{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_37513/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_37513","id":"gutenberg_37513","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37513","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Science -- Philosophy","Spencer, Herbert, 1820-1903"],"text":"</pre>\n\nE-text prepared by Adrian Mastronardi, David E. Brown, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images\ngenerously made available by Internet Archive/American Libraries\n(http://www.archive.org/details/americana)\n\n\n\nNote: Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive/American Libraries. See\n      http://www.archive.org/details/spencersphilosop00morgrich\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\n      Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).\n\n      Text enclosed by curly brackets is subscripted (example:\n      H{2}O) unless preceded by a carat character, in which\n      case it is superscripted (example: ^{2}).\n\n\n\n\n\nSPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\n\nThe Herbert Spencer Lecture\nDelivered at the Museum\n7 November, 1913\n\nby\n\nC. LLOYD MORGAN, F.R.S.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPrice Two Shillings net\n\nOxford\nAt the Clarendon Press\nMCMXIII\n\nOxford University Press\nLondon      Edinburgh      Glasgow      New York\nToronto      Melbourne      Bombay\nHumphrey Milford M.A.\nPublisher to the University\n\n\n\n\nSPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\n\n\nTowards the close of 1870, while I was still in my teens, my youthful\nenthusiasm was fired by reading Tyndall's Discourse on _The Scientific\nUse of the Imagination_. The vision of the conquest of nature by\nphysical science--a vision which had but lately begun to open up to my\nwondering gaze--was rendered clearer and more extensive. Of the theory\nof evolution I knew but little; but I none the less felt assured that it\nhad come to stay and to prevail. Was it not accepted by all of _us_--the\nenlightened and emancipated men of science whose ranks I had joined as a\nraw recruit? Believing that I was independently breaking free of all\nauthority, to the authority that appealed to my fancy, and to a new\nloyalty, I was a willing slave. And here in one glowing sentence the\ninner core of evolution lay revealed.\n\n  'Strip it naked and you stand face to face with the notion that\n  not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular and animal life,\n  not alone the nobler forms of the horse and the lion, not alone\n  the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that\n  the human mind itself--emotion, intellect and all their\n  phenomena--were once latent in a fiery cloud.'[1]\n\nWith sparkling eyes I quoted these brave words to a friend of my\nfather's, whose comments were often as caustic as his sympathy in my\ninterests was kindly. With a grave smile he asked whether the notion was\nnot perhaps stripped too naked to preserve the decencies of modest\nthought; he inquired whether I had not learnt from _Sartor Resartus_\nthat the philosophy of nature is a Philosophy of Clothes; and he bade me\ndevote a little time to quiet and careful consideration of what Tyndall\nreally meant--meant in terms of the exact science he professed--by the\nphrase 'latent in a fiery cloud'. I dimly suspected that the old\ngentleman--old in the sense of being my father's contemporary--was\nignorant of those recent developments of modern science with which I had\nbeen acquainted for weeks, nay more for months. Perhaps he had never\neven heard of the nebular hypothesis! But I felt that I had done him an\ninjustice when, next morning, he sent round a volume of the _Westminster\nReview_ with a slip of paper indicating an article on 'Progress: its Law\nand Cause'.\n\nSuch was my introduction to Herbert Spencer, some of whose works I read\nwith admiration during the next few years.\n\nI have no very distinct recollection of the impression produced on my\nmind by the germinal essay of 1857, save that it served to quicken that\ncraving, which is, I suppose, characteristic of those who have some\nnatural bent towards philosophy--the imperative craving to seek and, if\nit may be, to find the one in the many. In any case Tyndall's suggestive\nsentence was here amplified and the underlying law was disclosed.\n\n  'Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development\n  of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of\n  Government, of Manufacture, of Commerce, of Language, Literature,\n  Science, Art, the same evolution of the simple into the complex,\n  through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the\n  earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of\n  civilisation, we shall find that the transformation of the\n  homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which Progress\n  essentially consists.'[2]\n\nHere was just what I wanted--on the one hand the whole wide universe of\nexistence; and on the other hand a brief formula with which to label its\npotted essence. How breathlessly one was led on, with only such breaches\nof continuity as separate paragraphs inevitably impose, right away from\nthe primitive fire-mist to one of Bach's fugues or the critical\ndoctrines of Mr. Ruskin, guided throughout by the magic of\ndifferentiation. What if the modes of existence, dealt with in\nsuccessive sections, were somewhat startlingly diverse! Was not this\nitself a supreme example of the evolution of that diversity which the\nformula enables us to interpret? For if there were a passage from the\nhomogeneous to the heterogeneous, the more heterogeneous the\nproducts--inorganic, organic, and superorganic, as I learnt to call\nthem--the stronger the evidence for the law. Only by shutting one's eyes\nto the light that had been shed on the world by evolution could one fail\nto see how simple and yet how inevitable was the whole business.\n\nIf then differentiation be the cardinal law of evolution--for the\ncorrelative concept of integration receives no emphasis in this early\nessay--does not the universality of the law imply a universal cause?\nJust as gravitation was assignable as a _cause_ of each of the groups of\nphenomena which Kepler formulated; so might some equally simple\nattribute of things be assignable as the cause of each of the groups of\nphenomena formulated in terms of differentiation. Now the only obvious\nrespect in which all kinds of Progress are alike, is, that they are\nmodes of change; and hence in some characteristic of changes in general,\nthe desired solution must be found. Thus we are led up to the statement\nof the all-pervading principle which determines the all-pervading\nprocess of differentiation. It is this: _Every active force produces\nmore than one change--every cause produces more than one effect._[3]\n\nIn the first part of the Essay many and varied facts are adduced to show\nthat every kind of progress is from the simple to the complex. The aim\nof the second part is to show why this is so: it is 'because each change\nis followed by many changes'. From the beginning, the decomposition of\nevery expended force into several forces has been perpetually producing\na higher complication, and thus Progress is not an accident but a\nbeneficent necessity. In a brief third part we are bidden to remember\nthat\n\n  'after all that has been said the ultimate mystery remains just as\n  it was. The explanation of that which is explicable does but bring\n  out into greater clearness the inexplicableness of that which\n  remains behind.... The sincere man of science, content to follow\n  wherever the evidence leads him becomes by each new enquiry more\n  profoundly convinced that the Universe is an insoluble problem....\n  In all directions his investigations bring him face to face with\n  the unknowable; and he ever more clearly perceives it to be the\n  unknowable'.[4]\n\nThere is I think a growing consensus of opinion that the first of\nthese three parts, subsequently expanded and illustrated with\nastonishing wealth of detail in the volumes of the _Synthetic\nPhilosophy_, contains the germ of all that is best in the teaching of\nHerbert Spencer; and that it was amid phenomena which admitted of\ninterpretation from the biological, or quasi-biological, point of view\nthat he found his most congenial sphere of work and the one in which his\nmethod was most effectively employed. The story of evolution is the\nstory of inter-related changes. In any organic whole there are certain\nsalient features of the historical sequence.[5] The parts get more\ndifferent from each other, and they also get more effectively connected\nwith each other; the individual whole gets more different from its\nenvironment, and it also preserves and extends its connexion with the\nenvironment; the several individuals get more different from others,\nwhile their connexion with others is retained and new connexions are\nestablished. Nowadays these central ideas may seem familiar enough; but\nthat is just because Spencer's thought has been so completely\nassimilated. And then we must remember that these main principles are\nsupplemented by a great number of ancillary generalizations, many of\nwhich have been incorporated in the scientific doctrine which is current\nto-day. We must bear in mind that of the _Biology_ Charles Darwin\nwrote:[6] 'I am astonished at its prodigality of original thought.' Of\nthe _Psychology_ William James says[7] that of the systematic treatises\nit will rank as the most original. These are the opinions of experts. No\ndiscussion of sociology or ethics is complete if it ignores Spencer's\ncontributions to these subjects. The _Ethics_, says James[8] is a most\nvital and original piece of attitude-taking in the world of ideals. It\nwas his firm and often inflexible 'attitude' which was a source of\nstrength in Spencer, though it was the strength of rigidity rather than\nthat of sinewy suppleness. This was part of a certain 'narrowness of\nintent and vastness of extent' which characterized his mental vision. He\nwas so obsessed with the paramount importance of biological\nrelationships that in his _Sociology_, his _Ethics_, his _Psychology_,\nhe failed to do justice to, or even to realize the presence of, other\nand higher relationships--higher, that is, in the evolutionary scale.\nBut it was his signal merit to work biological interpretation for all,\nand perhaps more than, it was worth. It was on these lines that he was\nled to find a clue to those social and political developments, the\ndiscussion of which, in the _Nonconformist_ of 1842, constituted the\nfirst step from the life of an engineer to that other kind of life which\nled to the elaboration of the _Synthetic Philosophy_.[9] In his later\nyears he was saddened to see that many of the social and political\ndoctrines, for the establishment of which he had striven so strenuously,\nwere not accepted by a newer generation of thinkers. Still, to have\ntaken a definite and, for all his detractors may say, an honoured\nposition in the line of those who make history in the philosophy of life\nand mind--that could never be taken away from him.\n\nIt will perhaps be said that this emphasis on the philosophy of life\nand mind does scant justice to the range and sweep of Spencer's\nphilosophy as a whole; and no doubt others will contend that the\nemphasis should be laid elsewhere; on the mechanical foundations; on\nevolution as a universal principle. It will be urged that Spencer\nwidened to men's view the scope of scientific explanation. He proclaimed\n'the gradual growth of all things by natural processes out of natural\nantecedents'.[10] Even in the _Nonconformist_ letters 'there is', he\nhimself says,[11] 'definitely expressed a belief in the universality of\nlaw--law in the realm of mind as in that of matter--law throughout the\nlife of society as throughout the individual life. So, too, is it with\nthe correlative idea of universal causation.' And if there be law it\nmust at bottom be one law. Thus in _First Principles_ Spencer propounded\na sweeping and sonorous formula, which every disciple knows by heart,\nembodying the fundamental traits of that unceasing redistribution of\nmatter and motion which characterizes evolution as contrasted with\ndissolution. Was it not this that he himself regarded as his main\ncontribution to philosophy? Did he not himself provide a summary,\nsetting forth the sixteen articles of the Spencerian creed; and is not\nthis summary given a prominent position in the Preface he wrote to\nHoward Collins's _Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy_? Do not these\nfundamental articles of his faith deal with ubiquitous causes, with the\ninstability of the homogeneous and the multiplication of effects, with\nsegregation and equilibration, and with the basal conception of the\npersistence of force? There is here, it may be said, no special\nreference to the organic and the superorganic. And why? Just because\nSpencer's interpretation is all-inclusive; because biology, psychology,\nsociology, ethics are, broadly considered, concerned only with incidents\nof the later scenes of the great mechanical drama of evolution. Are we\nnot again and again bidden, now in forecast, now in retrospect, to look\nbelow the surface, and constantly to bear in mind that the aim of\nphilosophy, as completely unified knowledge, is 'the interpretation of\nall phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force'?[12] It is true\nthat the affairs of the mind give pause and seem to present something of\na difficulty. But even here 'specifically stated, the problem is to\ninterpret mental evolution in terms of the redistribution of matter and\nmotion'.[13] An adequate explanation of nervous evolution involves an\nadequate explanation of the concomitant evolution of mind. It is true\nthat the antithesis of subject and object is never to be transcended\n'while consciousness lasts'.[14] But if all existence, distinguishable\nas subjective, is resolvable into units of consciousness, which in their\nobverse or objective aspect are oscillations of molecules,[15] what more\nis required to round off the explanation of every thing, save the\nUnknowable--save the Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are\nunited? In the end we are baffled by mystery; let us, therefore, make\nthe best of it and rejoice.\n\n  'We can think of Matter only in terms of Mind. We can think of\n  Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations\n  of the first to its uttermost limit we are referred to the second\n  for a final answer; and when we have got the final answer to the\n  second we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of\n  it.'[14]\n\nAnd so neither answer is final. Finality is only reached when both are\nswallowed up, not in victory, but in defeat. Shall we not then glory in\ndefeat and sing its praises often?\n\nI must leave to some future Herbert Spencer lecturer the discussion of\nhis doctrine of the Unknowable and the critical consideration of its\nplace and value in philosophy. I would fain leave it altogether on one\nside; but that is impossible. Although the _First Principles_ is divided\ninto two Parts, dealing respectively with the Unknowable and the\nKnowable, we have not by any means done with the former when we turn\nfrom the First Part to the Second. With Spencer we have never done with\nthe Unknowable, the Unconditioned Reality and the other aliases by which\nit goes. His persistence of force is the persistence of Unknowable\nForce. In a leading passage, at any rate, it is avowedly 'the\npersistence of some Cause which transcends our knowledge and conception.\nIn asserting it we assert an Unconditioned Reality without beginning or\nend'.[16] There must, he holds, be something at the back of the\nevolutionary drama which we study--something that is both a principle of\nactivity and a permanent _nexus_.[17] The pity of it is that we know\nnot, and can never know, what on earth (or in heaven!) it is. We only\nknow that it exists, and somehow produces the whole show. Now it would\nmuch conduce to clearness of thought and of statement if we could agree\nto eliminate those terribly ambiguous words 'force' and 'cause' when we\nare dealing with the fundamental postulate (if such it be) that there\nmust be something at the back of evolution to make it what it is; and\nthe word Source seems ready to our hand and might well be given this\nspecial significance. But Spencer uses Agency, Power, Cause, Force, in\nthis connexion. In how many senses he uses the word 'force' I am not\nprepared to say. It is often a synonym for cause; it stands alike for\nmatter and energy;[18] it is the objective correlate of our subjective\nsense of effort.[19] There is a 'correlation and equivalence between\nexternal forces and the mental forces generated by them under the form\nof sensations'.[20] And when we pass to human life in society, whatever\nin any way facilitates or impedes social, political, or economic change,\nis spoken of in terms of force.[21] With an apparent vagueness and\nlaxity almost unparalleled, force is used in wellnigh every conceivable\nsense of this ambiguous word--except, perhaps, that which is now\nsanctioned by definition in mathematical physics. I say apparent\nvagueness and laxity because, subtly underlying all this varied usage,\nis the unifying conception of Source as the ultimate basis of all\nenforcement. From this flows all necessity whether in things or thoughts\nor any combination of the two. Thus persistence of force is Spencer's\nfavourite expression for uniform determinism at or near its Source.\n\nNow, as I understand the position, science has nothing whatever to do\nwith the Source or Sources of phenomena. By a wise self-denying\nordinance it rules all questions of ultimate origin out of court. It\nregards them as beyond its special sphere of jurisdiction. It deals with\nphenomena in terms of connexion within an orderly scheme, and it does\nnot profess to explain _why_ the connexions are such as they are found\nto be. In any discussion of this or that sequence of events which may\nfall under the wide and rather vague heading of evolution, it is just a\nconsistent story of the events in their total relatedness that science\nendeavours to tell. The question: But what evolves the evolved? is for\nscience (or should I say for those who accept this delimitation of the\nprovince of science?) not so much unanswerable in any terms, as\nunanswerable in scientific terms. For the terms in which an answer must\nbe given are incommensurable with the concepts with which science has\nelected to carry on its business as interpreter of nature. To this\nquestion therefore the man of science, speaking for his order, simply\nreplies: We do not know. Is this, then, Spencer's answer? Far from it.\nThe man of science here makes, or should make, no positive assertion,\nsave in respect of the limits of his field of inquiry. If you beg him to\ntell you what that which he knows not is, or does, he regards such a\nquestion as meaningless. But Spencer's Unknowable, notwithstanding its\nnegative prefix, is the Ultimate Reality, and does all that is in any\nway done. We may not know _what_ it is; but _that_ it is, is the most\nassured of all assured certainties. And when it comes to doing, what can\nbe more dramatically positive than that which bears a name of negation?\nWhatever it may not be, it is the Power that drives all the machinery in\nthis workshop of a world; it is the Power which lies at the back of such\nwit as man has to interpret it, and, in some measure, to utilize its\nmechanism.\n\nIt seems plain enough that Spencer distinguishes, or seeks to\ndistinguish, between those knowable effects which we call natural\nphenomena and their Unknowable Cause or Source. And this seems to be in\nline with the distinction which his critic, M. Bergson, draws between\n'the evolved which is a result' and 'evolution itself, which is the act\nby which the result is obtained'.[22] An act implies an agent, and the\nagency of which the evolved is a manifestation is for M. Bergson Life,\nwhile for Spencer it is that very vigorous agency--the Unknowable. Now\nin criticizing Spencer, M. Bergson says:\n\n  'The usual device of the Spencerian method consists in\n  reconstructing evolution with the fragments of the evolved.... It\n  is not however by dividing the evolved that we shall reach the\n  principle of that which evolves. It is not by recomposing the\n  evolved with itself that we shall reproduce the evolution of which\n  it is the term.'[23]\n\nBut does Spencer ever suggest that we shall thus reach the principle of\nthat which evolves--by which, if I mistake not, M. Bergson means the\nSource of evolution? Does he not urge that we can neither reach it in\nthis way, nor in any other way? For M. Bergson, as for Spencer, it is\nunknowable by the intellect--it can only be known by what M. Bergson\ncalls intuition. For both thinkers, the intellect provides only a world\nof symbols; and Spencer's transfigured realism may be matched by what\nDr. Wildon Carr calls M. Bergson's transformed realism.[24] So long as\nwe are dealing with the evolved--which is that with which alone science\nattempts to deal--Spencer, M. Bergson, and the rest of us are in like\ncase. We must stumble on intellectually with our symbols as best we may.\n'Whether we posit the present structure of mind or the present\nsubdivision of matter in either case we remain in the evolved: we are\ntold nothing of what evolves, nothing of evolution.'[25] _Nothing of\nwhat evolves!_ Spencer might exclaim with a groan. Have I then written\nall those pages and pages on the Unknowable for nought? Is it not a\nfundamental tenet of my philosophy that there must be, and therefore is,\na Source of the evolved--of the phenomenal world which is merely an\nexpression in terms of intellectual symbolism, of that ultimate Power\nwhich, though its nature may baffle the intellect, is none the less the\nmost real of all realities?\n\nIt would take us too far from the line of Spencer's thought to consider\nM. Bergson's doctrine that it is the intellect that portions the world\ninto lots;[26] that cuts the facts out of the interpenetrating whole of\nreality, and renders them artificially distinct within the continuity of\nbecoming. It suffices to note that on such a presupposition 'the\ncardinal error of Spencer is to take experience already allotted as\ngiven, whereas the true problem is to know how the allotment was\nworked'.[27] I am not prepared to give--indeed I have been unable to\nfind--M. Bergson's own solution of the problem. I gather that it was\nLife itself that somehow allotted concepts and objects in such\ncorrespondence as should be practically useful though metaphysically\nfalse and illusory. But just how it was done I have still to learn. 'The\noriginal activity was', we are told, 'a simple thing which became\ndiversified through the very construction of mechanisms such as those of\nthe brain,'[28] which, as Life's tool, has facilitated the chopping up\nof a continuous interpenetrating reality into mince-meat for\nintellectual assimilation. Such a conception was foreign to Spencer's\nthought. But some of us may find it hard to distinguish M. Bergson's\n'original activity' from Spencer's Unknowable, which, so far as one can\nmake out, somehow produced precisely the same results. As a matter of\nfact, M. Bergson seems to put into Life, as Spencer put into the\nUnknowable, the potentiality of producing all that actually exists.\n\nFor Spencer, as for M. Bergson, we live in a world of change. But\nneither is content to accept changes as facts to be linked up within a\nscheme of scientific interpretation. Both must seek their Source. Now to\ninquire into the Source or Sources of phenomena is characteristic of man\nas thinker. And if, in common with those whom I follow, I regard this\nquest as beyond the limits of science, I am well aware that such\ndelimitation of fields of inquiry is by no means universally accepted.\nM. Bergson, for example, regards metaphysics as the _Science_[29] which\nclaims to dispense with symbols, which turns its back on analysis, which\neschews logic, which dispenses with relativity and pierces to the\nabsolute, which, apparently, uses the intellect only to establish its\nutter incompetence in this department of 'science'. Merely saying that\nthis, whatever else it may be, is not what I, for one, understand by\nscience--and not, by the way, what M. Bergson in other passages seems to\nmean by science[30]--I pass on to Spencer's treatment of the philosophy\nof science which, for him, is 'completely unified knowledge', 'the\ntruths of philosophy bearing the same relation to the highest scientific\ntruths that each of these bears to lower scientific truths.'\n\nI suppose one of the basal truths in his philosophy of science is for\nSpencer the universality of connexion between cause and effect. Now let\nus eliminate Source as the Ultimate Cause (so far as that is possible in\nSpencer); let us restrict our attention to cause and effect in the realm\nof the knowable. When we try to do this we find his statements\nconcerning them scarcely less puzzling than those that refer to force,\nwith which cause is so often identified. Thus we are told[31] that\n'motion set up in any direction is itself a cause of further motion in\nthat direction since it is a manifestation of a surplus force in that\ndirection'; and elsewhere[32] that 'the momentum of a body causes it to\nmove in a straight line and at a uniform velocity'. A distinction is\ndrawn between cause and conditions. But both produce effects, and only\non these terms can there be that 'proportionality or equivalence between\ncause and effect' on which Spencer insists.[33] There is, however,\nscarcely a hint of what constitutes the difference between cause and\nconditions, save in so far as he speaks[34] of 'those conspicuous\nantecedents which we call the causes' and 'those accompanying\nantecedents which we call the conditions'. Many of the details of his\ntreatment I find most perplexing; but to recite examples would be\nwearisome. And then, in the ninth and tenth articles of the Spencerian\ncreed, cause plays a somewhat different part. For, there, the\ninstability of the homogeneous and the multiplication of effects are\ngiven as the chief causes which 'necessitate' that redistribution of\nmatter and motion of which evolution is one phase. Similarly, as I have\nnoted above, in 'Progress: its Law and Cause', the fundamental attribute\nof all modes of change--that every cause produces more than one\neffect--is itself spoken of as a cause, and likened to 'gravitation as\nthe cause of each of the groups of phenomena which Kepler formulated'.\nIn these cases a generalization is regarded as the cause of the\nphenomena from which the generalization is drawn. But sometimes it is\nspoken of as the reason for the phenomena.[35] Here again, however, as\nthroughout his work, reference to Source is close at hand. Hence, in\nplace of the words cause and force, the word agency[36] sometimes stands\nfor that which produces effects; or the word factor may be used. Thus we\nare told[37] of phenomena continually complicating under the influence\nof the same original factors'; and we meet with the argument (contra\nHuxley) that states of consciousness are factors, that is, they 'have\nthe power of working changes in the nervous system and setting up\nmotions'.[38] Always close at hand, constantly underlying Spencer's\nthought, is the notion of power which works changes. In his treatment of\nthe philosophy of science we are never far from the noumenal Source of\nphenomena.\n\n  'For that interpretation of things which is alone possible for us\n  this is all we require to know--that the force or energy\n  manifested, now in one way now in another, persists or remains\n  unchanged in amount. But when we ask what this energy is, there is\n  no answer save that it is the noumenal Cause implied by the\n  phenomenal effect.'[39]\n\nWas it partly with Spencer in view that Mr. Bertrand Russell recently\nurged[40] that the word cause 'is so inextricably bound up with\nmisleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the\nphilosophical vocabulary desirable'? Professor Mach[41] had previously\nexpressed the hope 'that the science of the future will discard the use\nof cause and effect as formally obscure'. And as long ago as 1870 W. K.\nClifford[42] tried to show in 'what sort of way an exact knowledge of\nthe facts would supersede an enquiry after the causes of them'; and\nurged that the hypothesis of continuity 'involves such an\ninterdependence of the facts of the universe as forbids us to speak of\none fact or set of facts as the cause of another fact or set of facts'.\nSuch views may, perhaps, be regarded as extreme; and the word cause is\nnot likely to be extruded from the vocabulary of current speech, of the\nless exact branches of science, or of general discussions of\nworld-processes. Still, a philosophy of science must take note of this\ncriticism of the use of a term which is, to say the least of it,\nambiguous. We must at any rate try to get rid of ambiguity. Now we live\nin a world of what, in a very broad and inclusive sense, may be called\nthings; and these things are in varied ways related to each other. (I\nmust beg leave to assume, without discussion, that the relatedness of\nthings is no less constitutive of the world with which a philosophy of\nscience has to deal than the things which are in relation.) And when\nthings stand in certain kinds of relatedness to each other changes take\nplace. The trouble is that the kinds of relatedness are so many and the\nkinds of change are also so many! Spencer tried to reduce all kinds of\nrelatedness to one quasi-mechanical type; and he signally failed--or\nshall I say that he succeeded only by ignoring all the specific\ndifferences on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by so smudgy an\nextension of the meaning of mechanical and physical terms as to make\nthem do duty in every conceivable connexion?\n\nSo long as we can deal with simple types of relatedness, such as that\nwhich we call gravitative, in any given system of things regarded as\nisolated, we can express in formulae not only the rate of change within\nthe system, but also the rate at which the rate of change itself\nchanges. And these formulae are found to be generally applicable where\nlike things are in a like field of relatedness. So that Spencer's\npersistence of force (at least in one of its many meanings) is replaced\nin such cases by sameness of differential equations. And in such cases\nwe have no need for the word cause. Of course the value of the constants\nin any such formula depends upon the nature of the field of relatedness\nand of the things therein; and only certain systems, in which the\nrelations are simple, or are susceptible of simplification, can be dealt\nwith, at present, in this manner. It is imperative to remember that not\nonly the rate of change but the kind of change differs in different\nrelational fields--a fact of which Spencer took too little cognizance,\nso bent was he on some sort of unification at all hazards. Revert now to\na field of gravitative relatedness, in which the motion of things is the\nkind of change, while the rate of change is expressible in a formula;\nmay we not say that the co-presence of things in this relationship does\nimply certain motions and changes of motion within the system to which\nthe term gravitative applies? There seems little room for ambiguity if\nwe call what is thus implied the effect, and if we term those modes of\nrelatedness which carry this kind of implication, effective. It may,\nhowever, be said that it sounds somewhat strange to speak of relations\nas effective. How can mere relatedness as such _do_ anything? What is\nimplied by the effect is surely, it will be urged, a cause in the full\nand rich sense of the word--a cause which produces the effect. For what\nis here suggested is nothing more than a generalized statement of the\ntruth that the relational constitution of the system being what it is,\nthe changes are what they are! And so we come back to the conception of\nan agency which in some way produces the observable change--of a power\nwhich is active behind the phenomenal scene--of force and cause in the\nSpencerian sense. But, so far as scientific interpretation is concerned,\nthis reference to Source--for such it really is--is useless. The\ngravitative system can be dealt with scientifically just as well without\nit as with it.\n\nWhat, then, becomes of the scientific conception of energy? Is not\nenergy that which produces observable change? Is it not active in the\nsense required? And can we say that this conception is useless for\nscientific interpretation? I suppose most of us, in our student days,\nhave passed through the phase of regarding energy as an active demon\nwhich plays a notorious part in the physical drama. Spencer loved it\ndearly. But some of us, under what we consider wiser guidance, hold that\nwhat we should understand by kinetic energy is nothing of this sort. It\nis a constant ratio of variables, conveniently expressed as 1/2_mv_^{2}.\nThat, however, it may be said, is absurd. Energy is not merely a ratio\nor a formula; it is something much more real; perhaps the most real of\nall the realities the being of which has been disclosed by physical\nscience. Granted in a sense, and a very true sense. But what is this\nreality? It is the reality of the changes themselves in those fields of\nrelatedness to which the formula has reference. There is nothing, I\nconceive, in the modern treatment of energy that affords any scientific\njustification of the Spencerian view[43] that energy is an agent through\nthe activity of which the constant ratio of variables is maintained in\nthe physical world.\n\nI feel sure that it will still be said that change must inevitably\nimply that which produces change, and that, even if energy be only a\nratio of variables within a changing field, there is still the\nimplication of Force as the real Cause of which the change itself,\nhowever formulated, is the effect. No doubt this is one of the meanings\nwhich the ambiguous words force and cause may carry. It is to remove\nthis ambiguity that I have suggested that the word Source should be\nsubstituted for cause in this sense. And what about force? In one of its\nmeanings it now generally stands for a measure of change. For those who\naccept Source as a scientific concept it may well stand for the measure\nor degree of its activity gauged by the phenomenal effect; for those who\ndo not accept it, the measure or degree of the change itself[44]--to be\ndealt with in mechanics in terms of mass and acceleration. This leaves\noutstanding, however, the use of the word force in the phrase--the\nforces of nature--gravitative force, cohesive force, electromotive\nforce, and so on. It was, I take it, with this usage in view that\nSpencer spoke of vital, mental, and social forces. Now the reference in\neach of these cases is to some specific mode of relatedness among the\nthings concerned. We need to name it in some way; and this is the way\nthat is, rather unfortunately, sanctioned by custom and long usage. When\nwe say that a thing is in a field of electromotive force we mean (do we\nnot?) that the relatedness is of that particular kind named\nelectromotive, and not of another kind. When Spencer spoke of social\nforces he had in view changes which take place within a field of social\nrelationships. We do not really need the word force in this sense, since\nthe term relatedness would suffice, and has no misleading associations.\nBut there it is: our business should be to understand clearly what it\nmeans. It does not, or should not, I think, mean more, in this\nconnexion, than a particular kind of relatedness in virtue of which an\nobservable kind of change occurs.\n\nWe may now pass to cause and conditions. When Spencer distinguishes\nbetween those conspicuous antecedents which we call the causes and those\naccompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, he invites the\nquestion: What, then, is the essential difference between them? If the\naccompanying antecedents are distinguished as inconspicuous, we surely\nneed some criterion of the distinction. Furthermore, inconspicuous\nconditions are, in science, every whit as important as those which are\nconspicuous. Now we all know that Mill regarded the cause as 'the sum\ntotal of the conditions positive and negative taken together.'[45] But\nhe expressly distinguishes between _events_ and _states_.[46]\nDiscussing, for example, the case of a man who eats of a particular dish\nand dies in consequence, he says:\n\n  'The various conditions, except the single one of eating the food,\n  were not events but states possessing more or less of permanency,\n  and might therefore have preceded the effect by an indefinite\n  length of duration, for want of that event which was requisite to\n  complete the required concurrence of conditions.'\n\nAgain he says:\n\n  'When sulphur, charcoal, and nitre are put together in certain\n  proportions and in a certain manner, the effect is, not an\n  explosion, but that the mixture acquires a property by which in\n  given circumstances it will explode. The ingredients of the\n  gunpowder have been brought into a state of preparedness for\n  exploding as soon as the other conditions of an explosion shall\n  have occurred.'\n\nAnd he tells us that physiological processes 'often have for the chief\npart of their operation to predispose the constitution to some mode of\naction'.\n\nThis distinction may profitably be carried further and emphasized in\nour terminology. Take any thing, or any integrated group of things,\nregarded as that higher order of thing which we call a self-contained\nsystem. Process occurs therein, and process involves change. In so far\nas the system is self-contained its changes and states are inherent in\nits constitution. We need a term by which to designate that which is\nthus inherent and constitutional. The term _ground_ might be reserved\nfor this purpose. The word ground has its natural home in logic. It is\nhere extended (if it be an extension) to that to which the logic has\nreference in the existing world. One is here following Spencer, who\nclaims[47] that 'Logic is a science pertaining to objective existence'.\nOn these terms the constitution of any system is the ground of the\nproperties, states, and happenings in that system regarded as isolated.\nBut the changes or properties will be also in relation to surrounding\nthings or systems. _These_ changes, or modifications of change, in\nrelation to external things or events, may properly be said to be\nconditioned; and we may well restrict the term conditions to influences\n_outside_ the constitution as ground. Of course, if we accept this\nusage, we must not speak, with Mill, of the constitution of any system\nas the condition of its inherent changes or properties. That is why we\nneed some such word and concept as ground. Now we may fix our attention\non any constituent part of some natural system and make that part the\ncentre of our interest. That part may be changing in virtue of its\nconstitution; and the rest of the system, regarded as external to this\nselected part, must therefore be regarded as conditioning. It is a\nmatter of convenience for purposes of scientific interpretation whether\nwe select a larger or a smaller system-group and discuss its\nconstitutional character. Thus we may think of the constitution of the\nsolar system, or of that of the sun's corona; of the constitution of an\norganism or of that of one of its cells; of the constitution of a\ncomplex molecule or of that of an atom therein. We have here reached, or\nnearly reached, the limiting case in one direction--that of restricting\nour field of inquiry. The limiting case in the other direction is, I\nsuppose, the universe. But could we so expand our thought as to embrace,\nif that were possible, the whole universe, then there are no conditions;\nfor _ex hypothesi_ there is nothing for science outside the universe. We\nhave reached the limiting concept. Hence, for science, the constitution\nof nature is the ultimate ground of all that is or happens.\n\nLet us now see how we stand. Consider the following statements:\n\n1. The Unknowable is the cause of all the phenomena we observe.\n\n2. The constitution of gunpowder is the cause of its explosiveness.[48]\n\n3. The fall of a spark was the cause of the actual explosion of the\npowder.[49]\n\nOr these:\n\n1. Life is the cause of all vital manifestations.\n\n2. The inherited nature of a hen's egg is the cause of its producing a\nchick and not a duckling.\n\n3. The cause of the development of the chick embryo is the warmth\nsupplied by the incubating mother.[50]\n\nIn each case the reference under (1) is to a transcendent cause which\nproduces the phenomena under consideration. I suggest that the word\nSource should here be used instead of cause. In each case the reference\nunder (2) is to the nature or constitution of that within which some\nprocess occurs. I suggest that the word ground should here be used\ninstead of cause. In each case the reference under (3) is to some\nexternal influence. I suggest that the word condition should here be\nused instead of cause. We thus eliminate the word cause altogether. But\nsince, in nine cases out of ten, the conditions, or some salient\ncondition, is what is meant by cause in popular speech, and in the less\nexact sciences, the word cause may perhaps be there retained with this\nparticular meaning. These are of course merely suggestions towards the\navoidance of puzzling ambiguity. One could wish that Spencer could have\nthought out some such distinctions to help his sorely perplexed readers.\n\nOne could wish, too, that he had devoted his great powers of thought to\na searching discussion of the different types of relatedness which are\nfound in nature, and to a fuller consideration of a synthetic scheme of\ntheir inter-relatedness. It is imperative that our thought of relations\nshould have a concrete backing. 'Every act of knowing', says Spencer,\n'is the formation of a relation in consciousness answering to a relation\nin the environment.' But the knowledge-relations are of so very special\na type; and the relations in the environment are so many and varied.\nMuch more analysis of natural relations is required than Spencer\nprovides. I do not mean, of course, that there is any lack of\nanalysis--and of very penetrating analysis--in the _Psychology_, the\n_Biology_, the _Sociology_, and the _Ethics_. I mean that in _First\nPrinciples_, which must be regarded as his general survey of the\nphilosophy of science, there is no searching analysis of the salient\ntypes of relationship which enter into the texture of this very complex\nworld. Such omnibus words as differentiation, integration, segregation,\ndo duty in various connexions with convenient elasticity of meaning to\nsuit the occasion. But apart from qualifying adjectives,[51] such as\nastronomic, geologic, and so on up to artistic and literary, there is\ntoo little attempt at either a distinguishing of the types of\nrelatedness or at a relationing of the relations so distinguished. One\njust jumps from one to another after a break in the text, and finds\noneself in a wholly new field of inquiry. Little but the omnibus\nterminology remains the same. Nor does the _Essay on the Classification\nof the Sciences_, with all its tabulation, furnish what is really\nrequired. What one seeks to know is how those specific kinds of\nrelatedness which characterize the successive phases of evolutionary\nprogress, inorganic, organic, and superorganic, differ from one another\nand how they are connected. This one does not find. The impression one\ngets, here and elsewhere, is that all forms of relatedness must somehow,\nby the omission of all other specific characters, be reduced to the\nmechanical type. This, no doubt, is unification of a sort. But is it the\nsort of unification with which a philosophy of science should rest\ncontent?\n\nIt may be said that unification can only be reached by digging down to\nsome ubiquitous type of relation which is common to all processes\nthroughout the universe at any stage of evolution. But what, on these\nterms, becomes of evolution itself as a problem to be solved? Surely any\nsolution of that problem must render an account of just those specific\nmodes of relatedness which have been ignored in digging down to the\nfoundations. Surely there must be unification of the superstructure as\nwell as of the substructure. Here and now is our world, within the\ntexture of which things stand to each other in such varied relations,\nthough they may be reducible to a few main types. There, in the faraway\npart, was the primitive fire-mist, dear to Spencer's imagination, in\nwhich the modes of relationship were so few and so simple, and all\nseemingly of one main type. How do we get in scientific interpretation\nfrom the one to the other? Will it suffice to breathe over the scene the\nmagic words differentiation and integration? Spencer appears to think\nso. Of course he did exceptionally fine work in elucidating the modes of\ndifferentiation and integration within certain relational fields--though\nhe sometimes uses the latter word for mere shrinkage in size.[52] But\nwhat one asks, and asks of him in vain, is just how, within a connected\nscheme, the several relational fields in the domain of nature are\nthemselves related, and how they were themselves differentiated. How,\nfor instance, did the specific relationships exhibited in the fabric of\ncrystals arise out of the primitive fire-mist relations? At some stage\nof evolution this specific form of relatedness came into being, whereas\nbefore that stage was reached it was not in being. No doubt we may say\nthat the properties of the pre-existing molecules were such that these\nmolecules could in due course become thus related, and enter into the\nlatticed architecture of the crystal. They already possessed the\npotentiality of so doing. And if we have resort to potentialities, all\nsubsequently developed types and modes of relatedness were potentially\nin existence _ab initio_--they were, as Tyndall said, 'once latent in a\nfiery cloud.' But it is difficult to see how the specific modes of\nrelatedness which obtain within the crystal, can be said to exist prior\nto the existence of the crystal within which they so obtain.\n\nPreserving the spirit of Spencer's teaching we must regard all modes\nof relatedness which are disclosed by scientific research as part and\nparcel of the constitution of nature, from whatever Source, knowable or\nunknowable, that constitution be derived. Of these modes there are many;\nindeed, if we deal with all concrete cases, their number is legion. For\npurposes of illustration, however, we may reduce them, rather\ndrastically, to three main types. There are relations of the\nphysico-chemical type,[53] which we may provisionally follow Spencer in\nregarding as ubiquitous; there are those of the vital type, which are\nrestricted to living organisms; there are those of the cognitive type,\nwhich seem to be much more narrowly restricted. How we deal with these\nis of crucial importance. Denoting them by the letters A, B, C we find\nthat there are progressively ascending modes of relatedness within any\ngiven type. There is evolution within each type. Within the\nphysico-chemical type A, for example, atoms, molecules, and synthetic\ngroups of molecules follow in logical order of evolution. Now the\nsuccessive products, in which this physico-chemical type of relatedness\nobtains, have certain _new and distinctive properties_ which are not\nmerely the algebraic sum of the properties of the component things prior\nto synthesis. We may speak of them as constitutive of the products in a\nhigher stage of relatedness, thus distinguishing constitutive from\nadditive properties.[54] Similarly when B, the vital relations, are\nevolved, the living products, in which these specific relations obtain,\nhave new constitutive properties, on the importance of which vitalists\nare right in insisting, though I emphatically dissent from some of the\nconclusions they draw from their presence. For if, beyond the\nphysico-chemical, a special agency be invoked to account for the\npresence of new constitutive properties, then, in the name of logical\nconsistency, let us invoke special agencies to account for the\nconstitutive properties within the physico-chemical--for radio-active\nproperties for example. If a Source of phenomena be postulated, why not\npostulate One Source of all phenomena from the very meanest to the very\nhighest? There remains the case of C--the synthetic whole in which\ncognitive relatedness obtains. This is unquestionably more difficult of\nscientific interpretation. But I believe that like statements may be\nmade in this case also. What we have, I conceive, is just a new and\nhigher type of relatedness with specific characters of its own. But of\nthis more in the sequel.\n\nIt must be remembered that A, B, C stand for _relationships_ and that\nthe related things are progressively more complex within more complex\nrelational wholes. Relationships are every whit as real as are the terms\nthey hold in their grasp. I do not say more real; but I say emphatically\nas real. And if this be so, then they ought somehow to be introduced\ninto our formulae, instead of being taken for granted. We give H{2}O as\nthe formula for a molecule of water. But that molecule is something very\nmuch more than two atoms of hydrogen + one atom of oxygen. The\nabsolutely distinctive feature of the molecule is the specific\nrelatedness of these atoms. This constitutive mode of relatedness is,\nhowever, just taken for granted. And it is scarcely matter for surprise\nthat, when we find not less specific modes of vital relatedness in the\nliving organism, they are too apt to be just ignored!\n\nRevert now to the empirical outcome of scientific research, for as such\nI regard it, that new constitutive properties emerge when new modes and\ntypes of relatedness occur, and when new products are successively\nformed in evolutional synthesis. This, it will be said, involves the\nacceptance of what is now commonly called creative evolution. I am far\nfrom denying that, in the universe of discourse where Source is under\nconsideration, the adjective is justifiable. But, in the universe of\ndiscourse of science, I regard it as inappropriate. What we have is just\nplain evolution; and we must simply accept the truth--if, as I conceive,\nit be a truth--that in all true evolution there is more in the\nconclusion than is given in the premises; which is only a logical way of\nsaying that there is more in the world to-day than there was in the\nprimitive fire-mist. Not more 'matter and energy', but more varied\nrelationships and new properties, quite unpredictable from what one may\nperhaps speak of as the fire-mist's point of view. This is no new\ndoctrine, though it has received of late a new emphasis. Mill, dealing\nwith causation,[55] speaks of a 'radical and important distinction'.\nThere are, he says in substance, some cases in which the joint effect of\nthe several causes is the algebraical sum of their separate effects. He\nspeaks of this as the 'composition of causes', and illustrates it from\nthe 'composition of forces' in dynamics. 'But in the other description\nof cases', he says, 'the agencies which are brought together cease\nentirely, and a totally different set of phenomena arise.' In these\ncases 'a concurrence of causes takes place which calls into action new\nlaws bearing no analogy to any that we can trace in the separate\noperation of the causes'. They might, he suggests, be termed\n'heteropathic laws'. G. H. Lewes, too,[56] in his _Problems of Life and\nMind_, drew the distinction between properties which are _resultant_ and\nthose which are _emergent_. These suggestions were open to Spencer's\nconsideration long before the last edition of _First Principles_\nappeared. They were, however, too foreign to the established lines of\nhis thought to call for serious consideration.\n\nBut if new relationships and new properties appear in the course of\nevolutionary progress, where is the opportunity for that unification of\nscientific knowledge which, according to Spencer, is the goal of\nphilosophy? To be frank, I am by no means sure that this question can be\nanswered in a manner that is other than tentative. Perhaps we have not\nyet reached the stage at which more than provisional unification is\npossible. Such provisional unification as is suggested by a survey of\nthe facts is that of seemingly uniform correlation in a hierarchy of\nlogical implication. There are certain modes of relatedness which belong\nto the cognitive type. It would seem that whenever these obtain they may\nbe correlated with other modes of relatedness which are of the vital or\nphysiological type; and that these, in turn, may be correlated with\nthose that are physico-chemical. Thus C implies B, and B implies A. The\norder cannot be reversed. Physico-chemical relations, _as a class_, do\nnot imply those that are physiological.[57] The implication is not\nsymmetrical. Spencer was within sight of this when he spoke[58] of the\nabstract-concrete sciences as 'instrumental' with respect to the\nconcrete sciences, though the latter are not 'instrumental' in the same\nsense with respect to the former. But unfortunately he regarded the\n'chasm' between the two groups as 'absolute'. And for him the proper\nhome of properties--of all properties it would appear--is the\nabstract-concrete group--mechanics, physics, and chemistry. This\nseemingly leaves no place for a specific type of properties connected\nwith vital relatedness as such. In fact Spencer's method of treatment\nreduces all modes of relatedness to the A type, the laws of which are,\nfor him, the primary 'causes' of all kinds of differentiation and\nintegration. Hence the laws of biology and psychology can ultimately be\nexpressed and explained, he thinks, in mechanical or mechanistic terms.\nBut in the doctrine of implication they are just the laws of B and C\nrespectively, though laws of A may underlie them in a logical sense. And\nas we ascend the evolutionary plane from A to AB and thence to ABC--from\nthe physico-chemical to the vital and thence to the cognitive--we find\nnew modes of relatedness, new forms of more complex integration and\nsynthesis, new properties successively appearing in serial order. This\nseems to me simply to express, in outline, the net result of\ninterpretation based on empirical observation--though much, very much,\nrequires to be filled in by future research. And the new properties are\nnot merely additive of preceding properties; they are constitutive, and\ncharacterize the higher evolutionary products as such. Why they are thus\nconstitutive, science is unable to say. Spencer, of course, calls in the\nUnknowable to supply the required nexus.[59] Otherwise, in each case, he\nconfesses that 'we can learn nothing more than that here is one of the\nuniformities in the order of phenomena'.[60] None the less we may be\nable some day to establish an ordinal correlation[61] of cognitive\nprocesses with physiological processes, and an ordinal correlation of\nthese physiological processes with those of the physico-chemical type.\nThat I conceive to be the ideal of strictly scientific interpretation if\nit is to be raised progressively to a level approaching that of the\nexact sciences. It certainly is not yet attained. But I see no reason\nwhy we should not regard it as attainable. It will involve the very\ndifficult determination of many correlation coefficients and\nconstants--and for some of these our data are, it must be confessed,\nboth scanty and unreliable.\n\nWe must here note a much-discussed departure on Spencer's part from his\nearlier position. On the first page of the _Biology_ in the earlier\neditions, and in the last, we are told:\n\n  'The properties of substances, though destroyed to sense by\n  combination are not destroyed in reality. It follows from the\n  persistence of force that the properties of a compound are\n  resultants of the properties of its components, resultants in\n  which the properties of the components are severally in full\n  action, though mutually obscured.'\n\nThere is no hint here of Mill's heteropathic laws nor of Lewes's\nemergents. But in the last edition a special chapter is inserted on the\nDynamic Element in Life. We here find a tardy recognition of the\npresence of specific vital characters.\n\n  'The processes which go on in living things are incomprehensible\n  as the results of any physical actions known to us.... In brief,\n  then, we are obliged to confess that Life in its essence cannot be\n  conceived in physico-chemical terms.'[62]\n\nI speak of this as a tardy recognition; but it is one that does honour\nto the man; it is a frank admission that his previous treatment was in\nsome measure inadequate, which a smaller man would not have had the\nhonesty or the strength of character to make. Of course it is traced\ndown to the Unknowable. 'Life as a principle of activity is unknown and\nunknowable; while phenomena are accessible to thought the implied\nnoumenon is inaccessible.'[63] Still, certain specific characteristics\nof living organisms are explicitly recognized as among the accessible\nphenomena; and these cannot be conceived in physico-chemical terms. But\ndid Spencer fully realize how big a hole this knocks in the bottom of\nthe purely mechanical interpretation of nature he had for so long\nchampioned?\n\nThere remains for consideration the place of the cognitive relation in\nSpencer's philosophy of science. We need not here discuss his\ntransfigured realism. Apart from the customary references to the\nUnknowable, of which what is knowable is said to be symbolic, it comes\nto little more than laying special emphasis on the truism that what is\nknown in the so-called objective world involves the process of knowing;\nfrom which it follows that, apart from knowing it the objective world\ncannot be known. From this Spencer draws the conclusion that terms in\ncognitive relatedness have their very nature determined in and through\nthat relatedness, and cannot _in themselves_ be what they are, and as\nthey are, in the field of cognitive symbolism. This may or may not be\ntrue. I am one of those who question the validity of the arguments in\nfavour of this conclusion. Since, however, the philosophy of science\ndeals only with the knowable--of which the so-called appearances with\nwhich we have direct acquaintance are the primary data--we need not here\ntrouble ourselves with the controversy between realists and symbolists.\nEven on Spencer's view the world as symbolized is the real world _for\nscience_.\n\nNow one way of expressing the fact that the cognitive relation is\nalways present where knowledge is concerned is to proclaim 'the truth\nthat our states of consciousness are the only things we can know'.[64]\nBut it is a terribly ambiguous way of expressing the fact. What is here\nmeant by a state of consciousness? So far as cognition is concerned it\nis, or at any rate it involves, a relationship between something known\nand the organism, as knowing--for Spencer assuredly the organism, though\na so-called inner aspect therein. Of course it is a very complex\nrelationship. It comprises relations in what is known, and relations in\nthe organism as knowing. Hence Spencer defines life, psychical as well\nas physical, as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to\nexternal relations'.[65]\n\n  'That which distinguishes Psychology is that each of its\n  propositions takes account both of the connected internal\n  phenomena and of the connected external phenomena to which they\n  refer. It is not only the one, nor only the other, that\n  characterises cognition. It is the connexion between these two\n  connexions.'[66]\n\nSo far well. Cognition is a very complex network of relatedness\ninvolving many terms. What are these terms? For Spencer the internal\nterms are ultimately nervous (=psychic) shocks in highly integrated\naggregates; and the external terms are, proximately at least, things in\nthe environment. But both alike are spoken of as states of\nconsciousness. There is surely an opening for ambiguity here. Sometimes,\ntoo, the words subjective affections are used in place of states of\nconsciousness. 'Thus we are brought to the conclusion that what we are\nconscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and\nresistance, are but subjective affections.'[67] Well, these states of\nconsciousness, these subjective affections, fall into two great\nclasses--the vivid and the faint. The former, which we know as\nsensations, accompany direct and therefore strong excitations of the\nnerve-centres; the latter, which we know as remembered sensations, or\nideas of sensations, accompany indirect and therefore weak excitations\nof the same nerve-centres.[68] And then we are told that the aggregate\nof the faint is what we call the mind, the subject, the _ego_; the\naggregate of the vivid is what we call the external world, the object,\nthe _non-ego_.[69] It would seem, then, that the aggregate of vivid\n_subjective_ affections is the _objective_ world so far as knowable. To\nsay the least of it, this terminology is somewhat perplexing.\n\nNo doubt our knowledge of the external world involves a subtle and\nintricate inter-relation of what is experienced vividly and what is\nexperienced faintly--of what is actually presented and what is ideally\nre-presented. The distinction between them is a valid one. But when\nSpencer equates this distinction with that between the external world\nand the mind, as he does in the passages to which I have referred, the\nvalidity of his procedure is seriously open to question.\n\nIt must be confessed that an adequate analysis of cognitive relatedness\non scientific lines is not to be found in Spencer's works. I am not sure\nthat it is yet to be found in the works of any other philosopher, though\nthere are many signs that the difficult problems it involves are\nreceiving serious attention. This much seems certain, for those who\naccept the spirit, though not perhaps the letter, of Spencer's teaching:\nthat there it is as a constitutive mode of relatedness in the realm of\nnature, and that, if it forms part of the evolutionary scheme, if it is\npresent in the conclusion, so far reached, though it was absent in the\nphysico-chemical premises, if it is to be included in a philosophy of\nscience it must be dealt with by that philosophy on lines strictly\nanalogous to those on which any other relational problem is treated.\nFirmly as we may believe in the reality of Source, we must not call to\nour aid some psychic entity, some entelechy, some _elan vital_, to help\nus out of our difficulties; for one and all of these lie wholly outside\nthe universe of discourse of science; and not one of them affords the\nsmallest help in solving a single scientific problem in a manner that is\nitself scientific.\n\nWe have seen that Spencer believed that the task of psychology is to\ninvestigate the correlation of external and internal relations, and, in\nthat sense, itself to correlate them within a scientific interpretation.\nNow the outcome of the former correlation is some form of behaviour or\nconduct on the part of the organism. No doubt such behaviour affords\ndata to be dealt with in subsequent cognition. But it implies the prior\ncognition which leads up to it; and it is this prior cognition,\nabstracted from the behaviour to which it leads, that we have to\nconsider. It is so terribly complex that it is difficult to deal with it\ncomprehensibly in a brief space. Let me, however, try to do so, at least\nin tentative outline. There occurs, let us say, an external event in the\nphysical world, such as the motion of a billiard-ball across the table;\nand when during its progress this stimulates the retina, there is an\ninternal physico-chemical process which runs its course in retina, optic\nnerves, and the central nervous system. We may regard these two\nprocesses, external and internal, as _so far_, of like physical order.\nWith adequate knowledge the two could, in some measure, be serially\ncorrelated as such. But the physico-chemical processes in the organism\nare not only of this physical type. They are vital or physiological as\nwell. And this makes a real difference. Of course this statement is open\nto question. But I, for one, believe that there are specific relations\npresent in physiological processes, _qua_ vital, other than those of the\nphysico-chemical type--relations which are effective and which require a\ndistinctive name. So far I am a vitalist. At some stage of evolution\nthese new modes of effective relatedness came into being, whereas in the\nfire-mist and for long afterwards they were not in being. None the less\nwhen they did actually come into being, under conditions of which we are\nat present ignorant--though not so ignorant as we were--they were\ndependent upon, and, for our interpretation, they logically imply, the\nphysico-chemical relations which are also present. In any given case\nthey further imply, through heredity-relatedness, the evolutionary\nhistory of the organism in which they obtain. This so-called historical\nelement in biology no doubt involves a characteristic vital\nrelationship. But, I take it, the physico-chemical constitution of any\ninorganic compound, and of any molecule therein, has also its\nhistory--has relationship to past occurrences within its type, which\nhave helped to make it what it is. Still, in the organism the relation\nto past happenings has a quite distinctive form which we deal with in\nterms of heredity. See, then, how we stand so far. The internal\nphysiological process implies a long chain of heredity-relationships\nthrough which the organism is prepared for its occurrence. It also\nimplies a physico-chemical basis, an underlying[70] physico-chemical\nprocess. And this implies as a condition of its occurrence, the external\nevent, the passage of the billiard-ball across the table. In a broad\nsense we may say that the inner process knows the external event which\nis a condition of its occurrence. But we have not yet reached cognition\nof the psychological type.\n\nBefore passing on to indicate, in tentative outline, the nature of this\nhigher mode of relatedness, I pause to note two points. The first is\nthat knowing in that extended sense which I have borrowed,[71] is\nessentially selective in its nature. The physiological process, in the\ncase I have taken, knows only that external event which is directly\nbefore the eyes and which is serially correlated with changes in the\nretinal images through the stimulation of specialized receptors. Of\nother external events it has no such knowledge. Compare this with the\ngravitative knowledge--if a yet wider extension of the meaning of the\nword be permitted--which the earth has of the sun and all the other\nmembers of the solar system--nay more, in degrees perhaps infinitesimal,\nof all other material bodies in the universe. The motion of the earth in\nits orbit implies the whole of this vast field of gravitative\nrelatedness. The existing orbital motion at any moment implies, too, the\npreceding motion which it has, in a sense, inherited from the past.\nAbolish the rest of the universe at this moment and the earth's motion\nwould cease to be orbital. In virtue of its 'inheritance from the past',\nit would continue at uniform velocity in one direction. The continuous\nchange of direction and velocity we observe, is a response which implies\ngravitative knowledge. In a sense, then, the whole solar system is known\nby the earth as it swings in its orbit.\n\nThe second point may be introduced by a question. Granted that we may\nsay, in a very liberal sense, that the earth in its motion has this\ngravitative knowledge--is such knowledge accompanied by awareness? We do\nnot know. But the point I have in mind is this, that the question itself\nis vague. Awareness of what? There must be awareness of something; and a\ndefinite question should be directed towards the nature of that\nsomething. For example: is the earth aware of its own motion? Or is it\naware of the solar system? Or is it aware of the relation of the one to\nthe other? If it be said that the second of these is meant when we ask\nwhether the knowledge is accompanied by awareness, well and good. The\nanswer will serve to define the question. Take now a case of biological\nknowledge. Are the plants in the cottager's window, when they grow\ntowards the light, aware of a process in their own tissues? Or are they\naware of the sunshine? Or are they in some measure aware of the\nconnexion between the one and the other? To all these questions we must\nanswer, I suppose, that we do not know. But it may have been worth while\nto ask them in a definite way.\n\nWe pass, then, to cognition in the usual acceptation of the term--to\nwhat we speak of as knowledge in the proper and narrower sense. My\ncontention is that this is a mode of relatedness which science must\nendeavour to treat on precisely the same lines as it deals with any\nother natural kind of relatedness. At some stage of evolution it came\ninto being, whereas in the fire-mist, and for long afterwards, it was\nnot in being. None the less when it did come into being, it was\ndependent on, and for our interpretation it logically implies,\nunderlying physiological processes, as they in turn imply\nphysico-chemical processes, in each case serially correlated. It is\npre-eminently selective. And just as any physiological process, however\nexternally conditioned, is grounded in[72] the constitution of the\norganism, as such, so too is any cognitive process grounded in the\nconstitution of the organism as one in which this higher type of\nrelatedness has supervened. Again, just as the physiological\nconstitution implies a prolonged racial preparation, describable in\nterms of that mode of relatedness we name heredity, so, too, does any\ncognitive process imply, not only this racial preparation of the\nbiological kind, but also an individual preparation of the psychological\nkind--implies relatedness to what we call, rather loosely, prior\nexperience--which itself implies a concurrent physiological preparation.\n\nNow there can be no doubt that awareness is a characteristic feature of\nthe knowledge of cognition, whether it be present or absent in knowledge\nin the more extended sense. We must just accept this as what appears to\nbe a fact. In science we do not pretend to say why facts are what they\nare and as they are. We take them as they are given, and endeavour to\ntrace their connexions and their implications. Accepting, then,\nawareness as given, we must ask: Awareness of what? It is sometimes said\nthat cognition is aware of itself. I am not sure that I understand what\nthis means. If we are speaking of the cognitive relation, which is an\nawareness relation, the question seems to be whether a relation of\nawareness is related to itself. But of course if a field of cognitive\nrelatedness be regarded as a complex whole, any part may be related to\nthe rest, and the rest to any part. That kind of self-awareness--if we\nmust so call it!--is eminently characteristic of cognition in the higher\nforms of its development. On these terms cognition is aware of\nitself--though the mode of statement savours of ambiguity.\n\nLet us next ask whether there is awareness of the underlying cortical\nprocess. If we are speaking of direct awareness, apparently not. The\ncorrelation between the two is only discoverable through a very\nelaborate and complex[73] application of further cognition in\ninterpretative knowledge. We only know the correlated cortical process\nby description, as Mr. Bertrand Russell would say,[74] and never by\ndirect acquaintance.\n\nParenthetic reference must here, I suppose, be made to psycho-physical\nparallelism. But it shall be very brief. The sooner this cumbrous term\nwith its misleading suggestions is altogether eliminated from the\nvocabulary of science the better. The locus of the so-called parallelism\nis, we are told, the cortex of the brain. But the cortical process is\nonly an incident--no doubt a very important one, but still an\nincident--in a much wider physiological process, the occurrence of\nwhich, in what we may speak of as primary cognition, implies events in\nthe external world. It is of these events that there is direct physical,\nphysiological, and cognitive knowledge. Of course there are also\ninter-cortical relations which underlie the relations of those ideal\ncognita (Spencer's faint class) that supplement the primary cognita\nwhich imply direct stimulation of sensory receptors (Spencer's vivid\nclass). It is questionable whether any form of cognition, properly so\ncalled, is possible in their absence. Now I see no objection to\nlabelling the fact (if it be a fact) that the cognitive process implies\na physiological process in which, as in a larger whole, the cortex\nplays its appropriate part, by the use of some such convenient\ncorrelation-word as psycho-physical; but only so long as this does not\ninvolve a doctrine of parallelism; so long as it merely means that\ncognition implies, let us say, certain underlying cortical changes. Of\ncourse it implies a great deal more than cortical process only; but this\nmay perhaps be taken for granted. My chief objection to the word\n'parallelism' is that it suggests two separate orders of being, and not\ntwo types of relationship within one order of being for scientific\nstudy.[75] We do not speak of parallelism between physiological and\nphysico-chemical processes. We just say that scientific interpretation\nproceeds on the working hypothesis that there is a correlation of such a\nkind that physiological process implies a physico-chemical basis. So\ntoo, I urge, we should be content to say that scientific interpretation\nproceeds on the working hypothesis that there is a correlation of such a\nkind that cognitive process implies a physiological basis.\n\nIt may be said that Spencer accepted the so-called identity hypothesis\nwhich does not lie open to the objection that it suggests two orders of\nbeing. He believed[76] 'that mind and nervous action are the subjective\nand objective faces of the same thing', though 'we remain utterly\nincapable of seeing or even imagining how the two are related'. Well, we\nmay call them in one passage the same thing, we may speak, in another\npassage, of the antithesis between them as never to be transcended, and\nwe may try to save the situation by reference to duality of aspect. But\nthis kind of treatment does not help as much towards a scientific\ninterpretation. It is true that, in yet another passage, speaking of the\ncorrelation of the physical and the psychical, Spencer says:[77] 'We can\nlearn nothing more than that here is one of the uniformities in the\norder of phenomena.' Then why not leave it at that? And if there be a\nconstant and uniform correlation which is 'in a certain indirect way\nquantitive', it would seem that we _do_ see, as far as science ever\nprofesses to see, 'how the two are related.' We see, or conceive, how\nthey are related in much the same way as we do in the case of the\nconnexion between the physiological and the physico-chemical, and in\nnumberless other cases. Both parallelism and identity will have to go by\nthe board in a philosophy of science. They must be replaced by the far\nmore modest hypothesis, which seems to express all that they really mean\nfor science, that cognition always implies certain physiological\nprocesses in the organism.\n\nIf we do speak of mind and nervous action as two faces of the same\nthing, it seems pretty certain that the one face is not directly aware\nof the other. When we speak of awareness in cognition we must therefore,\nit appears, exclude any direct awareness of concurrent physiological\nprocesses. Of what, then, is there awareness? Primarily perhaps of some\noccurrence in the external world. But the difficulty here is that, in\nthe simplest case of human cognition there is awareness of so many\nthings and in such varying degrees. There may be primary awareness of\nevents in the external world (Spencer's vivid series), awareness of the\nrelations involved in these occurrences as such, of the relations of\nthese to ideal re-presentations of like kind (Spencer's faint series),\nof the relations of any or all of these to behaviour as actually taking\nplace or as ideally re-presented; and all in different degrees within a\nrelational meshwork of bewildering complexity, which we have not, as\nyet, adequately unravelled. The essential point to bear in mind is that\nthe cognitive relation always involves relatedness of _many terms_, and\nthat its discussion involves the analysis of what, in the higher phases\nof its existence, is probably the most complex natural occurrence in\nthis complex world.\n\nI cannot here follow up further the difficult problem of\ncognition[78]--save to add one or two supplementary remarks. First: it\nis, I suppose, fairly obvious that any given field of cognitive\nrelatedness comprises _all_ that is then and there selectively cognized.\nJust as, in the very extended sense of the word 'knowledge', the earth\nknows, in gravitative fashion, the whole solar system, as does also any\none of the planets, so, in the restricted sense, is knowledge\nco-extensive with all that is, selectively, in cognitive relationship\nwith the organism or that part of the organism which is the locus of\nawareness. I speak here of the locus of awareness in just the same sense\nas I might speak of the earth as a locus of gravitative knowledge of the\nsolar system. The locus of awareness is just a specialized portion of\nthe whole relational web. In other words, the relatedness is of the\npart-whole kind, where whole means rest of the whole other than the\nspecific part. In any such integrated system the part implies the\nwhole--which, by the way, is quite a different matter from saying that\nthe part includes the whole, or, as I understand the words, is\nequivalent to the whole. But, whereas gravitative knowledge is\nreciprocal--the sun knowing the earth in the same fashion as the earth\nknows the sun--cognitive knowledge is not reciprocal. My cognitive\nawareness of a spinning-top does not imply that the spinning-top is in\nlike manner aware of me. The part knows the whole in a way that the\nwhole does not know the part. The relationship of the part to the rest\nof the whole is not reciprocal or symmetrical. This we must just accept\nas a given feature of cognitive relatedness.[79]\n\nAnother very important point is that cognitive relatedness is\neffective. By this I mean that just as, when the earth is in gravitative\nrelation to the sun and the other planets (the constitution of nature\nbeing what it is), changes take place because the parts of the system as\na whole are in this field of effective relatedness; so too, when the\norganism is in cognitive relation to its environment, changes in this\nsystem also take place just because a part of the whole system is in\ncognitive relatedness to the rest of the system. That means that the\ncognitive relation really counts--that it is not merely an epiphenomenal\naccompaniment of changes which would be precisely the same if it were\nabsent. The 'sum of energy' presumably remains constant. There is no\nnecessary interference with physical principles. But we know of so many\ncases in which the direction of change may be changed without any\nalteration of the 'amount of energy', as the phrase goes, that I see no\nreason, based on physical science,[80] for denying this kind of\neffectiveness, within a field of cognitive relatedness, if the facts\nseem indubitably to point to its existence. To assert that the presence\nor absence of cognitive relatedness makes absolutely no difference\nappears to me, I confess, little short of preposterous; to urge that it\nmay be brought under the rubric of physico-chemical relatedness surely\ninvolves the ignoring of differentiating features, which science should\nnot ignore. But, on the other hand, to invoke an immaterial psychic\nentity[81]--unless this merely names the relatedness itself[82] as\ngravitation names the gravitative relatedness--appears to me quite\nunwarranted in the scientific universe of discourse.[83]\n\nI must, however, draw to a conclusion. I cannot but think that Spencer\nfailed to bring cognition and the conscious awareness it involves into\nreally close touch with the rest of his philosophy of science. No such\ndouble-aspect theory as he accepted affords a satisfactory avenue of\nscientific approach. But where Spencer failed, who has come within\nmeasurable sight of success? We are only just beginning to see our way\nto stating the problem in such a form as to bring it within the purview\nof science. What we must insist on, as followers, at a distance, of\nHerbert Spencer, is the treatment of this type of relatedness on lines\nsimilar to our treatment of other types of relatedness within one order\nof nature.\n\nSurveying his work as a whole, we may confidently assert that Spencer\nbrought to a conclusion a great task, and was himself great in its\nexecution. The present generation can, perhaps, hardly realize how\npotent his influence was on the thought of the latter half of the last\ncentury. Many of his conclusions ran counter to those which were, in his\nday, widely accepted. If only they seemed to him to be true, however, he\nheld to them with a tenacity which his opponents branded as obstinacy.\nBut as he himself said:\n\n  'It is not for nothing that a man has in him sympathies with some\n  principles and repugnance to others. He, with all his capacities,\n  and aspirations, and beliefs, is not an accident but a product of\n  his time. While he is a descendant of the past he is a parent of\n  the future; and his thoughts are as children born to him, which he\n  may not carelessly let die. Not as adventitious therefore will the\n  wise man regard the faith that is in him. The highest truth he\n  sees he will fearlessly utter; knowing that, let what may come of\n  it, he is thus playing his right part in the world.'[84]\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\n[1] _Fragments of Science_, vol. ii, p. 132.\n\n[2] _Essays_, vol. i (American reprint), p. 3.\n\n[3] _Op. cit._, p. 32.\n\n[4] _Op. cit._, p. 58.\n\n[5] Cf. W. K. Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_, vol. i, p. 95.\n\n[6] _More Letters_, vol. ii, p. 235.\n\n[7] _Memories and Studies_, p. 139.\n\n[8] _Ibid._, p. 140.\n\n[9] _Autobiography_, vol. i, p. 212.\n\n[10] James, _op. cit._, p. 124.\n\n[11] _Autobiography_, vol. i, p. 211.\n\n[12] _First Principles_, Sixth (Popular) Edition, p. 446 (hereafter F.\nP.).\n\n[13] _Principles of Psychology_, Third Edition, vol. i, p. 508\n(hereafter Ps.).\n\n[14] Ps., vol. i, p. 627.\n\n[15] _Ibid._, p. 158.\n\n[16] F. P., p. 155.\n\n[17] Ps., vol. ii, p. 484.\n\n[18] There is '_intrinsic_ force by which a body manifests itself as\noccupying space, and that _extrinsic_ force distinguished as energy'. F.\nP., p. 150.\n\n[19] 'Divest the conceived unit of matter of the objective correlate to\nour subjective sense of effort and the entire fabric of physical\nconceptions disappears.' F. P., p. 151 note. Cf. Ps., vol. ii, pp. 237,\n239.\n\n[20] F. P., p. 171.\n\n[21] e.g. 'Social changes take directions that are due to the joint\nactions of citizens determined as are those of all other changes wrought\nby the composition of forces.' 'The flow of capital into business\nyielding the largest returns, the buying in the cheapest market and\nselling in the dearest, the introduction of more economical modes of\nmanufacture, the development of better agencies for distribution,\nexhibit movements taking place in directions where they are met by the\nsmallest totals of opposing forces.' F. P., pp. 193-6.\n\n[22] _Creative Evolution_, English translation, p. 53.\n\n[23] _Op. cit._, pp. 385, 6.\n\n[24] According to Dr. Carr's interpretation of M. Bergson, 'The whole\nworld, as it is presented to us and thought of by us, is an illusion.\nOur science is not unreal, but it is a transformed reality. The\nillusions may be useful, may, indeed, be necessary and indispensable,\nbut nevertheless it is illusion.' _Problem of Truth_, p. 66.\n\n[25] _Creative Evolution_, p. 389.\n\n[26] 'But, when I posit the facts with the shape they have for me\nto-day, I suppose my faculties of perception and intellection such as\nthey are in me to-day; for it is they that portion the real into lots,\nthey that cut the facts out of the whole of reality.' C. E., p. 389.\n\n[27] _Creative Evolution_, p. 389.\n\n[28] _Op. cit._, p. 387.\n\n[29] _Introduction to Metaphysics_, English translation, p. 8 and\n_passim_.\n\n[30] e.g. 'Organisation can only be studied scientifically if the\norganised body has first been likened to a machine.' C. E., p. 98.\nScience is, I think, generally used by M. Bergson for _intellectual_\nknowledge in contradistinction to intuitional knowledge.\n\n[31] F. P., p. 184.\n\n[32] _Essays_, vol. iii, p. 14.\n\n[33] _Essays_, vol. iii, p. 366.\n\n[34] F. P., p. 156.\n\n[35] 'There remained to assign a reason for that increasingly-distinct\ndemarkation of parts, &c.... This reason we discovered to be the\nsegregation, &c.... This cause of the definiteness of local\nintegrations, &c.' F. P., p. 440.\n\n[36] F. P., p. 43.\n\n[37] _Essays_, vol. iii, p. 47.\n\n[38] F. P., p. 176.\n\n[39] F. P., p. 154.\n\n[40] _Proceedings Aristotelian Society_, 1912-13, p. 1.\n\n[41] _Popular Scientific Lectures_, English translation, p. 254.\n\n[42] _Lectures and Essays_, vol. i, p. 111.\n\n[43] 'But when we ask what this energy is, there is no answer save that\nit is the noumenal cause implied by the phenomenal effect.' F. P., p.\n154. It is towards this and like statements that my criticism is\ndirected. There can be no objection to the treatment, by physicists, of\nenergy as an entity in the sense given below in note 82. Those phenomena\nto which 1/2 _mv_^{2} has reference are fundamental realities for\nphysical science.\n\n[44] In a statement of the law of gravitation we may substitute the\nwords 'in a degree' for 'with a force'; we may speak of 'the measure of\nattraction' instead of 'the force of attraction'.\n\n[45] _System of Logic_, Bk. III, ch. v, Sec. 3, Eighth Edition, vol. i,\np. 383.\n\n[46] _Ibid._, Sec. 3 and Sec. 5, pp. 379 and 389.\n\n[47] Ps., vol. ii, p. 93; cf. p. 97. One has now, however, to add the\nrealm of subsistence.\n\n[48] As a more technical example the following may be given:--The\ndifference in properties of isomers is caused by difference of internal\nmolecular structure notwithstanding identity of chemical composition.\n\n[49] If we take spark as cause and explosion as effect there is\nobviously no proportionality between the cause and its effect. Thus M.\nBergson speaks of the spark as 'a cause that acts by releasing'; and he\nadds that 'neither quality nor quantity of effect varies with quality or\nquantity of the cause: the effect is invariable'. _Creative Evolution_,\np. 77. Compare what Spencer introduced into the Sixth edition of F. P.\n(pp. 172-3), concerning 'trigger action which does not produce the power\nbut liberates it'. According to the treatment in the text there can be\nno 'proportionality' unless both ground and conditions are taken into\naccount.\n\n[50] Spencer says (F. P., pp. 169-70) that 'the transformation of the\nunorganised contents of an egg into the organised chick is a question of\nheat' ['altogether a question of heat', in the Third Edition], and tells\nus that 'the germination of plants presents like relations of cause and\neffect as every season shows'. But he also says that 'the proclivities\nof the molecules determine the typical structure assumed'. Obviously\nhere the 'heat supplied' falls under (3) of the text, and 'the\nproclivities of the molecules' is his notion of what should fall under\n(2).\n\n[51] See Index to F. P., _sub verbo_ 'integration'.\n\n[52] e. g. 'Diminish the velocities of the planets and their orbits will\nlessen--the solar system will contract, or become more integrated.'\n_Essays_, vol. iii, p. 28. Mere condensation is often spoken of as\nintegration. But then the term is used with bewildering laxity. Cf.\nJames, _Memories and Studies_, p. 134.\n\n[53] I retain in this connexion the current term physico-chemical. It\nseems that the basal type of relatedness here is electrical. It may be\nsaid that when we come down to the atom the _things in_ relation are\nelectrical, are electrons, are positive and negative charges. So be it.\nBut is it not the _electrical relatedness_ that is constitutive of the\natom as such?\n\n[54] 'A large number of physical properties', says Nernst, 'have been\nshown to be clearly additive; that is, the value of the property in\nquestion can be calculated as though the compound were such a mixture of\nits elements that they experience no change in their properties.' But\nother properties are not additive. 'The kind of influence of the atom in\na compound is primarily dependent on the mode of its union, that is,\nupon the constitution and configuration of the compound. Such\nnon-additive properties may be called constitutive.' Quoted by E. G.\nSpaulding in _The New Realism_, p. 238.\n\n[55] _System of Logic_, vol. i, Bk. III, ch. vi.\n\n[56] _Problems of Life and Mind_, Series II, p. 212.\n\n[57] Of course if a particular physico-chemical change (_a_) is\ncorrelated with a particular physiological or vital change (_b_), then\n(_b_) implies (_a_) as (_a_) implies (_b_). The statement in the text\nrefers to the implications of classes of change. There may be\nphysico-chemical relatedness without any correlated vital relatedness;\nbut there does not appear to be any vital relatedness which is not\ncorrelated with physico-chemical relatedness.\n\n[58] _Essays_, vol. iii, pp. 31, 55.\n\n[59] Ps., vol. ii, p. 484.\n\n[60] F. P., p. 178.\n\n[61] An ordinal correlation is one that couples every term of a series\n(_a_) with a specific term of another series (_b_) and _vice versa_ in\nthe same order in each. Cf. Spaulding in _The New Realism_, p. 175. I\nshall sometimes speak of such correlation as serial.\n\n[62] _Principles of Biology_, Edition of 1898, pp. 117, 120.\n\n[63] _Op. cit._, p. 122.\n\n[64] Ps., vol. i, p. 208.\n\n[65] F. P., p. 61. Cf. Ps., vol. i, p. 134.\n\n[66] Ps., vol. i, p. 132. James well says 'Spencer broke new ground here\nin insisting that, since mind and its environment have evolved together,\nthey must be studied together. He gave to the study of mind in isolation\na definite quietus, and that certainly is a great thing to have\nachieved'. _Memories and Studies_, p. 140.\n\n[67] Ps., vol. i, p. 206.\n\n[68] Ps., vol. i, p. 124.\n\n[69] F. P., p. 120. Ps., vol. ii, p. 472. Cf. Ps., vol. i, p. 98.\n\n[70] The word underlying is used in the sense of occupying a lower\nposition in the logical hierarchy above indicated. If any one likes to\nspeak of the physico-chemical and the vital as two aspects of one\nprocess, he is free to do so. And if he likes to say that the vital is\ncaused by the physico-chemical, let him do so; but he must define the\nexact sense in which he uses the ambiguous word cause. The word inner in\nthe text means within the organism.\n\n[71] See S. Alexander, 'On Relations: and in particular the Cognitive\nRelation.' _Mind._, vol. xxi, N. S., No. 83, p. 318.\n\n[72] I have avoided the use of the word determine. It would be well to\ndistinguish between that which is _determined_ from without, that is,\nconditioned, and that which is _determinate_, that is, grounded in the\nconstitution. I am here, I think, in line with Bosanquet. (See\n_Principle of Individuality and Value_, e. g. pp. 341, 352.) I have also\navoided all reference to teleology. Without committing myself to the\nacceptance of all that Mr. Bosanquet says in the fourth lecture of the\nseries to which reference has just been made, his treatment, there,\nappears to be on right lines. There is no opposition in teleology, so\ntreated, to what is determinate. Indeed, such teleology is the\nexpression of the logical structure of the world, or, as Spencer would\nsay, the universality of law. For just as higher types of relatedness\nimply a substratum of physico-chemical processes, so do all events imply\nthe underlying logic of events. Cf. W. T. Marvin, _A First Book of\nMetaphysics_, ch. xiii, 'On the logical strata of reality.'\n\n[73] Cf. Ps., vol. i, pp. 99 and 140.\n\n[74] _Problems of Philosophy_, ch. v; cf. _Proc. Aristotelian Soc._,\n1910-11, p. 108.\n\n[75] It should be distinctly understood that I here speak of one order\nof being in reference to the phenomena dealt with by science, including\nthe cognitive phenomena discussed in the text. Whether we should speak\nof the Source of phenomena as constituting a separate order of being is\na question I cannot discuss in a note. Does the logic of events imply a\nLogos? That is the question in brief. But, since the implication in\nquestion is not of the scientific kind, I may leave it on one side in\nconsidering a philosophy of science.\n\n[76] Ps., vol. i, p. 140.\n\n[77] F. P., p. 178.\n\n[78] I have confined my attention to the cognitive type of relatedness.\nOther higher modes supervene when the course of evolution is traced\nfurther upwards. Indeed, cognition is only part of the underlying basis\nimplied by the richer forms of distinctively human relational life.\nSpencer has much to say of them in his _Sociology_ and his _Ethics_,\nthough he fails to realize that the phenomena he is dealing with involve\nessentially new constitutive features in man and in society. Can music\nor any form of art be discussed in terms of cognition only? I merely add\nthis note to show that I am not unaware of the patent fact that when we\nhave reached the cognitive type of relatedness, we are nowhere near the\ntop of the evolutional tree.\n\n[79] The part which is the centre of awareness, may be spoken of as\nexperienc_ing_, in contradistinction to what is experienc_ed_. It is\nclear that such experiencing is always correlative to what is\nexperienced actually or ideally (Spencer's vividly or faintly). The\ncentre of awareness is either the cortex, or some specific part of the\ncortex, or (more generally) the organism as owning the cortex, in each\ncase in accordance with the universe of discourse.\n\n[80] Few physicists would, I think, be prepared to deny that, within a\nfield of effective relatedness, there may be, and very often is,\nguidance without work done or any change in the 'amount of energy'. What\nphysicists are concerned to insist on is their cardinal principle that\nevery physical change involves physical terms in physical relatedness.\nThis can be fully and freely accepted in accordance with the doctrine of\nimplication sketched in the text. It is when Life or Consciousness is\ninvoked to play the part of a non-physical term, or thing, which acts\nand reacts as if it were a physical term or thing, that physicists enter\nan emphatic protest. Cognitive relatedness among physical things may\nwell be effective in guidance. To claim its presence must not, however,\nbe regarded as in any sense equivalent to a denial of underlying\nphysico-chemical relatedness.\n\n[81] Until those who seek to furnish evidence of the existence of\ndiscarnate spirits can make some plausible suggestions as to the nature\nof a comprehensible scheme of correlation which shall serve to link the\ndiscarnate with the incarnate, one is forced to enter their results in a\nsuspense account. It is of little use to proclaim the existence of\n'facts scorned by orthodox science'. The so-called facts must be\nincorporated within a consistent scheme, before they can claim a place\nin the fabric of scientific truth.\n\n[82] As the word entity is now often used, for example by Mr. G. E.\nMoore, cognitive relatedness may be termed an entity. 'When I speak of\nan entity I shall mean to imply absolutely nothing more with regard to\nthat which I so call, than that it _is_ or _was_--that it is or was\ncontained in the Universe; and of anything whatever which _is_ or _was_,\nI shall take the liberty to say that it is an entity.' G. E. Moore,\n_Proc. Aristotelian Soc._, 1909-10, p. 36.\n\n[83] I have no space to discuss the physiological differentiation which\nis implied by the effectiveness of the cognitive relation. It involves,\nI believe, the differentiation of a superior cortical system from an\ninferior system of nervous arcs. I have dealt with it in some detail\nelsewhere. See _Instinct and Experience_.\n\n[84] F. P., pp. 91-2.\n\n\n  OXFORD: HORACE HART M.A.\n  PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n<pre id=\"pg-footer\">","title":"Spencer's Philosophy of Science: The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered at the Museum 7 November, 1913","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":16032}