{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_37694/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_37694","id":"gutenberg_37694","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37694","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Rationalism"],"text":"Produced by David Widger\n\n\n\n\n\nREASON,\n\nTHE ONLY ORACLE OF MAN;\n\nOR A COMPENDIUS\n\nSYSTEM OF NATURAL RELIGION.\n\nBy Col. Ethan Allen.\n\nBoston:\n\nJ. P. Mendum, Cornhill.\n\n1854.\n\n\n\n\nREASON\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nColonel Ethan Allen, the author of Oracles of Reason, was the son of\nJoseph Allen, a native of Coventry, Connecticut, a farmer in moderate\ncircumstances. He afterwards resided in Litchfield, where Ethan was born\nin the year 1739. The family consisted of eight children, of whom our\nauthor was the eldest. But few incidents connected with his early life\nare known. We are apprised, however, that notwithstanding his education\nwas very limited, his ambition to prove himself worthy of that attention\nwhich superior intellect ever commands, induced him diligently to\nexplore every subject that came under his notice. A stranger to fear,\nhis opinions were ever given without disguise or hesitation; and an\nenemy to oppression, he sought every opportunity to redress the wrongs\nof the oppressed.\n\nAt the breaking out of the Revolutionary War, he raised in Vermont,\nwhere he had resided, a company of volunteers, consisting of two hundred\nand thirty, with which he surprised the fortress of Ticonderoga, May 10,\n1775, containing about forty men, and one hundred pieces of cannon. He\nwas unfortunately taken prisoner in September following, in an attempt\non Montreal, and sufferred a cruel imprisonment for several years. For\nan account of which, the reader is referred to his narrative, contained\nin a memoir of the author, by Mr. Hugh Moore, Plattsburg, 1834.\n\nSoon after the close of the revolution, Col. Allen composed the\nfollowing work; which, on account of the bold and unusual manner,\nparticularly in this country, that the subject of religion is treated,\nhe had great difficulty to get published. It lay a long time in the\nhands of a printer at Hartford, who had not the moral courage to print\nit. It was finally printed by a Mr. Haswell, of Bennington, Vt. in 1784.\nNot long after its publication, a part of the edition, comprising the\nentire of several signatures, was accidentally consumed by fire. Whether\nMr. H. deemed this fire a judgment upon him for having printed the\nwork or not, is unknown--but, the fact is, he soon after committed\nthe remainder of the edition to the flames, and joined the Methodist\nConnection; so that but few copies were circulated.\n\nCol. Allen died in the town of Burlington, Vt., on the 12th of February,\n1789, of apoplexy.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\nAn apology appears to me to be impertinent in writers who venture their\nworks to public inspection, for this obvious reason, that if they need\nit, they should have been stifled in the birth, and not permitted\na public existence. I therefore offer my composition to the candid\njudgment of the impartial world without it, taking it for granted that\nI have as good a natural right to expose myself to public censure,\nby endeavouring to subserve mankind, as any of the species who have\npublished their productions since the creation; and I ask no favor at\nthe hands of philosophers, divines or critics, but hope and expect they\nwill severely chastise me for my errors and mistakes, least they\nmay have a share in perverting the truth, which is very far from my\nintention.\n\nIn the circle of my acquaintance, (which has not been small,) I have\ngenerally been denominated a Deist, the reality of which I never\ndisputed, being conscious I am no Christian, except mere infant baptism\nmake me one; and as to being a Deist, I know not, strictly speaking,\nwhether I am one or not, for I have never read their writings; mine will\ntherefore determine the matter; for I have not in the least disguised my\nsentiments, but have written freely without any conscious knowledge of\nprejudice for, or against any man, sectary or party whatever; but wish\nthat good sense, truth and virtue may be promoted and flourish in the\nworld, to the detection of delusion, superstition, and false religion;\nand therefore my errors in the succeeding treatise, which may be\nrationally pointed out, will be readily rescinded.\n\nBy the public's most obedient and humble servant.\n\nETHAN ALLEN.\n\n\n\n\nORACLES OF REASON,\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. THE DUTY OF REFORMING MANKIND FROM SUPERSTITION AND ERROR...\n\nAND THE GOOD CONSEQUENCES OF IT\n\nThe desire of knowledge has engaged the attention of the wise and\ncurious among mankind in all ages which has been productive of extending\nthe arts and sciences far and wide in the several quarters of the globe,\nand excited the contemplative to explore nature's laws in a gradual\nseries of improvement, until philosophy, astronomy, geography, and\nhistory, with many other branches of science, have arrived to a great\ndegree of perfection.\n\nIt is nevertheless to be regretted, that the bulk of mankind, even in\nthose nations which are most celebrated for learning and wisdom, are\nstill carried down the torrent of superstition, and entertain very\nunworthy apprehensions of the being, perfections, creation, and\nprovidence of God, and their duty to him, which lays an indispensable\nobligation on the philosophic friends of human nature, unanimously to\nexert themselves in every lawful, wise, and prudent method, to\nendeavor to reclaim mankind from their ignorance and delusion, by\nenlightening their minds in those great and sublime truths concerning\nGod and his providence, and their obligations to moral rectitude which\nin this world, and that which is to come, cannot fail greatly to affect\ntheir happiness and well being.\n\nThough \"none by searching can find out God, or the Almighty to\nperfection,\" yet I am persuaded, that if mankind would dare to exercise\ntheir reason as freely on those divine topics as they do in the common\nconcerns of life, they would, in a great measure, rid themselves of\ntheir blindness and superstition, gain more exalted ideas of God\nand their obligations to him and one another, and be proportionally\ndelighted and blessed with the views of his moral government, make\nbetter members of society, and acquire many powerful incentives to the\npractice of morality, which is the last and greatest perfection that\nhuman nature is capable of.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. OF THE BEING OF A GOD\n\nThe laws of nature having subjected mankind to a state of absolute\ndependence on something out of it, and manifestly beyond themselves,\nor the compound exertion of their natural powers, gave them the first\nconception of a superior principle existing; otherwise they could have\nhad no possible conception of a superintending power. But this sense of\ndependency, which results from experience and reasoning on the facts,\nwhich every day cannot fail to produce, has uniformly established the\nknowledge of our dependence to every individual of the species who are\nrational, which necessarily involves, or contains in it, the idea of a\nruling power, or that there is a God, which ideas are synonymous.\n\nThe globe with its productions, the planets in their motions, and the\nstarry heavens in their magnitudes, surprise our senses and confound our\nreason, in their munificent lessons of instruction concerning God, by\nmeans whereof, we are apt to be more or less lost in our ideas of the\nobject of divine adoration, though at the same time every one is truly\nsensible that their being and preservation is from God. We are too apt\nto confound our ideas of God with his works, and take the latter for\nthe former. Thus barbarous and unlearned nations have imagined, that\ninasmuch as the sun in its influence is beneficial to them in bringing\nforward the spring of the year, causing the production of vegetation,\nand food for their subsistence, that therefore it is their God: while\nothers have located other parts of creation, and ascribe to them\nprerogatives of God; and mere creatures and images have been substituted\nfor Gods by the wickedness or weakness of man, or both together. It\nseems that mankind in most ages and parts of the world have been fond of\ncorporeal Deities with whom their outward senses might be gratified, or\nas fantastically diverted from the just apprehension of the true God,\nby a supposed supernatural intercourse with invisible and mere spiritual\nbeings, to whom they ascribe divinity, so that through one means or\nother, the character of the true God has been much neglected, to the\ngreat detriment of truth, justice, and morality in the world; nor is\nit possible that mankind can be uniform in their religious opinions, or\nworship God according to knowledge, except they can form a consistent\narrangement of ideas of the Divine character.\n\nAlthough we extend our ideas retrospectively ever so far upon the\nsuccession, yet no one cause in the extended order of succession, which\ndepends upon another prior to itself, can be the independent cause of\nall things: nor is it possible to trace the order of the succession of\ncauses back to that self-existent cause, inasmuch as it is eternal\nand infinite, and cannot therefore be traced out by succession, which\noperates according to the order of time, consequently can bear no more\nproportion to the eternity of God, than time itself may be supposed\nto do, which has no proportion at all; as the succeeding arguments\nrespecting the eternity and infinity of God will evince. But\nnotwithstanding the series of the succession of causes cannot be\nfollowed in a retrospective succession up to the self-existent or\neternal cause, it is nevertheless a perpetual and conclusive evidence\nof a God.--For a succession of causes considered collectively, can\nbe nothing more than effects of the independent cause, and as much\ndependent on it as those dependent causes are upon one another; so that\nwe may with certainty conclude that the system of nature, which we call\nby the name of natural causes, is as much dependent on a self-existent\ncause, as an individual of the species in the order of generation is\ndependent on its progenitors for existence. Such part of the series of\nnature's operations, which we understand, has a regular and necessary\nconnection with, and dependence on its parts, which we denominate by the\nnames of cause and effect. From hence we are authorised from reason to\nconclude, that the vast system of causes and effects are thus\nnecessarily connected, (speaking of the natural world only,) and the\nwhole regularly and necessarily dependent on a self-existent cause: so\nthat we are obliged to admit an independent cause, and ascribe\nself-existence to it, otherwise it could not be independent, and\nconsequently not a God. But the eternity or manner of the existence of a\nself-existent and independent being is to all finite capacities utterly\nincomprehensible; yet this is so far from an objection against the\nreality of such a being, that it is essentially necessary to support the\nevidence of it; for if we could comprehend that being whom we call God,\nhe would not be God, but must have been finite and that in the same\ndegree as those may be supposed to be who could comprehend him;\ntherefore so certain that God is, we cannot comprehend his essence,\neternity, or manner of existence. This should always be premised, when\nwe assay to reason on the being, perfection, eternity, and infinity of\nGod, or of his creation and providence. As far as we understand nature,\nwe are become acquainted with the character of God, for the knowledge of\nnature is the revelation of God. If we form in our imagination a\ncompendious idea of the harmony of the universe, it is the same as\ncalling God by the name of harmony, for there could be no harmony\nwithout regulation, and no regulation without a regulator, which is\nexpressive of the idea of a God. Nor could it be possible, that there\ncould be order or disorder, except we admit of such a thing as creation,\nand creation contains in it the idea of a creator, which is another\nappellation for the Divine Being, distinguishing God from his creation.\nFurthermore, there could be no proportion, figure, or motion, without\nwisdom and power; wisdom to plan, and power to execute, and these are\nperfections, when applied to the works of nature, which signify the\nagency or superintendency of God. If we consider nature to be matter,\nfigure, and motion, we include the idea of God in that of motion; for\nmotion implies a mover as much as creation does a creator. If from the\ncomposition, texture, and tendency of the universe in general, we form a\ncomplex idea of general good resulting therefrom to mankind, we\nimplicitly admit a God by the name of good, including the idea of his\nprovidence to man. And from hence arises our obligations to love and\nadore God, because he provides for, and is beneficent to us. Abstract\nthe idea of goodness from the character of God, and it would cancel all\nour obligations to him, and excite us to hate and detest him as a\ntyrant: hence it is, that ignorant people are superstitiously misled\ninto a conceit that they hate God, when at the same time it is only the\nidol of their own imagination, which they truly ought to hate and be\nashamed of; but were such persons to connect the ideas of power, wisdom,\ngoodness, and all possible perfection in the character of God, their\nhatred towards him would be turned into love and adoration.\n\nBy extending our ideas in a larger circle, we shall perceive our\ndependence on the earth and waters of the globe which we inhabit, and\nfrom which we are bountifully fed and gorgeously arrayed; and next\nextend our ideas to the sun, whose fiery mass darts its brilliant rays\nof light to our terraqueous ball with amazing velocity, and whose\nregion of inexhaustible fire supplies it with fervent heat, which causes\nvegetation, and gilds the various seasons of the year with ten thousand\ncharms: this is not the achievement of man, but the workmanship and\nprovidence of God. But how the sun is supplied with materials, thus to\nperpetuate its kind influences, we know not. But will any one deny the\nreality of those beneficial influences, because we do not understand the\nmanner of the perpetuality of that fiery world, or how it became such\na body of fire? or will any one deny the reality of nutrition by food,\nbecause we do not understand the secret operation of the digesting\npowers of animal nature, or the minute particulars of its cherishing\ninfluence? None will be so stupid as to do it. Equally absurd would it\nbe for us to deny the providence of God, by \"whom we live, move, and\nhave our being,\" because we cannot comprehend it.\n\nWe know that earth, water, fire and air, in their various compositions\nsubserve us, and we also know that these elements are devoid of\nreflection, reason, or design; from whence we may easily infer, that a\nwise, understanding, and designing being has ordained them to be thus\nsubservient. Could blind chance constitute order and decorum, and\nconsequently a providence? That wisdom, order, and design should be the\nproduction of nonentity, or of chaos, confusion, and old night, is too\nabsurd to deserve a serious confutation, for it supposeth that there may\nbe effects without a cause, viz.: produced by nonentity, or that chaos\nand confusion could produce the effects of power, wisdom, and goodness.\nSuch absurdities as these we must assent to, or subscribe to the\ndoctrine of a self-existent and providential being.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. THE MANNER OF DISCOVERING THE MORAL PERFECTIONS...\n\nAND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD\n\nHaving in a concise manner offered a variety of indisputable reasons\nto evince the certainty of the being and providence of God, and of\nhis goodness to man through the intervention of the series of nature's\noperations, which are commonly described by the name of natural\ncauses, we come now more particularly to the consideration of his moral\nperfections; and though all finite beings fall as much short of an\nadequate knowledge thereof as they do of perfection itself, nevertheless\nthrough the intelligence of our own souls we may have something of a\nprospective idea of the divine perfections. For though the human\nmind bears no proportion to the divine, yet there is undoubtedly a\nresemblance between them. For instance, God knows all things, and\nwe know some things, and in the things which we do understand, our\nknowledge agrees with that of the divine, and cannot fail necessarily\ncorresponding with it. To more than know a thing, speaking of that thing\nonly, is impossible even to omniscience itself; for knowledge is but the\nsame in both the infinite and finite minds. To know a thing is the same\nas to have right ideas of it, or ideas according to truth, and truth is\nuniform in all rational minds, the divine mind not excepted. It will\nnot be disputed but that mankind in plain and common matters understand\njustice from injustice, truth from falsehood, right from wrong, virtue\nfrom vice, and praise-worthiness from blame-worthiness, for other wise\nthey could not be accountable creatures. This being admitted, we are\ncapable of forming a complex idea of a moral character, which when done\nin the most deliberate, the wisest, and most rational manner in our\npower, we are certain bears a resemblance to the divine perfections. For\nas we learn from the worlds of nature an idea of the power and wisdom\nof God, so from our own rational nature we learn an idea of his moral\nperfections.\n\nFrom what has been observed on the moral perfections of God, we infer\nthat all rational beings, who have an idea of justice, goodness, and\ntruth, have at the same time either a greater or less idea of the moral\nperfections of God. It is by reason that we are able to compound an idea\nof a moral character, whether applied to God or man; it is that which\ngives us the supremacy over the irrational part of the creation.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON IV. THE CAUSE OF IDOLATRY, AND THE REMEDY OF IT\n\nInasmuch as God is not corporeal, and consequently does not and cannot\ncome within the notice of our bodily sensations, we are therefore\nobliged to deduce inferences from his providence, and particularly from\nour own rational nature, in order to form our conceptions of the divine\ncharacter, which through inattention, want of learning, or through the\nnatural imbecility of mankind, or through the artifice of designing men,\nor all together, they have been greatly divided and subdivided in their\nnotions of a God. Many have so groped in the dark as wholly to mistake\nthe proper object of divine worship, and not distinguishing the creator\nfrom his creation, have paid adoration to \"four footed beasts and\ncreeping things.\" And some have ascribed divine honors to the sun, moon,\nor stars; while others have been infatuated to worship dumb, senseless,\nand unintelligent idols, which derived their existence as Gods, partly\nfrom mechanics, who gave them their figure, proportion, and beauty, and\npartly from their priests, who gave them their attributes; whose\nbelievers, it appears, were so wrought upon, that they cried out in the\necstasy of their deluded zeal, \"Great is Diana.\" Whatever delusions have\ntaken place in the world relative to the object of divine worship, or\nrespecting the indecencies or immoralities of the respective\nsuperstitions themselves, or by what means soever introduced or\nperpetuated, whether by designing men whose interest it has always been\nto impose on the weakness of the great mass of the vulgar; or as it is\nprobable, that part of those delusions took place in consequence of the\nweakness of uncultivated reason, in deducing a visible instead of an\ninvisible God from the works of nature. Be that as it will, mankind are\ngenerally possessed of an idea that there is a God, however they may\nhave been mistaken or misled as to the object. This notion of a God, as\nhas been before observed, must have originated from a universal sense of\ndependence, which mankind have on something that is more wise, powerful,\nand beneficent than themselves, or they could have had no apprehensions\nof any superintending principle in the universe, and consequently would\nnever have sought after a God, or have had any conception of his\nexistence, nor could designing men have imposed on their credulity by\nobtruding false Gods upon them; but taking advantage of the common\nbelief that there is a God, they artfully deceive their adherents with\nregard to the object to be adored. There are other sorts of idols which\nhave no existence but in the mere imagination of the human mind; and\nthese are vastly the most numerous, and universally (either in the\ngreater or less degree) dispersed over the world; the wisest of mankind\nare not and cannot be wholly exempt from them, inasmuch as every wrong\nconception of God is (as far as the error takes place in the mind)\nidolatrous. To give a sample, an idea of a jealous God is of this sort.\nJealousy is the offspring of finite minds, proceeding from the want of\nknowledge; which in dubious matters makes us suspicious and distrustful;\nbut in matters which we clearly understand, there can be no jealousy,\nfor knowledge excludes it, so that to ascribe it to God is a manifest\ninfringement on his omniscience.*\n\n     * \"The Lord thy God is a jealous God.\"\n\nThe idea of a revengeful God is likewise one of that sort, but this\nidea of divinity being borrowed from a savage nature, needs no further\nconfutation. The representation of a God, who (as we are told by certain\ndivines) from all eternity elected an inconsiderable part of mankind to\neternal life, and reprobated the rest to eternal damnation, merely from\nhis own sovereignty, adds another to the number;--this representation\nof the Deity undoubtedly took its rise from that which we discovered\nin great, powerful, and wicked tyrants among men, however tradition may\nsince have contributed to its support, though I am apprehensive that\na belief in those who adhere to that doctrine, that they themselves\nconstitute that blessed elect number, has been a greater inducement to\nthem to close with it, than all other motives added together. It is\na selfish and inferior notion of a God void of justice, goodness, and\ntruth, and has a natural tendency to impede the cause of true religion\nand morality in the world, and diametrically repugnant to the truth of\nthe divine character, and which, if admitted to be true, overturns\nall religion, wholly precluding the agency of mankind in either their\nsalvation or damnation, resolving the whole into the sovereign disposal\nof a tyrannical and unjust being, which is offensive to reason and\ncommon sense, and subversive of moral rectitude in general. But as\nit was not my design so much to confute the multiplicity of false\nrepresentations of a God, as to represent just and consistent ideas of\nthe true God, I shall therefore omit any further observation on them in\nthis place, with this remark, that all unjust representations, or ideas\nof God, are so many detractions from his character among mankind. To\nremedy these idolatrous notions of a God, it is requisite to form right\nand consistent ideas in their stead.\n\nThe discovery of truth necessarily excludes error from the mind, which\nnothing else can possibly do; for some sort of God or other will crowd\nitself into the conceptions of dependent creatures, and if they are\nnot so happy as to form just ones, they will substitute erroneous and\ndelusive ones in their stead; so that it serves no valuable purpose to\nmankind, to confute their idolatrous opinions concerning God, without\ncommunicating to them just notions concerning the true one, for if this\nis not effected, nothing is done to the purpose. For, as has been before\nobserved, mankind will form to themselves, or receive from others, an\nidea of Divinity either right or wrong: this is the universal voice of\nintelligent nature, from whence a weighty and conclusive argument may\nbe drawn of the reality of a God, however inconsistent most, of their\nconceptions of him may be. The fact is, mankind readily perceives that\nthere is a God, by feeling their dependence on him, and as they explore\nhis works, and observe his providence, which is too sublime for finite\ncapacities to understand but in part, they have been more or less\nconfounded in their discoveries of a just idea of a God and of his moral\ngovernment. Therefore we should exercise great applications and care\nwhenever we assay to speculate upon the Divine character, accompanied\nwith a sincere desire after truth, and not ascribe anything to his\nperfections of government which is inconsistent with reason or the best\ninformation which we are able to apprehend of moral rectitude, and be\nat least wise enough not to charge God with injustice and contradictions\nwhich we should scorn to be charged with ourselves. No king, governor,\nor parent would like to be accused of partiality in their respective\ngovernments, \"Is it fit to say unto Princes, ye are ungodly, how much\nless to him that regardeth not the persons of princes, or the rich more\nthan the poor, for they are all the work of his hands.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. OF THE ETERNITY OF CREATION\n\nAs creation was the result of eternal and infinite wisdom, justice,\ngoodness, and truth, and effected by infinite power, it is like its\ngreat author, mysterious to us. How it could be accomplished, or in what\nmanner performed, can never be comprehended by any capacity.\n\nEternal, whether applied to duration, existence, action, or creation, is\nincomprehensible to us, but implies no contradiction in either of\nthem; for that which is above comprehension we cannot perceive to be\ncontradictory, nor on the other hand can we perceive its rationality or\nconsistency. We are certain that God is a rational, wise, understanding\nBeing, because he has in degree made us so, and his wisdom power, and\ngoodness is visible to us in his creation, and government of the world.\nFrom these facts we are rationally induced to acknowledge him, and\nnot because we can comprehend his being, perfections, creation, or\nprovidence. Could we comprehend God, he would cease to be what he is.\nThe ignorant among men cannot comprehend the understanding of the\nwise among their own species, much less the perfection of a God;\nnevertheless, in our ratiocination upon the works and harmony of nature,\nwe are obliged to concede to a self-existent and eternal cause of all\nthings, as has been sufficiently argued, though at the same time it is\nmysterious to us, that there should be such a being as a self-existent\nand eternally independent one;--thus we believe in God, although we\ncannot comprehend anything of the how, why or wherefore it was\npossible for him to be; and as creation was the exertion of such an\nincomprehensible and perfect being, it must of necessary consequence be,\nin a great measure, mysterious to us. We can nevertheless be certain,\nthat it has been of an equal eternity and infinitude of extension with\nGod.\n\nImmensity being replete with creation, the omniscient, omnipresent,\nomnipotent, eternal, and infinite exertion of God in creation, is\nincomprehensible to the understanding or the weakness of man, and will\neternally remain the prerogative of infinite penetration, sagacity, and\nuncreated intelligence to understand.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. OBSERVATIONS OF MOSES'S ACCOUNT OF CREATION\n\nThe foregoing theory of creation and providence will probably\nbe rejected by most people in this country, inasmuch as they are\nprepossessed with the theology of Moses, which represents creation to\nhave a beginning. \"In the beginning God created the heavens and the\nearth.\" In the preceding part of this chapter it has been evinced that\ncreation and providence could not have had a beginning, and that they\nare not circumscribed, but unlimited; yet it seems that Moses limited\ncreation by a prospective view of the heavens, or firmament from this\nglobe, and if creation was thus limited, it would consequently have\ncircumscribed the dominion and display of the divine providence or\nperfection; but if Moses's idea of the creation of \"the heavens and the\nearth,\" was immense, ever so many days of progressive work could never\nhave finished such a boundless creation; for a progressive creation\nis the same as a limited one; as each progressive day's work would be\nbounded by a successive admeasurement, and the whole six days' work\nadded together could be but local, and bear no manner of proportion to\ninfinitude, but would limit the dominion, and consequently the display\nof the divine perfections or providence, which is incompatible with a\njust idea of eternity and infinity of God, as has been argued in the\nforegoing pages.\n\nThere are a variety of other blunders in Moses's description of\ncreation, one of which I shall mention, which is to be found in his\nhistory of the first and fourth day's work of God: \"And God said, Let\nthere be light, and there was light; and God called the light day, and\nthe darkness he called night: and the evening and the morning were the\nfirst day.\" Then he proceeds to the second and third day's work, and so\non to the sixth; but in his chronicle of the fourth day's work, he says\nthat \"God made two great lights, the greater light to rule the day, and\nthe lesser light to rule the night.\" This appears to be an inconsistent\nhistory of the origin of light. Day and night were ordained the first\nday, and on the fourth day the greater and less lights were made to\nserve the same purposes; but it is likely that many errors have\ncrept into his writings, through the vicissitudes of learning, and\nparticularly from the corruptions of translations, of his as well as the\nwritings of other ancient authors; besides, it must be acknowledged that\nthose ancient writers labored under great difficulties in writing to\nposterity, merely from the consideration of the infant state of learning\nand knowledge then in the world, and consequently we should not act the\npart of severe critics, with their writings, any further than to prevent\ntheir obtrusion on the world as being infallible.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. OF THE ETERNITY AND INFINITUDE OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE\n\nWhen we consider our solar system, attracted by its fiery centre, and\nmoving in its several orbits, with regular, majestic, and periodical\nrevolutions, we are charmed at the prospect and contemplation of those\nworlds of motions, and adore the wisdom and power by which they are\nattracted, and their velocity regulated and perpetuated. And when we\nreflect that the blessings of life are derived from, and dependent on,\nthe properties, qualities, constructions, proportions and movements,\nof that stupendous machine, we gratefully acknowledge the divine\nbeneficence. When we extend our thoughts (through our external\nsensations) to the vast regions of the starry heavens, we are lost in\nthe immensity of God's works. Some stars appear fair and luminous, and\nothers scarcely discernible to the eye, which by the help of glasses\nmake a brilliant appearance, bringing the knowledge of others far\nremote, within the verge of our feeble discoveries, which merely by the\neye could not have been discerned or distinguished. These discoveries of\nthe works of God naturally prompt the inquisitive mind to conclude that\nthe author of this astonishing part of creation which is displayed to\nour view, has still extended his creation; so that if it were possible\nthat any of us could be transported to the farthest extended star,\nwhich is perceptible to us here, we should from thence survey worlds as\ndistant from that as that is from this, and so on _ad infinitum_.\n\nFurthermore, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that the heavenly\nbodies, _alias_ worlds, which move or are situate within the circle of\nour knowledge, as well all others throughout immensity, are each and\nevery one of them possessed or inhabited by some intelligent agents or\nother, however different their sensations or manners of receiving or\ncommunicating their ideas may be from ours, or however different from\neach other. For why would it not have been as wise or as consistent with\nthe perfections which we adore in God, to have neglected giving being to\nintelligence in this world as in those other worlds, interspersed with\naether of various qualities in his immense creation? And inasmuch\nas this world is thus replenished, we may, with the highest rational\ncertainty infer, that as God has given us to rejoice, and adore him for\nour being, he has acted consistent with his goodness, in the display of\nhis providence throughout the university of worlds.\n\nTo suppose that God Almighty has confined his goodness to this world, to\nthe exclusion of all others, is much similar to the idle fancies of some\nindividuals in this world, that they, and those of their communion or\nfaith, are the favorites of heaven exclusively; but these are narrow\nand bigoted conceptions, which are degrading to a rational nature, and\nutterly unworthy of God, of whom we should form the most exalted ideas.\n\nIt may be objected that a man cannot subsist in the sun; but does it\nfollow from thence, that God cannot or has not constituted a nature\npeculiar to that fiery region, and caused it to be as natural and\nnecessary for it to suck in and breathe out flames of fire, as it is for\nus to do the like in air. Numerous are the kinds of fishy animals which\ncan no other way subsist but in the water, in which other animals would\nperish, (amphibious ones excepted,) while other animals, in a variety\nof forms, either swifter or slower move on the surface of the earth, or\nwing the air. Of these there are sundry kinds, which during the season\nof winter live without food; and many of the insects which are really\npossessed of animal life, remain frozen, and as soon as they are let\nloose by the kind influence of the sun, they again assume their wonted\nanimal life; and if animal life may differ so much in the same world,\nwhat inconceivable variety may be possible in worlds innumerable, as\napplicable to mental, cogitative, and organized beings. Certain it is,\nthat any supposed obstructions, concerning the quality or temperature of\nany or every one of those worlds, could not have been any bar in the way\nof God Almighty, with regard to his replenishing his universal creation\nwith moral agents. The unlimited perfection of God could perfectly\nwell adapt every part of his creation to the design of whatever rank or\nspecies of constituted beings, his Godlike wisdom and goodness saw fit?\nto impart existence to; so that as there is no deficiency of absolute\nperfection in God, it is rationally demonstrative that the immense\ncreation is replenished with rational agents, and that it has been\neternally so, and that the display of divine goodness must have been as\nperfect and complete, in the antecedent, as it is possible to be in the\nsubsequent eternity.\n\nFrom this theological way of arguing on the creation and providence\nof God, it appears that the whole, which we denominate by the term\n_nature_, which is the same as creation perfectly regulated, was\neternally connected together by the creator to answer the same all\nglorious purpose, _to wit_: the display of the divine nature, the\nconsequences of which are existence and happiness to beings in general,\nso that creation, with all its productions operates according to the\nlaws of nature, and is sustained by the self-existent eternal cause, in\nperfect older and decorum, agreeable to the eternal wisdom, unalterable\nrectitude, impartial justice, and immense goodness of the divine nature,\nwhich is a summary of God's providence. It is from the established order\nof nature, that summer and winter, rainy and fair seasons,\nmoonshine, refreshing breezes, seed time and harvest, day and night,\ninterchangeably succeed each other, and diffuse their extensive\nblessings to man. Every enjoyment and support of life is from\nGod, delivered to his creatures in and by the tendency, aptitude,\ndisposition, and operation of those laws. Nature is the medium, or\nintermediate instrument through which God dispenses his benignity to\nmankind. The air we breathe in, the light of the sun, and the waters of\nthe murmuring rills, evince his providence: and well it is, that they\nare given in so great profusion, that they cannot by the monopoly of the\nrich be engrossed from the poor.\n\nWhen we copiously pursue the study of nature, we are certain to be lost\nin the immensity of the works and wisdom of God; we may nevertheless,\nin a variety of things discern their fitness, happifying tendency\nand sustaining quality to us ward, from all which, as rational and\ncontemplative beings we are prompted to infer, that God is universally\nuniform and consistent in his infinitude of creation and providence,\nalthough we cannot comprehend all that consistency, by reason of\ninfirmity; yet we are morally sure, of all possible plans, infinite\nwisdom must have eternally adopted the best, and infinite goodness have\napproved it, and infinite power have perfected it. And as the good of\nbeings in general must have been the ultimate end of God in his creation\nand government of his creatures, his omniscience could not fail to\nhave it always present in his view. Universal nature must therefore be\nultimately attracted to this single point, and infinite perfection must\nhave eternally displayed itself in creation and providence. From hence\nwe infer, that God is as eternal and infinite in his goodness, as his\nself-existent and perfect nature is omnipotently great.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON IV. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD DOES NOT INTERFERE...\n\nWITH THE AGENCY OF MAN.\n\nThe doctrine of Fate has been made use of in armies as a policy to\ninduce soldiers to face danger. Mahomet taught his army that the \"term\nof every man's life was fixed by God, and that none could shorten it, by\nany hazard that he might seem to be exposed to in battle or otherwise,\"\nbut that it should be introduced into peaceable and civil life, and be\npatronized by any teachers of religion, is quite strange, as it subverts\nreligion in general, and renders the teaching of it unnecessary, except\namong other necessary events it may be premised that it is necessary\nthey teach that doctrine, and that I oppose it from the influence of the\nsame law of fate upon which thesis we are all disputing and acting in\ncertain necessary circles, and if so, I make another necessary movement,\nwhich is, to discharge the public teachers of this doctrine, and expend.\ntheir salaries in an economical manner, which might better answer the\npurposes of our happiness, or lay it out in good wine or old spirits to\nmake the heart glad, and laugh at the stupidity or cunning of those who\nwould have made us mere machines.\n\nSome advocates for the doctrine of fate will also maintain that we are\nfree agents, notwithstanding they tell us there has been a concatenation\nof causes and events which has reached from God down to this time, and\nwhich will eternally be continued--that has and will control, and bring\nabout every action of our lives, though there is not anything in nature\nmore certain than that we cannot act necessarily and freely in the same\naction, and at the same time; yet it is hard for such persons, who have\nverily believed that they are elected, (and thus by a predetermination\nof God become his special favorites.) to give up their notions of a\npredetermination of all events, upon which system their election and\neverlasting happiness is nonsensically founded; and on the other hand,\nit is also hard for them to go so evidently against the law of nature\n(or dictates of conscience) which intuitively evinces the certainty of\nhuman liberty, as to reject such evidence; and therefore hold to both\nparts of the contradiction, _to wit_, that they act necessarily, and\nfreely, upon which contradictory principle they endeavored to maintain\nthe dictates of natural conscience, and also their darling folly of\nbeing electedly and exclusively favorites of God.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INFINITY OF EVIL AND OF SIN CONSIDERED\n\nThat God is infinitely good in the eternal displays of his providence,\nhas been argued in the third section of the second chapter, from which\nwe infer that there cannot be an infinite evil in the universe, inasmuch\nas it would be incompatible with infinite good; yet there are many who\nimbibe the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, and the maxim on which\nthey predicate their arguments in its support, are, that the greatness\nof sin, or adequateness of its punishment, is not to be measured, or\nits viciousness ascertained by the capacity and circumstances of the\noffender, but by the capacity and dignity of the being against whom\nthe offence is committed; and as every transgression is against the\nauthority and law of God, it is therefore against God; and as God is\ninfinite, therefore, sin is an infinite evil, and from hence infer the\ninfinite and vindictive wrath of God against sinners, and of his justice\nin dooming them, as some say to infinite, and others say to eternal\nmisery; the one without degree or measure, and the other without end or\nduration.\n\nAdmitting this maxim for truth, that the transgressions or sins of\nmankind are to be estimated by their heinousness, by the dignity and\ninfinity of the divine nature, then it will follow that all sins\nwould be equal, which would confound all our notions of the degrees\nor aggravations of sin; so that the sin would be the same to kill my\nneighbor as it would be to kill his horse. For the divine nature, by\nthis maxim, being the rule by which man's sin is to be estimated, and\nalways the same, there could therefore be no degrees in sin or guilt,\nany more than there are degrees of perfection in God, whom we all admit\nto be infinite, and who for that reason only cannot admit of any degrees\nor enlargement. Therefore as certain as there are degrees in sin, the\ninfinity of the divine nature cannot be the standard whereby it is to be\nascertained, which single consideration is a sufficient confutation of\nthe doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, as predicated on that maxim,\ninasmuch as none are so stupid as not to discern that there are degrees\nand aggravations in sin.\n\nI recollect a discourse of a learned Ecclesiastic, who was laboring\nin support of this doctrine. His first proposition was, \"That moral\nrectitude was infinitely pleasing to God;\" from which he deduced this\ninference, viz., \"That a contrariety to moral rectitude was consequently\ninfinitely displeasing to God and infinitely evil.\" That the absolute\nmoral rectitude of the divine nature is infinitely well pleasing to God,\nwill not be disputed; for this is none other but perfect and infinite\nrectitude; but there cannot in nature be an infinite contrariety\nthereto, or any being infinitely evil, or infinite in any respect\nwhatever, except we admit a self-existent and infinite diabolical\nnature, which is too absurd to deserve argumentative confutation.\nTherefore, as all possible moral evil must result from the agency of\nfinite beings, consisting in their sinful deviations from the rules\nof eternal unerring order and reason, which is moral rectitude in the\nabstract, we infer that, provided _all finite beings in the universe_\nhad not done anything else but sin and rebel against God, reason and\nmoral rectitude in general; all possible moral evil would fall as much\nshort of being infinite, as all finite capacities, complexly considered,\nwould fail of being infinite, which will bear no proportion at all. For\nthough _finite minds_, as has been before argued, bear a _resemblance to\nGod_, yet they bear _no proportion to his infinity_; and therefore there\nis not and cannot be any being, beings or agency of being or beings,\ncomplexly considered or otherwise, which are infinite in capacity, or\nwhich are infinitely evil and detestable in the sight of God, in that\nunlimited sense; for the actions or agency of limited beings, are also\nlimited, which is the same as finite: so that both the virtues and\nvices of man are finite; they are not virtuous or vicious but in degree;\ntherefore moral evil is finite and bounded.\n\nThough there is one, and but one infinite good, which is God, and there\ncan be no dispute, but that God judges, and approves or disapproves of\nall things and beings, and agencies of beings, as in truth they are, or\nin other words judges of every thing as being what it is; but to judge\na finite evil to be infinite, would be infinitely erroneous and\ndisproportionate; for so certain as there is a distinction between,\ninfinity and infinitude, so certain finite sinful agency cannot be\ninfinitely evil; or in other words finite offences cannot be infinite.\nNor is it possible that the greatest of sinners should in justice\ndeserve infinite punishment, or their nature sustain it; finite beings\nmay as well be supposed to be capable of infinite happiness as of\ninfinite misery, but the rank which they hold in the universe exempts\nthem from either; it nevertheless admits them to a state of agency,\nprobation or trial, consequently to interchangeable progressions in\nmoral good and evil, and of course to alternate happiness or misery.\nWe will dismiss the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin with this\nobservation, that as no mere creature can suffer an infinitude of misery\nor of punishment, it is therefore incompatible with the wisdom of God,\nso far to capacitate creatures to sin, as in his constitution of things\nto foreclose himself from adequately punishing them for it.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD AS INCOMPATIBLE...\n\nWITH ETERNAL PUNISHMENT\n\nWe may for certain conclude, that such a punishment will never have the\ndivine approbation, or be inflicted on any intelligent being or beings\nin the infinitude of the government of God. For an endless punishment\ndefeats the very end of its institution, which in all wise and good\ngovernments is as well to reclaim offenders, as to be examples to\nothers; but a government which does not admit of reformation and\nrepentance, must unavoidably involve its subjects in misery; for the\nweakness of creatures will always be a source of error and inconstancy,\nand a wise Governor, as we must admit God to be, would suit his\ngovernment to the capacity and all other circumstances of the governed;\nand instead of inflicting eternal damnation on his offending children,\nwould rather interchangeably extend his beneficence with his vindictive\npunishments, so as to alienate them from sin and wickedness, and incline\nthem to morality; convincing them from experimental suffering, that\nsin and vanity are their greatest enemies, and that in God and\nmoral rectitude their dependence and true happiness consists, and by\nreclaiming them from wickedness and error, to the truth, and to the love\nand practice of virtue, give them occasion to glorify God for the wisdom\nand goodness of his government, and to be ultimately happy under it.\nBut we are told that the eternal damnation of a part of mankind greatly\naugments the happiness of the elect, who are represented as being vastly\nthe less numerous, (a diabolical temper of mind in the elect:) besides,\nhow narrow and contractive must such notions of infinite justice and\ngoodness be? Who would imagine that the Deity conducts his providence\nsimilar to the detestable despots of this world? Oh horrible? most\nhorrible impeachment of Divine Goodness! Rather let us exaltedly suppose\nthat God eternally had the ultimate best good of beings generally\nand individually in his view, with the reward of the virtuous and the\npunishment of the vicious, and that no other punishment will ever be\ninflicted, merely by the divine administration, but that will finally\nterminate in the best good of the punished, and thereby subserve the\ngreat and important ends of the divine government, and be productive of\nthe restoration and felicity of all finite rational nature.\n\nThe most weighty arguments deducible from the divine nature have\nbeen already offered, _to wit_, ultimate end of God, in creation and\nprovidence, to do the greatest possible good and benignity to beings in\ngeneral, and consequently, that the great end and design of punishment,\nin the divine government, must be to reclaim, restore, and bring\nrevolters from original rectitude back to embrace it and to be ultimately\nhappy; as also, that an eternal punishment, would defeat the very end\nand design of punishment itself; and that no good consequences to the\npunished could arise out of a never ending destruction; but that a\ntotal, everlasting, and irreparable evil would take place on such\npart of the moral creation, as may be thus sentenced to eternal and\nremediless perdition; which would argue imperfection either in the\ncreation, or moral government of God, or in both.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. HUMAN LIBERTY, AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CANNOT...\n\nBE ATTENDED WITH ETERNAL CONSEQUENCES, EITHER GOOD OR EVIL\n\nFrom what has been argued in the foregoing section, it appears that\nmankind in this life are not agents of trial for eternity, but that\nthey will eternally remain agents of trial! To suppose that our eternal\ncircumstances will be unalterably fixed in happiness or misery, in\nconsequence of the agency or transactions of this temporary life, is\ninconsistent with the moral government of God, and the progressive and\nretrospective knowledge of the human mind. God has not put it into our\npower to plunge ourselves into eternal woe and perdition; human liberty\nis not so extensive, for the term of human life bears no proportion to\neternity succeeding it; so that there could be no proportion between a\nmomentary agency, (which is liberty of action,) or probation, and any\nsupposed eternal consequences of happiness or misery resulting from it.\nOur liberty consists in our power of agency, and cannot fall short of,\nor exceed it, for liberty is agency itself, or is that by which agency\nor action is exerted; it may be that the curious would define it, that\nagency is the effect of liberty, and that liberty is the cause which\nproduces it; making a distinction between action and the power of\naction; be it so, yet agency cannot surpass its liberty; to suppose\notherwise, would be the same as to suppose agency without the power of\nagency, or an effect without a cause; therefore, as our agency does not\nextend to consequences of eternal happiness or misery, the power of that\nagency, which is liberty, does not. Sufficient it is for virtuous minds,\nwhile in this life, that they keep \"Consciences void of offence towards\nGod and towards man.\" And that in their commencement in the succeeding\nstate, they have a retrospective knowledge of their agency in this, and\nretain a consciousness of a well spent life. Beings thus possessed of\na habit of virtue, would enjoy a rational felicity beyond the reach\nof physical evils which terminate with life; and in all rational\nprobability would be advanced in the order of nature, to a more exalted\nand sublime manner of being, knowledge and action, than at present we\ncan conceive of, where no joys or pains can approach, but of the mental\nkind; in which elevated state virtuous minds will be able, in a clearer\nand more copious manner in this life, to contemplate the superlative\nbeauties of moral fitness; and with ecstatic satisfaction enjoy it,\nnotwithstanding imperfection and consequently agency, proficiency and\ntrial, of some kind or other, must everlastingly continue with finite\nminds.\n\nAnd as to the vicious, who have violated the laws of reason and\nmorality, lived a life of sin and wickedness, and are at as great\na remove from a rational happiness as from moral rectitude; such\nincorrigible sinners, at their commencing existence in the world of\nspirits, will undoubtedly have opened to them a tremendous scene of\nhorror, self-condemnation and guilt, with an anguish of mind; the more\nso, as no sensual delights can there, (as in this world,) divert the\nmind from its conscious guilt; the clear sense of which will be the\nmore pungent, as the mind in that state will be greatly enlarged,\nand consequently more capaciously susceptible of sorrow, grief, and\nconscious woe, from a retrospective reflection of a wicked life.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON IV. OF PHYSICAL EVILS.\n\nPhysical evils are in nature inseparable from animal life, they\ncommenced existence with it, and are its concomitants through life; so\nthat the same nature which gives being to the one, gives birth to the\nother also; the one is not before or after the other, but they are\ncoexistent together, and cotemporaries; and as they began existence in a\nnecessary dependence on each other, so they terminate together in death\nand dissolution. This is the original order to which animal nature is\nsubjected, as applied to every species of it. The beasts of the field,\nthe fowls of the air, the fishes of the sea, with reptiles, and all\nmanner of beings, which are possessed with animal life; nor is pain,\nsickness, or mortality any part of God's punishment for sin. On the\nother hand sensual happiness is no part of the reward of virtue: to\nreward moral actions with a glass of wine or a shoulder of mutton, would\nbe as inadequate, as to measure a triangle with sound, for virtue and\nvice pertain to the mind, and their merits or demerits have their\njust effects on the conscience, as has been before evinced: but animal\ngratifications are common to the human race indiscriminately, and also,\nto the beasts of the field: and physical evils as promiscuously and\nuniversally extend to the whole, so \"_That there is no knowing good or\nevil by all that is before us, for all is vanity_.\" It was not among the\nnumber of possibles, that animal life should be exempted from mortality:\nomnipotence itself could not have made it capable of eternalization and\nindissolubility; for the self same nature which constitutes animal life,\nsubjects it to decay and dissolution; so that the one cannot be without\nthe other, any more than there could be a compact number of mountains\nwithout vallies, or that I could exist and not exist at the same\ntime, or that God should effect any other contradiction in nature;\nall contradictions being equally impossible, inasmuch as they imply an\nabsolute incompatibility with nature and truth; for nature is predicated\non truth, and the same truth which constitutes mountains, made the\nvallies at the same time; nor is it possible that they could have a\nseparate existence. And the same truth which affirms my existence,\ndenies its negative; so also the same law of nature, which in truth\nproduceth an animal life and supports it for a season, wears it out,\nand in its natural course reduces it to its original elements again. The\nvegetable world also presents us with a constant aspect of productions\nand dissolutions; and the bustle of elements is beyond all conception;\nbut the dissolution of forms is not the dissolution of matter, or the\nannihilation of it, nor of the creation, which exists in all possible\nforms and fluxilities; and it is from such physical alterations of\nthe particles of matter, that animal or vegetable life is produced\nand destroyed. Elements afford them nutrition, and time brings them to\nmaturity, decay and dissolution; and in all the prolific production\nof animal life, or the productions of those of a vegetative nature,\nthroughout all their growth, decay and dissolution, make no addition or\ndiminution of creation; but eternal nature continues its never ceasing\noperations, (which in most respects are mysterious to us) under the\nunerring guidance of the providence of God.\n\nAnimal nature consists of a regular constitution of a variety of organic\nparts, which have a particular and necessary dependance on each other,\nby the mutual assistance whereof the whole are animated. Blood seems\nto be the source of life, and it is requisite that it have a proper\ncirculation from the heart to the extreme parts of the body, and from\nthence to the heart again, that it may repeat its temporary rounds\nthrough certain arteries and veins, which replenish every minutia\npart with blood and vital heat; but the brain is evidently the seat of\nsensation, which through the nervous system conveys the animal spirits\nto every part of the body, imparting to it sensation and motion,\nconstituting it a living machine-, which could never have been produced,\nor exercised its respective functions in any other sort of world but\nthis; which is in a constant series of fluxilities, and which causeth\nit to produce food for its inhabitants. An unchangeable world could not\nadmit of production or dissolution, but would be identically the same,\nwhich would preclude the existence and nutriment of such sensitive\ncreatures as we are. The nutrition extracted from food by the secret\naptitudes of the digesting powers (by which mysterious operation it\nbecomes incorporated with the circulating juices, supplying the animal\nfunctions with vital heat, strength and vigor) demands a constant\nflux and reflux of the particles of matter, which is perpetually\nincorporating with the body, and supplying the place of the superfluous\nparticles that are constantly discharging themselves by insensible\nperspiration; supporting, and at the same time, in its ultimate\ntendency, destroying animal life. Thus it manifestly appears, that the\nlaws of the world in which we live, and the constitution of the animal\nnature of man, are all but one uniform arrangement of cause and effect;\nand as by the course of those laws, animal life is propagated and\nsustained for a season, so by the operation of the same laws, decay and\nmortality are the necessary consequences.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. SPECULATION ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE DEPRAVITY...\n\nOF HUMAN REASON.\n\nIn the course of our speculation on Divine Providence we proceed next\nto the consideration of the doctrine of the depravity of human reason: a\ndoctrine derogatory to the nature of man, and the rank and character of\nbeing which he holds in the universe, and which, if admitted to be true\noverturns knowledge and science and renders learning, instruction and\nbooks useless and impertinent; inasmuch as reason, depraved or spoiled,\nwould cease to be reason; as much as the mind of a raving madman would\nof course cease to be rational: admitting the depravity of reason, the\nconsequence would unavoidably follow, that as far as it may be supposed\nto have taken place in the midst of mankind, there could be no judges of\nit, in consequence of their supposed depravity; for without the exercise\nof reason, we could not understand what reason is, which would be\nnecessary for us previously to understand, in order to understand what\nit is not; or to distinguish it from that which is its reverse. But\nfor us to have the knowledge of what reason is, and the ability to\ndistinguish it from that which is depraved, or is irrational, is\nincompatible with the doctrine of the depravity of our reason. Inasmuch\nas to understand what reason is, and to distinguish it from that which\nis marred or spoiled, is the same to all intents and purposes, as\nto have, exercise and enjoy, the principle of reason itself, which\nprecludes its supposed depravity: so that it is impossible for us to\nunderstand what reason is, and at the same time determine that our\nreason is depraved; for this would be the same as when we know that we\nare in possession and exercise of reason, to determine that we are not\nin possession or exercise of it.\n\nIt may be, that some who embrace the doctrine of the depravity of human\nreason, will not admit that it is wholly and totally depraved, but that\nit is in a great measure marred or spoiled. But the foregoing arguments\nare equally applicable to a supposed depravity in parts, as in the\nwhole; for in order to judge whether reason be depraved in part or not,\nit would be requisite to have an understanding of what reason may be\nsupposed to have been, previous to its premised depravity; and to have\nsuch a knowledge of it, would be the same as to exercise and enjoy it in\nits lustre and purity, which would preclude the notion of a depravity in\npart, as well as in the whole; for it would be utterly impossible for\nus to judge of reason undepraved and depraved, but by comparing\nthem together. But for depraved reason to make such a comparison, is\ncontradictory and impossible; so that, if our reason had been depraved,\nwe could not have had any conception of it any more than a beast. Men of\nsmall faculties in reasoning cannot comprehend the extensive reasonings\nof their superiors, how then can a supposed depraved reason comprehend\nthat reason which is uncorrupted and pure? To suppose that it could, is\nthe same as to suppose that depraved and undepraved reason is alike, and\nif so, there needs no further dispute about it.\n\nThere is a manifest contradiction in applying the term _depraved_ to\nthat of reason, the ideas contained in their respective definitions\nwill not admit of their association together, as the terms convey\nheterogeneous ideas; for reason spoiled, marred, or robbed of its\nperfection, ceaseth to be rational, and should not be called reason;\ninasmuch as it is premised to be depraved, or degenerated from a\nrational nature; and in consequence of the deprivation of its nature,\nshould also be deprived of its name, and called subterfuge, or some such\nlike name, which might better define its real character.\n\nThose who invalidate reason, ought seriously to consider, \"_whether they\nargue against reason, with or without reason; if with reason, then they\nestablish the principle, that they are laboring to dethrone:_\" but\nif they argue without reason, (which, in order to be consistent with\nthemselves, they must do,) they are out of the reach of rational\nconviction, nor do they deserve a rational argument.\n\nWe are told that the knowledge of the depravity of reason, was first\ncommunicated to mankind by the immediate inspiration of God. But\ninasmuch as reason is supposed to be depraved, what principle could\nthere be in the human irrational soul, which could receive or understand\nthe inspiration, or on which it could operate so as to represent to\nthose whom it may be supposed were inspired, the knowledge of the\ndepravity of (their own and mankind's) reason (in general:) for a\nrational inspiration must consist of rational ideas, which pre-sup-poses\nthat the minds of those who were inspired, were rational previous\nto such inspiration, which would be a downright contradiction to the\ninspiration itself; the import of which was to teach the knowledge\nof the depravity of human reason, which without reason could not be\nunderstood, and with reason it would be understood, that the inspiration\nwas false.\n\nWill any advocates for the depravity of reason suppose, that inspiration\ningrafts or superadds the essence of reason itself to the human mind?\nAdmitting it to be so, yet such inspired persons could not understand\nany thing of reason, before the reception of such supposed inspiration;\nnor would such a premised inspiration prove to its possessors or\nreceivers, that their reason had ever been depraved. All that such\npremised inspired persons could understand, or be conscious of,\nrespecting reason, would be after the inspiration may be supposed to\nhave taken effect, and made them rational beings, and then instead\nof being taught by inspiration, that their reason had been previously\ndepraved, they could have had no manner of consciousness of the\nexistence or exercise of it, until the impairing the principle of it\nby the supposed energy of inspiration; nor could such supposed inspired\npersons communicate the knowledge of such a premised revelation to\nothers of the species, who for want of a rational nature, could not be\nsupposed, on this position, to be able to receive the impressions of\nreason.\n\nThat there are degrees in the knowledge of rational beings, and also\nin their capacities to acquire it, cannot be disputed, as it is so very\nobvious among mankind. But in all the retrospect gradations from the\nexalted reasonings of a Locke or a Newton, down to the lowest exercise\nof it among the species, still it is reason, and not depraved; for a\nless degree of reason by no means implies a depravity of it, nor does\nthe imparting of reason argue its depravity, for what remains of reason,\nor rather of the exercise of it, is reason still. But there is not, and\ncannot be such a thing as depraved reason, for that which is rational\nis so, and for that reason cannot be depraved, whatever its degree of\nexercise may be supposed to be.\n\nA blow on the head, or fracture of the cranium, as also palsies and many\nother casualties that await our sensorium, retard, and in some cases\nwholly prevent the exercise of reason for a longer or shorter period;\nand sometimes through the stage of human life; but in such instances as\nthese, reason is not depraved, but ceases in a greater or less degree,\nor perhaps wholly ceases its rational exertions or operations; by\nreason of the breaches or disorders of the organs of sense, but in such\ninstances, wherein the organs become rectified, and the senses recover\ntheir usefulness, the exercise of reason returns, free from any blemish\nor depravity. For the cessation of the exercise of reason, by no means\ndepraves it.\n\nFrom what has been argued on this subject, in this and the preceding\nchapters, it appears that reason is not and cannot be depraved, but that\nit bears a likeness to divine reason, is of the same kind, and in its\nown nature as uniform as truth, which is the test of it; though in the\ndivine essence, it is eternal and infinite, but in man it is eternal\nonly as it respects their immortality, and finite as it respects\ncapaciousness. Such people as can be prevailed upon to believe, that\ntheir reason is depraved, may easily be led by the nose, and duped into\nsuperstition at the pleasure of those in whom they confide, and there\nremain from generation to generation: for when they throw by the law\nof reason _the only one_ which God gave them to direct them in their\nspeculations and duty, they are exposed to ignorant or insidious\nteachers, and also to their own irregular passions, and to the folly and\nenthusiasm of those about them, which nothing but reason can prevent\nor restrain: nor is it a rational supposition that the commonality of\nmankind would ever have mistrusted that their reason was depraved,\nhad they not been told so, and it is whispered about, that the first\ninsinuation of it was from the Priests; (though the Armenian Clergymen\nin the circle of my acquaintance have exploded the doctrine.) Should we\nadmit the depravity of reason, it would equally affect the priesthood,\nor any other teachers of that doctrine, with the rest of mankind;\nbut for depraved creatures to receive and give credit to a depraved\ndoctrine, started and taught by depraved creatures, is the greatest\nweakness and folly imaginable, and comes nearer a proof of the doctrine\nof total depravity, than any arguments which have been advanced in\nsupport of it.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. CONTAINING A DISQUISITION OF THE LAW OF NATURE...\n\nAS IT RESPECTS THE MORAL SYSTEM, INTERSPERSED WITH OBSERVATIONS ON\nSUBSEQUENT RELIGIONS\n\nThat mankind are by nature endowed with sensation and reflection,\nfrom which results the power of reason and understanding, will not be\ndisputed. The senses are well calculated to make discoveries of external\nobjects and to communicate those notices, or simple images of things to\nthe mind, with all the magnificent simplicity of nature, which opens an\nextensive field of contemplation to the understanding, enabling the mind\nto examine into the natural causes and consequences of things, and to\ninvestigate the knowledge of moral good and evil, from which, together\nwith the power of agency, results the human conscience. This is the\noriginal of moral obligation and accountability, which is called natural\nreligion; for without the understanding of truth from falsehood, and\nright from wrong, which is the same as justice from injustice, and a\nliberty of agency, which is the same as a power of proficiency in\neither moral good or evil: mankind would not be rational or accountable\ncreatures. Undoubtedly it was the ultimate design of our Creator, in\ngiving us being, and furnishing us with those noble compositions of\nmental powers and sensitive aptitudes, that we should, in, by, and with\nthat nature, serve and honor him; and with those united capacities,\nsearch out and understand our duty to him, and to one another, with the\nability of practising the same as far as may be necessary for us in this\nlife. To object against the sufficiency of natural religion, to effect\nthe best ultimate good of mankind, would be derogating from the wisdom,\ngoodness, and justice of God, who in the course of his providence to\nus, has adopted it: besides, if natural religion may be supposed to\nbe deficient, what security can we have that any subsequently revealed\nreligion should not be so also? For why might not a second religion from\nGod be as insufficient or defective as a first religion may be supposed\nto be? From hence we infer that if natural religion be insufficient to\ndictate mankind in the way of their duty and make them ultimately happy,\nthere is an end to religion in general. But as certain as God is perfect\nin wisdom and goodness, natural religion is sufficient and complete;\nand having had the divine approbation, and naturally resulting from\na rational nature, is as universally promulgated to mankind as\nreason itself. But to the disadvantage of the claim of all subsequent\nreligions, _called revelations, whether denominated inspired, external,\nsupernatural, or what not_, they came too late into the world to be\nessential to the well being of mankind, or to point out to them the only\nway to heaven and everlasting blessedness: inasmuch as for the greatest\npart of mankind who have ever lived in this world, have departed\nthis life previous to the eras and promulgations of such revelations.\nBesides, those subsequent revelations to the law of nature, began as\nhuman traditions have ever done in very small circumferences, in the\nrespective parts of the world where they have been inculcated, and made\ntheir progress, as time, chance, and opportunity presented. Does this\nlook like the contrivance of heaven, and the only way of salvation? Or\nis it not more like this world and the contrivance of man? Undoubtedly\nthe great parent of mankind laid a just and sufficient foundation of\nsalvation for every one of them; for otherwise such of them, who may be\nsupposed not to be thus provided for would not have whereof to glorify\nGod for their being, but on the contrary would have just matter of\ncomplaint against his providence or moral government for involuntarily\nnecessitating them into a wretched and miserable existence, and that\nwithout end or remedy: which would be ascribing to God a more extensive\ninjustice than is possible to be charged on the most barbarous despots\nthat ever were among mankind.\n\nBut to return to our speculations on the law of nature. That this divine\nLaw surpasses all positive institutions, that have ever been ushered\ninto the world since its creation as much as the wisdom and goodness\nof God exceeds that of man, is beautifully illustrated in the following\nquotation: \"But it may be said what is virtue? It is the faithful\ndischarge of those obligations which reason dictates. And what is\nwisdom itself, but a portion of intelligence? with which the creator\nhas furnished us, in order to direct us in our duty? It may be further\nasked, what is this duty? whence does it result? and by what law is it\nprescribed? I answer that the law which prescribed it is the immutable\nwill of God; to which right reason obliges us to conform ourselves, and\nin this conformity virtue consists. No law which has commenced since the\ncreation, or which may ever cease to be in force, can constitute virtue;\nfor before the existence of such a law, mankind could not be bound to\nobserve it; but they were certainly under an obligation to be virtuous\nfrom the beginning. Princes may make laws and repeal them, but they can\nneither make nor destroy virtue, and how indeed should they be able to\ndo what is impossible to the Deity himself? Virtue being as immutable in\nits nature as the divine will which is the ground of it.*\n\n     * Virtue did not derive its nature merely from the\n     omnipotent will of God, but also from the eternal truth and\n     moral fitness of things; which was the eternal reason why\n     they were eternally approved of by God, and immutably\n     established by him, to be what they are; and so far as our\n     duty is connected with those eternal measures of moral\n     fitness, or we are able to act on them, we give such actions\n     or habits the name of virtue or morality. But when we, in\n     writing or conversation, say that virtue is grounded on the\n     divine will, we should at the same time include in the\n     complex idea of it, that the divine will which constituted\n     virtue, was eternally and infinitely reasonable.\n\nA Prince may command his subjects to pay taxes or subsidies, may forbid\nthem to export certain commodities, or to introduce those of a foreign\ncountry. The faithful observance of these laws make obedient subjects,\nbut does not make virtuous men; and would any one seriously think\nhimself possessed of a virtue the more for not having dealt in painted\ncalico; or if the Prince should by his authority abrogate these laws,\nwould any one say he had abrogated virtue? It is thus with all positive\nlaws; they all had a beginning--are all liable to exceptions, and may be\ndispensed with and even abolished. That law alone which is engraven on\nour hearts by the hand of our creator, is unchangeable and of universal\nand eternal obligation. The law, says Cicero, is not a human invention,\nnor an arbitrary political institution, it is in its nature eternal and\nof universal obligation. The violence Tarquin offered to Lucretia, was\na breach of that eternal law, and though the Romans at that time might\nhave no written law which condemned such kind of crimes, his offence was\nnot the less heinous; for this law of reason did not then begin, when it\nwas first committed to writing; its original is as ancient as the divine\nmind. For the true, primitive and supreme law, is no other than the\nunerring reason of the great Jupiter. And in another place he says, this\nlaw is founded in nature, it is universal, immutable, and eternal, it is\nsubject to no change from any difference of place, or time, it extends\ninvariably to all ages and nations, like the sovereign dominion of that\nBeing, who is author of it.\"\n\nThe promulgation of this supreme law to creatures, is co-extensive and\nco-existent with reason, and binding on all intelligent beings in the\nuniverse; and is that eternal rule of fitness, as applicable to God, by\nwhich the creator of all things conducts his infinitude of providence,\nand by which he governs the moral system of being, according to the\nabsolute perfection of his nature. From hence we infer, that admitting\nthose subsequent revelations, which have more or less obtained credit in\nthe world, as the inspired laws of God, to be consonant to the laws of\nnature, yet they could be considered as none other but mere transcripts\ntherefrom, promulgated to certain favorite nations, when at the same\ntime all mankind was favored with the original.\n\nThe moral precepts contained in Moses' decalogue to the people of\nIsrael, was previously known to every nation under heaven, and in all\nprobability by them as much practised as by the tribes of Israel.\nTheir keeping the seventh day of the week as a sabbath was an arbitrary\nimposition of Moses, (as many other of his edicts were) and not included\nin the law of nature. But as to such laws of his, or those of any other\nlegislator, which are morally fit, agree with, and are a part of the\nnatural law, as for instance; \"Thou shalt not covet,\" or \"kill.\" These\npositive injunctions cannot add anything to the law of nature, inasmuch\nas it contains an entire and perfect system of morality; nor can any\npositive injunctions or commands enforce the authority of it, or confer\nany additional moral obligation on those to whom they are given to obey;\nthe previous obligation of natural religion, having ever been as binding\nas reason can possibly conceive of, or the order and constitution of the\nmoral rectitude of things, as resulting from God, can make it to be.\n\nTo illustrate the argument of the obligatory nature of the natural law\nlet us reverse the commandments of the decalogue, by premising that\nMoses had said thou shalt covet; thou shalt steal and murder; would any\none conclude, that the injunctions would have been obligatory? surely\nthey would not, for a positive command to violate the law of nature\ncould not be binding on any rational being. How then came the\ninjunctions of Moses, or any others, to be binding in such cases,\nin which they coincide with the law of nature? We answer, merely in\nconsequence of the obligatory sanctions of the natural law, which does\nnot at all depend on the authority of Moses or of any other legislator,\nshort of him who is eternal and infinite; nor is it possible that the\nJews, who adhere to the law of Moses, should be under greater obligation\nto the moral law, than the Japanese; or the Christians than the Chinese;\nfor the same God extends the same moral government over universal\nrational nature, independent of Popes, Priests and Levites. But with\nrespect to all mere positive institutions, injunctions, rites and\nceremonies, that do not come within the jurisdiction of the law of\nnature, they are political matters, and may be enacted, perpetuated,\ndispensed with, abolished, re-enacted, compounded or diversified,\nas conveniency, power, opportunity, inclination, or interest, or all\ntogether may dictate; inasmuch as they are not founded on any stable or\nuniversal principle of reason, but change with the customs, fashions,\ntraditions and revolutions of the world; having no centre of attraction,\nbut interest, power and advantages of a temporary nature.\n\nWas the creator and governor of the universe to erect a particular\nacademy of arts and sciences in this world, under his immediate\ninspection, with tutors rightly organized, and intellectually qualified\nto carry on the business of teaching, it might like other colleges,\n(and possibly in a superior manner,) instruct its scholars. But that God\nshould have given a revelation of his will to mankind, as his law, and\nto be continued to the latest posterity as such, which is premised to be\nabove the capacity of their understanding, is contradictory and in its'\nown nature impossible. Nor could a revelation to mankind, which comes\nwithin the circle of their knowledge, be edifying or instructing\nto them, for it is a contradiction to call that which is above my\ncomprehension, or that which I already, (from natural sagacity)\nunderstand, a revelation to me: to tell me, or inspire me, with the\nknowledge of that which I knew before, would reveal nothing to me, and\nto reveal that to me which is supernatural or above my comprehension,\nis contradictory and impossible. But the truth of the matter is, that\nmankind are restricted by the law of nature to acquire knowledge\nor science progressively, as before argued. From which we infer the\nimpropriety, and consequently the impossibility of God's having ever\ngiven us any manuscript copy of his eternal law: for that to reveal it\nat first would bring it on a level with the infancy of knowledge then\nin the world, or (fishermen, shepherds, and illiterate people could not\nhave understood it,) which would have brought it so low that it\ncould not be instructive or beneficial to after generations in their\nprogressive advances in science and wisdom.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. ARGUMENTATIVE REFLECTIONS ON SUPERNATURAL...\n\nAND MYSTERIOUS REVELATION IN GENERAL.\n\nThere is not anything which has contributed so much to delude mankind\nin religious matters, as mistaken apprehensions concerning supernatural\ninspiration or revelation; not considering that all true religion\noriginates from reason, and can no otherwise be understood but by the\nexercise and improvement of it; therefore they are apt to confuse their\nminds with such inconsistencies. In the subsequent reasonings on this\nsubject, we shall argue against supernatural revelation in general,\nwhich will comprehend the doctrine of inspiration or immediate\nillumination of the mind. And first--we will premise, that a revelation\nconsists of an assemblage of rational ideas, intelligibly arranged\nand understood by those to whom it may be supposed to be revealed,\nfor otherwise it could not exist in their minds as such. To suppose a\nrevelation, void of rationality or understanding, or of communicating\nrational intelligence to those, to whom it maybe supposed to be given,\nwould be a contradiction; for that it could contain nothing except it\nwere unintelligibleness which would be the same as to reveal and not\nto reveal; therefore, a revelation must consist of an assemblage of\nrational ideas, intelligibly communicated to those who are supposed\nto have been the partakers or receivers of it from the first supposed\ninspiration, down to this or any other period of time. But such a\nrevelation as this, could be nothing more or less than a transcript\nof the law of nature, predicated on reason, and would be no more\nsupernatural, than the reason of man may be supposed to be. The simple\ndefinition of supernatural is, that which is \"beyond or above the powers\nof nature,\" which never was or can be understood by mankind; the first\npromulgators of revelation not excepted; for such revelation, doctrine,\nprecept or instruction only, as comes within the powers of our nature,\nis capable of being apprehended, contemplated or understood by us,\nand such as does not, is to us incomprehensible and unknown, and\nconsequently cannot for us compose any part of revelation.\n\nThe author of human nature impressed it with certain sensitive aptitudes\nand mental powers, so that apprehension, reflection or understanding\ncould no otherwise be exerted or produced in the compound nature of\nman, but in the order prescribed by the creator. It would therefore be a\ncontradiction in nature, and consequently impossible for God to inspire,\ninfuse, or communicate the apprehension, reflection or understanding\nof any thing whatever into human nature, out of, above, or beyond the\nnatural aptitudes, and mental powers of that nature, which was of his\nown production and constitution; for it would be the same as to inspire,\ninfuse, or reveal apprehension, reflection or understanding, to that\nwhich is not; inasmuch as out of, beyond or above the powers of nature,\nthere could be nothing to operate upon, as a prerequisite principle\nto receive the inspiration or infusion of the revelation, which might\ntherefore as well be inspired into, or revealed to nonentity, as to man.\nFor the essence of man is that, which we denominate to be his nature,\nout of or above which he is as void of sensation, apprehension,\nreflection and understanding, as nonentity may be supposed to be;\ntherefore such revelation as is adapted to the nature and capacity of\nman, and comes within his powers of perception and understanding, is\nthe only revelation, which he is able to receive from God or man.\nSupernatural revelation is as applicable to beasts, birds and fishes,\nas it is to us; for neither we nor they are capable of being acted upon\nsupernaturally, as all the possible exertions and operations of nature,\nwhich respect the natural or moral world, are truly natural. Nor does\nGod deviate from his rectitude of nature in matters of inspiration,\nrevelation or instruction to the moral world, any more than in that of\nhis government of the natural. The infinitude of the wisdom of God's\ncreation, providence and moral government will eternally remain\nsupernatural to all finite capacities, and for that very reason we\ncan never arrive to the comprehension of it, in any state of being and\nimprovement whatever; inasmuch as progression can never attain to that\nwhich is infinite, so that an eternal proficiency in knowledge could not\nbe supernatural, but on the other hand would come within the limits and\npowers of our nature, for otherwise such proficiency would be impossible\nto us; nor is this infinite knowledge of God supernatural to him, for\nthat his perfection is also infinite. But if we could break over the\nlimits of our capacity, so as to understand any one supernatural thing,\nwhich is above or beyond the power of our natures, we might by that rule\nas well understand all things, and thus by breaking over the confines\nof finite nature and the rank of being which we hold in the universe,\ncomprehend the knowledge of infinity. From hence we infer, that every\nkind and degree ef apprehension, reflection and understanding, which\nwe can attain to in any state of improvement whatever, is no more\nsupernatural than the nature of man, from whence perception and\nunderstanding is produced, may be supposed to be so: nor has or could\nGod Almighty ever have revealed himself to mankind in any other way or\nmanner, but what is truly natural.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROVIDENCE...\n\nAND AGENCY OF GOD, AS IT RESPECTS THE NATURAL AND MORAL WORLD, WITH\nSTRICTURES ON REVELATION IN GENERAL.\n\nThe idea of a God we infer from our experimental dependence on something\nsuperior to ourselves in wisdom, power and goodness, which we call God;\nour senses discover to us the works of God which we call nature, and\nwhich is a manifest demonstration of his invisible essence. Thus it is\nfrom the works of nature that we deduce the knowledge of a God, and not\nbecause we have, or can have any immediate knowledge of, or revelation\nfrom him. But on the other hand, all our understanding of, or\nintelligence from God, is communicated to us by the intervention of\nnatural causes, (which is not of the divine essence;) this we denominate\nto be natural revelation, for that it is mediately made known to Us by\nour senses, and from our sensations of external objects in general,\nso that all and every part of the universe, of which we have any\nconception, is exterior from the nature or essence of God; nor is it\nin the nature of things possible for us to receive, or for God\nto communicate any inspiration or revelation to us, but by the\ninstrumentality of intermediate causes, as has been before observed.\nTherefore all our notions of the immediate interposition of divine\nilluminations, inspiration, or infusion of ideas or revelations into\nour minds, is mere enthusiasm and deception; for that neither the divine\nmind, nor those of any finite intelligences can make any representation\nto, or impression on our external senses without the assistance of some\nadequate, intermediate cause. The same is the case between man and man,\nor with mankind in general; we can no otherwise hold a correspondence\nbut by the aptitude, and through the medium of our senses. Since this\nis the only possible way in nature by which we can receive any notices,\nperceptions, or intelligence from God or man.\n\nNothing can be more unreasonable than to suppose, because God is\ninfinitely powerful, that he can therefore inspire or infuse perception,\nreflection or revelation into the mind of man in such a way or manner\nas is incompatible with the aptitudes and powers of their nature: such\na revelation would be as impossible to be revealed by God, as by a mere\ncreature. For though it is a maxim of truth, \"That with God all things\nare possible,\" yet it should be considered, that contradictions, and\nconsequently impossibilities are not comprehended in the definition of\nthings, but are diametrically the reverse of them, as may be seen in\nthe definition of the word things, to wit: \"whatever is.\" There is no\ncontradiction in nature or truth, which comprehends or contains all\nthings, therefore the maxim is just, \"That with God all things are\npossible,\" viz: all things in nature are possible with God; but\ncontradictions are falsehoods which have no positive existence, but are\nthe negatives to things, or to nature, which comprehends, \"Whatever\nis;\" so that contradictions are opposed to nature and truth, and are\nno things, but the chimeras of weak, unintelligent minds who make false\napplication of things to persons, or ascribe such powers, qualities,\ndispositions and aptitudes to things as nature never invested them with;\nsuch are our deluded notions of the immediate operations of the\nholy spirit, or of any mere spirit, on our minds independent of the\nintervention of some adequate, natural or intermediate cause. To make\na triangle four square, or to make a variety of mountains contiguously\nsituated, without vallies, or to give existence to a thing and not\nto give existence to it at the same time, or to reveal anything to\nus incompatible with our capacity of receiving the perception of it,\npertains to those negatives to nature and truth, and are not things\nrevealed, nor have they any positive existence as has been before\nargued; for they are inconsistent with themselves, and the relations\nand effects which they are supposed to have upon and with each other. It\nderogates nothing from the power and absolute perfection of God that he\ncannot make both parts of a contradiction to be true.\n\nBut let us reverse the position concerning revelation, and premise that\nit is accommodated to our capacity of receiving and understanding it,\nand in this case it would be natural, and therefore possible for us to\nreceive and understand it; for the same truth which is predicated on\nthe sufficiency of our capacity to receive and understand a revelation,\naffirms at the same time the possibility of our receiving and\nunderstanding it. But to suppose that God can make both parts of a\ncontradiction to be true, to reveal and not reveal, would be the same as\nascribing a falsehood to him and to call it by the name of power.\n\nThat God can do anything and everything, that is consonant to his moral\nperfections, and which does not imply a contradiction to the nature of\nthe things themselves, and the essential relation which they bear to\neach other, none will dispute. But to suppose, that inasmuch as God is\nall-powerful, he can therefore do everything, which we in our ignorance\nof nature or of moral fitness may ascribe to him, without understanding,\nwhether it is either consonant to moral rectitude, or to the nature of\nthe things themselves, and the immutable relations and connections which\nthey bear to each other, or not, is great weakness and folly. That God\ncannot in the exercise of his providence or moral government, counteract\nthe perfections of his nature, or do any manner of injustice, is\nmanifestly certain; nor is it possible for God to effect a contradiction\nin the natural world, any more than in the moral. The impossibility of\nthe one results from the moral perfections of God, and the impossibility\nof the other from the immutable properties, qualities, relations and\nnature of the things themselves, as in the instances of the mountains,\nvallies, &c., before alluded to, and in numberless other such like\ncases.\n\nAdmitting a revelation to be from God, it must be allowed to be\ninfallible, therefore those to whom it may be supposed to have been\nfirst revealed from God, must have had an infallible certainty of their\ninspiration: so likewise the rest of mankind, to whom it is proposed as\na Divine Law, or rule of duty, should have an infallible certainty,\nthat its first promulgators were thus truly inspired by the immediate\ninterposition of the spirit of God, and that the revelation has been\npreserved through all the changes and revolutions of the world to\ntheir time, and that the copies extant present them with its original\ninspiration and unerring composure, or are perfectly agreeable to it.\nAll this we must have an infallible certainty of, or we fail of an\ninfallible certainty of revelation, and are liable to be imposed upon by\nimpostors, or by ignorant and insidious teachers, whose interest it may\nbe to obtrude their own systems on the world for infallible truth, as in\nthe instance of Mahomet.\n\nBut let us consult our own constitutions and the world in which we live,\nand we shall find that inspiration is, in the very nature of things,\nimpossible to be understood by us, and of consequence not in fact true.\nWhat certainty can we have of the agency of the divine mind on ours? Or\nhow can we distinguish the supposed divine illuminations or ideas from\nthose of our own which are natural to us? In order for us to be certain\nof the interposition of immediate divine inspiration in our minds\nwe must be able to analyze, distinguish, and distinctly separate the\npremised divine reflections, illuminations or inspiration from our own\nnatural cogitations, for otherwise we should be liable to mistake our\nreflections and reasonings for God's inspiration, as is the case with\nenthusiasts, or fanatics, and thus impose on ourselves, and obtrude our\nromantic notions on mankind, as God's revelation.\n\nNone will, it is presumed, pretend that the natural reflections of our\nminds are dictated by the immediate agency of the divine spirit; for\nif they were thus dictated, they would be of equal authority with any\nsupposed inspired revelation. How then shall we be able to distinguish\nor understand our natural perceptions, reflections or reasonings, from\nany premised immediately inspired ones? Should God make known to us, or\nto any of us, a revelation by a voice, and that in a language which we\nunderstand, and admitting that the propositions, doctrines, or subject\nmatter of it, should not exceed our capacity, we could understand it\nthe same as we do in conversation with one another; but this would be an\nexternal and natural revelation, in which God is supposed to make use\nof language, grammar, logic and sound, alias of intermediate causes, in\norder to communicate or reveal it, which would differ as much from an\nimmediately inspired revelation, as this book may be supposed to do; for\nthe very definition of immediate inspiration precludes all natural\nor immediate causes. That God is eternally perfect in knowledge,\nand therefore knows all things, not by succession or by parts, as we\nunderstand things by degrees, has been already evinced; nevertheless all\ntruth, which we arrive at the understanding of, accords with the divine\nomniscience, but we do not come at the comprehension of things by\nimmediate infusion, or inspiration, but from reasoning; for we cannot\nsee or hear God think or reason any more than man, nor are our senses\nsusceptible of a mere mental communion with him, nor is it in nature\npossible for the human mind to receive any instantaneous or immediate\nilluminations or ideas from the divine spirit (as before argued,) but\nwe must illuminate and improve our minds by a close application to the\nstudy of nature, through the series whereof God has been pleased to\nreveal himself to man, so that we may truly say, that the knowledge of\nnature is the revelation of God. In this there can be no delusion, it is\nnatural, and could come from none other but God.\n\nUnless we could do this, we should compound them together at a venture,\nand form a revelation like Nebuchadnezzar's idol, \"partly iron and\npartly clay,\" alias partly divine and partly human. The Apostle Paul\ninforms us, that sometimes he \"spake, and not the Lord,\" and at other\ntimes speaks doubtfully about the matter, saying, \"and I think also\nthat I have the spirit of God,\" and if he was at a loss about his\ninspiration, well may we be distrustful of it. From the foregoing\nspeculations on the subject of supernatural inspiration, it appears,\nthat there are insuperable difficulties in a mere mental discourse with\nthe divine spirit; it is what we are unacquainted with, and the law\nof our nature forbids it. Our method of conversation is vocal, or by\nwriting, or by some sort of external symbols which are the mediate\nground of it, and we are liable to errors and mistakes in this natural\nand external way of correspondence; but when we have the vanity to\nrely on dreams and visions to inform ourselves of things, or attempt\nto commune with invisible finite beings, or with the holy spirit, our\ndeceptions, blunders and confusions are increased to fanaticism itself;\nas the diverse supposed influence of the spirit, on the respective\nsectaries, even among Christians, may witness, as it manifestly, in\ntheir empty conceit of it, conforms to every of their traditions. Which\nevinces, that the whole bustle of it is mere enthusiasm, for was\nit dictated by the spirit of truth and uniformity itself, it would\ninfluence all alike, however zealots persuade themselves and one another\nthat they have supernatural communion with the Holy Ghost, from whence\nthey tell us they derive their notions of religion, and in their frenzy\nare proof against reason and argument, which if we tender them, they\ntell us, that it is carnal and depraved reasoning, but that their\nteachings are immediately from God, and then proceed to vent upon us all\nthe curses and punishments, which are written in the book of the law.\n\nThere has in the different parts and ages of the world, been a\nmultiplicity of immediate and wonderful discoveries, said to have been\nmade to godly men of old by the special illumination or supernatural\ninspiration of God, every of which have, in doctrine, precept and\ninstruction, been essentially different from each other, which are\nconsequently as repugnant to truth, as the diversity of the influence of\nthe spirit on the multiplicity of sectaries has been represented to be.\n\nThese facts, together with the premises and inferences as already\ndeduced, are too evident to be denied, and operate conclusively\nagainst immediate or supernatural revelation in general; nor will\nsuch revelation hold good in theory any more than in practice. Was\na revelation to be made known to us, it must be accommodated to our\nexternal senses, and also to our reason, so that we could come at the\nperception and understanding of it, the same as we do to that of things\nin general. We must perceive by our senses, before we can reflect with\nthe mind. Our sensorium is that essential medium between the divine and\nhuman mind, through which God reveals to man the knowledge of nature,\nand is our only door of correspondence with God or with man.\n\nA premised revelation, adapted to our external senses, would enable our\nmental powers to reflect upon, examine into, and understand it. Always\nprovided nevertheless, that the subject matter of such revelation, or\nthat of the doctrines, precepts or injunctions therein contained, do\nnot exceed our reason, but are adapted to it as well as to our external\nsenses. To suppose that God, merely from his omnipotence, without the\nintervention of some adequate intermediate cause could make use of\nsound, or grammatical and logical language, or of writing, so as to\ncorrespond with us, or to reveal any thing to us, would run into the\nsame sort of absurdity, which we have already confuted; for it is the\nsame as to suppose an effect without a suitable or a proportionable\ncause, or an effect without a cause; whereas, effects must have adequate\ncauses or they could not be produced. God is the self-existent and\neternal cause of all things, but the eternal cause can no otherwise\noperate on the eternal succession of causes and effects, but by the\nmutual operation of those causes on each other, according to the fixed\nlaws of nature. For as we have frequently observed before that of all\npossible systems, infinite wisdom comprehended the best; and infinite\ngoodness and power must have adopted and perfected it; and being once\nestablished into an ordinance of nature, it could not be deviated from\nby God: for that it would necessarily imply a manifest imperfection in\nGod, either in its eternal establishment, or in its premised subsequent\nalteration, which will be more particularly considered in the next\nchapter.\n\nTo suppose that Almighty power could produce a voice, language, grammar,\nor logic, so as to communicate a revelation to us, without some sort of\norganic or instrumentated machine or intermediate vehicle, or adequate\nconstituted external cause, would imply a contradiction to the order of\nnature and consequently to the perfection of God, who established it;\ntherefore, provided God has ever given us any particular revelation, we\nmust suppose, that he has made use of a regular and natural constituted\nand mediate cause, comprehended in the external order of nature, rightly\nfitted and abilitated to make use of the vocal power of language, which\ncomprises that of characters, orthography, grammar and logic, all which\nmust have been made use of, in communicating a supposed revelation to\nmankind, which forecloses inspiration.\n\nFurthermore, this heavenly dictating voice should have been accommodated\nto all languages, grammars and logical ways of speaking, in which a\nrevelation may have been divulged, as it would be needful to have been\ncontinued from the beginning to every receiver, compiler, translator,\nprinter, commentator on and teacher of such revelation, in order to have\ninformed mankind in every instance, wherein at any time they may have\nbeen imposed upon by any spurious adulterations or interpolations, and\nhow it was in the original. These, with the refinements of languages and\ntranslations, are a summary of the many ways, wherein we may have been\ndeceived by giving credit to antiquated written revelation, which would\nneed a series of miracles to promulgate and perpetuate it in the world\nfree from mistakes and frauds of one kind or other, and which leads me\nto the consideration of the doctrine of miracles.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. OF MIRACLES\n\nPrevious to the arguments concerning miracles, it is requisite that we\ngive a definition of them, that the arguments may be clearly opposed to\nthe doctrine of miracles, the reality of which we mean to negative; so\nthat we do not dispute about matters in which we are all agreed, but\nthat we may direct our speculations to the subject matter or essence of\nthe controversy.\n\nWe will therefore premise, that miracles are opposed to, and counteract\nthe laws of nature, or that they imply an absolute alteration in either\na greater or less degree, the eternal order, disposition and tendency\nof it; this, we conclude, is a just definition of miraculousness, and is\nthat for which the advocates for miracles contend, in their defining of\nmiracles. For if they were supposed to make no alteration in the natural\norder of things, they could have no positive existence, but the laws of\nnature would produce their effects, which would preclude their reality,\nand render them altogether fictitious, inasmuch as their very existence\nis premised to consist in their opposition to, and alteration of the\nlaws of nature: so that if this is not effected, miracles can have no\npositive existence, any more than nonentity itself; therefore, if in the\ncourse of the succeeding arguments, we should evince that the laws of\nnature have not and cannot be perverted, altered or suspended, it will\nforeclose miracles by making all things natural. Having thus defined\nmiracles, and stated the dispute, we proceed to the arguments.\n\nShould there ever have been a miraculous suspension and alteration of\nthe laws of nature, God must have been the immediate author of it, as\nno finite beings may be supposed to be able to alter those laws or\nregulations, which were established by omnipotent power and infinite\nperfection, and which nothing short of such power and perfection can\nperpetuate. This then is the single point at issue, viz: whether\nGod has, or can, consistent with his nature as God, in any instance\nwhatever, alter or deviate from the laws, with which he has eternally\nimpressed the universe, or not.\n\nTo suppose that God should subvert his laws, (which is the same as\nchanging them) would be to suppose him to be mutable; for that it\nwould necessarily imply, either that their eternal establishment was\nimperfect, or that a premised alteration thereof is so. To alter or\nchange that which is absolutely perfect, would necessarily make it\ncease to be perfect, inasmuch as perfection could not be altered for the\nbetter, but for the worse, and consequently an alteration could not meet\nwith the divine approbation; which terminates the issue of the matter\nin question against miracles, and authorizes us to deduce the following\nconclusive inference, to wit: that Almighty God, having eternally\nimpressed the universe with a certain system of laws, for the same\neternal reason that they were infinitely perfect and best, they could\nnever admit of the least alteration, but are as unchangeable, in their\nnature, as God their immutable author. To form the foregoing argument\ninto syllogisms, it would be thus:--\n\nGod is perfect--the laws of nature were established by God; therefore,\nthe laws of nature are perfect.\n\nBut admitting miracles, the syllogism should be thus:--\n\nThe laws of nature were in their eternal establishment perfect;--the\nlaws of nature have been altered; therefore, the alteration of the laws\nof nature is imperfect.\n\nOr thus: the laws of nature have been altered;--the alteration has\nbeen for the better; therefore, the eternal establishment thereof was\nimperfect.\n\nThus it appears, from a syllogistical as well as other methods of\nreasoning, that provided we admit of miracles, which are synonymous to\nthe alterations of nature, we by so doing derogate from the perfection\nof God, either in his eternal constitution of nature, or in a supposed\nsubsequent miraculous alteration of it, so that take the argument either\nway, and it preponderates against miracles.\n\nFurthermore, was it possible, that the eternal order of nature should\nhave been imperfect, there would be an end to all perfection. For God\nmight be as imperfect in any supposed miraculous works, as in those of\nnature; nor could we ever have any security under his natural or moral\ngovernment, if they were liable to change; for mutability is but another\nterm for imperfection, or is inseparably connected with it.\n\nGod, the great architect of nature, has so constructed its machinery,\nthat it never needs to be altered or rectified. In vain* we endeavor to\nsearch out the hidden mystery of a perpetual motion, in order to copy\nnature, for after all our researches we must be contented with such\nmechanism as will run down, and need rectification again; but the\nmachine of the universe admits of no rectification, but continues its\nnever ceasing operations, under the unerring guidance of the providence\nof God. Human architects make and unmake things, and alter them as\ntheir invention may dictate, and experience may determine to be most\nconvenient and best. But that mind, which is infinitely perfect, gains\nnothing by experience, but surveys the immense universality of things,\nwith all their possible relations, fitnesses and unfitnesses, of both a\nnatural or moral kind, with one comprehensive view.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. A SUCCESSION OF KNOWLEDGE, OR OF THE EXERTION OF POWER...\n\nIN GOD, INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS OMNISCIENCE OR OMNIPOTENCE, AND THE\nETERNAL AND INFINITE DISPLAY OF DIVINE POWER FORECLOSES ANY SUBSEQUENT\nEXERTION OF IT MIRACULOUSLY\n\nThat creation is as eternal and infinite as God, has been argued in\nchapter second; and that there could be no succession in creation, or\nthe exertion of the power of God, in perfecting the boundless work, and\nin impressing the universe with harmonious laws, perfectly well adapted\nto their design, use and end.\n\nFirst. These arguments may be further illustrated, and the evidence\nof the being of a God more fully exhibited, from the following\nconsiderations, to wit: dependent beings and existences must be\ndependent on some being or cause that is independent, for dependent\nbeings, or existences, could not exist independently; and, in as much\nas by retrospectively tracing the order of the succession of causes, we\ncannot include in our numeration the independent cause, as the several\nsuccessive causes still depend on their preceding cause, and that\npreceding cause on the cause preceding it, and so on beyond numerical\ncalculations, we are therefore obliged (as rational beings) to admit an\nindependent cause of all things, for that a mere succession of dependent\ncauses cannot constitute an independent cause; and from hence we are\nobliged to admit a self-existent and sufficient cause of all things, for\notherwise it would be dependent and insufficient to have given existence\nto itself, or to have been the efficient cause of all things.\n\nHaving thus established the doctrine of a self-sufficient,\nself-existent, and consequently all-powerful cause of all things, we\nascribe an eternal existence to this cause of all causes and effects,\nwhom we call God. And, inasmuch, as from the works of nature it is\nmanifest, that God is possessed of almighty power, we from hence infer\nhis eternal existence. Since his premised existence at (and not before)\nany given era, would be a conclusive objection to the omnipotency of\nhis power, that he had not existed before, or eternally. For as God is\na being self-sufficient, self-existent, and almighty, (as before argued)\nhis power must apply to his own existence as well as to the existence of\nthings in general, and therefore, if he did not eternally exist, it must\nbe because he had not the almighty power of existence in himself, and if\nso, he never could have existed at all; so that God must have eternally\nexisted or not have existed at all; and inasmuch as the works of nature\nevince his positive existence, and as he could not be dependent on\nthe power, will, or pleasure of any other being but himself for his\nexistence, and as an existence, in time would be a contradiction to his\nalmighty power of self-existency, that he had not eternally existed;\ntherefore, his existence must have been (in truth) eternal.\n\nAlthough it is to us incomprehensible that any being could be\nself-existent or eternal (which is synonymous,) yet we can comprehend,\nthat any being that is not self-existent and eternal and dependent\nand finite, and consequently not a God. Hence we infer, that though we\ncannot comprehend the true God (by reason of our own finiteness,) yet\nwe can negatively comprehend that an imperfect being cannot be God. A\ndependent being is finite, and therefore imperfect, and consequently not\na God. A being that has existed at a certain era (and not before) is a\nlimited one, for beyond his era he was not, and therefore finite, and\nconsequently not a God. Therefore, that being only who is self-existent,\ninfinitely perfect and eternal, is the true God: and if eternally\nand infinitely perfect, there must have been an eternal and infinite\ndisplay, and if an eternal and infinite display, it could be nothing\nshort of an eternal and infinite creation and providence.\n\nAs to the existence of a God, previous to Moses's era of the first day's\nwork, he does not inform us. The first notice he gives us of a God was\nof his laborious working by the day, a theory of creation (as I should\nthink) better calculated for the servile Israelitish Brick-makers, than\nfor men of learning and science in these modern times.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. RARE AND WONDERFUL PHENOMENA NO EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES...\n\nNOR ARE DIABOLICAL SPIRITS ABLE TO EFFECT THEM, OR SUPERSTITIOUS\nTRADITIONS TO CONFIRM THEM, NOR CAN ANCIENT MIRACLES PROVE RECENT\nREVELATIONS.\n\nComets, earthquakes, volcanoes, and northern lights (in the night,) with\nmany other extraordinary phenomena or appearances intimidate weak minds,\nand are by them thought to be miraculous, although they undoubtedly\nhave their proper natural causes, which have been in a great measure\ndiscovered. Jack-with-a-lantern is a frightful appearance to some\npeople, but not so much as the imaginary spectre. But of all the\nscarecrows which have made human nature tremble, the devil has been\nchief; his family is said to be very numerous, consisting of \"legions,\"\nwith which he has kept our world in a terrible uproar. To tell of all\nthe feats and diabolical tricks, which this infernal family is said to\nhave played upon our race, would compose a volume of an enormous size.\nAll the magicians, necromancers, wizards, witches, conjurors, gypsies,\nsybils, hobgoblins, apparitions and the like, are supposed to be under\ntheir diabolical government: old Belzebub rules them all. Men will face\ndestructive cannon and mortars, engage each other in the clashing of\narms, and meet the horrors of war undaunted, but the devil and his\nbanditti of fiends and emissaries fright them out of their wits, and\nhave a powerful influence in plunging them into superstition, and also\nin continuing them therein.\n\nThis supposed intercourse between mankind and those infernal beings, is\nby some thought to be miraculous or supernatural; while others laugh at\nall the stories of their existence, concluding them to be mere juggle\nand deception, craftily imposed on the credulous, who are always gaping\nafter something marvellous, miraculous, or supernatural, or after that\nwhich they do not understand: and are awkward and unskilful in their\nexamination into nature, or into the truth or reality of things, which\nis occasioned partly by natural imbecility, and partly by indolence and\ninattention to nature and reason.\n\nThat any magical intercourse or correspondence of mere spirits with\nmankind, is contradictory to nature, and consequently impossible, has\nbeen argued in chapter sixth. And that nothing short of the omnipotent\npower of God, countermanding his eternal order of nature, and impressing\nit with new and contrary law, can constitute a miracle has been argued\nin this, and is an effect surpassing the power of mere creatures, the\ndiabolical nature not excepted. From hence we infer, that devils cannot\nwork miracles. Inattention to reason, and ignorance of the nature of\nthings makes many of mankind give credit to miracles. It seems that by\nthis marvellous way of accounting for things, they think to come off\nwith reputation in their ignorance; for if nature was nothing but\na supernatural whirligig, or an inconstant and irregular piece of\nmechanism, it would reduce all learning and science to a level with the\nfanaticism and superstition of the weak and credulous, and put the wise\nand unwise on a level in point of knowledge, as there would not, on\nthis thesis, be any regular standard in nature, whereby to ascertain the\ntruth and reality of things. What is called sleight-of-hand, is by\nsome people thought to be miraculous. Astrological calculations of\nnativities, lucky and unlucky days and seasons, are by some, regarded,\nand even moles on the surface of the skin are thought to be portentive\nof good or bad fortune.\n\n\"The Swedish Laplanders, the most ignorant mortals in Europe,\" are\n\"charged with being conjurors, and are said to have done such feats, by\nthe magic art, as do not at all fall far short of miracles; that they\nwill give the sailors such winds as they want in any part of their\nvoyage; that they can inflict and cure diseases at any distance; and\ninsure people of success in their undertakings; and yet they are just\nsuch poor miserable wretches as used to be charged with witchcraft\nhere,\" viz: in England and in New England, \"and cannot command so much\nas the necessaries of life: and indeed, none but very credulous and\nignorant people give credit to such fables at this day, though the whole\nworld seems to have been bewitched in believing them formerly.\" \"The\n24th of March, 1735, an act passed in the Parliament of Great Britain\nto repeal the statute of I _Jac's_, entitled an act against conjuration,\nwitchcraft, and dealing with evil and wicked spirits, and to repeal an\nact in Scotland entitled Amentis Witchcraft.\" It is but forty-six\nyears since the supreme legislature became apprized of the natural\nimpossibility of any magical intercourse between mankind and evil and\nwicked spirits; in consequence whereof they repealed their statute laws\nagainst it, as they were naturally void, unnecessary, and unworthy of\ntheir legislative restriction. For that such a crime had no possible\nexistence in nature, and therefore could not be acted by mankind; though\nprevious to the repeal of those laws, more or less of that island\nhad fallen a sacrifice to them; and the relations of those imaginary\ncriminals were stamped with infamy by such executions, which had the\nsanction of law, alias of the legislature and the judges, and in which\nmany learned attorneys have demonstrated the turpitude of such capital\noffences, and the just sanction of those laws in extirpating such pests\nof society from the earth; to which the clergy have likewise given their\napprobation, for that those capital transgressors made too free with\ntheir devils.\n\nFurthermore, the repeal of those laws, as far as the wisdom and\nauthority of the British Parliament may be supposed to go, abrogated\nthat command of the law of Moses, which saith, \"Thou shalt not suffer a\nwitch to live,\" and not only so, but the doctrine of the impossibility\nof intercourse, or of dealing with wicked spirits, forecloses the\nsupposed miraculous casting out of devils, of which we have sundry\nchronicles in the New Testament.\n\nBut to return to the annals of my own country, it will present us with a\nscene of superstition in the magical way, which will probably equal any\nthat is to be met with in history, to wit: the Salem witchcraft in New\nEngland; great numbers of the inhabitants of both sexes were judicially\nconvicted of being wizards and witches, and executed accordingly; some\nof whom were so infatuated with the delusion, that at their execution\nthey confessed themselves guilty of the sorcery for which they were\nindicted; nor did the fanaticism meet with a check until some of the\nfirst families were accused with it, who made such an opposition to the\nprosecutions, as finally to put an end to any further execution of the\nSalemites.\n\nThose capital offenders suffered in consequence of certain laws,\nwhich, by way of derision, have since been called the _Blue Laws_,\nin consequence of the multiplicity of superstition, with which they\nabounded, most of which are repealed; but those that respect sorcery\nhave had favorite legislators enough to keep them alive and in force to\nthis day.\n\nI recollect an account of prodigies said to have been carried on by the\nRomish Clergy in France, upon which his most Christian Majesty sent one\nof his officers to them with the following prohibition, to wit: \"by the\ncommand of the king, God is forbid to work any more miracles in this\nplace;\" upon which the marvellous work ceased.\n\nThere has been so much detection of the artifice, juggle and imposture\nof the pretenders to miracles, in the world, especially in such parts\nwhere learning and science have prevailed, that it should prompt us to\nbe very suspicious of the reality of them, even without entering into\nany lengthy arguments from the reason and nature of things to evince the\nutter impossibility of their existence in the creation and providence of\nGod.\n\nWe are told, that the first occasion and introduction of miracles into\nthe world, was to prove the divine authority of revelation, and the\nmission of its first teachers; be it so. Upon this plan of evincing the\ndivinity of revelation, it would be necessary that its teachers should\nalways be vested with the power of working miracles; so that when their\nauthority or the infallibility of the revelation which they should\nteach, should at any time be questioned, they might work a miracle;\nor that in such a case God would do it; which would end the dispute,\nprovided mankind were supposed to be judges of miracles, which may be\ncontroverted. However, admitting that they are possible, and mankind in\nthe several generations of the world to be adequate judges of them,\nand also, that they were necessary to support the divine mission of the\nfirst promulgators of revelation, and the divinity which they taught;\nfrom the same parity of reasoning, miracles ought to be continued to\nthe succeeding generations of mankind, co-extensive with its divine\nauthority, or that of its teachers. For why should we in this age of the\nworld be under obligation to believe the infallibility of revelation, or\nthe heavenly mission of its teachers, upon less evidence than those of\nmankind who lived in the generations before us? For that which may be\nsupposed to be a rational evidence, and worthy to gain the belief and\nassent of mankind at one period of time, must be so at another; so\nthat it appears, from the sequel of the arguments on this subject, that\nprovided miracles were requisite to establish the divine authority of\nrevelation originally, it is equally requisite that they be continued to\nthe latest posterity, to whom the divine legislator may be supposed to\ncontinue such revelation as his law to mankind.\n\nNothing is more evident to the understanding part of mankind, than that\nin those parts of the world where learning and science has prevailed,\nmiracles have ceased; but in such parts of it as are barbarous and\nignorant, miracles are still in vogue; which is of itself a strong\npresumption that in the infancy of letters, learning and science, or in\nthe world's non-age, those who confided in miracles, as a proof of the\ndivine mission of the first promulgators of revelation, were imposed\nupon by fictitious appearances instead of miracles.\n\nFurthermore, the author of Christianity warns us against the impositions\nof false teachers, and ascribes the signs of the true believers, saying,\n\"And, these signs shall follow them that believe, in my name shall they\ncast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up\nserpents, and if they drink any deadly thing it shall not hurt them,\nthey shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover.\" These are the\nexpress words of the founder of Christianity, and are contained in\nthe very commission, which he gave to his eleven Apostles, who were to\npromulgate his gospel in the world; so that from their very institution\nit appears that when the miraculous signs, therein spoken of, failed,\nthey were considered as unbelievers, and consequently no faith or trust\nto be any longer reposed in them or their successors. For these signs\nwere those which were to perpetuate their mission, and were to be\ncontinued as the only evidences of the validity and authenticity of it,\nand as long as these signs followed, mankind could not be deceived\nin adhering to the doctrines which the Apostles and their successors\ntaught; but when these signs failed, their divine authority ended.\nNow if any of them will drink a dose of deadly poison, which I could\nprepare, and it does not \"hurt them,\" I will subscribe to their divine\nauthority, and end the dispute; not that I have a disposition to poison\nanyone, nor do I suppose that they would dare to take such a dose as\nI could prepare for them, which, if so, would evince that they were\nunbelievers themselves, though they are extremely apt to censure others\nfor unbelief, which according to their scheme is a damnable sin.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON IV. PRAYER CANNOT BE ATTENDED WITH MIRACULOUS CONSEQUENCES\n\nPrayer to God is no part of a rational religion, nor did reason\never dictate it; but, was it duly attended to, it would teach us the\ncontrary.\n\nTo make known our wants to God by prayer, or to communicate any\nintelligence concerning ourselves or the universe to him, is impossible,\nsince his omniscient mind has a perfect knowledge of all things, and\ntherefore is beholden to none of our correspondency to inform himself of\nour circumstances, or of what would be wisest and best to do for us\nin all possible conditions and modes of existence, in our never ending\nduration of being. These, with the infinitude of things, have been\neternally deliberated by the omniscient mind, who can admit of no\nadditional intelligence, whether by prayer or otherwise, which renders\nit nugatory.\n\nWe ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and demean ourselves,\nas creatures of our rank and capacity, and not presume to dictate any\nthing, less or more, to the governor of the universe; who rules not by\nour proscriptions, but by eternal and infinite reason. To pray to God,\nor to make supplication to him, requesting certain favors for ourselves,\nor from any, or all the species, is inconsistent with the relation which\nsubsists between God and man. Whoever has a just sense of the absolute\nperfection of God, and of their own imperfection, and natural subjection\nto his providence, cannot but from thence infer the impropriety of\npraying or supplicating to God, for this, that, or the other thing; or\nof remonstrating against his providence: inasmuch, as \"known to God are\nall our wants;\" and as we know, that we ourselves are inadequate judges\nof what would be best for us, all things considered. God looks through\nthe immensity of things, and understands the harmony, moral beauty and\ndecorum of the whole, and will by no means change his purposes, or\nalter the nature of the things themselves for any of our entreaties or\nthreats. To pray, entreat, or make supplication to God, is neither\nmore nor less than dictating to eternal reason, and entering into the\nprovince and prerogative of the Almighty; if this is not the meaning and\nimport of prayer, it has none at all, that extends to the final events\nand consequences of things. To pray to God with a sense, that the prayer\nwe are making will not be granted any more for our making it, or that\nour prayer will make no alteration in the state, order or disposal\nof things at all, or that the requests, which we make, will be no more\nlikely to be granted, or the things themselves conferred upon us by\nGod, than as though we had not prayed for them, would be stupidity or\noutright mockery, or \"to be seen of men,\" in order to procure from them\nsome temporary advantages. But on the other hand for us to suppose, that\nour prayers or praises do in any one instance or more alter the eternal\nconstitution of things, or of the providence of God, is the same as to\nsuppose ourselves so far forth to hold a share in the divine government,\nfor our prayers must be supposed to effect something or nothing, if they\neffect nothing they are good for nothing; but that they should effect\nany alteration in the nature of things, or providence of God, is\ninadmissible: for if they did, we should interfere with the providence\nof God in a certain degree, by arrogating it to ourselves. For if there\nare any particulars in providence, which God does not govern by his\norder of nature, they do not belong to the providence of God, but of\nman; for if in any instance, God is moved by the prayers, entreaties, or\nsupplications of his creatures, to alter his providence, or to do that\nin conformity thereto, which otherwise, in the course of his providence,\nhe would not have done; then it would necessarily follow, that as far\nas such alteration may be supposed to take place, God does not govern by\neternal and infinite reason, but on the contrary is governed himself by\nthe prayer of man.\n\nOur great proficients in prayer must need think themselves to be of\ngreat importance in the scale of being, otherwise they would not indulge\nthemselves in the notion, that the God of nature would subvert his laws,\nor bend his providence in conformity to their prayers. But it may be\nobjected, that they pray conditionally, to wit: that God would answer\ntheir prayers, provided they are agreeable to his providential order or\ndisposal of things; but to consider prayer in such a sense renders it,\nnot only useless, but impertinent; for the laws of nature would produce\ntheir natural effects as well without it, as with it The sum total of\nsuch conditional prayer could amount to no more than this, viz: that God\nwould not regard them at all, but that he would conduct the kingdom of\nhis providence agreeable to the absolute perfections of his nature;\nand who in the exercise of common sense would imagine that God would do\notherwise?\n\nThe nature of the immense universality of things having been eternally\nadjusted, constituted and settled, by the profound thought, perfect\nwisdom, impartial justice, immense goodness, and omnipotent power\nof God, it is the greatest arrogance in us to attempt an alteration\nthereof. If we demean ourselves worthy of a rational happiness, the laws\nof the moral system, already established, will afford it to us; and as\nto physical evils, prudent economy may make them tolerable, or ward most\nof them off for a season, though they will unavoidably bring about the\nseparation of a soul and body, and terminate with animal life, whether\nwe pray for or against it.\n\nTo pray for any thing, which we can obtain by the due application of our\nnatural powers, and neglect the means of procuring it, is impertinence\nand laziness in the abstract; and to pray for that which God in the\ncourse of his providence, has put out of our power to obtain, is only\nmurmuring against God, and finding fault with his providence, or acting\nthe inconsiderate part of a child; for example, to pray for more wisdom,\nunderstanding, grace or faith; for a more robust constitution--handsomer\nfigure, or more of a gigantic size, would be the same as telling God,\nthat we are dissatisfied with our inferiority in the order of being;\nthat neither our souls nor bodies suit us; that he has been too sparing\nof his beneficence; that we want more wisdom, and organs better fitted\nfor show, agility and superiority. But we ought to consider, that \"_we\ncannot add one cubit to our stature_,\" or alter the construction of our\norganic frame; and that our mental talents are finite; and that in a\nvast variety of proportions and disproportions, as our Heavenly Father\nin his order of nature, and scale of being saw fit; who has nevertheless\nfor the encouragement of intelligent nature ordained, that it shall\nbe capable of improvement, and consequently of enlargement; therefore,\n\"_whosoever lacketh wisdom_\" instead of \"_asking it of God_,\" let him\nimprove what he has, that he may enlarge the original stock; this is\nall the possible way of gaining in wisdom and knowledge, a competency of\nwhich will regulate our faith. But it is too common for great faith and\nlittle knowledge to unite in the same person; such persons are beyond\nthe reach of argument and their faith immovable, though it cannot remove\nmountains. The only way to procure food, raiment, or the necessaries or\nconveniences of life, is by natural means; we do not get them by wishing\nor praying for, but by actual exertion; and the only way to obtain\nvirtue or morality is to practice and habituate ourselves to it, and\nnot to pray to God for it: he has naturally furnished us with talents or\nfaculties suitable for the exercise and enjoyment of religion, and it is\nour business to improve them aright, or we must suffer the consequences\nof it. We should conform ourselves to reason, the path of moral\nrectitude, and in so doing, we cannot fail of recommending ourselves to\nGod, and to our own consciences. This is all the religion which reason\nknows or can ever approve of.\n\nMoses, the celebrated prophet and legislator of the Israelites,\ningratiated himself into their esteem, by the stratagem of prayer, and\npretended intimacy with God; he acquaints us, that he was once admitted\nto a sight of his back-parts! and that \"_no man can see\" his \"face and\nlive_;\" and at other times we are told that he \"_talked with God, face\nto face, as a man talketh with his friend_;\" and also that at times God\nwaxed, wroth with Israel, and how Moses prayed for them; and at other\ntimes, that he ordered Aaron to offer sweet incense to God, which\n_appeased his wrath_, and prevented his destroying Israel in his _hot\ndispleasure!_ These are the footsteps, by which we may trace sacerdotal\ndominion to its source, and explore its progress in the world. \"_And the\nLord said unto Moses, how long will this people provoke me?\nI will smite them with the pestilence, and disinherit them, and I\nwill make of thee a great nation, and mightier than they_,\" but Moses\nadvertises God of the injury, which so rash a procedure would do to\nhis character among the nations; and also reminds him of his promise\nto Israel, saying, \"_Now if thou shall kill all this people as one man,\nthen the nations, which have heard the fame of thee will speak, saying,\nbecause the Lord was not able to bring this people into the land, which\nhe swear unto them, therefore he hath slain them in the wilderness_.\"\nThat Moses should thus advise the omniscient God, of dishonorable\nconsequences which would attend a breach of promise, which he tells us,\nthat God was unadvisedly about to make with the tribes of Israel, had\nnot his remonstrance prevented it, is very extraordinary and repugnant\nto reason; yet to an eye of faith it would exalt the man Moses, \"and\nmake him very great;\" for if we may credit his history of the matter, he\nnot only averted God's judgment against Israel, and prevented them from\nbeing cut off as a nation, but by the same prayer procured for them\na pardon of their sin. \"_Pardon, I beseech thee, the iniquity of this\npeople_,\" and in the next verse follows the answer, \"_and the Lord\nsaid I have pardoned according to thy word_.\" It seems that God had\nthe power, but Moses had the dictation of it, and saved Israel from the\nwrath and pestilential fury of a jealous God; and that he procured\nthem a pardon of their sin, \"_for the Lord thy God is a jealous God_.\"\nJealousy can have no existence in that mind, which possesses perfect\nknowledge, and consequently cannot, without the greatest impropriety,\nhe ascribed to God, who knows all things, and needed none of the\nadmonitions, advice or intelligence of Moses, or any of his dictatorial\nprayers. \"_And the Lard hearkened unto me at that time also_;\"\nintimating that it was a common thing for him to do the like. When\nteachers can once make the people believe that God answers their\nprayers, and that their eternal interest is dependent on them, they soon\nraise themselves to opulency, rule and high sounding titles; as that\nof _His Holiness--the Reverend Father in God--The Holy Poker--Bishop of\nSouls_--and a variety of other such like appellations, derogatory to the\nhonor or just prerogative of God; as is Joshua's history concerning the\nLord's hearkening unto him at the battle of the Amorites, wherein he\ninforms us, that he ordered the sun to stand still, saying, \"_Sun stand\nthou still upon Gidaen, and thou Moon in the valley of Ajalon, so\nthe Sun stood still and the Moon stayed until the people had avenged\nthemselves upon their enemies;\" so the Sun stood still in the midst of\nHeaven, \"and hasted not to go down about a whole day;_\" and then adds,\nby way of supremacy to Himself above all others, and in direct\ncontradiction to the before recited passages of Moses concerning the\nLord's hearkening unto him, or to any other man but himself, saying,\n\"_And there was no day like that before it, or after it, that the Lord\nhearkened unto the voice of a man_.\" There is not any thing more evident\nthan that if the representation given by Joshua, as matter of fact, is\ntrue, those exhibited by Moses concerning the Lord's hearkening unto him\nare not: though the representations of fact by Moses and by Joshua,\nare allowed to be both canonical, yet it is impossible that both can be\ntrue. However, astronomy being but little understood in the age in which\nJoshua lived, and the earth being in his days thought to be at rest, and\nthe sun to revolve round it, makes it in no way strange, that he caught\nhimself by ordering the sun to stand still, which having since been\ndiscovered to have been the original fixed position of that luminous\nbody, eclipses the miraculous interposition of Joshua. Furthermore, if\nwe but reflect that on that very day Israel vanquished the Amorites\nwith a great slaughter, \"_and chased them along the way that goeth to\nBethoron, and smote them to Azekah, and unto Makkedah_,\" in so great a\nhurry of war, clashing of arms, exasperation and elevation of mind, in\nconsequence of such triumphant victory, they could make but a partial\nobservation on the length of the day; and being greatly elated with such\nan extraordinary day's work, Joshua took the advantage of it, and told\nthem that it was an uncommon day for duration; that he had interposed in\nthe system and prescribed to the sun to stand still about a whole day;\nand that they had two days' time to accomplish those great feats. The\nbelief of such a miraculous event to have taken place in the solar\nsystem, in consequence of the influence which Joshua insinuated that he\nhad with God, would most effectually establish his authority among the\npeople; for if God would hearken to his voice well might man. This\nis the cause why the bulk of mankind in all ages and countries of the\nworld, have been so much infatuated by their ghostly teachers, whom they\nhave ever, imagined to have had a special influence with God Almighty.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. THE VAGUENESS AND UNINTELLIGIBLENESS OF THE PROPHECIES...\n\nRENDER THEM INCAPABLE OF PROVING REVELATION.\n\nProphecy is by some thought to be miraculous, and by others to be\nsupernatural, and there are others, who indulge themselves in an\nopinion, that they amount to no more than mere political conjectures.\nSome nations have feigned an intercourse with good spirits by the art\nof divination; and others with evil ones by the art of magic; and most\nnations have pretended to an intercourse with the world of spirits both\nways.\n\nThe Romans trusted much to their sibylline oracles and soothsayers;\nthe Babylonians to their magicians and astrologers; the Egyptians and\nPersians to their magicians; and the Jews to their seers or prophets;\nand all nations and individuals, discover an anxiety for an intercourse\nwith the world of spirits; which lays a foundation for artful and\ndesigning men, to impose upon them. But if the foregoing arguments in\nchapter sixth, respecting the natural impossibility of an intercourse of\nany unbodied or imperceptible mental beings with mankind, are true,\nthen the foretelling of future events can amount to nothing more.\nthan political illusion. For prophecy as well as all other sorts of\nprognostication must be super-naturally inspired, or it could be no more\nthan judging of future events from mere probability or guess-work, as\nthe astronomers ingenuously confess in their calculations, by saying:\n\"Judgment of the weather,\" &c. So also respecting astrology, provided\nthere is any such thing as futurity to be learned from it, it would\nbe altogether a natural discovery; for neither astronomy nor astrology\nclaim anything of a miraculous or supernatural kind, but their\ncalculations are meant to be predicated on the order and course of\nnature, with which our senses are conversant, and with which inspiration\nor the mere cooperation of spirits is not intended to act as part. So\nalso concerning prophecy, if it be considered to be merely natural,\n(we will not at present dispute whether it is true or false) upon this\nposition it stands on the footing of probability or mere conjecture and\nuncertainty. But as to the doctrine of any supernatural agency of the\ndivine mind on ours, which is commonly called inspiration, it has been\nsufficiently confuted in chapter sixth; which arguments need not be\nrepeated, nor does it concern my system to settle the question, whether\nprophecy should be denominated miraculous or supernatural, inasmuch as\nboth these doctrines have been confuted; though it is my opinion, that\nwere we to trace the notion of supernatural to its source, it would\nfinally terminate in that which is denominated miraculous; for that\nwhich is above or beyond nature, if it has any positive existence, must\nbe miraculous.\n\nThe writings of the prophets are most generally so loose, vague and\nindeterminate in their meaning, or in the grammar of their present\ntranslation, that the prophecies will as well answer to events in one\nperiod of time, as in another; and are equally applicable to a variety\nof events, which have and are still taking place in the world, and are\nliable to so many different interpretations, that they are incapable\nof being understood or explained, except upon arbitrary principles, and\ntherefore cannot be admitted as a proof of revelation; as for instance,\n\"it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God.\" Who can understand\nthe accomplishment of the prophecies, that are expressed after this\nsort? for every day in its turn has been, and will in its succession be\nthe last day; and if we advert to the express words of the prophecy, to\nwit, \"_the last days_,\" there will be an uncertain plurality \"_of last\ndays_,\" which must be understood to be short of a month, or a year; or\nit should have been expressed thus, and it shall come to pass in the\nlast months or years, instead of days: and if it had mentioned last\nyears, it would be a just construction to suppose, that it included a\nless number of years than a century; but as the prophecy mentions \"_last\ndays_\" we are at a loss, which among the plurality of them to assign for\nthe fulfilling of the prophecy.\n\nFurthermore, we cannot learn from the prophecy, in what month, year, or\nany other part of duration those last days belong; so that we can never\ntell when such vague prophecies are to take place, they therefore remain\nthe arbitrary prerogative of fanatics to prescribe their events in any\nage or period of time, when their distempered fancies may think most\neligible: there are other prophecies still more abstruse; to wit, \"_And\none said unto the man clothed in linen, which was upon the waters of the\nriver, how long shall it be to the end of these wonders? and I heard the\nman clothed in linen, which was upon the waters of the river, when he\nheld up his right hand and his left hand unto Heaven, and sware by him\nthat liveth forever, that it should be for an time, times and an half_.\"\nThe question, in the prophecy is asked \"how long shall it be to the\nend of these wonders?\" and the answer is given with the solemnity of\nan oath, \"_it shall be for a time, times and a half_.\" A time is an\nindefinite part of duration, and so are times, and the third description\nof time is as indefinite as either of the former descriptions of it;\nto wit, \"and an half;\" that is to say, half a time. There is no certain\nterm given in any or either of the three descriptions of the end of the\nwonders alluded to, whereby any or all of them together are capable of\ncomputation, as there is no certain period marked out to begin or end\na calculation. To compute an indefinite time in the single number\nor quantity of duration is impossible, and to compute an uncertain\nplurality of such indefinite times is equally perplexing and\nimpracticable; and lastly, to define half a time by any possible\nsuccession of its parts, is a contradiction, for half a time includes no\ntime at all; inasmuch as the smallest conception or possible moment or\ncriterion of duration, is a time, or otherwise, by the addition of ever\nso many of those parts together, they would not prolong a period; so\nthat there is not, and cannot be such a part of time, as half a time,\nfor be it supposed to be ever so momentous, yet if includes any part of\nduration, it is a time, and not half a time. Had the prophet said half\na year, half a day, or half a minute, he would have spoken intelligibly;\nbut half a time has no existence at all, and consequently no period\ncould ever possibly arrive in the succession or order of time, when\nthere could be an end to the wonders alluded to; and in this sense only,\nthe prophecy is intelligible; to wit, that it will never come to pass.\n\nThe revelation of St. John the divine, involves the subject of time, if\npossible, in still greater inconsistencies, viz: \"_And to the woman\nwas given two wings of a great eagle, that she might fly into the\nwilderness, into her place: Where she is nourished for a time, and times\nand half a time.\" \"And the angel which I saw stand upon the sea and upon\nthe earth lifted up his hands to heaven, and sware by him that liveth\nforever and ever, who created heaven and the things that therein are,\nand the earth and the things that therein are, and the sea and the\nthings which are therein, that there should be time no longer._\" Had\nthis tremendous oath been verified there could have been no farther\ndisputations on the calculation of \"_time and times and half a time_,\"\n(or about any thing else) for its succession would have reached its last\nand final period at that important crisis when time should have been \"no\nlonger.\" The solar system must have ceased its motions, from which we\ncompute the succession of time, and the race of man would have been\nextinct; for as long as they may be supposed to exist, time must of\nnecessary consequence have existed also; and since the course of nature,\nincluding the generations of mankind, has been continued from the time\nof the positive denunciation of the angel to this day, we may safely\nconclude, that his interference in the system of nature, was perfectly\nromantic.\n\nThe apostle Peter, at the first Christian pentecost, objecting to the\naccusation of their being drunk with new wine, explains the prophecy of\nthe prophet Joel, who prophesied of the events which were to take place\nin the last days, as coming to pass at that early period; his words are\nhanded down to us as follows: \"_But this is that which is spoken by the\nprophet Joel, and it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God,\nthat I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your\ndaughters shall prophecy, and your young men shall see visions, and your\nold men shall dream dreams_.\"\n\nThe history of the out-pouring of the spirit at the Pentecost,\nadmitting it to have been a fact, would have been very inadequate to the\nprophetical prediction, viz: I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh;\nthe most favorable construction is that the prophet meant human flesh,\n_i. e._ all human flesh; but instead of a universal effusion of the\nspirit, it appears to have been restricted to a select number, who were\ncollected together at Jerusalem, and the concourse of spectators thought\nthem to be delirious; It may however be supposed, that St. Peter was a\nbetter judge of the accomplishment of the prophecy than I am: well then,\nadmitting his application of the prophecy of the last days to take place\nat the first pentecost; it being now more than seventeen hundred years\nago, they consequently could not have been the last days.\n\nStill a query arises, whether every of the prophecies, which were\npredicted to be fulfilled in the last days, must not have been\naccomplished at that time; or whether any of the prophecies thus\nexpressed are still to be completed by any events which may in future\ntake place; or by any which have taken place since those last days\ncalled pentecost; or whether any prophecy whatever can be fulfilled more\nthan once; and if so, how many times; or how is it possible for us, out\nof the vast variety of events (in which there is so great a similarity)\nwhich one in particular to ascribe to its right prediction among the\nnumerous prophecies?\n\nFurthermore, provided some of the prophecies should point out some\nparticular events, which have since taken place, there might have been\nprevious grounds of probability, that such or such events would in the\nordinary course of things come to pass; for instance, it is no ways\nextraordinary, that the prophet Jeremiah should be able to predict that\nNebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, should take Jerusalem, when we consider\nthe power of the Babylonish empire at that time, and the feebleness\nof the Jews. \"_The word, which came to Jeremiah from the Lord, when\nNebuchadnezzar king of Babylon and all his army, and all the kingdoms of\nthe earth of his dominion, and all the people fought against Jerusalem,\nand against all the cities thereof, saying, thus saith the Lord the God\nof Israel, go and speak unto Zedekiah king of Judah, and tell him thus\nsaith the Lord, behold, I will give this city of Jerusalem into the\nhand of the king of Babylon._\" No politicians could at the time of the\nprediction be much at a loss respecting the fate of Jerusalem. Nor would\nit be at all evidential to any candid and ingenious enquirer, that God\nhad any manner of agency in fabricating the prophecies, though, some\nof them should seem to decypher future events, as they might, to human\nappearance, turn out right, merely from accident or contingency. It\nis very improbable, or rather incompatible with human nature, that the\nprophecy of Micah will ever come to pass, who predicts that \"they,\"\nspeaking of mankind, \"_shall beat their swords into plough-shares, and\ntheir spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against\nnation, neither shall they learn war any more_.\" Some of the\nprophecies are so apparently contradictory, that they contain their own\nconfutation; as for instance, the prophecy of Micaiah contained in the\nbook of Chronicles, which probably is as absurd as any thing that is to\nbe met with in story: \"And when he was come unto the king, the king said\nunto him, Micaiah, shall we go to Ramoth Gilead to battle, or shall I\nforbear? and he said go ye up and prosper, and they shall be delivered\ninto your hand, and the king said unto him, how many times shall I\nadjure thee, that thou shalt tell me nothing, but that which is true in\nthe name of the Lord? then he said I did see all Israel scattered upon\nthe mountains, as sheep that have no shepherd, and the Lord said, these\nhave no master, let them return, therefore, every man to his house in\npeace: and the king said unto Jehoshaphat, did not I tell thee, that\nhe would prophecy no good concerning me, but evil?\" \"Again he said,\ntherefore, hear the word of the Lord--I saw the Lord sitting upon his\nthrone, and all the host of Heaven standing on his right hand and on his\nleft, and the Lord said who shall entice Ahab, King of Israel, that he\nmay go up and fall at Ramoth Gilead, and one spake saying after this\nmanner, and another saying after that manner; then there came out a\nspirit and stood before the Lord, and said I will entice him, and the\nLord said unto him wherewith? And he said I will go forth and be a lying\nspirit in the mouth of all his prophets, and the Lord said thou shalt\nentice him and thou shalt prevail; go out and do even so. Now therefore,\nbehold the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of these thy\nprophets and the Lord hath spoken evil against thee.\" It is observable\nthat the prophet at first predicted the prosperity of Ahab, saying,\n\"go ye up and prosper, and they shall be delivered into your hand,\"\nbut after a little adjurement by the king, he alters his prediction and\nprophecies diametrically the reverse. What is more certain than that the\nevent of the expedition against Ramoth Gilead must have comported with\nthe one or the other of his prophecies? Certain it was, that Ahab would\ntake it or not take it, he must either prosper or not prosper, as there\nwould be no third way or means between these two; and it appears that\nthe prophet was determined to be in the right of it by his prophecy\nboth ways. It further appears from his prophecy, that there was a great\nconsultation in Heaven to entice Ahab King of Israel to his destruction,\nand that a certain lying spirit came and stood before the Lord, and\nproposed to him to go out and be a lying spirit in the mouth of the\nking's prophets. But what is the most incredible is, that God should\ncountenance it, and give him positive orders to falsify the truth to the\nother prophets. It appears that Micaiah in his first prophecy, viz: \"Go\nup to Ramoth Gilead and prosper, and they shall be delivered into your\nhand,\" acted in concert with the lying spirit which stood before the\nLord, but afterwards acted the treacherous part by prophecying the\ntruth, which, if we may credit his account, was in direct opposition to\nthe scheme of Heaven.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. THE CONTENTIONS WHICH SUBSISTED BETWEEN THE PROPHETS...\n\nRESPECTING THEIR VERACITY, AND THEIR INCONSISTENCIES WITH ONE ANOTHER,\nAND WITH THE NATURE OF THINGS, AND THEIR OMISSION IN TEACHING THE\nDOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY, PRECLUDES THE DIVINITY OF THEIR PROPHECIES.\n\nWhoever examines the writings of the prophets will discover a spirit\nof strife and contention among them; they would charge each other\nwith fallacy and deception; disputations of this kind are plentifully\ninterspersed through the writings of the prophets; we will transcribe a\nfew of those passages out of many: \"Thus saith the Lord to the foolish\nprophets that follow their own spirit, and have found nothing, they have\nseen vanity and lying divination, saying the Lord saith, and the Lord\nhath, not sent them, and they have made others to hope that they\nwould confirm the word.\" And in another place, \"I have not sent these\nprophets, yet they ran; I have not spoken unto them, yet they prophecy.\"\nAgain, \"I have heard what the prophets said, that prophecy lies in my\nname, saying, I have dreamed, I have dreamed, yet they are the prophets\nof the deceit of their own hearts.\" And again, \"Yea, they are greedy\ndogs, which can never have enough, and they are shepherds that cannot\nunderstand; they all look to their own way, every one for his gain from\nhis quarter.\" It being the case that there was such a strife among\nthe prophets to recommend themselves to the people, and every art\nand dissimulation having been practised by them to gain power and\nsuperiority, all which artifice was to be judged of by the great vulgar,\nor in some instances by the political views of the Jewish Sanhedrim,\nhow could those who were cotemporaries with the several prophets,\ndistinguish the premised true prophets from the false? Much less, how\ncan we, who live more than seventeen hundred years since the last of\nthem, be able to distinguish them apart? And yet, without the knowledge\nof this distinction, we cannot with propriety give credit to any of\nthem, even admitting there were some true prophets among them. Nor is\nit possible for us to know but that their very institution was merely\na reach of policy of the Israelitish and Judaic governments, the\nmore easily, implicitly and effectually to keep their people in\nsubordination, by inculcating a belief that they were ruled with special\ndirections from heaven, which in fact originated from the Sanhedrim.\nMany other nations have made use of much the same kind of policy.\n\nIn the 22d chapter of Genesis, we have a history of a very extraordinary\ncommand from God to Abraham, and of a very unnatural attempt of his\nto obey it. \"And it came to pass after these things that God did tempt\nAbraham, and he said unto him, Abraham, and he said behold here I am,\nand he said take now thy son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee to the\nland of Moriah, and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the\nmountains which I will tell thee of;\" \"And they came to the place which\nGod had told him of, and Abraham built an altar there, and laid the wood\nin order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the\nwood; and Abraham stretched forth his hand and took the knife to slay\nhis son.\" Shocking attempt! Murder is allowed by mankind in general to\nbe the most capital crime that is possible to be acted among men; it\nwould therefore be incompatible with the divine nature to have enjoined\nit by a positive command to Abraham to have killed his son; a murder\nof all others the most unnatural and cruel and attended with the most\naggravating circumstances, not merely from a prescribed breach of the\nties of parental affection, but from the consideration that the child\nwas to be (if we may credit the command,) offered to God as a religious\nsacrifice. What could have been a more complicated wickedness than the\nobedience of this command would have been? and what can be more absurd\nthan to suppose that it came from God? It is argued, in vindication\nof the injunction to Abraham to kill his son, that it was merely for a\ntrial of his obedience, and that God never designed to have him do it;\nto prevent which an angel from heaven called to him and gave him counter\norders, not to slay his son; but to suppose that God needed such an\nexperiment, or any other, in order to know whether Abraham would be\nobedient to his commands, is utterly incompatible with his omniscience,\nwho without public exhibitions understands all things; so that had the\ninjunction been in itself, fit and reasonable, and also from God,\nthe compliance or non-compliance of Abraham thereto, could not have\ncommunicated any new idea to the divine mind. Every part of the conduct\nof mankind is a trial of their obedience and is known to God, as well as\nthe particular conduct of Abraham; besides in the canonical writings,\nwe read that \"_God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any\nman_.\" How then can it be, \"_that God did tempt Abraham?_\" a sort of\nemployment which, in scripture, is commonly ascribed to the devil. It\nis a very common thing to hear Abraham extolled for attempting to comply\nwith the supposed command of sacrificing his son; but it appears to me,\nthat it had been wiser and more becoming the character of a virtuous\nman, for Abraham to have replied in answer to the injunction as follows,\nto wit, that it could not possibly have come from God; who was the\nfountain of goodness and perfection, and unchangeable in his nature, who\nhad endowed him with reason and understanding, whereby he knew his duty\nto God, his son, and to himself, better than to kill his only son, and\noffer him as a religious sacrifice to God, for God would never have\nimplanted in his mind such a strong affection towards him, nor such a\nconscious sense of duty to provide for, protect and succor him in all\nduties, and to promote his happiness and well being, provided he\nhad designed that he should have laid violent hands on his life. And\ninasmuch as the command was, in itself, morally speaking, unfit, and\naltogether unworthy of God, he presumed that it never originated from\nhim, but from some inhuman, cruel and destructive being, who delighted\nin wo, and pungent grief; for God could not have been the author of so\nbase an injunction, nor could he be pleased with so inhuman and sinful a\nsacrifice.\n\nMoses in his last chapter of Deuteronomy crowns his history with the\nparticular account of his own death and burial. \"So Moses, the servant\nof the Lord, died there, in the land of Moab, according to the word\nof the Lord, and he buried him in a valley, in the land of Moab, over\nagainst Bethpeor, but no man knew of his sepulchre unto this day; and\nMoses was an hundred and twenty years old when he died, his eyes were\nnot dim, nor his natural force abated, and the children of Israel wept\nfor Moses in the plains of Moab thirty days.\" This is the only historian\nin the circle of my reading, who has ever given the public a particular\naccount of his own death, and how old he was at that decisive period,\nwhere he died, who buried him, and where he was buried, and withal of\nthe number of days his friends and acquaintances mourned and wept for\nhim. I must confess I do not expect to be able to advise the public of\nthe term of my life, nor the circumstances of my death and burial, nor\nof the days of the weeping or laughing of my survivors.\n\nPart of the laws of Moses were arbitrary impositions upon the tribes\nof Israel, and have no foundation in the reason and fitness of things,\nparticularly that in which he inculcates punishing the children for the\niniquities of the father; \"visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon\nthe children, and upon the children's children unto the third and fourth\ngeneration.\" There is no reason to be given, why the iniquity of the\nfather might not as well have involved the fifth, sixth and seventh\ngenerations, and so on to the latest posterity in guilt and punishment,\nas the first four generations; for if it was possible, that the iniquity\nof the father could be justly visited upon any of his posterity, who\nwere not accomplices with him in the iniquity, or were not some way or\nother aiding or accessary in it, then the iniquity might as justly be\nvisited upon any one of the succeeding generations as upon another, or\nupon the generation of any indifferent person: for arbitrary imputations\nof iniquity are equally absurd in all supposable cases; so that if we\nonce admit the possibility of visiting iniquity upon any others than\nthe perpetrators, be they who they will, we overturn our natural and\nscientifical notions of a personal retribution of justice among mankind.\nIt is, in plain English, punishing the innocent for the sin of the\nguilty. But virtue or vice cannot be thus visited or imputed from the\nfathers to the unoffending children, or to children's children; or which\nis the same thing, from the guilty to the innocent; for moral good or\nevil is mental and personal, which cannot be transferred, changed or\naltered from one person to another, but is inherently connected with its\nrespective personal actors, and constitutes a quality or habit, and is\nthe merit or demerit of the respective agents or proficients in moral\ngood or evil, and is by nature inalienable, \"The righteousness of the\nrighteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be\nupon him.\" But as we shall have occasion to argue this matter at large\nin the twelfth chapter of this treatise, where we shall treat of the\nimputed sin of Adam to his posterity, and of imputative righteousness,\nwe will discuss the subject of imputation no farther in this place.\nHowever, the unjust practice of punishing the children for the iniquity\nof the father having been an ordinance of Moses, was more or less\ncontinued by the Israelites, as in the case of Achan and his children.\n\"And Joshua and all Israel with him took Achan the son of Zorah, and\nthe silver and the garment, and the wedge of gold, and his sons, and his\ndaughters, and his oxen, and his asses, and his sheep, and his tent, and\nall that he had, and brought them to the valley of Achor, and all Israel\nstoned him with stones, and burned them with fire, after they had stoned\nthem with stones, and they raised over him a great heap of stones unto\nthis day; so the Lord turned from the fierceness of his anger.\" \"_Fierce\nanger_\" is incompatible with the divine perfection, nor is the cruel\nextirpation of the innocent family, and live stock of Achan, to be\naccounted for on principles of reason. This flagrant injustice of\npunishing the children for the iniquity of the father had introduced\na proverb in Israel, viz: \"The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the\nchildren's teeth are set on edge.\" But the prophet Ezekiel in the 18th\nchapter of his prophecies, has confuted Moses's statutes of visiting the\niniquities of the father upon the children, and repealed them with the\nauthority of thus saith the Lord, which was the manner of expression\nby which they were promulgated. But the prophet Ezekiel did not repeal\nthose statutes of Moses merely by the authority of thus saith the Lord,\nbut over and above gives the reason for it, otherwise he could not\nhave repealed them; for Moses enacted them as he relates, from as high\nauthority as Ezekiel could pretend to in nullifying them; so that had\nhe not produced reason and argument, it would have been \"thus saith the\nLord,\" against \"thus saith the Lord.\" But Ezekiel reasons conclusively,\nviz: \"The word of the Lord came unto me again, saying, what meat ye that\nye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, the fathers\nhave eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge; as I\nlive, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have occasion any more to use\nthis proverb in Israel. Behold all souls are mine, as the soul of the\nfather so also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth it\nshall die, the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither\nshall the father bear the iniquity of the son, the righteousness of the\nrighteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall\nbe upon him, therefore, I will judge you, O house of Israel, every one\naccording to their ways saith the Lord God.\" It is observable, that the\nprophet ingeniously says, \"Ye shall not have occasion any more to use\nthis proverb in Israel,\" implicitly acknowledging that the law of Moses\nhad given occasion to that proverb, nor was it possible to remove that\nproverb or grievance to which the Israelites were liable on account of\nvisiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, but by the\nrepeal of the statute of Moses in that case made and provided; which was\neffectually done by Ezekiel: in consequence whereof the administration\nof justice became disencumbered of the embarrassments under which it\nhad labored for many centuries. Thus it appears, that those laws,\ndenominated the laws of God, are not infallible, but have their\nexceptions and may be dispensed with.\n\nUnder the dispensation of the law a breach of the Sabbath was a capital\noffence. \"And while the children of Israel were in the wilderness, they\nfound a man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath day, and the Lord\nsaid unto Moses, the man shall surely be put to death, and all the\ncongregation shall stone him with stones without the camp; and all the\ncongregation brought him without the camp and stoned him with stones,\nand he died, as the Lord commanded Moses.\" The very institution of\nthe Sabbath was in itself arbitrary, otherwise it would not have been\nchanged from the last to the first day of the week. For those ordinances\nwhich are predicated on the reason and fitness of things can never\nchange: as that which is once morally fit, always remains so, and\nis immutable, nor could the same crime, in justice, deserve death in\nMoses's time (as in the instance of the Israelite's gathering sticks),\nand but a pecuniary fine in ours; as in the instance of the breach of\nSabbath in these times.\n\nFurthermore, the order of nature respecting day and night, or the\nsuccession of time, is such, as renders it impossible that any\nidentical part of time, which constitutes one day, can do it to all the\ninhabitants of the globe at the same time, or in the same period. Day\nis perpetually dawning, and night commencing to some or other of\nthe inhabitants of the terraqueous ball without intermission. At the\ndistance of fifteen degrees of longitude to the east of us, the day\nbegins an hour sooner than it does with us here in Vermont, and with us\nan hour sooner than it does fifteen degrees to the westward, and thus\nit continues in succession round the globe, and night as regularly\nrevolving after it, succeeding each other in their alternate rounds;\nso that when it is mid-day with us, it is mid-night with our species,\ndenominated the Periaeci, who live under the same parallel of latitude\nwith us, but under a directly opposite meridian; so likewise, when it\nis mid-day with them, it is mid-night with us. Thus it appears that\nthe same identical part of time, which composes our days, compose their\nnights, and while we are keeping Sunday, they are in their midnight\ndreams; nor is it possible in nature, that the same identical part of\ntime, which makes the first day of the week with us, should make the first\nday of the week with the inhabitants on the opposite side of the globe.\nThe apostle James speaks candidly on this subject, saying, \"Some esteem\none day above another, others esteem every day alike, let every one be\nfully persuaded in his own mind,\" and keep the laws of the land. It was\nunfortunate for the Israelite who was accused of gathering sticks on the\nIsraelitish Sabbath, that he was convicted of it; for though by the law\nof his people he must have died, yet the act for which he suffered was\nno breach of the law of nature. Supposing that very delinquent should\ncome to this world again, and gather sticks on Saturday in this country,\nhe might as an hireling receive his wages for it, without being exposed\nto a similar prosecution of that of Moses; and provided he should gather\nsticks on our Sunday, his wages would atone for his crime instead of\nhis life, since modern legislators have abated the rigor of the law for\nwhich he died.\n\nThe barbarous zeal of the prophet Samuel in hewing Agag to pieces after\nhe was made prisoner by Saul, king of Israel, could not proceed from a\ngood spirit, nor would such cruelty be permitted towards a prisoner\nin any civilized nation at this day. \"And Samuel hewed Agag to pieces\nbefore the Lord in Gilgal.\" The unmanly deed seems to be mentioned with\na phiz of religion, viz: that it was done before the Lord; but that\ncannot alter the nature of the act itself, for every act of mankind,\nwhether good or evil, is done before the Lord, as much as Samuel's\nhewing Agag to pieces. The orders which Samuel gave unto Saul, (as\nhe says by the word of the Lord) to cut off the posterity of the\nAmalekites, and to destroy them utterly, together with the cause of\nGod's displeasure with them, are unworthy of God as may be seen at large\nin the 15th chapter of the Book of Samuel, \"Spare them not, but slay both\nman and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.\"\nThe ostensible reason for all this, was, because the ancestors of the\nAmalekites, as long before the days of Samuel as when the children\nof Israel came out of Egypt, which was near five hundred years, had\nambushed and fought against Israel, in their passage from thence to\nthe land which they afterwards inhabited. Although it appears from the\nhistory of Moses and Joshua, that Israel was going to disposess them of\ntheir country, which is thought to be a sufficient cause of war in these\ndays. It is true they insinuate that the Lord had given the land to the\nchildren of Israel, yet it appears that they had to fight for it and get\nit by the hardest, notwithstanding, as is the case with nations in these\ndays, and ever has been since the knowledge of history.\n\nBut be the old quarrel between Israel and Amalek as it will, it cannot\non any principle be supposed, the successors of those Amalekites, in the\ndays of Samuel, could be guilty of any premised transgressions of their\npredecessors. The sanguinary laws of Moses did not admit of visiting the\niniquities of the fathers upon the children in the line of succession,\nfarther than to the fourth generation, but the Amalekites against whom\nSamuel had denounced the wrath of God, by the hand of Saul, were at a\nmuch greater remove from those their progenitors, who were charged with\nthe crime for which they were cut off as a nation. Nor is it compatible\nwith reason to suppose, that God ever directed either Moses or Joshua to\nextirpate the Canaanitish nations. \"And we took all his cities at that\ntime, and utterly destroyed the men and the women, and the little ones\nof every city, we left none to remain.\" There is not more propriety in\nascribing these cruelties to God, than those that were perpetrated by\nthe Spaniards against the Mexican and Peruvian Indians or natives of\nAmerica. Every one who dares to exercise his reason, free from bias,\nwill readily discern, that the inhumanities exercised towards the\nCanaanites and Amorites, Mexicans and Peruvians, were detestably\nwicked, and could not be approbated by God, or by rational and good men.\nUndoubtedly avarice and domination were the causes of those abounding\ncruelties, in which religion had as little to do as in the crusades of\nthe holy land (so called.)\n\nThe writings of the prophets abound with prodigies, strange and\nunnatural events. The walls of Jericho are represented to have fallen\nto the ground in consequence of a blast of ram's horns; Balaam's ass to\nspeak to his master, and the prophet Elijah is said to have been carried\noff bodily into heaven by a chariot, in a whirlwind. Strange stories!\nBut other scriptures tell us, \"Flesh and blood cannot inherit the\nkingdom of God.\" The history of the affront, which the little children\nof Bethel gave the prophet Elisha, his cursing them, and their\ndestruction by the bears, has the appearance of a fable. That Elisha\nshould be so exasperated at the children for calling him _bald head_,\nand telling him to _go up_, was rather a sample of ill breeding; most\ngentlemen would have laughed at the joke, instead of cursing them,\nor being instrumental in their destruction, by merciless, wild and\nvoracious beasts. Though the children were saucy, yet a man of any\nconsiderable candor, would have made allowance for their non-age,\n\"for childhood and youth are vanity.\" \"And he went up from thence unto\nBethel, and as he was going up by the way, there came forth little\nchildren out of the city and mocked him, and said unto him, go up thou\nbald-head, go up thou bald-head, and he turned back and looked on them,\nand he cursed them in the name of the Lord, and there came forth two\nshe bears out of the wood, and tare forty and two children of them.\"\nIt seems by the children's address to Elisha, that he was an old\nbald-headed man, and that they had heard, that his mate, Elijah, had\ngone up a little before; and as it was an uncommon thing for men to kite\naway into the air, and leave the world after that sort, it is likely\nthat it excited a curiosity in the children to see Elisha go off with\nhimself in the same manner, which occasioned their particular mode of\nspeech to him, saying, \"go up bald head.\" The writings of Solomon, Song\nof Israel, must needs have been foisted into the canonical volume\nby some means or other, for no one passage therein gives the least\nintimation of inspiration, or that he had any immediate dictation from\nGod in his compositions, but oh the contrary, he informs us, that he\nacquired his knowledge by applying himself to wisdom, \"to seek and to\nsearch out concerning all things that are done under the sun. This sore\ntravail,\" says he, \"has God given to the sons of men to be exercised\ntherewith.\" And since Solomon never pretended to inspiration, others\ncannot justly claim his writings to have been anything more than natural\nreasonings, for who can, with propriety stamp his writings with divine\nauthority, when he pretended no such thing, but the contrary? His song\nof songs appears to be rather of the amorous kind, and is supposed to\nhave been written at the time he was making love to the daughter of\nPharaoh, King of Egypt, who is said to have been a princess of exquisite\nbeauty and exceeding coy, and so captivated his affections that it made\nhim light headed and sing about the \"_joints of her thighs_,\" and her\n\"_belly_.\"\n\nThe divine legation of Moses and the prophets is rendered questionable\nfrom the consideration that they never taught the doctrine of\nimmortality, their rewards and punishments are altogether temporary,\nterminating at death; they have not so much as exhibited any speculation\nof surviving the grave; to this is ascribed the unbelief of the\nSadducees of the resurrection of the dead, or of an angel or spirit,\nas they strenuously adhered to the law of Moses, for they could not\nimagine, but that their great prophet and law giver would have apprised\nthem of a state of immortality had it been true; and in this the\nSadducees seem to argue with force on their position of the divine\nlegation of Moses. For admitting the reality of man's immortality,\nit appears incredible to suppose, that God should have specially\ncommissioned Moses, as his prophet and instructor to the tribes of\nIsrael, and not withal to have instructed them in the important doctrine\nof a future existence.\n\nSECTON III. DREAMS OR VISIONS UNCERTAIN AND CHIMERICAL CHANNEL...\n\nFOR THE CONVEYANCE OF REVELATION; WITH REMARKS ON THE COMMUNICATION OF\nTHE HOLY GHOST TO THE DISCIPLES, BY THE PRAYERS AND LAYING ON OF THE\nAPOSTLES HANDS, WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE DIVINE DICTATIONS OF THE FIRST\nPROMULGATORS OF THE GOSPEL, AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE ELECT LADY, AND HER\nNEW SECTARY OF SHAKERS.\n\nIt appears from the writings of the prophets and apostles, that part of\ntheir revelations were communicated to them by dreams and visions, which\nhave no other existence but in the imagination, and are defined to\nbe \"the images which appear to the mind during sleep, figuratively, a\nchimera, a groundless fancy or conceit, without reason.\" Our experience\nagrees with this definition, and evinces that there is no trust to be\nreposed in them. They are fictitious images of the mind, not under the\ncontrol of the understanding, and therefore not regarded at this day\nexcept by the credulous and superstitious, who still retain a veneration\nfor them. But that a revelation from God to man, to be continued to the\nlatest posterity as a divine and perfect rule of duty or law, should be\ncommunicated through such a fictitious and chimerical channel, carries\nwith it the evident marks of deception itself, or of unintelligibleness,\nas appears from the vision of St. Paul. \"It is not expedient for me\ndoubtless to glory, I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord;\nI knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, whether in the body I\ncannot tell, or whether out of the body I cannot tell, God knoweth such\nan one caught up to the third heavens. And I knew such a man, whether in\nthe body or out of the body I cannot tell, God knoweth how that he was\ncaught up into Paradise and heard unspeakable words which it is not\nlawful for a man to utter.\" That God knoweth the whole affair, will not\nbe disputed, but that we should understand it is impossible, for the\napostle's account of his vision is unintelligible; it appears that he\nwas rather in a delirium or a stupor, so that he knew not that whether\nhe was in or out of the body: he says he heard \"_unspeakable words,_\"\nbut this communicates no intelligence of the subject-matter of them to\nus; and that they \"_were not lawful for a man to utter_,\" but what they\nwere, or wherein their unlawfulness to be uttered by man consisted, he\ndoes not inform us. His revelation from his own story was unspeakable\nand unlawful, and so he told us nothing what it was, nor does it compose\nany part of revelation, which is to make known. He is explicit as to his\nbeing caught up to the third heaven, but how he could understand that is\nincredible, when at the same time he knew not whether he was in the body\nor out of the body; and if he was in such a delirium that he did not\nknow so domestic a matter as that, it is not to be supposed that he\ncould be a competent judge whether he was at the first, second, third,\nor fourth heaven, or whether he was advanced above the surface of the\nearth, or not.\n\nThat the apostles in their ministry were dictated by the Holy Ghost,\nin the settlement of disputable doctrines, is highly questionable.\n\"Forasmuch as we have heard that certain, which went out from us have\ntroubled you with words, subverting your souls, saying, ye must be\ncircumcised and keep the law, to whom we gave no such commandment, for\nit seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no other\nburden than these necessary things.\" Acts 15. And after having given a\nhistory of the disputations concerning circumcision, and of keeping the\nlaw of Moses, and of the result of the council, the same chapter informs\nus, that a contention happened so sharp between Paul and Barnabas, \"that\nthey parted asunder the one from the other.\" Had the Holy Ghost been the\ndictator of the first teachers of Christianity, as individuals, there\ncould have been no disputable doctrines or controversies, respecting the\nreligion which they were promulgating in the world or in the manner of\ndoing it, to be referred to a general council of the apostles and elders\nheld at Jerusalem, for had they been directed by the Holy Ghost, there\ncould have been no controversies among them to have referred to the\ncouncil. And inasmuch as the Holy Ghost neglected them as individuals,\nwhy is it not as likely that it neglected to dictate the council held\nat Jerusalem or elsewhere? It seems that the Holy Ghost no otherwise\ndirected them in their plan of religion, than by the general council of\nthe apostles and elders, the same as all other communities are governed.\n\"Paul having passed through the upper coasts came to Ephesus, and\nfinding certain disciples, he said unto them have ye received the Holy\nGhost since ye believed? and they said unto him we have not so much as\nheard whether there be any Holy Ghost; and when Paul had laid his hands\nupon them, the Holy Ghost came on them, and they spoke with tongues and\nprophesied.\"\n\nThe spirit of God is that which constitutes the divine essence, and\nmakes him to be what he is, but that he should be dictated, or his\nspirit be communicated by any acts or ceremonies of the apostles, is by\nno means admissible; for such exertions of the apostles, so far as they\nmay be supposed to communicate the holy spirit to their disciples, would\nhave made God passive in the premised act of the gift of the spirit; for\nit must have been either the immediate act of God or of the apostles,\nand if it was the immediate act of the one, it could not have been the\nimmediate act of the other.\n\nTo suppose that the act of the gift of the spirit was the mere act of\nGod, and at the same time the mere act of the apostles, are propositions\ndiametrically opposed to each other, and cannot both be true. But it may\nbe supposed that the gift of the spirit was partly the act of God and\npartly the act of the apostles; admitting this to have been the case the\nconsequences would follow, that the act of the gift of the spirit was\npartly divine and partly human, and therefore the beneficence and glory\nof the grant of the gift of the spirit unto the disciples, would belong\npartly to God and partly to the apostles, and in an exact proportion to\nthat which God and they may be supposed to have respectively contributed\ntowards the marvellous act of the gift of the spirit. But that God\nshould act in partnership with man, or share his providence and glory\nwith him, is too absurd to demand argumentative confutation, especially\nin an act which immediately respects the display or exertion of the\ndivine spirit on the spirits of men.\n\nSuch delusions have taken place in every age of the world since history\nhas attained to any considerable degree of intelligence; nor is there\nat present a nation on earth, but what is more or less infatuated with\ndelusory notions of the immediate influence of good or evil spirits on\ntheir minds. A recent instance of it appears in the Elect Lady (as she\nhas seen fit to style herself) and her followers, called Shakers; this\npretended holy woman began her religious scheme at Connestaguna; in the\nnorthwestardly part of the State of New York, about the year 1769,\nand has added a new sectary to the religious catalogue. After having\ninstilled her tenets among the Connestagunites, and the adjacent\ninhabitants, she rambled into several parts of the country, promulgating\nher religion, and has gained a considerable number of scattering\nproselytes, not only in the State of New York, but some in the New\nEngland States. She has so wrought on the minds of her female devotees,\nrespecting the fading nature, vanity and tempting allurements of their\nornaments (which by the by are not plenty among her followers,) and the\ndeceitfulness of riches, that she has procured from them a considerable\nnumber of strings of gold beads and jewels, and amassed a small\ntreasure; and like most sectaries engrosses the kingdom of heaven to\nherself and her followers, to the seclusion of all others. She gives out\nthat her mission is immediately from heaven, that she travails in pain\nfor her elect, and pretends to talk in seventy-two unknown languages,\nin which she converses with those who have departed this life, and says,\nthat there has, not been a true church on earth since the apostles days\nuntil she had erected hers. That both the living and the dead must be\nsaved in, by, and through her, and that they must confess their sins\nunto her and procure her pardon, or cannot be saved. That every of the\nhuman race who have died since the apostle's time, until her church\nwas set up has been damned, and that they are continually making\nintercession to her for salvation, which is the occasion of her talking\nto them in those unknown tongues; and that she gathers her elect from\nearth and hell. She wholly refuses to give a reason for what she does\nor says: but says that it is the duty of mankind to believe in her, and\nreceive her instructions, for they are infallible.\n\nFor a time she prohibited her disciples from propagating their\nspecies, but soon after gave them ample license, restricting them,\nindiscriminately, to the pale of her sanctified church, for that she\nneeded more souls to complete the number of her elect. Among other\nthings, she instructs those who are young and sprightly among her\npupils, to practise the most wild, freakish, wanton and romantic\ngestures, as to that of indecently stripping themselves, twirling round,\nextorting their features, shaking and twitching their bodies and limbs\ninto a variety of odd and unusual ways, and many other extravagancies\nof external behavior, in the practice of which they are said to be very\nalert even to the astonishment of spectators, having by use acquired an\nuncommon agility in such twirling, freakish and romantic practices. The\nold Lady having such an ascendancy over them as to make them believe\nthat those extravagant actions were occasioned by the immediate power of\nGod, it serves among them as a proof of the divinity of her doctrines.\n\nA more particular account of this new sectary has been lately published\nin a pamphlet by a Mr. Rathburn, who, as he relates, was for a time, one\nof her deluded disciples, but after a while apostatised from the faith,\nand has since announced to the world the particulars of their doctrine\nand conduct.\n\nProbably there never was any people or country, since the era of\nhistorical knowledge, who were more confident than they that they are\nacted upon by the immediate agency of the divine spirit; and as there\nare facts now existing in a considerable tract of country, and are\nnotoriously known in this part of America, I take the liberty to mention\nthem, as a knowledge of these facts, together with the concurrent\ntestimony of the history of such deceptions in all ages and nations,\nmight induce my countrymen to examine strictly into the claim and\nreality of ghostly intelligence in general.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. OF THE NATURE OF FAITH AND WHEREIN IT CONSISTS\n\nFaith in Jesus Christ and in his Gospel throughout the New Testament,\nis represented to be an essential condition of the eternal salvation of\nmankind. \"Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law,\nbut by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ,\nthat we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works\nof the law, for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.\"\nAgain, \"If thou shalt confess the Lord Jesus Christ, and believe in\nthine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou mayst be\nsaved.\" And again, \"He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved,\nbut he that believeth not shall be damned.\" Faith is the last result of\nthe understanding, or the same which we call the conclusion, it is the\nconsequence of a greater or less deduction of reasoning from certain\npremises previously laid down; it is the same as believing or Judging of\nany matter of fact, or assenting to or dissenting from the truth of any\ndoctrine, system or position; so that to form a judgment, or to come to\na determination in one's own mind, or to believe, or to have faith, is\nin reality the same thing, and is synonymously applied both in writing\nand speaking, for example, \"Abraham believed in God.\" Again, \"for he,\"\nspeaking of Abraham, \"judged him faithful who had promised,\" and again\n\"his faith was counted unto him for righteousness.\" It is not only in\nscripture that we meet with examples of the three words, to wit, belief,\njudgment, and faith, to stand for the marks of our ideas for the same\nthing, but also all intelligible writers and speakers apply these\nphrases synonymously, and it would be good grammar and sense, for us to\nsay that we have faith in a universal providence, or that we judge\nthat there is a universal providence. These three different phrases, in\ncommunicating our ideas of providence, do every one of them exhibit the\nsame idea, to all persons of common understanding, who are acquainted\nwith the English language. In fine, every one's experience may convince\nthem that they cannot assent to, or dissent from the truth of any matter\nof fact, doctrine or proposition whatever, contrary to their judgment;\nfor the act of the mind in assenting to or dissenting from any position,\nor in having faith or belief in favor of, or against any doctrine,\nsystem, or proposition, could not amount to anything more or less, than\nthe act of the judgment, or last dictate of the understanding, whether\nthe understanding be supposed to be rightly informed or not: so that our\nfaith in all cases is as liable to err, as our reason is to misjudge\nof the truth; and our minds act faith in disbelieving any doctrine or\nsystem of religion to be true, as much as in believing it to be so. From\nhence it appears, that the mind cannot act faith in opposition to its\njudgment, but that it is the resolution of the understanding itself\ncommitted to memory or writing, and can never be considered distinct\nfrom it. And inasmuch as faith necessarily results from reasoning,\nforcing itself upon our minds by the evidence of truth, or the mistaken\napprehension of it, without any act of choice of ours, there cannot be\nany thing, which pertains to, or partakes of the nature of moral good or\nevil in it. For us to believe such doctrines, or systems of religion, as\nappears to be credibly recommended to our reason, can no more partake\nof the nature of goodness or morality, than our natural eyes may be\nsupposed to partake of it in their perception of colors; for the\nfaith of the mind, and the sight of the eye are both of them necessary\nconsequences, the one results from the reasonings of the mind, and the\nother from the perception of the eye. To suppose a rational mind without\nthe exercise of faith would be as absurd as to suppose a proper and\ncomplete eye without sight, or the perception of the common objects\nof that sense. The short of the matter is this, that without reason we\ncould not have faith, and without the eye or eyes we could not see, but\nonce admitting that we are rational, faith follows of course, naturally\nresulting from the dictates of reason.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. OF THE TRADITIONS OF OUR FOREFATHERS\n\nIt may be objected, that the far greater part of mankind believe\naccording to the tradition of their forefathers, without examining into\nthe grounds of it, and that argumentative deductions from the reason\nand nature of things, have, with the bulk of them, but little or no\ninfluence on their faith. Admitting this to have been too much the\ncase, and that many of them have been blameable for the omission of\ncultivating or improving their reason, and for not forming a better\njudgment concerning their respective traditions, or a juster and\nmore exalted faith; yet this does not at all invalidate the foregoing\narguments respecting the nature of faith: for though it be admitted that\nmost of the human race do not, or will not reason, with any considerable\ndegree of propriety, on the traditions of their forefathers, but receive\nthem implicitly, they nevertheless establish this one proposition in\ntheir minds, right or wrong, that their respective traditions are right,\nfor none could believe in them were they possessed of the knowledge\nthat they were wrong. And as we have a natural bias in favor of our\nprogenitors, to whose memory a tribute of regard is justly due, and\nwhose care in handing down from father to son such notions of religion\nand manners, as they supposed would be for the well being and happiness\nof their posterity in this and the coming world, naturally endears\ntradition to us, and prompts us to receive and venerate it. Add to this,\nthat the priests of every denomination are \"_instant in season and out\nof season,_\" in inculcating and instilling the same tenets, which, with\nthe foregoing considerations, induces mankind in general to give at\nleast a tacit consent to their respective traditions, and without\na thorough investigation thereof, believe them to be right and very\ncommonly infallible, although their examinations are not attended with\nargumentative reasonings, from the nature of things; and in the same\nproportion as they may be supposed to fall short of conclusive arguing\non their respective traditions they cannot fail to be deceived in the\nrationality of their faith.\n\nBut after all it may be that some of the human race may have been\ntraditionally or accidentally right, in many or most respects. Admitting\nit to be so, yet they cannot have any rational enjoyment of it, or\nunderstand wherein the truth of the premised right tradition consists,\nor deduce any more satisfaction from it, than others whose traditions\nmay be supposed to be wrong; for it is the knowledge of the discovery\nof truth alone, which is gratifying to that mind who contemplates its\nsuperlative beauty.\n\nThat tradition has had a powerful influence on the human mind is\nuniversally admitted, even by those who are governed by it in the\narticles or discipline of their faith; for though they are blind with\nrespect to their own superstition, yet they can perceive and despise it\nin others. Protestants very readily discern and expose the weak side of\nPopery, and Papists are as ready and acute in discovering the errors of\nheretics. With equal facility do Christians and Mahometans spy out each\nothers inconsistencies and both have an admirable sagacity to descry the\nsuperstition of the heathen nations. Nor are the Jews; wholly silent\nin this matter; \"O God the heathen are come into thine inheritance, thy\nholy temple have they defiled.\" What abomination must this have been in\nthe opinion of a nation who had monopolized all religion to themselves!\nMonstrous vile heathen, that they should presume to approach the sanctum\nsanctorum! The Christians call the Mahometans by the odious name\nof infidels, but the Musslemen, in their opinion, cannot call the\nChristians by a worse name than that which they have given themselves,\nthey therefore call them Christians.\n\nWhat has been already observed upon tradition, is sufficient to admonish\nus of its errors and superstitions, and the prejudices to which a\nbigoted attachment thereto exposes us, which is abundantly sufficient to\nexcite us to a careful examination of our respective traditions, and not\nto rest satisfied until we have regulated our faith by reason.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. OUR FAITH IS GOVERNED BY OUR REASONINGS...\n\nWHETHER THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO BE CONCLUSIVE OR INCONCLUSIVE, AND NOT\nMERELY BY OUR OWN CHOICE\n\nIt is written that \"Faith is the gift of God.\" Be it so, but is faith\nany more the gift of God than reflection, memory or reason are his\ngifts? Was it not for memory, we could not retain in our minds the\njudgment which we have passed upon things; and was it not for reasoning,\nin either a regular or irregular manner, or partly both, there could be\nno such thing as judging or believing; so that God could not bestow the\ngift of faith separate from the gift of reason, faith being the mere\nconsequence of reasoning, either right or wrong, or in a greater or less\ndegree, as has been previously argued.\n\nStill there is a knotty text of scripture to surmount, viz: \"He that\nbelieveth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be\ndamned.\" This text is considered as crowding hard upon unbelievers in\nChristianity; but when it is critically examined, it will be found not\nto militate at all against them, but is merely a Jesuitical fetch to\noverawe some and make others wonder. We will premise, that an unbeliever\nis destitute of faith, which is the cause of his being thus denominated.\nThe Christian believes the gospel to be true and of divine authority,\nthe Deist believes that it is not true and not of divine authority; so\nthat the Christian and Deist are both of them believers, and according\nto the express words of the text, \"shall be saved,\" and a Deist may as\nwell retort upon a Christian and call him an infidel, because he differs\nin faith from him, as a Christian may upon the Deist; for there is the\nsame impropriety in applying the cant of infidelity to either, as both\nare believers; and it is impossible for us to believe contrary to\nour judgments or the dictates of understanding, whether it be rightly\ninformed or not. Why then may there not in both denominations be honest\nmen, who are seeking after the truth, and who may have an equal right to\nexpect the favor and salvation of God.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. A TRINITY OF PERSONS CANNOT EXIST IN THE DIVINE ESSENCE...\n\nWHETHER THE PERSONS BE SUPPOSED TO BE FINITE OR INFINITE: WITH REMARKS\nON ST. ATHENASIUS'S CREED\n\nOf all errors which have taken place in religion, none have been so\nfatal to it as those that immediately respect the divine nature. Wrong\nnotions of a God, or of his providence, sap its very foundation in\ntheory and practice, as is evident from the superstition discoverable\namong the major part of mankind; who, instead of worshipping the true\nGod, have been by some means or other infatuated to pay divine homage\nto mere creatures, or to idols made with hands, or to such as have no\nexistence but in their own fertile imaginations.\n\nGod being incomprehensible to us, we cannot understand all that\nperfection in which the divine essence consists, we can nevertheless\n(negatively) comprehend many things, in which (positively) the divine\nessence does not and cannot consist.\n\nThat it does not consist of three persons, or of any other number of\npersons, is as easily demonstrated, as that the whole is bigger than a\npart, or any other proposition in mathematics.\n\nWe will premise, that the three persons in the supposed Trinity are\neither finite or infinite; for there cannot in the scale of being be\na third sort of beings between these two; for ever so many and exalted\ndegrees in finiteness is still finite, and that being who is infinite\nadmits of no degrees of enlargement; and as all beings whatever must\nbe limited or unlimited, perfect or imperfect, they must therefore be\ndenominated to be finite or infinite: we will therefore premise the\nthree persons in the Trinity to be merely finite, considered personally\nand individually from each other, and the question would arise whether\nthe supposed Trinity of finites though united in one essence, could be\nmore than finite still. Inasmuch as three imperfect and circumscribed\nbeings united together could not constitute a being perfect or infinite,\nany more than absolute perfection could consist of three imperfections;\nwhich would be the same as to suppose that infinity could be made up\nor compounded of finiteness; or that absolute, uncreated and infinite\nperfection, could consist of three personal and imperfect natures.\nBut on the other hand, to consider every of the three persons in the\nsupposed Trinity as being absolutely infinite, it would be a downright\ncontradiction to one infinite and all comprehending essence. Admitting\nthat God the Father is infinite, it would necessarily preclude the\nsupposed God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost from the god-head,\nor essence of God; one infinite essence comprehending every power,\nexcellency and perfection, which can possibly exist in the divine\nnature. Was it possible that three absolute infinites, which is the\nsame as three Gods, could be contained in one and the self-same essence,\nwhy not as well any other number of infinites? But as certain as\ninfinity cannot admit of addition, so certain a plurality of infinites\ncannot exist in the same essence; for real infinity is strict and\nabsolute infinity, and only that, and cannot be compounded of infinities\nor of parts, but forecloses all addition. A personal or circumscribed\nGod, implies as great and manifest a contradiction as the mind of\nman can conceive of; it is the same as a limited omnipresence, a weak\nAlmighty, or a finite God.\n\nFrom the foregoing arguments on the Trinity, we infer, that the divine\nessence cannot consist of a Trinity of persons, whether they are\nsupposed to be either finite or infinite.\n\nThe creed-mongers have exhibited the doctrine of the Trinity in an\nalarming point of light, viz.: \"Whoever would be saved before all things\nit is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith, which faith, except\nevery one doth keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish\neverlastingly.\" We next proceed to the doctrine, \"The Father is eternal,\nthe Son is eternal, and the Holy Ghost is eternal, and yet there are not\nthree eternals but one eternal.\" The plain English is, that the three\npersons in the Trinity are three eternals, individually considered, and\nyet they are not three eternals but one eternal.\n\nTo say that there are three eternals in the Trinity, and yet that there\nare not three eternals therein, is a contradiction in terms, as much as\nto say, that there are three persons in the Trinity and yet there are\nnot three persons in the Trinity.\n\nThe first proposition in the creed affirms, that \"the Father is\neternal,\" the second affirms that \"the Son is eternal,\" the third\naffirms that \"the Holy Ghost is eternal,\" the fourth affirms that \"there\nare not three eternals,\" and the fifth that there is \"but one eternal.\"\n\nThe reader will observe, that the three first propositions are denied by\nthe fourth, which denies that there are three eternals, though the three\nfirst propositions affirmed, that there were three eternals by\nname, viz. the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. The fifth proposition is\nunconnected with either of the former, and is undoubtedly true, viz.\n\"but there is one eternal.\" \"The Father is God, the Son is God, and the\nHoly Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods but one God.\" Here\nagain we have three Gods by name, affirmed to have an existence by the\nthree first propositions, by the fourth they are negatived, and the\nfifth affirms the truth again, viz. that there is \"but one God.\"\n\nAdmitting the three first propositions to be true, to wit, that there\nare three Gods, the three could not be one and the same God, any more\nthan Diana, Dagan and Moloch may be supposed to be the same; and if\nthree Gods, their essences and providences would interfere and make\nuniversal confusion and disorder.\n\n\"The Father is Almighty, the Son is Almighty, and the Holy Ghost is\nAlmighty, and yet there are not three Almighties but one Almighty.\" Here\nwe have three Almighties and at the same time but one Almighty. So that\nthe point at issue is brought to this simple question, viz. whether\nthree units can be one, or one unit three or not? Which is submitted to\nthe curious to determine. Our creed further informs us, that the three\npersons in the Trinity are co-eternal together and co-equal, but in\nits sequel we are told that one was begotten of the other; and when we\nadvert to the history of that transaction, we find it to be not quite\neighteen hundred years ago, and took place in the reign of Herod, the\nKing of Judea, which faith except \"we keep whole and undefined,\" we have\na threat, that \"without doubt we shall perish everlastingly.\"\n\n\n\n\nSECTON IX. ESSENCE BEING THE CAUSE OF IDENTITY...\n\nIS INCONSISTENT WITH PERSONALITY IN THE DIVINE NATURE\n\nOne God can have but one essence, which must have been eternal and\ninfinite, and for that reason precludes all others from a participation\nof his nature, glory, and universal and absolute perfection.\n\nWhen we speak of any being who by nature is capable of being rightfully\ndenominated an individual, we conceive of it to exist but in one\nessence; so that essence as applied to God, denominates the divine\nnature; and as applied to man, it denotes an individual: for although\nthe human race is with propriety denominated the race of man, and though\nevery male of the species, is with equal propriety called man, for\nthat they partake of one common sort of nature and likeness, yet the\nrespective individuals are not one and the same. The person of A is not\nthe person of B, nor are they conscious of each other's consciousness,\nand therefore the joy or grief of A, is not and cannot be the joy or\ngrief of B; this is what we know to be a fact from our own experience.\nThe reason of this personal distinction is founded in nature, for though\nwe partake of one common nature and likeness, yet we do not partake of\none and the same essence. Essence is therefore, in the order of nature,\nthe primary cause of identity or sameness and cannot be divided.\n\nFrom hence we infer, that the doctrine of the Trinity is destitute of\nfoundation, and tends manifestly to superstition and idolatry.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. THE IMPERFECTION OF KNOWLEDGE...\n\nIN THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST, INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS DIVINITY\n\nThat Jesus Christ was not God is evident from his own words, where,\nspeaking of the day of judgment, he says, \"Of that day and hour knoweth\nno man, no not the angels which are in Heaven, neither the Son, but the\nFather.\" This is giving up all pretention to divinity, acknowledging in\nthe most explicit manner, that he did not know all things, but compares\nhis understanding to that of man and angels; \"of that day and hour\nknoweth no man, no not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son.\"\nThus he ranks himself with finite beings, and with them acknowledges,\nthat he did not know the day and hour of judgment, and at the same time\nascribes a superiority of knowledge to the lather, for that he knew the\nday and hour of judgment.\n\nThat he was a mere creature is further evident from his prayer to the\nfather, saying, \"father if it be possible, let this cup pass from me,\nnevertheless, not my will but thine be done.\" These expressions speak\nforth the most humble submission to his father's will, authority and\ngovernment, and however becoming so submissive a disposition to the\ndivine government would be, in a creature, it is utterly inconsistent\nand unworthy of a God, or of the person of Jesus Christ, admitting him\nto have been a divine person, or of the essence of God.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATE OF MAN, IN MOSES'S PARADISE...\n\nON THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL, AND ON THE TREE OF LIFE: WITH\nSPECULATIONS ON THE DIVINE PROHIBITION TO MAN, NOT TO EAT OF THE FRUIT\nOF THE FORMER OF THOSE TREES, INTERSPERSED WITH REMARKS ON THE MORTALITY\nOF INNOCENT MAN.\n\nThe mortality of animal life, and the dissolution of that of the\nvegetable, has been particularly considered in chapter three, section\nfour, treating on physical evils. We now proceed to make an application\nof those arguments, in the case of our reputed first parents, whose\nmortality is represented by Moses to have taken place in consequence of\ntheir eating of the forbidden fruit.\n\nMoses in his description of the garden of Eden acquaints us with two\nchimerical kinds of fruit trees, which, among others, he tells us were\nplanted by God in the place appointed for the residence of the new made\ncouple; the one he calls by the name of \"the tree of knowledge of good\nand evil,\" and the other by the name of \"the tree of life.\" And previous\nto his account of the apostacy, he informs us, that God expressly\ncommanded the man and woman, saying, \"be fruitful and multiply and\nreplenish the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of\nthe sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that\nmoveth upon the earth; and God said, behold I have given you every herb\nbearing seed, which is upon, the face of all the earth, and every tree,\nin which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed, to you it shall be for\nmeat.\" Again, \"and the Lord commanded the man saying, of every tree of\nthe garden thou mayest freely eat, but of the tree of knowledge of\ngood and evil thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day that thou eatest\nthereof thou shalt surely die.\" \"And the Lord said, it is not good for\nman to be alone, I will make him an help meet for him; and the Lord God\ncaused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept, and he took out one\nof his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof, and the rib which\nthe Lord God had taken from man made he a woman.\"\n\nThus it appears from Moses's representation of the state of man's\ninnocency, that he was commanded by God to labor, and to replenish the\nearth; and that to him was given the dominion over the creatures, and\nthat at two several times he was licensed by God himself to eat of every\nof the fruit of the trees, and of the herbage, except of the tree of\nknowledge of good and evil; and because it was not good that the man\nshould be alone, but that he might multiply and replenish the earth,\nour amorous mother Eve, it seems, was formed, who I dare say well\ncompensated father Adam for the loss of his rib.\n\nThis short description of man's state and condition in innocency, agrees\nwith the state and circumstances of human nature at present. Innocent\nman was required to labor and subdue the earth, out of which he was to\nbe subsisted; had a license to eat of the fruit of the trees, or herbage\nof the garden, which pre-supposeth that his nature needed refreshment\nthe same as ours does; for otherwise it would have been impertinent to\nhave granted him a privilege incompatible with his nature, as it would\nhave been no privilege at all, but an outright mockery, except we admit,\nthat innocent human nature was liable to decay, needed nutrition by\nfood, and had the quality of digestion and perspiration; or in fine, had\nthe same sort of nature as we have; for otherwise he could eat but one\nbelly-full, which without digestion would remain the same, and is too\nromantic to have been the original end and design of eating. And though\nthere is nothing mentioned by Moses concerning his drinking, yet it\nis altogether probable, that he had wit enough to drink when he was\nthirsty. That he consisted of animal nature is manifest, not only from\nhis being subjected to subdue the earth, out of which he was to be\nsubsisted, and from his eating and drinking, or his susceptibility of\nnutrition by food, but also from his propensity to propagate his kind;\nfor which purpose a helpmate was made for him.\n\nNothing could more fully evince, that Moses's innocent progenitors of\nmankind, in that state, were of a similar nature to ours, than their\nsusceptibility of propagating the species; and as they required\nnutrition, their nature must have had the quality or aptitude of\ndigestion and perspiration, and every property that at present we\nascribe to an animal nature; from hence we infer, that death, or\nmortality, must have been the necessary consequence. What would have\nprevented them from having been crushed to death by a fall from a\nprecipice, or from suffering death by any other casualty, to which human\nnature is at present liable? will any suppose that the bodies of those\npremised innocent progenitors of the human race were invulnerable; were\nthey not flesh and blood? surely they were, for otherwise they could not\nhave been male and female; as it was written, \"male and female created\nhe them:\" and inasmuch as animal life has, from its original, consisted\nof the same sort of nature, and been propagated and supported in the\nsame manner, and obnoxious to the same fate, it would undoubtedly, in\nthe premised day of Adam, required the same order in the external system\nof nature, which it does at present, to answer the purposes of animal\nlife.\n\nWas it possible that the laws of nature, which merely respect\ngravitation, could be and were suspended, so as not to be influential on\nmatter, our world would be immediately disjointed and out of order,\nand confusion would succeed its present regularity; in the convulsions\nwhereof animal life could not subsist. So that not only the laws which\nimmediately respect animal nature in particular, but the laws which\nrespect our solar system, must have been the same in man's innocency,\nas in his whimsically supposed state of apostacy; and consequently, his\nmortality the same. From hence we infer, that the curses, which Moses\ninforms us of in chapter three: as being by God pronounced upon man,\nsaying, \"dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return,\" could not have\nbeen any punishment, inflicted as a penalty for eating the forbidden\nfruit; for turn to dust he must have done, whether he eat of it or\nnot; for that death and dissolution was the inevitable and irreversible\ncondition of the law of nature, which wholly precludes the curse, of\nwhich Moses informs us, from having any effect on mankind.\n\nThe story of the \"tree of life\" is unnatural. And there being but one of\nthe kind, it may be called an only tree, the world not having produced\nanother of the sort; the fruit of which, according to Moses, had such an\nefficacious quality, that had Adam and Eve but eaten thereof, they would\nhave lived forever. \"And now lest he put forth his hand and take also of\nthe tree of life, and eat, and live forever.\" To prevent which, they are\nsaid to be driven out of the garden, that the eating thereof might not\nhave reversed the sentence of God, which he had previously pronounced\nagainst them, denouncing their mortality. \"So he drove out the man, and\nhe placed at the east of the garden of Eden, cherubims, and a flaming\nsword, which turneth every way to keep the way of the tree of life.\" A\nbite of this fruit it seems would have reinstated mankind, and spoiled\npriestcraft. Yet it is observable, that there are no travellers or\nhistorians, who have given any accounts of such a tree, or of the\ncherubims or flaming sword, which renders its existence disputable, and\nthe reality of it doubtful and improbable; the more so, as that part of\nthe country, in which it is said to have been planted, has for a long\nsecession of ages been populously inhabited.\n\nYet it may be objected, that the tree may have rotted down and consumed\nby time. But such conjectures derogate from the character of the quality\nof the tree. It seems, that so marvellous a tree, the fruit of which\nwould have preserved animal life eternally, would have laughed at time,\nand bid defiance to decay and dissolution, and eternally have remained\nin its pristine state under the protection of the flaming sword, as a\nperpetual evidence of the divine legation of Moses, and the reality of\nman's apostacy for ever. But alas! it is no where to be found, it is\nperished from off the face of the earth, and such a marvellous fruit is\nno more, and consequently no remedy against mortality remains.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. POINTING OUT THE NATURAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ALL AND EVERY...\n\nOF THE DIVERSE SPECIES OF BIPED ANIMALS, COMMONLY TERMED MAN, TO\nHAVE LINEALLY DESCENDED FROM ADAM AND EVE, OR FROM THE SAME ORIGINAL\nPROGENITORS.\n\nIt is altogether improbable and manifestly contradictory to suppose,\nthat the various and diverse nations and tribes of the earth, who walk\nupon two legs, and are included under the term man, have or possibly\ncould have descended by ordinary generation, from the same parents, be\nthey supposed to be who they will.\n\nThose adventurers,-who have sailed or travelled to the several parts of\nthe globe, inform us, in their respective histories, that they find\nthe habitable part of it more or less populated by one kind or other\nof rational animals, and that considered as tribes or nations, there\nis evidently a gradation of intellectual capacity among them, some\nmore exalted and others lower in the scale of being; and that they are\nspecially diverse from each other with respect to their several animal\nnatures, though in most respects they appear to have one sort of nature\nwith us, viz: more like us that like the brute creation; as they walk\nerect, speak with man's voice, and make use of language of one sort or\nother, though many of them are more or less inarticulate in their manner\nof speaking: and in many other particulars bear a general likeness to\nus. They are nevertheless considered as distinct tribes or nations,\nare of different sizes, and as to complexion, they vary from the two\nextremes of white and black, in a variety of tawny mediums.\n\nThe learned nations can trace their genealogies, (though somewhat\nincorrect) for a considerable time, but are certain to be sooner or\nlater lost in the retrospect thereon, and those that are of an inferior\nkind, or destitute of learning or science have no other knowledge of\ntheir genealogies, than they retain by their respective traditions,\nwhich are very inconsiderable. They are likewise diverse from each other\nin their features and in the shape of their bodies and limbs, and some\nare distinguished from others by their rank smell and the difference\nin their hair, eyes and visage, but to point out the distinctions would\nexceed my design.\n\nThe Ethiopians, though of a shining black complexion, have regular and\nbeautiful features, and long black hair (one of those female beauties\ncaptivated the affections of Moses) they differ very materially from\nthe negro blacks, so that it appears impossible that they should have\ndescended in a lineal succession from the same ancestors. They are\nuniformly in their respective generations essentially diverse from each\nother, so that an issue from a male and female of the two nations would\nbe a mongrel, partaking partly of the kind of both nations. So also\nconcerning the difference which subsists between us and the negroes;\ntheir black skin is but one of the particulars in which they are\ndifferent from us; their many and very essential differences fully\nevince, that the white nations, and they, could not according to the\nlaw of their respective generations, have had one and the same lineal\noriginal, but that they have had their diverse kind of original\nprogenitors.\n\nIt is true that the several nations and tribes of the earth,\ncomprehended under the general term man, notwithstanding their\ndiversity to each other in bodily shape and mental powers, bear a nearer\nresemblance to one another than the brute kind, for which reason they\nare known by one common appellation: though it is manifest that they\ncould never have lineally descended from the same first parents, whether\ntheir names were Adam and Eve, or what not.\n\nBut inasmuch as our genealogies are wholly insufficient for the purpose\nof explaining our respective originals or any or either of them, or to\ngive us or any of us, considered as individuals or nations, who fall\nunder the denomination of the term man, any manner of insight or\nknowledge from whom we are lineally descended, or who were our\nrespective original ancestors, or what their names were: we must\ntherefore reason on this subject from the facts and causes now\nexisting, which abundantly evince, that we are of different kinds, and\nconsequently are not of the same lineage.\n\nThe acquaintance, which we have had with the negro nation in particular,\nfully evinces the absurdity of supposing them to be of the same blood\nand kindred with ourselves. But that there are some original intrinsic\nand hereditary diversity or essential difference between us and them,\nwhich cannot be ascribed to time, climate, or to mere contingence.\n\nFor that we and they are in nature inherently and uniformly diverse from\neach other in our respective constitutions and generations, and have\nbeen so time immemorial. So that the negroes are of a different species\nof rational beings from us, and consequently must have had their\ndistinct lineal original; was it not so, there could be no such thing\nas a mongrel or a mulatto, who is occasioned by a copulation between\nthe males and the females of the respective diverse species, the issue\npartaking of both natures.\n\nHad all the nations and tribes of the world, who are denominated\nrational, been lineally descended from the same progenitors, mongrelism\ncould never have taken place among them, as in this case they would have\nbeen all of the same kind: from hence we infer, that they have had their\nrespective original progenitors. The Dutch colony at the Cape of Good\nHope have enacted laws to punish with death such of their Dutch subjects\nas may be convicted of copulating with the Hottentots: for that their\nnature is adjusted to be of an inferior species to theirs, so that\nmixing their nature with them would essentially degenerate and debase\ntheir own.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. OF THE ORIGIN OF THE DEVIL OR OF MORAL EVIL...\n\nAND OF THE DEVIL'S TALKING WITH EVE; WITH A REMARK THAT THE DOCTRINE OF\nAPOSTACY IS THE FOUNDATION OF CHRISTIANITY\n\nInasmuch as the devil is represented to have had so great and undue an\ninfluence in bringing about the apostacy of Adam, and still to continue\nhis temptations to mankind, it may be worth our while to examine into\nthe nature and manner of his being and the mode of his exhibiting his\ntemptations.\n\nJohn's gospel, verse 1 and 3, the Christian's God is the creator of the\ndevil and consequently the original cause of evil in heaven--and among\nmen he planted the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and knew at the\ntime he planted it of the awful consequences that would follow.\n\nBut if it be admitted, that the creature called the devil (who must\nbe supposed to be under the divine government, as much as any other\ncreature) could become inflexible, and perpetually rebellious and\nwicked, incapable of a restoration, and consequently subjected to\neternal punishment (which to me appears to be inconsistent with the\nwisdom and goodness of the divine government, and the nature, end and\ndesign of a probationary agent) yet it would by no means follow from\nhence, that so stubbornly wicked and incorrigible a creature would have\nbeen permitted, by the providence of God, to tempt, ensnare or seduce\nmankind, by plying his temptations to their weak side. One thing we are\ncertain of, viz. that the devil does not visit our world in a bodily or\norganized shape, and there is not in nature a second way, in which it is\npossible for him to make known himself to us, or that he could have done\nit to our progenitors, nor could he ever have communicated to them or\nto us, any temptations or ideas whatever, any otherwise than by making\na proper application to our external senses, so that we could understand\nhim, or receive the ideas of his temptations in a natural way. For\nsupernatural intercourse with the world of spirits or invisible beings\nhas been shown to be contradictory and impossible in the arguments\ncontained in the sixth chapter, to which the reader is referred. Those\narguments will hold equally good as applied to either good or evil\nspirits, and are demonstrative of the utter impossibility of mankind's\nholding any manner of intercourse or intelligence with them.\n\nBut should we premise, that, according to the history of Moses, it was\nin the power of the devil to assume a bodily shape, and that he did in\nvery deed transform himself into the figure, likeness and organization\nof a snake, yet by and with that organ he could not have spoken or\nuttered the following articulate words, which Moses charged him with, to\nwit, \"And the serpent said unto the woman, ye shall not surely die, for\nGod doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, that your eyes shall be\nopened, and ye shall be as Gods knowing good and evil.\"\n\nWho speaks the truth in the above passages, the devil, for neither the\nman nor the woman died for many years after they are said to have eaten\nof the forbidden fruit, for death is the annihilation of life, and they\ndid not die on the day they eat.\n\nAs the serpent is by nature incapable of speech, it must have put the\ndevil into the same predicament; admitting that he transformed himself\ninto the same figure or likeness, and consequently for want of the\nproper and adequate organs of speech, he must necessarily have been\nincapable of any other language than that of rattling his tail, and\ntherefore could never have spoken those recited words unto Eve, or\ncommunicated any of his temptations unto her by language, while in that\nsimilitude. However, admitting that the first parents of mankind were\nbeguiled by the wiles of the devil to transgress the divine law, yet of\nall transgressions it would have been the most trivial (considered\nunder all the particular circumstances of it) that the mind of man can\nconceive of.\n\nWho in the exercise of reason can believe, that Adam and Eve by eating\nof such a spontaneous fruit could have incurred the eternal displeasure\nof God, as individuals? Or that the divine vindictive justice should\nextend to their unoffending offspring then unborn? And sentence the\nhuman progeny to the latest posterity to everlasting destruction? As\nchimerical as Moses's representation of the apostacy of man manifestly\nappears to be, yet it is the very basis, on which Christianity is\nfounded, and is announced in the New Testament to be the very cause why\nJesus Christ came into this world, \"that he might destroy the works\nof the devil,\" and redeem fallen man, alias, the elect, from the\ncondemnation of the apostacy; which leads me to the consideration of the\ndoctrine of imputation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON I. IMPUTATION CANNOT CHANGE, ALIENATE OR TRANSFER...\n\nTHE PERSONAL DEMERIT OF SIN; AND PERSONAL MERIT OF VIRTUE TO OTHERS, WHO\nWERE NOT ACTIVE THEREIN, ALTHOUGH THIS DOCTRINE SUPPOSES AN ALIENATION\nTHEREOF\n\nThe doctrine of imputation according to the Christian scheme, consists\nof two parts; first, of imputation of the apostacy of Adam and Eve to\ntheir posterity, commonly called original sin; and secondly, of the\nimputation of the merits or righteousness of Christ, who in scripture is\ncalled the second Adam, to mankind, or to the elect. This is a concise\ndefinition of the doctrine, and which will undoubtedly be admitted to\nbe a just one by every denomination of men, who are acquainted with\nChristianity, whether they adhere to it or not I therefore proceed to\nillustrate and explain the doctrine by transcribing a short, but very\npertinent conversation, which in the early years of my manhood, I had\nwith a Calvinistical divine: but previously remark, that I was educated\nin what is commonly called the Armenian principles, and among other\ntenets to reject the doctrine of original sin, this was the point at\nissue between the clergyman and me. In my turn I opposed the doctrine\nof original sin with philosophical reasonings, and as I thought\nhad confuted the doctrine. The reverend gentleman heard me through\npatiently, and with candor replied, \"your metaphysical reasonings are\nnot to the purpose; inasmuch as you are a Christian, and hope and expect\nto be saved by the imputed righteousness of Christ to you; for you may\nas well be imputedly sinful as imputedly righteous. Nay, said he, if\nyou hold to the doctrine of satisfaction and atonement by Christ, by so\ndoing you pre-suppose the doctrine of apostacy or original sin to be in\nfact true; for said he, if mankind were not in a ruined and condemned\nstate by nature, there could have been no need of a redeemer, but each\nindividual would have been accountable to his creator and judge,\nupon the basis of his own moral agency. Further observing, that upon\nphilosophical principles it was difficult to account for the doctrine\nof original sin, or original righteousness, yet as they were plain\nfundamental doctrines of the Christian faith, we ought to assent to\nthe truth of them, and that from the divine authority of revelation.\nNotwithstanding, said he, if you will give me a philosophical\nexplanation of original imputed righteousness, which you profess to\nbelieve, and expect salvation by, then I will return you a philosophical\nexplanation of the doctrine of original sin; for it is plain, said he,\nthat your objections lie with equal weight against original imputed\nrighteousness, as against original imputed sin.\" Upon which I had\nthe candor to acknowledge to the worthy ecclesiastic, that upon the\nChristian plan, I perceived that the argument had fairly terminated\nagainst me. For at that time I dared not distrust the infallibility\nof revelation, much more to dispute it. However, this conversation was\nuppermost in my mind for several months after, and after many painful\nsearches and researches after the truth respecting the doctrine of\nimputation, resolved at all events to abide the decision of rational\nargument in the premises, and on a full examination of both parts of\nthe doctrine, rejected the whole; for on a fair scrutiny I found, that\nI must concede to it entirely or not at all, or else believe\ninconsistently as the clergyman had argued.\n\nHaving opened and explained the doctrine, we proceed argumentatively to\nconsider it. Imputation of sin or righteousness includes an alteration\nor transferring of the personal merits or demerits of sin or\nrighteousness, from those who may be supposed to have been active in the\none or the other, to others, who are premised not to have been active\ntherein, otherwise it would not answer the Bible notion of imputation.\nFor if sin or righteousness, vice or virtue, are imputable only to their\nrespective personal proficients or actors, in this case original sin\nmust have been imputed to Adam and Eve, to the exclusion of their\nposterity, and the righteousness of Christ as exclusively imputed to\nhimself, precluding all others therefrom; so that both the sin of the\nfirst Adam and the righteousness of the second, would, on this stating\nof imputation, have been matters which respect merely the agency, of the\ndemerits or merits of the two respective Adams themselves, and in which\nwe could have had no blame, reward or concern, any more than in the\nbuilding of Babel.\n\nThis then is the question that determines the sequel of the dispute for\nor against the doctrine of imputation, viz. whether the personal\nmerit or demerit of mankind, that is to say, their virtue or vice,\nrighteousness or wickedness can be alienated, imputed to, or transferred\nfrom one person to another, or not? If any should object against this\nstating of the question now in dispute, it would be the same in reality\nas disputing against the doctrine of imputation itself, for imputation\nmust transfer or change the personal merit or demerit of the sin or\nrighteousness of mankind or not do it; if it does not do it, the whole\nnotion of original sin or of righteousness, as being imputed from the\nfirst and second Adams to mankind, is without foundation, consequently,\nif there is any reality in the doctrine of imputation, it must needs\ntransfer or change the guilt of original sin, or of the apostacy of Adam\nand Eve, to their posterity, or otherwise they could need no atonement\nor imputative righteousness, as a remedy therefrom, but every individual\nof \"mankind would have stood accountable to their creator and judge on\nthe basis of their own moral agency,\" which is undoubted the true state\nof the case, respecting all rational and accountable beings; so that if\nthe transferring of the individual merits or demerits of one person\nto another, is not contained in the act or doctrine of imputation, it\ncontains nothing at all, but is a sound without a meaning, and after all\nthe talk which has been in the world about it, we must finally adopt to\nold proverb, viz. \"every tub stands upon its own bottom.\"\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. THE MORAL RECTITUDE OF THINGS FORECLOSES...\n\nTHE ACT OF IMPUTATION.\n\nImputation confounds virtue and vice, and saps the very foundation of\nmoral government, both divine and human. Abstract the idea of personal\nmerit and demerit, from the individuals of mankind, justice would be\ntotally blind, and truth would be nullified, or at least excluded from\nany share in the administration of government. Admitting that moral good\nand evil has taken place in the system of rational agents, yet, on the\nposition of imputation, it would be impossible, that a retribution of\njustice should be made to them by God or by man, except it be according\nto their respective personal merits and demerits; which would fix upon\nthe basis of our own moral agency and accountability, and preclude the\nimputation of righteousnes.\n\nTruth respects the reality of things, as they are in their various\ncomplicated and distinct natures, and necessarily conforms to all facts\nand realities. It exists in, by and with every thing that does exist,\nand that which does not and cannot exist, is fictitious and void of\ntruth, as is the doctrine of imputation. It is a truth that some of the\nindividuals of mankind are virtuous, and that others are vicious, and\nit is a truth, that the former merit peace of conscience and praise, and\nthe latter horror of conscience and blame; for God has so constituted\nthe nature of things, that moral goodness, naturally and necessarily\ntends to happiness in a moral sense, and moral evil as necessarily tends\nto the contrary; and as truth respects every thing, as being what it\nis, it respects nature, as God has constituted it, with its tendencies,\ndispositions, aptitudes and laws; and as the tendency of virtue is to\nmental happiness, and vice the contrary, they fall under the cognizance\nof truth, as all other facts necessarily do; which tendencies will\nfor ever preclude imputation, by making us morally happy or miserable\naccording to our works.\n\nTruth respects the eternal rules of unalterable rectitude and fitness,\nwhich comprehends all virtue, goodness and true happiness; and as sin\nand wickedness is no other but a deviation from the rules of eternal\nunerring order and reason, so truth respects it as unreasonable, unfit,\nunrighteous and unhappy deviation from moral rectitude, naturally\ntending to misery. This order of nature, comprehended under the terms of\ntruth, must have been of all others the wisest and best; in fine it\nmust have been absolutely perfect; for this order and harmony of things,\ncould not have resulted from anything short of infinite wisdom, goodness\nand power, by which it is also upheld; and all just ideas of equity, or\nof natural and moral fitness must be learned from nature, and predicated\non it; and nature predicated on the immutable perfection of a God; and\nto suppose that imputation, in any one instance has taken place, is the\nsame as to suppose, that the eternal order, truth, justice, equity and\nfitness of things has been changed, and if so, the God of nature must\nneeds have been a changeable being, and liable to alter his justice or\norder of nature, which is the same thing; for without the alteration\nof nature, and the tendency of it, there could be no such thing as\nimputation, but every of the individuals of mankind would be ultimately\nhappy or miserable, according as their respective proficiencies may be\nsupposed to be either good or evil, agreeable to the order and tendency\nof nature before alluded to. For all rational and accountable agents\nmust stand or fall upon the principles of the law of nature, except\nimputation alters the nature and tendency of things; of which the\nimmutability of a God cannot admit. From what has been already argued\non this subject, we infer, that as certain as the individuals of mankind\nare the proprietors of their own virtues or vices, so certain, the\ndoctrine of imputation cannot be true. Furthermore, the supposed act\nor agency of imputing or transferring the personal merit or demerit\nof moral good or evil, _alias_, the sin of the first Adam, or the\nrighteousness of the second Adam, to others of mankind, cannot be the\nact or exertion of either the first or second Adam, from whom original\nsin and righteousness is said to have been imputed. Nor can it be\nthe act or doings of those individuals, to whom the supposed merit or\ndemerit of original sin or righteous is premised to be imputed; so that\nboth Adam and each individual of mankind are wholly excluded from acting\nany part in the premised act of imputation; and are supposed to be\naltogether passive in the matter, and consequently it necessarily\nfollows, that if there ever was such an act as that of imputation, it\nmust have been the immediate and sovereign act of God, to the preclusion\nof the praise or blame of man But to suppose, that God can impute the\nvirtue or vice of the person of A, to be the virtue or vice of the\nperson of B, is the same as to suppose that God can impute or change\ntruth into falsehood, or falsehood into truth, or that he can reverse\nthe nature of moral rectitude itself, which is inadmissable. But\nadmitting, that imputation was in the power and at the option of man,\nit is altogether probable that they would have been very sparing in\nimputing merit and happiness, but might nevertheless have been vastly\nliberal in imputing demerit and misery, from one to another, which is\ntoo farcical.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. CONTAINING REMARKS ON THE ATONEMENT...\n\nAND SATISFACTION FOR ORIGINAL SIN\n\nThe doctrine of imputation is in every point of view incompatible with\nthe moral perfections of God. We will premise, that the race of Adam in\ntheir respective generations was guilty of the apostacy, and obnoxious\nto the vindictive justice and punishment of God, and accordingly doomed\nto either an eternal or temporary punishment therefore, which is the\nBible representation of the matter. What possibility could there have\nbeen of reversing the divine decree? It must be supposed to have\nbeen just, or it could not have had the divine sanction, and if so,\na reversal of it would be unjust. But it would be still a greater\ninjustice to lay the blame and vindictive punishment of a guilty race\nof condemned sinners upon an innocent and inoffensive being, for in this\ncase the guilty would be exempted from their just punishment, and the\ninnocent unjustly suffer for it, which holds up to view two manifest\ninjustices; the first consists in not doing justice to the guilty, and\nthe second in actually punishing the innocent, which instead of atoning\nfor sin, would add sin to sin, or injustice to injustice; and after all,\nif it was ever just, that the race of Adam should have been punished for\nthe imputed sin of their premised original ancestor, be that punishment\nwhat it will, it is so still, notwithstanding the atonement, for the\neternal justice and reason of things can never, be altered. This justice\nalways defeats the possibility of satisfaction for sin by way of a\nmediator.\n\nThat physical evils may and have been propagated by natural generation,\nnone can dispute, for that the facts themselves are obvious. But that\nmoral evil can be thus propagated, is altogether chimerical, for we are\nnot born criminals.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON IV. REMARKS ON REDEMPTION, WROUGHT OUT BY INFLICTING...\n\nTHE DEMERITS OF SIN UPON THE INNOCENT, WOULD BE UNJUST, AND THAT IT\nCOULD CONTAIN NO MERCY OR GOODNESS TO THE UNIVERSALITY OF BEING\n\nThe practice of imputing one person's crime to another, in capital\noffences among men, so that the innocent should suffer for the guilty,\nhas never yet been introduced into any court of judicature in the world,\nor so much as practised in any civilized country; and the manifest\nreason in this, as in all other cases of imputation, is the same, viz.\nit confounds personal merit and demerit.\n\nThe murderer ought to suffer for the demerit of his crime, but if the\ncourt exclude the idea of personal demerit (guilt being always the\ninherent property of the guilty and of them only) they might as well\nsentence one person to death for the murder as another: for justice\nwould be wholly blind was it not predicated on the idea of the fact of a\npersonal demerit, on the identical person who was guilty of the murder:\nnor is it possible to reward merit abstractly considered from its\npersonal agents. These are facts that universally hold good in human\ngovernment. The same reasons cannot fail to hold good in the divine mind\nas in that of the human, for the rules of justice are essentially the\nsame whether applied to the one or to the other, having their uniformity\nin the eternal truth and reason of things.\n\nBut it is frequently objected, that inasmuch as one person can pay,\nsatisfy and discharge a cash debt for another, redeem him from prison\nand set him at liberty, therefore Jesus Christ might become responsible\nfor the sins of mankind, or of the elect, and by suffering their\npunishments atone for them and free them from their condemnation. But it\nshould be considered, that comparisons darken or reflect light upon an\nargument according as they are either pertinent or impertinent thereto;\nwe will therefore examine the comparison, and see if it will with\npropriety apply to the atonement.\n\nUpon the Christian scheme, Christ the Son was God, and equal with God\nthe Father, or with God the Holy Ghost, and therefore original sin must\nbe considered to be an offence equally against each of the persons\nof the premised Trinity, and being of a criminal nature could not be\ndischarged or satisfied by cash or produce, as debts of a civil contract\nare, but by suffering; and it has already been proved to be inconsistent\nwith the divine or human government, to inflict the punishment of the\nguilty upon the innocent, though one man may discharge another's debt in\ncases where lands, chattels or cash are adequate to it; but what capital\noffender was ever discharged by such commodities?\n\nStill there remains a difficulty on the part of Christianity, in\naccounting for one of the persons in the premised Trinity satisfying a\ndebt due to the impartial justice of the unity of the three persons. For\nGod the Son to suffer the condemnation of guilt in behalf of man, would\nnot only be unjust in itself, but incompatible with his divinity, and\nthe retribution of the justice of the premised Trinity of persons in\nthe god-head (of whom God the Son must be admitted to be one) toward\nmankind; for this would be the same as to suppose God to be judge,\ncriminal and executioner, which is inadmissible.\n\nBut should we admit for argument's sake, that God suffered for original\nsin, yet taking into one complex idea the whole mental system of beings,\nuniversally, both finite and infinite, there could have been no display\nof grace, mercy, or goodness to being in general, in such a supposed\nredemption of mankind; inasmuch as the same quantity or degree of evil\nis supposed to have taken place upon being, universally considered, as\nwould have taken place, had finite individuals, or the race of Adam,\nsuffered according to their respective demerits.\n\nShould we admit that there is a Trinity of persons in the divine\nessence, yet the one could not suffer without the other, for essence\ncannot be divided in suffering, any more than in enjoyment. The essence\nof God is that which includes the divine nature, and the same identical\nnature must necessarily partake of the same glory, honor, power, wisdom,\ngoodness and absolute uncreated and unlimited perfection, and is equally\nexempted from weakness and suffering. Therefore, as certain as Christ\nsuffered he was not God, but whether he is supposed to be God or man, or\nboth, he could not in justice have suffered for original sin, which must\nhave been the demerit of its perpetrators as before argued.\n\nSupposing Christ to have been both God and man, he must have existed in\ntwo distinct essences, viz. the essence of God and the essence of man.\nAnd if he existed in two distinct and separate essences, there could be\nno union between the divine and human natures. But if there is any such\nthing as an hypostatical union between the divine and human natures,\nit must unite both in one essence, which is impossible: for the divine\nnature being infinite, could admit of no addition or enlargement and\nconsequently cannot allow of a union with any nature whatever. Was such\nan union possible in itself, yet, for a superior nature to unite with an\ninferior one in the same essence, would be degrading to the former,\nas it would put both natures on a level by constituting an identity of\nnature: the consequences whereof would either deify man, or divest God\nof his divinity, and reduce him to the rank and condition of a creature;\ninasmuch as the united essence must be denominated either divine or\nhuman.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nSECTON I. OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSLATING AN INFALLIBLE...\n\nREVELATION FROM ITS ORIGINAL COPIES, AND PRESERVING IT ENTIRE THROUGH\nALL THE REVOLUTIONS OF THE WORLD, AND VICISSITUDES OF HUMAN LEARNING TO\nOUR TIME\n\nAdmitting for argument sake that the Scriptures of the Old and New\nTestament were originally of divine supernatural inspiration, and that\ntheir first manuscript copies were the infallible institutions of God,\nyet to trace them from their respective ancient dead languages, and\ndifferent and diverse translations, from the obscure hieroglyphical\npictures of characters, in which they were first written, through\nall the vicissitudes and alterations of human learning, prejudices,\nsuperstitions, enthusiasms and diversities of interests and manners, to\nour time, so as to present us with a perfect edition from its premised\ninfallible original manuscript copies would be impossible. The\nvarious and progressive methods of learning, with the insurmountable\ndifficulties of translating any supposed antiquated written revelation\nwould not admit of it, as the succeeding observations on language and\ngrammar will fully evince.\n\nIn those early ages of learning, hieroglyphics were expressive of\nideas; for instance, a snake quirled (a position common to that venomous\nreptile) was an emblem of eternity, and the picture of a lion, a\nrepresentation of power, and so every beast, bird, reptile, insect and\nfish, had in their respective pictures, particular ideas annexed to\nthem, which varied with the arbitrary custom and common consent of the\nseveral separate nations, among whom this way of communicating ideas was\npractised, in some sense analogous to what is practised at this day by\ndifferent nations, in connecting particular ideas to certain sounds or\nwords written in characters, which according to certain rules of grammar\nconstitute the several languages. But the hieroglyphical manner of\nwriting by living emblems, and perhaps in some instances by other\npictures, was very abstruse, and inadequate to communicate that\nmultiplicity and diversity of ideas which are requisite for the purpose\nof history, argumentation or general knowledge in any of the sciences or\nconcerns of life; which mystical way of communicating ideas underwent a\nvariety of alterations and improvements, though not so much as that\nof characters and grammar has done; for in the hieroglyphical way of\ncommunicating their ideas, there was no such thing as spelling, or\nwhat is now called orthography, which has been perpetually refining and\naltering, ever since characters, syllables, words or grammar have been\nbrought into use, and which will admit of correction and improvement as\nlong as mankind continue in the world. For which reason the original of\nall languages is absorbed and lost in the multiplicity of alterations\nand refinements, which have in all ages taken place, so that it is out\nof the power of all Etymologists and Lexieonists now living, to explain\nthe ideas, which were anciently connected with those hieroglyphical\nfigures or words, and which may have composed the original of any\nlanguage, written in characters, in those obsolete and antiquated ages,\nwhen learning and science were in their infancy: since the beneficial,\nart of printing has arrived to any considerable degree of perfection,\nthe etymology of words, in the scientifical and learned languages, has\nbeen considerably well understood: though imperfectly, as the various\nopinions of the learned concerning it may witness. But since the era\nof printing, the knowledge of the ancient learning has been in a great\nmeasure, or in most respects, wholly lost; and inasmuch as the modern\nsubstitute is much better, it is no loss at all. Some of the old English\nauthors are at this day quite unintelligible, and others in their\nrespective latter publications, more or less so. The last century and a\nhalf has done more towards the perfecting of grammar, and purifying the\nlanguages than the world had ever done before.\n\nI do not understand Latin, Greek or Hebrew, in which languages, it\nis said, that the several original manuscripts of the Scriptures were\nwritten; but I am informed by the learned therein, that, the other\nlanguages, they have gone through their respective alterations and\nrefinements, which must have been the case, except they reached their\ngreatest perfection in their first composition; of which the progressive\ncondition of man could not admit. So that the learned in those\nlanguages, at this day, know but little or nothing how they were spoken\nor written when the first manuscript copies of the Scriptures were\ncomposed; and consequently, are not able to inform us, whether their\npresent translations do, any of them, perfectly agree with their\nrespective original premised infallible manuscript copies or not. And\ninasmuch as the several English translations of the Bible do materially\ndiffer from each other, it evinces the confused and blundering condition\nin which it has been handed down to us.\n\nThe clergy often informs us from the desk, that the translation of the\nBible, which is now in use in this country, is erroneous, after having\nread such and such a passage of it, in either Latin, Greek or Hebrew,\nthey frequently give us to understand, that instead of the present\ntranslation, it should have been rendered thus and thus in English, but\nnever represent to us how it was read and understood in the antiquated\nand mystical figures or characters of those languages, when the\nmanuscripts of Scripture were first written, or how it has been\npreserved and handed down entire, through every refinement of those\nlanguages, to the present condition of Latin, Greek and Hebrew. Probably\nthis is too abstruse a series of retrospective learning for their\nscholarship, and near or quite as foreign from their knowledge as from\nthat of their hearers.*\n\nIt is not to be supposed that all the alterations which have taken\nplace in language, have been merely by improving it. In many instances,\nignorance, accident or custom has varied it to its disadvantage, but it\nhas nevertheless been subject to correction, and generally speaking\nhas been altered for the better, yet, by one means or other has been\nso fluctuating and unstable, as that an infallible revelation could\nnot have been genuinely preserved, through all the vicissitudes and\nrevolutions of learning, for more than seventeen hundred years last past\nto this day.\n\nThe diversity of the English language is represented with great accuracy\nby Mr. Samuel Johnson, the celebrated lexicographer, in the samples of\ndifferent ages, in his history of the English language, subjoined to\nthe preface of the dictionary, to which the curious are referred for the\nobservance of the various specimens.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. THE VARIETY OF ANNOTATIONS AND EXPOSITIONS...\n\nOF THE SCRIPTURES, TOGETHER WITH THE DIVERSITY OF SECTARIES EVINCES\nTHEIR FALLIBILITY.\n\nEvery commentary and annotation on the Bible, implicitly declares its\nfallibility; for if the Scriptures remained genuine and entire, they\nwould not stand in need of commentaries and expositions, but would shine\nin their infallible lustre and purity without them. What an idle phantom\nit is for mortals to assay to illustrate and explain to mankind, that\nwhich God may be supposed to have undertaken to do, by the immediate\ninspiration of his spirit? Do they understand how to define or explain\nit better than God may be supposed to have done? This is not supposable;\nupon what ground then do these multiplicity of comments arise, except it\nbe pre-supposed that the present translations of the Bible have, by some\nmeans or other, become fallible and imperfect, and therefore need to\nbe rectified and explained? and if so, it has lost the stamp of divine\nauthority; provided in its original composition it may be supposed to\nhave been possessed of it.\n\nTo construe or spiritualize tie Bible is the same as to inspire it over\nagain, by the judgment, fancy or enthusiasm of men; and thus the common\npeople, by receiving God's supposed revelation at secondary hands\n(whether at the thousandth or ten thousandth remove from its first\npremised inspiration they know not) cannot in fact be taught by the\nrevelation of God. Add to this the diverse and clashing expositions of\nthe Bible, among which are so many flagrant proofs of the fallibility\nand uncertainty of such teachings, as must convince even bigots, that\nevery one of these expositions are erroneous, _except their own!_\n\nIt has been owing to different comments on the Scriptures, that\nChristians have been divided into sectaries. Every commentator, who\ncould influence a party to embrace his comment, put himself, at the head\nof a division of Christians; as Luther, Calvin, and Arminius, laid the\nfoundation of the sectaries who bear their names; and the Socinians were\ncalled after the Scismatical Socinius; the same may be said of each of\nthe sectaries. Thus it is that different commentaries or acceptations of\nthe original meaning of the Scriptures, have divided the Christian world\ninto divisions and subdivisions of which it consists at present. Nor\nwas there ever a division or subdivision among Jews, Christians or\nMahometans, respecting their notions or opinions of religion, but what\nwas occasioned by commentating on the Scriptures, or else by latter\npretended inspired revelations from God in addition thereto. The law\nof Moses was the first pretended immediate revelation from God, which\nrespects the Bible, and after that in succession the several revelations\nof the prophets, and last of all (in the Christian system) the\nrevelations of Jesus Christ and apostles, who challenged a right of\nabolishing the priesthood of Moses; Christ claiming to be the antitype\nof which the institution of sacrifices and ceremonial part of the law of\nMoses was emblematical; but this infringement of the prerogative of the\nLevitical priests gave such offence, not only to them, but to the Jews\nas a nation, that they rejected Christianity, and have not subscribed to\nthe divine authority of it to this day, holding to the law of Moses and\nthe prophets. However Christianity made a great progress in the world,\nand has been very much divided into sectaries, by the causes previously\nassigned.\n\n\"Mahomet taking notice of the numerous sects and divisions among\nChristians, in his journies to Palestine, &c, thought it would not be\ndifficult to introduce a new religion, and make himself high priest\nand sovereign of the people.\" This he finally effected, prosecuting his\nscheme so far, that he new modelled the Scriptures, presenting them, (as\nhe said,) in their original purity, and called his disciples after\nhis own name. He gained great numbers of proselytes and became their\nsovereign in civil, military and spiritual matters, instituted the order\nof mystical priesthood, and gave the world a new Bible by the name of\nthe Alcoran; which he gives us to understand was communicated to him\nfrom God, by the intermediate agency of the angel Gabriel, chapter by\nchapter. \"His disciples at this day inhabit a great part of the richest\ncountries in the world, and are supposed to be more numerous than the\nChristians,\" and are as much, if not more, divided into sectaries, from\ncauses similar to those which produced the division of Christians,\nviz.: the different commentators on, and expositions of the Alcoran. The\nMufti, or priests, represented the doctrines and precepts of the Alcoran\nin a variety of lights different from each other, each of them claiming\nthe purity of the original and infallible truths prescribed to the world\nby Mahomet, their great reformer of Christianity. For though the several\nsectaries of Mahometans differ, respecting the meaning of their Alcoran,\nyet they all hold to the truth and divine authority thereof, the same\nas the Christian sectaries do concerning their Bible: so that all the\ndifferent opinions which ever did, or at present do subsist, between\nJews, Christians and Mahometans, may be resolved into one consideration,\nviz.: the want of a right understanding of the original of the\nScriptures. All sat out at first, as they imagined, from the truth\nof God's word, (except the impostors,) concluded that they had an\ninfallible guide, and have, by one means or other, been guided into\nas many opposite faiths as human Invention has been capa-ble of\nfabricating; each sect among the whole, exulting in their happy\nignorance, believing that they are favored with an infallible revelation\nfor their direction.\n\nIt alters not the present argument, whether the Scriptures were\noriginally true or not; for though they be supposed to have been either\ntrue or false, or a mixture of both, yet they could never have been\nhanded down entire and uncorrupted to the present time, through the\nvarious changes and perpetual refinements of learning and language; this\nis not merely a matter of speculative and argumentative demonstration,\nthe palpable certainty of it stands confessed in every Jewish, Christian\nand Mahometan sectary.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON III. ON THE COMPILING OP THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE SCRIPTURES...\n\nINTO ONE VOLUME, AND OF ITS SEVERAL TRANSLATIONS. THE INFALLIBILITY OF\nTHE POPES, AND OF THEIR CHARTERED RIGHTS TO REMIT OR RETAIN SINS, AND OF\nTHE IMPROPRIETY OF THEIR BEING TRUSTED WITH A REVELATION FROM GOD.\n\nThe manuscripts of Scripture, which are said to have been originally\nwritten on scrolls of bark, long before the invention of paper or\nprinting, and are said to compose our present Bible, were in a loose and\nconfused condition, scattered about in the world, deposited nobody knows\nhow or where, and at different times were compiled into one volume. The\nfour gospels are by the learned generally admitted to have been wrote\nmany years after Christ, particularly that of St. John: and sundry other\ngospels in the primitive ages of Christianity were received as divine\nby some of its then sectaries, which have unfortunately not met with\napprobation in subsequent eras of the despotism of the church.\n\nThe translation of the Scriptures by Ptolemy Phila-delphus, king of\nEgypt, was before Christ, and therefore could not include the writings\nof the New Testament in his translation, and \"whether by seventy-two\ninterpreters, and in the manner as is commonly related, is justly\nquestioned.\" But where, at what time, and by whom, the Scriptures of the\nOld and New Testament were first compiled into one volume, is what I do\nnot understand: but was it a longer or shorter period after Christ,\nit alters not the present argument materially, since the scattered\nmanuscripts were in a loose and confused condition for a long time; and\nthe grand query is, when the compilers of those manuscripts collected\nthem together in order to form them into one volume, how they could have\nunderstood the supposed divine writings, or symbolical figures, with the\nideas originally connected with them, and distinguish them from those\nwhich were merely human, and in comparison of the others are called\nprofane. To understand this distinction would require a new revelation,\nas much as may be supposed necessary for composing the original\nmanuscripts themselves; but it is not pretended that the compilers or\ntranslators of the Bible were inspired by the divine spirit in the doing\nand completing their respective business; so that human reason,\nfancy, or some latent design, must needs have been substituted, in\ndistinguishing the supposed divine and human writings apart, and in\ngiving a perfect transcript of the original manuscripts. Now admitting\nthat the compilers were really honest principled men, (which is more\nthan we are certain of,) it would follow, that they would be obliged to\ncull out of the mixed mass of premised divine and human writings, such\nas to them appeared to be divine, which would make them to be the sole\narbitrators of the divinity that they were compiling to be handed down\nto posterity as the infallible word of God, which is a great stretch\nof prerogative for mortal and fallible man to undertake, and as great a\nweakness in others to subscribe to it, as of divine authority.\n\nMr. Fenning, in his dictionary definition of the word Bible, subjoins\nthe following history of its translations:\n\n\"The translation of this sacred volume was begun very early in this\nkingdom,\" [England,] \"and some part of it was done by King Alfred.\nAdelmus translated the Psalms into Saxon in 709, other parts were done\nby Edfrid or Ecbert in 730, the whole by Bede in 731 Trevisa published\nthe whole in English in 1357. Tindal's was brought higher in 1534,\nrevised and altered in 1538, published with a preface of Cranmers in\n1549. In 1551, another translation was published, which was revised by\nseveral bishops, was printed with their alterations in 1560. In 1607,\na new translation was published by authority, which is that in present\nuse.\" From this account it appears, that from the first translation\nof the Bible by Trevisa, into English, in 1357, it has been revised\naltered, and passed through six different publications, the last of\nwhich is said to have been done by authority, which I conclude means\nthat of the king, whose prerogative in giving us a divine revelation,\ncan no more be esteemed valid than that of other men, though he may\nbe possessed of an arbitrary power within the limits of his realm to\nprevent any further correction and publication of it. As to the changes\nit underwent previous to Trevisa's translation, in which time it was\nmost exposed to corruptions of every kind, we, will not at present\nparticularly consider, but only observe that those translations could\nnot, every one of them, be perfect, since they were diverse from each\nother, in consequence of their respective revisions and corrections; nor\nis it possible that the Bible, in any of its various editions could be\nperfect, any more than all and every one of those persons who have acted\na part in transmitting them down to our time may be supposed to be so:\nfor perfection does not pertain to man, but is the essential prerogative\nof God.\n\nThe Roman Catholics, to avoid the evils of imperfection, fallibility and\nimposture of man, have set up the Pope to be infallible; this is their\nsecurity against being misguided in their faith, and by ascribing\nholiness to him, secure themselves from imposture; a deception which\nis incompatible with holiness. So that in matters of faith, they have\nnothing more to do, but to believe as their church believes. Their\nauthority for absolving or retaining sins is very extraordinary;\nhowever, their charter is from Christ, (admitting them to be his vicars,\nand the successors of St. Peter,) and the present English translation\nof the Bible warrants it. The commission is in these words: \"And I will\ngive unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whoever thou shalt\nbind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shall loose\non earth, shall be loosed in heaven. Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are\nremitted unto them, and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained.\"\nThat St. Peter or his successors should have a power of binding and\ndetermining the state and condition of mankind in the world to come by\nremitting or retaining sins, is too great a power to be intrusted to\nmen, as it interferes with the providence and prerogative of God, who\non this position would be exempted from judging the world, (as it would\ninterfere with the chartered prerogative of the Popes in their remitting\nor retaining of sins, admitting it to have been genuine,) precluding the\ndivine retribution of justice; we may, therefore, from the authority\nof reason, conclude it to be spurious. It was a long succession of ages\nthat all Christendom were dupes to the See of Rome, in which time it is\ntoo evident to be denied, that the holy fathers obtruded a great deal of\npious fraud on their devotees; all public worship was real to the people\nin unknown languages, as it is to this day in Roman Catholic countries.\nNor has the Bible, in those countries, to this time, been permitted\nto be published in any but the learned languages, which affords great\nopportunity to the Romish church to fix it to answer their lucrative\npurposes. Nor is it to be supposed that they want the inclination to do\nit. The before recited grant of the power of the absolution of sin, to\nSt Peter in particular, was undoubtedly of their contrivance.\n\nIn short, reason would prompt us to conclude, that had God, in very\ndeed, made a revelation of his mind and will to mankind, as a rule of\nduty and practice to them, and to be continued as such to the latest\nposterity, he would in the course of his providence have ordered matters\nso that it should have been deposited, translated, and kept, in the\nhands of men of a more unexceptionable character than those holy cheats\ncan pretend to.\n\nWitchcraft and priestcraft, were introduced into this world together, in\nits non-age; and has gone on, hand in hand together, until about half a\ncentury past, when witchcraft began to be discredited, and is at\npresent almost exploded, both in Europe and America. This discovery has\ndepreciated priestcraft, on the scale of at least fifty per cent,\nper annum, and rendered it highly probable that the improvement of\nsucceeding generations, in the knowledge of nature and science, will\nexalt the reason of mankind, above the tricks and impostures of priests,\nand bring them back to the religion of nature and truth; ennoble their\nminds, and be the means of cultivating concord, and mutual love in\nsociety, and of extending charity, and good will to all intelligent\nbeings throughout the universe; exalt the divine character, and lay a\npermanent foundation for truth and reliance on providence; establish our\nhopes and prospects of immortality, and be condusive to every desirable\nconsequence, in this world, and that which is to come; which will\ncrown the scene of human felicity in this sublunary state of being and\nprobation; 'which can never be completed while we are under the power\nand tyranny of priests, since as it ever has, it ever will be their\ninterest, to invalidate the law of nature and reason, in order to\nestablish systems incompatible therewith.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nSECTON I. MORALITY DERIVED FROM NATURAL FITNESS...\n\nAND NOT FROM TRADITION.\n\nSuch parts or passages of the Scriptures as inculcate morality, have\na tendency to subserve mankind, the same as all other public\ninvestigations or teachings of it, may be supposed to have; but are\nneither better or worse for having a place in the volume of those\nwritings denominated canonical; for morality does not derive its nature\nfrom books, but from the fitness of things; and though it may be more\nor less, interspersed through the pages of the Alcoran, its purity and\nrectitude would remain the same; for it is founded in eternal right; and\nwhatever writings, books or oral speculations, best illustrate or teach\nthis moral science, should have the preference. The knowledge of this as\nwell as all other sciences, is acquired from reason and experience,\nand (as it is progressively obtained) may with propriety be called, the\nrevelation of God, which he has revealed to us in the constitution of\nour rational natures; and as it is congenial with reason and truth,\ncannot (like other revelations) partake of imposture. This is natural\nreligion, and could be derived from none other but God. I have\nendeavored, in this treatise, to prune this religion from those\nexcrescences, with which craft on the one hand, and ignorance on\nthe other, have loaded it; and to hold it up to view in its native\nsimplicity, free from alloy; and have throughout the contents of\nthe volume, addressed the reason of mankind, and not their passions,\ntraditions or prejudices; for which cause, it is noways probable that it\nwill meet with any considerable approbation.\n\nMost of the human race, by one means or other are prepossessed with\nprinciples opposed to the religion of reason. In these parts of America,\nthey are most generally taught, that they are born into the world in\na state of enmity to God and moral good, and are under his wrath and\ncurse, that the way to heaven and future blessedness is out of their\npower to pursue, and that it is incumbered with mysteries which none\nbut the priests can unfold, that we must \"be born again,\" have a special\nkind of faith, and be regenerated; or in fine, that human nature, which\nthey call \"the old man,\" must be destroyed, perverted, or changed by\nthem, and by them new modelled, before it can be admitted into the\nheavenly kingdom. Such a plan of superstition, as far as it obtains\ncredit in the world, subjects mankind to sacerdotal empire; which is\nerected on the imbecility of human nature. Such of mankind, as break the\nfetters of their education, remove such other obstacles as are in their\nway, and have the confidence publicly to talk rational, exalt reason to\nits just supremacy, and vindicate truth and the ways of God's providence\nto men, are sure to be stamped with the epithet of irreligious, infidel,\nprofane, and the like. But it is often observed of such a man, that he\nis morally honest, and as often replied, what of that? Morality will\ncarry no man to heaven. So that all the satisfaction the honest man\ncan have while the superstitious are squibbling hell fire at him, is to\nretort back upon them that they are priest ridden.\n\nThe manner of the existence, and intercourse of human souls, after the\ndissolution of their bodies by death, being inconceiveable to us in\nthis life, and fill manner of intelligence between us and departed souls\nimpracticable, the priests have it in their power to amuse us with a\ngreat variety of visionary apprehensions of things in the world to come,\nwhich, while in this life, we cannot contradict from experience, the\ntest of great part of our certainty (especially to those of ordinary\nunderstandings) and having introduced mysteries into their religion,\nmake it as incomprehensible to us, (in this natural state) as the\nmanner of our future existence; and from Scripture authority, having\ninvalidated reason as being carnal and depraved, they proceed further\nto teach us from the same authority, that, \"the natural man knoweth not\nthe-things of the spirit, for they are foolishness unto him, neither\ncan he know them for they are spiritually discerned.\" A spiritualizing\nteacher is nearly as well acquainted with the kingdom of heaven, as a\nman can be with his home lot. He knows the road to heaven and eternal\nblessedness, to which happy regions, with the greatest assurance, he\npresumes to pilot his dear disciples and unfold to them the mysteries\nof the canonical writings, and of the world to come; they catch the\nenthusiasm and see with the same sort of spiritual eyes, with which they\ncan pierce religion through and through, and understand the spiritual\nmeaning of the Scriptures, which before had been \"a dead letter\" to\nthem, particularly the revelations of St. John the divine, and\nthe allusion of the horns therein mentioned. The most obscure and\nunintelligible passages of the Bible, come within the compass of their\nspiritual discerning as apparently as figures do to a mathmetician: then\nthey can sing songs out of the Canticles, saying, \"I am my beloved's and\nmy beloved is mine;\" and being at a loose from the government of reason,\nplease themselves with any fanaticisms they like best, as that of their\nbeing \"snatched as brands out of the burning, to enjoy the special and\neternal favor of God, not from any worthiness or merit in them, but\nmerely from the sovereign will and pleasure of God, while millions of\nmillions, as good by nature and practice as they, were left to\nwelter eternally, under the scalding drops of divine vengeance;\" not\nconsidering, that if it was consistent with the perfections of God to\nsave them, his salvation could not fail to have been uniformly extended\nto all others, whose circumstances may be supposed to be similar to, or\nmore deserving than theirs, for equal justice cannot fail to apply in\nall cases in which equal justice demands it. But these deluded people\nresolve the divine government altogether into sovereignty: \"even so\nFather, for so it seemed good in thy sight.\" And as they exclude reason\nand justice from their imaginary notions of religion, they also exclude\nit from the providence or moral government of God. Nothing is more\ncommon, in the part of the country where I was educated, than to\nhear those infatuated people, in their public and private addresses,\nacknowledge to their creator, from the desk and elsewhere, \"hadst thou,\nO Lord, laid judgment to the line and righteousness to the plummet, we\nhad been in the grave with the dead and in hell with the damned, long\nbefore this time.\" Such expressions from the creature to the creator\nare profane, and utterly incompatible with the divine character.\nUndoubtedly, (all things complexly considered) the providence of God to\nman is just, inasmuch as it has the divine approbation.\n\nThe superstitious thus set up a spiritual discerning, independent of,\nand in opposition to reason, and their mere imaginations pass with each\nother, and with themselves, for infallible truth. Hence it is, that they\ndespise the progressive and wearisome reasonings of philosophers (which\nmust be admitted to be a painful method of arriving at truth) but as\nit is the only way in which we can acquire it, I have pursued the old\nnatural road of ratiocination, concluding, that as this spiritual\ndiscerning is altogether inadequate to the management of any of the\nconcerns of life, or of contributing any assistance or knowledge towards\nthe perfecting of the arts and sciences, it is equally unintelligible\nand insignificant in matters of religion: and therefore conclude, that\nif the human race in general, could be prevailed upon to exercise common\nsense in religious concerns, those spiritual fictions would cease, and\nbe succeeded by reason and truth.\n\n\n\n\nSECTON II. OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXERCISE OF REASON...\n\nAND PRACTICE OF MORALITY, IN ORDER TO THE HAPPINESS OF MANKIND.\n\nThe period of life is very uncertain, and at the longest is but short; a\nfew years bring us from infancy to manhood, a few more to a dissolution;\npain, sickness and death are the necessary consequences of animal life.\nThrough life we struggle with physical evils, which eventually are\ncertain to destroy our earthly composition; and well would it be for\nus did evils end here; but alas! moral evil has been more or less\npredominant in our agency, and though natural evil is unavoidable,\nyet moral evil may be prevented or remedied by the exercise of virtue.\nMorality is therefore of more importance to us than any or all other\nattainments; as it is a habit of mind, which, from a retrospective\nconsciousness of our agency in this life, we should carry with us into\nour succeeding state of existence, as an acquired appendage of our\nrational nature, and as the necessary means of our mental happiness.\nVirtue and vice are the only things in this world, which, with our\nsouls, are capable of surviving death; the former is the rational and\nonly procuring cause of all intellectual happiness, and the latter of\nconscious guilt and misery; and therefore, our indispensable duty and\nultimate interest is, to love, cultivate and improve the one, as the\nmeans of our greatest good, and to hate and abstain from the other, as\nproductive of our greatest evil. And in order thereto, we should so far\ndivest ourselves of the incumbrances of this world, (which are too\napt to engross our attention) as to inquire a consistent system of the\nknowledge of religious duty, and make it our constant endeavor in life\nto act conformably to it. The knowledge of the being, perfections,\ncreation and providence of God, and of the immortality of our souls, is\nthe foundation of religion; which has been particularly illustrated in\nthe four first chapters of this discourse. And as the Pagan, Jewish,\nChristian and Mahometan countries of the world have been overwhelmed\nwith a multiplicity of revelations diverse from each other, and which,\nby their respective promulgators, are said to have been immediately\ninspired into their souls by the spirit of God, or immediately\ncommunicated to them by the intervening agency of angels (as in the\ninstance of the invisible Gabriel to Mahomet) and as those revelations\nhave been received and credited, by afar the greater part of the\ninhabitants of the several countries of the world (on whom they have\nbeen obtruded) as super-naturally revealed by God or angels, and which,\nin doctrine and discipline, are in most respects repugnant to each\nother, it fully evinces their imposture, and authorizes us, without a\nlengthy course of arguing, to determine with certainty, that not one of\nthem had their original from God; as they clash with each other, which\nis ground of high probability against the authenticity of each of them.\n\nA revelation, that may be supposed to be really of the institution of\nGod, must also be supposed to be perfectly consistent or uniform, and\nto be able to stand the test of truth; therefore such pretended\nrevelations, as are tendered to us as the contrivance of heaven, which\ndo not tear that test, we may be morally certain, was either originally\na deception, or has since, by adulteration become spurious.\n\nReason therefore must be the standard by which we determine the\nrespective claims of revelation; for otherwise we may as well subscribe\nto the divinity of the one as of the other, or to the whole of them, or\nto none at all. So likewise on this thesis, if reason rejects the whole\nof those revelations, we ought to return to the religion of nature and\nreason.\n\nUndoubtedly it is our duty, and for our best good, that we occupy and\nimprove the faculties, with which our creator has endowed us, but so far\nas prejudice, or prepossession of opinion prevails over our minds, in\nthe same proportion, reason is excluded from our theory or practice.\nTherefore if we would acquire useful knowledge, we must first divest\nourselves of those impediments; and sincerely endeavor to search out\nthe truth: and draw our conclusions from reason and just argument, which\nwill never conform to our inclination, interest or fancy; but we must\nconform to that if we would judge rightly. As certain as we determine\ncontrary to reason, we make a wrong conclusion; therefore, our wisdom\nis, to conform to the nature and reason of things, as well in religious\nmatters, as in other sciences. Preposterously absurd would it be, to\nnegative the exercise of reason in religious concerns, and yet, be\nactuated by it in all other and less occurrences of life. All our\nknowledge of things is derived from God, in and by the order of nature,\nout of which we cannot perceive, reflect or understand any thing\nwhatsoever; our external senses are natural; and those objects are also\nnatural; so that ourselves, and all things about us, and our knowledge\ncollected therefrom, is natural, and not supernatural; as argued in the\nfifth chapter.\n\nAn unjust composition never fails to contain error and falsehood.\nTherefore an unjust connection of ideas is not derived from nature, but\nfrom the imperfect composition of man. Misconnection of ideas is the\nsame as misjudging, and has no positive existence, being merely a\ncreature of the imagination; but nature and truth are real and uniform;\nand the rational mind by reasoning, discerns the uniformity, and is\nthereby enabled to make a just composition of ideas, which will stand\nthe test of truth. But the fantastical illuminations of the credulous\nand superstitious part of mankind, proceed from weakness, and as far as\nthey take place in the world subvert the religion of reason, nature and\ntruth.\n\nEthan Allen.","title":"Reason, the Only Oracle of Man; Or, A Compendius System of Natural Religion","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":48042}