ways. For\ninstance, _all_ being may be said to be \u201crelative\u201d _to the knowing mind_,\nin the sense that all knowledge involves a transcendental relation of the\nknown object to the knowing subject. In this widest and most improper\nsense even God Himself is relative, not however as being, but as known.\nAgain, when we apply the same attribute to a variety of things we may see\nthat it is found in one of them in the most perfect manner conceivable, or\nat least in a fuller and higher degree than it is found in the others; and\nthat it is found in these others only with some sort of subordination to,\nand dependence on, the former: we then say that it belongs to this\n_primarily_ or _absolutely_, and to the others only _secondarily_ or\n_relatively_. This is a less improper application of the terms than in the\npreceding case. What we have especially to remember here is that there are\nmany different kinds of dependence or subordination, all alike giving rise\nto the same usage.\n\nHence, applying the terms absolute and relative to the predicate \u201cbeing\u201d\nor \u201creal\u201d or \u201creality,\u201d it is obvious in the first place that the\n_potential_ as such can be called \u201cbeing,\u201d or \u201creality\u201d only in relation\nto the _actual_. It is the actual that is being _simpliciter_, _par\nexcellence_; the potential is so only in relation to this.(70) Again,\n_substances_ may be termed beings absolutely, while _accidents_ are beings\nonly relatively, because of their dependence on substances; though this\nrelation is quite different from the relation of potential to actual\nbeing. Finally all finite, contingent realities, actual and possible, are\nwhat they are only because of their dependence on the Infinite and\nNecessary Being: and hence the former are relative and the latter\nabsolute; though here again the relation is different from that of\naccident to substance, or of potential to actual.\n\nSince the order of being includes all orders, and since a being is\n_absolutely_ such-or-such in any order only when that being realizes in\nall its fulness and purity such-or-such reality, it follows that the being\nwhich realizes in all its fulness the reality of _being_ is the Absolute\nBeing in the highest possible sense of this term. This concept of Absolute\nBeing is the richest and most comprehensive of all possible concepts: it\nis the very antithesis of that other concept of \u201cbeing in general\u201d which\nis common to everything and distinguished only from nothingness. It\nincludes in itself all actual and possible modes and grades and\nperfections of finite things, apart from their limitations, embodying all\nof them in the one highest and richest concept of that which makes all of\nthem real and actual, _viz._ the concept of Actuality or Actual Reality\nitself.\n\n\n    Hegel and his followers have involved themselves in a pantheistic\n    philosophy by neglecting to distinguish between those two totally\n    different concepts.(71) A similar error has also resulted from\n    failure to distinguish between the various modes in which being\n    that is relative may be dependent on being that is absolute. God\n    is the Absolute Being; creatures are relative. So too is substance\n    absolute being, compared with accidents as inhering and existing\n    in substance. But God is not therefore to be conceived as the one\n    all-pervading substance, of which all finite things, all\n    phenomena, would be only accidental manifestations.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II. BECOMING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.\n\n\n6. THE STATIC AND THE CHANGING.\u2014The things we see around us, the things\nwhich make up the immediate data of our experience, not only _are_ or\n_exist_; they also _become_, or _come_ into actual existence; they\n_change_; they pass out of actual existence. The abstract notion of being\nrepresents its object to the mind in a static, permanent, changeless,\nself-identical condition; but if this condition were an adequate\nrepresentation of reality change would be unreal, would be only an\nillusion. This is what the Eleatic philosophers of ancient Greece\nbelieved, distinguishing merely between being and nothingness. But they\nwere mistaken; for change in things is too obviously real to be eliminated\nby calling it an illusion: even if it were an illusion, this illusion at\nleast would have to be accounted for. In order, therefore, to understand\nreality we must employ not merely the notion of being (something\n_static_), but also the notion of becoming, change, process, appearing and\ndisappearing (something _kinetic_, and something _dynamic_). In doing so,\nhowever, we must not fall into the error of the opposite extreme from the\nEleatics\u2014by regarding change as the adequate representation of reality.\nThis is what Heraclitus and the later Ionians did: holding that nothing\n_is_, that all _becomes_ (\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c1\u03ad\u03b9), that change is all reality, that the\nstable, the permanent, is non-existent, unreal, an illusion. This too is\nfalse; for change would be unintelligible without at least an abiding\n_law_ of change, a permanent _principle_ of some sort; which, in turn,\ninvolves the reality of some sort of abiding, stable, permanent being.\n\nWe must then\u2014with Aristotle, as against both of those one-sided\nconceptions\u2014hold to the reality both of being and of becoming; and proceed\nto see how the stable and the changing can both be real.\n\nTo convince ourselves that they are both real, very little reflection is\nneeded. We have actual experience of both those elements of reality in our\nconsciousness and memory of our own selves. Every human individual in the\nenjoyment of his mental faculties knows himself as an abiding,\nself-identical being, yet as constantly undergoing real changes; so that\nthroughout his life he is really the same being, though just as certainly\nhe really changes. In external nature, too, we observe on the one hand\ninnumerable processes of growth and decay, of motion and interaction; and\non the other hand a similarly all-pervading element of sameness or\nidentity amid all this never-ending change.\n\n7. THE POTENTIAL AND THE ACTUAL. (_a_) POSSIBILITY, ABSOLUTE, RELATIVE,\nAND ADEQUATE.\u2014It is from our experience of actuality and change that we\nderive not only our notion of temporal duration, but also our notion of\n_potential being_ or _possibility_, as distinct from that of _actual\nbeing_ or _actuality_. It is from our experience of what actually exists\nthat we are able to determine what can, and what cannot exist. We know\nfrom experience what gold is, and what a tower is; and that it is\nintrinsically possible for a golden tower to exist, that such an object of\nthought involves no contradiction, that therefore its existence is not\nimpossible, even though it may never actually exist as a fact. Similarly,\nwe know from experience what a square is, and what a circle is; and that\nit is intrinsically impossible for a square circle to exist, that such an\nobject of thought involves a contradiction, that therefore not only is\nsuch an object never actually existent in fact, but that it is in no sense\nreal, in no way possible.\n\nThus, _intrinsic_ (or _objective_, _absolute_, _logical_, _metaphysical_)\npossibility is the mere non-repugnance of an object of thought to actual\nexistence. Any being or object of thought that is conceivable in this way,\nthat can be conceived as capable of actually existing, is called\nintrinsically (or objectively, absolutely, logically, metaphysically)\npossible being. The absence of such intrinsic capability of actual\nexistence gives us the notion of the intrinsically (objectively,\nabsolutely, logically, metaphysically) impossible. We shall return to\nthese notions again. They are necessary here for the understanding of real\nchange in the actual universe.\n\nFixing our attention now upon the real changes which characterize the data\nof our experience, let us inquire what conditions are necessary in order\nthat an intrinsically possible object of thought become here and now an\nactual being. It matters not whether we select an example from the domain\nof organic nature, of inorganic nature, or of art\u2014whether it be an oak, or\nan iceberg, or a statue. In order that there be here and now an actual\noak-tree, it is necessary not only (1) that such an object be\nintrinsically possible, but (2) that there have been planted here an\nactual acorn, _i.e._ an actual being having in it subjectively and really\nthe passive potentiality of developing into an actual oak-tree, and (3)\nthat there be in the actual things around the acorn active powers or\nforces capable of so influencing the latent, passive potentiality of the\nacorn as gradually to evolve the oak-tree therefrom. So, too, for the (1)\nintrinsically possible iceberg, there are needed (2) water capable of\nbecoming ice, and (3) natural powers or forces capable of forming it into\nice and setting this adrift in the ocean. And for the (1) intrinsically\npossible statue there are needed (2) the block of marble or other material\ncapable of becoming a statue, and (3) the sculptor having the power to\nmould this material into an actual statue.\n\nIn order, therefore, that a thing which is not now actual, but only\nintrinsically or absolutely possible, become actual, there must actually\nexist some being or beings endowed with the _active power or potency_ of\nmaking this possible thing actual. The latter is then said to be\n_relatively, extrinsically_ possible\u2014in relation to such being or beings.\nAnd obviously a thing may be possible relatively to the power of one\nbeing, and not possible relatively to lesser power of another being: the\nstatue that is intrinsically possible in the block of marble, may be\nextrinsically possible relatively to the skilled sculptor, but not\nrelatively to the unskilled person who is not a sculptor.\n\nFurthermore, relatively to the same agent or agents, the production of a\ngiven effect, the doing of a given thing, is said to be _physically_\npossible if it can be brought about by such agents acting according to the\nordinary course of nature; if, in other words they have the physical power\nto do it. Otherwise it is said to be physically impossible, even though\nmetaphysically or intrinsically possible, _e.g._ it is physically\nimpossible for a dead person to come to life again. A thing is said to be\n_morally_ possible, in reference to free and responsible agents, if they\ncan do it without unreasonable inconvenience; otherwise it is considered\nas morally impossible, even though it be both physically and\nmetaphysically possible: as often happens in regard to the fulfilment of\none\u2019s obligations.\n\nThat which is _both intrinsically and extrinsically possible_ is said to\nbe _adequately possible_. Whatever is intrinsically possible is also\nextrinsically possible in relation to God, who is _Almighty_,\n_Omnipotent_.\n\n8. (_b_) SUBJECTIVE \u201cPOTENTIA,\u201d ACTIVE AND PASSIVE.\u2014Furthermore, we\nconceive the Infinite Being, Almighty God, as capable of _creating_, or\nproducing actual being _from nothingness_, _i.e._ without any actually\npre-existing material out of whose passive potentiality the actual being\nwould be developed. Creative power or activity does not need any\npre-existing subject on which to exercise its influence, any subject in\nwhose _passive potentiality_ the thing to be created is antecedently\nimplicit.\n\nBut all other power, all activity of created causes, does require some\nsuch actually existing subject. If we examine the activities of the\nagencies that fall within our direct experience, whether in external\nnature or in our own selves, we shall find that in no case does their\noperative influence or causality extend beyond the production of changes\nin existing being, or attain to the production of new actual being out of\nnothingness. The forces of nature cannot produce an oak without an acorn,\nor an iceberg without water; nor can the sculptor produce a statue except\nfrom some pre-existing material.\n\n\n    The _natural_ passive potentiality of things is, moreover, limited\n    in reference to the active powers of the created universe. These,\n    for example, can educe life from the passive potentiality of\n    inorganic matter, but only by assimilating this matter into a\n    living organism: they cannot restore life to a human corpse; yet\n    the latter has in it the capacity to be restored to life by the\n    direct influence of the Author of Nature. This special and\n    supernatural potentiality in created things, under the influence\n    of Omnipotence, is known as _potentia obedientalis_.(72)\n\n\nThis consideration will help us to realize that all reality which is\nproduced by change, and subject to change, is essentially a mixture of\n_becoming_ and _being_, of _potential_ and _actual_. The reality of such\nbeing is not _tota simul_. Only immutable being, whose duration is\n_eternal_, has its reality _tota simul_: it alone is _purely actual_, the\n\u201c_Actus Purus_\u201d; and its duration is one eternal \u201c_now_,\u201d without\nbeginning, end, or succession. But mutable being, whose duration in actual\nexistence is measured by _time_, is actualized only successively: its\nactuality at any particular instant does not embody the whole of its\nreality: this latter includes also a \u201c_was_\u201d and \u201c_will be_\u201d; the thing\nwas _potentially_ what it now is _actually_, and it will become actually\nsomething which it now is only potentially; nor shall we have understood\neven moderately the nature or essence of any mutable being\u2014an oak-tree,\nfor example\u2014until we have grasped the fact that the whole reality of its\nnature embraces more than what we find of it actually existing at any\ngiven instant of its existence. In other words, we have to bear in mind\nthat the reality of such a being is not pure actuality but a mixture of\npotential and actual: that it is an _actus non-purus_, or an _actus\nmixtus_.\n\nWe have to note well that the _potential being_ of a thing is something\n_real_\u2014that it is not merely a _modus loquendi_, or a _modus\nintelligendi_. The oak is in the acorn in some true and real sense: the\npotentiality of the oak is something real in the acorn: if it were not so,\nif it were nothing real in the acorn, we could say with equal truth that a\nman or a horse or a house is potentially in the acorn; or, again with\nequal truth, that the oak is potentially in a mustard-seed, or a grain of\ncorn, or a pebble, or a drop of water. Therefore the oak is _really_ in\nthe acorn\u2014not actually but potentially, _potentia passiva_.\n\nThe oak-tree is also really in those _active_ forces of nature whose\ninfluence on the acorn develop the latter into an actual oak-tree: it is\nin those causes not actually, of course, but _virtually_, for they possess\nin themselves the _operative power_\u2014_potentia activa sive operativa_\u2014to\neduce the oak-tree out of the acorn. These two potential conditions of a\nbeing\u2014in the active causes which produce it, and in the pre-existing\nactual thing or things from which it is produced\u2014are called each a real or\nsubjective potency, _potentia realis_, or _potentia subjectiva_, in\ndistinction from the mere logical or objective possibility of such a\nbeing.\n\nAnd just as the passive potentiality of the statue is something real in\nthe block of marble, though distinct from the actuality of the statue and\nfrom the process by which this is actualized, so is the active power of\nmaking the statue something real in the sculptor, though distinct from the\noperation by which he makes the statue. If an agent\u2019s _power_ to act, to\nproduce change, were not a reality in the agent, a reality distinct from\nthe _action_ of the latter; or if a being\u2019s capacity to undergo change,\nand thereby to become something other, were not a reality distinct from\nthe process of change, and from the actual result of this process\u2014it would\nfollow not only that the actual alone is real, and the merely possible or\npotential unreal, but also that no change can be real, that nothing can\nreally become, and nothing really disappear.(73)\n\n9. (_c_) ACTUALITY: ITS RELATION TO POTENTIALITY.\u2014It is from our\nexperience of change in the world that we derive our notions of the\npotential and the actual, of active power and passive potentiality. The\nterm \u201cact\u201d has primarily the same meaning as \u201caction,\u201d \u201coperation,\u201d that\nprocess by which a change is wrought. But the Latin word _actus_ (Gr.\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1) means rather that which is achieved by the _actio_,\nthat which is the correlative and complement of the passive potentiality,\nthe actuality of this latter: that by which potential being is rendered\nformally actual, and, by way of consequence, this actual being itself.\n\u201c_Potentia activa_\u201d and its correlative \u201c_actus_\u201d might, perhaps, be\nappropriately rendered by \u201c_power_\u201d (_potestas agendi_) and \u201c_action_\u201d or\n\u201c_operation_\u201d; \u201c_potentia passiva_\u201d and its correlative \u201c_actus_,\u201d by\n\u201c_potentiality_\u201d and \u201c_actuality_\u201d respectively.\n\nIn these correlatives, the notion underlying the term \u201cactual\u201d is\nmanifestly the notion of something completed, achieved, perfected\u2014as\ncompared with that of something incomplete, imperfect, determinable, which\nis the notion of the potential. Hence the notions of _potentia_ and\n_actus_ have been extended widely beyond their primary signification of\npower to act and the exercise of this power. Such pairs of correlatives as\nthe determinable and the determined, the perfectible and the perfected,\nthe undeveloped or less developed and the more developed, the generic and\nthe specific, are all conceived under the aspect of this widest relation\nof the potential to the actual. And since we can distinguish successive\nstages in any process of development, or an order of logical sequence\namong the contents of our concept of any concrete reality, it follows that\nwhat will be conceived as an _actus_ in one relation will be conceived as\na _potentia_ in another. Thus, the disposition of any faculty\u2014as, for\nexample, the scientific habit in the intellect\u2014is an _actus_ or perfection\nof the faculty regarded as a _potentia_; but it is itself a _potentia_\nwhich is actualized in the _operation_ of actually studying. This\nillustrates the distinction commonly drawn between an \u201c_actus primus_\u201d and\nan \u201c_actus secundus_\u201d in any particular order or line of reality: the\n_actus primus_ is that which presupposes no prior actuality in the same\norder; the _actus secundus_ is that which does presuppose another. The act\nof knowing is an _actus secundus_ which presupposes the cognitive faculty\nas an _actus primus_: the faculty being the _first_ or fundamental\nequipment of the soul in relation to knowledge. Hence the child is said to\nhave knowledge \u201c_in actu primo_\u201d as having the faculty of reason; and the\nstudent to have knowledge \u201c_in actu secundo_\u201d as exercising this faculty.\n\nThe _actus_ or perfecting principles of which we have spoken so far are\nall conceived as presupposing an existing subject on which they supervene.\nThey are therefore _accidents_ as distinct from _substantial constitutive_\nprinciples of this subject; and they are therefore called _accidental_\nactualities, _actus_ \u201c_accidentales_\u201d. But the actual existence of a being\nis also conceived as the complement and correlative of its essence: as\nthat which makes the latter actual, thus transferring it from the state of\nmere possibility. Hence existence also is called an _actus_ or actuality:\nthe _actus_ \u201c_existentialis_,\u201d to distinguish it from the existing thing\u2019s\nactivities and other subsequently acquired characters. In reference to\nthese existence is a \u201cfirst actuality\u201d\u2014\u201c_Esse est actus primus_\u201d; \u201c_Prius\nest esse quam agere_\u201d: \u201cExistence is the first actuality\u201d; \u201cAction\npresupposes existence\u201d\u2014while each of these in reference to existence, is a\n\u201csecond actuality,\u201d an _actus secundus_.\n\nWhen, furthermore, we proceed to examine the constitutive principles\nessential to any being in the concrete, we may be able to distinguish\nbetween principles which are determinable, passive and persistent\nthroughout all essential change of that being, and others which are\ndetermining, specifying, differentiating principles. In water, for\nexample, we may distinguish the passive underlying principle which\npersists throughout the decomposition of water into oxygen and hydrogen,\nfrom the active specifying principle which gives that substratum its\nspecific nature as water. The former or material principle (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7,\n_materia_) is _potential_, compared with the latter or formal principle\n(\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03ae, \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, _forma_, _species_, _actus_) as _actual_. The\nconcept of _actus_ is thus applied to the essence itself: the _actus_\n\u201c_essentialis_\u201d or \u201c_formalis_\u201d of a thing is that which we conceive to be\nthe ultimate, completing and determining principle of the essence or\nnature of that thing. In reference to this as well as the other\nconstitutive principles of the thing, the actual existence of the thing is\na \u201csecond actuality,\u201d an _actus secundus_.\n\nIn fact all the constitutive principles of the essence of any existing\nthing, and all the properties and attributes involved in the essence or\nnecessarily connected with the essence, must all alike be conceived as\nlogically antecedent to the existential _actus_ whereby they are\nconstituted something in the actual order, and not mere possible objects\nof our thought. And from this point of view the existence of a thing is\ncalled the ultimate actualization of its essence. Hence the scholastic\naphorism: \u201c_Esse est ultimus actus rei_\u201d.\n\nThe term _actus_ may designate that complement of reality by which\npotential being is made actual (_actus_ \u201c_actuans_\u201d), or this actual being\nitself (_actus_ \u201c_simpliciter dictus_\u201d). In the latter sense we have\nalready distinguished the Being that is immutable, the Being of God, as\nthe _Actus Purus_, from the being of all mutable things, which latter\nbeing is necessarily a mixture of potential and actual, an _actus mixtus_.\n\nNow if the essences of corporeal things are composite, if they are\nconstituted by the union of some determining, formative principle with a\ndeterminable, passive principle\u2014of \u201cform\u201d with \u201cmatter,\u201d in scholastic\nterminology\u2014we may call these formative principles _actus_\n\u201c_informantes_\u201d; and if these cannot actually exist except in union with a\nmaterial principle they may be called actus \u201c_non-subsistentes_\u201d: _e.g._,\nthe formative principle or \u201c_forma substantialis_\u201d of water, or the vital\nprinciple of a plant. If, on the other hand, there exist essences which,\nbeing simple, do not actualize any material, determinable principle, but\nsubsist independently of any such, they are called _actus_\n\u201c_non-informantes_,\u201d or _actus_ \u201c_subsistentes_\u201d. Such, for example, are\nGod, and pure spirits whose existence is known from revelation. Finally,\nthere may be a kind of actual essence which, though it naturally\nactualizes a material principle _de facto_, can nevertheless continue to\nsubsist without this latter: such an actual being would be at once an\n_actus informans_ and an _actus subsistens_; and such, in fact, is the\nhuman soul.\n\nThroughout all distinctions between the potential and the actual there\nruns the conception of _the actual as something more perfect than the\npotential_. There is in the actual something positive and real over and\nabove what is in the potential. This is an ultimate fact in our analysis;\nand its importance will be realized when we come to apply the notions we\nhave been explaining to the study of change.\n\nThe notion of grades of perfection in things is one with which everyone is\nfamiliar. We naturally conceive some beings as higher upon the scale of\nreality than others; as having \u201cmore\u201d reality, so to speak\u2014not\nnecessarily, of course, in the literal sense of size or quantity\u2014than\nothers; as being more perfect, nobler, of greater worth, value, dignity,\nexcellence, than others. Thus we regard the infinite as more perfect than\nthe finite, spiritual beings as nobler than material beings, man as a\nhigher order of being than the brute beast, this again as surpassing the\nwhole vegetable kingdom, the lowest form of life as higher on the scale of\nbeing than inorganic matter, the substance-mode of being as superior to\nall accident-modes, the actualized state of a being as more perfect than\nits potential state, _i.e._ as existing in its material, efficient and\nideal or exemplar causes. The grounds and significance of this mental\nappreciation of relative values in things must be discussed elsewhere. We\nrefer to it here in order to point out another scholastic aphorism,\naccording to which the higher a thing is in the scale of actual being, and\nthe more perfect it is accordingly, the more efficient it will also be as\na principle of action, the more powerful as a cause in the production of\nchanges in other things, the more operative in actualizing their passive\npotentialities; and conversely, the less actual a thing is, and therefore\nthe more imperfect, the greater its passive capacity will be to undergo\nthe influence of agencies that are actual and operative around it. \u201cAs\npassive potentiality,\u201d says St. Thomas,(74) \u201cis the mark of potential\nbeing, so active power is the mark of actual being. For a thing acts, in\nso far as it is actual; but is acted on, so far as it is potential.\u201d Our\nknowledge of the nature of things is in fact exclusively based on our\nknowledge of their activities: we have no other key to the knowledge of\nwhat a thing is than our knowledge of what it does: \u201c_Operari sequitur\nesse_\u201d: \u201c_Qualis est operatio talis est natura_\u201d\u2014\u201cActing follows being\u201d:\n\u201cConduct is the key to nature\u201d.\n\nA being that is active or operative in the production of a change is said\nto be the efficient cause of the change, the latter being termed the\neffect. Now the greater the change, _i.e._ the higher and more perfect be\nthe grade of reality that is actualized in the change, the higher too in\nthe scale of being must be the efficient cause of that change. There must\nbe a proportion in degree of perfection or reality between effect and\ncause. The former cannot exceed in actual perfection the active power, and\ntherefore the actual being, of the latter. This is so because we conceive\nthe effect as being produced or actualized _through the operative\ninfluence_ of the cause, and _with real dependence_ on this latter; and it\nis inconceivable that a cause should have power to actualize other being,\ndistinct from itself, which would be of a higher grade of excellence than\nitself. The nature of efficient causality, of the influence by which the\ncause is related to its effect, is not easy to determine; it will be\ndiscussed at a subsequent stage of our investigations (ch. xi.); but\nwhatever it be, a little reflection should convince us of the truth of the\nprinciple just stated: that an effect cannot be more perfect than its\ncause. The medi\u00e6val scholastics embodied this truth in the formula: _Nemo\ndat quod non habet_\u2014a formula which we must not interpret in the more\nrestricted and literal sense of the words _giving_ and _having_, lest we\nbe met with the obvious objection that it is by no means necessary for a\nboy to have a black eye himself in order to give one to his neighbour!\nWhat the formula means is that an agent cannot give to, or produce in, any\npotential subject, receptive of its causal influence, an actuality which\nit does not itself possess virtually, or in its active power: that no\nactuality surpassing in excellence the actual perfection of the cause\nitself can be found thus virtually in the active power of the latter.\nThere is no question of the cause or agent transferring bodily as it were\na part of its own actuality to the subject which is undergoing change(75);\nnor will such crude imagination images help us to understand what real\nchange, under the influence of efficient causality, involves.(76) An\nanalysis of change will enable us to appreciate more fully the real\ndifficulty of explaining it, and the futility of any attempt to account\nfor it without admitting the real, objective validity of the notions of\nactual and potential being, of active powers or forces and passive\npotentialities in the things that are subject to change.\n\n10. ANALYSIS OF CHANGE.\u2014_Change_ (_Mutatio_, _Motus_, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae, \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)\nis one of those simplest concepts which cannot be defined. We may describe\nit, however, as _the transition of a being from one state to another_. If\none thing entirely disappeared and another were substituted for it, we\nshould not regard the former as having been changed into the latter. When\none thing is put in the place of another, each, no doubt, undergoes a\nchange of place, but neither is changed into the other. So, also, if we\nwere to conceive a thing as absolutely ceasing to exist, as lapsing into\nnothingness at a given instant, and another as coming into existence out\nof nothingness at the same instant (and in the same place), we should not\nconsider this double event as constituting a real change of the former\nthing into the latter. And although our _senses_ cannot testify to\nanything beyond _sequence_ in sense phenomena, our _reason_ detects in\nreal change something other than a total substitution of things for one\nanother, or continuous total cessations and inceptions of existence in\nthings. No doubt, if we conceive the whole phenomenal or perceptible\nuniverse and all the beings which constitute this universe as essentially\ncontingent, and therefore dependent for their reality and their actual\nexistence on a Supreme, Necessary Being who created and conserves them,\nwho at any time may cease to conserve any of them, and produce other and\nnew beings _out of nothingness_, then such absolute cessations and\ninceptions of existence in the world would not be impossible. God might\n_annihilate_, _i.e._ cease to conserve in existence, this or that\ncontingent being at any instant, and at any instant _create_ a new\ncontingent being, _i.e._ produce it in its totality from no pre-existing\nmaterial. But there is no reason to suppose that this is what is\nconstantly taking place in Nature: that all change is simply a series of\nannihilations and creations. On the contrary, the modes of being which\nappear and disappear in real change, in the transition of anything from\none state to a really different state of being, do not appear _de novo_,\n_ex nihilo_, as absolute beginnings out of nothingness; or disappear\n_totaliter_, _in nihilum_, as absolute endings or lapses of reality into\nnothingness. The real changes which take place in Nature are due to the\noperation of natural causes. These causes, being finite in their operative\npowers, cannot create, _i.e._ produce new being from nothingness. They\ncan, however, with the concurrence of the Omnipotent Being, modify\nexisting modes of being, _i.e._ make actual what was only potential in\nthese latter. The notion of change is not verified in the conception of\nsuccessive annihilations and creations; for there is involved in the\nformer concept not merely the notion of a real difference between the two\n_actual_ states, that before and that after the change, but also the\nnotion of some _potential_ reality persisting throughout the change,\nsomething capable of being actually so and so before the change and\nactually otherwise after the change. For real change, therefore, we\nrequire (1) two positive and really different states of the same being, a\n\u201c_terminus a quo_\u201d and a \u201c_terminus ad quem_\u201d; and (2) a real process of\ntransition whereby something potential becomes actual. In creation there\nis no real and positive _terminus a quo_; in annihilation there is no real\nand positive _terminus ad quem_; these therefore are not changes in the\nproper sense of the term. Sometimes, too, change is affirmed, by purely\nextrinsic denomination, of a thing in which there is no real change, but\nonly a relation to some other really changing thing. In this sense when an\nobject unknown or unthought of becomes the actual object of somebody\u2019s\nthought or cognition, it is said to \u201cchange,\u201d though the transition from\n\u201cunknown\u201d to \u201cknown\u201d involves no real change of state in the object, but\nonly in the knowing subject. If thought were in any true sense\n\u201cconstitutive\u201d of reality, as many modern philosophers contend, the change\nin the object would of course be real.\n\nSince, therefore, change consists in this, that a thing which is actually\nin a given state ceases to be actually such and begins to be actually in\nanother state, it is obvious that there persists throughout the process\nsome reality which is in itself potential and indifferent to either actual\nstate; and that, moreover, something which was actual disappears, while\nsome new actuality appears, in this persisting potentiality. The abiding\npotential principle is called the _matter_ or _subject_ of the change; the\ntransient actualizing principles are called _forms_. Not all these \u201cforms\u201d\nwhich precede or result from change are necessarily positive entities in\nthemselves: they may be mere _privations_ of other forms (\u201c_privatio_,\u201d\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): not all changes result in the acquisition of a new degree of\npositive actual being; some result in loss of perfection or actuality.\nStill, even in these cases, the state characterized by the less perfect\ndegree of actuality has a determinate actual grade of being which is\nproper to itself, and which, as such, is not found actually, but only\npotentially, in the state characterized by the more perfect degree of\nactuality. When, then, a being changes from a more perfect to a less\nperfect state, the actuality of this less perfect state cannot be\nadequately accounted for by seeking it in the antecedent and more perfect\nstate: it is not in this latter state _actually_, but only _potentially_;\nnor do we account for it by saying that it is \u201cequivalently\u201d in the\ngreater actuality of the latter state: the two actualizing principles are\nreally distinct, and neither is wholly or even partially the other. The\nsignificance of this consideration will appear presently in connection\nwith the scholastic axiom: _Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur_.\n\nMeanwhile we must guard against conceiving the potential or material\nfactor in change as a sort of actual but hidden core of reality which\nitself persists unchanged throughout; and the formative or actualizing\nfactors as superficially adorning this substratum by constantly replacing\none another. Such a substitution of imagination images for intellectual\nthought will not help, but rather hinder, all accurate analysis. It is not\nthe potential or material factor in things that changes, nor yet the\nactualizing or formal factors, but the things themselves; and if \u201cthings\u201d\nare subject to \u201creal change\u201d it is manifest that this fact can be made\nintelligible, if at all, only by intellectually analysing the things and\ntheir changes into constitutive principles or factors which are nor\nthemselves \u201cthings\u201d or \u201cchanges\u201d. Were we to arrive only at principles of\nthe latter sort, so far from explaining anything we would really only have\npushed back the problem a step farther. It may be that none of the\nattempts yet made by philosophers or scientists to offer an ultimate\nexplanation of change is entirely satisfactory,\u2014the scholastic explanation\nwill be gradually outlined in these pages,\u2014but it will be of advantage at\nleast to recognize the shortcomings of theories that are certainly\ninadequate.\n\nWe are now in a position to state and explain the important scholastic\naphorism embodying what has been called the Principle of Change\n(\u201c_Principium Motus_\u201d): _Quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur_: \u201cWhatever\nundergoes change is changed by something else\u201d. The term _motus_ is here\ntaken in the wide sense of any real transition from potentiality to\nactuality, as is evident from the alternative statements of the same\nprinciple: _Nihil potest seipsum reducere e potentia in actum_: \u201cNothing\ncan reduce itself from potentiality to actuality,\u201d or, again, _Potentia,\nqua talis, nequit per semetipsam ad actum reduci, sed reducitur ab alio\nprincipio in actu_: \u201cThe potential as such cannot be reduced by itself to\nthe actual, but only by some other already actual principle\u201d.(77) This\nassertion, rightly understood, is self-evidently true; for the state of\npassive potentiality, as such, involves the absence of the correlative\nactuality in the potential subject; and since the actual, as such,\ninvolves a perfection which is not in the potential, the latter cannot\nconfer upon itself this perfection: nothing can be the adequate principle\nor source of a perfection which is not in this principle or source: _nemo\ndat quod non habet_.\n\nWe have already anticipated the objection arising from the consideration\nthat the state resulting from a change is sometimes in its totality less\nperfect than the state which existed prior to the change. Even in such\ncases there results from the change a new actuality which was not in the\nprior state, and which cannot be conceived as a mere part or residue of\nthe latter, or regarded as equivalently contained in the latter. Even\ngranting, as we must, that the net result of such a change is a loss of\nactuality or perfection in the subject of change, still there is always a\ngain which is not accounted for by the loss; there is always a new actual\nstate which, as such, was not in the original state.\n\nA more obvious objection to the principle arises from the consideration of\nvital action; but it is based on a misunderstanding of the principle under\ndiscussion. Living things, it is objected, move themselves: their _vital_\naction is spontaneous and immanent: originating within themselves, it has\nits term too within themselves, resulting in their gradual development,\ngrowth, increase of actuality and perfection. Therefore it would appear\nthat they move and perfect themselves; and hence the so-called \u201cprinciple\nof change\u201d is not true universally.\n\nIn reply to all this we admit that vital action is immanent, remaining\nwithin the agent to perfect the latter; also that it is spontaneous,\ninasmuch as when the agent is actually exercising vital functions it need\nnot be actually undergoing the causal influence of any other created\nagent, or actually dependent on any such agent. But it must, nevertheless,\nin such action, be dependent on, and influenced by, _some actual being\nother than itself_. And the reason is obvious: If by such action it\nincreases its own actual perfection, and becomes actually other than it\nwas before such action, then it cannot have given itself the actuality of\nthis perfection, which it possessed before only potentially. No doubt, it\nis not merely passively potential in regard to such actual perfections, as\nis the case in non-vital change which results in the subject from the\ntransitive action of some outside cause upon the latter. The living thing\nhas the active power of causing or producing in itself these actual\nperfections: there is interaction between its vital parts: through one\norgan or faculty it acts upon another, thus educing an actuality, a new\nperfection, in this other, and thus developing and perfecting its own\nbeing. But even considered as active it cannot be the adequate cause of\nthe actuality acquired through the change. If this actuality is something\n_really_ over and above the reality of its active and passive potential\nprinciples, then it remains true that change implies the influence of an\nactual being other than the subject changed: _Quid quid movetur, ab alio\nmovetur_.\n\n\n    The question here arises, not only in reference to vital agents,\n    but to _all finite, created causes_: Does the active cause of\n    change (together with the passive potentiality of the subject of\n    change, whether this subject be the agent itself as in immanent\n    activity, or something other than the agent as in transitive\n    activity),\u2014does this active power account _adequately_ for the new\n    actuality educed in the change? It obviously does not; for the\n    actuality acquired in the change is, as such, a new entity, a new\n    perfection, in some degree positively surpassing the total reality\n    of the combined active powers and passive potentialities which it\n    replaces. In other words, if the actuality resulting from the\n    change is not to be found in the immediate active and passive\n    antecedents of the change, then we are inevitably referred, for an\n    adequate explanation of this actuality, to some actual being above\n    and beyond these antecedents. And to what sort of actual being are\n    we referred? To a being in which the actuality of the effect\n    resides only in the same way as it resides in the immediate active\n    and passive antecedents of the change, that is _potentially_? No;\n    for this would be useless, merely pushing the difficulty one step\n    farther back. We are obliged rather to infer the existence of an\n    Actual Being in whom the actuality of the said effect resides\n    _actually_: not formally, of course, as it exists in itself when\n    it is produced through the change; but eminently, _eminenter_, in\n    such a way that its actualization outside Himself and under His\n    influence does not involve in Him any loss of perfection, any\n    increase of perfection, or any manner of change whatsoever. We are\n    compelled in this way to infer, from the existence of change in\n    the universe of our direct experience, the existence of a\n    transcendent Immovable Prime Mover, a _Primum Movens Immobile_.\n    All the active causes or principles of change which fall under our\n    notice in the universe of direct experience are themselves subject\n    to change. None of them causes change in any other thing without\n    itself undergoing change. The active power of finite causes is\n    itself finite. By educing the potentiality of other things into\n    actuality they gradually use up their own energy; they diminish\n    and lose their active power of producing effects: this belongs to\n    the very nature of finite causes as such. Moreover, they are\n    themselves passive as well as active; interaction is universal\n    among the finite causes which constitute the universe of our\n    direct experience: they all alike have passive potentiality and\n    undergo change. Now, if any one finite cause in this system cannot\n    adequately account for the new actuality evolved from the\n    potential in any single process of change, neither can the whole\n    system adequately account for it. What is true of them\n    distributively is true of them taken all together when there is\n    question of what belongs to their nature; and the fact that their\n    active powers and passive potentialities _fall short_ of the\n    actuality of the effects we attribute to them is a fact that\n    appertains to their very nature as finite things. The phenomenon\n    of continuous change in the universe involves the continuous\n    appearance of _new actual being_. To account for this constant\n    stream of actuality we are of necessity carried beyond the system\n    of finite, changing being itself; we are forced to infer the\n    existence of a source and principle which must itself be purely\n    actual and exempt from all change\u2014a Being who can cause all the\n    actuality that results from change without losing or gaining or\n    changing in any way Himself, because He possesses all finite\n    actuality in Himself in a supereminent manner which transcends all\n    the efforts of finite human intelligence to comprehend or\n    characterize in any adequate or positive manner. The scholastics\n    expressed this in the simple aphorism: _Omne novum ens est a Deo_.\n    And it is the realization of this profound truth that underlies\n    their teaching on the necessity of the Divine _Concursus_, _i.e._\n    the influence of the Infinite First Cause or Prime Mover\n    permeating the efficiency of all finite or created causes. Here,\n    for example, is a brief recent statement of that doctrine:\u2014\n\n    \u201cIf we must admit a causal influence of these things [of direct\n    experience] on one another, then a closer examination will\n    convince us that a finite thing can never be the adequate cause of\n    any effect, but is always, metaphysically regarded, only a\n    part-cause, ever needing to be completed by another cause. Every\n    effect is\u2014at least under one aspect, at least as an\n    effect\u2014something new, something that was not there before. Even\n    were the effect contained, whether formally or virtually, in the\n    cause, it is certainly not identical with this latter, for if it\n    were there would be no causality, nothing would \u2018happen\u2019. In all\n    causing and happening, something which was heretofore only\n    possible, becomes real and actual. But things cannot determine\n    themselves to influence others, or to receive the influence of\n    others, since they are not dependent in their being on one\n    another. Hence the necessary inference that all being, all\n    happening, all change, requires the concurrence of an Absolute\n    Principle of being. When two things act on each other the Absolute\n    Being must work in and with them, the same Absolute Being in\n    both\u2014to relate them to each other, and supplement their natural\n    insufficiency.\u201d\n\n    \u201cSuch is the profound teaching about the Divine Concursus with\n    every creature.... God works in all and with all. He permeates all\n    reality, everywhere; there is no being beyond Him or independent\n    of His conserving and concurring power. Just as creatures are\n    brought into being only through God\u2019s omnipotence, and of\n    themselves have no independent reality, so do they need the\n    self-same ever-present, all-sustaining power to continue in this\n    being and develop it by their activity. Every event in Nature is a\n    transitory, passing phenomenon, so bound up with conditions and\n    circumstances that it must disappear to give place to some other.\n    How could a mode of being so incomplete discharge its function in\n    existence without the concurrence of the First Cause?\u201d(78)\n\n\nWe have seen now that _in the real order_ the potential presupposes the\nactual; for the potential cannot actualize itself, but can be actualized\nonly by the action of some already actual being. Nor can we avoid this\nconsequence by supposing the potential being to have had no actual\nbeginning in time, but to be eternally in process of actualization; for\neven so, it must be eternally actualized _by some other actual being_\u2014a\nposition which Aristotle and some scholastics admit to be possible.\nWhether, then, we conceive the actualization as beginning in time or as\nproceeding from all eternity, it is self-contradictory to suppose the\npotential as capable of actualizing itself.\n\nIt is likewise true that the actual precedes the possible _in the order of\nour knowledge_. The concept of a thing as possible presupposes the concept\nof that thing as actual; for the possible is understood to be possible\nonly by its intelligible relation to actual existence. This is evidently\ntrue of extrinsic possibility; but our knowledge even of the intrinsic\npossibility of a thing cannot be the first knowledge we possess in the\norder of time. Our first knowledge is of the actual; for the mind\u2019s first\ncognitive act must have for object either itself or something not itself.\nBut it knows itself as a consciously acting and therefore actual being.\nAnd it comes to know things other than itself only by the fact that such\nother things act upon it either immediately or mediately through\nsense-consciousness; so that in every hypothesis its first known object is\nsomething actual.(79)\n\n\n    The priority of the actual as compared with the potential in the\n    real order, suggests a proof of the existence of God in the manner\n    indicated above. It also affords a refutation of Hegelian monism.\n    The conception of the world, including all the phenomena of mind\n    and matter, as the gradual self-manifestation or evolution of a\n    potential being eternally actualizing itself, is a\n    self-contradictory conception. Scholastics rightly maintain that\n    the realities from which we derive our first most abstract and\n    transcendental notion of being in general, are actual realities.\n    Hegelians seize on the object of this notion, identify it with\n    pure thought, proclaim it the sole reality, and endow it with the\n    power of becoming actually everything. It is manifest, therefore,\n    that they endow purely potential being with the power of\n    actualizing itself.\n\n    Nor can they fairly avoid this charge by pointing out that\n    although their starting-point is not actual being (with which the\n    scholastic philosophy of being commences), yet neither is it\n    possible or potential being, but being which has neither of these\n    determinations, being which abstracts from both, like the real\n    being of the scholastics (7, 13). For though real being can be _an\n    object of abstract human thought_ without either of the predicates\n    \u201cexistent\u201d or \u201cnon-existent,\u201d yet it cannot be anything _in the\n    real order_ without either of them. There it must be either\n    actually existent or else merely potential. But Hegelians claim\n    absolutely indeterminate being to be _as such_ something in the\n    real order; and though they try to distinguish it from potential\n    being they nevertheless think of it as potential being, for they\n    distinctly and repeatedly declare that it can become all things,\n    and does become all things, and is constantly, eternally\n    transforming itself by an internal dialectic process into the\n    phenomena which constitute the worlds of mind and matter.\n    Contrasting it with the abstract \u201cinert\u201d being which they conceive\n    to be the object of the traditional metaphysics, they endow\n    \u201cindeterminate being\u201d with the active power of producing, and the\n    passive potentiality of becoming, actually everything. Thus, in\n    order to show _a priori_ how this indeterminate being must evolve\n    itself by internal logical necessity into the world of our direct\n    and immediate experience, they suppose it to be subject to change\n    and to be at the same time self-actualizing, in direct opposition\n    to the axiom that potential reality, reality which is subject to\n    change, cannot actualize itself: _Quidquid movetur ab alio\n    moveatur oportet_.\n\n\n11. KINDS OF CHANGE.\u2014Following Aristotle,(80) we may recognize a broad and\nclear distinction between four great classes of change (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae,\n_mutatio_) in the phenomena of our sense experience: local change (\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac, _latio_); quantitative change (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03cd\u03b6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f24\n\u03c6\u03b8\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _augmentatio vel diminutio_); qualitative change (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _alteratio_); and substantial change (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f24\n\u03c6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac). The three former are accidental, _i.e._ do not reach or affect the\nessence or substance of the thing that is changed; the fourth is\nsubstantial, a change of essence. Substantial change is regarded as taking\nplace instantaneously, as soon as the condition brought about by the\naccidental changes leading up to it becomes naturally incompatible with\nthe essence or nature of the subject. The accidental changes, on the other\nhand, are regarded as taking place gradually, as realizing and involving a\nsuccession of states or conditions in the subject. These changes,\nespecially when they take place in corporeal things, are properly\ndescribed as movement or motion (_motus_, _motio_). By movement or motion\nin the strict sense we therefore mean any change which takes place\ngradually or successively in a corporeal thing. It is only in a wider and\nimproper sense that these terms are sometimes applied to activity of\nwhatsoever kind, even of spiritual beings. In this sense we speak of\nthoughts, volitions, etc., as movements of the soul, _motus animae_; or of\nGod as the Prime Mover ever in motion, the _Primum Movens semper in motu_.\n\nWith local change in material things, as also with quantitative change,\ngrowth and diminution of quantity (mass and volume), everyone is perfectly\nfamiliar. From the earliest times, moreover, we find both in science and\nphilosophy the conception of matter as composed of, and divisible into,\nultimate particles, themselves supposed to admit of no further real\ndivision, and hence called _atoms_ (\u1f04-\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u03ad\u03bc\u03bd\u03c9). From the days of\nGrecian atomism men have attempted to show that all change in the Universe\nis ultimately reducible to changes of place, order, spatial arrangement\nand collocation, of those hypothetical atomic factors. It has likewise\nbeen commonly assumed that change in mass is solely due to change in the\nnumber of those atoms, and change in volume (of the same mass) to the\nrelative density or closeness with which the atoms aggregate together;\nthough some have held\u2014and it is certainly not inconceivable\u2014that exactly\nthe same material entity, an atom let us say, may be capable of _real_\ncontraction and expansion, and so of _real_ change of volume: as distinct\nfrom the _apparent_ contraction and expansion of bodies, a change which is\nsupposed to be due to change of density, _i.e._ to decrease or increase in\nthe dimensions of the pores or interstices between the smaller constituent\nparts or molecules. However this may be, the attempts to reduce all change\nin physical nature to mere _mechanical_ change _i.e._ to spatial motions\nof the masses (_molar_ motions), the molecules (_molecular_ motions), and\nthe atoms or other ultimate components of matter (whether vibratory,\nundulatory, rotatory or translational motions), have never been\nsatisfactory.\n\nQualitative change is wider than material change, for it includes changes\nin spiritual beings, _i.e._ in beings which are outside the category of\nquantity and have a mode of existence altogether different from the\nextensional, spatial existence which characterizes matter. When, for\ninstance, the human mind acquires knowledge, it undergoes qualitative\nchange. But matter, too, has qualities, and is subject to qualitative\nchange. It is endowed with _active_ qualities, _i.e._ with powers, forces,\nenergies, whereby it can not merely perform mechanical work by producing\nlocal changes in the distribution of its mass throughout space, but also\nproduce physical and chemical changes which seem at least to be different\nin their nature from mere mechanical changes. It is likewise endowed with\n_passive_ qualities which appear to the senses to be of various kinds,\ndiffering from one another and from the mechanical or quantitative\ncharacteristics of size, shape, motion, rest, etc. While these latter are\ncalled \u201cprimary qualities\u201d of bodies\u2014because conceived to be more\nfundamental and more closely inherent in the real and objective nature of\nmatter\u2014or \u201ccommon sensibles\u201d (_sensibilia communia_), because perceptible\nby more than one of our external senses\u2014the former are called \u201csecondary\nqualities,\u201d because conceived to be less characteristic of the real and\nobjective nature of matter, and more largely subjective products of our\nown sentient cognitive activity\u2014or \u201cproper sensibles\u201d (_sensibilia\npropria_), because each of them is apprehended by only one of our external\nsenses: colour, sound, taste, odour, temperature, material state or\ntexture (_e.g._ roughness, liquidity, softness, etc.). Now about all these\nperceived qualities and their changes the question has been raised: Are\nthey, as such, _i.e._ as perceived by us, really in the material things or\nbodies which make up the physical universe, and really different in these\nbodies from the quantitative factors and motions of the latter? Or, as\nsuch, are they not rather partially or wholly subjective\nphenomena\u2014products, at least in part, of our own sense perception, states\nof our own consciousness, having nothing really corresponding to them in\nthe external matter of the universe beyond the quantitative, mechanical\nfactors and motions whereby matter acts upon our faculties of sense\ncognition and produces these states of consciousness in us? This is a\nquestion of the first importance, the solution of which belongs to\nEpistemology. Aristotle would not allow that the objective material\nuniverse can be denuded, in the way just suggested, of qualities and\nqualitative change; and scholastic philosophers have always held the same\ngeneral view. What we have to note here, however, in regard to the\nquestion is simply this, that even if the world of matter were thus\nsimplified by transferring all qualitative change to the subjective domain\nof consciousness, the reality of qualitative change and all the problems\narising from it would still persist. To transfer qualitative change from\nobject to subject, from matter to mind, is certainly something very\ndifferent from explaining it as reducible to quantitative or mechanical\nchange. The simplification thus effected would be more apparent than real:\nit would be simplifying the world of matter by transferring its complexity\nto the world of mind. This consideration is one which is sometimes lost\nsight of by scientists who advance mechanical hypotheses as ultimate\nexplanations of the nature and activities of the physical universe.\n\nIf all material things and processes could be ultimately analysed into\nconfigurations and local motions of space-occupying atoms, homogeneous in\nnature and differing only in size and shape, then each of these ultimate\natomic factors would be itself exempt from intrinsic change as to its own\nessence and individuality. In this hypothesis there would be really no\nsuch thing as _substantial_ change. The collection of atoms would form an\nimmutable core of material reality, wholly simple and ever actual. Such an\nhypothesis, however, is utterly inadequate as an explanation of the facts\nof life and consciousness. And even as an account of the processes of the\ninorganic universe it encounters insuperable difficulties. The common\nbelief of men has always been that even in this domain of reality there\nare fundamentally different _kinds_ of matter, kinds which differ from one\nanother not merely in the shape and size and configuration and arrangement\nof their ultimate _actual_ constituents, but even in the very substance or\nnature of these constituents; and that there are some material changes\nwhich affect the actual substance itself of the matter which undergoes\nthem. This belief scholastics, again following Aristotle, hold to be a\ncorrect belief, and one which is well grounded in reason. And this belief\nin turn involves the view that every type of actual material\nentity\u2014whether merely inorganic, or endowed with life, or even allied with\na higher, spiritual mode of being as in the case of man himself\u2014is\n_essentially composite_, essentially a synthesis of _potential_ and\n_actual_ principles of being, and therefore capable of _substantial_\nchange. The actually existing material being scholastics describe as\n_materia secunda_, the \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7 of Aristotle; the purely potential\nfactor, which is actualized in this or that particular kind of matter,\nthey describe as _materia prima_, the \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 of Aristotle; the\nactualizing, specifying, formative principle, they designate as _forma\nsubstantialis_ (\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2). And since the purely potential principle cannot\nactually exist except as actualized by some formative principle, all\nsubstantial change or transition from one substantial type to another is\nnecessarily both a _corruptio_ and a _generatio_. That is, it involves the\nactual disappearance of one substantial form and the actual appearance of\nanother. Hence the scholastic aphorism regarding substantial change:\n_Corruptio unius est generatio alterius_: the corruption or destruction of\none kind of material thing involves the generation of another kind.\n\nThe concepts of _materia prima_ and _forma substantialis_ are concepts not\nof phenomenal entities directly accessible to the senses or the\nimagination, but of principles which can be reached only mediately and by\nintellect proper. They cannot be pictured in the imagination, which can\nonly attain to the sensible. We may help ourselves to grasp them\nintellectually by the analogy of the shapeless block of marble and the\nfigure educed therefrom by the sculptor, but this is only an analogy: just\nas the statue results from the union of an _accidental_ form with an\nexisting matter, so this matter itself, the substance _marble_, is\ncomposed of a _substantial_ form and a primordial, _potential_ matter. But\nthere the analogy ceases.\n\nFurthermore, when we consider that the proper and primary objects of the\nhuman intellect itself are corporeal things or bodies, and that these\nbodies actually exist in nature only as composite substances, subject to\nessential or substantial change, we shall realize why it is that the\nconcept of _materia prima_ especially, being a mediate and negative\nconcept, is so difficult to grasp; for, as the scholastics describe it,\ntranslating Aristotle\u2019s formula, it is in itself _neque quid, neque\nquantum, neque quale, neque aliquid eorum quibus ens determinatur_.(81)\nBut it is through intellectual concepts alone, and not through imagination\nimages, that we may hope to analyse the nature and processes even of the\nworld of corporeal reality; and, as St. Thomas well observes, it was\nbecause the ancient Greek atomists did not rise above the level of\nthinking in imagination images that they failed to recognize the\nexistence, or explain the nature, of substantial change in the material\nuniverse(82): an observation which applies with equal force to those\nscientists and philosophers of our own time who would fain reduce all\nphysical processes to mere mechanical change.\n\nThose, then, are the principal kinds of change, as analysed by Aristotle\nand the scholastics. We may note, finally, that the distinction between\n_immanent_ and _transitive_ activity is also applied to change\u2014that is, to\nchange considered as a process, not to the result of the change, to change\n_in fieri_, not _in facto esse_. Immanent movement or activity (_motio_,\n_actio immanens_) is that of which the term, the educed actuality, remains\nwithin the agent\u2014which latter is therefore at once both _agens_ and\n_patiens_. Vital action is of this kind. Transitive movement or activity,\non the other hand (_motio_, _actio transiens_), is that of which the term\nis some actuality educed in a being other than the agent. The _patiens_ is\nhere really distinct from the _agens_; and it is in the former, not in the\nlatter, that the change takes place: _actio fit in passo_. All change in\nthe inorganic universe is of this sort (101).\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III. EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE.\n\n\n12. EXISTENCE.\u2014In the preceding chapters we examined reality in itself and\nin its relation to change or becoming. We have now to examine it in\nrelation to its actual existence and to its intrinsic possibility (7,\n_a_).\n\n_Existing_ or _being_ (in the participial sense: esse, _existere_, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) is a simple, indefinable notion. A being is said to exist when it\nis not merely possible but actual, when it is not merely potential in its\nactive and passive causes but has become actual through those causes\n(_existere_: _ex-sisto_: _ex-stare_: to stand forth, distinct from its\ncauses); or, if it have no causes, when it simply is (_esse_),\u2014in which\nsense God, the Necessary, purely Actual Being, simply _is_. Thus,\nexistence implies the notion of actuality, and is conceived as that by\nwhich any thing or essence _is, distinct from nothingness, in the actual\norder_.(83) Or, again, it is _the actuality of any thing or essence_.\nAbout any conceivable being we may ask two distinct questions: (_a_) What\nis it? and (_b_) Does such a being actually exist? The answer to the\nformer gives us the _essence_, what is presented to the mind through the\nconcept; the answer to the latter informs us about the actual _existence_\nof the being or essence in question.\n\nTo the mind of any individual man the real existence (as also the real\nessence) of any being whatsoever, not excepting his own, can be known only\nthrough its ideal presence in his mind, through the concept or percept\nwhereby it becomes for him a \u201cknown object,\u201d an _objectum cognitum_. But\nthis actual presence of known being to the knowing mind must not be\nconfounded with the real existence of such being (4). Real being does not\nget its real existence in our minds or from our minds. Our cognition does\nnot produce, but only discovers, actually existing reality. The latter, by\nacting on the mind, engenders therein the cognition of itself. Now all our\nknowledge comes through the senses; and sense cognition is excited in us\nby the direct action of material or phenomenal being on our sense\nfaculties. But through sense cognition the mind is able to attain to a\nknowledge both of the possibility and of the actual existence of\nsuprasensible or spiritual realities. Hence we cannot describe existence\nas the power which material realities have to excite in us a knowledge of\nthemselves. Their existence is prior to this activity: _prius est esse\nquam agere_. Nor can we limit existence to material realities; for if\nthere are spiritual realities these too have existence, though this\nexistence can be discerned only by intellect, and not by sense.\n\n13. ESSENCE.\u2014In any existing thing we can distinguish _what the thing is_,\nits _essence_, from its actual _existence_. If we abstract from the actual\nexistence of a thing, not considering whether it actually exists or not,\nand fix our attention merely on _what the thing is_, we are thinking of\nits _real essence_. If we positively exclude the notion of actual\nexistence from our concept of the essence, and think of the latter as not\nactually existing, we are considering it formally as a _possible essence_.\nThere is no being, even the Necessary Being, whose essence we cannot think\nof in the former way, _i.e._ _without including_ in our concept the notion\nof actual existence; but we cannot without error _positively exclude_ the\nnotion of actual existence from our concept of the Necessary Being, or\nthink of the latter as a _merely possible_ essence.\n\nTaken in its widest sense, the essence of a thing (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, _essentia_, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, _quod quid est_, _quidditas_) means _that by which a thing is\nwhat it is_: _id quo res est id quod est_: that which gives us the answer\nto the question, What is this thing? _Quid est haec res?_ \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\n\u03c4\u03b9.(84) Now of course any individual thing is what it is just precisely by\nall the reality that is in it; but we have no direct or intuitive\nintellectual insight into this reality; we understand it only by degrees;\nwe explore it from various points of view, abstracting and generalizing\npartial aspects of it as we compare it with other things and seek to\nclassify and define it: _ratio humana essentias rerum quasi venatur_, as\nthe scholastics say: the human mind hunts, as it were, after the essences\nor natures of things. Understanding the individual datum of sense\nexperience (what Aristotle called \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9, or \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7, and the\nscholastics _hoc aliquid_, or _substantia prima_), _e.g._ this individual,\nSocrates, first under the vaguest concept of being, then gradually under\nthe more and more determinate concepts of substance, corporeal, living,\nsentient, rational, it finally forms the complex concept of his _species\ninfima_, expressed by his lowest class-name, \u201cman,\u201d and explicitly set\nforth in the definition of his specific nature as a \u201crational animal\u201d. Nor\ndoes our reason fail to realize that by reaching this concept of the\n_specific_ essence or nature of the individual, Socrates, it has not yet\ngrasped all the reality whereby the individual is what he is. It has\nreached what he has in common with all other individuals of his class,\nwhat is essential to him _as a man_; it has distinguished this from the\nunanalysed something which makes him _this particular individual_ of his\nclass, and which makes his specific essence this _individual essence_\n(_essentia_ \u201c_atoma_,\u201d or \u201c_individua_\u201d); and it has also distinguished\nhis essence from those accidental and ever varying attributes which are\nnot essential to him as a man, and from those which are not essential to\nhim as Socrates. It is only the unfathomed individual essence, as existing\n_hic et nunc_, that is _concrete_. All the mind\u2019s generic and specific\nrepresentations of it\u2014_e.g._ of Socrates as a corporeal substance, a\nliving being, a sentient being, a rational animal\u2014are _abstract_, and all\nmore or less inadequate, none of them exhausting its knowable reality. But\nit is only in so far as the mind is able to represent concrete individual\nthings by such abstract concepts, that it can attain to _intellectual_\nknowledge of their nature or reality. Hence it is that by the term\n\u201cessence,\u201d simply and _sine addito_, we always mean the essence as grasped\nby abstract generic or specific concepts (\u1f14\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, _species_), and as thus\ncapable of definition (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, _ratio rei_). \u201cThe essence,\u201d says St.\nThomas, \u201cis that by which the thing is constituted in its proper genus or\nspecies, and which we signify by the definition which states what the\nthing is\u201d.(85) Thus understood, the essence is abstract, and gives the\nspecific or generic type to which the individual thing belongs; but we may\nalso mean by essence, the concrete essence, the individual person or thing\n(_persona_, _suppositum_, _res individua_). The relations between the\nobjects of those two concepts of essence will be examined later.\n\nSince the specific essence is conceived as the most fundamental reality in\nthe thing, and as the seat and source of all the properties and activities\nof the thing, it is sometimes defined or described, in accordance with\nthis notion of it, as the primary constitutive of the thing and the source\nof all the properties of the thing. Conceived as the foundation of all the\nproperties of the thing it is sometimes called _substance_ (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1,\n_substantia_). Regarded as the source of the thing\u2019s activities, and the\nprinciple of its growth or development, it is called the _nature_ of the\nthing (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _natura_, from \u03c6\u03cd\u03c9, _nascor_).(86)\n\nSince what makes a thing that which it is, by the same fact differentiates\nthis thing from every other thing, the essence is rightly conceived as\nthat which gives the thing its characteristic being, thereby marking it\noff from all other being. In reality, of course, each individual being is\ndistinct by all that it is from every other. But since we get our\nintellectual knowledge of things by abstracting, comparing, generalizing,\nand classifying partial aspects of them, we apprehend part of the\nimperfectly grasped abstract essence of each individual as common to other\nclasses (generic), and part as peculiar to that class itself\n(differential); and thus we differentiate classes of things by what is\nonly part of their essence, by what we call the _differentia_ of each\nclass, _distinguishing mentally_ between it and the generic element: which\ntwo are really _one_, really identical, in every individual of the species\nthus defined and classified.\n\nBut in the Aristotelian and scholastic view of the constitution of any\n_corporeal_ thing, there is a danger of taking what is really only part of\nthe essence of such a thing for the whole essence. According to this view\nall corporeal substance is essentially composite, constituted by two\nreally distinct, substantial principles, primal matter (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7,\n_materia prima_) and substantial form (\u1f14\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03ae) united substantially,\nas potential and actual principles, to form one composite nature or\nessence. Now the kind, or species, or specific type, to which a body\nbelongs\u2014_e.g._, a horse, an oak, gold, water, etc.\u2014depends upon the\nsubstantial form which actualizes the matter or potential principle. In so\nfar as the corporeal essence is known to us at all it is known through the\nform, which is the principle of all the characteristic properties and\nactivities of that particular kind of body. Hence it is quite natural that\nthe \u03b5\u1f32\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03c6\u03b7, or _forma substantialis_ of a body should often be\nreferred to as the specific essence of the body, though of course the\nessence of the body really includes the material as well as the formal\nfactor.\n\nWe may look at the essence of any being from two points of view. If we\nconsider it as it is conceived actually to exist in the being, we call it\nthe _physical essence_. If we consider it after the manner in which it is\napprehended and defined by our intellects through generic and\ndifferentiating concepts, we call it the _metaphysical essence_. Thus, the\nessence of man conceived by the two defining concepts, \u201crational animal,\u201d\nis the metaphysical essence; the essence of man as known to be composed of\nthe two really distinct substantial principles, soul and body, is the\nphysical essence. Understood in this way both are one and the same essence\nconsidered from different points of view\u2014as existing in the actual order,\nand as conceived by the mind.(87)\n\nThe physical essence of any being, understood as the constitutive\nprinciple or principles from which all properties spring, is either\n_simple_ or _composite_ according as it is understood to consist of one\nsuch constitutive principle, or to result from the substantial union of\ntwo constitutive principles, a material and a formal. Thus, the essence of\nGod, the essence of a purely spiritual being, the essence of the human\nsoul, are physically simple; the essence of man, the essences of all\ncorporeal beings, are physically composite.\n\nAccording to our mode of conceiving, defining and classifying essences by\nmeans of the abstract generic and differential grades of being which we\napprehend in them, all essences, even physically simple essences, are\nconceived as logically and metaphysically composite. Moreover we speak and\nthink of their generic and differential factors as \u201cmaterial\u201d and \u201cformal\u201d\nrespectively, after the analogy of the composition of corporeal or\nphysically composite essences from the union of two really distinct\nprinciples, matter and form; the analogy consisting in this, that as\nmatter is the indeterminate principle which is determined and actuated by\nform, so the _generic_ concept is the indeterminate concept which is made\ndefinite and specific by that of the _differentia_.(88) But when we think\nof the _genus_ of any corporeal essence as \u201cmaterial,\u201d and the\n_differentia_ as \u201cformal,\u201d we must not consider these \u201cmetaphysical parts\u201d\nas really distinct; whereas the \u201cphysical parts\u201d of a corporeal substance\n(such as man) are really distinct. The genus (animal), although a\nmetaphysical part, expresses the _whole essence_ (man) in an indeterminate\nway; whereas the \u201cmatter\u201d which is a physical part, does not express the\nwhole essence of man, nor does the soul which is also a physical part, but\nonly both together. Not a little error has resulted from the confusion of\nthought whereby _genus_ and _differentia_ have been regarded as material\nand formal constitutives in the literal sense of those expressions.\n\n14. CHARACTERISTICS OF ABSTRACT ESSENCES.\u2014When we consider the essences of\nthings not as actually existing, but as intrinsically possible\u2014the\nabstract, metaphysical essences, therefore\u2014we find that when as objects of\nour thought they are analysed into their simplest constituents and\ncompared or related with themselves and with one another they present\nthemselves to our minds in these relations as endowed with certain more or\nless remarkable characteristics.\n\n(_a_) In the first place, being abstract, they present themselves to the\nmind as being what they are independently of actual existence at any\nparticular time or place. Their intelligibility is something apart from\nany relation to any actual time or place. Being intrinsically possible,\nthey might exist at any time or place; but as possible, they are out of\ntime and out of place\u2014_detemporalized_ and _delocalized_, if we may be\npermitted to use such expressions.(89)\n\n(_b_) Furthermore, since the intellect forms its notions of them, through\nthe aid of the senses and the imagination, from actual realizations of\nthemselves or their constituent factors, and since it understands them to\nbe intrinsically possible, or free from intrinsic incompatibility of their\nconstituent factors, it conceives them to be capable of indefinitely\nrepeated actualizations throughout time and space\u2014unless it sees some\nspecial reason to the contrary, as it does in the case of the Necessary\nBeing, and (according to some philosophers) in the case of purely\nimmaterial beings or pure spirits. That is to say it _universalizes_ them,\nand sees them to be capable of existing at any and every conceivable time\nand place. This relation of theirs to space is not likely to be confounded\nwith the _immensity_ or _ubiquity_ of God. But their corresponding\nrelation to time is sometimes described as _eternity_; and if it is so\ndescribed it must be carefully distinguished from the _positive_ eternity\nof God, the Immutable Being. To distinguish it from the latter it is\nusually described as _negative_ eternity,\u2014this indifference of the\npossible essence to actual existence at any particular point of time.\n\n\n    But apart from this relation which we conceive it as having to\n    existence in the order of actual reality, can we, or do we, or\n    must we conceive it as in itself an intrinsic possibility _from\n    all eternity_, in the sense that it _never began_ to be\n    intrinsically possible, and will never cease to be so? Must we\n    attribute to it a _positive_ eternity, not of course of actuality\n    or existence, but of _ideal_ being, as an object of thought to an\n    Eternally Existing Mind? What is this supposed eternal possibility\n    of the possible essence? Is it nothing actual: the possible as\n    such is nothing actual. But is it anything real? Has it only ideal\n    being\u2014_esse ideale_ or _intentionale_? And has it this only in and\n    from the human mind, or independently of the human mind? And also\n    independently of the _actual_ essences from which the human mind\n    gets the data for its thought,\u2014so that we must ascribe to it an\n    _eternal_ ideal being? To these questions we shall return\n    presently.\n\n\n(_c_) Thirdly, essences considered apart from their actual existence, and\ncompared with their own constitutive factors or with one another, reveal\nto the mind relations which the mind sees to be _necessary_, and which it\nformulates for itself in _necessary_ judgments,\u2014judgments _in materia\nnecessaria_. By virtue of the principle of identity an abstract essence is\n_necessarily_ what it is, what the mind conceives it to be, what the mind\nconceives as its definition. Man, as an object of thought, is\n_necessarily_ a rational animal, whether he actually exists or not. And if\nhe is thought of as existing, he cannot at the same time be thought of as\nnon-existing,\u2014by the principle of contradiction. An existing man is\nnecessarily an existing man,\u2014by the principle of identity. These logical\nprinciples are rooted in the nature of reality, whether actual or\npossible, considered as an _object of thought_. There is thus a necessary\nrelation between any complex object of thought and each of the constituent\nfactors into which the mind can analyse it. And, similarly, there is a\nnecessary negative relation\u2014a relation of exclusion\u2014between any object of\nthought and anything which the mind sees to be incompatible with that\nobject as a whole, or with any of its constituent factors.\n\nAgain, the mind sees necessary relations between abstract essences\ncompared with one another. Five and seven are _necessarily_ twelve.\nWhatever begins to exist actually _must_ have a cause. Contingent being,\nif such exists, is _necessarily_ dependent for its existence on some other\nactually existing being. If potential being is actualized it _must_ be\nactualized by actual being. The three interior angles of a triangle are\n_necessarily_ equal to two right angles. And so on.\n\nBut is the abstract essence itself\u2014apart from all mental analysis of it,\napart from all comparison of it with its constituent factors or with other\nessences\u2014in any sense _necessary_? There is no question of its actual\nexistence, but only of itself as an object of thought. Now our thought\ndoes not seem to demand _necessarily_, or have a _necessary_ connexion\nwith, any particular object of which we do _de facto_ think. What we do\nthink of is determined by our experience of _actual_ things. And the\nthings which we conceive to be possible, by the exercise of our reason\nupon the data of our senses, memory and imagination, are determined as to\ntheir nature and number by our experience of actual things, even although\nthey themselves can and do pass beyond the domain of actually experienced\nthings. The only necessary object of thought is reality in general: for\nthe exercise of the function of thought necessarily demands an object, and\nthis object must be reality of some sort. Thought, as we saw, begins with\nactual reality. Working upon this, thought apprehends in it the\nfoundations of those necessary relations and judgments already referred\nto. Considering, moreover, the actual data of experience, our thought can\ninfer from these the actual existence of one Being Who must exist by a\nnecessity of His Essence.\n\n\n    But, furthermore, must all the possible essences which the mind\n    does or can actually think of, be conceived as _necessarily\n    possible_ in the same sense in which it is suggested that they\n    must be conceived as eternally possible? To this question, too, we\n    shall return presently.\n\n\n(_d_) Finally, possible essences appear to the mind as _immutable_, and\nconsequently _indivisible_. This means simply that the relations which we\nestablish between them and their constitutive factors are not only\nnecessary but immutable: that if any constitutive factor of an essence is\nconceived as removed from it, or any new factor as added, we have no\nlonger the original essence but some other essence. If \u201canimal\u201d is a being\nessentially embodying the two objective concepts of \u201corganism\u201d and\n\u201csentient,\u201d then on removing either we have no longer the essence\n\u201canimal\u201d. So, too, by adding to these some other element compatible with\nthem, _e.g._ \u201crational,\u201d we have no longer the essence \u201canimal,\u201d but the\nessence \u201cman\u201d. Hence possible essences have been likened to numbers,\ninasmuch as if we add anything to, or subtract anything from, any given\nnumber, we have now no longer the original number but another.(90) This,\ntoo, is only an expression of the laws of identity and contradiction.\n\n\n    We might ask, however, whether, apart from analysis and comparison\n    of an abstract object of thought with its constitutive notes or\n    factors, such a possible essence is in itself _immutably_\n    possible. This is similar to the question whether we can or must\n    conceive such a possible essence as eternally and necessarily\n    possible.\n\n\n15. GROUNDS OF THOSE CHARACTERISTICS.\u2014In considering the grounds or\nreasons of the various characteristics just enumerated it may be well to\nreflect that when we speak of the _intrinsic possibility_ of a possible\nessence we conceive the latter as something complex, which we mentally\nresolve into its constitutive notes or factors or principles, to see if\nthese are compatible. If they are we pronounce the essence intrinsically\npossible, if not we pronounce it intrinsically impossible. For our minds,\nabsence of internal incompatibility in the content of our concept of any\nobject is the test of its intrinsic possibility. Whatever fulfils this\ntest we consider capable of existing. But what about the possibility of\nthe notes, or factors, or principles themselves, whereby we define those\nessences, and by the union of which we conceive those essences to be\nconstituted? How do we know that those abstract principles or factors\u2014no\none of which can actually exist alone, since all are abstract\u2014can in\ncertain combinations form _possible_ objects of thought? We can know this\nonly because we have either experienced such objects as actual, or because\nwe infer their possibility from objects actually experienced. And\nsimilarly our knowledge of what is impossible is based upon our experience\nof the actual. Since, moreover, our experience of the actual is finite and\nfallible, we may err in our judgments as to what essences are, and what\nare not, intrinsically possible.(91)\n\nIf now we ask ourselves what intelligible reason can we assign for the\ncharacteristics just indicated as belonging to possible essences, we must\nfix our attention first of all on the fundamental fact that the human\nintellect always apprehends its object _in an abstract condition_. It\ncontemplates the essence apart from the existence in which the essence is\nsubject to circumstances of time and place and change; it grasps the\nessence in a static condition as simply identical with itself and distinct\nfrom all else; it sees the essence as indifferent to existence at any\nplace or time; reflecting then on the actualization of this essence in the\nexisting order of things, it apprehends the essence as capable of\nindefinite actualizations (except in cases where it sees some reason to\nthe contrary), _i.e._ it _universalizes_ the essence; comparing it with\nits constituent notes or elements, and with those of other essences, it\nsees and affirms certain relations (of identity or diversity,\ncompatibility or incompatibility, between those notes or elements) as\nholding good _necessarily_ and _immutably_, and independently of the\nactual embodiment of those notes or elements in any object existing at any\nparticular place or time. All these features of the relations between the\nconstituents of abstract, possible essences, seem so far to be adequately\naccounted for by the fact that the intellect apprehends those essences _in\nthe abstract_: the data in which it apprehends them being given to it\nthrough sense experience. What may be inferred from the fact that the\nhuman intellect has this power of abstract thought, is another\nquestion(92). But granting that it does apprehend essences in this manner,\nwe seem to have in this fact a sufficient explanation of the features just\nreferred to.\n\nWe have, however, already suggested other questions about the reality of\nthose possible essences. Is their possibility, so far as known to us,\nexplained by our experience of actual things? Or must we think them as\neternally, necessarily and immutably possible? From the manner in which we\nmust apprehend them, can we infer anything about the reality of an\nEternal, Immutable, Necessary Intelligence, in whose Thought and Essence\nalone those essences, as apprehended by our minds, can find their ultimate\nground and explanation? These are the questions we must now endeavour to\nexamine.\n\n16. POSSIBLE ESSENCES AS SUCH ARE SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM MERE LOGICAL\nBEING, AND FROM NOTHINGNESS.\u2014There have been philosophers who have held\nthat the actual alone is real, and only while it is actual; that a purely\n(intrinsically) possible essence as such is nothing real; that the actual\nalone is possible; that the purely possible as such is impossible. This\nview is based on the erroneous assumption that whatever is or becomes\nactual is so, or becomes so, by some sort of unintelligible fatalistic\nnecessity. Apart from the fact that it is incompatible with certain truths\nof theism, such as the Divine Omnipotence and Freedom in creating, it also\ninvolves the denial of all real becoming or change, and the assertion that\nall actuality is eternal; for if anything becomes actual, it was\npreviously either possible or impossible; if impossible, it could never\nbecome actual; if possible, then as possible it was something different\nfrom the impossible, or from absolute nothingness. Moreover, the\nintrinsically possible is capable of becoming actual, and may be\nactualized if there exists some actual being with power to actualize it;\nbut absolute nothingness\u2014or, in other words, the intrinsically\nimpossible\u2014cannot be actualized, even by Omnipotence; therefore the\npossible essence as such is something positive or real, as distinct from\nnothingness. Finally, intrinsically possible essences can be clearly\ndistinguished from one another by the mind; but their negation which is\npure non-entity or nothingness cannot be so distinguished. It is therefore\nclear that possible essences are in some true sense something positive or\nreal. From which it follows that nothingness, in the strict sense, is not\nthe mere absence or negation of actuality, but also the absence or\nnegation of that positive or real something which is intrinsic\npossibility; in other words that nothingness in the strict sense means\nintrinsic impossibility.\n\nEven those who hold the opinion just rejected\u2014that the purely possible\nessence as such has no reality in any conceivable sense\u2014would presumably\nadmit that it is an object of human thought at all events; they would\naccord to it the being it has from the human mind which thinks it. It\nwould therefore be an _ens rationis_ according to this view, having only\nthe ideal being which consists in its being constituted and contemplated\nby the human mind. That it has the ideal being, the _esse ideale_ or _esse\nintentionale_, which consists in its being contemplated by the human mind\nas an object of thought, no one will deny. But a little reflection will\nshow, firstly, that this ideal being is something more than the ideal\nbeing of an _ens rationis_, of a mere logical entity; and, secondly, that\na possible essence must have some other ideal being than that which it has\nin the individual human mind.\n\nThe possible essence is not a mere logical entity; for the latter cannot\nbe conceived as capable of existing apart from the human mind, in the\nworld of actual existences (3), whereas the former can be, and is in fact,\nconceived as capable of such existence. Its ideal being in the human mind\nis, therefore, something other than that of a mere logical entity.\n\nThe ideal being which it has in the human mind as an object of thought is\nundoubtedly derived from the mind\u2019s knowledge of actual things. We think\nof the essences of actually experienced realities apart from their actual\nexistence. Thus abstracted, we analyse them, compare them, reason from\nthem. By these processes we can not merely attain to a knowledge of the\nactual existence of other realities above and beyond and outside of our\nown direct and immediate intuitional experience, but we can also form\nconcepts of multitudes of realities or essences as intrinsically possible,\nthus giving these latter an ideal existence in our own minds. Here, then,\nthe question arises: Is this the only ideal being that can be ascribed to\nsuch essences? In other words, are essences intrinsically possible because\n_we think_ them as intrinsically possible? Or is it not rather the case\nthat we think them to be intrinsically possible because they are\nintrinsically possible? Does our thought constitute, or does it not rather\nmerely discover, their intrinsic possibility? Does the latter result from,\nor is it not rather presupposed by, our thought-activity? The second\nalternative suggested in each of these questions is the true one. As our\nthought is not the source of their actuality, neither is it the source of\ntheir intrinsic possibility. Solipsism is the _reductio ad absurdum_ of\nthe philosophy which would reduce all _actuality_ experienced by the\nindividual mind to phases, or phenomena, or self-manifestations, of the\nindividual mind itself as the one and only actuality. And no less absurd\nis the philosophy which would accord to all _intrinsically possible_\nrealities no being other than the ideal being which they have as the\nthought-objects of the individual human mind. The study of the _actual_\nworld of direct experience leads the impartial and sincere inquirer to the\nconclusion that it is in some true sense a manifestation of mind or\nintelligence: not, however, of his own mind, which is itself only a very\ntiny item in the totality of the actual world, but of one Supreme\nIntelligence. And in this same Intelligence the world of possible essences\ntoo will be found to have its original and fundamental ideal being.\n\n17. POSSIBLE ESSENCES HAVE, BESIDES IDEAL BEING, NO OTHER SORT OF BEING OR\nREALITY PROPER AND INTRINSIC TO THEMSELVES.\u2014Before inquiring further into\nthe manner in which we attain to a knowledge of this Intelligence, and of\nthe ideal being of possible essences in this Intelligence, we may ask\nwhether, above and beyond such ideal being, possible essences have not\nperhaps from all eternity some being or reality proper and intrinsic to\nthemselves; not indeed the actual being which they possess when actualized\nin time, but yet some kind of _intrinsic_ reality as distinct from the\n_extrinsic_ ideal being, or _esse intentionale_, which consists merely in\nthis that they are objects of thought present as such to a Supreme\nIntelligence or Mind.\n\nSome few medieval scholastics(93) contended that possible essences have\nfrom all eternity not indeed the existence they may receive by creation or\nproduction in time, but an intrinsic essential being which, by creation or\nproduction, may be transferred to the order of actual existences, and\nwhich, when actual existence ceases (if they ever receive it), still\ncontinues immutable and incorruptible: what these writers called the _esse\nessentiae_, as distinct from the _esse existentiae_, conceiving it to be\nintermediate between the latter on the one hand and mere ideal or logical\nbeing on the other, and hence calling it _esse diminutum_ or _secundum\nquid_. Examining the question from the standpoint of theism, these authors\nseem to have thought that since God understands these essences as possible\nfrom all eternity, and since this knowledge must have as its term or\nobject something real and positive, these essences must have some real and\nproper intrinsic being from all eternity: otherwise they would be simply\nnothingness, and nothingness cannot be the term of the Divine\nIntelligence. But the obvious reply is that though possible essences as\nsuch are _nothing actual_ they must be distinguished as realities, capable\nof actually existing, from _absolute nothingness_; and that as thus\ndistinguished from absolute nothingness they are really and positively\nintelligible to the Divine Mind, as indeed they are even to the human\nmind. To be intelligible they need not have actual being. They must, no\ndoubt, be capable of having actual being, in order to be understood as\nrealities: it is precisely in this understood capability that their\nreality consists, for the real includes not only what actually exists but\nwhatever is capable of actual existence. Whatever is opposed to absolute\nnothingness is real; and this manifestly includes not only the actual but\nwhatever is intrinsically possible.\n\nRealities or essences which have not actual being have only ideal being;\nand ideal being means simply presence in some mind as an object of\nthought. Scholastic philosophers generally(94) hold that possible essences\nas such have no other being than this; that before and until such essences\nactually exist they have of themselves and in themselves no being except\nthe ideal being which they have as objects of the Divine Intelligence and\nthe virtual being they have in the Divine Omnipotence which may at any\ntime give them actual existence. One convincing reason for this view is\nthe consideration that if possible essences as such had from all eternity\nany proper and intrinsic being in themselves, God could neither create nor\nannihilate. For in that hypothesis essences, on becoming actual, would not\nbe produced _ex nihilo_, inasmuch as before becoming actual they would in\nthemselves and from all eternity have had their own proper real being; and\nafter ceasing to be actual they would still retain this. But creation is\nthe production of _the whole reality_ of actual being from nothingness;\nand is therefore impossible if the actual being is merely produced from an\nessence already real, _i.e._ having an eternal positive reality of its\nown. The same is true of annihilation. The theory of eternally existing\nuncreated _matter_ is no less incompatible with the doctrine of creation\nthan this theory of eternally real and uncreated forms or essences.\n\nAgain, what could this supposed positive and proper reality of the\npossible essence be? If it is anything distinct from the mere ideal being\nof such an essence, as it is assumed to be, it must after all be _actual_\nbeing of some sort, which would apparently have to be actualized again in\norder to have actual existence! Finally, this supposed eternal reality,\nproper to possible essences, cannot be anything uncreated. For whatever is\nuncreated is God; and since it is these supposed proper realities of\npossible essences that are made actual, and constitute the existing\ncreated universe, the latter would be in this view an actualization of the\nDivine Essence itself,\u2014which is pantheism pure and simple. And neither can\nthis supposed eternal reality, proper to possible essences, be anything\ncreated. For such creation would be eternal and necessary; whereas God\u2019s\ncreative activity is admitted by all scholastics to be essentially free;\nand although they are not agreed as to whether \u201ccreation from all\neternity\u201d (\u201c_creatio ab aeterno_\u201d) is possible, they are agreed that it is\nnot a fact.\n\nPossible essences as such are therefore nothing actual. Furthermore, as\nsuch they have in themselves no positive being. But they are not therefore\nunreal. They are positively intelligible as capable of actual existence,\nand therefore as distinct from logical entities or _entia rationis_ which\nare not capable of such existence. They are present as objects of thought\nto mind; and to some mind other than the individual human mind. About this\nideal being which they have in this Mind we have now in the next place to\ninquire.\n\n18. INFERENCES FROM OUR KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBLE ESSENCES.\u2014We have stated\nthat an impartial study of the _actual_ world will lead to the conclusion\nthat it is dependent on a Supreme Intelligence; and we have suggested that\nin this Supreme Intelligence also possible essences as such have their\nprimary ideal being (16, 17). When the existence of God has been\nestablished\u2014as it may be established by various lines of argument\u2014from\n_actual_ things, we can clearly see, as will be pointed out presently,\nthat in the Divine Essence all possible essences have the ultimate source\nof their possibility. But many scholastic philosophers contend that the\nnature and properties of possible essences, as apprehended by the human\nmind, furnish a distinct and conclusive argument for the existence of a\nSupreme Uncreated Intelligence.(95) Others deny the validity of such a\nline of reasoning, contending that it is based on misapprehension and\nmisinterpretation of those characteristics.\n\n\n    All admit that it is not human thought that makes essences\n    possible: they are intelligible to the human mind because they are\n    possible, not _vice versa_.(96) For the human mind the immediate\n    source and ground of their intrinsic possibility and\n    characteristics is the fact that they are given to it in _actual_\n    experience while it has the power of considering them _apart from\n    their actual existence_.\n\n    But (1) are they not independent of experienced actuality, no less\n    than of the human mind, so that we are forced to infer from them\n    the reality of a Supreme Eternal Mind in which they have eternal\n    ideal being?\n\n    (2) Is not any possible essence (_e.g._ \u201cwater,\u201d or \u201ca triangle\u201d)\n    so necessarily what it is that even if it never did and never will\n    exist, nay even were there no human or other finite mind to\n    conceive it, it would still be what it is (_e.g._ \u201ca chemical\n    compound of oxygen and hydrogen,\u201d or \u201ca plane rectilinear\n    three-sided figure\u201d)\u2014so that there must be some Necessarily\n    Existing Intelligence in and from which it has this necessary\n    truth as a possible essence?(97) These essences, as known to us,\n    are so far from being grounded in, or explained by, the things of\n    our actual experience, that we rather regard the latter as\n    grounded in the former. Do we not consider possible essences as\n    the prototypes and exemplars to which actual things must conform\n    in order to be actual, in order to exist at all?(98)\n\n    (3) Finally, the relations which we apprehend as obtaining between\n    them, we see to be necessary and immutable relations. They embody\n    necessary truths which are for our minds the standards of all\n    truth. Such necessary truths cannot be grounded either in the\n    contingent human mind, or in the contingent and mutable actuality\n    of the things of our immediate experience. Therefore we can and\n    must infer from them the reality of a Necessary, Immutable Being,\n    of whose essence they must be imitations.\n\n    If, then, this ideal order of intrinsically possible essences is\n    logically and ontologically prior to the contingent actualizations\n    of any of them (even though it be posterior to them _in the order\n    of our knowledge_, which is based on _actual experience_), there\n    must be likewise ontologically prior to all contingent actualities\n    (including our own minds) some _Necessary Intelligence_ in which\n    this order of possible essences has its ideal being.\n\n    19. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THOSE INFERENCES.\u2014The validity of the\n    general line of argument indicated in the preceding paragraphs has\n    been seriously questioned. Among other criticisms the following\n    points have been urged(99):\u2014\n\n    (1) _Actual_ things furnish the basis of irrefragable proofs of\n    the existence of God\u2014the Supreme, Necessary, Eternal, Omniscient,\n    and Omnipotent Being. But we are here inquiring whether a mind\n    which has not yet so analysed actual being as to see how it\n    involves this conclusion, or a mind which abstracts altogether\n    from the evidence furnished by actual things for this conclusion,\n    can prove the existence of such a being from the separate\n    consideration of possible essences, their attributes and\n    relations. Now it is not evident that to such a mind possible\n    essences reveal themselves as having _eternal_ ideal being. Such a\n    mind is, no doubt, conscious that it is not itself the cause of\n    their possibility. But it sees that actual things _plus_ the\n    abstract character of its own thought account sufficiently for all\n    their features as it knows them. To the question: Is not their\n    ideal being _eternal_? it can only answer: That will depend on\n    whether the world of actual things can be shown to involve the\n    existence of an Eternal Intelligence. Until this is proved we\n    cannot say whether possible essences have any ideal being other\n    than that which they have in human minds.\n\n    (2) The actual things from which we get our concepts of possible\n    essences do not exist _necessarily_. But, granted their existence,\n    we know from them that certain essences are _de facto_ possible.\n    They are not _necessarily_ given to us as possible, any more than\n    actual things are necessarily given to us as actual. Of course,\n    when they are thought of at all, they are, as objects of thought,\n    necessarily and immutably identical with themselves, and related\n    to one another as mutually compatible or incompatible, etc. But\n    this necessity of relations, hypothetical as it is and contingent\n    on the mental processes of analysis and comparison, involved as it\n    is in the very nature of being and thought, and expressed as it is\n    in the principles of identity and contradiction, is just as true\n    of actual contingent essences as of possible essences;(100) and it\n    is something very different from the sort of necessity claimed for\n    possible essences by the contention that they must be conceived as\n    having ideal being _necessarily_. The ideal being they have in the\n    human mind is certainly not necessary: the human mind might never\n    have conceived these possible essences.\n\n    But must the human mind conceive a possible essence as having\n    _some_ ideal being _necessarily_? No; unless that mind has already\n    convinced itself, from a study of _actual_ things, that an\n    Eternal, Necessary, Omniscient Intelligence exists: to which, of\n    course, such essences would be eternally and necessarily present\n    as objects of thought. If the human mind had already reached this\n    conviction it could then see that \u201ceven if there were no human\n    intellect, things would still be true in relation to the Divine\n    Intellect. But if both intellects were, _per impossibile_,\n    conceived as non-existent truth would persist no longer.\u201d(101)\n    Suppose, therefore, that it has not yet reached this conviction,\n    or abstracts altogether from the existence of God as known from\n    _actual_ things; and then, further, imagines the actual things of\n    its experience and all human intellects and finite intellects of\n    whatsoever kind as non-existent: must it still conceive possible\n    things as possible? No; possibility and impossibility, truth and\n    falsity will now have ceased to have any meaning. After such\n    attempted abstraction the mind would have before it only what\n    Balmes describes as \u201cthe abyss of nothing\u201d. And Balmes is right in\n    saying that the mind is unable \u201cto abstract all existence\u201d. But\n    the reason of the inability is not, as Balmes contends, because\n    when it has removed actual things and finite minds there still\n    remains in spite of it a system or order of possible essences\n    which forces it to infer and posit the existence of an Eternal,\n    Necessary Mind as the source and ground of that order. The reason\n    rather is because the mind sees that the known _actual_ things,\n    from which it got all its notions of possible essences,\n    necessarily imply, as the only intelligible ground of their\n    actuality, the existence of a Necessary Being, in whose\n    Intelligence they must have been contained ideally, and in whose\n    Omnipotence they must have been contained virtually, from all\n    eternity. From contingent _actuality_, as known to it, the mind\n    can argue to the eternal actuality of Necessary Being, and to the\n    impossibility either of a state of absolute nothingness, or of an\n    order of purely possible things apart from all actuality.\n\n    (3) Of course, whether the mind has thus thought out the ultimate\n    implications of the actuality of experienced things or not, once\n    it has thought and experienced those things it cannot by any\n    effort banish the memory of them from its presence: they are there\n    still as objects of its thought even when it abstracts from their\n    actual existence. But if, while it has not yet seen that their\n    actuality implies the existence of a Necessary, Omniscient and\n    Omnipotent Being, it abstracts not only from their actual\n    existence but from the existence of all finite minds (itself\n    included), then in that state, so far as its knowledge goes, there\n    would be neither actual nor ideal nor possible being. Nor can the\n    fact that an ideal order of possible things still persists in its\n    own thought mislead it into concluding that such an ideal order\n    really persists in the hypothesis it has made. For it knows that\n    this ideal order still persists for itself simply because it\n    cannot \u201cthink itself away\u201d. It sees all the time that if it could\n    effectively think itself away, this ideal order would have to\n    disappear with it, leaving nothing\u2014so far as it knows\u2014either\n    actual or possible. Mercier has some apposite remarks on this very\n    point. \u201cFrom the fact,\u201d he writes, \u201cthat those abstract essences,\n    grasped by our abstractive thought from the dawn of our reason,\n    have grown so familiar to us, we easily come to look upon them as\n    pre-existing archetypes or models of our thoughts and of things;\n    they form a fund of predicates by which we are in the habit of\n    interpreting the data of our experience. So, too, the\n    hypothetically necessary relations established by abstract thought\n    between them we come to regard as a sort of eternal system of\n    principles, endowed with a sort of legislative power, to which\n    created things and intelligences must conform. But they have\n    really no such pre-existence. The eternal pre-existence of those\n    essence-types, which Plato called the \u2018intelligible world,\u2019 the\n    \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2, and the supposed eternal legislative power of their\n    relations, are a sort of mental optical illusion. Those abstract\n    essences, and the principles based upon them, are the products of\n    our mental activity working on the data of our actual experience.\n    When we enter on the domain of _speculative reflection_ ... they\n    are there before us; ... but we must not forget that reflection is\n    _consequent_ on the spontaneous thought-activity which\u2014by working\n    abstractively on the actual data of sensible, contingent,\n    changeable, temporal realities\u2014set them up there.... We know from\n    psychology how those ideal, abstract essence-types are formed....\n    But because we have no actual memory of their formation, which is\n    so rapid as practically to escape consciousness in spontaneous\n    thought, we are naturally prone to imagine that they are not the\n    product of our own mental action on the data of actual experience,\n    but that they exist in us, or rather above us, and independently\n    of us. We can therefore understand the psychological illusion\n    under which Plato wrote such passages as the following: \u2018But if\n    anyone should tell me why anything is beautiful, either because it\n    has a blooming, florid colour, or figure, or anything else of the\n    kind, I dismiss all other reasons, for I am confounded by them\n    all; but I simply, wholly, and perhaps na\u00efvely, confine myself to\n    this, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, except either\n    the presence or communication of that abstract beauty, by whatever\n    means and in whatever way communicated; for I cannot yet affirm\n    with certainty, but only that by means of beauty all beautiful\n    things become beautiful (\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03ac). For this\n    appears to me the safest answer to give both to myself and others,\n    and adhering to this I think that I shall never fall [into\n    error].... And that by magnitude great things become great, and\n    greater things greater; and by littleness less things become\n    less.\u2019(102) St. Augustine\u2019s doctrine on the invariable laws of\n    numbers, on the immutable principles of wisdom, and on truth\n    generally, draws its inspiration from this Platonic\n    idealism.\u201d(103)\n\n    But this Platonic doctrine, attributing to the abstract essences\n    conceived by our thought a reality independent both of our thought\n    and of the actual sense data from which directly or indirectly we\n    derive our concepts of them, is rejected as unsound by scholastics\n    generally. When we have proved from actual things that God exists,\n    and is the Intelligent and Free Creator of the actual world of our\n    direct experience, we can of course consider the Divine Intellect\n    as contemplating from all eternity the Divine Essence, and as\n    seeing therein the eternal archetypes or ideas of all actual and\n    possible essences. We may thus regard the Divine Mind as the\n    eternal \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2, or _mundus intelligibilis_. This, of course,\n    is not Plato\u2019s thought; it is what St. Augustine substituted for\n    Platonism, and very properly. But we must not infer, from this\n    truth, that when we contemplate possible essences, with all the\n    characteristics we may detect in them, we are contemplating this\n    _mundus intelligibilis_ which is the Divine Mind. This was the\n    error of the ontologists. They inferred that since possible\n    essences, as known by the human mind, have ideal being\n    independently of the latter and of all actual contingent reality,\n    the human mind in contemplating them has really an intuition of\n    them as they are seen by the Divine Intellect Itself in the Divine\n    Essence; so that, in the words of Gioberti, the _Primum\n    Ontologicum_, the Divine Being Himself, is also the _primum\n    logicum_, or first reality apprehended by human thought.(104)\n\n    Now those authors who hold that the ideal order of possible\n    essences contemplated by the human mind is seen by the latter, as\n    so contemplated, to have some being, some ideal being, really\n    independent of the human mind itself, and of the actual contingent\n    things from which they admit that the human mind derives its\n    knowledge of such essences,\u2014these authors _do not hold_, but\n    _deny_, that this independent ideal being, which they claim for\n    these essences, is _anything Divine_, that it is the Divine\n    Essence as seen by the Divine Intellect to be imitable _ad\n    extra_.(105) Hence they cannot fairly be charged with the error of\n    ontologism.\n\n    Renouncing Plato\u2019s exaggerated realism, and holding that our\n    knowledge of the ideal order of possible essences is derived by\n    our mind from its consideration of _actual_ things, they yet hold\n    that this ideal order is seen to have some sort of being or\n    reality independent both of the mind and of actual things.(106)\n    This is not easy to understand. When we ask, Is this supposed\n    independent being (or reality, or possibility) of possible\n    essences the ideal being they have in the Divine mind?\u2014we are told\n    that it is not;(107) but that it is something from which we can\n    _infer, by reasoning_, this eternal, necessary, and immutable\n    ideal being of these same essences in the Divine Mind.\n\n    The considerations urged in the foregoing paragraphs will,\n    however, have shown that the validity of this line of reasoning\n    from possible essences to the reality of an Eternal, Divine,\n    Immutable Intelligence is by no means evident or free from\n    difficulties. Of course, when the existence of God has been proved\n    from actual things, the conception of the Divine Intelligence and\n    Essence as the ultimate source of all possible reality, no less\n    than of all actual reality, will be found to shed a great deal of\n    new light upon the intrinsic possibility of possible essences.\n    Since, however, our knowledge of the Divine is merely analogical,\n    and since God\u2019s intuition of possible essences, as imitations of\n    His own Divine Essence, completely transcends our comprehension,\n    and is totally different from our abstractive knowledge of such\n    essences, our conception of the manner in which these essences are\n    related to the Divine Nature and the Divine Attributes, must be\n    determined after the analogy of the manner in which our own minds\n    are related to these essences.\n\n\n20. ESSENCES ARE INTRINSICALLY POSSIBLE, NOT BECAUSE GOD CAN MAKE THEM\nEXIST ACTUALLY; NOR YET BECAUSE HE FREELY WILLS THEM TO BE POSSIBLE; NOR\nBECAUSE HE UNDERSTANDS THEM AS POSSIBLE; BUT BECAUSE THEY ARE MODES IN\nWHICH THE DIVINE ESSENCE IS IMITABLE _ad extra_.\u2014(_a_) The ultimate source\nof the _extrinsic_ possibility of all contingent realities is the Divine\nOmnipotence: just as the proximate source of the extrinsic possibility of\na statue is the power of the sculptor to educe it from the block of wood\nor marble. But just as the power of the sculptor presupposes the\n_intrinsic_ possibility of the statue, so does the Divine Omnipotence\npresuppose the intrinsic possibility of all possible things. It is not, as\nWilliam of Ockam (\u2020 1347), a scholastic of the decadent period,\nerroneously thought, because God can create things that such things are\nintrinsically possible, but rather because they are intrinsically possible\nHe can create them.\n\n(_b_) Not less erroneous is the _voluntarist_ theory of Descartes,\naccording to which possible essences are intrinsically possible because\nGod freely willed them to be possible.(108) The _actuality_ of all created\nthings depends, of course, on the free will of God to create them; but\nthat possible essences are what they are, and are related to each other\nnecessarily as they are, because God has willed them to be such, is\nabsolutely incredible. Descartes seems to have been betrayed into this\nstrange error by a false notion of what is requisite for the absolute\nfreedom and independence of the Divine Will: as if this demanded that God\nshould be free to will, _e.g._ that two _plus_ two be five, or that the\nradii of a circle be unequal, or that creatures be independent of Himself,\nor that blasphemy be a virtuous act! The intrinsic possibility of essences\nis _not_ dependent on the Free Will of God; the actualization of possible\nessences is; but God can will to actualize only such essences as He sees,\nfrom comprehending His own Divine Essence, to be intrinsically possible.\nBut it derogates in no way from the supremacy of the Divine Will to\nconceive its free volition as thus consequent on, and illumined by, the\nDivine Knowledge; whereas it is incompatible with the wisdom and sanctity\nof God, as well as inconceivable to the human mind, that the necessary\nlaws of thought and being\u2014such as the principles of contradiction and\nidentity, the principle of causality, the first principles of the moral\norder\u2014should be what they are simply because God has freely willed them to\nbe so, and might therefore have been otherwise.\n\n\n    From the fact that we have no direct intuition of the Divine\n    Being, some philosophers have concluded that all speculation on\n    the relation of God to the world of our direct experience is\n    necessarily barren and fruitless. This is a phase of agnosticism;\n    and, like all error, it is the exaggeration of a truth: the truth\n    being that while we may reach real knowledge about the Divine\n    Nature and attributes by such speculation, we can do so only on\n    condition that we are guided by analogies drawn from God\u2019s\n    creation, and remember that our concepts, as applied to God, are\n    analogical (2).\n\n    \u201cWe can know God only by analogy with contingent and finite\n    beings, and consequently the realities and laws of the contingent\n    and finite world must necessarily serve as our term of comparison.\n    But, among finite realities, we see an essential subordination of\n    the extrinsically possible to the intelligible, of this to the\n    intrinsically possible, and of this again to the essential type\n    which is presupposed by our thought. Therefore, _a pari_, we must\n    consider the omnipotent will of God, which is the first and\n    universal cause of all [contingent] existences, as under the\n    direction of the Divine Omniscience, and this in turn as having\n    for its object the Divine Essence and in it the essential types\n    whose intrinsic possibility is grounded on the necessary\n    imitability of the Divine Being.\n\n    \u201cWhen, therefore, in defence of his position, Descartes argues\n    that \u2018In God willing and knowing are one and the same; the reason\n    why He knows anything is because He wills it, and for this reason\n    only can it be true: _Ex hoc ipso quod Deus aliquid velit, ideo\n    cognoscit, et ideo tantum talis res est vera_\u2019\u2014he is only\n    confusing the issue. We might, indeed, retort the argument: \u2018In\n    God willing and knowing are one and the same; the reason why He\n    wills anything is because He knows it, and for this reason only\n    can it be good: _Ex hoc ipso quod aliquid cognoscit, ideo vult, et\n    ideo tantum talis res est bona_,\u2019 but both inferences are equally\n    unwarranted. For, though willing and knowing are certainly one and\n    the same _in God_, this one and the same thing is formally and for\n    our minds neither will nor intellect, but a reality transcending\n    will and intellect, a substance infinitely above any substances\n    known to us: \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1, _supersubstantia_, as the Fathers of the\n    Church and the Doctors of the Schools call it. But of this\n    transcendent substance we have no intuitive knowledge. We must\n    therefore either abandon all attempts to find out anything about\n    it, or else apprehend it and designate it after the analogy of\n    what we know from direct experience about created life and mind.\n    And as in creatures will is not identical with intellect, nor\n    either of these with the nature of the being that possesses them;\n    so what we conceive in God under the concept of will, we must not\n    identify in thought with what we conceive in Him under the concept\n    of intellect, nor may we with impunity confound either in our\n    thought with the Nature or Essence of the Divine Being.\u201d(109)\n\n\n(_c_) Philosophers who deny the validity of all the arguments advanced by\ntheists in proof of the existence of a transcendent Supreme Being,\ndistinct from the world of direct human experience, endeavour to account\nin various ways for the intrinsic possibility of abstract essences.\nAgnostics either deny to these latter any reality whatsoever (16), or else\ndeclare the problem of their reality insoluble. Monists of the materialist\ntype\u2014who try to reduce all mind to matter and its mere mechanical energies\n(11)\u2014treat the question in a still more inadequate and unsatisfactory\nmanner; while the advocates of idealistic monism, like Hegel and his\nfollowers, refer us to the supposed Immanent Mind of the universe for an\nultimate explanation of all intrinsic possibility. Certainly this must\nhave its ultimate source in some mind; and it is not in referring us to an\nEternal Mind that these philosophers err, but in their conception of the\nrelation of this mind to the world of direct actual experience. It is not,\nhowever, with such theories we are concerned just now, but only with\ntheories put forward by theists. And among these latter it is surprising\nto find some few(110) who maintain that the intrinsic possibility of\nabstract essences depends ultimately and exclusively on these essences\nthemselves, irrespective of things actually experienced by the human mind,\nirrespective of the human mind itself, and irrespective of the Divine Mind\nand the Divine Nature.\n\nAs to this view, we have already seen (19) that if we abstract from all\nhuman minds, and from all actual things that can be directly experienced\nby such minds, we are face to face either with the alternative of absolute\nnothingness wherein the true and the false, the possible and the\nimpossible, cease to have any intelligible meaning, or else with the\nalternative of a Supreme, Eternal, Necessary, Omniscient and Omnipotent\nBeing, whose actual existence has been, or can be, inferred from the\nactual data of human experience. Now the theist, who admits the existence\nof such a Being, cannot fail to see that possible essences must have their\nprimary ideal being in the Divine Intellect, and the ultimate source of\ntheir intrinsic possibility in the Divine Essence Itself. For, knowing\nthat God can actualize intrinsically possible essences by the creative\nact, which is intelligent and free, he will understand that these essences\nhave their ideal being in the Divine Intellect; that the Divine Intellect\nsees their intrinsic possibility by contemplating the Divine Essence as\nthe Uncreated Prototype and Exemplar of all intrinsically possible things;\nand that these latter are intrinsically possible precisely because they\nare possible adumbrations or imitations of the Divine Nature.\n\n(_d_) But are we to conceive that essences are intrinsically possible\nprecisely because the Divine Intellect, by understanding them, makes them\nintrinsically possible? Or should we rather conceive their intrinsic\npossibility as antecedent to this act by which the Divine Intellect\nunderstands them, and as dependent only on the Divine Essence Itself, so\nthat essences would be intrinsically possible simply because the Divine\nEssence is what it is, and because they are possible imitations or\nexpressions of it? Here scholastics are not agreed.\n\nSome(111) hold that the intrinsic possibility of essences is _formally_\nconstituted by the act whereby the Divine Intellect, contemplating the\nDivine Essence, understands the latter to be indefinitely imitable _ad\nextra_; so that as the actuality of things results from the _Fiat_ of the\nDivine Will, and as their extrinsic possibility is grounded in the Divine\nOmnipotence, so their intrinsic possibility is grounded in the Divine\nIntellect. The latter, by understanding the Divine Essence, would not\nmerely give an ideal being to the intrinsic possibility of essences, but\nwould make those essences _formally_ possible, they being only _virtually_\npossible in the Divine Essence considered antecedently to this act of the\nDivine Intellect. Or, rather, as some Scotists explain the matter,(112)\nthis ideal being which possible essences have from the Divine Intellect is\nnot as extrinsic to them as the ideal being they have from the human\nintellect, but is rather the very first being they can be said _formally_\nto have, and is somehow intrinsic to them after the analogy of the being\nwhich mere logical entities, _entia rationis_, derive from the human mind:\nwhich being is intrinsic to these entities and is in fact the only being\nthey have or can have.\n\nOthers(113) hold that while, no doubt, possible essences have ideal being\nin the Divine Intellect from the fact that they are objects of the Divine\nKnowledge, yet we must not conceive these essences as deriving their\nintrinsic possibility from the Divine Intellect. For intellect as such\npresupposes its object. Just, therefore, as possible essences are not\nintrinsically possible because they are understood by, and have ideal\nbeing in, the human mind, so neither are they intrinsically possible\nbecause they are understood by, and have ideal being in, the Divine Mind.\nIn order to be understood actually, in order to have ideal being, in order\nto be objects of thought, they must be intelligible; and in order to be\nintelligible they must be intrinsically possible. Therefore they are\nformally constituted as intrinsically possible essences, not by the fact\nthat they are understood by the Divine Intellect, but by the fact that\nantecedently to this act (in our way of conceiving the matter: for there\nis _really_ no priority of acts or attributes in God) they are already\npossible imitations of the Divine Essence Itself.\n\nThis view seems preferable as being more in accordance with the analogy of\nwhat takes place in the human mind. The speculative intellect in man does\nnot constitute, but presupposes its object. Now, while _actual_ things are\nthe objects of God\u2019s _practical science_\u2014the \u201c_scientia visionis_,\u201d which\nreaches what is freely decreed by the Divine Will,\u2014_possible_ things are\nthe objects of God\u2019s _speculative_ science\u2014the \u201c_scientia simplicis\nintelligentiae_,\u201d which is not, like the former, productive of its object,\nbut rather contemplative of objects presented to it by and in the Divine\nEssence.\n\nWhy, then, ultimately will the notions \u201csquare\u201d and \u201ccircle\u201d not coalesce\nso as to form one object of thought for the human mind, while the notions\n\u201cequilateral\u201d and \u201ctriangle\u201d will so coalesce? Because the Essence of God,\nthe Necessary Being, the First Reality, and the Source of all contingent\nreality, affords no basis for the former as a possible expression or\nimitation of Itself; in other words, because Being is not expressible by\nnothingness, and a \u201csquare circle\u201d is nothingness: while the Divine\nEssence does afford a basis for the latter; because Necessary Being is in\nsome intelligible way imitated, expressed, manifested, by whatever has any\nbeing to distinguish it from nothingness, and an \u201cequilateral triangle\u201d\nhas such being and is not nothingness.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to add that when we conceive the Divine Essence,\ncontemplated by the Divine Intellect, as containing in itself the\nexemplars or prototypes of all possible things, we are not to understand\nthe Divine Essence as the _formal_ exemplar of each, or, _a fortiori_, as\na vast collection of such formally distinct exemplars; but only as\n_virtually_ and _equivalently_ the exemplar of each and all. We are not to\nconceive that possible essences are seen by the Divine Intellect imaged in\nthe Divine Essence _as in a mirror_, but rather _as in their supreme\nsource and principle_: so that they are faint and far off reflections of\nIt, and, when actualized, become for us the only means we have, in this\npresent state, for reaching any knowledge of the Deity: _videmus nunc per\nspeculum_.(114)\n\n21. DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN ACTUALLY EXISTING\nCONTINGENT OR CREATED BEINGS.\u2014Passing now from the consideration of\npossible essences as such, to the consideration of actually existing\nessences, we have to examine a question which has given rise to a great\ndeal of controversy, partly on account of its inherent difficulty, and\npartly because of a multitude of ambiguities arising from confusion of\nthought: What is the nature of the distinction between essence and\nexistence in the actually existing things of our experience?\n\nWe have seen already that the _concepts_ of essence and existence are\ndistinct from each other (12, 13); in other words, that in all cases there\nis at least a _logical_ distinction between the essence and the existence\nof any being. We must, however, distinguish between created or contingent\nbeings and the Uncreated, Necessary, Self-Existent Being. The latter\nexists _essentially_, eternally, by His own Essence, so that in Him\nessence and existence are _really identical_. His essence is _formally_\nHis Existence; and, therefore, in thinking of His Essence we cannot\npositively exclude the notion of existence or think of Him as\nnon-existent. The distinction between essence and existence, which we find\nin our thoughts, is, therefore, when applied to God, a _purely logical_\ndistinction, due solely to our finite human mode of thinking, and having\nno ground or basis or reason in the reality which is the object of our\nthought. On this there is complete unanimity among scholastic\nphilosophers.\n\nBut while we conceive that God actually exists by that whereby He is God,\nby His Essence Itself, we do not conceive that any created or contingent\nbeing exists by that whereby it is what it is, by its essence. We do not,\nfor example, regard the essence of Socrates, whether specific or\nindividual (that whereby he is a _man_, or that whereby he is _this_ man,\nSocrates), as that whereby he actually exists. In other words, the essence\nof the existing Socrates, being a contingent essence, does not necessarily\ndemand or imply that it actually exist. Our concept of such an essence\ndoes not include the note of actual existence. Therefore if we find such\nan essence actually existing we consider this actually existing essence as\ncaused or produced, and conserved in existence, by some other being,\n_viz._ by the Necessary Being: so that if it were not so created and\nconserved it would be a pure possibility and nothing actual.(115) The same\ndifference between the Necessary Being and contingent beings will be seen\nfrom considering their existence. The abstract concept of existence is\nrendered definite and determinate by the essence which it actualizes. Now\nevery finite essence is of some particular kind; and its existence is\nrendered determinate by the fact that it is the existence of a definite\nkind of essence. The existence of a contingent being we conceive as the\nactuality of its essence; and its essence as a definite potentiality of\nexistence. Thus if we conceive existence as a perfection it is restricted\nby the finite nature of the potentiality which it actualizes. But the\nexistence of the Necessary Being is the plenitude of actuality, an\nexistence not restricted by being the existence of any essence that is\ndeterminate because finite, but of an essence that is determinate by being\nabove all genera and species, by being infinite, by being Itself pure\nactuality, in no sense potential but perfectly and formally identical with\nactual existence. While, therefore, the essence of the Necessary Being is\na necessarily existing essence, that of a contingent being is not\nnecessarily existent, but is conceived as a potentiality which has been\n_de facto_ actualized or made existent by the Necessary Being, and which\nmay again cease to be actually existent.(116) On this too there is\nunanimity among scholastic philosophers.\n\nWe distinguish mentally or logically between the essence of an actually\nexisting contingent being and its existence; considering the former as the\npotential principle, in relation to the latter as the actualizing\nprinciple, of the contingent existing reality. But is the distinction\nbetween such an essence and its existence something more than a logical\ndistinction? Is it a real distinction? This is the question in dispute.\nAnd in order to avoid misunderstanding, we must be clear on these two\npoints: firstly, of what essence and existence is there question? and\nsecondly, what exactly are we to understand by a real distinction in this\nmatter?\n\n22. STATE OF THE QUESTION.\u2014In the first place, there is no question here\nof the relation of a _possible_ essence as such to existence. The possible\nessence of a contingent being, as such, has no reality outside the Divine\nEssence, Intellect, Will, and Omnipotence. Before the world was created\nthe possible essences of all the beings that constitute it were certainly\nreally distinct from the actual existence of these beings which do\nconstitute the created universe. On this point there can be no difference\nof opinion. To contend that it is on the eternal reality of the possible\nessence that actual existence supervenes, when a contingent being begins\nto exist, would be equivalent to contending that it is the Divine Essence\nthat becomes actual in the phenomena of our experience: which is the error\nof Pantheism.\n\nAgain, before a contingent thing comes into actual existence it may be\nvirtually and potentially in the active powers and passive potentialities\nof other actually existing contingent things: as the oak, for instance, is\nin the passive potentiality of the acorn and in the active powers of the\nnatural agencies whereby it is evolved from the acorn; or the statue in\nthe block of marble and in the mind and artistic power of the sculptor.\nBut neither is there any question here of the relation of such potential\nbeing or essence as a thing has in its causes to the actual existence of\nthis thing when actually produced. Whatever being or essence it has in its\nactive and passive causes is certainly really distinct from the existence\nwhich the thing has when it has been actually produced. Nor is there any\ndoubt or dispute about this point. At the same time much controversy is\ndue to misunderstandings arising from a confusion of thought which fails\nto distinguish between the essence as purely possible, the essence as\nvirtually or potentially in its causes, and the essence as actually\nexisting. It is about the distinction between the latter and its existence\nthat the whole question is raised. And it must be borne in mind that this\nessence, whether it is really distinct from its existence or not, is\nitself a positive reality from the moment it is created or produced. The\nquestion is whether the creative or productive act\u2014whereby this essence is\nplaced \u201coutside its causes,\u201d and is now no longer merely possible, or\nmerely virtual or potential in its causes, but something real _in\nitself_\u2014has for its term _one reality_, or _two realities_, _viz._ the\nessence as real subjective potentiality of existence, and the existential\nact or perfection whereby it is constituted actually existent.(117)\n\nThe question is exclusively concerned with the essence which began to\nexist when the contingent being came into actual existence, and which\nceases to exist when, or if, this being again passes out of actual\nexistence; and the question is whether this essence which actually exists\nis really distinct from the existence whereby it actually exists. Finally,\nthe question concerns the essence and existence of any and every actual\ncontingent reality, whether such reality be a substance or an accident. Of\ncourse it is primarily concerned with the essence and existence of\nsubstances; but it also applies to the essence and existence of accidents\nin so far as these latter will be found to be really distinct from the\nsubstances in which they inhere, and to have reality proper to themselves.\n\n23. THE THEORY OF DISTINCTIONS IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE QUESTION.\u2014In the\nnext place, what are we to understand by a _real_ distinction in this\nmatter? Ambiguity and obscurity of thought in regard to the theory of\n_distinctions_, and in regard to the application of the theory to the\npresent question, has been probably the most fertile source of much\ntedious and fruitless controversy in this connexion.\n\nAnticipating what will be considered more fully at a later stage (30), we\nmust note here the two main classes of distinction which, by reflecting on\nour thought-processes, we discover between the objects of our thought. The\n_real_ distinction is that which exists in things independently of the\nconsideration of our minds; that which is discovered, but not made, by the\nmind; that which is given to us in and with the data of our experience.\nFor example, the act of thinking is a reality other than, and therefore\n_really_ distinct from, the mind that thinks; for the mind persists after\nthe act of thinking has passed away.\n\nOpposed to this is the mental or logical distinction, which is the\ndistinction made by the mind itself between two different concepts of one\nand the same reality; which is not in the reality independently of our\nthought, but is introduced into it by our thought, regarding the same\nreality under different aspects or from different points of view. The mind\nnever makes such a distinction without some ground or reason for doing so.\n\nSometimes, however, this reason will be found exclusively in the mind\nitself\u2014in the limitations of its modes of thought\u2014and not in the reality\nwhich is the matter or object of the thought. The distinction is then said\nto be _purely_ logical or mental. Such distinctions are _entia rationis_,\nlogical entities. An example would be the distinction between the concept\n\u201cman\u201d and the concept \u201crational animal,\u201d or, in general, between any\ndefinable object of thought and its definition; the distinction,\ntherefore, between the essence and the existence of the Necessary Being is\na purely logical distinction, for in a definition it is the essence of the\nthing we define, and existence is of the essence or definition of the\nNecessary Being.\n\nSometimes, again, the reason for making a mental distinction will be found\nin the reality itself. What is one and the same reality presents different\naspects to the mind and evokes different concepts of itself in the mind:\nthough really one, it is virtually manifold; and the distinction between\nthe concepts of these various aspects is commonly known as a _virtual_\ndistinction. For example, when we think of any individual man as a\n\u201crational animal,\u201d though our concept of \u201canimal nature\u201d is distinct from\nthat of \u201crational nature,\u201d we do not regard these in him as two realities\nco-existing or combining to form his human nature, but only as two\ndistinct aspects under which we view the one reality which is his human\nnature. And we view it under these two aspects because we have actual\nexperience of instances in which animal nature is really distinct and\nseparated from rationality, _e.g._, in the brute beast. Or, again, since\nwe can recognize three grades of life in man\u2014vegetative, sentient, and\nrational\u2014we conceive the one principle of life, his soul, as virtually\nthree principles; and so we distinguish mentally or virtually between\nthree souls in man, although in reality there is only one. Or, once more,\nwhen we think of the Wisdom, the Will, and the Omnipotence of God, we know\nthat although these concepts represent different aspects of the Deity,\nthese aspects are not distinct realities in Him; but that because of His\ninfinite perfection and infinite simplicity they are all objectively one\nand the same self-identical reality.\n\nA virtual distinction is said to be _imperfect_ (thus approaching nearer\nto the nature of a purely logical distinction) when each of the concepts\nwhereby we apprehend the same reality only prescinds _explicitly_ from\nwhat is expressed by the other, although one of them is found on analysis\nto include _implicitly_ what is expressed by the other. Such is the\ndistinction between the _being_ and the _life_ of any living thing; or the\ndistinction between the spirituality and the immortality of the human\nsoul; or the distinction between _Infinite_ Wisdom and _Infinite_ Power:\nthe distinction between the divine attributes in general. A virtual\ndistinction is said to be _perfect_ (thus approaching nearer to the nature\nof a real distinction) when neither of the concepts includes either\nexplicitly or implicitly what is expressed by the other. Such, for\ninstance, is the distinction between the principle of intellectual life\nand the principle of animal or sentient life in man; for not only can\nthese exist separately (the former without the latter, _e.g._ in pure\nspirits, the latter without the former, _e.g._ in brute beasts), but also\nit will be found that by no analysis does either concept in any way\ninvolve the other.(118)\n\nOur only object in setting down the various examples just given is to\nillustrate the general scholastic teaching on the doctrine of distinction.\nIn themselves they are not beyond dispute, for the general doctrine of\ndistinction is not easy of application in detail; but they will be\nsufficient for our present purpose. Probably the greatest difficulty in\napplying the general doctrine will be found to lie in discriminating\nbetween virtual distinctions\u2014especially perfect virtual distinctions\u2014and\nreal distinctions.(119) And this difficulty will be appreciated still more\nwhen we learn that a real distinction does not necessarily involve\n_separability_ of the objects so distinguished. In other words there may\nbe, in a composite existing individual being, constitutive factors or\nprinciples, or integral parts, each of which is a positive real entity,\nreally distinct from the others, and yet incapable of existing separately\nor in isolation from the others. \u201cSeparability,\u201d says Mercier,(120) \u201cis\none of the signs of a real distinction; but it is neither essential to,\nnor a necessary property of the latter. Two separable things are of course\nreally distinct from each other; but two entities may be really distinct\nfrom each other without being separable or capable of existing apart from\neach other. Thus we believe that the intellect and the will in man are\nreally distinct from each other, and both alike from the substance of the\nhuman soul; yet they cannot exist isolated from the soul.\u201d Therefore, even\nthough the objects which we apprehend as distinct, by means of distinct\nconcepts, be understood to be such that they cannot actually exist in\nisolation from each other, but only as united in a composite individual\nbeing, still if it can be shown that each of them has its own proper\nreality independently of our thought, so that the distinction between them\nis not the result of our thought, or introduced by our thought into the\nindividual thing or being which we are considering, then the distinction\nmust be regarded as real. If, on the other hand, it can be shown that the\ndifferent aspects which we apprehend in any _datum_ by means of distinct\nconcepts have not, apart from the consideration of the mind, apart from\nthe analytic activity of our own thought, each its own proper reality, but\nare only distinct mental views of what is objectively one and the same\nreality, then the distinction must be regarded as logical, not real,\u2014and\nthis even although there may be in the richness and fulness of that one\nreality comparatively to the limited capacity of our minds, as well as in\nthe very constitution and modes of thought of our minds themselves, a\nreason or basis for, and an explanation of, the _multiplicity of concepts_\nwhereby we attain to an understanding of some _one reality_.\n\n24. SOLUTIONS OF THE QUESTION.\u2014Postponing further consideration of the\nserious problems on the validity of knowledge and its relation to reality,\nto which those reflections inevitably give rise, let us now return to the\nmain question: the nature of the distinction between the essence and the\nexistence of any actually existing contingent being. We need not be\nsurprised to find that the greatest minds have been unable to reach the\nsame solution of this question. For it is but a phase of the more general\nmetaphysical problem\u2014at once both ontological and epistemological\u2014of the\nnature of reality and the relation of the human mind thereto. Nor will any\nserious modern philosopher who is at all mindful of the wealth of current\ncontroversial literature on this very problem, or of the endless variety\nof conflicting opinions among contemporary thinkers in regard to it, be\ndisposed to ridicule the medieval controversies on the doctrine of\ndistinction as applied to essence and existence. No doubt there has been a\ngood deal of mere verbal, and perhaps trifling, argumentation on the\nmatter: it lends itself to the dialectical skill of the controversialist\nwho \u201ctakes sides,\u201d as well as to the serious thought of the open-minded\ninvestigator. It is not, however, through drawing different conclusions\nfrom the same premisses that conflicting solutions of the question have\nbeen reached, but rather through fundamentally different attitudes in\nregard to the premisses themselves which different philosophers profess to\nfind in the common data of their experience. When we have once grasped\nwhat philosophers mean by a logical or a real distinction as applied to\nthe relation between essence and existence we shall not get any very\nmaterial assistance towards the choice of a solution by considering at\nlength the arguments adduced on either side.(121)\n\nThose who believe there is a real distinction(122) between the essence and\nthe existence of all actually existing contingent beings mean by this that\nthe real essence which comes into actual existence by creation, or by the\naction of created causes, is a reality distinct from the existence whereby\nit actually exists. The actually existing essence is the total term of the\ncreative or productive act; but what we apprehend in it under the concept\nof _essence_ is really distinct from what we apprehend in it under the\nconcept of _existence_: the existence being a real principle which\n_actualizes_ the essence, and this latter being itself another real\nprinciple which is in itself a positive, subjective _potentiality_ of\nexistence.(123) Neither, of course, can actually exist without the other:\nno actual existence except that of a real essence; no existing essence\nexcept by reason of the existence which makes it actual. But these two\nreal principles of existing contingent being, inseparable as they are and\ncorrelative, are nevertheless distinct realities\u2014distinct in the objective\norder and independently of our thought,\u2014and form by their union a really\n_composite_ product: the existing thing.\n\n\n    We might attempt to illustrate this by the analogy of a body and\n    its shape or colour. The body itself is really distinct from its\n    actual shape and colour: it may lose them, and yet remain the same\n    body; and it may acquire other shapes and colours. At any time the\n    body has actually some particular shape and colour; but that by\n    which it is formally so shaped and coloured is something really\n    different from the body itself. Furthermore, before the body\n    _actually_ possessed this particular shape and colour, these were\n    in it _potentially_: that is to say, there were then in the body\n    the real, passive, subjective potentialities of this particular\n    shape and colour. So too _that by which_ a real (contingent)\n    essence actually exists (_i.e._ the existential _act_, existence)\n    is really distinct from _that which_ actually exists (_i.e._ the\n    essence, the _potentiality_ of that existential act). The analogy\n    is, however, at best only a halting one. For while it is\n    comparatively easy to understand how the passive, subjective\n    _potentiality_ of a shape or colour can be _something real_ in the\n    _already actually existing_ body, it is not so easy to understand\n    how the _potentiality of existence_, _i.e._ the real essence, can\n    be anything that is itself real and really distinct from the\n    existence.(124) The oak is _really_ in the acorn, for the passive,\n    subjective potentiality of the oak is in the actual acorn; but is\n    this potentiality anything really distinct from the acorn? or\n    should we not rather say that the _actual_ acorn _is potentially_\n    the oak, or _is_ the potentiality of the oak? At all events even\n    if it is really distinct from the actual acorn, it is in the\n    actual acorn. But is it possible to conceive a _real, subjective\n    potentiality_ which _does not reside in anything actual_?(125) Now\n    if the real essence is really distinct from its existence it must\n    be conceived as a _real, subjective potentiality_ of existence.\n    Yet it cannot be conceived as a potentiality _in_ anything actual:\n    except indeed in the actually existing essence which is the\n    composite result of its union with the existential act. It is not\n    a real, subjective potentiality antecedently to the existential\n    act, and on which the latter is, as it were, superimposed:(126) in\n    itself, it is, in fact, nothing real except as actualized by the\n    latter; but, as we have already observed, the process of\n    actualization, whether by direct creation or by the action of\n    created causes, must be conceived as having for its total term or\n    effect a composite reality resulting from what we can at best\n    imperfectly describe as the union of two correlative, con-created,\n    or co-produced principles of being, a potential and an actual,\n    really distinct from each other: that whereby the thing _can_\n    exist, the potentiality of existence, the essence; and that\n    whereby the thing _does_ exist, the actuality of essence, the\n    existence. The description is imperfect because these principles\n    are not con-created or co-produced separately; but, rather, the\n    creation or production of an existing essence, the efficiency by\n    which it is \u201cplaced outside its causes,\u201d has one single, though\n    composite, term: the actually existing thing.\n\n\nThis view, thus advocating a real distinction between essence and\nexistence, may obviously be regarded as an emphatic expression of the\nobjective validity of intellectual knowledge. It might be regarded as an\napplication of the more general view that the objective concepts between\nwhich the intellect distinguishes in its interpretation of reality should\nbe regarded as representing _distinct realities_, except when the\ndistinction is seen to arise not from the nature of the object but from\nthe nature of the subject, from the limitations and imperfections of our\nown modes of thought. But in the case of any particular (disputed)\ndistinction, the _onus probandi_ should lie rather on the side of those\nwho contend that such distinction is logical, and not real. On the other\nhand, many philosophers who are no less firmly convinced of the objective\nvalidity of intellectual knowledge observe that it is possible to push\nthis principle too far, or rather to err by excess in its application.\nInstead of placing the burden of proof solely on the side of the logical\ndistinction, they would place it rather more on the side of the real\ndistinction\u2014in conformity with the maxim of method, _Entia non sunt\nmultiplicanda praeter necessitatem_. And they think that it is an error by\nexcess to hold the distinction between essence and existence to be real.\nThis brings us to the second alternative opinion: that the distinction in\nquestion is not real, but only virtual.(127)\n\nAccording to this view, the essence and the existence of any existing\ncontingent being are one and the same reality. There is, however, in this\nreality a basis for the two distinct objective concepts\u2014of essence and of\nexistence\u2014whereby we apprehend it. For the contingent being does not exist\nnecessarily: we see such beings coming into existence and ceasing to\nexist: we can therefore think of _what they are_ without thinking of them\nas _actually existent_: in other words, we can think of them as possible,\nand of their existence as that by which they become actual. This is a\nsufficient reason for distinguishing mentally, in the existing being, the\nessence which exists and the existence by which it exists.(128) But when\nwe think of the essence of an actually existing being as objectively\npossible, or as potential in its causes, we are no longer thinking of it\nas anything real in itself, but only of its ideal being as an object of\nthought in our minds, or of the ideal being it has in the Divine Mind, or\nof the potential being it has in created causes, or of the virtual being\nit has in the Divine Omnipotence, or of the ultimate basis of its\npossibility in the Divine Essence. But all these modes of \u201cbeing\u201d we know\nto be really distinct from the real, contingent essence itself which\nbegins to exist actually in time, and may cease once more to exist in time\nwhen and if its own nature demands, and God wills, such cessation. But\nthat the real, contingent essence itself which so exists, is something\nreally distinct from the existence whereby it exists; that it forms with\nthe latter a really composite being; that it is in itself a real,\nsubjective potentiality, receptive of existence as another and actualizing\nreality, really distinct from it, so that the creation or production of\nany single actually existing contingent being would have for its term two\nreally distinct principles of being, a potential and an actual, essence\nand existence, created or produced _per modum unius_, so to speak: for\nasserting all this it is contended by supporters of the virtual\ndistinction that we have no sufficient justifying reason.(129) Hence they\nconclude that a real distinction must be denied: _Entia non sunt\nmultiplicanda praeter necessitatem_.\n\n\n    Though each of these opinions has been defended with a great deal\n    of ability, and an exhaustive array of arguments, a mere rehearsal\n    of these latter would not give much material assistance towards a\n    solution of the question. We therefore abstain from repeating them\n    here. There are only a few points in connexion with them to which\n    attention may be directed.\n\n    In the first place, some defenders of the real distinction urge\n    that were the distinction not real, things would exist\n    essentially, _i.e._ necessarily; and thus the most fundamental\n    ground of distinction between God and creatures, between the\n    Necessary Being and contingent beings, would be destroyed:\n    creatures would be no longer in their very constitution composite,\n    mixtures of potentiality and actuality, but would be purely\n    actual, absolutely simple and, in a word, identical with the\n    Infinite Being Himself. Supporters of the virtual distinction deny\n    that those very serious consequences follow from their view. They\n    point out that though the existence of the creature is really\n    identical with its essence, the essence does not exist necessarily\n    or _a se_; the whole existing essence is _ab alio_, is caused,\n    contingent; and the fundamental distinction between such a being\n    and the Self-Existing Being is in this view perfectly clear. Nor\n    is the creature, they contend, purely actual and absolutely\n    simple; it need not have existed, and it may cease to exist; it\n    has, therefore, a potentiality of non-existence, which is\n    inconceivable in the case of the Necessary and purely Actual\n    Being; it is, therefore, mutable as regards existence; besides\n    which the essences even of the most simple created beings, namely\n    pure spirits are composite in the sense that they have faculties\n    and operations really distinct from their substance.\n\n    Secondly, it is alleged by some defenders of the real distinction\n    that this latter view of the nature of existing contingent reality\n    is a cardinal doctrine in the whole philosophical system of St.\n    Thomas, and of scholastics generally: so fundamental, in fact,\n    that many important doctrines, unanimously held to be true by all\n    scholastics, cannot be successfully vindicated apart from it.(130)\n    To which it is replied that there are no important truths of\n    scholastic philosophy which cannot be defended quite adequately\n    apart altogether from the view one may hold on the present\n    question; and that, this being the case, it is unwise to endeavour\n    to base admittedly true doctrines, which can be better defended\n    otherwise, upon an opinion which can at best claim only the amount\n    of probability it can derive from the intrinsic merits of the\n    arguments by which it is itself supported.(131)\n\n    Before passing from this whole question we must note the existence\n    of a third school of thought, identified mainly with the followers\n    of Duns Scotus.(132) These authors contend that the distinction\n    between essence and existence is not a real distinction, nor yet,\n    on the other hand, is it merely a virtual distinction, but one\n    which they call _formalis, actualis ex natura rei_, that between a\n    reality and its intrinsic modes. It is better known as the\n    \u201cScotistic\u201d distinction. We shall see the nature of it when\n    dealing _ex professo_ with the general doctrine of distinctions.\n\n    The multiplicity of these views, and the unavoidable difficulty\n    experienced in grasping and setting forth their meaning with any\n    tolerable degree of clearness, would suggest the reflection that\n    in those controversies the medieval scholastics were perhaps\n    endeavouring to think and to express what reality is, apart from\n    thought and \u201cindependently of the consideration of the mind\u201d\u2014a\n    task which, conceived in these terms, must appear fruitless; and\n    one which, anyhow, involves in its very nature the closest\n    scrutiny of the epistemological problem of the power of the human\n    mind to get at least a true and valid, if not adequate and\n    comprehensive, insight into the nature of reality.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV. REALITY AS ONE AND MANIFOLD.\n\n\n25. THE TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTES OR PROPERTIES OF BEING: UNITY, TRUTH,\nAND GOODNESS.\u2014So far, we have analysed the notions of Real Being, of\nBecoming or Change, of Being as Possible and as Actual, of Essence and\nExistence. Before approaching a study of the Categories or _Suprema Genera\nEntis_, the highest and widest modes in which reality manifests itself, we\nhave next to consider certain attributes or properties of being which\nreveal themselves as co-extensive with reality itself. Taking human\nexperience in its widest sense, as embracing all modes that are cognitive\nor allied with consciousness, as including intellect, memory, imagination,\nsense perception, will and appetite, as speculative, ethical or moral, and\nesthetic or artistic,\u2014we find that the reality which makes up this complex\nhuman experience of ours is universally and necessarily characterized by\ncertain features which we call the _transcendental attributes or\nproperties of being_, inasmuch as they transcend all specific and generic\nmodes of being, pervade all its categories equally, and are inseparable\nfrom any datum of experience. We shall see that they are not really\ndistinct from the reality which they characterize, but only logically\ndistinct from it, being aspects under which we apprehend it, negations or\nother logical relations which we necessarily annex to it by the mental\nprocesses whereby we seek to render it actually intelligible to our minds.\n\nThe first in order of these ontological attributes is _unity_: the concept\nof that whereby reality considered in itself becomes a definite object of\nthought. The second in order is _truth_: which is the conception of\nreality considered in its relation to cognitive experience, to intellect.\nThe third is _goodness_: the aspect under which reality is related as an\nobject to appetitive experience, to will.\n\nNow when we predicate of any reality under our consideration that it is\n\u201cone,\u201d or \u201cgood,\u201d or \u201ctrue\u201d\u2014in the ontological sense to be explained,\u2014that\nwhich we predicate is not a mere _ens rationis_, but something real,\nsomething which is really identical with the subject, and which is\ndistinguished from the latter in our judgment only by a logical\ndistinction. The attribution of any of these properties to the subject\ndoes not, however, add anything real to the latter: it adds merely some\nlogical aspect involved in, or supposed by, the attribution. At the same\ntime, this logical aspect gives us real information by making explicit\nsome real feature of being not explicitly revealed in the concept of being\nitself, although involved in, and following as a property from, the\nlatter.\n\nThere do not seem to be any other transcendental properties of being\nbesides the three enumerated. The terms \u201creality,\u201d \u201cthing,\u201d \u201csomething,\u201d\nare synonymous expressions of the concept of being itself, rather than of\nproperties of being. \u201cExistence\u201d is not a transcendental attribute of\nbeing, for it is not co-extensive with reality or real being. And although\nreality _must_ be \u201c_either_ possible _or_ actual,\u201d \u201c_either_ necessary\n_or_ contingent,\u201d \u201c_either_ infinite _or_ finite,\u201d etc., this necessity of\nverifying in itself one or other member of any such alternatives is not a\nproperty of being, but rather something essentially rooted in the very\nconcept of reality itself. Some would regard as a distinct transcendental\nattribute of being the conception of the latter as an object of esthetic\ncontemplation, as manifesting order and harmony, as _beautiful_. This\nconception of being will be found, however, to flow from the more\nfundamental aspects of reality considered as _true_ and as _good_, rather\nthan directly from the concept of being itself.\n\n26. TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY.\u2014When we think of anything as one we think of it\nas undivided in itself. The unity or oneness of being is the undividedness\nof being: _Unum est id quod est indivisum in se: Universaliter quaecunque\nnon habent divisionem, inquantum non habent, sic unum dicuntur_.(133)\nWhen, therefore, we conceive being as undivided into constitutive parts,\nand unmultiplied into repetitions of itself, we conceive it as _a_ being,\nas _one_. For the concept of being, formally as one, it does not seem\nnecessary that we conceive being as _divided or distinct from all other\nbeing_. This second negation, of identity with other being, rather follows\nthe conception of being as one: being is distinct from other being because\nit is already itself one: it is a prior negation that formally constitutes\nits unity, namely, _the negation of internal division or multiplication of\nitself_: God was truly _one_ from all eternity, before there was any\n_other_ being, any created being, distinct from Him. The division or\ndistinction of an object of thought from whatever is not itself is what\nconstitutes the notion of _otherness_.(134)\n\nIt is manifest that being and unity are really identical, that when we\nthink of being we think of what is really undivided in itself, that once\nwe introduce dividedness into the object of our concept we are no longer\nthinking of being but of _beings_, _i.e._ of a multitude or plurality each\nmember of which is a _being_ and _one_. For being, as an object of\nthought, is either simple or composite. If simple, it is not only\nundivided but indivisible. If composite, we cannot think of it as _a_\nbeing, capable of existing, so long as we think its parts as separate or\ndivided: only when we think of them as actually united and undivided have\nwe the concept of _a_ being: and _eo ipso_ we have the concept of being as\none, as a unity.(135)\n\nHence the scholastic formul\u00e6: _Ens et unum convertuntur_, and _Omne ens\nest unum_. The truth embodied in these is so self-evident that the\nexpression of it may seem superfluous; but they are not mere tautologies,\nand in the interests of clear and consistent thinking our attention may be\nprofitably directed to them. The same remark applies to much in the\npresent and subsequent chapters on the transcendental attributes of being.\n\n27. KINDS OF UNITY.\u2014(_a_) The unity we have been describing has been\ncalled _transcendental_, to distinguish it from _predicamental_ unity\u2014the\nunity which is proper to a special category of being, namely, _quantity_,\nand which, accordingly, is also called _quantitative_ or _mathematical_\nunity. While the former is common to all being, with which it is really\nidentical, and to which it adds nothing real, the latter belongs and is\napplicable, properly speaking, only to the mode of being which is\ncorporeal, which exists only as affected by quantity, as occupying space,\nas capable of measurement; and therefore, also, this latter unity adds\nsomething real to the being which it affects, namely, the attribute of\nquantity, of which unity is the measure and the generating principle.(136)\nFor quantity, as we shall see, is a mode of being really distinct from the\ncorporeal substance which it affects. The quantity has its own\ntranscendental unity; so has the substance which it quantifies; so has the\ncomposite whole, the quantified body, but this latter transcendental\nunity, like the composite being with which it is identical, is not a _unum\nper se_ but only a _unum per accidens_ (_cf._ _b_, _infra_).\n\nWe derive our notion of quantitative or mathematical unity, which is the\nprinciple of counting and the standard of measuring, from dividing\nmentally the continuous quantity or magnitude which is one of the\nimmediate data of sense experience. Now the distinction between this unit\nand transcendental unity supposes not merely that quantity is really\ndistinct from the corporeal substance, but also that the human mind is\ncapable of conceiving as real certain modes of being other than the\ncorporeal, modes to which quantitative concepts and processes, such as\ncounting and measuring, are not _properly_ applicable, as they are to\ncorporeal reality, but only in an _analogical_ or _transferred_ sense (2).\nThe notion of transcendental unity, therefore, bears the same relation to\nthat of quantitative unity, as the notion of being in general bears to\nthat of quantified or corporeal being.\n\n(_b_) Transcendental unity may be either _essential_ (or _substantial_,\n\u201cunum _per se_,\u201d \u201cunum _simpliciter_\u201d), or _accidental_ (\u201cunum _per\naccidens_,\u201d \u201cunum _secundum quid_\u201d). The former characterizes a being\nwhich has nothing in it beyond what is essential to it as such, _e.g._ the\nunity of any substance: and this unity is twofold\u2014(1) _unity of\nsimplicity_ and (2) _unity of composition_\u2014according as the substance is\nessentially simple (such as the human soul or a pure spirit) or\nessentially composite (such as man, or any corporeal substance: since\nevery such substance is composed essentially of a formative and an\nindeterminate principle).(137)\n\nAccidental unity is the unity of a being whose constituent factors or\ncontents are not really united in such a way as to form one essence,\nwhether simple or composite. It is threefold: (1) _collective_ unity, or\nunity _of aggregation_, as of a _heap_ of stones or a _crowd_ of men; (2)\n_artificial_ unity, as of a house or a picture; and (3) _natural_ or\n_physical_ unity, as of any existing substance with its connatural\naccidents, _e.g._ a living organism with its size, shape, qualities, etc.,\nor the human soul with its faculties.(138)\n\n(_c_) Transcendental unity may be either individual (singular, numerical,\nconcrete, real) or universal (specific, generic, abstract, logical). The\nformer is that which characterizes being or reality considered as actually\nexisting or as proximately capable of existing: the unity of an\n_individual_ nature or essence: the unity whereby a being is not merely\nundivided in itself but incapable of repetition or multiplication of\nitself. It is only the individual as such that can actually exist: the\nabstract and universal is incapable of actually existing as such. We shall\nexamine presently what it is that _individuates_ reality, and what it is\nthat renders it capable of existing actually in the form of \u201cthings\u201d or of\n\u201cpersons\u201d\u2014the forms in which it actually presents itself in our\nexperience.\n\nAbstract or universal unity is the unity which characterizes a reality\nconceived as an abstract, universal object by the human intellect. The\nobject of a specific or generic concept, \u201cman\u201d or \u201canimal,\u201d for example,\nis one in this sense, undivided in itself, but capable of indefinite\nmultiplication or repetition in the only mode in which it can actually\nexist\u2014the individual mode. The universal is _unum aptum inesse pluribus_.\n\nFinally, we can conceive any nature or essence without considering it in\neither of its alternative states\u2014either as individual or as universal.\nThus conceived it is characterized by a unity which has been commonly\ndesignated as _abstract_, or (by Scotists) as _formal_ unity.\n\n28. MULTITUDE AND NUMBER.\u2014The _one_ has for its correlative the\n_manifold_. Units, one of which is not the other, constitute multitude or\nplurality. If unity is the negation of actual division in being, multitude\nresults from a second negation, that, namely, by which the undivided being\nor unit is marked off or divided from other units.(139) We have defined\nunity by the negation of actual _intrinsic_ dividedness; and we have seen\nit to be compatible with _extrinsic_ dividedness, or otherness. Thus the\nvague notion of dividedness is anterior to that of unity. Now multitude\ninvolves dividedness; but it also involves and presupposes the intrinsic\nundividedness or _unity_ of each constituent of the manifold. In the real\norder of things the _one_ is prior to all _dividedness_; but on account of\nthe sensuous origin of our concepts we can define the former only by\nexclusion of the latter. The order in which we obtain these ideas seems,\ntherefore, to be as follows: \u201cfirst _being_, then _dividedness_, next\n_unity_ which excludes dividedness, and finally _multitude_ which consists\nof units\u201d.(140)\n\nThe relation of the _one_ to the _manifold_ is that of undivided being to\ndivided being. The same reality cannot be one and manifold under the same\naspect; though obviously a being may be actually one and potentially\nmanifold or _vice versa_, or one under a certain aspect and manifold under\nanother aspect.\n\nFrom the transcendental plurality or multitude which we have just\ndescribed we can distinguish _predicamental_ or _quantitative_ plurality:\na distinction which is to be understood in the same way as when applied to\nunity. Quantitative multitude is the actually separated or divided\ncondition of quantified being. _Number_ is a multitude measured or counted\nby unity: it is a _counted_, and, therefore, necessarily a _definite_ and\n_finite_ multitude. Now it is _mathematical_ unity that is, properly, the\nprinciple of number and the standard or measure of all counting; and\ntherefore it is only to realities which fall within the category of\nquantity\u2014in other words, to material being\u2014that the concept of number is\nproperly applicable. No doubt we can and do conceive transcendental unity\nafter the analogy of the quantitative unity which is the principle of\ncounting and measuring; and no doubt we can use the transcendental concept\nof \u201cactually undivided being\u201d as a principle of enumeration, and so\n\u201ccount\u201d or \u201cenumerate\u201d spiritual beings; but this counting is only\nanalogical; and many philosophers, following Aristotle and St. Thomas,\nhold that the concepts of _numerical_ multiplicity and _numerical_\ndistinction are not properly applicable to immaterial beings, that these\nlatter differ individually from one another _not numerically_, but each by\nits whole nature or essence, that is, _formally_.(141)\n\n29. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE UNIVERSAL.\u2014We have distinguished transcendental\nunity into individual and universal (27, _c_). Reality as endowed with\nuniversal unity is reality as apprehended by abstract thought to be\ncapable of indefinite repetition or multiplication of itself in actual\nexistence. Reality as endowed with individual unity is reality apprehended\nas actually existing, or as proximately capable of actually existing, and\nas therefore incapable of any repetition or multiplication of itself, of\nany division of itself into other \u201cselves\u201d or communication of itself to\nother \u201cselves\u201d. While, therefore, the universal has its reality only in\nthe individuals to which it communicates itself, and which thus embody it,\nthe individual has its reality in itself and of its own right, so to\nspeak: when it actually exists it is \u201c_sui juris_,\u201d and as such\nincommunicable, \u201c_incommunicabilis_\u201d. The actually existing individual is\ncalled in Latin a \u201c_suppositum_\u201d\u2014a term which we shall render by the\nEnglish \u201cthing\u201d or \u201cindividual thing\u201d. It was called by Aristotle the\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03ae, _substantia prima_, \u201cfirst substance,\u201d or \u201cfirst essence,\u201d to\ndistinguish it from the substance or essence conceived by abstract thought\nas universal; the latter being designated as \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03b4\u03ad\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1, _substantia\nsecunda_, \u201csecond substance\u201d or \u201csecond essence\u201d.\n\nNow it is a fundamental assumption in Aristotelian and scholastic\nphilosophy that whatever actually exists, or whatever is real in the sense\nthat as such it is proximately capable of actual existence, is and must be\nindividual: that the universal as such is not real, _i.e._ as such cannot\nactually exist. And the manifest reason for this assumption is that\nwhatever actually exists must be, with entire definiteness and\ndeterminateness, its own self and nothing else: it cannot be capable of\ndivision or repetition of itself, of that which it really is, into \u201cother\u201d\nrealities which would still be \u201cthat individual thing\u201d. But reality\nconsidered as universal _is_ capable of such repetition of itself\nindefinitely. Therefore reality cannot actually exist as universal, but\nonly as individual.\n\n\n    This is merely plain common sense; nor does the idealistic monism\n    which appears to attribute reality to the universal as such, and\n    which interprets reality exclusively according to the forms in\n    which it presents itself to abstract thought, really run counter\n    to this consideration; for what it really holds is not that\n    universals as such are real, but that they are phases of the\n    all-one reality which is itself _one individual being_.\n\n    But many modern philosophers hold that individuality, no less than\n    universality, is a form of thought. No doubt \u201cindividuality\u201d _in\n    the abstract_ is, no less than universality, an object abstracted\n    from the data of experience by the mind\u2019s analysis of the latter.\n    But this is not what those philosophers mean. They mean that the\n    individual as such is not a real datum of experience. From the\n    Kantian view that individuality is a purely mental form with which\n    the mind invests the datum, they draw the subjectivist conclusion\n    that the world, thus interpreted as consisting of \u201cindividuals,\u201d\n    is a phenomenal or mental product for the objective validity of\n    which there can be to man\u2019s speculative reason no sufficient\n    guarantee.\n\n    To this theory we oppose that of Aristotle and the scholastics,\n    not merely that the individual alone is actually existent, but\n    that as actually existent and as individual it is actually given\n    to us and apprehended by us in internal and external sense\n    experience; and that although in the inorganic world, and to some\n    extent in the lower forms of life, we may not be able to determine\n    for certain what portions of this experience are distinct\n    individuals, still in the world of living things generally, and\n    especially of the animal kingdom, there can be no difficulty in\n    determining this, for the simple reason that here reality is given\n    to us in sense experience as consisting of distinct individuals.\n\n\nAt the same time it is true that we can understand these individual\nrealities, interpret them, read the meaning of them, only by the\nintellectual function of judgment, _i.e._ by the analytic and synthetic\nactivity whereby we abstract and universalize certain aspects of them, and\nuse these aspects as predicates of the individuals. Now, seeing that\nintellectual thought, as distinct from sense experience, apprehends its\nobjects only as abstract and potentially universal, only as static,\nself-identical, possible essences, and nevertheless predicates these of\nthe concrete, individual, contingent, actually existing \u201cthings\u201d of sense\nexperience, identifying them with the latter in affirmative judgments;\nseeing moreover, that\u2014since the intellectual knowledge we thus acquire\nabout the data of sense experience is genuine and not chimerical\u2014those\n\u201cobjects\u201d of abstract thought must be likewise real, and must be really in\nthose individual sense data (according to the theory of knowledge which\nfinds its expression in Moderate Realism),\u2014there arises immediately the\nproblem, or rather the group of problems, regarding the relations between\nreality as revealed to intellect, _i.e._ as abstract and universal, and\nreality as revealed to sense, _i.e._ as concrete and individual. In other\nwords, we have to inquire how we are to interpret intellectually the fact\nthat reality, which as a possible essence is _universal_ for abstract\nthought, is nevertheless, as actually existing, _individualized_ for\nsense\u2014and consequently for intellect reflecting on the data of sense.(142)\n\n30. THE \u201cMETAPHYSICAL GRADES OF BEING\u201d IN THE INDIVIDUAL.\u2014What, then is\nthe relation between all that intellect can apprehend in the individual,\n_viz._ its lowest class essence or specific nature, and its whole nature\nas an individual, its _essentia atoma_ or individual nature? We can best\napproach this problem by considering first these various abstract\nthought-objects which intellect can apprehend in the individual.\n\nWhat are called the metaphysical grades of being, those positive moments\nof perfection or reality which the mind detects in the individual, as, for\ninstance, substantiality, materiality, organic life, animality,\nrationality, individuality, in the individual man\u2014whether we describe them\nas \u201cphases\u201d or \u201caspects\u201d or \u201cformalities\u201d of being\u2014are undoubtedly\ndistinct objects for abstract thought. Why does it thus distinguish\nbetween them, and express them by distinct concepts, even when it finds\nthem embodied in a single individual? Because, reflecting on the manner in\nwhich reality presents itself, through sense experience, as actually\nexisting, it finds resemblances and differences between individually\ndistinct data. It finds in some of them grades of reality which it does\nnot find in others, individual, specific, and generic grades; and\nsome\u2014transcendental\u2014grades common to all. Now between these various grades\nof being as found in one and the same individual it cannot be denied that\nthere exists a logical distinction with a foundation or ground for it in\nthe individual reality; because the latter, _being more or less similar_\nto other individual realities, causes the mind to apprehend it by a number\nof distinct concepts: the individuality whereby it differs really from all\nother individuals of the same species; the specific, differential and\ngeneric grades of being whereby it is conceptually identified with wider\nand wider classes of things; and the transcendental grades whereby it is\nconceptually identified with all others. The _similarity_ of really\ndistinct individuals, which is the _conceptual identity_ of their\n_qualities_, is the ground on which we conceptually identify their\n_essences_. Now is there any reason for thinking that these grounds of\nsimilarity, as found in the individual, are _really distinct_ from one\nanother in the latter? They are certainly conceptually distinct\nexpressions\u2014each less inadequate than the wider ones\u2014of what is really one\nindividual essence. But we must take them to be all really identical in\nand with this individual essence, unless we are prepared to hold\nconceptual plurality as such to be real plurality; in which case we should\nalso hold conceptual unity as such to be real unity. But this latter view\nis precisely the error of extreme realism, of reifying abstract concepts\nand holding the \u201c_universale a parte rei_\u201d: a theory which leads logically\nto monism.(143)\n\n31. INDIVIDUALITY.\u2014The distinction, therefore, between these grades of\nbeing in the individual, is a virtual distinction, _i.e._ a logical\ndistinction with a ground for it in the reality. This is the sort of\ndistinction which exists between the specific nature of the individual,\n_i.e._ what is contained in the definition of the lowest class to which it\nbelongs, and its _individuality_, _i.e._ what constitutes its _nature or\nessence as an individual_. No doubt the concrete existing individual\ncontains, besides its individual nature or essence, a variety of\naccidental characteristics which serve as marks or signs whereby its\nindividuality _is revealed to us_. These are called \u201cindividualizing\ncharacteristics,\u201d \u201c_notae individuantes_,\u201d the familiar scholastic list of\nthem being \u201c_forma_, _figura_, _locus_, _tempus_, _stirps_, _patria_,\n_nomen_,\u201d with manifest reference to the individual \u201cman\u201d. But though\nthese characteristics enable us to mark off the individual in space and\ntime from other individuals of the same class, thus _revealing_\nindividuality to us in the concrete, it cannot be held that they\nconstitute the individuality of the nature or substance in each case. If\nthe human substance, essence, or nature, as found in Socrates, were held\nto differ from the human substance, essence, or nature, as found in Plato,\nonly by the fact that in each it is affected by a different set of\naccidents, _i.e._ of modes accidental to the substance as found in each,\nthen it would follow that this substance is not merely _conceptually_\nidentical in both, but that it is _really_ identical in both; which is the\nerror of extreme realism. As a matter of fact it is the converse that is\ntrue: the sets of accidents are distinct because they affect individual\nsubstances already really and individually distinct.\n\nIt is manifest that the accidents which are _separable_ from the\nindividual substance, _e.g._ name, shape, size, appearance, location,\netc., cannot constitute its individuality. There are, however, other\ncharacteristics which are _inseparable_ from the individual substance, or\nwhich are _properties_ of the latter, _e.g._ the fact that an individual\nman was born of certain parents. Perhaps it is such characteristics that\ngive its individuality to the individual substance?(144) To think so would\nbe to misunderstand the question under discussion. We are not now\ninquiring into the _extrinsic_ causes whereby actually existing reality is\nindividuated, into the _efficient_ principles of its individuation, but\ninto the _formal_ and _intrinsic_ principle of the latter. There must\nobviously be something intrinsic to the individual reality itself whereby\nit is individuated. And it is about this intrinsic something we are\ninquiring. The individual man is this individual, human nature is thus\nindividuated in him, by something that is essential to human nature as\nfound in him. This something has been called\u2014after the analogy of the\n_differentia specifica_ which differentiates species within a genus\u2014the\n_differentia individua_ of the individual. It has also been called by some\nthe _differentia numerica_, and by Scotists the _haecceitas_. However we\nare to conceive this something, it is certain at all events that,\nconsidered as it is really found in the individual, it cannot be anything\n_really distinct_ from the specific nature of the latter. No doubt, the\n_differentia specifica_, considered in the abstract, it is not essential\nand intrinsic to the _natura generica_ considered in the abstract: it is\nextrinsic and accidental to the abstract content of the latter notion; but\nthis is because we are conceiving these grades of being in the abstract.\nThe same is true of the _differentia individua_ as compared with the\n_natura specifica_ in the abstract. But we are now considering these\ngrades of reality as they are actually in the concrete individual being:\nand as they are found here, we have seen that a real distinction between\nthem is inadmissible.\n\n32. THE \u201cPRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION\u201d.\u2014How, then, are we to conceive this\nsomething which individuates reality? It may be well to point out that for\nthe erroneous doctrine of extreme realism, which issues in monism, the\nproblem of individuation, as here understood, does not arise. For the\nmonist all plurality in being is merely apparent, not real: there can be\nno question of a real distinction between individual and individual.(145)\nSimilarly, the nominalist and the conceptualist evade the problem. For\nthese the individual alone is not merely formally real: it alone is\nfundamentally real: the universal is not even fundamentally real, has no\nfoundation in reality, and thus all scientific knowledge of reality as\nrevealed in sense experience is rendered impossible. But for the moderate\nrealist, while the individual alone is formally real, the universal is\nfundamentally real, and hence the problem arises. It may be forcibly\nstated in the form of a paradox: That whereby Socrates and Plato are\nreally distinct from each other as individuals is really identical with\nthe human nature which is really in both. But what individuates human\nnature in Socrates, or in Plato, is logically distinct from the human\nnature that is really in Socrates, and really in Plato. We have only to\ninquire, therefore, whether the intrinsic principle of individuation is to\nbe conceived merely as a negation, as something negative added by the mind\nto the concept of the specific nature, whereby the latter is apprehended\nas incapable of multiplication into \u201cothers\u201d each of which would be\nformally that same nature, or, in other words, as incommunicable; or is\nthe intrinsic ground of this incommunicability to be conceived as\nsomething positive, not indeed as something really distinct from, and\nsuperadded to, the specific nature, but as a positive aspect of the\nlatter, an aspect, moreover, not involved in the concept of the specific\nnature considered in the abstract.\n\nOf the many views that have been put forward on this question two or three\ncall for some attention. In the opinion of Thomists generally, the\nprinciple which individuates _material_ things, thus multiplying\nnumerically the same specific nature, is to be conceived as a positive\nmode affecting the latter and revealing it in a new aspect, whereas the\nspecific nature of the _spiritual_ individual is itself formally an\nindividual. The principle of the latter\u2019s individuation is already\ninvolved in the very concept of its specific nature, and therefore is not\nto be conceived as a distinct positive aspect of the latter but simply as\nthe absence of plurality and communicability in the latter. In material\nthings, moreover, the positive mode or aspect whereby the specific nature\nis found numerically multiplied, and incommunicable as it exists in each,\nconsists in the fact that such a specific nature involves in its very\nconstitution a _material_ principle which is actually allied with certain\n_quantitative dimensions_. Hence the principle which individuates material\nsubstances is not to be conceived\u2014after the manner in which Scotists\nconceive it\u2014as an ultimate _differentia_ affecting the _formal_ factor of\nthe nature, determining the specific nature just as the _differentia\nspecifica_ determines the generic nature, but as a _material_\ndifferentiating principle. What individuates the material individual, what\nmarks it off as one in itself, distinct or divided from other individuals\nof the same specific nature, and incommunicable in that condition, is the\nmaterial factor of that individual\u2019s nature\u2014not, indeed, the material\nfactor, _materia prima_, considered in the abstract, but the material\nfactor as proximately capable of actual existence by being allied to\ncertain more or less definite spatial or quantitative dimensions: \u201cmatter\naffected with quantity\u201d: \u201c_materia quantitate signata_\u201d.(146)\n\nIn regard to material substances this doctrine embraces two separate\ncontentions: (_a_) that the principle which individuates such a substance\nmust be conceived as something positive, not really distinct from, but yet\nnot contained in, the specific nature considered in the abstract; (_b_)\nthat this positive aspect is to be found not in the formal but in the\nmaterial principle of the composite corporeal substance.\n\nTo the former contention it might be objected that what individuates the\nspecific nature cannot be conceived as anything _positive_, superadded to\nthis nature: it cannot be anything _accidental_ to the latter, for if it\nwere, the individual would be only an accidental unity, a \u201c_unum per\naccidens_\u201d and would be constituted by an accident, which we have seen to\nbe inadmissible; nor, on the other hand, can it be anything _essential_ to\nthe specific nature, for if it were, then individuals should be capable of\nadequate essential definition, and furthermore the definition of the\nspecific nature would not really give the whole essence or _quidditas_ of\nthe individuals\u2014two consequences which are commonly rejected by all\nscholastics. To this, however, it is replied that the principle of\nindividuation is something essential to the specific nature in the sense\nthat it _is_ something intrinsic to, and really identical with, the whole\nreal substance or entity of this nature, though not involved in the\nabstract concept by the analysis of which we reach the definition or\n_quidditas_ of this nature. What individuates Socrates is certainly\nessential to Socrates, and is therefore really identical with his human\nnature; it is intrinsic to the human nature in him, a mode or aspect of\nhis human substance; yet it does not enter into the definition of his\nnature\u2014\u201c_animal rationale_\u201d\u2014for such definition abstracts from\nindividuality. When, therefore, we say that definition of the specific\nnature gives the whole _essence_ of an individual, we mean that it gives\nexplicitly the abstract (specific) essence, not the individuality which is\nreally identical with this, nor, therefore, the whole substantial reality\nof the individual. We give different answers to the questions, \u201cWhat is\nSocrates?\u201d and \u201cWho is Socrates?\u201d The answer to the former question\u2014a\n\u201cman,\u201d or a \u201crational animal\u201d\u2014gives the \u201cessence,\u201d but not explicitly the\nwhole substantial reality of the individual, this remaining incapable of\nadequate conceptual analysis. The latter question we answer by giving the\nnotes that _reveal_ individuality. These, of course, are \u201caccidental\u201d in\nthe strict sense. But even the principles which constitute the\nindividuality of separate individuals of the same species, and which\ndifferentiate these individuals numerically from one another, we do not\ndescribe as _essential_ differences, whereas we do describe specific and\ngeneric differences as _essential_. The reason of this is that the latter\nare abstract, universal, conceptual, amenable to intellectual analysis,\nscientifically important, while the former are just the reverse; the\nuniversal differences alone are principles about which we can have\nscientific knowledge, for \u201call science is of the abstract and\nuniversal\u201d;(147) and this is what we have in mind when we describe them as\n\u201cessential\u201d or \u201cformal,\u201d and individual differences as \u201centitative\u201d or\n\u201cmaterial\u201d.\n\nThe second point in the Thomistic doctrine is that corporeal substances\nare individuated by reason of their _materiality_. The formative,\nspecific, determining principle of the corporeal substance is rendered\n_incommunicable_ by its union with the material, determinable principle;\nand it becomes individually _distinct_ or separate by the fact that this\nlatter principle, in order to be capable of union with the given specific\nform, has in its very essence an exigence for certain more or less\ndeterminate dimensions in space. Corporeal things have their natural size\nwithin certain limits. The individual of a given corporeal species can\nexist only because the material principle, receptive of this specific\nform, has a natural relation to the fundamental property of corporeal\nthings, _viz._ quantity, within certain more or less determinate limits.\nThe form is rendered incommunicable by its reception in the matter. This\nconcrete realization of the form in the matter is individually distinct\nand separate from other realizations of the same specific form, by the\nfact that the matter of this realization demands certain dimensions of\nquantity: this latter property being the root-principle of numerical\nmultiplication of corporeal individuals within the same species.\n\nOn the other hand, incorporeal substances such as angels or pure spirits,\nbeing \u201cpure\u201d forms, \u201c_form\u00e6 subsistentes_,\u201d wholly and essentially\nunallied with any determinable material principle, are _of themselves_ not\nonly specific but individual; they are themselves essentially\nincommunicable, superior to all multiplication or repeated realization of\nthemselves: they are such that each can be actualized only \u201conce and for\nall\u201d: each is a species in itself: it is the full, exhaustive, and\nadequate expression of a divine type, of an exemplar in the Divine Mind:\nits realization is not, like that of a material form, the actuation of an\nindefinitely determinable material principle: it sums up and exhausts the\nimitable perfection of the specific type in its single individuality,\nwhereas the perfection of the specific type of a corporeal thing cannot be\nadequately expressed in any single individual realization, but only by\nrepeated realizations; nor indeed can it ever be adequately, exhaustively\nexpressed, by any finite multitude of these.\n\nIt follows that in regard to pure spirits the individuating principle and\nthe specific principle are not only really but also logically,\nconceptually identical; that the distinction between individual and\nindividual is here properly a specific distinction; that it can be\ndescribed as numerical only in an analogical sense, if by numerical we\nmean material or quantitative, _i.e._ the distinction between corporeal\nindividuals of the same species (28).\n\nBut the distinction between individual human souls is not a specific or\nformal distinction. These, though spiritual, are not _pure_ spirits. They\nare spiritual substances which, of their very nature, are essentially\nordained for union with matter. They all belong to the same species\u2014the\nhuman species. But they do not constitute individuals of this species\nunless as existing actually united with matter. Each human soul has a\ntranscendental relation to its own body, to the \u201c_materia signata_\u201d for\nwhich, and in which, it was created. For each human soul this relation is\nunique. Just as it is the material principle of each human being, the\nmatter as allied to quantitative dimensions, that individuates the man, so\nit is the unique relation of his soul to the material principle thus\nspatially determined, that individuates his soul. Now the soul, even when\ndisembodied and existing after death, necessarily retains in its very\nconstitution this essential relation to its own body; and thus it is that\ndisembodied souls, though not actually allied with matter, remain\nnumerically distinct and individuated in virtue of their essential\nrelation, each to its own body. We see, therefore, that human souls,\nthough spiritual, are an entirely different order of beings, and must be\nconceived quite differently, from pure spirits.\n\n\n    We must be content with this brief exposition of the Thomistic\n    doctrine on individuation. A discussion of the arguments for and\n    against it would carry us too far.(148) There is no doubt that\n    what _reveals_ the individuality of the corporeal substance to us\n    is its material principle, in virtue of which its existence is\n    circumscribed within certain limits of time and space and affected\n    with individual characteristics, \u201c_notae individuantes_\u201d. But the\n    Thomistic doctrine, which finds in \u201c_materia signata_\u201d the formal,\n    intrinsic, constitutive principle of individuation, goes much\n    deeper. It is intimately connected with the Aristotelian theory of\n    knowledge and reality. According to this philosophy the formative\n    principle or \u1f14\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, the _forma subtantialis_, is our sole key to\n    the intelligibility of corporeal things: these are intelligible in\n    so far forth as they are actual, and they are actual in virtue of\n    their \u201cforms\u201d. Hence the tendency of the scholastic commentators\n    of Aristotle to use the term \u201cform\u201d as synonymous with the term\n    \u201cnature,\u201d though the whole nature of the corporeal substance\n    embraces the material as well as the formal principle: for even\n    though it does, we can understand nothing about this \u201cnature\u201d\n    beyond what is intelligible in it in virtue of its \u201cform.\u201d The\n    material principle, on the other hand, is the potential,\n    indeterminate principle, in itself unintelligible. We know that in\n    ancient Greek philosophy it was regarded as the \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, the surd\n    and contingent principle in things, the element which resisted\n    rational analysis and fell outside the scope of \u201cscience,\u201d or\n    \u201cknowledge of the necessary and universal\u201d. While it revealed the\n    forms or natures of things to sense, it remained itself impervious\n    to intellect, which grasped these natures and rendered them\n    intelligible only by divesting them of matter, by abstracting them\n    from matter. Reality is intelligible only in so far forth as it is\n    immaterial, either in fact or by abstraction. The human intellect,\n    being itself spiritual, is \u201creceptive of forms without matter\u201d.\n    But being itself allied with matter, its proper object is none\n    other than the natures or essences of corporeal things,\n    abstracted, however, from the matter in which they are actually\n    \u201cimmersed\u201d. The only reason, therefore, why any intelligible form\n    or essence which, as abstract and universal, is \u201cone\u201d for\n    intellect, is nevertheless actually or potentially \u201cmanifold\u201d in\n    its reality, is because it is allied with a material principle. It\n    is the latter that accounts for the numerical multiplication, in\n    actual reality, of any intelligible form or essence. If the latter\n    is material it can be actualized only by indefinitely repeated,\n    numerically or materially distinct, alliances with matter. It\n    cannot be actualized \u201c_tota simul_,\u201d or \u201conce for all,\u201d as it\n    were. It is, therefore, the material principle that not merely\n    reveals, but also constitutes, the individuation of such corporeal\n    forms or essences. Hence, too, the individual as such cannot be\n    adequately apprehended by intellect; for all intelligible\n    principles of reality are formal, whereas the individuating\n    principle is material.\n\n    On the other hand, if an intelligible essence or form be purely\n    spiritual, wholly unrelated to any indeterminate, material\n    principle, it must be \u201cone\u201d not alone conceptually or logically\n    but also really: it can exist only as \u201cone\u201d: it is of itself\n    individual: it can be differentiated from other spiritual essences\n    not materially but only formally, or, in other words, not\n    numerically but by a distinction which is at once individual and\n    specific. Two pure spirits cannot be \u201ctwo\u201d numerically and \u201cone\u201d\n    specifically, two for sense and one for intellect, as two men are:\n    if they are distinct at all they must be distinct for intellect,\n    _i.e._ they cannot be properly conceived as two members of the\n    same species.\n\n    In this solution of the question it is not easy to see how the\n    material principle, which, by its alliance with quantity,\n    individuates the form, is itself individuated so as to be the\n    source and principle of a multiplicity of numerically distinct and\n    incommunicable realizations of this form. Perhaps the most that\n    can be said on this point is that we must conceive quantity, which\n    is the fundamental property of corporeal reality, as being itself\n    essentially divisible, and the material principle as deriving from\n    its essential relation to quantity its function of multiplying the\n    same specific nature numerically.\n\n\nOf those who reject the Thomistic doctrine some few contend that it is the\n_actual existence_ of any specific nature that should be conceived as\nindividuating the latter. No doubt the universal as such cannot exist;\nreality in order to exist actually must be individual. Yet it cannot be\nactual existence that individuates it. We must conceive it as individual\nbefore conceiving it as actually existent; and we can conceive it as\nindividual while abstracting from its existence. We can think, for\ninstance, of purely possible individual men, or angels, as numerically or\nindividually distinct from one another. Moreover, what individuates the\nnature must be essential to the latter, but actual existence is not\nessential to any finite nature. Hence actual existence cannot be the\nprinciple of individuation.(149) Can it be contended that _possible_\nexistence is what individuates reality? No; for possible existence is\nnothing more than intrinsic capacity to exist actually, and this is\nessential to all reality: it is the criterion whereby we distinguish real\nbeing from logical being; but real being, as such, is indifferent to\nuniversality or individuality; as far as the simple concept of real being\nis concerned the latter may be either universal or individual; the concept\nabstracts equally from either condition of being.\n\nThe vast majority, therefore, of those who reject the Thomistic doctrine\non individuation, support the view that what individuates any nature or\nsubstance is simply the whole reality, the total entity, of the\nindividual. This total entity of the individual, though really identical\nwith the specific nature, must be conceived as something positive,\nsuperadded to the latter, for it involves a something which is logically\nor mentally distinct from the latter. This something is what we conceive\nas a _differentia individua_, after the analogy of the _differentia\nspecifica_ which contracts the concept of the genus to that of the\nspecies; and by Scotists it has been termed \u201c_haecceitas_\u201d or \u201cthisness\u201d.\nWithout using the Scotist terminology, most of those scholastics who\nreject the Thomist doctrine on this point advocate the present view. The\nindividuality or \u201cthisness\u201d of the individual substance is regarded as\nhaving no special principle in the individual, other than the whole\nsubstantial entity of the latter. If the nature is simple it is of itself\nindividual; if composite, the intrinsic principles from which it\nresults\u2014_i.e._ matter and form essentially united\u2014suffice to individuate\nit.\n\nIn this view, therefore, the material principle of any individual man, for\nexample, is numerically and individually distinct from that of any other\nindividual, _of itself_ and independently of its relation either to the\nformative principle or to quantity. The formative principle, too, is\nindividuated _of itself_, and not by the material principle which is\nreally distinct from it, or by its relation to this material principle.\nLikewise the union of both principles, which is a substantial mode of the\ncomposite substance, is individuated and rendered numerically distinct\nfrom all other unions of these two individual principles, not by either or\nboth these, but by itself. And finally, the individual composite substance\nhas its individuation from these two intrinsic principles thus\nindividually united.\n\n\n    It may be doubted, perhaps, whether this attempt at explaining the\n    real, individual \u201cmanifoldness\u201d of what is \u201cone\u201d for intellect,\n    _i.e._ the universal, throws any real light upon the problem. No\n    doubt, every element or factor which is grasped by intellect in\n    its analysis of reality\u2014matter, form, substance, accident,\n    quantity, nay, even \u201cindividuality\u201d itself\u2014is apprehended as\n    abstract and universal; and if we hold the doctrine of Moderate\n    Realism, that the intellect in apprehending the universal attains\n    to reality, and not merely to a logical figment of its own\n    creation, the problem of relating intelligibly the reality which\n    is \u201cone\u201d for intellect with the same reality as manifestly\n    \u201cmanifold\u201d in its concrete realizations for sense, is a genuine\n    philosophical problem. To say that what individuates any real\n    essence or nature, what deprives it of the \u201coneness\u201d and\n    \u201cuniversality\u201d which it has for intellect, what makes it \u201cthis,\u201d\n    \u201cthat,\u201d or \u201cthe other\u201d incommunicable individual, must be\n    conceived to be simply the whole essential reality of that nature\n    itself\u2014leaves us still in ignorance as to why such a nature, which\n    is really \u201cone\u201d for intellect, can be really \u201cmanifold\u201d in its\n    actualizations for sense experience. The reason why the nature\n    which is one and universal for abstract thought, and which is\n    undoubtedly not a logical entity but a reality capable of actual\n    existence, can be actualized as a manifold of distinct\n    individuals, must be sought, we are inclined to think, in the\n    relation of this nature to a material principle in alliance with\n    quantity which is the source of all purely numerical, \u201cspace and\n    time\u201d distinctions.\n\n\n33. INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS.\u2014The r\u00f4le of quantity in the Thomistic\ntheory of individuation suggests the question: How are accidents\nthemselves individuated? We have referred already (29, _n._) to the view\nthat they are individuated by the individual subjects or substances in\nwhich they inhere. If we distinguish again between what _reveals_\nindividuality and what _constitutes it_, there can be no doubt that when\naccidents of the same kind are found in individually distinct subjects\nwhat reveals the numerical distinction between the former is the fact that\nthey are found inhering in the latter. So, also, distinction of individual\nsubstances is the _extrinsic_, _genetic_, or _causal_ principle of the\nnumerical distinction between similar accidents arising in these\nsubstances. But when the same kind of accident recurs successively in the\nsame individual substance\u2014as, for example, when a man performs repeated\nacts of the same kind\u2014what reveals the numerical or individual distinction\nbetween these latter cannot be the individual substance, for it is one and\nthe same, but rather the _time_ distinction between the accidents\nthemselves.\n\nThe intrinsic constitutive principle which formally individuates the\naccidents of individually distinct substances is, according to Thomists\ngenerally, their essential relation to the individual substances in which\nthey appear. It is not clear how this theory can be applied to the\nfundamental accident of corporeal substances. If the function of formally\nindividuating the corporeal substance itself is to be ascribed in any\nmeasure to _quantity_, it would seem to follow that this latter must be\nregarded as individuated by itself, by its own total entity or reality.\nAnd this is the view held by most other scholastics in regard to the\nindividuation of accidents generally: that these, like substances, are\nindividuated by their own total positive reality.\n\nWhen there is question of the same kind of accident recurring in the same\nindividual subject, the \u201ctime\u201d distinction between such successive\nindividual accidents of the same kind would appear not merely to _reveal_\ntheir individuality but also to indicate a different relation of each to\nits subject as existing at that particular point of space and time: so\nthat the relation of the accident to its individual subject, as here and\nnow existing in the concrete, would be the individuating principle of the\naccident.\n\nWhether a number of accidents of the same _species infima_, and distinct\nmerely numerically, could exist simultaneously in the same individual\nsubject, is a question on which scholastic philosophers are not agreed:\nthe negative opinion, which has the authority of St. Thomas, being the\nmore probable. Those various questions on the individuation of accidents\nwill be better understood from a subsequent exposition of the scholastic\ndoctrine on accidents (Ch. viii.).\n\n\n    It may be well to remark that in inquiring about the individuation\n    of substances and accidents we have been considering reality from\n    a static standpoint, seeking how we are to conceive and interpret\n    intellectually, or for abstract thought, the relation of the\n    universal to the individual. If, however, we ascribe to \u201ctime\u201d\n    distinctions any function in individuating accidents of the same\n    kind in the same individual substance, we are introducing into our\n    analysis the kinetic aspect of reality, or its subjection to\n    processes of change.\n\n    We may call attention here to a few other questions of minor\n    import discussed by scholastics. First, have all individuals of\n    the same species the same _substantial_ perfection, or can\n    individuals have different grades of substantial perfection within\n    the same species? All admit the obvious fact that individual\n    differs from individual within the same species in the number,\n    variety, extent and intensity of their accidental properties and\n    qualities. But, having the human soul mainly in view, they\n    disagree as to whether the substantial perfection of the specific\n    nature can be actualized in different grades in different\n    individuals. According to the more common opinion there cannot be\n    different _substantial_ grades of the same specific nature, for\n    the simple reason that every such grade of substantial perfection\n    should be regarded as specific, as changing the species: hence,\n    _e.g._ all human souls are substantially equal in perfection. This\n    view is obviously based upon the conception of specific types or\n    essences as being, after the analogy of numbers, immutable when\n    considered in the abstract. And it seems to be confirmed by the\n    consideration that the intrinsic principle of individuation is\n    nothing, or adds nothing, _really distinct_ from the specific\n    essence itself.\n\n    Another question in connexion with individuation has derived at\n    least an historical interest from the notable controversy to which\n    it gave rise in the seventeenth century between Clarke and\n    Leibniz. The latter, in accordance with the principles of his\n    system of philosophy,\u2014the _Law of Sufficient Reason_ and the _Law\n    of Continuity_ among the _monads_ or ultimate principles of\n    being,\u2014contended that two individual beings so absolutely alike as\n    to be _indiscernible_ would be _eo ipso identical_, in other\n    words, that the reality of two such beings is impossible.\n\n    Of course if we try to conceive two individuals so absolutely\n    alike both in essence and accidents, both in the abstract and in\n    the concrete, as to be indiscernible either by our senses or by\n    our intellect, or by any intellect\u2014even the Divine Intellect\u2014we\n    are simply conceiving _the same thing_ twice over. But is there\n    anything impossible or contradictory in thinking that God could\n    create two perfectly similar beings, distinct from each other only\n    individually, so similar, however, that neither human sense nor\n    human intellect could apprehend them as two, but only as one? The\n    impossibility is not apparent. Were they two material individuals\n    they should, of course, occupy the same space in order to have\n    similar spatial relations, but impenetrability is not essential to\n    corporeal substances. And even in the view that each is\n    individuated by its \u201c_materia signata_\u201d it is not impossible to\n    conceive numerically distinct quantified matters allied at the\n    same time to the same dimensions of space. If, on the other hand,\n    there be question of two pure spirits, absolutely similar\n    specifically, even in the Thomistic view that here the individual\n    distinction is at the same time specific there seems to be no\n    sufficient ground for denying that the Divine Omnipotence could\n    create two or more such individually (and therefore specifically)\n    distinct spirits:(150) such distinction remaining, of course,\n    indiscernible for the finite human intellect.\n\n    The argument of Leibniz, that there would be _no sufficient\n    reason_ for the creation of two such indiscernible beings, and\n    that it would therefore be repugnant to the Divine Wisdom, is\n    extrinsic to the question of their intrinsic possibility: if they\n    be intrinsically possible they cannot be repugnant to any\n    attribute of the Divinity, either to the Divine Omnipotence or to\n    the Divine Wisdom.\n\n\n34. IDENTITY.\u2014Considering the order in which we acquire our ideas we are\neasily convinced that the notion of finite being is antecedent to that of\ninfinite being. Moreover, it is from reflection on finite beings that we\narrive at the most abstract notion of being in general. We make the object\nof this latter notion definite only by dividing it off mentally from\nnothingness, conceived _per modum entis_, or as an _ens rationis_. Thus\nthe natural way of making our concepts definite is by _limiting_ them; it\nis only when we come to reflect on the necessary implications of our\nconcept of \u201cinfinite being\u201d that we realize the possibility of conceiving\na being which is _definite_ without being really _limited_, which is\ndefinite by the very fact of its infinity, by its possession of unlimited\nperfection; and even then our imperfect human mode of conceiving \u201cinfinite\nbeing\u201d is helped by distinguishing or dividing it off from all finite\nbeing and contrasting it with the latter. All this goes to prove the truth\nof the teaching of St. Thomas, that the mental function of _dividing_ or\n_distinguishing_ precedes our concepts of unity and multitude. Now the\nconcepts of _identity_ and _distinction_ are closely allied with those of\nunity and multitude; but they add something to these latter. When we think\nof a being as one we must analyse it further, look at it under different\naspects, and _compare it with itself_, before we can regard it as _the\nsame_ or _identical_ with itself. Or, at least, we must think of it twice\nand compare it with itself in the affirmative judgment \u201cThis is itself,\u201d\n\u201cA is A,\u201d thus formulating the logical _Principle of Identity_, in order\nto come into possession of the concept of _identity_.(151) Every\naffirmative categorical judgment asserts _identity_ of the predicate with\nthe subject (\u201c_S is P_\u201d): asserts, in other words, that what we apprehend\nunder the notion of the predicate (_P_) is _really identical_ with what we\nhave apprehended under the _distinct_ notion of the subject (_S_). The\nsynthetic function of the affirmative categorical judgment _identifies_ in\nthe real order what the analytic function of mental abstraction had\n_separated_ in the logical order. By saying that the affirmative\ncategorical judgment asserts identity we mean that by asserting that \u201cthis\nis that,\u201d \u201cman is rational\u201d we identify \u201cthis\u201d with \u201cthat,\u201d \u201cman\u201d with\n\u201crational,\u201d thus _denying_ that they are _two_, that they are _distinct_,\nthat they _differ_. Identity is one of those elementary concepts which\ncannot be defined; but perhaps we may describe it as _the logical relation\nthrough which the mind asserts the objects of two or more of its thoughts\nto be really one_.\n\nIf the object formally represented by each of the concepts is one and the\nsame\u2014as, _e.g._ when we compare \u201c_A_\u201d with \u201c_A_,\u201d or \u201cman\u201d with \u201crational\nanimal,\u201d or, in general, any object with its definition\u2014the identity is\nboth _real and logical_ (or _conceptual_, _formal_). If the concepts\ndiffer in their formal objects while representing _one and the same\nreality_\u2014as when we compare \u201cSt. Peter\u201d with \u201chead of the apostles,\u201d or\n\u201cman\u201d with \u201crational\u201d\u2014the identity is _real, but not logical_ or formal.\nFinally, if we represent two or more realities, \u201cJohn, James, Thomas,\u201d by\nthe same formal concept, \u201cman,\u201d the identity is _merely logical_ or\nformal, _not real_. Of these three kinds of identity the first is\nsometimes called _adequate_, the second and third _inadequate_.\n\nLogical identity may be _specific_ or _generic_, according as we identify\nreally distinct individuals under one specific concept, or really distinct\nspecies or classes under one generic concept. Again, it may be _essential_\nor _accidental_, according as the abstract and universal class-concept\nunder which really distinct members are classified represents a common\npart of the essence of these members or only a common property or\naccident. Thus John, James and Thomas are essentially identical in their\n_human nature_; they are accidentally identical in being all three\n_fair-haired_ and _six feet in height_. Logical identity under the concept\nof _quality_ is based on the real relation of _similarity_; logical\nidentity under the concept of _quantity_ is based on the real relation of\n_equality_. When we say that _essential_ (logical) _identity_ (_e.g._ the\nidentity of John, James and Thomas under the concept of \u201cman\u201d) is based on\nthe fact that the really distinct individuals have really _similar_\nnatures, we merely mean that _our_ knowledge of natures or essences is\nderived from our knowledge of qualities, taking \u201cqualities\u201d in the wide\nsense of \u201caccidents\u201d generally: that the properties and activities of\nthings are our only key to the nature of these things: _Operari sequitur\nesse._ It is not implied, nor is it true, that real _similarity_ is a\npartial _real identity_: it is but the ground of a partial _logical_\nidentity,\u2014identity under the common concept of some quality (in the wide\nsense of this term). For example, the height of John is as really distinct\nfrom that of James as the humanity of John is from that of James. If,\nthen, individual things are _really_ distinct, how is it that we can\nrepresent (even inadequately) _a multitude_ of them by _one_ concept? To\nsay that we can do so because they reveal themselves to us as _similar_ to\none another is to say what is undoubtedly true; but this does not solve\nthe problem of the relation between the universal and the individual in\nhuman experience: rather it places us face to face with this problem.\n\nReverting now to _real_ identity: whatever we can predicate affirmatively\nabout a being considered as _one_, and as subject of a judgment, we regard\nas really identical with that being. We cannot predicate a real part of\nits real whole, or _vice versa_. But our concepts, when compared together\nin judgment, bear _logical_ relations of extension and intension to each\nother, that is, relations of logical part to logical whole. Thus, the\n_logical_ identity of subject and predicate in the affirmative judgment\nmay be only _inadequate_.(152) But the real identity underlying the\naffirmative judgment is an adequate real identity. When we say, for\nexample, that \u201cSocrates is wise,\u201d we mean that the object of our concept\nof \u201cwisdom\u201d is in this case really and adequately identical with the\nobject of our concept of \u201cSocrates\u201d: in other words that we are conceiving\none and the same real being under two distinct concepts, each of which\nrepresents, more or less adequately, the whole real being, and one of them\nin this case less adequately than the other.\n\nWe have to bear in mind that while considering being as one or manifold,\nidentical or distinct, we are thinking of it in its _static_ mode, as an\nobject of abstract thought, not in its _dynamic and kinetic_ mode as\nactually existing in space and time, and subject to change. It is the\nidentity of being with itself when considered in this static, unchanging\ncondition, that is embodied in the logical _Principle of Identity_. In\norder, therefore, that this principle may find its application to being or\nreality _as subject to actual change_\u2014and this is the state in which _de\nfacto_ reality is presented to us as an immediate datum of experience\u2014we\nmust seize upon the changing reality and think of it in an indivisible\ninstant apart from the change to which it is actually subject; only thus\ndoes the Principle of Identity apply to it\u2014as _being_, not as _becoming_,\nnot _in fieri_, but _in facto esse_. The Principle of Identity, which\napplies to all real being, whether possible or actual, tells us simply\nthat \u201ca thing is what it is\u201d. But for the understanding of actual being as\nsubject to real change we must supplement the Principle of Identity by\nanother principle which tells us that such an actual being not only is\nactually what it is (Principle of Identity), but also that it _is\npotentially something other than what it actually is, that it is\npotentially what it can become actually_ (Ch. ii.).\n\nWe have seen that, since change is not continuous annihilation and\ncreation, the changing being must in some real and true sense _persist_\nthroughout the process of change. It is from experience of change we\nderive our notion of time-duration; and the concept of permanence or\nstability throughout change gives us the notion of a real sameness or\nabiding self-identity which is compatible with real change. But a being\nwhich persists in existence is identical with itself throughout its\nduration only in so far forth as it has not changed. Only the Necessary\nBeing, whose duration is absolutely exempt from all change, is\n_absolutely_ or _metaphysically_ identical with Himself: His duration is\neternity\u2014which is one perpetual, unchanging _now_. A being which persists\nunchanged in its essence or nature, which is exempt from substantial\nchange, but which is subject to accidental change, to a succession of\naccidental qualities such as vital actions\u2014such a being is said to retain\nits _physical_ identity with itself throughout those changes. Such, for\ninstance, is the identity of the human soul with itself, or of any\nindividual living thing during its life, or even of an inorganic material\nsubstance as long as it escapes substantial change. Finally, the\npersisting identity of a collection of beings, united by some moral bond\nso as to form a moral unit, is spoken of as _moral_ identity as long as\nthe bond remains, even though the constituent members may be constantly\ndisappearing to be replaced by others: as in a nation, a religious\nsociety, a legal corporation, etc.\n\n35. DISTINCTION.\u2014Distinction is the correlative of identity; it is the\nabsence or negation of the latter. We express the relation called\ndistinction by the negative judgment, \u201cthis is not that\u201d; it is the\nrelation of a being to whatever is not itself, the relation of _one_ to\n_other_.\n\nDistinction may be either _adequate_ or _inadequate_, according as we\ndistinguish one total object of thought from another total object, or only\nfrom a part of itself. For example, the distinction between John and James\nis an adequate real distinction, while that between John and his body is\nan inadequate real distinction; the distinction between John\u2019s rationality\nand his animality is an adequate logical distinction, while the\ndistinction between either of these and his humanity is an inadequate\nlogical distinction.\n\nWe have already (23) briefly explained and illustrated the most important\nclassification of distinctions: that into real and logical; the\nsub-division of the latter into purely logical and virtual; and of the\nlatter again into perfect (complete, adequate) and imperfect (incomplete,\ninadequate). But the theory there briefly outlined calls for some further\nanalysis and amplification.\n\n36. LOGICAL DISTINCTIONS AND THEIR GROUNDS.\u2014The purely logical distinction\nmust not be confounded with a mere _verbal_ distinction, _e.g._ that\nbetween an \u201cedifice\u201d and a \u201cbuilding,\u201d or between \u201ctruthfulness\u201d and\n\u201cveracity\u201d. A logical distinction is a distinction _in the concepts_:\nthese must represent one and the same reality but in different ways: the\none may be more explicit, more fully analysed than the other, as a\ndefinition is in comparison with the thought-object defined; or the one\nmay represent the object less adequately than the other, as when we\ncompare (in intension) the concepts \u201cman\u201d and \u201canimal\u201d; or the one may be\npredicated of the other in an affirmative judgment; or the one may\nrepresent the object as concrete and individual, the other the same object\nas abstract and universal.(153)\n\nComparing, in the next place, the purely logical with the virtual\ndistinction, we see that the grounds for making these distinctions are\ndifferent. Every distinction made by the mind must have an intelligible\nground or reason of some sort\u2014a _fundamentum distinctionis_. Now in the\ncase of the purely logical distinction the ground is understood to consist\nexclusively in the needs of the mind itself\u2014needs which spring from the\nmind\u2019s own limitations when confronted with the task of understanding or\ninterpreting reality, of making reality intelligible. Purely logical\ndistinctions are therefore seen to be a class of purely logical relations,\n_i.e._ of those _entia rationis_ which the mind must construct for itself\nin its effort to understand the real. They have no other reality as\nobjects of thought than the reality they derive from the constitutive or\nconstructive activity of the mind. They are modes, or forms, or terms, of\nthe cognitive activity itself, not of the reality which is the object\napprehended and contemplated by means of this cognitive activity.\n\nThe virtual distinction, on the other hand, although it also, as an object\nof thought, is only an _ens rationis_\u2014inasmuch as there is no real duality\nor plurality corresponding to it in the reality into which the mind\nintroduces it, this reality being a real _unity_\u2014the virtual distinction\nis considered, nevertheless, to have a ground, or reason, or foundation\n(for making and introducing it) in the nature of this one reality; that\nis, it is regarded as having a _real_ foundation, a _fundamentum in re_.\nIn so far, therefore, as our knowledge is permeated by virtual\ndistinctions, reality cannot be said to be _formally_, but only\n_fundamentally_ what this knowledge represents it to be. Does this fact\ninterfere with the objective validity of our knowledge? Not in the least;\nfor we do not ascribe to the reality the distinctions, and other such\nmodes or forms, which we know by reflection to be formally characteristic\n_not of things_ but _of our thought or cognition of things_. Our\nknowledge, therefore, so far as it goes, may be a faithful apprehension of\nreality, even though it be itself affected by modes not found in the\nreality.\n\nBut what is this _real_ foundation of the virtual distinction? What _is_\nthe _fundamentum in re_? It is not a real or objective duality in virtue\nof which we could say that there are, in the object of our thought, two\nbeings or realities one of which is not the other. Such duality would\ncause a _real_ distinction. But just here the difficulties of our analysis\nbegin to arise: for we have to fix our attention on actually existing\nrealities; and, assuming that each and every one of these is an\nindividual, we have to bear in mind the relation of the real to the\nactual, of reality as abstract and universal to reality as concrete and\nindividual, of the simple to the composite, of the stable to the changing,\nof essential to accidental unity\u2014in any and every attempt to discriminate\nin detail between a real and a virtual distinction. Nor is it easy to lay\ndown any general test which will serve even theoretically to discriminate\nbetween them. Let us see what grounds have been mainly suggested as real\nfoundations for the virtual distinction.\n\nIf a being which is not only one but simple, manifests, in the superior\ngrade of being to which it belongs, a perfection which is equivalent to\nmany lesser perfections found really distinct and separate elsewhere, in\nseparate beings of an inferior order, this is considered a sufficient real\nground for considering the former being, though really one and simple, as\nvirtually manifold.(154) The human soul, as being virtually\nthreefold\u2014rational, sentient and vegetative\u2014is a case in point: but only\non the assumption that the soul of the individual man can be proved to be\none and simple. This, of course, all scholastics regard as capable of\nproof: even those of them who hold that the powers or faculties whereby it\nimmediately manifests these three grades of perfection are _accidental_\nrealities, _really distinct_ from one another and from the _substance_ of\nthe soul itself.\n\nAgain, the being which is the object of our thought may be so rich in\nreality or perfection that our finite minds cannot adequately grasp it by\nany one mental intuition, but must proceed discursively, by analysis and\nabstraction, taking in partial aspects of it successively through\ninadequate concepts; while realizing that these aspects, these objects of\nour distinct concepts, are only partial aspects of one and the same real\nbeing. This, in fact, is our common experience. But the theory assumes\nthat we are able to determine when these objects of our concepts are only\nmental aspects of _one_ reality, and when they are several separate\nrealities; nay, even, that we can determine whether or not they are really\ndistinct entities united together to form one _composite_ individual\nbeing, or only mentally distinct views of one _simple_ individual being.\nFor example, it is assumed that while the distinction between the sentient\nand the rational grades of being in a human individual can be shown to be\nonly a virtual distinction, that between the body and the soul of the same\nindividual can be shown to be a real distinction; or, again, that while\nthe distinction between essence, intellect, and will in God, can be shown\nto be only a virtual distinction, that between essence, intellect, and\nwill in man, can be shown to be a real distinction.\n\n37. THE VIRTUAL DISTINCTION AND THE REAL DISTINCTION.\u2014Now scholastics\ndiffer considerably in classifying this, that, or the other distinction,\nas logical or as real; but this does not prove that it is impossible ever\nto determine with certitude whether any particular distinction is logical\nor real. What we are looking for just now is a general test for\ndiscriminating, if such can be found. And this brings us to a\nconsideration of the test suggested in the very definitions themselves. At\nfirst sight it would appear to be an impracticable, if not even an\nunintelligible test: \u201cThe distinction is real if it exists in the\nreality\u2014_i.e._ if the reality is _two_ (or more) _beings_, not _one\nbeing_\u2014antecedently to, or independently of, the consideration of the\nmind; otherwise the distinction is logical\u201d. But\u2014it might be objected\u2014how\ncan we possibly know whether or not any object of perception or thought is\n_one_ or _more than one_ antecedently to, or independently of, the\nconsideration of the mind? It is certainly impossible for us to know what,\nor what kind, reality is, or whether it is one or manifold, apart from and\nprior to, the exercise of our own cognitive activity. This, therefore,\ncannot be what the test means: to interpret it in such a sense would be\nabsurd. But when we have perceived reality in our actual sense experience,\nwhen we have interpreted it, got the meaning of it, made it intelligible,\nand actually understood it, by the spontaneous exercise of intellect, the\njudging and reasoning faculty: then, obviously, we are at liberty to\nreflect critically on those antecedent spontaneous processes, on the\nknowledge which is the result of them, and the reality which is known\nthrough them; and by such critical reflection on those processes, their\nobjects and their products, on the \u201creality as perceived and known\u201d and on\nthe \u201cperceiving\u201d and \u201cknowing\u201d of it, we may be able to distinguish\nbetween two classes of contributions to the total result which is the\n\u201cknown reality\u201d: those which we must regard as purely mental, as modes or\nforms or subjectively constructed terms of the mental function of\ncognition itself (whether perceptual or conceptual), and those which we\nmust regard as given or presented to the mind as objects, which are not in\nany sense constructed or contributed by the mind, which, therefore, are\nwhat they are independently of our mental activity, and which would be and\nremain what they are, and what we have apprehended them to be, even if we\nhad never perceived or thought of them. This, according to the\nscholastics, is the sense\u2014and it is a perfectly intelligible sense\u2014in\nwhich we are called on to decide whether the related terms of any given\ndistinction have been merely rendered distinct by the analytic activity of\nthe cognitive process, or are themselves distinct realities irrespective\nof this process. That it is possible to carry on successfully, at least to\nsome extent, this work of discrimination between the subjective and the\nobjective factors of our cognitive experience, can scarcely be denied. It\nis what philosophers in every age have been attempting. There are,\nhowever, some distinctions about the nature of which philosophers have\nnever been able to agree, some holding them to be real, others to be only\nvirtual: the former view being indicative of the tendency to emphasize the\nr\u00f4le of cognition as a passive representation of objectively given\nreality; the latter view being an expression of the opposite tendency to\nemphasize the active or constitutive or constructive factors whereby\ncognition assimilates to the mind\u2019s own mode of being the reality given to\nit in experience. In all cognition there is an assimilation of reality and\nmind, of object and subject. When certain distinctions are held to be real\nthis consideration is emphasized: that in the cognitive process, as such,\nit is the mind that is assimilated to the objective reality.(155) When\nthese same distinctions are held to be logical this other consideration is\nemphasized: that in the cognitive process reality must also be assimilated\nto mind, must be mentalized so to speak: _Cognitum est in cognoscente\nsecundum modum cognoscentis_: that in this process the mind must often\nregard what is _one_ reality under _distinct aspects_: and that if we\nregard these distinct aspects as distinct realities we are violating the\nprinciple, _Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_.\n\n\n    Now those philosophers who hold certain distinctions to be\n    virtual, and not real, thereby ascribe to cognitive experience a\n    larger sphere of constitutive or constructive influence than would\n    be allowed to it by advocates of the reality of such distinctions.\n    But by doing so are they to be regarded as calling into question\n    the objective validity of human knowledge? By no means: the fact\n    that the human mind can understand reality only by processes of\n    abstracting, generalizing, comparing, relating, analysing and\n    synthesizing\u2014processes which involve the production of logical\n    entities\u2014in no way vitiates the value of these modes of\n    understanding: it merely indicates that they are less perfect than\n    intuitive modes of understanding which would dispense with such\n    logical entities,\u2014the modes characteristic of pure, angelic\n    intelligences, or the knowledge of the Deity. The objective\n    validity of human cognition is not interfered with either by\n    enlarging or by restricting the domain of the mind\u2019s constitutive\n    activity in forming such logical entities; nor, therefore, by\n    claiming that certain distinctions are real rather than virtual,\n    or _vice versa_. It must be remembered, moreover, that the virtual\n    distinction is not purely logical: it has a foundation in the\n    reality, a \u201c_fundamentum in re_\u201d; and in so far as it has it gives\n    us an insight into the nature of reality.\n\n    No doubt, any particular distinction cannot be virtual and at the\n    same time simply real: either view of it must be erroneous: and\n    possibly both, if it happen to be _de facto_ a _purely_ logical\n    distinction. But the error of confounding a virtual distinction\n    with a real is not so great as that of regarding either as a\n    purely logical distinction. Now the tendency of much modern\n    philosophy, under the influence of Kant, has been to regard all\n    the categories in which the mind apprehends reality as being\n    wholly and exclusively forms of cognition, as being in the reality\n    neither formally nor even fundamentally; and to infer from this an\n    essential, constitutional inability of the mind to attain to a\n    valid knowledge of reality. But if, as a matter of fact, these\n    categories are in the reality formally, nay, even if they are in\n    it only fundamentally, the inference that issues in Kantian\n    subjectivism is unwarranted. And those categories we hold to be in\n    the reality at least fundamentally; we therefore reject the\n    Kantian phenomenism of the speculative reason. Moreover, we can\n    see no valid ground for admitting the Kantian division of the\n    human mind into two totally separate cognitive compartments, the\n    speculative and the practical reason, and ascribing to each\n    compartment cognitive principles and capacities entirely alien to\n    the other. To arrive at a right theory of knowledge human\n    cognitive experience as a whole must be analysed; but provided the\n    analysis is really an analysis of this experience it may be\n    legitimately directed towards discovering what the mental\n    conditions must be\u2014_i.e._ the conditions on the side of the\n    knowing subject, the subject having the experience\u2014which are\n    _necessarily prerequisite_ for having such experience. And if it\n    be found by such analysis that cognitive experience presupposes in\n    the knowing subject not merely a sentient and intelligent mind,\n    but a mind which perceives, imagines, remembers reality in certain\n    definite ways; which thinks reality in certain modes and through\n    certain forms which by its own constitutive activity it constructs\n    for itself, and which it recognizes by reflection to be its own\n    constructions (_e.g._ distinctions, relations, affirmations and\n    negations, abstractions, generalizations, etc.: _intentiones\n    logicae_, logical entities),\u2014there is no reason whatever in all\n    this for inferring that because the mind is so constituted,\n    because it has these modes of cognition, it must necessarily fail\n    to reach, by means of them, a true, valid, and genuine knowledge\n    of reality. From the fact that human modes of cognition are human,\n    and not angelic or divine; from the fact that reality can be known\n    _to man_ only through these modes, these finite modes of finite\n    human faculties,\u2014we may indeed infer that even our highest\n    knowledge of reality is inadequate, that it does not _comprehend_\n    all that is in the reality, but surely not that it is essentially\n    illusory and of its very nature incapable of giving us any true\n    and valid insight into the nature of reality.\n\n\nFixing our attention on the virtual distinction we see that the mind is\nsupposed by means of it to apprehend, through a plurality of distinct\nconcepts, what it knows somehow or other to be _one_ being. Now if it\nknows the reality to be _really one_, it knows that the formal object of\nevery distinct concept of this reality is really identical with the\nobjects of all the other concepts of the latter. This condition of things\nis certainly verified when the mind can see that each of the distinct\nconcepts, though not _explicitly_ presenting the objects of the others,\nnevertheless _implicitly and necessarily_ involves all these other\nobjects:(156) for by seeing that the distinct concepts necessarily involve\none another objectively it sees that the reality apprehended through all\nof them must necessarily be _one reality_. This is what takes place in the\n_imperfect_ virtual distinction: the concepts prescind from one another\nformally, not objectively. But suppose that the distinct concepts prescind\nfrom one another _objectively_, so that they cannot be seen by any\nanalysis to involve one another even implicitly, but present to the mind,\nso far as they themselves are concerned, adequately distinct modes of\nbeing\u2014as happens in the _perfect_ virtual distinction, _e.g._ between\norganic life, sentient life, and intellectual life (in man), or between\nanimality and rationality (in man),\u2014then the all-important question\narises: How do we know, in any given case of this kind, whether or not\nthese adequately distinct thought-objects are _identical with one another\nin the reality_? What is the test for determining whether or not, in a\ngiven case, these objects, which are _many_ for abstract intellectual\nthought, are _one being_ in the real order? The answer seems to be that\n_internal and external sense experience_ can and does furnish us with\nembodiments of these intellectual manifolds,\u2014embodiments each of which we\napprehend as _a being that is really one_, as an _individual subject_ of\nwhich they are conceptually distinct predicates.\n\n\n    It would appear, therefore, that we cannot reach a true conception\n    of what we are to regard as _really one_, or _really manifold_, by\n    abstract thought alone. It is external and internal sense\n    experience, not abstract thought, which first brings us into\n    direct and immediate mental contact with _actually existing_\n    reality. What we have therefore to determine is this: Does sense\n    experience, or does it not, reveal reality to us as a _real\n    manifold_, not as _one being_ but as _beings_ coexisting outside\n    one another in space, succeeding one another in time,\n    interdependent on one another, interacting on one another, and by\n    this interaction causing and undergoing real change, each\n    producing others, or being produced by others, really distinct\n    from itself? In other words, is separateness of existence in time\n    or space, as revealed in sense experience, a sufficient index of\n    the real manifoldness of corporeal being, and of the really\n    distinct individuality of each such being?\u2014or are we to take it\n    that because those space and time distinctions have to be\n    apprehended by thought in order that not merely sense but\n    intellect may apprehend corporeal beings as really manifold,\n    therefore these distinctions are not _in the reality_ given to us?\n    Or, again, is each person\u2019s own conscious experience of himself as\n    one being, of his own unity, and of his distinctness from other\n    persons, a sufficient index that the distinction between person\n    and person is a real distinction?\u2014or are we to take it that\n    because his _feeling_ of his individual unity through sense\n    consciousness must be interpreted by the _thought-concepts_ of\n    \u201cone\u201d\u2014\u201cindividual\u201d\u2014\u201cperson\u201d\u2014\u201cdistinct\u201d from \u201cothers,\u201d these\n    concepts do not truly express what is really given him to\n    interpret? Finally, if we can infer from the actually existing\n    material reality which forms the immediate datum of direct\n    experience, or from the human _Ego_ as given in this experience,\n    the actual existence of a real mode of being which is not material\n    but spiritual, by what tests can we determine whether this\n    spiritual mode of being is really one, or whether there is a real\n    plurality of such beings? The solution of these questions bears\n    directly on the validity of the adequate or \u201cgreater\u201d real\n    distinction, the \u201c_distinctio realis major seu absoluta_\u201d.\n\n    The philosophy which defends the validity of this\n    distinction,\u2014which holds that the distinction between individual\n    human beings, and between individual living things generally, is\n    in the fullest and truest sense a real distinction,\u2014is at all\n    events in conformity with universally prevailing modes of thought\n    and language; while the monism which repudiates these spontaneous\n    interpretations of experience as invalid by denying all real\n    manifoldness to reality, can make itself intelligible only by\n    doing violence to thought and language alike. Not that this alone\n    is a disproof of monism; but at all events it creates a\n    presumption against a system to find it running counter to any of\n    those universal spontaneous beliefs which appear to be rooted in\n    man\u2019s rational nature. On the other hand, the philosophy which\n    accords with common belief in proclaiming a real plurality in\n    being has to reconcile intellect with sense, and the universal\n    with the individual, by solving the important problem of\n    _individuation_: What is it that makes real being individual, if,\n    notwithstanding the fact that intellect apprehends reality as\n    abstract and universal, reality nevertheless can exist only as\n    concrete and individual? (29-33).\n\n\n38. THE REAL DISTINCTION.\u2014In the next place it must be remembered,\ncomparing the virtual distinction with the real, that philosophers have\nrecognized two kinds of real distinction: the _major_ or _absolute_ real\ndistinction, and the _minor_ real, or _modal_ distinction. Before defining\nthese let us see what are the usual signs by which a real distinction in\ngeneral can be recognized.\n\n\n    The relation of efficient causality, of efficient cause and\n    effect, between two objects of thought, is sometimes set down as a\n    sure sign of a (major) real distinction between them.(157) And the\n    reason alleged is that a thing cannot be the efficient cause of\n    itself: the efficient cause is necessarily extrinsic to the effect\n    and cannot be really identical with the latter. It is to be noted\n    that this test applies to reality as actually existing, as\n    producing or undergoing change, and that it is derived from our\n    sense experience of reality in process of change. But since our\n    concept of efficient causality has its origin in our internal\n    experience of our own _selves_ as active agents, as causing some\n    portion of what enters into our experience, the test seems to\n    assume that we have already introduced into this experience a real\n    distinction between the self and what is caused by the self. It is\n    not clear that the relation of efficient cause to effect, as\n    applied to created causes, can precede and reveal, in our\n    experience, the relation of what is _really one_ to what is\n    _really other_, in this experience. If the reality revealed to us\n    in our direct experience, the phenomenal universe, has been\n    brought into existence by the creative act of a Supreme Being,\n    this, of course, implies a real distinction between Creator and\n    creature. But it does not seem possible in this case, or indeed in\n    any case, to prove the existence of the causal relation\n    antecedently to that of the real distinction, or to utilize the\n    former as an index to the latter.\n\n\nTwo distinct thought-objects are regarded as _really_ distinct (1) when\nthey are found to exist separately and apart from each other in time or\nspace, as is the case with any two individuals such as John and James, or\na man and a horse; (2) when, although they are found in the same\nindividual, one of them at least is separable from the other, in the sense\nthat it can actually exist without that other: for example, the soul of\nany individual man can exist apart from the material principle with which\nit is actually united to form this living human individual; the individual\nhimself can exist without the particular accidental modes, such as\nsitting, thinking, speaking, which actually affect his being at any\nparticular instant of his existence.\n\nFrom this we can gather in the first place that the distinction between\ntwo \u201cindividuals,\u201d\u2014individual \u201cpersons\u201d or individual \u201cthings\u201d\u2014is a real\ndistinction in the fullest and plainest sense of this expression, a major\nor absolute real distinction. It is, moreover, not merely real but actual.\nTwo existing \u201cindividuals\u201d are always actually divided and separate from\neach other, while each is actually one or actually undivided in itself.\nAnd they are so \u201cindependently of the consideration of the mind\u201d.\n\nIn the second place, assuming that the mind can apprehend, in the\nindividuals of its experience, a unity resulting from the union or\ncomposition of separable factors or principles, whether essential or\naccidental [27 (_b_)]; and assuming that it can know these factors to be\nreally separable (though actually one and undivided), that is, separable\nin the sense that each of any two such factors, or at least one of them,\ncould actually exist without the other,\u2014it regards the distinction between\nsuch factors as real. They are really distinct because though _actually_\none and undivided they are _potentially_ manifold. If each has a positive\nentity of its own, so that absolutely speaking each could exist without\nthe other, the distinction is still regarded as an absolute or major real\ndistinction. For example, the human soul can exist without the body; the\nbody can exist without the soul, being actualized by the new formative\nprinciple or principles which replace the soul at death; therefore there\nis an absolute real distinction between the soul and the body of the\nliving human individual: although both factors form _one actual being_,\nstill, independently of the consideration of the mind _the one factor is\nnot the other_: each is really, though only potentially, other than the\nfactor with which it is united: the relation of \u201cone\u201d to \u201cother\u201d though\nnot _actually_ verified of either factor (since there is only _one actual_\nbeing: the existing individual man), is potentially and really verified,\n_i.e._ _verifiable_ of each. Again, the individual corporeal substance\ncan, absolutely speaking, exist without its connatural accident of\nexternal or local extension; this latter can, absolutely speaking, exist\nwithout its connatural substance;(158) therefore these are absolutely and\nreally distinct.\n\nIf only one of the factors is seen to be capable of existing without the\nother, and the latter to be such that it could not actually exist except\nas united with the former, so that the separability is not mutual, the\ndistinction is regarded still as real, but only as a _minor_ or _modal_\ndistinction. Such, for instance, is the distinction between a body and its\nlocation, or its state of rest or motion: and, in general, the distinction\nbetween a substance and what are called its accidental modes or modal\naccidents. The distinction is regarded as real because reflection is held\nto assure us that it is in the reality itself independently of the mind,\nand not merely imposed by the mind on the reality because of some ground\nor reason in the reality. It is called a modal distinction rather than an\nabsolute real distinction because those accidental modes of a substance do\nnot seem to have of themselves sufficient reality to warrant our calling\nthem \u201cthings\u201d or \u201crealities,\u201d but rather merely \u201cmodes\u201d or\n\u201cdeterminations\u201d of things or realities. It is significant, as throwing\nlight on the relation of the virtual to the real distinction, that some\nauthors call the modal distinction not a real distinction but a\n\u201cdistinctio _media_,\u201d _i.e._ intermediate between a real and a logical\ndistinction; and that the question whether it should be called simply a\nreal distinction, or \u201cintermediate\u201d between a real and a logical\ndistinction is regarded by some as \u201ca purely verbal question.\u201d(159) We\nshall recur to the modal distinction later (68).\n\nIn the third place it must be noted that separability _in the sense\nexplained_, even non-mutual, is not regarded as the _only_ index to a real\ndistinction. In other words, certain distinctions are held by some to be\nreal even though this test of separability does not apply. For instance,\nit is commonly held that not merely in man but in _all_ corporeal\nindividuals the formative and the determinable principle of the nature or\nsubstance, the _forma substantialis_ and the _materia prima_, are really\ndistinct, although it is admitted that, apart from the case of the human\nsoul, _neither_ can actually exist except in union with the other. What is\nheld in regard to _accidental_ modes is also applied to these essential\nprinciples of the corporeal substance: _viz._ that there is here a special\nreason why such principles cannot actually exist in isolation. Of their\nvery nature they are held to be such that they cannot be _actualized_ or\n_actually exist_ in isolation, but only in union. But this fact, it is\ncontended, does not prove that the principles in question are merely\nmentally distinct aspects of one reality: the fact that they cannot\nactually exist as such separately does not prove that they are not really\nseparable; and it is contended that they are really and actually separated\nwhenever an individual corporeal substance undergoes substantial change.\n\n\n    This, then, raises once more the question: What sort of\n    \u201cseparation\u201d or \u201cseparability\u201d is the test of a real distinction?\n    Is it separateness in and for sense perception, or separateness in\n    and for intellectual thought? The former is certainly the\n    fundamental index of the real distinction; for all our knowledge\n    of reality originates in sense experience, and separateness in\n    time and space, which marks its data, is the key to our knowledge\n    of reality as a manifold of really distinct individual beings; and\n    when we infer from sense-experience the actual existence of a\n    _spiritual_ domain of reality we can conceive _its_ \u201cindividuals\u201d\n    only after the analogy of the corporeal individuals of our\n    immediate sense experience. Scholastic philosophers, following\n    Aristotle, have always taken the manifoldness of reality, _i.e._\n    its presentation in sense experience in the form of \u201cindividuals,\u201d\n    of \u201cthis\u201d and \u201cthat,\u201d \u201c\u03c4\u03bf\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b9,\u201d \u201c_hoc aliquid_,\u201d as an\n    unquestioned and unquestionable _real datum_. Not that they\n    na\u00efvely assumed everything _perceived by the senses_ as an\n    individual, in time and space, to be really an individual: they\n    realized that what is perceived by sense as _one_ limited\n    continuum, occupying a definite portion of space, may be in\n    reality an aggregate of many individuals; and they recognized the\n    need of scrutinizing and analysing those apparent individuals in\n    order to test their real individuality; but they held, and\n    rightly, that sense experience does present to us some data that\n    are unmistakably real individuals\u2014individual men, for instance.\n    Next, they saw that intellectual thought, by analysing sense\n    experience, amasses an ever-growing multitude of abstract and\n    conceptually distinct thought-objects, which it utilizes as\n    predicates for the interpretation of this sense experience. These\n    thought-objects intellect can unite or separate; can in some cases\n    positively see to be mutually compatible or incompatible; can form\n    into ideal or possible complexes. But whether or not the\n    _conceptually_ distinct, though mutually compatible,\n    thought-objects forming any such complex, will be also _really\n    distinct_ from one another, is a question which evidently cannot\n    arise until such a complex is considered as an actual or possible\n    _individual being_: for it is the individual only that exists or\n    can exist. They will be _really_ distinct when found actualized in\n    _distinct individuals_. Even the _conceptually_ one and\n    self-identical abstract thought-object will be _really distinct\n    from itself_ when embodied in distinct individuals; the one single\n    abstract thought-object, \u201chumanity,\u201d \u201chuman nature,\u201d is really\n    distinct from itself in John and in James; the humanity of John is\n    _really other_ than the humanity of James.\n\n    Of course, if conceptually distinct thought-objects are seen to be\n    mutually incompatible they cannot be found realized except in\n    really distinct individuals: the union of them is only an _ens\n    rationis_. Again it may be that the intellect is unable to\n    pronounce positively as to whether they are compatible or not\n    (18): as to whether the complex forms a possible being or not. But\n    when the intellect positively sees such thought-objects to be\n    mutually compatible\u2014by interpretation of, and inference from, its\n    actual sense experience of them as embodied in individuals\n    (18)\u2014and when, furthermore, it now finds a number of them\n    co-existing in some one actual individual, the question recurs:\n    How can it know whether they are _really distinct_ from each\n    other, though actually united to form one (essentially or\n    accidentally composite) individual, or only conceptually distinct\n    aspects of one (simple) individual [27 (_b_)]?\n\n    This, as we have seen already, is the case for which it is really\n    difficult to find a satisfactory test: and hence the different\n    views to be found among scholastic philosophers as to the nature\n    of the distinctions which the mind makes or discovers _within the\n    individual_. The difficulty is this. The conceptual distinction\n    between compatible thought-objects is not a proof of real\n    distinction when these thought-objects are found united in _one\n    individual_ of sense experience, as _e.g._ animality and\n    rationality in man; and the only distinction given to us by sense\n    experience, at least directly and immediately, as undoubtedly\n    real, is the distinction _between_ corporeal _individuals_\n    existing apart in space or time, as _e.g._ between man and man.\n    How then, can we show that any distinctions _within the\n    individual_ are real?\n\n    Well, we have seen that certain entities, which are objects of\n    sense or of thought, or of both, can disappear from the individual\n    without the residue thereby perishing or ceasing to exist actually\n    as an individual: the human soul survives, as an actual individual\n    reality, after its separation from the material principle with\n    which it formed the individual man; the individual man persists\n    while the accidental modes that affect him disappear. In such\n    cases as these, intellect, interpreting sense experience and\n    reasoning from it, places a real distinction, in the composite\n    individual, between the factors that can continue to exist without\n    others, and these latter. In doing so it is apparently applying\n    the analogy of the typical real distinction\u2014that between one\n    individual and another. The factor, or group of factors, which can\n    continue to exist actually after the separation of the others, is\n    an individual: and what were separated from it were apparently\n    real entities, though they may have perished by the actual\n    separation. But on what ground is the distinction between the\n    material principle and the vital principle of a plant or an\n    animal, for example, regarded as real? Again on the ground\n    furnished by the analogy of the distinction between individuals of\n    sense experience. Note that it is not between the material and the\n    vital principles _as objects of abstract thought_, _i.e._ between\n    the _materiality_ and the _vitality_ of the plant or the animal,\n    that a real distinction is claimed: these are regarded only as\n    conceptually distinct aspects of the plant or the animal; nor is\n    it admitted that because one of these thought-objects is found\n    embodied elsewhere in nature without the other\u2014materiality without\n    vitality in the inorganic universe\u2014we can therefore conclude that\n    they are really distinct in the plant or the animal. No; it is\n    between the two principles conceived as coexisting and united in\n    the concrete individual that the real distinction is claimed. And\n    it is held to be a real distinction because substantial change in\n    corporeal things, _i.e._ corruption and generation of individual\n    corporeal substances, is held to be real. If it is real there is a\n    real separation of essential factors when the individual perishes.\n    And the factors continue to be real, as _potential_ principles of\n    other individuals, when any individual corporeal substance\n    perishes. Each principle may not continue to exist actually as\n    such in isolation from the other\u2014though some scholastics hold\n    that, absolutely speaking, they could be conserved apart, as\n    actual entities, by the Author of Nature. But they _can_ actually\n    exist _as essential principles of other actual individuals_: they\n    are real _potentialities_, which _become actual_ in other\n    individuals. Thus we see that they are conceived throughout _after\n    the analogy of the individual_. Those who hold that, absolutely\n    speaking, the material principle as such, _materia prima_, could\n    actually exist in isolation from any formative principle, should\n    apparently admit that in such a case it would be _an individual\n    reality_.\n\n\n39. SOME QUESTIONABLE DISTINCTIONS. THE SCOTIST DISTINCTION.\u2014The\ndifficulty of discriminating between the virtual and the real distinction\nin an individual has given rise to the conception of distinctions which\nsome maintain to be real, others to be less than real. The virtual\ndistinction, as we have hitherto understood it, may be described as\n_extrinsic_ inasmuch as it arises in the individual only when we consider\nthe latter under different aspects, or in different relations to things\nextrinsic to it. By regarding an individual under different aspects\u2014_e.g._\na man under the aspects of animality and rationality\u2014we can predicate\ncontradictory attributes of the individual, _e.g._ of a man that \u201che is\nsimilar to a horse,\u201d and that \u201che is not similar to a horse\u201d. Now it is\nmaintained by some that although independently of the consideration of the\nmind the grounds of these contradictory predications are not _actually_\ndistinct in the individual, nevertheless even before such consideration\nthe individual has a real _intrinsic capacity_ to have these contradictory\npredicates affirmed of him: they can be affirmed of him not merely when he\nis regarded, and because he is regarded, under conceptually different\naspects, but because these principles, \u201canimality\u201d and \u201crationality,\u201d are\nalready really in him not merely as aspects but as distinct capacities, as\npotentially distinct principles of contradictory predications.\n\nThe virtual distinction, understood in this way, is described as\n_intrinsic_. It is rejected by some on the ground that, at least in its\napplication to finite realities, it involves a violation of the principle\nof contradiction: it seems to imply that one and the same individual has\nin itself absolutely (and not merely as considered under different aspects\nand relations) the capacity to verify of itself contradictory predicates.\n\nScotus and his followers go even farther than the advocates of this\nintrinsic virtual distinction by maintaining the existence of a\ndistinction which on the one hand they hold to be less than real because\nit is not between \u201cthing and thing,\u201d and on the other hand to be more than\nlogical or virtual, because it _actually_ exists between the various\nthought-objects or \u201c_formalitates_\u201d (such, _e.g._ as animality and\nrationality) in the individual, independently of the analytic activity\nwhereby the mind detects these in the latter. This distinction Scotists\ncall a \u201cformal distinction, actual on the part of the thing\u201d\u2014\u201c_distinctio\nformalis_, _actualis ex natura rei_.\u201d Hence the name \u201cformalists\u201d applied\nto Scotists, from their advocacy of this \u201cScotistic\u201d distinction. It is,\nthey explain, a distinction not between \u201cthings\u201d (\u201c_res_\u201d) but between\n\u201cformalities\u201d (\u201c_formalitates_\u201d). By \u201cthing\u201d as opposed to \u201cformality\u201d\nthey mean not merely the individual, but also any positive thought-object\nwhich, though it may not be capable of existing apart, can really appear\nin, or disappear from, a thing which can so exist: for instance, the\nessential factors of a really composite essence, its accidental modes, and\nits real relations. By \u201cformality\u201d they mean a positive thought-object\nwhich is absolutely inseparable from the thing in which it is apprehended,\nwhich cannot exist without the thing, nor the thing without it: for\ninstance, all the metaphysical grades of being in an individual, such as\nsubstantiality, corporeity, life, animality, rationality, individuality,\nin an individual man. The distinction is called \u201cformal\u201d because it is\nbetween such \u201cformalities\u201d\u2014each of which is the positive term of a\nseparate concept of the individual. It is called \u201c_actual_ on the side of\nthe thing\u201d because it is claimed to be _actually_ in the latter apart from\nour mental apprehension of the individual. What has chiefly influenced\nScotists in claiming this distinction to be thus _actually_ in the\nindividual, independently of our mental activity, is the consideration\nthat these metaphysical grades are grounds on which we can predicate\ncontradictory attributes of the same individual, _e.g._ of an individual\nman that \u201che is similar to a horse\u201d and that \u201che is not similar to a\nhorse\u201d: whence they infer that in order to avoid violation of the\nprinciple of contradiction, we must suppose these grounds to be _actually_\ndistinct in the thing.\n\nTo this it is replied, firstly, that if such predications were truly\ncontradictory we could avoid violation of the principle of contradiction\nonly by inferring a _real_ distinction\u2014which Scotists deny to\nexist\u2014between these grounds; secondly, that such predications are not\ntruly contradictory inasmuch as \u201che is similar\u201d really means \u201che is\npartially similar,\u201d and \u201che is not similar\u201d means \u201che is not completely\nsimilar\u201d; therefore when we say that a man\u2019s rationality \u201c_is not_ the\nprinciple whereby he resembles a horse,\u201d and his animality \u201c_is_ the\nprinciple whereby he resembles a horse,\u201d we mean (_a_) that his\nrationality is not the principle of complete resemblance, though we know\nit is the principle of partial resemblance, inasmuch as we see it to be\nreally identical with that which is the principle of partial resemblance,\n_viz._ his animality; and we mean (_b_) that his animality is the\nprinciple of his partial resemblance to a horse, not of total resemblance,\nfor we know that the animality of a man is not perfectly similar to that\nof a horse, the former being really identical with rationality, the latter\nwith irrationality. When, then, we predicate of one thing that \u201cit is\nsimilar to some other thing,\u201d and that \u201cit is not similar to this other\nthing\u201d we are not really predicating contradictories of the same thing; if\nwe take the predicates as contradictories they are true of the same\nreality undoubtedly, but not under the same aspect. Scotists themselves\nadmit that the _real identity_ of these aspects involves no violation of\nthe principle of contradiction; why, then, should these be held to be\n_actually_ distinct formalities independently of the consideration of the\nmind? How can a distinction that is actual independently of the mind\u2019s\nanalysis of the reality be other than real? Is not predication a work of\nthe mind? And must not the conditions on which reality verifies the\npredication be determined by the mind? If, then, we see that in order to\njustify this predication\u2014of \u201csimilar\u201d and \u201cnot similar\u201d\u2014about any reality,\nit is merely necessary that the mind should apprehend this reality to be\nin its undivided unity equivalent to manifold grades of being or\nperfection which the mind itself can grasp as mentally distinct aspects,\nby distinct concepts, how can we be justified in supposing that these\ngrades of being are not merely _distinguishable_, but _actually distinct_\nin the reality itself, _independently of the mind_?\n\n\n    The Scotist doctrine here is indicative of the tendency to\n    emphasize, perhaps unduly, the assimilation of reality as a datum\n    with the mind which interprets this datum; to regard the\n    constitution of reality itself as being what abstract thought,\n    irrespective of sense experience, would represent it; and\n    accordingly to place in the reality as being actually there,\n    independently of thought, distinctions which as a matter of fact\n    may be merely the product of thought itself.\n\n    Scotists, by advocating an _actual_ distinction between these\n    grades of being, as \u201cformalities\u201d in the individual, have exposed\n    themselves to the charge of extreme realism. They teach that each\n    of these \u201cformalities\u201d has, for abstract thought, a _formal_ unity\n    which is _sui generis_. And this unity is not regarded as a\n    product of thought, any more than the distinction between such\n    unities. Thus, the materiality apprehended by thought in all\n    material things is one, not because it is made one by the\n    abstracting and universalizing activity of thought, as most if not\n    all other scholastics teach; it is not merely _conceptually one_\n    through our thought-activity, it is _formally one_ apart from the\n    latter; and it thus knits into a \u201cformal\u201d unity all material\n    things. And so does \u201clife\u201d all living things; and \u201canimality\u201d all\n    animals; and \u201crationality\u201d all men. Now, if this \u201cformal unity\u201d of\n    any such essential or metaphysical grade of being were regarded as\n    a real unity, monism would be of course the logically inevitable\n    corollary of the theory.\n\n    But the \u201cformal\u201d unity of any such essential grade of being\n    Scotists will not admit to be a real unity, though they hold it to\n    be characteristic of reality independently of our thought. They\n    contend that this unity is quite compatible with the _real\n    plurality_ conferred upon being by the principles which\n    individuate the latter; and thus they cannot be fairly accused of\n    monism. Their reasoning here is characteristically subtle. Just as\n    any metaphysical grade of being, considered as an object of\n    thought, is in itself neither manifold individually nor one\n    universally\u2014so that, as Thomists say, designating it in this\n    condition as the _universale directum_, or _metaphysicum_, or\n    _fundamentale_, or _quoad rem conceptam_, we can truly affirm of\n    it in this condition neither that it is one (logically, as a\n    universal) nor that it is manifold (really, as multiplied in\n    actual individuals),(160)\u2014so likewise, Scotists contend, it is in\n    this condition _ontologically_, as an entity in the real order\n    independently of thought, and as such has a unity of its own, a\n    formal unity, which, while uniting in a formal unity all the\n    individuals that embody it, is itself incapable of fitting this\n    grade of being for actual existence, and therefore admits those\n    ultimate individuating principles which make it a real manifold in\n    the actual order.(161)\n\n    Thus, the metaphysical grade of being, which, as considered in\n    itself, Thomists hold to be an abstraction, having no other unity\n    than that which thought confers upon it by making it logically\n    universal, Scotists on the contrary hold to be as such something\n    positive in the ontological order, having there a \u201cformal\u201d unity\n    corresponding to the \u201cconceptual\u201d or \u201clogical\u201d unity which thought\n    confers upon it by universalizing it. The metaphysical grade of\n    being, thus conceived as something positive in the real order,\n    Scotists will not admit to be a \u201creality,\u201d nor the unity which\n    characterizes it a \u201creal\u201d unity. But after all, if such a\n    \u201cformality\u201d with its proportionate \u201cunity,\u201d is independent of\n    thought; and if on the other hand \u201cuniversality\u201d is the work of\n    thought, so that the universal as such cannot be real, it is not\n    easy to see how the Scotist doctrine escapes the error of extreme\n    realism. The metaphysical grade of being is a \u201cformality\u201d only\n    because it is _made abstract_ by thought; and it has \u201cunity\u201d only\n    because it is _made logically universal_ by thought; therefore to\n    contend that as such it is something positive in the real order,\n    independently of thought, is to \u201creify\u201d the abstract and universal\n    as such: which is extreme realism.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. REALITY AND THE TRUE.\n\n\n40. ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH CONSIDERED FROM ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE.\u2014We have seen\nthat when the mind thinks of any reality it apprehends it as \u201cone,\u201d that\nontological unity is a transcendental attribute of being; and this\nconsideration led us to consider the manifoldness and the distinctions\nwhich characterize the totality of our experience. Now man himself is a\nreal being surrounded by all the other real beings that constitute the\nuniverse. Moreover he finds himself endowed with faculties which bring him\ninto conscious relations both with himself and with those other beings;\nand only by the proper interpretation of these relations can he understand\naright his place in the universe. The first in order of these relations is\nthat of reality to mind (25). This relation between mind and reality is\nwhat we understand by _Truth_.\n\nNow truth is attributed both to knowledge and to things. We say that a\nperson thinks or judges _truly_, that his knowledge is _true_ (or correct,\nor accurate), when things really are as he thinks or judges them to be.\nThe truth which we thus ascribe to knowledge, to the mind interpreting\nreality, is _logical_ truth: a relation of concord or conformity of the\nmind interpreting reality\u2014or, of the mind\u2019s judgment about reality\u2014with\nthe reality itself.(162) Logical truth is dealt with in Logic and\nEpistemology. We are concerned here only with the truth that is attributed\nto reality, to things themselves: ontological, metaphysical,\ntranscendental truth, as it is called. There is nothing abstruse or\nfar-fetched about the use of the terms \u201ctrue\u201d and \u201ctruth\u201d as equivalent to\n\u201creal\u201d and \u201creality\u201d. We speak of \u201ctrue\u201d gold, a \u201ctrue\u201d friend, a\n\u201cveritable\u201d hero, etc. Now what do we mean by thus ascribing truth to a\nthing? We mean that it corresponds to a mental type or ideal. We call a\nliquid true wine or real wine, for instance, when it verifies in itself\nthe definition we have formed of the nature of wine. Hence whenever we\napply the terms \u201ctrue\u201d or \u201ctruth\u201d to a thing we shall find that we are\nconsidering that thing not absolutely and in itself but in reference to an\nidea in our minds: we do not say of a thing simply that it is true, we say\nthat it is _truly such or such_ a thing, _i.e._ that it is really of a\ncertain nature already conceived by our minds. If the appearance of the\nthing suggests comparison with some such ideal type or nature, and if the\nthing is seen on examination not really to verify this nature in itself,\nwe say that it is not really or truly such or such a thing: _e.g._ that a\ncertain liquid is not really wine, or is not true wine. When we have no\nsuch ideal type to which to refer a thing, when we do not know its nature,\ncannot classify and name it, we have to suspend our judgment and say that\nwe do not know what the thing _really_ is. Hence, for example, the new\nrays discovered by R\u00f6ntgen were called provisionally \u201cX rays,\u201d their real\nnature being at first unknown. We see, then, that real or ontological\ntruth is simply reality considered as conformable with an ideal type, with\nan idea in the mind.\n\nWhence does the human mind derive these ideal types, these concepts or\ndefinitions of the nature of things? It derives them from actually\nexperienced reality by abstraction, comparison, generalization, and\nreflection on the data of its experience.(163) Hence it follows that the\nontological truth of things is not known by the mind antecedently to the\nformation of the mental type. It is, of course, in the things antecedently\nto any judgment we form about the things; and the logical truth of our\njudgments is dependent on it, for logical truth is the conformity of our\njudgments with the real nature of things. But antecedently to all exercise\nof human thought, antecedently to our conception of the nature of a thing,\nthe thing has not for us _formal_ or _actual_ ontological truth: it has\nonly fundamental or _potential_ ontological truth. If in this condition\nreality had actual ontological truth for us, there would be no ground for\nour distinguishing mentally between the reality and the truth of things;\nwhereas the existence of this mental or logical distinction is undeniable.\nThe concept of reality is the concept of something absolute; the concept\nof ontological truth is the concept of something relative, not of an\nabsolute but of a relative property of being.\n\n\n    But if for the human mind the ontological truth of things is\u2014at\n    least proximately, immediately, and in the first place\u2014their\n    conformity with the abstract concepts of essences or natures,\n    concepts derived by the mind from an analysis of its experience,\n    how can this ontological truth be one for all men, or immutable\n    and necessary? For, since men form different and divergent and\n    conflicting conceptions as to the natures of things, and so have\n    different views and standards of truth for things, ontological\n    truth would seem, according to the exposition just outlined, to be\n    not one but manifold, not immutable but variable: consequences\n    which surely cannot be admitted? The answer to this difficulty\n    will lead us to a deeper and more fundamental conception of what\n    ontological truth really is.\n\n    First, then, we must consider that all men are endowed with the\n    same sort of intellect, an intellect capable of some insight at\n    least into the nature of things; that therefore they abstract the\n    same transcendental notions and the same widest concepts from\n    their experience: transcendental concepts of being, unity, truth,\n    goodness; generic concepts of substance, matter, spirit, cause, of\n    accident, quantity, multitude, number, identity, similarity,\n    distinction, diversity, etc. They also form the same _specific_\n    concepts of possible essences. Although, therefore, they may\n    disagree and err in regard to _the application_ of those concepts,\n    especially of the lower, richer and more complex specific\n    concepts, to the actual data of their experience, they agree in\n    the fact that they have those common concepts or idea-types of\n    reality; also in the fact that when they apply those concepts\n    _rightly_ (_i.e._ by _logically true_ judgments) to the things\n    that make up their experience, they have so far grasped the real\n    natures of these things; and finally in recognizing that the\n    ontological truth of these things lies in the conformity of the\n    latter with their true and proper mental types or essences. And\n    just as each of these latter is one, indivisible, immutable,\n    necessary and eternal (14, 15), so is the ontological truth of\n    things, whether possible or actual, one, indivisible, immutable,\n    necessary and eternal. Of course, just as the human mind does not\n    constitute but only apprehends reality, so the human mind does not\n    constitute the ontological truth of reality, but only apprehends\n    it. Every reality is capable of producing in the human mind a more\n    or less adequate mental representation of itself: in this lies\n    what we may call the potential or fundamental ontological truth of\n    reality. When it does produce such a mental concept of itself its\n    relation of conformity to this concept is its formal ontological\n    truth. Of course the human mind may err in applying to any reality\n    a wrong concept; when it does it has so far failed to grasp the\n    real nature of the thing and therefore the ontological truth which\n    is really identical with this nature. But the thing still has its\n    ontological truth, independently of the erring mind; not only\n    fundamental truth, but also possibly formal truth in so far as it\n    may be rightly apprehended, and thus related to its proper mental\n    type, by other human minds. Reality itself, therefore, is not and\n    cannot be false, as we shall see more fully later; error or\n    falsity is an accident only of the mind interpreting reality.\n\n\n41. ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH CONSIDERED SYNTHETICALLY, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ITS\nULTIMATE REAL BASIS.\u2014So far we have explained ontological truth as a\nrelation of reality to the human intelligence; but this relation is not\none of dependence. The objective term of the relation, the reality itself,\nis anterior to the human mind, it is not constituted by the latter. The\nsubjective term, the abstract concept, is indeed as a vital product\ndependent on the mind, but as representative of reality it is determined\nonly by the latter. Is there, however, an Intelligence to which reality is\n_essentially_ conformed, other than the human intelligence? Granted the\nactual existence of contingent realities, and granted that the human mind\ncan derive from these realities rational principles which it sees to be\nnecessarily and universally applicable to all the data of experience, we\ncan demonstrate the existence of a Necessary Being, a First and\nSelf-Existent Intelligence. Realizing, then, that God has created all\nthings according to Infinite Wisdom, we can see that the essences of\nthings are imitations of exemplar ideas in the Divine Mind (20). On the\nDivine Mind they depend essentially for their reality and intelligibility.\nIt is because all created realities, including the human mind itself, are\nadumbrations of the Divine Essence, that they are intelligible to the\nhuman mind. Thus we see that in the ontological order, in the order of\nreal gradation and dependence among things, as distinct from the order of\nhuman experience,(164) the reason why reality has ontological truth for\nthe human mind is because it is antecedently and essentially in accord\nwith the Divine Mind from which it derives its intelligibility. Although,\ntherefore, ontological truth is for us proximately and immediately the\nconformity of reality with our own conceptions, it is primarily and\nfundamentally the essential conformity of all reality with the Divine\nMind. All reality, actual and possible, including the Divine Essence\nitself, is actually comprehended by the Divine Mind, is actually in\nconformity with the exemplar ideas in the Divine Mind, and has therefore\nontological truth even independently of its relation to created minds; but\n\u201cin the (impossible) hypothesis of the absence of all intellect, such a\nthing as truth would be inconceivable\u201d.(165)\n\nThe reason, therefore, why things are ontologically true for our minds,\nwhy our minds can apprehend their essences, why we can have any true\nknowledge about them, is in fact because both our minds and all things\nelse, being expressions of the Divine Essence, are in essential conformity\nwith the Divine Intellect. Not that we must know all this in order to have\nany logical truth, any true knowledge, about things; or in order to\nascribe to things the ontological truth which consists in their conformity\nwith our conception of their nature. The atheist can have a true knowledge\nof things and can recognize in them their conformity with his mental\nconception of their nature; only he is unaware of the real and fundamental\nreason why he can do so. Nor can he, of course, while denying the\nexistence of God, rise to the fuller conception of ontological truth which\nconsists in the essential conformity of all reality with the Divine\nIntellect, and its essential dependence on the latter for its\nintelligibility to the human intellect.\n\nNaturally, it is this latter and fuller conception of ontological truth\nthat has been at all times expounded by scholastic philosophers.(166) We\nmay therefore, define ontological truth as _the essential conformity of\nreality, as an object of thought, with intellect, and primarily and\nespecially with the Divine Intellect_.\n\n\n    The conformity of reality with the Divine Intellect is described\n    as _essential_ to reality, in the sense that the reality is\n    dependent on the Divine Intellect for its intelligibility; it\n    derives its intelligibility from the latter. The conformity of\n    reality with the human intellect is also essential in the sense\n    that _potential_ conformity with the latter is inseparable from\n    reality; it is an aspect really identical with, and only logically\n    distinct from, the latter. But inasmuch as the _actual_ conformity\n    of reality with our human conception of it is contingent on the\n    existence of human intelligences, and is not _ultimately_\n    dependent on the latter, inasmuch as reality does not derive its\n    intelligibility _ultimately_ from this conception\u2014seeing that\n    rather this conception is derived from the reality and is\n    ultimately dependent on the Divine Exemplar,\u2014this conformity of\n    reality with the human mind is sometimes spoken of as _accidental_\n    to reality in contrast with the relation of dependence which\n    exists between reality and the Divine Mind.\n\n    Bearing in mind that reality derives its intelligibility from its\n    essential conformity with the Divine Mind, and that the human mind\n    derives _its_ truth from the reality, we can understand how it has\n    been said of truth in general that it is first in the Uncreated\n    Intellect, then in things, then in created intellects; that the\n    primary source and measure of all truth is the Divine Intellect\n    Itself Unmeasured, \u201cmensurans, non mensuratus\u201d; that created\n    reality is measured by, or conformed with, the Divine Intellect,\n    and is in turn the measure of the human intellect, conforming the\n    latter with itself, \u201cmensurans et mensurata\u201d; and that, finally,\n    the human intellect, measured by created reality and the Divine\n    Mind, is itself the measure of no natural things but only of the\n    products of human art, \u201cintellectus noster ... non mensurans\n    quidem res naturales, sed artificiales tantum\u201d.(167)\n\n    Is truth _one_, then, or is it _manifold_? Logical truth is\n    manifold\u2014multiplied by the number of created intelligences, and by\n    the number of distinct cognitions in each. The primary ontological\n    truth which consists in the conformity of all reality with the\n    Divine Intellect is one: there is no real plurality of archetype\n    ideas in the Divine Mind; they are manifold only to our imperfect\n    human mode of thinking. The secondary ontological truth which\n    consists in the conformity of things with the abstract concepts of\n    created intelligences is conditioned by, and multiplied with, the\n    manifoldness of the latter.(168)\n\n    Again to the question: Is truth _eternal_ or _temporal_?\u2014we reply\n    in a similar way that the truth of the Divine comprehension of\n    reality, actual and possible, is eternal, but that no other truth\n    is eternal. There is no eternal truth outside of God. Created\n    things are not eternal; and truth is consecutive on reality: where\n    there is no reality there is no ontological truth: the conformity\n    of things with human conceptions and the logical truth of the\n    latter are both alike temporal.(169)\n\n    Finally, we may say that the truth of the Divine Intellect is\n    _immutable_; and so is the essential conformity of all reality\n    with the Divine Intellect. The change to which created reality is\n    essentially subject is itself essentially conformed with the\n    Divine Mind; it is, so to speak, part and parcel of the\n    ontological truth of this reality in relation to the Divine Mind,\n    and cannot therefore interfere with this ontological truth. When\n    the acorn grows into the oak the whole process has its ontological\n    truth; that of the acorn changes, not into falsity, but into\n    another truth, that of the oak.(170) We see, then, that as things\n    change, their truth does not change in the sense of being lost or\n    giving place to falsity: the truth of one state changes to the\n    truth of another while the ontological truth of the changing\n    reality perseveres immutably.\n\n    The same immutability attaches to the truth of things in relation\n    to the human mind: with the qualification, to which we shall\n    return (43), that they may occasion false judgments in the human\n    mind, and on that account be designated \u201cfalse\u201d.\n\n    Finally, the logical truth which has its seat in created\n    intelligences is _mutable_: it may be increased or diminished,\n    acquired or lost.\n\n\n42. ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF REALITY.\u2014From what has\nbeen said it will be apparent that ontological truth is a transcendental\nattribute of reality. That is to say, whatever is real, whether actual or\npossible, is ontologically true; or, in scholastic terminology, \u201c_Omne ens\nest verum; Ens et verum convertuntur_: All being is true; The real and the\ntrue are convertible terms\u201d. For in the first place there is no mode or\ncategory of real being, of which the human mind actually thinks, to which\nit does not attribute ontological truth in the sense of conformity with\nthe right human conception of it. Moreover, the proper object of the human\nintellect is reality; all true knowledge is knowledge of reality. Reality\nof itself is manifestly knowable, intelligible, and thus potentially or\nfundamentally true; and, on the other hand, intellect is, according to the\nmeasure of its capacity, a faculty of insight into all reality, into\nwhatever is real: _intellectus potens fieri omnia; anima ... quodammodo\nfit omnia_.(171) Deny either of these postulates regarding the terms of\nthe ontological relation, reality and mind, and all rational thought is\ninstantly paralysed. Hence, in so far as a reality becomes an actual\nobject of human knowledge it has formal ontological truth in relation both\nto the human mind and to the Divine Mind; while antecedently to human\nthought it is fundamentally true, or intelligible, to the human mind, and\nof course formally true in relation to the Divine Mind.\n\nThus we see that whatever is real is ontologically true; that ontological\ntruth is really identical with real being; that, applied to the latter, it\nis not a mere extrinsic denomination, but signifies an intrinsic, positive\naspect of reality, _viz._ the real, essential, or transcendental relation\nof all real being to Mind or Intellect: a relation which is logically or\nconceptually distinct from the notion of reality considered in itself.\n\n43. ATTRIBUTION OF FALSITY TO REAL BEING.\u2014If ontological truth is really\nidentical with real being, if it is an essential aspect of the latter, a\ntranscendental relation of reality to mind, it follows immediately that\nthere can be no such thing as transcendental falsity: if whatever is real\nis ontologically true, then the ontologically false must be the unreal,\nmust be nothingness. And this is really so: ontologically falsity _is_\nnothingness. We have, therefore, to discover the real meaning of\nattributing falsity to things, as when we speak of a false friend, false\ngold, false teeth, a false musical note, a false measure in poetry, etc.\n\nFirst of all, then, it will be noted that each such object has its own\nreal nature and character, its proper mental correlate, and, therefore,\nits ontological truth. The false friend is a true or real deceiver, or\ntraitor, or coward, or whatever his real character may be; the false gold\nis true or real bronze, or alloy, or whatever it may be in reality; the\nfalse teeth are true or real ivory, or whatever substance they are made\nof; a false musical note is a true or real note but not the proper one in\nits actual setting; and so of a false measure in poetry. Next, when we\nthus ascribe falsity to a friend, or gold, or such like, we see that the\nepithet \u201cfalse\u201d is in reality merely transferred from the false judgment\nwhich a person is liable to make about the object. We mean that to judge\nthat person a friend, or that substance gold, or those articles real\nteeth, would be to form a false judgment. We see that it is only in the\njudgment there can be falsity; but we transfer the epithet to the object\nbecause the object is likely to occasion the erroneous judgment in the\nfallible human mind, by reason of the resemblance of the object to\nsomething else which it really is not. We see, therefore, that falsity is\nnot in the objects, but is transferred to them by a purely extrinsic\ndenomination on account of appearances calculated to mislead. We commonly\nsay, in such cases that \u201cthings mislead us,\u201d that \u201cappearances deceive\nus\u201d. Things, however, do not deceive or mislead us _necessarily_, but only\n_accidentally_: they are the _occasions_ of our allowing ourselves to be\ndeceived: the fallibility and limitations of our own minds in interpreting\nreality are the real cause of our erroneous judgments.(172)\n\nSecondly, there is another improper sense in which we attribute falsity to\nworks of art which fail to realize the artist\u2019s ideal. In this sense we\nspeak of a \u201cfalse\u201d note in music, a \u201cfalse\u201d measure in poetry, a \u201cfalse\u201d\ntint in painting, a \u201cfalse\u201d curve in sculpture or architecture. \u201cFalse\u201d\nhere means defective, bad, wanting in perfection. The object being out of\nharmony with the ideal or design in the practical intellect of the artist,\nwe describe it as \u201cfalse\u201d after the analogy of what takes place when we\ndescribe as \u201cfalse gold\u201d a substance which is out of harmony with the idea\nof gold in the speculative intellect. It is in relation to the\nspeculative, not the practical, intellect, that things have ontological\ntruth. All created things are, of course, as such, in conformity not only\nwith the Divine Intellect considered as speculative, but also with the\nDivine Intellect considered as practical. For God, being omnipotent, does\nall things according to the designs of His Wisdom. For Him nothing is\naccidental, nothing happens by chance. But the world He has freely willed\nto create is not the best possible world. Both in the physical and in the\nmoral order there are things and events which are defective, which fall\nshort of their natural perfection. This defectiveness, which is properly\nphysical or moral evil, is sometimes described as falsity, lying, vanity,\netc., on account of the discrepancy between those things and the ideal of\nwhat they should be. But all such defective realities are known to be what\nthey are by the Divine Mind, and may be known as they really are by the\nhuman mind. They have, therefore, their ontological truth. The question of\ntheir perfection or imperfection gives rise to the consideration of quite\na different aspect of reality, namely its _goodness_. This, then, we must\ndeal with in the next place.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. REALITY AND THE GOOD.\n\n\n44. THE GOOD AS \u201cDESIRABLE\u201d AND AS \u201cSUITABLE\u201d.\u2014The notion of the _good_\n(L. _bonum_; Gr. \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd) is one of the most familiar of all notions. But\nlike all other transcendental or widely generic concepts, the analysis of\nit opens up some fundamental questions. The princes of ancient Greek\nphilosophy, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, gave much anxious thought to\nits elucidation. The tentative gropings of Socrates involved an ambiguity\nwhich issued in the conflicting philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism.\nNor did Plato succeed in bringing down from the clouds the \u201cIdea of the\nGood\u201d which he so devotedly worshipped as the Sun of the Intellectual\nWorld. It needed the more sober and searching analysis of the Stagyrite to\nbring to light the formula so universally accepted in after ages: The Good\nof beings is that which all desire: _Bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.(173)\nLet us try to reach the fundamental idea underlying the terms \u201cgood,\u201d\n\u201cgoodness,\u201d by some simple examples.\n\nThe child, deriving sensible pleasure from a sweetmeat, cries out: That is\n_good_! Whatever gratifies its senses, gives it sensible delight, it\n_likes_ or _loves_. Such things it _desires_, _seeks_, _yearns for_, in\ntheir absence; and in their presence _enjoys_. At this stage the good\nmeans simply the _pleasure-giving_. But as reason develops the human being\napprehends and describes as good not merely what is pleasure-giving, but\nwhatever satisfies any natural need or craving, whether purely organic, or\npurely intellectual, or more widely human: food is good because it\nsatisfies a physical, organic craving; knowledge is good because it\nsatisfies a natural intellectual thirst; friendship is good because it\nsatisfies a wider need of the heart. Here we notice a transition from\n\u201cagreeable\u201d in the sense of \u201cpleasure-giving\u201d to \u201cagreeable\u201d in the more\nproper sense of \u201csuitable\u201d or useful. The good is now conceived not in the\nnarrow sense of what yields sensible pleasure but in the wider sense of\nthat which is useful or suitable for the satisfaction of a natural\ntendency or need, that which is _the object of a natural tendency_.\n\nNext, let us reflect, with Aristotle, that each of the individual persons\nand things that make up the world of our direct experience has an end\ntowards which it naturally tends. There is a purpose in the existence of\neach. Each has a nature, _i.e._ an essence which is for it a principle of\ndevelopment, a source of all the functions and activities whereby it\ncontinually adapts itself to its environment and thereby continually\nfulfils the aim of its existence. By its very nature it tends towards its\nend along the proper line of its development.(174) In the world of\nconscious beings this natural tendency is properly called appetite: _sense\nappetite_ of what is apprehended as good by sense cognition, and rational\nappetite or _will_ in regard to what is apprehended as good by intellect\nor reason. In the world of unconscious things this natural tendency is a\nreal tendency and is analogous to conscious appetite. Hence it is that\nAristotle, taking in all grades of real being, describes the good as that\nwhich is the object of any natural tendency or \u201cappetite\u201d whatsoever: the\ngood is the \u201c_appetibile_\u201d or \u201cdesirable,\u201d that which all things seek:\n_bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.\n\n45. THE GOOD AS AN \u201cEND,\u201d \u201cPERFECTING\u201d THE \u201cNATURE\u201d.\u2014So far, we have\nanalysed the notion of what is \u201cgood\u201d _for some being_; and we have\ngathered that it implies what _suits_ this being, what contributes to the\nlatter\u2019s realization of its end. But we apply the term \u201cgood\u201d to objects,\nand speak of their goodness, apart from their direct and immediate\nrelation of helpfulness or suitability _for us_. When, for instance, we\nsay of a watch that it is a _good_ one, or of a soldier that he is a\n_good_ soldier, what precisely do we mean by such attribution of goodness\nto things or persons? A little reflection will show that it is\nintelligible _only in reference to an end or purpose_. And we mean by it\nthat the being we describe as good has the powers, qualities, equipments,\nwhich _fit it for its end or purpose_. A being is good whose nature is\nequipped and adapted for the realization of its natural end or purpose.\n\nThus we see that the notion of goodness is correlative with the notion of\nan end, towards which, or for which, a being has a natural tendency or\ndesire. Without the concept of a nature as tending to realize an end or\npurpose, the notion of \u201cthe good\u201d would be inexplicable.(175) And the two\nformul\u00e6, \u201cThe good is that which beings desire, or towards which they\nnaturally tend,\u201d and \u201cThe good is that which is adapted to the ends which\nbeings have in their existence,\u201d really come to the same thing; the former\nstatement resolving itself into the latter as the more fundamental. For\nthe reason why anything is desirable, why it is the object of a natural\ntendency, is because it is good, and not _vice versa_. The description of\nthe good as that which is desirable, \u201c_Bonum est id quod est appetibile_,\u201d\nis an _a posteriori_ description, a description of cause by reference to\neffect.(176) A thing is desirable because it is good. Why then is it good,\nand therefore desirable? Because it _suits_ the natural needs, and _is\nadapted_ to the nature, of the being that desires it or tends towards it;\nbecause it _helps_ this being, _agrees with_ it, by contributing towards\nthe realization of its end: _Bonum est id quod convenit natur\u00e6\nappetentis_: The good is that which suits the nature of the being that\ndesires it. The greatest good for a being is the realization of its end;\nand the means towards this are also good because they contribute to this\nrealization.\n\nNo doubt, in beings endowed with consciousness the gradual realization of\nthis natural tendency, by the normal functioning and development of their\nactivities, is accompanied by pleasurable feeling. The latter is, in fact,\nnot an end of action itself, but rather the natural concomitant, the\neffect and index, of the healthy and normal activity of the conscious\nbeing: _delectatio sequitur operationem debitam_. It is the pleasure felt\nin tending towards the good that reveals the good to the conscious agent:\nthat is, taking pleasure in its wide sense as the feeling of well-being,\nof satisfaction with one\u2019s whole condition, activities and environment.\nHence it is the anticipated pleasure, connected by past association with a\ncertain line of action, that stimulates the conscious being to act in that\nway again. It is in the first instance because a certain operation or\ntendency is felt to be _pleasing_ that it is desired, and apprehended as\n_desirable_. Nor does the brute beast recognize or respond to any stimulus\nof action other than pleasure. But man\u2014endowed with reason, and reflecting\non the relation between his own nature and the activities whereby he duly\norients his life in his environment\u2014must see that what is pleasure-giving\nor \u201cagreeable\u201d in the ordinary sense of this term is generally so because\nit is \u201cagreeable\u201d in the deeper sense of being \u201csuitable to his nature,\u201d\n\u201cadapted to his end,\u201d and therefore \u201cgood\u201d.\n\nThe good, then, is whatever suits the nature of a being tending towards\nits end: _bonum est conveniens natur\u00e6 appetentis_. In what precisely does\nthis suitability consist? What suits any nature _perfects_ that nature,\nand suits it precisely in so far as it perfects it. But whatever perfects\na nature does so only because and in so far as it is _a realization of the\nend_ towards which this nature tends. Here we reach a new notion, that of\n\u201cperfecting\u201d or \u201cperfection,\u201d and one which is as essentially connected\nwith the notion of \u201cend\u201d or \u201cpurpose,\u201d as the concept of the \u201cgood\u201d itself\nis. Let us compare these notions of \u201cgoodness,\u201d \u201cend,\u201d and \u201cperfection\u201d.\nWe have said that a watch or a soldier are good when they are adapted to\ntheir respective ends. But they are so only because the end itself is\nalready good. And we may ask why any such end is itself good and therefore\ndesirable. For example, why is the accurate indication of time good, or\nthe defence of one\u2019s country? And obviously in such a series of questions\nwe must come to something which is good and desirable in and for itself,\nfor its own sake and not as leading and helping towards some remoter good.\nAnd this something which is good in and for itself is a last or ultimate\nend\u2014an absolute, not a relative, good. There must be such an absolute\ngood, such an ultimate end, if goodness in things is to be made\nintelligible at all. And it is only in so far as things tend towards this\nabsolute good, and are adapted to it, that they can be termed good. The\nrealization of this tendency of things towards the absolute good, or\nultimate end, is what constitutes the goodness of those things, and it\ndoes so because it _perfects their natures_.\n\n\n    The end towards which any nature tends is the cause of this\n    tendency, its _final_ cause; and the influence of a final cause\n    consists precisely in its goodness, _i.e._ in its power of\n    actualizing and perfecting a nature. This influence of the good is\n    sometimes described as the \u201cdiffusive\u201d character of goodness:\n    _Bonum est diffusivum sui_: Goodness tends to diffuse or\n    communicate itself, to multiply or reproduce itself. This\n    character, which we may recognize in the goodness of finite,\n    created things, is explained in the philosophy of theism as being\n    derived, with this goodness itself, from the uncreated goodness of\n    God who is the Ultimate End and Supreme Good of all reality. Every\n    creature has its own proper ultimate end and highest perfection in\n    its being a manifestation, an expression, a shewing forth, of the\n    Divine Goodness. It has its own actuality and goodness, distinct\n    from, but dependent on, the Divine Goodness; but inasmuch as its\n    goodness is an expression or imitation of the Divine Goodness, we\n    may, by an _extrinsic_ denomination, say that the creature is good\n    _by the Divine Goodness_. In a similar way, and without any\n    suspicion of pantheism, we may speak of the goodness of creatures\n    as being a _participation_ of the Divine Goodness (5).\n\n\n46. THE PERFECT. ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF PERFECTION.\u2014It is the\nrealization of the end or object or purpose of a nature that perfects the\nlatter, and so far formally constitutes the goodness of this nature. Now\nthe notion of perfection is not exactly the same as the notion of\ngoodness: although what is perfect is always good, what is good is not\nalways perfect. The term \u201cperfect\u201d comes from the Latin _perficere_,\n_perfectum_, meaning fully made, thoroughly achieved, completed, finished.\nStrictly speaking, it is only finite being, potential being, capable of\ncompletion, that can be spoken of as _perfectible_, or, when fully\nactualized, _perfect_. But by universal usage the term has been extended\nto the reality of the Infinite Being: we speak of the latter as the\nInfinitely _Perfect_ Being, not meaning that this Being has been\n\u201cperfected,\u201d but that He is the purely Actual and Infinite Reality.\nApplied to any finite being, the term \u201cperfect\u201d means that this being has\nattained to the full actuality which we regard as its end, as the ideal of\nits natural capacity and tendency. The finite being is subject to change;\nit is not actualized all at once, but gradually; by the play of those\nactive and passive powers which are rooted in its nature it is gradually\nactualized, and thus perfected, gaining more and more reality or being by\nthe process. But what directs this process and determines the line of its\ntendency? The _good_ which is the _end_ of the being, the good towards\nwhich the being by its nature tends. This good, which is the term of the\nbeing\u2019s natural tendency\u2014which is, in other words, its end\u2014is the\nfundamental principle(177) which perfects the nature of the being, is the\nsource and explanation of the process whereby this nature is perfected:\n_bonum est perfectivum_: _the good is the perfecting principle of\nreality_. The end itself is \u201cthe good which perfects,\u201d _bonum quod_; the\n\u201cperfecting\u201d itself is the formal cause of the goodness of the being that\nis perfected, _bonum quo_; the being itself which is perfected, and\ntherefore ameliorated or increased in goodness, is the _bonum cui_. In\nproportion, therefore, to the degree in which a being actually possesses\nthe perfection due to its nature it is \u201cgood\u201d; in so far as it lacks this\nperfection, it is wanting in goodness, or is, as we shall see,\nontologically \u201cbad\u201d or \u201cevil\u201d.\n\nWhile, then, the notion of the \u201cgood\u201d implies a relation of the appetite\nor natural tendency of a being towards its end, the notion of\n\u201cperfection,\u201d or \u201cperfecting,\u201d conveys to our minds actual reality simply,\nor the actualizing of reality. The term \u201cperfection\u201d is commonly used as\nsynonymous with actual reality. In so far forth as a reality is actual we\nsay it \u201chas perfection\u201d. But we do not call it \u201cperfect\u201d _simply_, unless\nit has all the actuality we conceive to be due to its nature: so long as\nit lacks any of this it is only perfect _secundum quid_, _i.e._ in\nproportion to the actuality it does possess. Hence we define \u201cthe perfect\u201d\nas _that which is actually lacking in nothing that is due to its nature_.\nThe perfect is therefore not simply the good, but the complete or finished\ngood; and it is even logically distinct from the latter, inasmuch as the\nactuality connoted by the former has added to it the relation to appetite\nconnoted by the latter. Similarly \u201cgoodness\u201d is logically distinct from\n\u201cperfection\u201d by adding the like relation to the latter. Although a thing\nhas goodness in so far as it has perfection, and _vice versa_, still its\nperfection is its actuality simply, while its goodness is this actuality\nconsidered as the term of its natural appetite or tendency.\n\n47. GRADES OF PERFECTION. REALITY AS STANDARD OF VALUE.\u2014We may distinguish\nbetween stages of perfection in the changing reality of the same being, or\ngrades of perfection in comparing with one another different classes or\norders of being.\n\nIn one and the same being we may distinguish between what is called its\n_first_ or _essential_ perfection, which means its essence or nature\nconsidered as capable of realizing its purpose in existence by tending\neffectively towards its end; what is called its _intermediate_ or\n_accidental_ perfection, which consists in all the powers, faculties and\nfunctions whereby this tendency is gradually actualized; and what is\ncalled its _final_ or _integral_ perfection, which consists in its full\nactualization by complete attainment of its end.\n\nAgain, comparing with one another the individual beings that make up our\nexperience, we classify them, we arrange them in a hierarchical order of\nrelative \u201cperfection,\u201d of inferiority or superiority, according to the\ndifferent grades of reality or perfection which we think we apprehend in\nthem. Thus, we look on living things as a higher, nobler, more perfect\norder of beings than non-living things, on animal life as a higher form of\nbeing than plant life, on intelligence as higher than instinct, on will as\nsuperior to sense appetite, on mind or spirit as nobler than matter, and\nso on. Now all such comparisons involve the apprehension of some standard\nof value. An estimation of relative values, or relative grades of\nperfection in things, is unintelligible except in reference to some such\nstandard; it involves of necessity the intuition of such a standard. We\nfeel sure that some at least of our appreciations are unquestionably\ncorrect: that man, for instance, is superior to the brute beast, and the\nlatter superior to the plant; that the lowest manifestation of life\u2014in the\nam\u0153ba, or whatever monocellular, microscopic germ may be the lowest\u2014is\nhigher on the scale of being than the highest expression of the\nmechanical, chemical and physical forces of the inorganic universe. And if\nwe ask ourselves what is our standard of comparison, what is our test or\nmeasure, and why are we sure of our application of it in such cases, our\nonly answer is that our standard of comparison is reality itself, actual\nbeing, perfection; that we rely implicitly on our intuition of such actual\nreality as manifested to us in varying grades or degrees within our\nexperience; that without claiming to be infallible in our judgments of\ncomparison, in our classifications of things, in our appreciations of\ntheir relative perfection, we may justly assume reality itself to be as\nsuch intelligible, and the human mind to be capable of obtaining some true\nand certain insight into the nature of reality.\n\n48. THE GOOD, THE REAL, AND THE ACTUAL.\u2014Having compared \u201cperfection\u201d with\n\u201cgoodness\u201d and with \u201cbeing,\u201d let us next compare the two latter notions\nwith each other. We shall see presently that every actual being has its\nontological goodness, that these are in reality identical. But there is a\nlogical distinction between them. In the first place the term \u201cbeing\u201d is\napplied _par excellence_ to substances rather than to accidents. But we do\nnot commonly speak of an individual substance, a person or thing, as good\nin reference to essential or substantial perfection.(178) When we describe\na man, or a machine, as \u201cgood,\u201d we mean that the man possesses those\n_accidental_ perfections, those qualities and endowments, which are\nsuitable to his nature as a man; that the machine possesses those\nproperties which adapt it to its end. In the second place the notion of\nbeing is absolute; that of the good is relative, for it implies the notion\nnot of reality simply but of reality as desirable, agreeable, suitable, as\nperfecting the nature of a subject, as being the end, or conducive to the\nend, towards which this nature tends. And since what thus _perfects_ must\nbe something not potential but actual, it follows that, unlike real truth,\nreal goodness is identical not with potential, but only with actual\nreality. It is not an attribute of the abstract, possible essence, but\nonly of the concrete, actually existing essence.(179)\n\nFrom the fact that the notion of the good is relative it follows that the\nsame thing can be simultaneously good and bad in different relations:\n\u201cWhat is one man\u2019s meat is another man\u2019s poison\u201d.\n\n49. KINDS OF GOODNESS; DIVISIONS OF THE GOOD.\u2014(_a_) The goodness of a\nbeing may be considered in relation to this being itself, or to other\nbeings. What is good for a being itself, what makes it intrinsically and\nformally good, _bonum sibi_, is whatever perfects it, and in the fullest\nsense the realization of its end. Hence we speak of a virtuous, upright\nman, whose conduct is in keeping with his nature and conducive to the\nrealization of his end, as a good man. But a being may also be good to\nothers, _bonum alteri_, by an extrinsic, active, effective goodness,\ninasmuch as by its action it may help other beings in the realization of\ntheir ends. In this sense, a beneficent man, who wishes the well-being of\nhis fellow-men and helps them to realize this well-being, is called a good\nman. This kind of goodness is what is often nowadays styled\n_philanthropy_; in Christian ethics it is known as _charity_.\n\n(_b_) We have described the good as the term or object of natural tendency\nor appetite. In the domain of beings not endowed with the power of\nconscious apprehension, determinism rules this natural tendency; this\nlatter is always oriented towards the _real_ good: it never acts amiss: it\nis always directed by the Divine Wisdom which has given to things their\nnatures. But in the domain of conscious living agents this natural\ntendency is consequent on apprehension: it takes the form of instinctive\nanimal appetite or of rational volition. And since this apprehension of\nthe good may be erroneous, since what is not really good but evil may be\napprehended as good, the appetite or will, which follows this\napprehension\u2014_nil volitum nisi praecognitum_\u2014may be borne towards evil\n_sub ratione boni_. Hence the obvious distinction between _real good_ and\n_apparent good_\u2014_bonum verum_ and _bonum apparens_.\n\n(_c_) In reference to any individual subject\u2014a man, for instance\u2014it is\nmanifest that _other_ beings can be good for him in so far as any of them\ncan be his end or a means to the attainment of his end. They are called in\nreference to him _objective goods_, and their goodness _objective\ngoodness_. But it is equally clear that they are good for him only because\nhe can perfect his own nature by somehow identifying or uniting himself\nwith them, possessing, using, or enjoying them. This possession of the\nobjective good constitutes what has been already referred to as _formal_\nor _subjective goodness_.(180)\n\n(_d_) We have likewise already referred to the fact that in beings endowed\nwith consciousness and appetite proper, whether sentient or rational, the\nfunction of possessing or attaining to what is objectively good, to what\nsuits and perfects the nature of the subject, has for its natural\nconcomitant a feeling of pleasure, satisfaction, well-being, delight,\nenjoyment. And we have observed that this pleasurable feeling may then\nbecome a stimulus to fresh desire, may indeed be desired for its own sake.\nNow this subjective, pleasure-giving possession of an objective good has\nbeen itself called by scholastics _bonum delectabile_\u2014delectable or\ndelight-giving good. The objective good itself considered as an end, and\nthe perfecting of the subject by its attainment, have been called _bonum\nhonestum_\u2014good which is really and _absolutely_ such _in itself_. While if\nthe good in question is really such only when considered as a means to the\nattainment of an end, of something that is good in itself, the former is\ncalled _bonum utile_\u2014useful good.(181)\n\nIn this important triple division _bonum honestum_ is used in the wide\nsense in which it embraces any _real_ good, whether physical or moral. As\napplied to man it would therefore embrace whatever perfects his physical\nlife as well as whatever perfects his nature considered as a rational, and\ntherefore moral, being. But in common usage it has been restricted to the\nlatter, and is in this sense synonymous with _moral good_, _virtue_.(182)\n\nFurthermore, a good which is an end, and therefore desirable for its own\nsake, whether it be physical or moral, can be at the same time a means to\nsome higher good and desired for the sake of this latter. Hence St.\nThomas, following Aristotle, reduces all the moral goods which are\ndesirable in themselves to two kinds: that which is desirable only for\nitself, which is the last end, final felicity; and those which, while good\nin themselves, are also conducive to the former, and these are the\nvirtues.(183)\n\n\n    When these various kinds of goodness are examined in reference to\n    the nature, conduct and destiny of man, they raise a multitude of\n    problems which belong properly to Ethics and Natural Theology. The\n    fact that man has a composite nature which is the seat of various\n    and conflicting tendencies, of the flesh and of the spirit; that\n    he perceives in himself a \u201cdouble law,\u201d a higher and a lower\n    appetite; that he is subject to error in his apprehension of the\n    good; that he apprehends a distinction between pleasure and duty;\n    that he feels the latter to be the path to ultimate happiness,\u2014all\n    this accentuates the distinction between real and apparent good,\n    between _bonum honestum_, _bonum utile_, and _bonum delectabile_.\n    The existence of God is established in Natural Theology; and in\n    Ethics, aided by Psychology, it is proved that no finite good can\n    be the last end of man, that God, the Supreme, Infinite Good, is\n    his last end, and that only in the possession of God by knowledge\n    and love can man find his complete and final felicity.\n\n\n50. GOODNESS A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF BEING.\u2014We have shown that there\nis a logical distinction between the concept of \u201cgoodness\u201d and that of\n\u201cbeing\u201d. We have now to show that the distinction is not real, in other\nwords, that goodness is a transcendental attribute of all actual reality,\nthat all being, in so far forth as it is actual, has\ngoodness\u2014transcendental or ontological goodness in the sense of\n_appetibility_, _desirability_, _suitability_, as already explained.\n\nWhen the thesis is formulated in the traditional scholastic statement,\n\u201c_Omne ens est bonum_: _All being is good_\u201d it sounds a startling paradox.\nSurely it cannot be contended that everything is good? A cancer in the\nstomach is not good; lies are not good; yet these are actual realities;\ncancers exist and lies are told; therefore not every reality is good. This\nis unquestionably true. But it does not contradict the thesis rightly\nunderstood. The true meaning of the thesis is, not that every being is\ngood in all respects, or possesses such goodness as would justify us in\ndescribing it as \u201cgood\u201d in the ordinary sense, but that every being\npossesses some goodness: every being in so far as it has actuality has\nformal, intrinsic goodness, or is, in other words, the term or object of\nnatural tendency or desire. This goodness, which we predicate of any and\nevery actual being, may be (1) the term of the natural tendency or\nappetite of that being itself, _bonum sibi_, or (2) it may be conceivably\nthe term of the appetite of some other being, _bonum alteri_. Let us see\nwhether it can be shown that every actual being has goodness in one or\nboth of these senses.\n\n(1) _Bonum sibi_.\u2014Is there any intelligible sense in which it can be said\nthat the actuality of any and every existing being is _good for that\nbeing_\u2014_bonum sibi_? There is. For if we recognize in every such being, as\nwe must, a _nature_, a potentiality of further actualization, a tendency\ntowards a state of fuller actuality which is its _end_; and if,\nfurthermore, we recognize that every such being at any instant not merely\n_is_ or exists, but is _becoming_ or _changing_, and thereby tending\neffectively towards its end; we must admit not merely that the full\nattainment of its end (its integral or final perfection) is \u201cdesired\u201d by,\nand \u201cperfects,\u201d and is \u201cgood\u201d for, that being\u2019s nature; but also that the\npartial realization of its end, or, in other words, the actuality it has\nat any instant in its changing condition of existence (its accidental or\nintermediate perfection) is similarly \u201cgood\u201d for it; and even that its\nactual existence as compared with its mere possibility (its first or\nessential perfection) is \u201cdesirable\u201d and \u201cgood\u201d for its nature. Actually\nexisting beings are intelligible only because they exist for some end or\npurpose, which, by their very existence, activities, operations, conduct,\nthey tend to realize. If this be admitted we cannot deny that the full\nattainment of this end or purpose is \u201cgood\u201d for them\u2014suitable, desirable,\nagreeable, perfecting them. In so far as they fail in this purpose they\nare wanting in goodness, they are bad, evil. For the realization of their\nend their natures are endowed with appropriate powers, faculties, forces,\nby the normal functioning of which they gradually develop and grow in\nactuality. No real being is by nature inert or aimless; no real being is\nwithout its connatural faculties, forces and functions. But the natural\nresult of all operation, of all action and interaction among things, is\n_actualization_ of the potential, amelioration, development, growth in\nperfection and goodness by gradual realization of ends. If by accident any\nof these powers is wanting, or acts amiss by failing to contribute its due\nperfection to the nature, there is in the being a proportionate want of\ngoodness\u2014it is so far bad, evil. But, even so, the nature of the thing\npreserves its fundamental orientation towards its end, towards the\nperfection natural to it, and struggles as it were against the evil\u2014tries\nto make good the deficiency. A cancer in the stomach is never good _for\nthe stomach_, or _for the living subject_ of which the stomach is an\norgan. For the living being the cancer is an evil, a _failure_ of one of\nthe organs to discharge its functions normally, _an absence of a good_,\n_viz._ the healthy functioning of an organ. But the cancerous growth,\nconsidered in itself and for itself, biologically and chemically, has its\nown nature, purpose, tendencies, laws; nor can we deny that its\ndevelopment according to these laws is \u201cgood\u201d for its specific\nnature,(184) _bonum sibi_.\n\nIt may be asked how can the _first_ or _essential_ perfection of an\nexisting substance, which is nothing else than the actual existence of the\nnature itself, be conceived as \u201cgood\u201d for this nature? It is so inasmuch\nas the actual existence of the substance is the first stage in the process\nby which the nature tends towards its end; an existing nature desires and\ntends towards the conservation of its own being;(185) hence the saying,\n\u201cSelf-preservation is the first law of nature\u201d; and hence, too, the\nscholastic aphorism, \u201c_Melius est esse quam non esse_\u201d.\n\nThe argument just outlined tends to show that every nature of which we can\nhave direct experience, or in other words every finite, contingent nature,\nis _bonum sibi_, formally and intrinsically good for itself.\n\nIt is, of course, equally applicable to the Uncreated, Necessary Being\nHimself. The Infinite Actuality of the Divine Nature is essentially the\nterm and end of the Divine Love. Therefore every actual being has\nintrinsic, formal goodness, whereby it is _bonum sibi_, _i.e._ its\nactuality is, in regard to its nature, really an object of tendency,\ndesire, appetite, a something that really suits and perfects this nature.\nThus understood, the thesis formulates no mere tautology. It makes a real\nassertion about real being; nor can the truth of this assertion be proved\notherwise than by an argument based, as ours is, on the recognition of\npurpose, of final causality, of adaptation of means to ends, in the actual\nuniverse of our experience.\n\nNotwithstanding all that has been said, it may still be asked why should\nthose individual beings, whose existence we have claimed to be good for\nthem, exist at all. It will be objected that there exist multitudes of\nbeings whose existence is manifestly _not_ good for them. Take, for\ninstance, the case of the reprobate. If they wish their total\nannihilation, if they desire the total cessation of their being, rather\nthan an existence of eternal punishment, they undoubtedly wish it _as a\ngood_. Is annihilation or absolute non-existence _really_ a good _for\nthem_? _De facto_ it is _for them_, considered _in their actual condition_\nwhich is _accidental to their nature_. Christ said of the scandal-giver\nwhat is surely true of the reprobate: \u201cIt were better for that man had he\nnever been born\u201d. We may admit, therefore, that for the reprobate\nthemselves simple non-existence is more desirable, and better, than their\nactual concrete state of existence as reprobate: because simple\nnon-existence is for them the simple _negation_ of their reality, whereas\nthe absolute and irreparable loss of their last end, the total frustration\nof the purpose for which they came into being, is for them the greatest\nconceivable _privation_. But this condition of the reprobate is accidental\nto their nature, alien to the purpose of their being, a self-incurred\nfailure, a deliberate thwarting of their natural tendency. It remains\ntrue, therefore, that their nature is good though incapable of progress,\nits purpose is good though frustrated. In so far as they have actual\nreality they have \u201cessential\u201d goodness. Their _natures_ still tend towards\nself-conservation and the realization of their end. They form no _real_\nexception to the general truth that \u201cit is better to be than not to be:\n_melius est esse quam non esse_\u201d. It is not annihilation as such that is\ndesired by them, but only as a less evil alternative than the eternal\nprivation of their last end.(186) If the evils accidentally and actually\nattaching to a certain state of existence make the continuance of _this\nstate_ undesirable for a being, it by no means follows that the\ncontinuance of this being in existence, simply and in itself, is less\ndesirable than non-existence.\n\n(2) BONUM ALTERI.\u2014Even, however, if it were granted that the actual\nexistence of some beings is not good for _themselves_, might it not\nnevertheless be good for _other beings_, and in relation to the general\nscheme of things? Is there not an intelligible sense in which _every_\nactual being is _bonum alteri_, good for other things? Here again the same\nexperience of actual reality, which teaches us that each individual being\nhas a nature whereby it tends to its own good as a particular end, also\nteaches us that in the general scheme of reality things are helpful to one\nanother, nay, are intended by their interaction and co-operation with one\nanother to subserve the wider end which is the good of the whole system of\nreality. There is little use in puzzling, as people sometimes do, over the\n_raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of individual things or classes of things in human\nexperience, over the good or the evil of the existence of these things,\nover the question whether or not it would be better that these things\nshould never have existed, until we have consulted not any isolated\nportion of human experience but _this experience as a whole_. In this we\ncan find sufficient evidence for the prevalence of a beneficent purpose\neverywhere. Not that we can read this purpose in every detail of reality.\nEven when we have convinced ourselves that all creation is the work of a\nSupreme Being who is Infinite Goodness Itself, we cannot gain that full\ninsight into the secret designs of His Providence, which would be needed\nin order to \u201cjustify His ways\u201d in all things. But when we have convinced\nourselves that the created universe exists because God wills it, we can\nunderstand that every actual reality in it must be \u201cgood,\u201d as being an\nobject or term of the Divine Will. Every created reality is thus _bonum\nalteri_ inasmuch as it is good for God, not, of course, in the impossible\nsense of perfecting Him, but as an imitation and expression of the\nGoodness of the Divine Nature Itself. The experience which enables us to\nreach a knowledge of the existence and nature of God, the Creator,\nConserver, and Providence of the actual universe, also teaches us that\nthis universe can have no other ultimate end or good than God Himself,\n_i.e._ God\u2019s will to manifest His goodness by the extrinsic glory which\nconsists in the knowledge and love of Him by His rational creatures. The\nomnipotence of the Creator, His freedom in creating, and our knowledge of\nthe universe He has actually chosen to create from among indefinite\npossible worlds, all alike convince us that the actual world is neither\nthe best possible nor the worst possible, _absolutely_ speaking. But our\nknowledge of His wisdom and power also convinces us that for the purpose\nof manifesting His glory in the measure and degree in which He has\nactually chosen to manifest it by creating the existing universe, and\n_relatively_ to the attainment of this specific purpose, the existing\nuniverse is the best possible.\n\n51. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.\u2014Those few outlines of the philosophy of\ntheism\u2014theses established in Natural Theology\u2014will reveal to us the place\nof theism in relation to \u201coptimist\u201d and \u201cpessimist\u201d systems of philosophy.\nPessimism, as an outcome of philosophical speculation, is the proclamation\nin some form or other of the conviction that human existence, nay,\nexistence in general, is a failure, an evil. It is the analogue, in\nrelation to will, of what scepticism is in relation to intellect; and it\nis no less self-contradictory than the latter. While the latter points to\ntotal paralysis of thought, the former involves a like paralysis of all\nwill, all effort, all purpose in existence\u2014a philosophy of despair,\ndespondency, gloom. Both are equally erroneous, equally indicative of\nphilosophical failure, equally repugnant to the normal, healthy mind.\nOptimism on the other hand is expressive of the conviction that good\npredominates in all existence: _melius est esse quam non esse_; that at\nthe root of all reality there is a beneficent purpose which is ever being\nrealized; that there is in things not merely a truth that can be known but\na goodness that can be loved. Existence is not an evil, life is not a\nfailure. This is a philosophy of hope, buoyancy, effort and attainment.\nBut is it true, or is it an empty illusion? Well, to maintain that the\nactual universe is the best absolutely, would, of course, be absurd. If\nLeibniz\u2019s \u201cPrinciple of Sufficient Reason\u201d obliged him to contend, in face\nof the painfully palpable facts of physical and moral evil in the\nuniverse, that this universe is the best absolutely possible, the best\nthat God could create, we can only say: so much the worse for his\n\u201cPrinciple\u201d. The true optimism is that of the theist who, admitting the\nprevalence of evil in the universe, in the sense to be explained\npresently, at the same time holds that throughout creation the good\npredominates, that God\u2019s beneficent purpose in regard to individuals does\nin the main prevail, and that His glory is manifested in giving to\nrational creatures the perfection and felicity of knowing and loving\nHimself. For the theist, then, the problem of the existence of evil in the\nuniverse assumes the general form of reconciling the fact of evil in God\u2019s\ncreation with the fact of God\u2019s infinite power and goodness. This is a\nproblem for Natural Theology. Here we have merely to indicate some general\nprinciples arising from the consideration of evil as the correlative and\nantithesis of goodness.\n\n52. EVIL: ITS NATURE AND CAUSES. MANICHEISM.\u2014Admitting the existence of\nevil in the universe, the scholastic apparently withdraws the admission\nforthwith by denying the reality of evil. The paradox explains itself by\ncomparing the notions of good and evil, and thus trying to arrive at a\nproper conception of the latter.\n\nIf ontological goodness is really identical with actual being, if being is\ngood in so far as it is actual, then it would appear that ontological evil\nmust be identical with non-being, nothingness. And so it is, in the sense\nthat no evil is a positive, actual reality, that all evil is an absence of\nreality. But just as the good, though really identical with the actual, is\nnevertheless logically distinct from the latter, so is evil logically\ndistinct from nothingness, or the absence of reality. As we have seen, the\ngood is that which perfects a nature, that which is due to a nature as the\nrealization of the end of the latter. So, too, is evil the _privation_ of\nany perfection due to a nature, the absence of something positive and\nsomething which ought to be present. Evil, therefore, is not a mere\nnegation or absence of being; it is the absence of a good, or in other\nwords the absence of a reality that should be present. All privation is\nnegation, but not _vice versa_; for privation is the negation of something\n_due_: the absence of virtue is a mere negation in an animal, in man it is\na privation. Hence the commonly accepted definition of evil: _Malum est\nprivatio boni debiti_: _Evil is the privation of the goodness due to a\nthing_.(187) Evil is always, therefore, a defect, a deficiency. The notion\nof evil is a relative, not an absolute notion. As goodness is the right\nrelation of a nature to its proper end, so is evil a failure, a defect in\nthis relation: _Malum est privatio ordinis ad finem debitum_.(188)\n\nThe very finiteness of a finite being is the absence of further reality in\nthis being; but as this further reality is not due to such a being, its\nabsence, which has sometimes been improperly described as \u201cmetaphysical\nevil,\u201d is not rightly regarded as evil at all: except, indeed, we were to\nconceive it as happening to the Infinite Being Himself, which would be a\ncontradiction in thought.\n\nEvil, then, in its formal concept is nothing positive; it is essentially\nnegative, or rather privative. For this very reason, when we consider evil\nin the concrete, _i.e._ as affecting actual things, as occurring in the\nactual universe\u2014we can scarcely speak of it with propriety as\n\u201cexisting,\u201d\u2014we see that it essentially involves some positive, real\nsubject which it affects, some nature which, by affecting, it renders so\nfar evil. Cancer in the stomach is a real evil of the stomach, a defect, a\ndeficiency, a failure, in the adaptation of the stomach to its proper end.\nIt is not itself a positive, absolute, _evil entity_. In so far as it is\nitself a positive, physical reality, a growth of living cells, it has its\nown nature, its natural tendency, its development towards an end in\naccordance with biological laws: in all of which it verifies the\ndefinition of ontological goodness. But the existence of such a growth in\nthe stomach is pathological, _i.e._ a disease of the stomach, a prevention\nof the natural, normal function of the stomach, a _failure of the latter\u2019s\nadaptation to its end_, and hence an _evil for the stomach_. Lying, too,\nis an evil, a moral evil of man as a moral subject. But this does not mean\nthat the whole physical process of thinking, judging, speaking, whereby a\nman lies, is itself a positive evil entity. The thinking is itself good as\na physical act. So is the speaking in itself good as a physical act.\nWhatever of positive reality there is in the whole process is good,\nontologically good. But there is a _want of conformity_ of the language\nwith the thought, entailing a _privation_ or _failure of adaptation_ of\nthe man as a moral subject with his end, with his real good; and in this\nfailure of adaptation, this privation of goodness, lies the moral evil of\nlying.\n\nEvil, then, has a _material_ or subjective cause, _viz._ some positive,\nactual reality, which is good in so far forth as it is actual, but which\nis evil, or wanting in something due to it, in so far as the privation\nwhich we have called evil affects it.\n\nBut evil has no _formal_ cause: formally it is not a reality but a\nprivation: \u201cevil has no formal cause, but is rather the privation of a\nform\u201d.(189)\n\nNor has evil any _final_ cause, for it consists precisely in the failure\nof a being\u2019s natural tendency towards its end, in the want of adaptation\nof a nature to its end: \u201cnor has evil a final cause, but is rather the\nprivation of a being\u2019s due relation to its natural end\u201d.(190) Evil cannot\nbe the natural result of a being\u2019s tendency towards its end, or a means to\nthe attainment of this end. For that which is really an end must be good,\nand a means derives its goodness from the end to which it is a means. The\ngood, because it is an end, or a means to an end, is desirable; and so,\ntoo, might evil be defined _a posteriori_ as that which is the object of\nno natural tendency or desire, that from which all things are averse:\n_malum est quod nullum ens appetit, vel a quo omnia aversantur_. Nor can\nevil be itself an end, or be as such desired or desirable. Real evil is no\ndoubt often sought and desired by conscious beings, sometimes physical\nevil, sometimes moral evil. But it is always desired and embraced as a\ngood, _sub specie boni_, _i.e._ when apprehended as here and now good in\nthe sense of gratifying, pleasure-giving, _bonum delectabile_. This is\npossible because _pleasure_, especially organic, sensible pleasure, as\ndistinct from the state of real well-being which characterizes true\n_happiness_, is not the exclusive concomitant of seeking and possessing a\n_real_ good: it often accompanies the seeking and possessing of a merely\napparent good: and in such cases it is itself a merely apparent good, and\nin reality evil. The unfortunate man who commits suicide does not embrace\nevil as such. He wrongly judges death to be good, as being in his view a\nlesser evil than the miseries of his existence, and under this aspect of\ngoodness he embraces death.\n\nFinally we have to inquire whether evil has an _efficient_ cause. Seeing\nthat it is not merely a logical figment, seeing that it really affects\nactual things, that it really occurs in the actual universe, it must have\na real source among the efficient causes of these actual things that make\nup the universe. It is undoubtedly due to the action of efficient causes,\n_i.e._ to the _failure_, the _defective_ action, of efficient causes. But\nbeing itself something negative, a privation, it cannot properly be said\nto have an \u201cefficient\u201d cause; for the influence of an efficient cause is\npositive action, which in turn must have for its term something positive,\nsomething real, and therefore good. Hence St. Augustine very properly says\nthat evil should be described as having a \u201c_deficient_\u201d cause rather than\nan \u201cefficient\u201d cause.(191) In other words, evil is not the direct, natural\nor normal result of the activity of efficient causes; for this result is\nalways good. It must therefore be always an indirect, abnormal, accidental\nconsequence of their activity. Let us see how this can be\u2014firstly in\nregard to physical evil, then in regard to moral evil.\n\nIn the action of physical causes we may distinguish between the operative\nagencies themselves and the subjects in which the effects of these\noperations are produced. Sometimes the effect is wanting in due\nperfection, or is in other words imperfect, physically evil, because of\nsome defect in the agencies: the statue may be defective because the\nsculptor is unskilled, or his instruments bad; offspring may be weak or\nmalformed owing to some congenital or accidental weakness or unfitness in\nthe parents. Sometimes the evil in the effect is traceable not to the\nagents but to the materials on which they have to work: the sculptor and\nhis instruments may be perfect, but if there be a flaw in the marble the\nstatue will be a failure; the educator may be efficient, but if the pupil\nbe wanting in aptitude or application the results cannot be \u201cgood\u201d.\n\nAll this, however, does not carry us very far, for we must still inquire\n_why_ are the agencies, or the materials, themselves defective. Moreover,\nphysical evil sometimes occurs without any defect either in the agencies\nor in the materials. The effect produced may be incompatible with some\nminor perfection already in the subject; it can then be produced only at\nthe sacrifice of this minor perfection: which sacrifice is for the subject\n_pro tanto_ an evil. It is in the natural order of things that the\nproduction of a new \u201cform\u201d or perfection excludes the actuality of a\npre-existing form or perfection. All nature is subject to change, and we\nhave seen that all change is ruled by the law: _Generatio unius est\ncorruptio alterius_. It might perhaps be said that this privation or\nsupplanting of perfections in things by the actualization in these things\nof incompatible perfections, is inherent in the nature of things and\nessential to their finiteness\u2014at least, if we regard the things not\nindividually but as parts of a whole, as members of a system, as\nsubserving a general scheme;\u2014and that therefore such privation should not\nbe regarded as physical evil proper, but rather as \u201cmetaphysical\u201d evil,\nimproperly so called. However we regard it, it can have no other first\nsource than the Will of the Creator decreeing the actual order of the\nexisting universe. And the same must be said of the physical evils proper\nthat are incident to the actual order of things. These evils are\n\u201caccidental\u201d when considered in relation to the individual natures of the\ncreated agencies and materials. They are defects or failures of natural\ntendencies: were these natural tendencies always realized there would be\nno such evils. But they are not realized; and their \u201cfailure\u201d or \u201cevil\u201d is\nnot \u201caccidental\u201d in regard to God; for God has willed and created these\nagencies with natural tendencies which He has destined to be fulfilled not\nalways and in every detail, but in such measure as will secure the actual\norder of the universe and show forth His perfections in the finite degree\nin which He has freely chosen to manifest these perfections. The world He\nhas chosen to create is not the best absolutely possible: there are\nphysical evils in it; but it is the best for the exact purpose for which\nHe created it.\n\nThere is also moral evil in the universe. In comparison with moral evil,\nthe physical defects in God\u2019s creation\u2014physical pain and suffering,\nmaterial privations and hardships, decay and death of living things\u2014are\nnot properly evils at all. At least they are not evils in the same\nprofound sense as the deliberate turning away of the moral agent from God,\nhis Last End and Ultimate Good, is an evil. For the physical evils\nincident to individual beings in the universe can be not only foreseen by\nGod but accepted and approved, so to speak, by His Will, as subserving the\nrealization of the total physical good which He wills in the universe; and\nas subordinate to, and instrumental in the realization of, the moral good\nof mankind: for it is obvious that in the all-wise designs of Providence\nphysical evils such as pain, suffering, poverty, hunger, etc., may be the\nmeans of realizing moral goodness. But moral evil, on the contrary, or, in\nthe language of Christian ethics, _Sin_\u2014the conscious and deliberate\nrejection, by the free agent, of God who is his true good\u2014though\nnecessarily foreseen by God in the universe He has actually chosen to\ncreate, and therefore necessarily permitted by the Will of God\nconsequently on this foresight, cannot have been and cannot be intended or\napproved by Him. Having created man an intelligent and free being, God\ncould not will or decree the revolt of the latter from Himself. He loves\nessentially His own Infinite Goodness: were He to identify His Will with\nthat of the sinning creature He would at the same time be turning away\nfrom His Goodness: which is a contradiction in terms. God, therefore, does\nnot will moral evil. Nevertheless He permits it: otherwise it would not\noccur, for nothing can happen \u201cagainst His will\u201d. He has permitted it by\nfreely choosing to create this actual universe of rational and free\ncreatures, foreseeing that they would sin. He could have created instead a\nuniverse of such beings, in which there would be no moral evil: for He is\nomnipotent. Into the secrets of His election it is not given to finite\nminds to penetrate. Acknowledging His Infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness,\nrealizing at the same time the finiteness of our faculties, we see how\nrational it is to bow down our minds with St. Paul and to exclaim in\nadmiration: \u201cO, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge\nof God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His\nways!\u201d(192)\n\nIf it be objected that God\u2019s permission of moral evil in the universe is\nreally the cause of this evil, and makes God Himself responsible for sin\nand its consequences, a satisfactory answer is not far to seek. It is\nabsolutely incompatible with God\u2019s Infinite Sanctity that He be\nresponsible for sin and its consequences. For these the free will of the\ncreature is _alone_ responsible. The creation of intelligent beings,\nendowed with the power _freely_ to love, honour and serve God, is the most\nmarvellous of all God\u2019s works. Free will is the noblest endowment of a\ncreature of God, as it is also the most mysterious. Man, who by his\nintelligence has the power to know God as his Supreme Good, has by his\nwill the power _freely_ to tend towards God and attain to the possession\nof God as his Last End. In so far as man sins, _i.e._ knowingly,\ndeliberately, and freely violates the tendency of his nature towards God\nby turning away from Him, he and he alone is responsible for the\nconsequences, because he has the power to accomplish what he knows to be\nGod\u2019s design in his regard, and to be his true destiny and path to\nhappiness\u2014_viz._ that he tend towards union with God and the possession of\nGod\u2014and he deliberately fails to make use of this power. Such failure and\nits consequences are, therefore, his own; they leave absolutely untouched\nand unassailed the Infinite Goodness and Benevolence of God\u2019s eternal\ndesign in his regard.\n\nIn scholastic form, the objection is proposed and answered in this way:\n\u201cThe cause of a cause is the cause of the latter\u2019s effects; but God is the\ncause of man, and sin is the latter\u2019s effect; therefore God is the cause\nof sin\u201d. \u201cThat the cause of a _non-free_ cause is the cause of the\nlatter\u2019s effects, we admit. That the cause of a _free_ cause is the cause\nof the latter\u2019s effects, at least in the sense of permitting, without\nintending and being thereby responsible for them, we also admit; always in\nthe sense of intending and being responsible for them, we deny. The\n_positive effects_ of a created free cause, those which the latter by\nnature is intended to produce, are attributable to the first cause or\ncreator of the free cause, and the first cause is responsible for them.\nThe _failures_ of the created free cause to produce its natural and\nintended effects, are not due to the first cause; they are not intended\nby, nor attributable to, the first cause; nor is the latter responsible\nfor them: they are failures of the free cause, and of him alone; though\nthey are of course foreseen and permitted by the first cause or creator of\nthe latter. The minor premiss of the objection we may admit\u2014noting,\nhowever, that sin is not properly called an effect, but rather, like all\nevil, a _failure_ of some cause to produce its connatural effect: it is a\ndefect, a deficiency, a privation of some effect, of some positive\nperfection, which the cause ought naturally to have produced. The\nconclusion of the objection we distinguish, according to our analysis of\nthe major premiss: God is the cause of sin in the proper sense of\nintending it, willing it, and producing it positively, and being thereby\nresponsible for it, we deny; God is the cause of sin in the improper sense\nof merely foreseeing and permitting it as incidental to the universe He\nhas actually willed and decreed to create, as occurring in this universe\nby the deliberate failure of free creatures to conform themselves to His\nprimary benevolent intention in their regard, we may grant. And this\nDivine permission of moral evil cannot be shown to be incompatible with\nany attribute of the Divinity.\u201d\n\nIn the preceding paragraphs we have barely outlined the principles on\nwhich the philosophy of theism meets the problem of evil in the universe.\nWe have made assumptions which it is the proper province of Natural\nTheology to establish, and to that department also we must refer the\nstudent for a fuller treatment of the whole problem.\n\nIt has been sometimes said that the fact of evil in the universe is one of\nthe greatest difficulties against the philosophy of Theism. If this be\ntaken as an insinuation that the fact of evil can be better explained\u2014or\neven as well explained\u2014on the assumptions of Pantheism, Monism,\nManicheism, or any other philosophy besides Theism, it is false. If it\nmeans simply that in accounting for evil\u2014whether on principles of Theism\nor of any other philosophy\u2014we are forced to raise some ultimate questions\nin the face of which we must admit that we have come upon depths of\nmystery which the plummet of our finite intellects cannot hope to fathom,\nin this sense indeed the assertion may be admitted. As we have already\nhinted, even with the light of the Christian Revelation to aid the natural\nlight of reason, there are questions about the existence and causes of\nevil which we may indeed ask, but which we cannot adequately answer. And\nobviously this is no reflection on Theism; while in the latter system we\nhave a more intelligible and more satisfactory analysis of the problem\nthan in any other philosophy.\n\nAmong the ancient Greek philosophers we find \u201cmatter\u201d (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7) identified\nwith \u201cvacuum\u201d or \u201cempty space\u201d (\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd) and this again with\n\u201cnothingness\u201d or non-being (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03bd\u1f40). Now the concept of evil is the\nconcept of something negative\u2014a privation of goodness, of being or\nreality. Thus the notion of evil came to be associated with the notion of\nmatter. But the latter notion is not really negative: it is that of a\nformless, chaotic, disorderly material. When, therefore, the Manicheans\nattributed a positive reality to evil\u2014conceiving it as the principle of\nall disorder, strife, discord\u2014they naturally regarded all matter as the\nexpression of the Evil Principle, in opposition to soul or spirit as the\nexpression of the Good Principle. The Manichean philosophy of Evil, a\nproduct of the early Christian centuries, has been perhaps the most\nnotable alternative or rival system encountered by the theistic philosophy\nof Evil; for, notwithstanding the fantastic character of its conceptions\nManicheism has reappeared and reasserted itself repeatedly in after ages,\nnotably in the Middle Ages. Its prevalence has probably been due partly to\nthe concreteness of its conceptions and partly to a certain analogy which\nthey bear towards the conception of Satan and the fallen angels in\nChristian theology. In both cases there is the idea of conflict, strife,\nactive and irreconcilable opposition, between the powers of good and the\npowers of evil. But there the analogy ends. While in Christian theology\nthe powers of evil are presented as essentially subject to the Divine\nOmnipotence, in Manicheism the _Evil Principle_, the _Summum Malum_, is\npresented as a supreme, self-existent principle, essentially independent\nof, as well as antagonistic to, the Divine Being, the _Summum Bonum_.\nSince there is evil in the world, and since good cannot be the cause of\nevil\u2014so the Manicheans argue\u2014there must be an essentially Evil First\nPrinciple which is the primary source of all the evil in the universe,\njust as there is an essentially Good First Principle which is the source\nof all its good. Everything in the world\u2014and especially man himself,\ncomposed of matter and spirit\u2014is the expression and the theatre of the\nessential conflict which is being ever waged between the Good and the Evil\nPrinciple. Everywhere throughout the universe we find this dualism:\nbetween spirit and matter, light and darkness, order and disorder, etc.\n\nFrom all that has been said in the preceding paragraphs regarding the\nnature and causes of good and evil the errors of the Manichean system will\nbe apparent. Its fundamental error is the conception of evil as a positive\nentity. Evil is not a positive entity but a privation. And this being so,\nits occurrence does not demand a positive efficient cause. It can be\nexplained and accounted for by deficiency or failure in causes that are\ngood in so far forth as they are operative, but which have not all the\ngoodness their nature demands. And we have seen how this failure of\ncreated causes is permitted by the First Cause, and is not incompatible\nwith His Infinite Goodness.\n\nBesides, the Manichean conception of an intrinsically evil cause, a cause\nthat could produce only evil, is a contradiction in terms. The operation\nof an efficient cause must have a positive term: in so far as the term is\npositive it is good: and therefore its cause cannot have been totally\nevil, but must have been in some degree good. The crucial point in the\nwhole debate is this, that we cannot conceive evil as a positive entity.\nBy doing so we render reality unintelligible; we destroy the fundamental\nground of any possible distinction between good and evil, thus rendering\nboth alike inconceivable. Each is correlative to the other; we cannot\nunderstand the one without the other. If, therefore, goodness is an aspect\nof real being, and identical with reality, evil must be a negation of\nreality, and cannot be made intelligible otherwise.\n\nFinally, the Manichean conception of two Supreme, Self-Existent,\nIndependent First Principles is obviously self-contradictory. As is shown\nin Natural Theology, Being that is absolutely Supreme, Self-Existent and\nNecessary, must by Its very nature be unique: there could not be two such\nBeings.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII. REALITY AND THE BEAUTIFUL.\n\n\n53. THE CONCEPT OF THE BEAUTIFUL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EXPERIENCE.\u2014Truth\nand Goodness characterize reality as related to intellect and to will.\nIntimately connected with these notions is that of _the beautiful_,(193)\nwhich we must now briefly analyse. The fine arts have for their common\nobject the expression of the beautiful; and the department of philosophy\nwhich studies these, the philosophy of the beautiful, is generally\ndescribed as _Esthetics_.(194)\n\nLike the terms \u201ctrue\u201d and \u201cgood,\u201d the term \u201cbeautiful\u201d (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd; _pulchrum_,\n_beau_, _sch\u00f6n_, etc.) is familiar to all. To reach a definition of it let\nus question experience. What do men commonly mean when, face to face with\nsome object or event, they say \u201cThat is _beautiful_\u201d? They give expression\nto this sentiment in the presence of a natural object such as a landscape\nrevealing mountain and valley, lake and river and plain and woodland,\nglowing in the golden glow of the setting sun; or in contemplating some\nwork of art\u2014painting, sculpture, architecture, music: the _Sistine\nMadonna_, the _Moses_ of Michael Angelo, the Cathedral of _Notre Dame_, a\nsymphony of Beethoven; or some literary masterpiece: Shakespeare\u2019s\n_Macbeth_, or Dante\u2019s _Divina Commedia_, or Newman\u2019s _Apologia_, or\nKickham\u2019s _Knocknagow_. There are other things the sight of which arouses\nno such sentiment, but leaves us indifferent; and others again, the sight\nof which arouses a contrary sentiment, to which we give expression by\ndesignating them as \u201ccommonplace,\u201d \u201cvulgar,\u201d \u201cugly\u201d. The sentiment in\nquestion is one of _pleasure_ and _approval_, or of _displeasure_ and\n_disapproval_.\n\nHence the first fact to note is that _the beautiful pleases us_, _affects\nus agreeably_, while the commonplace or the ugly leaves us indifferent or\n_displeases us_, _affects us disagreeably_.\n\nBut the _good_ pleases us and affects us agreeably. Is the beautiful,\nthen, identical with the good? No; the really beautiful is indeed always\ngood; but not everything that is good is beautiful; nor is the pleasure\naroused by the good identical with that aroused by the beautiful. Whatever\ngratifies the lower sense appetites and causes organic pleasure is\ngood\u2014_bonum delectabile_\u2014but is not deemed beautiful. Eating and drinking,\nresting and sleeping, indulging the senses of touch, taste and smell, are\nindeed pleasure-giving, but they have no association with the beautiful.\nAgain, the deformed child may be the object of the mother\u2019s special love.\nBut the pleasure thus derived from the good, as the object of appetite,\ndesire, delight, is not esthetic pleasure. If we examine the latter, the\npleasure caused by the beautiful, we shall find that it is invariably a\npleasure peculiar to _knowledge_, to apprehension, perception,\nimagination, contemplation. Hence in the domain of the senses we designate\nas \u201cbeautiful\u201d only what can be apprehended by the two higher senses,\nseeing and hearing, which approximate most closely to intellect, and\nwhich, through the imagination, furnish data for _contemplation_ to the\nintellect.(195) This brings us to St. Thomas\u2019s definition: _Pulchra sunt\nqu\u00e6 visa placent_: those things are beautiful whose vision pleases\nus,\u2014where vision is to be understood in the wide sense of apprehension,\ncontemplation.(196) The owner of a beautiful demesne, or of an art\ntreasure, may derive pleasure from his sense of proprietorship; but this\nis distinct from the esthetic pleasure that may be derived by others, no\nless than by himself, from the mere contemplation of those objects.\nEsthetic pleasure is disinterested: it springs from the mere\n_contemplation_ of an object as beautiful; whereas the pleasure that\nsprings from the object as good is an interested pleasure, a pleasure of\n_possession_. No doubt the beautiful is really identical with the good,\nthough logically distinct from the latter.(197) The _orderliness_ which we\nshall see to be the chief objective factor of beauty, is itself a\nperfection of the object, and as such is good and desirable. Hence the\nbeautiful can be an object of interested desire, but only under the aspect\nof goodness. Under the aspect of beauty the object can excite only the\ndisinterested esthetic pleasure of contemplation.\n\nBut if esthetic pleasure is derived from contemplation, is not this\nidentifying the beautiful with the true, and supplanting art by science?\nAgain the consequence is inadmissible; for not every pleasure peculiar to\nknowledge is esthetic. There is a pleasure in seeking and discovering\ntruth, the pleasure which gratifies the scholar and the scientist: the\npleasure of the philologist in tracing roots and paradigms, of the chemist\nin analysing unsavoury materials, of the anatomist in exploring the\nstructure of organisms _post mortem_. But these things are not\n\u201cbeautiful\u201d. The really beautiful is indeed always true, but it cannot\nwell be maintained that all truths are beautiful. That two and two are\nfour is a truth, but in what intelligible sense could it be said to be\nbeautiful?\n\nBut besides the scientific pleasure of seeking and discovering truth,\nthere is the pleasure which comes from contemplating the object known. The\naim of the scientist or scholar is _to discover truth_; that of the artist\nis, through knowledge to derive complacency from _contemplating the thing\nknown_. The scientist or scholar may be also an artist, or _vice versa_;\nbut the scientist\u2019s pleasure proper lies exclusively in discovering truth,\nwhereas that of the artist lies in contemplating something apprehended,\nimagined, conceived. The artist is not concerned as to whether what he\napprehends is real or imaginary, certain or conjectural, but only as to\nwhether or how far the contemplation of it will arouse emotions of\npleasure, admiration, enthusiasm; while the scientist\u2019s supreme concern is\nto know things, to see them as they are. The beautiful, then, is always\ntrue, either as actual or as ideal; but the true is beautiful only when it\nso reveals itself as to arouse in us the desire to see or hear it, to\nconsider it, to dwell and rest in the contemplation of it.\n\nLet us accept, then, the _a posteriori_ definition of the beautiful as\n_that which it is pleasing to contemplate_; and before inquiring what\nprecisely is it, on the side of the object, that makes the latter\nagreeable to contemplate, let us examine the subjective factors and\nconditions of esthetic experience.\n\n54. THE ESTHETIC SENTIMENT. APPREHENSION OF THE BEAUTIFUL.\u2014We have seen\nthat both the appetitive and the cognitive faculties are involved in the\nexperience of the beautiful. Contemplation implies cognition; while the\nfeeling of pleasure, complacency, satisfaction, delight, indicates the\noperation of appetite or will. Now the notion of the beautiful, like all\nour notions, has its origin in sense experience; but it is itself\nsuprasensible for it is reached by abstraction, and this is above the\npower of sense faculties. While the senses and imagination apprehend\nbeautiful objects the intellect attains to that which makes these objects\nbeautiful, to the _ratio pulchri_ that is in them. No doubt, the\nperception or imagination of beautiful things, in nature or in art,\nproduces as its natural concomitant, a feeling of sensible pleasure. To\nhear sweet music, to gaze on the brilliant variety of colours in a\ngorgeous pageant, to inhale delicious perfumes, to taste savoury\ndishes\u2014all such experiences gratify the senses. But the feeling of such\nsensible pleasure is quite distinct from the esthetic enjoyment which\naccompanies the apprehension of the beautiful; though it is very often\nconfounded with the latter. Such _sentient_ states of agreeable feeling\nare mainly _passive_, organic, physiological; while esthetic enjoyment,\nthe appreciation of the beautiful, is eminently _active_. It implies the\noperation of a suprasensible faculty, the _intelligence_; it accompanies\nthe reaction of the latter faculty to some appropriate objective stimulus\nof the suprasensible, intelligible order, to some \u201cidea\u201d embodied in the\nobject of sense.(198)\n\nThe error of confounding esthetic enjoyment with mere organic sense\npleasure is characteristic of all sensist and materialist philosophies. A\nfeeling of sensible gratification always, no doubt, accompanies our\napprehension and enjoyment of the beautiful; for just as man is not a\nmerely sentient being so neither is he a pure intelligence. Beauty reaches\nhim through the senses; in order that an object be beautiful for him, in\norder that the contemplation of it may please him, it must be in harmony\nwith his whole _human_ nature, which is both sentient and intelligent; it\nmust, therefore, be agreeable to the senses and imagination as well as to\nthe intellect. \u201cThere is no painting,\u201d writes M. Bruneti\u00e8re,(199) \u201cbut\nshould be above all a joy to the eye! no music but should be a delight for\nthe ear!\u201d Otherwise we shall not apprehend in it the order, perfection,\nharmony, adaptation to human nature, whereby we pronounce an object\nbeautiful and rejoice in the contemplation of it. And it is this\nintellectual activity that is properly esthetic. \u201cWhat makes us consider a\ncolour beautiful,\u201d writes Bossuet,(200) is the secret judgment we\npronounce upon its adaptation to the eye which it pleases. Beautiful\nsounds, songs, cadences, have a similar adaptation to the ear. To\napprehend this adaptation promptly and accurately is what is described as\nhaving a good ear, though properly speaking this judgment should be\nattributed to the intellect.\n\nAccording to some the esthetic sentiment, the appreciation and enjoyment\nof the beautiful, is an exclusively subjective experience, an emotional\nstate which has all its sources within the conscious subject, and which\nhas no real, extramental correlative in things. According to others beauty\nis already in the extramental reality independently of any subjective\nconditions, and has no mental factors in its constitution as an object of\nexperience. Both of these extreme views are erroneous. Esthetic pleasure,\nlike all pleasure, is the natural concomitant of the full, orderly, normal\nexercise of the subject\u2019s conscious activities. These activities are\ncalled forth by, and exercised upon, some _object_. For esthetic pleasure\nthere must be in the object something the contemplation of which will\nelicit such harmonious exercise of the faculties. Esthetic pleasure,\ntherefore, cannot be purely subjective: there must be an objective factor\nin its realization. But on the other hand this objective factor cannot\nprovoke esthetic enjoyment independently of the dispositions of the\nsubject. It must be in harmony with those dispositions\u2014cognitive,\nappetitive, affective, emotional, temperamental\u2014in order to evoke such a\nmental view of the object that the contemplation of the latter will cause\nesthetic pleasure. And it is precisely because these dispositions, which\nare so variable from one individual to another, tinge and colour the\nmental view, while this in turn determines the quality of the esthetic\njudgment and feeling, that people disagree and dispute interminably about\nquestions of beauty in art and nature. Herein beauty differs from truth.\nNo doubt people dispute about the latter also; but at all events they\nrecognize its objective character and the propriety of an appeal to the\nindependent, impersonal standard of evidence. Not so, however, in regard\nto beauty: _De gustibus non est disputandum_: there is no disputing about\ntastes. The perception of beauty, the judgment that something is or is not\nbeautiful, is the product of an act of _taste_, _i.e._ of the individual\u2019s\nintelligence affected by numerous concrete personal dispositions both of\nthe sentient and of the spiritual order, not only cognitive and appetitive\nbut temperamental and emotional. Moreover, besides this variety in\nsubjective dispositions, we have to bear in mind the effects of artistic\nculture, of educating the taste. The eye and the ear, which are the two\nmain channels of data for the intellect, can be made by training more\ndelicate and exacting, so that the same level of esthetic appreciation can\nbe maintained only by a constantly increasing measure of artistic\nstimulation. Finally, apart from all that a beautiful object _directly\nconveys_ to us for contemplation, there is something more which it may\n_indirectly suggest_: it arouses a distinct activity of the imagination\nwhereby we fill up, in our own individual degree and according to our own\ninterpretation, what has not been actually supplied in it by nature or\nart.\n\nAll those influences account sufficiently for the subjectivity and\nvariability of the esthetic sentiment, for diversity of artistic tastes\namong individuals, for the transitions of fashion in art from epoch to\nepoch and from race to race. But it must not be concluded that the\nsubjective factors in the constitution of the beautiful are wholly\nchangeable. Since human nature is fundamentally the same in all men there\nought to be a fund of esthetic judgments and pleasures common to all;\nthere ought to be in nature and in art some things which are recognized\nand enjoyed as beautiful by all. And there are such. In matters _of\ndetail_ the maxim holds: _De gustibus non disputandum_. But there are\nfundamental esthetic judgments for which it does not hold. Since men have\na common nature, and since, as we shall see presently, there are\nrecognizable and stable objective factors to determine esthetic judgments,\nthere is a legitimate foundation on which to discuss and establish some\nesthetic canons of universal validity.\n\n55. OBJECTIVE FACTORS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BEAUTIFUL.\u2014\u201cAsk the\nartist,\u201d writes St. Augustine,(201) \u201cwhether beautiful things are\nbeautiful because they please us, or rather please us because they are\nbeautiful, and he will reply unhesitatingly that they please us because\nthey are beautiful.\u201d What, then is it that makes them beautiful, and so\ncauses the esthetic pleasure we experience in contemplating them? In order\nthat an object produce pleasure of any sort in a conscious being it must\nevoke the exercise of this being\u2019s faculties; for the conscious condition\nwhich we describe as pleasure is always a reflex of conscious activity.\nFurthermore, this activity must be _full_ and _intense_ and\n_well-ordered_: if it be excessive or defective, if it be ill-regulated,\nwrongly distributed among the faculties, it will not have pleasure for its\nreflex, but either indifference or pain.\n\nHence the object which evokes the esthetic pleasure of contemplation must\nin the _first_ place be _complete_ or _perfect_ of its kind (46). The\ntruncated statue, the stunted oak, the deformed animal, the crippled human\nbeing, are not beautiful. They are wanting in the integrity due to their\nnature.\n\nBut this is not enough. To be beautiful, the object must in the _second_\nplace have a certain _largeness_ or amplitude, a certain greatness or\npower, whereby it can act _energetically_ on our cognitive faculties and\nstimulate them to _vigorous_ action. The little, the trifling, the\ncommonplace, the insignificant, evokes no feeling of admiration. The sight\nof a small pasture-field leaves us indifferent; but the vision of vast\nexpanses of meadow and cornfield and woodland exhilarates us. A collection\nof petty hillocks is uninteresting, while the towering snow-clad Alps are\nmagnificent. The multiplication table elicits no emotion; but the\ntriumphant discovery and proof of some new truth in science, some\nfar-reaching theorem that opens up new vistas of research or sheds a new\nlight on long familiar facts, may fill the mind with ecstasies of pure\nesthetic enjoyment.(202) There is no moral beauty in helping up a child\nthat has stumbled and fallen in the mud, but there is in risking one\u2019s\nlife to save the child from burning or drowning. There must, then, be in\nthe object a certain largeness which will secure energy of appeal to our\ncognitive faculties; but this energy must not be excessive, it must not\ndazzle, it must be in proportion to the capacity of our faculties.(203)\n\nA _third_ requisite for beauty is that the object be in itself _duly\nproportioned_, _orderly_, _well arranged_. _Order_ generally may be\ndefined as right or proper arrangement. We can see in things a twofold\norder, _dynamic_, or that of _subordination_, and _static_, or that of\n_co-ordination_: the right arrangement of means towards ends, and the\nright arrangement of parts in a whole, or members in a system. The former\nindicates the influence of _final_ causes and expresses primarily the\n_goodness_ of things. The latter is determined by the _formal_ causes of\nthings and expresses primarily their _beauty_. The order essential to\nbeauty consists in this, that the manifold and distinct things or acts\nwhich contribute to it must form one whole. Hence order has been defined\nas _unity in variety_: _unitas in varietate_; variety being the material\ncause, and unity the formal cause, of order. But we can apprehend unity in\na variety of things only on condition that they are _arranged_, _i.e._\nthat they show forth clearly to the mind a set of mutual relations which\ncan be easily grasped. Why is it that things mutually related to one\nanother in one way make up what we declare to be a chaotic jumble, while\nif related in another way we declare them to be orderly? Because unless\nthese relations present themselves in a certain way they will fail to\nunify the manifold for us. We have an intellectual intuition of the\nnumerical series; and of _proportion_, which is equality of numerical\nrelations. In the domains of magnitude and multitude the mind naturally\nseeks to detect these proportions. So also in the domains of sensible\nqualities, such as sounds and colours, we have an analogous intuition of a\nqualitative series, and we naturally try to detect _harmony_, which is the\ngradation of qualitative relations in this series. The detection of\n_proportion_ and _harmony_ in a _variety_ of things pleases us, because we\nare thus enabled to grasp the manifold as exhibiting _unity_; while the\nabsence of these elements leaves us with the dissatisfied feeling of\nsomething wanting. Whether this be because order in things is the\nexpression of an intelligent will, of purpose and design, and therefore\ncalls forth our intelligent and volitional activity, with its consequent\nand connatural feeling of satisfaction, we do not inquire here. But\ncertain it is that order is essential to beauty, that esthetic pleasure\nsprings only from the contemplation of proportion and harmony, which give\nunity to variety.(204) And the explanation of this is not far to seek. For\nthe full and vigorous exercise of contemplative activity we need objective\nvariety. Whatever lacks variety, and stimulates us in one uniform manner,\nbecomes monotonous and causes _ennui_. While on the other hand mere\nmultiplicity distracts the mind, disperses and weakens attention, and\nbegets fatigue. We must, therefore, have variety, but variety combined\nwith the unity that will concentrate and sustain attention, and thus call\nforth the highest and keenest energy of intellectual activity. Hence the\nfunction of rhythm in music, poetry and oratory; of composition and\nperspective in painting; of design in architecture.\n\nThe more perfect the relations are which constitute order, the more\n_clearly_ will the unity of the object _shine forth_; hence the more fully\nand easily will it be grasped, and the more intense the esthetic pleasure\nof contemplating it.\n\nSt. Thomas thus sums up the objective conditions of the beautiful:\n_integrity_ or _perfection_, _proportion_ or _harmony_, and _clarity_ or\n_splendour_.(205)\n\n56. SOME DEFINITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL.\u2014An object is beautiful when its\ncontemplation pleases us; and this takes place when the object, complete\nand entire in itself, possesses that order, harmony, proportion of parts,\nwhich will call forth the full and vigorous exercise of our cognitive\nactivity. All this amounts to saying that the beauty of a thing is the\n_revelation or manifestation of its natural perfection_.(206) Perfection\nis thus the _foundation_ of beauty; the showing forth of this perfection\nis what constitutes beauty _formally_. Every real being has a nature which\nconstitutes it, and activities whereby it tends to realize the purpose of\nits existence. Now the perfection of any nature is manifested by the\nproportion of its constitutive parts and by the harmony of all its\nactivities. Hence we see that order is essential to beauty because order\nshows forth the perfection of the beautiful. An object is beautiful in the\ndegree in which the proportion of its parts and the harmony of its\nactivities show forth the perfection of its nature.\n\nThus, starting with the subjective, _a posteriori_ definition of beauty\nfrom its effect: _beauty is that whose contemplation pleases us_\u2014we have\npassed to the objective and natural definition of beauty by its\nproperties: _beauty is the evident integrity, order, proportion and\nharmony, of an object_\u2014and thence to what we may call the _a priori_ or\nsynthetic definition, which emphasizes the perfection revealed by the\nstatic and dynamic order of the thing: _the beauty of an object is the\nmanifestation of its natural perfection by the proportion of its parts and\nthe harmony of its activities_.(207)\n\n\n    A few samples of the many definitions that have been set forth by\n    various authors will not be without interest. Vallet(208) defines\n    beauty as _the splendour of perfection_. Other authors define it\n    as _the splendour of order_. These definitions sacrifice clearness\n    to brevity. Beauty is _the splendour of the true_. This\n    definition, commonly attributed to Plato, but without reason, is\n    inadequate and ambiguous. Cousin(209) defines beauty as _unity in\n    variety_. This leaves out an essential element, the _clarity_ or\n    _clear manifestation_ of order. Kant defines beauty as _the power\n    an object possesses of giving free play to the imagination without\n    transgressing the laws of the understanding_.(210) This definition\n    emphasizes the necessary harmony of the beautiful with our\n    cognitive faculties, and the fact that the esthetic sentiment is\n    not capricious but subject to the laws of the understanding. It\n    is, however, inadequate, in as much as it omits all reference to\n    the objective factors of beauty.\n\n\n57. CLASSIFICATIONS. THE BEAUTIFUL IN NATURE.\u2014All real beauty is either\n_natural_ or _artificial_. Natural beauty is that which characterizes what\nwe call the \u201cworks of Nature\u201d or the \u201cworks of God\u201d. Artificial beauty is\nthe beauty of \u201cworks of art\u201d.\n\nAgain, just as we can distinguish the _real_ beauty of the latter from the\n_ideal_ beauty which the human artist conceives in his mind as its\narchetype and exemplar cause, so, too, we can distinguish between the real\nbeauty of natural things and the ideal beauty of their uncreated\narchetypes in the Mind of the Divine Artist.\n\nWe know that the beauty of the human artist\u2019s ideal is superior to, and\nnever fully realized in, that of the actually achieved product of his art.\nIs the same true of the natural beauty of God\u2019s works? That the works of\nGod in general are beautiful cannot be denied; His Wisdom \u201cspreads beauty\nabroad\u201d throughout His works; He arranges all things according to weight\nand number and measure:_cum pondere, numero et mensura_; His Providence\ndisposes all things strongly and sweetly: _fortiter et suaviter_. But\nwhile creatures, by revealing their own beauty, reflect the Uncreated\nbeauty of God in the precise degree which He has willed from all eternity,\nit cannot be said that they all realize the beauty of their Divine\nExemplars according to His primary purpose and decree. Since there is\nphysical and moral evil in the universe, since there are beings which fail\nto realize their ends, to attain to the perfection of their natures, it\nfollows that these beings are not beautiful. In so far forth as they have\nreal being, and the goodness or perfection which is identical with their\nreality, it may be admitted that all real beings are _fundamentally_\nbeautiful; for goodness or perfection is the foundation of beauty.(211)\nBut in so far as they fail to realize the perfection due to their natures\nthey lack even the foundation of beauty. Furthermore, in order that a\nthing which has the full perfection due to its nature be _formally_\nbeautiful, it must actually show forth by the clearness of its proportions\nand the harmony of its activities the fulness of its natural perfections.\nBut there is no need to prove that this is not universally verified in\nnature\u2014or in art either. And hence we must infer that formal beauty is not\na transcendental attribute of reality.(212)\n\nReal beauty may be further divided into _material_ or _sensible_ or\n_physical_, and _intellectual_ or _spiritual_. The former reveals itself\nto hearing, seeing and imagination; the latter can be apprehended only by\nintellect; but intellect depends for all its objects on the data of the\nimagination. The beauty of spiritual realities is of course of a higher,\nnobler and more excellent order than that of the realities of sense. The\nspiritual beauty which falls directly within human experience is that of\nthe human spirit itself; from the soul and its experiences we can rise to\nan apprehension\u2014analogical and inadequate\u2014of the Beauty of the Infinite\nBeing. In the soul itself we can distinguish two sources of beauty: what\nwe may call its _natural_ endowments such as intellect and will, and its\n_moral_ dispositions, its perfections and excellences as a free,\nintelligent, moral agent\u2014its _virtues_. Beauty of soul, especially the\nmoral beauty of the virtuous soul, is incomparably more precious than\nbeauty of body. The latter, of course, like all real beauty in God\u2019s\ncreation, has its proper dignity as an expression and revelation, however\nfaint and inadequate, of the Uncreated Beauty of the Deity. But inasmuch\nas it is so inferior to the moral beauty proper to man, in itself so frail\nand evanescent, in its influence on human passions so dangerous to virtue,\nwe can understand why in the Proverbs of Solomon it is proclaimed to be\nvain and deceitful in contrast with the moral beauty of fearing the Lord:\n_Fallax gratia et vana est pulchritudo; mulier timens dominum ipsa\nlaudabitur_.(213)\n\n58. THE BEAUTIFUL IN ART. SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF THE FINE ARTS.\u2014The\nexpression of beauty is the aim of the fine arts. Art in general is \u201cthe\nproper conception of a work to be accomplished\u201d: \u201cars nihil aliud est quam\nrecta ratio aliquorum operum faciendorum\u201d.(214) While the _mechanical_\narts aim at the production of things useful, the _fine_ arts aim at the\nproduction of things beautiful, _i.e._ of works which by their order,\nsymmetry, harmony, splendour, etc., will give such apt expression to human\nideals of natural beauty as to elicit esthetic enjoyment in the highest\npossible degree. The artist, then, must be a faithful student and admirer\nof all natural beauty; not indeed to aim at exact reproduction or\nimitation of the latter; but to draw therefrom his inspiration and ideals.\nEven the most beautiful things of nature express only inadequately the\nideal beauty which the human mind may gather from the study of them. This\nideal is what the artist is ever struggling to express, with the\never-present and tormenting consciousness that the achievement of his\nhighest effort will fall immeasurably short of giving adequate expression\nto it.\n\nIf each of the things of nature were so wholly simple and intelligible as\nto present the same ideal type of beauty to all, and leave no room for\nindividual differences of interpretation, there would be no variety in the\nproducts of artistic genius, except indeed what would result from perfect\nor imperfect execution. But the things of nature are complex, and in part\nat least enigmatical; they present different aspects to different minds\nand suggest a variety of interpretations; they leave large scope to the\nplay of the imagination both as to conception of the ideal itself and as\nto the arrangement and manipulation of the sensible materials in which the\nideal is to find expression. By means of these two functions, _conception_\nand _expression_, the genius of the artist seeks to interpret and realize\nfor us ideal types of natural beauty.\n\nThe qualities of a work of art, the conditions it must fulfil, are those\nalready enumerated in regard to beauty generally. It must have unity,\norder, proportion of parts; it must be true to nature, not in the sense of\na mere copy, but in the sense of drawing its inspiration from nature, and\nso helping us to understand and appreciate the beauties of nature; it must\ndisplay a power and clearness of expression adjusted to the capacity of\nthe normal mind.\n\nWe may add\u2014as indicating the connexion of art with morality\u2014that the work\nof art must not be such as to excite disapproval or cause pain by shocking\nany normal faculty, or running counter to any fundamental belief,\nsympathy, sentiment or feeling, of the human mind. The contemplation of\nthe really beautiful, whether in nature or in art, ought _per se_ to have\nan elevating, ennobling, refining influence on the mind. But the beautiful\nis not the good; nor does the cultivation of the fine arts necessarily\nenrich the mind _morally_. From the ethical point of view art is one of\nthose indifferent things which the will can make morally good or morally\nevil. Since man is a moral being, no human interest can fall outside the\nmoral sphere, or claim independence of the moral law; and art is a human\ninterest. Neither the creator, nor the critic, nor the student of a work\nof art can claim that the latter, simply because it is a work of art, is\nneither morally good nor morally bad; or that he in his special relation\nto it is independent of the moral law.\n\nUnder the specious plea that science in seeking truth is neither\npositively moral nor positively immoral, but abstracts altogether from the\nquality of morality, it is sometimes claimed that, _a pari_, art in its\npursuit of the beautiful should be held to abstract from moral\ndistinctions and have no concern for moral good or evil. But in the first\nplace, though science as such seeks simply the true, and in this sense\nabstracts from the good and the evil, still the man of science both in\nacquiring and communicating truth is bound by the moral law: he may not,\nunder the plea that he is learning or teaching truth, do anything _morally\nwrong_, anything that will _forfeit or endanger moral rectitude_, whether\nin himself or in others. And in the second place, owing to the different\nrelations of truth and beauty to moral goodness, we must deny the parity\non which the argument rests. Truth appeals to the reason alone; beauty\nappeals to the senses, the heart, the will, the passions and emotions:\n\u201c_Pulchrum trahit ad se desiderium_\u201d. The scientist expresses truth in\nabstract laws, definitions and formulas: a law of chemistry will help the\nfarmer to fertilize the soil, or the anarchist to assassinate sovereigns.\nBut the artist expresses beauty in concrete forms calculated to provoke\nemotions of esthetic enjoyment from the contemplation of them. Now there\nare other pleasure-giving emotions, sensual and carnal emotions, the\nindiscriminate excitement and unbridled indulgence of which the moral law\ncondemns as evil; and if a work of art be of such a kind that it is\ndirectly calculated to excite them, the artist stands condemned by the\nmoral law, and that even though his aim may have been to give expression\nto beauty and call forth esthetic enjoyment merely. If the preponderating\ninfluence of the artist\u2019s work on the normal human individual be a\nsolicitation of the latter\u2019s nature towards what is evil, what is opposed\nto his real perfection, his moral progress, his last end, then that\nartist\u2019s work is not a work of art or truly beautiful. The net result of\nits appeal being evil and unhealthy, it cannot be itself a thing of\nbeauty.\n\n\n    \u201cArt for art\u2019s sake\u201d is a cry that is now no longer novel. Taken\n    literally it is unmeaning, for art is a means to an end\u2014the\n    expression of the beautiful; and a means as such cannot be \u201cfor\n    its own sake\u201d. But it may signify that art should subserve no\n    _extrinsic_ purpose, professional or utilitarian; that it should\n    be disinterested; that the artist must aim at the conception and\n    expression of the beautiful through a disinterested admiration and\n    enthusiasm for the beautiful. In this sense the formula expresses\n    a principle which is absolutely true, and which asserts the noble\n    mission of the artist to mankind. But the formula is also commonly\n    understood to claim the emancipation of the artist from the bonds\n    of morality, and his freedom to conceive and express beauty in\n    whatever forms he pleases, whether these may aid men to virtue or\n    solicit them to vice. This is the pernicious error to which we\n    have just referred. And we may now add that this erroneous\n    contention is not only ethically but also _artistically_ unsound.\n    For surely art ought to be based on truth: the artist should\n    understand human nature, to which his work appeals: he should not\n    regard as truly beautiful a work the contemplation of which will\n    produce a _discord_ in the soul, which will _disturb the right\n    order_ of the soul\u2019s activities, which will solicit the lower\n    faculties to revolt against the higher; and this is what takes\n    place when the artist ignores moral rectitude in the pursuit of\n    his art: by despising the former he is false to the latter. He\n    fails to realize that the work of art must be judged not merely in\n    relation to the total _amount_ of pleasure it may cause in those\n    who contemplate it, but also in relation to the _quality_ of this\n    pleasure; and not merely in relation to esthetic pleasure, but in\n    relation to the total effect, the whole concrete influence of the\n    work on all the mental faculties. He fails to see that if this\n    total influence is evil, the work that causes it cannot be good\n    nor therefore really beautiful.\n\n    Are we to conclude, then, that the artist is bound to aim\n    positively and always at producing a _good moral effect_ through\n    his work? By no means. Esthetic pleasure is, as we have said,\n    indifferent. The pursuit of it, through the conception and\n    expression of the beautiful, is the proper and intrinsic end of\n    the fine arts, and is in itself legitimate so long as it does not\n    run counter to the moral law. It has no need to run counter to the\n    moral law, nor can it do so without defeating its own end. Outside\n    its proper limits art ceases to be art; within its proper limits\n    it has a noble and elevating mission; and it can serve indirectly\n    but powerfully the interests of truth and goodness by helping men\n    to substitute for the lower and grosser pleasures of sense the\n    higher and purer esthetic pleasures which issue from the\n    disinterested contemplation of the beautiful.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII. THE CATEGORIES OF BEING. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.\n\n\n59. THE CONCEPTION OF ULTIMATE CATEGORIES.\u2014Having examined so far the\nnotion of real being itself, which is the proper subject-matter of\nontology, and those widest or transcendental notions which are coextensive\nwith that of reality, we must next inquire into the various modes in which\nwe find real being expressed, determined, actualized, as it falls within\nour experience. In other words, we must examine the _highest categories of\nbeing_, the _suprema genera entis_. Considered from the point of view of\nthe logical arrangement of our concepts, each of these categories reveals\nitself as a primary and immediate limitation of the extension of the\ntranscendental concept of real being itself. Each is ultimately distinct\nfrom the others in the sense that no two of them can be brought under any\nother as a genus, nor can we discover any intermediate notion between any\none of them and the notion of being itself. The latter notion is not\nproperly a genus of which they would be species, nor can it be predicated\nunivocally of any two or more of them (2). Each is itself an ultimate\ngenus, a _genus supremum_.\n\nBy using these notions as predicates of our judgments we are enabled to\ninterpret things, to obtain a genuine if inadequate insight into reality;\nfor we assume as established in the _Theory of Knowledge_ that all our\nuniversal concepts have real and objective validity, that they give us\nreal knowledge of the nature of those individual things which form the\ndata of our sense experience. Hence the study of the categories, which is\nfor Logic a classification of our widest concepts, become for Metaphysics\nan inquiry into the modes which characterize real being.(215) By\ndetermining what these modes are, by studying their characteristics, by\ntracing them through the data of experience, we advance in our knowledge\nof reality.\n\nThe most divergent views have prevailed among philosophers both as to what\na category is or signifies, and as to what or how many the really ultimate\ncategories are. Is a category, such as substance, or quality, or quantity,\na mode of real being revealed to the knowing mind, as most ancient and\nmedieval philosophers thought, with Aristotle and St. Thomas? or is it a\nmental mode imposed on reality by the knowing mind, as many modern\nphilosophers have thought, with Kant and after him? It is for the Theory\nof Knowledge to examine this alternative; nor shall we discuss it here\nexcept very incidentally: for we shall assume as true the broad\naffirmative answer to the first alternative. That is to say, we shall hold\nthat the mind is able to see, in the categories generally, modes of\nreality; rejecting the sceptical conclusions of Kantism in regard to the\npower of the Speculative Reason, and the principles which lead to such\nconclusions.\n\nAs to the number and classification of the ultimate categories, this is\nobviously a question which cannot be settled _a priori_ by any such purely\ndeductive analysis of the concept of being as Hegel seems to have\nattempted; but only _a posteriori_, _i.e._ by an analysis of experience in\nits broadest sense as including Matter and Spirit, Nature and Mind, Object\nand Subject of Thought, and even the Process of Thought itself. Moreover\nit is not surprising that with the progress of philosophical reflection,\ncertain categories should have been studied more deeply at certain epochs\nthan ever previously, that they should have been \u201cdiscovered\u201d so to speak,\nnot of course in the sense that the human mind had not been previously in\npossession of them, but in the sense that because of closer study they\nfurnished the mind with a richer and fuller power of \u201cexplaining\u201d things.\nIt is natural, too, that historians of philosophy, intent on tracing the\nmovement of philosophic thought, should be inclined to over-emphasize the\n_relativity_ of the categories, as regards their \u201cexplaining\u201d value\u2014their\nrelativity to the general mentality of a certain epoch or period.(216) But\nthere is danger here of confounding certain large _hypothetical\nconceptions_, which are found to yield valuable results at a certain stage\nin the progress of the sciences,(217) with the categories proper of real\nbeing. If the mind of man is of the same nature in all men, if it\ncontemplates the same universe, if it is capable of reaching truth about\nthis universe\u2014real truth which is immutable,\u2014then the modes of being which\nit apprehends in the universe, and by conceiving which it interprets the\nlatter, must be in the universe as known, and must be there immutably.\nNowhere do we find this more clearly illustrated than in the futility of\nthe numerous attempts of modern philosophers to deny the reality of the\ncategory of _substance_, and to give an intelligible interpretation of\nexperience without the aid of this category. We shall see that as a matter\nof fact it is impossible to deny _in thought_ the reality of substance, or\nto think at all without it, however philosophers may have denied it _in\nlanguage_,\u2014or thought that they denied it when they only rejected some\nerroneous or indefensible meaning of the term.\n\n60. THE ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES.\u2014The first palpable distinction we observe\nin the data of experience is that between _substance_ and _accident_. \u201cWe\nmight naturally ask,\u201d writes Aristotle,(218) \u201cwhether what is signified by\nsuch terms as _walking_, _sitting_, _feeling well_, is a being (or\nreality).... And we might be inclined to doubt it, for no single one of\nsuch acts _exists by itself_ (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2), no one of them is\nseparable from _substance_ (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1); it is rather to _him who_ walks, or\nsits, or feels well, that we give the name of _being_. That which is a\nbeing _in the primary meaning of this term_, a being _simply and\nabsolutely_, and not merely a being _in a certain sense_, or with a\nqualification, is substance\u2014\u1f61\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f42\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f76 \u1f42\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u1f42\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f21\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03bd.\u201d(219) But manifestly, though substances, or what in ordinary\nlanguage we call \u201cpersons\u201d and \u201cthings\u201d\u2014men, animals, plants, minerals\u2014are\nreal beings in the fullest sense, nevertheless sitting, walking, thinking,\nwilling, and actions generally, are also undoubtedly realities; so too are\nstates and qualities; and shape, size, posture, etc. And yet we do not\nfind any of these latter actually existing in themselves like substances,\nbut only dependently on substances\u2014on \u201cpersons\u201d or \u201cthings\u201d that think or\nwalk or act, or are large or small, hot or cold, or have some shape or\nquality. They are all _accidents_, in contradistinction to substance.\n\nIt is far easier to distinguish between accidents and substance than to\ngive an exhaustive list of the ultimate and irreducible classes of the\nformer. Aristotle enumerates _nine_: Quantity (\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03bd), Quality (\u03c0\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd),\nRelation (\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9), Action (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ad\u03b9\u03bd), Passion (\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd), Where (\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6), When\n(\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad), Posture (\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9), External Condition or State (\u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd). Much has\nbeen said for and against the exhaustive character of this classification.\nScholastics generally have defended and adopted it. St. Thomas gives the\nfollowing reasoned analysis of it:(220) Since accidents may be\ndistinguished by their relations to substance, we see that some affect\nsubstances intrinsically, others extrinsically; and in the former case,\neither absolutely or relatively: if relatively we have the category of\n_relation_; if absolutely we have either _quantity_ or _quality_ according\nas the accident affects the substance by reason of the matter, or the\nform, of the latter. What affects and denominates a substance\nextrinsically does so either as a cause, or as a measure, or otherwise. If\nas a cause, the substance is either _suffering_ action, or _acting_\nitself; if as a measure, it denominates the subject as in _time_, or in\n_place_, or in regard to the relative position of its parts, its\n_posture_, in the place which it occupies. Finally, if the accident\naffects the substance extrinsically, though not as cause or as measure,\nbut only as characterizing its external condition and immediate\nsurroundings, as when we describe a man as clothed or armed, we have the\ncategory of _condition_.\n\nIt might be said that all this is more ingenious than convincing; but it\nis easier to criticize Aristotle\u2019s list than to suggest a better one. In\naddition to what we have said of it elsewhere,(221) a few remarks will be\nsufficient in the present context.\n\nSome of the categories, as being of lesser importance, we may treat\nincidentally when dealing with the more important ones. _Ubi_, _Quando_,\nand _Situs_, together with the analysis of our notions of Space and Time,\nfall naturally into the general doctrine of _Quantity_. The final\ncategory, \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, however interpreted,(222) may be referred to _Quality_,\n_Quantity_, or _Relation_.\n\nA more serious point for consideration is the fact, generally admitted by\nscholastics,(223) that one and the same real accident may belong to\ndifferent categories if we regard it from different standpoints. _Actio_\nand _passio_ are one and the same _motus_ or change, regarded in relation\nto the agent and to the effect, respectively. _Place_, in regard to the\nlocated body belongs to the category _ubi_, whereabouts; in regard to the\nlocating body it is an aspect of the latter\u2019s _quantity_. _Relation_, as\nwe shall see, is probably not an entity really distinct from its\nfoundation\u2014quality, quantity, or causality. The reason alleged for this\npartial absence of real distinction between the Aristotelian categories is\nthat they were thought out primarily from a logical point of view\u2014that of\npredication.(224) And the reason is a satisfactory one, for real\ndistinction is not necessary for diversity of predication. Then, where\nthey are not really distinct entities these categories are at least\naspects so fundamentally distinct and mutually irreducible that each of\nthem is indeed a _summum genus_ immediately under the concept of being in\ngeneral.\n\nIt seems a bold claim to make for any scheme of categories, that it\nexhausts all the known modes of reality. We often experience objects of\nthought which seem at first sight incapable of reduction to any of\nAristotle\u2019s _suprema genera_. But more mature reflection will always\nenable us to find a place for them. In order that any extrinsic\ndenomination of a substance constitute a category distinct from those\nenumerated, it must affect the substance _in some real_ way distinct from\nany of those nine; and it must moreover _be not a mere complex or\naggregate_ of two or more of the latter. Hence denominations which objects\nderive from the fact that they are terms of mental activities which are\nreally immanent, _actiones_ \u201c_intentionales_,\u201d\u2014denominations such as\n\u201cbeing known,\u201d \u201cbeing loved,\u201d\u2014neither belong to the category of \u201c_passio_\u201d\nproper, nor do they constitute any distinct category. They are _entia\nrationis_, logical relations. Again, while efficient causation resolves\nitself into the categories of _actio_ and _passio_, the causation of\nfinal, formal and material causes cannot be referred to these categories,\nbut neither does it constitute any new category. The influence of a final\ncause consists in nothing more than its being a good which is the term of\nappetite or desire. The causation of the formal cause consists in its\nformally constituting the effect: it is always either a substantial or an\naccidental form, and so must be referred to the categories of substance,\nor quality, or quantity. Similarly material causality consists in this\nthat the matter is a partial constitutive principle of the composite\nbeing; and it therefore refers us to the category of substance. It may be\nnoted, too, that the ontological principles of a composite being\u2014such as\nprimal matter and substantial form\u2014since they are themselves not properly\n\u201cbeings,\u201d but only \u201cprinciples of being,\u201d are said to belong each to its\nproper category, not formally but only referentially, not _formaliter_ but\nonly _reductiv\u00e9_. Finally, the various properties that are assigned to\ncertain accidents themselves are either logical relations (such as \u201cnot\nhaving a contrary\u201d or \u201cbeing a measure\u201d), or real relations, or intrinsic\nmodes of the accident itself (as when a quality is said to have a certain\n\u201cintensity\u201d); but in all cases where they are not mere logical entities\nthey will be found to come under one or other of the Aristotelian\ncategories.\n\nThe \u201creal being\u201d which is thus \u201cdetermined\u201d into the supreme modes or\ncategories of substance and accidents is, of course, \u201cbeing\u201d considered\n_substantially_ as _essential_ (whether possible or actual), and not\nmerely being that is actually existent, _existential_ being, in the\n_participial_ sense. Furthermore, it is primarily finite or created being\nthat is so determined. The Infinite Being is above the categories,\n_super_-substantial. It is because substance is the most perfect of the\ncategories, and because the Infinite Being verifies in Himself in an\nincomprehensibly perfect manner all the perfections of substance, that we\nspeak of Him as a substance: remembering always that these essentially\nfinite human concepts are to be predicated of Him only _analogically_ (2,\n5).\n\nIt may be inquired whether \u201caccident\u201d is a genus which should be\npredicated _univocally_ of the nine Aristotelian categories as species? or\nis the concept of \u201caccident\u201d only _analogical_, so that these nine\ncategories would be each a _summum genus_ in the strict sense, _i.e._ an\nultimate and immediate determination of the concept of \u201cbeing\u201d itself? We\nhave seen already that the concept of \u201cbeing\u201d as applied to \u201csubstance\u201d\nand \u201caccident\u201d is analogical (2). So, too, it is analogical as applied to\nthe various categories of accidents. For the characteristic note of\n\u201caccident,\u201d that of \u201caffecting, inhering in\u201d a subject, can scarcely be\nsaid to be verified \u201cin the same way,\u201d \u201cunivocally,\u201d of the various kinds\nof accidents; it is therefore more probably correct not to regard\n\u201caccident\u201d as a genus proper, but to conceive each kind of accident as a\n_summum genus_ coming immediately under the transcendental concept of\n\u201cbeing\u201d.\n\n61. THE PHENOMENIST ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF\nSUBSTANCE.\u2014Passing now to the question of the existence and nature of\nsubstances, and their relation to accidents, we shall find evidences of\nmisunderstandings to which many philosophical errors may be ascribed at\nleast in part. It is a fairly common contention that the distinction\nbetween substance and accident is really a groundless distinction; that we\nhave experience merely of transient events or happenings, internal and\nexternal, with relations of coexistence or sequence between them; that it\nis an illusion to suppose, underlying these, an inert, abiding basis\ncalled \u201csubstance\u201d; that this can be at best but a useless name for each\nof the collections of external and internal appearances which make up our\ntotal experience of the outer world and of our own minds. This is the\ngeneral position of _phenomenists_. \u201cWhat do you know of substance,\u201d they\nask us, \u201cexcept that it is an indeterminate and unknown something\nunderlying phenomena? And even if you could prove its existence, what\nwould it avail you, since in its nature it is, and must remain, unknown?\nNo doubt the mind naturally supposes this \u2018something\u2019 underlying\nphenomena; but it is a mere mental fiction the reality of which cannot be\nproved, and the nature of which is admitted, even by some who believe in\nits real existence, to be unknowable.\u201d\n\nNow there can be no doubt about the supreme importance of this question:\nall parties are pretty generally agreed that on the real or fictitious\ncharacter of substance the very existence of genuine metaphysics in the\ntraditional sense depends. And at first sight the possibility of such a\ncontroversy as the present one seems very strange. \u201cIs it credible,\u201d asks\nMercier,(225) \u201cthat thinkers of the first order, like Hume, Mill, Spencer,\nKant, Wundt, Paulsen, Littr\u00e9, Taine, should have failed to recognize the\nsubstantial character of things, and of the _Ego_ or Self? Must they not\nhave seen that they were placing themselves in open revolt against sound\ncommon sense? And on the other hand is it likely that the genius of\nAristotle could have been duped by the na\u00efve illusion which phenomenists\nmust logically ascribe to him? Or that all those sincere and earnest\nteachers who adopted and preserved in scholastic philosophy for centuries\nthe peripatetic distinction between substance and accidents should have\nbeen all utterly astray in interpreting an elementary fact of common\nsense?\u201d\n\nThere must have been misunderstandings, possibly on both sides, and much\nwaste of argument in refuting chimeras. Let us endeavour to find out what\nthey are and how they gradually arose.\n\nPhenomenism has had its origin in the _Idealism_ which confines the human\nmind to a knowledge of its own states, proclaiming the unknowability of\nany reality other than these; and in the _Positivism_ which admits the\nreality only of that which falls directly within external and internal\nsense experience. Descartes did not deny the substantiality of the soul,\nnor even of bodies; but his idealist theory of knowledge rendered suspect\nall information derived by his deductive, _a priori_ method of reasoning\nfrom supposed innate ideas, regarding the nature and properties of bodies.\nLocke rejected the innatism of Descartes, ascribing to sense experience a\npositive r\u00f4le in the formation of our ideas, and proving conclusively that\nwe have no such intuitive and deductively derived knowledge of real\nsubstances as Descartes contended for.(226) Locke himself did not deny the\nexistence of substances,(227) any more than Descartes. But unfortunately\nhe propounded the mistaken assumption of Idealism, that the mind can know\nonly its own states; and also the error of thinking that because we have\nnot an intuitive insight into the specific nature of individual substances\nwe can know nothing at all through any channel about their nature: and he\ngathered from this latter error a general notion or definition of\nsubstance which is a distinct departure from what Aristotle and the\nmedieval scholastics had traditionally understood by substance. For Locke\nsubstance is merely a supposed, but unknown, support for accidents.(228)\nSetting out with these two notions\u2014that all objects of knowledge must be\nstates or phases of mind, and that material substance is a supposed, but\nunknown and unknowable, substratum of the qualities revealed to our minds\nin the process of sense perception\u2014it was easy for Berkeley to support by\nplausible arguments his denial of the reality of any such things as\nmaterial substances. And it was just as easy, if somewhat more audacious,\non the part of Hume to argue quite logically that if the supposed but\nunknowable substantial substratum of external sense phenomena is illusory,\nso likewise is the supposed substantial _Ego_ which is thought to underlie\nand support the internal phenomena of consciousness.\n\nHume\u2019s rejection of substance is apparently complete and absolute, and is\nso interpreted by many of his disciples. But a thorough-going phenomenism\nis in reality impossible; no philosophers have ever succeeded in thinking\nout an intelligible theory of things without the concepts of \u201cmatter,\u201d and\n\u201cspirit,\u201d and \u201cthings,\u201d and the \u201cEgo\u201d or \u201cSelf,\u201d however they may have\ntried to dispense with them; and these are concepts of substances. Hence\nthere are those who doubt that Hume was serious in his elaborate reasoning\naway of substances. The fact is that Hume \u201creasoned away\u201d substance only\nin the sense of an unknowable substratum of phenomena, and not in the\nsense of a something that exists in itself.(229) So far from denying the\nexistence of entities that exist in themselves, he seems to have\nmultiplied these beyond the wildest dreams of all previous philosophers\n_by substantializing accidents_.(230) What he does call into doubt is the\ncapacity of the human mind to attain to a knowledge of the specific\nnatures of such entities; and even here the arguments of phenomenism\nstrike the false Cartesian theory of knowledge, rather than the sober and\nmoderate teachings of scholasticism regarding the nature and limitations\nof our knowledge of substances.\n\n62. THE SCHOLASTIC VIEW OF OUR KNOWLEDGE IN REGARD TO THE EXISTENCE AND\nNATURE OF SUBSTANCES.\u2014What, then, are these latter teachings? That we have\na direct, intellectual insight into the specific essence or nature of a\ncorporeal substance such as gold, similar to our insight into the abstract\nessence of a triangle? By no means; Locke was quite right in rejecting the\nCartesian claim to intuitions which were supposed to yield up all\nknowledge of things by \u201cmathematical,\u201d _i.e._ deductive, _a priori_\nreasoning. The scholastic teaching is briefly as follows:\u2014\n\nFirst, as regards our knowledge of the _existence_ of substances, and the\nmanner in which we obtain our concept of substance. We get this concept\nfrom corporeal substances, and afterwards apply it to spiritual\nsubstances; so that our knowledge of the former is \u201cimmediate\u201d only in the\nrelative sense of being prior to the latter, not in the sense that it is a\ndirect intuition of the natures of corporeal substances. We have no such\ndirect insight into their natures. But our concept of them as actually\nexisting is also immediate in the sense that _at first_ we _spontaneously_\nconceive _every_ object which comes before our consciousness _as something\nexisting in itself_. The child apprehends each separate stimulant of its\nsense perception\u2014resistance, colour, sound, etc.\u2014as a \u201cthis \u201dor a \u201cthat,\u201d\n_i.e._ as a separate something, existing there in itself; in other words\nit apprehends all realities as substances: not, of course, that the child\nhas yet any reflex knowledge of what a substance is, but unknowingly it\napplies to all realities at first the concept which it undoubtedly\npossesses \u201csomething existing in itself\u201d. It likewise apprehends each such\nreality as \u201cone\u201d or \u201cundivided in itself,\u201d and as \u201cdistinct from other\nthings\u201d. Such is the child\u2019s immediate, direct, and implicit idea of\nsubstance. But if we are to believe Hume, what is true of the child\nremains true of the man: for the latter, too, \u201cevery perception is a\nsubstance, and every distinct part of a perception a distinct\nsubstance\u201d.(231) Nothing, however, could be more manifestly at variance\nwith the facts. For as reason is developed and reflective analysis\nproceeds, the child most undoubtedly realizes that not everything that\nfalls within its experience has the character of \u201ca something existing in\nitself and distinct from other things\u201d. \u201cWalking,\u201d \u201ctalking,\u201d and\n\u201cactions\u201d generally, it apprehends as realities,\u2014as realities which,\nhowever, do _not_ \u201cexist in themselves,\u201d but in other beings, in the\nbeings that \u201cwalk\u201d and \u201ctalk\u201d and \u201cact\u201d. And these latter beings it still\napprehends as \u201cexisting in themselves,\u201d and as thus differing from the\nformer, which \u201cexist not in themselves but in other things\u201d. Thus the\nchild comes into possession of the notion of \u201caccident,\u201d and of the\nfurther notion of \u201csubstance\u201d as something which not only exists in itself\n(\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, _ens in se subsistens_), but which is also a support or subject of\naccidents (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, _substans_, _substare_).(232) Nor, indeed, need\nthe child\u2019s reason be very highly developed in order to realize that if\nexperience furnishes it with \u201cbeings that do not exist in themselves,\u201d\nthere must also be beings which do exist in themselves: that if\n\u201caccidents\u201d exist at all it would be unintelligible and self-contradictory\nto deny the existence of \u201csubstances\u201d.\n\nHence, _in the order of our experience_ the first, _implicit_ notion of\nsubstance is that of \u201csomething existing in itself\u201d (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1); the first\n_explicit_ notion of it, however, is that by which it is apprehended as \u201ca\nsubject or support of accidents\u201d (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, _sub-stare_, _substantia_);\nthen by reflection we go back to the _explicit_ notion of it as \u201csomething\nexisting in itself\u201d. In the _real_ or _ontological_ order the perfection\nof \u201cexisting in itself\u201d is manifestly more fundamental than that of\n\u201csupporting accidents\u201d. It is in accordance with a natural law of language\nthat we name things after the properties whereby they reveal themselves to\nus, rather than by names implying what is more fundamental and essential\nin them. \u201cTo exist in itself\u201d is an absolute perfection, essential to\nsubstance; \u201cto support accidents\u201d is only a relative perfection; nor can\nwe know _a priori_ but a substance might perhaps exist without any\naccidents: we only know that accidents cannot exist without some\nsubstance, or subject, or power which will sustain them in existence.\n\nCan substance be apprehended by the senses, or only by intellect? Strictly\nspeaking, only by intellect: it is neither a \u201cproper object\u201d of any one\nsense, such as taste, or colour, or sound; nor a \u201ccommon object\u201d of more\nthan one sense, as extension is with regard to sight and touch: it is, in\nscholastic language, not a \u201c_sensibile per se_,\u201d not itself an object of\nsense knowledge, but only \u201c_sensibile per accidens_,\u201d _i.e._ it may be\nsaid to be \u201caccidentally\u201d an object of sense because of its conjunction\nwith accidents which are the proper objects of sense: so that when the\nsenses perceive accidents what they are really perceiving is the substance\naffected by the accidents. But strictly and properly it is by intellect we\nconsciously grasp that which in the reality is the substance: while the\nexternal and internal sense faculties make us aware of various qualities,\nactivities, or other accidents external to the \u201cself,\u201d or of various\nstates and conditions of the \u201cself,\u201d the intellect\u2014which is a faculty of\nthe same soul as the sense faculties\u2014makes us simultaneously aware of\ncorporeal substances actually existing outside us, or of the concrete\nsubstance of the \u201cego\u201d or \u201cself,\u201d existing and revealing itself to us in\nand through its conscious activities, as the substantial, abiding, and\nunifying subject and principle of these conscious activities.\n\nThus, then, do we attain to the concept of substance in general, to a\nconviction of the concrete actual existence of that mode of being the\nessential characteristic of which is \u201cto exist in itself\u201d.\n\nIn the next place, how do we reach a knowledge of the _specific natures_\nof substances?(233) What is the character, and what are the limitations,\nof such knowledge? Here, especially, the very cautious and moderate\ndoctrine of scholasticism has been largely misconceived and misrepresented\nby phenomenists and others. About the specific nature of substances we\nknow just precisely what their accidents reveal to us\u2014that and no more. We\nhave no intuitive insight into their natures; all our knowledge here is\nabstractive and discursive. As are their properties\u2014their activities,\nenergies, qualities, and all their accidents\u2014so is their nature. We know\nof the latter just what we can infer from the former. _Operari sequitur\nesse_; we have no other key than this to knowledge of their specific\nnatures. We have experience of them only through their properties, their\nbehaviour, their activities; analysis of this experience, _a posteriori_\nreasoning from it, inductive generalization based upon it: such are the\nonly channels we possess, the only means at our disposal, for reaching a\nknowledge of their natures.\n\n63. PHENOMENIST DIFFICULTIES AGAINST THIS VIEW. ITS VINDICATION.\u2014Now the\nphenomenist will really grant all this. His only objection will be that\nsuch knowledge of substance is really no knowledge at all; or that, such\nas it is, it is useless. But surely the knowledge that this mode of being\n_really exists_, that there _is_ a mode of being which \u201cexists in itself,\u201d\nis already some knowledge, and genuine knowledge, of substance? No doubt,\nthe information contained in this very indeterminate and generic concept\nis imperfect; but then it is only a starting point, an all-important\nstarting point, however; for not only is it perfectible but every item of\nknowledge we gather from experience perfects it, whereas without it the\nintellect is paralysed in its attempt to interpret experience: indeed so\nindispensable is this concept of substance to the human mind that, as we\nhave seen, no philosopher has ever been really able to dispense with it.\nWhen phenomenists say that what _we_ call mind is only a bundle of\nperceptions and ideas; when they speak of the flow of events, which is\n_ourselves_, of which _we_ are conscious,(234) the very language they\nthemselves make use of cries out against their professed phenomenism. For\nwhy speak of \u201cwe,\u201d \u201courselves,\u201d etc., if there be no \u201cwe\u201d or \u201courselves\u201d\nother than the perceptions, ideas, events, etc., referred to?\n\nOf course the explanation of this strange attitude on the part of these\nphilosophers is simple enough; they have a wrong conception of substance\nand of the relation of accidents thereto; they appear to imagine that\naccording to the traditional teaching nothing of all we can discover about\naccidents\u2014or, as they prefer to term them, \u201cphenomena\u201d\u2014can possibly throw\nany light upon the nature of substance: as if the r\u00f4le of phenomena were\nto cover up and conceal from us some sort of inner core (which they call\nsubstance), and not rather to reveal to us the nature of that \u201cbeing,\nexisting in itself,\u201d of which these phenomena are the properties and\nmanifestations.\n\nThe denial of substance leads inevitably to the substantializing of\naccidents. It is possible that the manner in which some scholastics have\nspoken of accidents has facilitated this error.(235) Anyhow the error is\none that leads inevitably to contradictions in thought itself. Mill, for\ninstance, following out the arbitrary postulates of subjectivism and\nphenomenism, finally analysed all reality into present sensations of the\nindividual consciousness, _plus_ permanent possibilities of sensations.\nNow, consistently with the idealistic postulate, these \u201cpermanent\npossibilities\u201d should be nothing more than a certain tone, colouring,\nquality of the \u201cpresent\u201d sensation, due to the fact that this has in it,\nas part and parcel of itself, feelings of memory and expectation; in which\ncase the \u201cpresent sensation,\u201d taken in its concrete fulness, would be the\nsole reality, and would exist in itself. This \u201csolipsism\u201d is the ultimate\nlogical issue of subjective idealism, and it is a sufficient _reductio ad\nabsurdum_ of the whole system. Or else, to evade this issue, the\n\u201cpermanent possibilities\u201d are supposed to be something really other than\nthe \u201cpresent sensations\u201d. In which case we must ask what Mill can mean by\na \u201cpermanent _possibility_\u201d. Whether it be subjective or objective\npossibility, it is presumably, according to Mill\u2019s thought, some property\nor appurtenance of the individual consciousness, _i.e._ a quality proper\nto a subject or substance.(236) But to deny that the conscious subject is\na substance, and at the same time to contend that it is a \u201cpermanent\n_possibility_ of sensation,\u201d _i.e._ that it has properties which can\nappertain only to a substance, is simply to hold what is\nself-contradictory.\n\nAfter these explanations it will be sufficient merely to state formally\nthe proof that substances really exist. It is exceedingly simple, and its\nforce will be appreciated from all that has been said so far: Whatever we\nbecome aware of as existing at all must exist either in itself, or by\nbeing sustained, supported in existence, in something else in which it\ninheres. If it exists in itself it is a substance; if not it is an\naccident, and then the \u201csomething else\u201d which supports it, must in turn\neither exist in itself or in something else. But since an infinite regress\nin things existing not in themselves but in other things is impossible, we\nare forced to admit the reality of a mode of being which exists in\nitself\u2014_viz._ substance.\n\nOr, again, we are forced to admit the real existence of accidents\u2014or, if\nyou will, \u201cphenomena\u201d or \u201cappearances\u201d\u2014_i.e._ of realities or modes of\nbeing whose nature is manifestly to modify or qualify in some way or other\nsome subject in which they inhere. Can we conceive a _state_ which is not\na state of something? a phenomenon or appearance which is not an\nappearance of something? a vital act which is not an act of a living\nthing? a sensation, thought, desire, emotion, unless of some conscious\nbeing that feels, thinks, desires, experiences the emotion? No; and\ntherefore since such accidental modes of being really exist, there exists\nalso the substantial mode of being in which they inhere.\n\nAnd the experienced realities which verify this notion of \u201csubstance\u201d as\nthe \u201cmode of being which exists in itself,\u201d are manifestly _not one but\nmanifold_. Individual \u201cpersons\u201d and \u201cthings\u201d\u2014men, animals, plants\u2014are all\nso many really and numerically distinct substances (38). So, too, are the\nultimate individual elements in the inorganic universe, whatever these may\nbe (31). Nor does the universal interaction of these individuals on one\nanother, or their manifold forms of interdependence on one another\nthroughout the course of their ever-changing existence and activities,\ninterfere in any way with the substantiality of the mode of being of each.\nThese mutual relations of all sorts, very real and actual as they\nundoubtedly are, only constitute the universe a _cosmos_, thus endowing it\nwith _unity of order_, but not with _unity of substance_ (27).\n\nLet us now meet the objection of Hume: that there is no substantial soul\ndistinct from its acts, that it is only the sum-total of the acts, each of\nthese being a substance. The objection has been repeated in the\nmetaphorical language in which Huxley and Taine speak of the soul, the\nliving soul, as nothing more than a _republic_ of conscious states, or the\nmovement of a _luminous sheaf_ etc. And Locke and Berkeley had already\ncontended that an apple or an orange is nothing more than a collection or\nsum-total of sensible qualities, so that if we conceive these removed\nthere is nothing left, for beyond these there was nothing there.\n\nNow we admit that the substance of the soul is not _adequately_ distinct\nfrom its acts, or the substance of the apple or orange from its qualities.\nAs a matter of fact we never experience substance apart from accidents or\naccidents apart from substance;(237) we do not know whether there exists,\nor even whether there can exist, a created substance devoid of all\naccidents; nor can we know, from the light of reason alone, whether any\naccidents could exist apart from substance.(238) We have, therefore, no\nground in natural experience for demonstrating such an _adequate_ real\ndistinction (38) between substance and accidents as would involve the\nseparability of the latter from the former. But that the acts of the soul\nare so many really distinct entities, each \u201cexisting in itself,\u201d each\ntherefore a substance, so that the term \u201csoul\u201d is merely a title we give\nto their sum-total; and similarly the terms \u201capple\u201d and \u201corange\u201d merely\ntitles of collections of qualities each of which would be an entity\nexisting in itself and really distinct from the others, each in other\nwords a substance,\u2014this we entirely deny. We regard it as utterly\nunreasonable of phenomenists thus to multiply substances. Our contention\nis that the individual soul or mind is one substance, and that it is\n_partially_ and _really_, though _not adequately_, distinct from the\nvarious conscious acts, states, processes, functions, which are certainly\nthemselves real entities,\u2014entities, however, the reality of which is\ndependent on that of the soul, entities which this dependent or \u201cinhering\u201d\nmode of being marks off as distinct in their nature, and incapable of\ntotal identification with that other non-inhering or subsisting mode of\nbeing which characterizes the substance of the soul.\n\nWe cannot help thinking that this phenomenist denial of substance, with\nits consequent inevitable substantialization of accidents, is largely due\nto a mistaken manner of regarding the concrete existing object as a mere\nmechanical bundle of distinct and independent abstractions. Every aspect\nof it is mentally isolated from the others and held apart as an\n\u201cimpression,\u201d an \u201cidea,\u201d etc. Then the object is supposed to be\nconstituted by, and to consist of, a sum-total of these separate\n\u201celements,\u201d integrated together by some sort of mental chemistry. The\nattempt is next made to account for our total conscious experience of\nreality by a number of principles or laws of what is known as \u201cassociation\nof ideas\u201d. And phenomenists discourse learnedly about these laws in\napparent oblivion of the fact that by denying the reality of any\nsubstantial, abiding, self-identical soul, distinct from the transient\nconscious states of the passing moment, they have left out of account the\nonly reality capable of \u201cassociating\u201d any mental states, or making mental\nlife at all intelligible. Once the soul is regarded merely as \u201ca series of\nconscious states,\u201d or a \u201cstream of consciousness,\u201d or a succession of\n\u201cpulses of cognitive consciousness,\u201d such elementary facts as memory,\nunity of consciousness, the feeling of personal identity and personal\nresponsibility, become absolutely inexplicable.(239)\n\nExperience, therefore, does reveal to us the real existence of substances,\nof \u201cthings that exist in themselves,\u201d and likewise the reality of other\nmodes of being which have their actuality only by inhering in the\nsubstances which they affect. \u201cA substance,\u201d says St. Thomas, \u201cis a thing\nwhose nature it is to exist not in another, whereas an accident is a thing\nwhose nature it is to exist in another.\u201d(240) Every concrete being that\nfalls within our experience\u2014a man, an oak, an apple\u2014furnishes us with the\ndata of these two concepts: the being existing in itself, the substance;\nand secondly, its accidents. The former concept comprises only\nconstitutive principles which we see to be _essential_ to that sort of\nbeing: the material, the vegetative, the sentient, the rational principle,\nin a man, or his soul and his body; the material principle and the formal\nor vital principle in an apple. The latter concept, that of accidents,\ncomprises only those characteristics of the thing which are no doubt real,\nbut which do not constitute the essence of the being, which can change or\nbe absent without involving the destruction of that essence. An\nintellectual analysis of our experience enables us\u2014and, as we have\nremarked above, it alone enables us\u2014to distinguish between these two\nclasses of objective concepts, the concept of the principles that are\nessential to the substance or being that exists in itself, and the concept\nof the attributes that are accidental to this being; and experience alone\nenables us, by studying the latter group, the accidents of the being,\nwhether naturally separable or naturally inseparable from the latter, to\ninfer from those accidents whatever we can know about the former group,\nabout the principles that constitute the specific nature of the particular\nkind of substance that may be under investigation.\n\nIt may, perhaps, be urged against all this, that experience does _not_\nwarrant our placing a _real_ distinction between the entities we describe\nas \u201caccidents\u201d and those which we claim to be constitutive of the\n\u201csubstance,\u201d or \u201cthing which exists in itself\u201d; that all the entities\nwithout exception, which we apprehend by distinct concepts in any concrete\nexisting being such as a man, an oak, or an apple, are only one and the\nsame individual reality looked at under different aspects; that the\ndistinction between them is only a logical or mental distinction; that we\nseparate in thought what is one in reality because we regard each aspect\nin the abstract and apart from the others; that to suppose in any such\nconcrete being the existence of two distinct modes of reality\u2014_viz._ a\nreality that exists in itself, and other realities inhering in this\nlatter\u2014is simply to make the mistake of transferring to the real order of\nconcrete things what we find in the logical order of conceptual\nabstractions.\n\nThis objection, which calls for serious consideration, leads to a\ndifferent conclusion from the previous objection. It suggests the\nconclusion, not that substances are unreal, but that accidents are unreal.\nEven if it were valid it would leave untouched the existence of\nsubstances. We hope to meet it satisfactorily by establishing presently\nthe existence of accidents really distinct from the substances in which\nthey inhere. While the objection draws attention to the important truth\nthat distinctions recognized in the conceptual order are not always real,\nit certainly does not prove that all accidents are only mentally distinct\naspects of substance. For surely a man\u2019s thoughts, volitions, feelings,\nemotions, his conscious states generally, changing as they do from moment\nto moment, are not really identical with the man himself who continues to\nexist throughout this incessant change; yet they are realities, appearing\nand disappearing and having all their actuality in him, while he persists\nas an actual being \u201cexisting in himself\u201d.\n\n64. ERRONEOUS VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF SUBSTANCE.\u2014If we fail to remember\nthat the notion of substance, as \u201ca being existing in itself and\nsupporting the accidents which affect it,\u201d is a most abstract and generic\nnotion; if we transfer it in this abstract condition to the real order; if\nwe imagine that the concrete individual substances which actually exist in\nthe real order merely verify this widest notion and are devoid of all\nfurther content; that they possess in themselves no further richness of\nreality; if we forget that actual substances, in all the variety of their\nnatures, as material, or living, or sentient, or rational and spiritual,\nare indeed full, vibrant, palpitating with manifold and diversified\nreality; if we rob them of all this perfection or locate it in their\naccidents as considered apart from themselves,\u2014we are likely to form very\nerroneous notions both of substances and of accidents, and of their real\nrelations to one another. It will help us to form accurate concepts of\nthem, concepts really warranted by experience, if we examine briefly some\nof the more remarkable misconceptions of substance that have at one time\nor other gained currency.\n\n(_a_) Substance is not a concrete core on which concrete accidents are\nsuperimposed, or a sort of kernel of which they form the rind. Such a way\nof conceiving them is as misleading as it is crude and material. No doubt\nthe language which, for want of better, we have to employ in regard to\nsubstance and accidents, suggests fancies of that kind: we speak of\nsubstance \u201csupporting,\u201d \u201csustaining\u201d accidents, and of these as \u201csupported\nby,\u201d and \u201cinhering in\u201d the former. But this does not really signify any\njuxtaposition or superposition of concrete entities. The substance is a\nsubject determinable by its various accidents; these are actualizations of\nits potentiality; its relation to them is the relation of the potential to\nthe actual, of a \u201cmaterial\u201d or \u201cdeterminable\u201d subject to \u201cformal\u201d or\n\u201cdetermining\u201d principles. But the appearance or disappearance of accidents\nnever takes place in the same concrete subject: by their variations the\nconcrete subject is changed: at any instant the substance affected by its\naccidents is one individual concrete being (27), and the inevitable result\nof any modification in them is that this individual, concrete being is\nchanged, is no longer the same. No doubt, it preserves its substantial\nidentity throughout accidental change, but not its concrete identity,\u2014that\nis to say, not wholly. This is the characteristic of every finite being,\nsubject to change and existing in time: it has the actuality of its being,\nnot _tota simul_, but only gradually, successively (10). From this, too,\nwe see that although substance is a more perfect mode of being than\naccident\u2014because the former exists in itself while the latter has its\nactuality only in something else,\u2014nevertheless, created, finite substance\nis a mode of being which is itself imperfect, and perfectible by\naccidents: another illustration of the truth that all created perfection\nis only relative, not absolute. To the notion of \u201cinherence\u201d we shall\nreturn in connexion with our treatment of accidents (65).\n\n(_b_) Again, substance is wrongly conceived as an _inert_ substratum\nunderlying accidents. This false notion appears to have originated with\nDescartes: he conceived the two great classes of created substances,\nmatter and spirit, as essentially inert. For him, matter is simply a _res\nextensa_; extension in three dimensions constitutes its essence, and\nextension is of course inert: all motion is given to matter and conserved\nin it by God. Spirit or soul is simply a _res cogitans_, a being whose\nessence is thought; but in thinking spirit too is passive, for it simply\nreceives ideas as wax does the impress of a seal. Nay, even when soul or\nspirit wills it is really inert or passive, for God puts all its volitions\ninto it.(241) From these erroneous conceptions the earlier disciples of\nDescartes took the obvious step forward into Occasionalism; and to them\nlikewise may be traced the conviction of many contemporary philosophers\nthat the human soul\u2014a being that is so eminently vital and active\u2014cannot\npossibly be a substance: neither indeed could it be, if substance were\nanything like what Descartes conceived it to be. The German philosophers,\nWundt and Paulsen, for example, argue that the soul cannot be a substance.\nBut when we inquire what they mean by substance, what do we find? That\nwith them the concept of substance applies only to the _corporeal_\nuniverse, where it properly signifies the atoms which are \u201cthe absolutely\npermanent substratum, qualitatively and quantitatively unchangeable, of\nall corporeal reality\u201d.(242) No wonder they would argue that the soul is\nnot a substance!\n\nNo actually existing substance is inert. What is true, however, is this,\nthat when we conceive a being as a substance, when we think of it under\nthe abstract concept of substance, we of course abstract from its concrete\nexistence as an active agent; in other words we consider it not from the\n_dynamic_, but from the _static_ aspect, not as it is in the concrete, but\nas constituting an object of abstract thought: and so the error of\nDescartes seems to have been that already referred to,\u2014the mistake of\ntransferring to the real order conditions that obtain only in the logical\norder.\n\n(_c_) To the Cartesian conception of substances as inert entities endowed\nonly with motions communicated to them _ab extra_, the mechanical or\natomist conception of reality, as it is called, Leibniz opposed the other\nextreme conception of substances as _essentially active entities_. For him\nsubstance is an _ens pr\u00e6ditum vi agendi_: activity is the fundamental note\nin the concept of substance. These essentially active entities he\nconceived as being all _simple_ and _unextended_, the corporeal no less\nthan the spiritual ones. And he gave them the title of _monads_. It is\nunnecessary for our present purpose to go into any details of his\ningenious dynamic theory of the universe as a vast system of these monads.\nWe need only remark that while combating the theory of inert substances he\nhimself erred in the opposite extreme. He conceived every monad as endowed\nessentially with active tendency or effort which is never without its\neffect,\u2014an exclusively _immanent_ effect, however, which is the constant\nresult of constant immanent action: for he denied the possibility of\ntransitive activity, _actio transiens_; and he conceived the immanent\nactivity of the monad as being in its nature _perceptive_,(243) that is to\nsay, _cognitive_ or _representative_, in the sense that each monad, though\n\u201cwrapt up in itself, doorless and windowless,\u201d if we may so describe it,\nnevertheless mirrors more or less inchoatively, vaguely, or clearly, all\nother monads, and is thus itself a miniature of the whole universe, a\nmicrocosm of the macrocosm. Apart from the fancifulness of his whole\nsystem, a fancifulness which is, however, perhaps more apparent than real,\nhis conception of substance is much less objectionable than that of\nDescartes. For as a matter of fact every individual, actually existing\nsubstance is endowed with an internal directive tendency towards some term\nto be realized or attained by its activities. Every substance has a\ntranscendental relation to the operations which are natural to it, and\nwhereby it tends to realize the purpose of its being. But nevertheless\nsubstance should not be defined by action, for all action of created\nsubstances is an accident, not a substance; nor even by its transcendental\nrelation to action, for when we conceive it under this aspect we conceive\nit as an _agent_ or _cause_, not as a _substance_ simply. The latter\nconcept abstracts from action and reveals its object simply as \u201ca reality\nexisting in itself\u201d. When we think of a substance as a principle of action\nwe describe it by the term _nature_.\n\n(_d_) A very widespread notion of substance is the conception of it as a\n\u201c_permanent_,\u201d \u201c_stable_,\u201d \u201c_persisting_\u201d subject of \u201c_transient_,\u201d\n\u201c_ephemeral_\u201d realities called accidents or phenomena. This view of\nsubstance is mainly due to the influence of Kant\u2019s philosophy. According\nto his teaching we can think the succession of phenomena which appear to\nour sense consciousness only by the aid of a pure intuition in which our\nsensibility apprehends them, _viz._ _time_. Now the application of the\ncategory of substance to this pure intuition of our sensibility engenders\na _schema_ of the imagination, _viz._ the _persistence_ of the object in\ntime. Persistence, therefore, is for him the essential note of substance.\n\nHerbert Spencer, too, has given apt expression to this widely prevalent\nnotion: \u201cExistence means nothing more than persistence; and hence in Mind\nthat which persists in spite of all changes, and maintains the unity of\nthe aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it, is that of which\nexistence in the full sense of the word must be predicated\u2014that which we\nmust postulate as the substance of Mind in contradistinction to the\nvarying forms it assumes. But if so, the impossibility of knowing the\nsubstance of Mind is manifest.\u201d(244)\n\nThus, substance is conceived as the unique but hidden and unknowable basis\nof all the phenomena which constitute the totality of human experience.\n\nWhat is to be said of such a conception? There is just this much truth in\nit: that substance is _relatively_ stable or permanent, _i.e._ in\ncomparison with accidents; the latter cannot survive the destruction or\ndisappearance of the substance in which they inhere, while a substance can\npersist through incessant change of its accidents. But accidents are not\n_absolutely_ ephemeral, nor is substance _absolutely_ permanent: were an\naccident to exist for ever it would not cease to be an accident, nor would\na substance be any less a substance were it created and then\ninstantaneously annihilated. But in the latter case the human mind could\nnot apprehend the substance; for since all human cognitive experience\ntakes place _in time_, which involves _duration_, the mind can apprehend a\nsubstance only on condition that the latter has some permanence, some\nappreciable duration in existence. This fact, too, explains in some\nmeasure the error of conceiving permanence as essential to a substance.\nBut the error has another source also: Under the influence of subjective\nidealism philosophers have come to regard the individual\u2019s consciousness\nof his own self, the consciousness of the _Ego_, as the sole and unique\nsource of our concept of substance. The passage we have just quoted from\nSpencer is an illustration. And since the spiritual principle of our\nconscious acts is a permanent principle which abides throughout all of\nthem, thus explaining the unity of the individual human consciousness,\nthose who conceive substance in general after the model of the _Ego_,\nnaturally conceive it as an essentially stable subject of incessant and\nevanescent processes.\n\nBut it is quite arbitrary thus to conceive the _Ego_ as the sole type of\nsubstance. Bodies are substances as well as spirits, matter as well as\nmind. And the permanence of corporeal substances is merely relative.\nNevertheless they are really substances. The relative stability of spirit\nwhich is immortal, and the relative instability of matter which is\ncorruptible, have nothing to do with the substantiality of either. Both\nalike are substances, for both alike have that mode of being which\nconsists in their existing in themselves, and not by inhering in other\nthings as accidents do.\n\n(_e_) Spencer\u2019s conception of substance as the permanent, unknowable\nground of phenomena, implies that substance is one, not manifold, and thus\nsuggests the view of reality known as _Monism_. There is yet another\nmistaken notion of substance, the notion in which the well known\npantheistic philosophy of Spinoza has had its origin. Spinoza appears to\nhave given the ambiguous definition of Descartes\u2014\u201c_Substantia est res quae\nita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum_\u201d\u2014an interpretation\nwhich narrowed its application down to the Necessary Being; for he defined\nsubstance in the following terms: \u201c_Per substantiam intelligo id quod est\nin se et per se concipitur: hoc est, id cujus conceptus non indiget\nconceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat_\u201d. By the ambiguous phrase,\nthat substance \u201crequires no other thing for existing,\u201d Descartes certainly\nmeant to convey what has always been understood by the scholastic\nexpression that substance \u201cexists _in_ itself\u201d. He certainly did not mean\nthat substance is a reality which \u201cexists _of_ itself,\u201d _i.e._ that it is\nwhat scholastics mean by _Ens a se_, the Being that has its actuality from\nits own essence, by virtue of its very nature, and in absolute\nindependence of all other being; for such Being is One alone, the\nNecessary Being, God Himself, whereas Descartes clearly held and taught\nthe real existence of finite, created substances.(245) Yet Spinoza\u2019s\ndefinition of substance is applicable only to such a being that our\nconcept of this being shows forth the actual existence of the latter as\nabsolutely explained and accounted for by reference to the essence of this\nbeing itself, and independently of any reference to other being. In other\nwords, it applies only to the Necessary Being. This conception of\nsubstance is the starting-point of Spinoza\u2019s pantheistic philosophy.\n\nNow, the scholastic definition of substance and Spinoza\u2019s definition\nembody two entirely distinct notions. Spinoza\u2019s definition conveys what\nscholastics mean by the Self-Existent Being, _Ens a se_; and this the\nscholastics distinguish from caused or created being, _ens ab alio_. Both\nphrases refer formally and primarily, not to the mode of a being\u2019s\nexistence when it does exist, but to the origin of this existence in\nrelation to the being\u2019s essence; and specifically it marks the distinction\nbetween the Essence that is self-explaining, self-existent, essentially\nactual (\u201c_a_ se\u201d), the Necessary Being, and essences that do not\nthemselves explain or account for their own actual existence, essences\nthat have not their actual existence from themselves or of themselves,\nessences that are in regard to their actual existence contingent or\ndependent, essences which, therefore, if they actually exist, can do so\nonly dependently on some other being whence they have derived this\nexistence (\u201c_ab_ alio\u201d) and on which they essentially depend for its\ncontinuance.\n\nNot the least evil of Spinoza\u2019s definition is the confusion caused by\ngratuitously wresting an important philosophical term like _substance_\nfrom its traditional sense and using it with quite a different meaning;\nand the same is true in its measure of the other mistaken notions of\nsubstance which we have been examining. By defining substance as an _ens\nin se_, or _per se stans_, scholastic philosophers mean simply that\nsubstance does not depend _intrinsically_ on any _subjective_ or\n_material_ cause in which its actuality would be supported; they do not\nmean to imply that it does not depend _extrinsically_ on an efficient\ncause from which it has its actuality and by which it is conserved in\nbeing. They assert that all _created_ substances, no less than all\naccidents, have their being \u201c_ab alio_\u201d from God; that they exist only by\nthe Divine creation and conservation, and act only by the Divine\n_concursus_ or concurrence; but while substances and accidents are both\nalike dependent on this extrinsic conserving and concurring influence of a\nDivine, Transcendent Being, substances are exempt from this other and\ndistinct mode of dependence which characterizes accidents: intrinsic\ndependence on a subject in which they have their actuality.(246)\n\n\n    When we say that substance exists \u201c_in_ itself,\u201d obviously we do\n    not attach to the preposition \u201c_in_\u201d any _local_ signification, as\n    a part existing \u201cin\u201d the whole. Nor do we mean that they exist\n    \u201cin\u201d themselves in the same sense as they have their being \u201cin\u201d\n    God. In a certain true sense all creatures exist \u201cin\u201d God: _In\n    ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus_ (Acts xxii., 28), in the\n    sense that they are kept in being by His omnipresent conserving\n    power. But He does not sustain them as a subject in which they\n    inhere, as substance sustains the accidents which determine it,\n    thereby giving expression to its concrete actuality.(247) By\n    saying that substance exists \u201cin itself\u201d we mean to exclude the\n    notion of its existing \u201cin another\u201d thing, as an accident does.\n    And this we shall understand better by examining a little more\n    closely this peculiar mode of being which characterizes accidents.\n\n\n65. THE NATURE OF ACCIDENT. ITS RELATION TO SUBSTANCE. ITS CAUSES.\u2014From\nall that has preceded we will have gathered the general notion of\n_accident_ as that mode of real being which is found to have its reality,\nnot by existing in itself, but by affecting, determining, some substance\nin which it inheres as in a subject. What do we mean by saying that\naccidents _inhere in_ substances as their _subjects_? Here we must at once\nlay aside as erroneous the crude conception of something as located\nspatially within something else, as contained in container, as _e.g._\nwater in a vessel; and the equally crude conception of something being in\nsomething else as a part is in the whole, as _e.g._ an arm is in the body.\nSuch imaginations are wholly misleading.\n\nThe actually existing substance has its being or reality; it is an actual\nessence. Each real accident of it is likewise a reality, and has an\nessence, distinct from that of the substance, yet not wholly independent\nof the latter: it is a determination of the determinable being of the\nsubstance, affecting or modifying the latter in some way or other, and\nhaving no other _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ than this r\u00f4le of actualizing in some\nspecific way some receptive potentiality of the concrete substance. And\nsince its reality is thus dependent on that of the substance which it\naffects, we cannot ascribe to it actual essence or being in the same sense\nas we ascribe this to substance, but only analogically(248) (2). Hence\nscholastics commonly teach that we ought to conceive an accident rather as\nan \u201centity _of an entity_,\u201d \u201cens _entis_,\u201d than as an entity simply;\nrather as inhering, indwelling, affecting (_in_-esse) some subject, than\nsimply as existing itself (_esse_); as something whose essence is rather\nthe determination, affection, modification of an essence than itself an\nessence proper, the term \u201cessence\u201d designating properly only a substance:\n_accidentis esse est inesse_.(249) This conception might, no doubt, if\npressed too far, be inapplicable to absolute accidents, like quantity,\nwhich are something more than mere modifications of substance; but it\nrightly emphasizes the dependence of the reality of accident on that of\nsubstance, the non-substantial and \u201cdiminished\u201d character of the\n\u201caccident\u201d-mode of being; it also helps to show that the \u201cinherence\u201d of\naccident in substance is a relation\u2014of determining to determinable\nbeing\u2014which is _sui generis_; and finally it puts us on our guard against\nthe errors that may be, and have been, committed by conceiving accidents\nin the abstract and reasoning about them apart from their substances, as\nif they themselves were substances.\n\nThis \u201cinherence\u201d of accident in substance, this mode of being whereby it\naffects, determines or modifies the substance, differs from accident to\naccident; these, in fact, are classified into _suprema genera_ by reason\nof their different ways of affecting substance (60). To this we shall\nreturn later. Here we may inquire, about this general relation of accident\nto substance, whether it is _essential_ to an accident _actually to inhere\nin_ a substance, if not immediately, then at least through the medium of\nsome other accident. We suggest this latter alternative because as we\nshall see presently there are some accidents, such as colour, taste,\nshape, which immediately affect the _extension_ of a body, and only\nthrough this the substance of the body itself. Now the ordinary course of\nnature never presents us with accidents except as inhering, mediately or\nimmediately, in a substance. Nor is it probable that the natural light of\nour reason would ever suggest to us the possibility of an exception to\nthis general law. But the Christian philosopher knows, from Divine\nRevelation, that in the Blessed Eucharist the _quantity_ or _extension_ of\nbread and wine, together with the taste, colour, form, etc., which affect\nthis extension, _remain in existence_ after their connatural substance of\nbread and wine has disappeared by transubstantiation. In the supernatural\norder of His providence God preserves these accidents in existence without\na subject; but in this state, though they do not _actually inhere_ in any\nsubstance, they _retain their natural aptitude and exigence_ for such\ninherence. The Christian philosopher, therefore, will not define accident\nas \u201cthe mode of being which inheres in a subject,\u201d but as \u201cthe mode of\nbeing which _in the ordinary course of nature_ inheres in a subject,\u201d or\nas \u201cthe mode of being which has _a natural exigence_ to inhere in a\nsubject\u201d. It is not _actual inherence_, but the _natural exigence to\ninhere_, that is essential to an accident as such.(250)\n\nFurthermore, an accident needs a substance not formally _qua_ substance,\nor as a mode of being naturally existing in itself; it needs a substance\n_as a subject_ in which to inhere, which it will in some way affect,\ndetermine, qualify; but the subject in which it immediately inheres need\nnot always be a substance: it may be some other accident, in which case\nboth of course will naturally require some substance as their ultimate\nbasis.\n\nComparing now the concept of accident with that of substance, we find that\nthe latter is presupposed by the former; that the latter is prior _in\nthought_ to the former; that we conceive accident as something over and\nabove, something superadded to substance as subject. For instance, we can\ndefine matter and form without the prior concept of body, or animality and\nrationality without the prior concept of man; but we cannot define colour\nwithout the prior concept of body, or the faculty of speech without the\nprior concept of man.(251)\n\nSubstance, therefore, is prior _in thought_ to accident; but is the\nsubstance itself also prior _temporally_ (prior _tempore_) to its\naccidents? It is prior in time to some of them, no doubt; the individual\nhuman being is thus prior, for instance, to the knowledge he may acquire\nduring life. But there is no reason for saying that a substance must be\nprior _in time_ to _all_ its accidents;(252) so far as we can discover, no\ncreated substance comes into existence devoid of all accidents: corporeal\nsubstance devoid of internal quantity, or spiritual substance devoid of\nintellect and will.\n\nIf prior in thought, though not necessarily in time, to its accidents, is\na substance prior to its accidents _really_, _ontologically_ (prior\n_natura_)? Yes; it is the real or ontological principle of its accidents;\nit sustains them, and they depend on it. It is a passive or material cause\n(using the term \u201cmaterial\u201d in the wide sense, as applicable even to\nspiritual substances), or a receptive subject, determined in some way by\nthem as formal principles. It is at the same time an efficient and passive\ncause of some of its own accidents: the soul is an efficient cause of its\nown immanent processes of thought and volition, and at the same time a\npassive principle of them, undergoing real change by their occurrence. Of\nothers it is merely a receptive, determinable subject, of those, namely,\nwhich have an adequate and necessary foundation in its own essence, and\nwhich are called _properties_ in the strict sense: without these it cannot\nexist, though they do not constitute its essence, or enter into the\nconcept of the latter; but it is not prior to them in time, nor is it the\n_efficient cause_ of them; it is, however, a real principle of them, an\nessence from the reality of which they necessarily result, and on which\ntheir own reality depends. Such, for instance, is the faculty of thought,\nor volition, or speech in regard to man.\n\nThe accident-mode of being is, therefore, a mode of being which determines\na substance in some real way. Its _formal effect_ is to give the substance\nsome real and definite determination: not _esse simpliciter_ but _esse\ntale_. With the substance it constitutes a concrete real being which is\n_unum per accidens_, not _unum per se_.\n\nThe accident has no _formal cause_: it is itself a \u201cform\u201d and its\ncausality is that of a formal cause, which consists in its communicating\nitself to a subject, and, by its union therewith, constituting some new\nreality\u2014in this case a concrete being endowed with \u201caccidental\u201d unity.\n\nAccidents have of course, a _material cause_; not, however, in the sense\nof a _materia ex qua_, a material from which they are constituted,\ninasmuch as they are simple \u201cforms\u201d; but in the sense of a _subject_ in\nwhich they are received and in which they inhere; and this \u201cmaterial\ncause\u201d is, proximately or remotely, _substance_.\n\nSubstance also is the _final cause_, the _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_, of the reality\nof the accidental mode of being. Accidents exist for the perfecting of\nsubstances: _accidentia sunt propter substantiam_. As we have seen\nalready, and as will appear more clearly later on, the fundamental reason\nfor the reality of an accidental mode of being, really distinct from the\ncreated or finite substance (for the Infinite Substance has no accidents),\nis that the created substance is imperfect, limited in its actual\nperfection, does not exist _tota simul_, but develops, through a process\nof change in time, from its first or _essential_ perfection, through\n_intermediate_ perfections, till it reaches the _final_ perfection (46) of\nits being.\n\nHave all accidents _efficient causes_? Those which are called common\naccidents as distinct from _proper_ accidents or _properties_ (66) have\nundoubtedly efficient causes: the various agencies which produce real but\naccidental changes in the individual substances of the universe. _Proper_\naccidents, however, inasmuch as they of necessity exist simultaneously\nwith the substances to which they belong, and flow from these substances\nby a necessity of the very essence of these latter, cannot be said to have\nany efficient causes other than those which contribute by their efficiency\nto the _substantial changes_ by which these substances are brought into\nactual existence; nor can they be said to be _caused efficiently_ by these\nsubstances themselves, but only to \u201cflow\u201d or \u201cresult\u201d necessarily from the\nlatter, inasmuch as they come into existence simultaneously with, but\ndependently on, these substances. Hence, while substances are universally\nregarded as _real principles_ of their properties\u2014as, for instance, the\nsoul in regard to intellect and will, or corporeal substance in regard to\nquantity\u2014they are not really efficient causes of their properties, _i.e._\nthey do not _produce_ these properties by _action_. For these properties\nare antecedent to all _action_ of the substance; nor can a created\nsubstance _act_ by its _essence_, but only through active powers, or\nfaculties, or forces, which meditate between the essence of a created\nsubstance and its actions, and which are the proximate principles of these\nactions, while the substance or nature is their remote principle. Hence\nthe \u201cproperties\u201d which necessarily result from a substance or nature, have\nas their efficient causes the agencies productive of the substance\nitself.(253)\n\n66. MAIN DIVISIONS OF ACCIDENTS.\u2014These considerations will help us to\nunderstand the significance of a few important divisions of accidents:\ninto proper and common, inseparable and separable. We shall then be in a\nposition to examine the nature of the distinction between accidents and\nsubstance, and to establish the existence of accidents really distinct\nfrom substance.\n\n(_a_) The attributes which we affirm of substance, other than the notes\nconstitutive of its essence, are divided into _proper_ accidents, or\n_properties_ in the strict sense (\u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, _proprium_), and _common_\naccidents, or accidents in the more ordinary sense (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2,\n_ac-cidens_). A property is an accident which belongs exclusively to a\ncertain class or kind of substance, and is found _always_ in _all_ members\nof that class, inasmuch as it has an adequate foundation in the nature of\nthat substance and a necessary connexion therewith. Such, for instance,\nare the faculties of intellect and will in all spiritual beings; the\nfaculties of speaking, laughing, weeping in man; the temporal and spatial\nmode of being which characterizes all created substances.(254) When\nregarded from the logical point of view, as attributes predicable of their\nsubstances considered as logical subjects, they are distinguished on the\none hand from what constitutes the essence of this subject (as _genus_,\n_differentia_, _species_), but also on the other hand from those\nattributes which cannot be seen to have any absolutely necessary connexion\nwith this subject. The latter attributes alone are called _logical\naccidents_, the test being the absence of a necessary connexion in thought\nwith the logical subject.(255) But the former class, which are\ndistinguished from \u201clogical\u201d accidents and called _logical properties_\n(\u201c_propria_\u201d) are none the less _real accidents_ when considered from the\nontological standpoint; for they do not constitute the essence of the\nsubstance; they are outside the concept of the latter, and\nsuper-added\u2014though necessarily\u2014to it. Whether, however, all or any of\nthese \u201cproperties,\u201d which philosophers thus classify as real or\nontological accidents, \u201cproper\u201d accidents, of certain substances, are\n_really_ distinct from the concrete, individual substances to which they\nbelong, or are only aspects of the latter, \u201csubstantial modes,\u201d only\n_virtually_ distinct in each case from the individual substance itself,\u2014is\nanother and more difficult question (69). Such a property is certainly not\nreally separable from its substance; we cannot conceive either to exist\nreally without the other; though we can by abstraction think, and reason,\nand speak, about either apart from the other.(256) Real inseparability is,\nhowever, regarded by scholastic philosophers as quite compatible with what\nthey understand by a real distinction (38).\n\nA _common_ accident is one which has no such absolutely necessary\nconnexion with its substance as a \u201cproperty\u201d has; one which, therefore,\ncan be conceived as absent from the substance without thereby entailing\nthe destruction of the latter\u2019s essence, or of anything bound up by a\nnecessity of thought with this essence. And such common accidents are of\ntwo kinds.\n\nThey may be such that in the ordinary course of nature, and so far as its\nforces and laws are concerned, they are never found to be absent from\ntheir connatural substances\u2014_inseparable_ accidents. Thus the colour of\nthe Ethiopian is an inseparable accident of his human nature as an\nEthiopian; he is naturally black; but if born of Ethiopian parents he\nwould still be an Ethiopian even if he happened to grow up white instead\nof black. We could not, however, conceive an Ethiopian, or any other human\nbeing, existing without the faculties (not the use) of intellect and will,\nor the faculty (not the organs, or the actual exercise of the faculty) of\nhuman speech.\n\nOr common accidents may be such that they are sometimes present in their\nsubstances, and sometimes absent\u2014_separable_ accidents. These are by far\nthe most numerous class of accidents: thinking, willing, talking, and\nactions generally; health or illness; virtues, vices, acquired habits;\nrest or motion, temperature, colour, form, location, etc.\n\n(_b_) The next important division of accidents is that into mere\n_extrinsic denominations_ and intrinsic accidents; the latter being\nsubdivided into _modal_ and _absolute_ accidents, respectively.\n\nAn _absolute_ accident is one which not merely affects its substance\nintrinsically, giving the latter an actual determination or mode of being,\nof some sort or other, but which has moreover some entity or reality\nproper to itself whereby it thus affects the substance, an entity really\ndistinct from the essence of the substance thus determined by it. Such,\nfor instance, are all vital activities of living things;(257) knowledge,\nand other acquired habits; quantity, the fundamental accident whereby\ncorporeal substances are all capable of existing extended in space; and\nsuch sensible qualities and energies of matter as heat, colour, mechanical\nforce, electrical energy, etc. Such, too, according to many, are\nintellect, will, and sense faculties in man.\n\nThere are, however, other intrinsic determinations of substance, other\nmodifications of the latter, which do not seem to involve any new or\nadditional reality in the substance, over and above the modification\nitself. Such, for instance, are motion, rest, external form or figure, in\nbodies. These are called _modal_ accidents. They often affect not the\nsubstance itself immediately, but some absolute accident of the latter,\nand are hence called \u201caccidental modes\u201d. Those enumerated are obviously\nmodes of the quantity of bodies. Now the appearance or disappearance of\nsuch an accident in a substance undoubtedly involves a real change in the\nlatter, and not merely in our thought; when a body moves, or comes to\nrest, or alters its form, there is a change in the reality as well as in\nour thought; and in this sense these accidents are real and intrinsic to\ntheir substances. Yet, though we cannot say that motion, rest, shape,\netc., are really identical with the body and only mentally distinct\naspects of it, at the same time neither can we say that by their\nappearance or disappearance the body gains or loses any reality other than\nan accidental determination of itself; whereas it does gain something more\nthan this when it is heated, or electrified, or increased in quantity;\njust as a man who acquires knowledge, or virtue, is not only really\nmodified, but is modified by real entities which he has acquired, not\nhaving actually possessed them before.\n\nFinally, there are accidents which do not affect the substance\nintrinsically at all, which do not determine any real change in it, but\nmerely give it an extrinsic denomination in relation to something outside\nit (60). Thus, while the _quality_ of heat is an absolute accident in a\nbody, the _action_ whereby the latter heats neighbouring bodies is no new\nreality in the body itself, and produces no real change in the latter, but\nonly gives it the extrinsic denomination of _heating_ in reference to\nthese other bodies in which the effect really takes place. Similarly the\n_location_ of any corporeal substance in _space_ or in _time_ relatively\nto others in the space or time series\u2014its _external_ place (_ubi_) or time\n(_quando_), as they are called\u2014or the relative position of its parts\n(_situs_) in the place occupied by it: these do not intrinsically\ndetermine it or confer upon it any intrinsic modification of its\nsubstance. Not, indeed, that they are mere _entia rationis_, mere logical\nfictions of our thought. They are realities, but not realities which\naffect the substances denominated from them; they are accidental modes of\nother substances, or of the absolute accidents of other substances.\nFinally, the accident which we call a \u201c_real_ relation\u201d presupposes in its\nsubject some absolute accident such as quantity or quality, or some real\nand intrinsic change determining these, or affecting the substance itself;\nbut whether relation is itself a reality over and above such foundation,\nis a disputed question.\n\nFrom these classifications of accidents it will be at once apparent that\nthe general notion of accident, as a dependent mode of being, superadded\nto the essence of a substance and in some way determining the latter, is\nrealized in widely different and merely analogical ways in the different\nultimate classes of accidents.\n\n67. REAL EXISTENCE OF ACCIDENTS. NATURE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN\nACCIDENTS AND SUBSTANCE.\u2014It would be superfluous to prove the general\nproposition that accidents really exist. In establishing the real\nexistence of substances we have seen that the real existence of some\naccidents at least has never been seriously denied. These are often called\nnowadays _phenomena_; and philosophers who have denied or doubted the real\nexistence of substances have been called \u201cphenomenists\u201d simply because\nthey have admitted the real existence only of these phenomena; though, if\nthey were as logical as Hume they might have seen with him that such\ndenial, so far from abolishing substance, could only lead to the\nsubstantializing of accidents (63).\n\nBut while undoubtedly there are realities which \u201cexist in themselves,\u201d\nsuch as individual men, animals and plants, there is no reason for\nattributing this same mode of existence to entities such as the thoughts,\nvolitions, emotions, virtues or vices, of the individual man; or the\ninstinct, hunger, or illness of the dog; or the colour, perfume, or form\nof the rose. The concrete individual man, or dog, or rose, reveals itself\nto our minds as a substantial entity, affected with these various\naccidental entities which are really distinct from the substantial entity\nitself and from one another. Nay, in most of the instances just cited,\nthey are physically separable from the substantial entity in which they\ninhere; not of course in the sense that they could actually exist without\nit, but in the sense that it can and does continue to exist actually\nwithout them (38); for it continues to exist while they come and go,\nappear and disappear.(258) Of course the _concrete individual_ man, or\ndog, or rose, does not continue to _exist actually unchanged_, and\n_totally_ identical with itself throughout the change of accidents (64),\nfor the accidents are part of the concrete individual reality; nay, even\nthe substance itself of the concrete individual does not remain totally\nunaffected by the change of the accidents; because if they _really_ affect\nit, as they do, their change cannot leave it totally unaffected; substance\nis not at all a changeless, concrete core, surrounded by an ever-changing\nrind or vesture of accidents; or a dark, hidden, immutable and inscrutable\nbackground of a panorama of phenomena (64). But though it is beyond all\ndoubt really affected by the change of its accidents, it is also beyond\nall doubt independent of them in regard to the essential mode of its\nbeing, in as much as it exists and continues to exist in itself throughout\nall fluctuation of its accidents; while these on the other hand have only\nthat essentially dependent mode of being whereby they are actual only by\naffecting and determining some subject in which they inhere and which\nsupports their actuality.\n\nThe existence, therefore, of some accidents, which are not only really\ndistinct but even physically separable from their substances, cannot\nreasonably be called into question. To deny the existence of such\naccidents, or, what comes to the same thing, their real distinction from\nsubstance, is to take up some one of these three equally untenable\npositions: that all the changes which take place within and around us are\nsubstantial changes; or, that there is no such thing as real change, all\nchange being a mental illusion; or, that contradictory states can be\naffirmed of the same reality.(259)\n\nBut the nature of the real distinction between accidents and substance is\nnot in all cases so easy to determine. Nor can we discuss the question\nhere in reference to each _summum genus_ of accident separately. Deferring\nto the chapter on _Relation_ the question of the distinction of this\nparticular accident from substance and the other categories, we may\nconfine our attention here to the distinction between substance and the\nthree classes of accidents we have called _extrinsic denominations_,\n_modal_ accidents, and _absolute_ accidents respectively. \u201cThere are\naccidents,\u201d writes Kleutgen,(260) \u201cwhich place nothing and change nothing\nin the subject itself, but are ascribed to it by reason of some extrinsic\nthing; others, again, produce indeed in the subject itself some new mode\nof being, but without their existing in it as a new reality, distinct from\nits reality; others, finally, are themselves a new reality, and have thus\na being which is proper to themselves, though this being is of course\ndependent on the substance. These latter alone can be _really_ distinct\nfrom the substance, in the full sense in which a real distinction is that\nbetween thing and thing. Now Cartesian philosophers have denied that there\nare any such accidents as those of the latter class; rejecting the\ndivision of accidents into absolute and modal, they teach that all\naccidents are mere _modifications_ or determinations of substance, that\nthey consist solely of various locations and combinations of the ultimate\nparts of a substance, or relations of the latter to other substances.\u201d\n\nNow all _extrinsic denominations_ of a substance do seem on analysis\nultimately to resolve themselves partly into relations of the latter to\nother substances, and partly into modal or absolute accidents of other\nsubstances. Hence we may confine our attention here to the distinction\nbetween these two classes of accident and their connatural substances.\n\n\n    And, approaching this question, it will be well for us to bear two\n    things in mind. In the first place, our definitions both of\n    substance and of accident are abstract and generic or universal.\n    But the abstract and universal does not exist _as such_. The\n    concrete, individual, actually existing substance is never\n    _merely_ \u201ca being that naturally exists in itself,\u201d nor is the\n    accident of such a substance _merely_ a verification of its\n    definition as \u201ca being that naturally inheres in something else\u201d.\n    In every case what really and actually exists is _the individual_,\n    a being concreted of substance and accidents, a being which is\n    ever and always a _real unity_, composite no doubt, but really\n    one; and this no matter what sort of distinction we hold to obtain\n    between the substance and its accidents. This is important; its\n    significance will be better appreciated according as we examine\n    the distinctions in question. Secondly, as scholastics understand\n    a real distinction, this can obtain not merely between different\n    \u201cpersons\u201d or \u201cthings\u201d which are separate from one another in time\n    or space, but also between different constitutive principles of\n    any one single concrete, composite, individual being (38). We have\n    seen that they are not agreed as to whether the essence and the\n    existence of any actual creature are really distinct or not (24).\n    And it may help us to clear up our notion of \u201caccident\u201d if we\n    advert here to their discussion of the question whether or not an\n    accident ought to be regarded as having an existence of its own,\n    an existence proper to itself.\n\n    Those who think that the distinction between essence and existence\n    in created things is a real distinction, hold that accidents as\n    such have no existence of their own, that they are actualized by\n    the existence of the substance, or rather of the concrete,\n    composite individual; that since the latter is a real unity\u2014not a\n    mere artificial aggregation of entities, but a being naturally\n    one\u2014it can have only one existence: _Impossibile est quod unius\n    rei non sit unum esse_;(261) that by this one existence the\n    concrete, composite essence of the substance, as affected and\n    determined by its accidents, is actualized. They contend that if\n    each of the principles, whether substantial or accidental, of a\n    concrete individual being had its own existence, their union, no\n    matter how intimate, could not form a natural unitary being, an\n    individual, but only an aggregate of such beings. It is neither\n    the matter, nor the form, nor the corporeal substance apart from\n    its accidents, that exists: it is the substance completely\n    determined by all its accidents and modes that is the proper\n    subject of existence.(262) It alone is actualized, and that by\n    _one_ existence, which is the \u201cultimate actuality\u201d of the\n    concrete, composite, individual essence: _esse est ultimus actus_.\n    Hence it is too, they urge, that an accident should be conceived\n    not properly as \u201ca being,\u201d but only as that whereby a being is\n    such or such: Accidens non est ens, sed _ens entis_. But it cannot\n    be so conceived if we attribute to it an existence of its own; for\n    then it would be \u201ca being\u201d in the full and proper sense of the\n    word.\n\n    This is the view of St. Thomas, and of Thomists generally. The\n    arguments in support of it are serious, but not convincing. And\n    the same may be said of the reasons adduced for the opposite view:\n    that existence not being really distinct from essence, accidents\n    in so far as they can be said to have an essence of their own have\n    likewise an existence of their own.\n\n    Supporters of this view not only admit but maintain that the\n    entity of a real, existing accident is a \u201cdiminished\u201d entity,\n    inasmuch as it is dependent in a sense in which a really existing\n    substance is not dependent. They simply deny the Thomist assertion\n    that substantial and accidental principles cannot combine to form\n    a real and natural unit, an individual being, if each be accorded\n    an existence appropriate and proportionate to its partial essence;\n    nor indeed can Thomists _prove_ this assertion. Moreover, if\n    existence be not _really_ distinct from essence, there is no more\n    inconvenience in the claim that partial existences can combine to\n    form one complete existence, _unum esse_, than in the Thomist\n    claim that partial essences, such as substantial and accidental\n    constitutive principles, can combine to form one complete essence,\n    one individual subject of existence. Then, furthermore, it is\n    urged that the substance exists prior _in time_ to some of its\n    accidents; that it is prior _in nature_ to its properties, which\n    are understood to _proceed_ or _flow_ from it; and that therefore\n    its existence cannot be theirs, any more than its essence can be\n    theirs. Finally, it is pointed out that since existence is the\n    actuality of essence, the existence which actualizes a substance\n    cannot be identical with that which actualizes an accident. At all\n    events, whether the one existence of the concrete individual\n    substance as determined by its accidents be as it were a simple\n    and indivisible existential act, which actualizes the composite\n    individual subject, as Thomists hold, or whether it be a composite\n    existential act, really identical with the composite individual\n    subject, as in the other view,(263) this concrete existence of the\n    individual is constantly varying with the variation of the\n    accidents of the individual. This is equally true on either view.\n\n\nInquiring into the distinction between substance and its intrinsic\naccidents, whether modal or absolute, we have first to remark that all\naccidents cannot possibly be reduced to relations; for if relation itself\nis something _extrinsic_ to the things related, it must at least\npresuppose a real and _intrinsic_ foundation or basis for itself in the\nthings related. Local motion, for instance, is a change in the spatial\nrelations of a body to other bodies. But it cannot be _merely_ this. For\nif spatial relations are not mere subjective or mental fabrications, if\nthey are in any intelligible sense _real_, then a change in them must\ninvolve a change of _something intrinsic_ to the bodies concerned. Now\nDescartes, in denying the existence of _absolute_ accidents, in reducing\nall accidents to _modes_ of substances, understood by modes not any\n_intrinsic_ determinations of substance, but only extrinsic determinations\nof the latter. All accidents of _material_ substance were for him mere\nlocations, arrangements, dispositions of its extended parts: extension\nbeing its essence. Similarly, all accidents of spiritual substance were\nfor him mere modalities and mutual relations of its \u201cthought\u201d or\n\u201cconsciousness\u201d: this latter being for him the essence of spirit. We have\nhere not only the error of identifying or confounding accidents such as\nthought and extension with their connatural substances, spirit and matter,\nbut also the error of supposing that extrinsic relations and modes of a\nsubstance, and changes in these, can be real, without there being in the\nsubstances themselves any intrinsic, real, changeable accidents, which\nwould account for the extrinsic relations and their changes. If there are\nno intrinsic accidents, really affecting and determining substances, and\nyet really distinct from the latter, then we must admit either that all\nchange is an illusion or else that all change is substantial; and this is\nthe dilemma that really confronts the Cartesian philosophy.\n\n68. MODAL ACCIDENTS AND THE MODAL DISTINCTION.\u2014The real distinction which\nwe claim to exist between a substance and its intrinsic accidents is not\nthe same in all cases: in regard to some accidents, which we have called\nintrinsic modes of the substance, it is a _minor_ or _modal_ real\ndistinction; in regard to others which we have called absolute accidents,\nit is a _major_ real distinction (38). Let us first consider the former.\n\nThe term _mode_ has a variety of meanings, some very wide, some\nrestricted. When one concept determines or limits another in any way we\nmay call it a mode of the latter. If there is no real distinction between\nthe determining and the determined thought-object, the mode is called a\n_metaphysical_ mode: as rationality is of animality in man. Again, created\nthings are all \u201cmodes\u201d of being; and the various aspects of a creature may\nbe called \u201cmodes\u201d of the latter: as \u201cfiniteness\u201d is a mode of every\ncreated being. We do not use the term in those wide senses in the present\ncontext. Here we understand by a mode some positive reality which so\naffects another and distinct reality as to determine the latter\nproximately to some definite way of existing or acting, to which the\nlatter is itself indifferent; without, however, adding to the latter any\nnew and proper entity other than the said determination.(264) Such modes\nare called _physical_ modes. And some philosophers maintain that there are\nnot only _accidental_ modes, thus really distinct from the substance, but\nthat there are even some _substantial_ modes really distinct from the\nessence of the substance which they affect: for instance, that the really\ndistinct constitutive principles of any individual corporeal substance,\nmatter and form, are actually united only in virtue of a substantial mode\nwhereby each is ordained for union with the other; or that _subsistence_,\nwhereby the individual substance is made a subsistent and incommunicable\n\u201cperson\u201d or \u201cthing,\u201d is a substantial mode of the individual nature.(265)\nWith these latter we are not concerned here, but only with accidental\nmodes, such as external shape or figure, local motion, position,\naction,(266) etc. Now when a substance is affected by such accidents as\nthese it is impossible on the one hand to maintain that they add any new\npositive entity of their own to it; they do not seem to have any reality\nover and above the determination or modification in which their very\npresence in the substance consists. And on the other hand it cannot be\ndenied that they express some real predicate which can be affirmed of the\nsubstance in virtue of their presence in it, and that independently of our\nthought; in other words it cannot be maintained that they are mere\nfigments or forms of thought, mere _entia rationis_. If a piece of wax has\na certain definite shape, this shape is inseparable from the wax: it is\nnothing except in the wax, for it cannot exist apart from the wax; but in\nthe wax it is something in some real sense distinct from the wax, inasmuch\nas the wax would persist even if it disappeared. No doubt it is essential\nto the wax, as extended in space, to have some shape or other; but it is\nindifferent to any particular shape, and hence something distinct from it\nis required to remove this indifference. This something is the particular\nshape it actually possesses. The shape, therefore, is an accidental mode\nof the extension of the wax, a mode which is really distinct, by a minor\nreal distinction, from this extension which is its immediate subject.(267)\nHence we conclude that there are accidental modes, or modal accidents,\nreally distinct from the subjects in which they inhere.\n\n69. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ITS \u201cPROPER\u201d ACCIDENTS. UNITY OF THE\nCONCRETE BEING.\u2014Turning next to the distinction between absolute accidents\nand substance, we have seen already that separable absolute accidents such\nas acquired habits of mind and certain sensible qualities and energies of\nbodies are really distinct from their subjects. Absolute accidents which\nare _naturally inseparable_ from their subjects\u2014such as external quantity\nor spatial extension or volume is in regard to the corporeal substance\u2014are\nalso really distinct from their subjects; though we cannot know by reason\nalone whether or how far such accidents are _absolutely separable_ from\nthese subjects: from Christian Revelation we know that extension at least\nis separable from the substance of a body, and with extension all the\nother corporeal accidents which inhere immediately in extension.(268)\n\nBut a special difficulty arises in regard to the nature of the distinction\nbetween a substance and its _proper_ accidents,(269) _i.e._ those which\nhave such an adequate and necessary ground in the essence of the substance\nthat the latter cannot exist without them: accidents which are\nsimultaneous with the substance and proceed necessarily from it, such as\nthe internal quantity of a corporeal substance, or the intellectual and\nappetitive powers or faculties of a spiritual substance. The medieval\nscholastic philosophers were by no means unanimous as to the nature of\nthis distinction. Their discussion of the question centres mainly around\nthe distinction between the spiritual human soul and its spiritual\nfaculties, intellect and will, and between these faculties themselves. It\nis instructive\u2014as throwing additional light on what they understood by a\nreal distinction\u2014to find that while Thomists generally have held that the\ndistinction here in question is a real distinction, many other scholastics\nhave held that it is only a virtual distinction, while Scotists have\ngenerally taught that it is a formal distinction (35-39).\n\nKleutgen(270) interprets the formal distinction advocated by Scotus in the\npresent context as really equivalent to the virtual distinction. St.\nBonaventure, after referring to the latter distinction, and to the real\ndistinction propounded by St. Thomas, adopts himself an intermediate view:\nthat the faculties of the soul are indeed really distinct from one\nanother, but nevertheless are not really distinct, as accidental entities,\nfrom the substance of the soul itself. We see how this can be by\nconsidering that the material and formal principles which constitute a\ncorporeal substance, though really distinct from each other, are not\nreally distinct from the substance itself. They are not accidents of the\nlatter but _constitute_ its essence, and so are to be referred _reductiv\u00e9_\nto the category of substance. So, by analogy, the faculties of the soul,\nthough really distinct from each other, do not belong to any accidental\ncategory really distinct from the substance of the soul, but belong\n_reductiv\u00e9_ to the latter category, not indeed as constituting, but as\nflowing immediately and necessarily from, the substance of the soul\nitself.(271) And, like St. Thomas, he finds the ultimate source and\nexplanation of this multiplicity of faculties and forces _in the\nfiniteness_ of the created substance as such.(272) But St. Thomas went\nfarther than St. Bonaventure, for he taught\u2014as indeed Thomists generally\nteach, and many who are not Thomists\u2014that the faculties of the human soul\nare really distinct from one another, not merely as proximate principles\nof really distinct vital acts, but as accidental entities or essences; and\nthat as such they are really distinct from the essence or substance itself\nof the human soul. The arguments in favour of this view will be given in\ntheir proper place in connexion with the category of _Quality_. If they\nare not demonstrative in their force, they are certainly such that the\nview for which they make is very highly probable; but we are concerned\nhere to show, in this concluding section, that the recognition of a real\ndistinction in general between substance and its accidents does not in any\nway compromise the real unity of the concrete individual being. It has\nbeen widely accused of doing so by philosophers who try to discredit this\nview without fully understanding it. This characteristically modern\nattitude is illustrated by the persistent attempts that have been made in\nrecent times to throw ridicule on what they describe as the \u201cfaculty\npsychology\u201d.(273)\n\nThe source of this groundless charge lies partly in the mistaken\nconception of accident and substance as concrete entities superadded the\none to the other; partly in the mistaken notion that the union of\nsubstance and accidents cannot result in a real unity, that there cannot\nbe more or less perfect grades of real unity (27); and partly in the false\nassumption that real distinction always implies mutual separability of\nconcrete entities. Of these errors we need only refer to that concerning\nunity.\n\nModern philosophers not uncommonly conceive the union of substance and\naccidents as being necessarily a mere _mechanical_ union or aggregation,\nand oppose it to \u201corganic\u201d unity which they regard as a real unity\ninvolving the richness of an energetic, \u201cliving\u201d multiplicity. This\ninvolves a misrepresentation of the traditional scholastic view. The union\nof substance and accident is not a mechanical union. Nothing could be\nfarther from the minds of the scholastic interpreters of Aristotle than\nthe conception of the ultimate principles of the universe of our\nexperience as inert entities moved according to purely mechanical laws; or\nof the individual concrete being as a mere machine, or a mere aggregate of\nmechanical elements. They recognized even in the individual inorganic\nsubstance an internal, unifying, active and directive principle of all the\nenergies and activities of the thing\u2014its substantial form. And if this is\nall those philosophers mean by the metaphorical transference of the terms\n\u201corganic unity,\u201d \u201cinternal living principle of development,\u201d etc., to the\nmineral world, they are so far in accord with the traditional scholastic\nphilosophy;(274) while if they mean that all substances are principles of\n\u201cvital\u201d energy, or that all reality is one organic unity, in the literal\nsense of these terms, they are committing themselves either to the\npalpably false theory of pan-psychism, or to the gratuitous reassertion of\na very old and very crude form of monism.\n\nBy \u201corganic\u201d unity we understand the unity of any living organism, a unity\nwhich is much more perfect than that of the parts of a machine, or than\nany natural juxtaposition of material parts in an inorganic whole; for the\norgans, though distinct in number and in nature from one another, are\nunited by an internal principle to form one living individual, so that if\nany organ were separated from the living organism it would cease to be an\norgan.(275) But organic unity is not by any means the most perfect kind of\nunity conceivable.(276) The living organism exists and develops and\nattains to the perfection of its being only through a multiplicity of\nintegral parts extended in space. The spiritual substance is subject to no\nsuch dispersion of its being. From its union with the faculties whereby it\nattains to its natural development, there results a real unity of a higher\norder than that of any organism.\n\nAnd nevertheless, even though the unity of the concrete spiritual\nsubstance and its faculties be so far higher than a mechanical or even an\norganic unity, it is not perfect. Even though the faculties of the soul be\ndeterminations of its substance, even though they flow from it as\nactualities demanded by its essence for the normal and natural development\nof its being, still it is a complete subsisting essence of its kind\nwithout them; it possesses its _essential_ perfection without them, so\nthat however intimate be their union with it they can never form one\nessence with it; it needs them only for the fuller development of its\nbeing by acquiring further _intermediate_ perfections and thus attaining\nto its _final_ perfection (46).\n\nAnd here we touch on the most fundamental ground of the distinction, in\nall created things, between their substance and their accidental\nperfections. Unlike the Necessary, Absolute Being, whose infinite\nperfection is the eternal actuality of His essence, no creature possesses\nthe actuality of its being _tota simul_, but only by a progressive\ndevelopment whereby it gradually acquires really new intermediate and\nfinal perfections, really distinct from, though naturally due to, its\nessence. Hence, even though some of its accidents\u2014properties such as the\npowers and faculties we have been discussing\u2014be not really distinct from\nthe essence wherewith they are necessarily connected, this is not true of\nits acquired habits and dispositions, or of the activities which proceed\nfrom these latter as their proximate principles. At the same time the\nconcrete being is, at every moment of its existence and development, a\nreal unity, but a unity which, involving in itself as it does a real\nmultiplicity of distinct principles, must ever fall infinitely short of\nthe perfect type of real unity\u2014that realized only in the Self-Existent,\nNecessary Being.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX. NATURE AND PERSON.\n\n\n70. SOME DIVISIONS OF SUBSTANCES.\u2014In the preceding chapter we discussed\nthe nature of substance and accident in general, and the relation between\na substance and its accidents. We must next examine the category of\nsubstance more in detail, terminating as it does in the important concept\nof personality or person. This latter conception is one which must have\nits origin for all philosophers in the study of the human individual, but\nwhich, for scholastic philosophers, is completed and perfected by the\nlight of Christian Revelation. We shall endeavour to show in the first\nplace what can be gathered from the light of reason about the constitution\nof personality, and also briefly to note how Christian Revelation has\nincreased our insight into the perfections involved in it. As leading up\nto the concept of person, we must set forth certain divisions or\nclassifications of substance: into _first_ and _second_ substances, and\ninto _complete_ and _incomplete_ substances.(277)\n\n(_a_) The specific and generic natures of substantial entities do not\ninhere, like accidents, in individual substances; they constitute the\nessence of the latter, and hence these _universals_ are called substances.\nBut the universal as such does not really exist; it is realized only in\nindividuals; in the logical order it pre-supposes the individual as a\nlogical subject of which it is affirmed, a _subjectum attributionis seu\npraedicationis_. Hence it is called a _second_ substance, while the\nindividual substance is called a _first_ substance. Of course we can\npredicate attributes of universal substances, and use these as logical\nsubjects, as when we say \u201c_Man_ is mortal\u201d. But such propositions have no\nreal meaning, and give us no information about reality, except in so far\nas we can refer their predicates (\u201cmortal\u201d), through the medium of their\nuniversal subjects (\u201cman\u201d), back ultimately to the individual substances\n(John, James, etc.) which alone are real, and in which alone the universal\n(\u201cman\u201d) has its reality. Hence the individual is, in the logical order,\nthe ultimate and fundamental subject of all our predications. And\nfurthermore, the individual substance cannot be used as a logical\npredicate of anything underlying itself, while the universal substance can\nbe so used in relation to the individual.\n\nIn the ontological order, of course, the universal substance is\nindividualized, and, as individual, it is the subject in which all\naccidents inhere, their _subjectum inhaesionis_: the _only_ subject of\nmany of them, and the _remote_ or _ultimate_ subject of those of them\nwhich inhere _immediately_ in other accidents.\n\nThus while in the ontological order all substances, whether we think of\nthem as universal or as individual, are the ultimate subjects of inhesion\nfor all real accidents, in the logical order it is only the individual\nsubstance that is the ultimate subject of attribution for all logical\npredicates. Hence it was that the individual substance (\u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03af \u1f44\u03bd),\nvindicating for itself more fully the r\u00f4le of subject, was called by\nAristotle \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7, _substantia prima_, while he called the universal,\nspecific or generic substance, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1, _substantia secunda_.(278)\nThese are, of course, two ways of regarding substance, and not two really\ndistinct species of substance as genus. The distinction between the\n_membra dividentia_ is logical, not real.\n\n\n    The perfectly intelligible sense in which Aristotle and the\n    scholastics designate the universal a substance, the sense of\n    moderate realism, according to which the universal constitutes,\n    and is identical with, the essence of the individual \u201cperson\u201d or\n    \u201cthing,\u201d is entirely different from the sense in which many\n    exponents of modern monistic idealism conceive the universal as\n    the substance _par excellence_, the _ens realissimum_,\n    determining, expressing, evolving itself in the individual\n    phenomena of mind and of nature, which would be merely its\n    manifestations.(279)\n\n\n(_b_) The divisions of substance into spiritual and corporeal, of the\nlatter into inorganic and organic, of these again into vegetative and\nanimal, and finally of animal substances into brute animals and human\nbeings,\u2014offer no special difficulties. All purely natural or rational\nknowledge of the possibility and nature of purely spiritual substances is\nbased on the analogy of our knowledge of the human soul, which, though a\nspiritual substance, is not a pure spirit, but is naturally allied with\nmatter in its mode of existence. The individual human being offers to\nhuman experience the sole example of the sufficiently mysterious\nconjunction and combination of matter and spirit, of the corporeal mode of\nbeing and the spiritual mode of being, to form one composite substance,\npartly corporeal and partly spiritual.\n\n(_c_) This in turn suggests the division of substances into _simple_ and\n_composite_. The latter are those which we understand to be constituted by\nthe natural and substantial union of two really distinct but incomplete\nsubstantial principles, a formative, determining, specifying principle,\nand a material, determinable, indifferent principle: such are all\ncorporeal substances whether inorganic, vegetative, sentient, or rational.\nThe former, or simple substances, are those which we understand to be\nconstituted by a sole and single substantial principle which determines\nand specifies their essence, without the conjunction of any material,\ndeterminable principle. We have no direct and immediate experience of any\n_complete_ created substance of this kind; but each of us has such direct\nexperience of an _incomplete_ simple substance, _viz._ his own soul; while\nwe can infer from our experience the _existence_ of other incomplete\nsimple substances, _viz._ the formative principles of corporeal\nsubstances, as also the _possibility_ of such complete simple substances\nas pure spirits, and the actual _existence_ of the perfectly simple,\nuncreated substance of the Infinite Being.\n\n(_d_) If there are such things as composite substances, _i.e._ substances\nconstituted by the substantial union of two really distinct principles,\nthen it follows that while the composite substance itself is _complete_,\neach of its substantial constitutive principles is _incomplete_. Of course\nthere are many philosophers nowadays who reject as mere mental fictions,\nas products of mere logical distinctions, and as devoid of objective\nvalidity, the notions of _composite_ substance and _incomplete_ substance.\nNor is this to be wondered at when we remember what a variety of\ngroundless and gratuitous notions are current in regard to substance\nitself (64). But understanding substance in the traditional sense already\nexplained (62), there is nothing whatever inconsistent in the notion of a\ncomposite substance, or of an incomplete substance,\u2014provided these notions\nare understood in the sense to be explained presently. Nay, more, not only\nare these notions intrinsically possible: we must even hold them to be\nobjectively valid and real, to be truly expressive of the nature of\nreality, unless we are prepared to hold that there is no such thing as\nsubstantial change in the universe, and that man himself is a mere\n_aggregate_ of material atoms moved according to mechanical laws and\ninhabited by a conscious soul, or thinking principle, rather than an\nindividual being with one definite substantial nature.\n\nWhat, then, are we to understand by complete and incomplete substances\nrespectively? A substance is regarded as complete in the fullest sense\nwhen it is wanting in no _substantial_ principle without which it would be\nincapable of _existing_ and discharging _all_ its functions in the actual\norder as an individual of some definite species. Of course no created\nsubstance exists or discharges its functions unless it is endowed with\nsome accidents, _e.g._ with properties, faculties, forces, etc. But there\nis no question of these here. We are considering only the essential\nperfections of the substance. Thus, then, any existing individual of any\nspecies\u2014a man, a horse, an oak\u2014is a complete substance in this fullest\nsense. It is complete _in the line of substance_, in _substantial_\nperfection, \u201c_in ordine substantialitatis_,\u201d inasmuch as it can exist (and\ndoes actually exist) without being conjoined or united substantially with\nany other substance to form a composite substance other than itself. And\nit is complete _in the line of specific perfection_, \u201c_in ordine\nspeciei_,\u201d because not only can it exist without such conjunction with any\nother substantial principle, but it can discharge _all_ the functions\nnatural to its species, and thus tend towards its _final_ perfection (47)\nwithout such conjunction.\n\nBut it is conceivable that a substance might be complete in the line of\nsubstantial perfections, and thus be capable of _existing_ in the actual\norder and discharging there _some_ of the functions of its species without\nconjunction with any other substantial principle, and yet be incapable of\ndischarging _all_ the functions natural to an individual of its species\nwithout conjunction with some other substantial principle, in which case\nit would be _incomplete_ in the line of _specific_ perfection, though\ncomplete in everything pertaining to its _substantiality_. We know of one\nsuch substance,\u2014the human soul. Being spiritual and immortal, it can exist\napart from the body to which it is united by nature, and in this separated\ncondition retain and exercise its spiritual faculties of intellect and\nwill; it is therefore complete as regards the distinctively substantial\nperfection whereby it is \u201ccapable of existing in itself\u201d. But being of its\nnature destined for union with a material principle, constituting an\nindividual of the human species only by means of such union, and being\ncapable of discharging some of the functions of this species, _viz._ the\nsentient and vegetative functions, only when so united, it has not _all_\nthe perfections of its species independently of the body; and it is\ntherefore an incomplete substance in the line of specific perfections,\nthough complete in those essential to its substantiality.\n\nAgain, if it be true that just as man is composed of two substantial\nprinciples, soul and body, so every living thing is composed of a\nsubstantial vital principle and a substantial material principle, and that\nevery inorganic individual thing is likewise composed of two really\ndistinct substantial principles, a formative and a passive or material\nprinciple; and if, furthermore, it be true that apart from the spiritual\nprinciple in man every other vital or formative principle of the composite\n\u201cthings\u201d of our experience is of such a nature that it cannot actually\nexist except in union with some material principle, and _vice versa_,\u2014then\nit follows necessarily that all such substantial principles of these\ncomplete composite substances are themselves _incomplete_ substances: and\nincomplete not only in regard to perfections which would make them\nsubsisting individuals of a species, but (unlike the human soul)\nincomplete even in the line of substantiality itself, inasmuch as no one\nof them is capable of actually existing at all except in union with its\nconnatural and correlative principle.\n\nThus we arrive at the notion of substances that are _incomplete_ in the\nline of specific perfections, or in that of substantial perfections, or\neven in both lines. An incomplete substance, therefore, is not one which\nverifies the definition of substance only in part. The incomplete\nsubstance _fully_ verifies the definition of a substance.(280) It is\nconjoined, no doubt, _with another_ to form a complete substance; but it\ndoes not exist _in the other_, or in the composite substance, as accidents\ndo. It is _a substantial_ principle of the composite substance, not an\n_accidental_ determination of the latter, or of the other substantial\nprinciple with which it is conjoined. It thus verifies the notion of\nsubstance as a mode of being which naturally exists in itself; and united\nwith its correlative substantial principle it discharges the function of\nsupporting all accidental determinations which affect the composite\nsubstantial essence. Since, however, it does not exist itself\nindependently as an individual of a species, but only forms the complete\nindividual substance by union with its correlative substantial principle,\nit may be, and has been, accurately described as not belonging to the\ncategory of substance _formally_, but only _referentially_, \u201c_reductiv\u00e9_\u201d.\n\nThe concepts of composite substance, of complete and incomplete\nsubstances, understood as we have just explained them, are therefore\nperfectly intelligible in themselves. And this is all we are concerned to\nshow in the present context. This is not the place to establish the theses\nof psychology and cosmology from which they are borrowed. That the human\nsoul is spiritual and immortal; that its union with a really distinct\nmaterial principle to form the individual human substance or nature is a\nsubstantial union; that all living organisms and all inorganic bodies are\nreally composite substances and subject to substantial change: these\nvarious theses of scholastic philosophy we here assume to be true. And if\nthey are true the conception of incomplete substances naturally united to\nform a complete composite substance is not only intelligible as an\nhypothesis but is objectively true and valid as a thesis; and thus the\nnotion of an incomplete substance is not only a consistent and legitimate\nnotion, but is also a notion which gives mental expression to an objective\nreality.\n\nWe may add this consideration: The concept of an accident really distinct\nfrom its substance involves no intrinsic repugnance. Yet an accident is a\nmode of being which is so weak and wanting in reality, if we may speak in\nsuch terms, that it cannot naturally exist except by inhering, mediately\nor immediately, in the stronger and more real mode of being which is\nsubstance. But an incomplete substance is a higher grade of reality than\nany accident. Therefore if accidents can be real, _a fortiori_ incomplete\nsubstances can be real.\n\n71. SUBSTANCE AND NATURE.\u2014We have already pointed out (13) that the terms\n\u201cessence,\u201d \u201csubstance,\u201d and \u201cnature\u201d denote what is really the same thing,\nregarded under different aspects. The term \u201cessence\u201d is somewhat wider\nthan \u201csubstance,\u201d inasmuch as it means \u201cwhat a thing is,\u201d whether the\nthing be a substance, an accident, or a concrete existing individual\nincluding substance and accidents.\n\nThe traditional meaning of the term \u201cnature\u201d in Aristotelian and\nscholastic philosophy is unmistakable. It means the essence or substance\nof an individual person or thing, regarded as _the fundamental principle\nof the latter\u2019s activities_. Every finite individual comes into existence\nincomplete, having no doubt its _essential_ perfections and properties\n_actually_, but its _intermediate_ and _final_ perfections only\n_potentially_ (47). These it realizes gradually, through the exercise of\nits connatural activities. Every being is essentially intended for\nactivity of some sort: \u201cOmne ens est propter suam operationem,\u201d says St.\nThomas. And by the constant interplay of their activities these beings\nrealize and sustain the universal order which makes the world a _cosmos_.\nThere is in all things an immanent purpose or finality which enables us to\nspeak of the whole system which they form as \u201cUniversal _Nature_\u201d.(281)\n\nTherefore what we call a _substance_ or _essence_ from the _static_ point\nof view we call a _nature_ when we consider it from the _dynamic_\nstandpoint, or as an agent.(282) No doubt the forces, faculties and\npowers, the active and passive accidental principles, whereby such an\nagent exerts and undergoes action, are the _proximate_ principles of all\nthis action and change, but the _remote_ and fundamental principle of the\nlatter is the essence or substance of the agent itself, in other words its\n_nature_.\n\n\n    Not all modern scholastics, however, are willing thus to identify\n    nature with substance. We have no intuitive insight into what any\n    real essence or substance is; our knowledge of it is discursive,\n    derived by inference from the phenomena, the operations, the\n    conduct of things, in accordance with the principle, _Operari\n    sequitur esse_. Moreover, the actually existing, concrete\n    individual\u2014a man, for instance\u2014has a great variety of activities,\n    spiritual, sentient, vegetative, and inorganic; he has, moreover,\n    in the constitution of his body a variety of distinct organs and\n    members; he assimilates into his body a variety of inorganic\n    substances; the tissues of his body _appear_ to be different _in\n    kind_; the vital functions which subserve nutrition, growth and\n    reproduction are at least analogous to mechanical, physical and\n    chemical changes, if indeed they are not really and simply such;\n    it may be, therefore, that the _ultimate material_ constituents of\n    his body remain _substantially unaltered_ in their passage into,\n    and through, and out of the cycle of his vegetative life; that\n    they retain their elemental _substantial forms_ while they assume\n    a _new nature_ by becoming parts of the one organic whole, whose\n    higher directive principle dominates and co-ordinates all their\n    various energies.(283) If this be so there is in the same\n    individual a multiplicity of really and actually distinct\n    substances; each of these, moreover, has its own existence\n    proportionate to its essence, since the existence of a created\n    reality is not really distinct from its essence; nor is there any\n    reason for saying that any of these substances is incomplete; what\n    we have a right to say is that no one of them separately is a\n    complete _nature_, that each being an _incomplete nature_ unites\n    with all the others to form one _complete nature_: inasmuch as no\n    one of them separately is an adequate intrinsic principle of all\n    the functions which it can discharge, and is naturally destined to\n    discharge, by its natural union with the others, whereas there\n    results from their union a _new fundamental principle_ of a\n    co-ordinated and harmonized system of operations\u2014in a word, a _new\n    nature_.\n\n    This line of thought implies among other things (_a_) the view\n    that whereas there is no ground for admitting the existence of\n    _incomplete substances_, there is ground for distinguishing\n    between _complete and incomplete natures_; (_b_) the view that\n    from the union or conjunction of an actual multiplicity of\n    substances, each remaining unaltered and persisting in its\n    existence actually distinct from the others, there _can_ arise one\n    single complete nature\u2014a nature which will be _one being_ simply\n    and really, _unum ens per se et simpliciter_, and not merely an\n    aggregate of beings or an accidental unity, _unum per\n    accidens_,\u2014and there _does_ arise such a nature whenever the\n    component substances not merely co-operate to discharge certain\n    functions which none of them could discharge separately (which\n    indeed is true of an accidental union, as of two horses drawing a\n    load which neither could draw by itself), but when they unite in a\n    more permanent and intimate way according to what we call \u201cnatural\n    laws\u201d or \u201claws of nature,\u201d so as to form a new fundamental\n    principle of such functions.(284) These views undoubtedly owe\n    their origin to the belief that certain facts brought to light by\n    the physical and biological sciences in modern times afford strong\n    evidence that the elementary material constituents of bodies,\n    whether inorganic or living, remain _substantially unaltered_\n    while combining to form the multitudinous _natural kinds_ or\n    _natures_ of those living or non-living material things. It was to\n    reconcile this supposed _plurality_ of _actually distinct_ and\n    _diverse_ substances in the individual with the indubitable _real\n    unity_ of the latter, that these philosophers distinguished\n    between substance and nature. But it is not clear that the facts\n    alleged afford any such evidence. Of course if the philosopher\n    approaches the consideration of it with what we may call the\n    atomic preconception of material substances as permanent,\n    unchangeable entities, this view will preclude all recognition of\n    _substantial_ change in the universe; it will therefore force him\n    to conclude that each individual, composite agent has a unity\n    which must be _less_ than substantial, and which, because he feels\n    it to be _more_ than a mere accidental or artificial unity, he\n    will describe as _natural_, as a union to form _one nature_. But\n    if he approach the evidence in question with the view that\n    substantial change is possible, this view, involving the\n    recognition of incomplete substances as real, will remove all\n    necessity for distinguishing between substance and nature, and\n    will enable him to conclude that however various and manifold be\n    the activities of the individual, their co-ordination and\n    unification, as proceeding from the individual, point to a\n    _substantial_ unity in the latter as their fundamental principle,\n    a unity resulting from the _union of incomplete substances_.\n\n    This latter is undoubtedly the view of St. Thomas, of practically\n    all the medieval scholastics, and of most scholastics in modern\n    times. Nor do we see any sufficient reason for receding from it,\n    or admitting the modern distinction between substance and nature.\n    And if it be objected that the view which admits the reality of\n    incomplete substances and substantial change is as much a\n    preconception as what we have called the atomic view of substance,\n    our answer is, once more, that since we have no intellectual\n    intuition into the real constitution of the substances which\n    constitute the universe, since we can argue to this only by\n    observing and reasoning from their activities on the principle\n    _Operari requitur esse_, the evidence alone must decide which view\n    of these substances is the correct one. Does the evidence afforded\n    us by a scientific analysis of all the functions, inorganic,\n    vegetative, sentient and rational, of an individual man, forbid us\n    to conclude that he is one complete substance, resulting from the\n    union of two incomplete substantial principles, a spiritual soul\n    and a material principle? and at the same time compel us to infer\n    that he is one complete nature resulting from the union of a\n    plurality of principles supposed to be complete as substances and\n    incomplete as natures? We believe that it does not; nor can we see\n    that any really useful purpose is served by thus setting up a real\n    distinction between substance and nature. From the evidence to\n    hand it is neither more nor less difficult to infer unity of\n    substance than unity of nature in the individual. The inference in\n    question is an inference from facts in the phenomenal order, in\n    the domain of the senses, to what must be actually there in the\n    noumenal order, in the domain of nature or substance, a domain\n    which cannot be reached by the senses but only by intellect. Nor\n    will any imagination images which picture for us the physical\n    fusion or coalescence of material things in the domain of the\n    senses help us in the least to conceive in any positive way the\n    mode in which incomplete natures or substances unite to form a\n    complete nature or substance. For these latter facts belong to the\n    domain which the senses cannot reach at all, and which intellect\n    can reach only inferentially and not by direct insight.\n\n    Hence we consider the view which regards real unity of nature as\n    compatible with real and actual plurality of complete substances\n    in the individual, as improbable. At the same time we do not\n    believe that this view is a necessary corollary from the real\n    identification of essence with existence in created things. We\n    have seen that even if accidents have their own existence in so\n    far as they have their own essence\u2014as they have if essence and\n    existence be really identical\u2014nevertheless the concrete substance\n    as determined by its accidents can have a really unitary\n    existence, _unum esse_ corresponding to and identical with its\n    composite constitution (67). Similarly, if the existence of each\n    incomplete substance is identical with its incomplete essence,\n    this is no obstacle to the complete substance\u2014which results from\n    the union of two such incomplete substantial principles\u2014having one\n    complete unitary existence identical with its composite essence.\n    Hence it is useless to argue against the view that a plurality of\n    actually distinct and complete substances can unite to form a\n    complete nature which will be really _one being_, on the ground\n    that each complete substance has already its own existence and\n    that things which have and preserve their own existence cannot\n    form _one being_. Such an argument is inconclusive; for although\n    _one being_ has of course only one existence, it has not been\n    proved that this one existence cannot result from the union of\n    many incomplete existences: especially if these existences be\n    identical with the incomplete essences which are admittedly\n    capable of uniting to form one complete essence.\n\n    It may, however, be reasonably urged against the opinion under\n    criticism that, since the complete substances are supposed to\n    remain complete and unchanged in their state of combination, it is\n    difficult to see how this combination can be a real union and not\n    merely an extrinsic juxtaposition,\u2014one which remains in reality a\n    merely accidental conjunction, even though we may dignify it with\n    the title of a \u201cnatural union\u201d.\n\n    And finally it may be pointed out that in this view the operations\n    of the individual have not really _one ultimate_ intrinsic\n    principle at all, since behind the supposed unity of nature there\n    is a more fundamental plurality of actually distinct substances.\n\n\n72. SUBSISTENCE AND PERSONALITY.\u2014We have already examined the relation\nbetween the individual and the universal, between _first_ and _second_\nsubstances, in connexion with the doctrine of Individuation (31-3). And we\nthen saw that whatever it be that individuates the universal nature, it is\nat all events not to be regarded as anything extrinsic and superadded to\nthis nature in the individual, as anything really distinct from this\nnature: that, for instance, what makes Plato\u2019s human nature to be Plato\u2019s\nis not anything really distinct from the human nature that is in Plato. We\nhave now to fix our attention on the nature as individualized. We have to\nconsider the complete individual nature or substance itself in actually\nexisting individual \u201cthings\u201d or \u201cpersons\u201d.\n\nWe must remember that scholastics are not agreed as to whether there is a\nreal distinction or only a virtual distinction between the actual\nexistence and the complete individual essence or substance or nature of\ncreated individual beings (21-4). Furthermore we have seen that\nphilosophers who study the metaphysics of the inorganic world and of the\nlower forms of life are unable to say with certainty what is the\nindividual in these domains: whether it is the chemical molecule or the\nchemical atom or the electron; whether it is the single living cell or the\nliving mass consisting of a plurality of such cells (31). But we have also\nseen that as we ascend the scale of living things all difficulty in\ndesignating the genuine individual disappears: that a man, a horse, an oak\ntree, are undoubtedly individual beings.\n\nBearing these things in mind we have now to inquire into what has been\ncalled the _subsistence_ or _personality_ of the complete individual\nsubstance or nature: that perfection which enables us formally to\ndesignate the latter a \u201csubsisting thing\u201d(285) or a \u201cperson\u201d. By\npersonality we mean the subsistence of a complete individual _rational_\nnature. We shall therefore inquire into the meaning of the generic term\n_subsistentia_ (or _suppositalitas_), _subsistence_, in the abstract. But\nlet us look at it first in the concrete.\n\nA complete individual nature or substance, when it exists in the actual\norder, really distinct and separate in its own complete entity from every\nother existing being, exercising its powers and discharging its functions\nof its own right and according to the laws of its own being, is said to\n_subsist_, or to have the perfection of _subsistence_. In this state it\nnot only _exists in itself_ as every substance does; it is not only\n_incommunicable_ to any other being as every individual is, in\ncontradistinction with _second_ or _universal_ substances which are, as\nsuch, indefinitely communicable to individuals; but it is also a complete\nwhole, incommunicable _as a mere integral or essential part_ to some other\nwhole, unlike the incomplete substantial constituents, or integral parts,\nmembers or organs of, say, an individual organic body; and finally it is\nincommunicable in the sense that it is not capable of being assumed into\nthe subsisting unity of some other superior \u201csuppositum\u201d or \u201cperson\u201d. All\nthose characteristics we find in the individual \u201csubsisting thing\u201d or\n\u201cperson\u201d. It \u201cexists in itself\u201d and is not communicable to another\nsubstance _as an accident_, because it is itself a substance. It is not\ncommunicable _to individuals as a universal_, because it is itself an\nindividual. It is not communicable _as an integral or essential part to a\nwhole_, because it is itself a complete substance and nature.(286) Finally\nit is not communicable to, and cannot be assumed into, the unity of a\nhigher personality so as to subsist by virtue of the latter\u2019s subsistence,\nbecause it has a perfection incompatible with such assumption, _viz._ its\nown proper subsistence, whereby it is already an actually subsisting thing\nor person in its own right, or _sui juris_, so to speak.\n\n\n    The mention of this last sort of incommunicability would be\n    superfluous, and indeed unintelligible, did we not know from\n    Divine Revelation that the human nature of our Divine Lord and\n    Saviour, Jesus Christ, though it is a complete and most perfect\n    individual nature, is nevertheless _not a person_, because It is\n    assumed into the Personality of the Second Person of the Divine\n    Trinity, and, united hypostatically or personally with this Divine\n    Person, subsists by virtue of the Divine Subsistence of the\n    latter.\n\n\nWe see, therefore, what subsistence does for a complete individual nature\nin the _static_ order. It makes this nature _sui juris_, incommunicable,\nand entirely independent in the mode of its actual being: leaving\nuntouched, of course, the essential dependence of the created \u201csubsisting\nthing\u201d or \u201cperson\u201d on the Creator. In the _dynamic_ order, the order of\nactivity and development, subsistence makes the complete individual nature\nnot only the ultimate principle _by which_ all the functions of the\nindividual are discharged, but also the ultimate principle or agent\n_which_ exercises these functions: while the nature _as such_ is the\nultimate _principium_ QUO, the nature _as subsisting_ is the ultimate\n_principium_ QUOD, in regard to all actions emanating from this nature.\nHence the scholastic aphorism: _Actiones sunt suppositorum_. That is, all\nactions emanating from a complete individual nature are always ascribed\nand attributed to the latter _as subsisting_, to the \u201csubsisting thing\u201d or\n\u201cperson\u201d. In regard to an individual human person, for instance, whether\nhis intellect thinks, or his will resolves, or his imagination pictures\nthings, or his eyes see, or his hand writes, or his stomach digests, or\nhis lungs breathe, or his head aches, it is the _man_, the _person_,\nproperly, that discharges or suffers all these functions, though by means\nof different faculties, organs and members; and it is to him properly that\nwe ascribe all of them.(287)\n\nNow the individual human person is neither his soul, nor his body, nor\neven both conceived as two; he is _one_ being, one complete substance or\nnature composed partly of a spiritual principle or soul and partly of a\nmaterial principle which the soul \u201cinforms\u201d and so constitutes a living\nhuman body. Hence the human soul itself, whether we consider it as united\nto the material principle in the living human person, or as disembodied\nand separate from its connatural material principle, is not a complete\nsubstance, is not capable of _subsisting_ and having its human activities\nreferred ultimately to itself as the subsisting, personal principle which\nelicits these activities. No doubt the disembodied soul has actual\n_existence_, but it has not the perfection of _subsistence_ or\n_personality_: it is not a complete individual of the human species to\nwhich it belongs, and therefore it cannot be properly called a human\nperson, a complete subsisting individual of the human species.(288)\n\n\n    Furthermore, even though an individual nature be complete as a\n    nature, endowed with all the substantial and specific perfections\n    which constitute it a complete individual of the species to which\n    it belongs, nevertheless if it is assumed into the personality of\n    another and higher nature, and subsists in personal union with the\n    latter and by virtue of the latter\u2019s subsistence, then that\n    nature, not having its own proper and connatural subsistence, is\n    not itself a person. Nor can the actions which are elicited by\n    means of it be ascribed ultimately to it; they must be ascribed to\n    the person by whose subsistence it subsists and into whose\n    personality it has been assumed. If an individual human nature be\n    thus hypostatically or personally assumed into, and united with, a\n    higher Divine Personality, and subsists only by this Personality,\n    such a human nature will be really and truly an individual nature\n    of the human species; the actions elicited through it and\n    performed by means of it will be really and truly human actions;\n    but it will not be a human person; while its actions will be\n    really and truly the actions of the Divine Person, and will\n    therefore be also really and truly divine: they will be the\n    actions of the God-Man, divine and human, _theandric_. All this we\n    know only from Divine Revelation concerning the hypostatic union\n    of the human nature of Christ with the Person of the Divine Word;\n    nor could we know it otherwise. But all this does not modify, it\n    only supplements and completes, what the light of reason discloses\n    to us regarding the subsistence or personality of any complete\n    individual nature.\n\n\nWe are now in a position to give nominal definitions of subsistence and\npersonality both in the abstract and in the concrete, _i.e._ definitions\nwhich will indicate to us what exactly it is that these terms denote,(289)\nand which will thus enable us to inquire into their connotation, or in\nother words to ask what is it precisely that constitutes subsistence or\npersonality.\n\nBy \u201c_subsistence_\u201d (\u201c_subsistentia_,\u201d \u201c_suppositalitas_\u201d) we mean that\nperfection whereby a fully complete individual nature is rendered in every\nway, in its being and in its actions, distinct from and incommunicable to\nany and every other being, so that it exists and acts _sui juris_,\nautonomously, independently of every other being save the Creator.(290)\n\nBy a \u201c_subsisting being_\u201d in the concrete (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u201c_suppositum_,\u201d\n_hypostasis_), we mean a being endowed with this perfection of\nsubsistence; in other words, a being that is a complete individual nature\nexisting and acting in every way distinct from and incommunicable to any\nother being, so that it exists and acts _sui juris_, autonomously.\n\n\u201c_Personality_\u201d is simply the subsistence of a complete individual nature\nthat is _rational_, _intelligent_.\n\nA \u201c_person_\u201d is simply a _subsisting_ nature that is _rational_,\n_intelligent_: _Persona est suppositum rationale_. The definition given by\nBo\u00ebtius is classic: \u201c_Persona est substantia individua_ RATIONALIS\n_naturae_\u201d: \u201cthe individual substance of a rational nature,\u201d\u2014where the\nterm _individual_ is understood to imply _actually existing and\nsubsisting_.\n\nThe special name which has thus been traditionally applied to _rational_\nor _intelligent_ subsisting beings (as distinct from animals, plants, and\nmaterial \u201cthings\u201d)\u2014the term \u201cperson\u201d (\u201c_persona_,\u201d a mask: _per-sonus_;\n_cf._ Gr. \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03ad\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, from \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, the face, countenance)\u2014originally\nmeaning a r\u00f4le or character in a drama, came to be applied to the\nsubsisting human individual, and to connote a certain dignity of the\nlatter as compared with the lower or non-rational beings of the universe.\nAnd in fact the ascription of its actions to the subsisting being is more\ndeeply grounded in the subsistence of rational, intelligent beings, who,\nas free agents, can more properly direct and control these actions.(291)\n\n73. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE AND ITS SUBSISTENCE. WHAT\nCONSTITUTES PERSONALITY?\u2014Knowing now what we mean by the terms\n\u201csubsistence,\u201d \u201csuppositum,\u201d \u201cperson,\u201d and \u201cpersonality,\u201d we have next to\ninquire in what precisely does subsistence consist. What is it that\nconstitutes a complete individual nature a \u201csubsisting being,\u201d or if the\nnature be rational, a \u201cperson\u201d? Subsistence connotes, over and above the\nmode of \u201cexisting in itself\u201d which characterizes all substance, the notion\nthat the substance or nature is individual, that it is complete, that it\nis in every way incommunicable, that it is _sui juris_ or autonomous in\nits existence and activities. These notions are all positive; they imply\npositive perfections: even incommunicability is really a positive\nperfection though the term is negative. But is any one of the positive\nperfections, thus contained in the notion of subsistence, a positive\nsomething _over and above_, and _really distinct from_, the perfection\nalready implied in the concept of _a complete individual nature as such_?\n\nSome of those philosophers who regard the distinction between essence and\nexistence in creatures as a real distinction, identify the _subsistence_\nof the complete individual nature with its _actual existence_, thus\nplacing a real distinction between nature and subsistence or\npersonality.(292) Apart from these, however, it is not likely that any\nphilosophers, guided by the light of reason alone, would ever have held,\nor even suspected, that the subsistence of an actually existing individual\nnature is a positive perfection really distinct from, and superadded to,\nthe latter. For we never, in our natural experience, encounter an existing\nindividual substance, or nature, or agent, that is not distinct,\nautonomous, independent, _sui juris_, and incommunicable in its mode of\nbeing and acting.\n\n\n    Rigorously, however, this would only prove that subsistence is a\n    perfection _naturally inseparable_ from the complete individual\n    nature; _conceivably_ it _might_ still be _really_ distinct from\n    the latter. But whether or not such real distinction could be\n    suspected by the unaided light of reason working on natural\n    experience, at all events what we know from Divine Revelation\n    concerning the hypostatic union of the human nature of our Lord\n    Jesus Christ with the Person of the Divine Word, enables us to\n    realize that there _can_ be, in the actual order of things, a\n    complete individual nature which is not a \u201csubsisting being\u201d or\n    \u201cperson\u201d; for the human nature of our Lord is _de facto_ such a\n    nature,\u2014and _ab actu ad posse valet consecutio_. This information,\n    however, is not decisive in determining the character of the\n    distinction between the individual substance or nature and its\n    subsistence.\n\n\nIt may be that the complete individual nature is _eo ipso_ and identically\na \u201csubsisting being\u201d or \u201cperson,\u201d that it is always independent,\nautonomous, _sui juris_, by the very fact that it is a complete individual\nnature, _unless it is_ DE FACTO _assumed into the personality of a higher\nnature_, so that in this intercommunication with the latter, in the unity\nof the latter\u2019s personality, it is not independent, autonomous, _sui\njuris_, but dependent, subordinate, and _alterius juris_. In this\ncondition, it loses nothing positive by the fact that it is not now a\nperson and has not its own subsistence; nor does it gain any _natural_\nperfection, for it was _ex hypothesi_ complete and perfect _as a nature_;\nbut it gains something _supernatural_ inasmuch as it now subsists in a\nmanner wholly undue to it.(293) According to this view, therefore,\nsubsistence would not be a perfection really distinct from the complete\nindividual nature; it would be a mentally distinct aspect of the latter, a\npositive aspect, however, consisting in this nature\u2019s completeness, its\nself-sufficing, autonomous character, and consequent\nincommunicability.(294)\n\n\n    The principal difficulty against this view is a theological\n    difficulty. As formulated by Urraburu,(295) it appears to involve\n    an ambiguity in the expression \u201csubstantial union\u201d. It is briefly\n    this: If the subsistence proper to a complete individual nature\n    adds no positive perfection to the latter, so that the latter\n    necessarily subsists and is a person unless it is actually assumed\n    into a higher personality, and by the very fact that it is not\n    actually so assumed, then the human nature of Christ \u201cis as\n    complete in every way and in every line of substantial perfection,\n    by virtue of its own proper entity, when actually united with the\n    Divine Person, as it would be were it not so united, or as the\n    person of Peter, or Paul, or any other human person is\u201d. But this\n    implies that there are in Christ \u201ctwo substances complete in every\n    respect\u201d. Now between two such substances \u201cthere cannot be a\n    substantial union,\u201d a union which would constitute \u201cone being,\u201d\n    \u201cunum per se ens\u201d. Hence the view in question would appear to be\n    inadmissible.\n\n    But it is not proved that the union of \u201ctwo substances complete in\n    every respect\u201d cannot result in the constitution of a being that\n    is really and genuinely one\u2014\u201cunum per se ens\u201d\u2014_in the case in\n    which the union is a personal union_. The hypostatic union of the\n    human nature of Christ with the Divine Person is primarily a\n    _personal_ union whereby the former nature subsists by and in the\n    Divine Personality. It has the effect of constituting the united\n    terms \u201cone subsisting being,\u201d and therefore has supereminently, if\n    not formally, the effect of a \u201csubstantial union\u201d. Nay, it is a\n    \u201csubstantial\u201d union in the sense that it is a union of two\n    substances, not of a substance and accidents; and also in the\n    sense that it is not a mere accidental aggregation or artificial\n    juxtaposition of substances, resulting merely in the constitution\n    of collective or artificial unity, a _unum per accidens_. But is\n    it a \u201csubstantial\u201d union in the sense that it is such a union of\n    substances as results in one \u201cnature\u201d? Most certainly not; for\n    this was the heresy of the Monophysites: that in Christ there is\n    only one nature resulting from the union of the human nature with\n    the Divine. If then, with Urraburu, we mean by \u201cnature\u201d simply\n    \u201csubstance regarded as a principle of action\u201d (71), and if,\n    furthermore, the hypostatic union does not result in one \u201cnature,\u201d\n    neither does it result in one \u201csubstance,\u201d nor can it be a\n    \u201csubstantial\u201d or \u201cnatural\u201d union in this sense.(296) He does not\n    say, of course, that the hypostatic union is a \u201csubstantial union\u201d\n    which results in \u201cone nature,\u201d or even explicitly that it results\n    in \u201cone substance,\u201d but he says that the two substances are\n    \u201csubstantially conjoined,\u201d \u201csubstantialiter conjunguntur\u201d; and he\n    continues, \u201ca substantial union is such a conjunction of two\n    substantial realities that there results from it one substantial\n    something, which is truly and properly one\u201d\u2014\u201cunio enim\n    substantialis, est talis duarum rerum substantialium conjunctio,\n    per quam resultat unum aliquid substantiale quod vere et proprie\n    sit unum,\u201d(297)\u2014and he concludes that \u201cthere is something\n    substantial wanting in the human nature of Christ, _viz._\n    personality, which, of course, is most abundantly supplied in the\n    hypostatic union by the Divine Person\u201d\u2014\u201creliquum est, ut naturae\n    humanae in Christo aliquid desit substantiale, nempe personalitas,\n    quod per unionem hypostaticam cumulatissime suppleatur a\n    Verbo.\u201d(298) Now, this \u201caliquid substantiale\u201d cannot be \u201caliquid\n    naturale\u201d in the sense that it is something _constitutive_ of the\n    human substance or nature; for the human substance or nature of\n    Christ is certainly complete and perfect as a substance or nature.\n    It must be some complement or mode, that is naturally due to it,\n    but supernaturally supplied by the Person of the Divine Word.(299)\n    This brings us to the view that subsistence is a something\n    positive, distinct in some real way, and not merely in our\n    concepts, from the complete individual substance.\n\n\nAccording to the more common view of catholic philosophers (and\ntheologians) subsistence is some positive perfection really distinct from\nthe complete individual nature. But the supporters of this general view\nexplain it in different ways. We have already referred to the view of\ncertain Thomists who, identifying _subsistence_ with the _actual\nexistence_ of the complete substance or nature, place a real distinction\nbetween the existence and the substance or nature. Other Thomists, while\ndefending the latter distinction, point out that actual existence confers\nno real perfection, but only actualizes the real; they hold, therefore,\nthat subsistence is not existence, but is rather a perfection of the real,\nessential, or substantial order, as distinct from the existential order\u2014a\nperfection presupposed by actual existence, and whose proper function is\nto _unify_ all the substantial constituents and accidental determinations\nof the individual substance or nature, thus making it a really unitary\nbeing\u2014\u201cunum ens per se\u201d\u2014proximately capable of being actualized by the\nsimple existential act: which latter is the ultimate actuality of the real\nbeing: _esse est ultimus actus_.(300)\n\nThe concrete individual nature, containing as it does a plurality of\nreally distinct principles, substantial and accidental, needs some\nunifying principle to make these one incommunicable reality, proximately\ncapable of receiving a corresponding unitary existential act: without such\na principle, they say, each of the substantial and accidental principles\nin the concrete individual nature would have its own existence: so that\nthe result would be not _really_ one being, but a being really _manifold_\nand only accidentally one\u2014\u201cunum per accidens\u201d. This principle is\n_subsistence_.\n\n\n    The human nature of our Divine Lord has not its own connatural\n    subsistence; this is supplied by the subsistence of the Divine\n    Person. Moreover, since the human nature in question has not its\n    own subsistence, neither has it its own existence; existence is\n    the actuality of the subsisting being; therefore there is in\n    Christ but one existence, that of the Divine Person, whereby also\n    the human nature of Christ exists.(301)\n\n\nOf those who deny that the distinction between the existence and the\nessence of any created nature is a real distinction, some hold in the\npresent matter the Scotist view that subsistence is not a positive\nperfection really distinct from the complete individual nature. Others,\nhowever, hold what we have ventured to regard as the more common view:\nthat personality is something positive and really distinct from nature.\nBut they explain what they conceive subsistence to be without any\nreference to existence, and without distinguishing between the essential\nand the existential order of reality.\n\nThe most common explanation seems to be that subsistence is a unifying\nprinciple of the concrete individual nature, as stated above. Thus\nconceived, it is not an _absolute_ reality; nor is the distinction between\nit and the nature a _major_ real distinction. It is a _substantial mode_\n(68), naturally superadded to the substance and modally distinct from the\nlatter. It so completes and determines the substance or nature that the\nlatter not only exists in itself but is also, by virtue of this mode,\nincommunicable in every way and _sui juris_.(302) It gives to the\nsubstance that ultimate determinateness which an accidental mode such as a\ndefinite shape or location gives to the accident of quantity.(303)\n\n\n    This mode is absent (supernaturally) from the human nature of our\n    Divine Lord; this nature is therefore communicable; and the\n    Personality of the Divine Word supernaturally supplies the\n    function of this absent natural mode.\n\n\nIt must be confessed that it is not easy to understand how this or any\nother _substantial_ mode can be _really_ distinct from the substance it\nmodifies. And in truth the distinction is not real in the full sense: it\nis not between _thing_ and _thing_, _inter rem et rem_. All that is\nclaimed for it is that it is not merely mental; that it is not merely an\n_ens rationis_ which the mind projects into the reality; that it is a\npositive perfection of the nature or substance, a perfection which, though\nnaturally inseparable from the latter, is not absolutely inseparable, and\nwhich, therefore, is _de facto_ supernaturally absent from the human\nnature and replaced by the Divine Personality in the case of the\nhypostatic union.\n\nIt belongs, moreover, to the order of substance, not to that of accidents:\nthe substantial mode differs from the accidental mode, or modal accident,\nin this, that it gives to the substance some ultimate determining\nperfection which appertains to the substance as such, and whereby the\nsubstance is completed in the order of \u201cexisting in itself\u201d. Subsistence\nis not an accident, even though it supervenes on the complete nature, for\nit determines the substance of the latter, not in relation to any line of\naccidental activity, as a power or faculty, nor as something modifying it\naccidentally, but as a mode which ultimately determines and perfects it in\nthe order of substantial reality itself, in the order of \u201cexisting in\nitself\u201d in such a full and perfect manner as to be _sui juris_ and\nincommunicable.\n\n\n    The main difficulty against this view is also theological: If\n    subsistence is a positive perfection it either belongs to the\n    complete individual nature or it does not; in the former case the\n    humanity of Christ, assumed by the Divine Word, was not a complete\n    human nature; in the latter case the individual human nature can\n    exist without it: and both consequences are equally inadmissable.\n    But it may be replied that, granting the first member of the\n    disjunctive, the consequence inferred from it does not really\n    follow: subsistence belongs to the complete individual nature as\n    an ultimate natural complement; but when it is absent and supplied\n    supernaturally by the Divine Personality the nature is still\n    complete as a nature: it is wanting in no absolute or entitative\n    perfection, but only in a modality which is supereminently\n    supplied by the Divine Personality. Neither is the consequence\n    from the second member of the disjunctive a valid inference. For\n    though personality as a mode does not belong to the essence of an\n    individual human nature, no such individual nature can exist\n    without _some_ personality, either its own or another: just as\n    extension cannot exist without _some_ shape, though any particular\n    shape is not essential to it.\n\n\nTo sum up, then, the doctrine of the two preceding sections: What are we\nto understand by a _person_, and by _personality_? Unquestionably our\nconception of person and personality (concrete and abstract) is mainly\ndetermined, and very rightly so, by an analysis of what constitutes the\nactually existing individual of the human species. Whatever our concept\nbe, it must certainly be realized and verified in all human individuals:\nthese, before all other beings, must be included in the denotation of our\nconcept of person. In fact, for the philosopher, guided by the natural\nlight of reason alone, the term can have hardly any other connotation. He\nwill, no doubt, ascribe personality, as the highest mode of being he knows\nof, to the Supreme Being; but he will here ascribe it only in an\nanalogical and supereminent way; and only from Divine Revelation can he\nknow that this Supreme Being has not a single but a threefold Personality.\nAgain, his consideration of the nature of the human soul as an embodied\nsubstance which is nevertheless spiritual and immortal will enable him to\naffirm the possibility of _purely spiritual_ created beings; and these he\nwill of course conceive as persons. But, conceiving the human soul itself\nas a constituent principle of the human individual, he will not conceive\nthe soul itself as a person.\n\nThe philosopher who understands the traditional Aristotelian conceptions\nof substance, of individual substance (_substantia prima_), of incomplete,\ncomplete, and composite substances, of substance considered as _nature_ or\nprinciple of action, of substance considered as _hypostasis_, as the\nactually existing individual being which is the ultimate logical subject\nof all predications and the ultimate ontological subject of all real\ndeterminations: the philosopher who understands these concepts, and who\nadmits them to be validly grounded in experience, and to offer as far as\nthey go a correct interpretation of reality, will have no difficulty in\nmaking up his mind about what is requisite to constitute a person.\n\nWherever he finds an existing individual being of any species, a being\nwhich, even if it is really composite, is nevertheless really one, such a\nbeing he will pronounce to be a \u201csubsisting individual being\u201d. He may not\nbe able, in the inorganic world or among the lower forms of life, to\ndistinguish for certain what is the real individual from what may be\nperhaps only an accidental, if natural, colony or group of real\nindividuals. As a test he will always seek for the manifestation of an\ninternal directive principle whereby all the vital functions of the\norganized mass of matter in question are co-ordinated in such a manner as\nto make for the preservation, growth and development of the whole\nthroughout a definite life cycle from birth to death. This formative and\ndirective principle is evidence of an individual unity of nature and\nsubsistence; and such evidence is abundantly present in \u201cindividuals\u201d of\nall the higher species in botany and zoology. The \u201cindividual subsisting\nbeing\u201d will therefore be a \u201ccomplete individual substance or nature,\nexisting and acting in every way distinct from and incommunicable to any\nother being, so that it exists and acts _sui juris_, autonomously\u201d.\n\nIf such an individual nature is not merely corporeal but organic or\nanimate, not merely animate but sentient, and not merely sentient but\n_rational_ or _intelligent_, _i.e._ constituted at least in part by a\n_spiritual substantial principle_ whereby the individual is _intelligent_\nand _free_, then that individual is a person. Every individual of the\nhuman species is such. And all that is essential to his complete\nindividual human nature enters into and constitutes his person in the\nconcrete. Not merely, therefore, his intellect and will; not merely his\nsoul considered as \u201cmind,\u201d _i.e._ as the basis and principle of his whole\nconscious and subconscious psychic life; or also as the principle of his\nmerely organic life; or also as the actualizing principle of his corporeal\nnature; but no less also the corporeal principle itself of his composite\nbeing, the body itself with all its parts and members and organs: all\nthese without exception belong equally to the human person; all of them\nwithout exception go to constitute the _Ego_.(304) This, which is the\nAristotelian and scholastic view of the human person, is in perfect accord\nwith the common-sense view of the matter as evidenced by the ordinary\nusages of language. We speak intelligibly no less than correctly when we\nsay that a man\u2019s body is part of his person as well as his soul or mind.\nAnd we make a no less accurate, intelligible, and necessary distinction,\nwhen we distinguish between all that which _constitutes_ the human person\nand that _whereby we know_ ourselves and other human individuals to be\npersons. Yet this distinction is not kept clearly in mind by many modern\nphilosophers, who, approaching the study of personality exclusively from\nthe side of what the individual consciousness testifies as to the unity\nand continuity (or otherwise) of mental life in the individual, are\nscandalized at the assertion that the human body can have anything to do\nwith human personality.\n\n74. CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PERSONAL SELF.\u2014In order to form the concept of\nperson, and to find that concept verified in the data of our experience,\nit is absolutely essential that we be endowed with the _faculty of\nintelligence_, the spiritual power of forming abstract concepts; and\nsecondly, that having formed the concept of person as a \u201crational or\nintelligent subsisting being,\u201d we be capable, by the exercise of _reflex\nconsciousness_, to find in our own mental life the data from which we can\nconclude that this concept of person is verified in each and every one of\nourselves. It is because we are endowed with intelligence that we can form\nall the abstract notions\u2014of substance, individual, subsistence, existence,\netc.,\u2014which enter into and constitute our concept of person. And it is\nbecause we can, by means of this faculty, reflect on our own mental\noperations, and infer from them that each of us is a complete individual\nrational nature subsisting independently and incommunicably, that we can\nknow ourselves to be persons.\n\nHow the human individual forms these concepts and finds them verified in\nhis own \u201cself,\u201d how he gradually comes into conscious possession of the\nknowledge of his own individual being as an _Ego_, self, or person, are\nproblems for Psychology.(305) It will be sufficient here to point out that\nthere are grounds for distinguishing between the individual\u2019s implicit\nsubjective awareness of his subsistence or \u201cselfhood\u201d\u2014an awareness which\naccompanies all his conscious mental functions, and which becomes more\nexplicit and definite as the power of introspection and reflex\nconsciousness develops\u2014and the \u201c_abstract quasi-objective notion_ of his\nown _personality_ habitually possessed by every human being\u201d.(306)\n\nThe individual human being _immediately_ apprehends his own existence, and\nhis abiding unity or sameness throughout incessantly changing states, in\nthe temporal series of his conscious activities; but his knowledge of the\n_nature_ of his own being can be the result only of a long and carefully\nconducted analysis of his own activities, and of inferences based on the\ncharacter of these activities. The former or implicit knowledge of the\nself in the concrete is direct and intuitive. The individual _Ego_\napprehends _itself_ in _its states_. This knowledge comes mainly from\nwithin, and is subject to gradual development. Father Maher thus describes\nhow the child comes gradually into possession of it:\u2014\n\n\n    As thoughts of pleasures and pains repeated in the past and\n    expected in the future grow more distinct, the dissimilarity\n    between these and the permanent abiding self comes to be more\n    fully realized. Passing emotions of fear, anger, vanity, pride, or\n    sympathy, accentuate the difference. But most probably it is the\n    dawning sense of power to resist and overcome rising impulse, and\n    the dim nascent consciousness of responsibility, which lead up to\n    the final revelation, until at last, in some reflective act of\n    memory or choice, or in some vague effort to understand the\n    oft-heard \u201cI,\u201d the great truth is manifested to him: the child\n    enters, as it were, into possession of his personality, and knows\n    himself as a _Self-conscious Being_. The _Ego_ does not _create_\n    but _discovers_ itself. In Jouffroy\u2019s felicitous phrase, it\n    \u201cbreaks its shell,\u201d and finds that it is _a Personal Agent with an\n    existence and individuality of its own_, standing henceforward\n    alone in opposition to the universe.(307)\n\n\nAfter this stage is reached, the human individual easily distinguishes\nbetween the \u201cself\u201d as the _cause_ or _subject_ of the states, and the\nstates as _modifications_ of the self. This distinction is implicit in the\nconcomitant awareness of self which accompanies all exercise of direct\ncognitive consciousness. It is explicit in all deliberate acts of reflex,\nintrospective self-consciousness. The data from which we form the abstract\nconcepts of substance, nature, individual, person, self, etc., and from\nwhich we arrive by reasoning at a philosophical knowledge of the nature\nand personality of the human individual, are furnished mainly by\nintrospection; but also in part by external observation of the universe\naround us.\n\nConcomitantly, however, with the process by which we become implicitly but\nimmediately aware of the _Ego_ or self as an abiding self-identical person\nin and through our own mental activity, we gradually form a\nquasi-objective and historical view of our own personality as one of a\nnumber of similar personalities around us in the universe. This view, says\nFather Maher,\n\n\n    gathers into itself the history of my past life\u2014the actions of my\n    childhood, boyhood, youth, and later years. Interwoven with them\n    all is the image of my bodily organism, and clustering around are\n    a fringe of recollections of my dispositions, habits, and\n    character, of my hopes and regrets, of my resolutions and\n    failures, along with a dim consciousness of my position in the\n    minds of other selves.\n\n    Under the form of a representation of this composite art, bound\n    together by the thread of memory, each of us ordinarily conceives\n    his complete abiding _personality_. This idea is necessarily\n    undergoing constant modification; and it is in comparing the\n    present form of the representation with the past, whilst adverting\n    to considerable alterations in my character, bodily appearance,\n    and the like, that I sometimes say: \u201cI am completely changed,\u201d \u201cI\n    am quite another person,\u201d though I am, of course, convinced that\n    it is the same \u201cI\u201d who am changed in accidental qualities. _It is\n    because this complex notion of my personality is an abstraction\n    from my remembered experiences __ that a perversion of imagination\n    and a rupture of memory can sometimes induce the so-called\n    _\u201cillusions or alterations of personality\u201d_._(308)\n\n\nWhen we remember that this objective conception of the self is so\ndependent on the function of memory, and that the normal exercise of this\nfaculty is in turn so dependent on the normal functioning of the brain and\nthe nervous system,(309) we can hazard an intelligible explanation of the\nabnormal facts recorded by most modern psychologists concerning hypnotism,\nsomnambulism and \u201cdouble\u201d or \u201cmultiple\u201d consciousness.(310) Father Maher,\nascribing these phenomena partly to dislocations of memory, partly to\nunusual groupings of mental states according to the laws of mental\nassociation\u2014groupings that arise from peculiar physiological connexions\nbetween the various neural functionings of the brain centres,\u2014and partly\nto semi-conscious or reflex nerve processes, emphasizes an important fact\nthat is sometimes lost sight of: the fact that some section at least of\nthe individual\u2019s conscious mental life is common to, and present\nthroughout, the two or more \u201cstates\u201d or \u201cconditions\u201d between which any\nsuch abnormal individual is found to alternate. This consideration is\nitself sufficient to disprove the theory\u2014to which we shall presently\nrefer\u2014that there is or may be in the individual human being a double, or\neven a multiple \u201chuman personality\u201d.\n\n75. FALSE THEORIES OF PERSONALITY.\u2014It is plain that conscious _mental\nactivity_ cannot _constitute_ human personality, or subconscious mental\nactivity either, for all activity is of the accidental mode of being, is\nan _accident_, whereas a person must be a _substance_. Of course it is the\nself-conscious cognitive activity of the human individual that _reveals_\nto the latter his own self as a person: it is the exercise of reflex\nconsciousness combined with memory that gives us the feeling of personal\nidentity with ourselves throughout the changing events of our mental and\nbodily life. Furthermore, this self-consciousness has its root in the\n_rational_ nature of the human individual; and rationality of nature is\nthe differentiating principle which makes the subsisting individual a\n\u201cperson\u201d as distinct from a (subsisting) \u201cthing\u201d. But then, it is not the\nfeeling of personal identity that _constitutes_ the person. Actual\nconsciousness is neither the essence, nor the source, nor even the index\nof personality; for it is only an activity, and an activity which reveals\nimmediately not the _person_ as such, but the _nature_ as rational;(311)\nnor does the rational (substantial) principle of a composite nature\nconstitute the latter a person; but only the subsistence of the complete\n(composite) individual nature itself.\n\nThese considerations are sufficiently obvious; they presuppose, however,\nthe truth of the traditional doctrine already explained in regard to the\nexistence, nature and cognoscibility of _substance_. Philosophers who have\nmisunderstood and rejected and lost this traditional doctrine of substance\nhave propounded many varieties of unsatisfactory and inconsistent theories\nin regard to what constitutes \u201cperson\u201d and \u201cpersonality\u201d. The main feature\nof all such theories is their identification of personality with the\nhabitual consciousness of self, or habitual feeling of personal identity:\na feeling which, however, must be admitted to include _memory_ in some\nform, while the function of memory in any shape or form cannot be\nsatisfactorily explained on any theory of the human _Ego_ which denies\nthat there is a human _substance_ persisting permanently as a unifying\nprinciple of successive mental states (63-4).\n\nSo far as English philosophy is concerned such theories appear to have had\ntheir origin in Locke\u2019s teaching on person and personal identity.\nDiscussing the notions of identity and diversity,(312) he distinguishes\nbetween the identity of an individual substance with itself in its\nduration throughout time, and what he terms personal identity; while by\nidentity in general he means not abstract identity but the concrete\npermanence of a thing throughout time (34). On this we have to call\nattention to the fact that just as _duration_ is not essential to the\n_constitution_ of a substance, so neither is it essential to the\nconstitution of a complete subsisting individual substance or person (64);\nthough it is, of course, an essential condition for all human apprehension\nwhether of substance or of person. Locke was wrong, therefore, in\nconfounding what reveals to us the abiding permanence, identity or\nsameness of a subsisting thing or person (whether the \u201cself\u201d or any other\nsubsisting thing or person) throughout its duration in time, with what\nconstitutes the subsisting thing or person.\n\nFurthermore, his distinction between substantial identity, _i.e._ the\nsameness of an individual substance with itself throughout time, and\npersonal identity or sameness, was also an error. For as long as there is\n_substantial_ unity, continuity, or identity of the subsisting individual\nsubstance, so long is there unity, continuity, or identity of its\nsubsistence, or of its personality if it be a rational substance. The\n_subsistence_ of a complete individual inorganic substance is changed as\nsoon as the individual undergoes _substantial_ change: we have them no\nlonger _the same_ subsisting individual being. So, too, the subsistence of\nthe organic individual is changed as soon as the latter undergoes\n_substantial_ change by the dissolution of life, by the separation of its\nformative and vital substantial principle from its material substantial\nprinciple: after such dissolution we have no longer _the same_ subsisting\nplant or animal. And, finally, the subsistence of an individual man is\nchanged, or interrupted, or ceases by death, which separates his soul, his\nvital principle, from his body. We say, moreover, that in the latter case\nthe human _person_ ceases to exist when the identity or permanence of his\nsubsisting substance or nature terminates at death; for _personal\nidentity_ we hold to be the identity of the complete subsisting substance\nor nature with itself. But Locke, who practically agrees with what we have\nsaid regarding the abiding identity of the subsisting individual being\nwith itself\u2014whether this individual be an inorganic individual, a plant, a\nbrute beast, or a man(313)\u2014distinguishes at this point between identity of\nthe subsisting individual substance and _personal_ identity.\n\nOf identity in general he says that \u201cto conceive and judge of it aright,\nwe must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for; it being\none thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the\nsame person, if person, man, and substance, are three names standing for\nthree different ideas\u201d.(314) And, struggling to dissociate \u201cperson\u201d from\n\u201csubstance,\u201d he continues thus:\u2014\n\n\n    To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what\n    person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent\n    being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as\n    itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places;\n    which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from\n    thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it. When we see,\n    hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know\n    that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and\n    perceptions, and by this every one is to himself what he calls\n    self; it not being considered in this case whether the same self\n    be continued in the same or divers substances. For since\n    consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which\n    makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby\n    distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this\n    alone consists personal identity, _i.e._ the sameness of a\n    rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended\n    backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the\n    identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and\n    it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on\n    it, that that action was done.(315)\n\n\nThe definition of person in this passage as \u201ca thinking, intelligent\nbeing,\u201d etc., is not far removed from our own definition; but surely\nconscious thought is not \u201cthat which _makes_ every one to be what he calls\nself,\u201d seeing that conscious thought is only an _activity_ or _function_\nof the \u201crational being\u201d. It is conscious thought, of course, including\nmemory, that _reveals_ the \u201crational being\u201d to himself as a self, and as\nthe same or identical self throughout time; but unless the \u201crational\nbeing,\u201d or the \u201cthinking, intelligent being, that has reason and\nreflection,\u201d etc.\u2014which is Locke\u2019s own definition of \u201cperson\u201d\u2014were there\nall the time identical with itself, exercising those distinct and\nsuccessive acts of consciousness and memory, and unifying them, how could\nthese acts _even reveal_ the \u201cperson\u201d or his \u201cpersonal identity\u201d to\nhimself, not to speak of their _constituting_ personality or personal\nidentity? It is perfectly plain that these acts _presuppose_ the \u201cperson,\u201d\nthe \u201cthinking, intelligent being,\u201d or, as we have expressed it, the\n\u201csubsisting, rational, individual nature\u201d _already constituted_; and it is\nequally plain that the \u201cpersonal identity\u201d which they _reveal_ is\n_constituted by_, and _consists simply in_, the duration or continued\nexistence of this same subsisting individual rational nature; nor could\nthese acts reveal any identity, personal or otherwise, unless they were\nthe acts of one and the same actually subsisting, existing and persisting\nsubstance.\n\nYet Locke thinks he can divorce personal identity from identity of\nsubstance, and account for the former independently of the latter. In face\nof the obvious difficulty that actual consciousness is not continuous but\nintermittent, he tries to maintain that the consciousness which links\ntogether present states with remembered states is sufficient to constitute\npersonal identity even although there may have intervened between the\npresent and the past states a complete change of substance, so that it is\nreally a different substance which experiences the present states from\nthat which experienced the past states. The question\n\n\n    Whether we are the same thinking thing, _i.e._ the same substance\n    or no ... concerns not personal identity at all: the question\n    being, what makes the same person, and not whether it be the same\n    identical substance, which always thinks in the same person:\n    different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do\n    partake in it), being united into one person, as well as different\n    bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity\n    is preserved, in that change of substances, by the unity of one\n    continued life ... [for] animal identity is preserved in identity\n    of life, and not of substance.(316)\n\n\nHere the contention is that we can have \u201cthe same person\u201d and yet not\nnecessarily \u201cthe same identical substance,\u201d because _consciousness_ may\ngive a personal unity to distinct and successive substances in the\nindividual man just as _animal life_ gives an analogous unity to distinct\nand successive substances in the individual animal. This is very\nsuperficial; for it only substitutes for the problem of human personality\nthe similar problem of explaining the unity and sameness of subsistence in\nthe individual living thing: a problem which involves the fact of _memory_\nin animals. For scholastic philosophers unity of life in the living thing,\ninvolving the fact of memory in animals, is explained by the perfectly\nintelligible and will-grounded teaching that there is in each individual\nliving thing a _formative and vital principle_ which is _substantial_, a\n_forma substantialis_, which unites, in the _abiding self-identical unity\nof a complete individual composite substance_, the material principle of\nthe corporeal substances which thus go, in the incessant process of\nsubstantial change known as metabolism, to form partially, and to support\nthe substantial continuity of, the living individual. While the latter is\nthus in constant process of material, or partial, substantial change, it\nremains, as long as it lives, the same complete individual substance, and\nthis in virtue of the abiding _substantial_ formative and vital principle\nwhich actuates and animates it. The abiding permanence or self-identity of\nthe _subsisting individual substance_ which feels or thinks, and\nremembers, is an intelligible, and indeed the only intelligible, ground\nand explanation of memory, and of our consciousness of personal identity.\n\nBut if we leave out of account this abiding continuity and self-identity\nof the subsisting individual substance or nature, which is the subject,\ncause and agent of these acts of memory and consciousness, how can these\nlatter, in and by themselves, possibly form, or even indeed reveal to us,\nour personal identity? Locke felt this difficulty; and he tried in vain to\nmeet it: in vain, for it is insuperable. He merely suggests that \u201cthe same\nconsciousness ... can be transferred from one thinking substance to\nanother,\u201d in which case \u201cit will be possible that two thinking substances\nmay make [successively] one person\u201d.(317) This is practically his last\nword on the question,\u2014and it is worthy of note, for it virtually\n_substantializes consciousness_. It makes consciousness, which is really\nonly an act or a series of acts, a _something substantial and subsisting_.\nWe have seen already how modern phenomenists, once they reject the notion\nof substance as invalid or superfluous, must by that very fact\nequivalently _substantialize accidents_ (61); for substance, being a\nnecessary category of human thought as exercised on reality, cannot really\nbe dispensed with. And we see in the present context an illustration of\nthis fact. The abiding self-identity of the human person cannot be\nexplained otherwise than by the abiding self-identical subsistence of the\nindividual human substance.\n\nIf personal identity were constituted and determined by consciousness, by\nthe series of conscious states connected and unified by memory, then it\nwould appear that the human being in infancy, in sleep, in\nunconsciousness, or in a state of insanity, is not a human person!\nPhilosophers who have not the hardihood to deny human personality to the\nindividual of the human species in these states, and who on the other hand\nwill not recognize the possession of a _rational nature_ or substance by\nthe subsisting individual as the ground of the latter\u2019s personality and\npersonal identity, have recourse to the hypothesis of a _sub-conscious_,\nor \u201c_sub-liminal_\u201d _consciousness_ in the individual, as a substitute. If\nby this they merely meant an abiding _substantial_ rational principle of\nall mental activities, even of those which may be semi-conscious or\nsub-conscious, they would be merely calling by another name what we call\nthe _rational nature_ of man. And the fact that they refer to this\nprinciple as the sub-conscious \u201cself\u201d or \u201cEgo\u201d shows how insistent is the\nrational need for rooting personality and personal identity in something\nwhich is a _substance_. But they do not and will not conceive it as a\nsubstance; whereas if it is not this, if it is only a \u201cprocess,\u201d or a\n\u201cfunction,\u201d or a \u201cseries\u201d or \u201cstream\u201d of processes or functions, it can no\nmore constitute or explain, or even reveal, personal identity, than a\nseries or stream of _conscious_ states can.(318)\n\nUnable as he was to explain how the same consciousness could persist\nthroughout a succession of really and adequately distinct substances\n(except by virtually substantializing consciousness), Locke nevertheless\npersisted in holding that consciousness and consciousness alone (including\nmemory, which, however, is inexplicable on any other theory than that of a\nsubsisting and persisting substance or nature which remembers),\nconstitutes personality and personal identity. We have dwelt upon his\nteaching mainly because all modern phenomenists try to explain personality\non the same principles\u2014_i.e._ independently of the doctrine of substance.\n\n\n    As a corollary from his doctrine he inferred that if a man\n    completely and irrevocably loses consciousness [or rather memory]\n    of his past life, though he remains the same \u201cman\u201d he is no longer\n    the same \u201cperson\u201d: \u201cif it be possible for the same man to have\n    distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is\n    past doubt the same man would at different times make different\n    persons\u201d;(319) and he goes on in this sense to give a literal\n    interpretation to the modes of speech we have referred to\n    above.(320) He likewise admitted that two or more \u201cpersons,\u201d\n    _i.e._ consciousnesses, can be linked with the same individual\n    human being, or the same individual human soul, alternately\n    appearing and disappearing, giving place successively to one\n    another. When any one of these \u201cpersonalities\u201d or consciousnesses\n    ceases to be actual, it must in Locke\u2019s view cease to be in any\n    sense real: so that there could not be two or more personalities\n    at the same time in the same individual human being. Modern\n    psychologists, however, of the phenomenist school, convinced that\n    sub-conscious mental activities are not only possible, but that\n    the fact of such activities is well established by a variety of\n    experiences, have extended Locke\u2019s conception of personality (as\n    actual consciousness) to embrace groups of mental activities which\n    may emerge only intermittently \u201cabove the threshold of\n    consciousness\u201d. Hence they explain the abnormal cases of double or\n    multiple consciousness already referred to, as being\n    manifestations of really distinct \u201cpersonalities\u201d in one and the\n    same human individual. In normal human beings there is, they say,\n    only one normally \u201cconscious personality\u201d. The sub-conscious\n    mental activities of such an individual they bulk together as\n    forming this individual\u2019s \u201csub-liminal\u201d or \u201csub-conscious\u201d _Ego_\n    or \u201cself\u201d: presumably a distinct personality from the conscious\n    one. In the abnormal cases of \u201cdouble-consciousness\u201d the\n    subliminal self struggles for mastery over the conscious self and\n    is for a time successful: the two personalities thus for a time\n    changing places as it were. In the rarer or more abnormal cases of\n    treble or multiple consciousness, there are presumably three or\n    more \u201cpersonalities\u201d engaged in the struggle, each coming to the\n    surface in turn and submerging the others.\n\n    It is not the fancifulness of this theory that one might object to\n    so much as its utter inadequacy to explain the facts, nay, its\n    utter unintelligibility _on the principles of those who propound\n    it_. For we must not lose sight of the fact that it is propounded\n    by philosophers who purport to explain mental life and human\n    personality without recourse to a _substantial soul_, to any\n    _substantial_ basis of mental life, or indeed to the concept of\n    _substance_ at all: by philosophers who will talk of a mental\n    process without admitting mind or soul as a _substance_ or\n    _subject_ of that process, of a \u201cseries\u201d or \u201cstream\u201d of mental\n    functions or activities without allowing any _agent_ that would\n    exercise those functions, or any _substantial abiding principle_\n    that would unify the series or stream and know it as such;\n    philosophers who regard the _Ego_, \u201cself,\u201d or \u201cperson,\u201d as\n    _nothing other than_ the group or series or stream of mental\n    states, and not as anything of which these are the states; and,\n    finally, who speak of these groups of functions or activities as\n    \u201cpersonalities\u201d\u2014which they describe as \u201cstruggling\u201d with one\n    another\u2014apparently oblivious of the fact that by using such\n    language they are _in their thought at least_ transforming these\n    _activities_ into _agents_, these _states_ into _subjects of\n    states_, in a word, these _accidents_ into _substances_; or else\n    they are making their language and their thought alike\n    unintelligible.(321)\n\n    Of course those numerous modern philosophers who, like James, try\n    to \u201cfind a place for all the experiential facts unencumbered by\n    any hypothesis [like that of an individual substantial soul,\n    presumably] save that of passing states of mind\u201d [_ibid._, p.\n    480], do not really leave these \u201cstates\u201d suspended in mid-air as\n    it were. The imperative need for admitting the reality of\n    substance always ultimately asserts itself: as when James\n    recognizes the necessity of admitting something \u201cmore than the\n    bare fact of co-existence of a passing thought with a passing\n    brain-state\u201d [_Principles of Psychology_, i., p. 346\u2014_apud_ MAHER,\n    _ibid._, p. 483]. Only his speculation as to what constitutes this\n    \u201csomething \u2018more\u2019 which lies behind our mental states\u201d [_ibid._,\n    p. 485] is not particularly convincing: \u201cFor my own part,\u201d he\n    says, \u201cI confess that the moment I become metaphysical and try to\n    define the _more_, I find the notion of some sort of an _anima\n    mundi_ thinking in all of us to be a more promising hypothesis, in\n    spite of all its difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely\n    individual souls\u201d [_ibid._, p. 346\u2014apud MAHER, _ibid._]. This\n    restatement of the medieval pantheistic theory known as Averro\u00efsm,\n    Monopsychism, or the theory of the _intellectus separatus_ [_cf._\n    DE WULF, _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 381 _sqq._], is a\n    somewhat disappointing contribution to Metaphysics from the most\n    brilliant of our modern psychologists. The \u201cdifficulties\u201d of this\n    \u201cmore promising hypothesis\u201d had discredited it a rather long time\n    before Professor James resurrected it [_cf._ criticisms\u2014_apud_\n    MAHER, _ibid._].\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X. SOME ACCIDENT-MODES OF BEING: QUALITY.\n\n\n76. ONTOLOGY AND THE ACCIDENT-MODES OF BEING.\u2014Under the ultimate category\nor _genus supremum_ of Substance experience reveals to us two broadly\ndistinct sub-classes: corporeal substances, \u201cbodies\u201d or \u201cmaterial\u201d things,\nand spiritual substances or \u201cspirits\u201d. Of these latter we have direct\nexperience only of one class, _viz._ _embodied_ spirits or human souls.\nThe investigation of the nature of these belongs to _Psychology_, and from\nthe data of that science we may infer, by the light of reason, the\n_possibility_ of another class of spirits, _viz._ _pure_ spirits, beings\nof whose actual existence we know from Divine Revelation. The existence of\na Supreme Being, Whom we must conceive analogically as substance and\nspirit, is demonstrated by the light of reason in _Natural Theology_. The\ninvestigation of the nature of corporeal substances belongs properly to\n_Cosmology_. Hence in the present treatise we have no further direct\nconcern with the substance-mode of reality;(322) but only with its\naccident-modes, and not with all of these.\n\nNot with all of them; for those which belong properly to spiritual\nsubstances, or properly to corporeal substances, call for special\ntreatment in Psychology and Cosmology respectively. In the main, only such\nspecies of accidents as are common to matter and spirit alike, will form\nthe subject of the remaining portion of the present volume. Only the\nbroader aspects of such categories as Quality, Quantity and\nCausality\u2014aspects which have a more direct bearing on the Theory of Being\nand the Theory of Knowledge in general,\u2014call for treatment in General\nMetaphysics. A more detailed treatment must be sought in other departments\nof Philosophy.\n\n77. NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT CALLED QUALITY.\u2014In the widest sense of the\nterm, _Quality_ is synonymous with _logical attribute_. In this sense\nwhatever can be predicated of a subject, whatever _logically_ determines a\nsubject in any way for our thought is a quality or \u201cattribute\u201d of that\nsubject. In a sense almost equally wide the term is used to designate any\n_real_ determination, whether substantial or accidental, of a subject. In\nthis sense the differential element, or _differentia specifica_,\ndetermines the generic element, or genus, of a substance: it tells us what\n_kind_ or _species_ the substance is: _e.g._ what kind of animal a man is,\n_viz._ rational; what kind of living thing an animal is, _viz._ sentient;\nwhat kind of body or corporeal thing a plant is, _viz._ living. And hence\nscholastics have said of the predicable \u201c_differentia specifica_\u201d that it\nis predicated adjectivally, or as a _quality_, to tell us in _what the\nthing consists_, or what is its nature: differentia specifica praedicatur\n_in quale quid_: it gives us the determining principle of the specific\nnature. Or, again, quality is used synonymously with any _accidental_\ndetermination of a substance. In this sense magnitude, location, action,\netc., though they determine a subject in different accidental ways,\nnevertheless are all indiscriminately said to \u201cqualify\u201d it in the sense of\ndetermining it somehow or other, and are therefore called \u201cqualities\u201d in\nthe wide sense of \u201caccidents\u201d. Hence, again, the scholastics have said\nthat inasmuch as all accidents determine or qualify their subjects, they\nare predicated of these _qualitatively_, and may be called in a wide sense\n\u201cqualifications\u201d or \u201cqualities\u201d: omnia genera accidentium qualificant\nsubstantiam et praedicantur _in quale_.\n\nIt is in this wide sense that we use the term when we say that the\n(specific) nature (or \u201ckind\u201d) of a thing is revealed by its \u201cqualities\u201d;\nfor the nature of a thing is revealed by all its accidents. And when we\ninfer the nature of a thing from its activities, in accordance with the\nmaxim _Qualis est operatio talis est natura_, we must take the term\n\u201c_operatio_\u201d or \u201cactivity\u201d to include the operation of the thing on our\ncognitive faculties, the states of cognitive consciousness thus aroused in\nus, and all the other accidents thus revealed to us in the thing by its\n\u201cknowledge-eliciting\u201d action on our minds.\n\nBut the term _Quality_ has been traditionally restricted, after Aristotle,\nto designate properly one particular category of accidents distinct from\nthe others and from substance.\n\nA definition proper of any _genus supremum_ is of course out of the\nquestion. But it is not easy to give even a description which will convey\nan accurate notion of the special category of Quality, and mark it off\nfrom the other accident-categories. If we say with Aristotle that quality\nis \u201cthat whereby we are enabled to describe _what sort_ (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd, _quale_)\nanything is\u201d(323)\u2014_e.g._ that it is white by whiteness, strong by\nstrength, etc.\u2014we are only illustrating the abstract by the concrete. But\neven this serves the purpose of helping us to realize what quality in\ngeneral means. For we are more familiar with the concrete than with the\nabstract: and we can see a broad distinction between the question: \u201c_What\nsort_ is that thing? _Qualis_ est ista res?\u201d (Quality), and the question:\n\u201c_How large_ is that thing? _Quanta_ est ista res?\u201d (Quantity), or\n\u201c_Where_ is that thing?\u201d (Place), or \u201cWhat is it _doing_? What is\n_happening_ to it?\u201d (_Actio et Passio_), or \u201cWhat does it _resemble_?\u201d\n(_Relation_), etc. This will help us to realize that there are accidental\nmodes of being which affect substances in a different way from all the\nextrinsic denominations of the latter (60), and also in a different way\nfrom Quantity, Relation, and Causality; and these modes of being, whereby\nthe substance is _of such a sort_, or _in such a condition_, we call\n_qualities_. And if we inquire what special kind of _determination_ of the\nsubstance is common to qualities, and marks these off from the other\naccidents, we shall find it to consist in this, that quality is an\naccidental mode of being which so affects the substance that it disposes\nthe latter well or ill in regard to the perfections natural to this\nparticular kind of substance: it _alters_ the latter accidentally by\nincreasing or diminishing its natural perfection. We have seen that no\ncreated substance has all the perfection natural to its kind, _tota simul_\nor _ab initio_ (46); that it fulfils its r\u00f4le in existence by development,\nby tending towards its full or final perfection. The accidental realities\nwhich supervene on its essence, and thus _alter_ its perfection _within\nthe limits of its kind or species_, are what we call qualities. They\ndiversify the substance accidentally in its perfection, in its concrete\nmode of existing and behaving: by their appearance and disappearance they\ndo not change the _essential perfection_ of the substance (46), they do\nnot effect a substantial change; but they change its intermediate,\naccidental perfection; and this qualitative change is technically known\nand described as _alteration_(324) (11).\n\nHence we find _Quality_ described by St. Thomas as the sort of accident\nwhich modifies or disposes the substance in itself: \u201c_accidens\nmodificativum sen dispositivum substantiaein seipsa_,\u201d and by Albertus\nMagnus somewhat more explicitly as \u201cthe sort of accident which completes\nand perfects substance in its existence and activity: _accidens complens\nac perficiens substantiam tarn in existendo quam in operando_\u201d.(325) This\nnotion will be conveyed with sufficient clearness if we describe _Quality_\nas _that absolute accident which determines a substance after the manner\nof an accidental _\u201cdifferentia,\u201d_ affecting the essential perfection of\nthe substance in regard to its existence or to its activity_.\n\nHence (1) the Pure Actuality of the Infinitely Perfect Being cannot admit\nqualities, inasmuch as quality implies only a relative and limited\nperfection; (2) the qualities of a corporeal substance are grounded in the\n_formative_ principle which gives that substance its specific nature and\nis the principle of its tendency and development towards its final\nperfection, whereas its _quantity_ is grounded in its determinable or\n_material_ principle; (3) the _essential_ differentiating principles of\nsubstances\u2014being known to us not intuitively, but only abstractively and\ndiscursively, _i.e._ by inference from the behaviour of these substances,\nfrom the effects of their activities\u2014are often designated not by what\nconstitutes them intrinsically, but by the _accidental perfections_ or\n_qualities_ which are our only key to a knowledge of them. For instance,\nwe differentiate the nature of man from that of the brute beast by\ndescribing the former as _rational_: a term which really designates not\nthe essence or nature itself, but one of its fundamental qualities, _viz._\nthe faculty of reason.\n\n78. IMMEDIATE SUB-CLASSES OF QUALITY AS _Genus Supremum_.\u2014On account of\nthe enormous variety of qualities which characterize the data of our\nexperience, the problem of classifying qualities is not a simple one. Its\ndetails belong to the special sciences and to the other departments of\nphilosophy. Here we must confine ourselves to an attempt at indicating the\nimmediate sub-classes of the _genus supremum_. And in this context it will\nnot be out of place to call attention to a remarkable, and in our view\nquite erroneous, trend of modern thought. It accompanied the advent of\nwhat is known as _atomism_ or _the mechanical conception of the universe_,\na conception much in vogue about half a century ago, but against which\nthere are already abundant evidences of a strong reaction. We refer to the\ninclination of scientists and philosophers to eliminate Quality altogether\nas an ultimately distinct category of human experience, by reducing all\nqualities to _quantity_, _local relations_, and _mechanical_ or _spatial\nmotions_ of matter (_cf._ 11). In this theory all the sensible qualities\nof the material universe would be really and objectively nothing more than\nlocations and motions of the ultimate constituents of perceptible matter.\nAll the chemical, physical and mechanical energies or forces of external\nnature would be purely quantitative dispositions or configurations of\nmatter in motion: realities that could be _exhaustively_ known by\nmathematical analysis and measurement. And when it was found that\n_qualitative_ concepts stubbornly resisted all attempts at elimination, or\nreduction to _quantitative_ concepts, even in the investigation of the\nmaterial universe or external nature, scientists and philosophers of\nexternal nature thought to get rid of them by locating them exclusively in\nthe human mind, and thus pushing them over on psychologists and\nphilosophers of the mind for further and final exorcism. For a time\nextreme materialists, less wise than daring, endeavoured to reduce even\nmind and all its conscious states and processes to a mere subjective\naspect of what, looked at objectively, would be merely matter in\nmotion.(326) It can be shown in Cosmology, Psychology, and Epistemology\nthat all such attempts to analyse qualities into something other than\nqualities, are utterly unsatisfactory and unsuccessful. And we may see\neven from an enumeration of some of the main classes of qualities that\nsuch attempts were foredoomed to failure.\n\nScholastic Philosophy has generally adopted Aristotle\u2019s division of\nqualities into four great groups:(327) (1) \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _habitus vel\ndispositio_; (2) \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, potentia _naturalis vel\nimpotentia_; (3) \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7, _potentiae passivae et\npassiones_; (4) \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74 \u1f22 \u03c3\u03c7\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1, _forma vel figura_. St. Thomas offers the\nfollowing ground for this classification. Since quality, he says,(328) is\nan accidental determination of the substance itself, _i.e._ of the\nperfection of its concrete existence and activity, and since we may\ndistinguish four aspects of the substance: its nature itself as\nperfectible; its intrinsic principles of acting and receiving action,\nprinciples springing from the _formative_, specific constituent of its\nnature; its receptivity of change effected by such action, a receptivity\ngrounded in the determinable or _material_ principle of its nature; and\nfinally its quantity, if it be a corporeal substance,\u2014we can likewise\ndistinguish between (1) _acquired habits or dispositions_, such as health,\nknowledge, virtue, vice, etc., which immediately determine the perfection\nof the substance, disposing it well or ill in relation to its last end;\n(2) intrinsic _natural forces_, _faculties_, _powers of action_,\n_aptitudes_, _capacities_, such as intellect, will, imagination, instinct,\norganic vital forces, physical, chemical, mechanical energies; (3) states\nresulting in a corporeal being from the action of its _milieu_ upon it:\nthe _passions_ and emotions of sentient living things, such as sensations\nof pleasure, pain, anger, etc.; the _sensible qualities_ of matter, such\nas colour, taste, smell, temperature, feel or texture, etc.; and, finally\n(4) the quality of _form or shape_ which is a mere determination of the\nquantity of a corporeal substance.\n\nThis classification is not indeed perfect, for the same individual quality\ncan be placed in different classes when looked at from different\nstandpoints: heat, for instance, may be regarded as a _natural operative\npower_ of a substance in a state of combustion, or as a _sensible quality_\nproduced in that substance by the operation of other agencies. But it has\nthe merit of being an exhaustive classification; and philosophers have not\nsucceeded in improving on it.\n\nQualities of the third and fourth class do not call for special treatment.\nIn the third class, Aristotle\u2019s distinction between \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\n(_qualitates passibiles_) and \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7 (_passiones_) is based upon the\nrelatively permanent or transient character of the quality in question.\nThe transient quality, such as the blush produced by shame or the pallor\nproduced by fear, would be a _passio_;(329) whereas the more permanent\nquality, such as the natural colour of the countenance, would be a\n_passibilis qualitas._ The \u201cpassions\u201d or sensible changes which result\nfrom certain conscious states, and affect the organism of the sentient\nliving being, are included in this class as _passiones_; while the visible\nmanifestations of more permanent mental derangement or insanity would be\nincluded in it as _passibiles qualitates_. We may, perhaps, get a fairly\nclear and comprehensive notion of all that is contained in this class as\n\u201csensible qualities\u201d by realizing that these embrace whatever is the\nimmediate _cause_ or the immediate _result_ of the _sense modification\ninvolved in any act or process of sense consciousness_. Such \u201csensible\nqualities,\u201d therefore, belong in part to the objects which provoke sense\nperception, and in part to the sentient subject which elicits the\nconscious act. One of the most important problems in the Theory of\nKnowledge, and one which ramifies into Cosmology and Psychology, is that\nof determining the precise significance of these \u201csensible qualities,\u201d\u2014and\nespecially in determining whether they are qualities of an extramental\nreality, or merely states of the individual mind or consciousness itself.\n\n_Form_ or _figure_, which constitutes the fourth class of quality, is a\nmode of the quantity of a body, being merely the particular surface\ntermination of its extension or volume. Considered as a mode of abstract\nor mathematical quantity, it belongs to the domain of mathematics.\nConsidered in the concrete body, it is the physical, sensible form, shape,\nor figure, of the latter; and here it may be either natural or artificial,\naccording as it results from the unimpeded action of natural forces or\nfrom these forces as manipulated and directed by intelligent agents. It is\nworthy of special note that while extension or volume is indicative of the\n_material_ principle of corporeal substances, the figure or shape\nnaturally assumed by this volume is determined by their _formative_\nprinciple, and is thus indicative of their specific nature. This is\nalready noticeable in the inorganic world, where many of the chemically\ndifferent substances assume each its own distinctive crystalline form. But\nit is particularly in the domains of botany and zoology that the natural\nexternal form of the living individual organism is recognized as one of\nthe most important grounds of its classification and one of the surest\ntests of its specific nature.(330)\n\n79. HABITS AND DISPOSITIONS.\u2014Every created being is subject to change,\ncapable of development or retrogression, endowed with a natural tendency\ntowards some end which it can reach by a natural process of activity, and\nwhich constitutes for it, when attained, its full and final perfection\n(66). Through this process of change it acquires accidental modes of being\nwhich help it or hinder it, dispose it or indispose it, in the exercise of\nits natural activities, and therefore also in the concrete perfection of\nits nature as tending towards its natural end. Such an accidental mode of\nbeing is acquired by a series of transient actions and experiences,\n_actiones et passiones_: after these have passed away it remains, and not\nmerely as a state or condition resulting from the changes wrought in the\nsubject by these experiences, but as a _disposition_ towards easier\nrepetition of such experiences. Moreover, it may be not a mere transient\ndisposition, but something stable and permanent, not easily removed or\nannulled, a _dispositio difficile mobilis_. And just as it is essentially\nindicative of past actions whereby it was acquired, so, too, the very\n_raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of its actuality is to dispose its subject for further and\nfuture changes, for operations and effects which are not yet actual but\nonly potential in this subject. Such an accidental mode of being is what\nAristotle called \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, and the scholastics _habitus_. With Aristotle, they\ndefine _habit_ as a _more or less stable disposition whereby a subject is\nwell or ill disposed in itself or in relation to other things_: _Habitus\ndicitur dispositio difficile mobilis secundum quam bene vel male\ndisponitur subjectum aut secundum se aut in ordine ad aliud_.(331)\n\nThe difference between a _habit_ (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) and a simple _disposition_\n(\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) is that the former is by nature a more or less _stable_ quality\nwhile the latter is unstable and transient. Moreover, the facilities\nacquired by repeated action of the organs or members of men or animals,\nand the particular \u201cset\u201d acquired by certain tools or instruments from\ncontinued use, are more properly called _dispositions_ than _habits_: they\nare not habits in the strict sense, though they are often called habits in\nthe ordinary and looser usage of common speech. A little reflection will\nshow that _the only proper subjects of natural habits in the strict sense\nare the spiritual faculties of an intelligent and free agent_.\n\nSince all natural habits are acquired by the past activities, and dispose\nfor the future activities, of a being not absolutely perfect, but partly\npotential and partly actual, and subject to change, it follows that only\nfinite beings can have habits. But, furthermore, beings that are not free,\nthat have not control or dominion of their own actions, that have not\nfreedom of choice, are determined by their nature, by a necessary law of\ntheir activity, to elicit the actions which they do actually elicit: such\nbeings are by their nature _determinata ad unumn_; they are confined\nnecessarily to the particular lines of action whereby they fulfil their\nr\u00f4le in the actual order of things. As Aristotle remarks, you may throw\nthe same stone repeatedly in the same direction and with the same\nvelocity: it will never acquire a _habit_ of moving in that direction with\nthat velocity.(332) The same is true of plants and animals; for a habit in\nthe strict sense implies not merely a certain mutability in its subject;\nit implies, and consists in, a stable modification of some power or\nfaculty _which can have its activities directed indifferently in one or\nother of a variety of channels or lines_: the power or faculty which is\nthe proper subject of a habit must be a _potentia dirigibilis vel\ndeterminabilis ad diversa_. Hence merely material powers of action\u2014such as\nthe mechanical, physical and chemical forces of inorganic nature, or the\norganic powers of living bodies, whether vegetative or merely\nsentient,\u2014since they are all _of themselves_, of _their nature_,\ndetermined to certain lines of action, and to these only,\u2014such powers\ncannot become the subjects of habits, of stable dispositions towards one\nline of action rather than another. \u201cThe powers of material nature,\u201d says\nSt. Thomas, \u201cdo not elicit their operations by means of habits, for they\nare of themselves [already adequately] determined to their particular\nlines of action.\u201d(333)\n\nOnly the spiritual faculties of free agents are, then, the proper seat of\nreal habits. Only of free agents can we say strictly that \u201chabit is second\nnature\u201d. Only these can direct the operations of their intellect and will,\nand through these latter the operations of their sense faculties, both\ncognitive and appetitive, in a way conducive to their last end or in a way\nthat deviates therefrom, by attaching their intellects to truth or to\nerror, their wills to virtue or to vice, and thus forming in these\nfaculties stable dispositions or _habits_.(334)\n\nIs there any sense, then, in which we can speak of the sentient (cognitive\nand appetitive) and executive powers of man as the seat of habits? The\nactivities of those faculties are under the control of intellect and will;\nthe acts _elicited_ by the former are _commanded_ by the latter; they are\nacts that issue primarily from the latter faculties; and hence the\ndispositions that result from repetition of these acts and give a facility\nfor further repetition of them\u2014acts of talking, walking, singing, playing\nmusical instruments, exercising any handicraft\u2014are partly, though only\nsecondarily, _dispositions_ formed in these sentient faculties (the\n\u201ctrained\u201d eye, the \u201ctrained\u201d ear, the \u201cdiscriminating\u201d sense of taste, the\n\u201calert\u201d sense of touch in the deaf, dumb, or blind), or in these executive\npowers, whereby the latter more promptly and easily obey the \u201ccommand\u201d of\nthe higher faculties; but they are primarily and principally _habits_ of\nthese higher faculties themselves rendering the latter permanently \u201capt\u201d\nto \u201ccommand\u201d and utilize the subordinate powers in the repetition of such\nacts.(335)\n\nUnquestionably the bodily organs acquire by exercise a definite \u201cset\u201d\nwhich facilitates their further exercise. But this \u201cset\u201d is not something\nthat they can use themselves; nor is it something that removes or lessens\na natural indeterminateness or indifference of these powers; for they are\nnot indifferent: they _must_ act, at any instant, in the _one_ way which\ntheir concrete nature in all its surroundings actually demands. They\nthemselves are only instruments of the higher faculties; these alone have\nfreedom of choice between lines of action; it is only the stable\nmodifications which these acquire, which they themselves can use, and\nwhich _dispose_ them by lessening their indeterminateness, that are\nproperly called habits. There are, therefore, in the organic faculties of\nman _dispositions_ which give facility of action. There are, moreover,\norganic dispositions which dispose the organism not for _action_ but for\nits union with the _formative principle_ or soul: _habituales\ndispositiones materiae ad formam_.(336) Aristotle gives as instances\nbodily health or beauty.(337) But these _dispositiones materiales ad\nformam_ he does not call _habits_, any more than the organic\n_dispositiones ad operationem_ just referred to: and for this reason, that\nalthough all these dispositions have a certain degree of stability in the\norganism\u2014a stability which they derive, moreover, from the soul which is\nthe formative principle that secures the continuity and individual\nidentity of the organism,\u2014yet they are not of themselves, of their own\nnature, stable; whereas the acquired dispositions of the spiritual\nfaculties, intellect and will, rooted as they are in a subject that is\nspiritual and substantially immutable, are of their own nature stable and\npermanent. Nor are all dispositions of these latter faculties to be deemed\nhabits, but only those which arise from acts which give them the special\ncharacter of stability. Hence mere _opinion_ in the intellectual order, as\ndistinct from _science_, or a mere _inclination_ resulting from a few\nisolated acts, as distinct from a _virtue_ or a _vice_ in the moral order,\nare not habits.(338) Habits, therefore, belong properly to the faculties\nof a spiritual substance; indirectly, however, they extend their influence\nto the lower or organic powers dependent on, and controlled by, the\nspiritual faculties.\n\nTo the various dispositions and facilities of action acquired by animals\nthrough \u201ctraining,\u201d \u201cadaptation,\u201d \u201cacclimatization,\u201d etc., we may apply\nwhat has been said in regard to the sense faculties and executive powers\nof the human body. Just as we may regard the internal sense faculties\n(memory, imagination, sense appetite) in man as in a secondary and\nsubordinate way subjects of habits, in so far as these faculties act under\nthe direction and control of human reason and will,(339) so also the\norganic dispositions induced in irrational animals by the direction and\nguidance of human reason may indeed be regarded as extensions or effects\nof the habits that dispose the rational human faculties, but not as\nthemselves in the strict sense habits.(340)\n\nIf, then, habits belong properly to intellect and will, and if their\nfunction is to dispose or indispose the human agent for the attainment of\nthe perfection in which his last end consists, we must naturally look to\n_Psychology_ and _Ethics_ for a detailed analysis of them. Here we must be\ncontent with a word on their origin, their effects, and their importance.\n\nHabits are produced by acts. The act modifies the faculty. If, for\ninstance, nothing remained in our cognitive faculties after each transient\ncognitive act had passed, memory would be inexplicable and knowledge\nimpossible; nor could the repetition of any act ever become easier than\nits first performance. This something that remains is a habit, or the\nbeginning of a habit A habit may be produced by a single act: the mind\u2019s\nfirst intuition of an axiom or principle produces a _habit or habitual\nknowledge_ of that principle. But as a rule it requires a repetition of\nany act, and that for a long time at comparatively short intervals, to\nproduce a _habit_ of that act, a stable disposition whereby it can be\nreadily repeated; and to strengthen and perfect the habit the acts must be\nformed with a growing degree of intensity and energy. Progress in virtue\ndemands sustained and increasingly earnest efforts.\n\nThe natural effect of habit is to perfect the faculty,(341) to increase\nits energy, to make it more prompt to act, and thus to _facilitate_ the\nperformance of the act for which the habit disposes it. It also engenders\nand develops a natural _need_ or _tendency_ or _desire_ to repeat the act,\nand a natural aversion from the acts opposed to the habit. Finally,\naccording as the habit grows, the performance of the act demands less\neffort, calls for less actual attention; thus the habit diminishes the\nfeeling of effort and tends to bring about a quasi-automatic and\nsemi-conscious form of activity.\n\nGood habits are those which _perfect_ the nature of the agent, which\nadvance it towards the realization of its end; bad habits are those which\nretard and prevent the realization of this end. Hence the _ethical_\nimportance, to the human person, of forming, fostering and confirming good\nhabits, as also of avoiding, resisting and eradicating bad habits, can\nscarcely be exaggerated.\n\nThe profound and all-pervading influence of habit in the mental and moral\nlife of man is unfortunately far from being adequately appreciated even by\nthose responsible for the secular, moral and religious education of the\nyoung. This is perhaps mainly due to the fact that the influence of habit\non the conduct of life, enormous as it is in fact, is so secret, so\nlargely unconscious, that it easily escapes notice. Careful reflection on\nour actions, diligent study of the springs of action in our everyday life,\nare needed to reveal this influence. But the more we analyse human conduct\nin ourselves and others, the more firmly convinced we become that human\ncharacter and conduct are _mainly_ dependent on _the formation of habits_.\nHabits are the grand conserving and perfecting\u2014or the terrible undermining\nand destroying\u2014force of life. They are the fruit of our past and the seed\nof our future. In them the words of Leibniz find their fullest\nverification: \u201cthe present is laden with the past and pregnant with the\nfuture\u201d. By forming good habits we escape the disheartening difficulties\nof perpetual beginnings; and thus the labour we devote to the acquisition\nof wisdom and virtue has its first rich recompense in the facility it\ngives us to advance on the path of progress.\n\nIt has been truly and rightly said that all genuine education consists in\nthe formation of good habits.\n\n80. POWERS, FACULTIES AND FORCES.\u2014A natural operative power, faculty, or\nforce (\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2, _potentia_, _facultas_, _virtus agendi_) is a quality\nwhich renders the nature of the individual agent apt to elicit certain\nactions. By _impotence_ or _incapacity_ (\u1f00\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, _impotentia_,\n_incapacitas_) Aristotle meant not an opposite kind of quality, in\ncontradistinction to power or faculty, but only a _power of a weaker\norder_, differing _in degree_, not _in kind_, from the real power which\nrenders an agent proximately capable of acting; such weaker capacities,\nfor instance, as the infant\u2019s power to walk, or the defective eyesight of\nthe aged.\n\nIt is to the individual subsisting person or thing that all the actions\nproceeding from the latter are ascribed: _actiones sunt suppositorum_: the\n\u201c_suppositum_\u201d or person is the _principium_ QUOD _agit_. And it acts in\naccordance with its nature; this latter is the _principium_ QUO _agens\nagit_: the nature is the substance or essence as a principle of the\nactions whereby the individual tends to realize its end. But is a created,\nfinite nature the _immediate_ or _proximate_ principle of its activities,\nso that it is operative _per se_? Or is it only their _remote principle_,\neliciting them not by itself but _only_ by means of _powers_, _faculties_,\n_forces_, which are themselves accidental perfections of the substance and\n_really distinct_ from it, qualities intermediate between the latter and\nits actions, being the _proximate_ principles of the latter?\n\nNo doubt when any individual nature is acted upon by other agencies, when\nit undergoes real change under the influence of its environment, its\n_passive potentiality_ is being so far forth actualized. Moreover when the\nnature itself acts _immanently_, the term of such action remaining within\nthe agent itself to actualize or perfect it, some _passive potentiality_\nof the agent is being actualized. In these cases the nature before being\nthus actualized was really capable of such actualization. This _passive\npotentiality_, however, is itself nothing actual, it implies no actual\nperfection in the nature. But we must distinguish carefully from this\n_passive or receptive potentiality_ of a nature its _active or operative\npowers_\u2014_potentiae operativae_. These may be themselves _actual\nperfections_ in the nature, _accidental_ perfections actually in the\nnature, and perhaps really distinct from it.\n\nThat they are indeed _actual_ perfections of the nature is fairly obvious:\nit is an actual perfection of a nature to be _proximately_ and\n_immediately_, and without any further complement or addition to its\nreality, _capable of acting_; and this is true whether the action in\nquestion be immanent or transitive: if it be immanent, the perfection\nresulting from the action, the term of the latter, will be a perfection of\nthe agent itself, and in this case the agent by virtue of its operative\npower will have had _the capacity of perfecting itself_; while if the\naction be transitive the agent will have had, in virtue of its operative\npower, _the capacity of producing perfections in other things_. In either\ncase such capacity is undoubtedly an actual perfection of the agent that\npossesses it. Hence the truth of the scholastic formula: _Omne agens agit\nin quantum est in_ ACTU, _patiatur vero inquantum est in_ POTENTIA.\n\nFurthermore, all such operative powers are _really distinct from the\nactions_ which immediately proceed from them: this, too, is obvious, for\nwhile the operative power is a stable, abiding characteristic of the\nagent, the actions elicited by means of it are transient.\n\nBut what is the nature of this operative power in relation to the nature\nitself of the agent? It is an actual perfection of this nature. It is,\nmoreover, unlike acquired habits, native to this nature, born with it so\nto speak, naturally inseparable from it. Further still, operative powers\nwould seem to be all _properties_ (69) of their respective natures:\ninasmuch as it is only in virtue of the operative power that the nature\ncan act, and there can be no nature without connatural operations whereby\nit tends to realize the full and _final_ perfection of its being, the\nperfection which is the very _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of its presence in the actual\norder of things. The question therefore narrows itself down to this: Are\noperative powers, which perfect the nature of which they are properties,\nreally distinct from this nature, or are they only virtually distinct\naspects under which we view the nature itself? For example, when we speak\nof intellect and will as being faculties of the human soul, do we merely\nmean that intellect is the soul itself regarded as capable of reasoning,\nand will the soul itself regarded as capable of willing? Or do we mean\nthat the soul is not _by itself_ and _in virtue of its own essence_\ncapable of reasoning and willing; that it can reason and will only through\nthe instrumentality of two realities of the accidental order, really\ndistinct from, though at the same time _necessarily_ rooted in and\nspringing from, the substance of the soul itself: realities which we call\n_powers_ or _faculties_? Or again, when we speak of a man or an animal as\nhaving various _sense faculties_\u2014internal and external, cognitive,\nappetitive, executive\u2014do we merely mean that the living, sentient organism\nis itself directly capable of eliciting acts of various kinds: of\nimagining, desiring, seeing, hearing, etc.? Or do we mean that the\norganism can elicit these various acts only by means of several accidental\nrealities, really distinct from, and inhering in, itself?\n\nIf such operative powers or faculties are naturally inseparable from the\nsubstance in which they inhere, if they are so necessarily consequent on\nthe nature of the latter that it cannot exist without them, are they\nanything more than virtually distinct aspects of the substance itself? On\nthis question, as we have already seen (69), scholastics are not agreed.\nSt. Thomas, and Thomists generally, maintain that intellect and will are\nreally distinct from the substance of the soul, and likewise that the\nsense faculties are really distinct from the substance of the animated\norganism in which they inhere.(342) In this view the distinction is not\nmerely a virtual distinction between different aspects of the soul (or the\norganism) itself, grounded in the variety and complexity of the acts which\nemanate from the latter: the faculties are real entities of the accidental\norder, mediating between the substance and its actions, and involving in\nthe concrete being a plurality which, however, is not incompatible with\nthe real unity of the latter (69).\n\nThe following are some of the arguments urged in proof of a real\ndistinction:\u2014\n\n(_a_) Existence and action are two really distinct actualities; therefore\nthe potentialities which they actualize must be really distinct: for such\nis the transcendental relation between the potential and the actual that\nany potential subject and the corresponding perfection which actualizes it\nmust belong to the same _genus supremum_: the one cannot be a substance\nand the other an accident.(343) Now existence is the actuality of\n_essence_ and action is the actuality of _operative power_ or _faculty_.\nBut action is certainly an accident; therefore the operative power which\nit actualizes must also be an accident, and must therefore be really\ndistinct from the substance of which it is a power, and of which existence\nis the actuality. This line of argument applies with equal force to all\ncreated natures.(344)\n\nIn the Infinite Being alone are operation and substance identical. No\ncreature is operative in virtue of its substance. The actions of a\ncreature cannot be actualizations _of its substance_: _existence_ is the\nactualization of its substance; therefore its actions must be\nactualizations of potentialities which are _accidents_ distinct from its\nsubstance; in other words, of operative powers which belong indeed\nnecessarily to its substance but are really distinct from the latter.\n\nThis argument rests on very ultimate metaphysical conceptions. But not all\nscholastics will admit the assumptions it involves. How, for instance,\ndoes it appear that the created or finite substance as such cannot be\n_immediately_ operative? Even were it immediately operative its actions\nwould still be accidents, and the distinction between Creator and creature\nwould stand untouched. The operative power must be an accident because the\naction which actualizes it, the \u201c_actus secundus_,\u201d is an accident. But\nthe _consequentia_ has not been proved, and it is not self-evident. On the\ntheory of the real distinction, is not the operative power itself an\n_actual perfection_ of the substance, and therefore in some sort an\nactualization of the latter? And yet they are not in the same ultimate\ncategory, _in eodem genere supremo_. The nature which is the potential\nsubject, perfected by the operative power, is a substance, while the\noperative power which perfects the substance by actualizing this\npotentiality is an accident. Of course there is not exactly the same\ncorrelation between substance and operative power as between the latter\nand action. But anyhow the action is in some true sense an actualization\nof the substance, at least through the medium of the power, unless we are\nprepared to break up the concrete unity of the agent by referring the\naction solely to the power of the agent, and isolating the substance of\nthe latter as a sort of immutable core which merely \u201cexists\u201d: a mode of\nconceiving the matter, which looks very like the mistake of reifying\nabstract concepts. And if the action is in any true sense an actualization\nof the substance, we have, after all, a _potentia_ and _actus_ which are\nnot in the same ultimate category.\n\n\n    These considerations carry us, of course, right into what is\n    perhaps the most fundamental of all metaphysical problems: that of\n    the mode in which finite reality is actual. In its concrete\n    actuality every finite real being is essentially subject to\n    change: its actuality is not _tota simul_: at every instant it not\n    only _is_ but is _becoming_: it is a mixture of potentiality and\n    actuality: it is ever really changing, and yet the \u201cit\u201d which\n    changes can in some real degree and for some real space of time\n    persist or endure identical with itself as a \u201csubsisting thing\u201d or\n    \u201cperson\u201d. How, then, are we to conceive aright the mode of its\n    actuality? Take the concrete existing being at any instant of its\n    actuality: suppose that it is not merely undergoing change through\n    the influence of other beings in its environment, or through its\n    own immanent action, but that it is itself \u201cacting,\u201d whether\n    immanently or transitively. If we consider that at this instant\n    its _existence_ is \u201creally distinct\u201d from its _action_ we cannot\n    mean by this that there is in it an unchanging substantial core,\n    which is actually merely \u201cexisting,\u201d and a vesture of active and\n    passive accidental principles, which is just now actual (though\n    always in a state of flux or change) by \u201cacting\u201d or \u201cbeing acted\n    on\u201d.(345) Such a conception would conflict with the truth that the\n    existing substance is ever being really and actually, though\n    accidentally, determined, changed, modified, improved or\n    disimproved, in its total concrete existing reality. Even when\n    these changes are not so profound as to destroy its substantial\n    identity and thus terminate its actuality as an individual being,\n    even when, in other words, they are not substantial, they are none\n    the less real and really affect the substance. Since they are real\n    they necessarily involve the recognition of really distinct\n    principles in the concrete being and preclude the view that the\n    distinctions which we recognize in the ever-changing modes of its\n    actuality, as revealed to us in time and space, are all _merely_\n    conceptual or logical distinctions projected by the mind into what\n    would therefore be in fact a simple and immutable reality. The\n    denial of any real distinction between successive actual states,\n    or between co-existing principles of those states, in any finite\n    being, would lead logically to the Eleatic doctrine, _i.e._ to\n    denial of the reality of change. On the other hand, while\n    recognizing that change is a reality and not a subjective mental\n    illusion, and that real change can be grounded only in a plurality\n    of really distinct principles in the finite individual being, we\n    must at the same time hold that this plurality of really distinct\n    principles in the individual does not destroy a real unity,\n    stability, and self-identical continuity of the individual being\n    in the mode of its actuality throughout time. Not, of course, that\n    this stability or sameness of the individual throughout time is\n    complete and adequate to the exclusion of all real change, but it\n    is certainly a _real_ continuity of one and the same individual\n    being: to deny this would be to remove all permanence from reality\n    and to reduce all real being to flux or change, _i.e._ to the\n    \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c1\u03ad\u03b9 of the Ionian philosopher, Heraclitus.\n\n    We cannot get a true conception of any finite reality by\n    considering it merely from the _static_ point of view, which is\n    the natural standpoint of abstract thought; we must view it also\n    from the _dynamic-kinetic_ standpoint, _i.e._ not merely as an\n    essence or principle of existence, but as a power or principle of\n    action, and of consequent change, evolution, or decay. And the\n    philosophy which is the latest fashion among contemporary systems,\n    that of the brilliant French thinker and writer, Bergson, has at\n    all events the merit of emphasizing this important truth, that if\n    our philosophical analysis of experience is to be fruitful we must\n    try to grasp reality not merely as it presents itself to abstract\n    thought at any section drawn by the latter through the incessant\n    process of its _fieri_ or continuous actualization in time, but\n    also to grasp and analyse as far as possible the _fieri_ or\n    process itself, and bring to light whatever we find that this\n    process implies.\n\n    These considerations may help the student to estimate for himself\n    the value and the limitations of the argument which has suggested\n    them.\n\n\n(_b_) A thing cannot be really identical with a variety of things that are\nreally distinct from one another; but the faculties of the soul are really\ndistinct from one another; therefore they must be really distinct from the\nsubstance of the soul. The minor premiss is supported by these\nconsiderations: The vegetative and sentient operations of the human\nindividual are operations of the living _organism_, while the higher\noperations of rational thought and volition are operations of the _soul\nalone_, the spiritual or immaterial principle in the individual. But the\nimmaterial principle cannot be really and adequately identical with the\nanimated organism. Therefore the _powers_ or _immediate principles_ of\nthese two classes of functions, belonging as they do to two really (though\nnot adequately) distinct substantial principles, cannot be really\nidentical with one of them, _viz._ with the soul itself, the spiritual\nprinciple. Again: The exercise of certain functions by the human\nindividual is subordinate to, and dependent on the previous exercise of\nother functions. For example, actual volition is necessarily dependent and\nconsequent on actual thought: we cannot will or desire any good without\nfirst knowing it as a good. But the immediate principle of any function or\nactivity cannot be dependent on or subordinate to itself. Therefore the\nimmediate principles of such controlling and controlled\nactivities\u2014intellect and will, for example\u2014must be really distinct\nfaculties.(346)\n\n(_c_) Suppose the substance or nature of an agent\u2014the human individual,\nfor instance\u2014were really identical with all its powers or faculties, that\nthese were merely the nature itself viewed under different aspects, so\nthat there would be in reality only one operative power in the individual,\nthen there would be no reason why the individual could not or should not\nat any instant elicit one single action or operation which would be\nsimultaneously an act of thinking, willing, seeing, hearing, etc., _i.e._\nwhich would have at once in itself the modalities of all human activities.\nBut universal experience testifies, on the contrary, that the operations\nof the individual are each of some particular mode only, that he cannot\nelicit every mode of human activity simultaneously, that he never elicits\none single act having a variety of modes. But why could he not, if his\nsubstance or nature itself were the one and only _proximate principle_ of\nall his modes of activity? Because the conditions for the _full and\nadequate_ exercise of this one single or proximate principle (at once\nsubstance and power) are never realized! But it is arbitrary to assume the\nexistence of a power which could never pass fully into the act connatural\nto it. And moreover, even if these conditions are partially realized we\nshould see as a consequence of this some human activity which would\nmanifest _in some degree at least_ all the modalities of the various human\nactions of which we have experience. But we have no experience of a single\nhuman activity manifesting _in any degree_ the modalities of the numerous\nand really distinct human activities which experience reveals to us. Hence\nthe variety of these really distinct modes of activity can be explained\nonly by the fact that the human individual elicits them through proximate\noperative principles or powers which are really distinct from one another\nand from the nature itself of the individual.(347)\n\n\n    The problem of analysing and classifying the forces, faculties, or\n    powers of the subsisting things and persons in the universe of our\n    experience, belongs partly to Cosmology and partly to Psychology.\n    In the latter it becomes mainly a problem of classifying our\n    mental acts, functions, or processes\u2014our states of consciousness.\n    Apart from the question whether or not our mental faculties are\n    really distinct from one another and from the human nature or\n    substance itself of the individual, the problem of their proper\n    classification is important from the point of view of _method_ and\n    of _accurate psychological analysis_. We have seen already (69)\n    that the greatest scholastic philosophers are not unanimous in\n    declaring the distinction to be real. But it is at least a virtual\n    distinction; and even as such it gives rise to the problem of\n    classification. It will be sufficient here to indicate the general\n    principle on which the classification proceeds: Wherever the\n    _acts_ are _adequately distinct_ they proceed from distinct\n    powers; and the acts are adequately distinct when they have\n    adequately distinct _formal objects_.(348) _Potentiae\n    specificantur per actus et objecta._ The operation or act is the\n    correlative of the power or faculty; and the _formal object_ or\n    _term_ of the operation is the _final cause_ of the latter, the\n    end for which it is elicited. On this basis Aristotle and the\n    scholastics distinguish two mental faculties of the higher or\n    spiritual order, intellect and will; and in the lower or sense\n    order of mental life they distinguish one appetitive faculty,\n    sense appetite, and several cognitive sense faculties. These\n    latter comprise the internal sense faculties, _viz._ the _sensus\n    communis_ or unifying and associating sense, the imagination,\n    sense memory, and instinct; and the external sense faculties\n    comprise sight, sound, taste, smell and touch.\n\n\n81. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF QUALITIES.\u2014(_a_) _Qualities __ have\ncontraries_. Health and illness, virtue and vice, science and error, etc.,\nare opposed as contraries. This, however, is not a _property_ of\nqualities; it is not verified in powers, or in forms and figures; and it\nis verified in accidents which are not qualities, _e.g._ in _actio_ and\n_passio_.\n\n(_b_) _Quality is the basis or _\u201cfundamentum\u201d_ of all relations of\nsimilarity and dissimilarity._ This attribute seems to be in the strict\nsense a _property_ of all qualities. Substances are _similar_ in so far as\nthey have the same kind of qualities, _dissimilar_ in so far as they have\ndifferent kinds. _Similarity_ of substances is the main index to _identity\nof nature or kind_; but it must not be confounded with the latter. The\nlatter cannot always be inferred even from a high degree of similarity:\nsome specifically distinct classes of things are very similar to one\nanother. Nor, on the other hand, is full and complete similarity a\nnecessary consequence of identity of nature: individuals of the same\nspecies are often very dissimilar, very unlike one another.\n\n(_c_) _Qualities admit of varying degrees of intensity._ They can increase\nor diminish in the same substance, while numerically (and specifically)\ndistinct substances can have the same kind of quality in different\ndegrees. This is manifest in regard to \u201chabits,\u201d \u201cpassions\u201d and \u201csensible\nqualities\u201d. On the other hand, it is clearly not true of \u201cform\u201d or\n\u201cfigure\u201d. Different individuals can have the same kind of \u201cnatural power\u201d\nin different degrees. One man may be naturally of keener intellect and\nstronger will than another: the _weak_ power was what Aristotle called\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 (_impotentia_). But whether the natural powers of the same\nindividual can _themselves_ increase or decrease in strength or\nintensity\u2014and not merely the _habits_ that affect these powers\u2014is not so\nclear. Operative powers are certainly perfected (or injured) by the\nacquisition of good (or bad) habits. In the view of those who deny a real\ndistinction between natural operative power or faculty and substance, it\nis, of course, the substance itself that is so perfected (or injured).\n\nThis attribute, therefore, is _not_ found in _all_ qualities; but it is\nfound in qualities _alone_, and not in any other category or mode of\nbeing.\n\nHow are we to conceive this variation in intensity, this growth or\ndiminution of any quality, in a substance in which such change takes\nplaces? On this point philosophers are not agreed. By \u201cdegree of\nintensity\u201d\u2014\u201c_intensio vel remissio __ qualitatis_\u201d\u2014we understand the\ndegree (or change of degree) in which the same numerical quality affects\n_the same part_ or _the same power_ of its subject, thus rendering this\npart or power formally more or less \u201cqualified\u201d in some particular way.\nThis is clearly something quite different from the _extension_ of the same\nquality to different parts (or its withdrawal from different parts) of the\nsame extended subject. In a corporeal, extended substance, there can\naccordingly be question of both kinds of change, _intensive_ and\n_extensive_; while in a simple, spiritual substance there can obviously be\nquestion only of _intensive_ change of qualities. And the fact of\nintensive change of qualities is an undeniable fact of experience. In what\nmanner does it take place? Some authors conceive it as an addition or\nsubtraction of _grades_ or _degrees_ of the same quality. Others,\nconceiving qualities as simple, indivisible entities or \u201cforms,\u201d and\nthence denying the possibility of distinct grades of any quality, conceive\nsuch change to take place by this simple entity affecting its subject\n_more or less intimately_, becoming _more or less firmly rooted_, as it\nwere, in its subject.(349) And they explain this more or less perfect mode\nof inherence in a variety of ways, all of which are grounded on certain\ntexts of St. Thomas:(350) the quality receives a new accidental mode\nwhereby it \u201ccommunicates itself to\u201d the subject, and \u201cinforms\u201d the latter,\nmore or less perfectly; or, it is educed more or less fully from the\npotentiality of its subject, thus qualifying the latter in the degree in\nwhich it is educed from, and rooted in, the latter.\n\n\n    These explanations are instructive, as illustrating the view that\n    the actual reality of the accidental mode of being consists in its\n    affecting, determining, the subject in which it inheres. St.\n    Thomas, professing that he can attach no intelligible meaning to\n    addition or substraction of grades,(351) teaches that the habit of\n    charity, for example, can be increased \u201csecundum essentiam\u201d by\n    \u201cinhering more perfectly,\u201d \u201cbeing more firmly rooted\u201d in its\n    subject; for, he says, since it is an accident, \u201cejus esse est\n    inesse. Unde nihil est aliud ipsam secundum essentiam augeri, quam\n    eam magis inesse subjecto, quod est magis eam radicari in\n    subjecto. Augetur ergo essentialiter... ita quod magis ac magis in\n    subjecto esse incipiat.\u201d(352) And elsewhere he concludes with the\n    words: \u201cPonere igitur quod aliqua qualitas non augeatur secundum\n    essentiam, sed augeatur secundum radicationem in subjecto vel\n    secundum intensionem actus, est ponere contradictoria esse\n    simul\u201d.(353)\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI. QUANTITY, SPACE AND TIME.\n\n\n82. ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF QUANTITY.\u2014A detailed study of Quantity,\nincluding Space and Time, and the Aristotelian categories _Ubi_, _Quando_\nand _Situs_, belongs to Cosmology. Here we shall confine ourselves mainly\nto the exposition of certain elementary notions preparatory to such\ndetailed study; and we shall assume the validity of the Scholastic Theory\nof Knowledge: that a real, material world exists independently of our\nminds; that it consists of material substances or bodies, animate and\ninanimate, endowed with the fundamental accident of quantity or extension;\nthat these bodies possess, moreover, many other real accidents such as\nqualities and energies, chemical, physical and mechanical; that they are\nsubject to real change, local, quantitative, qualitative and substantial;\nthat our concepts of space and time, derived from those of extension and\nchange, are not purely subjective or mental forms of cognition, but are\nobjectively valid notions grounded in the reality of the corporeal\nuniverse and giving us a genuine, if inadequate, insight into the nature\nof this reality.\n\nAmong the characteristics recognized by physicists in all perceptible\nmatter\u2014divisibility, commensurability, impenetrability, passivity or\ninertia, subjection to external forces or energies, external extension or\nvolume, internal quantity or mass\u2014there are none more fundamental than\nthose of volume and mass, or extension and quantity.(354) Nowhere,\nhowever, do we find a better illustration of the fact that it is\nimpossible to give a definition proper of any supreme category, or even a\ndescription of it by the aid of any more elementary notions, than in the\nattempts of philosophers to describe _Quantity_. When, for instance, we\ndescribe _external_, _actual_, _local_, or _spatial extension_ as _that\naccident of a corporeal substance or body in virtue of which the latter so\nexists that it has parts outside parts in space_, we have to admit at once\nthat the notions expressed by the terms \u201cparts,\u201d \u201coutside\u201d and \u201cspace\u201d are\nno simpler than the notion of extension itself: in fact our notions of\n\u201cplace\u201d (_locus_) and \u201cspace\u201d (_spatium_) are derived from, and\npresuppose, that of extension. This, however, is no serious disadvantage;\nfor the description, such as it is, indicates what we mean by the terms\n\u201clocal, spatial, external, actual extension,\u201d and declares this latter to\nbe an accident of corporeal substances.\n\nExtension, as it is actually in the concrete body, affected by a variety\nof sensible qualities, is called _physical_ extension; regarded in the\nabstract, apart from these qualities, it is called _geometrical_ or\n_mathematical_ extension: _trina dimensio_, or extension in three\ndimensions, length, breadth and depth. If we abstract from one of these we\nhave extension in _two_ dimensions, _superficial_ extension; if we\nabstract from _two_, we have extension in _one_ dimension, _linear_\nextension; and if we abstract from all three we have the extreme _limiting\nconcept_ of the _mathematical point_. Of these four abstract mathematical\nconcepts, \u201cpoint,\u201d \u201cline,\u201d \u201csurface,\u201d and \u201cvolume,\u201d each expresses the\n_mathematical limitation_ of the succeeding one.\n\nWe cannot conceive a body existing by having parts outside parts in space,\neach part occupying exclusively a place appropriated to itself, unless we\nconceive the body, the corporeal _substance_, as having already a\nplurality of _really distinct_ or _distinguishable_ parts _in itself_, and\nabstracting from all relation to space. The _substance_ must be conceived\nas having a plurality of really distinct or distinguishable _integral_\nparts of itself, before these parts can be conceived as existing _outside_\none another, each in its own place. And the property in virtue of which\nthe corporeal substance has in itself this plurality of distinct integral\nparts, whereby it is _capable_ of occupying space, and of being\nimpenetrable, divisible, measurable, etc., is called _internal_,\n_radical_, _potential quantity_ or _extension_.(355)\n\nThe corporeal substance itself is, of course, _essentially_ composite,\nessentially divisible into two _essential_ constitutive principles, the\npassive, determinable, or material principle (_materia prima_), and the\nspecifying, determining, formative principle (_forma substantialis_). Then\nwe conceive this essentially composite substance as necessarily endowed\nwith the _property_ of _internal quantity_ whereby it is composite in\nanother order: composed of, and divisible into, really distinct _integral_\nparts, each of which is, of course, essentially composite like the whole\nitself.(356) Finally we conceive that the corporeal substance, endowed\nwith this property, has also, as a connatural but really distinct and\nabsolutely separable effect of the latter, the accidental mode of being,\ncalled external or local extension, in virtue of which it actually\noccupies space, and thus becomes the subject of all those qualities\nwhereby it is perceptible to our senses.\n\nWe have next to inquire into the relations between these three distinct\nobjective concepts, corporeal substance, internal quantity, and local or\nexternal extension.\n\n83. CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE, QUANTITY AND EXTENSION.\u2014The corporeal substance\nis an essentially composite substance, resulting from the union of two\ndistinct essential constitutive principles. It exists in itself and is the\nultimate subject of all the determinations whereby it reveals itself to\nour senses. Its actual extension in space is a fundamental mode or\ndetermination of its reality, but it is a mode which is distinct from the\nreality itself of the corporeal substance. Aristotle regarded the\ndistinction as real. In his _Metaphysics_ he declares that the three\ndimensions of bodies are quantities, not substances, that quantity is not\na substance, whereas that in which it ultimately inheres is a\nsubstance;(357) in his _Physics_ he says that substance is of itself\nindivisible and is made divisible by its quantity or extension;(358) in\nhis _De Anima_(359) he observes that [external] quantity is directly\nperceptible by the senses (_sensibile_ per se) while substance is only\nindirectly perceptible (_sensibile_ per accidens):(360) from which it is\ninferred that substance and extension cannot be really identical. Again,\nSt. Thomas argues that a corporeal substance as such, and so far as its\nessence is concerned, is indifferent to greater or less extension in\nspace, that the whole nature or substance of a man, for instance, is\nindifferent to, and independent of, his particular size at any point of\ntime, that while he grows from childhood to manhood it is his external\nquantity that changes, but not his humanity, his human essence, nature, or\nsubstance.(361)\n\nConsiderations such as these, though they do not indeed amount to cogent\nproofs of a real distinction between spatial extension and corporeal\nsubstance, should make any serious philosopher hesitate to identify these\nabsolutely, as Descartes and his followers did when they declared the\nessence of corporeal substance to consist in three dimensions of spatial\nextension. Even looking at the matter from the point of view of natural\nreason alone, and apart altogether from any light that may be thrown upon\nit for the Christian philosopher by Divine Revelation, it is only the\nsuperficial thinker who will conclude that because extension\u2014which reveals\nto his intellect through the medium of external sense perception the\npresence of a corporeal substance\u2014is naturally inseparable from the\nlatter, therefore it is really and absolutely identical with this latter.\nThe philosopher who remembers how little is known for certain about the\nultimate, essential constitution of bodies or corporeal substances, will\nbe slow to conclude that the spatially extended mode of their being enters\ninto the constitution of their essence, and is not rather an accidental\ndetermination whereby these substances have their integral parts dispersed\nor extended in space and thus revealed to the human intellect through\nsense perception.\n\n\n    And if he be a Christian philosopher he will naturally inquire\n    whether any truth of the Christian Revelation will help indirectly\n    to determine the question. Descartes and his followers were\n    Christian philosophers; and hence it was all the more rash and\n    imprudent of them, in spite of what they knew concerning the\n    Blessed Eucharist, to identify the corporeal substance with its\n    spatial extension. They knew that by transubstantiation the bread\n    and wine are changed _substantially_ into the Body and Blood of\n    Christ. But all the _appearances_ or _phenomena_ of bread and wine\n    remain after transubstantiation, the Eucharistic _species_ as they\n    are called, the taste, colour, form, etc., in a word, all the\n    sensible qualities of these substances, including the _extension_\n    in which they immediately inhere. From the revealed truth that the\n    _substances_ disappear, and from the manifest fact that all their\n    _accidents_ remain, Christian philosophers and theologians have\n    rightly drawn the sufficiently obvious inference that the\n    spatially extended quantity, which immediately supports all the\n    other sensible qualities, must be itself an _absolute_ accident\n    not only _really distinct_, but by the absolute power of God\n    _really separable_, from its _connatural substance_, the bread and\n    the wine respectively; and that this extended quantity remains in\n    this state of actual separation miraculously supported by the\n    direct influence of the Divine Omnipotence. And while Christian\n    philosophers who hold this view can defend it from all charges of\n    inconsistency, unreasonableness and impossibility, Descartes and\n    his followers can defend their particular view only by the\n    admission that in the case of the consecrated Eucharist our senses\n    are deceived. In this view, while no accidents of the bread and\n    wine remain objectively, God Himself produces directly in our\n    minds the subjective, mental states which the bread and wine\n    produced before consecration.(362) This gratuitous aspersion is\n    cast on the trustworthiness of sense perception, simply on account\n    of the preconceived theory identifying the corporeal substance\n    with its extension. According to the common view, on the other\n    hand, the senses are not really deceived. That to which they\n    testify is really there, _viz._ the whole collection of natural\n    accidents of bread and wine. It is not the function of the senses,\n    but of the intellect, to testify to the presence of the substance.\n    Of course the unbeliever looking at the consecrated species, or\n    the believer who looks at them not knowing that they have been\n    consecrated, thinks that the substance of bread and the substance\n    of wine are there. Each is deceived intellectually, the one by his\n    unbelief of a truth, the other by his ignorance of a fact. If both\n    knew of the fact of consecration, and if the former believed in\n    the effect of it, neither would be deceived.(363)\n\n    While the Cartesian view is thus open to such serious objections,\n    the only plausible difficulty against the traditional view is that\n    of conceiving how the reality of a merely accidental mode of\n    being, such as extension, can be sustained in the actual order of\n    things apart from its connatural substance, and yet not become\n    itself _eo ipso_ a substance. Needless to say we have no\n    _positive_ conception of the manner in which the Divine\n    Omnipotence thus sustains extension; but since this latter, being\n    an absolute accident, and not a mere modal determination of the\n    substance, has a reality of its own, the miraculous persistence of\n    this reality cannot be shown to be impossible. Nor is it, in this\n    separated condition, itself a substance, for it still retains its\n    natural aptitude for inherence in its connatural substance; and\n    this _aptitude_ alone, not _actual_ inherence, is of its essence\n    as an accident (65): retaining this natural aptitude it cannot\n    possibly become a substance, it cannot be identified with the\n    _substantial_ mode of being which has essentially the very\n    opposite aptitude, that of _existing in itself_.\n\n\nExternal extension, then, is an absolute accident, really distinct from\nthe corporeal substance, and naturally though not absolutely inseparable\nfrom the latter. It is the natural concomitant or consequence of the\n_internal quantity_ whereby the corporeal substance has in itself a\nplurality of distinct integral parts. This _internal quantity_ itself is\neither an aspect of the corporeal substance itself, only virtually\ndistinct from the latter, or else in the strict sense a _property_,\nabsolutely inseparable, if really distinct, from the substance. Natural\nexperience furnishes no example of a corporeal substance actually existing\ndevoid of internal quantity or internal distinction of integral\nparts.(364) But scholastic philosophers are not agreed as to whether the\ncorporeal substance is itself and by its own essence a manifold of really\ndistinct integral parts (in which case internal quantity would be merely\nthe aspect under which the essence is thus regarded as an integral whole\nconstituted by a plurality of distinct integral parts; while, looked at as\nan essence, it would be an essential whole constituted by the union of two\nessential parts or principles)\u2014or whether it is formally constituted an\nintegral whole, not by its essence (which makes it only an essential\nwhole, an essentially composite substance), but by a property really\ndistinct, though necessarily flowing, from this essence, _viz._ internal\nquantity. According to the former view the material principle (_materia\nprima_) of the composite corporeal substance is such that the essence\nresulting from its union with the formative principle (_forma\nsubstantialis_) is necessarily an integral whole with distinguishable\nintegral parts, each of which naturally demands the spatially extended\nmode of being which external extension _de facto_ confers upon it.\nAccording to the latter view, which is that of St. Thomas and his\nfollowers generally, the corporeal substance as such has no mode of\ncomposition other than _essential_ composition: it is not of itself an\n_integral_ whole, compounded of distinct or distinguishable integral parts\n(each of which would be, like the whole, essentially composite): of itself\nit is _indivisible_ into integral parts: it is, therefore, in this order\nof being, simple and not composite. It has, no doubt, by reason of its\nmaterial principle, an absolutely necessary exigence for divisibility into\ndistinct integral parts, for integral composition in other words. But this\nactual integral composition, this actual divisibility, is the formal\neffect of a property really distinct from the substantial essence itself;\nand this property is internal quantity: the connatural, but absolutely\nseparable, complement of this internal quantity being, as in the other\nview, local or spatial extension.\n\nIn both views external extension is an absolute accident of the corporeal\nsubstance; and in the Thomist view internal quantity would also appear to\nbe an absolute accident, and not a mere mode.\n\n\n    It is instructive to reflect how far this scholastic doctrine\n    removes us from the Cartesian view which sets up an absolute\n    antithesis between mind or spirit, and matter or body, placing the\n    essence of the former in _thought_ and that of the latter in\n    _extension_. According to the scholastic view the spiritual\n    substance is an immaterial \u201cactuality\u201d or \u201cform\u201d; it is\n    _essentially simple_, and not like a corporeal substance an\n    _essentially composite_ substance resulting from the union of a\n    formative principle or \u201cform\u201d with a passive, determinable,\n    material principle. And since it is the material principle that\n    demands the property of internal quantity and the accident of\n    external extension, whereby the corporeal substance becomes an\n    integral whole with its parts extended in space, it follows that\n    the spiritual substance, having no material principle in its\n    constitution, is not only _essentially_ simple\u2014to the exclusion of\n    distinct principles of its essence,\u2014but is also and as a\n    consequence _integrally_ simple, to the exclusion of distinct\n    integral parts, and of the extended or characteristically\n    corporeal mode of occupying space. So far there is contrast\n    between the two great substantial modes of finite being, matter\n    and spirit; but the contrast is by no means an absolute\n    antithesis. For if we look at the essence alone of the corporeal\n    substance it is not _of itself_ actually extended in space: in the\n    Thomist view it is not even of itself divisible into distinct\n    integral parts. It differs from spirit in this that while the\n    latter is essentially simple the former is essentially composite\n    and has by reason of this compositeness a natural aptitude for\n    divisibility into parts and for the extension of these parts in\n    space, an aptitude which spirit does not possess. But the\n    corporeal substance _may_ exist without actual extension, and\n    consequently without any of those other attributes such as\n    impenetrability, solidity, colour, etc., through which it is\n    perceptible to our senses. In this condition, how does it differ\n    from spirit? In being essentially composite, and in being perhaps\n    endowed with distinguishable integral parts.(365) But in this\n    condition the essential mode of its being has a relation to space\n    which closely resembles the mode in which spirit exists in space:\n    it is related to space somewhat in the manner in which the soul is\n    in the space occupied by the body\u2014whole in the whole of this space\n    and whole in every assignable portion of this space. So that after\n    all, different as matter and spirit undoubtedly are, the\n    difference between them is by no means that sort of Cartesian\n    chasm which human thought must for ever fail to bridge.\n\n\nBy virtue of its external extension the corporeal substance exists by\nhaving distinguishable parts outside parts in space. We can conceive any\nperceptible volume of matter as being _perfectly continuous_, if it has no\n_actual_ limits or _actual_ distinction of parts within itself, but is\n_one_ individual being _completely filling_ the whole space within its\nouter surface; or _imperfectly continuous_, if while being one and\nundivided it has within its volume pores or interstices, whether these be\nempty or filled with some other sort of matter; or as made up of\n_contiguous_ integral parts if each or these is really distinct and\nactually divided from every other, while each actually touches with its\nouter limits the adjacent limits of the parts lying next to it, so that\nall the internal parts or limits are co-terminous; or as made up of\nseparate, _discrete_ or distant parts no one of which actually touches any\nother.\n\nIt is clear that there must be, in any actually extended volume of matter,\n_ultimate_ parts which are really _continuous_\u2014unless we are to hold, with\ndynamists, that our perception of extension is produced in our minds by\nthe action of extramental points or centres of force which are themselves\n_simple_ or _unextended_. But the physical phenomena of contraction,\nexpansion, absorption, undulatory and vibratory motions accompanying our\nsensations of light, heat and sound, as well as many other physical\nphenomena, all point to the fact that volumes of matter which are\n_apparently_ continuous are really porous: the molecular structure of\nperceptible matter is an accepted physical theory; and scientists also\nuniversally accept as a working hypothesis the existence of an\nimperceptible material medium pervading and filling all real space, though\nthere is no agreement as to the properties with which they suppose this\nhypothetical medium, the \u201cether,\u201d to be endowed.\n\nAgain, as regards the _divisibility_ of extended matter, it is obvious\nthat if we conceive extension in three dimensions _geometrically_,\n_mathematically_ or _in the abstract_, any such volume or extension is\n_indefinitely divisible_ in thought. But if we inquire how far any\nconcrete, actually existing volume of matter is divisible, we know in the\nfirst place that we cannot divide the body of any actual organic living\nthing indefinitely without destroying its life, and so its specific\ncharacter. Nor can we carry on the division of inorganic matter\nindefinitely for want of sufficiently delicate dividing instruments. But\napart from this the science of chemistry points to the fact that every\ninorganic chemical compound has an ultimate individual unit, the chemical\nmolecule, which we cannot sub-divide without destroying the specific\nnature of the compound by resolving it into its elements or into less\ncomplex compounds. Furthermore, each \u201celementary\u201d or \u201cchemically simple\u201d\nbody\u2014such as gold, oxygen, carbon, etc.\u2014seems resolvable into units called\n\u201catoms,\u201d which appear to be ultimate _individual_ units in the sense that\nif their mass _can_ be subdivided (as appears possible from researches\nthat have originated in the discovery of radium) the subdivisions are\nspecifically different kinds of matter from that of the atom so divided.\n\nIn the inorganic world the perceptible mass of matter is certainly not an\n_individual_ being, a _unum per se_, but only a collection of individual\natoms or molecules, a _unum per accidens_. Whether the molecule or the\natom of the chemically elementary body is the \u201cindividual,\u201d cannot be\ndetermined with any degree of certitude. It would appear, however, that\nevery specifically distinct type of inorganic matter, whether compound or\nelementary, requires for its existence a certain minimal volume, by the\nsub-division of which the type is substantially changed; and this is\nmanifestly true of organic or living matter: so that matter _as it\nnaturally exists_ would appear not to be indefinitely divisible.\n\n\n    If in a chemically homogeneous mass of _inorganic_ matter (such as\n    carbon or water) the chemical molecule be regarded as the\n    \u201cindividual,\u201d this cannot be the case in any _organic_, _living\n    thing_, for whatever matter is assimilated into the living\n    substance of such a being _eo ipso_ undergoes substantial change\n    whereby it loses the nature it had and becomes a constituent of\n    the living individual. The _substantial_, \u201c_individual_\u201d unity of\n    the organic living being seems to be compatible not merely with\n    qualitative (structural and functional) heterogeneity of parts,\n    but also with (perhaps even _complete_) spatial separateness of\n    these parts. If the structure of the living body is really\n    \u201cmolecular,\u201d _i.e._ if it has _distances_ between its ultimate\n    integral units, so that these are not in spatial contact, then the\n    fact that the formative, vital principle (_forma substantialis_,\n    _anima_) unifies this material manifold, and constitutes it an\n    \u201cindividual\u201d by actualizing and vitalizing each and all of the\n    material units, spatially separate as they are,\u2014this fact will\n    help us to realize that the _formative principle_ of the composite\n    corporeal substance has not _of itself_ the _spatial_, _extended_\n    mode of being, but that the substance derives the latter from its\n    material principle (_materia prima_).\n\n\n84. PLACE AND SPACE.\u2014From the concept of the volume or actual extension of\na body we pass immediately to that of the \u201cplace\u201d (_locus_) which it\noccupies. We may distinguish between the _internal_ and the _external_\nplace of a body. By the former we understand _the outer (convex) surface\nof the body itself, regarded as a receptacle containing the volume of the\nbody_. If, therefore, there were only one body in existence it would have\nits own internal place: this is independent of other bodies. Not so,\nhowever, the external place; for by the external place of a body we mean\n_the immediately surrounding (concave) surface_, formed by the bodies\nwhich circumscribe the body in question, and _considered formally as an\nimmovable container of this body_. This is a free rendering of Aristotle\u2019s\ndefinition: _Place is the first (or immediate) immovable surface (or\nlimit) of that which contains a body_: _prima immobilis superficies ejus\nquod continet_.(366) If a hollow sphere were filled with water, the inner\nor concave surface of the sphere would be the \u201cexternal place\u201d of the\nwater. Not, however, this surface considered materially, but _formally as\na surface_, so that if the sphere could be removed, and another\ninstantaneously substituted for it, the water would still be contained\nwithin the same _formal_ surface; its _locus externus_ would remain the\nsame. And, again, it is the containing surface considered as _immovable_\nor as circumscribing that definite portion of space, that constitutes the\n_locus externus_ or \u201cexternal place\u201d of the located body: so that if the\nsphere with the water were moved the latter would thereby obtain a new\nexternal location, for though the containing surface be still materially\nand formally the same, it is no longer the same _as a locating_ surface,\nseeing that it now marks off a portion of space different from that marked\noff by it before it was moved.\n\nAristotle\u2019s definition defines what is known as the _proper_ external\nplace of a body. From this we distinguish the _common_ external place or\nlocation of a body: understanding by the latter, or \u201clocus _communis_,\u201d\nthe whole collection of spatial relations of the body in question to all\nthe bodies in its immediate neighbourhood. It is by indicating these\nrelations, or some of them, that we assign the Aristotelian category, or\nextrinsic denomination, _Ubi_.(367)\n\nRegarded ontologically, the internal place of a body is an absolute\naccident: it is the accident which gives the latter concrete volume or\nexternal extension, and it is not really distinct from the latter. The\nexternal place of a body includes in addition the spatial relations of the\nlatter to other bodies, relations grounded in the volumes of those bodies.\n\n\n    It is by reason of these spatial relations with certain bodies,\n    that a being is said to be \u201cpresent\u201d in a certain place. A\n    corporeal extended substance is said to occupy space\n    _circumscriptiv\u00e9_, or by having parts outside parts in the place\n    it occupies. A finite or created spiritual substance is said to\n    occupy space _definitiv\u00e9_ inasmuch as it can naturally exercise\n    its influence only within certain more or less extended spatial\n    limits: as the human soul does within the confines of the\n    body.(368) The Infinite Being is said to occupy space _repletiv\u00e9_.\n    The actual presence of God in all real space, conserving in its\n    existence all created, contingent reality, is called the Divine\n    _Ubiquity_. The perfection whereby God can be present in other\n    worlds and other spaces which He may actualize is called the\n    Divine _Immensity_.\n\n    The local presence of a finite being to other finite beings is\n    itself a positive perfection\u2014based on its actual extension if it\n    be an extended corporeal substance, or on its power of operating\n    within a certain space if it be a spiritual substance. The fact\n    that in the case of a finite being this local presence is itself\n    limited, is at once a corollary and an index of the finiteness of\n    the being in question. Only the Infinite Being is omnipresent or\n    ubiquitous. But every finite being, whether corporeal or\n    spiritual, from the very fact that it exists at all, must exist\n    somewhere or have some _locus internus_, and it must have some\n    local presence if there are other corporeal, extended beings in\n    existence. Thus the _local presence_ of a being is a (finite)\n    perfection which seems to be grounded in the very nature itself of\n    the creature.(369)\n\n\nFrom the concept of _place_ we pass naturally to the more complex and\nabstract notion of _space_. It is, of course, by cognitive processes, both\nsentient and intellectual, that we come into possession of the abstract\nconcept of space. These processes are subjective in the sense that they\nare processes of the individual\u2019s mental faculties. Distinguishing between\nthe processes and the object or content which is brought into\nconsciousness, or put in presence of the mind, by means of them; and\nassuming that this object or content is not a _mere_ form or groove of our\ncognitive activity, not a _mere_ antecedent condition requisite on the\nmental side for the conscious exercise of this activity on its data, but\nthat on the contrary it is, or involves, an objective, extramental reality\napprehended by the mind,\u2014we go on to inquire in what this objective\nreality consists. In approaching the question we must first note that what\nis true of every abstract and universal concept is true of the concept of\nspace, _viz._ that the _abstractness_ and _universality_ (\u201c_intentio\nuniversalitatis_\u201d) of real being, as apprehended by the intellect, are\nmodes or forms of thought, _entia rationis_, logical conditions and\nrelations which are created by thought, and which exist only in and for\nthought; while the reality itself is the object apprehended in these modes\nand under these conditions: _Universale est formaliter in mente et\nfundamentaliter in re_. Now through the concept of space we apprehend a\nreality. Our concept of real space has for its object an actual reality.\nWhat is this reality? If space is real, in what does its reality consist?\nWe answer that the reality which we apprehend through this concept is _the\ntotal amount of the actual extension or magnitude of all created and\ncoexisting bodies_; not, however, this total magnitude considered\nabsolutely and in itself, but _as endowed with real and mutual relations\nof all its parts to one another_,(370) relations which are apprehended by\nus as distances, linear, superficial, and voluminal.\n\nSuch, then, is the reality corresponding to our concept of real and actual\nspace. But no sooner have we reached this concept than we may look at its\nobject in the abstract, remove mentally all limits from it, and conceive\nall extended bodies as actually non-existent. What is the result? The\nresult is that we have now present to our minds the _possibility_ of the\nexistence of extended bodies, and a concomitant imagination image (which\nmemory will not allow us to banish from consciousness) of a vast and\nboundless emptiness, an indefinite and unmeasurable vacuum in which bodies\nwere or may be. The intellectual concept is now not a concept of any\n_actual_ object, but of a mere _possibility_: the possibility of a\ncorporeal, extended universe. This is the concept of what we call _ideal_\nor _possible space_; and like the concept of any other possible reality it\nis derived by us from our experience of actual reality,\u2014in this case from\nour experience of extended bodies as actually existing. The corporeal\nuniverse has not existed from all eternity, but it was possible from all\neternity. When we think of that possibility as antecedent to all creation,\nwe are thinking of bodies, and of their extension, as possible; and the\nconcept of their total extension as possible is the concept of ideal or\npossible space. This concept is, through a psychological necessity,\naccompanied by an imagination image of what we call _imaginary space_: the\nunlimited vacuity which preceded corporeal creation, which would still\npersist were the latter totally annihilated, which reaches out\nindefinitely beyond its actual limits, which imagination pictures for us\nas a receptacle in which bodies may exist but which all the time our\nreason assures us is actually nothing, being really only the known\npossibility of corporeal creatures. This familiar notion of an empty\nreceptacle for bodies is what we have in mind when we think of bodies as\nexisting \u201c_in_ space\u201d. Hence we say that space, as conceived by the human\nmind, is not a mere subjective form of cognition, a mere _ens rationis_,\ninasmuch as our concept has a foundation in reality, _viz._ the actual\nextension of all existing bodies; nor is it on the other hand simply a\nreal entity, because this actual extension of bodies does not really exist\nin the manner in which we apprehend it under the abstract concept of\nspace, as a mere possibility, or empty receptacle, of bodies. Space is\ntherefore an _ens rationis cum fundamento in re_.\n\n\n    A great variety of interesting but abstruse questions arise from\n    the consideration of space; but they belong properly to Cosmology\n    and Natural Theology. For example: Is real space actually infinite\n    in magnitude, or finite? In other words, besides the whole solar\n    system\u2014which is in reality merely one star _plus_ its planets and\n    their satellites,\u2014is there in existence an actually infinite\n    multitude of such stellar worlds? It is not likely that this can\n    ever be determined empirically. Many philosophers maintain that\n    the question must be answered in the negative, inasmuch as an\n    actually infinite multitude is _impossible_. Others, however, deny\n    that the impossibility of an actually infinite multitude can be\n    proved.(371) Again, within the limits of the actual corporeal\n    universe, are there really _vacant_ spaces, or is all space within\n    these limits actually (or even necessarily) filled with an\n    all-pervading ether or corporeal medium of some sort? How would\n    local motion be possible if all space were full of impenetrable\n    matter? How would the real interaction of distant bodies on one\n    another be possible if there were only vacant space between them?\n    Is the _real_ volume or extension of a corporeal substance (as\n    distinct from its _apparent_ volume, which is supposed to include\n    interstices, or spaces not filled with that body) actually or\n    necessarily unchangeable? Or is the internal quantity of a body\n    actually or necessarily unchangeable? Can more than one individual\n    corporeal substance simultaneously occupy exactly the same space?\n    (This is not possible naturally, for impenetrability is a natural\n    consequence of local extension; but it is possible miraculously\u2014if\n    all the bodies, or all except one, be miraculously deprived of\n    local or spatial extension.) Can the same individual body be\n    present at the same time in totally different and distant places?\n    (Not naturally, of course; but how it can happen even miraculously\n    is a more difficult question than the preceding one. It is in\n    virtue of its actual or local extension that a body is present\n    sensibly in a definite place. Deprived miraculously of this\n    extension it can be simultaneously in several places, as our\n    Blessed Lord\u2019s Body is in the Eucharist. But if a body has its\n    natural local extension at one definite place, does this extension\n    so confine its presence to this place that it cannot be\n    simultaneously present\u2014miraculously, and without its local\n    extension\u2014at other places? The most we can say is that the\n    absolute impossibility of this is neither self-evident nor capable\n    of cogent proof. The Body of our Lord has its natural local\n    extension in heaven\u2014for heaven, which will be the abode of the\n    glorified bodies of the blessed after the general resurrection,\n    must be not merely a state or condition, but a place\u2014and at the\n    same time it is sacramentally present in many places on earth.)\n\n\n85. TIME: ITS APPREHENSION AND MEASUREMENT.\u2014If the concept of space is\ndifficult to analyse, and gives rise to some practically insoluble\nproblems, this is still more true of the concept of time. \u201cWhat, then, is\ntime?\u201d exclaims St. Augustine in his _Confessions_.(372) \u201cIf no one asks\nme, I know; but if I am asked to explain it, then I do not know!\u201d We reach\nthe notion of space through our external perception of _extension_ by the\nsenses of sight and touch. So also we derive the notion of time from our\nperception of _motion_ or _change_, and mainly from our consciousness of\nchange and succession in our own conscious states. The concept of time\ninvolves immediately two other concepts, that of _duration_, and that of\n_succession_. Duration, or continuance in existence, is of two kinds,\n_permanent_ and _successive_. Permanent duration is the duration of an\n_immutable_ being, formally and in so far as it is immutable. Successive\nduration is the continued existence or duration of a being that is\n_subject_ to change, formally and in so far as it is mutable. Now real\nchange involves a continuous _succession_ of real states, it is a\ncontinuous _process_ or _fieri_; and it is the duration of a being subject\nto such change that we call _time_ or _temporal duration_. Had we no\nconsciousness of change, or succession of states, we could have no notion\nof time; though we might have a notion of unchanging duration if _per\nimpossibile_ our cognitive activity were itself devoid of any succession\nof conscious states and had for its object only unchanging reality. But\nsince our cognitive activity is _de facto_ successive we can apprehend\npermanent or unchanging duration, not as it is in itself, but only after\nthe analogy of successive or temporal duration (86). The continuous series\nof _successive states involved in change_ is, therefore, the real and\nobjective content of our notion of time; just as the _co-existing_ total\nof _extension_ forms the content of our notion of space. The concept of\nspace is the concept of something static; that of time is the concept of\nsomething kinetic. Time is the continuity of change: where there is change\nthere is time; without change time would be inconceivable. Change involves\nsuccession, and succession involves the temporal elements of \u201cbefore\u201d and\n\u201cafter,\u201d separated by the indivisible limiting factor called the \u201cnow\u201d or\n\u201cpresent instant\u201d. The \u201cpast\u201d and the \u201cfuture\u201d are the two _parts_ of\ntime, while the \u201cpresent instant\u201d is not a part of time, but a _point of\ndemarcation_ at which the future flows into the past. Change is a reality;\nit is a real mode of the existence of mutable things; but neither the\nimmediately past state, nor the immediately future state of a changing\nreality, are actual at the present instant: it is only to the permanent,\nabiding mind, apprehending real change, and endowed with memory and\nexpectation, that the past and the future are actually (and, of course,\nonly _ideally_, not _really_) present. And it is only by holding past and\nfuture in present consciousness, by distinguishing mentally between them,\nby counting or measuring the continuous flow of successive states from\nfuture to past, through the present instant, that the mind comes into\npossession of the concept of time.(373) The mind thus apprehends time as\nthe measure of the continuous flow of successive states in things subject\nto change. As thus apprehended, time is not merely the reality of change:\nit is the successive continuity or duration of change considered as a\nmeasure of change. It is that within which all changes are conceived to\nhappen: just as space is conceived as that within which all extended\nthings are conceived to exist. We have said that without real change or\nmotion there could be no time. We can now add that without a mind to\napprehend and measure this motion there could be no time. As St. Thomas\ndeclares, following Aristotle: _Si non esset anima non esset tempus_.(374)\nFor time, as apprehended by means of our abstract and universal concept,\nis not simply a reality, but a reality endowed with logical relations, or,\nin other words, a logical entity grounded in reality, an _ens rationis cum\nfundamento in re_.\n\nThis brings us to Aristotle\u2019s classic definition,(375) which is at once\npithy and pregnant: \u03a4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f53\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd: _Tempus est numerus motus secundum prius et\nposterius_: Time is the measure of motion or change by what we conceive as\n_before_ and _after_, or _future_ and _past_, in its process. Every change\ninvolves its own intrinsic flow of states from future to past. It is by\nmentally distinguishing these states, and by thus computing, counting,\nnumbering, the continuous flow or change, that we derive from the latter\nthe notion of time.(376) If, then, we consider all created things, all\nthings subject to change, we shall realize that real time commenced with\nthe creation of the first of them and will continue as long as they (or\nany of them) continue to exist. We thus arrive at a conception of time in\ngeneral, analogous to that of space: _the whole continuous series of\nsuccessions, in changing things, from future to past, regarded as that in\nwhich these changes occur, and which is the measure of them_.\n\nHere, too, as in the case of space, we can distinguish _real time_, which\nis the total duration of actual changes, from _ideal or imaginary time_\nwhich is the conceived and imagined duration of merely possible changes.\n\nBut a more important distinction is that between _intrinsic_ or _internal\ntime_, or the duration of any concrete mutable reality considered in\nitself, and _extrinsic_ or _external time_, which is some other extrinsic\ntemporal duration with which we compare, and by which we may measure, the\nformer duration. Every change or motion has its own internal time; and\nthis is what we have been so far endeavouring to analyse. If two men start\nat the same instant to walk in the same direction, and if one walk three\nmiles and the other four, while the hands of a watch mark the lapse of an\nhour, the _external time_ of each walk will be the same, will coincide\nwith one and the same motion of the hands of the watch used as a measure.\nBut the internal time of the four-mile walk will be greater than that of\nthe three-mile walk. The former will be a greater amount of change than\nthe latter; and therefore its internal time, estimated by this amount\nabsolutely, will be greater than that of the latter estimated by its\namount absolutely.(377) The greater the amount of a change the greater the\ninternal time-duration or series of successive states which measures this\nchange absolutely.(378)\n\nJust as the category _Where_ is indicated by the spatial relations of a\nbody to other bodies, so the category _When_ is indicated, in regard to\nany event or process, by its commensuration or comparison with other\nevents or processes.\n\nThis brings us to the notion of measurement. To measure anything\nquantitatively is to apply to it successively some quantitative unit taken\nas a standard and to count the number of times it contains this unit. This\nis a process of mentally breaking up continuous quantity or\n_magnitude_\u2014whether permanent or successive, _i.e._ whether extension or\nmotion\u2014into discontinuous quantity or _multitude_. If the measurement of\npermanent quantity by spatial units, and the choosing of such units, are\ndifficult processes,(379) those of measuring successive quantity and\nfixing on temporal units are more difficult still. Is there any natural\nmotion or change of a general character, whereby we can measure\n(externally) the time-duration of all other changes? The motions of the\nearth itself\u2014on its axis and around the sun\u2014at once suggest themselves.\nAnd these motions form in fact the _natural_ general standard for\nmeasuring the time of all other events in the universe. All _artificial_\nor mechanical devices, such as hour-glasses, watches, clocks,\nchronometers, etc., are simply contrivances for the more convenient\napplication of that general and natural standard to all particular events.\n\nIt requires a little reflection to realize that all our means of measuring\ntime-duration can only attain to _approximate_ accuracy, inasmuch as our\nfaculties of sense perception, no matter by what devices they are aided,\nare so limited in range and penetration that fluctuations which fall below\nthe _minima sensibilia_ cannot be detected. It is a necessary condition of\nany motion used as a standard for time-measurement that it be _regular_.\nThat the standard motions we actually employ are _absolutely_ regular we\nhave no guarantee. We can test their regularity only up to the point at\nwhich our power of detecting irregularity fails.\n\nReflection will also show that our appreciation of time-duration is also\n_relative_, not absolute. It is always a comparison of one flow or current\nof conscious experiences with another. It is the greater regularity of\nastronomical motions, as compared with changes or processes experienced as\ntaking place within ourselves, that causes us to fix on the former as the\nmore suitable standard for the measurement of time. \u201cThere is indeed,\u201d\nwrites Father Maher,(380) \u201ca certain rhythm in many of the processes of\nour organic life, such as respiration, circulation, and the recurrent\nneeds of food and sleep, which probably contribute much to our power of\nestimating duration.... The irregular character and varying duration of\nconscious states, however, soon bring home to us the unfitness of these\nsubjective phenomena to serve as a standard measure of time.\u201d Moreover,\nour estimate of duration is largely dependent on the nature of the\nestimated experiences and of our mental attitude towards them: \u201cA period\nwith plenty of varied incident, such as a fortnight\u2019s travel, passes\nrapidly _at the time_. Whilst we are interested in each successive\nexperience we have little spare attention to notice the duration of the\nexperience. There is almost complete lapse of the \u2018enumerating\u2019 activity.\nBut _in retrospect_ such a period expands, because it is estimated by the\nnumber and variety of the impressions which it presents to recollection.\nOn the other hand a dull, monotonous, or unattractive occupation, which\nleaves much of our mental energy free to advert to its duration, is\nover-estimated whilst taking place. A couple of hours spent impatiently\nwaiting for a train, a few days in idleness on board ship, a week confined\nto one\u2019s room, are often declared to constitute an \u2018age\u2019. But when they\nare past such periods, being empty of incident, shrink up into very small\ndimensions.... Similarly, recent intervals are exaggerated compared with\nequal periods more remote. Whilst as we grow older and new experiences\nbecome fewer and less impressive, each year at its close seems shorter\nthan its predecessor.\u201d(381)\n\n\n    From those facts it would seem perfectly legitimate to draw this\n    rather surprising inference: that if the rate of _all_ the changes\n    taking place in the universe were to be suddenly and\n    simultaneously altered in the same direction\u2014all increased or all\n    diminished in the same degree\u2014and _if our powers of perception\n    were simultaneously_ so altered as to be _readjusted to this new\n    rate_ of change, _we could not become aware of the\n    alteration_.(382) Supposing, for instance, that the rate of motion\n    were doubled, the same amount of change would take place in the\n    new day as actually took place in the old. The _external or\n    comparative_ time of all movements\u2014that is to say, the time of\n    which alone we can have any appreciation\u2014would be the same as of\n    old. The new day would, of course, appear only half as long as the\n    old to a mind not readjusted to the new conditions; but this would\n    still be external time. But would the _internal_, _intrinsic_ time\n    of each movement be unaltered? It would be the same for the\n    readjusted mind as it was previously for the mind adjusted to\n    these previous conditions. By an unaltered mind, however, by the\n    Divine Mind, for instance, the same amount of motion would be seen\n    to constitute the same movement under both conditions, but to take\n    place twice as quickly under the new conditions as it did under\n    the old. This again, however, involves a comparison, and thus\n    informs us merely of external or relative time. If we identify\n    intrinsic time with _amount of change_, making the latter the\n    measure of the former, we must conclude that alteration in the\n    _rate_ of a motion does not alter its absolute time: and this is\n    evident when we reflect that the very notion of a _rate_ of motion\n    involves the comparison of the latter with some other motion.(383)\n    Finally, we have no positive conception of the manner in which\n    time duration is related to, or known by, the Divine Eternal Mind,\n    which is present to all time\u2014past, present and future.\n\n    Besides the question of the relativity of time, there are many\n    other curious and difficult questions which arise from a\n    consideration of time-duration, but a detailed consideration of\n    them belongs to Cosmology. We will merely indicate a few of them.\n    How far is time _reversible_, at least in the case of purely\n    mechanical movements?(384) Had time a beginning? We know from\n    Revelation that _de facto_ it had. But can we determine by the\n    light of reason alone whether or not it _must_ have had a\n    beginning? The greatest philosophers are divided as to possibility\n    or impossibility of _created_ reality existing _from all\n    eternity_. St. Thomas has stated, as his considered opinion, that\n    the impossibility of _creatio ab aeterno_ cannot be proved. If a\n    series of creatures could have existed successively from all\n    eternity, and therefore without any _first_ term of the series,\n    this would involve the possibility of an _actually infinite\n    multitude_ of creatures; but an actually infinite multitude of\n    creatures, whether existing simultaneously or successively, is\n    regarded by most philosophers as being self-contradictory and\n    intrinsically impossible. And this although the Divine Essence,\n    being infinitely imitable _ad extra_, and being clearly\n    comprehended as such by the Divine Mind, contains virtually the\n    Divine exemplars of an infinite multitude of possible creatures.\n    Those who defend the possibility of an actually infinite multitude\n    of creatures consider this fact of the infinite imitability of the\n    Divine Essence as the ground of this possibility. On the other\n    hand, those who hold that an actually infinite multitude is\n    self-contradictory deny the validity of this argument from\n    possibility to actuality; and they bring forward such serious\n    considerations and arguments in favour of their own view that this\n    latter has been at all times much more commonly advocated than the\n    former one.(385) Will time have an end? All the evidence of the\n    physical sciences confirms the truth of the Christian faith that\n    external time, as measured by the motions of the heavens, will\n    have an end. But the internal or intrinsic time which will be the\n    measure of the activities of immortal creatures will have no\n    end.(386)\n\n\n86. DURATION OF IMMUTABLE BEING: ETERNITY.\u2014We have seen that _duration_ is\nthe perseverance or continuance of a being in its existence. The duration\nof the Absolutely Immutable Being is a positive perfection identical with\nthe essence itself of this Being. It is a duration without beginning,\nwithout end, without change or succession, a _permanent_ as distinct from\na _successive_ duration, for it is the duration of the Necessary Being,\nwhose essence is Pure Actuality. This duration is eternity: _an\ninterminable duration existing all together_. _Aeternitas est\ninterminabilis duratio tota simul existens._ This is the common definition\nof eternity in the proper sense of the term\u2014absolute or necessary\neternity. The word \u201c_interminabilis_\u201d connotes a _positive_ perfection:\nthe exclusion of beginning and end. The word \u201c_tota_\u201d does not imply that\nthe eternity has parts. The expression \u201c_tota simul_\u201d excludes the\nimperfection which is characteristic of time duration, _viz._ the\n_succession_ of \u201cbefore\u201d and \u201cafter\u201d. The definition given by Bo\u00ebtius(387)\nemphasizes these points, as also the indefectible character of immutable\nlife in the Eternal Being: _Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul\net prefecta possessio_.\n\nThere is, in the next place, a kind of duration which has been called\n_hypothetical_, _relative_, or _borrowed_ eternity: _aeternitas\nhypothetica_, _relativa_, _participata_, also called by scholastics\n\u201c_aeviternitas_\u201d. It is the duration in existence of a being that is\ncontingent, but _of its nature incorruptible, immortal_, such as the human\nsoul or a pure spirit. Even if such a being existed from all eternity its\nexistence would be contingent, dependent on a real principle distinct from\nitself: its duration, therefore, would not be eternity in the strict\nsense. On the other hand, once created by God, its nature would demand\nconservation without end; nor could it naturally cease to exist, though\nabsolutely speaking it could cease to exist were God to withdraw from it\nHis conserving power. Its duration, therefore, differs from the duration\nof corporeal creatures which are by nature subject to change, decay, and\ncessation of their being. A contingent spiritual substance has by nature a\nbeginning to its duration, or at least a duration which is not essential\nto it but dependent on the Necessary Being, a duration, however, which is\nnaturally without end; whereas the duration of the corporeal being has by\nnature both a beginning and an end.\n\n\n    But philosophers are not agreed as to the nature and ground of the\n    distinction between these two kinds of duration in contingent\n    beings. No contingent being is self-existent, neither has any\n    contingent being the principle of its own duration in its own\n    essence. Just as it cannot begin to exist of itself, so neither\n    can it continue to exist of itself. At the same time, granted that\n    it has obtained from God actual existence, some kind or degree of\n    duration, of continuance in that existence, seems to be naturally\n    due to its essence. Otherwise conservation would be not only\n    really but formally a continued creation. It is such indeed on the\n    part of God: in God there is no variety of activity. But on the\n    part of the creature, the preservation of the latter in existence,\n    and therefore some degree of duration, seems to be due to it on\n    the hypothesis that it has been brought into existence at all. The\n    _conserving_ influence of God is to its duration in existence what\n    the _concurring_ influence of God is to the exercise of its\n    activities.(388) In this sense the duration of a finite being in\n    existence is a positive perfection which we may regard as a\n    property of its nature. But is this perfection or property of the\n    creature which we call _duration_, (_a_) essentially _successive_\n    in all creatures, spiritual as well as corporeal? And (_b_) is it\n    really identical with their actual existence (or with the reality\n    of whatever change or actualization occurs to their existence), or\n    it is a _mode_ of this existence or change, really distinct from\n    the latter and conferring upon the latter the perfection of\n    continuity or persistence?\n\n    This, at all events, is universally admitted: that _we_ cannot\n    become aware of any duration otherwise than through our\n    apprehension of _change_; that we have direct knowledge only of\n    _successive_ duration; that we can conceive the _permanent_\n    duration of immutable reality only after the analogy of successive\n    duration, or as the co-existence of immutable reality with the\n    successive duration of mutable things.\n\n    Now some philosophers identify successive duration with change,\n    and hold that successive duration is formally the duration of\n    things subject to change; that in so far as a being is subject to\n    change its duration is successive, and in so far as it is free\n    from change its duration approaches the essentially permanent\n    duration of the Eternal, Immutable Being; that therefore the\n    duration of corporeal, corruptible, mortal beings is _par\n    excellence_ successive or temporal duration (_tempus_); that\n    spiritual beings, which are substantially immutable, but\n    nevertheless have a successive series of spiritual activities,\n    have a sort of duration more perfect, because more permanent, than\n    mere temporal duration, but less perfect, because less permanent,\n    than eternal duration (_aevum_, _aeviternitas_); while the\n    Absolutely Immutable Being alone has perfect permanent duration\n    (_aeternitas_).(389) It is not clear whether according to this\n    view we should distinguish between the duration of spiritual\n    _substances_ as permanent, and that of their _acts_ as successive;\n    or why we should not attribute _permanent_ duration to corporeal\n    _substances_ and their _permanent accidents_, confining successive\n    duration formally to motion or change itself. It is, moreover,\n    implied in this view that duration is not any really distinct\n    perfection or mode superadded to the actuality of the being that\n    endures.\n\n    Other philosophers hold that _all_ duration of _creatures_ is\n    _successive_; that no individual creature has a mixture of\n    permanent and successive duration; that this successive duration\n    is really distinct from that which endures by means of it; that it\n    is really distinct even from the reality of change or motion\n    itself; that it is a _real mode_ the formal function of which is\n    to confer on the enduring reality a series of _actualities in the\n    order of_ \u201c_succession of posterior to prior_,\u201d a series of\n    intrinsic _quandocationes_ (analagous to the intrinsic locations\n    which their extension confers upon bodies in space). These\n    philosophers distinguish between _continuous_ or (indefinitely)\n    _divisible_ successive duration, the (indefinitely divisible)\n    parts of which are \u201cpast\u201d and \u201cfuture,\u201d and the present not a\n    \u201cpart\u201d but only an \u201cindivisible limit\u201d between the two parts; and\n    _discontinuous_ or _indivisible_ successive duration, whose parts\n    are separate and indivisible units of duration succeeding one\n    another discontinuously: each part being a real but indivisible\n    duration, so that besides the parts that are _past_ and _future_,\n    the _present_ is also a _part_, which is\u2014like an instant of\n    time\u2014indivisible, but which is also\u2014unlike an instant of time\u2014a\n    real duration. The former kind of successive duration they ascribe\n    to corporeal, corruptible creatures; the latter to spiritual,\n    incorruptible creatures. This view is defended with much force and\n    ingenuity by De San in his _Cosmologia_;(390) where also a full\n    discussion of most of the other questions we have touched upon\n    will be found.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII. RELATION; THE RELATIVE AND THE ABSOLUTE.\n\n\n87. IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESENT CATEGORY.\u2014An analysis of the concept of\n_Relation_ will be found to have a very direct bearing both on the Theory\nof Being and on the Theory of Knowledge. For the human mind knowledge is\nembodied in the mental act of judgment, and this is an act of\n_comparison_, an act whereby we _relate_ or _refer_ one concept to\nanother. The act of cognition itself involves a relation between the\nknowing subject and the known object, between the mind and reality.\nReality itself is understood only by our mentally recognizing or\nestablishing relations between the objects which make up for us the whole\nknowable universe. This universe we apprehend not as a multitude of\nisolated, unconnected individuals, but as an _ordered whole_ whose parts\nare _inter-related_ by their mutual _co-ordinations_ and _subordinations_.\nThe _order_ we apprehend in the universe results from these various\ninter-relations whereby we apprehend it as a _system_. What we call a _law\nof nature_, for instance, is nothing more or less than the expression of\nsome constant relation which we believe to exist between certain parts of\nthis system. The study of _Relation_, therefore, belongs not merely to\nLogic or the Theory of Knowledge, but also to the Theory of Being, to\nMetaphysics. What, then, is a relation? What is the object of this mental\nconcept which we express by the term _relation_? Are there in the known\nand knowable universe of our experience _real_ relations? Or are all\nrelations _merely logical_, pure creations of our cognitive activity? Can\nwe classify relations, whether real or logical? What constitutes a\nrelation formally? What are the properties or characteristics of\nrelations? These are some of the questions we must attempt to answer.\n\nAgain, there is much ambiguity, and not a little error, in the use of the\nterms \u201cabsolute\u201d and \u201crelative\u201d in modern philosophy. To some of these\nsources of confusion we have referred already (5). It is a commonplace of\nmodern philosophy, a thing accepted as unquestioned and unquestionable,\nthat we know, and can know, only the relative. There is a true sense in\nthis, but the true sense is not the generally accepted one.\n\nConsidering the order in which our knowledge of reality progresses it is\nunquestionable that we first simply perceive \u201cthings\u201d successively, things\nmore or less _similar_ or _dissimilar_, without realizing _in what_ they\nagree or differ. To realize the latter involves _reflection_ and\n_comparison_. Similarly we perceive \u201cevents\u201d in succession, events some of\nwhich _depend on_ others, but without at first noting or realizing this\ndependence. In other words we apprehend at first _apart from their\nrelations_, or _as absolute_, things and events which are really relative;\nand we do so spontaneously, without realizing even that we perceive them\nas absolute.\n\nThe seed needs soil and rain and sunshine for its growth; but these do not\nneed the seed. The turbine needs the water, but the water does not need\nthe turbine. When we realize such facts as these, _by reflection_,\ncontrasting what is dependent with what is independent, what is like or\nunlike, before or after, greater or less than, other things, with what\neach of these is in itself, we come into conscious possession of the\nnotion of \u201cthe relative\u201d and oppose this to the notion of \u201cthe absolute\u201d.\n\nWhat we conceive as dependent we conceive as relative; what we conceive,\nby negation, as independent, we conceive as absolute. Then by further\nobservation and reflection we gradually realize that what we apprehended\nas independent of certain things is dependent on certain other things;\nthat the same thing may be independent in some respects and dependent in\nother respects. The rain does not depend on the seed which it causes to\ngerminate, but it does depend on the clouds. The water which turns the\nturbine does not depend on the turbine, but it does depend on the rain;\nand the rain depends on the evaporation of the waters of the ocean; and\nthe evaporation on the solar heat; and this again on chemical and physical\nprocesses in the sun; and so on, as far as sense experience will carry us:\nuntil we realize that everything which falls directly within this sense\nexperience is dependent and therefore relative. Similarly, the accident of\nquantity, in virtue of which we pronounce one of two bodies to be _larger_\nthan the other, is something _absolute_ as compared with this _relation_\nitself; but as compared with the substance in which it inheres, it is\ndependent on the latter, or _relative_ to the latter, while the substance\nis _absolute_, or free from dependence on it. But if substance is absolute\nas compared with accident, in the sense that substance is not dependent on\na subject in which to inhere, but exists _in itself_, it is not absolute\nin the sense understood by Spinoza, in the sense of existing _of itself_,\nindependently of any efficient cause to account for its origin (64). All\nthe substances in the universe of our direct sense experience are\ncontingent, dependent _ab alio_, and therefore in this sense relative, not\nabsolute.\n\nThis is the true sense in which relativity is an essential note of the\nreality of all the data of the world of our sense experience. They are all\ncontingent, or relative, or conditioned existences. And, as Kant rightly\ntaught, this experience forces us inevitably to think of a Necessary,\nAbsolute, Unconditioned Being, on whom these all depend. But, as can be\nproved in _Natural Theology_ against Kant, this concept is not a mere\nregulative idea of the reason, a form of thought whereby we systematize\nour experience: it is a concept the object of which is not merely a\nnecessity of thought but also an objectively existing reality.(391)\n\n\n    But in the thought of most modern philosophers relativism, or the\n    doctrine that \u201cwe can know only the relative,\u201d is something very\n    different from all this. For positivists, disciples of Auguste\n    Comte (1798-1857), it means that we can know only the phenomena\n    which fall under the notice of our senses, and the laws of\n    resemblance, succession, etc., according to which they occur. All\n    \u201ctheological\u201d quests for supra-mundane causes and reasons of these\n    events, and all \u201cmetaphysical\u201d quests for suprasensible forces,\n    powers, influences, in the events themselves, as explaining or\n    accounting for these latter, are according to this theory\n    necessarily futile: the mind must rest content with a knowledge of\n    the _positive facts_ of sense, and their relations. Relativism is\n    thus another name for Positivism.\n\n    For the psychological sensism of English philosophers from Hobbes\n    [1588-1679] and Locke [1632-1704] down to Mill [1806-73] and Bain\n    [1818-1903] relativism means that all conscious cognition\u2014which\n    they tend to reduce to modes and complexes of _sensation_\u2014must be,\n    and can only be, a cognition of the changing, the transitional,\n    the relative.(392) According to an extreme form of this theory the\n    mind can apprehend only relations, but not the terms of any of\n    these relations: it can apprehend nothing as absolute. Moreover\n    the relations which it apprehends it creates itself. Thus all\n    reality is reduced to a system of relations. For Mill the supreme\n    category of real being was _Sensation_: but sensation can be only\n    a feeling of a relation: thus the supreme category of real being\n    would be _Relation_.(393)\n\n    But the main current of relativism is that which has issued from\n    Kant\u2019s philosophy and worked itself out in various currents such\n    as Spencer\u2019s Agnosticism, Hegel\u2019s Monism, and Renouvier\u2019s\n    Neo-criticism.(394) The mind can know only what is related to it,\n    what is present to it, what is in it; not what is apart from it,\n    distinct from it. The mind cannot know the real nature of the\n    extramental, nor even if there be an extramental real. Subject and\n    object in knowledge are really one: individual minds are only\n    self-conscious phases in the ever-evolving reality of the One Sole\n    Actual Being.\n\n    These are but a few of the erroneous currents of modern\n    relativism. A detailed analysis of them belongs to the _Theory of\n    Knowledge_. But it may be pointed out here that they are erroneous\n    because they have distorted and exaggerated certain profound\n    truths concerning the scope and limits of human knowledge.\n\n    It is true that we have no positive, proper, intuitive knowledge\n    of the Absolute Being who is the First Cause and Last End of the\n    universe; that all our knowledge of the nature and attributes of\n    the Infinite Being is negative, analogical, abstractive. In a\n    certain sense, therefore, He is above the scope of our faculties;\n    He is Incomprehensible. But it is false to say that He is\n    Unknowable; that our knowledge of Him, inadequate and imperfect as\n    it is, is not genuine, real, and instructive, as far as it goes.\n\n    Again, a _distinct_ knowledge of any object implies _defining_,\n    _limiting_, _distinguishing_, _comparing_, _relating_, _judging_;\n    _analysing and synthesizing_. It implies therefore that we\n    apprehend things _in relations_ with other things. But this\n    supposes an antecedent, if indistinct, apprehension of the\n    \u201cthings\u201d themselves. Indeed we cannot help pronouncing as simply\n    unintelligible the contention that all knowledge is of relations,\n    and that we can have no knowledge of things as absolute. How could\n    we become aware of relations without being aware of the terms\n    related? Spencer himself admits that the very reasoning whereby we\n    establish the \u201crelativity of knowledge\u201d leads us inevitably to\n    assert as necessary the existence of the non-relative, the\n    Absolute:(395) a necessity which Kant also recognizes.\n\n    Finally, the fact that reality, in order to be known, must be\n    present to the knowing mind\u2014or, in other words, that knowledge\n    itself is a relation between object and subject\u2014in no way\n    justifies the conclusion that we cannot know the real nature of\n    things as they are in themselves, absolutely, but only our own\n    subjective, mental impressions or representations of the absolute\n    reality, in itself unknowable.(396) The obvious fact that any\n    reality in order to be known must be related to the knowing mind,\n    seems to be regarded by some philosophers as if it were a\n    momentous discovery. Then, conceiving the \u201cthing-in-itself,\u201d the\n    absolute, as a something standing out of all relation to mind,\n    they declare solemnly that we cannot know the absolute: a\n    declaration which may be interpreted either as a mere truism\u2014that\n    we cannot know a thing without knowing it!\u2014or as a purely\n    gratuitous assertion, that besides the world of realities which\n    reveal themselves to our minds there is another world of\n    unattained and unattainable \u201cthings-in-themselves\u201d which are as it\n    were the _real_ realities! These philosophers have yet to show\n    that there is anything absurd or impossible in the view that there\n    is simply one world of realities\u2014realities which exist absolutely\n    in themselves apart from our apprehension of them and which in the\n    process of cognition come into relation with our minds.(397)\n    Moreover, if besides this world of known and knowable realities\n    there were such a world of \u201ctranscendental\u201d things-in-themselves\n    as these philosophers discourse of, such a world would have very\n    little concern for us,(398) since by definition and _ex hypothesi_\n    it would be _for us_ necessarily as if it were not: indeed the\n    hypothesis of such a transcendental world is self-contradictory,\n    for even did it exist we could not think of it.\n\n    The process of cognition has indeed its difficulties and\n    mysteries. To examine these, to account for the possibility of\n    truth and error, to analyse the grounds and define the scope and\n    limits of human certitude, are problems for the _Theory of\n    Knowledge_, on the domain of which we are trenching perhaps too\n    far already in the present context. But at all events to conceive\n    reality as absolute in the sense of being totally unrelated to\n    mind, and then to ask: Is reality so transformed in the very\n    process of cognition that the mind cannot possibly apprehend it or\n    represent it as it really is?\u2014this certainly is to misconceive and\n    mis-state in a hopeless fashion the main problem of Epistemology.\n\n\n88. ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF RELATION.\u2014Relation is one of those ultimate\nconcepts which does not admit of definition proper. And like other\nultimate concepts it is familiar to all. Two lines, each measuring a yard,\nare _equal_ to each other _in length_: _equality_ is a _quantitative_\nrelation. The number 2 is _half_ of 4, and 4 is _twice_ 2: _half_ and\n_double_ express each a _quantitative_ relation of _inequality_. If two\ntwin brothers are _like_ each other we have the _qualitative_ relation of\n_resemblance_ or _similarity_; if a negro and a European are _unlike_ each\nother we have the _qualitative_ relation of _dissimilarity_. The steam of\nthe locomotive moves the train: a relation of _efficient causality_, of\nefficient cause to effect. The human eye is adapted to the function of\nseeing: a relation of _purpose_ or _finality_, of means to end. And so on.\n\nThe objective concept of relation thus establishes a _conceptual unity_\nbetween a pair of things in the domain of some other category. Like\nquantity, quality, _actio_ and _passio_, etc., it is an ultimate mode of\nreality as apprehended through human experience. But while the reality of\nthe other accident-categories appertains to substances considered\nabsolutely or in isolation from one another, the reality of this category\nwhich we call _relation_ appertains indivisibly to two (or more) together,\nso that when one of these is taken or considered apart from the other (or\nothers) the relation formally disappears. Each of the other (absolute)\naccidents is formally \u201csomething\u201d (\u201c_aliquid_\u201d; \u201c\u03c4\u03b9\u201d), whereas the formal\nfunction of _relation_ is to refer something \u201cto something\u201d else (\u201c_ad\naliquid_\u201d; \u201c\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u201d). The other accidents formally inhere in a subject,\n\u201chabent _esse in_ subjecto\u201d; relation, considered formally as such, does\nnot inhere in a subject, but gives the latter a respect, or bearing, or\nreference, or ordination, _to_ or _towards_ something else: \u201crelatio dat\nsubjecto respectum vel _esse ad_ aliquid aliud\u201d. The length of each of two\nlines is an _absolute_ accident of that line, but the _relation_ of\nequality or inequality is intelligible only of both together. Destroy one\nline and the relation is destroyed, though the other line retains its\nlength absolutely and unaltered. And so of the other examples just given.\nRelation, then, considered formally as such, is not an absolute accident\ninhering in a subject, but is a reference of this subject to some other\nthing, this latter being called the _term_ of the relation. Hence relation\nis described by the scholastics as the _ordination or respect or reference\nof one thing to another_: _ordo vel respectus vel habitudo unius ad\naliud_. The relation of a subject to something else as term is formally\nnot anything absolute, \u201c_aliquid_\u201d in that subject, but merely refers this\nsubject to something else as term, \u201c_ad aliquid_\u201d. Hence Aristotle\u2019s\ndesignation of relation as \u201c\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9,\u201d \u201c_ad aliquid_,\u201d \u201cto or towards\nsomething\u201d. \u201cWe conceive as relations [\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9],\u201d he says, \u201cthose things\nwhose very entity itself we regard as being somehow _of_ other things or\n_to_ another thing.\u201d(399)\n\nTo constitute a relation of whatsoever kind, three elements or factors are\nessential: the _two extremes_ of the relation, viz. the _subject_ of the\nrelation and the _term_ to which the subject is referred, and what is\ncalled the _foundation_, or basis, or ground, or reason, of the relation\n(_fundamentum_ relationis). This latter is the cause or reason on account\nof which the subject bears the relation to its term. It is always\nsomething absolute, in the extremes of the relation. Hence it follows that\nwe may regard any relation in two ways, either _formally_ as the actual\nbond or link of connexion between the extremes, or _fundamentally_, _i.e._\nas in its cause or foundation in these extremes. This is expressed\ntechnically by distinguishing between the relation _secundum esse in_ and\n_secundum esse ad_, _i.e._ between the absolute entity of its foundation\nin the subject and the purely relative entity in which the relation itself\nformally consists. Needless to say, the latter, whatever it is, does not\nadd any _absolute entity_ to that of either extreme. But in what does this\nrelative entity itself consist? Before attempting an answer to this\nquestion we must endeavour to distinguish, in the next section (89),\nbetween _purely logical_ relations and relations which are in some true\nsense _real_. Here we may note certain corollaries from the concept of\nrelation as just analysed.\n\nRealities of which the objective concept of relation is verified derive\nfrom this latter certain _properties_ or special characteristics. The\n_first_ of these is _reciprocity_: two related extremes are as such\nintelligible only in reference to each other: father to son, half to\ndouble, like to like, etc., and _vice versa_: _Correlativa se invicem\nconnotant_. The _second_ is that things related to one another are\ncollateral or concomitant in _nature_: _Correlativa sunt simul natura_:\nneither related extreme is as such naturally prior to the other. This is\nto be understood of the relation only in its _formal_ aspect, not\nfundamentally. Fundamentally or _materialiter_, the cause for instance is\n_naturally prior_ to its effect. The _third_ is that related things are\nconcomitant _logically_, or in the order of knowledge: _Correlativa sunt\nsimul cognitione_: a reality can be known and defined as relative to\nanother reality only by the simultaneous cognition of both extremes of the\nrelation.\n\n89. LOGICAL RELATIONS.\u2014Logical relations are _those which are created by\nour own thought, and which can have no being other than the being which\nthey have in and for our thought_. That there are such relations, which\nare the exclusive product of our thought-activity, is universally\nadmitted. The mind can reflect on its own direct concepts; it can compare\nand co-ordinate and subordinate them among themselves; it thus forms ideas\nof relations between those concepts, ideas which the scholastics call\n_reflex_ or _logical_ ideas, or \u201c_secund\u00e6 intentiones mentis_\u201d. These\nrelations are _entia rationis_, purely logical relations. Such, for\ninstance, are the relations of _genus_ to _species_, of predicate to\nsubject, the relations described in Logic as the _pr\u00e6dicabilia_. Moreover\nwe can compare our direct universal concepts with the individual realities\nthey represent, and see that this feature or mode of _universality_ in the\nconcept, its \u201c_intentio universalitatis_\u201d is a _logical relation_ of the\nconcept to the reality which it represents: a logical relation, inasmuch\nas its _subject_ (the concept) and its _foundation_ (the _abstractness_ of\nthe concept) are in themselves pure products of our thought-activity.\nFurthermore, we are forced by the imperfection of the thought-processes\nwhereby we apprehend reality\u2014conception of _abstract_ ideas, _limitation_\nof concepts in extension and intension, _affirmation_ and _negation_,\netc.\u2014to apprehend _conceptual_ limitations, negations, comparisons, etc.,\nin a word, all _logical entities_, as if they were _realities_, or after\nthe manner of realities, _i.e._ to conceive what is really \u201cnothing\u201d as if\nit were really \u201csomething,\u201d to conceive the _non-ens_ as if it were an\n_ens_, to conceive it _per modum entis_ (3). And when we compare these\nlogical entities with one another, or with real entities, the relations\nthus established by our thought are all _logical relations_. Finally, it\nfollows from this same imperfection in our human modes of thought that we\nsometimes understand things only by attributing to these certain logical\nrelations, _i.e._ relations which affect not the reality of these things,\ntheir _esse reale_, but only the mode of their presence in our minds,\ntheir _esse ideale_ (4).\n\n\n    In view of the distinction between logical relations and those we\n    shall presently describe as real relations, and especially in view\n    of the prevalent tendency in modern philosophy to regard all\n    relations as merely logical, it would be desirable to classify\n    logical relations and to indicate the ways in which they are\n    created by, or result from, our thought-processes. We know of no\n    more satisfactory analysis than that accomplished by St. Thomas\n    Aquinas in various parts of his many monumental and enduring\n    works. In his _Commentaries on the Sentences_(400) he enumerates\n    four ways in which logical relations arise from our\n    thought-processes. In his _Quaestiones Disputatae_(401) he reduces\n    these to two: some logical relations, he says, are invented by the\n    intellect reflecting on its own concepts and are attributed to\n    these concepts; others arise from the fact that the intellect can\n    understand things only by relating, grouping, classifying them,\n    only by introducing among them an _arrangement_ or _system of\n    relations_ through which alone it can understand them, relations\n    which it could only erroneously ascribe to these things as they\n    really exist, since they are only projected, as it were, into\n    these things by the mind. Thus, though it consciously thinks of\n    these things as so related, it deliberately abstains from\n    asserting that these relations really affect the things\n    themselves. Now the mistake of all those philosophers, whether\n    ancient, medieval or modern, who deny that any relations are real,\n    seems to be that they carry this abstention too far. They contend\n    that all relations are simply read into the reality by our\n    thought; that none are in the reality in any true sense\n    independently of our thought. They thus exaggerate the r\u00f4le of\n    thought as a _constitutive_ factor of known or experienced\n    reality; and they often do so to such a degree that according to\n    their philosophy human thought not merely _discovers_ or _knows_\n    reality but practically _constitutes_ or _creates_ it: or at all\n    events to such a degree that cognition would be mainly a process\n    whereby reality is assimilated to mind and not rather a process\n    whereby mind is assimilated to reality. Against all such idealist\n    tendencies in philosophy we assert that not all relations are\n    logical, that there are some relations which are not mere products\n    of thought, but which are themselves real.\n\n\n90. REAL RELATIONS; THEIR EXISTENCE VINDICATED.\u2014A real relation is _one\nwhich is not a mere product of thought, but which obtains between real\nthings independently of our thought_. For a real relation there must be\n(_a_) a _real_, individual _subject_; (_b_) a _real foundation_; and (_c_)\na _real_, individual _term_, really distinct from the subject. If the\nsubject of the relation, or its foundation, be not real, but a mere _ens\nrationis_, obviously the relation cannot be more than logical. If,\nmoreover, the term be not a really distinct entity from the subject, then\nthe relation can be nothing more than a mental comparison of some thing\nwith itself, either under the same aspect or under mentally distinct\naspects. A relation is real in the fullest sense when the extremes are\n_mutually_ related in virtue of a foundation really existing in both.\nHence St Thomas\u2019 definition of a real relation as a _connexion between\nsome two things in virtue of something really found in both_: _habitudo\ninter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique_.(402)\n\nNow the question: Are there in the real world, among the things which make\nup the universe of our experience, relations which are not merely logical,\nwhich are not a mere product of our thought?\u2014can admit of only one\nreasonable answer. That there are relations which are in some true sense\nreal and independent of our thought-activity must be apparent to everyone\nwhose mental outlook on things has not been warped by the specious\nsophistries of some form or other of Subjective Idealism. For _ex\nprofesso_ refutations of Idealist theories the student must consult\ntreatises on the _Theory of Knowledge_. A few considerations on the\npresent point will be sufficiently convincing here.\n\nFirst, then, let us appeal to the familiar examples mentioned above. Are\nnot two lines, each a yard long, _really equal_ in length, whether we know\nit or not? Is not a line a yard long _really greater than_ another line a\nfoot in length, whether we know it or not? Surely our thought does not\n_create_ but _discovers_ the equality or inequality. The twin brothers\n_really resemble_ each other, even when no one is thinking of this\nresemblance; the resemblance is there whether anyone adverts to it or not.\nThe motion of the train _really depends_ on the force of the steam; it is\nnot our thought that produces this relation of dependence. The eye is\n_really_ so constructed as to perceive light, and the light is really such\nby nature as to arouse the sensation of vision; surely it is not our\nthought that produces this relation of mutual adaptation in these\nrealities. Such relations are, therefore, in some true sense real and\nindependent of our thought: unless indeed we are prepared to say with\nidealists that the lines, the brothers, the train, the steam, the eye, and\nthe light\u2014in a word, that not merely relations, but all accidents and\nsubstances, all realities\u2014are mere products of thought, ideas, states of\nconsciousness.\n\nAgain, _order_ is but a system of relations of co-ordination and\nsubordination between really distinct things. But there is real order in\nthe universe. And therefore there are real relations in the universe.\nThere is real order in the universe: In the physical universe do we not\nexperience a real subordination of effects to causes, a real adaptation of\nmeans to ends? And in the moral universe is not this still more apparent?\nThe domestic society, the family, is not merely an aggregate of\nindividuals any one of whom we may designate indiscriminately husband or\nwife, father or mother, brother or sister. These relations of order are\nreal; they are obviously not the product of our thought, not produced by\nit, but only discovered, apprehended by it.\n\nIt is a profound truth that not all the reality of the universe which\npresents itself to the human mind for analysis and interpretation, _not\nall_ the reality of this universe, is to be found in the mere sum-total of\nthe individual entities that constitute it, considering these entities\neach absolutely and in isolation from the others. Nor does _all_ its real\nperfection consist in the mere sum-total of the absolute perfections\nintrinsic to, and inherent in, those various individual entities. Over and\nabove these individual entities and their absolute perfections, there is a\ndomain of reality, and of real perfections, consisting in the real\n_adaptation_, _interaction_, _interdependence_, _arrangement_,\n_co-ordination_ and _subordination_, of those absolute entities and\nperfections among themselves. And if we realize this profound truth(403)\nwe shall have no difficulty in recognizing that, while the\nthought-processes whereby we interpret this universe produce logical\nrelations which we utilize in this interpretation, there is also in this\nuniverse itself a system of relations which are real, which are not\ninvented, but are merely detected, by our minds.\n\nAccording to idealists, relation is a subjective category of the mind. It\nbelongs to phenomena only on the introduction of the latter into the\nunderstanding. \u201cLaws no more exist in phenomena,\u201d writes Kant,(404) \u201cthan\nphenomena exist in themselves; the former are relative to the subject in\nwhich the phenomena inhere, in so far as this subject is endowed with\nunderstanding; just as the latter are relative to this same subject in so\nfar as it is endowed with sensibility.\u201d This is ambiguous and misleading.\nOf course, laws or any other relations do not exist _for us_, are _not\nknown_ by us, are not _brought into relation to our understanding_, as\nlong as we do not consciously grasp the two terms and the foundation on\nwhich the law, or any other relation, rests. But there are relations whose\nterms and foundations are anterior to, and independent of, our thought,\nand which consequently are not a product of thought.\n\n\u201cSensations, or other feelings being given,\u201d writes J. S. Mill,(405)\n\u201csuccession and simultaneousness are the two conditions to the alternative\nof which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties.\u201d But, as M.\nBoirac pertinently asks,(406) \u201cwhy do we apply in any particular case the\none alternative of the two-faced category rather than the other? Is it not\nbecause in every case the concrete application made by our faculties is\ndetermined by the objects themselves, by an objective and real foundation\nof the relation?\u201d\n\n91. MUTUAL AND MIXED RELATIONS; TRANSCENDENTAL RELATIONS.\u2014There are, then,\nrelations which are in some true sense real. But in what does the reality\nof a real relation consist? Before answering this question we must examine\nthe main classes of real relations.\n\nWe have already referred to the _mutual_ relation as one which has _a real\nfoundation in both_ of the extremes, such as the relation between father\nand son, or between a greater and a lesser quantity, or between two equal\nquantities, or between two similar people.(407) Such a relation is called\na _relatio aequiperantiae_, a relation of _the same denomination_, if it\nhas the same name on both sides, as \u201c_equal\u2014equal_,\u201d \u201c_similar\u2014similar_,\u201d\n\u201c_friend\u2014friend_,\u201d etc. It is called a _relatio disquiperantiae_, of\n_different denomination_, if it has a different name, indicating a\ndifferent kind of relation, on either side, as \u201c_father\u2014son_,\u201d\n\u201c_cause\u2014effect_,\u201d \u201c_master\u2014servant_,\u201d etc.\n\nDistinct from this is the _non-mutual_ or _mixed_ relation, which has a\nreal foundation only in one extreme, so that the relation of this to the\nother extreme is real, while the relation of the latter to the former is\nonly logical.(408) For instance, the relation of every creature to the\nCreator is a real relation, for the essential dependence of the creature\non the Creator is a relation grounded in the very nature of the creature\nas a contingent being. But the relation of the Creator to the creature is\nonly logical, for the creative act on which it is grounded implies in the\nCreator no reality distinct from His substance, which substance has no\nnecessary relation to any creature. Similarly, the relation of the\n(finite) knowing mind to the known object is a real relation, for it is\ngrounded in a new quality, _viz._ knowledge, whereby the mind is\nperfected. But the relation of the object to the mind is not a real\nrelation, for by becoming actually known the object itself does not\nundergo any real change or acquire any new reality or perfection. We have\nseen already (42, 50) that all reality has a _transcendental_ or\n_essential_ relation to intellect and to will, ontological truth and\nontological goodness. These relations of reality to the _Divine_ Intellect\nand Will are _formally_ or _actually_ verified in all things; whereas the\ntranscendental truth and goodness of any thing in regard to any created\nintellect and will are formal or actual only when that thing is _actually_\nknown and willed by such created faculties: the relations of a thing to a\nmind that does not actually know and desire that thing are only\n_fundamental_ or _potential_ truth and goodness. This brings us to a\nsecond great division of relations, into _essential_ or _transcendental_\nand _accidental_ or _predicamental_.\n\nAn essential or transcendental relation is _one which is involved in the\nvery essence itself of the related thing_. It enters into and is\ninseparable from the concept of the latter. Thus in the concept of the\n_creature_ as such there is involved an _essential_ relation of the\nlatter\u2019s dependence on the _Creator_. So, too, every individual reality\ninvolves essential relations of _identity_ with itself and _distinction_\nfrom other things, and essential relations of _truth_ and _goodness_ to\nthe Divine Mind and created minds. Knowledge involves an essential\nrelation to a known object. _Accidents_ involve the essential relation of\nan aptitude to inhere in _substances_. _Actio_ involves an essential\nrelation to an _agens_, and _passio_ to a _patiens_; matter to form and\nform to matter. And so on. In general, wherever any subject has an\nintrinsic and essential exigence or aptitude or inclination, whereby there\nis established a connexion of this subject with, or a reference to,\nsomething else, an ordination or \u201c_ordo_\u201d to something else, there we have\nan \u201cessential\u201d relation.(409) Such a relation is termed \u201ctranscendental\u201d\nbecause it can be verified of a subject in any category; and, since it\nadds nothing real to its subject it does not of itself constitute any new\ncategory of real being. Like the logical relation it is referred to here\nin order to bring out, by way of contrast, the accidental or predicamental\nrelation which is the proper subject-matter of the present chapter.\n\n92. PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS; THEIR FOUNDATIONS AND DIVISIONS.\u2014An\naccidental or predicamental relation is one which is _not essential to the\nrelated subject, but superadded to, and separable from, the latter_. Such,\nfor instance, are relations of equality or inequality, similarity or\ndissimilarity. It is not involved in the nature of the subject itself, but\nis superinduced on the latter by reason of some real foundation really\ndistinct from the nature of this subject. Its sole function is to refer\nthe subject to the term, while the essential or transcendental relation is\nrather an intrinsic attribute or aptitude of the nature itself as a\nprinciple of action, or an effect of action. The real, accidental relation\nis the one which Aristotle placed in a category apart as one of the\nultimate accidental modes of real being. Hence it is called a\n\u201cpredicamental\u201d relation. What are its principal sub-classes?\n\nReal relations are divided according to the nature of their foundations.\nBut some relations are real _ex utraque parte_\u2014mutual relations, while\nothers are real only on the side\u2014mixed relations. Moreover, some real\nrelations are transcendental, others predicamental. Aristotle in assigning\nthree distinct grounds of predicamental relations seems to have included\nsome relations that are transcendental.(410) He distinguishes(411) (_a_)\nrelations grounded in unity and multitude; (_b_) relations grounded in\nefficient causality; and (_c_) relations grounded in \u201ccommensuration\u201d.\n\n(_a_) By \u201cunity and multitude\u201d he is commonly interpreted to mean identity\nor diversity not merely in _quantity_, but in any \u201cformal\u201d factor, and\ntherefore also in _quality_, and in _nature_ or _substance_. Things that\nare one in quantity we term _equal_; one in quality, _similar_; one in\nsubstance, _identical_. And if they are not one in these respects we call\nthem _unequal_, _dissimilar_, _distinct_ or _diverse_, respectively. About\nquantity as a foundation for real, predicamental relations there can be no\ndifficulty. Indeed it is in a certain sense implied in all relations\u2014at\nleast as apprehended by the human mind. For we apprehend relations, of\nwhatsoever kind, by mental comparison, and this involves the consciousness\nof _number_ or _plurality_, of _two_ things compared.(412) And when we\ncompare things on the basis of any _quality_ we do so only by\ndistinguishing and measuring _intensive grades_ in this quality, after the\nanalogy of _extensive_ or _quantitative_ measurement (80). Nevertheless\njust as quality is a distinct accident irreducible to quantity (77), so\nare relations based on quality different from those based on quantity. But\nwhat about substance or nature as a foundation of _predicamental_\nrelations? For these, as distinct from transcendental relations, some\naccident really distinct from the substance seems to be required. The\nsubstantial, individual _identity_ of any real being with itself is only a\nlogical relation, for there are not two really distinct extremes. The\nspecific identity of John with James in virtue of their common human\nnature is a real relation but it would appear to be transcendental.(413)\nThe relation of the real John and the real James to our knowledge of them\nis the transcendental relation of any reality to knowledge, the relation\nof ontological truth. This relation is _essentially_ actual in regard to\nthe Divine mind, but only potential, and _accidentally_ actual, in regard\nto any created mind (42). The relation of real distinction between two\nindividual substances is a real but _transcendental_ relation, grounded in\nthe transcendental attribute of _oneness_ which characterizes every real\nbeing (26, 27).\n\n(_b_) Efficient causality, _actio et passio_, can undoubtedly be the\nground of real predicamental relations. If the action is transitive(414)\nthe _patiens_ or recipient of the real change acquires by this latter the\nbasis of a relation of real dependence on the cause or _agens_. Again, if\nthe action provokes reaction, so that there is real interaction, each\n_agens_ being also _patiens_, there arises a mutual predicamental relation\nof interdependence between the two agencies. Furthermore, if the agent\nitself is in any way really perfected by the action there arises a real\npredicamental relation which is mutual: not merely a real relation of\neffect to agent but also of agent to effect. This is true in all cases of\nwhat scholastics call \u201cunivocal\u201d as distinct from \u201cequivocal\u201d causation.\nOf the former, in which the agent produces an effect _like in nature to\nitself_, the propagation of their species by living things is the great\nexample. Here not only is the relation of offspring to parents a real\nrelation, but that of parents to offspring is also a real relation. And\nthis real relation is permanent because it is grounded not merely in the\ntransient generative processes but in some real and abiding result of\nthese processes\u2014either some physical disposition in the parents\nthemselves,(415) or some _specific_ perfection attributed by extrinsic\ndenomination to the _individual_ parents: the parents are in a sense\ncontinued in their offspring: \u201cgeneration really perpetuates the species,\nthe specific nature, and in this sense may be said to perfect the\nindividual parents\u201d.(416) In cases of \u201cequivocal\u201d causation\u2014_i.e._ where\nthe effect is different in nature from the cause, as when a man builds a\nhouse\u2014the agent does not so clearly benefit by the action, so that in such\ncases, while the relation of the effect to the cause is real, some authors\nwould regard that of the cause to the effect as logical.(417) When,\nhowever, we remember that the efficient activity of all _created_ causes\nis necessarily dependent on the Divine _Concursus_, and necessarily\ninvolves _change in the created cause itself_, we can regard this change\nas in all cases the ground of a real relation of the created cause to its\neffect. But the creating and conserving activity of the Divine Being\ncannot ground a real relation of the latter to creatures because the\nDivine Being is Pure and Unchangeable Actuality, acquiring no new\nperfection, and undergoing no real change, by such activity.(418)\n\n(_c_) By commensuration as a basis of real relations Aristotle does not\nmean quantitative measurement, but the determination of the perfection of\none reality by its being essentially conformed to, and regulated by,\nanother: as the perfection of knowledge or science, for instance, is\ndetermined by the perfection of its object. This sort of commensuration,\nor essential ordination of one reality to another, is obviously the basis\nof _transcendental_ relations. Some authors would consider that besides\nthe transcendental relation of science to its object, a relation which is\nindependent of the actual existence of the latter, there also exists an\naccidental relation in science to its object as long as this latter is in\nactual existence. But rather it should be said that just as the\ntranscendental truth-relation of any real object to intellect is\nfundamental (potential) or formal (actual) according as this intellect\nmerely _can_ know this object or actually _does_ know it, so also the\ntranscendental relation of knowledge to its object is fundamental or\nformal according as this object is merely possible or actually existing.\n\nWe gather from the foregoing analysis that the three main classes of\npredicamental relations are those based on _quantity_, _quality_, and\n_causality_, respectively.\n\n93. IN WHAT DOES THE REALITY OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS CONSIST?\u2014We have\nseen that not all relations are purely logical. There are real relations;\nand of these some are not merely aspects of the other categories of real\nbeing, not merely transcendental attributes virtually distinct from, but\nreally identical with, these other absolute modes of real being which we\ndesignate as \u201csubstance,\u201d \u201cquantity,\u201d \u201cquality,\u201d \u201ccause,\u201d \u201ceffect,\u201d etc.\nThere are real relations which form a distinct accidental mode of real\nbeing and so constitute a category apart. The fact, however, that these\npredicamental relations have been placed by Aristotle and his followers in\na category apart does not of itself prove that the predicamental relation\nis a special reality _sui generis_, really and adequately distinct from\nthe realities which constitute the other categories (60). If the\npredicamental relation be not a _purely logical entity_, if it be an _ens\nrationis cum fundamento in re_, or, in other words, if the object of our\nconcept of \u201cpredicamental relation,\u201d has a foundation in reality (_e.g._\nlike the concepts of \u201cspace\u201d and \u201ctime\u201d), then it may reasonably be placed\nin a category apart, even although it may not be itself formally a\nreality. We have therefore to see whether or not the predicamental\nrelation is, or embodies, any mode of real being adequately distinct from\nthese modes which constitute the other categories.\n\nThe predicamental relation is real in the sense that it implies, in\naddition to two really distinct extremes, a real foundation in one or both\nof these extremes, a real accident such as quantity, quality, or\ncausality. That is to say, considered in its foundation or cause,\nconsidered fundamentally or _secundum suum esse in subjecto_, the\npredicamental relation is real, inasmuch as its foundation is a reality\nindependently of the consideration of the mind. No doubt, if the\npredicamental relation, adequately considered, implies no other reality\nthan that of its foundation and terms, then the predicamental relation\ndoes not contain any special reality _sui generis_, distinct from\nsubstances, quality, quantity, and other such absolute modes of real\nbeing. This, however, does not prevent its ranking as a distinct category\nprovided it adds a virtually distinct and altogether peculiar aspect to\nthose absolute realities. Now, considered adequately, the predicamental\nrelation adds to the reality it has in its foundation the _actual\nreference_ of subject to term. In fact, it is in this reference of subject\nto term, this \u201c_esse ad_,\u201d that the relation _formally_ consists. The\nquestion therefore may be stated thus: Is this formal relation of subject\nto term, this \u201c_esse ad_\u201d a real entity _sui generis_, really distinct\nfrom the absolute entities of subject, term and foundation, and in\ncontradistinction to these and all absolute entities a \u201crelative entity,\u201d\nactually existing in the real universe independently of our thought? Or is\nit, on the contrary, itself formally a mere product of our thought, a\nproduct of the mental act of comparison, an _ens rationis_ an aspect\nsuperadded by our minds to the extremes compared, and to the foundation in\nvirtue of which we compare them?\n\nA good many scholastics, and some of them men of great name,(419) have\nespoused the former alternative, considering that the reality of the\npredicamental relation cannot be vindicated\u2014against idealists, who would\nreduce all relations to mere logical entities\u2014otherwise than by according\nto the relation considered _formally_, _i.e._ _secundum suum_ \u201c_esse ad_,\u201d\nan entity in the actual order of things independent of our thought: adding\nas an argument that if relation formally as such is anything at all, if\nall relation be not a mere mental fabrication, it is essentially a\n\u201crelative\u201d entity, and that manifestly a \u201crelative\u201d entity cannot be\nreally identical with any \u201cabsolute\u201d entity. And they claim for this view\nthe authority of St Thomas.(420)\n\nThe great majority of scholastics, however, espouse the second\nalternative: that the relation, considered _formally_, \u201csecundum _esse\nad_,\u201d is a product of our mental comparison of subject with term. It is\nnot itself a real entity or a real mode, superadded to the reality of\nextremes and foundation.\n\nIn the first place there is no need to suppose the reality of such a\nrelative entity. _Entia non sunt multiplicanda pr\u00e6ter necessitatem._ It is\nan abuse of realism to suppose that the _formal_ element of a relation,\nits \u201c_esse ad_,\u201d is a distinct and separate reality. The reality of the\npraedicamental relation is safeguarded without any such postulate. Since\nthe predicamental relation, considered _adequately_, _i.e._ not merely\nformally but fundamentally, not merely _secundum esse ad_ but _secundum\nesse in_, involves as its foundation an absolute accident which is real\nindependently of our thought, the predicamental relation is not a _mere\nens rationis_. It has a foundation in reality. It is an _ens rationis cum\nfundamento in re_. This is a sufficient counter-assertion to Idealism, and\na sufficient reason for treating relation as a distinct category of real\nbeing.\n\nThat there is no need for such a relative entity will be manifest if we\nconsider the simple case of two bars of iron each a yard long. The length\nof each is an absolute accident of each. The length of either, considered\nabsolutely and in itself, is not formally the _equality_ of this with the\nother. Nor are both lengths considered separately the formal relation of\nequality. But both considered together are the adequate foundation of this\nformal relation; both considered together are this relation _potentially_,\n_fundamentally_, so that all that is needed for the _actual_, _formal_\nrelation of _equality_ is the mental apprehension of the two lengths\ntogether. The mental process of comparison is the only thing required to\nmake the potential relation actual; and the product of this mental process\nis the _formality_ or \u201c_esse ad_\u201d of the relation, the actual reference of\nthe extremes to each other. Besides the absolute accidents which\nconstitute the foundation of the relation something more is required for\nthe constitution of the adequate predicamental relation. This \u201csomething\nmore,\u201d however, is a mind capable of comparing the extremes, and not any\nreal entity distinct from extremes and foundation. Antecedently to the act\nof comparison the formally relative element of the relation, its \u201c_esse\nad_,\u201d was not anything actual; it was the mere _comparability_ of the\nextremes in virtue of the foundation. If the \u201c_esse ad_\u201d were a separate\nreal entity, a relative entity, really distinct from extremes and\nfoundation, what sort of entity could it be? Being an accident, it should\ninhere in, or be a mode of its subject. But if it did it would lose its\nformally relative character by becoming an inherent mode of an absolute\nreality. While to conceive it as an entity astride on both extremes, and\nbridging or connecting these together, would be to substitute the crude\nimagery of the imagination for intellectual thought.\n\nIn the second place, if a subject can acquire a relation, or lose a\nrelation, _without undergoing any real change_, then the relation\nconsidered formally as such, or _secundum_ \u201c_esse ad_,\u201d cannot be a\nreality. But a subject can acquire or lose a relation without undergoing\nany real change. Therefore the relation considered formally, as distinct\nfrom its foundation and extremes, is not a reality.\n\nThe minor of this argument may be proved by the consideration of a few\nsimple examples. A child already born is neither larger nor smaller than\nits brother that will be born two years hence.(421) But after the birth of\nthe latter child the former can acquire those relations successively\n_without any real change in itself_, and merely by the growth of the\nyounger child. Again, one white ball _A_ is similar in colour to another\nwhite ball _B_. Paint the latter black, and _eo ipso_ the former loses its\nrelation of resemblance _without any real change in itself_.\n\n\n    And this appears to be the view of St. Thomas. If, he writes,\n    another man becomes equal in size to me by growing while I remain\n    unchanged in size, then although _eo ipso_ I become equal in size\n    to him, thus acquiring a new relation, _nevertheless I gain or\n    acquire nothing new_: \u201cnihil advenit mihi de novo, per hoc quod\n    incipio esse alteri aequalis per ejus mutationem\u201d. Relation, he\n    says, is an extramental reality _by reason of its foundation or\n    cause_, whereby one reality is referred to another.(422) Relation\n    itself, considered formally as distinct from its foundation, is\n    not a reality; it is real only inasmuch as its foundation is\n    real.(423) Again, relation is something inherent, but not formally\n    as a relation, and hence it can disappear without any real change\n    in its subject.(424) A real relation may be destroyed in one or\n    other of two ways: either by the destruction or change of the\n    foundation in the subject, or by the destruction of the term,\n    entailing the cessation of the reference, _without any change in\n    the subject_.(425) Hence, too, the reason alleged by St. Thomas\n    why relation, unlike the other categories of real being, can be\n    itself divided into logical entity and real entity, _ens rationis_\n    and _ens reale_: because formally it is an _ens rationis_, and\n    only fundamentally, or in virtue of its foundation, is it an _ens\n    reale_.(426) And hence, finally, the reason why St. Thomas,\n    following Aristotle, describes relation as having a \u201clesser\n    reality,\u201d an \u201cesse debilius,\u201d(427) than the other or absolute\n    categories of real being: not as if it were a sort of diminutive\n    entity, intermediate between nothingness and the absolute modes of\n    reality, but because being dependent for its formal actuality not\n    merely on a foundation in its subject, but also on a term to which\n    the latter is referred, it can perish not merely by the\n    destruction of its subject like other accidents, but also by the\n    destruction of its term while subject and foundation remain\n    unchanged.\n\n\nIf, then, the real relation, considered formally or \u201csecundum _esse ad_\u201d\nis not a reality, the relation under this aspect is a _logical_, not a\n_real_, accident.\n\nTo constitute a mutual real relation there is needed a foundation in\n_both_ of the extremes. As long as the term of the relation does not\nactually exist, not only does the relation not exist formally and\nactually, but it is not even _adequately potential_: the foundation in the\nsubject alone is not an adequate foundation.\n\nTo this view, which denies any distinct reality to the predicamental\nrelation considered formally, it has been objected that the predicamental\nrelation is thus confounded with the transcendental relation. But this is\nnot so; for the transcendental relation is always essential to its\nsubject, whatever this subject may be, while the predicamental relation,\nconsidered formally, is a logical accident separable from its subject, and\nconsidered fundamentally it is some absolute accident really distinct from\nthe substance of the related extremes. For instance, the _action_ which\nmediates between cause and effect is itself transcendentally related to\nboth; while it is at the same time the adequate foundation whereby cause\nand effect are predicamentally related to each other.(428)\n\nIf what we have called the formal element of a relation be nothing really\ndistinct from the extremes and foundation, it follows that some real\nrelations between creatures are really identical with their\nsubstances;(429) and to this it has been objected that no relation _in\ncreatures_ can be, _quoad rem_, substantial: \u201cNulla relatio,\u201d says St.\nThomas,(430) \u201cest substantia secundum rem in creaturis\u201d. To this it may be\nreplied that even in these cases the relation itself, considered\nadequately, is not wholly identical with the substance of either extreme.\nIt superadds a separable logical accident to these.(431)\n\nFinally it is objected that the view which denies a distinct reality to\nthe formal element of a real relation, to its \u201c_esse ad_,\u201d equivalently\ndenies all reality to relations, and is therefore in substance identical\nwith the idealist doctrine already rejected (90). But this is a\nmisconception. According to idealists, relations grounded on quality,\nquantity, causality, etc., are exclusively in the intellect, in our mental\nactivity and its mental products, in our concepts alone, and are in no\ntrue sense characteristic of reality. This is very different from saying\nthat our concepts of such relations are grounded in the realities\ncompared, and that these realities are really endowed with everything that\nconstitutes such relations, the comparative act of the intellect being\nrequired merely to apprehend these characteristics and so to give the\nrelation its formal completeness.(432) There is all the difference that\nexists between a theory which so exaggerates the constitutive function of\nthought as to reduce all intellectual knowledge to a knowledge of mere\nsubjective mental appearances, and a theory which, while recognizing this\nfunction and its products, will not allow that these cast any cloud or\nveil between the intellect and a genuine insight into objective reality.\nThese mental processes are guided by reality; the _entia rationis_ which\nare their products are grounded in reality; moreover we can quite well\ndistinguish between these _mental_ modes and products of our intellectual\nactivity and the _real_ contents revealed to the mind in these modes and\nprocesses. So long, therefore, as we avoid the mistake of ascribing to the\nobjective reality itself any of these mental modes (as, for instance,\nextreme realists do when they assert the extramental reality of the\n_formal_ universal), our recognition of them can in no way jeopardize the\nobjective validity of intellectual knowledge. Perhaps an excessive\ntimidity in this direction is in some degree accountable for the \u201cabuse of\nrealism\u201d which ascribes to the formal element of a relation a distinct\nextramental,(433) objective reality.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII. CAUSALITY; CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSES.\n\n\n94. TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSE.\u2014The modes of real being which we have\nbeen so far examining\u2014substance, quality, quantity, relation\u2014are modes of\nreality considered as _static_. But it was pointed out in an early chapter\n(ch. ii.) that the universe of our experience is subject to change, that\nit is ever _becoming_, that it is the scene of a continuous world-process\nwhich is apparently regulated by more or less stable principles or laws,\nthese laws and processes constituting the _universal order_ which it is\nthe duty of the philosopher to study and explain. We must now return to\nthis _kinetic_ and _dynamic_ aspect of reality, and investigate the\nprinciples of change in things by a study of _Causes_.\n\nAs with the names of the other ultimate categories, so too here, the\ngeneral sense of the term \u201ccause\u201d (_causa_, \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd) is familiar to all,\nwhile analysis reveals a great variety of modalities of this common\nsignification. We understand by a cause _anything which has a positive\ninfluence of any sort on the being or happening of something else_. In\nphilosophy this is the meaning which has been attached traditionally to\nthe term since the days of Aristotle; though in its present-day scientific\nuse the term has almost lost this meaning, mainly through the influence of\nmodern phenomenism.(434) The traditional notion of cause is usually\nexpounded by comparing it with certain kindred notions: _principle_,\n_condition_, _occasion_, _reason_.\n\nA _principle_ is _that from which anything proceeds in any way\nwhatsoever_.(435) Any sort of intrinsic connexion between two objects of\nthought is sufficient to constitute the one a \u201cprinciple\u201d of the other;\nbut a mere extrinsic or time sequence is not sufficient. A _logical_\nprinciple is some _truth_ from which further truths are or may be derived.\nA _real_ principle is some _reality_ from which the _being_ or _happening_\nof something originates and proceeds.(436) If this procession involves a\nreal and positive influence of the principle on that which proceeds from\nit, such a real principle is a cause. But there may be a real and\nintrinsic connexion without any such influence. For instance, in the\nsubstantial changes which occur in physical nature the generation of the\nnew substantial formative principle necessarily presupposes the\n_privation_ of the one which antecedently \u201cinformed\u201d the material\nprinciple; but this \u201c_privatio formae_\u201d has no positive influence on the\ngeneration of the new \u201cform\u201d; it is, however, the necessary and natural\nantecedent to the generation of the latter; hence although this \u201c_privatio\nformae_\u201d is a real principle of substantial change (the process or\n_fieri_) it is not a _cause_ of the latter. The notion of principle, even\nof real principle, is therefore wider than the notion of cause.(437)\n\nA _condition_, in the proper sense of a necessary condition or _conditio\nsine qua non_, is something which must be realized or fulfilled before the\nevent or effect in question can happen or be produced. On the side of the\nlatter there is real dependence, but from the side of the former there is\nno real and positive influence on the happening of the event. The\ninfluence of the condition is negative; or, if positive, it is only\nindirect, consisting in the removal of some obstacle\u2014\u201c_removens\nprobibens_\u201d\u2014to the positive influence of the cause. In this precisely a\ncondition differs from a cause: windows, for instance, are a condition for\nthe lighting of a room in the daylight, but the sun is the cause. The\ndistinction is clear and intelligible, nor may it be ignored in a\nphilosophical analysis of causality. At the same time it is easy to\nunderstand that where, as in the inductive sciences, there is question of\ndiscovering _all_ the antecedents, positive and negative, of any given\nkind of phenomenon, in order to bring to light and formulate the law or\nlaws according to which such phenomenon occurs, the distinction between\ncause and condition is of minor importance.(438)\n\nAn _occasion_ is _any circumstance or combination of circumstances\nfavourable to the action of a free cause_. For instance, a forced sale is\nan occasion for buying cheaply; night is an occasion of theft; bad\ncompanionship is an occasion of sin. An occasion has no intrinsic\nconnexion with the effect as in the case of a principle, nor is it\nnecessary for the production of the effect as in the case of a condition.\nIt is spoken of only in connexion with the action of a free cause; and it\ndiffers from a cause in having no positive and direct influence on the\nproduction of the effect. It has, however, a real though indirect\ninfluence on the production of the effect by soliciting and aiding the\ndetermination of the free efficient cause to act. In so far as it does\nexert such an influence it may be regarded as a partial efficient cause,\nnot a physical but a moral cause, of the effect.\n\nTo ask for the _reason_ of any event or phenomenon, or of the nature or\nexistence of any reality, is to demand an _explanation_ of the latter; it\nis to seek what _accounts_ for the latter, what makes this _intelligible_\nto our minds. Whatever is a cause is therefore also a reason, but the\nlatter notion is wider than the former. Whatever explains a _truth_ is a\n_logical_ reason of the latter. But since all truths are concerned with\nrealities they must have ultimately _real_ reasons, _i.e._ explanatory\nprinciples inherent in the realities themselves. The knowledge of these\nreal or ontological principles of things is the logical reason of our\nunderstanding of the things themselves. But the ontological principles,\nwhich are the real reasons of the things, are wider in extent than the\ncauses of these things, for they include principles that are not causes.\n\nFurthermore, the grades of reality which we discover in things by the\nactivity of abstract thought, and whereby we compare, classify and define\nthose things, we apprehend as explanatory principles of the latter; and\nthese principles, though really in the things, and therefore real\n\u201creasons,\u201d are not \u201ccauses\u201d.\n\nThus, life is a real reason, though not a cause, of sensibility in the\nanimal organism; the soul\u2019s independence of matter in its mode of\nexistence is a real reason, though not a cause, of its spiritual\nactivities. Hence, between a reason and that which it accounts for there\nmay be only a logical distinction, while between a cause and that which it\ncauses there must be a real distinction (38).\n\nTo understand all the intrinsic principles which constitute the _essence_\nof anything is to know the _sufficient reason_ of its _reality_. To\nunderstand all the extrinsic principles which account for its actual\n_existence_ is to know the sufficient reason of its _existence_; and to\nunderstand this latter adequately is to realize that the thing depends\nultimately for its actual existence on a Reality or Being which\nnecessarily exists by virtue of its own essence.\n\n\n    What has been called the _Principle of Sufficient Reason_ asserts,\n    when applied to reality, that every existing reality must have a\n    sufficient reason for existing and for being what it is.(439)\n    Unlike the _Principle of Causality_ which is an axiomatic or\n    self-evident truth, this principle is rather a necessary postulate\n    of all knowledge, an assumption that _reality is intelligible_. It\n    does not mean that all reality, or even any single finite reality,\n    is adequately intelligible to our finite minds. In the words of\n    Bossuet, we do not know everything about anything: \u201cnous ne savons\n    le tout de rien\u201d.\n\n    In regard to contingent _essences_, if these be composite we can\n    find a sufficient reason why they are such in their constitutive\n    principles; but in regard to simple essences, or to the simple\n    constitutive principles of composite essences, we can find no\n    sufficient reason why they are such in anything even logically\n    distinct from themselves: they are what they are because they are\n    what they are, and to demand why they are what they are, is, as\n    Aristotle remarked, to ask an idle question. At the same time,\n    when we have convinced ourselves that their actual existence\n    involves the existence of a Supreme, Self-Existent, Intelligent\n    Being, we can see that the essence of this Being is the ultimate\n    ground of the intrinsic possibility of all finite essences (20).\n\n    In regard to contingent _existences_ the Principle of Sufficient\n    Reason is coincident with the Principle of Causality, inasmuch as\n    the sufficient reason of the actual existence of any contingent\n    thing consists in the extrinsic real principles which are its\n    causes. The existence of contingent things involves the existence\n    of a Necessary Being. We may say that the sufficient reason for\n    the existence of the Necessary Being is the Divine Essence Itself;\n    but this is merely denying that there is outside this Being any\n    sufficient reason, _i.e._ any cause of the latter\u2019s existence; it\n    is the recognition that the Principle of Causality is inapplicable\n    to the Necessary Being. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, in\n    this application of it, is logically posterior to the Principle of\n    Causality.(440)\n\n\n95. CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSES: ARISTOTLE\u2019S FOURFOLD DIVISION.\u2014In modern\ntimes many scientists and philosophers have thought it possible to explain\nthe order and course of nature, the whole cosmic process and the entire\nuniverse of our experience, by an appeal to the operation of _efficient\ncauses_. Espousing a mechanical, as opposed to a teleological, conception\nof the universe, they have denied or ignored all influence of _purpose_,\nand eschewed all study of _final causes_. Furthermore, misconceiving or\nneglecting the category of substance, and the doctrine of substantial\nchange, they find no place in their speculations for any consideration of\n_formal_ and _material_ causes. Yet without final, formal and material\ncauses, so fully analysed by Aristotle(441) and the scholastics, no\nsatisfactory explanation of the world of our experience can possibly be\nfound. Let us therefore commence by outlining the traditional fourfold\ndivision of causes.\n\nWe have seen already that change involves composition or compositeness in\nthe thing that is subject to change. Hence two _intrinsic_ principles\ncontribute to the constitution of such a thing, the one a passive,\ndeterminable principle, its _material cause_, the other an active,\ndetermining principle, its _formal cause_. Some changes in material things\nare superficial, not reaching to the substance itself of the thing; these\nare _accidental_, involving the union of some _accidental_ \u201cform\u201d with the\nconcrete pre-existing substance as material (_materia_ \u201c_secunda_\u201d).\nOthers are more profound, changes of the substance itself; these are\n_substantial_, involving the union of a new _substantial_ \u201cform\u201d with the\nprimal material principal (_materia_ \u201c_prima_\u201d) of the substance\nundergoing the change. But whether the change be substantial or accidental\nwe can always distinguish in the resulting composite thing two intrinsic\nconstitutive principles, its _formal cause_ and its _material cause_. The\nagencies in nature which, by their activity, bring about change, are\n_efficient causes_. Finally, since it is an undeniable fact that there is\n_order_ in the universe, that its processes give evidence of _regularity_,\nof operation according to _law_, that the cosmos reveals a _harmonious\nco-ordination of manifold_ agencies and a _subordination of means to\nends_, it follows that there must be working in and through all nature a\ndirective principle, a principle of plan or design, a principle according\nto which those manifold agencies work together in fulfilment of a purpose,\n_for the attainment of ends_. Hence the reality of a fourth class of\ncauses, _final causes_.\n\nThe separate influence of each of those four kinds of cause can be clearly\nillustrated by reference to the production of any work of art. When, for\ninstance, a sculptor chisels a statue from a block of marble, the latter\nis the material cause (_materia secunda_) of the statue, the form which he\ninduces on it by his labour is the formal cause (_forma accidentalis_),\nthe sculptor himself as agent is the efficient cause, and the motive from\nwhich he works\u2014money fame, esthetic pleasure, etc.\u2014is the final cause.\n\nThe formal and material causes are _intrinsic_ to the effect; they\nconstitute the effect _in facto esse_, the distinction of each from the\nlatter being an inadequate real distinction. It is not so usual nowadays\nto call these intrinsic constitutive principles of things _causes_ of the\nlatter; but they verify the general definition of cause. The other two\ncauses, the efficient and the final, are _extrinsic_ to the effect, and\nreally and adequately distinct from it,(442) extrinsic principles of its\nproduction, its _fieri_.\n\nThis classification of causes is adequate;(443) it answers all the\nquestions that can be asked in explanation of the production of any\neffect: _a quo?_ _ex quo?_ _per quid?_ _propter quid?_ Nor is there any\nsort of cause which cannot be brought under some one or other of those\nfour heads. What is called an \u201cexemplar cause,\u201d _causa exemplaris_, _i.e._\nthe ideal or model or plan in the mind of an intelligent agent, according\nto which he aims and strives to execute his work, may be regarded as an\nextrinsic formal cause; or again, in so far as it aids and equips the\nagent for his task, an efficient cause; or, again, in so far as it\nrepresents a good to be realized, a final cause.(444)\n\nThe objects of our knowledge are in a true sense causes of our knowledge:\nany such object may be regarded as an efficient cause, both physical and\nmoral, of this knowledge, in so far as by its action on our minds it\ndetermines the activity of our cognitive faculties; or, again, as a final\ncause, inasmuch as it is the end and aim of the knowledge.\n\nThe essence of the soul is, as we have seen (69), not exactly an efficient\ncause of the faculties which are its properties; but it is their final\ncause, inasmuch as their _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ is to perfect it; and their\nsubjective or material cause, inasmuch as it is the seat and support of\nthese faculties.\n\nThe fourfold division is analogical, not univocal: though the matter, the\nform, the agent, and the end or purpose, all contribute positively to the\nproduction of the effect, it is clear that the character of the causal\ninfluence is widely different in each case.\n\nAgain, its members do not demand distinct subjects: all four classes of\ncause may be verified in the same subject. For instance, the human soul is\na formal cause in regard to the composite human individual, a material\ncause in regard to its habits, an efficient cause in regard to its acts,\nand a final cause in regard to its faculties.\n\nFurthermore, the fourfold division is not an immediate division, for it\nfollows the division of cause in general into _intrinsic_ and _extrinsic_\ncauses. Finally, it is a division of the causes which we find to be\noperative _in_ the universe. But the philosophical study of the universe\nwill lead us gradually to the conviction that itself and all the causes in\nit are themselves _contingent_, themselves caused by and dependent on, a\nCause _outside_ or extrinsic to the universe, a _First_, _Uncaused_,\n_Uncreated_, _Self-Existent_, _Necessary Cause_ (_Causa Prima_,\n_Increata_), at once the _efficient_ and _final_ cause of all things. In\ncontrast with this _Uncreated_, _First Cause_, all the other causes we\nhave now to investigate are called _created_ or _second_ causes (_causae\nsecundae_, _creatae_).\n\nA cause may be either _total_, _adequate_, or _partial_, _inadequate_,\naccording as the effect is due to its influence solely, or to its\ninfluence in conjunction with, or dependence on, the influence of some\nother cause or causes _of the same order_. A created cause, therefore, is\na total cause if the effect is due to its influence independently of other\ncreated causes; though of course all created causes are dependent, both as\nto their existence and as to their causality, on the influence of the\nFirst Cause. Without the activity of created efficient and final causes\nthe First Cause can accomplish directly whatever these can\naccomplish\u2014except their very causality itself, which cannot be actualized\nwithout them, but for which He can supply _eminenter_. Similarly, while it\nis incompatible with His Infinite Perfection that He discharge the\nfunction of material or formal cause of finite composite things, He can\nimmediately create these latter by the simultaneous production (_ex\nnihilo_) and union of their material and formal principles.\n\nA cause is said to be _in actu secundo_ when it is actually exercising its\ncausal influence. Antecedently to such exercise, at least _prioritate\nnaturae_, it is said to be _in actu primo_: when it has the expedite power\nto discharge its function as cause it is _in actu primo proximo_, while if\nits power is in any way incomplete, hampered or unready, it is _in actu\nprimo remoto_.\n\nMany other divisions of cause, subordinate to the Aristotelian division,\nwill be explained in connexion with the members of this latter.\n\n96. MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSES.\u2014These are properly subject-matter for\n_Cosmology_. We will therefore very briefly supplement what has been said\nalready concerning them in connexion with the doctrine of _Change_ (ch.\nii.). By a material cause we mean _that out of which anything is made_:\n_id ex quo aliquid fit_. Matter is correlative with form: from the union\nof these there results a composite reality endowed with either essential\nor accidental unity\u2014with the former if the material principle be\nabsolutely indeterminate and the correlative form substantial, with the\nlatter if the material principle be some actually existing individual\nreality and the form some supervening accident. Properly speaking only\ncorporeal substances have material causes,(445) but the term \u201cmaterial\ncause\u201d is used in an extended sense to signify any potential, passive,\nreceptive subject of formative or actuating principles: thus the soul is\nthe subjective or material cause of its faculties and habits; essence of\nexistence; _genus of differentia_, etc.\n\nIn what does the positive causal influence of a material cause consist?\nHow does it contribute positively to the actualization of the composite\nreality of which it is the material cause? It _receives_ and _unites with_\nthe form which is educed from its potentiality by the action of efficient\ncauses, and thus contributes to the generation of the concrete, composite\nindividual reality.(446)\n\nIt is by reason of the causality of the _formal cause_ that we speak of a\nthing being _formally_ such or such. As correlative of material cause it\nfinds its proper application in reference to the constitution of corporeal\nthings. The formative principle, called _forma substantialis_, which\nactuates, determines, specifies the material principle, and by union with\nthe latter constitutes an individual corporeal substance of a definite\nkind, is the (substantial) formal cause of this composite substance.(447)\nThe material principle of corporeal things is of itself indifferent to any\nspecies of body; it is the form that removes this indefiniteness and\ndetermines the matter, by its union with the latter, to constitute a\ndefinite type of corporeal substance.(448) The existence of different\nspecies of living organisms and different types of inorganic matter in the\nuniverse implies in the constitution of these things a common material\nprinciple, _materia prima_, and a multiplicity of differentiating,\nspecifying, formative principles, _formae substantiales_. That the\ndistinction between these two principles in the constitution of any\nindividual corporeal substance, whether living or inorganic, is not merely\na virtual distinction between metaphysical (generic and specific) grades\nof being in the individual, but a real distinction between separable\nentities, is a scholastic thesis established in the Special Metaphysics of\nthe organic and inorganic domains of the universe.(449)\n\nSince the _form_ is a perfecting, actuating principle, the term is often\nused synonymously with _actus_, _actuality_. And since besides the\nessential perfection which a being has by virtue of its substantial form\nit may have accidental perfections by reason of supervening accidental\nforms, these, too, are formal causes.\n\nIn what does the causal influence of the formal cause consist? In\ncommunicating itself intrinsically to the material principle or passive\nsubject from whose potentiality it is evoked by the action of efficient\ncauses; in actuating that potentiality by intrinsic union therewith, and\nthus determining the individual subject to be actually or formally an\nindividual of such or such a kind.\n\nThe material and formal causes are _intrinsic_ principles of the\nconstitution of things. We next pass to an analysis of the two _extrinsic_\ncauses, and firstly of the efficient cause and its causality.\n\n97. EFFICIENT CAUSE; TRADITIONAL CONCEPT EXPLAINED.\u2014By efficient cause we\nunderstand that _by which_ anything takes place, happens, occurs: _id a\nquo aliquid fit_. The world of our external and internal experience is the\nscene of incessant _changes_: men and things not only are, but are\nconstantly _becoming_. Now every such change is originated by some active\nprinciple, and this we call the efficient cause of the change. Aristotle\ncalled it \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd or \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, the _kinetic_ or _moving_\nprinciple; or again, \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9, _principium motus\nvel mutationis in alio_, \u201cthe principle of motion or change in some other\nthing\u201d. The result achieved by this change, the actualized potentiality,\nis called the _effect_; the causality itself of the efficient cause is\ncalled _action_ (\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), _motion_, _change_\u2014and, from the point of view\nof the effect, _passio_ (\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). The perfection or endowment whereby an\nefficient cause acts, _i.e._ its efficiency (\u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), is called _active\npower_ (_potentia seu virtus activa_); it is also called _force_ or\n_potential energy_ in reference to inanimate agents, _faculty_ in\nreference to animate agents, especially men and animals. This active power\nof an efficient cause or agent is to be carefully distinguished from the\n_passive potentiality_ acted upon and undergoing change. The former\nconnotes a perfection, the latter an imperfection: _unumquodque agit\ninquantum est in actu, patitur vero inquantum, est in potentia_. The scope\nof the active power of a cause is the measure of its actuality, of its\nperfection in the scale of reality; while the extent of the passive\npotentiality of _patiens_ is a measure of its relative imperfection. The\nactuation of the former is _actio_, that of the latter _passio_. The point\nof ontological connexion of the two _potentiae_ is the _change_ (_motus_,\n\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), this being at once the formal perfecting of the passive\npotentiality in the _patiens_ or effect, and the immediate term of the\nefficiency or active power of the _agens_ or cause. _Actio_ and _passio_,\ntherefore, are not expressions of one and the same concept; they express\ntwo distinct concepts of one and the same reality, _viz._ the change:\n_actio et passio sunt idem numero motus_. This change takes place\n_formally_ in the subject upon which the efficient cause acts, for it is\nan actuation of the potentiality of the former under the influence of the\nlatter: \u1f21 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff7; \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cc\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5. Considered in\nthe potentiality of this subject\u2014\u201c\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03b4\u03ad \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7\u03b4\u03b5: _hujus in hococ_\u201d\u2014it\nis called _passio_. Considered as a term of the active power of the\ncause\u2014\u201c\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03b4\u03b5 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03b4\u03b5: _hujus per hoc_\u201d\u2014it is called _actio_.\n\nThe fact that _actio_ and _passio_ are really and objectively one and the\nsame _motus_ does not militate against their being regarded as two\nseparate supreme categories, for they are objects of distinct\nconcepts,(450) and this is sufficient to constitute them distinct\ncategories (60).\n\nDoubts are sometimes raised, as St. Thomas remarks,(451) about the\nassertion that the action of an agent is not formally in the latter but in\nthe _patiens_: _actio fit in passo_. It is clear, however, he continues,\nthat the action is formally in the _patiens_ for it is the actuation not\nof any potentiality of the agent, but of the passive potentiality of the\n_patiens_: it is in the latter that the _motus_ or change, which is both\n_actio_ and _passio_, takes place, dependently of course on the influence\nof the agent, or efficient cause of the change. The active power of an\nefficient cause is an index of the latter\u2019s actuality; the exercise of\nthis power (_i.e._ _action_) does not formally perfect the agent, for it\nis not an actuation of any passive potentiality of the latter; it formally\nperfects the _patiens_. Only _immanent_ action perfects the agent, and\nthen not as agent but as _patiens_ or receiver of the actuality effected\nby the action (_cf._ 103 _infra_).\n\nWe may, then, define efficient cause as _the extrinsic principle of the\nchange or production of anything by means of action_: _principium\nextrinsicum a quo fluit motus vel productio rei mediante actione_.\n\nIt is a \u201cfirst\u201d principle as compared with material and formal causes for\nits influence is obviously prior in nature to theirs; also as compared\nwith the other extrinsic cause, the final cause, _in ordine executionis_,\nnot, however, _in ordine intentionis_. The \u201cend,\u201d not as realized but as\nrealizable, not in execution but in intention, discharges its function and\nexerts its influence as \u201cfinal _cause_\u201d and in this order the final cause,\nas will appear later, is _the first of all causes_: _finis est ultimus in\nexecutione sed primus in intentione_.\n\n\u201cChange or production,\u201d in the definition, is to be understood not in the\nstrict sense in which it presupposes an existing subject or material, but\nin the wide sense in which it includes any production of new reality, even\ncreation or production _ex nihilo_.\n\n\u201cAction,\u201d too, is to be understood in the wide sense in which it includes\nthe action of the First Cause, which action is really identical with the\nessence of the latter. We conceive creation after the analogy of the\nefficient action of created or \u201csecond\u201d causes: we have no _proper_\nconcept of the infinite perfection of the Divine activity. In all created\nefficient causes not only is the action itself, but also the efficiency,\nforce, power, faculty, which is its _proximate_ principle, really distinct\nfrom the nature or essence of the agent; the former is a substance, the\nlatter an accident.\n\nFinally, the action of a created efficient cause is either transitive\n(_transiens_) or immanent (_immanens_) according as the change wrought by\nthe action takes place in something else (as when _the sun_ heats or\nlights _the earth_) or in the cause itself (as when a man reasons or\nwills). In the former case the action perfects not the agent but the other\nthing, the _patiens_; in the latter case it perfects the agent itself,\n_agens_ and _patiens_ being here the same identical concrete\nindividual.(452)\n\n98. SOME SCHOLIA ON CAUSATION. THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.\u2014Before\nenumerating the principal kinds of efficient cause, and analysing the\nnature of efficient causality, we may set down here certain self-evident\naxioms and aphorisms concerning causation in general. (_a_) The most\nimportant of these is the _Principle of Causality_, which has been\nenunciated in a variety of ways: _Whatever happens has a cause_; _Whatever\nbegins to be has a cause_; _Whatever is contingent has a cause_; _Nothing\noccurs without a cause_. Not everything that begins to be has necessarily\na _material_ cause, or a _formal_ cause, really distinct from itself. For\ninstance, simple spiritual beings, like the human soul, have no material\ncause, nor any formal cause or constitutive principle distinct from their\nessence. Similarly, the whole universe, having been created _ex nihilo_,\nhad no pre-existing material cause. All the material beings, however,\nwhich are produced, generated, brought into actual existence in the course\nof the incessant changes which characterize the physical universe, have\nboth material and formal causes. But the Principle of Causality refers\nmainly to extrinsic causes. It is commonly understood only of efficient\ncauses; and only in regard to these is it self-evident. We shall see that\nas a matter of fact nothing happens without a _final_ cause: that\nintelligent purpose pervades reality through and through. This, however,\nis a conclusion, not a principle. What is really a self-evident,\naxiomatic, necessary principle is that _whatever happens has an_ EFFICIENT\n_cause_. Only the Necessary, Self-Existing, Eternal Being, has the\nsufficient reason of His actual existence in Himself, in His own essence.\nThat any being which is contingent could exist _independently of some\nother actual being_ as the cause of this existence; that it could have\ncome into existence or begun to exist _from absolute nothingness, or be\nproduced or brought into actual existence without any actual being to\nproduce it_; or that, once existing and subject to change, it could\nundergo change and have its potentialities actualized _without any actual\nbeing to cause such change_ (10)\u2014all this is positively unthinkable and\nabsolutely repugnant to our intelligence; all this our reason peremptorily\ndeclares to be intrinsically impossible. Nor is there question of a mere\npsychological inconceivability, such as might be due to a long-continued\ncustom of associating the idea of a \u201cbeginning\u201d with the idea of a \u201ccause\u201d\nof this beginning\u2014as phenomenists generally contend.(453) There is\nquestion of an impossibility which our reason categorically dictates to be\na real, ontological impossibility. The Principle of Causality is therefore\na necessary, _a priori_, self-evident principle.\n\n(_b_) _Every effect must have an adequate efficient cause_, _i.e._ a cause\nsufficiently perfect, sufficiently high on the scale of being, to have the\nactive power to produce the effect in question; otherwise the effect would\nbe partially uncaused, which is impossible.\n\n(_c_) _An effect cannot as such be actually more perfect than its adequate\n(created) cause_. The reason is that the effect as such is really\ndependent for its actuality on its adequate created cause. It derives its\nactuality from the latter. Now it is inconceivable that an agent could be\nthe active, productive principle of a greater perfection, a higher grade\nof actuality, than itself possesses. Whatever be the nature of efficient\ncausality, _actio_ and _passio_ (102), or of the dependence of the\nproduced actuality upon the active power of its adequate efficient cause\n(10), the reality of this dependence forbids us to think that in the\nnatural order of efficient causation a higher grade of reality can be\nactualized than the agent is capable of actualizing, or that the agent can\nnaturally actualize a higher or more perfect grade of reality than is\nactually its own. We must, however, bear in mind that there is question of\nthe _adequate_ created cause of an effect; and that to account _fully_ for\nthe actualization of any potential reality whatsoever we are forced to\nrecognize in all causation of created efficient causes the _concursus_ of\nthe _First Cause_.\n\n(_d_) The actuality of the effect is in its adequate created cause or\ncauses, _not actually and formally, but potentially_ or _virtually_. If\nthe cause produce an effect of the same kind as itself (_causa\n____univoca___), as when living organisms propagate their species, the\nperfection of the effect is said to be in the cause _equivalently_\n(_aequivalenter_); if it produce an effect of a different kind from itself\n(_causa ____analoga___), as when a sculptor makes a statue, the perfection\nof the effect is said to be in the cause _eminently_ (_eminenter_).\n\n(_e_) _Omne agens agit inquantum est in actu._ The operative power of a\nbeing is in proportion to its own actual perfection: the higher an agent\nis on the scale of reality, or in other words the more perfect its grade\nof being, the higher and more perfect will be the effects achieved by the\nexercise of its operative powers. In fact our chief test of the perfection\nof any nature is analysis of its operations. Hence the maxim so often\nreferred to already:\u2014\n\n(_f_) _Operari sequitur esse; qualis est operatio talis est natura; modus\noperandi sequitur modum essendi._ Operation is the key to nature; we know\nwhat any thing is by what it does.\n\n(_g_) _Nihil agit ultra suam speciem_; or, again, _Omne agens agit simile\nsibi_. These are inductive generalizations gathered from experience, and\nhave reference to the natural operation of agents, especially in the\norganic world. Living organisms reproduce only their own kind. Moreover,\nevery agency in the universe has operative powers of a definite kind;\nacting according to its nature it produces certain effects and these only;\nothers it cannot produce: this is, in the natural order of things, and\nwith the natural _concursus_ of the First Cause. But created causes have a\npassive _obediential capacity_ (_potentia obedientialis_) whereby their\nnature can be so elevated by the First Cause that they can produce, with\nHis special, supernatural _concursus_, effects of an entirely higher order\nthan those within the ambit of their natural powers.(454)\n\n(_h_) From a known effect, of whatsoever kind, we can argue with\ncertainty, _a posteriori_, to the _existence_ of an adequate efficient\ncause, and to _some knowledge_ of the _nature_ of such a cause.(455) By\nvirtue of the principle of causality we can infer the existence of an\nadequate cause containing either equivalently or eminently all the\nperfections of the effect in question.\n\n99. CLASSIFICATION OF EFFICIENT CAUSES.\u2014(_a_) We have already referred to\nthe distinction between the _First_ Cause and _Second_ or _Created_\nCauses. The former is absolutely independent of all other beings both as\nto His power and as to the exercise of this power. The latter are\ndependent, for both, upon the former.\n\nThe distinction between a first, or primary, or independent cause, and\nsecond, or subordinate, or dependent causes can be understood not only of\ncauses universally, but also as obtaining among created causes themselves.\nIn general the _subordination_ of a cause to a superior or anterior cause\nmay be either _essential_ or _accidental_: essential, when the second\ncause depends\u2014either for its existence or for an indispensable complement\nof its efficiency\u2014on the _present_ actual influence of the other cause;\naccidental when the second cause has indeed received its existence or\nefficiency from this other cause, but is now no longer dependent, for its\nexistence or action, on the latter. Thus, living organisms are, as causes,\naccidentally subordinate to their parent organisms: they derived their\nexistence from the latter, but are independent of these when in their\nmaturity they continue to exist, and live, and act of themselves and for\nthemselves. But all creatures, on the other hand, are, as causes,\n_essentially_ subordinate to the Creator, inasmuch as they can exist and\nact only in constant dependence on the ever present and ever actual\nconserving and concurring influence of the Creator.\n\nIt is obvious that all the members of any series of causes _essentially_\nsubordinate the one to the other _must exist simultaneously_. Whether such\na series could be infinite depends, therefore, on the question whether an\n_actually infinite multitude_ is intrinsically possible. This difficulty\ncannot be urged with such force against an infinite regress in causes\n_accidentally_ subordinate to one another; for here such a regress would\nnot involve an actually infinite multitude of things existing\nsimultaneously. In the case of essentially subordinate causes, moreover,\nthe series, whatever about its infinity, must contain, or rather imply\n_above_ it, _one_ cause which is _first_ in the sense of being\n_independent_, or exempt from the subordination characteristic of all the\nothers. And the reason is obvious: Since no one of them can exist or act\nexcept dependently on another, and this on another, and so on, it is\nmanifest that the series cannot exist at all unless there is some one\ncause which, unlike all the others, exists and acts without such\nsubordination or dependence. Hence, _in essentially subordinate causes an\ninfinite regress is impossible_.(456) In Natural Theology these\nconsiderations are of supreme importance.\n\n(_b_) An efficient cause may be described as _immanent_ or _transitive_\naccording as the term of its action remains within the cause itself, or is\nproduced in something else. The action of the First Cause is formally\nimmanent, being identical with the Divine Nature itself; it is virtually\ntransitive when it is creative, or operative among creatures.\n\n(_c_) An efficient cause is either a _principal_ or an _instrumental_\ncause. When two causes so combine to produce an effect that one of them\nuses the other the former is called the principal and the latter the\ninstrumental cause. Thus I am the principal cause of the words I am\nwriting; my pen is the instrumental cause of them. Such an effect is\nalways attributed to the principal cause, not to the instrumental. The\nnotion of an instrument is quite a familiar notion. An instrument helps\nthe principal agent to do what the latter could not otherwise do, or at\nleast not so easily. An instrument therefore is really a cause. It\ncontributes positively to the production of the effect. How does it do so?\nBy reason of its nature or structure it influences, modifies, and directs\nin a particular way, the efficiency of the principal cause. But this\nproperty of the instrumental cause comes into play only when the latter is\nbeing actually used by a principal cause. A pen, a saw, a hammer, a spade,\nhave each its own instrumentality. The pen will not cut, nor the saw mould\niron, nor the hammer dig, nor the spade write, for the agent that uses\nthem. Each will produce its own kind of effect when used; but none of them\nwill produce any effect except when used: though each has in itself\npermanently and inherently the power to produce its own proper effect in\nuse.(457) We have instanced the use of _artificial_ instruments. But\nnature itself provides some agencies with what may be called _natural_\ninstruments. The _semen_ whereby living organisms propagate their kind is\nan instance. In a less proper sense the various members of the body are\ncalled instruments of the human person as principal cause, \u201cinstrumenta\n_conjuncta_\u201d.\n\nThe notion of an instrumental cause involves then (_a_) subordination of\nthe latter, in its instrumental activity, to a principal cause, (_b_)\nincapacity to produce the effect otherwise than by modifying and directing\nthe influence of the principal cause. This property whereby the\ninstrumental cause modifies or determines in a particular way the\ninfluence of the principal cause, is called by St. Thomas an _actio_ or\n_operatio_ of the former; the distinction between the principal and the\ninstrumental cause being that whereas the former acts by virtue of a power\npermanently inherent in it as a natural perfection, the latter acts as an\ninstrument only by virtue of the transient motion which it derives from\nthe principal cause which utilizes it.(458)\n\nWe may, therefore, define an _instrumental_ cause as _one which, when\nacting as an instrument, produces the effect not by virtue of its inherent\npower alone, but by virtue of a power communicated to it by some principal\ncause which acts through it_. A _principal_ cause, on the other hand, is\n_one which produces its effect by virtue of an active power permanently\ninherent in itself_.\n\nThe designations _principal_ and _instrumental_ are obviously correlative.\nMoreover, _all created_ causes may be called _instrumental_ in relation to\nthe _First Cause_. For, not only are they dependent on the latter for the\n_conservation_ of their nature and active powers; they are also dependent,\nin their action, in their actual exercise of these powers, on the First\nCause (for the _concursus_ of the latter).(459) Yet some created causes\nhave these powers permanently, and can exercise them without subordination\nto other creatures; while others need, for the exercise of their proper\nfunctions, not only the Divine _concursus_, but also the motion of other\ncreatures. Hence the former are rightly called _principal_ created causes,\nand the latter _instrumental_ created causes.\n\n(_d_) Efficient causes are divided into _free_ causes and _necessary_\ncauses. A free or self-determining cause is _one which is not determined\nby its nature to one line of action_, but _has the power of choosing, or\ndetermining itself_, to act or abstain, when all the conditions requisite\nfor acting are present. Man is a free agent, or free cause, of his\ndeliberate actions. A necessary cause, or natural cause as it is sometimes\ncalled, is _one which is determined by its nature to one invariable line\nof action_, so that, granted the conditions requisite for action, it\ncannot naturally abstain from acting in that invariable manner. All the\nphysical agencies of the inorganic world, all plant and animal organisms\nbeneath man himself, are necessary causes.\n\nThe freedom of the human will is established against determinism in\nPsychology.(460) The difficulties of determinists against this doctrine\nare for the most part based on misconceptions, or on erroneous and\ngratuitous assumptions. We may mention two of them here.(461) Free\nactivity, they say, would be _causeless_ activity: it would violate the\n\u201claw of universal causation\u201d. We reply that free activity is by no means\ncauseless activity. The free agent himself is in the fullest and truest\nsense the efficient cause of his free acts. It is by his causal, efficient\ninfluence that the act of free choice is determined and elicited. Free\ncausality evidently does not violate the necessary, _a priori_ principle\nset forth above under the title of the Principle of Causality. But\u2014they\nurge in the second place\u2014it violates the \u201claw of universal causation,\u201d\n_i.e._ the law that every event in nature must be the result of some set\nof phenomenal antecedents which _necessitate_ it, and which, therefore,\nwhenever verified, _must_ produce this result and no other; and by\nviolating this law it removes all supposed \u201cfree\u201d activities from the\ndomain of that regularity and uniformity without which no scientific\nknowledge of such phenomena would be possible. To this we reply, firstly,\nthat the law of uniform causation in nature, the law which is known as the\n\u201cLaw of the Uniformity of Nature,\u201d and which, under the title of the \u201cLaw\nof Universal Causation\u201d is confounded by determinists and phenomenists\nwith the entirely distinct \u201cPrinciple of Causality\u201d\u2014is not by any means a\nlaw of _necessary_ causation.(462) The statement that Nature is uniform in\nits activities is not the expression of an _a priori_, necessary truth,\nlike the Principle of Causality. It is a generalization from experience.\nAnd experience testifies to the existence of grades in this all-prevailing\nuniformity. In the domain of physical nature it is the expression of the\nFree Will of the Author of Nature, who may miraculously derogate from this\nphysical uniformity for higher, moral ends. In the domain of deliberate\nhuman activities it is the expression of that less rigorous but no less\nreal uniformity which is dependent on the free will of man. And just as\nthe possibility of miracles in the former domain does not destroy the\nregularity on which the generalizations of the physical sciences are\nbased, so neither does the fact of human free will render worthless or\nunreliable the generalizations of the human sciences (ethical, social,\npolitical, economic, etc.) about human conduct. Were the appearance of\nmiracles in the physical domain, or the ordinary play of free will in the\nhuman domain, entirely _capricious_, _motiveless_, _purposeless_, the\nresults would, of course, be chaotic, precarious, unaccountable,\nunintelligible, and scientific knowledge of them would be impossible: for\nthe assumption that reality is the work of intelligent purpose, and is\ntherefore a regular, orderly expression of law, in other words, the\nassumption that the universe is intelligible, is a prerequisite condition\nfor scientific knowledge about the universe. But determinists seem to\nassume that Divine Providence and human free will must necessarily imply\nthat the whole universe of physical phenomena and human activities would\nbe an unintelligible chaos; and having erected this philosophical\nscarecrow on a gratuitous assumption they think it will gradually exorcise\nall belief in Divine Providence and human freedom from the \u201cscientific\u201d\nmind!\n\n(_e_) Efficient causes are either _physical_ or _moral_. A physical\nefficient cause is _one which produces its effect by its own proper power\nand action_\u2014whether immediately or by means of an instrument. For\ninstance, the billiard player is the physical cause of the motion he\nimparts to the balls by means of the cue. A moral cause is one which\nproduces its effect by the representation of something as good or evil to\nthe mind of a free agent; by inducing the latter through example, advice,\npersuasion, promises, threats, commands, entreaties, etc., to produce the\neffect in question. For instance, a master is the moral cause of what his\nservant does in obedience to his commands. The motives set forth by way of\ninducement to the latter are of course _final_ causes of the latter\u2019s\naction. But the former, by setting them forth, is the moral cause of the\naction: he is undoubtedly more than a mere condition; he contributes\npositively and efficiently to the effect. His physical causation, however,\ndoes not reach to the effect itself, but only to the effect wrought in the\nmind of the servant by his command. It is causally connected with the\nphysical action of the servant by means of an intermediate link which we\nmay call _mental_ or _psychical causation_\u2014_actio_ \u201c_intentionalis_,\u201d\u2014the\naction of cognition on the mind of a cognitive agent.\n\nThe agent employed by a moral cause to produce an effect physically may be\ncalled an instrumental cause in a wide and less proper sense of this term,\nthe instrumentality being moral, not physical. Only free agents can be\nmoral causes; and as a rule they are termed moral causes only when they\nproduce the effect through the physical operation of another free agent.\nWhat if they employ not free agents, nor yet inanimate instruments, but\nagents endowed with sense cognition and sense appetite, to produce\neffects? If a man set his dog at another, is he the _moral_ or the\n_physical_ cause of the injuries inflicted by the dog? That he is the\nprincipal _efficient_ cause is unquestionable. But is he the principal\n_physical_ cause and the dog the _instrument_? We think it is more proper\nto call the principal efficient cause a _moral_ cause in all cases where\nthere intervenes between his physical action and the effect an\nintermediate link of \u201cpsychical\u201d or \u201cintentional\u201d action, even though, as\nin the present example, this psychical link is of the sentient, not the\nintellectual, order.\n\n(_f_) The efficient cause, like other causes, may be either _partial_ or\n_total_, according as it produces the effect by co-operation with other\ncauses, or by itself alone. The aim of the inductive sciences is to\ndiscover for each kind of natural event or phenomenon the \u201ctotal cause\u201d in\nthe comprehensive sense of the whole group of _positive_ agencies or\ncauses proper, and _negative_ antecedent and concomitant _conditions_\nwhich are _indispensable_ and _necessitating_ principles of the happening\nof such kind of event.(463)\n\n(_g_) We can distinguish between the _immediate or determining_, the more\nor less _proximate_, and the more or less _remote_, efficient causes of an\nevent. Thus, the application of the fuse to the charge of dynamite in a\nrock is the immediate or determining cause of the explosion which bursts\nthe rock; the lighting of the fuse, the placing of the charge, etc., the\nmore proximate causes; the making of the fuse, dynamite, instruments,\netc., the more remote causes. Again the aim of the inductive sciences is\nto discover the \u201ctotal _proximate_ cause\u201d of events,(464) leaving the\ninvestigation of ultimate causes, as well as the analysis of causality\nitself, to philosophy.\n\n(_h_) Finally, we must distinguish between the _individual_ agent itself\nas cause (the _suppositum_ or person that acts); the agent\u2019s _nature_ and\n_active power_ as causes; and the _action_, or exercise of this power as\ncause. The former, the individual, concrete agent, is the \u201cprincipium\n_quod_ agit,\u201d and is called the \u201ccausa _ut quae_\u201d. The nature and the\nactive power of the agent are each a \u201cprincipium _quo_ agens agit,\u201d the\nremote and the proximate principle of action respectively; and each is\ncalled a \u201ccausa _ut qua_\u201d. The action of the agent is the cause of the\neffect in the sense that the actual production or _fieri_ of anything is\nthe immediate cause of this thing _in facto esse_. Corresponding to these\ndistinctions we distinguish between the cause _in actu primo remoto_, _in\nactu primo proximo_, and _in actu secundo_. These distinctions are of no\nlittle importance. By ignoring them, and by losing sight of the intrinsic\n(formal and material) causes of natural phenomena, many modern scientists\nand philosophers have confounded cause and effect with the process itself\nof causation, and declared that cause and effect are not distinct\nrealities, but only two mental aspects of one and the same reality.(465)\n\n\n    The same may be said of all the distinctions so far enumerated.\n    They are absolutely essential to the formation of clear ideas on\n    the question of causality. No term in familiar use is of more\n    profound philosophical significance, and at the same time more\n    elastic and ambiguous in its popular meanings, than the term\n    _cause_. This is keenly felt in the Logic of the Inductive\n    Sciences, where not only the discovery, but the exact measurement,\n    of physical causes, is the goal of research.\n\n    \u201cWhen we call one thing,\u201d writes Mr. Joseph,(466) \u201cthe cause of\n    another, the real relation between them is not always the same....\n    We say that molecular action is the cause of heat, that the heat\n    of the sun is the cause of growth, that starvation is sometimes\n    the cause of death, that jealousy is a frequent cause of crime. We\n    should in the first case maintain that cause and effect are\n    reciprocally necessary; no heat without molecular motion and no\n    molecular motion without heat. In the second the effect cannot\n    exist without the cause, but the cause may exist without the\n    effect, for the sun shines on the moon but nothing grows there. In\n    the third the cause cannot exist without the effect, for\n    starvation must produce death, but the effect may exist without\n    the cause, since death need not have been produced by starvation.\n    In the fourth case we can have the cause without the effect, and\n    also the effect without the cause; for jealousy may exist without\n    producing crime, and crime may occur without the motive of\n    jealousy. It is plain then that we do not always mean the same\n    thing by our words when we say that two things are related as\n    cause and effect; and anyone who would classify and name the\n    various modes in which two things may be causally related would do\n    a great service to clear thinking.\u201d\n\n    In the popular acceptation of the term _cause_, the same kind of\n    event can have a _plurality of (efficient) causes_. Death, for\n    example, may be brought about in different cases by different\n    diseases or accidents. But if we understand by the total efficient\n    cause of any given kind of effect the sum-total of agencies and\n    conditions which when present _necessitate_ this kind of an\n    effect, and which are collectively and severally _indispensable_\n    for its production, then it is obvious that a given _kind_ of\n    effect can have _only one kind_ of such total group of antecedents\n    as total cause, just as any one individual effect can have only\n    one individual total cause, _viz._ the one which actually produced\n    it; a _similar_ total cause would produce a _similar_ effect, but\n    could not produce the numerically identical individual effect of\n    the other similar cause.(467)\n\n    The medieval scholastics discussed the question in connexion with\n    the problem of individuation: \u201cWould Alexander the Great have been\n    the same individual had he been born of other parents than Philip\n    and Olympia?\u201d The question is hardly intelligible. The person born\n    of these other parents might indeed have been as similar as you\n    will to the actual Alexander of history, but would not and could\n    not have been the actual Alexander of history. Nowadays the\n    question discussed in this connexion is not so much whether the\n    same kind of natural phenomenon can be produced by different kinds\n    of total cause\u2014for the answer to this question depends wholly on\n    the wider or the narrower meaning attached to the term \u201ctotal\n    cause,\u201d(468)\u2014but rather whether or how far the inductive\n    scientist\u2019s ideal of searching always for the _necessitating and\n    indispensable_ cause (or, as it is also called, the\n    \u201creciprocating\u201d or \u201ccommensurate\u201d cause) is a practical ideal.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV. EFFICIENT CAUSALITY; PHENOMENISM AND OCCASIONALISM.\n\n\n100. OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF EFFICIENT\nCAUSALITY.\u2014We have seen how modern sensists, phenomenists, and positivists\nhave doubted or denied the power of the human mind to attain to a\nknowledge of any objective reality corresponding to the category of\nsubstance (\u00a7\u00a7 61 _sqq._). They treat in a similar way the traditional\nconcept of efficient causality. And in delivering their open or veiled\nattacks on the real validity of this notion they have made a misleading\nuse of the proper and legitimate function of the inductive sciences. The\nchief aim of the natural scientist is to seek out and bring to light the\n_whole group of necessitating and indispensable_ (phenomenal)\n_antecedents_ of any given kind of event, and to formulate the natural law\nof their connexion with this kind of event. There is no particular\nobjection to his calling these antecedents the _invariable_, or even the\n_necessary_ or _necessitating_, antecedents of the event; provided he does\nnot claim what he cannot prove\u2014and what, as we shall see later (104), is\nnot true, _viz._\u2014that the invariability or necessity of this connexion\nbetween phenomenal antecedents and consequents is wholly inviolable,\nfatal, absolute in character. He may rightly claim for any such\nestablished connexion the hypothetical, conditional necessity which\ncharacterizes all inductively established laws of physical nature. There\nare such antecedents and consequents in the universe; there are connexions\nbetween them which are more than mere _casual_ connexions of _time\nsequence_, which are connexions of physical law, inasmuch as they are\nconnexions based on the _natures_ of agencies in an _orderly_ universe,\nconnexions of these agencies with their natural effects. All this is\nundeniable. Moreover, so long as _the scientist_ confines himself to\ninferences concerning such connexions between phenomena, to inferences and\ngeneralizations based on the assumed uniformity of nature, he is working\nin his proper sphere. Nay, even if he chooses to designate these groups of\ninvariable phenomenal antecedents by the title of \u201cphysical causes\u201d we\nknow what he means; though we perceive some danger of confusion, inasmuch\nas we see him arrogating to the notion of regularity or uniformity of\nconnexion _i.e._ to the notion of _physical law_, a term, _causality_,\nwhich traditionally expressed something quite distinct from this, _viz._\nthe notion of _positive influence_ of one thing on the being or happening\nof another. But when _phenomenist philosophers_ adopt this usage we cannot\nfeel reassured against the danger of confusion by such protestations as\nthose of Mill in the following passage:\u2014(469)\n\n\n    I premise, then, that when in the course of this inquiry I speak\n    of the cause of any phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not\n    itself a phenomenon; I make no research into the ultimate or\n    ontological cause of anything. To adopt a distinction familiar in\n    the writings of the Scotch metaphysicians, and especially of Reid,\n    the causes with which I concern myself are not _efficient_, but\n    _physical_ causes. They are causes in that sense alone, in which\n    one physical fact is said to be the cause of another. Of the\n    efficient causes of phenomena, or whether any such causes exist at\n    all I am not called upon to give an opinion. The notion of\n    causation is deemed, by the schools of metaphysics most in vogue\n    at the present moment, to imply a mysterious and most powerful\n    tie, such as cannot, or at least does not, exist between any\n    physical fact and that other physical fact on which it is\n    invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its cause;\n    and thence is deduced the supposed necessity of ascending higher,\n    into the essences and inherent constitution of things, to find the\n    true cause, the cause which is not only followed by, but actually\n    produces, the effect. No such necessity exists for the purposes of\n    the present inquiry, nor will any such doctrine be found in the\n    following pages. The only notion of a cause, which the theory of\n    induction requires, is such a notion as can be gained by\n    experience. The Law of Causation, which is the main pillar of\n    inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariability\n    of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact\n    in nature and some other fact which has preceded it; independently\n    of all considerations respecting the ultimate mode of production\n    of phenomena, and of every other question regarding the nature of\n    \u201cThings in themselves\u201d.\n\n\nThis passage\u2014which expresses fairly well the phenomenist and positivist\nattitude in regard to the reality, or at least the cognoscibility, of\n_efficient_ causes\u2014fairly bristles with inaccuracies, misconceptions, and\nfalse insinuations.(470) But we are concerned here only with the denial\nthat any notion of an _efficient_ cause \u201ccan be gained from experience,\u201d\nand the doubt consequently cast on the objective validity of this notion.\nThe Sensism which regards our highest intellectual activities as mere\norganic associations of sentient states of consciousness, has for its\nlogical issue the Positivism which contends that all valid knowledge is\nconfined to the existence and time and space relations of sense phenomena.\nIn thus denying to the mind all power of attaining to a valid knowledge of\nanything suprasensible\u2014such as substance, power, force, efficient cause,\netc.\u2014Positivism passes over into Agnosticism.\n\nIn refutation of this philosophy, in so far as it denies that we have any\ngrounds in experience for believing in the real existence of efficient\ncauses, we may set down in the first place this universal belief itself of\nthe human race that there are in the universe efficient causes of the\nevents that happen in it. Men universally believe that they themselves as\nagents contribute by a real and positive influence to the actual\noccurrence of their own thoughts, reasonings, wishes, desires, sensations;\nthat their mental resolves to speak, walk, write, eat, or perform any\nother external, bodily works do really, positively, and efficiently\nproduce or cause those works; that external phenomena have a real\ninfluence on happenings in their own bodies, that fire burns them and food\nnourishes them; that external phenomena also have a real and positive\ninfluence on their sense organs, and through these on their minds by the\nproduction there of conscious states such as sensations; finally that\nexternal phenomena have a real and positive influence on one another; that\nby action and interaction they really produce the changes that are\nconstantly taking place in the universe: that the sun does really heat and\nlight the earth, that the sowing of the seed in springtime has really a\npositive influence on the existence of crops in the harvest, that the\ntaking of poison has undoubtedly a real influence on the death which\nresults from it. And if any man of ordinary intelligence and plain common\nsense is told that such belief is an illusion, that in all such cases the\nconnexion between the things, facts or events which he designates as\n\u201ccause\u201d and \u201ceffect,\u201d is a mere connexion of invariable time sequence\nbetween antecedents and consequents, that in no case is there evidence of\nany _positive, productive influence_ of the one fact upon the other, he\nwill either smile incredulously and decline to take his objector\nseriously, or he will simply ask the latter to _prove_ the universal\nbelief to be an illusion. His conviction of the real and objective\nvalidity of his notion of efficient cause, as something which positively\ninfluences the happening of things, is so profound and ineradicable that\nit must necessarily be grounded in, and confirmed by, his constant\nexperience of the real world in which he lives and moves. Not that he\nprofesses to be able to explain the _nature_ of this efficient influence\nin which he believes. Even if he were a philosopher he might not be able\nto satisfy himself or others on this point But being a plain man of\nordinary intelligence he has sense enough to distinguish between the\n_existence_ of a fact and its _nature_, its explanation, its _quomodo_;\nand to believe in the real existence of a _positive efficient, productive_\ninfluence of cause on effect, however this influence is to be conceived or\nexplained.\n\nA second argument for the objective validity of the concept of efficient\ncause may be drawn from a consideration of the _Principle of Causality_.\nThe experience on which the plain man grounds his belief in the validity\nof his notion of cause is not mere uninterpreted sense experience in its\nraw and brute condition, so to speak; it is this sense experience\nrationalized, assimilated into his intelligence\u2014spontaneously and half\nunconsciously, perhaps\u2014by the light of the self-evident Principle of\nCausality, that whatever happens has a cause. When the plain man believes\nthat all the various agencies in nature, like those enumerated above, are\nnot merely _temporal_ antecedents or concomitants of their effects, but\nare _really productive_ of those effects, he is really applying the\nuniversal and necessary truth\u2014that an \u201cevent,\u201d a \u201chappening,\u201d a \u201cchange,\u201d\na \u201ccommencement\u201d of any new actual mode of being demands the existence of\nanother actual being as cause\u2014the truth embodied in the Principle of\nCausality, to this, that, and the other event of his experience: he is\n_locating_ the \u201ccauses\u201d of these events in the various persons and things\nwhich he regards as the agents or producers of these events. In making\nsuch applications he may very possibly err in detail. But no actual\napplication of the principle at all is really required for establishing\nthe objective validity of the concept of cause. There are philosophers\nwho\u2014erroneously, as we shall see\u2014deny that the Principle of Causality\nfinds its application in the domain of _created_ things, who hold, in\nother words, that no created beings can be efficient causes (102), and who\nnevertheless recognize, and quite rightly, that the concept of efficient\ncause is an objectively valid concept. And they do so because they see\nthat since events, beginnings, happenings, changes, are real, there must\nbe really and objectively existent an efficient cause of them\u2014whatever and\nwherever such efficient cause may be: whether it be one or manifold,\nfinite or infinite, etc.\n\n\n    We have already examined Hume\u2019s attempt to deny the ontological\n    necessity of the Principle of Causality and to substitute therefor\n    a subjectively or psychologically necessary \u201cfeeling of\n    expectation\u201d grounded on habitual association of ideas. Kant, on\n    the other hand, admits the self-evident, necessary character of\n    the Principle; but holds that, since this necessity is engendered\n    by the mind\u2019s imposing a subjective form of thought on the data of\n    sense consciousness, the principle is validly applicable only to\n    connexions within the world of mental appearances, and not at all\n    to the world of real being. He thus transfers the discussion to\n    the domain of Epistemology, where in opposition to his theory of\n    knowledge the Principle of Causality can be shown to be applicable\n    to all contingent reality, and to be therefore legitimately\n    employed in Natural Theology for the purpose of establishing the\n    real existence of an Uncaused First Cause.\n\n\n101. ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF EFFICIENT CAUSE.\u2014We have seen that universal\nbelief in the real existence of efficient causes is grounded in\nexperience. The formation of the concept, and its application or extension\nto the world within and around us, are gradual.(471) Active power, force,\nenergy, efficiency, faculty, or by whatever other name we may call it, is\nof course experienced only in its actual exercise, in action, motion,\nproduction of change. Our first experience of its exercise is found in our\nconsciousness of our own personal activities, mental and bodily: in our\nthinking, willing or choosing, in our deliberate control of our mental\nprocesses, and in the deliberate exercise of our sense faculties and\nbodily organs. In all this we are conscious of exerting power, force,\nenergy: we apprehend _ourselves_ as agents or efficient causes of our\nmental processes and bodily movements. We apprehend these happenings as\ndue to the exercise of _our own power to produce them_. Seeing other human\nbeings behave like ourselves, we infer by analogy that they also possess\nand exercise active powers like our own, that they, too, are efficient\ncauses. Finally, observing that effects like to those produced by\nourselves, whether in ourselves or in the material world around us, are\nalso consequent on certain other changes in external nature, whether\norganic or inorganic, we infer by analogy that these corporeal things have\nalso powers, forces, energies, whereby they produce these effects. While\nour senses testify only to time and space connexions between physical\nhappenings in external nature, our intellect apprehends action and\ninteraction, _i.e._ causal dependence of events on the active influence or\nefficiency of physical things as agents or causes.(472) Thus, our\nknowledge of the existence and nature of the forces, powers and energies\nwhich constitute _material_ things efficient causes is posterior to, and\nderived by analogy from, our knowledge of the _mental_ and bodily powers\nwhich reveal themselves to us in our conscious vital processes as\nconstituting our own personal efficient causality.\n\nThis conception of efficient causality even in the inanimate things of\nexternal nature, _after the analogy of our own vital powers_ as revealed\nin our conscious activities, is sometimes disparaged as na\u00efve\nanthropomorphism. It just depends on the manner and degree in which we\npress the analogy. Observing that our earlier notion of cause is \u201cthe\nnotion of power combined with a purpose and an end\u201d (thus including\n_efficient_ and _final_ causality), Newman remarks(473) that \u201cAccordingly,\nwherever the world is young, the movements and changes of physical nature\nhave been and are spontaneously ascribed by its people to the presence and\nwill of hidden agents, who haunt every part of it, the woods, the\nmountains and the streams, the air and the stars, for good or for\nevil\u2014just as children again, by beating the ground after falling, imply\nthat what has bruised them has intelligence\u201d. This is anthropomorphism.\nSo, too, would be the conception of the forces or powers of inanimate\nnature as powers of sub-conscious \u201c_perception_\u201d and \u201c_appetition_\u201d\n(Leibniz), or, again, as rudimentary or diminished \u201cwill-power\u201d\n(Cousin).(474) \u201cPhysical phenomena, as such, are without sense,\u201d as Newman\nrightly observes; and consequently we may not attribute to them any sort\nof conscious efficiency, whether perceptive or appetitive. But Newman\nappears to err in the opposite direction when he adds that \u201cexperience\nteaches us nothing about physical phenomena as causes\u201d.(475) The truth\nlies between these extremes. Taking experience in the wide sense in which\nit includes rational interpretation of, and inference from, the data of\ninternal and external sense perception, experience certainly reveals to us\nthe _existence_ of physical phenomena as efficient causes, or in other\nwords that there is real and efficient causality not only in our own\npersons but also in the external physical universe; and as to the _nature_\nof this causality it also gives us at least some little reliable\ninformation.\n\nBy pursuing this latter question a little we shall be led to examine\ncertain difficulties which lie at the root of _Occasionalism_: the error\nof denying that creatures, or at least merely corporeal creatures, can be\nin any true sense efficient causes. A detailed inquiry into the nature of\nthe active powers, forces or energies of the inorganic universe, _i.e._\ninto the nature of _corporeal_ efficient causality, belongs to Cosmology;\njust as a similar inquiry into _vital_, _sentient_ and _spiritual_\nefficient causality belongs to Psychology. Here we have only to ascertain\nwhat is common and essential to all efficient causality as such, what in\ngeneral is involved in the exercise of efficient causality, in _actio_ and\n_passio_, and what are the main implications revealed in a study of it.\n\n102. ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENT CAUSALITY, OR _Actio_ AND _Passio_: (_a_) THE\nFIRST CAUSE AND CREATED CAUSES.\u2014We have already referred to the universal\ndependence of all created causes on the First Cause; and we shall have\noccasion to return to it in connexion with Occasionalism. God has created\nall second causes; He has given them their powers of action; He conserves\ntheir being and their powers in existence; He applies these powers or puts\nthem in act; He concurs with all their actions; He is therefore the\n_principal_ cause of all their effects; and in relation to Him they are as\ninstrumental causes: \u201cDeus est causa actionis cujuslibet inquantum _dat_\nvirtutem agendi, et inquantum _conservat_ eam, et inquantum _applicat_\nactioni, et inquantum _ejus virtute_ omnis alia virtus agit.\u201d(476)\n\nIn our analysis of change (10) we saw why no finite, created agent can be\nthe _adequate_ cause of the _new actualities_ or perfections involved in\nchange, and how we are therefore obliged, by a necessity of thought, to\ninfer the existence of a First Cause, an Unchanging, Infinite Source of\nthese new actualities.(477)\n\nThe principle upon which the argument was based is this: that the\nactuality of the effect is something over and above the reality which it\nhad in the passive potentiality of its created material cause and in the\nactive powers of its created efficient cause antecedently to its\nproduction: that therefore the production of this actuality, this _novum\nesse_, implies the influence\u2014by way of co-operation or _concursus_ with\nthe created efficient cause\u2014of an Actual Being in whom the actuality of\nall effects is contained in an eminently perfect way. Even with the Divine\n_concursus_ a created cause cannot itself _create_, because even with this\n_concursus_ its efficiency attains only to the modifying or changing of\npre-existing being: and in creation there is no pre-existing being, no\nmaterial cause, no real passive potentiality to be actuated. But _without_\nthis _concursus_ not only can it not create; it cannot even, as an\nefficient cause, actuate a real pre-existing potentiality. And why?\nBecause its efficiency cannot attain to the _production of new actuality_.\nIt determines the mode of this actuality, and therein precisely lies the\nefficiency of the created cause. But _the positive entity or perfection_\nof this new actuality can be produced only by the Infinite, Changeless,\nInexhaustible Source of all actuality, co-operating with the created\ncause(478) (103).\n\nBut, it might be objected, perhaps created efficient causes are themselves\nthe adequate and absolutely independent principles of the whole actuality\nof their effects? They cannot be such; and that for the simple reason that\nthey are not always _in act_. Were they such they should be always and\nnecessarily in act: they should always and necessarily contain in\nthemselves, and that actually and in an eminently perfect manner, all the\nperfections of all the effects which they gradually produce in the\nuniverse. But experience shows us that created causes are not always\nacting, that their active power, their causality _in actu primo_ is not to\nbe identified with their action, their causality _in actu secundo_; and\nreason tells us that since this is so, since action is something more than\n_active power_, since a cause acting has more actuality than the same\ncause not acting, it must have been determined or reduced to action by\nsome actuality other than itself. This surplus of actuality or perfection\nin an acting cause, as compared with the same cause prior to its acting,\nis the Divine _concursus_. In other words, an active power which is really\ndistinct from its action requires to be moved or reduced to _its_ act\n(which is _actio_) no less than a passive potentiality required to be\nmoved to _its_ act (which is _passio_), by some really distinct actual\nbeing. A created efficient cause, therefore, by passing from the state of\nrest, or mere power to act, into the state of action, is perfected by\nhaving its active power actualized, _i.e._ by the Divine _concursus_: in\nthis sense action is a perfection of the agent. But it is not an\nentitative perfection of the latter\u2019s essence; it is not a permanent or\nstable elevation or perfection of the latter\u2019s powers; it is not the\ncompletion of any passive potentiality of the latter; nor therefore is it\nproperly speaking a _change_ of the agent as such; it is, as we have said\nalready, rather an index of the latter\u2019s perfection in the scale of real\nbeing.(479) Action really perfects the _patiens_; and only when this is\nidentical in its concrete individuality with the _agens_ is the latter\npermanently perfected by the action.\n\nThe action of created causes, therefore, depends on the action of the\nFirst Cause. We derive our notion of action from the former and apply it\nanalogically to the latter. If we compare them we shall find that,\nnotwithstanding many differences, the notion of action in general involves\na \u201csimple\u201d or \u201cunmixed\u201d perfection which can, without anthropomorphism, be\napplied analogically to the Divine Action. The Divine Action is identical\nwith the Divine Power and the Divine Essence. In creatures essence, power\nand action are really distinct. The Divine Action, when creative, has not\nfor its term a _change_ in the strict sense (10, 11), for it produces\nbeing _ex nihilo_, whereas the action of creatures cannot have for term\nthe production of new being _ex nihilo_, but only the change of\npre-existing being. The Divine Action, whether in creating or conserving\nor concurring with creatures, implies in God no real transition from power\nto act; whereas the action of creatures does imply such transition in\nthem. Such are the differences; but with them there is this point of\nagreement: the Divine Action implies in God an efficiency which has for\nits term _the origin of new being dependently on this efficiency_.(480)\nSo, too, does the _action of creatures_. _Positive efficient influence on\nthe one side, and the origin, production, or _\u201cfieri\u201d_ of new actual being\non the other, with a relation of real dependence on this efficiency_: such\nis the essential note of all efficient causality, whether of God or of\ncreatures.(481)\n\n103. (_b_) ACTIO IMMANENS AND ACTIO TRANSIENS.\u2014Let us compare in the next\nplace the perfectly immanent spiritual causality of thought, the less\nperfectly immanent organic causality of living things, and the transitive\nphysical causality of the agencies of inorganic nature. The term of an\nimmanent action remains either within the very faculty which elicits it,\naffecting this faculty as a habit: thus acts of thought terminate in the\nintellectual habits called _sciences_, acts of free choice in the habits\nof will called _virtues_ or _vices_.(482) Or it remains at least within\nthe agent: as when in the vital process of nutrition the various parts and\nmembers of the living organism so interact as procure the growth and\ndevelopment of the living individual which is the cause of these\nfunctions.(483) In those cases the agent itself is the _patiens_, whereas\nevery agency in the inorganic universe acts not upon itself, but only on\nsome other thing, _transitively_. But immanent action, no less than\ntransitive action, is productive of real change\u2014not, of course, in the\nphysical sense in which this term is identified with \u201cmotion\u201d and\nunderstood of corporeal change, but in the metaphysical sense of an\n_actuation of some passive potentiality_ (10, 11).(484)\n\nWhat, then, do we find common to the immanent and the transitive causality\nof created causes? _An active power or influence on the side of the agent,\nan actuation of this active power_, either by the action of other causes\non this agent, or by the fulfilment of all conditions requisite for the\naction of the agent, and in all cases by the concursus of the First Cause;\nand, _on the side of the effect, the production of some new actuality, the\nactuation of some passive potentiality, dependently on the cause_ now in\naction.\n\nThus we see that in all cases _action_, or the exercise of efficient\ncausality, implies that _something which was not actual becomes actual_,\nthat _something which was not_, _now is_; and that this _becoming_, this\n_actuation_, this _production_, is really and essentially dependent on the\ninfluence, the efficiency, of some actual being or beings, which we\ntherefore call _efficient causes_.\n\n\n    104. ERRONEOUS THEORIES OF EFFICIENT CAUSALITY. IMAGINATION AND\n    THOUGHT.\u2014Are we certain of anything more about the nature of this\n    connecting link between efficient cause and effect, which we call\n    _action_? Speculations and theories there are indeed in abundance.\n    Some of these can be shown to be false; and thus our knowledge of\n    the real nature of action may be at least negatively if not\n    positively perfected. Our concept of action is derived, like all\n    our concepts, from experience; and although we are conscious of\n    _spiritual_ action in the exercise of intellect and will, yet it\n    is inseparably allied with sentient action and this again with\n    organic and corporeal action. Nor can we conceive or describe\n    spiritual action without the aid of imagination images, or in\n    language other than that borrowed from the domain of corporeal\n    things, which are the proper object of the human intellect.(485)\n    Now in all this there is a danger: the danger of mistaking\n    imagination images for thoughts, and of giving a literal sense to\n    language in contexts where this language must be rightly\n    understood to apply only analogically.\n\n    In analysing the nature of efficient causality we might be tempted\n    to think that we understood it by imagining some sort of a _flow_\n    or _transference_ of some sort of actual reality from _agens_ to\n    _patiens_. It is quite true that in describing _action_, the\n    actual connecting link between _agens_ and _patiens_, we have to\n    use language suggestive of some such imagination image. We have no\n    option in the matter, for all human language is based upon sense\n    consciousness of physical phenomena. When we describe efficiency\n    as an \u201cinfluence\u201d of cause on effect, or the effect as \u201cdependent\u201d\n    on the cause, the former term suggests a \u201cflowing,\u201d just as the\n    latter suggests a \u201changing\u201d. So, too, when we speak of the effect\n    as \u201carising,\u201d \u201coriginating,\u201d \u201cspringing,\u201d or \u201cemanating,\u201d from the\n    cause.(486) But we have got to ask ourselves what such language\n    _means_, _i.e._, what concepts it expresses, and not what\n    imagination images accompany the use of it.\n\n    Now when we reflect that the senses testify only to time and space\n    sequences and collocations of the phenomena which we regard as\n    causally connected, and when we feel convinced that there is\n    something more than this in the causal connexion,\u2014which something\n    more we describe in the terms illustrated above,\u2014we must inquire\n    whether we have any rational ground for thinking that this\n    something more is really anything in the nature of a spatial\n    transference of some actual reality from _agens_ to _patiens_.\n    There are indeed many philosophers and scientists who seem to\n    believe that there is such a local transference of some actuality\n    from cause to effect, that efficient causality is explained by it,\n    and cannot be intelligibly explained otherwise. As a matter of\n    fact there is no rational ground for believing in any such\n    transference, and even were there such transference, so far from\n    its being the only intelligible explanation of efficient\n    causality, it would leave the whole problem entirely\n    unexplained\u2014and not merely the problem of spiritual, immanent\n    causality, to which it is manifestly inapplicable, but even the\n    problem of corporeal, transitive causality.(487)\n\n    We have already referred at some length (9-11) to the philosophy\n    which has endeavoured to reduce all change, or at least all\n    corporeal change, to mechanical change; all qualities, powers,\n    forces, energies of the universe, to ultimate particles or atoms\n    of matter in motion; and all efficient causality to a flow or\n    transference of spatial motion from particle to particle or from\n    body to body. A full analysis of all such theories belongs to\n    Cosmology. But we may recall a few of the more obvious\n    considerations already urged against them.\n\n    In the first place, the attempt to explain all _qualities_ in the\n    material universe\u2014all the powers, forces, energies, of matter\u2014by\n    maintaining that objectively and extramentally they are all purely\n    _quantitative_ realities, all spatial motions of matter\u2014does not\n    explain the qualitative factors and distinctions in the world of\n    our sense experience at all, but simply transfers the problem of\n    explaining them from the philosophy of matter to the philosophy of\n    mind, by making them all subjective after the manner of Kant\u2019s\n    analysis of experience (11).\n\n    In the second place, when we endeavour to conceive, to apprehend\n    intellectually, how _motion_, or indeed any other physical or real\n    entity, could actually pass or be transferred from _agens_ to\n    _patiens_, whether these be spatially in contact or not, we find\n    such a supposition positively unintelligible. Motion is not a\n    substance; and if it is an accident it cannot migrate from subject\n    to subject. The idea that corporeal efficient causality\u2014even\n    mechanical causality\u2014can be explained by such a transference of\n    actual accidental modes of being from _agens_ to _patiens_ is\n    based on a very crude and erroneous conception of what an\n    accidental mode of being really is (65).\n\n    The more we reflect on the nature of real change in the universe,\n    and of the efficient causality whereby it is realized, the more\n    convinced we must become that there can be no satisfactory\n    explanation of these facts which does not recognize and take\n    account of this great fundamental fact: that contingent real being\n    is _not all actual_, that it is partly potential and partly\n    actual; that therefore our concepts of \u201cpassive potentiality\u201d and\n    \u201cactive power\u201d are not mere subjective mental motions, with at\n    best a mere regulative or systematizing function (after the manner\n    of Kant\u2019s philosophy), but that they are really and objectively\n    valid concepts\u2014concepts which from the time of Aristotle have\n    given philosophers the only insight into the nature of efficient\n    causality which is at any rate satisfactory and intelligible as\n    far as it goes.\n\n    Of this great fact the advocates of the mechanical theory of\n    efficient causality have, in the third place, failed to take\n    account. And it is partly because with the revival of atomism at\n    the dawn of modern philosophy this traditional Aristotelian\n    conception of contingent being as potential and actual was lost\n    sight of (64), that such a crude and really unintelligible account\n    of efficient causality, as a \u201cflow of motion,\u201d has been able to\n    find such continued and widespread acceptance.\n\n    Another reason of the prevalence of this tendency to \u201cexplain\u201d all\n    physical efficient causality as a propagation of spatial motions\n    of matter is to be found in the sensist view of the human mind\n    which confounds intellectual thought with mental imagery, which\n    countenances only _picturable_ factors in its \u201cexplanations,\u201d and\n    denounces as \u201cmetaphysical,\u201d \u201coccult,\u201d and \u201cunverifiable\u201d all\n    explanatory principles such as forces, powers, potentialities,\n    etc., which are not directly picturable in the imagination.(488)\n    And it is a curious fact that it is such philosophers themselves\n    who are really guilty of the charge which they lay at the door of\n    the traditional metaphysics: the charge of offering\n    explanations\u2014of efficient causality, for instance\u2014which are really\n    no explanations. For while they put forward their theory of the\n    \u201cflow of motion\u201d as a real explanation of the _quomodo_ of\n    efficient causality\u2014and the ultimate and only explanation of it\n    within reach of the human mind, if we are to accept their view of\n    the matter\u2014the exponent of the traditional metaphysics more\n    modestly confines himself to setting forth the inevitable\n    implications of the fact of efficient causality, and, without\n    purporting to offer any positive explanation of the real nature of\n    action or efficient influence, he is content to supplement his\n    analysis negatively by pointing out the unintelligible and\n    illusory character of their proffered \u201cexplanations\u201d.\n\n    In the exact methods of the physical sciences, their quantitative\n    evaluation of all corporeal forces whether mechanical, physical,\n    or chemical, in terms of mechanical work, which is measured by the\n    motion of matter through space, and in the great physical\n    generalization known as the law of the equivalence of energies, or\n    of the equality of action and reaction,\u2014we can detect yet further\n    apparent reasons for the conception of efficient causality as a\n    mere transference or interchange of actual physical and measurable\n    entities among bodies. It is an established fact not only that all\n    corporeal agents gradually lose their energy or power of action by\n    actually exercising this power, but that this loss of energy is in\n    direct proportion to the amount of energy gained by the recipients\n    of their action; and this fact would naturally suggest the mental\n    picture of a transference of some actual measurable entity from\n    cause to effect. But it does not necessarily imply such\n    transference\u2014even if the latter were intelligible, which, as we\n    have seen, it is not. The fact is quite intelligibly explained by\n    the natural supposition that in proportion as the _agens_ exhausts\n    its active power by exercise the _patiens_ gains in some form of\n    actuality. Similarly, the fact that all forms of corporeal energy\n    can be measured in terms of mechanical energy does not at all\n    imply that they all _really are_ mechanical energy, but only that\n    natural agents can by the use of one form of energy produce\n    another form in equivalent quantity. And finally, the law of the\n    conservation of corporeal energy in the universe is explained by\n    the law of the equality of action and reaction, and without\n    recourse to the unintelligible supposition that this sum-total of\n    energy is one unchanging and unchangeable _actuality_.\n\n    There is just one other consideration which at first sight appears\n    to favour the \u201ctransference\u201d theory of causality, but which on\n    analysis shows how illusory the proffered explanation is, and how\n    unintelligible the simplest phenomenon of change must be to those\n    who fail to grasp the profound significance of the principle that\n    all real being which is subject to change must of necessity be\n    _partly potential and partly actual_. We allude to the general\n    assumption of physical scientists that corporeal action of\n    whatsoever kind takes place _only on contact_, whether mediate or\n    immediate, between the bodies in question.(489) Now it is well to\n    bear in mind that this is not a self-evident truth or principle,\n    but only an hypothesis, a very legitimate hypothesis and one which\n    works admirably, but still only an hypothesis. It implies the\n    assumption that some sort of substance\u2014called the universal\n    ether\u2014actually exists and fills all space, serving as a medium for\n    the action of gravitation, light, radiant heat, electricity and\n    magnetism, between the earth and the other planets, the sun and\n    the stars. This whole supposition is the only thinkable\n    alternative to _actio in distans_. If those bodies really act on\n    one another\u2014and the fact that they do is undeniable,\u2014and if there\n    were no such medium between them, then the causal influence of one\n    body should be able to produce an effect in another body spatially\n    distant from, and not physically connected by any material medium\n    with, the former. Hence two questions: Is this alternative, _actio\n    in distans_, imaginable? _i.e._ can we form any _positive\n    imagination image_ of _how_ this would take place? And secondly:\n    Is it _thinkable_, _conceivable_, _intrinsically possible_? We\n    need not hesitate to answer the former question in the negative.\n    But as to the latter question all we can say is that we have never\n    met any cogent proof of the intrinsic impossibility of _actio in\n    distans_. The efficient action of a finite cause implies that it\n    has active power and is conserved in existence with this power by\n    the Creator or First Cause, that this power is reduced to act by\n    the Divine _concursus_, and that _dependently on this cause so\n    acting_ some change takes place, some potentiality is actualized\n    in some other finite being. Nothing more than this is involved in\n    the general concept of efficient causality. Of course real\n    influence on the one side, and real dependence on the other, imply\n    some _real_ connexion of cause with effect. But is _spatial_\n    connexion a necessary condition of real connexion? Is a\n    _physical_, _phenomenal_, _imaginable_, _efflux_ of some entity\n    out of the cause into the effect, either immediately or through\n    some medium as a channel, a necessary condition for real\n    influence? There is nothing of the kind in spiritual causality;\n    and to demand anything of the kind for causality in general would\n    be to make imagination, not thought, the test and measure of the\n    real. But perhaps _spatial_ connexion is essential to the real\n    connexion involved in _this particular kind_ of causality,\n    _corporeal_ causality? Perhaps. But it has never been proved. Too\n    little is known about the reality of space, about the ultimate\n    nature of material phenomena and their relation to our minds, to\n    justify anything like dogmatism on such an ultimate question. It\n    may well be that if we had a deeper insight into these things we\n    could pronounce _actio in distans_ to be absolutely incompatible\n    with the essences of the things which do as a matter of fact\n    constitute the actual corporeal universe. But in the absence of\n    such insight we cannot pronounce _actio in distans_ to be\n    intrinsically impossible. Physical scientists assume that as a\n    matter of fact bodies do not act _in distans_. Granted the\n    assumption to be correct, it still remains an open question\n    whether by a miracle they could act _in distans_, _i.e._ whether\n    or not such action would be incompatible with their nature as\n    finite corporeal causes.\n\n    Owing to a very natural tendency to rest in imagination images we\n    are inclined not only to pronounce as impossible any process the\n    mode of which is not positively imaginable, but also to think that\n    we rightly understand a process once we have provided ourselves\n    with an imagination image of it\u2014when as a matter of fact this\n    image may cover an entirely groundless conception or theory of the\n    process. Hence the fairly prevalent idea that while _actio in\n    distans_ is impossible, _the interaction of bodies on contact_ is\n    perfectly intelligible and presents no difficulties. When a\n    billiard ball in motion strikes another at rest it communicates\n    some or all of its motion to the other, and that is all: nothing\n    simpler! And then all the physical, chemical, and substantial\n    changes in the material universe are reducible to this common\n    denominator! The atomic philosophy, with its two modest postulates\n    of matter and motion, is a delightfully simple philosophy; but\n    unfortunately for its philosophical prestige _it does not explain\n    causality or change_. Nor can these facts be explained by any\n    philosophy which ignores the most elementary implication of all\n    real change: the implication that changing reality involves real\n    passive potentialities and real active powers or forces in the\n    phenomena which constitute the changing reality of the universe.\n\n\n105. THE SUBJECT OF EFFICIENT CAUSALITY. OCCASIONALISM.\u2014We have\nestablished the objective validity of the concept of efficient causality\nand analysed its implications. There have been philosophers who, while\nadmitting the objective validity of the concept, have maintained that no\ncreature, or at least no corporeal creature, can be an efficient cause.\nEfficient influence is, in their view, incompatible with the nature of a\ncorporeal substance: only spiritual substances can be efficient causes:\ncorporeal things, conditions, and happenings, are all only the _occasions_\non which spiritual substances act efficiently in and through all created\nnature. Hence the name of the theory: _Occasionalism_. There are two forms\nof it: the milder, which admits that created spirits or minds are\nefficient causes; and the more extreme view, according to which no\ncreature can be an efficient cause, inasmuch as efficient causality is\nessentially a Divine attribute, a prerogative of the Divinity.\n\nThis error was not unknown in the Middle Ages,(490) but it was in the\nseventeenth century that certain disciples of Descartes,\u2014Geulincx\n(1625-1669) and Malebranche (1638-1715),\u2014expressly inferred it from the\nCartesian antithesis of matter and spirit and the Cartesian doctrine that\nmatter is essentially inert, or inactive. According to the gratuitous and\nunproven assertion laid down by Geulincx as a principle: _Quod nescis\nquomodo fiat_, _id non facis_,\u2014we do not cause our own sensations or\nreasoning processes, nor our own bodily movements, inasmuch as we do not\nknow _how_ these take place; nor can bodies cause them, any more than our\nown created spirits, inasmuch as bodies are essentially inactive.\nAccording to Malebranche the mind can perceive no necessary _nexus_\nbetween effects and any cause other than the Divine Will;(491) moreover\nreflection convinces us that efficient causality is something essentially\nDivine and incommunicable to creatures;(492) and finally neither bodies\ncan be causes, for they are essentially inert, nor our minds and wills,\nfor we do not know how a volition could move any organ or member of our\nbodies.(493) Yet Malebranche, at the cost of inconsistency with his own\nprinciples, safeguards free will in man by allowing an exclusively\n_immanent_ efficiency to spiritual causes.(494)\n\nSuch is the teaching of Occasionalism. Our criticism of it will be\nbrief.(495)\n\n(1) Against the doctrine that creatures generally are not, and cannot be,\nefficient causes, we direct the first argument already outlined (100)\nagainst Phenomenism and Positivism,\u2014the argument from the universal belief\nof mankind, based on the testimony of consciousness as rationally\ninterpreted by human intelligence. Consciousness testifies not merely that\nprocesses of thought, imagination, sensation, volition, etc., _take place_\nwithin our minds; not merely that our bodily movements, such as speaking,\nwalking, writing, _occur_; but that _we are the causes of them_.(496) It\nis idle to say that we do not efficiently move our limbs because we may\nnot be able to understand or explain fully \u201c_how_ an unextended volition\ncan move a material limb\u201d.(497) Consciousness testifies to the fact that\nthe volition does move the limb; and that is enough.(498) The fact is one\nthing, the _quomodo_ of the fact is quite another thing. Nor is there any\nground whatever for the assertion that a cause, in order to produce an\neffect, must _understand how_ the exercise of its own efficiency brings\nthat effect about. Moreover, Malebranche\u2019s concession of at least immanent\nactivity to the will is at all events an admission that there is in the\nnature of the creature as such nothing incompatible with its being an\nefficient cause.\n\n(2) Although Malebranche bases his philosophy mainly on deductive, _a\npriori_ reasonings from a consideration of the Divine attributes, his\nsystem is really derogatory to the perfection of the First Cause, and\nespecially to the Divine Wisdom. To say, for instance, that God created an\norgan so well adapted to discharge the function of seeing as the human\neye, and then to deny that the latter discharges this or any function, is\ntantamount to accusing God of folly. There is no reason in this system why\nany created thing or condition of things would be even the appropriate\n_occasion_ of the First Cause producing any definite effect. Everything\nwould be an equally appropriate occasion, or rather nothing would be in\nany intelligible sense an appropriate occasion, for any exercise of the\nDivine causality. The admirable order of the universe\u2014with its unity in\nvariety, its adaptation of means to ends, its gradation of created\nperfections\u2014is an intelligible manifestation of the Divine perfections on\nthe assumption that creatures efficiently co-operate with the First Cause\nin realizing and maintaining this order. But if they were all inert,\ninoperative, useless for this purpose, what could be the _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_\nof their diversified endowments and perfections? So far from manifesting\nthe wisdom, power and goodness of God they would evidence an aimless and\nsenseless prodigality.\n\n(3) Occasionalism imperils the distinction between creatures and a\npersonal God. Although Malebranche, fervent catholic that he was,\nprotested against the pantheism of \u201cle mis\u00e9rable Spinoza,\u201d his own system\ncontains the undeveloped germ of this pernicious error. For, if creatures\nare not efficient causes not only are their variety and multiplicity\nmeaningless, as contributing nothing towards the order of the universe,\nbut their very existence _as distinct realities_ seems to have no _raison\nd\u2019\u00eatre_. Malebranche emphasizes the truth that _God does nothing useless_:\n_Dieu ne fait rien d\u2019inutile_. Very well. If, then, a being _does\nnothing_, what purpose is served by its existence? Of what use is it? What\nis the measure of a creature\u2019s reality, if not its action and its power of\naction? So intimately in fact is this notion of causality bound up with\nthe notion of the very reality of things that the concept of an absolutely\ninert, inactive reality is scarcely intelligible. It is almost an axiom in\nscholastic philosophy that every nature has its correlative activity,\nevery being its operation: _Omne ens est propter suam operationem; Omnis\nnatura ordinatur ad propriam operationem_. Hence if what we call creatures\nhad really no proper activity distinct from that of the First Cause, on\nwhat grounds could we suppose them to have a real and proper existence of\ntheir own distinct from the reality of the Infinite Being? Or who could\nquestion the lawfulness of the inference that they are not really\ncreatures, but only so many phases, aspects, manifestations of the one and\nsole existing reality? Which is Pantheism.\n\n(4) Occasionalism leads to Subjective Idealism by destroying all ground\nfor the objective validity of human science. How do we know the real\nnatures of things? By reasoning from their activities in virtue of the\nprinciple, _Operari sequitur esse_.(499) But if things have no activities,\nno operations, such reasoning is illusory. How, for instance, do we\njustify by rational demonstration, in opposition to subjectivism, the\ncommon-sense interpretation of the data of sense consciousness as\nrevealing to us the real and extramental existence of a material universe?\nBy arguing, in virtue of the principle of causality, from our\nconsciousness of our own passivity in external sense perception, to the\nreal existence of bodies outside our minds, as _excitants_ of our\ncognitive activity and _partial causes_ of these conscious, perceptive\nprocesses. But if occasionalism were true such inference would be\nillusory, and we should infer, with Berkeley, that only God and minds\nexist, but not any material universe. Malebranche admits the possible\nvalidity of this inference to immaterialism from his principles, and\ngrounds his own belief in the existence of an external material universe\nsolely on faith in Divine Revelation.(500)\n\nIt only remains to answer certain difficulties urged by occasionalists\nagainst the possibility of attributing real efficiency to creatures.\n\n(1) They argue that efficient causality is something essentially Divine,\nand therefore cannot be communicated to creatures.\n\nWe reply that while the absolutely independent causality of the First\nCause is essentially Divine, another kind or order of causality, dependent\non the former, but none the less real, can be and is communicated to\ncreatures. And just as the fact that creatures have real being, real\nexistence, distinct from, but dependent on, the existence of the Infinite\nBeing, does not derogate from the supremacy of the latter, so the fact\nthat creatures have real efficient causality, distinct from, but dependent\non, the causality of the First Cause, does not derogate from the latter\u2019s\nsupremacy.\n\n(2) They urge that efficient causality is creative, and therefore infinite\nand incommunicable.\n\nWe reply that there is a plain distinction between creative activity and\nthe efficient activity we claim for creatures. Creation is the production\nof new being from nothingness. God alone, the Infinite Being, can create;\nand, furthermore, according to the common view of Theistic philosophers a\ncreature cannot even be an instrument of the First Cause in this\nproduction of new being from nothingness. And the main reason for this\nappears to be that the efficiency of the creature, acting, of course, with\nthe Divine _concursus_, necessarily presupposes some pre-existing being as\nmaterial on which to operate, and is confined to the _change_ or\n_determination of new forms or modes_ of this pre-existing reality. Such\nefficiency, subordinate to the Divine _concursus_ and limited to such an\norder of effects, is plainly distinct from creative activity.\n\n(3) But the creature, acting with the Divine _concursus_, either\ncontributes something real and positive to the effect or contributes\nnothing. The former alternative is inadmissible, for God is the cause of\neverything real and positive: _omne novum ens est a Deo_. And in the\nlatter alternative, which is the true one, the _concursus_ is superfluous;\nGod does all; and creatures are not really efficient causes.\n\nWe reply that the former alternative, not the latter, is the true one. But\nthe former alternative does not imply that the creature produces any new\nreality _independently of the First Cause_; nor is it incompatible with\nthe truth that God is the author and cause of all positive reality: _omne\nnovum ens est a Deo_. No doubt, were we to conceive the co-operation of\nGod and the creature after the manner of the co-operation of two partial\ncauses of the same order, producing by their joint efficiency some one\ntotal effect\u2014like the co-operation of two horses drawing a cart,\u2014it would\nfollow that the creature\u2019s share of the joint effect would be independent\nof the Divine _concursus_ and attributable to the creature alone, that the\ncreature would produce some reality independently of the First Cause. But\nthat is _not_ the way in which the First Cause concurs with created\ncauses. They are not partial causes of the same order. Each is a total\ncause in its own order. They so co-operate that God, besides having\ncreated and now conserving the second cause, and moving the latter\u2019s power\nto act, produces Himself the whole effect directly and immediately by the\nefficiency of His _concursus_; while at the same time the second cause,\nthus reduced to act, and acting with the _concursus_, also directly and\nimmediately produces the whole effect. There is one effect, one change _in\nfacto esse_, one change _in fieri_, and therefore one action as considered\nin the subject changed, since the action takes place in this latter:\n_actio fit in passo_. This change, this action considered thus passively,\nor \u201c_in passo_,\u201d is the total term of each efficiency, the Divine and the\ncreated, not partly of the one and partly of the other. It is one and\nindivisible; it is wholly due to, and wholly attained by, each efficiency;\nnot, however, under the same formal aspect. We may distinguish in it two\nformalities: it is a _novum ens_, a new actuality, something positive and\nactual superadded to the existing order of real, contingent being; but it\nis not \u201cbeing in general\u201d or \u201cactuality in general,\u201d it is some\nspecifically, nay individually, determinate mode of actuality or actual\nbeing. We have seen that it is precisely because every real effect has the\nformer aspect that it demands for its adequate explanation, and as its\nonly intelligible source, the presence and influence of a purely actual,\nunchanging, infinite, inexhaustible productive principle of all actual\ncontingent reality: hence the necessity and efficacy of the Divine\n_concursus_. And similarly it is because the new actuality involved in\nevery change is an individually definite mode of actuality that we can\ndetect in it the need for, and the efficacy of, the created cause: the\nnature of this latter, the character and scope and intensity of its active\npower is what determines the individuality of the total result, to the\ntotal production of which it has by the aid of the Divine _concursus_\nattained.\n\n(4) But God can Himself produce the total result _under both formalities_\nwithout any efficiency of the creature. Therefore the difficulty remains\nthat the latter efficiency is superfluous and useless: and _entia non sunt\nmultiplicanda praeter necessitatem_.\n\nWe reply that as a matter of fact the effects produced in the ordinary\ncourse of nature are produced by God under both formalities; but also by\nthe created cause under both formalities: inasmuch as the formalities are\nbut mentally distinct aspects of one real result which is, as regards its\nextrinsic causes, individual and indivisible. The distinction of these\nformal aspects only helps us to realize how _de facto_ such an effect is\ndue to the cooperation of the First Cause and created causes. That God\n_could_ produce all such effects without any created causes\u2014we must\ndistinguish. Some such effects He could not produce without created\ncauses, for such production would be self-contradictory. He could not\nproduce, for instance, a volition except as the act of a created will, or\na thought except as the act of a created intellect, or a vital change\nexcept as the act of a living creature. But apart from such cases which\nwould involve an intrinsic impossibility, God could of course produce,\nwithout created agents, the effects which He does produce through their\ncreated efficiency. It is, however, not a question of what _could be_, but\nof what _actually is_. And we think that the arguments already set forth\nprove conclusively that creatures are not _de facto_ the inert, inactive,\naimless and unmeaning things they would be if Occasionalism were the true\ninterpretation of the universe of our actual experience; but that these\ncreatures are in a true sense efficient causes, and that just as by their\nvery co-existence with God, as contingent beings, they do not derogate\nfrom His Infinite Actuality but rather show forth His Infinity, so by\ntheir cooperation with Him as subordinate and dependent efficient causes\nthey do not derogate from His supremacy as First Cause, but rather show\nforth the infinite and inexhaustible riches of His Wisdom and Omnipotence.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV. FINAL CAUSES; UNIVERSAL ORDER.\n\n\n106. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF EXPERIENCE, THE MECHANICAL AND THE\nTELEOLOGICAL.\u2014We have seen that all change in the universe demands for its\nexplanation certain real principles, _viz._ passive potentiality,\nactualization, and active power or efficiency; in other words that it\npoints to material, formal and efficient causes. Do these principles\nsuffice to explain the course of nature to the inquiring mind? Mechanists\nsay, Yes; these principles explain it so far as it is capable of\nexplanation. Teleologists say, No; these principles do not of themselves\naccount for the universe of our experience: this universe reveals itself\nas a _cosmos_: hence it demands for its explanation real principles or\ncauses of another sort, _final causes_, the existence of which implies\npurpose, plan or design, and therefore also intelligence.\n\nThe problem whether or not the universe manifests the existence and\ninfluence of final causes has been sometimes formulated in this striking\nfashion: Is it that birds have wings in order to fly, or is it merely that\nthey fly because they have wings? Such a graphic statement of the problem\nis misleading, for it suggests that the alternatives are mutually\nexclusive, that we must vote either for final causes or for efficient\ncauses. As a matter of fact we accept both. Efficient causes account for\nthe course of nature; but they need to be determined by the influence of\nfinal causes. Moreover, the question how far this influence of final\ncauses extends\u2014_finality_ (_finalitas_), as it is technically termed\u2014is a\nsecondary question; nor does the advocate of final causality in the\nuniverse undertake to decide its nature and scope in every instance and\ndetail, any more than the physical scientist does to point out all the\nphysical laws embodied in an individual natural event, or the biologist to\nsay whether a doubtful specimen of matter is organic or inorganic, or\nwhether a certain sort of living cell is animal or vegetable. The\nteleologist\u2019s thesis, as against that of mechanism, is simply that _there\nare final causes in the universe, that the universe does really manifest\nthe presence and influence of final causes_.(501)\n\nThere are two ways, however, of conceiving this influence as permeating\nthe universe. The conception of final causality in general is, as we shall\nsee, the conception of acting _for an end_, from a _motive_, with a\n_purpose_, _plan_ or _design_ for the attainment of something. It implies\narrangement, ordination, adaptation of means to ends (55). Now at least\nthere _appears_ to be, pervading the universe everywhere and directing its\nactivities, such an adaptation. The admirable equilibrium of forces which\nsecures the regular motions of the heavenly bodies; the exact mixture of\ngases which makes our atmosphere suitable for organic life; the distance\nand relative positions of the sun and the earth, which secure conditions\nfavourable to organic life; the chemical transformations whereby inorganic\nelements and compounds go to form the living substance of plants and are\nthus prepared for assimilation as food by animal organisms; the\nwonderfully graded hierarchy of living species in the animate world, and\nthe mutual interdependence of plants and animals; the endless variety of\ninstincts which secure the preservation and well-being of living\nindividuals and species; most notably the adaptability and adaptation of\nother mundane creatures to human uses by man himself,\u2014innumerable facts\nsuch as these convince us that the things of the universe are _useful to\none another_, that they are constituted and disposed in relation to one\nanother _as if they had been deliberately chosen_ to suit one another, to\nfit in harmoniously together in mutual co-ordination and subordination so\nthat by their interaction and interdependence they work out a plan or\ndesign and _subserve as means to definite ends_. This suitability of\nthings _relatively to one another_, this harmony of the nature and\nactivity of each with the nature and activity of every other, we may\ndesignate as _extrinsic_ finality. The Creator has willed so to arrange\nand dispose all creatures in conditions of space and time that such\nharmonious but purely extrinsic relations of mutual adaptation do _de\nfacto_ obtain and continue to prevail between them under His guidance.\n\nBut are these creatures themselves, in their own individual natures,\nequally indifferent to any definite mode of action, so that the orderly\nconcurrence of their activities is due to an initial collocation and\nimpulse divinely impressed upon them from without, and not to any\npurposive principle intrinsic to themselves individually? Descartes,\nLeibniz and certain supporters of the theory of atomic dynamism regarding\nthe constitution of matter, while recognizing a relative and extrinsic\nfinality in the universe in the sense explained, seem to regard the\nindividual agencies of the universe as mere efficient causes, not of\nthemselves endowed with any immanent, intrinsic directive principle of\ntheir activities, and so contributing by mere extrinsic arrangement to the\norder of the universe. Scholastic philosophers, on the contrary, following\nthe thought of Aristotle,(502) consider that every agency in the universe\nis endowed with an _intrinsic principle of finality_ which constantly\ndirects its activities towards the realization of a perfection which is\nproper to it and which constitutes its intrinsic end (45-46). And while\neach thus tends to its own proper perfection by the natural play of its\nactivities, each is so related to all others that they simultaneously\nrealize the extrinsic purpose which consists in the order and harmony of\nthe whole universe. Thus the extrinsic and relative finality whereby all\nconspire to constitute the universe a _cosmos_ is secondary and posterior\nand subordinate to the deeper, intrinsic, immanent and absolute finality\nwhereby each individual created nature moves by a tendency or law of its\nbeing towards the realization of a _good_ which _perfects_ it as its\nnatural end.\n\nIn order to understand the nature of this intrinsic and extrinsic finality\nin the universe, and to vindicate its existence against the philosophy of\nMechanism, we must next analyse the concept, and investigate the\ninfluence, of what are called _final causes_.\n\n107. THE CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSE; ITS OBJECTIVE VALIDITY IN ALL NATURE.\nCLASSIFICATION OF FINAL CAUSES.\u2014When we speak of the _end_ of the year, or\nthe _end_ of a wall, we mean the extreme limit or ultimate point; and the\nterm conveys no notion of a cause. Similarly, were a person to say \u201cI have\ngot to the _end_ of my work,\u201d we should understand him to mean simply that\nhe had finished it. But when people act deliberately and as intelligent\nbeings, they usually act for some _conscious purpose_, with some _object\nin view_, for the achievement or attainment of something; they continue to\nact until they have attained this object; when they have attained it they\ncease to act; its attainment synchronizes with the _end_ of their action,\ntaking this term in the sense just illustrated. Probably this is the\nreason why the term _end_ has been extended from its original sense to\nsignify the _object_ for the attainment of which an intelligent agent\nacts. This object of conscious desire _induces_ the agent to seek it; and\nbecause it thus influences the agent to act it verifies the notion of a\n_cause_: it is a _final cause_, an _end_ in the causal sense. For\ninstance, a young man wishes to become a medical doctor: the _art of\nhealing_ is the _end_ he wishes to secure. For this purpose he pursues a\ncourse of studies and passes certain examinations; these acts whereby he\nqualifies himself by obtaining a certain fund of knowledge and skill are\n_means_ to the end intended by him. He need not desire these preparatory\nlabours _for their own sake_; but he does desire them as _useful for his\npurpose_, as _means_ to his end: in so far as he wills them as means he\nwills them not for their own sake but because of the end, _propter finem_.\nHe _apprehends_ the end as a _good_; he _intends_ its attainment; he\n_elects_ or _selects_ certain acts or lines of action as means suitable\nfor this purpose. An end or final cause, therefore, may be defined as\n_something apprehended as a good, and which, because desired as such,\ninfluences the will to choose some action or line of action judged\nnecessary or useful for the attainment of this good_. Hence Aristotle\u2019s\ndefinition of end as \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bf\u1f56 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1: id cujus gratia aliquid fit: _that for\nthe sake of which an agent acts_.\n\nThe end understood in this sense is a _motive_ of action; not only would\nthe action not take place without the agent\u2019s intending the end, showing\nthe latter to be a _conditio sine qua non_; but, more than this, the end\nas a good, apprehended and willed, _has a positive influence_ on the\nultimate effect or issue, so that it is really a _cause_.\n\nMan is conscious of this \u201cfinality,\u201d or influence of final causes on his\nown deliberate actions. As an intelligent being he acts \u201cfor ends,\u201d and\norders or regulates his actions as means to those ends; so much so that\nwhen we see a man\u2019s acts, his whole conduct, utterly unrelated to rational\nends, wholly at variance and out of joint with the usual ends of\nintelligent human activity, we take it as an indication of loss of reason,\ninsanity. Furthermore, man is free; he _chooses_ the ends for which he\nacts; he acts _electiv\u00e9 propter fines_.\n\nBut in the domain of animal life and activity is there any evidence of the\ninfluence of final causes? Most undoubtedly. Watch the movements of\nanimals seeking their prey; observe the wide domain of animal instincts;\nstudy the elaborate and intricate lines of action whereby they protect and\nfoster and preserve their lives, and rear their young and propagate their\nspecies: could there be clearer or more abundant evidence that in all this\nconduct they are _influenced_ by objects which they _apprehend_ and seek\nas _sensible goods_? Not that they can conceive in the abstract the _ratio\nbonitatis_ in these things, or freely choose them as good, for they are\nincapable of abstract thought and consequent free choice; but that these\nsensible objects, apprehended by them in the concrete, do really influence\nor move their sense appetites to desire and seek them; and the influence\nof an object on sense appetite springs from the goodness of this object\n(44, 45). They tend towards _apprehended_ goods; they act _apprehensiv\u00e9\npropter fines_.(503)\n\nFinally, even in the domains of unconscious agencies, of plant life and\ninorganic nature, we have evidence of the influence of final causes. For\nhere too we witness innumerable varied, complex, ever-renewed activities,\nconstantly issuing in results useful to, and good for, the agents which\nelicit them: operations which contribute to the _development_ and\n_perfection_ of the natures of these agents (46). Now if similar effects\ndemand similar causes how can we refuse to recognize even in these\nactivities of physical nature the influence of final causes? Whenever and\nwherever we find a great and complex variety of active powers, forces,\nenergies, issuing invariably in effects which suit and develop and perfect\nthe agents in question,\u2014in a word, which are _good_ for these\nagents,\u2014whether the latter be conscious or unconscious, does not reason\nitself dictate to us that all such domains of action must be subject to\nthe influence of final causes? Of course it would be mere unreflecting\nanthropomorphism to attribute to _unconscious_ agencies a _conscious_\nsubjection to the attracting and directing influence of such causes. But\nthe recognition of such influence in this domain implies no na\u00efve\nsupposition of that sort. It does, however, imply this very reasonable\nview: that there must be some reason or ground in the nature or\nconstitution of even an inanimate agent for its acting always in a uniform\nmanner, conducive to its own development and perfection; that there must\nbe in the nature of each and every one of the vast multitude of such\nagents which make up the whole physical universe a reason or ground for\neach co-operating constantly and harmoniously with all the others to\nsecure and preserve that general order and regularity which enables us to\npronounce the universe not a _chaos_ but a _cosmos_. Now that ground or\nreason in things, whereby they act in such a manner\u2014not indifferently,\nchaotically, capriciously, aimlessly, _unintelligibly_, but definitely,\nregularly, reliably, purposively, _intelligibly_\u2014is a real principle of\ntheir natures, impressing on their natures a definite tendency, directive\nof their activities towards results which, as being suited to these\nnatures, bear to these latter the relation of final causes. A directive\nprinciple need not itself be conscious; the inner directive principle of\ninanimate agents towards what is _good_ for them, what _perfects_ them,\nwhat is therefore in a true and real sense their end (45, 46), is not\nconscious. But in virtue of it they act as if they were conscious, nay\nintelligent, _i.e._ they act _executiv\u00e9 propter fines_.\n\n\n    Of course the existence of this principle in inanimate agencies\n    necessarily _implies_ intelligence: this indeed is our very\n    contention against the whole philosophy of mechanism, positivism\n    and agnosticism. But is this intelligence really identical with\n    the agencies of nature, so that all the phenomena of experience,\n    which constitute the _cosmos_ or universe, are but phases in the\n    evolution of One Sole Reality which is continually manifesting\n    itself under the distinct aspects of nature and mind? Or is this\n    intelligence, though _virtually immanent_ in the universe, really\n    distinct from it\u2014_really transcendent_,\u2014a Supreme Intelligence\n    which has created and continues to conserve this universe and\n    govern all its activities? This is a distinct question: it is the\n    question of Monism or Theism as an ultimate interpretation of\n    human experience.\n\n\nWe conclude then that what we call _finality_, or the influence of final\ncauses, pervades the whole universe; that in the domain of conscious\nagents it is _conscious_, _instinctive_ when it solicits _sense appetite_,\n_voluntary_ when it solicits _intelligent will_; that in the domain of\nunconscious agencies it is not conscious but \u201c_natural_\u201d or \u201c_physical_\u201d\nsoliciting the \u201c_nature_\u201d or \u201c_appetitus naturalis_\u201d of these agencies.\n\nBefore inquiring into the nature of final causality we may indicate\nbriefly the main divisions of final causes: some of these concern the\ndomain of human activity and are of importance to Ethics rather than to\nOntology.\n\n(_a_) We have already distinguished between _intrinsic_ and _extrinsic_\nfinality. An intrinsic final cause is an end or object which perfects the\nnature itself of the agent which tends towards it: nourishment, for\ninstance, is an intrinsic end in relation to the living organism. An\nextrinsic final cause is not one towards which the nature of the agent\nimmediately tends, but one which, intended by some other agent, is _de\nfacto_ realized by the tendency of the former towards its own intrinsic\nend. Thus, the general order of the universe is an extrinsic end in\nrelation to each individual agency in the universe: it is an end intended\nby the Creator and _de facto_ realized by each individual agency acting in\naccordance with its own particular nature.\n\n(_b_) Very similar to this is the familiar distinction between the _finis\noperis_ and the _finis operantis_. The former is the end necessarily and\n_de facto_ realized by the act itself, by its very nature, independently\nof any other end the agent may have expressly intended to attain by means\nof it. The latter is the end expressly intended by the agent, and which\nmay vary for one and the same kind of act. For instance, the _finis\noperis_ of an act of almsgiving is the actual aiding of the mendicant; the\n_finis operantis_ may be charity, or self-denial, or vanity, or whatever\nother motive influences the giver.\n\n(_c_) Akin to those also is the distinction between an unconscious, or\nphysical, or \u201cnatural\u201d end, and a conscious, or mental, or \u201cintentional\u201d\nend. The former is that towards which the nature or \u201c_appetitus\nnaturalis_\u201d of unconscious agencies tends; the latter is an end\napprehended by a conscious agent.\n\n(_d_) An end may be either _ultimate_ or _proximate_ or _intermediate_. An\nultimate end is one which is sought for its own sake, as contrasted with\nan intermediate end which is willed rather as a means to the former, and\nwith a proximate end which is intended last and sought first as a means to\nrealizing the others. It should be noted that proximate and intermediate\nends, in so far as they are sought for the sake of some ulterior end, are\nnot ends at all but rather means; only in so far as they present some good\ndesirable for its own sake, are they properly ends, or final causes.\nFurthermore, an ultimate end may be such absolutely or relatively:\nabsolutely if it cannot possibly be subordinated or referred to any\nulterior or higher good; relatively if, though ultimate in a particular\norder as compared with means leading up to it, it is nevertheless capable\nof being subordinated to a higher good, though not actually referred to\nthis latter by any explicit volition of the agent that seeks it.\n\n(_e_) We can regard the end for which an agent acts either\n_objectively_,\u2014_finis_ \u201c_objectivus_,\u201d\u2014or _formally_,\u2014_finis_\n\u201c_formalis_\u201d. The former is the objective good itself which the agent\nwishes to realize, possess or enjoy; the latter is the act whereby the\nagent formally secures, appropriates, unites himself with, this objective\ngood. Thus, God Himself is the objective happiness (_beatitudo objectiva_)\nof man, while man\u2019s actual possession of, or union with, God, by knowledge\nand love, is man\u2019s formal happiness (_beatitudo formalis_).\n\n(_f_) We may distinguish also between the _real_ end (_finis_ \u201c_qui_\u201d or\n\u201c_cujus_\u201d, and the _personal_ end (_finis_ \u201c_cui_\u201d). The former is the\ngood _which_ the agent desires, the good for the sake of _which_ \u201c_cujus_\u201d\n_gratia_) he acts. The latter is the subject or person _to whom_ he wishes\nthis good, or _for whom_ he wishes to procure it. Thus, a labourer may\nwork to earn _a sustenance_ for _himself_ or also for _his family_. The\nreal and the personal end are never willed separately, but always as one\nconcrete good.\n\n(_g_) The distinction between a _principal_ end and an _accessory_ end\n(motivum \u201c_impulsivum_\u201d) is obvious. The former can move to act of itself\nwithout the latter, but the latter strengthens the influence of the\nformer. A really charitable person, while efficaciously moved to give alms\nby sympathy with the poor, may not be uninfluenced by vanity to let others\nknow of his charity.\n\n\n    (_h_) Finally we may note the theological distinction between the\n    _natural_ end, and the _supernatural_ end, of man as a rational\n    and moral agent. The former is the end _due_ to man\u2019s nature, the\n    latter is an end which is gratuitous and undue to his nature. God\n    might not have created the world or man, and in this sense even\n    the natural end of man is a gratuitous gift of God; but granted\n    that God did decree to create the world and man, an end\n    corresponding to man\u2019s nature and powers was due to him: the\n    knowledge, service and love of God as known to man by the light of\n    natural reason. But as a matter of fact God, in His actual\n    providence, has decreed for man an incomparably higher and purely\n    gratuitous end, an end revealed to man by God Himself, an end\n    entirely undue not only to man but to any and every possible\n    creature: the Beatific Vision of the Divine Essence for ever in\n    heaven.\n\n\n108. CAUSALITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE; RELATION OF THE LATTER TO EFFICIENT,\nFORMAL, AND MATERIAL CAUSES.\u2014We can best analyse the influence of the\nfinal cause by studying this influence as exerted on conscious and\nintelligent agents. The final cause has a positive influence of some sort\non the production, happening, actualization of effects. What is the nature\nof this influence? The final cause exerts its influence by being _a __\ngood_, an apprehended good; it exerts this influence on the appetite of\nthe agent, soliciting the latter to perform certain acts for the\nrealization, attainment, possession, or enjoyment of this good. But it\nmust not be conceived as the _efficient cause_ of this movement of the\nappetite, nor may its influence be conceived as _action_. An efficient\ncause must actually exist in order to act; but when the final cause, as an\napprehended good, exerts its influence on the appetite _it is not yet\nactual_: not until the agent, by his action, has realized the end and\nactually attained it, does the end, as a good, actually exist. We must\ndistinguish between the end _as attained_ and the end _as intended_,\nbetween the _finis in executione_ and the _finis in intentione_. It is not\nthe end as attained that is a final cause; as attained it is an effect\npure and simple. It is the end as intended that is a final cause; and as\nintended it does not yet actually exist: hence its influence cannot be by\nway of _action_. Perhaps it is the _idea_ or _cognition_ of the intended\nend that exerts the peculiar influence of final cause? No; the _idea_ or\n_cognition_ of the end actually exists, no doubt, in the conscious agent,\nbut this is only a condition, a _conditio sine qua non_, for the\napprehended good, the final cause, to exert its influence: _nil volitum\nnisi praecognitum_. It is not the cognition of the good, however, that\nmoves the agent to act, it is not the idea of the good that the agent\ndesires or strives for, but the good itself. It is the good itself, the\nknown good, that exerts the influence, and this influence consists in the\n_passive inclination_ or _attraction_ or _tendency_ of the appetite\ntowards the good: a tendency which necessarily results from the very\npresence of the good (not really or physically of course, but\nrepresentatively, mentally, \u201c_intentionally_,\u201d by \u201c_esse intentionale_\u201d;\ncf. 4) in the agent\u2019s consciousness, and which is formally the\nactualization of the causal power or influence of the final cause. \u201cJust\nas the efficient cause influences by acting,\u201d says St. Thomas,(504) \u201cso\nthe final cause influences by being yearned for and desired\u201d.\n\nLooked at from the side of the agent that undergoes it, this influence is\na _passive yielding_: this next becomes an _active_ motion of appetite;\nand in the case of free will a deliberate act of intending the end,\nfollowed by acts of choosing means, and finally by acts commanding the\nexecutive faculties to employ these means.\n\nLooked at from the side of the final cause, the influence consists in an\n_attraction_ of appetite towards union with itself as a good. The matter\ncannot be analysed much further; nor will imagination images help us here\nany more than in the case of efficient causality. It must be noted,\nhowever, that the influence of the final cause is the influence not of a\nreality as actual, or in its _esse actuale_, but of a reality as present\nto a perceiving mind, or in its _esse intentionale_. At the same time it\nwould be a mistake to infer from this that the influence of the final\ncause is not _real_. It is sometimes described as \u201cintentional\u201d causality,\n\u201c_causalitas intentionalis_\u201d; but this must not be taken to mean that it\nis not real: for it is not the \u201c_esse intentionale_\u201d of the good, _i.e._\nthe cognition of the good, its presence in the mind or consciousness of\nthe agent, that moves the latter\u2019s appetite: it is the apprehended good,\napprehended _as real_, as possible of actual attainment, that moves the\nagent to act. The influence may not be _physical_ in the sense of being\nproductive of, or interchangeable with, or measurable by, corporeal\nenergy, or in terms of mechanical work; nor is it; but it is none the less\nreal.\n\nBut if the influence of a final cause really reaches to the effect of the\nagent\u2019s actions only through the medium of the latter\u2019s appetite, and\ntherefore through a link of \u201cintentional\u201d causality, does it not at once\nfollow that the attribution of final causality to the domain of\nunconscious and inorganic activities, can be at best merely metaphorical?\nThe attribution to such agencies of an \u201c_appetitus naturalis_\u201d is\nintelligible indeed as a striking and perhaps not unpoetic metaphor. But\nto contend that it is anything more than a metaphor, to claim seriously\nthat inanimate agencies are swayed and influenced by \u201cends,\u201d\u2014is not this\nreally to substitute mysticism and mystery for rational speculation and\nanalysis?\n\nMechanists are wont to dismiss the doctrine of final causes in the\nphysical universe with offhand charges of this kind. They are but too\nready to attribute it to a mystical attitude of mind. Final causes, they\nsay, are not discovered in inanimate nature by the cold, calculating,\nunemotional analysis to which reason submits its activities, but are read\ninto it by minds which allow themselves to be prompted by the imagination\nand emotions to personify and anthropomorphize inanimate agencies. The\naccusation is as plausible as it is unjust. It is plausible because the\nattribution of final causes to inanimate nature, and of an \u201cappetitus\n_naturalis_\u201d to its agencies, _seems_ to imply the recognition of\nconscious, mental, \u201cintentional\u201d influence in this domain. But it really\nimplies nothing of the sort; and hence the injustice of the charge. What\nit does imply is the existence of a genuine _analogy_ between the nature\nand natural activities of physical agencies on the one hand and the\nappetite and appetitive activities of conscious agencies on the other. The\nexistence of this analogy is absolutely undeniable. The orderly,\ninvariable and uniformly suitable character of physical activities, simply\nforces our reason to recognize in physical agencies _natures_ which tend\ntowards their development, and which by their activities attain to what is\n_good_ for them, to what _perfects_ them. In other words we have to\nrecognize that each by its natural line of activity attains to results\nthat are good and useful to it _just as if_ it apprehended them as such\nand consciously tended towards them. The analogy is there; and the\nrecognition of it, so far from being a \u201cmystic\u201d interpretation of facts,\nis an elementary logical exercise of our reasoning faculty. The\nscholastics emphasized their recognition of the analogy by calling the\n_nature_ of an unconscious agent,\u2014the principle of its active tendencies\ntowards the realization of its own perfection\u2014an \u201c_appetitus naturalis_\u201d:\nan expression into which no one familiar with scholastic terminology would\nventure to read any element of mysticism.(505)\n\nEvery separate agency in nature has a uniform mode of activity; by\nfollowing out this line of action each co-operates with all the others in\nmaintaining the orderly course of nature. These are facts which call for\nexplanation. They are not explained by the supposition of mechanists that\nthese agencies are mere efficient causes: efficient causality does not\naccount for order, it has got simply nothing to do with order or\nregularity. Consequently the last word of the mechanical philosophy on the\nfact of order in the universe is\u2014Agnosticism. In opposition to this\nattitude we are far from contending that there is no mystery, or that all\nis clear either in regard to the fact of _change_ or the fact of\n_regularity_. Just as we cannot explain everything in _efficient_\ncausality, so neither can we explain everything in _final_ causality. But\nwe do contend that the element of order, development, evolution, even in\nthe physical universe, can be partially explained by recognizing in its\nseveral agencies a _nature_, a principle of development, a passive\ninclination implanted in the very being of these agencies by the\nIntelligent Author of their being.\n\nIn conscious agencies this inclination or tendency to actions conformable\nor _connatural_ to their being is not always in act; it is aroused by\nconscious cognition, perception, or imagination of a _good_, and operates\nintermittently. In unconscious agencies it is congenital and constantly in\nact, _i.e._ as a tendency, not as actually operative: for its actual\ndevelopment due conditions of environment are required: the seed will not\ngrow without a suitable soil, temperature, moisture, etc. In conscious\nagencies the tendency, considered entitatively or as a reality in them, is\nan _accidental form_; in unconscious agencies it is their _forma\nsubstantialis_, the formative substantial principle, which determines the\nspecific type to which their nature belongs.(506)\n\nIn all agencies the inclination or appetite or tendency to action arises\nfrom a form; an elicited appetite from an \u201cintentional\u201d form, a natural\nappetite from a \u201cnatural\u201d form: _Omnis inclinatio seu appetitus\nconsequitur formam; appetitus elicitus formam intentionalem, appetitus\nnaturalis formam naturalem_. The scholastic view that final causality\npervades all things is expressed in the aphorism, _Omne agens agit propter\nfinem_: Every agency acts for an end.\n\nFrom our analysis of final causality it will be seen that the \u201cend\u201d\nbecomes a cause by exercising its influence on the agent or efficient\ncause, and thus initiating the action of the latter. We have seen already\nthat material and formal causes exercise their causality dependently on\nthe efficient cause of the change or effect produced by the latter. We now\nsee that the final cause, the end as _intended_, determines the action of\nthe efficient cause; hence its causality holds the primacy as compared\nwith that of the other causes: it is in this sense the cause of causes,\n_causa causarum_.(507) But while the end _as intended_ is the starting\npoint of the whole process, the end _as attained_ is the ultimate term of\nthe latter. Hence the scholastic aphorism: _Finis est primus in intentione\net ultimus in executione_. And this is true where the process involves a\nseries of acts attaining to means subordinate to an end: this latter is\nthe first thing intended and the last attained.\n\nThe final cause, the end as intended, is extrinsic to the effect. It is\nintrinsic to the efficient cause. It is a \u201c_forma_\u201d or determinative\nprinciple of the latter: a _forma intentionalis_ in conscious agents, a\n_forma naturalis_ in unconscious agents.\n\n109. NATURE AND THE LAWS OF NATURE. CHARACTER AND GROUNDS OF THEIR\nNECESSITY AND UNIVERSALITY. SCIENTIFIC DETERMINISM AND PHILOSOPHIC\nFATALISM.\u2014By the term _nature_ we have seen that Aristotle and the\nscholastics meant the essence or substance of an agent regarded as inner\nprinciple of the latter\u2019s normal activities, as determining the bent or\ninclination of these, and therefore as in a real sense their final cause.\nHence Aristotle\u2019s definition of _nature_ as _a certain principle or cause\nof the motion and rest of the thing in which that principle is rooted\nfundamentally and essentially and not merely accidentally_.(508) The\nscholastics, recognizing that this _intentio naturae_, this subjection to\nfinality, in _unconscious_ agencies must be the work and the index of\nintelligence, in other words that this _analogical_ finality in inanimate\nthings must connote a _proper_ finality, a properly purposive mode of\naction, in the author of these things, conceived this _nature_ or\n_intentio naturae_ as the impression of a divine art or plan upon the very\nbeing of all creatures by the Creator Himself. Hence St. Thomas\u2019s profound\nand well-known description of _nature_ as \u201c_the principle of a divine art\nimpressed upon things, in virtue of which they move towards determinate\nends_\u201d. Defining _art_ as _the just conception __ of external works to be\naccomplished_,(509) he observes that nature is a sort of art: \u201cas if a\nship-builder were to endow his materials with the power of moving and\nadapting themselves so as to form or construct a ship\u201d.(510) And elsewhere\nhe remarks that nature differs from art only in this that the former is an\nintrinsic, the latter an extrinsic, principle of the work which is\naccomplished through its influence: so that if the art whereby a ship is\nconstructed were intrinsic to the materials, the ship would be constructed\nby nature as it actually is by art.(511)\n\nSuch, then, is the teleological conception of the nature of each\nindividual agency in the universe. When we speak of \u201cuniversal _nature_,\u201d\n\u201cexternal _nature_,\u201d \u201cphysical _nature_,\u201d \u201cthe course of _nature_,\u201d \u201cthe\nlaws of _nature_,\u201d etc. we are using the term in a collective sense to\nsignify the sum-total of all the agencies which constitute the whole\nphysical universe; and furthermore in all such contexts we usually\nunderstand by _nature_ the world of _corporeal_ things as distinct from\nthe domain of _mind_ or _spirit_.\n\nThe proof of this view,\u2014that the agencies of the physical universe are not\nmerely efficient causes, but that they act under the influence of ends;\nthat they have definite lines of action which are natural to them, and\nwhereby they realize their own individual development and the maintenance\nof the universe as a _cosmos_; that by doing so they reveal the influence\nof _intelligent purpose_,\u2014the proof of this view lies, as we have seen, in\nthe fact that their activities are regular, uniform, and mutually useful,\nor, in other words, that they are productive of _order_ (110). Bearing\nthis in mind let us inquire into the various meanings discernible in the\nvery familiar expressions, \u201claws of nature,\u201d \u201cphysical laws,\u201d \u201cnatural\nlaws\u201d.(512)\n\nWe may understand firstly by a law of nature this innate tendency we have\nbeen describing as impressed upon the very being of all created things by\nthe Creator. It is in this sense we speak of a thing acting \u201cnaturally,\u201d\nor \u201caccording to the _law_ of its nature,\u201d or \u201caccording to its nature,\u201d\nwhen we see it acting according to what we conceive to be the end intended\nfor it, acting in a manner conducive to the development of its own\nindividuality, the preservation of its specific type or kind, and the\nfulfilment of its r\u00f4le in the general scheme of things. What this\n\u201cnatural\u201d mode of action is for this particular kind of thing, we gather\nfrom our experience of the regular or normal activity of things of its\nkind. Thus, we say it is a _law_ of oxygen and hydrogen to combine in\ndefinite proportions, under suitable conditions, to form water; a _law_ of\nall particles of matter in the universe to tend to move towards one\nanother with a definite acceleration; a _law_ of living organisms to\nreproduce their kind. This usage comes nearest to the original meaning of\nthe term _law_: a precept or command imposed on intelligent agents by a\nsuperior. For we conceive this natural tendency impressed on physical\nagencies by the Creator after the analogy of a precept or command. And we\nhave good reason to do so: because _uniformity of conduct_ in intelligent\nagents is the normal result of their obedience to a law imposed upon them;\nand we see in the activities of the physical universe an _all-pervading\nfeature of regularity_.\n\nSecondly, we transfer the term _law_ to _this result itself_ of the\nnatural tendency of the being, of the convergence of its activities\ntowards its end. That is to say, we call _the uniform mode of action_ of\nan agent a _law of nature_, a _natural_ or _physical law_. This usage,\nwhich is common in the positive sciences, implies a less profound, a more\nsuperficial, but a perfectly legitimate mode of apprehending and studying\nthe changes and phenomena of the physical universe.\n\nThirdly, since the several agencies of the universe co-exist in time and\nspace, since they constantly interact on one another, since for the\nexercise of the natural activities of each _certain extrinsic conditions\nof relationship with its environment_ must be fulfilled, an accurate\nknowledge and exact formulation of these relations are obviously requisite\nfor a scientific and practical insight into the mode of activity of any\nnatural agency. In fact the physical scientist may and does take for\ngranted the natural tendency and the uniformity of action resulting\ntherefrom, and confines himself to _discovering and formulating the\nrelations between any given kind of action and the extrinsic conditions\nrequisite for its exercise_. Such, for instance, would be any chemical\n\u201claw\u201d setting forth the measure, and the conditions of temperature,\npressure, etc., in which certain chemical elements combine to form a\ncertain chemical compound. To all such formulae scientists give the title\nof _physical laws_, or _laws of physical nature_. These formulae,\ndescriptive of the manner in which a phenomenon takes place, setting forth\nwith the greatest possible quantitative exactness the phenomenal\nfactors(513) that enter into and precede and accompany it, are laws in a\nstill more superficial and still less philosophical sense, but a sense\nwhich is most commonly\u2014and justly\u2014accepted in the positive or physical\nsciences.\n\n\n    Before examining the feature and characteristic of _necessity and\n    universality_ which enters into all these various conceptions of a\n    \u201cphysical law\u201d we have here to observe that it would make for\n    clearness, and for a better understanding between physics and\n    metaphysics, between science and philosophy, between the\n    investigator who seeks by observation and experiment for the\n    proximate phenomenal conditions and \u201cphysical\u201d causes of\n    phenomena, and the investigator who seeks for the ultimate real\n    ground and explanation of these latter by speculative analysis of\n    them, and by reasoning from the scientist\u2019s discoveries about\n    them,\u2014if it were understood and agreed that investigation into the\n    scope and significance and ultimate ground of this feature of\n    stability in the laws of physical nature belongs to the\n    philosopher rather than to the scientist. We have already called\n    attention to the fact that the propriety of such an obviously\n    reasonable and intelligible division of labour is almost\n    universally admitted in theory both by scientists and by\n    philosophers; though, unfortunately, it is not always remembered\n    in practice (100).\n\n    In theory the scientist assumes, and very properly assumes, that\n    the agencies with which he deals are not capricious, unreliable,\n    irregular, but stable, reliable, regular in their mode of action,\n    that in similar sets of conditions and circumstances they will act\n    uniformly. Without inquiring into the ultimate grounds of this\n    assumption he premises that all his conclusions, all his inductive\n    generalizations about the activity of these agencies, will hold\n    good of these latter just in so far as they do act according to\n    his general postulate as to their regularity. He then proceeds, by\n    the inductive processes of hypothesis and experimental\n    verification, to determine what agencies produce such or such an\n    event, under what conditions they bring this about, what are all\n    the phenomenal conditions, positive and negative, antecedent and\n    concomitant, in the absence of any one of which this event will\n    not happen, and in the presence of all of which it will happen.\n    These are, in accordance with his assumption, _determining_ causes\n    of the event; the knowledge of them is from the speculative point\n    of view extremely important, and from the practical standpoint of\n    invention and applied science extremely useful. As a scientist he\n    has no other knowledge in view: he aims at discovering the \u201chow,\u201d\n    the _quomodo_, of natural phenomena,\u2014how, for instance, under what\n    conditions and in what measure, water is produced from oxygen and\n    hydrogen. When he has discovered all these positive and negative\n    conditions his _scientific_ knowledge of the formation of water is\n    complete.\n\n    But there are other questions in regard to natural phenomena to\n    which the experimental methods of the positive sciences can offer\n    no reply. They can tell us nothing about the _wider_ \u201chow\u201d which\n    resolves itself into a \u201cwhy.\u201d They can give no information about\n    the ultimate causes, origins, reasons, or essences, of those\n    phenomena. As Pasteur and other equally illustrious scientists\n    have proclaimed, experimental science is essentially positive,\n    _i.e._ confined to the proximate phenomenal conditions and causes\n    of things; it has nothing to say, nor has it any need or any right\n    to say anything, about the ultimate nature, or first origin, or\n    final destiny, of the things and events of the universe.\n\n    Yet such questions arise, and clamour insistently for solution.\n    _How_ is it, or _why_ is it, that natural phenomena are uniformly\n    linked to certain other phenomenal antecedents or \u201cphysical\u201d\n    causes? Is it absolutely impossible, inconceivable, that this\n    sequence should be found not to obtain in even a single individual\n    instance? Why should there be such uniform \u201csequences\u201d or \u201claws\u201d\n    at all? Are there exceptions, or can there be exceptions to these\n    \u201claws of physical nature\u201d? What is the character and what are the\n    grounds of the _necessity_ of these laws? Every living organism\n    comes from a living cell\u2014not from _any_ living cell, but from\n    _some particular kind_ of living cell. But _why_ are there such\n    kinds of cells? Why are there living cells at all? Whence their\n    first origin? Again, granted that there are different kinds or\n    types of living cells, _why_ should a particular kind of cell give\n    rise, by division and evolution, to an organism of the same kind\n    or type as the parent organisms? Why does it not _always_ do so?\n    Why are what biologists describe as \u201cmonsters\u201d in the organic\n    kingdom possible? And why, since they are possible, are they not\n    as numerous as what are recognized as the normal types or kinds of\n    living organisms?\n\n    Now these are questions in regard to which not only every\n    professing physical scientist and every professing metaphysician,\n    but every thinking man, _must_ take up some attitude or other. A\n    refusal to consider them, on the plea that they are insoluble, is\n    just as definite an attitude as any other; nor by assuming this\n    attitude does any man, even though he be a specialist in some\n    department of the positive or physical sciences, escape being a\n    \u201cmetaphysician\u201d or a \u201cphilosopher,\u201d however much he may deprecate\n    such titles; for he is taking up a reasoned attitude\u2014we presume it\n    is such, and not the outcome of mere prejudice\u2014on ultimate\n    questions. And this is philosophy; this is metaphysics. When,\n    therefore, a physical scientist either avows or insinuates that\n    _because_ the methods of physical science, which are suitable for\n    the discovery of the _proximate_ causes of phenomena, can tell him\n    nothing about _ultimate_ questions concerning these phenomena,\n    _therefore_ there is nothing to be known about these questions, he\n    is not only committing himself, _nolens volens_, to definite\n    philosophical views, but he is doing a serious disservice to\n    physical science itself by misconceiving and mis-stating its\n    rightful scope and limits. He has just an equal right with any\n    other man to utilize the established truths of physical science to\n    help him in answering ultimate questions. Nay, he may even use the\n    unverified hypotheses and systematic conceptions(514) of physical\n    science for what they are worth in helping him to determine his\n    general world-view. But his competence as a specialist in physical\n    science does not confer upon him any _special_ qualification for\n    estimating the value of these truths and hypotheses as evidence in\n    the domain of ultimate problems. Nor can he, because he is a\n    scientist, or even because he may go so far as to assert the right\n    of speaking in the name of \u201cscience,\u201d claim for his particular\n    interpretation the privilege of exemption from criticism; and this\n    is true no matter what his interpretation may be\u2014whether it be\n    agnosticism, mechanism, teleologism, monism, or theism. These\n    observations may appear elementary and obvious; but the\n    insinuation of positivism and phenomenism, that whatever is not\n    itself phenomenal and verifiable by the experimental methods of\n    the physical sciences is in no wise knowable, and the insinuation\n    of mechanists that their world-view is the only one compatible\n    with the truths of science and therefore the only \u201cscientific\u201d\n    philosophy, justify us in reiterating and emphasizing even such\n    obvious methodological considerations. Bearing them in mind, let\n    us now examine the uniformity and necessity of the laws of\n    physical nature.\n\n\nUnderstanding by natural law the natural inclination or tendency of the\ncreature to a definite line of activity, this law is of itself determining\nor necessitating. Moreover, it is absolutely inseparable from the essence\nof the creature. Granted that the creature exists, it has this tendency to\nexert and direct all its forces and energies in a definite, normal way,\nfor the realization of its end. This _nisus naturae_ is never absent; it\nis observable even where, as in the generation of \u201cmonsters\u201d by living\norganisms, it partially fails to attain its end. A law of nature, taken in\nthis sense, is absolutely necessary to, and inseparable from, the created\nagent; it admits of no exceptions; no agent can exist without it; for it\nis identical with the very being of the agent\n\nBut the uniformity of action resulting from this natural tendency, the\nuniform series of normal operations whereby it realizes its end, is not\nabsolutely necessary, inviolable, unexceptional. In the first place the\nAuthor of Nature can, for a higher or moral purpose, prevent any created\nagency supernaturally, miraculously, from actually exercising its active\npowers in accordance with its nature for the prosecution of its natural\nend. But apart altogether from this, abstracting from all special\ninterference of the First Cause, and confining our attention to the\nnatural order itself, we have to consider that for any physical agency to\nact in its natural or normal manner certain extrinsic conditions are\nalways requisite: oxygen and hydrogen, for instance, will combine to\nproduce water, but only under certain conditions of contact, pressure,\ntemperature, etc. This general requirement arises from the fact already\nmentioned, that physical agencies co-exist in time and space and are\nconstantly interacting. These extrinsic conditions are, of course, not\nexpressly stated in the formulation of those uniformities and quantitative\ndescriptions called \u201claws of nature\u201d in the second and third\ninterpretations of this expression as explained above. It is taken as\nunderstood that the law applies only if and when and where all such\nconditions are verified. The law, therefore, as stated categorically, does\nnot express an absolutely necessary, universal, and unexceptional truth.\nIt may admit of exceptions.\n\nIn the next place, when we come to examine these exceptions to uniformity,\nthese failures or frustrations of the normal or natural activities of\nphysical agencies, we find it possible to distinguish roughly, with\nAristotle, between two groups of such \u201cuniformities\u201d or \u201claws\u201d. There are\nfirstly those which, so far as our experience goes, seem to prevail\n_always_ (\u1f00\u03b5\u1f76), unexceptionally; and secondly, those which seem to prevail\n_generally_, _for the most part_ (\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a), though not\nunexceptionally. The former would be the outcome of active powers,\nenergies, forces, _de facto_ present and prevalent always and everywhere\nin all physical agencies, and of such a character that the conditions\nrequisite for their actual operation would be always verified. Such, for\ninstance, would be the force of gravity in all ponderable matter; and\nhence the law of gravitation is regarded as all-pervading, universal,\nunexceptional. But there are other natural or normal effects which are the\noutcome of powers, forces, energies, not all-pervading, but restricted to\nspecial groups of agencies, dependent for their actual production on the\npresence of a great and complex variety of extrinsic conditions, and\nliable therefore to be impeded by the interfering action of numerous other\nnatural agencies. Such, for instance, would be the natural powers and\nprocesses whereby living organisms propagate their kind. The law,\ntherefore, which states it to be a uniformity of nature that living\norganisms reproduce offspring similar to themselves in kind, is a general\nlaw, admitting exceptions.\n\nOperations and effects which follow from the nature of their causes are\ncalled natural (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u1f01\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2).(515) Some causes\nproduce their natural effects _always_ (\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03bd\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1),\nothers produce their natural effects _usually_, _as a general rule_ (\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f61\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1).(516) Operations and effects which are produced by the\ninterfering influence of extrinsic agencies (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u201cviolent,\u201d as\nopposed to natural), and not in accordance with the nature of their\nprincipal cause, are called by Aristotle _accidental_ (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2,\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03c5\u03b3\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9); and these, he remarks, people commonly describe\nas due to chance (\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2).(517)\n\nAll are familiar with events or happenings described as \u201cfortuitous,\u201d\n\u201caccidental,\u201d \u201cexceptional,\u201d \u201cunexpected,\u201d with things happening by\n\u201cchance,\u201d by (good or bad) \u201cluck\u201d or \u201cfortune\u201d.(518) There are terms in\nall languages expressive of this experience\u2014_casus_, _sors_, _fortuna_,\n\u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7, etc. The notion underlying all of them is that of something\noccurring unintentionally, _praeter intentionem agentis_. Whether chance\neffects result from the action of intelligent agents or from the operation\nof physical causes they are not \u201cintended,\u201d\u2014by the deliberate purpose of\nthe intelligent agent in the one case, or by the natural tendency, the\n_intentio naturae_, of the mere physical agency in the other. Such an\neffect, therefore, has not a _natural_ cause; hence it is considered\n_exceptional_, and is always more or less unexpected. _Nature_, as\nAristotle rightly observes,(519) never produces a chance effect. His\nmeaning is, that whenever such an effect occurs it is not brought about in\naccordance with the natural tendency of any physical agency. It results\nfrom a collision or coincidence of two or more such agencies, each acting\naccording to its nature. The hunter\u2019s act of firing at a wild fowl is an\nintentional act. The boy\u2019s act of coming into the thicket to gather wild\nflowers is an intentional act. The accidental shooting of the boy is the\nresult of a coincidence of the two intentional acts. Similarly, each of\nall the various agencies which bring about the development of an embryo in\nthe maternal womb has its own immediate and particular natural effect, and\nonly mediately contributes to the general effect of bringing the embryo to\nmaturity. As a rule these particular effects are favourable to the general\neffect. But sometimes the immediate ends do not subserve this ulterior\npurpose. The result is accidental, exceptional, a deviation from the\nnormal type, an anomaly, a \u201cmonster\u201d in the domain of living organisms.\n\nAristotle\u2019s analysis, correct so far, is incomplete. It assigns no\nultimate explanation of the fact that there are such encounters of\nindividual natural tendencies in the universe, such failures in the\nsubordination of particular ends to wider ulterior ends. As a matter of\nfact these chance effects, although not \u201cintended\u201d by the natures of\nindividual created agencies, are not wholly and entirely unintended. They\nare not wholly aimless. They enter into the general plan and scheme of\nthings as known and willed by the Author of Nature. They are known to His\nIntelligence, and willed and ruled by His Providence. For Him there can be\nno such thing as chance. Effects that are accidental in relation to\ncreated causes, effects that run counter to the nature or _intentio\nnaturae_ of these, are foreseen and willed by Him and made to subserve\nthat wider and more general end which is the universal order of the world\nthat He has actually willed to create. It is only in relation to the\nnatures of individual agencies, and to the limited horizon of our finite\nintelligences, that such phenomena can present the aspect of fortuitous or\nchance occurrences.\n\nBefore passing on to deal, in our concluding section, with the great fact\nof order, let us briefly compare with the foregoing explanation of nature\nand its laws the attempt of mechanists to explain these without\nrecognizing in the physical universe any influence of final causes, or any\nindication of a purposive intelligence. We have ventured to describe their\nattitude as philosophic fatalism.(520) According to their view there is no\nground for the distinction between phenomena that happen \u201cnaturally\u201d and\nphenomena that happen \u201caccidentally\u201d or \u201cby chance\u201d. All alike happen by\nthe same kind of general necessity: the generation of a \u201cmonster\u201d is as\n\u201cnatural\u201d as the generation of normal offspring; the former, when it\noccurs, is just as inevitably the outcome of the physical forces at work\nin the particular case as the latter is the outcome of the particular set\nof efficient causes which do actually produce the normal result: the only\ndifference is that the former, occurring less frequently and as the result\nof a rarer and less known conjunction of \u201cphysical\u201d causes than the\nlatter, is not expected by us to occur, and is consequently regarded, when\nit does occur, as exceptional. Now it is quite true that what we call\n\u201cchance\u201d effects, or \u201cexceptional\u201d effects, result just as inevitably from\nthe set of forces operative in their case, as normal effects result from\nthe forces operative in theirs. But this leaves for explanation something\nwhich the mechanist cannot explain. He regards a physical law merely as a\ngeneralization, beyond experience, of some experienced uniformity; and he\nholds that all our physical laws are provisional in the sense that a wider\nand deeper knowledge of the actual conditions of interaction among the\nphysical forces of the universe would enable us to eliminate\nexceptions\u2014which are all apparent, not real\u2014by restating our laws in such\na comprehensive way as to include all such cases. We may, indeed, admit\nthat our physical laws are open to revision and restatement in this sense,\nand are _de facto_ often modified in this sense by the progress of\nscience. But the important point is this, that the mechanist does not\nadmit the existence, in physical agencies, of any law in the sense of a\n_natural inclination towards an end_, or in any sense in which it would\nimply intelligence, design, or purpose. On the contrary, claiming as he\ndoes that all physical phenomena are _reducible to mechanical motions of\ninert masses, atoms, or particles of matter in space_, he is obliged to\nregard all physical agencies as being, so far as their nature is\nconcerned, wholly _indifferent_ to any particular form of activity.(521)\nCommitted to the indefensible view that all qualitative change is\nreducible to quantitative (11), and all material differences to\ndifferences in the location of material particles and in the velocity and\ndirection of the spatial motion impressed upon each by others extrinsic to\nitself, he has left himself no factors wherewith to explain the actual\norder and course of the universe, other than the purely _indifferent_\nfactors of essentially or naturally homogeneous particles of inert matter\nendowed with local motion. We emphasize this feature of indifference; for\nthe conception of an inert particle of matter subject to mechanical motion\nimpressed upon it from without, is the very type of an indifferent agency.\nWhat such an entity will do, whether or not it will move, with what\nvelocity and in what direction it will move\u2014in a word, its entire conduct,\nits r\u00f4le in the universe, the sum-total of its functions\u2014nothing of all\nthis is dependent on itself; everything depends on agencies extrinsic to\nit, and on its extrinsic time-and-space relations to these agencies; and\nthese latter in turn are in the same condition as itself. Now is it\nconceivable that agencies of this kind, of themselves absolutely\nindifferent to any particular kind of effect, suitable or unsuitable,\nregular or irregular, orderly or disorderly, could actually produce and\nmaintain the existing order of the universe? If they were themselves\n_produced by an All-Wise and All-Powerful Being_, and _definitely\narranged_ in spatial relations to one another, and _initial mechanical\nmotion in definite directions and velocities_ impressed on the different\nparts of the system, there is no denying that Infinite Wisdom and Power\ncould, by Divine concurrence even with such indifferent agencies, realize\nand maintain a _cosmos_, or _orderly_ universe. Such _purely extrinsic\nfinality_ (106) could, absolutely speaking, account for the existence of\norder, uniformity, regularity, system; though all the evidence furnished\nby the universe of our actual experience points to the existence of\n_intrinsic finality_ also as understood by Aristotle and the scholastics.\nBut the mechanist will not allow even extrinsic finality; he will not\nrecognize in the actual universe of our experience any evidence of a\nRuling Intelligence realizing a plan or design for an intelligent purpose;\nhe denies the necessity of the inference from the data of human experience\nto the existence of a Guiding Intelligence. And what are his alternatives?\nHe may choose one or other of two.\n\nHe may restate in the more scientific and imposing terminology of modern\nmechanics the crude conception of the ancient Greek atomists: that the\nactual order of the universe is the absolutely inevitable and fatal\noutcome of a certain collocation of the moving masses of the physical\nuniverse, a collocation favourable to order, a collocation which _just\nhappened to occur_ by some happy chance from the essentially aimless,\npurposeless, indifferent and _chaotic_ motions of those material masses\nand particles. We say \u201cchaotic,\u201d for _chaos_ is the absence of _cosmos_;\nand _order_ is the fact that has got to be explained. In the concept of\n_indifferent, inert_ atoms of matter moving through space there is\nemphatically no principle of order;(522) and hence the mechanist who will\nnot admit the necessity of inferring an Intelligence to give these moving\nmasses or atoms the collocation _favourable to order_ is forced to\n\u201cexplain\u201d this supposed collocation by attributing it to pure chance\u2014the\n_concursus fortuitus atomorum_ of the ancient Greeks. When, however, we\nreflect that the more numerous these atoms and the more varied and complex\ntheir motions, the smaller is the chance of a collocation favourable to\norder; that the atoms and motions are supposed actually to surpass any\nassignable number; that therefore the chance of any such favourable\ncollocation occurring is indefinitely smaller than any measurable\nproportion,\u2014we can draw our own conclusions about the value of such a\nspeculation as a rational \u201cexplanation\u201d of the existing _cosmos_. And this\napart altogether from the consideration that the fact to be explained is\nnot merely the _momentary_ occurrence of an orderly collocation, but the\n_maintenance_ of an orderly system of cosmic phenomena _throughout the\nlapse of all time_. No orderly finite system of mechanical motions\narranged by human skill can preserve its orderly motions indefinitely\nwithout intelligent human supervision: the neglected machine will get out\nof order, run down, wear out, if left to itself; and we are asked to\nbelieve that the whole universe is one vast machine which not only goes on\nwithout intelligent supervision, but which actually made itself by\nchance!(523)\n\nNaturally such an \u201cexplanation\u201d of the universe does not commend itself to\nany man of serious thought, whatever his difficulties may be against the\nargument from the fact of order in the universe to the existence of an\nIntelligent Designer. Add to this the consideration that the mechanist\ntheory does not even claim to account for the first origin of the\nuniverse: it postulates the existence of matter in motion. In regard to\nthis supreme problem of the _first origin_ of the universe the attitude of\nthe mechanist is avowedly _agnostic_; and in view of what we have just\nremarked about the \u201cchance\u201d theory as an \u201cexplanation\u201d of the _existing\norder_ of the universe, it is no matter for surprise that most mechanists\nreject this theory and embrace the agnostic attitude in regard to this\nlatter problem also. Whether the agnostic attitude they assume be negative\nor positive, _i.e._ whether they are content to say that they themselves\nat least fail to find any satisfactory rational explanation of the\n_origin_ and _nature_ of the _cosmos_, or contend further that no rational\nsolution of these problems is within the reach of the human mind, their\nteaching is refuted in Natural Theology, where the theistic solution of\nthese problems is set forth and vindicated.\n\n110. THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE; A FACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.\u2014The\nconsiderations so far submitted in this chapter, as pointing to the\nexistence and influence of final causes in the universe, will be\nstrengthened and completed by a brief analysis of _order_ and its\nimplications.\n\nWe have seen already (55) that the apprehension of order in things implies\nthe recognition of _some unifying principle in what is manifold_. What, in\ngeneral, is the nature of this principle? It is the _point of view_, the\n_standpoint_ from which the unifying arrangement or disposition of the\nmanifold is carried out; in other words it is the _end_, _object_, or\n_purpose_, of the orderly arrangement. The arrangement, and the order\nresulting from it, will vary according to the end in view\u2014whether, for\ninstance, it be an arrangement of books in a library, of pictures in a\ngallery, of materials in an edifice, of parts in a machine. Hence St.\nThomas\u2019s definition of order as the due adaptation of means to ends:\n_recta ratio rerum ad finem_. When this adaptation is the work of human\nintelligence the order realized is _artificial_, when it is the work of\nnature the order realized is _natural_. Art is an extrinsic principle of\norder, nature implies indeed also an intelligent extrinsic principle of\norder, but is itself an intrinsic principle of order: the works of nature\nand those of art have this feature in common, that they manifest\nadaptation of means to ends.(524)\n\nThe _subordination_ of means to ends realizes an order which has for its\nunifying principle the influence of an _end_, a _final cause_. The group\nof _dynamic_ relations thus revealed constitutes what is called\n_teleological_ order, the order of _purpose_ or _finality_. The\nrealization or execution of such an order implies the simultaneous\nexistence of _co-ordinated_ parts or members in a system, a realized whole\nwith complex, co-ordinated, orderly parts, the principle of unity in this\nsystem being the _form_ of the whole. This realized, disposed, or\nconstituted order, is called the _esthetic_ order (55), the order of\nco-ordination, composition, constitution. In ultimate analysis, however,\nthese two orders, the _teleological_ and the _esthetic_, having as\nrespective unifying principles the _final_ cause and the _formal_ cause,\nare not two really distinct orders, but rather two aspects of one and the\nsame order: we have seen that in the things of nature the intrinsic end or\nfinal cause of each is identical with its _forma substantialis_ or formal\ncause (108). But the final cause is naturally prior to the formal cause,\nand consequently the teleological order is more fundamental than the\nesthetic.\n\nSt. Augustine\u2019s definition of order as \u201cthe arrangement of a multiplicity\nof things, similar and dissimilar, according its proper place to\neach,\u201d(525) reveals the _material_ cause of order in the multiplicity of\nvaried elements, the _formal_ cause of order in the group of relations\nresulting from the arrangement or _dispositio_, and the _efficient_ cause\nof order in the agent that disposes or arranges them. The _final_ cause,\nthough not directly mentioned, is implied in the fact that the place of\neach factor in the system is necessarily determined by the function it has\nto fulfil, the part it is suited by its nature to play, in contributing to\nthe realization of the end or purpose of the arrangement.\n\nIf, then, order is _the right arrangement or disposition of things\naccording to their destination, or in the mutual relations demanded by\ntheir ends_, it necessarily follows that the very existence of _natural_\norder in the universe implies that this universe is not a work of _chance_\nbut a _purposive_ work, just as the existence of _artificial_ order in\nproducts of human art implies that these products are not the result of\nchance but of activity influenced by final causes.(526)\n\nIt is in fact impossible to conceive order except as resulting from the\ninfluence of final causes. Right reason rejects as an utterly inadequate\nexplanation of the natural order of the universe the fantastic and\nfar-fetched supposition of a chance collocation of indifferent,\nundetermined and aimless physical agencies.(527) If we find in the actual\nphysical universe difficulties against the view that this universe reveals\nthe influence of final causes, such difficulties do not arise from the\nfact that there is order in the universe, but rather from the fact that\nwith this order there seems to coexist some degree of disorder also. In so\nfar forth as there is natural order there is _cogent_ evidence of the\ninfluence of final causes. And so necessary is this inference that even\none single authentic instance of natural order in an otherwise chaotic\nuniverse would oblige us to infer the existence and influence of a final\ncause to account for that solitary instance. We mean by an authentic\ninstance one which evidences a real and sustained uniformity, regularity,\nmutual co-ordination and subordination of factors in the behaviour of any\ngroup of natural agencies; for we allow that transient momentary\ncollocations and concurrences of _indifferent_ agencies, acting aimlessly\nand without purpose as a matter of fact, might present to our minds,\naccustomed to seek for orderly and purposive phenomena, the deceptive\nappearance of order.\n\nOrder, then, we take it, necessarily implies the existence and influence\nof final causes. This in turn, as we have already observed, implies with\nequal necessity the existence of _Intelligent Purpose_. If, then, there is\nnatural order in the universe, there must exist an _Intelligent Will_ to\naccount for this natural order.\n\nLeaving the development of this line of argument to its proper place in\nNatural Theology, there remains the simple question of fact: Is the\nphysical universe a _cosmos_? Does it reveal order\u2014a natural order\ndistinct from the artificial order realized by the human mind in the\nmechanical and fine arts, an order, therefore, realized not by the human\nmind but by some other mind, by the Divine Mind? The evidences of such\norder superabound. We have already referred to some of them (106), nor is\nthere any need to labour the matter. Two points, however, in connexion\nwith this universally recognized fact of order in the universe, call for a\nbrief mention before we conclude. They are in the nature of difficulties\nagainst the ordinary, reasonable view of the matter, the view on which the\ntheistic argument from order is based.\n\nIn accordance with the Kantian theory of knowledge it is objected that the\norder which we apprehend, or think we apprehend, in the universe, is not\n_really in_ the universe of our experience, but is as it were _projected\ninto_ this universe by our own minds in the very process of cognition\nitself. It is therefore not real but only apparent, not noumenal but only\nphenomenal. It is simply a product of the categorizing, unifying,\nsystematizing activity of our minds. It is a feature of the phenomenon or\nmental product, _i.e._ of the noumenal _datum_ as _invested with a\ncategory of thought_. But whether or not it is a characteristic of the\nreal universe itself man\u2019s speculative reason is by its very constitution\nessentially incapable of ever discovering. The theory of knowledge on\nwhich this difficulty is based can be shown to be unsound and erroneous.\nFor a criticism of the theory we must refer the reader to scholastic works\non Epistemology. It may be observed, however, apart from the merits or\ndemerits of the theory, that the experienced fact of order is by no means\ndemolished or explained away by any questions that may be raised about the\nexact _location_ of the fact, if we may so express it. Order is a fact, an\nundeniable, experienced fact; and it looms just as large, and cries out\njust as insistently for explanation, with whichever of the imposing\nadjectives \u201cnoumenal\u201d or \u201cphenomenal\u201d a philosopher may choose to qualify\nit; nor do we diminish its reality by calling it phenomenal one whit more\nthan we increase that reality by calling it noumenal.\n\nThe other difficulty arises from the existence of _disorder_ in the\nuniverse. Pessimists of the type of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche concentrate\ntheir attention so exclusively on the evidences of disorder, the failures\nof adaptation of means to ends, the defects and excesses, the prodigality\nand penury, the pain and suffering, which abound in physical nature\u2014not to\nspeak of moral evil,\u2014that they become blind to all evidences of order, and\nproclaim all belief in order an illusion.\n\nThe picture of\n\n\n    Nature, red in tooth and claw\n    With ravine(528)\n\n\nis, however, the product of a morbid and distraught imagination rather\nthan a sane view of the facts. The undeniable existence of disorder, of\nphysical evils, defects, failures, frustrations of natural tendency in the\nuniverse, does not obscure or conceal from the normal, unbiassed mind the\nequally undeniable evidences of a great and wide and generally prevailing\norder. Nor does it conceal from such a mind the fact that the existence of\norder in any measure or degree implies of necessity the existence of plan\nor design, and therefore of intelligent purpose also. Inferring from this\nfact of order the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, and inferring by\nother lines of reasoning from the data of experience the dependence of the\nuniverse on this Intelligence as Creator, Conserver and Ruler, the theist\nis confronted with the reality of moral and physical evil (52), _i.e._ of\n_disorder_ in the universe. But he does not see in this disorder anything\nessentially incompatible with his established conclusion that the universe\nis a finite creation of Infinite Wisdom, and a free manifestation of the\nlatter to man. If the actual universe is imperfect, he knows that God\ncreated it freely and might have created a more perfect or a less perfect\none. Knowing that God is All-Powerful as He is All-Wise, he knows that the\nactual universe, though imperfect _absolutely_, is perfect _relatively_,\nin that it infallibly reveals the Divine Wisdom and Goodness exactly in\nthe measure in which God has willed to reveal Himself in His works.\nConscious on the one hand that his finite mind cannot trace in detail all\nthe purposes of God in nature, or assign to all individual events their\ndivinely appointed ends, he is confident on the other hand that the whole\nuniverse is intelligible only as the working out of a Divine plan, and not\notherwise. To his mind as a theist these lines are a clearer expression of\nrationally grounded optimism than they were perhaps even to the poet who\npenned them:\u2014\n\n\n    I trust in nature for the stable laws\n    Of beauty and utility. Spring shall plant\n    And Autumn garner to the end of time.\n    I trust in God\u2014the right shall be the right\n    And other than the wrong, while He endures;\n    I trust in my own soul, that can perceive\n    The outward and the inward, Nature\u2019s good\n    And God\u2019s.(529)\n\n\nWe have seen that the agencies which constitute the universal order have\neach its own inner principle of finality; that these agencies are not\nisolated but mutually related in such ways that the ends of each subserve\nan extrinsic and remoter end which is none other than this universal order\nwhereby we recognize the world as a _cosmos_. The maintenance of this\norder is the _intrinsic_ end of the universe as a whole: an end which is\n_immanent_ in the universe, an end which is of course _a good_. But this\nuniversal order itself is _for an end_, an _extrinsic_, _transcendent_\nend, distinct from itself; and this end, too, must be _a good_. \u201cThe\nuniverse,\u201d says St. Thomas,(530) \u201chas the good of order and another\ndistinct good.\u201d The universal order, says Aristotle, has itself an end, a\n_good_, which is _one_, and to which all else is ordained: \u201c\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u201d.(531) What can this Supreme Good be, this absolutely Ultimate\nEnd, this Transcendent Principle of all nature, and of all nature\u2019s\ntendencies and activities? Whence comes this universal tendency of all\nnature, if not from the Being who is the One, Eternal, Immutable Prime\nMover,(532) and whose moving influence is Love?(533) Such is the profound\nthought of Aristotle, a thought re-echoed so sublimely by the immortal\npoet of Christian philosophy in the closing line of the _Paradiso_:\u2014\n\n\n    L\u2019amor che muove il Sole e l\u2019altre stelle.\n\n\nThe immediate factors of the universal order of nature, themselves devoid\nof intelligence, must therefore be the work of Intelligent Will. To\narrange these factors as parts of one harmonious whole, as members of one\norderly system, Supreme Wisdom must have conceived the plan and chosen the\nmeans to realize it. The manifestation of God\u2019s glory by the realization\nof this plan, such is the ultimate transcendent end of the whole created\nuniverse. \u201cThe whole order of the universe,\u201d writes St. Thomas, developing\nthe thought of Aristotle,(534) \u201cis for the Prime Mover thereof; this order\nhas for its purpose the working out in an orderly universe of the plan\nconceived and willed by the Prime Mover. And hence the Prime Mover is the\nprinciple of this universal order.\u201d\n\nThe truths so briefly outlined in this closing chapter on the order and\npurpose of the universe have nowhere found more apt and lucid\nphilosophical formulation than in the monumental writings of the Angel of\nthe Christian Schools; nor perhaps have they ever elsewhere appeared in a\nmore felicitous setting of poetic imagery than in these stanzas from the\nimmortal epic of the Poet of the Christian Schools:\u2014\n\n\n                ... Le cose tutte quante\n    Hann\u2019 ordine tra lora; e questa \u00e8 forma\n    Che l\u2019universo a Dio fa simigliante.\n\n    Qui veggion l\u2019alte creature l\u2019orma\n    Dell\u2019eterno Valore, il quale \u00e8 fine\n    Al quale \u00e8 fatta la toccata norma.\n\n    Nell\u2019 ordine ch\u2019io dico sono accline\n    Tutte nature per diverse sorti\n    Pi\u00f9 al Principio loro e men vicine;\n\n    Onde si muovono a diversi porti\n    Per lo gran mar dell\u2019essere, e ciascuna\n    Con instinto a lei dato che la porti.\n\n    Questi ne porta il fuoco inver la Luna:\n    Questi ne\u2019 cuor mortali \u00e8 permotore;\n    Questi la terra in se stringe ed aduna.\n\n    N\u00e8 pur le creature, che son fuore\n    D\u2019intelligenza, quest\u2019 arco saetta\n    Ma quelle ch\u2019 hanno intelletto ed amore.\n\n    La Providenza, che cotanto assetta,\n    Del suo lume fa il ciel sempre quieto,\n    Nel qual si volge quel ch\u2019ha maggior fretta:\n\n    Ed ora li, com\u2019 a sito decreto,\n    Cen porta la virt\u00f9 di quella corda,\n    Che ci\u00f2 che scocca drizzo in segno lieto.(535)\n\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\nAbsolute, the, 47 _sq._;\n  and relative, 332 _sqq._\n\nAccidents, individuation of, 133 _sqq._;\n  causes of, 235-6;\n  divisions of, 237 _sqq._;\n  existence and relation to substance, 232 _sqq._, 240 _sqq._, 243, 247\n              _n._, 249, 313.\n\n_Actio et passio_, _v._ causality, causes.\n\n_Actio intentionalis_, 378.\n\n_Actio in distans_, 395-6.\n\nAction, immanent and transitive, 73, 369, 391-2.\n\nActual and potential, 52 _sqq._ and _passim_.\n\nActuality, goodness and perfection, 173 _sqq._\n\n_Actus Purus_, 54, 58.\n\nAEGIDIUS, 108 _n._\n\n_Aeveternitas_, _aevum_, 230.\n\nAgnosticism, 96, 97, 335, 383, 409, 414, 427.\n\nALBERTUS MAGNUS, 108 _n._, 201 _n._, 288.\n\nALEXANDER OF HALES, 110 _n._, 112 _n._\n\nAnalogy, analogical predication, 36 _sqq._, 122 _n._, 212, 240, 272, 330;\n  a. inference, 386-7, 391.\n\nANDRONICUS OF RHODES, 17.\n\n_Anima mundi_, 284.\n\nANSELM, ST., 353 _n._\n\nAnthropology, 19.\n\nAppetite, 167 _sqq._\n\n_Appetitus naturalis_, 409-10, 413-15.\n\nARISTOTLE, on philosophy, 5;\n  on esthetics, 13;\n  on theology, 15, 16;\n  on special sciences, 16;\n  on analogy, 40;\n  on change, 51, 56, 68 _sqq._;\n  on essence, 75;\n  on individual, 120-1;\n  on the good, 167 _sqq._;\n  on beauty, 200 _n._, 201 _n._;\n  on substance and accident, 209, 249;\n  on \u201cfirst\u201d and \u201csecond\u201d substances, 252-3;\n  on quality, 287, 290-2;\n  on habits, 293-6;\n  on quantity, 311 _n._;\n  on place, 318;\n  on time, 342;\n  on relation, 337 _n._, 346-8;\n  on principles, 358 _n._;\n  on causes, 361 _sqq._, 367;\n  on final causes, 406 _sqq._;\n  on \u201cnature,\u201d 416 _sqq._, 422-4, 426;\n  on order of the universe, 433.\n\nArt, and nature, 416-17.\n\nArts, fine and mechanical, 13, 14, 430;\n  and science, 194-5;\n  scope of, 204 _sqq._;\n  and morals, 205-6.\n\nAtomism, _v._ Mechanism.\n\nAUGUSTINE, ST., on basis of possible essences, 89 _n._, 94;\n  on evil, 185 _n._;\n  on beauty, 198, 200 _n._, 202 _n._;\n  on time, 322;\n  on order, 429.\n\nAUREOLUS, 110 _n._\n\nAVERRO\u00cfSM, 284.\n\nBALMES, 89 _n._, 90 _n._, 93.\n\nBA\u00d1EZ, D., 108 _n._, 350 _n._\n\nBAUMGARTEN, 192 _n._\n\n_Beatitudo_, 175 _n._, 411.\n\nBeauty, the Beautiful, 13, 14;\n  analysis of, 192 _sqq._;\n  definitions of, 201 _sqq._\n\nBeing, concept analysed, 32 _sqq._;\n  real being and logical being, 10, 42 _sqq._, 85, 140.\n\n\u2014 and Ideal Being, 45 _sqq._, 85.\n\n\u2014 fundamental distinction in, 46 _sqq._\n\n\u2014 metaphysical grades of, 123 _sqq._\n\n\u2014 potential and actual, 51 _sqq._\n\nBERGSON, 30, 289 _n._, 303.\n\nBERKELEY, 215, 221, 350 _n._, 400.\n\nBIEL, G., 110 _n._\n\nBILLOT, 266 _n._\n\nBilocation, 322.\n\nBO\u00cbTIUS, 329.\n\nBOIRAC, 343.\n\nBONAVENTURE, ST., on distinction of soul and faculties, 247-8.\n\nBOSSUET, 196, 360.\n\nBROWNING, 432.\n\nBRUNETI\u00c8RE, 196.\n\nBULLIAT, 130 _n._\n\nCAJETAN, 24, 38 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._\n\nCAPREOLUS, 87 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._\n\nCARY, 434 _n._\n\nCategories, ultimate, analysis of, 208 _sqq._;\n  not adequately distinct as modes, 210-11, 350;\n  but exhaustive, 211-12.\n\n_Causa exemplaris_, 362.\n\n_Causalitas_ \u201c_intentionalis_,\u201d 413.\n\nCausality, causes, notion analysed, 357 _sqq._;\n  classification, 361 _sqq._;\n  principle of C., 369 _sqq._, 384-5;\n  \u201cplurality\u201d of causes, 380;\n  causality and uniformity, 377, 381, 382;\n  \u201cphysical\u201d cause, 382, 419;\n  phenomenist view of, 382 _sqq._;\n  and inductive science, 359, 379, 381, 382 _n._;\n  and determinism, 377;\n  and creation, 391, 400-1.\n\nCausality, efficient, as index of real distinction, 148;\n  classification of efficient causes, 372 _sqq._;\n  instrumental, 373-6;\n  objective validity of concept, 382 _sqq._;\n  origin of concept, 385 _sqq._;\n  analysis of, 366 _sqq._, 388 _sqq._;\n  erroneous theories of, 392-6;\n  and occasionalism, 396 _sqq._, 400 _sqq._\n\n\u2014 final (_v._ purpose), 361, 368;\n  intrinsic and extrinsic finality, 404 _sqq._, 426;\n  all-pervading influence of, 409;\n  divisions of, 409 _sqq._;\n  analysis of, 411_sqq._;\n  as implying intelligence, 409, 414-15, 426.\n\n\u2014 formal, 361, 364-5.\n\n\u2014 material, 361, 364-6.\n\nChance, 423 _sqq._\n\nChange, 61 _sqq._, 302-5;\n  and time, 323;\n  and causality, 367, 389-96.\n\nCICERO, 1.\n\nCLARKE, 135.\n\n_Cognitio_ \u201c_vulgaris_,\u201d 2.\n\nComposition, logical and metaphysical, 34;\n  essential and integral, 311, 314-16;\n  as index of finiteness, 248.\n\nCOMTE, 30, 334.\n\nConceptualism, 24, 125.\n\n_Concursus Divinus_,66, 329, 348, 375 _n._, 388 _sqq._;\n  necessity of, 389-91, 401-3.\n\nCondition, and cause, 358-9, 419.\n\nConsciousness, and personality, 273, 277 _sqq._;\n  \u201csubliminal,\u201d 282 sqq.\n\nConstitutive or constructive factors in thought, 45, 74, 340, 355-6.\n\nContingent and necessary Being, 47.\n\nCo-operation, in philosophical studies, 30.\n\nCorrelatives, 388.\n\n_Corruptio et generatio_, 71, 186.\n\nCosmology, 16, 19, 285, 309, 364, 388, 393.\n\nCOUSIN, 301, 387.\n\n_Creatio ab aeterno_, 89, 328.\n\nCriteriology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.\n\nDANTE, 434 n.\n\nDAVID OF DINANT, 125 _n._\n\nDE MUNNYNCK, 84 _n._, 89 _n._, 91 _n._, 94 _n._, 95 _n._\n\nDE SAN, 241 _n._, 327 _n._, 331 _n._\n\nDESCARTES, on basis of essences, 96, 97;\n  on substance, 214, 226-8, 230, 241 _n._;\n  on accidents, 244;\n  on corporeal substance, 312-13, 315, 397.\n\nDesign, _v._ purpose and final cause.\n\nDE WULF, 6 _n._, 27 _n._, 29 _n._, 156 _n._, 195 _n._, 284.\n\nDisposition, _v._ habit.\n\n_Dispositiones ad formam_, 295 n.\n\nDisorder, fact of, 431-2.\n\nDistinctions, doctrine of, 105 _sqq._, 139 _sqq._, 242-3, 249-51, 301-5.\n\nDOMET DE VORGES, 387 _n._\n\n\u201cDouble law\u201d in man, 176.\n\n\u201cDouble personality,\u201d 282-4.\n\nDRISCOLL, 89 _n._\n\nDUPASQUIER, 99 _n._\n\nDURANDUS, 110 _n._\n\nDuration, 322, 325 _n._, 328 _sqq._\n\nEducation, and habits, 298.\n\nEfficiency, concept of, _v._ cause (efficient).\n\nEgo, _v._ person.\n\nELEATICS, 51, 125, 303.\n\nEnd (_v._ purpose), 406.\n\nEnergies, equivalence of, 395.\n\n_Ens a se_, _ab alio_, 47;\n  and _ens in se_, 230-1, 334.\n\n_Ens rationis_, _v._ Being.\n\nEntitative habit, 292 _n._\n\nEpistemology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.\n\n_Esse_ \u201c_intentionale_,\u201d 45, 46, 412.\n\nEssence, analysis of, 75 _sqq._;\n  and nature and substance, 79, 258.\n\nEsthetics, 13, 14, 192 sqq.\n\nEternity, 328 _sqq._;\n  of essences, 80 _sqq._\n\nEther, hypothesis of, 317, 395.\n\nEthics, 11-12, 296-7, 428-9.\n\nEucharist, and substance and accidents, 223 _n._, 233, 243 _n._;\n  and quantity, 312-16; 319 _n._, 322, 345 _n._\n\nEUCKEN, 28.\n\nEvil, analysis of, 182 _sqq._\n\nExemplarism, 98, 100, 161-2.\n\nExistence, and essence, 101-13;\n  of accidents, 243-61;\n  and subsistence, 266, 269;\n  and action, 301.\n\nExtension, _v._ quantity.\n\nExtrinsic denominations, 238, 239.\n\nFaculties, 298 _sqq._;\n  and substance, 300 _sqq._\n\nFaith and reason, 5.\n\nFatalism, 424 _n._\n\nFigure, or form, as indicative of nature, 292-3.\n\n_Finis_, finality, _v._ purpose and final causes.\n\nFinite and Infinite, 47, 301-3.\n\nFONSECA, 113 n.\n\n\u201c_Forma_\u201d as essence or nature, 78-9, 130.\n\n_Formae subsistentes_, 129.\n\n\u201cFormal\u201d unity, 156.\n\n_Formalitates_, 154.\n\nFormative principles, simplicity of, 317-18;\n  plurality in the individual, 365 (_n._ 4).\n\nFRANCIS OF VITTORIA, 113 _n._\n\nFRANZELIN, 110 _n._, 267 _n._\n\nFree causes, 376-7;\n  and occasionalism, 398.\n\nFreedom of thought, 6.\n\n_Generatio_, _v._ _corruptio_.\n\nGenuensis, 98 _n._\n\n\u201c_Genus_\u201d and \u201c_differentia_\u201d as \u201c_materia_\u201d and \u201c_forma_,\u201d 79 _n._, 365\n            (_n._ 4).\n\nGEULINCX, 397.\n\nGIOBERTI, 94.\n\nGood, analysis of the, 167 _sqq._;\n  divisions of the, 175 _sqq._;\n  and being, 177 _sqq._;\n  and beauty, 193.\n\nGOUDIN, 108 _n._\n\nGraceful, elegant, the, 199 _n._\n\nGREGORY OF VALENTIA, 110 _n._\n\nHabit, analysis of, 292 _sqq._\n\n_Haecceitas_, 125, 132.\n\nHARPER, 99 _n._\n\nHEGEL, Hegelianism, 30, 33, 46, 49, 67-8, 97, 208, 335.\n\nHENRY OF GHENT, 87 _n._, 113 _n._\n\nHERACLITUS, 51, 303.\n\nHICKEY, 89 _n._\n\nHOBBES, 334.\n\nH\u00d6FFDING, 230 _n._\n\nHUME, 213;\n  on substance, 215, 217, 221;\n  on cause, 370 _n._, 385.\n\nHUNLEY, 219 _n._\n\n_Hypostasis_, 265.\n\nHypostatic Union, 267-71.\n\nIdealism, 214, 334-6, 341, 343, 400.\n\nIdentity, 135 _sqq._;\n  and change, 139, 226, 241, 278;\n  personal, 276, 277 _sqq._\n\nImmaterial, positively and negatively, 16.\n\nImmensity, Divine, 319.\n\nImpenetrability, 309, 322.\n\n_Incommutabilia vera_, 89 _n._\n\nIndiscernibles, identity of, 135.\n\nIndividuation, 120, 123 _sqq._, 148, 261.\n\nInfinite and Finite, 47;\n  and categories, 212.\n\nInfinite regress in causation, 373.\n\nInherence, _v._ accident.\n\n_Intentio mentis_, 10, 43, 144 _n._, 145, 211, 339.\n\n\u201c_Intentio naturae_,\u201d 414 _n._, 416, 423.\n\n\u201cIntentional\u201d causality, 413.\n\nJAMES, 30;\n  on personal identity, 283-4.\n\nJOHN OF ST. THOMAS, 108 _n._, 350 _n._\n\nJOSEPH, on meanings of \u201ccause,\u201d 379-80.\n\nJOUFFROY, 275.\n\nKANT, 21, 30, 121, 145, 201, 208, 228, 334, 335, 343, 385, 393, 394, 430.\n\nKAPPES, M., 75 _n._\n\nKLEUTGEN, 38, 39, 40, 43, 87 _n._, 103 _n._, 142 _n._;\n  on accidents, 242, 247 _n._, 267 _n._, 330 _n._\n\nKLIMKE, 67 _n._\n\nKnowledge, relativity of, 335 _sqq._\n\n\u2014scientific, 2.\n\n\u2014theory of, 11, 20, 23, 45, 46, 70, 108;\n  and doctrine of distinctions, 143-6, 151-3;\n  and categories of being, 207 _sqq._, 285, 289;\n  and category of relation, 332 _sqq._, 385;\n  and causality, 393;\n  and order, 430-1.\n\n_Lacensis, Philosophia_, 21.\n\nLACORDAIRE, 89 _n._\n\nLADD, 24, 27.\n\nLAHOUSSE, 99 _n._\n\nLAMINNE, 60 _n._, 371 _n._\n\nLaw, of nature, 418 _sqq._\n\nLEIBNIZ, 21, 98 _n._, 135, 182, 227, 298, 387, 406.\n\nLEO XIII, 7, 26.\n\nLIBERATORE, 99 _n._\n\nLITTR\u00c9, 213.\n\nLOCKE, on substance, 214, 221;\n  on personality, 277-84, 334.\n\nLogic, 10.\n\nMAHER, 223 _n._, 230 _n._, 273 _n._;\n  on consciousness of self, 274-6, 282 _n._;\n  on theories of self, 283-4, 289 _n._;\n  on perception of time, 324 _n._, 326-7;\n  on relativity of knowledge, 336 _n._;\n  on cause, 386 _n._\n\nMALEBRANCHE, 397-400.\n\nManicheism, 182, 189-91.\n\nMASTRIUS, 99 _n._\n\n_Materia prima_, Aristotle on, 71-2.\n\n_Materia signata_, 127, 129, 131, 135.\n\nMathematical unity, 116, 119.\n\nMathematics, philosophy of, 17, 25.\n\nMatter, and evil, 190.\n\n\u2014 divisibility of (_v._ individuation), 317;\n  continuity of, 317-18.\n\nMeasurement, relativity of, 325-7.\n\nMechanism, mechanical conception of universe, 69, 265, 289, 393-6, 404,\n            409, 413, 414, 424-9.\n\nMemory, and personality, 276-84.\n\nMENDIVE, 99 _n._\n\nMERCIER, on division of metaphysics, 21;\n  on scholasticism, 26-7;\n  on characteristics of essences, 83, 93-4;\n  on analogical concept of God, 97;\n  on distinction, 107;\n  on phenomenism, 213, 224 _n._, 269 _n._;\n  on faculty and substance, 305 _n._;\n  on interaction, 391;\n  on efficient cause, 393 _n._;\n  on occasionalism, 398 _n._;\n  on mechanism, 426 _n._, 429 _n._\n\nMetaphor, and analogy, 39.\n\nMetaphysics, division of, 15 _sqq._;\n  etymology of, 17, 18;\n  scope of, 24, 25, 27;\n  and physics, _v._ physics.\n\nMILL, 213, 220, 334, 343;\n  on causes, 382.\n\nModal distinction, 150, 245 _sqq._\n\nModes, accidental and substantial, 150-1, 239, 245 _sqq._, 270, 325 _n._,\n            330-1.\n\nMOLINA, 113 _n._\n\nMonadology, of Leibniz, 227.\n\nMonism, 46, 97, 103, 125, 230, 284, 350 _n._, 399. 409.\n\nMonophysites, 268.\n\nMonopsychism, 284.\n\nMoral cause, 377-8.\n\nMorality and art, 205-6.\n\nMotion (_v._ change), and efficient causality, 392-6.\n\nMultitude, actually infinite, 321-2.\n\nNature and substance, 257 _sqq._;\n  and person, 261 _sqq._;\n  analysis of notion of, 461 _sqq._\n\nNecessary and Contingent Being, 47.\n\nNecessity of essences, 81 _sqq._\n\n\u2014 of physical laws, 419-28.\n\nNEWMAN, on scope of philosophy, 22, 31;\n  on causality, 377, 387.\n\nNIETZSCHE, 431.\n\n_Nisus naturae_, 421.\n\nNominalism, 125.\n\n_Notas individuantes_, 124, 131.\n\nNYS, 309 _n._, 311 _n._, 321 _n._, 327 _n._, 328 _n._, 395 _n._\n\nOccasion, and cause, 359.\n\nOccasionalism, 226, 387, 388;\n  examined, 396-403.\n\nOntology, 21, 23.\n\nOntologism, 95, 350 _n._\n\nOptimism, 181-2, 432.\n\nOlder, static and dynamic, 199, 428;\n  and beauty, 194, 199, 428;\n  natural and artificial, 428;\n  and relation, 342;\n  and final cause, 428;\n  and formal cause, 429;\n  and intelligent purpose, 417, 429-30, 433.\n\nPanpsychism, 250.\n\nPantheism, _v._ monism.\n\nPAULSEN, 213, 226-7.\n\nPerfection, analysis of, 171 _sqq._;\n  and beauty, 201;\n  grades of, 59, 172-3;\n  in substances, 134, 255;\n  and distinction, 142 _n._;\n  and habit, 297;\n  and relation, 342.\n\nPerson, personality, 262 _sqq._;\n  definition of, 265, 270 _n._;\n  distinction from individual nature, 266 _sqq._;\n  false theories of, 276 _sqq._;\n  \u201csubconscious,\u201d 283-4.\n\nPESCH, 99 _n._\n\nPessimism, 181-2, 431.\n\nPhenomenism, and substance, 213 _sqq._, 223;\n  substantializes accidents, 215;\n  substantializes consciousness, 281, 282-4;\n  and causality, 382 _sqq._, 398, 421.\n\nPhilosophy, notion of, 2 _sqq._;\n  divisions of, 7 _sqq._;\n  and special sciences, 28-9.\n\nPlace, analysis of, 318 _sqq._\n\nPLATO, 93, 94, 95, 167, 200 _n._, 201.\n\nPleasure, sensible and esthetic, 196-7, 205-6.\n\nPOINCAR\u00c9, 199 _n._\n\nPositivism, 214, 334, 383, 409, 421.\n\nPossible, the, 52 _sqq._, 82 _sqq._;\n  and intelligible, 97;\n  and passive potentiality, 109.\n\n_Potentia obediantialis_, 372.\n\nPotential, _v._ actual.\n\nPower, operative, 55;\n  and passive potentiality, 298 _sqq._;\n  as index of perfection, 202 _n._;\n  classification of, 305.\n\n_Praescisio objectiva et formalis_, 34, 146-7.\n\nPrime mover, necessity of, 65-7.\n\nPrinciple, notion of, 357-8.\n\n_Privatio_, 62, 358.\n\nProvidence, and chance, 424.\n\nPsychology, 19, 296.\n\nPurpose, and the good, 169, 405 _sqq._;\n  and perfection, 408;\n  and order, 429.\n\nPYTHAGORAS, 1.\n\nQUALITY, analysis of, 286 _sqq._;\n  divisions of, 288 _sqq._;\n  characteristics of, 305 _sqq._;\n  grades of intensity in, 307.\n\nQuantity, and individuation, 133;\n  analysis of, 309 _sqq._;\n  and corporeal substance, 311 _sqq._;\n  internal and external, 309-10, 314.\n\nRate, notion of, 325 _n._, 327 _n._\n\nRADA, 99 _n._\n\nRealism, moderate, 23, 125, 133, 242-3, 320.\n\n\u2014 extreme, 46, 156-7.\n\nReason, and cause, 359-60.\n\n\u2014 \u201csufficient,\u201d 135, 182, 360.\n\nREINSTADLER, 106 _n._\n\nRelation, analysis of, 336 _sqq._;\n  logical, 338 _sqq._;\n  real, 341 _sqq._;\n  transcendental, 345;\n  predicamental, 346 _sqq._ ;\n  reality of the \u201c_esse ad_,\u201d 350-6.\n\nRelative, the, 47 _sqq._, 332 _sqq._\n\nRENOUVIER, 335.\n\nRevelation, 4 _sqq._, 12, 25, 189, 233, 247, 252, 263, 265, 267, 312-15,\n            328, 358 _n._\n\nRICKABY, 276 _n._\n\nROSCOE, 83 _n._\n\nROYCE, 25.\n\nSCHIFFINI, 99 _n._\n\nScholasticism, 26, 30;\n  on substance, 218 _sqq._\n\nSCHOPENHAUER, 431.\n\nScience, _v._ knowledge.\n\nSciences, special, 16, 27;\n  at Louvain and Maynooth, 29 _n._\n\nSCOTUS, 34, 39 _sqq._, 99, 113, 125, 132, 153 _sqq._, 247, 267 _n._\n\nSelf, consciousness of, 274 _sqq._ (_v._ person.)\n\nSENECA, 424 _n._\n\n_Sensibilia propria et communia_, objectivity of, 70;\n  _per se et per accidens_, 218, 260.\n\nSensism, 334, 383 _n._, 394 _n._\n\nSimilarity, and identity, 137, 306;\n  and distinction, 153.\n\nSimplicity, and quantity, 307 _n._\n\n_Situs_, category of, 309, 319 _n._\n\nSOCRATES, 167.\n\nSolipsism, 86.\n\nSONCINAS, 108 _n._\n\nSOTO, D. DE, 113 _n._\n\nSpace, analysis of, 319 _sqq._;\n  problems on, 321-2.\n\nSpecialists, scientific, and metaphysics, 27-28.\n\n_Species expressa_, 46;\n  _sensibilis_, 313.\n\nSPENCER, 30, 213, 228, 229, 335.\n\nSPINOZA, on substance, 230-2, 334, 399.\n\nSpirits, individuation of, 129, 131.\n\nSTORCHENAU, 98 _n._\n\nSUAREZ, 41, 44, 110 _n._, 111 _n._, 267 _n._\n\nSublime, the, 199 _n._\n\n_Subsistentia_, 131, 261 _sqq._ (_v._ person), 271-3.\n\nSubstance, category of, undeniable in thought, 209, 215, 220, 281, 282-4;\n  reality of, 213 _sqq._;\n  cognoscibility of, 213 _sqq._, 219 _sqq._;\n  plurality of, 221;\n  distinction from accidents, 224 _sqq._, 301-5;\n  erroneous notions of, 225 _sqq._;\n  permanence of, 229, 277;\n  divisions of, 252 _sqq._;\n  complete and incomplete, 254 _sqq._;\n  corporeal and spiritual, 253-4, 315-6;\n  relation to space, 319.\n\nSubstantial change, 71.\n\nSULLY-PRUDHOMME, 203 _n._\n\nSupernatural theology, 5, 12, 13.\n\n\u2014 end, 411.\n\n_Suppositum, suppositalitas_, _v._ person, personality.\n\nTAINE, 213.\n\nTaste, esthetic, 197.\n\nTeleology, _v._ purpose and final cause.\n\nTENNYSON, 31, 431.\n\nTheodicy, 21.\n\nTheology, natural, 15, 19, 182, 189, 285, 334, 438, 430.\n\nTHOMAS, ST., on division of philosophy, 9, 18, 26;\n  on analogy, 36;\n  on absolute being, 49;\n  on action, 60, 64;\n  on essences, 76, 79, 92;\n  on existence and essences, 102 _n._, 110 _n._, 112 _n._;\n  on unity, 116 _n._, 117 _n._, 119 _n._, 120 _n._, 156 _n._, 250;\n  on individuation, 127 _n._;\n  on ontological truth, 162-3, and falsity, 165 _n._;\n  on the good, 169 _n._, 174 _n._, 176 _n._, 180 _n._;\n  on evil, 183 _n._, 184 _n._;\n  on the beautiful, 193 _n._, 194 _n._, 200 _n._;\n  on Aristotle\u2019s categories, 210, 211 _n._;\n  on substance and accident, 209 _n._, 223 _n._, 231 _n._, 232 _n._, 234\n              _n._, 241 _n._, 243 _n._, 248;\n  on essence as nature, 258-61;\n  on subsistence and personality, 263 _n._, 266 _n._, 269;\n  on quality, 283, 290, 293;\n  on habits, 294-6;\n  on power and substance, 300 _sqq._;\n  on grades in quality, 307-8;\n  on quantity and corporeal substance, 311 _sqq._;\n  on body and spirit, 314-6;\n  on time, 323-4;\n  on _creatio ab aeterno_, 328;\n  on duration, 330 _n._;\n  on relations, 339-40, 341 _n._, 342 _n._, 344 _n._, 347, 348 _n._, 351\n              _n._, 353 _n._, 354 _n._, 355 _n._, 356 _n._;\n  on classification of causes, 362 _n._;\n  on material and formal causes, 365 _n._;\n  on action, 367-8;\n  on instrumental cause, 375;\n  on created causes, 388 _n._, 389 _n._;\n  on occasionalism, 400 _n._;\n  on final causality, 408 _n._, 412 _n._, 415 _n._;\n  on nature and art, 417, 428 _n._;\n  on order, 428, 432 _n._, 433.\n\nThought and imagery, 392-6.\n\nTime, analysis of, 322 _sqq._;\n  problems on, 328.\n\nTradition, 31.\n\nTranscendental and generic notions, 35;\n  attributes of being, 114 _sqq._;\n  relations, 345.\n\nTransubstantiation, 233.\n\nTruth, ontological, 158 _sqq._\n\nTURNER, 21 _n._\n\n_Ubi_, category of, 309, 319.\n\nUbiquity, Divine, 319.\n\nUniformity of Nature, 377;\n  and law, 418;\n  and inductive science, 419;\n  degrees of, 422 _sqq._\n\nUnion, substantial and personal, 268.\n\nUnity, doctrine of, 114 _sqq._, 242-3;\n  \u201corganic\u201d and \u201cmechanical,\u201d 249-51, 260-1, 278;\n  of living individual, 280-1, 301-5;\n  conceptual, 337.\n\nUniversal and individual (_v._ individuation), 252-3.\n\nUnivocal, _v._ analogical.\n\nURRABURU, 35, 87 _n._, 88 _n._, 99 _n._, 124 _n._;\n  on modes, 245 _n._;\n  on nature and person, 267-8, 270 _n._, 288 _n._, 345 _n._, 355 _n._;\n  on instrumental causes, 374 _n._;\n  on cause, 393 _n._\n\nVacuum, and motion, 321.\n\nVALLET, 201.\n\nVariety, and beauty, 200.\n\nVASQUEZ, 110 _n._\n\nVEITCH, 334 _n._\n\nVital change, 64-5.\n\n\u2014 acts, 246 _n._\n\nVoluntarism, 96-7.\n\nWeltanschauung, World-view, 4, 29, 30.\n\nWILLIAM OF OCKAM, 95.\n\nWINDELBAND, 7, 208 _n._\n\nWOLFF, 21, 98.\n\nWUNDT, 213, 226, 267 _n._\n\nZIGLIARA, 64 _n._, 107 _n._, 156 _n._, 301 _n._, 320 _n._, 398 _n._\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 2 vols. Longmans, 1912.\n\n_    2 Institutions Metaphysica, quas Roma, in Pontificia Universitate\n      Gregoriana tradiderat_ P. JOANNES JOSEPHUS URRABURU, S.J. Volumen\n      Secundum: _Ontologia_ (Rome, 1891).\n\n    3 French version by SIERP, 4 vols. Paris, Gaume, 1868.\n\n_    4 Ontologie, ou M\u00e9taphysique G\u00e9n\u00e9rale_, par D. MERCIER. Louvain, 3me\n      \u00e9dit., 1902.\n\n    5 \u03a4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\n      \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2.\u2014ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, I., 1. \u201cSapientia [philosophia] est\n      scientia quae considerat primas et universales causas.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS,\n      _In Metaph._, I., I. 2.\n\n_    6 Cf._ DE WULF, _Scholasticism Old and New_, pp. 59-61, 191-4;\n      _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 311-13; also two articles in\n      the _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_ (March and May, 1906) on _Thoughts\n      on Philosophy and Religion_, and an article in the _Irish\n      Theological Quarterly_ (October, 1910) on _Philosophy and\n      Sectarianism in Belfast University_, by the present writer.\n\n_    7 Cf._ Encyclical _Aeterni Patris_, on Philosophical Studies, by Pope\n      Leo XIII., August 4,1880.\n\n    8 Introduction, \u00a7 1.\n\n    9 As a brief general statement of the matter this is sufficiently\n      accurate and will not be misunderstood. Of course the general\n      standpoint of ultimate causes and reasons admits within itself some\n      variety of aspects. Thus Epistemology and Psychology deal with human\n      thought, but under different aspects; Psychology and Ethics deal\n      with human volition, but under different aspects, etc.\n\n   10 \u201cTheoreticus sive speculativis intellectus, in hoc proprie ab\n      operativo sive practico distinguitur, quod speculativus habet pro\n      fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus autem veritatem\n      consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem; et ideo\n      differunt ab invicem fine; finis speculativae est veritas, finis\n      operativae sive practicae actio.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In lib. Boetii de\n      Trinitate_.\n\n   11 Here is St. Thomas\u2019 exposition and justification of the doctrine in\n      the text: \u201cSapientis est ordinare. Cujus ratio est, quia sapientia\n      est potissima perfectio rationis, cujus proprium est cognoscere\n      ordinem.... Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatatur. Est\n      enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut\n      est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio\n      considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos\n      ad invicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae.\n      Tertius autem est quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus\n      voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in\n      exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo. Et\n      quia consideratio rationis per habitum perficitur, secundum hos\n      diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae\n      scientiae. Nam ad _philosophiam naturalem_ pertinet considerare\n      ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod\n      sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus _et metaphysicam_. Ordo\n      autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad\n      _rationalem philosophiam_, cujus est considerare ordinem partium\n      orationis ad invicem et ordinem principiorum ad invicem et ad\n      conclusiones. Ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad\n      considerationem _moralis philosophiae_. Ordo autem quem ratio\n      considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem\n      humanam, pertinet ad _artes mechanicas_.\u201d\u2014_In X. Ethic. ad Nichom._,\n      i., lect. 1.\n\n_   12 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., Introduction, ch. ii. and iii.\n\n   13 ARISTOTLE and the scholastics distinguished between the domain of\n      the practical (\u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03c3\u03c3\u03c9, \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, _agere_, _agibilia_) and the\n      operative or productive (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _facere_, _factibilia_).\n\n_   14 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7 8.\n\n   15 \u201cQu\u00e6dam igitur sunt _speculabilium_ qu\u00e6 dependent a materia secundum\n      esse, quia non nisi in materia esse possunt, et h\u00e6c distinguuntur\n      quia dependent qu\u00e6dam a materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut\n      illa in quorum definitione ponitur materia sensibilis: unde sine\n      materia sensibili intelligi non possunt; ut in definitione hominis\n      oportet accipere carnem et ossa: et de his est _physica_ sive\n      scientia naturalis. Qu\u00e6dam vero sunt qu\u00e6, quamvis dependeant a\n      materia sensibili secundum esse, non tamen secundum intellectum,\n      quia in eorum definitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis, ut\n      linea et numerus: et de his est _mathematica_. Qu\u00e6dam vero sunt\n      speculabilia qu\u00e6 non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine\n      materia esse possunt: sive nunquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et\n      angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut\n      substantia, qualitas, potentia et actus, unum et multa, etc., de\n      quibus omnibus est _theologia_, id est scientia divina, quia\n      pr\u00e6cipuum cognitorum in ea est Deus. Alio nomine dicitur\n      _metaphysica_, id est, transphysica, quia post physicam dicenda\n      occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus competit in insensibilia\n      devenire. Dicitur etiam _philosophia prima_, in quantum scientiae\n      ali\u00e6 ab ea principia sua accipientes eam sequuntur.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In\n      lib. Boetii de Trinitate_, q. 5, a. 1.\n\n   16 \u1f18\u03c4\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f24 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u1ff3 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd\n      \u1f01\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc.\u2014_Metaph._ III., I (ed. Didot).\n\n_   17 Metaph._ X., ch. vii., 5 and 6.\n\n_   18 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7\u00a7 251-5.\n\n   19 When the term \u201cscience\u201d is used nowadays in contradistinction to\n      \u201cphilosophy,\u201d it usually signifies the knowledge embodied in what\n      are called the special, or positive, or inductive sciences\u2014a\n      knowledge which Aristotle would not regard as strictly or fully\n      scientific.\n\n   20 Aristotle\u2019s conception of the close relation between _Physics_ (or\n      the _Philosophy_ of Nature) and those analytic studies which we\n      nowadays describe as the physical sciences, bears witness to the\n      close alliance which he conceived to exist between sense observation\n      on the one hand and rational speculation on the other. This sane\n      view of the continuity of human knowledge, a view to which the\n      Schoolmen of the Middle Ages were ever faithful, was supplanted at\n      the dawn of modern philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth\n      centuries by the opposite view, which led to a divorce between\n      physics and metaphysics, and to a series of misunderstandings which\n      still prevail with equal detriment to science and philosophy alike.\n\n_   21 Cf._ DE WULF, _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 28-9, 66;\n      MERCIER, _Ontologie_, Introd., p. v., n.\n\n   22 \u201cDicitur metaphysica [scientia] id est, transphysica, quia post\n      physicam dicenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus competit in\n      insensibilia devenire.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In Lib. Boetii de Trinitate_,\n      q. 5, a. 1.\n\n   23 This is also the title of the social and ethnological study of the\n      various races of men, their primitive habits, customs, institutions,\n      etc.\n\n   24 Not entirely; for instance, what is perhaps the most comprehensive\n      course of philosophy published in recent times, the _Philosophia\n      Lacensis_ (11 vols., Herder, 1888-1900) apparently follows the\n      arrangement of metaphysics outlined above. The fundamental questions\n      on _knowing_ and _being_, which usually constitute distinct\n      departments under the respective titles of _Epistemology_ and\n      _Ontology_, are here treated under the comprehensive title of\n      _Institutiones Logicales_ (3 vols.). However, they are really\n      metaphysical problems, problems of speculative philosophy, wherever\n      they be treated; and the fact that the questions usually treated in\n      Ontology are here treated in a volume apart (vol. iii. of the\n      _Institutiones Logicales_: under the peculiar title of _Logica\n      Realis_), and not in the volumes assigned to general metaphysics,\n      shows the necessity and convenience of the more modern arrangement.\n      General metaphysics are dealt with in 2 vols. of _Institutiones\n      Philosophiae Naturalis_ and 3 vols. of _Institutiones\n      Psychologicae_; special metaphysics in the _Institutiones\n      Theodic\u0153ae_ (1 vol.); ethics in 2 vols. of _Institutiones Juris\n      Naturae_.\n\n_   25 Cf._ TURNER, _History of Philosophy_, p. 525.\n\n   26 MERCIER, _Logique_, Introd., \u00a7 9.\n\n   27 pp. 45, 51.\n\n_   28 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7 17.\n\n_   29 Cf._ _ibid._ i., Introd., ch. i.\n\n   30 CAJETAN, _In 2 Post Anal._, ch. xiii.\n\n_   31 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, \u00a7\u00a7 6-13; LADD, _A Theory of Reality_,\n      ch. i.\n\n_   32 infra_, ch. viii.; _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., Part IV., ch.\n      iii.-vi.; Part V., ch. i.\n\n   33 p. 18\u2014in which context will be found a masterly analysis and\n      criticism of current prejudices and objections against systematic\n      metaphysics.\n\n_   34 ibid._ pp. 19-20.\n\n   35 ROYCE, _The Conception of God_, p. 207.\n\n   36 MERCIER, _Logique_, Introd., \u00a7 14.\n\n   37 Encyclical, _Aeterni Patris_, on philosophical studies.\n\n_   38 Summa Theologica_, 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad. 2.\n\n_   39 Cf._ MERCIER, _Origines de la psychologie contemporaine_, ch.\n      viii.; DE WULF, _Scholasticism Old and New_ (_passim_).\n\n_   40 Cf._ LADD, _op. cit._, pp. 9, 10.\n\n   41 EUCKEN, _Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Philosophie und Lebensanschauung_,\n      \u00a7 157 (Leipzig, 1903).\n\n_   42 Cf._ art. _Philosophy and the Sciences at Louvain_, in the _Irish\n      Ecclesiastical Record_, May, 1905, reprinted as Appendix in DE\n      WULF\u2019S _Scholasticism Old and New_.\n\n   43 Hence the necessity of equipping the student of philosophy with a\n      knowledge of the main conclusions and theories of the sciences that\n      have an immediate bearing on philosophy: chemistry, physics,\n      geology, astronomy, mechanics, the axioms and postulates of pure and\n      applied mathematics, cellular biology, embryology, the physiology of\n      the nervous system, botany and zoology, political economy, sociology\n      and ethnology. Nowhere is the system of combining the scientific\n      with the philosophical formation of mind more thoroughly carried out\n      at the present time than in the curriculum of the Philosophical\n      Institute at the University of Louvain. In the College of Maynooth\n      not only is the study of philosophy completed by a fuller course of\n      Christian Theology,\u2014both disciplines thus combining to give the\n      student all the essential elements of a complete _Philosophy of\n      Life_ (ii.),\u2014but it is preceded by an elementary training in the\n      physical sciences and accompanied by courses on the history of\n      scientific theories in chemistry, physics, physiology, and general\n      biology.\n\n   44 \u201cWe may mention it in passing,\u201d writes Mercier in his general\n      introduction to philosophy (_Logique_, \u00a7 1, p. 6)\u2014\u201cit was this\n      feeling of individual impotence in face of the task confronting the\n      philosopher at the present day, that inspired the foundation of the\n      Philosophical Institute at the University of Louvain\u201d. He had\n      previously outlined the project in his _Rapport sur les \u00e9tudes\n      philosophiques_ at the Congress of Mechlin in 1891. Here are a few\n      brief extracts from that memorable document: \u201cSince individual\n      effort feels itself well nigh powerless in the presence of the field\n      of observation which goes on widening day by day, association must\n      make up for the insufficiency of the isolated worker; men of\n      analysis and men of synthesis must come together and form, by their\n      daily intercourse and united action, an atmosphere suited to the\n      harmonious development of science and philosophy alike....\u201d \u201cMan has\n      multiplied his power of vision; he enters the world of the\n      infinitely small; he fixes his scrutinizing gaze upon regions where\n      our most powerful telescopes discern no limits. Physics and\n      Chemistry progress with giant strides in the study of the properties\n      of matter and of the combinations of its elements. Geology and\n      Astronomy reconstruct the history of the origin and formation of our\n      planet. Biology and the natural sciences study the minute structure\n      of living organisms, their distribution in space and succession in\n      time; and Embryology explores their origin. The arch\u00e6ological,\n      philological and social sciences reconstruct the past ages of our\n      history and civilizations. What an inexhaustible mine is here to\n      exploit, what regions to explore and materials to analyse and\n      interpret; finally what pioneers we must engage in the work if we\n      are to have a share in garnering those treasures!\u201d\n\n_   45 Grammar of Assent_, p. 229.\n\n   46 Lucerna pedibus meis verbum tuum, et lumen semitis meis.\u2014Ps.\n      cxviii., 105.\n\n   47 TENNYSON, _In Memoriam_.\n\n_   48 Cf._ _Logic_, i., \u00a7 123.\n\n_   49 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 204-6.\n\n_   50 Cf._ SCOTUS, _Summa Theologica_, edit. by Montefortino (Rome,\n      1900), i., p. 106, _Ad tertium_.\n\n_   51 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 119-20.\n\n_   52 Cf._ SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 104, 129; also URRABURU,\n      _Ontologia_, Disp. III., Cap. II., Art. III., p. 155.\n\n   53 Hence St. Thomas calls the things about which a generic or specific\n      concept is predicated \u201canaloga secundum esse et non secundum\n      intentionem\u201d (_In 1 Sent._, Dist. xix., q. 5, a. 2, ad a am): we\n      bring them under the same notion or \u201cintentio\u201d (_e.g._ \u201cliving\n      being\u201d), but the content of this notion is realized in the various\n      things (_e.g._ in Socrates, this horse, that rose-tree, etc.) in\n      varying and unequal degrees of perfection. Hence, too, this univocal\n      relation of the genus to its subordinate subjects is sometimes\n      (improperly) called \u201canalogy of inequality\u201d.\n\n_   54 Cf._ _infra_, ch. viii.\n\n_   55 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie der Vorzeit_, \u00a7\u00a7 599, 600.\n\n   56 This, of course, is the proper sort of analogical predication: the\n      predication based upon similarity of proportions or relations.\n      Etymologically, analogy means equality of proportions (_Cf._\n      _Logic_, ii., p. 160). On the whole subject the student may consult\n      with profit Cajetan\u2019s _Opusculum de Nominum Analogia_, published as\n      an appendix to vol. iv. of St. Thomas\u2019 _Qu\u00e6stiones Disputat\u00e6_ in De\n      Maria\u2019s edition (1883).\n\n_   57 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 40-42.\n\n_   58 Cf._ SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 318-22, 125-131, 102-7 (especially\n      p. 128, _Ad tertium_); p. 131, _Ad sextum_; p. 321, _Ad tertium_.\n\n   59 KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 599.\n\n_   60 ibid._, \u00a7 600.\n\n   61 SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Dist. xxviii., \u00a7 3; Dist. xxxii., \u00a7 2.\n\n   62 SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 106-7, 128-9.\n\n_   63 ibid._, p. 107.\n\n_   64 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _La philosophie scolastique_ (\u201c_Die Philosophie der\n      Vorzeit_\u201d). Fr. trans. by Sierp (Paris, 1868), vol. i., p. 66, \u00a7 35.\n\n   65 The logical copula, which expresses this relation and asserts the\n      truth of the judgment, expresses, of course, a logical entity, an\n      _ens rationis_. True judgments may be stated about logical entities\n      as well as about realities. But since the former can be conceived\n      only after the manner of the latter, the appropriateness of using\n      the verb which expresses existence or reality, as the logical\n      copula, will be at once apparent. _Cf._ _Logic_, i., p. 249, n. 1.\n\n   66 SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Dist. 54, \u00a7 i., 6.\n\n_   67 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 28-9.\n\n_   68 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 551-2.\n\n_   69 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 70-1.\n\n   70 \u201cEsse actum quondam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc,\n      quod est in potentia, sed ex hoc, quod est in actu.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS,\n      _Contra Gent._ i., c. xxii., 4.\n\n   71 Certain medieval philosophers had made the same mistake. St. Thomas\n      points out their error frequently. _Cf._ _Contra Gentes_, i., c.\n      xxvi: \u201cQuia id, quod commune est, per additionem specificatur vel\n      individuatur, \u00e6stimaverunt, divinum esse, cui nulla fit additio, non\n      esse aliquid proprium, sed esse commune omnium: non considerantes,\n      quod id, quod commune est, vel universale, sine additione esse non\n      potest, sed sine additione consideratur. Non enim animal potest esse\n      absque rationali vel irrationali differentia, quamvis sine his\n      differentiis consideretur; licet enim cogitetur universale absque\n      additione, non tamen absque receptibilitate additionis est. Nam si\n      animali nulla differentia addi posset, genus non esset; et similiter\n      est de omnibus aliis nominibus. Divinum autem esse est absque\n      additione, non solum cogitatione, sed etiam in rerum natura; et non\n      solum absque additione, sed absque receptibilitate additionis. Unde\n      ex hoc ipso quod additionem non recipit, nec recipere potest, magis\n      concludi potest quod Deus non sit esse commune, sed esse proprium.\n      Etenim ex hoc ipso suum esse ab omnibus aliis distinguitur, quia\n      nihil ei addi potest.\u201d\n\n_   72 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, QQ. DD. _De Potentia_, q. i. art. 1, ad. 18.\n\n   73 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, c. iv., v., _apud_ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, iii.,\n      p. 60.\n\n_   74 Contra Gentes_, II., c. vii.\n\n_   75 Cf._ LAMINNE, _Cause et Effet_\u2014_Revue neo-scolastique_, February,\n      1914, p. 38.\n\n   76 St. Thomas uses what is for him strong language when he describes\n      such a view as ridiculous: \u201cRidiculum est dicere quod ideo corpus\n      non agat, quia accidens non transit de subjecto in subjectum; non\n      enim hoc modo dicitur corpus calidum calefacere, quod idem numero\n      calor, qui est in calefaciente corpore, transeat ad corpus\n      calefactum; sed quia virtute caloris, qui est in calefaciente\n      corpore, alius calor numero fit actu in corpore calefacto, qui prior\n      erat in eo in potentia. Agens enim naturale non est traducens\n      propriam formam in alterum subjectum, sed reducens subjectum quod\n      patitur de potentia in actum.\u201d\u2014_Contra Gentes_, L. III., c. lxix.\n\n_   77 Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (8), ix., _Quintum_. _Cf._ also\n      ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._ v., ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, v., \u00a7 14, and\n      _Contra Gentes_, i., c. xvi., where he emphasizes the truth that\n      potential being presupposes actual being: \u201cQuamvis id quod quandoque\n      est in potentia, quandoque in actu, prius sit tempore in potentia\n      quam in actu, tamen simpliciter actus est prior potentia; quia\n      potentia non educit se in actum, sed opportet quod educatur in actum\n      per aliquid quod sit in actu. Omne igitur quod est aliquo modo in\n      potentia, habet aliquid prius se\u201d.\n\n   78 KLIMKE, _Der Monismus und seine philosophischen Grundlagen_, p. 185.\n      _Cf._ _Irish Theological Quarterly_, vol. vii. (April, 1912), p. 157\n      _sqq._, art. _Reflections on Some Forms of Monism_.\n\n   79 For relations of _potentia_ and _actus_, _cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_,\n      \u00a7 214.\n\n_   80 Cf._ _Physics_, v., 1; _De Anima_, i., 3.\n\n   81 \u039b\u03b5\u03b3\u03ce \u03b4\u1fbd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u1f01\u03c5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f76, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u1f78\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5\n      \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03bc\u03b5\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f36\u03c2 \u1f64\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd.\u2014_Metaph._ vi., c. iii.\n\n   82 \u201cDecepit antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes, ignorantia\n      formae substantialis. Non enim adhuc tantum profecerant ut\n      intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia:\n      et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt, qu\u00e6 sunt sensibilia\n      propria vel communia. Hujusmodi autem manifestum est esse\n      accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et hujusmodi.\n      Forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens, et\n      ideo ad ejus cognitionem non bervenerunt, ut scirent ipsam materiam\n      distinguere.\u201d\u2014_In Metaph._ vii., 2.\n\n   83 \u201cEsse actum quemdam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid, ex hoc\n      quod est in potentia, sed ex hoc quod est in actu.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS,\n      _Contra Gentes_, i., ch. xxii., 4.\n\n   84 The etymology of Aristotle\u2019s description of the essence as \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd\n      \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 is not easy to explain. The expression \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 supposes a\n      dative understood, _e.g._ \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, the being proper to man.\n      To the question \u03c4\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u1ff3 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9; what is the being or\n      essence proper to man? the answer is: that which gives the\n      definition of man, that which explains what he is\u2014\u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd. Is the\n      imperfect, \u03c4\u1f76 \u1f26\u03bd, an archaic form for the present, \u03c4\u1f76 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9; or is it\n      a deliberate suggestion of the profound doctrine that the essence as\n      ideal, or possible, is anterior to its actual, physical realization?\n      Commentators are not agreed. _Cf._ MATTHIAS KAPPES,\n      Aristoteles-Lexicon, p. 25 (Paderborn, 1894); MERCIER, _Ontologie_,\n      p. 30 n.\n\n   85 Essentia est illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel\n      specie, et quod significamus per definitionem indicantem quid est\n      res.\u2014_De Ente et Essentia_, ch. i.\n\n   86 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, v., 4; ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. ix.,\n      art. 1.\n\n   87 Sometimes, however, the expression \u201cmetaphysical essence\u201d is used to\n      signify those objective concepts, and those only, _without which the\n      thing cannot be conceived_, (or sometimes, even the one which is\n      considered most fundamental among these), and therefore as not\n      explicitly involving the concepts of properties which follow\n      necessarily from the former; while the \u201cphysical essence\u201d is\n      understood to signify all those real elements _without which the\n      thing cannot actually exist_, including, therefore, all such\n      necessary properties. Taken in this sense the physical essence of\n      man would include not merely soul and body, but also such properties\n      as the capacity of speech, of laughter, of using tools, of cooking\n      food, etc.\n\n   88 Et ex hoc patet ratio, writes St. Thomas, quare genus et species et\n      differentia se habeant proportionaliter ad materiam, formam et\n      compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem cum illis; quia neque\n      genus est materia, sed sumitur a materia ut significans totum; nec\n      differentia est forma, sed sumitur a forma ut significans totum.\n      Unde dicimus hominem esse _animal rationale_, et non _ex animali et\n      rationali_; sicut dicimus eum esse ex corpore et anima. Ex corpore\n      enim et anima dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus qu\u00e6dam tertia\n      res constituta, qu\u00e6 neutra illarum est: homo enim nec est anima\n      neque corpus; sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali\n      dicatur esse, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus sed sicut\n      intellectus [conceptus] tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus\n      enim _animalis_ est sine determinatione formae specialis naturam\n      exprimens rei, ex eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae\n      perfectionis. Intellectus autem hujus differentiae, _rationalis_,\n      consistit in determinatione formae specialis: ex quibus duobus\n      intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel definitionis. Et\n      ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit pr\u00e6dicationem\n      earum rerum ex quibus constituitur; ita nec intellectus recipit\n      pr\u00e6dicationem eorum intellectuum ex quibus constituitur; non enim\n      dicimus, quod definitio sit genus vel differentia.\u2014_De Ente et\n      Essentia_, cap. iii.\n\n_   89 Cf._ MERCIER, _Psychologie_, vol. ii., \u00a7 169 (6th edit., 1903, pp.\n      24-5).\n\n_   90 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, L. viii., 10; ST. THOMAS, _In_ viii.,\n      _Metaph._, Lect. iii., par. i.\n\n_   91 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 42-3. How do we know that not only\n      water (H2O) is a possible essence but also hydrogen di-oxide (H2O2)?\n      Because the latter substance has been _actually formed_ by chemists\n      (_Cf._ ROSCOE, _Elementary Chemistry_, Lesson VI.). Is hydrogen\n      tri-oxyde (H2O3) a possible substance? We may ask chemists,\u2014and they\n      may not be able to tell us with any certainty whether it is or not.\n\n   92 The actual existence of a thinking mind is of course a necessary\n      condition, in the actual order, for the apprehension of objects in\n      this abstract way. But such existence is no part of the apprehended\n      object. That the human mind, which is itself finite, contingent,\n      allied with matter, and dependent on the activity of corporeal sense\n      organs for the objects of its knowledge, should nevertheless have\n      the power to apprehend contingent realities apart from their\n      contingent actual existence in time and space,\u2014is a fact of the\n      greatest significance as regards the nature of the mind itself. But\n      if we try to prove the existence of God from a consideration of the\n      nature and powers of the human mind, our argument proceeds from the\n      actual, and is distinct from any argument based exclusively on the\n      nature and properties of possible essences as such. St. Augustine\u2019s\n      argument assumes as a fact that the human mind represents to itself\n      possible essences as having reality independently both of its own\n      thought and of any actual existence of such essences (_Cf._ DE\n      MUNNYNCK, _Praelectiones de Dei Existentia_, p. 23). But _is_ this a\n      fact? This is the really debatable point.\n\n   93 Among others Henry of GHENT (\u2020 1293; _Cf._ DE WULF, _History of\n      Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 364-6; KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie der\n      Vorzeit_, Dissert, vi., cap. ii., 2 \u00a7\u00a7 581-5), Capreolus\n      (1380-1444), certain Scotists, and certain theosophists of the\n      thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, are credited with this peculiar\n      view. For numerous references, _Cf._ URRABURU, _Ontologia_, Disp.\n      iii., cap. ii., art. v. pp. 650-63.\n\n_   94 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, pp. 652-3, for references; among others,\n      to ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia_, q. 3, art. 1, ad 2um; art. 7, ad 10um;\n      art. 5, argum. 2o; _ibid._, ad 2um. _Summa Theol._, i., q. 14, art.\n      9; q. 45, art. 1; _ibid._ , art. 2, ad 2um; q. 61, art. 2, corp.\n\n   95 Among others, BALMES (_Fundamental Philosophy_, bk. iv., ch. xxvi.),\n      LEPIDI (_Ontologia_, quoted by DE MUNYNCK, _Praelectiones de Dei\n      Existentia_, Louvain, 1904, p. 19); DE MUNYNCK (_ibid._, pp. 19-23,\n      46-7, 75); HICKEY (_Theologia Naturalis_, pp. 31-4); DRISCOLL\n      (_God_, pp. 72 sqq.); LACORDAIRE (_God_, p. 21); KLEUTGEN,\n      _Philosophie der Vorzeit_, Dissert. iv., \u00a7 476.\n\n   96 Truth is not the work of any human intelligence, says St. Augustine,\n      nor can any one arrogate to himself the right to say \u201c_my_ truth,\u201d\n      or \u201c_thy_ truth,\u201d but all must say simply \u201c_the_ truth\u201d:\n      \u201cQuapropter, nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem,\n      haec omnia, quae incommutabiliter vera sunt, continentem, quam non\n      possis dicere vel tuam vel meam, vel cujuscumque hominis, sed\n      omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tamquam miris modis\n      secretum et publicum lumen, praesto esse ac se praebere communiter:\n      omne autem quod communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque\n      intelligentibus praesto est, ad ullius eorum proprie naturam\n      pertinere quis dixerit?\u201d\u2014_De Libero Arbitrio_, lib. ii., ch. xii.\n      _Cf._ his striking expression of the same thought in his Commentary,\n      _Super Genesim ad Litteram_, lib. ii., cap. vii.: \u201cWe may conceive\n      the heavens and the earth, that were created in six days, ceasing to\n      exist; but can we conceive the number \u2018six\u2019 ceasing to be the sum of\n      six units?\u201d: \u201cFacilius coelum et terra transire possunt, quae\n      secundum numerum senarium fabricata sunt, quam effici possit ut\n      senarius numerus suis partibus non compleatur\u201d (_apud_ MERCIER,\n      _Ontologie_, pp. 35-6).\n\n_   97 Cf._ BALMES (_Fundamental Philosophy_, bk. iv., ch. xxvi.), who,\n      analysing the truth of the proposition \u201cTwo circles of equal\n      diameters are equal,\u201d as an example of the necessary, eternal,\n      immutable characteristics of possible essences, goes so far as to\n      write (italics ours): \u201cWhat would happen, if, withdrawing all\n      bodies, all sensible representations, _and even all intelligences_,\n      we should imagine absolute and universal nothing? We see the truth\n      of the proposition even on this supposition: for it is impossible\n      for us to hold it to be false. On every supposition, our\n      understanding sees a connection which it cannot destroy: the\n      condition once established, the result will infallibly follow.\n\n      \u201cAn absolutely necessary connection, founded neither on us, nor on\n      the external world, which exists before anything we can imagine, and\n      subsists after we have annihilated all by an effort of our\n      understanding, must be based upon something, it cannot have nothing\n      for its origin: to say this would be to assert a necessary fact\n      without a sufficient reason.\n\n      \u201cIt is true that in the proposition now before us nothing real is\n      affirmed, but if we reflect carefully we find even here the greatest\n      difficulty for those who deny a real foundation to pure possibility.\n      What is remarkable in this phenomenon, is precisely this, that our\n      understanding feels itself forced to give its assent to a\n      proposition which affirms an absolutely necessary connection\n      _without any relation to an existing object_. It is conceivable that\n      an intelligence affected by other beings may know their nature and\n      relations; but it is not so easy of comprehension how it can\n      discover their nature and relations in an absolutely necessary\n      manner, when it abstracts all existence, when the ground upon which\n      the eyes of the understanding are fixed, is the abyss of nothing.\n\n      \u201cWe deceive ourselves when we imagine it possible to abstract all\n      existence. Even when we suppose our mind to have lost sight of every\n      thing, a very easy supposition, granting that we find in our\n      consciousness the contingency of our being, the understanding still\n      perceives a possible order, and imagines it to be all occupied with\n      pure possibility, _independent of a being upon which it is based_.\n      We repeat, that this is an illusion, which disappears so soon as we\n      reflect upon it. In pure nothing, nothing is possible; there are no\n      relations, no connections of any kind; in nothing there are no\n      combinations, it is a ground upon which nothing can be pictured.\n\n      \u201cThe objectivity of our ideas and the perception of necessary\n      relations in a possible order, reveal _a communication of our\n      understanding with a being on which is founded all possibility_.\n      This possibility can be explained on no supposition except that\n      which makes the communication consist in _the action of God giving\n      to our mind faculties_ perceptive of the necessary relation of\n      certain ideas, based upon necessary being, and representative of His\n      infinite essence.\u201d\n\n      Balmes, therefore, does not mean that we could continue to see\n      essences as possible were we to imagine withdrawn not merely finite\n      minds but even the Divine Mind. In such an absurd hypothesis,\n      nothing would appear true or false, possible or impossible. But he\n      contends that even when we _try_ to think away _all_ minds, even the\n      Divine Mind, we still see possible essences to be possible. And from\n      this he argues that, since we have successfully thought away finite\n      minds and the actuality of essences, while the possibility of these\n      latter still persists, these must be grounded in the Mind of God,\n      the Actual, Eternal, Necessary Being, where they have eternal ideal\n      being.\n\n      _Cf._ DE MUNNYNCK (_op. cit._, pp. 22-3): \u201cPonamus mundum non esse,\n      nec supponamus Dei existentiam. In nihilo illo, omne ens actuale\n      excludens, remanet intacta\u2014hoc certissime scimus ex objectivo valore\n      intellectus nostri\u2014realitas aeterna, immutabilis, ordinis idealis.\n      [Illa realitas essentiarum, he adds (_ibid._, n. 2), independens ab\n      omni actuali existentia, atque ab omni actu intellectus, est\n      fundamentum metaphysicum realismi platonici.\u2014Habet praeterea mirum\n      hoc systema, ut omnes sciunt, fundamentum criteriologicum.]\n      Essentiae _sunt_, nec tamen existunt. Illa realitas, praeter mundum\n      totum, praeter entia rationis, indestructibilis perseverat, nec\n      tamen actualis est. Haec quomodo intelligi possit nescimus, nisi\n      ponatur illam fundari in plenitudine aeterna, infinita, absoluta \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n      Esse absoluti. Hoc ente supremo posito, omnia lucidissima se\n      praebent intellectui; illo Deo optimo\u2014quem non possumus, perspectis\n      illis altissimis, non adorare\u2014sublato, admittendae sunt essentiae\n      rerum ab aeterno reales sine actuali existentia; atque proinde quid\n      non-individuale est reale in se, quod tamen concipi non potest nisi\n      objective in mente.\u201d\n\n_   98 Cf._ ST. AUGUSTINE, _De Libero Arbitrio_, lib. ii., ch. viii.\n\n_   99 Cf._ especially MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 40-49.\n\n  100 It is, for example, just as necessarily and immutably true of any\n      actually existing man that he cannot be at the same time existing\n      and not existing as it is that a man cannot be an irrational animal.\n\n  101 \u201cUnde, etiamsi intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur\n      verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus,\n      quod est impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio\n      veritatis remaneret.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. ii.\n\n_  102 Ph\u00e6do_, 100, C. ff.\n\n  103 MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 45-7.\n\n_  104 Cf_. DE MUNNYNCK, _op. cit._, pp. 24-5.\n\n_  105 Cf._ DE MUNNYNCK, _op. cit._, pp. 24-5.\n\n_  106 ibid._, pp. 22, 24.\n\n  107 \u201cQu\u00e6 objecta non divina esse, luce clarius apparet. Attamen ilia\n      ponderando, _modumque inspiciendo quo representantur a mente\n      humana_, atque praesupponendo valorem objectivum intellectus,\n      concludimus ex ideis ad realitates illas qu\u00e6 in Esse divino\n      fundantur ... ratione horum [objectorum _scil._ idearum nostrarum]\n      percipimus, ope ratiocinii, illa positive aeterna et immutabilia,\n      qu\u00e6 reapse in Deitate fundantur, atque sunt ipse Deus quatenus\n      imitabilis.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, pp. 24-5. _Cf._ extract quoted above, p. 91 n.\n\n  108 \u201cNon ideo voluit Deus mundum creare in tempore, quia vidit melius\n      sic fore, quam si creasset ab \u00e6terno; _nec voluit tres angulos\n      trianguli \u00e6quales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non\n      posse_. Sed contra, quia voluit creare mundum in tempore, ideo sic\n      melius est, quam si creatus fuisset ab \u00e6terno, _et quia voluit tres\n      angulos trianguli necessario \u00e6quales esse duobus rectis, idcirco jam\n      verum est, et aliter fieri non potest_, atque ita de\n      reliquis.\u201d\u2014DESCARTES, in _Resp. ad Sext. Objectiones_, ad 6um\n      scrupulum.\n\n  109 MERCIER, _op. cit._, pp. 58-60.\n\n  110 URRABURU (_op. cit._ Disp. iii., cap. ii., \u00a7 iii., p. 671) mentions\n      Wolff, Leibniz, Genuensis and Storchenau as holding this view.\n\n  111 Among others, Liberatore, Lahousse, Pesch, Harper. _Cf._ URRABURU,\n      _op. cit._, _ibid._\n\n  112 Dupasquier, Mastrius and Rada, _apud_ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._,\n      pp. 679-81.\n\n  113 Urraburu, Schiffini, Mendive. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._,\n      p. 671.\n\n  114 1 Cor. xiii. 12.\n\n  115 \u201cEx hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed\n      ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est,\n      nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed\n      creatrix essentia.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia_, q. iii., art. v., ad\n      2 um.\n\n  116 \u201cIpsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam: esse\n      enim Dei est ejus substantia, ut ostensum est (_C. G._, Lib. i., c.\n      22). Quod autem competit alicui secundum naturam suam, non convenit\n      aliis nisi per modum participationis, sicut calor aliis corporibus\n      ab igne [_i.e._ as caused or produced in them. _Cf._ Kleutgen, _op.\n      cit._, Dissert., i., c. iii., \u00a7 61]. Ipsum igitur esse competit\n      aliis omnibus a primo agente per participationem quamdam. Quod autem\n      alicui competit per participationem, non est substantia ejus.\n      Impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis praeter agens\n      primum sit ipsum esse. Hinc est quod Exod. iii., proprium nomen Dei\n      ponitur esse _qui est_, quia ejus solius proprium est, quod sua\n      substantia non sit aliud quam suum esse.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Contra\n      Gentes_, L. ii., cap. 52, n. 7.\n\n      \u201cQuod inest alicui ab agente, oportet esse actum ejus; agentis enim\n      est facere aliquid actu. Ostensum est autem supra, quod omnes aliae\n      substanti\u00e6 habent esse a primo agente, et per hoc ips\u00e6 substanti\u00e6\n      creat\u00e6 sunt, quod esse ab alio habent. Ipsum igitur esse inest\n      substantiis creatis ut quidam actus earum. Id autem, cui actus\n      inest, potentia est: nam actus in quantum hujusmodi ad potentiam\n      refertur. In qualibet igitur substantia creata est potentia et\n      actus.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, cap. 53, n. 2.\n\n      \u201cOmne quod recipit aliquid ab alio, est in potentia respectu illius:\n      et hoc quod receptum est in eo, est actus ejus; ergo oportet, quod\n      ipsa forma vel quidditas, qu\u00e6 est intelligentia [_i.e._ a pure\n      spirit], sit in potentia respectu esse, quod a Deo recipit, et illud\n      esse receptum est per modum actus, et ita invenitur actus et\n      potentia in intelligentiis [_i.e._ pure spirits], non tamen forma et\n      materia nisi aequivoce.\u201d\u2014_De Ente et Essentia_, cap. v. _Cf._ also\n      _Summa Theol._, P. i., q. iii., art. 4; q. xiii., art. 11; q. lxxv.,\n      art. 5, ad 4 um. _Quodlibeta_, ii., art. 3; ix., art. 6. _De\n      Potentia_, q. vii., art. 2. _In Metaph._, iii., Dist. vi., q. 2,\n      art. 2. _Contra Gentes_, L. ii., cap. 54, 68. St. Thomas is usually\n      interpreted as teaching that the distinction between essence and\n      existence in created things is a real distinction. But there are\n      some who have been unable to convince themselves that the Angelic\n      Doctor has made his mind entirely clear on the subject. Kleutgen,\n      for instance, writes (_op. cit._, Dissert. vi., c. ii., \u00a7 574, n.\n      2): \u201cIn the extracts quoted above St. Thomas clearly states that the\n      distinction made by our thought is based on the nature of created\n      things, but not that this distinction is that which exists between\n      different parts, dependent on one another, each having its own\n      proper being or reality.\u201d\n\n_  117 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 249, 5o.\n\n_  118 Cf._ REINSTADLER, _Ontologia_, lib. ii., cap. i., art. ii., \u00a7 2.\n\n  119 Zigliara (_Ontologia_ (14), iii. iv.) gives the virtual distinction\n      as a sub-class of the real distinction; adding, however (according\n      to Goudin, _Metaph._, Disp. i., q. iii. art. ii., \u00a7 i) that \u201cthis\n      virtual distinction is not so much a [real] distinction as the basis\n      of a [mental] distinction\u201d.\n\n_  120 op. cit._, p. 110.\n\n  121 These may be seen in abundance in the works of any of the scholastic\n      writers, medieval or modern, who discuss the question. _Cf._, _e.g._\n      URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 251-4.\n\n  122 Besides St. Thomas (_cf._ _supra_, p. 102, n. 2), Albertus Magnus\n      (1193-1280), Aegidius Romanus (\u2020 _circa_ 1300), Capreolus\n      (1380-1444), Soncinas (\u2020 1494), Cajetan (1468-1534), Sylvester\n      Ferrariensis (1474-1528), Dominicus Ba\u00f1ez (1528-1604), John of St.\n      Thomas (1589-1644), Goudin (1639-95), are among the most noted\n      scholastics to hold this view. It is supported by the members of the\n      Dominican Order generally; and by not a few Jesuits among recent\n      scholastic writers; also by MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 48-51.\n\n_  123 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 575.\n\n_  124 ibid._, \u00a7 577.\n\n_  125 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. iv., cap. i., art. 2, pp. 730-31.\n\n  126 \u201cEsse rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est\n      intelligendum, quod sit aliquod superadditum, ad modum accidentis,\n      sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen,\n      quod imponitur ab esse (ens) significat idem cum nomine quod\n      imponitur ab ipsa essentia.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, L. iv., l. 2.\n\n  127 Among the advocates of this view are Alexander of Hales (\u2020 1245),\n      Aureolus (\u2020 1322), Durandus (\u2020 1332), Gabriel Biel (\u2020 1495), Suarez\n      (1548-1617), Toletus (1532-1596), Vasquez (1551-1604), Gregory of\n      Valentia (\u2020 _circa_ 1600), and the Jesuits generally: some few\n      regarding the distinction as _purely_ logical, _e.g._ Franzelin\n      (_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 47, p. 110, n. 2). For details and\n      arguments on both sides, _cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. iv., cap.\n      i., art. 2.\n\n  128 \u201cCompositum ex esse et essentia dicitur de ratione entis creati\n      secundum fundamentum, quod in ipso ente creato habet; hoc autem\n      fundamentum non est aliud nisi quia creatura non habet ex se actu\n      existere, sed tantum est ens potentiale, quod ab alio potest esse\n      participare: nam hinc fit, ut essentia creaturae concipiatur a nobis\n      ut potentiale quid, esse vero ut modus seu actus, quo talis essentia\n      ens in actu constituitur.\u201d\u2014SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Disp. xxxi., \u00a7 13.\n\n  129 When we speak of an essence as _receiving_ existence, we do not\n      necessarily imply a real distinction between receiver and received:\n      \u201cNon est imaginandum quod una res sit, quae participat sicut\n      essentia, et alia quae participatur sicut esse, sed quia una et\n      eadem res est realitas modo participato et per vim alterius sicut\n      per vim agentis: haec enim realitas de se non est nisi sub modo\n      possibili; quod autem sit et vocari possit actus, hoc habet per vim\n      agentis.\u201d\u2014ALEXANDER OF HALES, _In Metaph._, L. vii., text 22. \u201cNon\n      omne acceptum,\u201d writes St. Thomas, \u201cest receptum in aliquo subjecto;\n      alioquin non posset dici quod tota substantia rei creatae sit\n      accepta a Deo, cum totius substantiae non sit aliquod subjectum\n      receptivum\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._, I., q. xxvii., art. ii., ad. 3um.\n\n_  130 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 49. Some of these doctrines we shall\n      examine later, by way of illustration, in connexion with the _Unity_\n      of being.\n\n_  131 Cf._ URRABURU, _ibid._, art. iii., Obj. 9, Resp.\n\n  132 This view is advocated by, among others, Duns Scotus (1266-1308),\n      Henry of Ghent (\u2020 1293), Francis de Vittoria (1480-1566), Dominicus\n      de Soto (1496-1560), Molina (1535-1600), Fonseca (1548-97), and\n      Scotists generally.\n\n  133 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, lib. 5, text ii., cap. 6; ST. THOMAS, _in\n      loc._ et alibi.\n\n  134 \u201cSi ... modus entis accipiatur ... secundum divisionem unius ab\n      altero, ... hoc exprimit hoc nomen _aliquid_, dicitur enim aliquid\n      quasi _aliud quid_. Unde sicut ens dicitur _unum_ inquantum est\n      _indivisum in se_, ita dicitur _aliquid_ inquantum est _ab aliis\n      diversum_.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 1, a. 1.\n\n  135 \u201cNam omne ens est aut simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est\n      simplex, est indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est\n      compositum, non habet esse, quamdiu partes ejus sint divisae, sed\n      postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum\n      est quod esse cujuslibet rei consistit in indivisione; et inde est,\n      quod unumquodque sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam\n      unitatem.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xi., a. 1.\n\n  136 \u201cUnum vero quod est principium numeri, addit supra substantiam\n      _rationem mensurae_, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo\n      invenitur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem\n      divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuam. _Nam numerus ex\n      divisione continui causatur._\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, lib. 4,\n      lect. 2, par. _b_.\n\n  137 Those who regard the distinction between the essence and the\n      existence of an actually existing substance as real consider the\n      latter as an _ens unum per se_. The existence of a real distinction\n      between the essential constitutive factors of a composite substance\n      is universally regarded by scholastics as compatible with essential\n      unity\u2014unitas _per se_\u2014in the latter. Such factors are really\n      distinct, and separable or divisible, but actually undivided. So\n      also, the union of an individual nature and its subsistence (73)\n      forms a _unum per se_ (unum _compositionis_) in the view of those\n      who place a real distinction between these factors.\n\n  138 Of course essential unity of composition is also \u201cnatural\u201d. _Cf._\n      KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 631-8.\n\n  139 \u201cUnum quod convertitur cum ente ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil\n      superaddit, nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei\n      correspondens addit supra res, qu\u00e6 dicuntur mult\u00e6, quod unaqu\u00e6que\n      earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera.... Et sic, cum unum\n      addat supra ens unam negationem, secundum quod aliquid est indivisum\n      in se, multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est\n      in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum, et unum eorum non\n      esse alterum.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Potent._, q. 9, a. 7.\n\n  140 \u201cSic ergo primo in intellectu nostro cadit _ens_, et deinde\n      _divisio_, et post hoc _unum_ quod divisionem privat, et ultimo\n      _multitudo_ qu\u00e6 ex unitatibus constituitur.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In\n      Metaph._, lib. 10, lect. 4, par. _c_.\n\n  141 Omnis pluralitas consequitur aliquam divisionem. Est autem duplex\n      divisio: una materialis qu\u00e6 fit secundum divisionem continui, et\n      hanc sequitur numerus, qui est species quantitatis. Unde talis\n      numerus, non est nisi in rebus materialibus habentibus quantitatem.\n      Alia est divisio formalis, qu\u00e6 fit per oppositas vel diversas\n      formas: et hanc divisionem sequitur multitudo qu\u00e6 non est in aliquo\n      genere, sed est de transcendentibus, secundum quod ens dividitur per\n      unum et multa. Et talem multitudinem solam contingit esse in rebus\n      immaterialibus.\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xxx., art. 3.\n\n  142 We may confine our attention here to substances, assuming for the\n      present that accidents are individuated by the individual substances\n      in which they inhere. We may note further that it is only corporeal\n      individuals that fall directly within our experience. We can, of\n      course, infer from the latter the actual existence of individual\n      spiritual realities subsisting apart from matter, _viz._ human souls\n      after death, and also the possibility of purely spiritual individual\n      beings such as angels. But when we conceive these as individuals we\n      must conceive them after the analogy of individuals in the domain of\n      corporeal reality: it is only through concepts derived from this\n      domain, and finding their _proper_ application within it, that we\n      can have any knowledge of suprasensible or spiritual realities,\n      _viz._ by applying those concepts _analogically_ to the latter.\n\n  143 The \u201c_formal-actual_\u201d distinction, which Scotists advocate between\n      these grades of being, we shall examine later.\n\n_  144 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 280: \u201cPrincipium ... intrinsicum vel\n      formale est aliquid insitum rei, pertinensque ad intrinsecam et\n      ultimam individui constitutionem, et fundans formalitatem illam,\n      quae _individitatio_ dicitur. Sicut enim materia est in homine, v.g.\n      principium et fundamentum propter quod est, ac praedicatur\n      _materialis_, et forma fundat in eodem praedicatum _rationalis_,\n      totaque natura composita, _humanitas_, praedicatum _hominis_; ita\n      quaerimus quid sit illud primum principium, unde existit in quovis\n      individuo sua peculiaris ac propria individuatio.\u201d\n\n  145 In ancient Greece the Eleatics argued against the possibility of\n      real plurality somewhat in this wise: If there were really different\n      beings any two of them would differ from each other only by some\n      third reality, and this again from each of the former by a fourth\n      and a fifth reality, and so on _ad infinitum_: which would involve\n      the absurdities of infinite number and infinite regress. A similar\n      argument was used by the medieval pantheist, David of Dinant, to\n      identify God with the material principle of corporeal reality: God\n      and primary matter exist and do not differ; therefore they are\n      identical: for if they differed they should differ by something\n      distinct from either, and this again should differ from both by\n      something distinct from all three, and so on _ad infinitum_: which\n      is absurd. Such sophisms arise from accepting the purely abstract\n      view of reality as adequate. We have seen already, in dealing with\n      the abstract notion of being, that from this point of view it must\n      be recognized and admitted that the reality whereby things differ\n      (_viz._ being) is also the reality wherein they agree (_viz._ being,\n      also). The paradox is restated below in regard to individuation.\n\n  146 Materia ... dupliciter accipitur, scilicet, ut signata et non\n      signata. Et dicitur signata, secundum quod consideratur cum\n      determinatione dimensionum harum scilicet vel illarum; non signata\n      autem, qu\u00e6 sine determinatione dimensionum consideratur. Secundum\n      hoc igitur est sciendum, quod materia signata est individuationis\n      principium.\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. ii., art. 6, ad. 7am.\n\n_  147 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. 2, \u00a7 iii., pp. 271-3.\n\n  148 These will easily be found in any of the fuller scholastic\n      treatises. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. 2, art. 4.\n      _Philosophia Lacencis, Logica_, \u00a7\u00a7 1282 _sqq._; MERCIER,\n      _Ontologie_, \u00a7\u00a7 36-42; KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie Scolastique_, \u00a7\u00a7 610\n      _sqq._; BULLIAT, _Th\u00e6saurus Philosophiae Thomisticae_ (Nantes,\n      1899), pp. 171 _sqq._\u2014a useful book of reference for the teaching of\n      St. Thomas.\n\n  149 A kindred view to this is the view that subsistence\n      (\u201c_subsistentia_,\u201d \u201c_suppositalitas_\u201d) or personality\n      (\u201c_personalitas_\u201d) is the principle of individuation. We shall see\n      later in what subsistence or personality is supposed to consist.\n      Here it is sufficient to observe that the individual nature as such\n      has not necessarily subsistence or personality; hence it cannot be\n      individuated by this latter.\n\n  150 The consistent attitude for the Thomist here would, however, appear\n      to be a denial that such a thing would be intrinsically possible.\n\n  151 Hujusmodi relatio non potest consistere nisi in quodam ordine, quem\n      ratio adinvenit alicujus ad seipsum secundum aliquas ejus duas\n      considerationes.\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xxviii., art. 3,\n      ad. 2am.\n\n_  152 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, vol. i., \u00a7 59.\n\n  153 It is only the concrete and individual that as such can exist\n      actually; the abstract and universal as such cannot exist actually:\n      abstractness and universality are mental modes\u2014_entia\n      rationis_\u2014annexed by the mind to the real content of its concepts:\n      considered as thought-objects they are themselves not real entities:\n      they do not affect reality as given to us in our experience. But\n      perhaps concreteness and individuality are also mere mental modes,\n      affecting reality not as given to us in our experience but only as\n      subjected to the process of intellectual conception, or at least as\n      subjected to the process of sense perception? This would appear to\n      be part of the general Kantian theory of knowledge: that we can\n      apprehend reality as concrete and individual only because space and\n      time, which characterize the concrete and individual mode of being,\n      are mental modes which must be applied to reality as a prerequisite\n      condition for rendering the latter capable of apprehension in our\n      experience. This contention is examined in another context. _Cf._\n      _infra_, pp. 145, 147, 151.\n\n  154 Thus the recognition of a virtual distinction in a being is a sign\n      of the _relative perfection_ of the latter: the being involves in\n      its higher sort of unity perfections elsewhere dispersed and\n      separate. The being is of a higher order than if the principles of\n      these perfections in it were really distinct from one another. But\n      the virtual distinction also seems to imply a _relative\n      imperfection_ when it is found in creatures, inasmuch as here the\n      thought-objects so distinguished are always principles of a\n      plurality of really distinct accidental perfections: and real\n      plurality in a being is less perfect than unity.\u2014_Cf._ KLEUTGEN,\n      _op. cit._, \u00a7 633.\n\n  155 \u201cOmnis cognitio est a potentia et objecto, sive a cognoscente et\n      cognito. Ratio a priori est, quia omnis cognitio saltem creata est\n      expressio et imitatio atque imago vitalis objecti. Inquantum igitur\n      est vitalis, procedit a cognoscente; implicat enim cognoscentem\n      vivere per aliquid, quod ab ipso non est, sed pure illud recipit ab\n      alio mere passive se habendo; inquantum vero cognitio est expressio,\n      imitatio et imago objecti, procedit ab objecto\u201d\u2014SILVESTER MAURUS,\n      _Quaest. Philos._, q. 2. This is the common scholastic distinction:\n      cognition as a product representative or expressive of reality is a\n      product determined by the influence of reality (as active) on the\n      mind (as passive); cognition as a vital process is active, a\n      reaction of mind to the influence of reality. It may be remarked,\n      however, that the cognitive process, as vital, has always a positive\n      term. Our cognitive processes are partly at least processes of\n      abstracting, comparing, relating, universalizing: processes which\n      produce \u201c_intentiones logicas_\u201d or \u201c_entia rationis_,\u201d such as the\n      \u201c_intentio universalitatis_\u201d the relation of subject to predicate,\n      and other logical relations and logical distinctions: and hence\n      arises the difficulty, when we come to reflect on our cognitive\n      experience, of discriminating between these \u201clogical entities\u201d and\n      the reality which we interpret by means of them: of discriminating,\n      in other words, between logical and real distinctions.\n\n  156 It is not necessary of course that this implicit embodiment of all\n      the others, by any one of them, be seen to be _mutual_. It is\n      sufficient, for instance, that of the concepts _a_, _b_, _c_ and\n      _d_, _a_ be seen implicitly to involve _b_, _b_ to involve _c_,\n      etc., though not _vice versa_. However, it must be remarked that in\n      the exercise of _thought_ upon its _abstract_ objects we feel\n      something wanting to our intellectual insight as long as the\n      relations we apprehend are not _reciprocal_. In the sciences of\n      abstract quantity we approximate to the ideal of establishing\n      reciprocal relations throughout the whole system of the concepts\n      analysed. But abstract thought does not give us an adequate\n      apprehension of the real: it represents reality only under the\n      _static_ aspect, and as _abstract_, _i.e._ apart from the\n      individualizing conditions of time and space which affect its\n      _concrete, actual existence_ as revealed in sense experience. Were\n      we to neglect the latter, and consider merely what abstract thought\n      gives us, we should regard as _really one_ what is _one for\n      thought_. But what is one for thought is _the universal_; and the\n      logical issue of holding the universal as such to be real is monism.\n      Or again, to put the matter in another way, in so far as intellect\n      sees the objects of its various abstract concepts to involve one\n      another necessarily, it has no reason\u2014as long as it ignores the\n      verdict of sense experience on the real manifoldness of actually\n      existing being\u2014to abstain from attributing a _real unity_ to the\n      whole system of abstract thought-objects which it contemplates as\n      reciprocally and necessarily interrelated. On the contrary, it\n      should pronounce that whatever plurality can be unified by the\n      dialectically necessary relations discovered by thought, is _really\n      one_, and must be regarded as _one reality_: which, again, is\n      monism. But a philosophy which thus ignores sense experience must be\n      one-sided and misleading.\n\n_  157 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. ii., art. 5 (p. 319).\n\n_  158 Cf._ _infra_, \u00a7 83.\n\n_  159 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._ p. 322.\n\n  160 ST. THOMAS, _De Ente et Essentia_, cap. iv.: \u201cIdeo, si quaeratur\n      utrum ista natura possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum\n      est: quia utrumque est extra intellectum [conceptum] humanitatis, et\n      utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de ratione\n      ejus, nunquam posset esse una: cum tamen una sit secundum quod est\n      in Sorte. Similiter si unitas esset de intellectu et ratione ejus,\n      tunc esset una et eadem natura Sortis et Platonis, nec posset in\n      pluribus plurificari.\u201d _Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Summa Philos._, _Ontologia_\n      (1), iv., v.; (3) iv.\n\n  161 \u201cLicet enim (natura) nunquam sit sine aliquo istorum, non tamen est\n      de se aliquod istorum, ita etiam in rerum natura secundum illam\n      entitatem habet verum \u2018esse\u2019 extra animam reale: et secundum illam\n      entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionabilem, quae est indifferens\n      ad singularitatem, ita quod non, repugnat illi unitati de se, quod\n      cum quacumque unitate singularitatis ponatur.\u201d\u2014SCOTUS, _In L.\n      Sent._, 2, dist. iii., q. 7.\u2014_Cf._ DE WULF, _History of Medieval\n      Philosophy_, p. 372.\n\n_  162 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 248. _Moral_ truth or veracity\u2014the\n      conformity of language with thought\u2014is treated in Ethics.\n\n_  163 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, P. ii., \u00a7 4, i.\n\n_  164 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7\u00a7 252-4.\n\n  165 \u201cSi omnis intellectus (quod est impossibile) intelligeretur auferri,\n      nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q.\n      i., art 1, 2 in fine.\n\n_  166 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., and _passim_.\n\n  167 ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 2.\n\n  168 ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 4; _Summa Theol._, i., q. 16,\n      art. 6.\n\n  169 \u201cSi intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur ver\u00e6 in\n      ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est\n      impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis\n      remaneret.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 2.\n\n  170 \u201cSi ergo accipiatur veritas _rei_ secundum ordinem ad intellectum\n      divinum, tunc quidem mutatur veritas rei mutablis in aliam\n      veritatem, non in falsitatem.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _ibid._ q. i., art. 6.\n\n_  171 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _De Anima_, iii.; ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i.,\n      art. 1.\n\n  172 \u201cRes per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim occasionem\n      falsitatis; eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt quorum non habent\n      existentiam.... Res notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa\n      exterius apparent ... et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent\n      sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest,\n      dicitur res illa esse falsa.... Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa\n      falsitatis in anima, quod necessario falsitatem causat.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS,\n      _Summa Theol._, i., q. 17, art. 1, ad. 2; _De Veritate_, q. i., art.\n      10, c.\n\n  173 \u039a\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f56 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c6\u03af\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\u2014ARISTOTLE, _Eth._, i.\n\n_  174 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 217.\n\n  175 \u201cBonum autem, cum habeat notionem appetibilis, importat habitudinem\n      caus\u00e6 finalis.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 2, ad. 1.\n\n  176 \u201cPrima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed\n      notificantur per posteriora, sicut caus\u00e6 per proprios effectus. Cum\n      autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per\n      motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et\n      ideo dicit (Aristoteles) quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt bonum\n      esse id quod omnia appetunt.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Comment. in Eth. Nich._,\n      i., lect. 1a.\n\n  177 The \u201cend,\u201d which is last in the order of actual attainment, is first\n      as the ideal term of the aim or tendency of the nature: _finis est\n      ultimus in executione, sed primus in intentione_: it is that for the\n      sake of which, and with a view to which, the whole process of\n      actualization or \u201cperfecting\u201d goes on. _Cf._ _infra_, \u00a7 108.\n\n  178 \u201cLicet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt\n      secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et\n      bonum simpliciter. Nam, cum ens dicat aliquid esse in actu, actus\n      autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam, secundum hoc simpliciter\n      aliquid dicitur esse ens secundum quod primo secernitur ab eo quod\n      est in potentia tantum; hoc autem est esse substantiale rei\n      uniuscujusque. Unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque\n      ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse\n      secundum quid.... Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est\n      substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum\n      quid, id est, inquantum est ens; secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur\n      aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa\n      Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 1, ad. 1.\n\n  179 \u201cRespectus ... qui importatur nomine boni est _habitudo perfectivi_\n      secundum quodaliquid natum est perficere non solum secundum rationem\n      speciei [_i.e._ the abstract essence], sed secundum esse quod habet\n      in rebus; hoc enim modo finis perficit ea quae sunt ad finem.\u201d\u2014ST.\n      THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 26, art. 6.\n\n_  180 Cf._ the familiar ethical distinction between objective, and formal\n      or subjective happiness, _beatitudo objectiva_ and _beatitudo\n      formalis seu subjectiva_.\n\n  181 \u201cIn motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus\n      secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur\n      _utile_. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum terminans totaliter\n      motum appetitus sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit,\n      vocatur _honestum_; quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur.\n      Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus, ut quies in se desiderata,\n      est _delectabile_.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 3.\n\n  182 Excellentia hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quae est\n      dis positio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in 6 Physic. Et ideo,\n      honestum, _proprie loquendo_, in idem refertur cum virtute.\u2014_ibid._,\n      2a 2ae, q. 145, art. I, c.\n\n  183 \u201cEorum quae propter se apprehenduntur, quaedam apprehenduntur solum\n      propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est\n      ultimus finis; quaedam vero apprehenduntur et propter se, in quantum\n      habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiamsi nihil aliud\n      boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter\n      aliud, in quantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum\n      perfectius: et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se\n      apprehendendae.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, ad I.\n\n_  184 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, p. 236.\n\n  185 \u201cOmnia ... quae jam habent esse, illud esse suum naturaliter amant,\n      et ipsam tota virtute conservant.... Ipsum igitur esse habet\n      rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod\n      non habeat esse, ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso\n      quod habet esse.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 21, art. 2, c.\n\n  186 \u201cNon-esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens,\n      inquantum scilicet ablatio alicujus mali est appetibilis; quod malum\n      quidem aufertur per non-esse; ablatio vero mali non est appetibilis,\n      nisi inquantum per malum privatur quoddam esse. Illud igitur, quod\n      per se est appetibile, est esse; non-esse vero, per accidens tantum,\n      inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo homo non sustinet\n      privari; et sic etiam per accidens non-esse dicitur bonum.\u201d\u2014ST.\n      THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 2, ad. 3.\n\n  187 \u201cMalum est defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi.\u201d\u2014ST.\n      THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 49, art. 1, c.\n\n_  188 ibid._\n\n  189 \u201cCausam formalem malum non habet, sed est magis privatio\n      formae.\u201d\u2014St. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 49, art. 1, c.\n\n  190 \u201cNec causam finalem habet malum, sed magis est privatio ordinis ad\n      debitum finem.\u201d\u2014_ibid._\n\n  191 \u201cNon est causa efficiens sed _deficiens_ mali, quia malum non est\n      effectio sed _defectio_.\u201d\u2014_De Civ. Dei_, xii., 7.\n\n  192 \u201cO, altitudo divitiarum sapientiae, et scientiae Dei! Quam\n      incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et investigabiles viae\n      ejus!\u201d\u2014Rom. xi., 33.\n\n  193 Connected with the transcendental notion of unity is another\n      concept, that of _order_, which will be more fully examined when we\n      come to treat of causes.\n\n  194 BAUMGARTEN, a German philosopher of the eighteenth century, was the\n      first to use the term _Aesthetica_ in this sense.\n\n  195 \u201cDicendum est quod pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens.\n      Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est, quod in\n      eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri attinet quod _in\n      ejus aspectu seu cognitione_ quietetur appetitus; unde et illi\n      sensus pr\u00e6cipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt,\n      scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes; dicimus enim pulchra\n      visibilia et pulchros sonos; in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum\n      non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros sapores,\n      aut odores.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia. ii\u00e6., q. 27, art. 1,\n      ad. 3.\n\n  196 \u201cAd rationem pulchri pertinet, quod in ejus aspectu seu _cognitione_\n      quietetur appetitus ... ita quod pulchrum dicatur id, cujus ipsa\n      _apprehensio_ placet.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia. ii\u00e6., q. 27,\n      art. 1, ad. 3. And the Angelic Doctor justifies the extended use of\n      the term _vision_: \u201cDe aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno\n      modo secundum ejus primam impositionem, alio modo secundum usum\n      nominis, sicut patet in nomine _visionis_, quod primo impositum est\n      ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et\n      certitudinem hujus sensus extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum\n      loquentium, ad omnem _cognitionem aliorum_ sensuum; dicimus enim:\n      Vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum; et\n      ulterius etiam ad _cognitionem intellectus_, secundum illud Matt. v.\n      8: Beati mundi corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.\u201d\u2014i., q. 67, art. 1,\n      c.\n\n  197 \u201cPulchrum et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem\n      rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc bonum laudatur\n      ut pulchrum: sed ratione differunt: nam bonum proprie respicit\n      appetitum: ... et ideo habet rationem finis.... Pulchrum autem\n      respicit vim cognoscitivam: pulchra enim dicuntur qu\u00e6 visa\n      placent.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 4, ad. 1.\n\n_  198 Cf._ DE WULF, _La Valeur esth\u00e9tique de la moralit\u00e9 dans l\u2019art_, pp.\n      28-9.\n\n_  199 L\u2019Art et la Morale_, p. 29.\n\n_  200 De la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-m\u00eame_, ch. i., \u00a7 8.\n\n_  201 De Vera Religione_, c. 32.\n\n_  202 Cf._ POINCAR\u00c9, _Conf\u00e9rence sur les rapports de l\u2019analyse et de la\n      physique mathematique_.\u2014_apud_ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, \u00a7 274, pp.\n      546-7 n.\n\n  203 When the object so excels in greatness or grandeur as to exceed more\n      or less our capacity to realize it we speak of it as _sublime_. The\n      sublime calls forth emotions of self-abasement, reverence, and even\n      fear. If an object possessing the other requisites of beauty is\n      wanting in due magnitude, we describe it as _pretty_ or _elegant_.\n      The terms _grace_, _graceful_, apply especially to gait, gesture,\n      movement.\n\n  204 On this point all the great philosophers are unanimous. For Plato,\n      beauty whether of soul or of body, whether of animate or of\n      inanimate things, results not from chance, but from order,\n      rectitude, art: \u03bf\u1f50\u03c7 \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n      \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u1fc3, \u1f25\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03ad\u03b4\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd (Plato, _Gorg._\n      506D). Aristotle places beauty in grandeur and order: \u03a4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f78\u03bd\n      \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af (_Poetics_, ch. viii., n. 8). \u03a4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\n      \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03af\u03b4\u03b7 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f61\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (_Metaph._, xii.,\n      ch. iii., n. 11). \u201cNihil,\u201d writes St. Augustine, \u201cest ordinatum quod\n      non sit pulchrum.\u201d \u201cPulchra,\u201d says St. Thomas, \u201cdicuntur quae visa\n      placent; unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit\u201d (_Summa\n      Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 4, ad. 1).\n\n  205 \u201cAd pulchritudinem tria requiruntur; primo quidem integritas sive\n      perfectio; quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt; et debita\n      proportio sive consonantia; et iterum claritas.\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._, i.,\n      q. 39, art. 8, c. Elsewhere he omits integrity, supposing it implied\n      in order: \u201cad rationem pulchri sive decori concurrit et claritas et\n      debita proportio\u201d. And elsewhere again he omits clarity, this being\n      a necessary effect of order: \u201cpulchrum in debita proportione\n      consistit\u201d.\n\n  206 By \u201cnatural perfection\u201d is meant the perfection which a nature\n      acquires by the realization of its end (5): \u03a4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2\n      (Aristotle).\n\n  207 This definition coincides with that found in a medieval scholastic\n      treatise _De Pulchro et Bono_, attributed to St. Thomas or Albertus\n      Magnas: \u201cRatio pulchri in universali consistit in resplendentia\n      formae super partes materiae proportionatas, vel super diversas\n      vires vel actiones.\u201d _Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, p. 554.\n\n_  208 L\u2019Id\u00e9e du beau dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d\u2019Aquin_, p. 2.\n\n_  209 Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_, viie le\u00e7on.\n\n_  210 Kritik der Urtheilskraft_, Th. i., Abschn. 1, B. 1, passim.\n\n  211 \u201cOmnis corporea creatura ... bonum est infimum, _et in genere suo\n      pulchrum_ quoniam forma et specie continetur.\u201d\u2014ST. AUGUSTINE, _De\n      Vera Relig._, c. 20.\n\n  212 At the same time it must be borne in mind that many of the judgments\n      by which things are pronounced \u201cugly\u201d or \u201ccommonplace\u201d are\n      erroneous. This is partly because they are based on first and\n      superficial sense impressions: beauty must be apprehended and judged\n      by the _intellect_, and by the intellect \u201cinformed\u201d with genuine\n      knowledge; to the eye of enlightened intelligence there are beauties\n      of structure and organization in the beetle or the tadpole as well\n      as in the peacock or the spaniel. It is partly, too, because we\n      unconsciously or semi-consciously apply standards of human beauty to\n      beings that are merely animal: \u201cTo know really whether there are\n      ugly monkeys we should have to consult a monkey; for the beauty we\n      unconsciously look for, and certainly do not find, in the monkey, is\n      the beauty of the human form; and when we declare the monkey ugly\n      what we really mean is that it would be ugly if it were a human\n      being; which is undeniable.\u201d\u2014SULLY-PRUDHOMME, _L\u2019Expression dans les\n      beaux arts_, p. 104.\n\n  213 Proverbs, xxxi. 30.\n\n  214 ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 57, art. 3, c.\n\n_  215 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7\u00a7 70 _sqq._\n\n_  216 Cf._ WINDELBAND, _History of Philosophy_ (tr. Tufts),\n      _Introduction_.\n\n_  217 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii. P. iv., ch. v.\n\n_  218 Metaph._, vi., 1.\n\n_  219 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 90, art. 2: \u201cIllud proprie\n      dicitur esse quod ipsum habet esse quasi in suo esse subsistens.\n      Unde _sol\u00e6 substanti\u00e6 proprie et vere dicuntur entia_; accidens vero\n      non habet esse sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur ...\n      accidens dicitur _magis entis quam ens_.\u201d\n\n_  220 In Metaph._, L. v., lect. 9; cf. _In Physic._, L. iii., lect. 5.\n\n_  221 Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7\u00a7 71, 73-76.\n\n_  222 ibid._, \u00a7\u00a7 74, 76.\n\n_  223 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 268 (p. 668); MERCIER, _Logique_, \u00a7 33\n      (4th edit., p. 99).\n\n_  224 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, L. xi., lect. 9: \u201cSed sciendum est\n      quod pr\u00e6dicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos\n      pr\u00e6dicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis\n      pr\u00e6dicatur, ad diversa pr\u00e6dicamenta pertinet.... Similiter motus\n      secundum quod pr\u00e6dicatur de subjecto in quo est, constituit\n      pr\u00e6dicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod pr\u00e6dicatur de eo a quo\n      est, constituit pr\u00e6dicamentum actionis.\u201d\n\n_  225 Ontologie_, \u00a7 138 (3rd edit., p. 263).\n\n_  226 Cf._ _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, book iv., ch. vi., \u00a7\n      11: \u201cHad we such ideas of substances, as to know what real\n      constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them, and\n      how these qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific\n      ideas of their real essences in our own minds, more certainly find\n      out their properties, and discover what properties they had or had\n      not, than we can now by our senses: and to know the properties of\n      gold, it would be no more necessary that gold should exist, than it\n      is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle, that the\n      triangle should exist in any matter; the idea in our minds would\n      serve for the one as well as the other.\u201d\n\n  227 \u201cSensation convinces us that there are solid, extended substances;\n      and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us\n      of the existence of such beings.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, book ii., ch. xxiii., \u00a7\n      29. Locke protested repeatedly against the charge that he denied the\n      existence of substances.\n\n  228 The notion one has of pure substance is \u201conly a supposition of he\n      knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of\n      producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called\n      accidents.... The idea then we have, to which we give the general\n      name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support\n      of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot\n      subsist, \u2018sine re substante,\u2019 without something to support them, we\n      call that support _substantia_.\u201d\u2014book ii., ch. xxiii., \u00a7 2. In the\n      following passage we may detect the idealistic insinuation that\n      knowledge reaches only to \u201cideas\u201d or mental states, not to the\n      extramental reality, the \u201csecret, abstract nature of substance\u201d:\n      \u201cWhatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in\n      general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of\n      substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas,\n      co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes\n      the whole subsist of itself\u201d. It belongs, of course, to the Theory\n      of Knowledge, not to the Theory of Being, to show how groundless the\n      idealistic assumption is.\n\n  229 Inquiring into the causes of our \u201cimpressions\u201d and \u201cideas,\u201d he\n      admits the existence of \u201cbodies\u201d which cause them and \u201cminds\u201d which\n      experience them: \u201cWe may well ask, _What causes induce us to believe\n      in the existence of body_? but \u2019tis vain to ask, _Whether there be\n      body or not_? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all\n      our reasonings.\u201d\u2014_A Treatise on Human Nature_, Part iv., \u00a7 ii.\n\n  230 Of the definition of a substance as _something which may exist by\n      itself_, he says: \u201cthis definition agrees to everything that can\n      possibly be conceiv\u2019d; and will never serve to distinguish substance\n      from accident, or the soul from its perceptions.... Since all our\n      perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else\n      in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be\n      consider\u2019d as separately existent, and may exist separately, and\n      have no need of anything else to support their existence. They are,\n      therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a\n      substance.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, \u00a7 v. \u201cWe have no perfect idea of substance, but\n      ... taking it for _something that can exist by itself_, \u2019tis evident\n      every perception is a substance, and every distinct part of a\n      perception a distinct substance.\u201d\u2014_ibid._\n\n_  231 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 142 (p. 272).\n\n_  232 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, Dissert. vi., ch. iii., li, \u00a7 592.\n\n  233 Assuming for the moment that we can know substance to be not _one_\n      but _manifold_: that experience reveals to us a plurality of\n      numerically or _really_, and even specifically and generically,\n      distinct substances. _Cf._ _infra_, p. 221.\n\n_  234 Cf._ HUXLEY, _Hume_, bk. ii., ch. ii. TAINE, _De L\u2019Intelligence_,\n      t. i., Preface, and _passim_.\n\n_  235 Cf._ \u00a7 65, _infra_.\n\n  236 Such terms as \u201ccorruptible,\u201d \u201cdestructible,\u201d etc., imply certain\n      attributes _of a thing_ which can be corrupted, destroyed.\n      Conceiving this attribute in the abstract we form the terms\n      \u201ccorruptibility,\u201d \u201cdestructibility,\u201d etc. So, too, the term\n      \u201cpossibility\u201d formed from the adjective \u201cpossible,\u201d simply implies\n      in the abstract what the latter implies in the concrete\u2014an active or\n      passive power _of a thing_ to cause or to become something; or else\n      the mind\u2019s conception of the non-repugnance of this something. To\n      substantialize a possibility, therefore, is sufficiently absurd; but\n      to speak of a possibility as real and at the same time to deny the\n      reality of any subject in which it would have its reality, is no\n      less so.\n\n  237 except in the Blessed Eucharist: here we know from Divine Revelation\n      that the accidents of bread and wine exist apart from their\n      connatural substance. We cannot, by the light of reason, prove\n      _positively_ the possibility of such separate existence of\n      accidents; at the most, men of the supreme genius of an Aristotle\n      may have strongly suspected such possibility, and may have convinced\n      themselves of the futility of all attempts to prove in any way the\n      impossibility of such a condition of things. Nor can we, even with\n      the light of Revelation, do any more than show the futility of such\n      attempts, thus _negatively_ defending the possibility of what we\n      know from Revelation to be a fact.\n\n_  238 Cf._ n. 1.\n\n_  239 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxii., for a full analysis and\n      refutation of phenomenist theories that would deny the\n      substantiality of the human person.\n\n  240 \u201cSubstantia est res, cujus naturae debetur esse non in alio;\n      accidens vero est res, cujus naturae debetur esse in\n      alio.\u201d\u2014_Quodlib._, ix., a. 5, ad. 2.\n\n_  241 Cf._ DESCARTES, _Oeuvres_, edit. Cousin, tome ix., p. 166\u2014_apud_\n      MERCIER, _Ontologie_, p. 280.\n\n  242 PAULSEN, _Einleitung in die Philosophie_, Berlin, 1896, S.\n      135\u2014_apud_ MERCIER, _loc. cit._\n\n  243 and also _appetitive_; as in mental life appetition is a natural\n      consequent of perception. It is in accordance with this latter idea\n      that Wundt conceives all reality as being in its ultimate nature\n      appetitive activity: the _Ego_ is a \u201cvolitional unit\u201d and the\n      universe a \u201ccollection of volitional units\u201d.\u2014_Cf._ WUNDT, _System\n      der Philosophie_, Leipzig, 1889, S. 415-421.\n\n_  244 Principles of Psychology_, Pt. ii., ch. i., \u00a7 59.\n\n  245 But from Descartes\u2019 doctrine of two passive substances so\n      antithetically opposed to each other the transition to Spinozism was\n      easy and obvious. If mind and matter are so absolutely opposed as\n      thought and extension, how can they unite to form one human\n      individual in man? If both are purely passive, and if God alone puts\n      into them their conscious states and their mechanical movements\n      respectively, what remains proper to each but a pure passivity that\n      would really be common to both? Would it not be more consistent then\n      to refer this thought-essence or receptivity of conscious\n      activities, and this extension-essence or receptivity of mechanical\n      movements, to God as their proper source, to regard them as two\n      attributes of His unique and self-existent substance, and thus to\n      regard God as substantially immanent in all phenomena, and these as\n      only different expressions of His all-pervading essence? This is\n      what Spinoza did; and his monism in one form or other is the last\n      word of many contemporary philosophers on the nature of the universe\n      which constitutes the totality of human experience.\u2014_Cf._ H\u00d6FFDING,\n      _Outlines of Psychology_, ch. ii., and criticism of same _apud_\n      MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxiii.\n\n  246 \u201cEsse substanti\u00e6 non dependet ab esse alterius sicut ei inh\u00e6rens,\n      licet omnia dependeant a Deo sicut a causa prima.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De\n      Causa Materi\u00e6_, cap. viii.\n\n_  247 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._ \u00a7 594.\n\n_  248 Ibid._, \u00a7\u00a7 597-600.\n\n  249 \u201cIllud proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo\n      esse subsistens. Unde sol\u00e6 substanti\u00e6 proprie et vere dicuntur\n      entia; accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac\n      ratione ens dicitur: sicut albedo dicitur ens quia ea aliquid est\n      album. Et propter hoc dicitur in _Metaph._, l. 7 [al. 6], c. i.\n      [Arist.], quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS,\n      _Summa Theol._, i. q. 90, art. 2. \u201cIllud cui advenit accidens, est\n      ens in se completum consistens in suo esse, quod quidem esse\n      naturaliter pr\u00e6cedit accidens, quod supervenit: et ideo accidens\n      superveniens, ex conjunctione sui cum eo, cui supervenit, non causat\n      illud esse in quo res subsistit per quod res est ens per se: sed\n      causat quoddam esse secundum, sine quo res subsistens intelligi\n      potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo, vel\n      pr\u00e6dicatum sine subjecto. Unde ex accidente et subjecto non fit unum\n      per se, sed unum per accidens, et ideo ex eorum conjunctione non\n      resultat essentia qu\u00e6dam, sicut ex conjunctione form\u00e6 cum materia:\n      propter quod accidens neque rationem complet\u00e6 essenti\u00e6 habet, neque\n      pars complet\u00e6 essenti\u00e6 est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et\n      essentiam secundum quid habet.\u201d\u2014_De Ente et Essentia_, ch. vii.\n\n  250 \u201cNon est definitio substanti\u00e6, ens per se sine subjecto, nec\n      definitio accidentis, ens in subjecto; sed quidditati seu essenti\u00e6\n      substanti\u00e6 _competit_ habere _esse_ non in subjecto; quidditati\n      autem sive essenti\u00e6 accidentis _competit_ habere _esse_ in\n      subjecto.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 77, art. 1, ad. 2.\n\n_  251 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 595-596.\n\n_  252 ibid._, \u00a7 619.\n\n_  253 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 320-325.\n\n  254 KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 618, 624.\n\n  255 This logical usage is applied equally to attributes of a logical\n      subject which is not itself a substance but an accident; it turns\n      solely on the point whether the concept of the logical predicate of\n      a judgment is or is not connected by an absolute logical connexion,\n      a connexion of thought, with the concept of the logical subject.\n\n_  256 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp._, _De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad.\n      7.\n\n_  257 Cf._, however, \u00a7 68, p. 246, n. 2, _infra_.\n\n  258 St. Thomas, whose language is usually so moderate, thus expresses\n      his view of the doctrine afterwards propounded by Descartes when the\n      latter declared the essence of the soul to be thought: \u201cQuidquid\n      dicatur de potentiis animae, tamen nullus unquam opinatur, nisi\n      insanus, quod habitus et actus animae sint ipsa ejus\n      essentia.\u201d\u2014_Quaest. Disp., De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad 1. For a\n      very convincing treatment of this question, _cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op.\n      cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 625-626.\n\n  259 DE SAN, _Cosmologia_, \u00a7 323, _apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 158.\n\n_  260 op. cit._, \u00a7 625.\n\n  261 ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 17, art. 2, c.\n\n  262 Hence St. Thomas says, in regard to the Blessed Eucharist, that the\n      accidents of bread and wine had not an existence of their own as\n      long as the substance of bread and wine was there; that this is true\n      of accidents generally; that it is not they that exist, but rather\n      their subjects; that their function is to determine these subjects\n      to exist as characterized in a certain way, as whiteness gives snow\n      a white existence: \u201cDicendum quod accidentia panis et vini, manente\n      substantia panis et vini non habebant ipsa _esse_ sicut nec alia\n      accidentia, sed subjecta eorum habebant hujusmodi _esse_ per ea,\n      sicut nix est alba per albedinem.\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 77, art.\n      1, ad. 4.\n\n  263 For the arguments on both sides _cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, \u00a7 156\n      (pp. 308 _sqq._). The indirect argument which the author derives\n      from the fact that the Divine _Concursus_ is necessary for the\n      activity of creatures, while offering an intelligible explanation of\n      this necessity on Thomistic principles, does not touch the\n      probability of other explanations.\n\n_  264 Cf._ URRABURU\u2019S definition: \u201centitas vel realitas a subjecto\n      realiter distincta, cujus totum esse consistit in ultima\n      determinatione rei ad aliquod munus obeundum, vel ad aliquam realem\n      denominationem actu habendam, sine qua, saltem in individuo sumpta,\n      res eadem potest existere absolute\u201d.\u2014_op. cit._, \u00a7 120 (p. 380).\n\n_  265 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 291 (p. 854, _quarta opinio_), p. 854.\n\n  266 Whether immanent vital acts\u2014especially of the spiritual faculties in\n      man: thoughts, volitions, etc.\u2014are mere modes, or whether they are\n      absolute accidents, having their own proper and positive reality\n      which perfects their subject by affecting it, is a disputed\n      question. Habits, acquired by repetition of such acts, _e.g._\n      knowledge and virtue, belonging as they do to the category of\n      quality, are more than mere modalities of the human subject: they\n      have an absolute, positive entity, whereby they add to the total\n      perfection of the latter.\n\n_  267 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 121 (pp. 386 _sqq._).\n\n  268 The fact that Aristotle [_Metaph._, lib. vii. (al. vi.), ch. iii.]\n      seems to have placed a _real distinction_ between extension and\n      corporeal substance, while he could not have suspected the absolute\n      _separability_ of the former from the latter, would go to show that\n      he did not regard separability as the only test of a real\n      distinction. _Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, _ibid._\n\n  269 Obviously we are not concerned herewith _all_ the attributes which\n      by a necessity of thought we ascribe to an essence, _e.g._ the\n      _corruptibility_ of a corporeal substance, or the _immortality_ of a\n      spiritual substance. These are not entities really distinct from the\n      substance, but only aspects which we recognize to be necessary\n      corollaries of its nature. We are concerned only with properties\n      which are real powers, faculties, forces, aptitudes of things.\u2014_Cf._\n      KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 627.\n\n_  270 op. cit._, \u00a7 628.\n\n  271 \u201cTertii sunt, qui dicunt, quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem\n      ipsi animae, sicut sunt ejus principia intrinsica et essentialia,\n      nec adeo diversae, ut cedant in aliud genus, sicut accidentia; sed\n      in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem ... et ideo quasi medium\n      tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt, quasdam animae potentias\n      sic differre ad invicem, ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia:\n      non tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum\n      essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre\n      essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversa\n      instrumenta ejusdem substantiae.\u201d\u2014_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1,\n      art. 2, q. 1.\n\n      In the same context he explains what we are to understand by\n      referring anything to a certain category _per reductionem_: \u201cSunt\n      enim quaedam, quae sunt in genere _per se_, aliqua _per reductionem_\n      ad idem genus. Illa per se sunt in genere, quae participant\n      essentiam completam generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per\n      reductionem, quae nan dicunt completam essentiam.... Quaedam\n      reducuntur sicut principia ... aut essentialia, sicut sunt materia\n      et forma in genere substantiae; aut integrantia, sicut partes\n      substantiae.... Quaedam reducuntur sicut _viae_ ... aut sicut _viae\n      ad res_, et sic motus et mutationes, ut generatio, reducuntur ad\n      substantiam; aut sicut _viae a rebus_, et sic habent reduci\n      potentiae ad genus substantiae. Prima enim agendi potentia, quae\n      egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia, ad idem genus reducitur,\n      quae non adeo elongatur ab ipsa substantia, ut dicat aliam essentiam\n      completam.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, ad. 8.\n\n  272 \u201cQuoniam potentia creaturae arctata est, non potuit creatura habere\n      posse perfectum, nisi esset in ea potentiarum multitudo, ex quarum\n      collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius,\n      resultaret unum posse completum, sicut manifeste animadverti potest\n      in organis humani corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute\n      alterius adjuvari.\u201d\u2014_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1, art. 2, q. 8.\n\n  273 The student will find in MAHER\u2019S _Psychology_ (ch. iii.) a clear and\n      well-reasoned exposition of the inconsistency and groundlessness of\n      such attacks on the doctrine of faculties.\n\n_  274 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 636-637.\n\n  275 \u201cCum corpus hominis aut cujuslibet alterius animalis sit quoddam\n      totum naturale, dicit unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat qua\n      perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem, ut\n      accidit in domo et in aliis hujusmodi. Unde opportet quod quaelibet\n      pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse [_i.e._ sibi proprium] et\n      speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma. Unde Philosophus dicit (l.\n      ii. de anima, text. 9), quod recedente anima neque oculus neque caro\n      neque aliqua pars manet nisi aequivoce.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp.\n      de anima_, art. 10\u2014_apud_ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 632.\n\n  276 The most perfect real unity is of course that which includes all\n      perfection in the simplicity of its actual essence, without any\n      dispersion or plurality of its being, without any admixture of\n      accident or potentiality. Such is the unity of the Infinite Being\n      alone. No finite being possesses its actuality _tota simul_. And the\n      creature falls short of perfect unity in proportion as it attains to\n      this actuality only by a multiplicity of real changes, by a variety\n      of really distinct principles and powers, essential and accidental,\n      in its concrete mode of being. In proportion as created things are\n      higher or lower in the scale of being (47), they realize a higher or\n      a lower grade of unity in their mode of individual existence.\n\n  277 We are concerned here only with finite, created substances, as\n      distinct from the Divine Uncreated Substance on whom these depend\n      (64).\n\n  278 ARISTOTLE, _Categ._ ch. iii., _passim_; _Metaph._, l. v. (al. vi.),\n      ch. viii.; ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, l. v. lect. 10; KLEUTGEN, _op.\n      cit._, \u00a7 589-591.\n\n_  279 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 587, 602-603.\n\n_  280 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 277, 279.\n\n_  281 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 217 (pp. 66 _sqq._).\n\n  282 Sciendum est quod nomen naturae significat quodlibet principium\n      intrinsicum motus; secundum quod Philosophus dicit quod _natura est\n      principium motus in eo in quo est per se, et non secundum\n      accidens_.\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 2, art. 1 in c.\n\n  283 And here we are reminded of the view of many medieval scholastics of\n      high authority, that the same material entity can have at the same\n      time a plurality of formative principles or _substantial forms_ of\n      different grades of perfection.\n\n_  284 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 282 (p. 825).\n\n  285 For want of a more appropriate rendering we translate the Latin term\n      _suppositum_ (Gr. \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) by the phrase \u201csubsisting thing\u201d;\n      though the classical terms are really generic: _suppositum_ being a\n      genus of which there are two species, _suppositum irrationale_\n      (\u201c_thing_\u201d or \u201csubsisting _thing_\u201d) and _suppositum rationale_\n      (\u201c_person_\u201d).\u2014_Cf._ _infra_, pp. 265-6.\n\n  286 Complete in every way: in _substantial_ and in _specific_\n      perfections. The separated soul, though it is an existing individual\n      substance, retains its essential communicability to its connatural\n      material principle, the body. Hence it has not \u201csubsistence,\u201d it is\n      not a \u201cperson\u201d.\u2014_Cf._ _infra_, p. 264.\n\n  287 \u201cPer se agere _convenit per se existenti_. Sed per se existens\n      quandoque potest dici aliquid, si non sit inh\u00e6rens ut accidens, vel\n      ut forma materialis, etiamsi sit pars. Sed proprie et per se\n      subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inh\u00e6rens neque est\n      pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non potest dici per se\n      subsistens, et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et\n      operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod\n      homo videt per oculum et palpat per manum.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa\n      Theol._, i., q. 75, art. 2, ad. 2.\n\n_  288 Cf._ preceding note. St. Thomas continues: \u201cPotest igitur dici quod\n      anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod\n      homo intelligat per animam\u201d (ibid.); and elsewhere he writes:\n      \u201cDicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei [_i.e._ naturae]. Et\n      ideo, licet sit separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis,\n      non potest dici substantia individua quae est hypostasis vel\n      substantia prima, sicut nec manus, nec quaecumque alia partium\n      hominis; et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae, neque\n      nomen.\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._, i., q. 29, art. 1, ad. 5.\n\n_  289 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7\u00a7 54-5.\n\n  290 All _created_ subsisting things and persons depend, of course,\n      essentially on the Necessary Being for their existence and for their\n      activity. This Necessary Being we know from Revelation to be\n      _Triune_, Three in Persons, One in Nature. The subsistence of each\n      Divine Person of the Blessed Trinity excludes _all_ modes of\n      dependence.\n\n  291 \u201cHoc ... quod est per se agere, excellentiori modo convenit\n      substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis. Nam solae substantiae\n      rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et\n      non agere; aliae vero substantiae magis aguntur quam agunt. Et ideo\n      conveniens fuit ut substantia individua _rationalis_ naturae\n      speciale nomen haberet.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp. de Potentia_, q.\n      ix., art. 1, ad. 3.\n\n_  292 Cf._ BILLOT, _De Verbo Incarnato_, q. ii.\u2014_apud_ MERCIER, _op.\n      cit._, \u00a7 151 (pp. 299-300).\n\n_  293 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 291, for an exhaustive list of the\n      authorities in favour of each of the various views propounded in\n      this present context.\n\n  294 \u201cNatura singularis et integra per se consituitur in sua\n      independentia, non aliquo positivo addito ultra illam entitatem\n      positivam, qua est haec natura.\u201d\u2014SCOTUS, iii., Dist. i. q. 1, n. 9\n      and n. 11, ad. 3. _Cf._ SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Disp. xxxiv. \u00a7 2;\n      KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 616; FRANZELIN, _De verbo Incarnato_, Th.\n      xxix.\n\n_  295 op. cit._, \u00a7 293 (p. 861).\n\n  296 Neither is it a _natural_ union in the sense of being _due_ to the\n      human nature; it is wholly _undue_ to the latter, and is in this\n      sense _supernatural_.\n\n_  297 op. cit._, \u00a7 293 (p. 861).\n\n_  298 ibid._ Farther on (p. 863) he says it is certain that the Divine\n      Nature of the Word is _substantially_ united with humanity in a\n      unity of person or subsistence: \u201ccertum est eamdem [naturam divinam]\n      substantialiter uniri cum humanitate in unitate suppositi;\u201d and for\n      this he considers that the human nature must be incomplete \u201cin\n      ratione personae\u201d. But this proves nothing; for of course the human\n      nature must be wanting in personality. But it is complete _as a\n      nature_. Nor does the aphorism he quotes\u2014\u201cQuidquid substantiae in\n      sua specie completae accedit, accidens est,\u201d\u2014apply to subsistence or\n      personality supervening on a complete substance.\n\n  299 \u201cHumanitas illa [_scil._ Christi], quamvis completa in _esse_\n      naturae, non tamen habet ultimum complementum in genere substantiae\n      cum in se non subsistat.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, \u00a7 296 (p. 866).\n\n  300 This view, which has many supporters, is clearly explained and ably\n      defended by MERCIER in his _Ontologie_, \u00a7 151 (pp. 298-302), \u00a7 52\n      (pp. 134-5), \u00a7 49 (p. 127, n. 1).\n\n_  301 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 49 (p. 127, n. 1).\n\n  302 Hence Urraburu gives this _real_ definition of subsistence: _ultimus\n      naturae terminus in ordine substantiali_ sive in ratione existentis\n      per se: the ultimate term (or determination) of a nature in the\n      order of substantiality or of \u201cexisting by itself\u201d\u2014_op. cit._, \u00a7 296\n      (p. 866).\n\n  303 \u201cSicut enim modus accidentalis figurae terminat quantitatem, et\n      modus ubicationis constituit rem hic et non alibi, ita modus\n      substantialis personalitatis terminans naturam reddit illam\n      incommunicabilem alieno supposito.\u201d\u2014URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 291 (p.\n      854).\n\n  304 The terms \u201cSelf,\u201d \u201c_Ego_,\u201d and \u201cPerson\u201d we take to be identical in\n      reference to the human individual. The _mind_ is not the _Ego_,\n      self, or person, but only a part of it.\u2014_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_,\n      ch. vi., p. 104.\n\n_  305 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.\n\n_  306 ibid._, p. 365.\n\n_  307 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 363.\n\n_  308 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 365 (italics in last sentence ours).\n\n_  309 Cf._ RICKABY, _First Principles_, p. 370.\n\n_  310 Cf._ MAHER, _ibid._, pp. 487-92; MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., pp.\n      197-224 (6th edit.); _Ontologie_, \u00a7 153 (p. 304).\n\n  311 There are cogent theological reasons also against the view that\n      consciousness constitutes personality. For instance, the human\n      nature of our Divine Lord has its own proper consciousness, which,\n      nevertheless, does not constitute this nature a person.\n\n_  312 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii.\n\n  313 \u201cThat being then one plant which has such an organization of parts\n      in one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to\n      be the same plant as long as it continues to partake of the same\n      life, though that life be communicated to different particles of\n      matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued\n      organization conformable to that sort of plants....\n\n      \u201cThe case is not so much different in brutes, but that anyone may\n      hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same....\n\n      \u201cThis also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists:\n      _viz._ in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by\n      constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally\n      united to the same organized body.... For if the identity of soul\n      alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of\n      matter why the same individual spirit may be united [_i.e._\n      successively] to different bodies, it will be possible that ... men\n      living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the\n      same man....\u201d\u2014_Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii. ch.\n      xxvii. \u00a7 4-6. Yet though \u201cidentity of soul\u201d does not make \u201cthe same\n      man,\u201d Locke goes on immediately to assert that identity of\n      _consciousness_, which is but a function of the soul, makes _the\n      same person_.\n\n_  314 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., \u00a7 7.\n      Names do not stand for ideas or concepts but for _conceived_\n      realities; and the question here is: What is the conceived reality\n      (in the existing human individual) for which the term \u201cperson\u201d\n      stands?\n\n_  315 ibid._, \u00a7 9.\n\n_  316 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., \u00a7\u00a7 13,\n      14.\n\n_  317 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., \u00a7 13.\n\n  318 For a searching criticism of such theories of the Ego or human\n      person, _cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxii.\n\n_  319 ibid._, \u00a7 19.\n\n  320 p. 276.\n\n_  321 Cf._ MAHER\u2019S criticism of Professor James\u2019 theory on double\n      personality (_op. cit._, ch. xxii., pp. 491-2): \u201cProfessor James\n      devotes much space to these \u2019mutations\u2019 of the Ego, yet overlooks\n      the fact that they are peculiarly fatal, not to his adversaries, but\n      to his own theory that \u2018the present thought is the only thinker,\u2019\n      and that seeming identity is sufficiently preserved by each thought\n      \u2019appropriating\u2019 and \u2018inheriting\u2019 the contents of its predecessor.\n      The difficulties presented to this process of inheritance by such\n      facts as sleep and swooning have been already dwelt upon [_cf._\n      _ibid._, p. 480 (c)]; but here they are if possible increased. The\n      last conscious thought of, say, Felida 2 has to transmit its\n      gathered experience not to its _proximate_ conscious successor,\n      which is Felida 1, but across seven months of vacuum until on the\n      extinction of Felida 1 the next conscious thought which constitutes\n      Felida 2 is born into existence. If the single personality is hard\n      for Mr. James to explain, \u2018double-personality\u2019 at least doubles his\n      difficulties.\u201d\n\n_  322 Cf._ _infra_, \u00a7 82.\n\n  323 \u03a0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u1f24\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\u2014_Categ._, ch.\n      iv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS: \u201cHaec est ratio formalis qualitatis, per quam\n      respondemus interroganti qualis res sit.\u201d\n\n  324 The other accidents, _e.g._ _actio_ and _passio_, in so far as they\n      change the perfection of the substance, do so only by producing\n      qualities in it. Quantity, which is the connatural accident of all\n      corporeal substance, adds of itself no special complement or degree\n      of accidental perfection to the latter, in the sense of disposing\n      (or indisposing) the latter for the attainment of the full and final\n      perfection due to its specific nature; but only in the sense that it\n      supposes more or less of that kind of substance to exist, or in the\n      sense in which it is understood to include the _qualities_ of which\n      it may be the _immediate_ subject.\u2014_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7\n      326.\n\n_  325 In Praedicamenta_, ch. i.\n\n_  326 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xii, xiii, xxiii, xxv. BERGSON\n      rightly recognizes the irreducibility of quality to quantity (_Essai\n      sur les donn\u00e9es immediates de la conscience, passim_). But he\n      wrongly infers from this \u201cfundamental antinomy,\u201d as he calls it, the\n      existence, in each human individual, of a two-fold _Ego_, a deeper\n      self where all is quality, and a superficial self which projects\n      conscious states, in static and numerical isolation from one\n      another, into a homogeneous space where all is quantitative,\n      mathematical. The reasonable inference is merely that the human mind\n      recognizes in the data of its experience a certain richness and\n      variety of modes of real being.\n\n_  327 Metaph._ V., ch. xiv., where the four groups are finally reduced to\n      two.\n\n_  328 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 49, art. 2.\n\n  329 To be distinguished from the _passio_ which is correlative of\n      _actio_ and which consists in the actual undergoing of the latter,\n      the actual reception of the accidental form which is the term of the\n      latter.\n\n  330 \u201cInter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime sequuntur et demonstrant\n      speciem rerum. Quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus\n      nullo certiori indicio diversitas specierum dijudicari potest, quam\n      diversitate figurae.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In_ VII. _Physic_, lect. 5.\n\n  331 Every natural habit, as we have just seen, has an essential relation\n      to _activity_. Every such habit inheres immediately in some\n      operative faculty, as science in the intellect, or justice in the\n      will. All natural habits are _operative_. There is, however, as we\n      know from Divine Revelation, an \u201centitative\u201d habit, a _habitus\n      entitativus_, which affects the substance itself of the human soul,\n      ennobling its natural mode of being and so perfecting it as to raise\n      it to a higher or supernatural plane of being, to an order of\n      existence altogether undue to its nature: the _supernaturally\n      infused_ habit of _sanctifying grace_.\n\n_  332 Eth. Eud._, ii., 2.\n\n  333 \u201cVires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus\n      habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum.\u201d\u2014_Summa\n      Theol._, ia ii\u00e6, q. 49, art. 4, ad 2.\n\n  334 \u201cIntellectus ... est subjectum habitus. Illi enim competit esse\n      subjectum habitus quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime\n      competit intellectui....\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iie, q.\n      50, art. 4, ad. 1. \u201cOmnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari\n      ad agendum, indiget habitu, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum.\n      Voluntas autem cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad\n      agendum ordinari: et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum\n      ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum ...,\u201d\u2014_ibid._ art. 5, in\n      c.\n\n  335 \u201cHabitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subjectum est in potentia ad\n      multa. Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter\n      quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus\n      autem proportionantur operationibus; unde ex similibus actibus\n      similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in 2 Ethic., cap. 1 et 2; in\n      corpore vero possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus\n      disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus\n      animae.\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._, ia ii\u00e6, q. 49, art. 1, in c.\n\n_  336 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 50, art. 1.\u2014MERCIER, _Ontologie_, \u00a7\n      164.\n\n  337 According to the scholastic theory of matter and form the matter\n      must be predisposed by certain qualities for the reception of a\n      given substantial form. The chemical elements which form a compound\n      will not do so in any and every condition, but only when definitely\n      disposed and brought together under favourable conditions. These\n      elementary qualities, considered in themselves, are not habits or\n      dispositions: \u201cUnde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum\n      unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus\n      _dispositiones_ vel _habitus_, sed _simplices qualitates_.\u201d\u2014ST.\n      THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 49, art. 4, in C. They are natural qualities and\n      not dispositions produced by disposing causes.\n\n  338 St. Thomas regards the distinction between _habits_ and mere\n      dispositions as a distinction not of _degree_ but of _kind_:\n      \u201cDispositio et habitus possunt distingui sicut diversae species\n      unius generis subalterni, ut dicantur _dispositiones_ illae\n      qualitates primae speciei quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem\n      ut de facili amittantur, quia habent causas mutabiles, ut aegritudo\n      et sanitas; _habitus_ vero dicantur illae qualitates quae secundum\n      suam rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur quia habent\n      causas immobiles; sicut scientia et virtutes; et secundum hoc\n      disposito non fit habitus.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, ii\u00e6, q.\n      49, art. 2, ad. 3.\n\n  339 \u201cVires sensitivae _dupliciter_ possunt considerari: _uno modo_,\n      secundum quod operanter ex instinctu naturae; _alio modo_, secundum\n      quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operantur\n      ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura; et\n      ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ta\n      etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu\n      naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis,\n      sic ad diversa ordinari possunt: et sic possunt esse in eis aliqui\n      habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS,\n      _ibid._, q. 50, art. 3, in c. In this context the angelic doctor,\n      following Aristotle, places the virtues of temperance and fortitude\n      in the sense _appetite_ as controlled by the rational will. For the\n      same reason he admits the possibility of habits in the faculties of\n      _internal_ sense perception, though not in the _external_ senses\n      (_ibid._, ad. 3).\n\n  340 \u201cQuia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam consuetudinem\n      disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic, vel aliter, hoc modo in brutis\n      animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt.... Deficit tamen ratio\n      habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis quia non habent dominium utendi\n      vel non utendi, quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere; et ideo,\n      proprie loquendo, in eis habitus esse non possunt.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, ad. 2.\n\n  341 It must not be forgotten that habit is an _accident_, an accidental\n      perfection of the substance or nature of an individual agent; it\n      immediately affects the operative power of the agent, which\n      operative power is itself an accident of this agent\u2019s nature\n      (constituting the second sub-class of the accident, _Quality_).\n      Habit is thus at once an _actuality_ or actualization of the\n      operative power and a _potentiality_ of further and more perfect\n      acts. It is intermediate between the operative power and the\n      complete actualization which the power receives by the acts that\n      spring from the latter as perfected by the habit. Faculty and habit\n      form one complete proximate principle of those acts: a principle\n      which is at once a partial actualization of the individual agent\u2019s\n      nature and a potentiality of further actualization of this nature.\n\n  342 \u201cSi potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sequitur quod\n      sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in\n      secunda specie qualitatis, qu\u00e6 dicitur potentia vel impotentia\n      naturalis.\u201d\u2014_Q. Disp. de Spir. Creat._, art. 11, in c.\n\n_  343 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 76, art. 1, in c.\u2014\u201cCum\n      potentia et actus dividant ens, et quodlibet genus entis, opportet\n      quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus; et ideo si actus non\n      est in genere substantiae, potentia, qu\u00e6 dicitur ad illum actum, non\n      potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in\n      genere substantiae, sed in solo Deo, cujus operatio est ejus\n      substantia.\u201d\u2014_Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (9), xi.: \u201cActus et\n      potentia essentialiter ad illum actum ordinata sunt in eodem genere\n      supremo.\u201d\n\n  344 \u201cNec in angelo, nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia\n      operativa est idem quod sua essentia.... Actus ad quem comparatur\n      potentia operativa est operatio. In angelo autem non est idem\n      intelligere et esse; nec aliqua alia operatio, aut in ipso aut in\n      quocunque alio creato, est idem quod ejus esse. Unde essentia angeli\n      non est ejus potentia intellectiva, nec alicujus creati essentia est\n      ejus operativa potentia.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, q. 54, art 3.\n\n  345 As we shall see later, action as such does not perfect or change the\n      _agens_, unless when, as in immanent action, the _agens_ is\n      identical with the _patiens_. Action formally actualizes or perfects\n      the _patiens_: _actio fit in passo_. But the exercise of any\n      activity by an agent undoubtedly connotes or implies a perfection of\n      this agent. It is not, however, that the actual operation as such\n      (unless it is immanent) adds a new perfection to the agent. Rather\n      the agent\u2019s _power_ of acting, revealed to us in its exercise, is\n      for us a measure of the actual perfection of the agent. But the\n      question remains: Is this power or perfection, so far as we know it,\n      a _substantial_ perfection? Is it _the very perfection itself of the\n      agent\u2019s substance or nature_ as known to us? Or is it an\n      _accidental_ perfection which is for us an index of a corresponding\n      degree of substantial perfection? In getting our knowledge of the\n      nature of a substance from a consideration of its _sensible_\n      accidents, its _phenomena_, its _operations_\u2014according to the rule,\n      _Operari sequitur esse: qualis est operatio talis est natura_\u2014can we\n      use a _single_ inference, from _action_ to _nature_, or must we use\n      a _double_ inference, from action to power, and from power to\n      nature? But even if we have to make the double inference, this _of\n      itself_ does not prove any more than a conceptual distinction\n      between _power_ and _nature_.\n\n_  346 Cf._. ST. THOMAS, _Q. Disp. de spir. creat._, art. 11, in c.\u2014MAHER,\n      _Psychology_ ch. iii.\n\n_  347 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, \u00a7 168.\n\n_  348 Cf._ _ibid._, _op. cit._, \u00a7 169; MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. iii. (p.\n      29, n. 3.)\n\n  349 Of course all accidents are \u201cforms\u201d in the sense of being\n      _determining principles_ of their subjects, these being considered\n      as _determinable_ or _receptive_ principles. Even quantity is a form\n      in this sense. But quantity itself does not appear to be a \u201csimple\u201d\n      principle in the sense of being \u201cindivisible\u201d: its very function is\n      to make the corporeal substance divisible into integral parts. What\n      then of all those qualities which inhere _immediately_ in the\n      quantity of corporeal substances? They are determinations or\n      affections of a composite, extended, divisible subject. Conceived in\n      the abstract they have, of course, the attributes of indivisibility,\n      immutability, etc., characteristic of all _abstract_ essences (14).\n      But in their physical actuality in what intelligible sense can they\n      be said to be simple, indivisible entities?\n\n_  350 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 52, art. 2; iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4,\n      5.\u2014_Q. Disp. de Virtutibus in communi_, q. i, art. 11, in c.\u2014I. _In\n      Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.\u2014_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7\n      329-332, for arguments and authorities. The author himself defends\n      the former view, according to which alteration takes place by a real\n      addition or substraction of grades of the same quality.\n\n  351 I. _In Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.\n\n  352 iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4, ad. 3.\n\n_  353 Q. Disp. de Virtut._, q. 1, art. 11, in c.\n\n  354 The scientific concept of \u201cvolume\u201d is identical with the common and\n      philosophical concept of \u201cexternal, actual, local, or spatial\n      extension\u201d. The functions ascribed by physics and mechanics to the\n      \u201cmass\u201d of a body have no other source, in the body, than what\n      philosophers understand by the \u201cinternal extension\u201d or \u201cquantity\u201d of\n      the body.\u2014_Cf._ Nys, _Cosmologie_ (Louvain, 1903), \u00a7\u00a7 192-203.\n\n  355 The terms _quantity_ and _extension_ are commonly taken as\n      synonymous; but _quantity_ is more properly applied to the internal\n      plurality of integral parts of the substance itself, _extension_ to\n      the dispersion of these parts outside one another in space.\n\n  356 Hence Aristotle\u2019s definition in _Metaph._, iv.: \u201cQuantum dicitur,\n      quod [est] in insita divisibile, quorum utrumque aut singula unum\n      quid et hoc quid apta sunt esse\u201d: a quantified substance is one\n      which is divisible into parts that are really in it [_i.e._ _partes\n      integrantes_], parts each of which is capable of becoming a distinct\n      subsisting individual thing.\u2014_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, \u00a7 154.\n\n  357 \u201cLongitudo, latitudo et profunditas quantitates quaedam, sed non\n      substantiae sunt. Quantitas enim non est substantia, sed magis cui\n      haec ipsa primo insunt illud est substantia.\u201d\u2014_Metaph._, L. vii.,\n      ch. iii.\n\n_  358 Physic_, L. i., ch. ii.\n\n  359 L. ii., ch. iv.\n\n_  360 Cf._ \u00a7 62 _supra_.\n\n  361 \u201cPropria ... totalitas substantiae continetur indifferenter in parva\n      vel magna quantitate; sicut ... tota natura hominis in magno, vel\n      parvo homine.\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 76, art. 1, ad. 3.\n\n  362 No argument in favour of this view can be based on the use of the\n      term _species_ (\u201c_manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini_\u201d) by\n      the Fathers of the Council of Trent. For them, as for all Catholic\n      philosophers and theologians of the time, the scholastic term\n      _species_, used in such a context, meant simply the objective,\n      perceptible accidents of the substance. _Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, \u00a7\n      175.\n\n  363 Hence the significance of the lines in ST. THOMAS\u2019 hymn, _Adoro Te\n      devote_:\u2014\n\n      _Visus, tactus, gustus_ in te fallitur,\n      Sed _auditu_ solo tuto creditur.\n\n  364 and neither does Revelation. The Body of our Blessed Lord exists in\n      the Eucharist without its connatural external extension and\n      consequent impenetrability. But according to the common teaching of\n      Catholic theologians it has its _internal quantity_, its distinct\n      integral parts, organs and members\u2014really distinct from one another,\n      though interpenetrating and not spatially external to one another.\n      Its mode of existence in the space occupied by the sacramental\n      species is thus analogous to the mode in which the soul is in the\n      body, or a pure spirit in space.\n\n  365 We know from Revelation that the Body of our Lord exists in this way\n      in the Eucharist. We know, too, from Revelation that after the\n      general resurrection the glorified bodies of the just will be _real_\n      bodies, real _corporeal substances_, and nevertheless that they will\n      be endowed with properties very different from those which they\n      possess in the present state: that they will be immortal,\n      incorruptible, impassible, \u201cspiritual\u201d (_cf._ 1 Cor. xv.). The\n      Catholic philosopher who adds those scattered rays of revealed light\n      to what his own rational analysis of experience tells him about\n      matter and spirit, will understand the possibility of such a kinship\n      between the latter as will make the fact of their union in his own\n      nature and person not perhaps any less wonderful, but at any rate a\n      little less surprising and inscrutable: and this without committing\n      himself to the objective idealism whereby Berkeley, while\n      endeavouring to show the utter unreality of matter, only succeeded\n      in persuading himself that its reality was not independent of all\n      mind.\n\n  366 \u201c\u1f6d\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u1fbd \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\n      \u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2.\u201d\u2014_Physic_, L. iv., ch. iv. (6).\n\n  367 The category _Situs_ is commonly interpreted to signify the _mutual_\n      spatial relations or dispositions of the various parts of a body in\n      the place actually occupied by the latter.\n\n  368 A body deprived of its connatural extension exists in space in a\n      manner analogous to that in which the soul is in the body. The Body\n      of our Divine Lord is in the Eucharist in this\n      manner\u2014\u201c_sacramentaliter_\u201d.\n\n_  369 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 624.\n\n_  370 Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (35), iv.\n\n_  371 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion d\u2019Espace_ (Louvain, 1901), pp. 95 _sqq._\u2014_La\n      Notion de Temps_ (Louvain, 1898), pp. 123 _sqq._\n\n  372 \u201cQuid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti\n      explicare velim, nescio.\u201d\u2014_Confess_. L. xi., ch. xiv.\n\n  373 \u201cCum enim intelligimus extrema diversa alicujus medii, et anima\n      dicat, illa esse duo _nunc_, hoc _prius_, illud _posterius_ quasi\n      numerando _prius_ et _posterius_ in motu, tunc hoc dicimus esse\n      tempus.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, in _Phys._, L. iv. lect. 17a.\n\n_  374 Sentent._, Dist. xix., q. ii., art. 1.\u2014_Cf._ Lect. xxiii. in iv.\n      _Physic._\n\n_  375 Physic._, iv., ch. xi.\u2014_Cf._ ST. THOMAS _in loc_.\n\n  376 \u201cThe conception of variation united with sameness is not, however,\n      the whole cognition of time. For this the mind must be able to\n      combine in thought two different movements or pulsations of\n      consciousness, so as to represent an interval between them. It must\n      hold together two _nows_, conceiving them, in succession, yet\n      uniting them through that intellectual synthetic activity by which\n      we _enumerate_ a collection of objects\u2014a process or act which\n      carries concomitantly the consciousness of its own continuous\n      unity.\u201d\u2014MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.\n\n  377 That is, provided we abstract from all comparison of this internal\n      time duration with that of any other current of conscious\n      experiences in the estimating mind. As a matter of fact we always\n      and necessarily compare the time duration of any particular\n      experienced change with that of the remaining portion of the whole\n      current of successive conscious states which make up our mental\n      life. And thus we feel, not that the four-mile walk had a longer\n      time duration than the three-mile walk, but rather that it took\n      place at a quicker _rate_, more rapidly, than the latter. But if a\n      mind which had no other consciousness of change whatsoever than,\n      _e.g._ that of the two walks experienced successively, no other\n      standard change with which to compare each of them as it occurred\u2014if\n      such a mind experienced each in this way, would it pronounce the\n      four-mile walk to have occupied a longer time than the three-mile\n      walk?\u2014_Cf._ _infra_, p. 327.\n\n  378 This is true on the assumption that the intrinsic _time-duration_ of\n      a successive, continuous change, its divisibility into distinct\n      \u201cnows\u201d related as \u201cbefore\u201d and \u201cafter,\u201d is _really identical with_\n      the continuous, successive _states constituting the change_ itself,\n      and is not _a really distinct mode_ superadded to this change, a\n      continuous series of \u201c_quandocationes_,\u201d distinct from the change,\n      and giving the latter its temporal duration. But many philosophers\n      hold that in all creatures _duration_ is a mode of their existence\n      really distinct from the creatures themselves that have this\n      duration or continued existence.\u2014_Cf._ _infra_, \u00a7 86.\n\n_  379 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 246, pp. 201 _sqq._\n\n_  380 op. cit._, c. xvii.\n\n_  381 op. cit._, c. xvii.\n\n_  382 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_ (Lovain, 1898), p. 104.\n\n  383 The fact that we can perceive and estimate temporal duration only\n      _extrinsically_, and in ultimate analysis by comparison with the\n      flow of our own conscious states, and that therefore we can have no\n      perception or conception of the intrinsic time duration of any\n      change, seems to have been overlooked by DE SAN _(Cosmologia_, pp.\n      528-9) when he argues from our perception of different _rates_ of\n      motion, in favour of the view that time _duration_ is not really\n      identical with motion or change, but a superadded mode, really\n      distinct from the latter.\n\n_  384 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_, pp. 85 _sqq._\n\n_  385 Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, pp. 120 _sqq._, for a defence of the view\n      that an actually infinite multitude involves no contradiction.\n\n_  386 ibid._, pp. 162-9.\n\n_  387 De Consolatione_, L. v., _pr. ult._\n\n_  388 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, \u00a7 624.\n\n  389 \u201cEst ergo dicendum, quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura esse\n      permanentis secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi,\n      secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic recedunt a\n      permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis,\n      vel in transmutatiose consistit; et hujusmodi mensurantur _tempore_,\n      sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero\n      recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in\n      transmutatione consistit nec est subjectum transmutationis; tamen\n      habent transmutationem adjunctam vel in actu vel in potentia ...\n      patet de angelis, quod scilicet habent esse intransmutabile cum\n      transmutabilitate secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam\n      pertinet, et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum, et affectionum,\n      et locorum suo modo. Et ideo hujusmodi mensurantur _aevo_, quod est\n      medium inter aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat\n      _aeternitas_, nec est mutabile nec mutabilitati adjunctum. Sic ergo\n      tempus habet prius et posterius, aevum non habet in se prius et\n      posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt; aeternitas autem non habet prius\n      neque posterius, neque ea compatitur.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._,\n      i., q. x., art. 5, in c.\n\n  390 pp. 517-57.\n\n_  391 Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt\n      intellecta, conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et\n      divinitas, ita ut [qui veritatem Dei in injustitia detinent] sint\n      inexcusabiles._\u2014Rom. ii. 20 [18].\n\n_  392 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_ (4th edit.), pp. 90-2.\n\n  393 For a clear and trenchant criticism of modern relativist theories,\n      _cf._ VEITCH, _Knowing and Being_, especially ch. iv., \u201cRelation,\u201d\n      pp. 129 _sqq._\n\n_  394 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 179-80.\n\n_  395 Principles of Psychology_, P. ii., ch. iii., \u00a7 88.\n\n_  396 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, pp. 157-9.\n\n  397 \u201cWe cannot of course _perceive_ an _unperceived_ world, nor can we\n      conceive a world the conception of which is not in the mind; but\n      there is no contradiction or absurdity in the proposition: \u2018A\n      material world of three dimensions has existed for a time\n      unperceived and unthought of by any created being, and then revealed\n      itself to human minds\u2019.\u201d\u2014MAHER, _Psychology_, p. iii, n.\n\n  398 \u201cI do not pretend to demonstrate anything, nor do I feel much\n      concern, about any unknowable _noumenon_ which never reveals itself\n      in my consciousness. If there be in existence an inscrutable\n      \u2018transcendental Ego,\u2019 eternally screened from my ken by this\n      self-asserting \u2018empirical Ego,\u2019 I confess I feel very little\n      interest in the nature or the welfare of the former. _The only soul\n      about which I care is that which immediately presents itself in its\n      acts, which thinks, wills, remembers, believes, loves, repents, and\n      hopes._\u201d\u2014MAHER, _op. cit._, p. 475. _Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7\n      180, pp. 363.\n\n  399 \u03a0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac, \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u1f76\u03bd, \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n      \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f22 \u1f41\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\u2014_Categ._ v. 1.\n\n  400 I _Sentent._, Dist. xxvi., q. 2, art. 1.\n\n  401 \u201cSicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio\n      rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum [ordination of concepts];\n      quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere. Uno modo secundum quod\n      iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei, quod\n      relative dicitur; et hujusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab\n      intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio\n      generis et speciei; has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando\n      ordinem ejus, quod est in intellectu ad res, quae sunt extra, vel\n      etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod\n      hujusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod\n      intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum\n      ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate\n      consequatur modum intelligendi. Et hujusmodi relationes intellectus\n      non attribuit ei, quod est in intellectu, sed ei, quod est in re. Et\n      hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se\n      ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligit ea\n      habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua\n      habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque\n      ordinabile ad aliud. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo\n      ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens; sicut cum\n      accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et\n      intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicit alterum esse prius\n      altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum\n      intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et\n      intelligit ea cum quodam ordine; sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem\n      sibi: et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero\n      accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est\n      ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo; sicut cum\n      dicit relationem accidere subjecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad\n      quodcumque aliud est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid\n      cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad\n      ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile\n      ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum.\u201d\u2014_De Potentia_, q. vii.,\n      art. 11; _cf._ _ibid._ art. 10.\n\n      \u201cCum relatio requirit duo extrema, tripliciter se habet ad hoc quod\n      sit res naturae aut rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est\n      res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest\n      esse inter aliqua nisi secundum apprehensionem intellectus tantum,\n      utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio\n      apprehendit bis aliquod unum statuit illud ut duo; et sic\n      apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est\n      de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens, quas format\n      ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem\n      est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut\n      genus, species, et hujusmodi....\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art.\n      7.\n\n_  402 Summa Theol._,1. q. xiii. art. 7. Elsewhere he points the\n      distinction in these terms: \u201cRespectus ad aliud aliquando est in\n      ipsa natura rerum, utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam\n      ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et ad invicem inclinationem habent; et\n      hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales.... Aliquando vero\n      respectus significatus per ea, quae dicuntur _Ad aliquid_, est\n      tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri; et\n      tunc est relatio rationis tantum, sicut cum comparat ratio hominem\n      animali, ut speciem ad genus.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, q. xxviii., art. 1.\n\n  403 St. Thomas gives expression to it in these sentences: \u201cPerfectio et\n      bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenduntur\n      secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum\n      ordinem unius rei ad aliam; sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus,\n      bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini comparat Philosophus\n      [Aristot., xii. (x.) _Metaph._, Comment. 52 _sqq._] ordinem\n      universi. Oportet, ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic\n      autem ordo relatio quaedam est.... Sic ergo oportet quod res\n      habentes ordinem ad aliquid, realiter referantur ad ipsum, et quod\n      in eis aliqua res sit relatio.\u201d\u2014_QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. vii.,\n      art. 9.\n\n_  404 Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, bk. i., Hauptst. ii., Abschn. ii., \u00a7\n      26.\n\n_  405 Logic_, bk. i., ch. iii., \u00a7 10.\n\n_  406 L\u2019Id\u00e9e du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne_, p. 181\u2014_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 173.\n\n  407 \u201cQuaedam vero relationes sunt quantum ad utrumque extremum res\n      naturae, quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum\n      aliquid realiter conveniens utrique; sicut patet de omnibus\n      relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum,\n      duplum et dimidium, et hujusmodi; nam quantitas est in utroque\n      extremorum: et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem\n      et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et\n      similia.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.\n\n  408 \u201cQuandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in\n      altero est res rationis tantum: et hoc contingit quandocunque duo\n      extrema non sunt unius ordinis; sicut sensus et scientia referuntur\n      ad sensibile et scibile; quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in\n      esse naturale existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et\n      intelligibilis. Et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio\n      realis, inquantum ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res\n      ipsae in se consideratae sunt extra ordinem hujusmodi; unde in eis\n      non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum, sed secundum\n      rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos\n      relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde Philosophus dicit in 5 Metaph.,\n      text. 20, quod non dicuntur relative, eo quod ipsa referantur ad\n      alia, sed quia alia referantur ad ipsa.\u201d\u2014_ibid._\n\n  409 Being really and adequately identical with its foundation, which is\n      the essence of its subject, this relation does not necessarily need\n      the _actual_ existence of its term. Thus actual knowledge or\n      science, which is a habit of the mind, has a transcendental relation\n      to its object even though this latter be not actual but only a pure\n      possibility. Similarly the accident of quantity sustained without\n      its connatural substance in the Eucharist, retains its\n      transcendental relation to the latter.\u2014_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7\n      335 (p. 997).\n\n_  410 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 336 (p. 990).\n\n_  411 Metaph._, L. v., ch. xv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _in loc._, lect. 17,\n      where, approving of this triple division, he writes: \u201cCum enim\n      relatio quae est in rebus, consistat in ordine unius rei ad aliam,\n      oportet tot modis hujusmodi relationes esse, quot modis contingit\n      unam rem ad aliam ordinari. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam, vel\n      secundum esse, prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia, et sic est\n      tertius modus. Vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam, secundum\n      quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid; et sic est\n      secundus modus. Vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest\n      mensurari per aliam; et sic est primus modus.\u201d\n\n_  412 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 175. For transcendental and\n      predicamental unity, _cf._ _supra_, \u00a7\u00a7 26, 28.\n\n_  413 Cf._ _infra_, p. 355. Some authors hold that the relation in\n      question is predicamental. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 987. The\n      nature or essence of any individual would seem to imply in its very\n      concept a transcendental relation of specific identity with all\n      other actual and possible individual embodiments of this essence.\n      The point is one of secondary importance.\n\n  414 Even virtually, though not formally. The creative act is not\n      formally transitive; it is virtually so: and in the creature it\n      grounds the latter\u2019s relation of real dependence on the Creator.\n\n  415 Cf. URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 336 (p. 989), \u00a7 341 (p. 1011); ST.\n      THOMAS, iii. _Sentent._, Dist., viii., q. i., art. 5.\n\n  416 MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 175.\n\n  417 MERCIER, _ibid._\n\n  418 \u201cCum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes\n      creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum et non e converso; manifestum est quod\n      creaturae realiter, referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est\n      aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem\n      tantum, inquantum creaturae referantur ad ipsum.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa\n      Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.\n\n  419 Among others Cajetan, Ferriariensis, Capreolus, Ba\u00f1ez, Joannes a St.\n      Thoma. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 338 (p. 994); MERCIER, _op.\n      cit._, \u00a7 174. It would be interesting to know how precisely those\n      authors conceived this \u201crelative\u201d entity, this \u201c_esse ad_\u201d as a\n      reality independent of their own thought-activity. _Cf._ art. by the\n      present writer in the _Irish Theological Quarterly_ (vol. vii.,\n      April, 1912: \u201cReflections on some Forms of Monism,\u201d pp. 167-8): \u201cThe\n      whole universe of direct experience displays a unity of order or\n      design which pervades it through and through; it is a revelation of\n      intelligent purpose. Now a _Cosmos_, an orderly universe\u2014which is\n      intelligible only as the expression of intelligent purpose, and not\n      otherwise\u2014is a system of _interrelated_ factors. But _relating_ is\n      unintelligible except as an expression of the activity of mind or\n      spirit, that is, of something at least analogous to our mental\n      activity of comparing and judging. Scholastic philosophers, as we\n      know, discuss the question whether or how far the exact object of\n      our \u2018relation\u2019 concept is real; that is, whether this object is, in\n      itself and apart from the terms related [and the foundation], a mere\n      _ens rationis_, a product of our thought, or whether it is in itself\n      something more than this; and some of them hold that there are\n      relations which, in themselves and formally as relations, _are_\n      something more than mere products of our thought. Now if there be\n      such relations, since they are not products of _our_ thought, we may\n      fairly ask: Must they be the product of _some_ thought? And from our\n      analysis of our very notion of what a relation is, it would seem\n      that they must be in some sort or other a product or expression of\n      some thought-activity: even relations between _material_ things. It\n      is in determining how precisely this is, or can be, that the theist\n      and the monist differ. The theist regards all material things, with\n      their real relations\u2014and all our finite human minds, which apprehend\n      the material world and its relations and themselves and one\n      another\u2014as being indeed in a true sense terms or objects of the\n      Thought of God; not, however, as therefore identical or\n      consubstantial with the Divine Spirit, but as distinct from It\n      though dependent on It: inasmuch as he holds the Divine Thought to\n      be creative, and regards all these things as its _created_ terms.\n      The kinship he detects between matter and spirit lies precisely in\n      this, that matter is for him a created term of the Divine Thought.\n      For him too, therefore, matter can have no existence except as a\n      term of thought\u2014the creative Thought of God.\u201d Not that \u201cthe\n      intelligible relations apprehended by us in matter are ... identical\n      in reality with the thought-activity of the Divine Mind,\u201d as\n      Ontologists have taught [_cf._ _supra_, 14, 18, 19]; nor that we can\n      directly infer the existence of a Supreme Spirit from the existence\n      of matter, as Berkeley tried to do by erroneously regarding the\n      latter merely as an essentially mind-dependent phenomenon; because\n      \u201cfor the orthodox theist matter is in its own proper nature not\n      spiritual, mental, psychical; not anything after the manner of a\n      thought-process, or endowed with the spirit-mode of being\u201d. If\n      predicamental relations, such as _quality_ or _similarity_ of\n      material things, are, as those medieval scholastics contended, real\n      entities, \u201crelative\u201d in their nature, and really distinct from their\n      extremes and foundations, did those scholastics conceive such\n      \u201crelative entities\u201d as essentially mind-dependent entities? If they\n      did they would probably have conceived them in the sense of\n      Berkeley, as created terms of the Divine Thought, rather than in the\n      Ontologist sense which would identify them with the Divine Thought\n      itself. But it is not likely that they conceived such relative\n      entities as essentially thought-dependent, any more than the\n      absolute material realities related to one another by means of these\n      relative entities. On the other hand it is not easy to see how such\n      relative entities can be anything more than mere products of some\n      thought-activity or other.\n\n  420 They rely especially on this text from the _De Potentia_ (q. vii.,\n      art. 9): \u201cRelatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta;\n      ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Secundum\n      ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra\n      animam sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et\n      secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim\n      praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res praeter animam existens. Nam\n      ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem\n      praedicamenta.... Si autem relatio non est in rebus extra animam non\n      poneretur _ad aliquid_ unum genus praedicamenti.\u201d\n\n_  421 Cf._ ST. ANSELM, _Monolog._, ch. xxvi.\n\n  422 \u201cRelatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa per quam una res\n      naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram.\u201d\u2014_Quodl._ 1, art. 2.\n\n  423 \u201cIn hoc differt _Ad Aliquid_ [_i.e._ Relation] ab aliis generibus;\n      quod alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent, quod aliquid sint,\n      sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas, aliquid ponit: et\n      similiter est de aliis. Sed _Ad Aliquid_ ex propria sui generis\n      ratione non habet, quod ponat aliquid, sed ad aliquid.... Habet\n      autem relatio quod sit aliquid reale ex eo, quod relationem\n      causat.\u201d\u2014_Quodl._ 9, art. 4. _Cf._ _De Potentia_, q. ii., art. 5.\n\n  424 \u201cRelatio est aliquid inhaerens _licet non ex hoc ipso quod est\n      relatio_.... Et ideo nihil prohibet, _quod esse desinat hujusmodi\n      accidens sine mutatione ejus in quo est_.\u201d\u2014_De Potentia_, q. vii.,\n      art. 9, ad. 7.\n\n  425 \u201cEt utroque modo contingit in realibus relationibus destrui\n      relationem: vel per destructionem quantitatis [or other foundation],\n      unde ad hanc mutationem quantitatis sequitur per accidens mutatio\n      relationis: vel etiam secundum quod cessat respectus ad alterum,\n      _remoto illo ad quod referebatur_; et tunc _relatio cessat, nulla\n      mutatione facta in ipsa_. Unde in illis in quibus non est relatio\n      nisi secundum hunc respectum, _veniunt et recedunt relationes sine\n      aliqua mutatione ejus, quod refertur_.\u201d\u2014In i. _Sent._, Dist. xxvi.,\n      q. ii., art. 1, ad. 3.\n\n  426 \u201cRelationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis rerum generibus, quia\n      ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent,\n      quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis, et\n      qualitates ex ratione qualitatis. Sed relationes non habent quod\n      sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum.... Sed relatio\n      habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa, per quam una res naturalem\n      ordinem habet ad alteram, qui quidem ordo naturalis et realis est\n      ipsis ipsa relatio.\u201d\u2014_Quodl._, 1, art. 2.\n\n_  427 Cf._ _supra_, p. 351, n. 1; in which context we may reasonably\n      suppose him to be arguing that relation _considered adequately_ is\n      not a _mere logical entity_, \u201cex secundis intellectibus,\u201d inasmuch\n      as, having _a real foundation_ in things outside the mind, it is in\n      this respect real, independently of our thought.\n\n_  428 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 341 (p. 1008).\n\n_  429 ibid._, p. 1007; _cf._ _supra_, p. 347.\n\n  430 In i. _Sentent._, Dist. iv., q. 1, art. 1, ad. 3.\n\n_  431 Cf._ URRABURU, _ibid._, pp. 1006-7: \u201cDeinde _nullam relationem esse\n      substantiam_ scripsit [S. Thomas] vel quia plerumque ratio fundandi\n      non est substantia ... vel potius quia semper relatio, etiam cum in\n      substantia fundatur, aliquid addit supra substantiam cujuslibet\n      extremi relati singillatim sumpti, quia non identificatur cum\n      fundamento prout se tenet ex parte solius subjecti, vel solius\n      termini, sed prout se tenet ea parte utriusque. Quare relatio ...\n      semper exprimit denominationem contingentem et accidentaliter\n      supervenientem subjecto, utpote quae adesse vel abesse potest, prout\n      adsit vel deficiat terminus.\u201d\n\n  432 \u201cIlli enim [the reference is to certain medieval idealists] quamvis\n      agnoscerent duo alba existentia negabant dari actu in rebus formalem\n      similaritatem [_i.e._ even after the comparative activity of\n      thought], sed formalem similitudinem, et aliam quamvis relationem,\n      reponebant in actu intellectus unum cum alio comparantis; nos vero\n      ante actum intellectus agnoscimus in rebus, quidquid sufficit ad\n      constituendam relationem similitudinis, diversitatis, paternitatis,\n      etc., ita ut hujusmodi denominationes non verificentur de actu\n      intellectus unum cum alio comparantis, sed plenam habeant in rebus\n      ipsis verificationem.\u201d\u2014URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 1010.\n\n  433 In what sense \u201cextramental\u201d?\u2014_Cf._ _supra_, p. 350, n. 1 (end).\n\n_  434 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 218. For the concepts of \u201ccause\u201d\n      and \u201ccausality\u201d in the inductive sciences, as well as for much that\n      cannot be repeated here, the student may consult with advantage vol.\n      ii., p. iv., ch. iii., iv. and vi. of the work referred to.\n\n  435 \u201cId a quo aliquid procedit quocunque modo.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa\n      Theol._, i., q. xxxiii., art. 1.\n\n  436 Hence Aristotle\u2019s definition of principle, including both logical\n      and real principles: \u03a0\u03b1\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n      \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f22 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\u2014_Metaph._ IV., ch. i.\n\n  437 A _cause_ must be prior _in nature_ to its effect, but not\n      necessarily prior _in time_. In fact the _action_ of the cause and\n      the _production_ of the effect must be simultaneous. _Cf._ _Science\n      of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 220. Considered formally as correlatives they are\n      _simul natura_. A _principle_ must likewise be in some sense _prior_\n      to what proceeds from it, not necessarily, however, by priority of\n      time, nor by priority of nature involving real dependence. The\n      Christian Revelation regarding the Blessed Trinity involves that the\n      First Divine Person is the \u201cprinciple\u201d from which the Second\n      proceeds, and the First and the Second the \u201cprinciple\u201d from which\n      the Third proceeds; yet here there is no dependence or inequality,\n      or any priority except the \u201crelation of origin\u201d be called priority.\n\n_  438 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 216.\n\n_  439 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7 16; ii., \u00a7\u00a7 214, 224 (p. 113).\n\n_  440 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 252.\n\n_  441 Cf._ _Physic._, Lib. ii., cap. 3; _Metaph._, Lib. i., cap. 3; v.,\n      cap. 2.\n\n_  442 i.e._ from the effect considered _formally_ as a term of the\n      activity; in the case of _immanent_ activity, as, _e.g._ thought or\n      volition, where the effect remains within the agent (as a _verbum\n      mentale_ or other mental term), uniting with the concrete reality of\n      the latter, the effect is not adequately distinct from the agent as\n      affected by this term or product.\n\n_  443 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _In Physic._, ii., lect. 10: \u201cNecesse est quatuor\n      esse causas: quia cum causa sit, ad quam sequitur esse alterius,\n      esse ejus quod habet causam potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo\n      absolute, et sic causa essendi est forma per quam aliquid est ens in\n      actu; alio modo secundum quod de potentia ente fit actu ens: et quia\n      omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per id quod est actu\n      ens, ex hoc necesse est esse duas alias causas, scilicet materiam,\n      et agentem quod reducit materiam de potentia in actum. Actio autem\n      agentis ad aliquod determinatum tendit, sicut ab aliquo determinato\n      principio procedit; nam omne agens agit quod est sibi conveniens. Id\n      autem ad quod intendit actio agentis dicitur causa finalis. Sic\n      igitur necesse est esse causas quatuor.\u201d\n\n_  444 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 247-8.\n\n  445 Certain medieval scholastics, especially of the Franciscan School,\n      regarded spiritual substances as having in their constitution a\n      certain potential, determinable principle, which they called\n      \u201c_materia_\u201d. St. Thomas, without objecting to the designation,\n      insisted that such potential principle cannot be the same as the\n      _materia prima_ of corporeal substances (_cf._ _De Substantis\n      Separatis_, ch. vii.).\n\n_  446 Cf._ ST. THOMAS: \u201cActio est actus activi _et passio est actus\n      passivi_\u201d (iii. _Physic._, l. 5); \u201c_Materia_ non fit _causa in actu_\n      nisi _secundum quod alteratur et mutatur_\u201d (i. _Contra Gentes_,\n      xvii.); \u201cMateria est causa formae, inquantum forma non est nisi in\n      materia\u201d (_De Princip. Naturae_).\n\n_  447 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _De Princip. Naturae_, _ibid._: \u201c... et similiter\n      forma est causa materiae, inquantum materia non habet esse in actu\n      nisi per formam; materia enim et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem;\n      dicuntur etiam relative ad compositum, sicut pars ad totum\u201d.\n\n  448 \u201cMateria cum sit infinitarum formarum determinatur per formam, et\n      per eam consequitur aliquam speciem.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._,\n      i., q. vii., art. 1.\n\n  449 To Special Metaphysics also belongs the controverted question\n      whether or not a plurality of really distinct substantial forms can\n      enter into the constitution of an individual corporeal substance.\n      When we classify corporeal things into _genera_ and _species_\n      according to their _natural kinds_ (_cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7\n      67), these latter are determined by the _formae substantiales_ of\n      the things classified, and are called _infim\u00e6 species_. Numerically\n      distinct individuals which have (conceptually) the same _forma\n      substantialis_, fall into the same _infima species_; while if such\n      individuals have (conceptually and numerically) distinct _formae\n      substanialis_ they fall into distinct _infimae species_ of some\n      higher common genus. The wider the generic concept the larger the\n      group of individuals which it unifies: it is a principle of\n      conceptual unity, _i.e._ of universality. The objects of our\n      _generic_, _differential_, and _specific_ concepts, throughout this\n      process of classification, are only virtually distinct metaphysical\n      grades of being in the individuals. Now if the _forma substantialis_\n      which yields the unifying concept of the _species infima_ for the\n      individuals, and the material principle which is the ground of the\n      numerical distinction between these latter, were likewise regarded\n      by the scholastics as being merely virtually distinct metaphysical\n      grades of being, in each individual, then the question of a\n      plurality of really distinct forms in one and the same individual\n      would have no meaning: all \u201cforms\u201d in the latter would be only\n      virtually distinct from one another and from the material principle.\n      But the scholastics did not conceive that the real ground for\n      grouping individuals into _species infimae_ was the same as that for\n      grouping these latter into wider genera. They regarded the relation\n      between the _forma substantialis_ and the _materia prima_ in the\n      individual as quite different from that between the generic and\n      specific grades of being in the individual (_cf._ _supra_, \u00a7 38;\n      _Science of Logic_, i., \u00a7 44; JOSEPH, _Introduction to Logic_, pp.\n      93-6). While they considered the latter a relation of virtual\n      distinction they held the former to be one of real distinction. And\n      while they recognized the concept of the _species infima_ to be a\n      principle of conceptual unity in grouping the individuals together\n      mentally, St. Thomas emphasized especially the r\u00f4le of the _forma\n      substantialis_ (on which that concept was founded) as a principle of\n      _real unity_ in the individual: \u201cAb eodam habet res _esse_ et\n      _unitatem_. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam.\n      Unde et per formam res habet unitatem\u201d (_Quodlib._ i., art. 6). If\n      we accept this doctrine of St. Thomas the arguments which he bases\n      on it against the possibility of a plurality of distinct substantial\n      forms in the same corporeal individual are unanswerable (_Cf._\n      MERCIER, _Ontologie_, \u00a7 215).\n\n  450 \u201cIdem actus secundum rem est duorum secundum diversam rationem:\n      agentis quidem, secundum quod est ab eo, patientis autem, secundum\n      quod est in ipso.... Ex eo quod actio et passio sunt unus motus non\n      sequitur quod actio et passio, vel doctio et doctrina, sint idem;\n      sed quod motus cui inest utrumque eorum, sit idem. Qui quidem motus\n      secundum unam rationem est actio, et secundum aliam rationem est\n      passio; alterum enim est secundum rationem esse actus hujus, ut _in\n      hoc_, et esse actus hujus, ut _ab hoc_; motus autem dicitur actio\n      secundum quod est actus agentis ut ab hoc; dicitur autem passio\n      secundum quod est actus patientis ut in hoc. Et sic patet quod licet\n      motus sit idem moventis et moti, propter hoc quod abstrahit ab\n      utraque ratione: tamen actio et passio differunt propter hoc quod\n      diversas rationes in sua significatione habent.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In\n      Phys._, iii. 1. 5.\n\n  451 \u201cSolet dubium esse apud quosdam, utrum motus sit in movente, aut in\n      mobili.... Sed manifestum est quod actus cujuslibet est in eo cujus\n      est actus; actus autem motus est in mobili, cum sit actus mobilis,\n      causatus tamen in eo a movente ... cum motus sit actus existentis in\n      potentia, sequitur quod motus non sit actus alicujus inquantum est\n      movens, sed inquantum est mobile.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, 1. 4.\n\n  452 Some languages mark the distinction between these two kinds of\n      action: \u201cDiffert autem _facere_ et _agere_: quia _factio_ est actio\n      transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare et\n      hujusmodi; _agere_ autem est actio permanenslin ipso agente sicut\n      videre, velle et hujusmodi.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._ iae iia, q.\n      lxvii., art. 4, c.\n\n  453 Hume went even farther, at least in language; for he alleged\n      (whether he really believed is another question) that he could\n      overcome the supposed merely psychological difficulty, that he could\n      easily\u2014and, presumably, without doing violence to his rational\n      nature\u2014conceive a non-existent thing as coming into existence\n      without a cause! He proclaimed that he could achieve the feat of\n      thinking what the universal voice of mankind has declared to be\n      unthinkable: _an absolute beginning of being from nothingness_. \u201cThe\n      knowledge of this relation (causality) is not,\u201d he writes, \u201cin any\n      instance attained by reasonings _a priori_; but arises entirely from\n      experience, when we find that any particular objects are _constantly\n      conjoined_ with each other \u201d(_Works_, ed. Green and Grose, iv., 24).\n      \u201cAll distinct ideas are separable from each other, and, as the ideas\n      of cause and effect are evidently distinct, \u2019twill be easy for us\n      (!) to conceive any object as nonexistent this moment, and existent\n      the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or\n      producing principle\u201d (_Treatise on Human Nature_, p. 381). On this\n      argument (?) even such an ardent admirer of the pan-phenomenist as\n      Huxley was, is forced to remark that \u201cit is of the circular sort,\n      for the major premise, that all distinct ideas are separable in\n      thought, assumes the question at issue\u201d (HUXLEY\u2019S _Hume_, p. 122).\n\n  454 Thus, for instance, man, elevated by sanctifying grace, can perform\n      acts which merit the supernatural reward of the Beatific Vision.\n\n_  455 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 231.\n\n_  456 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, ii., cap. 2.\n\n_  457 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7 392 (p. 1123): \u201cUnde adaequata virtus\n      instrumentalis videtur conflari ex naturali instrumenti virtute vel\n      efficacitate et ex virtute causae principalis sibi transeunter\n      addita, docente S. Thoma: _Instrumentum virtutem instrumentalem\n      acquirit dupliciter scilicet quando accipit formam instrumenti et\n      quando movetur a principali agente ad effectum_ (_Summa Theol._,\n      iii., q. xix., art. 3, ad. 2).\u201d\n\n  458 \u201cAd aliquem effectum aliquid operatur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut per\n      se agens; et dicitur per se agere quod agit per aliquam formam sibi\n      inhaerentem per modum naturae completae, sive habeat illam formam a\n      se, sive ab alio.... Alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem\n      instrumentaliter, quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam\n      sibi inhaerentem, sed solum inquantum est motum a per se agente.\n      Haec est ratio instrumenti, inquantum est instrumentum, ut moveat\n      motum; unde sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem, ita se\n      habet motus, quo movetur a principale agente, ad instrumentum, sicut\n      serra operatur ad scamnum. Quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam\n      actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, ut dividere;\n      tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit, nisi inquantum\n      est mota ab artifice, scilicet facere rectam incisionem, et\n      convenientem formae artis: et sic instrumentum habet duas\n      operationes; unam quae competit ei secundam rationem propriam; aliam\n      quae competit ei secundam quod est motum a per se agente, quae\n      transcendit virtutem propriae formae.\u201d\u2014_De Veritate_, q. xxvii.,\n      art. 4. It is not clear, however, that St. Thomas regarded these two\n      \u201c_operationes_\u201d of the instrumental cause as really distinct, for he\n      says that it acts as an instrument (_i.e._ modifies the efficiency\n      of the principal cause) only by exercising its own proper function:\n      \u201cOmne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis\n      per aliquam operationem propriam, et connaturalem sibi, sicut calor\n      naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur\n      ad factionem scamni secando\u201d (_Contra Gentes_, ii., ch. xxi.): from\n      which he goes on to argue that no creature can act even as an\n      instrumental cause _in creating_.\u2014_Cf._ iv. _Sent._, Dist. i., q.\n      i., art. 4, sol. 2.\u2014_De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7.\u2014_Summa Theol._,\n      iii., q. lxii., art. 1, ad. 2.\n\n  459 St. Thomas, proving the necessity of the Divine _concursus_ for all\n      created causes, illustrates the general distinction between a\n      _principal_ and an _instrumental_ cause: \u201cVirtus naturalis quae est\n      rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis _ut quaedem\n      forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura_. Sed id quod a Deo fit\n      in re naturali, quo actualiter agat, est ut intentio sola, habens\n      esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo ... virtus artis [est] in\n      instrumento artificis. Sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit\n      acumen, ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit\n      quod _vis artis_ esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens, _nisi\n      haberet intellectum_; ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus\n      propria, ut forma in ipsa permanens, non autem _vis qua agit ad\n      esse_ ut instrumentum primae causae, _nisi daretur ei quod esset\n      universale essendi principium_; nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri\n      potuit ut moveret seipsam, nec ut conservaret se in esse: unde sicut\n      patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod\n      operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit\n      quod operaretur absque operatione divina.\u201d\u2014_QQ. DD. De. Pot._, q.\n      iii., art. 7.\n\n_  460 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xix.\u2014MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., ch.\n      i. \u00a7 2.\n\n  461 For a fuller treatment of this whole subject, _cf._ _Science of\n      Logic_, ii., Part iv., chs. iii., iv.; Part v., ch. i.\u2014MAHER,\n      _Psychology_, ch. xix., pp. 423-4.\n\n_  462 Cf._ NEWMAN, _Grammar of Assent_, Part i., ch. iv., \u00a7 1 (5), (6); \u00a7\n      2, remark 1.\n\n_  463 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7\u00a7 216, 218, 219.\n\n_  464 ibid._, \u00a7 216.\n\n_  465 ibid._, \u00a7 220.\n\n_  466 Introduction to Logic_, pp. 64-5.\n\n_  467 Cf._ what was said above (32) about the causal or extrinsic, as\n      distinct from the intrinsic, principle of individuation.\n\n  468 \u201cWhenever science tries to find the cause not of a particular event,\n      such as the French Revolution (whose cause must be as unique as that\n      event itself is), but of an event of a kind, such as consumption, or\n      commercial crises, it looks in the last resort for a _commensurate_\n      cause. What is that exact state or condition of the body, given\n      which it must and without which it cannot be in consumption? What\n      are those conditions in a commercial community, given which there\n      must and without which there cannot be a commercial crisis?\u201d\u2014JOSEPH,\n      _op. cit._, p. 65. _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 221.\n\n_  469 System of Logic_, iii., v., \u00a7 2.\n\n  470 For instance: (_a_) The \u201contological\u201d or \u201ctrue\u201d cause, which\n      \u201cactually produces\u201d the effect, need not necessarily be the\n      \u201cultimate\u201d cause of the latter. (_b_) A \u201cphysical fact\u201d can be the\n      cause of another in the sense of being the invariable antecedent (or\n      _physical_ cause) of the latter, but not \u201cin that sense alone\u201d; it\n      may also be an _efficient_ cause of the latter by exerting an active\n      influence on the happening of this latter. (_c_) Whether or not\n      efficiency is \u201ca mysterious and most powerful tie,\u201d at any rate it\n      does exist between \u201cphysical facts\u201d in the universe. (_d_) Its\n      analysis reveals not a \u201csupposed necessity of ascending ... to ...\n      the true cause, ... which ... produces the effect,\u201d as if the\n      proximate causes did not also truly produce the latter; but a real\n      necessity of ascending to a First Cause as the source and support\n      and complement of the real efficiency of these proximate causes.\n      (_e_) A merely _logical_ theory of Induction does not indeed demand\n      any inquiry either into the efficiency of natural agencies, or into\n      the nature and grounds of the \u201cinvariability\u201d or \u201cnecessity\u201d or\n      \u201claw\u201d whereby these are connected with their effects. But a\n      _philosophical_ theory of Induction does imply such inquiries. And\n      here phenomenist writers like Mill have laid themselves open to two\n      accusations. For while professing merely to abstract from the\n      problem of _efficiency_ they have tried equivalently to deny its\n      existence by proclaiming it superfluous and insoluble, besides\n      consciously or unconsciously misrepresenting it. And similarly, in\n      dealing with the _invariability_ of causal sequences in the\n      universe, with the _necessary_ character of its physical laws, they\n      have misconceived this necessity as being mechanical, fatal,\n      absolutely inviolable; and have wrongly proclaimed its ultimate\n      grounds to be unknowable (Agnosticism). Cf. _infra_, \u00a7 104; _Science\n      of Logic_, ii., Part IV., chs. iii., iv., and v.; Part V., ch. i.\n      Thus, while eschewing the genuine Metaphysics, which seeks the real\n      nature and causes of the world of our experience, as superfluous and\n      futile, they have substituted for it a masked and spurious\n      metaphysics which they have wrongly fathered on Physical Science: a\n      mass of more or less superficial speculations which have not even\n      the merit of consistency. No philosopher, starting with their views\n      on the nature of the human mind, can consistently claim for the\n      latter any really valid or reliable knowledge of _laws_, any more\n      than of causes. For the knowledge of a _law_, even as a\n      _generalized_ fact, is a knowledge that claims to pass beyond the\n      limits of the individual\u2019s present and remembered experiences. But\n      there can be no rational justification, whether psychological or\n      ontological, for the certain reliability of such a step, in the\n      philosophy which logically reduces all certain knowledge to the mere\n      awareness of a flow of successive sensations supposed to constitute\n      the total content of the individual consciousness and the total\n      reality of human experience.\n\n_  471 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii., pp. 368-70.\u2014MERCIER, _op.\n      cit._, \u00a7 229.\n\n  472 \u201cWhen an _effort_ of attention combines two ideas, when one billiard\n      ball moves another, when a steam hammer flattens out a lump of solid\n      iron, when a blow on the head knocks a man down, in all these cases\n      there is something more than, and essentially different from, the\n      mere _sequence_ of two phenomena: there is _effective force_\u2014_causal\n      action_ of an agent endowed with _real energy_.\u201d\u2014MAHER, _op. cit._,\n      _ibid._, p. 370.\n\n_  473 Grammar of Assent_, p. 66.\n\n_  474 Cf._ DOMET DE VORGES, _Cause efficiente et cause finale_, p. 39.\n      Volitional activity is no doubt the most prominent type of efficient\n      causality in our mental life. But it is not the only type; we have\n      direct conscious experience of intellectual effort, of the work of\n      the imagination, of the exercise of organic and muscular energy.\n      There is no warrant therefore for conceiving all efficient power or\n      energy, after the model of will-power, as Newman among others\n      appears to have done when he wrote in these terms: \u201cStarting, then,\n      from experience, I consider a cause to be an effective will: and by\n      the doctrine of causation, I mean the notion, or first principle,\n      that all things come of effective will\u201d (_ibid._, p. 68). No doubt,\n      all things do come ultimately from the effective will of God. This,\n      however, is not a first principle, but a remote philosophical\n      conclusion.\n\n_  475 ibid._, p. 66.\n\n  476 ST. THOMAS, _QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7, in c.\n\n  477 \u201cNulla res per seipsam movet vel agit, nisi sit movens non motum....\n      Et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota ... et hoc non\n      cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum, sequitur de necessitate quod\n      Deus sit causa actionis cujuslibet rei naturalis, ut movens et\n      applicans virtutem ad agendum.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q.\n      iii., art. 7.\n\n  478 This is the principle repeatedly expressed by ST. THOMAS: \u201cUnde\n      quarto modo unum est causa alterius, sicut principale agens est\n      causa actionis instrumenti: et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere, quod\n      Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis. Quanto enim aliqua\n      causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, tanto\n      profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum\n      reducit in actum. In qualibet autem re naturali invenimus _quod est\n      ens_ et quod est res naturalis, et quod est talis vel talis naturae.\n      Quorum primum est commune omnibus entibus; secundum omnibus rebus\n      naturalibus; tertium in una specie; et quartum, si addamus\n      accidentia, est proprium huic individuo. Hoc ergo individuum agendo\n      non potest constituere aliud in simili specie, nisi prout est\n      instrumentum illius causae _quae respicit totam speciem_ et ulterius\n      _totum esse_ naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit in\n      speciem in istis inferioribus ... nec aliquid agit _ad esse_ nisi\n      per virtutem Dei. _Ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus,\n      primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo\n      competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus_: unde etiam, ut\n      dicitur in _Lib. de Causis_ (prop. 9), intelligentia non dat esse,\n      nisi prout est in ea virtus divina. Sic ergo Deus est causa omnis\n      actionis prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinae virtutis\n      operantis.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. iii. art 7.\u2014_Cf._\n      _supra_, 99 (_c_), p. 375, n. 2.\n\n  479 Why, then, is a finite cause not capable of acting uninterruptedly?\n      why are its powers, forces, energies, fatigued, lessened, exhausted\n      by exercise? Simply because its action is proportionate to its\n      powers, and these to its _finite_ nature.\n\n  480 \u201cCreatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum.\n      Nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter\n      nunc et prius.... Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota\n      substantia rei, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc\n      et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si intelligatur\n      aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. Sed cum actio\n      et passio conveniant in una substantia motus, et differant solum\n      secundum habitudines diveras ... oportet quod subtracto motu, non\n      remaneant nisi diversae habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia\n      modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi ... creatio\n      significatur per modum mutationis; et propter hoc dicitur quod\n      creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere; quamvis facere et fieri magis\n      in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari; quia facere et fieri\n      important habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed\n      mutationem ex consequenti.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xlv.,\n      art. 2, ad. 2.\n\n  481 \u201cRemoto motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis\n      [effectus] secundum quod [effectus] a causa aliqua procedit.\u201d\u2014_op.\n      cit._, i. q. xli., art. 1, ad 2.\n\n  482 The act of the will is, of course, virtually transitive when it\n      wills or determines bodily movements.\u2014_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_,\n      chs. x., xxiii. (pp. 517-24).\n\n  483 At the same time it must be noted that organic vital activity is\n      transitive in the sense that no part or member of the organism acts\n      upon itself, but only on other parts, in the production of the\n      local, quantitative and qualitative changes involved in nutrition.\n      It is subject to the inductively established law which seems to\n      regulate all _corporeal_ action: that all such action involves\n      _reaction_ of the _patiens_ on the _agens_. Mental activity is\n      outside this law. Cognitive and appetitive faculties do not react on\n      the objects which reduce these faculties to act, thus arousing their\n      immanent activity.\u2014_Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 227.\n\n_  484 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._\n\n_  485 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, chs. xiii. and xiv.\n\n_  486 Cf._ URRABURU: \u201cVel, si mavis, dic causam efficientem esse causam,\n      a qua fit aliquid, vel a quo proprie oritur actio, intelligendo per\n      actionem emanationem et fluxum ac dependentiam effectus a\n      causa.\u201d\u2014_op. cit._, \u00a7 389 (p. 1112).\n\n_  487 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 229: \u201cL\u2019action, l\u2019efficience, qu\u2019est\n      elle, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Est-ce une sorte d\u2019\u00e9coulement de la\n      cause dans l\u2019effet? \u00c9videmment non. Lorsque nous voulons nous \u00e9lever\n      \u00e0 une conception m\u00e9taphysique, nous nous raccrochons \u00e0 une image\n      sensible, et nous nous persuadons volontiers, que la nettet\u00e9 de la\n      premi\u00e8re r\u00e9pond \u00e0 la facilit\u00e9 avec laquelle nous nous figurons la\n      seconde. Il faut se d\u00e9fier de cette illusion. Puisque l\u2019action, m\u00eame\n      corporelle, ne modifie point l\u2019agent, la causalit\u00e9 efficiente ne\n      peut consister dans un influx physique, qui passerait de la cause\n      dans l\u2019effet.\u201d\n\n_  488 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7\u00a7 228-9.\n\n  489 We might add this other fact: that _all_ kinds of corporeal activity\n      and change (11) seem to involve _motion_ or local change. This does\n      not prove that they all _are_ motion or local change. The\n      significance of the fact lies probably in this, that local motion is\n      necessary for procuring and continuing physical contact between the\n      interacting physical agencies.\u2014_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, \u00a7\u00a7 227-9.\n\n_  490 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iii., 69.\n\n  491 \u201cUne cause v\u00e9ritable est une cause, entre laquelle et son effet\n      l\u2019esprit aper\u00e7oit une liaison n\u00e9cessaire: c\u2019est ainsi que je\n      l\u2019entendes. [This is ambiguous.] Or il n\u2019y a que l\u2019\u00eatre infiniment\n      parfait entre la volont\u00e9 duquel et les effets l\u2019esprit aper\u00e7oive une\n      liaison n\u00e9cessaire. Il n\u2019y a donc que Dieu qui soit v\u00e9ritable cause,\n      et il semble m\u00eame qu\u2019il y ait contradiction \u00e0 dire que les hommes\n      puissent l\u2019\u00eatre\u201d\u2014_De la r\u00e9cherche de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9_, Liv. 6me, 2e\n      partie, ch. iii.\n\n  492 \u201cSi l\u2019on vient \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer attentivement l\u2019id\u00e9e que l\u2019on a de cause\n      ou de puissance d\u2019agir, on ne peut en douter que cette id\u00e9e ne\n      pr\u00e9sente quelque chose de divin.\u201d\u2014_ibid._\n\n  493 \u201cIl n\u2019y a point d\u2019homme qui sache seulement ce qu\u2019il faut faire pour\n      remuer un de ses doigts par le moyen des esprits animaux.\u201d\u2014_ibid._\n\n  494 \u201cJ\u2019ai toujours soutenue que l\u2019\u00e2me \u00e9tait l\u2019unique cause de ses actes,\n      c\u2019est \u00e0 dire de ses d\u00e9terminations libres ou de ses actes bons ou\n      mauvais.... J\u2019ai toujours soutenu que l\u2019\u00e2me \u00e9tait active, mais que\n      ses actes ne produisaient rien de physique.\u201d\u2014_R\u00e9flexions sur la\n      pr\u00e9motion physique_. \u201cJe crois que la volont\u00e9 est une _puissance\n      active_, qu\u2019elle a un v\u00e9ritable pouvoir de se d\u00e9terminer; mais son\n      action est _immanente_; c\u2019est une action qui ne produit rien par son\n      efficace propre, pas m\u00eame le mouvement de son bras.\u201d\u2014_R\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la\n      3__me__ lettre d\u2019Arnauld_.\n\n_  495 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 230-2; ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (45);\n      URRABURU, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 393 _sqq._\n\n  496 We may reasonably ask the occasionalist to suppose for the moment\n      that we are efficient causes of our mental processes and to tell us\n      what better proof of it could he demand, or what better proof could\n      be forthcoming, than this proof from consciousness.\n\n  497 MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. x., p. 220.\n\n  498 Should anyone doubt that consciousness does testify to this fact, we\n      may prove it inductively from the constant correlation between the\n      mental state and the bodily movement: \u201cI will to move my arm, it\n      moves; I will that it remain at rest, it does not move; I will that\n      its movement be more or less strong and rapid, the strength and\n      rapidity vary with the determination of my will. What more complete\n      inductive proof can we have of the efficiency of our will-action on\n      the external world?\u201d\u2014MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 231.\n\n  499 \u201cSi effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum, sed solum\n      ex actione Dei, impossibile est quod per effectus manifestetur\n      virtus alicujus causae creatae: non enim effectus ostendit virtutem\n      causae nisi ratione actionis, quae a virtute procedens ad effectum\n      terminatur. Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum, nisi\n      inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus, quae naturam consequitur. Si\n      igitur res creatae non habent actiones ad producendum effectum,\n      sequitur, quod nunquam naturam alicujus rei creatae poterit cognosci\n      per effectum; et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiae\n      naturalis, in qua praecipuae demonstrationes per effectum\n      sequuntur.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, L. iii., cap. 69.\n\n  500 \u201cJe demeure d\u2019accord que la foi oblige \u00e0 croire qu\u2019il y a des corps;\n      mais, pour l\u2019\u00e9vidence, il me semble qu\u2019elle n\u2019est point enti\u00e8re, et\n      que nous ne sommes point invinciblement port\u00e9s \u00e0 croire qu\u2019il y ait\n      quelqu\u2019autre chose que Dieu et notre esprit.\u201d\u2014_R\u00e9cherche de la\n      v\u00e9rite_, 6me \u00e9claircissement.\n\n_  501 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 217.\n\n_  502 Metaph._, v., 17.\n\n  503 \u201cQuaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem\n      sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod\n      bonum particulare.... Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens\n      dicitur appetitus _sensitivus_. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum\n      cum cognitione qua cognoscant ipsam boni rationem; et haec\n      inclinatio dicitur _voluntas_.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q.\n      xlix., art. 1.\n\n  504 \u201cSicut influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae\n      finalis est appeti et desiderari.\u201d\u2014_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art. 2.\n\n  505 In its modern usage the term \u201cintention\u201d is inseparable from the\n      notion of _conscious_ direction. The scholastics used the term\n      \u201c_intentio_\u201d in a _wider_ and _deeper_ sense to connote the natural\n      tendency of all created agencies towards their natural activities\n      and lines of development. And in unconscious agencies they did not\n      hesitate to refer to it as \u201c_intentio naturae_\u201d or \u201c_appetitus\n      naturalis_\u201d.\n\n  506 \u201cRes naturalis per _formam_ qua perficitur in sua specie, habet\n      inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per\n      operationes consequitur; quale enim unumquodque est, talia operatur,\n      et in sibi convenientia tendit.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iv.,\n      19.\n\n      \u201cOmnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode.\n      Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem\n      absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata; et talis\n      inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._,\n      i., q. xlix., art. 1.\n\n  507 \u201cCausa efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem, quia efficiens\n      est principium motus, finis autem terminus. Et similiter materia et\n      forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit. Est igitur\n      efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est\n      causa finis quantum ad esse, quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens\n      ad hoc, quod _sit_ finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non\n      quantum ad esse sed quantum ad _rationem causalitatis_. Nam\n      efficiens est causa in quantum agit; non autem agit nisi causa\n      [gratia] finis. Unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens.\u201d\u2014ST.\n      THOMAS, _In Metaph._, v., 2.\n\n      \u201cSciendum quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in\n      causalitate tamen est prior semper, unde dicitur _causa causarum_,\n      quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa\n      causalitatis efficientis, ut jam dictum est. Efficiens autem est\n      causa causalitatis et materiae et formae.\u201d\u2014_ibid._, lect. 3.\n\n  508 \u03a6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f76\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f20\u03c1\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1ff7 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\n      \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2. Natura est principium\n      quoddam et causa cur id moveatur et quiescat, in quo inest primum,\n      per se et non secundum accidens.\u2014_Physic._, L. ii., cap. 1.\n\n  509 \u201cArs nihil aliud est quam recta ratio aliquorum operum\n      faciendorum.\u201d\u2014_Summa Theol._ ia iiae, q. lvii., art. 3.\u2014_Cf._ _In\n      Post. Anal._, l. 1.\n\n  510 \u201cNatura nihil aliud est quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae,\n      indita rebus qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum; sicut si\n      artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere quod ex seipsis\n      moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.\u201d\u2014_In II Phys._, lect. 14.\n\n      \u201cOmnia naturalia, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata,\n      habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cujus\n      eorum inclinatio naturalis est, _ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et\n      non solum ducantur in fines debitos_.\u201d\u2014_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art.\n      7.\n\n  511 \u201cIn nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre, nisi quia\n      natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium\n      extrinsicum. Si enim ars factiva navis esset intrinseca ligno, facta\n      fuisset navis a natura, sicut modo fit ab arte.\u201d\u2014_In II. Phys._,\n      lect. 13.\n\n_  512 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7 217.\n\n_  513 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii, \u00a7 227.\n\n_  514 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7\u00a7 226-31.\n\n  515 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, iv., ch. v.\n\n_  516 Physic._, ii., ch. v.\n\n_  517 ibid._\n\n_  518 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7\u00a7 264, 268-9.\n\n  519 \u039f\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f64\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f21 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\u2014_De Coelo_, ii., 8.\n\n  520 Fatalism is the view that all things happen by a blind, inevitable,\n      eternally foredoomed and unintelligible necessity. Thus SENECA\n      (_Nat. Quaest._, L. III., cap. 36) describes _fatum_ as _necessitas\n      omnium rerum actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat_. This _necessitas\n      ineluctabilis_ is totally different from the conditional physical\n      necessity of the course of Nature dependently on the _Fiat_ of a\n      Supreme Free Will guided by Supreme Intelligence (_Cf._ _Science of\n      Logic_, \u00a7\u00a7 224, 249, 253, 257). If the necessity of actual\n      occurrences is not ultimately traceable to the _Fiat_ of an\n      Intelligent Will\u2014and mechanists deny that it can be so traced\u2014it is\n      rightly described as fatalistic, blind, purposeless, unintelligible.\n\n_  521 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 259, 260.\n\n  522 \u201cExpliquer par une rencontre fortuite, la convergence d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ments,\n      dont chacun a sa pouss\u00e9e propre, c\u2019est rendre raison de la\n      _convergence_ par des principes de _divergence_.... Il est donc\n      contradictoire d\u2019attribuer au hasard la raison explicative de\n      l\u2019ordre.\u201d\u2014MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7 260.\n\n_  523 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., \u00a7\u00a7 224, 250, and _passim_.\n\n  524 \u201cSimiliter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in\n      natura: unde si artificialia, ut domus, fierent a natura, hoc ordine\n      fierent, quo nunc fiunt per artem: scilicet prius institueretur\n      fundamentum, et postea erigerentur parietes, et ultimo supponeretur\n      tectum.... Et similiter si ea quae fiunt a natura fierent ab arte,\n      hoc modo fierent sicut apta nata sunt fieri a natura; ut patet in\n      sanitate, quam contigit fieri, et ab arte et a natura.... Unde\n      manifestum est quod in natura est alterum propter alterum, scilicet\n      priora propter posteriora, sicut et in arte.\u201d\u2014ST. THOMAS, _In II.\n      Phys._, lect. 13.\u2014_Cf._ _supra_, p. 417, n. 3.\n\n  525 \u201cOrdo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens\n      dispositio.\u201d\u2014_De Civ. Dei_, xix., 13.\n\n_  526 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, \u00a7\u00a7 257-61.\n\n  527 \u201c_La convergence de causes indiff\u00e9rentes qui r\u00e9alisent d\u2019une mani\u00e8re\n      harmonieuse et persistante un m\u00eame objet ordonn\u00e9, ne s\u2019explique\n      point par des coincidences fortuites; elle r\u00e9clame un principe\n      interne de convergence._\u201d\u2014_Ibid._, \u00a7 260.\n\n  528 TENNYSON, _In Memoriam_, lvi.\n\n  529 BROWNING, _A Soul\u2019s Tragedy_, Act. 1.\n\n  530 \u201cUniversum habet bonum ordinis et bonum separatum.\u201d\u2014_In Metaph._,\n      xii., l. 12.\n\n  531 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, xi., 10. Does Aristotle teach that God moves\n      the universe only as its Final Cause, as the Supreme Good towards\n      which it tends, or also as Efficient Cause? His thought is here\n      obscure, and has given rise to much controversy among his\n      interpreters.\n\n  532 \u1f29 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u1f01\u03c5\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n      \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\u2014_Ibid._,\n      xi., 8.\n\n  533 \u039a\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 (\u03bf\u1f50 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1) \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9.\u2014_ibid._,\n      7.\n\n  534 \u201cTotus ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet\n      explicetur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et\n      voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet quod a primo movente sit\n      tota ordinatio universi.\u201d\u2014_Ibid._, xii., l. 12.\n\n  535 ... Among themselves all things\n      Have order; and from hence the form, which makes\n      The universe resemble God. In this\n      The higher creatures see the printed steps\n      Of that eternal worth, which is the end\n      Whither the line is drawn. All natures lean\n      In this their order, diversely, some more,\n      Some less approaching to their primal source.\n      Thus they to different havens are moved on\n      Through the vast sea of being, and each one\n      With instinct giv\u2019n, that bears it in its course;\n      This to the lunar sphere directs the fire,\n      This prompts the hearts of mortal animals,\n      This the brute earth together knits and binds.\n      Nor only creatures, void of intellect,\n      Are aim\u2019d at by this bow; but even those\n      That have intelligence and love, are pierced.\n      That Providence, who so well orders all,\n      With her own light makes ever calm the heaven,\n      In which the substance that hath greatest speed\n      Is turned: and thither now, as to our seat\n      Predestin\u2019d, we are carried by the force\n      Of that strong cord, that never looses dart,\n      But at fair aim and glad ...\n\n      \u2014DANTE, _Paradiso_, Cant. i. (tr. by CARY).\n\n\n\n\n\n<pre id=\"pg-footer\">","title":"Ontology, or the Theory of Being","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":198178}