{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_36801/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_36801","id":"gutenberg_36801","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36801","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Logic"],"text":"</pre>\n\n\n\nProduced by David Widger\n\n\n\n\n\nA LOGIC OF FACTS:\n\nor\n\nEvery-day Reasoning\n\nBy G. J. Holyoake\n\n     \"Call him wise whose thoughts and words are a clear\n      because to a clear why.\"--Lavater.\n\n[FOURTH THOUSAND.]\n\nLONDON: F. FARRAH, 282, STRAND, W.C.\n\n1866.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION OF 1848.\n\nThe Logic of the Schools, however indispensable in its place, fails to\nmeet half the common want in daily life. The Logic of the Schools begins\nwith the _management_ of the premises of an argument; there is, however,\na more practical lesson to be learned in beginning with the _premises_\nthemselves. A thousand errors arise through the assumption of premises\nfor one arising in the misplacement of terms. The Logic of the Schools\nis an elaborate attack upon the lesser evil.\n\nSir James Mackintosh has remarked that 'Popular reason can alone correct\npopular sophistry'--and it is in vain that we expect amendment in the\nreasoning of the multitude, unless we make reasoning intelligible to\nthe multitude. As to my object, could I, like Gridiron-Cobbett, adopt a\nsymbol of it, I would have engraved AEsop's 'Old Man and his Ass,' who,\nin a vain attempt to please everybody, failed (like his disciples--for\neven _he_ has disciples) to please anybody. The folly of that\nsuperfluously philanthropic old gentleman should teach us _proportion_\nof purpose. To be of real service; to _some_ is in the compass of\nindividual capacity, and consequently, the true way of serving, if not\nof pleasing _all_. The republic of literature, like society, has its\naristocratic, its middle, and its lower classes. No one has combined, in\none performance, the refinement applauded in the universities, with the\npractical purpose, popular among those who toil to live, and live to\ntoil. The populace are my choice--of them I am one, and, like a recent\npremier, Earl Grey, am disposed 'to stand by my order.' I write for this\nclass both from affection and taste. If I can benefit any, I can them.\nI know their difficulties, for I have encountered them--their wants, for\nthey have been mine. This will account for the liberties taken with the\nsubjects upon which I treat. There is more than one kind of hunger that\nwill break through barriers, and I have taken with an unlicensed hand,\nwherever it was to be found, what I wanted for myself, and what I know\nto be wanted by those who stand at the anvil and the loom, and who never\nhad the benefits of scholastic education, and who never will.\n\nMany of the arts and sciences, which formerly resided exclusively in the\ncolleges, and ministered only to the sons of opulence and leisure,\nhave escaped from their retreat, and have become the hand-maids of the\npopulace. But as respects logic, there still remains between the learned\nand the illiterate an impassable gulf. The uninformed look on the\nrecondite structure of logic, and they are repelled by the difficulty\nof comprehending it, and wrap themselves up in absolute and obstinate\nignorance, which they believe to be their destiny. The populace, in our\nmanufactories, have to choose between subsistence and intelligence. For\nstudy, after protracted toil, they have not the strength--and to abridge\ntheir labour is to abridge their subsistence, and this they cannot\nafford. But because they are precluded by the destiny of civilisation\nfrom knowing much, they need not remain utterly unskilled in reasoning.\nTheir natural good sense may be systematized, their natural logic may be\nreduced to some rule and order--though it may not be refined it may be\npractical, it may give power, and develop capacity now dormant.\n\nThe hints, general rules, and elementary remarks dispersed throughout\nthis work, will probably be of service to the uninitiated, perhaps put\nthem on the road to higher acquirements, give them a confidence in their\nown powers, perhaps inspire them with a love of these essential studies,\nand impart a taste for the refinements which lie beyond. My hope is that\nmany will be induced to consult scholastic treatises, and acquire\nthat accurate knowledge which makes the society of educated people so\ninteresting. Impulse has been given to knowledge, and the populace have\nbegun to think, and both to speak and write their thinkings--and why\nshould they not be enabled to do it free from obvious mistakes, and with\na broad propriety commensurate with the native capacity they possess?\nWhy should they, like a certain learned politician on a public\noccasion, propose, as a sentiment, 'The three R's, Reading, 'Riting, and\n'Rithmetic?'* Why, in writing, should they not express themselves with\nstrong grammatical coherence, and a certain bold perspicuity, if not\nable to reach refinement and elegance? Why, in pronunciation, should\nthey not speak with a certain manly openness of vowel sound and a\ndistinct articulation, if not with all elocutionary modulation? Why\nshould not their discourse be expressed in brief, clear sentences? If\ntheir punctuation went no farther than placing capital letters at\nthe commencement of sentences and of proper names, and periods at\nthe conclusion of sentences, it would render their writings more\nintelligible than are half the communications they now send to the\npress. If they mastered only brevity and abrupt directness, and learned\nto omit tedious prolixity, they would command a hearing in many cases\nwhere now they are denied one. If in logic they made a shrewd mastery\nof plain facts--being as sure as they could, when once set on surety,\neschewing conjecture and pernicious supposition--if they followed the\nmethods of nature and good sense, where the elaborate methods of art\nare hidden from them, who will not admit that they would be more\nintelligible than now, exercise a power they never yet possessed, and\nextort the attention and esteem of the public where now they excite only\nits pity, or contempt, or outrage what just taste it has? The people\nwould be enabled to do these things, but that so many who prepare\ntreatises for their guidance alarm them by the display of abstruse\ndissertation above their powers, their means, their time, and their\nwants. That a little learning is a dangerous thing is not a maxim\nalone believed in by the race of country squires steeped in port and\nprejudice, but by schoolmen who cannot bring themselves to give a little\nproportion of sound knowledge, but must give all, the reconite as well.\nThe statesman decries the ignorance and want of wisdom displayed by\nembryo politicians who will accept no instalment of liberty, but insist\non the concession of _all_ their claims--but the scholar does the same\nthing when he will impart none but the completest information to the\npeople.\n\n     * This case is cited by S. G. Goodrich, the original Peter\n     Parley, in his preface to 'Fireside Education.' Sir William\n     Curtis, to whom, probably, Mr. Goodrich refers, gave also\n     'the three K's--King, Church, and Constitution.'\n\nIn quoting, I have been a borrower, but not a plagiarist. In no case am\nI conscious of having taken from others without at the same time making\nthe fairest acknowledgment in my power.\n\nIf the references to the highest authorities are sometimes through\nothers, it is because the highest authorities have not always been\naccessible. Those who have had ordinary experience estimate highly the\nvalue of minute integrity in this respect. Fruitless hours are spent\nin tracing false and careless references, and to one whose time is his\nmeans, no little injury is done when it is thus wasted.\n\nUnbounded gratitude is due to those authors, old and new, who, with\nlearning and grace, with care and patience, have put the world in\npossession of thoughts which are real additions to its knowledge--and\ncorresponding should be the contempt of those whose high-sounding and\npretending books seduce readers to wade through them only to find in\nthem the millioneth echo of some commonplace idea.\n\nThe 'Spectator' was pleased to say that I wrote 'Practical Grammar' in\nthe spirit of an 'ultra-radical, setting the world to rights.' Yet I\nhave always declared, with Butler--\n\n     Reforming schemes are none of mine,\n     To mend the world's a vast design;\n     Like those who toil in little boat\n     To drag to them the ship afloat.\n\nUtopianism is not my idiosyncracy. But I have confidence in endeavour.\nContinuity of ameliorative effort is the sole enthusiasm that can serve\nthe cause of improvement. It is useful to do what seems to be useful,\nwhether little or much--a moderate rule, but one that will take those\nwho carry it out, a long way.\n\nMy illustrations, I need scarcely say, are neutral in politics and\ntheology. In the grammar of J. A. D. D'Orsey, published in 'Chambers'\nEducational Course,' there are disputations, Biblicisms, and bits of\nintense theology. Professor John Radford Young, in his treatise on\nAlgebra, has introduced a reply to Hume's controverted theory of\nmiracles--and Dr. Whately makes his 'Logic' an avowedly theological\nauxiliary, showing that much passes for good taste in this country which\nis only an irrelevant propitiation of powerful opinion. I have not,\nhowever, been seduced by this species of example. There are distinct\nprovinces in intellect as well as in industry--and what political\neconomy justifies in one case, good sense dictates in the other. No man\nhas a right to intrude theology into every question, and agitate points\nof faith when he pretends to instruct the understanding.\n\nThere is less occasion to speak of the utility of logic, than to show\nit to be easy of acquisition. Mr. Stuart Mill, in confirmation of this\nview, observes: We need not seek far for a solution of the question so\noften agitated, respecting the utility of Logic. If a science of logic\nexists, or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If there be rules\nto which every mind conforms, in every instance in which it judges\nrightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is\nmore likely to observe those rules when he knows the rules, than when he\nis unacquainted with them.* Certainly people are not so much prejudiced\nagainst logic on account of its supposed uselessness as on account of\nits supposed difficulties. Deserved or not, logic has always had a good\nreputation. Well or ill founded, the popular impression has uniformly\nbeen in its favour. It has been valued like the diamond--but considered,\nlike that precious stone, of very uncertain access.\n\n     *'System of Logic,' p. 12.   Second Edition.\n\nThe high popularity of common sense--'the exercise of the judgment\nunaided by rule'--has been interpreted into a virtual rejection of logic\nby the multitude. But it ought not to be overlooked, that the credit\nin which mere common sense is held, is a matter of necessity as well as\nchoice. It being the best sense the untutored have, they wisely use it,\nand no wonder that they are inclined to laud what they are constrained\nto employ. Doubtless they always perceived that common sense would be\nthe better for being made orderly, as a spirited horse is the fitter for\nuse after being 'broken.' Logical sense, among the masses, is secretly\nsupposed to be disciplined sense, and to have all the advantage of the\ntrained soldier over the raw recruit.\n\nIt is quite true, as Abram Tucker puts it, that 'The science of abstruse\nlearning, when completely attained, is like Achilles' spear, that healed\nthe wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the\ndamage itself had occasioned, it casts no additional light upon the\npaths of life.' But few persons sensible of the value of exact knowledge\nwill complain of the _necessary_ elaboration to which it sometimes\nleads. Nor will those who have felt the thrill of pleasure which\ncomplete analysis imparts, regret the patience which put them in\npossession of a secret of science, or made them master of a new field of\nknowledge.\n\nCommon sense is the substratum of all logic. Common sense is the natural\nsense of mankind. It is founded on common observation and experience. It\nis modest and plain and unsophisticated. It sees with everybody's eyes\nand hears with everybody's ears. It has no capricious distinctions, no\npartialities, and no mysteries. It never equivocates and never trifles.\nIts language is always the same, and is always intelligible. It is known\nby its perspicuity of speech and singleness of purpose. The most prudent\nof all the children of fact, it never forsakes nature or reason. Some\noutline laws for its employment, if they can be indicated, must be\nbetter than its popular aimless and desultory use.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE OF 1866.\n\nOne has no right to make a literary subject political--that is, to make\nit partisan; but to give a political motive which concerns all equally,\nfor promoting a literary study, is allowable, and does not partake of\nthe nature of party politics. One may, like Cobbett, look on literature\nwith political eyes, without, like him, making it a vehicle of party\nattacks.\n\nIn this country, where the political genius of the people lies in\nself-government--where the public growth of the people and their\ninternal liberty depend upon their capacity to manage their own\naffairs--the art of public speaking has political importance to every\naide in politics.\n\nTo be able to take a subject well in hand, like a stage-coach driver\ndoes his horses--to hold the reins of your arguments firmly--to direct\nand drive well home the burden of your meaning, is a power which every\nman ought to study to attain, who rises to address a council, or stands\nup on a platform to convince a meeting.\n\n\n\n\n\nA LOGIC OF FACTS.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I. THE LOGIC OF THE SCHOOLS\n\nIt is a humiliating reflection that mankind never reasoned so ill as\nwhen they most professed to cultivate the art of reasoning.--Life of\nGalileo, p. 1. society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.\n\nCommon sense--the foundation of logic--first received (to a limited\nextent) the regularity of an art and the certainty of a science, from\nthe master hand of Aristotle. Impartial scholars, familiar with his\nwritings on logic, allow them to have not only ingenuity but real merit;\nand his admirers contend that he has been misunderstood by some and\nabused by others. This is highly probable, as we are certain that when\nhis works were interpreted by the schools, and his logic proclaimed the\ngreat text-book of knowledge and the only weapon of truth, 'men's minds,\ninstead of studying nature, were in an endless ferment about occult\nqualities and imaginary essences; little was talked of but intention\nand remission, proportion and degree, infinity, formality, quiddity and\nindividuality.'* Logic then was jargon, controversy chicane, and truth\na shuttlecock, with which the disputants respectively played, or the\nobject which they mutually disguised. Logic was a labyrinth in which the\nsubtlest lost their Way--a bourne from which the traveller after truth\nseldom returned.\n\n     * Account of Lord Bacon's Novum Organon Scientiarum, Lib. of\n     Useful Knowledge, p. 4.\n\nA striking illustration of this has been furnished by a candid and\ndistinguished writer--Dr. Reid. 'Of the analytics and of the topics\nof Aristotle, ingenuousness requires me to confess, that though I have\noften purposed to read the whole with care, and to understand _what is\nintelligible_, yet my courage and patience always failed me before I had\ndone. Why should I throw away so much time and painful attention upon\na thing of so little real use? If I had lived in those ages when the\nknowledge of Aristotle's Organon entitled a man to the highest rank in\nphilosophy, ambition might have Induced me to employ upon it some years\nof painful study; and, less, I conceive, would not be sufficient. Such\nreflections as these always got the better of my resolution.'*\n\nDr. Whately, who has for many years occupied the throne of Logic and\nwhose work maybe taken, from its currency in our colleges and academies,\nas the representative of the logic of the schools, seems to obviate all\nobjections to the abstruseness of this subject by a counter charge,\nto the effect that logic is now underrated only because it has been\noverrated. But it is not the complexity found in it, but the laudations\nbestowed upon it which have brought it into neglect. Dr. Whately contends\nthat certain writers, 'by representing logic as furnishing the sole\ninstrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching\nthe use of the intellectual faculties in general, raised expectations\nwhich could not be realised, and which naturally led to a reaction--to\nlogic being regarded as utterly futile and empty.'** Deeply deploring\nthis kind of injury, from which many important arts have suffered, I am\nneither disposed to defend such a course, nor to imitate it. But I demur\nto the truth of this representation with regard to logic. If logic be not\nthe 'sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects,' it is\ncertainly the _principal_ one. Instead of charging scholastic logicians\nwith having unduly 'raised,' it would be nearer the truth, in my opinion,\nto say that they have _confused_ 'expectations' by intricate machinery\nand extreme elaborations.\n\n     * Lord Kamet's Sketches vol. 8, chap. S.   Aristotle's\n     Logic.\n\n     ** Dr. Whately: Elements of Logic, preface, p. vii.   Second\n     edition.\n\nIntricacy and minuteness of detail might be a trifling disqualification\ndid they lead to something immediately practical. But Dr. Whately\ncontends that logic, in the most extensive sense which the name can,\nwith propriety, be made to bear, is that of the science, and also the\nart of reasonings 'Inasmuch as logic institutes an analysis of the\nprocess of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a _science_, while\nconsidered in reference to the practical rules it furnishes it is an\n_art_.'* He confines the province of logic, as an art, to 'employing\nlanguage properly for the purpose of reasoning,' and restricts the\nlogician to the use of the syllogism as the sole test of argument. Mr.\nAugustus de Morgan thus exhibits the spirit of Whately's restriction:--\n\nLogic has nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or\npresumptions, from which an inference is derived; but simply takes care\nthat the inference shall certainly be true if the premises be true.'\n\nIt has been, and _is_ to be, objected, that logic, thus confined,\n'leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the\nsources of the greatest errors in reasoning.' To this powerful objection\nDr. Whately thinks it sufficient to reply, that 'no art is to be\ncensured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and,\nindeed, more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system\nof universal knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning\nor meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity, certainty or\nuncertainty of every proposition, thus superseding all other studies, it\nis most unphilosophical to expect, or even to imagine. And to find fault\nwith logic for not performing this, is as if one should object to optics\nfor not giving sight to the blind--or complain of a reading glass for\nbeing of no service to a person who had never learnt to read.'***\nThis would be a most conclusive answer if confident assertion could be\naccepted in lieu of proof. The objection still remains to be removed.\nWe may still demand, does it not fall within the legitimate province of\nlogic to provide means of encountering the 'greatest difficulties' with\nwhich it is confessed logic is beset? True, there is no art can teach\neverything, but is that a reason why logic should teach nothing, or next\nto nothing, compared with what seems essentially necessary?\n\n     * Intro., p. 1.\n\n     ** Klein. of Logic, Synthetical Compendium, chap.  2, part\n     1, sec. 9.\n\n     *** Elem. of Logic, Intro., pp. 12, 13.\n\nDr. Whately contends that the 'difficulties' and 'errors' in the\nobjection adduced, are in the _subject matter_ about which logic is\nemployed, and _not_ in the process of reasoning--which alone is the\nappropriate province of logic. But it seems to me that Dr. Whately has\nfound it impossible to keep within the bounds of the restriction he thus\nendeavours to establish.\n\nIn treating upon 'apprehension,' he introduces, as indeed he was obliged\nto do, from the department of metaphysics, several speculations on\n'generalisation' and 'abstractions,' and from ontology (the science\nwhich explains the most general conceptions respecting the phenomena of\nnature) he borrows the leading principles of definition. Because he thus\ngoes so far, it is not to be contended that _therefore_ he should have\ngone further; but when he found he must depart from his rule and borrow\nfrom other branches of knowledge (no matter for what end), why did he\nnot depart from it to some purpose, and borrow from natural philosophy\nsuch rules as would have guarded the logician from the 'chief errors'\ninto which he may fall?\n\nDr. Whately informs us, indeed, that logic furnishes certain syllogistic\nforms to which all sound arguments may be reduced, and thus establishes\nuniversal tests for the detection of fallacy--but it is to be observed\nthat it is only _such_ fallacy as may creep in _between_ the premises\nand the conclusion of an argument. It is to this narrow and Aristotelian\nobject that logic is restricted. 'The process of reasoning itself is\nalone the appropriate province of logic. This process will have been\ncorrectly conducted if it have conformed to the logical rules, which\npreclude the possibility of any error creeping in _between_ the\nprinciples from which we are arguing, and the conclusions we deduce from\nthem.'* We learn from our authority, that as arithmetic does not profess\nto introduce any notice of the _things_, whether coins, persons, or\ndimensions, respecting which calculations are made; neither does logic\nundertake 'the ascertainment of facts, or the degree of evidence of\ndoubtful propositions.' And just as an arithmetical result will be\nuseless if the data of the calculation be incorrect, so a logical\nconclusion is liable to be false if the premises are so. Neither does\nthe logic, now under consideration, concern itself with the 'discovery\nof truth,' excepting so far as that may be said to be implied by the\ndetection of error in a false inference.** Logic thus, confined to the\nactual process of reasoning, however important its functions there,\nevidently leaves us in the dark as to the value of what we reason about.\nFor the information thus missing, this logic refers us to knowledge\nin general--to grammar and composition for the art of expressing, with\ncorrectness and perspicuity, the terms of propositions--to natural,\nmoral, political, or other philosophy, for the facts which alone can\nestablish the truth of the premises reasoned from.\n\n     * Intro., p. 13.\n\n     ** For the grounds of these representations, see\n     Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning, chap. 2, sec. 4\n     Dr. Whately's Logic.\n\nThe exclusion from logic of all consideration of the facts on which\npropositions are founded, is thus endeavoured to be justified by the\nArchbishop of Dublin:--'No arithmetical skill will secure a correct\nresult, unless the data are correct from which we calculate: nor does\nany one on that account undervalue arithmetic; and yet the objection\nagainst logic rests on no better foundation.' This is true, but is\nit true that arithmetic is on _this account_ to be imitated? If the\narithmetician must take his data for granted, it is what the searcher\nafter truth must never do--_he_ must use his eyes and examine for\nhimself, in all cases, as far as possible, unless he intends to be\ndeceived. And for want of such precaution as this, the arithmetician is\nat sea the moment he steps out of the narrow path of mechanical routine.\nWho is not aware of the failures of calculation when applied to the\ngeneral business of life--to statistics, moral and political? Every\nday, facts have to be called in to correct the egregious blunders of\nfigures.* The calculations are conducted in most approved form, but are\nof no use. Does not this demonstrate that when arithmetic, like logic,\nis applied to the business of life, general rules for securing the\naccuracy of data would be of essential service? Supposing, however, that\narithmetic could do very well without them, does it follow that logic\nshould, when it would be safer and more efficient with them?\n\n     * 'In Art, in Practice, innumerable critics will demonstrate\n     that most things are impossible. It was proved by fluxionary\n     calculus, that steam-ships could never get across from the\n     farthest point of Ireland to the nearest of Newfoundland;\n     impelling force, resisting force, maximum here, minimum\n     there; by law of Nature, and geometric demonstration--what\n     could be done? The Great Western could weigh anchor from\n     Bristol Port; that could be done. The Great Western,\n     bounding safe through the gullets of the Hudson, threw her\n     cable out on the capstan of New York, and left our still\n     moist paper-demonstration to dry itself at leisure.'--\n     Thomas Carlyle, Chartism, pp. 96-7.\n\nSince our author's canons are held absolute in the schools, it may be\nuseful to consider this last cited argument in another light. A stronger\nobjection may be urged, one which particularly addresses itself to those\nwho mistake mere pertinence for general relevance, and suppose that a\nsingle analogy decides a case.\n\nHis Grace reasons, that, because arithmetic does not concern itself\nabout its data, logic should follow the same example. But why overlooks\nhe pure mathematics--a much higher science than arithmetic? Surely\ngeometry, which through all time has been the model of the sciences, was\nbetter worthy than arithmetic to be the model of logic! Was it classical\nin the principal of St. Alban's College to abandon Euclid and cleave\nunto Cocker or Walkingame?\n\nArithmetic is mechanical--geometry is reasoning; surely it was more\nbefitting to compare reason with reason, when endeavouring to discover\nthe true way of perfecting reason. Geometry is, of all sciences, reputed\nthe most conclusive in its arguments--and we know it is distinguished\nabove all sciences for carefulness in its data. It begins with axioms,\nthe most indubitable of all data, and its subsequent conclusions\nare founded only on established facts--and to be sure that they are\nestablished facts, the geometer, before he employs them, establishes\nthem himself. If an analogy is to decide the province of logic, here is\nan analogy whose pretensions over those of arithmetic are eminent.\n\nSo conclusive did Dr. Whately deem the argument just examined, that he\nmany times, in various forms, reproduced it. One of the last instances\nis under the head of 'Fallacies.' 'It has been made a subject of bitter\ncomplaint against logic, that it presupposes the most difficult point to\nbe already accomplished; viz., the sense of the terms to be ascertained.\nA similar objection might be urged against every other art in existence\ne.g., against agriculture, that all the precepts for the cultivation of\nland presuppose the possession of a farm.'*\n\n     * Logic, chap. 3.  Fallacies, sec. 2.\n\nAlready has been pointed out what may reasonably induce a suspicion\nof the soundness of these analogies; viz., that their author found\nit necessary to disregard them and introduce, from other branches of\nknowledge, certain disquisitions on the 'sense of terms.' With regard to\nthis particular instance, it may be observed, that though treatises\non agriculture do presuppose the possession of a farm, they do not\npresuppose the knowledge requisite for cultivating it, but inform\n_fully_ of soil, and seed, and crops. So logic may be allowed to\npresuppose the existence of the universe, whence truth is drawn, or the\nexistence of language, 'whereby it is expressed; but it is surely not\nto _pre-suppose_ the knowledge of facts and terms, the great instruments\nfor the cultivation of truth. Agricultural treatises hardly warrant this\ninference. There are the representations that induced the confession\nthat 'Logic is not so much an instrument of acquirement as of defence.\nIt is a good armour to buckle on when compelled to battle for our\nheritage, but a poor implement for its cultivation.'*\n\nAll _practical_ arts include a knowledge of materials as well as\nimplements. Platers, ignorant of the nature of metals, cabinetmakers,\nof the different species of wood, make but sorry artizans; and in like\nmanner, reasoners, unacquainted, at least in a general way, with the\naccuracy of what is reasoned about, make but sorry logicians.**\n\nIt will readily be expected that in the modern progress of knowledge,\nthe Aristotelian province of logic would be enlarged. The far-seeing\nintellect of Lord Verulam heralded the innovation--'Our glorious Bacon\nled philosophy forth from the jargon of schools and the fopperies\nof sects. He made her to be--the handmaid of nature, friendly to her\ncreatures, and faithful to her laws.'***\n\n     *  W. J. Fox, Mon. Rep., p. 45: 1835.\n\n     ** The reader will find that logician is need in the sense\n     of skilfulness in eliciting and exhibiting reality. By that\n     which I call logical is meant that which is truthful. I\n     presume that is the sense to which this high word should be\n     confined. It is the lax application of this term to mere\n     dexterity in evading the truth according to rule, that has\n     so increased the unsatisfactory race of professed sceptics.\n     --See Scepticism, chap. XII.\n\n     *** Langhornea' Preface to the Lives of Plutarch.\n\nThe general object of Lord Bacon's philosophy, writes Bruce, an\nEdinburgh professor of logic of the last century, is to connect the\nreasoning powers of man with experiments for the improvement of natural\nknowledge.\n\nTo create a just taste for philosophical investigation, required--\n\n1. A display of the true, that they may be distinguished from the false\nsubjects of inquiry.\n\n2. Scientific rules to direct the discovery of the laws of nature.\n\nBut to 'display the true,' is to display the _facts_ on which the truth\nrests. The 'discovery of the laws of nature' implies _observation_ of\nthe operations of nature. The philosophy of Bacon, says Macaulay, began\nin observation and ended in arts.\n\nIt is most obvious, as the reader will gather from what has been\nadvanced, that for guarding, to the greatest possible extent, against\nerror in conclusions, it is necessary to take into consideration the\ncharacter of the data from which we reason--and to do this, we must draw\nfrom the general sources of knowledge to which the Logic of the Schools\nrefers us. If we happen not to possess an accurate acquaintance with\nthese branches, we must draw upon the best notions we have of them, or\napply such natural sagacity as we happen to possess. But whether the\ninformation we happen to possess be complete or partial, it is not well\nthat we are left to apply it at random, without any definite mode of\nprocedure; and if logic refuses to assist us, and gives only a vague\nreference elsewhere, we must endeavour to assist ourselves. The datum\nof all arguments is a proposition, an assertion, or denial; and to\nascertain its truth (upon which the value of the whole reasoning\ndepends) we have to do with the facts upon which it rests, and the terms\nin which it is expressed. For it may be here observed, that the truth\nor falsity of every proposition depends upon facts. To ascertain the\ngeneral accuracy of facts, we have to appeal to received standards of\ncertainty; and to fix the meaning of terms, we have recourse to a plain\nprinciple of definition. In the task of recognising truth, so necessary\nin examining the premises of an argument, one is wonderfully assisted\nby being familiarised with the sources of truth, and the mode of its\ndiscovery. In these operations the tutored and untutored may alike be\nassisted by simple general rules. If these rules prove not infallible in\nevery case, they will prove successful in the majority of cases.\n\nSince general rules are the only, rules that the vast field of facts\nadmits of, they are not to be rejected on light grounds. They enable\nus to set forth intelligibly the reasons of our own conviction, and to\ndetect and expose the fundamental fallacies of apparent arguments. Since\nthey direct us where the Logic of the Schools leaves us without a guide,\ntheir value is apparent.\n\nThe logical management of the syllogism involves much abstruseness\nrespecting 'genus' and 'species,' the 'quantity' and 'quality' of\n'propositions', 'contraries,' 'sub-contraries,' 'contradictions,'\nand 'subalterns.' Stepping by 'illative conversion,' 'six rules to be\nobserved with respect to categorical syllogism' next demand attention,\nfollowed hard by eleven moods which can be used in a legitimate\nsyllogism, Viz.---- A, A, A, A, A, I, A., E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O,\nO, E, A, E, E, A, O, E, I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O.' In the middle of\nthis abstract train march the 'undistributed middle' and the 'illicit\nprocess,' attended by four figures represented by the following\nmnemonic lines, which must be carefully committed to memory:'--\n\nFig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArII, fErIOque prioris.\n\nFig. 2. cEsArE, dAmEstrEs, fEstInO, bArOkO,* secundae.\n\nFig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtIsI, fElAptOn, bOkArdO,** fErlsO,\nhabet; quarta insuper addit.\n\nFig. 4. brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArIs, fEsApo, frEsIsOn.\n\nA motley group, too numerous to be particularised, bring up the complex\nrear of 'Modals,' 'Hypotheticals,' 'Conditionals,' and 'Disjunctives.'\nThis is certainly not the portal through which the populace can at\npresent pass to logic, even if such logic helped them to all truth, and\nsaved them from all fallacy.\n\nBut this species of logic is not without interest. Symbolic letters and\nmnemonic lines are not without attractions to those who understand\nthem. There is poetry in an algebraic sign, when it is the emblem of a\ndifficulty solved, and a wonderful result simply arrived at. To try the\nwhole power of words, and discover every form of language in which a\nlegitimate deduction can be expressed, is no ignoble task. It is a high\ndiscipline, but it belongs rather to the age of leisure than this of\n'copperasfames, cotton-fuz, gin-riot, wrath, and toil'--to the luxuries\nrather than the utilities of learning.\n\nThere is the inefficiency of the syllogism, and also the vitiation\nproduced by its employment.\n\n1. It corrupts the taste for philosophical invention by placing\nphilosophy in abstractions, and withdrawing it from the observation of\nnature.\n\n2. It creates a reliance on principles, which originate in the\n_hypotheses_ of philosophers, not in the laws of nature.\n\n3. It makes truth the result of the forms of argument, not of scientific\nevidence.***\n\n     * Or, Fakoro, as indeed all the particulars in this place\n     recited.\n\n     ** Or, Dokamo.  but a brief summary of the subjects\n     comprised in his logic in reference to the syllogism.\n\n     ***Bruce. These references to Fakoro and Dokamo are Whately's.\n\nLord Kames cites from the father of logic the following syllogism, which\nwill bear repetition as an extraordinary instance of that assumption for\nwhich the Logic of the Schools provides no remedy:--\n\n  Heavy bodies naturally tend to the centre of the universe.\n  We know, by experience, that heavy bodies tend to the centre of the earth.\n  Therefore the centre of the earth is the centre of the universe.\n\nBut by what experience did Aristotle discover the centre of the\nuniverse, so as to become aware that heavy bodies _naturally_ tend\nthere? On what facts rest the measurement of the radii from our earth to\nthe boundless circumference of space? How did he ascertain the limits of\nthat which has no limits? Yet, strange to say, the Logic of the Schools\nprides itself in leaving us where the Stagyrite left us.\n\n'When mankind began to reason on the phenomena of nature, they were\nsolicitous to _abstract_, and they formed general propositions from a\n_limited_ observation. Though these propositions were assumed, they were\nadmitted as true. They were not examined _by appeals to nature_, but by\ncomparison with other propositions.'*\n\nIn this syllogism from Aristotle, there is the usual compliance with\naccredited rules, and the same defiance of common sense. Such examples\nare deemed perfect reasoning and legitimate argument; but is it not a\nmockery to encourage the belief that we can have reason and argument,\nwithout the truth? Only this shallow consolation remains to us. If the\nlogician of the schoole does not enlighten the understanding, he is at\nleast reputed not to offend the taste, and he wins the equivocal praise\nof Butler:--\n\n     'He'll run in debt by disputation,\n     And pay with ratiocination;\n     All this by syllogism, true\n     In mood and figure, he will do.'\n\nSyllogisms are to truth what rhyme is to poetry. 'It is a well known\nfact that verse, faultless in form, may be utterly destitute of poetic\nfire or feeling.'**\n\n     * Bruce.\n\n     ** A. J. D. D'Orsey, Eng. Gram., part 2, article Prosody.\n\nAccording to the Logic of the Schools, 'the question respecting the\nvalidity of an argument is not whether the conclusion be _true_, but\nwhether it _follows_ from the premises adduced.' It was the bitter\nexperience of Bordon of the delusiveness of such partial logic that\ninduced him to exclaim, '_one_ fact is worth fifty _arguments_.'\n\nWith such authorities, 'a valid argument is that which it so stated that\nits conclusiveness is evident from the mere _form_ of the expression.'\nBut since it is admitted that if the data reasoned upon be incorrect,\nno logical skill can secure a correct result; it is evident that however\n_faultless the form_, the inquirer after truth is in no way nearer his\nobject, unless he be instructed how to lay a foundation of _faultless\nfacts_. He then, who is in love with truth rather than logomachy, will\nadmit, in spite of the most ingenious analogies, that there is some room\nfor a logic of facts, as well as a logic of words.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II. LOCKE-LOGIC.\n\nLogic is a general guide to the discovery of truth, and teaches us\nits systematic communication to others. This definition is intended to\ncombine logic and rhetoric into one system. According to a quotation in\nPinnock's Guide to Knowledge, Locke defined logic as 'that art by which\nwe rightly use our mental faculties in the discovery and communication\nof truth,' a definition, called by the writer, the definition of nature\nechoed by genius. There exists a natural connection between logic\nand rhetoric. The discovery of truth could avail us little if we were\nwithout the means of communicating it; and it is easy to see that it\nwould be in vain to possess the means of communicating truth, unless we\nhad the truth to communicate. Therefore, ingenuity is but ill employed\nin separating these mutual departments of learning which nature has\nconnected together. Besides, the skill of the logician is as serviceable\nin the statement of a case, as in arguing it. Arrangement is as much a\nmatter of logic as ratiocination; and to impress this neglected\ntruth upon the young inquirer, is one reason for proposing a combined\ndefinition.\n\nThe mutual connection of logic and rhetoric is illustrated by the\nfact, that the Logic of the Schools is purely a branch of rhetoric. It\nconsists in putting an argument into 'the most perspicuous form in\nwhich it can be exhibited,'*--i. e., in _communicating_ it in the most\nefficient way to others.\n\n     * Dr. Whatetly: Anal. Ont., chap. 1, aec. 6, p. 45.\n\nIndeed, Dr. Whately (who makes logic to consist in reasoning) defines\nreasoning as _discourse_, and discourse is rhetoric. '_Grammar_,'\nsays Doherty,' represents the mechanism of letters in forming\nwords--_Rhemar_, the mechanism of words in forming sentences. We have\n_Grammar_ for letters, _Rhemar_ for words, _Logic for arguments_, and\n_Rhetoric_ for discourse.' Locke-logic, therefore--i. e., logic in the\nsense in which Locke treated it--seems to come nearer the truth, as well\nas nearer the common requirement, than the restricted definition of it\nby others insisted on.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III. LOGICAL TRUTH\n\nAll men know something of truth. Happily it is the first impulse of\nchildhood, and nature teaches us its pleasure before reason instructs us\nin its truth. In infancy we own its beauty, in manhood its power. There\nis nothing, says Cicero, sweeter to man than the light of truth. Truth,\nobserves Godwin, is the native element of an intellectual nature. It\nhas been wisely remarked, said Lord Kames, that truth is to the\nunderstanding what beauty is to the eye, or music to the ear.\n\nPhilosophy sanctions what unsophisticated feelings suggested. He that\nhas made but a little progress beyond ignorance and privilege, cannot be\nedified by anything but truth.** Truth, like a mathematical point, has\nhad various descriptions; and it may be useful to select those which\ngraduate to its logical definition. Bulwer tells us, that 'the agitation\nof thought is the beginning of truth.' Locke, Lord Kames, Mill, and\nothers, agree that truth, or falsehood, is an affair of language. An\nassertion which represents things as they really are, is a truth--an\nassertion that represents things what in reality they are _not_, is a\nfalsehood.\n\n     ** Mr. Hobhouse: Note 15. to 4th Canto of Childe Harold.\n\nTruth, in sculpture, means an exact similitude of some living form,\nchiselled in stone or marble. Truth, in painting, is a natural\nrepresentation on canvass of some person, or object. In the same\nmanner, moral 'truth is an exact image of things set forth in speech,\nor writing.' The logical definition of truth is given in these\nwords:--'Truth is that which admits of proof,'* that is, an assertion or\ndenial which can be substantiated by facts.\n\n     * Chambers' Information.\n\nA fact is commonly called a truth, but this practice leads to great\nconfusion in reasoning. A fact is only an element in truth, A logical\ntruth is a proposition supported by facts. Facts compose the premises\nof an argument--a truth is the inference from the facts. Unless this\ndistinction is observed, recourse must be had to the expedient of\ncalling a fact a particular truth, and an induction from facts a general\ntruth. Or we must adopt this distinction, that a moral truth, that is,\nthe truth of parlance, is the coincidence of language with reality; and\na logical truth, a proposition which admits of demonstration.\n\nA lady, who has given intellectual laws to many whom I address, has\nsaid--'A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact, which truth would\nbe changed into an error the moment the fact on which it rested was\ndisproved.' But that which can be disproved cannot be an '_ascertained_\nfact.' Allowing, however, the relevancy of this definition of a truth,\nit would, in a treatise on logic, be considered as a definition only\nof a particular truth. Many such truths are required to make a logical\ntruth.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV. DISCOVERY OF TRUTH\n\n     The great treasure-house of nature is open to all, and the\n     only fee demanded for inspection is attention.--Detrosibr.\n\nObservation** of nature is the only source of truth. Discursive\nobservation is the art of noticing circumstances evident to the senses.\nMen who do this intentionally and carefully, with a view of acquiring\na knowledge of phenomena and their causes, are distinguished for their\nvaried knowledge and often for their great discoveries. Shakspere must\nhave owed the varied facts interwoven into his delineations of human\ncharacter to this source. The clever personations of Garrick were\nsuggested by his curious observations of men and manners. Sir Walter\nScott is known to have been a careful observer. It is said, 'no\nexpression escaped him if it bore on the illustration of character.'\n\n     ** The term observation is used here in the sense in which\n     it is commonly understood, signifying cognisance in general.\n     It includes whatever information we acquire by the meant of\n     consciousness, or experience, or through the agency of the\n     senses.\n\nClaude Lorraine, with a passionate sympathy for the beautiful, sate in\nthe fields from sun-rise to dewy eve, watching, catching, and saturating\nhis very soul, as it were, with all the evanescent beauties of a\nsummer's day, as they chased each other over the face of the fair scene;\nfixing on canvass, taking captive and imprisoning in our cabinets, the\nwanton daughters of nature, that before his time never were caught, but\nflitted before the fascinated eye only long enough to make the heart\nafterwards feel more achingly the void of their vanishing. And the\nartist who has done all this, do we not justly call him an _imaginative_\npainter, to distinguish him from those meaner geniuses who were, in\npainting, very like Crabbe in poetry, merely faithful delineators of\nthe vulgarer objects of social life, bunches of carrots, drunken boors,\nchamber maids and chimney corners.\n\n'Has the reader ever seen Mr. Macready in the character of Macbeth? If\nhe have, he can never forget the stupefied murderer withdrawing from the\nchamber in which he has just done the dread act, with fascinated gaze\nretreatingly regarding his royal victim, and awaking with a guilty start\nas he runs unconsciously against his hard-souled partner in guilt, who\nin vain tries to infuse into the weaker spirit of her paralysed husband\nher own metaphysical superiority. In this scene we know that Mr.\nMacready's acting was perfect, for the pressure at our heart, the\nsuspension of our breathing, and the creeping of our hair, made us\n_feel_ that it was so. We see him now, as stealthily he places his foot\nover the threshold of the chamber of death to re-appear on the stage;\nthe intensely staring eye, that cannot remove from what 'tis horror to\nlook upon; the awfully natural absorption of his soul by that \"sorry\nsight,\" which one little minute has brought about; his starting and\nawaking from his entranced state, as he runs against his wife in his\nretreat, and his full passionate burst of blended remorse, terror, and\nsuperstition, as refusing counsel, regardless of remonstrance, heedless\nof probable detection, he pours forth his \"brain-sickly\" convictions, of\nhaving in one little moment cut the cable that had held him to the rest\nof the great human family. All this we can see in our mind's eye, for\nthe actor gave us a picture of passion that time can never obliterate.\nBut how would it have been with a cloddish unimaginative fellow,\nwhom nature never intended should understand Shakspere? Would he not,\nconscious that he was among shoals and quicksands of feelings, too nice\nfor his appreciation, seek to tear over all by a tempest of rant, which\nwould be a more ruthless murder on Shakspere than Macbeth's on the king?\nAnd why should we be delighted with Mr. Macready's delineation, and\ndisgusted with the ranter? Simply because the former has _observed_,\ntreasured up, and felt every genuine exhibition of human feeling that\ncame in his way, and applied it appropriately to all the situations to\nwhich it was related in nature. A single instance will make this clear.\nMr. Kean one night, in the concluding part of the combat scene of\nRichard III., when supposed to be wounded to the death, before falling,\nsteadily regarded his foe, and painfully raising his right arm in act\nto strike, the relaxed and dying limb, unable to second the spirit, fell\nheavily and harmlessly to his side, indicating merely the fierce bravery\nof the usurper living in all its strength, when the body which it would\nmove, was all but a senseless clod. Pit, gallery, and boxes arose with\nan enthusiasm beyond description, and by their repeated plaudits bore\ntestimony the intense naturalness of the struggle. The actor being\nafterwards complimented upon the _hit_, said, that he had taken the\naction from Jack Painter, the prize-fighter, when the latter was beaten\nin some one of his contests, and it immediately struck the tragedian\nthat the very same thing would come in beautifully in the dying scene\nof Richard III. What was this, if not imagination? Kean saw Painter's\naction to be the natural effects of undying valour in vain endeavouring\nto contend against overwhelming power. Remembering and associating it\nwith his previous conception of the character of Richard III., the\nactor saw it could be most strikingly incorporated with that picture of\npassion the usurper's death should present to our view. Seeing this, he\ncombined it with his previous delineation, and thereby did precisely\nthe same thing as the poet in using a fine simile, or the painter in\nintroducing sun-light over a part of his picture. It was a portion\nof nature carried away by the actor to be reproduced on a future and\nfitting occasion.'*\n\nThe beginning of all knowledge is observation. It has been shown by Mr.\nMill that 'axioms,' which lie at the foundation of all reasoning and all\nscience, 'are experimental truths--generalisations _from observation_.\nThe proposition that Two straight lines cannot inclose a space--or, in\nother words, Two straight lines which have once met do not meet again,\nbut continue to diverge--is an induction from the _evidence of our\nsenses._'** 'Axioms are but a class of inductions from _experience_: the\nsimplest and easiest cases of generalisation,' from the facts furnished\nto, us by our senses or by our internal consciousness.'***\n\nAutobiography, or the metaphysical revelation of a man to himself, is\na source of valuable psychological and moral truths. From this centre\nfrequently radiate new lights upon human nature. But this is resolvable\ninto a species of mental observation. It is self-inspection.\n\nWe have lately been told that 'Poetry is called upon to work in\nthe _discovery_ of truth. The imagination has always been the great\ndiscovering power. Discoveries are the poetry of science. The case is\nrare indeed in which, by merely advancing step by step in the exercise\nof the logical faculty, any new truth has been arrived at. Logic comes\nafterwards, to verify that which imagination sees with its far-darting\nglance.'****\n\n     * Phrenology Tested, by A. M., of the Middle Temple, pp.\n     143-5.\n\n     ** Logic, vol 1, p. 305.\n\n     *** Idem, pp. 328-9.\n\n     **** W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes: Genius and\n     Poetry of Campbell, p.;5.\n\nThis seems to call upon us to recognise the imagination as fresh source\nof truth. But the definition of imagination, as given by Emerson,\nreveals to us its origin in observation;--'The imagination may be\ndefined to be the use which reason makes of the material world.\nShakspere's imperial muse tosses the creation like a bauble from hand to\nhand, to embody any capricious shade of thought that is uppermost in his\nmind.' Hence, though we agree with Gilfillan that imagination is thought\non fire, we must confess that the ignition is material.\n\nWe will, however, hear a poet's defence of his fraternity:--'Poets are\nvulgarly considered deficient in the reasoning faculty; whereas no man\nwas ever a great poet without having it in excess, and after a century\nor two, men become convinced of it. They jump the middle terms of their\nsyllogisms, it is true, and assume premises to which the world has not\nyet arrived; but time stamps their deductions as invincible.'*\n\nImagination is based on observation, and bears the same relation to the\n'material world' that the magician bears to the appliances of his art.\nImagination is the dexterous and astonishing use of realities. It is\na species of mental experiment, whereby, without permission of the\nline-and-rule men, we join strange things together, and to the surprise\nof every body, the junction is a happy one. 'Angelo's greatness lay in\nsearching for untried existence.'** But observation primarily suggests\nthe combination. If, as in the case of Angelo, imagination essays the\nhighest flights of genius, and goes in search of untried existence, it\nis not existence out of nature, but founded upon nature--its success is\na revelation of some hidden reality.\n\n     * Lowell's Conversations on the Old Poets.\n\n     ** J. T. Seymour; Oracle of Reason.\n\nSome of the most praised conceptions of Shakspere have been traced by\ncritics to the tritest observation. Instance Hamlet's remark:--\n\n     There's a divinity doth shape our ends,\n     Bough-hew them as we will.\n\nCritics tell us, that Shakspere here fell into the conventional cant\nof a mechanic making skewers. But it is no detraction to cull the best\nphrases from the most common sources. Knight remarks:--'Philosophy, as\nprofound as it is beautiful! says the uninitiated reader of Shakspere.\nBut he that is endued with the wisdom of the commentators, will learn\nhow easy it is to mistake for philosophy and poetry what really only\nproceeded from the very vulgar recollection of an ignorant mind. Dr.\nFarmer informs me, says Steevens, that these words are merely technical.\nA woodman, butcher, and dealer in skewers, lately observed to him, that\nhis nephew (an idle lad), could only assist in making them; he could\nrough-hew them, but I was obliged to shape their ends. To shape the ends\nof wood skewers, i. e., to point them, requires a degree of skill: any\none can rough-hew them. Whoever recollects the profession of Shakspere's\nfather, will admit that his son might be no stranger to such terms. I\nhave frequently seen packages of wool pinned up with skewers.'* To admit\nthe likelihood of all this, notwithstanding Mr. Knight's jeer at the\n'wisdom of the commentators,' is rather to exalt than degrade the genius\nof Shakspere, who could derive exalted figures from humble sources.\nThe 'Athenaeum,' far more wisely than Mr. Knight, in this instance,\nobserves:--'This is the test of a truly great man; that his thoughts\nshould be _things_, and become things in instantaneous act, and not for\na moment mere speculations and abstractions.'\n\nAs the theories of the schoolmen subside, and men no longer ignore\nnature, it will become recognised as the source rather than the tool\nof intellect. We shall have less occasion to contend that all lofty and\nsublime ideas derive their value and beauty from their coherence with\nthe instincts of sensation, 'Poetry, we grant, creates a world of its\nown; but it creates it out of _existing_ materials.' 'Imagination' may\nbe but 'thought on fire,' but the spark, which ignites it, is material.\nIs there any other distinction between the nights of the rhapsodist\nand those of genius, than that genius _illumines_ reality and rhapsody\n_obscures_ it? 'We know of no great generalisation that has ever been\nmade by a man unacquainted with the details on which it rests.'\n\nExperiment is invented observation. It is putting into operation certain\nsupposed causes in order to observe their effects. An experiment may\nbe defined as an observation, which we are at some trouble to make.\nExperiment is usually set down as being a process of discovering truth\ndifferent from observation. It is evidently included under observation,\nand there is no practical advantage in separating it. Discursive,\ngeneral, ordinary, or common observation is the observation of the\nphenomena we _find_. Experiment is observation of the phenomena we\n_bring together_. Experimental observation has been the great agent\nof modern discovery. Newton ranked it as the most valuable knowledge.\nWhatever is not founded on phenomena is hypothesis, and has no place in\nexperimental philosophy. It is the principal source of accurate\nfacts. When Jenner first communicated to John Hunter, what he thought\nrespecting the prevention of small pox--'Don't think, but try; be\npatient, be accurate,' was Hunter's characteristic reply. Locke\nremarks--'While the philosophy of Aristotle prevailed in the schools,\nwhich dealt often in words without meaning, the knowledge of nature was\nat a stand; men argued concerning things of which they had no idea;\nin this enlightened age, we keep to trial and experiment, as the only\ncertain foundation of philosophy.'\n\n     * Philosophy and Religion of Shakspere, pp. 173-4\n\n     **  No 946. p. 1103.\n\n     *** Athenaeum, No. 946, p. 1191.\n\nHypothesis may be noticed here as being a species of _embryo_\nexperiment. Hypothesis is guessing at the truth. It is a conjecture or\nsupposition relating to the cause of an effect. It imagines that where\ncertain conditions exist, the desired result will ensue. But all\nthese conjectures must be founded on observation. For, in the wildest\nconjecture, unless made by a madman, there is some reason. Hypothesis is\nincipient truth founded on a few facts which make it probable, but not\non sufficient to make it certain. Hypothesis does not directly discover\ntruth, but it is a guide to experiment, which does. The hypotheses of\nColumbus respecting an unknown continent, did not of itself discover\nAmerica--but it directed the experiment of his voyage there, which did.\nTo hypothesise alone is the error of the visionary and the dreamer.\nPractical wisdom, as far as possible, tests hypothesis by experiment.\nSir C. Bell conjectured that the nervous fluid of the human body\nwas analogous to galvanic fluid, and then, by experiments on various\nanimals, he endeavoured to test his hypothesis. However, great\nthinkers arise who are best employed in contriving plans for others to\nexecute--in telling others what they are to do. Great poets belong\nto this class. They are often incapable of the concentrated labour of\nfurnishing proofs of their hypothesis. Gladly should we recognise the\nmission of such men. They work for humanity by thinking for humanity.\n'All who think,' says Lytton, 'are co-operative with all who work.'\nLabour supplies our wants, thought teaches us dominion over nature.\nLabour is but the means of subsistence, it is thought that makes it the\nsource of wealth by multiplying its powers.\n\nTo the value of hypothesis Mr. Mill bears this testimony, that by\nsuggesting observations and experiments, it puts us upon the road\nto, independent evidence, if it be really attainable, and till it be\nattained, the hypothesis ought not to count for more than a suspicion.\nThe function of hypothesis is one which must be reckoned absolutely\nindispensable in science. Without such assumption, science would not\nhave attained its present state. Nearly everything which is now theory\nwas once hypothesis.*\n\n     * Logic, Vol. II, p. 18.\n\nInduction is systematic observation of a given class of phenomena.\nIt consists in bringing together a variety of facts and instances,\ncarefully and patiently viewing them in all possible lights to\ndiscover from a comparison of the whole what, if any, new principle is\nelicitable. Induction is an experiment with a number of facts, to see\nif any general result can be arrived at. Thus observation is of three\nkinds--discursive, experimental, and inductive. For brevity of speech,\nwe use respectively the terms observation, experiment, and induction,\nas the names of the three recognised modes of investigation. But it\nfacilitates a clear view of this subject, to note that experiment and\ninduction are but phases of observation--and that observation is the\ngreat source of the discovery of truth.\n\nDiscursive observation and experiment are the sources of facts or\nparticular truths. Nature, poetically says Dr. Reid, is put to the\nquestion by a thousand observations and experiments, and forced to\nconfess her secrets. Out of these secrets induction gathers its general\ntruths, which become the premises of argument. Facts, like stones, are\nof little service while scattered--it is in the edifice raised by them\nthat their value is apparent. They have been compared to blocks, upon\n_one_ of which, if a person stand, he has but a partially increased\nview; but when many are piled up, a person from their summit commands\nthe prospect round. Particular truth seldom proves anything but itself.\nArgument is proving something else, and we have seen that that which is\nproved must be _contained_ in something which proves it. In other words,\nan argument is an assertion or denial of something substantiated by\nother things--by facts.\n\nGall _observed_ the peculiar formation of a certain head, but the one\nfact proved nothing, except that the head had a certain form. It was\na barren observation, except that it suggested to his imagination\nthe hypothesis that the peculiar form of the head might be caused by\npeculiarity of mind. This set him upon the experiment of observing\nthe habits and dispositions of the individual in order to test his\nhypothesis. But the one fact of finding a peculiarity proved nothing new\nof any value. The two facts, though incident, were hardly convincing.\nThey proved only that a peculiar head was accompanied in one case by\npeculiar habits--but whether one was the cause of the other, or whether\nthe phenomena were in any way connected, still remained unknown. When,\nhowever, Gall, Spurzheim, and others, had travelled through Europe,\nmaking observations and experiments, and at last putting all the facts\nand instances together, and carefully and patiently viewing them in all\npossible lights, and finding that they shadowed forth that the brain was\nthe organ, the map and measure of intelligence, they inducted a general\ntruth, which enters the lists of argument and takes its place as an\naddition to our metaphysical and moral treasures.\n\nMr. Macaulay, who, perhaps, might be accused of underrating both Bacon\nand Induction, with a view of exalting Aristotle, remarks that 'The\nvulgar notion about Bacon we take to be this, that he invented a new\nmethod of arriving at truth, which method is called induction, and that\nhe detected some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning which had been in\nvogue before his time. This notion is about as well founded as that of\nthe people who, in the middle ages, imagined that Virgil was a great\nconjurer. Many who are far too well informed to talk such extravagant\nnonsense, entertain what we think incorrect notions as to what Bacon\nreally effected in this matter. The inductive method has been practised\never since the beginning of the world by every human being. It is\nconstantly practised by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless\nschoolboy, by the very child at the breast. That method leads the clown\nto the conclusion, that if he sows barley he shall not reap wheat. By\nthat method, the schoolboy learns that a cloudy day is the best for\ncatching trout. The very infant we imagine is led by induction to expect\nmilk from his mother or nurse, and none from his father. Not only is it\nnot true that Bacon invented the inductive method, but it is not true\nthat he was the first person who correctly analysed that method and\nexplained its uses. Aristotle had long before pointed out the absurdity\nof supposing that syllogistic reasoning could ever conduct men to the\ndiscovery of any new principle, had shown that such discoveries must be\nmade by induction and by induction alone, and had given the history of\nthe inductive process concisely, indeed, but with great perspicuity and\nprecision. We are not inclined to ascribe much practical value to that\nanalysis of the Inductive method which Bacon has given in the second\nbook of the Novum Organon. It is, indeed, an elaborate and correct\nanalysis. But it is an analysis of that which we are all doing from\nmorning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dream.'*\n\n     * Macaulay's Hist Essays, vol. 3, p. 407.\n\nIt is not 'some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning' which Bacon is\nsupposed to have detected, it is rather the partial protection against\nerror afforded by syllogisms, which he exposed and provided against,\nfor which he is estimated. Certainly Aristotle must have had a very\ndifferent opinion of the value of inductive philosophy from that\nentertained by Bacon, or he would have indoctrinated his disciples with\nit. Few will doubt that had Bacon's Novum Organon appeared in the place\nof Aristotle's logic, and Aristotle's work in the place of Bacon's,\nthat the advancement of learning in the world would now be in a very\ndifferent state. Could Bacon have arrested the attention of the\nancient sages with his methods of discovering new principles, ancient\nphilosophy, instead of being a treadmill, would have been a path, and we\nshould not have had a contempt for all learning which was useful. When\nPosidonius said that we owed to philosophy the principles of the\narch and the introduction of metals. We should not have had Seneca\nrepudiating such insulting compliments, nor Archimedes considering that\ngeometry was degraded by being employed in anything useful.\n\nBut these observations of Macaulay have the merit of showing us\nthat induction has its foundation in nature, and afford a further\nconfirmation of our views, that observation is the source of our\nknowledge, and that it is the province of logic to teach us to\nsystematise our thoughts. Observation, experiment, hypothesis and\ninduction, are but different names for the operation--varying in degree,\nin method, in expedient, and elaboration--whereby we discover truth.\nNature is the treasure-house of truth, and the sole fee of appropriation\nis attention.\n\nMuch discussion has taken place upon the nature of necessary truths.\nMr. Mill, however, after an elaborate analysis of Dr. Whewell's theory,\npronounces that 'nothing is necessary except the connection between a\nconclusion and the premises.' A necessary truth is commonly defined as a\nproposition, the negation of which is not only false, but inconceivable.\nMr. Mill contests this doctrine in words embodying suggestions of great\nvalue.\n\n'Now I cannot but wonder that so much stress should be laid upon the\ncircumstance of inconceivableness, when there is such ample experience\nto show that our capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing has very\nlittle to do with a possibility of the thing in itself; but is in truth\nvery much an affair of accident, and depends upon the past history and\nhabits of our own minds. There is no more generally acknowledged fact\nin human nature, than the extreme difficulty at first felt in conceiving\nanything as possible, which is in contradiction to long established and\nfamiliar experience; or even to old and familiar habits of thought. And\nthis difficulty is a necessary result of the fundamental laws of the\nhuman mind. When we have often seen and thought of two things together,\nand have never in any one instance either seen or thought of them\nseparately, there is by the primary law of association an increasing\ndifficulty, which in the end becomes insuperable, of conceiving the two\nthings apart. This is most of all conspicuous in uneducated persons, who\nare in general utterly unable to separate any two ideas which have once\nbecome firmly associated in their minds; and if persons of cultivated\nintellect have any advantage on the point, it is only because, having\nseen and heard and read more, and been more accustomed to exercise their\nimagination, they have experienced their sensations and thoughts in\nmore varied combinations, and have been prevented from forming these\ninseparable associations. But this advantage has necessarily its limits.\nThe man of the most practised intellect is not exempt from the universal\nlaws of our conceptive faculty. If daily habit presents to him for a\nlong period two facts in combination, and if he is not led during that\nperiod either by accident or intention to think of them apart, he will\nin time become incapable of doing so even by the strongest effort; and\nthe supposition that the two facts can be separated in nature, will\nat last present itself to his mind with all the characters of an\ninconceivable phenomenon. There are remarkable instances of this in\nthe history of science: instances, in which the wisest men rejected\nas impossible, because inconceivable, things which their posterity, by\nearlier practice and longer perseverance in the attempt, found it quite\neasy to conceive, and which everybody knows to be true. 'If, then, it be\nso natural to the human mind, even in its highest state of culture, to\nbe incapable of conceiving, and on that ground to believe impossible,\nwhat is afterwards not only found to be conceivable but proved to be\ntrue; what wonder if in cases where the association is still older, more\nconfirmed, and more familiar, and in which nothing ever occurs to shake\nour conviction, or even suggest to us any conception at variance\nwith the association, the acquired incapacity should continue, and be\nmistaken for a natural incapacity? It is true our experience of the\nvarieties in nature enables us, within certain limits, to conceive other\nvarieties analogous to them. We can conceive the sun or moon falling;\nfor although we never saw them fall, nor ever perhaps, imagined\nthem falling, we have seen so many other things fall, that we have\ninnumerable familiar analogies to assist the conception; which after\nall, we should probably have some difficulty in framing, were we not\nwell accustomed to see the sun and moon move, (or appear to move,)\nso that we are only called upon to conceive a slight change in the\ndirection of motion, a circumstance familiar to our experience. But when\nexperience affords no model on which to shape the new conception, how is\nit possible for us to form it? How, for example, can we imagine an end\nto space or time? We never saw any object without something beyond\nit, nor experienced any feeling without something following it. When,\ntherefore, we attempt to conceive the last point of space, we have\nthe idea irresistibly raised of other points beyond it. When we try\nto imagine the last instant of time, we cannot help conceiving another\ninstant after it Nor is there any necessity to assume, as is done by a\nmodern school of metaphysicians, a peculiar fundamental law of the mind\nto account for the feeling of infinity inherent in our conceptions of\nspace and time; that apparent infinity is sufficiently accounted for by\nsimpler and universally acknowledged laws.'*\n\n     * Mill's Logic, vol. 1, pp. 313-17.\n\nThus we stand on the verge of boundless possibility. What truths may yet\nbe discovered in that great and untrodden field, which lies without our\nexperience, no man can tell. All we have yet brought between assertion\nand proof, is all we have yet conquered, is all that we as yet know,\nis all that we can yet rely upon. The search after the untried is the\nhighest and apparently the inherent aspiration of roan. The revelation\nof new worlds continually rewards his noble ambition. At once arrested\nand allured by the magnificence of nature--we wonder, we work, we wait.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. FACTS\n\n     We must never forget that accurate and multiplied\n     quantitative facts form the only substantial basis of\n     science.--Parker.\n\nAs clear fountains send forth pellucid streams, so do clear truths give\naccurate sciences. The more definite the facts, the more perfect the\nscience; it is therefore of importance that all facts should be capable\nof being tested by the standard of physical certainty. Dr. Reid says,\nthat 'the inquirer after truth must take only facts for his guide.' It\nis then of moment that he takes true and not false guides. A writer in\nthe 'Monthly Repository' observes, that 'the basis of all knowledge is\nsuch an extensive induction from particular facts, as leads to general\nconclusions and fundamental axioms'--and if the facts are erroneous,\nevidently the conclusions will be also erroneous. He also remarks,\nthat 'in reasoning, all sciences are the same, being founded on an\nexamination of facts--comparison of ideas.' But If the examination is\nincomplete, or the facts admitted incorrect, the comparison will\nbe alike defective and the reasoning vitiated. If suppositions or\nconjectures are mixed up with facts, the inductions from them will be\nsuppositions, and the conclusions but conjectures.\n\nThere are three words--consciousness, conscience, and\nconscientiousness--very much alike to the ear but very different in\nsignification. Consciousness, is feeling--conscience, the sense of right\nand wrong---conscientiousness, the practice of what is believed to be\nright. Conscience and conscientiousness are often confounded. We say,\nlawyers have no conscience, we mean no conscientiousness. They\nknow right from wrong as men, but not professionally. It is with\nconsciousness that the logician has to deal. Consciousness is the\nprimary source of knowledge. Consciousness and the 'Evidences of the\nSenses' are synonymous terms. Facts referable to consciousness are said\nto be physically certain. The evidence of the senses is the highest\nstandard of certainty.\n\nThe intuitive principles of belief are--\n\n  1st. A conviction of our own existence.\n  2nd. A confidence in the evidences of our senses.\n  3rd. In our mental operations.\n  4th. In our mental identity.\n  5th. In the conformity of the operations of nature.\n\nThese truths of intuition or consciousness are the foundation of all\nknowledge. Truths which we know, by way of inference, are occurrences\nwhich took place while we were absent--the events of history and the\ntheorems of mathematics. But the truths known by intuition are the\noriginal premises from which all others axe inferred. Our assent to the\nconclusion being grounded upon the truth of the premises, we could never\narrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known\nantecedently to all reasoning.\n\n'Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility\nof question. What one sees, or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one\ncannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for\nthe purpose of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our\nknowledge of them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic\nfor this portion of our know ledge.'*\n\nAll discussions pertaining to the nature and limits of intuition or\nconsciousness are referred to the higher or transcendental metaphysics,\nbut all the facts that compose evidence and become the grounds of\ninference are, according to the view taken here, necessarily subjects of\nexamination.\n\n'Cogito ergo sum--I think, therefore I am, argued Des Cartes. We\nlearn by this that consciousness of the operations of the mind is the\nstrongest evidence of our existence. It cannot be proved so forcibly by\nany other means; and although Des Cartes' language may appear to involve\na logical fallacy, yet the proof of our personal existence which we have\nfrom _thinking_, is the fullest and best we are acquainted with.'**\n\n     * J. 8. Mil: Logic, vol. l, p. 7.\n\n     ** Rev. Robert Amalie.\n\nThere is a numerous class of facts from which all men draw conclusions,\nwhich facts are not referable to the evidence of the senses. There are\nthe facts of testimony. Testimony is founded on laws almost as fixed\nand certain as those of nature. All our knowledge, scientific,\nliterary, historical--all except what arises from our experience and\nconsciousness--depends on it. In the administration of justice it is\nthe sole guardian of property and life. If a man of known integrity and\nveracity state a fact, without any possible motive of self-interest, and\nevidently subject to no delusion; and if others of like character, who\ncould have no understanding or collusion with him, state the same, men\nare nearly as certain of it as of any truth in mathematics. I believe\nin the existence of Rome and the facts of astronomy on this evidence,\nalthough I never saw the city or examined the stars through a telescope.\n\nThe conclusiveness of testimony is designated moral certainty. The value\nof testimony depends on three things. 1. On the nature of the subject.\nSome subjects are capable of more accurate observation than others. 2.\nOn the powers and character of the observer--his ability to understand\nor note that of which he testifies--and his honesty in common matters.\n3. On the number of our informers. Several persons are less likely to be\nimposed upon than one.\n\nTestimony or moral certainty is inferior to physical certainty. A\nphysical certainty bears uniformly the name of certainty, while a moral\ncertainty is characterised as a probability. Great, very great may\nbe the probability, still it is less in reliableness than a\nphysical certainty. The evidence of Cato or Aristides would be very\nconclusive--yet somewhat less certain than that which our own senses\nhave proved.\n\nThe conclusions from moral certainties are obtained like other\nconclusions, by induction. The induction from moral facts is like\nthe induction from physical facts, with this difference--that the\nconclusions from moral facts are probabilities, like the facts on which\nthey are founded. Whatever has physical certainty in its favour is\nconsidered demonstrable, and when sufficient probable evidence is\nadduced in favour of a proposition, it is considered to be fairly\nproved. Some persons, biased by the strictness of mathematical proof,\ninsist upon the same accuracy in moral investigations. I have elsewhere\npointed out the juvenility and infatuation of this error. Insist upon\ndemonstration where the nature of the questions admits it. Less should\nnot, in such case, suffice. Accept probability where probability is the\nsole evidence attainable. Never ask more than reason can grant. We must\nadmit gradations of validity. What we are conscious of, we _know_.\nAll we receive on testimony, we _believe_. Physical certainty is\n_knowledge_: moral certainty, _belief_. Hume remarks, in his 'Essay on\nProbabilities,' that 'Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative\nand probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all\nmen must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform\nour language more to common us, we ought to divide arguments into\n_demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities_. By proofs, meaning such\narguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.'*\n\n     * Hume's Essays, vol. 2, p.59.\n\nConjecture is probable truth. Some subjects only furnish a sufficient\nnumber of facts to make them probable in the lowest degree--not to\ndecide them as positively true. The propositions expressing results\npertaining to such subjects are called conjectures.\n\nA conjecture founded on no fact or upon too few to make it likely, is\ncalled a vagary.\n\nIt will be seen that probability is a thing of degree. A probability may\nvary in weight from a moral certainty, where it ranks next to a physical\ncertainty, down to a conjecture, and descend lower in likelihood till it\nis lost in conjecture.\n\nLord Kames remarks, in his preface to his 'Sketches'--'Most of\nthe subjects handled in the following sheets, admit but of probable\nreasoning: and, with respect to such reasoning, it is often difficult to\nsay, what degree of conviction they ought to produce. It is easy to form\nplausible arguments; but to form such as can stand the test of time,\nis not always easy. I could amuse the reader with numerous examples\nof conjectural arguments, which, fair at a distant view, vanish like a\ncloud on a near approach'. Did all authors so judiciously apprise their\nreaders of the probable logical value of their speculations, fewer would\nbe misled than now.\n\nTo numerous questions of undoubted interest, which have been agitated in\nall ages, only a moderate degree of certainty attaches--these are termed\nspeculative. Such subjects may afford but few facts and instances, and\nthe chances of conclusiveness may seem remote--yet ultimate results\nare not to be despaired of: the new comparison of conjectures and the\narrangement of facts daily throws new light on age-contested points.\nSystems of conduct should not be founded on conjectures in opposition to\nevident moral utility; but if speculation is kept 'within the sphere of\nspeculation, it may be prosecuted with safety and prospect of success.\n\nThere are problems in metaphysics as there are in mathematics, which may\nbe demonstrated to be insolvable. To describe the limit of human power\nwith respect to contested questions will yet result from speculative\ncontroversy. The capacities of our understanding will be one day well\nconsidered, the extent of our knowledge discovered, and the horizon\nfound which sets bounds between the enlightened and the dark part of\nthings--between what is and what is not comprehensible by us. But this\nwill only be when the _untried_ has been _universally_ attempted in all\ndirections. Bailey, I think, has defined truth as being that which is\nuniversally accepted after having been universally examined. Little of\nthis truth is yet extant. When every man shall be a thinker, when the\nautobiography of intellect shall be more freely furnished than it ever\nyet has been, unanimity of opinion not yet dreamed of will prevail.\nHarmony of opinion is the sign of intellectual conquest--the\nstandard-bearer of truth no advocacy is victorious while dissent\noccupies the field.\n\nWhat we _know_ to be true, is _knowledge_; what we have only reason\nto believe true, is _opinion_. All human information is made up of\nknowledge and opinion. The primary importance of knowledge is evident\nfrom the fact that knowledge is the umpire of all opinion. We believe\nin the existence of the ruins of Palmyra and Thebes, and in certain\ndiscoveries of algebraists and astronomers. It is our _opinion_ that\nthese things are true, although we may never have visited Palmyra\nor Thebes, nor made the calculations of the algebraist, nor the\nobservations of the astronomer. In these cases our belief is founded\non our _experience_ and knowledge of mankind. It is quite true that\ntravellers exaggerate, and scientific men are sometimes mistaken; but\nwe know that there is always _some_ truth at the bottom of what\nis communicated by well-meaning writers. More or less, every man's\n_experience_ assures him of this; and it is the cause of our reliance on\nthe records of history, and the reports of science. Therefore, since all\ninformation is made up of knowledge and opinion, plainly knowledge is\nthe one thing which comprises all intelligence.\n\n'Questions of fact,' observes Pascal, in his celebrated 'Provincial\nLetters,' 'are only to be determined by the senses. If what you assert\nbe true, prove it to be so; if it be not, you labour in _vain_ to induce\nbelief. All the authority in the world cannot enforce or alter belief as\nto facts; nothing can possibly have power to cause that not to be which\nactually _is_.'*\n\nA remarkable instance of the verification of what was assumed to be\nis related of Pascal by Goodrich. 'Pascal was a philosopher even in\nchildhood. At a very early age he was taught the ten commandments. For\nseveral days after, he was observed to be measuring the growth of a\nblade of grass. When asked the meaning of this, he replied, \"The fourth\ncommandment says, 'Six days shalt thou labour, but the seventh is the\nSabbath in which thou shalt do no work.' Now I wished to ascertain if\nnature obeyed this great law, and therefore measured the grass, to see\nif it grew as much on Sunday as on other days.\" '**\n\n'We are informed,' says Beattie, 'by Father Malebranche, that the senses\nwere at first as honest faculties as one could desire to be endued with,\ntill after they were debauched by original sin; an adventure from which\nthey contracted such an invincible propensity to cheating, that they\nare now continually lying in wait to deceive us. But there is in man,\nit seems, a certain clear-sighted, stout, old faculty, called _reason_,\nwhich, without being deceived by appearances, keeps an eye upon the\nrogues, and often proves too cunning for them.'***\n\n     * Letter xviii.\n\n     ** Fireside Education, p. 89.\n\n     *** Essay on Truth, p. 105.\n\nThough it is so abundantly obvious that the evidences of our senses,\ninternal and external, are, in effect, the sources of all certainty,\nyet we are not warranted in rejecting, as mere hypothesis, every theory\nwhich we cannot at once corroborate. When Euler remarked of his new\nlaw of arches, 'This will be found true, though contrary to all\nexperience'--when Gall exclaimed of his new philosophy of the sensorium,\n'This is true, though opposed to the philosophy of ages'--they expressed\ndemonstrable truths hidden from the multitude. They announced new\ngeneralisations to man. New truths are commonly found to be old unnoted\nexperiences, for the first time subjected to classification, and\npresented in a scientific form.\n\nTo me it seems almost in vain to urge men to notice facts who have\nnever noticed themselves. The truest standards of certainty arise\nfrom individuality of retrospection. An intelligent man is, himself to\nhimself, the measure of all things in the universe.\n\nIn appealing to the young on the aspiration after improvement, one\ncannot say 'Consult your aptitudes--follow your bias.' This Is the\nsole appeal-injunctive to which all natures can respond. But in this\nhalf-natured, half-trained, doubtfully-conditioned state of society,\nthough the generous would be incited to noble deeds, the sordid would\nlay their vulture claws on the world, and the unprincipled victimise\ntheir fellows. You have, therefore, to say, 'Man, do what thou listest,\nprovided it be compatible with the welfare of thy fellow men.' Men are\nnot well-natured, and we have thus to guard individuality, and qualify\nthe appeal, and so we miss the soil of great enterprise. Great is the\ndisadvantage. For the fulcrum which is to raise men is without their\nnatures--remote in the wide world.\n\nMan should begin with himself. He loves Truth--it is the first impulse\nof his nature. He loves Justice--the bandit on the throne, as well as\nthe bandit in the forest, respects justice in some form or other. Man\nloves Cheerfulness--it is the attribute of innocence and courage. He\nloves Fraternity--it knits society together in brotherhood. These are\nstandards. His codes of life and judgment arise from these aspirations.\nThat which accords with these principles is _reasonable_. Whatever\ndevelops these principles in conduct is _moral_. These sentiments are to\nbe confirmed by his own observations. His experience in connection with\nthese rules is the right with which he may examine religions, creeds,\nbooks, systems, opinions.\n\nThe right understanding of physical and moral facts greatly depends upon\nintellectual character--and there enters largely into the recondite and\nultimate inquiries of intelligent men another class of facts, called\nmental facts. There is no chance of identifying these without the power\nof self-analysis, which is one reason why metaphysic ability belongs to\nso few, and why questions involving metaphysical considerations are such\nprofound enigmas to the majority of the people. The illiterate in these\nthings are easily led or misled by words. They who will not bow before a\nthrone fall prostrate before a sound.\n\nThe first principles of things are few. The axioms from which men date\ntheir reasoning are chiefly personal. They are expressed in an infinite\nvariety of ways, occasioned by the various conceptions of those who\nconceive them, and by the different capacities to which they are adapted\nwhen offered for the instruction and guidance of others. But this\nmust not mislead us as to the number, and overwhelm us with a sense of\ncomplexity, where in fact simplicity reigns. Those who have the power\nof self-analysis make for themselves rules of conduct, and the best are\noriginated in this way--for when a man recasts his acquirements of sense\nand education, in order to see on what all rests, and what are essential\nstandards of action and judgment, he resolves all into few, and those\nthe clear and strong. Rob Roy's self-examination paper is presented\nto us in those lines which Sir Walter Scott, with grace and justice,\ncharacterised as the 'high-toned poetry of his gifted friend\nWordsworth.'\n\n     Say, then, that he was wise as brave,\n     As wise in thought as bold in deed;\n     For in the principles of things\n     He sought his morai creed.\n\n     Said generous Rob, 'What need of Books?\n     Burn all the statutes and their shelves!\n     They stir us up against our kind,\n     And worse, against ourselves.\n\n     We have a passion, make a law,\n     Too false to guide us or control;\n     And for the law itself we fight\n     In bitterness of soul.\n\n     And puzzled, blinded, then we lose\n     Distinctions that are plain and few;\n     These find I graven on my heart,\n     That tells me what to do.\n\nSir Walter Scott himself has enforced the same views:--'How much do I\nneed such a monitor,' said Waverley to Flora. 'A better one by far Mr.\nWaverley will always find in his own bosom, when he will give its still\nsmall voice leisure to be heard.\n\n     All that hath been majestical\n     In life or death, since time began,\n     Is native in the simple heart of all,--\n     The angel heart of man.--Lowell.\n\nTo awaken the senses and instruct them and direct them aright in the art\nof observation, is a great and essential undertaking. All scattered aids\nneed collecting together. De la Beche in 'Geology,' and Miss Martineau\nhave written books, entitled 'How to Observe.' This quality is the\ndistinction between the natural and artificial man--the natural man\nobserves what is in nature--the artificial notes what he finds in\nbooks--the one depends on himself--the other on an encyclopaedia.\nWe want contrast, in order to know as well as to explain. Foreigners\nobserve us better than we observe ourselves. The common escapes our\nattention. To know a fact fully we seek its opposite to compare it with.\n\nWere men reared with the powers of men without the genius of the child\nbeing impaired, the ability to observe would be more general and perfect\namong us. Children stop at everything to question its nature, at every\nword to ask its import. It was the aim of Pestalozzi to cultivate by his\nsystem of tuition this incessant questioning. But parents among the poor\nknow not the value of the habit, or knowing it have not time to gratify\nit, and thus this happiest aptitude of childhood is repressed.\n\nWith regard to the analysis of groups of facts, Mr. J. S. Mill\nremarks--'The observer is not he who merely sees the thing before his\neyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this\nwell is a rare talent. One person from inattention, or attending only in\nthe wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees; another sets down much\nmore than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines, or with what\nhe infers $ another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but\nbeing inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each\nvague and uncertain; another sees indeed the whole, but makes such an\nawkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass\nwhich require to be separated, and separating others which might more\nconveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same,\nsometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all.'*\n\n     * Logic, vol. 1, p. 438.\n\nIn the case of the Leigh Peerage there was a number of witnesses\nexamined in the House of Lords, as to the existence of a certain\nmonument in Stonely Church--'The first witness described the monument as\nbeing black; the second spoke of it as a kind of dove-colour; the third\nsaid it was black and white; the fourth said it was originally white,\nbut dirty, when he saw it; the fifth differing from the others, said it\nwas blue; the next witness described it as a light marble, but said it\nhad a dark appearance as if it had been bronzed, and the last witness\nspoke of it as feeing of a light grey colour. Then, as to the form of\nthe monument, the first witness said it was oblong; the next said it\nwas square at the top, and came down narrower to the bottom, and there\nrested on a single truss; the third witness described it as being\nsquare at the bottom, testing upon two trusses; and went up narrower and\nnarrower to a point at the top; the fourth witness said it was angular\nat the top; the next said it was square at the bottom, was brought to\na point in the middle, and was then curved into a sort of festoon; the\nsixth witness stated that it was square at the top and bottom, and had a\ncurve; and the last said it was square at the top and bottom. As to the\nlanguage of the inscriptions, the first witness stated that the names\nof _Thomas_ and _Christopher Leigh_ were in English; the next said the\ninscription was not in English; the third said there was a great deal in\nEnglish; the fourth witness said the whole, (with the exception of the\nname Christopher Lee), was in a language, which he did not understand;\nthe next witness stated that the inscription was all in English,\nexcept the words _Anno Domini_; and the last witness said it was not in\nEnglish.'*\n\n     * Times, May 10, 1828.\n\nAll these witnesses agree as to the fact in dispute, but their variances\nin testimony illustrate the common inattention of observation--and this\ncase farther admonishes us that if such differences may exist as to\na question of fact, where the senses are the same, little wonder that\ndifferences exist as to matters of opinion, where intellectual capacity\nand information are so various.\n\nWe know from experience that the sportsman sees a point which is hidden\nfrom the unpractised aimer--the painter sees traits of character of\nlight and shade in an object which the untaught limner never observes;\nthe musician distinguishes harmonies and discords that fall unnoted on\nthe uneducated ear.\n\nThus we learn that by cultivation we can increase natural susceptibility\nto observe.\n\nThe extent is surprising to which the unanalytic are in ignorance of the\nreal nature of phenomena. 'There is nothing which we appear to ourselves\nmore directly conscious of, than the distance of an object from us. Yet\nit has long been ascertained, that what is perceived by the eye, is at\nmost nothing more than a variously coloured surface; that when we fancy\nwe see distance, all we really see is certain variation of apparent\nsize, and more or less faintness of colour.'*\n\nIn preparing to support an argument on any question, we must first\ndetermine the sources whence the facts are to be collected. Instance:\nThe objects of municipal laws are rights and crimes.\n\nThe evidence of rights are:--  1. Public consent.\n  2. Testimony.\n  3. Records.\n\nThe evidence of crimes are:--  1. Confession.\n  2. Previous malice.\n  3. Testimony.\n\nThis outline of the investigation prosecuted, the inquirer next consults\nthe authors who treat of the rules which are applied for determining\nthe facts of public consent, testimony, records, confessions: he is\nthen able to support his own argument in a valid manner, or prepared to\nexamine the facts offered by an opponent in support of an opposite view.\n\nThe opinion may be hazarded that it is not so much from want of capacity\nto observe that error arises, as from the want of conviction that we\nshould observe well before we attempt to infer. Nature is inventive, and\ndesire, once awakened, will, without formal rules, find out a thousand\nmodes of gratification. The foundation for a soldier logic than now\nprevails will be laid when the people are impressed with the great\nimportance of looking well to facts as the data of all inferential\ntruth.\n\nThere is a noted aphorism of Cendillac, to the effect that the one\nsufficient rule for discovering the nature and properties of objects is\nto name them properly, as if, observes Mr. J. S. Mill, 'the reverse was\nnot the truth, that it is impossible to name them properly except\nin proportion as we are already acquainted with their nature and\nproperties.' Need it be added that this knowledge is only to be had by\npatient observation?\n\n     * Mill Logic vol. l, p.7.\n\nTo assist this habit, Dr. Watts recommends the thinker to ascertain if\na given idea is clear and distinct, obscure and confused, learned or\nvulgar, perfect or imperfect, adequate or inadequate--true or false.\n'View a subject, says he, as through a telescope, so as to command a\nclear view of it; examine its whole bearings as you look over a globe;\nconsider it in its several properties--anatomise it as with a scalpel.\nTake cognizance of its various aspects as though inspecting it through\na prismatic glass. Whenever we contemplate a single object in nature\nis obvious it must have duration, size, weight, form, colour, such\nqualities being essentially present in all adequate conceptions of\nphysical phenomena.'\n\nIt was objected to the 'Cricket' of Mr. Dickens, that his delineation of\nBertha was wanting in truthfulness. The teachers of the blind who knew\ntheir nature could detect the departure from the reality of their habits\nin the sketch of Bertha. The study of the blind was necessary to insure\nsuccess. We may not be able in any one book to give rules for the study\nof all subjects, but we may indicate that we ought not to speak of what\nwe do not know, and that if we mean to introduce certain facts into our\nspeech or writing, we should consult the records and experienee of those\npersons who are known to have written upon the subject, and follow the\nbest directions they give, and we shall generally attain accuracy.\n\nMr. Combe observes, in his introduction to his notes on the United\nStates of North America, p. xi.--'I was told that a _certain person_\nboasts of having given Miss Martineau erroneous information for the\npurpose of leading her into mistakes; and another in Philadelphia\nassures his friends that he \"crammed\" Capt. Marryatt with old \"Joe\nMillers,\" which the Capt. embodied into his books as facts illustrative\nof American manners. This seems to be a case in which some uncertainty\nmust ever exist as to the value of the facts collected by travellers.\nThey cannot observe all, or test half that they do observe. They must\nrely on testimony. But they might do this--They might tell us precisely\nthe kind of authority they followed, and then the reader could form some\nopinion of the value of what was communicated. Had Miss Martineau and\nCaptain Marryatt given the name and addresses of their informants,\nthe latter would now be punished by being infamously known throughout\nEurope; and all future travellers warned from them--and all future\ninformants warned by their example. Where informants cannot be mentioned\nby name and address, the chances are, they cannot be trusted. When first\nconnected with public proceedings, I found myself made the depository of\ninnumerable bits of scandal, and ominous reports of public characters.\nTo all who told me anything, if I attached importance to it, I made it\na rule to ask--'May I mention it to the party with your name?' 'O, no,\nI would rather not,' was the common reply. To all written communications\nanswer--'Please add your name and address--and may I publish them if\noccasion requires?' 'O, no, don't,' would be the general injunction.\nThus I found that huge reports, inflated as balloons, shrunk like them\nwhen pricked by the pin of a question--'Will you answer for it?' Thus\nI saved myself from being imposed upon by, or being the retailer of,\nreports for which the originator or relator would not or could not\nvouch.\n\n'Upwards of twenty years ago,' says George Combe, 'I accompanied a\nmember of the bar of Paris, a philosopher and a man of letters, on a\nvisit to the Highlands of Scotland. At Callendar a boy of twelve or\nthirteen years of age attended as a guide to some interesting spot,\nand in external appearance he seemed to be in every respect one of the\ncommon lads of the village. My Parisian friend entered into conversation\nwith him; asked him if he had been at school, and soon discovered that\nto a tolerable acquaintance with the Greek and Latin languages, he added\na pretty extensive-knowledge of arithmetic and geography, and was then\nengaged in the study of mathematics. My friend conceived that the boy\nwas an average specimen of the peasantry of the country; and greatly\nadmired the educational attainments of the Scotch people, which he had\npreviously heard highly extolled. But,' adds Mr. Combe, 'the boy was the\nnatural son of an English officer, who had resided in the neighbourhood,\nand who, while he ordered him to be reared in the hardy habits of\nthe Scottish Highlanders, had provided ample funds for his mental\neducation.'*\n\n     * Intro, to notes on United States of North America, p. 10.,\n     vol. 1\n\nIt is difficult to believe in this Frenchman being a 'philosopher,\nmaking, as he did, a national induction from a single instance. Had he\npreviously inquired, as he ought to have done, the particulars of that\nlad's life and rearing, before coming to so large a conclusion, he would\nat once have discovered the error he was falling into.\n\nIn the Registrar General's Report of 1840, the mean of married\npersons unable to write is presented. The conclusion is based upon the\nstatistics of nine counties. But when it was found that only three\nper cent, of the persons marriageable, did marry, the datum was found\ninsufficient to afford sure results. This fact; is given by Mr. Combe\nin the same book. Then how many boys ought our 'philosopher' to have\nquestioned before making his vast inference?\n\nAnother instance of the value of a question I extract from the\nsame work. Mr. Combe says:--'A few years ago, when travelling in\nSomersetshire, I saw four horses, attended by two men, drawing a light\nplough in a light soil. \"What a waste of labour is here,\" said I to an\nintelligent farmer; \"in Scotland, two horses and one man will accomplish\nthis work.\" \"We rear and train young horses for the London market,\"\nsaid he; \"two of the four which you see are serving an apprenticeship to\nlabour.\"' Had Mr. Combe asked a few questions as to the correctness\nof his assumed inference, he would have been saved from his erroneous\nconclusion. We should be wary of unquestioned data.\n\nWhen Murray's Grammar was first placed in my hands, I found in it\ncertain references to the Canons of Language in the larger edition.\nI questioned my teacher as to what it meant. 'It is a trick of the\nprinter,' he answered, 'to induce you to buy the larger volume.' I do\nnot believe this now. I believe that it was a necessary reference. An\nauthor who has written upon a given subject, naturally finds his own\nideas coincident illustrations of his views, and honestly refers to\nthem. In this book I have made a few references to previous works of\nmine, and it has struck me that nine ont of ten of the readers will set\nthis down to artifice or egotism. Yet it is neither. I have referred\nonly to avoid the full quotation of some necessary illustration of the\nargument. Yet few will penetrate to the fact, and most will be apt to\ninfer a trick from appearances.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. SCIENCE\n\n     Whatever we know must be in the number of the primitive\n     data, or of the conclusions which can be drawn therefrom.--\n     J.S. Mill\n\nTo have reached, in the study of observed phenomena, the point of\nperception indicated in this motto, and to feel the full force of the\nremark, is to have imbibed the spirit of science---whose traits are dear\ndistinctions, accurate classification, and strict reference to primitive\ndata. The bases of all science are methodical facts. The first step to\nthe perfection and enlargement of a science is the resolution of its\npropositions into axioms, and into propositions which are to be\nproved. Dr. Reid observes--'This has been done in mathematics from the\nbeginning, and has tended greatly to the emolument of that science.\nIt has lately been done in natural philosophy, and by this means that\nscience has advanced more in 160 years than it had done before in 2,000.\nEvery science is in an unformed state until its first principles are\nascertained; after this it advances regularly, and secures the ground it\nhas gained.'\n\nClassification is one of the first steps to Science. The maxim in\ngovernment, divide and conquer, retains, when applied to science, all\nits wisdom without its machiavelialism. The young grammarian reduces the\nmass of words, that so threaten to confound his powers, to a few natural\nclasses, and he conquers them separately with ease.\n\n'The single power by which we discover resemblance or relation in\ngeneral, is a sufficient aid to us in the perplexity and confusion of\nour first attempts at arrangement. It begins by converting thousands,\nand more than thousands, into one; and, reducing in the same manner\nthe numbers tiros formed, it arrives at last at the few distinctive\ncharacters of those great comprehensive tribes, on which it ceases to\noperate, 'because there is nothing left to oppress the memory or the\nunderstanding.'*\n\n     * Brown's Moral Philosophy, Lect, xvi.\n\nMerell has spoken more comprehensively on this subject--'That human\nknowledge dees not consist in the bare collection and enumeration of\nfacts; this alone would be of little service were we net to attempt the\nclassification of them, and to educe from such classification general\nlaws and principles. The knowledge, which consists in individual truths,\ncould never be either extensive ear definite--for the multiplicity of\nobjects which then must crowd in upon the mind only tends to confound\nand perplex it, while the memory, overburdened with particulars, is not\nable to retain a hundredth part of the materials which are collected. To\nprevent this, the power el generalisation comes to our aid, by which the\nindividual facts are so classified under their proper conceptions, that\nthey may at the same time be more easily retained, and their several\nrelations to all other branches of knowledge accurately defined. The\ncolligation and classification of facts, then, we may regard as the two\nfirst steps, which are to be taken in the attainment of truth.'*\n\nAristotle, says Morell, classified the _matter_, Kant the _forms_.\nAristotle was the first man who undertook the gigantic task of reducing\nthe multiplicity of all the objects of human knowledge to a few general\nheads---1. Substance. 2. Quality. 3. Quantity. 4. Relation. Action.\n6. Passion. 7. Place. 8. Time. 9. Posture. 10. Habit. Aristotle's\nphilosophy was _objective_, Kant's _subjective_. Kant's categories were\ntwelve. 1. Unity. 2. Plurality. 3. Totality. 4. Affirmation. Negation.\n6. limitation. 7. Substance. 8. Casualty. 9. Reciprocity. 10.\nPossibility. 11. Actuality. 12. Necessity.\n\n'It is a fundamental principle in logic, that the power of framing\nclasses is unlimited as long as there is any (even the smallest)\ndifference to found a distinction upon.**\n\nWhat Geoffroy Saint Hilaire has said of natural history is applicable\nto all science:--'The first problem to be solved by him who wishes to\npenetrate deeply into this; study, consists evidently in the formation\nof clear and precise distinctions between the various brings. This is\nthe most elementary problem, in so-far as it precedes all the\nothers; but it is in reality, in most cases, complicated and full of\ndifficulties. Its accurate solution requires--first, _Observation_,\nwhich makes known the facts; next, _Description_, which fixes them\npermanently; then _Characterisation_, which selects and displays\nprominently the most important of them--and lastly, _Classification_,\nwhich arranges them in systematic order.'***\n\nOf the value of classification, Lamartine has given a fine\nillustration:----'Montesquieu had sounded the institutions and analysed\nthe laws of all people. By _classing_ governments he had compared them,\nby comparing them he passed judgment on them; and this judgment brought\nout, in its bold relief and contrast, on every page, right and force,\nprivilege and equality, tyranny and liberty.'****\n\n     * Morell's Hist. of Speculative Phil., p. 34, vol. 1.\n\n     ** Mill, p. 165, vol. 1.\n\n     *** T. W. Thornton: Reasoner No. 72, p. 664.\n\n     **** Lamartine's Hist. Girondists, pp. 14-15, vol. 1.\n\nFamiliarity with the characteristics of science imparts considerable\npower for the detection of fallacy. A logician is imperfect without\nscientific tastes and habits. The man of science has all his knowledge\nsystematised and arranged. What other people have in confusion, he\nhas in order. The elements of knowledge are, more or less, as has been\nobserved, known to all men--but in their perfect, communicable, and\nusable state, they are-known only to the educated and scientific man.\nWhat training is to the soldier, science is to the thinker. It enables\nhim to control all his resources and employ his natural powers to the\nbest advantage. It is this which constitutes the superiority of the\neducated over the ignorant. Astronomy, navigation, architecture,\ngeometry, political economy, morals, all rest, or should rest, and do\nrest, if they have-attained to the perfection of science, on\nprimary facts and first principles. Every step can be measured by an\naxiom--every result can be traced to a first principle.* To detect\nerror, then, in any province of investigation, or any domain of\nargument, the logician first looks to the primary principles on which it\nis based, and thus tests the legitimacy of its conclusions.\n\nAs respects those who deal in things professedly above reason, It\nwas well said by an anonymous writer of the old school of sturdy\nthinkers,--'Of such men as these I usually demand, whether their own\nassent to things they would have us believe, be grounded upon some\n_rational argument_. If they say 'tis not, they are fools to believe\nit themselves; and I should add to the number of fools, if, after this\nacknowledgment, I should believe them: but if they say it is, I desire\nthem to produce their argument; for since 'tis framed by a human\nunderstanding, the force of it may also be comprehended and judged of\nby a human understanding: and tis to no purpose to say that the subject\nsurpasses human reason: for if it do so indeed, it will surpass _theirs_\nas well as _mine_, and so leave us both upon even terms. And let the\nthing assented to be what it will, the assent itself must be founded\nupon a _sufficient reason_, and consequently upon one that is\n_intelligible_ to the human intellect that is wrought on by it.'**\n\n     * See Beauties and Uses of Euclid, chap. vi., Logic of\n     Euclid.\n\n     **  A Discourse on Things above Reason, 1681.\n\n\"What is it?--\" \"'Tis impossible the same thing should be, and not be\nat the same time,\" are maxims of such universal usefulness, that without\nthem we could neither _judge, discourse,_ nor _act_. These principles\nmay not always make their appearance in formal propositions, but still\nthey guide all our thoughts in the same manner as when a musician plays\na careless voluntary upon a harpsichord--he is guided by rules of music\nhe long since became familiar with, though now scarcely sensible of\nthem.\n\n'A butcher loses his knife, and looks all about for it, and remarks as\nthe motive of his search, \"I am sure it must be somewhere or other.\"\nBy which rude saying it is evident he is guided by the axiom last\nmentioned. Had he not the knowledge of this axiom beforehand, did he\nthink it possible that his knife could be _no where_ or in _no place_\nhe would never take pains to look for it. We may observe many such\naxioms as this guiding the actions of the vulgar, and it is no unworthy\nspeculation to observe their behaviour and words, which proceed from\nuncorrupted nature, and retrieve the axioms from which their conduct\nproceeds.'*\n\n     *  Solid Philosophy, asserted against the Fancies of the\n     Idealists. (Locke's Understanding is the work controverted.)\n     By J. S..  London, 1679.\n\nThe outlines of the science of morality are thus comprehensively\nsketched by Sir James Mackintosh: the origin, value, and application of\nfirst principles are indicated with his usual felicity. 'The usages and\nlaws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers,\nthe sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observations of\ncommon life, are in truth, the materials out of which the science of\nmorality to formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable\nwith a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and\nexperienee--the sole foundation of all true philosophy.\n\nThe natural order undoubtedly dictates that we should first search for\nthe _original principles_ of the science in human nature; then apply them\nto the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and lastly employ them\nfor the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise\nwith respect to the intercourse of nations.'\n\nTo search for ultimate principles is to discover at a glance the whole\nbearings of a great question. Through what clouds of politics had the\nhistorian of Rome penetrated when he announced that the principles of a\nfree constitution are irrecoverably lost when the legislative power is\nnominated by the executive.\n\nThis habit--it cannot be too often insisted on aids not only the\nacquisition of knowledge, but also its _retention_. Around these first\nprinciples, as around a standard, the thoughts naturally associate.\nTouch but a remote chord of any question, and it will vibrate to\nthe central principle to which it has once been well attached. Every\nrelative impression owns a kindred connection, and the moment one is\nattacked, it, like a faithful sentinel, arouses a whole troop, which,\nmarshalled and disciplined, bear down and challenge the enemy.'*\n\n     * Beauties and Uses of Euclid, pp. 47-9.\n\nWhat Rogers has so exquisitely sung of the associations of childhood, is\ntrue of the associations of science.\n\n     Childhood's loved group revisit! every scene,--\n     The tangled wood-walk and the tufted green.\n     The school's lone porch, with reverend mosses grey,\n     Just tells the pensive pilgrim where it lay.\n\n     Mute is the bell which rang at peep of dawn,\n     Quick'ning my truant steps across the lawn:\n     Unheard the shout that rent the noontide air,\n     When the slow dial gave a pause to care.\n\n     Up springs at every step, to claim a tear,\n     Some little friendship formed and cherished here?\n     And not the lightest leaf but trembling teems\n     With golden visions and romantic dreams.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII. PROPOSITIONS\n\n     All truth and all error lie in Propositions.--J. S. Mill.\n\nIn accordance with that experience which directs to the profoundest\nbooks for the simplest statements, we turn to Mill's Logic for the\nphilosophy of propositions. The answer to every question which it is\npossible to frame is contained in a proposition or assertion. Whatever\ncan be an object of belief or even of disbelief, must, when put into\nwords, assume the form of a proposition * * What we call a truth is\nsimply a true proposition; and errors are false propositions. To know\nthe import of all possible propositions would be to know all questions\nwhich can be raised, all matters which are susceptible of being either\nbelieved or disbelieved. * * Since then the objects of all belief and\nall inquiry express themselves in propositions, a sufficient scrutiny\nof propositions and of their varieties will apprise us what questions\nmankind have asked themselves, and what it the nature of the answers to\nthose questions they have actually thought they had grounds to believe.\n\n'Now the first glance at a proposition shows that it is formed by\nputting together two names. A proposition, according to the common\nsimple definition, which is sufficient for our purpose, is, _discourse\nin which something is affirmed or denied of something_. Thus, in the\nproposition, gold is yellow, the quality _yellow_ is affirmed of the\nsubstance _gold_. In the proposition, Franklin was not born in England,\nthe fact expressed by the words _born in England_ is denied of the man\nFranklin.\n\n'Every proposition consists of three parts: the subject, the predicate,\nand the copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is\naffirmed or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or\nthing which something is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign\ndenoting that there is an affirmation or denial; and thereby enabling\nthe hearer or reader to distinguish a proposition from any other kind of\ndiscourse. Thus, in the proposition, the earth is round, the predicate\nis the word _round_, which denotes the quality affirmed, or (as the\nphrase is) predicated: _the earth_ words denoting the object which that\nquality is affirmed of, compose the subject; the word it, which serves\nas the connecting mark between the subject and predicate, to show that\none of them is affirmed of the other, is called the copula.'\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII. DEFINITIONS\n\n     No difficulty is unsurmountable, if words be allowed to pass\n     without meaning.--Lord Kames.\n\nAs every proposition consists of two names, and as every proposition\naffirms or denies one of these names of the other, the value of\ndefinition, which fixes the import of names, is apparent.\n\n'A _name_ is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may\nraise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and\nwhich being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought\nthe speaker had before in his mind [Hobbes]. This simple definition of\na name, as a word (or set of words) serving the double purpose of a mark\nto recall to ourselves the likeness of a former thought, and a sign to\nmake it known to others, appears unexceptionable.'*\n\nDefinition originates in accurate and comprehensive observation. 'There\ncannot be,' says Mill, 'agreement about the definition of a thing, until\nthere is agreement about the thing itself. _To define a thing is to\nselect from among the whole of its properties those which shall\nbe understood to be designated and declared by its name_; and the\nproperties must be very well known to us before we can be competent to\ndetermine which of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose.'**\n\n'The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is, a proposition\ndeclaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, either the meaning which\nit bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or writer, for\nthe particular purposes of his discourse, intends to annex to it.'***\n\n     * J. Stuart Mill: System of Logic, 2nd ed., chap. 11, sec.\n     I.  p. 27.\n\n     ** Introduction to Logic, p. 1.\n\n     *** Mill's Logic, p. 183, vol. 1.\n\nBut with most persons the object of a definition is merely to guide them\nto the correct use of a term as a protection against applying it in a\nmanner inconsistent with custom and convention. Anything, therefore, is\nto them a sufficient definition of a term which will serve as a correct\nindex to what the term denotes; although not embracing the whole, and\nsometimes perhaps not even any part of what it connotes.\n\nDefinitions are sometimes explained as being of two kinds--of things and\nwords.\n\nThe definition of _words_ is the explanation of the sense in which they\nare used.\n\nThe definition of _things_ is an explanation of the specific properties\nby which they differ from all other things.\n\nTo define a thing, says Dr. Watts, we must ascertain with what it\nagrees, then note the most remarkable attribute of difference, and join\nthe two together.\n\nProbity--the disposition to acknowledge the rights of mankind.\n\nJustice--the disposition to maintain the rights of mankind.\n\nBenevolence--the disposition to improve the rights of mankind.\n\nDeceit--the concealed violation of the rights of mankind.\n\nInjustice--the open violation of the rights of mankind.\n\nMalevolence--hatred of the rights of mankind.\n\nIn defining a word we seek some class to which to refer it, that we may\nidentify it, and fix attention upon that peculiarity by which we\ncan distinguish it from all other things. 'Probity and 'justice' are\nreferred to 'disposition,' with reference to the 'rights of mankind' as\ntheir sphere of existence: and _acknowledgment, and maintenance_, are\nmentioned as the distinguishing features.\n\nDistinctions must not be made without differences. The definition should\nbe plainer than the thing defined. Aristotle's definition of motion is\nconsidered defective in this respect:--'Motion--an act of a being in\npower, so far forth as it is in power.' Tautological definitions cause\nmore to be supposed than is true--the too terse explanation leaves some\nnecessary thing unmentioned. A perfect definition requires the union of\nthe concise, the clear, and the adequate. Some persons are so\nunskilful in the analysis of terms as to occasion the advice _Nil\nexplicare_--never explain yourself if you wish to be understood.\n\nDouble meanings should be avoided. The writer may himself alternate in\ntheir use, and the reader may take the word in the unintended meaning.\nAll men have not the strong sense of Johnson. When Caleb Whiteford\ninquired seriously of the Doctor, whether he really considered that a\nman ought to be transported, like Barrington, the pickpocket, for being\nguilty of a double meaning. 'Sir,' said Johnson, 'if a man means well,\nthe more he means the better'--which, whether real or fictitious, is one\nof the happiest answers that ever crushed a quibble.*\n\n     * Hood's Own.\n\nI have frequently put the question--What is consciousness? to persons\nwho have been conscious for twenty or thirty years, but who were yet\nunable to reply. Had any one deprived these persons of consciousness, a\njudge would have hanged him for the offence; yet, could they themselves\nhave been interrogated as to what harm they had suffered, they could\nnot have told what they had lost. And upon the principle, that he not\nknowing what he has lost, is no loser, these persons, though murdered,\nhad suffered no harm.\n\nThe various definitions of the same subject which prevail, originate in\nthe caprice, or partial, or profound knowledge the definer may have of\nhis subject. It seems to be admitted by logicians, that an author has a\nright to give whatever provisional definition he pleases of his terms.\nBut having once given them, perspicuity requires that he should adhere\nto them. Any new sense in which a term is employed should be specially\ndefined. In discoursing on an ordinary subject, as the right of public\nassembly,--such words as perception, conception, apprehension, might be\nused reciprocally, but in a dissertation on metaphysics each requires\nrestriction in use and precision in purport.\n\nOften genius strikes out new relations of words. In recent political\ndebates, Mr. Cobden resorted with new force and point to a charge of\nrashness against ministers: he showed that rashness consisted more\nfrequently in inaction than action. He is rash who stands surrounded\nby the elements of danger without taking; any precaution against the\ncontingencies of peril; he is rash who does not take advantage of the\ncalm, to repair his shattered rigging; he is rash who looks not out for\na proper supply of water until the conflagration is raging around\nhim; and more rash than all is he who exercises no provident care for\nsupplying a nation with food, but waits for the pressure of famine and\nthe perils of starvation.\n\nAt the last soiree of the Leeds Mechanics' Institution, Mr. Dickens\nreferred to ignorance, commonly considered as a passive negation, and\nplaced it in the light of a power. 'Look where we will, do we not find\nignorance powerful for every kind of wrong and evil? Powerful to take\nits enemies to its heart and strike its best friends down--powerful\nto fill the prisons, the hospitals, and the graves--powerful for blind\nviolence, prejudice, and error in all their destructive shapes.'\n\nThe variations which not only common but technical terms undergo, is\na considerable source of perplexity in reasoning. Mr. Mill cites the\ninstance of the term felony. No lawyer will undertake to tell what a\nfelony is otherwise than by enumerating the various kinds of offences\nwhich are so called. Originally, felony denoted all offences, the\npenalty of which included forfeiture of goods; but, subsequent Acts\nof Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without\nenjoining that penalty, and have taken away the penalty from others\nwhich continue still to be called felonies, insomuch that the acts\nso called have now no property whatever in common, save that of being\nunlawful and punishable. This inattention to precision in terms has\narisen not among the vulgar, but among educated English lawyers.\n\n'Language,' says Mr. Mill, borrowing a political simile from Sir James\nMackintosh, '\"is not made, but grows.\" A name not unfrequently passes\nby successive links of resemblance from one object to another, until it\nbecomes applied to things having nothing in common with the first things\nto which the name was given; which, however, do not, for that reason,\ndrop the name; so that it at last denotes a confused huddle of objects,\nhaving nothing whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not even a\nvague and general resemblance. When a name has fallen into this state,\nin which by predicating it of any object we assert literally nothing\nabout the object, it has become unfit for the purposes either of thought\nor of the communication of thought; and can only be made serviceable by\nstripping it of some part of its multifarious denotation, and confining\nit to objects possessed of some attributes in common, which it may be\nmade to connote. Such are the inconveniences of a language which \"is not\nmade, but grows.\" like a road which is not made, but has made itself, it\nrequires continual mending in order to be passable.'*\n\n     * Logic, p. 207.\n\nIt is well observed, that the spontaneous growth of language is of\nthe utmost importance to the thinker. There seems to be so palpable a\nsubstratum of right sense, in the rude classifications of the multitude,\nthat the logician has little else to do, in many cases, than to retouch\nthem and give them precision. Guizot observes, there is frequently more\ntruth in common acceptations of general terms than in the more precise\ndefinitions of science. Common sense gives to words their ordinary\nsignification. The leading terms of philosophy are clothed in\ninnumerable shades of meaning acquired in their transitional use, and\nimmense is the knowledge of _thing:_ requisite to enable a man to affirm\nthat any given argument turns wholly on _words_. The study of terms,\nfor which logicians have provided multiplied means, is one of the most\ninteresting and profitable upon which men can enter. If it be worth\nwhile to speak at all, it is worth while to know certainly what we speak\nabout.\n\nPhilanthropic genius has pointed out a perversion of power, arising\nthrough definitional incapacity, which makes it a moral duty to study\nanalysis of terms, and exactitude of expression.\n\n'All battle,' says Carlyle, 'is _misunderstanding_--did the parties know\none another, the battle would cease. No man at bottom means injustice;\nhe contends for some distorted image of right. _Clear_, undeniable\nright--_clear_, undeniable might--either of these, once ascertained,\nputs an end to battle. Battle is a confused experiment to ascertain\nthese.'\n\nOf the power of names to impose on the multitude, history furnishes too\nmany examples. Strength to forefend us against they delusion ability to\nsee that the meaning governs the term, and not the term the meaning--are\nspecies of intellectual self-defence.\n\n'Augustus,' says Gibbon, 'was sensible that mankind is governed by\nnames; nor was he deceived in his expectation that the senate and people\nwould submit to slavery provided that they were respectably assured that\nthey still enjoyed their ancient freedom.'\n\n'Never,' adjures W. J. Fox, 'be deceived by words. Always try to\npenetrate to realities. Have your wits sharpened, your senses exercised\nto discern good and evil. Be not imposed upon by pompous manners. Many a\nsolemnly-uttered sentence is often a sheer inanity, which will not\nbear the scrutiny of an observant intellect. Be not frightened by\ndenunciations; by being told that you are not a good subject or a good\nChristian, if you do not believe, or say that you believe this or\nthat. Be not led astray by iteration--mistake not the familiar for the\nintelligible. Ascertain what words are meant to convey, and what they\nactually do convey. Go to the substance and soul of whatever is\npropounded. Be on your guard against bold assumptions, nor let them bear\nyou away against the dictates of your own understanding.\n\nLook at phrases as counters, or paper money, that may pass for much or\nlittle according to circumstances. Endeavour to arrive at truth, and\nmake that your treasure. Be ever wide awake to see through any veil\nof sophistry and cant; nor by the agency of words be made the dupe of\ncritic or lawyer, of priest of politician.'*\n\n     * Lectures to the Working Classes, p. 70, vol. 2.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX. SYLLOGISMS\n\nPropositions being assertions--as soon as sufficient reasons are\nadduced to make the proposition credible, it becomes a truth probable or\ncertain, as the case may be.\n\nReasoning is a simple business. To reason is to state facts in support\nof a proposition. A conclusive fact so advanced is called a reason. All\nthe reasons offered in proof of a proposition are called premises. The\nPythagorean, who lays down the proposition that fruits and grain are the\nproper food of man, and cites facts to prove his assertion--reasons. A\nproposition and its reasons are called an argument.\n\nReason is the faculty of perceiving coherences. Effective reasoning is\nstating them so that others cannot but see them too. 'Reasoning on the\nabstrusest questions is nothing more than arriving at a remote truth by\ndiscovering its coherence with the preceding facts in the same chain.'*\n\n     * Uses and Beauties of Euclid, p. 52.\n\nA syllogism is a peculiar _form_ of expression, in which every argument\nmay be stated. It consists of three propositions.\n\n1. Whoever have their heads cut off ought to be allowed to ask the\nreason why.\n\n2. Women have their heads cut off.\n\n3. Therefore women ought to be allowed to ask (politically) the reason\nwhy.\n\nThis is an argument of Mad. de Stael, in allusion to the beheading of\nwomen in France, without allowing them any voice in making the laws\nwhich determine the offences for which they suffered.\n\nA syllogism is constructed upon the principle (known as the Dictum of\nAristotle) that whatever is affirmed or denied universally of a whole\nclass of things, may be affirmed or denied of anything comprehended in\nthat class. Thus the first proposition introduces the class of persons\nwho have their heads cut off. Of this class it is affirmed that they\nought to be allowed to ask the reason why. But women are included in the\nclass of persons who have their heads cut off, and consequently that\nmay be affirmed of them which is affirmed of the whole class--that they\nshould be allowed to ask the reason why.\n\n'To prove an affirmative,' says Mr. Mill, 'the argument must admit of\nbeing stated in this form:--\n\nAll animals are mortal;\n\n  All men        |\n  Some men       }    are animals;\n  Socrates       |\n\n  therefore\n\n  All men        |\n  Some men       }    are mortal.\n  Socrates       |\n\n'To prove a negative, the argument must be capable of being expressed in\nthis form:--\n\n'No one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious;\n\n  All negroes        |\n  Some negroes       }   are capable of self-control;\n  Mr. A.'s negro     |\n\n  therefore\n\n  No negroes are           |\n  Some negroes are not     }   necessarily vicious.\n  Mr. A.'s negro is not    |\n\n'Although all ratiocination admits of being thrown into one or the other\nof these forms, and sometimes gains considerably by the transformation,\nboth in clearness and in the obviousness of its consequence; there are,\nno doubt, cases in which the argument falls more naturally into one\nof the other three figures, and in which its conclusiveness is more\napparent at the first glance in those figures, than when reduced into\nthe first. Thus, if the proposition were that pagans may be virtuous,\nand the evidence to prove it were the example of Aristides; a syllogism\nin the third figure,\n\n  Aristides was virtuous,\n  Aristides was a pagan,\n\ntherefore\n\n  Some pagan was virtuous,\n\nWould be a more natural mode of stating the argument, and would carry\nconviction more instantly home, than the same ratiocination strained\ninto the first figure, thus--\n\n Aristides was virtuous,\n Some pagan was Aristides,\n\ntherefore\n\n  Some pagan was virtuous.'\n\nThe best thing that can be said in favour of the syllogism, as an\ninstrument of reasoning, is that it is a regular form to which every\nvalid argument can be reduced; and may be accompanied by a rule, showing\nthe validity of every argument in that form, and consequently the\nunsoundness of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to it. This\nwould be high praise if every 'valid argument' was a trusty one. But\nunfortunately 'the question respecting the validity of an argument is\nnot whether the conclusion be _true_, but whether it _follows_ from the\npremises adduced.'* Even this small advantage is purchased at a greater\nexpense of tedium and trouble than the bulk of mankind are willing to\npay, or able to pay if they were willing.\n\n     * Logic, vol. 1, pp. 232-3.\n\nThere is some reason to believe that the syllogistic form, as a _test_\nof valid arguments, may be entirely dispensed with, if we can secure\naccuracy of data, and intelligibility in terms.\n\nIt is not contended now that we discover new truths by the syllogism.\nThe syllogism is allowed to be only a form of _stating_ a truth.\nExample:--\n\n  No predacious animals are ruminant,\n  The lion is predacious,\n\ntherefore\n\n  The lion is not ruminant.\n\n     * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out. chap. 1, sec. 3.\n\n\nOf course, if we know that no animal that lives by prey chews the cud,\nand know, also, that the lion lives by prey, we know that the lion\ndoes not chew the cud. This conclusion, as Lord Kames contends, and Dr.\nWhately admits, is not a truth _inferred_ from the fundamental premises,\nbut _included_ in it. Smart, whom Mr. J. S. Mill calls acute and often\nprofound, remarks--'Every one, as to the _mere_ act of reasoning,\n_reasons rightly_: we may reason from wrong premises, or mistake right\nones; we may be unable to infer from proper ones; but from such premises\nas we do reason from, we reason _correctly_: for all premises contain\ntheir conclusion; and in knowing the premises, we therefore know the\nconclusion. The art wanted is one that will enable us to use\nlanguage perspicuously in expressing our premises:' and he might\nhave added--_direct us in selecting proper materials of which to make\npremises_.\n\nThe strength and weakness of the syllogism as an instrument of reasoning\nwill now be understood. Whately remarks, that 'since all reasoning may\nbe resolved into syllogisms, and since in a syllogism the premises do\nvirtually assert the conclusion, it follows at once that no new truth can\nbe elicited by any process of reasoning.'* We therefore no longer look to\nthe syllogism to discover truth, its value is in stating it. In this\nsense it is worthy of all attention. It is the form of nature.\n\n     * Logic, p. 223.\n\nOf such a syllogism as the one quoted--\n\n  No predacious animals are ruminant,\n  The lion is predacious,\n\ntherefore\n\n  The lion is not ruminant.\n\nIt has been insisted by some logicians that the genius required for its\nconstruction was _invention_. Having made a general proposition like\nthe first, we then have to invent or find out a middle term as the\nsecond--but if we bear in mind that the general affirmation of the first\nproposition relates to a class of (predacious animals in this case)\nobjects which include the middle term, the necessity of invention is\nconsequently dispensed with. We need only look well to what we have\nthere. Simplicity will be promoted by returning to our previous remark,\nviz.--that reasoning is asserting a proposition, and then showing why\nit is true--in other words, adducing the fact or facts, on which the\nassertion rests.\n\nIn the Logic given in 'Chambers' Information,' it is said--' In choosing\nyour middle terms, or arguments to prove any question, always take such\ntopics as are purest and least fallible, and which carry the greatest\nevidence and strength with them,' But it rather appears that we have\nnot to invent a middle term, but only to look to the major premises, and\nfind it included there.\n\nBy methodical questioning any argument may be tested. Thus, on any\nassertion being made, ask--Why is the assertion true? In this manner, if\nan argument has truth in it, it may be elicited. In this manner you dig\nthrough assertions down to premises, and discover whether any ore of\ntruth lies there.\n\nThe value of the argument depends upon the final answer which reveals\nthe premises or data of facts, upon which the conclusion rests. Forms\nof speech, classification of propositions, figures of syllogisms, are of\nminor importance when you have once elicited the rough truth. The best\ntest of an argument is the soundness of its data, and the simplest\nformula for drawing out and exhibiting such data, is of the greatest\nservice in enabling us to judge of the validity thereof.\n\nTyranny, says Cobbett, has no enemy so formidable as the pen, Why?\n'Because the pen pursues tyranny both in life and beyond the grave.'\nHow is this proved to be the most formidable enemy of tyranny? 'From the\nfact that tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not\nonly its existence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life\nand beyond the grave.' Such interrogatories and replies generate the\nexpository syllogism.\n\n1. Tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not only its\nexistence, but its reputation, which pursues it in life and beyond the\ngrave.\n\n2. The pen pursues tyranny in life and beyond the grave.\n\n3. Therefore, tyranny has no enemy so formidable as the pen. A syllogism\nis made up of collective and single facts. It is the process of\nreasoning, whereby we show that a single truth is proved by a collective\none which contains it, or a less quantity is proved by a greater, or\nthat an assertion is proved by an induction from a class of facts. From\nthe class of the enemies of tyranny the pen is selected, and is\nproved, by passing in inductive review the whole class, to be the most\nformidable.\n\nThe usual manner in which an argument is presented is called the\nentihymeme. Thus:--\n\n  He is an industrious man,\n\ntherefore\n\n  He will acquire wealth.\n\nThe first or major proposition is in this form suppressed. The\nsyllogistic form would be this:--\n\n  Every industrious man acquires wealth,\n  He is an industrious man,\n\ntherefore\n\n  He will acquire wealth.\n\nBut if we ask for the proof that every industrious man acquires wealth,\nwe find the facts wanting--for the idle are often rich, and the diligent\npoor. The industrious _may_ acquire wealth, the chances are in their\nfavour.\n\nAgain.\n\n  We must cherish self-respect,\n  Because self-respect is the stay of virtue.\n\nThe suppressed proposition is--'We must cherish whatever is the stay of\nvirtue.'\n\nThe whole syllogism then stands thus:--\n\n  We must cherish whatever is the stay of virtue,\n  Self-respect is the stay of virtue,\n\ntherefore\n\n  We must cherish self-respect.\n\nDilemma is derived from a Greek word, and signifies twice an argument.\nIt is an argument divided into several members, and infers of each part\nwhat is to be inferred of the whole. Thus: Either we shall live or die.\nIf we live, we can only live happily by being virtuous; and if we die,\nwe can only die happy by being virtuous; therefore, we ought always\nto be virtuous. In the dilemma, question one argument at a time, as in\npreceding cases.\n\nThe Sorites uses several middle terms by which the predicate of the last\nproposition is connected with the first subject. Of this argument the\nwell-known speech of Themistocles is a specimen. 'My son,' said that\neminent person, 'governs his mother, his mother governs me, I govern\nthe Athenians, the Athenians govern Greece, Greece governs Europe, and\nEurope governs the world; therefore, my son governs the world.' In\nthese instances, question each assertion, as there are as many acts of\nreasoning as intermediate propositions.\n\nThe Onus Probandi, or Burden of Proof, is said to rest with him who\nwould dispute any point in favour of a presumptive, or generally\nallowed truth. But manly logic holds no quibbling about who shall prove.\nWhatever he asserts, the honest reasoner should be prompt to prove.\n\nChalmers, it is said, made Morell known--but Morell has written a\nsynopsis of metaphysical philosophy that only needed to be known to be\nappreciated. If Chalmers gave Morell distinction, Morell had previously\nearned it. From his work I extract the following passage, which passes\nin review the steps taken, marks the analytic point reached, and\noutlines the ground before us:--'Different as were the minds of those\ntwo great men [Bacon and Descartes] in themselves, different as were\ntheir respective labours, and opposite as were, in many respects, the\nresults at which they arrived, yet the writings of both were marked\nby one and the same great characteristic, namely, by the _spirit of\nmethod_. The most important works of Bacon, it will be remembered, were\nthe \"Instanratio Magna,\" and the \"Novum Organum;\" those of Descartes\nwere his \"Dissertatio de Methodo,\" and his \"Meditationes de Prima\nPhilosophia,\" The fruitlessness of the ancient logic, as an instrument\nof discovery, had been abundantly proved by past experience, and the\nwatchword which these two great thinkers of their age both uttered,\nand which has been ever since the guiding principle of all philosophy,\nwas--analysis. Bacon, who gave his attention chiefly to the direction\nand improvement of physical science, taught to analyse nature, while\nDescartes, who aimed rather at grounding all human knowledge upon its\nultimate principles, instructed how to analyse _thought_. All modern\nphilosophy, therefore, whether it arise from the Baconian or the\nCartesian point of view, bears upon it the broad outline of the analytic\nmethod. It matters not whether it be the outer or the inner world to\nwhich its investigations apply, in each case it teaches us to observe\nand analyse _facts_ to induce instances, and upon such observation and\ninduction to ground our knowledge of laws and principles. In this alone\nconsists the Unity of modern science, and from this arises its broad\ndistinction from that of the ancient world. Every natural philosopher\nsince Bacon has grounded his success upon an induction of the facts\nof the outward world, and every metaphysician, since Descartes, has\nprogressed onwards in his department of knowledge by analysing the facts\nof our inward consciousness.'*\n\n     * Morell: Modern Philosophy, pp. 76-8.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X. INDUCTION\n\nInduction is an inference from many facts. Induction is verification.\nJust as in a syllogism we show that a part is contained in the whole, so\nin induction we show that a part is illustrated by the whole. It seems\nthat every single fact contains many truths, but induction establishes\ntheir _universality_. A single brain contains all the truths of\nphrenology, a single stone includes the phenomena of gravitation, the\ntemperance of a single individual exhibits the whole law of moderation,\nbut we learn the universality of these truths by induction.\n\nEvery legal statute, says Dr. Johnson, is founded on induction. 'Law is\nthe science in which the greatest powers of understanding are applied\nto the greatest number of facts.' The _basis of all_ science is such an\nextensive induction of particulars as leads to general definitions and\nfundamental axioms, and furnishes the premises from which inferences may\nbe deduced.\n\nInductive observation is the great instrument of discovering important\ntruths. 'What are called the principles of human nature are learned from\nindividual instances. It is the only possible way of learning them. *\n* When we reason from a general law or principle, we are in truth\nreasoning from a number of instances represented by It.'*\n\n     * Rationale of Political Representation, p. 34.\n\nA general election is an induction of the intelligence of the country\nrepresented by the members of Parliament. The difference between\ndemocracy and monarchy is in one sense an affair of logic. Where\nelectors are limited in franchise, and candidates restricted by property\nqualification, the induction is partial, but where all can vote and many\ncan be chosen from, the premises are more capacious and the inference\nsounder.\n\nDr. Whately says, that 'in Natural Philosophy a _single instance_ is\noften accounted a _sufficient_ induction; e.g., having once ascertained\nthat an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorised to\nconclude that this property is universal.'\n\n'The Edinburgh Reviewer of Whewell's \"History of the Inductive\nSciences,\" observes that, \"by the _accidental_ placing of a rhomb\nof calcareous spar, upon a book or line, Bartholinus discovered the\nproperty of the double refraction of light. By _accidentally_ combining\ntwo rhombs in different positions, Huygens discovered the polarisation\nof light. By _accidentally_ looking through a prism of the same\nsubstance, and turning it round, Mains discovered the polarisation of\nlight by reflection; and by placing thin chrystalline films between two\nsimilar prisms or rhombs, M. Arago discovered the phenomena of polarised\ntints.\"\n\n'To this Mr. Whewell, in his \"Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,\"\nmakes the following reply:--\"But Bartholinus could have seen no such\nconsequence in the accident, if he had not previously had a clear\nconception of single refraction. A lady, in describing an optical\nexperiment which had been shown her, said of her teacher, 'he told me\nto increase and diminish the angle of refraction: and, at last, I found\nthat he only meant me to move my head up and down.' At any rate, till\nthe lady had acquired a knowledge of the meaning which the technical\nterms convey, she could not have made Bartholinus's discovery by means\nof this accident. Suppose that Huygens made the experiment alluded to,\nwithout design, what he really observed was that the images appeared\nand disappeared alternately as he turned the rhomb round. His success\ndepended on his clearness of thought, which enabled him to perform\nthe intellectual analysis which would never have occurred to most men,\nhowever often they had combined two rhombs in different positions. Malus\nsaw that in some positions the light reflected from the windows of\nthe Louvre became dim. Another person would have attributed this to\naccident; he, however, considered the position of the prism, and the\nwindow; repeated the experiment often; and by virtue of the eminently\ndistinct conceptions of space which he possessed, resolved the\nphenomenon into its geometrical conditions.\"* \"If it were true, that\nthe fall of an apple was the occasion of Newton's pursuing that train of\nthought which led to the doctrine of universal gravitation, the habits\nand constitution of Newton's intellect were the real source of this\ngreat event in the progress of knowledge.\"** \"In whatever manner facts\nmay be presented to the notice of a discoverer, they can never become\nthe materials of exact knowledge, except they find his mind already\nprovided with precise and suitable conceptions, by which they may be\nanalysed and connected.\"'***\n\n     * Whewell:  Phil. Induct. Sciences, vol. 2. pp. 199-1.\n\n     ** Ibid, vol. 2, p. 189.\n\n     *** See J. N. Bailey's Essays pp. 87-8-9.\n\nThese admissions seem to me to prove that whenever a casual fact proves\nto us a new truth, it does so by its coincidence with previously known\nfacts, and that the novelty of the occasion attracts all credit to\nitself, and we lose sight of the generalisation below--the fruitful\nsoil of experience on which the new fact, like a seed, falls. We only\nrecognise difference by comparison, and the comparison is an induction,\nhowever slender.\n\nMonsieur de Montmorine was recaptured and brought to the scaffold,\nthrough the trifling circumstance of some chicken bones being found near\nthe door of his landlady--a woman too poor to indulge in such dainties.*\nThe discovery of de Montmorine was not, as at first sight appears, an\ninference from a single fact, but from an adjacent induction. It was\na general truth, (known to the party who observed the bones) a truth\ninducted from a number of facts that poor people could not afford to\nluxuriate on chickens. It was, therefore, from this induction, inferred\nthat some one of superior fortune must be living in that particular\nplace.\n\n     * Chambers' Miscellany of Useful and Entertaining Tracts,\n     No. 61: the Story of Lavaiette, p. 27\n\nThe judicious care which the great fathers of science have exhibited in\nmaking their inferences, incontestably establishes their conviction\nof the danger of any other reasoning than that from inductions. Lord\nBrougham informs us, that what Newton's Principia is to science, Locke's\nessay to metaphysics, Demosthenes in oratory, and Homer in poetry,\nCuvier's researches to our fossil osteology. But Cuvier never attempted\nto draw any inferences until he had examined the _whole_ osteology of\nthe living species.\n\nLord Brougham remarks, that 'from examining a _single_ fragment of bone\nwe infer that, in the wilds where we found it, there lived and ranged,\nsome thousands of years ago, an animal of a peculiar kind.' This is a\ncase in which the inference spoken of is arrived at in a way different\nfrom that apparently stated. We recognise in the 'fragment of bone'\na link in a chain of facts constituting the basis of a well-known\ninduction, which comparative anatomy has many times verified. It\nis important to distinguish well the grounds from which accurate\ninferences, such as these in the cases before us, have really been\nadduced, in order to ascertain the grounds from which we should reason\ngenerally. It will be found that solid reasoning can only proceed from\ngeneral rules--i.e., inductions from facts. It will be found that the\nprime source of fallacy lies in reasoning from isolated facts. It is\nnot to be denied that such reasoning is sometimes right, but it is to\nbe remembered that it is right by accident, not by design. There is no\nscience or certainty in it. It is hazard, not logic.\n\nThis habit however, is very common. Mr. Mill says, that 'Not only _may_\nwe reason from particulars to particulars, without passing through\ngenerals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences\nare of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw\ninferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general\nlanguage. The child, who, having burnt his fingers, avoids to thrust\nthem again into the fire, has reasoned or inferred, though he has never\nthought of the general maxim--fire burns. He knows from memory that he\nhas been burnt, and on this evidence believes, when he sees a candle,\nthat if he puts his fingers into the flame of it, he will be burnt\nagain. He believes this in every case which happens to arise; but\nwithout looking, in each instance, beyond the present case. He is not\ngeneralising; he is inferring a particular from particulars. In the same\nway, also, brutes reason. There is little or no ground, for attributing\nto any of the lower animals the use of conventional signs, without\nwhich general propositions are impossible. But those animals profit by\nexperience, and avoid what they have found to cause them pain, in the\nsame manner, though not always with the same skill, as a human creature.\nNot only the burnt child, but the burnt dog, dreads the fire.\n\n'I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing inferences from our\npersonal experience, and not from maxims handed down to us by books\nor tradition, we much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars\ndirectly, than through the intermediate agency of any general\nproposition. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people,\nor from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to\nerect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature.\nWhen we conclude that some person will, on some given occasion, feel or\nact so and so, we sometimes judge from an enlarged consideration of the\nmanner in which men in general, or men of some particular character,\nare accustomed to feel and act; but much oftener from having known the\nfeelings and conduct of the same man in some previous instance, or from\nconsidering how we should feel or act ourselves. It is not only the\nvillage matron who, when called to a consultation upon the case of a\nneighbour's child, pronounces on the evil and its remedy simply on the\nrecollection and authority of what she accounts the similar case of\nher Lucy. We all, where we have no definite maxims to steer by, guide\nourselves in the same way; and if we have an extensive experience, and\nretain its impressions strongly, we may acquire, in this manner, a\nvery considerable power of accurate judgment, which we may be utterly\nincapable of justifying or of communicating to others. Among the higher\norder of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was\nremarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without\nbeing able to give any sufficient reasons for what they did and\napplied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly\nunable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored\nwith appropriate particulars, and having been long accustomed to reason\nat once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of\nstating to oneself or to others the corresponding general propositions.\nAn old warrior, on a rapid glance at the outlines of the ground, is able\nat once to give the necessary orders for a skilful arrangement of his\ntroops; though if he has received little theoretical instruction, and\nhas seldom been called upon to answer to other people for his conduct,\nhe may never have had in his mind a single general theorem respecting\nthe relation between ground and array. But his experience of\nencampments, under circumstances more or less similar, has left a number\nof vivid, unexpressed, ungeneralised analogies in his mind, the most\nappropriate of which, instantly suggesting itself, determines him to a\njudicious arrangement.\n\n'The skill of an uneducated person in the use of weapons, or of tools,\nis of a precisely similar nature. The savage who executes unerringly the\nexact throw which brings down his game, or his enemy, in the manner\nmost suited to his purpose, under the operation of all the conditions\nnecessarily involved, the weight and form of the weapon, the direction\nand distance of the object, the action of the wind, &c., owes this\npower to a long series of previous experiments, the results of which he\ncertainly never framed into any verbal theorems or rules. It is the\nsame in all extraordinary manual dexterity. Not long ago a Scotch\nmanufacturer procured from England, at a high rate of wages, a working\ndyer, famous for producing very fine colours, with a view of teaching\nto his other workmen the same skill. The workman came; but his mode of\nproportioning the ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects he\nproduced, was by taking them up in handfuls while the common method was\nto weigh them. The manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling\nsystem into an equivalent weighing system, that the general principle of\nhis peculiar mode of proceeding might be ascertained. This, however,\nthe man found himself quite unable to do, and therefore could impart\nhis skill to nobody. He had, from the individual cases of his own\nexperience, established a connection in his mind between fine effects\nof colour, and tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials;\nand from these perceptions he could, in any particular cases, infer the\nmeans to be employed, and the effect which would be produced, but could\nnot put others in possession of the grounds on which he proceeded, from\nhaving never generalised them in his own mind, or expressed them in\nlanguage.\n\n'Almost every one knows Lord Mansfield's advice to a man of practical\ngood sense, who, being appointed governor of a colony, had to preside\nin its court of justice, without previous judicial practice or legal\neducation. The advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would\nprobably be right; but never to venture on assigning reasons, for they\nwould almost infallibly be wrong. In cases like this, which are of no\nuncommon occurrence, it would be absurd to suppose that the bad reason\nwas the source of the good decision. Lord Mansfield knew that if any\nreason were assigned it would be necessarily an afterthought, the judge\nbeing _in fact_ guided by impressions from past experience, without the\ncircuitous process of framing general principles from them, and that if\nhe attempted to frame any such he would assuredly fail. Lord Mansfield,\nhowever, would not have doubted that a man of equal experience, who\nhad also a mind stored with general propositions derived by legitimate\ninduction from that experience, would have been greatly preferable as\na judge, to one, however sagacious, who could not be trusted with the\nexplanation and justification of his own judgments. The cases of able\nmen performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the\nless civilised and most spontaneous form of the operations of superior\nminds It is a _defect in them_, and _often a source of errors_, not to\nhave generalised as they went on; but generalisation is a help, the most\nimportant indeed of all helps, yet not an essential.'*\n\n     * Mill's Logic, pp. 251-5.\n\nIn illustration of generalising from single instances, Miss Martineau\ngives this example:--'A raw Chinese traveller in England was landed by\na Thames waterman who had a wooden leg. The stranger saw that the wooden\nleg was used to stand in the water with, while the other was high and\ndry. The apparent economy of the fact struck the Chinese; he saw in it\nstrong evidence of design, and wrote home that in England one-legged men\nare kept for watermen, to the saving of all injury to health, shoe, and\nstocking, from standing in the river.'*\n\nReasoning on insufficient data--\n\n     Falls like an inverted cone,\n     Wanting its proper base to stand upon.\n\nSamuel Bailey has furnished, in one passage, both a clear illustration\nof the process, and the validity of an induction:--'Whoever had\nwitnessed the acts of a landlord to his tenants, of a schoolmaster to\nhis pupils, of artizans towards their apprentices, of husbands towards\ntheir wives, on points where the power of the superior could not be\ncontested, and where his personal gratification was incompatible with\njust conduct to the subordinate, would necessarily have formed in his\nown mind a species of general rule; and from this rule he might safely\ndraw an inference as to what would be the conduct of a despot, seated on\na throne, in the possession of unchecked authority; assisted too, as the\ninquirer would be, by that _indispensable and inestimable guide to the\nknowledge of mankind, an appeal to his own feelings_, in a variety of\n_analogous_ instances.\n\n'We conclude, that a ruler with uncontrolled power will act the tyrant,\nnot merely from the fact that Caligula, or Nero, or Bonaparte did,\nbut from a thousand facts attesting that men, in, every situation, use\nuncontrolled power in this way--just as we infer that all bodies tend to\nthe centre of the earth, _not merely from the circumstance of an apple\ndropping from a tree, but from seeing the tendency in stones, water,\nanimals, and all things within our observation_. The use of uncontrolled\npower, for the gratification of the possessor, without an equitable\nrespect to others, is no more peculiar to monarchs, than a tendency\nto the earth is peculiar to apples. It may be useful to know that\n_monarchs_ act in this way, as it may be useful to know that apples drop\nto the ground; but it is much more useful to know that _men_ act in\nthis manner. _An inference is safer when gathered from the widest\ninduction.'_\n\n     *  How to Observe, p. 6.\n\n     ** Rationale of Political Representation. Introduction, pp.\n     85-6. The last sentence of this extract is abridged--but, as\n     the reader will find upon reference, the sense of the author\n     is faithfully rendered.\n\nIt may be useful to observe that, though a few instances are insufficient\nto establish a theory, one may be sufficient to overturn a theory,\nfancifully or hypothetically supported, Gibbon overturns the entertaining\ntheory of Rudbeck, an antiquarian of Upsal, of profound learning and easy\nfaith, who, by the dim light of legends and traditions, of conjectures\nand etymologies, sought to establish the antiquity of Sweden over half\nthe earth. Gibbon annihilated this well laboured system of German\nantiquities, by a single fact too well attested to admit of any doubt,\nand of too decisive a nature to leave room for any reply--the fact that\nthe Germans, of the age of Tacitus, were unacquainted with the use of\nletters. A circumstance fatal to their literary claims, urged by Olaus\nRudbeck.\n\nIn the chapter on 'Facts' I have cautioned the reader against\nunquestioned data. This seems the place to remark that the unsuspected\nsources of error and unfriendliness have their rise in the criminal\nimplicitness with which we listen to reports, and infer from rumours as\nfrom facts. These are the very little handles which move men and women\nto strange performances.'* All the plots of dramas and romances are\nfounded on misunderstandings, which a little sagacity of action (such as\na wise resolution not to be imposed upon would lead to) would commonly\nsuffice to arrest the error at its birth. With regard to character we\nconstantly infer from data, partial, limited, and doubtful. If most\nquarrelers were called into a court of Inquiry to confess the real\ngrounds from which they have arrived at certain conclusions with regard\nto their neighbours, and often with regard to their friends, they would\nbe at once overwhelmed with a conviction of the weakness of which they\nhave been guilty. Upon analysing the miserable sources of opinions\nof which scandal and calumny are born, I have found it impossible\nto restrain astonishment at the imbecility of logical power men will\nsometimes be content to exhibit, where meanness prevails, malice\nincites, and passion governs. Well might Bacon exclaim--'Doth any man\ndoubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds, vain opinions,\nflattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations, and the like, but it\nwould leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things?'** The\nwise rule is, never judge from appearances when facts can be had--never\nreceive a report without challenging its foundation, nor adopt it\nwithout permission to give the authority.\n\n     * Cricket on the Hearth.\n\n     ** Essay on Truth.\n\nIn all cases, in which you must judge from appearances and reason\nfrom conjectures, adopt the _fairest_ interpretation possible. On this\nprinciple, credit will sometimes be given where none is due--but in nine\ncases out of ten, justice will be done, for I am satisfied that there is\nmore worth among men than wisdom, and that we do well much oftener than\nwe reason well. We seldom need judge charitably, did we always endeavour\nto judge justly. But we make a virtue of our own errors, and we often\naffect to _condescend_ to pronounce an opinion, which it would be\ncriminal to withhold. If ever I go to the Herald's, office, the motto I\nwill have emblazoned shall be this--Justice is sufficient. Could we only\nget justice in the world, we could afford to excuse it all its 'charity'\nof judgment, and its benevolence even of act.\n\nWhere should a man's reputation be safe from suspicion if not in the\nhands of his friend? It ought to be a principle of action with all\nmen, never to judge a friend except out of his own mouth. 'There was\na generous friend of mine once, who never would have judged me or any\nother man unheard.'* With the sublime intensity of one who felt the\ninfinite value of private justice, has Schiller delineated this spirit\nin the interview between Octavio and his son Max Piccolomini. After\na violent and visible struggle with his feelings--wrought upon by his\nfather's endeavours to sow suspicions in his mind, and detach him from\nthe service of his friend, Wallenstein--Max exclaims:--\n\n     * Edward to Mr. Peerybing.\n\nI will procure me light a shorter way. Farewell.\n\nOctavio. Where now?\n\nMax. (To the Duke.)\n\n  If thou hast believed that I shall act\n  A part in this thy play----\n  Thou hast miscalculated on me grievously.\n  My way must be straight on.\n  True with the tongue,\n  False with the heart--I may not, cannot be:\n  Nor can I suffer that a man should trust me--\n  As his friend trust me--and then lull my conscience\n  With such low pleas as these:--\"I ask him not--\n  He did it all at his own hazard--and\n  My mouth has never lied to him.\"--No, no\n  What a friend takes me for, that I must be.\n  --I'll to the Duke; ere yet this day is ended\n  Will I demand of him that he do save\n  His good name from the world, and with one stride\n  Break through and rend this fine-spun web of yours.\n  He can, he will!--I still am his believer.\n  Yet I'll not pledge myself, but that those letters\n  May furnish you, perchance, with proofs against him.\n  How far may not this Tertsky have proceeded--\n  What may not he himself too have permitted\n  Himself to do, to snare the enemy,\n  The laws of war excusing?   Nothing, save\n  His own mouth shall convict him--nothing less!\n  And face to face will I go question him.\n  Ay--this state-policy?   O how I curse it!\n  You will some time, with your state-policy,\n  Compel him to the measure; it may happen\n  Because ye are _determined_ that he is guilty,\n  Guilty ye'll make him.   All retreat cut off,\n  You close up every outlet, hem him in\n  Narrower and narrower, till at length ye force him--\n  Yes, ye,--ye force him in his desperation,\n  To set fire to his prison.   Father! father!\n  That never can end well--it cannot--will not!\n  Deem of it what thou wilt; but pardon me,\n  That I must bear me on in my own way.\n  All must remain pure betwixt him and me;\n  And, ere the day-light dawns, it must be known\n  Which I must lose--my father, or my friend.*\n\n     * Shiller's Piccolomini, act 3,  scene 9.\n\nHad Othello been thus honourable to Desdemona, he would never have\nmurdered her. Incalculable is the evil we bring on ourselves and\nsociety, by supposing and surmising facts we ought resolutely to\nquestion. The motto of the garter--\n\n  Evil be to him who evil thinks,\n\nought to be,\n\n  Evil is to him who evil thinks.\n\nEvery man will be his own Lawyer and his own Doctor, and such is the\nperversity of human nature, he will also be his own _Iago_, and feed\nhimself with suspicions. Nearly all tragedies hinge on this error.\n\nTo avoid being the cause of misunderstanding to others, it is a good\nrule never to speak critically of others, except in their presence, or\nin print. When I am obliged to do this in conversation, with persons of\nunknown or doubtful exactitude, I take care to keep much below the truth\nin matters of censure, as anything of that kind may gain ten or twenty\nper cent, in carriage. When with men of just habits of interpretation,\nI pay them the highest compliment of friendship, and speak to them of\nothers, without reserve.\n\nNotorious are the contumelies put upon the cases of grievance presented\nfrom the people in the House of Commons. Nor is it altogether causeless.\nSo prone are the ignorant to mistake their prejudices for facts, and\nascribe to others as crimes what exists only in their own surmises, that\nmost popular cases may be stripped of half their pretensions without\ninjuring their truth. Exaggeration is the vice of ignorance. Half the\nspeeches addressed to 'King Mob' are hyperbolic. The sentiments of\npublic meetings minister too often to the prevalent inflation. The\npeople will be powerful when they learn to be exact--and not till then.\n\nThe only mode of correcting this evil is to instil into the people the\nwise rule of Burlamiqui. To reason, (that is, inductively) says this\nwriter, is to calculate, and as it were draw up an account, after\nbalancing all arguments, in order to see on which side the advantage\nlies. Burlamiqui had law chiefly in view in his remark, but the rule is\nof immense application. A logician is a secretary or banker's clerk, who\nkeeps an account between truth and error. When a lady once consulted Dr.\nJohnson on the degree of turpitude to be attached to her son's robbing\nan orchard--'Madam,' said Johnson, 'it all depends upon the weight of\nthe boy. I remember my schoolfellow, Davy Garrick, who was always a\nlittle fellow, robbing a dozen orchards with impunity, but the very\nfirst time I climbed up an apple tree, for I was always a heavy boy, the\nbough broke with me, and it was called a judgment. I suppose that is\nwhy Justice is represented with a pair of scales.' This may not be the\nprecise reason why Justice has a pair of scales, but the point goes to\nthe root of the matter. Without weighing there can be neither justice\nnor fair induction.\n\nIn illustration of these views Mr. Mill has some able remarks:--'In\nproportion to any person's deficiency of knowledge and mental\ncultivation, is generally his inability to discriminate between his\ninferences and the perceptions on which they were grounded.\n\nMany a marvellous tale many a scandalous anecdote, owes its origin to\nthis incapacity. The narrater relates, not what he saw or heard, but\nthe impression which he derived from what he saw or heard, and of which\nperhaps the greater part consisted of inference, though the whole\nis related not as inference but as matter-of-fact. The difficulty\nof inducing witnesses to restrain, within any moderate limits,\nthe intermixture of their inferences with the narrative of their\nperceptions, is well known to experienced cross-examiners; and still\nmore is this the case when ignorant persons attempt to describe any\nnatural phenomenon. \"The simplest narrative,\" says Dugald Stewart, \"of\nthe most illiterate observer involves more or less of hypothesis nay,\nin general, it will be found that, in proportion to his ignorance,\nthe greater is the number of conjectural principle involved in his\nstatements. A village apothecary (and, if possible, in a still greater\ndegree, an experienced nurse) is seldom able to describe; the plainest\ncase, without employing a phraseology of which every word is a theory;\nwhereas a simple and genuine specification of the phenomena which mark a\nparticular disease--a specification unsophisticated by fancy, or by\npreconceived opinions, may be regarded as unequivocal evidence of a mind\ntrained by long and successful study to the most difficult of all arts,\nthat of the faithful _interpretation_ of nature.\"'*\n\n     * Logic, pp. 408-9, vol. 2.\n\nIt is in judgments formed, in reprehensible indifference to the actual\nfacts of the case, that party rancour and the proverbial injustice of\npopular political opinion take their rise. A useful caution on this\nhead is pronounced by Lord Brougham in his sketch of the life of Lord\nWellesley:--'How often do we see,' observes his lordship, 'vehement: and\nunceasing; attacks made upon a minister or a statesman, perhaps not in\nthe public service, for something which he does not choose to defend or\nexplain, resting his claims to the confidence of his countrymen upon\nhis past exertions and his known character. Yet these assaults are\nunremittingly made upon him, and the people believe that so much noise\ncould not be stirred up without something to authorise it. Sometimes the\nobjects of the calumny are silent from disdain; sometimes from knowing\nthat the base propagators of it will only return to their slander the\nmore eagerly alter their conviction of falsehood; but sometimes, also,\nthe silencer may be owing to official reserve, of which we see a most\nremarkable instance in the ease of Lord Wellesly.'\n\nNot only are enemies of the people afforded a justification for their\nopposition by wrongful judgment pronounced upon them, but the friends\nof the people often pass over to the other side through the same cause.\nWhen a leader of the people first comes in personal contact with the\nopposite party, and becomes acquainted with merits of feeling and\njudgment which he had as it were pledged himself to deny, and indeed\nachieved himself a position by disbelieving in, he becomes ashamed of\nthe injustice exacted from him by his inexorable adherents, and forsakes\nhis party when he should only forsake its errors. The case of Barnave,\nin the first French Revolution, is a memorable instance of this. On\nlesser theatres I have seen many instances of this kind of conversion;\nSuch changes have always been ascribed to venality, yet they are men\nof generous instincts who are thus overcome--but they want logical\nstrength, and cannot correct themselves without falling.\n\nIt is a wise rule in conversation, never to guess at meanings. When, an\nobservation is made, capable of affording two inferences, at once put\nthe question which shall elicit the meaning intended. Conversation is\nheld to no purpose unless explicitness comes out of it. Innumerable are\nthe errors that arise through letting remarks pass, of which we\nonly _suppose_ we know the purport. This is a fruitful source of\nmisunderstanding. When in Scotland I was much instructed by the\nintellectual characteristics of the people. The Scotch are essentially a\nreflective people. The English conceive doubts, but the Scotch put them\ninto queries. Before I had been in the country many hours I was struck\nby the inductive habits of the people. A very old and illiterate woman,\nto whom I put an indefinite question, eyed me deliberately from head to\nfoot before she gave me an answer. Not in rudeness did she gaze, so much\nas in inquiry as to what could be my object. I spent more than a week\nin inquiring at places, where apartments were to be let, by which I\nacquired profitable acquaintance with the people. Upon asking the\nterms of apartments, I was met, in all cases, by several preliminary\nquestions, as for whom were they? what number of persons? what station,\nhabits, and probable stay? Then I received the precise answer required.\nIt did not seem to me that they were answering one question by asking\nanother, as is sometimes said of the Scotch--but by a happy and wise\npresence of mind they asked, as all should do, at many questions as were\nrequired to complete the data of the specific answer they were called\nupon to give.\n\nA wise practice is followed in courts of law. No judge pronounces an\nopinion on a hypothetical case. What he would do? or what would be the\njudgment of the law, suppose a certain case should arise?--are questions\nhe never condescends to answer. 'Bring the plaintiff into court, let the\nevidence be taken, and then we will decide. We sit here to judge actual,\nnot suppositious cases.' Such would be the reply. People out of court\nmight profit by the example.\n\nI remember one striking instance of the pernicious effects of surmise.\nSome years ago I took part in a Fraternal Demonstration at Highbury\nBarn. The assembly was numerous, and composed of persons of all nations\nand all parties. The celebration was avowedly one of fraternity. The\ntone of the meeting reflected its object. Pacific words were on every\ntongue, and harmony reigned up till eleven o'clock. At that hour\nMonsieur Chillman asked me if some steps could not be taken to annualize\nthe meeting, and he requested me to prepare and propose a resolution to\nthat effect. Monsieur Chillman, thinking the resolution ought to come\nfrom an Englishman, strongly urged me to move it. I, thinking it too\nimportant to emanate from a young man, looked about for a person of\nexperience and known discretion to introduce it. After several had\ndeclined, Mr. Hetherington undertook it. The English politicians were\ncomposed of two parties, the friends of Mr. O'Connor, and the members of\nthe National Hall. At that time they were pleased to be the antipodes of\neach other. No sooner had Mr. Hetherington spoken, he being the friend\nof Mr. Lovett, than his motion was supposed to come from Mr. Lovett's\nparty, though they were utterly ignorant of its origination. Clamour's\nhundred tongues were loosened. Slumbering differences were awakened.\nSuspicion spread like an infection. Fraternity perished of the\ncontagion. Twenty amendments were proposed, and it was not till\nmidnight, and then in a storm indescribably contradictory of the\nmeeting's whole purport, that a common understanding was come to.\nHad the least inquiry been made by the objecting party, previously\nto dissenting, they would have found that the suspicious proposition\noriginated with one of themselves. But assuming premises, they inferred\nfrom conjecture instead of fact, and raised disastrous doubts as to the\nability of that assembly for domestic or international fraternisation.\n\nThe use and abuse of authority Is a subject worthy of the young\nlogician's serious attention. Many great writers like Bacon, through\npolicy--Burke through position, or Shakspere through versatility of\ngenius, have written on both sides of important questions. Such men,\ntaken piece-meal, may be quoted by the most opposite parties in favour\nof the most opposite opinions. Unless there is time to make a broad\ninduction from their writings, showing, by weighty, quantitive evidence,\nthe side to which they leaned, better not quote them as _authorities_\nat all, but give what expresses your own views on your own\nresponsibility--indeed, in _all_ cases, the quoter ought to stand\nprepared, if possible, to justify all he cites from another in argument.\n'There is perhaps something weak and servile in our wishing to rely\non, or draw assistance from, ancient opinions. Reason ought not, like\nvanity, to adorn herself with old parchments, and the display of a\ngenealogical tree; more dignified in her proceedings, she ought to\nderive everything from herself; she should disregard past times, and be,\nif I may use the phrase, the contemporary of all ages.'* Quote others as\nGrotius did: not as judges from whose decision there is no appeal, but\nas witnesses whose conspiring testimony confirms the view taken.\n\n     * Necker.\n\nAnalogy has frequently been confounded with induction. Analogy signifies\nreasoning from resemblances subsisting between phenomena--induction,\nreasoning from the sameness of phenomena.\n\nThe phenomena affording an induction of a law of nature must be obvious,\nuniform, and universal.\n\nThe rules to be observed in deducing general principles are, that the\ncase be true and the facts universal.\n\nOn this subject, as exhibiting the clearest results arrived at, I\ntranscribe a passage from Mill: 'There is no word which is used more\nloosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than analogy. It sometimes\nstands for arguments which may be examples of the most rigid induction.\nArchbishop Whately, for instance, following Ferguson and other writers,\ndefines analogy conformably to its primitive acceptation, that which was\ngiven to it by mathematicians, resemblance of relations. In this sense,\nwhen a country which has sent out colonies is termed the mother country,\nthe expression is analogical, signifying that the colonies of a country\nstand in the same _relation_ to her in which children stand to their\nparents. And if any inference be drawn from this resemblance of\nrelations, as, for instance, that the same obedience or affection is\ndue from colonies to the mother country which is due from children to a\nparent, this is called reasoning by analogy. Or if it be argued that\na nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly elected by the\npeople, from the admitted fact that other associations for a common\npurpose, such as joint stock companies, are best managed by a committee\nchosen by the parties interested; this, too, is an argument from analogy\nin the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a nation is\nlike a joint stock company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but\nthat Parliament stands in the same _relation_ to the nation in which a\nboard of directors stands to a joint stock company. Now, in an argument\nof this nature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness like\nother arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may\nbe a perfect and conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the\ntwo cases resemble, may be capable of: being shown to be the _matereal_\ncircumstance; to be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be\ntaken into account in the particular discussion, depend. In the case\nin question, the resemblance is one of relation; the _fundamentum\nrelationis_ being the management, by a few persons, of affairs in which\na much greater number are interested along with them. Now, some may\ncontend that this circumstance which is common to the two cases, and\nthe various consequences which follow from it, have the chief share in\ndetermining all those effects which make up what we term good or bad\nadministration. If they can establish this, their argument has the force\nof a rigid induction: if they cannot, they are said to have failed\nin proving the analogy between the two cases, a mode of speech which\nimplies that when the analogy can be proved, the argument founded upon\nit cannot be resisted.'*\n\n     * Logic, pp. 97-8, vol. 2.\n\n'Many of the most splendid and important discoveries in this science\nwere the result of analogical reasonings. It was from this source that\nDr. Priestley proved the compound nature of atmospheric air; and it is\nrelated that it was in consequence of hints which he had given, when\non a visit to Paris, to Lavoisier, founded entirely upon analogical\nconjectures, that the latter philosopher was induced to commence\nexperiments, with the view of proving the compound nature of water, and\nof reducing it to its constituent elements. Indeed the whole history of\nthis very important and useful department of human knowledge exhibits\nvery striking and incontestable proofs how much of the art owed its\nexistence to mere hints and conjectures, founded, in many cases, upon\nvery slight resemblances or analogies.*. The chief province of analogy\nis confined to that of suggestion. Analogies are the great hinters of\nexperiments. They illustrate an argument, but do not establish it.\nThey are probabilities, not proofs. Hence Lord Brougham in one place\nexclaims:--'I have a dread, at least a suspicion, of all analogies, and\nnever more than when on the slippery heights of an obscure subject;\nwhen we are, as it were, _inter apices_ of a metaphysical argument, and\nfeeling, perhaps groping, our way in the dark, or among the clouds.\nI then regard analogy as a dangerous light, a treacherous _ignii\nfatuus_.'**\n\nA striking instance of the fallacy of analogy is afforded in the\nexperiments of Professor Matteuoci, which seem to prove that though the\nanalogies between electricity and nervous substance are nearly perfect,\nyet they are two distinct agencies.***\n\n     * Blakey's  Logic, pp. 97-7.\n\n     ** Pal. Illus.  vol. 2.\n\n     ***  See Zoist No. 20, p. 363.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI. DETECTION OF FALLACIES\n\nWE hope to be able to save students from the fate of Diodorus, (a great\nlogician, who died in his school through shame at being, unable to\nresolve a quibble propounded by Stilno)--not by hardening, but by\nenlightening them. Though we bring neither mood nor figure wherewith to\ntest the presence of error, we are not without the hope of qualifying\nthe student for its discovery.\n\nIt has been confessed from the throne of logic that, 'After all, in the\npractical detection of each individual fallacy, _much must depend on\nnatural and acquired acuteness_: nor can any rules be given, the\nmere learning of which will enable us to _apply_ them with mechanical\ncertainty and readiness.'\n\nBulwer, in remarking that error is a view of _some_ facts instead of\na survey of _all_, indicated the key to logical fallacy. Error lies\nprincipally in defective premises. Sophistry in science is referable\nto incomplete analysis of nature, of systems--to artificial\narrangements--to _supposing_ qualities, to _assuming_ principles, to\nfalse inductions from imperfect demonstration.\n\nDickens, in 'Nicholas Nickleby,' gives the case of a certain lady, who,\nbecause she knew _one_ young milliner, who retained red cheeks and\ndid not die of consumption, was immovably of opinion that all\nrepresentations of the injurious effect of such sedentary occupation\nwere false. It is ever so with the vulgar. Some one case has come under\ntheir notice, and it is in vain that you appeal to a chain of facts.\nThey know nothing of induction--they know one case to the contrary, and\nthat is enough. This error is the source of vulgar prejudice. Once teach\nmen that truth does not lie in a single instance, but in a calculation\nin a balance of probabilities, and you rationalise them. 'The chapter\nof accidents [or single instances] is the Bible of the fool--it supplies\nhim with a text against everything great, or good, or wise.'*\n\n          * Times.\n\n     Where others toil with philosophic force,\n     Their nimble nonsense takes a shorter course,\n     Flings at your head convictions in the lump,\n     And gains' remote conclusions with a jump.--Cowper,\n\nThe first source of error is defective induction. We easily arrive at\nthis point of examination by the questions we have proposed for use\nin the test of syllogism. Formerly, one syllogism was required to be\ndefeated by another--we now attack a fallacy by induction. No false\nsyllogism, says Biennan, can resist the inductive process of sifting\nparticulars.\n\n     I do not like thee. Dr. Fell,\n     The reason why, I cannot tell--\n     But this I know, and know full well,\n     I do not like thee, Dr. Fell.\n\nThis kind of thing will not do. Induction pursues the reasoner with an\neternal _why_. A clear because to a clear why, is a demand that is never\nremitted in sound logic.\n\nLord Melbourne, in giving his reason for his religion in the House\nof Lords, said it was the religion of his forefathers and that of his\ncountry, _therefore_, he would support the church. (Cheers from the\nopposition benches.) The Brahmin and Mussulman give the same reason\nfor theirs. A logician in facts would have said, I hold and support my\nreligion because it is _true_. What the standard of physical certainty\nis to facts, what axioms are to science, such is induction to\nsyllogisms--it is the test of their correctness.\n\nDr. Whately exhibits the following instance of a regularly expressed\nsyllogism:--\n\n  Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial:\n  Afflictions are dispensations of Providence,\n  Therefore, they are beneficial.\n\nEvery applicable rule of Dr. Whately's logic is, of course, applied\nhere--it is true in mood and figure, and yet the argument is fallacious.\nA fallacy is defined as 'an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood,\nso entangled as to be intimately blended--that the falsehood is, in\nchemical phrase, _held in solution_: one drop of sound logic is that\ntest which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign substance\nvisible, and precipitates it to the bottom.'* But whence is to come\n'this drop of sound logic?' Not from the Doctor's _Elements,_ they have\nsent forth the fallacy. But touch it with the talisman of facts and; the\nerror will appear.\n\n     * Whately's Logic, Anal. Out., chap. 1, stc. 4.\n\nWhat facts support the assertion that Afflictions are dispensations of\nProvidence?' The simple question is fatal to the argument. Can such\na proposition have facts for its support? Ignorance, congregating in\nnarrow courts, and laziness, accumulating filth, generate sickness\nand affliction. Are these the dispensations of Providence, or the\ndispensations of folly and crime? To ascribe them to Providence is\nvirtually to allow ignorance and laziness to step into the throne of\nGod, and call upon men to believe in _their_ beneficent dispensations.\nDr. Watts, another writer on logic, set the Christian congregations of\nEngland to sing the same species of fallacy:---\n\n     \"Diseases are the servants, Lord,\n     They come at thy command;\n     I'll not attempt a murm'ring word,\n     Against thy chast'ning hand.\"\n\nAccording to this lyrical logician, whenever wise precautions arrest\nthe progress of pestilence, or the physician's skill subdues disease,\nJehovah is robbed of a servant. By such an argument, humanity is made\nto be in rebellion against heaven, and our medical colleges are in\nantagonism with Deity, and the recent appointment, by the Russell\ngovernment, of a Sanatory Commission, was high blasphemy. It is the\ndegradation of language to employ it to such a purpose, and logic\nneeds revising to save us from publishing such puerility in the name\nof learning and of reason. It must have been logic of this kind\nthat induced a strong-thoughted woman to hazard the bold but tenable\nconjecture, that 'If an argument has truth in it, less than a\nphilosopher will see it--and if it has not, less than a logician will\nrefute it.'*\n\n     * A Few Days in Athens, by Frances Wright.\n\nR. G. Latham, M.D., in his 'First Outlines of Logic applied to Grammar\nand Etymology,' has introduced the particular instance of the syllogism\non Providence here cited from Whately. It would be no difficult task to\npresent other instances of the same species of polemical fallacy from\nDr. Whately and other writers on logic, did it comport with the rule\nI have chosen for observance. I give these cases chiefly to show how\nextensively and obtrusively they are introduced.\n\n'We have,' says Mr. Mill, 'five distinguishable classes of fallacy,\nwhich may to expressed in the following synoptic table:--\n\n[Illustration: Mill's Fallacy Table]\n\nIt was the boast of Archimedes, that if any one would find him a\nfulcrum, on which to rest a prop, he would raise the world, But this was\nmere assertion unsupported by facts, for if the fulcrum had been found\nhim, Archimedes could not have performed his promise. This has been\nproved by Ferguson, who has demonstrated that if Archimedes could have\nmoved with the swiftness of a cannon ball--480 miles every hour--it\nwould have taken him just 44,963,540,000,000 of years to have-raised the\nworld one inch. Bulwer remarks, 'Critics have said, what a fine idea of\nArchimedes! But how much finer is the fact that refutes it. _One of the\nsublimest things in the world is plain truth_.'\n\n  All motion generates warmth,\n  Shaking (with cold) is motion,\n  _Ergo_, shaking with cold generates warmth.\n\nWe look, in this case, to the facts on which the first proposition\nrests, and find the assertion too general.\n\nTo one who said that none were happy who were not above opinion, a\nSpartan replied, 'Then none are happy but knaves and robbers.'\n\nMr. Goodrich, the original Peter Farley gives, In his 'Fireside\nEducation,' an instance to this effect of two boys arguing on the\ndivision of their beds. William exclaims, 'You take more than your share\nof the bed, James.' James answers, 'I only take half the bed.' William\nreplies, 'True, but you take your half out of the middle, and I am\nobliged to lie on both sides to get my half.'\n\nInnumerable sophisms are suffered to pass in consequence of Some\nbrilliancy of position which, dazzles us and prevents our seeing that\nthey are wide of the' mark of reason. An instance occurs in Bulwer--who\nsays, 'Helvetius erred upon education--but his dogma has been\nbeneficial.' Probably so--but not so beneficial as the truth would have\nbeen. Many persons have argued from such an instance, that error is\nuseful. Dickens, in those incidental observations of striking good\nsense strewed up and down his writings, says, in the 'Cricket on the\nHearth:'--'These remarks (of Mrs. Fielding) were quite unanswerable:\nwhich is the happy property of all remarks that are _sufficiently wide\nof the purpose_.' Of the refutation of such remarks he has presented an\nable instance in 'Martin Chuzzlewit':\n\n'Bless my soul, Westlock,' says Pinch, is it nothing to see Pecksniff\nmoved to that extent and know one's self to be the cause? And did you\nnot hear him say that he could have shed his blood for me?\n\n'Do you want any blood shed for you?' returned Westlock with\nconsiderable irritation. 'Does he shed anything for you that you _do_\nwant? Does he shed employment for you, instruction for you pocket\nmoney for you? Does he even shed legs of mutton for you in any decent\nproportion to potatoes and garden stuff?'\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII. SCEPTICISM\n\nMan has been called the plaything of chance, but there is no logic more\nclose and inflexible than that of human life: all is entwined together;\nand for him who is able to disentangle the premises and patiently await\nthe conclusion it is the most correct of syllogisms.--Jules Sandau:\nPeople's Journal, No. 87.\n\n'To quote authors,' says Harris, in his preface to his Hermes,' 'who\nhave lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full\nmaturity of Grecian and Roman literature; some in its declension;\nand others in periods still more barbarous and depraved; may afford,\nperhaps, no unpleasing speculation, to see how the same reason has\nat all times prevailed; how there is one truth like one sun, that has\nenlightened human intelligence through every age, and saved it from the\ndarkness both of sophistry and error.' This is the assurance which right\nreason will ever impart. Underneath all the change after which we pant,\namid all the variety which surrounds us, and seem the very aliment of\nour nature, lies the instinct after the permanent. It is the province of\nsound logic to guarantee this in conclusion.\n\nThe novelty, change, fluctuation, which scientific discovery has\nbrought, and will yet bring, into the formerly settled worlds of opinion\nand social condition, will unsettle men's minds, and pave the way to an\nage of scepticism. Sound logic is necessary to provide that this doubt\nis transitional and not ultimate.\n\nScepticism is of two kinds, that of Pyrrho, and that of examination. The\nfollowers of Pyrrho, it is said, made doubting a profession, until at\nlast they doubted whether they did doubt. This is the scepticism of the\nscorner and trifler.\n\nHe did not know that he did not know it, and if he did know it it was\nmore than he knew. This is as far as the philosopher, of this school can\ngo. Dickens has drawn the portrait of these, logicians in Mr. Tigg:--\n\n'When a man like Slyme,' said Mr. Tigg, 'is detained for such a thing as\na bill' I reject the superstition of ages, and believe nothing. I don't\neven believe that I don't believe, curse me if I do.'\n\nHood is ironical on the professors of uncertainty. 'On a certain day\nof a certain year, certain officers went, on certain information, to\na certain court, in a certain city, to take up a certain Italian for\na certain crime. What gross fools are they who say there is nothing\ncertain in this world.'\n\nBut scepticism is not capable of disturbing the well-grounded repose\nof the wise; for when the sceptic thinks he has involved everything in\ndoubt, everything is still left in as much certainty as his scepticism.\n\nIn the great maze of conflicting opinion, it matters little that we are\ncautioned that reason is not all-sufficient--it is the best sufficiency\nwe have. If reason will not serve us well, will anything serve us\nbetter? Bishop Berkeley may demonstrate that we are not sure of matter's\nexistence--but are we more sure of any thing else? We are not thus to\nbe cajoled. But it is right to say that Mr. J. S. Mill contends that\nBerkeley has been misunderstood--but if he did argue, as popularly\nbelieved, to such argument, the answer of Byron is sufficient--\n\n     When Berkeley said there  was no matter,\n     It was no matter what he said.\n\nIf all is delusion, the delusion is very orderly--it observes regular\nlaws, and we proceed in logical method to inform each other, how\nthe delusion of things appears to our understandings or affects our\nfortunes.\n\n     Where nothing is, and all things seem,\n     And we the shadows of a dream,\n\nWe discuss the seemings with the same gravity as realities.' If a man\nseems to do wrong, and I seem to prevent him, and the wrong, therefore,\nseems not to be done, I am satisfied.\n\nThe 'wise considerate scepticism' of inquiry has been well expressed by\nEmerson, in his recent lecture on Montaigne.--'Who shall forbid a wise\nscepticism, seeing that there is no practical question on which anything\nmore than a proximate solution is to be had? Marriage itself is an open\nquestion: those \"out\" wish to be \"in:\" those \"in\" to be \"out.\"\n\nThe state. With all its obvious advantages, nobody loves it. Is\nit; otherwise with the Church? Shall the young man enter trade or a\nprofession without being vitiated? Shall he stay on shore or put out to\nsea? There is much to be said on both sides. Then there is competition\nand the attractions of the co-operative system. The labourer has a poor\nhut, is without knowledge, virtue, civilisation. If: we say, \"Let us\nhave culture,\" the expression awakens a new indisposition; for culture\ndestroys spontaneous and hearty unencumbered action. Let us have a\nrobust manly life; let us have to do with realities, not with shadowy\nghosts. Now this precisely is the right ground of the sceptic; not of\nunbelief, denying or doubting--least of all of scoffing and profligate\njeering at what is stable and good. He is _the considerer_. He has,\ntoo many enemies around him to wish to be his own. The position of the\nsceptic is one taken up for defence; as we build a house not too high or\ntoo low; under the wind, but out of the dust. For him the Spartan vigour\nis too-austere. St. John too thin and aerial. The wise sceptic avoids to\nbe fooled by any extreme; he wishes to, see the game. He wishes to see\nall things, but mainly men. Really our life in this world not of so easy\ninterpretation as preachers and school-books are accustomed to describe\nit.' These have not so efficiently solved the problem, that the sceptic\nshould yield himself contentedly to their interpretation. True, he does\nnot wish to speak harshly of what is best in us,--to turn himself into a\n\"devil's attorney.\" But he points out the room there is for doubt;--the\npower of moods;--the power of complexion, and so forth. Shall we, then,\nbecause good-nature inclines us to virtue's side, smoothly cry: \"There\nare no doubts!\"--and lie for the right? We ask whether life is to be led\nin a brave or a cowardly way: whether the satisfaction of our doubts be\nnot essential to all manliness: whether the name of virtue is to be a\nbarrier to that which is virtue? The sceptic wants truth, wants to have\nthings made plain to him, and has a right to be convinced in his own\nway. In such scepticism there is no malignity; it is honest, and does\nnot hinder his being convinced; and this hard-headed man, once convinced\nwill prove a giant in defence of his faith. The true and final answer\nin which all scepticism is lost is the moral sentiment: that never\nforfeits the supremacy. It is the drop that balances the universe.'\n\nScience and logic have so far advanced as to abridge the field of\ndoubtful questions. When syllogism answered syllogism, uncertainty\nreigned absolute--but now that the appeal is to facts, we can, wherever\nfacts can be had, weigh or number them, and decide on one side or the\nother.\n\nWhen Ali Pacha was at Janina, the case of a poor woman, who accused a\nman of the theft of all her property, was brought before him; but the\nplaintiff having no witnesses, the case was discharged, as the other\nasserted his innocence, and insisted as a proof, that he had not a\nfarthing in the world. On their leaving his presence, Ali ordered\nboth to be weighed, and then released them without further notice. A\nfortnight afterwards, he commanded both into his presence, and again\nweighed them; the accuser had lost as much as the defendant had\ngained in weight. The thing spoke for itself, and Ali decided that the\naccusation was just. Ali Pacha was the Burlamiqui of justice. Induction,\ntoo, has its scales, and seldom leaves us in doubt when it gets truth\nand falsehood in them. Scepticism is now happily restricted to those\nquestions resting on conjectures, and which do not pertain to the\npractical affairs of this life. On matter-of-fact questions, only the\nweak are perplexed. After men have been in deliberation till the time of\naction approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done,\nit is a sign the difference of motives the one way and the other is\nnot great; therefore, not to resolve then is to lose the occasion by\nweighing of trifles, which is pusillanimity.\n\nQuaint old Bunyan tells us, that when he had completed his 'Pilgrim's\nProgress' he took the opinions of various friends on the propriety of\npublishing it. Some said 'John, do;' others 'John, don't.' But solid\nold John was not to be thus confounded. 'Then I will print it,' said\nhe, 'and thus the case decide.' To this good sense the public owe that\nimmortal dream.\n\nIn the great field of physical investigation, science has conquered\ndoubt. 'Contingency and versimilitude are the offspring of human\nignorance, and, with an intellect of the highest order, cannot be\nsupposed to have any existence.'*\n\n     *Edinburgh Review, September 1814, article Probabilities\n\n'Probability,' says Laplace,' has reference partly to our ignorance, and\npartly to our knowledge.'\n\n'Chance,' observes Mr. Mill, 'is usually spoken of in direct antithesis\nto _law_; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to law, If\nattributed to chance. It is, however, certain, that whatever happens\nis the result of some law; is an effect of causes, and could have been\npredicted from a knowledge of the existence of those causes, and from\ntheir laws. If I turn up a particular card, that is a consequence of its\nplace in the pack. Its place in the pack was a consequence of the manner\nin which the cards were shuffled, or of the order in which they were\nplayed in the last game; which, again, were the effects of prior causes.\nAt every stage, if we had possessed an accurate knowledge of the causes\nin existence, it would have been abstractedly possible to foretell the\neffect.'*\n\n'In the domain of morals, too, a certainty, not dreamed of in past\ntimes, now prevails. However much man, as an individual, may be an\nenigma, in the aggregate he is a mathematical problem.'**\n\nIn the great world of opinion it is the duty of honest reasoners to\nendeavour to find out the truth, and take sides, undeterred by the\nphilosophical frivolity now growing fashionable. If men are silent\nconcerning objects and principles, it is said they have none, and it is\nimpatiently asked 'where is their bond of union?' And no sooner is it\nexplained than they are told 'it is very unphilosophical to think of\nsetting up a creed.' Where the alternatives are thus put against them\nthey should take their own course. Creeds are the necessary exponents\nof conviction. The creedless philosopher is out on the sea of opinion,\nwithout compass or chart. To bind yourself for the future to present\nopinions is doubtless unwise, but he who has inquired to any purpose has\ncome to some conclusion, affirmative, negative, or neutral; and it is\nthe province of a creed to avow the actual result, and the consequent;\nconduct intended to be followed. It is the vice of free thinking that\nit spreads universal uncertainty, and assumes right and wrong to be so\nprotean that no man can tell one hour what opinion he shall hold the\nnext. Logic should correct this unsatisfactory extreme, and extirpate\nthe tiresome race whom Shelley described in Peter Bell:--\n\n     To Peter's view, all seems one hue;\n     He is no Whig, he is no Tory;\n     No Deist and no Christian he--\n     But is so subtle, that to be\n     Nothing is all his glory**\n\n          * Logic, pp. 57-8, vol. 2\n\n          ** Vestiges.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII. INTELLECTUAL DARING\n\nFreedom has been hunted through the world, and is ever exposed to Insult\nand injury. It is crushed by conquest; frowned from courts; expelled\nfrom colleges; scorned out of society; flogged in schools; and\nanathematised in churches. Mind is her last asylum; and if freedom quail\nthere, what becomes of the hope of the world, or the worth of human\nnature?--W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes, part 12, p. 65.\n\nWe should be prepared to dare all things for truth. If the 'very hopes\nof man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manners\nand morals of mankind, are all at the mercy of a new generalisation,'\nwe should be prepared to risk them. If we must choose between truth\nand repose, we ought not to hesitate. There is danger in having the\ntruth--philosophers are obliged to conceal it. Mankind vaunt their love\nof truth, but they are not to be trusted. From interest or ignorance\nthey always persecute, and often kill, the discoverer. Still the\npursuit of truth is a _duty_, and we must find consolation in the heroic\nreflection of Burke, that _in all exertions of duty there it something\nto be hazarded_. But intellectual daring will never be common while it\nis so generally believed to be criminal. We will, therefore, quote some\nconsiderations touching the rightfulness of inquiry.\n\nWithout inquiry it is impossible for us to know whether our opinions\nare true or false, and various are the pretences employed for declining\ninvestigation: frequently they are masked under vague and metaphorical\nphrases: \"inquiry implies the weighing of evidence, and might lead to\ndoubt and perplexity\"--\"to search into a subject might shake the settled\nconvictions of the understanding\"--to examine opposite arguments, and\ncontradictory opinions, might contaminate the mind with false views.\n\n'Every one who alleges pretexts like these for declining inquiry, must\nobviously begin by assuming that his own opinions are unerringly in the\nright. Nothing could justify a man for declining the investigation of\na subject involving important opinions, but the possession of\nan understanding free from liability of error. Not gifted with\ninfallibility, in what way, except by diligent inquiry, can he obtain\nany assurance that he is not pursuing a course of injurious action? If\nhe holds any opinion, he must have acquired it either by examination,\nby instillation, rote, or some other process. On the supposition that\nhe has acquired it by proper examination, the duty on which I am now\ninsisting has been discharged, and the matter is at an end--but if he\nhas acquired it in any other manner, the mere plea, that his mind might\nbecome unsettled, can be no argument against the duty of investigation.\nFor anything he can allege to the contrary, his present opinions are\nwrong--and, in that case, the disturbance of his blind convictions,\ninstead of being an evil, is an essential step towards arriving at the\ntruth.\n\n'It may possibly be assigned, as a further reason for his declining\ninquiry, that he may come to some fallacy which he cannot surmount,\nalthough convinced of its character. If he is convinced of its\ncharacter, he must either have grounds for that conviction or not.\nIf he has grounds, let him examine them, draw them out, try if they are\nvalid, and then the fallacy will stand exposed. If he has no grounds for\nsuspecting a fallacy, what an irrational conclusion he confesses himself\nto have arrived at! But perhaps he will reply--he may be unable to solve\nthe difficulty; his mind may become perplexed, and the issue may prove,\nafter all, that it would have been much better had he remained in his\nformer strong, though unenlightened, conviction. Why better? If he is in\nperplexity let him read, think, consult the learned and the wise, and\nin the end he will probably reach a definite opinion on one side or the\nother. But if he should still remain in doubt, where is the harm? or\nrather, why is it not to be considered a good? The subject is evidently\none which admits strong probabilities on opposite sides. Doubt is\ntherefore the proper sentiment for the occasion--it is the result of\nthe best exercise of the faculties--and either positively to believe,\nor positively to disbelieve, would imply an erroneous appreciation of\nevidence.\n\nIn the minds of some people a strong prejudice appears to exist\nagainst that state of the understanding which is termed doubt. A little\nreflection, however, will convince any one that on certain subjects\n\"doubt\" is as appropriate a state of the reasoning faculties as belief\nor disbelief on others. There are doctrines, propositions, facts,\nsupported and opposed by every degree of evidence, and amongst them\nby that degree of evidence of which the proper effect is to leave the\nunderstanding in an equipoise between two conclusions. In these cages\n\"doubt\" is the appropriate result, which there can be no reason to\nshrink from or lament. But it may be further urged, that inquiry might\ncontaminate the understanding with false views--and, therefore, It is\nwise and laudable to abstain from it.\n\n'We can comprehend what is meant by contaminating a man's habits or\ndisposition, or even imagination. But there is no analogy on these\npoints in reference to the understanding. There is contamination,\nthere is evil, in preposterous and obscene images crowding before the\nintellectual vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct perception of\ntheir character--but there is no contamination, no evil, in a thousand\nfalse arguments coming before the understanding, if their quality is\nclearly discerned. The only possible evil in this case is mistaking\nfalse for true--but the man who shrinks from investigation lest he\nshould mistake false for true, can have no reason for supposing himself\nfree from that delusion in his actual opinions. Besides these objections\nto inquiry, there are other prejudices of a similar character, forming\nserious impediments to the attainment of truth.\n\n'One of these is a _fear that we may search too far, and become\nchargeable with presumption in prying into things we ought not to know_.\nA few words will suffice to prove that nothing can be more irrational\nand absurd. We have already shown that true opinions are conducive to\nthe welfare of mankind--and the prosecution of inquiry is therefore a\nprocess from which we have everything to hope and nothing to fear, and\nto which there are no limits but such as the nature of our own faculties\npre scribes.\n\n'A second prejudice--that _we may contract guilt, if, in the course of\nour researches, we miss the right conclusion, and had therefore better\nlet inquiry alone_--is still more influential in preventing those\ninvestigations which it is our duty to make. As our opinions on any\nsubject are not voluntary acts, but involuntary effects, in whatever\nconclusions our researches terminate they can involve us in no\nculpability. All that we have to take care of is, to bestow on every\nsubject an adequate and impartial attention. Having done this, we have\ndischarged our duty; and it would be irrational and unmanly to entertain\nany apprehension for the result.\n\n'In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the prejudice now under\nconsideration. If we may contract guilt by searching after truth, wo may\nequally do so by remaining in our present state The reason alleged in\nthe prejudice itself, and the only reason which can be assigned with any\nplausibility, why we may commit an offence by embarking in any inquiry,\nis that we may, by so doing, miss the right conclusion, or, in other\nwords, fall into error--for no one would seriously contend that we\nincur any moral culpability by an investigation which conducts us to the\ntruth. But it is obvious that we may equally miss the right conclusion\nby remaining in our actual opinions. It is, then, incumbent on us to\nascertain whether we are committing an offence by remaining in them--in\nother words, it is necessary to examine whether those opinions are true.\nThus the reasons assigned for not inquiring, lead to the conclusion that\nit is necessary to inquire.\n\n'The third prejudice is that acquiescence in received opinions, or\nforbearing to think for ourselves, shows a degree of humility highly\nproper and commendable--if closely examined will be found usually\nto evince nothing but a great degree of indolent presumption, or\nintellectual cowardice. There is often, in truth, as great a measure of\npresumption in this species of acquiescence as in the boldest hypothesis\nwhich human invention can start. That received and established opinions\nare true, is one of those sweeping conclusions which would require\nvery strong reasons, and often elaborate research, to justify. On\nwhat grounds are they considered to be true by one who declines\ninvestigation? Because (on the most favourable supposition) they have\nbeen handed down to us by our predecessors, and have been held\nwith unhesitating faith by a multitude of illustrious men. But what\ncomprehensive reasons are these? What investigation would it require to\nshew that they were valid? As the whole history of mankind teems with\ninstances of the transmission of the grossest errors from one generation\nto another, and of their having been countenanced by the concurrence of\nthe most eminent of our race--how, without examination, can we show that\nthis particular instance is an exception from the general lot?\n\n'From the necessity of using our own judgment, or, in other words, of\narriving at a conclusion for ourselves, we cannot be absolved. Far from\nbeing a virtue, blind acquiescence in the opinions of others is, in most\ncases, a positive vice, tending to stop all advancement in knowledge,\nand all improvement in practice.\n\nFrom the preceding it is evident that the inquirer may enter on his task\nwith full confidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or forbidden,\nor presumptuous enterprise, but is, on the contrary, engaging in\nthe discharge of a duty. Let him be as circumspect as he pleases in\ncollecting his facts and deducing his conclusions, cautious in the\nprocess, but fearless in the result. Let him be fully aware of his\nliability to error, of the thousand sources of illusions, of the limited\npowers of the individual, of the paramount importance of truth--but let\nhim dismiss all apprehensions of the issue of an investigation conducted\nwith due application of mind and rectitude of purpose.'*\n\n     * Extracts of Summary, by Aliquis. of arguments on the Duty\n     of Inquiry, from the 'Pursuit of Truth, and other Essays, by\n     S. Bailey, in Reasoner No. 12.\n\nMarcus Antoninus, indeed, said 'I seek after truth, by which no man yet\nwas ever injured.' But there is a great practical mistake here. There is\ndanger in truth---and the admission should be plainly made. Men, where\nforewarned, make the choice more manfully. We have been wisely told by\nEmerson, that the cherished thoughts and institutions of mankind are\nat the mercy of a new generalisation--rest, commodity, reputation.\nInconvenience, and suspense, are the consequences of the partizanship\nof truth. Certain political truths annihilate the interests of whole\nclasses. Certain social truths war with life-cherished prejudices.\nCertain sanitary truths reduce the value of all city property. Certain\nscientific truths ruin the working classes by thousands. In a wiser\nstate of society this could be prevented, but our present business is\nwith what is. It is therefore idle to conceal the truth--that there is\ndanger in truth. Pope's dictum, that party is the madness of many for\nthe gain of a few, is inversely true of truth. Truth is the ultimate\nbenefit of many, but the immediate ruin of the few. Here, however, comes\nto our aid the wise and far-seeing aphorism of Burke--'In all exertions\nof duty there is something to be hazarded'--and the brave man and wise\nfriend of mankind will risk the fate which surely awaits him--the fate\nof Galileo, Newton, Salomon de Caus, Volta, Fulton, Winser, Arkwright,\nGall, and all who present themselves, with truth in their hands, at the\ndoor of this great bedlam called the world--the fate of being received\nwith stones and hisses.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV. IDOLS\n\nThe term Idol is employed by Bacon to designate those prejudices which\nmen prefer to truth. A prejudice is a bias without a reason for it, an\nopinion without a foundation, a judgment formed of persons and things\nwithout sufficient examination, an assent given to a proposition without\nsufficient evidence. The bias may be honourable, the opinion correct,\nthe assent in the right direction, but still of the nature of\nprejudice, because, if right, it is right by accident rather than\ndesign.\n\nIgnorance hides from us facts, and we decide partially rather than\nconfess our deficiency. Ill-directed education gives us pre-possessions,\nwhich are obstacles in the way of truth, and we continue to cherish\nwhat, having become a part of our nature, it pains us to discard. The\nsenses will occasionally mislead us and although we are conscious that\nappearances are not to be wholly trusted, we reluctantly doubt our own\ninfallibility. From early, and therefore unquestioned, associations, we\nhave acquired certain habits, and from fashion certain sentiments,\nand we continue old customs, and fall into the current opinion\nunconsciously. Of these sources of prejudice, logic warns us to beware.\nOf so much importance did Bacon regard these hindrances to truth,\nthat he considered the pursuit of new truth hopeless while they\nwere cherished. In a mixed vein of poetry and philosophy, he divided\nprejudices into four classes, which he called Idols of the Tribe, the\nDen, the Market and the Theatre. Idols of the Tribe are prejudices men\nimbibe from early training, and love of hypothesis. They are so called\nbecause common to the whole race or tribe of mankind. Idols of the Den\nare those which relate to a man's particular character, Idols of the\nMarket are those which are accommodated to common notions. Idols of the\nTheatre denote such as pertain to hypothetical systems of philosophy.\n\nRemembering the declarations of Euler and Gall, and the daily\ndiscoveries of science, we should stand, as it were, on the verge of\nthe old world of experience, and look out on the new world of troth.\nA young thinker should make for himself a chart of proposed reforms,\nsystems, and changes, agitated in his day--place\n\nIn relative positions in the scale of importance such as he deems of\nvalue, if true--and then analyse his experience to see what is\nsoundly opposed thereto. Such a practice would go far to rid men of\nidol-prejudices, which retard private improvement and public progress.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXERCISES\n\n1. All men possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power, leading\nto the aggrandisement and profit of their own body, have always abused\nit.'--Burke's Thoughts on the Present Discontents.\n\nThe student will find the proof of this proposition exhibited in the\nexample of Induction, quoted from Mr. Bailey, p. 63.\n\n2. Prosperity could never be reached and maintained in this country,\nwithout some provision for the regular employment of the poor.--Mr.\nBeckett's Speech in the House of Commons, Feb. 3,1842.\n\nThe demonstration, to universal conviction, of this proposition, would\nlead to an entire and beneficial change of the social condition of this\ncountry.\n\n3. The pen is the tongue of the world.--Paine. Put this in the\nsyllogistic form.\n\n4. A good instance of a metaphorical argument drawn out is given by Mr.\nMill:--'For instance, when Mr. Carlyle, rebuking the Byronic vein, says\nthat \"strength does not manifest itself in spasms, but in stout bearing\nof burdens;\" the metaphor proves nothing, it is no argument, only\nan allusion to an argument; in no other way however could so much of\nargument be so completely suggested in so few words. The expression\nsuggests a whole train of reasoning, which it would take many sentences\nto write out at length. As thus: Motions which are violent but brief,\nwhich lead to no end, and are not under the control of the will, are,\nin the physical body, more incident to a weak than to a strong\nconstitution. If this be owing to a cause which equally operates in what\nrelates to the mind, the same conclusion will told there likewise. But\nsuch is really the fact. For the body's liability to these sudden\nand uncontrollable motions arises from irritability, that is, unusual\nsusceptibility of being moved out of its ordinary course by\ntransient influences: which may equally be said of the mind. And this\nsusceptibility, whether of mind or body, must arise from a weakness\nof the forces which maintain and carry on the ordinary action of the\nsystem. All this is conveyed in one short sentence. And since the causes\nare alike in the body and in the mind, the analogy is a just one, and\nthe maxim holds of the one as much as of the other.'*\n\n     * Logic, pp. 433-4, vol. 2.\n\n5. A youth, named Evathlus, engaged with Protagoras to learn dialectics,\nand promised his tutor a large sum of money, _in case he gained the\nfirst cause he pleaded_, Evathlus, when fully instructed, refused to pay\nhis instructor. Protagoras brought his action thus--'You must pay the\nmoney however the cause go, for if I gain you must pay in consequence of\nthe sentence, as being cast in the cause; and if you gain it, you must\npay in pursuance of our covenant.' 'Nay,' Evathlus retorts, 'which way\nsoever the cause be decided, you will have nothing, for if I prevail,\nthe sentence gives it that nothing is due: and if I lose, then there is\nnothing due by the covenant.' What should be the decision in this case?\n\n6. The first case, says Cervantes, requiring Sancho's attention was a\nquestion put by a stranger, in presence of the stewards and rest of the\nattendants. 'My Lord,' said he, 'a certain manor is divided by a large\nriver. I beg your honour will be attentive, for the case is of great\nconsequence and of some difficulty. I say then, upon this river is a\nbridge, and at one end of it the gibbet, together with a sort of court\nhall, in which four judges usually sit to execute the law enacted by the\nlord of the river, bridge, and manor, which runs to this effect: Whoever\nshall pass this bridge, must first swear whence he comes and whither\nhe goes; if he swear the truth he shall be allowed to pass, but if he\nforswear himself he shall die upon the gallows without mercy or respite.\nThis law, together with the rigorous penalty, being known, numbers\npassed, and as it appeared they swore nothing but the truth, the judges\npermitted them to pass freely and without control. It happened, however,\nthat one man's oath being taken, he affirmed and swore by his deposition\nthat he was going to be hanged on that gibbet, and had no other errand\nor intention. The judges, having considered this oath, observed: if we\nallow this man to pass freely, he swore to a lie, and, therefore, ought\nto be hanged according to law; and if we ordered him to be hanged after\nhe hath sworn he was going to be suspended on that gibbet, he will have\nsworn the truth, and by the same law he ought to be acquitted, I beg,\ntherefore, to know, my lord governor [and student], what the judges must\ndo with this man?'\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI. TECHNICAL TERMS.\n\nAbstract names--the names of attributes.--J. S. Mill. Abstraction--fixing\nthought on the point of resemblance in one body.--drawing off and\ncontemplating separately any part of an an object.\n\nAction--a volition followed by an effect.--J. S. Mill.\n\nAnalogy--resemblance of relation.--Whately.\n\nAnalysis--the resolution of a complex whole into its component elements.\n--J. S. Mill.\n\nArgument--an expression in which, from something laid down as granted,\nsomething else is deduced--Whately.\n\nArgumentum ad hominem--appealing to an opponent's professed views.\n\nA priori--reasoning from cause to effect.\n\nA posteriori--arguing from effects to cause.\n\nBody--the unknown cause of our sensations--J. S. Mill.\n\nCause--the invariable antecedent, or thing going before.--the stimulus\nof an effect.\n\nConclusion--a proposition proved by argument.\n\nConnotative terms--denote a subject, and imply an attribute.---. J.S.\nMill.\n\nConsciousness--sensation of existences.\n\nDefinition--the separation of a thing, as by a boundary, from everything\nelse.\n\nDiscovery--finding out something already existing.\n\nEffect--the immediate, invariable consequent, or the change produced by\npower.\n\nENTHYMEME-An argument with one premiss suppressed being understood.\n\nExperience--events which have taken place within a person's own\nknowledge.--Whately.\n\nFallacy--an apparent argument.\n\nGeneral Terms--express the notion of partial similarity.\n\nGeneralisation--tracing certain points of resemblance.--naming one\nrespect in which many things agree.\n\nInduction--universalisation of truth by inference from uniform facts.\n\nIntuition--imaginary looking.--Whewell,\n\nLogic--a scientific use of facts.\n\nLogical Truth--that which admits of proof.--Chambers.\n\nMind--the unknown percipient of sensation.--J. S. Mill.\n\nNecessary Truths--are those in which we not only learn that the\nproposition is true, but see that it must be true; in which the negative\nof the truth is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even\nby an effort of the imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the\nreverse of that which is asserted.--Dr. Whewell: Phil. Inductive\nSciences, pp. 54-5, vol. 1.*\n\n* As 'necessary truths' are much talked of I have introduced here, from\nWhewell, the completest definition with which I am acquainted. For\nmyself, I coincide on this question with J. S. Mill, as quoted pp. 22-3.\n\nNon-connotative Terms--denote a subject only and an attribute only.--J.\nS. Mill.\n\nPhilosophy--the science of realities in opposition to that of mere\nappearances--the attempt to comprehend things as they are, rather than as\nthey seem.--Morell.\n\nPoint at issue--the real question to be decided.\n\nPower in logic, is the relation of circumstances to each other in time.\n\nPremises the propositions which precede a \"conclusion.\"--the name of the\npropositions from which a conclusion is deduced.\n\nPrinciple--an invariable rule.\n\nProof--sufficient evidence; the balance of probability in favour of a\nproposition.\n\nProposition--a sentence which affirms or denies something.--Whately.--An\nexpression in words of a judgment.--J. S. Mill, Reason--the recognition\nof facts.--the classification of facts.--following in the pathway of\nfacts.--the power of discerning coherences.--a premiss placed after its\nconclusion.--the minor premiss--in the sense of Reason for asserting\nsomething.\n\nReasoning--argumentation.--process, the same always. Subject--first term\nof a proposition.\n\nSyllogism--1. A general rule. 2. A fact contained under that rule. 3. A\nconclusion that the fact is so contained.--an argument stated regularly\nand at full length.--a valid argument so stated that its conclusiveness\nis evident from the mere form of the expression.\n\nTechnical Terms--the tools of art.--Whately.\n\nTechnical Language--regularly formed, defined, and agreed on set of\nexpressions.\n\nTestimony--second-hand experience. Direct evidence is that which is\nprofessedly given. Incidental, is corroboration casually introduced on\none subject in the course of an evidence delivered on another.\n\nTheory--is a system of rules intended to explain a class of facts. The\nrules should be precise, and rest on a rigorous induction of facts or\nprobabilities.\n\nTradition--the relation of a circumstance, not committed to writing by\nany person who observed it, but communicated orally from one to another\nfor a long period of time.","title":"A Logic of Facts; Or, Every-day Reasoning","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":37768}