{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_37552/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_37552","id":"gutenberg_37552","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37552","summary":null,"tags":["Category: American Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Dewey, John, 1859-1952","James, William, 1842-1910","Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914","Pragmatism"],"text":"</pre>\n\n\n\nProduced by Adrian Mastronardi, Barbara Tozier and the\nOnline Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net\n(This file was produced from images generously made\navailable by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH AS DEVELOPED BY PEIRCE, JAMES, AND DEWEY\n\n\nBY\n\n\nDENTON LORING GEYER\n\nB.A. University of Wisconsin, 1910\n\nM.A. University of Wisconsin, 1911\n\n\nTHESIS\n\nSubmitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of\n\nDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY\n\nIN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS\n\n1914\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  INTRODUCTION\n  CHAPTER I.\n    THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY PEIRCE\n  CHAPTER II.\n    THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO PRAGMATISM BY JAMES\n      JAMES' EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE\n      THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE THROUGH THE\n          EARLIER WRITINGS OF JAMES\n      THE THEORY OF TRUTH IN 'PRAGMATISM' AND 'THE MEANING OF TRUTH'\n        _The Ambiguity of 'Satisfaction'_\n        _The Relation of Truth to Utility_\n        _The Relation of Satisfaction to Agreement and Consistency_\n  CHAPTER III.\n    THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH BY DEWEY\n      \"THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\"\n      CONTRAST BETWEEN JAMES AND DEWEY\n  CHAPTER IV.\n    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION\n    BIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH AS DEVELOPED BY PEIRCE, JAMES, AND\nDEWEY.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY.\n\n\nThis thesis attempts to trace the growth of the pragmatic doctrine of\ntruth through the works of its three most famous advocates in America.\n\nAn examination of Peirce's initial statement of pragmatism is followed\nby a discussion of his objections to the meaning put upon his doctrine\nby his would-be disciples, and his resort, in order to save himself\nfrom these 'perversions', to a renaming of his theory. Some evident\ncontradictions in his different principles are pointed out.\n\nThe changing position of William James is then followed through\nmagazine articles and books appearing successively during a period of\nabout thirty years. One finds here a gradually but continually\nwidening divergence from the rationalistic theories, which culminates\nfinally in the much-quoted extreme statements of the book\n'Pragmatism'. The few subsequently published references to truth seem\nto consist largely of defenses or retractions of the tenets there set\nforth. As has been so often said, William James was too sympathetic\ntoward the doctrines of other men to maintain a consistent doctrine of\nhis own. His best work, like that of the higher literary type to which\nhe approached, was to transcribe and interpret the feelings of other\nmen. His genius lay in the clearness with which he could translate\nthese ideas and the lucid fashion in which he could cut to the heart\nof ambiguities in them. With the highest and most sincere admiration\nfor the spirit of James' labors in philosophy and psychology, the\nwriter is unable to find there permanent contributions to the solution\nof the particular problem which we have before us here, the problem of\ntruth. In his splendid protest against all static theories, he seems\nto have accepted pragmatism for what it was not rather than for what\nit was. It was not a cut-and-dried system leaving no room for\nindividuality, and that this was one of his strongest reasons for\naccepting it is shown by his asking again and again: \"If this\n(pragmatism) is not truth, what is?\" He was attempting to find a\ntheory--almost any theory, one thinks sometimes--which would serve as\nan alternative to the older doctrines so incompatible with his\ntemperament.\n\nIt is interesting to note that the frequent protests made by Peirce\nagainst the turn given his ideas by his followers are always directed\nagainst the work of James and Schiller, and never, so far as I have\nbeen able to ascertain, against that of Dewey. It therefore seems\nworth while to undertake a direct comparison between the views of\nPeirce and Dewey. This comparison, then, occupies the latter part of\nthe thesis, with the result, it may be said at once, that Dewey's work\nis found to be very closely related to the original formulation of\npragmatism as made by Peirce.\n\nThe excellent historical sketches of pragmatism which have appeared\nduring the last five years[1] have been somewhat broader in scope than\nthe present treatise, for they have usually described the development\nof all the pragmatic doctrines in the mass while the emphasis here is\nplaced on the intensive treatment of a single doctrine, and this\ndoctrine is followed, moreover, through a limited number of its\nexpounders. Further, almost all such sketches are taken up for the\nmost part in showing how pragmatism grew out of the older doctrines or\nin contrasting it with various alternative theories while the thing\nattempted here is, again, a careful comparison of the views of three\nthinkers within the School itself--with of course the writer's own\nreaction to these views. It has thus seemed best to undertake no\n(necessarily fragmentary) treatment of truth as 'intuition' or\n'coherence' or 'correspondence' or the rest.\n\n    [1] See for example an article by Alfred Lloyd on\n        \"Conformity, Consistency, and Truth\" in the Journal of\n        Philosophy for May 22, 1913; also Boodin's Truth and\n        Reality, Caldwell's Pragmatism and Idealism, De Laguna's\n        Dogmatism and Evolution, Murray's Pragmatism, Moore's\n        Pragmatism and Its Critics, and others.\n\nGeneral criticism of the pragmatic theory of truth, as is evident to\nanyone who has followed the controversy, has been principally directed\nagainst the more 'radical' statements of James and Schiller. Whether\nthis is merely because these champions of the theory are more extreme,\nor whether they are really more prone to errors in their reasoning, we\nneed not determine here. But it is worth pointing out that, on the\nother hand, if Peirce and Dewey were to be taken as the truer\nrepresentatives of pragmatism a large part of the flood of recent\ncriticism would be irrelevant. This is by no means to say that the\nwork of Peirce and Dewey is above criticism; it is merely to call\nattention to the fact that most of the criticism of pragmatism is\ndirected against principles which these two men do not happen to hold.\nAn understanding of the doctrine in its more conservative terms,\nhowever, is certainly on the increase, and we are seldom nowadays\nburdened with refutations of such alleged pragmatism as that anything\nis true which it is pleasant to believe or that any theory of\nprocedure is true which happens to turn out well.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY PEIRCE.\n\n\nPragmatism has been described as an attitude of mind, as a method of\ninvestigation, and as a theory of truth. The attitude is that of\nlooking forward to outcomes rather than back to origins. The method is\nthe use of actual or possible outcomes of our ideas to determine these\nideas' real meaning. The theory of truth defines the truth of our\nbeliefs in terms of the outcome of these beliefs.\n\nPragmatism as a principle of method, like the Mendelian laws of\nheredity, lay for decades in oblivion. It was brought to light and to\nthe world's notice in 1898 by William James, who by his wonderful\nliterary style immediately gave it the widest currency. The doctrine\nwas originally proposed in 1878 by C. S. Peirce in a paper for the\nPopular Science Monthly entitled \"How To Make Our Ideas Clear.\" This\narticle was the second of six on the general topic. \"Illustrations of\nthe Logic of Science.\" The other articles of the series were\nrespectively called \"The Fixation of Belief,\" \"The Doctrine of\nChances,\" \"The Probability of Induction,\" \"The Order of Nature,\" and\n\"Induction, Deduction, and Hypothesis.\"\n\nIn the famous discussion of How To Make Our Ideas Clear, Peirce\npointed out that by a _clear_ idea is meant, according to the\nlogicians, one which will be recognized wherever it is met with, so\nthat no other will be mistaken for it. But since to do this without\nexception is impossible to human beings, and since to have such\nacquaintance with the idea as to have lost all hesitancy in\nrecognizing it _in ordinary cases_ amounts only to a subjective\nfeeling of mastery which may be entirely mistaken, they supplement the\nidea of 'clearness' with that of 'distinctness'. A distinct idea is\ndefined as one that contains nothing which is not clear. By the\n_contents_ of an idea logicians understand whatever is contained in\nits definition, so that an idea is _distinctly_ apprehended, according\nto them, when we can give a precise definition of it, in abstract\nterms. Here the professional logicians leave the subject, but it is\neasy to show that the doctrine that familiar use and abstract\ndistinctness make the perfection of apprehension, \"has its only true\nplace in philosophies which have long been extinct\", and it is now\ntime to formulate a method of attaining \"a more perfect clearness of\nthought such as we see and admire in the thinkers of our own time\".\n\nThe action of thought is excited by the irritation of a doubt, and\nceases when belief is attained; so that the production of belief is\nthe sole function of thought. As thought appeases the irritation of a\ndoubt, which is the motive for thinking, it relaxes and comes to rest\nfor a moment when belief is reached. But belief is a rule for action,\nand its application requires further thought and further doubt, so\nthat at the same time that it is a stopping place it is also a new\nstarting place for thought. The final upshot of thinking is the\nexercise of volition.\n\n\"The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different\nbeliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which\nthey give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they\nappease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no\nmore differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them\ndifferent beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is\nplaying a different tune.\"\n\nImaginary distinctions are made very frequently, it is true, between\nbeliefs which differ only in their mode of expression. Such false\ndistinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really\ndifferent. \"One singular deception of this sort, which often occurs,\nis to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought\nfor a character of the object we are thinking. Instead of perceiving\nthat the obscurity is purely subjective, we fancy that we contemplate\na quality of the object which is essentially mysterious; and if our\nconception be afterwards presented to us in a clear form we do not\nrecognize it as the same, owing to the absence of the feeling of\nunintelligibility.... Another such deception is to mistake a mere\ndifference in the grammatical construction of two words for a\ndistinction between the ideas they express.... From all these sophisms\nwe shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the whole\nfunction of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever\nis connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an\naccretion to it, but no part of it\".\n\n\"To develop a meaning we have, therefore, simply to determine what\nhabits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it\ninvolves. Now the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us\nto act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise,\nbut under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable....\nThus we come down to what is tangible and practical as the root of\nevery real distinction of thought, no matter how _subtle_ it may be;\nand there is no distinction so fine as to consist in anything but a\npossible difference in practice\".\n\nAs an example, consider the doctrine of transubstantiation. Are the\nelements of the sacrament flesh and blood 'only in a tropical sense'\nor are they literally just that? Now \"we have no conception of wine\nexcept what may enter into a belief either, (1) that this, that, or\nthe other is wine, or (2) that wine possesses certain properties. Such\nbeliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon\noccasion, act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine\naccording to the qualities which we believe wine to possess. The\noccasion of such action would be some sensible perception, the motive\nof it to produce some sensible result. Thus our action has exclusive\nreference to what affects our senses, our habit has the same bearing\nas our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the\nsame as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but\nwhat has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon the senses; and to\ntalk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet\nbeing in reality blood, is senseless jargon.... Our idea of anything\n_is_ our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have\nany other, we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation\naccompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself\".\n\n\"It appears, then, that the rule for attaining ... clearness of\napprehension is as follows: _Consider what effects, which might\nconceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our\nconception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole\nof our conception of the object\"._ (Italics mine).\n\nAn application of this method to a conception which particularly\nconcerns logic occupies the last section of the article,--a use of the\nmethod to make clear our conception of \"reality\". Considering\nclearness in the sense of familiarity, no idea could be clearer than\nthis, for everyone uses it with perfect confidence. Clearness in the\nsense of definition is only slightly more difficult,--\"we may define\nthe real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may\nthink them to be\". But however satisfactory this is as a definition,\nit does not by any means make our idea of reality perfectly clear.\n\"Here, then, let us apply our rules. According to them, reality, like\nevery other quality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects which\nthings partaking of it produce. The only effect which real things have\nis to cause belief, for all the sensations which they excite emerge\ninto consciousness in the form of beliefs. The question therefore is,\nhow is true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false\nbelief (belief in fiction)\". Briefly this may be answered by saying\nthat the true belief is the one which will be arrived at after a\ncomplete examination of all the evidence. \"That opinion which is fated\nto be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by\nthe truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.\"\n(Note: \"Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can\nnohow be avoided\".) The real thus depends indeed upon what is\nultimately thought about it, but not upon what any particular person\nthinks about it. This is clearly brought out in contrast to\nnon-scientific investigation, where personal equation counts for a\ngreat deal more. \"It is hard to convince a follower of the _a priori_\nmethod by adducing facts; but show him that an opinion that he is\ndefending is inconsistent with what he has laid down elsewhere, and he\nwill be very apt to retract it. These minds do not seem to believe\nthat disputation is ever to cease; they seem to think that the opinion\nwhich is natural for one man is not so for another, and that belief\nwill, consequently, never be settled. In contenting themselves with\nfixing their own opinions by a method which would lead another man to\na different result, they betray their feeble hold upon the conception\nof what truth is. On the other hand, all the followers of science are\nfully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed\nfar enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which\nthey can be applied. One man may investigate the velocity of light by\nstudying the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars;\nanother by the opposition of Mars and eclipses of Jupiter's\nsatellites; a third by the method of Fizian.... They may at first\nobtain different results, but as each perfects his method and his\nprocesses, the results will move steadily together toward a destined\ncenter. So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out\nwith the most antagonistic views, but the process of investigation\ncarries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same\nconclusion\". This conclusion, to be sure, may be long postponed, and\nmight indeed be preceded by a false belief which should be accepted\nuniversally. But \"the opinion which would finally result from\ninvestigation does not depend on how anybody may actually think....\nThe reality of that which is real does depend on the real fact that\nthe investigation is destined to lead, at last, if continued long\nenough, to a belief in it\".\n\nIt will be seen that this article does not intend to put forward any\nnew theory of truth. It is simply an attempt at expounding a new\ntheory of clearness. Peirce desires to describe a new way of clearing\nup metaphysical disputes, the method, namely, of finding the meaning\nof each question by reducing it to its experimental consequences.\n\nFor Peirce a doctrine could be perfectly clear and yet false. This\nwould be the case where one had a vivid idea of all the outcomes in\nexperience involved by the idea, but yet was unable to prophesy any\noutcome that should be verified by future fact. Our idea of the object\nwould not in that case 'correspond to the reality' in the sense of\ngiving us a belief which could be 'verified by all investigators'.\n\nPeirce, then, instead of having a radical and startling theory of\ntruth to propose, would consider himself an ultra-conservative on the\nquestion of what shall be called truth. Approaching the matter from\nthe standpoint of a scientist, (for he says in another connection that\nhe had at this time spent most of his life in a laboratory), he is\nconcerned only with an attempt to apply \"the fruitful methods of\nscience\" to \"the barren field of metaphysics\". For metaphysics seems\nto him very much in need of outside help. His different conception of\nthe two disciplines may be seen from the following passage. In\ncontrast to philosophy, he is eulogizing the natural sciences, \"where\ninvestigators, instead of condemning each the work of the others as\nmisdirected from beginning to end, co-operate, stand upon one\nanother's shoulders, and multiply incontestable results; where every\nobservation is repeated, and isolated observations count for little;\nwhere every hypothesis that merits attention is subjected to severe\nbut fair examination, and only after the predictions to which it leads\nhave been remarkably borne out by experience is trusted at all, and\nthen only provisionally; where a radically false step is rarely taken,\neven the most faulty of those theories which gain credence being true\nin their main experiential predictions\".\n\nIt is in a desire to elevate metaphysics to somewhere near this level\nthat Peirce proposes his new theory of clearness, believing that much\nof the useless disputation of philosophy, as he sees it, will end when\nwe know exactly what we are talking about according to this test.\n\nOn the question of truth he might indeed have referred to another of\nhis early articles, where the same idea of the independence of truth\nfrom individual opinion is brought out. The much-quoted paper on \"How\nTo Make Our Ideas Clear\" was, as we have noted, the second of a series\ncalled \"Illustrations of the Logic of Science\". In order to get his\ndoctrine of truth more adequately before us, we may turn for a moment\nto the first article of the series, the paper called \"The Fixation of\nBelief\".\n\nHere Peirce begins by pointing out four methods for fixing belief. In\nthe first, or 'method of tenacity', one simply picks out the belief\nwhich for some reason he _desires_, and holds to it by closing his\neyes to all evidence pointing the other way. The second, or the\n'method of authority', is the same except that the individual is\nreplaced by the state. The third, or 'a priori method', makes a thing\ntrue when it is 'agreeable to reason'. But this sort of truth varies\nbetween persons, for what is agreeable to reason is more or less a\nmatter of taste.\n\nIn contrast with these, and especially with the _a priori_ method, a\nmethod must be discovered which will determine truth entirely apart\nfrom individual opinion. This is the method of science. That is, \"To\nsatisfy our doubt ... it is necessary that a method should be found by\nwhich our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external\npermanency--by something upon which our thinking has no effect.... It\nmust be something which affects, or might affect, every man. And,\nthough these affections are necessarily as various as are individual\nconditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion\nof every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. Its\nfundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this:\nThere are real things whose characters are entirely independent of our\nopinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to\nregular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our\nrelations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of\nperception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and\nany man, if he have sufficient experience, and reason enough about it,\nwill be led to one true conclusion. The new conception here involved\nis that of reality. It may be asked how I know that there are any\nrealities. If this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of\ninquiry, my method of inquiry must not be used to support my\nhypothesis. The reply is this: 1. If investigation cannot be regarded\nas proving that there are real things, it at least does not lead to a\ncontrary conclusion; but the method and conception on which it is\nbased remain ever in harmony. No doubts of the method, therefore,\narise with its practice, as is the case with all the others. 2. The\nfeeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a\ndissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a\nvague concession that there is some _one_ thing to which a proposition\nshould conform.... Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are\nrealities, or, if he did, doubt would not be a source of\ndissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind\nadmits. So that the social impulse does not cause me to doubt it. 3.\nEverybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and\nonly ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it. 4.\nExperience of the method has not led me to doubt it, but, on the\ncontrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs\nin the way of settling opinion. These afford the explanation of my not\ndoubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes\". (p.12)\n\nThe method of science, therefore, is procedure based on the hypothesis\nthat there are realities independent of what we may think them to be.\nThis, it seems, is what Peirce regards as the fundamental principle of\nthe 'logic of science'. This principle, stated here in the first\npaper, is again stated as we have seen, towards the close of the\nsecond paper. There he says again, \"All the followers of science are\nfully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed\nfar enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which\nthey can be applied.... Different minds may set out with the most\nantagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by\na force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion.... This\ngreat law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. That\nopinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who\ninvestigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in\nthis opinion is the real. This is the way I would explain reality\".\n(p.300).\n\nIt is well at this point to call attention to a distinction. It is to\nbe noticed that in the first paper and in the latter part of the\nsecond he is talking of a method for attaining truth. But in the body\nof the second paper he is talking of a method for attaining clearness.\nThese two should be kept distinct in our minds. The use of the various\nmethods described for finding the velocity of light were endeavors to\nfind the truth, not to make our ideas clear. Clearness and truth\nPeirce believes to have no invariable connection. He says in ending\nthe article on \"How To Make Our Ideas Clear\", \"It is certainly\nimportant to know how to make our ideas clear, _but they may be ever\nso clear without being true_\". (p.302, italics mine.) There are, then,\ntwo methods under consideration: the scientific method for reaching\ntruth, with its postulate that there are independent realities, and\nthe logical method for securing clearness, which as he has just\nstated, has no necessary connection with truth.\n\nNow I should like to point out, in criticism, that these two methods\ncannot be used together, or rather that the postulate of the\n'scientific method' will not endure the test proposed by the 'method\nfor clearness'. The scientific method postulates a reality unaffected\nby our opinions about it. But when we apply the method for clearness\nto this reality it seems to vanish.\n\nThe process is this: Peirce, as we will remember, begins his\ndiscussion of the real by defining it as \"that whose characters are\nindependent of what anybody may think them to be.\" Then passing on to\napply his method for clearness he finds that \"reality, like every\nother quality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things\npartaking of it produce\", and adds that \"the only effects which real\nthings have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they\nexcite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs\". Reality is\nthe sum of its sensible effects, its sensible effects are beliefs, so\nreality is a sum of beliefs.\n\nNow, reality cannot be the sum of _all_ beliefs regarding the real,\nbecause reality is defined in another connection as the object\nrepresented by a _true_ opinion, and a true opinion is that which is\nfated to be agreed to after an investigation is complete. Reality then\ncan consist only in certain selected beliefs. But if reality is this\nset of ultimately-adopted beliefs, what is truth itself? For truth has\nbeen defined as the beliefs which will be ultimately adopted.\n\nIn other words, when Peirce applies his method for clearness to the\nconcept of reality, he reduces reality to truth. He identifies the\ntwo. Then there remains no independent realty which stands as a\n_check_ on truth. And this was the postulate of his method of science.\n\nSince the application of his own method for clearness eliminates\nreality, it looks as though Peirce must abandon either this method or\nthe postulate of science. He cannot use both the method for clearness\nand the postulate of the method of science.\n\nWe must remember that Peirce was a pioneer in this movement. And in\nmaking the transition from the older form of thought, he occasionally\nuses a word both in the old sense and in the new. Such would seem to\nbe his difficulty with the word 'reality', which he uses both in the\nnewer sense which the method for clearness would show it to have, and\nin the old orthodox sense of something absolute. When he says \"reality\n... consists of the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking\nof it produce\", he seems to have the two senses of the word in one\nsentence. Reality consists in sensible effects, or it is that which is\nproduced somehow by means of our senses. But, when things _partake_ of\nreality, reality exists in advance and produces those effects. Reality\nis conceived both as the things produced and as the producer of these\nthings.\n\nA somewhat similar difficulty occurs, as I may point out again in\ncriticism, in the use of the words 'meaning' and 'belief'. Here the\nconfusion is caused, not by using a word in two senses, as in the case\nof 'reality', but by using both the words 'meaning' and 'belief' in\nthe same sense. Peirce defines both 'meaning' and 'belief' as a sum of\nhabits, and indicates no difference between them.\n\nThus he says of meaning, \"There is no distinction of meaning so fine\nas to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice\".\n(293) \"To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine\nwhat habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits\nit involves\". (p. 292).\n\nBut he says similarly of belief, \"Belief involves the establishment in\nour nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, of a habit\". \"Since\nbelief is a rule for action, it is a new starting point for thought\".\n\"The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different\nbeliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which\nthey give rise\". (p. 291).\n\nNow it will be agreed that instead of defining belief and meaning in\nterms of the same thing and thus identifying them, we ought sharply to\ndistinguish between them. To have the meaning of a thing is not at all\nthe same as to believe in it. Thus one may have clearly in mind the\nmeaning of centaurs or of fairies or of any of the characters of\nmythology without in the slightest degree believing in them. Defining\nthese things in terms of sensible effects, we could say that we know\ntheir meaning in the sense that we understand which sensible effects\nwould be involved if they did exist. But to have a belief about them\nwould mean that we would _expect_ these sensible effects. In other\nwords, a belief involves the possibility of fulfillment or frustration\nof expectation. To believe in anything is therefore a distinct step\nbeyond understanding it.\n\nIn inserting these theories of reality and of belief in this\ndiscussion of a method for clear apprehension, Peirce is passing\nbeyond a doctrine of clearness and involving himself in a doctrine of\ntruth. We have seen that he does not seem to be able to maintain the\npostulated reality underlying his description of the scientific method\nfor attaining truth. And it now seems that he is in equal difficulty\nwith belief. If _meaning_ is simply a sum of habits, belief is _not_\nsimply a sum of habits, for the two are not the same. And if, as we\nhave said, the quality that distinguishes belief from meaning is the\nfact that it involves expectation, then we appear to be on the verge\nof a new theory of truth,--a theory saying that truth is simply the\nfulfillment of these expectations.\n\nSuch, we may note, is the interpretation that Dewey puts upon the\npragmatic method,--such is the theory of truth that he finds involved\nin it.\n\nThe interpretations of pragmatism which came particularly to the\nnotice of Peirce, however, were those made by James and Schiller, and\nagainst these, we may say here, he made vigorous protest. These he\nregarded as perversions of his doctrine. And he was so desirous of\nindicating that his own theory of clearness involved for himself no\nsuch developments as these, that, in order to make the distinctions\nclear, he renamed his own doctrine.\n\nHis first article of dissent, appearing in The Monist in 1905, was\ndirected mainly, however, against the looseness of popular usage. He\ntraces briefly the doctrine's growth. Referring back to his original\nstatement in 1878, he says of himself that he \"framed the theory that\na _conception_, that is, the rational purpose of a word or other\nexpression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the\nconduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not\nresult from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if\none can define accurately all the conceivably experimental phenomena\nwhich the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will\nhave therein a complete definition of the concept, and _there is\nabsolutely nothing more in it_. For this doctrine he [Peirce, now\nspeaking of himself] invented the name of pragmatism.... His word\n'pragmatism' has gained general recognition in a generalized sense\nthat seems to argue power of growth and vitality. The famed\npsychologist, James, first took it up, seeing that his 'radical\nempiricism' substantially answered to the writer's definition, albeit\nwith a certain difference in point of view. Next the admirably clear\nand brilliant thinker, Mr. Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, casting about for\na more attractive name for the 'anthropomorphism' of his _Riddle of\nthe Sphinx_, lit, in that most remarkable paper of his on Axioms as\nPostulates, upon the designation 'pragmatism', which in its original\nsense was in generic agreement with his own doctrine, for which he has\nsince found the more appropriate specification 'humanism', while he\nstill retains pragmatism in a somewhat wider sense. So far all went\nhappily. But at present the word begins to be met with occasionally in\nthe literary journals, where it gets abused in the merciless way that\nwords have to expect when they fall into literary clutches. Sometimes\nthe manners of the British have effloresced in scolding at the word as\nill-chosen--ill-chosen, that is, to express some meaning that it was\nrather designed to exclude. So, then, the writer, finding his bantling\n'pragmatism' so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child\ngood-by and relinquish it in its higher destiny; while to serve the\nprecise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to\nannounce the birth of the word 'pragmaticism', which is ugly enough to\nbe safe from kidnappers\". (pp. 165-6).\n\nThree years later Peirce published an article of much more outspoken\nprotest, this time including in his repudiation the professional\nphilosophers as well as the popularists. Writing for the Hibbert\nJournal (v.7) he states his case as follows:\n\n\"About forty years ago my studies of Kant, Berkeley, and others led\nme, after convincing myself that all thinking is performed in signs,\nand that mediation takes the form of dialogue, so that it is proper to\nspeak of the 'meaning' of a concept, to conclude that to acquire full\nmastery of that meaning it is requisite, in the first place, to learn\nto recognize that concept under every disguise, through extensive\nfamiliarity with instances of it. But this, after all, does not imply\nany true understanding of it; so that it is further requisite that we\nshould make an abstract logical analysis of it into its ultimate\nelements, or as complete an analysis as we can compass. But even so,\nwe may still be without any living comprehension of it; and the only\nway to complete our knowledge of its nature is to discover and\nrecognize just what habits of conduct a belief in the truth of the\nconcept (of any conceivable subject, and under any conceivable\ncircumstances) would reasonably develop; that is to say, what habits\nwould ultimately result from a sufficient consideration of such truth.\nIt is necessary to understand the word 'conduct', here, in the\nbroadest sense. If, for example, the predication of a given concept\nwere to lead to our admitting that a given form of reasoning\nconcerning the subject of which it was affirmed was valid, when it\nwould not otherwise be valid, the recognition of that effect in our\nreasoning would decidedly be a habit of conduct\". (p.108).\n\nAfter referring to his own expositions he continues, \"... But in 1897\nProfessor James remodelled the matter, and transmogrified it into a\ndoctrine of philosophy, some parts of which I highly approved, while\nother and more prominent parts I regarded, and still regard, as\nopposed to sound logic. About the same time Professor Papirie\ndiscovered, to the delight of the Pragmatist school, that this\ndoctrine was incapable of definition, which would certainly seem to\ndistinguish it from every other doctrine in whatever branch of\nscience, I was coming to the conclusion that my poor little maxim\nshould be called by another name; and I accordingly, in April 1905,\nrenamed it Pragmaticism.\" (p.109).\n\n\"My original essay, having been written for a popular monthly,\nassumes, for no better reason than that real inquiry cannot begin\nuntil a state of real doubt arises, and ends as soon as a real Belief\nis attained, that a 'settlement of belief', or in other words, a\n_state of satisfaction_, is all that Truth, or the aim of inquiry,\nconsists in. The reason I gave for this was so flimsy, while the\ninference was so nearly the gist of Pragmaticism, that I must confess\nthe argument of that essay might be said with some justice to beg the\nquestion. The first part of the essay is occupied, however, with\nshowing that, if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any\n_actual_ satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction that would\nultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and\nindefeasible issue. This, I beg to point out, is a very different\nposition from that of Mr. Schiller and the pragmatists of to-day....\nTheir avowedly undefinable position, if it be not capable of logical\ncharacterization, seems to me to be characterized by an angry hatred\nof strict logic, and even a disposition to rate any exact thought\nwhich interferes with their doctrine as all humbug. At the same time\nit seems to me clear that their approximate acceptance of the\nPragmaticistic principle, and even that very casting aside of\ndifficult distinctions (although I cannot approve of it), has helped\nthem to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths that\nother philosophers have seen but through a mist, or most of them not\nat all. Among such truths,--all of them old, of course, yet\nacknowledged by few--I reckon their denial of necessitarianism; their\nrejection of any 'consciousness' different from a visceral or other\nexternal sensation; their acknowledgment that there are, in a\nPragmatistical sense, Real habits ... and their insistence upon\ninterpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they _would_\nor _might_ (not actually _will_) come to in the concrete. It seems to\nme a pity that they should allow a philosophy so instinct with life to\nbecome infected with seeds of death in such notions as that of the\nunreality of all ideas of infinity and that of the mutability of\ntruth, and in such confusions of thought as that of active willing\n(willing to control thought, to doubt, and to weigh reasons) with\nwilling not to exert the will (willing to believe)\". (pp.111, 112).\n\nThe difference between the position of Peirce and of James may be\nstated in another way as constituted by the fact that James introduces\nthe factor of _value_ as a criterion for meaning and for truth, while\nfor Peirce these elements did not enter the question at all. For James\nthe value of a belief is an apparent evidence for its truth, while for\nPeirce value had no relation to truth. For an account of this\ndevelopment of the pragmatic doctrine we pass on now to a discussion\nof James.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO PRAGMATISM BY JAMES.\n\n\nJames first uses the term 'pragmatism', as Peirce had done, to refer\nto a method for attaining clearness. When, in 1898, he brought again\nbefore the public the original article by Peirce, he was simply\nexpounding the Peircian doctrine without making any attempt to pass\nbeyond it. But, as we have just seen, he later gave it a construction,\nan interpretation as a theory of truth, with which its originator\ncould not agree. In this chapter we may, therefore, look first at his\nexposition of the doctrine of clearness, and after that, in order to\nunderstand James' development of the doctrine into a theory of truth,\nwe may turn back for a moment to some of his previous publications on\nthe question of truth. It will then be possible to trace\nchronologically his developing attitude toward the truth controversy.\nFrom this we may pass finally to an indication of some of the\ndifficulties in which he becomes involved. The most important of\nthese, it may be said again, is that he construes the test of truth of\nan idea to be, not merely that the idea leads to expected\nconsequences, but that it leads to predominantly desirable\nconsequences. The outcomes which stand as evidence for truth are then\nnot merely outcomes bringing fulfilled expectations but outcomes\nbringing happiness.\n\n\nJAMES' EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE.\n\nJames in expounding the doctrine of Peirce explains the pragmatic\nprinciple as a method of investigating philosophic controversies,\nreducing them to essentials (clear meanings), and selecting those\nworthy of discussion.[2] \"Suppose\", he says, \"that there are two\ndifferent philosophical definitions, or propositions, or maxims, or\nwhat not, which seem to contradict each other, and about which men\ndispute. If, by assuming the truth of the one, you can foresee no\npractical consequence to anybody, at any time or place, which is\ndifferent from what you would foresee if you assumed the truth of the\nother, why then the difference between the two propositions is no real\ndifference--it is only a specious and verbal difference, unworthy of\nfuture contention.... There can _be_ no difference which does not\n_make_ a difference--no difference in the abstract truth which does\nnot express itself in a difference of concrete fact, and of conduct\nconsequent upon that fact, imposed upon somebody, somehow, somewhere\nand somewhen.... The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find\nout what definite difference it would make to you and me, at definite\ninstants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be\nthe one which is true\". (p.675).\n\n    [2] \"The Pragmatic Method\", University of California\n        Chronicle 1898. Reprinted in Journal of Philosophy, 1904,\n        v. 1, p. 673. Page references are to the latter.\n\nThis doctrine is illustrated by using it to secure the essence of two\nphilosophical questions, materialism vs. theism and the one _vs._ the\nmany. If we suppose for an instant, he suggests, that this moment is\nthe last moment of the universe's existence, there will be no\n_difference_ between materialism and theism. All the effects that\nmight be ascribed to either have come about.\n\n\"These facts are in, are bagged, are captured; and the good that's in\nthem is gained, be the atom or be the God their cause.\" (p. 677). \"The\nGod, if there, has been doing just what the atom could do--appearing\nin the character of atoms, so to speak, and earning such gratitude as\nis due to atoms, and no more\". Future good or ill is ruled out by\npostulate. Taken thus retrospectively, there could be no difference\nbetween materialism and theism.\n\nBut taken prospectively, they point to wholly different consequences.\n\"For, according to the theory of mechanical evolution, the laws of\nredistribution of matter and motion, though they are certainly to\nthank for all the good hours which our organisms have ever yielded us\nand all the ideals which our minds now frame, are yet fatally certain\nto undo their work again, and to redissolve everything that they have\nevolved.... We make complaint of |materialism| for what it is\n_not_--not a permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a\nfulfiller of our remotest hopes.... Materialism means simply the\ndenial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of\nultimate hopes; theism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order\nand the letting loose of hope. Surely here is an issue genuine enough\nfor anyone who feels it....\n\n\"[And] if there be a God, it is not likely that he is confined solely\nto making differences in the world's latter end; he probably makes\ndifferences all along its course. Now the principle of practicalism\nsays that that very meaning of the conception of God lies in the\ndifferences which must be made in experience if the conception be\ntrue. God's famous inventory of perfections, as elaborated by dogmatic\ntheology, either means nothing, says our principle, or it implies\ncertain definite things that we can feel and do at certain definite\nmoments of our lives, things that we could not feel and should not do\nwere no God present and were the business of the universe carried on\nby material atoms instead. So far as our conceptions of the Deity\ninvolve no such experiences, they are meaningless and verbal,--scholastic\nentities and abstractions, as the positivists say, and fit objects for\ntheir scorn. But so far as they do involve such definite experiences,\nGod means something for us, and may be real\". (pp.678-680).\n\nThe second illustration of the pragmatic principle--the supposed\nopposition between the One and the Many--may be treated more briefly.\nJames suggests certain definite and practical sets of results in which\nto define 'oneness', and tries out the conception to see whether this\nresult or that is what oneness means. He finds this method to clarify\nthe difficulty here as well as in the previous case. In summarizing he\nsays: \"I have little doubt myself that this old quarrel might be\ncompletely smoothed out to the satisfaction of all claimants, if only\nthe maxim of Peirce were methodically followed here. The current\nmonism on the whole still keeps talking in too abstract a way. It says\nthat the world must either be pure disconnectedness, no universe at\nall, or absolute unity. It insists that there is no stopping-place\nhalf-way. Any connection whatever, says this monism, is only possible\nif there be still more connection, until at last we are driven to\nadmit the absolutely total connection required. But this absolutely\ntotal connection either means nothing, is the mere word 'one' spelt\nlong, or else it means the sum of all the partial connections that can\npossibly be conceived. I believe that when we thus attack the\nquestion, and set ourselves to search for these possible connections,\nand conceive each in a definite and practical way, the dispute is\nalready in a fair way to be settled beyond the chance of\nmisunderstanding, by a compromise in which the Many and the One both\nget their lawful rights\". (p. 685).\n\nIn concluding, James relates Peirce to the English Empiricists,\nasserting that it was they \"who first introduced the custom of\ninterpreting the meaning of conceptions by asking what differences\nthey make for life.... The great English way of investigating a\nconception is to ask yourself right off, 'What is it known as? In what\nfacts does it result? What is its _cash-value_ in terms of particular\nexperience? And what special difference would come into the world\naccording as it were true or false?' Thus does Locke treat the\nconception of personal identity. What you mean by it is just your\nchain of memories, says he.... So Berkeley with his 'matter'. The\ncash-value of matter is just our physical sensations.... Hume does the\nsame thing with causation. It is known as habitual antecedence....\nStewart and Brown, James Mill, John Mill, and Bain, have followed more\nor less consistently the same method; and Shadworth Hodgson has used\nit almost as explicitly as Mr. Peirce.... The short-comings and\nnegations and the baldnesses of the English philosophers in question\ncome, not from their eye to merely practical results, but solely from\ntheir failure to track the practical results completely enough to see\nhow far they extend\". (pp. 685-6).\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt will be at once observed that James, as well as Peirce, is at this\npoint saying nothing about a new doctrine of truth, but is concerning\nhimself only with a new doctrine of clearness. Meaning and clearness\nof meanings are his only topics in this paper. Thus he states, \"The\nonly _meaning_ of the conception of God lies in the differences which\nmust be made in experience _if_ the conception be true. God's famous\ninventory of perfection ... either _means_ nothing, says our\nprinciple, or it implies certain definite things that we can feel and\ndo at certain definite moments in our lives\". And again in speaking of\nthe pluralism-monism controversy, \"Any connection whatever, says this\nmonism, is only possible if there be still more connection, until at\nlast we are driven to admit the absolutely total connection required.\nBut this absolutely total connection either _means_ nothing, is the\nmere word 'one' spelt long, or else it means the sum of all the\npartial connections....\"\n\nBut as we all know, James did afterward embrace the new pragmatic\ntheory of truth. While he did not in 1898 use the word pragmatism to\ndesignate anything except a new method for securing clearness, yet it\ncan be shown that he had been developing another line of thought,\nsince a much earlier date, which did lead quite directly toward the\npragmatic theory of truth. It may be well at this point then to go\nback and trace the growth of this idea of truth through such writing\nas he had done before this time. It will be found, I think, that\nJames' whole philosophic tendency to move away from the transcendental\nand unitary toward the particular was influencing him towards this new\nconception.\n\n\nDEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE THROUGH THE EARLIER WRITINGS OF JAMES.\n\nThe first article which James wrote on truth, as he later states,[3]\nwas entitled \"The Function of Cognition\", and was published in _Mind_\nin 1885. Commenting on this article in 1909 he asserts that many of\nthe essential theses of the book \"Pragmatism\", published twenty-two\nyears later, were already to be found here, and that the difference is\nmainly one of emphasis.[4]\n\n    [3] \"The Meaning of Truth\", Preface, p. viii.\n\n    [4] Same, p. 137.\n\nThis article attempts to give a description of knowing as it actually\noccurs,--not how it originated nor how it is antecedently possible.\nThe thesis is that an idea knows an external reality when it points to\nit, resembles it, and is able to affect it. The plan of exposition is\nto start with the simplest imaginable material and then gradually\nintroduce additional matter as it is needed until we have cognition as\nit actually occurs. James postulates a single, momentarily-existing,\nfloating feeling as the entire content, at the instant, of the\nuniverse. What, then, can this momentary feeling know? Calling it a\n'feeling of _q_', it can be made any particular feeling (fragrance,\npain, hardness) that the reader likes. We see, first, that the feeling\ncannot properly be said to know itself. There is no inner duality of\nthe knower on the one hand and content or known on the other. \"If the\ncontent of the feeling occurs nowhere else in the universe outside of\nthe feeling itself, and perish with the feeling, common usage refuses\nto call it a reality, and brands it as a subjective feature of the\nfeeling's constitution, or at most as the feeling's dream. For the\nfeeling to be cognitive in the specific sense, then, it must be\nself-transcendent\". And we must therefore \"create a reality outside of\nit to correspond to the intrinsic quality _q_\". This can stand as the\nfirst complication of that universe. Agreeing that the feeling cannot\nbe said to know itself, under what conditions does it know the\nexternal reality? James replies, \"If the newly-created reality\n_resemble_ the feeling's quality _q_, I say that the feeling may be\nheld by us to be _cognizant of that reality_\". It may be objected that\na momentary feeling cannot properly know a thing because it has no\n_time_ to become aware of any of the _relations_ of the thing. But\nthis rules out only one of the kinds of knowledge, namely \"knowledge\nabout\" the thing; knowledge as direct acquaintance remains. We may\nthen assert that \"if there be in the universe a _q_ other than the _q_\nin the feeling the latter may have acquaintance with an entity\nejective to itself; an acquaintance moreover, which, as mere\nacquaintance it would be hard to imagine susceptible either of\nimprovement or increase, being in its way complete; and which would\noblige us (so long as we refuse not to call acquaintance knowledge) to\nsay not only that the feeling is cognitive, but that all qualities _of\nfeeling, so long as there is anything outside of them which they\nresemble_, are feelings of qualities of existence, and perceptions of\noutward fact\". But this would be true, as unexceptional rule, only in\nour artificially simplified universe. If there were a number of\ndifferent _q's_ for the feeling to resemble, while it meant only one\nof them, there would obviously be something more than resemblance in\nthe case of the one which it did know. This fact, that resemblance is\nnot enough in itself to constitute knowledge, can be seen also from\nremembering that many feelings which do resemble each other\nclosely,--e. g., toothaches--do not on that account know each other.\nReally to know a thing, a feeling must not only resemble the thing,\nbut must also be able to act on it. In brief, \"the feeling of _q_\nknows whatever reality it resembles, and either directly or indirectly\noperates on. If it resemble without operating, it is a dream; if it\noperates without resembling, it is an error\". Such is the formula for\nperceptual knowledge. Concepts must be reduced to percepts, after\nwhich the same rule holds. We may say, to make the formula complete,\n\"A percept knows whatever reality it directly or indirectly operates\non and resembles; a conceptual feeling, or thought, knows a reality,\nwhenever it actually or potentially terminates in a percept that\noperates on, or resembles that reality, or is otherwise connected with\nit or with its context\".\n\n\"The latter percept [the one to which the concept has been reduced]\nmay be either sensation or sensorial idea; and when I say the thought\nmust _terminate_ in such a percept, I mean that it must ultimately be\ncapable of leading up thereto,--by way of practical experience if the\nterminal feeling be a sensation; by way of logical or habitual\nsuggestion, if it be only an image in the mind\". \"These percepts,\nthese _termini_, these sensible things, these mere matters of\nacquaintance, are the only realities we ever directly know, and the\nwhole history of our thought is the history of our substitution of one\nof them for the other, and the reduction of the substitute to the\nstatus of a conceptual sign. Condemned though they be by some\nthinkers, these sensations are the mother-earth, the anchorage, the\nstable rock, the first and last limits, the _terminus a quo_ and the\n_terminus ad quem_ of the mind. To find such sensational termini\nshould be our aim with all our higher thought. They end discussion;\nthey destroy the false conceit of knowledge; and without them we are\nall at sea with each other's meanings.... We can never be sure we\nunderstand each other till we are able to bring the matter to this\ntest. This is why metaphysical discussions are so much like fighting\nwith the air; they have no practical issue of a sensational kind.\nScientific theories, on the other hand, always terminate in definite\npercepts. You can deduce a possible sensation from your theory and,\ntaking me into your laboratory prove that your theory is true of my\nworld by giving me the sensation then and there\".\n\nAt this point James quotes, in substantiation, the following passage\nfrom Peirce's article of 1878: \"There is no distinction in meaning so\nfine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in\npractice.... It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the highest\ngrade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what\neffects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive\nthe object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these\neffects is the whole of our conception of the object.\"\n\nIn this early paper of James' are to be found foreshadowings of\npragmatism both as a method and as a theory of truth. Pragmatism as a\nmethod is shown in the whole discussion of the primacy of sensations\nand of the necessity for reducing conceptions to perceptions. This is\nexactly in line with the pragmatism proposed by Peirce in 1878 and\nhere quoted from by James. Pragmatism as a theory of truth is\nanticipated by the proposal that the idea knows, and knows truly, the\nreality which it is able to make changes in. The idea _proves_ its\nreference to a given reality by making these specified changes. It is\nantecedently true only if it can bring about these changes. The next\nstep is to say that its truth _consists_ in its ability to forecast\nand bring to pass these changes. Then we have pragmatism as a theory\nof truth. James did not take this step, as we shall see, until after\n1904.\n\nThere is also a suggestion of the 'subjectivity' of James' later\ntheory of truth, which would differentiate him even at this time from\nPeirce on the question of truth. He has said that a true idea must\nindeed resemble reality, but who, he asks, is to determine what is\nreal? He answers that an idea is true when it resembles something\nwhich I, as critic, _think_ to be reality. \"When [the enquirer] finds\nthat the feeling that he is studying contemplates what he himself\nregards as a reality he must of course admit the feeling itself to be\ntruly cognitive\". Peirce would say that the idea is not true unless it\npoints to a reality that would be found by _all_ investigators, quite\nirrespective of what the _one_ person acting as critic may think.\nJames and Pierce would therefore, begin to diverge even at this early\ndate on the truth question. As to what constitutes clearness, they are\nin agreement.\n\nSomething of the same idea is stated again four years later in an\narticle which appeared in Mind[5] and which was republished the\nfollowing year as a chapter of the Principles of Psychology.[6] One\npassage will show the general trend; \"A conception to prevail, must\n_terminate_ in a world of orderly experience. A rare phenomenon, to\ndisplace frequent ones, must belong with others more frequent still.\nThe history of science is strewn with wrecks and ruins of\ntheory--essences and principles, fluids and forces--once fondly clung\nto, but found to hang together with no facts of sense. The exceptional\nphenomena solicit our belief in vain until such time as we chance to\nconceive of them as of kinds already admitted to exist. What science\nmeans by 'verification' is no more than this, that _no object of\nconception shall be believed which sooner or later has not some\npermanent object of sensation for its term_.... Sensible vividness or\npungency is then the vital factor in reality when once the conflict\nbetween objects, and the connecting of them together in the mind, has\nbegun.\" (Italics mine).\n\n    [5] \"The Psychology of Belief\", Mind 1889, v. 14, p. 31.\n\n    [6] Vol. II, chapter XXI.\n\nAnd in another connection he expresses the idea as follows:\n\"Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in sensations\nwould be like bridges without piers. Systems about fact must plunge\nthemselves into sensations as bridges plunge themselves into the rock.\nSensations are the stable rock, the _terminus a quo_ and the _terminus\nad quem_ of thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our\ntheories---to conceive first when and where a certain sensation may be\nhad and then to have it. Finding it stops discussion. Failure to find\nit kills the false conceit of knowledge. Only when you deduce a\npossible sensation for me from your theory, and give it to me when and\nwhere the theory requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought has\nanything to do with truth.\" (11:7).\n\nIn 1902 James contributed to the \"Dictionary of Philosophy and\nPsychology\" published by J. Mark Baldwin the following definition for\nPragmatism.\n\n\"The doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses\nitself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of\nconduct to be recommended, or in that of experience to be expected, if\nthe conception be true; which consequences would be different if it\nwere untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the\nmeaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second\nconception should not appear to have either consequences, then it must\nreally be only the first conception under a different name. In\nmethodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective\nconsequences is an admirable way of establishing the different\nmeanings of different conceptions\".\n\nIt will be seem that James has not in 1902 differentiated between\npragmatism as a method and as a theory of truth. Leaving out the one\nreference to truth, the definition is an excellent statement of the\nPeircian doctrine of clearness. This is especially to be noticed in\nthe last two sentences, which are perfectly 'orthodox' statements of\nmethod alone.\n\nIn 1904 and 1905 James published two papers in Mind on the truth\nquestion. The first, \"Humanism and Truth\", may be called his\n'border-line' article. In this he is attempting to give a sympathetic\ninterpretation of the humanistic theory of truth--which he later said\nis exactly like his own--but is still making the interpretation as an\noutsider. In the second article he has definitely embraced the\nhumanistic theory and is defending it.\n\nThe first article begins as follows:[7] \"Receiving from the editor of\nMind an advance proof of Mr. Bradley's article for July on 'Truth and\nPractice', I understand this as a hint to me to join in the\ncontroversy over 'Pragmatism' which seems to have seriously begun. As\nmy name has been coupled with the movement, I deem it wise to take the\nhint, the more so as in some quarters greater credit has been given me\nthan I deserve, and probably undeserved discredit in other quarters\nfalls also to my lot.\n\n    [7] Mind, N. S. 13, p. 457.\n\n\"First, as to the word 'pragmatism'. I myself have only used the term\nto indicate a method of carrying on abstract discussion. The serious\nmeaning of a concept, says Mr. Peirce, lies in the concrete difference\nto someone which its being true will make. Strive to bring all debated\nquestions to that 'pragmatic' test, and you will escape vain\nwrangling: if it can make no practical difference which of two\nstatements be true, then they are really one statement in two verbal\nforms; if it can make no practical difference whether a given\nstatement be true or false, then the statement has no real meaning. In\nneither case is there anything fit to quarrel about; we may save our\nbreath, and pass to more important things.\n\n\"All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that truths should\n_have_ practical consequences. In England the word has been used more\nbroadly, to cover the notion that the truth of any statement consists\nin the consequences, and particularly in their being good\nconsequences. Here we get beyond affairs of method altogether; and\nsince this pragmatism and the wider pragmatism are so different, and\nboth are important enough to have different names, I think that Mr.\nSchiller's proposal to call the wider pragmatism by the name of\n'Humanism' is excellent and ought to be adopted. The narrower\npragmatism may still be spoken of as the 'pragmatic method'.\n\n\"If further egotism be in order. I may say that the account of truth\ngiven by Messrs. Sturt and Schiller and by Professor Dewey and his\nschool ... goes beyond any theorizing which I personally had ever\nindulged in until I read their writings. After reading these, _I feel\nalmost sure that these authors are right in their main contentions_,\nbut the originality is wholly theirs, and I can hardly recognize in my\nown humble doctrine that concepts are teleological instruments\nanything considerable enough to warrant my being called, as I have\nbeen, the 'father' of so important a movement forward in\nphilosophy\".[8] (Italic mine).\n\n    [8] This paragraph appears as a footnote.\n\n\"I think that a decided effort at a sympathetic mental play with\nhumanism is the provisional attitude to be recommended to the reader.\n\n\"_When I find myself playing sympathetically with humanism_, something\nlike what follows is what I end by conceiving it to mean\". (Italics\nmine).\n\nSuch is the conservative tone in which the article is begun. Yet\nbefore it is ended we find these passages: \"It seems obvious that the\npragmatic account of all this routine of phenomenal knowledge is\naccurate\". (p.468). \"The humanism, for instance, which I see and try\nso hard to defend, is the completest truth attained from my point of\nview up to date\". (p.472).\n\nIn a supplementary article, \"Humanism and Truth Once More\", published\na few months later in answer to questions prompted by this one, the\nacceptance of humanism is entirely definite. And here James finds that\nhe has been advocating the doctrine for several years. He says, \"I\nmyself put forth on several occasions a radically pragmatist account\nof knowledge\". (Mind, v. 14, p. 196). And again he remarks, \"When\nfollowing Schiller and Dewey, I define the true as that which gives\nthe maximal combination of satisfaction ...\". (p.196).\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF TRUTH IN 'PRAGMATISM' AND 'THE MEANING OF TRUTH'.\n\nIn 1907 when he published his book \"Pragmatism\", James, as we all\nknow, was willing to accept the new theory of truth unreservedly. The\nhesitating on the margin, the mere interpreting of other's views, are\nthings of the past. From 1907 James' position toward pragmatism as a\ntruth-theory is unequivocal.\n\nThroughout the book, as I should like to point out, James is using\n'pragmatism' in two senses, and 'truth' in two senses. The two\nmeanings of pragmatism he recognizes himself, and points out clearly\nthe difference between pragmatism as a method for attaining clearness\nin our ideas and pragmatism as a theory of the truth or falsity of\nthose ideas. But the two meanings of 'truth' he does not distinguish.\nAnd it is here that he differs from Dewey, as we shall presently see.\nHe differed from Peirce on the question of the meaning of\npragmatism--as to whether it could be developed to include a doctrine\nof truth as well as of clearness. He differs from Dewey on the\nquestion of 'truth'--as to whether truth shall be used in both of the\ntwo specified senses or only in one of them.\n\n_The Ambiguity of 'Satisfaction'_--The double meaning of truth in\nJames' writing at this date may be indicated in this way: While truth\nis to be defined in terms of satisfaction, what is satisfaction? Does\nit mean that I am to be satisfied _of_ a certain quality in the idea,\nor that I am to be satisfied _by_ it? In other words, is the criterion\nof truth the fact that the idea leads as it promised or is it the fact\nthat its leading, whether just as it promised or not, is desirable?\nWhich, in short, are we to take as truth,--fulfilled expectations or\nvalue of results?\n\nIt is in failing to distinguish between these two that James involves\nhimself, I believe, in most of his difficulties, and it is in the\nrecognition and explicit indication of this difference that Dewey\ndifferentiates himself from James. We may pass on to cite specific\ninstances in which James uses each of these criteria. We will find, of\ncourse, that there are passages which can be interpreted as meaning\neither value or fulfillment, but there are many in which the use of\nvalue as a criterion seems unmistakable.\n\nThe following quotations may be instanced: \"If theological views prove\nto have value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in\nthe sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true,\nwill depend entirely on their relation to the other truths that have\nalso to be acknowledged\". For example, in so far as the Absolute\naffords comfort, it is not sterile; \"it has that amount of value; it\nperforms a concrete function. I myself ought to call the Absolute true\n'in so far forth', then; and I unhesitatingly now do so\". (p.72).\n\n\"On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works\nsatisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now\nwhatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it\ncertainly does work, and that the problem is to build out and\ndetermine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other\nworking truths\". (p. 299).\n\n\"The true is the name for whatever proves itself to be good in the way\nof belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons\". (p. 76).\n\n\"Empirical psychologists ... have denied the soul, save as the name\nfor verifiable cohesions in our inner life. They redescend into the\nstream of experience with it, and cash it into so much small-change\nvalue in the way of 'ideas' and their connections with each other. The\nsoul is good or '_true_' for just so much, but no more\". (p. 92,\nitalics mine).\n\n\"Since almost any object may some day become temporarily important,\nthe advantage of having a stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall\nbe true of merely possible situations, is obvious.... Whenever such\nextra truths become practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it\npasses from cold storage to do work in the world and our belief in it\ngrows active. You can say of it then either that _'it is useful\nbecause it is true' or that it is 'true because it is useful'_. _Both\nthese phrases mean exactly the same thing_.... From this simple cue\npragmatism gets her general notion of truth as something essentially\nbound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead\nus towards other moments _which it will be worth while to have been\nled to_. Primarily, and on the common-sense level, the truth of a\nstate of mind means this function of _a leading that is worth while_\".\n(pp. 204-205, italics mine).\n\n\"To 'agree' in the widest sense with reality can only mean to be\nguided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put\ninto such working touch with it as to handle either it or something\nconnected with it better than if we disagreed. _Better either\nintellectually or practically!..._ An idea that helps us to deal,\nwhether _practically or intellectually_, with either reality or its\nbelongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that\nfits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting,\nwill----hold true of that reality\". (pp. 212-213).\n\n\"'The true', to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way\nof our thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in the way\nof our behaving. _Expedient in almost any fashion_; and expedient in\nthe long run and on the whole of course\". (p. 222).\n\nWe may add a passage with the same bearing, from \"The Meaning of\nTruth\". In this quotation James is retracting the statement made in\nthe University of California Address that without the future there is\nno difference between theism and materialism. He says: \"Even if matter\ncould do every outward thing that God does, the idea of it would not\nwork as satisfactorily, because the chief call for a God on modern\nmen's part is for a being who will inwardly recognize them and judge\nthem sympathetically. Matter disappoints this craving of our ego, and\nso God remains for most men the truer hypothesis, and indeed remain so\nfor definite pragmatic reasons\". (p. 189, notes).\n\nThe contrast between 'intellectual' and 'practical' seems to make his\nposition certain. If truth is tested by practical workings, _as\ncontrasted with_ intellectual workings, it cannot be said to be\nlimited to fulfilled expectation.\n\nThe statement that the soul is good _or_ true shows the same thing.\nThe relation of truth to extraneous values is here beyond question.\nThe other passages all bear, more or less obviously, in the same\ndirection.\n\nAs James keeps restating his position, there are many of the\ndefinitions that could be interpreted to mean either values or\nfulfillments, and even a few which seem to refer to fulfillment alone.\nThe two following examples can be taken to mean either:\n\n\"'Truth' in our ideas and beliefs means ... that ideas (which\nthemselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far\nas they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of\nour experience, to summarize them and get about among them by\nconceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession\nof particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak;\nany idea that will carry us prosperously from one part of our\nexperience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working\nsecurely, simplifying, saving labor, is true for just so much, true in\nso far forth, true instrumentally\". (p.58).\n\n\"A new opinion counts as true just in proportion as it gratifies the\nindividual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his\nbeliefs in stock. It must both lean on old truth and grasp new fact;\nand its success ... in doing this, is a matter for individual\nappreciation. When old truth grows, then, by new truth's addition, it\nis for subjective reasons. We are in the process and obey the reasons.\nThe new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function\nof satisfying this double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself\nclassed as true, by the way it works.\" (p.64).\n\nBut we can turn from these to a paragraph in which truth seems to be\nlimited to fulfilled expectations alone.\n\n\"True ideas are those which we can assimilate, validate, corroborate,\nand verify. False ideas are those which we cannot. That is the\npractical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that,\ntherefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known\nas....\n\n\"But what do validation and verification themselves pragmatically\nmean? They again signify certain practical consequences of the\nverified and validated idea.... They head us ... through the acts and\nother ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other\nparts of experience with which we feel all the while ... that the\noriginal ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions\ncome to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious,\nsatisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an\nidea's verification\". (pp.201-202).\n\n_The Relation of Truth to Utility_--It seems certain from the\nforegoing that James means, at least at certain times, to define the\ntrue in terms of the valuable. Satisfaction he is using as\nsatisfaction _by_ rather than satisfaction _of_. As we have pointed\nout, one may be satisfied of the correctness of one's idea without\nbeing at all satisfied by it. This distinction has been most clearly\nset forth by Boodin, in his discussion of 'What pragmatism is not', in\nthe following words: \"The truth satisfaction may run counter to any\nmoral or esthetic satisfaction in the particular case. It may consist\nin the discovery that the friend we had backed had involved us in\nfinancial failure, that the picture we had bought from the catalogue\ndescription is anything but beautiful. But we are no longer uncertain\nas regards the truth. Our restlessness, so far as that particular\ncuriosity is concerned, has come to an end\".[9]\n\n    [9] Boodin: Truth and Reality, pp. 193-4.\n\nIt is clear then, that the discovery of truth is not to be identified\nwith a predominantly satisfactory state of mind at the moment. Our\nstate of mind at the moment may have only a grain of satisfaction, yet\nthis is of so unique a kind and so entirely distinguishable from the\nother contents of the mind that it is perfectly practicable as a\ncriterion. It is simply \"the cessation of the irritation of a doubt\",\nas Peirce puts it, or the feeling that my idea has led as it promised.\nThe feeling of fulfilled expectation is thus a very distinct and\nrecognizable _part_ of the whole general feeling commonly described as\n'satisfaction'. When 'utility' in our ideas, therefore, means a\nmomentary feeling of dominant satisfaction, truth cannot be identified\nwith it.\n\nAnd neither, as I wish now to point out, can truth be identified with\nutility when utility means a long-run satisfactoriness, or\nsatisfactoriness of the idea for a considerable number of people\nthrough a considerable period of time. The same objection arises here\nwhich we noted a moment ago--that the satisfaction may be quite\nindifferent to the special satisfaction arising from tests. As has\nbeen often shown, many ideas are satisfactory for a long period of\ntime simply because they are _not_ subjected to tests. \"A hope is not\na hope, a fear is not a fear, once either is recognized as\nunfounded.... A delusion is delusion only so long as it is not known\nto be one. A mistake can be built upon only so long as it is not\nsuspected\".\n\nSome actual delusions which were not readily subjected to tests have\nbeen long useful in this way. \"For instance, basing ourselves on\nLafcadio Hearn, we might quite admit that the opinions summed up under\nthe title 'Ancestor-Worship' had been ... 'exactly what was required'\nby the former inhabitants of Japan\". \"It was good for primitive man to\nbelieve that dead ancestors required to be fed and honored ... because\nit induced savages to bring up their offspring instead of letting it\nperish. But although it was useful to hold that opinion, the opinion\nwas false\". \"Mankind has always wanted, perhaps always required, and\ncertainly made itself, a stock of delusions and sophisms\".[10]\n\n   [10] Lee: Vital Lies, vol. 1, pp. 11, 31, 33, 72.\n\nPerhaps we would all agree that the belief that 'God is on our side'\nhas been useful to the tribe holding it. If has increased zeal and\nfighting efficiency tremendously. But since God can't be on both\nsides, the belief of one party to the conflict is untrue, no matter\nhow useful. To believe that (beneficial) tribal customs are enforced\nby the tribal gods is useful, but if the tribal gods are non-existent\nthe belief is false. The beautiful imaginings of poets are sometimes\nuseful in minimizing and disguising the hard and ugly reality, but\nwhen they will not test out they cannot be said because of their\nbeauty or desirability to be true.\n\nWe must conclude then, that some delusions are useful. And we may go\non and question James' identification of truth and utility from\nanother point of view. Instead of agreeing that true ideas and useful\nideas are the same, we have shown that some useful ideas are false:\nbut the converse is also demonstrable, that some true ideas are\nuseless.\n\nThere are formulas in pure science which are of no use to anyone\noutside the science because their practical bearings, if such there\nbe, have not yet been discovered, and are of no use to the scientist\nhimself because, themselves the products of deduction, they as yet\nsuggest nothing that can be developed farther from them. While these\nformulas may later be found useful in either of these senses--for\n'practical demands' outside the science, or as a means to something\nelse within the science--they are now already true quite apart from\nutility, because they will test out by fulfilling expectations.\n\nKnowledge that is not useful is most striking in relation to 'vice'.\nOne may have a true idea as to how to lie and cheat, may know what\ncheating is and how it is done, and yet involve both himself and\nothers in most _un_satisfactory consequences. The person who is\nattempting to stop the use of liquor, and who to this end has located\nin a 'dry' district, may receive correct information as to the\nlocation of a 'blind-tiger'--information which while true may bring\nabout his downfall. Knowledge about any form of vice, true knowledge\nthat can be tested out, may upon occasion be harmful to any extent we\nlike.\n\nWe may conclude this section by citing a paragraph which will show the\nfallacious reasoning by which James came to identify the truth and the\nutility of ideas. At one point in replying to a criticism he says: \"I\ncan conceive no other objective _content_ to the notion of an ideally\nperfect truth than that of penetration into [a completely\nsatisfactory] terminus, nor can I conceive that the notion would ever\nhave grown up, or that true ideas would ever have been sorted out from\nfalse or idle ones, save for the greater sum of satisfactions,\nintellectual or practical, which the truer ones brought with them. Can\nwe imagine a man absolutely satisfied with an idea and with all his\nrelations to his other ideas and to his sensible experiences, who\nshould yet _not_ take its content as a true account of reality? The\n_matter_ of the true is thus absolutely identical with the matter of\nthe satisfactory. You may put either word first in your way of\ntalking; but leave out that whole notion of satisfactory working or\nleading (which is the essence of my pragmatic account) and call truth\na static, logical relation, independent even of possible leadings or\nsatisfactions, and it seems to me that you cut all ground from under\nyou\". (Meaning of Truth, p. 160).[11]\n\n   [11] It is interesting to see that Peirce had the\n        following comment to make in 1878 upon the utility of truth.\n        \"Logicality in regard to practical matters is the most\n        useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore,\n        result from the action of natural selection; but outside of\n        these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have\n        his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions,\n        independently of their truth; and thus upon impractical\n        subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious\n        tendency of thought\". (From the first article in the series\n        \"Illustrations of the Logic of Science\", Popular Science\n        Monthly, vol. 12, p. 3).\n\nNow it is to be observed that this paragraph contains at least three\nlogical fallacies. In the first sentence there is a false assumption,\nnamely that 'all that survives is valuable'. 'Then', we are given to\nunderstand, 'since true ideas survive, they must be valuable'. No\nbiologist would agree to this major premise. 'Correlation' preserves\nmany things that are not valuable, as also do other factors.\n\nIn the second sentence there is an implied false conversion. The\nsecond sentence says, in substance, that all true ideas are\nsatisfactory (valuable). This is supposed to prove the assertion of\nthe first sentence, namely, that all satisfactory (valuable) ideas are\ntrue.\n\nIn the last sentence there is a false disjunction. Truth, it is\nstated, must either be satisfactory (valuable) working, or a static\nlogical relation. We have tried to show that it may simply mean\nreliable working or working that leads as it promised. This may be\nneither predominantly valuable working nor a static logical relation.\n\n_The Relation of Satisfaction to Agreement and Consistency._--James\ncontinually reasserts that he has 'remained an epistemological\nrealist', that he has 'always postulated an independent reality', that\nideas to be true must 'agree with reality', etc.[12]\n\n   [12] For example, in the Meaning of Truth, pages 195 and 233.\n\nReality he defines most clearly as follows:\n\n\"'Reality' is in general what truths have to take account of....\n\n\"The first part of reality from this point of view is the flux of our\nsensations. Sensations are forced upon us.... Over their nature, order\nand quantity we have as good as no control....\n\n\"The second part of reality, as something that our beliefs must also\ntake account of, is the _relations_ that obtain between their copies\nin our minds. This part falls into two sub-parts: (1) the relations\nthat are mutable and accidental, as those of date and place; and (2)\nthose that are fixed and essential because they are grounded on the\ninner nature of their terms. Both sorts of relation are matters of\nimmediate perception. Both are 'facts'....\n\n\"The third part of reality, additional to these perceptions (tho\nlargely based upon them), is the _previous truths_ of which every new\ninquiry takes account\". (Pragmatism, p. 244).\n\nAn idea's agreement with reality, or better with all those parts of\nreality, means a satisfactory relation of the idea to them. Relation\nto the sensational part of reality is found satisfactory when the idea\nleads to it without jar or discord. \"... What do the words\nverification and validation themselves pragmatically mean? They again\nsignify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated\nidea. It is hard to find any one phrase that characterizes these\nconsequences better than the ordinary agreement-formula--just such\nconsequences being what we have in mind when we say that our ideas\n'agree' with reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other\nideas which they instigate, into and up to, or towards, other parts of\nexperience with which we feel all the while ... that the original\nideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions come to us\nfrom point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory.\nThis function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's\nverification\". (Pragmatism, pp. 201-2).\n\nAn idea's relation to the other parts of reality is conceived more\nbroadly. Thus pragmatism's \"only test of probable truth is what works\nbest in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and\ncombines with the collectivity of life's demands, nothing being\nomitted. If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in\nparticular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny\nGod's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as 'not true' a\nnotion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth\ncould there be, for her, than all this _agreement with concrete\nreality_\"? (Pragmatism, p. 80, italics mine). Agreement with reality\nhere means ability to satisfy the sum of life's demands.\n\nJames considers that this leaves little room for license in the choice\nof our beliefs. \"Between the coercions of the sensible order and those\nof the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly\". \"Our (any)\ntheory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new\nexperiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as\nlittle as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or\nother that can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things;\nand the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any\nhypothesis. Our theories are thus wedged and controlled as nothing\nelse is\". \"Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees\nhimself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from\nthe past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so\nwell as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which\nour minds perform their operations\". (Pragmatism, pp. 211, 217, 233).\n\nNow on the contrary it immediately occurs to a reader that if reality\nbe simply \"what truths have to take account of\", and if\ntaking-account-of merely means agreeing in such a way as to satisfy\n\"the collectivity of life's demands\", then the proportion in which\nthese parts of reality will count will vary enormously. One person may\nfind the 'previous-truths' part of reality to make such a strong\n'demand' that he will disregard 'principles' or reasoning almost\nentirely.\n\nAnother may disregard the 'sensational' part of reality, and give no\nconsideration whatever to 'scientific' results. These things, in fact,\nare exactly the things that do take place. The opinionated person, the\ncrank, the fanatic, as well as the merely prejudiced, all refuse to\nopen their minds and give any particular consideration to such kinds\nof evidence. There is therefore a great deal of room for license, and\na great deal of license practiced, when the agreement of our ideas\nwith reality means nothing more than their satisfactoriness to our\nlives' demands.\n\nHow James fell into this error is shown, I believe, by his\noverestimation of the common man's regard for truth, and especially\nfor consistency. Thus he remarks: \"As we humans are constituted in\npoint of fact, we find that to believe in other men's minds, in\nindependent physical realities, in past events, in eternal logical\nrelations, is satisfactory.... Above all we find _consistency_\nsatisfactory, consistency between the present idea and the entire rest\nof our mental equipment....\" \"After man's interest in breathing\nfreely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates\nor remits, as most of his physical interests do), is his interest in\n_consistency_, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he\nthinks on other occasions\". (Meaning of Truth, pp. 192, 211).\n\nThe general method of James on this point, then, is to define truth in\nterms of satisfaction and then to try to show that these satisfactions\ncannot be secured illegitimately. That is, that we _must_ defer to\nexperimental findings, to consistency, and to other _checks_ on\nopinion. Consistency must be satisfactory because people are so\nconstituted as to find it so. Agreement with reality, where reality\nmeans epistemological reality, is satisfactory for the same reason.\nAnd agreement with reality, where reality includes in addition\nprinciples and previous truths, must be satisfactory because agreement\nin this case merely means such taking-account-of as will satisfy the\ngreater proportion of the demands of life. In other words, by defining\nagreement in this case in terms of satisfactions, he makes it certain\nthat agreement and satisfaction will coincide by the device of arguing\nin a circle. It turns out that, from over-anxiety to assure the\ncoincidence of agreement and satisfaction, he entirely loses the\npossibility of using reality and agreement with reality in the usual\nsense of checks on satisfactions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH BY DEWEY.\n\n\nThe position of Dewey is best represented in his paper called \"The\nExperimental Theory of Knowledge\".[13] In the method of presentation,\nthis article is much like James' account \"The Function of Cognition\".\nBoth assume some simple type of consciousness and study it by\ngradually introducing more and more complexity. In aim, also, the two\nare similar, for the purpose of each is simply to describe. Dewey\nattempts here to tell of a knowing just as one describes any other\nobject, concern, or event. \"What we want\", he announces \"is just\nsomething which takes itself for knowledge, rightly or wrongly\".\n\n   [13] Mind, N. S. 15, July 1906. Reprinted in \"The Influence\n        of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays\", p. 77.\n        Page references are to the latter.\n\nLet us suppose, then, that we have simply a floating odor. If this\nodor starts changes that end in picking and enjoying a rose, what sort\nof changes must these be to involve some where within their course\nthat which we call knowledge?\n\nNow it can be shown, first, that there is a difference between knowing\nand mere presence in consciousness. If the smell is simply displaced\nby a felt movement, and this in turn is displaced by the enjoyment of\nthe rose, in such a way that there is no experience of connection\nbetween the three stages of the process,--that is, without the\nappearance of memory or anticipation,--then \"such an experience\nneither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge\". \"Acquaintance is\npresence honored by an escort; presence is introduced as familiar, or\nan association springs up to greet it. Acquaintance always implies a\nlittle friendliness; a trace of re-knowing, of anticipatory welcome or\ndread of the trait to follow.... To be a smell (or anything else) is\none thing, to be _known_ as a smell, another; to be a 'feeling' is one\nthing, to be _known_ as a 'feeling' is another. The first is\nthinghood; existence indubitable, direct; in this way all things _are_\nthat are in 'consciousness' at all. The second is _reflected_ being,\nthings indicating and calling for other things--something offering the\npossibility of truth and hence of falsity. The first is genuine\nimmediacy; the second (in the instance discussed) a pseudo-immediacy,\nwhich in the same breath that it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in\nanother term (and one which is unexperienced both in itself and in its\nrelation) the subject of 'consciousness', to which the immediate is\nrelated.... To be acquainted with a thing is to be assured (from the\nstandpoint of the experience itself) that it is of such and such a\ncharacter; that it will behave, if given an opportunity, in such and\nsuch a way; that the obviously and flagrantly present trait is\nassociated with fellow traits that will show themselves if the leading\nof the present trait is followed out. To be acquainted is to\nanticipate to some extent, on the basis of previous experience\". (pp.\n81, 82).\n\nBesides mere existence, there is another type of experience which is\noften confused with knowledge,--a type which Dewey calls the\n'cognitive' as distinct from genuine knowledge or the 'cognitional'.\nIn this experience \"we retrospectively attribute intellectual force\nand function to the smell\". This involves memory but not anticipation.\nAs we look back from the enjoyment of the rose, we can say that in a\nsense the odor meant the rose, even though it led us here blindly.\nThat is, if the odor suggests the finding of its cause, without\nspecifying what the cause is, and if we then search about and find the\nrose, we can say that the odor meant the rose in the sense that it\nactually led to the discovery of it. \"Yet the smell is not cognitional\nbecause it did not knowingly intend to mean this, but is found, after\nthe event, to have meant it\". (p. 84).\n\nNow, \"before the category of confirmation or refutation can be\nintroduced, there must be something which _means_ to mean something\".\nLet us therefore introduce a further complexity into the illustration.\nLet us suppose that the smell occurs at a later date, and is then\n\"aware of something else which it means, which it intends to effect by\nan operation incited by it and without which its own presence is\nabortive, and, so to say, unjustified, senseless\". Here we have\nsomething \"which is contemporaneously aware of meaning something\nbeyond itself, instead of having this meaning ascribed to it by\nanother at a later period. _The odor knows the rose_, _the rose is\nknown by the odor_, and the import of each term is constituted by the\nrelationship in which it stands to the other\". (p. 88). This is the\ngenuine 'cognitional' experience.\n\nWhen the odor recurs 'cognitionally', both the odor and the rose are\npresent in the same experience, though both are not present in the\nsame way. \"Things can be presented as absent, just as they can be\npresented as hard or soft\". The enjoyment of the rose is present as\n_going_ to be there in the same way that the odor is. \"The situation\nis inherently an uneasy one--one in which everything hangs upon the\nperformance of the operation indicated; upon the adequacy of movement\nas a connecting link, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and the\nthing meant. Generalizing from this instance, we get the following\ndefinition: An experience is a knowledge, if in its quale there is an\nexperienced distinction and connection of two elements of the\nfollowing sort: one means or intends the presence of the other in the\nsame fashion in which it itself is already present, while the other is\nthat which, while not present in the same fashion, must become present\nif the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be\nfulfilled through the operation it sets up\". (p. 90).\n\nNow in the transformation from this tensional situation into a\nharmonious situation, there is an experience either of fulfilment or\ndisappointment. If there is a disappointment of expectation, this may\nthrow one back in reflection upon the original situation. The smell,\nwe may say, seemed to mean a rose, yet it did not in fact lead to a\nrose. There is something else which enters in. We then begin an\ninvestigation. \"Smells may become the object of knowledge. They may\ntake, _pro tempore_, the place which the rose formerly occupied. One\nmay, that is, observe the cases in which the odors mean other things\nthan just roses, may voluntarily produce new cases for the sake of\nfurther inspection; and thus account for the cases where meanings had\nbeen falsified in the issue; discriminate more carefully the\npeculiarities of those meanings which the event verified, and thus\nsafeguard and bulwark to some extent the employing of similar meanings\nin the future\". (p. 93). When we reflect upon these fulfilments or\nrefusals, we find in them a quality \"quite lacking to them in their\nimmediate occurrence as just fulfilments and disappointments\",--the\nquality of affording assurance and correction. \"Truth and falsity are\nnot properties of any experience or thing, in and of itself or in its\nfirst intention; but of things where the problem of assurance\nconsciously enters in. Truth and falsity present themselves as\nsignificant facts only in situations in which specific meanings and\ntheir already experienced fulfilments and non-fulfilments are\nintentionally compared and contrasted with reference to the question\nof the worth, as to the reliability of meaning, of the given meaning\nor class of meanings. Like knowledge itself, truth is an experienced\nrelation of things, and it has no meaning outside of such relation\".\n(p. 95).\n\nThough this paper is by title a discussion of a theory of knowledge,\nwe may find in this last paragraph a very clear relating of the whole\nto a theory of truth. If we attempt to differentiate in this article\nbetween knowledge and truth, we find that while Dewey uses 'knowledge'\nto refer either to the prospective or to the retrospective end of the\nexperimental experience, he evidently intends to limit truth to the\nretrospective or confirmatory end of the experience. When he says,\n\"Truth and falsity are not properties of any experience or thing in\nand of itself or in its first intention, but of things where the\nproblem of assurance consciously enters in. Truth and falsity present\nthemselves as significant facts only in situations in which specific\nmeanings and their already experienced fulfilments are intentionally\ncompared and contrasted with reference to the question of the worth,\nas to reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of\nmeanings\", it seems that truth is to be confined to retrospective\nexperience. The truth of an idea means that it allows one at its\nfulfilment to look back at its former meaning and think of it as now\nconfirmed. The difference between knowledge and truth is then a\ndifference in the time at which the developing experience is examined.\nIf one takes the experience at the appearance of the knowing odor, he\ngets acquaintance; if one takes it at the stage at which it has\ndeveloped into a confirmation, he gets truth. Knowledge may be either\nstage of the experience of verification, but truth is confined to the\nlater, confirmatory, stage.\n\nTruth, then, is simply a matter of confirmation of prediction or of\nfulfilment of expectation. An idea is made true by leading as it\npromised. And an idea is made false when it leads to refutation of\nexpectation. There seems to be no necessity here for an absolute\nreality for the ideas to conform to, or 'correspond' to, for truth is\na certain kind of relation between the ideas themselves--the relation,\nnamely, of leading to fulfilment of expectations.\n\n\nCONTRAST BETWEEN JAMES AND DEWEY.\n\nIf, now, we wish to bring out the difference between the account of\ntruth which we have just examined and the account that is given by\nJames, we will find the distinction quite evident. Truth, for Dewey,\nis that relation which arises when, at an experience of fulfilment,\none looks back to the former experience and thinks of its leading as\nnow confirmed. An idea is true, therefore, when we can refer back to\nit in this way and say, \"That pointing led me to this experience, as\nit said it would\". The pointing, by bringing a fulfilment, is _made_\ntrue--at this point of confirmation it _becomes_ true.\n\nSince a true idea is defined, then, as one which leads as it promised,\nit is obvious that truth will not be concerned in any way with\nincidental or accidental _values_ which might be led to by the idea.\nIt has no relation to whether the goal is _worth while_ being led to\nor not. James speaks of truth as a leading that is worth while. For\nDewey the goal may be valuable, useless, or even pernicious,--these\nare entirely irrelevant to truth, which is determined solely by the\nfact that the idea leads _as it promised_.\n\nThe existence of this distinction was pointed out, after the\nappearance of James' \"Pragmatism\", by Dewey himself.[14] After a\ncareful discussion of some other points of difference, he says of this\nmatter of the place of the value of an idea in reference to its truth:\n\"We have the theory that ideas as ideas are always working hypotheses\nconcerning attaining particular empirical results, and are tentative\nprograms (or sketches of method) for attaining them. If we stick\nconsistently to this notion of ideas, only consequences which are\nactually produced by the working of the idea in cooperation with, or\napplication to, prior realities are good consequences in the specific\nsense of good which is relevant to establishing the truth of an idea.\nThis is, at times, unequivocally recognized by Mr. James.... But at\nother times any good that flows from acceptance of a belief is treated\nas if it were an evidence, _in so far_, of the truth of the idea. This\nholds particularly when theological notions are under consideration.\nLight would be thrown upon how Mr. James conceives this matter by\nstatements from him on such points as these: If ideas terminate in\ngood consequences, but yet the goodness of the consequence was no part\nof the intention of the idea, does the goodness have any verifying\nforce? If the goodness of consequences arises from the context of the\nidea rather than from the idea itself, does it have any verifying\nforce? If an idea leads to consequences which are good in the _one_\nrespect only of fulfilling the intent of the idea, (as when one drinks\na liquid to test the idea that it is a poison), does the badness of\nthe consequences in every other respect detract from the verifying\nforce of these consequences?\n\n   [14] \"What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical?\",\n        Journal of Philosophy, etc., 1908, v. 5, p. 85.\n\n\"Since Mr. James has referred to me as saying 'truth is what gives\nsatisfaction' (p. 234), I may remark ... that I never identified _any_\nsatisfaction with the truth of an idea, save _that_ satisfaction which\narises when the idea as working hypothesis or tentative method is\napplied to prior existences in such a way as to fulfil what it\nintends....\n\n\"When he says ... of the idea of an absolute, 'so far as it affords\nsuch comfort it surely is not sterile, it has that amount of value; it\nperforms a concrete function. As a good pragmatist I ought to call the\nabsolute true _in so far forth_ then; and I unhesitatingly now do so',\nthe doctrine seems to be unambiguous: that _any_ good, consequent upon\nacceptance of belief, is, in so far forth, a warrant for truth. Of\ncourse Mr. James holds that this 'in so far' goes a very small way....\nBut even the slightest concession, is, I think, non-pragmatic unless\nthe satisfaction is relevant to the idea as intent. Now the\nsatisfaction in question comes not from the _idea as idea_, but from\nits acceptance _as true_. Can a satisfaction dependent upon an\nassumption that an idea is already true be relevant to testing the\ntruth of an idea? And can an idea, like that of the absolute, which,\nif true, 'absolutely' precludes any appeal to consequences as test of\ntruth, be confirmed by use of the pragmatic test without sheer\nself-contradiction\"?[15] \"An explicit statement as to whether the\ncarrying function, the linking of things, is satisfactory and\nprosperous and hence true in so far as it executes the intent of the\nidea; or whether the satisfaction and prosperity reside in the\nmaterial consequences on their own account and in that aspect make the\nidea true, would, I am sure, locate the point at issue and economize\nand fructify future discussion. At present pragmatism is accepted by\nthose whose own notions are thoroughly rationalistic in make-up as a\nmeans of refurbishing, galvanizing, and justifying those very notions.\nIt is rejected by non-rationalists (empiricists and naturalistic\nidealists) because it seems to them identified with the notion that\npragmatism holds that the desirability of certain beliefs overrides\nthe question of the meaning of the idea involved in them and the\nexistence of objects denoted by them. Others (like myself) who believe\nthoroughly in pragmatism as a method of orientation as defined by Mr.\nJames, and who would apply the method to the determination of the\nmeaning of objects, the intent and worth of ideas as ideas, and to the\nhuman and moral value of beliefs, when these problems are carefully\ndistinguished from one another, do not know whether they are\npragmatists or not, because they are not sure whether the 'practical',\nin the sense of the desirable facts which define the worth of a\nbelief, is confused with the practical as an attitude imposed by\nobjects, and with the practical as a power and function of idea to\neffect changes in prior existences. Hence the importance of knowing\nwhat pragmatism means by practical....\n\n   [15] The last four sentences appear in a footnote.\n\n\"I would do Mr. James an injustice, however, to stop here. His real\ndoctrine, I think, is that a belief is true when it satisfies _both_\nthe personal needs _and_ the requirements of objective things.\nSpeaking of pragmatism, he says, 'Her only test of probable truth is\nwhat works best in the way of _leading us_, what fits every part of\nlife best _and combines with the collectivity of experience's\ndemands_, nothing being omitted'. And again, 'That new idea is truest\nwhich performs most felicitously its function of satisfying _our\ndouble urgency_'. (p. 64). It does not appear certain from the context\nthat this 'double urgency' is that of the personal and the objective\ndemands, but it is probable.... On this basis, the 'in so far forth'\nof the truth of the absolute because of the comfort it supplies, means\nthat _one_ of the two conditions which need to be satisfied has been\nmet, so that if the absolute met the other one also it would be quite\ntrue. I have no doubt that this is Mr. James' meaning, and it\nsufficiently safeguards him from charges that pragmatism means that\nanything that is agreeable is true. At the same time, I do not think,\nin logical strictness, that satisfying one of two tests, when\nsatisfaction of both is required, can be said to constitute a belief\ntrue even 'in so far forth'\".\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nSUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.\n\n\nWriting as a scientist and publishing his work in a scientific\njournal, Peirce proposed in 1878 a new method for making our ideas\nclear. He was attempting a description of the logic of the sciences.\nHe believed himself to be showing how the greatest of our modern\nthinkers do make clear to themselves their ideas of the objects with\nwhich they work. The meaning of anything, said Peirce, consists in the\nactual or possible effects which it might produce. Our idea of the\nthing is clear when we have in mind these sensible effects. This\ntheory of clearness he called pragmatism.\n\nNo one, it seems, paid any especial attention to this theory at the\ntime. But twenty years later James brought the subject to the\nforefront of discussion by explaining it anew in his exceptionally\nlucid way and by making a particular application of it to religion.\nBut for James the method for clearness very soon grew into a new\ntheory of truth, and in this way, in spite of the fact that the method\nhad been proposed by a scientist as a description of the procedure of\nscience, he seems to have lost for it the support of science. The\nreason for this outcome was his introduction of value as a criterion\nfor truth. This, James recognizes, was counter to all the scientific\nideals of many of the workers in science, for the essence of their\nprocedure, as they saw it, was to put all desire as to outcomes behind\nthem and to try to find out how things actually prove or test out to\nbe, quite apart from how we would like them to be. To introduce the\ngeneral value of an outcome, then, as a criterion for truth, seems to\ndestroy what the scientist had been thinking of as 'pure research',\nand to involve control by an outside influence that would determine\nwhich things are or are not valuable and worth investigating. It was\nsufficiently well known to the scientist that most of the greatest\nscientific discoveries were made by men who had no appreciation or\ninterest in the general utility of the outcome, and whose results were\napplied only much later and, as it were, by accident. To say, then,\nthat the truth of an idea was influenced by its general value was to\nrun afoul of all the sorely sensitive ideals which the scientist had\nacquired in his recent contest with the domination of the church. It\nis hardly to be wondered at, therefore, that the interpretation of\npragmatism given by James was not popular with persons of a scientific\ntemperament.\n\nFurther, if the value or desirability of an idea has an influence upon\nits truth, then truth will vary from person to person, for\ndesirability varies with the taste of the person concerned. Peirce had\nwarned against individual standards of truth in his discussion of the\nMethods of Fixing Belief. The scientific conception, as it had\ndifferentiated itself from other conceptions of truth, had attempted\nto secure a kind of truth not determined by what we would like or by\nwhat can be made to seem desirable by oratory or by what can be made\nto win out over other opinions by skill in debate, but by some\ncriterion quite apart from desire and opinion. Peirce had attempted\nsuch a criterion in his postulate of an unchanging eternal reality.\nInstead, that is, of consulting with each other, of debating with each\nother to find the truth, we ought to consult this reality. In other\nwords, to undertake scientific experiment. Such had been Peirce's\ndescription of the scientific and modern method of attaining truth as\ncontrasted, as he says, with that of the medievalists.\n\nNow the difficulty in Peirce's method, as we have seen, was that this\npostulate of an external reality unaffected by our opinions would not\nendure the test for clearness. Every object, says Peirce, reduces to\nthe sum of its effects. The only effect of real things, he says again,\nis to produce belief. From these two propositions it would seem to\nfollow that reality is a sum of beliefs. But this, of course,\neliminates any unchanging reality independent of our opinions about\nit.\n\nWe saw further that Peirce defined both belief and meaning as habit\nand made no distinction between them. Now as belief and meaning are\nobviously not the same, we are in need of new definitions for these\nterms.\n\nAt this point we turned to the interpretation of Dewey. For Dewey the\ndistinction would seem to be that while meaning may well be defined as\nhabit, belief is to be defined as expectation. If we believe in\nanything, this means that we expect certain results from it. To\nbelieve is to suppose that if we were to come into relation with the\nthing we would find certain effects to come about.\n\nFrom this conception the Deweyan theory of truth would seem to follow\nimmediately. If belief means a sum of expectations, the truth of a\nbelief would mean the verification of these expectations. A true\nbelief simply means one that fulfils expectations.\n\nThe Deweyan development of the pragmatic method is obviously very much\nmore in harmony with the procedure of science than that of James.\nJames seems to have 'left the track' in his interpretation of the\npragmatic method when he related truth to the predominantly valuable.\nTruth we have found to have no necessary or invariable connection with\ngeneral value, for many ideas would be acknowledged to be perfectly\ntrue while at the same time being either useless or harmful. For Dewey\nthis matter of value has no place in relation to the test of the truth\nof an idea, for its truth means nothing more than its ability to lead\nas it promises.\n\nWe seem, then, it may be said in conclusion, to be confronted with\nsomething like the following alternatives:\n\nIf we believe that Dewey could not have made a correct deduction from\nthe pragmatic method when he developed it into a theory of truth\nmaking truth dependent upon fulfilled expectations alone, then very\nobviously the next step in this investigation is to find the point at\nwhich his inference went wrong. This means a re-examination of each\nstep in his reasoning.\n\nIf we believe that Dewey does make a correct deduction from the\npragmatic method in this development toward truth, then we are\nconfronted with the alternative of either accepting the Deweyan theory\nof truth or of rejecting the Peircian theory of clearness. That is, if\nwe begin with Peirce on method, we must then go clear through to Dewey\non truth. And if we reject Dewey, while believing that Peirce gave a\ncorrect description of the method of science, then it seems that we\nmust conclude that the method of science and the method of philosophy\nare not the same.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\nTHE WORKS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE\n\n1865. On an improvement of Boole's calculus of logic. Proc. Am. Acad.\n          Arts and Sci., v. 7, p. 250.\n\n1867. Logical Papers.\n\n1868. Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man. Jour.\n          Spec. Phil. 2:103.\n\n      Nominalism and realism. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:57.\n\n      On the meaning of 'determined'. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:190.\n\n      Some consequences of four incapacities. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:140.\n\n      Grounds for the validity of the laws of logic. Jour. Spec.\n          Phil. 2:193.\n\n1871. 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Monist 18:227, 416, 19:36.\n\n      A neglected argument for the reality of God. Hib. Jour. 7:90.\n\n1910. On non-Aristotelian logic. Monist 20:158.\n\n\nTHE WORKS OF WILLIAM JAMES\n\nA \"List of the Published Writings of William James\" will be found in\nthe Psychological Review for March 1911, v. 18, p. 157.\n\n\nTHE WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY\n\n_On Logic and Metaphysics:_\n\n1882. The metaphysical assumptions of materialism. Jour. Spec.\n          Phil. 16:208.\n\n      The pantheism of Spinoza. Jour. Spec. Phil. 16:249.\n\n1883. Knowledge and the relativity of feeling. Jour. Spec. Phil. 17:56.\n\n1884. Kant and philosophic method. Jour. Spec. Phil. 18:162.\n\n1886. The psychological standpoint. Mind 11:1.\n\n      Psychology as philosophic method. Mind 11:153.\n\n1887. \"Illusory psychology.\" Mind 12:83.\n\n      Knowledge as idealization. Mind 12:382.\n\n1888. Leibniz's New Essays Concerning Human Understanding.\n\n1890. On some current conceptions of the term 'self'. Mind 15:58.\n\n1891. The present position of logical theory. Monist 2:1.\n\n1892. The superstition of necessity. Monist 3:362.\n\n1894. The ego as cause. Phil. Rev. 3:337.\n\n1895. Interest as Related To Will.\n\n1900. Some stages of logical thought. Phil. Rev. 9:465.\n\n1903. Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality.\n\n      (And others) Studies in Logical Theory.\n\n1904. Notes upon logical topics.\n        I--A classification of contemporary tendencies. Jour. Phil. 1:57.\n        II--The meaning of the term idea. Jour. Phil. 1:175.\n\n1905. Immediate empiricism. Jour. Phil. 2:597.\n\n      The knowledge experience and its relationships. Jour. Phil. 2:652.\n\n      The knowledge experience again. Jour. Phil. 2:707.\n\n      The postulate of immediate empiricism. Jour. Phil. 2:393.\n\n      The realism of pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 2:324.\n\n1906. Reality as experience. Jour. Phil. 3:253.\n\n      The terms 'conscious' and 'consciousness'. Jour. 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Jour.\n          Phil. 7:169.\n\n      Science as subject-matter and as method. Science n. s. 31:121.\n\n      How We Think.\n\n      Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays.\n\n1911. Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding. Jour. Phil. 8:77.\n\n      Brief studies in realism. Jour. Phil. 8:393, 546.\n\n      Joint discussion with Dr. Spaulding. Jour. Phil. 8:574.\n\n1912. Reply to Professor McGilvary's questions. Jour. Phil. 9:19.\n\n      In response to Professor McGilvary. Jour. Phil. 9:544.\n\n      Perception and organic action. Jour. Phil. 9:645.\n\n      Reply to Professor Royce's critique of instrumentalism. Phil.\n          Rev. 21:69.\n\n\n_On Psychology, Ethics, Education, etc.:_\n\n1890. Moral theory and practice. Int. Jour. Ethics 1:186.\n\n1891. Psychology.\n\n      Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics.\n\n1892. Green's theory of the moral motive. Phil. Rev. 1:593.\n\n1893. Teaching ethics in high school. Ed. Rev. 6:313.\n\n      Self-realization as the moral ideal. Phil. Rev. 2:652.\n\n1894. The psychology of infant language. Psy. Rev. 1:63.\n\n      The theory of emotion.\n        I--Emotional attitudes. Psy. Rev. 1:553.\n\n1895. The theory of emotion.\n        II--The significance of the emotions. Psy. Rev. 2:13.\n\n1896. The metaphysical method in ethics. Psy. Rev. 3:181\n\n      The reflex arc concept in psychology. Psy. Rev. 3:357.\n\n      Influence of the high school upon educational methods.\n          Ed. Rev. 4:1.\n\n1897. The psychology of effort. Phil. Rev. 6:43.\n\n      (And J. A. McLellan) Psychology of Number and its Application to\n          Methods of Teaching Arithmetic.\n\n      Evolution and ethics. Monist 8:321.\n\n      Psychological aspects of school curriculums. Ed. Rev. 13:356.\n\n1898. Some remarks on the psychology of number. Ped. Sem. 5:426.\n\n      W. T. Harris's Psychological Foundation of Education. Ed. Rev. 16:1.\n\n      Social interpretations. Phil. Rev. 7:631.\n\n1900. Psychology and social practice. Psy. Rev. 7:105.\n\n1901. Psychology and Social Practice.\n\n      Are the schools doing what the people want them to do? Ed.\n          Rev. 21:459.\n\n      The situation as regards the course of study. Ed. Rev. 22:26.\n\n1902. The evolutionary method as applied to morality.\n        I--Its scientific necessity. Phil. Rev. 11:107.\n        II--Its significance for conduct. Phil. Rev. 11:353.\n\n      Interpretation of the savage mind. Psy. Rev. 9:217.\n\n      Academic freedom. Ed. Rev. 23:1.\n\n      Problems in secondary education. Sch. Rev. 19:13.\n\n      Syllabus of courses. El. Sch. 73:200.\n\n      The school as a social center. El. Sch. 73:563.\n\n1903. Emerson: The philosopher of democracy. Int. Jour. Ethics 13:405.\n\n      Shortening the years of elementary schooling. Sch. Rev. 11:17.\n\n      The psychological and the logical in teaching geometry. Ed.\n          Rev. 25:386.\n\n1904. The philosophical work of Herbert Spencer. Phil. Rev. 13:159.\n\n1906. Culture and industry in education. Ed. Bi-Monthly 1:1.\n\n      The Educational Situation.\n\n1907. The life of reason. Ed. Rev. 34:116.\n\n1908. (And Tufts) Ethics.\n\n      Religion and our schools. Hib. Jour. 6:796.\n\n1909. Is nature good? Hib. Jour. 7:827.\n\n      Moral Principles in Education.\n\n1910. How We Think.\n\n      William James. Jour. Phil. 7:505.\n\n1911. Is coeducation injurious to girls? Ladies Home Jour. 28:22.\n\n      Maeterlinck's philosophy of life. Hib. Jour. 9:765.\n\n1913. Interest and Effort in Education.\n\n      An undemocratic proposal. Vocational Ed. 2:374.\n\n      Industrial education and democracy. Survey 29:870.\n\n1914. Report on the Fairhope experiment in organic education.\n          Survey 32:199.\n\n      National policy of industrial education. New Republic, v. I.\n\n      Nature and reason in law. Int. Jour. Eth. 25:25.\n\n\nWORKS ON TRUTH\n\n(See also the list under 'Pragmatism').\n\n1624. Herbert de Clerbury, E.--De Veritate Prout Distinguitur a\n          Revelatione, a Possibiliti et a Falso.\n\n1674. Malbranche, N.--De la Recherche de la Verite.\n\n1690. Locke, J.--Essay Concerning the Human Understanding.\n\n1780. Beattie, James.--An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth.\n\n1781. Kant, Im.--Kritik der reinen Vernunft.\n\n1800. Kant, Im.--Logik.\n\n1811. Fries, J.--System der Logik, p. 448 ff.\n\n1817. Hegel, F.--Encyclopaedie. Sec. 21.\n\n1826. Hume, D.--Treatise on Human Nature. iv, sec. 2.\n\n1840. Abercombie, J.--An Inquiry Concerning the Intellectual Powers and\n          the Investigation of Truth.\n\n1842. Thomson, W.--Outlines of the Necessary Laws of Thought.\n\n1854. Bailey, S.--Essays on the Pursuit of Truth.\n\n1862. Tiberghien, G.--Logique. v. 2, pp. 322-355.\n\n1866. Hamilton, Sir Wm.--Logic. Lectures 28-31.\n\n1875. Forster, W.--Wahrheit und Wahrschleinlichkeit.\n\n1877. Jevons, W. S.--The Principles of Science. 2nd ed., pp. 374-396.\n\n1878. Schuppe, W.--Logik. v. 1, pp. 622-696.\n\n1880. Wundt, W.--Logik.\n\n1882. Bergmann, J.--Die Grundprobleme der Logik. p. 96ff.\n\n1884. Schulbert-Soldern, R. von.--Grundlagen einer Erkenntnisstheorie.\n          p. 156ff.\n\n1885. Royce, J.--The Religious Aspect of Philosophy.\n\n1889. Argyle, Duke of--What Is Truth?\n\n      Stephen, L.--On some kinds of necessary truth. Mind 14:50, 188.\n\n1890. Carus, Paul--The criterion of truth. Monist 1:229.\n\n1892. Rickert, H.--Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss. Freib. pp. 63-64.\n\n1893. Bradley, F. H.--Appearance and Reality. Chapters 16, 24.\n\n      Cousin, Victor--Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.\n\n      Soyen, Shakn--Universality of truth. Monist 4:161.\n\n      Miller, D. S.--The meaning of truth and error. Phil. Rev. 2:408.\n\n      Smith, W.--Certitude. Phil. Rev. 2:665.\n\n1894. Gordy, J. P.--The test of belief. Phil. Rev. 3:257.\n\n1895. Jerusalem, W.--Die Urteilsfunction. p. 185ff.\n\n      Bosanquet, B.--Essentials of Logic. pp. 69-79.\n\n      Sigwart, C.--Logic. v. 1, pp. 295-326.\n\n1896. Hodder, A.--Truth and the tests of truth. Phil. Rev. 5:1.\n\n      Wundt, W.--Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus. Phil.\n          Studien 12:332.\n\n1897. Brochard, Victor--De L'Erreur.\n\n      Jordan, D. S.--The stability of truth. Pop. Sci. Mo. 4:642, 749.\n\n      Struempell, Ludw.--Unterchiede der Wahrheiten und irrtuemer. p. 58.\n\n1898. Baillie, J. B.--Truth and history. Mind 7:506.\n\n      Powell, J. W.--Truth and Error.\n\n1899. Eisler, W.--Woerterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe.\n\n1900. Sidgwick, H.--Criteria of truth and error. Mind 9:8.\n\n1901. Creighton, J. E.--Methodology and truth. Phil. Rev. 10:408.\n\n      French, F. C.--The doctrine of the twofold truth. Phil.\n          Rev. 10:477.\n\n      Royce, J.--The World and the Individual.\n\n      Smyth, J.--Truth and Reality.\n\n1902. Baldwin, J. M.--Development and Evolution. Chapter 17.\n\n      Pritchett, H. S.--What is truth? Outlook 70:620.\n\n1903. Duprat, Guillaume L.--Le Mesonge. Etude de psycho-sociologie\n          pathologique et normale.\n\n      Pilate's What is truth. Catholic World 77:705.\n\n1904. Bradley, F. H.--On truth and practice. Mind 13:309.\n\n      Glasenapp, G. v.--Der Wert der Wahrheit. Zeitsch. f. Philos. u.\n          phil. Kr. 123:186, 124:25.\n\n      Rogers, A. K.--James on humanism and truth. Jour. Phil. 1:693.\n\n1905. Alexander, H. B.--Phenomenalism and the problem of knowledge.\n          Jour. Phil. 2:182.\n\n      Alexander, H. B.--Quantity, quality, and the function of\n          knowledge. Jour. Phil. 2:459.\n\n      Hyslop, J. H.--Problems of Philosophy. Chapter 7.\n\n      Joachim, H. H.--'Absolute' and 'relative' truth. Mind 14:1.\n\n      Joseph, H. W. B.--Professor James on 'humanism and truth'.\n          Mind 14:28.\n\n      Knox, H. V.--Mr. Bradley's absolute criterion. Mind 14:210.\n\n      Overstreet, H. A.--Conceptual completeness and abstract truth.\n          Phil. Rev. 14:308.\n\n      Pitkin, W. B.--Psychology of eternal truths. Jour. Phil. 2:449.\n\n      Taylor, A. E.--Truth and practice. Phil. Rev. 14:265.\n\n1906. Gore, George--Scientific sketch of untruth. Monist 16:96.\n\n      Russell, B.--The nature of truth. Mind 15:528.\n\n      Review of Joachim's The Nature of Truth. Nation 83:42.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.---The ambiguity of truth. Mind 15:161.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Joachim's The Nature of Truth. Jour.\n          Phil. 3:549.\n\n      Taylor, A. E.--Truth and consequences. Mind 15:81.\n\n      Openmindedness. Catholic World 82:756.\n\n1908. Bakewell, C. M.--On the meaning of truth. Phil. Rev. 17:579.\n\n      Creighton, J. E.--The nature and criterion of truth. Phil.\n          Rev. 17:592.\n\n      Gardiner, H. N.--The problems of truth. Phil. Rev. 17:113.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--Truth value. Jour. Phil. 5:429.\n\n      Prat, J. B.--Truth and ideas. Jour. Phil. 5:122.\n\n      Urbana, F. M.--On a supposed criterion of the absolute truth of\n          some propositions. Jour. Phil. 5:701.\n\n1909. Bradley, F. H.--On truth and coherence. Mind 18:322.\n\n      Bradley, F. H.--Coherence and contradiction. Mind 18:489.\n\n      Buckham, J. W.--Organization of truth. Int. Jour. Eth. 20:63.\n\n      Carritt, E. F.--Truth in art and religion. Hib. Jour. 8:362.\n\n      Knox, H. V.--The evolution of truth. Quarterly Rev. No. 419.\n\n1910. Alexander, H. B.--Truth and nature. Monist 20:585.\n\n      Boodin, J. E.--The nature of truth. Phil. Rev. 19:395.\n\n      Bradley, F. H.--On appearance, error, and contradiction.\n          Mind 19:153.\n\n      Jacobson, Edmund--Relational account of truth. Jour. Phil. 7:253.\n\n      Russell, B.--Philosophical Essays. Essays 5, 6, 7.\n\n      Schmidt, Karl--Hertz's theory of truth. Monist 20:445.\n\n      Tsanoff, R. A.--Professor Boodin on the nature of truth. Phil.\n          Rev. 19:632.\n\n      Plea for the half-truth. Atlantic 105:576.\n\n      Truth as once for all delivered. Bib. World 35:219.\n\n1911. Alexander, H. B.--Goodness and beauty of truth. Jour. Phil. 5:29.\n\n      Boodin, J. E.--The divine five-fold truth. Monist 21:288.\n\n      Boodin, J. E.--The nature of truth: a reply. Phil. Rev. 20:59.\n\n      Boodin, J. E.--Truth and Reality.\n\n      Bradley, F. F.--On some aspects of truth. Mind 20:305.\n\n      Carus, Paul--Truth on Trial.\n\n      McGilvary, E. B.--The 'fringe' of William James's psychology as\n          the basis of logic. Phil. Rev. 20:137.\n\n      Rother, A. J.--Certitude.\n\n      Royce, J.--William James, and Other Essays.\n\n      Self-sufficiency of truth. Bib. World 37:147.\n\n1912. Fawcett, E. D.--Truth's 'original object'. Mind 21:89.\n\n      Larson, C. D.--What Is Truth?\n\n      Leuba, J. H.--Religion and the discovery of truth. Jour.\n          Phil. 9:406.\n\n      Review of Jordan's Stability of Truth. Int. Jour. Eth. 23:92.\n\n      Zahlfeisch, Johann--Ist die Luege erlaubt? Archiv. f. system.\n          Philos. 18:241.\n\n1913. Alexander, S.--Collective willing and truth. Mind 22:14, 161.\n\n      Gerould, K. F.--Boundarie of truth. Atlantic 112:454.\n\n      Lloyd, A. H.--Conformity, consistency, and truth. Jour.\n          Phil. 10:281.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--The aviary theory of truth and error. Jour.\n          Phil. 10:542.\n\n      Wright, W. K.--Genesis of the categories. Jour. Phil. 10:645.\n\n      Wright, H. W.--Practical success as the criterion of truth.\n          Phil. Rev. 22:606.\n\n1914. Bowman, A. A.--The problem of knowledge from the standpoint of\n          validity. Phil. Rev. 23:1, 146, 299.\n\n      Bradley, F. H.--Essays on Truth and Reality.\n\n      Broad, C. D.--Mr. Bradley on truth and reality. Mind 23:349.\n\n      Capron, F. H.--Anatomy of Truth.\n\n      Leighton, J. A.--Truth, reality, and relation. Phil. Rev. 23:17.\n\n      Rother, A. J.--Truth and Error.\n\n      Sidgwick, A.--Truth and working. Mind 23:99.\n\n      Strange, E. H.--Objectives, truth, and error. Mind 23:489.\n\n\nWORKS ON PRAGMATISM\n\n(See also the list under 'Truth').\n\n1900. Caldwell, W.--Pragmatism. Mind 9:433.\n\n1902. Schiller, F. C. S.--'Useless' knowledge. Mind 11:196.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Axioms As Postulates.\n\n1903. King, Irving--Pragmatism as a philosophical method. Phil.\n          Rev. 12:511.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Humanism: Philosophical Essays.\n\n1904. Bawden, Heath--What is pragmatism? Jour. Phil. 1:421.\n\n      Creighton, J. E.--Purpose as a logical category. Phil. Rev. 13:284.\n\n      Leighton, J. A.--Pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 1:148.\n\n1905. Bode, B. H.--Pure experience and the external world. Jour.\n          Phil. 2:128.\n\n      Bode, B. H.--The cognitive experience and its object. Jour.\n          Phil. 2:658.\n\n      Bode, B. H.--The concept of pure experience. Phil. Rev. 14:684.\n\n      Hoernle, R. F. A.--Pragmatism versus absolutism. Mind 14:297, 441.\n\n      King, Irving--Pragmatic interpretation of the Christian dogma.\n          Monist 15:248.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism and its critics. Phil. Rev. 14:284.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--The definition of 'pragmatism' and\n          'humanism'. Mind 14:235.\n\n1906. Bode, B. H.--Realism and pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 3:393.\n\n      Colvin, S. S.--Pragmatism, old and new. Monist 16:547.\n\n      Rogers, A. K.--Professor James' theory of knowledge. Phil.\n          Rev. 15:577.\n\n      Rousmaniere, F. H.--A definition of experimentation. Jour.\n          Phil. 3:673.\n\n      Russell, J. E.--Pragmatism's meaning of truth. Jour. Phil. 3:599.\n\n      Russell, J. E.--Some difficulties with the epistemology of\n          pragmatism and radical empiricism. Phil. Rev. 15:406.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Pragmatism and pseudo-pragmatism.\n\n      Sturt, H.--Idola Theatri, a Criticism of Oxford Thought and\n          Thinkers from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism. Mind 15:375.\n\n      Vailati, Giovanni--Pragmatism and mathematical logic. Monist\n      16:481.\n\n1907. Brown, W. A.--Pragmatic value of the absolute. Jour.\n          Phil. 4:459.\n\n      Bush, W. T.--Papini on Introduzione al prafmatismo. Jour.\n          Phil. 4:639.\n\n      Foster, G. B.--Pragmatism and knowledge. Am. Jour. Theol. 11:591.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--Perry on pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 4:567.\n\n      Nichols, H.--Pragmatism versus science. Jour. Phil. 4:122.\n\n      Papini, G.--What pragmatism is like. Pop. Sci. Mo. 71:351.\n\n      Perry, R. B.--A review of pragmatism as a philosophical\n          generalization. Jour. Phil. 4:421.\n\n      Perry, R. B.--A review of pragmatism as a theory of knowledge.\n          Jour. Phil. 4:365.\n\n      Pratt, J. B.--Truth and its verification. Jour. Phil. 4:320.\n\n      Review of Schiller's Humanism. Nation 84:436.\n\n      Review of Papini's Tragico Quotidiano. Nation 85:521.\n\n      Reviews of James's Pragmatism. Bookman 26:215. No. Am. 185:884.\n          Science n. s. 26:464. Nation 85:57. Ind. 63:630.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--The pragmatic babe in the woods. Jour.\n          Phil. 4:42.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Cure of doubt. Jour. Phil. 4:235.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Pragmatism versus skepticism. Jour.\n          Phil. 4:482.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Studies in Humanism.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Review of James's Pragmatism. Mind 16:593.\n\n      Sellars, R. W.--Dewey's view of agreement. Jour. Phil. 4:432.\n\n      Shorey, P.--Equivocation of pragmatism. Dial 43:273.\n\n      Slosson, E. E.--What is pragmatism? Ind. 62:422.\n\n      Talbot, Ellen B.--The philosophy of Fichte in its relation to\n          pragmatism. Phil. Rev. 16:488.\n\n      Fascination of the pragmatic method. Cur. Lit. 43:186.\n\n      A new philosophy. Harper's W. 51:1264.\n\n      The newest philosophy. Cur. Lit. 42:652.\n\n      Pragmatic philosophy. Ind. 62:797.\n\n      Pragmatism, a new philosophy. Ed. Rev. 34:227.\n\n      Where pragmatism fails. Cur. Lit. 46:415.\n\n1908. Armstrong, A. C.--Evolution of pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 5:645.\n\n      Bawden, H. H.--New philosophy called pragmatism. Pop. Sci.\n          Mo. 73:61.\n\n      Bradley, F. H.--On the ambiguity of pragmatism. Mind 17:226.\n\n      Burke, J. B.--Fashionable philosophy at Oxford and Harvard. Liv.\n          Age 257:559.\n\n      Bush, W. T.--Provisional and eternal truth. Jour. Phil. 5:181.\n\n      Carus, Paul--Pragmatism. Monist 18:321.\n\n      Hebert, M.--Le Pragmatisme. Etude de ses Diverse Formes.\n\n      Hibben, J. B.--The test of pragmatism. Phil. Rev. 17:365.\n\n      Lovejoy, A. O.--Thirteen pragmatisms. Jour. Phil. 5:5, 29.\n\n      Lovejoy, A. O.--Pragmatism and theology. Am. Jour. Theol. 12:116.\n\n      McGilvary, E. B.--British exponents of pragmatism. Hib.\n          Jour. 6:632.\n\n      McTaggart, J. E.--Review of James's Pragmatism. Mind 17:104.\n\n      Salter, W. M.--A. new philosophy. Atlantic 101:657.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Is Mr. Bradley a pragmatism? Mind 17:370.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--British exponents of pragmatism. Hib.\n          Jour. 6:903.\n\n      Schinz, A.--Dewey's pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 5:617.\n\n      Sidgwick, A.--The ambiguity of pragmatism. Mind 17:368.\n\n      Strong, A. L.--Religious aspects of pragmatism. Am. Jour.\n          Theol. 12:231.\n\n      Strong, C. A.--Pragmatism and its definition of truth. Jour.\n          Phil. 5:256.\n\n      Vialiti, G.--A pragmatic zoologist. Monist 18:142.\n\n1909. Agnew, P. G.--What is pragmatism? Forum 41:70.\n\n      Carus, Paul--A German critic of pragmatism. Monist 19:136.\n\n      Carus, Paul--A postscript on pragmatism. Monist 19:85.\n\n      Carus, Paul--Professor John Hibben on 'the test of pragmatism'.\n          Monist 19:319.\n\n      Corrance, H. C.--Review of Hebert's Le Pragmatisme. Hib.\n          Jour. 7:218.\n\n      Cox, J. W.--Concepts of truth and reality. Am. Cath. Q. 34:139.\n\n      Huizinga, A. V.--The American philosophy pragmatism. Bib. Sac. 66:78.\n\n      Kallen, H. M.--Affiliations of pragmatism. Jour. Phil. 6:655.\n\n      Kallen, H. M.--Dr. Montague and the pragmatic notion of value.\n          Jour. Phil. 6:549.\n\n      Knox, H. V.--Pragmatism: the evolution of truth. Quarterly\n          Rev. 210:379.\n\n      Ladd, G. T.--The confusion of pragmatism. Hib. Jour. 7:784.\n\n      McGilvary, E. B.--British exponents of pragmatism (A rejoinder).\n          Hib. Jour. 7:443.\n\n      Montague, W. P.--The true, the good, and the beautiful from a\n          pragmatic standpoint. Jour. Phil. 6:233.\n\n      Montague, W. P.--May a realist be a pragmatist? Jour.\n          Phil. 6:460, 485, 543, 501.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--\"Anti-pragmatisme.\" Jour. Phil. 6:291.\n\n      Moore, T. V.--Pragmatism of William James. Catholic World 90:341.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism and solipsism. Jour. Phil. 6:378.\n\n      More, P. E.--New stage of pragmatism. Nation 88:456.\n\n      Murray, D. L.--Pragmatic realism. Mind 18:377.\n\n      Pratt, J. B.--What Is Pragmatism?\n\n      Pratt, J. B.--What is pragmatism? Am. Jour. Theol. 13:477.\n\n      Schiller, F. C S.--Humanism and intuition. Mind 18:125.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Logic as psychology. Mind 18:400.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Humanism, intuitionism, and objective\n          reality. Mind 18:570.\n\n      Schinz, A.--Anti-pragmatisme.\n\n      Schinz, A.--Rousseau a forerunner of pragmatism. Monist 19:481.\n\n      Schinz, A.--A few words in reply to Professor Moore's criticism\n          of 'Anti-pragmatism'. Jour. Phil. 6:434.\n\n      Shackleford, T. M.--What pragmatism is, as I understand it.\n          Pop. Sci. Mo. 75:571.\n\n      Taylor, A. E.--Review of James's Pluralistic Universe.\n          Mind 18:576.\n\n      Tausch, Edwin--William James the pragmatist. Monist 19:1.\n\n      Origin of pragmatism. Nation 88:358.\n\n      Philosophy in the open. Bookman 29:661.\n\n      Pragmatism as a strangler of literature. Cur. Lit. 46:637.\n\n1910. Boodin, J. E.--Pragmatic realism. Monist 20:602.\n\n      Carus, Paul--Pragmatist view of truth. Monist 20:139.\n\n      Carus, Paul--Truth. Monist 20:481.\n\n      Cockrell, T. D. A.--Is pragmatism pragmatic? Dial 48:422.\n\n      De Laguna, T.--Dogmatism and Evolution.\n\n      Fite, W.--O'Sullivan's Old Criticism and New Pragmatism. Jour.\n          Phil. 7:499.\n\n      Gillespie, C. M.--The truth of Protagoras. Mind 19:470.\n\n      Jacoby, Gunther--Der Pragmatismus.\n\n      Kallen, H. M.--James, Bergson, and Mr. Pitkin. Jour.\n          Phil. 7:353.\n\n      Lee, V.--Two pragmatisms. No. Am. 192:449.\n\n      Lloyd, A. H.--Possible idealism of a pluralist. Am. Jour.\n          Theol. 14:406.\n\n      Macintosh, D. C.--Pragmatic element in the teaching of Paul. Am.\n          Jour. Theol. 13:361.\n\n      McGiffert, A. C.--The pragmatism of Kant. Jour. Phil. 7:197.\n\n      Miller, D. S.--Some of the tendencies of Professor James's work.\n          Jour. Phil. 7:645.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism and Its Critics.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--How ideas work. Jour. Phil. 7:617.\n\n      O'Sullivan, J. M.--Old Criticism and New Pragmatism.\n\n      Russell, B.--Philosophical Essays. Chapters 4, 6.\n\n      Reviews of James's Meaning of Truth. Nation 90:88. Hib. Jour.\n          8:904. Ed. Rev. 40:201.\n\n      Russell, J. E.--Review of James's Meaning of Truth. Jour.\n          Phil. 7:22.\n\n      Schinz, A.--Anti-pragmatism.\n\n      Shackelford, T. M.--What is pragmatism? Sci. Am. S. 70:78.\n\n      Sidgwick, A.--The Application of Logic.\n\n      Stettheimer, E.--Rowland's Right To Believe. Jour. Phil. 7:330.\n\n      Walker, L. J.--Theory of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, and\n          Realism.\n\n1911. Brown, H. C.--De Laguna's Dogmatism and Evolution. Jour.\n          Phil. 8:556.\n\n      Cockerell, T. D. A.--Reality and truth. Pop. Sci. Mo. 78:371.\n\n      Eastman, Max--Dewey's How We Think. Jour. Phil. 8:244.\n\n      Fawcett, E. D.--A note on pragmatism. Mind 20:399.\n\n      Jacks, L. P.--William James and his message. Contemp. Rev. 99:20.\n\n      Kallen, H. M.--Boutroux's William James. Jour. Phil. 8:583.\n\n      Kallen, H. M.--Pragmatism and its 'principles'. Jour. Phil. 8:617.\n\n      More, P. E.--The Pragmatism of William James.\n\n      Patten, S. N.--Pragmatism and social science. Jour. Phil. 8:653.\n\n      Pratt, J. B.--The religious philosophy of William James. Hib.\n          Jour. 10:225.\n\n      Riley, I. W.--Continental critics of pragmatism. Jour.\n          Phil. 8:225, 289.\n\n      Russell, J. E.--Truth as value and the value of truth. Mind 20:538.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Article 'pragmatism' in Encyclopedia Brittanica.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Review of James's Some Problems of\n          Philosophy. Mind 20:571.\n\n      Turner, W.--Pragmatism: what does it mean? Cath. World 94:178.\n\n      Vibbert, C. B.--Moore's Pragmatism and its Critics. Jour.\n          Phil. 8:468.\n\n1912. Berkeley, H.--The kernel of pragmatism. Mind 21:84.\n\n      Ceulemans, J. B.--Metaphysics of pragmatism. Am. Cath. Q. 37:310.\n\n      Jacoby, Gunther--Bergson, pragmatism, and Schopenhauer.\n          Monist 22:593.\n\n      Kallen, H. M.--Royce's William James. Jour. Phil. 9:548.\n\n      Lee, Vernon--Vital Lies. v. 1, part 1.\n\n      Lee, Vernon--What is truth? a criticism of pragmatism. Yale\n          Rev. n. s. 1:600.\n\n      Loewenberg, J.--Vaihinger's Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Jour.\n          Phil. 9:717.\n\n      Macintosh, D. C.--Representational pragmatism. Mind 21:167.\n\n      Montague, W. P.--Review of James's Some Problems of Philosophy.\n          Jour. Phil. 9:22.\n\n      Murray, D. L.--Pragmatism.\n\n      Reviews of Moore's Pragmatism and Its Critics. Nation 92:13. Int\n          Jour. Eth. 22:222.\n\n      Riley, I. W.--Huizinga's The American Philosophy Pragmatism.\n          Jour. Phil. 9:248.\n\n      Russell, B.--Review of James's Essays in Radical Empiricism.\n          Mind 21:571.\n\n      Russell, J. E.--Bergson's anti-intellectualism. Jour.\n          Phil. 9:129.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Formal Logic, A Scientific and Social\n          Problem.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--The 'working' of 'truth'. Mind 21:532.\n\n1913. Alexander, S.--Collective willing and truth. Mind 22:14, 161.\n\n      Boodin, J. E.--Pragmatic realism.--The five attributes.\n          Mind 22:509.\n\n      Carr, H. W.--Logic and life. Mind 22:484.\n\n      Carr, H. W.--The Problem of Truth.\n\n      Caldwell, W.--Pragmatism and Idealism.\n\n      Knox, H. V.--William James and his philosophy. Mind 22:231.\n\n      Moore, A. W.--Pragmatism, science, and truth.\n\n      Perry, R. B.--Realism and pragmatism. Mind 22:544.\n\n      Review of Vernon Lee's Vital Lies. Nation 96:414.\n\n      Royce, J.--Psychological problems emphasized by pragmatism. Pop.\n          Sci. Mo. 83:394.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--The 'working' of truths and their\n          'criterion'. Mind 22:532.\n\n      Schiller, F. C. S.--Humanism.\n\n      Stebbing, L. S.--The 'working' of 'truths'. Mind 22:250.\n\n      Wright, W. K.--Practical success as the criterion of truth.\n          Phil. Rev. 22:606.\n\n1914. Knox, H. V.--Philosophy of William James.\n\n      Moore, J. S.--Value in its relation to meaning and purpose.\n          Jour. Phil. 11:184.\n\n      Ross, G. R. T.--Aristotle and abstract truth--A reply to Mr.\n          Schiller. Mind 23:396.\n\n      Sidgwick, A.--Truth and working. Mind 23:99.\n\n      Stebbing, L. S.--Pragmatism and French Voluntarism.\n\n      Wilde, N.--The pragmatism of Pascal. Phil. Rev. 23:540.\n\n      Can socialism be identified with pragmatism? Cur. Opinion 56:45.\n\n\n\n\nVITA.\n\n\nThe writer was born in 1884 at Pomeroy, Ohio, and received his earlier\neducation in the country schools near that city. His college\npreparatory work was done in the high school of Roswell, New Mexico,\nfrom which he was graduated in 1906. He then entered immediately the\nUniversity of Wisconsin, and from this institution received the\nBachelor's degree in 1910 and the Master's degree in 1911. From 1911\nto 1914, while acting as fellow or as assistant, he studied in the\ngraduate school of the University of Illinois.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n    Page numbers have been removed from the Table of Contents\n\n    Footnotes have been sequentially numbered and placed after the\n    paragraph where they are noted.\n\n\nOther changes to the text:\n\n    JAMES' EXPOSITION OF PEIRCE. (in the Table of Contents)\n    (Removed 's in JAMES'S to match the title of Section in\n    Chapter 2, which is consistent with author's usage throughout)\n\n    consider the doctrine of transubstantiation\n    (transubstantiation was transsubstantiation)\n\n    true in their main experiential predictions\n    (experiential was experiental)\n\n    multiply incontestable results\n    (incontestable was incontestible)\n\n    false belief (belief in fiction)\".\n    (. was ,)\n\n    and then only provisionally;\n    (then was when)\n\n    towards the close of\n    (the was th)\n\n    cannot be used together\n    (together was togethehr)\n\n    if one can define accurately all\n    (accurately was acurately)\n\n    or false?' Thus does Locke\n    (missing closing quote added)\n\n    only an image in the mind\n    (mind was mand)\n\n    try so hard to defend\n    (so was to)\n\n    In Footnote 12, the word pages was pagges\n\n    Yet the smell is not cognitional\n    (smell is was small was)\n\n    Let us suppose that the smell occurs\n    (smell was small)\n\n    thus account for the cases where meanings\n    (cases was cses)\n\n    their immediate occurrence as\n    (occurrence was occurence)\n\n    which the developing experience is examined\n    (experience was experince)\n\n    if one takes it at the stage\n    (at was t)\n\n    for truth is a certain\n    (certain was certian)\n\n    the collectivity of experience's demands\n    (experience's was experiences)\n\n    I have no doubt that this is\n    (this was his)\n\n    true even 'in so far forth'\".\n    (was missing closing single quote mark)\n\n    The reason for this outcome\n    (reason was reasons)\n\n    The scientific conception, as it had differentiated itself from\n    (differentiated was differenciated)\n\n\nTypographic errors in the bibliography have been repaired without\nnote, with the following exceptions.\n\n    1854. Bailey, S.--Essays on the Pursuit of Truth.\n    (S. was originally missing)\n\n    1780. Beattie, James.--An Essay on the Nature and Immutability\n          of Truth.\n    (duplicate entry removed)\n\n    1902. Pritchett, H. S.--What is truth? Outlook 70:620.\n    (H. S. originally missing)\n\n    Wright, H. W.--Practical success as the criterion of truth.\n    (was W. K.)\n\n    1879. Illustrations of the logic of science.\n    (added second header for clarity)\n\n    1895. The theory of emotion.\n    (added second header for clarity)\n\n\n\n\n\n<pre id=\"pg-footer\">","title":"The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":23371}