{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_37864/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_37864","id":"gutenberg_37864","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37864","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Hamilton, William, Sir, 1788-1856","Mansel, Henry Longueville, 1820-1871","Spencer, Herbert, 1820-1903","Theism"],"text":"Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe,\nMatthew Wheaton and the Online Distributed Proofreading\nTeam at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from\nimages generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia\nCenter, Michigan State University Libraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n    KNOW THE TRUTH;\n\n    A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY OF LIMITATION,\n\n    INCLUDING\n\n    SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND\n    MR. HERBERT SPENCER\n\n    BY JESSE H. JONES\n\n\n    \"Give me to see, that I may know where to strike.\"\n\n\n    NEW YORK:\n    PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON.\n    BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES\n    1865.\n\n\n    Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by JESSE\n    H. JONES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the\n    Southern District of New York.\n\n    RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:\n    STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY\n    H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.\n\n\n    Dedication.\n\n    TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL\n    SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED HIS TEACHINGS,\n\n    This Little Treatise\n\n    IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY\n\n    _THE AUTHOR_.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThis book has been written simply in the interest of Truth. It was\nbecause the doctrines of the Hamiltonian School were believed to be\ndangerous errors, which this process of thought exposes, that it was\nundertaken.\n\nLogically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two systems of\nphilosophical theology in the world. The one will be Pantheism, or\nAtheism,--both of which contain the same essential principle, but viewed\nfrom different standpoints,--the other will be a pure Theism. In the\nschools of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth is\nto be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be held\nresponsible for all which can be logically deduced from his system; and\nevery erroneous result which can be so deduced is decisive of the\npresence of an error in principle in the foundation; and all schemes of\nphilosophy, by such a trial, are seen to be based on one of these two\nclasses of schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's\n\"Rational Psychology\" will be in point:\n\n\"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality wholly out of and\nbeyond all the conditions and modes of space and time, we can by no\npossibility leave nature for the supernatural. The clear-sighted and\nhonest intellect, resting in this conclusion that the conditions of\nspace and time cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the\ndeluded intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive\nunderstanding in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an\nall-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have found a\ndeity within the modes of space and time, will be Pantheistic. The\nPantheism will be ideal and transcendent, when it reaches its\nconclusions by a logical process in the abstract law of thought; and it\nwill be material and empiric, when it concludes from the fixed\nconnections of cause and effect in the generalized law of nature; but in\nneither case is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity,\ncircumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, is but\nnature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized reality,\nis no God.\"\n\nThe Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving that the Deity\ncannot be found in Nature, it denies that he can be known at all. What\nthe mind cannot know at all, _it is irrational to believe_. If man\ncannot _know that_ God is, and have a clear sight of his attributes as a\nrational ground of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind\ncredulity to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such\nknowledge, he has _no standard_ by which to measure teachings, and be\n_sure_ he has the truth. Under such circumstances, faith is\n_impossible_. Faith can only be based on _Reason_. If there is no\nReason, there can be no faith. Hence he who talks about faith, and\ndenies Reason, does not know what faith is. The logician rightfully held\nthat God could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in\nasserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, as he was\nright in the former instance. The acceptance of his one truth, and one\nerror, compels man to be an Atheist; because then he has no faculty by\nwhich to know aught of God; and few thorough men will accept blind\ncredulity as the basis of Religion.\n\nThe author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot be too\nstrongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that this little\ntreatise could never have been written. Indeed, the author looks for but\nscanty credit on the score of originality, since most of what he has\nwritten he has learned, directly or indirectly, from that profound\nthinker. He has deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles\ndeveloped by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall be\njudged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have been satisfied.\n\nAfter the substance of this treatise had been thought out, and while the\nauthor was committing it to paper, the essays on \"Space and Time,\" and\non \"The Philosophy of the Unconditioned,\" in the numbers of the \"North\nAmerican Review\" for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his\nnotice. Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with which\nhe read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure student, almost\nwholly isolated in the world, to find the views which he had wrought out\nin his secluded chamber, so ably advocated in the leading review of his\ncountry. Not that he had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand\nas thoroughly as has been there done. By no means. Rather what results\nhe had attained accord with some of those therein laid down. Of those\nessays it is not too much to say, that, if they have not exhausted the\ntopics of which they treat, they have settled forever the conclusions to\nbe reached, and leave for other writers only illustration and comment.\nIf the author shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,--that\nof quantitative infinity,--the difference will, it is believed, be found\nto be one of the form of expression only. And the difference is\nmaintained from the conviction that no term in science should have more\nthan one signification. It is better to adopt illimitable and\nindivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, in place of the\ncommonly used terms infinite and absolute.\n\nA metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched upon in the\nfollowing discussion, which deserves a more extensive consideration than\nthe scope and plan of this work would permit to it here; and which, so\nfar as the author's limited reading goes, has received very little\nattention from modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the\ndistinction between the animal nature and spiritual person, so\nrepeatedly enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the\napostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle John, in\nthe terms \"flesh\" and \"spirit.\" The thinkers of the world, even the best\nChristian philosophers, seem to have esteemed this a moral and religious\ndistinction, and no more, when in fact it cleaves down through the whole\nhuman being, and forms the first great radical division in any proper\nanalysis of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements.\n_This is a purely natural division._ It is organic in man. It belonged\nas much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the most degraded wretch on\nthe globe now. It is of such a character that, had it been properly\nunderstood and developed, the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could\nnever have been constructed.\n\nAn adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as follows. First,\nthe animal nature should be carefully analyzed, its province accurately\ndefined, and both the laws and forms of its activity exactly stated.\nSecond, a like examination of the spiritual person should follow; and\nthird, the relations, interactions, and influences of the two parts upon\neach other should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is\nto be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, of\nthese two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, it is\ndoubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can read all their relations and\ninter-communications. The development of the third point, by any one\nmind, must needs, therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the\nabove designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend upon\ncircumstances beyond control of the writer.\n\nAs will appear, it is believed, in the development of the subject, the\ngreat, the _vital_ point upon which the whole controversy with the\nHamiltonian school must turn, is a question of _fact_; viz., whether man\nhas a Reason, as the faculty giving _a priori_ principles, or not. If he\nhas such a Reason, then by it the questions now at issue can be settled,\nand that finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge,\nexcept of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense and judged\nby the Understanding. Until, then, the question of fact is decided, it\nwould be a gain if public attention was confined wholly to it. Establish\nfirst a well ascertained and sure foundation before erecting a\nsuperstructure.\n\nThe method adopted in constructing this treatise does not admit the\npresentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. On the contrary, it\ninvolves some, perhaps many, repetitions. What has been said at one\npoint respecting one author must be said again in reply to another. Yet\nthe main object for which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be\nthoroughly accomplished in no other way.\n\nThe author has in each case used American editions of the works named.\n\n\n\n\nKNOW THE TRUTH.\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nTHE SEEKING AND THE FINDING.\n\n\nIn April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an English print,\na volume entitled \"The Limits of Religious Thought Examined,\" &c., \"by\nHenry Longueville Mansel, B. D.\"\n\nThe high position occupied by the publishers,--a firm of Christian\ngentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication of books either\ndevoutly religious, or, at least, having a high moral tone, and being\nmarked by deep, earnest thought, have obtained the confidence of the\nreligious community; the recommendations with which its advent was\nheralded, but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme\nannounced, and its consonance with many of the currents of mental\nactivity in our midst,--gave the book an immediate and extensive\ncirculation. Its subject lay at the foundation of all religious, and\nespecially of all theological thinking. The author, basing his teaching\non certain metaphysical tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the\nboundary to all positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in\nits upward surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to say,\n\"Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here must thy proud waves\nbe stayed.\" And this effort was declaredly made in the interest of\nreligion. It was asserted that from such a ground only, as was therein\nsought to be established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and\ndestroyed. Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine in the\nAnglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume was composed of\nlectures delivered upon what is known as \"The Bampton Foundation;\"--a\nbequest of a clergyman, the income of which, under certain rules, he\ndirected should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ,\nby Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on such a theme, by\nsuch a man, and composed under such auspices, would necessarily receive\nthe almost universal attention of religious thinkers, and would mark an\nera in human thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England,\nthe birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her most careful\nand studious examination. And the West alike with the East pored over\nits pages, and wrought upon its knotty questions. Clergymen especially,\nand theological students, perused it with the earnestness of those who\nsearch for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not hesitate to\nsay that it was unqualified rejection. The book now takes its place\namong religious productions, not as a contribution to our positive\nknowledge, not as a practicable new road, surveyed out through the\nUnknown Regions of Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative\nvalue, as a monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside\nwhere the writer branched off in his explorations, and on which is\ninscribed, \"In this direction the truth cannot be found.\"\n\nThe stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently to\npublic attention a writer heretofore not extensively read in this\ncountry, Sir William Hamilton, upon whose metaphysical teachings the\nlecturer avowedly based his whole scheme. The doctrines of the\nmetaphysician were subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which\ndissolved the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were\npronounced \"wanting.\" This decision was not reached or expressed in any\nextensive and exhaustive criticism of these writers; in which the errors\nof their principles and the revolting nature of the results they\nattained, were presented; but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous\nand deep-seated conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and\npupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's highest\nnature. It was rejected because it _could_ not be received.\n\nSomething more than a year ago, and while the American theological mind,\nresting in the above-stated conviction, was absorbed in the tremendous\ninterests connected with the Great Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors\nappeared upon the stage. A book was published entitled \"The Philosophy\nof Herbert Spencer: First Principles.\" This was announced as the\nfoundation of a new system of Philosophy, which would command the\nconfidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all succeeding ages.\nAvowing the same general principles with Mansel and Hamilton, this\nwriter professed to have found a radical defect in their system, which\nbeing corrected, rendered that system complete and final; so that, from\nit as a base, he sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal\nScience. This man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his\npredecessors; because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity\ndemonstrated, he does not care, unless from professional motives, to\nexamine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the folly; but still\nso widely read, as to be generally associated with the other writers\nabove mentioned, and, like them, rejected. Upon being examined, he is\nfound to be a man of less scope and mental muscle than either of his\nteachers; yet going over the same ground and expressing the same ideas,\nscarcely in new language even; and it further appears that his discovery\nis made at the expense of his logic and consistency, and involves an\nunpardonable contradiction. Previous to the publication of the books\njust mentioned, an American writer had submitted to the world a system\nof thought upon the questions of which they treat, which certainly\nseems worthy of some notice from their authors. Yet it has received\nnone. To introduce him we must retrace our steps for a little.\n\nIn 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn Theological\nSeminary, published a work entitled \"Rational Psychology,\" in which he\nprofessed to establish, by _a priori_ processes, positions which, if\ntrue, afford a ground for the answer, at once and forever, of all the\ndifficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being\ncomparatively a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the\nattention it should have done. It was too much like Analytical Geometry\nand Calculus for the popular mind, or even for any but a few patient\nthinkers. For them it was marrow and fatness.\n\nSince the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we will hereafter term\nLimitists, have neglected to take the great truths enunciated by the\nAmerican metaphysician, and apply them to their own system, and so be\nconvinced by their own study of the worthlessness of that system, it\nbecomes their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work\nin their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to unravel each\nof their well-knit sophistries, to show to the world that it may \"_know\nthe truth_;\" and thus to destroy a system which, if allowed undisputed\nsway, would sap the very foundations of Christian faith.\n\nThe philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a single\nfundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions with it. He\nwho would strike these effectually, must aim his blow, and give it with\nall his might, straight at that one object; sure that if he destroys\nthat, the destruction of the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as\nthe Limitists are determined not to confess the dissolution of their\nscheme, by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot\nprove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of their own\ntenets, it is further necessary to go through their writings, and\nexamine them passage by passage, and show the fallacy of each. In the\nformer direction we can but re-utter some of the principles of the great\nAmerican teacher. In the latter there is room for new effort; and this\nshall be our especial province.\n\nThe proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists is founded,\nwas originally enunciated by Sir William Hamilton, in the following\nterms. \"The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion\nbeing only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be\npositively known or conceived.\" \"In our opinion, the mind can conceive,\nand consequently can know, only the _limited and the conditionally\nlimited_. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the\nunconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed\nto the mind; they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or\nabstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is\nrealized; consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only\nnegative--negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one\nhand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a\nwhole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a\nstill greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small,\nthat we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into\nsmaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or\nrealize, or construe to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination\ncoincide,) an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the\ninfinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself\nrequire an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same\nreason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of\nparts.... As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the\nconditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge, and of\npositive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. _To think_ is\n_to condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the\npossibility of thought.\" ... \"The conditioned is the mean between two\nextremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of\nwhich _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principles of\ncontradiction and excluded middle, one _must be admitted as necessary_.\"\n\nThis theory may be epitomized as follows:--\"The Unconditioned denotes\nthe genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species.\" This\ngenus is inconceivable, is \"negative of the conceivable itself.\" Hence\nboth the species must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable,\nthey may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as \"that which is beyond all\nlimits;\" the other, the Absolute, as \"a whole beyond all conditions:\"\nor, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, the other,\nunconditional totality. As defined, these are seen to be \"mutually\nrepugnant:\" that is, if there is illimitable immensity, there cannot be\nabsolute totality; and the reverse. Within these two all possible being\nis included; and, because either excludes the other, it can be in only\none. Since both are inconceivable we can never know in which the\nconditioned or conceivable being is. Either would give us a\nbeing--God--capable of accounting for the Universe. This fact is assumed\nto be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may therefore rationally\nsatisfy himself with the study of those matters which are\ncognizable--the conditioned.\n\nIt is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism of the\nphilosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, in the natural\ncourse, upon a subsequent page. We have stated it here, for the purpose\nof placing in that strong light which it deserves, another topic, which\nhas received altogether too little attention from the opponents of the\nLimitists. Underlying and involved in the above theory, there is a\nquestion of _fact_, of the utmost importance. Sir William Hamilton's\nmetaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if his psychology is true, his\nsystem is impregnable. It is his diagnosis of the human mind, then,\nwhich demands our attention. He has presented this in the following\npassage:--\n\n\"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time and Space into\nconditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the\n'Categories of Understanding' and the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as\nthe work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of\nunderstanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not,\ntherefore, generalize the _Conditioned--Existence Conditioned_, as the\nsupreme category, or categories, of thought?--and if it were necessary\nto analyze this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop\nthese immediately out of the generic principle, instead of\npreposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws\nof the understanding from a questionable division of logical\nproposition? Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding\n(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or\nrather tends toward, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently\napparent, that the unconditioned is conceived as the negation of the\nconditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one? In\nthe Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function, both\nseek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff)\nsublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which\nhas 'overleaped itself.'\"\n\nNot stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement that \"both\nfaculties,\" _i. e._, Understanding and Reason, \"perform the same\nfunction,\" we are to notice the two leading points which are made,\nviz.:--1. That there is no distinction between the Understanding and the\nReason; or, in other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is\nclaimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, 2. A\ngeneralization is the highest form of human knowledge; both of which may\nbe comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding is the highest\nfaculty of knowledge belonging to the human soul. Upon this, a class of\nthinkers, following Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and\nassert that the distinction between the two faculties named above, has a\nsubstantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in _kind_, and that\nthe mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike the mode of activity\nin the other. Thus, then, is the great issue between the Hamiltonian and\nPlatonic schools made upon a question of _fact_. He who would attack the\nformer school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their\nfundamental assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of the Pure\nReason as an unquestionable faculty in the human soul, will, in such\nestablishment, accomplish the destruction of the Hamiltonian system of\nphilosophy. Believing this system to be thoroughly vicious in its\ntendencies; being such indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the\nwhole Christian religion; and what is of equal importance, being false\nto the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will attempt to\nachieve the just named and so desirable result; and by the mode\nheretofore indicated.\n\nIt is required, then, to _prove_ that there is a faculty belonging to\nthe human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or the Understanding;\na faculty peculiar and unique, which possesses such qualities as have\ncommonly been ascribed by its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby\nto establish such faculty as a fact, and under that name.\n\nPrevious to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to make an\nexact statement of what is to be proved. To this end, let the following\npoints be noted:--\n\n_a._ Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those of the\nSense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. According to the\nlaws of its construction, it receives impressions from objects, either\nmaterial, and so in a different place from that which it occupies, or\nimaginary, and so proceeding from the imaging faculty in itself. But it\nis only capacity to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding,\nthough more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within the limits\nof the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up the presentations of\nthe Sense, analyzes and classifies them, and deduces conclusions: but it\ncan attain to nothing more than was already in the objects presented. It\ncan construct a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a\nrelation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, but of\nanother and higher kind from that of the Sense. Sense can have no object\nexcept such, at least, as is constructed out of impressions received\nfrom without. What we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can\nhave no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover,\nbut not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty and capacity in\none, which, possessing inherent within itself, as objects, the _a\npriori_ conditional laws of the Universe, and the _a priori_ conditional\nideal forms which these laws, standing together according to their\nnecessary relations, compose, transcends, in its activity and\nacquisitions, all limitations of a _Nature_; and attends to objects\nwhich belong to the Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness\nqualifies. We observe, therefore,\n\n_b._ The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse in kind\nfrom those of the Sense and the Understanding. All the objects of the\nSense must come primarily or secondarily, from a material Universe; and\nthe discussions and conclusions of the Understanding must refer to such\na Universe. The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, _laws_,\nor, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons why\nconduct must be one way, and not another; which, in their combinations,\ncompose the forms conditional for all activity; and which, therefore,\nconstitute within us an _a priori_ standard by which to determine the\nvalidity of all judgments. To illustrate. Linnaeus constructed a system\nof botanical classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in\na flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding.\nLater students have, however, discovered that certain _organic laws_\nextend as a framework through the whole vegetable kingdom; which, once\nseen, throw back the Linnaean system into company with the Ptolemaic\nAstronomy; and upon which laws a _science_ of Botany becomes possible.\nThat faculty which intuits these laws, is called the Pure Reason.\n\nTo recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects of activity,\ndiverse from the Sense and Understanding. It is at once capacity and\nfaculty, having as object first principles, possessing these as an\n_inherent heritage_, and able to compare with them as standard all\nobjects of the Sense and judgments of the Understanding; and to decide\nthereby their validity. These principles, and combinations of\nprinciples, are known as _Ideas_, and, being innate, are denominated\n_innate Ideas_. It is their reality which Sir William Hamilton denies,\ndeclaring them to be only higher generalizations of the Understanding,\nand it is the faculty called the Pure Reason, in which they are supposed\nto inhere, whose actuality is now to be proved.\n\nThe effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown that the\nlogician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially defective;\nwhat are the phenomena which cannot be comprehended in his scheme; and,\nfinally, that they can be accounted for on no other ground than that\nstated.\n\n1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and essentially\ndefective. They start with the assumption that a generalization is the\nhighest form of human knowledge. To appreciate this fully, let us\nexamine the process they thus exalt. A generalization is a process of\nthought through which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a\nconclusion, embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all the facts\nof the class. For instance. The inhabitants of the north temperate zone\nhave long observed it to be a fact, that north winds are cold; and so\nhave arrived at the general conclusion that such winds will lower the\ntemperature. A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in\nthe south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their judgment has\nto be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation shows that, at\none period in geologic history, north winds, even in northern climes,\nwere warm, and that tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and\nthe judgment is again modified. Now observe this most important fact\nhere brought out. _Every judgment may be modified by a larger\nexperience._ Apply this to another class of facts. An apple is seen to\nfall when detached from the parent stem. An arrow, projected into the\nair, returns again. An invisible force keeps the moon in its orbit.\nOther like phenomena are observed; and, after patient investigation, it\nis found to be a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our\nplanet belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the\ndistance, and which thus binds it together. But if a generalization is\nthe highest form of knowledge, we can never be sure we are right, for a\nsubsequent experience may teach us the reverse. We know we have not _all\nthe facts_. We may again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was\nonce here, warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere so\ndistant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest ray, even,\nof its shining, and testify to us that there, the force we called\ngravitation, was inversely as the _cube_ of the distance, we could only\naccept the testimony, and modify our judgment accordingly. Conclusions\nof to-day may be errors to-morrow; and we can never know we are right.\nThe Limitists permit us only interminable examinations of interminable\nchanges in phenomena; which afford no higher result than a new basis for\nnew studies.\n\nFrom this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns to itself,\ncrying its wailing cry, \"Is this true? Is this all?\" when suddenly, as\nif frenzied by the presence of a god, it shouts exultingly \"The truth!\nthe truth! I see the eternal truth.\"\n\nThe assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their diagnosis is\nboth defective and false. It is defective, in that they have failed to\nperceive those qualities of _universality_ and _necessity_, which most\nmen instinctively accord to certain perceptions of the mind; and false,\nin that they deny the reality of those qualities, and of the certain\nperceptions as modified by them, and the actuality of that mental\nfaculty which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a\npart of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the mind both\ngeneralizes and intuits.\n\nIt is the _essential_ tenet of their whole scheme, that the human mind\nnowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an affirmation which it\nunreservedly qualifies as necessary and universal. Their doctrine is,\nthat these affirmations _seem_ to be such, but that a searching\nexamination shows this seeming to be only a bank of fog. For instance.\nThe mind seems to affirm that two and two _must_ make four. \"Not so,\"\nsays the Limitist. \"As a fact, we see that two and two do make four, but\nit may make five, or any other sum. For don't you see? if two and two\nmust make four, then the Infinite must see it so; and if he must see it\nso, he is thereby conditioned; and what is worse, we know just as much\nabout it as he does.\" In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be\nsaid,--there is no seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly\nmendacious, it affirms, positively and unreservedly, \"Two and two are\nfour, _must_ be four; and to see it so, _is conditional for_ ALL\n_intellect_.\" Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often\nunconsciously, always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, In\nsociety the rights of the individual can never trench upon the rights of\nthe body politic,--is a necessary, and universally applicable principle;\nwhich, however much it may be violated, can never be changed. The whole\nfabric of society is based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it\ncould not construct a practical system of society upon what would be\nleft,--its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, \"All this\nseems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, that it can never be\nsure. You must modify (correct?) this seeming, by the consideration\nthat, if it is so, then the Infinite must know it so, and the finite and\nInfinite must know it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and\nconditioned thereby, which would be impious.\" Again, the intellect\nunreservedly asserts, \"There is no seeming in the matter. The utterance\nis true, absolutely and universally true, and every intellect _must_ see\nit so.\"\n\nIllustrations like the above might be drawn from every science of which\nthe human mind is cognizant. But more are not needed. Enough has been\nadduced to establish the _fact_ of those qualities, universality and\nnecessity, as inherent in certain mental affirmations. Having thus\npointed out the essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is\nrequired to state:\n\n2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended therein.\n\nIn general, it may be said that all those perceptions and assertions of\nthe mind, which are instinctive, and which it involuntarily qualifies as\nuniversal and necessary, are not, and cannot be comprehended in Sir\nWilliam Hamilton's scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the\n_a priori_ laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of the present\nundertaking, and would be unnecessary to its success. This will be\nsecured by presenting a classification of them, and sufficient examples\nunder each class. Moreover, to avoid a labor which would not be in place\nhere, we shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without\nquestion, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of our purest\nand every way best thinkers,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of\nWilliams College, Mass.\n\n\"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be divided into,\nfirst, mathematical ideas and axioms. These are at the foundation of the\nabstract sciences, having for their subject, quantity. In the second\ndivision are those which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon\nthese rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations.\nThe third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. These are at\nthe foundation of aesthetical science. In the fourth division are those\nwhich pertain to morals and religion. Of these the pervading element is\nthe sense of obligation or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in\nconnection with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, and\nwith the performance of actions supposed to bear upon that.\"--_Moral\nScience_, p. 161.\n\nFirst.--Mathematical ideas and axioms.\n\nTake, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, except a\nLimitist, be induced to believe that it was originally _constructed_;\nthat a will put it together, and might take it apart? Seven times seven\nnow make forty-nine. Will any one say that it might have been made to\nmake forty-seven; or that at some future time such may be the case? Or\nagain, take the axiom \"Things which are equal to the same thing are\nequal to one another.\" Will some one say, that the intellectual beings\nin the universe might, with equal propriety, have been so constructed as\nto affirm that, in some instances, things which are equal to the same\nthing are _unequal_ to one another? Or consider the properties of a\ntriangle. Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties\nare a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle might\nhave been made to have three right angles? Yet again. Examine the\nsyllogism. Was its law constructed?\n\n    All M is X;\n    All Z is M;\n    All Z is X.\n\nWill any one say that _perhaps_, we don't know but it might have been so\nmade, as to appear to us that the conclusion was Some Z is not X? Or\nwill the Limitists run into that miserable petty subterfuge of an\nassertion, \"All this _seems_ to us as it is, and we cannot see how it\ncould be different; but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined\nin such narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to\nassert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of wider\nscope? Perhaps they see things differently.\" _Perhaps_ they do; but if\nthey do, their minds or ours falsify! The question is one of _veracity_,\nnothing more. Throughout all the range of mathematics, the positive and\n_unqualified_ affirmation of the mind is that its intuitions are\nabsolute and universal; that they are _a priori_ laws conditional of\n_all_ intellect; that of the Deity just as much as that of man.\nFeebleness and want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its\naffirmation, \"Seven times seven _must_ make forty-nine; _and cannot by\nany possibility of effort make any other product_;\" and every intellect,\n_if it sees at all, must see it so_. And so on through the catalogue.\nFrom this, it follows in this instance, that human knowledge is\n_exhaustive_, and so is exactly similar, and equal to the Deity's\nknowledge.\n\nSecond. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere being and its\nrelations.\n\nTake, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist in the\nUniverse without standing in some relation to all the other material\nbodies in that Universe. Either this is absolutely true, or it is not.\nIf it is so true, then every intellectual being to whom it presents\nitself as object at all, must see it as every other does. One may see\nmore relations than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must\nbe seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the converse,\nor any partially contradictory proposition, may be true. For example. A\nmaterial body may exist in the Universe, and stand in no relation to\nsome of the other material bodies in that Universe. But, few men will\nhesitate to say, that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it\ncould only become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of\nthought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind.\n\nTake another instance, arising from the fact of parentage and offspring,\nin the sentient beings of the world. A pair, no matter to what class\nthey belong, by the fact of becoming parents, establish a new relation\nfor themselves; and, \"after their kind,\" they are under bonds to their\nyoung. And, to a greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon\nthem. As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is greater,\nand the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether it be the fierce eagle,\nor the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; whether it be the prowling\nlion, or the distrustful deer, or the cowering hare; or whether it be\nthe races of man who are examined, the relations established by\nparentage are everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this\nmight be changed for aught we know; that, what we call law, is only a\njudgment of mankind; and so that this relation did not exist at first,\nbut was the product of growth? And will one further say that there is no\nnecessity or universality in this relation; but that the races might,\nfor aught we know, have just as well been established with a parentage\nwhich involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference of the\nostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the law of sentient\nbeing? Yet such results logically flow from the principles of the\nLimitists. Precisely the same line of argument might be pursued\nrespecting the laws of human society. But it is not needed here. It is\nevident now, that what gives validity to judgments _is the fact that\nthey accord with an a priori principle in the mind_.\n\nThird. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. A science of\nbeauty has not yet been sufficiently developed to permit of so extensive\nan illustration of this class as the others. Yet enough is established\nfor our purpose. Let us consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is\nsaid that certain Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian\nera, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, and\nconstructed a statue according to it; and that both were pronounced at\nthe time _perfect_. Both statue and formula are now lost. Be the story\ntrue, or a legend, there is valid ground for the assertion, that the\nmind instinctively assumes, in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a\nperfect ideal by which as standard, all art must be judged. The very\nfact that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its own\nideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some mind, there is an\nideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect arm, and a perfect foot a\nperfect leg, and these a perfect trunk; and a perfect neck supports a\nperfect head, adorned by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect\nideal, is _decisive_ that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is\ntrue, because God who made us, and constructed the ground from whence\nthis instinctive affirmation springs, is true.\n\nTake another instance. Few men, who have studied Gothic spires, have\nfailed to observe that the height of some, in proportion to their base,\nis too great, and that of others, too small. The mind irresistibly\naffirms, that between these opposite imperfections, there is a golden\nmean, at which the proportion shall be _perfect_. When the formula of\nthis proportion shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled with\ntools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered and\npromulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical skill will be all that\ncan differentiate one workman from another. The fact that the law has\nnot been discovered yet, throws no discredit upon the positive\naffirmation of the mind, that there must be such a law; any more than\nthe fact of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he saw\nthe apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon seeing\nthat phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with which it fell.\n\nNow how comes the mind instinctively and positively to make these\nassertions. If they were judgments, the mind would only speak of\nprobabilities; but here, it qualifies the assertion with necessity. Men,\nhowever positive in their temperament, do not say, \"I know it will rain\nto-morrow,\" but only, \"In all probability it will.\" Not so here. Here\nthe mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance is the\nextreme of positiveness. It says _must_. And if its affirmation is not\ntrue, then there is no _reason_ why those works of art which are held in\nhighest esteem, should be adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro,\nexcept the whim of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of\ntheir admirers.\n\nFourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals and religion.\n\nWe now enter a sphere of which no understanding could by any possibility\never guess, much less investigate. Here no sense could ever penetrate;\nthere is no object for it to perceive. Here all judgments are\nimpertinent; for in this sphere are only laws, and duties, and\nobligations. An understanding cannot \"conceive\" of a moral law, because\nsuch a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because it has\nno eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon in the other\nclasses, it would be utterly impotent to explain a single phenomenon in\nthis. What is moral obligation? Whence does it arise, or how is it\nimposed? and who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All\nthese, and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even by the\nUnderstanding, much less answered by it. The moral law of the Universe\nis one which can be learned from no judgment, or combination of\njudgments. It can be learned only by being _seen_. The moral law is no\nconclusion, which may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an\naffirmation which is _imperative_. To illustrate. It is an axiom, that\nthe fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. Man is a\nfree moral agent; and so, under the obligation imposed. At the first, it\nwas optional with the Deity whether he would create man or not. But will\nany one assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it\nwas optional with him, whether man should be under the obligation, or\nnot? Can man be a free moral agent, and be free from the duties inherent\ntherein? Does not the mind instinctively and necessarily affirm, that\nthe fact of free moral agency assures the fact of such a relation to\nGod's moral government, that obligation _must_ follow? One cannot\nhesitate to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released from his\nobligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable.\n\nAgain, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the Universe; and yet\nman knows it. Jesus Christ, when he proclaimed that law in the words\n\"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind and strength, and\nthy neighbor as thyself,\" only uttered what no man can, in thought,\ndeny. A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of the\nUniverse, than he can think two and two to be five. Man not only sees\nthe law, but he feels and acknowledges the obligation, even in his\nrebellion. In fact there would be no rebellion, no sense of sin, if\nthere were no obligation. Whence comes the authority of the law? No\npower can give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a\nUniverse, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can have authority;\nit imposes, and can impose obligation; only because _it is an a priori\nlaw of the Universe_, alike binding upon _all_ moral beings, upon God as\nwell as man; and is so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct\nintuition. Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a\nnecessarily fundamental law of _all_ moral beings. _Therefore_ he\nacknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set up a throne for\nPassion, over against the throne of Benevolence, is an involuntary\nacknowledgment of the authority of that law he seeks to rival.\n\nIt was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding can take any\ncognizance of the objects of investigation which fall in this class.\nThis is because the Sense can gather no material over which the\nUnderstanding can run. Is the moral law matter? No. How then can the\nSense observe it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced\nfrom the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this it is replied\n\n_a._ The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral law of the\nUniverse. Their conduct accords with the law of selfishness. Such\nconclusions as that of Hobbes, that war is the natural condition of\nSociety, are those which would follow from a consideration of man, as he\nappears to the Sense.\n\n_b._ If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,--How came it there?\n_How came this fundamental law to be?_ and to this the Sense and\nUnderstanding return no shadow of answer.\n\nBut from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. All the ideas\nand beliefs, every process of thought which belongs to this sphere, are\nabsolute and universal. They must be what they are; and so are\nconditional of all moral beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just\nwhat the Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that\nthe truth, as far as so seen, is _common_ to both.\n\nAlthough the facts which have been adduced above, are inexplicable by\nthe Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality of the Reason, as it\nhas been heretofore described, yet another line of argument of great\nwight must not be omitted. There are in language certain _positive_\nterms, which the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in\nasserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by the Sense and\nUnderstanding. Such are the words infinite and absolute. The mere\npresence of such words in language, as positive terms, is a decisive\nevidence of the fact, that there is also a faculty which entertains\npositive ideas corresponding to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in\nthis matter, is not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that\nthese words express only \"negative notions.\" \"They,\" the infinite and\nabsolute, \"can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstraction\nof, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized;\nconsequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative--negative\nof the conceivable itself.\" But, if this is true, how came these words\nin the language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions.\nIndeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to designate another\ncase in language, in which a positive term can be alleged to have a\n_purely_ negative signification. Take an illustration to which we shall\nrecur further on. The question has been raised, whether a sixth sense\ncan be. Can the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a\npositive term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? We\nfind in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but can such\npositive terms be found, which will correspond to the phrase, no sixth\nsense? In this instance, in physics, the absurdity is seen at once. Why\nis not as readily seen the equal absurdity of affirming that, in\nmetaphysics, positive terms have grown up in the language which are\nsimple negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts may\nrest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. The axioms in\nmathematics, the principles of the relations of being, the laws of\naesthetics, and most of all the whole system of principles pertaining to\nmorals and religion, standing, as they do, a series of mental\naffirmations, which all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as\nnecessary and universal, compel assent to the proposition, that\nthere must be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and\nUnderstanding,--for these have already been found impotent--which can be\nground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. And the presence in\nlanguage of such positive terms as absolute and infinite, is a most\nvaluable auxiliary argument. The faculty which is required,--the faculty\nwhich qualifies all the products of its activity with the\ncharacteristics above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality may\ntherefore be deemed established.\n\nThe Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next required to\nshow the mode of its activity. This can best be done, by first noticing\nthe _kind_ of results which it produces. The Reason gives us, not\nthoughts, but ideas. These are simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is\nevident that any such object of mental examination can be known only in,\nand by, itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot be\ncompared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element which can be\nground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, for it is primary and\nnecessary. _It can only be seen._ Such an object must be known under the\nfollowing circumstances. It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and\nmust be _immediately and directly seen_ by that faculty; all this in\nsuch a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would annihilate\nthe faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? Above we found it to\nbe both capacity and faculty: capacity in that it possessed as integral\nelements, _a priori_ first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in\nthat it saw, brought forward, and made available, those principles. The\nmode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a _seeing_, direct,\nimmediate, _sure_; which holds pure truth _fast_, right in the very\ncentre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in thus seeing\npure truth is best denominated an intuition of the Reason. And here it\nmay be said,--If perception and perceive could be strictly confined to\nthe Sense; concept and conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and\nintuit to the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of\nexpression regarding these departments of the mind.\n\nHaving thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the existence of\na Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its activity, it devolves to\ndeclare the function of that faculty.\n\nThe function of the Pure Reason is, first:--to intuit, by an immediate\nperception, the _a priori_ elemental principles which condition all\nbeing; second,--to intuit, by a like immediate perception, those\nprinciples, combined in _a priori_ systematic processes, which are the\nconditional ideal forms for all being; and third,--again to intuit, by\nanother immediate perception, precisely similar in kind to the others,\nthe fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all _a\npriori_ elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, into\na perfect unity,--an absolute, infinite Person,--God.\n\nTo illustrate.\n\n1. The Reason asserts that \"Malice is criminal;\" and that it is\n_necessarily_ criminal; or, in other words, that no act, of any will,\ncan make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, then, that \"Malice is\ncriminal,\" is an axiom, and conditions all being, God as well as man.\n\n2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in Space\nand Time, and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former\ncase.\n\n3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's _a priori_\nargument for the existence of God. His statement of it should, however,\nbe so modified as to appear, not as an _a priori_ argument for the\nexistence of God, but as an amplified declaration of the fact, that the\nexistence of God is a first principle of Reason; and as such, can no\nmore be denied than the multiplication table. Objection.--This doctrine\ndegrades God to the level of the finite; both being alike conditioned.\nAnswer.--By no means; as will be seen from the two following points.\n\n1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, which\nmeans, if it means anything, that the existence of God is _beyond his\nown control_; or, in other words, that self-existence is an _a priori_\nelemental principle, which conditions God's existing at all.\n\n2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition has\nentirely different significations. God is conditioned only by _Himself_.\nNot only is this conditioning not a limitation, properly speaking, but\nthe very absence of limitation. The fact that He is absolute and\ninfinite, is a condition of His existence. Man's conditions are the very\nopposite of these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead\nof infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he differs in\n_kind_ from God as do his conditions.\n\nSuch being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully competent to\nsolve the difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his followers;\nand the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand.\n\nMuch of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, attended\nevery discussion of this subject, will be removed by examining the\ndefinitions given to certain terms;--either by statement, or by\nimplication in the use made of them;--by exposing the errors involved;\nand by clearly expressing the true signification of each term.\n\nBy way of criticism the general statement may be made,--that the\nLimitists--as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the\nPure Reason--use only such terms, and in such senses, as are pertinent\nto those subjects which come under the purvey of the Understanding and\nthe Sense; but which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the\nsphere of spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error\nare sufficient to illustrate the criticism.\n\n1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express abstractions. For\ninstance, \"_the infinite_, from a human point of view, is merely a name\nfor the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible.\"\n\"It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally\nself-contradictory with that of the Infinite.\"--_Limits of Religious\nThought_, pp. 94 and 96. If asked \"Absolute\" what? \"Infinite\" what? Will\nyou allow person, or other definite term to be supplied? Mansel would\nreply--No! no possible answer can be given by man.\n\nNow, without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can\nrepresent concrete objects of thought or not, it is to be said, that the\nuse of them to express abstract notions, is utterly unsound. The mere\nfact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite\nand Absolute Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract\nInfinite.\n\n2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the Limitists in\ntheir use of the words infinite and absolute, as expressing quantity.\nTake a few examples from many.\n\n\"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole,\nthat is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative\npart of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so\nsmall, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible\ninto smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent,\nor realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and\nimagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by\nthe infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself\nrequire an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same\nreason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of\nparts.\"--_Hamilton's Essays_, p. 20.\n\n\"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute and infinite,\nmust necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged,\namount to nothing less than the sum of all reality.\"--_Limits of\nReligious Thought_, p. 76.\n\n\"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think of the First Cause\nas finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited,\nnecessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits; it is\nabsolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving\na region surrounding its boundaries.\"--_Spencer's First Principles_, p.\n37.\n\nThe last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever stood on the\nnorth side of the affections. Besides the extracts selected, any person\nreading the authors above named, will find numerous phrases like these:\n\"infinite whole,\" \"infinite sum,\" \"infinite number,\" \"infinite series,\"\nby which they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a material\namount.\n\nUpon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite and\nabsolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any object of the Sense or\nof the Understanding, judging according to the Sense, or to any number.\nThere is no whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and\nlimited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as absurd as\nto say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, is to \"multiply words\nwithout knowledge.\"\n\nAgain, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do not tend in\nany degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves, but\nonly make the muddle thicker. Take, for instance, the following\nextract:--\n\n\"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be\nconceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it\ncannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple;\nit cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by\nthe absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the\nUniverse, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the\nMany, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike\nincomprehensible.\"--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 79.\n\nThe soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the watery waste of\nsuch a philosophy, can find no rest for the sole of her foot, except on\nthat floating carcase of a doctrine, Chaos is God. The simple fact that\nsuch confusion logically results from the premises of the Limitists, is\na sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of\nthought,--principle and process; and for striking for a new base of\noperations. But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable\nArarat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? Man seeks a\nRock upon which he can climb and cry, I KNOW that this is truth. Where\nis the Everlasting Rock? In our search for the answer to these queries,\nwe may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,--the object to\nbe obtained.\n\nBy observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in,\nand forms part of, a system of things, which he comprehensively terms\nthe Universe. The problem is,--_To find an Ultimate Ground, a Final\nCause, which shall be adequate to account for the existence and\nsustentation of this Universe_. There are but two possible directions\nfrom which the solution of this problem can come. It must be found\neither within the Universe, or without the Universe.\n\nCan it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of two positions\nmust be true. Either a part of the Universe is cause for the existence\nof the whole of the Universe; or the Universe is self-existent. Upon the\nfirst position nothing need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the\nvery statement of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than\na notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second point,\nwould be beyond the intention of the author. The questions at issue lie\nnot between theists and pantheists, but between those who alike reject\nPantheism as erroneous. The writer confesses himself astonished that a\nclass of rational men could ever have been found, who should have\nattempted to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe _in itself_. All\nthat man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns by\nobservation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is, that a vast\nsystem of physical objects exists. From the facts observed, he draws\nconclusions: but the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. With\nreference to any lesser object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A\nwatch is. It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to\neach other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, upon being\nasked to account for the existence of the watch, should confine himself\nwholly to an examination of the nature of the springs, the wheels, the\nhands, face, &c., endeavoring to find the reason of its being within\nitself, the world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the world\nlaugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man who rummages among\nthe springs and wheels of the vast machine of the Universe, to find the\nreason of _its_ being. In the former instance, the bystander would\nexclaim,--\"The watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only\nintelligent being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. Man made\nthe watch.\" And his assertion would be true. _A fortiori_ would a\nbystander of the Universe exclaim, \"The Universe is an evidence of\nintelligence. An intelligent Being, superior to the Universe, made the\nUniverse.\" And his assertion is true. We are driven then to our last\nposition; but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy.\n\nTHE ULTIMATE GROUND OF THE UNIVERSE MUST BE SOUGHT FOR, AND CAN ONLY BE\nFOUND, WITHOUT THE UNIVERSE.\n\nFrom this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any hope of reaching\nthe goal. Setting out on our new course we will gain a step by noticing\na fact involved in the illustration just given. The bystander exclaims,\n\"The watch is an evidence of intelligence.\" In this very utterance is\nnecessarily expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: the\none the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of mind. One cannot think\nof matter except as inferior, nor of mind except as superior. These\ntwo, matter and mind, comprise all possible existence. The Reason not\nonly cannot see _how_ any other existence can be, but affirms _that_ no\nother can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the Universe. What\nmind?\n\nBy examination, man perceives what appears to be an order in the\nUniverse, concludes that there is such an order, assumes the conclusion\nto be valid, and names the order Nature. Turning his eye upon himself,\nhe finds himself not only associated with, but, through a portion of his\nfaculties, forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper\nscrutiny, a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most\nsecret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows refulgent\nin the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, indeed, in Nature;\nbut he thrills with joy at the quickly acquired knowledge that Nature is\nonly a nest, in which he, a purely supernatural being, must flutter for\na time, until he shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the\nSpirit Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central\nself utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that he\ninstinctively cries, \"My soul is worth more than a Universe of gold and\ndiamonds;\" _a fortiori_ must that Being, who is the Ultimate Ground, not\nonly of Nature, but of those supernatural intelligences who live in\nNature, be supernatural, spiritual, and supreme?\n\nJust above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all possible\nexistence. It has now been found that mind, in its highest form, even in\nman, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly supernatural. It has further\nbeen determined, that the object of our search must be the Supreme\nSpirit.\n\nJust at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, the most\negregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists have made. In order to\ndo this satisfactorily, the following analysis of the human mind is\npresented. The soul is a spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this\nanimal nature belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally\nacknowledged,--at least the Limitists will not deny,--that the Sense and\nthe Understanding are wholly within, and conditioned by Nature. Observe\nthen their folly. They deny that a part can account for a whole; they\nreject Pantheism; _and yet they employ only those faculties which they\nconfess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature_--for they deny the\nexistence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive faculty of the spiritual\nperson--_to search, only in Nature, for the cause of Nature_. A fly\nwould buzz among the wheels of a clock to as little purpose.\n\nThe result arrived at just above, now claims our careful attention.\n\n_The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is_ THE SUPREME SPIRIT.\n\nTo appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis of man. In his\nspiritual personality we have found him wholly supernatural. We have\nfurther found that, only as a spiritual person is he capable of pursuing\nthis investigation to a final and valid termination. If, then, we would\ncomplete our undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no\neagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring wing can\nnever beat. There no sense can ever enter; no judgments are needed.\nThrough Reason--the soul's far-darting eye,--and through Reason alone,\ncan we gaze on the Immutable.\n\nTurning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that man, as\nspiritual person, is a Pure Reason,--the faculty which gives him _a\npriori_ first principles, as the standard for conduct and the forms for\nactivity,--a Spiritual Sensibility, which answers with emotive music to\nthe call of the Reason; and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells\ncentral, solitary, and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny.\nEvery such being is therefore a miniature final cause.\n\nThe goal of our search must be near at hand. In man appears the very\nlikeness of the Being we seek. His highest powers unmistakably shadow\nforth the form of that Being, who is The Final. Man originates; but he\nis dependent for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to\nhis own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is utterly\nindependent; and the sphere of whose activity extends wherever, without\nhimself, he chooses. Man, after a process of culture, comes to intuit\nsome first principles, in some combinations. We seek a being who\nnecessarily sees, at once and forever, all possible first principles, in\nall possible relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man\nstumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of the way, but\nmore frequently perversely violating the eternal law which he finds\nwritten on his heart. We seek a being who never stumbles, but who is\nperfectly wise; and whose conduct is in immutable accord with the _a\npriori_ standards of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent\nfor existence, and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom we seek\nwill be found to be also a spiritual person who is self-existent, and\nwho sets his own bounds to his activity.\n\nThat the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true one, and that\nthe result which we approach, and are about to utter, is well founded,\nreceives decisive confirmation from the following facts. Man perceives\nthat malice must be criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A\nsimilar remark is true of mathematical, and all other _a priori_ laws.\nSometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable thrill\nof benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal river which flows,\ncalmly and forever, through the bosom of the \"Everlasting Father.\" For\nhis own conduct, man is the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the\nlikeness of the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible\nform of being. It is then a form common to God and man. Here, therefore,\nPhilosophy and Revelation are at one. With startling, and yet grateful\nunanimity, they affirm the solemn truth, \"GOD MADE MAN IN HIS OWN\nIMAGE.\"\n\nWe reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full in the field of\nour vision. \"I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith\nJehovah, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty.\" THAT\nSPIRITUAL PERSON WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE, AND INFINITE, IS THE\nULTIMATE GROUND, THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nThe problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within the portico of\nthe sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, at last, the veil of\nIsis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries.\n\nIt is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those expressions must\nbe, in which the terms infinite and absolute are employed as signifying\nabstractions or amounts. They can have no meaning with reference to the\nUniverse. But what their true significance is, stands out with\nunmistakable clearness and precision.\n\n1. _Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the\nnecessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except by Himself,\nand as complete_.\n\n2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,--the one the positive, and\nthe other the negative term expressive of the same idea.\n\n3. _Infinity is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the necessary\nBeing which gives to Him universality_.\n\nAbsoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of the\nself-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all other persons,\nconstitute Him unique and supreme.\n\nIt is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, that\nwhenever, by a process of thought, a result has been attained and set\nforth, he who propounds the result is directly responsible for all that\nis logically involved in it. The authority of that law is here both\nacknowledged and invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical\ndevelopment of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human mind is\ncapable of, is challenged, in the confidence that there can be found\ntherein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle of contradiction. As germain,\nand important to the matter in hand, some steps in this development will\nbe noted.\n\nIn solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account for the being\nand continuance of the Universe, we have found that the Universe and its\nCause are two distinct and yet intimately and necessarily connected\nbeings, the one dependent upon the other, and that other utterly\nindependent; and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other\nabsolute and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person,\nand that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness belong;\nwhile the other is wholly person, and consequently the pure, absolute,\nand infinite Person. We have further found that absoluteness and\ninfinity are spiritual qualities of that one Person, which are\nincommunicable, and differentiate Him from all other possible beings;\nand which establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all\npossible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the limitations\nand conditions of personality,--a Person at once limited and unlimited,\nconditioned and unconditioned, related and unrelated, whose limitations,\nconditions, and relations are entirely consistent with his absoluteness\nand infinity, who is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the\nUniverse.\n\nThe finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure\nself-comprehending; but he only partially perceives the workings of his\nown being. _A fortiori_, must the infinite Person be self-conscious, and\nexhaustively self-comprehending. The finite person is an intellect,\nsensibility, and will; but these are circumscribed by innumerable\nlimitations. So must the infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and\nwill; but His intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure\nDelight, and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as act,\nOmnipotence.\n\n1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius.\n\nThen, he \"must possess the primary copies or patterns of what it is\npossible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;\" or, in other\nwords, \"The pure ideals of all possible entities, lie as pure reason\nconceptions in the light of the divine intelligence, and in these must\nbe found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth.\"\nThese _a priori_ \"pure ideals\" are _conditional_ of his knowledge. They\nare the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He must know them as\nthey are. He cannot intuit, or think otherwise than in accordance with\nthem. However many there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and\ndefinite, and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. In\nfine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved the fact,\nthat the number of his qualities, attributes, faculties, forms of\nactivity, and acts, are, and must be limited, definite, and so known to\nhim; and yet he is infinite and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself\nto be so.\n\n2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight.\n\nThen he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, produced by\nthe ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth and worthiness, and his\nentire complacency therein. Yet he is pleased with the good conduct, and\ndispleased with the evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And\nif two are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more than\nthe other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or lessens his\nown absolute self-satisfaction and happiness.\n\n3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; in\nact, Omnipotence.\n\n_a._ In choice, the whole personality,--both the spontaneous and self\nactivity, are entirely and concordantly active in the one direction.\nSome of the objects towards which this state manifests itself may be\nvery small. The fact that each receives the attention appropriate to his\nplace in the system of beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which\nspontaneously prompts to all good acts. But\n\n_b._ In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always must be,\nlimited. His ability to act is limited and determined by the \"pure\nideals,\" in which \"must be found the rules after which the creative\nagency must go forth.\" In act he is also limited by his choice. The fact\nthat he is Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act\nwhich is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct a\nrational being, to whom two and two will appear five; and if he should\nattempt to, he would cease to be perfect Goodness. Again, the infinite\nPerson performs an act--of Creation. The act is, must be, limited and\ndefinite; and so must the product--the Universe be. He cannot create an\nunlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very words\nunlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, are\ncontradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, an infinite act, even\nif possible, would not, could not create, or have any relation to the\nconstruction of a Universe. An infinite act must be the realization of\nan infinite ideal. The infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of\nhimself; and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, being\nthe idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the only\npossible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in himself. But,\nshould it be in his power to realize it _again_, that exertion of power\nwould be an infinite act, and its product another infinite Person. No\nother infinite act, and no other result, are rationally supposable.\n\nThe Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited and\ndefinite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; but in the mind of\nits Creator every atom is numbered. No spirit may ever have skirted its\nboundary; but that boundary is as clear and distinct to his eye as the\noutline of the Alps against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The\nquestions Where? How far? How long? How much? and the like, are\npertinent only in the Universe; and their answers are always limited and\ndefinite.\n\nThe line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by a large class of\nthinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly contradictory and\nself-destructive. We speak of a Person, a term which necessarily\ninvolves limitation and condition, as infinite and absolute. We speak of\nthis infinity and absoluteness as spiritual qualities, which are\nconditional and limiting to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an\ninability to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists,\nour sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, for the\ncompletion of this portion of our task, to present a rational ground\nupon which these apparent contradictions shall become manifestly\nconsistent.\n\nIn those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of as limited and\nunlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a play upon words, and that\nthey apply to different qualities in the personality. It is not said, of\ncourse, that the number of his faculties is limited and unlimited; or\nthat his self-complacency is boundless and constrained; or that his act\nis conditioned and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes stated\nto puzzle and disturb. They are written to express a great, fundamental,\nand all-important truth, which seems never once to have shadowed the\nminds of the Limitists,--a truth which, when once seen, dispels forever\nall the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. The\ntruth is this.\n\nThat Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations are wholly\nsubjective, _i. e._ find their whole base and spring in his self; and\nwho is therefore entirely free from on all possible limitations,\nconditions, and relations, from without himself; and who possesses,\ntherefore, all possible fulness of all possible excellences, and finds\nthe perennial acme of happiness in self-contemplation, and the\nconsciousness of his perfect worth; and being such is ground for all\nother possible being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated,\nunconditioned, unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed by\nUniversal Genius upon the absolute and infinite Person are _different in\nkind_ from the conditions imposed upon finite persons and physical\nthings. The former in no way diminish aught from the fulness of their\npossessor's endowments; the latter not only do so diminish, but render\nit impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency.\n\nThe following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly express the truth\nwe have attained.\n\n_Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which diminish\nthe fulness of the possessor's endowments._\n\nAn admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from some\nreflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we quote. \"What we need\nis not merely a rule by which to direct _the process_ in the attainment\nof any artistic end, but we must find the legislator who may determine\nthe end itself\"...\n\nWhence is the ultimate behest that is to determine the archetype, and\ncontrol the pure spontaneity in its action.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner want to gratify,\nwith no higher end than the gratification of the highest constitutional\ncraving? Can we find nothing beyond a want, which shall from its own\nbehest demand that this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the\nround worlds and all their furniture are _good_--but why good? Certainly\nas means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness of sentient\nbeings, is _good_--but why good? Because it supplies the want of the\nSupreme Architect. And is this the _supreme good_? Surely if it is, we\nare altogether within nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment\nby what name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only as the\nhighest architect finds such wants within himself, and the archetypal\nrule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual manner; and\nprecisely as the ox goes to his fodder in the shortest way, so he goes\nto his work in making and peopling worlds in the most direct manner.\nHere is no will; no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds\nhimself so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving\nof his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and the gratifying of\nthis craving is _the highest good_.\"\n\nWe attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the diminishing from the\nundiminishing condition. A sense of want, _a craving_, is the necessary\nresult of a diminishing condition. Hence the presence of any craving is\nthe distinguishing mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments\nwhich excludes all possible craving or lack, is the distinguishing mark\nof the infinite and absolute Person. In this plenitude his infinity and\nabsoluteness consist; and it is, therefore, conditional of them. Upon\nthis plenitude, as conditional of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok\nspeaks further, as follows:--\n\n\"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and law for\nbenevolence, and for the sake of which the artist shall be put to his\nbeneficent agency above all considerations that he finds his nature\ncraving it. It must be that for whose sake, happiness, even that which,\nas kind and benevolent, craves on all sides the boon to bless others,\nitself should be. Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic\nautonomy, which knows that within itself there is an excellency which\nobliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be found, nor anything\nvery analogous to it, in sensient nature and a dictate from some\ngeneralized experience. It lies within the rational spirit, and is law\nin the heart, as an inward imperative in its own right, and must there\nbe found.... This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating and\nself-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth imperative above\nwant; an end in itself, and not means to another end; a user of things,\nbut not itself to be used by anything; and, on account of its intrinsic\nexcellency, an authoritative determiner for its own behoof of the entire\nartistic agency with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or\naccusing.\n\n\"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, gives the\nultimate estimate to nature, which needs and can attain to nothing\nhigher, than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end; and thereby\nin all his works, he fixes, in his own light, upon the subjective\narchetype, and attains to the objective result of that which is\nbefitting his own dignity. It is, therefore, in no craving want which\nmust be gratified, but from the interest of an inner behest, which\nshould be executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created\nall things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'\"\n\nIn the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, the division\nof conditions into two classes--the one class, conditions proper,\ncomprising those which diminish the endowments of the being upon whom\nthey lie, and are ground for a craving or lack; and the other class,\ncomprising those conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the\nbeing upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground for perfect\nplenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction on account thereof--is\nseen to be thoroughly philosophical. And let it be here noted, that the\nvery construction, or, if the term suit better, perception of this\ndistinction, is a decisive evidence of the fact, and a direct product of\nthe operation of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only what\nthe Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, not\nonly could no other but diminishing conditions be thought of, but by no\npossibility could a hint that there were any others flit through the\nmind. Such a mind, being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature,\n_cannot_ climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those\nconditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural and\nspiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed at, much more examined\ncritically and classified, but by a being possessed of a faculty the\nsame in kind with the intellect in which such spiritual conditions\ninhere.\n\nThe actual processes which go on in the mind are as follows. The Sense,\npossessing a purely mechanical structure, a structure not differing in\n_kind_ from that of the vegetable,--both being alike entirely\nconditioned by the law of cause and effect,--perceives phenomena. The\nrelation of the object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory,\nand the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, are\nfixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in fixed mechanical forms,\nit is, by this very construction, incapable, not only of receiving\nimpressions and examining phenomena outside of those forms, but it can\nnever be startled with the guess that there _is_ anything else than what\nis received therein. For instance: A man born blind, though he can have\nno possible notion of what light is, knows that light is, from the\ntestimony of those who can see. But if a race of men born blind should\nbe found, who had never had any communication with men who could see, it\nis notorious that they could have no possible notion even that light\nwas. A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. This\nposition is strengthened and established beyond controversy, by the\nfailure of the mind in its efforts to construct an entirely new sense.\nEvery attempt only intensifies our appreciation of the futility of the\neffort. From fragments of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a\npatchwork sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new\nsense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental faculty, must\ntranscend the very conditions of its existence. It is precisely with the\nUnderstanding as with the lower faculty. It cannot transcend its limits.\nIt can add no item to the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces\nit from a presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond to\nthose in its associate faculty.\n\nIt is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties may\nconstruct a _system_, but can never develop a _science_. It can arrange,\nclassify, by such standards as its fancy may select, the phenomena in\nnature; but this must be in accordance with some sensuous form. _No law\ncan be seen_, by which it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such\nclassification must always be determined by the number of stamens in the\nflower, for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as\ngood as any other, _unless there comes a higher faculty_ which,\noverlooking all nature, perceives the _a priori_ law working in nature,\nwhich gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive development of a\nscience which in its _idea_ cannot be improved. It is manifest, further,\nthat those conditions, to which we have applied the epithet proper, lie\nupon the two faculties we have been considering. In this we agree with\nthe Limitists.\n\nIt now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose existence was\nproved in the earlier part of our work, is competent to overlook, and so\ncomprehend nature, and all the conditions of nature, and thereby assign\nto said conditions their true and inferior place, while it soars out of\nnature, and intuits those _a priori_ laws which, though the conditions\nof, are wholly unconditioned _by nature_; but which are both the\nconditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this in an\nentirely different sense from the other. This is the province of the\nPure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, above all clouds of sense,\nunder the full blaze of eternal truth, the soul sees all nature spread\nlike a vast map before her searching eye, sharply observes, and\nappreciates all the conditions of nature; and then, while holding it\nfull in the field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other\nland, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too in all\ntheir conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision never\napproximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these supernatural\nconditions are no deprivation which awaken a want, but that they inhere\nand cohere, as final ground for absolute plenitude of endowments and\nfulness of bliss, in the Self-existent Person.\n\nIt will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves the\ndoctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par\nwith the Universal Genius in the infinite spiritual Person. The\nobjection is fallacious, because based upon the assumption that likeness\nin mode of action involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the\nfinite Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal Genius;\nthe objects perceived by both are the same, they are seen in the same\nlight, and so are in accord; but the _range_ of the finite is one, and\nthe _range_ of the infinite is another; and so diverse also are the\ncircumstances attending the act of seeing. The range of the finite\nReason is, _always must be, partial_: the range of the infinite Reason\nis, _always must be, exhaustive_ (not infinite). In circumstances, the\nfinite Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a germ\nin which it is inactive, and _must_ be developed by association with\nnature, and under forms of nature; and can never, by any possibility of\ngrowth, attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied, or to\na point in development from which it can continue its advance as _pure\nspirit_. It always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a\nspiritual body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore\nindependent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute possession of\nall possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. Hence, while the infinite\nand finite reasons see the same object in the same light, and therefore\n_alike_, the difference in range, and the difference in circumstance,\nmust forever constitute them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight\njust noticed is the _necessary a priori_ ground upon which a moral\ngovernment is _possible_.\n\nIn thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the\ntwo classes of conditions rests, we have been led to distinguish more\nclearly between the faculties of the mind, and especially to observe how\nthe Pure Reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised.\nIn this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication\nof all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears that the\nterms must, possible, and the like, being used to express no idea of\nrestraint, as coming from without upon the infinite Person, or of lack\nor craving, as subsisting within him, are properly employed in\nexpressing the fact that his _Self, as a priori ground for his\nactivity_, is, though the only, yet a real, positive, and irremovable\nlimit, condition, and law of his action. Of two possible ends he may\nfreely choose either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one;\nbut the constituting laws of the Self he _cannot_, and the moral laws of\nhis Self he _will not_, violate.\n\nThat point has now been reached at which this branch of the discussion\nin hand may be closed. The final base from which to conduct an\nexamination of the questions respecting absoluteness and infinity has\nbeen attained. In the progress to this consummation it was found that a\nradical psychological error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by\nthe Limitists. Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially\ndefective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found to belong to\ncertain mental affirmations. Four classes of these affirmations or ideas\nwere named and illustrated; and by them the fact of the Reason was\nestablished. Then its mode of activity and its functions were stated;\nand finally the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by\nthis faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the final\ncause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; and it was\nthen seen that\n\n     That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and\n     infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the\n     Universe.\n\nDefinitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to such a\nposition were then given, with a few concluding reflections. From the\nresult thus secured the way is prepared for an examination of the\ngeneral principles and their special applications which the Limitists\nmaintain, and this will occupy our future pages.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nAN EXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION OF THE LIMITISTS, AND OF\nCERTAIN GENERAL COROLLARIES UNDER IT.\n\n\nIt has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid and final\nbasis of truth, one which would satisfy the cravings of the human soul,\nand afford it a sure rest. In the fact that God made man in his own\nimage, and that thus there is, _to a certain extent_, a community of\nfaculties, a community of knowledge, a community of obligations, and a\ncommunity of interests, have we found such a basis. We have hereby\nlearned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary and final; in other\nwords, that he can know the truth, and be sure that his knowledge is\ncorrect. If the proofs which have been offered of the fact of the Pure\nReason, and the statements which have been made of the mode of its\nactivity and of its functions, and, further, of the problem of the\nUniverse, and the true method for solving it, shall have been\nsatisfactory to the reader, he will now be ready to consider the\nanalysis of Sir William Hamilton's fundamental proposition, which was\npromised on an early page. We there gave, it was thought, sufficiently\nfull extracts for a fair presentation of his theory, and followed them\nwith a candid epitome. In recurring to the subject now, and for the\npurpose named, we are constrained at the outset to make an\nacknowledgment.\n\nIt would be simple folly, a childish egotism, to pass by in silence the\nmasterly article on this subject in the \"North American Review\" for\nOctober, 1864, and after it to pretend to offer anything new. Whatever\nthe author might have wrought out in his own mental workshop,--and his\nwork was far less able than what is there given,--that article has left\nnothing to be said. He has therefore been tempted to one of two courses:\neither to transfer it to these pages, or pass by the subject entirely.\nEither course may, perhaps, be better than the one finally chosen; which\nis, while pursuing the order of his own thought, to add a few short\nextracts therefrom. One possibility encourages him in this, which is,\nthat some persons may see this volume, who have no access to the Review,\nand to whom, therefore, these pages will be valuable. To save needless\nrepetition, this discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned\nback and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to.\n\nUpon the very threshold of Sir William Hamilton's statement, one is met\nby a logical _faux pas_ which is truly amazing. Immediately after the\nassertion that \"the mind can know only the _limited and the\nconditionally limited_,\" and in the very sentence in which he denies the\npossibility of a knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, _he proceeds to\ndefine those words in definite and known terms_! The Infinite he defines\nas \"the unconditionally unlimited,\" and the Absolute as \"the\nunconditionally limited.\" Or, to save him, will one say that the\ndefining terms are unknown? So much the worse, then! \"The Infinite,\" an\nunknown term, may be represented by _x_; and the unconditionally\nunlimited, a compound unknown term, by _ab_. Now, who has the right to\nsay, either in mathematics or metaphysics, in any philosophy, that\n_x_=_ab_? Yet such dicta are the basis of \"The Philosophy of the\nUnconditioned.\" But, one of two suppositions is possible. Either the\nterms infinite and absolute are known terms and definable, or they are\nunknown terms and undefinable. Yet, Hamilton says, they are unknown and\ndefinable. Which does he mean? If he is held to the former, they are\nunknown; then all else that he has written about them are batches of\nmeaningless words. If he is held to the latter, they are definable;\nthen are they known, and his system is denied in the assertion of it.\nSince his words are so contradictory, he must be judged by his deeds;\nand in these he always assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the\ninfinite and absolute, else he would not have argued the matter; for\nthere can be no argument about nothing. Our analysis of his theory,\nthen, must be conducted upon this hypothesis.\n\nTurn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory is quoted, and\nread the last sentence. Is his utterance a \"principle,\" or is it a\njudgment? Is it an axiom, or is it a guess. The logician asserts that we\nknow only the conditioned, and yet bases his assertion upon \"the\nprinciples,\" &c. What is a principle, and how is it known? If it is\naxiom, then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence in\nwhich he uttered it. And this, we have no hesitation in saying, is just\nwhat he did. He blindly assumed certain \"fundamental laws of\nthought,\"--to quote another of his phrases--to establish the impotence\nof the mind to know those laws _as fundamental_. Again, if his\nphilosophy is valid, the words \"must,\" \"necessary,\" and the like are\nentirely out of place; for they are unconditional. In the conditioned\nthere is, can be, no must, no necessity.\n\nFrom these excursions about the principle let us now return to the\nprinciple itself. It may be stated concisely thus: There are two\nextremes,--\"the Absolute\" and the \"Infinite.\" These include all being.\nThey are contradictories, that is, one must be, to the exclusion of the\nother. But the mind can \"conceive\" of neither. What, then, is the\nlogical conclusion? _That the mind cannot conceive of anything._ What is\nhis conclusion? That the mind can conceive of something between the\ninfinite and the absolute, which is neither the one nor the other, but a\n_tertium quid_--the conditioned. Where did this _tertium quid_ come\nfrom, when he had already comprehended everything in the two extremes?\nIf there is a mean, the conditioned, and the two extremes, then\n\"excluded middle\" has nothing to do with the matter at all.\n\nTo avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just stated, Hamilton\nerected the subterfuge of _mental imbecility_. To deny any knowledge to\nman, was to expose himself to ridicule. He, therefore, and his followers\nafter him, drew a line in the domain of knowledge, and assigned to the\nhither side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations in\nthe Understanding; and then asserted that the contradictions which\nappeared in the mind, when one examined those questions which lie on the\nfurther side of that line, resulted from the impotency of the mind to\ncomprehend the questions themselves. This was, is, their psychology. How\nsatisfactory it may be to Man, a hundred years, perhaps, will show. But\nstrike out the last assertion, and write, Both are cognizable; and then\nlet us proceed with our reasoning. The essayist in the North American\npresents the theory under four heads, as follows:--\n\n\"1. The Infinite and Absolute as defined, are contradictory and\nexclusive of each other; yet, one must be true.\n\n\"2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.\n\n\"3. Each is inconceivable; and the inconceivability of each is referable\nto the same cause, namely, mental imbecility.\n\n\"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between\nthem.\"\n\nThe first and fourth points require our especial attention.\n\n1. Let us particularly mark, then, that it is _as defined_, that the\nterms are \"contradictory.\" The question, therefore, turns upon the\ndefinitions. Undoubtedly the definitions are erroneous; but in order to\nsee wherein, the following general reflections may be made:--\n\nThe terms infinite and absolute, as used by philosophers, have two\ndistinct applications: one to Space and Time, and one to God. Such\ndefinitions as are suitable to the latter application, and\nself-consistent, have already been given. Though reluctant to admit into\na philosophical treatise a term bearing two distinct meanings, we shall\nwaive for a little our scruples,--though choosing, for ourselves, to\nuse the equivalent rather than the term.\n\nSuch definitions are needed, then, as that absolute Space and Time shall\nnot be contradictory to infinite Space and Time. Let us first observe\nHamilton's theory. According to it, Space, for instance, is either\nunconditional illimitation, or it is unconditional limitation; in other\nwords, it is illimitable, or it is a limited whole. The first part of\nthe assertion is true. That Space is illimitable, is unquestionably a\nself-evident truth. Any one who candidly considers the subject will see\nnot only that the mind cannot assign limits to Space, but that the\nattempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with the attempt to think two\nand two five. The last part is a psychological blunder, has no\npertinence to the question, and is not what Hamilton was groping for. He\nwas searching for the truth, that _there is no absolute unit in\nSpace_. A limited whole has nothing to do with the matter in\nhand--absoluteness--at all. The illimitability of Space, which has just\nbeen established as an axiom, precludes this. What, then, is the\nopposite pole of thought? We have just declared it. There is no absolute\nunit of Space; or, in other words, all division is in Space, but Space\nis indivisible. This, also, is an axiom, is self-evident. We attain,\nthen, two poles of thought, and definitions of the two terms given,\nwhich are exhaustive and consistent.\n\n    \"Space is illimitable.\n    Space is indivisible.\"\n\nThe one is the infinity of Space, the other is the absoluteness of\nSpace. The fact, then, is, all limitation is _in_ Space, and all\ndivision is _in_ Space; but Space is neither limited or divided. One of\nthe logician's extremes is seen, then, to have no foundation in fact;\nand that which is found to be true is also found to be consistent with,\nnay, essential to, what should have been the other.\n\nHaving hitherto expressed a decided protest against any attempt to find\nout God through the forms of Space and Time, a repetition will not be\nneeded here. God is only to be sought for, found, and studied, by such\nmethods as are suitable to the supreme spiritual Person. Hence all the\nattempts of the Limitists to reason from spatial and temporal\ndifficulties over to those questions which belong to God, are simply\nabsurd. The questions respecting Space and Time are to be discussed by\nthemselves. And the questions respecting God are to be discussed by\nthemselves. He who tries to reason from the one to the other is not less\nabsurd than he who should try to reason from a farm to the\nmultiplication table.\n\nIn Sir William Hamilton's behalf it should be stated, that there is just\na modicum of truth underlying his theory,--just enough to give it a\ndegree of plausibility. The Sense, as faculty for the perception of\nphysical objects, or their images, and the Understanding as discursive\nfaculty for passing over and forming judgments upon the materials\ngathered by the Sense, lie under the shadow of a law very like the one\nhe stated. The Sense was made _incapable_ of perceiving an ultimate atom\nor of comprehending the universe. From the fact that the Sense never has\nperceived these objects, the Understanding concludes that it never will.\nOnly by the insight and oversight of that higher faculty, the Pure\nReason, do we come to know that it never _can_. It was because those\nlower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of Space and Time,\nand are unable to perceive or conceive anything out of those conditions,\nand because, in considering them, he failed to see the other mental\npowers, that Sir William Hamilton constructed his Philosophy of the\nUnconditioned.\n\n2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.\n\nLiterally, this is true. The word \"conceive\" applies strictly to the\nwork of the Understanding; and that faculty can never have any notion of\nthe Infinite or Absolute. But, assuming that \"conceive\" is a general\nterm for cognize, the conclusion developed just above is inevitable. If\nall being is in one or the other, and neither can be known, nothing can\nbe known.\n\n3. They cannot be known, because of mental imbecility. If man can know\nnothing because of mental imbecility, why suppose that he has a mental\nfaculty at all? Why not enounce, as the fundamental principle of one's\ntheory, the assertion, All men are idiots? This would be logically\nconsistent. The truth is, the logician was in a dilemma. He must confess\nthat men know something. By a false psychology he had ruled the Reason\nout of the mind, and so had left himself no faculty by which to form any\nnotion of absoluteness and infinity; and yet they would thrust\nthemselves before him, and demand an explanation. Hence, he constructed\na subterfuge. He would have been more consistent if he had said, There\nis no absolute and infinite. The conditioned is the whole of existence;\nand this the mind knows.\n\n\"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between\nthem.\"\n\nWhat the essayist in the North American says upon this point is so apt,\nand so accords with our own previous reflections, that we will not\nforbear making an extract. \"The last of the four theses will best be\nre-stated in Hamilton's own words; the italics are his. 'The conditioned\nis the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each\nother, neither of which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on\nthe principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be\nadmitted as necessary_.' This sentence excites unmixed wonder. To\nmention in the same breath the law of excluded middle, and two\ncontradictions with a mean between them, requires a hardihood\nunparalleled in the history of philosophy, except by Hegel. If the two\ncontradictory extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a\ncogitable mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either\nextreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories is\nwholly based upon the supposed impossibility of a mean; if the mean\nexists, that may be true, and both the contradictories false. But if a\nmean between the two contradictories be both impossible and absurd,\n(and we have hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,)\nHamilton's conditioned entirely vanishes.\"\n\nUpon a system which, in whatever aspect one looks at it, is found to be\nbut a bundle of contradictions and absurdities, further criticism would\nappear to be unnecessary.\n\nHaving, impliedly at least, accepted as true Sir William Hamilton's\npsychological error,--the rejection of the Reason as the intellectual\nfaculty of the spiritual person,--and having, with him, used the terms\nlimit, condition, and the like, in such significations as are pertinent\nto the Sense and Understanding only, the Limitists proceed to present in\na paradoxical light many questions which arise concerning \"the\nInfinite.\" They take the ground that, to our view, he can be neither\nperson, nor intellect, nor consciousness; for each of these implies\nlimitation; and yet that it is impossible for us to know aught of him,\nexcept as such. Then having, as they think, completely confused the\nmind, they draw hence new support for their conclusion, that we can\nattain to no satisfactory knowledge on the subject. The following\nextracts selected from many will show this.\n\n\"Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in\nwhatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction\nbetween one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of\nsomething; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by\nbeing distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is\nnecessarily a limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from\nanother, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not,\nor it must not possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious\nthat the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by\nthe absence of any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence\nwould be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence\nof an attribute which the Finite has not; for as no finite part can be a\nconstituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must\nitself be infinite; and must at the same time have nothing in common\nwith the finite....\n\n\"That a man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition\nwhich, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself.\nConsciousness is essentially a limitation; for it is the determination\nof the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the\nInfinite, if it is conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially\neverything, and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general\nwhich it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything\nin particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being\nany other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually\neverything, and potentially nothing; for an unrealized potentiality is\nlikewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that which it is not, it\nis by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a\nhigher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no\ncharacteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything\nelse, and discerned as an object of consciousness....\n\n\"Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it refuses to\nattribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in the only form in which\nwe can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the perception of\none object out of many, and a comparison of that object with others. To\nhe always conscious of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be\nconscious at all; and, beyond its human manifestation, we can have no\nconception of what consciousness is.\"--_Limits of Religious Thought_,\npp. 93-95.\n\n\"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the\nconditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of\npositive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. To _think_ is\nto _condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the\npossibility of thought....\n\n\"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible\nunder the antithesis of a subject and object of thought; known only in\ncorrelation, and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of\nthis, all that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or\nmatter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of\nthe different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the\nconsequence of this doctrine is--that philosophy, if viewed as more than\na science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the\nparticular, we admit that we can never, in out highest generalizations,\nrise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter,\ncan be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of\nan existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as\nbeyond the reach of philosophy.\"\n\n\"In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially\nagree; for a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only\nthat a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for\nman, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a\nknowledge even in the Deity himself, without contradicting our human\nconceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself.\"--_Sir William\nHamilton's Essays_, pp. 21, 22, 38.\n\n\"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God--Benevolence,\nHoliness, Justice, Wisdom, for example--can be conceived by us only as\nexisting in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not\nidentical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them\nall; in one word, a _Person_. But Personality, as we conceive it, is\nessentially a limitation and relation. Our own personality is presented\nto us as relative and limited; and it is from that presentation that all\nour representative notions of personality are derived. Personality is\npresented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various\nmodes of his consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought\nwithout a thinker: there is no thinker unless he exercises some mode of\nthought. Personality is also a limitation; for the thought and the\nthinker are distinguished from and limit each other; and the various\nmodes of thought are distinguished each from each by limitation\nlikewise....\"--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 102.\n\n\"Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the\nabsolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating,\nmore religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in\nwhich men babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite and\nPersonal conscious existence, limited though it be, is yet the noblest\nof all existence of which man can dream.... It is by consciousness alone\nthat we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer Him any\nservice. It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can\nstand in any religious relation to Him at all; that we can form\nsuch a representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual\nwants, insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual\ncuriosity.\"--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 104.\n\nThe conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are as follows:--\n\n\"The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive\nof each other as equally possible; _but only as unable to understand_ as\npossible two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their\nmutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true.... And by a\nwonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our\ninability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with\na belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere\nof all comprehensive reality.\"--_Sir William Hamilton's Essays_, p. 22.\n\n\"To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception of the\nAbsolute and Infinity, from whatever side we view it, appears\nencompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing\nsuch an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others;\nand there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a\ncontradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in\nconceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as\npersonal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.\nIt cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without\nequal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived\nas the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only\nof that sum.\"--_Limits of Religious Thought_, pp. 84, 85.\n\nWe have quoted thus largely, preferring that the Limitists should speak\nfor themselves. Their doctrine, as taught, not simply in these passages,\nbut throughout their writings, may be briefly summed up as follows.\n\nThe human mind, whenever it attempts to investigate the profoundest\nsubjects which come before it, and which it is goaded to examine, finds\nitself in an inextricable maze of contradictions; and, after vainly\nstruggling for a while to get out, becomes nonplussed, confused,\nconfounded, dazed; and, falling down helpless and effortless in the\nmaze, and with devout humility acknowledging its impotence, it finds\nthat the \"highest reason\" is to pass beyond the sphere and out of the\nlight of reason, into the sphere of a superrational and therefore dark,\nand therefore _blind_ faith.\n\nBut it is to be stated, and here we strike to the centre of the errors\nof the Limitists, that a perception and confession of mental impotence\nis _not_ the logical deduction from their premises. Lustrous as may be\ntheir names in logic,--and Sir William Hamilton is esteemed a sun in the\nlogical firmament,--no one of them ever saw, or else dared to\nacknowledge, the logical sequence from their principles. They have\nclimbed upon the dizzy heights of thought, and out on their verge; and\nthere they stand, hesitating and shivering, like naked men on Alpine\nprecipices, with no eagle wings to spread and soar away towards the\nEternal Truth; and not daring to take the awful plunge before them.\nBehold the gulf from which they shrink. Mr. Mansel says:--\n\n\"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty\nto believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile\nthese two representations with each other, as our conception of\npersonality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion\nof infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists\nanywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any\nimpossibility in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction,\nin this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary\nconsequence of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend\nthe boundaries of his own consciousness. It proves that there are limits\nto man's power of thought; and it proves no more.\"--_Limits of Religious\nThought_, p. 106.\n\nOr, to put it in sharp and accurate, plain and unmistakable English. \"It\nis our duty to think of God as personal,\" when to think of Him as\npersonal is to think a lie; \"to believe that He is infinite,\" when so to\nbelieve is to believe the lie already thought; and when to believe a lie\nis to incur the penalty decreed by the Bible--God's book--upon all who\nbelieve lies. And this is the religious teaching of a professed\nChristian minister in one of the first Universities in the world. Not\nthat Mr. Mansel meant to teach this. By no means. But it logically\nfollows from his premises. In his philosophy the mind instinctively,\nnecessarily, and with equal authority in each case, asserts\n\nThat there must be an infinite Being;\n\nThat that Being must be Self-conscious,\n\nMust be unlimited; and that\n\nConsciousness is a limitation.\n\nThese assertions are contradictory and self-destructive. What follows\nthen? That the mind is impotent? No! It follows that the mind is a\ndeceiver! We learn again the lesson we have learned before. It is not\nweakness, it is falsehood: it is not want of capacity, it is want of\nintegrity that is proved by this contradiction. Man is worse than a\nhopeless, mental imbecile, he is a hopeless, mental cheat.\n\nBut is the result true? How can it be, when with all its might the mind\nrevolts from it, as nature does from a vacuum? True that the human mind\nis an incorrigible falsifier? With the indignation of outraged honesty,\nman's soul rejects the insulting aspersion, and reasserts its own\nintegrity and authority. Ages of controversy have failed to obliterate\nor cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul, \"I have within myself\nthe ultimate standard of truth.\"\n\nIt now devolves to account for the aberrations of the Limitists. The\nground of all their difficulties is simple and plain. While denying to\nthe human mind the faculty of the Pure Reason, they have, _by the (to\nthem) undistinguished use of that faculty_, raised questions which the\nUnderstanding by no possibility could raise, which the Reason alone is\ncapable of presenting, and which that Reason alone can solve; and have\nattempted to solve them solely by the assistance, and in the forms of,\nthe Sense and the Understanding. Their problems belong to a spiritual\nperson; and they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an\nanimal nature. Better, by far, could they see with their ears. All their\nprocesses are developed on the vicious assumption, that the highest form\nof knowledge possible to the human mind is a generalization in the\nUnderstanding, upon facts given in the Sense: a form of knowledge which\nis always one, whether the substance be distinguished in the form, be a\npeach, as diverse from an apple; or a star, as one among a million. The\nmeagreness and utter insufficiency of this doctrine, to account for all\nthe phenomena of the human mind, we have heretofore shown; and shall\ntherefore need only now to distinguish certain special phases of their\nfundamental error.\n\nAs heretofore, there will be continual occasion to note how the doctrine\nof the Limitists, that the Understanding is man's highest faculty of\nknowledge, and the logical sequences therefrom respecting the laws of\nthought and consciousness vitiate their whole system. One of their most\nimportant errors is thus expressed:--\"To be conscious, we must be\nconscious of something; and that something can only be known as that\nwhich it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not.\" \"Thought\ncannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the\nantithesis of subject and object of thought known only in correlation,\nand mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all that\nwe know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a\nknowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of\nthe modified, of the phenomenal.\" In other words, our highest possible\nform of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach, distinguish its\nqualities among themselves, and discriminate between them and the\nqualities of the apple. And Sir William Hamilton fairly and truly\nacknowledges that, as a consequence, science, except as a system of\nobjects of sense, is impossible.\n\nThe fact is, as has been made already sufficiently apparent, that the\ndiagnosis by the Limitists of the constitution of the mind is erroneous.\nTheir dictum, that all knowledge must be attained through \"relation,\nplurality, and difference,\" is not true. There is a kind of knowledge\nwhich we obtain by a direct and immediate _sight_; and that, too, under\nsuch conditions as are no limitation upon the object thought. For\ninstance, the mind, by a direct intuition, affirms, \"Malice is\ncriminal.\" It also affirms that this is an eternal, immutable, universal\nlaw, conditional for all possibility of moral beings. This direct and\nimmediate sight, and the consciousness attending it, are _full_ of that\none object, and so are occupied only with it; and it does NOT come under\nany forms of relation, plurality, and difference. So is it with all _a\npriori_ laws. The mode of the pure reason is thus seen to be the direct\nopposite of that of the Understanding and the Sense.\n\nIntimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose importance\ncannot be overstated. It is one which involves the very possibility of\nGod's existence as a self-conscious person. To present it, we recur\nagain to the extracts made just above from Sir William Hamilton.\n\"Consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and\nobject of thought known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each\nother.\" Subsequently, he makes the acknowledgment as logically following\nfrom this: \"that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such\nknowledge,\" _i. e._ of the absolute, \"even in the Deity himself.\" That\nis, God can be believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the\nhuman intellect is a cheat. The theory which underlies this assertion of\nthe logician--a theory not peculiar to the Limitists, but which has,\nperhaps, been hitherto universally maintained by philosophers--may be\nconcisely stated thus. In every correlation of subject and object,--in\nevery instance where they are to be contrasted,--the subject must be\none, and the object must be _another and different_. Hamilton, in\nanother place, utters it thus: \"Look back for a moment into yourselves,\nand you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble\nconsciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of which the one\nperceives the other, of which the other is perceived by the first; in\nthis consists self-knowledge,\" &c. Mark the \"several terms,\" and that\nthe one can only see the other, never itself.\n\nThis position is both a logical and psychological error. It is a logical\nerror because it _assumes_, without argument, that there is involved in\nthe terms subject and object such a logical contradiction and\ncontradistinction that the subject cannot be object to itself. This\nassumption is groundless. As a matter of fact, it is _generally_ true\nthat, so far as man is concerned, the subject is one, and the object\nanother and different. But this by no means proves that it is _always_\nso; it only raises the presumption that such may be the case. And when\none comes to examine the question in itself, there is absolutely no\nlogical ground for the assumption. It is found to be a question upon\nwhich no decision from logical considerations can have any validity,\nbecause _it is purely psychological_, and can only be decided by\nevidence upon a matter of fact. Furthermore, it is a psychological\nerror, because a careful examination shows that, in some instances, the\nopposite is the fact; that, in certain experiences, the subject and\nobject are identical.\n\nThis fact that the subject and object are often identical in the\nsearching eye of human reason, and _always_ so under the eye of\nUniversal Genius, is of too vast scope and too vital importance to be\npassed with a mere allusion. It seems amazing that a truth which, the\ninstant it is stated, solves a thousand difficulties which philosophy\nhas raised, should never yet have been affirmed by any of the great\nspiritual-eyed thinkers, and that it should have found utterance, only\nto be denied, by the pen of the Limitists. A word of personal\nreminiscence may be allowed here. The writer came to see this truth\nduring a process of thought, having for its object the solution of the\nproblem, How can the infinite Person be self-comprehending, and still\ninfinite? While considering this, and without ever having received a\nhint from any source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned\non a human mind before, there blazed upon him suddenly, like a heaven\nfull of light, this, which appeared the incomparably profounder\nquestion: How can any soul, not God only, but any soul, be a\nself-examiner? Why don't the Limitists entertain and explain this? It\nwas only years after that he met the negative statement in Herbert\nSpencer's book. The difficulty is, that the Limitists have represented\nto their minds the mode of the seeing of the Reason, by a sensuous\nimage, as the eye; and because the eye cannot see itself, have concluded\nthat the Reason cannot see itself. It is always dangerous to argue from\nan illustration; and, in this instance, it has been fatal. If man was\nonly an animal nature, and so only a _receiver_ of impressions, with a\ncapacity to generalize from the impressions received, the doctrine of\nthe Limitists would be true. But once establish that man is also a\nspiritual _person_, with a reason, which sees truth by immediate\nintuition, and their whole teaching becomes worthless. The Reason is not\nreceptivity merely, or mainly; it is originator. In its own light it\ngives to itself _a priori_ truth, and itself as seeing that truth; and\nso the subject and object are identical. This is one of the\ndifferentiating qualities of the spiritual person.\n\nOur position may be more accurately stated and more amply illustrated\nand sustained as follows:\n\n_Sometimes, in the created spiritual person, and always in the\nself-existent, the absolute and infinite spiritual Person, the subject\nand object are_ IDENTICAL.\n\n1. Sometimes in the created spiritual person, the subject and object are\nidentical. The question is a question of fact. In illustrating the fact,\nit will be proved. When a man looks at his hands, he sees they are\ninstruments for _his_ use. When he considers his physical sense, he\nstill perceives it to be instrument for _his_ use. In all his\nconclusions, judgments, he still finds, not himself, but _his_\ninstrument. Even in the Pure Reason he finds only _his_ faculty; though\nit be the highest possible to intellect. Yet still he searches, searches\nfor the _I am_; which claims, and holds, and uses, the faculties and\ncapacities. There is a phrase universally familiar to American\nChristians, a fruit of New England Theology, which leads us directly to\nthe goal we seek. It is the phrase, \"self-examination.\" In all thorough,\nreligious self-examination the subject and object are identical. In the\nordinary labors and experiences of life, man says, \"I can do this or\nthat;\" and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities. But\nin this last, this profoundest act, the assertion is not, \"I can do this\nor that.\" It is, \"I am this or that.\" The person stands unveiled before\nitself, in the awful sanctuary of God's presence. The decision to be\nmade is not upon the use of one faculty or another. It is upon the end\nfor which all labor shall be performed. The character of the person is\nunder consideration, and is to be determined. The selfhood, with all its\nwondrous mysteries, is at once subject and object. The I am in man,\nalike in kind to that most impenetrable mystery, the eternal I AM of\n\"the everlasting Father,\" is now stirred to consider its most solemn\nduty. How shall the finite I am accord _itself_ to the pure purpose of\nthe infinite I AM? It may be, possibly is, that some persons have never\nbeen conscious of this experience. To some, from a natural inaptitude,\nand to others, from a perverse disinclination, it may never come. Some\nhave so little gift of introspection, that their inner experiences are\nnever observed and analyzed. Their conduct may be beautiful, but they\nnever know it. Their impressions ever come from without. Another class\nof persons shun such an experience as Balshazzar would have shunned, if\nhe could, the handwriting on the wall. Their whole souls are absorbed in\nthe pursuit of earthly things. They are intoxicated with sensuous\ngratification. The fore-thrown shadow of the coming thought of\nself-examination awakens within them a vague instinctive dread; and they\nshudder, turn away, and by every effort avoid it. Sometimes they\nsucceed; and through the gates of death rush headlong into the\nspirit-land, only to be tortured forever there with the experience they\nso successfully eluded here. For the many thousands, who know by\nexperience what a calm, candid, searching, self-examination is, now that\ntheir attention has been drawn to its full psychological import, no\nfurther word is necessary. They know that in that supreme insight there\nwas seen and known, at one and the same instant, in a spontaneous and\nsimultaneous action of the soul, the seer and the seen as one, as\nidentical. And this experience is so wide-spread, that the wonder is\nthat it has not heretofore been assigned its suitable place in\nphilosophy.\n\n2. Always in the self-existent, the absolute and infinite, spiritual\nPerson, the subject and object are identical. This question, though one\nof fact, cannot be determined _by us_, by our experience; it must be\nshown to follow logically from certain _a priori_ first principles. This\nmay be done as follows. Eternity, independence, universality, are\nqualities of God. Being eternal, he is ever the same. Being independent,\nhe excludes the possibility of another Being to whom he is necessarily\nrelated. Being universal, he possesses all possible endowment, and is\nground for all possible existence; so that no being can exist but by his\nwill. As Universal Genius, all possible objects of knowledge or\nintellectual effort are immanent before the eye of his Reason; and this\nis a _permanent state_. He is an object of knowledge, comprehending all\nothers; and therefore he _exhaustively_ knows himself. He distinguishes\nhis Self as object, from no what else, because there is no else to\ndistinguish his Self from; but having an exhaustive self-comprehension,\nhe distinguishes within that Self all possible forms of being each from\neach.\n\nHe is absolute, and never learns or changes. There is nothing to learn\nand nothing to change to, except to a wicked state; and for this there\n_can be to him no temptation_. He is ever the same, and hence there can\nbe no instant in time when he does not _exhaustively_ know himself. Thus\nalways in him are the subject and object identical.\n\nThese two great principles, viz: That the Pure Reason sees _a priori_\ntruth _immediately_, and out of all relation, plurality and difference,\nand that in the Pure Reason, in self-examination, the subject and object\nare identical, by their simple statement explode, as a Pythagorean\nsystem, the mental astronomy of the Limitists. Reason is the sun, and\nthe Sense and the Understanding, with their satellite faculties, the\ncircumvolving planets.\n\nThe use of terms by the Limitists has been as vicious as their processes\nof thought, and has naturally sprung from their fundamental error. We\nwill note one in the following sentence. \"Consciousness, in the only\nform in which we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the\nperception of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object\nwith others.\" Conceive is the vicious word. Strictly, it is usable only\nwith regard to things in Nature, and can have no relevancy to such\nsubjects as are now under consideration. It is a word which expresses\n_only_ such operations as lie in the Sense and Understanding. The\nfollowing definition explains this: \"The concept refers to all the\nthings whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives\n(con-cepis), or _grasps together_ into one class and one act of\nmind.\"--_Bowen's Logic_, p. 7. This is not the mode of the Reason's\naction at all. It does not run over a variety of objects and select out\nfrom them the points of similarity, and grasp these together into one\nact of mind. It sees one object in its unity as pure law, or first\ntruth; and examines that in its own light. Hence, the proper word is,\n_intuits_. Seen from this standpoint, consciousness does _not_ imply\nlimitation and change. A first truth we always see as _absolute_,--we\nare conscious of this sight; and yet we know that neither consciousness\nnor sight is any limitation upon the truth. We would paraphrase the\nsentence thus: Consciousness, in the highest form in which we know it,\nimplies and possesses _permanence_; and is the light in which pure truth\nis seen as pure object by itself, and forever the same.\n\nIt is curious to observe how the Understanding and the Pure Reason run\nalong side by side in the same sentence; the inferior faculty\nencumbering and defeating the efforts of the other. Take the following\nfor example.\n\n\"If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very\npossibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher\nperfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic\nfeature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and\ndiscerned as an object of consciousness.\" The presence in language of\nthe word infinite and its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence\nof a faculty capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation.\nThis faculty, the Reason having presented the subject for consideration,\nthe Understanding seizes upon it and drags it down into her den, and\nsays, \"can be that which it is not.\" This she says, because she cannot\nact, except to conceive, and cannot conceive, except to distinguish\nthis from something else; and so cannot perceive that the very utterance\nof the word \"infinite\" excludes the word \"else.\" The Understanding\nconceives the finite as one and independent, and the infinite as one and\nindependent. Then the Reason steps in, and says the infinite is\nall-comprehending. This conflicts with the Understanding's _conception_,\nand so the puzzle comes. In laboring for a solution, the Reason's\naffirmation is expressed hypothetically: \"If it (the infinite) is\nactually everything;\" and thereupon the Understanding puts in its blind,\nimpertinent assertion, \"it possesses no characteristic feature by which\nit can be distinguished from anything else.\" _There is nothing else from\nwhich to distinguish it._ The perception of the Reason is as follows.\nThe infinite Person comprehends intellectually, and is ground for\npotentially and actually, all that is possible and real; and so there\ncan be no else with which to compare him. Because, possessing all\nfulness, he is actually everything, by this characteristic feature of\ncompleteness he distinguishes himself from nothing, which is all there\nis, (if no-thing--void--can be said to _be_,) beside him; and from any\npart, which there is within him. Thus is he object to himself in his own\nconsciousness.\n\nThis vicious working of the Understanding against the Reason, in the\nsame sentences, can be more fully illustrated from the following\nextracts. \"God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence\nto relative manifestation, is determined to pass either _from the better\nto the worse, or from the worse to the better_. A third possibility that\nboth states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted\nby our author, it is not necessary to consider.\"--_Sir William\nHamilton's Essays_, p. 42. \"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as\ncoming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it\nmust be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to\nconceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for\nthat which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that\nconception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but if we\nthink of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at\none time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it\nas already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the\nprogress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very\nthought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems\nforced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the\ncondition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is\nconceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the\nCreator.\"--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 81.\n\n\"God,\" a word which has _no significance_ except to the Reason: \"as\nnecessarily determined,\"--a phrase which belongs only to the\nUnderstanding. The opposite is the truth: \"to pass from absolute\nessence.\" This can have no meaning except to the Pure Reason: \"to\nrelative manifestation.\" This belongs to the Understanding. It\ncontradicts the other; and the process is absurd. The mind balks in the\nattempt to think it. In creation there is no such process as \"passing\nfrom absolute essence to relative manifestation.\" The words imply that\nGod, in passing from the state of absolute essence, ceased to be\nabsolute essence, and became \"relative manifestation.\" All this is\nabsurd; and is in the Understanding and Sense. God never _became_. The\nCreator is still absolute essence, as before creation; and the\nlogician's this or that are both false; and his third possibility is not\na contradiction, but the truth. The fact of creation may be thus stated.\nThe infinite Person, freely according his will to the behest of his\nworth, and yet equally free to not so accord his will, put forth from\nhimself the creative energy; and this under such modes, that he neither\nlost nor gained by the act; but that, though the latter state was\ndiverse from the first, still neither was better than the other, but\nboth were equally good. Before creation, he possessed absolute plenitude\nof endowments. All possible ideals were present before his eye. All\npossible joy continued a changeless state in his sensibility. His will,\nas choice, was absolute benevolence; and, as act, was competent to all\npossible effort. To push the ideal out, and make it real, added nothing\nto, and subtracted nothing from, his fulness.\n\nThe fact must be learned that muscular action and the working of pure\nspirit are so diverse, that the inferior mode cannot be an illustration\nof the superior. A change in a pure spirit, which neither adds nor\nsubtracts, leaves the good unchanged. Hence, when the infinite Person\ncreated, he passed neither from better to worse, nor from worse to\nbetter; but the two states, though diverse, were equally good.\n\nWe proceed now to the other extract. \"Again, how can the relative,\" etc.\n\"If the Relative is a distinct reality from the absolute,\" then each is\n_self-existent_, and independent. The sentence annihilates itself. \"It\nmust be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence.\" The\nimage here is from the Sense, as usual, and vicious accordingly. It is,\nthat the soul is to look into void, and see, out of that void, existence\ncome, without there being any cause for that existence coming. This\nwould be the phenomenon to the Sense. And the Sense is utterly unable to\naccount for the phenomenon. The object in the Sense must appear as\n_form_; but in the Reason it is idea. Mr. Mansel's presentation may well\nbe illustrated by a trick of jugglery. The performer stands before his\naudience, dressed in tights, and presents the palms of his hands to the\nspectators, apparently empty. He then closes his right hand, and then\nopening it again, appears holding a bouquet of delicious flowers, which\nhe hands about to the astonished gazers. The bouquet seems to come from\nnothing, _i. e._ to have no cause. It appears \"to pass from\nnon-existence to existence.\" But common sense corrects the cheating\nseeming, and asserts, \"There is an adequate cause for the coming of the\nbunch of flowers, though we cannot see it.\" Precisely similar is\ncreation. Could there have been a Sense present at that instant,\ncreation would have seemed to it a juggler's trick. Out of nothing\nsomething would have seemed to come. But under the correcting guide of\nthe Pure Reason, an adequate cause is found. Before creation, the\ninfinite Person did not manifest himself; and so was actually alone. At\ncreation his power, which before was immanent, he now made emanent; and\nput it forth in the forms chosen from his Reason, and according to the\nrequirement of his own worth. Nothing was added to God. That which was\nideal he now made actual. The form as Idea was one, the power as\nPotentiality was another, and each was in him by itself. He put forth\nthe power into the form, the Potentiality into the Idea, and the\nUniverse was. Thus it was that \"the Relative came into being.\" In the\nsame manner it might be shown how, all along through the writings of the\nLimitists, the Understanding runs along by the Reason, and vitiates her\nefforts to solve her problems. We shall have occasion to do something of\nthis farther on.\n\nThe topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished without an\nexamination of the celebrated dictum, \"To think is to condition.\" Those\nwho have held this to be universally true, have also received its\nlogical sequence, that to the finite intellect God cannot appear\nself-comprehending. In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not\na universal, but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, to\ncircumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall best enter upon\nthis labor by answering the question, What is thinking?\n\nFirst. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is called thinking.\nSecond. Specifically, all acts of reflection are thinkings. Under this\nhead we notice two points. _a._ That act of the Understanding in which\nan object presented by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and\ngeneric elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations\ndetermined, is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I\ndistinguish specifically that it is domestic, and generically that it is\ncarnivorous. _b._ That act of the finite spiritual person by which he\ncompares the judgments of the Understanding with the _a priori_ laws of\nthe Pure Reason, and by this final standard decides their truth or\nerror. Thus, the judgment of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought\nto hunt down and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The\nstandard of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is found\nto involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, the intuitions of\nthe reason. These, in the finite person, come _after_ a process of\nreflection, and are partly consequent upon it; yet they take place in\nanother faculty, which is developed by this process; but they are such,\nthat by no process of reflection _alone_ could they be. Thinking, in the\nUniversal Genius, is the _sight_, at once and forever, of all possible\nobject of mental effort. It is necessary and _spontaneous_, and so is an\nendowment, not an attainment; and is possessed without effort. We are\nprepared now to entertain the following statements:--\n\nA. So far as it represents thinking as the active, _i. e._ causative\nground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not true. The fact of\nthe thinking is not, cannot be, the ground of the condition. The\ncondition of the object thought, whatever the form of thinking may be,\nmust lie as far back at least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's\nself, as ground for his Genius, must also be ground for _all_\nconditions. Yet men think of an object _in its conditions_. This is\nbecause the same Being who constructed the objects in their conditions,\nconstructed also man as thinker, _correlated to those conditions_, so\nthat he should think upon things _as they are_. In this view, to think\nis not condition, but is mental activity in the conditions already\nimposed. Thus it is with the Understanding; and the process of thinking,\nas above designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in _a_,\nof the second general definition. It follows, therefore,\n\nB. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within the sphere\nof conditions proper,--observing the distinction of conditions into two\nclasses heretofore made,--the finite intellect must act under them, and\nsee those objects upon which they lie, accordingly,--as, for instance,\na geometrical figure must be seen in Time and Space,--so far it is true,\nand no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, is to see it under\nall the conditions imposed upon the bird as flying, and the observer as\nseeing. But when men intuit the _a priori_ truth, Malice is criminal,\nthey perceive that it lies under no conditions proper, but is absolute\nand universal. We perceive, then,\n\nC. That for all mental operations which have as object pure laws and\nideal forms, and that Being in whom all these inhere, this dictum is not\ntrue. The thinker may be conditioned in the proper sense of that term;\nyet he entertains objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they\nare not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality of the\nprinciple in morals above noted that I perceive it to be such, and that\nnecessarily.\n\nAssuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, is meant,\nnot that the thinker, by the act of thinking, constructs the conditions,\nbut that he recognizes in himself, as thinking subject, and in the\nobject thought, the several conditions (proper) thereof,--the following\nstatements will define the province of this dictum.\n\n1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, and the\ndiscursive Understanding, lie wholly within it.\n\n2. Created spiritual persons, _as constituted beings,_ also lie wholly\nwithin it. _But it extends no farther._ On the other hand,\n\n3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit pure laws,\nand pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms themselves lie wholly\nwithout it.\n\n4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those laws and forms\ninhere. Or, in general terms,\n\nWhen conditions (proper) already lie upon the object thought, since the\nthinker must needs see the object under its conditions, it is true that,\nTo think is to condition. But so far as it is meant that thinking is\nsuch a kind of operation that it cannot proceed except the object be\nconditioned, it is not true; for there are processes of thought whose\nobjects are unconditioned.\n\nThe question, \"What are Space and Time?\" with which Mr. Spencer opens\nhis chapter on \"Ultimate Scientific Ideas,\" introduces a subject common\nto all the Limitists, and which, therefore, should be considered in this\npart of our work. A remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in\nthe \"North American Review\" for October 1864, applies with equal force\nhere in reference to another essay by the same writer, in the preceding\nJuly number of that periodical. At most, his view can only be unfolded.\nHe has left nothing to be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and\ndifficult as this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought\nat least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than the\nSense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and so will we do.\n\nIn general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are _a priori_\nconditions of created being. The following extracts are in point. \"Pure\nSpace, therefore, as given in the primitive intuition, is pure form for\nany possible phenomenon. As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is\ngiven in the primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and\nuniversal. Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological\norder subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction from experience,\nnor at all given by experience; but it is wholly independent of all\nexperience, prior to it, and without which it were impossible that any\nexperience of outer object should be.\" \"Pure Time, as given in the\nintuition, is immediately beheld to be conditional for all possible\nperiod, prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily\ncontinuing, though all bounded period be taken away.\"--_Rational\nPsychology_, pp. 125, 128.\n\nAgain, a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as\nconditions. Space is the _a priori_ condition of _material_ being.\nShould a spiritual person, as the soul of a man, be stripped of all its\nmaterial appurtenances, and left to exist as pure spirit, it could hold\nno communication with any other being but God; and no other being but he\ncould hold any communication with it. It would exist out of all relation\nto Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the _a priori_ condition\nof all created being, of the spiritual as well as material. In the case\njust alluded to, the isolated spiritual person would have a\nconsciousness of succession and duration, although he would have no\nstandard by which to measure that duration, he could think in processes,\nand only in processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time.\nDr. Hickok has expressed this thus: \"Space in reference to time has no\nsignificancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the\ninternal sense only, and in these there can be only succession. The\ninner phenomenon may endure in time, but can have neither length,\nbreadth, nor thickness in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon,\nmay fill a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may\nbe before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with any\nouter or inner side.\"--_Rational Psychology_, p. 135.\n\nSpace and Time may also be distinguished thus: \"Space has three\ndimensions,\" or, rather, there can be three dimensions in\nspace,--length, breadth, and thickness. In other words, it is solid\nroom. \"Time has but one dimension,\" or, rather, but one dimension can\nenter into Time,--length. In Time there can only be procession. Space\nand Time may then be called, the one \"statical,\" the other \"dynamical,\"\nillimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they may be\ndefined as follows:\n\n\"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.\n\n\"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence.\"\n\nBoth, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and\nillimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object may come\ninto it; the other, that event may occur in it. There is for neither a\nfinal unit nor any limit. All objects are divisible in Space, and all\nperiods in Time; and thus also are all limits comprehended, but they are\nwithout limit. Turning now from these more general aspects of the\nsubject, a detailed examination may be conducted as follows.\n\nThe fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen above, that\nSpace and Time are _a priori_ conditions of created being. We can best\nconsider this law in its application to the facts, by observing two\ngeneral divisions, with two sub-divisions under each. Space and Time\nhave, then, two general phases, one within, and one without, the mind.\nEach of these has two special phases. The former, one in the Sense, and\none in the Understanding. The latter, one within, and one without, the\nUniverse.\n\nFirst general phase within the mind. First special phase, in the Sense.\n\"As pure form in the primitive intuition, they are wholly limitless, and\nvoid of any conjunction in unity, having themselves no figure nor\nperiod, and having within themselves no figure nor period, but only pure\ndiversity, in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and\nperiods may, in some way, be effected.\" In other words, they are pure,\n_a priori_, formal laws, which are conditional to the being of any sense\nas the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this sense could present no\nfigure or period, till some figure or period was produced into it by an\nexternal agency. As such necessary formal laws, Space and Time \"have a\nnecessity of being independently of all phenomena.\" Or, in other words,\nthe fact that all phenomena _must_ appear in them, lies beyond the\nprovince of power. This, however, is no more a limit to the Deity than\nit is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good. In\nour experience the Sense gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the\nactual phenomena of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with\nideal objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the physical\nsense, of a material object, as a house; the other, by the activity of\nthe imaging faculty, engaged in constructing some form in the inner or\nmental sense, from forms actually observed. Upon both alike the formal\nlaw of Space and Time must lie.\n\nSecond special phase, in the Understanding. Although there is pure form,\nif there was no more than this, no notion of a system of things could\nbe. Each object would have its own space, and each event its own time.\nBut one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another\nobject and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some ground\nby which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a\nunity of Space and Time; so that all objects shall be seen in one Space,\nand all events in one Time. \"A notional connective for the phenomena may\ndetermine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of\nall space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena and their\nspace and time in an objective experience.\" The operation of the\nUnderstanding is, then, the connection, by a notional, of all particular\nspaces and times; _i. e._ the space and time of each phenomenon in the\nSense, into a comprehensive unity of Space and Time, in which all\nphenomena can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, not\nonly must each phenomenon be seen in its own space and time, but all\nphenomena must be seen in _one_ Space and Time. This connection of the\nmanifold into unity is the peculiar work of the Understanding. An\nexamination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a\ngeneral formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law\ngiven by the Reason. That law, that all objects must be seen in Space,\nand all events in Time, involves the subordinate law:\n\n_That no mind can observe material objects or any events except under\nthe conditions of Space and Time_; or, to change the phraseology, _Space\nand Time are_ a priori _conditional to the being of any mind or faculty\nin a mind capable of observing a material object or any event_. This\nwill, perhaps, be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However\nthat may be, this is true, but is only _a part of the truth_. The rest\nwill appear just below. The reader will notice that no exception is made\nto the law here laid down, and will start at the thought that this law\nlies upon the Deity equally as upon created beings. No exception is\nmade, because none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as\nunqualified in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on an\nearlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of numbers does the law\nof Space and Time condition all intellect. The Deity can no more see a\nhouse out of all relation to Space and Time than he can see how to make\ntwo and two five.\n\nSecond general phase, without the mind. First special phase, within the\nUniverse. All that we are now to examine is objective to us; and all the\nquestions which can arise are questions of fact. Let us search for the\nfact carefully and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It\nwas found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and Time as\npure conditions for matter and event. We are now to observe the pure\nbecome the actual condition; or, in other words, we are to see the\ncondition _realized_. Since, then, we are to observe material objects\nand events in a material system, it is fitting to use the Sense and the\nUnderstanding; and our statements and conclusions will conform to those\nfaculties.\n\nWe have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in the form of a\nsphere in which all things are included. This spherical system is\ncomplete, definite, limited, and so has boundaries. A portion of\n\"immeasurable void\"--Space--has been occupied. Where there was nothing,\nsomething has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our\nhaving a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time in the\nUniverse, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying,\nall-pervading substance, which fills and forms the boundaries of the\nUniverse, and thus enables spaces and times to be. We have no concept\nexcept as in limits, and those limits are conceived to be substance. In\nother words, space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept.\nTake away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession of\nevents which forms the duration, and in the concept pure negation is\nleft. To illustrate. Suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of\nvacuum. Is this vacuum an entity? Not at all. It can neither be\nperceived by the Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a\nspace. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube was object to\nus. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries. All, then,\nthat is object, all that is entity, is substance. In our concept,\ntherefore, a space is solid distance within the substance, and the\ntotality of all distances in the Universe is conceived to be Space.\nAgain; suppose there pass before our mind a procession of events. One\nevent has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession of events is\na time, and the recurring event marks a period in time. The events\nproceeding are all that there is in the concept; and apart from the\nprocession a conception of time is impossible. The procession of all the\nevents of the Universe, that is _duration_, is our concept of Time.\nThus, within the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration;\nand neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. Let us assume\nfor a moment that our concept is the final truth, and observe the\nresult. In that concept space is limited by matter, and matter is\nconceived of as unlimited. This result is natural and necessary, because\nmatter, substance, \"a space-filling force,\" is the underlying notional\nupon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is truly\nillimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really atheism,\nlogically follows. Again; in our concept time is duration, and duration\nis conceived of as unlimited. If so, the during event is unlimited. From\nthis hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows. But bring our\nconcept into the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and\nall ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of finding\nmatter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is seen to be\nillimitable and pure condition, that matter may establish a limit within\nit. And Time, instead of being duration, and so limited by the during\nevent, is found to be illimitable and pure condition, that event may\nhave duration in it. This brings us to the\n\nSecond special phase, without or independent of the Universe. We have\nbeen considering facts in an objective experience, and have used\ntherefore the Sense and Understanding, as was proper. What we are now to\nconsider is a subject of which all experience is impossible. It can\ntherefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure\nReason. Remove now from our presence all material object in Space, and\nall during event in Time; in a word, remove the Universe, and what will\nbe left? As the Universe had a beginning, and both it and all things in\nit are conditioned by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will\nits conditions cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, upon\nwhich would be imposed no conditions of Space and Time? These questions\nare answered in the statement of them. Those conditions must remain.\nWhen we have abstracted from our _concept_ all substance and duration,\nthere is left only _void_. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to\nsay that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe there was\nvoid. Also, that in void there is no thing, no where, and no when; or,\nvoid is the negation of actual substance, space and time. But pure Space\nand Time, as _a priori_ conditions that material object and during event\nmay be, have not ceased. There is still _room_, that an object may\nbecome. There is still _opportunity_, that an event may occur. By the\nReason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being\nfor material object and occurring event, as the conditions of mental\nactivity have for mind; and they have their peculiar characteristics\nexactly according with what they do condition, just as the laws of\nthought have their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to\nwhat they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the moral law must\nbe given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him; and this is\nan _a priori_ condition of the being of such person. Precisely similar\nis the relation between Space and Time as _a priori_ conditions, and\nobject and event upon which they lie. The moral law has its\ncharacteristics, which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and\nTime have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object and\nevent. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, and both as _a\npriori_ conditions of a Universe, must have the same necessity of being\nthat God has. They _must_ be, as he _must_ be. But observe, they are\npure conditions, and no more. They are neither things nor persons. The\nidea of them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can be\nassigned their logical position, but further than this the mind cannot\ngo.\n\nThe devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of the positions\nstated above. We have not wrought to pain such soul, but only for truth,\nand the clue of escape from all dilemmas. The only question to be raised\nis, are they true? If a more patient investigation than we have given to\nthis subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only have\nfailed as others before us have; but we shall love the truth which shall\nbe found none the less. But if they shall be found true, then is it\ncertain that God always knew them so and was always pleased with them,\nand no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them,\nhowever much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. Most\nblessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those\npure words of the apostle John, \"No lie is of the truth.\"\n\nThe conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is\nthat primarily God was out of all relation to Space and Time. He was out\nof all relation to Space, because he is not material object, thereby\nhaving limits, form, and position in Space. He was out of all relation\nto Time, because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible\nobjects of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can learn\nnothing, and can experience no process of thought. Within his mind no\nevent occurs, no substance endures. Yet, while this is true, it is\nequally true that, as the Creator, he is conditioned by Space and Time,\njust as he is conditioned by himself; and it may be found by future\nexamination that they are essential to that Self. But, whatever\nconclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a\nsubject, this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute\nspiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; and\nSpace and Time, whatever they are, will, _can_ in no wise interfere with\nand compromise his perfectness and supremacy. It is a pleasure to be\nable to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as\nthose contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore\nalluded to.\n\n\"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are veiled in\nimpenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to\nSpace and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of God. Such\ntimidity has but a slender title to respect. If the Laws of Thought\nnecessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion\nthat Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this\nresult with the infinity of God, there is no alternative but to accept\nof scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join\nin the search for truth, who trembles at the sight of it when found. But\na profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by\nanticipation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is infinite,\nTime is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. Limitation\nis possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be\ntwo infinite Spaces, two infinite Times, or two infinite Gods; but while\ninfinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds\nmay. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space;\nwhen a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite Space\nand Time will limit the infinite God. _But not before._ Time exists\nubiquitously, Space exists eternally, God exists ubiquitously and\neternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so\nlong as Space and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and\nabsolutely incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or\nmutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is\nirreverent.\"\n\n\n\n\nPART III.\n\nAN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES IN THE WRITINGS\nOF THE LIMITISTS.\n\nADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.\n\n\nIt never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended\nexamination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice\nit particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the\nrefutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated\nessay, \"The Philosophy of the Unconditioned,\" a monograph that has\ngenerally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof;\nand which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments\nadduced, and illustrations presented, in the first part, in behalf of\nthe fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the analysis and\nattempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes,\nan excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as\nsufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and\nthe explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as\nSir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark\nwill be expected. A few subordinate passages in the essay above referred\nto may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of\ncriticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention\nis now called.\n\nIn remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: \"Now, it is\nmanifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the\nproposition, _that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is\nimmediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality,\nand relation_.\" It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism,\nthat the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when\nused to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite--what? The\nfact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates\nevery such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus\nstated:--The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in\nthat Person, is _immediately_ known in consciousness, and this, not by\ndifference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the\nPure Reason. In this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the\nReason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not\nknown by difference, because there is no other object but the one before\nthat eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality,\nbecause it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated,\nwith which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen\nto be what it is _in itself_, and as out of all relation. A little\nbelow, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin,\nthus:--\"The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of\nintelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of\nphilosophy.\" The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact\nthat, by a constituting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately\nintuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of _a priori_ first\nprinciples, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the\ncondition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.\n\nThese two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated\n\"statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the\nUnconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought.\" The\nfour \"opinions,\" to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are\ntoo well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to\nafford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is\nbelieved, the true opinion, which is as follows.\n\nThe infinite Person is \"inconceivable,\" but is cognizable as a fact, is\nknown to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all\nthis, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the\nspiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to\nbe primarily unconditioned, _i. e._ out of all relation, difference, and\nplurality.\n\n\"Inconceivable.\" As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force\nexcept with regard to things in nature.\n\nIs cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an\n_exhaustive_ knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But\nequally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive,\n_reliable_ knowledge of him _as he is_, we cannot be moral beings under\nhis moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the\nexpression of God's nature. 1. Either \"God is love,\" or he is not\nlove--hate; or he is indifferent, _i. e._ love has no relation to him.\nIf the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to\nthe subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true\nthat he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which\nthe Limitists assert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our\nwhole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is\npossible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we\nought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him\nand beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of\naffection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow;\nand, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable\nmystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does\nsuch a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer\nsensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a\nconclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made\nthe soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It\nis impossible, then, to think of God except as _love_. We know what love\nis. We know what God is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and\nhis spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as\nfollows.\n\n_In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities in common\nwith him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to\nwhich their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him\nnegatively;_ i. e. _they know that he is the opposite of themselves._\n\nThat passage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir\nWilliam Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the\nUnderstanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination.\nHe says: \"In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same\nfunction; both seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the\nConcept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the\nUnderstanding which has 'overleaped itself.'\" In this sentence, and the\nremarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends\nthe assigned function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any\naccurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes\njudgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than\nhis. For \"both faculties\" do _not_ \"perform the same function.\" Only the\nUnderstanding seeks \"the one in the many.\" The Reason seeks _the many in\nthe one_. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are\nexactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and\ngathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason\nsees the truth _first_, as necessary _a priori_ law, and holding it up\nas standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts\nin which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is guilty\nof a most glaring _petitio principii_. For, the very question at issue\nis, whether \"both faculties\" do \"perform the same function\"; whether\n\"both\" do \"seek the one in the many.\" In order not to leave the hither\nside of the question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to\nrevert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the\ntruth first. Take now the assertion, Malice is criminal. Is this\nprimarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which\nconditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to\nbe taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its\nletters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it\nspontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true\nexperience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an\nidea of right and wrong, as an _a priori_ law, is organic in man; and,\nby our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in\nconsciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one\nprinciple was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the\nmany acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was\nseen _first_, and as necessarily true. Take another illustration. All\nreligions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of\nagreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men,\nproduced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more\nsubtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form,\nis associated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How\nshall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first\nhuman beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable\nobjection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then\nthere would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant\npeople have the experience,--persons who never learned anything but the\nrudest forms of work, from the accumulated experience of others; nor by\ntheir own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple\nagricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one\nof the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said\nthey were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact,\nthat philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people,\neither immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the\nleast philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point,\nnone of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the\nidea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or\nBrahm, or God, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem\nthat any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men,\nwere this possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn now\nand examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above,\nrespecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come\ndirectly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its\nform, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual\ntakes it--\"the one,\"--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of\nnature--\"the many,\"--and is satisfied. And this is an experience not\npeculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the\nilliterate,--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions.\nThese illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length,\nshowing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are\naccustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as \"It is\ncloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow,\" but also to measure phenomena by\nan original and fixed standard, as, \"This man is malicious, and\ntherefore wicked.\" Between the two modes of procedure, the following\ndistinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful,\nonly probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what\nmay be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and\nexperience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is\nmade plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir\nWilliam Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely\nmistaken one class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the\nactuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind.\nIn view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that,\nwhether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never \"has clearly shown that\nthe idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality,\" for it is\nimpossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective\nreality is God; it therefore \"conveys\" to us the most important\n\"knowledge,\" and \"involves\" no \"contradictions.\" Moreover,\nunconditionedness is a \"simple,\" \"positive,\" \"notion,\" and not \"a\nfasciculus of negations\"; but is an attribute of God, who comprehends\nall positives. A little after, Hamilton says: \"And while he [Kant]\nappropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these\nnegations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of\n_Ideas_,\" &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the\nReason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they\nhypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative\nanswer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly,\nand the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of\nthought into _positive_ and _negative_ is simply absurd. All thought is\n_positive_. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient\nexpression for the refusal of the mind to think. But \"Ideas\" are not\nthoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the\noperations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are\na part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The\nphrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction,\nwe see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of\nthe human race affirms this.\n\nThe following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. \"For those who,\nwith M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and\nreal knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who\nconsequently employ the terms _Absolute_, _Infinite_, _Unconditioned_,\nas only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively\nbound to prove that their idea of _the One corresponds, either with that\nUnconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that\nUnconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes\nboth, or that it excludes both_. This they have not done, and, we\nsuspect, have never attempted to do.\" The italics are Hamilton's. The\nabove statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute,\ntherein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand,\nand an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term \"limited whole,\" as\napplied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since\nwe seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the\ndefinitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found\nconsistent, and pertinent to Space and Time, have been further found\nirrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is\nthe Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to Space\nand Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The\nterms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to\nhim, have entirely different significations from what they will when\napplied to Space and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in\nthis latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former.\nThe questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as\nmust those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the\nPerson, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as\nqualities, consistently inhere in that _unity_. As this has already been\ndone in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.\n\nSome pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton\nquotes from him as follows: \"The condition of intelligence _is\ndifference_; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists\na plurality of terms.\" In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues\nfrom this, thus: \"But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the\ncondition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference;\nconsequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which\nit must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of\nknowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable,\nit must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or,\nsecond, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of\nboth.\" Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: \"The _third_ hypothesis,\non the other hand, is _contradictory of the plurality of intelligence_;\nfor, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of\nterms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is\ntherefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at\nall, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of\nplurality and difference.\"\n\nIn these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author\nis informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician\npresents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost,\nif not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to assign\nplurality, relation, difference, and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of\nMr. Spencer--likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them\nthose who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The\nerror by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely\npsychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed\nout, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the\nSense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about,\nthings in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with\nan _absolutely certain_ knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject\nthis faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if\nthe logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If \"an\nact of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of\nterms,\" then is it impossible that we should know God, _or that he\nshould know himself_. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is\nrevolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of\nmental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not\nsatisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as\na most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is\nso plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked\nit. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will\ngive us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle\nthat _every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth_; and\nhold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is\ntrue. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic\nwill give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A\nplurality of terms is _not_ the necessary condition of intelligence; but\nobjects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly known by\nan intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference,\nand likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense\nand Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the\nReason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are\n_self-evident_, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions.\nWhatever knowledge we may have of \"mammals,\" we undoubtedly gain under\nthe conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for\n\"mammals\" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple,\nunanalyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a\ndirect insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and\nlikeness: for this is a _quality_ of the self-existent Person, and so\nbelongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined\nonly by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.\n\nLet us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given\nby the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for\nexample, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that\nmany characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color,\nskin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also,\nthat it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as\nwell, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One\ncolor belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover,\nrelates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is\ndistinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of\nlikeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different\nflavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and\npossesses those marks just named, which, though differing among\nthemselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a\ncommonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This\ndistinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of characteristics, and\nconnecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and\nUnderstanding.\n\n2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of _a priori_ laws,\nof these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of God as the\nSupreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental\ndifference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's\nattention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and\n_analysis_. In the latter it is by comprehension and _synthesis_. Take\nthe idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. No one but a\nLimitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr\nHopkins, \"that this idea of obligation or _oughtness_ is a simple idea.\"\nThis being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the\nauthor seeks to maintain. How may \"a simple idea\" be known? It cannot be\ndistinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is _sui generis_. Hence, it\ncannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If\nknown at all, it must be known _as it is in itself_, by a spontaneous\ninsight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason,\nand such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the\ndoctrine of \"intellectual intuition,\" M. Cousin was right, but wrong in\nsubjecting all knowledge \"to the conditions of plurality and\ndifference.\"\n\nNear the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states\ncertain problems, which he is \"confident\" Cousin cannot solve. There is\nnothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should\nhave so presented them. Following the passage--which is here\nquoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions.\n\n\"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)--(1) how liberty can be\nconceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a\nknowledge of that plurality;--(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by\npreference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final\ncauses;--(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without\noperating as an efficient cause;--(4) or how, in fine, morality can be\nfounded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking\nrefuge with chance;--these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his\nworks, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve.\"\n\n1. Liberty cannot be _conceived_. It must be intuited. There is \"a\nplurality of modes,\" and there is \"a knowledge of that plurality.\" 2. \"A\nfaculty\" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot\ndetermine itself _at all_. Only a _spiritual person_ can _resolve_, can\nhave a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence.\nBlind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be\ninfluenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and\nonly he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot \"be founded on a\nliberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;\"\nand, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as\npossible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the\nLimitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment\nboth in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and\nqualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is\nthoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to\nanswer this whole passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The\ninfinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible,\nand indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of\npersonality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint\nin the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a\nmultitude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which\nenables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring\naccuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure\nthe end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put\nin force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides\nthat the best mode shall _be_. He also possesses all-power. This is\n_his_ endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not\nperson, but _faculty_ in the person. So is it with the _power_. So then\nthis Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his\ndignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is\nefficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He\nis not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him\nto choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under\nchance, because he is _certain_ which is the best mode of action to gain\nthe end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity,\nwhich has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in\nthe motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for\nanswering _all_ difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or\nchance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's\nphilosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his\nfollowers.\n\n\n\n\nREVIEW OF \"LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.\"\n\n\nThis volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid\nand reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is\nmanifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety,\nand an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom\nits author reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe him\nto have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever\ninspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the\nintellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but\ndesire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems\ninscrutable.\n\nIn proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly\nnoticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found\nplainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the\nUnderstanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the\nconsequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge.\nThe word \"conceive\" he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the\nmind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word\nand act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies\nthem; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak\nof \"starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human\"; or of\n\"starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine\"; where, upon\nthe hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process,\nbased upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any\nknowledge of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the\nground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain\nrespects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly\ndeclared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, \"God made man\nin his own image.\" If man's mind is wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot\nknow truth as God knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty,\nman cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a\nmoral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must\nknow the law _as it is_. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will\ndo. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is\n_one_. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees\nit as God sees it, and feels the same obligation that God feels. And\nsuch an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an\nagent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of\nsociety are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be\nassumed as granted.\n\nOf the \"three terms, familiar as household words,\" which Mr. Mansel, in\nhis second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that \"First\nCause,\" if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and\nthat \"Infinite\" and \"Absolute\" are not pertinent to Cause, but to\nPerson. So then when we consider \"the Deity as He is,\" we consider him,\nnot as Cause, for this is _incidental_, but as the infinite and absolute\nPerson, for these three marks are _essential_. Further, these\nlast-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause\nexpresses \"an _a priori_ Element of connection, and thus a primitive\nunderstanding-conception.\" Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the\nterm Cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He\ndefines \"the Absolute\" to be \"that which exists in and by itself, having\nno necessary relation to any other Being,\" when it is rather the\nexclusion of the possibility of any other Being. Again, he defines \"the\nInfinite\" to be \"that which is free from all possible limitation; that\nthan which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can\nreceive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not\nfrom all eternity.\" \"That which\" means the thing which, for which is\nneuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the _Thing_. This _Thing_ \"is\nfree from all possible limitation.\" How can that be when the Being he\nthus defines is, must be, necessarily existent, and so is bound by one\nof the greatest of limitations, the inability to cease to be. But some\nlight may be thrown upon his use of the term \"limitation\" by the\nsubsequent portions of his definition. The Thing \"which is free from all\npossible limitation\" is \"that than which a greater is inconceivable.\"\nMoreover, this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible\n\"attributes,\" and is in every possible \"mode of existence\" \"from all\neternity.\" Respecting the phrase \"than which a greater is\ninconceivable,\" two suppositions may be made. Either there may be a\nthing \"greater\" than, and diverse from, all other things; or there may\nbe a thing greater than, and including all, other things. Probably the\nlatter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but it is Materialistic Pantheism. This\nBeing must be in every \"mode of existence\" \"from all eternity.\"\nPersonality is a \"mode of existence\"; therefore this Being must forever\nhave been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode of existence,\ntherefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. Yet again\nthese two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive; then this\nBeing must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually\nexclusive modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show\nthat Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the\nunderstanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, therefore,\nutterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great as to be without\nlimits? Has greatness anything to do with infinity? Manifestly not. It\nbecomes necessary, then, to recur to and amplify those definitions which\nwe have already given to the terms he uses.\n\nAbsoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary Being.\n\nAbsoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by which he is\nendowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and totality. Or in other\nwords, having this quality, he is wholly independent of any other being;\nand also the possibility of the existence of any other independent Being\nis excluded; and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all\npossible beings must depend.\n\nInfinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives him\nuniversality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that he possesses\nall possible endowments in perfection.\n\nPossessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external\nrestraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, which his\nvery constituting elements themselves impose, are not removed by these\nqualities. For instance, the possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom,\nPower, and the like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession\nof them in _perfect harmony_ is essential to his perfectness in the\nentirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars him from the\n_undue_ exercise of any one of his attributes; or, concisely, his\nperfection restrains him from being imperfect. We revert, then, to the\nfundamental distinction, attained heretofore, between improper\nlimitations, or those which are involved in perfection; and proper\nlimitations, or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence;\nand applying it here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of\nas belonging to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are\nnecessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection\nwhich constitutes him the Ultimate.\n\nIn this view infinity can have no relevancy to \"number.\" It is not that\nGod has one, or one million endowments. It asks no question about the\nnumber; and cares not for it. It is satisfied in the assertion that he\npossesses _all that are possible_, and in perfect harmony. It is,\nfurther, an idea, not a concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be\n\"conceived.\" No analogy of \"line\" or \"surface\" has any pertinence;\nbecause these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding and\nSense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, _is_, the quality of an\nintelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes;--for there can\nbe no number without limitation, since the phrase unlimited number is a\ncontradiction of terms;--but this limitation involves no lack, because\nthere are no \"others,\" which can be \"thereby related to it, as cognate\nor opposite modes of consciousness.\" Without doubt it is, in a certain\nsense, true, that \"the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as\nabsolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest\nmetaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of\nall reality.\" This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and\nfrom him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion by\nno means follows, in which he says: \"What kind of an Absolute Being is\nthat which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil\nincluded.\" This is founded upon the suppressed premiss, that such a\nBeing _must_ do what he does, and his creatures _must_ do what they do;\nand so evil must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may be\nadmitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: viz., that he\nsees in the ideals of his Reason _how_ his laws may be violated, and so,\nhow sin may and will be in this moral system; but it is a perversion of\nwords to say that this knowledge on the part of God is evil.\n\nThe knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law, is involved in\nthe knowing how such agent may keep that law. But the fact of the\nknowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation.\nOn the other hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth\nof every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced by\nthose persons whom God has made, who violate his moral laws. He being\nperfectly wise and perfectly good, for perfectly wise and good reasons\nsustains them in the ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of\nthings, no persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not\ndirect them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon\nhim for sustaining their existence during their sinning. That definition\nof the term absolute, upon which Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit\nonly for the Sense and Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of\nall existence. It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the\ndefinitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid down, it\nmay be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, as that of finite\nperson, may be denied to God, and no lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's\nblasphemy may, then, be answered as follows: God is the infinite and\nabsolute spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The\nform cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. Infinity and\nabsoluteness are _qualities_ of the Person as thus organized. The\nquality of absoluteness, for instance, as transfusing the essence, is\nthe endowment of pure independence, and involves the exclusion of the\npossibility of any other independent Being, and the possession of the\nability to create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as\nHegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, except he\nis created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. But in so far as it\nmeans--and this is undoubtedly what Hegel did mean--that God must be the\nefficient author of sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must\nproduce evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been\nuttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the\nUnderstanding, possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true\nnature of the subject he had in hand,--the character of God. From the\nabove considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the\nReason are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things--the\nUniverse--are dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent.\n\nThe paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted with entire\napprobation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly vitiated by their\nauthor's indefensible assumption, that cause is \"indispensable\" to our\nidea of the Deity. As was remarked above, the notion of cause is\nincidental. The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall\ndecide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not.\nHence we may freely admit that \"the cause, as such, exists only in\nrelation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the\neffect is an effect of the cause.\" It is also true that \"the\nconception\"--idea--\"of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of\nall relation.\" The position we have taken is in advance of this, for we\nsay, involves an actual existence out of all relation. Introducing,\nthen, not \"the idea of succession in time,\" but the idea of the logical\norder, we rightly say, \"the Absolute exists first by itself, and\nafterwards becomes a Cause.\" Nor are we here \"checked by the third\nconception, that of the Infinite.\" \"Causation is a possible mode of\nexistence,\" and yet \"that which exists without causing\" is infinite. How\nis this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment.\nNow, taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort\nof the Deity, this is true. Before that act he was perfect in every\npossible endowment, and accorded his choice thereto. He was able to\ncreate, but did not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that\nact, he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no\n_essential_ change in God. But he was in one mode of being before, and\nin another mode of being in and after that act. Yet he was equally\nperfect, and equally blessed, before as after. What then follows? This:\nthat there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he\nshould be a potential creator, and in that act he should become an\nactual creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, _i. e._ the\ninfinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, \"if\nCausation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without\ncausing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has passed beyond\nits former limits,\" his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic\nunderstanding-conception of God, which thinks him the sum of all that\nwas, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this, he is\n_actual_. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that is required to\nfulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, whom it qualifies,\npossesses all fulness, has all the forms and springs of being in\nhimself. It is optional with him whether he will create or not; and his\nremaining out of all relation, or his creating a Universe, and thus\nestablishing relations to and for himself, in no way affect his\nessential nature, _i. e._ his infinity. He is a person, possessing all\npossible endowments, and in this does his infinity consist. In this\nview, \"creation at any particular moment of time\" is seen to be the only\npossible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. Such a\n_Person_, the necessary Being, must have been in existence before the\nUniverse; and his first act in producing that Universe would mark the\nfirst moment of time. No \"alternative of Pantheism\" is, can be,\npresented to the advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that\nscheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd.\n\nOne cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next paragraph he says,\nthat, \"supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it\noperates by means of free will and consciousness.\" But the difficulties\nwhich he then raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained\nthus. Always in God's consciousness _the subject and object are\nidentical_. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. Hence all\nrelations always appear subordinate to, and dependent upon him; and it\nis a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose, that any relation\nwhich falls _in idea_ within him, and only becomes actual at his will,\nis any proper limitation. Both subject and object are thus absolute,\nbeing identical; and yet there is no contradiction.\n\nThe difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute\nBeing any interrelations, as of attributes among themselves, or of\nattributes to the Being. This arises from an erroneous definition of the\nterm absolute. The definition heretofore given in this treatise presents\nno such difficulty. The possession of these attributes and\ninterrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of\nanother independent Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality\nwhich is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the\nconsistency of his being what he must be. If then \"the almost unanimous\nvoice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and\nsimple,\" uses the term \"simple\" in the same sense that it would have\nwhen applied to the idea of moral obligation, viz., that it is\nunanalyzable, then that voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice\nof antiquity in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong;\nand is to be treated as that was. On such questions _opinions_ have no\nweight. The search is after a knowledge which is sure, and which every\nman may have within himself. We land, then, in no \"inextricable\ndilemma.\" The absolute Person we see to be conscious; and to possess\ncomplexity in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition\nwe know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, difference, and\nlikeness; and yet as having, of his own self, established the Universe,\nwhich is still entirely dependent upon him; from which he differs, and\nwith which he is not identified.\n\nAgain Mr. Mansel says: \"A mental attribute to be conceived as infinite,\nmust be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is\npotential only, with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and\nan unrealized potentiality is a limitation.\" With our interpretation the\nassertion is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute of the\nDeity is most assuredly \"in actual exercise,\" upon every one of its\n\"possible objects\" _as ideas_. But the objects are not therefore actual.\nNeither is there any need that they should ever become so. He sees them\njust as clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he does\nas actual objects. All ideal objects are \"unrealized potentialities\";\nand yet they are the opposite of limitations proper. But this sentence,\nas an expression of the thought which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to\nconvey, is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception\nthat infinity is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity as\n_quality_ of the necessarily existent Person, and it directly follows\nthat this or that act, of that Person, in no way disturbs that infinity.\nThe quality conditions the acting being; but the act of that being\ncannot limit the quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the\nreverse. Hence the questions arising from the interrelations of Power\nand Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at once. Infinity as\nquality, not amount, pervades them all, and holds them all in perfect\nharmony, adjusting each to each, in a melody more beautiful than that of\nthe spheres. Even \"the existence of Evil\" is \"compatible with that of\"\nthis \"perfectly good Being.\" He does not will that it shall be; neither\ndoes he will that it shall not be. If he willed that it should not be,\nand it was, then he would be \"thwarted\"; but only on such a hypothesis\ncan the conclusion follow. But he does will that certain creatures shall\nbe, who, though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, are,\nlike him, final causes,--the final arbiters of their own destinies, who\nin the choice of ends are unrestrained, and may choose good or ill. He\nmade these creatures, knowing that some of them would choose wrong, and\nso evil would be: but _he_ did not will the evil. He only willed the\nconditions upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper bars to\nprevent the evil; and the _a priori_ facts of his immutable perfection\nin endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, are decisive of the\nconsequent fact, that, in willing those conditions, God did the very\nbest possible deed. If it be further asserted that the fact, that the\nBeing who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not\nwisely prevent sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better\nto have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a\nwise act; it can only be replied: This is the same as to say, that it is\nessential to God's perfection that he be imperfect; or, that it was\nbetter for the perfect Being to violate his Self than to permit sin. If\nany one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives, there\nremains no ground of argument with him; but only \"a certain fearful\nlooking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the\nadversary.\"\n\nCarrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel further\nremarks: \"Let us however suppose for an instant, that these difficulties\nare surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established\non the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling\nthis idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining\nhow the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the\nfinite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that\nof quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or\ninvoluntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection\nto one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally\nperfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of\nquiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original\nperfection.\" On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore\nadduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not\nbelong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God _is_, as ground for\nwhat God does, and standing in the logical order before his act; and it\nwill directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity\nin no way modifies his perfection. What God is, remains permanent and\nperfect, and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and\nperfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as the point\nof departure, that, before that point, God was in a state of complete\nblessedness, and that after that point he was also in such a state; and,\nfurther, that while these two states are equal, there is not \"complete\nindifference,\" because there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine\nmind, why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when it was,\nand as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged in his\nconduct, gives to the two states equality, and yet differentiates the\none from the other.\n\n\"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being?\" It\ncannot be _conceived_ at all. The faculty of the mind by which it forms\na concept--the discursive Understanding--is impotent to conceive what\ncannot be conceived--the act of creation. The changes of matter can be\nconcluded into a system, but not the power by which the matter came to\nbe, and the changes were produced. If the how is known at all, it must\nbe seen. The laws of the process must be intuited, as also the process\nas logically according with those laws. The following is believed to be\nan intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the above\nquestion. The absolute and infinite Person possesses as _a priori_\norganic elements of his being, all possible endowments in perfect\nharmony. Hence all laws, and all possible combinations of laws, are at\nonce and always present before the Eye of his Reason, which is thus\nconstituted Universal Genius. These combinations may be conveniently\nnamed ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way dependent\nupon his will, but are rather _a priori_ conditional of any creative\nactivity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange themselves into\nsystems,--archetypes of what may be, some of which may appear nobler,\nand others inferior. This Person, being such as we have stated,\npossesses also as endowment all power, and thereby excludes the\npossibility of there being any \"_other_\" power. This power is adequate\nto do all that _power_ can do,--to accomplish all that lies within the\nprovince of power. So long as the Person sees fit not to exert his\npower, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and the power will be simply\npower. But whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power, and\norganize it according to the ideal forms, the Universe will become. In\nall this the Person, \"of his own will,\" freely establishes whatever his\nunerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the\nactualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or\nrestraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but are only a\nmanifestation of that fulness,--a declaration of his glory. In a word,\nCreation is that executive act of God by which he combines with his\npower that ideal system which he had chosen because best, or _it is the\norganization of ample power according to perfect law_. If one shall now\nask, \"How could he send forth the power?\" it is to be replied that the\nquestion is prompted by the curiosity of the \"flesh,\" man's animal\nnature; and since no representation--picture--can be made, no answer can\nbe furnished. It is not needed to know _how_ God is, or does anything,\nbut only that he does it. All the essential requirements of the problem\nare met when it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all\nfulness is in God, that from this fulness he established all other\nbeings and their natural relations, and that no relation is _imposed_\nupon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the evil of the\nunderstanding-conception, that creation is the bringing of something out\nof nothing. There is an actual self-existent ground, from which the\nUniverse is produced. Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts\nwith the _a priori_ idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is\n\"before all things, and by whom all things consist,\"--who organizes his\nown power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces the\nUniverse, and all this by free will in self-consciousness.\n\nOn page eighty-four, in speaking \"of the atheistic alternative,\" Mr.\nMansel makes use of the following language: \"A limit is itself a\nrelation; and to conceive a limit as such, is virtually to acknowledge\nthe existence of a correlative on the other side of it.\" Upon reading\nthis sentence, some sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense.\nSome object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. But\nlet the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses all limitation\nwithin himself, and for whom there is no \"other side,\" nor any\n\"correlative,\" and the difficulty vanishes. We do not seek to account\nfor sensuous objects. It is pure Spirit whom we consider. We do not need\nto form a concept of \"a first moment in time,\" or \"a first unit of\nspace,\" nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty\nwhich forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization.\nWhat we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit is, who, possessing\npersonality as form, and absoluteness and infinity as qualities, thereby\ncontains all limits and the ground of all being in himself, and\nantithetical to whom is only negation.\n\nFrom the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not the dreary\nSahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair land of harmonious\nconsistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, self-conscious, the absolute and\ninfinite Person, is the Being we seek and have found; and upon such a\nBeing the soul of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant\nin its mother's arms. One cannot pass by unnoticed the beautiful spirit\nof religious reverence which shines through the closing paragraphs of\nthis lecture. It is evident with what dissatisfaction the writer views\nthe sterile puzzles of which he has been treating, and what a relief it\nis to turn from them to \"the God who is 'gracious and merciful, slow to\nanger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the evil.'\" The\nwonder is, that he did not receive that presentation which his devout\nspirit has made, as the truth--which it is--and say, \"I will accept this\nas final. My definitions and deductions shall accord with this highest\nrevelation. This shall be my standard of interpretation.\" Had he done\nso, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and truthful\nwould have been the conclusions he would have given us.\n\nIn his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination of the\nhuman nature, for the purpose, if possible, of finding \"some explanation\nof the singular phenomenon of human thought,\" which he has just\ndeveloped. At the threshold of the investigation the fact of\nconsciousness appears, and he begins the statement of its conditions in\nthe following language: \"Now, in the first place, the very conception of\nConsciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily\nimplies _distinction between one object and another_. To be conscious we\nmust be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as\nthat which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not.\" In\nthis statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very\nquestion at issue; for, the position maintained by one class of writers\nis, that in certain of our mental operations, viz., in intuitions, the\nmind sees a simple truth, idea, first principle, as it is, in itself,\nand that there is no distinction in the act of knowledge. It is\nunquestionably true that, in the examination of objects on the Sense,\nand the conclusion of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come\ninto consciousness without implying a \"distinction between one object\nand another.\" But it is also evident that a first truth, to be known as\nsuch, must be intuited--seen as it is in itself; and so directly known\nto have the qualities of necessity and universality which constitute it\na first truth. Of this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been\naware, when he denied the actuality of the Reason,--perceiving,\ndoubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his own theory\ntenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would seem it must be, that\nmen have necessary and universal convictions, then it must also be\nadmitted that these convictions are not entertained by distinguishing\nthem from other mental operations, but that they are seen of themselves\nto be true; and thus it appears that there are some modes of\nconsciousness which do not imply the \"distinction\" claimed. The\nsubsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. If\nthe author means that \"the Infinite\" cannot be infinite without he is\nalso finite, so that all distinction ceases, then his meaning is both\npantheistic and contradictory; for the word infinite has no meaning, if\nit is not the opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly\nPantheism. Or if he means \"that the Infinite cannot be distinguished\" as\nindependent, from the Finite _as independent_, and thus, as possessing\nsome quality with which it was not endowed by the infinite Person, then\nthere can be no doubt of his correctness. But if, as would seem, his\nidea of infinity is that of amount, is such that it appears\ninconsistent, contradictory, for the infinite Person to retain his\ninfinity, and still create beings who are really other than himself, and\npossessing, as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality,\nthen is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, and the\ncapacity to thus create is essential to it. All that the Reason requires\nis, that the finite be created by and wholly dependent upon the infinite\nPerson; then all the relations and conditions are only _improper_,--such\nas that Person has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish\nhis glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, \"A\nconsciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a\nself-contradiction, for it implies the recognition, by limitation and\ndifference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and\nindifferent,\" it is evident that he uses the term infinite to express\nthe understanding-conception of unlimited amount, which is not relevant\nhere, rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not\ncontradictory to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite.\nThere is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we have no\nknowledge except of the limited and different, or, in other words, that\nthe Understanding is the highest faculty of the mind. It has already\nbeen abundantly shown that this is erroneous,--that the Reason knows its\nobjects in themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or\nlikeness. Dropping now the abstract term \"the infinite,\" and using the\nconcrete and proper form, we may say:\n\nWe are conscious of infinity, _i. e._ we are conscious that we see with\nthe eye of Reason infinity as a simple, _a priori_ idea; and that it is\nquality of the Deity.\n\n2. We are conscious of the infinite Person; in that we are conscious,\nthat we see with the eye of Reason the complex _a priori_ idea of a\nperfect Person possessing independence and universality as qualities of\nhis Self. But we are not conscious of him in that we exhaustively\ncomprehend him. As is said elsewhere, we know that he is, and to a\ncertain extent, but not wholly what he is.\n\nIn further discussing this question Mansel is guilty of another grave\npsychological error. He says, \"Consciousness is essentially a\nlimitation, for it is the determination to one actual out of many\npossible modifications.\" There is no truth in this sentence.\nConsciousness is not a limitation; it is not a determination; it is not\na modification. It may be well to state here certain conclusions on this\nassertion, which will be brought out in the fuller discussion of it,\nwhen we come to speak of Mr. Spencer's book. Consciousness is _one_, and\nretains that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur in the\nunity as items of experience affect it. Doubtless Dr. Hickok's\nillustration is the best possible. Consciousness is the _light_ in which\na spiritual person sees the modifications of himself, _i. e._ the\nactivity of his faculties and capacities. Like Space, only in a\ndifferent sphere, it is an illimitable indivisible unity, which is, that\nall limits may be in it--that all objects may come into it. If, then,\nonly one modification--object--comes into it at a time, this is because\nthe faculties which see in its light are thus organized;--the being to\nwhom it belongs is partial; but there is nothing pertaining to\nconsciousness _as such_, which constitutes a limit,--which could bar the\ninfinite Person from seeing all things at once in its light. This\nPerson, then, so far as known, must be known as an actual absolute,\ninfinite Spirit, and hence no \"thing\"; and further as the originator and\nsustainer of all \"_things_,\"--which, though dependent on him, in no way\ntake aught from him. He may be known also, as potentially everything, in\nthe sense that all possible combinations, or forms of objects, must ever\nstand as ideals in his Reason; and he can, at his will, organize his\npower in accordance therewith. But he must also be known as free to\ncreate or not to create; and that the fact that many potential forms\nremain such, in no way detracts from his infinity.\n\nAnother of Mr. Mansel's positions involve conclusions which, we feel\nassured, he will utterly reject. He says, \"If all thought is\nlimitation,--if whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception,\nregarded as finite,--the infinite, from a human point of view, is merely\na name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is\npossible.\" \"From a human point of view,\" and _we_, at least, can take no\nother, what follows? That the Deity _can have no thoughts_; cannot know\nwhat our thoughts are, or that we think. But three suppositions can be\nmade. Either he has no thoughts, is destitute of an intellect; or his\nintellect is Universal Genius, and he sees all possible objects at once;\nor there is a faculty different in kind from and higher than the Reason,\nof which we have, can have, no knowledge. The first, though acknowledged\nby Hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted, and logically following from\nthe position taken by Mr. Mansel, is so abhorrent to the soul that it\nmust be unhesitatingly rejected. The second is the position advocated in\nthis treatise. The third is hinted at by Mr. Herbert Spencer. We reject\nthis third, because the Reason affirms it to be impossible; and because,\nbeing unnecessary, by the law of parsimony it should not be allowed. To\nadvocate a position of which, in the very terms of it, the intellect can\nhave no possible shadow of knowledge, is, to say the least, no part of\nthe work of a philosopher. \"The condition of consciousness is\" not\n\"distinction\" in the understanding-conception of that term. So\nconsciousness is not a limitation, though all limits when cognized are\nseen in the light of consciousness. According to the philosophy we\nadvocate, God is a particular being, and is so known; yet he is not\nknown as \"one thing out of many,\" but is known in himself, as being such\nand such, and yet being _unique_. When Mr. Mansel says, \"In assuming the\npossibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore,\nthat it is at the same time limited and unlimited,\" he evidently uses\nthose terms with a signification pertinent only to the Understanding. He\nis thinking of _amount_ under the forms of Space and Time; and so his\nremark has no validity. He who thinks of God rightly, will think of him\nas the infinite and absolute spiritual Person; and will define infinity\nand absoluteness in accordance therewith.\n\nIf the views now advanced are presentations of truth, a consistent\nrationalism _must_ attribute \"consciousness to God.\" _We_ are always\nconscious of \"limitation and change,\" because partiality and growth are\norganic with us. But we can perceive no peculiarity in consciousness,\nwhich should produce such an effect. On the contrary we see, that if a\nperson has little knowledge, he will be conscious of so much and no\nmore. And if a person has great capabilities, and corresponding\ninformation, he is conscious of just so much. Whence, it appears, that\nthe \"limitation and change\" spring from the nature of the constitution,\nand not from the consciousness. If, then, there should be one Person who\npossessed the sum of all excellencies, there could arise no reason from\nconsciousness why he should be conscious thereof.\n\nMr. Mansel names as the \"second characteristic of Consciousness, that it\nis only possible in the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject,\nor person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious.\"\nThis utterance, taken in the sense which Mr. Mansel wishes to convey,\ninvolves the denial of consciousness to God. But upon the ground that\nthe subject and object in the Deity are always identical the difficulty\nvanishes. But how can man be \"conscious of the Absolute?\" If by this is\nmeant, have an exhaustive comprehension of the absolute Person, the\nexperience is manifestly impossible. But man may have a certain\nknowledge, _that_ such Person is without knowing in all respects _what_\nhe is, just as a child may know that an apple is, without knowing what\nit is. Again Mr. Mansel uses the terms absolute and infinite to\nrepresent a simple unanalyzable Being. In this he is guilty of\npersonifying an abstract term, and then reasoning with regard to the\nBeing as he would with regard to the term. Absoluteness is a simple\nunanalyzable idea, but it is not God; it is only one quality of God. So\nwith infinity. God is universal complexity; and to reason of him as\nunanalyzable simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the\napple's skin, and call that the apple, and then reason from it about the\napple. So, then, though man cannot comprehend the absolute Person _as\nsuch_, he has a positive idea of absoluteness, and a positive knowledge\nthat the Being is who is thus qualified. Upon the subsequent question\nrespecting the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute\nPerson, a remark made above may be repeated and amplified. We may have a\ntrue, clear, thorough knowledge _that_ he exists without having an\nexhaustive knowledge of _what_ he is. The former is necessary to us; the\nlatter impossible. So, too, the knowledge by us, of any _a priori_ law,\nwill be exhaustive. Yet while we know that it _must_ be such, and not\notherwise, it neither follows that we know all other _a priori_ laws,\nnor that we know all the exemplifications of this one. And since, as we\nhave heretofore seen, neither absoluteness nor infinity relate to\nnumber, and God is not material substance that can be broken into\n\"parts,\" but an organized Spirit, we see that we may consider the\nelements of his organization in their logical order; and, remembering\nthat absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all, we may examine\nhis nature and attributes without impiety.\n\nMr. Mansel says further: \"But in truth it is obvious, on a moment's\nreflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite can be\nrepresented in the form of a whole composed of parts.\" This is\ntantamount to saying, the spiritual cannot be represented under the form\nof the material--a truth so evident as hardly to need so formal a\nstatement. But what the Divine means is, that that Being cannot be known\nas having qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and\nfrom himself; which is an error. God is infinite. So is his Knowledge,\nhis Wisdom, his Holiness, his Love, &c. Yet these are distinguished from\neach other, and from him. All this is consistent, because infinity is\n_quality_, and permeates them all; and not amount, which jumbles them\nall into a confused, _indistinguishable_ mass.\n\nIn speaking of \"human consciousness\" as \"necessarily subject to the law\nof Time,\" Mr. Mansel says, \"Every object of whose existence we can be in\nany way conscious is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time\nto some former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a\ncertain portion of time.\" In so far as there is here expressed the law\nof created beings, under which they must see objects, the remark is\ntrue. But when Mr. Mansel proceeds further, and concludes that, because\nwe are under limitation in seeing the object, it is under the same\nlimitation, so far as we apprehend it in being seen, he asserts what is\na psychological error. To show this, take the mathematical axiom,\n\"Things which are equal to the same things, are equal to one another.\"\nExcept under the conditions of Time, we cannot see this, that is, we do,\nmust, occupy a time in observing it. But do we see that the axiom is\nunder any condition of Time? By no means. We see, directly, that it is,\n_must be_, true, and that in itself it has no relation to Time. It is\nthus _absolutely_ true; and as one of the ideas of the infinite and\nabsolute Person, it possesses these his qualities. We have, then, a\nfaculty, the Reason, which, while it sees its objects in succession, and\nso under the law of Time, also sees that those objects, whether ideas,\nor that Being to whom all ideas belong, are, _in themselves_, out of all\nrelation to Time. Thus is the created spiritual person endowed; thus is\nhe like God; thus does he know \"the Infinite.\" Hence, \"the command, so\noften urged upon man by philosophers and theologians, 'In contemplating\nGod, transcend time,'\" means, \"In all your reflections upon God, behold\nhim in his true aspect, in the reason-idea, as out of all relation.\" It\nis true that \"to know the infinite\" _exhaustively_, \"the human mind must\nitself be infinite.\" But this knowledge is not required of that mind.\nOnly that knowledge is required which is possible, viz., that the Deity\nis, and what he is, _in so far as we are in his image_.\n\nAgain; personality is not \"essentially a limitation and a relation,\" in\nthe sense that it necessarily detracts aught from any being who\npossesses it. It rather adds,--is, indeed, a pure addition. We appear to\nourselves as limited and related, not because of our personality, but\nbecause of our finiteness as _quality_ in the personality.\n\nHence we not only see no reason why the complete and universal Spirit\nshould not have personality, but we see that if he was destitute of it,\nhe must possess a lower form of being,--since this is the highest\npossible form,--which would be an undoubted limitation; or, in other\nwords, we see that he must be a Person. In what Mr. Mansel subsequently\nsays upon this subject, he presents arguments for the personality of God\nso strong, that one is bewildered with the question, \"How could he\nescape the conviction which they awaken? How could he reject the cry of\nhis spiritual nature, and accept the barren contradictions of his lower\nmind?\" Let us note a few sentences. \"It is by consciousness alone that\nwe know that God exists, or that we are able to offer him any service.\nIt is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in\nany religious relation to Him at all,--that we can form such a\nrepresentation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants,\ninsufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity.\"\n\"Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation\nto personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist.\nAnd when, from the little world of man's consciousness and its objects,\nwe would lift up our eyes to the inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask\nto whom all this is related, the highest existence is still the highest\npersonality, and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, 'I\nAM.'\" \"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our\nduty to believe that He is infinite.\" We may at this point quote with\nprofit the words of that Book whose authority Mr. Mansel, without\ndoubt, most heartily acknowledges. \"And for this cause God shall send\nthem strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all\nmight be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in\nunrighteousness.\" \"I have not written unto you because ye know not the\ntruth, but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth.\" Either\nGod is personal or he is not. If he is, then all that we claim is\nconceded. If he is not personal, and \"it is our duty to think\" of him as\npersonal, then it is our duty to think and believe a _falsehood_. This\nno man, at least neither Mr. Mansel nor any other enlightened man, _can_\nbring his mind to accept as a moral law. The soul instinctively asserts\nthat obligation lies parallel with _truth_, and \"that no lie is of the\ntruth.\" So, then, there can be no duty except where truth is. And the\nconverse may also be accepted, viz.: Where an enlightened sense of duty\nis, there is truth. When, therefore, so learned and truly spiritual a\nman as Mr. Mansel asserts \"that it is our duty to think God personal,\nand believe him infinite,\" we unhesitatingly accept it as the utterance\nof a great fundamental truth in that spiritual realm which is the\nhighest realm of being, and so, as one of the highest truths, and with\nit we accept all its logical consequences. It is a safe rule anywhere,\nthat if two mental operations seem to clash, and one must be rejected,\nman should cling to, and trust in the higher--the teaching of the nobler\nnature. Thus will we do, and from the Divine's own ground will we see\nthe destruction of his philosophy. \"It is our duty to think of God as\npersonal,\" because he is personal; and we know that he is personal\nbecause it is our duty to think him so. We need pay no regard to the\nperplexities of the Understanding. We soar with the eagle above the\nclouds, and float ever in the light of the Sun. The teachings of the\nMoral Sense are far more sure, safe, and satisfactory than any\ndiscursions of the lower faculty. Therefore it is man's wisdom, in all\nperplexity to heed the cry of his highest nature, and determine to\nstand on its teachings, as his highest knowledge, interpret all\nutterances by this, and reject all which contradict it. At the least,\nthe declaration of this faculty is _as_ valid as that of the lower, and\nis to be more trusted in every disagreement, because higher. Still\nfurther, no man would believe that God, in the most solemn, yea, awful\nmoment of his Self-revelation, would declare a lie. The bare thought,\nfully formed, horrifies the soul as a blasphemy of the damned. Yet, in\nthat supreme act, in the solitude of the Sinaitic wilderness, to one of\nthe greatest, one of the profoundest, most devout of men, He revealed\nHimself by the pregnant words, \"I AM\": the most positive, the most\nunquestionable form in which He could utter the fact of His personality.\nThis, then, and all that is involved in it, we accept as truth; and all\nperplexities must be interpreted by this surety.\n\nIn summing up the results to which an examination of the facts of\nconsciousness conducted him, Mr. Mansel utters the following\npsychological error: \"But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation\nbetween something within and something without itself; and the\nconsciousness of a limit of thought implies, though it does not directly\npresent to us, the existence of something of which we do not and cannot\nthink.\" Not so; for a limit may be seen to be wholly within the being to\nwhom it belongs, and so _not_ to be \"a relation between something within\nand something without itself.\" This is precisely the case with the\nDeity. All relations and limits spring from within him, and there is\nnothing \"without\" to establish the relation claimed. This absence of all\nlimit from without is rudely expressed in such common phrases as this:\n\"It must be so in the _nature of things_.\" This \"nature of things\" is,\nin philosophical language, the system of _a priori_ laws of the\nUniverse, and these are necessary ideas in the Divine Reason. It\nappears, then, that what must be in the nature of things, finds its\nlimits wholly within, and its relations established by the Deity.\n\nWith these remarks the author would close his criticism upon Mr.\nMansel's book. We start from entirely different bases, and these two\nsystems logically follow from their foundations. If Sir William Hamilton\nis right in his psychology, his follower is unquestionably right in his\ndeductions. But if that psychology is partial, if besides the\nUnderstanding there is the Reason, if above the judgment stands the\nintuition, giving the final standard by which to measure that judgment,\nthen is the philosophical system of the Divine utterly fallacious. The\nestablishment of the validity of the Pure Reason is the annihilation of\n\"the Philosophy of the Unconditioned.\" On the ground which the author\nhas adopted, it is seen that \"God is a spirit,\" infinite, absolute,\nself-conscious, personal; and a consistent interpretation of these terms\nhas been given. We have found that certain objects may be seen as out of\nall relation, plurality, difference, or likeness. Consciousness and\npersonality have also been found to involve no limit, in the proper\nsense of that term. On the contrary, the one was ascertained to be the\nlight in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions of\nTime, or at once; and that this seeing was according to the capacity\nwith which the being was endowed, and was not determined by any\npeculiarity of the consciousness; while the other appeared to be the\nhighest possible form of existence, and that also in which God had\nrevealed himself. From such a ground it is possible to go forward and\nconstruct a Rational Theology which shall verify by Reason the teachings\nof the Bible.\n\n\n\n\nREVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S \"FIRST PRINCIPLES.\"\n\n\nIn the criticisms heretofore made, some points, held in common by the\nthree writers named early in this work, have been, it may be, passed\nover unnoticed. This was done, because, being held in common, it was\nbelieved that an examination of them, as presented by the latest writer,\nwould be most satisfactory. Therefore, what was peculiar in thought or\nexpression to Sir Wm. Hamilton or Mr. Mansel, we have intended to notice\nwhen speaking of those writers. But where Mr. Spencer seems to present\ntheir very thought as his own, it has appeared better to remark upon it\nin his latest form of expression. Mr. Spencer also holds views peculiar\nto himself. These we shall examine in their place. And for convenience'\nsake, what we have to say will take the form of a running commentary\nupon those chapters entitled, \"Ultimate Religious Ideas,\" \"Ultimate\nScientific Ideas,\" \"The Relativity of all Knowledge,\" and \"The\nReconciliation.\" Before entering upon this, however, some general\nremarks will be pertinent.\n\n1. Like his teachers, Mr. Spencer believes that the Understanding is the\nhighest faculty of the human intellect. This is implied in the following\nsentence: \"Those imbecilities of the understanding that disclose\nthemselves when we try to answer the highest questions of objective\nscience, subjective science proves to be necessitated by the laws of\nthat understanding.\"--_First Principles_, p. 98.\n\nHis illustrations, also, are all, or nearly all, taken from sensuous\nobjects. In speaking of the Universe, evidently the _material_ Universe\nis present to his mind. His questions refer to objects of sense, and he\nshows plainly enough that any attempt to answer them by the Sense or\nUnderstanding is futile. Hence he concludes that they cannot be\nanswered. But those who \"know of a surety,\" that man is more than an\nanimal nature, containing a Sense and an Understanding; that he is also\na spiritual person, having an _Eye_, the pure Reason, which can _see_\nstraight to the central Truth, with a clearness and in a light which\ndims and pales the noonday sun, know also that, and how, these\ndifficulties, insoluble to the lower faculties, are, in this noble\nalembic, finally dissolved.\n\n2. As Mr. Spencer follows his teachers in the psychology of man's\nfaculties, so does he also in the use of terms. Like them, he employs\nonly such terms as are pertinent to the Sense and Understanding. So also\nwith them he is at fault, in that he raises questions which no Sense or\nUnderstanding could suggest even, questions whose very presence are\ndecisive that a Pure Reason is organic in man; and then is guilty of\napplying to them terms entirely impertinent,--terms belonging only to\nthose lower tribunals before which these questions can never come. For\ninstance, he always employs the word \"conceive\" to express the effort of\nthe mind in presenting to itself the subjects now under discussion. In\nsome form of noun, verb, or adjective, this word seems to have rained\nupon his pages; while such terms as \"infinite period,\" \"infinitely\ndivisible,\" \"absolutely incompressible,\" \"infinitesimal,\" and the like,\ndot them repeatedly. Let us revert, then, a moment to the positions\nattained in an earlier portion of this work. It was there found that the\nword conceive was _utterly irrelevant_ to any subject except to objects\nof Sense and the Understanding in its work of classifying them, or\ngeneralizing from them, so, also, with regard to the other terms quoted,\nit was found that they not only presented no object of thought to the\nmind, but that the words had no relation to each other, and could not\nproperly be used together. For instance, infinite has no more relation\nto, and can no more qualify period, than the points of the compass are\npertinent to, and can qualify the affections. The phrase, infinite\nperiod, is simply absurd, and so also are the others. The words infinite\nand absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort. They can be\npertinent only to God and his _a priori_ ideas. Many, perhaps most of\nthe criticisms in detail we shall have to make, will be based on this\nsingle misuse of words; which yet grows naturally out of that denial and\nperversion of faculties which Mr. Spencer, in common with the other\nLimitist writers, has attempted. On the other hand, it is to be\nremembered, that, if we arrive at the truth at all, we must _intuit_ it;\nwe must either see it as a simple _a priori_ idea, or as a logical\ndeduction from such ideas.\n\n3. A third, and graver error on Mr. Spencer's part is, that he goes on\npropounding his questions, and asserting that they are insoluble,\napparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an enchanted castle that they\nhave all been solved, or at least that the principles on which it would\nseem that they could be solved have been stated by a man of no mean\nability,--Dr. Hickok,--and that until the proposed solutions are\nthoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound, his own pages are idle. He\nimplies that there is no cognition higher than a conception, when some\nvery respectable writers have named intuitions as incomparably superior.\nHe speaks of the Understanding as if it were without question the\nhighest faculty of man's intellect, when no less a person than Coleridge\nsaid it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into English\nthinking the distinction between the Understanding, as \"the faculty\njudging according to sense,\" and the Reason, as \"the power of universal\nand necessary convictions,\" which, being such, must necessarily rank far\nabove the other. And finally he uses the words and phrases above\ndisallowed, and the faculties to which they belong, in an attempt to\nprove, by the citation of a few items in an experience, what had already\nbeen demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning as\nCalculus. No one, it is believed, can master the volume heretofore\nalluded to, entitled \"Rational Psychology,\" and so appreciate the\n_demonstration_ therein contained, of the utter incompetency of the\nSense or Understanding to solve such questions as Mr. Spencer has raised\nby his incident of the partridge, (p. 69,) and the utter irrelevancy to\nthem of the efforts of those faculties, without feeling how tame and\nunsatisfactory in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few facts in a\nsensuous experience. One cares not to see a half dozen proofs, more or\nless that a theory is fallacious who has learned that, and why, the\ntheory _cannot_ be true. Let us now take up in order the chapters\nheretofore mentioned.\n\n\n\n\n\"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS.\"\n\n\nThe summing up of certain reflections with which this chapter opens,\nconcludes thus: \"But that when our symbolic conceptions are such that no\ncumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain\nthat there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made\nwhose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and\nillusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions,\"--p. 29. So\nfar very good; but his use of it is utterly unsound. \"And now to\nconsider the bearings of this general truth on our immediate\ntopic--Ultimate Religious Ideas.\" But this \"general truth\" has _no_\nbearings upon \"ultimate religious ideas\"; how then can you consider\nthem? _No_ ideas, and most of all religious ideas, are conceptions, or\nthe results of conceptions--or are the products of \"cumulative or\nindirect processes of thought.\" They are not results or products _at\nall_. They are organic, are the spontaneous presentation of what is\ninborn, and so must be directly seen to be known at all. Man might pile\nup \"cumulative processes of thought\" for unnumbered ages, and might form\nmost exact conceptions of objects of Sense,--conceptions are not\npossible of others,--and he could never creep up to the least and\nfaintest religious idea.\n\nOn the next page, speaking of \"suppositions respecting the origin of the\nUniverse,\" Mr. Spencer says, \"The deeper question is, whether any one of\nthem is even conceivable in the true sense of that word. Let us\nsuccessively test them.\" This is not necessary. It has already been\n_demonstrated_ that a conception, or any effort of the Understanding,\ncannot touch, or have relation to such topics. But it does not follow,\ntherefore, that no one of them is cognizable at all; which he implies.\nTake the abstract notion of self-existence, for example. No \"vague\nsymbolic conceptions,\" or any conception at all, of it _can be formed_.\nA conception is possible only \"under relation, difference, and\nplurality.\" _This_ is a pure, simple idea, and so can only be known in\nitself by a seeing--an immediate intuition. It is seen by itself, as out\nof all relation. It is seen as simple, and so is learned by no\ndifference. It is seen as a unit, and so out of all plurality. The\ndiscursive faculty cannot pass over it, because there are in it no\nvarious points upon which that faculty may fasten. It may, perhaps,\nbetter be expressed by the words pure independence. Again, it is _not_\nproperly \"existence without a beginning,\" but rather, existence out of\nall relation to beginning; and so it is an idea, out of all relation to\nthose faculties which are confined to objects that did begin. Because we\ncan \"by no mental effort\" \"form a conception of existence without a\nbeginning,\" it does not follow that we cannot _see_ that a Being\nexisting out of all relation to beginning _is_. \"To this let us add\"\nthat the intuition of such a Being is a complete \"explanation of the\nUniverse,\" and does make it \"easier to understand\" \"that it existed an\nhour ago, a day ago, a year ago\"; for we see that this Being primarily\nis _out of all relation to time_, that there is no such thing as an\n\"infinite period,\" the phrase being absurd; but that through all the\nprocession of events which we call time he _is_; and that before that\nprocession began--when there was no time, he was. Thus we see that all\nevents are based upon Him who is independent; and that time, in our\ngeneral use of it, is but the measure of what He produces. We arrive,\nthen, at the conclusion that the Universe is not self-existent, not\nbecause self-existence cannot be object to the human mind, and be\nclearly seen to be an attribute of one Being, but because the Universe\nis primarily object to faculties in that mind, which cannot entertain\nsuch a notion at all; and because this notion is _seen_ to be a\nnecessary idea in the province of that higher faculty which entertains\nas objects both the idea and the Being to whom it primarily belongs.\n\nThe theory that the Universe is self-existent is Pantheism, and not the\ntheory that it is self-created, though this latter, in Mr. Spencer's\ndefinition of it, seems only a phase of the other. To say that\n\"self-creation is potential existence passing into actual existence by\nsome inherent necessity,\" is only to remove self-existence one step\nfarther back, as he himself shows. Potential existence is either no\nexistence at all, or it is positive existence. If it is no existence,\nthen we have true self-creation; which is, that out of nothing, and with\nno cause, actual existence starts itself. This is not only unthinkable,\nbut absurd. But if potential existence is positive, it needs to be\naccounted for as much as actual. While, then, there can be no doubt as\nto the validity of the conclusions to which Mr. Spencer arrives,\nrespecting the entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence\nand self-creation, to account for the Universe, the distinction made\nabove between self-existence as a true and self-creation as a pseudo\nidea, and the fact that the true idea is a _reality_, should never be\nlost sight of. By failing to discriminate--as in the Understanding he\ncould not do--between them, and by concluding both as objects alike\nimpossible to the human intellect, and for the same reasons, he has also\ndecided that the \"commonly received or theistic hypothesis\"--creation by\nexternal agency--is equally untenable. In his examination of this, he\nstarts as usual with his ever-present, fallacious assumption, that this\nis a \"conception\"; that it can be, _is_ founded upon a \"cumulative\nprocess of thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it.\"\nThese words, phrases, and notions, are all irrelevant. It is not a\nconception, process, or prediction that we want; it is a _sight_. Hence,\nno assumptions have to be made or granted. No \"proceedings of a human\nartificer\" _can in the least degree_ \"vaguely symbolize to us\" the\n\"method after which the Universe\" was \"shaped.\" This differed in _kind_\nfrom all possible human methods, and had not one element in common with\nthem.\n\nMr. Spencer's remarks at this point upon Space do not appear to be well\ngrounded. \"An immeasurable void\"--Space--is not an entity, is _no_\nthing, and therefore cannot \"exist,\" neither is any explanation for it\nneeded. His question, \"how came it so?\" takes, then, this form: How came\nimmeasurable nothing to be nothing? Nothing needs no \"explanation.\" It\nis only _some_ thing which must be accounted for. The theory of creation\nby external agency being, then, an adequate one to account for the\nUniverse, supplies the following statement. That Being who is primarily\nout of all relation, produced, from himself, and by his immanent\npower, into nothing--Space, room, the condition of material\nexistence,--something, matter and the Universe became. \"The genesis of\nthe universe\" having thus been explained and seen to be \"the result of\nexternal agency,\" we are ready to furnish for the question, \"how came\nthere to be an external agency?\" that true answer, which we have already\nshadowed forth. That pure spiritual Person who is necessarily existent,\nor self-existent, _i. e._ who possess pure independence as an essential\nattribute, whose being is thus fixed, and is therefore without the\nprovince of power, is the external agency which is needed. This Person,\ndiffering in kind from the Universe, cannot be found in it, nor\nconcluded from it, but can only be known by being seen, and can only be\nseen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual _Eye_, like in\nkind to His own All-seeing eye, by which spiritual things may be\ndiscerned. This Person, being thus seen immediately, is known in a far\nmore satisfactory mode than he could be by any generalizations of the\nUnderstanding, could he be represented in these at all. The knowledge of\nHim is, like His self, _immutable_. We KNOW that we stand on the eternal\nRock. Our eye is illuminated with the unwavering Light which radiates\nfrom the throne of God. Nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist.\nIt is the simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure\ntruth in itself. It is the Pure Reason seeing, by an immediate\nintuition, God as pure spirit, revealed directly to itself. It is, then,\nbecause self-existence is a pure, simple idea, organic in man, and seen\nby him to be an attribute of God, that God is known to be the Creator of\nthe Universe. Having attained to this truth, we readily see that the\nconclusions which Mr. Spencer states on pages 35, 36, as that\n\"self-existence is rigorously inconceivable\"; that the theistic\nhypothesis equally with the others is \"literally unthinkable\"; that \"our\nconception of self-existence can be formed only by joining with it the\nnotion of unlimited duration through past time\"; so far as they imply\nour destitution of knowledge on these topics, are the opposite of the\nfacts. We _see_, though we cannot \"conceive,\" self-existence. The\ntheistic hypothesis becomes, therefore, literally thinkable. We see,\nalso, that unlimited duration is an absurdity; that duration must be\nlimited; and that self-existence involves existence out of all relation\nto duration.\n\nMr. Spencer then turns to the nature of the Universe, and says: \"We find\nourselves on the one hand obliged to make certain assumptions, and yet,\non the other hand, we find these assumptions cannot be represented in\nthought.\" Upon this it may be remarked:\n\n1. What are here called assumptions are properly assertions, which man\nmakes, and cannot help making, except he deny himself;--necessary\nconvictions, first truths, first principles, _a priori_ ideas. They are\norganic, and so are the foundation of all knowledge. They are not\nresults learned from lessons, but are _primary_, and conditional to an\nability to learn. But supposing them to be assumptions, having, at\nmost, no more groundwork than a vague guess, there devolves a labor\nwhich Mr. Spencer and his coadjutors have never attempted, and which, we\nare persuaded, they would find the most difficult of all, viz., to\naccount for the fact of these assumptions. For the question is pertinent\nand urgent;\n\n2. How came these assumptions to suggest themselves? Where, for\ninstance, did the notion of self come from? Analyze the rocks, study\nplants and their growth, become familiar with animals and their habits,\nor exhaust the Sense in an examination of man, and one can find no\nnotion of self. Yet the notion is, and is peculiar to man. How does it\narise? Is it \"created by the slow action of natural causes?\" How comes\nit to belong, then, to the rudest aboriginal equally with the most\ncivilized and cultivated? Was it \"created\" from nothing or from\nsomething? If from something, how came that something to be? We might\nask, Does not the presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality\nof a somewhat, in which that phenomenon inheres, and of a receptivity by\nwhich it is appreciated? Does not the fact of this assumption, as a\nmental phenomenon, involve the higher fact of some mental ground, some\nform, some capacity, which is both organic to the mind, and organized in\nthe mind, in accordance with which the assumption is, and which\ndetermines what it must be? Or are we to believe that these assumptions\nare mere happenings, without law, and for which no reason can be\nassigned? Again we press the question, How came these assumptions to\nsuggest themselves?\n\n3. \"These assumptions cannot be represented in thought.\" If \"thought\" is\nrestricted to that mental operation of the Understanding by which it\ngeneralizes in accordance with the Sense, the statement is true. But if\nit is meant, as seems to be implied, that the notions expressed in these\nassumptions are not, cannot be, clearly and definitely known at all by\nthe mind, then it is directly contrary to the truth. The ideas presented\nby the phrases are, as was seen above, clear and definite.\n\nSince Mr. Spencer has quoted _in extenso_, and with entire approbation,\nwhat Mr. Mansel says respecting \"the Cause, the Absolute, and the\nInfinite,\" we have placed the full examination of these topics in our\nremarks upon Mr. Mansel's writings, and shall set down only a few brief\nnotes here.\n\nUpon this topic Mr. Spencer admits that \"we are obliged to suppose\n_some_ cause\"; or, in other words, that the notion of cause is organic.\nThen we must \"inevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a First\nCause.\" Then, this First Cause \"must be infinite.\" Then, \"it must be\nindependent;\" \"or, to use the established word, it must be absolute.\"\nOne would almost suppose that a _rational_ man penned these decisions,\ninstead of one who denies that he has a _reason_. The illusion is\nquickly dispelled, however, by the objections he lifts out of the dingy\nground-room of the Understanding. It is curious to observe in these\npages a fact which we have noticed before, in speaking of Sir William\nHamilton's works, viz.: how, on the same page, and in the same sentence,\nthe workings of the Understanding and Reason will run along side by\nside, the former all the while befogging and hindering the latter. Mr.\nSpencer's conclusions which we have quoted, and his objections which we\nare to answer, are a striking exemplification of this. Frequently in his\nremarks he uses the words limited and unlimited, as synonymous with\nfinite and infinite, when they are not so, and cannot be used\ninterchangeably with propriety. The former belong wholly in the Sense\nand Understanding. The latter belong wholly in the Pure Reason. The\nformer pertain to material objects, to mental images of them, or to\nnumber. The latter qualify only spiritual persons, and have no\npertinence elsewhere. Limitation is the conception of an object _as\nbounded_. Illimitation is the conception of an object as without\nboundaries. Rigidly, it is a simple negation of boundaries, and gives\nnothing positive in the Concept. Finity or finiteness corresponds in the\nReason to limitation in the Sense and Understanding. It does not refer\nto boundaries at all. It belongs only to created spiritual persons, and\nexpresses the fact that they are partial, and must grow and learn. Only\nby its place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the Reason to\nillimitation in the lower faculties. It is _positive_, and is that\nquality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as _universality_.\nIt expresses the idea of _all possible endowments in perfect harmony_.\nFrom his misuse of these terms Mr. Spencer is led to speak in an\nirrelevant manner upon the question, \"Is the First Cause finite or\ninfinite?\" He uses words and treats the whole matter as if it were a\nquestion of material substance, which might be \"bounded,\" with a \"region\nsurrounding its boundaries,\" and the like, which are as out of place as\nto say white love or yellow kindness. His methods of thought on these\ntopics are also gravely erroneous. He attempts an analysis by the\nlogical Understanding, where a synthesis by the Reason is required,--a\nsynthesis which has already been given by our Creator to man as an\noriginal idea. It is not necessary to examine some limited thing, or all\nlimited things, and wander around their boundaries to learn that the\nFirst Cause is infinite. We need to make no discursus, but only to look\nthe idea of first cause through and through, and thoroughly analyze it,\nto find all the truth. By such a process we would find all that Mr.\nSpencer concedes that \"we are obliged to suppose,\" and further, that\nsuch a being _must be_ self-existent. And this conviction would be so\nstrong that the mind would rest itself in this decision: \"A thousand\nphantasmagoria of the imagination may be wrong,\" says the soul, \"but\nthis I know must be true, or there is no truth in the Universe.\"\n\nOne sentence in the paragraph now under consideration deserves special\nnotice. It is this. \"But if we admit that there can be some thing\nuncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything.\" This\n\"assumes\" the truth of a major premise all _things_ are substantially\nalike. If the word \"thing\" is restricted to its exact limits,--objects\nof sense,--then the sentence pertains wholly to the Sense and\nUnderstanding, and is true. But if, as it would seem, the implication is\nmeant that there are no other entities which can be object to the mind\nexcept such \"things,\" then it is a clear _petitio principii_. For the\nvery question at issue is, whether, in fact, there is not one\nentity--\"thing\"--which so differs in kind from all others, that it is\nuncaused, _i. e._ self-existent; and whether the admission that that\nentity is uncaused does not, because of this seen difference, satisfy\nthe mind, and furnish a reasonable ground on which to account for the\nsubordinate causes which we observe by the Sense.\n\nIn speaking of the First Cause as \"independent,\" he says, \"but it can\nhave no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it\nwhich determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if\nit contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this\nsomething must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd.\nThus, the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total,\nincluding within itself all power, and transcending all law.\" We cannot\ncriticize this better, and mark how curiously truth and error are mixed\nin it, than by so parodying it that only truth shall be stated. The\nFirst Cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging\nto his necessary ideals. Hence, change, in the exact sense of that term,\nis impossible to him, for there is nothing for him to _change to_. This\nis not invalidated by his passing from inaction to action; for creation\ninvolves no change in God's nature or attributes, and so no real or\nessential change, which is here meant. But he is the permanent, through\nwhom all changes become. He is not, then, a _simple_ unit, but is an\norganized Being, who is ground for, and comprehends in a unity, all\npossible laws, forms, and relations, as necessary elements of his\nnecessary existence,--as endowments which necessarily belong to him, and\nare conditional of his pure independence. Hence, these restraints are\nnot \"imposed\" upon him, except as his existence is imposed upon him.\nThey belong to his Self, and are conditional of his being. So, then,\ninstead of \"transcending all law,\" he is the embodiment of all law; and\nhis perfection is, that possessing this endowment, he accords his\nconduct thereto. A being who should \"transcend all law\" would have no\nreason why he should act, and no form how he should act, neither would\nhe be an organism, but would be pure lawlessness or pure chaos. Pure\nchaos cannot organize order; pure lawlessness cannot establish law; and\nso could not be the First Cause. As Mr. Spencer truly says, \"we have no\nalternative but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute.\"\n\nAnd now having learned, by a true diagnosis of the mental activities,\nthat the positions we have gained are fixed, final, irrevocable; and\nfurther, that they are not the \"results\" of \"reasonings,\" but that first\nthere was a seeing, and then an analysis of what was seen, and that the\nseeing is _true_, though every other experience be false; we _know_ that\nour position is not \"illusive,\" but that we stand on the rock; and that\nwhat we have seen is no \"symbolic conception of the illegitimate order,\"\nbut is pure truth.\n\nFor the further consideration of this subject, the reader is referred\nback to our remarks on that passage in Mr. Mansel's work, which Mr.\nSpencer has quoted.\n\nA few remarks upon his summing up, p. 43 _et seq._, will complete the\nreview of this chapter. \"Passing over the consideration of credibility,\nand confining ourselves to that of\" consistency, we would find in any\nrigorous analysis, that Atheism and Pantheism are self-contradictory;\nbut we _have found_ that Theism, \"when rigorously analyzed,\" presents an\nabsolutely consistent system, in which all the difficulties of the\nUnderstanding are explained to the person by the Reason, and is entirely\nthinkable. Such a system, based upon the necessary convictions of man,\nand justly commanding that these shall be the fixed standard, in\naccordance with which all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and\ndecided, gives a rational satisfaction to man, and discloses to him his\neternal REST.\n\nIn proceeding to his final fact, which he derives as the permanent in\nall religions, Mr. Spencer overlooks another equally permanent, equally\ncommon, and incomparably more important fact, viz: that Fetishism,\nPolytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism,--all religions alike assert _that\na god created the Universe_. In other words, the great common element,\nin all the popular modes of accounting for the vast system of things in\nwhich we live is, _that it is the product of an agency external to\nitself, and that the external agency is personal_. Take the case of the\nrude aboriginal, who \"assumes a separate personality behind every\nphenomenon.\" He does not attempt to account for all objects. His mind is\ntoo infantile, and he is too degraded to suspect that those material\nobjects which appear permanent need to be accounted for. It is only the\nchanges which seem to him to need a reason. Behind each change he\nimagines a sort of personal power, superior to it and man, which\nproduces it, and this satisfies him. He inquires no further; yet he\nlooks in the same direction as the Monotheist. In this crude form of\nbelief, which is named Fetishism, we see that essential idea which can\nbe readily traced through all forms of religion, that some _personal_\nbeing, external, and superior to the things that be, produced them. Nor\nis Atheism a proper exception to this law. For Atheism is not a\nreligion, but the denial of all religion. It is not a doctrine of God,\nbut is a denial that there is any God; and what is most in point, it\nnever was a _popular_ belief, but is only a philosophical Sahara over\nwhich a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander.\nNeither can Hindu pantheism be quoted against the position taken: for\nBrahm is not the Universe; neither are Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. Brahm\ndoes not lose his individuality because the Universe is evolved from\nhim. _Now_ he is thought of as one, and the Universe as another,\nalthough the Universe is thought to be a part of his essence, and\nhereafter to be reabsorbed by him. _Now_, this part of his essence which\nwas _produced_ through Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is _individualized_;\nand so is one, while he is another. Thus, here also, the idea of a\nproper external agency is preserved. The facts, then, are decisively in\nfavor of the proposition above laid down. \"_Our_ investigation\"\ndiscloses \"a fundamental verity in each religion.\" And the facts and the\nverity find no consistent ground except in a pure Theism, and there they\ndo find perfect consistency and harmony.\n\nIt is required, finally, in closing the discussion of this chapter, to\naccount for the fact that, upon a single idea so many theories of God\nhave fastened themselves; or better, perhaps, that a single idea has\ndeveloped itself in so many forms. This cannot better be done than in\nthe language of that metaphysician, not second to Plato, the apostle\nPaul. In his Epistle to the Romans, beginning at the 19th verse of the\n1st chapter, he says: \"Because that which may be known of God is\nmanifest to them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible\nthings of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being\nunderstood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and\nGodhead, so that they are without excuse. Because that, when they knew\nGod, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became\nvain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened:\nprofessing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the\nglory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible\nman, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.\" This\npassage, which would be worthy the admiring study of ages, did it\npossess no claim to be the teaching of that Being whom Mr. Spencer\nasserts it is _impossible for us to know_, gives us in a popular form\nthe truth. Man, having organic in his mind the idea of God, and having\nin the Universe an ample manifestation to the Sense, of the eternal\npower and Godhead of the Creator of that Universe, corresponding to that\nidea, perverted the manifestation to the Sense, and degraded the idea in\nthe Reason, to the service of base passion. By this degradation and\nperversion the organic idea became so bedizened with the finery of\nfancy formed in the Understanding, under the direction of the animal\nnature, as to be lost to the popular mind,--the trappings only being\nseen. When once the truth was thus lost sight of, and with it all that\nrestraint which a knowledge of the true God would impose, men became\nvain in their imaginations; their fancy ran riot in all directions.\nCutting loose from all law, they plunged into every excess which could\nbe invented; and out of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner\nof vagaries were devised. This was the first stage; and of it we find\nsome historic hints in the biblical account of the times, during and\nprevious to the life of Abraham. Where secular history begins the human\nrace had passed into the second stage. Crystallization had begun.\nStudents were commencing the search for truth. Religion was taking upon\nitself more distinct forms. The organic idea, which could not be wholly\nobliterated, formed itself distinctly in the consciousness of some\ngifted individuals, and philosophy began. Philosophy in its purest form,\nas taught by Socrates and Plato, presented again the lost idea of pure\nTheism. But the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth, lifted\nthem so far above the common people, that they could affect only a few.\nAnd what was most disheartening, that same degradation which originally\nlost to man the truth, now prevented him from receiving it. Thus it was\nthat by a binding of the Reason to the wheels of Passion, and discursing\nthrough the world with the Understanding at the beck of the Sense, the\nmany forms of religion became.\n\n\n\n\n\"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS.\"\n\n\nOn a former page we have already attempted a positive answer to the\nquestion, \"What are Space and Time,\" with which Mr. Spencer opens this\nchapter. It was there found that, in general terms, they are _a priori_\nconditions of created being; and, moreover, that they possess\ncharacteristics suitable to what they condition, just as the _a priori_\nconditions of the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to\nwhat they condition. It was further found that this general law is, from\nthe necessity of the case, realized both within the mind and without it;\nthat it is, must be, the form of thought for the perceiving subject,\ncorresponding to the condition of existence for the perceived object. It\nalso appeared that the Universe as object, and the Sense and\nUnderstanding as faculties in the subject, thus corresponded; and\nfurther, that these faculties could never transcend and comprehend Space\nand Time, because these were the very conditions of their being;\nmoreover, that by them all spaces and times must be considered with\nreference to the Universe, and apart from it could not be examined by\nthem at all. Yet it was further found that the Universe might in the\npresence of the Reason be abstracted; and that, then, pure Space and\nTime still remained as pure _a priori_ conditions, the one as _room_,\nthe other as _opportunity_, for the coming of created being. Space and\nTime being such conditions, _and nothing more_, are entities only in the\nsame sense that the multiplication table and the moral law are entities.\nThey are _conditions_ suited to what they condition. In the light of\nthis result let us examine Mr. Spencer's teachings respecting them.\n\nStrictly speaking, Space and Time do not \"exist.\" If they exist (ex\nsto), they must stand out somewhere and when. This of course involves\nthe being of a where and a when in which they can stand out; and that\nwhere and when must needs be accounted for, and so on _ad infinitum_.\nAgain, Mr. Spencer would seem to speak, in his usual style, as if they,\nin existing \"objectively,\" had a _formal_ objective existence. Yet this,\nin the very statement of it, appears absurd. The mind apprehends many\nobjects, which do not \"exist.\" They only are. Thus, as has just been\nsaid, Space and Time, as conditions of created being, _are_. They are\nentities but not existences. They are _a priori_ entities, and so are\n_necessarily_. By this they stand in the same category with all pure\nlaws, all first principles.\n\n\"Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and so by implication\nto call them nothings, involves the absurdity that there are two kinds\nof nothings.\" This sentence \"involves the absurdity\" of assuming that\n\"nothing\" is an entity. If I say that Space is nothing, I say that it\npresents no content for a concept, and cannot, because there is no\ncontent to be presented. It is then _blank_. Just so of Time. As\nnothings they are, then, both equally blank, and destitute of meaning.\nNow if Mr. Spencer wishes to hold that nothing represented by one word,\ndiffers from nothing represented by another, we would not lay a straw in\nhis way, but yet would be much surprised if he led a large company.\n\nAgain, having decided that they are neither \"nonentities nor the\nattributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them as\nentities.\" But he then goes on to speak of them as \"things,\" evidently\nusing the word in the same sense as if applying it to a material object,\nas an apple or stone; thereby implying that entity and thing in that\nsense are synonymous terms. Upon this leap in the dark, this blunder in\nthe use of language, he proceeds to build up a mountain of difficulties.\nBut once take away this foundation, once cease attempting \"to represent\nthem in thought as things,\" and his difficulties vanish. Space is a\ncondition. Perhaps receptivity, indivisibility, and illimitability are\nattributes. If so, it has attributes, for these certainly belong to it.\nBut whether these shall be called attributes or not, it is certain that\nSpace is, is a pure condition, is thus a positive object to the Reason,\nis qualified by the characteristics named above; and all this without\nany contradiction or other insuperable difficulty arising thereby. On\nthe ground now established, we learn that extension and Space are _not_\n\"convertible terms.\" Extension is an attribute of matter. Space is a\ncondition of phenomena. It is only all _physical_ \"entities which we\nactually know as such\" that \"are limited.\" From our standpoint, that\nSpace is _no_ thing, such remarks as \"We find ourselves totally unable\nto form any mental image of unbounded Space,\" appear painfully absurd.\n\"We find ourselves\" just as \"totally unable to form any mental image of\nunbounded\" love. Such phrases as \"mental image\" have _no relevancy_ to\neither Space or Time. In criticizing Kant's doctrine, which we have\nfound _true_ as far as it goes, Mr. Spencer evinces a surprising lack of\nknowledge of the facts in question. \"In the first place,\" he says, \"to\nassert that Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective\nconditions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective\nrealities.\" But the conclusion does not follow. If the reader will take\nthe trouble to construct the syllogism on which this is based, he will\nat once perceive the absurdity of the logic. It may be said in general\nthat all conditions of a thinking being are both subjective and\nobjective: they are conditions of his being--subjective; and they are\nobjects of his examination and cognizance--objective. Is not the\nmultiplication table an objective reality, _i. e._, would it not remain\nif he be destroyed? And yet is it not also a subjective law; and so was\nit not originally discovered by introspection and reflection? Again he\nsays, \"for that consciousness of Space and Time which we cannot rid\nourselves of, is the consciousness of them as existing objectively.\" Now\nthe fact is, that primarily we do not have _any_ consciousness of Space\nand Time. _Consciousness has to do with phenomena._ When examining the\nmaterial Universe, the _objects_, and the objects as at a distance from\neach other and as during, are what we are conscious of. For instance, I\nview the planets Jupiter and Saturn. They appear as objects in my\nconsciousness. There is a distance between them; but this distance _is_\nnot, except as they _are_. If they are not, the word distance has no\nmeaning with reference to them. Take them away, and I have no\nconsciousness of distance as remaining. These planets continue in\nexistence. They endure. This endurance we call time, but if they should\ncease, one could not think of endurance in connection with them as\nremaining. Here we most freely and willingly agree with Mr. Spencer that\n\"the question is, What does consciousness directly testify?\" but he will\nfind that consciousness on this side of the water testifies very\ndifferently from his consciousness: as for instance in the two articles\nin the \"North American Review,\" heretofore alluded to. Here, \"the direct\ntestimony of consciousness is,\" that spaces and times within the\nUniverse are without the mind; that Space and Time, as _a priori_\nconditions for the possibility of formal object and during event, are\nalso without the mind; but the \"testimony\" is none the less clear and\n\"direct\" that Space and Time are laws of thought in the mind\ncorresponding to the actualities without the mind. And the question may\nbe asked, it is believed with great force, If this last were not so, how\ncould the mind take any cognizance of the actuality? Again, most truly,\nSpace and Time \"cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the\nmind to become non-existent.\" Much more strongly than this should the\ntruth be uttered. They could not become non-existent if the Universe\nwith every sentient being, yea, even--to make an impossible\nsupposition--if the Deity himself, should cease to be. In this they\ndiffer no whit from the laws of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Morals.\nThese too would remain as well. Thus is again enforced the truth, which\nhas been stated heretofore, that Space and Time, as _a priori_\nconditions of the Universe, stand in precisely the same relation to\nmaterial object and during event that the multiplication table does to\nintellect, or the moral law to a spiritual person. It will now be\ndoubtless plain that Mr. Spencer's remarks sprang directly from the\nlower faculties. The Sense in its very organization possesses Space and\nTime as void forms into which objects may come. So also the\nUnderstanding possesses the notional as connecting into a totality.\nThese faculties cannot be in a living man without acting. Activity is\ntheir law. Hence images are ever arising and _must_ arise in the Sense,\nand be connected in the Understanding, and all this in the forms and\nconditions of Space and Time. He who thinks continually in these\nconditions will always _imagine_ that Space and Time are only without\nhim--because he will be thinking only in the iron prison-house of the\nimagining faculty--and so cannot transcend the conditions it imposes.\nNow how shall one see these conditions? They do \"exist objectively\"; or,\nto phrase it better, they have a true being independent of our minds. In\nthis sense, as we have seen, every _a priori_ condition must be\nobjective to the mind. What is objective to the Sense is not Space but a\nspace, _i. e._ a part of Space limited by matter; and, after all, it is\nthe boundaries which are the true object rather than the space, which\ncannot be \"conceived\" of if the boundaries be removed. Without further\nargument, is it not evident that there Space, like all other _a priori_\nconditions, is object only to the Reason, and that as a condition of\nmaterial existence?\n\nAt the bottom of page 49 we have another of Mr. Spencer's psychological\nerrors:--\"For if Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be\nthought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the _form_\nof thought and the matter of thought.\" Although this topic has been\namply discussed elsewhere, it may not be uninstructive to recur to it\nagain. Exactly the opposite of Mr. Spencer's remark is the truth. The\nquestion at issue here is one of those profound and subtile ones which\ncannot be approached by argument, but can be decided only by a _seeing_.\nIt is a psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths of\nour being. If one says, \"I see the forms of thought,\" and another, \"I\ncannot see them,\" neither impeaches the other. All that is left is to\nstimulate the dull faculty of the one until he can see. The following\nreflections may help us to see. Mr. Spencer's remark implies that we\nhave no higher faculty than the Sense and the Understanding. It implies,\nalso, that we can never have any _self_-knowledge, in the fundamental\nsignification of that phrase. We can observe the conduct of the mind,\nand study and classify the results; but the laws, the constitution of\nthe activity itself must forever remain closed to us. As was said, when\nspeaking of this subject under a different phase, the eye cannot see and\nstudy itself. It is a mechanical organism, capable only of reaction as\nacted upon, capable only of seeing results, but never able to penetrate\nto the hidden springs which underlie the event. Just so is it with the\nSense and Understanding. They are mere mechanical faculties capable of\nacting as they are acted upon, but never able to go behind the\nappearance to its final source. On such a hypothesis as this all science\nis impossible, but most of all a science of the human mind. If man is\nenclosed by such walls, no knowledge of his central self can be gained.\nHe may know what he _does_; but what he _is_, is as inscrutable to him\nas what God is. As such a being, he is only a higher order of brute. He\nhas some dim perceptions, some vague feelings, but he has no\n_knowledge_; he is _sure_ of nothing. He can reach no ground which is\nultimate, no _Rock_ which he knows is _immutable_. Is man such a being?\nThe longings and aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing NO! He\nis capable of placing himself before himself, of analyzing that self to\nthe very groundwork of his being. All the laws of his constitution, all\nthe forms of his activity, he can clearly and amply place before himself\nand know them. And how is this? It is because God has endowed him with\nan EYE like unto His own, which enables man to be self-comprehending, as\nHe is self-comprehending,--the Reason, with which man may read himself\nas a child reads a book; that man can make \"the _form_ of thought the\n_matter_ of thought.\" True, the Understanding is shut out from any\nconsideration of the forms of thought; but man is not simply or mainly\nan Understanding. He is, in his highest being, a spiritual person, whom\nGod has endowed with the faculty of VISION; and the great organic evil,\nwhich the fall wrought into the world, was this very denial of the\nspiritual light, and this crowding down and out of sight, of the\nspiritual person beneath the animal nature, this denial of the essential\nfaculties of such person, and this elevation of the lower faculties of\nthe animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, into the highest place,\nwhich is involved in all such teachings as we are criticizing.\n\nMr. Spencer's remarks upon \"Matter\" are no nearer the truth. In almost\nhis first sentence there is a grievous logical _faux pas_. He says:\n\"Matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; no third\npossibility can be named.\" Yet we will name one, as follows: _The\ndivisibility of matter has no relation to infinity_. And this _third_\nsupposition happens to be the truth. But it will be said that the\nquestion should be stated thus: Either there is a limit to the\ndivisibility of matter, or there is no limit. This statement is\nexhaustive, because limitation belongs to matter. Of these alternatives\nthere can be no hesitation which one to choose. There is a limit to the\ndivisibility of matter. This answer cannot be given by the physical\nsense; for no one questions but what it is incapable of finding a limit.\nThe mental sense could not give it, because it is a question of actual\nsubstance and not of ideal forms. The Reason gives the answer. Matter is\nlimited at both extremes. Its amount is definite, as are its final\nelements. These \"ultimate parts\" have \"an under and an upper surface, a\nright and a left side.\" When, then, one of these parts shall be broken,\nwhat results? Not _pieces_, as the materialist, thinking only in the\nSense, would have us believe. When a final \"part\" shall be broken, there\nwill remain _no matter_,--to the sense nothing. To it, the result would\nbe annihilation. But the Reason declares that there would be left _God's\npower_ in its simplicity,--that final Unit out of which all diversity\nbecomes.\n\nThe subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity of Matter may\nbe explained thus. And for convenience sake, we will limit the term\nMatter to such substances as are object to the physical sense, like\ngranite, while Force shall be used to comprise those finer substances,\nlike the Ether, which are impalpable to the physical sense. Matter is\ncomposed of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch, but which\nare held together by Force. The space between the atoms, which would\notherwise be _in vacuo_, is _full_ of Force. We might be more exhaustive\nin our analysis, and say--which would be true--that a space-filling\nforce composes the Universe; and that Matter is only Force in one of its\nmodifications. But without this the other statement is sufficient. When,\nthen, a portion of matter is compressed, the force which holds the\nultimate particles in their places is overcome by an external force, and\nthese particles are brought nearer together. Now, how is it with the\nmoving body and the collision? Bisect a line and see the truth.\n\n        C\n    A--------B\n        1\n\nA body with a mass of 4 is moving with a velocity of 4 along the line\nfrom A to B. At C it meets another body with a mass of 4 at rest. From\nthence the two move on towards B with a velocity of 2. What has\nhappened? In the body there was a certain amount of force, which set it\nin motion and kept it in motion. And just here let us make a point. _No\nforce is ever lost or destroyed. It is only transferred._ When a bullet\nis fired from a gun, it possesses at one _point_ a maximum of force.\nFrom that point this force is steadily _transferred_ to the air and\nother substances, until all that it received from the powder is spent.\nBut at any one point in its flight, the sum of the force which has been\ntransferred since the maximum, and of the force yet to be transferred,\nwill always equal the maximum. Now, how is it respecting the question\nraised by Mr. Spencer? The instant of contact is a point in time, _not a\nperiod_, and the transfer of force is instantaneous. C, then, is a\n_point_, not a period, and the velocity on the one side is 4 and the\nother side 2, while the momentum or force is exactly equal throughout\nthe line. If it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one\nvelocity to another without passing through the intermediate velocities,\nwe cannot help it. The above are the facts, and they give the truth. The\nfollowing sentence of Mr. Spencer is, at least, careless. \"For when, of\ntwo such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the\nstriking unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to\nvelocity 2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of\ntime, and without passing through intermediate velocities; must be\nmoving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same instant, which is\nimpossible.\" If there is any sense in the remark, \"instantaneously\" must\nmean a _point_ of time _without period_. For, if any period is allowed,\nthe sentence has no meaning, since during that period \"the striking\nunit\" passes through all \"intermediate velocities.\" But if by\ninstantaneously he means _without period_, then the last clause of the\nsentence is illogical, since instant there evidently means a period. For\nif it means point, then it contradicts the first clause. There, it is\nasserted that 4 was \"_reduced_\" to 2, _i. e._ that at one point the\nvelocity was 4, and at the next point it was 2, and that there was _no\ntime_ between. If 4 was instantaneously reduced to 2, then the velocity\n2 was next after the velocity 4, and not coeval with it. Thus it appears\nthat these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous are\ncontradictory.\n\nBearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting atoms, we\nshall not be troubled by the objections to the Newtonian theory which\nfollow. In reply to the question, \"What is the constitution of these\nunits?\" the answer, \"We have no alternative but to regard each of them\nas a small piece of matter,\" would be true if the Sense was the only\nfaculty which could examine them. But even upon this theory Mr.\nSpencer's remarks \"respecting the parts of which each atom consists,\"\nare entirely out of place; for the hypothesis that it is an ultimate\natom excludes the supposition of \"parts,\" since that phrase has no\nmeaning except it refers to a final, indivisible, material unit. All\nthat the Sense could say, would be, \"What this atom is I know not, but\nthat it is, and _is not divisible_, I believe.\" But when we see by the\nReason that the ultimate atom, when dissolved, becomes God's power, all\ndifficulty in the question vanishes. Having thus answered the above\nobjections, it is unnecessary to notice the similar ones raised against\nBoscovich's theory, which is a modification of that of Newton.\n\nMr. Spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion. The fact that he\nseeks for absolute motion by the _physical sense_, a faculty which was\nonly given us to perceive relative--phenomenal--motion, and is, _in its\nkind_, incapable of finding the absolute motion, (for if it should see\nit, it could not _know_ it,) is sufficient to condemn all that he has\nsaid on this subject. For the presentations which he has made of the\nphenomena given us by the Sense does not exhaust the subject. The\nperplexities therein developed are all resolvable, as will appear\nfurther on. The phenomena adduced on page 55 are, then, merely\n_appearances_ in the physical sense; and the motion is merely relative.\nIn the first instance, the captain walks East with reference to the ship\nand globe. In the second, he walks East with reference to the ship; the\nship sails West with reference to the globe; while the resultant motion\nis, that he is _stationary_ with reference to this larger object. What,\nthen, can the Sense give us? Only resultant motion, at the most. So we\nsee that \"our ideas of Motion\" are not \"illusive,\" but _deficient_. The\nmotion is just what it appears, measured from a given object. It is\n_relative_, and this is all the Sense _can_ give. Our author\nacknowledges that \"we tacitly assume that there are real motions\"; that\n\"we take for granted that there are fixed points in space, with respect\nto which all motions are absolute; and we find it impossible to rid\nourselves of this idea.\" A question instantly arises, and it seems to be\none which he is bound to entertain, viz: How comes this idea to be? We\npress this question upon Mr. Spencer, being persuaded that he will find\nit much more perplexing than those he has entertained. Undoubtedly,\n\"absolute motion cannot even be imagined.\" _No_ motion can be imagined,\nthough the moving body may be. But by no means does it follow, \"much\nless known.\" This involves that the knowing faculty is inferior to, and\nmore circumscribed than, the imagining faculty, when the very opposite\nis the fact. Neither does it follow from what is said in the paragraph\nbeginning with, \"For motion is change of place,\" that \"while we are\nobliged to think that there is absolute motion, we find absolute motion\nincomprehensible.\" The Universe is limited and bounded, and is a sphere.\nWe _may_ assume that the centre of the sphere is at rest. Instantly\nabsolute motion becomes comprehensible, for it is motion measured from\nthat point. Surely there can be no harm in the _supposition_. The Reason\nshows us that the supposition is the truth; and that that centre is the\nthrone of the eternal God. In this view not only is motion, apart from\nthe \"limitations of space,\" totally unthinkable, but it is absolutely\nimpossible. Motion _cannot_ be, except as a formal body is. Hence, to\nspeak of motion in \"unlimited space\" is simply absurd. Formal object\n_cannot_ be, except as _thereby_ a limit is established in Space. Hence\nit is evident that \"absolute motion\" is not motion with reference to\n\"unlimited Space,\" which would be the same as motion without a moving;\nbut is motion with reference to that point fixed in Space, around which\nall things revolve, but which is itself at perfect rest.\n\n\"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself, when we contemplate the\ntransfer of Motion.\" Motion is simply the moving of a body, and _cannot\nbe transferred_. The _force_ which causes the motion is what is\ntransferred. All that can be said of motion is, that it is, that it\nincreases, that it diminishes, that it ceases. If the moving body\nimpinges upon another moving body, and causes it to move, it is not\nmotion that is transferred, but the force which causes the motion. The\nmotion in the impinging body is diminished, and a new motion is begun in\nthe body which was at rest. Again it is asked: \"In what respect does a\nbody after impact differ from itself before impact?\" And further on:\n\"The motion you say has been communicated. But how? What has been\ncommunicated? The striking body has not transferred a _thing_ to the\nbody struck; and it is equally out of the question to say that it has\ntransferred an _attribute_.\" Observe now that a somewhat is\nunquestionably communicated; and the question is:--What is it? Query.\nDoes Mr Spencer mean to comprehend the Universe in \"thing\" and\n\"attribute\"? He would seem to. If he does, he gives a decision by\nassertion without explanation or proof, which involves the very question\nat issue, which is, Is the somewhat transferred a \"thing\" or an\n\"attribute\"; and a decision directly contrary to the acknowledgment that\na somewhat has been communicated? On the above-named hypothesis his\nstatement should be as follows: A somewhat has been communicated.\n\"Thing\" and \"attribute\" comprise all the Universe. Neither a thing, nor\nan attribute has been communicated, _i. e._ no somewhat has been\ncommunicated; which contradicts the evidence and the acknowledgment. If\non the other hand Mr. Spencer means that \"thing\" and \"attribute\"\ncomprise only a part of the Universe, then the question is not fairly\nmet. It may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the Universe\nin the two terms thing and attribute; and then, as attribute is\nessential to the object it qualifies, and so cannot be communicated, it\nwill follow that a thing has been communicated. This thing we call\nforce. It is not in hand now to inquire what force is. It is manifest to\nthe Sense that the body is in a different state after impact, than it\nwas before. Something has been put into the body, which, though not\ndirectly appreciable to the Sense, is indirectly appreciable by the\nresults, and which is as real an addition as water is to a bowl, when\npoured in. Before the impact the body was destitute of that kind of\nforce--motor force would be a convenient term--which tended to move it.\nAfter the impact a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the\nmotion. It may be asked, where does this force go to when the motion\ndiminishes till the body stops. It passes into the substances which\ncause the diminution until there is no surplus in the moving body, and\nat the point of equilibrium motion ceases. If it be now asked, where\ndoes this force ultimately go to, it is to be said that it comes from\nGod, and goes to God, who is the Final. The Sense gives only subordinate\nanswers, but the Reason leads us to the Supreme.\n\nIf the view adopted be true, Mr. Spencer's halving and halving again\n\"the rate of movement forever,\" is irrelevant. It is not a _mental\noperation_ but an _actual fact_ which is to be accounted for. Take a\nstriking illustration. A ball lying on smooth ice is struck with a\nhockey. Away it goes skimming over the glassy surface with a steadily\ndiminishing velocity till it ceases. It starts, it proceeds, it stops.\nThese are the facts; and the mental operation must accord with them.\nThere is put into the ball, at the instant of contact, a certain amount\nof motor force. From that instant onward, that force flows out of the\nball into the resisting substances by which it is surrounded, until none\nis left. And it is just as pertinent to ask how all the water can flow\nout of a pail, as how all the motor force can flow out of a moving\nsubstance. \"The smallest movement is separated\" by no more of \"an\nimpassable gap from no movement,\" _than it is from a larger movement\nabove it_. That which will account for a movement four becoming two,\nwill account for a movement two becoming zero. The \"puzzle,\" then, may\nbe explained thus. Time is the procession of events. Let it be\nrepresented by a line. Take a point in that line, which will then mark\nits division but represent _no period_. On one side of that point is\nrest; on the other motion. That point is the point of contact, and\noccupies no period. At this point the motion is maximum. The force\ninstantly begins to flow off, and continues in a steady stream until\nnone is left, and the body is again at rest. Here, also, we take a\npoint. This is the point of zero. It again divides the line. Before the\nbisection is motion; after the bisection is rest. All this cannot be\nperceived by the Sense, nor conceived by the Understanding. It is seen\nby the Reason. Now observe the actual phenomenon. The ball starts,\nproceeds, stops. From maximum to zero there is a steady diminution, or\nnearly enough so for the experiment; at least the diminution can be\naveraged for the illustration. Then comparing motion with time, the same\ndifficulty falls upon the one as the other. If the motion is halved, the\ntime must be; and so, \"mentally,\" it is impossible to imagine how a\nmoment of time can pass. To the halving faculty--the Sense--this is\ntrue, and so we are compelled to correct our course of procedure. This\nit is. The Sense and Understanding being impotent to discover an\nabsolute unit of any kind, the Sense _assumes_ for itself what meets all\npractical want--a standard unit, by which it measures parts in Space and\nTime. So motion must be measured by some assumed standard; and as, like\ntime,--duration,--it can be represented by a line, let them have a\ncommon standard. Suppose, then, that the ball's flight occupies ten\nminutes of time. The line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly\nequal spaces; and it will be no more difficult to account for the flow\nof force from 10 to 9, than from 1 to 0. Also let it be observed that\nthe force, like time, is a unit, which the Sense, for its convenience,\ndivides into parts; but that neither those parts, nor any parts, have\nany real existence. As Time is an indivisible whole, measured off for\nconvenience, so any given force is such a whole, and is so measured off.\nAll this appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the Sense. It is the\nReason which sees that they can be _only_ phenomenal, and that behind\nthe appearance is pure Spirit--God, who is primarily out of all\nrelation.\n\nOn page 58, near the close of his illustration of the chair, Mr. Spencer\nsays: \"It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an\naffection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force as existing in\nthe chair under the same form without endowing the chair with\nconsciousness.\" This very strange assertion can only be true, provided a\nmajor premiss, No force can be conceived to exist without involving an\naffection of consciousness in the object in which it _apparently_\ninheres, is true. Such a premiss seems worse than absurd; it seems\nsilly. We cannot learn that force exists, without our consciousness is\naffected thereby; but this is a very different thing from our being\nunable to conceive of a force as _existing_, without there is a\nconsciousness in the object through which it _appears_. If Mr. Spencer\nhad said that no force can be, without being exerted, and no force can\nbe exerted, without an affection of the consciousness of the exertor, he\nwould have uttered the truth. We would then have the following result.\nPrimarily all force is exerted by the Deity; and he is conscious\nthereof. He draws the chair down just as really as though the hand were\nvisible. Secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their Creator with\nthe ability to exert his force for their uses, and so I lift the chair.\nThe great error, which appears on every page of Mr. Spencer's book and\ninvalidates all his conclusions, shows itself fully here. He presents\nimages from the Sense, and then tries to satisfy the Reason--the faculty\nwhich calls for an absolute account--by the analyses of that Sense. His\nattempt to \"halve the rate,\" his remark that \"the smallest movement is\nseparated by an impassable gap from no movement,\" and many such, are\nonly pertinent to the Sense, can never be explained by the Sense, and\nare found by the Reason to need, and be capable of, no such kind of\nexplanation as the Sense attempts; but that the phenomena are\nappearances in _wholes_, whose partitions cannot be absolute, and that\nthese wholes are accounted for by the being of an absolute and infinite\nPerson--God, who is utterly impalpable to the Sense, and can be known\nonly by the Reason.\n\nThe improper use of the Sense mentioned above, is, if possible, more\nemphatically exemplified in the remarks upon \"the connection between\nForce and Matter.\" \"Our ultimate test of Matter is the ability to\nresist.\" This is true to the Sense, but no farther. \"Resist\" what? Other\nmatter, of course. Thus is the sensuousness made manifest. In the Sense,\nthen, we have a material object. But Force is not object to the Sense\ndirectly, but only indirectly by its effects through Matter. The Sense,\nin its percept, deems the force other than the matter. Hence it is\nreally no more difficult for the Sense to answer the question, How could\nthe Sun send a force through 95,000,000 of miles of void to the Earth\nand hold it, than through solid rock that distance? All that the Sense\n_can do_ is to present the phenomena. It is utterly impotent to account\nfor the least of them.\n\nIn the following passage, on page 61, Mr. Spencer seems to have been\nunaccountably led astray. He says: \"Let the atoms be twice as far apart,\nand their attractions and repulsions will both be reduced to one fourth\nof their present amounts. Let them be brought within half the distance,\nand then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled. Whence it\nfollows that this matter will as readily as not assume any other\ndensity; and can offer no resistance to any external agents.\" Now if\nthis be true, there can be no \"external agents\" to which to offer any\n\"resistance.\" It is simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself;\nand that matter is impossible. But the conclusion does not \"follow.\" It\nis evidently based on the supposition that the \"attractions and\nrepulsions\" are _contra_-acting forces which exactly balance each other,\nand so the molecules are held in their position by _no_ force. Instead\nof this, they are _co_-acting forces, which are wholly expended in\nholding the molecules in their places. The repulsions, then, are\nexpended in resisting pressure from without which seeks to crowd the\nparticles in upon themselves and thus disturb their equilibrium; while\nthe attractions are expended in holding the particles down to their\nnatural distance from each other when any disturbing force attempts to\nseparate them. Hence, referring to the two cases mentioned, in the first\ninstance the power of resistance is reduced to one fourth, and this\ncorresponds with the fact; and in the second instance the power of\nresistance is increased fourfold, and this corresponds with the fact.\n\nWe thus arrive at the end of Mr. Spencer's remarks concerning the\nmaterial Universe and of our strictures thereon. Perhaps the reader's\nmind cannot better be satisfied as to the validity of these strictures\nthan by presenting an outline of the system furnished by the Reason, and\nupon which they are based.\n\nThe Reason gives, by a direct and immediate intuition, and as a\nnecessary _a priori_ idea, God. This is a _spontaneous_, synthetical\nact, precisely the same in kind with that which gives a simple _a\npriori_ principle, as idea. In it the Reason intuits, not a single\nprinciple seen to be necessary simply, but the fact that all possible\nprinciples _must_ be combined in a perfectly harmonious unity, in a\nsingle Being, who thereby possesses all possible endowments; and so is\nutterly independent, and is seen to be the absolute and infinite Person,\nthe perfect Spirit. This act is no conclusion of the One from the many\nin a synthetical judgment, but is entirely different. It is the\nnecessary seeing of the many in the One; and so is not a judgment but an\nintuition, not a guess but a certainty. God, then, is known, when known\nat all, not \"by plurality, difference, and relation,\" but by an\n_immediate_ insight into his unity, and so is directly known as he is.\nAnd the whole Universe is, that creatures might be, to whom this\nrevelation was possible. Among the other necessary endowments which this\nintuition reveals, is that of immanent power commensurate with his\ndignity, and adequate to realize in actual creatures the necessary _a\npriori_ ideas, which he also possesses as endowments. Power is, then, a\nsimple idea, incapable of analysis; and which cannot therefore be\ndefined, except by synonymous terms; and to which President Hopkins's\nremark upon moral obligation is equally pertinent; viz: \"that we can\nonly state the occasion on which it arises.\" From these data the _a\npriori_ idea of the Universe may be developed as follows:--\n\nGod, the absolute and infinite Person, possesses, as inherent endowment\nforever immanent in himself, Universal Genius; which is at once capacity\nand faculty, in which he sees, and by which he sees, all possible ideas,\nand these in all possible combinations or ideals. Thus has he all\npossible knowledge. From the various ideal systems which thus are, he,\nhaving perfect wisdom, and according his choice to the behest of his own\nworth, selects that one which is thus seen to be best; and thereby\ndetermines the forms and laws under which the Universe shall become. He\nalso possesses, as inherent endowment, all power; _i. e._ the ability to\nrealize every one of his ideals; but _not_ the ability to violate the\nnatural laws of his being, as to make two and two five. The ideal system\nis only ideal: the power is simply power; and so long as the two remain\nisolated, no-thing will be. Therefore, in order to the realization of\nhis ideal, it must be combined with the power; _i. e._, the power must\nbe organized according to the ideal. How, then, can the power, having\nbeen sent forth from God, be organized? Thus. If the power goes forth in\nits simplicity, it will be expended uselessly, because there is no\nsubstance upon which it may be exercised. It follows, then, that, if\nexercised at all, it must be exercised upon _itself_. When, therefore,\nGod would create the Universe, he sent forth two \"pencils,\" or columns\nof power, of equal and sufficient volume, which, acting upon each other\nfrom opposite directions, just held each other in balance, and thus\nforce was. These two \"pencils,\" thus balancing each other, would result\nin a sphere of \"space-filling force.\" The point of contact would\ndetermine the first place in Space, and the first point in Time; from\nwhich, if attainable, an absolute measure of each could be made. All we\nhave now attained is the single duality \"space-filling force,\" which is\nwholly homogeneous, is of sufficient volume to constitute the Universe,\nand yet by no means _is_ the Universe. There is only Chaos, \"without\nform and void, and darkness\" is \"upon the face of the deep.\" Now must\n\"the Spirit of God move upon the face of the waters\"; then through vast\nand to us immeasurable periods of time, through cycle and epicycle, the\nwork of organization will go on. Ever moving under forms laid down in\nthe _a priori_ ideal, God's power turns upon itself, as out of the crush\nof elemental chaos the Universe is being evolved. During this process,\nwhatever of the force is to act under the law of heat in the _a priori_\nideal, assumes that form and the heat force becomes; whatever is to act\nunder the law of magnetism, assumes that form, and magnetic force\nbecomes; so of light, and the various forms of matter. At length, in the\nrevolution of the cycles, the Universe attains that degree of\npreparation which fits it for living things to be, and the life force is\norganized; and by degrees all its various forms are brought forth. After\nanother vast period that point is reached when an animal may be\norganized, which shall be the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose\nlife is utterly different in kind from any animal life, and man appears.\nNow in all these vast processes, be it observed that God is personally\npresent, that the first energy was his, and that every subsequent\nenergizing act is his special and personal act. He organized the\nduality, force. He then organized this force into heat-force,\nlight-force, magnetic-force, matter-force, life-force, and soul-force.\nAnd so it is that his personal supervision and energy is actually\npresent in every atom of the Universe. When we turn from this process of\nthought to the sensible facts, and speak of granite, sandstone, schist,\nclay, herbage, animals, yes, of the thousand kinds of substance which\nappear to the eye, it is to be remembered that all these are but _forms\nto the Sense_ of that \"reason-conception,\" force,--that primal duality,\nwhich power acting upon itself becomes. Now as the machine can never\ncarve any other image than those for which it is specially constructed,\nand must work just as it is made to work, so the Sense, which is purely\nmechanical, can never do any other than the work for which it was made,\ncan never transcend the laws of its organization. It can only give\nforms--results, but is impotent to go behind them. It can only say _that\nthings are_, but never say _what_ or _why_ they are.\n\nSeen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented, Mr.\nSpencer's difficulties vanish. Matter is force. Motion is matter\naffected by another form of force. The \"puzzle\" of motion and rest is\nonly phenomenal to the Sense; it is an appearance of force acting\nthrough another force. It may also be said that the Universe is solid\nforce. There is no void in it. There is no nook, no crevice or cranny,\nthat is not full of force. To seek, then, for some medium through which\nforce may traverse vast distances, is the perfection of superfluity.\nFrom centre to circumference it is present, and controls all things, and\nis all things. So it is no more difficult to see how force reaches forth\nand holds worlds in their place, than how it draws down the pebble which\na boy has thrown into the air. It is no substance which must travel over\nthe distance, it is rather an inflexible rod which swings the worlds\nround in their orbits. Whether, then, we look at calcined crags or\nlilies of the valley, whether astronomy, or geology, or chemistry be our\nstudy, the objects grouped under those sciences will be found to be\nequally the results of this one force, acting under different laws, and\ntaking upon itself different forms, and becoming different objects.\n\nThat faculty and that line of thought, which have given so readily the\nsolution of the difficulties brought to view by Mr. Spencer's\nexamination of the outer world, will afford us an easier solution, if\npossible, of the difficulties which he has raised respecting the inner\nworld. That which is not of us, but is far from us, may perchance be\nimperfectly known; but ourselves, what we are, and the laws of our\nbeing, may be certainly and accurately known. And this is the highest\nknowledge. It may be important, as an element of culture, that we become\nacquainted with many facts respecting the outer world. It cannot but be\nof the utmost importance, that we know ourselves; for thus only can we\nfulfil the behest of that likeness to God, in which we were originally\ncreated. We seek for, we may obtain, we _have obtained_ knowledge in the\ninner world,--a knowledge sure, steadfast, immutable.\n\nIt seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism, rather a fundamental\none, that it is not \"our states of consciousness\" which \"occur in\nsuccession\"; but that the modifications in our consciousness so occur.\nConsciousness is _one_, and retains that oneness throughout all\nmodifications. These occur in the unity, as items of experience affect\nit. Is this series of modifications \"of consciousness infinite or\nfinite\"? To this question experience _can_ give no answer. All\nexperiments are irrelevant; because these can only be after the faculty\nof consciousness is. They can go no further back than the _forms_ of the\nactivity. These they may find, but they cannot account for. A law lies\non all those powers by which an experiment may be made, which forever\nestops them from attaining to the substance of the power which lies back\nof the form. The eye cannot examine itself. The Sense, as mental\ncapacity for the reception of impressions, cannot analyze its\nconstituents. The Understanding, as connective faculty concluding in\njudgments, is impotent to discover why it must judge one way and not\nanother. It is only when we ascend to the Reason that we reach the\nregion of true knowledge. Here, overlooking, analyzing all the conduct\nof the lower powers, and holding the self right in the full blaze of the\nEye of self, Man attains a true and fundamental _self-knowledge_. From\nthis Mount of Vision we know that infinity and finiteness have no\npertinence to modifications of consciousness, or in fact to any series.\nWe attain to the further knowledge that this series is, _must be_,\nlimited; because the constituted beings, in whom it in each case\ninheres, are limited, and had a beginning. It matters not now to inquire\nhow a self-conscious person could be created. It is sufficient to know\nthat one has been created. This fact involves the further fact that\nconsciousness, as an actuality, began in the order of nature, after the\nbeing to whom it belongs as endowment, or, in other words, an\norganization must be, before the modifications which inhere in that\norganization can become. The attainment of this as necessary law is far\nmore satisfactory than any experience could be, were it possible; for we\ncan never know but that an experience may be modified; but a law given\nin the intuition is immutable. The fact, ascertained many pages back,\nthat the subject and the object are identical under the final\nexamination of the Reason, enables us to attain the present end of the\nchain. The question is one of fact, and is purely psychological. It\ncannot be passed upon, or in any way interfered with, by logical\nprocesses. It is only by examination, by seeing, that the truth can be\nknown. Faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel\npropelled by steam could cross the ocean, and demonstrated, to his\nentire satisfaction, the impossibility of the event. Yet the Savannah\ncrossed, and laughed at him. Just so here, all arguing is folly. The\nquestion is one of fact in experience. And upon it the soul gives\nundoubted answer, as we have stated. Nor is it so difficult, as some\nwould have us believe, to see how this may be. Consciousness is an\nindivisible unity, and, as we have before seen, may best be defined as\nthe light in which the person intuits his own acts and activities. This\nunity is abiding, and is ground for the modifications. It is, then,\n_now_, and the person now knows what the present modification _is_. The\nperson does not need to look to memory and learn what the former\nmodification was. It immediately knows what the modification _is_ now.\nThus a simple attainment of the psychological truth through a careful\nexamination dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of Mr. Spencer's\ndifficulties. Well might President Hopkins say, \"The only question is,\nwhat is it that consciousness gives? If we say that it does thus give\nboth the subject and the object, that simple affirmation sweeps away in\na moment the whole basis of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It\nbecomes as the spear of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what\nseemed whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of German\nfog.\" We have learned, then, that it is not possible, or necessary,\neither to \"perceive\" or \"conceive\" the terminations of consciousness,\nbecause this involves the discovery, by _mechanical_ faculties, of their\nown being and state before they became activities on the one hand, which\nis a contradiction, and on the other an utter transcending of the sphere\nof their capability, the attempt to do which would be a greater folly\nthan would be that of the hand to see Jupiter. But we have intuited the\nlaw, which declares the necessity of a beginning for us and all\ncreatures; and we ever live in the light of the present end. When, then,\nMr. Spencer says that \"Consciousness implies perpetual change and the\nperpetual establishment of relations between its successive phases,\" we\nknow that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error, in fact,\nthat almost the opposite is the truth. Consciousness is the permanent,\nthe abiding, the changeless. It is the light of the personal Eye. Into\nit all changes come; but they are only _incidental_. In the finite and\npartial person, they come, because such person _must grow_; and so,\nbecause of his partiality and incompleteness, they become necessary\nincidents; but let there be a Person having all knowledge, who therefore\ncannot learn, having all perfection, who therefore cannot change, and it\nis plain that these facts in no way interfere with his consciousness.\nAll variety is immanent in its light, and no change can come into it\nbecause _there is no change to come_; but this Person sees _all_ his\nendowments _at once_, in the unity of this his light, just as we see\n_some_ of our endowments in the unity of this our light. The change is\nnot in the consciousness, but in the objects which come into it. This\nview also disposes of the theory that \"any mental affection must be\nknown as like these foregoing ones or unlike those\"; that, \"if it is not\nthought of in connection with others--not distinguished or identified by\ncomparison with others, it is not recognized--is not a state of\nconsciousness at all.\" Such comparison we have found only incidental in\nconsciousness, pertaining to things in the Sense and Understanding and\nnot essential. Thus does a true psychology dissipate all these\ndifficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities \"of Motion\nand Rest.\"\n\nTake another step and we can answer the question \"What is this that\nthinks?\" It is a spiritual person. What, then, is a spiritual person? A\nsubstance--a kind of force--the nature of which we need inquire about no\nfurther than to know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it,\nwhich is organized, according to a set of constituting laws, into such\nspiritual person. The substance without the laws would be simple\nsubstance, and nothing more. The laws without the substance would be\nonly laws, and could give no being having no ground in which to inhere.\nBut the substance as ground and the complete set of laws as inhering in\nthe ground, and being its organization when combined, become a spiritual\nperson who thinks. The _ego_, that is the sense of personality, is only\none of the forms of activity of this being, and therefore cannot be said\nto think. The pages now before us are all vitiated by the theory that\n\"successive impressions and ideas constitute consciousness.\" Once attain\nto the true psychology of the person, and learn that consciousness is as\nstated above,--an abiding light into which modifications come,--and\nthere arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of self, and in\nentirely justifying that belief by Reason. Yea, more, from such a\nstandpoint it is utter unreason, the height of folly, to doubt for an\ninstant, for immanent and central in the light of Reason lies the solemn\nfact of man's selfhood. We arrive, then, directly at Mr. Spencer's\nconclusion, that \"Clearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in\nwhich the knowing and the known are one--in which subject and object are\nidentified,\" and we _know_ that such a state is an actuality. Mr. Mansel\nmay hold that such an assertion is the annihilation of both, but he is\nwholly wrong. The Savannah has crossed the Atlantic.\n\nWe attain, then, exactly the opposite result from Mr. Spencer. We have\nseen that \"Ultimate Scientific Ideas are all\" presentative \"of\nrealities\" which can \"be comprehended.\" We have, indeed, found it to be\ntrue, that, \"after no matter how great a progress in the colligation of\nfacts and the establishment of generalizations ever wider and\nwider,--after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths\nthat are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how far,--the\nfundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever.\" But having\nlearned this, we do not arrive at the conclusion that \"the explanation\nof that which is explicable does but bring out into greater clearness\nthe inexplicableness of that which remains behind.\" On the other hand we\nknow that such a conclusion is erroneous, and _that the method by which\nit is reached is a false method, and utterly irrelevant to the object\nsought_. Could this lesson but be thoroughly learned, Mr. Spencer's\nwork, and our work, would not have been in vain. Only by a method\ndiffering from this IN KIND--a method in which there is no \"colligation\nof facts,\" and no \"generalizations\" concluded therefrom, but a simple,\ndirect insight into Pure Truth--can \"the fundamental truth\" be known;\nand thus it may be known by every human soul. \"_God made man in his own\nimage._\" In our scheme there is ample room for the man of Science, with\nthe eye of Sense, to run through the Universe, and gather facts. With\ntelescope and microscope, he may pursue them, and capture innumerable\nmultitudes of them. But having done this, we count it folly to attempt\nto generalize truth therefrom. But holding up the facts in the clear\nlight of Reason, and searching them through and through, we _see_ in\nthem the immutable principle, known by a spontaneous, immediate,\nintuitive knowledge to be immutable, and thus we \"_know the truth_.\"\n\n\n\n\n\"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE.\"\n\n\nIn the opening of this chapter, Mr. Spencer states the result, which, in\nhis opinion, philosophy has attained as follows: \"All possible\nconceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting; and so the\nentire field of speculation has been gradually exhausted without\npositive result; the only result arrived at being the negative one above\nstated--that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must\never be, unknown.\" He then sets down a considerable list of names of\nphilosophers, who are claimed by Sir William Hamilton as supporters of\nthat position. Such a parade of names may be grateful to the feelings of\nthe Limitists, but it is no support to their cause. The questions at\nissue are of such a nature that no array of dignities, of learning, of\nprofound _opinions_, can have a feather's weight in the decision. For\ninstance, take Problem XLVII, of the first book of Euclid. What weight\nhave human opinion with reference to its validity? Though a thousand\nmathematicians should deny its truth, it would be just as convincing as\nnow; and when a thousand mathematicians assert its truth, they add no\nitem to the vividness of the conviction. The school-boy, who never heard\nof one of them, when he first reads it, knows it must be so, and that\nthis is an inevitable necessity, beyond the possibility of any power or\nwill to change. On principles simple, fixed, and final, just like those\nof mathematics, seen by the same Eye and known with the same\nintellectual certainty, and by logical processes just as pure,\nconclusive, _demonstrative_ as those of geometry, _and by such alone_,\ncan the questions now before us be settled. But though names and\nopinions have no weight in the final decision, though a demonstration is\ndemanded and must be given, still it is interesting to note the absence\nof two names, representatives of a class, which must ever awaken, among\nthe devout and pure-hearted, attention and love, and whose teachings,\nhowever unnoticed by Mr. Spencer, are a leaven working in the minds and\nhearts of men, which develop with continually increasing distinctness\nthe solemn and sublime truth, that the human mind is capable of absolute\nknowledge. Plato, with serious, yea, sad countenance, the butt of jeer\nand scoff from the wits and comedians of his day, went about teaching\nthose who hung upon his lips, that in every human soul were Ideas which\nGod had implanted, and which were final truth. And Jesus Christ, with a\ncountenance more beautifully serious, more sweetly sad, said to those\nJews which believed on him, \"If ye continue in my word, then are ye my\ndisciples indeed; _and ye shall know the truth_, and the truth shall\nmake you free.\" It may seem to men who grope about in the dismal cavern\nof the animal nature--the Sense and Understanding--wise to refuse the\nlight, and reject the truths of the Pure Reason and the God-man, and to\ncall the motley conglomeration of facts which they gather, but cannot\nexplain, philosophy; but no soul which craves \"the Higher Life\" will,\ncan be satisfied with such attainments. It yearns for, it cries after,\nyea, with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication for the highest\ntruth; and it shall attain to it, because God, in giving the tongue to\ncry, gave also the Eye to see. The Spiritual person in man, made in the\nvery image of God, can never be satisfied till, stripped of the weight\nof the animal nature, it sees with its own Eye the Pure Reason, God as\nthe Highest Truth. And to bring it by culture, by every possible\nmanifestation of his wondrous nature, up to this high Mount of Vision,\nis one object of God in his system of the Universe.\n\nThe teaching of the Word--that august personage, \"who came forth from\nGod, and went to God,\" has been alluded to above. It deserves more than\nan allusion, more than any notice which can be given it here. It is\nastonishing, though perhaps not wholly unaccountable, that the writings\nof the apostles John and Paul have received so little attention from\nthe metaphysicians of the world, as declarations of metaphysical truths.\nEven the most devout students of them do not seem to have appreciated\ntheir inestimable value in this regard. The reason for this undoubtedly\nis, that their transcendent importance as declarations of religious\ntruth has shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those who\nhave loved them, that the lesser, but harmoniously combining beams of a\ntrue spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed in the glory of the nobler\nlight. It will not, therefore, we trust, be deemed irreverent to say\nthat, laying aside all questions of the Divinity of Christ, or of the\ninspiration of the Bible, and considering the writings of John and Paul\nmerely as human productions, written at some time nobody knows when, and\nby some men nobody knows who, they are the most wonderful revelations,\nthe profoundest metaphysical treatises the world has ever seen. In them\nthe highest truths, those most difficult of attainment by processes of\nreflection, are stated in simple, clear language, and _they answer\nexactly to the teachings of the Reason_. Upon this, President Hopkins\nsays: \"The identity which we found in the last lecture between the\nteaching of the constitution of man and the law of God, was not sought.\nThe result was reached because the analysis would go there. I was myself\nsurprised at the exactness of the coincidence.\" Nor is this coincidence\nto be observed simply in the statement of the moral law. In all\nquestions pertaining to man's nature and state, the two will be found in\nexact accord. No law is affirmed by either, but is accorded to by the\nother. In fine, whoever wrote the Book must have had an accurate and\nexhaustive knowledge of Man, about whom he wrote. Without any reference\nthen to their religious bearings, but simply as expositions of\nmetaphysical truths, the writings of the two authors named deserve our\nmost careful attention. What we seek for are laws, final, fixed laws,\nwhich are seen by a direct intuition to be such; and these writings are\nof great value, because they cultivate and assist the Reason in its\nsearch for these highest Truths.\n\nOne need have no hesitation, then, in rejecting the authority of Mr.\nSpencer's names, aye, even if they were a thousand more. We seek for,\nand can obtain, that which he cannot give us--a demonstration; which he\ncannot give us because he denies the very existence of that faculty by\nwhich alone a demonstration is possible. As his empiricism is worthless,\nso is his rationality. No \"deduction\" from any \"_product_ of thought, or\nprocess of thought,\" is in any way applicable to the question in hand.\nIntuitions are the mental actions needed. Light is neither product nor\nprocess. We pass over, then, his whole illustration of the partridge. It\nproves nothing. He leads us through an interminable series of questions\nto no goal; and says there is none. He gives the soul a stone, when it\ncries for bread. One sentence of his is doubtless true. \"Manifestly, as\nthe _most_ general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a\nmore general one, it cannot be understood.\" Of course not. When the\nUnderstanding has attained to the last generalization _by these very\nterms_, it cannot go any farther. But by no means does his conclusion\nfollow, that \"Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring\nus down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must\nbe unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than\ncomprehension, before the ultimate fact can be comprehended.\" How shall\nwe account for the last generalization, and show this conclusion to be\nfalse? Thus. Hitherto there have been, properly speaking, no\ncomprehensions, only perceptions in the Sense and connections in the\nUnderstanding. \"The sense _distinguishes_ quality and _conjoins_\nquantity; the understanding _connects_ phenomena; the reason\n_comprehends_ the whole operation of both.\" The Reason, then, overseeing\nthe operations of the lower faculties, and possessing within itself the\n_a priori_ laws in accordance with which they are, _sees_ directly and\nimmediately why they are, and thus comprehends and accounts for them. It\nsees that there is an end to every process of generalization; and it\nthen sees, what the Understanding could never guess, that _after_--in\nthe order of our procedure--the last generalization there is an eternal\ntruth, in accordance with which process and conclusion were and must be.\nThere remains, then, no inexplicable, for the final truth is seen and\nknown in its very self.\n\nThe passages quoted at this point from Hamilton and Mansel have been\nheretofore examined, and need no further notice. We will pass on then to\nhis subsequent reflections upon them. It is worthy of remark, as a\ngeneral criticism upon these comments, that there is scarcely one, if\nthere is a single expression in the remainder of this chapter, which\ndoes not refer to the animal nature and its functions. The illustrations\nare from the material world, and the terms and expressions are suited\nthereto. With reference to objects in the Sense, and connections in the\nUnderstanding, the \"fundamental condition of thought,\" which Mr. Spencer\nsupplies, is unquestionably valuable. There is \"likeness\" as well as\n\"relation, plurality, and difference.\" But observe that both these laws\nalike are pertinent only to the Sense and Understanding, that they\nbelong to _things in nature_, and consequently have no pertinence to the\nquestions now before us. We are discussing _ideas_, not _things_; and\nthose are simple, and can only be seen, while these are complex, and may\nbe perceived, distinguished, and conceived. If any one shall doubt that\nMr. Spencer is wholly occupied with things in nature, it would seem that\nafter having read p. 80, he could doubt no longer. \"Animals,\" \"species\nor genus,\" \"mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes,\" are objects by which\nhe illustrates his subject. And one is forced to exclaim, \"How can he\nspeak of such things when they have nothing to do with the matter in\nhand? What have God and infinity and absoluteness to do with 'mammals,\nbirds, reptiles, or fishes'? If we can know only these, why speak of\nthose?\" It would seem that the instant they are thus set together and\ncontrasted, the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry, \"It is by\nan utterly different faculty, and in entirely other modes, that I dwell\nupon God and the questions concerning him. These modes of the animal\nnature, by which I know 'mammals,' are different in kind from those of\nthe spiritual person, by which I know God and the eternal truth.\" And\nwhen this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's\nmind, and the query arises, how could a man so confound the two, and\nmake utter confusion of the subject, as the Limitists have done, he can\nhardly refrain from quoting Romans I. 20 _et seq._ against them.\n\nLet us observe now Mr. Spencer's corollary. \"A cognition of the Real as\ndistinguished from the Phenomenal must, if it exists, conform to this\nlaw of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the\nAbsolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought\nof, it must be thought of as such or such--as of this or that kind.\" To\nbegin with the law which is here asserted, is _not_ a \"general\" law, and\nso does not lie upon all cognition. It is only a special law, and lies\nonly upon a particular kind of cognition. This has been already\nabundantly shown; yet we reproduce one line of proof. No mathematical\nlaw comes under his law of cognition; neither can he, nor any other\nLimitist, make it appear that it does so come. His law is law only for\nthings in nature, and not for principles. Since then all ideas are known\nin themselves--are _self-evident_, and since God, infinity, and\nabsoluteness are ideas, they are known in themselves, and need not be\nclassed. So his corollary falls to the ground. Can we have any \"sensible\nexperience\" of God? Most certainly not. Yet we can have just as much a\nsensible experience of him as of any other person--of parent, wife, or\nchild. Did you ever see a person--a soul? No. Can you see--\"have\nsensible experience of\"--a soul? No. What is it, then, that we have such\nexperience of? Plainly the body--that material frame through which the\nsoul manifests itself. The Universe is that material system through\nwhich God manifests himself to those spiritual persons whom he has made;\nand that manifestation is the same in kind as that of a created soul\nthrough the body which is given it. It follows then,--and not only from\nthis, but it may be shown by further illustration,--that every other\nperson is just as really inscrutable to us as God is; and further, that,\nif we can study and comprehend the soul of our wife or child, we can\nwith equal certainty study, and to some extent comprehend, the soul of\nGod. Or, in other words, if man is only an animal nature, having a Sense\nand Understanding, all personality is an insoluble mystery; all\nspiritual persons are alike utterly inscrutable. And this is so,\nbecause, upon the hypothesis taken, man is destitute of any faculty\nwhich can catch a glimpse of such object. A Sense and Understanding can\nno more see, or in any possible manner take cognizance of, a spiritual\nperson than a man born blind can see the sun. Again, we say he is\ndestitute of the faculty. Will Mr. Spencer deny the fact of the idea of\npersonality? Will he assert that man has no such notion? Let him once\nadmit that he has, and in that admission is involved the admission of\nthe reality of that faculty by which we know God, for the faculty which\ncognizes personality, and cognizes God, is one and the same.\n\nAlthough we do not like certain of Mr. Spencer's terms, yet, to please\nhim, we will use them. Some conclusions, then, may be expressed thus:\nGod as the Deity cannot be \"classed\"; he is unique. This is involved in\nthe very terms by which we designate him. Yet we cognize him, but this\nis by an immediate intuition, in which we know him as he is in himself.\n\"We shall see him as he is,\" says the apostle; and some foretastes of\nthat transcendent revelation are vouchsafed us here on earth. But the\ninfinite Person, _as person_, must be \"assimilated\" with other persons.\nYet his infinity and absoluteness, _as such_, cannot be \"grouped.\" And\nyet again, _as qualities_, they can be \"grouped\" with other qualities.\nUnquestionably between the Creator, _as such_, and the created, _as\nsuch_, \"there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions\nexisting between different divisions of the created.\" God as\nself-existent differs in kind from man as dependent, and this difference\ncontinues irrevocable; while that same God and that same man are _alike_\nin kind _as persons_. This is true, because all spiritual persons are\ncomposite beings; and while the essential elements of a spiritual person\nare common to created persons and the uncreated Person, there are\n_other_ characteristics, _not essential_ to personality, which belong\nsome to the created, and some to the uncreated, and differentiate them.\nOr, in other words, God as person, and man as person, are alike. Yet\nthey are diverse in kind, and so diverse in kind that it is out of the\nrange of possibility for that diversity to be removed. How can this be\nexplained? Evidently thus. There are _qualities_ transfusing the\npersonality which cannot be interchangeable, and which constitute the\ndiversity. Personality is _form_ of being. Qualities transfuse the form.\nAbsoluteness and infinity are qualities which belong to one Person, and\nare such that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging to\nany other person; and so they constitute that one to whom they belong,\nunique and supreme. Dependence and partiality are also qualities of a\nspiritual person, but are qualities of the created spiritual person, and\nare such as must always subordinate that person to the other. In each\ninstance it is, \"_in the nature of things_,\" impossible for either to\npass over and become the other. Each is what he is by the terms of his\nbeing, and must stay so.\n\nBut from all this it by no means follows that the dependent spiritual\nperson can have no knowledge of the independent spiritual Person. On the\nother hand, it is the high glory of the independent spiritual Person,\nthat he can create another being \"in his own image,\" to whom he can\ncommunicate a knowledge of himself. \"Like as a father pitieth his\nchildren, so Jehovah pitieth them that fear him.\" Out of the fact of\nhis Father-hood and our childhood, comes that solemn, and, to the loving\nsoul, joyful fact, that he teaches us the highest knowledge just as\nreally as our earthly parents teach us earthly knowledge. This he could\nnot do if we had not the capacity to receive the knowledge; and we could\nnot have had the capacity, except he had been able, in \"the nature of\nthings,\" and willing to bestow it upon us. While, then, God as \"the\nUnconditioned cannot be classed,\" and so as unconditioned we do not know\nhim \"as of such or such kind,\" after the manner of the Understanding,\nyet we may, do, \"see him as he is,\" do know that he is, and is\nunconditioned, through the insight of the Reason, the eye of the\nspiritual person, and what it is to be unconditioned.\n\nWe now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified amazement.\nAs much as we had familiarized ourselves with the materialistic\nteachings of the Limitists, we confess that we were utterly unprepared\nto meet, even in Mr. Spencer's writings, a theory of man so ineffably\ndegrading, and uttered with so calm and naive an unconsciousness of the\ndegradation it involved, as the following. Although for want of room his\nillustrations are omitted, it is believed that the following extracts\ngive a fair and ample presentation of his doctrine.\n\n\"All vital actions, considered not separately but in their ensemble,\nhave for their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by\ncertain inner processes.\n\n\"There are unceasing external forces, tending to bring the matter of\nwhich organic bodies consist, into that state of stable equilibrium\ndisplayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal forces by which this\ntendency is constantly antagonized; and the perpetual changes which\nconstitute Life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the\nantagonism....\n\n\"When we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that the\ncorrespondences thus maintained are direct and simple; as in a plant,\nthe vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic and chemical actions\nresponding to the coexistence of light, heat, water, and carbonic acid\naround it. But in animals, and especially in the higher orders of them,\nthe correspondences become extremely complex. Materials for growth and\nrepair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere present,\nbut being widely dispersed and under special forms, have to be formed,\nto be secured, and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation....\n\n\"What is that process by which food when swallowed is reduced to a fit\nform for assimilation, but a set of mechanical and chemical actions\nresponding to the mechanical and chemical actions which distinguish the\nfood? Whence it becomes manifest, that, while Life in its simplest form\nis the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with\ncertain outer physico-chemical actions, each advance to a higher form of\nLife consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence by\nthe establishment of other correspondences. Divesting this conception of\nall superfluities, and reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see\nthat Life is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal\nrelations to external relations. And when we so define it, we discover\nthat the physical and the psychial life are equally comprehended by the\ndefinition. We perceive that this, which we call intelligence, shows\nitself when the external relations to which the internal ones are\nadjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time and space;\nthat every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the\nestablishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved\nadjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are\nresolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so\ncooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence\nand sequence that occur externally....\n\n\"And lastly let it be noted that what we call _truth_, guiding us to\nsuccessful action and the consequent maintenance of life, is simply the\naccurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while\n_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence\nof such accurate correspondence.\n\n\"If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in\nits highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal\nrelations to external relations, the necessarily relative character of\nour knowledge becomes obvious. The simplest cognition being the\nestablishment of some connection between subjective states, answering to\nsome connection between objective agencies; and each successively more\ncomplex cognition being the establishment of some more involved\nconnection of such states, answering to some more involved connection of\nsuch agencies; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it be\ncarried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence either the\nstates themselves or the agencies themselves.\"\n\nOr, to condense Mr. Spencer's whole teaching into a few plain every-day\nwords, Man is an animal, and only an animal, differing nowhat from the\ndog and chimpanzee, except in the fact that his life \"consists in the\nestablishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved\nadjustments,\" than the life of said dog and chimpanzee. Mark\nparticularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage. Forget\nnot one syllable of the profound and most important knowledge he would\nimpart. \"Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in\nits highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal\nrelations to external relations.\" See, there is not a limit, not a\nqualification to the assertion! Now turn back a page or two, reader, if\nthou hast this wonderful philosophy by thee, and gazing, as into a cage\nin a menagerie, see the being its author would teach thee that thou art.\nFrom the highest to the lowest forms, life is one. In its lower forms,\nlife is a set of \"direct and simple\" \"correspondences.\" \"But in animals,\n_and especially in the higher orders of them_,\" and, of course, most\nespecially in the human animal as the highest order, \"the\ncorrespondences become extremely complex.\" As much as to say, reader,\nyou are not exactly a plant, nor are you yet of quite so low a type as\nthe chimpanzee aforesaid; but the difference is no serious matter. You\ndo not differ half as much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does\nfrom the forest he roves in. All the difference there is between you and\nhim is, that the machinery by which \"the continuous adjustment of\ninternal relations to external relations\" is carried on, is more\n\"complex\" in you than in the chimpanzee. He roams the forest, inhabits\nsome cave or hollow tree, and lives on the food which nature\nspontaneously offers to his hairy hand. You cut down the forest,\nconstruct a house, and live on the food which some degree of skill has\nprepared. He constructs no clothing, nor any covering to shield him from\nthe inclemency of the weather, but is satisfied with tawny, shaggy\ncovering, which nature has provided. You on the contrary are destitute\nof such a covering, and rob the sheep, and kill the silk-worm, to supply\nthe lack. But in all this there is no _difference in kind_. The\nmechanism by which life is sustained in you is more \"complex,\" it is\ntrue, than that by which life is sustained in him; there arise,\ntherefore, larger needs, and the corresponding \"intelligence\" to supply\nthose needs. But sweet thought, cheering thought, oh how it supports the\nsoul! Your life in its highest form is only this animal life,--is only\nthe constructive force by which that \"extremely complex\" machinery\ncarries on \"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external\nrelations.\" All other notions of life are \"superfluities.\"\n\nReader, in view of the teaching of this new and widely heralded sage,\nhow many \"superfluities\" must you and I strip off from our \"conception\"\nof life! And with what bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we\ntake up our lamentation for man, and say: How art thou fallen, oh man!\nthou noblest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast down to the\nground. But a little ago we believed thee a spiritual being; that thou\nhadst a nature too noble to rot with the beasts among the clods; that\nthou wast made fit to live with angels and thy Creator, God. But a\nlittle ago we believed thee possessed of a psychical life--a soul; that\nthou wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's life\nwas wholly occupied in the consideration of \"heavenly and divine\nthings.\" A little ago we believed in holiness, and that thou,\nconsecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, shouldst become\npurer and more beautiful, nobler and more lovely, until perfect love\nshould cast out all fear, and thou shouldst then see God face to face,\nand rejoice in the sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is\nchanged now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter mockery\nto the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English sage, and learned\nhow dismally different is our destiny. Painful is it, oh reader, to\nlisten; and the words of our teacher sweep like a sirocco over the\nheart; yet we cannot choose but hear.\n\n\"The pyschical life\"--the life of the soul, \"the immortal spark of\nfire,\"--and the physical life \"are _equally_ definable as the continuous\nadjustment of internal relations to external relations.\" We had supposed\nthat intelligence in its highest forms was wholly occupied with the\ncontemplation of God and his laws, and the great end of being, and all\nthose tremendous questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the\nactivities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. We find we have\nshot towards the pole opposite to the truth. Now \"we perceive that this\nwhich we call Intelligence shows itself when the external relations to\nwhich the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and\nremote in time or space; that _every advance in Intelligence essentially\nconsists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more\ninvolved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science_\nare resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so\ncooerdinated as _exactly to tally_ with certain relations of coexistence\nand sequence that occur externally.\" In such relations consists the life\nof the \"caterpillar.\" In such relations, _only a little \"more\ncomplex,\"_ consists the life of \"the sparrow.\" Such relations only does\n\"the fowler\" observe; such only does \"the chemist\" know. This is the\npath by which we are led to the last, the highest \"truth\" which man can\nattain. Thus do we learn \"that what we call _truth_, guiding us to\nsuccessful action, and the consequent maintenance of life, is _simply_\nthe accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while\nerror, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence of\nsuch accurate correspondence.\" What a noble life, oh, reader, what an\nexalted destiny thine is here declared to be! The largest effort of\nthine intelligence, \"the highest achievement of science,\" yea, the total\nobject of the life of thy soul,--thy \"psychial\" life,--is to attain such\nexceeding skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of\napparel, in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing \"the\naccurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations,\" and thus\nin attaining the \"_truth_\" which shall guide \"us to successful action\nand the consequent maintenance of life,\" that we shall secure forever\nour animal existence on earth. Study patiently thy lesson, oh human\nanimal! Con it o'er and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to\nthis acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below what\nthou hadst once fondly expected,--mayest attain a perfect knowledge of\nthe \"_truth_,\" and a perfect skill in the application of that truth, _i.\ne._ in \"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external\nrelations\"; and so be guided \"to successful action, and the consequent\nmaintenance of life,\" whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless\nhunter who pursues thee,--the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. But\nwhen bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of thy soul, to this\ntask, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate moment to the dreams and\naspirations which have hitherto lain like golden sunlight on thy\npathway. Let no vain regret for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever\nsadden thy day, or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst\ndeem thyself capable of something higher than \"the continuous\nadjustment of internal relations to external relations\"; didst often\noccupy thyself with contemplating those \"things which eye hath not seen,\nnor ear heard\"; didst deem thyself a son of God, and \"a joint-heir with\nJesus Christ,\" \"of things incorruptible and undefiled, and which fade\nnot away, eternal in the heavens\"; didst sometimes seem to see, with\nfaith's triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst\ntraverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure spiritual\nlife with other spirits, where all earthliness had been stripped off,\nall tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness was thine through\nall eternity. But all these visions were only dreams; they wholly\ndeluded thee. We have learned from the lips of this latest English sage\nthat thy god is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as\nto keep up \"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external\nrelations.\" Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a lot being \"the\nhighest achievement of science,\" permit not thyself to be disturbed by\nthose old-fashioned and sometimes troublesome notions that \"_truth_\" and\nthose \"achievements\" pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual\nrelations to God as the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was\nbound to know the truth and obey it; that his \"errors\" were violations\nof perfect law,--the truth he knew,--were _crimes_ against Him who is\n\"of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot look upon sin with the\nleast degree of allowance\"; that for these crimes there impended a just\npenalty--an appalling punishment; and that the only real \"failure\" was\nthe failure to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the\npenalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this wise man's\nbook. As he teaches us, the only \"error\" we can make, is, to miss in\nmaintaining perfectly \"the continuous adjustment of internal relations\nto external relations,\"--is to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding\nat dinner, or to wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose\none's self imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which\nmay produce \"the absence of such accurate correspondence\" as shall\nsecure unending life, and so lead to his only \"failure\"--the advance\n\"towards death.\" When, then, oh reader! by some unfortunate mischance,\nsome \"error\" into which thine ignorance hath led thee, thou hast\nrendered thy \"failure\" inevitable, and art surely descending \"towards\ndeath,\" hesitate not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean\nsong, \"Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.\"\n\n    Sing and be gay\n    The livelong day,\n    Thinking no whit of to-morrow.\n    Enjoy while you may\n    All pleasure and play,\n    For after death is no sorrow.\n\nThou hast committed thine only \"error\" in not maintaining \"the accurate\ncorrespondence\"; thou hast fallen upon thine only \"failure,\" the\ninevitable advance \"towards death.\" Than death no greater evil can\nbefall thee, and that is already sure. Then let \"dance and song,\" and\n\"women and wine,\" bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting\ndays.\n\nDelightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate man, and\nespecially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian man, who has\nthese many years cherished those vain, deceitful dreams of which we\nspoke a little ago! To be brought down from such lofty aspirations; to\nbe made to know that he is only an animal; that \"Life in all its\nmanifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists\nin the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external\nrelations.\" Do you not join with me in pitying him?\n\nAnd such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from over the sea as\nthe newly found and wonderful truth, which is to satisfy the hungering\nsoul of man and still its persistent cry for bread. And this is the\nteacher, mocking that painful cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after\nnewspaper, and periodical after periodical on this side the water, even\nto those we love best and cherish most, have pronounced one of the\nprofoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us some sage\nremarks upon \"laughter,\" as it is observed in the human animal, and on\nthat point compare therewith other animals. But, speaking in all\nsincerity after the manner of the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say,\n\"From all such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us.\"\n\nFew, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a denial in terms\nof such a theory. When a man, aspiring to be a philosopher, advances the\ndoctrine that not only is \"Life in its simplest form\"--the animal\nlife--\"the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with\ncertain outer physico-chemical actions,\" but that \"_each advance to a\nhigher form of Life_ consists in a better preservation of this primary\ncorrespondence\"; and when, proceeding further, and to be explicit, he\nasserts that not only \"the physical,\" _but also \"the psychical life_ are\n_equally_\" but \"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to\nexternal relations\"; and when, still further to insult man, and to utter\nhis insult in the most positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he\nasserts \"that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable\ninto mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as\nexactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that\noccur externally,\"--that is, that the highest science is the attainment\nof a perfect cuisine; in a word, when a human being in this nineteenth\ncentury offers to his fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy\nthe tenet that the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal\nlife, and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as an\nanimal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, but\nnot different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a doctrine is\npresented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as a healthy stomach\nrejects a roll of tobacco.\n\nWith what a sense of relief does one turn from a system of philosophy\nwhich, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen words and large\nsounding, plausible phrases, appears in such vile shape and hideous\nproportions, to the teachings of that pure and noble instructor of our\nyouth, that man who, by his gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully\nillustrates the spirit and life of the Apostle John,--Rev. Mark Hopkins,\nD. D., President of Williams College. No one who has read his \"Lectures\non Moral Science,\" and no lover of truth should fail to do so, will\ndesire an apology for inserting the following extract, wherein is\npresented a theory upon which the soul of man can rest, as at home the\nsoldier rests, who has just been released from the Libby or Salisbury\ncharnel-house.\n\n\"And here, again, we have three great forces with their products. These\nare the vegetable, the animal, and the rational life.\n\n\"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as strictly\nconditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for vegetable, for\nthe animal is nourished by nothing that has not been previously\nelaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit of the earth is for all; the\nking himself is served by the field.'\n\n\"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of enjoyment and\nsuffering, and having the instincts necessary to its preservation.\n_This_, as man is now constituted, _is conditional for his rational\nlife_. The rational has its roots in that, and manifests itself only\nthrough the organization which that builds up.\n\n\"_We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and moral\nlife, by which man is made in the image of God._ In man, as thus\nconstituted, we first find a being who is capable of choosing his own\nend, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting the end indicated by his whole\nnature. This is moral freedom, _and in this is the precise point of\ntransition from all that is below to that which is highest_. For\neverything below man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may\nbe in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their\nend,--and they have one somewhat wide,--they have none in respect to the\nend itself. This, for our purpose, and for all purposes, is the\ncharacteristic distinction, so long sought, between man and the brute.\nMan determines his own end; the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to\nman everything is driven to its end by a force working from without or\nfrom behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself in\nfront, and he follows it or not, as he chooses.\n\n\"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one of the\naddition of new forces, with a constant limitation of the field within\nwhich the forces act.... It is to be noticed, however, that while the\nfield of each added and superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is\ndropped. Each lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all\nthat is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject to\ngravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has also the organic\nlife that belongs to the animal. In him none of these are dropped; _but\nthe rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these_, so\nthat man is not only a microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of\nthe world. He partakes of all that is below him, _and becomes man by the\naddition of something higher_.... Here, then, is our model and law. Have\nwe a lower sensitive and animal nature? Let that nature be cherished and\nexpanded by all its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an\nend. But--and here we find the limit--let it be cherished _only as\nsubservient to the higher intellectual life_, for it is also a means.\"\nThe italics are ours.\n\nSatisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,--and it is one\nwhich like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and calm into the\natmosphere, standing firm and immovable in its own clear and\nself-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand assaulting materialistic\nstorms,--we would buttress it with the utterances of other of the\nearth's noble ones; and this we do not because it is in any degree\nneedful, but because our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to\ngather the concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon this\nsubject. Exactly in point is the following--one of many passages which\nmight be selected from the works of that profoundest of English\nmetaphysicians and theologians, S. T. Coleridge:--\n\n\"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this\ninvestigation are greatly increased by our not considering the\nunderstanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not\naccompanied with and modified by the cooeperation of the will, the moral\nfeeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of\nReason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing\nlaws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of\ncontemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will--having a\nself-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by\nwhich its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for\nitself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the\nfaculty of selecting and appropriating the means--seems best to account\nfor that progressiveness of the human race, _which so evidently marks an\ninsurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the\ninferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, were there no\nother difference than in the degree of their intellectual\nfaculties_.\"--_Works_, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours.\n\nThe attention of the reader may with profit be also directed to the\nwords of another metaphysician, who has been much longer known, and has\nenjoyed a wider fame than either of those just mentioned; and whose\nteachings, however little weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer,\nhave been these many years, and still are received and studied with\nprofound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of persons. We\nrefer to the apostle Paul, \"There is, therefore, now no condemnation to\nthose who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after\nthe spirit.\" That is, who do not walk after the law of the animal\nnature, but who do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is\nof this great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and\ncontinually speaks. \"For they that are after the flesh do mind the\nthings of the flesh; but they that are after the spirit, the things of\nthe spirit. For the minding of the flesh is death, but the minding of\nthe spirit is life and peace; because the minding of the flesh as enmity\nagainst God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can\nbe.\" _Romans_ VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, \"Walk in the spirit\nand fulfil not the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the\nspirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one\nto the other.\"--_Galatians_ V. 16, 17.\n\nUpon these passages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, that\nour translators in writing the word spirit with a capital, and thus\nintimating that it is the Holy Spirit of God which is meant, have led\ntheir readers astray. The apostle's repeated use of that term, in\ncontrasting the flesh with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that\nhe is contrasting, in all such passages, the animal nature with the\nspiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position and thinks\nto reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of the spiritual person\nin man and of the Holy Spirit of God is _identical_.\n\nThe reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind will have\nalready accomplished--the construction in our own terms, and the\ncontrasting of the system above embodied with that presented by Mr.\nSpencer. The human being, Man, is a twofold being, \"flesh\" and \"spirit,\"\nan animal nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the\nSense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are the Reason, the\nspiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal nature is common to\nman and the brutes. The spiritual person is common to man and God. It is\nmanifest, then, that there is \"an insurmountable distinction and\nimpassable barrier\" not only \"between man and the inferior animals,\" but\nbetween man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, and that this\nis a greater distinction than any other in the Universe, except that\nwhich exists between the Creator and the created. What relation, then,\ndo these so widely diverse natures bear to each other? Evidently that\nwhich President Hopkins has assigned. \"Because he is rational, man is\nnot the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity.\nHe has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and the\nsensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal.\" Thus far his\nlife \"is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions\nwith certain outer physico-chemical actions,\"--undoubtedly \"consists in\nthe continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations\";\nand being the highest order of animal, his life \"consists in the\nestablishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved\nadjustments\" than that of any other animal. What, then, is this life\nfor? \"This, as man is now constituted, is _conditional for his rational\nlife_.\" \"The rational life is united with and _superinduced upon all\nthese_.\" As God made man, and in the natural order, the \"flesh,\" the\nanimal life, is wholly subordinate to the \"spirit,\" the spiritual life.\nAnd the spirit, or spiritual person of which Paul writes so much,--does\nthis also, this \"Intelligence in its highest form,\" consist \"in the\ncontinuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations\"? Are\nthe words of the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, \"For if ye live\nafter the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit\"--_i. e._ by\nliving with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the law of\nthe spiritual person--\"do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live?\"\nAnd are Mr. Spencer's words, in which he teaches exactly the opposite\ndoctrine, true? wherein he says: \"And lastly let it be noted that what\nwe call truth,\" &c., (see _ante_, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that \"if\nye live after the flesh,\" if you are guided by \"_truth_,\" if you are\nable perfectly to maintain \"the accurate correspondence of subjective to\nobjective relations,\" \"ye shall not surely die,\" you will attain to what\nis _successful action_, the preservation of \"life,\" of \"the continuous\nadjustment of internal relations to external relations,\" of the animal\nlife, and thus your bodies will live forever--the highest good for man;\nbut if you \"mortify the deeds of the body,\" if you pay little heed to\n\"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,\"\nyou will meet with \"_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards\ndeath,\"--the death of the body, the highest evil which can befall\nman,--and so \"ye shall\" not \"live.\" Proceeding in the direction already\ntaken, we find that in his normal condition the spiritual person would\nnot be chiefly, much less exclusively, occupied with attending to \"the\ncontinuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,\" but\nwould only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the body\nas the ground through which, in accordance with the present dispensation\nof God's providence, that person may exert himself and employ his\nenergies upon those objects which belong to his peculiar sphere, even\nthe laws and duties of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ\nhis superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation of\nits animal life, but this only as a means. God has ordained that through\nthis means that person shall develop and manifest himself; yet the life,\ncontinuance in being, of the soul, is in no way dependent on this means.\nStrip away the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense\nand Understanding, leave him--as he would then be--with no possible\nmedium of communication with the Universe, and he, the I am, the\nspiritual person, would remain intact, as active as ever. He would have\nlost none of his capacity to see laws and appreciate their force; he\nwould feel the _bindingness_ of obligation just as before; and finally,\nhe would be just as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an\nultimate end, though he would be unable to make a single motion towards\nputting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, then, being such\nthat he has in himself no element of decomposition, has no need, for the\npreservation of his own existence, to be continually occupied with\nefforts to maintain \"the accurate correspondence of subjective to\nobjective relations.\" Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an\nactivity having objects which accord with this his indestructible\nnature. With what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There\nis for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself the laws and\nideals of his action. As such, and created, he is near of kin to that\naugust Being in whoso image he was created. His laws are the created\nperson's laws. The end of the Creator should be that also of the\ncreated. But God is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an\nundeveloped germ, and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge.\nWhat nobler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could this\nbeing, endowed with the faculties of a God, find, than to employ all his\npower in the contemplation of the eternal laws of the Universe, _i. e._\nto the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance with himself and God; and\nto bend all his energies to the realization by his own efforts of that\npart in the Universe which God had assigned him, _i. e._, to accord his\nwill entirely with God's will. This course of life, a spiritual person\nstanding in his normal relation to an animal nature, would pursue as\nspontaneously as if it were the law of his being. But this which we have\nportrayed is not the course which human beings do pursue. By no means.\nOne great evil, at least, that \"the Fall\" brought upon the race of man,\nis, that human beings are born into the world with the spiritual person\nall submerged by the animal nature; or, to use Paul's figure, the spirit\nis enslaved by the flesh; and such is the extent of this that many,\nperhaps most, men are born and grow up and die, and never know that they\nhave any souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through\nall the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and Mr.\nSpencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual persons at all,\nwho say that the highest knowledge is a generalization in the\nUnderstanding, a form of a knowledge common to man and the brutes, and\nthat \"the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental\nrelations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as exactly to\ntally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur\nexternally.\" It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays so\nvividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines that he thunders\nhis maledictions.\n\nWe have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from, superior\nto, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. This is his _position_ in\nthe logical order. We have also spoken of him as submerged under the\nanimal nature, as enslaved to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to\nexpress the awfully degraded _condition_ in which every human being is\nborn into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural degradation. Let\nus then, as philosophers, carry our examination one step farther and\nask: In this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the\nspiritual person. Is it that \"continuous adjustment\"? He turns from it\nwith loathing. Already he has served the \"flesh\" a long and grievous\nbondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with all his might to\nregain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally\ngood,--he should fill his soul with thoughts of God, and then he should\nmake every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his\nfootsteps.\n\nWe attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. \"The highest\nachievements of science\" for us, our \"truth,\" guiding us \"to successful\naction,\" is that pure _a priori_ truth, the eternal law of God which is\nwritten in us, and given to us for our guidance to what is truly\n\"successful action,\"--the accordance of our wills with the will of God.\n\nWhat we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered of this\nchapter, is that passage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, as he believes,\na new principle of philosophy, a principle which will symmetrize and\ncomplete the Hamiltonian system, and thus establish it as the true and\nfinal science for mankind. Since we do not view this principle in the\nsame light with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to\nturn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish that with it,\nthere might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole passage should\nbe quoted, that there might be no doubt as to his meaning. This we\nshould willingly do, did our space permit. Yet it seems not in the least\nnecessary. That part of the passage which contains the gist of the\nsubject, followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and\nillustrations, would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full\npresentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which we might safely\nbuild our criticism. These then will be given.\n\n\"There still remains the final question--What must we say concerning\nthat which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the\nconsciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly\nfrom our minds everything but the relative; or must we also believe in\nsomething beyond the relative?\n\n\"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our\nintelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that\nanything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure\nnegation, or as a non-existence. 'The _absolute_ is conceived merely by\na negation of conceivability,' writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The\n_Absolute_ and the _Infinite_,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the\n_Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object\nof thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the\nconditions under which consciousness is possible.' From each of which\nextracts may be deduced the conclusion, that, since reason cannot\nwarrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable\nonly as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence\nof anything beyond phenomena.\n\n\"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave\nerror. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be\nadmitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton\nand Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages,\nthe arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is\nunknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments\nhave been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet there remains to\nbe stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise\nnecessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine\nourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions\nquoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate\nits more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these\npropositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, or\nrather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak\nspecifically:--Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which Logic\nformulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness which\ncannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the\nthoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are\nthoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still\nreal, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.\n\n\"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which\nthe relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates\nthe positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we\ncannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_\nan Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the\nAbsolute is, there lies hidden the assumption _that_ it is; and the\nmaking of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to\nthe mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly with every step\nin the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon,\neverywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout\nnecessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to\nconceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without\nat the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for\nappearance without reality is unthinkable.\" After carrying on this train\nof argument a little further, he reaches this just and decisive result.\n\"Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness\nof the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an\nindefinite consciousness of it.\" Carrying the argument further, he says:\n\"Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of\nthought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness\nof this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to analyze our\nconception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute.\" He follows\nthe presentation of certain \"antinomies of thought\" with an extract from\nSir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician enounces his\ndoctrine that in \"correlatives\" \"the positive alone is real, the\nnegative is only an abstraction of the other\"; or, in other words, the\none gives a substance of some kind in the mind, the other gives simply\nnothingness, void, absolute negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is\nunquestionably right in saying: \"Now the assertion that of such\ncontradictories 'the negative is _only_ an abstraction of the\nother'--'is _nothing else_ than its negation'--is not true. In such\ncorrelatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the\nnegative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive\none; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from\nconsciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William\nHamilton is, that the like holds, even with those correlatives of which\nthe negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word.\"\nProceeding with his argument, he establishes, by ample illustration, the\nfact that a \"something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative\nor Absolute.\" He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, \"that both Sir\nWilliam Hamilton and Mr. Mansel do,\" in certain places, \"distinctly\nimply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is,\nis positive not negative.\" Further on he argues thus: \"Though Philosophy\ncondemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; though\nit proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that;\nthough in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as\nit arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness,\nthere ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The\ncontinual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in\nthe more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so\nends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited.\"\nThus he brings us to \"the ultimate difficulty--How can there possibly be\nconstituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its\nvery nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?\"\nThis he accounts for by by hypostatizing a \"raw material\" in\nconsciousness which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion as\nfollows: \"By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is\nat once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our\nconsciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned\nconsciousness, or raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give\ndefinite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence\nis the very basis of our intelligence.\" ...\n\n\"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:--We have seen how, in\nthe very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is\nRelative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a\nNon-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which\nthis doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. We have seen\nhow, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that\nthe Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real\nNon-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative or Absolute\nbe postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the\nargument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of\nthought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the\nconsciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from\nthis impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that\nactuality.\"\n\nThe approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced\nby Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial point, that the Absolute is a\npositive somewhat in consciousness, and to that point as established,\nmust not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of \"indefinite\nconsciousness\" by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his\nformer teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter to\nshow that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy.\n\nAs against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel,\nMr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive. Admitting\nthe logical accuracy of their reasoning, he very justly turns from the\nlogical to the psychological aspect of the subject, takes exception to\ntheir premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives an\napproximate, though unfortunately a very partial and defective\npresentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue which must now be made\nwith him is whether the position he has here taken, and which he puts\nforth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system, that new\ntruth, which shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of\nhuman nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in\ndiametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, and all\nthat he has before written, and so does not annihilate them. It will be\nour present endeavor to show that such is the result.\n\nPerhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory than, first, to\ntake up what we believe to be the element of truth in it, and carry out\nthis to its logical results; and afterwards to present what seem to be\nthe elements of error, and show them to be such.\n\n1. \"We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of\"\n\"the Absolute.\" Without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if\nit were a faculty of knowledge, and remembering that we cannot have a\nconsciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with\nthat consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's assertion is\ntantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is.\nIt does not seem that he himself can disallow this. Grant this, and our\nwhole system follows, as does also the fallacy of his own. Our argument\nwill proceed thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and\nis mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it is law for\nall intellect, for God as well as man. But three positions can be taken.\nEither it is true for the Deity, or else it is false for him, or else\nit has no reference to him. In the last instance God is Chaos; in the\nsecond he and man are in organic contradiction, and he created man so;\nthe first is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses\nrefute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains but the\nposition taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on God and man. One of\nthose laws is, that, if any assertion is true, all that is logically\ninvolved in it is true; in other words, all truth is in absolute and\nperfect harmony. This is fundamental to the possibility of Logic. Now\napply this law to the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have\na positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of expression\nwould be, The absolute Being is. It follows then that he is in a _mode_,\nhas a _formal_ being. But three hypotheses are possible. He is in no\nmode, he is in one mode; he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there\nis no form, no order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is\nChaos. Chaos is not God, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, and\nmen are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in all modes, he is\nin a state of utter contradiction. God \"is all in every part.\" He is\nthen all infinite, and all finite. Infinity and finiteness are\ncontradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. God is wholly possessed\nof contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities, which is more than\nunthinkable--it is absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us\npause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established,\nfrom Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that God _is limited_. He must\nbe in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes. He is limited then\nby the necessity to be what he is; and if he could become what he is\nnot, he would not have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to\nthe exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being. Other\nbeings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and subordinate to him.\nSince he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest\npossible mode of being. Personality is the highest possible mode of\nbeing. This will appear from the following considerations. A person,\npossesses the reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act,\nwithin himself, and is thus a _final cause_. No higher form of being\nthan this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of\nany other must be excluded. God is then a person.\n\nWe have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with\nthe system advocated in this treatise is manifest. If the links are well\nwrought, and the chain complete, not only is this system firmly grounded\nupon Mr. Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, he\nhas in this his special point given partial utterance to what, once\nestablished, involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before,\nbut as well of the whole Limitist Philosophy. It remains now to remark\nupon the errors in his form of expressing the truth.\n\n2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness as a\nfaculty of knowledge. He speaks of a \"vague,\" an \"indefinite\nconsciousness.\" Let us examine these in their order.\n\n_a._ He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. In this he\nuses the term in the inexact, careless, popular manner, rather than with\ndue precision. As has been observed on a former page, consciousness is\nthe light in which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling\nis affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, and\nof this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical expression to\nsay \"I am conscious of the feeling.\" The full form being \"I am conscious\nthat I know the feeling.\" Thus is it with all man's activities. Applying\nthis to the case in hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the\nAbsolute, but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual\nfaculty, the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the\nabsolute Person is, and through this presentation--intuition--the\nspiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, our position:\nconsciousness is the indivisible unity, the light in which the person\nsees all his faculties and capacities act; and so is to be considered as\ndifferent in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of\na spiritual person.\n\n_b._ Mr. Spencer speaks of a \"vague,\" an \"indefinite consciousness.\" The\nexpression \"vague consciousness\" being a popular and very common one,\ndeserves a careful examination, and this we hope to give it, keeping in\nmind meantime the position already attained.\n\nThe phrase is used in some such connection as this, \"I have a vague or\nundefined consciousness of impending evil.\" Let us analyze this\nexperience. In doing so it will be observed that the consciousness, or\nrather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness, is\npositive, clear, and definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling.\nAgain, the feeling is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread,\nof threatening danger. What, then, is vague--is undefined? This. That\ncause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive\nfaculties, and of course cannot be known; because what produces the\nfeeling is unknown, the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of\nvagueness; and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the\nfeeling. Yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of\nthe cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not\nconsciousness that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's \"_indefinite_\nconsciousness, which cannot be formulated,\" has no foundation in fact.\nBut this may be shown by another line of thought. Consciousness is\ncommensurate with knowledge, _i. e._, man can have no knowledge except\nhe is conscious of that knowledge; neither can he have any consciousness\nexcept he knows that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness\nis, _i. e._, what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it\nis only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our knowledge of\nan object is indefinite, we mean that we partly know its\ncharacteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. Thus then also the\nresult above stated follows; and what Mr. Spencer calls \"_indefinite_\nconsciousness\" is a \"_definite_ consciousness\" that we partly know, and\nare partly ignorant of the object under consideration.\n\nIn the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under consideration,\nMr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion respecting\nconsciousness, which, when examined in the light of the positions we\nhave advocated, affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his\ntheory. We quote it again, that the reader may not miss of giving it\nfull attention. \"By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental\nelement is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily\nindestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally\n_the unconditioned consciousness_, or _raw material of thought_, to\nwhich in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an\never-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our\nintelligence.\" Upon reading this passage, the question spontaneously\narises, What does the writer mean? and it is a question which is not so\neasily answered. More than one interpretation may be assigned, as will\nappear upon examination. A problem is given. To find what the \"raw\nmaterial of thought\" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in him\nthe \"raw material of thought\"--the crude thought-ore which he smelts\ndown in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, giving forth in its\nstead the refined metal--exact thought. We must then proceed to attain\nour answer by analyzing man's natural organization.\n\nSince man is a complex, constituted being, there is necessarily a\nlogical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity. He may\nbe considered as a substance in which a constitution inheres, _i. e._,\nwhich is organized according to a _set_ of fixed laws, and that set of\nlaws may be stated in their logical order. It is sufficient, however,\nfor our purpose to consider him as an organized substance, the\norganization being such that he is a person--a selfhood, _self-active_\nand capable of self-examination. The raw material of _all_ the\nactivities of such a person is this organized substance. Take away the\nsubstance, and there remains only the set of laws as _abstract_ ideas.\nAgain, take away the set of laws, and the substance is simple,\nunorganized substance. In the combining of the two the person becomes.\nThese, then, are all there is of the person, and therefore in these must\nthe raw material be. From this position it follows directly that any\ncapacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, is\nthe substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that\nform of the activity. To explain the term, form of activity. There is a\n_set_ of laws. Each law, by itself, is a simple law, and is incapable of\norganizing a substance into a being. But when these laws are considered,\nas they naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each other,\nit is seen that this, their standing together, constitutes ideals, or\nforms of being and activity. To illustrate from an earthly object. The\nlaw of gravitation alone could not organize a Universe; neither could\nthe law of cohesion, nor of centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any\nother one law. All these laws must be acting together,--or rather all\nthese laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to their\nown nature, thus constituting an ideal form, in accordance with which\nGod may create this Universe. For an illustration of our topic in its\nhighest form, the reader is referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's\n\"Rational Psychology,\" where he analyzes personality into its elements\nof Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is\nsufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a\nperson, but that all three must be present in order to constitute such a\nbeing. There are, then, various forms of activity in the person, as\nReason, Sensibility, and Will, in each of which the organized substance\nacts in a mode or form, and this form is determined by the set of\norganizing laws. Consciousness also is such a form. The \"raw material of\nthought,\" then, must be this substance considered under the peculiar\nform of activity which we call consciousness, but _before the substance\nthus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circumstances\nwhich are naturally suited to it, for bringing it into action_. Now,\nby the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus\norganized in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness\nconsidered apart from and prior to its activity, can never be known _by\nexperience_, i. e., _we can never be conscious of an unconscious state_.\n\"Unconditioned consciousness\" is consciousness considered as quiescent\nbecause in it have been awakened no \"definite forms\"--no \"thinking.\" \"In\nthe nature of things,\" then, it is impossible to be conscious of an\n\"unconditioned consciousness.\" Yet Mr. Spencer says that \"our\nconsciousness of the unconditioned,\" which he has already asserted and\nproved, is a \"positive,\" and therefore an active state; is identical\nwith, is \"literally the unconditioned consciousness,\" or consciousness\nin its quiescent state, considered before it had been awakened into\nactivity, which is far more absurd than what was just above shown to be\na contradiction.\n\nTo escape such a result, a less objectionable interpretation may be\ngiven to the dictum in hand. It may be said that it looks upon\nconsciousness only as an activity, and in the logical order after its\naction has begun. We are, then, conscious, and in this is positive\naction, but no definite object is present which gives a form in\nconsciousness, and so consciousness _returns upon itself_. We are\nconscious that we are conscious, which is an awkward way of saying that\nwe are self-conscious, or, more concisely yet, that we are conscious;\nfor accurately this is all, and this is the same as to say that the\nsubject and object are identical in this act. The conclusion from this\nhypothesis is one which we judge Mr. Spencer will be very loath to\naccept, and yet it seems logically to follow. Indeed, in a sentence we\nare about to quote, he seems to make a most marked distinction between\nself-consciousness and this \"consciousness of the unconditioned,\" which\nhe calls its \"obverse.\"\n\nBut whatever Mr. Spencer's notion of the \"raw material of thought\" is,\nwhat more especially claims our attention and is most strange, is his\napplication of that notion. To present this more clearly, we will quote\nfurther from the passage already under examination. \"As we can in\nsuccessive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace\nthem by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of\nconsciousness, which is conditioned anew in every thought, there ever\nremains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and\nindependently of conditions. At the same time that by the laws of\nthought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of\nabsolute existence, we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from\nridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence: this\nconsciousness being, as we here see, the obverse of our\nself-consciousness.\" Now, by comparing this extract with the other,\nwhich it immediately follows, it seems plain that Mr. Spencer uses as\nsynonymous the phrases \"consciousness of the unconditioned,\"\n\"unconditioned consciousness,\" \"raw material of thought,\"\n\"undifferentiated substance of consciousness,\" and \"consciousness of\nabsolute existence.\" Let us note, now, certain conclusions, which seem\nto follow from this use of language. We are conscious \"of absolute\nexistence.\" No person can be conscious except he is conscious of some\nstate or condition of his being. Absolute existence is, therefore, a\nstate or condition of our being. Also this \"consciousness of absolute\nexistence\"--as it seems _our_ absolute existence--is the \"raw material\nof thought.\" But, again, as was shown above, this \"raw material,\" this\n\"undifferentiated substance of consciousness,\" if it is anything, is\nconsciousness considered as capacity, and in the logical order before it\nbecomes, or is, active; and it further appeared that of this quiescent\nstate we could have no knowledge by experience. But since the above\nphrases are synonymous, it follows that \"consciousness of absolute\nexistence\" is the \"undifferentiated substance of consciousness,\" is a\nconsciousness of which we can have no knowledge by experience, is a\nconsciousness of which we can have no consciousness. Is this\nphilosophy?\n\nIt would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact which Mr.\nSpencer has endeavored to express in the language we are criticizing.\nThere is such a fact, a statement of which will complete this criticism.\nUnquestionably, in self-examination, a man may abstract all \"successive\nmental acts,\" may consider himself as he is, in the logical order before\nhe _has experiences_. In this he will find \"that an ever-present sense\nof real existence is the very basis of our intelligence\"; or, in other\nwords, that it is an organic law of our being that there cannot be an\nexperience without a being to entertain the experience; and hence that\nit is impossible for a man to think or act, except on the assumption\nthat he is. But all this has nothing to do with a \"consciousness of the\nunconditioned,\" or of \"absolute existence\"; for our existence is not\nabsolute, and it is _our_ existence of which we are conscious. The\nreality and abidingness of _our_ existence is ground for _our_\nexperience, nothing more. Even if it were possible for us to have a\nconsciousness of our state before any experience, or to actually now\nabstract all experience, and be conscious of our consciousness\nunmodified by any object, _i. e._ to be conscious of unconsciousness,\nthis would not be a \"consciousness of absolute existence.\" We could find\nno more in it, and deduce no more from it, than that our existence was\ninvolved in our experience. Such a consciousness would indeed appear\n\"unconditioned\" by the coming into it of any activity, which would\ngive a form in it; but this would give us no notion of true\nunconditionedness--true \"absolute existence.\" This consciousness, though\nundisturbed by any experience, would yet be conditioned, would have been\ncreated, and be dependent upon God for continuance in existence, and for\na chance to come into circumstances, where it could be modified by\nexperiences, and so could grow. While, then, Mr. Spencer's theory gives\nus the fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our\nexperience, it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness of\nthe unconditioned, be that what it may.\n\nBut to return from this considerable digression to the result which was\nattained a few pages back, viz: that what Mr. Spencer calls\n\"_indefinite_ consciousness\" is a \"_definite_ consciousness\" that we\npartly know, and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration.\nLet this conclusion be applied to the topic which immediately concerns\nus,--the character of God.\n\nBut three suppositions are possible. Either we know nothing of God, not\neven that he is; or we have a partial knowledge of him, we know that he\nis, and all which we can logically deduce from this; or we know him\nexhaustively. The latter, no one pretends, and therefore it needs no\nnotice. The first, even if our own arguments are not deemed\nsatisfactory, has been thoroughly refuted by Mr. Spencer, and so is to\nbe set aside. Only the second remains. Respecting this, his position is\nthat we know that God is and no more. Admit this for a moment. We are\nconscious then of a positive, certain, inalienable knowledge that God\nis; but that with reference to any and all questions which may arise\nconcerning him we are in total ignorance. Here, again, it is apparent\nthat it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague; it is our\nignorance.\n\nWe might suggest the question--of what use can it be to man to know that\nGod is, and be utterly and necessarily, yea, organically ignorant of\nwhat he is? Let the reader answer the question to his own mind. It is\nrequired to show how the theory advocated in this book will appear in\nthe light of the second hypothesis above stated.\n\nMan knows that God is, and what God is so far as he can logically deduce\nit from this premiss; but, in so far as God is such, that he cannot be\nthus known, except wherein he makes a direct revelation to us, he must\nbe forever inscrutable. To illustrate. If the fact that God is, be\nadmitted, it logically follows that he must be self-existent.\nSelf-existence is a positive idea in the Reason, and so here is a second\nelement of knowledge respecting the Deity. Thus we may go on through\nall that it is possible to deduce, and the system thus wrought will be\nThe Science of Natural Theology, a science as pure and sure as pure\nequations. Its results will be what God must be. Looking into the\nUniverse we will find what must be corresponding with what is, and our\nknowledge will be complete. Again, in many regards God may be utterly\ninscrutable to us, since he may possess characteristics which we cannot\nattain by logical deductions. For instance, let it be granted that the\ndoctrine of the Trinity is true--that there are three persons in one\nGodhead. This would be a fact which man could never attain, could never\nmake the faintest guess at. He might, unaided, attain to the belief that\nGod would forgive; he might, with the profound and sad-eyed man of\nGreece, become convinced that some god must come from heaven to lead men\nto the truth; but the notion of the Trinity could never come to him,\nexcept God himself with carefulness revealed it. Respecting those\nmatters of which we cannot know except by revelation, this only can be\ndemanded; and this by inherent endowment man has a right to demand; viz:\nthat what is revealed shall not contradict the law already \"written in\nthe heart.\" Yet, once more, there are certain characteristics of God\nthat must forever be utterly inscrutable to every created being, and\nthis, because such is their nature and relation to the Deity, that one\ncannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining the knowledge in\nquestion. Such for instance are the questions, How is God self-existent,\nhow could he be eternal, how exercise his power, and the like? These are\nquestions respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should\nknow them, except the gratification of curiosity, which in reality is no\nreason at all, and therefore the inability in question is no detriment\nto man.\n\nBy the discussion which may now be brought to a close, two positions\nseem to be established. 1. That we have, as Mr. Spencer affirms, a\npositive consciousness that the absolute Being is, and that this and all\nwhich we can logically deduce from this are objects of knowledge to us;\nin other words, that the system advocated in this volume directly\nfollows from that premiss. 2. That any doctrine of \"indefinite\nconsciousness\" is erroneous, that the vagueness is not in consciousness,\nbut in our knowledge; and further, that the hypothesis of a\nconsciousness of the \"raw material of thought\" is absurd.\n\n\n\n\n\"THE RECONCILIATION.\"\n\n\nIt would naturally seem, that, after what is believed to be the thorough\nrefutation of the limitist scheme, which has been given in the preceding\ncomments on Mr. Spencer's three philosophical chapters, the one named in\nour heading would need scarce more than a notice. But so far is this\nfrom being the case, that some of the worst features in the results of\nhis system stand out in clearest relief here. Before proceeding to\nconsider these, let us note a most important admission. He speaks of his\nconclusion as bringing \"the results of speculation into harmony with\nthose of common sense,\" and then makes the, for him, extraordinary\nstatement, \"Common Sense asserts the existence of reality.\" In these two\nremarks it would appear to be implied that Common Sense is a final\nstandard with which any position most be reconciled. The question\ninstantly arises, What is Common Sense? The writer has never seen a\ndefinition, and would submit for the reader's consideration the\nfollowing.\n\nCommon Sense _is the practical Pure Reason_; it is that faculty by which\nthe spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness the _a priori_\nlaw as inherent in the fact presented by the Sense.\n\nFor the sake of completeness its complement may be defined thus:\n\nJudgment is the practical Understanding; it is that faculty by which\nthe spiritual person selects such means as he thinks so conformed to\nthat law thus intuited, as to be best suited to accomplish the object in\nview.\n\nA man has good Common Sense, who quickly sees the informing law in the\nfact; and good judgment, who skilfully selects and adapts his means to\nthe circumstances of the case, and the end sought. Of course it will not\nbe understood that it is herein implied that every person who exercises\nthis faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it.\n\nThe reader will readily see the results which directly follow from Mr.\nSpencer's premiss. It is true that \"Common Sense asserts the existence\nof a reality,\" and this assertion is true; but with equal truth does it\nassert the law of logic; that, if a premiss is true, _all that is\nlogically involved in it is true_. It appears, then, that Mr. Spencer\nhas unwittingly acknowledged the fundamental principle of what may be\ncalled the Coleridgian system, the psychological fact of the Pure\nReason, and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his\nown.\n\nIt was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. Spencer's system\nassumed in this chapter their worst phases. This remark is illustrated\nin the following extract: \"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as\na manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena\nbeing, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are\nobliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism teaches us\nthat this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this consciousness of an\nIncomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on\nwhich Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and\nScience coalesce.\" The evils referred to may be developed as follows:\n\"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some\nPower by which we are acted upon.\" This may be expressed in another form\nthus: Every phenomenon is a manifestation of some Power by which we are\nacted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise meaning of this\nsentence, unless the exact signification of the term phenomenon be\nascertained. It might be confined to material appearances, appreciable\nby one of the five senses. But the context seems to leave no doubt but\nthat Mr. Spencer uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the\nUniverse, since he speaks of \"phenomena\" as \"unlimited.\" Putting the\ndefinition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat in the\nUniverse is \"a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon.\"\nIt follows, then, that there is no somewhat in the Universe, except we\nare acted upon by it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we\nbegan to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in\nourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further is to be\nasked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were created. But we were\nnot created by Mr. Spencer's \"some Power,\" because it only _acts upon\nus_. In his creation, man was not acted upon, because there was no man\nto be acted upon; but in that act a being was originated _who might be\nacted upon_. Then, however, we came into being, another than \"some\nPower\" was the cause of us. But the act of creating man was a somewhat.\nEvery somewhat _in_ the Universe is \"a manifestation of some Power.\"\nThis is not such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took\nplace outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to say that the\ncreation of man is \"a manifestation of some Power acting upon\" him!\n\nThe position above taken seems the more favorable one for Mr. Spencer.\nIf, to avoid the difficulties which spring from it, he limits the term\nphenomenon, as for instance to material appearances, then his assertion\nthat phenomena are unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on\nwhich to establish the omnipresence of his Power.\n\nBut another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly speaking, all\nevents are phenomena. Let there be named an event which is universally\nknown and acknowledged, and which, in the nature of the case, cannot be\n\"a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon,\" and in that\nstatement also will the errors of the passage under consideration be\nestablished. The experience by the human soul of a sense of guilt, of a\nconsciousness of ill-desert, is such an event. No \"Power\" can make a\nsinless soul feel guilty; no \"Power\" _can relieve a sinful soul from\nfeeling guilty_. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance\nof Power, _it arises from the violation of Law_. And not only may this\nexperience be named, but every other experience of the moral nature of\nman. In this connection let it be observed that Mr. Spencer always\nelsewhere uses the term phenomenon to represent material phenomena in\nthe material universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged\nto find a single instance in which he attempts to account for any other\nphenomena than these and their concomitants, the affections of the\nintellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so thoroughly is his philosophy\nvitiated by this omission, that one could never learn from anything he\nhas said in these pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there\nwere any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be accounted\nfor. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are just as bad as he.\nYet in this the Limitists have done well; it is impossible, on the basis\nof their system, to render such an account. To test the matter, the\nfollowing problem is presented.\n\nTo account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the fact that\nthe nations of men have universally made public acknowledgment of their\nguilt, in having violated the law of a superior being; and that they\nhave offered propitiatory sacrifices therefor, except in the case of\nthose persons and nations who have received the Bible, or have learned\nthrough the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one\nGod, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice has\nalready been made.\n\nAnother pernicious result of the system under examination is, that it\naffords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's omnipresence than\n_experience_. Mr. Spencer's words are: \"phenomena being, _so far as we\ncan ascertain_, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard\nthis Power as omnipresent.\" Now, if he, or one of his friends, should\nhappen to get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space,\nand should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, skirting in\nastonishment along that boundary, should happen to light upon an open\nplace and a bridge, which invited them to pass across to another sphere\nor system of phenomena, made by another \"Power,\"--said bridge being\nconstructed \"'alf and 'alf\" by the two aforesaid Powers,--then there\nwould be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again to\nEngland, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the other Limitists\nhis new experience; and they, having no ground on which to argue against\nor above experience, must needs receive the declaration of their\ncolaborator, with its inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we\nare here acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when,\ninstead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the doctrine,\nbased not upon human experience, but upon God's inborn ideas that\nphenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, and that upon these facts\nexperience can afford no decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real\ndifficulties of philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison\nbetween human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy.\n\nAttached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. Spencer in an\nearlier part of his work, that \"criticism teaches us that this Power is\nwholly incomprehensible.\" We might, it is believed, ask with pertinence,\nWhat better, then, is man than the brute? But the subject is recurred to\nat this time, only to quote against this position a sentence from a\nsomewhat older book than \"First Principles,\" a book which, did it\ndeserve no other regard than as a human production, would seem, from its\nperfect agreement with the facts of human nature, to be the true basis\nfor all philosophy. The sentence is this: \"Beloved, let us love one\nanother, for love is of God; and every one that loveth, is born of God,\n_and_ KNOWETH GOD.\"\n\nBut the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents its worst\nphase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. A \"phenomenon\" is \"a\nmanifestation of some Power.\" \"In this consciousness of an\nIncomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on\nwhich Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and\nScience coalesce.\" An \"Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power\" is all the\nDeity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power is omnipresent, so that\nwe can never escape it; and incomprehensible, so that we can never know\nthe law of its action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may\nfall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may become one vast\nVesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity\nthe children of men may either live in continual dread, or in continual\ndisregard; they may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or\npurple and fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table\nmay be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification of the\nflesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to propitiate, if\npossible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent Power; or, reckless of\nconsequences, they may laugh and dance and be gay, saying, we know\nnothing of this Power, he may crush us any moment, let us take the good\nof life while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the \"rough and\nragged rocks,\" the hills, the snow-crowned mountains Titan-piled; the\navalanche starting with ominous thunder, to rush with crash and roar and\nterrible destruction upon the hapless village beneath it; the flood\ngathering its waters from vast ranges of hills into a single valley,\nspreading into great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and\ntheir agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges from\ntheir foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little gatherings\nof man, and leaving the country, over which its devastating waters\nflowed, a mournful desolation; and finally, perhaps the completest\nsymbol of all may be found in that collection of the united streams and\nlakes of tens upon tens of thousands of miles of the earth's surface,\ninto the aorta of the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the\ncrowded waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come\nsuddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara.\n\nIt should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct\nantagonism with that of the Bible,--that, if Spencerianism is true, the\nBible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. Spencer's \"Power,\" the\nBible presents us a doctrine of God as follows: \"And God said unto\nMoses, I AM THAT I AM. And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the\nchildren of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.\"--_Exodus_ IV. 14. This\ndeclaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one man ever heard,\nall the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, either in distinct terms, or\nby implication, deny. That other declaration is this: \"Beloved, let us\nlove one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born\nof God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; _for God\nis love_.\"--1 _John_ IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism between the\ntwo philosophies now presented, the later one appears in an especially\nbad light from the fact, that, being very recent and supported by a mere\nhandful of men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice\nof the other and elder one, although the adherents of this may be\nnumbered by millions, and among them have been and are many of the\nablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great majority of Bible readers do\nnot study it as a philosophical treatise, but rather as a book of\nreligious and spiritual instruction; yet, since it is the most\nprofoundly philosophical book which has ever been in the hands of man,\nand professedly teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also the\nphilosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates of the new\nand innovating system should have taken up that one which it sought to\nsupplant, and have made an attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of\nthe work before them, to show its position to be fallacious and\nunworthy of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the\nexistence even of this philosophy except in the single instance of a\nquotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge the\nantagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's volume this neglect is\nespecially noteworthy. Judging from internal evidence, one would much\nsooner conclude that it was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of\nBuddha, than by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian\nchurches. Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no higher\nthan the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, and that it\npresents a most profound philosophy, which is so largely received in his\nown and neighboring nations, made it imperative upon him not only to\ntake some notice of it, but to meet and answer it, as we have indicated\nabove.\n\nAnother fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he will be less\nwilling to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, at the same time, one\nwhich will be more likely forcibly to move a certain class of mind, is,\nthat it is in direct antagonism to human nature. Not only is the Bible a\nfalsehood and a cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true,\nbut human nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. Human\nnature universally considers God, or its gods, as persons; or, in other\nwords, all human beings, or at least with very rare exceptions,\nspontaneously ascribe personality to Deity. This position is in no wise\nnegatived by the fact of the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class\nof philosophical atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the\npower of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the religion in\nwhich he is brought up, some inconsistency, which he, thinking it, as it\nmay be, integral, for philosophical reasons rejects, and all religion\nwith it, he may educate himself into speculative atheism. But no child\nis an atheist. Not even Shelley became such, until he had dashed against\nsome of the distorted and monstrous _human_ theologies of his day. But\ncounting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and all the\nEnglish atheists, and all the American atheists, and all other atheists\nwherever they may be found, they will not number one tenth of the human\nrace. On what ground can the unanimity of the other nine tenths be\naccounted for? There appears none possible, but that the notion that God\nis a person, _is organic in human nature_. Another equally universal and\nspontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there is a likeness, in some\nway, between God and man. There are the grossest, and in many instances\nmost degrading modes of representing this; but under them all, and\nthrough them all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and\npertinacity of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, and\nunder every variety of circumstance, and reappearing after every\nrevolution, which, tearing down old customs and worships, established\nnew ones, can without doubt only be accounted for on the precise ground\nof the other,--that the notion _is organic in man_. A third utterance of\nthe human race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that\nthe Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had revolting,\nyea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, even to human\nsacrifices. But the notion has remained indestructible through all ages,\nand must therefore be accounted for, as have been the others. Over\nagainst the I AM, which human nature presents and the Bible supports;\nover against Him in whose image man and the Bible say man was created;\nand over against Him who, those two still agreeing witnesses also\naffirm, is moved by his great heart of Love to have mercy on those\ncreatures who come to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the\nresult of _Science_, an incomprehensible omnipresent _Power_; only a\nPower, nothing more; and that \"utterly inscrutable.\" For our part,\nwhatever others may do, we will believe in human nature and the Bible.\nOn the truthfulness of these two witnesses, as on the Central Rock in\nthe Universe, we plant ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar.\n\nMr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this Power\n\"Religion dwells.\" Now, so far is this assertion from according with the\nfact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible to account for the\npresence of religion as a constitutive element of the human race.\nReligion was primarily worship, the reverential acknowledgment, by the\nsinless creature, of the authority of the Creator, combined with the\nadoration of His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race,\nit has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory\nsacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or equally, if this is all\nthe notion we can form of him, we are utterly at a loss to find aught in\nhim to worship, much less can we account for the fact of the religious\nnature in us, and most of all are we confounded by the persistent\nassertion, by this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of\nGod, for Power can be neither personal nor merciful.\n\nMr. Spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his position by\nstating that \"from age to age Science has continually defeated it\n(Religion) wherever they have come into collision, and has obliged it to\nrelinquish one or more of its positions.\" In this assertion, also, he\nmanifests either a want of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to\ncomprehend their significance. Religion may properly be divided into two\nclasses.\n\n1. Those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously among\nmen, having all the errors and deformities which a fleshly imagination\nwould produce.\n\n2. The religion of Jesus Christ.\n\n1. From the three great ideas mentioned above, no Science has ever\ndriven even the religions of this class. It has, indeed, corrected many\n_forms of expression_, and has sometimes driven _individuals_, who\nfailed to distinguish between the form, and the idea which the form\noverlies, into a rejection of the truth itself.\n\n2. Respecting the religion of Jesus Christ, Mr. Spencer's remark has no\nshadow of foundation. Since the beginning of its promulgation by\nJehovah, and especially since the completion of that promulgation by\nour Saviour and his apostles, not one whit of its practical law or its\nphilosophy has been abated; nay, more, to-day, in these American States,\nthere may be found a more widespread, thoroughly believed, firmly held,\nand intelligent conviction of God's personality, and personal\nsupervision of the affairs of men, of his Fatherhood, and of that\nfatherhood exercised in bringing \"order out of confusion,\" in so\nconducting the most terrible of conflicts, that it shall manifestly\nredound, not only to the glory of himself, but to the very best good of\nman, so manifestly to so great a good, that all the loss of life, and\nall the suffering, is felt to be not worthy to be compared to the good\nachieved, and that too _most strongly by the sufferers_, than was ever\nbefore manifested by any nation under heaven. The truth is, that, in\nspite of all its efforts to the contrary, criticism has ever been\nutterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the elements we have\npresented. Its utmost triumph has been to force a change in the form of\nexpression; and in the Bible it meets with forms of expression which it\never has been, is now, and ever shall be, as helpless to change as a\nparalytic would be to overturn the Himalaya.\n\nThe discussion of the topic immediately in hand may perhaps be now\nproperly closed with the simple allusion to a single fact. Just as far\nas a race of human beings descends in the gradations of degradation,\njust so far does it come to look upon Deity simply as power. African\nFetishism is the doctrine that Deity is an incomprehensible power,\nrendered into the form of a popular religion; only the religion stands\none step higher than the philosophy, in that it assumes a sort of\npersonality for the Power.\n\nOn page 102 the following extract will be found: \"And now observe that\nall along, the agent which has effected the purification has been\nScience. We habitually overlook the fact that this has been one of its\nfunctions. Religion ignores its immense debt to Science; and Science is\nscarcely at all conscious how much Religion owes it. Yet it is\ndemonstrable that every step by which Religion has progressed from its\nfirst low conception to the comparatively high one it has now reached,\nScience has helped it, or rather forced it to take; and that even now,\nScience is urging further steps in the same direction.\" In this passage\nhalf truths are so sweepingly asserted as universal that it becomes\nsimply untrue. The evil may be stand under two heads.\n\n1. It is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer undertakes to be altogether too\nprofound. Since he has observed that certain changes for the better have\nbeen made in some human religions, by the study of the natural sciences,\nhe jumps to the conclusion that religion has been under a state of\nsteady growth; and of course readily assumes--for there is not a shadow\nof other basis for his assertion--that the \"first\" \"conception\" of\nreligion was very \"low.\" This assumption we utterly deny, and demand of\nMr. Spencer his proof. For ourselves we are willing to come down from\nthe impregnable fortresses of the Bible upon the common ground of the\nGrecian Mythology, and on this do battle against him. In this we are\ntaught that the Golden Age came _first_, in which was a life of spotless\npurity; after which were the silver and brazen ages, and the Iron Age in\nwhich was crime, and the \"low conception\" of religion came _last_. How\nmarked is the general agreement of this with the Bible account!\n\n2. But more and worse may be charged on this passage than that it is too\nphilosophical. Mr. Spencer constructs his philosophy first and cuts his\nfacts to match it. This is a common mistake among men, and which they\nare unconscious of. Now the fact is, Science was _not_ \"the agent which\neffected the purification.\" Religion owes a very small debt to Science.\nScience can never be more than a supplement, \"a handmaid\" to Religion.\nReligion's first position was not a low one, but nearly the highest.\nAfterwards it sunk very low; but men sunk it there. Science never\n\"helped it\" or \"forced it\" one atom upwards. Science alone only degrades\nReligion and gives new wings and hands to crime. This will be\nespecially manifest to those who remember what Mr. Spencer's doctrine of\nScience is. He says: \"That even the _highest_ achievements of Science\nare resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so\ncooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence\nand sequence that occur externally.\" Of course the highest _object_ of\nScience will be \"_truth_\"; and this, our teacher tells us, \"is simply\nthe accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations.\" To\ninterpret. A science of medicine, a science of ablutions, a science of\nclothing, a science of ventilation, a science of temperature, and to\nsome largely, to many chiefly, a science of _cookery_ do, combined,\nconstitute Science, and the preservation of the body is its highest\nattainment. Is this Science \"the agent which has effected the\npurification of Religion?\" What then is the truth?\n\n\"Lo this have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they have\nsought out many inventions.\"--_Eccl._ VII. 29. The first religion was a\ncommunion with God. The Creator taught man, as a father would his\nchildren. But when man sinned, he began to seek out many inventions, and\nsank to that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary\nsketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of\nAbraham,--_Gen._ XII. XXV.; which Paul epitomizes with such fiery vigor\nin the first chapter of Romans, and which may be found fully paralleled\nin our own day. At the proper time, God took mankind in hand, and began\nto develop his great plan for giving purity to religion. So he raised up\nMoses, and gave to Israel the Levitical law. Or if Mr. Spencer shall\ndeny the biblical account of the origin of the five books of Moses, he\nat least cannot deny that they have a being; and, placing them on the\nsame ground of examination and criticism as Herodotus, that they were\nwritten more than a thousand years before the Christian era. Now mark.\nWhoever wrote them, they remained as they were first framed, and no one\nof the prophets, who came after, added one new idea. They only\nemphasized and amplified \"The Law.\" So far then as this part of\nReligion was concerned, Science never helped a particle. Yea, more, the\nwords to Moses in the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances\nof man before the Christian era.\n\n\"In the fulness of time God sent his own Son.\" However defective was the\nformer dispensation, he, who appeared to most of the men of his day as\nonly a carpenter's son, declared to mankind the final and perfect truth.\nAs the system taught by Moses was not the result of any philosophical\ndevelopments, but was incomparably superior to the religion of the most\ncivilized people of the world, at whose court Moses was brought up, and\nwas manifestly constructed _de novo_, and from some kind of revelation,\nso this, which the carpenter's son taught, was incomparably superior to\nany utterance which the human soul had up to that time, or has since,\nmade. It comes forth at once complete and pure. It utters the highest\nprinciples in the simplest language. Indeed, nothing new was left to say\nwhen John finished his writing; and the canon might well be closed. And\nsince that day, has Religion advanced? Not a syllable. The purest water\nis drank at the old fountain. But it will be said that the cause of\nReligion among men has advanced. Very true, but Science did not advance\nit. You can yet count the years on your fingers since men of Science\ngenerally ceased to be strenuously hostile to Religion. Religion, in\nevery instance, has advanced just where it has gone back, and drank at\nthe old fountains. Who, then, has purified Religion? God is \"the agent\nwhich has effected the purification.\" God is he to whom Religion owes\n\"its immense debt,\" not Science. He it is who has brought her up to her\npresent high position.\n\nWhen, now, we see how completely Mr. Spencer--to use a commonplace but\nvery forcible phrase--has \"ruled God out of the ring,\" how impertinent\nseems his rebuke, administered a few pages further on, in the passage\nbeginning, \"Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious,\" to\nthose who believe that God means what he says, and that men may know\nhim. These men at least stand on a far higher plane than he who teaches\nthat an \"incomprehensible omnipresent Power\" is all there is for us to\nworship, and his words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns\nunder a pot.\n\nThere does not appear in this chapter any further topic that has not\nalready been touched upon. With these remarks, then, the examination of\nthis chapter, and of Mr. Spencer's First Principles, may be closed.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\n\nIf it has ever been the reader's lot to examine Paley's \"Evidences of\nChristianity,\" or the \"Sermons of President Dwight on the Existence of\nGod\"; and if he has risen from their perusal with a feeling of utter\nunsatisfaction, enduring the same craving for a sure truth harassing as\nbefore, he will have partly shared the experience which drove the author\nforward, until he arrived at the foundation principles of this treatise.\nThose works, and all of that class are, for the object they have in\nview, worthless; not because the various statements they make are\nuntrue, not because elegant language and beauty of style are wanting;\nbut because they are radically defective in that, their _method_ is\nirrelevant to the subject in hand; because in all the arguments that\nhave been or can be brought forward there is nothing decisive and final;\nbecause the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through\nevery one of them; because, in fine, the very root of the matter, their\nmethod itself is false, and men have attempted to establish by a series\nof arguments what must be ground for the possibility of an argument, and\ncan only be established by the opposite, the _a priori_ method. Though\nthe Limitist Philosophy has no positive value, it has this negative one,\nthat it has established, by the most thorough-going criticism, the\nworthlessness of the _a posteriori_ processes of thought on the matter\nin hand. Yea, more, the existence of _any_ spiritual person cannot be\nproved in that way. You can prove that the boy's body climbs the tree;\nbut never that he has a soul. This is always taken for granted. Lest the\nauthor should appear singular in this view, he would call the attention\nof the reader to a passage in Coleridge's writings in which he at once\nsets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency of the logic of Dr.\nPaley's book. \"I have, I am aware, in this present work, furnished\noccasion for a charge of having expressed myself with slight and\nirreverence of celebrated names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if\nI were fond and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how\nwell content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration\nwhich, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of Paley! And\nhow gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary praise, could I\neven approach to the incomparable grace, propriety, and persuasive\nfacility of his writings! But on this very account, I feel myself bound\nin conscience _to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of\nthis triumphal car_, on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is\nborne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels.\"\n\nInstead of the method now condemned, there is one taught us in the Book,\nand the only one taught us there, which is open to every human being,\nfor which every human being has the faculty, and respecting which all\nthat is needed is, that the person exercise what he already has. The boy\ncould not learn his arithmetic, except he set himself resolutely to his\ntask; and no man can learn of God, except he also fulfils the\nconditions, except he consecrate himself wholly to the acquisition of\nthis knowledge, except his soul is poured out in love to God; \"for every\none that _loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God_.\" We come then to the\nknowledge of God by a direct and immediate act of the soul. The Reason,\nthe Sensibility, and the Will, give forth their combined and highest\naction in the attainment of this knowledge. As an intellectual\nachievement, this is the highest possible to the Reason. She attains\nthen, to the Ultima Thule of all effort, and of this she is fully\nconscious. Nor is there awakened any feverish complaining that there are\nno more worlds to conquer. In the contemplation of the ineffable\nGoodness she finds her everlasting occupation, and her eternal rest.\nPlainly, then, both Reason and Revelation teach but a single, and that\nthe _a priori_ method, by which to establish for man the fact of the\nbeing of God. Let us buttress this conclusion with other lines of\nthought.\n\nReader, now that it is suggested to you, does it not seem in the highest\ndegree improbable, that the most important truths which can pertain to\nman, truths which do not concern primarily the affairs of this life, but\nof his most exalted life, the life of the spiritual person as the\ncompanion of its Creator, should be based upon an inferior, less\nsatisfactory, and less adequate foundation of knowledge, than those of\nour childhood's studies, of the arithmetic and the algebra? The boy who\ncons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book, soon learns what he\nknows to be _self-evident_ truths. He who should offer to _prove_ the\ntruth of the multiplication-table, would only expose himself to\nridicule. When the boy has attained to youth, and advanced in his\nstudies, the pages of the algebra and geometry are laid before him, and\nhe finds new and higher orders of self-evident truths. Would any\nevidence, any argument, strengthen his conviction of the validity of the\naxioms? Yea, rather, if one should begin to offer arguments, would he\nnot instinctively and rightfully feel that the confession was thereby\ntacitly made, that self-evidence was not satisfactory; and would he not,\nfinding his spontaneous impulse, and his education, so contradictory, be\n_liable_ to fall into complete skepticism? If now there be this\nspontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal conviction\nrespecting matters of subordinate importance, can it be possible,--I\nrepeat the question, for it seems to carry with it irresistibly its own\nand the decisive answer,--can it be possible that the decisions of\nquestions of the highest moment, that the knowledge of the principles of\nour moral being and of the moral government to which we are amenable,\nand most of all of the Governor who is at once Creator, Lawgiver, and\nJudge, is not based on at least equally spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea,\nunalterable, yea, universal convictions? And when the teacher seemingly,\nand may it not with truth be said _actually_, distrusting the\nreliability of such a conviction, goes about to bolster up his belief,\nand the belief of his pupil, in the existence of God, and thereto rakes\ntogether, with painstaking labor, many sticks and straws of evidence,\ninstead of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon him\nwith steady ineffable effulgence, is it at all strange that the\nsharper-eyed pupil, keenly appreciating the contradiction between his\nspontaneous conviction and his teaching, should become uncertain which\nto follow, a doubter, and finally a confirmed skeptic? If, then, it is\nincredible that the fundamental principles of man's moral nature--that\nto which all the other elements of his being are subordinate, and for\nwhich they were created--are established on inferior grounds, and those\nless satisfactory than the grounds of other principles; and if, on the\nother hand, the conviction is irresistible, that they are established on\nthe highest grounds, and since the truths of mathematics are also based\non the highest ground, self-evidence, and since there can be none higher\nthan the highest, it follows that the moral principles of the Universe,\nso far as they can be known by man, have _precisely the same foundation\nof truthfulness as the principles of mathematics--they are_\nSELF-EVIDENT.\n\nBut some good Reader will check at the result now attained because it\ninvolves the position that the human Reason is the final standard of\ntruth for man. Good reader, this position is involved, and is true; and\nfor the sake of Christ's religion it must be taken. The only possible\nground for a thoroughly satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable\nChristian Philosophy, is the principle that _The human Reason is the\nfinal standard of truth for man_.\n\nIt has been customary for the devout Bible-reader to esteem that book as\nhis final standard; and to such an extent in many instances has his\nreverential regard for it been carried, that the expression will hardly\nbe too strong for truth, that it has become an object of worship; and\nupon the mind of such a one the above assertion will produce a shock.\nWhile the author would treat with respect every religious feeling, he\nwould still remind such a person that the Bible is the moral school-book\nof the spiritual person in man, which God himself prepared for man's\nuse, and must in every case be inferior and subordinate to the being\nwhom it was meant to educate; and furthermore, that, by the very fact of\nmaking man, God established in him the standard, and the right to\nrequire that this fact be recognized. Mark, God made the standard and\nthus established the right. This principle may be supported by the\nfollowing considerations:\n\n1. The church universally has acted upon it; and none have employed it\nmore vigorously than those who have in terms most bitterly opposed it.\nOne of the class just referred to affirms that the Bible is the standard\nof truth. \"Admit,\" says a friend standing by, \"that it would be if it\nwere what it purports to be; but what evidence is there that this is the\ncase.\" Thereupon the champion presents evidence from the fathers, and\nevidence from the book itself; and finally closes by saying, that such\nan array of evidence is ample to satisfy any _reasonable_ man of its\ntruth and validity. His argument is undoubtedly satisfactory; but if he\nhas not appealed to a reasonable man, _i. e._ to the Reason, _i. e._, if\nhe has not acknowledged a standard for _the_ standard, and thus has not\ntacitly, unconsciously and yet decisively employed the Reason as the\nhighest standard of truth, then his conduct has for us no adequate\nexpression.\n\n2. Nicodemus and Christ, in express terms, recognized the validity of\nthis standard. Said the ruler to Christ, \"We know that thou art a\nteacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest,\nexcept God be with him.\"--_John_ III. 2. In these words, he both\nrecognized the validity of the standard, and the fact that its\nrequirements had been met. But decisively emphatic are the words of our\nSaviour: \"If I had not done among them the works which none other man\ndid, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me\nand my Father.\"--_John_ XV. 24. As if he had said, \"While I appeared\namong them simply as a man, I had no right to claim from them a belief\nin my mission; but when I had given them adequate and ample evidence of\nmy heavenly character, when, in a word, I had by my works satisfied all\nthe rational demands for evidence which they could make, then no excuse\nremained for their rejection of me.\"\n\nThe doctrine of this treatise, that man may know the truth, and know\nGod, is one which will never be too largely reflected upon by the human\nmind, or too fully illustrated in human thought. In no better strain can\nwe bring our work to a close than by offering some reflections on those\nwords of Jesus Christ which have formed the title of our book.\n\n\"Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, 'If ye continue in\nmy word, _then_ are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth,\nand the truth shall make you free.'\"--_John_ VIII. 31, 32. Throughout\nall the acts of Christ, as recorded in John and especially during the\nlast days of his life, there may be traced the marks of a super-human\neffort to express to the Jews, in the most skilful manner, the nature\nand purport of his mission. He appeared to them a man; and yet it would\nseem as if the Godhead in him struggled with language to overcome its\ninfirmities, and express with perfectest skill his extraordinary\ncharacter and work. But \"he came unto his own, and his own received him\nnot.\" Being then such, even the Divine Man, Jesus Christ possessed in\nhis own right _an absolute and exhaustive metaphysic_. We study out some\nlaws in some of their applications; he knew all laws in all their\napplications. In these his last days he was engaged in making the most\nprofound and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one\nbeing ever made to another. Or does the reader prefer to call them\nreligious? Very well: for here Religion and Philosophy are identical.\nBeing engaged in such a labor, it is certain that no merely human\nteacher ever used words with the careful balancing, the skilful\nselection, the certain exactitude, that Jesus did. Hence in the most\nemphatic sense may it be said, that, whether he used figurative or\nliteral language, he meant just what he said. The terms used in the text\nquoted are literal terms, and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken in\nits most literal signification. In these words then, in this passage of\nthe highest philosophical import, is to be found the basis of the whole\n_a priori_ philosophy. They were spoken of the most important truths,\nthose which pertain to the soul's everlasting welfare; but as the\ngreater includes the less, so do they include all lesser science. In\npositive and unmistakable terms has Christ declared the fact of\nknowledge. God knows all truth. In so far as we also know the truth, in\nso far are we like him. And mark, this is knowledge, a purely\nintellectual act. Love is indeed a _condition_ of the act, but it is not\nthe very act itself.\n\nOn this subject it is believed that the Christian church has failed to\nassert the most accurate doctrine. Too generally has this knowledge been\ntermed a spiritual knowledge, meaning thereby, a sort of an impression\nof happiness made upon the spiritual sensibility; and this state of\nbliss has been represented as in the highest degree desirable. Beyond\nall question it is true, that, when the spiritual person, with the eye\nof Reason, sees, and thus knows the truth, seeing it and knowing it\nbecause his whole being, will, and intellect is consecrated to, wrapt in\nthe effort, and he is searching for it as for hid treasures, there will\nroll over his soul some ripples of that ineffable Delight which is a\nboundless ocean in Deity. But this state of the Sensibility follows\nafter, and is dependent upon, the act of love, and the act of knowledge.\nThere should be, there was made in Christ's mind, a distinction in the\nvarious psychical modifications of him who had sold all that he had to\nbuy the one pearl. The words of Christ are to be taken, then, as the\nwords of the perfect philosopher, and the perfect religionist. Bearing,\nas he did, the destiny of a world on his heart, and burdened beyond all\nutterance by the mighty load, his soul was full of the theme for which\nhe was suffering, he could speak to man only of his highest needs and\nhis highest capabilities. The truth which man may know, then, is not\nonly eternal,--all truth is eternal,--but it is that eternal truth most\nimportant to him, the _a priori_ laws of the spiritual person and of all\nhis relations. The what he is, the why he is, and the what he ought to\nbecome, are the objects of his examination. When, then, a spiritual\nperson has performed his highest act, the act of unconditional and\nentire consecration to the search after the truth, _i. e._ to God; and\nwhen, having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of the flesh,\nhe shall in this condition become absorbed, wrapt away in the\ncontemplation of the truth; then his spiritual eye will be open, and\nwill dart with its far-glancing, searching gaze throughout the mysteries\nof the Universe, and he will know the truth. Before, when he was\nabsorbed in the pursuit of the things of Sense, he could see almost no\n_a priori_ principles at all, and what he did see, only in their\npractical bearing upon those material and transitory things which perish\nwith their using; but now balancing himself on tireless pinion in the\nupper ether, anon he stoops to notice the largest and highest and most\nimportant of those objects which formerly with so much painful and\npainstaking labor he climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine, and\nhaving touched upon them cursorily, to supply the need of the hour, he\nagain spreads his powerful God-given wings of faith and love, and soars\nupward, upward, upward, towards the eternal Sun, the infinite Person,\nthe final Truth, God. Then does he come to comprehend, \"to KNOW, with\nall saints, what is the height and depth and length and breadth of the\nlove of God.\" Then do the pure _a priori_ laws, especially those of the\nrelations of spiritual persons, _i. e._ of the moral government of God,\ncome full into the field of his vision. Then in the clear blaze, in the\nnoonday effulgence of the ineffable, eternal Sun, does he see the Law\nwhich binds God as it binds man,--that Law so terrible in its demands\nupon him who had violated it, that the infinite Person himself could\nfind no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending \"his\nonly-begotten Son into the world.\" And he who is lifted up to this\nknowledge needs no other revelation. All other knowledge is a child's\nlesson-book to him. All lower study is tasteless; all lower life is\nneglected, forgotten. He studies forever the pure equations of truth; he\nlives in the bosom of God. Such an one may all his life-long have been\nutterly ignorant of books. A poor negro on some rice plantation, he may\nhave learned of God only by the hearing of the ear, but by one act, in a\nmoment, in the twinkling of an eye, he has passed all the gradations of\nearthly knowledge, and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven. He\nreceived little instruction from men; but forevermore God is his\nteacher.\n\nThis of which we have been speaking is, be it remembered, no rhapsody of\nthe imagination. It is a simple literal fact respecting man's intellect.\nIt is the same in kind, though of far nobler import, as if upon this act\nof consecration there should be revealed to every consecrated one, in a\nsudden overwhelming burst of light, the whole _a priori_ system of the\nphysical Universe. This is not so revealed because it is not essential,\nand so would only gratify curiosity. The other and the higher is\nrevealed, because it is essential to man's spiritual life.\n\nIn the culminating act, then, of a spiritual person, in the unreserved,\nthe absolute consecration of the whole being to the search after truth,\ndo we find that common goal to which an _a priori_ philosophy inevitably\nleads us, and which the purest, Christ's, religion teaches us. Thus does\nit appear that in their highest idea Philosophy and Religion are\nidentical. The Rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal. The\nprinciples of both have the highest possible evidence, for they are\nself-evident; and, having them given by the intuition of the Reason, a\nman can cipher out the whole natural scheme of the Universe as he would\ncipher out a problem in equations. He has not done it, because he is\nwicked; and God has given him the Bible, as the mathematical astronomy\nof the moral heavens, as a school-book to lead him back to the goal of\nhis lost purity.\n\nHow beautiful, then, art thou, O Religion, supernal daughter of the\nDeity! how noble in thy magnificent preeminence! how dazzling in thy\ntranscendent loveliness! Thou sittest afar on a throne of pearl; thy\ndiadem the Morning Stars, thy robe the glory of God. Founded is thy\nthrone on Eternity; and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are\nenduring truth. Sitting thus, O Queen, more firmly throned than the\nsnow-capped mountains, calmer than the ocean's depths, in the surety of\nthy self-conscious integrity and truth, thou mayest, with mien of\nnoblest dignity, in unwavering confidence, throw down the gauntlet of\nthy challenge to the assembled doubters of the Universe.\n\nIt may be that to some minds, unaccustomed to venturing out fearlessly\non the ocean of thought, with an unwavering trust in the pole-star truth\nin the human soul, certain of the positions attained and maintained in\nthis volume will seem to involve the destruction of all essential\ndistinction between the Creator and the created. If the universe is a\ndefinite and limited object, some created being may, at some period,\ncome to know every atom of it. Moreover, if there is a definite number\nof the qualities and attributes--the endowments of Deity, some one may\nlearn the number, and what they are, and come at length to have a\nknowledge equal to God's knowledge. Even if this possibility should be\nadmitted,--which it is not, for a reason to appear further on,--yet it\nwould in no way involve that the creature had, in any the least degree,\nreduced the difference in _kind_ which subsists between him and the\nCreator. A consideration of the following distinctive marks will, it\nwould seem, be decisive upon this point.\n\nGod is self-existent. His creatures are dependent upon him.\nSelf-existence is an essential, inherent, untransferable attribute of\nDeity; and so is not a possible attainment for any creature. Every\ncreature is necessarily dependent upon the Creator every moment, for his\ncontinuance in being. Let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge;\nlet him, if the supposition were rational, acquire a knowledge equal to\nthat of Deity; let him be endowed with all the power he could use, and\nhe would not have made, nor could he make an effort even, in the\ndirection of removing his dependence upon his Creator. In the very\nheight of his glory, in the acme of his attainment, it would need only\nthat God rest an instant, cease to sustain him, and he would not be, he\nwould have gone out, as the light goes out on a burner when one turns\nthe faucet.\n\nAgain, the mode by which their knowledge is attained is different in\nkind; and the creature never can acquire the Creator's mode. The Deity\npossesses his knowledge as a necessary endowment, given to him at once,\nby a spontaneous intuition. Hence he could never learn, for there was no\nknowledge which he did not already possess. Thus he is out of all\nrelation to Time. The creature, on the other hand, can never acquire any\nknowledge except through processes; and, what is more, can never review\nthe knowledge already acquired, except by a process which occupies a\ntime. This relation of the creature to Time is organic; and this\ndistinction between the creature and Creator is thus also irremovable.\n\nAnother organic distinction is that observed in the mode of seeing\nideals. The Divine Reason not only gives ideas, _a priori_ laws, but it\ngives all possible images, which those laws, standing in their natural\nrelations to each other, can become. Thus all ideals are realized to\nhim, whether the creative energy goes forth, and power is organized in\naccordance therewith, or not. Here again the creature is of the opposite\nkind. The creature can never have an idea until he has been educated by\ncontact with a material universe; and then can never construct an ideal,\nexcept he have first seen the elements of that ideal realized in\nmaterial forms. To illustrate: The infant has no ideas; and there is no\nradical difference between the beginning of a human being and any other\ncreated spiritual person. He has a rudimentary Reason, but it must grow\nbefore it can make its presentations, and the means of its education\nmust be a material system. Let a spiritual person be created, and set in\nthe Universe, utterly isolated, with no medium of communication, and it\nwould stay forever just what it was at the beginning, a dry seed. The\nnecessity of alliance with a material Universe is equally apparent in\nthe mature spiritual person. Such a one cannot construct a single ideal,\nexcept he have seen all the elements already in material forms. He who\nwill attempt to construct an ideal of any _thing_, which never has been,\nas a griffin, and not put into it any form of animals which have been on\nearth, will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness of this\nposition. Therefore it is that no one can, \"by searching, find out God.\"\nThe creature can only learn what the Creator declares to him.\n\nStill another element of distinction, equally marked and decisive as\nthose just named, may be mentioned. The Deity possesses as inherent and\nimmanent endowment Power, or the ability of himself to realize his\nideals in objects. Thus is he the Creator. If this were not so, there\ncould have been no Universe, for there was no substance and no one to\nfurnish a substance but he. The creature, on the other hand, cannot\nreceive as a gift, neither attain by culture the power to create. Hence\nhe can only realize his ideals in materials furnished to his hand.\nPigments and brushes and chisels and marble must be before painters and\nsculptors can become.\n\nEach and every one of the distinctions above made is _organic_. They\ncannot be eliminated. In fact their removal is not a possible object of\neffort. The creature may _wish_ them removed; but no line of thought can\nbe studied out by which a movement can be made towards the attainment of\nthat wish. It would seem, then, that, such being the facts, the fullest\nscope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use of every power\nof the creature. Such, it is believed, is God's design.\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Note:\n\n\nArchaic/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been\nmaintained.","title":"Know the Truth: A Critique on the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation: Including Some Strictures Upon the Theories of Rev. Henry L. Mansel and Mr. Herbert Spencer","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":80150}