{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_36271/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_36271","id":"gutenberg_36271","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36271","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free thought"],"text":"</pre>\n\n\n\nProduced by David Widger\n\n\n\n\n\nNATURE AND THE GODS\n\nFrom \"The Atheistic Platform\", Twelve Lectures\n\nBy Arthur B. Moss\n\nLondon: Freethought Publishing Company\n\n63, Fleet Street, E.C.\n\n1884\n\n\n\nNATURE AND THE GODS\n\nLadies and Gentlemen,--No word has played a more important part in\nthe discussion of scientific and philosophical questions than the word\nNature. Everyone thinks he knows the meaning of it. Yet how few have\nused it to express the same idea; indeed it has been employed to convey\nsuch a variety of impressions that John Stuart Mill asserts that it has\nbeen the \"fruitful source\" of the propagation of \"false taste, false\nphilosophy, false morality, and even bad law.\" Now, I propose in this\nlecture that we start with some clear ideas concerning the meaning of\nsuch words, upon the right understanding of which the whole force of my\narguments depends. What, then, is meant by the word Nature? When used\nby a materialist it has two important meanings. In its large and\nphilosophical sense it means, as Mr. Mill says: \"The sum of all\nphenomena, together with the causes which produce them, including not\nonly all that happens, but all that is capable of happening--the unused\ncapabilities of matter being as much a part of the idea of Nature as\nthose which take effect.\" But the word Nature is often used, and rightly\nused, to distinguish the \"natural\" from the \"artificial\" object--that\nis, to indicate the difference between a thing produced spontaneously by\nNature, from a thing wrought by the skill and labor of man.\n\nBut it must not be supposed that the artificial object forms no part of\nNature. All art belongs to Nature. Art simply means the adaptation, the\nmoulding into certain forms of the things of Nature, and therefore the\nartistic productions of man are included in the comprehensive sense of\nthe term Nature which I just now used.\n\nNow in Nature there is a permanent and a changeable-element, but man\nonly takes cognisance of the changeable or phenomenal element; of the\nsubstratum underlying phenomena he knows and can know nothing whatever;\nthat is, man does not know what matter and force are in themselves in\nthe abstract, he only knows them in the concrete, as they affect him\nthrough the medium of his senses.\n\nNow I allege that nearly all the mistakes of theology have arisen from\nthe ignorance of man in regard to Nature and her mode of operation. Let\nus consider for a moment a few facts in reference to man. Of course I\ndon't want to take you back to his origin. But suppose we go back no\nfurther than a few thousand years, we shall find that man lived in holes\nin the earth; that he moved about in fear and trembling; that not only\ndid he fight against his fellow creatures, but that he went in constant\nfear of animals who sought him as their prey. Under these circumstances\nhe looked to Nature for assistance. He felt how unspeakably helpless he\nwas, and he cried aloud for help. Sometimes he imagined that he received\nwhat in his agony he had yearned for. Then it was that he thought that\nNature was most kind. Perhaps he wanted food to eat and had tried in\nvain to procure it. But presently a poor beast comes across his path,\nand he slays it and satisfies his hunger. Or perhaps he himself is in\ndanger. A ferocious animal is in pursuit of him and he sees no means of\nescape, but presently comes in view a narrow stream of water which he\ncan swim across, but which his pursuer cannot. When he is again secure\nhe utters a deep sigh of relief. In time he makes rapid strides of\nprogress. He learns to keep himself warm while the animals about him are\nperishing with cold; he learns to make weapons wherewith to destroy his\nenemies; but his greatest triumph of all is when he has learned how to\ncommunicate his thoughts to his fellows. Up to now it would be pretty\nsafe to say that man was destitute of all ideas concerning the existence\nof god or gods. But he advances one stage further, and his thoughts\nbegin to take something like definite shape. He forms for himself a\ntheory as to the cause of the events happening about him. And now the\nreign of the gods begins. Man is still a naked savage; as Voltaire truly\nsays: \"Man had only his bare skin, which continually exposed to the\nsun, rain and hail, became chapped, tanned, and spotted. The male in our\ncontinent was disfigured by spare hairs on his body, which rendered him\nfrightful without covering him. His face was hidden by these hairs. His\nskin became a rough soil which bore a forest of stalks, the roots of\nwhich tended upwards and the branches of which grew downwards. It was\nin this state that this animal ventured to paint god, when in course\nof time he learnt the art of description.\" (\"Philosophical Dictionary,\"\nvol. ii., page 182).\n\nNaturally enough man's first objects of worship were fetishes--gods of\nwood, stone, trees, fire, water. By-and-bye, however, he came to worship\nliving beings; in fact, any animal that he thought was superior in any\nway to himself was converted into an object of worship. But none of\nthese gods were of any assistance to him in promoting his advancement\nin the world. And neither did he receive any assistance from the\nspontaneous action of Nature. In fact he advanced in the road of\ncivilisation only in proportion as he offered ceaseless war against the\nhurtful forces of nature, using one force to counteract the destructive\ncharacter of another. Think what the earth must have been without a\nsolitary house upon it, without a man who yet knew how to till the soil!\nMust it not have been a howling wilderness fit only for savage beasts\nand brutal barbarians? In course of time, however, man made great\nstrides. He began to live in communities, which afterwards grew, into\nnations. He betook himself also to the art of agriculture, and supplied\nhimself and his fellows with good, nutritious food. And with this growth\nof man the gods underwent a similar transition. Now instead of bowing\ndown before fetishes, man transferred his worship to gods and goddesses\nwho were supposed to dwell somewhere in the sky. And these gods were of\na very peculiar kind. Each of them had a separate department to himself\nand performed only a certain class of actions. One made the sun to shine\nand the trees to grow; one had a kind of dynamite factory to himself,\nand manufactured lightning and thunder; another was a god of love;\nanother secretary for war; another perpetual president of the Celestial\nPeace Society. Some had several heads; some had only one eye or one\narm; some had wings, while others appeared like giants, and hurled\nthunderbolts at the heads of unoffending people. But these gods were of\nno more service to man than those that preceded them. If man advanced it\nwas by his own effort, by virtue of using his intelligence, by strife,\nwarfare, and by suffering.\n\nNeither Nature nor the gods taught man to be truthful, honest, just,\nnor even to be clean. No god came to tell him that he must not lie,\nnor steal, nor murder.. All virtues are acquired, all are the result of\neducation. And it was only after coming together and being criticised by\none another; men being criticised by women who no doubt taught them that\nwhen they came a-wooing they would have a very slight chance if they\nwere not clean and respectable; living in societies and being governed\nby the wisest among their fellows, who were able to judge as to what\nkind of actions produced the most beneficial results, that laws against\ntheft, adultery, and murder, and other evil actions, were established.\nFrom Polytheism, or belief in many gods, the next great step was to\nMonotheism, or belief in one god. This was an important transition,\nand meant the clearing from the heavens of many fictitious deities. But\nthough the monotheist believed only in one god, that did not prevent\nothers from believing in an entirely different deity. The ancient Jew\nworshipped Jahveh, but that did not prevent the Baalites from having\na god of their own, to whom they could appeal in the hour of need. And\njust let me here observe that the early monotheist always worshipped an\nanthropomorphic or man-like deity. And he worshipped such a god because\nman was the highest being of whom he had any conception. His god was\nalways the counterpart of himself and reflected all the characteristics\nof his own nature. Was he brutal and licentious? So was his god. Was he\nin favor of aggressive wars? So was his god. Was he a petty tyrant, in\nfavor of slavery? So was his god. Was he a polygamist? So was his god.\nWas he ignorant of the facts of life? So was his god. Was he revengeful\nand relentless? So was his god.\n\nAnd in whatever book we find a deity described as a malevolent or\nfiendish wretch depend upon it, by whatever name that book may be\nknown, and by whomsoever it may be reverenced, it was written by one who\npossessed in his own person precisely the same characteristics as those\nhe depicted in the character of his deity.\n\nThe Jewish god, Jahveh, it must be understood, was not a spiritual\nbeing, although it is sometimes pretended that he was. No. He was a\npurely material being. True he lived somewhere up above, but he made\nvery frequent visits to the earth. Once he walked in the garden of Eden\n\"in the cool of day,\" or \"his voice\" did for him (Gen. iii., 8). Once he\nstood upon a mountain, whither Moses, Aaron, Nadab and Abihu had gone to\nhold a consultation with him (Ex. xxiv., 10). Once he talked with Moses\n\"face to face\" (Ex. xxxiii., 11).\n\nAnd not only was Jahveh a material being, but on the whole he was not\na very formidable deity. In point of truth he was a very little fellow.\nAnd by way of diversion he was sometimes drawn about in a small box,\nor ark, two feet long and three feet wide (Sam. vi., 6, 7). As evidence\nthat even among professional Christians to-day Jahveh is not looked upon\nas a very stalwart fellow, Mr. Edward Gibson, in the House of Commons,\na short time ago said that if Mr. Bradlaugh were admitted into that\nassembly the effect of it would be that god would be \"thrown out of the\nwindow.\"\n\nAnd if you want to find a man with \"small ideas\" on general matters\nit is only necessary to know the kind of god he worships to be able to\ndetermine the intellectual width and depth of such a man's mind.\n\nWhy is this? Because all ideas of god were born in the fertile\nimaginations of men, and a man's idea of god is invariably the exact\nmeasurement of himself, morally and intellectually. It may be urged by\nsome Theists that man is indebted to Jahveh for his existence, and that\nhe owes his moral and intellectual advancement to the fact that this\ndeity, through the medium of Moses and the other inspired writers,\nlaid down certain commandments for his guidance in life. When it is\nremembered, however, that if man is indebted in any way to Jahveh for\nhis existence, he owes him only the exact equivalent of the benefits\nhe has received, I think it will be seen that on the whole man's\nindebtedness to this deity is very small indeed.\n\nWas Adam indebted to Jahveh for the imperfect nature which compelled him\nto commit the so-called sin which imperilled the future destiny of human\nrace? Were all the \"miserable sinners\"--the descendants of the first\npair--indebted to Jahveh for their \"corrupt\" natures?\n\nIf yes, what kind of god was man indebted to? To a god who once drowned\nthe whole of mankind except one family? To a god who said that he was a\njealous being who \"visited the sins of the father upon the children\nunto a third and fourth generation.\" (Ex. xx., 5)? To a god who sanctioned\nslavery (Lev. xxv., 44, 45) and injustice of all kinds? To a god who\nsaid \"thou shalt not suffer a witch to live\" (Ex. xxii., 18), and gave\ninstructions for men to kill the blasphemers among their fellows (Lev.\nxxiv., 16)? To a god who told Moses to go against the Midianites and\nslay every man among them, preserving only the virgins among the women\nto satisfy the lustful natures of a brutal horde of soldiers (Numbers\nxxxi., 7--18)? To a god to whom, as Shelley says, the only acceptable\nofferings were \"the steam of slaughter, the dissonance of groans,\nand the flames of a desolate land\" (Dialogue between \"Eusebes and\nTheosophus,\" prose writings, page 300)? I deny that man has ever been\nin any way indebted to such a god, and I say moreover that such a\ndeity never had any real existence, except in the base imaginations of\nignorant and brutal men. But the next stage was from the material to the\nspiritual god. Many ages must have elapsed before this more elevating\nthough equally absurd belief became to be accepted, even by a small\nminority of mankind. But the time eventually did come--a time which\nhappily is now rapidly passing away--when intellectual men believed that\nthe proposition of the existence of god could be demonstrated to all\nrational minds. Some said that god's existence was self-evident to every\nintelligent mind; others that Nature and men could not have come by\n\"chance\"; that they must have had a cause; some said that the harmony\nexisting in the universe proved god's existence; others that everybody\nexcept fools \"felt in their hearts\" that there was a god. But these\nimaginary proofs did not always convince. At last there came forth\nphilosophers who said that there was a mode of reasoning, the adoption\nof which \"leads irresistibly up to the belief in god,\" and that that\nmode was called the mode _a priori_. Another school said that the _a\npriori_, or reasoning from cause to effect, was an altogether fallacious\nmethod, and that the only satisfactory mode of establishing god's\nexistence was the _a posteriori_, or reasoning from effect to cause.\n\nAnother school said that taken singly neither of these modes of\nreasoning established the existence of deity, but that both taken\ntogether \"formed a perfect chain\" of reasoning that was quite conclusive\non the point. Neither of these schools, however, showed how two bad\narguments could possibly make one good one. But let me just briefly\nexamine these arguments put forward so confidently by leading Theists.\nThe first method--_a priori_--invariably takes the form of an attempt to\nestablish what is called a \"Great First Cause.\"\n\nWhen it is said that there must be a \"first cause\" to account for the\nexistence of Nature, such language, to say the least, shows a total\nmisapprehension of the meaning of the word \"cause,\" as used by\nscientific men. \"First cause,\" as applied to Nature as a whole,\nremembering the definition I have given, is an absurdity. Cause\nand effect apply only to phenomena. Each effect is a cause of some\nsubsequent effect, and each cause is an effect of some antecedent\ncause. The phenomena of the universe form a complete chain of causes and\neffects, and in an infinite regression there can be no first cause.\nLet me explain what I mean more fully. For instance, here is a chain;\nsuppose it is to form a perfect circle, every link in which is perfect;\nnow if you were to go round and round this chain from now to doomsday\nyou would never come to the first link. It is the same in Nature. You\ncan go back, and back, and back through successive causes and effects,\nbut you will never come to a \"first cause\"; you will not be able to say\n\"here is the end of Nature, and here the beginning of something else.\"\nThere is no brick wall to mark the boundary line of Nature. You\ncannot \"look through Nature up to Nature's God,\"--the poet Pope\nnotwithstanding--for Nature seems endless, and you can neither penetrate\nher heights nor fathom her depths. And I have one other word to say in\nreference to this _a priori_ method, before finally disposing of it. It\nis this, that it is an altogether unscientific method. Man knows nothing\nwhatever of cause except in the sense' that in the immediate antecedent\nof an effect. Man's experience is of effects; these he takes cognisance\nof; of these he has some knowledge, but of cause, except as a means to\nan end, he has none. But this brings me to the second mode of reasoning\nin proof of God's existence, the _a posteriori_ and this has one\nadvantage in its favor, and that is, that it is a scientific method. It\nreasons from known effects up to the supposed causes of them. Now this\ngenerally assumes the form, no matter under what guise, of the famous\n\"design argument.\" Dr. Paley stated it many years ago, and it has not\nbeen much improved since his day. It is generally stated in this\nway: \"The world exhibits marks of design; that design must have had a\ndesigner; that designer must be a person; that person is God.\" A number\nof illustrations are then brought forward to support this contention.\nFor instance, it is argued that when a man observes a watch or a\ntelescope, or any article that has been made to answer a certain\npurpose, and the mechanism of which is so adjusted as to effect the\ndesired object, it is said that from the marks of design or contrivance\nobserved in the mechanism, he infers that these articles are the\nproducts of some human designer. And so it is said that when we look\naround the world and see how beautifully things are designed, the eye\nto see, the ear to hear; how admirably things are adapted the one to\nthe other, are we not justified by similar reasoning in concluding that\nthese are the productions of an almighty and infinite designer? Briefly\nstated that is the argument. Now let me examine it. And in the first\nplace it will be observed that it is assumed that there is a great\nresemblance between the works of Nature and the artistic works of\nman. But is this really a fact? Man simply moulds natural objects into\ncertain forms; they are then called artificial objects. We know that man\ndesigns watches and telescopes; it is a fact within our experience. But\nthere is not the slightest similarity between the process of manufacture\nand the natural process of growth; so that when we see various objects\nof Nature, we do hot conclude, however harmoniously the parts may work\ntogether, that they were designed. We know a manufactured article from\na natural object, we could not mistake the one for the other. But let us\nsuppose that we did not know that men made watches; it is very probable\nthat we should then think that a watch was not made at all, but that it\nwas a natural object. Take an illustration. Suppose that I were to lay a\nwatch upon the earth somewhere in South Africa; suppose that in a short\ntime a savage wandering near the spot where the watch was deposited\nshould observe it, should take it into his hand and handle it--I am\nassuming that the savage had never seen a watch before, and was not\naware that men designed and constructed watches--think you that he would\nfor a moment notice that it exhibited marks of design? No, I think\nhe would be more likely to come to the opinion that it was alive. The\ndesign argument therefore is purely an argument drawn from experience.\nBut what experience has man of god? Speaking for myself I can say that\nI have absolutely no experience of him at all, and I am not acquainted\nwith anybody who has. Man does not know god as a designer or\nconstructor; he neither knows of his capabilities, nor his existence;\nand he therefore cannot reasonably say that god is the designer of\nanything.\n\nThe human eye is very often adduced by the Theist as an illustration of\ndesign. Now nobody can deny that the eye is a delicate, complicated,\nand beautiful structure; nobody could fail to see and acknowledge with\nfeelings of admiration the wonderful adjustment and harmonious working\nof its various parts; and all would readily acknowledge how admirably it\nis fitted to perform its functions. But yet to acknowledge all this is\nnot to admit that the eye is designed. To point to the combinations\nand conditions which produce this result, without showing that these\nconditions were designed, is to beg the whole question. And it must be\ndistinctly understood that the _onus probandi_ as the lawyers say, lies\nwith the affirmer of the design argument and not with him who does not\nsee evidence in it sufficient to command belief. To show that a thing\nis capable of effecting a certain result does not prove that it was\ndesigned for that purpose.\n\nFor example. I hold this glass in my hand; I now release my hold from it\nand it instantly falls to the ground; that does not surely prove\neither that I was designed to hold up that glass, or that the glass was\ndesigned to fall on withdrawing my grasp from it. At most it only proves\nthat I am capable of holding it, and that when I release it, it is\nimpelled by the law of gravitation to fall towards the earth.\n\nBut there is another view of this question I wish to present to you.\nFrom this argument it is not quite clear that there is only one\nsupreme god of the universe. Admittedly this is an argument based upon\nexperience. What does experience teach us in respect to a person? Simply\nthis. That a person must have an organisation, and a person with an\norganisation must be a limited being. Has god an organisation? If he has\nnot, he cannot be intelligent, cannot perceive, recollect, judge; and\nif he has, then an organisation implies contrivance, and contrivance\nimplies a contriver, and this again instead of leading up to one\ngod, leads to an innumerable tribe of deities each mightier and more\ncomplicated than the other.\n\nIf the Theist retorts that a person need not have an organisation, the\nAtheist at once replies that neither need the designer of Nature be a\nperson.\n\nBut these are not the only objections to be used against the design\nargument. The _a priori_ theologians have some very potent arguments to\nadvance. Mr. William Gillespie has discovered twenty-four defects of _a\nposteriori_ arguments, and I think he has conclusively shown that all\nthe attributes claimed for deity are impeached by this method.\n\nIn my humble opinion the design argument has grown out of the arrogance\nand conceit of man, who imagines that the earth and all the things\nexisting upon it were treated especially for his benefit.\n\nSuppose that I admit that there is design in Nature, the Theist has then\nto account for some awkward and many horrible designs. How will he get\nover the fact that Nature is one vast battle-field on which all life is\nengaged in warfare? What goodness will he see in the design that gives\nthe strong and cunning the advantage over the weak and simple? What\nbeneficence will he detect in the fact that all animals \"prey\" upon one\nanother? and that man is not exempt from the struggle? Famine destroys\nthousands; earthquakes desolate a land; and what tongue can tell the\nanguish and pain endured by the very poor in all great countries of the\nearth? Think of the \"ills to which flesh is heir.\" Think of the diseases\nfrom which so many thousands suffer. Think how many endure agony from\ncancer or tumor, how many have within their bodies parasites which\nlocate themselves in the liver, the muscles, and the intestines, causing\ngreat agony and sometimes death. Think how many are born blind and how\nmany become sightless on account of disease. Think of the deaf and the\ndumb, and of the poor idiots who pass a dreary and useless existence in\nasylums. Then think of the accidents to which all men are liable. Think\nof the many who are killed or injured on railways every year. Think of\nmen and boys who injure or destroy their limbs in machinery during\nthe performance of their daily work. Think of the thousands who find\na premature and watery grave. In one of our London workhouses I saw\nrecently a young man who had met with a dreadful accident; who had had\nhis hand frightfully lacerated by a circular saw, which will prevent him\nfrom ever working again. Think of his suffering. Think of the misery his\nwife and children will have to bear on account of it. It almost makes\none shed bitter tears to think of it; and yet we are to be told, we who\nare striving to alleviate suffering and mitigate the evils which afflict\nour fellow creatures, we are to be told that an infinitely wise and good\ngod designs these things.\n\nOh the blasphemy of it! Surely an infinite fiend could not do worse;\nand if I thought that Nature were intelligent, that Nature knew of the\nsuffering she inflicted on all kinds of living beings and had the power\nto prevent it, but would not, I would curse Nature even though the curse\ninvolved for me a sudden and painful death. But Nature heareth not man's\nprotests or appeals--she is blind to his sufferings and deaf to his\nprayers.\n\nOh, but it's said: \"See what harmony there is in the Universe:\" _per se_\nthere is neither harmony nor chaos in Nature; we call that harmony\nwhich pleasantly affects us, and that chaos which does the reverse.\nSome Theist may say: \"Suppose that I grant that I cannot prove that\ngod exists, what then? You cannot prove your own existence, and yet\nyou believe that you exist.\" I am well aware that I cannot prove my\nown existence; I don't want to prove it; it's a fact, and it stands for\nitself--to me it is not a matter of belief, it is a matter of certainty.\nI know that I exist. Cannot god make the evidence of his existence as\nclear as my own is to me? If he cannot, what becomes of his power? and\nif he will not, what of his goodness?\n\nAnd it must be remembered that there are thousands of intelligent\nAtheists in the world to-day. Now, either god does not wish man to\nbelieve in him, or if he does he lacks the power to produce conviction.\nO Theist--you who profess to be conversant with the ways of the\nalmighty--explain to me, now, how it is that in proportion as men\ncultivate their minds and reason on theological questions that the\ntendency is for them to disbelieve even in the ethereal deity of modern\nTheism. And it will not do in the nineteenth century to put Jesus\nforward as a god. He was no god. He possessed many good qualities, no\ndoubt, as a man--but not one attribute which is claimed for god. He\nwas neither all-wise, nor all-good, nor all-powerful, and he was only\na finite being. And how can it be pretended by sensible persons that\na finite man living on the earth, born of a woman, and dying like\nany other ordinary being, could possibly be the infinite god of the\nUniverse? Is it not absurd? I cannot believe it, and anybody with brains\nthat devotes a moment's thought to the matter, must acknowledge either\nthat it is incomprehensible, or that it is monstrously absurd.\n\nIn this country we are not asked to believe in any of the \"foreign\ngods\"--the gods of ancient Greece or Rome--the gods of China, India,\nor Egypt, etc.--and we need not now discuss as to how far these deities\nhave influenced human conduct for good or for ill. England, as a\ncivilised country, is not very old. And civilisation has always meant\na banishment of the gods. While men considered how to please the gods,\nthey neglected in a great measure the work of the world. As Plato said:\n\"The gods only help those who help themselves.\" Well they are just the\npersons who do not want help; and I shall never worship any god who\nleaves the helpless and the unfortunate to perish.\n\nIf god only \"helps those who help themselves,\" he might as well leave\nthe helping alone, because even as we find the world to-day, the whole\nof life seems to be based on the principle that, \"unto him that hath\nshall be given, and he shall have in abundance, and from him that hath\nnot shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have.\" The man who\nhas a strong constitution may struggle successfully in the world; the\nman with great affluence may win an easy victory over his fellows; the\nman who has plenty of \"influential friends\" has good prospects; but the\npoor, the weakly, the ignorant, what hope have they--they have to suffer\nand toil, and toil and suffer from the cradle to the tomb.\n\nHow is it, then, you may ask, if man has received no assistance from\nwithout, either from Nature or the gods, that he has achieved such\nsplendid results in the world? The answer is simple enough. The great\nstruggle for life--the desire to get food, clothing, habitation,\ncomfort--these have been the motives which have urged men on. The desire\nto get food caused men to till the soil, and, as the demand increased,\nthe methods of cultivation improved; with improved taste came improved\nraiment and dwellings for the rich; plain dress and decent habitation\nfor the poor. Men having given up the worship of Nature, began to study\nher; they found that by diligent investigation, and the application of\ntheir augmented knowledge, they were able to beautify the world,\nand render their lives happy. Then we began to have great scientific\ndiscoveries. Navigation, steam-power, telegraphy, electricity; by a\nknowledge of the use of these powers man has been able to conquer the\ndestructive character of many natural forces, and to transfer a world of\nmisery into a home of comparative comfort. And I say that the world is\nindebted far more to those who built houses, made clothes, navigated\nships, made machinery, wrote books, than to all the gods and their\nclerical representatives the world has ever known. Belief in god never\nhelped a man to supersede the sailing vessel by the steamship, the\nold coach by the railroad, the scythe by the reaping machine, nor the\nfastest locomotion by the telegraph wires. Man's necessities allured\nhim on to all these achievements. One Stephenson is worth a thousand\npriests--one Edison of more value to the world than all the gods ever\npictured by the imagination. And we must not forget the men who freed\nthe human intellect from the fetters of a degrading superstition. We\nmust not forget what the world owes to our Brunos, our Spinozas, our\nVoltaires, our Paines, our Priestleys; for these, by teaching men to\nrely on their reason, have opened out channels of thought that were\npreviously closed, and mines of intellectual and material wealth that\nhave since yielded great results. And so it must now be said that man is\nmaster of Nature, and he finds that she is just as good as a servant as\nshe was bad as a master.\n\nBut the earth is not yet a Paradise. Theology is not yet entirely\nbanished; the debris of the decayed beliefs still cumber our path and\nimpede our progress. There is even now much that remains to be done.\nPlenty of labor to be performed. Ignorance, poverty, and crime and\nmisery still exist and exert their evil influence in the world. The\nphilanthropist and the reformer have still their work to do. The\nignorant have yet to be instructed, the hungry have yet to be fed, the\nhomeless have yet to be provided for. And I have come to the opinion\nafter years of experience, that ignorance is the real cause of all the\nmisery and suffering in the world; that that man is truly wise who sees\nthat it is against his own interest to do a paltry act, to perform an\nevil deed. All actions carry with them their consequences, and you can\nno more escape the effects of your evil deeds than you can evade the\nlaw of gravitation, or elude the grim monster Death when the dread hour\narrives.\n\nNo. If you would be happy you must act virtuously--act as you would\ndesire all others to do to promote your happiness. Say to yourselves:\n\"if every one were to act as I am doing, would the world be benefited?\"\nand if you come to the opinion that the world would not be improved by\nsuch conduct, depend upon it your actions are not good. Remember that\nonce you perform a deed in Nature it is irrevocable; and if it is bad\nrepentance is worse than useless. All actions either have an evil or\na good result. Every deed leaves its indelible impress on the book of\nNature, from which no leaves can be torn and nothing can be expunged.\nAnd remember, too, that the man who makes his fellow-creatures happy\ncannot displease a god who is good; and a god who is not good is neither\ndeserving of admiration nor service.\n\nAn infinite and all-powerful god cannot need the assistance of man;\nbut man needs the assistance of his brothers and sisters to diffuse\nthe glorious light of knowledge through the world; needs assistance to\nalleviate suffering, to remove injustice, and secure the possibility of\nfreedom and happiness for all. Therefore I urge you to abate not your\nenthusiasm, but work bravely on; and when the evening of your life\napproaches, with wife by your side and your children playing joyously\nabout you, with many friends to cheer and thank you--then will you know\nthat your life's labor has not been in vain.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<pre id=\"pg-footer\">","title":"Nature and the Gods: From \"The Atheistic Platform\", Twelve Lectures","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":5794}