{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_37370/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_37370","id":"gutenberg_37370","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37370","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Physics","Religion and science"],"text":"</pre>\n\n\n\nProduced by Curtis Weyant, Leonard Johnson and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby Case Western Reserve University Preservation Department\nDigital Library)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nRELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION.\n\nUniform with this Volume.\n\n=I. NATURE AND THE BIBLE.=\n\nA Course of Lectures on the Morse Foundation of the Union Theological\nSeminary, by J. W. DAWSON, LL.D. 12mo. $1.75.\n\n    \"Professor Dawson discusses his topic from the various\n    standpoints of a student of nature, not from the single\n    standpoint which has mostly been occupied by theologians The\n    book is not a _partisan_ publication. It will be found by those\n    opposed to be perfectly candid and fair, admitting difficulties\n    in their full force, and not seeking to evade, misinterpret, or\n    exaggerate any fact or argument\"--_Interior_.\n\n=II. CHRISTIANITY AND POSITIVISM.=\n\nA Series of Lectures to the Times on Natural Theology and Apologetics.\nBy JAMES MCCOSH, D.D., LL.D., President of Princeton College. 12mo.\n$1.75.\n\n    \"This book grapples directly with the vital questions. Every\n    reader must admire its fairness It is all the better adapted to\n    popular reading from having been written to be delivered to an\n    audience. Indeed, the thinking is generally so clear, and the\n    style so animated and luminous, that any person of average\n    intelligence and culture may understand and enjoy the discussion\n    and no such person who has begun to read the work will be likely\n    to rest satisfied till he has finished it. It is in some parts\n    eloquent and beautiful, and is throughout forcible and effective\n    for its end. Would that thousands of the young people of our\n    country, and of all classes whose faith may be in peril, might\n    read it with the attention it deserves\" _Independent_.\n\n=III. CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE.=\n\nA Series of Lectures. By Rev. A. P. PEABODY, D.D., of Harvard College.\n$1.75.\n\n    \"One of the best books we have read in a long time,--a manly,\n    candid, noble, reasonable defence of the Christian faith. We do\n    not see how any thoughtful person can read it in vain. Dr\n    Peabody plants himself fairly on the very postulates of\n    scientific men, and proceeds to show how all that they claim for\n    true science is fulfilled in the religion of\n    Jesus\"--_Illustrated Christian Weekly_.\n\nROBERT CARTER AND BROTHERS.\n\n\n[Illustration: NERVE CELLS\n\n1 MULTIPOLAR 2 BIPOLAR 3 UNIPOLAR 4 CELL WITH RAMIFICATION. NUCLEUS OR\nLIFE CENTRE IS MARKED IN EACH]\n\n[Illustration: NERVE FIBRES\n\n1 SECTION, SHOWING NERVE SHEATH CUT AND NERVE LINE PROJECTING 2 BUNDLE\nOF NERVES SPLIT UP INTO FILAMENTS 3 COMBINATION OF NERVES 4 NERVE LOOPS\n5 SENSORY CORPUSCLES ON THE NERVE FIBRES]\n\n\n\n\n  THE RELATIONS\n\n  OF\n\n  SCIENCE AND RELIGION.\n\n  The Morse Lecture, 1880,\n\n  _CONNECTED WITH THE UNION THEOLOGICAL\n  SEMINARY, NEW YORK._\n\n  BY\n\n  HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL.D.,\n\n  PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, AUTHOR\n  OF \"RELATIONS OF MIND AND BRAIN,\" ETC.\n\n  NEW YORK:\n  ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS,\n\n  530 BROADWAY.\n\n  1881.\n\n\n  Copyright, 1881,\n  BY ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS.\n\n  CAMBRIDGE:\n  PRESS OF\n  JOHN WILSON AND SON.\n\n  ST. JOHNLAND\n  STEREOTYPE FOUNDRY\n  SUFFOLK CO., N. Y.\n\n\n\n\n_EXTRACT FROM THE DEED OF TRUST, ESTABLISHING THE MORSE LECTURESHIP._\n\n\n\"The general subject of the Lectures, I desire to be:\n\n\"The relation of the Bible to any of the Sciences, as Geography,\nGeology, History, and Ethnology, the vindication of the inspiration and\nauthenticity of the Bible, against attacks made on scientific grounds,\nand the relation of the facts and truths contained in the Word of God,\nto the principles, methods and aims of any of the Sciences.\n\n\"Upon one or more of these topics a course of ten public Lectures shall\nbe given at least once in two or three years, by a Lecturer, ordinarily\nto be chosen two years in advance of the time for delivering of the\nLectures.\n\n\"The appointment of the Lecturer shall be by the concurrent action of\nthe Founder of the Lectureship, during his life, the Board of Directors,\nand the faculty of said Seminary.\n\n\"The funds shall be securely invested, and the interest of the same\nshall be devoted to the payment of the Lecturer, and to the publication\nof the Lectures within a year after the delivery of the same.\n\n\"The copyright of the Lectures shall be vested in the Seminary.\"\n\n  (_Signed_) SAMUEL F. B. MORSE.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe aim of the present volume is to indicate the measure of harmony\ntraceable between recent advances in science, and the fundamental\ncharacteristics of religious thought, and the extent to which harmony is\npossible. This attempt has been made in the hope of contributing towards\na better understanding of the relative positions of scientists and\ntheologians, thereby aiding the formation of public opinion on questions\nappearing to involve serious antagonism.\n\nThe plan followed is to bring under review the great fields of\nscientific inquiry, advancing from unorganized existence to Man; to\npresent the most recent results of research in these separate fields,\nwithout extending to minute details; as far as possible, to allow\nscientific observers to state results in their own words; and then to\nexamine carefully the reasonings deduced from ascertained facts, and the\nbearing of facts and inferences on religious thought.\n\nThe general result is that marked modifications of thought concerning\nthe structure and order of the universe have arisen on account of\nscientific discoveries, to be accepted by theologians, as by all\nthinkers; that the bearing of these modifications on religious\nconceptions has been greatly mistaken by many scientific observers; and\nthat it must be held clear by scientists and theologians alike, that\nwhile scientific methods are reliable within their own spheres, science\ncan bear no testimony, and can offer no criticism, as to the\nsupernatural, inasmuch as science is only an explanation of ascertained\nfacts by recognition of natural law. In accordance with this last\nstatement, it is maintained, that science does not reach, far less deal\nwith, the problem concerning the origin of Nature, the solution of which\ncan be found only by transcending Nature, that is, by recognizing the\nsupernatural.\n\nIn the course followed I believe the purpose of the eminent Physicist\nwho founded the lecture, has been rigidly kept in view.\n\nI desire here to express to the President and Professors of Union\nTheological Seminary, my sense of their great kindness while I delivered\nthe course of lectures in New York, and specially for so arranging as to\nallow of including the full course within eight lectures,--a form which\nhas been retained in publication.\n\nI have also to express my thanks for the kind manner in which these\nlectures were received in Edinburgh, where, with the exception of the\ntwo first, the course was, by request, redelivered.\n\n  H. C.\n\n  UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,\n  _January 31st, 1881_\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nLECTURE I.\n\nCONDITIONS OF THE INQUIRY.\n\n  Advantages resulting from recent advances in physical science\n  -- Advance does not unsettle the whole mass of conviction --\n  Religion and science agree in seeking a rational basis, and\n  both present a body of harmonized conceptions -- Diversity of\n  view is to be expected in both spheres -- Needless anxiety as\n  to alleged conflict between science and religion -- The first\n  requisite is to trace the boundaries of the two departments\n  of thought -- Description of religion, natural and revealed\n  -- Description of science, its method and sphere -- Common\n  starting ground for both -- Each supplies inducement for\n  seeking a harmony                                                   9\n\n\nLECTURE II.\n\nEXPERIENCE GATHERED FROM PAST CONFLICTS.\n\n  Value of the lessons from past failures -- Discussions as to\n  \"spontaneous generation\" -- Range of experiments and mode of\n  conducting them -- Difficulties in excluding germinal forms,\n  and in determining the temperature at which their destruction\n  was ensured -- Hopefulness awakened by earlier investigations\n  -- Acknowledged failure as the result of more rigid tests --\n  Conclusions of Pasteur, Roberts, Tyndall -- Close of the\n  discussion as maintained by Bastian -- Dr. Draper's \"History\n  of the Conflict between Religion and Science\" -- Objections\n  to the plan of the book -- Misleading representations of\n  conflict -- Alleged scriptural view of the nature of the\n  world, incapable of vindication -- The Bible not a book of\n  science, but a revelation of the way of deliverance for\n  sinful man                                                         43\n\n\nLECTURE III.\n\nINORGANIC ELEMENTS IN THE UNIVERSE.\n\n  Two forms of existence to be recognized -- Matter and Energy\n  -- Distinction of the two -- Tait on energy -- MATTER -- Its\n  indestructibility and uncreatability by any process at the\n  command of man -- The atomic theory as related to the\n  divisibility and compressibility of matter -- Scientific\n  belief, as analogous to theologic -- ENERGY -- Perpetual\n  change in form and distribution of materials -- Position,\n  motion, and force -- Transmutation or conversion of energy --\n  Conservation of Energy -- Deterioration and dissipation of\n  energy -- Heat as a form of motion -- Results of scientific\n  research are such as to support religious thought concerning\n  the origin of the world -- The changeable can not be the\n  eternal -- Science here reaches its _ultimatum_ as to the\n  structure of the world, and gives all the support possible to\n  the reality of the supernatural                                    82\n\n\nLECTURE IV.\n\nORGANIZED EXISTENCE. LIFE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.\n\n  The new problem -- Origin of life, relation of the organized\n  to the unorganized -- Origin of species -- Darwin's theory of\n  evolution by natural selection -- Characteristics of life --\n  The prominent features of Mr. Darwin's theory -- Power of\n  adaptability to environment inherent in organism -- History\n  of the steps by which the author was led to the adoption of\n  his theory -- Wallace's \"Contributions\" -- Darwin's\n  acknowledgment that science does not favor the belief that\n  living creatures are produced from inorganic matter --\n  Admission of creation of life -- Favorable impression made by\n  the theory -- Common ancestry of allied species -- Rejection\n  of fixedness of species -- Difficulties which beset the\n  theory -- All change does not indicate progress -- Difficulty\n  connected with the early stages of evolution -- Persistence\n  of species                                                        119\n\n\nLECTURE V.\n\nRELATIONS OF LOWER AND HIGHER ORGANISMS.\n\n  Fertilization of flowering plants -- Relation of pollen to\n  the seed vessels -- Need for transference of pollen -- Means\n  to prevent self-fertilization -- Relation between animal life\n  and vegetable -- Search for honey by bees and other insects\n  -- Bearing the pollen to distant flowers -- Distribution of\n  work among insects and birds -- Evidence of adaptation --\n  Interdependence of lower and higher organisms -- ANTS --\n  Their exclusion from certain flowers -- Their work,\n  perseverance, intelligence, slave-holding, extracting honey\n  from other insects, constructing bridges                          162\n\n\nLECTURE VI.\n\nHIGHER ORGANISMS; -- RESEMBLANCES AND CONTRASTS.\n\n  Sensibility and motor activity characteristic of animal life\n  -- Both uniformly provided for by identical arrangements of\n  nerve system -- Two distinct lines of nerve fibre combined in\n  a nerve centre -- Structure of nerve fibre -- Isolation --\n  Combination -- Brain structure -- White matter, and grey --\n  Subdivisions of the organ -- Complexity of brain structure\n  according to complexity of organism -- Brain in insects,\n  fishes, reptiles, smaller quadrupeds, larger quadrupeds,\n  monkeys, apes, man -- Close resemblance of the brain of the\n  ape to the human brain -- Researches as to brain function by\n  means of electric excitation of the organ -- Fritsch and\n  Hitzig -- Ferrier -- Identification of sensory and of motor\n  centres -- Silence of front and back regions -- Confirmatory\n  evidence from brain diseases                                      204\n\n\nLECTURE VII.\n\nMAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD.\n\n  Human organism modelled on the same plan as lower organisms\n  -- Prevailing opinion opposes an attempt to refer all human\n  activity to organism -- Religious thought not directly\n  involved -- Science must include the study of human life --\n  Science by discovery of the structure and functions of the\n  nerve system has explained many phases of action formerly\n  regarded as voluntary -- The contrast remains between\n  muscular action and human conduct -- Acquired aptitudes --\n  Intellectual superiority -- H\u00e6ckel's suggestion of \"mind\n  cells\" -- Adverse evidence -- Nerve cells, varied sizes, the\n  largest found in the spinal canal, as well as in the brain --\n  Government of human conduct -- Man's application of a higher\n  law -- Benevolence, as an illustration -- Contrast with\n  struggle for existence -- Man's ideal law, constituting the\n  _ought_ in human conduct                                          239\n\n\nLECTURE VIII.\n\nDIVINE INTERPOSITION FOR MORAL GOVERNMENT.\n\n  Summary of recent scientific conclusions with which religious\n  thought is to be harmonized -- Religious conceptions as to\n  divine interposition, in their relation to fixed law --\n  MIRACLE -- Its place as evidence for the Messiahship of Jesus\n  Christ -- Credibility of miracles -- Our Saviour's miracles\n  -- Their benevolent purpose as bearing on their evidential\n  value -- How related to the laws of nature -- Incapable of\n  explanation by these laws -- They do not conflict with these\n  laws in any intelligible sense -- Meaning of the old formula,\n  \"a violation of the laws of nature\" -- Importance of the\n  scientific position that violation of natural law is\n  inconsistent with our knowledge of the government of the\n  world -- Method and result in miracle-working, as related to\n  natural law -- Explanation of the antagonism of scientific\n  thought to the conception of miracle -- PRAYER -- How its\n  answer stands related to natural law -- The cruder thoughts\n  concerning the province of prayer -- All law, fixed law,\n  whether physical, intellectual, or moral -- These laws a\n  harmony -- It is in recognition of this, with subordination\n  of physical to moral, that the spirit of prayer lives --\n  Fixed law is concerned with varying conditions, and with\n  varying results -- Interpretation of \"fixed law\" --\n  Dependence of physical results on moral action -- That there\n  are two spheres is no help out of difficulty -- Nothing in\n  scientific teaching to warrant denial of the doctrine that\n  God interposes for moral ends -- Warrant for prayer rests on\n  a divine promise, involving moral conditions -- To ask\n  evidence of its answer, irrespective of these conditions, is\n  to seek evidence in neglect of that which is essential for\n  the result -- The answer of prayer must be in all cases more\n  an evidence of divine righteousness than it is of divine\n  power                                                             275\n\n\n  APPENDIX.\n\n  I. Relations of Science and Religion                              313\n\n  II. Spontaneous Generation                                        313\n\n  III. Energy and Force                                             314\n\n  IV. All Organized Existence is Constructed on a Common Plan       314\n\n  V. Embryology                                                     316\n\n  VI. Non-advancement of Lower Orders                               319\n\n  VII. Protoplasm                                                   319\n\n  VIII. Number of Species of Insects                                320\n\n  IX. Fertilization of Flowers by Insects                           320\n\n  X. Ants                                                           320\n\n  XI. Likeness of the Ape's Brain to the Human Brain                321\n\n  XII. The Large Sized or Multipolar Cells                          322\n\n  XIII. The Conception of Duty                                      323\n\n\n\n\nRELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE I.\n\nCONDITIONS OF THE INQUIRY.\n\n\nAmong the many advantages enjoyed by the present generation, one of the\nmost conspicuous is that arising from the large advance made in physical\nscience. The high value of this is apparent from whatever standpoint it\nis regarded. The vastly wider range of knowledge, the increase of\nappliances for inquiry, the greater facilities for work of all kinds,\nthe freer intercommunion of all the divisions of our race, and the\ngreater altitude from which the whole realm of existence can be\ncontemplated; all these involve an immense gain for the present century.\n\nWith these advantages, however, there comes the difficulty of using them\naright, a difficulty which we may expect to be greater when we are\ndealing with wider and more general aspects of existence, than when we\nare concerned with more restricted ranges of knowledge. It may be a much\neasier thing to state precisely how recent advances have affected a\nparticular branch of science, such as astronomy or geology, than to say\nhow they bear upon the general conception of the universe. Yet, while\nthe latter is the more difficult question, it is that with which men\ngenerally must be more concerned. Only a very limited number of men can\nbelong to the ranks of specialists devoted to a single branch of\nscience. All men, specialists as well as others, are concerned with the\nwider question as to the true conception of the universe, and the\nbearing it has on human life and destiny. It is impossible to imagine\nthat marked advance can be made in any of the sciences, without its\nhaving some bearing on the more general problem in which all men are\npractically interested. Each specialist perceives this more or less\nclearly as he is working out the result of complicated observations or\ncalculations. The public mind may be said rather to _feel_ that some\nmodification of common belief is taking place, while there is great\nuncertainty as to the actual change. What gives a sense of security to\nthe general conviction of educated men is that all increase of\nknowledge is clear gain, and that all advance is secured on familiar and\nwell-tried lines. Progress is transition, and in a sense unsettling; but\nit is also accumulation, and thus in a more enduring sense,\nconsolidating. Fresh observation in some one department of research does\nnot overthrow all that was credited previously. It extends the area of\nknowledge, or carries us into a more minute acquaintance with\nparticulars, and only in a restricted way modifies accepted positions,\nby introducing relations formerly unrecognized. Thus, progress in a\nparticular science does not unsettle scientific belief.\n\nIn a manner exactly analogous, because resting on the same intellectual\nconditions, the combined advance of the whole order of sciences does not\nunsettle the mass of conviction belonging to instructed and ordinarily\nreflective men. It must, indeed, modify the form of general conviction,\nas it quickens intellectual interest, for the public mind receives, not\nreluctantly but gladly, additional results gathered under carefully\ntested scientific methods. This is nothing more than saying, that love\nof truth, and submission to the laws of evidence, are characteristic of\nall disciplined intelligence. Scientific inquirers are the trained\ninstructors of the race, and others receive what they communicate, with\ntrue sense of its abiding worth. At the same time, such inquirers work\nfrom an intellectual basis which is common to all, finding application\nin all fields of activity. Upon that basis all men lean as they shape\nand regulate their life, finding themselves involved in disaster, or\nconfirmed in a wise course, according as they are partial or thorough in\ntheir adherence to the conditions of rational life. As the mass of human\ninterests can not be isolated from the results discovered in the path of\nadvancing science; so neither can any form of inquiry be separated from\nthe conditions which are common to all intellectual life, including even\nthe least cultivated. So it happens that the race as a whole has a clear\nshare in all the products of science, such as it has not in the products\nof industry. Rational conditions provide for a community of interest in\nintellectual work and results, greater than can be approached by all the\nvalue of material production.\n\nThese few general and very obvious considerations bring us into direct\nline with the relations of religion and science. Religion has a rational\nbasis, as the condition of its practical worth. It takes its start from\nthat common intellectual basis, which affords to science its essential\nconditions. Religion and science are exactly alike in these respects,\nthat both present a body of harmonized conceptions, a clearly defined\ncircle of intelligible statements, and both have a definite bearing on\nhuman action. Their practical value depends upon conformity with the\ncommon requirements of intelligence, and harmony with recognized fact. I\nplace this declaration in the foreground of the present discussion, not\nonly as a clear avowal of the footing on which religion presents its\nclaims to acceptance, but more especially as a distinct and broad\nacknowledgment that the whole range of tests afforded by the entire\ncircle of the sciences is legitimately applied to religion, and is to be\ndeliberately met.\n\nThe object of the present course of lectures is to consider the\nrelations of science to the Christian religion, as authoritatively\nrevealed in the Bible, and as understood and accepted by those who\nprofess themselves Christians, in grateful acknowledgment of what the\nScriptures declare. The relations now to be dealt with are those\nsubsisting between religion as presented in the Bible, (which is in the\nhands of all, to be examined and dealt with by scientific inquirers),\nand science as presented to us in the present day, for the acceptance of\nall. The claim to universal acceptance found here on both sides, is that\nwhich gives special interest and true logical importance to the problem.\nChristianity professes to discover a religion to be accepted of all men,\nand a practice to be observed by all: science professes to give an\naccount of the state of things around us in the world, to be accepted by\nall, and acknowledged in practice if men would adapt themselves to the\nnatural conditions of their life. This claim to universal acceptance is\nnot affected on either side by the fact that diversities of\ninterpretation and application emerge among the upholders of\nChristianity, and the expounders of science. Such diversities are well\nknown to exist in both spheres of thought. It needs to be recognized at\nall times, and prominently stated in such a discussion as the present,\nthat under the conditions determining the attainment of knowledge,\nthere must be diversity of opinion. Indeed, the wider the area of\nacquired truth, the more extensive becomes the field of possible\ndifferences, both in respect of what is involved under conclusions\nalready reached, and of what may transcend the boundaries of present\nknowledge. It is, therefore, no marvel that there is large diversity of\nopinion among scientific men, on many problems arising out of\nuniversally accepted positions. It is only by the same necessity that\nthere is diversity of opinion on matters of religion. The materials of\nstudy are set before us in the mass, and our knowledge is to be obtained\nby the slow processes of intellectual procedure, in accordance with\nwhich some things become clear, while many more remain obscure. Whether\nwe are dealing with book knowledge, or with knowledge obtained by direct\nobservation of existing things, does not affect this matter. The\nintellectual conditions are the same in both cases, and it is from\nexactly the same intellectual source that inevitable conflict of opinion\narises.\n\nThe simple and obvious truth is that there can be no field of human\ninquiry in which diversity of opinion can be avoided, for two reasons,\nthat all knowledge possessed by us is incomplete, and active\nintelligence can not rest in the incomplete. Neither science nor\ntheology can afford to dispense with hypothesis, that is conjecture, and\nwhere conjecture is, there is a wide region for devious wandering.\nConjecture means inquiry into the unknown, and this is essential to\nintellectual life, equally necessary for science and religion, and\naccordingly diversity of opinion is inevitable in the history of both,\nas in the history of all forms of human activity. In every region of\nhuman knowledge there is a realm of the certain, and another of the\nuncertain, and accordingly there is diversity of opinion and conviction.\nOccasionally, in controversial writing, it is suggested that there is\ngreater diversity of view in matters religious, than in matters\nscientific; and it is implied that such diversity is a reasonable ground\nof reproach. Both allegations are at fault, and the error arises from\nwant of observation, involving imperfect acquaintance with the facts.\nReligion as it is concerned with the life of man himself, and is the\nsubject of interest to all, has not only its common positions generally\nrecognized, but also many of its phases of conflicting thought.\nScience, as it is beyond the range of the great majority as a subject of\npersonal research, and within reach of only a limited number as a\nsubject even of book knowledge, has its questions of conflict concealed\nto some extent from the public view. But, even moderate acquaintance\nwith science makes us aware of the fact that there is conflict of\nopinion in every region of inquiry. Indeed it should be alien to the\nreflective observer, to marvel at the discovery of diversity of thought\nin any region, or to make its existence a ground for adverse criticism.\nCommonly accepted conclusions must afford the basis for competent\ncriticism, whatever be the field of inquiry brought under review;\ndiversity of opinion beyond and around these, must be accepted as the\nuniform attendant of human knowledge, indicating at once the provision\nfor intellectual progress and the inducement to it. Thus, on grounds\nindisputable from a scientific basis, we escape the need for vindicating\nreligion from the charge of having its claims to rational homage\nweakened, by the diversity of opinion found within the boundaries of\nreligious thought. Such diversity is in strict accordance with familiar\nfacts connected with every branch of science. Whatever may be said of\nthe strong and paradoxical, because one-sided, utterance of Lessing,[A]\nit must be manifest that in all directions we are of necessity searchers\nafter truth, and it is in such circumstances an intellectual weakness to\nobject to the reliability of generally accepted conclusions, because\nthey become starting-points for many lines of conflicting speculation.\nIn religious thought, as in scientific, there are on all hands the marks\nof the unfinished; and the varieties of opinion associated with\ngenerally accepted conviction only afford needful evidence of healthy\nintellectual activity.\n\nAs we daily hear much of the conflict between science and religion, and\nas it is one part of the purpose of the present course to deal with what\nis loudly proclaimed to be a serious feature in modern thought, it\nbecomes needful to clear the ground considerably, with the view of\ndiscovering where the alleged conflict is, and what form it assumes. In\nthis, as in many conflicts, there is much more din and tumult, than\ndamage. We shall by and by hear much less of _conflict_ than we are\nhearing at present. Meanwhile, however, the work is considerable which\nneeds to be done in clearing the field, tracing boundaries, and\ndisclosing the exact position of parties. In the ruder warfare of\nnations, this clearing work is undertaken by the combatants themselves,\nand if not accomplished by preliminary measures, it is at length\nachieved by the actual events of the struggle. But in this case, it may\nbe done quietly enough by non-combatants, while it may contribute\nlargely to the restricting of the conflict, and the establishment of\npeace. This I desire to attempt, in the hope that some service may be\nrendered both to the scientific, and non-scientific, by contributing\ntowards a general understanding of the actual position of affairs. A\nquiet survey of events occurring during the last twenty-five years or\nso, which have influenced the relations of science and religion, may\nsuffice to convince us that there has been on both sides needless\nplanting of batteries, and pouring forth of shot. In many cases, the\nshot has only sunk into sand banks with no other result than heavy\nexpenditure; in other cases, it has only shattered timber defences which\nwere going at any rate, and soon to be abandoned. The worst result has\nbeen that the whole district around has been thrown into trouble under\nfear of disastrous results. This description must be held to apply to\noutbreaks of theological fury, as well as of scientific. I apprehend\nthat there are few friends of religion conversant with the higher phases\nof intellectual life during the period to which reference is here made,\nwho will not grant that scientific theories have been assailed with\nundue severity, and quite needless apprehension, under the influence of\nreligious zeal. On the other hand, it is equally beyond dispute that\nthere has been in some scientific quarters an eagerness to interpret\nscientific theories in a manner adverse to theological belief, and often\nwith undisguised pleasure in the task, as if some real gain to thought\nand practical interests were to be secured by injury to religion. The\nbest work on both sides has been done quite apart from these outbreaks\nof antagonism. But it would be unwise to omit reference to them here,\nor to overlook the lesson they convey, all the more that both sides\nadmit reasonable ground for regret. There has been, on the one hand, too\ngreat readiness in charging an atheistic conclusion as the logical\nresult of scientific theory; and, on the other, too hasty an assumption\nthat newly recognized facts must prove damaging to Christian faith.\nDetailed illustration would be in every sense undesirable here, but\noutstanding examples will readily occur. Take the theory of the\nDevelopment of Species by Natural Selection, to which detailed reference\nwill be made hereafter, which has a great multitude of facts to favor\nit, and at the same time a mass of facts presenting most serious logical\ndifficulties; it is obvious that even if this theory were accepted in\nthe form in which it is at present propounded, not only would the\nrational basis for belief in the Divine existence and government not be\naffected by it, but the demand on a Sovereign Intelligence would be\nintensified. The contrast in the form of the general question may be\nrepresented thus: in the one case, to account for the origin of varied\nforms of life entirely distinct and independent; in the other, to\naccount for an origin in the simplest germinal form, or in a few\nprimordial forms, which shall nevertheless provide for the appearance of\nall the varieties of species of animal life now known to us. In\npresenting the latter hypothesis, science presses into notice a much\ngreater perplexity affecting the origin of the universe, originating a\ndifficulty towards the solution of which it is altogether unable to\noffer the slightest contribution. In this single illustration, there is\nmuch to convince theologians and scientific men that each division of\nthinkers will best fulfil its own part, and most honor religion and\nscience, by working unreservedly on data within its own reach, without\napprehension as to ultimate conflict.\n\nFrom the other side, it is not difficult to find evidence that continued\ninquiry and reflection have led to the abatement, if not the actual\nwithdrawal, of scientific hypotheses which seemed at variance with\ncommon belief, and which might be taken as adverse to religious thought.\nFor example, as a branch of the inquiry connected with the theory of\ndevelopment of species, and coming directly upon the position of man in\nthe scale of being, we had for a time a wonderful amount of\nobservation, description, and discussion concerning monkeys and apes.\nLaborious inquiries became provocative of grotesque fancy. In the train\nof science came the workers who minister to the popular imagination, and\nthere appeared a whole series of comic pictures, amusing narratives, and\neven musical compositions, representing monkeys and apes as taking part\nin human occupations. These have left their testimony to the power of\nscientific hypothesis in determining the thought and interest of the\ntime during which they find favor. It was demonstrated incontestably\nthat the anatomical structure of the ape was much more like to that of\nman than the structure of the dog, or the horse; and that the brain of\nthe ape was so like in form and arrangement to the human brain, that it\nmight be represented as a smaller and undeveloped example of the human\nbrain. But when the work of observation and description had been well\nnigh completed; when the work of deliberate thinking was commenced with\nthe assurance that the facts were pretty fully and fairly before us,\nthere came a considerable abatement for the enthusiasm of scientific\nspeculation in the new line of discovery. Next came the acknowledgment\nthat even with all the analogies and homologies of structure, seen and\nunseen, there was a vast chasm between the ape and man. Forthwith, the\nstimulus to comic talent began to die away; and it must be confessed\nthat the department of anthropology has not been greatly advanced from\nthis new region of observation.\n\nThese examples may suffice to impress at once upon theologians and\nscientists,--and upon the public mind also,--the obvious, but easily\nforgotten lesson, that there is need for deliberation before we can\nclearly decide the exact significance of new scientific discoveries.\nNeither the spirit of religion, nor the scientific spirit, disposes\ninquirers to make haste. There is a basis of certainty, sufficiently\nbroad and deep to deliver the mind from concern lest intellectual\nconfusion should arise from continued observation and thought.\nEnthusiasm, acuteness, patience, and also boldness of speculation, are\nneeded in order to widen the range of our knowledge of the mysteries of\nexistence; but caution is as certainly a necessary feature in the\ngathering of appliances which must lie at the command of theologians\nand also of scientific observers. In fact, there is at every fresh\nadvance in science, much _thinking_ to be done, after observation and\nexposition have accomplished their part, and this thinking can not be\nquickly done.\n\nTowards a clear marking out of the boundaries of science and religion,\nit is needful that some definition or description of both be attempted.\nIt is easy to be religious without sharply marking off for one's self\nthe exact boundaries of religion; and equally easy to be scientific,\nwithout exactly laying down the limits of science. But any intelligent\nview of the relations of the two is not to be had without carefully\nmarking off the territory which they respectively occupy. Science at\nleast should seek for itself \"a scientific boundary,\" and though this is\nnot always easily found, it is essential for keeping up friendly\nrelations with neighboring states. In view, therefore, of the\nrequirements of the present subject, something must here be done in the\nway of definition, or at least, description, delicate and difficult as\nis the task.\n\nThe object of these lectures is, to vindicate the place of the Christian\nreligion within the region of human intelligence, to show its rational\nharmony with science, and to promote active co-operation between the\ntwo. And this is to be done for the Christian religion in view of all\nthe advantages, and of all the alleged disadvantages too, of what has\nbeen reproachfully named \"a book religion,\" which assuredly it is, just\nas all science must become \"book science,\" if it is to become a living\nand abiding intellectual power among men. For all reliable knowledge\nmust be formulated, must take a definite orderly shape, if it is to find\na place and dominion. In the history of intelligent being in this world,\nreligion first of all met this requirement, and subjected itself to this\ntest, adapting itself also to successive ages, and submitting itself to\ntheir criticism. Science owns a like intellectual necessity, and has had\nto write and rewrite, to correct and expand, in order that the\nbook-science might be the true science of the day. Whatever be the\nnature of the truth received by man, its statement is greatly enhanced\nin value when it has been reduced to written form, suitable not only for\nbeing passed from hand to hand, but for being pondered with all\ndeliberation.\n\nWhile, however, it is a great advantage to Christianity that it can be\ndescribed as the religion of the Bible,--and it is to Christianity that\nreference is directly made here when religion is named,--there is in\nreligion as in science that which comes before the written form.\nObservation and reflection are natural avenues to religion, as well as\nto science. The Bible appeals to the intelligence of man for its\nacceptance, subjecting to rational test not only its evidence but also\nits teaching. Its uniform demand is that men put its teaching to proof.\nIt thus presupposes a natural religion as the prerequisite for special\nrevelation of the supernatural. The full breadth of the argument in\nexposition and defence of Christianity is seen only by starting from\nthis position, that all religion, whatever its form, rests on a rational\nbasis. And its correlative is this, irreligion is the irrational. The\nvindication of the Christian religion thus implies at its basis the\ndefence of religious thought and feeling in whatever associations they\nmay be found. For though it is true that the Christian religion may be\nsaid to war against all religions besides, seeking to supplant them, in\norder to become the universal religion, it does so only on the footing\nthat religious thought and feeling wherever found have a genuine\nintellectual value, which must work towards deliverance from what is\nimmoral and what is inconsistent in tradition. If it be here remarked\nthat science also tends to the destruction of the traditional beliefs\nbelonging to many of the religions of the world, it may thereby appear\nthat science becomes a fellow-worker with Christianity in a process of\ndemolition required in the interests equally of intelligence, morality,\nand religion. But whatever may be said of this destructive process as\none in which Christianity performs a conspicuous part, the religion of\nJesus recognizes a voice in the works of creation speaking to the hearts\nof men, in all lands, insomuch that \"there is no speech nor language\nwhere their voice is not heard.\" Religious belief is thus recognized as\na natural possession, and reverence for the Most High as following by\nrational sequence.\n\nWhen therefore we offer a defence of the Christian faith and practice,\nwe necessarily undertake some defence of the varied manifestations of\nnatural religion presenting themselves in the world's history. We are\nnot precluded from assigning value to the loftier and purer thought of\nancient civilization testifying against \"the gods many and lords many\"\nof the popular religion; nor do we refuse to make acknowledgment of\nthose ruder and baser examples of religious observance appearing among\ntribes of uncivilized men in modern times. In defending religion, we are\nupholding the lofty conceptions of the Greek philosopher, who said that\n\"God is not the author of evil, but of good only;\" who declared that God\n\"is one and the same, immutably fixed in his own proper nature,\" and\nthat \"God and his attributes are absolutely perfect.\"[B] On the other\nhand, we can not escape the serious entanglement found among heathen\nidolatries, for even while such idolatries are utterly condemned, we are\nready to maintain that the most irrational idolatries have more of\nreason in them than the life which has been emptied of religious faith\nand exercise.\n\nIn view of the wide range of natural religion, and the defence of it\nhere implied, we may define religion, as the recognition of a Sovereign\nIntelligence originating and governing all dependent being, with the\nhomage due from intelligent beings to the Sovereign Intelligence. This\nis the definition which will include all natural religion, and present\nthe ground of its defence in view of scientific suggestions and\nperplexities.\n\nBut taking the Christian religion as the crown and centre of religious\nlife in the world, we have a more full and commanding testimony as to\nthe glory of the divine nature, and the genuine exercises of a religious\nlife. He is God creating and sustaining all, ruling in righteousness,\nrevealing himself in Jesus Christ, whose glory is \"the glory as of the\nonly begotten of the Father full of grace and truth.\" He is a God\nseeking the reconciliation of the guilty with himself. He is a God of\nmercy, calling all intelligent creatures to fellowship with him, and\nrequiring them all to be \"holy even as he is holy.\" Such is a summary of\nthe teaching of Scripture as to the Divine Being, and our relation to\nhim. Thus are we guided in our utterance before him, \"O Lord of hosts,\nGod of Israel, that dwellest between the cherubim, thou art the God,\neven thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth: thou hast made heaven\nand earth\" (Isa. xxxvii. 16).\n\nI content myself with a mere summary; for a full knowledge we must take\nthe Bible itself, knowledge of which must be presumed as the condition\nof criticism, though criticism has been abundant which has borne witness\nto ignorance of the revelation criticised,--ignorance so marked that had\nit applied to science it would have been held a proof of incompetence\nfor criticism. We are now to take the Bible representation of God, and\nof his relation to us; and on the other hand of man's faith in him, and\nspiritual devotion and service. These are the materials to be harmonized\nwith the teachings of science, by demonstrating that the testimony of\nscience points to a government of the universe harmonizing with the\ntestimony of Scripture. And here it is needful that there be\nexplicitness, that our thesis may be placed beyond doubt. The purpose is\nnot merely to show that science lays no foundation for denial of a\nSupreme Intelligence, or for an atheistic conception of the universe;\nnor merely that it affords no place for belief in Deity without\nknowledge of his nature, for utterance of an empty name, without\nintelligible content, or an agnosticism, which affects to celebrate the\npraises of Ignorance, in homage to the name of science; nor merely an\nimmanent or indwelling Deity, who is in all things, and all things in\nhim, so that he is the unifying power, the soul and life of all that is,\nincluding those strange contrasts which we call good and evil; but\npassing all these representations as strange and alien to the Bible, to\nshow that religion and science find their harmony in recognition of a\nTranscendent Deity, a personal Deity, distinct from the universe,--a\npersonality ruling in righteousness, and delighting to meet the desires\nof intelligent beings longing after the perfection of holiness.\n\nI can imagine that some devoted students of science are prepared to\nobject to having any share in a discussion which is to include as one of\nits terms such a purely spiritual conception as this, involving a\nspiritual relation,--and having as its practical expression a spiritual\nlife.\n\nNot a few scientific men may be prepared to say that all this is quite\nremote from the region with which they are familiar,--that science can\nhardly be said to come into contact with such a spiritual region of\ninquiry. And I grant that there is reason for urging such a\nconsideration. Science can not occupy the place of religion, any more\nthan religion can occupy the place of science. But if there be any on\nthat account feeling themselves precluded from entering on the\ndiscussion, they do thereby proclaim themselves disqualified for making\nany affirmation as to conflict between the two courses of thought and\ninterest. The logical fairness of this argument admits of no challenge.\nEither scientists must refrain from assertions of conflict,--or they\nmust take the declarations of the Bible, and prove their antagonism to\nthe teachings of science, recognized as belonging to a different sphere\nof inquiry. As well propose to criticise the conclusions of astronomy in\ndisregard of spectrum analysis, as propose to criticise the intellectual\nworth of religion in neglect of its spiritual significance.\n\nI next pass over to inquire what Science is, taking its own testimony\nconcerning its province and purpose, as I have taken the testimony of\nreligion. Science has for its sphere or province the whole field of\noutward observation; and has for its purpose the explanation of facts\nwithin this field, either by means of direct observations as to the\nrelations of things, or by logical inference from such observations.\nThis field of study is full of interest, and practically inexhaustible.\nThe trustworthiness of the method admits of no doubt, whether we\nconsider direct observation, or guarded and careful inference from\nthings observed. To trust our powers of observation, and to rely on our\nreasoning faculty, are the fundamental conditions of all knowledge.\nThrough these avenues religious knowledge must come, as well as\nscientific. The risk of conflict is thus excluded here. Nor will any one\ndispute the inherent value of scientific knowledge.[C] Least of all\ncould such a challenge come from a religious basis, for the book of\nnature is to the religious mind the revelation of God in its own place\nand form, just as the Bible is in a different and higher form. The\nreverence belonging to religion will not derogate from the dignity of\nscience. The natural and genuine tendency of religious thought must be\nto exalt science, in its proper sense, as a verified explanation of the\nfacts of existence. A contrary tendency can arise only in one of two\nways, either when religion is driven back on the defensive on account of\nscientific theory assuming an attitude of antagonism; or when religious\nthought has been contracted into narrow and hardened form, such as to\nencourage isolation from regions of investigation personally disliked.\nIn the one case, dishonor is reflected on scientific thinking, in the\nother, dishonor is cast on religious thought.\n\nThese considerations will indicate the true intellectual spirit in which\nwe should face the question concerning the relations of religion and\nscience. To our rational nature, every thing which is entitled to rank\nas genuine knowledge must be matter of interest; and reliance on common\nmeans of acquiring knowledge, must involve confidence in the unity of\nall truth, and the possibility of demonstrating such unity, if only it\nbe possible for us to penetrate deep enough, and extend our researches\nwide enough,--a confidence which will not be sacrificed even when the\nactual unity waits discovery. As each one of the planets diffuses its\nown share of light, and all combine to constitute the solar system, so\neach science must be a centre of knowledge, and all combined must\nconstitute a system of truth.\n\nThis being granted on purely intellectual grounds, our concluding point\nis connected with competency to enter upon critical inquiry as to the\nharmony of religion and science. What has been said as to knowledge of\nthe Bible as a prerequisite for the discussion of our problem, must\nequally hold as to science. One thing, however, needs to be fairly\nstated and deliberately allowed; the possibility of intelligent and\nadequate criticism does not imply full acquaintance with scientific\nmethods, and personal ability to test the results of their application.\nMost of us must be content to take our scientific knowledge on trust, as\nChaucer did, when he declined to enter upon the intricacies of\nastronomical study, because he was too old for making satisfactory\nprogress.[D] To accept scientific conclusions without personal\nverification is simply inevitable. When scientific men themselves have\ncome to a general agreement, and are not any longer in conflict on a\nparticular conclusion, this must be enough for the great majority of\nintelligent inquirers. There is not, in this, absolute security for\naccuracy, but neither is there such security in the circumstances for\nscientific men themselves, and there can be no reasonable ground for\nhesitancy or complaint, either on our part or on theirs, if we are ready\nto accept general agreement as sufficient testimony for the time. It\nwould be utterly impracticable and unreasoning to insist that we can not\nintelligently accept the conclusions of astronomy unless we are able to\ngo through the mathematical processes; or the main facts of human\nphysiology unless we have verified each position by personal\ninvestigation into the structure of the organs, and the conditions of\nfunctional activity. Conjectures find from an intelligent public no\nhigher acknowledgment than is due to conjecture, simply because those\nwho have devoted themselves to research in the department concerned are\nnot agreed in attributing to them any higher significance. On the other\nhand, conclusions are accepted as true, however much they may be at\nvariance with previously existing conviction, when the great majority of\nscientific inquirers have admitted the observations to be undoubted or\nthe reasonings conclusive. This is the only conceivable test. It is\nthat which scientific thinkers must themselves recognize as the rule of\ncredence in all departments of investigation lying beyond their own\nfamiliar field of study; and it is that which is naturally accepted by\nthe whole body of non-scientific readers and thinkers interested in the\nadvance of knowledge. All practiced theologians, and all upholders of\nreligion on the ground of intelligent warrant for belief and practice,\nonly take the ground of common intelligence when they accept implicitly\nthe conclusions reached by scientific procedure.\n\nWhatever then may be the evidence of conflict between science and\nreligion, and whatever the difficulties lying in the way of working out\nreconciliation, there is clear warrant for claiming common ground from\nwhich to start, and that so ample and secure that it is provided by\nscientific inquiry itself, and generally accepted by educated men of all\nclasses. There can be no patchwork contrivance, made up of what may be\ntaken to be final statements of theological and scientific positions. We\ndo not aim at some agglomeration of materials gathered from opposite\nquarters and brought together with the design of constructing a compact\nand durable unity. Neither from the side of religion, nor from that of\nscience, could such a proposal find countenance. Each must work from its\nown basis, the one from Revelation, the other from Nature. Each must go\non its own course of development and active service, unaided and\nundeterred by the other. And from age to age in the world's progress it\nmust continue part of the task connected with intelligent existence, to\ngo from one to the other, in search of the lines of harmony. From both\nsides must come an impulse to this search for agreement. From the\nscientific side, by an intellectual necessity, for all intelligent\nresearch presses on towards unity in a complete conquest of the region\nof investigation, pushing out in distinct lines with full conviction of\nthe harmony of being, and of conclusions expressing so much of this\nharmony as has been definitely ascertained. And what is no less certain,\nthough not so freely admitted, all investigation as to the laws of\nexistence, even that which proclaims confidence only in observation,\nwith inference from what it discloses, is urging the human mind onward\nto a higher range of questions as to existence beyond observation, and\nthe causes of things visible. Impotent in the extreme has been the voice\nof a \"positive\" philosophy, denouncing the search for causes, sounding\nits trumpet call to rally all divisions of scientific workers to search\nexclusively for facts, as if such workers were but a band of quarrymen,\nboring, blasting, and gathering up shattered fragments of rock. For\nfacts must science ever search; with nothing short of ascertained facts\ncan it be satisfied; but, having found them, it must classify and\nharmonize, seeking for the laws which regulate their occurrence, and for\nthe causes by which they may be rationally explained.\n\nOn the other hand, from the sphere of religion must ever arise a\npowerful impulse to seek harmony of conviction with the verified results\nof scientific research. This may be expected to prove a more urgent and\npractical necessity than that which operates from within the region of\nscience. The belief in a personal Deity, as the source of all dependent\nexistence, and the controller of all, leads by a necessity both\nintellectual and spiritual to a search for order in all things, and a\nharmony of the universe. Viewed only as an intellectual\ndiscipline,--and this is an important though partial view of\nit,--religion develops what may be described as the intellectual\ninstinct, craving for knowledge, with expectation of order and harmony\neverywhere, and with prospect of ample reward for patient research.\nReligion, beginning with the conception of a transcendent Being,--seeing\nin finite existence a creation and a cosmos,--gives more powerful\nstimulus to search for harmony of truth, than can be said to spring from\nscience. The latter by the necessity of its procedure begins by\ncontracting thought in order to concentrate, and is apt to encourage its\nmost devoted servants to work on isolated divisions of existence,\nrelegating to a distant future the greater and more puzzling task of\ncontemplating the harmony of all sciences. It is, then, by pressing into\nview an urgent practical and personal need, that religion may be said in\nthe history of individual life to contribute the strongest motive power\ntowards such intellectual effort as is concerned with the harmonizing of\nall truth. This will appear in personal experience according to the\nintellectual activity of the individual, under the requirements of his\nreligious life, and in study of all that belongs to the system of the\nuniverse. This being recognized and avowed, as following from the very\nnature of religion, it devolves on the Church in all its divisions,--the\nbrotherhood of believers,--to manifest a genuine and profound interest\nin the progress of science, making felt in the world the full influence\nof the spirit, at once scientific and religious, which seeks to discover\nand demonstrate the harmony of created existence.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[A] \"If God had held all truth in his right hand, and in his left the\never-living desire for truth, although with the condition that I should\nremain in error for ever, and if he should say to me 'choose,' I should\nhumbly incline towards his left, and say, 'Father, give: pure truth is\nfor thee alone?'\"--_Wolferbuttel Fragments_. See Zimmern's _Life of\nLessing_, p. 361.\n\n[B] Plato's _Republic_ II. 380, 381.\n\n[C] See Appendix I.\n\n[D]\n\n    \"'Wilt thou learne of sterres ought?'\n    'Nay, certainly,' quod I, 'right naught.'\n    'And why?' quod he. 'For I am old.'\"\n\nHOUSE OF FAME, B. II, 487.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE II.\n\nEXPERIENCE GATHERED FROM PAST CONFLICTS.\n\n\nThere have been within quite recent times conflicts as to the relations\nof science and religion, which have now lost their living interest. All\nclasses greatly affected by current literature, and scientific\ndiscussion, whether ranking themselves on the side of religion, or\notherwise, were deeply moved by them. It appeared at the time, as if\nsome new position were to be marked off, destined to affect our whole\nconception of the government of the universe. The expectation was not\nverified; public interest died away; and preparations for conflict were\nabandoned, on account of the unexpected discovery that there was nothing\nto fight about.\n\nIt is a wise rule affecting our busy life, crowded with present-day\nduties, that we allow subjects quietly to drop out of view which have\nlost living interest. But this wise rule is turned to unwise ends, if\nit make us forgetful of the lessons of the past. Scientific progress\nconsists in the abandonment of untenable positions, for occupancy of\nothers proved to be more reliable. Accordingly the conflict which seems\nto threaten the interests of religion wears now one aspect and now\nanother, as determined by the stage of scientific progress which has\nbeen reached. But all intellectual progress is an evolution, bearing at\nevery moment some trace of what has been left behind, as well as\nevidence of accretion. A large amount of the experience connected with\nintellectual life is gathered from events connected with abandoning\npositions of past interest, as well as from those associated with what\nis new. I propose, therefore, though within comparatively narrow limits,\nto refer to past conflicts, quite recent, but practically at an end. The\nebb and flow of intellectual interests follow in such rapid succession,\nand each is so absorbing during its continuance, that we readily forget\nthe tangled waste buried from sight under the spring-tide of rising\nexpectation. We easily lose sight of the past, even though it lie close\nat hand, and as we feel the pulse of life beat high in proportion to\nthe vividness and apparent value of our prospects, we are ever liable to\noverestimate the importance of the present position, thus severing\nourselves too readily from all that lies behind. There may be reason for\ncutting down bridges in the rear, if there be apprehension of cowardice\nin the ranks; but where the calmness and courage of resolute progress\nare found, there is no need for a yawning chasm behind. It is true,\nindeed, that just beyond some bridges recently crossed, there lie a good\nmany traces of humiliation. And it is according to the tendency of human\nnature, whether religious or anti-religious, to turn away from that\nwhich occasions uneasiness. But there is a moral, as well as an\nintellectual demand, for thoroughness in recognizing the continuity of\nevents. The scientific spirit can not excuse a covering up of past\nfailures, as the formulating of verified results must imply testimony\nconcerning them. It is of the very nature of religious conviction that\nwe should learn from the failures of the past, and should advance out of\nthem with higher wisdom. By common consent, therefore, we can have no\naccurate survey of the present situation, without making account of what\nhas been recently passed, as well as what may be regarded as pressing\nupon our notice in these days.\n\nWe do not need to travel a long way to the rear in order to discover how\nfar astray we may be, both in expectations and in apprehensions; how\nreadily we may get into confusion as to the interests involved in\nexciting controversies; and how much we need caution, making allowance\nfor our partial survey of facts, and our uncertainty as to what may open\nup.\n\nBy way of illustration, I shall refer to the history of discussions\nconcerning so-called \"_spontaneous generation_,\" mixed up with\nascertained facts as to protoplasm, bathybius, or \"living slime,\" as it\nhas been called, and bacterium. The question eagerly discussed was\nwhether there might be origin of life, without development from germ,\nseed, or ovum. The problem was one of those suggestions apt to arise\nunder pressure of new conjectures and theories. While the scientific\nworld was astir on the question of development, attention was turned for\na time towards the possibility of a fresh beginning of organic forms,\nlife which should be no development, but should rather seem as an\nuncaused existence,--\"spontaneous generation.\" It might have been urged\nthat the suggestion was contrary to reason; that \"inexorable logic,\" of\nwhich we often hear from scientific observers, forbade the supposition;\nthat all the conditions of scientific thought were against it; that the\nvery conception of \"spontaneous generation\" was a logical inconsistency,\nalien to the requirements of scientific thought, as implying uncaused\nexistence; but we were reminded that we are prohibited from supposing\nany thing is impossible in the pathway of science, that observation must\nbe first, and reason only second, and accordingly the needful\nexperiments went on under all due precautions. The brief chapter in the\nhistory of science which records expectations and results connected with\nthese experiments, well deserves to be remembered. It is here selected\nfor illustration, both on account of its inherent importance, and its\nrelation to the theory of development, which must afterwards have\nspecial attention.\n\nSome descent is required from ordinary scientific observation to the\nlevel where this question is discussed. From the germ-cell, we pass\ndown to an albuminous substance spread over the ocean-bed, said to have\nlife, or we descend to microscopic organisms, such as bacteria; and a\nstep lower down still, we are introduced to the question whether in\nwater passed through the boiling process so as to guard against the\npresence of germinal forms, we may not witness the origin of life.\n\nThe question so raised had additional interest because of the bearing it\nmight have on the first appearance of life in the history of this world.\nThis interest was shared on both sides, by those who held that creation\nis a conception not only alien to scientific thought (which it may well\nbe[E]), but inconsistent with it; and by those who regarded creation as\nthe only conception adequate to meet rational requirements. The question\nhad at the same time a direct practical interest connected with public\nhealth, on account of its bearing upon the diffusion and vital tenacity\nof spores or germinal forms capable of spreading contagious disease.[F]\n\nThe controversy on this subject was at its height in the years 1876,\nand 1877, having a large amount of most careful and difficult experiment\ndevoted to it. The result has been a valuable addition to scientific\nknowledge as to the vitality of germinal forms, and a quietus to\ntheories as to \"spontaneous generation.\"\n\nThe direct object placed before the scientific mind when the discussion\narose was this,--to ascertain whether an origin of vital activity could\nbe observed in the midst of materials from which all germinal forms of\nlife were certainly excluded.\n\nThe selection of materials to experiment upon was for a time according\nto the fancy of the experimenter. It was not proposed that a vacuum\nshould be made by withdrawal of all air from a glass vessel, thereafter\nwatching for the appearance of some organic form. Nor was it suggested\nthat pure water might be taken from a spring, and boiled, and left\nstanding under daily observation. A great variety of materials was\nselected to provide an infusion which might afford the conditions for\napplication of scientific tests. In this way the following materials\nwere used and tested, infusion of turnip, of pounded cheese, hay, meat,\nfish, besides egg-albumen, blood, and urine. Vegetable productions,\nanimal tissue, and secretions of the human body closely connected with\nvital processes, were thus subjected to test. In the history of\ninvestigation, attention ultimately concentrated on the infusion of hay\nand on urine. Observations were conducted in Paris and London; results\nwere published from time to time; singular divergence became apparent in\nthese recorded results; this led to controversy, which became so keen,\nthat the Academy of Sciences in Paris appointed a commission of three to\nadjudicate upon a challenge given by M. Pasteur of Paris to Dr. Bastian\nof London; which Commission met in Paris on 15th July, 1877, but never\nadjudicated in the matter.[G]\n\nThe perplexities encountered in conducting observations arose chiefly\nfrom two causes: the difficulty of ascertaining the temperature at which\nliving organisms were certainly destroyed, and the materials sterilized;\nand that of guarding against interference with this state when\nestablished, by contact with the atmosphere. The latter perplexity,\ninvolving much care, skilful manipulation, and mechanical contrivance,\nwas at last overcome by the construction of glass tubes, separating for\na time the distinct materials, with facility for their mixture at the\nproper moment without contact with the air.\n\nThe true scientific difficulty, however, was determination of a reliable\ntest for destruction of germinal forms, either adhering to the\nmaterials, embedded in them, or floating in the atmosphere. The history\nof observations bearing on this question is deeply interesting. In the\nearlier tentative experiments, the material placed under observation was\nboiled; it was concluded that no vital organism could endure this\nprocess; and the material was kept for a time in a temperature of from\nseventy to eighty degrees Fahr., which was regarded as favorable to the\ndevelopment of life. In process of time, a deposit appeared in the tube,\nand this when examined under the microscope was found to contain\nbacteria,[H] living, moving germinal forms so minute as to require high\nmagnifying power for their discovery. Here then was \"spontaneous\ngeneration.\" Who could be so credulous as to believe that minute\norganic forms could live through the boiling process? If this appeared\ntoo absurd to fancy, then spontaneous generation, or actual origin of\nlife out of non-organized matter, must be held to be established. It was\nonly the audacity of prejudice, and hopeless alienation from the\n\"advanced thought\" of the time, which could induce any one to doubt, in\nface of these experiments, carefully recorded and published.[I]\nScientific observers of great experience and reputation felt it needful\nto express themselves with caution, leaving results to be tested.\n\nA considerable number of investigators began to turn their attention to\nthe subject, and a period of seven years was occupied before the results\nbecame so certain as to be practically final. Pasteur, Pouchet, and\nJoubert were at work in France, Crookes, Child, Beale, Roberts, Bastian,\nTyndall and others in England.\n\nAll experiments concentrated upon certainty in sterilizing the substance\noperated upon. Pasteur pointed out that the chemical properties of the\ninfusion affected the vitality of the microscopic germs inclosed in it;\nand Roberts at a later stage confirmed this by independent\ninvestigation, proving \"that slightly alkaline liquids are more\ndifficult to sterilize by heat than slightly acid liquids.\"[J] In this\nway, it was shown that distinct records of temperature were needful,\ngreater intensity of heat being required in some cases than in others,\nin order to secure destruction of germs. The facts were illustrated by\nhay infusion, \"the acid infusion invariably remaining barren after a few\nminutes' boiling, and the neutralized infusion invariably becoming\nfertile after a similar boiling.\"[K] The neutralizing element was liquor\npotass\u00e6, and the next question started was this, Did the liquor potass\u00e6\nenable the germs to live longer under the boiling process, or did its\ninfusion operate so as to originate life where germs no longer had any\nexistence? A contrivance was adopted by which the boiling could be\napplied to the hay infusion, while the liquor potass\u00e6 was kept enclosed\nin another part of the tube, ready to be added without exposure to the\nair, after the boiling process was over. When added in this way, \"the\nliquor potass\u00e6 had not any power to excite germination:\" the expectation\nthat a certain mixture of acid and alkali would originate life was\ndisappointed; all the earlier experiments were discredited. Still, some\nclung to their expressed belief, for there is a prejudice of advanced\nthought, as there is a prejudice of old beliefs. Tenacity of avowed\nopinion, with strong love of research, prolonged the inquiry, and led to\nmore decided evidence.\n\nThe controversy was conducted by Dr. Roberts against Dr. Bastian, while\nall the experiments of Professor Tyndall were converging upon the same\nconclusions as those reached by Roberts.[L] That Bastian had obtained\nbacteria after boiling, admitted of no doubt, and he naturally clung to\nthis fact as encouraging; others regarded it as only misleading. Bastian\nmaintained that the alkali had a positive power of originating life, and\nstated one hundred and twenty-two degrees Fahr. as favorable to the\nappearance of life. Roberts took ten examples of sterilized urine, and\ntwenty-nine examples of fermentible liquids which had remained over\nfrom the earlier experiments of 1873-74, and these thirty-nine examples\nwere subjected to careful experiment and observation. In the first ten\ncases, the tube was heated in oil for fifteen minutes up to two hundred\nand eighty degrees Fahr.; the ten tubes were then set in a warm place\n(from seventy degrees to eighty degrees Fahr.) for a fortnight; the\ncontents were transparent; the alkali was then allowed to mingle with\nit, and the tubes were placed in an incubator kept at a temperature of\none hundred and fifteen degrees Fahr.; at the end of two days there was\na sediment, and the liquor was clear; the tubes were replaced in the\nincubator, the temperature being raised to one hundred and twenty-two\ndegrees Fahr. as recommended by Dr. Bastian; there they continued for\nthree days; they were then withdrawn and placed under the microscope,\nbut no trace of living organism was found either in the fluid or in the\ndeposit under it. The twenty-nine cases, including a variety of\nvegetable and animal preparations were next treated in like manner, and\nwith like results. Tyndall's experiments were reported to the Royal\nSociety of London at the same time, with exactly the same result. M.\nPasteur had previously reported to the Academy of Sciences in Paris to\nthe same effect. It was thus proved by a mass of evidence that if proper\nprecautions were taken to destroy germinal forms, no mixture of alkali\nwith acid, whatever the variety of materials selected, was adequate to\nproduce life.\n\nA few months later than the communications of Roberts and Tyndall, that\nis, May, 1877, the results of ten years' experiment, first by Mr.\nDallinger himself, and thereafter by Mr. Dallinger and Mr. Drysdale\nconjointly, were communicated to the Royal Institution, London, on \"the\norigin and development of minute and lowly life forms.[A]\" The purpose\nof these experiments was to watch the growth of the minutest germs,\ncapable of being seen only under a powerful microscope, putting to\nactual test their tenacity of life. The largest objects were\none-thousandth of an inch, the smallest, the four-thousandth of an inch.\nSix distinct forms were selected for observation, and their history was\nmade out. A magnifying power of five thousand degrees was used. In the\nglairy fluid a monad larger than usual seized on a smaller; they became\nfused after swimming about together; the single object then appeared a\nmotionless spec; this proved to be a sac, from which at the close of a\nperiod varying from ten to thirty-six hours, it burst, and young spores\nbecame visible in the fluid, which were kept under observation till they\nreached maturity. Special interest was connected with these observations\nnot only as illustrating the growth of spores, or germs; but as allowing\napplication of the test of heat at different stages of growth. When this\ntest was applied, it was found that one hundred and forty degrees Fahr.\nwas sufficient to cause the death of adults, whereas the young spores\nwere able to live notwithstanding the application of three hundred\ndegrees Fahr. for ten minutes. In this direction fresh discovery was to\nbe made.\n\nIn June 1877,--a month later,--Professor Tyndall gave the record of\nfurther researches.[M] These presented additional results as to degrees\nof temperature requisite for destroying microscopic organisms. It had\nbeen already shown that alkaline liquids are more difficult to\nsterilize, than acid liquids; it was further shown that the death point\nwas higher in air, than in water; for Professor Tyndall extended his\nresearches to air, as well as liquid. First dealing with the fluid form,\nhe found germs possessed of vitality so singular that five or six hours\nof boiling did not destroy them, and in one case eight hours was\ninsufficient for the purpose. In this connection, he came to the\nconclusion that some germinal orders were more easily destroyed than\nothers.\n\nWhen dealing with bacteria, he found that they differed from other forms\nin this, that they rose to the air as if it were a requisite, whereas\nother germs, such as those belonging to the process of fermentation,\ncould exist without oxygen. This led to an additional form of\nexperiment, with the view of deciding whether bacteria could be\ndestroyed by withdrawal of air; and if so, whether the bacteria would\nreappear after the existing microscopic life had been stifled. Tyndall\nbegan by applying the air-pump. Under this process the bacteria were\nenfeebled greatly, but not destroyed. Thereafter Sprengel pumps were\nused, by means of which the air dissolved in the infusions was\nwithdrawn, as well as that diffused in the spaces above. In numerous\ncases there was success in destroying the germs by removal of the air in\nthis way without any boiling process. In these cases, the air was\ncarefully restored, precautions being adopted to guard against admission\nof germinal forms, and in no case did life reappear in the infusions. As\nin the more common style of experiment, the warmth suitable could not\ncharm the life back again; so in this, the restoration of oxygen, could\nnot secure restoration of life.\n\nThus evidence from all sides directed surely to the conclusion that the\nalleged discovery of \"spontaneous generation\" was a delusion, the result\nof hasty and insufficient experiment. Dr. Bastian, nevertheless, stuck\nheroically to his original position, and came into conflict with M.\nPasteur of Paris, by means of a communication which the English\nProfessor had sent to the Academy of Sciences in July of the previous\nyear, 1876. In the beginning of 1877, M. Pasteur threw down an explicit\nchallenge to Professor Bastian, which resulted in the appointment of a\ncommission to observe the experiments and adjudicate. With this\nterminates the history of nearly ten years of curious and singular\ninvestigation, and Dr. Bastian himself has supplied the history of the\nclosing scene, laying open the whole correspondence to public\ninvestigation, as if he were unconscious of the complete demolition of\nhis favorite theory of \"spontaneous generation.\" The 15th of July, 1877,\nwitnessed the close of a battle he had been fighting against steadily\nincreasing odds, and which he had begun in June, 1870. Dr. Bastian's\nposition was \"that a solution of boiled potash caused bacteria to appear\nin sterile urine at fifty degrees Cent., added in a quantity sufficient\nto neutralize the latter.\" These he regarded as the physico-chemical\nconditions for spontaneous generation of bacteria.\n\nThe challenge from M. Pasteur was in these terms;--\"I defy Dr. Bastian\nto obtain, in the presence of competent judges, the result to which I\nhave referred with sterile urine, on the sole condition that the\nsolution of potash which he employs be pure, _i. e._, made with pure\nwater and pure potash, both free from organic matter. If Dr. Bastian\nwishes to use a solution of impure potash, I freely authorize him to\ntake any in the English or any other Pharmacopoeia, being diluted or\nconcentrated, on the sole condition that that solution shall be raised\nbeforehand to one hundred and ten degrees for twenty minutes, or to one\nhundred and thirty degrees for five minutes.\"\n\nA Commission was appointed by the Academy, and Dr. Bastian agreed to\nappear before it, but only on conditions he laid down greatly\nrestricting the range of inquiry. He ignored the first and most\nsearching form of M. Pasteur's challenge; claimed that the adjudication\nof the Commission should be only on the second; and further stated that\nif the Commission were \"to express an opinion upon the interpretation of\nthe fact attested, and upon its bearings on 'the germ theory of\nfermentation,' or 'spontaneous generation,'\" he would respectfully\ndecline to take part in this wider inquiry. The Commission refused to be\nrestricted to the worst form of the experiment, and to be bound to\nwithhold an opinion as to its bearing on the question of \"spontaneous\ngeneration.\" Dr. Bastian went to Paris, but the members of the\nCommission declined to deal with less than the challenge given, and the\nmeeting was never properly constituted. \"Thus ended,\" as Dr. Bastian has\nsaid, \"the proceedings of this remarkable Commission of the French\nAcademy.\" The proceedings ended before they had begun. Dr. Bastian by\nhis restrictions, surrendered the real question at issue, and\npractically acknowledged that he would not submit it to the judgment of\nthe Commission. He sought only testimony as to his own form of\nexperiment, which there was then good reason to know was accurate,\nbecause M. Pasteur had stated a temperature too low, and a time too\nshort, but which was at the same time an experiment of no scientific\nvalue for establishing \"spontaneous generation.\" Thus ended a battle\nwhich had been protracted long after it was to all observers manifestly\nlost.\n\nThe discussion thus narrated may be easily overestimated, but there\nseems even more risk that the manifest failure should lead to an\noversight of the value of the protracted investigations. These convey\nlessons of special value to scientific inquirers on the one hand, and to\ntheologians on the other. They are of great value for illustrative\npurposes in such a course of lectures as the present, and that because\nthey provide needful training for intelligent observation of the advance\nof science.\n\nThe promulgation of the development theory of species has given a\nconception of the unity of organic life in the world, which even in its\nmost modified form has an imposing grandeur. Influenced by this,\nscientific men are naturally concerned to make out, if possible, some\nconnection between inorganic and organic being. To work at this, is part\nof the inevitable task of science, even though the result should be only\nto establish the helplessness of science in dealing with it.\n\nWe have chemical and dynamical theories of life which stimulate\nrepetition of experiments, in the hope that some grand discovery may be\nmade. Those just described present a curious illustration. In the\ncircumstances, we can well understand the persistence with which Dr.\nBastian clung to his supposed discovery of the physico-chemical\nconditions for production of living organism.\n\nScience finds in these experiments a fresh lesson of the need for\ncaution, guarding against the hampering influence of popular notions, as\nin reference to the probable effects of the boiling process. For if the\nexperiments have proved a failure so far as support to a theory of\nspontaneous generation is concerned, they have revealed a tenacity of\nlife belonging to the lowest microscopic organisms, far beyond higher\norganic forms, and the consequent weakness of ordinary human devices in\nstruggling against the development of such germs. These experiments also\nemphasize the need for attention to the laws of rational procedure, as\nwell as to skill in experimental observation, if science is to be\nexempted from needless toils.\n\nTheology has here also a lesson of patience, for it may well leave\nscience to do its own work, undisturbed by apprehensions as to possible\nconsequences to morality and religion. All that the telescope can\nreveal, and the microscope can make known, through years of\nexperimenting, we wish to have discovered, for only thus shall we come\nto understand the world's lessons of wisdom and power lying far beyond\nthe range of our unaided vision. All the churches of Christ have reason\nto hail the extension of scientific knowledge. Those who set high\naccount on patient interpretation of the written Revelation, have reason\nto value this laborious reading out of the lessons written in the book\nof Nature.\n\nA wider and more general result may be expected than that which bears\ndirectly on the relations of science and religion. All intelligent\nreaders of scientific discussions will find discipline from pondering\nthese experiments. They illustrate the toil connected with scientific\nresearch, the risks which beset such inquiry, and the limits of\nscientific investigations. There lies in these experiments a warning of\nthe constant need for falling back not only on the laws of evidence, but\nalso on the laws of reason. The mere conception of \"spontaneous\ngeneration,\" rigidly interpreted, were a curiosity, coming wonderfully\nnear a contradiction of scientific thought itself, which seeks for\ncauses, and repudiates uncaused occurrences. There may naturally enough\nbe a discovery of the chemical elements belonging to definite types of\norganism, or of the form and measure of energy operating in life. Even\nwhen surmising \"that possibly we may by the help of physical principles,\nespecially that of the dissipation of energy, sometime attain to a\nnotion of what constitutes life, mere vitality, nothing higher,\"\nProfessor Tait has thought it needful to add, \"but let no one imagine\nthat, should we ever penetrate this mystery, we shall thereby be enabled\nto produce, except from life, even the lowest form of life.\"[N] If it\nwere suggested that physico-chemical elements could originate life,\nchemistry would easily supply the ingredients. If it were hinted that\nreliance might be placed exclusively on the action of air or of heat for\nproducing living organism from inorganic matter, this were to fall back\non the old elemental philosophy of ancient Greece, which the thought of\nGreece easily repudiated without the aid of experimental science.\n\nAttention is, however, here concentrated on the failure of these\nexperiments meant to establish \"spontaneous generation,\" and in this\nfailure we find illustration of the fact that supposed conflicts between\nscience and religion are often misunderstandings and nothing more, based\non unreliable experiments or unwarranted expectations.\n\nOne other fact deserves to be recorded and placed in companionship with\nthat just stated, that some of the alleged conflicts between science and\nreligion are delusively so described, on account of misunderstanding or\nmisrepresentation of religion. They are fictitious articles, requiring\nto be properly branded, and quietly laid aside. A single illustration\nmay suffice, taken from Dr. Draper's _History of the Conflict between\nReligion and Science_, which is easily accessible, and reasonably claims\nsome attention in connection with the present subject. The criticism\nhere offered is not meant to carry a general condemnation of the book.\nThis work includes a vast deal more than it's title suggests; in the\nmidst of much that is extraneous, there is not a little of valuable\nhistorical matter written in a clear and attractive style. The book is,\nhowever, in many parts misleading, often by its style suggesting that\nthe author has allowed himself to be carried away in his eagerness to\nmake out serious conflict. The plan of the book is hardly compatible\nwith fairness. This may be illustrated by reference to the grounds for\nselecting illustrations of Christianity. Our author says, \"In speaking\nof Christianity reference is generally made to the Roman Church, partly\nbecause its adherents compose the majority of Christendom, partly\nbecause its demands are the most pretentious, and partly because it has\ncommonly sought to enforce those demands by the civil power.\"[O] In view\nof these explanations, it may be in a sense satisfactory, as suggesting\nmore harmony between science and religion than the general tenor of the\nbook conveys, that Professor Draper has \"had little to say\" respecting\nthe Protestant and Greek Churches. But the reasons for making the Roman\ndivision of the Church representative of the whole are far from\nsatisfactory. It is as if one were bent on fighting, but determined\nalways to select the weakest antagonist to be found. Nor is the case\nimproved by the defence offered. Dr. Draper says, \"In thus treating the\nsubject, it has not been necessary to pay much regard to more moderate\nor intermediate opinions, for, though they may be intrinsically of great\nvalue, in conflicts of this kind it is not with the moderates, but with\nthe extremists, that the impartial reader is mainly concerned. Their\nmovements determine the issue.\"[P] This is, I think, an unwise\nconclusion. Extremists may determine the erratic deflections of a\nmovement; they do not decide its issues. They discover the heat, rather\nthan the thought, involved in intellectual conflict. They contribute to\nvortex movement, rather than onward.\n\nIn consequence of his plan of procedure, Dr. Draper gives often a\nmisleading view of the relative positions of religion and science. A\nreference to Chapter VI. will afford illustration. The subject is,\n\"Conflict Respecting the Nature of the World.\" The two prominent\ncontrasts placed at the head of this chapter are these:--\"Scriptural\nview of the world; the earth a flat surface: scientific view; the earth\na globe.\" These are, indeed, complete contrasts; but the question is,\nAre they accurately stated? Is there any warrant for saying that\nScripture teaches that the earth is a flat surface? Most Bible readers\nof the present day will take this as quite a discovery. That there was\nlong and earnest discussion of the question whether the earth was flat\nor a globe, is certain. But it is erroneous to refer to Scripture as the\nsource of the former position. The opening of the chapter sufficiently\ndisposes of the suggestion. Dr. Draper says,--\"An uncritical observation\nof the aspect of nature persuades us that the earth is an extended level\nsurface which sustains the dome of the sky, a firmament dividing the\nwaters above from the waters beneath; that the heavenly bodies--the sun,\nthe moon, the stars--pursue their way moving from east to west, their\ninsignificant size, and motion round the motionless earth, proclaiming\ntheir inferiority. Of the various organic forms surrounding man none\nrival him in dignity, and hence he seems justified in concluding that\nevery thing has been created for his use--the sun for the purpose of\ngiving him light by day, the moon and stars by night. Comparative\ntheology shows that this is the conception of nature universally adopted\nin the early phase of intellectual life. It is the belief of all nations\nin all parts of the world in the beginning of their civilization.\"[Q]\n\nIn determining the relations of religion and science it is impossible to\naccept a passage so general, and full of mixed references as this. There\nis, indeed, no reason to complain of statements as to the general\nimpressions resulting from \"an uncritical observation\" of nature, and of\nthe testimony which may be drawn from \"comparative theology.\" Such\nreferences are to be valued, as belonging to an important branch of\ninquiry; but they are not to be mixed up with statements concerning\nScripture teaching. Such commingling leads to confusion, and deprives a\ndiscussion of historical accuracy and scientific precision. In view of\nthe immense practical, as well as scientific interests involved, it is\nneedful to guard against loose statements encouraging a belief in\nconflict between religion and science, where no such conflict exists.\nThe passage here selected is taken as an example, and its criticism will\nindicate what claims religion has a right to make upon scientific men in\ntheir management of such discussions. It may be that with equal reason a\nsimilar claim can be turned upon defenders of religion in view of their\ncriticisms of scientific discussions. But the real value of such\ninvestigations, from whatever side they come, depends upon accurate and\nguarded statement. It is to be feared, however, that Dr. Draper's theory\nthat \"extremists determine the issue,\" may tempt him to favor a\ndifferent rule.\n\nTo state that the scriptural view of the world is, that \"the earth is a\nflat surface,\" is misrepresentation. And the variety of form into which\nthis statement is thrown throughout the chapter makes it greatly worse.\nThus our author speaks of \"the flat figure of the earth, as revealed in\nthe Scriptures,\"[R] as if this quasi-scientific statement were part of\nBible revelation. Again he speaks of \"the theological doctrine of the\nflatness of the earth\" being irretrievably overthrown.[S] Once more,\nwhere speaking of the Copernican system of astronomy, he speaks of\nCopernicus not only as influenced by his exposure to punishment from the\nRoman Church, but as being \"aware that his doctrines were totally\nopposed to revealed truth.\"[T] These successive statements involve\nadditional exaggeration.\n\nOur author gives no references which the reader may examine for himself.\nThere can be little doubt that he points to the exceedingly grand and\nimpressive passage at the opening of the book of Genesis. But in that\npassage there is nothing to support the statement that \"the flat figure\nof the earth\" is part of Bible revelation. That the earth has been\nsupposed flat, and that this is really taught in Scripture, are two very\ndifferent things. The Bible which says, that \"the earth was without form\nand void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep,\" and records the\nwill of the Supreme Ruler at a later stage in these words, \"And God said\nlet the waters under the heaven be gathered together into one place, and\nlet the dry land appear,\"[U] does something quite the opposite of\nteaching that \"the earth is a flat surface.\"\n\nNor do the Scriptures teach that \"the earth sustains the dome of the\nsky.\" In remote times such an opinion as to the resting-place for the\ngreat dome had its supporters. But there is no pretext for attributing\nthe teaching of this to the Bible. The scriptural statement is \"God made\nthe firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament\nfrom the waters which were above the firmament; and it was so. And God\ncalled the firmament Heaven.\" There is no reader of these words, even if\nhe have only \"an uncritical observation of the aspect of nature,\" who\ncan suppose that the \"firmament\" here means \"the dome of the sky.\" This\nstatement places certain waters \"_above_ the firmament,\" and there is no\none who is at once a reader of the Bible, and an observer of nature, who\nthinks of the clouds as above the sky; but every one knows that there\nis an expanse which bears these water treasures far up from the earth's\nsurface. The word rendered \"firmament,\"[V] from the Vulgate\n_firmamentum_, really means \"expanse,\" and most naturally and obviously\nrefers to the atmosphere surrounding the earth, upon which the clouds\nare borne aloft, and carried to and fro. Taking into account the want of\nscientific knowledge of the structure of the earth in far past ages, and\nthe representations inconsistent with facts which found currency, the\ntrue marvel is that the statements of Scripture so simply and naturally\nharmonize with discoveries not made till the sixteenth century of the\nChristian era. This is a marvel which will more deeply impress us the\nlonger it is pondered.\n\nIf we extend our consideration to the cruder notions which found\nacceptance in the dark ages, such as that to which Bruno referred, that\nthe earth is a flat surface, _supported on pillars_, the scriptural\nevidence pled in its favor appears grotesquely inadequate. The passages\nare these. First stands Hannah's outburst of devotional feeling on the\noccasion of presenting her son Samuel before the Lord. In magnifying the\ngreatness of God, she says, \"the pillars of the earth are the Lord's,\nand he hath set the world upon them.\"[W] Next come the utterances of\nJob, when enlarging on the power of the Almighty. In one of his replies\nto his irritating counsellors, when speaking of the works of Jehovah, he\nsays, \"which shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof\ntremble.\"[X] In another passage of similar construction, he says of God,\n\"He hath compassed the waters with bounds, until the day and night come\nto an end. The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his\nreproof.\"[Y] There is no Bible reader who can readily fall into such an\nobvious mistake as to treat these highly figurative utterances, as if\nthey were formal revelations concerning the structure of the universe.\nAs well might we, in reading the words of Paul concerning the position\nand influence of prominent disciples in the early church, in which he\nsays that James, Cephas, and John \"seemed to be pillars,\" proceed to\ndeduce from this statement the revelation that the spiritual kingdom is\na flat surface on which are based the pillars upholding the heavenly\nkingdom into which the Saviour has entered.\n\nThis short reference to the structure and relative position of the\nearth, will suffice to illustrate the fact that in dealing with the\nalleged conflicts between religion and science, it is needful to cast\naside a number of manufactured difficulties, which do not arise from\nlegitimate interpretation of Scripture. The particular criticism here\nintroduced is adopted for a general purpose,--to lessen complications,\nand secure a proper understanding of the actual relation of the Bible to\nscientific research.\n\nFrom a very early period in the history of scientific inquiry, it has\nbeen more or less clearly recognized that the Bible is not a\nscience-revelation, but a revelation of religious truth and duty,\ndiscovering the true ideal and destiny of man in fellowship with God.\nLet us have it kept clear on both sides, that there is no divine\nrevelation of scientific truth. Nature is its own revelation, and the\nonly revelation, whose secrets must be laboriously sought out by\nsuccessive generations of investigators, from all of whom is required\npatient, persevering research, with undeviating and single love of\ntruth. Those early inquirers who found themselves in painful contact\nwith the persecuting power of the Roman Church, such as Galileo, and\nBruno, recognized to some extent that conflict with the Church and\nconflict with the Bible were not exactly identical. And those of us who\nare clearly and resolutely on the side of religious faith and religious\nlife, have need to ponder this lesson of history, that those defending\nthe Bible have not always been guided by its teaching in their defence,\nand have not always fully apprehended the Bible teaching on the subject\nwith which their efforts were concerned.\n\nBut what we most need in these days to keep conspicuous is the true view\nof the Bible as a professed revelation from God. It does not profess to\nbe a revelation of facts such as scientific appliances are adequate to\nascertain, while it does profess to discover facts both as to the\nuniverse and as to man, which science can not approach. It is not a\nhistory of the earth, but it includes within it, historical records of\nevents closely connected with man's moral and spiritual well-being. It\ndoes not train man \"to regard himself as the principal object of the\ncare of Nature\";[Z] it does not even suggest thought in this direction,\nbut it teaches that God cares for righteousness more than he cares for\nmaterial things; that man as a being of flesh and blood is unspeakably\ninsignificant, his life being \"even a vapor that appeareth for a little\ntime, and then vanisheth away\";[AA] that his spiritual life, in the love\nof God and in fellowship with him, is immeasurably great, the purpose of\nthe Bible concerning man, as revealed by Jesus Christ, God's Son, being\nthis, that man shall be like to God in moral purity.\n\nFrom these few statements it may readily appear what is the attitude of\nthe Bible towards science. It leaves man to his own research for the\nstructure of science in all its divisions; it proffers no help in such\nwork; but has a range of application quite beyond the area traversed by\nscience.\n\nIn this way we find the natural interpretation of inevitable conflicts\nin the past, which have been roughly and often inaccurately described as\nconflicts between religion and science. These conflicts were in the\nstrictest sense inevitable, simply because thought and discovery have\nbeen progressive; and it is impossible for those not personally engaged\nin research to accept without reluctance new representations of familiar\nfacts. If men long continued unwilling to admit that the earth moves\nround the sun, and that the rising and setting of the luminary are\ndelusions, while the succession of light and darkness is real, we can\nnot wonder at this slowness of assent, or charge it to the power of\nreligious thought. The conflict was not between religion and science,\nbut between popular notions and scientific observations. Often in the\nearlier periods of awakened thought, following the slumber of the middle\nages, the contest accidentally wore a religious aspect, but it was so\nonly because the higher intelligence and the general work of instruction\nbelonged to the religious orders.\n\nIf, however, we give due weight to historical facts, it will appear that\nthe rectification of common thought as to the form of the earth, and its\nplace in relation to the heavenly bodies, was achieved through the\nconflict of a later science with an earlier. Science has first taught\none thing, and then abandoned its old positions to teach something\ndifferent, and if religious thought was at times found in the ranks of\nthe antagonists of change, it was only as the popular thought was\nopposed, and as all had been placed in opposition by the earlier forms\nof scientific teaching. We rightly interpret the facts, only in\nrepresenting that science both makes its own difficulties and clears\nthem; first presents the imperfect or erroneous views which are to be\nswept away, and afterwards trains men to more careful sifting of\nevidence and exercise of thought, thereby clearing and widening its own\npath.\n\nThus are we enabled to trace the boundaries of two distinct regions of\nthought, closely related, yet clearly separated. Science can not do the\nwork of religion, nor can religion do the work of science. Each must\nfulfil its own part, and abide its proper tests. Science has its own\nplace and its own task. Religion will simply wait upon science, leaving\nit to make its own discoveries, gladly accepting each one of them as it\nis established. The most reverend students of the Bible do not regard it\nas a revelation presenting a key to scientific research; though they do\nnot hesitate to express their conviction that neither in express\nstatement, nor in the spirit inculcated, does it place itself in\nantagonism to the search for truth, or the claims of any conclusions\nwhich can be legitimately described as philosophical or scientific. But\nits upholders press this consideration specially on scientific men, that\nthe Bible has this title to be regarded as a book for all nations and\nfor all ages, that it has proved itself intelligible to men in ages the\nleast enlightened, and has also maintained a commanding influence in\nages specially distinguished and favored by the advance of science and\nthe widening power of literature.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[E] Science can not reach the beginning of things.\n\n[F] See _Disease Germs, their Nature and Origin_, by Beale. London,\nChurchill; Philadelphia, Lindsay and Blaikiston.\n\n[G] _Nature_ vol. xvi. p. 276.\n\n[H] Examples of the bacteria magnified 1,800, 3,000, and 5,000 times are\ngiven in Plate I. p. 16, of Beale's _Disease Germs_.\n\n[I] For Dr. Bastian's experiments see _Times_, April 13, 1870; and\n_Nature_, June and July, 1870.\n\n[J] Contribution to Royal Society of London. _Nature_ xv. p. 302, Feb.\nI, 1877.\n\n[K] _Ib._\n\n[L] _Nature_ vol. xv. p. 302, and Appendix II.\n\n[M] _Nature_ vol. xvi. p. 127.\n\n[N] _Recent Advances in Physical Science_, p. 24.\n\n[O] _Preface_ x.\n\n[P] _Preface_ x.\n\n[Q] _History of the Conflict between Religion and Science_, by J. W.\nDraper, M.D., LL.D., Professor in the University of New York, 12 ed., p.\n152.\n\n[R] _History of the Conflict between Religion and Science_, p. 163.\n\n[S] _Ib_. p. 165.\n\n[T] _Ib_. p. 167.\n\n[U] Genesis i. 2, 9.\n\n[V] [Hebrew: rakiya], Raqia, from [Hebrew: raka], to spread out.\n\n[W] I Samuel ii. 8.\n\n[X] Job xi. 6.\n\n[Y] Job xxvi. 10, 11.\n\n[Z] _Conflict between Religion and Science_, p. 172.\n\n[AA] James iv. 14.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE III.\n\nINORGANIC ELEMENTS IN THE UNIVERSE.\n\n\nIn view of the wide range of materials at command, and the limits of the\npresent inquiry, there is need for some definite method of selection,\nwhich may secure a careful, though necessarily very general survey of\nthe whole ground. That which seems to give most promise of meeting these\nrequirements is the contemplation in order of the great leading\nconceptions which have received prominence within recent years in\nconsequence of continued research under strictly scientific methods.\nThese may be said to constitute the scientific revolution of the\nnineteenth century, giving occasion for reconstructing the popular\nconceptions of the universe. They claim to mark the truly scientific\nperiod, inaugurated by command of instruments never before within reach,\nallowing an immense advance in the modes of research, and placing the\nsecrets of nature within compass of human observation as they had never\nbeen before. The intellectual conditions for observation and inference\nno doubt remain simply what they have been; the laws of intelligent\ninquiry are the same, determining sufficiency of evidence, and\ntrustworthiness in reasoning; but the range of observation has been\nindefinitely multiplied, and things transcending previous conjecture\nhave become matters of certain observation. The telescope and the\nmicroscope provided for this revolution. They brought the universe\nwithin range as it had never previously been, and thus making an\nenormous addition to the sum of human knowledge, suggested new modes of\ncontemplating and explaining the facts which had been familiar through\nall the ages. There can be no reversal of all this--no return on the old\nmethods. Nor can there be reversal in the sense of overturning presently\nrecognized conclusions. There are indeed hosts of theories of which it\nmay be safely predicted that they will be overturned and forgotten; but\na veritable knowledge has been acquired, which will certainly be\npreserved among the treasures of the race. We now know the constituent\nelements of many forms of existence, and the laws which determine change\nand continuance, as these were never previously known; and thus there\nhas been vastly extended for us the range of recognized facts.\n\nTo this advance, the whole human race has to adapt itself. It is not\nmerely one class of men, but all; not merely one department of thought,\nbut all departments which must adjust themselves to this new order of\nthings. Religious thought is not thrown into any singular position; it\nmerely shares in the common experience, that is, the common advantage.\nAnd we may say religious thought is most prepared for the mighty\nrevolution. This startling success in unlocking the mysteries of nature;\nthis sudden accession to the wealth of our ideas, apt to have an\nintoxicating effect upon those who value science and nothing higher,\nawakens reverence and gratitude in the religious thinker. The greater\nthe application of human intelligence to the study of nature, and the\ngreater the discoveries which reward such labor, so much greater becomes\nthe demand upon intelligence in accounting for the origin and\ncontinuance of the universe, involving innumerable phases of activity\nnever to be witnessed by ordinary observers who are absorbed in their\ndaily avocations. The supernatural is not more remote from us by such\ndiscoveries as science can boast, but is in reality brought nearer. The\nfancy that enlarged knowledge of the natural, is steadily driving before\nit all recognition of the supernatural, is one of which thinking men\nwill by and by be ashamed. That men should consider the discovery of the\ncomponent parts of certain forms of existence, or of the laws of well\nknown movements, as a _final_ disposal of the demands of intelligence,\nonly shows how little the intellect of inquirers has been prepared for\nappreciation of the full demands of reason. In this connection, it\nshould be remembered that the most profoundly scientific, have been the\nmost cautious, least inclined to boast of discovery, or to anticipate\nthe overthrow of the deeper convictions of the moral and spiritual life,\nwhich, as the necessaries of life in all ages, are least liable to be\ntouched by any thing belonging to the region of science. Even after\nevery allowance has been made for sanguine and passionate temperament,\nand for reaction against untenable forms of religious belief among\nopponents of religion,[AB] the award can not be otherwise than\nsuggested. The facts are already on record bearing on the most testing\nperiod,--the transition from an old and restricted knowledge, to a new\nand greatly enlarged knowledge of the universe,--and the roll of names\nstanding high in the annals of science, while devoted to religious faith\nand practice, may be accepted as a reasonable forecast of coming\nresults.[AC]\n\nThat greater knowledge of nature by discovery of the natural causes in\noperation, intensifies the rational demand for recognition of\nSupernatural Intelligence, is the position to be maintained throughout\nthis argument. The most rigid test of this position is to be found in\nthe outstanding scientific conceptions concerning inorganic and organic\nnature, and the contrasts recognized between lower and higher organisms.\nThe order most suitable for application of this test is progress upwards\nfrom the most subordinate forms of existence to the most complex\norganism. A beginning will, therefore, be male with the inorganic world,\nafter which lower organisms may be considered, after that the relative\nplace of higher organisms, and finally the whole class of questions\nconcerning the powers and requirements of mind. In each of these\nrelations, I desire to inquire into the reasonableness of our\nacknowledgment of the supernatural.\n\nAs the world presents a vast range of inorganic existence, we have to\nconsider the most prominent scientific conceptions concerning inorganic\nelements, as these afford a general view of the material structure of\nthe earth.\n\nConcentrating on this region of observation, and taking no account,\nmeanwhile, of the manifold phases of life, there are two forms of\nexistence to be recognized, Matter and Energy. Matter is solid, visible,\ntangible; Energy is invisible and intangible, but measurable by the work\nit is capable of doing. The one may be represented as the solid inert\nmass, the other as the moving power whose action is the source of\ncontinual change. This duality we must regard as essential to the\nstructure of the universe, for it is impossible to identify the two, so\nas to regard the world as merely a mass of matter. This duality is now\ncommonly admitted as the result of recent scientific investigations. To\nquote the words of Professor Tait,--\"It is only within comparatively\nrecent years that it has been generally recognized that there is\nsomething else in the physical universe which possesses to the full as\nhigh a claim to objective reality as matter possesses, though it is by\nno means so tangible, and therefore the conception of it was much longer\nin forcing itself upon the human mind.\"[AD] This is Energy. \"Just as\ngold, lead, oxygen, etc., are different kinds of matter, so sound,\nlight, heat, etc., are now ranked as different forms of energy.\"[AE]\n\nHere, then, is one of the conspicuous results of recent scientific\nresearch to which all our thoughts and theories need to adapt\nthemselves. And it must be obvious without argumentation, that\ntheological thought will not experience any serious shock, or even\njolt, in passing over to this new line of rails prepared for it.\n\nTaking these two, Matter and Energy, as distinct, let us concentrate for\na little upon each of them separately. Let us first turn attention upon\nMATTER. This form of existence is most easily contemplated, as most\ndirectly presenting itself to observation. A piece of metal may best\nserve for illustration, such as the _iron_ out of which we form so many\nof our industrial implements. This metal may be mingled through earth or\nrock; it may be held in solution in water, or made to flow out in liquid\nform from the furnace; it may be hardened either in the more brittle\nform of cast iron, or in the more rigid form known as malleable; but\nthrough all these changes the material is the same. Further, suppose we\nwere to receive a quantity of ore, and for the sake of experiment were\nto have part presented in each one of these forms, the quantity would\ncontinue exactly the same as was originally received. To quote again\nfrom the same author:--\"The grand test of the reality of what we call\nMatter, the proof that it has an objective existence, is its\nindestructibility and uncreatability--if the term may be used--by any\nprocess at the command of man. The value of this test to modern\nchemistry can scarcely be estimated. In fact we can barely believe that\nthere could have existed an exact science of chemistry had it not been\nfor the early recognition of this property of matter; nor in fact would\nthere be the possibility of a chemical analysis, supposing that we had\nnot the assurance by enormously extended series of previous experiments,\nthat no portion of matter, however small, goes out of existence, or\ncomes into existence in any operation whatever. If the chemist were not\ncertain that at the end of his operations, provided he has taken care to\nadmit nothing and to let nothing escape, the contents of his vessels\nmust be precisely the same in quantity as at the beginning of the\nexperiment, there could be no such thing as chemical analysis.\"[AF]\n\nIf now we press our inquiry further, seeking some explanation of the\nultimate nature or structure of matter, that is, the common physical\ncharacteristics of matter in all its forms, whether air, water, or solid\nmass, science has no certain answer to give. There is no theory of the\nultimate structure of matter which has secured general acceptance. On\nthe contrary, there is the acknowledgment that the complexity of the\nproblem is so great as completely to baffle the present resources of\nscience. There have been discussions, and careful investigations as to\nthe _divisibility of matter_, and it has been generally admitted on\nrational grounds, that there must be in all matter particles or atoms so\nminute as to be quite beyond the range of the microscope. This has led\nto the acceptance of an _atomic theory_ as in one form or another\napplicable to the structure of matter, _belief_ in such particles or\nmolecules being a natural result of scientific procedure. I say\n_belief_, for the existence of such ultimate atoms is not established on\nexperimental evidence, and yet is generally acknowledged; for it is\nclearly enough recognized that there is a region of faith for science,\nas for theology, just as there must be for all ordinary exercise of\nhuman intelligence. Besides the actual divisibility of matter, we have\nin the same connection to consider its _compressibility_, for the\nrecognized facts as to compression of iron, for example, or of any\nmetal, seem to imply that there are certain particles related to each\nother, which can be pressed in upon each other, or brought into nearer\nproximity. There is, however, a clear limit to compressibility, as there\nis to divisibility of matter. Even if this be granted, however, we are\nstill without a scientific account of the ultimate structure of matter.\nThis is still a perplexity to be handed on to future workers. There may,\nindeed, seem to be promise of aid in the analysis of different forms of\nmatter, as in the reduction of water to its constituent gases by the\naction of a galvanic battery; but such processes, however rich in\nsuggestiveness, are insufficient to advance the main inquiry. It is\noftentimes in this very class of experiments, that science at once\nmanifests its power, and discovers the limits which encircle and\nrestrain its efforts. It can decompose, what it can not recompose, thus\nleaving difficulties as perplexing as before. And besides, even when by\nanalysis the ultimate parts or chemical constituents, of compound\nsubstances have been discovered, science is unable to demonstrate that\nthe constituent elements are ultimately composed of distinct atoms, as\nfor example that oxygen and hydrogen are so constituted. We are thus\nwithout a science of the ultimate nature of matter. There is, indeed,\nthe suggestion of Sir William Thomson that matter of all kinds may be\nregarded as of a common nature, only variously compounded, filling space\nin a fluid state, and that its compressibility can be accounted for on\nthe supposition that its ultimate forms are vortex rings capable of\ncompression and expansion like an india-rubber ball; but this can not be\nregarded otherwise than as a bold conjecture, beset with a host of\ndifficulties both physical and mathematical which neither Thomson nor\nany of his fellow-workers in physical science, professes to have yet\ngrappled with.\n\nThere are thus before us the chief results of physical science, as to\nthe nature of MATTER, when we specify that it is indestructible, that it\nconsists of ultimate molecules or atoms, and that its compressibility is\nto be explained by pressure upon such atoms, or cohesion, or comparative\ncloseness of relation between them, this being greater in solids, less\nin liquids, and least in gases.\n\nFrom the structure of matter, we are led by science to the consideration\nof ENERGY, as distinct from matter. These two stand in some respect in\ncontrast with each other. In taking a survey of the physical aspects of\nthe world, we can not limit attention to the mere mass, or to questions\nbearing on its structure. Observation must now be turned on the\nperpetual change going on in form, arrangement, and distribution of\nmaterials. There is need for a science of all this, in accordance with\nwhich the perpetual round of change may be reduced to order by reference\nto causality and the laws of its operation. Thus we are introduced to\nour ordinary conceptions concerning _position_, that is, the situation\nor place of objects, or of masses of material, or even of worlds, to\neach other; _motion_, or change of position, modifying or altering the\nrelations of objects; and _force_, that is the relative amount or\nproportion of energy at work for the accomplishment of such changes as\nthose already mentioned. In these connections we are introduced to\nrecently formulated doctrines of _energy_, reached in searching for \"the\ncause which alters or tends to alter a body's natural state of rest,\" as\nthis problem was indicated in Newton's first law of motion. In the\nearlier stages of inquiry, attention was directed mainly on the active\nforces of nature, as these are recognized in operation, admitting of\ncalculation as to rate of movement on the one hand, and relative amount\nof force on the other. Computations of this kind were necessarily\ninvolved in research connected with the movements of the heavenly\nbodies. When astronomical theory had been matured and a truly scientific\nunderstanding of the solar system had been reached, physical science had\nnext to deal with the more general problem raised by the contemplated\nforces of nature, having a reference at once wider and more minute. It\nis not possible here to do more than give a very summary view of the\ndoctrine of energy, its mutations, dissipation, and conservation, as\ndeveloped through study of the laws of gravitation, electricity, light,\nheat, etc., and now generally accepted. An outline will, however,\nsuffice for an understanding of the general conclusions.\n\nEnergy is the term now employed to designate every form of power\nbelonging to the physical world capable of doing work, and of being\nestimated according to the comparative amount of work it can perform.\nThe whole phenomena of motion thus belong to this department of inquiry.\nThe first distinction here has been described as the difference between\n_energy of position_ and _energy of motion_.[AG] Both of these must be\ntaken into account in order to have a full view of the facts. ENERGY OF\nPOSITION, is illustrated by a water-head, or reservoir, where an\naccumulation of water is laid up in store, ready to be drawn upon for\nmotive power when machinery set up in a position somewhat lower is to be\nbrought into action and made to do the work for which it has been\nconstructed. ENERGY OF MOTION is seen when the storehouse of water is\nopened and the rush of the current sweeps along the prepared channel\ndescending upon the great wheel, which sets in motion the whole\nmachinery. In such a case as this, the amount of work done by the\nrevolutions of the great wheel is an exact measure of the amount of\nwater which has passed to a lower level. Or let us suppose there is only\na limited supply in the water-head, and that there are no feeders, but\nthat the streamlets and springs from which it is supplied, have ceased\nto flow, and let us suppose that the mill comes to a stand because of\nfailure of motive power, the amount of work done up to that moment is\nthe measure of the energy stored in the water-head before the sluice\nwas opened. This illustration indicates the mode of calculation to be\napplied to energy in all its forms, including the great forces of\nnature, before which human power is as nothing. Taking thus the\ncorrelatives position and motion, we may regard the former as\npreparation for the latter, for, as Professor Balfour Stewart has said,\n\"It is the fate of all kinds of energy of position to be ultimately\nconverted into energy of motion.\"[AH] On this account, energy of motion\nmost naturally exemplifies what we understand by energy; but on the\nother hand what has been called the energy of position must be regarded\nas a power distinctly calculable. If a stone be thrown into the air, the\nenergy expended in propelling it to a certain height, is the exact\nmeasure of the energy expended in its descent. There is no need for\nentering here upon the calculations of the relation between energy and\nvelocity, showing the exact proportion of the one to the other, or the\nratio of increase according to velocity, which is expressed in the\nformula \"that the energy varies as the square of the velocity,\" giving\nus an exact measure of force.\n\nAided by the conceptions of position and motion, we take the next step\nwhen we advance to _transmutation or conversion of energy_. What is made\nvisible to us by motion is the transference of energy from one object or\nportion of matter to another. And this is the sole explanation of what\noccurs. There is no such thing known to physical science as the origin\nor creation of energy; all that is recognized is the disappearance of\nenergy from one position and its appearance in another. If work has been\ndone, energy was somewhere stored capable of doing it; a transmutation\nhas taken place; and the work accomplished is the record of the process.\nIn recognition of this, every machine is merely a more or less skilful\ncontrivance for transmuting energy into a form more convenient or\nsuitable for human purposes. The intelligence of man simply recognizes\nthe law of transmutation, and deals with the problems which arise\nconnected with the mechanical arrangements facilitating the process.\n\nWe next advance a further step, only to embrace another phase of the\nsame truth,--the complement of what has been already stated,--that is,\nthe _conservation of energy_. As we have seen, all that appears in\nmotion, is transmutation or conversion of energy; accordingly it\nfollows, that there is change of position, but no destruction of energy,\nor absolute disappearance of it from existence. This generalization is\nillustrated by a most attractive series of observations, introducing to\na fuller knowledge of the laws of heat. The natural tendency of ordinary\nobservation is to favor the opinion that when work has been done, energy\nis spent or lost. And this popular notion, which has a kind of accuracy,\nin so far as it is needful to make fresh draughts upon available\nresources, is favored by reference to the economy of our bodily\nexistence constantly renewing its demand for fresh food supply. But this\npopular tendency is easily explained by the circumstance that ordinary\nobservation makes much more account of the phenomena of motion, than of\nthe development of heat as a direct consequence. The machinist can not,\nindeed, afford to make little of the consequences of friction; but the\nordinary observer makes much more of mass, and complication of\nmechanical contrivance, and velocity of movement. From this he passes\neasily to the fabric, or other production, sent forth; and then he may\noccupy himself with calculations bearing on the expenditure for coals\nand labor, along with tear and wear of machinery. But scientific\nobservation has concentrated much more on the evolution of heat, and out\nof this has come the completed theory of the laws of energy. In this\nway, it became matter of distinct calculation that friction and\npercussion convert energy into heat.\n\nAlong with these observations we have to remark upon an attendant\nconclusion, which has an important bearing on all speculation concerning\nthe destiny of the universe. I refer to the fact that transmutation of\nenergy involves a deterioration and dissipation of energy. As in the\nhistory of energy, improved position adds to the advantage for the doing\nof work, so transmutation tends to diminish the advantage or utility of\nthe energy for human purposes. Thus the energy expended in working a\nmachine gives return in a product of recognized value, but the energy\nspent in contending with friction generates heat which is of no\npractical value in respect of accomplished work. Or as the latter fact\nhas been stated by Professor Balfour Stewart, friction proves \"itself\nto be, not the destroyer of energy, but merely the converter of it into\nsome less apparent, and perhaps less useful form.\"[AI] In this\nconnection, scientific observation was directed upon the appearance of\nheat simultaneously with the disappearance of visible energy. Gradually\nthe conception dawned upon scientific observers that _heat is a form of\nmotion_, and this has found general acceptance, although it is\nimpossible to give direct proof of the doctrine. The conclusion has been\nsupported by all the experiments of Davis, Rumford, Joule, Colding, and\nHelmholtz. This conception having been launched as to the probable\nexplanation of heat, it immediately found, in accordance with the\nanalogies of scientific thought, a greatly extended circle of\napplication. Light and sound came to be classified with heat, as only\ndifferent forms of motion. It would involve too extended a range to\ninclude here a detailed account of these experiments, or to consider\nwhat is involved in dissipation of energy, as bearing upon a still wider\naspect of the order of things in the universe. I must, therefore, be\ncontent with the reference just given to the conception of heat as a\nform of molecular motion; and in doing so may revert to the\nconsideration already adduced, that this is another doctrine of\nscientific _belief_, of which there is a constant tendency to increase\nthe number, as science widens the range of its inquiries and\nspeculations.\n\nThe outstanding general results of science as to the nature of energy\nare now before us. All observations concerning motion only present to\nview transmutations of energy, all of them imply that there is no such\nthing as the origin of energy, and no such thing as its extinction.\nThere is indeed a constant tendency towards the degradation of energy,\nand a constant equalizing process which may bring to an end the present\norder of things in the universe. But the leading scientific conception\nwith which we have specially to deal is that expressed in the phrase,\n\"_Conservation of energy_,\" which must be regarded as completing our\nview of inorganic existence along with the other doctrine of the\nindestructibility of matter. As Professor Tait has expressed it,--\"The\ngrand principle of conservation of energy, which asserts that no portion\nof energy can be put out of existence, and no amount of energy can be\nbrought into existence by any process at our command, is simply a\nstatement of the invariability of the quantity of energy in the\nuniverse,--a companion statement to that of the invariability of the\nquantity of matter.\"[AJ]\n\nThe position is now reached at which it becomes possible to combine the\nresults of scientific research as to matter and energy into a harmonious\nunity, with which to test the view of the world recognized by religious\nthought. Religion as an intelligent and devotional acknowledgment of a\nSupreme Being, involves a very clear and definite conception concerning\nthe origin of the universe and its continuance. What is thus implied\nwill be best indicated by negative as well as positive statements, in\nsome such form as the following. First, _negatively_, the world we\ninhabit does not carry _within it_ any explanation of the origin of its\nown existence; that is to say, neither the materials existing, nor the\nforces operating, are sufficient to account for its origin; neither can\nit have had existence without beginning. In _positive_ form, the\nuniverse can be accounted for only by that which _transcends_ itself;\nthe supernatural is the key to the natural; Nature is a creation to be\nattributed to an Intelligent First Cause.\n\nAre science and religion here in harmony in the form and measure\ncompatible in the circumstances? This qualified and guarded form of the\nquestion is obviously required, for religious thought does not profess\nto be scientific, or in any sense authoritative as to the phenomena of\nnature, that is, as to the facts which observation alone can ascertain,\nor as to the immediate causes by which these facts are to be explained.\nOn the other hand, science is exclusively a knowledge of nature,\nconsisting of methodized observations concerning distinct orders of\nfacts, and rational inferences founded upon these. It can not in true\nsense be concerned with the supernatural, but can only present\nconclusions as to the order and processes of nature, which by subsequent\nand independent exercise of our intelligence may be contemplated in\ntheir relation to the conception of the supernatural, as Intelligent\nFirst Cause. This subsequent exercise of thought, whether critical or\nconstructive, is more properly the task of philosophy, in prosecution of\nthose reflective and speculative exercises, which, proceeding from\nscientific conclusions as accepted data, consider their intellectual\nvalue as contributing towards a theory of the universe. Scientific men\nwill, of course, more or less readily pass over to take some share in\nsuch philosophic speculation; just as religious men, purely under the\nimpulse of religious interests, will be more or less disposed to do, in\nproportion to the range of their intellectual life. What is here said is\nnot intended as an argument for any restriction upon such speculation on\nthe part either of scientific or of religious men, for such questions\nare common property, and the arguments bearing upon them are to be\ntested by all. But it is of some consequence, specially in the present\nunsettled and sensitive state of the public mind, that it be clearly\nrecognized that science is not itself responsible for the thoughts of\nscientific men on these questions; and that religion is not responsible\nfor the thoughts of religious men upon them. Science can not determine\nany thing as to a philosophy of the supernatural, any more than religion\ncan determine any thing as to a science of nature. Whether we take the\nviolent and even passionate antipathy to any acknowledgment of the\nsupernatural which is found in the Essays of Clifford, or the profoundly\nreverential acknowledgment of the Deity in the writings and life of\nFaraday, science is to be credited with neither. And so in like manner,\nwhen we have violent denunciations of science professedly in the name of\nreligion, or intelligent appreciation of its high value from accredited\nupholders of religious truth, religion itself is to be credited with\nneither the one nor the other. This is a matter which comes within the\nrange of ordinary intelligence. It may indeed belong to philosophy to\nformulate and develop the arguments in strict harmony with the\nrecognized laws of mind; but it belongs equally to all men to estimate\nthe general sweep and range of acquired knowledge as to the structure\nand order of the universe, as bearing upon the more general conceptions\nto be rationally entertained regarding its government. With this branch\nof the subject, ordinary thought may readily deal without entanglement\nin technicalities.\n\nThere is as we have seen a _duality_ of existence in the inorganic\nstructure of the world, and a continual succession of changes, on\naccount of the interaction of these two. Different forms of matter stand\nin different relations; and these relations are being constantly\ninterchanged by the transmutation of energy. Thus taking the world as\npresented to us, it has a constitution which requires for its\nexplanation that we go beyond every thing to be found within itself. The\nmatter in the universe can not account for the energy; nor can the\nenergy account for the matter; and the relations between the two must\nfind explanation in something higher than both. What their source may\nbe, science is incapable of telling; it can not contribute towards\nsatisfying the requirements of the law of causality in view of the\nmutual relations of matter and energy which it has itself revealed. But\nequally by what it has revealed, and by acknowledgment of its inability\nto transcend the limits of its own discoveries, does it present harmony\nwith religious thought in the form and measure in which it is possible\nthat such harmony could be manifested. Discovering the objective\nexistence of matter and energy, and the laws in accordance with which\nthe latter acts upon the former, it presents an unsolved problem\naffording the most direct and positive testimony possible to science in\nsupport of the existence of a First Cause, transcending the universe\nitself. How matter and energy came into being, it can not tell; but it\nmost explicitly declares that by no power existing and operating within\nrange of observation is it possible either to add to the sum of\nexistence, or in the least degree to diminish it. Religious thought\ncould expect nothing more direct and explicit in the form of scientific\ntestimony as confirmation of its fundamental position. Scientific\nthought while dealing with inorganic existence could not, even by a\nsingle line of approach, be brought nearer to the actual support of\nreligious belief.\n\nHere the question may be raised,--May not the world have existed from\neternity? In the answer to this question there are several\nconsiderations requiring to be distinguished. First, science has no\ntestimony to offer, inasmuch as it does not get beyond the area of laws\nnow operating. Second, the testimony of science concerning the world as\nnow existing is inconsistent with the supposition of its eternal\nexistence. The matter which is constantly operated upon by energy\ndistinct from itself, does not possess the property of self-subsistence;\nneither does the energy which is constantly undergoing change. Continual\ntransition or change from one phase of existence, or set of relations,\nto another, is a mark of the not-abiding, an evidence of subjection to,\nand dependence on, what is beyond and above itself. The non-enduring, or\never-changing, is constantly pointing to the ever-enduring.\n\nFull understanding of the situation of things as discovered by science\nwill produce a much deeper impression on the public mind than has yet\nbeen effected. The reasonableness of this expectation will readily\nappear, if only some few of the positions be placed conspicuously in\nview.\n\nIt is of special consequence to note that science has in this direction\n_finished its work_, and reached its _ultimatum_, in demonstrating the\nphysical impossibility of either increasing or diminishing the existing\nsum total of matter, or of energy. The conclusions are not such as can\nbe regarded as provisional, liable to be overreached, modified, or\nenlarged, by what may afterwards be discovered. We are so much\ninfluenced at present,--and scientific men share in the experience, as\nwell as others,--by the general and well-grounded expectation of the\nunceasing advance of science, that it is peculiarly easy in sight of a\ngreat general problem such as the origin and government of the world, to\noverlook the significance of ultimate conclusions in given directions.\nIn this way, we too readily fall into the delusive tendency of regarding\naccredited conclusions as still hanging in a measure of uncertainty, or\nat least as having a dubious future before them, because they border\nupon the region of the unknown so far as science is concerned, or upon a\nrealm of mystery, which science regards either with aversion, or with\ncherished determination of attack. In the present singularly favorable\nposition of science, it is impossible for the public mind to escape this\ntendency; but it becomes only the more imperative to distinguish as\noccasion offers, those conclusions which are to be taken as final. This\nis of immense consequence as bearing upon general conceptions concerning\nthe universe.\n\nThat matter can not be originated, and can not by even a single atom be\ndestroyed, is one of those ultimate statements, upon which physical\nscience itself relies as on a foundation. This is a universally\naccredited truth, that \"no portion of matter, however small, goes out of\nexistence or comes into existence in any operation whatever.\"[AK] The\nwonderful chemical laboratory of living organism may change many forms\nof matter into living tissue, but all returns again to its place in the\ninorganic mass. Material may pass from one phase into another, but there\nis nothing more than change. The sum total of material existence is\nunaltered. To suggest the contrary,--and specially to do so in the name\nof science,--were to bring science face to face with the conceptions\nrejected as alien to its very nature; for to say that matter may be\noriginated, is to affirm _creation_; to say that it may be destroyed, is\nto affirm the possibility of _annihilation_; and these two are beyond\nthe range of science, and if once admitted within its boundaries, they\nwould destroy science itself.\n\nSo it is when we pass over to the doctrine of energy. The same clear and\nultimate conclusion is proclaimed. The doctrine of the conservation of\nenergy is the _ultimatum_ on which physical science finds sure and firm\nfoothold. In those two ultimate positions of scientific research\nconcerning inorganic existence, religion finds support, and that of a\nkind so powerful, that science itself depends upon its immovability.\n\nThere is, however, a further point connected with the doctrine of\nenergy, which deserves consideration as bearing on the tendency to\nanticipate an indefinite line of progression in the history of this\nworld, that is, deterioration or degradation in the form of energy,\nwhile it continues of equal amount. The efficient value of energy is\naccording to the possibilities of transformation or transmutation. But\nits use implies limitation of the available forms, or steady\ndeterioration of value. \"Thus the energy of the universe is, on the\nwhole, constantly passing from higher to lower forms, and therefore the\npossibility of transformation is becoming smaller and smaller, so that\nafter the lapse of sufficient time all higher forms of energy must have\npassed from the physical universe, and we can imagine nothing as\nremaining, except those lower forms which are incapable, so far as we\nyet know, of any further transformation.\"[AL] Such a statement of the\nposition, though it can not be regarded as an ultimate one in scientific\nresearch, is so obviously a deduction from present knowledge that it\nmust to some extent modify prevailing conceptions. It may, indeed be\nsuggested that some catastrophe may terminate the present order of\nthings, and that some action of the law of gravitation may combine the\nfragments of worlds, and give a fresh start with new combinations of\nenergy; but the bare suggestion of this implies a much wider range for\nscientific research than any thing yet known to us, and at the same time\na larger demand upon intelligence in the control and regulation of what\nmust nevertheless seem to us violent catastrophes. Such speculation, if\nit may warrantably find encouragement under purely scientific\nconditions, religious thought will neither gainsay nor resist; but will\nfind itself in no perplexity to accept.\n\nWaiving, however, all speculation as to the possible future of the\nphysical universe, we here concentrate attention on the past; we take\nthe most recent scientific testimony as to the structure of the physical\nuniverse, as it bears on the problem concerning the origin of our\nworld. Here the testimony of science is clearly and unmistakably in\nfavor of the creation or absolute origin of matter and energy, in the\nonly form in which science can bear any testimony on the subject. It is,\nof course, impossible that science should present direct testimony to\nthe fact of creation, as it is impossible that history should; for such\na fact as creation must be entirely beyond the range of science. But in\ntestifying to the indestructibility and uncreatability of matter under\nthe conditions capable of being investigated by observational science;\nand in bearing the same testimony as to the energy in the world, it\noffers all the support it is capable of offering to the reality of the\nsupernatural,--testifying to the dependence of nature on some power\naltogether transcending itself. But here I prefer rather to use the\nwords of a purely scientific observer. When dealing with the doctrine of\nenergy, and specially with the consequences of dissipation of energy,\nProfessor Tait uses these words,--\"As it alone is able to lead us, by\nsure steps of deductive reasoning, to the necessary future of the\nuniverse--necessary, that is, if physical laws remain forever\nunchanged--so it enables us distinctly to say that the present order of\nthings has _not_ been evolved through infinite past time by the agency\nof laws now at work; but must have had a distinctive beginning, a state\nbeyond which we are totally unable to penetrate; a state, in fact, which\nmust have been produced by other than the now visibly acting\ncauses.\"[AM] This is the utmost that science can say, bearing on the\ngreat problem of the origin of the universe; and nothing more powerful\ncould be said in direct testimony to the reality of the supernatural,\nand the reasonableness of Christian faith, thus shown to be in complete\nharmony with science.\n\nIt is not here suggested that all scientific men would employ such\nlanguage as that now quoted, or even readily acquiesce in its use. I\nhave been careful to indicate, that a passionately excited antagonism to\nany recognition of the supernatural is avowed by some scientific men.\nAccordingly, it must be granted that the conclusion here stated is not\nso manifest a deduction as to preclude denial. The testimony of the\nsenses commonly terminates dispute, but such testimony is not available\nas to the reality of the supernatural. The only testimony that can be\ngiven here must be of a different kind; and if there be some who refuse\nto credit anything save what comes within range of the senses, or is\ndeducible directly and simply from what the senses make known, there is\nno help for them. Neither science, nor philosophy, nor religion can\ndeliver them from the narrow round of materialism. But neither science,\nnor philosophy, nor religion, can restrict itself to the testimony of\nthe senses. A deeper, and wider range of inquiry is demanded of the man\nwho would walk at large in the vast field spread out in nature. All\nhuman life is subjected to the test of accepting evidence other than\nthat the senses supply. If some refuse to submit to this deeper and\nwider test, narrowing their convictions accordingly, others are not to\nbe restricted in this way, nor are they to be influenced by such\ndetermination even on the part of highly distinguished scientific men.\nFor, it can not be overlooked that this is not a question of science,\nnor does it imply any thing but an ordinary exercise of intelligence.\nThe one test for the public mind is this,--Is it or is it not true that\nnot an atom of matter can be originated or destroyed? Is the doctrine\nof the conservation of energy to be taken as scientifically\ndemonstrated? These things science must decide, and beyond these, all is\nclear for ordinary intelligence. Of the testimony of science on these\ntwo questions there is no doubt whatever. Religion, therefore, has no\nconflict with science here; it simply accepts the teaching of science,\nfinding in it ample support for its fundamental position. What creation\nreally means, or how we can fittingly represent it to our minds, does\nnot in the least affect the question here under discussion, for these\nare not points on which science can offer any testimony. Nor have the\ndefenders of religion any complaint to urge against the claims which\nscience makes to explain all that belongs to nature. But when those who\nmake the largest claims for science, acknowledge that science is baffled\nhere, their testimony gains in value by reason of the strength of their\nantipathy to the acknowledgment of the miraculous. When from an\naccredited scientific witness we have these words:--\"The investigation\nof nature does not shrink from enrolling life and the processes of life\nin the world of the comprehensible,\" followed up by this explicit\nstatement, \"We are foiled only at the conception of matter and\nforce\";[AN] the claims of science are raised to the highest pitch; and\nyet its insuperable limits are clearly defined. The defender of the\nharmony of scientific with religious thought has nothing more to desire.\nThe very place where science comes to a halt, acknowledging that its\nutmost boundary has been reached, is the place where it is demonstrated\nthat scientific thought and religious are not involved in real conflict.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[AB] These allowances may well be made for Professor Clifford, one of\nthe most extravagant assailants of religious faith.\n\n[AC] Professor Tait in answer to Mr. Froude has advanced the evidence.\n_International Review_, Nov. 1878, vol. v. No. 6. The collected papers\nhave been republished, _Atlas Series_, No. 11.\n\n[AD] _Recent Advances in Physical Science_, by P. G. Tait, Professor of\nNatural Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, p. 17.\n\n[AE] _Ib_. p. 2.\n\n[AF] _Recent Advances in Physical Science_, p. 14.\n\n[AG] See Appendix III.\n\n[AH] _The Conservation of Energy_, by Balfour Stewart, p. 26.\n\n[AI] _The Conservation of Energy_, p. 36.\n\n[AJ] _Recent Advances of Physical Science_, p. 17.\n\n[AK] Tait's _Recent Advances_, p. 15.\n\n[AL] _Recent Advances_, p. 20.\n\n[AM] _Recent Advances_, p. 22.\n\n[AN] _The Doctrine of Descent_, by Oscar Schmidt, p. 20.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE IV.\n\nORGANIZED EXISTENCE: LIFE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.--(DARWIN'S \"THEORY OF\nEVOLUTION.\")\n\n\nIn prosecuting our inquiry as to the most recent advances in science, we\npass now from inorganic to organic existence; from the testimony of\nphysicists, to that of zo\u00f6logists. This transition in itself starts a\nscientific problem, beyond which we are carried onward to a distinct and\nvery complicated area of existence, higher in order, and pressing upon\nattention an incalculable variety of details, exceedingly difficult to\nharmonize. In the earlier stage of physical research, all observation\nand experiment lead forward to general results, which gain ready\nacceptance because they may be said to be involved in scientific\nprocedure itself. In this more advanced stage it is otherwise. In the\nformer, unorganized matter is the same everywhere; and the laws of\nenergy can be studied with equal facility in Europe or in America, in\nnorthern latitudes or in southern. But when we begin to direct attention\nupon life in its manifold forms, as these are scattered all over the\nworld, multitudes of distinct observations have to be prosecuted, and\ntheir results slowly accumulated, before even the most competent workers\ncan occupy a position from which it is possible to make a beginning with\nour forecast of general conclusions. Even in the most favorable\ncircumstances, a great deal must be left to problematic inference, and\neven to imagination. Gatherings of facts may be recorded in a manner\nwhich places them beyond reach of doubt, while theories founded upon\nthem hang long in suspense, waiting confirmation on condition of being\nable to endure protracted criticism, and manifold applications. This\naccounts for the difficulty experienced in finding ready to hand general\nconclusions which have secured universal acceptance, when we begin to\nmove somewhat freely over the wide regions presenting the manifold\nproblems of organized existence. And as it is solely with general\nconclusions, that religious thought is concerned, some share of\nperplexity must attach to the attempt to discuss the question of\nharmony. We must here therefore be considerably involved in questions\naffecting theories which have gained wide favor in scientific circles,\nas well as with clearly recorded and certain results. Some general\nquestions, such as that affecting the classification of animals, must be\nregarded as peculiarly scientific. Whether the classification of\nLinn\u00e6us, or of Cuvier, or some other more recently suggested, is to be\npreferred, is a matter which does not here concern us. But a theory of\nthe origin of species must be considered, because it is not purely\nscientific, but brings science into direct relation with common thought\nas to the order of the universe, and may therefore stand related to\nreligious thought.\n\nImmediately on directing attention to organized existence,--to LIFE in\nany form,--we encounter a new problem, namely the relation of the\norganized to the unorganized. How is the appearance of this higher order\nof existence to be accounted for? Can we find in the nature of matter,\nand in the mechanical and chemical laws influencing its position and\ncombination, any explanation of the appearance of life in the world? Or\nmust we regard life as a new and higher fact, unexplained by reference\nto the lower form of existence, and incapable of explanation in this\nway? Whether there is a clear line of demarcation between vegetable and\nanimal life is a comparatively subordinate question. It is the wider and\nmore perplexing question which most fundamentally affects our general\nconceptions as to the history and government of the world? And when this\nquestion is pressed singly,--how can we account for the appearance of\nlife in the world?--science has no answer to present. Life still remains\na mystery in scientific times, as it had been in past ages. Much has\nbeen written as to the origin of species; nothing to any purpose has yet\nbeen said as to the origin of life itself. The secrets of the universe\nin this respect have eluded discovery, and a constrained silence is the\nconsequence.\n\nBut if science itself has nothing to say as to this fundamental problem,\nscientific men have much to say as to the probability of a true solution\nof the mystery being forthcoming. There is in many quarters an\nexpectation that we may yet understand the physical principles, that is,\nthe mechanical and chemical combinations, which go to explain life as a\nworking organism.[AO] The suggestions of Rumford and Joule may yet bear\nresults in this direction, for it is matter of general agreement that\nliving organism may be regarded as an engine doing a given amount of\nwork, on condition of being supplied with a given amount of fuel in the\nform of nourishment. When therefore Rumford suggests that the animal is\na more economical engine than any of the mechanical contrivances which\nman constructs, and when Joule advances considerably beyond this to\nsuggest that the animal more resembles an electro-magnetic engine, than\na heat engine, it seems quite within the range of possibility that in\nsome such direction discovery may yet be made of the physical principles\ninvolved in life.\n\nThis, however, leaves untouched the deeper question as to the _origin of\nlife_. We are entirely ignorant of any beginning of life which is not\ntraced directly to a preceding living organism. Either, as in the case\nof plants, there is increase of life by fission, or separation from an\nearlier growth, or by means of seed grown upon the parent plant; or, as\nin the case of animals, by germ or ovum. But the question of the origin\nof life is remote from us historically, and perplexing to us\nexperimentally. If we seek guidance historically, we turn to geology,\nand learn that the structure of the earth has involved successive\nformations. The materials of the earth's crust are not thrown together\nconfusedly, but \"exhibit a certain order of arrangement\";[AP] the\nmineral masses are partly aqueous, partly igneous, in formation;\naccording as they are one or other, they contain organic remains, or are\nmarked by their absence. All that can be inferred from the data thus\nafforded is that at a certain period in the world's history, when\ntemperature and other conditions affecting the possibility of organic\nexistence were favorable, life appeared. As to the cause of its\nappearance, geology can give no testimony. If next, we refer to\npal\u00e6ontology, we learn of the existence of colossal animals which have\nlong since become extinct; but such researches only widen our\nacquaintance with different orders of animals, contributing nothing\ntowards the solution of the problem concerning the origin of life. The\nexperimental science of the present day, with all the advantages\narising from microscopical observation, is altogether unable to offer\nany explanation. Experiments for the purpose of testing the probability\nof \"spontaneous generation\" have been already described, and their\nfailure leaves experimental science without any direct testimony; while\ntheir history yields powerful indirect evidence in support of the\nposition that origin of life apart from germ is unknown.\n\nIt is, however, desirable here, in order to give completeness to our\nview of the present situation, to remark that among scientific men there\nare some who have no expectation of a scientific explanation of the\norigin of life; while others are exceedingly hopeful that such\nexplanation may be reached, in the latter class appearing naturally all\nthose who openly proclaim against what they name an \"incomprehensible\nact of creation,\" and voluntarily place themselves in antagonism to\nreligious thought. It is, therefore, of some consequence to indicate the\ngrounds on which such opposite views rest. On the one side, Professor\nTait, while suggesting the possibility of yet discovering the physical\nprinciples which determine life, nevertheless adds, \"Let no one imagine\nthat, should we ever penetrate this mystery, we shall thereby be enabled\nto produce, except from life, even the lowest form of life.\"[AQ] On the\nother hand Professor Schmidt of Strasburg maintains the opposite view,\naffirming that \"the investigation of nature does not shrink from\nenrolling _life_, and the processes of life in the world of the\ncomprehensible.\"[AR] This latter assertion is not to be accounted for on\nthe ground that Schmidt is the ardent admirer and defender of the theory\nof origin of species by natural selection, for it is clear, as he\nmaintains in replying to Max M\u00fcller, that \"the origin of life has in\nfact nothing to do with actual Darwinism, or natural selection, unless\nthe principle of selection be extended to the inorganic world of\nmatter.\"[AS] Mr. Darwin himself does not suggest any such extension, and\nhis theory of species is not chargeable with it. It should, indeed, be\nclearly recognized on all hands that the naturalist confines himself to\na narrower range of inquiry, taking existing phases of life as the\nsubject of his study. Accordingly, whoever claims that the origin of\nlife comes within the compass of science, does so on the ground that\nthere is no demarcation between the organic and the inorganic,--that the\nformer may arise directly from the latter,--and so he commits himself to\na doctrine of descent world-wide in its application, involving\ndevelopment in the world of all its varied phases of existence from a\nmass of unorganized matter.\n\nThis explains the difference of opinion among scientific men as to the\npossibility of accounting for the origin of life. A certain number deny\nthe possibility, as they do the possibility of explaining scientifically\nthe origin of matter on the explicit ground indicated by\nLaplace,--\"Present events are connected with the events of the past by a\nlink resting on the obvious principle, that a thing can not begin to\nexist without a cause which produces it.\"[AT] They do not find in\ninorganic matter sufficient cause to account for life, and their\nexpectations are restricted accordingly. Those who cherish a contrary\nexpectation, do not vindicate it by contradiction of the obvious\nprinciple enunciated by Laplace, or even by maintaining that inorganic\nmatter is adequate to produce living organism. They cling to the more\ngeneral and doubtful position that no limits are to be assigned to\nscience, or as it is often stated, all nature belongs to the\ncomprehensible. The failure of past experiments is no proof that\ninevitable failure awaits other experiments which may yet be made. To\nabandon expectation seems to them to be unfaithful to science. In this\nfashion, Professor Schmidt declares that \"to any one who holds open the\npossibility that, even now, animate may be evolved from inanimate,\nwithout the mediation of progenitors, _the first origin of life in this\nnatural method is at once self-evident_.\"[AU] To this view the other\nside may legitimately reply, that if the origin of life be as easily\naccounted for, as provision is here made for the \"self-evident,\" science\nwill soon be at a discount. To those regarding the matter from without,\nand waiting for testimony as to what is scientifically established, it\nis clear that there is no explanation of the origin of life; and I think\nit will be most commonly held that the weight of reason as to\nexpectations for the future lies with those who abandon the anticipation\nof any scientific explanation. There is, however, in actual conclusions\non scientific evidence nothing involving conflict with religious\nconviction; and allowance will be made for continued and extended\nexperiments, provided only that the \"holding open the possibility,\" does\nnot make the probability \"self-evident.\"\n\nPassing thus from the unsolved problem of the origin of life,--with the\nattendant acknowledgment that there is no scientific theory of the\nworld's descent from primordial atoms, we advance to the testimony of\nscience concerning different orders of life, and their relations to each\nother. Here there is no restriction as to the use of scientific methods;\nthere is wide range for free action by the hosts of observers required\nfor the work. A sense of the relief which this implies, in contrast with\nthe hampering restraints surrounding the earlier question, imparts to\nthe words of Schmidt a more jubilant tone, as he says, \"Between\nbeginning and end, we naturalists may do as we please.\"[AV]\n\nIn this region it will be universally admitted that the development of\nspecies by selection is the conception which has gained greatest hold\nupon the scientific mind within recent times. Accordingly it seems\nbetter to begin with an outline of this theory, and of its history as\ndeveloped by Mr. Darwin, keeping, however, steadily in view the range of\nproblem with which the theory has to deal.\n\nAs already remarked the origin of life is a problem quite distinct, and\nthe theory of selection does not entangle itself by maintaining origin\nof life by development from unorganized matter. Mr. Darwin clearly\nguarded himself against responsibility for such a conception of its\norigin.[AW] Restricting thus far, we have to keep in view the vast range\nof the problem demanding scientific explanation.\n\nAnimal life manifests itself by spontaneous movement,--movement from\nwithin the living organism, in contrast with movement caused by energy\napplied from without. This holds true of every living germ, from which a\nmature animal form may be developed. This is the test of the presence of\nlife under the microscope in minute germinal structures otherwise\nincapable of observation. In its lowest known form life appears in a\nminute vessel containing so much nourishment, which is within a nucleus\nor vital centre from which movement originates.[AX] This depends for\nits development on external conditions such as heat and moisture.[AY]\nAdvance in the scale is connected with greater complexity in the\norganism. As we ascend, separate organs appear, fulfilling distinct\nfunctions, and controlled by means of a nerve system whose ramifications\nare according to the intricacy of the organism. The appearance of such a\nnerve system implies sensibility and motor activity, provision for an\n_experience_ more or less varied, and _movement_ in some measure\naccording with it, or adapted to it. From a nerve system consisting of a\ncentre and a few fibres, we gradually ascend, until in the higher\nvertebrate orders, we find a vast system of nerves harmonized and\ngoverned from a grand centre or terminus constituting the brain.[AZ]\nWith the steadily advancing complexity of nerve system, there is great\ndiversity in the orders of animals, in the variety of actions of which\nthey are capable, in adaptation to different conditions of life, and in\nthe modes in which they obtain subsistence. The scientific problem\nis--How far can we account for all this complex system of things by the\naction of natural causes?\n\nAs we are here specially concerned with ruling conceptions, and only\nindirectly with details, the relations of the animal and vegetable\nkingdoms may be passed, with the acknowledgment that the two are\nobviously distinct, and yet that the vegetable very nearly merges into\nthe animal at certain points, as illustrated by sensibility, if not by\nlocomotion. So may we waive discussion of the classification of animals,\nwhich involves important points closely connected with the main\nquestion. Allowing that the wonderful diversity in animal organization,\nmay admit of different modes of classification; and yet granting that\nthe structure of the animal economy in all its forms proceeds on common\nprinciples, which must lead to practical agreement as to modes of\nclassification; we deal with the single question as to the natural\ncauses serving to explain different orders.\n\nMr. Darwin's suggestion, largely supported by evidence from many\nquarters, and now commanding a very general support is, that all this\ndiversity may be regarded as the product of a long process of\ndevelopment. This theory takes the whole orders of existence into one\nsweep. The lowest type of animal life presents to view the beginning of\na protracted history; the highest order of animate existence indicates\nthe stage of advance at which we observe things at the present period.\nFor such a theory the history of individual development belonging to\nwhatever order, and the history of distinct orders as indicating\nimprovement and deviation of whatever aspect, present evidence of\nspecial value. The most important causes relied upon as contributing to\nthe formation of a scientific theory may be presented under these four\nheads--(1) The action of external causes as provided for by environment;\n(2) power of adaptability within each organism, providing for changes\naccording to requirement from without, which may be described as\n\"adaptive changes of structure;\" (3) \"the struggle for existence,\" in\naccordance with which the strongest gain the mastery and consequent\nadvantage in obtaining the means of subsistence; and (4) \"natural\nselection\" among the sexes, giving to the offspring all advantages\naccording to the laws of hereditary descent.\n\nThe essential feature in this theory is the _power of adaptability\ninherent in the organism_. This is postulated as characteristic of all\norganized existence; and it is implied, that this power of adaptability\nmultiplies in a degree approximating to the measure of complexity\nbelonging to the organism. The inherent capacity for deviation is thus\nmuch less in the mollusk than in the bird; and in the bird much less\nthan in the quadruped. Thus the development process which must,\naccording to this view, have been exceedingly slow in the earlier\nstages, must have been greatly accelerated when more complex organisms\nhad come into existence, and all the advantages accrued from greater\ndiversity of materials. Such is a brief outline of the theory; and\nlooked at simply as a theory, there is a manifest attraction in the\nboldness of the conception, and the wide sweep of the generalization\nwhich it includes. Taken merely as an intellectual representation\nsetting forth a conceivable order of things in the universe, it has a\ngreat deal to command attention and awaken interest. It is, indeed, a\nnovelty in the history of scientific thought, and as such at variance\nwith previous conceptions, both scientific and non-scientific. But it is\nno more at variance with religious thought, than with ordinary notions\nof preceding times; while to the author whose name is now associated\nwith it all over the scientific world, it is a more striking testimony\nof the marvels of creative power,[BA] than notions previously current,\nwhich regarded it as historically true that every existing variety of\nanimal was launched into being by a distinct creative act. Whatever may\nbe the ultimate view of the history of life on the earth, based on\npurely scientific data,--and we are still a far way removed from what\nmay be regarded as scientific evidence for such a view,--the fewer the\nprimordial forms to which the multiplicity of existing species can be\ntraced, the greater is the marvel which science presents, and the more\nconvincing becomes the intellectual necessity by which we travel back to\na Supernatural Intelligence as the source of all. On the other hand, the\nslow process by which scientific research tends to make out the natural\nhistory of living organisms far removed from each other in the scale of\nbeing, tracing many groups to a common parentage, and assigning their\nappearance in the world to distinct periods in its history, will be\nseen to be so far anticipated and favored by the graphic description of\nthe introduction of animal life given in the opening page of revelation,\nwhere different orders are assigned to successive epochs.\n\nWhile, however, these things are said at the outset, as affording\ncommencement for the study of an evolution theory, and delivering us\nfrom the supposition that there is an inevitable antagonism between\nscience and recognition of the supernatural, we revert to the ruling\nprinciple for this whole inquiry, that science must prosecute its own\nresearches, unfettered by forecast of consequences; and that the Bible\nis not to be handled as if it were a book of science, for it neither\nlays restraints upon human inquiry, nor delivers us from the need for\nit.\n\nThe best method for entering upon a study of the theory of evolution by\nnatural selection is to take Mr. Darwin's own account of the manner in\nwhich it began to take shape before his mind. In his \"historical sketch\nof the recent progress of opinion on the origin of species,\"[BB] he\ntraces to Lamark the first suggestions on the subject, directing public\nattention to the question in 1801; thereafter a succession of\nnaturalists including St. Hilaire, Wells, and Patrick Matthew, from\nseparate and incidental observations, dwelt upon the difficulty of\ndistinguishing species, and on the evidence of an archetypal idea, or\ncommon plan of structure, being applicable in the history of whole\norders. Mr. Darwin then gives the following biographical references at\nthe outset,--\"When on board H. M. S. 'Beagle,' as naturalist, I was much\nstruck with certain facts in the distribution of the organic beings\ninhabiting South America, and in the geological relations of the present\nto the past inhabitants of that continent. These facts seemed to throw\nsome light on the origin of species--that mystery of mysteries, as it\nhas been called by one of our greatest philosophers. On my return home,\nit occurred to me in 1837, that something might perhaps be made out on\nthis question by patiently accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of\nfacts which could possibly have any bearing on it. After five years'\nwork I allowed myself to speculate on the subject, and drew up some\nshort notes; these I enlarged in 1844 into a sketch of the conclusions\nwhich then seemed to me probable: from that period to the present day I\nhave steadily pursued the same object.\"[BC] Such is Mr. Darwin's opening\nparagraph in the now celebrated _Origin of Species_. No one interested\nin such investigations will hesitate to approve and trust the \"patiently\naccumulating and reflecting on all sorts of facts;\" nor can there be any\nhesitation in granting the warrantableness of his beginning to speculate\nas to the probable results. On the other hand, even the most ardent\nadmirers of the evolution theory can not refuse to allow that only its\nprinciples are certain, while its ultimate form is still matter of\nconjecture and speculation. Quite divergent lines of speculation have\nfound a start within the compass of the phenomena brought under review,\nand it is already apparent that opposite tendencies of thought have\neffected a lodgment under the common name of evolution. In these\ncircumstances there is no direct call, as there are no proper materials,\nfor attempting a reconciliation between the principles of religion, and\ndefinite scientific conclusions as to the origin of species. We are\nstill occupying that position which makes historical treatment of the\nsubject the most appropriate, leaving to speculation the probable lines\nof adjustment which may render possible a wider induction bearing on a\ngeneral theory of the universe.\n\nThe observations of Alfred Russell Wallace in the Malay Archipelago led\ntowards the same conclusions as those indicated by Darwin, to whom Mr.\nWallace dedicated his book,[BD] giving the results of research extending\nfrom 1854 to 1862, and in confirmation of Darwin's theory, though\ndiffering on important points, Wallace published in 1870 his\n_Contribution to the Theory of Natural Selection_. Mr. Darwin's views\nwhen first promulgated received decided though somewhat guarded support\nfrom Sir Charles Lyell, whose geological studies marked him out as a\nhighly qualified witness on the subject, and were strongly favored by\nDr. Hooker, author of _Introduction to the Australian Flora_, while they\nencountered not a little criticism, and were met with announcements of\nformal reservations, on the part of distinguished naturalists.\n\nA fuller statement as to the history of his own thought was given by Mr.\nDarwin in the fifth edition of his work, and also in a letter to H\u00e6ckel,\nauthor of the bolder venture as to the _History of the Creation_, and\nthe _Evolution of Man_. This letter to H\u00e6ckel may be given here as\nhaving considerable value in its bearing on the formation of the theory\nof evolution. After referring to his early researches as to lower forms\nof life, Mr. Darwin proceeds thus--\"Having reflected much on the\nforegoing facts, it seemed to me probable that _allied species_ were\ndescended from a common ancestor. But during several years I could not\nconceive how each form could have been modified so as to become\nadmirably adapted to its place in nature. I began therefore to study\ndomesticated animals and cultivated plants, and after a time perceived\nthat _man's power of selecting and breeding_ from certain individuals\nwas the most powerful of all means in the production of _new races_.\nHaving attended to the habits of animals and their relations to the\nsurrounding conditions, I was able to realize the severe _struggle for\nexistence_ to which all organisms are subjected; and my geological\nobservations had allowed me to appreciate to a certain extent the\nduration of past geological periods. With my mind thus prepared, I\nfortunately happened to read Malthus's _Essay on Population_; and the\nidea of natural selection through the struggle for existence at once\noccurred to me. Of all the subordinate points in the theory, the last\nwhich I understood was the cause of the _tendency_ in the descendants\nfrom a common progenitor _to diverge_ in character.\"[BE] This short\npassage in personal history may considerably aid others in their study\nof the theory.\n\nThis letter may with advantage be supplemented by one or two brief\nextracts from _The Origin of Species_. In one of his most recent\neditions, our author says,--\"It may be metaphorically said, that natural\nselection is daily; and hourly scrutinizing throughout the world the\nslightest variations, rejecting those that are bad, preserving and\nadding up all that are good; silently and insensibly working, whenever\nand wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic\nbeing in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life.\"\nSuch a metaphorical representation attributing to nature different\nprocesses, such as scrutinizing, rejecting, preserving, and working,\nconsiderably aids us by pointing to the _intellectual_ conditions\ninvolved in the acceptance of the theory of evolution. To this it may\nsuffice if there be added the closing passage in our author's work on\nspecies, indicating his view of the relation of all to the supernatural.\nIt is in these words--\"Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and\ndeath, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving,[BF]\nnamely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is\ngrandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been\noriginally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and\nthat whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law\nof gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and\nmost wonderful have been, and are being evolved.\"[BG] On this passage,\nSchmidt has remarked--\"In this concession, Darwin has certainly been\nuntrue to himself; and it satisfies neither those who believe in the\ncontinuous work of creation by a personal God, nor the partisans of\nnatural evolution.\" In this criticism we have a good example of the\nmanner in which an impression of conflict is fostered. The rejoinder to\nSchmidt is obvious. Those who value religion seek no concessions, but\ndesire to banish from scientific and philosophic writing all thought\ntending in this direction. If, however, needless complications are to be\navoided, we must have exact statements of the relative positions. The\nsentence just quoted involves a misrepresentation equally of religion\nand science. Belief in the supernatural does not imply belief in _a\ncontinuous work of creation_, and therefore does not carry any thing\ninherently antagonistic to the conception of evolution under natural\nlaw. On the other hand, belief in evolution of species under the action\nof natural law does not decide the question, concerning _the origin of\nlife_, just as a science of nature can decide nothing concerning the\nsupernatural.\n\nProfessor Schmidt is, however, so far from clearly and consistently\nrecognizing the exact limit of the theory, that within the compass of a\nsingle page he first affirms the limitation, and then denies it. First\nvindicating Darwin from the attack of Max M\u00fcller as to beginning and\nend of living organism, he says, \"The origin of life has in fact nothing\nto do with actual Darwinism, or natural selection, unless the principle\nof selection be extended to the inorganic world of matter,\"[BH] an\nentanglement which Schmidt is willing to avoid, and which Darwin\ncarefully shuns, distinctly stating that \"Science in her present state\ndoes not countenance the belief that living creatures are now ever\nproduced from inorganic matter.\"[BI] But Schmidt has no sooner placed\nhimself behind this line of defence, than he attacks Darwin for\nacknowledging origin of life by creation, maintaining that \"it is\ndirectly incompatible with the doctrine of descent.\"[BJ] The theorist\nmust take either one side or the other. Either he must maintain that the\ntheory of descent has \"nothing to do with the origin of life,\" and in\nthat case there is no conflict with religious thought; or that the\ntheory of descent is incompatible with creation, and in that case there\nis conflict with religious thought, and at the same time inconsistency\nwith science, in respect of its own definition as an explanation of\nnature, and in respect of its own results which do not involve\n\"spontaneous generation,\" but do include the position that not a single\nparticle of matter can be originated or destroyed by any power\nrecognized in operation. No one will \"dispute the claims of the\ninvestigation of nature to its logical inferences,\" but \"where the\nmaterial substratum is deficient,\" most reasonable men will demand that\ndistinct acknowledgment be made of the fact, and that the boundaries of\nscience be defined accordingly. If, however, any one be inclined to\nmaintain that \"where the material substratum is deficient,\" all inquiry\nmust terminate, and human thought must refuse to go further, or to\nattempt to rise higher, this certainly is not science, but an illogical\nattempt to make the science of nature commensurate with the boundaries\nof thought,--an arbitrary declaration that \"the causal series\" within\nthe material universe is the sum total of causality. Such an affirmation\ncan not warrantably attach itself to a theory of descent, as it can not\nbe tested by observational methods, but altogether by reference to the\nlaws of thought determining the value of rationalizing processes. The\ntheory of \"natural evolution,\" implies evolution from something; it\npostulates a beginning from which it takes procedure, and it exhausts\nitself in observations concerning such deviations as occur in the annals\nof natural history. If, therefore, any of \"the partisans of natural\nevolution,\" take up a position involving denial of a rational\nacknowledgment of the supernatural, they isolate themselves in so doing,\nleaving the theory free from responsibility as to their attitude, and\ntaking upon themselves the logical necessity for vindicating their\nposition on grounds with which the theory of evolution itself has no\nconcern.\n\nHaving thus vindicated the theory of natural evolution from all share in\nthe denial of creation, and having entered a protest upon purely\nscientific grounds against the attempt to translate a scientific theory\nconcerning a limited order of facts within the universe into a\nmetaphysical theory concerning the origin of the universe, we are in a\nposition to concentrate upon the theory itself as an attempt to provide\na scientific explanation of the history of living organism. And this is\nhere done with the view of ascertaining, in a general and necessarily\nrestricted manner, the value of the evidence presented for its\nacceptance, thereby ascertaining its relations to the essential\ncharacteristics of religious thought.\n\nThe first and simplest part of the task is to indicate the favorable\nimpression it has made on the minds of men,--the conquest it has already\nwon for itself,--as a theory carrying within it a large amount of truth,\nwhatever may be its final form, after the very intricate and difficult\nquestions involved have been carefully examined. The theory has carried\ngeneral approval for the position that \"allied species are descended\nfrom a common ancestor,\" or, stating the same view in the manner\nsuggested by experiment, that it is possible to obtain in the history of\na single race of animals, considerable deviations in structure, and to\ngive these deviations fixedness or permanence by continuance of selected\nfeatures along the line of hereditary descent. This has been amply\nillustrated by the examples of the various orders of pigeons, and of\ndogs; both classes of animals having been largely experimented upon, and\nthe distinct varieties being easily recognized and popularly known.\nComparatively little hesitation exists as to acknowledging that the\ndifferent orders of pigeons have had a common ancestry; and that the\nsame may be said of the different races of dogs. These examples afford\nthe governing conception of the evolution theory, presenting the type of\nevidence which has led on to the wider generalization. Under the\ndiscussions which the theory has originated facts previously familiar\nhave been contemplated in a different light, as bearing upon a general\nplan or order of procedure apparent in the history of organized\nexistence. The consequent gain for the theory is altogether favorable to\nthe restricted doctrine that allied species have had a common descent,\nor that a single type of organism may under the law of evolution lead to\nthe appearance of different orders or races of animals.\n\nThe clear advance thus made in our conceptions of the history of the\nuniverse will appear by simple statement of negative results following\nfrom the admission of the modified form of doctrine just given. These\ninvolve the rejection of views previously held, not by religious men in\nreligious interests, but by men generally, as the natural consequence\nof the want of scientific investigations fitted to guide the public\nmind. So far as a general conclusion has gained assent, men show no\nreluctance to accept the clear logical inferences following from the\ninvestigation of nature.\n\nAmong these results is _rejection of fixedness of species_ as implying\nimpossibility of deviation from a single normal type of structure. The\npossibility of adaptive changes being granted, the absolute fixedness of\nspecies in the rigid sense formerly acknowledged is abandoned. How great\nthe modification of view must be, is much more difficult to decide, and\nhardly admits of exact statement. There is certainly no denial of\ndistinction of species, nor can such denial ever find acceptance,\nwhatever be the advance of theory, for the distinctions are so broad as\nto render this impossible. But the whole work of classification of the\ndifferent orders of animal life, exceedingly difficult in any case, has\nbeen rendered much more perplexing in consequence of the accumulation of\nevidence favoring the doctrine of evolution. What can properly be\nregarded as the origin of a new species, and what as a mere modification\nor advance in a species already recognized, are questions for which it\nis difficult to find an exact answer. The theory of the \"origin of\nspecies\" by natural selection seems placed in an awkward perplexity as\nto what constitutes _origin_ of a new order of life. And this difficulty\nmust be regarded as a constant attendant on the scheme of thought, since\n\"adaptive changes\" must be of slow progress, and historically obscure,\ninasmuch as a succession of very slight differences must contribute to a\ngeneral result. In this way it may even become matter of keen discussion\nwhat actually constitutes organic advance. Mr. Darwin admits serious\ndifficulty at this point. He says, \"Here we enter on a very intricate\nsubject, for naturalists have not defined to each other's satisfaction\nwhat is meant by an advance in organization.\"[BK] Thus there is dispute\namong competent authorities as to which may properly be considered the\nhighest order of plants, and which the highest order of fishes. On the\nother hand, it is comparatively easy to decide among the more highly\norganized animals, when an advance is made, by reference to increased\ncomplexity in structure, or provision of separate organs for\naccomplishment of distinct functions. These considerations, however,\nsuffice to indicate how many and complicated are the subjects requiring\nto be examined on evidence, and adjusted in their relations to each\nother, before it can be possible to get beyond surmise, in order to\nformulate a complete scientific theory. That \"adaptive changes\" by\nnatural law of evolution are not only possible, but that they frequently\noccur under observation, admits of no question; but whether this\nincludes changes of structure such as imply origin of species may still\nbe subject of grave doubt. The alterations made by Mr. Darwin in\nsuccessive editions of his book, from the first edition in 1859, to the\nsixth edition in 1872,[BL] introduced, as he explains, \"according as the\nevidence has become somewhat stronger or weaker,\" are sufficient to\nsuggest that a vast amount of work remains to be done before a\nwell-defined theory can be formulated. While there is universal\nagreement as to the possibility of \"adaptive changes\" to which Mr.\nDarwin provisionally restricted his theory on account of the\ninvestigations of Nageli as to plants, and those of Broca as to\nanimals, there is much diversity of opinion concerning the wider\napplication of the theory of evolution. This diversity arises in part\nfrom the varying estimate of the value of evidence as now accumulated,\nand in part from the varying conception of the completeness of our\nrecords of the ancient history of organism as presented by geology.\nThere is as yet no general consensus of opinion, nor is there likely to\nbe for a long time to come. Mr. Darwin himself is sufficiently cautious\nand faithful to observational methods, to admit that there are serious\ndifficulties, of some of which he ventures only to say that they \"are\ngreatly diminished,\" while some have disappeared. Other writers, such as\nH\u00e6ckel, with greatly less caution, and with much greater alacrity in\nleaping over chasms, are prepared to go much further and faster than\nDarwin. Many more are exceedingly doubtful as to the scientific value of\nthe evidence at command, being, as Mr. Darwin has said, \"much shaken in\ntheir former belief.\"[BM] And of many it must be said that they are\nconvinced that the evidence is far from warranting the conclusion that\nall organized existence can be traced to \"only a few forms,\" or to\n\"one,\" according to the alternatives suggested by Darwin in the closing\nsentence of his book.\n\nWaiving, then, meanwhile, as the state of scientific evidence warrants\nus to do, the question of the probable number of primordial forms in\nwhich organized existence appeared, there is at least another definite\nresult to be recorded as following from even a modified recognition of a\ntheory of development, that is the _rejection of belief in the\nsimultaneous origin of all species_ or orders of animal life existing\nnow in the world. The scientific conception of the history of animal\nlife is, that there has been a historical progression in the appearance\nof animals, in so far as lower orders took precedence of higher, while\nthe higher have shown large power of adaptation to the circumstances in\nwhich they have been placed. In accordance with the whole principles\nregulating the relations of religion and science, religious men,\nscientific and non-scientific, will readily acquiesce in this\nmodification of general belief, as largely favored by evidence which\ngeology supplies, and supported by testimony drawn from the actually\nexisting order of things; and they will do so with clear recognition\nthat this view involves no conflict with scriptural statement, and is so\nfar from containing in it any thing antagonistic to the fundamental\nconception of the supernatural origin of existence, that it harmonizes\nwith it, even intensifying the demand upon a transcendent cause for the\nrational explanation of the admitted order of things.\n\nHaving thus indicated in definite form the favorable impression made on\nthe public mind by the theory of evolution under a law of natural\nselection, it will suffice to indicate very briefly the more prominent\ndifficulties with which the theory has grappled, but from which it has\nnot escaped. In doing so, it should be said that the careful and\ndeliberate manner in which Mr. Darwin has faced the host of difficulties\nwhich have gathered around is deserving of highest praise, as in harmony\nwith the scientific spirit, and in marked contrast with the\nlight-and-go-easy style in which others, such as H\u00e6ckel, and even\nSchmidt, pass over the ground, announcing things as undoubted facts, and\neven \"self-evident\" truths, of which no man can speak with any degree\nof certainty. On the other hand, it seems a reasonable ground of\ncomplaint against many opponents of the theory, which Mr. Darwin urges\nspecially against Mr. St. George Mivart, that it is no part of their\nplan \"to give the various facts and considerations opposed to their own\nconclusions,\" while marshalling the difficulties against an evolution\ntheory. And yet it should be remembered that a great service is done to\nscience in a period of transition, when difficulties are powerfully\nurged against a popular hypothesis, as an injury is done to science by\nprecipitate and ill-considered arguments in support of such a\nhypothesis.\n\nOf the most serious difficulties in the way of a theory of descent by\nevolution, the _first_ concerns _the nature of the evidence_, inasmuch\nas all change coming under observation does not indicate progression or\nimprovement in the organism. The importance of this may be best\nindicated by quoting Mr. Darwin's explanatory words as to alterations in\nthe fifth edition of his book on species. He says, \"In the earlier\neditions of my _Origin of Species_, I probably attributed too much to\nthe action of natural selection or survival of the fittest. I have\naltered the fifth edition of the _Origin_ so as to confine my remarks to\nadaptive changes of structure. I had not formerly sufficiently\nconsidered the existence of many structures, which appear to be, as far\nas we can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious, and this I believe to\nbe one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my work.\" When it\nis certain that deviation from the normal structure may take place which\nis a disadvantage to the individual, and that this may descend to\noffspring; when it is also shown that deviation may occur which appears\nto serve no end, that is, contributes to no phase of functional\nactivity; when besides advantages gained are lost, and the race returns\nto its original type of structure; and when farther there are examples\nof degeneration, as in parasitic races,--such facts interpose special\ndifficulties in the way of an all-embracing theory of progress by\nnatural selection. Besides, as deviations occur of an unfavorable kind\namong domesticated animals under the care of man, it becomes obvious\nthat progress may be readily lost even in most favorable circumstances.\n\nThe next outstanding difficulty is that of _meeting the requirements of\nlogical inference_. This has been specially urged by Mr. Mivart as\nbearing upon the \"incipient stages\" of advance, and the difficulty\ncertainly presses heavily at that point. Natural selection may account\nfor much in the history of higher organisms where powers of sensibility\nand locomotion are great, but how can we find in natural selection an\nadequate explanation of progress in organisms within which these powers\nare at the lowest. The difficulty is to get a cause sufficient to\naccount for the start of a movement so vast as that which is to\nculminate in man. Mr. Darwin feels the force of this difficulty, and\nreplies thus, \"as we have no facts to guide us, speculation on the\nsubject is almost useless.\"[BN] But this perplexity which is most\nglaring at the beginning of the upward course, clings to the theory at\nevery stage in the combination of struggle and improvement,--descent\ninvolving a real _ascent_. Whether the organism be more or less complex,\nit depends upon _external causes_ for its improvement, and the\ndependence continues at every stage. Granting that there is everywhere\nstruggle for existence and survival of the fittest, are these sufficient\nto account for results so great as are involved in unceasing advance of\norganism?\n\nIf it be argued that they are sufficient, a serious perplexity comes\nfrom the opposite quarter,--How does it happen that all organic\nexistence does not advance together to a common elevation? If the theory\naccounts for advance, how shall we account for the want of it? The\ndifficulties are as great for the theory in view of the large body of\nfacts it does not attempt to include, as in the facts it strives to\nembrace. Agassiz put this difficulty with much force in 1857, and it has\nnot received any satisfactory answer. He said, \"It is a fact which seems\nto be entirely overlooked by those who assume an extensive influence of\nphysical causes upon the very existence of organized beings, that the\nmost diversified types of animals and plants are everywhere found under\nidentical circumstances.\"[BO] If, as Mr. Darwin says, \"looking to the\nfirst dawn of life,\" we may believe that \"all organic beings presented\nthe simplest structure\"; if the struggle for existence is uniformly\nencountered and leads to survival of the fittest, how is it that within\nthe same area, organism has not advanced to similar complexity? If under\nconstraint of the evidence for the theory, we surrender the doctrine of\ninevitable fixedness of species, how shall we nevertheless account for\nthe permanence of species? It is not suggested that there is at\nsuccessive stages \"new and simple forms continually being produced by\nspontaneous generation.\" This hypothesis of Lamark is rejected by Mr.\nDarwin,[BP] as it is by almost all scientific observers? How, then, can\nwe explain the facts? We are told that certain orders have \"fallen out\"\nin the march of progress; but we need a scientific account of this which\nshall harmonize with a theory of action of environment, and such an\naccount is not forthcoming. It may be said that the very success of the\ntheory by accumulation of most striking and important evidence, is\nbringing it into difficulty, and suggesting its insufficiency. The more\npowerful and imposing the action of the law of natural selection, the\nmore pressing becomes the need for a scientific explanation, at once\ndistinct and harmonious, which will account for the persistence of\nspecies, when struggle for existence goes on under similar or even\nanalogous action of environment. The presence everywhere of these lower\nforms alongside of the higher, adds greatly to the attractiveness of\nnature, and not even the grandeur of a universal advance towards the\nhigher levels of organization would make up for the disappearance of the\nmarvels of lower orders of animals. A monotony of grandeur may compare\nunfavorably with the wealth of variety and adversity; and so a law of\ncontinuity or persistence may be found adding to the greatness of a\nuniverse in which a law of progress or evolution also finds uniform\napplication.\n\nUpon this contrast between persistence and progress, general attention\nwill henceforth be concentrated in judging of the place and value of a\ntheory of descent. There is no need for hurry or impatience in this\nmatter. The words of Mr. Darwin will find ready assent as he says, \"No\none ought to feel surprise at much yet remaining unexplained on the\norigin of species, if we make due allowance for our profound ignorance\non the mutual relations of the inhabitants of the world at the present\ntime, and still more during past ages.\"[BQ] In accordance with this\nacknowledgment, a wide range of scientific research still remains to be\nundertaken, and religious thought can have nothing but friendly interest\nin the work, as it may well be assured of drawing thence fresh\ncontributions of great value for higher speculation concerning the\ngovernment of the universe.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[AO] Tait's _Recent Advances_, p. 23.\n\n[AP] Lyell's _Elements of Geology_, p. 2.\n\n[AQ] _Recent Advances_, p. 24.\n\n[AR] _Doctrine of Descent_, p. 20.\n\n[AS] _Ib._ p. 161.\n\n[AT] _Introduction to the Theory of Science_.\n\n[AU] _Doctrine of Descent_, p. 163.\n\n[AV] _Doctrine of Descent_, p. 162.\n\n[AW] _Origin of Species_, p. 577.\n\n[AX] See Appendix VII.\n\n[AY] See Appendix V.\n\n[AZ] See Appendix IV.\n\n[BA] _Origin of Species_, p. 577.\n\n[BB] _The Origin of Species_, xiii. 4th ed.\n\n[BC] _The Origin of Species_, p. 1.\n\n[BD] _Malay Archipelago_, 1869.\n\n[BE] The passage is quoted as given by Schmidt in his _Doctrine of\nDescent_, p. 132. Italics are inserted to guide the eye of the reader to\nthe successive stages.\n\n[BF] Referring to organized being.\n\n[BG] _Origin of Species_, p. 577.\n\n[BH] _Doct. of Descent_, p. 161-2.\n\n[BI] _Origin of Species_, 4th ed. p. 143.\n\n[BJ] _Doct. of Descent_, 162.\n\n[BK] _Origin of Species_, 4th ed. p. 141.\n\n[BL] It may be well to mention here that the _third_ American edition is\nfrom the _fifth_ English edition.\n\n[BM] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed., p. 289.\n\n[BN] _Origin of Species_, 6th. ed. chap. iv. p. 100.\n\n[BO] _Contributions to the Natural History of the United States_,\nIntroduction, Boston, 1857; and _Essay on Classification_, p. 15,\npublished separately; London, 1859. See Appendix VI.\n\n[BP] _Origin_, 4th ed. p. 143.\n\n[BQ] _Origin of Species_, 6th. ed. chap. iv. p. 100.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE V.\n\nRELATIONS OF LOWER AND HIGHER ORGANISMS.\n\n\nFrom the general aspects of the theory of species, we pass to the\nconsideration of distinct groups of organism, with the view of\nascertaining their relations to each other. In doing so, it is better to\nbegin at the lower end of the scale, leaving for a more advanced stage\nof inquiry the higher types of organism. In this department of the\nsubject, special obligations are due to the wide range of investigations\neither occasioned or stimulated by the theory of evolution. For,\nwhatever may be the ultimate award passed on this theory, there will be\na unanimous recognition of the great value to science attending on the\nvaried forms of inquiry stimulated by the writings of Mr. Charles\nDarwin. And one obvious and strong reason for such acknowledgment is\nthat so many of the results of these researches have an inherent value\nquite distinct from their testimony in favor of the theory that the\nstruggle for existence is the principal factor in the origin of new\nspecies.\n\nOne of the most interesting fields of observation thus opened, is that\nconcerned with the fertilization of plants by the intervention of\ninsects and birds. A beginning in this department was made by the German\nnaturalist, Christian Konrad Sprengel, who published in 1793 the report\nof his observations. In this he has been followed by Darwin, in 1862; by\nDr. Hooker, Professor Asa Gray whose contributions appeared in the\n_American Journal of Science and Art_ in 1862, and 1863, Moggridge,\nFritz M\u00fcller, and Sir John Lubbock. The facts now accumulated, rank as\nan important contribution to botany and zo\u00f6logy, and naturally fall\nwithin the circle of recent advances to which it is desirable that\nattention be turned.\n\nThe general result is one of great interest, as illustrating a striking\ndegree of interdependence between lower and higher organisms,--the\nvegetable and animal kingdom contributing to each other's subsistence\nand propagation. Flowers present special attractions to insects flying\naround, alluring them by varied colors, and providing for them by\nsecreting stores of honey; on the other hand, these insects (flies,\nbees, wasps, etc.), seeking the honey which satisfies their wants, at\nthe same time carry the pollen from one flower to another, thus\nproviding for the fertilizing of the plants. In some cases,\nfertilization is secured by a natural process within the organism\nitself; in other cases, the pollen is scattered over a region by the\nwind; but the most wonderful, and at the same time efficient mode of\nproviding for the growth of vigorous plants, is fertilization by the\nagency of insect life.\n\nA brief outline of the ordinary structure of the flower will introduce\nto a ready appreciation of the scientific interest attaching to this\nlast mode of fertilization, both as concerning the functions of\ndifferent portions of the flowers, and the relation of dependence\nestablished between higher and lower forms of organism, so that each is\ndependent on the other.\n\nEvery flower as it unfolds from the bud, consists of a series of whorls,\nor layers of substance twined or twirled round in such a manner as to\nunfold or coil back, as the flower opens. The _outermost_ of these\nwhorls (_calyx_) is a mere covering or sheath, usually of a green\ncolor, which protects the bud during the more tender period, curling up\nand withering as the flower opens, spreading forth its beauty. The\n_second_ whorl (_corolla_) is what we more commonly regard as the flower\nproper, the colored leaves, or cup, or bell, according to the specific\nshape distinguishing the plant. The _third_ whorl consists of a series\nof stalks or filaments (_stamens_) which as the flower matures or ripens\nstand up distinct from each other, each one having at its summit a\nlittle tuft or cushion (_anther_) covered with a fine dust or powder\n(_pollen_). The _fourth_ or inner-most whorl, the centre piece of the\nflower (_pistil_) is that in which the seed is generated and brought to\nmaturity. We may thus say of the flower, that its outermost whorl is a\ntemporary covering which withers and shrinks out of view, when the\nbeauty of the inner structure is laid open; that the second is that\nwhich attracts the eye by the loveliness of its hues; while the two\nwhich belong to the internal structure of the flower are concerned with\nthe reproduction or propagation of the plant, providing for the healthy\ngerm from which a fresh plant of the same order may spring up. The\nrelation of the fine yellow powder produced at the tips of the third\nwhorl, to the seeds which are gathered together within the fourth whorl,\nis the matter to which special attention has been directed by the recent\ndiscoveries which have rewarded patient research. The fine powder or\npollen needs to be carried to the seed, so that its properties may\noperate upon that seed, if it is to be fertilized, or so matured, as to\nfulfil its function in generating a new plant when it is committed to\nthe soil. In many cases it is enough that the fine powder should fall\ndown from its elevation on the seeds below. This is self-fertilization,\nand is easily provided for by the mere bending of the head of the flower\nas it approaches maturity, or by the swaying of it in the breeze. But a\nmore difficult, and as we might be inclined to add, more precarious,\nbecause less certain, method for fertilization is required in many\ncases. The experiments carried on by all our gardeners, and in a still\nmore extended scale in all our centres of botanic research, have\nestablished the fact that in many cases, the yellow powder of one plant\nmust be in some manner carried over to the seed produced within another\nflower, if that seed is to yield a satisfactory result to the\nhorticulturist.\n\nWe have thus two prominent facts here. The one is _the essential\nimportance of the pollen_ for fertilization; and the other, _the need\nfor the transference of the pollen_ from one plant to another in order\nto secure reproduction of vigorous growth by the sowing of the seed. As\nto the first, the pollen, which appears a fine powder or flour contains\nfluid protoplasm, that which Professor Huxley has described as the\n\"single physical basis of life under all the diversities of vital\nexistence.\"[BR] These pollen grains falling on the seed discharge their\nprotoplasmic fluid upon it, and by this means contribute to\nfertilization. This original or primordial form of vitalising agency is\ncarried from one part of the flower to another, and this transference is\nthe law regulating the propagation of flowering plants.\n\nBut, just at this point, we come upon the most striking results of\nrecent research. Though all pollen is of this primary nature, named\nprotoplasm, it is not found to hold true that pollen is of the same\nvalue for fertilization from whatever quarter it comes. On the\ncontrary, most important differences result according to the source of\nthe pollen. There is first the process of self-fertilization. But in\nmany cases,--Mr. Darwin has shown that this holds of the majority of the\norchids,--transference of the pollen from one plant to another proves to\nbe a great advantage, if not an actual necessity for propagation of the\nplant. This process, known as cross-fertilization, gives a healthy and\nvigorous growth; want of it, will lead to degeneration, and ultimate\nextinction. This discovery has introduced a whole series of the most\nstriking observations, throwing a flood of light on the distribution and\ninterdependence of distinct forms of organism. The necessary relation\nbetween the pollen and the seed having been acknowledged, and next the\nvalue of transference of pollen from one plant to another, the first\nstep in the line of discovery was made by the observation of a natural\nprovision to _prevent self-fertilization_ by rendering it impossible\nthat the pollen of a plant should fall on the seed of that plant. This\nentrance on the line of discovery was made by Sprengel so far back as\n1790, by whom it was observed that in many plants the pollen and the\nseed did not come to ripeness at the same time.[BS] In some cases, the\npollen is ripened before the seeds are ready; in other cases, the order\nof events is reversed. This observation naturally suggested transference\nof pollen from one plant to another; and this, connected with the\ncontinual coming and going of flies, bees, and butterflies, led to the\nfurther discovery, that _insects_ unwittingly perform a large part of\nthe work needful in order to _provide for fertilization_. Mr. Darwin has\npointed out that from the paper of Robert Brown in the _Linnean\nTransactions_, in 1833; and from that of Dr. Hooker in the _Philosophic\nTransactions_ for 1854, the peculiar phenomena had begun to awaken\nscientific interest. It was, however, when the researches as to origin\nof species had given fresh motive to observation concerning the\nrelations of different types of organism, that the whole facts were\nbrought to view, separately recorded, and at length systematized so as\nto lead to their full interpretation. Mr. Darwin himself concentrated on\nthe orchids as peculiarly interesting and suggestive, while a host of\nworkers all over the world were turning their energies into this new\nfield of observation which promised ample return for patient research.\n\nAs a reward of these investigations important facts have been\nestablished on ample evidence. First, it has been confirmed by varying\nlines of evidence that transference of pollen, or cross-fertilization,\nis of special value in the development of plant life. Investigation has\nstrengthened the evidence of disadvantage arising from fertilization by\nexclusive dependence on self-produced pollen. Fritz M\u00fcller has recorded\na variety of observations that the pollen of some flowers has so little\ninfluence on the seed produced on the same stem that when it falls upon\nthe seeds no effect is produced; the pollen lies there as if possessed\nof no more vitalizing power than grains of dust. And, what is even more\nsurprising, M\u00fcller has found examples in which the pollen does act upon\nthe seeds of its own flower, but acts _injuriously_, insomuch that the\nflower, the pollen, and the seed-producing portion of the plant begin to\ndecay.[BT] So deep has been the impression made on Mr. Darwin's mind by\nthe evidence of provision for transference of pollen, that he closes his\nvaluable and interesting book on the _Fertilization of Orchids_ with the\nfollowing statements. Having remarked that \"self-fertilization would\nhave been an incomparably safer and easier process than the transportal\nof pollen from flower to flower,\" he adds these words,--\"It is hardly an\nexaggeration to say that Nature tells us, in the most emphatic manner,\nthat she abhors perpetual self-fertilization.\"[BU]\n\nThe next result secured presents an important relation between animal\nlife and vegetable. These flowers do not depend for their fertilization\nupon the action of the wind, which in scattering profusely in all\ndirections must occasion large waste of pollen. There is found to be\ndistinct provision for carrying the pollen from one flower to another by\ninsects, such as the bees, whose industry in gathering honey has been\ncelebrated from ancient times, specially because of our interest in the\nstorehouse, but with little suspicion of the double work being done by\nthe bees, who add to their other industry that of horticulturists. These\nbees are the pollen-bearers,--the recognized local carriers, regularly\non the road,--doing the work which the flowers, in lack of locomotive\npower, could not do for each other. Or, looking at the relation of\nthings from another point of view, the bees are at the same time\ngathering the honey, and sowing the seed for a future harvest. This\nreference to the honey, however, introduces to notice a companion series\nof facts, showing the provision in completed form for an interchange of\nservices. The plants supply an attraction to the animals, while the\nanimals render a service to the plants. This phase of interdependence is\nmade more conspicuous by the contrast apparent in the structure and\nfunctions of plants fertilized by the wind, such as the larger shrubs\nand trees, which as they present a greater surface to the breeze, do not\ncall for the same detailed provision for carrying the pollen. In\ncontrast with these more bulky representatives of the vegetable kingdom,\nthe more lowly and insignificant in size, as well as more short-lived,\npresent many attractions in color, scent, and secretion of honey, all\nadapted to the nature of insects, suited for the work of pollen\ncarrying. The attractions of form, color, and scent in the flowers are\nwell known to us; but they are also appreciated by the insects,--a fact\nwhich may possibly suggest that a high degree of intellectual power is\nnot required for appreciation of these qualities, as no one professes\nthat bees rank high intellectually. At the same time, if comparisons are\nto be made at this point, the farther suggestion may also be introduced,\nthat there is little testimony to intelligence where search for food is\nconcerned, and while the human race do not feed on flowers, insects are\nconstantly feeding from them. The attractions in the two cases therefore\nvary considerably in their significance. Restricting attention, however,\nto the special field of observation now before us, with the view simply\nof ascertaining the relations of plants and insects, color and honey\npresent the two most prominent attractions accounting for the perpetual\nhum of life heard amongst the flowering plants. Different parts of the\nflower provide for variegated coloring, and stores of honey; these\npresent attractions to the insects; and the structure of the flowers as\nthey provide for the landing of the insects, and require that they\npenetrate to their centre for the secreted honey, secures that the work\nneedful for fertilization be effectually done. This last feature of\nadaptation is that on which attention may be specially concentrated\nhere. Mr. Darwin in treating of orchids has described this part of their\nstructure in these words;--\"In almost all the species, one of the petals\n(or leaves of the flower) which is properly the upper one, is larger\nthan the others and stands on the lower side of the flower, where it\noffers a landing-place for insects.\"[BV] Towards the inner or root end\nof this leaf (_labellum_) is the gland, in some flowers appearing only\nas a slit, in others forming like a tube, (_nectary_) which secrets the\nhoney. Just over the entrance to the part where the honey is to be found\nstands that which secrets the pollen prepared for fertilizing some other\nflower. So soon as the bee or other insect presses its head well into\nthe centre of the flower, some of the pollen adheres to it; when the\nhead is withdrawn, this pollen is borne off to the flower which the bee\nnext visits; and as the head is pressed into the core of this flower\nthe pollen is deposited, and provision for fertilization is complete.\nSpecial features appearing in certain classes of the orchids illustrate\nhow it is possible for the bee so laden to visit many flowers without\ndepositing the pollen, yet a little later accomplish the object quite\nsimply. The following illustration from Mr. Darwin's account of the\nfirst orchid selected, will suffice. Just _above_ the entrance to the\nhoney store, lies a pouch connected with the pollen store. As the head\nof the bee is pressed down towards the honey, this pouch is burst open,\nand from it issues a little sticky gland or disc, or it may be two of\nthese discs. These adhere at once to the head of the bee, and being\nconnected by a slight band with packets of pollen grains so soon as the\nanimal retires the pollen is drawn with it, standing out like a seed\nvessel on the head. The strangest part of the contrivance appears in\nwhat thereafter follows. \"The viscid matter has the peculiar chemical\nquality, of setting like cement, hard and dry in a few minutes.\" Suppose\nboth the little viscid balls have been withdrawn, the bands bearing the\npollen will appear \"projecting up like horns.\" \"How then can the flower\nbe fertilized? This is effected by a beautiful contrivance; though the\nviscid surface remains immovably affixed, the apparently insignificant\nand minute disc of membrane to which the caudicle adheres is endowed\nwith a remarkable power of contraction, which causes the pollinium to\nsweep through an angle of about ninety degrees, always in one direction\ntowards the apex of the proboscis, in the course of thirty seconds on an\naverage.\"[BW] That is, the two erections bearing packets of pollen which\nformerly stood up almost perpendicular, like horns, begin to lower until\nthey reach the horizontal; in this way when the bee enters a flower the\npackets of pollen inevitably touch the seed stores, communicating what\nis required for their fertilization. Nor have we even yet the whole of\nthe contrivances adapted for this end. \"Here comes into play another\npretty adaptation.\" The seed vessel to be fertilized is very sticky,\n\"but not so viscid as when touched by a pollinium to pull the whole off\nan insect's head.\" But it is sufficiently adhesive \"to break the elastic\nthreads by which the packets of pollen grains are tied together.\" In\nthis way, it tears off so much from the store adhering to the head of\nthe bee, and still leaves there what may supply the requirements of many\nflowers besides. The description thus given will suffice to indicate how\nclose is the relation of the lower orders of animal life with vegetable\nlife, and will illustrate how the lower organism may be dependent for\nexistence on the higher, an illustration in some respect the converse of\nthe facts illustrating origin of species by development.\n\nThere remains in this department of inquiry only one additional set of\nfacts, to which reference may be made, as illustrating _distribution of\nwork among insects and birds_, assigning them to different orders of\nplants. This will illustrate contrivance on a still wider scale,\ndiscovering distinct sets of affinity, which imply common localization\nfor given plants and animals. In this it appears that flies, humble\nbees, and birds with long slender bills, such as the humming birds, all\nhave a share in the work required for fertilizing plants.\n\nThere is one example, _epipactis latifolia_, with a cup-shaped labellum,\nin which honey is secreted, and which bees are never seen to frequent.\nWhat, however, the bees pass, the wasps suck eagerly, and by them it is\nfertilized. Of this flower, Mr. Darwin says,--\"It is very remarkable\nthat the sweet nectar of this _epipactis_ should not be attractive to\nany kind of bee. If wasps were to become extinct in any district, so\nprobably would the _Epipactis Latifolia_.\"[BX]\n\nAnother example there is of an orchid _(Spiranthes Autumnalis_),\ncommonly known as _Ladies' Tresses_, having a series of spikes, of which\nthe lowest flowers are first matured, the others following in order as\nthey rise towards the summit. This plant is frequented by bees, whose\npractice it is to begin with the lowest flowers and ascend gradually to\nthe top. This order in seeking to extract the honey, proves to be the\nproper one for fertilizing of the plant, because the pollen which the\nbee brings will be received by the riper flower on which it lands, and\nwhen that has been deposited, fresh pollen will adhere to the bee as it\nrises to the less matured flowers, and thus it departs laden with pollen\ndestined for the lowest flowers of the next plant it visits.[BY]\n\n[Illustration: 1 SECTION OF ORCHID FLOWER SHOWING POLLEN VESSEL, SEED\nSTORE AND HONEY STORE 2 BEE ENTERING 3 POLLEN VESSEL 4 BEE RETREATING 5\nBEE PREPARED FOR ENTERING ANOTHER FLOWER]\n\nThese examples introduce us to a general plan for fertilization of\nplants by the intervention of insects, so complete in the order of\ndistribution that we may classify the plants according to the insect by\nwhich they are fertilized, making it natural to speak of fly orchids,\nspider orchids, wasp orchids, and bee orchids. In all cases the search\nfor honey determines the visits made, leaving still unexplained,\nhowever, the fact that the nectar of some plants is shunned by certain\ninsects, and eagerly absorbed by others. With the general source of\nattraction in the flowering plants, there are diversities of arrangement\namong the insects, according to the comparative size of the flower, and\nstrength required in order to penetrate to the inner chamber where the\nhoney is stored. Because of the minuteness of the aperture, there are\nflowers from which the bee can not draw supplies; on the other hand,\nbecause of the size and strength of the flower, there are cases in which\nthe ordinary bee is incapable of reaching the store, and the stronger\nhumble bee alone succeeds in effecting an entrance.\n\nThere is thus presented in mere outline a general view of the\ninterdependence of lower and higher orders of organism. While each\nflower develops pollen and seed, there are arrangements connected with\nthe ripening of these two, which restrain or even prevent\nself-fertilization. Along with this there are distinct lines of evidence\nto establish the rule that cross-fertilization, or transference of\npollen from one flower to the seed of another, secures the growth of a\nmuch healthier and more vigorous order. Where such transference is\nprovided for otherwise than by the wind, the attractiveness of the\nflowers brings to them at the proper season, the insects which carry the\npollen, and to each class of insect is distributed a distinct share in\nthe work. In these facts we have a natural law for preservation of\nspecies, discovering in a very striking manner the dependence of lower\norganism on higher. As Mr. Darwin has said,--\" The _meaning_ of these\nfacts is clear.\" Referring to the examples in which the insects have to\nbore holes in order to reach the honey, where there is need for time to\nallow for the hardening of the viscid matter, he has used the following\nwords which are most fitly applied,--\"If this double relation is\naccidental, it is a fortunate accident for the plants; but I can not\nbelieve it to be so, and it appears to me one of the most wonderful\ncases of adaptation which has ever been recorded.\"[BZ] It is most\nobviously true, as Sir John Lubbock has said, that \"neither plants nor\ninsects would be what they are, but for the influence which each has\nexercised on the other.\"[CA] In view of the facts here very briefly\ndescribed it will generally be allowed that Mr. Darwin's expectation\nfrom the study of orchids will be verified,--\"An examination of their\nmany beautiful contrivances will exalt the whole vegetable kingdom in\nmost persons' estimation.\"[CB] We have enough before us to enable us to\nappreciate our author's feeling when he says, \"Hardly any fact has\nstruck me so much as the endless diversities of structure,--the\nprodigality of resources for gaining the very same end.\"[CC] Again when\ngiving us his prevailing impression he says,--\"The more I study nature,\nthe more I become impressed with ever-increasing force, that the\ncontrivances and beautiful adaptations, slowly acquired through each\npart occasionally varying in a slight degree, but in many ways, with the\npreservation of those variations which were beneficial to the organism\nunder complex and ever varying conditions of life, transcend in an\nincomparable manner the contrivances and adaptations which the most\nfertile imagination of man could invent.\"[CD]\n\nIn preparing the present summary of recent advances in this department\nof natural history, I have resorted freely to quotation, because of the\nobvious rule, that it is better for scientific interest, for proper\nunderstanding, and for regulation of all subsequent reasoning on the\nfacts, that we have the observations presented as nearly as possible by\nthose who made them, and that we have more general inferences in the\nvery words of those whose minds have been filled and swayed by\nimpressions made in the field of observation itself. In now proceeding\nto consider the bearing of these advances on religious thought, I shall\nkeep as far as possible by the same rule, desiring that science may\ninterpret itself, and translate its own special conclusions into their\nfit place within a scheme of the universe. And whatever there may be\nhere of material for detailed inference, it will be taken by religious\nmen as abundantly clear, that science in slowly unfolding to general\nview these secrets of nature, renders a lasting and most valuable\nservice to religion. Our religious convictions and emotions rest on a\nwider intellectual basis according to the fulness with which we\nunderstand the marvels of adaptation and contrivance which lie covered\nfrom ordinary observation under the attractive surface of nature.\n\nAltogether beyond such a general admission as this, however, it must be\nobvious that in the mass of deeply interesting material now before us,\nthere lies a considerable number of truths needing to be gathered into\ngeneralized form, bearing upon the laws of nature applying to living\norganism. As records of details are extended before us, the marvels of\nstructure are obvious. The multifarious contrivances become quite\nstartling, until we are ready to lose our reckoning in the very\nmultiplicity of facts narrated. In order to make sure of general result,\nwe need to draw off somewhat from details,--to be content even to lose\nsight of many of them,--in order to gain a position, sufficiently\nremoved for a sight of general relations. In attempting this it is clear\nthat there are certain truths bearing on the preservation and\ndevelopment of species in the vegetable kingdom, and an analogous set\nof truths as to the animal kingdom, and above these, possibly still more\nimportant for general appreciation of the universe as a whole, a body of\ntruth as to the relations of plants and animals.\n\nAs to the first of these, it seems obvious that within the single field\nof observation presented by orchids,--comparatively narrow, in view of\nthe wide domain of the vegetable kingdom, and yet astonishingly\nextensive, on account of the richness of detail,--there is a large body\nof evidence to support the theory of origin of species by selection and\nadaptation. Whether all the orchide\u00e6 now found in existence have sprung\nfrom one order of plant, or from several, the testimony appears ample to\nsupport at least the following conclusion as presented in the words of\nMr. Darwin, \"that the now wonderfully changed structure of the flower is\ndue to a long course of slow modification,--each modification having\nbeen preserved which was useful to the plant, during the incessant\nchanges to which the organic and inorganic world has been exposed.\"[CE]\n\n\nBy a line of inference exactly similar, a like conclusion, must be\nreached as to insect life. For, important as the observations are,\nbearing on the transference of pollen from the place where it is\ngenerated to the place where it is wanted, we must notice that the whole\nwork is done in consequence of search for honey by flies, moths, ants,\nwasps, and bees. It naturally follows that all these insects have been\ngoing through some measure of adaptation, as well as the plants. The\nsame law must have been operating in their history while prosecuting the\nunceasing search for food. It may be exceedingly difficult to fill up\nthe line of progress, or trace the causes in operation, which could\nfavor the conclusion that all the insects named have sprung from a\ncommon stock. Still more perplexing might it be to maintain the argument\nthat these very insects have sprung according to a sure law of descent,\nfrom vegetable life itself. But there is ample evidence to warrant the\ninference that in length of proboscis, formation of limbs, and other\nfeatures in their structure, modifications have resulted from the\nstruggle needful to reach the nectar secreted in the flowers.\n\nBut it is clearly impossible to stop here in our inferences. There is\ninterdependence of lower and higher organisms, to which a distinct place\nneeds to be assigned in our theory of the universe. Even if it be\ngranted, as it readily will be by those who have studied the results of\nrecent research, that there is a vast body of evidence to prove that\nthere is development of species by adaptation and selection, it is\nequally evident that this is not the only law affecting the existence of\ndifferent orders of organized beings. Just as clear as it is that pollen\nand seed are both required to provide for the continuance of plant life,\nso clear is it that plants are needed to support insects, and insects to\npropagate plants. Proceeding on the same lines of reasoning as have been\nalready employed, we must inquire how this interdependence is to be\naccounted for under natural law? The struggle for existence is clearly\nperforming an important part in the development of plants, and also of\nanimals; and so long as we regard these two orders singly, it seems\nobvious how changes in structure may be accounted for; but observations\nhave become so interlaced, that a new problem has been raised in\nconnection with facts manifestly abating the struggle for existence. In\nview of this problem Dr. Hooker has said,--\"The adjustment of the parts\nof the flower to the form and habits of the insect or bird, and of these\nto the flower, is so accurate, that it is in vain to speculate whether\nthe plant was adapted to feed the animal, or the animal adapted to\nfertilize the plant.\"[CF] This suggestion of the needlessness of\nspeculation is natural from a scientific point of view, and we may do\nwell to remember the warnings against risks attending the search for\nfinal causes, which have been sounded from the days of Spinoza to the\npresent time; but there is a problem here which science can not leave in\nabeyance. The facts are undoubted, and the natural causes must be\nsought. The parts of the flowers are adapted to the forms and habits of\nthe insects; the insects are adapted to the work of fertilizing the\nplants; the question is, How are these two things secured? The inquiry\nwhich has awakened general interest as to the development of species in\nthe history of distinct orders such as orchids, insects, pigeons, and\ndogs, must strive to complete its work, by pressing on to this more\ncomplicated question concerning the adaptation of distinct organisms to\ninfluence and aid each other in the work of development. In what way\nscience may deal with this question, and how far it may be able to\nadvance in the search for an answer, it may be difficult to decide. For\nit is much easier to indicate the logical necessity for an advance, than\nto say in what manner the advance is to be accomplished. The one is a\nsimple question of logical requirement; the other must be a matter of\ncontinued observation, and scientific inference. Whether science may yet\ndiscover an answer; or whether it may prove true at this point, as at\nother points already mentioned, that science has here reached clear\nmarks of its own limits, must be left to the future, to be determined by\nthose devoted to scientific research. As long, however, as this question\nof interdependence remains without a scientific explanation, it must be\nobvious that there are important facts which seem to imply some\nmodification of the theory of descent, or evolution of species by means\nof selection, under the severe struggle for existence. Or, to put it\nfrom another point of view, nature has marvellously provided for\nmitigation of the struggle for existence, by contrivances providing both\nfor vegetable and animal life; therefore the theory of the origin and\ndevelopment of life which depends chiefly on the struggle for existence\nmust be adjusted to allow for a theory of the effects arising from the\nnatural provision for obviating the struggle, and providing for a large\nincrease of life.\n\nQuite beyond this, as a matter entirely distinct, is the question as to\nthe primordial forms of existence in the history of plants and insects.\nAs to this, science may be able to give very little testimony, as it is\na question of the remote past, on which present facts may afford little\nevidence. Still, beyond these primordial forms, in a region which\nscience can not enter, there lies the question of origin, of actual\nbeginning, creation of life, as to the reality of which science can\nspeak only indirectly by discovery of its own limits, in the terms of\nits _ultimatum_, nature has provided that such and such things shall be.\n\nBefore leaving the department of insect life, there is a collateral and\ncomplementary series of observations, bearing upon the nature and\nactivity of ANTS, which deserves attention. The ants are a race of\ninsects as diligently industrious as the bees, like them also fond of\nhoney and of all sweet substances; but unlike them ready to devour other\ninsects. Along with the industry of the bee, they have predatory\ntendencies, leading them into conflict with other races, or even\ninvolving different orders of their own race in warfare. It is a curious\nfact, in this connection, that many of the flowering plants have\ncontrivances which guard them from the approach of ants. Creeping\ninsects find the way barred against them while the flying insect at once\nand easily reaches the stores of honey, not knowing any thing of the\ndifficulties in the path of the less favored rival. Spikes grow with\ntheir points in a downward direction, against which no creeping insect\ncan make way; waxy or glutinous matter is spread over the leaves, which\ninsects shun as a trap; and there are velvety flexible leaves from the\nedge of which the insect easily slips off. Special attention has been\nturned to this field of research by Kerner,[A] an interesting outline of\nthe results of his observations being given by Sir John Lubbock.[CG]\nThe conclusion reached as to the utility of these contrivances for\nexclusion of creeping insects, is that they perform an auxiliary part in\nthe general plan for fertilization which has been described. To allow\nthe store of honey to go to the ants would be merely to feed them\nwithout any equivalent advantage to the flowers. To diminish the supply\nin this way, might cause the bees to abandon many flowers, and so\ngreatly diminish fertilization. This would ultimately lead to short\nsupplies, and probable extinction of several orders of plants and\nanimals, and accordingly these contrivances to hinder the access of\nants, must be added to those for facilitating the approach of bees, and\nother flying insects, affording further evidence of the adjustment of\nrival interests involved in the relations of the vegetable and animal\nkingdoms. The serried spikes are a phalanx of bayonets planted for\nresistance of an advancing foe.\n\nContemplating now the ants as in some respects an excluded race, which\nwith a large share of pugnacity can not find a basis of operations for\ncontending against the bees, we have to turn attention briefly on their\nmodes of life. The industry of the ant is proverbial, and can not fail\nto arrest the attention of any one who spends a few minutes before an\nant-hill. But carefully recorded observations prove it to be much\ngreater than could have been imagined. Sir John Lubbock has rendered\nspecial service here by carefully noting the time occupied, as well as\nthe amount of work done, thus preserving a series of observations\nexceedingly suggestive in many ways, and having an important bearing on\na considerable number of difficult questions connected with the relative\npowers of lower and higher orders of life. A similar service has been\nrendered in America in the work of the Rev. H. C. McCook of\nPhiladelphia, on _The Natural History of the Agricultural Ant of\nTexas_,--a book recording careful and most important observations,\nadding much to the stores of knowledge concerning ants.[CH]\n\nThe work of the ants is directed mainly to the two great objects of\nanimal life, procuring food, and caring for the young, to which falls to\nbe added, the repelling of attacks upon their nests, or removal of any\nthing obnoxious. They destroy great numbers of smaller insects, bearing\nthem to their nests for consumption, besides going off in search of\nhoney which may be within reach, and not guarded with spikes. This mode\nof providing implies a very busy life, and they do not as a rule grudge\nwork. Besides procuring supplies, however, there is a large amount of\nlabor in the care bestowed upon their young. Without attempting to\ndistinguish various orders, of which \"more than seven hundred kinds are\nknown,\"[CI] a general description of their young will suffice. In the\nearliest stage of their existence, the larv\u00e6 are small conical shaped\ngrubs, without power of movement. In this state they are fed, carried\nabout from place to place as if their seniors were seeking change of air\nand temperature for them; and in process of these removals and\narrangements, they are often grouped together in separate companies, and\nin exact order according to their size. In their next stage, they become\npup\u00e6, sometimes quite exposed, in other cases covered with a thin silken\ncovering. From this, they pass into the mature state as perfect insects,\nand in process of this transition older ants render assistance by way of\naiding the transition, \"carefully unfolding their legs and smoothing\nout their wings.\"\n\nIn the ant nest there is a singular distinction of orders which prevents\nus speaking of the _parent_ ants as doing all this work for the young.\nThe great majority in every nest are neuters, not producing young; these\nare the workers, and they are destitute of wings. The smaller numbers\nonly are the males and females producing the young. The workers, shorn\nof wings, and entrusted with all that is required in household and\nout-door duties, labor assiduously. These neuter ants have occasioned\nspecial perplexity to Mr. Darwin as bearing on the theory of evolution,\na difficulty which is seriously increased by the fact that in some cases\nthey \"differ from each other, sometimes to an almost incredible degree,\nand are thus divided into two or even three castes,\" and these \"do not\ncommonly graduate into each other,\" but are \"as distinct from each other\nas any two species.\"[CJ] Without following Mr. Darwin through his\nreasoning as to the adaptation of neuters for their task in life, it may\nbe well to quote his words towards its close, where he says, \"I must\nconfess, that, with all my faith in natural selection, I should never\nhave anticipated that this principle could have been efficient in so\nhigh a degree, had not the case of these neuter insects led me to this\nconclusion.\"[CK] Besides the fact that these neuters are the workers,\nthere is an additional circumstance, established by Mr. Frederick Smith\nby observations in England, confirmed by the observations of Pierre\nHuber in Switzerland, and afterwards verified in the clearest way by Mr.\nDarwin, that there is a species of ant (_formica sanguinea_) which\ncaptures slaves of a weaker order, making war against the weaker race,\ncarrying off their young, rearing them within their own nests, and\ntraining them to serve. Mr. Darwin was himself sceptical of such a\nstatement, but gives an interesting narrative of distinct observations\nby which it was confirmed.\n\nThe amount of labor undertaken by the workers from an ants' nest, may be\njudged by one or two extracts from the records of Sir John Lubbock. He\nsays, \"I once watched an ant from six in the morning, and she worked\nwithout intermission till a quarter to ten at night,\" and in that time\nshe had carried one hundred and eighty-seven larv\u00e6 into the nest.[CL]\nThere is evidence not only of co\u00f6peration, but of division of labor\namong the workers. The observations of Mr. Forel lead to the conclusion\nthat \"very young ants devote themselves at first to the care of the\nlarv\u00e6 and pup\u00e6, and that they do not take share in the defence of the\nnest or other out-of-door work, until they are some days old.\"[CM] By a\ndistinct set of observations, watching all ants that came and went from\nthe nest, and laying up in captivity some of the number, Mr. Lubbock\ncame to the conclusion \"that certain ants are told off as foragers.\"[CN]\nAnd in the winter season, when in the case of some orders little food is\nrequired, a few only of the inhabitants of the nest come and go, for the\npurpose of carrying in supplies. This makes observation much more easy\nat that season, rendering it possible to number and identify individual\nworkers. The results as applicable to one of the nests are given in the\nfollowing sentences. \"From the 1st of November to the 5th of January,\nwith two or three casual exceptions, the whole of the supplies were\ncarried in by three ants, one of whom, however, did comparatively\nlittle. The other two were imprisoned, and then, but not till then, a\nfresh ant appeared on the scene. She carried in the food for a week, and\nthen she being imprisoned, two others undertook the task.\"[CO]\n\nOne consideration more bearing upon obtaining supplies deserves to be\nrecorded as altogether singular. Some species of ants watch over a\ndistinct order of insects, the aphides, which exude a sweet fluid, using\nthem exactly as we do cows for obtaining supplies of milk. The ant comes\nup to the aphis, gently strokes it with her feelers, forthwith the aphis\ngives forth its supply of honey, which the ant drinks up and departs.\nThe facts were observed by Pierre Huber, and verified by Mr. Darwin.\nThis verification was so interesting, that I give the narrative in a\nslightly condensed form. Mr. Darwin says,--\"I removed all the ants from\na group of about a dozen aphides on a dock-plant, and prevented their\nattendance during several hours.\" Mr. Darwin tried in vain by stroking\nthe aphides with a hair, in imitation of the play of the feelers of the\nants, to induce them to give up the honey. \"Afterwards,\" he says, \"I\nallowed an ant to visit them, and it immediately seemed, by its eager\nway of running about, to be well aware what a rich flock it had\ndiscovered; it then began to play with its antenn\u00e6 on the abdomen first\nof one aphis and then of another; and each, as soon as it felt the\nantenn\u00e6, immediately lifted up its abdomen and excreted a limpid drop of\nsweet juice, which was eagerly devoured by the ant.\"[CP] So the ants\nhave their \"cows\" and milk them.\n\nTo attempt any account of the ants of tropical countries, where ants are\nmost numerous, swarming in the regions they inhabit, and marching in\nhosts, would occupy too much space. I give, therefore, only a single\nreference extracted from the testimony of Mr. Savage concerning the\ndriver ant of Western Africa (_Anomma Arcens_), so called because of the\nsuccess with which it drives every thing before it. Mr. Savage annoyed\nby the proximity of a large settlement, discovered its quarters in some\ndecaying granite. Kindling a fire around it, he believed he had\nsucceeded in disposing of that settlement. Two days after, he went back\nto the spot, and instead of desolation and death, he found \"a tree at a\nshort distance, about eighteen inches in diameter, to the height of four\nfeet from the ground, with the adjacent plants and earth perfectly black\nwith them.\" The most striking thing, however, was that the ants had made\nfestoons from the lower branches to the ground, formed in the following\nmanner, as witnessed by Mr. Savage: \"ant after ant coming down from\nabove, extending their long limbs, and opening wide their jaws,\ngradually lengthening out the living chain\" until first it was swaying\nto and fro, and ultimately fastened to the ground, when \"others were\nascending and descending upon them, thus holding free and ready\ncommunication with the lower and upper portions of this dense mass.\" In\nthis same manner these ants provide for the crossing of water when on\nthe march. \"They make a line or chain of one another, gradually\nextending themselves by numbers across till the opposite side is\nreached.\"[CQ] This is exactly similar to the manner in which some\nmonkeys are known to construct a natural bridge, only that the monkeys\nhave the advantage of greater size and muscular strength, as well as\nprehensile power by the use of their tails. With such characteristics as\nhave been briefly described, there is little wonder that a high place in\nthe scale of intelligence has been claimed for these small insects. Sir\nJohn Lubbock, who has so patiently conducted his observations as to\ntheir modes of life, has stated this in the following manner,--\"The\nanthropoid apes no doubt approach more to man in bodily structure than\ndo any other animals; but when we consider the habits of ants, their\nsocial organization, their large communities, elaborate habitations,\ntheir roadways, their possession of domestic animals, and even in some\ncases of slaves, it must be admitted that they have a fair claim to rank\nnext to man in the scale of intelligence.\"[CR] Whether, even with all\nthis evidence, we may be able to rank the ants quite as high as Lubbock\nhere suggests, may be open to question. There may, for example, be\nreasonable debate whether the dog does not present still higher signs of\nintelligence, but it says a great deal for the ants that debate in the\ncase should be possible. A question of very great scientific importance\nis here raised, affecting the whole scheme of interpretation applicable\nto animal life, as connected with development of brain.\n\nWithout attempting to enter upon the argument yet to be conducted\nthrough the wider relations concerned, it must be obvious that the facts\nbearing on insect life must erelong have a larger share than they have\nyet had in influencing our generalizations. By reference to these, it\nbecomes apparent, that anatomical structure is not in itself an adequate\nguide in determining comparative importance on the scale of organic\nexistence; and, what is still more startling, that even comparative\nbrain structure can not be taken as the sole test of the measure of\nintelligence belonging to animals. The whole orders of ants, taken\ncollectively, must be regarded as presenting quite exceptional\ndifficulties, not only for a theory of evolution regarded as an\nall-embracing science of life; but also for that theory of intelligence\nwhich seeks to account for diversities of power by the comparative\ncomplexity of brain structure.\n\nPassing from more detailed discussion, it is needful to observe how wide\nand valuable are the results of these researches concerning the\nrelation of the vegetable kingdom with lower orders of animals. Facts\nnow recorded in multitudes of scientific journals, and more elaborate\ntreatises, illustrate wonderful minuteness of contrivance and\ncompleteness of adaptation in the works of nature, giving to the range\nof knowledge possessed only a century ago an aspect of insignificance.\nWhat the microscope has done by enlarging the range of human vision,\nsubdivision of labor among scientific inquirers, and proportionate\nconcentration, have done, in the way of embracing the vast and\ncomplicated field, of observation lying open to all eyes. The results\nexalt to a greatly higher place in our appreciation the evidence of\ndesign in the world. The consequence is that while the line of thought\nfollowed by Paley, in what he designated _Natural Theology_, has become\na thousand-fold more interesting, the familiar and now almost antiquated\nillustration of the _watch_, taken as a model of human design, by the\ncomparative simplicity of its adjustments, seems strangely inadequate to\nrepresent even in the most temporary form, a minuteness of design quite\noverwhelming to the human mind in its attempts to bring it within a\nuniform scheme. Whether all this was provided for by manifold creative\nacts, or by development from a few primordial forms, does not affect the\nargument; the latter suggestion only greatly increases its force. To\nthose who are swayed only by an intellectual interest, the facts of\nvegetable and insect life must be full of significance, suggestive of\nfar-reaching reflection. But to no body of men can these results of\nscientific research be so attractive as to those who require for all\nnature a supernatural explanation.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[BR] _Lay Sermons_, chap, vii., p. 134.\n\n[BS] Darwin's _Fertilization of Orchids_, p. 2; Lubbock's _Scientific\nLectures_, p. 8.\n\n[BT] Sir John Lubbock's _Scientific Lectures_, p. 3. Mr. Darwin refers\nto Fritz M\u00fcller's papers as reported in _Botanische Zeitung_, 1869-70.\nAppendix IX.\n\n[BU] _The Various Contrivances by which Orchids are fertilized by\nInsects_, 2d ed. p. 293.\n\n[BV] _Fertilization_, p. 5.\n\n[BW] _Fertilization_, p. 12.\n\n[BX] _Fertilization_, p. 102.\n\n[BY] _Ib._ p. 113.\n\n[BZ] _Fertilization_, p. 44.\n\n[CA] _Scientific Lectures_, p. 31.\n\n[CB] _Fertilization_, p. 2.\n\n[CC] _Ib._ p. 284.\n\n[CD] _Fertilization_, p. 285.\n\n[CE] _Fertilization_, p. 246.\n\n[CF] _Botany_, (Science Primers) by Dr. J. D. Hooker, C.B., P.R.S., p.\n79.\n\n[CG] _Scientific Lectures_, p. 36.\n\n[CH] See Appendix X.\n\n[CI] See Appendix VIII.\n\n[CJ] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 230.\n\n[CK] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 233.\n\n[CL] _Scient. Lects._ p. 73.\n\n[CM] _Ib._ p. 78.\n\n[CN] _Ib._ p. 135.\n\n[CO] _Scientific Lectures_, p. 135.\n\n[CP] _Origin of Species_ 6th ed. p. 207.\n\n[CQ] _Museum of Natural History_ edited by Richardson, Dallas, Cobbold,\nBaird, and White, vol. ii. p. 184.\n\n[CR] _Scient. Lects._ p. 68.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VI.\n\nHIGHER ORGANISMS.--RESEMBLANCES AND CONTRASTS.--BRAIN STRUCTURE.\n\n\nThe stage of investigation now reached requires us to consider recent\nadvances in our knowledge of more complicated organisms. This leads into\nthe line of observation disclosing steadily advancing complexity of\nstructure, and brings us into contact with the claim that man be\nincluded within the area of scientific inquiry, and regarded as a more\nfully organized life to which lower orders are not only pointing, but\nactually tending.\n\nAs to this last claim, about which more must be said as we approach the\nclose of these investigations, it may be remarked by way of preliminary,\nthat as man belongs to nature, all the characteristics of his life must\ncome within the area of scientific inquiry, and indeed the test of any\ntheory of existence which may be offered, will be found in the measure\nof success with which it explains our own nature. That man stands\nhighest in the scale of organism belonging to this world admits of no\ndoubt, therefore the explanation of human nature may be regarded as the\nsupreme effort of science. Around this subject, however, serious\ndifferences have arisen among scientific men, but these differences do\nnot concern the very simple question whether all that belongs to nature\ncomes within the range of the science of nature. This is granted by all,\nwhether there be a preference for including all such inquiry under the\nsingle name of science, or for distinguishing between physical science\nand mental philosophy. This is simply a matter of defining terms, and\ntracing the boundaries of recognized departments of inquiry. But whether\na continued study of organism will conduct us to an adequate\nunderstanding of human nature, must be a matter of observation and\ninference. If it do, science has completed its work. If it do not, there\nremains a still higher question, how shall we account for features of\nlife for which organism affords no scientific explanation? The whole\nfield is certainly free to science, and the whole task which this\nimmense field of research imposes must be undertaken, and persistently\nprosecuted to a rational issue.\n\nEntering now, therefore, on the contemplation of animal life, regarded\nas a higher order, distinguishable from vegetable life, we have the\noutstanding characteristics of sensibility and locomotion. Whether there\nis a distinct line of demarcation between vegetable and animal does not\nrequire special attention, for no matter of controversy on this point\ncan delay procedure. There is, as already remarked, in the vegetable\nkingdom a singular approximation towards animal life, in so far as we\nhave evidence of sensibility to touch among the plants, to a degree\nwhich appears wonderful chiefly by contrast with the common\ncharacteristics of the vegetable kingdom.\n\nOn the other hand, sensibility to influences operating from without is a\ncommon feature of animal life. Even the very lowest orders of animals\nare sensitive to touch, and as this form of experience is closely\nconnected with power of locomotion, all animals have the conditions of\ntheir life largely affected by interference with their own movements, or\nresistance offered, whether by objects lying in their way, or by some\nforce restraining their progress, or causing movement in an opposite\ndirection. Now these two characteristics--sensibility to impression from\nwithout, and movement caused by an exercise of energy from within the\norganism itself--are both provided for by means of the nerve system\nbelonging to the animal. This nerve system varies in the number and\ncomplexity of its arrangements, according to the complexity of the\norganism with which it is associated. As, therefore, we rise in the\nscale, passing from the soft pulpy form of the lowest orders, to those\nformed in segments or rings, next to those with distinct portions of\norganism fulfilling separate functions, as in insect life, with head,\nbody, and legs; and next pass up to the vertebrates, with back-bone and\nskeleton, on which is built up a more or less complicated muscular\nsystem, we find a nerve system, growing in complexity along with the\nappearance of different organs of the body. And in all cases, this\nsystem fulfils these two functions--sensibility to touch, and movement\nof the body. These two are provided for by distinct lines or nerve\nfibres; and in all cases, these two sets are combined in a centre,\nthereby securing that the two sets be co\u00f6perative, unitedly\ncontributing to the management of the living organism. This appears even\nif we take for illustration an organism so low as the _ascidian\nmollusk_, which floats in the water as if it were a sack drawn together\ntowards the top, bulging out below; and which is nourished simply by the\npassing of a current of water in at the mouth, and out at a vent towards\nthe lower end of the sac. A series of nerve lines comes from the mouth;\na distinct ramification spreads over the lower portion of the sac; and\nthese two are united in a single knot or ganglion, a little above the\nvent. By these contrivances, this little body, though for the most part\nstationary, is sensitive to the approach of any thing injurious, and by\ncontraction of its mass expels the water with considerable force,\ndriving the injurious matter to a distance. This combination of the two\nsets of nerves appears more strikingly in such an animal as the\n_centipede_, along whose body are successive groups of nerves, combined\nin regular order in a series of knots, and united longitudinally by\nconnecting threads, attaching the successive knots. The same plan is\ncarried up into a more articulated form in the case of the _winged\ninsect_, with head, antenn\u00e6 or feelers projecting from the head, wings,\nand legs, leading to a more marked appearance of separate combinations,\ngiving greater prominence to the head. When from this we rise to the\n_fish_, thence to the _bird,_ thence to the _quadruped_, we find the\nhead made conspicuously the central organ of the entire nerve system of\nthe animal, while it occupies the front position in the body. It is no\nlonger one of a set or series of knots; nor even the largest or more\nconspicuous in a graduated order of centres; but in the head of the\nanimal is found that which is the true nerve centre for the whole nerve\nsystem, designated the brain. In the case of the vertebrates, not only\ndoes the skeleton afford the solid frame-work on which the muscular\nsystem is built, but the back-bone contains within it the main column of\nnerve fibres, which are given out at the several joints according to the\nrequirements of the body.\n\nIf meanwhile we concentrate attention on our own bodies, we may by the\naid of personal experience find easy illustration of the prominent\nfeatures of the nerve system. We shall take first the _two distinct\nlines_ of nerves already mentioned, the one set concerned with\nsensibility, the other with movement of the muscles. From the tips of\nthe fingers there run lines of nerve fibre, which are brought into\ncombination at the wrist, and are carried up the arm, and onward by the\nshoulder and upper portion of the back-bone to the head. These are the\nnerves of _sensibility_, by means of which, as by telegraph wires, the\nslightest impression made on the tips of the fingers is instantly\nconveyed to the great nerve centre in the brain. Distinct from these is\nanother set of nerves issuing from the brain, and descending the arm,\ngiving off its fibres as it passes to the several muscles above the\nelbow, next to those above the wrist, and next to the muscles of the\nhand and fingers. These are the nerves of _movement_, by means of which\nthe whole arm may be brought into action at pleasure, or the hand may be\nset to work, while the arm is at rest.\n\nThese two sets of nerves--the sensory and motor--are exactly _similar in\nstructure_, consisting of an outer covering, within which floating in a\nwhite fluid is a thread which constitutes the nerve proper. The outer\ncovering provides for _isolation_ of the fibre, from other fibres laid\nalongside of it, just as copper wire is isolated by a gutta-percha\ncovering when the two connecting lines from an electric battery are laid\ndown in close proximity as in the arrangement for electric bells. By\nthis provision the nerve fibres are completely isolated making it\npossible to distinguish sensory impressions so as to tell which finger\nhas been touched. The similarity of structure in the two lines of nerves\nis a striking fact in view of the completely distinct functions\nfulfilled. This leads to a special explanation of the provision for\ndifferent modes of action. This is secured by _diversity in the terminal\narrangements_ for the two classes of nerves. The nerves of sensibility\nhave a peculiarly sensitive arrangement spread under the skin,\nconstituting an end-bulb or touch organ. In certain parts of the body\nmore sensitive than others, such as the tips of the fingers, there are\nadditional minute corpuscles, grouped alongside of the nerve, liable to\ncontract under the slightest pressure, and which add greatly to the\nsensitiveness of the particular parts about which they cluster. The\nterminal arrangements of the motor nerves are quite different. The nerve\nfibres pass into the substance of the muscle to be moved by them, and\nthe nerve fibre is subdivided and distributed, so as to bring the\nseveral parts of the muscle under control. These fibres are so laid and\nconnected, that a whole set of muscles can be moved simultaneously,\nbeing made to work in perfect harmony.\n\n_The vital activity_ of this whole arrangement of nerve fibres,\nincluding sensory and motor in one system, depends upon living\nconnection of all with the great nerve centre in the brain, where the\nnerve energy is provided which keeps all in functional activity. Only,\nthere is this striking difference with the two sets of fibres, that in\nthe case of the sensory nerve the pulsation of energy is upwards to the\nbrain, in the case of the motor nerve it is downwards towards the\nmuscle. There is no scientific explanation yet reached of this contrast\nof molecular action. But by means of it the one order of nerves plays\nthe part of a vehicle of impression providing for knowledge of what is\nwithout, the other order fulfils the part of an instrument for moving\nthe muscular system which is part of the organism itself.\n\n[Illustration: DIAGRAM OF CEREBRO-SPINAL NERVE CENTRES. DARK\nREPRESENTING SENSORY; THE LIGHT, MOTOR CENTRES. THE ARROWS INDICATE THE\nDIRECTION OF THE CURRENT OF INFLUENCE.]\n\n[Illustration: NERVE SYSTEM OF THE INSECT, SHOWING DISTINCT CENTRES.]\n\nThese two orders are not, however, to be regarded as separate systems\nquite apart from each other, but as two sides of one system, which are\nessentially and closely related to each other. There is a provision for\n_combined action_ of the two sets, so that an impulse communicated along\na sensory nerve or set of nerves, may pass over to the motor system and\nterminate in muscular activity. This is most simply illustrated by the\ncircumstance that the nerves of sensibility become instruments of\n_pain_, when a severe shock or blow is given, or some injury is\ninflicted. Suffering becomes a signal of risk and instantly the injured\npart shrinks or starts away from the source of suffering. This is a\nphase of sensori-motor activity illustrating a law which has a wide\nrange of application in animal life. This sketch of the arrangements and\nfunctions of the two sides of the nerve system though traced in view of\nits application to human nature, will suffice to indicate the general\nplan in accordance with which sensibility and muscular activity are\nprovided for in the animal kingdom generally. The ramification of the\nnerve lines will in each case be according to the simplicity or\ncomplexity of structure belonging to the animal; but the provisions for\nsensitiveness to touch, and power of movement are in all cases the same.\nFish, bird, and quadruped are alike sensitive to touch, and they are\nalike capable of movement, though the mechanical contrivances by which\nlocomotion is secured vary greatly; but a double distribution of nerve\nfibres in all cases provides for these two characteristics of animal\nlife.\n\nFrom this, we advance to the nerve centre,--the brain,--to which the\nnerves of sensibility run up, and from which the nerves of motion come\nforth. Here also there is identity in the nature of the organ, while\nthere is variety in its size, with more or less complicated plans of\narrangement, according to the extent of the nerve system of which it is\nthe central organ. Still keeping to the human body for illustration, we\nmay find in the most complex organism known to us illustration of what\nholds good in the main so far as essential structure is concerned.\n\nThe brain is made up of two entirely distinct substances. In the\ninterior of the organ, and altogether concealed from view when a drawing\nof it is made, or the organ itself is exposed to observation, is _a\nwhite mass_ consisting of a multitude of fibres. These are simply\ncrowds of nerve lines gathered together, led up from the extremities and\ntrunk, or provided for intercommunication with the several parts of this\ncentral organ. Gathered all round about this, and constituting the\nexternal mass, on the summit, sides, and base of the brain, is a\ncompletely distinct substance known as _the grey matter_, folded up in\nwavings, twistings, or convolutions, enclosing myriads of cells from\nwhich nerve energy is discharged. These cells differ considerably in\nform and size, suggesting the possibility of distinct functions being\nassigned to cells of different structure, some being smaller and less\nintimately connected with those around, others so much larger and more\nimportant as to have suggested the name of pyramidal cells, and also\nhaving lines of connection between themselves and other parts much more\nnumerous than in the case of the smaller cells. Every cell has a nucleus\nor central point, which is the centre of vitality, while the fibres\nwhich they send out, varying in number from one to four or five,\nestablish connection between cells, or pass into the nerves proper.\nThese cells are packed together in a soft glutinous substance, in the\nouter layer of which they are fewer in number; approaching the interior,\nthey become more numerous; and they are both more abundant, larger in\nsize, and more distinguished by the number of their protoplasmic[CS]\nfibres as they lie nearer to the mass of nerve fibres. In this crowd of\nnerve cells are the stores of nerve energy supplied to the nerve system,\nwith every exercise of which molecular changes in the brain are believed\nto take place. On this account there must be regular and ample supply of\nnourishment for the brain, for which such provision has been made that,\naccording to Haller's computation, one fifth part of the whole blood\nsupply goes to the brain.\n\n[Illustration: HUMAN BRAIN, WITH CENTRES OF ELECTRIC EXCITATION.]\n\nRegarded as the great central organ, the brain is divided into two\nhalves or hemispheres, from each one of which goes forth supply of nerve\nfibres and nerve energy for the opposite side of the body. Its greatest\ndepth is in the central part, the front and back being rounded down, the\nfrontal region being, however, considerably more massive than the rear.\nBesides this great central body, there are several dependent subordinate\nbodies, placed underneath, and directly above the upper part of the\nspine. Most important of these is the _cerebellum_, or little brain,\nwhose functions are now generally believed to be closely connected with\nthe equilibrium of the body when moving. Somewhat nearer the centre, and\nquite under the brain proper is the _pons_ or bridge, providing for the\ninterlacing of the fibres on their way out from the the central organ,\nand just below that are certain elongated bodies (_medulla oblongata_),\nconsisting of masses of fibre just above the spinal cord.\n\nBefore closing this very brief and hasty description of the nerve\nsystem, there is one peculiarly striking arrangement to which special\nreference may be made. The mass of nerve fibre which passes down within\nthe back-bone constituting the spinal column, which is formed in two\ndivisions equivalent to the hemispheres of the brain, gives out at each\nof the vertebr\u00e6 or spinal joints a supply of nerve for the portion of\nthe body contiguous. This supply is sent out from each side of the\ncolumn, and issues in two roots, a posterior and anterior; the posterior\nroot being a body of sensory nerves, the anterior root of motor nerves.\nShortly after passing out, these two form into one, uniting to\nconstitute a nerve trunk. Just after they have thus united, the trunk\nagain opens up into two, and in each one of these two a share of the\nsensory and motor roots finds a place, and thus preparation is made for\nsending out towards both the front and back of the body suitable\nproportion of both sets of nerves. The two roots drawn together as if to\nbind them into one, are by some inexplicable process subdivided, and the\ntwo bands issuing from the united band are found to have each a share of\nthe contents of each root. Of all the singular occurrences coming under\nscientific observation there is nothing more surprising. The fact is\ncertain, but there is no scientific explanation of the contrivance by\nwhich such a singular result is secured.\n\n[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE CRAB.]\n\n[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE COD, THE TWO LARGER LOBES BEING THOSE OF\nVISION, THE BRAIN BEING IN FRONT OF THESE.]\n\nHaving now before us in outline a representation of the nervous system\nof man, and having in this a guide to the understanding of the prominent\nfeatures involved in the distribution of two orders of nerves over the\nbody, and their concentration in a central organ, we are prepared for\nconsidering the comparative brain development presented to view as we\nascend the scale of animal life. The main features of gradation may be\nshortly stated. In all cases, the brain is a soft pulpy body, composed\nas described, the exterior portion being cellular tissue, the interior\nfibrous, from the gathering of nerve lines. In the lowest orders of\nanimals, the brain is of very small size. In the _insects_, such as the\nant, bee, and wasp, it is only a slight band stretching from eye to eye.\nIn the whole order of _fishes_ an advance in organization appears,\nthough the brain is small relatively to the size of the body, a fact\nwhich seems readily explained by the fact that there is little\narticulation in the structure of the fish, the whole body moving in one\nmass, by simple management of the fins and tail. The brain as a rule is\nsimply two small round lobes of smooth surface laid together; and what\nis most to be remarked is that the brain proper is quite inferior in\nsize to lobes of vision.[CT] In front of the brain are slight strands\nconnected with the organ of smell; and behind it are the two large lobes\nknown as optic lobes, before which the brain appears comparatively\ninsignificant. This is the ordinary arrangement, but in the case of the\nshark the brain extends to much larger proportions, greatly surpassing\nthe optic lobes, and having in front of it unusually ample provision for\nthe organ of smell.[CU]\n\nWhen we reach the _reptiles_ the normal order appears which continues\nthereafter up the whole range of animal life. The brain takes precedence\nof the lobes of special sense, and is the most important organ. This\nappears quite decisively in the brain of the frog. On account of the\npossession of four limbs, and its power of locomotion by forward leaps,\nprovided for by the superior size and strength of the hind legs, there\nis much greater need for distribution of nerve lines, to place distinct\nmuscles under control, and as a consequence the brain or central organ\nassumes a position of greater importance.\n\n[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE BIRD.]\n\n[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE CAT, WITH BULB OF SMELL IN FRONT, AND LITTLE\nBRAIN BEHIND.]\n\nPassing next to _birds_, we find a marked advance in the structure of\nthe brain. The two hemispheres are considerably extended towards the\nrear, and the two optic lobes underneath the back part of the brain are\nseparated from each other, being placed somewhat to the side. The\ncerebellum, or little brain, regulating equilibrium becomes more\nimportant in size and form, being laid up in transverse furrows. These\nimportant advances indicate a life of much more varied activity than in\nthe lower orders. This animal walks, hops, perches on branches by the\nclutching of its claws, and flies from place to place. To provide for\nthese varied forms of activity, there must be a more detailed\narrangement of nerve system, which is clearly indicated in the\ncomplexity of the central organ.\n\nThe next advance introduces to notice the _smaller quadrupeds_, known as\nthe rodents, of which the rat, rabbit, and hare may be taken as the most\nfamiliar examples. Here we still have the smooth surface of the brain,\nwithout any subdivision and twining into folds such as afterwards\nappears, but it is somewhat elongated in shape. An additional element\nhere comes into view, that is, extra provision for acuteness of smell,\nin accordance with the well-known characteristics of the class of\nanimals. Set out in front of the brain are two distinct lobes, which are\nthe olfactory lobes. Wherever these are so placed in front of the\nbrain, it is a clear proof that the life of the animal is largely\ndirected by smell, that is, in a relatively greater degree than by\nsight, though constantly using the organs of vision with rapidity and\nacuteness. The cerebellum is in all cases prominent to the rear,\npresenting the laminated appearance always distinctive of the organ.\n\nWe now make a very marked transition in the development of brain,\nintroducing to view the doubled or convoluted form occasioned by the\nfolding of the material in a series of windings,--a form which is in\ncomplete contrast from the smooth surface characteristic of the brain in\nall lower orders. This series of windings or convolutions appears quite\ndecidedly in the brain of the _cat_, in a manner very similar in the\nbrain of the _dog_, and with still greater beauty and amplitude of fold\nin the brain of the _horse_. This folding process which is resorted to\nin the case of all the higher quadrupeds, seems a contrivance by which\nit is possible to pack a greater amount of material in such a way as to\nexpose a greater degree of surface, within the narrow space at command\ninside the cranium. In all the three examples named, great prominence\nis given to the bulbs of smell, which are spread out quite conspicuously\nin front of the brain,--implying, as in lower examples, a life largely\ngoverned by sense of smell.\n\n[Illustration: BRAIN OF HORSE, WITH BULB OF SMELL IN FRONT, LITTLE BRAIN\nIN REAR.]\n\n[Illustration: DIAGRAM OF SENSORY AND MOTOR APPARATUS. THE UPPER IS THE\nSENSORY, WITH BULB, NERVE LINE, AND NERVE CELL. THE UNDER IS THE MOTOR,\nWITH MUSCLE, NERVE LINE, AND NERVE CELL.]\n\nOmitting special reference to animals of great bulk, and possessing\nenormous muscular power, such as the elephant and the whale, both of\nwhich have singularly complicated and beautiful brains, I pass to the\nraces of _monkeys_ and _apes_, which are nearest in structure to man. In\nthese animals the configuration of body is certainly the nearest\napproach to the human figure which is to be found anywhere in the animal\nkingdom. They can not, indeed, assume the perfectly erect posture of\nman, but they come very near to it; and though they move on all four\nlimbs, feeling themselves more secure in that mode of advance, they have\na formation of hand analogous to that of man, with a distinctly formed\nthumb, enabling them to grasp an object in a manner closely resembling\nthe human grasp. The apes have even an advantage over the human race,\nfor they have a thumb on the foot, as well as on the hand; which may\nalso have its own disadvantages, for it might prove no convenience to us\nif we were so endowed. But the presence of the thumb on the lower\nextremities suggests the use which it serves in the animal's ordinary\nlife, in grasping the branches along which it moves. If from the\nsimilarity of outward configuration, we pass to contemplate the brain,\nwe find here also great similarity of structure. And indeed if the\nrelations of muscle, nerve, and brain be as already indicated, it\nfollows from the resemblances of outward form that there must be a\ngreater resemblance between the brain of man and the brain of the monkey\nand of the ape, than between the human brain and that of any other\nanimal known to us. And so it proves to be. The brain of the monkey has\nits subdivisions and convolutions very similar to those of the human\nbrain, only the convolutions are simpler in arrangement. In outline it\nis deficient only in the diminished bulk of the front part, and also the\nback part of the organ; but in its expansion it resembles the human\nbrain in this, that to the rear it spreads back over the cerebellum, so\nas to cover it. The brain of the ape, including under this designation\nthe orang, gorilla, and chimpanzee, is in still closer resemblance to\nthe human, being still, however, somewhat simpler in the arrangement\nof its convolutions, but so closely approximating that the exact state\nof the case is as nearly as possible described, if we say that the brain\nof the ape, while it is decidedly smaller, appears like a miniature of\nthe human brain in a slightly undeveloped state.[CV]\n\n[Illustration: HUMAN BRAIN]\n\n[Illustration: BRAIN OF MONKEY, WITH CEREBELLUM BENEATH]\n\nThe human brain is an elaborate organ, exceedingly complicated in its\nconvolutions. We can not, indeed, describe it as the most convoluted,\nfor the brain of the elephant is at least as distinguished for the\nbeauty and complication of its folding, and the brain of the whale is\nfar more minute and detailed, presenting quite a multitude of minute\nconvolutions. For descriptive purposes, the human brain is divided into\nfour superficial areas, known as lobes, and pretty clearly defined by\ncertain natural boundaries. From the lower part of the organ, entering\nat a point scarcely half way back is a fissure or cutting running up\ninto the mass in a direction uniformly inclining towards the rear, known\nas the Sylvian fissure; while coming over the summit, at a point near\nthe middle, and inclining down towards that just described, is another\nfissure, known as the fissure of Rolando. By these two deeply cut\nhollows, the brain is marked off into four separate areas superficially,\na front and a rear lobe; and two central lobes, the one upper and the\nother under. Besides this there is a concealed and isolated lobe,\ndescribed on account of its situation as an island, which is covered\nfrom view by the overlapping of the two sides of the Sylvian fissure.\nSuch is a description in outline of the configuration of the human\nbrain, to which must be added the statement that each lobe is filled in\nwith its own special arrangement of convolutions, each one having at\nleast three well defined lines of convolution. Each of the hemispheres\nis similarly arranged, though not by any means quite identical in\ndisposal of convolutions, yet the general description now given is\nstrictly applicable to both. The two hemispheres, connected mainly with\nthe ramification of nerve fibre running to the opposite sides of the\nbody, are united together a considerable way down by a transverse band\nof nerve fibres, which at once unite the two into one organ, and make\nthe union so effected a living efficient union by carrying a multitude\nof lines of communication from the one side to the other. Just below\nthis, in the interior of the organ are two great central bodies, known\nas the basal ganglia, and consisting of nerve fibres massed together\nwith grey matter around them, that in front being chiefly motor nerves\nbrought to a junction, the latter sensory nerves combined in like\nmanner. The same arrangement holds in both hemispheres, thereby\nproviding that the respective masses of motor, and of sensory nerves lie\nexactly opposite each other. Behind these in the centre, lying in a\nposition under both hemispheres are four small bulbs connected with the\nnerves of vision, and also with the cerebellum; and behind them, covered\nby the posterior lobe of the brain is the cerebellum itself, or little\nbrain, largely concerned with co\u00f6rdination of movements, or equilibrium\nof the two sides of the system. Just below these arrangements the two\ngreat cords of nerve fibre descend towards the body, which are covered\nby a transverse mass, known as the bridge, appearing complete as a\ncrossing, and containing transverse fibres from the cerebellum, as well\nas a series of longitudinal fibres. Immediately underneath the bridge\nare pillars or masses of nerve, constituting the crowning portion of\nthe spinal system, and formed in eight distinct bodies, the two in front\nand the two in rear being elongated and known as pyramids, those in the\ncentre being rounded in figure. From the elongated bodies, the nerve\nfibres pass across to the opposite sides of the body. This gathering is\nknown as the _medulla oblongata._ Just beneath comes the spinal canal,\nfrom which at the different joints of the spine are given out a suitable\nsupply of sensory and motor nerves as previously described.\n\nHaving thus given a general account of the central arrangements of the\nnerve system of the human body, it is important to state that an order\nof things closely analogous obtains in other and lower orders of\norganism, in respect of interior plan, so that if the interior of the\nbrain of the dog were laid open to view it would present a plan of\ndistribution very similar to that now described.\n\nTo complete the view of the functions of the brain as indicated by\nrecent research, I have next to give a brief account of an extended\ncourse of experiments of great delicacy designed to ascertain whether it\nmay be possible to localize certain functions within a definite area of\nthe brain. All are familiar with the fanciful subdivisions of the outer\nsurface of the human skull, under the name of phrenology, represented on\nmoulds of the head, all marked with dividing lines and figures. This\npretentious and unscientific assumption of knowledge which no one\npossessed, has had its time of popularity, aided by a general\nrecognition of comparative superiority in head formation in persons of\nknown ability. Any thing equivalent to an exact partition of the bony\ncovering protecting the brain, has not been favored by scientific\nobservations; but these fanciful maps of the head, which have been sold\ncheap, and fully certified, may serve as a guide to a general notion of\nwhat has been attempted on the surface of the brain itself, after\nremoval of the skull. The illustrative aid, however, consists in nothing\nmore than the suggestion of distinct areas, for there is no analogy\nbetween what has been discovered by the observations now to be\ndescribed, and the \"bumps\" alleged to be found on the cranium.\n\nThe conjecture which may be said to have originated experiments as to\nlocalization was that there was a close resemblance between the action\nof nerve energy, and an electric current. The attempt made was to\nsimilate the action of the nerve cells, by discharging a current of\nelectricity upon the grey matter of the brain, and recording the results\nwhich came under observation. Experiments were begun in 1870 in Germany\nby Fritsch and Hitzig, the dog being the animal experimented upon. The\ninvestigation was undertaken also by Dr. Ferrier of King's College\nLondon, and much more extended and varied results were published by him\nin 1873. Confirmatory work, executed with many precautions, was\nundertaken on the subject in 1874 by a committee of the New York Society\nof Neurology and Electrology,--a committee which included Drs. Dalton,\nArnold, Beard, Flint, and Masson,--testing results by frequent renewal\nof the experiments; and at the same time, a similar course of inquiry\nwas being conducted in Paris by Carville and Duret.[CW]\n\nBy these investigations, the possibility of electric stimulation of the\ncortical or grey matter of the brain, and consequent activity of the\nnerve system has been fully established; and though there is still\nconsiderable diversity of opinion concerning the interpretation of the\nfacts, it can not be disputed that by directing the electrode on certain\nwell defined areas of the surface of the brain, it is possible to bring\ninto natural activity certain portions of the muscular system, as\ncontrolled by the motor nerves.\n\nThe plan adopted is, after putting the animal into an insensible state\nby use of chloroform, and removing the cranium so as to expose the\nbrain, to apply the electrode connected with an electric battery to a\ngiven point on the surface, record the result, and gradually shift the\nneedle round the original spot until a new result is obtained, in which\nthe spot previously tested becomes an index for the boundary of one\ncircle, and this marks the fact that a new circle has been entered.\n\nBy this process of investigation a series of centres for active\nstimulation have been discovered. These number, in the brain of the rat,\nsix; in the brain of the rabbit, seven; of the cat, eleven; of the dog,\nthirteen; and of the monkey, at least, seventeen. A curious limitation\nto the area of experiment has been encountered here, for all the centres\nidentified are found to cluster over the central region of the brain,\nand both the front and rear parts of the organ are silent, offering no\nresponse however greatly stimulated. The explanation of this silence\nremains a matter of doubt. It may be that these portions of the brain\nare concerned with movements which do not come under the observation of\nthe operator, or that they are centres of sensibility from which no\nmovement can naturally follow, or that they fulfil functions which can\nnot be recognized by this mode of experiment. Uncertainty hangs over\nthis department in the investigation.\n\nThe actual results may be indicated by a few examples. At a point well\nforward in the brain of the dog, marked number one by Ferrier, is a\ncentre which when stimulated leads to movement of the hind leg on the\nopposite side; and by exciting another portion of the brain quite\ncontiguous, marked number four, movement of the opposite fore leg is\nproduced. By exciting a point situated over these two and on a distinct\nconvolution, wagging of the tail is induced. By transferring the needle\nto a point much lower down, towards the base of the brain, but still\nwell forward, marked by Ferrier nine, the mouth is opened and the tongue\nmoved, while in many cases a decided bark is emitted. These examples\nmay suffice to indicate the class of results obtained; and similar\nresults have been seen in all animals subjected to this test, with such\nvariations as may be considered inevitable in view of the configuration\nof the animal.\n\nWhile distinct areas or circles of the brain have thus been marked,\nwarranting localizing of certain functions, the facts connected with\nthese experiments do not favor the view that each area is to be taken as\nso rigidly distinct that it may be supposed to operate separately in a\nquite isolated manner. On the contrary, a conjoint action of several\ncentres seems more commonly implied when the natural activity of the\nbrain is contemplated in line of these results. Additional weight must\nbe given to this consideration, when it is noticed that the centres are\nnominally _motor centres_,--movement and not sensibility being the\nresult most patent to the observer,--nevertheless on closer scrutiny it\nproves true, that many of the movements occasioned by electric\nstimulation are those induced naturally as the result of sensation. Such\nfor example are the movements of the eyelids consequent upon a dazzling\nof the eyes, or movement of the ears because of a startling sound. In\nthis way it becomes clear that within a given area a centre of\nsensibility is in communication with a motor centre close by, or it may\nbe even at some little distance. Thus this most delicate and difficult\ncourse of investigation supports the view that much of the activity of\nthe animal organism is provided for by an established connection between\nnerve cells respectively presenting the terminus in the brain for a\nsensory nerve, and the starting point for a motor nerve, or point of\ncommunication with such a nerve. From this conclusion, it follows that a\nvery large amount of the activity which we witness in the case of\nanimals, often attributed to instinct, or even to voluntary\ndetermination, is to be described as _sensori-motor activity_. That is\nto say, the action is brought about by a contrivance which may be\ndescribed as partly mechanical, partly chemical. Its history may be\nsketched in this way: an impression is made on one of the nerves of\nsensibility, or on one of the organs of special sense, such as the eye\nor ear; a wave of impulse passes along the incarrying nerve fibre,\nleading to molecular change in the nerve cell, and to sensibility in\nsome way unknown; the excitation occasioned there is extended along a\nconnecting fibre to a second nerve cell, which is the starting point for\na motor nerve; along that line the impulse is instantly and inevitably\ncontinued; and as an almost instantaneous result, without any form of\nsensibility to indicate what is taking place, the muscular energy is\nliberated, and action is the direct consequence. The problem which\nimmediately arises is this,--How far may the activity of all living\norganism be accounted for in this way, including even the activity of\nman? This is a problem which will present an interesting subject for\ndiscussion in the next stage of this inquiry, the import of which must\nnow be made apparent by the sketch of the structure of the nerve system,\nand the results of the experiments as to localization.\n\nNothing more is now required to complete this narrative leading up to\nthis problem, and discovering its proportions, than a brief account of\ncorrelative inquiry which has afforded strong confirmatory evidence as\nto the truth of the conclusions favoring localization, and co\u00f6rdinate\naction of different portions of the brain as the central organ governing\nthe whole nerve system. The corroborative evidence at once supporting\nthe conclusions as to localization and favoring their extension to human\nnature is obtained by reference to the results of injury to the nerve\nsystem at various parts of the body, and injury to the brain as\nascertained after death. Continuing experiments on the animals, it has\nbeen shown that even if a portion of the brain be cut away, it is still\npossible to operate on the nerve lines in the usual manner by means of\nelectricity. Pushing experiment in this direction still further it has\nbeen found that more serious injury permanently destroys the centre, and\nentails paralysis of the muscles controlled by it when in a healthy\nstate. In like manner it has been proved that if the nerve itself be\ncut, the communication is at an end, and movement by stimulation has\nbecome impossible.\n\nBy perpetually occurring cases of paralysis in human experience, and\ncareful examination after death of the exact situation and extent of\ndisease in the brain, it has been shown by accumulation of evidence,\nthat the laws which provide for sensibility and for muscular activity in\nthe history of the lower animals, do also hold in the case of man. While\nthe brain continues in full vigor, all the usual forms of sensibility,\nand modes of action are simple; where these have become disturbed,\nrestricted or impossible, some injury has been accidentally inflicted on\nthe brain of the sufferer, or disease has begun in the organ, and has\ngained a hold exactly proportionate to the forms of restraint and\ndisturbance which have become outwardly manifest. These are results\nwhich show how much is due by way of sympathy, and patience, and\nencouragement to those who suffer under any degree of brain injury or\ndisease, due from all around them whose conduct may have any part in\ndetermining their experience. These results testify how closely the\nhuman organism stands allied to lower orders of organism around; how\nmany homologies of structure there are, and how many analogies in\nexperience. These things declare that science has a clear and\nunchallengeable field of inquiry in seeking an explanation of human\nnature on the same lines of procedure as those which have been followed\nin ascending the scale of living organism. The nature and extent of\nmaterials at its disposal as the result of the most recent\ninvestigations have now been indicated. The problem is, How far can the\nanatomy and physiology of the human frame account for the facts of human\nlife? The strength and practical power of religious thought in the world\nwill depend upon the answer, for science must here carry some test of\nreligion. On the other hand, the problem which human life presents is by\nfar the most severe test which science has to encounter. In facing the\nfacts, science is engaged with the settlement of its own\nboundaries,--the demonstration of its own limits. In facing this highest\nproblem which human observation encounters,--man's explanation of\nhimself,--let us cease from comparisons between scientific claims and\nreligious, and let us face with patience and resolution the\nquestion--What is the exact place, and what the destiny of man, who has\npiled up the sciences, and midst the turmoil and conflict of life, has\nfound his most elevating exercise, and most profound calm, in worship of\n\"the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God\"?\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[CS] Protoplasm, see Appendix VII.\n\n[CT] Unless references are otherwise given, illustration of the\nstructure of brain here referred to, will be found in my work, _The\nRelations of Mind and Brain_, from p. 125, onwards.\n\n[CU] _The Brain as the Organ of Mind_, by Dr. Bastian, p. 115.\n\n[CV] See Appendix XI.\n\n[CW] For detailed narrative, see my work on _The Relations of Mind and\nBrain_, chap. iv. p. 79.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VII.\n\nMAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD.\n\n\nThe accumulated interest gathered around the direct and collateral\ninvestigations bearing on the development of species, has naturally\nturned greatly increased attention on man's position in the universe. As\nhas been shown by study of the nervous system belonging to animal life,\nall organism has been constructed on a uniform plan, advancing in\ncomplication as the organism becomes more intricate in structure, having\nseparate parts assigned to distinct functions. This uniform plan is seen\nto culminate in man. Thus it follows, that man appears to the scientific\nobserver, as the last or most advanced figure in a gradually ascending\nscale. That this is man's place in the field of organized existence no\none will doubt.\n\nThe prevailing view of our nature, however, recognizes more in it than\nbone, muscle, nerve, and cellular tissue, while observational science\nis capable of recognizing no more than these, so that, if there be any\nthing more, it is quite beyond the range of physical science, and within\nthe territory of mental philosophy. Here then, is preparation for\nconflict, which may be accepted as inevitable, because of the advance of\nscience. The occasion for this expectation should, however, be fully\nunderstood. Its certainty may be maintained on two obvious grounds. The\nfirst is concerned with the history of scientific progress. Science is\npushing its way up the extended scale of existence with no exact\nknowledge of its own limits; knowing what its achievements have been,\nanimated to a high degree by the vastness of the problems still before\nit, but knowing nothing quite definite as to its own boundaries. The\naggressive force of science at such a stage must be great. On the other\nhand, there is a large body of settled conviction, which has swayed men\nand moulded society in all ages, which is an opposing force operating on\nthat very line along which science is advancing, and which must be\nencountered whenever man's place in the universe becomes the subject of\ninquiry. This opposing conviction is not necessarily religious in type,\nthough it is supported by the whole range of thought concerned with the\nsupernatural. The conviction here referred to, as lying more obviously\nacross the path on which science is travelling, is that concerned with\nthe personality of man, with the rights and responsibilities of\nindividuals, implying accepted conclusions on which the government, and\npolice, and administration of affairs in every nation are based. It\nmust, then, be clearly recognized that the conflict anticipated as\ninevitable is the conflict of knowledge of one order, with knowledge of\na different order. It is conflict of knowledge obtained by the slow and\ndifficult processes available to science, with knowledge possessed by\nall, applied in the regulation of individual and social life, and\nsystematized in the annals of mental philosophy; or, we may more nearly\ndescribe the condition of matters by saying that the occasion of\nconflict is the determination of science to include all within its own\narea, rather than the possession of actual knowledge as to the highest\norder of life, for science is only seeking, and can not profess to have\nfound, an explanation of the functions of human life, as it can profess\nto have done in the case of lower orders. There could, therefore, be no\nmore mistaken representation of the pending conflict than the allegation\nthat it is a conflict of knowledge with ignorance. To put it in the best\nlight for science, it is the conflict of one kind of knowledge with\nanother; but there is a nearer approach to accuracy if we say that the\nconflict is occasioned by the _want of verified conclusions_ within the\nboundaries of science itself, in contrast with very definite conclusions\nbelonging to men generally, and verified by practical tests which\nscientific men can not refuse. It is not essential to the point, but may\nbe of consequence in view of the range of application belonging to this\ninquiry, to remark that religious thought is not itself directly\ninvolved here; nevertheless, religious thought is deeply concerned in\nthe issue of the conflict.\n\nHaving thus briefly indicated the occasion of the conflict, and the\ncontending forces, it is desirable to find the standpoint of science.\nThe nature and origin of life having been passed as problems for which\nno solution has yet been found, science has concentrated on the\nfunctions of the various portions of each organism, and on the\ncontrivances for its protection and continuance in the world; and still\nmore in advance, on the laws favoring the development of species. From\noutward form it has passed to inward structure, and pressing still more\nclosely towards the secrets of life has endeavored to ascertain by\nmicroscopic investigation what provision has been made for maintaining\nthe vital processes involved in the action of organism. Travelling up\nthe advancing orders of animate existence, science has discovered a\nuniform plan adapted to varying complexity of structure. Thus entered\nand far advanced on the course of investigation, science sees no limit\nto its field of inquiry save the limits of organism itself. What has\nalready been achieved, gives full warrant for the claim of inclusion, in\nwhich all scientific men naturally concur, and with which men generally\nwill readily agree. This agreement, however, lies on the very boundary\nline of disagreement and dissension. Immediately when an attempt is made\nto set forth what is implied, it becomes clear that some scientific men\ninclude very large expectations as to what science is yet to\naccomplish, while others, showing more of the caution of the scientific\nspirit, decline to commit themselves to dogmatic assertions. Up to the\nline of agreement indicated we are dealing with science; beyond that\nline, where we come upon disagreements, we are not dealing with science,\nbut with the comparative sanguineness or caution of scientific men.\n\nWhat we have before us as clearly admitted on all sides is that human\nlife presents the common characteristics of organic life, and is\nsubjected to the ordinary laws of organism. The problem with which we\nhave now to deal in view of this admission is this,--How far do the\nfunctions of organism account for the universally recognized\ncharacteristics of human life?\n\nIn facing this problem there are not a few scientific inquirers who look\nupon the mere raising of it as a claim to include all that belongs to\nhuman nature within the realm of physical science. They have allowed\nthemselves to regard the two things as interchangeable, and all their\nresearches are in their view so involved in this identification, that\nthey resent the challenging of it, as if it implied antagonism to\nscience. But the scientific inconsistency of this is easily shown. That\nscience must extend its investigations to human organism, admits of no\ndoubt; that by means of this investigation all the phenomena of human\nlife will be traced to organism, is the very thing to be proved, and\nuntil established on clear and full evidence is not to be regarded\notherwise than problematic. If we are in this matter to be influenced by\nregard to the slow and difficult procedure in cases of much greater\nsimplicity, we shall be guarded in the utterance of expectations; if we\nmake account of the enormous difficulties to be encountered in arranging\nthe facts to be explained, we shall be still more guarded; and if we\nremember that the practical demands of life must all be met day by day\nwithout waiting for science as an aid, it will not appear strange that\nthe non-scientific thinker regards the whole scientific investigation as\nwide of the sphere in which questions of self-government are settled,\neven though this view seems to affirm, without knowledge of both sides,\nthat there is a sphere belonging to human life into which science can\nnot enter.\n\nStill, it must be allowed that in the pathway of science nothing is to\nbe foreclosed, and no area, whether large or small, is to be shut off on\nwhich the appliances of science can be brought to bear. Science can not\nexclude man from the range of investigation; can not on any warrant\nsupplied by the conditions of its own procedure, draw a line within the\ncircumference of nature, even though it may be constrained to allow that\nthere are many things within nature of which it can offer no\nexplanation.\n\nThat science has by recent research done much to explain phases of human\nactivity previously unexplained, may be clearly shown. The modification\nof previously received opinion may be indicated thus,--that many forms\nformerly regarded as in the true sense voluntary, and so described in\nthe life not only of man, but also of the higher animals, can be\nexplained by the action of brain and nerve. This involves a considerable\nextension of the area of the mechanical in human action, and a\nconsiderable restriction of the area of the voluntary. In seeking to\nindicate roughly the form of this restriction, we may find enough for\nour purpose in the distinction between what we may describe as\n_muscular action_, and what we would more naturally denominate _personal\nconduct_. This contrast will serve throughout, as we proceed to estimate\nthe explanations which science has reached in dealing with the\ncharacteristics of human life.\n\nThe proved superiority of brain and nerve in man affords an adequate\nexplanation of his generally recognized superiority in the variety of\nthe forms of his muscular activity. In mere muscular power man can not\ncompete with the more powerful animals. His practical superiority is\nseen in manipulation and the vastly greater variety of occupations to\nwhich he can turn; and in the greater wisdom he has for self-government.\nLeaving meanwhile out of account comparative intelligence, we have only\nto consider the superior use man has of the general sensibilities of the\nbody, and of the special senses of touch and sight; the greater variety\nof the joints and muscles in his body; the more complicated arrangements\nof his nerve system; and the relation of all these in a single economy,\nin order to perceive a distinct phase of the superiority of man,\nsufficiently accounted for by clearly recognized facts, anatomical and\nphysiological. In a multitude of well-known forms of action, of which\nthe mechanical arts afford illustration, man can do what can not be\nattempted by lower forms of organism.\n\nAnother step higher is taken by the advance of physiological science,\ninvolving an explanation of _acquired aptitudes_. The interaction of\nsensibility and motor activity has been shown to be great. A message\nconveyed along a sensory line is readily transferred to a motor line;\nthe sense of touch becomes a natural guide to familiar forms of action;\na form of sensibility may thus be connected with a given range of motor\napparatus, just as the history of the blind illustrates how much more\ncan be accomplished by aid of touch without sight, than is ordinarily\nachieved. By these means, what at first requires consideration and care\n(neither of which is accounted for by physiological explanations), comes\nat last to be done without deliberation, and with so much facility, that\nit does not seem to engage much attention. Physiological science thus\naccounts for a considerable amount of superior activity characteristic\nof man in his daily engagements. It must, however, be noticed that the\nexplanation is not a complete one, inasmuch as the action of the sensory\nand motor apparatus referred to, presupposes consideration and care,\nthat is intellectual and voluntary guidance commensurate with the\ninitial difficulties of attainment, in order that the nerve system may\nbe brought to accomplish what becomes possible afterwards by mere\nmechanical and chemical contrivance within the living organism.\n\nHaving thus briefly indicated the advances in knowledge of the working\nof our own organism gained by recent research, and the explanation thus\nafforded of much of the superiority manifest in human life, we come upon\nthe grand difficulty of science,--How to account for _intellectual\nsuperiority_. It is obvious that animals give proofs of intelligence as\nwell as men; and that the human brain has a marked superiority in the\nfrontal region, to which intelligence is commonly referred, as it\ncertainly is superior also in the back part of the organ, to which\nintelligence is not so commonly referred. But the pressing difficulty is\nthis, to show how nerve cells, confessedly concerned with the\ndevelopment of nerve energy, and the production of sensory and motor\nactivity, can be further considered capable of performing the function\nof thought, covering the whole variety of mental occupations. Attention\nhas been directed to the recognized diversities of nerve cells, which\nare unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar, on the hypothesis that these\ndiversities may point to differences of function so great as to provide\nwhat is required. But there is a total failure of evidence to\nsubstantiate this hypothesis. The differences among the nerve cells of\nthe brain are differences in size, and in the number of the lines of\ncommunication taking rise from them. In accordance with the plan of\narrangement everywhere recognized, the number of protoplasmic lines\noriginating from a cell gives an index to the points of contact it has\nin the surrounding tissue, and thus to the part it may perform in the\nwork of co\u00f6rdination or interaction. A small cell with only a single\nline or fibre proceeding from it, must be regarded as a cell conveying\nnerve stimulus in only a single direction, and to only a single\ndestination. A bipolar cell in accordance with the same rule of\ninterpretation, is a cell having communication in two opposite\ndirections, and thus may be capable of transmitting stimulus by the one\nchannel or by the other, besides which it is possible, so far as\nstructure is concerned, that such a cell may receive stimulus from one\ndirection and send it forth in an opposite, thus proving a centre of\nintercommunication. On the same plan, a multipolar cell, being of\ngreater size, and having from five to ten fibres proceeding from it,\nholds a more important place in the manifold ramifications of cellular\ntissue, sending out stimulus in an increased variety of courses\naccording to the number of the lines pertaining to it, and proving thus\nan intermediate station in communication with a variety of distinct\ncentres. No observation yet directed upon the nerve cells has proved\nsufficient to establish all this, but the supposition is in strict\nharmony with what has been ascertained as to the laws governing the\naction of the nerve system.\n\nWhen, however, an attempt is made to proceed farther, selecting the\nlargest cells as \"mind cells,\"[CX] or cells generating thought and\nvolition, there is a complete break away from evidence, and from the\nclear lines of interpretation already established. We are dealing with\nconjecture, not with science. There is no reason in the interests of\ntruth to object to hypothesis in this region, any more than in another,\nfor conjecture has often proved the handmaid of discovery, and it is\nlikely to be so in a still larger degree. But an essential condition of\nthis acknowledgment is, that conjecture do not claim any respect beyond\nwhat its nature warrants, and specially do not take to itself the name\nof science,--knowledge, or certainty. Beyond this, it must be recognized\nin every intelligent circle, that conjectures, like men of different\ncharacter, are entitled to different degrees of respect, some to only a\nmoderate and guarded measure, others to a very high degree, and some to\nvery little indeed. In a case like the present, we can have no sure test\nfor a provisional judgment entitled to regulate provisional procedure,\nother than the harmony of the conjecture with scientific knowledge\nalready acquired as to the same region of existence. Judged by this\ntest, the conjecture that the intellectual life of man is to be\naccounted for by the presence in the brain of myriads of thought cells,\nvolitional cells, memory cells, imagination cells, and emotional cells,\nhas little on which to claim a high degree of consideration. Its most\nobvious scientific difficulties are these two, that it implies a\ndeparture from the scheme of brain action scientifically established,\nand that it passes away from the scientific appliances employed to\nobtain knowledge of brain action. The real discoveries which have been\nmade are the existence of sensory and motor apparatus, and the\ninteraction of these two branches or divisions of the system. Beyond\nthis, science has made no advance. The scientific appliances by which\nthese discoveries have been reached are those available in post-mortem\ndissection, and in experiment under such exposure of the brain tissue as\nhas been found compatible with functional activity of the organ. This\nconjecture of \"mind-cells\" does not either experimentally or logically\nconnect itself with the recent advances in knowledge of the brain. The\nsystem of sensory and motor apparatus spread over the body for which the\nbrain is the great central and governing organ does not under the\nscientific explanation of it already obtained, lead on by natural\nsequence to the conjecture of additional and greatly higher functions\nbeing assigned to the brain. Besides, the suggestion that place should\nbe found in the brain for something more and higher than sensori-motor\nactivity, does not come from any necessity which has arisen in the\ncourse of scientific observation. It is only because we know, in a\nmanner quite different from that in which scientific knowledge of nerve\nand brain has been acquired, that man does observe, and reason,\nconstruct hypotheses and cherish expectations, contemplate rules of\nconduct and regulate his actions in accordance with them, that\nscientific inquirers, attempting to include the whole range of human\npowers, have felt themselves urged forward to seek an explanation of the\ncharacteristics of mental life which are the familiar facts of man's\nexperience. The course of _experiment_ has not brought them up to these\nfacts; common acquaintance with them has pressed on scientific inquirers\nthe need for dealing with them in order to make good the claim that\nscience contains the explanation of all existence, man included. The\ndilemma for this conjecture that the brain thinks and wills is serious.\nIf the brain is capable of what is commonly named _mental_ activity, all\nthat science has demonstrated is susceptibility and motor activity, that\nis nerve impulse involving molecular and muscular action, and this\ncarries no explanation of mental action.\n\nIn this, as in previous cases, it is better to take purely scientific\nstatements concerning the structure and functions of the nerve cells,\nwithout regard to theoretical result. The following quotations will show\nwhat account has been given of the variety of appearance and position of\nthe nerve cells. Professor Turner says, nerve cells are \"the\ncharacteristic structures in the nerve centres, are susceptible to\nimpressions or nervous impulses, and are the texture in which the\nmolecular changes occur that produce or disengage the special form of\nenergy named nerve energy, the evolution of which is the distinctive\nmark of a nerve centre.\"[CY] \"The central extremities of the nerve\nfibres lie in relation to, and are often directly connected with the\nnerve cells.\" From opposite points of the surface of the _bipolar cell_\n\"a strong process is given off, which is directly continued into a nerve\nfibre.[CZ]\" When we pass next to _multipolar cells_, we have the\nfollowing explanations. \"In many localities they present characteristic\nforms. In the gray matter of the _spinal cord_, more especially in its\nanterior horn,[DA] they give rise to numerous processes, and have a\nstellate or radiate form. In the gray matter on the surface of the\nconvolutions of the cerebrum they are pyramidal in shape; the apex is\ndirected to the surface of the convolution, the base towards the white\nmatter; the processes arise from the base, apex, and sides of the\npyramid.\"[DB] \"The processes which arise from a multipolar nerve cell as\na rule divide and subdivide as they pass away from the body of the cell,\nuntil at last they give rise to branches of extreme tenuity. These\nbranching processes apparently consist exclusively of cell protoplasm,\nand have been called protoplasm processes. Gerlach has described the\nprotoplasm processes of the multipolar nerve cells of the brain and\nspinal cord as forming an excessively minute net-work, from which\nminute medullated _nerve fibres_ arise.\"[DC] \"From the observations of\nLockhart Clark, Arndt, Cleland and Meynert, there can be no doubt that\nthe pyramidal nerve cells vary in relative size and in numbers in the\ndifferent layers of the gray cortex, and that the largest sized\npyramidal cells lie in the third and fourth layers.\"[DD] \"Large\npyramidal cells are found in the _frontal lobe_ in considerable\nnumbers,\" but it is added, \"there is no difficulty in recognizing in the\noccipital lobe\" (the back region of the brain) \"a small proportion of\ncells quite equal in magnitude to the largest cells of the frontal\nlobe.\"[DE]\n\nFrom these statements, it is easy to judge what value can be attached to\nthe conjecture that multipolar or pyramidal cells are to be regarded as\n\"_mind-cells_.\" The result may be summarized thus; (1) The larger cells\nare invariably distinguished by the number of fibres given off, or the\nlines of communication they have with other parts of the tissue; (2) As\nto distribution of these cell-fibres appearing in the brain, it is found\nthat as the cells themselves are in the lower strata of the gray matter,\nthe majority of their fibres stretch downwards, the mass of the nerve\nfibres thus communicating with the organism; (3) These pyramidal cells\nare not peculiar to any part of the brain, and they do not belong to the\nbrain alone, but are found in the gray matter of the spinal cord, and\nalso of the sympathetic system, which provides for the action of the\nheart, lungs, and other vital organs. All these characteristics are\nadverse to the conjecture that for the larger sized cells a claim can be\nmade assigning to them distinctively intellectual or mental functions.\n\nIn contrast with this view, I shall here introduce an extract from\nH\u00e6ckel's _Evolution of Man_, as he may be accounted the most advanced\nadvocate of the theory of \"mind-cells.\" He says,--\"The nerve cell of the\nbrain is an extremely one-sided formation. It can not, like the\negg-cell, develop from itself numerous generations of cells, of which\nsome transform themselves into skin-cells, some into flesh-cells, and\nothers into bone-cells, etc. But instead, the nerve-cell, which is\nformed for the highest activities of life, possesses the capacity to\nfeel, to will, to think. It is a true mind-cell, an elementary organ of\nmental activity. Correspondingly, it has an extremely complex minute\nstructure. Innumerable filaments of exceeding fineness, which may be\ncompared to the numerous electric wires of a great central telegraph\nstation, traverse (crossing each other again and again), the finely\ngranulated protoplasm of the nerve-cell, and pass into branched\nprocesses, which proceed from this mind-cell, and connect with other\nnerve-cells and nerve-fibres. It is scarcely possible to trace, even\napproximately, the tangled paths of these filaments in the fine\nsubstance of the protoplasmic body. We thus, have before us a highly\ncomplex apparatus, the more minute structure of which we have hardly\nbegun to know, even with the help of our strongest microscope, and the\nsignificance of which we rather guess than know. Its complex mechanism\nis capable of the most intricate physical functions. But even this\nelementary organ of mental activity, of which there are thousands in our\nbrain, is only a single cell. Our whole intellectual life is but the sum\nof the results of all such nerve-cells, or mind-cells.\"[DF]\n\nFrom this passage it will be seen that ascertained facts are given in\nharmony with previous descriptions; but that while naming some as\nsensory, others as motor, there is no distinct evidence for classifying\ncertain cells as \"mind-cells.\" Along with the admission of our\ncomparative ignorance of the minute structure of the cell, is the\nassertion that this cell \"possesses the capacity to feel, to will, to\nthink.\" This latter statement is advanced without any trace of\nscientific evidence, and has no better substratum on which to rest than\nthe admission that man not only feels, but also thinks and wills.\nFurther, when we recall the singular variety of situation in which these\ncells are found, as they lie within the spinal canal, subordinate\ncentres, and the brain, the insufficiency of the whole theory of\n\"mind-cells\" is apparent. Still more conspicuous does this become when\nwe turn to H\u00e6ckel's illustrative diagram, and read underneath it this\ndescription,--\"A large branched nerve-cell, or 'mind-cell' from the\nbrain of an electric fish.\" The investigator who makes in the directest\nmanner statements as to thinking and willing, which he has not verified\nand can not verify; and who with undisturbed composure of mind proceeds\nto illustrate and support his position by giving a drawing of the\n\"mind-cell of an electric fish,\" does almost every thing that can be\ndone to discredit his testimony on scientific subjects.\n\nHaving now set forth the grounds on which I think it clearly shown that\nphysiological science has done no more than identify sensory and motor\ncells; and that the search for the true \"mind-cell\" has proved a\nfailure; I pass from this division of the subject with the\nacknowledgment that the front and back portions of the brain still\npresent area for fresh research, and to this must be added the striking\nfact that in all the brains subjected to electric excitation these two\nportions have uniformly remained silent. These considerations may\npossibly hereafter afford valuable suggestions towards guidance of the\nwork yet to be done in the investigation of brain structure and\nfunctions.\n\nIn view of the limits of the present discussion, I shall at this point\npass over at once and directly to the region concerned with _the\ngovernment of human conduct_, with the view of illustrating in what\nrespects human life differs from merely animal life. On this single\ntest, I must here be content to rest an argument for the insufficiency\nof physiology, and the necessity for observation of our own experience,\nif we are to have an intelligible account of the most familiar\ncharacteristics of human life. By way of securing a sharp contrast\nserviceable for illustrative and argumentative purposes, I take an\nextract from Mr. Darwin. His statement is this,--\"There is no evidence\nthat any animal performs an action for the exclusive good of\nanother.\"[DG] Alongside of this statement, for the purpose of comparison\nand contrast, let me place this. It is an essential law of human life,\nhaving daily application, that man shall so act as to make the good of\nhis fellowman the express end of his action. This is a law of moral life\nwhich we do not dream of applying to any lower order of beings, but\nwhich we do regard as binding on all men equally. Explicit testimony to\nthis law of human life may be drawn from the philosophy of Greece and of\nChina in times so remote as to precede the Christian era, or from the\nteaching of our Saviour, or from the daily life of men in any land in\nthis nineteenth century. The contrast is thus sharp enough, and it\npresents the most perplexing difficulty for physiologists of the school\nof H\u00e6ckel; while it affords the strongest line of evidence for that\nphilosophy which accounts for the higher characteristics of human life\nby reference to mind as distinct from brain, and immeasurably higher in\nfunction.\n\nWhether Mr. Darwin's account of animal conduct will be uniformly\naccepted by naturalists, need not concern us, as the possibility of\ndissension would not seriously affect the argument, the main stress of\nwhich must fall on these two points, that the law of pure benevolence is\na law of human life, and that the mere recognition of this law (I do not\nsay _obedience to it_, which is a stage further in advance), can not be\nincluded within the functions of brain.[DH]\n\nFrom what has been written by some naturalists as to the \"benevolence\"\nof animals, it is probable that some may be prepared to take exception\nto the statement of Mr. Darwin. There is no need for here entering upon\ndiscussion which might thus be raised, and which would entail the task\nof criticising multitudes of statements made in a singularly loose and\nunscientific manner. There is not any more careful observer than Mr.\nDarwin, the whole record of whose observations gives confidence in his\ntestimony, and his patient reflection on the real significance of what\nhe has seen. We may, however, leave this matter to naturalists, that\nthey may decide whether this conclusion as to animals requires some\nmodification. The purpose of the present argument is to show that an\nauthoritative law of benevolence does apply to human life, in direct\ncontrast with the ordinary law of animal life, giving special force to\nthe struggle for existence as witnessed in the history of the lower\norders of beings.\n\nOne possible entanglement for the present argument must, however, be\ncarefully shunned. In the comparison between man and animal, we are apt\nto diverge into a discussion of what men and animals severally _do_.\nThis is a question considerably different from that now under\ndiscussion, and yet it lies in such close proximity as to afford the\ngreatest facilities for confusion of thought. We are not here comparing\nwhat animals do, with what men do; we are comparing the actions of\nanimals with what we _know men ought to do_. It is this question of\n_ought_ which appears as the outstanding and distinguishing feature in\nhuman life, on which we are now seeking to direct attention with all the\nconcentration which physiologists secure when the microscope is directed\non brain tissue. The true feature here is elevation and complexity of\n_intellectual_ action, and the possibility of assigning this to brain\naction. The question is no doubt concerned with conduct both in the\nanimal, and in man,--but what we wish to ascertain is, how far action or\nconduct in the two cases throws light on the exercise of intelligence\npossible to man and to animal. It is admitted that to act on a law of\nbenevolence requires a higher exercise of intelligence, than to act\nunder a law of desire or sensitive impulse; and we wish to reach\ndefinite conclusions on two points; _first_, and subordinately, whether\nanimals ever act on the higher law; _second_, and chiefly, whether such\naction does not involve as its condition an intellectual exercise of a\nhigher order than can be assigned to brain. The former of these\nquestions, subordinate to the present inquiry, may be left to\nnaturalists. The second concerns us directly here, in the more\nimportant discussion as to man.\n\nWith the view of completing the defence against disturbing entanglement,\nit may be well further to insert here the explicit statement that men do\nvery commonly act in neglect of the law of benevolence, and even in\nviolation of it. The fact is too well known in society to be overlooked.\nIt may be enough, however, in the present connection, to admit that men\ndo often act like the animals; or, to state the fact more precisely in\nform, the animal nature is often found governing men, so as to make\ntheir action resemble that of the lower animals in the struggle for\nexistence.\n\nThese lines of severance will now make clear what is our main\nquestion,--Is man capable of recognizing a higher law of life? Does a\nlaw of benevolence apply to him as a rational creature, as it can not\napply in the history of the animals around us? And if this question be\nanswered in the affirmative, does such answer imply the exercise of a\nhigher power than can be scientifically assigned to brain cells?\n\nThat man recognizes a law of benevolence as determining personal\nconduct will not be formally disputed by any one. Yet so very much\nbearing on the present argument is involved in the interpretation to be\nassigned to this admission, that it is desirable to present at least in\noutline, the evidence on which the statement rests. If we look at the\nfacts in view of the ordinary actions of the lower animals, a series of\ncontrasts is presented. The animals are seen to compete with each other\nfor what is a common object of desire, such as a favorite article of\nfood; and to fight with each other for possession; the consequence is\nthat the strongest and most daring get what they seek, while the weaker\nand more timid must be content with what is of less value for\ngratification of their desire. These facts are so conspicuous and so\nconstant in their influence on the whole race of animals that the theory\nof the origin of species by descent founds upon them. A complete\ncontrast appears in what man recognizes as the rule of his conduct, when\nhe admits the obligation to benevolence. There is a reflective exercise\nconcerned with the right and wrong in human conduct which regards it as\na wrong thing for a man to snatch from another the enjoyment within his\nreach, or subvert his opportunity for happiness in order to increase his\nown pleasure. On the other hand, there is an exercise of thought which\ncontemplates effort for the good of others as right, even extending the\napplication of this law of moral life so far as to require self-denial,\nand, in circumstances of special importance, self-sacrifice, for the\ngood of others. These are facts so elementary, that the statement of\nthem would be felt to be uncalled for, were we not seeking to\ndistinguish the elements of our ordinary experience. In accordance with\nwhat has been said, we are agreed in regarding it as a wrong done to\nanother if we deprive him of enjoyment simply for the sake of our own\nsatisfaction. Such conduct is what we condemn as _selfishness_ in the\nagent, and a _wrong_ to the sufferer. When on the contrary we\nsubordinate personal pleasure in order to secure the happiness of\nanother, we commend the benevolent disposition in which the act\noriginates, and we honor attention shown to the rights of a fellowman.\nAs the contrary lines of conduct are so often followed, and even\nvindicated as permissible in the competitions of life, we need to show\nwith some care that the law of benevolence is uniformly regarded as a\nlaw of human conduct even when its requirements are unfulfilled. This\nbecomes obvious if we look along another line of observation. If we pass\nfrom what a man does to his fellowmen to what he is seen to expect of\nthem, we at once perceive that the authoritative feature alleged to\nbelong to the principle of benevolence is admitted by him. He resents\nthe selfishness from which he has suffered, complains of the unmanly act\nwhich found its pleasure in his injury, and an appeal to public opinion,\non any occasion sufficiently important to involve a question of the\ninterests of society, at once calls forth general condemnation of the\nselfish act as a real injustice.\n\nThat such a form and direction of thought belongs naturally to man has\nbeen further shown by the ready assent of the young to the law of\nbenevolence, and their unhesitating test of their seniors by reference\nto it. If their irritability and resentment have been stirred, it may\nbe difficult to gain their assent to the special application of the law\nof benevolence in the circumstances. This, however, is only an example\nin early life, of what we find in more advanced years, that it is hard\nto do the right, and easy to excuse the wrong we do, while resenting the\nwrong done to us. But, apart from exciting causes, and simply in the\nexercise of a quiet reflection, the child recognizes the duty of\nbenevolence; and, notwithstanding the disadvantages of weakness and\ninexperience, proceeds to test others by this standard, and is felt by\nothers to be powerful by reason of the force belonging to the law,\nhowever superior in years, and in authority may be the persons of whom\nthe child expects that he be kindly treated. These are in very condensed\nform the facts of human life, which are as outstanding as the contrary\nfacts insisted upon as characteristic of animal life. We need an\nexplanation which shall put the nature of man as truly in contrast with\nthe nature of the animal, while it is at the same time allowed that man\nhas an animal nature which may operate to the influence of his conduct,\nin neglect of this higher law of intelligence.\n\nNow the most advanced results of physiological science carry no\nexplanation of this simple, ordinary fact, man's recognition of a law of\nbenevolence as authoritative. After we have assigned full value to the\n_sensibilities_ of a physical nature overspread with a sensitive\nnerve-system; after we have made account of the motor activity possible\nto an animal possessed of a complicated muscular system controlled by\nmotor nerves, we have not come near a region in which the reflective\nprocess takes place which applies the law of benevolence for the\nregulation of conduct. We discover within the range of physiological\npossibility, sensitiveness to impression from without, and to the\ninfluence of the cravings and appetites of a nature requiring support\nand satisfaction, and impelling power which urges to action for the sake\nof present satisfaction. All these things we find easily explained under\nthe teaching of physiology; but we have no explanation of the act of\nintelligence in perceiving a law of benevolence and owning submission to\nit. We do not even find a scientific account of the subordinate\nintellectual exercises involved in the application of the law of\nbenevolence when recognized. There is a form of discrimination here,\nincluding the distinction of men as persons, the claims involved in\npersonal rights, and the phase of individual duty ascertained while\ncontemplating the circumstances in the midst of which it is needful to\nact. All this is outside the range of the formulated results of\nphysiological research. There can be no hesitation in accepting all that\nhas been established as to nerve-sensibility,--the subjection of human\nlife to the interaction of external influences,--and the inevitable\nforms of experience which result in individual history. But we see in\nthese, only conditions in the midst of which man by exercise of his\nintelligence is to undertake the management of life on a higher level\nthan that of animal life. We clearly recognize the laws of motor\nactivity, including the full bearing of outward influences, and inward\ntendencies upon human action. But with these things we see what is meant\nwhen it is recognized that intellect must govern passion: while we see\nphysiological science laying open to us only the laws of passion, and\nnot the law for its government. We admit the convincing nature of the\nevidence by which it is shown that our nature with all the special\nphases of individuality, often involving strange perils and\nperplexities, has been inherited by us, gathering within the boundaries\nof our life a task which we would willingly have shunned. We perceive in\nthis a science of the specialities of individual nature, standing\nalongside the science explaining the common characteristics of man which\ncome within the range of physiological research. But it is beyond this,\nthat the problem arises concerning the moral government of life, so that\nequally what is common, and what is peculiar to man shall be regulated\naccording to rational law. For this all see to be true, excepting always\ncases of manifest infirmity and disorder, that equally the common and\nthe special powers of the individual are to be regulated by the law of\nbenevolence. There are no exemptions for special temperament, whatever\ndiversities there may be in the task which application of the law may\ninvolve for some. The _ought_ has ascendency over human life;[DI] the\nbare perception of this grand reality, taken with all the distinctions\ninvolved in its application to personal conduct, and all the forms of\npersonal control exercised for its fulfilment, lies apart from the\ndiscoveries of physiology. In these things we see most clearly what mind\nis, and what mind does in the management of human life. We discover\nclearly thus what it is which makes human life superior to the life of\nthe animals around us; what it is which makes the best in human life\nstand essentially connected with the subordination of the animal nature\nto a higher nature within; and in what respect it stands true that\nphysiology is a science of only a part of our nature, and that the\nlower, because the subject part. In this man knows, apart from all\nscience, and quite independently of philosophy too, that he has a higher\nlife, working, rejoicing, and advancing to nobler excellence, just as he\ngoverns his body, keeping it in subjection, while revering an ideal of\nmoral and spiritual excellence towards the attainment of which it is the\nduty and honor of humanity to strive.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[CX] H\u00e6ckel's _Evolution of Man_, vol. i. p. 129.\n\n[CY] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 198.\n\n[CZ] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 199.\n\n[DA] From which motor nerves emerge.\n\n[DB] _Human Anat._, i. p. 200.\n\n[DC] _Human Anat._, i. p. 201.\n\n[DD] _Ib._ p. 282.\n\n[DE] See Appendix XII.\n\n[DF] _Evolution of Man_, i. p. 129.\n\n[DG] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 208.\n\n[DH] Whether some of the animals may possess an inferior order of mind,\nis a question which need not be here discussed.\n\n[DI] See Appendix XIII.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VIII.\n\nRELATION OF SCIENCE TO OUR CONCEPTIONS OF DIVINE INTERPOSITION FOR MORAL\nGOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD.\n\n\nThe view given in previous lectures of the most prominent features of\nthe recent advances in scientific knowledge most intimately concerning\nour religious conceptions of the origin and government of the world, may\nafford some aid towards forming a judgment of the points of contact and\napparent conflict. A brief summary will afford the best introduction to\nthe lines of inquiry with which the present discussion may be brought to\na close.\n\nFirst, as to the inorganic in the universe, recent investigations favor\nthe conclusion that neither the matter in the world, nor the energy, can\nbe increased or diminished by operation of any laws known to apply to\nsuch existence. The laws under which these two forms of being hold their\nplace in the world involve only change of distribution and relation.\nBoth matter and energy are, however, perpetually undergoing change or\ntransformation, and whether the change be for the better or for the\nworse in the history of the universe as a whole, the fact of unceasing\nchange in subordination to fixed law, is clear evidence that matter and\nenergy are not eternal or self-subsisting, but are dependent on some\ntranscendent existence imposing the laws determining their relations.\n\nSecond, as to organized existence, recent researches go to prove that\nthere is in all animals a measure of adaptability to surrounding\nconditions of life, providing for \"adaptive changes\" in the organism,\nwhich become fixed, and are transmitted to succeeding generations of the\nsame order under the law of heredity. On warrant of the evidence for\nthis, it is to be taken as certain that the various orders of animals\nnow familiar to us did not at first come into being with all the\ncharacteristics now pertaining to them. The law of their life has\nprovided for a progression in development, in accordance with which we\nhave distinct orders of the pigeon, the dog, and the horse, with\nvariations in animals of every class. This law of development,\napplicable to all animal life, admits of greater or less diversity of\nresult in the history of distinct races, according to the complexity of\nthe organism.\n\nThird, as to the relations of different orders in the scale of animal\nlife, it is proved that all vital organism has been modelled on a common\nplan as appears in the arrangement and functions of the nerve system,\nproviding for sensibility and motor activity. In accordance with this,\nwe find in different orders of animal life not merely analogies or\nresemblances in structure, but homologies or examples of complete\nidentity of structure and function. Thus the brain, and the two sets of\nnerve lines, namely sensory and motor, are the same in nature and\nfunctions in all animals, from the frog to man inclusive, and they\ndiffer only in complexity of arrangement within the central organ, and\nextent of ramification of the nerve lines. Diversity of nature thus far\nappears in the relative complexity of organism. This is a conclusion\nwhich assigns to man his place in the scale of animal life; that is, in\nso far as we regard man exclusively by reference to his animal nature,\nhe stands highest in the scale of organism,--first in rank, judged\nsimply by complexity of brain structure, and minuteness of nerve system.\n\nFourth, in respect of moral life, that is, ability to contemplate a law\nof life absolutely authoritative as well as universally applicable\namongst intelligent beings,--such for example as the law of benevolence;\nability to control the whole animal nature so as to subject it to this\nhigher law of benevolence; ability to strive after the harmonizing of\nall dispositions and actions in accordance with the law of\nbenevolence,--man occupies a distinct place in the order of beings\nexisting in the world, no other living being standing associated with\nhim. There are innumerable forms of organized being in the world; but\nonly a single representative of moral life in it. No being save man\ncontemplates a general law of life, making its fulfilment a deliberate\nend of action; no being save man possesses a conception of duty or\noughtness, which, if it be regarded simply as an intellectual exercise,\ncan be apprehended only under application of a law of conduct such as\nbenevolence. That man stands entirely alone in these respects, and is,\ntherefore, to be ranked as a distinct order of being, appears from the\nfollowing definite lines of evidence: no animal contemplates a general\nlaw of conduct, or intelligible rule of life applicable for the\ngovernment of the order to which it belongs; no animal subordinates\nphysical impulse at the bidding of such a law; no animal aims at the\nperfecting of its nature under a general conception of the excellence of\nits own nature, as dog, horse, or ape. Therefore we conclude that man\nalone of all living beings known to us in this world is a moral being.\n\nTaking now these four aspects of existence as known to us in this\nworld,--without advancing to deal directly with the phases and\nconditions of religious life,--the whole four can be freely accepted by\nreligious men in strict harmony with all the requirements of religious\nthought. The three first named are distinct advances in the history of\nphysical science, and will be generally admitted to include the most\nimportant accessions to our knowledge of the physical universe having\nany bearing on the conceptions lying at the basis of religious thought.\nThe fourth is the product of philosophical inquiry, proceeding in\naccordance with direct observation of personal experience, and by means\nof simple analysis of our intelligent activity as that is concerned with\nthe government of personal life, especially in view of the relations\nsubsisting in society. This last as a philosophic conclusion, not\nattained by physiological research, not properly any part of physical\nscience, but reached only by distinguishing properly certain contents of\nour every-day thought, may be liable to rejection from those who rely\nonly on the methods peculiar to physical science. But such treatment of\nthe propositions has no bearing on their truth; as denial of them will\nnot deliver any man from the obligations of benevolence, or exempt him\nfrom the demands of his fellowmen, requiring that in seeking his own\nsatisfaction he shall not be selfish, and certainly not harsh, as if the\nstrongest might have all they desire, and the weakest must be content to\nwait on their pleasure. Denial of the recognition of a law of\nbenevolence will not exempt him from the experience consequent on the\nexpectations of his fellowmen as they seek help for the suffering, or\nsympathy for the sorrowful, or rescue for the perishing. Though what\nhas been said as to the law of benevolence implies that it is\nuniversally authoritative, there is no express philosophic theory here\nintroduced as to the mode by which this knowledge is attained, or the\ngrounds on which its universality is asserted. The bare fact that each\nman expects his fellowman to be benevolent is enough for the present\npurpose. The simple declaration that the man who seeks only his own\ngratification, setting at defiance all the rights of his fellowmen, is\nunworthy the name of man and acts a brute's part, is all that any one\nneeds who would make good the argument that human nature is distinct\nfrom that of the brutes. No man can escape the obligation to benevolent\ndisposition; no man except the man of gross character attempts to live\nas if he regarded the violation of it as capable of vindication. These\ntwo things being so, the testimony is as strong as that establishing the\nelementary truths of science, which demonstrates that man owns a\nuniversal moral law, and so distinguishes himself from the animals. The\nconditions of human life are too clearly recognized, and too constantly\ninsisted upon in ordinary society, to allow cover for ambiguities, and\ndenials which would favor the position of those who accept only what is\nascertained by the methods of physiological investigation. Hence it\nhappens that popular favor runs deeply and strongly for the kind and\ngood; and science itself must yield when the testimony of the race is\nuniform.\n\nBefore closing this inquiry, it is desirable to pass over from the\noutstanding conceptions of science and philosophy, to distinctive and\nprominent conceptions belonging to religious thought, with the view of\nconsidering whether these can be held in harmony with the teaching of\nscience. Of these, reference may be made specially to two which\nencounter opposition on professedly scientific grounds:--Miracle as an\nevidence of the Messiahship of our Lord Jesus Christ; and the efficacy\nof Prayer in the economy of spiritual life. These two conceptions have\nencountered strong opposition on the allegation of inconsistency with\nthe unchangeableness of the laws of nature. It becomes, therefore, an\nimportant part of the present investigation, to ascertain how far these\ntwo articles of Christian faith, miraculous testimony to the divinity\nof our Saviour, and habitual answer to the prayer offered to God by\nthose who approach Him in the merit of the Redeemer, are consistent with\nthe teaching of science. These two conceptions are naturally included in\nthe one question as to the compatibility with the laws of nature of the\ninterposition of supernatural agency for attainment of moral and\nspiritual ends in the history of the world.\n\nFirst in order stands the question of MIRACLE as involved in the\nevidence of divine power and authority given by our Lord, during His\nsojourn in this world to accomplish the great work of redemption.[DJ]\nThe testimony of miracle as presented in the historical narrative of\nChrist's life is frequent and abundant in variety; and its connection\nwith His work for the redemption of sinful men is everywhere proclaimed.\nIt is impossible to contemplate the scriptural testimony to the glory of\nChrist's nature without including miracle as a conspicuous part of it;\nand it is equally impossible to detach this testimony from relation to\nthe mediatorial work of the Redeemer as concerned with the pardon of\nsin, and restoration of man to holiness of character. It thus becomes an\nessential test of the validity of Christian evidence to settle the\ncompatibility of miracle with the knowledge now possessed of the laws of\nnature.\n\nIt is not necessary here to discuss the credibility of miracles, as\naffected by the question whether there can be sufficiency of testimony\nto support the occurrence of a miracle,--a question which has engaged an\namount of attention disproportionate to its intellectual worth. The\nsuggestion of the question was nothing better than an example of\nmisleading ingenuity, allowed to stand on the page on which it was\nindited in manifest violation of the laws of evidence and the essential\nconditions of human knowledge. The value of testimony does not depend on\nthe nature of the thing to which it applies, but on the character of the\nwitness, and the opportunity for observing and testing the facts\ndescribed. There are, for example, a series of surgical operations being\nperformed in Edinburgh for removal of tumors (Ovariotomy), and being\nrepeated at intervals of two or three weeks, which have hitherto been\ndeclared by the profession to be impossible without sacrifice of life;\nand yet they are successfully accomplished, leaving only an exceedingly\nsmall percentage of death. The whole combined testimony of preceding\nages has been against the possibility of such operations; but this is a\nconsideration of no value whatever in view of the testimony of the\nsurgeons who take part in the hazardous and responsible, but most\nbeneficent work, and of those professional men who have come from\nFrance, and Russia, and other lands, to witness the operation, and of\ncitizens well acquainted with patients who have been delivered from a\nburdened life, overshadowed with prospect of early death. The laws of\nevidence are too well understood to call for abstract reasoning as to\nthe credibility of the witnesses who are at present giving their\ntestimony to the scientific world, of the successful repetition of an\noperation hitherto believed to be impossible. The bearing of such an\nillustration on the discussions raised concerning the credibility of the\nevidence of our Lord's disciples to the miracles He performed is\nobvious. Nor is there need for occupying time in trampling out the\nbeaten straw by lingering over the argument that no evidence can be\nsufficient to establish a miracle, _because_ a miracle is contrary to\ncommon experience; for, it is obvious that a miracle must be contrary to\ncommon experience, since that which is matter of common experience can\nnot be a miracle, but must be an event determined by some law of nature.\nThe uniformity of the laws of nature is even a necessary condition for\nthe evidential value of miracles.\n\nWe pass to the real merits of the question in discussing the possibility\nof the miracles of Christ without violation of any of the laws of nature\nas ascertained by the most recent advances of science.\n\nThe miracles of Jesus Christ profess to be supernatural interpositions\nfor accomplishment of an immediate benevolent purpose, while in\ncombination they afford a body of evidence testifying to the power and\nbenevolent mission of a divine Saviour of the sinful. Their directly\nbenevolent aim is conspicuous throughout. Jesus never performs any\nwonderful work for display of power; when a desire is indicated for\nsigns in the heavens, these are refused; when His own wants are\nconcerned, there is no exercise of power to deliver Himself from\nsuffering; but when a poor sufferer appeals for deliverance, He is ready\nto act; or when the feeble, oppressed condition of one who has been a\nlong time in this case comes under His eye, He is moved to compassion\nand gives unexpected deliverance even without intervention of a request.\nAll this is done, not as if it were any part of the divine purpose to\nkeep men exempt from suffering, nor as if it were inconsistent with the\ndivine benevolence to allow its return and continuance, for He is at\npains to warn that even a worse thing may come; but as if deliverance\nfrom suffering were in harmony with His mission, and peculiarly\nappropriate as illustrative of a Saviour's design as well as of His\ndivine power. By way of sign He would rescue from disease, in order\nthereby to point to a grander deliverance, even from sin which causes\nall the world's sorrow.\n\nThe question here calling for attention is, How do these miracles stand\nrelated to the laws of nature which we now recognize as fixed and\nunchangeable? The _first_ portion of the answer must be that they are\nincapable of explanation under these laws. They are veritable\nexamples,--referring for the present exclusively to their nature, not to\nthe evidence on which we acknowledge that they occurred,--they are\nveritable examples of results incapable of being attained under the\noperation of natural law. The effects secured were indeed only such as\nwould have been attained had medical science been able to accomplish the\nresult, for the great majority of them belong to the region in which the\ngrand healing art works out its beneficent contribution to human well\nbeing. But in respect of the mode of their execution they were in _no\nsense analogous_ to what is achieved by unexpected advance in scientific\nknowledge and skill. There was nothing in the whole course of our Lord's\nlife, bearing resemblance to the work of him who laboriously ponders the\nvaried aspects of some selected form of disease, and ultimately attains\nto skill in a new mode of treatment, or a dangerous and difficult form\nof operation. The word spoken to the leper or the paralytic; the\nanointing of the eyes with clay and sending the blind man with his\nclay-covered eyelids to wash in a pool; the command to Jairus's\ndaughter, \"Maid, arise;\" and the call to the man of Bethany, \"Lazarus,\ncome forth,\"--present no likeness to the conduct of one merely\nexercising a deeper knowledge of the remedial measures which are\nconstantly being employed in some mode or other for relief of suffering.\nWhat we witness in the varied forms of His works is supernatural\nintervention, exercise of divine authority and power. There is no\ncompetent vindication of the sacred narrative by reduction of our Lord's\nworks to the level of those forms of knowledge and skill which are\nwithin the reach of human discovery. The sacred writings offer no\nsuggestion pointing in this direction; Christian faith, in the defence\nit offers for its recognition of the miraculous in Christ's life, does\nnot shelter itself behind such a poor breastwork, as that which is\ngained by eliminating the supernatural,--seeking to defend itself by\nsurrendering all that is distinctive of the God-man, who not only spake\nas man never spake, but who with profuse liberality performed works of\nhealing which made the ears of the nation to tingle, compelling\nreluctant witnesses to testify, that it was never so seen in Israel. The\nsupernatural works of Jesus belong to the same place in history, as\nthat which records the supernatural attributes belonging to His\npersonality.\n\nTo the question, How do the works of Jesus stand related to the laws of\nnature? the _next_ portion of the answer is that they do not conflict\nwith these laws in any intelligible sense. The believer in Christ's\nmiracles, as he meets the manifest requirements of science, may fairly\nask of scientific critics that they state any law of nature which was\nviolated in any example of the Saviour's benevolent doings, in a sense\nof the word \"violation\" which conflicts with the indubitable teaching of\nscience concerning the unchangeableness of the laws of nature. It might\nwell suffice for exposition of Christian thought at an earlier period of\nBible interpretation when the sole object was to set forth the\ntranscendent grandeur of Christ's works, to represent a miracle as \"a\nviolation of the laws of nature,\" meaning thereby to concentrate on the\nfact that equally by its character, and by profession of the agent, it\nwas a work which ordinary power was insufficient to explain. By parity\nof reasoning, it may equally be allowed that a legitimate course is\nfollowed, and an important service is rendered to the advance of\nChristian evidence, if it be urged by scientific men that a violation of\nthe laws of nature is inconsistent with what is now ascertained as to\nthe government of the physical world. This collision between old forms\nof statement and new forms of test is a gain to all interests concerned.\nIt must press into notice the inquiry as to the sense in which the old\nterminology was employed, and also the sense in which this new test is\npresented. If this comparison be prosecuted to its final result, no\nChristian believer will find himself disturbed by apprehension of a\npossible call to conflict with science, and no scientific men will feel\nthemselves drawn into antagonism with the accredited forms of Christian\nbelief as to the miraculous. A few carefully stated propositions should\nhelp towards making this clear, if only these can be so drawn as to meet\nthe demands of science, and also accurately represent Christ's life.\n\nThe testimony of science dealing with the evidence open to observation\nis that the laws of nature, such as the laws of gravitation,\ntransmutation of energy, and the development and support of living\norganism, are fixed and unchangeable, so that persistent antagonism to\nthem is only conflict of a weaker force with a stronger which must end\nin disaster or destruction to the weaker. Over against this we do not\nfind it possible to place any statement, either in the form of direct\naffirmation, or of inference deducible from the implications of Christ's\nactions or words, which can be regarded as directly contradictory. On\nthe contrary the deeds and sayings of Christ carry a multitude of\nsuggestions in strict harmony with this general teaching of science.\nWhen He would indicate to His hearers how they are guided in their\njudgment by the uniformity of natural law, He points to the signs which\nthey interpret in the aspect of the atmosphere morning and evening. When\nthe suggestion is placed before Him that He should cast Himself from an\neminence in token of His superiority to ordinary risks, He does not hint\nat a suspension of the law of gravitation, but teaches that man should\nnot transgress the divine will by rashly exposing himself to danger.\nWhen He would teach men to combine labor and trust, He points them to\nthe uniform provision for the clothing and adorning of the vegetable\nworld which can not in any measure care for itself. And so we might\nproceed, were there any need for multiplying evidence as to a feature of\nChrist's teaching manifest to every Bible reader.\n\nThe record of Scripture presenting the narratives of Christ's miracles\ndoes not at any time represent our Saviour as interposing to stay for a\nbrief period the action of fixed law, or to prevent the application of\nsuch law in the history of a particular individual. In all these wonders\nof healing nothing more happens as to actual _result_, having a general\nbearing on procedure in the physical world, than does happen when a cure\nof a critical phase of disease is accomplished by some newly discovered\nappliance at command of medical art. These two cases are essentially\ndifferent as to _mode_ of action, but they are strictly identical as to\n_result_, and this identity amounts to a demonstration of harmony with\nscientific requirements, as these actually guide men to the discovery of\nnew methods. That there is identity of result only _in some cases_ does\nnot affect the argument, but arises from the essential features of the\ncomparison, as a product of supernatural intervention must transcend\nwhat is ultimately attained by laborious processes of human research.\nBut that there is in any case an identity of result under the very\ndifferent conditions, is an indication that supernatural intervention is\nnot an interference with the laws of nature such as would be involved in\ntheir suspension or subversion. There is a great difference between\nrecovery from suspended animation and resurrection from the dead as in\nthe case of Lazarus, but the fixed order of the universe is no more\ndisturbed in the latter case than in the former.\n\nA further consideration bearing on the miracles of Christ needs to be\nstated, though it comes more directly into relation with philosophy than\nwith science properly so called. Every one of these miracles was\nperformed avowedly for moral ends, and under application of moral\nconditions, while for immediate physical effects. There is moral law as\nwell as physical law, and our Saviour subordinates the latter to the\nformer in determining the use He makes of supernatural agency. The\nevidence of this is interwoven through the very texture of the\nnarrative, so that an attempt to sever His miracles from their\nmoral purpose can result only in tearing the narrative into\nfragments,--mutilating the record which must be studied and interpreted\nas it has been put into our hands. Moral law is as unchangeable as\nphysical law, though the character and form of its sway differ from\nthose of physical law, and it is easier for man wilfully to violate the\nhigher law of life than to violate the lower. Yet so closely are the\nhigher and lower connected in human history, that the easy violation of\nmoral law is followed by painful consequences under the reign of\nphysical law. It lay within the purpose of Jesus to deliver from both,\nand it is only in recognition of this combined or complex purpose that\nwe discover the rational basis on which supernatural deliverance from\ndisease becomes a natural vehicle for presenting to rational beings\nrequisite evidence of divine intervention on their behalf as they are\nentangled in the disastrous consequences of violating unchangeable moral\nlaw. If on other grounds it be apparent that supernatural interference\nfor restoration of health or life does not involve interference with\nphysical law by which the government of the universe could be in any\ndegree affected; on the grounds now contemplated we come to recognize a\nharmony of higher and lower orders of fixed law bearing on the history\nof the human race, and for this harmony of law our Saviour manifested a\nsupreme concern.\n\nWith these brief statements before us, we are now prepared for turning\nin a different direction to ascertain what is the special view of\nmiracle which has found currency within some scientific circles,\ncarrying the explanation of intense antipathy to its acknowledgment, and\nunhesitating declaration that the whole body of scientific teaching, and\neven the characteristics of scientific method, are adverse to the very\nconception of miracle. For the purpose now in view it may be well to\npresent in close connection the successive utterances of a single\nauthor, who may be taken as representative of a class. The work of\nProfessor Schmidt on _The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism_ will supply\nillustrations of the kind to which reference has been made, as this\nauthor states at the outset that the doctrine of descent finds its\nantagonists among those \"who perceive, more or less distinctly, the\ndanger with which the new doctrine threatens their standpoint of\nmiracle.\"[DK] From this allusion it appears that he regards a doctrine\nof descent as opposed to what he describes as an \"incomprehensible act\nof creation.\"[DL] Accordingly he celebrates the praises of this theory\nin these terms,--\"it interprets by a single principle those great\nphenomena which without its aid remain a mass of unintelligible\nmiracles.\"[DM] In harmony with these utterances he speaks of gradual\nevolution of the organs of special sense, such as the organs of hearing\nand smell, as giving a negative to \"the sudden and incomprehensible\norigination of these organs in an immediate state of completion.\"[DN]\n\nThese few extracts may suffice to indicate the mental attitude of those\nwho show aversion to the acknowledgment of miracle. With Schmidt the\n\"miraculous\" is another name for the incomprehensible; to him the\nsuggestion of miracle is disagreeable as implying the impossibility of\nscientific explanation. If these things be kept in mind, it will be\nclear how widely apart this notion is from the Christian conception of\nmiracle. The one view is that observational science can make no account\nof miracle: the other is that thought concerning a supernatural Being\nreally involved the conception of miracle. Science can assign no place\nto the incomprehensible, can make no account of it. Religion finds a\nhigher sphere of comprehensibility in the action of supernatural power.\nThe two positions are radically distinct, and do not come into actual\nconflict. Hence religion has no opposition to the view of miracle just\nstated, which amounts to little more than a negative definition of\nscience. To say that science can take no account of the miraculous, is\nonly in other words to say that science is explanation of natural\nphenomena by recognition of the action of natural causes, consequently\nthe miraculous does not come within the boundaries of science. This is\nself-evident, and on this footing theology has no account to make of\nwhat is only a semblance of opposition, involving no real conflict.\nCreation, for example, can not come within the compass of observational\nscience; but creation may nevertheless be a rational conception in\ndealing with a purely rational problem, which does not at all belong to\nphysical science. In the same manner it appears that the whole series\nof our Lord's miracles are outside the area of science, which, as it has\nnothing of authority to advance against them, has not even a basis on\nwhich to offer any testimony concerning their possibility.\n\nOne topic more requires to be briefly considered as constituting an\nessential of religious thought, namely the acknowledgment of divine\ninterposition for the answer of PRAYER. Our question is, How this\nconception of divine answer to prayer stands related to scientific\nthought concerning the government of the world by fixed law? If the laws\nof nature are fixed, how can the government of the world allow for\nfulfilment of human desire as expressed in supplication? The question to\nbe discussed has two sides, the one concerned with the conditions on\nwhich an answer to prayer is expected; the other with the exact\nsignificance of the scientific conception of the government of the world\nby fixed law. If there be a rational basis for prayer as encouraged by\nthe teaching of Scripture, there can be no such dilemma as would be\nimplied in supposing that law is fixed yet not fixed, or that law is\nunchangeable in all cases save in the history of the man of prayer, in\nwhose behalf the laws of nature are liable to be held in check. There\nmay be among Christian men considerable diversity in the clearness of\napprehension with which they grasp the meaning of the divine promise to\nanswer prayer; but there is no one taught by the Scriptures as to the\nprivilege of prayer, who thinks of it as implying that the laws of the\nuniverse are liable to be held in suspension because the desires of his\nheart are rising to God in humble, earnest supplication. The man trained\nto recognize this truth affecting God's government that \"He maketh His\nsun to rise on the evil and on the good; and sendeth rain on the just,\nand on the unjust,\" does not readily fall into the mistake of supposing\nthat all the laws of the universe are at His bidding, because of the\ndivine encouragement to prayer. The Christian prays only under divine\nwarrant, and this does not convey any such suggestion.\n\nFirst, then, we can clear away at once the cruder thoughts of the\nunintelligent believer in the power of prayer; and those of the\nscientific objector to prayer, who is not instructed in scriptural\ndoctrine. Prayer does not imply a probable reversal of the laws of\nnature; but it does imply a moral government in the midst of the\nphysical world, and the subordination of the physical to the moral under\nregulation of an all-wise and almighty Ruler. The question before us\nconcerns this subordination, and the possibilities which it implies.\n\nTowards the attainment of exact conceptions here the first requisite is\na clear understanding of the scientific doctrine of the government of\nthe world by fixed law. In whatever sense we take the word \"_law_\" as\napplicable to God's government of the universe, there is no law which is\nfluctuating, or liable to have one signification at one time, and a\nquite different signification at another time; a narrower range of\napplication at one period, and a wider range at a later. Such\nfluctuation would imply a suspension of a law of nature, and the\nconception of such a thing is inconsistent with absolute rational\ngovernment, alien equally to the principles of science and of religion.\nLaws physical, moral, and spiritual are equally fixed laws.\n\nBut the laws of the universe are a harmony, and in the midst of the\ninterdependence of laws distinct in character, the harmony of the whole\nis secured by the subordination of physical law to moral and spiritual.\nIt is in the midst of this harmonized relationship of the diverse laws\nof the divine government that the spirit of prayer lives, and makes good\nits rational consistency. And it is only on condition of acknowledgment\nof diverse laws, including moral with physical, that the scientific man\ncan interpose any criticism as to the efficacy of prayer. Any denial of\na moral government in the midst of the physical universe, under sway of\na God of righteousness, places an objector entirely out of the sphere in\nwhich criticism can proceed. Physical law determining conditions of\nbodily life is fixed law; moral law deciding the conditions of right\nconduct in intelligent life is fixed law; spiritual law deciding the\nconditions of fellowship with the Father of our spirits is fixed law.\nThe believer in the Bible has no hesitancy in acknowledgment of all\nthis; he is a believer in fixed law in a higher and grander sense than\nscientific teaching indicates, and he believes in the harmony of all\nexistence under an unchangeable government, notwithstanding all the\nwrong doing in the world, and the dreadful misery resulting from it.\nHis belief in the harmony of the universe rests on his belief in the\nfixedness of law physical as well as moral, and moral as well as\nphysical.\n\nBut the _fixedness_ belonging to various orders of law, subsisting in a\nstate of interdependence, and involving subordination of lower to\nhigher, needs some more exact interpretation. The fixedness of law,\nphysical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, in no case involves\nfixedness of result, but _varying results according to diversity of\nconditions_. There is fixedness of physical law, but withal there is\ndiversity of weather, and seasons, and harvests, and that because a\nvariety of conditions are harmonized under fixed law. There is fixedness\nof intellectual law in accordance with which accuracy of thought is\ndetermined, but diversity of result according to the materials with\nwhich we deal. And so it is with moral and spiritual law, providing for\nthe regulation of our higher life.\n\nWhat then needs to be pondered by way of reaching an ampler\ninterpretation of the formula of \"fixed law\" is that it does not in any\ncase imply an iron rigidity of result, an undeviating uniformity of\noccurrence. There is no region in which perpetual change can be more\naccurately postulated than in the physical world. But there is order and\nsystem in these changes, admirably illustrated in the weather forecasts\nof the present advanced stage of physical science, which are attainable\nonly by continual watching of shifting conditions with application of\nfixed law to the appearance of wind and cloud and rain. But there are no\nforecasts without these two things, fixed laws and varying conditions\nfor their application. With the wider generalization which admits of\nrecognition of fixed law, there is always the narrower, concerned with\nvariable conditions to which the wider is to be applied. So it is under\nmoral law, and so under spiritual. So also does it hold when our\nobservation is directed on interdependence of two orders of law, such as\nthe moral and physical. This combination we have in human life, as it is\nsubjected to both. Physical law reigns in human history as illustrated\nby the laws of health, which are fixed irrespective of moral law, so\nthat sewerage gas will be prejudicial to health, apart from the moral\ncharacter of a man. Moral law reigns in human life, and truthfulness in\nutterance, or justice in action, will maintain a harmony of the inner\nlife, whether outwardly there be poverty or wealth. These two orders of\nlaw are independent, yet interwoven in their application to the complex\nlife of man. Immorality will find its accompaniment in physical\ndisorder; the repentance which has healing power within the mind will\nnot heal the body, yet may there be advance in moral life by reason of\nthe weakness and suffering which repentance can not remove. Such is at\nonce the independence and the interdependence of physical and moral law,\nin accordance with the fixedness of law in each case, and the harmony of\nboth under one government, by means of subordination of the physical to\nthe moral.\n\nThere are thus _two spheres_, physical and moral, but _one life_,\nbrought to harmony under the laws of both spheres. What then is the\nbearing of this distinction of spheres on the problem of the efficacy of\nprayer, viewing the question only in the light of science and\nphilosophy? An obvious bearing, in so, far as the conditions of physical\nand moral life are set forth and distinguished; but no determining\nvalue for interpretation of the possible influence of prayer as\nconcerning a life subject at once to physical and moral conditions.\nPrayer can be exercised in accordance with scientific teaching, only by\nintelligent recognition of the physical conditions of life; in\naccordance with philosophy, only by intelligent acknowledgment of the\nsubordination of physical life to moral. If then, we turn to the\nteaching of science, making account of all that it includes as to fixed\nlaws applicable to ever-varying conditions, there is nothing in it to\nwarrant the conclusion that there can be no interposition from a higher\nsphere in order to secure application of physical law for attainment of\nmoral ends. The whole product of scientific investigation leaves clear\nthe possibility of the administration of a moral government in\naccordance with subordination of physical law to the attainment of its\nhigher ends. It does not help the understanding of the government of the\nworld, but rather hampers our reflection, if it be suggested that there\nare two spheres, physical and moral, and that the application of prayer\nis restricted to one of these spheres. Human life can not be so severed\ninto parts; it is a unity self-regulated by harmony of submission to\nmoral and physical law, and it must be governed by the Supreme Ruler in\nthe harmonious application of these laws. There is no sphere of life\ninto which the moral does not enter, and accordingly no sphere within\nwhich prayer, which necessarily rests on moral conditions, may not\napply.\n\nIf next we pass to Scripture teaching concerning prayer, where alone we\nfind full instruction on the subject, in precept, example, and a variety\nof encouragements, it will appear that the warrant for prayer is found\nexclusively in the divine promise, and that the application of that\npromise is to every phase of life, subject to moral conditions which are\nexplicitly revealed. Prayer is a privilege divinely bestowed through the\nSaviour, in accordance with which fellowship with God is granted on the\nmerits of the Redeemer. Its nature reveals the true harmony between God\nand the moral creature, as a reality transcending all physical existence\nand all knowledge coming from study of physical law. The accepting of\nthis privilege, and the continuance of its exercise are the tokens of\nreturning harmony of sinful man with the holy God. Elevation in the\nexercise by steadily extending inclusion of a wider circle of personal\ndesire and activity within the area of conscious fellowship with God, is\nthe advance of the moral nature into fuller harmony with God, and with\nthe whole government of the universe. The teaching of Scripture which\nassures of all this, and guides man towards realization of it, clearly\ndistinguishes between material and moral good, yet does not exclude the\none any more than the other, but subordinates the physical to the moral,\nharmonizing the two in recognition of the supreme importance of all that\nis moral. It does not exclude desire of temporal good, but restricts its\nillustration to desire of \"daily bread,\"--assures us that our Father\nknoweth we have need of such good, and will supply it,--and promises\nthat having given most freely what is best, he will assuredly give that\nwhich is least.\n\nIf then it be said that the answer to prayer is a miracle of divine\ninterposition in human history, of which science finds no trace, we do\nnot marvel, for science does not extend its observations to the\ninclusion of what pertains to the higher life of man. If any man asks\nfor evidence in an exclusively physical sphere that God answers prayer,\nhe asks that evidence should be discovered apart from the conditions\ninvolved. A more unscientific demand there could not be. When he refuses\nto admit that there can be any trustworthy evidence of the answer of\nprayer apart from the test he proposes, he either misunderstands the\nChristian doctrine of prayer, or he is criticising a conception of\nprayer other than the Christian one. If we turn to the philosophy of\nhuman life as subjected to moral law, and called to its perfect\nfulfilment, we do not find any thing but harmonious truth in the\nsuggestion that God cares more for the moral life of man than for the\nphysical universe. If we turn to Scripture, receiving its teaching as to\nprayer, we find that the promised interposition in man's behalf is even\nless an illustration of divine power than of Divine righteousness; an\nevidence that the Divine Ruler seeks righteousness above all things, for\nthe entire significance of the exercise is this, trust in the holy One,\nand fellowship with Him through life. On this ground alone does He\npromise an answer to prayer, in this promise making moral conditions the\nessential test for use of the privilege, requiring the suppliant to\nsubordinate to these all desire of material good. It is towards success\nin attaining true fellowship with Himself that God is ever giving\npromise of blessing. It is in full view of the transcendent value of a\nlife of holiness, that the Supreme Ruler is daily condescending to stoop\ntowards His children, that they may be helped in all that pertains to\nholiness of character and life. The Bible makes it essential to the\ngovernment of the world, in harmony with fixed law, that God should be\nthe hearer and answerer of the prayer of His intelligent creatures,\nalways pointing to reliance on the Saviour's work as the test of the\nreality of the exercise, in the case of all who possess the written\nrevelation of His will, in the glorious Gospel of Jesus Christ.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[DJ] The limits of the present discussion make it impossible to include\na wider range; but this really embraces the whole question of the\nmiracles of Scripture.\n\n[DK] p. 6.\n\n[DL] p. 11.\n\n[DM] p. 12\n\n[DN] p. 151.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nI.\n\nRELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION. _Page_ 34.\n\n\"He who contemplates the universe from the religious point of view, must\nlearn to see that this which we call science, is one constituent of the\ngreat whole; and as such ought to be regarded with a sentiment like that\nwhich the remainder excites. While he who contemplates the universe from\nthe scientific point of view, must learn to see that this which we call\nReligion is similarly a constituent of the great whole; and being such,\nmust be treated as a subject of science with no more prejudice than any\nother reality. It behooves each party to strive to understand the other,\nwith the conviction that the other has something worthy to be\nunderstood; and with the conviction that when mutually recognized this\nsomething will be the basis of a complete reconciliation.\"--HERBERT\nSPENCER, _First Principles_, p. 21.\n\n\nII.\n\nSPONTANEOUS GENERATION. _Page_ 54.\n\nProfessor Tyndall, describing his own experiments, says, \"The\nexperiments have already extended to 105 instances, not one of which\nshows the least countenance to the doctrine of spontaneous generation.\"\nCommunicated to Royal Society of London, December 21, 1876.--_Nature_,\nvol. xv. p. 303.\n\n\nIII.\n\nENERGY AND FORCE. _Page_ 96.\n\nThe term Force is by many authors used as equivalent to Energy, rather\nthan as a distinct term for the amount of Energy. Force is thus used by\nSir W. R. Groves. \"The term Force, although used in very different\nsenses by different authors, in its limited sense may be defined as that\nwhich produces or resists motion.\" ... \"I use the term Force ... as\nmeaning that active principle inseparable from matter which is supposed\nto induce its various changes.\" ... \"All we know or see is the effect;\nwe do not see Force--we see motion or moving matter.\"--_The Correlation\nof Physical Forces_, sixth edition, by the Hon. Sir W. R. Grove, pp. 10,\n11.\n\n\nIV.\n\nALL ORGANIZED EXISTENCE IS CONSTRUCTED ON A COMMON PLAN. _Page_ 131.\n\n\"Biologists turn to the physical organization of man. They examine his\nwhole structure, his bony frame, and all that clothes it. They resolve\nhim into the finest particles into which the microscope will enable them\nto break him up. They consider the performance of his various functions\nand activities, and they look at the manner in which he occurs on the\nsurface of the world. Then they turn to other animals, and taking the\nfirst handy domestic animal--say a dog,--they profess to be able to\ndemonstrate that the analysis of the dog leads them, in gross, to\nprecisely the same results as the analysis of the man; that they find\nalmost identically the same bones, having the same relations; that they\ncan name the muscles of the dog by the names of the muscles of the man,\nand the nerves of the dog by those of the nerves of the man, and that\nsuch structures and organs of sense as we find in the man, such also we\nfind in the dog; they analyze the brain and spinal cord, and they find\nthat the nomenclature which fits the one answers for the other.\nMoreover, they trace back the dog's and the man's development, and they\nfind that at a certain stage of their existence, the two creatures are\nnot distinguishable the one from the other; they find that the dog and\nhis kind have a certain distribution over the surface of the world\ncomparable in its way to the distribution of the human species.... Thus\nbiologists have arrived at the conclusion that a fundamental uniformity\nof structure pervades the animal and vegetable worlds, and that plants\nand animals differ from one another simply as modifications of the same\ngreat plan. Again they tell us the same story in regard to the study of\nfunction. They admit the large and important interval which, at the\npresent time, separates the manifestations of the mental faculties\nobservable in the higher forms of mankind, and even in the lowest forms,\nsuch as we know them, mentally from those exhibited by other animals;\nbut, at the same time, they tell us that the foundations or rudiments\nof almost all the faculties of man are to be met with in the lower\nanimals; that there is a unity of mental faculty, as well as of bodily\nstructure, and that here also, the difference is a difference of degree\nand not of kind.\"--Lecture on \"The Study of Biology,\" by Professor\nHuxley, _Nature_, vol. xv. p. 219. Delivered at South Kensington Museum,\nLondon, December 16, 1876. On the grounds here admirably summarized, it\nis clear that the whole organism of our world has been constructed on a\ncommon plan. This being true, similarities will appear in process of\ndevelopment, and in the structure and functions of different orders.\nThis similarity, however, does not help us to explain \"the large and\nimportant interval\" which appears when mental characteristics are\nconsidered. It makes the diversity of mental power more difficult to\nexplain by reference to organism, in fact contributing to the strength\nof evidence for mind as a form of existence distinct from organism.\n\n\nV.\n\nEMBRYOLOGY. _Page_ 131.\n\nI have not felt warranted to include in the text any summary of results\nsecured by the important, but very difficult, investigations concerning\nthe growth of animal life in the womb. This whole department of inquiry\nis in such an unfinished and uncertain state, that there is not warrant\nto found upon the evidence already obtained any general argument as to\nits bearing on a theory of evolution. The most competent observers\nadmit that they are perplexed by facts ascertained, and confess that\nthey can not as yet offer an explanation. To others all is as plain as\npossible; embryology supplies a convincing proof of the accuracy of an\nevolution theory; but these are scientific theorists who see by\nimagination, and are impatient of uncertainty. There are certain general\nconsiderations which must interpose difficulties in the way of\nconstructing an argument from Embryology to evolution of species. (1)\nThe action of environment before birth is altogether different from the\naction of environment after birth. (2) The theory of the evolution of\nspecies emphasizes this difference by insisting on the struggle for\nexistence. (3) This difference being admitted, an argument from the one\nto the other can not hold. In the line of discovery the point of chief\ninterest has been the fact that in some cases embryonic life shows a\ntransition through lower forms analogous to lower orders of animal\nexistence prior to reaching the mature stage when birth occurs. But in\nconnection with the facts ascertained, two things are to be remarked.\n(1) Evidence of transition is most striking in the history of animal\nlife developed external to the parental life, as in the transition from\n_larv\u00e6_ to _pup\u00e6_ among insects, and in the changes in the life of the\ntadpole. (2) If it be admitted that there is a common plan of structure\nfor all organism, it is implied that there must be similarities in\nprocess of development. The question requiring answer, therefore, is\nwhether in the gradual development from the germ, any further\nresemblance to lower orders appears than is to be anticipated on the\nadmission of a common plan for organic structure. There are singular\nexamples of transition. But there are no illustrations of uniform\nprogress in the case of the higher orders such as would warrant the\nsupposition that a history of evolution of the species can be read in\nthe development of the foetus. The supposition has, however, found\ncurrency in not a little of our scientific teaching. The incompleteness\nof this evidence may appear from examples. Take the tadpole. Huxley\nstates the facts thus,--\"The tadpole is first a fish, then a tailed\namphibian, provided with gills and lungs, before it became a frog.\" This\nis development outside parental life, and does not belong to evidence in\nEmbryology. Confining attention to embryonic life, let us take Huxley's\nstatement, biologists \"trace back the dog's and the man's development,\nand they find that at a certain stage of their existence, the two\ncreatures are not distinguishable the one from the other.\" What is the\ninference to be drawn? If the two are not distinguishable, our powers of\ndistinguishing are insufficient, for no biologist suggests that the two\nare alike. The difficulty of distinguishing two germs, or two examples\nof foetus, is analogous to the difficulty which Darwin has pointed out\nof distinguishing the orders of dogs when they are six-days-old puppies,\nor the breed of three-days-old colt, or of nestling pigeons. At these\nstages, the animals may be so similar, that it is hardly possible to\ndistinguish them, and yet in the full grown state they are quite\ndifferent (Darwin's _Origin of Species_, sixth edition, p. 391). Mr.\nDarwin has presented the outstanding facts thus;--\"The very general,\nthough not universal, difference in structure between the embryo and the\nadult;--the various parts in the same individual embryo, which\nultimately become very unlike and serve for diverse purposes, being at\nan early period of growth alike;--the common, but not invariable\nresemblance between the embryos or larv\u00e6 of the most distinct species in\nthe same class;--the embryo often retaining whilst within the egg or\nwomb, structures which are of no service to it, either at that or at a\nlater period of life.\"\n\n\nVI.\n\nNON-ADVANCEMENT OF LOWER ORDERS. _Page_ 158.\n\nMr. Darwin's answer to the difficulty put by Agassiz is this;--\"On our\ntheory the continued existence of lowly organisms offers no difficulty;\nfor natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, does not\nnecessarily include progressive development,--it only takes advantage of\nsuch variations as arise and are beneficial to each creature under its\ncomplex relations of life.\"--_Origin of Species_, sixth edition, p. 98.\nThis wears the aspect of a limitation of the theory, and to that extent\nan acknowledgment of the force of the reasoning of Agassiz.\n\n\nVII.\n\nPROTOPLASM. _Page_ 131.\n\n\"Protoplasm, simple or nucleated, is the formal basis of all life;\" thus\n\"all living forms are fundamentally of one character.\" \"All the forms of\nProtoplasm which have yet been examined contain the four elements,\ncarbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, in very complex union.\" Thus\nthere is \"a general uniformity in the character of the Protoplasm, or\nphysical basis of life, in whatever group of living beings it may be\nstudied.\"--HUXLEY'S _Lay Sermons_, p. 142.\n\n\nVIII.\n\nNUMBER OF SPECIES OF INSECTS. _Page_ 193.\n\nProfessor Huxley mentions that \"Gersts\u00e6cker in the new edition of\nBroun's 'Thier-Reich' gives 200,000 as the total number of species of\n_Arthropoda_.\" In this connection Mr. McLauchlan, when claiming that\nthere are 200,000 species of Insects, adds, \"In one order alone\n(_Coleoptera_) it is estimated that 80,000 species have been\ndescribed.\"--_Nature_, xv. p. 275.\n\n\nIX.\n\nFERTILIZATION OF FLOWERS BY INSECTS. _Page_ 170.\n\nDr. Hermann M\u00fcller's Observations are described in _Nature_, vol. xiv.\np. 175; vol. xv. pp. 317, 473; vol. xvi. pp. 265, 507.\n\n\nX.\n\nANTS. _Page 192._\n\nMr. McCook's Observations are summarized in _Nature_, vol. xvii. p.\n433.\n\n\nXI.\n\nLIKENESS OF THE APE'S BRAIN TO THE HUMAN BRAIN. _Page_ 225.\n\nThe close resemblance of the brain of the ape to that of man, has been\nheld to prove that the ape comes next to man in intelligence. But the\nfacts bearing on this suggestion are fitted to occasion serious\nperplexity to its upholders. First stands the resemblance of bodily\nstructure as largely explaining similarity of brain. The results of\nelectric stimulation of the monkey's brain lend additional force to this\nconsideration. Again, facts are wanting to support the claim for\nsuperior intelligence in behalf of the monkey and ape. The habits of the\nape in its natural state afford little evidence of an encouraging kind.\nThe ape gathers together a few sticks for a nest, in comparison with\nwhich the work of very small birds presents marvels of architecture. And\nnest-building seems the highest evidence gathered from the natural\nhabits of the animal, when we compare it with leaning the back against a\ntree for rest, or staunching the blood of a wound. In the captive state\nthe ape gives no such evidence of superior intelligence as the\nsimilarity of its brain to the human, would lead us to expect, if brain\nstructure afford the test of intellectual power. Even after allowance\nhas been made for sudden transition from the wild state to the captive,\nthe evidence of capability does not appear which the theory requires.\nThe highest results reached by training monkeys, do not support a claim\nfor intellectual superiority. These are mainly forms of mimicry,\ngenerally inferior to the efforts of some other animals. Add to these\nconsiderations the evidence as to the singular intelligence shown by\nants, and the theory which measures intellect by brain structure is\nplaced at a great disadvantage. Whether science may not ere long point\nto some theory of mind connected with animal existence must be matter of\nuncertainty. If, however, the easy and familiar operations of our own\nintelligence are analyzed and classified; and if a statement of the\nascertained functions of the brain is laid alongside, it will appear\nthat nothing known to us in the action of brain, can supply a science of\nthe operations of the human mind.\n\n\nXII.\n\nTHE LARGE SIZED OR MULTIPOLAR CELLS. _Page_ 257.\n\nOn the functions of the large sized cells, it seems desirable to add a\nfew words as to the direction in which evidence as to their functions\nactually points. For this purpose, a further quotation is desirable,\nreferring to the number of fibres or processes passing off from these\nlarge cells, distinguishing those which branch out into a fine net-work,\nand those which pass directly to a nerve fibre. \"One at least of the\nprocesses of a multipolar nerve cell does not branch, but becomes\ndirectly continuous with a nerve fibre, and has been named the\naxial-cylinder process.\"--Professor Turner's _Human Anatomy_, i. 201.\nThis taken with the facts given in Lecture VII, seems to favor the\nconclusions, (1) that the large cell spreads nerve energy through the\ntissue of the brain, while each has at least one direct line of\ncommunication with the system of nerve fibres; (2) that the large cell\nhas intimate and extended relations with the motor system.\n\n\nXIII.\n\nTHE CONCEPTION OF DUTY. _Page_ 273.\n\n\"Duty! Thou great, thou exalted name! Wondrous thought that workest\nneither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, but by merely\nholding up thy naked law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself\nalways reverence, if not always obedience,--before whom all appetites\nare dumb, however secretly they rebel,--whence thy original?\"--KANT'S\n_Critique of Practical Reason_.\n\n\n\n\n530 BROADWAY, NEW YORK,\n\nOCTOBER, 1880.\n\nNEW BOOKS\n\nAND NEW EDITIONS OF IMPORTANT BOOKS,\n\nPUBLISHED BY\n\nROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS.\n\n\n*** _Any Book in this Catalogue, not too large to go by mail, will be\nsent postage prepaid, on receipt of the price._\n\n=The End of a Coil.= A Story. By the author of the \"Wide Wide World.\"\n717 pp. $1.75.\n\n=My Desire.= A Tale. By the author of the \"Wide Wide World.\" $1.75.\n\n=Christie's Old Organ, Saved at Sea, and Little Faith.= In one volume.\n$1.00.\n\n=Christ and His Religion.= By Rev. 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(Half the former price.)\n\n    \"Pool's Annotations are sound, clear, and sensible; and, taking\n    for all in all, I place him at the head of English commentators\n    on the whole Bible.\"--_Rev. J. C. Ryle._\n\n=* Matthew Henry's Commentary on the Bible.= 5 vols., quarto. (Sheep,\n$20.00.) Cloth, $15.00. Another edition in 9 vols., octavo. Cloth,\n$20.00.\n\n    Rev. C. H. Spurgeon says: \"First among the mighty for general\n    usefulness we are bound to mention the man whose name is a\n    household word,--Matthew Henry. He is most pious and pithy,\n    sound and sensible, suggestive and sober, terse and\n    trustworthy.... I venture to say that no better investment can\n    be made by a minister than that peerless exposition.\"\n\n=* Dr. McCosh's Works.= New and neat edition (reduced from $15.00). 5\nvols., 8vo., uniform, $10.00. Comprising:--\n\n  1. DIVINE GOVERNMENT.\n  2. TYPICAL FORMS.\n  3. THE INTUITIONS OF THE MIND.\n  4. DEFENCE OF FUNDAMENTALISM\n  5. 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Observer._\n\n=Guide to Family Devotion.= By the Rev. Alexander Fletcher, D.D. Royal\nquarto, with 10 steel plates (half morocco, $7.50; Turkey morocco,\n$12.00), cloth, gilt, and gilt edges, $5.00.\n\n    \"The more we look over the volume the more we admire it, and the\n    more heartily feel to commend it to families and devout\n    Christians. It is emphatically a book of devotion, from the\n    standpoint of an intelligent, broad-minded Christian minister,\n    who has here expressed many of the deepest emotions and wants of\n    the soul. The selections of Scripture and the hymns are all\n    admirably adapted to increase devotion; and the prayers are such\n    as can but aid the suppliant, even when not uttered from his\n    precise standpoint, and are especially valuable to many heads of\n    families who find it difficult to frame words for themselves in\n    conducting family worship.\"--_Journal and Messenger._\n\n=The A. L. O. E. 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Lectures on\nAncient Philosophy. 2 vols., $2.50.\n\n    \"A few weeks ago we spoke of the reprinting, by Carter &\n    Brothers, of the Sermons of Archer Butler, a body of preaching\n    so strong and massive as to be really wonderful. The 'Lectures\n    on Ancient Philosophy' that are now added, were delivered at the\n    University of Dublin, about the year 1840, when the author was\n    scarcely thirty years old.\"--_Watchman._\n\n=The Book and Its Story.= 12mo. $1.50.\n\n=Fresh Leaves from the Book and Its Story.= 12mo. $1.50.\n\n    \"Let any one who is inclined to think the bare Scriptures 'dry'\n    reading, peruse them in connection with a volume like this, and\n    they will be clothed to him with a new life. He will learn how\n    the separate books of the Bible were, as it were, built into one\n    another, and made to form a glorious whole: he will read\n    intelligently and with deep interest.\"--_Keystone._\n\n=Bonar (Horatius, D.D.).= Hymns of Faith and Hope. 3 vols., 18mo. $2.25.\n\n=Bible Thoughts and Themes.= 6 vols. 12mo, viz.:--\n\n  GENESIS             $2.00\n  OLD TESTAMENT        2.00\n  GOSPELS              2.00\n  ACTS, &C.            2.00\n  LESSER EPISTLES      2.00\n  REVELATION           2.00\n\n    \"With no attempt at exposition, except what is found in\n    comparing Scripture with Scripture, and drawing illustrations\n    and means of impressing rich gospel truth from almost every\n    source, the author proceeds with theme upon theme, giving floods\n    of edifying and comforting light from beginning to end. It is a\n    good book for the private Christian to have on his table for\n    frequent use, and ministers will often find in it that which\n    will be suggestive and useful.\"--_Christian Instructor_.\n\n  WAY OF PEACE                  $0.50\n  WAY OF HOLINESS                 .60\n  NIGHT OF WEEPING                .50\n  MORNING OF JOY                  .60\n  FOLLOW THE LAMB                 .40\n  THE RENT VEIL                  1.25\n  MY OLD LETTERS                 2.00\n  HYMNS OF THE NATIVITY, gilt,   1.00\n  THE CHRIST OF GOD              1.25\n  TRUTH AND ERROR                 .60\n  THE EVERLASTING RIGHTEOUSNESS   .60\n\n=Chalmers (Thomas, D.D.).= Sermons. 2 vols. in one $3.00.\n\n=Cowper (Wm.).= The Task. Illustrated by Birket Foster $3.50.\n\n=Cuyler (Rev. T. 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Henry, D.D.).= The Argument of the Book of Job\nUnfolded. 12mo. $1.75.\n\n    \"That ancient composition so marvellous in beauty, and so rich\n    in philosophy, is here treated in a thoroughly analytical\n    manner, and new depths and grander proportions of the divine\n    original portrayed. It is a book to stimulate\n    research\"--_Methodist Recorder_.\n\n=Guthrie (Thomas, D.D.).= Life and Works. 11 vols. $15.00.\n\n    \"His pages glow with the deep piety, the Scriptural beauty, the\n    rich imagery, and the tender pathos which breathed from his\n    lips.\"--_N. Y. Observer_.\n\n=Hamilton (James, D.D.).= Select Works. 4 vols. $5.00. Containing The\nRoyal Preacher; Mount of Olives; Pearl of Parables; Lamp and Lantern;\nGreat Biography; Harp on the Willows; Lake of Galilee; Emblems from\nEden; Life in Earnest.\n\n    \"Those familiar with the works of Dr Hamilton will perceive that\n    this set of volumes contains the choice gold from the author's\n    mine. They are put up in a neat box, and sold at the low price\n    of $5 for the set.\"--_Interior_.\n\n=Hamlin (Cyrus).= Among the Turks. 12mo. $1.50.\n\n=Hanna (Rev. William, D.D.).= Life of Christ. 3 vols. 12mo. $4.50.\n\n    \"We can heartily commend the 'Life of our Lord,' by Dr.\n    Hanna.\"--_Congregational Quarterly_.\n\n    \"Besides the beauty of the style and the careful scholarship\n    which mark these volumes, we cannot too warmly commend them for\n    their deep piety and hearty enforcement of the doctrines of\n    Christianity.\"--_N. Y. Observer_.\n\n=Hill (George).= Lectures on Divinity. 8vo. $2.50.\n\n    \"The candor and fairness of this author are remarkable, an\n    unfailing indication of real greatness.\"--_Christian Mirror_.\n\n=Hodge (Charles, D.D.).= Commentaries.\n\n  ON ROMANS. 12mo               $1.75\n  ON EPHESIANS. 12mo             1.75\n  ON CORINTHIANS. 2 vols. 12mo   3.50\n\n    Rev. C. H. Spurgeon says: \"Most valuable. With no writer do we\n    more fully agree. The more we use Hodge, the more we value him.\n    This applies to all his Commentaries.\"\n\n=Hodge (Rev. A. A., D.D.).= Outlines of Theology. Revised and Enlarged\nEdition. 8vo. $3.00.\n\n    \"At its first publication in 1860, this work attracted much\n    attention, and ever since it has had a large sale, and been\n    carefully studied both in this country and in Great Britain. It\n    has been translated into Welsh and modern Greek, and has been\n    used as a text-book in several theological schools. Prepared\n    originally in good part from notes taken by the author from his\n    distinguished father's lectures, with the assistance of standard\n    theological writers, after fourteen years of service as a\n    theological instructor, he has, with increased knowledge and\n    experience as a teacher, embodied in this new and enlarged\n    edition not only the treasures of the volume as it first\n    appeared, but the rich results of his additional studies and\n    investigations. This new edition contains fifty per cent more of\n    matter than the former one. Two chapters have been dropped, and\n    five new ones have been added.\"--_Presbyterian Banner_.\n\n=Holt (Emily Sarah).= Historical Tales.\n\n  ISOULT BARRY. 12mo              $1.50\n  ROBIN TREMAYNE. 12mo             1.50\n  THE WELL IN THE DESERT. 16mo     1.25\n  ASHCLIFFE HALL. 16mo             1.25\n  VERENA; A TALE. 12mo             1.50\n  THE WHITE ROSE OF LANGLEY. 12mo  1.50\n  IMOGEN. 12mo                     1.50\n  CLARE AVERY. 12mo                1.50\n  LETTICE EDEN. 12mo               1.50\n  FOR THE MASTER'S SAKE. 16mo      1.00\n  MARGERY'S SON. 12mo              1.50\n  LADY SYBIL'S CHOICE. 12mo        1.50\n  THE MAIDEN'S LODGE. 12mo         1.25\n\n    \"Whether it is regarded in its historical or its religious\n    aspect, 'Isoult Barry of Wynscote' is the finest contribution to\n    English literature, of its peculiar class, which has been made\n    in the present century.\"--_American Baptist_.\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\nItalics are noted by _underscores_ surrounding the word/words.\n\nBold words are surrounded by =equal signs=.\n\nFootnote V\n\n[V] Hebrew: rakiya, Raqia, from Hebrew: raka, to spread out.\n\nPage 145\n\n(an arbitrary declaration)\n\nChanged (arbitary) to (arbitrary).\n\nPage 212 Illustration\n\n(direction of the current of influence.)\n\nChanged (currnt) to (current).\n\nPage 235\n\n(whole nerve system. The corroborative)\n\nChanged (corroberative) to (corroborative).\n\nPage 237\n\n(has a clear and unchallengeable field of)\n\nChanged (unchallangeable) to (unchallengeable).\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n<pre id=\"pg-footer\">","title":"The Relations of Science and Religion: The Morse Lecture, 1880","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":65536}