{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_35958/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_35958","id":"gutenberg_35958","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/35958","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will","Free will and determinism"],"text":"</pre>\n\n\n\nProduced by Keith G Richardson\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA REVIEW OF EDWARDS'S\n\n\"INQUIRY\n\nINTO THE\n\nFREEDOM OF THE WILL.\"\n\n\nCONTAINING\n\nI. STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.\n\nII. THE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SYSTEM.\n\nIII. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING WILL.\n\nBY HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN.\n\n\"I am afraid that Edwards's book (however well meant,) has done much\nharm in England, as it has secured a favourable hearing to the same\ndoctrines, which, since the time of Clarke, had been generally ranked\namong the most dangerous errors of Hobbes and his disciples.\"--_Dugald\nStewart_.\n\n\nNEW-YORK:\n\nJOHN S. TAYLOR,\n\nTHEOLOGICAL PUBLISHER AND BOOKSELLER, BRICK CHURCH CHAPEL,\n\n1839.\n\n\n\n\nEntered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1839, by HENRY\nPHILIP TAPPAN, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United\nStates, for the Southern District of New-York.\n\nG. F. Hopkins, Printer, 2 Ann-street.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nDiscussions respecting the will, have, unhappily, been confounded with\ntheological opinions, and hence have led to theological controversies,\nwhere predilections for a particular school or sect, have generally\nprejudged the conclusions of philosophy. As a part of the mental\nconstitution, the will must be subjected to the legitimate methods of\npsychological investigation, and must abide the result. If we enter the\nfield of human consciousness in the free, fearless, and honest spirit of\nBaconian observation in order to arrive at the laws of the reason or the\nimagination, what should prevent us from pursuing the same enlightened\ncourse in reference to the will?\n\nIs it because responsibility and the duties of morality and religion are\nmore immediately connected with the will? This, indeed, throws solemnity\naround our investigations, and warns us of caution; but, at the same\ntime, so far from repressing investigation, it affords the highest\nreason why we should press it to the utmost limit of consciousness.\nNothing surely can serve more to fix our impressions of moral\nobligation, or to open our eye to the imperishable truth and excellency\nof religion, than a clear and ripe knowledge of that which makes us the\nsubjects of duty. As a believer in philosophy, I claim unbounded liberty\nof thought, and by thinking I hope to arrive at truth. As a believer in\nthe Bible I always anticipate that the truths to which philosophy leads\nme, will harmonize with its facts and doctrines. If in the result there\nshould appear to be a collision, it imposes upon me the duty of\nre-examining both my philosophy and my interpretation of the text. In\nthis way I may in the end remove the difficulty, and not only so, but\neven gain from the temporary and apparent collision, a deeper insight\ninto both philosophy and religion. If the difficulty cannot be removed,\nthen it remains a vexed point. It does not follow, however, that I must\neither renounce the philosophical conclusion, or remove the text.\n\nIf the whole of philosophy or its leading truths were in opposition to\nthe whole of revelation or its leading truths, we should then evidently\nbe placed on the alternative of denying one or the other; but as the\ndenial of philosophy would be the destruction of reason, there would no\nlonger remain in our being any principle on which a revelation could be\nreceived. Such a collision would therefore disprove the claims of any\nsystem to be from Heaven. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that\nwith every advance of philosophy the facts of the Bible are borne aloft,\nand their divine authority and their truth made more manifest, have we\nnot reason to bless the researches which have enabled us to perceive\nmore clearly the light from Heaven? A system of truth does not fear, it\ncourts philosophical scrutiny. Its excellency will be most resplendent\nwhen it has had the most fiery trial of thought. Nothing would so weaken\nmy faith in the Bible as the fact of being compelled to tremble for its\nsafety whenever I claimed and exercised the prerogative of reason. And\nwhat I say of it as a whole, I say of doctrines claiming to be derived\nfrom it.\n\nTheologists are liable to impose upon themselves when they argue from\nthe truths of the Bible to the truths of their philosophy; either under\nthe view that the last are deducible from the former, or that they serve\nto account for and confirm the former. How often is their philosophy\ndrawn from some other source, or handed down by old authority, and\nrendered venerable by associations arbitrary and accidental; and instead\nof sustaining the simplicity of the Bible, the doctrine is perhaps cast\ninto the mould of the philosophy.\n\nIt is a maxim commended by reason and confirmed by experience, that in\npursuing our investigations in any particular science we are to confine\nourselves rigorously to its subjects and methods, neither seeking nor\nfearing collision with any other science. We may feel confident that\nultimately science will be found to link with science, forming a\nuniversal and harmonious system of truth; but this can by no means form\nthe principle of our particular investigations. The application of this\nmaxim is no less just and necessary where a philosophy or science holds\na relation to revelation. It is a matter of the highest interest that in\nthe developements of such philosophy or science, it should be found to\nharmonize with the revelation; but nevertheless this cannot be received\nas the principle on which we shall aim to develope it. If there is a\nharmony, it must be discovered; it cannot be invented and made.\n\nThe Cardinals determined upon the authority of Scripture, as they\nimagined, what the science of astronomy must be, and compelled the old\nman Gallileo to give the lie to his reason; and since then, the science\nof geology has been attempted, if not to be settled, at least to be\nlimited in its researches in the same way. Science, however, has pursued\nher steady course resistlessly, settling her own bounds and methods, and\nselecting her own fields, and giving to the world her own discoveries.\nAnd is the truth of the Bible unsettled? No. The memory of Gallileo and\nof Cuvier is blessed by the same lips which name the name of Christ.\n\nNow we ask the same independence of research in the philosophy of the\nhuman mind, and no less with respect to the Will than with respect to\nany other faculty. We wish to make this purely a psychological question.\nLet us not ask what philosophy is demanded by Calvinism in opposition to\nPelagianism and Arminianism, or by the latter in opposition to the\nformer; let us ask simply for the laws of our being. In the end we may\npresent another instance of truth honestly and fearlessly sought in the\nlegitimate exercise of our natural reason, harmonizing with truths\nrevealed.\n\nOne thing is certain; the Bible no more professes to be a system of\nformal mental philosophy, than it professes to contain the sciences of\nastronomy and geology. If mental philosophy is given there, it is given\nin facts of history, individual and national, in poetry, prophecy, law,\nand ethics; and as thus given, must be collected into a system by\nobservation and philosophical criticism.\n\nBut observations upon these external facts could not possibly be made\nindependently of observations upon internal facts--the facts of the\nconsciousness; and the principles of philosophical criticism can be\nobtained only in the same way. To him who looks not within himself,\npoetry, history, law, ethics, and the distinctions of character and\nconduct, would necessarily be unintelligible. No one therefore can\nsearch the Bible for its philosophy, who has not already read philosophy\nin his own being. We shall find this amply confirmed in the whole\nhistory of theological opinion. Every interpreter of the Bible, every\nauthor of a creed, every founder of a sect, plainly enough reveals both\nthe principles of his philosophy and their influence upon himself. Every\nman who reflects and aims to explain, is necessarily a philosopher, and\nhas his philosophy. Instead therefore of professing to oppose the Bible\nto philosophy, or instead of the pretence of deducing our philosophy\nsolely and directly from the Bible, let us openly declare that we do not\ndiscard philosophy, but seek it in its own native fields; and that\ninasmuch as it has a being and a use, and is related to all that we know\nand do, we are therefore determined to pursue it in a pure, truth-loving\nspirit.\n\nI am aware, however, that the doctrine of the will is so intimately\nassociated with great and venerable names, and has so long worn a\ntheological complexion, that it is well nigh impossible to disintegrate\nit. The authority of great and good men, and theological interests, even\nwhen we are disposed to be candid, impartial, and independent, do often\ninsensibly influence our reasonings.\n\nIt is out of respect to these old associations and prejudices, and from\nthe wish to avoid all unnecessary strangeness of manner in handling an\nold subject, and more than all, to meet what are regarded by many as the\nweightiest and most conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open\nthis discussion with a review of \"Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of\nthe Will.\" There is no work of higher authority among those who deny the\nself-determining power of the will; and none which on this subject has\ncalled forth more general admiration for acuteness of thought and\nlogical subtlety. I believe there is a prevailing impression that\nEdwards must be fairly met in order to make any advance in an opposite\nargument. I propose no less than this attempt, presumptuous though it\nmay seem, yet honest and made for truth's sake. Truth is greater and\nmore venerable than the names of great and venerable men, or of great\nand venerable sects: and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a\nproper love and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself\nalone, neither asking the authority of men in her support, nor fearing a\ncollision with them, however great their authority may be. It is my\ninterest to think and believe aright, no less than to act aright; and as\nright action is meritorious not when compelled and accidental, but when\nfree and made under the perception and conviction of right principles;\nso also right thinking and believing are meritorious, either in an\nintellectual or moral point of view, when thinking and believing are\nsomething more than gulping down dogmas because Austin, or Calvin, or\nArminius, presents the cup.\n\nFacts of history or of description are legitimately received on\ntestimony, but truths of our moral and spiritual being can be received\nonly on the evidence of consciousness, unless the testimony be from God\nhimself; and even in this case we expect that the testimony, although it\nmay transcend consciousness, shall not contradict it. The internal\nevidence of the Bible under the highest point of view, lies in this:\nthat although there be revelations of that which transcends\nconsciousness, yet wherever the truths come within the sphere of\nconsciousness, there is a perfect harmony between the decisions of\ndeveloped reason and the revelation.\n\nNow in the application of these principles, if Edwards have given us a\ntrue psychology in relation to the will, we have the means of knowing\nit. In the consciousness, and in the consciousness alone, can a doctrine\nof the will be ultimately and adequately tested. Nor must we be\nintimidated from making this test by the assumption that the theory of\nEdwards alone sustains moral responsibility and evangelical religion.\nMoral responsibility and evangelical religion, if sustained and\nillustrated by philosophy, must take a philosophy which has already on\nits own grounds proved itself a true philosophy. Moral responsibility\nand evangelical religion can derive no support from a philosophy which\nthey are taken first to prove.\n\nBut although I intend to conduct my argument rigidly on psychological\nprinciples, I shall endeavour in the end to show that moral\nresponsibility is really sustained by this exposition of the will; and\nthat I have not, to say the least, weakened one of the supports of\nevangelical religion, nor shorn it of one of its glories.\n\nThe plan of my undertaking embraces the following particulars:\n\nI. A statement of Edwards's system.\n\nII. The legitimate consequences of this system.\n\nIII. An examination of the arguments against a self-determining will.\n\nIV. The doctrine of the will determined by an appeal to consciousness.\n\nV. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral agency and\nresponsibility.\n\nVI. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the truths and precepts of\nthe Bible.\n\nThe first three complete the review of Edwards, and make up the present\nvolume. Another volume is in the course of preparation.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nA STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.\n\nEdwards's System, or, in other words, his Philosophy of the Will, is\ncontained in part I. of his \"Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.\" This\npart comprises five sections, which I shall give with their titles in\nhis own order. My object is to arrive at truth. I shall therefore use my\nbest endeavours to make this statement with the utmost clearness and\nfairness. In this part of my work, my chief anxiety is to have Edwards\nperfectly understood. My quotations are made from the edition published\nby S. Converse, New-York, 1829.\n\n\"Sec. I.--Concerning the Nature of the Will.\"\n\nEdwards under this title gives his definition of the will. \"_The will\nis, that by which the mind chooses anything_. The faculty of the _will_,\nis that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing:\nan act of the _will_ is the same as an act of _choosing_ or _choice_.\"\n(p. 15.)\n\nHe then identifies \"choosing\" and \"refusing:\" \"In every act of refusal\nthe mind chooses the absence of the thing refused.\" (p. 16.)\n\nThe will is thus _the faculty of choice_. Choice manifests itself either\nin relation to one object or several objects. Where there is but one\nobject, its possession or non-possession--its enjoyment or\nnon-enjoyment--its presence or absence, is chosen. Where there are\nseveral objects, and they are so incompatible that the possession,\nenjoyment, or presence of one, involves the refusal of the others, then\nchoice manifests itself in fixing upon the particular object to be\nretained, and the objects to be set aside.\n\nThis definition is given on the ground that any object being regarded as\npositive, may be contrasted with its negative: and that therefore the\nrefusing a negative is equivalent to choosing a positive; and the\nchoosing a negative, equivalent to refusing a positive, and vice versa.\nThus if the presence of an object be taken as positive, its absence is\nnegative. To refuse the presence is therefore to choose the absence; and\nto choose the presence, to refuse the absence: so that every act of\nchoosing involves refusing, and every act of refusing involves choosing;\nin other words, they are equivalents.\n\n_Object of Will._\n\nThe object in respect to which the energy of choice is manifested,\ninducing external action, or the action of any other faculty of the\nmind, is always an _immediate object_. Although other objects may appear\ndesirable, that alone is the object of choice which is the occasion of\npresent action--that alone is chosen as the subject of thought on which\nI actually think--that alone is chosen as the object of muscular\nexertion respecting which muscular exertion is made. That is, every act\nof choice manifests itself by producing some change or effect in some\nother part of our being. \"The thing next chosen or preferred, when a man\nwills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would\nbe, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order\nto it.\" The same principle applies to any mental exertion.\n\n_Will and Desire._\n\nEdwards never opposes will and desire. The only distinction that can\npossibly be made is that of genus and species. They are the same in\n_kind_. \"I do not suppose that _will_ and _desire_ are words of\nprecisely the same signification: _will_ seems to be a word of a more\ngeneral signification, extending to things present and absent. _Desire_\nrespects something absent. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely\ndistinct that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man\nnever, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or\ndesires anything contrary to his will. The thing which he wills, the\nvery same he desires; and he does not will a thing and desire the\n_contrary_ in any particular.\" (p. 17.) The immediate object of\nwill,--that object, in respect of which choice manifests itself by\nproducing effects,--is also the object of desire; that is, of supreme\ndesire, at that moment: so that, the object chosen is the object which\nappears most desirable; and the object which appears most desirable is\nalways the object chosen. To produce an act of choice, therefore, we\nhave only to awaken a preponderating desire. Now it is plain, that\ndesire cannot be distinguished from passion. That which we love, we\ndesire to be present, to possess, to enjoy: that which we hate, we\ndesire to be absent, or to be affected in some way. The loving an\nobject, and the desiring its enjoyment, are identical: the hating it,\nand desiring its absence or destruction, or any similar affection of it,\nare likewise identical. The will, therefore, is not to be distinguished,\nat least in _kind_, from the emotions and passions: this will appear\nabundantly as we proceed. In other works he expressly identifies them:\n\"I humbly conceive, that the affections of the soul are not properly\ndistinguishable from the will; as though they were two faculties of\nsoul.\" (Revival of Religion in New England, part I.)\n\n\"God has endued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is\ncapable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and\nviews, and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The\nother faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and\nview things, but is in some way inclined with respect to the things it\nviews or considers; either is inclined _to them_, or is disinclined or\naverse _from them_. This faculty is called by various names: it is\nsometimes called _inclination_; and as it has respect to the actions\nthat are determined or governed by it, is called will. The _will_ and\nthe _affections_ of the soul are not two faculties: the affections are\nnot essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere\nactings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the\nliveliness and sensibleness of exercise.\" (The Nature of the Affections,\npart I.) That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the\nunderstanding and the will, as well as identifies the will and the\npassions, is fully settled by the above quotation.\n\n\"Sec. II.--Concerning the Determination of Will.\"\n\n_Meaning of the term._\n\n\"By _determining_ the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must\nbe intended, _causing_ that the act of the will or choice should be thus\nand not otherwise; and the will is said to be determined, when in\nconsequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and\nfixed upon, some particular object. As when we speak of the\ndetermination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in\nsuch a direction, rather than in another. The determination of the will\nsupposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be determined,\nthere is a determiner.\"\n\nNow the causation of choice and the determination of the will are here\nintended to be distinguished, no more than the causation of motion and\nthe determination of the moving body. The cause setting a body in\nmotion, likewise gives it a direction; and where there are several\ncauses, a composition of the forces takes place, and determines both the\nextent and direction of the motion. So also the cause acting upon the\nwill or the faculty of choice, in producing a choice determines its\ndirection; indeed, choice cannot be conceived of, without also\nconceiving of something chosen, and where something is chosen, the\ndirection of the choice is determined, that is, the will is determined.\nAnd where there are several causes acting upon the will, there is here\nlikewise a composition of the mental forces, and the choice or the\ndetermination of the will takes place accordingly. (See p. 23.) Choice\nor volition then being an effect must have a cause. What is this cause?\n\n_Motive._\n\nThe cause of volition or choice is called motive. A cause setting a body\nin motion is properly called the motive of the body; hence, analogously,\na cause exciting the will to choice is called the motive of the will. By\nlong usage the proper sense of motive is laid aside, and it has come now\nto express only the cause or reason of volition. \"By _motive_ I mean the\nwhole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition,\nwhether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly. And when I\nspeak of the _strongest motive_, I have respect to the strength of the\nwhole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that\nbe the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.\" And \"_that\nmotive which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest,\ndetermines the will_.\" (p. 19.) This is general, and means nothing more\nthan--1. the cause of volition is called motive; 2. that where there are\nseveral causes or motives of volition, the strongest cause prevails; 3.\nthe cause is often complex; 4. in estimating the strength of the cause,\nif it be complex, all the particulars must be considered in their\nco-operation; and, 5. the strength of the motive \"stands in view of the\nmind,\" that is, it is something which the mind knows or is sensible of.\n\n_What constitutes the strength of Motive?_\n\n\"Everything that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement,\nto a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of _tendency_\nor _advantage_ to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to\nthe act of will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I\ncall the _strength_ of the motive.\" When different objects are presented\nto the mind, they awaken certain emotions, and appear more or less\n\"inviting.\" (p. 20.) In the impression thus at once produced, we\nperceive their \"tendency or advantage to move or excite the will.\" It is\na preference or choice anticipated, an instantaneous perception of a\nquality in the object which we feel would determine our choice, if we\nwere called upon to make a choice. The object is felt to be adapted to\nthe state of the mind, and the state of the mind to the object. They are\nfelt to be reciprocal.\n\n_What is this quality which makes up the previous tendency?_\n\n\"Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary\nagent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or\nchoice, is considered or viewed _as good_; nor has it any tendency to\nengage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears\nsuch.\" Now, as the will is determined by the strongest motive; and as\nthe strength of motive lies in the previous tendency; and as the\nprevious tendency is made up of the quality of goodness; and as the\nhighest degree of this quality in any given case makes the strongest\nmotive; therefore, it follows that the \"_will is always as the greatest\napparent good is_.\" (p. 20.)\n\n_The sense in which the term_ \"good\" _is used._\n\n\"I use the term _'good'_ as of the same import with _'agreeable.'_ To\nappear _good_ to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to\n_appear agreeable_, or _seem pleasing_ to the mind. If it tends to draw\nthe inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of that\nwhich _suits_ the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest\ntendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's\nview, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense is the\ngreatest apparent good. The word _good_ in this sense includes the\navoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy.\" (p. 20.)\n\nIt follows then that the will is always determined by that which _seems\nmost pleasing or appears most agreeable_ to the mind.\n\nThis conclusion is in perfect accordance with the position with which\nEdwards set out: that will is always as the preponderating desire;\nindeed, that the will is the same in kind with desire, or with the\naffections; and an act of will or choice, nothing more than the\nstrongest desire in reference to an immediate object, and a desire\nproducing an effect in our mental or physical being. The determination\nof will is the strongest excitement of passion. That which determines\nwill is the cause of passion. The strength of the cause lies in its\nperceived tendency to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As\npossessing this tendency, it is called _good_, or _pleasing_, or\n_agreeable_; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the condition of\nthe affections.\n\nThe _\"good\"_ which forms the characteristic of a cause or motive is an\nimmediate good, or a good \"in the present view of the mind.\" (p. 21.)\nThus a drunkard, before he drinks, may be supposed to weigh against each\nother the present pleasure of drinking and the remote painful\nconsequences; and the painful consequences may appear to him to be\ngreater than the present pleasure. But still the question truly in his\nmind, when he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only;\nand if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. \"If he wills to\ndrink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his will; and\ndrinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him,\nand suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the\nimmediate object of his will, and is most pleasing to him.\" The\nreasoning is, that when the drunkard drinks, we are not to conclude that\nhe has chosen future misery over future good, but that the act of\ndrinking, in itself, is the object of choice; so that, in the view he\nhas taken of it, it is to him the greatest apparent good. In general we\nmay say, in accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of\nchoice takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in\nsuch a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind; it is at the moment,\nand in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent good. The man thus\nnever chooses what is disagreeable, but always what is agreeable to him.\n\n_Proper use of the term_ most agreeable, _in relation to the Will._\n\n\"I have chosen rather to express myself thus, _that the will always is\nas the greatest apparent good_, or _as what appears most agreeable_,\nthan to say the will is _determined by_ the greatest apparent good, or\nby what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the\nmind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict\npropriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that\nthe _voluntary action_, which is the immediate _consequence_ of the\nmind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than\nthe choice itself.\" (p. 21, 22.) Here _the perception or sense of the\nmost agreeable_ is identified in express terms with _volition_ or\n_choice_. \"The will is as the most agreeable,\"--that is, _the\ndetermination of will_, which means _its actual choice_, as a fact of\nthe consciousness is embraced in the _sense of the most agreeable;_ and\nas the _voluntary action_, or the action, or change, or effect,\nfollowing volition, in any part of our being,--as to walk, or talk, or\nread, or think,--has its cause in the volition, or the \"mind's\nchoice,\"--so it is entirely proper to say, either that this voluntary\naction is determined by the volition or that it is determined by the\nsense of the most agreeable. Edwards's meaning plainly is, that the\nterms are convertible: volition may be called the cause of voluntary\naction, or the sense of the most agreeable may be called the cause. This\nis still a carrying out of the position, that _the will is as the\ndesire_. \"The greatest apparent good\" being identical with \"the most\nagreeable,\" and this again being identical with _the most desirable_, it\nmust follow, that whenever, in relation to any object, the mind is\naffected with _the sense of the most agreeable_, it presents the\nphenomenon of \"volition\" or \"choice;\" and still farther, that which is\nchosen is the most agreeable object; and is known to be such by the\nsimple fact that it is chosen; for its being chosen, means nothing more\nthan that it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable,--and\nthe most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than\nchosen; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more than that it is\nthe object of the mind's choice or sense of the most agreeable. The\nobject, and the mind regarded as a sensitive or willing power, are\ncorrelatives, and choice is the unition of both: so that if we regard\nchoice as characterizing the object, then the object is affirmed to be\nthe most agreeable; and if, on the other side, we regard choice as\ncharacterizing the mind, then the mind is affirmed to be affected with\nthe sense of the most agreeable.\n\n_Cause of Choice, or of the sense of the most agreeable._\n\n\"Volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's\nview of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say _in\nor about the mind's view of the object;_ because what has influence to\nrender an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the\nobject viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the _state and\ncircumstances_ of the mind that views.\" (p. 22.)\n\nChoice being the unition of the mind's sensitivity and the object,--that\nis, being an affection of the sensitivity, by reason of its perfect\nagreement and correlation with the object, and of course of the perfect\nagreement and correlation of the object with the sensitivity, in\ndetermining the cause of choice, we must necessarily look both to the\nmind and the object. Edwards accordingly gives several particulars in\nrelation to each.\n\nI. In relation to the object, the sense of the most agreeable, or\nchoice, will depend upon,--\n\n1. The beauty of the object, \"viewing it as it is _in itself_,\"\nindependently of circumstances.\n\n2. \"The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or\n_the consequence_ of it,\" or the object taken with its \"concomitants\"\nand consequences.\n\n3. \"The apparent _state_ of the pleasure or trouble that appears with\nrespect to _distance of time_. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the\nmind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed.\"\n(p. 22.)\n\nII. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness will depend, first,\nupon the _manner_ of the mind's view; secondly, upon the state of mind.\nEdwards, under the first, speaks of the object as connected with future\npleasure. Here the manner of the mind's view will have influence in two\nrespects:\n\n1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind judges to attach to the\npleasure;\n\n2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the imagination, which the mind\nhas of it.\n\nNow these may be in different degrees, compounded with different degrees\nof pleasure, considered in itself; and \"the agreeableness of a proposed\nobject of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree\nof good supposed by the judgement, the degree of apparent probability or\ncertainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the\nmind has of that good.\" (p. 23.)\n\nSecondly: In reference to objects generally, whether connected with\npresent or future pleasure, the sense of agreeableness will depend also\nupon \"the _state of the mind_ which views a proposed object of choice.\"\n(p. 24.) Here we have to consider \"the particular temper which the mind\nhas by nature, or that has been introduced or established by education,\nexample, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the\nmind is in on a particular occasion.\" (ibid.)\n\nEdwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary to consider the _state\nof the mind_ as a ground of agreeableness distinct from the two already\nmentioned: viz.--the _nature and circumstances of the object_, and the\n_manner of the view_. \"Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter,\" he\nremarks, \"the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration\nas to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, than as it makes\nthe objects themselves appear differently; _beautiful_ or _deformed_,\nhaving apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the\n_manner_ of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or\ndeformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.\" (ibid.)\nIn this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind and\nobject to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of the two,\nchoice is. The _state of the mind_ is manifested only in relation to\n_the nature and circumstances of the object;_ and the sense of\nagreeableness being in the correlation of the two, _the sense of the\nmost agreeable_ or _choice_ is such a perfect unition of the two, that,\nhaving described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation\nto _the most agreeable_, we have comprehended in this the _state of\nmind_. On the other hand, the nature and circumstances of the object, in\nrelation to the most agreeable, can be known only by the state of mind\nproduced by the presence of the object and its circumstances. To give an\nexample,--let a rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and\nagreeableness of this object, I describe the _state of mind_ in relation\nto it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the\nsensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in philosophical\nlanguage, called the _secondary_ qualities of the object: and so, on the\nother hand, if I describe my sensations and emotions in the presence of\nthe rose, I do in fact describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind\nand object are thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not\nhave this sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object\nis presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they seem\nto melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of the most\nagreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. The only\ndifference between the agreeable simply and the most agreeable is this:\nthe agreeable refers merely to an emotion awakened on the immediate\npresentation of an object, without any comparison or competition. The\nmost agreeable takes place where there is comparison and competition.\nThus, to prefer or choose a rose above a violet is a sense of the most\nagreeable of the two. In some cases, however, that which is refused is\npositively disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these\ncases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every instance\nof choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating the act of\nchoosing itself in the contrast of positive and negative, the phrase\n_most agreeable_ or _greatest apparent good_ is convenient for general\nuse, and sufficiently precise to express every case which comes up.\n\nIt may be well here to remark, that in the system we are thus\nendeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word _choice_ is properly\nused to express the action of will, when that action is viewed in\nrelation to its immediate effects,--as when I say, I choose to walk.\n_The sense of the most agreeable_, is properly used to express the same\naction, when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice\nand volition are the words in common use, because men at large only\nthink of choice and volition in reference to effects. But when the cause\nof choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, and is supposed to lie\nin the nature and circumstances of mind and object, then the _sense of\nthe most agreeable_ becomes the most appropriate form of expression.\n\nEdwards concludes his discussion of the cause of the most agreeable, by\nremarking: \"However, I think so much is certain,--that volition, in no\none instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest\napparent good is, in the manner which has been explained.\" This is the\ngreat principle of his system; and, a few sentences after, he states it\nas an axiom, or a generally admitted truth: \"There is scarcely a plainer\nand more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than\nthat when men act voluntarily and do what they please, then they do what\nsuits them best, or what is most agreeable to them.\" Indeed, Edwards\ncannot be considered as having attempted to prove this; he has only\nexplained it, and therefore it is only the _explanation_ of a supposed\naxiom that we have been following out.\n\nThis supposed axiom is really announced in the first section: \"Will and\ndesire do not run counter at all: the thing which he wills, the very\nsame he desires;\" that is, a man wills as he desires, and of course\nwills what is most agreeable to him. It is to be noticed, also, that the\ntitle of part I. runs as follows: \"Wherein are explained and stated\nvarious terms and things, &c.\" Receiving it, therefore, as a generally\nadmitted truth, \"that choice or volition is always as the most\nagreeable,\" and is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, what is\nthe explanation given?\n\n1. That will, or the faculty of choice, is not a faculty distinct from\nthe affections or passions, or that part of our being which philosophers\nsometimes call the sensitivity.\n\n2. That volition, or choice, or preference, being at any given moment\nand under any given circumstances the strongest inclination, or the\nstrongest affection and desire with regard to an immediate object,\nappears in the constitution of our being as the antecedent of effects in\nthe mind itself, or in the body; which effects are called voluntary\nactions,--as acts of attention, or of talking, or walking.\n\n3. To say that volition is as the desire, is equivalent to saying that\nvolition is as the \"greatest apparent good,\" which again means only the\nmost agreeable,--so that the volition becomes again the _sense or\nfeeling of the greatest apparent good_. There is in all this only a\nvariety of expressions for the same affection of the sensitivity.\n\n4. Determination of will is actual choice, or the production in the mind\nof volition, or choice, or the strongest affection, or the sense of the\nmost agreeable, or of the greatest apparent good. It is therefore an\neffect, and must have a determiner or cause.\n\n5. This determiner or cause is called motive. In explaining what\nconstitutes the motive, we must take into view both _mind_ and _object_.\nThe object must be perceived by the mind as something existent. This\nperception, however, is only preliminary, or a mere introduction of the\nobject to the mind. Now, in order that the sense of the most agreeable,\nor choice, may take place, the mind and object must be suited to each\nother; they must be correlatives. The object must possess qualities of\nbeauty and agreeableness to the mind. The mind must possess a\nsusceptibility agreeable to the qualities of the object. But to say that\nthe object possesses qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind,\nis in fact to affirm that the mind has the requisite susceptibility; for\nthese qualities of the object have a being, and are what they are only\nin relation to mind. Choice, or the sense of agreeableness, may\ntherefore be called the unition of the sensitivity and the object.\nChoice is thus, like any emotion or passion, a fact perpetually\nappearing in the consciousness; and, like emotion or passion; and,\nindeed, being a mere form of emotion and passion, must ultimately be\naccounted for by referring it to the constitution of our being. But\ninasmuch as the constitution of our being manifests itself in relation\nto objects and circumstances, we do commonly account for its\nmanifestations by referring them to the objects and circumstances in\nconnexion with which they take place, and without which they would not\ntake place; and thus, as we say, the cause of passion is the object of\npassion: so we say also, in common parlance, the cause of choice is the\nobject of choice; and assigning the affections of the mind springing up\nin the presence of the object, to the object, as descriptive of its\nqualities, we say that choice is always as the most beautiful and\nagreeable; that is, as the greatest apparent good. This greatest\napparent good, thus _objectively_ described, is the motive, or\ndeterminer, or cause of volition.\n\n_In what sense the Will follows the last dictate of the Understanding._\n\n\"It appears from these things, that in some sense _the will always\nfollows the last dictate of the understanding_. But then the\nunderstanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole\nfaculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called\n_reason_ or _judgement_. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant\nwhat reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness,\ntaking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always\nfollows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason\nis quite a different matter from things appearing now most _agreeable_,\nall things being put together which relates to the mind's present\nperceptions in any respect.\" (p. 25.) The \"large sense\" in which Edwards\ntakes the understanding, embraces the whole intellectual and sensitive\nbeing. In the production of choice, or the sense of the most agreeable,\nthe suggestions of reason may have their influence, and may work in with\nother particulars to bring about the result; but then they are subject\nto the same condition with the other particulars,--they must appear, at\nthe moment and in the immediate circumstances, the most agreeable. It is\nnot enough that they come from reason, and are true and right; they must\nlikewise _suit the state of the mind_,--for as choice is the sense of\nthe most agreeable, that only as an object can tend to awaken this\nsense, which is properly and agreeably related to the feelings of the\nsubject. Where the suggestions of reason are not agreeably related, \"the\nact of the will is determined in opposition to it.\" (ibid.)\n\n\"Sec. III.--Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity,\nImpossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence.\"\n\nAfter having settled his definition of choice or volition, and explained\nthe cause of the same, Edwards takes up the nature of the connexion\nbetween this cause and effect: viz. motive and volition. Is this\nconnexion a necessary connexion?\n\nIn order to determine this point, and to explain his view of it, he\nproceeds to discuss the meaning of the terms contained in the above\ntitle. This section is entirely occupied with this preliminary\ndiscussion.\n\nEdwards makes two kinds of necessity: 1. Necessity as understood in the\ncommon or vulgar use; 2. Necessity as understood in the philosophical or\nmetaphysical use.\n\n1. In common use, _necessity_ \"is a relative term, and relates to some\nsupposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition\nis overcome or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. The word\n_impossible_ is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to\nsupposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient\nfor the effect. The word _unable_ is relative, and has relation to\nability, or endeavour, which is insufficient. The word _irresistible_ is\nrelative, and has reference to resistance which is made, or may be made,\nto some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to\nwithstand the power or hinder the effect. The common notion of necessity\nand impossibility implies _something that frustrates endeavour or\ndesire_.\"\n\nHe then distinguishes this necessity into _general and particular_.\n\"Things are necessary _in general_, which are or will be,\nnotwithstanding any supposable opposition, from whatever quarter:\" e. g.\nthat God will judge the world.\n\n\"Things are necessary _to us_ which are or will be, notwithstanding all\nopposition supposable in the case _from us_.\" This is _particular_\nnecessity: e. g. any event which I cannot hinder. In the discussions\n\"about liberty and moral agency,\" the word is used especially in a\nparticular sense, because we are concerned in these discussions _as\nindividuals_.\n\nAccording to this _common use_ of necessity in the _particular_ sense,\n\"When we speak of any thing necessary _to us_, it is with relation to\nsome supposable opposition _to our wills;_\" and \"a thing is said to be\nnecessary\" in this sense \"when we cannot help it, do what _we will_.\" So\nalso a thing is said to be _impossible to us_ when we cannot do it,\nalthough we make the attempt,--that is, put forth the volition; and\n_irresistible to us_, which, when we put forth a volition to hinder it,\novercomes the opposition: and we are _unable_ to do a thing \"when our\nsupposable desires and endeavours are insufficient,\"--are not followed\nby any effect. In the common or vulgar use of these terms, we are not\nconsidering volition in relation to its own cause; but we are\nconsidering volition as itself a cause in relation to its own effects:\ne. g. suppose a question be raised, whether a certain man can raise a\ncertain weight,--if it be affirmed that it is _impossible_ for him to\nraise it, that he has not the _ability_ to raise it, and that the weight\nwill _necessarily_ keep its position,--no reference whatever is made to\nthe production of a volition or choice to raise it, but solely to the\nconnexion between the _volition_ and the _raising of the weight_. Now\nEdwards remarks, that this common use of the term necessity and its\ncognates being habitual, is likely to enter into and confound our\nreasonings on subjects where it is inadmissible from the nature of the\ncase. We must therefore be careful to discriminate. (p. 27.)\n\n2. In metaphysical or philosophical use, necessity is not a _relative_,\nbut an _absolute term_. In this use necessity applies \"in cases wherein\nno insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed; but the very\nnature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or\nendeavour.\" (ibid.) Thus it is used \"with respect to God's existence\nbefore the creation of the world, when there was no other being.\"\n\"_Metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ necessity is nothing different from\ncertainty,--not the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty of things\nin themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of knowledge, or\nthat wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition\nwhich affirms them. Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than\nthe full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the subject\nand predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true; and\nin this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when\nI endeavour to prove _that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty_.\"\n(p. 27, 28, 29.)\n\n\"The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence\nof something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion, in several\nways.\"\n\n\"1. They, may have a full and perfect connexion _in and of themselves_.\nSo God's infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is\nnecessary, _in its own nature_, that two and two should be four.\"\n\n2. The subject and predicate of a proposition, affirming the existence\nof something which is already come to pass, are fixed and certain.\n\n3. The subject and predicate of a proposition may be fixed and certain\n_consequentially_,--and so the existence of the things affirmed may be\n\"consequentially necessary.\" \"Things which are _perfectly connected_\nwith the things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a\nnecessity of consequence.\" This is logical necessity.\n\n\"And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which\nwill hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are\nnecessary only in this last way,\"--that is, \"by a connexion with\nsomething that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already\nis or has been. This is the necessity which especially belongs to\ncontroversies about acts of the will.\" (p. 30.)\n\nPhilosophical necessity is _general_ and _particular._ 1. \"The existence\nof a thing may be said to be necessary with a _general_ necessity, when\nall things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of its\nexistence.\" This is unconditional necessity in the strictest sense.\n\n2. _Particular_ necessity refers to \"things that happen to particular\npersons, in the existence of which, no will of theirs has any concern,\nat least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not with\nregard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard\nto any volition of theirs at that time, as they prevent all acts of the\nwill about the affair.\" (p. 31.) This particular necessity is absolute\nto the individual, because his will has nothing to do with it--whether\nit be absolute or not in the general sense, does not affect his case.\n\n\"What has been said to show the meaning of terms _necessary_ and\n_necessity_, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms\n_impossible_ and _impossibility_. For there is no difference, but only\nthe latter are negative and the former positive.\" (ibid.)\n\n_Inability and Unable._\n\n\"It has been observed that these terms in their original and common use,\nhave relation to will and endeavour, as supposable in the case.\" That is\nhave relation to the connexion of volition with effects. \"But as these\nterms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on\ncontroversies about free will, they are used in a quite different and\nfar more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will\nor endeavour for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be\nsupposed:\" e. g. The connexion between volitions and their causes or\nmotives.\n\n_Contingent and Contingency._\n\n\"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or\naccident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with\nits causes or antecedents, according to the established course of\nthings, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing.\nBut the word, contingent, is abundantly used in a very different sense;\nnot for that, whose connexion with the series of things we cannot\ndiscern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has\nabsolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has\nany fixed connexion.\" (p. 31. 32.)\n\nContingency and chance Edwards uses as equivalent terms. In common use,\ncontingency and chance are relative to our knowledge--implying that we\ndiscern no cause. In another use,--the use of a certain philosophical\nschool,--he affirms that contingency is used to express absolutely no\ncause; or, that some events are represented as existing without any\ncause or ground of their existence. This will be examined in its proper\nplace. I am now only stating Edwards's opinions, not discussing them.\n\nSec. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessary and\nInability.\n\nWe now return to the question:--Is the connexion between motive and\nvolition necessary?\n\nThe term necessary, in its common or vulgar use, does not relate to this\nquestion, for in that use as we have seen, it refers to the connexion\nbetween volition considered as a cause, and its effects. In this\nquestion, we are considering volition as an effect in relation to its\ncause or the motive. If the connexion then of motive and volition be\nnecessary, it must be necessary in the philosophical or metaphysical\nsense of the term. Now this philosophical necessity Edwards does hold to\ncharacterize the connexion of motive and volition. This section opens\nwith the following distinction of philosophical necessity: \"That\nnecessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible\nconnexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a\nproposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is\ndistinguished into _moral_ and _natural_ necessity.\" He then\nappropriates _moral philosophical necessity_ to express the nature of\nthe connexion between motive and volition: \"And sometimes by moral\nnecessity is meant that necessity of connexion and _consequence_ which\narises from _moral causes_, as the strength of inclination, or motives,\nand the connexion which there is in many cases between these, and such\ncertain volitions and actions. And it is in _this_ sense that I use the\nphrase _moral necessity_ in the following discourse.\" (p. 32.) Natural\n_philosophical_ necessity as distinguished from this, he employs to\ncharacterize the connexion between natural causes and phenomena of our\nbeing, as the connexion of external objects with our various sensations,\nand the connexion between truth and our assent or belief. (p. 33.)\n\nIn employing the term _moral_, however, he does not intend to intimate\nthat it affects at all the absoluteness of the necessity which it\ndistinguishes; on the contrary, he affirms that \"moral necessity may be\nas absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as\nperfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect\nis with its natural cause. It must be allowed that there may be such a\nthing as a _sure_ and _perfect_ connexion between moral causes and\neffects; so this only (i. e. the sure and perfect connexion,) is what I\ncall by the name of _moral necessity_.\" (p. 33.)\n\nNor does he intend \"that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that\nthe act of the will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the _nature\nof things!_\" But these terms, moral and natural, are convenient to\nexpress a difference which really exists; a difference, however, which\n\"does not lie so much in the nature of the _connexion_ as in the two\nterms _connected_.\" Indeed, he soon after admits \"that choice in _many\ncases_ arises from nature, as truly as other events.\" His sentiment is\nplainly this choice lies in the great system and chain of nature as\ntruly as any other phenomenon, arising from its antecedent and having\nits consequents or effects: but we have appropriated nature to express\nthe chain of causes and effects, which lie without us, and which are\nmost obvious to us; and choice being, \"as it were, a new principle of\nmotion and action,\" lying within us, and often interrupting or altering\nthe external course of nature, seems to demand a peculiar designation.\n(p. 34.)\n\nEdwards closes his remarks on moral necessity by justifying his\nreduction of motive and volition under philosophical necessity. \"It must\nbe observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name\nof _moral necessity_, the word _necessity_ is not used according to the\noriginal design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before,\nsuch terms, _necessary, impossible, irresistible,_ &c. in common speech,\nand their most proper sense, are always relative, having reference to\nsome supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient.\nBut no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in\nthe case of moral necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and\nwill itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose\nand resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to\noppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite\nto, and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two\ncontrary motions in the same moving body at the same time. And therefore\nthe very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or\nresisting will can overcome this necessity.\" (p. 35.)\n\nThis passage is clear and full. Common necessity, or necessity in the\noriginal use of the word, refers to the connexion between volition and\nits effects; for here an opposition to will is supposable. I may choose\nor will to raise a weight; but the gravity opposed to my endeavour\novercomes it, and I find it _impossible_ for me to raise it, and the\nweight _necessarily_ remains in its place. In this common use of these\nterms, the _impossibility_ and the _necessity_ are _relative_ to my\nvolition; but in the production of choice itself, or volition, or the\nsense of the most agreeable, there is no reference to voluntary\nendeavour. Choice is not the cause of itself: it cannot be conceived of\nas struggling with itself in its own production. The cause of volition\ndoes not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition,\ntherefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be\nmade by a volition. The mind, with given susceptibilities and habits, is\nsupposed to be placed within the influence of objects and their\ncircumstances, and the choice takes place in the correlation of the two,\nas the sense of the most agreeable. Now choice cannot exist before its\ncause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It\ncomes into existence, therefore, by no necessity relating to voluntary\nendeavour; it comes into existence by a philosophical and absolute\nnecessity of cause and effect. It is necessary as the falling of a stone\nwhich is thrown into the air; as the freezing or boiling of water at\ngiven temperatures; as sensations of sight, sound, smell, taste, and\nfeeling, when the organs of sense and the objects of sense are brought\ntogether. The application of the epithet _moral_ to the necessity of\nvolition, evidently does not alter in the least the character of that\nnecessity. It is still philosophical and absolute necessity, and as sure\nand perfect as natural necessity. This we have seen he expressly admits,\n(p. 33;) affirming, (p. 34,) that the difference between a moral and\nnatural necessity is a mere difference in the \"two terms connected,\" and\nnot a difference \"_in the nature of the connexion_.\"\n\n_Natural and moral inability._\n\n\"What has been said of natural and moral necessity, may serve to explain\nwhat is intended by natural and moral _inability_. We are said to be\n_naturally_ unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will,\nbecause what is most commonly called _nature_ does not allow of it, or\nbecause of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the\nwill; either in the faculty of the understanding, constitution of body,\nor external objects.\" (p. 35.) We may make a voluntary endeavour to know\nsomething, and may find ourselves _unable_, through a defect of the\nunderstanding. We may make a voluntary effort _to do_ something by the\ninstrumentality of our hand, and may find ourselves unable through a\ndefect of the bodily constitution; or external objects may be regarded\nas presenting such a counter force as to overcome the force we exert.\nThis is natural inability; this is all we mean by it. It must be\nremarked too, that this is _inability_ not _metaphysically_ or\n_philosophically_ considered, and therefore not _absolute_ inability;\nbut only inability in the common and vulgar acceptation of the term--a\nrelative inability, relative to volition or choice--an inability to do,\nalthough we will to do.\n\nWhat is moral inability? \"Moral inability consists not in any of these\nthings; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a\ncontrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to\ninduce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives\nto the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be\nsaid, in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or\nwant of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such\na thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives,\nit is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an\ninclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such\ncircumstances and under the influence of such views.\" (bid.)\n\nThe inability in this case does not relate to the connexion between\nvolition and its consequents and effects; _but to the production of the\nvolition itself_. Now the inability to the production of a volition,\ncannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to\nexist, and as an effect cannot be conceived of as producing itself. The\ninability, therefore, must belong to the causes of volition, or to the\nmotive. But motive, as we have seen, lies in the _state of the mind_,\nand in the _nature and circumstances of the object;_ and choice or\nvolition exists when, in the correlation of mind and object, the sense\nof the most agreeable is produced. Now what reason can exist, in any\ngiven case, why the volition or sense of the most agreeable is not\nproduced? Why simply this, that there is not such a correlation of mind\nand object as to produce this sense or choice. But wherein lies the\ndeficiency? We may say generally, that it lies in both mind and\nobject--that they are not suited to each other. The mind is not _in a\nstate_ to be agreeably impressed by the object, and the object does not\npossess qualities of beauty and agreeableness to the mind. On the part\nof the mind, there is either a want of inclination to the object, or a\nstronger inclination towards another object: on the part of the object,\nthere is a want of interesting and agreeable qualities to the\n_particular state_ of mind in question, or a _suitableness_ to a\ndifferent state of mind: and this constitutes \"the want of sufficient\nmotives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength\nof apparent motives to the contrary.\" And both these may clearly be\nresolved into one, that above mentioned, viz, a want of inclination on\nthe part of the mind to the object, and a stronger inclination towards\nanother object; or, as Edwards expresses it, \"the opposition or want of\ninclination.\" For a want of inclination to one object, implying a\nstronger inclination to another object, expresses that the _state of the\nmind_, and the nature and circumstances of the one object, are not\ncorrelated; but that the _state of mind_, and the nature and\ncircumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first, is a \"want\nof sufficient motives;\" the second, stronger \"motives to the contrary.\"\nMoral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition; volition,\ntherefore, cannot produce or relieve it, for this would suppose an\neffect to modify its cause, and that too before the effect itself has\nany existence. Moral inability is a _metaphysical_ inability: it is the\nperfect and fixed impossibility of certain laws and principles of being,\nleading to certain volitions; and is contrasted with _physical\ninability_, which is the established impossibility of a certain\nvolition, producing a certain effect. So we may say, that _moral\nability_ is the certain and fixed connexion between certain laws and\nprinciples of being, and volitions; and is contrasted with _natural_\nability, which is the established connexion between certain volitions\nand certain effects.\n\nMoral inability, although transcending the sphere of volition, is a\n_real inability_. Where it exists, there is the absolute impossibility\nof a given volition,--and of course an absolute impossibility of certain\neffects coming to pass by that volition. The impossibility of water\nfreezing above an established temperature, or of boiling below an\nestablished temperature, is no more fixed than the impossibility of\neffects coming to pass by a volition, when there is a moral inability of\nthe volition. The difference between the two cases does not lie \"in the\nnature of the connexion,\" but \"in the two terms connected.\"\n\nEdwards gives several instances in illustration of moral inability.\n\n\"A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to\nprostitute herself to her slave.\" (ibid.) There is no correlation\nbetween _the state of her mind_ and _the act_ which forms the object\ncontemplated,--of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice\ncannot take place; and while the state of her mind remains the same, and\nthe act and its circumstances remain the same, there is, on the\nprinciple of Edwards, an utter inability to the choice, and of course to\nthe consequents of the choice.\n\n\"A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to\nkill his father.\" (ibid.) This case is similar to the preceding.\n\n\"A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and\ntemptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be\nunable to forbear gratifying his lust.\" There is here a correlation\nbetween _the state of mind_ and the _object_, in its _nature and\ncircumstances_,--and of course the sense of the most agreeable or choice\ntakes place. There is a _moral ability_ to the choice, and a _moral\ninability_ to forbear, or to choose the opposite.\n\n\"A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear\ntaking strong drink.\" (ibid.) This is similar to the last.\n\n\"A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an\nenemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power\nof a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are\nmost worthy of their esteem and affection.\" (ibid.) The _state of mind_\nis such,--that is, the disposition or sensitivity, as not to be at all\ncorrelated to the great duty of loving one's neighbour as one's\nself,--or to any moral excellency in another: of course the sense of the\nmost agreeable is not produced; and in this state of mind it is\nabsolutely impossible that it should be produced. \"A strong habit of\nvirtue, a great esteem of holiness, may cause a moral inability to love\nwickedness in general.\" (p. 36.) \"On the other hand, a great degree of\nhabitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose\nholiness, and render him _utterly unable_ to love an infinitely Holy\nBeing, or to choose and cleave to him as the chief good.\" (ibid.) The\nlove and choice of holiness is necessarily produced by the correlation\nof the mind with holiness; and the love and choice of holiness is\n_utterly impossible_ when this correlation does not exist. Where a moral\ninability to evil exists, nothing can be more sure and fixed than this\ninability. The individual who is the subject of it has absolutely no\npower to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he would have to\nput forth a volition to this effect; but this would be an evil volition,\nand by supposition the individual has no ability to evil volitions.\n\nWhere a moral inability to good exists, nothing can be more sure and\nfixed than this inability. The individual who is the subject of it, has\nabsolutely no power to alter it. If he were to proceed to alter it, he\nwould have to put forth a volition to this effect; but this would be a\ngood volition, and by supposition the individual has no ability to good\nvolitions.\n\n_General and habitual, particular and occasional Inability._\n\nThe first consists \"in a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual\nand stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination.\" (p. 36.)\n\nThe second is \"an inability of the will or heart to a particular act,\nthrough the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements\npresented to the view of the understanding, _on this occasion_.\" (ibid.)\n\nAn habitual drunkard, and a man habitually sober, on some _particular\noccasion_ getting drunk, are instances of general and particular\ninability. In the first instance, the _state_ of the man's mind has\nbecome correlated to the object; under all times and circumstances _it\nis fixed_. In the second instance, the _state_ of the man's mind is\ncorrelated to the object only when presented on certain occasions and\nunder certain circumstances. In both instances, however, the choice is\nnecessary,--\"it not being possible, in any case, that the will should at\npresent go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the\ngreatest advantage to induce it.\"\n\n\"Will and endeavour against, or diverse from _present_ acts of the will,\nare in no case supposable, whether those acts be _occasional_ or\n_habitual_; for that would be to suppose the will at present to be\notherwise than at present it is.\" (ibid.)\n\nThe passage which follows deserves particular attention. It may be\nbrought up under the following question:\n\nAlthough will cannot be exerted against present acts of the will, yet\ncan present acts of the will be exerted to produce future acts of the\nwill, opposed to present habitual or present occasional acts?\n\n\"But yet there may be will and endeavour against _future_ acts of the\nwill, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a\ndistance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the will\nat one time may be against the act of the will at another time; and\nthere may be desires and endeavours to prevent or excite future acts of\nthe will; but such desires and endeavours are in many cases rendered\ninsufficient and vain through fixedness of habit: when the occasion\nreturns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such\nopposition.\" (p. 37.)\n\nLet us take the instance of the drunkard. The choice or volition to\ndrink is the fixed correlation of his disposition and the strong drink.\nBut we may suppose that his disposition can be affected by other objects\nlikewise: as the consideration of the interest and happiness of his wife\nand children, and his own respectability and final happiness. When his\ncups are removed, and he has an occasional fit of satiety and loathing,\nthese considerations may awaken at the time the sense of the most\nagreeable, and lead him to avoid the occasions of drunkenness, and to\nform resolutions of amendment; but when the appetite and longing for\ndrink returns, and he comes again in the way of indulgence, then these\nconsiderations, brought fairly into collision with his habits, are\novercome, and drinking, as the most agreeable, asserts its supremacy.\n\n\"But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to\nsuch future acts as are only _occasional_ and _transient_; because the\noccasional or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be\nprevented or avoided.\" (ibid.)\n\nIn the case of occasional drunkenness, for instance, the habitual\ncorrelation is not of mind and strong drink, but of mind and\nconsiderations of honour, prudence, and virtue. But strong drink being\nassociated on some occasion with objects which are correlated to the\nmind, as hospitality, friendship, or festive celebrations,--may obtain\nthe mastery; and in this case, the individual being under no temptation\nfrom strong drink in itself considered, and being really affected with\nthe sense of the most agreeable in relation to objects which are opposed\nto drunkenness, may take care that strong drink shall not come again\ninto circumstances to give it an adventitious advantage. The repetition\nof occasional drunkenness would of course by and by produce a change in\nthe sensitivity, and establish an habitual liking for drink. \"On this\naccount, the moral inability that attends fixed habits, especially\nobtains the name of _inability_. And then, as the will may remotely and\nindirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong\nhabits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its\nresistance be insufficient: and this is more commonly the case, also,\nwhen the acts arise from strong habit.\" (ibid.)\n\nIn every act of the will, the will at the moment is unable to act\notherwise; it is in the strictest sense true, that a man, at the moment\nof his acting, must act as he does act; but as we usually characterize\nmen by the habitual state of their minds, we more especially speak of\nmoral inability in relation to acts which are known to have no\ncorrelation to this habitual state. This habitual state of the mind, if\nit be opposed to reason, overcomes reason; for nothing, not even reason\nitself, can be the strongest motive, unless it produce the sense of the\nmost agreeable; and this it cannot do, where the habitual disposition or\nsensitivity is opposed to it.\n\n_Common usage with respect to the phrase_ want of power _or_ inability\n_to act in a certain way._\n\n\"But it must be observed concerning _moral inability_, in each kind of\nit, that the word _inability_ is used in a sense very diverse from its\noriginal import. The word signifies only a natural inability, in the\nproper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present\nwill or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said\nto be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, _according to the\nordinary use of language_, that a malicious man, let him be never so\nmalicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to\nshow his neighbour a kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be\nnever so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. _In the strictest\npropriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his\nchoice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable\nto do a thing, when he can do it if he will_.\" (ibid.)\n\nMen, in the common use of language, and in the expression of their\ncommon and generally received sentiments, affirm that an individual has\nany thing in his power when it can be controlled by volition. Their\nconnexion of power does not arise from the connexion of volition with\nits cause, but from the conception of volition as itself a cause with\nits effects. Thus the hand of a malicious man when moved to strike,\nhaving for its antecedent a volition; and if withheld from striking,\nhaving for its antecedent likewise a volition; according to the common\nusage of language, he, as the subject of volition, has the power to\nstrike or not to strike. Now as it is \"improperly said that he cannot\nperform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will, it is\nin some respects more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the\nacts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with\nrespect to these, that he cannot if he will; for to say so is a\ndownright contradiction; it is to say he _cannot_ will if he _does_\nwill: and, in this case, not only is it true that it is easy for a man\nto do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing.\" (ibid.)\n\nIt is improper, according to this, to say that a man cannot do a thing,\nwhen nothing is wanting but an act of volition; for that is within our\npower, as far as it can be within our power, which is within the reach\nof our volition.\n\nIt is still more improper to say that a man is unable to exert the acts\nof the will themselves, or unable to produce volitions. To say that a\nman has power to produce volitions, would imply that he has power to\nwill volitions; but this would make one volition the cause of another,\nwhich is absurd. But, as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause\nof its own volitions, and of course to say that the man has ability to\nproduce his volitions, it must be absurd likewise to represent the man\nas _unable_, in any particular case, to produce volitions, for this\nwould imply that in other cases he is able. Nay, the very language is\nself-contradictory. If a man produce volitions, he must produce them by\nvolitions; and if in any case he is affirmed to be unable to produce\nvolitions; then this inability must arise from a want of connexion\nbetween the volition by which the required volition is aimed to be\nproduced, and the required volition itself. So that to affirm that he is\nunable to will is equivalent to saying, that he cannot will _if he\nwill_--a proposition which grants the very point it assumes to deny.\n\"The very willing is the doing,\" which is required.\n\nEdwards adopts what he calls the \"original\" and \"proper,\" meaning of\npower, and ability, as applied to human agents, and appearing, \"in the\nordinary use of language,\" as the legitimate and true meaning. In this\nuse, power, as we have seen, relates only to the connexion of volition\nwith its consequents, and not to its connexion with its antecedents or\nmotives. Hence, in reference to the human agent, \"to ascribe a\nnon-performance to the want of power or ability,\" or to the want of\nmotives, (for this is plainly his meaning,) \"is not just,\" \"because the\nthing wanting,\" that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the\nagent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, \"is not a\nbeing _able_,\" that is, a having the requisite motives, or the moral\nability, \"but a being _willing_, or the act of volition, itself. To the\nact of volition, or the fact of 'being willing,'\" there is no facility\nof mind or capacity of nature wanting, but only a disposition or state\nof mind adapted to the act; but with this, the individual can have no\nconcern in reference to his action, because he has all the ability which\ncan be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he\nwill to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral inability\nto do a thing--that is the motive may be wanting which causes the\nvolition, which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but\nstill if it is true that there is such a connexion between the volition\nand the thing to be done, that the moment the volition takes place the\nthing is done; then, according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be\nable to do it with the only ability that can be affirmed of him.\n\nWe can exert power only by exerting will, that is by putting forth\nvolitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert power over those\nmotives which are themselves the causes of our volitions. We are not\n_unable_ to do anything in the proper and original and legitimate use of\nthe word when, for the want of motive, we are not the subjects of the\nvolition required as the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done;\nbut we are _unable_ in this use when, although the volition be made;\nstill, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are conscious\nof power, or of the want of power only in the connexion between our\nactual volitions and their objects.\n\n\"Sec. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.\"\n\nWhat is liberty? \"The plain and obvious meaning of the words _freedom_\nand _liberty_, in common speech, is _power, opportunity, or advantage\nthat any one has to do as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being\nfree from hinderance, or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting\nin any way as he wills. And the _contrary_ to liberty, whatever name we\ncall it by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he\nwill, or being, necessitated to do otherwise.\" (p. 38.) Again, \"That\npower and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according\nto his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the\nmeaning of the word, anything of the _cause_ of that choice, or at all\nconsidering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was\ncaused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it\nwas determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it\nhappened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with\nsomething foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice\nany how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder\nhis pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free,\naccording to the primary and common notion of freedom.\" (p. 39.)\n\nThis is Edwards's definition of liberty, and he has given it with a\nclearness, a precision, and, at the same time, an amplification, which\nrenders it impossible to mistake his meaning.\n\nLiberty has nothing to do with the connexion between volition and its\ncause or motive. Liberty relates solely to the connexion between the\nvolition and its objects. He is free in the only true and proper sense,\nwho, when he wills, finds no impediment between the volition and the\nobject, who wills and it is done. He wills to walk, and his legs obey:\nhe wills to talk, and his intellect and tongue obey, and frame and\nexpress sentences. If his legs were bound, he would not be free. If his\ntongue were tied with a thong, or his mouth gagged, he would not be\nfree; or if his intellect were paralysed or disordered, he would not be\nfree. If there should be anything preventing the volition from taking\neffect, he would not be free.\n\n_Of what can the attribute of Liberty be affirmed?_\n\nFrom the definition thus given Edwards remarks, \"It will follow, that in\npropriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be\nascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty,\npower, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no\n_will_, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing _according to its\nwill_, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be\nrestrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of\nliberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the _very will itself_, is not\nto speak good sense; for the _will itself_, is not an agent that has _a\nwill_. The power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That\nwhich has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the\npower of volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who\nis possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of.\"\n(p. 38.)\n\nLiberty is the attribute of the agent, because the agent is the\nspiritual essence or being who is the subject of the power or capacity\nof choice, and his liberty consists as we have seen in the unimpeded\nconnexion between the volitions produced in him and the objects of those\nvolitions. Hence, _free will_ is an objectionable phrase. _Free agent_\nis the proper phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and\nwhose choice reaches effects.\n\n_Moral Agent._\n\n\"A _moral agent_ is a being that is capable of those actions that have a\n_moral_ quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a\nmoral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty.\" (p. 39.)\n\nIn what lies the capability of actions having a moral quality?\n\n\"To moral agency belongs a _moral faculty_, or sense of moral good and\nevil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame,\nreward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being\ninfluenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to\nthe view of the understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct\nagreeable to moral faculty.\" (p. 40.)\n\nA moral agent is a being who can perform moral actions, or actions which\nare subject to praise or blame. Now the same action may be committed by\na man or by a brute--and the man alone will be guilty: why is the man\nguilty? Because he has a moral sense or perception by which he\ndistinguishes right and wrong: the brute has no such sense or\nperception. The man having thus the power of perceiving the right and\nwrong of actions--actions and their moral qualities may be so correlated\nto him as to produce the sense of the most agreeable or choice. Or, we\nmay say generally, moral agency consists in the possession of a reason\nand conscience to distinguish right and wrong, and the capacity of\nhaving the right and wrong so correlated to the mind as to form motives\nand produce volitions. We might define a man of taste in the fine arts\nin a similar way; thus,--a man of taste is an agent who has the power of\ndistinguishing beauty and ugliness, and whose mind is so correlated to\nbeauty that the sense of the most agreeable or choice is produced. The\nonly difference between the two cases is this: that, in the latter, the\nsense of the most agreeable is always produced by the beauty perceived;\nwhile in the former, the right perceived does not always produce this\nsense; on the contrary, the sense of the most agreeable is often\nproduced by the wrong, in opposition to the decisions of reason and\nconscience.\n\nI have now completed the statement of Edwards's system, nearly in his\nown words, as contained in part I. of his work. The remarks and\nexplanations which have been thrown in, I hope will serve to make him\nmore perfectly understood. This end will be still more fully attained by\npresenting on the basis of the foregoing investigation and statement, a\ncompend of his psychological system, independently of the order there\npursued, and without largely introducing quotations, which have already\nbeen abundantly made.\n\nCOMPEND OF EDWARDS'S PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM.\n\nI. There are two cardinal faculties of the mind. 1. The\nintellectual--called reason or understanding. 2. The active and\nfeeling--called will or affections.\n\nII. The relation of these to each other. The first precedes the second\nin the order of exercise. The first perceives and knows objects in their\nqualities, circumstances, and relations. The second experiences emotions\nand passions, or desires and choices, in relation to the objects\nperceived.\n\nIII. Perception is necessary. When the understanding and its objects are\nbrought together, perception takes place according to the constituted\nlaws of the intelligence.\n\nIV. The acts of will or the affections are necessary. When this faculty\nof our being and its objects are brought together, volition or choice,\nemotions, passions, or desires take place, according to the constituted\nnature and laws of this faculty.\n\nThe objects and this faculty are correlates. In relation to the object,\nwe may call this faculty subject. When subject and object are suited to\neach other, that is, are agreeable, affections are produced which we\ncall pleasant; when they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable,\naffections take place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in\nrelation to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces\naccordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful.\n\nIn the perfection and harmony of our being, this correspondence is\nuniversal; that is, what is known to be agreeable is felt to be\npleasant;--what is known to be disagreeable is felt to be painful. But,\nin the corruption of our being, this is reversed in respect of moral\nobjects. Although what is right is known to be agreeable, that is,\nsuited to us, it is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to\nbe unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that\npleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as synonymous\nterms. The distinction I have here made is at least convenient in\ndescribing the same objects as presented to the understanding and to the\nwill.\n\nV. The emotions and passions, volitions or choices, are thus produced in\nthe correlation of subject, that is the will, and the object. In\nassigning the causes of these affections, we may refer to the nature of\nthe will, which is such, as to receive such and such affections when in\nthe presence of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects,\nand say their nature and circumstances are such as to produce such and\nsuch affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at once, and say\nthat the affections arise from the state of the mind, and from the\nnature and circumstances of the object.\n\nVI. The affections of the will stand connected with changes or effects\nin other parts of our being, as stated antecedents. First, they stand\nthus connected with muscular action,--as walking, talking, striking,\nresisting, &c. Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental\noperations,--as fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and\ninvestigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the memory.\n\nVII. The affections of the will, when thus connected with effects in\nother parts of our being, have a peculiar and striking characteristic.\nIt is this: that the effect contemplated takes place at the moment it\nappears the most agreeable,--the greatest apparent good; which, as\nEdwards uses these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect\ncontemplated produces the most pleasant affection,--the most intense\nsense of the agreeable,--it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most\npleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a particular\nsubject, then we think on that subject. Such is the constitution and law\nof our being. The play of the different parts is reciprocal. Perception\nmust bring up the objects, and the affections of will immediately\nfollow. The most agreeable are dwelt upon by the mind, and perception\nagain takes place particularly with regard to these; and according as\nobjects affect the will, do all the activities of our being come forth.\n\nVIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can be easily explained by\nthis system:--_Choice_ is the sense or the affection of the most\npleasant and agreeable. _Preference_ is its synonyme, with scarcely a\nshade of difference. They both have respect to the _act of selection_.\n_Volition_ is another name for this affection of will, and is used more\nparticularly in relation to effects or changes following the affection.\n_Desire_ is a nascent choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment,\nis choice. _Emotion_ is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to\nthe quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the first\nsudden affection arising from an object presented; and with respect to\ncertain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment possible in relation to\nthem,--for example, the emotion of sublimity, produced by an object\nwhich can hold no other relation to us. But then the sublimity of the\nobject may be the motive which causes the choice of gazing at it; that\nis, it connects this act of contemplation with the sense of the most\nagreeable.\n\n_Passion_ is emotion accompanied by desire in reference to other\nrelations with the object. Thus the emotion of beauty awakened by a\nflower may be accompanied by the desire of possessing it; and if this\ndesire becomes the strongest desire at the moment, then the passion has\nthe characteristic which makes it choice, and some corresponding effects\ntake place in order to possess it,--as walking towards it, stretching\nout the hand, &c.\n\n_The determination of will_ is the production or causation of choice. It\nis used in reference to the immediate and particular choice, in\nopposition to all other choices.\n\n_The will itself_ is the capacity of being affected by objects with\nemotion, passion, and desire,--and with that form of passion which we\ncall the sense of the most agreeable or choice, and which is connected\nwith effects or consequents as their stated antecedent.\n\n_The motive_ is the cause of choice, and is complex. It lies in the\nnature and susceptibilities of the will, and in the nature and\ncircumstances Of the object chosen.\n\nIX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is, what reason commands\nmay seem disagreeable to the will, and of course reason cannot be\nobeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when her commands produce the sense of\nthe most agreeable.\n\nX. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are opposed in reference\nto will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute of the man--the human soul.\nThe man is free when his volitions or choices are unimpeded,--when, upon\nchoosing to walk, he walks, &c. The man is not free, or is under\nnecessity, when his volitions or choices are impeded,--when, upon\nchoosing to walk, he finds his legs bound or paralysed, &c. Then it is\n_impossible_ for him to walk,--then he has _no liberty_ to walk,--then\nhe is under a _necessity_ of remaining in one place.\n\nNecessity in any other use is _metaphysical_ or _philosophical_\nnecessity, and is applied out of the sphere of the will: as the\nnecessity of truth, the necessity of being,--the necessary connexion of\ncause and effect. Hence,\n\nThe _connexion_ between volitions or choices, or the sense of the most\nagreeable with the motive or cause, is _necessary_ with a philosophical\nnecessity. The necessity of volitions in reference to motives is also\ncalled _moral_ necessity. This term _moral_ is given, not in reference\nto the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the _terms_\nconnected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings are thus\ndistinguished from those phenomena which we commonly call _natural_.\n\nXI. An agent is that which produces effects. A _natural_ agent is that\nwhich produces effects without volition. A _moral_ agent is one\nproducing effects by volitions, accompanied with an intellectual\nperception of the volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a\nsense of desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account\nof the volitions and their effects.\n\n_Brutes_ or irresponsible beings are agents that have volitions, but\nhave no reason to perceive right and wrong, and consequently have no\nsense of desert; and as they cannot perceive right and wrong, they\ncannot be made the subjects of moral appeals and inducements.\n\nXII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the possession of reason;\nsecondly, from the capacity of choice; thirdly, from natural ability.\n\nNatural ability exists when the effect or act commanded to be\naccomplished has an established connexion with volition or choice. Thus\nwe say a man has natural ability to walk, because if he chooses to walk,\nhe walks. Natural ability differs from freedom only in this:--The first\nrefers to an established connexion between volitions and effects. The\nsecond refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting\nforces from between volitions and effects.\n\nHence a man is _naturally unable_ to do anything when there is no\nestablished connexion between volition and that thing. A man is\nnaturally unable to push a mountain from its seat. He has no _liberty_\nto move his arm when it is bound.\n\n_Moral inability_ is metaphysical or philosophical inability.\nPhilosophical inability in general refers to the impossibility of a\ncertain effect for the want of a cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there\nis a philosophical inability of transmuting metal; or of restoring the\ndecay of old age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have\nno cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a philosophical\ninability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons weight with a pine\nlath, and by the hand of a single man, because we have not an adequate\ncause. _Moral inability_ relates to the connexion between motives and\nvolitions in distinction from natural ability, which relates to the\nconnexion between volitions and actions consequent upon them: but the\nterm moral as we have seen, does not characterize the nature of the\n_connexion_,--it only expresses the _quality_ of _terms connected_.\nHence _moral_ inability, as philosophical inability, is the\nimpossibility of a certain volition or choice for the want of a motive\nor cause, or an adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical\ninability of Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive\nor cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral\nphilosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for fifty\ndollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive is not\nadequate to produce a volition to such an act.\n\nPhilosophical necessity and inability are absolute in respect of us,\nbecause beyond the sphere of our volition.\n\nXIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness or guilt, apply only\nto volitions. This indeed is not formally brought out in the part of\nEdwards's work we have been examining. His discussion of it will be\nfound in part IV. sec. I. But as it is necessary to a complete view of\nhis system, we introduce it here.\n\nHe remarks in this part, \"If the essence of virtuousness or\ncommendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature\nof the disposition or acts of the mind, which are said to be our virtue\nor our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at\nall. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not\nin the nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad\nnature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some\nfaulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in us that is\nour fault, &c.\" (page 190.) \"Disposition of mind,\" or inclination,\n--\"acts of the mind,\" \"acts of will,\" here obviously mean\nthe same thing; that is, they mean volition or choice, and are\ndistinguished from their cause or motive. The question is not whether\nthe cause or motive be pure or impure, but whether our virtuousness or\nviciousness lie in the cause of our volition, or in the volition itself.\nIt plainly results from Edwards's psychology, and he has himself in the\nabove quotation stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the\nvolition itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is\nvolition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of doing\nor forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our volitions\nthat we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for evil-doing. If these\nvolitions are in accordance with conscience and the law of God, they are\nright; if not, they are wrong, and we are judged accordingly. The\n_metaphysical_ questions, how the volition was produced, and what is the\ncharacter of the cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are\nquestions which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our\npersonality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with this:--Do\n_we_ do right? do _we_ do wrong? What is the _nature of our volitions?_\n\nNor does the _necessary connexion_ between the motives and the\nvolitions, destroy the blameworthiness and the praiseworthiness of the\nvolitions. We are blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the character\nof the volitions in themselves, considered and judged according to the\nrule of right, without considering how these volitions came to exist.\nThe last inquiry is altogether of a philosophical or metaphysical kind,\nand not of a moral kind, or that kind which relates to moral agency,\nresponsibility, and duty.\n\nAnd so also we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing or not doing\nexternal actions, so far only as these actions are naturally connected\nwith volitions, as sequents with their stated antecedents. If the action\nis one which ought to be done, we are responsible for the doing of it,\nif we know that upon our willing it, it will be done; although at this\nvery moment there is no such correlation between the action and the\nwill, as to form the motive or cause upon which the existence of the act\nof willing depends. If the action is one which ought not to be done, we\nare guilty for doing it, when we know that if we were not to will it, it\nwould not be done; although at this very moment there is such a\ncorrelation between the action, and the state of the will, as to form\nthe cause or motive by which the act of willing comes necessarily to\nexist. The metaphysical or philosophical inquiry respecting the\ncorrelation of the state of the will and any action, or respecting the\nwant of such a correlation, is foreign to the question of duty and\nresponsibility. This question relates only to the volition and its\nconnexion with its consequents.\n\nThis does not clash at all with the common sentiment that our actions\nare to be judged of by our motives; for this sentiment does not respect\nvolitions in relation to their cause, but external actions in relation\nto the volitions which produce them. These external actions may be in\nthemselves good, but they may not be what was willed; some other force\nor power may have come in between the volition and its object, and\nchanged the circumstances of the object, so as to bring about an event\ndifferent from the will or intention; although being in connexion with\nthe agent, it may still be attributed to his will: or the immediate act\nwhich appears good, may, in the mind of the agent be merely part of an\nextended plan or chain of volitions, whose last action or result is\nevil. It is common, therefore, to say of an external action, we must\nknow what the man intends, before we pronounce upon him; which is the\nsame thing as to say we must know what his volition really is, or what\nhis motive is--that is, not the cause which produces his volition, but\nthe volition which is aiming at effects, and is the motive and cause of\nthese effects;--which again, is the same thing as to say, that before we\ncan pronounce upon his conduct, we must know what effects he really\nintends or wills, or desires, that is, what it is which is really\nconnected in his mind with the sense of the most agreeable.\n\n_Edwards and Locke._\n\nTheir systems are one: there is no difference in the principle. Edwards\nrepresents the will as necessarily determined so does Locke. Edwards\nplaces liberty in the unimpeded connexion of volition with its stated\nsequents--so does Locke.\n\nThey differ only in the mode of developing the necessary determination\nof will. According to Locke, desire is in itself a necessary\nmodification of our being produced in its correlation with objects; and\nvolition is a necessary consequent of desire when excited at any given\nmoment to a degree which gives the most intense sense of uneasiness at\nthat moment. \"The greatest present uneasiness is the spur of action that\nis constantly felt, and for the most part, determines the will in its\nchoice of the next action.\" (book 2. ch. 21, Sec. 40.) According to\nEdwards, desire is not distinguishable from will as a faculty, and the\nstrongest desire, at any moment, is the volition of that moment.\n\nEdwards's analysis is more nice than Locke's, and his whole developement\nmore true to the great principle of the system--necessary determination.\nLocke, in distinguishing the will from the desire, seems about to launch\ninto a different psychology, and one destructive of the principle.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nTHE LEGITIMATE CONSEQUENCES OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.\n\nThese consequences must, I am aware, be deduced with the greatest care\nand clearness. The deduction must be influenced by no passion or\nprejudice. It must be purely and severely logical--and such I shall\nendeavour to make it. I shall begin with a deduction which Edwards has\nhimself made.\n\nI. There is no self-determining power of will, and of course no liberty\nconsisting in a self-determining power.\n\nA self-determining power of will is a supposed power, which will has to\ndetermine its own volitions.\n\nWill is the faculty of choice, or the capacity of desire, emotion, or\npassion.\n\nVolition is the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable at\nany given moment.\n\nVolition arises from the state of the mind, or of the will, or\nsensitivity itself, in correlation with the nature and circumstances of\nthe object.\n\nNow, if the will determined itself, it would determine its own state, in\nrelation to objects. But to determine is to act, and therefore, for the\nwill to determine is for the will to act; and for the will to determine\nitself, is for the will to determine itself by an act. But an act of the\nwill is a volition; therefore for the will to determine itself is to\ncreate a volition by a volition. But then we have to account for this\nantecedent volition, and it can be accounted for only in the same way.\nWe shall then have an infinite, or more properly, an indefinite series\nof volitions, without any first volition; consequently we shall have no\nself-determiner after all, because we can arrive at no first determiner,\nand thus the idea of self-determination becomes self-destructive. Again,\nwe shall have effects without a cause, for the series in the nature of\nthe case never ends in a first, which is a cause per se. Volitions are\nthus contingent, using this word as a synonyme of chance, the negative\nof cause.\n\nNow that this is a legitimate deduction, no one can question. If\nEdwards's psychology be right, and if self-determination implies a will\nto will, or choosing a choice, then a self-determining power is the\ngreatest absurdity possible.\n\nII. It is clearly deducible from this also, that God can exercise a\nperfect control over his intelligent creatures, or administer perfectly\na moral government consisting in the influence of motives.\n\nTo any given state of mind, he can adapt motives in reference to\nrequired determinations. And when an individual is removed from the\nmotives adapted to his state of mind, the Almighty Providence can so\norder events as to bring him into contiguity with the motives.\n\nIf the state of mind should be such that no motives can be made\navailable in reference to a particular determination, it is dearly\nsupposable that he who made the soul of man, may exert a direct\ninfluence over this state of mind, and cause it to answer to the motives\npresented. Whether there are motives adapted to every state of mind, in\nreference to every possible determination required by the Almighty\nLawgiver, so as to render it unnecessary to exert a direct influence\nover the will, is a question which I am not called upon here to answer.\nBut in either case, the divine sovereignty, perfect and absolute,\nfore-determining and bringing to pass every event in the moral as well\nas the physical world; and the election of a certain number to eternal\nlife, and the making of this election sure, are necessary and plain\nconsequences of this system. And as God is a being all-wise and good, we\nmay feel assured in connexion with this system, that, in the working out\nof his great plan, whatever evil may appear in the progress of its\ndevelopement, the grand consummation will show that all things have been\nworking together for good.\n\nIII. It is plainly deducible from this system that moral beings exert an\ninfluence over each other by the presentation of motives. And thus\nefforts may be made either to the injury or benefit of society.\n\nIV. If, as Edwards contends, the sense of responsibility, the\nconsciousness of guilt or of rectitude, and consequently the expectation\nof punishment or reward, connect themselves simply with the nature of\nthe mere fact of volition.--that is, if this is a true and complete\nrepresentation of consciousness in relation to this subject, then upon\nthe mere fact of volition considered only in its own nature, and wholly\nindependently of its causes, can the processes of justice go forth.\n\nThus we may view the system in relation both to God and to man.\n\nIn relation to God. It makes him supreme and absolute--foreseeing and\nfore-determining, and bringing everything to pass according to infinite\nwisdom, and by the energy of an infinite will.\n\nIn relation to man. It shuts him up to the consideration of the simple\nfact of volition, and its connexion as a stated or established\nantecedent with certain effects. He is free to accomplish these effects,\nbecause he can accomplish them if he will. He is free to forbear,\nbecause he can forbear if he will. It is affirmed to be the common\njudgement of men, and of course universally a fact of consciousness,\nthat an individual is fully responsible for the doing of anything which\nought to be done, if nothing is wanting to the doing of it but a\nvolition: that he is guilty and punishable for doing anything wrong,\nbecause it was done by his volition: that he is praiseworthy and to be\nrewarded for doing anything right, because it was done by his volition.\nIn vain does he attempt to excuse himself from right-doing on the plea\nof _moral inability;_ this is _metaphysical_ inability, and transcends\nthe sphere of volition. He can do it if he will--and therefore he has\nall the ability required in the case. Nothing is immediately wanting but\na willingness, and all his responsibility relates to this; he can do\nnothing, can influence nothing, except by will; and therefore that which\ngoes before will is foreign to his consideration, and impossible to his\neffort.\n\nIn vain does he attempt to excuse himself for wrong-doing on the ground\nof moral _necessity_. This _moral necessity_ is _metaphysical_\nnecessity, and transcends the sphere of volition. He could have forborne\nto do wrong, if he had had the will. Whatever else may have been\nwanting, there was not wanting to a successful resistance of evil,\nanything with which the agent has any concern, and for which he is under\nany responsibility, but the volition. By his volitions simply is he to\nbe tried. No court of justice, human or divine, that we can conceive of,\ncould admit the plea--\"I did not the good because I had not the will to\ndo it,\" or \"I did the evil because I had the will to do it.\" \"This is\nyour guilt,\" would be the reply of the judge, \"that you had no will to\ndo the good--that you had a will to do the evil.\"\n\nWe must now take up a different class of deductions. They are such as\nthose abettors of this system who wish to sustain the great interests of\nmorality and religion do not make, but strenuously contend against. If\nhowever they are logical deductions, it is in vain to contend against\nthem. I am conscious of no wish to _force_ them upon the system, and do\nmost firmly believe that they are logical. Let the reader judge for\nhimself, but let him judge _thoughtfully_ and _candidly_.\n\nI. The system of Edwards leads to an absolute and unconditional\nnecessity, particular and general.\n\n1. A particular necessity--a necessity absolute in relation to the\nindividual.\n\nIt is granted in the system, that the connexion of motive and volition\nis necessary with an absolute necessity, because this precedes and\ntherefore is not within the reach of the volition. So also, the state of\nmind, and the nature and circumstances of the object in relation to this\nstate, forming a correlation, in which lies the motive, is dependent\nupon a cause, beyond the reach of volition. As the volition cannot make\nits motive, so neither can the volition make the cause of its motive,\nand so on in the retrogression of causes, back to the first cause.\nHence, all the train of causes preceding the volition are related by an\nabsolute necessity; and the volition itself, as the effect of motive,\nbeing necessary also with an absolute necessity, the only place for\nfreedom that remains, if freedom be possible, is the connexion of\nvolition and effects, internal and external. And this is the only place\nof freedom which this system claims. But what new characteristic appears\nin this relation? Have we here anything beyond stated antecedents and\nsequents? I will to walk, and I walk; I will to talk, and I talk; I will\nto sit down, and I sit down. The volition is an established antecedent\nto these muscular movements. So also, when I will to think on a certain\nsubject, I think on that subject. The volition of selecting a subject,\nand the volition of attending to it, are stated antecedents to that\nmental operation which we call thought. We have here only another\ninstance of cause and effect; the relation being one as absolute and\nnecessary as any other relation of cause and effect. The curious\norganism by which a choice or a sense of the most agreeable produces\nmuscular movement, has not been arranged by any choice of the individual\nman. The connexion is pre-established for him, and has its cause beyond\nthe sphere of volition. The constitution of mind which connects volition\nwith thinking is also pre-established, and beyond the sphere of\nvolition. As the volition itself appears by an absolute necessity in\nrelation to the individual man, so also do the stated sequents or\neffects of volition appear by an absolute necessity in relation to him.\n\nIt is true, indeed, that the connexion between volition and its objects\nmay be interrupted by forces coming between, or overcome by superior\nforces, but this is common to cause and effect, and forms no peculiar\ncharacteristic; it is a lesser force necessarily interrupted or overcome\nby a greater. Besides, the interruption or the overcoming of a force\ndoes not prove its freedom when it is unimpeded; its movement may still\nbe necessitated by an antecedent force. And this is precisely the truth\nin respect of volition, according to this system. The volition could\nhave no being without a motive, and when the motive is present it must\nhave a being, and no sooner does it appear than its effects follow,\nunless impeded. If impeded, then we have two trains of causes coming\ninto collision, and the same necessity which brought them together,\ngives the ascendency to the one or the other.\n\nIt seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion, that necessity,\nabsolute and unconditional, as far at least as the man himself is\nconcerned, reigns in the relation of volition and its effect, if the\nvolition itself be a necessary existence. All that precedes volition is\nnecessary; volition itself is necessary. All that follows volition is\nnecessary: Humanity is but a link of the inevitable chain.\n\n2. General necessity--a necessity absolute, in relation to all being and\ncausality, and applicable to all events.\n\nAn event proved to be necessary in relation to an individual--is this\nevent likewise necessary in the whole train of its relations? Let this\nevent be a volition of a given individual; it is necessary in relation\nto that individual. Now it must be supposed to have a connexion by a\nchain of sequents and antecedents with a first cause. Let us now take\nany particular antecedent and sequent in the chain, and that antecedent\nand sequent, in its particular place and relations, can be proved\nnecessary in the same way that the volition is proved necessary in its\nparticular place and relations; that is, the antecedent being given\nunder the particular circumstances, the sequent must follow. But the\nantecedent is linked by like necessity to another antecedent, of which\nit is the sequent; and the sequent is linked by like necessity to\nanother sequent, of which it is the antecedent; and thus the whole\nchain, from the given necessary volition up to the first cause, is\nnecessary. We come therefore at last to consider the connexion between\nthe first sequent and the first antecedent, or the first cause. Is this\na necessary connexion? If that first antecedent be regarded as a\nvolition, then the connexion must be necessary. If God will the first\nsequent, then it was absolutely necessary that that sequent should\nappear. But the volition itself cannot really be the first antecedent or\ncause, because volition or choice, from its very nature, must itself\nhave a determiner or antecedent. What is this antecedent? The\nmotive:--for self-determination, in the sense of the will determining\nitself, would involve the same absurdities on this system in relation to\nGod as in relation to man; since it is represented as an absurdity in\nits own nature--it is determining a volition by a volition, in endless\nretrogression. As the motive therefore determines the divine volition,\nwhat is the nature of the connexion between the motive and the volition?\nIt cannot but be a necessary connexion; for there is nothing to render\nit otherwise, save the divine will. But the divine will cannot be\nsupposed to do this, for the motive is already taken to be the ground\nand cause of the action of the divine will. The necessity which applies\nto volition, in the nature of the case must therefore apply to the\ndivine volition. No motives, indeed, can be supposed to influence the\ndivine will, except those drawn from his infinite intelligence, wisdom,\nand goodness; but then the connexion between these motives and the\ndivine volitions is a connexion of absolute necessity. This Edwards\nexpressly affirms--\"If God's will is steadily and surely determined in\neverything by _supreme_ wisdom, then it is in everything _necessarily\ndetermined_ to that which is _most_ wise.\" (p. 230.) That the universe\nis governed by infinite wisdom, is a glorious and satisfactory thought,\nand is abundantly contended for by this system; but still it is a\ngovernment of necessity. This may be regarded as the most excellent\ngovernment, and if it be so regarded it may fairly be contended for. Let\nus not, however, wander from the question, and in representing it as the\ngovernment of wisdom, forget that it is a government of necessity, and\nthat absolute. The volition, therefore, with which we started, is at\nlast traced up to a necessary and infinite wisdom as its first and final\ncause; for here the efficient cause and the motive are indeed one.\n\nWhat we have thus proved in relation to one volition, must be equally\ntrue in reference to every other volition and every other event, for the\nreasoning must apply to every possible case. Every volition, every\nevent, must be traced up to a first and final cause, and this must be\nnecessary and infinite wisdom.\n\nII. It follows, therefore, from this system, that every volition or\nevent is both necessary, and necessarily the best possible in its place\nand relations.\n\nThe whole system of things had its origin in infinite and necessary\nwisdom. All volitions and events have their last and efficient cause in\ninfinite and necessary wisdom. All that has been, all that is, all that\ncan be, are connected by an absolute necessity with the same great\nsource. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose it possible for\nany thing to be different from what it is, or to suppose that any change\ncould make any thing better than it is; for all that is, is by absolute\nnecessity,--and all that is, is just what and where infinite wisdom has\nmade it, and disposed of it.\n\nIII. If that which we call evil, in reality be evil, then it must be\nboth necessary evil and evil having its origin in infinite wisdom. It is\nin vain to say that man is the agent, in the common acceptation of the\nword; that he is the author, because the particular volitions are his.\nThese volitions are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried\nback to the one great source of all being and events. Hence,\n\nIV. The creature man cannot be blameable. Every volition which appears\nin him, appears by an absolute necessity,--and it cannot be supposed to\nbe otherwise than it is. Now the ground of blameworthiness is not only\nthe perception of the difference between right and wrong, and the\nconviction that the right ought to be done, but the possession of a\npower to do the right and refrain from the wrong. But if every volition\nis fixed by an absolute necessity, then neither can the individual be\nsupposed to have power to do otherwise than he actually does, nor, all\nthings considered, can it be supposed there could have been, at that\nprecise moment and in that precise relation, any other volition. The\nvolition is fixed, and fixed by an infinite and necessary wisdom. We\ncannot escape from this difficulty by perpetually running the changes\nof--\"He can if he will,\"--\"He could if he would,\"--\"There is nothing\nwanting but a will,\"--\"He has a natural ability,\" &c. &c. Let us not\ndeceive ourselves, and endeavour to stop thought and conclusions by\nthese words, \"he can if he will\"! but he cannot if he don't will. The\nwill is wanting,--and while it is wanting, the required effect cannot\nappear. And how is that new volition or antecedent to be obtained? The\nman cannot change one volition for another. By supposition, he has not\nthe moral or metaphysical ability,--and yet this is the only ability\nthat can produce the new volition. It is passing strange that the power\nupon which volition is absolutely dependent, should be set aside by\ncalling it _metaphysical_,--and the man blamed for an act because the\nconsequent of his volition, when the volition itself is the necessary\nconsequent of this power! The man is only in his volition. The volition\nis good or bad in itself. The cause of volition is none of his concern,\nbecause it transcends volition. He can if he will. That is enough for\nhim! But it is not enough to make him blameable, when whether he will or\nnot depends not only upon an antecedent out of his reach, but the\nantecedent itself is fixed by a necessity in the divine nature itself.\n\nI am not now disputing the philosophy. The philosophy may be true; it\nmay be very good: but then we must take its consequences along with it;\nand this is all that I now insist upon.\n\nV. It is another consequence of this system, that there can be nothing\nevil in itself. If infinite wisdom and goodness are the highest form of\nmoral perfection, as indeed their very names imply, then all the\nnecessary consequences of these must partake of their nature. Infinite\nwisdom and goodness, as principles, can only envelope parts of\nthemselves. It would be the destruction of all logic to deny this. It\nwould annihilate every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be\nsaid that infinite wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what\nis essentially right, and that it is a fact that volitions do transgress\nthis law, still this cannot affect what is said above. The promulgation\nof the law was a necessary developement of infinite wisdom; and the\nvolition which transgresses it is a developement of the same nature. If\nthis seems contradictory, I cannot help it. It is drawn from the system,\nand the system alone is responsible for its conclusions.\n\nIf it should be replied here, that every system must be subject to the\nsame difficulty, because if evil had a beginning, it must have had a\nholy cause, inasmuch as it could not exist before it began to exist,--I\nanswer, this would be true if evil is the _necessary_ developement of a\nholy cause. But more of this hereafter.\n\nVI. The system of Edwards is a system of utilitarianism. Every volition\nbeing the sense of the most agreeable, and arising from the correlation\nof the object and the sensitivity; it follows that every motive and\nevery action comes under, and cannot but come under, the one idea of\ngratification or enjoyment. According to this system, there can be no\ncollision between principle and passion, because principle can have no\npower to determine the will, except as it becomes the most agreeable.\nUniversally, justice, truth, and benevolence, obtain sway only by\nuniting with desire, and thus coming under conditions of yielding the\nhighest enjoyment. Justice, truth, and benevolence, when obeyed,\ntherefore, are not obeyed as such, but simply as the most agreeable; and\nso also injustice, falsehood, and malignity, are not obeyed as such, but\nsimply as the most agreeable. In this quality of the most agreeable, as\nthe quality of all motive and the universal principle of the\ndeterminations of the will, intrinsic moral distinctions fade away. We\nmay indeed _speculate_ respecting these distinctions,--we may say that\njustice evidently is right in itself, and injustice wrong in itself; but\nthis judgement has practical efficiency only as one of the terms takes\nthe form of the most agreeable. But we have seen that the most agreeable\ndepends upon the state of the sensitivity in correlation with the\nobject,--a state and a correlation antecedent to action; and that\ntherefore it is a necessary law of our being, to be determined by the\ngreatest apparent good or the most agreeable. Utility, therefore, is not\nonly in point of fact, but also in point of necessity, the law of\naction. There is no other law under which it is conceivable that we can\nact.\n\nVII. It follows from this system, again, that no individual can make an\neffort to change the habitual character of his volitions,--and of course\ncannot resist his passions, or introduce any intellectual or moral\ndiscipline other than that in which he is actually placed, or undertake\nany enterprise that shall be opposite to the one in which he is engaged,\nor not part or consequent of the same.\n\nIf he effect any change directly in the habitual character of his\nvolitions, he must do it by a volition; that is, he must will different\nfrom his actual will,--his will must oppose itself in its own act: but\nthis is absurd, the system itself being judge. As, therefore, the will\ncannot oppose itself, a new volition can be obtained only by presenting\na new motive; but this is equally impossible. To present a new motive is\nto call up new objects and circumstances in relation to the actual state\nof the mind, touching upon some principles which had been slumbering\nunder the habitual volitions; or the state of the mind itself must be\nchanged in relation to the objects now before it; or a change must take\nplace both of subject and object, for the motive lies in the correlation\nof the two. But the volition to call up new objects and circumstances in\nrelation to some principle of the mind that had been slumbering,--for\nexample, fear, must itself have a motive; but the motive to call up\nobjects of fear must preexist; if it exist at all. If it preexist, then\nof necessity the volition to call up objects of fear will take place;\nand, it will not be a change effected by the man himself, out of the\nactually existing state of mind and objects. If there be no such motive\npre-existing, then it would become necessary to present a new motive, to\ncause the choice of objects of fear; and here would be a recurrence of\nthe original difficulty,--and so on, ad infinitum.\n\nIf the problem be to effect a change in the state of the mind in\nrelation to existing objects, in the first place, this cannot be\neffected by a direct act of will, for the act of will is caused by the\nstate of mind, and this would be an effect changing or annihilating its\ncause.\n\nNor can it be done indirectly. For to do it indirectly, would be to\nbring influences to bear upon the state of mind or the sensitivity; but\nthe choice and volition of these influences would require a motive--but\nthe motive to change the state of mind must pre-exist in the state of\nmind itself. And thus we have on the one hand, to show the possibility\nof finding a principle in the state of mind on which to bring about its\nchange. And then if this be shown, the change is not really a change,\nbut a new developement of the long chain of the necessary causes and\nvolitions. And on the other, if this be not shown, we must find a motive\nto change the state of mind in order to a change of the state: but this\nmotive, if it exist, must pre-exist in the state of mind. If it\npre-exist, then no change is required; if it do not; then we must seek\nstill an antecedent motive, and so in endless retrogression. If the\nproblem be to change both subject and object, the same difficulties\nexist in two-fold abundance.\n\nThe grand difficulty is to find a _primum mobile_, or first mover, when\nthe very act of seeking implies a _primum mobile_, which the conditions\nof the act deny.\n\nAny new discipline, therefore, intellectual or moral, a discipline\nopposite to that which the present state of the mind would naturally and\nnecessarily bring about, is impossible.\n\nOf course, it is impossible to restrain passion, to deny or mortify\none's self. The present volition is as the strongest present\ndesire--indeed, is the strongest present desire itself. \"Will and desire\ndo not run counter at all.\" \"A man never in any instance, wills anything\ncontrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will.\" (p.\n17.) Hence to restrain a present passion would be to will against\nwill--would be to desire opposite ways at the same moment. Desires may\nbe relatively stronger and weaker, and the stronger will overcome the\nweaker; but the strongest desire must prevail and govern the man; it is\nutterly impossible for him to oppose any resistance, for his whole\npower, activity, and volition, are in the desire itself.\n\nHe can do nothing but will; and the nature and direction of his\nvolitions are, at least in reference to any effort of his own, immutable\nas necessity itself.\n\nVIII. All exhortations and persuasions which call upon the man to bestir\nhimself, to think, to plan, to act, are inconsistent and absurd. In all\nsuch exhortations and persuasions, the man is urged to will or put forth\nvolitions, as if he were the author, the determiner of the volitions. It\nmay be replied, 'that the man does will, that the volitions are his\nvolitions.' But then he wills only passively, and these volitions are\nhis only because they appear in his consciousness. You exhort and\npersuade him to arouse himself into activity; but what is his real\ncondition according to this system? The exhortations and persuasions do\nthemselves contain the motive power: and instead of arousing himself to\naction, he is absolutely and necessarily passive under the motives you\npresent. Whether he be moved or not, as truly and absolutely depends\nupon the motives you present, as the removing of any material mass\ndepends upon the power and lever applied. And the material mass, whether\nit be wood or stone, may with as much propriety be said to arouse itself\nas the man; and the man's volition is his volition in no other sense\nthan the motion of the material mass is its motion. In the one case, the\nman perceives; and in the other case, the material mass does not\nperceive--but perception is granted by all parties to be necessary; the\naddition of perception, therefore, only modifies the character of the\nbeing moved, without altering the nature of his relation to the power\nwhich moves him. In the material mass, too, we have an analogous\nproperty, so far as motion is considered. For as motive cannot determine\nthe will unless there be perception, so neither can the lever and power\nmove the mass unless it possess resistance, and cohesion of parts. If I\nhave but the wisdom to discover the proper correlation of object and\nsensitivity in the case of individuals or of masses of men, I can\ncommand them in any direction I please, with a necessity no less\nabsolute than that with which a machine is caused to work by the\napplication of a steam or water-power.\n\nWhen I bring motives before the minds of my fellow-beings in the proper\nrelation, the volition is necessarily produced; but let me not forget,\nthat in bringing these motives I put forth volitions, and that of course\nI am myself moved under the necessity of some antecedent motive. My\npersuasions and exhortations are necessary sequents, as well as\nnecessary antecedents. The water must run through the water-course; the\nwheel must turn under the force of the current; I must exhort and\npersuade when motives determine me. The minds I address must yield when\nthe motives are properly selected.\n\nIX. Divine commands, warnings, and rebukes, when obeyed and yielded to,\nare obeyed and yielded to by the necessary force which they possess in\nrelation to the state of mind to which they are addressed. When not\nobeyed and yielded to, they fail necessarily, through a moral inability\non the part of the mind addressed; or, in other words, through the want\nof a proper correlation between them and the state of mind addressed:\nthat is, there is not in the case a sufficient power to produce the\nrequired volitions, and their existence of course is an utter\nimpossibility.\n\nDivine commands, warnings, and rebukes, produce volitions of obedience\nand submission, only as they produce the sense of the most agreeable;\nand as the will of the creature can have no part in producing this\nsense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition, it is\nproduced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by a\npositive necessity. This is so clear from all that has gone before; that\nno enlargement here is required.\n\nWhen no obedience and submission take place, it is because the divine\ncommands, warnings, and rebukes, do not produce the sense of the most\nagreeable. And as the will of the creature can have no part in producing\nthis sense, since this would be producing a volition by a volition; and\nas it is produced in a correlation antecedent to will, and of course by\na positive necessity; so likewise the will of the creature can have no\npart in preventing this sense from taking place. The volition of\nobedience and the volition of disobedience are manifestations of the\nantecedent correlations of certain objects with the subject, and are\nnecessarily determined by the nature of the correlation.\n\nNow the Divine Being must know the precise relation which his commands\nwill necessarily hold to the vast variety of mind to which they are\naddressed, and consequently must know in what cases obedience will be\nproduced, and in what cases disobedience. Both results are equally\nnecessary. The commands have therefore, necessarily and fitly, a\ntwo-fold office. When they come into connexion with certain states of\nmind, they necessarily and fitly produce what we call obedience: when in\nconnexion with other states of mind, they necessarily and fitly produce\nwhat we call rebellion: and as all volitions are predetermined and fixed\nby a necessary and infinite wisdom, and are therefore in their time and\nplace the best, it must follow that rebellion no less than obedience is\na wise and desirable result.\n\nThe consequences I am here deducing seem almost too shocking to utter.\nBut show me, he that can, that they are not logical deductions from this\nsystem? I press the system to its consequences,--not to throw any\nreproach upon those great and good men who unfortunately were led away\nby a false philosophy, but to expose and bring to its close this\nphilosophy itself. It has too long been consecrated by its association\nwith the good. I know I shall be justified in the honest, though bold\nwork, of destroying this unnatural and portentous alliance.\n\nX. The sense of guilt and shame and the fear of retribution cannot,\naccording to this system, have a real and necessary connexion with any\nvolitions, but must be regarded as prejudices or errors of education,\nfrom which philosophy will serve to relieve us.\n\nEdwards labours to prove, (part iv. sec. 1,) that virtue and vice lie\nessentially in the volitions themselves, and that of course the\nconsciousness of evil volitions is the consciousness of guilt. I will,\nor put forth volitions. The volitions are mine, and therefore I am\nguilty. This reasoning is plausible, but not consequential; for,\naccording to this system, I put forth volitions in entire passivity: the\nvolitions appear necessarily and by Antecedent motives in my\nconsciousness, and really are mine only because they are produced in me.\nConnected with this may be the perception that those volitions are\nwrong; but if there is likewise the conviction that they are necessary,\nand that to suppose them different from what they are, is to suppose\nwhat could not possibly have been,--since a series of sequents and\nantecedents connect these volitions which now appear, by absolutely\nnecessary relations, with a first and necessary cause,--then the sense\nof guilt and shame, and the judgement I ought to be punished, can have\nno place in the human mind. It is of no avail to tell me that I will,\nand, according to the common judgement of mankind, I must be guilty when\nI will wrong,--if, at the same time, philosophy teaches me that I will\nunder the necessary and inevitable governance of an antecedent motive.\nThe common judgement of mankind is an error, and philosophy must soon\ndissipate the sense of guilt and shame, and of moral desert, which have\nhitherto annoyed me and made me fearful: and much more must such a\nresult ensue, when I take into consideration, likewise, that the\nnecessity which determines me, is a necessity which takes its rise in\ninfinite and necessary wisdom.\n\nWhat is true of guilt and retribution is true also of well-doing and\nreward. If I do well, the volitions being determined by an antecedent\nnecessity, I could not possibly have done otherwise. It does not answer\nthe conditions of the case at all, to say I might have done otherwise,\nif I had willed to do otherwise; because the will to do as I actually am\ndoing, is a will that could not have been otherwise. Give me, then, in\nany action called good, great, noble, glorious, &c. the conviction that\nthe choice of this action was a necessary choice, predetermined in a\nlong and unbroken chain of necessary antecedents, and the sense of\npraiseworthiness, and the judgement I ought to be rewarded, remain no\nlonger.\n\nMerit and demerit are connected in our minds with our volitions, under\nthe impression that the good we perform, we perform in opposition to\ntemptation, and with the power and possibility of doing evil; and that\nthe evil we perform, we perform in opposition to motives of good, and\nwith the power and possibility of doing good. But when we are informed\nthat all the power and possibility of a conduct opposite to our actual\nconduct is this,--that if we had put forth opposite volitions, there\nwould have been opposite external acts, but that nevertheless the\nvolitions themselves were necessary, and could not have been\notherwise,--we cannot but experience a revulsion of mind. We perhaps are\nfirst led to doubt the philosophy,--or if, by acute reasonings, or by\nthe authority of great names, we are influenced to yield an implicit\nbelief,--the sense of merit and demerit must either die away, or be\nmaintained by a hasty retreat from the regions of speculation to those\nof common sense.\n\nXI. It follows from this system, also, that nature and spirit, as causes\nor agents, cannot be distinguished in their operations.\n\nThere are three classes of natural causes or agents generally\nacknowledged 1. Inanimate,--as water, wind, steam, magnetism, &c.; 2.\nAnimate, but insensible,--as the life and affinities of plants; 3.\nAnimate and sensitive, or brute animal power.\n\nThese all properly come under the denomination of _natural_, because\nthey are alike _necessitated_. \"Whatever is comprised in the chain and\nmechanism of cause and effect, of course necessitated, and having its\nnecessity in some other thing antecedent or concurrent,--this is said to\nbe _natural_; and the aggregate and system of all such things is\n_nature_.\" Now spirit, as a cause or agent, by this system, comes under\nthe same definition: in all its acts it is necessitated. It is in will\nparticularly that man is taken as a cause or agent, because it is by\nwill that he directly produces phenomena or effects; and by this system\nit is not possible to distinguish, so far as necessary connexion is\nconsidered, a chain of antecedents and sequents made up of motives,\nvolitions, and the consequents of volitions, from a chain of sequents\nand antecedents into which the three first mentioned classes of natural\nagents enter. All the several classes have peculiar and distinguishing\ncharacteristics; but in the relation of antecedence and sequence,--their\nrelation as causes or agents producing effects,--no distinction can be\nperceived. Wind, water, &c. form one kind of cause; organic life forms\nanother; brute organization and sensitivity another; intelligent\nvolition another: but they are all necessary, absolutely necessary; and\ntherefore they are the co-ordinate parts of the one system of nature.\nThe difference which exists between them is a difference of terms\nmerely. There is no difference in the nature of the relation between the\nterms. The nature of the relation between the water-wheel and the\nwater,--of the relation between the organic life of plants and their\ndevelopement,--of the relation between passion and volition in\nbrutes,--of the relation between their efforts and material\neffects,--and the nature of the relation between motive and\nvolition,--are one: it is the relation of cause and effect considered as\nstated antecedent and sequent, and no more and no less necessary in one\nsubject than in another.\n\nXII. It follows, again, that sensations produced by external objects,\nand all emotions following perception, and all the acts of the\nintelligence, whether in intuitive knowledge or in ratiocination, are as\nreally our acts, and acts for which we are as really responsible, if\nresponsibility be granted to exist, as acts of volition. Sensations,\nemotions, perceptions, reasonings, are all within us; they all lie in\nour consciousness; they are not created by our volitions, like the\nmotions of the hands and feet; they take place by their own causes, just\nas volitions take place by their causes. The relation of the man to all\nis precisely the same. He is in no sense the cause of any of these\naffections of his being; he is simply the subject: the subject of\nsensation, of perception, of emotion, of reasoning, and of volition; and\nhe is the subject of all by the same necessity.\n\nXIII. The system of punishment is only a system accommodated to the\nopinions of society.\n\nThere is nothing evil in itself, according to this system of necessity,\nas we have already shown. Every thing which takes place is, in its time,\nplace, and relations generally, the necessary result of necessary and\ninfinite wisdom. But still it is a fact that society are desirous of\npreventing certain acts,--such as stealing, adultery, murder, &c.; and\nthey are necessarily so desirous. Now the system of punishment is a mere\ncollection of motives in relation to the sense of pain and the emotion\nof fear, which prevent the commission of these acts. Where these acts do\ntake place, it is best they should take place; but where they are\nprevented by the fear of punishment, it is best they should be\nprevented. Where the criminal suffers, he has no right to complain,\nbecause it is best that he should suffer; and yet, if he does complain,\nit is best that he should complain. The system of punishment is good, as\nevery thing else is good. The system of divine punishments must be\nconsidered in the same light. Indeed, what are human punishments, when\nproperly considered, but divine punishments? They are comprehended in\nthe pre-ordained and necessary chain of being and events.\n\nXIV. Hence we must conclude, also, that there cannot really be any\ncalamity. The calamities which we may at any time experience, we ought\nto endure and rejoice in, as flowing from the same perfect and necessary\nsource. But as calamity does nevertheless necessarily produce suffering\nand uneasiness, and the desire of relief, we may be permitted to hope\nthat perfect relief and entire blessedness will finally ensue, and that\nthe final blessedness will be enhanced just in proportion to the present\nsuffering.\n\nThe necessitarian may be an optimist of a high order. It he commits what\nis called crime, and remorse succeeds, and punishment is inflicted under\nlaw, the crime is good, the remorse is good, the punishment is good, all\nnecessary and good, and working out, as he hopes, a result of pure\nhappiness. Nothing can be bad in itself: it may be disagreeable; but\neven this will probably give way to the agreeable. And so also with all\nafflictions: they must be good in themselves, although disagreeable,\n--and will probably lead the way to the agreeable, just as\nhunger and thirst, which are disagreeable, lead the way to the\nenjoyments of eating and drinking. All is of necessity, and of a\nnecessary and perfect wisdom.\n\nXV. But as all is of necessity, and of a necessary and perfect wisdom,\nthere really can no more be folly in conduct, or error in reasoning and\nbelief, than there can be crime and calamity, considered as evils in\nthemselves. Every act that we call folly is a necessary act, in its\ntime, place, and relations generally, and is a necessary consequence of\nthe infinite wisdom; but a necessary consequence of infinite wisdom\ncannot be opposed to infinite wisdom; so that what we call folly, when\nphilosophically considered, ceases to be folly.\n\nIn any act of pure reasoning, the relations seem necessary, and the\nassent of the mind is necessary. This is granted by all parties. But it\nmust be admitted, that when men are said to reason falsely, and to yield\ntheir assent to false conclusions, the relations seem necessary to them;\nand, according to this system, they necessarily so seem, and cannot seem\notherwise: and the assent of the mind is also necessary.\n\nThe reasoning, to others, would be false reasoning, because it so\nnecessarily seems to them; but to the individual to whom it seems\ndifferent, it must really be different, and be good and valid reasoning.\n\nAgain: as all these different reasonings and beliefs proceed necessarily\nfrom the same source, they must all be really true where they seem true,\nand all really false where they seem false. It would follow, from this,\nthat no one can really be in a false position except the hypocrite and\nsophist, pretending to believe and to be what he does not believe and\nwhat he is not, and purposely reasoning falsely, and stating his false\nconclusions as if they were truths. I say this would follow, were we not\ncompelled by this system to allow that even the hypocrite and sophist\ncannot hold a false position, inasmuch as his position is a necessary\none, predetermined in its necessary connexion with the first necessary\nwisdom.\n\nXVI. Another consequence of this system is fatalism,--or, perhaps, more\nproperly speaking, the system is itself a system of fatalism.\n\nThis, indeed, has already been made to appear substantially. The word,\nhowever, has not yet been used. I here, then, charge directly this\nconsequence or feature upon the system.\n\nFatalism is the absolute negation of liberty. This system is fatalism,\nbecause it is the absolute negation of liberty.\n\nNo liberty is contended for, in this system, in relation to man, but\nphysical liberty: viz. that when he wills, the effect will follow,--that\nwhen he wills to walk, he walks, &c. \"Liberty, as I have explained it,\nis the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he\npleases, or conducting himself in any respect according to his pleasure,\nwithout considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is.\" (p. 291.)\n\nIn the first place, this is no higher liberty than what brutes possess.\nThey have power, opportunity, or advantage, to do as they please.\nEffects follow their volitions by as certain a law as effects follow the\nvolitions of men.\n\nIn the second place, this is no higher liberty than slaves possess.\nSlaves uniformly do as they please. If the motive be the lash, or the\nfear of the lash, still, in their case as well as in that of brutes\nunder similar circumstances, the volition which takes place is the most\npleasing at the moment. The slave and the animal do what is most\npleasing to them, or do according to their pleasure, When the one drags\nthe plough and the other holds it. Nay, it is impossible for any animal,\nrational or irrational, to act without doing what is most pleasing to\nhim or it. Volition is always as the greatest apparent good, or as the\nsense of the most pleasant or agreeable.\n\nIf any should reply that slaves and animals are _liable_ to be fettered,\nand this distinguishes them from the free, I rejoin that every being is\nliable to various restraints; none of us can do many things which in\nthemselves appear desirable, and would be objects of volition if there\nwere known to be an established connexion between them and our wills. We\nare limited in our actions by the powers of nature around us; we cannot\noverturn mountains, or command the winds. We are limited in the nature\nof our physical being. We are limited by our want of wealth, knowledge,\nand influence. In all these respects, we may, with as much propriety as\nthe slave, be regarded as deprived of liberty. It does not avail to say\nthat, as we never really will what we know to be impossible or\nimpracticable, so in relation to such objects, neither liberty or a want\nof liberty is to be affirmed; for the same will apply to the fettered\nslave; he does not will to walk or run when he knows it to be\nimpossible. But in relation to him as well as to every other being,\naccording to this system it holds true, that whether he act or forbear\nto act, his volitions are as the most agreeable.\n\nAll creatures, therefore, acting by volition, are to be accounted free,\nand one really as free as another.\n\nIn the third place, the liberty here affirmed belongs equally to every\ninstance of stated antecedence and sequence.\n\nThe liberty which is taken to reside in the connexion between volition\nand effects, is a liberty lying in a connexion of stated antecedence and\nsequence, and is perfect according as this connexion is necessary and\nunimpeded. The highest form of liberty, therefore, is to be found in the\nmost absolute form of necessity. Liberty thus becomes identified also\nwith power: where there is power, there is liberty; and where power is\nthe greatest, that is, where it overcomes the most obstacles and moves\non irresistibly to its effects, there is the greatest degree of liberty.\nGod is the most free of all beings, because nothing can impede his will.\nHis volitions are always the antecedents of effects.\n\nBut obviously we do not alter the relation, when we change the terms. If\nliberty lie in the stated antecedence of volition to effects, and if\nliberty is measured by the necessity of the relation, then when the\nantecedent is changed, the relation remaining the same, liberty must\nstill be present. For example: when a volition to move the arm is\nfollowed by a motion of the arm, there is liberty; now let galvanism be\nsubstituted for the volition, and the effect as certainly takes place;\nand as freedom is doing as we please, or will, \"without considering how\nthis pleasure (or will) comes to be as it is;\" that is, without taking\nits motive into the account. So likewise, freedom may be affirmed to be\ndoing according to the galvanic impulse, \"without considering how\" that\nimpulse \"comes to be as it is.\"\n\nIf we take any other instance of stated antecedence and sequence, the\nreasoning is the same. For example, a water wheel in relation to the\nmill-stone: when the wheel turns, the mill-stone moves. In this case\nfreedom may be defined: the mill-stone moving according to the turn of\nthe wheel, \"without considering how\" that turn of the wheel \"comes to be\nas it is.\" In the case of human freedom, freedom is defined, doing\naccording to our volitions, without considering how the volition comes\nto be as it is; doing \"according to choice, without taking into the\nmeaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice.\" (p. 39.)\n\nIf it be said that in the case of volition, we have the man of whom to\naffirm freedom; but in the case of the wheel and mill-stone, we have\nnothing of which liberty can properly be affirmed. I reply, that liberty\nmust be affirmed, and is properly affirmed, of that to which it really\nbelongs; and hence as volition is supposed to belong to the spiritual\nessence, man; and this spiritual essence is pronounced free, because\nvolition appears in it, and is attended by consequences:--so, likewise,\nthe material essence of the wheel may be pronounced free, because motion\nbelongs to it, and is followed by consequences. As every being that has\nvolition is free, so likewise every thing that hath motion is free:--in\nevery instance of cause and effect, we meet with liberty.\n\nBut volition cannot be the characteristic of liberty, if volition itself\nbe governed by necessity: and yet this system which affirms liberty,\nwherever there is unimpeded volition, makes volition a necessary\ndetermination. In the fact of unimpeded volition, it gives liberty to\nall creatures that have volition; and then again, in the fact of the\nnecessary determination of volition it destroys the possibility of\nliberty. But even where it affirms liberty to exist, there is no new\nfeature to characterize it as liberty. The connexion between volition\nand its stated consequences, is a connexion as necessary and absolute as\nthe connexion between the motive and the volition, and between any\nantecedent and sequent whatever. That my arm should move when I make a\nvolition to this effect, is just as necessary and just as\nincomprehensible too, as that water should freeze at a given\ntemperature: when the volition is impeded, we have only another instance\nof necessity,--a lesser force overcome by a greater.\n\nThe liberty therefore which this system affirms in the fact of volition\nand its unimpeded connexion with its consequents, is an assumption--a\nmere name. It is a part of the universal necessity arbitrarily\ndistinguished and named, its liberty does not reside in human volition,\nso neither can it reside in the divine volition. The necessary\ndependence of volition upon motive, and the necessary sequence of\neffects upon volition, can no more be separated from the divine mind\nthan from ours. It is a doctrine which, if true, is implied in the\nuniversal conception of mind. It belongs to mind generically considered.\nThe creation of volition by volition is absurd in itself--it cannot but\nbe an absurdity. The determination of will by the strongest motive, if a\ntruth is a truth universally; on this system, it contains the whole\ncause and possibility of volition. The whole liberty of God, it is\naffirmed, is contained in this, to do as pleases him, or, in other\nwords, that what he wills is accomplished, and necessarily accomplished:\nwhat pleases him is also fixed in the necessity of his own nature. His\nliberty, therefore, by its own definition, differs nothing from\nnecessity.\n\nIf the movements of mind are necessary, no argument is required to prove\nthat all being and events are necessary. We are thus bound up in a\nuniversal necessity. Whatever is, is, and cannot be otherwise, and could\nnot have been otherwise. As therefore there is no liberty, we are\nreduced to the only remaining alternative of fatalism.\n\nEdwards does not indeed attempt to rebut wholly the charge of fatalism.\n(part iv. Sec. vi.) In relation to the Stoics, he remarks:--\"It seems they\ndiffered among themselves; and probably the doctrine of _fate_ as\nmaintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But\nwhatever their doctrines was, if any of them held such a fate, as is\nrepugnant to any _liberty, consisting in our doing as we please,_ I\nutterly deny such a fate.\" He objects to fatalism only when it should\ndeny our actions to be connected with our pleasure, or our sense of the\nmost agreeable, that is our volition. But this connexion we have fully\nproved to be as necessary as the connexion between the volition and its\nmotive. This reservation therefore does not save him from fatalism.\n\nIn the following section, (sec. vii.) he represents the liberty and\nsovereignty of God as consisting in an ability \"to do whatever pleases\nhim.\" His idea of the divine liberty, therefore, is the same as that\nattributed to man. That the divine volitions are necessarily determined,\nhe repeatedly affirms, and indeed represents as the great excellence of\nthe divine nature, because this necessity of determination is laid in\nthe infinite wisdom and perfection of his nature.\n\nIf necessity govern all being and events, it is cheering to know that it\nis necessity under the forms of infinite wisdom and benevolence. But\nstill it remains true that necessity governs. If \"it is no disadvantage\nor dishonour to a being, _necessarily_ to act in the most excellent and\nhappy manner from the necessary perfection of his own nature,\" still let\nus remember that under this representation _he does act necessarily_.\nFate must have some quality or form; it must be what we call good or\nevil: but in determining its quality, we do not destroy its nature. Now\nif we call this fate a nature of goodness and wisdom, eternal and\ninfinite, we present it under forms beautiful, benign, and glorious, but\nit is nevertheless fate,--and as such it governs the divine volitions;\nand through the divine volitions, all the consequents and effects of\nthese volitions;--the universe of being and things is determined by\nfate;--and all volitions of angels or men are determined by fate--by\nthis fate so beautiful, benign, and glorious. Now if all things thus\n_proceeding_ from fate were beautiful, benign, and glorious, the theory\nmight not alarm us. But that deformity, crime, and calamity should have\nplace as developements of this fate, excites uneasiness. The abettors of\nthis system, however, may perhaps comfort themselves with the persuasion\nthat deformity, crime, and calamity, are names not of realities, but of\nthe limited conceptions of mankind. We have indeed an instance in point\nin Charles Bonnet, whom Dugald Stewart mentions as \"a very learned and\npious disciple of Leibnitz.\" Says Bonnet--\"Thus the same chain embraces\nthe physical and moral world, binds the past to the present, the present\nto the future, the future to eternity. That wisdom which has ordained\nthe existence of this chain, has doubtless willed that of every link of\nwhich it is composed. A Caligula is one of these links; and this link is\nof iron. A Marcus Aurelius is another link; and this link is of gold.\n_Both_ are necessary parts of one whole, which could not but exist.\nShall God then be angry at the sight of the iron link? What absurdity!\nGod esteems this link at its proper value. He sees it in its cause, and\nhe approves this cause, for it is good. God beholds moral monsters as he\nbeholds physical monsters. Happy is the link of gold! Still more happy\nif he know that he is _only fortunate_. He has attained the highest\ndegree of moral perfection, and is nevertheless without pride, knowing\nthat what he is, is the necessary result, of the place which he must\noccupy in the chain. The gospel is the allegorical exposition of this\nsystem; the simile of the potter is its summary.\" He might have added,\n\"Happy is the link of iron, if he know that he is not guilty, but at\nworst _only unfortunate;_ and really not unfortunate, because holding a\nnecessary place in the chain which both as a whole and in its parts, is\nthe result of infinite wisdom.\"\n\nIf anything more is required in order to establish this consequence of\nthe system we are examining, I would call attention to the inquiry,\nwhether after a contingent self-determining will there remains any\ntheory of action except fatalism? A contingent self-determining will is\na will which is the cause of its own volitions or choices--a\nself-conscious power, self-moved and directed, and at the moment of its\nchoice, or movement towards a particular object, conscious of ability of\nchoosing, or moving towards, an opposite object. Now what conception\nhave we to oppose to this but that of a will not determining\nitself,--not the cause of its own volitions,--a power not self-moved and\ndirected,--and not conscious of ability at the moment of a particular\nchoice, to make a contrary choice? And this last conception is a will\nwhose volitions are determined by some power antecedent to itself, not\ncontingently, but necessarily. As the will is the only power for which\ncontingent self-determination is claimed, if it be proved to be no such\npower, then no such power exists. The whole theory of action and\ncausality will then be expressed as follows:\n\n1. Absolute and necessary connexion of motives and volitions. 2.\nAbsolute and necessary connexion of volitions and effects. 3. Absolute\nand necessary connexion of all sequents and antecedents in nature. 4.\nAbsolute and necessary connexion of all things existent with a first and\nnecessary principle or cause. 5. The necessary determination of this\nprinciple or cause.\n\nDenying a contingent self-determining will, this theory is all that\nremains. If liberty be affirmed to reside in the 2d particular of this\ntheory, it becomes a mere arbitrary designation, because the _nature_ of\nthe relation is granted to be the same; it is not _contingent_, but\nnecessary. Nor can liberty be affirmed to reside in the 5th; because in\nthe first place, the supposed demonstration of the absurdity of a\ncontingent self-determining will, by infinite series of volitions, must\napply to this great first principle considered as God. And in the second\nplace, the doctrine of the necessary determination of motive must apply\nhere likewise, since God as will and intelligence requires motives no\nless than we do. Such determination is represented as arising from the\nvery nature of mind or spirit. Now this theory advanced in opposition to\na self-determining will, is plainly the negation of liberty as opposed\nto necessity. And this is all that can be meant by fatalism. Liberty\nthus becomes a self-contradictory conception, and fatalism alone is\ntruth and reality.\n\nXVII. It appears to me also, that pantheism is a fair deduction from\nthis system.\n\nAccording to this system, God is the sole and universal doer--the only\nefficient cause. 1. His volition is the creative act, by which all\nbeings and things exist. Thus far it is generally conceded that God is\nall in all. \"By him we live, and move, and have our being.\" 2. The\nactive powers of the whole system of nature he has constituted and\nregulated. The winds are his messengers. The flaming fire his servant.\nHowever we may conceive of these powers, whether as really powers acting\nunder necessary laws, or as immediate manifestations of divine energy,\nin either case it is proper to attribute all their movements to God.\nThese movements were ordained by his wisdom, and are executed directly\nor indirectly by his will. Every effect which we produce in the material\nworld, we produce by instrumentality. Our arms, hands, &c. are our first\ninstruments. All that we do by the voluntary use of these, we attribute\nto ourselves. Now if we increase the instrumentality by the addition of\nan axe, spade, or hammer, still the effect is justly attributed in the\nsame way. It is perfectly clear that to whatever extent we multiply the\ninstruments, the principle is the same. Whether I do the deed directly\nwith my hand, or do it by an instrument held in my hand, or by a\nconcatenation of machinery, reaching from \"the centre to the utmost\npole,\"--if I contemplate the deed, and designedly accomplish it in this\nway, the deed is mine. And not only is the last deed contemplated as the\nend of all this arrangement mine, all the intermediary movements\nproduced as the necessary chain of antecedents and sequents by which the\nlast is to be attained, are mine likewise.\n\nI use powers and instruments whose energy and capacity I have learned by\nexperience, but in whose constitution I have had no hand. They are\nprovided for me, and I merely use them. But God in working by these,\nworks by what his own wisdom and power have created; and therefore _a\nfortiori_ must every effect produced by these, according to his design,\nand by his volition as at least the first power of the series, be\nattributed to him,--be called his doing. He causeth the sun to rise and\nset. \"He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the\nservice of man.\" \"He watereth the hills from his chambers.\" This is not\nmerely poetry. It is truth.\n\nNow the system we are considering goes one step further; it makes human\nvolitions as much the objects of the eternal design, and as really the\neffects of the divine volition, as the rising of the stars, the flight\nof the lightning, the tumult of the waters, or the light which spreadeth\nitself like a garment over creation. Every volition of created mind is\nGod's act, as really as any effect in nature. We have seen how every\nvolition is connected with its motive; how the motive lies in a\npre-constitution; how the series of antecedents and sequents necessarily\nruns back and connects itself with the infinite wisdom. God's volition\nis his own act; the effect immediately produced by that volition is his\nown deed. Let that effect be the creation of man: the man in all his\npowers and susceptibilities is God's work; the objects around him are\nGod's work; the correlation of the objects with the sensitivity of man\nis God's work; the volition which necessarily takes place as the result\nof this correlation is God's work. The volition of the man is as\nstrictly attributable to God, as, according to our common apprehensions,\nthe blow which I give with an axe is attributable to me. What is true of\nthe first man, must be equally true of the man removed by a thousand\ngenerations, for the intermediary links are all ordained by God under an\ninevitable necessity. God is really, therefore, the sole doer--the only\nefficient, the only cause. All beings and things, all motion and all\nvolition, are absolutely resolved into divine volition. God is the\nauthor of all beings, things, motions, and volitions, and as much the\nauthor of any one of these as of any other, and the author of all in the\nsame way and in the same sense. Set aside self-determining will, and\nthere is no stopping-place between a human volition and the divine\nvolition. The human volition is but the divine, manifested through a\nlengthened it may be, but a connected and necessary chain of antecedents\nand sequents. I see no way of escaping from this, as a necessary and\nlegitimate consequence of the necessary determination of will. And what\nis this consequence but pantheism? God is the universal and\nall-pervading intelligence--the universal and only power. Every movement\nof nature is necessary; every movement of mind is necessary; because\nnecessarily caused and determined by the divine volition. There is no\nlife but his, no thought but his, no efficiency but his. He is the soul\nof the world.\n\nSpinosa never represented himself as an atheist, and according to the\nfollowing representation appears rather as a pantheist. \"He held that\nGod is the _cause_ of all things; but that he acts, not from choice, but\nfrom necessity; and, of consequence, that he is the involuntary author\nof all the good and evil, virtue and vice, which are exhibited in human\nlife.\" (Dugald Stewart, vol. 6. p. 276, note.)\n\nCousin remarks, too, that Spinosa deserves rather the reproach of\npantheism than of atheism. His pantheism was fairly deduced from the\ndoctrine of necessary determination, which he advocated.\n\nXVIII. Spinosa, however, is generally considered an atheist. \"It will\nnot be disputed,\" says Stewart, \"by those who comprehend the drift of\nhis reasonings, that in point of practical tendency atheism and\nSpinosism are one and the same.\"\n\nThe following is Cousin's view of his system. It apparently differs from\nthe preceding in some respects, but really tends to the same\nconclusions.\n\n\"Instead of accusing Spinosa of atheism, he ought to be reproached for\nan error in the other direction. Spinosa starts from the perfect and\ninfinite being of Descartes's system, and easily demonstrates that such\na being is alone a being in itself; but that a being, finite, imperfect,\nand relative, only participates of being, without possessing it, in\nitself: that a being in itself is one necessarily: that there is but one\nsubstance; and that all that remains has only a phenomenal existence:\nthat to call phenomena, finite substances, is affirming and denying, at\nthe same time; whereas, there being, but one substance which possesses\nbeing in itself, and the finite being that which participates of\nexistence without possessing it in itself, a substance finite implies\ntwo contradictory notions. Thus, in the philosophy of Spinosa, man and\nnature are pure phenomena; simple attributes of that one and absolute\nsubstance, but attributes which are co-eternal with their substance: for\nas phenomena cannot exist without a subject, the imperfect without the\nperfect, the finite without the infinite, and man and nature suppose\nGod; so likewise, the substance cannot exist without phenomena, the\nperfect without the imperfect, the infinite without the finite, and God\non his part supposes man and nature. The error of his system lies in the\npredominance of the relation of phenomenon to being, of attribute to\nsubstance, over the relation of effect to cause. When man has been\nrepresented, not as a cause, voluntary and free, but as necessary and\nuncontrollable desire, and as an imperfect and finite thought; God, or\nthe supreme pattern of humanity, can be only a substance, and not a\ncause--a being, perfect, infinite, necessary--the immutable substance of\nthe universe, and not its producing and creating cause. In Cartesianism,\nthe notion of substance figures more conspicuously than that of cause;\nand this notion of substance, altogether predominating, constitutes\nSpinosism.\" (Hist. de la Phil tom. 1. p. 466.)\n\nThe predominance of the notion of substance and attribute, over that of\ncause and effect, which Cousin here pronounces the vice of Spinosa's\nsystem, is indeed the vice of every system which contains the dogma of\nthe necessary determination of will. The first consequence is pantheism;\nthe second, atheism. I will endeavour to explain. When self\n-determination is denied to will, and it is resolved into mere\ndesire, necessitated in all its acts from its pre-constituted\ncorrelation with objects, then will really ceases to be a cause. It\nbecomes an instrument of antecedent power, but is no power in itself,\ncreative or productive. The reasoning employed in reference to the human\nwill, applies in all its force to the divine will, as has been already\nabundantly shown. The divine will therefore ceases to be a cause, and\nbecomes a mere instrument of antecedent power. This antecedent power is\nthe infinite and necessary wisdom; but infinite and necessary wisdom is\neternal and unchangeable; what it is now, it always was; what tendencies\nor energies it has now, it always had; and therefore, whatever volitions\nit now necessarily produces, it always necessarily produced. If we\nconceive a volition to have been, in one direction, the immediate and\nnecessary antecedent of creation; and, in another, the immediate and\nnecessary sequent of infinite, and eternal, and necessary wisdom; then\nthis volition must have always existed, and consequently, creation, as\nthe necessary effect of this volition, must have always existed. The\neternal and infinite wisdom thus becomes the substance, because this is\nexistence in itself, no antecedent being conceivable; and creation,\nconsisting of man and nature, imperfect and finite, participating only\nof existence, and not being existence in themselves, are not substances,\nbut phenomena. But what is the relation of the phenomena to the\nsubstance? Not that of effect to cause;--this relation slides entirely\nout of view, the moment will ceases to be a cause. It is the relation\nsimply of phenomena to being, considered as the necessary and\ninseparable manifestations of being; the relation of attributes to\nsubstance, considered as the necessary and inseparable properties of\nsubstance. We cannot conceive of substance without attributes or\nphenomena, nor of attributes or phenomena without substance; they are,\ntherefore, co-eternal in this relation. Who then is God? Substance and\nits attributes; being and its phenomena. In other words, the universe,\nas made up of substance and attributes, is God. This is Spinosism; this\nis pantheism; and it is the first and legitimate consequence of a\nnecessitated will.\n\nThe second consequence is atheism. In the denial of will as a cause _per\nse_,--in resolving all its volitions into the necessary phenomena of the\neternal substance,--we destroy personality: we have nothing remaining\nbut the universe. Now we may call the universe God; but with equal\npropriety we call God the universe. This destruction of\npersonality,--this merging of God into necessary substance and\nattributes,--is all that we mean by Atheism. The conception is really\nthe same, whether we name it fate, pantheism, or atheism.\n\nThe following remark of Dugald Stewart, shows that he arrived at the\nsame result: \"Whatever may have been the doctrines of some of the\nancient atheists about man's free agency, it will not be denied that, in\nthe history of modern philosophy, the schemes of atheism and of\nnecessity have been hitherto always connected together. Not that I would\nby any means be understood to say, that every necessitarian must _ipso\nfacto_ be an atheist, or even that any presumption is afforded, by a\nman's attachment to the former sect, of his having the slightest bias in\nfavour of the latter; but only that every modern atheist I have heard of\nhas been a necessitarian. I cannot help adding, that the most consistent\nnecessitarian who have yet appeared, have been those who followed out\ntheir principles till they ended in _Spinosism_,--a doctrine which\ndiffers from atheism more in words than in reality.\" (Vol. 6, p. 470.)\n\nCudworth, in his great work entitled \"The true Intellectual System of\nthe Universe,\" shows clearly the connexion between fatalism and atheism.\nThis work seems to have grown out of another undertaking, which\ncontemplated specifically the question of liberty and necessity, and its\nbearing upon morality and religion. The passage in the preface, in which\nhe informs us of his original plan, is a very full expression of his\nopinion. \"First, therefore, I acknowledge,\" says he, \"that when I\nengaged the press, I intended only a discourse concerning liberty and\nnecessity, or, to speak out more plainly, against the fatal necessity of\nall actions and events; which, upon whatsoever grounds or principles\nmaintained, will, as we conceive, serve the design of atheism, and\nundermine Christianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and\nblame, punishments and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgement\nridiculous.\" This opinion of the tendency of the doctrine of a\nnecessitated will, is the germ of his work. The connexion established in\nhis mind between this doctrine and atheism, naturally led him to his\nmasterly and elaborate exposition and refutation of the latter.\n\nThe arguments of many atheists might be referred to, to illustrate the\nconnexion between necessity and atheism. I shall here refer, however, to\nonly one individual, remarkable both for his poetic genius and\nmetaphysical acumen. I mean the late Piercy Bysshe Shelley. He openly\nand unblushingly professed atheism. In his Queen Mab we find this line:\n\"There is no God.\" In a note upon this line, he remarks: \"This negation\nmust be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of\na pervading spirit, co-eternal with the universe, remains unshaken.\"\nThis last hypothesis is Pantheism. Pantheism is really the negation of a\ncreative Deity,--the identity or at least necessary and eternal\nco-existence of God and the universe. Shelley has expressed this clearly\nin another passage:\n\n   \"Spirit of nature! all-sufficing power,\n   Necessity! thou mother of the world!\"\n\nIn a note upon this passage, Shelley has argued the doctrine of the\nnecessary determination of will by motive, with an acuteness and power\nscarcely inferior to Collins or Edwards. He makes, indeed, a different\napplication of the doctrine, but a perfectly legitimate one. Collins and\nEdwards, and the whole race of necessitarian theologians, evidently toil\nunder insurmountable difficulties, while attempting to base religion\nupon this doctrine, and effect their escape only under a fog of\nsubtleties. But Shelley, in daring to be perfectly consistent, is\nperfectly clear. He fearlessly proceeds from necessity to pantheism, and\nthence to atheism and the destruction of all moral distinctions. \"We are\ntaught,\" he remarks, \"by the doctrine of necessity, that there is\nneither good nor evil in the universe, otherwise than as the events to\nwhich we apply these epithets have relation to our own peculiar mode of\nbeing. Still less than with the hypothesis of a God, will the doctrine\nof necessity accord with the belief of a future state of punishment.\"\n\nI here close my deductions from this system. If these deductions be\nlegitimate, as I myself cannot doubt they are, then, to the largest\nclass of readers, the doctrine of necessity is overthrown: it is\noverthrown by its consequences, and my argument has the force of a\n_reductio ad absurdum_. If a self-determined will appear an absurdity,\nstill it cannot be as absurd as the contrary doctrine, if this doctrine\ninvolve the consequences above given. At least, practical wisdom will\nclaim that doctrine which leaves to the world a God, and to man a moral\nand responsible nature.\n\nA question will here very naturally arise: How can we account for the\nfact that so many wise and good men have contended for a necessitated\nwill, as if they were contending for the great basis of all morality and\nreligion? For example, take Edwards himself as a man of great thought\nand of most fervent piety. In the whole of his treatise, he argues with\nthe air and manner of one who is opposing great errors as really\nconnected with a self-determined will. What can be stronger than the\nfollowing language: \"I think that the notion of liberty, consisting in a\n_contingent self-determination of the will_, as necessary to the\nmorality of men's dispositions and actions, is almost inconceivably\npernicious; and that the contrary truth is one of the most important\ntruths of moral philosophy that ever was discussed, and most necessary\nto be known.\" The question is a fair one, and I will endeavour to answer\nit.\n\n1. The impossibility of a self-determining will as being in itself a\ncontradictory idea, and as leading to the consequence of affirming the\nexistence of effects without causes, takes strong hold of the mind in\nthese individuals. This I believe, and hope to prove in the course of\nthis treatise, to be a philosophical error;--but it is no new thing for\ngreat and good men to fall into philosophical errors.\n\nAs, therefore, the liberty consisting in a self-determining will, or the\n_liberty of indifference_, as it has been technically called, is\nconceived to be exploded, they endeavour to supply a _liberty of\nspontaneity_, or a liberty lying in the unimpeded connexion between\nvolition and sequents.\n\nHobbes has defined and illustrated this liberty in a clearer manner than\nany of its advocates: \"I conceive,\" says he, \"liberty to be rightly\ndefined,--the absence of all impediments to action, that are not\ncontained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. As for\nexample, the water is said to descend _freely_, or is said to have\nliberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no\nimpediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments:\nand though water cannot ascend, yet men never say, it wants the\n_liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the\nimpediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we\nsay, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment\nis not in him, but in his hands; whereas, we say not so of him who is\nsick or lame, because the impediment is in himself,\"--that is, he wants\nthe faculty or power of going:--this constitutes natural _inability_.\nLiberty is volition acting upon physical instrumentalities, or upon\nmental faculties, according to a fixed and constituted law of\nantecedents, and meeting with no impediment or overcoming antagonistic\npower. Natural ability is the fixed and constituted antecedence itself.\nHence there may be natural ability without liberty; but liberty cannot\nbe affirmed without natural ability. Both are necessary to constitute\nresponsibility. Natural ability is volition known as a stated antecedent\nof certain effects. Liberty is this antecedent existing without\nimpediment or frustration. Since this is the only possible liberty\nremaining, and as they have no wish to be considered fatalists, they\nenlarge much upon this; not only as the whole of liberty actually\nexisting, but as the full and satisfactory notion of liberty.\n\nIn basing responsibility and praise and blameworthiness upon this\nliberty, an appeal is made to the common ideas, feelings, and practices\nof men. Every man regards himself as free when he does as he\npleases,--when, if he pleases to walk, he walks,--when, if he pleases to\nsit down, he sits down, &c. if a man, in a court of justice, were to\nplead in excuse that he committed the crime because he pleased or willed\nto do it, the judge would reply--\"this is your guilt, that you pleased\nor willed to commit it: nay, your being pleased or willing to commit it\nwas the very doing of it.\" Now all this is just. I readily admit that we\nare free when we do as we please, and that we are guilty when, in doing\nas we please, we commit a crime.\n\nWell, then, it is asked, is not this liberty sufficient to constitute\nresponsibility? And thus the whole difficulty seems to be got over. The\nreasoning would be very fair, as far as it goes, if employed against\nfatalists, but amounts to nothing when employed against those who hold\nto the self-determining power of the will. The latter receive these\ncommon ideas, feelings, and practices of men, as facts indicative of\nfreedom, because they raise no question against human freedom. The real\nquestion at issue is, how are we to account for these facts? The\nadvocates of self-determining power account for them by referring them\nto a self-determined will. We say a man is free when he does as he\npleases or according to his volitions, and has the sense of freedom in\nhis volitions, because he determines his own volitions; and that a man\nis guilty for crime, if committed by his volition, because he determined\nthis volition, and at the very moment of determining it, was conscious\nof ability to determine an opposite volition. And we affirm, also, that\na man is free, not only when he does as he pleases, or, in other words,\nmakes a volition without any impediment between it and its object,--he\nis free, if he make the volition without producing effects by it:\nvolition itself is the act of freedom. But how do those who deny a\nself-determining power account for these facts? They say that the\nvolition is caused by a motive antecedent to it, but that nevertheless,\ninasmuch as the man feels that he is free and is generally accounted so,\nhe must be free; for liberty means nothing more than \"power and\nopportunity to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice,\nwithout taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the _cause_ of\nthat choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a\nvolition,\"--that is, the man is free, and feels himself to be so, when\nhe does as he pleases, because this is all that is meant by freedom.\n\nBut suppose the objection be brought up, that the definition of liberty\nhere given is assumed, arbitrary, and unsatisfactory; and that the sense\nor consciousness of freedom in the act of volition, and the common\nsentiments and practices of men in reference to voluntary action, are\nnot adequately accounted for,--then the advocates of necessitated\nvolition return to the first argument, of the impossibility of any other\ndefinition,--and affirm that, inasmuch as this sense of freedom does\nexist, and the sentiments and practices of men generally correspond to\nit, we must believe that we are free when volition is unimpeded in its\nconnexion with sequents, and that we are blame or praiseworthy,\naccording to the perceived character of our volitions,--although it\ncannot but be true that the volitions themselves are necessary. On the\none hand, they are compelled by their philosophy to deny a\nself-determining will. On the other hand, they are compelled, by their\nmoral sense and religious convictions, to uphold moral distinctions and\nresponsibility. In order to do this, however, a _quasi_ liberty must be\npreserved: hence the attempt to reconcile liberty and necessity, by\nreferring the first exclusively to the connexion between volition and\nits sequents, and the second exclusively to the connexion between the\nvolition and its antecedents or motives. Liberty is physical; necessity\nis metaphysical. The first belongs to man; the second transcends the\nsphere of his activity, and, is not his concern. In this very difficult\nposition, no better or more ingenious solution could be devised; but\nthat it is wholly illogical and ineffectual, and forms no escape from\nabsolute and universal necessity, has already been abundantly proved.\n\n2. The philosophers and divines of whom we are speaking, conceive that\nwhen volitions are supposed to exist out of the necessary determination\nof motives, they exist fortuitously and without a cause. But to give up\nthe necessary and universal dependence of phenomena upon causes, would\nbe to place events beyond the divine control: nay, more,--it would\ndestroy the great _a posteriori_ argument for the existence of a God. Of\ncourse it would be the destruction of all morality and religion.\n\n3. The doctrine of the divine foreknowledge, in particular, is much\ninsisted upon as incompatible with contingent volitions. Divine\nforeknowledge, it is alleged, makes all events certain and necessary.\nHence volitions are necessary; and, to carry out the reasoning, it must\nbe added likewise that the connexion between volitions and their\nsequents is equally necessary. God foresees the sequent of the volition\nas well as the volition. The theory, however, is careful to preserve the\n_name_ of liberty, because it fears the designation which properly\nbelongs to it.\n\n4. By necessary determination, the sovereignty of God and the harmony of\nhis government are preserved. His volitions are determined by his\ninfinite wisdom. The world, therefore, must be ruled in truth and\nrighteousness.\n\nThese philosophers and divines thus represent to themselves the theory\nof a self-determining will as an absurdity in itself, and, if granted to\nbe true, as involving the most monstrous and disastrous consequences,\nwhile the theory which they advocate is viewed only in its favourable\npoints, and without reaching forth to its legitimate consequences. If\nthese consequences are urged by another hand, they are sought to be\nevaded by concentrating attention upon the fact of volition and the\nsense of freedom attending it: for example, if fatalism be urged as a\nconsequence, of this theory, the ready reply is invariably--\"No such\nnecessity is maintained as goes to destroy the liberty which consists in\ndoing as one pleases;\" or if the destruction of responsibility be urged\nas a consequence, the reply is--\"A man is always held a just subject of\npraise or blame when he acts voluntarily.\" The argumentation undoubtedly\nis as sincere as it is earnest. The interests at stake are momentous.\nThey are supposed to perish, if this philosophy be untrue. No wonder,\nthen, that, reverencing and loving morality and religion, they should by\nevery possible argument aim to sustain the philosophy which is supposed\nto lie at their basis, and look away from consequences so destructive,\npersuading themselves that these consequences are but the rampant\nsophistries of infidelity.\n\nIt is a wonderful fact in the history of philosophy, that the philosophy\nof fate, pantheism, and atheism, should be taken as the philosophy of\nreligion. Good men have misapprehended the philosophy, and have\nsucceeded in bringing it into fellowship with truth and righteousness.\nBad men and erring philosophers have embraced it in a clear\nunderstanding of its principles, and have both logically reasoned out\nand fearlessly owned its consequences.\n\nXIX. Assuming, for the moment, that the definition of liberty given by\nthe theologians above alluded to, is the only possible definition, it\nmust follow that the most commonly received modes of preaching the\ntruths and urging the duties of religion are inconsistent and\ncontradictory.\n\nA class of theologians has been found in the church, who, perhaps\nwithout intending absolutely to deny human freedom, have denied all\nability on the part of man to comply with the divine precepts. A generic\ndistinction between inability and a want of freedom is not tenable, and\ncertainly is of no moment, where, as in this case, the inability\ncontended for is radical and absolute.\n\nThese theologians clearly perceived, that if volition is necessarily\ndetermined by motive, and if motive lies in the correlation of desire\nand object, then, in a being totally depraved, or a being of radically\ncorrupt desires, there can be no ability to good deeds: the deed is as\nthe volition, and the volition is as the strongest desire or the sense\nof the most agreeable.\n\nHence these theologians refer the conversion of man exclusively to\ndivine influence. The man cannot change his own heart, nor employ any\nmeans to that end; for this would imply a volition for which, according\nto the supposition, he has no ability.\n\nNow, at the same time, that this class represent men as unable to love\nand obey the truths of religion, they engage with great zeal in\nexpounding these truths to their minds, and in urging upon them the duty\nof obedience. But what is the aim of this preaching? Perhaps one will\nreply, I know the man cannot determine himself to obedience, but in\npreaching to him, I am presenting motives which may influence him. But\nin denying his ability to do good, you deny the possibility of moving\nhim by motives drawn from religious truth and obligation. His heart, by\nsupposition, is not in correlation with truth and duty; the more,\ntherefore, you preach truth and duty, the more intense is the sense of\nthe disagreeable which you awaken. As when you present objects to a\nman's mind which are correlated to his feelings, the more clearly and\nfrequently you present them, the more you advance towards the sense of\nthe most agreeable or choice. So when you present objects which are not\ncorrelated to his feelings, the more clearly and frequently you present\nthem, the more you must advance towards the sense of the most\ndisagreeable, or positive refusal.\n\nIf it be affirmed, in reply to this, that the presentation of truth\nforms the occasion or condition on which the divine influence is exerted\nfor the regeneration of the heart, then I ask, why do you urge the man\nto repent, and believe, and love God, and discharge religious duty\ngenerally, and rebuke him for sin, when you know that he is utterly\nunable to move, in the slightest degree, towards any of these affections\nand actions, and utterly unable to leave off sinning, until the divine\ninfluence be exerted, which brings his heart into correlation with\nreligion, and makes it possible for him to put forth the volitions of\npiety and duty? It can be regarded in no other light than playing a\nsolemn farce, thus to rebuke and urge and persuade, as if the man ought\nto make some exertion when you feel convinced that exertion is\nimpossible. It certainly can form no occasion for divine interposition,\nunless it be in pity of human folly. If you say that such a course does\nsucceed in the conversion of men, then we are constrained to believe\nthat your philosophy is wrong, and that your practice succeeds, because\ninconsistent with it, and really belonging to some other system which\nyou know not, or understand not and deny.\n\nA total inability to do good makes man the passive subject of influences\nto be employed for his regeneration, and he can no more be considered\nactive in effecting it than he is in the process of digesting food, or\nin the curative action of medicines upon any diseased part of his\nsystem. If you urge him to exert himself for his regeneration, you urge\nhim to put forth volitions which, according to this philosophy, are in\nno sense possible until the regeneration has been effected, or at least\ncommenced.\n\nI will go one step farther in this reasoning:--on supposition of total\ninability, not only is the individual a passive subject of regenerating\ninfluences, but he is also incapable of regeneration, or any disposition\nor tendency towards regeneration, from any influences which lie merely\nin motives, produced by arraying objects before the mind. Motive,\naccording to the definition, exhibited in the statement of Edwards's\nsystem, lies in the nature and circumstances of the object standing in\ncorrelation with the state of mind. Now the state of mind, in an\nunregenerate state, is a state represented by this system itself, as\ntotally adverse to the objects of religion. Hence, there is no\nconceivable array of religious truth, and no conceivable religious\nexhortation and persuasion that could possibly come into such a relation\nto this state of mind as to form the motive of a religious choice or\nvolition. It is perfectly plain, that before such a result could take\nplace, the state of mind itself would have to be changed. But as the\narray of religious truth and the energy of religious exhortation must\nfail to produce the required volitions, on account of the state of mind,\nso neither can the state of mind be changed by this array of truth or by\nthis exhortation. There is a positive opposition of mind and object, and\nthe collision becomes more severe upon every attempt to bring them\ntogether. It must follow, therefore, that preaching truth and duty to\nthe unregenerate, so far from leading to their conversion, can only\nserve to call out more actively the necessary determination, not to\nobey. The very enlightening of the intelligence, as it gives a clearer\nperception of the disagreeable objects, only increases the\ndisinclination.\n\nNor can we pause in this consequence, at human instrumentality. It must\nbe equally true, that if divine interposition lies in the presentation\nof truth and persuasions to duty, only that these are given with tenfold\nlight and power, it must fail of accomplishing regeneration, or of\nproducing any tendency towards regeneration. The heart being in no\ncorrelation with these,--its sense of the disagreeable,--and therefore\nthe energy of its refusal will only be the more intense and decided.\n\nIf it should be remarked that hope and fear are feelings, which, even in\na state of unregeneracy, can be operated upon, the state of things is\nequally difficult. No such hope can be operated upon as implies desire\nafter religious principles and enjoyments; for this cannot belong to the\ncorrupt nature; nor can any fear be aroused which implies a reverence of\nthe divine purity, and an abhorrence of sin. The fear could only relate\nto danger and suffering; and the hope, to deliverance and security,\nindependently of moral qualities. The mere excitement of these passions\nmight awaken attention, constrain to an outward obedience, and form a\nvery prudent conduct, but could effect no purification of the heart.\n\nThere is another class of theologians, of whom Edwards is one, who\nendeavour to escape the difficulties which attend a total inability, by\nmaking the distinction of moral and natural inability:--man, they say,\nis morally unable to do good, and naturally able to do good, and\ntherefore he can justly be made the subject of command, appeal, rebuke,\nand exhortation. The futility of this distinction I cannot but think has\nalready been made apparent. It may be well, however, inasmuch as so\ngreat stress is laid upon it, to call up a brief consideration of it in\nthis particular connexion.\n\nMoral inability, as we have seen, is the impossibility of a given\nvolition, because there are no motives or causes to produce it. It is\nsimply the impossibility of an effect for the want of a cause: when we\nspeak of moral cause and effect, according to Edwards, we speak of\nnothing different from physical cause and effect, except in the quality\nof the terms--the relation of the terms is the same. The impossibility\nof a given volition, therefore, when the appropriate motive is wanting,\nis equal to the impossibility of freezing water in the sun of a summer's\nnoon-tide.[1]\n\nWhen objects of volition are fairly presented, an inability to choose\nthem must lie in the state of the mind, sensitivity, desire, will, or\naffections, for all these have the same meaning according to this\nsystem. There is no volition of preference where there is no motive to\nthis effect; and there is no motive to this effect where the state of\nthe mind is not in correlation with the objects presented: on the\ncontrary, the volition which now takes place, is a volition of refusal.\n\nNatural inability, as defined by this system, lies in the connexion\nbetween the volition considered as an antecedent, and the effect\nrequired. Thus I am naturally unable to walk, when, although I make the\nvolition, my limbs, through weakness or disease, do not obey. Any defect\nin the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon volition,\nor any impediment which volition cannot surmount, constitutes natural\ninability.[2] According to this system, I am not held responsible for\nanything which, through natural inability, cannot be accomplished,\nalthough the volition is made. But now let us suppose that there is no\ndefect in the powers or instrumentalities dependent for activity upon\nvolition, and no impediment which volition cannot surmount, so that\nthere need be only a volition in order to have the effect, and then the\nnatural ability is complete:--I will to walk, and I walk.\n\nNow it is affirmed that a man is fairly responsible for the doing of\nanything, and can be fairly urged to do it when all that is necessary\nfor the doing of it is a volition although there may be a moral\ninability to the volition itself.\n\nNothing it seems to me can be more absurd than this distinction. If\nliberty be essential to responsibility, liberty, as we have clearly\nshown, can no more lie in the connexion between volition and its\neffects, than in the connexion between volition and its motives. One is\njust as necessary as the other. If it be granted to be absurd with the\nfirst class of theologians to urge men to do right when they are\nconceived to be totally unable to do right, it is equally so when they\nare conceived to have only a natural ability to do right, because this\nnatural ability is of no avail without a corresponding moral ability. If\nthe volition take place, there is indeed nothing to prevent the action;\nnay, \"the very willing is the doing of it;\" but then the volition as an\neffect cannot take place without a cause; and to acknowledge a moral\ninability, is nothing less than to acknowledge that there is no cause to\nproduce the required volition.\n\nThe condition of men as represented by the second class of theologians,\nis not really different from their condition as represented by the first\nclass. The inability under both representations is a total inability. In\nthe utter impossibility of a right volition on these, is the utter\nimpossibility of any good deed.\n\nWhen we have denied liberty, in denying a self-determining power, these\ndefinitions in order to make out a _quasi_ liberty and ability, are\nnothing but ingenious folly and plausible deception.\n\nYou tell the man, indeed, that he can if he will; and when he replies to\nyou, that on your own principles the required volition is impossible,\nyou refer him to the common notions of mankind. According to these, you\nsay a man is guilty when he forbears to do right, since nothing is\nwanting to right-doing but a volition,--and guilty when he does wrong,\nbecause he wills to do wrong. According to these common notions, too, a\nman may fairly be persuaded to do right, when nothing is wanting but a\nwill to do right. But do we find this distinction of natural and moral\nability in the common notions of men? When nothing is required to the\nperformance of a deed but a volition, do men conceive of any inability\nwhatever? Do they not feel that the volition has a metaphysical\npossibility as well as that the sequent of the volition has a physical\npossibility? Have we not at least some reason to suspect that the\nphilosophy of responsibility, and the basis of rebuke and persuasion\nlying in the common notions of men, are something widely different from\nthe scheme of a necessitated volition?\n\nThis last class of theologians, equally with the first, derive all the\nforce of their preaching from a philosophy, upon which they are\ncompelled to act, but which they stoutly deny. Let them carry out their\nphilosophy, and for preaching no place remains.\n\nPreaching can produce good effects only by producing good volitions; and\ngood volitions can be produced only by good motives: but good motives\ncan exist under preaching only when the subjects of the preaching are\ncorrelated with the state of mind. But by supposition this is not the\ncase, for the heart is totally depraved.\n\nTo urge the unregenerate man to put forth volitions in reference to his\nregeneration, may consist with a self-determining power of will, but is\naltogether irrelevant on this system. It is urging _him_ to do what _he_\ncannot do; and indeed what all persuasion must fail to do _in him_ as a\nmere passive subject. To assure him that the affair is quite easy,\nbecause nothing is required of him but to will, is equivalent to\nassuring him that the affair is quite easy, because it will be done when\nhe has done it. The man may reply, the affair would indeed be quite easy\nif there existed in me a motive to produce the volition; but as there\ndoes not, the volition is impossible. And as I cannot put forth the\nvolition without the motive, so neither can I make the motive which is\nto produce the volition--for then an effect would make its cause. What I\ncannot do for myself, I fear neither you, nor indeed an angel from\nheaven will succeed in doing for me. You array the truths, and duties,\nand prospects of religion before my mind, but they cannot take the\ncharacter of motives to influence my will, because they are not\nagreeable to my heart.\n\nYou indeed mean well; but do you not perceive that on your own\nprinciples all your zeal and eloquence must necessarily have an opposite\neffect from what you intend? My affections not being in correlation with\nthese subjects, the more you urge them, the more intense becomes my\nsense of the most disagreeable, or my positive refusal; and this, my\ngood friends, by a necessity which holds us all alike in an inevitable\nand ever-during chain.\n\nIt is plainly impossible to escape from this conclusion, and yet\nmaintain the philosophy. All efforts of this kind, made by appealing to\nthe common sentiments of mankind, we have seen are self-contradictory.\nIt will not do to press forward the philosophy until involved in\ndifficulty and perplexity, and then to step aside and borrow arguments\nfrom another system which is assumed to be overthrown. There is no\nnecessity more absolute and sovereign, than a logical necessity.[3]\n\nXVIII. The cardinal principles of Edwards's system in the sections we\nhave been examining, from which the above consequences are deduced, are\nthe three following:\n\n1. The will is always determined by the strongest motive.\n\n2. The strongest motive is always \"the most agreeable.\"\n\n3. The will is necessarily determined.\n\nI shall close this part of the present treatise with a brief examination\nof the reasoning by which he endeavours to establish these points.\n\nThe reasoning by which the first point is aimed to be established, is\nthe general reasoning respecting cause and effect. Volition is an\neffect, and must have a cause. Its cause is the motive lying in the\ncorrelation of mind and object. When several physical causes conflict\nwith each other, we call that the strongest which prevails and produces\nits appropriate effects, to the exclusion of the others. So also where\nthere are several moral causes or motives conflicting with each other,\nwe call that the strongest which prevails. Where a physical cause is not\nopposed by any other force, it of course produces its effect; and in\nthis case we do not say the _strongest_ cause produces the effect,\nbecause there is no comparison. So also there are cases in which there\nis but one moral cause or motive present, when there being no\ncomparison, we cannot affirm that the volition is determined by the\n_strongest_ motive: the doing of something may be entirely agreeable,\nand the not doing of it may be utterly disagreeable: in this case the\nmotive is only for the doing of it. But wherever the case contains a\ncomparison of causes or of motives, it must be true that the effect\nwhich actually takes place, is produced by the strongest cause or\nmotive. This indeed is nothing more than a truism, or a mere postulate,\nas if we should say,--let a cause or motive producing effects be called\nthe strongest. It may be represented, also, as a _petitio principii_, or\nreasoning in a circle,--since the proof that the will is determined by\nthe strongest motive is no other than the fact that it is determined. It\nmay be stated thus: The will is determined by the strongest motive. How\ndo you know this? Because it is determined. How does this prove it?\nBecause that which determines it must be the strongest.[4]\n\nEdwards assumes, also, that motive is the cause of volition. This\nassumption he afterwards endeavours indirectly to sustain, when he\nargues against a self-determining will. If the will do not cause its own\nvolitions, then it must follow that motive is the cause. The argument\nagainst a self-determining will we are about to take up.\n\n2. _The strongest motive is always the most agreeable_. Edwards\nmaintains that the motive which always prevails to cause volition, has\nthis characteristic,--that it is the most agreeable or pleasant at the\ntime, and that volition itself is nothing but the sense of the most\nagreeable. If there should be but one motive present to the mind, as in\nthat case there would be no comparison, we presume he would only say\nthat the will is determined by _the agreeable_.\n\nBut how are we to know whether the motive of every volition has this\ncharacteristic of agreeableness, or of most agreeableness, as the case\nmay be? We can know it only by consulting our consciousness. If,\nwhenever we will, we find the sense of the most agreeable identified\nwith the volition, and if we are conscious of no power of willing, save\nunder this condition of willing what is most agreeable to us, then\ncertainly there remains no farther question on this point. The\ndetermination of consciousness is final. Whether such be the\ndetermination of consciousness, we are hereafter to consider.\n\nDoes Edwards appeal to consciousness?\n\nHe does,--but without formally announcing it. The following passage is\nan appeal to consciousness, and contains Edwards's whole thought on this\nsubject: \"There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the\nsense and experience of mankind, than that when men act voluntarily, and\ndo what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most\n_agreeable to them_. To say that they do what _pleases_ them, but yet\nwhat is not _agreeable_ to them, is the same thing as to say, they do\nwhat they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say,\nthat they do what they please, and yet do not what they please.\" (p.\n25.) Motives differ widely, intrinsically considered. Some are in\naccordance with reason and conscience; some are opposed to reason and\nconscience. Some are wise; some are foolish. Some are good; some are\nbad. But whatever may be their intrinsic properties, they all have this\ncharacteristic of agreeableness when they cause volition; and it is by\nthis characteristic that their strength is measured. The appeal,\nhowever, which is made to sustain this, is made in a way to beg the very\npoint in question. Will not every one admit, that \"when men act\n_voluntarily and do what they please_, they do what suits them best, and\nwhat is most agreeable to them?\" Yes. Is it not a palpable\ncontradiction, to say that men \"do what pleases them,\" and yet do \"what\nis not agreeable to them,\" according to the ordinary use of these words?\nCertainly.\n\nBut the point in question is, whether men, acting voluntarily, always do\nwhat is pleasing to them: and this point Edwards assumes. He assumes it\nhere, and he assumes it throughout his treatise. We have seen that, in\nhis psychology, he identifies will and desire or the affections:--hence\nvolition is the prevailing desire or affection, and the object which\nmoves the _desire_ must of course appear _desirable_, or agreeable, or\npleasant; for they have the same meaning. If men always will what they\nmost desire, and desire what they will, then of course when they act\nvoluntarily, they do what they please; and when they do what they\nplease, they do what suits them best and is most agreeable to them.\n\nEdwards runs the changes of these words with great plausibility, and we\nmust say deceives himself as well as others. The great point,--whether\nwill and desire are one,--whether the volition is as the most\nagreeable,--he takes up at the beginning as an unquestionable fact, and\nadheres to throughout as such; but he never once attempts an analysis of\nconsciousness in relation to it, adequate and satisfactory. His\npsychology is an assumption.\n\n3. The will is necessarily determined.\n\nHow does Edwards prove this? 1. On the general connexion of causes and\neffects. Causes necessarily produce effects, unless resisted and\novercome by opposing forces; but where several causes are acting in\nopposition, the strongest will necessarily prevail, and produce its\nappropriate effects.\n\nNow, Edwards affirms that the nature of the connexion between motives\nand volitions is the same with that of any other causes and effects. The\ndifference is merely in the terms: and when he calls the necessity which\ncharacterizes the connexion of motive and volition \"a moral necessity,\"\nhe refers not to the connexion itself, but only to the terms connected.\nIn this reasoning he plainly assumes that the connexion between cause\nand effect in general, is a necessary connexion; that is, all causation\nis necessary. A contingent, self-determining cause, in his system, is\ncharacterized as an absurdity. Hence he lays himself open to all the\nconsequences of a universal and absolute necessity.\n\n2. He also endeavours to prove the necessity of volition by a method of\napproximation. (p. 33.) He here grants, for the sake of the argument,\nthat the will may oppose the strongest motive in a given case; but then\nhe contends that it is supposable that the strength of the motive may be\nincreased beyond the strength of the will to resist, and that at this\npoint, on the general law of causation, the determination of the will\nmust be considered necessary. \"Whatever power,\" he remarks, \"men may be\nsupposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not\ninfinite.\" If the power of the man is finite, that of the motive may be\nsupposed to be infinite: hence the resistance of the man must at last be\nnecessarily overcome. This reasoning seems plausible at first; but a\nlittle examination, I think, will show it to be fallacious. Edwards does\nnot determine the strength of motives by inspecting their intrinsic\nqualities, but only by observing their degrees of agreeableness. But\nagreeableness, by his own representation, is relative,--relative to the\nwill or sensitivity. A motive of infinite strength would be a motive of\ninfinite agreeableness, and could be known to be such only by an\ninfinite sense of agreeableness in the man. The same of course must hold\ntrue of any motive less than infinite: and universally, whatever be the\ndegree of strength of the motive, there must be in the man an affection\nof corresponding intensity. Now, if there be a power of resistance in\nthe will to any motive, which is tending strongly to determine it, this\npower of resistance, according to Edwards, must consist of a sense of\nagreeableness opposing the other motive, which is likewise a sense of\nagreeableness: and the question is simply, which shall predominate and\nbecome a sense of the most agreeable. It is plain that if the first be\nincreased, the second may be supposed to be increased likewise; if the\nfirst can become infinite, the second can become infinite likewise: and\nhence the power of resistance may be supposed always to meet the motive\nrequired to be resisted, and a point of necessary determination may\nnever be reached.\n\nIf Edwards should choose to throw us upon the strength of motives\nintrinsically considered, then the answer is ready. There are motives of\ninfinite strength, thus considered, which men are continually resisting:\nfor example, the motive which urges them to obey and love God, and seek\nthe salvation of their souls.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\nAN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A SELF-DETERMINING AND\nCONTINGENT WILL.\n\nEdwards's first and great argument against a self-determining will, is\ngiven in part II. sec. 1, of his work, and is as follows:\n\nThe will,--or the soul, or man, by the faculty of willing, effects every\nthing within its power as a cause, by acts of choice. \"The will\ndetermines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice;\nand there is no other way of the will's determining, directing, or\ncommanding any thing at all.\" Hence, if the will determines itself, it\ndoes it by an act of choice; \"and if it has itself under its command,\nand determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it in the\nsame way that it determines other things which are under its command.\"\nBut if the will determines its choice by its choice, then of course we\nhave an infinite series of choices, or we have a first choice which is\nnot determined by a choice,--\"which brings us directly to a\ncontradiction; for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first\nact in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free\nact of the will before the first free act of the will: or else we must\ncome at last to an act of the will determining the consequent acts,\nwherein the will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in\nthis notion of freedom.\" (p. 43.)\n\nThis reasoning, and all that follows in the attempt to meet various\nevasions, as Edwards terms them, of the advocates of a self-determining\nwill, depend mainly upon the assumption, that if the will determines\nitself, it must determine itself by an act of choice; that is, inasmuch\nas those acts of the will, or of the soul, considered in its power of\nwilling, or in its personal activity, by which effects are produced out\nof the activity or will itself, are produced by acts of choice, for\nexample, walking and talking, rising up and sitting down: therefore, if\nthe soul, in the power of willing, cause volitions, it must cause them\nby volitions. The causative act by which the soul causes volitions, must\nitself be a volition. This assumption Edwards does not even attempt to\nsustain, but takes for granted that it is of unquestionable validity. If\nthe assumption be of unquestionable validity, then his position is\nimpregnable; for nothing can be more palpably absurd than the will\ndetermining volitions by volitions, in an interminable series.\n\nBefore directly meeting the assumption, I remark, that if it be valid,\nit is fatal to all causality. Will is simply cause; volition is effect.\nI affirm that the will is the sole and adequate cause of volition.\nEdwards replies: if will is the cause of volition, then, to cause it, it\nmust put forth a causative act; but the only act of will is volition\nitself: hence if it cause its own volitions, it must cause them by\nvolitions.\n\nNow take any other cause: there must be some effect which according to\nthe general views of men stands directly connected with it as its\neffect. The effect is called the phenomenon, or that by which the cause\nmanifests itself. But how does the cause produce the phenomenon? By a\ncausative act:--but this causative act, according to Edwards's\nreasoning, must itself be an effect or phenomenon. Then this effect\ncomes between the cause, and what was at first considered the immediate\neffect but the effect in question must likewise be caused by a causative\nact; and this causative act, again, being an effect, must have another\ncausative act before it; and so on, _ad infinitum_. We have here then an\ninfinite series of causative acts--an absurdity of the same kind, with\nan infinite series of volitions.\n\nIt follows from this, that there can be no cause whatever. An infinite\nseries of causative acts, without any first, being, according to this\nreasoning, the consequence of supposing a cause to cause its own acts,\nit must therefore follow, that a cause does not cause its own acts, but\nthat they must be caused by some cause out of the cause. But the cause\nout of the cause which causes the causative acts in question, must cause\nthese causative acts in the other cause by a causative act of its\nown:--but the same difficulties occur in relation to the second cause as\nin relation to the first; it cannot cause its own acts, and they must\ntherefore be caused out of itself by some other cause; and so on, _ad\ninfinitum_. We have here again the absurdity of an infinite series of\ncausative acts; and also, the absurdity of an infinite series of causes\nwithout a first cause. Otherwise, we must come to a first cause which\ncauses its own acts, without an act of causation; but this is\nimpossible, according to the reasoning of Edwards. As, therefore, there\ncannot be a cause causing its own acts, and inasmuch as the denial of\nthis leads to the absurdities above mentioned, we are driven to the\nconclusion, that there is no cause whatever. Every cause must either\ncause its own acts, or its acts must be caused out of itself. Neither of\nthese is possible; therefore, there is no cause.\n\nTake the will itself as an illustration of this last consequence. The\nwill is cause; the volition, effect. But the will does not cause its own\nvolition; the volition is caused by the motive. But the motive, as a\ncause, must put forth a causative act in the production of a volition.\nIf the motive determine the will, then there must be an act of the\nmotive to determine the will. To determine, to cause, is to do, is to\nact. But what determines the act of the motive determining the act of\nthe will or volition If it determine its own act, or cause its own act,\nthen it must do this by a previous act, according to the principle of\nthis reasoning; and this again by another previous act; and so on, _ad\ninfinitum_.\n\nTake any other cause, and the reasoning must be the same.\n\nIt may be said in reply to the above, that volition is an effect\naltogether peculiar. It implies selection or determination in one\ndirection rather than in another, and therefore that in inquiring after\nits cause, we inquire not merely after the energy which makes it\nexistent, but also after the cause of its particular determination in\none direction rather than in another. \"The question is not so much, how\na spirit endowed with activity comes to _act_, as why it exerts _such_\nan act, and not another; or why it acts with a particular determination?\nIf activity of nature be the cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for\ninstance) acts and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the cause\nwhy its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined.\" (p.\n58.)\n\nEvery phenomenon or effect is particular and limited. It must\nnecessarily be one thing and not another, be in one place and not in\nanother, have certain characteristics and not others; and the cause\nwhich determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise\nall its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must,\nin producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction.\n\nVolition must have an object; something is willed or chosen; particular\ndetermination and direction are therefore inseparable from every\nvolition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily\ngive it character, and particular direction and determination.\n\nSelection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular\ndetermination and direction in the effect. As a phenomenon or effect\ncannot come to exist without a particular determination, so a cause\ncannot give existence to a phenomenon, or effect, without selection.\nThere must necessarily be one object selected rather than another. Thus,\nif fire be thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles,\nand produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular\ndetermination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor of\neffect without a particular determination. But in what lies the\nselection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with certain\nobjects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and consequently\nexhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In chemistry, under the\ntitle of affinities, we have wonderful exhibitions of selection and\nparticular determination. Now motive, according to Edwards, lies in the\ncorrelation of the nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects;\nand volition is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by\nwill, arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like the\nselection made by any other cause; and the particular determination or\ndirection of the volition, in consequence of this, is like that which\nappears in every other effect. In the case of will, whatever effect is\nproduced, is produced of necessity, by a pre-constitution and\ndisposition of will and objects, just as in the case of any other cause.\n\nFrom this it appears sufficiently evident, that on Edwards's principles\nthere is no such difference between volition and any other effect, as to\nshield his reasonings respecting a self-determining will, against the\nconsequences above deduced from them. The distinction of final and\nefficient causes does not lie in his system. The motive is that which\nproduces the sense of the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily,\nand often in opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the\nmost agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite system\nto make this distinction in all its clearness and force--where the\nefficient will is distinguished, both from the persuasions and\nallurements of passion and desire, and from the laws of reason and\nconscience.\n\nThus far my argument against Edwards's assumption,--that, to make the\nwill the cause of its own volitions, is to make it cause its volitions\nby an act of volition,--has been indirect. If this indirect argument has\nbeen fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed to\ndeny that the assumption is overthrown by its consequences. In addition\nto the above, however, on a subject so important, a direct argument will\nnot be deemed superfluous.\n\nSelf-determining will means simply a will causing its own volitions; and\nconsequently, particularly determining and directing them. Will, in\nrelation to volition, is just what any cause is in relation to its\neffect. Will causing volitions, causes them just as any cause causes its\neffects. There is no intervention of anything between the cause and\neffect; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by\nphenomena, is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a\nself-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we\ndo, and he assumes it as if it were unquestionable.\n\nThe will, he first remarks, determines all our external actions by\nvolitions, as the motions of the hands and feet. He next affirms,\ngenerally, that all which the will determines, it determines in this\nway; and then concludes, that if it determines its own volitions, they\nmust come under the general law, and be determined by volitions.\n\nThe first position is admitted. The second, involving the last, he does\nnot prove, and I deny that it is unquestionable.\n\nIn the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken as following from\nthe first. The relation of will to the sequents of its volitions, is not\nnecessarily the same as its relation to its volitions. The sequents of\nvolitions are changes or modifications, in external nature, or in parts\nof the being external to the will; but the volitions are modifications\nof the will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the\nwill can be effected only by that modification of itself called\nvolition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if\neffected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification of\nitself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents in\nexternal nature, or in parts of our being, external to will; but this\nexperience teaches us nothing respecting the production of volitions.\nThe acts of the will are volitions, and all the acts of wills are\nvolitions; but this means nothing more than that all the acts of the\nwill are acts of the will, for volition means only this--an act of the\nwill. But has not the act of the will a cause? Yes, you have assigned\nthe cause, in the very language just employed. It is the act of the\nwill--the will is the cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I\ndo not know, nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the\nproduction of its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The\nconnexion between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and\ninexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions. How does\nvolition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire burn, or the sun\nraise the tides? And how does will cause volitions? I know not; but if I\nknow that such are the facts, it is enough.\n\nVolitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards, will cannot be the\ncause, since this would lead to the absurdity of causing volitions by\nvolitions. But we cannot perceive that it leads to any such absurdity.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to explain how a cause acts. If the will\nproduce effects in external nature by its acts, it is impossible to\nconnect with this as a sequence, established either by experience or\nlogic, that in being received as the cause of its own acts, it becomes\nsuch only by willing its own acts. It is clearly an assumption\nunsupported, and incapable of being supported. Besides, in denying will\nto be the cause of its own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely,\nthe motive, Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he\ncreates; for I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains\nto motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects by\nexertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To suppose it\nthe cause of its own acts, involves all the absurdities which Edwards\nattributes to self-determination. But, _In the second place_,--let us\nlook at the connexion of cause and phenomena a little more particularly.\nWhat is cause? It is that which is the ground of the possible, and\nactual existence of phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is\ncause visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe phenomena,\nand by the law of our intelligence we assign them to cause. But how do\nwe conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By a _nisus_, an effort, or\nenergy. Is this _nisus_ itself a phenomenon? It is when it is observed.\nIs it always observed? It is not. The _nisus_ of gravitation we do not\nobserve; we observe merely the facts of gravitation. The _nisus_ of heat\nto consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of combustion.\nWhere then do we observe this _nisus?_ Only in will. Really, volition is\nthe _nisus_ or effort of that cause which we call will. I do not wish to\nanticipate subsequent investigations, but I am constrained here to ask\nevery one to examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I\nwish to do anything I make an effort--a _nisus_ to do it; I make an\neffort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply the\nvolition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my hand,--this effort\nis simply the volition to lift it,--and immediately antecedent to this\neffort, I recognise only my will, or really only myself. This\neffort--this _nisus_--this volition--whatever we call it,--is in the\nwill itself, and it becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes\nthat know ourselves. Every _nisus_, or effort, or volition, which we may\nmake, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not self-conscious, of\ncourse do not reveal this _nisus_ to themselves, and they cannot reveal\nit to us because it is in the very bosom of the cause itself. What we\nobserve in relation to all causes--not ourselves, whether they be\nself-conscious or not, is not the _nisus_, but the sequents of the\n_nisus_. Thus in men we do not observe the volition or _nisus_ in their\nwills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the _nisus_. And in\nphysical causes, we do not observe the _nisus_ of these causes, but only\nthe phenomena which form the sequents of this _nisus_. But when each one\ncomes to himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself--knows\nhimself. He is himself the cause--he, himself, makes the _nisus_, and is\nconscious of it; and this _nisus_ to him becomes an effect--a\nphenomenon, the first phenomenon by which he reveals himself, but a\nphenomenon by which he reveals himself only to himself. It is by the\nsequents of this _nisus_,--the effects produced in the external visible\nworld, that he reveals himself to others.\n\nSometimes the _nisus_ or volition expends itself in the will, and gives\nno external phenomena. I may make an effort to raise my arm, but my arm\nmay be bound or paralyzed, and consequently the effort is in vain, and\nis not known without. How energetic are the efforts made by the will\nduring a fit of the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful\nforce; we strive to run away from danger but all in vain.\n\nIt is possible for me to make an effort to remove a mountain: I may\nplace my hand against its side, and tug, and strive: the _nisus_ or\nvolition is the most energetic that I can make, but, save the straining\nof my muscles, no external expression of the energy of my will is given;\nI am resisted by a greater power than myself.\n\nThe most original movement of every cause is, then, this _nisus_ in the\nbosom of the cause itself, and in man, as a cause, the most original\nmovement is this _nisus_ likewise, which in him we call volition. To\ndeny such a _nisus_ would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and\nenergy of cause. This _nisus_, by its very conception and definition,\nadmits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it is in the substance\nof the cause; its first going forth to effects. A first movement or\n_nisus_ of cause is just as necessary a conception as first cause\nitself. There is no conception to oppose to this, but that of every\ncause having its first movement determined by some other cause out of\nitself--a conception which runs back in endless retrogression without\narriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of all\ncause.\n\nThe assumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will determine its own\nvolitions, it must determine them by an act of volition, is unsupported\nalike by the facts of consciousness and a sound logic,--while all the\nabsurdities of an infinite series of causation of acts really fasten\nupon his own theory, and destroy it by the very weapons with which it\nassails the opposite system.\n\n_In the third place_,--Edwards virtually allows the self-determining\npower of will.\n\nWill he defines as the desire, the affections, or the sensibility. There\nis no personal activity out of the affections or sensitivity. Volition\nis as the most agreeable, and is itself the sense of the most agreeable.\nBut what is the cause of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will,\nassuming that to make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the\nabsurdity of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time\nhe affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in\ncorrelation with the nature and circumstances of objects. But all\nnatural causes are in correlation with certain objects,--as, for\nexample, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these\nnatural causes act only under the condition of meeting with objects so\nconstituted as to be susceptible of being acted upon by them. So,\nlikewise, according to Edwards's representation, we may say that the\ncause of volition is the nature and state of the affections or the will,\nacting under the condition of objects correlated to it. The sense of the\nmost agreeable or choice cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an\nobject presented which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its\nappearing most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most\nagreeable, depends not only upon \"what appears in the object viewed, but\nalso in the manner of the view, and _the state and circumstances_ of the\nmind that views.\" (p. 22.) Now \"the _state_ and _circumstances_ of the\nmind that views, and the _manner_ of its view,\" is simply the mind\nacting from its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is\na representation which answers to every natural cause with which we are\nacquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of course its\ninherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken as the cause of\nvolition, on Edwards's own principles, as the nature and state of heat\nmay be taken as the cause of combustion: but by \"the state, of mind,\"\nEdwards means, evidently, the state of the will or the affections. It\nfollows, therefore, that he makes the state of the will or the\naffections the cause of volition; but as the state of the will or the\naffections means nothing more in reference to will than the state of any\nother cause means in reference to that cause,--and as the state of a\ncause, implying of course its inherent nature or constitution, means\nnothing more than its character and qualities considered as a\ncause,--therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause of its\nown volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause of its\ninvariable sequents.\n\nEdwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity of determining a\nvolition by a volition, overlooked that, according to our most common\nand necessary conceptions of cause, the first movement or action of\ncause must be determined by the cause itself, and that to deny this, is\nin fact to deny cause. If cause have not within itself a _nisus_ to\nproduce phenomena, then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that\nin assigning as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will,\nhe really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the very\npoint he laboured to overthrow.\n\nThe point in dispute, therefore, between us and Edwards, is not, after\nall, the self-determining power of the will. If will be a cause, it will\nbe self-determining; for all cause is self-determining, or, in other\nwords, is in its inherent nature active, and the ground of phenomena.\n\nBut the real point in dispute is this: \"_Is the will necessarily\ndetermined, or not?_\"\n\nThe inherent nature of cause may be so constituted and fixed, that the\n_nisus_ by which it determines itself to produce phenomena, shall take\nplace according to invariable and necessary laws. This we believe to be\ntrue with respect to all physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism,\nmagnetism, gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at\nwork in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to\nfixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary laws. We do\nnot conceive it possible for these powers to produce any other\nphenomena, under given circumstances, than those which they actually\nproduce. When a burning coal is thrown into a mass of dry gunpowder, an\nexplosion must take place.\n\nNow, is it true likewise that the cause which we call will, must, under\ngiven circumstances, necessarily produce such and such phenomena? Must\nits _nisus_, its self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a\nuniform and inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the\nsensitivity, and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its\nsense of the most agreeable, which is its most original _nisus_ or its\nvolition, follows certain necessary laws,--necessary in relation to\nitself. If we know the state of any particular will, and its correlation\nto every variety of object, we may know, with the utmost certainty, what\nits volition will be at a given time, and under given circumstances.\nMoral necessity and physical necessity differ only in the terms,--not in\nthe nature of the connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary\nas any physical phenomenon.\n\nNow, if the will and the affections or sensitivity are one, then, as a\nmere psychological fact, we must grant that volition is necessary; for\nnothing can be plainer than that the desires and affections necessarily\nfollow the correlation of the sensitivity and its objects. But if we can\ndistinguish in the consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from\nthe sensitivity,--if we can distinguish volition from the strongest\ndesire or the sense of the most agreeable,--then it will not follow,\nbecause the one is necessary, the other is necessary likewise, unless a\nnecessary connexion between the two be also an observed fact of\nconsciousness. This will be inquired into in another part of our\nundertaking. What we are now mainly concerned with, is Edwards's\nargument against the conception of a will not necessarily determined.\nThis he calls a contingent determination of will. We adopt the word\ncontingent; it is important in marking a distinction.\n\nEdwards, in his argument against a contingent determination, mistakes\nand begs the question under discussion.\n\n1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated of throughout as if\nidentical with chance or no cause. \"Any thing is said to be contingent,\nor to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of\nsuch words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according\nto the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we\nhave no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be\ncontingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass\nwithout our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope. But the word\n_contingent_ is used abundantly in a very different sense; not for that\nwhose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to\nforesee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous\nground or reason with which its existence has any fixed and certain\nconnexion.\" (p. 31.)\n\nThus, according to Edwards, not only is _contingent_ used in the same\nsense as chance and accident, in the ordinary and familiar acceptation\nof these words, but it is also gravely employed to represent certain\nphenomena, as without any ground, or reason, or cause of their\nexistence; and it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as\napplied to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he\nelaborately discusses the question--\"whether any event whatsoever, and\nvolition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its\nexistence;\" and in sec. 4,--\"whether volition can arise without a cause,\nthrough the activity of the nature of the soul.\"\n\nIf, in calling volitions contingent,--if, in representing the\ndetermination of the will as contingent, we intended to represent a\nclass of phenomena as existing without \"any previous ground or reason\nwith which their existence has a fixed and certain connexion,\"--as\nexisting without any cause whatever, and therefore as existing by\nchance, or as really self-existent, and therefore not demanding any\nprevious ground for their existence,--it seems to me that no elaborate\nargument would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That\n\"every phenomenon must have a cause,\" is unquestionably one of those\nprimitive truths which neither require nor admit of a demonstration,\nbecause they precede all demonstration, and must be assumed as the basis\nof all demonstration.\n\nBy a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is not a cause. By\ncontingent volitions, I do not mean volitions which exist without a\ncause. By a contingent will, I mean a will which is not a necessitated\nwill, but what I conceive only and truly to be a _free will_. By\ncontingent volitions, I mean volitions belonging to a contingent or free\nwill. I do not oppose contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be\nsupposed that we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not\nnecessary I call contingent.\n\nNow an argument against contingency of will on the assumption that we\nintend, under this title, to represent volitions as existing without a\ncause, is irrelevant, since we mean no such thing.\n\nBut an argument attempting to prove that contingency is identical with\nchance, or no cause, is a fair argument; but then it must be remembered\nthat such an argument really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is\npossible, for we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.\n\nThe argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is\ncontingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and\nabsurd? This is the main question; for if it be decided that contingency\nis a contradictory and absurd conception, then we are shut up to a\nuniversal and an absolute necessity, and no place remains for inquiry\nrespecting a contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and\nrational conception, then the _second_ point will be, to determine\nwhether the will be contingent or necessary.\n\nThe first point is the only one which I shall discuss in this place. The\nsecond properly belongs to the psychological investigations which are to\nfollow. But I proceed to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument\nagainst a contingent will, really begs the question in dispute. In the\nfirst place, he represents the will as necessarily determined. This is\nbrought out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first\npart of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute.\nThen, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss\ncontingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that necessity is\ninseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is plainly a begging of the\nquestion, as well as a mistaking of it; for when we are inquiring\nwhether there be any thing contingent, that is, any thing opposed to\nnecessity, he _begins_ his argument by affirming all cause to be\nnecessary, and contingency as implying no cause. If all cause be\nnecessary, and contingency imply no cause, there is no occasion for\ninquiry after contingency; for it is already settled that there can be\nno contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are these\ntwo: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be any cause,\nfor example, will, which is contingent.\n\nIf Edwards has both mistaken and begged the question respecting a\ncontingent will, as I think clearly appears, then of course he has\nlogically determined nothing in relation to it.\n\nBut whether this be so or not, we may proceed now to inquire whether\ncontingency be a possible and rational conception, or whether it be\ncontradictory and absurd.\n\nNecessity and contingency are then two ideas opposed to each other. They\nat least cannot co-exist in relation to the same subject. That which is\nnecessary cannot be contingent at the same time, and vice versa. Whether\ncontingency is a possible conception and has place in relation to any\nsubject, remains to be determined.\n\nLet us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: we will begin with\nnecessity, because that this idea is rational and admits of actual\napplication is not questioned. The only point in question respecting it,\nis, whether it be universal, embracing all beings, causes, and events.\n\nWhat is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under two points of view:--\n\n1. Viewed in relation to will.\n\n2. Viewed irrespective of will.\n\nThe first, supposes that opposition of will is possible, but\ninsufficient;--for example: it is possible for me to place myself in\nopposition to a rushing torrent, but my opposition is insufficient, and\nthe progress of the torrent relatively to me is _necessary_.\n\nThe second does not take will into consideration at all, and applies to\nsubjects where opposition of will is not supposable; for example,\nlogical necessity, a is b, and c is a, therefore c is b: mathematical\nnecessity, 2 x 2 = 4. The centre of a circle is a point equally distant\nfrom every point in the circumference: metaphysical necessity, the\nexistence of a first cause, of time, of space. Edwards comprehends this\nsecond kind of necessity under the general designation of metaphysical\nor philosophical. This second kind of necessity undoubtedly is absolute.\nIt is impossible to conceive of these subjects differently from what\nthey are. We cannot conceive of no space; no time; or that 2 x 2 = 5,\nand so of the rest.\n\nNecessity under both points of view he distinguishes into particular and\ngeneral.\n\nRelative necessity, as particular, is a necessity relative to individual\nwill; as general, relative to all will.\n\nMetaphysical necessity, as particular, is a necessity irrespective of\nindividual will; as general, irrespective of all will.\n\nRelative necessity is relative to the will in the connexion between\nvolition and its sequents. When a volition of individual will takes\nplace, without the sequent aimed at, because a greater force is opposed\nto it, then the sequent of this greater force is necessary with a\nparticular relative necessity. When the greater force is greater than\nall supposable will, then its sequents take place by a general relative\nnecessity. It is plain however, that under all supposable will, the will\nof God cannot be included, as there can be no greater force than a\ndivine volition.\n\nMetaphysical necessity, when particular, excludes the opposition of\nindividual will. Under this Edwards brings the connexion of motive and\nvolition. The opposition of will, he contends, is excluded from this\nconnexion, because will can act only by volition, and motive is the\ncause of volition. Volition is necessary by a particular metaphysical\nnecessity, because the will of the individual cannot be opposed to it;\nbut not with a general metaphysical necessity, because other wills may\nbe opposed to it.\n\nMetaphysical necessity, when general, excludes the opposition of all\nwill--even of infinite will. That 2 x 2 = 4--that the centre of a circle\nis a point equally distant from every point in the circumference--the\nexistence of time and space--are all true and real, independently of all\nwill. Will hath not constituted them, nor can will destroy them. It\nwould imply a contradiction to suppose them different from what they\nare. According to Edwards, too, the divine volitions are necessary with\na general metaphysical necessity, because, as these volitions are caused\nby motives, and infinite will, as well as finite will, must act by\nvolitions, the opposition of infinite will itself is excluded in the\nproduction of infinite volitions.\n\nNow what is the simple idea of necessity contained in these two points\nof view, with their two-fold distinction? _Necessity is that which is\nand which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is_.\n\n1. An event necessary by a relative particular necessity, is an event\nwhich is and cannot possibly not be or be otherwise by the opposition of\nan individual will.\n\n2. An event necessary by a relative general necessity, is an event which\ncannot possibly not be, or be otherwise by the opposition of all finite\nwill. In these cases, opposition of will of course is supposable.\n\n3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical particular necessity, when it\nis, and admits of no possible opposition from the individual will.\n\n4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general necessity, when it\nis, and cannot possibly admit of opposition even from infinite will.\n\nAll this, however, in the last analysis on Edwards's system, becomes\nabsolute necessity. The infinite will is necessarily determined by a\nmetaphysical general necessity. All events are necessarily determined by\nthe infinite will. Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a\nmetaphysical general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are\nmerely the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular\nindividual and relation:--the terms characterize only the manner of our\nview. The opposition of the particular will being predetermined by the\ninfinite will, which comprehends all, is to the precise limit of its\nforce absolutely necessary; and the opposite force which overcomes the\nopposition of the particular will, produces its phenomena necessarily\nnot only in reference to the particular will, but also in reference to\nthe infinite will which necessarily pre-determines it.\n\nHaving thus settled the definition of necessity, and that too, on\nEdwards's own grounds, we are next to inquire, what is the opposite idea\nof contingency, and whether it has place as a rational idea?\n\nNecessity is that which is, and which cannot possibly not be, or be\notherwise than it is. Contingency then, as the opposite idea, must be\n_that which is, or may be, and which possibly might not be, or might be\notherwise than it is_. Now, contingency cannot have place with respect\nto anything which is independent of will;--time and space;--mathematical\nand metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are equal,\nthat every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be contingent, for they\nare seen to be real and true in themselves. They do not arise from will,\nnor is it conceivable that will can alter them, for it is not\nconceivable that they admit of change from any source. If the idea of\ncontingency have place as a rational idea, it must be with respect to\ncauses, being, and phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation\nis the effect of divine volition. \"God said, let there be light, and\nthere was light:\" thus did the whole creation come to be.\n\nNow every one will grant, that the creation does not seem necessary as\ntime and space; and intuitive truths with their logical deductions, seem\nnecessary. We cannot conceive of these as having not been, or as ceasing\nto be; but we can conceive of the creation as not having been, and as\nceasing to be. No space is an impossible conception; but no body, or\nvoid space, is a possible conception; and as the existence of body may\nbe annihilated in thought, so, likewise, the particular forms and\nrelations of body may be modified in thought, indefinitely, different\nfrom their actual form. Now, if we wish to express in one word this\ndifference between space and body, or in general this difference between\nthat which exists independently of will, and that which exists purely as\nthe effect of will, we call the first necessary; the second, contingent.\nThe first we cannot conceive to be different from what it is. The second\nwe can conceive to be different from what it is. What is true of the\ncreation considered as a collection of beings and things, is true\nlikewise of all the events taking place in this creation. All these\nevents are either directly or mediately the effects of will, divine or\nhuman. Now we can conceive of these as not being at all, or as being\nmodified indefinitely, different from what they are;--and under this\nconception we call them contingent.\n\nNo one I think will deny that we do as just represented, conceive of the\npossibility of the events and creations of will, either as having no\nbeing, or as being different from what they are. This conception is\ncommon to all men. What is the meaning of this conception? Is it a\nchimera? It must be a chimera, if the system of Edwards be true; for\naccording to this, there really is no possibility that any event of will\nmight have had no being at all, or might have been different from what\nit is. Will is determined by motives antecedent to itself. And this\napplies to the divine will, likewise, which is determined by an infinite\nand necessary wisdom. The conception, therefore, of the possibility of\nthat which is, being different from what it is, must on this system be\nchimerical. But although the system would force us to this conclusion,\nthe conception still reigns in our minds, and does not _seem_ to us\nchimerical;--the deduction from the system strangely conflicts with our\nnatural and spontaneous judgements. There are few men who would not be\nstartled by the dogma that all things and all events, even the\nconstantly occuring volitions of their minds, are absolutely necessary,\nas necessary as a metaphysical axiom or a mathematical truth,--necessary\nwith a necessity which leaves no possibility of their being otherwise\nthan they actually are. There are few perhaps of the theological\nabettors of Edwards's system, who would not also be startled by it. I\nsuppose that these would generally attempt to evade the broad\nconclusion, by contending that the universal necessity here represented,\nbeing merely a metaphysical necessity, does not affect the sequents of\nvolition; that if a man can do as he pleases, he has a natural liberty\nand ability which relieves him from the chain of metaphysical necessity.\nI have already shown how utterly futile this attempted distinction\nis--how completely the metaphysical necessity embraces the so called\nnatural liberty and ability. If nothing better than this can be resorted\nto, then we have no alternative left but to exclaim with Shelley,\n\"Necessity, thou mother of the world!\" But why the reluctance to escape\nfrom this universal necessity? Do the abettors of this system admit that\nthere is something opposed to necessity? But what is this something\nopposed to necessity? Do they affirm that choice is opposed to\nnecessity? But how opposed--is choice contingent? Do they admit the\npossibility that any choice which is, might not have been at all, or\nmight have been different from what it is?\n\nWe surely do not distinguish choice from necessity by merely calling it\nchoice, or an act of the will. If will is not necessitated, we wish to\nknow under what condition it exists. Volition is plainly under necessity\non Edwards's system, just as every other event is under necessity. And\nthe connexion between volition and its sequents is just as necessary as\nthe connexion between volition and its motives. Explain,--why do you\nendeavour to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to\nvolition? why do you claim liberty here? Do _you_ likewise have a\nnatural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? It is\nevident that while Edwards and his followers embrace the doctrine of\nnecessity in its cardinal principles, they shrink from its application\nto will. They first establish the doctrine of necessity universally and\nabsolutely, and then claim for will an exception from the general\nlaw,--not by logically and psychologically pointing out the grounds and\nnature of the exception, but by simply appealing to the spontaneous and\nnatural judgements of men, that they are free when they do as they\nplease: but no definition of freedom is given which distinguishes it\nfrom necessity;--nor is the natural and spontaneous judgement against\nnecessity of volition explained and shown not be a mere illusion.\n\nThere is an idea opposed to necessity, says this spontaneous\njudgement--and the will comes under the idea opposed to necessity. But\nwhat is this idea opposed to necessity, and how does the will come under\nit? Edwards and his followers have not answered these questions--their\nattempt at a solution is self-contradictory and void.\n\nIs there any other idea opposed to necessity than that of contingency,\nviz.--that which is or may be, and possibly might not be, or might be\notherwise than it is? That 2 x 2 = 4 is a truth which cannot possibly\nnot be, or be otherwise than it is. But this book which I hold in my\nhand, I can conceive of as not being at all, or being different from\nwhat it is, without implying any contradiction, according to this\nspontaneous judgement.\n\nThe distinction between right and wrong, I cannot conceive of as not\nexisting, or as being altered so as to transpose the terms, making that\nright which now is wrong, and that wrong which now is right. But the\nvolition which I now put forth to move this pen over the paper, I can\nconceive of as not existing, or as existing under a different mode, as a\nvolition to write words different from those which I am writing. That\nthis idea of contingency is not chimerical, seems settled by this, that\nall men naturally have it, and entertain it as a most rational idea.\nIndeed even those who hold the doctrine of necessity, do either adopt\nthis idea in relation to will by a self-contradiction, and under a false\nposition, as the abettors of the scheme which I am opposing for example,\nor in the ordinary conduct of life, they act upon it. All the\ninstitutions of society, all government and law, all our feelings of\nremorse and compunction, all praise and blame, and all language itself,\nseem based upon it. The idea of contingency as above explained, is\nsomehow connected with will, and all the creations and changes arising\nfrom _will_.\n\nThat the will actually does come under this idea of contingency, must be\nshown psychologically if shown at all. An investigation to this effect\nmust be reserved therefore for another occasion. In this place, I shall\nsimply inquire, how the will may be conceived as coming under the idea\nof contingency?\n\nThe contingency of any phenomenon or event must depend upon the nature\nof its cause. A contingent phenomenon or event is one which may be\nconceived of, as one that might not have been at all, or might have been\ndifferent from what it is; but wherein lies the possibility that it\nmight not have been at all, or might have been different from what it\nis? This possibility cannot lie in itself, for an effect can determine\nnothing in relation to its own existence. Neither can it lie in anything\nwhich is not its cause, for this can determine nothing in relation to\nits existence. The cause therefore which actually gives it existence,\nand existence under its particular form, can alone contain the\npossibility of its not having existed at all, or of its having existed\nunder a different form. But what is the nature of such a cause? It is a\ncause which in determining a particular event, has at the very moment of\ndoing so, the power of determining an opposite event. It is a cause not\nchained to any class of effects by its correlation to a certain class of\nobjects--as fire, for example, is chained to combustion by its\ncorrelation to a certain class of objects which we thence call\ncombustibles. It is a cause which must have this peculiarity in\nopposition to all other causes, that it forbears of itself to produce an\neffect which it may produce, and of any given number of effects alike\nwithin its power, it may take any one of them in opposition to all the\nothers; and at the very moment it takes one effect, it has the power of\ntaking any other. It is a cause contingent and not necessitated. The\ncontingency of the event, therefore, arises from the contingency of the\ncause. Now every cause must be a necessary or not necessary cause. A\nnecessary cause is one which cannot be conceived of as having power to\nact differently from its actual developements--fire must\nburn--gravitation must draw bodies towards the earth's centre. If there\nbe any cause opposed to this, it can be only the contingent cause above\ndefined, for there is no third conception. We must choose therefore\nbetween a universal and absolute necessity, and the existence of\ncontingent causes. If we take necessity to be universal and absolute,\nthen we must take all the consequences, likewise, as deduced in part II.\nThere is no possible escape from this. As then all causes must be either\nnecessary or contingent, we bring will under the idea of contingency, by\nregarding it as a contingent cause--\"a power to do, or not to\ndo,\"[5]--or a faculty of determining \"to do, or not to do something\nwhich we conceive to be in our power.\"[6]\n\nWe may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a cause opposed to a\ncontingent cause? Its necessity lies in its nature, also. What is this\nnature? It is a nature in fixed correlation with certain objects, so\nthat it is inconceivable that its phenomena might be different from\nthose which long and established observation have assigned to it. It is\ninconceivable that fire might not burn when thrown amid combustibles; it\nis inconceivable that water might not freeze at the freezing\ntemperature. But is this necessity a necessity _per se_, or a determined\nnecessity? It is a determined necessity--determined by the creative\nwill. If the creative will be under the law of necessity, then of course\nevery cause determined by will becomes an absolute necessity.\n\nThe only necessity _per se_ is found in that infinite and necessary\nwisdom in which Edwards places the determining motives of the divine\nwill. All intuitive truths and their logical deductions are necessary\n_per se_. But the divine will is necessary with a determined necessity\non Edwards's system,--and so of all other wills and all other causes,\ndependent upon will--the divine will being the first will determined. We\nmust recollect, however, that on Edwards's theory of causation, a cause\nis always determined out of itself; and that consequently there can be\nno cause necessary _per se_; and yet at the same time there is by this\ntheory, an absolute necessity throughout all causality.\n\nNow let us consider the result of making will a contingent cause. In the\nfirst place, we have the divine will as the first and supreme contingent\ncause. Then consequently in the second place, all causes ordained by the\ndivine will, considered as effects, are contingent. They might not have\nbeen. They might cease to be. They might be different from what they\nare. But in the third place, these causes considered as causes, are not\nall contingent. Only will is contingent. Physical causes are necessary\nwith a determined necessity. They are necessary as fixed by the divine\nwill. They are necessary with a relative necessity--relatively to the\ndivine will. They put forth their _nisus_, and produce phenomena by a\nfixed and invariable law, established by the divine will. But will is of\nthe nature, being made after the image of the divine will. The divine\nwill is infinite power, and can do everything possible to cause. The\ncreated will is finite power, and can do only what is within its given\ncapacity. Its volitions or its efforts, or its _nisus_ to do, are\nlimited only by the extent of its intelligence. It may make an effort,\nor volition, or _nisus_, to do anything of which it can conceive--but\nthe actual production of phenomena out of itself, must depend upon the\ninstrumental and physical connexion which the divine will has\nestablished between it and the world, external to itself. Of all the\nvolitions or _nisus_ within its capacity, it is not necessitated to any\none, but may make any one, at any time; and at the time it makes any one\n_nisus_ or volition, it has the power of making any other.\n\nIt is plain, moreover, that will is efficient, essential, and first\ncause. Whatever other causes exist, are determined and fixed by will,\nand are therefore properly called secondary or instrumental causes. And\nas we ourselves are will, we must first of all, and most naturally and\nmost truly gain our idea of cause from ourselves. We cannot penetrate\nthese second causes--we observe only their phenomena; but we know\nourselves in the very first _nisus_ of causation.\n\nTo reason therefore from these secondary causes to ourselves, is indeed\nreversing the natural and true order on this subject. Now what is the\nground of all this clamour against contingency? Do you say it represents\nphenomena as existing without cause? We deny it. We oppose contingency\nnot to cause, but to necessity. Do you say it is contrary to the\nphenomena of physical causation,--we reply that you have no right to\nreason from physical causes to that cause which is yourself. For in\ngeneral you have no right to reason from the laws and properties of\nmatter to those of mind. Do you affirm that contingency is an absurd and\npernicious doctrine--then turn and look at the doctrine of an absolute\nnecessity in all its bearings and consequences, and where lies the\nbalance of absurdity and pernicious consequences? But we deny that there\nis anything absurd and pernicious in contingency as above explained.\nThat it is not pernicious, but that on the contrary, it is the basis of\nmoral and religious responsibility, will clearly appear in the course of\nour inquiries.\n\nAfter what has already been said in the preceding pages, it perhaps is\nunnecessary to make any further reply to its alleged absurdity.\n\nThere is one form under which this allegation comes up, however, which\nis at first sight so plausible, that I shall be pardoned for prolonging\nthis discussion in order to dispose of it. It is as follows: That in\nassigning contingency to will, we do not account for a volition being in\none direction rather than in another. The will, it is urged, under the\nidea of contingency, is indifferent to any particular volition. How then\ncan we explain the fact that it does pass out of this state of\nindifferency to a choice or volition?\n\nIn answer to this, I remark:--It has already been made clear, that\nselection and particular determination belong to every cause. In\nphysical causes, this selection and particular determination lies in the\ncorrelation of the nature of the cause with certain objects; and this\nselection and particular determination are necessary by a necessity\ndetermined out of the cause itself--that is, they are determined by the\ncreative will, which gave origin to the physical and secondary causes.\nNow Edwards affirms that the particular selection and determination of\nwill take place in the same way. The nature of the will is correlated to\ncertain objects, and this nature, being fixed by the creative will,\nwhich gave origin to the secondary dependent will, the selection and\nparticular determination of will, is necessary with a necessity\ndetermined out of itself. But to a necessitated will, we have nothing to\noppose except a will whose volitions are not determined by the\ncorrelation of its nature with certain objects--a will, indeed, which\nhas not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent;\nfor if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection\nand determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its\naction would become necessary, and that too by a necessity out of\nitself; and fixed by the infinite will. In order to escape an absolute\nand universal necessity, therefore, we must conceive of a will forming\nvolitions particular and determinate, or in other words, making a\n_nisus_ towards particular objects, without any correlation of its\nnature with the objects. Is this conception a possible and rational\nconception? It is not a possible conception if will and the sensitivity,\nor the affections are identical--for the very definition of will then\nbecomes that of a power in correlation with objects, and necessarily\naffected by them.\n\nBut now let us conceive of the will as simply and purely an activity or\ncause, and distinct from the sensitivity or affections--a cause capable\nof producing changes or phenomena in relation to a great variety of\nobjects, and conscious that it is thus capable, but conscious also that\nit is not drawn by any necessary affinity to any one of them. Is this a\npossible and rational conception? It is indeed the conception of a cause\ndifferent from all other causes; and on this conception there are but\ntwo _kinds_ of causes. The physical, which are necessarily determined by\nthe correlation of their nature with certain objects, and will, which is\na pure activity not thus determined, and therefore not necessitated, but\ncontingent.\n\nNow I may take this as a rational conception, unless its palpable\nabsurdity can be pointed out, or it can be proved to involve some\ncontradiction.\n\nDoes the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity, that there is, after\nall, nothing to account for the particular determination? I answer that\nthe particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or\nattribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular\ndetermination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which\nquality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of\nwill, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of\nthe cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular\ndetermination without being necessarily correlated to the object. A\nphysical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. The will\nis a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a cause instrumental\nof a first cause:--the will is first cause itself. The infinite will is\nthe first cause inhabiting eternity, filling immensity, and unlimited in\nits energy. The human will is first cause appearing in time, confined to\nplace, and finite in its energy; but it is the same in kind, because\nmade in the likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self\nmoved, it makes its _nisus_ of itself, and of itself it forbears to make\nit; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its\nobjects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary act, any\nparticular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as well as any\nparticular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted\nfor in itself alone. This does not make the created will independent of\nthe uncreated. The very fact of its being a created will, settles its\ndependence. The power which created it, has likewise limited it, and\ncould annihilate it. The power which created it, has ordained and fixed\nthe instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of effects.\nThe man may make the volition or _nisus_, to remove a mountain, but his\narm fails to carry out the _nisus_. His volitions are produced freely of\nhimself; they are unrestrained within the capacity of will given him,\nbut he meets on every side those physical causes which are mightier than\nhimself, and which, instrumental of the divine will, make the created\nwill aware of its feebleness and dependence.\n\nBut although the will is an activity or cause thus contingent,\narbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity or cause united with\nsensitivity and reason; and forming the unity of the soul. Will, reason,\nand, the sensitivity or the affections, constitute mind, or spirit, or\nsoul. Although the will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not\nfollow that it _must_ act without regard to reason or feeling.\n\nI have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am now only giving a\nscheme of psychology in order to prove the possibility of a contingent\nwill, that we have nothing else to oppose to an absolute and universal\nnecessity.\n\nAccording to this scheme, we take the will as the _executive_ of the\nsoul or the _doer_. It is a doer having life and power in itself, not\nnecessarily determined in any of its acts, but a power to do or not to\ndo. _Reason_ we take as the _lawgiver_. It is the \"source and substance\"\nof pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and\ncommands the executive will what ought to be done. The sensitivity or\nthe affections, or the desire, is the seat of enjoyment: it is the\ncapacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in general, hold to the\nsensitivity the relation of the agreeable or the disagreeable, are in\ncorrelation with it; and, according to the degree of this correlation,\nare the emotions and passions awakened.\n\nNext let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality,\nor more strictly, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean\nthe me, or myself. The personality--the me--the will, a self-moving\ncause, directs itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives\nthe laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with\nthe conviction of their rectitude and imperative obligation; at the same\ntime, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to disobey them.\n\nAgain, let the will be supposed to direct itself in an act of attention\nto the pleasurable emotions connected with the presence of certain\nobjects; and the painful emotions connected with the presence of other\nobjects; and then the desire of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain,\nbecome rules of action. There is here again the consciousness of power\nto resist or to comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may\ndirect itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them,\nand direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and\ndisgust.\n\nWe may suppose again two conditions of the reason and sensitivity\nrelatively to each other; a condition of agreement, and a condition of\ndisagreement. If the affections incline to those objects which the\nreason approves, then we have the first condition. If the affections are\nrepelled in dislike by those objects which reason approves, then we have\nthe second condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying\nreason, gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in\nobeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice versa.\n\nNow if the will were always governed by the highest reason, without the\npossibility of resistance, it would be a necessitated will; and if it\nwere always governed by the strongest desire, without the possibility of\nresistance, it would be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system\nof Edwards, where the strongest desire is identified with volition.\n\nThe only escape from necessity, therefore, is in the conception of a\nwill as above defined--a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey\nreason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or\nobey both in their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the\nindifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or\npassion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the reason, shall it be\nasked, what is the cause of the act of obedience? The will is the cause\nof its own act; a cause _per se_, a cause self-conscious and\nself-moving; it obeys the reason by its own _nisus_. When the will obeys\nthe strongest desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of\nobedience? Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we\ncalled upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a\nself-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an absolute\nnecessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason, we attempt to\nexplain it by saying, that obedience to the reason awakens the strongest\ndesire, or the sense of the most agreeable; we may then ask, why the\nwill obeys the strongest desire? and then we may attempt to explain this\nagain by saying, that to obey the strongest desire seems most\nreasonable. We may evidently, with as much propriety, account for\nobedience to passion, by referring to reason; as account for obedience\nto reason, by referring to passion. If the act of the will which goes in\nthe direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then\nthe act of the will which goes in the direction of the sensitivity, may\nfind its cause in the reason. But this is only moving in a circle, and\nis no advance whatever. Why does the will obey the reason? because it is\nmost agreeable: but why does the will obey because it is most agreeable?\nbecause to obey the most agreeable seems most reasonable.\n\nActs of the will may be conceived of as analogous to intuitive or first\ntruths. First truths require no demonstration; they admit of none; they\nform the basis of all demonstration. Acts of the will are first\nmovements of primary causes, and as such neither require nor admit of\nantecedent causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis\nof all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself admits of\nno explanation. It presents the primary and all-comprehending _fact_ of\npower. In God, will is infinite, primary cause, and untreated: in man,\nit is finite, primary cause, constituted by God's creative act, but not\nnecessitated, for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be\npower after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical\nor secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural antecedents\nand sequents.\n\nGod's will explains creation as an existent fact; man's will explains\nall his volitions. When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics\nof creation, we bring in the idea of infinite wisdom and goodness. But\nwhen we inquire _why_ God's will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we\nmust either represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and\ngoodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute\nnecessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself as a\nfirst cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, explaining all\neffects, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself.\n\nWhen we proceed to inquire after the characteristics of human volition,\nwe bring in the idea of right and wrong; we look at the relations of the\nreason and the sensitivity. But when we inquire _why_ the will now obeys\nreason, and now passion; and why this passion, or that passion; we must\neither represent the will as necessitated, and take all the consequences\nof a necessitated will, or we must stop short here likewise, with the\nwill itself as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, in\nexplaining its own volitions, neither requires nor admits of any\nexplanation itself, other than as a finite and dependent will it\nrequires to be referred to the infinite will in order to account for the\nfact of its existence.\n\nEdwards, while he burdens the question of the will's determination with\nmonstrous consequences, relieves it of no one difficulty. He lays down,\nindeed, a uniform law of determination; but there is a last inquiry\nwhich he does not presume to answer. The determination of the will, or\nthe volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of the\nmost agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one simple power or\ncapacity, there arise from it an indefinite variety of volitions; and\nvolitions at one time directly opposed to volitions at another time. The\nquestion now arises, how this one simple capacity of volition comes to\nproduce such various volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may\nbe the volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but\nthat it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only its\nrelation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically considered, is\nat one time right, at another wrong; at one time rational, at another\nfoolish. The volition really varies, although, relatively to the will,\nit always puts on the characteristic of the most agreeable. The question\ntherefore returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of\nvolitions, always however representing them to itself as the most\nagreeable? There are three ways of answering this. _First_, we may\nsuppose the _state_ of the will or sensitivity to remain unchanged, and\nthe different volitions to be effected by the different arrangements and\nconditions of the objects relatively to it. _Secondly_, we may suppose\nthe arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged, and\nthe different volitions to be effected by changes in the _state_ of the\nsensitivity, or will, relatively to the objects. Or, _thirdly_, we may\nsuppose both the state of the will, and the arrangements and conditions\nof the objects to be subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus\ngiving rise to the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet\nat an end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the\ndifferent arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought about?\nOn the second supposition, how the changes in the state of the\nsensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the changes in\nboth, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could be said, that the\nsensitivity changes itself relatively to the objects, then we should ask\nagain, why the sensitivity chooses at one time, as most agreeable to\nitself, that which is right and rational, and at another time, that\nwhich is wrong and foolish? Or, if it could be said, that the objects\nhave the power of changing their own arrangements and conditions, then\nalso we must ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make\nthe right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time, the\nwrong and foolish.\n\nThese last questions are the very questions which Edwards does not\npresume to answer. The motive by which he accounts for the existence of\nthe volition, is formed of the correlation of the state of the will, and\nthe nature and circumstances of the object. But when the correlation is\nsuch as to give the volition in the direction of the right and the\nrational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,--we ask _why_ does\nthe correlation give the volition in this direction. If it be said that\nthe volition in this direction appears most agreeable, the answer is a\nmere repetition of the question; for the question amounts simply to\nthis:--why the correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather\nthan the other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most\nagreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as the\nmost agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind changes its\nstate in relation to the objects; or why the objects change their\nrelations to the mind, so as to produce this sense of the most agreeable\nin one direction rather than in another? The difficulty is precisely of\nthe same nature which is supposed to exist in the case of a contingent\nwill. The will now goes in the direction of reason, and now in the\ndirection of passion,--but why? We say, because as will, it has the\npower of thus varying its movement. The change is accounted for by\nmerely referring to the will.\n\nAccording to Edwards, the correlation of will and its objects, now gives\nthe sense of the most agreeable, or volition, in the direction of the\nreason; and now in the direction of passion--but why?--Why does the\nreason _now_ appear most agreeable,--and now the indulgences of impure\ndesire? I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which\nis equivalent to saying,--I have the sense of the most agreeable in\nreference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do you know it\nis the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have the sense of the\nmost agreeable in reference to it. It is plain, therefore, that on\nEdwards's system, as well as on that opposed to it, the particular\ndirection of volition, and the constant changes of volition, must be\nreferred simply to the cause of volition, without giving any other\nexplanation of the different determinations of this cause, except\nreferring them to the nature of the cause itself. It is possible,\nindeed, to refer the changes in the correlation to some cause which\ngoverns the correlation of the will and its objects; but then the\nquestion must arise in relation to this cause, why it determines the\ncorrelation in one direction at one time, and in another direction at\nanother time? And this could be answered only by referring it to itself\nas having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to do\nor not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction, or in the\nopposite direction; or by referring it to still another antecedent\ncause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be the infinite will:\nthen the question would be, why the infinite will determines the\nsensitivity, or will of his creatures at one time to wisdom, and at\nanother to folly? And what answer could be given? Shall it be said that\nit seems most agreeable to him? But why does it seem most agreeable to\nhim? Is it because the particular determination is the most reasonable,\nthat it seems most agreeable? But why does he determine always according\nto the most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most\nreasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to Edwards,\nthe volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the same; to say\nthat God wills as he does will, because it is most agreeable to him, is\nto say that he wills because he wills; and to say that he wills as he\ndoes will, because it seems most reasonable to him, amounts to the same\nthing, because he wills according to the most reasonable only because it\nis the most agreeable.\n\nTo represent the volitions, or choices, either in the human or divine\nwill, as determined by motives, removes therefore no difficulty which is\nsupposed to pertain to contingent self-determination.\n\nLet us compare the two theories particularly, although at the hazard of\nsome repetition.\n\nContingent self-determination represents the will as a cause making its\n_nisus_ or volitions of itself, and determining their direction of\nitself--now obeying reason, and now obeying passion. If it be asked why\nit determines in a particular direction?--if this particular direction\nin which it determines be that of the reason?--then it may be said, that\nit determines in this direction because it is reasonable;--if this\nparticular direction be that of passion, as opposed to reason, then it\nmay be said that it determines in this direction, because it is\npleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction of\nreason, rather than in that of passion, as opposed to reason?--we cannot\nsay that it is most reasonable to obey reason and not passion; because\nthe one is all reason, and the other is all passion, and of course they\ncannot be compared under the reasonable; and no more can they be\ncompared under the pleasing,--when, by the pleasing, we understand, the\ngratification of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it\nis reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the\nwill does obey reason. To obey desire because it is desirable, is\nnothing more than the statement of the fact that the will does obey\ndesire. The will goes in one direction rather than in another by an act\nof self-determination, which neither admits of, nor indeed requires any\nother explanation than this, that the will has power to do one or the\nother, and in the exercise of this power, it does one rather than the\nother.\n\nTo this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; and what is this\nsystem? That the will is determined by the strongest motive;--and what\nis the strongest motive? The greatest apparent good, or the most\nagreeable:--what constitutes the greatest apparent good, or the most\nagreeable? The correlation of will or sensitivity and the object. But\nwhy does the correlation make one object appear more agreeable than\nanother; or make the same object at one time appear agreeable, at\nanother time disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the\nquestion,--why does the will go in the direction of one object rather\nthan of another; or go in the direction of a given object at one time,\nand in opposition to it at another time? For the will to determine\nitself toward an object in one system, answers to the will having the\nsense of the most agreeable towards an object in Edwards's system. If\nEdwards should attempt to give an answer without going beyond the\nmotive, he could only say that the sensitivity has the power of being\naffected with the sense of the most agreeable or of the most\ndisagreeable; and that in the exercise of this power it is affected with\nthe one rather than with the other. He could not say that to obey reason\nappears more agreeable than to obey passion as opposed to reason, for\nthe obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense of\nthe most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to obey\nreason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite, under the idea\nof itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to no more than this, on\nhis system, that it is most agreeable to obey the reasonable;--that is,\nthe reasonable is obeyed only as the most agreeable: but obedience of\nwill being nothing more than the sense of the most agreeable, to say it\nis obeyed because most agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the\nsense of the most agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is\nobeyed.\n\nTo refer the motive to the divine determination makes volition necessary\nto the man, and throws the difficulty in question, if it is to be\nconsidered a difficulty, only farther back.\n\nIf God's will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it\nis most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? If the\nreply be, because it is most reasonable, then we are only moving in a\ncircle; but if the agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch\nas to will is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows\nthat God has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only\nbecause it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in him; and\nthus the question why God wills in one direction rather than in another,\nor what is the cause of his determination, is not answered by Edwards,\nunless he says with us that the will in itself as a power to do or not\nto do, or to do one thing, or its opposite, is a sufficient explanation,\nand the only possible explanation;--or unless he refers the divine will\nto an antecedent cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in\nan endless series--and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless\nseries, and an absolute necessity.\n\nAll possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have\nabove given, must be either in the direction of the reason or of the\nsensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. If the volition be in the\ndirection of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good,\n&c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic\nfrom the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:--it is\ngenerous, benevolent, kind, &c.--or it is malicious, envious, unkind,\nvicious, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason?\nNothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction\nbecause it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go\nin the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause\n_per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that\ndirection.\n\nThere are in the intelligence or reason, as united with the will in the\nconstitution of the mind, necessary convictions of the true, the just,\nthe right. There are in the sensitivity, as united in the same\nconstitution, necessary affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable\nin reference to various objects. The will as the power which by its\n_nisus_ produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in\neither of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it makes\nits _nisus_ or volition in reference to the true, the just, the good;\nshould we attempt to explain this _nisus_ by saying that the true, the\njust, the good, affect the sensitivity agreeably, this would only amount\nto saying that the _nisus_ is made towards the true, not as the true,\nbut only as the agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the\n_nisus_ is always made in the direction of the agreeable. But then again\nwe might seek to explain why the _nisus_ is always made in the direction\nof the agreeable. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then we have an\nabsolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction\nof the agreeable seems most rational? Then it follows that the _nisus_\nis made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the\nrational; and then we would introduce the law that the _nisus_ is always\nmade in the direction of the rational. But then again we might seek to\nexplain why this _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the\nrational. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have\nan absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the\ndirection of the rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back\nin a circle to our first position.\n\nHow shall we escape from these difficulties? Shall we adopt the\npsychology of Edwards, and make the will and the sensitivity one? Then\nas the volition is always the strongest affection of the agreeable, if\nthe sensitivity be necessary, volitions are necessary, and we are\nplunged headlong again into an absolute and universal necessity. If the\nsensitivity be not necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we\nhave to account for its various determinations just as we are supposed\nto be called upon to account for the various determinations of the will\nwhen considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:--we are met\nwith the questions, why does the sensitivity represent this object as\nmore agreeable than that object?--or the same object as agreeable at one\ntime, and disagreeable at another? Or if these various determinations\nare resolved into an antecedent necessity comprehending them, then we go\nup to the antecedent cause in which this necessity resides, and question\nit in like manner.\n\nBut one thing remains, and that is to consider the will as primary\ncause, contingent in opposition to being necessitated--a cause having in\nitself the power of making these various volitions or _nisus_, and\nneither asking nor allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their\nparticular direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will.\n\nThe question respecting the indifferency of will must now be considered.\nThe term _indifferency_ comes up in consequence of considering the will\nas distinct from the sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling--it is a\npower indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects.\n\nIt is also a power distinct from the reason; it is not conviction or\nbelief--it is a power indifferent to the true and the right, to the\nfalse and the wrong, in the sense that it is not necessarily determined\nby conviction and belief, by the true and the right, or by the false and\nthe wrong. The conception of will in its utmost simplicity is the\nconception of pure power, self-moving, and self-conscious--containing\nwithin itself the ground and the possibility of creation and of\nmodification. In God it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every\n_nisus_ in his will is really creative or modifying, according to its\nself-directed aim. In man it is constituted, dependent, limited, and\naccountable.\n\nNow in direct connexion with power, we have the conception of law or\nrule, or what power _ought_ to do. This law or rule is revealed in the\nreason. In man as pure, and we conclude in God likewise, as the\narchetype of all spirit, there is given a sensitivity or a capacity to\nbe affected agreeably by, and to be drawn towards the objects approved\nand commanded by the reason. If this sensitivity does not move in\nharmony with the reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a\ntriunity with these two other powers. We can distinguish but not\nseparate it from them. A will without reason would be a power without\neyes, or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and\nisolated;--just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be\nwithout efficiency, or capacity of giving real manifestations.\n\nThe completeness and perfection of each, lies in a union with all; but\nthen each in its proper movements is in some sense independent and free\nof the others. The convictions, beliefs, or perceptions of reason are\nnot made, nor can they be unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the\nwill any direct command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can\nexcite and direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up\nobjects and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and\nyet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its manifestations.\n\nThe reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet the latter would\nhave no definite perception, and of course its highest sensibilities\nwould lie dormant without the reason.\n\nSo also the reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the\nwill. The will has efficiency, or creative and modifying power in\nitself--self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and\nsensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without\nrules,--a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing\nwhat to do.\n\nIt addition to the above, the will has this high and distinguishing\npeculiarity. That it alone is free--that it alone is opposed to\nnecessity. Reason _must_ perceive, _must_ believe. Sensitivity _must_\nfeel when its objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given\nits light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has\nawakened all its passions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. It is\nas conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may be called a\npower arbitrary and contingent; but this means only that it is a power\nwhich absolutely puts forth its own _nisus_, and is free.\n\nIt follows from this, that the will can act irrespective of both reason\nand sensitivity, if an object of action, bearing no relation to reason\nor sensitivity, be possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such\nrelation, must be very trifling. If a case in illustration could not be\ncalled up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency of\nwill;--it would only prove that all objects of action actually existing,\nbear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is a case, however,\nfrequently called up, and much disputed, which deserves some attention,\nand which it appears to me, offers the illustration required. Let it be\nrequired to select one of the squares of the chess-board. In selecting\none of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and\nsensitivity, or not? Those who hold that the will is necessarily\ndetermined, must make out some connexion between the act of selection,\nand the reason and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general\nmotive which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to\nillustrate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, to\nprove that the will can act without a motive.\n\nI reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the motive of bringing the\nchess-board before the eye, and in making all the preparations for a\nselection;--but now the last question is, which square shall I select?\nThe illustration will have the same force whichever square is selected,\nand there is no motive that can be drawn either from the reason or the\nsensitivity for taking one square in preference to the other: under the\nabsence of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at\nillustration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in making this\nselection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an entire indifferency\nas to which particular square is selected;--there is no command of the\nreason directing to one square rather than another;--there is no\naffection of the sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as\nmost agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.\n\nIt will be proper, in this place, to consider the following argument of\nEdwards against indifferency of will: \"Choice may be immediately _after_\na state of indifference, but cannot co-exist with it: even the very\nbeginning of it is not in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if\nthis be liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in\na state of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are\nso far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that\nthey are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the\nother, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and\ndeath.\" (p. 73.)\n\nEdwards reasons according to his own psychology: If the will and the\nsensitivity are one, the will cannot well be conceived of as in a state\nof indifference, and if it could be conceived of as in a state of\nindifference before it exercises volition, inasmuch as, according to his\nsystem again, volition is the sense of the most agreeable, the moment\nvolition begins, indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in\nindifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just as rest\nceases with motion.\n\nBut according to the system of psychology, which we adopt, and which I\nshall verify hereafter, the will is not one with the sensitivity, but is\nclearly distinguishable from it:--the sensitivity is the capacity of\nfeeling; the will is the causality of the soul:--a movement of the\nsensitivity, under the quality of indifference, is self-contradictory;\nand a movement of the will being a mere _nisus_ of cause, under the\nquality of any sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory\nlikewise; it would be confounding that which we had already\ndistinguished. From Edwards's very definition of will it cannot be\nindifferent; from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise\nthan indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and\nsensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the indifference\nwhich it possessed before the action; but this is no less true when it\ndetermines in the direction either of reason or sensitivity. When the\ndetermination is in the direction of the reason, there is an exercise of\nreason in connexion with the act, and all the interest of the reason is\nwakened up, but the will considered in its entire simplicity, knows only\nthe _nisus_ of power. When the determination is in the direction of the\nsensitivity, there is a play of emotions and passions, but the will\nagain knows only the _nisus_ of power which carries it in this\ndirection.\n\nIn the unity of the soul these powers are generally found acting\ntogether. It may be difficult to distinguish them, and this, in\nconnexion with the constantly observed fact of the fixed correlation\nbetween physical causes and the masses which they operate upon, may lead\nto the conclusion that there is a fixed correlation likewise between the\nwill and its objects, regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at\nleast, that there is a fixed connexion between the will and the\nsensitivity, so that the former is invariably governed by the latter. We\nhave already shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not\nrelieve us from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent\nwill, unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the\nsensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the sensitivity the\ndifficulties which we suppose, to encompass the will. In our\npsychological investigations it will appear how clearly distinguishable\nthose powers are, and also how clearly independent and sovereign will\nis, inasmuch as it does actually determine at one time, in opposition to\nthe most agreeable; at another, in opposition to reason; and at another,\nin opposition to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we\nperceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as subordinated\nto reason, to move within the delights of the sensitivity; and we know\nthat we are acting _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ when we act\notherwise; but yet _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ do we often act. But\nwhen we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its\ndirection, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason; and when\nwe do obey the sensitivity, will does not become sensitivity--will is\nstill simply cause, and its act the _nisus_ of power: thought, and\nconviction, and design, hold their place in the reason alone: emotion\nand passion their place in the sensitivity alone.\n\nARGUMENT\n\nFROM\n\nTHE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.\n\nEdwards's argument against a contingent, self-determining will, drawn\nfrom the divine prescience, remains to be considered.\n\nThe argument is introduced as follows: \"That the acts of the wills of\nmoral agents are not contingent events, in such a sense as to be without\nall necessity, appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events.\"\n(sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards devotes this section to \"the evidence of God's\ncertain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents.\" In the\nfollowing section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his\nargument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the\nconsequences of his position.\n\nGod foresees all volitions; that he foresees them makes their existence\nnecessary. If their existence were not necessary, he could not foresee\nthem; or, to express it still more generally, foreknowledge extends to\nall events, and foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of\neverything to which it extends. It follows from this, that all events\nexist with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all volitions,\nand moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all the divine\nvolitions, for God cannot but foresee his own volitions. In no part of\nhis work, does Edwards lay down more summarily and decidedly, the\ndoctrine of absolute and universal necessity. We have already, in part\nII. of this treatise, deduced the consequences of this doctrine. If then\nwe are placed upon the alternative of denying the divine prescience of\nvolitions, or of acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would\npractically be most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the\nalternative. \"If it could be demonstrated,\" remarks Dugald Stewart,\n(vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) \"which in my opinion has not yet been done,\nthat the prescience of the volitions of moral agents is incompatible\nwith the free agency of man, the logical inference would be, _not_ in\nfavour of the scheme of necessity, but that there are some events, the\nforeknowledge of which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to\naffirm, that it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of\ncontingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not\nextend to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of\nGod, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his omniscience?\"\nIf the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the doctrine of necessity,\nthere is nothing left that it is worth while to contend for; all moral\nand theological interests vanish away. But let us examine the argument\nof Edwards.\n\nThis argument consists of three parts; we shall consider them in order.\n\nI. Edwards lays down, that a past event is necessary, \"having already\nmade sure of existence;\" but divine foreknowledge is such an event, and\nis therefore necessary. This is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever\nis, is. He next affirms, that whatever is \"indissolubly connected with\nother things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;\" but events\ninfallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the\nforeknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by God, have an\nindissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are therefore\nnecessary.\n\nThe force of this reasoning turns upon the connexion between\nforeknowledge and the events foreknown. This connexion is affirmed to be\n\"indissoluble;\" that is, the foreknowledge is certainly connected with\nthe event. But this only amounts to the certainty of divine\nforeknowledge, and proves nothing as to the nature of the existence\nforeknown. We may certainly know a past or present event, but our\nknowledge of its existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it\ncame to exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a\ncertain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and it\ncannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge of his\nwalking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or necessary\nantecedent; and the question whether his walking be contingent or\nnecessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the cause of walking. I\nlooked out of my window yesterday, and saw a man walking; and the\nknowledge of that event I now retain, so that it cannot but be that the\nman walked yesterday: but this again leaves the question respecting the\nmode of existence untouched:--Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a\ncontingent event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of\nprescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by this\nfaculty I may see a man walking in the time called to-morrow, just as by\nthe faculty of memory I see a man walking in the time called yesterday.\nThe knowledge, whether it relate to past, present, or future, as a\nknowledge in relation to myself, is always a present knowledge; but the\nobject known may stand in various relations of time, place, &c. Now in\nrelation to the future, no more than in relation to the past and\npresent, does the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in\nrelation to the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge.\nEdwards remarks, (p. 121.) \"All certain knowledge, whether it be\nforeknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the\nthing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that\nit is impossible that it should now be otherwise than true.\"\n\nEdwards does not distinguish between the certainty of the mere _fact_ of\nexistence, and the necessity by which anything comes to exist.\nForeknowledge, after-knowledge, and concomitant knowledge,--that is, the\npresent knowledge of events, future, past, or present,--proves of course\nthe reality of the events; that they will be, have been, or are: or,\nmore strictly speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of\ntime, is the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the\nknowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity of its\nexistence. If the knowledge of the event were the _cause_ of the event,\nor if it _generically_ comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon\nstrict logical principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would\nbe affirmed of the event likewise.\n\nThat God foreknows all volitions is granted; that as he foreknows them,\nthey will be, is also granted; his foreknowledge of them is the positive\naffirmation of their reality in time future; but by supposition, God's\nforeknowledge is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend\nthem; they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence God's\nforeseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put forth or\ndetermine their volitions, does not take away from these wills the\ncontingency and freedom belonging to them, any more than our witnessing\nhow wills act in the time present, takes away from them their\ncontingency and freedom. God in his prescience, _is the spectator of the\nfuture, as really as we are the spectators of the present_.\n\nEdwards's reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that employed sometimes\nfor exercising the student of logic in the detection of fallacies: for\nexample, a man in a given place, must _necessarily_ either stay in that\nplace, or go away from that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes\naway, he acts necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things,\nthat a man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then\nit does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to stay or\ngo, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition as a body, is\nentirely distinct from the question respecting the necessity or\ncontingency of his volitions. And so also in respect of the divine\nforeknowledge: all human volitions as events occurring in time, are\nsubject to the necessary condition of being foreknown by that Being,\n\"who inhabiteth eternity:\" but this necessary condition of their\nexistence neither proves nor disproves the necessity or the contingency\nof their particular causation.\n\nII. The second proposition in Edwards's argument is, \"No future event\ncan be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without\nall necessity.\" His reasoning in support of this is as follows: 1. \"It\nis impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without\n_evidence_.\" 2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3.\nTherefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of\nknowledge. I dispute both premises: That which is known by _evidence_ or\n_proof_ is _mediate_ knowledge,--that is, we know it through something\nwhich is immediate, standing between the faculty of knowledge and the\nobject of knowledge in question. That which is known _intuitively_ is\nknown without proof, and this is _immediate_ knowledge. In this way all\naxioms or first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed\nevidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by which\nanything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a Being, therefore,\nwhose knowledge fills duration, future and past events may be as\nimmediately known as present events. Indeed, can we conceive of God\notherwise than immediately knowing all things? An Infinite and Eternal\nIntelligence cannot be thought of under relations of time and space, or\nas arriving at knowledge through _media_ of proof or demonstration. So\nmuch for the first premise. The second is equally untenable: \"_A\ncontingent future event is without evidence_.\" We grant with Edwards\nthat it is not _self-evident_; implying by that the evidence arising\nfrom \"the necessity of its nature,\" as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. What is\nself-evident, as we have already shown, does not require any evidence or\nproof, but is known immediately; and a future contingent event may be\nself-evident as a fact lying before the divine mind, reaching into\nfuturity, although it cannot be self-evident from \"the necessity of its\nnature.\"\n\nBut Edwards affirms, that \"neither is there any _proof_ or evidence in\n_anything else_, or evidence of connexion with something else that is\nevident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed\nthat there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of\nthe _contingent_ event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its\ncontingency and supposes necessity.\" (p. 116.) He illustrates his\nmeaning by the following example: \"Suppose that five thousand seven\nhundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine\nBeing,--and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at\nonce starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular\nnature and form--all in _absolute contingence_,--without any concern of\nGod, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or\nreason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all\nwith anything foregoing;--I say that if this be supposed, there was no\nevidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be\nseen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet was not; and there\nwas no evidence of it to be seen in _any thing else;_ for _evidence_ in\nsomething else; is _connexion_ with something else; but such connexion\nis contrary to the supposition.\" (p. 116.)\n\nThe amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch as a contingent\nevent exists \"_without any concern of God, or any other cause in the\nmatter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence,--or\nany dependence upon or connexion with anything foregoing_,\"--there is\nreally nothing by which it can be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right\nin this definition of a contingent event, viz.: that it is an event\nwithout any cause or ground of its existence, and \"that there is nothing\nnow existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is\nconnected,\" then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. But I\ndo not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat again, is not\nopposed to cause but to necessity. The world may have sprung into being\nby _absolute contingence_ more than five thousand years ago, and yet\nhave sprung into being at the command of God himself, and its existence\nhave been foreseen by him from all eternity. The contingence expresses\nonly the freedom of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign\nchoice, and at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold\nthe creative _nibus_,--creating in the light of his infinite wisdom, but\nfrom no compulsion or necessity of motive therein found. Under this view\nto foresee creation was nothing different from foreseeing his own\nvolitions.\n\nThe ground on which human volitions can be foreseen, is no less plain\nand reasonable. In the first place, future contingent volitions are\nnever without a cause and sufficient ground of their existence, the\nindividual will being always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of\nthe individual volitions. God has therefore provided for the possible\nexistence of volitions other than his own, in the creation and\nconstitution of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not\nrequired to conceive of _media_ by which all the particular volitions\nmay be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual\nexistence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite intuition;\nhe cannot be dependent upon any media for his knowledge. It is enough,\nas I have already shown, to assign him prescience, in order to bring\nwithin his positive knowledge all future contingent volitions. He knows\nall the variety and the full extent of the possible, and amid the\npossible he foresees the actual; and he foresees not only that class of\nthe actual which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively\nnecessary, but also that class of the actual which is to spring up under\nthe characteristic of contingency.\n\nAnd herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of the divine\nprescience over human forecast,--in that the former penetrates the\ncontingent as accurately as the necessary. With the latter it is far\notherwise. Human forecast or calculation can foresee the motions of the\nplanets, eclipses of the sun and moon, and even the flight of the\ncomets, because they are governed by necessary laws; but the volitions\nof the human will form the subject of only _probable_ calculations.\n\nBut if human volitions, as contingent, form the subject of probable\ncalculations, there must be in opposition to Edwards something \"that is\nevident\" and \"now existent, with which the future existence of the\n_contingent_ event is connected.\"\n\nThere are three kinds of certainty. _First_, absolute certainty. This is\nthe certainty which lies in necessary and eternal principles e. g. 2 x\n2=4; the existence of space; every body must be in space; every\nphenomenon must have a cause; the being of God.\n\nLogical certainty, that is, the connexion between premises and\nconclusion, is likewise absolute.\n\n_Secondly_. Physical certainty. This is the certainty which lies in the\nconnexion between physical causes and their phenomena: e. g.\ngravitation, heat, chemical affinities in general, mechanical forces.\n\nThe reason conceives of these causes as inherently active and uniform;\nand hence, wherever a physical cause exists, we expect its proper\nphenomena.\n\nNow we do not call the operation of these causes _absolutely_ certain,\nbecause they depend ultimately upon will,--the will of God; and we can\nconceive that the same will which ordained them, can change, suspend, or\neven annihilate them: they have no intrinsic necessity, still, as causes\ngiven in time and space, we conceive of them generally as immutable. If\nin any case they be changed, or suspended, we are compelled to recognise\nthe presence of that will which ordained them. Such change or suspension\nwe call a _miracle_; that is, a surprise,--a wonder, because it is\nunlooked for.\n\nWhen, therefore, we affirm any thing to be physically certain, we mean\nthat it is certain in the immutability of a cause acting in time and\nspace, and under a necessity relatively to the divine will; but still\nnot _absolutely_ certain, because there is a possibility of a miracle.\nBut when we affirm any thing to be absolutely certain, we mean that it\nis certain as comprehended in a principle which is unalterable in its\nvery nature, and is therefore independent of will.\n\n_Thirdly_. Moral certainty, is the certainty which lies between the\nconnexion of motive and will. By will we mean a self-conscious and\nintelligent cause, or a cause in unity with intelligence. It is also, in\nthe fullest sense, a cause _per se_; that is, it contains within itself\nproper efficiency, and determines its own direction. By _motives_ we\nmean the reasons according to which the will acts. In general, all\nactivity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons; for they have\nthe same meaning: but in mere material masses, the rule is not\ncontemplated by the acting force,--it is contemplated only by the\nintelligence which ordained and conditioned the force. In spirit, on the\ncontrary, the activity which we call will is self-conscious, and is\nconnected with a perception of the reasons, or ends, or motives of\naction. These motives or ends of action are of two kinds. _First_, those\nfound in the ideas of the practical reason, which decides what is fit\nand right. These are reasons of supreme authority. _Secondly_, those\nfound in the understanding and sensitivity: e. g. the immediately useful\nand expedient, and the gratification of passion. These are right only\nwhen subordinate to the first.\n\nNow these reasons and motives are a light to the will, and serve to\ndirect its activities; and the human conscience, which is but the\nreason, has drawn up for the will explicit rules, suited to all\ncircumstances and relations, which are called _ethics_, or _the rules_.\n\nThese rules the will is not compelled or necessitated to obey. In every\nvolition it is conscious of a power to do or not to do; but yet, as the\nwill forms a unity with the intelligence, we take for granted that it\nwill obey them, unless grounds for an opposite conclusion are apparent.\nBut the only probable ground for a disobedience of these rules lies in a\nstate of sinfulness,--a corruption of the sensitivity, or a disposition\nto violate the harmony and fitness of the spiritual constitution. Hence\nmoral certainty can exist only where the harmony of the spiritual being\nis preserved. For example: God and good angels. In God moral certainty\nis infinite. His dispositions are infinitely pure, and his will freely\ndetermines to do right; it is not compelled or necessitated, for then\nhis infinite meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is _not\nabsolute_, because will being a power to do or not to do, there is\nalways a possibility, although there may be no probability, nay an\ninfinite improbability, that the will may disobey the laws of the\nreason.\n\nIn the case of angels and good men, the moral certainty is such as to be\nattended with no apprehension of a dereliction. With respect to such men\nas Joseph, Daniel, Paul, Howard, and Washington, we can calculate with a\nvery high and satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in which they\nwill act in any given circumstances involving the influence of motives.\nWe know they will obey truth, justice, and mercy,--that is, the _first_\nclass of motives; and the _second_ only so far as they are authorized by\nthe first. If the first class of motives are forsaken, then human\nconduct can be calculated only according to the influence of the second\nclass.\n\nHuman character, however, is mixed and variously compounded. We might\nmake a scale of an indefinite number of degrees, from the highest point\nof moral excellence to the lowest point of moral degradation, and then\nour predictions of human conduct would vary with every degree.\n\nIn any particular case where we are called upon to reason from the\nconnexion of motives with the will, it is evident we must determine the\ncharacter of the individual as accurately as possible, in order to know\nthe probable _resultant_ of the opposite moral forces which we are\nlikely to find.\n\nWe have remarked that moral certainty exists only where the harmony of\nthe moral constitution is preserved. Here we know the right will be\nobeyed. It may be remarked in addition to this, however, that moral\ncertainty may almost be said to exist in the case of the lowest moral\ndegradation, where the right is altogether forsaken. Here the rule is,\n\"whatever is most agreeable;\" and the volition is indeed merged into the\nsense of the most agreeable. But in the intermediate state lies the wide\nfield of probability. What is commonly called the knowledge of human\nnature, and esteemed of most importance in the affairs of life, is not\nthe knowledge of human nature as it ought to be, but as it is in its\nvast variety of good and evil. We gain this knowledge from observation\nand history. What human nature ought to be, we learn from reason.\n\nOn a subject of so much importance, and where it is so desirable to have\nclear and definite ideas, the rhetorical ungracefulness of repetition is\nof little moment, when this repetition serves our great end. I shall be\npardoned, therefore, in calling the attention of the reader to a point\nabove suggested, namely, that the will is in a triunity with reason and\nsensitivity, and, in the constitution of our being, is designed to\nderive its rules and inducements of action from these. Acts which are in\nthe direction of neither reason nor sensitivity, must be very trifling\nacts; and therefore acts of this description, although possible, we may\nconclude are very rare. In calculating, then, future acts of will, we\nmay, like the mathematicians, drop infinitesimal differences, and assume\nthat all acts of the will are in the direction of reason or sensitivity,\nor of both in their harmony. Although the will is conscious of power to\ndo, out of the direction of both reason and sensitivity, still, in the\ntriunity in which it exists, it submits itself to the general interests\nof the being, and consults the authority of conscience, or the\nenjoyments of passion. Now every individual has acquired for himself\nhabits and a character more or less fixed. He is known to have submitted\nhimself from day to day, and in a great variety of transactions, to the\nlaws of the conscience; and hence we conclude that he has formed for\nhimself a fixed purpose of doing right. He has exhibited, too, on many\noccasions, noble, generous, and pure feelings; and hence we conclude\nthat his sensitivity harmonizes with conscience. Or he is known to have\nviolated the laws of the conscience from day to day, and in a great\nvariety of transactions; and hence we conclude that he has formed for\nhimself a fixed purpose of doing wrong. He has exhibited, too, on many\noccasions, low, selfish, and impure feelings; and hence we conclude that\nhis sensitivity is in collision with conscience.\n\nIn both cases supposed, and in like manner in all supposable cases,\nthere is plainly a basis on which, in any given circumstances, we may\nforesee and predict volitions. There is something \"that is evident and\nnow existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is\nconnected.\" On the one hand these predictions exert no necessitating\ninfluence over the events themselves, for they are entirely disconnected\nwith the causation of the events: and, on the other hand, the events\nneed not be assumed as necessary in order to become the objects of\nprobable calculations. If they were necessary, the calculations would no\nlonger be merely probable:--they would, on the contrary, take the\nprecision and certainty of the calculation of eclipses and other\nphenomena based upon necessary laws. But these calculations can aim only\nat _moral_ certainty, because they are made according to the generally\nknown and received determinations of will in a unity with reason and\nsensitivity; but still a will which is known also to have the power to\ndepart at any moment from the line of determination which it has\nestablished for itself. Thus the calculations which we make respecting\nthe conduct of one man in given circumstances, based on his known\nintegrity, and the calculations which we make respecting another, based\non his known dishonesty, may alike disappoint us, through the\nunexpected, though possible dereliction of the first, and the\nunexpected, though possible reformation of the latter. When we reason\nfrom moral effects to moral causes, or from moral causes to moral\neffects, we cannot regard the operation of causes as positive and\nuniform under the same law of necessity which appertains to physical\ncauses, because in moral causality the free will is the efficient and\nlast determiner. It is indeed true that we reason here with a high\ndegree of probability, with a probability sufficient to regulate wisely\nand harmoniously the affairs of society; but we cannot reason respecting\nhuman conduct, as we reason respecting the phenomena of the physical\nworld, because it is possible for the human will to disappoint\ncalculations based upon the ordinary influence of motives: e. g. the\nmotive does not hold the same relation to will which fire holds to\ncombustible substance; the fire must burn; the will may or may not\ndetermine in view of motive. Hence the reason why, in common parlance,\nprobable evidence has received the name of moral evidence: moral\nevidence being generally probable, all probable evidence is called\nmoral.\n\nThe will differs from physical causes in being a cause _per se_, but\nalthough a cause _per se_, it has laws to direct its volitions. It may\nindeed violate these laws and become a most arbitrary and inconstant law\nunto itself; but this violation of law and this arbitrary determination\ndo not arise from it necessarily as a cause _per se_, but from an abuse\nof its liberty. As a cause in unity with the laws of the reason, we\nexpect it to be uniform, and in its harmonious and perfect movements it\nis uniform. Physical causes are uniform because God has determined and\nfixed them according to laws derived from infinite wisdom.\n\nThe human will may likewise be uniform by obeying the laws of\nconscience, but the departures may also be indefinitely numerous and\nvarious.\n\nTo sum up these observations in general statements, we remark;--\n\nFirst: The connexion on which we base predictions of human volitions, is\nthe connexion of will with reason and sensitivity in the unity of the\nmind or spirit.\n\nSecondly: By this connexion, the will is seen to be designed to be\nregulated by truth and righteousness, and by feeling subordinated to\nthese.\n\nThirdly: In the purity of the soul, the will is thus regulated.\n\nFourthly: This regulation, however, does not take place by the necessary\ngovernance which reason and sensitivity have over will, but by a\nself-subjection of will to their rules and inducements;--this\nconstitutes meritoriousness,--the opposite conduct constitutes ill\ndesert.\n\nFifthly: Our calculations must proceed according to the degree and\nfixedness of this self-subjection to reason and right feeling; or where\nthis does not exist, according to the degree and fixedness of the habits\nof wrong doing, in a self-subjection to certain passions in opposition\nto reason.\n\nSixthly: Our calculations will be more or less certain according to the\nextent and accuracy of our observations upon human conduct.\n\nSeventhly: Our calculations can never be attended with _absolute_\ncertainty, because the will being contingent, has the power of\ndisappointing calculations made upon the longest observed uniformity.\n\nEighthly: Our expectations respecting the determinations of Deity are\nattended with the highest moral certainty. We say _moral_ certainty,\nbecause it is certainty not arising from necessity, and in that sense\nabsolute; but certainty arising from the free choice of an infinitely\npure being. Thus, when God is affirmed to be immutable, and when it is\naffirmed to be impossible for him to lie, it cannot be meant that he has\nnot the power to change or to determine contrary to truth; but that\nthere is an infinite moral certainty arising from the perfection of his\nnature, that he never will depart from infinite wisdom and rectitude.\n\nTo assign God any other immutability would be to deprive him of freedom.\n\nNinthly: The divine foresight of human volitions need not be supposed to\nnecessitate them, any more than human foresight, inasmuch as foreseeing\nthem, has no necessary connexion in any case with their causation.\nAgain, if it does not appear essential to the divine foresight of\nvolitions that they should be necessary. We have seen that future\ncontingent volitions may be calculated with a high degree of certainty\neven by men; and now supposing that the divine being must proceed in the\nsame way to calculate them through _media_,--the reach and accuracy of\nhis calculations must be in the proportion of his intelligence, and how\nfar short of a certain and perfect knowledge of all future contingent\nvolitions can infinite intelligence be supposed to fall by such\ncalculations?\n\nTenthly: But we may not suppose that the infinite mind is compelled to\nresort to deduction, or to employ _media_ for arriving at any particular\nknowledge. In the attribute of prescience, he is really present to all\nthe possible and actual of the future.\n\nIII. The third and last point of Edwards's argument is as follows: \"To\nsuppose the future volitions of moral agents, not to be necessary\nevents; or which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible\nbut that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God\ncertainly foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God's\nknowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say that God certainly\nand without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which\nat the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not\nbe, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one\nthing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows.\"\n(page 117.)\n\nThe substance of this reasoning is this. That inasmuch as a contingent\nfuture event is _uncertain_ from its very nature and definition, it\ncannot be called an object of _certain_ knowledge, to any mind, not even\nto the divine mind, without a manifest contradiction. \"It is the same as\nto say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth,\nwhich he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth.\"\n\nWe have here again an error arising from not making a proper\ndistinction, which I have already pointed out,--the distinction between\nthe certainty of a future volition as a mere fact existent, and the\nmanner in which that fact came to exist.\n\nThe fact of volition comes to exist contingently; that is, by a power\nwhich in giving it existence, is under no law of necessity, and at the\nmoment of causation, is conscious of ability to withhold the causative\n_nibus_. Now all volitions which have already come to exist in this way,\nhave both a certain and contingent existence. It is certain that they\nhave come to exist, for that is a matter of observation; but their\nexistence is also contingent, because they came to exist, not by\nnecessity as a mathematical conclusion, but by a cause contingent and\nfree, and which, although actually giving existence to these volitions,\nhad the power to withhold them.\n\nCertainty and contingency are not opposed, and exclusive of each other\nin reference to what has already taken place. Are they opposed and\nexclusive of each other in reference to the future? In the first place,\nwe may reason on probable grounds. Contingent causes have already\nproduced volitions--hence they may produce volitions in the future. They\nhave produced volitions in obedience to laws of reason and\nsensitivity--hence they may do so in the future. They have done this\naccording to a uniformity self-imposed, and long and habitually\nobserved--hence this uniformity may be continued in the future.\n\nA future contingent event may therefore have a high degree of\nprobability, and even a moral certainty.\n\nBut to a being endowed with prescience, what prevents a positive and\ninfallible knowledge of a future contingent event? His mind extends to\nthe actual in the future, as easily as to the actual in the past; but\nthe actual of the future is not only that which comes to pass by his own\ndetermination and _nibus_, and therefore necessarily in its relation to\nhimself as cause, but also that which comes to pass by the _nibus_ of\nconstituted wills, contingent and free, as powers to do or not to do.\nThere is no opposition, as Edwards supposes, between the infallible\ndivine foreknowledge, and the contingency of the event;--the divine\nforeknowledge is infallible from its own inherent perfection; and of\ncourse there can be no doubt but that the event foreseen will come to\npass; but then it is foreseen as an event coming to pass contingently,\nand not necessarily.\n\nThe error we have just noted, appears again in the corollary which\nEdwards immediately deduces from his third position. \"From what has been\nobserved,\" he remarks, \"it is evident, that the absolute _decrees_ of\nGod are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of the\nnecessity of the event which follows such decrees, than the absolute\nforeknowledge of God.\" (page 118.) The absolute decrees of God are the\ndeterminations of his will, and comprehend the events to which they\nrelate, as the cause comprehends the effect. Foreknowledge, on the\ncontrary, has no causality in relation to events foreknown. It is not a\ndetermination of divine will, but a form of the divine intelligence.\nHence the decrees of God do actually and truly necessitate events; while\nthe foreknowledge of God extends to events which are not necessary but\ncontingent,--as well as to those which are pre-determined.\n\nEdwards always confounds contingency with chance or no cause, and thus\nmakes it absurd in its very definition. He also always confounds\ncertainty with necessity, and thus compels us to take the latter\nuniversal and absolute, or to plunge into utter uncertainty, doubt, and\ndisorder.\n\nPrescience is an essential attribute of Deity. Prescience makes the\nevents foreknown, certain; but if certain, they must be necessary. And\non the other hand, if the events were not certain, they could not be\nforeknown,--for that which is uncertain cannot be the object of positive\nand infallible knowledge; but if they are certain in order to be\nforeknown, then they must be necessary.\n\nAgain: contingence, as implying no cause, puts all future events\nsupposed to come under it, out of all possible connexion with anything\npreceding and now actually existent, and consequently allows of no basis\nupon which they can be calculated and foreseen. Contingence, also, as\nopposed to necessity, destroys certainty, and excludes the possibility\neven of divine prescience. This is the course of Edwards's reasoning.\n\nNow if we have reconciled contingence with both cause and certainty, and\nhave opposed it only to necessity, thus separating cause and certainty\nfrom the absolute and unvarying dominion of necessity, then this\nreasoning is truly and legitimately set aside.\n\nNecessity lies only in the eternal reason, and the sensitivity connected\nwith it:--contingency lies only in will. But the future acts of will can\nbe calculated from its known union with, and self-subjection to the\nreason and sensitivity.\n\nThese calculations are more or less probable, or are certain according\nto the known character of the person who is the subject of these\ncalculations.\n\nOf God we do not affirm merely the power of calculating future\ncontingent events upon known data, but a positive prescience of all\nevents. He sees from the beginning how contingent causes or wills, will\nact. He sees with absolute infallibility and certainty--and the events\nto him are infallible and certain. But still they are not necessary,\nbecause the causes which produce them are not determined and\nnecessitated by anything preceding. They are causes contingent and free,\nand conscious of power not to do what they are actually engaged in\ndoing.\n\nI am persuaded that inattention to the important distinction of the\ncertainty implied in the divine foreknowledge, and the necessity implied\nin the divine predetermination or decree, is the great source of\nfallacious reasonings and conclusions respecting the divine prescience.\nWhen God pre-determines or decrees, he fixes the event by a necessity\nrelative to himself as an infinite and irresistible cause. It cannot be\notherwise than it is decreed, while his decree remains. But when he\nforeknows an event, he presents us merely a form of his infinite\nintelligence, exerting no causative, and consequently no necessitating\ninfluence whatever. The volitions which I am now conscious of\nexercising, are just what they are, whether they have been foreseen or\nnot--and as they now do actually exist, they have certainty; and yet\nthey are contingent, because I am conscious that I have power not to\nexercise them. They are, but they might not have been. Now let the\nintelligence of God be so perfect, as five thousand years ago, to have\nforeseen the volitions which I am now exercising; it is plain that this\nforesight does not destroy the contingency of the volitions, nor does\nthe contingency render the foresight absurd. The supposition is both\nrational and possible.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to consider the remaining corollaries of\nEdwards, as the application of the above reasoning to them will be\nobvious.\n\nBefore closing this part of the treatise in hand, I deem it expedient to\nlay down something like a scale of certainty. In doing this, I shall\nhave to repeat some things. But it is by repetition, and by placing the\nsame things in new positions, that we often best attain perspicuity, and\nsucceed in rendering philosophical ideas familiar.\n\nFirst: Let us consider minutely the distinction between certainty and\nnecessity. Necessity relates to truths and events considered in\nthemselves. Certainty relates to our apprehension or conviction of them.\nHence necessity is not certainty itself, but a ground of certainty.\n_Absolute certainty_ relates only to truths or to being.\n\nFirst or intuitive truths, and logical conclusions drawn from them, are\nnecessary with an absolute necessity. They do not admit of negative\nsuppositions, and are irrespective of will. The being of God, and time,\nand space, are necessary with an absolute necessity.\n\n_Relative necessity_ relates to logical conclusions and events or\nphenomena. Logical conclusions are always necessary relatively to the\npremises, but cannot be absolutely necessary unless the premises from\nwhich they are derived, are absolutely necessary.\n\nAll phenomena and events are necessary with only a relative necessity;\nfor in depending upon causes, they all ultimately depend upon will.\nConsidered therefore in themselves, they are contingent; for the will\nwhich produced them, either immediately or by second or dependent\ncauses, is not necessitated, but free and contingent--and therefore\ntheir non-existence is supposable. But they are necessary relatively to\nwill. The divine will, which gave birth to creation, is infinite; when\ntherefore the _nibus_ of this will was made, creation was the necessary\nresult. The Deity is under no necessity of willing; but when he does\nwill, the effect is said necessarily to follow--meaning by this, that\nthe _nibus_ of the divine will is essential power, and that there is no\nother power that can prevent its taking effect.\n\nCreated will is under no necessity of willing; but when it does will or\nmake its _nibus_, effects necessarily follow, according to the connexion\nestablished by the will of Deity, between the _nibus_ of created will\nand surrounding objects. Where a _nibus_ of created will is made, and\neffects do not follow, it arises from the necessarily greater force of a\nresisting power, established by Deity likewise; so that whatever follows\nthe _nibus_ of created will, whether it be a phenomenon without, or the\nmere experience of a greater resisting force, it follows by a necessity\nrelative to the divine will.\n\nWhen we come to consider will in relation to its own volitions, we have\nno more necessity, either absolute er relative; we have contingency and\nabsolute freedom.\n\nNow certainty we have affirmed to relate to our knowledge or conviction\nof truths and events.\n\nNecessity is one ground of certainty, both absolute and relative. We\nhave a certain knowledge or conviction of that which we perceive to be\nnecessary in its own nature, or of which a negative is not supposable;\nand this, as based upon an _absolute necessity_, may be called an\nabsolute certainty.\n\nThe established connexion between causes and effects, is another ground\nof certainty. Causes are of two kinds; first causes, or causes _per se_,\nor contingent and free causes, or will; and second or physical causes,\nwhich are necessary with a relative necessity.\n\nFirst causes are of two degrees, the infinite and the finite.\n\nNow we are certain, that whatever God wills, will take place. This may\nlikewise be called an absolute certainty, because the connexion between\ndivine volitions and effects is absolutely necessary. It is not\nsupposable that God should will in vain, for that would contradict his\nadmitted infinity.\n\nThe connexion between the volitions of created will and effects, and the\nconnexion between physical causes and effects, supposing each of course\nto be in its proper relations and circumstances, is a connexion of\nrelative necessity; that is, relative to the divine will. Now the\ncertainty of our knowledge or conviction that an event will take place,\ndepending upon volition or upon a physical cause, is plainly different\nfrom the certain knowledge of a necessary truth, or the certain\nconviction that an event which infinite power wills, will take place.\nThe will which established the connexion, may at any moment suspend or\nchange the connexion. I believe that when I will to move my hand over\nthis paper, it will move, supposing of course the continued healthiness\nof the limb; but it is possible for God so to alter the constitution of\nmy being, that my will shall have no more connexion with my hands than\nit now has with the circulation of the blood. I believe also that if I\nthrow this paper into the fire, it will burn; but it is possible for God\nso to alter the constitution of this paper or of fire, that the paper\nwill not burn; and yet I have a certain belief that my hand will\ncontinue to obey volition, and that paper will burn in the fire. This\ncertainly is not an _absolute certainty_, but a _conditional_ certainty:\nevents will thus continue to take place on condition the divine will\ndoes not change the condition of things. This conditional certainty is\nlikewise called a _physical_ certainty, because the events contemplated\ninclude besides the phenomena of consciousness, which are not so\ncommonly noticed, the events or phenomena of the physical world, or\nnature.\n\nBut we must next look at will itself in relation to its volitions: Here\nall is contingency and freedom,--here is no necessity. Is there any\nground of certain knowledge respecting future volitions?\n\nIf will as a cause _per se_, were isolated and in no relation whatever,\nthere could not be any ground of any knowledge whatever, respecting\nfuture volitions. But will is not thus isolated. On the contrary, it\nforms a unity with the sensitivity and the reason. Reason reveals _what\nought to be done_, on the basis of necessary and unchangeable truth. The\nsensitivity reveals what is most desirable or pleasurable, on the ground\nof personal experience. Now although it is granted that will can act\nwithout deriving a reason or inducement of action from the reason and\nthe sensitivity, still the instances in which it does so act, are so\nrare and trifling, that they may be thrown out of the account. We may\ntherefore safely assume as a general law, that the will determines\naccording to reasons and inducements drawn from the reason and the\nsensitivity. This law is not by its very definition, and by the very\nnature of the subject to which it relates, a necessary law--but a law\nrevealed in our consciousness as one to which the will, in the exercise\nof its freedom, does submit itself. In the harmony and perfection of our\nbeing, the reason and the sensitivity perfectly accord. In obeying the\none or the other, the will obeys both. With regard to perfect beings,\ntherefore, we can calculate with certainty as to their volitions under\nany given circumstances. Whatever is commanded by reason, whatever\nappears attractive to the pure sensitivity, will be obeyed and followed.\n\nBut what kind of certainty is this? It is not absolute certainty,\nbecause it is supposable that the will which obeys may not obey, for it\nhas power not to obey. Nor is it _physical_ certainty, for it does not\nrelate to a physical cause, nor to the connexion between volition and\nits effects, but to the connexion between will and its volitions. Nor\nagain can we, strictly speaking, call it a _conditional_ certainty;\nbecause the will, as a power _per se_, is under no conditions as to the\nproduction of its volitions. To say that the volitions will be in\naccordance with the reason and pure sensitivity, if the will continue to\nobey the reason and pure sensitivity, is merely saying that the\nvolitions will be right if the willing power put forth right volitions.\nWhat kind of certainty is it, then? I reply, it is a certainty\naltogether peculiar,--a certainty based upon the relative state of the\nreason and the sensitivity, and their unity with the will; and as the\ncommands of reason in relation to conduct have received the name of\n_moral_[7] laws, simply because they have this relation,--and as the\nsensitivity, when harmonizing with the reason, is thence called morally\npure, because attracting to the same conduct which the reason\ncommands,--this certainty may fitly be called _moral certainty_. The\nname, however, does not mark _degree_. Does this certainty possess\ndegrees? It does. With respect to the volitions of God, we have the\nhighest degree of moral certainty,--an infinite moral certainty. He,\nindeed, in his infinite will, has the power of producing any volitions\nwhatever; but from his infinite excellency, consisting in the harmony of\ninfinite reason with the divine affections of infinite benevolence,\ntruth, and justice, we are certain that his volitions will always be\nright, good, and wise. Besides, he has assured us of his fixed\ndetermination to maintain justice, truth, and love; and he has given us\nthis assurance as perfectly knowing himself in the whole eternity of his\nbeing. Let no one attempt to confound this perfect moral certainty with\nnecessity, for the distinction is plain. If God's will were affirmed to\nbe necessarily determined in the direction of truth, righteousness, and\nlove, it would be an affirmation respecting the manner of the\ndetermination of the divine will: viz.--that the divine determination\ntakes place, not in contingency and freedom, not with the power of\nmaking an opposite determination, but in absolute necessity. But if it\nbe affirmed that God's will, will _certainly_ go in the direction of\ntruth, righteousness, and love, the affirmation respects our _knowledge_\nand _conviction_ of the character of the divine volitions in the whole\neternity of his being. We may indeed proceed to inquire after the\ngrounds of this knowledge and conviction; and if the necessity of the\ndivine determinations be the ground of this knowledge and conviction, it\nmust be allowed that it is a sufficient ground. But will any man assume\nthat necessity is the _only_ ground of certain knowledge and conviction?\nIf necessity be universal, embracing all beings and events, then of\ncourse there is no place for this question, inasmuch as any other ground\nof knowledge than necessity is not supposable. But if, at least for the\nsake of the argument, it be granted that there may be other grounds of\nknowledge than necessity, then I would ask whether the infinite\nexcellence of the divine reason and sensitivity, in their perfect\nharmony, does afford to us a ground for the most certain and\nsatisfactory belief that the divine will will create and mould all being\nand order all events according to infinite wisdom and rectitude. In\norder to have full confidence that God will forever do right, must we\nknow that his will is absolutely necessitated by his reason and his\naffections? Can we not enjoy this confidence, while we allow him\nabsolute freedom of choice? Can we not believe that the Judge of all the\nEarth will do right, although in his free and omnipotent will he have\nthe power to do wrong? And especially may we not believe this, when, in\nhis omniscience and his truth, he has declared that his purposes will\nforever be righteous, benevolent, and wise? Does not the glory and\nexcellency of God appear in this,--that while he hath unlimited power,\nhe employs that power by his free choice, only to dispense justice,\nmercy, and grace? And does not the excellency and meritoriousness of a\ncreature's faith appear in this,--that while God is known to be so\nmighty and so absolute, he is confided in as a being who will never\nviolate any moral principle or affection? Suppose God's will to be\nnecessitated in its wise and good volitions,--the sun dispensing heat\nand light, and by their agency unfolding and revealing the beauty of\ncreation, seems as truly excellent and worthy of gratitude,--and the\ncreature, exercising gratitude towards God and confiding in him, holds\nno other relation to him than the sunflower to the sun--by a necessity\nof its nature, ever turning its face upwards to receive the influences\nwhich minister to its life and properties.\n\nThe moral certainty attending the volitions of created perfect beings is\nthe same in kind with that attending the volitions of the Deity. It is a\ncertainty based upon the relative state of the reason and the\nsensitivity, and their unity with the will. Wherever the reason and the\nsensitivity are in harmony, there is moral certainty. I mean by this,\nthat in calculating the character of future volitions in this case, we\nhave not to calculate the relative energy of opposing principles:--all\nwhich is now existent is, in the constituted unity of the soul,\nnaturally connected only with good volitions. But the _degree_ of the\nmoral certainty in created beings, when compared with that attending the\nvolitions of Deity, is only in the proportion of the finite to the\ninfinite. The confidence which we repose in the integrity of a good\nbeing, does not arise from the conviction that his volitions are\nnecessitated, but from his known habit of obeying truth and justice; and\nour sense of his meritoriousness does not arise from the impossibility\nof his doing wrong, but from his known determination and habit of doing\nright while having the power of doing wrong, and while even under\ntemptations of doing wrong.\n\nA certainty respecting volitions, if based upon the necessity of the\nvolitions, would not differ from a physical certainty. But a moral\ncertainty has this plain distinction,--that it is based upon the\nevidently pure dispositions and habits of the individual, without\nimplying, however, any necessity of volitions.\n\nMoral certainty, then, is predicable only of moral perfection, and\npredicable in degrees according to the dignity and excellency of the\nbeing.\n\nBut now let us suppose any disorder to take place in the sensitivity;\nthat is, let us suppose the sensitivity, to any degree, to grow into\nopposition to the reason, so that while the reason commands in one\ndirection, the sensitivity gives the sense of the most agreeable in the\nopposite direction,--and then our calculations respecting future\nvolitions must vary accordingly. Here moral certainty exists no longer,\nbecause volitions are now to be calculated in connexion with opposing\nprinciples: calculations now attain only to the probable, and in\ndifferent degrees.\n\nBy _the probable_, we mean that which has not attained to certainty, but\nwhich nevertheless has grounds on which it claims to be believed. We\ncall it _probable_ or _proveable_, because it both has proof and is\nstill under conditions of proof, that is, admits of still farther proof.\nThat which is certain, has all the proof of which the case admits. A\nmathematical proposition is certain on the ground of necessity, and\nadmits of no higher proof than that which really demonstrates its truth.\n\nThe divine volitions are certain on the ground of the divine\nperfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is found in the\ndivine perfections.\n\nThe volitions of a good created being are certain on the ground of the\npurity of such a being, and admit of no higher proof than what is found\nin this purity.\n\nBut when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being of reason, and of a\nsensitivity corrupted totally or in different degrees, then we have\nplace not for certainty, but for probability. As our knowledge of the\nfuture volitions of such a being can only be gathered from something now\nexistent, this knowledge will depend upon our knowledge of the present\nrelative state of his reason and sensitivity; but a perfect knowledge of\nthis is in no case supposable,--so that, although our actual knowledge\nof this being may be such as to afford us proof of what his volitions\nmay be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may be increased\nindefinitely by close observation and study, so likewise will the proof\nbe increased. According to the definition of probability above given,\ntherefore, our knowledge of the future volitions of an imperfect being\ncan only amount to probable knowledge.\n\nThe direction of the probabilities will be determined by the\npreponderance of the good or the bad in the mixed being supposed. If the\nsensitivity be totally corrupted, the probabilities will generally go in\nthe direction of the corrupted sensitivity, because it is one observed\ngeneral fact in relation to a state of corruption, that the enjoyments\nof passion are preferred to the duties enjoined by the conscience. But\nthe state of the reason itself must be considered. If the reason be in a\nhighly developed state, and the convictions of the right consequently\nclear and strong, there may be probabilities of volitions in opposition\nto passion which cannot exist where the reason is undeveloped and\nsubject to the errors and prejudices of custom and superstition. The\ndifference is that which is commonly known under the terms \"enlightened\nand unenlightened conscience.\"\n\nWhere the sensitivity is not totally corrupted, the direction of the\nprobabilities must depend upon the degree of corruption and the degree\nto which the reason is developed or undeveloped.\n\nWith a given state of the sensitivity and the reason, the direction of\nthe probabilities will depend also very much upon the correlated, or\nupon the opposing objects and circumstances:--where the objects and\ncircumstances agree with the state of the sensitivity and the reason, or\nto speak generally and collectively, with \"the state of the mind,\" the\nprobabilities will clearly be more easily determined than where they are\nopposed to \"the state of the mind.\"\n\nThe law which Edwards lays down as the law of volition universally, viz:\nthat \"the volition is as the greatest apparent good:\" understanding by\nthe term \"good,\" as he does, simply, that which strikes us \"agreeably,\"\nis indeed a general rule, according to which the volitions of characters\ndeeply depraved may be calculated. This law represents the individual as\ngoverned wholly by his passions, and this marks the worst form of\ncharacter. It is a law which cannot extend to him who is struggling\nunder the light of his reason against passion, and consequently the\nprobabilities in this last case must be calculated in a different way.\nBut in relation to the former it is a sufficient rule.\n\nProbability, as well as certainty, respects only the kind and degree of\nour knowledge of any events, and not the causes by which those events\nare produced: whether these causes be necessary or contingent is another\nquestion.\n\nOne great error in reasoning respecting the character of causes, in\nconnexion with the calculation of probabilities, is the assumption that\nuniformity is the characteristic of necessary causes only. The reasoning\nmay be stated in the following syllogism:\n\nIn order to calculate either with certainty or probability any events we\nmust suppose a uniform law of causation; but uniformity can exist only\nwhere there is a necessity of causation; hence, our calculations suppose\na necessity of causation.\n\nThis is another instance of applying to the will principles which were\nfirst obtained from the observation of physical causes, and which really\nbelong to physical causes only. With respect to physical causes, _it is\ntrue_ that uniformity appears to be a characteristic of necessary\ncauses, simply because physical causes are relatively necessary\ncauses:--but with respect to the will, _it is not true_ that uniformity\nappears to be a characteristic of necessary cause, because the will is\nnot a necessary cause. That uniformity therefore, as in the case of\nphysical causes, seems to become a characteristic of necessary cause,\ndoes not arise from the nature of the idea of cause, but from the nature\nof the particular subject, viz., _physical_ cause. Uniformity in logical\nstrictness, does not belong to cause at all, but to law or rule. Cause\nis simply efficiency or power: law or rule defines the direction, aims,\nand modes of power: cause explains the mere existence of phenomena: law\nexplains their relations and characteristics: law is the thought and\ndesign of the reason. Now a cause may be so conditioned as to be\nincapable of acting except in obedience to law, and this is the case of\nall physical causes which act according to the law or design of infinite\nwisdom, and thus the uniformity which we are accustomed to attribute to\nthese causes is not their own, but belongs to the law under which they\nnecessarily act. But will is a cause which is not so conditioned as to\nbe incapable of acting except in obedience to law; it can oppose itself\nto, and violate law, but still it is a cause in connexion with law, the\nlaw found in the reason and sensitivity, which law of course has the\ncharacteristic of uniformity. The law of the reason and pure sensitivity\nis uniform--it is the law of right. The law of a totally corrupted\nsensitivity is likewise a uniform law; it is the law of passion; a law\nto do whatever is most pleasing to the sensitivity; and every\nindividual, whatever may be the degree of his corruption, forms for\nhimself certain rules of conduct, and as the very idea of rule embraces\nuniformity, we expect in every individual more or less uniformity of\nconduct. Uniformity of physical causation, is nothing but the design of\nthe supreme reason developed in phenomena of nature. Uniformity of\nvolitions is nothing but the design of reason and pure sensitivity, or\nof corrupted passion developed in human conduct. The uniformity thus not\nbeing the characteristic of cause as such, cannot be the characteristic\nof necessary cause. The uniformity of causation, therefore, argues\nnothing respecting the nature of the cause; it may be a necessary cause\nor it may not. There is no difficulty at all in conceiving of uniformity\nin a free contingent will, because this will is related to uniform\nrules, which in the unity of the being we expect to be obeyed but which\nwe also know do not necessitate obedience. In physical causes we have\nthe uniformity of necessitated causes. In will we have the uniformity of\na free intelligent cause. We can conceive of perfect freedom and yet of\nperfect order, because the free will can submit itself to the light of\nthe reason. Indeed, all the order and harmony of creation, although\nspringing from the _idea_ of the reason, has been constituted by the\npower of the infinite free will. It is an order and harmony not\nnecessitated but chosen by a power determining itself. It is altogether\nan assumption incapable of being supported that freedom is identified\nwith disorder.\n\n_Of the words, Foreknowledge and Prescience._\n\nThese words are metaphorical: _fore_ and _pre_ do not qualify\n_knowledge_ and _science_ in relation to the mind which has the\nknowledge or science; but the time in which the knowledge takes place in\nrelation to the time in which the object of knowledge is found. The\nmetaphor consists in giving the attribute of the time of knowledge,\nconsidered relatively to the time of the object of knowledge, to the act\nof knowledge itself. Banishing metaphor for the sake of attaining\ngreater perspicuity, let us say,\n\nFirst: All acts of knowing are present acts of knowing,--there is no\n_fore_ knowledge and no _after_ knowledge.\n\nSecondly: The objects of knowledge may be in no relation to time and\nspace whatever, e. g. pure abstract and necessary truth, as 2 x 2 = 4;\nand the being of God. Or the objects of knowledge may be in relations of\ntime and space, e. g. all physical phenomena.\n\nNow these relations of time and space are various;--the object of\nknowledge may be in time past, or time present, or time future; and it\nmay be in a place near, or in a place distant. And the faculty of\nknowledge may be of a capacity to know the object in all these relations\nunder certain limitations, or under no limitations. The faculty of\nknowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and space, under\ncertain limitations, is the faculty as given in man. We know objects in\ntime present, and past, and future; and we know objects both near and\ndistant; but then our knowledge does not extend to all events in any of\nthese relations, or in any of these relations to their utmost limit.\n\nThe faculty of knowledge as knowing objects in all relations of time and\nspace, under no limitations, is the faculty under its divine and\ninfinite form. Under this form it comprehends the present perfectly, and\nthe past and the future no less than the present--and it reaches through\nall space. God's knowledge is an eternal now--an omnipresent here; that\nis, all that is possible and actual in eternity and space, is now\nperfectly known to him. Indeed God's knowledge ought not to be spoken of\nin relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute knowledge,\nfrom eternity to eternity the same; it is unchangeable, because it is\nperfect; it can neither be increased nor diminished.\n\nWe have shown before that the perfection of the knowledge does not\nsettle the mode of causation; that which comes to pass by necessity, and\nthat which comes to pass contingently, are alike known to God.\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nI here finish my review of Edwards's System, and his arguments against\nthe opposite system. I hope I have not thought or written in vain. The\nreview I have aimed to conduct fairly and honourably, and in supreme\nreverence of truth. As to style, I have laboured only for perspicuity,\nand where a homely expression has best answered this end, I have not\nhesitated to adopt it. The nice graces of rhetoric, as popularly\nunderstood, cannot be attended to in severe reasoning. To amble on a\nflowery surface with fancy, when we are mining in the depths of reason,\nis manifestly impossible.\n\nThe great man with whose work I have been engaged, I honour and admire\nfor his intellectual might, and love and venerate for a purity and\nelevation of spirit, which places him among the most sainted names of\nthe Christian church. But have I done wrong not to be seduced by his\ngenius, nor won and commanded by his piety to the belief of his\nphilosophy? I have not done wrong if that be a false philosophy. When he\nleads me to the cross, and speaks to me of salvation, I hear in mute\nattention--and one of the old preachers of the martyr age seems to have\nre-appeared. But when we take a walk in the academian grove, I view him\nin a different character, and here his voice does not sound to me so\nsweet as Plato's.\n\nThe first part of my undertaking is accomplished. When I again trouble\nthe public with my lucubrations, I shall appear not as a reviewer, but\nin an original work, which in its turn must become the subject of\nphilosophical criticism.\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nFootnotes\n\n[1] \"It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a\ndistinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into their\nservice; I mean moral and natural necessity. They say natural or\nphysical necessity takes away liberty, but moral necessity does not: at\nthe same time they explain moral necessity so as to make it truly\nphysical or natural. That is physical necessity which is the\n_invincible_ effect of the law of nature, and it is neither less\nnatural, nor less insurmountable, if it is from the laws of spirit than\nit would be if it were from the laws of matter.\"--(Witherspoon's\nLectures on Divinity, lect. xiii.)\n\n[2] Natural inability, and a want of liberty, are identified in this\nusage; for the want of a natural faculty essential to the performance of\nan action, and the existence of an impediment or antagonistic force,\nwhich takes from a faculty supposed to exist, the _liberty_ of action,\nhave the same bearing upon responsibility.\n\n[3] It is but justice to remark here, that the distinction of moral and\nnatural inability is made by many eminent divines, without intending\nanything so futile as that we have above exposed. By moral inability\nthey do not appear to mean anything which really render the actions\nrequired, impossible; but such an impediment as lies in corrupt\naffections, an impediment which may be removed by a self-determination\nto the use of means and appliances graciously provided or promised. By\nnatural ability they mean the possession of all the natural faculties\nnecessary to the performance of the actions required. In their\nrepresentations of this natural ability, they proceed according to a\npopular method, rather than a philosophical. They affirm this natural\nability as a fact, the denial of which involves monstrous absurdities,\nbut they give no psychological view of it. This task I shall impose upon\nmyself in the subsequent volume. I shall there endeavour to point out\nthe connexion between the sensitivity and the will, both in a pure and a\ncorrupt state,--and explain what these natural faculties are, which,\naccording to the just meaning of these divines, form the ground of\nrebuke and persuasion, and constitute responsibility.\n\n[4] \"The great argument that men are determined by the strongest\nmotives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call _petitio\nprincipii_. It is impossible even to produce any medium of proof that it\nis the strongest motive, except that it has prevailed. It is not the\ngreatest in itself; nor does it seem to be in all respects the strongest\nto the agent; but you say it appears strongest in the meantime. Why?\nBecause you are determined by it. Alas! you promised to prove that I was\ndetermined by the _strongest motive_, and you have only shown that I had\na _motive_ when I acted. But what has determined you then? Can any\neffect be without a cause? I answer--supposing my self-determining power\nto exist, it is as real a cause of its proper and distinguishing effect,\nas your moral necessity: so that the matter just comes to a stand, and\nis but one and the same thing on one side and on the other.\"\n--(Witherspoon's Lectures, lect. xiii.)\n\n[5] Cousin.\n\n[6] Dr. Reid.\n\n[7] Lat. _moralis_, from _mos_,--i. e. custom or ordinary conduct.\n\n\n\n\n\n<pre id=\"pg-footer\">","title":"A Review of Edwards's \"Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will\"","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":62826}