{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_38232/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_38232","id":"gutenberg_38232","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/38232","summary":null,"tags":["Calvinism","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Election (Theology)","Predestination"],"text":"Produced by Keith G Richardson\n\n\n\n\nCALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY:\n\nEMBRACING A SERMON\n\nON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION,\n\nAND SEVERAL NUMBERS,\n\nFORMERLY PUBLISHED IN THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL.\n\nBY REV. WILBUR FISK, D. D.\n\nNEW-YORK,\n\nPUBLISHED BY B. WAUGH AND T. MASON,\n\nFor the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Conference Office, 200\nMulberry-street.\n\n_J. Collord, Printer_.\n\n1835.\n\n\n\n\n\"Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by B. Waugh and\nT. Mason, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern\nDistrict of New-York.\"\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nAdvertisement\n\nSermon on Predestination and Election\n\nI. Reply to the Christian Spectator\n\nII. A proposition to Calvinists\n\nIII. Indefiniteness of Calvinism\n\nIV. Brief sketch of the past changes and present state of Calvinism in\nthis country\n\nV. Same subject continued\n\nVI. Predestination\n\nVII. Predestination, continued\n\nVIII. Moral agency and accountability\n\nIX. Moral agency and accountability, continued\n\nX. Moral agency as affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions\nof grace\n\nXI. Same subject continued\n\nXII. Objections to gracious ability answered\n\nXIII. Regeneration\n\nXIV. Regeneration, continued\n\nXV. Regeneration, continued\n\n\n\n\nADVERTISEMENT.\n\nThe numbers following the sermon on predestination and election, were\nwritten at different times, and in some instances at quite distant\nintervals from each other. This will be received, it is hoped, as an\napology for any want of connection or uniformity of style, which the\nreader may notice. And if any farther apology be necessary, it may be\nfound in the fact, that the entire contents of the volume as it is now\npresented, were written in the midst of other pressing duties.--And the\nsame reason has prevented my giving the work such a thorough revision,\nas it should have had, before it was presented to the public, in the\nmore set and imposing form of a book. Such a form was not originally\nthought of--and now that this is called for, the author is well aware\nthat the public might expect a careful revision and correction of the\nwhole. From this however, he must, of _necessity_, be excused. He has\nbeen able to do little more than correct the typographical errors. If\nthe public have it, therefore, it must go \"with all its imperfections on\nits head.\" Only let it be understood, that _I do not send it out_. The\npublishers say it is called for; and I consent that it may go. The\ndoctrines I believe, will stand the test of reason and Scripture,\nalthough some of the arguments by which they are defended may be found\ndefective.\n\nIt was my original design to have added one or two numbers on election;\nbut upon farther reflection, it appeared to me that enough had been said\nin the sermon on that point; and that at any rate, if Calvinian\npredestination, and the Calvinistic views of moral agency and\nregeneration, were found to be fallacious, the whole superstructure must\nfall of course. On these points therefore, we may safely rest the entire\nquestion between us and the Calvinists.\n\nW. Fisk.\n\n_Wesleyan University, April_ 28, 1835.\n\n\n\n\nA DISCOURSE\n\nON\n\nPREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.\n\nAccording as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the\nworld, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.\n\nHaving predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ,\nto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, Ephesians i, 4,\n5.\n\nIn this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election\nare brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respecting\nthem, and to exhibit what is believed to be the Scriptural and rational\nview of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present\ndiscourse. In doing this, much that is new cannot be expected. The whole\nground of this controversy has been examined and re-examined; and the\nvarious arguments, on both sides, have been urged and opposed, by the\nmost able polemics in philosophy and theology. The most, therefore, that\ncan now be expected, is to give a concise view of the subject, in a form\nand manner suited to the present state of the controversy, and to the\ncircumstances of the present congregation.\n\nIt is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the\nspirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly and\nChristian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. Yet, in a\ndesire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, nor neglect to\npoint out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and its unprofitable\ninfluences on the minds of those who propagate or receive it. The truth\nshould be spoken, but it should be spoken in love. Neither the subject,\nnor the age, nor the occasion, will admit of temporizing. With these\nviews, we come to our subject, by examining,\n\nI. Predestination in general;\n\nII. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of\nelection.\n\nI. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to\nbring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has\nknowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future\nevents; predestination, in a _proper_ and _strict_ sense, can only be\nused in reference to him. And with respect to God, predestination is\nthat efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity,\nrespecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and\ncreatures of the universe.--That God hath a predetermination of this\nkind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be\nno dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to\nwhich some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this\nsubject, says, \"Every action and motion of every creature is governed by\nthe hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was\nordained by him.\" The Assembly's Catechism is similar:--\"God did, from\nall eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass.\" And Mr. Buck\ndefines predestination to mean, \"The decree of God, whereby he hath, for\nhis own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass.\" With these\ndefinitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the\nCalvinistic divines in Europe and America.--To this view of\npredestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have\nobjected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings,\nso far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not\ndefinitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose\nand efficient decree of God. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe,\nwith the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws of the\nphysical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all\nthe various circumstances and contingencies of his government; but that\nit is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human\nwill. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us,\nthey affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon\nthem. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of\ntheir system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1]\n\nThe supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a\nthreefold argument--the foreknowledge of God--the necessity of a\nplan--and Scripture testimony.\n\n1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes\ncontended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This,\nhowever, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is\nself-evident, that _to know_, and _to decree_, are distinct operations;\nand to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms,\nthey must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct\noperations in the _human_ mind, they must be also in the _Divine_ mind,\nunless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God, have an\nentirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among\nmen. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible\nargument is, that the foreknowledge of God necessarily _implies_\npredestination. \"For how,\" they ask, \"can an action that is really to\ncome to pass, be foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every\nthing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had\nnot so determined it.\" \"God,\" says Piscator, \"foresees nothing but what\nhe has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge.\" And Calvin says,\n\"God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he\nhas decreed they shall come to pass.\" But to this idea there are\ninsuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the\nDivine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential\nto the Divine nature. For aught we can see, God might determine to make\na particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection\nof his nature is not affected. But _to know_, is so essential to him,\nthat the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be,\nunder any possible contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd,\nthen, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend\nupon the _exercise_ of his attributes?--the Divine prescience depend\nupon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument,\nthat, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought,\nand in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute\npreceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be\nexercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous\nconclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with\nit is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must predetermine\nevents in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent\non the effect, the decrees of God must be passed and his plan contrived,\nindependently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the\neffect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of\nthose decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will\nnot stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous\nto be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this\nconclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us,\ntherefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of\ncause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent\nupon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of\nhis infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth\nfrom the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords\nwith the Scriptures:--\"For whom he did foreknow, he also did\npredestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son.\" \"Elect according\nto the foreknowledge of God the Father.\" In these passages\npredestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on\nforeknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God foreknows\nin order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to\nforeknow.[2]\n\nBut foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. \"The\nforeknowledge of God,\" it is said, \"is tantamount to a decree; because,\ninasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take\nplace--his knowledge makes it certain.\" This is indeed shifting the\nargument; for if God's knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is\nnot his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing\ncontained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge,\nwhich is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at,\nthat knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd.\nBeside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent God's\nforeknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse\nthan unmeaning: \"Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate,\" would\nmean, \"whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate\"--and, \"Elect\naccording to the foreknowledge of God,\" would only mean, \"that the\ndecree of election was _according_ to the decree of election!\" the\nabsurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged,\nfarther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge\ncannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in\nmaking an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the\ncertainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that\nknowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it--to me such a\nconnection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will\nundoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, Does the event\ntake place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will\ntake place? Or, in other words, Does God know an event to be certain\nbecause it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it\ncertain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for\nhe would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously assert\nthat a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to\nthat, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be\nforeknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that\nforeknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain.\nSince, therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not,\naccording to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a\nconsequence, and has no possible influence in making an event certain,\nno proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour of the\ndoctrine that _God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass_.\n\n2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. \"It\ncannot be conceived,\" it is said, \"that God would leave things at\nrandom, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place\nupon condition that his creatures act in this or that way.\" But this\nargument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it assumes\nwhat ought to be proved; and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been\nproved, viz. that to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny that God\nhas a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one\npart of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, without\ncontrolling their will, by a fixed decree--to punish the incorrigible,\nand save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the\nnecessity of a change, \"on condition that his creatures act in this or\nthat way?\" If, indeed, it was necessary for God to decree an event, in\norder to foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen\nto be false, it follows that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity\nand eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all possibilities\nand contingencies; all that is, or will be, can perfectly arrange his\nplan, and preclude the possibility of a disappointment, although he does\nnot, by a decree of predestination, fix all the volitions and acts of\nhis subjects. Even in human governments, where the rulers can have no\nknowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and\nextent of the transgressions, the principles and plan of government\nundergo no change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of\nthe subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of\nthe universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he predestinate\nthe transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his saints! The\ntruth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom of God; for the\nperfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is predicated on the\nimperfection of his attributes. But our view of the Divine plan accords\nwell with our idea of his infinite nature. Over the universe, and\nthrough eternity, he throws his all-pervading knowledge--as he is in\nevery point of wide immensity, so he is in every moment of long\neternity--and can such a God be disappointed?\n\n3. \"But,\" say the advocates of this system, \"supposing there are\ndifficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with passages which\nat once prove the doctrine.\" If this is true, then indeed we must\nsubmit. But the question is, where are these passages? After such a\nstrong assertion, it would probably appear surprising to one\nunacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single\npassage which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever\ncomes to pass. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in\nScripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because God\nhath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed all\nthings. All those passages then which have been so frequently quoted as\nproof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that God hath\npredetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are the\npassages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many which say\nof certain events that have come to pass, that God did not _command_\nthem, nor _will_ them; so that the abundant Scripture proof seems\naltogether on the other side of the question. It is argued, however,\nthat certain acts of moral agents, even those acts for which they are\nheld responsible, are, according to the Scriptures, the results of God's\npredetermination, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that all are.\nThis general conclusion, however, is not contained in the premises;\nnevertheless, if the premises are true, if it can be proved from\nScripture that God holds his creatures responsible for the results of\nhis own decrees, such Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward\noff the objections that are brought against this system. For if it is\nconsistent with a righteous God to make a moral agent responsible for\none event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same\nprinciple, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though all\nwere decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, \"As for you,\" says\nJoseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to him, \"ye thought\nevil against me, but God meant it for good.\" Now without stopping here\nto inquire whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are\nready to acknowledge, that there are a number of similar scriptures\nwhich teach that, in the results of the wicked acts of wicked men, God\nhad a design and a controlling influence, and thereby made them\nsubservient to his own purposes. He hath wisdom and power \"to make the\nwrath of man praise him, and to restrain the remainder of wrath.\" But\ndoes he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary\nto the accomplishment of his purposes? As well might it be said, that\nbecause a government, in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer\nfrom the confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government\ndecreed the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of\nthe nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and\ncontrol the _results_ of an act is altogether different from making the\nact itself the result of an overruling and controlling power.\n\nAgain it is said, \"The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, even\nthe wicked for the day of evil.\" That the Lord hath made all things for\nhis own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and doubted, I trust,\nby none; and this is evidently the meaning of the former member of this\npassage. The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted\nat all, must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked,\nthat he might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the\ntext speak this shocking sentiment. We should do the text no violence to\nexplain it thus--The Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil,\nand this shall be for his glory.\n\nBut there is another class of passages like the following:--\"He doeth\naccording to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants\nof the earth.\" \"He worketh all things after the counsel of his will.\" \"I\nwill do all my pleasure.\" But these passages establish nothing, in\nopposition to our views, unless it should first be proved, by other\npassages, or in some other way, that it is God's will and pleasure to\nwork _all things_, even wickedness, in the wicked. These scriptures\nprove that all _God's works_ are in accordance with his own will and\npleasure; and that he will accomplish them in spite of the opposition of\nsinners. If it pleases him to form his moral government, so as to leave\nthe responsible acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this\nhe will do, for \"he will do all his pleasure.\"\n\nBut there is still another class of texts, which are supposed to favour\nthe doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. those passages\nwhich seem to represent God as bringing about and procuring the\nwickedness of the wicked. Like the following:--\"And I will harden\nPharaoh's heart, that he should not let the people go.\" \"Now therefore\nthe Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy\nprophets.\" \"He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts.\" \"Him,\nbeing delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye\nhave taken, and by wicked hands ye have crucified and slain.\" On these\nand similar passages it may be remarked, that God blinds men and hardens\ntheir hearts judicially, as a just punishment for their abuse of their\nagency. And for this act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does\nnot make them responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree\nof wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to this\nhardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are wicked men\nand lying spirits, they become fit instruments in deceiving and\ntormenting each other; and therefore God gives them power and liberty to\ngo abroad, \"deceiving and being deceived.\" But how does this prove that\nGod hath decreed sin? The idea that God hath made sin and wicked spirits\nthe instruments of hardening and tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and\nfinally of shutting the door of hope against him, has no kind of\naffinity to the idea, that he decreed the sin which occasioned this\nhardness, or ordained the wickedness of this lying spirit.\n\nAs to the passage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus Christ\nwas delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate counsel and\nforeknowledge of God; but it is most emphatically denied, that this or\nany other scripture proves, that the taking and slaying of Jesus Christ\nby wicked hands, was the result of the determinate counsel and\nforeknowledge of God. If any think otherwise, let them prove it.\n\nHaving stated and, as our time would permit, examined the arguments in\nfavour of the sentiment we are opposing, we are prepared to urge against\nthis doctrine, not only that its arguments are unsound and insufficient,\nbut also that the system itself is liable to the most serious and\nformidable objections.\n\n1. This doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin. Some\nacknowledge this, and expressly assert, that God is the \"_efficient_\ncause\" of sin. Others affirm it in fact, while they deny it in word.\nTake for instance the words of Calvin. \"I will not scruple to own,\" he\nsays, \"that the will of God lays a necessity on all things, and that\nevery thing he wills, necessarily comes to pass.\" In accordance with\nthis, Piscator, Dr. Twiss, Peter Martyr and others tell us, that \"God\nprocures adultery, cursings, and lyings\"--\"God is the author of that\nact, which is evil\"--\"God, by his working on the hearts of the wicked,\nbinds them and stirs them to do evil.\" They deny, however, that God is\nthe author of sin, because they say, \"God necessitates them to the\n_act_, and not to the _depravity_ of sin:\" or, that \"God does not sin\nwhen he makes men sin, because _he_ is under no law, and therefore\ncannot sin.\" But these are miserable shifts. Has not the _deformity_ of\nsin come to pass? Then God has decreed this deformity. To deny this, is\nto give up the doctrine. But to acknowledge it, is to own that God is as\nmuch the author of the deformity, as he is of the act. Again, God\ndoubtless decreed that sin should be _sin_, and not _holiness;_ and it\ncame to pass as sin, because it was so decreed. Is he not then the\ndirect procuring cause? A thousand turns of this kind, therefore, are\nnothing but evasions. The _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as certainly\nas it made the world.\n\nWe are often told, when we quote Calvin and his contemporaries, that\nthese are old authors; that modern Calvinists do not hold thus, and that\nthey ought not to be accountable for these writers. But the fact is, we\nmake them accountable only for the logical consequences of their own\ndoctrine. The whole system turns on this hinge, \"God foreordains\nwhatsoever comes to pass.\" For he that, by his will and decree, produces\nand causes sin, that makes sin a necessary part of his plan, and is the\nauthor of the very elements and materials of his own plan, must be the\nproper and sole cause of sin, or we have yet to learn the definition of\ncommon words, and the meaning of plain propositions. The distinction\ntherefore, of _ancient_ and _modern_, of _rigid_ and _moderate_\nCalvinists, is more in word, than in reality. And it would add much to\nthe consistency of this system, if all its advocates would acknowledge,\nwhat is evidently deducible from the premises, that God is the efficient\ncause of sin.\n\n2. This doctrine of predestination destroys the free agency, and of\ncourse the accountability of man. That it destroys free will was seen\nand acknowledged by many predestinarians of the old school. And the\nopposers of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher violently assailed them on this\nsubject. Mr. Southey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that the\nCalvinists called this doctrine of free will, \"a cursed doctrine\"--\"the\nmost God-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine of the day\"--\"one of\nthe prominent features of the beast\"--\"the enemy of God\"--\"the offspring\nof the wicked one\"--\"the insolent brat of hell.\" Others, and the greater\npart of the Calvinists of the present day, endeavour to reconcile the\nideas of _necessity_ and _free agency_. Man, they say, sins voluntarily,\nbecause he chooses or wills to sin; therefore he is a free agent. Hence\nthey exhort sinners to repent, and tell them they can repent if they\nwill. By which they mean, the only impossibility of their repenting, is\nin their will--their _cannot_ is their _will not_. This has led many to\nthink that there is no difference, between their preachers and the\nArminians. But let us look at this subject a little, and see if there is\nnot some sophistry concealed in this dexterous coil of words. God,\naccording to this doctrine, secures the end as well as the means, by his\ndecree of predestination. And therefore, as Calvin says, \"every action\nand motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God.\"\nThe will, therefore, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly\ncontrolled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling\narrangement. It is altogether futile, then, to talk about free agency\nunder such a constitution; the very spring of motion to the whole\nintellectual machinery is under the influence of a secret, invincible\npower. And it _must_ move as that power directs, or it is the hand of\nOmnipotence that urges it on. He _can_ act as he _wills_, it is true,\nbut the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and this is the\nresult of God's propelling power. He wills as he is _made_ to will--he\nchooses as he _must_ choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon\nhim. And can a man, upon the known and universally acknowledged\nprinciples of responsibility, be accountable for such a volition? It is\nargued, I know, that man is responsible, because he _feels_ that he acts\nfreely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that\nthis is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are\nfree--but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath\ndeceived us. He has made us _feel_ that we might do otherwise, but _he\nknows_ we _cannot_--he has _determined_ we _shall not_. So that, in\nfact, this argument makes the system more objectionable. While it does\nnot change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the\nAlmighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man\nis not a free agent, and therefore not responsible. A moral agent, to be\nfree, must be possessed of a self-determining principle. Make the will\nany thing short of this, and you put all the volitions, and of course\nthe whole moral man, under foreign and irresistible influences.\n\n3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose, is, it arrays\nGod's secret decrees against his revealed word. God commands men not to\nsin, and yet ordains that they shall sin, In his word, he sets before\nthem, in striking relief, motives of fear and of hope, for the express\npurpose, as he informs us, \"that they sin not;\" but by his\npredestination and secret counsel, he irresistibly impels them in an\nopposite course, for the express purpose, as this doctrine informs us,\nto secure their transgression. _His_ rule of action is in direct\nopposition to _our_ rule of duty. And yet he is the author of both! Is\nGod at war with himself, or is he sporting and trifling with his\ncreatures? Or is it not more probable than either, that the premises are\nfalse? When or where has God ever taught us, that he has two opposing\nwills? A character so suspicious, to say the least of it, ought not,\nwithout the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed to the adorable\nJehovah. In his word, we are taught, that he is \"of _one_ mind\"--that\nhis \"ways are equal;\" and who can doubt it? We are told, it is true, to\nrelieve the difficulty, that this seeming contradiction is one of the\nmysteries of God's incomprehensible nature. But it is not a _seeming_\ncontradiction, it is a _real_ one; not an insolvable mystery, but a\npalpable absurdity. _God prohibits the sinful act--God ordains and\nprocures the sinful act--God wills the salvation of the reprobate, whom\nhe has from all eternity irreversibly ordained to eternal death!_ When I\ncan embrace such opposite propositions by calling them mysteries, I can\nbelieve that two and two are more than four, that all the parts are less\nthan the whole, and that a thing may be made to exist and not exist at\nthe same time and explain them by a reference to the mystery of God's\nincomprehensible nature.\n\n4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be added,\nthat this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral attributes of\nGod. If he holds men responsible for what is unavoidable--if he makes\nlaws and then impels men to break them, and finally punishes them for\ntheir transgressions--if he mourns over the evils of the world, and\nexpostulates with sinners, saying, \"How can I give thee up--my heart is\nmelted within me, my repentings are kindled together,\"--\"O Jerusalem!\nJerusalem! how oft would I have gathered you, and ye would not,\"--and\nstill he himself \"impels the will of men,\" to all this wickedness--if I\nsay God does all this, where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where\nis his justice? What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant?\nWhat, of the most arrant hypocrite? What, of Satan himself? What does\nthis doctrine make of our heavenly Father? I shudder to follow it out\ninto its legitimate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is enough\nto drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death. If the supporters\nof this system _must_ adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their\neyes against its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them\nwretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical\nand practical errors. Indeed, in many instances it has done this--which\nleads to another objection to this doctrine.\n\n5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in\ntheir sins, and leads to Universalism and infidelity. They reason thus:\nWhatever God decrees is according to his will, and therefore right. And\nGod will not punish his creatures for doing right. Whatever God decrees\nis unavoidable, and God will not punish his creatures for what is\nunavoidable. But \"every action and motion of every creature is governed\nby the hidden counsel of God.\" Therefore God will not punish any of his\ncreatures for any of their acts. Now, who can point out any fallacy in\nthis reasoning? If therefore predestination be true, Universalism is\ntrue, according to the universally acknowledged principles of justice.\nAnd it is a notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is\nprevailing so generally through the country, rests for its chief support\non the doctrine of predestination. Others having seen, as they thought,\nthat the Scriptures would not support the doctrine of Universalism, and\nthat matter of fact seemed to contradict the above reasoning, inasmuch\nas men are made to suffer, even in this life, for their sins, have\nleaped over all Scriptural bounds into infidelity and philosophical\nnecessity. I have personally known numbers who have been driven, by the\ndoctrine we object to, into open infidelity. And it is well known, that\nthe doctrine of fate, which is closely allied to Calvinian\npredestination, is the element in which infidelity \"lives and moves and\nhas its being.\" And can this be the doctrine of the Bible? How much is\nit to be regretted, that our worthy pilgrim fathers should have sowed\nthis Geneva seed in our happy country! The evils done to the Church are\nincalculable.\n\nThese, candid hearers, are some of the objections we have to this\ndoctrine--objections so serious, and, as we think, so obvious, that you\nmay well ask, What has induced good men to advocate it so long? It is,\ndoubtless, because it stands connected intimately with the doctrine of\nunconditional election, and what have been called by Calvinists \"the\ndoctrines of grace.\" But for unconditional election, predestination\nwould not be desired, even by those who now hold to it; and but for\npredestination, unconditional election could not be maintained. Hence\nthese have very properly been called \"twin doctrines,\" and must stand or\nfall together. Let us pass then to the next proposition.\n\nII. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to\nelection.\n\nSeveral kinds of election are spoken of in the Scriptures. There is an\nelection of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by\nGod:--thus Christ was God's elect, for the redemption of the world; and\nCyrus was elected by him to rebuild the temple. There is an election of\nwhole communities and nations to the enjoyment of certain peculiar\nprivileges, political and ecclesiastical, relating of course to this\nlife:--thus Jacob and his descendants were God's chosen people, to the\nenjoyment of religious and national privileges, from which Esau and his\ndescendants, together with the whole Gentile world, were excluded; and\nthus, too, subsequently, the middle wall of partition, made by the\nformer decree of election between Jew and Gentile, being broken down,\nthe Gentiles became equal sharers with the Jews in the privileges of the\nnew covenant, called the \"election of grace.\" This election is\nunconditional, and is believed to be the one spoken of in our text, and\nmany other passages of Scripture. Of these, however, I shall speak more\nparticularly in another place.\n\nThere is a third election--an election unto eternal life, and this is\nthe one which has given rise to the great controversy in the\nChurch.--Those who contend for predestination, as objected to by us,\nmaintain that, \"By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his\nglory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and\nothers foreordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind that are\npredestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world, hath\nchosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, _without any foresight of\nfaith or good works_.\" Others, and this also is our doctrine, hold that\n\"God did decree from the beginning, to elect, or choose in Christ, all\nthat should believe unto salvation, and this decree proceeds from his\nown goodness, and is not built on any goodness of the creature; and that\nGod did from the beginning decree to reprobate all who should finally\nand obstinately continue in unbelief.\" Thus it is seen, from the\nstatement of the two doctrines, that ours is an election of character,\nand so far as it relates to individuals, it relates to them only as they\nare foreseen to possess that character; whereas the other relates\ndirectly to individuals, without any reference to character. It is an\nabsolute act of sovereignty--God elects them for no other reason or\ncondition than because he chooses. He makes no account of man's agency\nor responsibility in this decree of election, but it precedes and is\nentirely independent of any knowledge of the character of the elect. Our\nviews of election, on the contrary, make it conditionally dependent on\nthe responsible agency of man. In the one case, the sinner is made to\nreceive Christ, because he is elected; and in the other, he is elected,\nbecause he receives Christ. From this difference, too, proceed other\ndifferences. The Calvinistic election, to be consistent with itself,\nrequires that, as the end is arbitrarily fixed, so the means must be\nalso--hence the doctrines of irresistible grace, effectual calling, and\ninfallible perseverance. Calvinian election, therefore, stands\nintimately allied to Calvinian predestination; and the whole forms a\nchain of doctrines differing materially from ours. And here we\nacknowledge we have a position to prove as well as our opponents. We\nassert that election to eternal life is conditional; they, that it is\nunconditional. We will first attempt to prove our position--then state\nand answer the arguments in favour of unconditional election--and\nfinally, urge some objections against unconditional election and\nreprobation.\n\n1. Our first argument in favour of conditional election to eternal life,\nis drawn from the position already established, that the decrees of God\nare predicated on his foreknowledge. And especially, that the decree of\nelection to salvation, according to the Scriptures, is founded on the\nDivine prescience. \"Elect according to the foreknowledge of God, through\nsanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood\nof Jesus Christ.\" \"Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be\nconformed to the image of his Son.\" These scriptures seem to us\ndecisive, that the decree of election rests on foreknowledge, and that\nthis election is made, not according to the arbitrary act of God, but on\nthe ground of sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore,\nthat men are predestinated to eternal life, \"without any foresight of\nfaith or good works,\" must be false.\n\n2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, can\nonly exist in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free\nmoral agent. The Scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, man must\nbelieve and obey; and hence they command and exhort men to believe and\nobey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if they do this, and\ncriminate them, if they neglect it. But, according to the doctrine of\nfree agency already explained, man's obedience or disobedience, if it\nhas any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest, in its\nresponsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will.\nAnd if this view of the will be correct, there is an _utter\nimpossibility_ of an unconditional election. For the very act of God,\nimparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible,\nin the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral\nagent, unconditionally. The argument stands thus--The Scriptures make\nman a responsible moral agent; but this he cannot be, if his will be\ncontrolled by foreign and unavoidable influences, therefore it is not so\ncontrolled: that is, man has within himself a self-determining\nprinciple, in the exercise of which he becomes responsible. This being\nestablished, we argue again--The doctrine of unconditional election\nnecessarily implies irresistible grace, absolutely impelling and\ncontrolling the will. But this would be to counteract God's own work,\nand to destroy man's accountability; therefore there is no such\nirresistible grace, and, of course, no such unconditional election. And\nsince there is an election to eternal life, spoken of in the Scriptures,\nit follows conclusively, if the foregoing reasoning be sound, that this\nelection is conditional.--Hence we may bring forward, in one\noverwhelming argument, all the numerous and various Bible conditions of\nsalvation, as so many Scripture proofs of a conditional election.\n\n3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger, and\nthe possibility of their being lost, are so many Scripture proofs of a\nconditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted \"to take heed\nlest they fall?\" \"lest there be in them an evil heart of unbelief, in\ndeparting from the living God?\" \"lest a promise being left of entering\ninto rest, any should come short?\" lest _they_ should \"also be cut off?\"\nWhy should St. Paul fear lest, after having preached to others, he\nshould be a castaway? Either there is, or is not, danger of the elect's\nbeing lost. If not, then all these passages are not only without\nmeaning, but savour very strongly of deception. They are false colours\nheld out to the elect, for the purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear\nis. Will it be said, that possibly some of those addressed were not of\nthe elect, and were therefore deceiving themselves, and needed to be\ncautioned and warned? I answer, they had then nothing to fall from, and\nno promise of which to come short. Besides, to warn such to _stand\nfast_, seems to imply, that the Holy Spirit cautioned the reprobates\nagainst the danger of becoming the elect, which idea, while it intimates\na very ungracious work for the \"Spirit of grace\" to be engaged in,\nclearly indicates, that there was danger of breaking the decree of\nreprobation! We ask again, therefore, What do these scriptures mean?\nWill it be said, as some have argued, that these warnings and cautions\nare all consistent, because they are the very means by which the decree\nof election is made sure? But let it be understood, that the end is\nfixed, before the means; because Calvinism tells us, that this election\nis \"independent of any faith or good works foreseen,\" and that \"God's\ndecree lays a necessity on all things, so that every thing he wills\nnecessarily comes to pass,\" and is therefore sure, \"because he has\ndecreed it.\" The moment, therefore, God decrees an event, it becomes\nsure, and to talk of danger of a failure in that event, implies either a\nfalsehood, or that God's decree can be _broken_. But Calvinists, I\npresume, will not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or\nfrustrating the plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the\nelect's coming short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions, and\nwarnings therefore, recorded in the Scriptures, are false colours and\ndeceptive motives. They are like the attempts of some weak parents, who\nundertake to frighten their children into obedience, by superstitious\ntales and groundless fears. God knows, when he is giving out these\nintimations of danger, that there is no such danger; his own eternal,\nunchangeable decree had secured their salvation before the means were\nplanned--all this if election is unconditional. But far be this from a\nGod of truth. If he exhorts his creatures to \"make their election sure,\"\n_he_ has not made it sure.--If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail\nof the grace of God, there is doubtless real danger. The conclusion\ntherefore is irresistible, that Cod hath suspended his decree of\nelection to eternal life, on conditions; \"He that believeth: shall be\nsaved.\"\n\n4. This accords also with Christian experience. What is it that produces\nmuch fear and trembling in the mind of the awakened sinner? Why does he\nfeel that there is but a step between him and destruction? Is it fancy,\nor is it fact? If it is imagination merely, then all his alarm is\nfounded in deception, and he has either deceived himself, or the Spirit\nof God hath deceived him. In either case, this alarm seems necessary, in\norder to lead him to Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conversion\nof one of the elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be said,\nthat it is no lie, for he is really in danger, then we reply again, the\ndecree of God hath not made his election sure, and of course, therefore,\nit is conditional.\n\n5. Express passages of Scripture teach a conditional election. We have\ntime only to notice a few of them. Matt. xxii, 14, \"For many are called,\nbut few are chosen.\" This passage, with the parable of the wedding that\nprecedes it, teaches that the _choice_ was made subsequently to the\ncall, and was grounded on the fact, that those chosen had actually and\nfully complied with the invitation, and had come to the wedding duly\nprepared. John xv, 19, \"If ye were of the world, the world would love\nyou, but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of\nthe world, therefore the world hateth you.\" This passage teaches that\nChrist's disciples were once of the world, and that he had chosen them\nout of the world, and this _choice_ evidently refers to that time when\nthey became of a different character from the world; for then it was,\nand in consequence of that election, that the world hated them.--2\nThess. ii, 13, \"Because God hath from the beginning, _chosen_ you to\nsalvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the\ntruth.\" Here is a condition plainly expressed. This is not an election\n_unto_ sanctification, but an election _through_ or _by_ sanctification\nand faith unto salvation.\n\nFrom the whole then it appears, that the Holy Scriptures, the Divine\nattributes and government, and the agency of man, stand opposed to an\nunconditional, and are in favour of a conditional election.\n\nIn opposition to these arguments, however, and in favour of\nunconditional election, our opponents urge various scriptures, which, as\nthey think, are strong and incontrovertible arguments in favour of their\nsystem. And as these scriptures are their strong and only defence, it is\nproposed that they should be noticed. The limits of this discourse,\nhowever, will admit of but a short notice, and that not of individual\ntexts, but of classes of texts.\n\n1. The first class of passages that we will now examine, which are\nsupposed to favour the idea of unconditional election, is those that\nspeak of a predestination _unto_ holiness. Our text is one of the\nstrongest instances of this kind, \"He hath chosen us from the foundation\nof the world, that we should be holy--having predestinated us unto the\nadoption of sons,\" &c. See also Rom. viii, 29, \"For whom he did\nforeknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his\nSon,\" and \"whom he did predestinate--he called--justified--and\nsanctified.\" The argument upon these and similar passages is, that the\ndecree of predestination could not be founded on their faith or\nholiness; because they were predestinated to _become_ holy--the decree\nof predestination had their holiness for its object and end. But if\nthese passages had an allusion to a personal election to eternal life,\nthey would not prove unconditional election, \"because,\" to use the\nlanguage of another, \"it would admit of being questioned, whether the\nchoosing in Christ, before the foundation of the world here mentioned,\nwas a choice of certain persons _as men merely_, or as _believing_ men,\nwhich is certainly the most rational.\" This exposition must necessarily\nbe given to the passage from the Romans, since those who were the\nsubjects of predestination, were first _foreknown_: foreknown, not\nmerely as existing, for in this sense _all_ were foreknown, but\nforeknown, as possessing something which operated as a reason why _they_\nshould be elected, rather than others: foreknown doubtless as believers\nin Christ, and as such, according to the plan and decree of God, they\nwere to be made conformable to the image of Christ's holiness here, and\nglory hereafter. And according to the same Divine plan, the order of\nthis work was, 1. The call; 2. Justification; 3. Glorification. And this\ninterpretation, which so obviously upon the face of it is the meaning of\nthe passage from Romans, would also be a good meaning to the passage in\nEphesians, if that passage should be understood in reference to personal\nelection. But I do not so understand it; and I think any unprejudiced\nreader, by looking at the context, and especially from the 9th to the\n11th verses inclusive, in this chapter, and at most of the 2d chapter,\nwill perceive that the apostle is here speaking of that general plan of\nGod, which had been fixed from the beginning, of admitting the Gentiles\nas well as the Jews to the privileges of the covenant of grace, on equal\nterms and conditions. Thus the middle wall of partition was to be broken\ndown between Jew and Gentile; and this was the mystery which was\nconcealed for ages, not being understood even by the Jews themselves,\nbut then by the Gospel was brought to light. According to this plan, the\nEphesians and all other Gentiles were chosen or elected to these\nChristian privileges, the very design and purpose of which were to make\nthem holy; and in the improvement of which, according to the prescribed\nconditions of faith in Christ, and repentance toward God, they should\nbecome his adopted children.\n\nThis fore appointing of the Gentiles to the privileges of the gracious\ncovenant, is the election most spoken of in the New Testament.--And the\nreason why it was so often introduced, especially in the writings of\nPaul, who was the chief apostle to the Gentiles, was, because the Jews\nso uniformly and earnestly opposed this feature of Christianity. They\ncould not be reconciled to the idea, that the peculiar and distinctive\ncharacter of their theocracy and ecclesiastical policy should be so\nchanged, or that the dealings of God with the world should be explained\nin such a manner as to give _them_ no superior claims, in the privileges\nof the Divine covenant, over the Gentiles. They considered themselves to\nbe God's elect and favourite people, but the Gentiles were reprobates.\nThe apostles felt themselves under the strongest obligations to oppose\nthese notions, not only because, if allowed, they would operate as a\nbarrier to the diffusion of the Gospel among the heathens, and thus the\ndesigns of Divine mercy to the world would be thwarted, but also because\nthese Jewish sentiments were in direct opposition to the grace of God.\nThey implied, that the original design of God in favouring the Jews, was\nfounded, not upon his mere mercy and grace, but upon some goodness in\nthem or their fathers. Hence they not only limited the blessings of the\nGospel, but they also corrupted its gracious character, and thereby fed\ntheir own Pharisaic pride, and dishonoured God. This will open the way\nfor explaining many other scriptures which the Calvinists press into\ntheir service.\n\n2. Especially will it assist in explaining those passages which speak of\nelection as depending solely on the sovereign will of God. The strongest\nof these are in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. This\nportion of revelation is the strong hold, as is supposed, of Calvinism.\nWhereas, we humbly conceive that _there is not one word_ in the whole\nchapter, of unconditional and personal election to eternal life. It is\nonly necessary to read that epistle carefully, to see that the apostle\nis combatting that exclusive and Pharisaic doctrine of the Jews, already\nalluded to, and is proving in a forcible strain of argumentation, from\nreason and Scripture, that the foundation of the plan of salvation for\nsinners, was the goodness and unmerited love of God--that all, both Jews\nand Gentiles, were sinners, and therefore stood in the same relation to\nGod--all equally eligible to salvation, and must, if saved at all, be\nsaved on the same terms. To prove this, he argues strenuously, that\nGod's favour to the Jews, as a nation, was not of any goodness in them,\nbut of his own sovereign will and pleasure, so that his covenant of\nfavour with the Hebrews, and his covenant of grace which embraced the\nGentiles, was \"not of works, lest any man should boast,\" \"not of him\nthat willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.\"\nThe apostle shows them, too, that the covenant made with Abraham was not\nfor circumcision, nor for the works of the law, so far as it affected\nhim or his posterity, because it was made while Abraham was in\nuncircumcision, and on the condition of faith. He argues farther, that\nthis election of the Jews to the enjoyment of these national and\necclesiastical privileges, was not because they were children of\nAbraham, for Ishmael was a child of Abraham, and yet he and his\nposterity were rejected; nor yet because they were the children of\nAbraham through Isaac, because Esau and his posterity were reprobated\nfrom these national privileges, while Jacob and his posterity were the\nchosen seed--not chosen to eternal life, because many of them perished\nin sin and unbelief, but to the peculiar privileges of God's covenant\npeople. And all this because it was the good pleasure of his will. And\nas a sovereign, he had the same right to elect the Gentiles to the\nenjoyment of the covenant of mercy, and upon the same conditions of\nfaith. The apostle concludes this reasoning by an argument which cuts\noff entirely the idea of unconditional personal election and\nreprobation. He informs us, that the reason why the unbelieving Jews did\nnot attain to personal righteousness, was \"because they sought it not by\nfaith, but as it were by the works of the law;\" and the Gentiles\nattained to personal righteousness, because they sought it by faith.\nHence, those that were not his people, became his people, and those that\nwere not beloved, became beloved--and these, \"not of the Jews only, but\nalso of the Gentiles.\" Whereas, if the doctrine we oppose be true, the\nelect were _always_ his people, and _always_ beloved, and that because\nhe pleased to have it so. That portion of Scripture, therefore, on which\nCalvinism leans for its greatest support, not only affords it no aid,\nbut actually teaches a different doctrine. There is indeed something of\nmystery hanging over the providence of God, in bestowing peculiar\nadvantages on some, and withholding them from others. But on this\nsubject much light is cast from various considerations which we have not\ntime to enlarge upon; but especially from that wholesome and consistent\nScripture doctrine, that \"it is required of a man according to what he\nhath, and not according to what he hath not.\" This removes at once all\ncomplaint of Jew and Gentile, and authorizes the reply, so often\nmisapplied, \"Who art thou that repliest against God?\" As a sovereign,\nGod has a right to make his creatures differ in these things, so long as\nhe requires only as he gives. But this differs as widely from the\nCalvinistic idea of sovereignty, as _justice_ from _injustice_, as\n_equity_ from _iniquity_. In fact, God no where in the Scripture, places\nthe election of individuals to eternal life, solely on the ground of his\nsovereignty, but uniformly on the ground of their complying with the\nconditions of the covenant of grace. Hence his people are a _peculiar\npeople_--his sheep _hear his voice and follow him_--they are _chosen out\nof the world_--they are _in Christ_, not by an eternal decree of\nelection, but _by faith_--for \"if any man be _in Christ_, he is a _new\ncreature_\"--and of course, he is not _in him_, until he is a \"new\ncreature\"--then, and not before, they become his, and he seals them as\nsuch, \"In whom, _after that ye believed_, ye were sealed with the Holy\nSpirit of promise.\" But if they were elected from eternity, they would\nbe his when they did not _hear his voice_, and were not _new creatures_.\n\n3. From what has been said, we can easily answer a third class of\nscriptures which the Calvinists dwell upon to support their system\n--viz, those which declare salvation to be of _grace_ and not of\n_works_. Of these there is evidently a large catalogue of very express\nand unequivocal passages. Take two or three for an example of the whole,\n\"Even so then, at the present time, there is a remnant, according to the\nelection of grace, and if it be by grace then it is no more of works,\notherwise grace is no more grace; but if it be of works, then it is no\nmore grace, otherwise work is no more work.\" \"By grace ye are saved.\"\n\"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of his children, &c, to the\npraise of the glory of his grace.\" \"Not by works of righteousness which\nwe have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of\nregeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost.\" Now we profess to believe\nthese scriptures as unqualifiedly and as cordially as the Calvinists;\nand we think them perfectly in accordance with our views of election.\nFor we believe, as has been already stated, that God's plan for saving\nsinners originated entirely in his love to his undeserving creatures.\nThere was nothing in all the character and circumstances of the fallen\nfamily, except their sin and deserved misery, that could claim the\ninterposition of God's saving power. The way of executing his gracious\nplan, and rendering it available in any case, he of course, as a\nsovereign, reserved to himself. And if he saw that a conditional\nelection was best suited to the principles of his government, and the\nresponsibility of man, shall it be said, this cannot be, for it destroys\nthe idea of grace? _Cannot_ a conditional election be of grace? Let the\nintelligent and candid answer. Even many of the Calvinists acknowledge\nthat _salvation_ is conditional, and yet it is of grace; for \"by grace\nye are saved.\" Now if salvation is conditional and yet of grace, why not\nelection? Let Calvinists answer this question.\n\nBut that our doctrine of election is of grace, will appear evident, I\nthink, from the following considerations. 1. It was pure unmerited love\nthat moved God to provide salvation for our world. 2. The Gospel plan,\ntherefore, with all its _provisions_ and _conditions_, is of grace. Not\na step in that whole system, but rests in grace, is presented by grace,\nand is executed through grace. 3. Even the power of the will to choose\nlife, and the conditions of life, is a _gracious power_. A fallen man,\nwithout grace, could no more choose to submit to God than a fallen\nangel. Herein we differ widely from the Calvinists. They tell us man has\na _natural_ power to choose life. If so, he has power to get to heaven\nwithout grace! We say, on the contrary, that man is utterly unable to\nchoose the way to heaven, or to pursue it when chosen, without the grace\nof God. It is grace that enlightens and convinces the sinner, and\nstrengthens him to seek after and obtain salvation, for \"without Christ\nwe _can do nothing_.\" Let the candid judge between us, then, and decide\nwhich system most robs our gracious Redeemer of his glory, that which\ngives man a _native_ and _inherent_ power to get to heaven of himself,\nor that which attributes all to grace. 4. Finally, when the sinner\nrepents and believes, there is no merit in these acts to procure\nforgiveness and regeneration, and therefore, though he is _now_, and _on\nthese conditions_, elected, and made an heir of salvation, yet it is for\nChrist's sake, and \"not for works of righteousness which he has done.\"\nThus we \"bring forth the top stone with shouting, crying _grace_,\n_grace_, unto it.\" Having gone over and examined the arguments in favour\nof unconditional election, we come to the last part of our subject;\nwhich was to urge some objections against this doctrine.\n\n1. The doctrine of the unconditional election of a part, necessarily\nimplies the unconditional reprobation of the rest. I know some who hold\nto the former, seem to deny the latter; for they represent God as\nreprobating sinners, in view of their sins. When all were sinners, they\nsay God passed by some, and elected others. Hence, they say the decree\nof damnation against the reprobates is just, because it is against\n_sinners_. But this explanation is virtually giving up the system,\ninasmuch as it gives up all the principal arguments by which it is\nsupported. In the first place, it makes predestination dependent on\nforeknowledge; for God first foresees that they will be sinners, and\nthen predestinates them to punishment. Here is one case then, in which\nthe argument for Calvinian predestination is destroyed by its own\nsupporters. But again if God must fix by his decree all parts of his\nplan, in order to prevent disappointment, then he must fix the destiny\nof the reprobates, and the means that lead to it. But if he did not do\nthis, then the Calvinistic argument in favour of predestination, drawn\nfrom the Divine plan, falls to the ground. Once more: this explanation\nof the decree of reprobation destroys all the strongest Scripture\narguments which the Calvinists urge in favour of unconditional election.\nThe passages, for instance, in the ninth of Romans, which are so often\nquoted in favour of Calvinian election, are connected with others,\nequally strong, in favour of unconditional reprobation. When it is said,\n\"He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy,\" it is said also, \"Whom\nhe will he hardeneth.\" He that \"makes one vessel unto honour, maketh\nanother unto dishonour.\" He that says, \"Jacob have I loved,\" says also\nin the same manner, \"Esau have I hated.\" Now if these relate to personal\nelection to eternal life, they relate also to personal reprobation to\neternal death. But if there is any explanation, by which these are\nshowed not to prove unconditional reprobation to eternal death, the same\nprinciple of explanation will, and _must_ show, that they do not prove\nCalvinistic election. From henceforth, therefore, let all those\nCalvinists who profess not to believe in unconditional reprobation,\ncease to urge, in favour of their system, any arguments drawn from the\nforeknowledge of God, or the necessity of a Divine plan, or from those\nscriptures that are most commonly quoted in favour of their doctrine.\nBut when they do this, their system must necessarily fall; for all its\nmain pillars will be removed. But I have not done with this objection\nyet. Whoever maintains that \"God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to\npass,\" must also hold to unconditional reprobation. Does it come to\npass, that some are lost? Then this was ordained. Was sin necessary, as\na pretence to damn them? Then this was ordained. From these and other\nviews of the subject, Calvin was led to say, that \"election could not\nstand without reprobation,\" and that it was \"quite silly and childish\"\nto attempt to separate them. All, therefore, who hold to the\nunconditional election of a part of mankind to eternal life, _must_, to\nbe consistent with themselves, take into their creed, the \"horrible\ndecree\" of reprobation.--They must believe that in the ages of eternity\nGod determined to create men and angels for the express purpose to damn\nthem eternally! That he determined to introduce sin, and influence men\nto commit sin, and harden them in it, that they might be fit subjects of\nhis wrath! That for doing as they were impelled to do, by the\nirresistible decree of Jehovah, they must lie down for ever, under the\nscalding phials of his vengeance in the pit of hell! To state this\ndoctrine in its true character, is enough to chill one's blood--and we\nare drawn by all that is rational within us, to turn away from such a\nGod with horror, as from the presence of an Almighty Tyrant.\n\n2. This doctrine of election, while it professes to vindicate free grace\nand the mercy of God, destroys them altogether. To the reprobates, there\nis certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very existence, connected\nas it necessarily is with eternal damnation, is an infinite curse. The\ntemporal blessings which they enjoy, the insincere offers that are held\nout to them, and the Gospel privileges with which they are mocked, if\nthey can be termed grace at all, must be called _damning grace_. For all\nthis is only fattening them for the slaughter, and fitting them to\nsuffer, to a more aggravated extent, the unavoidable pains and torments\nthat await them. Hence Calvin's sentiment, that \"God calls to the\nreprobates, that they may be more deaf--kindles a light, that they may\nbe more blind--brings his doctrine to them, that they may be more\nignorant--and applies the remedy to them, that they may not be healed,\"\nis an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of this system. Surely,\nthen, no one will pretend, that, according to this doctrine, there is\nany grace for the reprobate. And perhaps a moment's attention will show,\nthat there is little or none for the elect. It is said, that God, out of\nhis mere sovereignty, without any thing in the creature to move him\nthereto, elects sinners to everlasting life. But if there is nothing in\nthe creature to move him thereto, how can it be called _mercy_ or\n_compassion?_ He did not determine to elect them because they were\nmiserable, but because he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the\nexciting cause, then as all were equally miserable, he would have\nelected them all. Is such a decree of election founded in love to the\nsuffering object? No: _it is the result of the most absolute and\nomnipotent selfishness conceivable_. It is the exhibition of a character\nthat sports most sovereignly and arbitrarily, with his Almighty power,\n_to create, to damn, and to save_.\n\nSome indeed pretend that, at any rate, _salvation_ is of grace, if\nelection is not, because God saves _miserable_, _perishing_ sinners. But\nwho made them miserable perishing sinners? Was not this the effect of\nGod's decree? And is there much mercy displayed in placing men under a\nconstitution which necessarily and unavoidably involves them in sin and\nsuffering, that God may afterward have the sovereign honour of saving\nthem? Surely the _tenderest_ mercies of this system are cruel--its\nbrightest parts are dark--its boasted mercy hardly comes up to sheer\njustice, even to the elect; since they only receive back what God had\ndeprived them of, and for the want of which they had suffered perhaps\nfor years; and to obtain which, they could do nothing even as a\ncondition, until God by his sovereign power bestowed it upon them. And\nas for the reprobates, the Gospel is unavoidably to them, a savour of\ndeath unto death. To them Christ came, that they might have death, and\nthat they might have it more abundantly. Thus, turn this system as you\nwill, it sweeps away the mercy and goodness of God, destroys the grace\nof the Gospel, and in most cases, transforms even the invitations and\npromises into scalding messages of aggravated wrath.\n\n3. The doctrine we oppose makes God partial and a respecter of persons;\ncontrary to express and repeated declarations of Scripture. For it\nrepresents God as determining to save some and damn others, without\nreference to their character, all being precisely in the same state. To\ndeny this, is to acknowledge that the decree of election and reprobation\nhad respect to character, which is to give up the doctrine. Some indeed\npretend, that the decree of election was unconditional, but not the\ndecree of reprobation. But this is impossible; for there could be no\ndecree of election, only in view of the whole number from which the\nchoice was to be made; and the very determination to select such a\nnumber, and those only, implied the exclusion of all the rest. If it be\nsaid, as the Sublapsarians contend, that the decree of election did not\ncome in until all were fallen, or viewed in the mind of God as fallen;\nand therefore since all might have been justly damned, there was no\ninjustice to those who were left, though some of the guilty were taken\nand saved; we reply, That even this would not wholly remove the\nobjection of partiality. But we need not dwell here, because we have a\nshorter and more decisive way to dispose of this argument. The truth is,\nit does not cover the whole ground of our objection. Had God nothing to\ndo with man until his prescient eye beheld the whole race in a ruined\nstate? How came man in this state? He was plunged there by the sin of\nhis federal head. But how came _he_ to sin? \"Adam sinned,\" says Calvin,\n\"because God so ordained.\" And so every one must say, that believes God\nforeordained whatsoever comes to pass. Taking all the links together,\nthey stand thus:--God decreed to create intelligent beings--he decreed\nthat they should all become sinners and children of wrath--and it was\nso. He then decreed that part of those whom he had constituted heirs of\nwrath, should be taken, and washed, and saved, and the others left to\nperish; and then we are told there is no unjust partiality in God, since\nthey all deserve to be damned! What a singular evasion is this! God\nwishes to damn a certain portion of his creatures, and save the rest;\nbut he cannot do this without subjecting himself to the charge of\npartiality. To avoid this, he plunges them all into sin and ruin, and\nforthwith he declares them all children of wrath, and heirs of hell. But\nin the plenitude of his grace, he snatches some from the pit of ruin,\nand leaves the rest in remediless wo! Is such a supposition worthy of\nour righteous God?--Does it accord either with his justice or wisdom?\nReason, with half an eye, can see through the flimsy veil, and discover\nthe weakness of the device. I know an attempt has been often made to\ncharge these consequences upon our system, as well as upon the\nCalvinistic doctrine. For if it is acknowledged that man is born\ndepraved, and this depravity is damning in its nature, does it not\nfollow, it is asked, that all deserve to perish? And therefore God may\nelect some and justly pass by the rest. I answer--Although all moral\ndepravity, derived or contracted, is damning in its nature, still, by\nvirtue of the atonement, the destructive effects of derived depravity\nare counteracted; and guilt is not imputed, until by a voluntary\nrejection of the Gospel remedy, man makes the depravity of his nature\nthe object of his own choice.--Hence, although abstractly considered,\nthis depravity is destructive to the possessors, yet through the grace\nof the Gospel, _all_ are born free from condemnation. So the Apostle\nPaul, \"As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to\ncondemnation, so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon\nall men, unto justification of life.\" In accordance with these views\nalso, the ground of condemnation, according to the Scriptures, is not\nour native depravity; but the sinner is condemned for _rejecting\nChrist_,--for _refusing_ to occupy upon the _talents given_,--for\n_rejecting light_,--for _quenching the Spirit_,--for _unbelief_. Here\nthen is the difference on this point between the Calvinists and us. They\nhold that God, by his decree, plunged Adam and all his race into the pit\nof sin, from which none of them had the means of escape; but by an\nomnipotent act of partial grace, he delivers a part, and the remainder\nare left unavoidably to perish. We, on the contrary, believe that by\nAdam's unnecessitated sin he, and in him all his posterity, became\nobnoxious to the curse of the Divine law. As the first man sinned\npersonally and actively, he was personally condemned; but as his\nposterity had no agency or personal existence, they could only have\nperished seminally in him. By the promise of a Saviour however, our\nfederal head was restored to the possibility of obtaining salvation,\nthrough faith in the Redeemer. And in this restoration, _all_ the\nseminal generations of men were included. Their possible and prospective\nexistence was restored; and their personal and active existence secured.\nAnd with this also, the possibility of salvation was secured to all. To\nsuch as never come to a personally responsible age, this salvation was\nsecured unconditionally by Christ; to _all_ those who arrived to the age\nof accountability, salvation was made possible, on equal and impartial\nconditions. Thus, while on our principle, there is not the slightest\nground for a charge of partiality; on the Calvinistic principle, the\ncharge seems to lie with all its weight. It makes God, in the worst\nsense of the terms, _partial, and a respecter of persons_.\n\n4. This doctrine is objectionable, because, contrary to express and\nrepeated passages of Scripture, it necessarily limits the atonement. It\nwill surely not be expected, that we should attempt to prove that Christ\n\"tasted death for every man\"--that he \"gave himself a ransom for\nall\"--that he \"died for all\"--that he became \"a propitiation for the\nsins of the whole world\"--because, these are so many express Scripture\npropositions, and rest directly on the authority of God. And while these\nstand, the doctrine of particular and unconditional election must fall,\nfor the two doctrines are incompatible. That particular election and\npartial redemption must stand or fall together, has been acknowledged,\nand is still maintained by most Calvinists; and therefore they have\nendeavoured to explain away those passages, which so clearly declare\nthat \"Christ died for all.\" But in this work they have found so many\ndifficulties, that others, and among them most of the Calvinistic clergy\nin New-England, have acknowledged a general redemption, and have\nundertaken to reconcile with it the doctrine of particular election and\nreprobation. But this reconciliation is as difficult as the other. To\nsay nothing now of the utter uselessness of making an atonement for the\nreprobates, unless for the purpose of making their unavoidable damnation\nmore aggravated, we would ask, What is the object of the atonement? Let\nthese very Calvinists themselves answer. They tell us, that its object\nwas, to open the way, by which it might be possible for sinners to be\nsaved. But has the atonement made it possible for the reprobates to be\nsaved? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and therefore the idea of\nunconditional election and reprobation is false. But if the atonement\nhas only made it possible for the elect to be saved, then it was made\nonly for the elect. Let the supporters of this system choose which horn\nof this dilemma they please; either will destroy their doctrine. For as\nit is absurd to talk about redeeming grace and Gospel provisions,\n_sufficient_ to save those who are eternally and effectually excluded\nfrom these blessings, so it is idle to talk about a redemption for\n_all_, which includes provisions sufficient only to save the _elect_.\nNot even the fiction of a _natural ability_ in all men to serve God and\nget to heaven, will help this difficulty. For allowing, in the argument,\nthat the reprobates have ability to serve God and gain heaven, without\ngrace, and in spite of God's decree, still, as this is called a\n_natural_ ability, it is plain it is not the fruit of the atonement. It\nis equally irrelevant to argue that the atonement may be said to be\nuniversal, because it contains enough to save the whole world, if they\nwould or could embrace it, and it is only their excessive depravity\nwhich renders it impossible for them to receive the atonement. For this\nis the same as to say, that a physician has an efficient remedy to heal\nhis patient, only he is so sick he cannot take it. This excessive\nweakness is that for which the physician should prescribe, and to which\nthe medicine should be applied. And if it does not come to this it is no\nmedicine for this case. So the atonement, if it is not a remedy for\nman's extreme depravity, it is no provision for him. If it does not give\na gracious power to all sinners to embrace salvation, it has\naccomplished nothing for the depraved reprobate. Since, therefore,\naccording to Calvinism, the atonement provides for the reprobate neither\nnatural nor moral ability to serve God, nor makes it possible for him to\nbe saved, it follows, that the atonement is made only for the elect. But\nas this is contrary to the word of God, the doctrine that leads to this\nconclusion must be false.\n\n5. If time would permit, I might here notice at some length several\nobjections to this doctrine:--Such as that it takes away all motives to\nrepentance, by giving the sinner just cause to say, \"If I am to be\nsaved, I shall be, do what I may; and if I am to be damned, I must be,\ndo what I can;\"--it leads to the idea of infant damnation--it weakens\nthe zeal and paralyzes The efforts of devotion and benevolence--it\ndestroys the end of punishment, the original design of which was to\nprevent sin, but which, according to this doctrine, was designed merely\nfor the glory of God; and sin was ordained for the purpose of giving God\nan opportunity of glorifying himself in punishing it. These and others\nmight be dwelt upon with effect; but passing them all, I hasten to the\nconclusion of my arguments, by urging only one more objection to the\nsystem I am opposing.\n\n6. We are suspicious of this doctrine, because its advocates themselves\nseem studious to cover up and keep out of sight many of its features,\nand are constantly changing their manner of stating and defending their\nsystem. A little attention to the history of the controversy between\npredestinarians and their opposers, will show the truth and force of\nthis objection. The charge that Calvinism covers up and keeps out of\nsight some of its most offensive features, does not lie so much against\nits advocates of the old school, as those of the modern. With the\nexception of some logical consequences, which we think chargeable upon\nthe system, and which they were unwilling to allow, these early\ndefenders of unconditional election came out boldly and fearlessly with\ntheir doctrine. If modern Calvinists would do the same, we should need\nno other refutation of the system. But even the early supporters of\nCalvinism, when pressed by their opponents, resorted to various forms of\nexplanation and modes of proof, and also to various modifications of the\nsystem itself. Goodwin, in his work entitled, \"Agreement of Brethren,\"\n&c, says:--\"The question, as to the object of the decrees, has gone out\namong our Calvinistic brethren into endless digladiations and\nirreconcilable divisions,\" and then goes on to mention nine of these\n\"irreconcilable divisions\" that prevailed at his day. At the present day\nthese school subtleties are not so prevalent, but numerous changes of a\nmore popular cast, and such as are suited to cover up the offensive\nfeatures of the system, are now introduced. The modern defence of this\ndoctrine consists chiefly in the dexterous use of certain ambiguous\ntechnicalities which, in this theology, mean one thing, and in common\nlanguage another. And this is carried to such an extent, that it is now\na common thing to hear parishioners contend strenuously that their\npastors do not hold to predestination, when it is well known to some, at\nleast, that they do; and that they are exerting themselves to spread the\nsentiment.\n\nThis is a subject, permit me here to say, on which I touch with more\nreluctance than upon any other point involved in this controversy. To\nrepresent the thing as it is, seems so much like accusing our brethren\nof insincerity and duplicity, that nothing but a regard to truth would\ninduce me to allude to it. Whether this arises from an excessive but\nhonest zeal for their system, or whether it is supposed the cause is so\nimportant, and at the same time so difficult to be sustained, that the\nend will justify what, in other cases, would be judged questionable\npolicy, and hardly reconcilable with the spirit of a guileless\nChristianity, is certainly not for me to decide. With respect to their\nmotives, they will stand or fall by the judgment of Him that trieth the\nreins. But the course, at any rate, seems very reprehensible. Take one\ninstance:--All sinners, we are told, may come to Christ _if they will;_\nand therefore they are criminal if they do not.--Now this mode of speech\ncorresponds very well with Scripture and reason. And who, that had not\nbeen specially instructed in the dialect of this theology, would\nunderstand that this mode of speech, according to Hopkinsian technics,\nimplied an inability and an impossibility of obtaining salvation? And\nyet this is the fact: for though, according to this system, if we have a\nwill to come to Christ, we _may_, yet by a _Divine constitution_ it is\nas much impossible to have this will as it is to break the decree of\nJehovah,--Hence all such modes of speech are worse than unmeaning; they\nhave a deceptive meaning. They mean one thing in this creed, and another\nthing in popular language. It never occurs to the generality of mankind,\nwhen they are told they may do thus and thus, _if they will_, that there\nis a secret omnipotent influence impelling and controlling the will.\nThey suppose these expressions, therefore, mean that, independent of all\nirresistible foreign influences, they have, within themselves, the power\nto choose or not to choose: and yet the real meaning of the speaker\ndiffers as much from this, as a negative differs from an affirmative.\n\nIn perfect accordance with the foregoing, is the common explanation that\nis given to the doctrine of election and reprobation. Reprobation is\nkept out of sight; and yet it is as heartily believed by modern\nCalvinists, as it was by John Calvin himself. It is taught too; but it\nis taught covertly. And yet when we quote old-fashioned Calvinism, in\nits primitive plain dress, we are told _these are old authors;_ we do\nnot believe with them: \"if we had lived in the days of our fathers, we\nwould not have been partakers with them in _their errors_,\" and yet\n\"they are witnesses unto themselves, that they _are the children_ of\nthem\" who taught these errors. They recommend their writings, they\ngarnish their sepulchres, they teach their catechisms to the rising\ngeneration; they say, even in their Church articles of faith, \"We\nbelieve in the doctrines of grace, as held and taught by the _fathers_\nand _reformers_ in the Church,\"--and especially do they hold to that\nroot and foundation of the whole system, \"God hath, from all eternity,\nforeordained whatsoever comes to pass.\"\n\nSince I have alluded to Church articles, it will be in support of this\nobjection to say that the written creeds of Churches partake of this\nsame ambiguous character. They are either expressed in texts of\nScripture, or in doubtful and obscure terms; so that different\nconstructions can be put upon them, according to the faith of the\nsubscriber. And instances have been known, in which articles of faith\nhave been altered, again and again, to accommodate scrupulous\ncandidates. And yet their candidates for holy orders, and for\nprofessorships, in their theological institutions, are required to\nsubscribe to a rigid Calvinistic creed. In this way it is expected,\ndoubtless, that the doctrine will be maintained and perpetuated, though\nin other respects public opinion should be accommodated. How would\nhonest John Calvin, if he could be introduced among us, with the same\nsentiments he had when on earth, frown upon the Churches that bear his\nname! He would not only call them \"silly and childish,\" but he would,\ndoubtless, in his bold, blunt manner, charge them with disingenuousness\nand cowardice, if not with downright duplicity, for thus shunning and\nsmoothing over and covering up the more repulsive features of their\nsystem. How would he chide them for shifting their ground, and changing\ntheir system, while they nevertheless pretend to build on the same\nfoundation of predestination! He would, we believe, sternly inquire of\nthem what they meant by saying, all sinners, not excepting reprobates,\nmay come to Christ and be saved?--why they pretended to hold to\nelection, and not to reprobation?--how they could reconcile general\nredemption with particular election?--and especially would he frown\nindignantly upon that new doctrine, lately preached and defended, in\nwhat has been supposed to be the head quarters of orthodoxy in New\n-England, by which we are taught that derived depravity is not any taint\nor sinful corruption of our moral constitution, but consists,\nexclusively and entirely, in _moral exercise!_ But probably he would get\nlittle satisfaction from those who profess his creed and bear his name.\nThey would tell him that the old forms of this system were so repulsive,\nthe people would not receive them; and that, being hard pressed by their\nantagonists, they had thrown up these new redoubts, and assumed these\nnew positions, not only to conceal their doctrine, but if possible to\ndefend it. And as he could get little satisfaction of _them_, he would\nget less from us.--Could we meet the venerable reformer, we would thank\nhim for his successful zeal and labour in the Protestant cause; but we\nwould expostulate with him for giving sanction and currency to his\n\"horrible decree.\" We would tell him he had committed to his followers a\nsystem so abhorrent to reason, and so difficult to be supported by\nScripture, that they had been _driven_ into all these changes in hope of\nfinding some new and safe ground of defence; and that, while we\nconsidered this as a striking and convincing argument against the\ndoctrine itself, we viewed it as auspicious of its final overthrow; that\nthese changes, refinements, and concealments, were symptoms that the\ndoctrine was waxing old, and was ready to vanish away.\n\nBut I must conclude this discourse. To your serious consideration,\nChristian brethren, I commend the sentiments contained in it. Whatever\nyou may think of the discourse itself, I cannot fail, I think, of\nescaping censure. Those who accord with the sentiments here defended,\nwill of course approve; and those who believe in predestination will of\ncourse be reconciled to the preaching because God hath decreed it. It\nhath come to pass that I have preached as I have, and therefore it is a\npart of the Divine plan. It hath come pass that Arminianism exists, and\ntherefore this is a part of the Divine plan. We beg our brethren who\ndiffer from us, not to fight against God's plan if they say it is right\nfor us to fight against it, because this also is decreed--I answer, This\nonly confirms our objections against the system, for it arrays the Deity\nagainst himself. From all such inconsistencies, _may the God of truth\ndeliver us_. Amen.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER I.\n\nREPLY TO THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.[3]\n\nThis sermon had been before the public almost two years before it\nreceived any notice, so far as the author is informed, from any of the\nadvocates of predestination. After the third edition was announced,\nthere were several passing acrimonious censures in some of the\nCalvinistic periodicals, which did not affect the merits of the question\nat issue between us and the predestinarians. At length the Rev. Mr.\nTyler, of this city, (Middletown, Conn.) published a sermon which was\nevidently written in reference to the sermon on predestination. This\nsermon of Mr. T. might have been noticed; but its general positions were\nso indefinite, and its modes of illustration so vague, it seemed hardly\ncalculated to narrow the field of controversy or hasten a decision of\nthe question at issue. For example: Mr. T. defines election to be \"the\neternal purpose of God to renew, sanctify, and save every man whom he\nwisely can, and no others.\" With such a proposition there certainly can\nbe no controversy, for it leaves the subject more vague, and the point\nin dispute more confused than before a definition was attempted. There\nare two errors, the antipodes of each other, which, in all controversy,\nand especially religious controversy, ought to be carefully guarded\nagainst. The one is an attempt to make the subjects of difference more\nnumerous and consequential than they are in truth; and the other is an\nattempt to cover up real differences under indefinite propositions and\nambiguous terms. Both these errors may be the result of honest motives:\nthe former may arise from a jealous regard to the truth, and the latter\nfrom a love of peace. Both, however, are injurious; for neither does the\none promote the cause of truth, nor does the other secure a permanent\npeace. Indeed, bringing antagonist principles into contact gives an\nadditional impulse to their repellent forces, so that a transient union\nproduces, in the end, greater discord. Though the controversy in the\nChurch, between Calvinists and Arminians, has been long and injurious;\nyet, as an individual, I never can sign a _union creed_ of doubtful\nterms and ambiguous articles. Nor can I deem it worth my while to\ncontend about such terms and articles. I should fear the searching\ninterrogatory of Him who questioned Job: \"Who is this that darkeneth\ncounsel by words without knowledge?\" In the present controversy there is\ndanger of this ambiguity also from a less commendable principle than a\nlove of peace, viz. an adherence to old symbols of faith to avoid the\nimputation of a change; while, at the same time, to escape the force of\nunanswerable argument, vague propositions, ambiguous definitions, and\nequivocal terms are made the bulwark of defence. This principle was\nalluded to in the sermon on predestination; and although it has given\ngreat offence to some of the Calvinists, and is represented by the\nauthor of the review which we are about to notice as being \"utterly\nunworthy of the attention of a person who is honestly inquiring after\ntruth;\" yet it seems to me he knows little of his own heart who thinks\nhimself incapable of such a course. Nor does it seem _utterly unworthy_\nof an honest inquirer after truth to mark the effects of arguments upon\nsystems, since the changes effected in those systems, by the arguments\nurged against them, show the strength of the one and the weakness of the\nother. If; therefore, I should undertake to answer Mr. Tyler's sermon,\nmy strictures would consist chiefly in pointing out its indefiniteness\nand incongruity. But this, without convincing, might give offence. And\nalthough I see no way of continuing the controversy, as the Calvinists\nnow manage it, without alluding to this course of the advocates of\npredestination, yet I am happy to say there is less of it in the\n\"review\" before us than is common in modern treatises on that subject.\nThough it is a laboured article of about forty-three pages, yet it is\ngenerally in a manly style, and sustained by a train of close and\nskilful argumentation. It would afford me great pleasure to be able to\nequal the reviewer's ingenuity, and still more to throw into my reply\nthe serenity of his spirit. I have little occasion, however, in the\npresent case, to dread his talents or lose my temper; for if I\nunderstand the reviewer, though his essay bears upon it, if not the\n\"rugged,\" at least the decided \"aspect of controversy\" with my sermon,\nhe is nevertheless in principle an Arminian. I allude now more\nespecially to his views of predestination. On election there is\nevidently a greater difference between us; and yet it strikes me when a\nman discards Calvinian predestination, consistency would require that\nthe peculiarities of Calvinian election should be discarded also. At any\nrate, as the settling of the former question will have a very strong\nbearing upon the other, I shall confine myself in this article to\npredestination. I am not certain that I understand the reviewer; but his\ncandour authorizes me to believe that he will explain himself frankly,\nand correct me if I misunderstand him. If we are agreed on this point we\nought to know it, and give over the controversy. If we are not, let us\nknow the precise ground of difference. And in either case we shall be\nthe better prepared to pursue the question of election.\n\nThe question in dispute is simply this: What relation is there between\nthe decrees or purposes of God and the responsible acts of man? The\nArminian views on this question, as I understand them, are these: God,\nas a Sovereign, in deciding upon his works, had a right to determine on\nsuch a system as pleased him; but, being infinitely wise and good, he\nwould of course choose, in the contemplation of all possible systems, to\ncreate such a one as, all things considered, would bring the most glory\nto himself, and the greatest good to the universe. In infinite wisdom he\ndecided that such a system would be a _moral government_, consisting of\nhimself, as the supreme and rightful Governor, and of intelligent\nsubjects, having full and unrestrained power to obey or disobey the\nmandates of their Sovereign. He foresaw that one of the unavoidable\nincidents of such a government would be the possible existence of moral\nevil; and, in glancing through the proposed system, he foresaw that\nmoral evil would _certainly_ exist, involving innumerable multitudes in\nits ruinous consequences. He did not approve of the evil; he did not\ndecree that it should exist: but still evil was a remote result of a\ndecree of his: for although he foresaw that _if_ he made such free\nagents, and governed them in the manner proposed, they would certainly\nsin, yet he determined, notwithstanding this _certainty_, to make these\nagents and govern them as proposed. He determined, however, that they\nshould be under no necessity of sinning, either by his decree, or by the\ncircumstances in which they should be placed; but if they sinned, it\nshould be their own free choice. As he foresaw they would sin, he also\ndetermined upon the plan he would pursue in reference to them as\nsinners, and arranged, in the counsels of his own infinite mind, the\nextended concatenation of causes and effects, so as to make the \"wrath\nof man praise him,\" and deduce the greatest possible good from the best\npossible system. Such, it is believed, is Arminianism--such is\nMethodism--such is the doctrine of the sermon--and such are the dictates\nof the Bible and of sound philosophy.\n\nThe next question is, What is the doctrine of the reviewer? He shall\nspeak for himself. On page 612, of the review, he asks the question,\n\"But in what sense are we to understand the position that he (God)\npurposes the existence of sin?\" He proceeds to answer: \"Not necessarily,\nin the sense of his preferring its existence in his kingdom to its\nnon-existence, &c. In affirming the doctrine of predestination we affirm\nno more necessarily than that God, with the knowledge that these beings\nwould sin in despite of the best measures of providence and government\nhe could take, purposed to create them and pursue those measures, not\nfor the sake of their sin, but for the good which he nevertheless saw it\nwas possible to secure in his moral kingdom. This would be a purpose\nwith respect to the existence of sin, a purpose to permit its existence,\nrather than to have no moral system.\"--Again, page 613: \"Nothing more\n(touching free agency) is implied in the purpose spoken of than a\nCERTAINTY _foreseen_ of God, that if he creates and upholds that being,\nand pursues wise and good measures of providence, he (the being) will at\na given time, fully choose in a given way.\" In page 612 he says, \"God\nconfers on them (mankind) in their creation the powers of free agency,\nand he uses _no influence_ in his providence or government to procure\ntheir sin.\" Page 614, \"He (God) most obviously has no will opposed to\nhis law, though with a foresight of their conduct he should purpose to\npermit their sin, rather than dispense with the existence of a moral\nkingdom.\" But it is useless to multiply quotations. Suffice it to say\nthat the reviewer's whole ground of defence against the arguments of the\nsermon, on the question of predestination, is solely this Arminian\nexplanation of the doctrine of predestination. He acknowledges, nay\nboldly asserts, in a strain \"of rugged controversy\" with his brethren\nwho may differ from this view of the subject, that there is no other\nexplanation by which the arguments of the sermon can be avoided--that\nis, as I understand it, the only way to avoid the arguments against the\ndoctrine of Calvinian predestination is to give it up, and assume the\nArminian sentiment on this subject. If the reviewer does not mean this,\nhe will of course explain himself fully, and point out the precise\ndifference between his views and those of the Arminians. If, on this\nsubject, the reviewer is an Arminian, he has too much candor, I trust,\nnot to acknowledge it frankly, and too much moral courage to be afraid\nof the name. If he is not, the cause of truth and his own consistency of\ncharacter imperiously demand an explanation. Until this point,\ntherefore, is decided, farther arguments on the merits of the question\nin which we are supposed to be at issue, are useless.\n\nI am not, however, quite ready to dismiss the review. I stated at the\ncommencement it was difficult to pursue this controversy without\nalluding to the manner in which it had been conducted on the part of our\nCalvinistic brethren; but that there was less ground for objection in\nthis article in the Spectator than in most others. There are some things\nin this article, however, that I cannot justify. I will state them\nfrankly, though I trust in Christian friendship. I cannot approve of the\nreviewer's use of terms: though, to my understanding, he has evidently\ngiven the doctrine of predestination not merely a new _dress_, but a new\n_character_, yet he more than intimates that it is the old doctrine with\nonly a new method of explanation; and seriously and repeatedly complains\nof the author of the sermon for \"confounding the _fact_ of God's\nforeordaining the voluntary actions of men with this or any other\n_solution_ of that fact or theory as to the _mode_ in which it comes to\npass.\" And so confident is the reviewer that he still believes in the\n_fact_ of predestination, in the old Calvinistic sense, that in stating\nhis sentiments on this subject he uses the same forms of expression\nwhich Calvinists have used, when their meaning was as distant from his\nas the two poles from each other. He tells us, for instance, that \"God\ndetermined that the events which take place should take place in the\nvery manner in which they do, and for the very ends.\" Now if the writer\nmean what the words naturally imply, then he believes that, in the case\nof a finally impenitent sinner, God predetermined that all his sins\n_should_ take place in the manner they did, and for the very end that he\nmight be damned! Again he tells us, \"God, in his eternal purpose, has\npredetermined all events.\" And, quoting from the Assembly's Catechism,\n\"God, from all eternity, did freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever\ncomes to pass,\" he tells us that this expresses essentially the views\nentertained by the orthodox Congregationalists of New-England, among\nwhom, I suppose of course, he would include himself. Now, after what I\nhave said of the reviewer's Arminianism, I doubt not but some of my\nreaders will be startled at these quotations, and be ready to accuse me\nof great credulity in the judgment I have formed of the writer's\nsentiments. I shall exculpate myself, however, by saying, in the first\nplace, that if there is any contradiction in the writer's sentiments or\nlanguage, it is not my fault, but his; and if I should attempt to\nreconcile them, perhaps the reviewer would not thank me for my\nofficiousness. Beside, after what has been said, I feel safer in\nunderstanding the reviewer in an _Arminian sense_, because he and some\nothers take it very ill of me that I have represented them as\nCalvinists. But, in fairness to the reviewer, it is presumed that he\nwill not consider himself justly chargeable with contradiction. He has\nused these old terms, it is true, and thus has _subscribed_ to the\nCalvinistic creed as positively as the staunchest Calvinist; but then,\nlet it be understood, he has _explained_ that creed, and defined the\nterms, and protests against being held responsible for any other\nconstruction than his own. Hence by God's predetermining that sin\n_should_ take place, in the very manner, and for the very ends it\ndoes--by God's foreordaining whatsoever comes to pass--he only means\nthat God foresaw that sin would certainly take place, and predetermined\nthat he would not hinder it, either by refraining from creating moral\nagents, or by throwing a restraint upon them that would destroy their\nfree agency. In short, that he would submit to it as an evil unavoidably\nincident to the best possible system, after doing all that he wisely\ncould to prevent it! This is _foreordaining sin!!_ This is\n_predetermining_ that it _should be!!!_ I cannot but express my _deepest\nregret_ that a gentleman of the reviewer's standing and learning should\nlend his aid and give his sanction to such a perversion of language--to\nsuch a confusion of tongues. We do not complain of the doctrine\ncontained in the _explanation;_ but we protest, in the name of all that\nis pure in language, in the name of all that is important in the\nsentiments conveyed by language, against such an abuse of terms. Alas\nfor us! When will the watchmen see eye to eye! when will the Church be\nat peace! while our spiritual guides, our doctors in divinity, pursue\nthis course? By what authority will the reviewer support this\ndefinition? Do the words _predestinate_, or _foreordain_, or _decree_\nmean, in common language, or even in their radical and critical\ndefinition, nothing more than _to permit--not absolutely to hinder--to\nsubmit to as an unavoidable but offensive evil?_ The reviewer certainly\nwill not pretend this. Much less do they mean this when used in a\nmagisterial or authoritative sense, to express the mind and will of a\nsuperior or governor toward an inferior or a subject.--What is the\n_decree_ of a king? What is the _ordinance_ of a senate? What is the\nofficial determination of a legislative body? Let common sense and\ncommon usage answer the question. Not a man probably can be found, from\nthe philosopher to the peasant, who would say these words would bear the\nexplanation of the reviewer. Yet it is in this official and\nauthoritative sense that theologians, and our reviewer among them, use\nthese terms. The Assembly's Catechism, as quoted by himself, says, \"God,\nfrom all eternity, _did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own\nwill, freely and unchangeably ordain_,\" &c. Now it would be a gross\ninsult to common sense to say of such language as this, in the mouth of\nan earthly potentate, that the sovereign meant by this nothing more than\nthat he permitted the existence of certain unavoidable, and in\nthemselves, highly offensive evils in his kingdom, because he could not\nremove them without embarrassing the essential operations of his\ngovernment. There is not, probably, a clearer case in the whole range of\nphilology.\n\nBut the use of these terms by those who believe as I understand the\nreviewer to believe, is the more unjustifiable, because they are used by\nmost Calvinistic authors in a different sense.--Why, then, should the\nreviewer, believing as he does, continue to use them in the symbols of\nhis faith? Different persons might give different answers to such a\nquestion. For one, I would prefer he should answer it himself.\n\nI cannot approve of the reviewer's censures upon my manner of treating\nthe doctrine of predestination. He accuses me of confounding the\n_doctrine_ itself, with _modes_ of explanation. He says they are\nperfectly distinct; and though some may have been unfortunate in their\nmodes of explanation, and though he acknowledges my arguments bear\nagainst such, yet the _fact_ of the doctrine itself is not thereby\naffected. His mode of explanation, for example, he thinks untouched by\nthe arguments of the sermon. But his mode of explanation, as we have\nseen, turns the doctrine into _Arminianism_. And it would, perhaps, be\nno difficult matter to show, that any explanation of the doctrine, short\nof doing it away, would be exposed to all the weight of the arguments\nurged in the sermon. But the sermon was never written to oppose those\nwho hold to the decrees of God in an Arminian sense. Why then does the\nreviewer complain of the sermon? Why does he so \"deeply regret\" that the\nauthor of the sermon \"should come before the public with an attack on\nthe faith of a _large part_ of the Christian community, conducted in a\nway so obviously erroneous and unjust?\" The sermon was against\nCalvinism, not Arminianism. It is true, the reviewer may say, the sermon\nalludes, in some parts, to the Calvinism of New-England, and therefore\nhe felt himself implicated. But he certainly was not unless he is a\nNew-England _Calvinist_--unless he believes that \"God foreordains\nwhatsoever comes to pass,\" in the proper sense of those terms. Indeed,\nit seems that Calvinism, in its proper character, is as obnoxious to the\nreviewer, as to the author of the sermon; and the former seems to have\ntaken this opportunity to show the _nakedness_ of the system, and bring\ninto notice a better doctrine. If so, is it safe that the reviewer\nshould still accord to them their old symbols of faith? And is it just,\nthat the author of the sermon should be held the defendant on the\nrecord, when the execution is issued against Calvinism itself? In answer\nto the former question, I would say, it is utterly _unsafe_, and never\nwill be approved of, I believe, by Arminians. With respect to the latter\nquestion, if it is _safer_ to attack Calvinism in this indirect way, I\nwill not object, though it may seem at present to my disadvantage. But I\ncannot see that it would be safer--an open bold front always ends best.\nWhat if it should subject the reviewer, and the theological doctors in\nNew-Haven generally, to the charge of heresy? Still they ought not to\nshrink from their responsibilities--they occupy a commanding influence\namong the Churches and over the candidates of their theological school,\nand that influence should be openly and decidedly directed to\ndiscountenance error. They should remove it, root and branch. Especially\nshould they discard those old symbols of faith, which are not only in\nthemselves, in _their true and proper meaning_, a reflection upon the\nclerical character, and a _black spot_ upon an otherwise orthodox creed,\nbut are also especially obnoxious, because they are the very articles\nwhich the great body of the Calvinists have maintained, in a sense\nwidely different from that of the reviewer. At the head of these stands\nCalvin, the author of the system, in the Protestant Church. Calvin, who\nsays, \"I will not scruple to own that the will of God lays a necessity\non all things, and that every thing he wills necessarily comes to pass.\"\n\"Adam fell, not only by the _permission_, but also by the _appointment_\nof God. He not only _foresaw_ that Adam would fall, but also _ordained_\nthat he should.\" \"The devil and wicked men are so held in on every side,\nwith the hand of God, that they cannot conceive or contrive or execute\nany mischief, any farther than God himself doth not _permit_ only, but\n_command_--nor are they held in fetters, but compelled also, as with a\nbridle, to perform obedience to those commands.\" Calvin, it seems, was\nfar from thinking that _appointment_ only meant _permission_, or that to\n_ordain_ only meant certainty _foreseen_. In this he was correct: in\nthis he has been followed by a host of writers down to the present day,\nand copied in numerous ecclesiastical symbols, in different parts of\nChristendom; and does not the reviewer know that these terms are\nunderstood by Hopkins and Emmons, and all the Calvinists of that school,\nin a sense widely different from his explanation, and in a sense, too,\nmuch more in accordance with the _proper meaning_ of the terms? Does he\nnot know that a great majority of the Calvinists of the United States,\nand perhaps in New-England, even understand these terms, as indeed they\nought to be understood, when used in reference to sin, as expressing a\npreference of sin, in that part of the Divine plan where sin occurs, to\nholiness in its stead? Indeed, as I understand the reviewer, from the\ndays of John Calvin down to the present hour, there is, on this point,\nbetween the great body of Calvinists and himself, almost no likeness,\nexcept in the use of words. Theirs is one doctrine--his another. Why,\nthen, does he oppose the opposers of Calvinism, and thus keep error in\ncountenance? Especially, why does he hail from that party, and hoist\ntheir signals, and then, alter _seeming_ to get the victory, by\nespousing the very cause of the assailed, encourage the _Calvinists_ to\ntriumph, as if _their_ cause had been successful? Is this justice to the\nauthor of the sermon? Is it the best way to promote truth? But I\nforbear. The reviewer's subsequent explanations may remove these\ndifficulties. At any rate, the cause of truth will doubtless advance.\nThe appearance of this review has given additional strength to the\nsentiment, Calvinism \"is waxing old, and is ready to vanish away.\" The\ndogma that \"God has predetermined all events, and elected (in a\nCalvinistic sense) out of our guilty world all who shall be heirs of\nsalvation,\" withers at the touch of advancing truth, and is fast losing\ncredit in the Christian Church.\n\nSince writing the above, I have seen an inquiry of a correspondent in\none of the Calvinistic papers, in these words, \"Why do our Calvinistic\nwriters retain the words which seem so sadly to perplex our Arminian\nbrethren, when it is certain that we do not attach the signification to\nthem which they always pretend?\" and then instances in the word\n\"foreordain.\" The editor, in reply, gives as a reason for using these\nwords, that they are Scriptural; and seems to deem it necessary that\nthey should _persist_ in this use until we submit. This reply of the\neditor reminded me of a remark of Mr. Tyler, in his sermon already\nalluded to: \"The Calvinist contends that God resolved, from eternity, to\npermit all the sins and miseries which were to take place; and this he\ncalls, in the language of the Bible, _foreordination_.\" Now, not to stop\nhere, to show that no true Calvinist would ever call _foreordination_\nand _permission_ the same thing, for Calvin has, as we have seen,\nclearly distinguished the two words from each other, I beg the privilege\nof adding a thought or two on this idea of Scripture authority for the\nuse or these terms. For if it is only because the Scriptures use these\nwords in this sense, that they _persist_ in using them, I think we may\neasily settle this question. Let it be shown that the Scriptures use\n\"foreordination,\" or \"predestination,\" in the sense of mere\n_permission--not absolutely hindering_. Again: let _one passage_ be\nshown in which it is said, God \"predestinates\" all things, or\n\"foreordains\" whatsoever comes to pass. If this cannot be done, how\nfutile, how more than absurd is it, to talk about using these words,\nbecause the Scriptures use them! To use Scripture words out of the\nScripture sense, and then appeal to Scripture to sanction this use, is\nas sad a perversion of the Scriptures as it is of logic. Indeed, to give\nsuch a meaning to the word predestinate, is at once to take away the\nprincipal scriptures quoted by the reviewer, and others, to prove\nCalvinistic election. See Eph. i, 5; ii, 10; Rom. viii, 29. Does\npredestination in these passages mean merely _to permit_, or not _to\nhinder?_ and do these passages teach a personal election to eternal\nlife? Is this all the Calvinists mean by the _election_ of _sovereign\ngrace_, not of man, nor of the will of mans but of God? Alas! for the\nelect! If man does not elect himself, and God _only predestinates_, that\nis, _permits--does not hinder_ his election; who, we ask, will elect\nhim? How does error destroy itself! These gentlemen may take which\nground they please; they may either acknowledge that Bible\npredestination means an _efficient purpose of God_ to accomplish an\nobject, and then meet the sermon on the issue there proposed; or they\nmay interpret these words as the reviewer has, and then give up those\npassages which they consider their strong hold, in favour of Calvinian\nelection. In either case their system must suffer serious loss. Nothing\ncould be more unfortunate, I think, than this appeal to the Bible to\nsanction such an abuse of terms. As to the word foreordain, I do not\nrecollect that it occurs in our translation. Jude 4, has \"before of old\nordained,\" &c, but it is in the original very different from the word\nrendered predestinate. The allusion is to characters that were\nproscribed for their sins, and designated for deserved punishment. The\noriginal for predestinate, proorizo, is used in only one place, so far\nas I can find, with any direct reference to a sinful act, Acts iv, 28.\nThis passage is quoted by the reviewer. But the determination here\nspoken of, he himself informs us, relates to \"the purpose of God to make\nan atonement for the sin of the world, by means of the death of Jesus\nChrist.\" Hence the predetermination of God, in this instance, probably\nrefers to the _work_ of atonement, without including therein any special\ndecree in respect to the means of the suffering. Christ _could_ have\nsuffered, even unto death, in the garden without any human means. But\ninasmuch as these men had the murderous purpose, God \"chose to leave\nChrist to their power,\" &c, therefore _decreed_ the atonement, but\n_permitted_ the means. This seems to be the most rational construction.\nBut whatever Calvinists may think of this passage, the Scriptural use of\nthe word is clearly on the side of its _proper_ meaning--an\n_authoritative ordinance_ that the thing predestinated _shall be_.\n\nI will avail myself of this opportunity to correct one or two errors of\nthe reviewer, respecting the sentiment of the sermon, which had escaped\nmy notice. He says, my \"view of predestination is a determination of God\nto produce a given result by his _own immediate_ and _efficient_\nenergy.\" This is a mistake. I said nothing about _immediate energy;_\nthis is an essential misrepresentation of the sermon. Again: \"On Dr.\nFisk's principle, it is impossible for God to use the voluntary agency\nof any creature, to accomplish any valuable end in his kingdom, and yet\nleave that creature accountable for his conduct.\" This is so manifestly\nincorrect and unjust, that I am sure I need only call the attention of\nthe reviewer to it a second time, to secure a correction from himself.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER II.\n\nA PROPOSITION TO CALVINISTS.\n\nThe communication below contains a proposition from Dr. W. Fisk, which,\nhowever much we dislike theological controversies, we believe is\nappropriate and interesting at this time. Such a discussion, under such\narrangements, will give the merits of the controversy to both sides; and\nwill, at least, convince all of one truth--that the Methodist Episcopal\nChurch seeks not concealment from the world or her members, as charged\nby her adversaries. But it will develop a still more important truth,\nand that is, what are the settled and definite opinions of the old or\nthe new school in the Calvinistic Churches. It is known to all the\nworld, that there is great difficulty in ascertaining what are the\ntheological opinions of those ancient Churches of the land. They seem to\nbe as far apart from each other as they are from Arminianism; and their\nreplies and rejoinders to each other are as severe as if directed\nagainst us. The discussion must be interesting and profitable, carried\non by two such persons as Dr. Fisk and his opponent, and under the\nsteady supervision, as to temper and manner, of third parties as\nproposed.--Eds.\n\nI have just received a pamphlet of about forty-eight pages, containing a\nseries of letters, in answer to my sermon on predestination and\nelection. These letters are written by the Rev. David Metcalf, of\nLebanon, Connecticut, and purport to be an answer, not only to the\ndoctrinal part of the sermon, but to the \"charges,\" as the writer is\npleased to call them, contained in the sermon, and published afterward\nin a specific form, first in the Connecticut Observer, and then in the\nChristian Advocate and Journal.\n\nIt will be recollected by your readers, that I pledged myself to\nvindicate my statements against any responsible person, who, with his\nown proper signature, would come forward and deny them: or if I failed\nto support them, I would retract what I had written. This pledge Mr.\nMetcalf calls upon me to redeem; not indeed by bringing forward my\nproofs, or by making a reply; but, having thrown in his plea, he\nsupposes that the cause is decided, and has himself made up the\njudgment, and issued the execution, and forthwith comes forward, and\nclaims his damage. His words are--\"Of the author of the sermon we claim\na public acknowledgment of his errors, and make justice and equity the\nground of our claim.\" Again, \"If Dr. F. makes no public retraction from\nthe ground taken in his sermon--if after he shall receive these letters,\n[!!] remembering also what is said in the Christian Spectator's review\nof his sermon, he shall allow another copy of it to be printed, I think\nhe will find it difficult to convince any intelligent candid man, that\nhe is not guilty of breaking the ninth commandment,\" &c. The intelligent\nreader, who has studied human nature, will know how to make suitable\nallowances for the dogmatical and premature decisions, and high claims\ncontained in the foregoing extracts. It is not an uncommon thing, that a\nzealous advocate succeeds in _convincing himself_ of the truth of his\ncause; but utterly fails with respect to all others. I do not say, that\nthis writer will not gain his argument; but it requires more\n\"foreknowledge\" than I am disposed to accord to him, to affirm this as a\n\"certainty.\" I demur against this hasty manner of making up the\njudgment. I wish to be heard in defence of my statements, and have\nobjections also to bring against his statements, and supposed proofs and\narguments.\n\nIn the first place, I object to him, that he has not come out and joined\nissue specifically and directly on any one of my \"charges,\" but talks\nfor most part in general terms, about the unfairness, injustice, and\nmisrepresentations of the sermon. This circumstance would, of itself,\nfree me from any obligation to notice these letters, on the ground of my\npledge in the Observer. But yet, as I feel the most perfect readiness to\ndiscuss this subject, and as I hope the cause of righteousness may be\nserved thereby, I will willingly proceed in this controversy, both as to\ndoctrine and policy, provided we can secure some suitable public medium,\nthrough which to prosecute the discussion. And on this point Mr. M.\ncomplains bitterly of the former editors of the Advocate and\nJournal--for he had applied, it seems, for the privilege of having his\nletters inserted in that paper, and was refused, on the ground that \"the\nsermon was not published in the Advocate, and therefore justice did not\nrequire that its answer should be.\" Now, since these letters are\nprofessedly an answer to the _whole sermon_, the editors, I think, were\nperfectly consistent with their former statements, in refusing to\npublish them. If Mr. M. had confined himself to the charges in the\nObserver, the editors would undoubtedly have given the subject a place\nin the columns of the Advocate: as it was, however, I think the charge\nof injustice and unfairness made against the editors by Mr. M. is\nentirely gratuitous and _unjustifiable_. If it was expected to produce\nan _effect_ on the public, by such a complaint, I think such an\nexpectation will be disappointed in all places where the subject is\nunderstood. And that this was the expectation appears evident from\nanother charge against Methodist preachers, in the following words:--\"It\nis supposed to be the common sentiment, if not 'the common talk in our\nland,' that the Methodist preachers have a strong aversion against their\nhearers reading our writings. The reason of this, in part, is supposed\nto be, that they choose to have their people receive all their knowledge\nof our creed from their statements of it, instead of ours; lest they\nshould be convinced, by our arguments, of the truth of our belief.\" Now\nthis charge we wholly and positively deny, and challenge the writer for\nthe proofs of what we know to be, not only an ungenerous, but an unjust\nallegation. Nothing can be farther from the whole genius of Methodism\nthan this. Does not the reverend gentleman know, that a great portion of\nour members in New England are those who were once members of\nCalvinistic congregations? Does he not know that they were trained up in\nthese doctrines from their infancy, and have heard them explained and\ndefended from their earliest recollections? Does he not know that\nMethodism has made its way against the impressions of the nursery, the\ncatechetical instruction of the priest and the school master--the\ninfluence of the pulpit and the press, and in maturer age against the\nstill stronger influence of academies and colleges? Does he not know,\nalso, that all this has been done in this generation? And shall we now\nbe told that Methodists examine but one side of the question? How\nastonishing such a charge, from a man who can make any pretension to a\nknowledge of ecclesiastical matters in our country! Does not this writer\nknow, also, that the editors of the Advocate, and others, have called\nloudly, and almost continually, for information upon this subject, that\nwe might know what the Calvinistic standards are, and ascertain what\nCalvinism is? and shall we now be told, that Methodists are ignorant of\nthe Calvinistic faith, and, what is worse, the preachers strive to keep\nthem in ignorance, and that with the base purpose of keeping them from a\nconviction of the truth! We say, if Calvinism is essentially what it was\nfrom five to thirty years ago, we know its character as well as we ever\ncan know it. If we do not understand it now, it is either because we\nhave not _natural ability_ to understand it, (and therefore. Calvinism\nitself being judge, we are not criminal,) or it is because the teachers\nof Calvinism have not had _natural ability_ to make it plain. But if\nCalvinism is not essentially what it was, we ask what it now is? If it\nis changed in the hands of its supporters, how much has it changed? Is\nit Calvinism still, or has it lost its identity? In what does the\nidentity of Calvinism consist? Shall we take the Rev. Mr. Metcalf's\nanswer to these questions? Shall we take the Christian Spectator's\nanswers? Mr. M. appears fully to agree with the Spectator, for he makes\nfrequent reference to it, with great apparent approbation. And yet two\nnumbers of this periodical have been issued since my reply to the review\nof my sermon in that work, in which reply I stated my understanding of\nthe reviewer's doctrine of predestination, and requested to be informed\nif I was incorrect; and neither my reply nor my request has been\nnoticed. And yet, let it be understood, that in the last number there is\na very laboured article, to show that Dr. Taylor does not differ\nessentially from the orthodox Calvinistic faith heretofore received.\n\nIt is also known, that though Drs. Woods, Griffin, Tyler, Green, and\nvarious others, come out and charge a portion of their brethren with a\nserious and dangerous dereliction from the Calvinistic faith, yet the\naccused, in their turn, strenuously maintain that they preserve the old\nlandmarks unremoved, and the essential principles of Calvinism\nunimpaired; and that it is a calumnious charge to say they have departed\nfrom the faith of the party.\n\nHow shall we judge in this matter? If we think, from our understanding\nof their writings, that some of them have changed their views, and we\nask them if they have, they are silent. If their brethren charge them\nwith changing, they deny it; and, standing up before the world and\nbefore the Churches, and before their God, pronounce _deliberately_ and\n_emphatically_, the old symbols of faith, as a test oath to prove their\northodoxy. Should we doubt their repeated asseverations? Mr. M., or\nsomebody else, might write another pamphlet to screw us into repentance\nand confession, for bearing false witness against our neighbour. But if\nwe hold them to the old doctrine, which we have had a good opportunity\nof learning, from our youth up, we are accused of misrepresentation, and\nof bearing false witness. None but the advocates of the New-Haven\ndivinity have, to my knowledge, taken a public stand against my sermon;\nand _they_ oppose it because _they_ say it is a misrepresentation of\ntheir doctrine.\n\nThis, therefore, seems to us to be the state of the case with respect to\nthese gentlemen--We make a representation of Calvinism as we have found\nit, and have heretofore understood it--they object, because this is not\ntheir belief, and therefore we break the ninth commandment! Their own\nbrethren charge _them_ with a departure from the old doctrines, and they\ndeny it! and charge them in turn with bearing false witness! In the\nmidst of our perplexity on this subject, while we are looking every way\nfor light, up comes Mr. M. and tells us, we are unwilling our people\nshould know what Calvinists believe!! Is this generous, or just? We\nrepel the charge, and demand proof. And in the mean time, as a farther\nproof that the charge is unfounded, I will, Messrs. Editors, with your\nconsent and approbation, make a proposition to Mr. Metcalf. It is\ncertainly desirable, that both Calvinists and Methodists should hear\n_both sides_. Mr. M. seems very desirous to enlighten the Methodists.\nThis is very well. But we also wish to enlighten the Calvinists. To\naccomplish this, the discussion on both sides should be put into the\nhands of the people on both sides. If, then, some reputable and\nextensively circulated Calvinistic periodical will publish my sermon,\nand the discussion which _has_ arisen, or _may_ arise out of it, on both\nsides, the Christian Advocate and Journal will publish Mr. M.'s letters\nand the discussions which shall follow; provided always, that it shall\nbe submitted to the respective editors, whether the pieces are written\nin respectful and becoming style and language; and provided also, that\nthe Calvinistic editor shall, by consenting to this arrangement, he\nconsidered as thereby acknowledging, that Mr. Metcalf is a suitable man\nto manage the controversy in behalf of the Calvinists, and that you,\nMessrs. Editors, by consenting to the arrangement, will thereby consent\nthat you are willing to trust the controversy in my hands, to be managed\nin behalf of the Methodists. To give an opportunity for the Calvinistic\nperiodical to be prepared, I shall wait a reasonable time, when, if the\noffer is not complied with, I shall want the privilege, perhaps, of\noccupying the columns of the Advocate, by the insertion of a few numbers\ntouching the present Calvinistic controversy, both as relates to their\nown differences, and also as relates to the general question between\nthem and us.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER III.\n\nINDEFINITENESS OF CALVINISM.\n\nTHE readers of the Christian Advocate and Journal will recollect the\nproposition, made to the Rev. David Metcalf, in the 8th No. of the\npresent volume, on the subject of his review of my sermon. This\nproposition has not been complied with on the part of Mr. M., and\naccording to the following extract from the New-York Evangelist, no\ncompliance can be expected:--\n\n\"We have seen,\" says the editor of the Evangelist, \"in the Advocate,\nsince Mr. Metcalf's work was published, a letter from Dr. F., in which\nhe shows his desire that the discussion shall still go forward. There is\none condition he exacts, however, which we think impracticable. It is,\nthat some person should be designated, by a sort of common suffrage, as\nthe champion of Calvinism. Now the truth is, Calvinists, as a class, are\nrather remarkable for thinking for themselves; and of course, while\nthere are great principles on which, as a class, they all agree, there\nare many things which will be held or stated differently, by different\nminds. Consequently, we can, each of us, defend ourselves, and defend\nCalvinists as a class; notwithstanding, each one may think his fellow\nholds some errors, and therefore, in his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F.\nmust assume to himself the responsibility of selecting those doctrinal\npoints and modes of statement which distinguish _Calvinists as a class_.\nAnd when he has found these principles, we hope he will either confute\nor embrace them.\"\n\nI have copied the above for the farther notice of the public, not only\nas a remarkable paragraph in itself, but also as having an important\nbearing on the present controversy. There are several things in it\nworthy of special notice.\n\nIn the first place we see, if other editors think with this one, and\nthat they do, we are left to infer from their not offering their\nperiodicals for the controversy, there is no hope that my proposition\nwill be accepted. We then have the reason--because there is one\nimpracticable condition. But why impracticable? The editor tells us,\n\"Dr. F. exacts that some person should be designated by a sort of common\nsuffrage to be the champion of Calvinism.\" I cannot believe the editor\nmeans to misrepresent me; and yet he has done it. My words are,\n\"Provided that the Calvinistic _editor_ shall, by consenting to this\narrangement, be considered as thereby acknowledging that Mr. Metcalf is\na suitable man to manage the controversy on the part of the Calvinists.\"\nHere is nothing said about a \"sort of common suffrage.\" In case of\ncompliance by Mr. Leavitt, or any other editor, the only vote to be\npolled and counted would be his own. Not a very extensive suffrage this!\nAnd if Mr. L. thinks the condition impracticable, it must be owing to\n_moral inability_ existing in his own mind, growing out of the belief\nthat Mr. Metcalf _is not a suitable person_ to manage this controversy.\nHence it is well I took the precaution I did; for Mr. M. is a stranger\nto me; and I do not wish to engage in a controversy on this subject with\nany man who is not, by his class, considered responsible. Perhaps Mr.\nLeavitt knows of some one, who would be suitable, in his judgment, and\nwho would accept of the offer; or perhaps he himself would be willing to\nengage in the discussion. I do not wish to confine it to Mr. M.; nor do\nI wish to be considered in the light of a general challenger who is\nseeking an adventure. The subject is an important one, and I am willing\nto discuss it with any candid responsible man. We were most unjustly, as\nI believed, accused of keeping our people in ignorance of Calvinism, and\nof preventing them from reading on the other side, for the base purpose\nof preventing them from being convinced of the truth. To render the\nsubject fair and equal, therefore, and to wipe off this aspersion, I\nmade the proposal; and if Mr. M. is not a suitable man, let some other\nbe found.\n\nBut we are informed farther in this paragraph, that one great difficulty\nin complying with my condition is, that \"Calvinists, as a class, are\nremarkable for thinking for themselves,\" &c. If the editor designs to\nsay, as the natural construction would imply, that the whole class are\nremarkable, in their character as Calvinists, for thinking and believing\ndifferently and independently of each other, then his proposition is a\ncontradiction. They, _as a class_, are remarkable _for not being a class\nat all_, having no properties or qualities in common! His argument also\nwould require this construction, because he is showing why no one could\nbe the proper champion of the class, for the reason that, as a class,\nthey did not think alike. If _Calvinism_ be a general term, it includes,\nin its extension, all those individuals or sub-classes of individuals,\nand only those, that hold certain doctrines in common, and it embraces\nall those doctrines, and only those that are held in common by the\nclass. If, therefore, there is any such class, then most certainly they\nthink alike in all those things that constitute them a class; and by\nconsequence, any one of the number, otherwise competent, would be\nqualified to represent and defend the class as such, however much he\nmight differ from many of \"his fellows,\" in other things. If, therefore,\nthere is any force in the argument, that it is impracticable for any one\nof the number bearing the name, to become the champion of _the class as\nsuch_, because they differ so among themselves, it must arise from the\nfact, that there are no \"great principles\" held in common among them,\nand, of course, there is _no class_. All the writer says afterward,\ntherefore, about \"great principles in which they all agree,\" is mere\nverbiage, signifying nothing. For if we give it any meaning, it would be\na contradiction of what he had stated before, and a complete\nnullification of the only argument adduced as a reason for not complying\nwith my proposal. There is another reason why I think the above a fair\nview of this subject. In the same paragraph it is said, \"Therefore, in\nhis contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. must assume to himself the\nresponsibility of selecting those doctrinal facts and modes of statement\nwhich distinguish _Calvinists as a class_.\" This is more unreasonable\nthan the requisition of Nebuchadnezzar, when he commanded the wise men\nto _make known the dream_, as well as the interpretation. Would an\nintelligent and ingenuous man, such as we have a right to expect a\nreligious editor to be, give such an answer, under such circumstances,\nif he could have told us what Calvinism is? We have been accused, not by\nMr. Metcalf only, but by Calvinists of the old school, and the new\nschool, and _all the schools_, that we misrepresent them, that our\npreachers make it their business to misrepresent them,--that my sermon\nwas a most scandalous misrepresentation, and that we studied to keep our\npeople ignorant of what Calvinism is. When this is replied to, by\nentreating and conjuring those who bear the name of Calvinism, to tell\nus what it is; and when we offer to discuss the subject, in their own\nperiodicals, and give them an opportunity to discuss it in ours, and to\ninform our people, in their own way, on this doctrine--a death-like\nsilence on the subject reigns throughout the whole _corps editorial;_\nuntil at length the Evangelist speaks,--We cannot comply; we each and\nall, as a class, are so remarkable for thinking for ourselves, it is\nimpracticable for any one to state and defend those doctrinal facts\nwhich _distinguish us as a class_, and therefore Dr. F. must assume to\nhimself the responsibility of selecting them!! If Calvinists cannot\nagree in their own system, and cannot trust any of their fraternity to\nstate and defend it in behalf of the class, why do they accuse us of\nwillful misrepresentations, in stating their system? Why, in short, do\nthey not begin to doubt whether, _as a class_, they have any system? It\nis time for those who bear the name to know, and for the public to be\ndistinctly informed, whether there is any thing _real_ represented by\nthe term Calvinism? If there is, then, whether the term is a common or a\nproper noun? If it is a common noun, or a general name, then, what are\nthe qualities, the properties, or doctrines designated by it? If no one\ncan tell,--if those who \"write about it, and about it,\" week after week,\nthink it _impracticable_ to define or describe those doctrines for the\nclass, because they think so differently, of course it follows, if the\nname is retained, it is not a general, but a _proper name_, and belongs\nonly to individuals. And though it has been assumed by many individuals,\nyet it has in each case an individual definition, which by no means\nenters into the definition of the term, as assumed by any other\nindividual. And therefore it is as inconsistent to talk about the _class\nof Calvinists_, as it is to talk about the class of Johns or Joshuas,\nand as absurd to infer that two men are in any of their real\ncharacteristics alike, because each is called _Calvinist_, as to argue\nthat the editor of the Evangelist and Joshua, the son of Nun, belonged\nto the same class, because both are called Joshua. And this appears to\nme to be very nearly the true state of the case. Calvinism, as\ndesignating a class, has always been rather vague and unsettled in its\ndefinition, from the days of John Calvin himself. And this was one of\nthe offensive objections brought against it in my sermon--an objection,\nhowever, that has been abundantly confirmed by recent events. As I wrote\nand published of another doctrine some years since, so I may say of\nCalvinism now. It is a proteus that changes its shape before one can\ndescribe it--an _ignis fatuus_, that changes its place before one can\nget his hand on it. And here I will stop to say, It will avail nothing\nfor any one to take offence at this statement. It is not because I\ndislike men who are called Calvinists, that I thus speak. I know many of\nthem personally, and esteem them highly, but of their doctrine, and\ntheir system, and their name, I must speak freely. And the best\nrefutation they can give, is to come out if they can, and define and\nexplain their system. I care not what shape it is presented in; I am\nwilling to meet it. If it puts on an Arminian character and dress, like\nthe review in the Christian Spectator, I will only ask the privilege of\nbaptizing it anew, and giving it a legitimate name. But as there seems\nnow little hope of being permitted to meet it in the manner proposed, it\nonly remains that I proceed, according to promise, to \"occupy the\ncolumns of the Advocate with a few numbers, touching the present\nCalvinistic controversy, both as relates to their own differences, and\nas relates to the general question between them and us.\"\n\nI cannot but think this an important moment to look into this subject.\nThe signs of the times indicate that the spirit of inquiry is abroad,\nand the old platforms are shaken. In this breaking up of erroneous\nsystems, there is danger of extremes and extravagancies, more to be\ndreaded, perhaps, than the old errors themselves. Hence, the necessity\nfor every man who _has_ the truth to be on his guard against the\ncurrents, new and unprovided for, that may otherwise drive him from his\nsafe moorings: and hence the necessity also, that he who has weighed\nanchor, and is afloat upon the unexplored sea of philosophic speculation\nshould be aware of the rocks and the quicksands on the opposite shore.\nAn abler hand than mine is certainly needed on this occasion; such a one\nI hope may be found. But in the mean time I will, as I am able, say a\n_few things_, with the sincere prayer that I and my readers may be led\ninto all truth.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER IV.\n\nSKETCH OF THE PAST CHANGES AND PRESENT STATE OF CALVINISM IN THIS\nCOUNTRY.\n\nIn the former No. it was seen that the indefiniteness and mutability of\nthe Calvinistic system had thrown a kind of irresponsibility around it;\nwhich renders this controversy, in many respects, extremely\nunsatisfactory. This might, at first, lead to the conclusion, that\nfarther discussion would be useless. On farther thought, however, it\n_may_ appear, that this very circumstance will render the controversy\nboth easier and more promising. This diversity of opinions has produced\nserious discussion among the predestinarians themselves, and has thrown\nthe system open to public view, and driven its advocates to a clearer\nstatement of their respective opinions. The effervescence, in short,\ngrowing out of this excitement, has led to a more distinct analysis of\nthe system, and of course to a clearer discovery of its constituent\nparts. Their arguments against each other, and the logical consequences\nwhich they urge against each other's views, are, in many cases,\nprecisely the same that we should advance, and have often urged, in\nopposition to predestination. Much of the work, therefore, is prepared\nfor us, and brought forward in a way to produce an effect among\nCalvinists themselves, where we could not be heard.\n\nTo understand this subject however fully, and to follow out this\ndiscussion advantageously, it will be necessary to glance at the\ndifferent changes and modifications of the Calvinistic system; and to\ntake a brief survey of the present state of the parties.\n\nThe religious faith of our puritanical fathers is too well known to need\na delineation here. This faith was at an early day defined and formally\nrecognized, in the Cambridge and Saybrook platforms. The first\nrefinement (improvement it can hardly be called) upon this ancient\nfaith, was the metaphysical theory of Dr. Hopkins. The leading dogmas of\nthis theory were, that God was the _efficient cause_ of all moral\naction, holy and unholy; and that holiness consisted in disinterested\nbenevolence. Insomuch, that the answer to the question, \"Are you willing\nto be damned?\" was deemed a very good criterion by which to judge of a\nreligious experience. While the doctrine of predestination was in this\nmanner _going to seed_, and bearing its legitimate fruits, in one\ndirection, it received a remarkably plausible modification in another.\nThe atonement, which was formerly limited to the elect, was now extended\nto all; and the invitations of the Gospel, instead of being restrained,\nas before, to the world of the elect, were extended to the world of\nmankind. But as it would be useless to hold out invitations to those who\ncould not accept of them, another refinement was introduced, and man was\nfound to possess a natural ability to receive salvation, although he\nlaboured under an invincible moral _inability_, which would for ever\nkeep him from Christ, until drawn by irresistible grace. This discovery\nled to other refinements in language, so that a kind of technical\nnomenclature was formed, out of words in popular use, which words, by an\naccompanying glossary, were so defined as to correspond with the\nCalvinistic system. Thus, \"You can repent if you will,\" meaning,\naccording to the technical definition, \"You can repent when God _makes_\nyou willing,\" and so of the rest.\n\nThis theory, sustained as it was by Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Emmons, and others,\ngained many proselytes, and seemed likely, at one time, to become the\nuniversal creed. Its metaphysical abstrusities and distinctions gave it\nan interest for the student; and its plausible and commonsense terms\ngave it popularity with the people. In the mean time, however, several\ncauses conspired to introduce a great revolution in the religious\nsentiments of many, which, as it has had a very important influence in\nmodifying Calvinism itself; I must here stop to notice; I allude to the\nintroduction of Unitarianism and Universalism. The proximate causes of\nthe introduction of these sentiments were, among others, probably the\nfollowing. The Antinomian features of old Calvinism had introduced into\nthe Churches a heartless Christianity and a very lax discipline. It was\nnatural, therefore, when religion had come, in point of fact, to consist\nchiefly in external performances, for its votaries to seek a theory that\nwould accord with their practice. Unitarianism was precisely such a\ntheory. It is also to be noticed, that the state of formality and\nspiritual death that prevailed, was greatly increased by the withering\nalliance which then existed between the Church and civil government.\nThis revolution was undoubtedly hastened also by the ultraism, on the\none part, and the technical inconsistencies on the other, of the\nHopkinsian theory. The elements had been long in motion, and at length\nthey united in an array of numbers and influence that wrested the\nfairest portions of their ecclesiastical domain from the orthodox\nChurches of Mass., and turned them over, together with the richly\nendowed university of the state, into the hands of the Unitarians.\n\nIn Connecticut, Unitarianism, as that term is commonly understood among\nus, has not prevailed. There is, I believe, but one Unitarian pastor,\nproperly so called, in the state. This sentiment, however, prevails very\nextensively in this and all the other New-England states, as well as in\nmany other parts of the union, under the name of Universalism; a\nsentiment which differs but little from Socinianism, and had its origin\ndoubtless from the same source. About half a century since, a\nCalvinistic clergyman, as he was supposed to be to the day of his death,\nleft a posthumous work, which was published, entitled, \"Calvinism\nImproved.\" It was merely an extension of the doctrines of unconditional\nelection and irresistible grace to all instead of a part. From the\npremises, the reasoning seemed fair, and the conclusions legitimate.\nThis made many converts. And this idea of universal salvation, when once\nit is embraced, can easily be moulded into any shape, provided its _main\nfeature_ is retained.--It has finally pretty generally run into the semi\ninfidel sentiments, of _no atonement--no Divine Saviour--no Holy Ghost_,\nand _no supernatural change of heart;_ as well as \"no hell--no devil--no\nangry God.\" It may be a matter of some surprise, perhaps, to a\nsuperficial observer, or to one not personally acquainted with the\ncircumstances of the case, why, in leaving Calvinism, these men should\ngo so far beyond the line of truth. But in this we see the known\ntendency of the human mind to run into extremes. The repulsive features\nof the old system drove them far the other way. It ought to be\nremembered, also, that there were few, if any, who were stationed on the\nmedium line, to arrest and delay the public mind in its fearful recoil\nfrom the \"horrible decree.\" Had Methodism been as well known in\nNew-England fifty years ago, as it now is, it is doubtful whether\nUniversalism or Unitarianism would have gained much influence in this\ncountry. Late as it was introduced, and much as it was opposed, it is\nbelieved to have done much toward checking the progress of those\nsentiments. And perhaps it is in part owing to the earlier introduction,\nand more extensive spread of Methodism, in Connecticut, that\nUnitarianism has not gained more influence in the state. This is\nundoubtedly the fact in the states of Vermont, New-Hampshire, and Maine,\nwhere Methodism was introduced nearly as early as those other\nsentiments. The result has shown that the foregoing supposition is\ncorroborated by facts in those cases where the experiment has been\ntried. These remarks may not now be credited, but the time will come,\nwhen the prejudices of the day are worn out, that the candid historian\nwill do the subject justice. But to return--though Unitarianism and\nUniversalism are believed to be dangerous errors, yet, as is often the\ncase, they have contributed much, doubtless, to detect the errors and\nmodify the features of the opposite system. Simultaneously with them,\nthe Methodists have engaged in opposing the Calvinistic dogmas. This\nclose examination and thorough opposition, with such other causes as may\nhave cooperated in the work, have driven some of the peculiarities of\nthe Hopkinsian theory into disrepute, more suddenly even than they rose\ninto credit. The sublimated doctrine of disinterested benevolence was so\nlike \"an airy nothing,\" that even the speculative minds of the shrewdest\nmetaphysicians could not find for it \"a local habitation,\" in heaven or\non earth; and the almost blasphemous dogma, that God was the efficient\ncause of sin, was more abhorrent, if possible, than even the horrible\ndecree of reprobation. Both, therefore, with the exceptions hereafter\nmentioned, disappeared. The former, being of an ethereal character,\nsilently evaporated into \"thin air;\" but the other, being of a grosser\nnature, and withal more essential to the system itself, _settled to the\nbottom_, and is now rarely visible, except when the hand of controversy\nshakes up the sediment. The doctrine of universal atonement, however,\nwas retained, and the theological vocabulary was not only retained, but\nenlarged and improved. So that from that day to this, we hear but little\nof the doctrine of reprobation, or of the decrees of God, but much is\nsaid of God's \"electing love,\" his \"Divine sovereignty,\" and \"gracious\npurposes.\" By which is meant, according to the glossary, the doctrine of\nunconditional election and reprobation, and of absolute predestination.\nThe scriptures, also, which used to be quoted to prove the direct\nefficiency of God, in producing sin and securing the condemnation of the\nreprobate, receive a different explanation, varying but little, if any,\nfrom the Arminian interpretation of those passages. It cannot be\ndoubted, I think, but there has been quite a change in the views of the\ngreat body of the Calvinists--and yet not so great and so thorough a\nchange as appearances and terms might at first view seem to indicate. It\nis not easy to _eradicate_ old prejudices. And it is often found that\nthe mind will cling to the first principles of a favourite system, even\nafter the other parts are so modified as that the new principles would\nsupplant the old, if suffered to be carried out into a consistent whole.\nIn every such case, much labour and argument will be spent in trying to\nunite the old with the new; but in every instance the rent becomes\nworse. This leads to a kind of vacillating policy, and an ambiguous\ncourse of argument, accompanied with reiterated complaints, that the\nopposers of the system misunderstand and misrepresent it. And it would\nbe no wonder if the constant friction in the incongruous machinery\nshould chafe the mind, and lead to a dogmatic and an impatient spirit.\nHow far this corresponds with the existing facts, in the Calvinistic\ncontroversy, others can judge. In my own view, the peculiar\ncircumstances of the case, connected with the known character of the\nhuman mind, fully account for the _apparent_ tergiversation and changing\nof argument, in this controversy, without criminating the _motives_ of\nour predestinarian brethren, as some have unjustly accused me of doing.\nThe different parts of the system have lost, in a measure, their\noriginal affinities, and yet they have some partial and irregular\nattractions, which lead them to unite in unnatural and grotesque forms.\nAnd as there is no common consent and settled mode of operating among\nthe many who are experimenting upon the materials, there are various\nsectional and individual formations, which are inconsistent with each\nother. And their incongruity is the more apparent from the unanimous\neffort (which I believe is the only work of union in \"the class\") to\namalgamate each and every variety with the old substratum of the\nsystem,--\"God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass.\"\n\nThe completion of this historical sketch, together with a view of the\npresent state of the Calvinistic parties, may be expected in the next\nnumber. After which it is proposed to proceed to an examination of the\ndoctrines in dispute.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER V.\n\nSAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\nOne modification of Calvinism remains to be mentioned. It is known by\nthe name of the \"New Divinity.\" The theological doctors connected with\nYale college are the reputed authors of this system. It is evident,\nhowever, that the tendency of the Calvinistic theory has been in this\ndirection for a number of years. The \"New Divinity,\" so alarming to some\nof the Calvinists, is only the ripe fruits of the very plants which they\nhave long cultivated with assiduous care. And why should they start back\nat results which they have long laboured to produce? This theory, in the\nfirst place, is an attempt to make the doctrine, and the technical terms\nalluded to, coincide. In the second place, it is designed, by a new\nphilosophy of predestination, to get rid of the \"logical consequences\"\nthat have always pressed heavily upon the old system. Finally, it is a\ndevice to reconcile the doctrine of depravity with the former current\nsentiment, that man has _natural ability_ to convert himself and get to\nheaven without grace. The two pillars of the new system are, 1. \"Sin is\nnot a propagated property of the human soul, but consists wholly in\n_moral exercise_.\" 2. \"Sin is not the necessary means of the greatest\ngood;\" or, in other words, \"Sin is not preferable to holiness in its\nstead.\" The Calvinistic opposers of this theory tell us that these\nsentiments have been held and taught to some extent for the last ten\nyears. They were more fully and more openly announced, however, by Dr.\nTaylor, of the theological school belonging to Yale College, in a concio\nad clerum preached Sept. 10th, 1828. From the time of the publication of\nthis sermon the alarm has been sounded, and the controversy has been\ncarried on. The opposers of the new doctrine call it heresy; and in a\nlate publication they seem to intimate that Dr. T. and his associates\nare nearly if not quite as heretical as the author of the sermon on\npredestination and election. The doctor and his friends, on the other\nhand, strenuously maintain that they are orthodox; and to prove it, they\nrepeat, again and again, \"We believe that God did, for his own glory,\nforeordain whatsoever comes to pass.\" The Christian Spectator, an ably\nconducted quarterly journal, is devoted chiefly to the defence of this\ntheory, aided by the New-York Evangelist, and several other minor\nperiodicals, and by a very respectable body of the clergy. What\nproportion, however, have embraced this system is not known; but many,\nboth in and out of Connecticut, have espoused the cause with great zeal.\nThe contest waxes warmer each year. Against the theory, Dr. Woods, of\nthe Andover theological seminary, Dr. Griffin, of Williams college, Dr.\nTyler, of Portland, the Rev. Mr. Hervey, of Connecticut, and several\nothers have entered the lists of controversy; and last of all, a\npamphlet, supposed to be the joint labour of a number of clergymen, has\nbeen published, in which the New Divinity is denounced as heresy, a\nformal separation of the Churches is predicted, and a withdrawal of\npatronage from Yale college is threatened on the ground that \"Yale will\nbecome in Connecticut what Harvard is in Massachusetts.\" It is\nuncertain, however, whether those ultra measures will be responded to by\nthe great body of the clergy in New-England. There is a party which\nstill adheres to the old--I may say, perhaps, to the _oldest_\nmodification of Calvinism in this country. This party are for\nmaintaining the old landmarks at all hazards, rightly judging that these\npalliations and explanations of the system will ultimate in its\ndestruction. They are not numerous, but still respectable as to numbers\nand talents. They are sustained in Boston by the Boston Telegraph, so\ncalled, a weekly periodical, which does not hesitate to go the whole\nlength--_logical consequences and all_. Witness the following quotation\nfrom a review of my sermon, in the number for Jan. 23d. Speaking of the\ncharge in the sermon, that Calvinism makes God the author of sin, the\nwriter says:--\"The word author is sometimes used to mean _efficient\ncause_. Now I am willing to admit that those scriptures which teach that\nGod has decreed the sinful conduct of men, do imply that he is the\nefficient cause of moral evil. For his own glory and the greatest good\nhe said, _Let there be sin, and there was sin!!!_\" The following is\nanother specimen of Calvinism from the same periodical. If any man\n\"affirms that man really chooses, and that his acts of will are caused\nby his own free, voluntary, and efficient mind, then he is _no\nCalvinist_.\" In this last quotation, as well as in the preceding, there\nis the most direct opposition to Dr. Taylor, since he maintains, if I\nunderstand him, that man's is an independent agency--that the human mind\nis the originator of thought and volition. Thus are these two branches\nof the Calvinistic family directly at variance with each other. And, in\nfact, the Telegraph and its supporters are not only at variance with the\nnewest divinity, but with all the different degrees of _new, newer,\nnewest_, and denounce them all as heresy.\n\nThe present advocates of predestination and particular election may be\ndivided into four classes:--1. The old school Calvinists. 2.\nHopkinsians. 3. Reformed Hopkinsians. 4. Advocates of the New Divinity.\nBy the reformed Hopkinsians I mean those who have left out of their\ncreed Dr. Hopkins' doctrine of disinterested benevolence, Divine\nefficiency in producing sin, &c, and yet hold to a general atonement,\nnatural ability, &c. These constitute, doubtless, the largest division\nin the \"class\" in New-England. Next, as to numbers, probably, are the\nnew school, then Hopkinsians, and last, the old school. These\nsubdivisions doubtless run into each other in various combinations; but\nthe outlines of these four sub-classes are, I think, distinctly marked.\n\nThe preceding sketch has been confined mostly to the theological changes\nin New-England; but it will apply, to a considerable extent, to other\nparts of the nation. The Presbyterian Church, by reason of its\necclesiastical government, is more consolidated, and of course less\nliable to change than the independent Congregational Churches of the\neastern states. But the Presbyterian Church has felt the changes of the\neast, and is coming more and more under their influence. It is now a\nnumber of years since the \"triangle,\" as it was called, was published in\nNew-York. This was a most severe and witty allegory, against the dogmas\nand bigotry of old Calvinism. From this work this old theory has\nobtained the epithet of \"triangular.\" Whenever a man advocates the\ndoctrine of limited atonement, imputed sin, and imputed righteousness,\nhe is said to be \"triangular.\" These old triangular notions are giving\nplace very rapidly to modern improvements. And although the most\nstrenuous opposition has been made in the General Assembly, in different\npublications, and elsewhere, yet the votes in the last General Assembly\nshow, I think, that the whole Church is yielding herself up to the\nresistless march of innovation. It may be doubted whether the state of\nNew-York is not emphatically the strong hold of the New Divinity, so far\nas popular sentiment is concerned; and whether, indeed, with the\nexception of New-Haven, there is not the greatest moral influence\nenlisted there, for the propagation of the new theory.\n\nThus have I endeavoured to glance over the various modifications and\npresent characteristics of that mode of Christian doctrines called\nCalvinism. Here a few suggestions present themselves, which, from their\nrelation to the present controversy, I will now set down.\n\nIt seems singular that, differing as they profess to, so materially, on\nmany points, each individual of each sub-class should feel himself\ninjured whenever Calvinism, under this common name, is opposed in any of\nits features. The sermon on predestination was against _Calvinism_, and\nlo! all parties rise up against the sermon. And yet, whether it object\nto Calvinistic policy or to Calvinistic doctrine, the different parties\naccuse their opponents of being guilty of the charge, but they\nthemselves are clear. I cannot think of a single important position\nassumed by the sermon against predestination and election, which is not\nsustained by Calvinists themselves in opposition to some of their\nbrethren; nor yet of a single charge against their policy, for their\nchanges and ambiguous methods of stating and defending their doctrines,\nwhich has not been reiterated by professed Calvinists themselves against\ntheir brethren. Thus the sermon is sustained by the Calvinists\nthemselves, and yet they all condemn it! If _some_ Calvinists think that\nthe objections of the sermon lie against some modifications of their\nsystem, is it not possible that these objections have a more _general_\napplication than any of them seem willing to acknowledge? For example:\nit is objected to predestination that it \"makes God the author of sin,\ndestroys free agency, arrays God's decrees against his revealed word,\nmars his moral attributes, puts an excuse into the mouth of the\nimpenitent sinner, implies unconditional reprobation, makes God partial\nand a respecter of persons, necessarily limits the atonement,\" &c. These\ncharges, say the Calvinists, are very unjust, ungenerous--in fact, they\nbear false witness against our neighbours. This is said by Mr. Metcalf,\nand by others of the New-Haven school. And yet what says the Spectator,\nthe organ and oracle of that school? It says of Dr. Tyler, and of others\nwho oppose the peculiar views of Dr. Taylor, comprising, as we have\nseen, the great majority of Calvinists, that their views \"limit God in\npower and goodness\"--\"make the worst kind of moral action the best\"--\"if\ncarried out in their legitimate consequences, would lead to\nuniversalism, to infidelity, to atheism\"--\"they confound right and\nwrong, and subvert all moral distinctions\"--\"according to these views,\nmankind are bound to believe that they shall please and glorify God more\nby sin than by obedience, and therefore to act accordingly\"--\"nothing\nworse can be imputed to the worst of men than this theory imputes to\nGod\"!!![4] Has the author of the sermon said more than this, and worse\nthan this, of Calvinism? And shall he be accused by these very men of\nbearing false witness against his brethren? And let it be observed\nfarther, in justification of the sermon, that these charges in the\nSpectator are made by men who have been brought up at the feet of the\nCalvinistic doctors, and have themselves grown up to the character and\nrank of doctors in theology. They know the system thoroughly; they have\nmade it the study of their lives, and have they testified to the truth\nrespecting this theory? _So then has the author of the sermon_. Such is\nthe testimony on the one side; and on the other we have decided\npredestinarians acknowledging, as an article of their creed, what in the\nsermon was urged as only a logical consequence. According to this\nsystem, says the sermon, \"the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as\ncertainly as it made the world.\" Hear the Boston Telegraph:--\"God, for\nhis own glory and for the good of the world, said, _Let there be sin,\nand there was sin!_\" Now I beg the reader to look at this subject for a\nmoment. For brevity's sake we will call the Boston Telegraph and its\nsupporters No. 1; the Andover theological seminary and its supporters,\nwhich constitute by far the larger body of predestinarians in\nNew-England, No. 2; and the New-Haven divines and their supporters No.\n3. The sermon charges predestination with making God the author of sin.\nNo. 2 says this is false: I neither believe it, nor is it to be inferred\nfrom my premises. _It is true_, says No. 1: I am willing to admit that\nGod is the efficient cause of sin. He said, Let there be sin, and there\nwas sin. _It is true_, responds No 3, that all who hold and explain\npredestination as Nos. 1 and 2 explain it, are exposed to the full force\nof the objections in the sermon--against such views \"the arguments of\nthe sermon are unanswerable.\" No. 2, in vindication, says that No. 1 is\non the old plan--very few hold with him in these days. And as for No. 3,\nhe is already a rank Arminian; and if he would be consistent, he must\ngive up unconditional election, and embrace the whole Arminian theory.\nThus do they destroy each other, and confirm the doctrine of the sermon.\nAnd shall we still be told that we do not understand this doctrine? Have\nanti-predestinarians misunderstood this from John Calvin's day to the\npresent? Does honest No. 1 misunderstand it? Does well instructed No. 3\nmisunderstand it? What then is Calvinism, that cannot, through the lapse\nof centuries, make itself understood either by friend or foe? Is not\nthis, of itself, a suspicious trait in its character? Let us quote a\nCalvinistic writer, whose sentiments are much in point, though aimed at\nthe New Divinity:--\"It is a serious ground of suspicion,\" says this\nwriter, \"that Dr. Taylor has failed, according to his own repeated\ndeclarations, to render his speculations intelligible to others. It must\nbe granted that a man of sense, who is acquainted with the power of\nlanguage, can, if he is disposed, make himself understood.\" \"Some of the\nmost intelligent men in the country have utterly failed to compass Dr.\nT.'s meaning in argument: so that he declares again and again, I am not\nunderstood--I am misrepresented. Who under such circumstances can\nrefrain from suspicion?\" \"Another suspicious circumstance in the case\nis, that Dr. Taylor expresses himself in ambiguous terms and phrases,\nwhich, though they are designed to influence the mind of a reader,\nafford him the opportunity to avoid responsibility.\" See pamphlet by\nEdwardian, pp. 28 and 29. If this is justly said of Dr. Taylor's\n_recent_ theory, what shall we say of a system the advocates of which,\n\"according to their repeated declarations, have not been able to render\ntheir speculations intelligible,\" after the theory has had exhausted\nupon it the highly cultivated intellects of hosts of expositors through\nsuccessive generations? \"Who, under such circumstances, can refrain from\nsuspicion?\" especially since these advocates have learned \"to express\nthemselves in ambiguous terms and phrases which, though they are\ndesigned to influence the mind of a reader, afford them an opportunity\nto avoid responsibility.\" To Calvinism it may truly be said, \"Out of\nthine own mouth will I judge thee.\" Let not the author of the sermon\nthen be accused of bearing false witness, when his testimony is\npredicated on principles which Calvinists have laid down, and is also\ncorroborated by men of their \"own class.\"\n\nWill it be said, All this is not argument. I answer, The sermon, it is\nsupposed, contains arguments--arguments which professed predestinarians\nthemselves tell us are unanswerable against the prevailing modes of\nstating and explaining the doctrine. Now let them be answered, if they\ncan be. Let them be answered, not by giving up predestination, in the\nCalvinistic sense, and still professing to hold it--not by attempting to\navoid the logical consequences, by giving the system the thousandth\nexplanation, when the nine hundred and ninety-nine already given have\nmade it no plainer, nor evaded at all the just consequences, so often\ncharged upon it; and when these are answered, it will then be time\nenough to call for new arguments.\n\nHaving prepared the way, as I hope, by the preceding numbers, for the\nproper understanding of the controversy; and having, by the remarks just\nmade, attempted (with what success the reader must judge) to repel the\ncharges of misrepresentation and bearing false witness, made against me,\nas the author of the sermon which gave rise to the controversy, I am now\nprepared, in my next number to commence an examination of some of the\nquestions of doctrine, connected with this discussion. In doing which,\nmy object will be, to let \"Greek with Greek contend\" so far as to show,\nif possible, the inconsistency of both, and then present the doctrine\nwhich we believe to be the true system, and show how it stands untouched\nby the conflicting elements around it as the immovable foundation of the\nChurch of God. I shall begin with the Divine purposes including\nforeknowledge; then take up human agency and responsibility; and last,\nregeneration, connected with the doctrine of human depravity, Divine and\nhuman agency, &c. May He that said, \"Let light be, and light was,\"\n\"shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of\nGod, in the face of Jesus Christ.\"\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER VI.\n\nPREDESTINATION.\n\nDefinitions are the foundations of reasoning. Hence in any reply to my\nsermon on predestination and election it was natural and fair that the\nfirst inquiry should be, Are the definitions correct? The definition of\npredestination assumed in the sermon was, that unalterable purpose and\nefficient decree of God, by which the moral character and responsible\nacts of man were definitely fixed and efficiently produced. On this\npoint the sermon joined issue. To this definition most of the notices\nand reviews, to the number of six or seven, which I have seen, have\ntaken exceptions. The review in the Boston Telegraph, however, is not of\nthis number.--That, as has already been noticed, agrees with the charge\nin the sermon, that \"the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as directly as\nit made the world.\" We have only to leave those Calvinists, who accord\nto that sentiment, to struggle, as they can, against the arguments of\nthe sermon--against the common sense of the world--against their own\nconvictions of right and wrong--and, I may add, against their own\nbrethren of \"the class,\" some of whom have already publicly denounced\nthe sentiment as \"horrid blasphemy.\" At this day of light, in which\n_naked Calvinism_ is abhorred by most of those who bear the name of\nCalvinists, it is hardly necessary to give a formal answer to such a\nreview. We approve of the _logical consistency_ of these men--we admire\nthe moral courage that, from assumed premises, pushes out a theory to\nits legitimate results without flinching; but we are astonished at the\n_moral nerve_ that can contemplate such results with complacency. For\nmyself I confess when I see this naked system of Calvinism fulminating\nthe curse of reprobation in the teeth of the miserable wretch whose only\ncrime is, that his God has made him a sinner, my heart recoils with\nindescribable horror! Let him contemplate this picture who can. I covet\nnot his head or his heart.\n\nOf others who have expressed their views of the sermon there are two\nclasses: 1. The conductors of the Christian Spectator and those who\nfavour their views; and 2. Those who in a former number were called\nReformed Hopkinsians. The latter comprehend the larger portion of\nCalvinists in New-England, and probably in the United States. Their\nviews on predestination shall be noticed in another number. At present I\nshall direct my remarks to the letters of Mr. Metcalf and to the first\nand second notices of the sermon in the Christian Spectator. And here\nlet me say, once for all, that I do not consider either of these\ngentlemen, or any who think with them, responsible for the doctrine of\npredestination as stated and opposed in the sermon. This I hope will be\nsatisfactory. If these gentlemen should ask me why I published my sermon\nin terms that included Calvinists generally, without making the\nexception in their favour, I answer, 1. The views of Dr. Taylor and\n\"those who believe with him,\" on this particular point, were unknown to\nme at the time. Nor is this strange, for it is but lately that those\nviews have been fully developed--never so fully before, probably, as in\nDr. Fitch's review of my sermon, already alluded to. 2. It never\noccurred to me that any man or any set of men holding, in respect to\npredestination, the doctrine of James Arminius, John Wesley, and the\nwhole body of Methodists, would call themselves Calvinists!! This is all\nthe apology I have, and whether or not it is sufficient, the public must\njudge. By acknowledging the views of these gentlemen to be Methodistical\non the subject of predestination, I by no means would be understood to\nsay this of their system as a whole--the objectionable parts will be\nnoticed in their place. But whatever is true is none the less so for\nbeing mixed with error. There are some things, however, to be regretted\nand exposed in the manner in which these reviewers have expressed their\ndoctrine of predestination, and also in the manner in which they have\nopposed the sermon and Arminianism generally. They complain of my\ndefinition of predestination. Mr. M. thinks it is bearing false witness.\nThe reviewer thinks it is obviously erroneous and unjust. And yet they\nthemselves acknowledge that the sermon is an unanswerable refutation of\npredestination as held by Dr. Tyler and others who oppose their views.\nBut what is a matter of the greatest surprise is the determination with\nwhich these gentlemen persist in holding up the idea that their views\nessentially differ from ours. Dr. Fitch, in his answer to my reply,\nsays:--\n\n\"There are three views, and only three, which can be taken of the Divine\npurposes in relation to a moral kingdom:--\n\n1. That God, foreseeing the certainty of the conduct of his creatures,\npurposes merely to _treat them in a corresponding manner_.\n\n2. That he, first of all, resolves _what the conduct of his creatures\nshall be_, and next resolves on such measures as _shall bring_ them to\nthat conduct.\n\n3. That, foreseeing the conduct which will certainly ensue on the\ndifferent measures it is possible for him to take, he purposes to\n_pursue those measures which will certainly lead to the best possible\nresults_.\"\n\n\"The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. Fisk,\nin the sermon we reviewed.\" The writer goes on farther to say that his\nobjection to this is, \"that it is utterly deficient\"--\"that it passes\nover in silence all those acts of God in creation and government by\nwhich he determines character.\" Of course he means to say that the\n_sermon_ advocated a theory which left out of the question all the\nDivine influence in determining character. How strangely he has\nmisunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have read it. It teaches\nthat God hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world: that he\nhas a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and\ncontingencies of government; that God gives the sinner power to choose\nlife; that his grace enlightens and strengthens the sinner to seek after\nand obtain salvation. In short, it must be obvious that no man who\nbelieves in the Divine government and in Gospel provisions can leave\nthis influence out of his system. I will therefore venture upon the\nfollowing declaration, which it is presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay,\nnamely, Dr. F. _never saw a man and never heard of a man_ that was a\nbeliever in revelation, who left out of his creed all that conduct in\nGod which determines character. That such was not the character of my\ncreed, the reviewer might have learned in my reply to his first review,\nif he could not from the sermon. In the reply it is said, \"As God\nforesaw men would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue\nin reference to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own\ninfinite mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to\n'make the wrath of man praise him,' and _deduce the greatest possible\ngood from the best possible system_.\"--And yet, strange to tell, in his\nanswer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were an\nundisputed truth, \"Dr. Fisk advocates the first,\" (meaning the first\nview of the Divine purposes given above.) \"We brought forward the\nthird,\" (meaning the third view.) \"Now since the third upholds the fact\nof foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we have succeeded\nin upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, denies, and which\nCalvinists maintain.\" Whereas he ought to have said, for he had my\nstatement for it directly before him, \"Dr. Fisk advocates the third,\"\nand then he might have added, \"Now since the third destroys the\nCalvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore in assisting Dr. Fisk\nto sustain the third we have succeeded in disproving the doctrine of\nforeordination, which Arminians deny, and Calvinists have attempted to\nmaintain.\" In fact, as the reviewer says, there can be but those three\nviews taken of the Divine purposes; and since neither I nor any other\nArminian ever believed in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself\nacknowledges we are directly opposed to the second, it follows that we\nmust believe the third. But the third is the reviewer's creed: therefore\non this point he is an Arminian, or we are Calvinists.\n\nThat the reviewer's theory on predestination is about the same with the\nMethodists' appears evident from the following quotations from Mr.\nWesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley's creed\ninclude all the Divine influence that goes \"to determine character,\" but\nalso that God \"pursues measures which will certainly lead to the best\npossible results;\" nay, that he does all that he _wisely can_ to exclude\nsin from the moral universe. These are points for which the advocates of\nthe New-Haven theory strongly contend. Let them see, then, how in this\nmatter they have identified themselves with Arminians.\n\n\"To God,\" says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, \"all\nthings are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power,\nas in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only he that can\ndo all things else cannot deny himself--he cannot counteract himself or\noppose his own work. Were it not for this, he would destroy all sin,\nwith its attendant pain, in a moment. But in so doing he would\ncounteract himself, and undo all that he has been doing since he created\nman upon the earth. For he created man in his own image--a spirit endued\nwith understanding, with will or affections, and liberty, without which\nhe would have been incapable of either virtue or vice. He could not be a\nmoral agent, any more than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence\nbe it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus\ncontradict himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it\nwould imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence.\nWhereas all the manifold wisdom of God (as well as all his power and\ngoodness) is displayed in governing man as man--as an intelligent and\nfree spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil.\"\n\nAgain. In the sermon entitled, The Wisdom of God's Counsels: \"In the\nmoral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine\nwill, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full scope\nfor the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of\nGod in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the\nsubtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, the salvation of\nlost mankind.\" Now let me ask the reviewer, is this leaving out all the\nDivine influence that determines character? Is not this maintaining\nthat, \"in view of the measures that it was possible tor God to take, he\npurposes to pursue those measures that will certainly lead to the best\npossible result?\" Is Dr. Fitch ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or\nis he unwilling to identify himself with us? Ignorant of _my_ views he\ncould not be, I think, after reading my reply.--Why, then, does he\npersist in talking of a difference where there is none?\n\nMr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After reading\nmy reply, he says, \"if you will preach this doctrine to your Methodist\nbrethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the strong\narguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it Calvinism,\nI will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I do. And if you\nwill preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they too do not call it\nCalvinism, I will grant that even _they_ too sometimes differ about\nterms. If you will take this course, I think when you shall see what the\ndoctrine will be called, the astonishment you express that it should be\nregarded as Calvinism will wear away.\" Now how surprised Mr. M. will be\nwhen he learns that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly\nand forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever\nsuspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him\nincorporated it into their creed, and _for some reason_ unknown to us,\ncalled it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that he who\nwas so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and Journal, for\nthe purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, and of\ndisabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this subject, himself\nunderstands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet so it is, Calvinists\nthemselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author\nof \"Views in Theology,\" the author or authors of the pamphlet by an\nEdwardian, all condemn the New-Haven theory of predestination as\nanti-Calvinistic, and as being essentially Arminian.\n\nDr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first principles. In\nreply to my answer he says, \"It was certainly our intention to place\nthis contested doctrine on grounds which our Wesleyan brethren _could\nnot_ dispute, and it gives us pleasure to find that in this we have had\ncomplete success!\" There are two things a little remarkable connected\nwith this sentiment. One is, that the writer should so express himself\nas to convey the idea that _he_ has traced up the subject to first\nprinciples with much care, and, to his _great satisfaction, has\nsucceeded in convincing us_ of the correctness of his premises. Whereas\nit is evident from the passages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from\nthe universal sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven\ndoctors have _at length_ come on to our ground; and it gives _us great\npleasure_ to find that, from _some source_, arguments in favour of our\nsystem have with them met with _complete success_. The other thing that\nstrikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had acknowledged\nthat we were agreed in these first principles, he should immediately go\non to say, as has already been mentioned, that I and the Arminians hold\nto the first view he has given of the three possible views that might be\ntaken of predestination, and deny the third; when at the same time the\nthird contains _those very first principles_ in which he says we are\nagreed. This looks so much like a contradiction, almost in the same\nbreath, that I really know not what other name to give it. If these\ngentlemen are disposed to come into the fortress of truth, and assist us\nin manning our guns and working our artillery against error, we\ncertainly can have no objection. We are fond of help. But they must\npardon us if we revolt a little at the idea of their taking the lead in\nthis business, and accounting us as mere novices who have only learned,\nand that too from themselves, some of the _elementary principles_. Nay,\nthey must not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our\npresent commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed\nin front of our own batteries, merely to give our _new allies_ an\nopportunity to blow us up _with our own ordnance!_\n\nIn reply to my objection to the reviewer that \"it was an abuse of terms\nto call the _permission of sin, not hindering it_, &c, a foreordination\nor purpose that it shall be,\" &c, he has said, \"If an evil, unavoidable\nand hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come into his kingdom, in one\nplace and time rather than any other, and is thus _particularly disposed\nof_ by his providence, because it is a disposition of it the best\npossible, is there no purpose of God in relation to the thing? In doing\nhis own pleasure, in this case, does he not decide on the fact of the\nentrance of sin into his kingdom just when and where it does?\" Now I beg\nthe reader to go over this last paragraph once more, and then say if he\ndoes not agree with me in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely\noccurs in any writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a\ncontested question as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between\na \"purpose in relation to a thing,\" and the foreordaining or decreeing\nthat the thing shall be? And pray what is meant by God's \"deciding on\nthe fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?\" You can make it mean\nalmost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch's theory on the\nsubject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin was\nunavoidable, God determined to restrain and control it so as to suffer\nit to do the least harm possible--preferring holiness in its stead in\nevery place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining sin!! This is\npredestination!! Let us illustrate this by a case in point. Cicero, a\nRoman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting treason against the\ncommonwealth. Cicero perceived that this _hated treason_, though\nunavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He determined therefore to\n\"make a disposition of it the best possible.\" He took his measures\naccordingly. By these Cataline and the principal conspirators were\ndriven out of the city, and compelled, before their plans were matured,\nto resort to open hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and\nunited, and the state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy\nwere suffered to come upon the commonwealth \"in one place and time\nrather than any other,\" and \"were thus _particularly disposed of_\" by\nCicero. In this case the consul had a special \"purpose about the thing.\"\nHe determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than\nsuffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the city\nwith fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not to the\nreviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but it is put\nto the common understanding of community, Did the Roman consul ordain or\nforeordain, or predestinate the treason of Cataline? If by common\nconsent all answer, No, such a statement is a libel upon the consul; and\nif, in addition to this common understanding of the term, the\ntheological use of the term will not bear such a construction; if the\ngreat body of the Calvinists of the present day, and of New-England\neven, use the term in a different sense, it remains to be seen how the\nNew-Haven divines can stand up before the world and say, \"We believe God\nhath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.\"\n\nBefore closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if not\nin the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning in the\nsermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is antecedent to\nforeordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have objected because,\nsay they, God must first have determined to make moral agents before he\ncould know they would sin: therefore his knowledge or his foreknowledge\nin this case must depend upon his determination. This objection, at\nleast so far as the New-Haven theology is concerned, is founded in\nerror. What says Dr. Fitch? \"That God, _foreseeing_ the conduct which\nwill certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to\ntake, _purposes_,\" &c. The sermon says, \"God knows all that is, or will\nbe, or might be, under any possible contingency,\" and that \"his plan is\nthe result of his infinite knowledge--the decrees of his throne flow\nforth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom.\" Where is the discrepancy\nhere? God saw this general plan, as a whole, before he resolved upon its\nadoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) he saw, if he made free\nmoral agents, and governed them as such, sin would ensue. And he also\nsaw what he might do in that case to counteract and overrule it to his\nown glory and the good of the universe.--And he judged, in his infinite\nwisdom, that such a moral universe, notwithstanding the sin that would\ncertainly result from it, would, on the whole, be the best; and\ntherefore upon this _foreknowledge_ of the whole, God _founded_ his\ndetermination to create the universe, and govern it as proposed. God's\nforeknowledge of the _certainty_ of any event in this universe, it must\nbe acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern\nthe universe. And in _this sense_ his purpose was _causa sine qua non_,\na cause without which any given event would not have happened, and\ntherefore could not have been foreseen as _certain_. But then it should\nbe remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all this, and\nwhich was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent instances of\nknowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense in which the\nsentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that \"God foreknows\nin order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) predestinate in\norder to foreknow.\"\n\nTo conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one\nclass of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable with\nall that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a rapidly\nincreasing class, have given up Calvinian predestination, and, in all\nbut the name, have in that point come on to the Methodist ground. There\nis still another class, who are evidently not Arminians, but still deny\nthe correctness of my definition of their doctrine. They say they are\nnot chargeable with such a doctrine, either directly or by inference. In\nthe next number, therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from\ntheir own positions this definition.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER VII.\n\nPREDESTINATION, CONTINUED.\n\nFrom my last number the reader will perceive that there are two classes\nof Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one\nthere is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the\ndoctrine; and with the other there is no _need_ of controversy, because\ntheir plain manner of avowing the doctrine, _logical consequences and\nall_, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too\nmonstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a\nlarger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven\ndivines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are\nnevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They\ndeny, as appears from some public intimations and many private\nstatements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine.\nThey appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea,\nthat \"the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and\nefficiently produced by the purpose and decree of God,\"--that these acts\n\"are the result of an overruling and controlling power,\"--\"that the\nwill, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by\nsome secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement.\" Hence,\nI suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine\ncharacteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least,\nbe given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition\nof the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our\nown cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are\nthese, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I\nshall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the\ncandid judge.\n\n1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this\nquestion, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians\nthemselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect\nto anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging\nthese things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system.\nAnd will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of\nunderstanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume\nthat they are free from blinding prejudice in _favour_ of their own\ndoctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be\nasserted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the\npride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal\nopposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what ought\nfirst to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also\nexhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism--a spirit\nthat says to a brother, \"Stand by, for I am holier than thou!\" There\nhave doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and\nhow is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to\nthem as to be able to see it free from these charges?\n\nBut not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these\nopinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a\ngreat variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before\nbeen made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will,\nby the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley's day--and quotations have also been\ngiven from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they\nheld that God moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To\nthese we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly\nacknowledge \"that those scriptures which teach that God has decreed the\nsinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral\nevil.\" (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not\nbe forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied\nCalvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding\nit, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to\nholiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections\nbrought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the\nMethodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated\npredestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers\nfor the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be.\nThe Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand\nthat this doctrine necessarily implies the _Divine efficiency_ in\nproducing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is not\nangry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his\ndecrees.\n\nSuppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments on\neither side, should be informed of what is true in this case, viz. that\na great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest portion of\npredestinarians, and _all_ anti-predestinarians, understood the doctrine\nof absolute predestination, as involving directly, or by consequence,\ncertain specified principles; but that a portion of predestinarians\npersisted in denying that these principles were involved in the\ndoctrine; and suppose this intelligent person should be informed of the\nadditional facts, that these predestinarians had tried all their skill\nat explanation and argument, generation after generation, but had never\nsucceeded in the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from\nthese charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very\nmany were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, for\nthe _very reason_ that they could not rid the system, in which they had\nbeen educated, from those principles which were charged upon it--and\nthat even among those who had adhered to the old doctrine there were new\nmodes of explaining and stating the theory, constantly springing up,\nuntil finally numbers of them _had explained themselves entirely out of\nthe doctrine_, and into the opposite sentiment; and that very many\nothers, by adhering to the doctrine, and following out the principles\ninvolved in it, had come to the conclusion that there was \"no hell\"--no\njudgment, and \"no angry God.\" Suppose, I say, this intelligent man\nshould be informed of all these facts, and then be requested to\n_presume_ whether or not these contested principles were involved in the\ndoctrine--what would be his judgment? I need not answer this question.\nThere is _strong_ presumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are\ncorrect.\n\n2. Another reason for believing that this doctrine is what we have\ndefined it to be, and involves in it the principles we have charged upon\nit, is drawn from the terms in which it is expressed, and the manner and\ncircumstances in which these terms are used. The more common terms are\n_decree, predestination, foreordination, predetermination, purpose_,\n&c.--These are all authoritative terms, and carry with them the idea of\nabsolute sovereignty. But lest they should not be sufficiently strong\nand imperious, they are, in this theory, generally accompanied by some\nstrong qualifying terms, such as _sovereign decree, eternal and\nimmutable purposes;_ and without any reference to other bearings, the\nwhole is placed on the ground of God's absolute and sovereign will.\nThese sovereign decrees, however, are not proposed to his subjects in\nthe light of a law enforced by suitable sanctions, and liable to be\nbroken. They are the _secret counsels_ of his own will; and so far from\nbeing law, that often, perhaps oftener than otherwise, in the moral\nworld, they are in direct opposition to the precepts of the law. When\nthese decrees come in contact with the law they supersede it. Laws may\nsometimes be broken, the decrees, never. God commits his law to\nsubordinate moral agents, who may break or keep them; but his decrees he\nexecutes himself. It should also be understood that the advocates of\nthis theory, in their late controversy with Dr. Taylor, strenuously\nmaintain that sin, wherever it occurs, is preferable to holiness in its\nstead, and is the _necessary means_ of the _greatest good_. The idea\nthat God, foreseeing what moral agents would do, under all possible\ncircumstances, _so ordered his works_ as to take up and incorporate into\nhis plan the foreseen volitions of moral agents, and thus constitute a\ngrand whole, as perfect as any system which involves a moral government\ncould be, they discard as rank Arminianism. Now is it possible that\ndecrees like these, concealed in the eternal mind of him that conceived\nthem--dependent solely on Almighty power to execute them, not modified\nby subordinate agencies, but made to control these agencies with\nabsolute and arbitrary sway; can it be _possible_, I say, that such\ndecrees do not efficiently control and actuate the human will? Must not\nhe who, in this manner, forms and executes the general plan, also form\nand execute all its parts? Must not he who gives the first impulse to\nthis concatenation of events, linked together by his eternal purposes,\nfollow up the whole with his continued and direct agency, and carry on\nthis work in every mind and through every emotion? Most assuredly he\nmust. His is, undoubtedly, according to this doctrine, that operative,\ncontrolling and propelling energy that\n\n   \"Lives through all life, extends through all extent,\n   Acts undivided, operates unspent.\"\n\nAnd that we may be sure not to misrepresent the Calvinists on this\nsubject, let them speak for themselves. Dr. Hill, who is a modern, and\nis reputed a moderate Calvinist, says:--\"The Divine decree is the\ndetermination to _produce_ the universe, that is, the _whole series_ of\n_beings_ and _events_ that was then future.\" Dr. Chalmers, who has been\nesteemed so moderate a Calvinist, that some had doubted whether he had\nnot given up absolute predestination altogether, comes out in his sermon\non predestination in the following language:--\"Every step of every\nindividual character, receives as determinate a character from the hand,\nof God, as every mile of a planet's orbit, or every gust of wind, or\nevery wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every\nrivulet of flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions: it is\nabsolute and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its\nresistless influence to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of\nexistence. It _reigns_ and operates through all the secrecies of the\ninner man. It gives birth to every purpose, it gives impulse to every\ndesire, it gives shape and colour to every conception. It wields an\nentire ascendancy over every attribute of the mind; and the will, and\nthe fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of\ntheir hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives\nmovement and direction through every one point of our pilgrimage. At no\nmoment of time does it abandon us. It follows us to the hour of death,\nand it carries us to our place, and to our everlasting destiny in the\nregion beyond it!!!\" These quotations need no comment; if they do not\ncome up to all we have ever charged upon this doctrine, there is no\ndefinite meaning in words.\n\nBut we have another authority on this subject, which bears more directly\non the Calvinists of this country, the Assembly's Catechism. Dr. Fitch,\nwho is certainly as well qualified to judge in this matter as another\nman, informs us, through the medium of the Christian Spectator, that\n\"the articles of faith prepared by that body, (the assembly of English\nand Scotch divines at Westminster,) are considered as expressing\nessentially the views not only of the Presbyterian Church in this\ncountry, but also of the orthodox Congregational Churches of\nNew-England.\" It is known, also, that the Shorter Catechism has been\nalmost universally used by them in their families, and in the religious\ninstruction of their children. Here then we have a standard of faith,\nwhich all the _classes_, I suppose, will acknowledge,--and what saith\nit? After stating that the decrees of God are his eternal purpose,\naccording to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he\nhath foreordained whatsoever cometh to pass, it goes on to say, \"God\n_executeth_ his decrees in the works of creation and providence,\" and\nthen for farther explanation adds--\"God's works of providence are his\nmost holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his\ncreatures and all their actions.\" This is certainly an awkward sentence,\nif I may be allowed to say this of the productions of an assembly which\nhas been characterised as a paragon of excellency in erudition and\ntheology. Its meaning, however, according to grammar and logic, must be,\nthat by his acts of providence God, in a most holy, wise, and powerful\nmanner, preserves and governs both all his creatures, and all their\nactions. But as it seems to be a solecism to talk about _preserving\nactions_, we will understand _preserving_ to belong to _creatures_, and\n_governing_ to _actions_, and then it will be thus: God powerfully\npreserves all his creatures, and powerfully governs all their actions:\nand it is in this way he _executes_ his decrees. There are evidently two\nmethods of governing. That control which is made up of legal precepts,\nand sanctions, and retributions, is called a government; not that all\nthe subjects of such a government always obey its ordinances, but if\nthey violate them, they are subjected to punishment. _This_ is evidently\nnot the kind of government that the assembly contemplated. It was a\ngovernment by which God _executed his decrees;_ but, as we have seen,\nhis decrees are not his laws, for they are frequently in direct\nopposition to his laws. Decree and law are not only frequently opposed,\nin respect to the moral action demanded by each, but even where those\ndemands are coincident they differ greatly in the _manner_ and\n_certainty_ of their fulfilment. Of course government, by _executing\ndecrees_, is another thing altogether from government by _executing\nlaws_. But there is another kind of government. It is that _efficient\ncontrol_ of a superior, by which a being or an act is _made to be what\nit is_, in opposition to _non-existence_, or a _different existence_.\nNow this appears to be precisely the kind of government alluded to when\nit said, \"God _executes his decrees_ by powerfully _governing_ all the\nactions of his creatures.\" That is, he efficiently produces and controls\nall the responsible volitions, good and bad, of the moral universe. And\nwhat is this, but affirming all that the sermon has affirmed on this\nsubject? If any one is disposed to deny that this is a fair exposition\nof the Catechism, let him reflect that as he cannot pretend that\n_government_ here means a _legal administration_, it will be incumbent\non him to show what other fair construction can be put upon it than the\none given above; to show how God can execute a secret decree, by his own\npowerful act, in any other way than in the one already explained.\n\nIn corroboration of the foregoing views it should also be borne in mind,\nthat the Calvinists uniformly use these very same terms, _decree,\npredestination_, &c, in the _same sense_, in reference to _all events_.\nThey say, God's decrees extend to all events, physical and moral, good\nand evil, by which they must mean, if they mean any thing intelligible,\nthat his predestination bears the same relation to all events. If then\nhis decree of election embraces the means to the accomplishment of the\nend, so also must his decree of reprobation. If his decree of election\nrequires for its accomplishment an _efficient_ operation, so also does\nhis decree of reprobation. If Divine agency is directly and efficiently,\nrequisite to produce a good volition, it must follow that it is in the\nsame sense requisite to produce a sinful volition.\n\nTo tell us a thousand times, without any distinction or discrimination,\nthat all things are _equally_ the result of the Divine decree, and then\ntell us that the relation between God's decree and sin is essentially\ndifferent from the relation existing between his decree and holiness,\nwould certainly be a very singular and unwarrantable use of language.\nHow then, I inquire, does God produce holy volitions?--Why, say the\nCalvinists, by a direct, positive, and efficient influence upon the\nwill, and in proof quote--\"Thy people _shall_ be willing in the day of\nthy power.\" Well, how, I ask again, does God execute his decrees\nrespecting unholy volitions? Consistency requires the same reply. But,\nsays the Calvinist, he need not exert the same influence to produce\nunholy volitions, because it is in accordance with the nature of sinful\nmen to sin. Indeed! and is not this _nature_ the result of a decree? It\nwould seem God approaches his work of executing his decree _respecting\nsin_, either more reluctantly or with greater difficulty, so that it\nrequires two steps to execute this, and only one the other. It is in\nboth cases, however, equally his work. This will be seen more clearly if\nwe turn our attention to the first sin; for it is certainly as much\nagainst a perfectly holy nature to commit sin, as it is against an\nunholy nature to have a holy volition. Hence the one as much requires a\ndirect and positive influence as the other, and therefore the passage in\nthe 110th Psalm, if it applies at all to a positive Divine influence in\nchanging the will, must have a much more extensive meaning, than has\nbeen generally supposed. It should be paraphrased thus:--Not only shall\nthy elect people, who are yet in their sins, and therefore not yet in a\nstrict and proper sense thine, be made willing to become holy in the day\nthat thou dost efficiently change their will, but also thy angels and\nthy first created human pair, who were before their fall more truly\nthine, as they were made perfectly holy, shall be made willing to become\nunholy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their wills from\nsubmission to rebellion. For if Divine efficiency is necessary to make a\nnaturally perverse will holy, it is also necessary to make a naturally\nholy will perverse.\n\nI am aware that we may be met here by this reply, that although God does\nefficiently control the will, still it is in a way suited to the nature\nof mind, and consistent with free agency, because he operates upon the\nmind through the influence of moral suasion, or by the power of motives.\nTo this it may be answered, that the Calvinists generally condemn Dr.\nTaylor's views of conversion, because they suspect him of holding that\nmotives alone convert the sinner; whereas they deem it necessary that\nthe Holy Spirit should act directly upon the will; if so, then, as I\nhave shown above, it is also necessary that there should be a direct\nDivine influence upon the will of a holy being, to make him sinful. And\nthis more especially, since both changes are decreed, and both stand in\nthe same relation to the Divine purpose. But this doctrine of motives\nleads me to another argument, viz.\n\n3. That the view I have taken of predestination is correct, appears\nevident from the Calvinistic doctrine of motives, especially when this\ndoctrine is viewed in connection with the Calvinistic theory of\ndepravity.\n\nThe doctrine of motives I understand to be this, that \"the power of\nvolition is never excited, nor _can be_, except in the presence and from\nthe excitement of motives,\" (see \"Views in Theology,\") and that the mind\nmust necessarily be swayed by the strongest motive, or by what appears\nto the mind to be the greatest good. Dr. Edwards, following Leibnitz,\nincorporated this doctrine of philosophical necessity with the\nCalvinistic theology. In this he has been followed by a great portion, I\nbelieve, of the Calvinistic clergy. Without stopping here to attempt a\nrefutation of this theory, my present object is to show that it\nnecessarily fastens upon Calvinism the charges brought against it, and\nsustains the definition that has been given to predestination. For since\nGod creates both the mind and the motives, and brings them together for\nthe _express purpose_ that the former should be swayed by the latter, it\nfollows conclusively that God _efficiently_ controls the will, and\nproduces all its volitions. And this is according to express Calvinistic\nteaching:--\"God,\" says the author of \"Views in Theology,\" already\nquoted, \"God is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the\ndeterminers of choices.\" The inference therefore is plain and\nunavoidable, _God is the determiner of choices_. The plea that God does\nnot produce volitions, by a direct influence, but indirectly, through\nsecond causes, avails nothing. Although there should be ten, or ten\nthousand intermediate links, if they are all arranged by our Creator in\nsuch order as to produce the intellectual vibration intended, whenever\nhe pleases to give the impulse, what is the difference? In point of\nefficient agency, none at all. Nor yet will it alter the case to say,\nthat \"this effect is produced by God through such a medium as is suited\nto the nature of the mind, and therefore it cannot be said, that God\ndoes any violence to the will, or to man's free agency.\" God created the\n_mind_, and the _means_ that were to influence it. He gave to mind its\nnature, and to motives their influence and arrangement, for _this very\npurpose_. Hence, unless man can unmake himself, he is _bound by the law\nof his nature_ to act in all cases as he does. Why talk about a _free_\nagency when it is such an agency as _must_, by _the constitution_ of\n_God_, lead inevitably to sin and ruin! That old, and in the premises,\nfoolish reply, that man could do differently, _if he chose_, does not\nhelp the case. It is only saying, the nature of man is such that it is\ngoverned by his perceptions, and since \"God is the determiner of\nperceptions, and perceptions the determiners of choices,\" whenever God\npleases to alter the perceptions so as thereby to change the choice,\n_then_, and not before, man can do differently. According to this\ndoctrine is it possible, according to the very nature of mind, for the\nchoice to be different until the perceptions are changed? And can the\nperceptions be changed, until God changes them? To answer either or both\nof these questions in the affirmative, would be to give up the doctrine\nof motives. To answer them in the negative, would be to entail upon the\ndoctrine all that I have charged upon it. The advocates of the theory\nmay have their choice. Nor yet, again, will it destroy the force of this\nargument, to say \"man has an _unholy nature;_ and this is the reason why\nthe motives presented influence him to sin; therefore the guilt is\nchargeable upon himself, and God is clear.\" For, in the first place,\nthis would not account for the first unholy volitions of holy angels and\nthe first human pair.\n\nThis argument presupposes that, but for the consideration of man's\n_unholy nature_, the charge against the Calvinistic theory would be\nvalid. And inasmuch as here are cases in which the argument obviously\naffords no relief to the system, it follows that in these uses, at\nleast, God is the efficient and procuring cause of unholy volitions--and\ntherefore the charges against predestination are established. But by a\nlittle farther attention we shall see that this argument affords as\nlittle relief to the system in the case of man as he now is. For this\nfirst sin, which was itself the necessary result of the Divine\narrangement and of positive Divine influence, threw, if possible, a\nstronger and a more dire necessity over all the coming generations of\nmen. For this act entailed upon man a depraved heart. Hence this corrupt\nnature came upon man without his knowledge or agency. We trace it back\nthen, thus:--Man's love of sin was produced by the unholy choice of the\nfirst pair--that choice was produced by perceptions--these perceptions\nwere produced by motives--and these motives were brought by God to bear\nupon the minds which he had made for this very purpose--therefore God,\nby design, and because he purposed it, produced our corrupt nature; and\nthen, for the express purpose of leading that unholy nature to put forth\nunholy volitions, he brings those motives to bear upon our minds, which,\nfrom the unavoidable nature of those minds, _must produce_ the sin\ndesigned. It is thus that, according to his theory, our Creator binds\nthe human mind by the strong cords of depravity with one hand, and with\nthe other lashes it, by the maddening scourge of motives, into all the\nexcitement of unholy delirium; and then, for his own glory, consigns the\nsinner over to the prison house of wo!! Turn this system, then, as you\nwill, you find this doctrine of predestination binding the human mind,\nand efficiently producing all the volitions of the moral universe. The\nstrong arm of Jehovah not more directly and irresistibly moves and binds\nthe planets in their orbits, than it moves and controls, in the\nmysterious circle of his eternal decrees, \"all the actions of all his\ncreatures.\"\n\nI know, as a closing argument, it is urged, whatever may be our\ninferences, we all know that we are free, and that we are responsible,\nbecause _we are conscious of it_. This is a most singular course of\nreasoning, and seems to have been adopted to reconcile contradictions.\nIf this doctrine be true, I am not _sure_ that I am free, and that I am\nresponsible merely because I feel that I am. I am at least _quite_ as\nconscious that I ought not to be held responsible for what is\nunavoidable, as I am that I am possessed of moral liberty. Break down my\nconsciousness in one case, and you prepare the way for me to suspect it\nof fallacy in another. And if I must give up my consciousness, between\ntwo alternatives I will choose that which will not involve the\ngovernment of God in injustice, and myriads of intelligent beings in\nunavoidable perdition. Hence, with Dr. Edwards' premises, which he holds\nin common with Lord Kaimes, I would come to his lordship's conclusion,\nviz. that God never intended to hold men responsible, and the universal\nfeeling of responsibility is a kind of pious fraud--a salutary delusion,\nimposed as a check and restraint upon man here, but to be followed by no\nunpleasant consequences either here or hereafter. But this would be\ncharging our Creator with both deception and folly--deception in the\ndelusive consciousness of responsibility, and folly in suffering Lord\nKaimes and others to disclose the secret, and frustrate the Divine\npurpose! This cannot be. The charge of deception and of fallacy,\ntherefore, must be rolled back from consciousness and from the throne of\nGod upon the doctrine of predestination. And if the reaction should\ncrush the theory for ever, it would doubtless be a blessing to the\nChurch and to the world.\n\nTo conclude. For the reasons given, I must still maintain that the\ncharges contained in the sermon against that modification of Calvinism I\nam now opposing, are just; and the definition assumed, is correct. If\nthe advocates of the system can clear themselves, or their doctrine, let\nit be done. If not, let one of two courses be pursued--either let the\nsystem be abandoned, or _let us have it as it is_.\n\nI have dwelt the longer on this subject, because I am weary, and I\nbelieve we all are, of hearing the oft-repeated complaint, \"You\nmisrepresent us!\" \"You mistake our doctrine!\"\n\nIn the next No., by the leave of Providence, the nature of human agency,\nand the ground of human responsibility, will be examined.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER VIII.\n\nMORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.\n\nBY what has been said on the theory of Calvinistic predestination, it\nwill be seen, I think, that this system involves such necessity of moral\naction as is incompatible with free agency. It is possible, I grant, to\ngive to the terms _will, liberty, free agency_, such a definition as\nwill make these terms, _thus defined_, compatible with the other\npeculiarities of the Calvinistic system.--Both parties agree that man is\na free moral agent; both maintain that he is responsible; but we\nmaintain that what the Calvinists call free moral agency, is not such in\nfact as is commonly understood by the term, nor such as is requisite to\nmake man accountable. Here, therefore, we are again thrown back upon our\ndefinitions, as the starting point of argument. What is that power, or\nproperty, or faculty of the mind, which constitutes man a free moral\nagent? It is the power of choice, connected with liberty to choose\neither good or evil. Both the _power_ and _liberty_ to choose either\n_good_ or _evil_ are requisite to constitute the free agency of a\nprobationer. It has been contended that choice, though from the\ncondition of the moral agent it must of necessity be exclusively _on one\nside_, is nevertheless free; since it implies a _voluntary_ preference\nof the mind. Hence it is contended that the fallen and the holy angels,\nglorified and lost human spirits, though some of these are confined in\nan impeccable state, and the others have a perpetual and invincible\nenmity to good, are nevertheless free agents. With respect to the free\nagency of these beings, a question might be started, whether it is such\nas renders them responsible for their _present acts_, the decision of\nwhich might have some bearing on the subject under investigation; but\nnot such bearing as would make it important to discuss it here. If they\nare responsible for their _present acts_, it must be on account of a\nformer probation, which by sin they have judicially forfeited. Or if any\none thinks otherwise, and is disposed to maintain that a being who is\nnot, and _never was_ so circumstanced as to render the choice of good\npossible to him, is nevertheless a free moral agent, in any such sense\nas renders him accountable, with such a sentiment at present I have no\ncontroversy. Indeed such an opinion is so violent an outrage upon all\nthe acknowledged principles of justice, that to controvert it would be a\nwork of little profit.\n\nIt is certain that the moral standing of those angels and men whose\nstates are now unalterably fixed, differs materially from their\nprobationary state; and this difference renders their moral agency\nunsuited to illustrate the agency of beings who are on probation. Man,\nin this life, is in a state of trial; good and evil are presented before\nhim as objects of choice; and upon this choice are suspended eternal\nconsequences of happiness or misery. Of a being thus circumstanced, it\nis not enough to say he is free to choose as he does, unless you can\nsay, also, he is equally free to make an opposite choice.--Hence, in\ndefining the free agency of man, as a probationer, we say, as above,\nthat it implies a power of choice, with full liberty to choose either\ngood or evil.\n\nThe foregoing definition, at first view, seems sufficient for all\npractical purposes, and so indeed it would have been, if a speculative\nphilosophy had not thrown it into the alembic of metaphysics for\ndecomposition and analysis. It is doubtful whether this process has\nsubserved the cause of truth; nay, it is certain, I think, that it has\nproduced many perplexing refinements and speculations that have greatly\naided the cause of error. Into these abstrusities, therefore, it seems\nnecessary to follow this question, to try, if possible, to draw out and\ncombine the elements of truth.\n\nHaving defined free agency to mean _the power of choice_, &c, it is\nasked again, _What is this power of choice?_ It is probable that the\ndifferent answers given to this question constitute the fundamental\ndifferences between Calvinists and Arminians. To the above question\nsome, like the reply of the Jews to Christ, have said, \"We cannot tell.\"\nAnd they give this evasive reply perhaps for a reason similar to that\nwhich influenced the Jews; they fear that a definite answer will involve\nthemselves or their theory in difficulty. This is a very convenient way\nto avoid responsibility, but not indicative of much fairness, or\nconfidence in their cause. When men have involved their system in\napparent contradictions, it will hardly satisfy the candid inquirer\nafter truth to see them start aside from the very point that is to give\ncharacter to their whole system. We are told by men who reason upon\nforeknowledge, &c, that \"God hath decreed whatsoever comes to pass;\" and\nthen we are told that all men are free, and they enter into a great deal\nof metaphysical speculation about foreknowledge, the nature of voluntary\naction, &c, to prove these positions; but when they are pressed upon\nthis point, \"How can you reconcile with free agency that kind of Divine\nefficiency necessary to secure the execution of the decrees, and that\nkind of dependency of moral agents which this efficiency implies?\" the\nreply is, \"We cannot tell--the how in the case we cannot explain.\" This\nevasion might be allowable, perhaps, in either of the two following\ncases: 1. If the apparent discrepancy of the two positions grew out of\nwhat is _mysterious_, and not of what is _palpably contradictory;_ or,\n2. If both propositions were so _clearly proved_, that it would do\ngreater violence to our reasons, and be a greater outrage upon all\nacknowledged principles of belief, to disbelieve either of them, than it\nwould to believe them with all their apparent contradictions. With\nrespect to the first alternative, it appears to me, and doubtless it\nwould so appear to all whose prejudices did not mislead the mind, that\nthe want of apparent agreement between the two is not for lack of light\nin the case, but from the natural incongruity of the things compared.\nWhen you say, \"God executes his decrees by efficiently controlling the\nwill of man,\" and say also, \"The mind of man is free,\" both these\npropositions are clear; there is nothing mysterious about them. But you\nsay, perhaps, \"The mystery is in the want of light to see the\n_agreement_ of the two; we cannot _see_ their agreement, but we should\nnot therefore infer that they do not agree.\" I answer, What is light, in\nthis case, but a clear conception of the propositions? This we have, and\nwe see that they are, _in their nature_, incompatible; and the more\nlight you can pour upon this subject, the more clearly must this\nincompatibility appear. If you say that \"perhaps neither you nor I fully\nunderstand the meaning of these propositions;\" then I reply, _We have no\nbusiness to use them_. \"Who is this that darkens counsel by words\nwithout knowledge?\" And this is what I have already complained of; men\nwill reason themselves into propositions which they call doctrinal\nfacts, but which seem to the eye of common sense to have all the\ncharacteristics of contradictions, and when we urge these contradictions\nin objection, the objection is not allowed to have any weight, because\nwe do not fully understand the propositions. So then the propositions\nmust be received, _though we do not understand them!_ and though, as far\nas we do understand them, they are obviously incompatible!! Is this the\nway to gain knowledge, and to make truth triumphant? How much more\nconsistent to say, Since it is evident the mind is free, and since the\ndoctrine of predestination is apparently incompatible with that freedom,\ntherefore this doctrine should be exploded!\n\nOr will this second alternative be resorted to? Will it be said that\nboth of these propositions are so clearly proved, that to deny them\nwould do greater violence to our reasons, and the principles of belief,\nthan to acknowledge them, notwithstanding their apparent incongruity?\nLet us examine them. Of one of them we cannot doubt, unless we doubt all\nprimary truths, viz. That the human mind is free. It is presumed, if the\nquestion come to this, that they must either give up human liberty or\nthe dogma of predestination, candid Calvinists themselves would not\nhesitate; they would say, the _former_ must stand, whatever becomes of\nthe _latter_. If I am correct here, it follows that, predestinarians\nthemselves being judges, the doctrine of predestination is not so clear\nas some other moral truths. But is there any thing clearer than that man\nought not to be held accountable for what is unavoidable? that he ought\nnot to be held to answer for volitions that are efficiently controlled\nby a superior? To me this is as clear as consciousness itself can make\nit, and I think it must be to mankind in general. If I am correct, then\nwe come to the conclusion at once, that to believe in the compatibility\nof predestination with human liberty and accountability does more\nviolence to the laws of belief than it would to discard predestination.\nWhatever, therefore, may _seem_ to be favourable to this doctrine,\nshould be sacrificed to a stronger claim upon our belief in another\ndirection. But, that the argument may be set in as strong light as\npossible, let the evidence of predestination be adduced. What is it? It\nis not consciousness certainly; and it is almost as clear that it is not\nmoral demonstration by a course of reasoning. The most I believe that\nhas ever been said, in the way of moral demonstration, has been in an\nargument founded on foreknowledge, which argument, it is supposed by the\nauthor, is fairly disposed of in the sermon on predestination, by\nreasoning which has not, to his knowledge, ever been refuted. A\nrefutation has been attempted, I grant, by some of the reviewers of the\nsermon, but the only apparent success that attended those attempts was,\nas we have already seen, in consequence of their taking the very ground\nof the sermon, and building the decrees of God upon a prior view and\nknowledge of all possible contingencies. If consciousness and reasoning\nare taken away from this doctrine, it has nothing left to stand upon but\ntestimony. And no testimony but Divine will here be of any authority;\nand does revelation prove this doctrine? In the sermon on predestination\nit was stated that \"there was not a single passage in the Bible which\nteaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass;\"\nand it is not known to the writer, that among the different reviews of\nthe sermon it has even been attempted to show that the statement was\nincorrect. But if a solitary passage could have been adduced, should we\nnot have heard of it? The evidence from Scripture then, if there is any,\nis indirect, and merely by inference. And even this indirect testimony\nis far from being the best of its kind; so, at least, a great portion of\nbelievers in revelation think.\n\nNow, candid reader, if you have carefully followed the chain of thought\nthus far, let me ask you to pause and propound for yourself, and\nhonestly answer the following question--\"Is there so much evidence in\nfavour of predestination, that I should do more violence to my own\nreason, and the laws of belief, by rejecting it, than I should by\nbelieving that this doctrine is compatible with free agency and\naccountability?\" Indeed, Calvinists themselves have so felt the force of\nthese difficulties, when the terms predestination and free will have\nbeen understood in their common and obvious sense, that they have\nattempted a variety of explanations of these terms to do away, if\npossible, the apparent discrepancy. These attempts have been the\nprincipal cause of those changes and modifications in the Calvinistic\nsystem, alluded to in a former number. The various explanations and\ndefinitions that have been given to foreordination, have already been\nnoticed. We have seen how every effort failed of affording any relief to\nthe system, until we came down to the last; I mean that of the New-Haven\ndivines. This new theory does indeed avoid the difficulty, but avoids it\nonly by giving up the doctrine! Any thing short of this amounts to\nnothing; it stands forth still the \"_absolute decree_,\" fixed as fate,\nand fixing, strong as fate, all the acts of subordinate intelligences.\nAny _real_ modification of it is a virtual renunciation, and a\nsubstitution in its stead of the public and consistent decree of Heaven,\n\"He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be\ndamned.\"\n\nNot succeeding as was hoped in such a definition of predestination as\nwould harmonize the opposing propositions, repeated trials have been\nmade to define and explain _human liberty_ and the _power of choice_, so\nas to _bend_ these into a coincidence with the _inflexible decree_. This\nbrings us back to the inquiry started above: \"What is this power of\nchoice?\" Now as this is a point more metaphysical in its nature than the\nproposition embracing the decrees, so there is more ground for laboured\nargument and refined speculation. Only one theory, however, needs to be\nparticularly noticed:--1. Because it is the most plausible of any other,\nso that if this will not bear the test, it is probable no other will;\nand 2. Because this is the theory which is now pretty generally, and\nperhaps almost universally adopted by the Calvinists; I mean the\nCalvinistic doctrine of motives. It is in substance this: the power of\nchoice is that power which the mind has of acting in view of motives,\nand of deciding according to the strongest motive. The strength and\ndirection of volition are always in accordance with the motive. And this\nrelation between mind and motives is fixed by the very constitution of\nour natures, so that it may be said there is a constitutional necessity\nthat the mind should be controlled by motives. These motives are\nmultitudinous and various.--All conceptions and perceptions of the mind,\nfrom whatever cause, productive of pleasure or pain, exciting emotions\nof love or aversion, are motives; or, more properly, perhaps, the causes\nof these mental states are motives. Between these motives and the mind\nthere is such a connection, that the _former_ not only excite, but\ncontrol the _latter_, in all its volitions. The nature of this relation\nis of course beyond the limits of human investigation: all we can say\nis, such is the nature of motives and of mind. Such is the theory. The\narguments by which it is defended are in substance the following\n--experience and observation. We are conscious, it is said, of acting\nfrom motives, and it is universally understood that others also act from\nmotives. It is on this principle that we govern ourselves in our\nintercourse with men; by this we calculate with moral certainty, in many\ninstances, what will be the conduct of a man in a given case; and, upon\nsuch calculations, we form most of our maxims, and rules of conduct in\nsocial life: nay, it is said a man that will act without a reason must\nbe insane--that, on this ground, whenever a man acts it is common to\ninquire what _induced_ him. What motive had he? That even children, at a\nvery early age so readily recognize this principle, that they are\nconstantly inquiring why do you do this or that. Such are the strongest\narguments by which this theory is sustained--arguments too strong it is\nsupposed to be overthrown.\n\nI object to the sovereign control of the mind by motives. But in\noffering my objections, it should first be observed that no man, in his\nsenses, it is presumed, will deny that motives have an important\ninfluence in determining our volitions. Nor is it necessary, in order to\noppose the doctrine of the controlling power of motives, to deny that\nthe power of volition may have been waked up to action, in the first\ninstance, by motive influence, or that the mind ever after may, in all\nits volitions, be more or less under this influence. As these are points\nwhich do not materially affect the question at issue between us and the\nCalvinists, they may be left out of the discussion for the present. The\nquestion is this--Has the mind a self-determining power, by which it can\nspontaneously decide, independent of the _control_ of motives, or is the\nmind absolutely controlled by motives? We maintain the former--our\nopponents the latter. By establishing our position, we disprove\ntheirs--by disproving theirs we establish ours--and it is believed that\ntheirs can be directly disproved, and ours directly established; at\nleast so far as we can hope to arrive at demonstration on these\nextremely difficult points.\n\n1. My first objection to this doctrine of motive influence is, that most\nof the arguments by which it is defended, as directly and certainly\nprove that the Divine mind is subject to the absolute control of motives\nas that human minds are. It is argued, that to maintain the doctrine of\nspontaneous volition, independent of the _control_ of motives, involves\nthe absurdity, that \"our volitions are excited without any intelligent\nreasons whatever, and as the effect, consequently, of nothing better\nthan a mere brute or senseless mechanism.\" (_Views in Theology_, p.\n163.)--Now if this has any bearing on the question, it relates not to\nhuman mind and human volition merely, but to _mind in general_, and must\napply to the Divine mind. The same may be said, in fact, of most of the\narguments that are brought in favour of this doctrine. Calvinists are\nconvinced of this--and hence this also is a part of their creed. It was\ndefended by Dr. Edwards, and is thus avowed by Professor Upham, in his\nSystem of Mental Philosophy. Speaking of the control of motives, he\nsays, \"Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same\nwith that of the Supreme Being himself--he is _inevitably_ governed in\nall his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and\nbest.\" (Vol. ii, p. 381.) Thus the Divine Being is, according to this\ntheory, and by the express showing of the leading advocates of the\ntheory, \"_inevitably_\" made a subordinate to a superior. It is believed\nthere is no avoiding this conclusion; and what then? Why then the\ndoctrine makes God a necessary agent, and leads to atheism! It is\nnearly, if not exactly, the same as the old heathen doctrine of fate.\nThe ancient heathens supposed that Jupiter himself, the omnipotent\nfather of the gods and men, must yield to fate. Modern Christians teach\nthat there is a certain fitness of things, certain constitutional\nrelations, existing independent of the Divine will, which God himself\ncannot supersede, but to which he must yield. How does this sink, at\nonce, both the natural and moral perfections of God! The exercises of\nhis wisdom and goodness are nothing more than the result of certain\nfixed and irresistible influences. Fixed not by God himself, for that\nwould be to give up the doctrine; for in that case, in the order of\ncause and effect, the Divine mind must have acted without control of\nmotive, if this law of motive influence did not exist until the Divine\nvolition willed it into being and if he could once act independent of\nthis control, he might so act for ever; and the argument built on the\nabsurdity of volition, without an intelligent reason, is contradicted.\nBut if that argument has any weight, it fixes, in the order of cause and\neffect, a paramount influence eternally antecedent to the exercise of\nthe Divine mind, and controlling that mind with irresistible sway. This\nis fate! This is atheism! Once set up an influence that controls the\nDivine mind, call that influence what you will, _fitness of\nthings--fate--energy_ of nature--or necessary relation, and that moment\nyou make God a subordinate; you hurl him from his throne of sovereignty,\nand make him the instrument of a superior. Of what use is such a Deity?\nMight we not as well have none! Nay better, as it seems to me, if under\nthe control of his own native influence he is led to create beings\nsusceptible of suffering, and fix the relations of those beings to the\nmotives around them such, that by a law of their nature they are\n\"inevitably\" led to sin and endless wo! Is it to be wondered at, that\nmany Calvinists have become infidels? This doctrine of motives is the\nvery essence of the system of Spinoza, whose deity was the _energy of\nnature!_ The supreme controlling power of Dr. Edwards and his followers\nis the _energy of motives_, which exists in the nature of things,\nanterior to the will of God. Can any one point out any essential\ndifference between the two systems?\n\nSuch are the objections to _any arguments_ in favour of the doctrine\nthat motives \"inevitably\" control the volitions of intelligent beings\n_in general_, involving of course the highest intelligence. But if any\nare disposed to give up this doctrine, as essential to intelligent\nvolition in general, and choose to maintain it only in respect to the\nvolitions of some particular intelligent beings; then they must give up\nall the strongest of their arguments. If God is free from this\n_control_, they must acknowledge also, or give some reason for their\ndissent, that he may, if he chooses, make and sustain subordinate\nintelligences, having the same freedom from this control; and if they\nacknowledge that there is nothing in the nature of the case that renders\nthis an impossibility, then they must show, if they can, that though God\n_might_ constitute beings otherwise, he has _so constituted man_ as to\nrender him incapable of choice, except _when_ and _as_ motives direct,\nby an inevitable influence. But in attempting this they must meet other\ndifficulties in their course, which, it is believed, will greatly\nembarrass the system. These difficulties, however, together with the\narguments which I design to advance directly in favour of the opposite\nview, must be reserved for another number.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER IX.\n\nMORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTINUED.\n\nAnother argument against the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is, that it\nleads to materialism. The doctrine, it will be recollected, is this:\nWhen the mind is brought into connection with objects of choice, it is\n_inevitably_ led, by a law of its nature, to the selection of one rather\nthan of the other, unless there is a _perfect equality_ between them; in\nwhich case I suppose, of course, the mind must remain in equilibrium;\nfor if it moves only by the influence of motives, and to the same degree\nand in the same direction with motive influence, of course when it is\nequally attracted in opposite directions it must be at rest! It is on\nthis ground that Leibnitz maintained that God could not make two\nparticles of matter in all respects alike; because, in that case, being\n\"inevitably\" governed by motives in his decisions, he could not\ndetermine where to place them, both having the same influence on his\nmind for a location in the same place! The same writer represents this\nmotive influence, also, as frequently imperceptible, but not the less\neffectual, and not the less voluntary! And to illustrate it makes the\nfollowing comparison:--\"It is as if a needle, touched with a loadstone,\nwere sensible of and pleased with its turning to the north, for it would\nbelieve that it turned itself independent of any other cause, not\nperceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic power.\" This statement\nof Leibnitz, who had paid great attention to this philosophical theory,\nis important in several respects. It is, in the first place, an\nacknowledgment that consciousness is against the doctrine; and it is\nalso a concession that the mind is _imposed upon_, in this matter, by\nthe Creator. But with respect to the argument, that this doctrine leads\nto materialism, this quotation is important, because it shows that one\nof the most _philosophical_, if not one of the most _evangelical_ of the\ndefenders of this doctrine, considered the law of motive influence\nsimilar to the law of magnetic attraction, differing only in being\naccompanied by sensation and a deceptive consciousness. And what says\nits great evangelical champion in this country, Dr. Edwards? He compares\nour volitions to the vibrations of a scale beam, the different ends of\nwhich are respectively elevated or depressed as the opposite weights may\nchance to vary. What is this but teaching that motions of mind are\ngoverned by the same fixed laws as those of matter, and that volitions\nare perfectly mechanical states of mind? What the advocates of this\ndoctrine charge on the opposite theory belongs, by their own showing, to\ntheir own system.--_They_, not we, make choices the result of animal\ninstinct, or senseless mechanism. I know Professor Stuart, in his late\nexposition of the Romans, seems to reprobate these comparisons; and\nwhile he contends, as I should think, as strenuously as Dr. Edwards, for\na complete and efficient control of the Divine Being over all our\nvolitions, he appears to think that there is a great difference between\nthe laws of intellectual and material action. So, indeed, do we think.\nBut we think that difference consists in the mind's being free from that\ncontrol for which the professor contends; and we believe when he\ncontends for that control in the volitions of the mind, he contends for\nthat which, from the nature of the case, entirely destroys the other\npart of his hypothesis, viz. that the operations of the mind are free,\nand essentially different from mechanical motion or the laws of\nattractive influence in the material world. If the attractive power of\nmotives over the mind is any thing different from the law of gravitation\nor magnetic attraction, what is that difference? Should any one say, I\ncannot tell; I ask then, How does he know but it is _that very power_\nfor which Arminians contend? Most probably it is that power. Or will it\nbe said, the difference between motive influence and gravity is\nconsciousness? I reply, Consciousness is no part of the relation between\nmotives and the power of choice. I see not indeed how it affects that\nrelation at all. And this the comparison of Leibnitz, already alluded\nto, clearly illustrates. Look at that flowing stream; it hastens on most\nfreely, and by the law of its own nature down the gentle declivities or\nmore precipitous slopes of its meandering channel. Suppose now that\nOmnipotence should impart consciousness to the particles of the\ncontinuous current, it would then wake up to perceive the action and\nfeel the pleasure of its own delightful motions. It would roll on still\nby the law of its own nature, and would feel that it was free to move\naccording to its own _inclination_ and voluntary tendency, for its will\nwould of course be in the direction of its _motive_, or in other phrase,\nits _gravitating_ influence. But could it turn its course and roll back\nits waters to their fountains? It could if it was so _inclined_. But its\npresent _inclination_ is toward the bottom of the valley or the bosom of\nthe ocean, and thither, by the relation that exists between its\nparticles and the gravitating influence of the earth, it rolls on _with\nthe utmost freedom_, though with the utter impossibility of changing its\nown course, without an inversion of the gravitating power. Let the hand\nof Omnipotence invert the slope of the mountain, and to! with the same\nfreedom these very waters roll back again to their original fountains!\nThus it is with the human mind. It is conscious of being free to move in\nthe direction of its inclinations, but require it to turn its course and\nmove in the current of its volitions, in an opposite direction, and it\nwould be utterly impossible, until Omnipotence himself should change the\nmotive influence.--\"God is the determiner of perceptions, and\nperceptions are the determiners of choices.\"\n\nWe see, therefore, that this doctrine of motive influence leads to\nmaterialism, for it makes the analogy between mental and material action\nso complete that it destroys all idea of _intellectual power_.\nPhilosophically speaking, there is no _power_ in the laws of nature.\nWhat we express by the _power_ of attraction, or repulsion, or\ndecomposition, is nothing more than the uniformity of the Divine agency.\nDoes the earth attract elevated bodies to its surface?--This is not an\nenergy inherent in nature; it is the God of nature acting by a uniform\nlaw. This is all that any intelligent man can mean by the power of\nnature. We, however, use the word _power_ in an accommodated sense in\nthese cases, but always I think in connection with that portion of\nmatter that _appears_ to act, and not _that_ which is acted upon. The\nmagnet, we say, has power to attract iron, because iron is attracted\ntoward the magnet, and not the magnet toward the iron. The antecedent,\nor that which takes the lead in the motion, is more properly said to\nhave the power, or is the efficient cause. If then we allow of the use\nof the term power at all, to express the relation of cause and effect,\ngrowing out of a philosophical constitution of things, the term should\nbe applied to the antecedent, and not to the consequent. In the case\nbefore us, mental action is not the cause of the motive, but the motive\nis the cause of the mental action: therefore we should say motives have\n_power_ to act upon the mind, and the mind has a _susceptibility_ of\nbeing acted upon. Dr. Reid has well observed, that a power to be acted\nupon is no power, or \"it is a _powerless power_,\" which is\nphilosophically absurd. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the\nmind has no _power_ of _choice_, but has a _susceptibility_ of being\ndrawn into a state called volition by the power of motives. It will\navail nothing, as I conceive, to say that there is evidently a\ndifference between the susceptibility of the mind in this case, and the\nsusceptibility of matter in other cases, unless it be shown what that\ndifference is: for when that difference is pointed out, it will\ndoubtless be found to be what is in direct opposition to the motive\ntheory. It is the misfortune of the Calvinistic system that it often has\nto assume positions to keep itself in countenance, which positions\nthemselves are a virtual abandonment of the system. So the New-Haven\ndivines have done to support predestination, and to this all Calvinists\nare driven in their attempts to reconcile free will, or the power of\nchoice, with their doctrine of motives, dependence &c. We may be told in\nthe case before us, that \"when the mind is acted upon it is then excited\nto action.\" But how excited to action? Is the action any stronger than\nthe motive influence?--Is it carried beyond this influence? or in a\ndifferent direction? To answer any _one_ of these questions in the\naffirmative is to give up the theory; but to answer them in the negative\nis to attribute to the mind nothing more than the inertia of matter. The\n_motives_ are (under God) the _agent_, the _mind_ is the _passive\nobject_, and the _volition_ is the _effect_. Can any one say then, on\nthis theory, that the mind has the power of choice? It has no power in\nthe first place, because its volitions are the result of philosophical\nnecessity; and it has no power, secondly, because it is not the cause of\nits own volitions, but in these volitions it is the passive subject of\nforeign influences. Now, so far as moral action is concerned, how does\nthis differ from materialism? It is true mental action differs from\nmaterial action in some associated circumstances; it is accompanied by\nconsciousness; but as consciousness of itself cannot give\naccountability, and as it gains nothing in this respect by being\nassociated with such kind of mental action as results from philosophical\nnecessity, it appears plain that man is not accountable; and if not\naccountable, it is more than probable that he has no future existence,\nand thus again we are driven to materialism and to deism, if not to\natheism.\n\nThat man is not _accountable_ upon the principle we are opposing, might\nhave been made a distinct argument; but I have connected it with the\nargument that this doctrine leads to materialism because they imply each\nother. If materialism is true, we are not accountable, and if we are not\naccountable, materialism is probably true; and both are true, as I\nconceive, if the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is true.\n\nIt may, however, be urged by the advocates of this theory, that the mind\nis not wholly passive, because we are conscious of putting forth a\nmental energy and making a responsible volition; _that_ I am ready to\ngrant, but then our consciousness is a fallacy if this system be true;\nand on the contrary, if consciousness be true, this system is false. I\nbelieve no one who pays attention to his own mind will doubt of having\nthis consciousness. But does that prove the truth of this theory? It is\none thing to be conscious of having this energy of mind and responsible\nvolition, and another to be conscious that the theory in question is\ntrue; indeed this consciousness destroys the theory.\n\nShould it be urged in opposition to the alleged tendency of this system\nto materialism, that different minds are not uniformly influenced by the\nsame motives, nor the same minds at different times, and therefore, in\nthis respect, it is evident that the laws of mind and of matter differ;\nI reply, It is precisely so with matter; for _that_ attracts or repels\naccording to its different magnetic or electrical states; or should it\nbe urged that mind differs from matter, and shows itself to be possessed\nof a peculiar energy, because it has power to suspend its decisions, to\nreview the subject, to investigate, &c; I answer, this it cannot do\nwithout a motive; and this it _must_ do if the motive preponderate in\nthat direction, but not otherwise.\n\nTo have a proper view of this subject let us go back to the first\nperception. Could the mind, according to this doctrine, act otherwise\nthan in coincidence with the motive influence of this perception; or\ncould it even suspend the volition this influence was calculated to\nproduce, until a second and more powerful motive was introduced? If it\ncould, then this doctrine is false; if it could not, then the mind, like\nmatter put in motion, must move on invariably in the same direction, and\nwith the same velocity of thought for ever, or until a new motive should\ncounteract the influence of the former! This is emphatically the _vis\ninertia_ of matter. The bare statement of which seems sufficient to\noverthrow the theory.\n\nAnother objection to this doctrine of motives is, it leads to the notion\nof regeneration by _moral suasion_ merely. There has been much said of\nlate, by the various writers in the old and the _new_ school, on this\npoint. The new school are charged with holding that the _truth alone_,\nwithout any immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, converts the sinner.\nThis is considered by the old school Calvinists as a fatal error. But\nwhy so? If motives _govern_ the mind, with absolute sway, all you _need_\nto convert a sinner, is to bring a motive strong enough to induce him to\nchoose God as his chief good, and he is converted. Until you do this\nthere is no conversion, it is impossible for the Holy Ghost to convert a\nsinner in any other way than by motives, for choice of good we are told\nis conversion; there is no choice without a motive, and the strongest\nmotive governs choice absolutely; therefore motive is the omnipotent\npower that changes the sinner's heart. This is the legitimate result of\nThe Calvinistic premises. We have more than once had occasion to wonder\nthat Calvinists should revolt at the result of their own doctrines; here\nwe have another instance of it; here too we have the enigma of \"_natural\nability_\" unriddled. The human mind, by the constitution of its nature,\nhas the power of choosing according to the influence of the strongest\nmotive; and therefore, so far as this can be called a power, it has the\nnatural power to convert itself; and this is the reason why \"_make you a\nnew heart_\" is the burden of almost every sermon and exhortation in\nmodern preaching; all the sinner has to do is to choose, in view of\nmotives, and he is converted. And here, too, is unravelled that other\nmystery which we have been so puzzled to understand, viz. that although\nall possess the natural power to convert themselves, yet no man ever did\nconvert himself without the special interposition of the Divine agency;\nfor, observe, God keeps the motives in his own hands; \"God is the\ndeterminer of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of\n_choices;_\" that is, of _conversions;_ for to choose in a particular\nway, is to be converted. Whenever, therefore, he is disposed to let the\nsinner convert himself, according to his natural power; that is, when he\nis disposed to overpower the mind by an irresistible motive, he brings\nthe motive and mind in contact, and _it is done_. Thus the sinner has as\nmuch power to convert himself as he has to resolve to eat when he is\nhungry; for all the power he has to do either, is a susceptibility of\nbeing operated upon, and controlled by the strongest motive; and thus\nyou see, also, that _God_ converts the sinner, because he supplies the\nmotive that influences the choice; and here, too, is seen the occasion\nfor misquoting so frequently and misapplying so universally, that\npassage in the Psalms: \"[My] people shall be [made] willing in the day\nof [my] power.\" That is, when God applies the controlling motive to\ninfluence to a right choice, then shall the sinner, by a law of his\nnature, _become willing to be converted_. Such are the wonderful\nphilosophical discoveries of modern theology! This is the way for man to\nconvert _himself_ by natural power, and this is the way for _God_ to\nconvert him, without the aid of _super_ natural power! Well might a\ndivine of this cast, whom I heard preach not long since, say of\nregeneration, \"There is nothing supernatural or miraculous in it.\" For\nsurely it is one of the most natural things in the world, according to\nthis theory, to be converted. It is only to be operated upon by a\nmotive, according to the law of his natural constitution, and the man is\nconverted.\n\nThis _philosophy of Christian experience_ has led modern orthodoxy to\nthe very borders of natural religion. Another step, and we can do\nwithout a Holy Ghost or a Divine Saviour. We will sit down with the\nphilosopher in his study, and _work out_ a religious experience, as\nphilosophically as a skilful casuist can solve a question of morals; we\nwill show the _rationale_ of the whole process, and demonstrate it so\nclearly, that infidels shall lose all their objections to the Gospel,\nand be induced to \"_submit_\" to God with scarcely a change of theory.\nHereafter let no man say, that the work of regeneration is a\nmystery--that in this work we cannot tell whence the regenerating\ninfluence comes, or whither it goes; for it comes through the\nphilosophical channel of motive influence by which it introduces a\n\"governing purpose\" into the mind, and the work is done. Let no man\nhereafter say that his \"faith stands not in the wisdom of man, but in\nthe power of God;\" or \"if any man would be wise let him become a fool\nthat he may be wise;\" or \"the wisdom of man is foolishness with God;\"\nfor lo, the philosophy of regeneration is at length explained! and the\nwhole secret is found to consist in the philosophical relation between\nmotives and mind!! Can any one wonder, after this, that in Geneva, in\nGermany, and in New-England, Calvinism has finally resulted in\nSocinianism? And can any one help trembling for a large portion of the\northodox Churches among us at the present day? Grant that there is an\nincrease of zeal, a greater stir among the people, more revivals, &c;\nall these, with a good foundation, would promise well for the Church;\nbut we fear there is a worm at the root. By this it is not intended to\ninsinuate that the work is always spurious and the professed conversions\nunsound. In many instances it is undoubtedly the reverse of this. It\nmight be expected after the people had been lulled for a long time under\nthe paralyzing opiates of old-fashioned Calvinism, that this new and\n_apparently_ opposite theory should rouse many to action. \"I had been\ntaught,\" said a man not far from this, \"that I must wait God's time to\nbe converted, and I waited many years in vain; but more recently I have\nbeen instructed that I might convert myself; I set about the work, and I\nbelieve it is done!\" Now this, which in the relation borders upon the\nludicrous, might have been a genuine conversion. His new views might\nonly have been sufficient to arouse him to a co-operation with the Holy\nSpirit in his conversion; and this may have been the case with\nthousands. In their practical effects two opposite errors may, in\nindividual cases, neutralize each other.--But is either therefore safe?\nWill the general effect be salutary? Let the history of the Church\nspeak; and in view of that record I confess I fear for our common Zion.\nBut let not the old Calvinists lay this blame, and charge this danger\nupon the new school; the new school doctrine is a legitimate scion from\nthat root which they have cultivated with such assiduity and care. It\ngrows out of the doctrine of motives, it springs from the idea of the\nentire dependence of the human mind for each and all its volitions upon\nthe directing influence of Omnipotence, whatever may be the theory by\nwhich that influence is explained.\n\nAnother argument in opposition to this doctrine is found in the\nconsideration, that we are constantly liable to disappointment in most\nof our calculations respecting human agents.--Though we may judge\nsomething of what will be the conduct of men in given circumstances, yet\nour calculations are very far from coming up to mechanical exactness.\nMotives have some influence; but that influence is very variable and\nuncertain. Why is this? It is not so in matter; the same causes will\nproduce the same effects to the end of time. But we see many choose,\nwithout being able to give what, _in their own estimation_, is a valid\nreason; they did thus because they chose to do so; they act in defiance\nof the strongest motives, drawn from whatever source. We see the\ngreatest possible caprice in the volitions of men; we see their minds\nstarting aside, and putting on the greatest possible and unaccountable\nmental states, in a way and form that baffles all human calculation, and\nwill for ever baffle it. A man may spend all his life in trying to\nreduce to uniformity the phenomena of human volitions, and thereby to\nfix, in an unerring code, the laws that govern them, and he may hand his\nlabours to his successor, and so on to the end of time, and after all,\nthat living, spontaneous, thought-producing essence which we call the\nhuman soul, will slide from our grasp and elude all our calculations. If\nthis consideration should have no direct weight in opposition to the\ntheory I am opposing, it will at least show the absurdity of defending\nthis system by what is called the _known regularity_ and _uniform\nphenomena_ of human volitions. To talk of _uniformity_ here, is to talk\nof, to say the least, what does not exist.\n\nIn the examination of this subject, we find that the arguments in favour\nof the motive theory are generally of the negative kind; they are not so\nmuch direct proofs of the truth of the theory, as they are attempts to\nshow the absurdity of denying it. But when statements of this kind are\naccompanied by no arguments, they need only be met by a denial. \"We are\nconscious,\" say the theorists, \"of being controlled by motives:\" I\nreply, we are not conscious of this control, but we are conscious of the\ncontrary fact. We know, indeed, that motives have their influence; but\nwe know also that the mind has an influence over motives, and probably a\ngreater influence than motives have over _it_. The mind is conscious too\nof having an influence over itself, and of possessing a self-directing\nenergy, a spontaneous power, and its consciousness of responsibility is\npredicated on this power of spontaneity. Only let the mind become\nclearly conscious that motives beyond its power and influence have an\nirresistible power in controlling its decisions, and you would as\ncertainly remove from man all sense of responsibility, as in those cases\nnow, where the spasmodic motion of the muscle is not the result of the\nwill.\n\nIt is said again, that to deny this control \"involves the absurdity that\nour volitions are exerted without any intelligent reasons, and are the\nresult of a brute or senseless mechanism.\" It appears to me, however,\nthat a system which represents the will as mechanically governed by\nmotives, as weights turn the scale beam, makes man a machine; while the\ntheory that gives the mind a spontaneous power and energy of its own,\nmakes him what he is, _an intelligent, responsible agent_.\n\nSince, then, these negative arguments in favour of the theory that\nmotives control the mind, are _assertions_ and not _proofs;_ and since\nthe theory itself leads to _fate_, to _atheism_, to _materialism_, to\n_conversion_ by mere _moral suasion_, to the subversion of _human\nliberty_ and _moral responsibility_, we must believe the theory false.\nBut against the theory of the spontaneous power of the mind, none of\nthese objections lie. It accords too with consciousness; and is, in\nfact, the only theory on which the responsibility of a moral agent can\nbe predicated. The opposite view claims our assent to two incongruous\nand apparently contradictory propositions, between which there is not\nonly no agreement, but an evident repugnancy. This is the embarrassment\nin the one case, and it is fatal to the theory.\n\nIf there are embarrassments in the other case, and what theory of mind\nor matter has not its _inexplicables?_--these embarrassments are\nevidently of another kind; it is not the want of light to see how two\nantagonist principles can agree, the repugnancy of which must be the\nmore apparent as light increases, but it is from the known limits to\nhuman knowledge. The principal embarrassment to the theory we defend is,\nwe cannot understand the _manner_ in which this faculty of the mind\noperates. But this is no more difficult than to understand the manner in\nwhich other faculties of the mind operate. To make this last statement\nclear, the reader is desired to recollect that the mind is not divided\ninto parts and members like the body. When we talk of the _faculties_ of\nthe mind, we should understand the power that the entire mind has to act\nin this or that way. Thus we say, the mind has the faculties of will and\nof memory, that is, the mind, as a whole, has the powers of choosing,\nand of calling up its past impressions. Now if any one will tell me\n_how_ the mind remembers, I will tell him how it wills; and I have the\nsame right to ask him what causes the memory to remember, as he has to\nask me what causes the will to will. In both cases it may be said, the\nmind _remembers_ and _wills_ because this is its nature--God _made it\nso_. When you analyze until you come to the original elements, or when\nyou trace back effects until you come to first principles, you must\nstop.--And if you will not receive these first principles because you\ncannot explain them farther, then indeed you must turn universal\nskeptic. I frankly acknowledge I cannot tell _how_ the mind acts in its\nvolitions. And let it be understood that the motive theory, with all its\nother embarrassments, has this one in common with ours.--Can its\nadvocates tell me _how_ motives act upon the mind? True philosophy is an\nanalysis of constituent principles, or of causes and effects, but the\norigin of these relations and combinations is resolvable only into the\nwill of the Creator. _It is so, because God hath made it so_. And the\nnature of these relations is beyond the reach of the human mind. However\nimpatient we may be at these restrictions, they are limits beyond which\nwe _cannot_ go; and our only duty in the case is, submission.\n\nI am aware, however, that what I have now said may, without farther\nexplanation, especially when taken in connection with a principle of\nphilosophy already recognized, be considered as an important concession\nto my opponents. I have before stated, in substance, that in the\nmaterial world there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as _power;_\nthat the efficiency of the laws of nature is, in fact, the Divine energy\noperating in a uniform way. \"Let it be granted,\" a Calvinist might say,\n\"that what we call the operation of second causes is universally the\nsupreme Intelligence operating in a uniform way, and it is all we ask to\ndefend our system. Then it will be granted, that in each volition of the\nhuman mind the operation of the will is nothing more than the energy of\nthe Divine mind operating in a uniform way.\"\n\nTo this I reply, Though matter, on account of its inertia, cannot in any\nproper sense be said to have power, yet the same is not true of mind. If\nany one thinks it is, then the supreme Mind itself has not power. In\nother words, as both matter and mind are inert, and cannot act only as\nacted upon, there is no such thing as _power_ in the universe! and thus\nwe again land in atheism. But if _mind_ has power, as all theists must\ngrant, then the _human_ mind may have power. If any one can prove that\nit is impossible, in the nature of things, for the Supreme Being to\ncreate and sustain subordinate agents, with a spontaneous power of\nthought and moral action, to a limited extent, in that case we must give\nup our theory. But it is presumed no one can prove this, or will even\nattempt to prove it. We say, God has created such agents, and that they\nact, in their responsible volitions, uncontrolled by the Creator, either\ndirectly or by second causes. We are expressly told, indeed, that God\nmade man \"in his own image;\" his _moral_ image doubtless. Man, then, in\nhis own subordinate sphere, has the power of originating thought, the\npower of spontaneous moral action: this, _this only_, is the ground of\nhis responsibility. Will it be said that this puts man entirely out of\nthe control of his Creator? I answer, By no means. It only puts him out\nof the control of such direct influences as would destroy his moral\nliberty. Does the power of moral action, independent of the magistracy\nand the laws, destroy all the control of the civil government over\nmalefactors? How much less in the other case? God can prevent all the\nmischief that a vicious agent might attempt, without throwing any\nrestraint upon his responsible volitions. It is thus that he \"makes the\nwrath of man praise him, and the remainder of wrath he restrains.\"\n\nLet it be understood, then, from this time forward, by all, as indeed it\nhas been understood heretofore by those who have carefully examined the\nsubject, that when the Calvinists talk about \"free will,\" and \"human\nliberty,\" they mean something _essentially different_ from what we mean\nby these terms; and, as it is believed, something essentially different\nfrom the _popular_ meaning of these terms. They believe in human\nliberty, they say, and the power of choice, and we are bound to believe\nthem; but we are also bound not to suffer ourselves to be deceived by\nterms. _Theirs_ is a liberty and power of a moral agent to will _as he\ndoes_, and _not otherwise_. _Ours_ is an unrestricted liberty, and a\nspontaneous power in all responsible volitions, to _choose as we do_, or\n_otherwise_.\n\nThus far I have examined the mind in its power of choosing good or evil,\naccording to its original constitution. How far this power has been\naffected by sin, on the one hand, or by grace, on the other, is a\nquestion that will claim attention in my next.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER X.\n\nMORAL AGENCY AS AFFECTED BY THE FALL, AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROVISIONS OF\nGRACE.\n\nMY last number was an attempt to prove that God created man with a\nspontaneous power of moral action; and that this was the only ground of\nhis moral responsibility. It is now proposed to inquire how far this\npower has been affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions of\ngrace. The doctrine of the Methodist Church on these points is very\nclearly expressed by the 7th and 8th articles of religion in her book of\nDiscipline.\n\n1. \"Original sin standeth not in the _following_ of Adam, (as the\nPelagians vainly talk,) but it is the corruption of the nature of every\nman that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man\nis very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature\ninclined to evil, and that continually.\"\n\n2. \"The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot\nturn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to\nfaith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works\npleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ\npreventing us, (going before to assist us,) that we may have a good\nwill, and working with us when we have that good will.\"\n\nIt is not pretended here that any intellectual faculties are lost by\nsin, or restored by grace; but that the faculties that are essential to\nmind have become corrupted, darkened, debilitated, so as to render man\nutterly incapable of a right choice without prevenient and cooperating\ngrace. As muscular or nervous power in a limb, or an external sense, may\nbe weakened or destroyed by physical disease, so the moral power of the\nmind or an inward sense may be weakened or destroyed by moral disease.\nAnd it is in perfect accordance with analogy, with universal language,\nand with the representations of Scripture, to consider the mind as\nsusceptible, in its essential nature, of this moral deterioration. If\nany one should say he cannot understand what this moral defect is, I\nwould answer by asking him if he can tell me what the essence of mind\nis? And if he chooses to object to this kind of depravity, because he\ncannot understand it, in its essence, he should turn materialist at\nonce; and then, as he will find equal difficulty to tell what the\nessence of matter is, and in what its weakness and disorder essentially\nconsist, he must turn universal skeptic.--The simple statement is, _the\nsoul has become essentially disordered by sin;_ and as no one can prove\nthe assertion to be unphilosophical or contrary to experience, so I\nthink it may be shown from Scripture that this is the real state of\nfallen human nature. And it may also be shown that this disorder is such\nas to mar man's free agency. There is a sense, indeed, in which all\nvoluntary preference may be considered as implying free agency. But\nvoluntary preference does not necessarily imply _such a free agency_ as\ninvolves moral responsibility. The mind may be free to act in one\ndirection, and yet it may so entirely have lost its moral equilibrium as\nto be utterly incapable, of its own nature, to act in an opposite\ndirection, and therefore not, in the full and responsible sense, a free\nagent. It is not enough, therefore, to say, \"Free agency (of a\nresponsible kind) consists in the possession of understanding,\nconscience, and will;\" (see Christian Spectator for September, 1830;)\nunless by _will_ is meant the spontaneous power already alluded to. The\nunderstanding may be darkened, the conscience may be seared or polluted,\nthe will, that is, the power of willing, may, to all good purposes, be\ninthralled; and this is what we affirm to be the true state and\ncondition of unaided human nature.\n\nIt will be farther seen that the above account of human nature does not\nrecognize the distinction of _natural_ and _moral_ ability. The fact is,\nman's inability is both natural and moral; it is natural, because it is\nconstitutional; and it is moral, because it relates to the mind. To say\na fallen man has natural power to make a right choice, because he has\nthe faculties of his mind entire, is the same as to say that a paralytic\nman has the natural power to walk, because he has his limbs entire. It\nappears to me that the whole of this distinction, and the reasoning from\nit, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind and\nan unwarranted definition of terms. The simple question is, Has fallen\nman, _on the whole_, the power to make a right choice, or has he not? We\nsay without grace he has not. And therefore fallen man is not, in the\nresponsible sense of that term, a free agent without grace.\n\nThis view of the subject is not novel in the Church. I readily\nacknowledge that a doctrine is not therefore true, because it has been\nheld by many, and can be traced back to antiquity, unless it can be\nproved to be Scriptural. The fact, however, that a doctrine has been\ngenerally received in the Church, entitles it to respect and to a\ncareful examination, before it is discarded. Hence to those who have\nonly read modern Calvinistic authors on this subject, it may be a matter\nof surprise to learn that not only the more ancient fathers, but even\nSt. Austin himself, the introducer of predestination into the Church,\nand Calvin, and the synod of Dort, were all supporters of sentiments\nsubstantially the same as are here vindicated--I say, those who have\nonly read modern Calvinistic authors will be surprised to learn this,\nbecause these authors treat this doctrine as though it were so\nunreasonable and absurd as scarcely to be tolerated in the view of\ncommon sense. Though it may have an influence with some, in a paucity of\nbetter reasons, to scout a doctrine from the Church by calling it\nabsurd, yet the candid will not readily give up an old doctrine for a\nnew, without good reason.\n\nI had at first thought of quoting pretty freely from some of the\nfathers, and especially from the early Calvinists, to show their views\non this point. But it may not be necessary, unless the statements here\nmade should be denied. Let therefore one or two quotations from Calvin\nand from the synod of Dort, both of which I think Calvinists will\nacknowledge as good Calvinistic authority, suffice. Calvin denies all\npower to man, in his apostasy, to choose good, and says that,\n\"surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, he (man)\nshould nevertheless be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is\ndestitute, and to _the liberty of which he is deprived_.\" The synod of\nDort decided thus:--\"We believe that God--formed man after his own\nimage, &c, _capable in all things to will_ agreeably to the will of\nGod.\" They then speak of the fall, and say, \"We reject all that is\nrepugnant to this concerning the free will of man, since man is but a\n_slave to sin_, and has nothing of himself, unless it is given him from\nheaven.\" And speaking of the change by grace, they add, \"The will thus\nrenewed is not only actuated and influenced by God, but _in consequence\nof this influence becomes itself active_.\" And to show that Calvin did\nnot consider the voluntary acts of a depraved sinner as proof of free\nwill, he says, \"Man _has not an equally free election of good and evil_,\nand can only be said to have free will, because he does evil\nvoluntarily, and not by constraint;\" and this he ironically calls\n\"egregious liberty indeed! if man be not compelled to serve sin, but yet\nis such a willing slave that his will is held in bondage by the fettors\nof sin.\" These quotations, I think, show satisfactorily that the early\nCalvinists believed man to have lost his power to choose good by\napostasy, and can only regain it by grace. It is true, they generally\nbelieved that whenever this grace was imparted to an extent to restore\nto the mind the power of choosing good, it was regenerating grace. And\nherein they differ from the Arminians, who believe that grace may and\ndoes restore the power to choose good before regeneration. This,\nhowever, does not affect the point now under examination, but involves a\ncollateral question, which will be examined in its proper place. One\nthought more, and I pass to the arguments on the main questions in the\narticles quoted above. These articles are taken from the 9th and 10th of\nthe articles of the Church of England. Our 8th is indeed identically the\nsame as the 10th of the Church of England; and the latter part of that\narticle, commencing, \"Wherefore, &c,\" is taken substantially from St.\nAustin himself. Thus much for the Calvinistic authority of the doctrine\nwe defend. To which, if it were necessary, we might add quotations from\nBeza, Dr. Owen, a decided Calvinist, and many of the ancient fathers.\nNay, the Remonstrants declared, in the presence of the synod of Dort,\nthat this was \"the judgment of all antiquity.\"\n\nLet us now notice some arguments in favour of this doctrine.\n\n1. The doctrine above stated, and now to be defended, must be true, as\nis believed, since only this view of man's condition will accord with\nthe Scripture account of depravity. If the Scriptures teach that man is\nconstitutionally depraved, that a blight and a torpor have come over his\nmoral nature, comparable to sleep, to disease, and to death, how can it\nbe otherwise than that this should affect his power to choose good? Had\nman any too much moral power in the first instance to constitute him an\naccountable moral agent? And if he had not, has he enough now that his\nmind has become darkened, his judgment perverted, and his moral powers\ncorrupted and weakened? Or will it be denied that the moral energies of\nhis nature have been impaired by sin? If not, how has he been affected?\nLet any one spend a thought on this question, and decide, if he can,\nwhat definite vicious effect can be produced on man's moral nature which\nwill not necessarily imply a weakening and an embarrassment of his\noriginal power to a right choice. Should it be said that his power is\nsomewhat weakened, but he has enough left to constitute him free to\nchoose good, this would imply that before the loss he had more than\nenough! Besides, such an idea would rest on the principle that man's\nmoral nature was not _wholly_ vitiated. It is said, I know, that all the\nembarrassment which man has to a right choice is a disinclination to\nmoral good. But if this disinclination to good be derived and\nconstitutional, it exists in the mind previous to any act of choice, and\nis therefore the very thing we mean--it is this very thraldom of the\nmind which utterly incapacitates it to choose good. If it be asked\nwhether disinclination can ever be so strong as to destroy the freedom\nof the will to act in one particular direction? I answer, most\nunhesitatingly, Yes; and if that disinclination is either created or\nderived, and not the result of an antecedent choice, the possessor is\nnot morally obligated to act in opposition to it, unless he receive\nforeign aid to help his infirmities, and to strengthen him for a\ncontrary choice.\n\nIt follows then, I think, that we must either give up constitutional\ndepravity, or discard the notion that we can make a right choice without\nDivine aid. And here, if I mistake not, we shall find the precise point\non which modern Calvinism has verged over into the New Divinity theory\nof depravity. Perceiving that to acknowledge any depravity of man's\nmoral constitution would either imply the necessity of supernatural aid\nin order to a right choice, or else free man from responsibility, Dr.\nTaylor and his associates have resolved all depravity into _choice_ or\n_voluntary preference_. They deny that there is any thing in the nature\nof man, antecedently to his act of willing, that possesses a moral\ncharacter. Their idea is perfectly consistent with the notion of natural\nability; and that the advocates of the New Divinity have embraced this\nidea is evidently a proof that they think closely and are seeking after\nconsistency, let it lead them where it will. The only wonder is, that\nall who cleave to the dogma of natural ability do not follow them. The\ndoctrine of natural ability, if it is any thing more than a name,\nappears evidently to be a part of the old Pelagian system, and should\nnever be separated from its counterpart--the doctrine of self conversion\nand the natural perfectability of the human character. But this clearly\nimplies that there is no serious derangement or radical viciousness of\nthe moral man. Here, then, is another instance in which Calvinists in\ngeneral revolt at the legitimate results of their own system.\n\nBut while the New Divinity advocates have fearlessly removed an\nimportant objection to their doctrine, they have, by this very act, as\nit is believed, however little they may have designed it, set themselves\nin fearful array against the Scripture doctrine of depravity and\nsalvation by grace, and have opened a wide door for the introduction of\nnumerous and dangerous heresies. It is true, they will not own that they\nhave gone very far from the old system. They think the doctrine of\nnatural depravity is asserted when they say, \"nature is _such_ that he\nwill sin, and only sin, in all the appropriate circumstances of his\nbeing.\" (See Dr. Taylor's Sermon.) But what this \"nature\" is, we are at\na loss to determine; as also what the \"_such_\" is that is predicated of\nthis nature; nor has Dr. T. told us how he knows that all men will sin\nand only sin, when in fact they have natural power to avoid it; or in\nwhat other than \"the appropriate circumstances of their being\" those are\nwho become regenerate. In fact, while this theory claims to be orthodox,\nand thus to assimilate itself with the old theory, it has only exchanged\none inconsistency for a half score. Its advocates, to be consistent,\nmust come out plain and open Pelagians, and then meet the Scripture\ndoctrine of depravity and salvation by grace as they can, or they must\ngo back to their old ground, and endure the manifest inconsistency they\nare now endeavouring to avoid; or, what seems to me better than either,\ncome on to the Arminian ground, which shuns all these difficulties,\nwhile it maintains constitutional depravity and salvation by grace from\nthe foundation to the top stone, including of course a gracious ability\nto choose life and gain heaven.\n\n2. Another argument in favour of the _necessity_ of Divine grace, in\norder to a right choice, is the fact, that God actually gives grace to\nthose who finally perish, as well as to those who are saved. Of this\nfact the Scriptures afford decisive proof. They speak in general terms.\nJesus Christ \"is the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into\nthe world.\" \"The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared unto\nall men.\" They speak in special terms of the unregenerate--that they\n_grieve_, _resist_, and _quench_ the _Spirit_ of _grace_, which\ncertainly they could not do if they had it not. But if they have the\noperations of the Spirit, what are these operations? What is the Spirit\ndoing to the inner man? Will it be said he is bringing motives to bear\nupon the mind? But what motives other than those found in the Gospel?\nThese the sinner has without the Spirit. If these motives can convert\nsinners, any of us can convert our neighbours. \"But,\" it is said, \"the\nSpirit makes the heart _feel_ these motives.\" Aye, truly he does, and\nthat not by operating upon the motives, but upon the _heart_, and this\nis the very work we contend for. It is thus that the Spirit graciously\narouses and quickens the dead soul, and brings it to _feel_, and excites\nit to _act_, in the great work of salvation.\n\nSince, then, it must be granted that unregenerate sinners, and those who\nare finally lost, have the operations of this Spirit of grace, let me\nseriously inquire, For what purpose is this grace given? On the\nCalvinistic ground it cannot be that they may have a chance for\nsalvation, and thus be without excuse; for this is secured without\ngrace. Since they have natural ability to come to Christ, the abuse of\nthat ability is sufficient to secure their just condemnation. So say the\nCalvinists; and on this ground they maintain that the reprobates are\njustly condemned. For what purpose, then, is this grace given? If we may\nestablish a general principle by an induction of particulars; if we may\njudge of the design of the God of providence or grace, by noticing, in\nany given case, the uniform results, then we can easily determine this\npoint. _God gives grace to the reprobates that their condemnation may be\nthe more aggravated_. The argument stands thus: God gives grace to the\nreprobates for some important purpose. He does not give it that\nsalvation may be possible to them, for they are able to be saved without\nit; he does not give it to make salvation certain, for this it does not\neffect; nevertheless he gives them grace, the invariable effect of which\nis to increase their condemnation. The only consistent inference;\ntherefore is, that he gives grace to the reprobates that they may have a\nmore aggravated condemnation. Here, then, we trace the Calvinistic\ntheory to one of these _logical consequences_ charged upon it in the\nsermon, and which has been so strenuously denied by the reviewers--a\nconsequence which, revolting as it is, must nevertheless be charged upon\nit still, unless its advocates can show why grace is given to the\nreprobates when they have all necessary ability to repent and believe\nwithout it.\n\n3. On the ground of this doctrine, also, there would be some difficulty\nin accounting for the necessity of giving grace, in all cases, even to\nthe elect. Why may not some of these repent without grace? Nay, why may\nnot some of the reprobates, in the plenitude of their natural ability,\nrepent and be converted, in despite of the decree of reprobation? Did\nGod foresee that they would not, and on that foresight predicate his\ndecree of reprobation? But that would be a _conditional_ reprobation,\nand would therefore imply its counterpart--a conditional election. This\nno class of Calvinists will admit. How happens it, then, that some of\nthese reprobates do not get converted, since they not only have natural\npowers enough to make a right choice but have some grace beside? Is it\nbecause God has fixed the barrier in something else, by which this\nability, grace, and all are rendered nugatory? But this would render\ntheir condemnation unjust, Calvinists themselves being judges. They tell\nus that the only just ground of condemnation is, that _the sinner will\nnot come to Christ_. Here, then, is the most extraordinary thing that\nangels or men ever knew; for almost six thousand years there has been\nupon our earth a succession of generations of sinners, and its the\npresent generation of them there are eight hundred millions. All of\nthese, throughout all their generations, have had no other obstruction\nto salvation but what exists in their own will, and each and all have\nhad by nature all needful ability in the will to a right choice, and\nhave had a measure of grace super-added, and yet not a reprobate among\nthem all has ever made a right choice; and not one of the elect ever did\nor ever will make such a choice until God, by an omnipotent act, \"makes\nhis elect willing in the day of his power!!\" This is a miracle to which\nall the other miracles in the world are as nothing--a miracle which\nOmnipotence alone can accomplish by a Divine constitution and an\nall-controlling energy. Thus this doctrine destroys itself. It assumes\npositions, with respect to free will, that cannot be maintained, only on\nthe supposition of an _efficient_ superior agency to direct the action\nof that _free will_, in a course of sinful volition, in hundreds of\nmillions of cases, without a single variation, save where that variation\nis the result of the same superior Power acting in the opposite\ndirection.\n\n4. That the sinner receives aid by Divine grace to enable him to repent;\nand that he could not repent, without this, appears evident from the\nScriptural representation of the ground of man's responsibility. \"If I\nhad not come,\" says the Saviour, \"ye had not had sin.\" \"This is the\ncondemnation, that light has come into the world, and men loved darkness\nrather than light.\" \"He that believeth not is condemned already,\n_because_ he hath not believed in the only begotten Son of God.\"\n\"_Because_ I have called, and ye have refused, &c, I also will laugh at\nyour calamity.\" These and many other passages seem to imply that the\nsinner is rejected on the ground of his neglecting offered grace. But if\nthis is the ground of his condemnation, it is not for the abuse of\nnatural power. I see no way for a plausible attempt even to get rid of\nthis argument, unless it should be attempted to raise a question\nrespecting the nature of this grace. It may be said that \"these passages\nonly relate to gracious provisions, such as the atonement, the\nScriptures of truth, &c, and have no reference whatever to a gracious\ninfluence upon the mind. The mind had sufficient strength to believe,\nrepent, &c, but something must be presented to believe in; and some\nprovision must be made to make repentance available.\" In reply I would\nsay, First, Even this shows that man could not have been saved from sin\nwithout grace, and hence on this ground this theory would be involved in\nthe very difficulty which it attempts to throw upon our view of the\nsubject, viz., that grace is necessary to make men guilty, because none\ncan be guilty in a case where their course is unavoidable. But, leaving\nthis for another place, I would say farther, in reply to the above, that\nthe Scriptures do not represent this grace as confined to _external\nprovisions_, but on the contrary speak of it as operating upon and\ninfluencing the mind, and that, too, in the very way for which we\ncontend. Look at a few Scriptural expressions, promiscuously selected,\nand see how clearly they sustain our position. In the first place, to\ngive the argument full force, let us notice the Scripture account of\nman's natural condition. He is \"in darkness,\" \"asleep,\" \"dead,\" \"without\nstrength,\" \"sick,\" \"deaf,\" \"blind,\" \"lame,\" \"bound,\" \"helpless;\" and all\nthis in consequence of sin. Indeed, this is the very definition of his\nsinful character and condition. If such language does not describe\n_utter inability_ of the sinner to serve God, then no language can do\nit. Now let us see what grace does. Its very design is to \"awake the\nsleeper;\" to unstop deaf ears, and \"open blind eyes;\" to \"lighten every\nman;\" to \"strengthen with might by the Spirit in the inner man.\" \"Christ\nstrengthens\" the sinner, that he may \"do all things.\" It is on the\nground that \"God worketh in him to will and to do,\" that man is exhorted\nto \"work out his salvation with fear and trembling.\" \"Thou\nstrengthenedst me with strength _in my soul_.\" But leaving farther\nquotations of this kind, let the reader fix his attention on the stress\nwhich the Scriptures lay upon the striving of the Spirit. All the\nefficacy of the word is ascribed to the Spirit; and hence the apostle\ndeclares that he \"preached the Gospel, with the Holy Ghost sent down\nfrom heaven;\" that it \"came, not in word, but in _power_.\" Indeed, \"the\nletter (of the word) killeth, but the Spirit giveth life.\" Hence the\nfrequent cautions not to \"grieve\" or \"quench the Spirit.\" Now what, I\nask, can all these scriptures mean? Is there any plausibility in the\nidea, that by such expressions nothing is meant but the general\nprovisions of grace in the Gospel economy? That no direct, gracious\ninfluence of the Spirit upon the heart is intended? In fact, the new\nidea of conversion by motives and moral suasion seems to be a device to\nmeet this very difficulty. The old Calvinists charge the advocates of\nthe New Divinity with holding that all the Spirit does in operating upon\nthe heart, is not by operating upon it directly, but indirectly _through\nthe truth_: which has given rise to the saying, \"If I were as eloquent\nas the Holy Ghost, I could convert souls as well as he.\" And if they do\nhold this, it is no wonder, for indeed it is the legitimate consequence\nof the doctrine of natural ability. They doubtless arrive at it\nthus:--According to the Scriptures, man's responsibility turns on his\nrejecting or improving the grace of God. That grace cannot be an\ninternal gracious influence upon man's moral nature, because that would\nconflict with the notion of responsibility, on the ground of natural\npower. These scriptures therefore can mean nothing more than that a\ngracious atonement is provided, and a record of Divine truth made, and\nnow, in the use of his natural power, the sinner is required to judge of\nand embrace this truth, which if he does, he in this sense improves the\ngrace of God, and is converted; but if he does it not, he grieves the\nSpirit, and is condemned. Thus in the one case, if he is converted, it\nis in the use of his natural power, \"choosing in the view of motives;\"\nand in the other case, if he is not converted, it is in the use of his\nnatural power, refusing in view of motives. Is not this correct\nreasoning? And ought not the New-Haven divines to be commended for\ncarrying out the system to its legitimate results? And ought not all to\nfollow them in this, who hold to natural ability? And yet no wonder that\nthey hesitate here, for cold and spiritless indeed must be that system\nof religious experience that resolves the conversion of the soul into a\nmere natural operation of choosing, through the influence of moral\nsuasion.\n\nLeaving this system, therefore, to labour under its fatal\nembarrassments, it may be seen, I think, that the system here vindicated\ncorresponds with the Scriptures and is consistent with itself; for it\nmakes man's responsibility turn upon grace improved or misimproved, and\nit makes that grace an internal quickening influence, and a\nstrengthening energy upon the heart; and these different features of the\ntheory, when placed together, all seem at once to be compatible with\neach other.\n\n5. Express passages of Scripture teach the doctrine here maintained.\n\nI need not now repeat the passages already referred to, in which the\nstate of the depraved heart is described, and which show, if any human\nlanguage can show it, that man is naturally \"without strength.\" But my\nobject is to call the attention of the reader to some very direct and\nexpress passages, to show that it is grace, and grace alone, that\nenables the soul to do the will of God. \"I can do all things,\" saith the\napostle, \"through Christ who strengtheneth me.\" Query: would not the\napostle have thought it presumption to have said, I can do all things\nwithout strength from Christ? Has he ever intimated such a sentiment in\nall his writings? Does he not rather say, \"We are not sufficient of\nourselves _to think any thing as of ourselves_, but our _sufficiency is\nof God?_\" This is the apostle's general language, and it is in perfect\naccordance with the declaration of his Master, \"Without me ye can do\nnothing.\" \"As the branch _cannot_ bear fruit of itself, except it abide\nin the vine, _no more can ye_, except ye abide in me.\" \"No man _can\ncome_ to me, except the Father draw him.\" \"Likewise the Spirit Helpeth\nour infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought.\" \"My\ngrace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in\nweakness.\" \"The God of all grace--stablish, strengthen, settle you.\"\n\"For this cause I bow my knees to the Father, &c, that he would grant\nyou, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with\n_might_, by his _Spirit_, in the _inner_ man,\" \"according to the power\nthat worketh _in us_.\" It is useless to quote farther. If these passages\ndo not show that our strength to do good is of grace, then it appears to\nme the Holy Spirit must fail of an _ability_ to communicate that idea\nthrough human language. Will it be said that some of these passages\nrefer to the regenerate, and therefore are not in point to meet the case\nof the unregenerate? I would ask, in reply, whether regenerating grace\ntakes away our natural ability? Certainly if the regenerate can neither\nthink nor do any thing acceptable without grace, much more do the\nunregenerate need this grace to enable them to make a right choice. And\nyet in the face of these most explicit scriptures, we are repeatedly\ntold that man has natural power to make himself a new heart!\n\nTo the foregoing considerations, I might add, if any farther proof of\nour doctrine were necessary, and if this paper had not been extended so\nfar already, the universal experience of all Christians. This appears,\nfrom their language, to be the experience of Bible saints, under both\nthe Jewish and Christian dispensations. And what Christian now living,\nbut feels now, and felt when he first embraced the Saviour, that the\nstrength to do this was from God--directly from God, through grace. Hear\nhis prayers--he pleads his weakness--he asks _for strength_. And what\ndoes he mean by that prayer? Does he ask for some external accommodation\nand aid? No; he wants strength, _by the Spirit, in the inner man_. And\nthis is the prayer of all Christians, whether they advocate this notion\nof natural ability or not. The sayings and writings also of these very\nadvocates of natural ability, so powerful is this feeling of dependence,\nare often in perfect coincidence, with the doctrine we defend. A most\nstriking instance of this is found in Dr. Wood's pamphlet (page 97) in\nopposition to Dr. Taylor, as follows:--\"The common theory (of\nCalvinistic orthodoxy) leads us to entertain low thoughts of ourselves,\nespecially in a moral view; and to feel that we are not of ourselves\n_sufficient for any thing spiritually good_, and that, for whatever\nholiness we now possess, or may hereafter attain, we are dependent on\nDivine grace.\" What stronger gracious ability do Arminians hold to, than\nthis? \"Not of ourselves sufficient for any thing spiritually good.\" And\nis this the common theory of Calvinism? Then Calvinism here, as in other\npoints, is divided against itself. Indeed one would be induced to think,\nwere it not for the context, either that Dr. Wood differed from his\nbrothers generally, on this point, or was off his guard at this moment.\nBut he tells us, in this very paragraph, that he \"does not differ at all\nfrom the generality of ministers, in New-England, respecting the natural\npowers and faculties of man, as a moral and accountable being.\" But he\nfears the \"unqualified language\" which Dr. T. \"employs respecting the\nnatural state, the free will, and the power of man.\" On reading this\nlast passage, I confess I am at a loss to know what to say or believe of\nthis Calvinistic opinion of natural power. Dr. Taylor's \"unqualified\nlanguage\" respecting \"the power of man,\" I take to be a frank statement\nof Dr. Wood's opinion, and that of other Calvinists. Dr. T. says man has\nnatural power _sufficient_ to make a right choice. Does not Dr. Wood say\nthis? He says he does not differ from \"the generality;\" and it is\nnotorious that this is the doctrine of the generality of those\nministers. Dr. Tyler, of Portland, one of Dr. Wood's coadjutors in\nopposing Dr. Taylor, says, in a sermon[5] on free salvation, \"There is\nno reprobation taught in the Scriptures, which destroys human liberty,\nor which impairs the sinner's _natural power_. Every man is a free moral\nagent. Life and death are set before him, and he is _capable_ of\nchoosing between them.\" What language can be more \"unqualified\" than\nthis? It teaches us that man has _natural power_, which renders him\n_capable_ to make a right choice. It is true, Dr. Taylor, and \"those who\nbelieve with him,\" carry out this doctrine into its legitimate and\npractical bearings. On the ground of this power, they exhort sinners \"to\nmake themselves new hearts.\" One of them, as reported to me by a\npreacher, went so far as to say, in a public address, that sinners ought\nto be ashamed to ask the aid of the Holy Spirit to convert them, since\nthey had power to convert themselves. And what objection can any, who\nhold to natural power to choose life, urge against this? If, as Dr.\nTyler teaches, in his \"Examination of Dr. Taylor's Theological Views,\" a\nright choice implies regeneration; and if every man is _naturally\ncapable_ of a right choice, as taught by this same Dr. Tyler, and the\n\"generality\" of his brethren, then it follows conclusively, and I see\nnot how any sophistry can cover up the inference, these sinners have\nnatural power to convert themselves. Instead therefore of hypocritically\npleading their own weakness, before a _throne of grace_, and asking for\nmercy and grace to help them in their time of need, they ought to be\ncrimsoned with shame, for their folly and hypocrisy, turn away from\ntheir impertinent suit, throw themselves upon the _resources of nature_,\nand regenerate their own hearts. If however these gentlemen believe it\nimpossible for sinners to do this, then, taking their whole theory\ntogether, this power is no power, and community, up to this hour, has\nbeen deluded by unmeaning words--words which only serve to conceal the\ndeformity of a theological system, which, when thoroughly examined, is\nfound after all, to teach that the poor reprobate has no adequate power\nby nature, and receives no available aid from grace to choose salvation,\nand must therefore, from the imperious necessity of his nature and\ncondition, go down to interminable death.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER XI.\n\nSAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.\n\nIt is not pretended that there are no difficulties in our view of the\nsubject. What important theory is there in philosophy, politics, morals,\nor religion, against which some apparently plausible objection may not\nbe urged? But the inquiry in each case should be, Are those objections\nfatal to the system? Or are the difficulties in the proposed system\ngreater than in some other view of the subject? For reasonable men will\nrefuse to be driven into the vortex of skepticism merely because there\nare some difficulties and obscurities in all subjects of faith, which\nthe limitations to human vision will not permit us to penetrate. To form\nan enlightened comparative view in the case before us, it will be\nimportant that we glance at the different theories on the subject of\ndepravity and the ground of responsibility.\n\n1. One form in which this subject has been held is, \"That the sin of\nAdam introduced into his nature such a radical impotence and depravity\nthat it is impossible for his descendants to make any voluntary efforts\ntoward piety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their\nmoral and religious character, and that faith and all the Christian\ngraces are communicated by the sole and irresistible operation of the\nSpirit of God, without any endeavour or concurrence on the part of man.\"\nThis of course makes the elect entirely passive in their conversion; and\nconsigns the reprobate to destruction for the sin of Adam, which, it is\nmaintained, is imputed to him by virtue of a federal relation; or at\nbest gives him over to unavoidable personal and eternal condemnation for\npossessing a nature which he had no agency in bringing upon himself, and\nfrom which he has no power to extricate himself. The difficulties of\nthis system are so numerous and so palpable, whether it be tried by the\nstandard of Scripture, of reason, or of common sense, that I need not\nhere allude to them. Suffice it to say that they have pressed so heavily\nupon the Calvinists themselves as to baffle all their ingenuity and\ninvention at defence, and have driven them finally into all those\nchanges and modifications so frequently alluded to in this controversy.\nI will here say in advance that, in my opinion, this, after all, is the\nstrongest position Calvinism can assume. The moment its advocates depart\nfrom this, they must either, to be consistent with themselves, verge\nover into the other extreme of Pelagianism, or strike off into the\n\"golden mean\" of Arminianism. This may be more clearly seen in the\nsequel.\n\n2. Pelagianism is another, and an opposite theory. It has a variety of\nshades, called Pelagian, Semi-pelagian, &c. Its varieties, however,\nrelate to some minor modifications of the relation of the human family\nto Adam, touching natural evil, the death of the body, and greater\nexposure to temptation. But there is a uniformity in the essential part\nof the theory, which is, that human nature is free from sin or guilt\nuntil it becomes guilty by _intelligent, voluntary exercise_. The\nobjections to this theory are, among others, as follows. It is in direct\nopposition to the Scripture doctrine of native depravity--a doctrine\nwhich has been often and ably treated of and defended by Calvinistic\nand, Arminian divines--a doctrine which is embodied in a palpable form\nin every man's own experience--a doctrine which not only flashes upon\nthe mind of the student in every page of the history of man, but also\nupon the mind of the unlettered nurse in the earliest emotions of the\ninfant that struggles in her arms.\n\nAnother objection to this theory is, that it gives to infants, previous\nto intelligent voluntary exercise, no moral character. Hence, should\nthey die at this age, as multitudes doubtless do, they would not be fit\nsubjects either for the rewards of heaven or the pains of hell. At the\nJudgment, as they will not be subjects of praise or blame, they will\nneither be on the right hand nor the left, and of course will neither be\nsentenced to \"everlasting punishment,\" nor welcomed \"into life eternal.\"\nIf, however, they by any means go into a state of punishment, their\nsufferings will be unjust; or if they are admitted into heaven, it will\nnot be a salvation by grace, nor will it be preceded by regeneration,\nnor will their song be, \"Unto Him that hath loved us,\" &c. This is not\nonly contrary to the whole Gospel system, but also is in direct\nopposition to many scriptures, especially Rom. v, 18: \"Therefore, as by\nthe offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; so, by\nthe righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto\njustification of life.\" It also leaves infants involved in the natural\nevils of diseases, pains; and death, not only without any assignable\ncause, but also in direct opposition to the cause assigned by the\napostle--\"And so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.\"\n\nA third objection to this theory is, that it destroys the Scripture\ndoctrine of regeneration. The Scripture account of this matter is, in\nsubstance, that there is a radical change of our moral nature by the\nefficient operations of the Holy Ghost. But as this doctrine makes sin\nconsist exclusively in exercise, so holiness must consist wholly in\nexercise. The whole work, therefore, of regeneration is a mere change of\nvolition; and this volition is not the result of a preceding change of\nmoral constitution, but it is, like any other volition, produced by the\nnative power of the mind, under the exciting influence of motives. The\nHoly Spirit, therefore, may well be dispensed with in this work. The\nsupernatural character of the change must be given up, and the whole\nwork is resolvable into a natural process. It is here worthy of remark\nthat this is not mere speculation. Such has, in fact, been the final\nresult of this theory, I believe, in every case where it has long been\ndefended. And hence, in close connection with this, the supernatural\nefficacy of the atonement, and of course the Divine character of the\nRedeemer, are found to be notions not at all essential to the system,\nand somewhat discordant with the philosophy of its other parts, and are\ntherefore soon brought into discredit. And this, too, as may be seen by\nthe history of the Church, has been the practical result wherever\nPelagianism or Semi-pelagianism has been cherished. It has degenerated\ninto Socinianism. It may be said, then, in one word, that this doctrine\nof Pelagianism does, in its teachings, tendencies, and practical\nresults, supplant and overthrow all the essential principles of the\nGospel system.\n\n3. A third and intermediate theory on the subject of depravity and human\nresponsibility is the one presented and advocated in the preceding\nnumber. This system is presented, in part, in the very language in which\nthe Ultra-Calvinists present theirs. Arminians, as well as \"Calvinists,\nsay that the sin of Adam introduced into his nature such a radical\nimpotence and depravity that it is impossible for his descendants [who,\nit is believed, are propagated in the moral likeness of their fallen\nancestor] to make any voluntary efforts [unassisted by grace] toward\npiety and virtue, or in any respect to correct and improve their moral\nand religious character.\" Thus far we go together; but this is a point\nof divergency, from which we take very different directions. Instead of\ngoing on to say \"that the Christian graces are communicated by the\nirresistible operation of the Spirit of God, without any endeavour or\nconcurrence on the part of man,\" we say that \"the saving grace of God\nhath appeared unto all Men;\" and that this grace so enlightens,\nstrengthens, and aids the human mind, that it is thereby enabled to make\nthat choice which is the turning point, conditionally, of the soul's\nsalvation; and that it is by this same gracious aid that the man, when\nhe has this good will, is enabled \"to work out his salvation\" unto the\nend. It is in this latter part of the statement that we are at issue\nwith the Calvinists; but we are at issue on both parts with the\nPelagians of every grade, including, of course, the advocates of the New\nDivinity in our country.\n\nTo the foregoing statement of our doctrine it is proper to add that we\nbelieve that the merits of the atonement are so available for and in\nbehalf of the whole human family, that the guilt of depravity is not\nimputed to the subject of it until, by intelligent volition, he makes\nthe guilt his own by resisting and rejecting the grace of the Gospel;\nand that being thus by grace in a justified state, the dying infant is\nentitled to all the promised blessings of the new covenant, and will, of\ncourse, have wrought in him all that meetness necessary to qualify him\nfor the gracious rewards of the saints in glory. Thus, according to this\nsystem, the dying infant, as well as the dying adult believer, is\nsanctified by the blood of the covenant, and saved by grace.\n\nThese are the three systems which are presented to the inquirer after\ntruth as the alternatives, and perhaps I may say the only alternatives\nof choice, in reference to this subject. It is true, the doctrine of\n_natural ability_ has been proposed as another alternative, holding an\nintermediate place between the doctrines of native impotency as first\nstated and of Pelagianism. And it may therefore appear to some, that I\nought, in my enumeration, to have given this as a separate and distinct\ntheory. My reason, however, for not doing this is, that there cannot, in\nmy opinion, be such a resting place between the doctrines of derived\nconstitutional depravity and Pelagianism. Natural ability that is any\nthing more than a name--that is, in fact, an _ability_, destroys the\nidea of constitutional depravity; and depravity that is any thing more\nthan a name--that is, in fact, _constitutional depravity_, destroys the\nidea of natural ability. A striking proof of this is found in the fact\nthat a great portion of those divines in the Calvinistic Churches who\nhave been most decided in preaching up natural ability, have gone over\nand embraced the New Divinity, which, as we have seen, abjures the\ndoctrine of constitutional depravity. The New-Haven divines are\ncertainly gentlemen of talents and of close thought; and they have been\nfollowing up this doctrine for a number of years, and it has landed them\nupon the logical conclusion that _there is no such depravity_. But we\nneed not trust to the conclusions of the New Divinity advocates, to show\nthat the notions of natural ability and natural freedom from guilt and\nsin necessarily and reciprocally imply each other. Why have Calvinists\nleft their old ground of natural impotency, and resorted to the dogma of\na natural ability? It is for the avowed reason that there can be no\nguilt without an ability to avoid it. But since the sin of his nature is\nunavoidable to the new-born infant, of course he can have no guilt, and\nby consequence _no sin_, until he is capable of an intelligent moral\nchoice. Again: this same theory tells us that where there is no natural\nability there is no moral character. But as the infant cannot be\nreasonably supposed to have ability to put forth an intelligent holy\nvolition, he can have no moral character, and of course no sin.\n\nThe only way to avoid this conclusion in connection with the assumed\npremises is, to maintain that \"the infant, from his birth, is a\nvoluntary agent; and thus, in fact, to a certain extent, sinful.\" And\nwould you believe, reader, that any reasonable man would resort to such\nan idea for the sake of helping out a theory? _And yet it is even so_. A\npaper lately published under the sanction of the New Divinity,\npurporting to be an inquiry into \"what is the real difference between\nthe New-Haven divines and those who differ from them,\" says, \"The ground\nhas of late been taken (if we understand the discussions on this\nsubject) that mankind are literally _at birth_ voluntary and accountable\nagents, and actual sinners against God; that the new-born infant is a\nresponsible subject of God's moral government, and actually sins with a\nknowledge of his duty, and in the same sense with the adult sinner\nviolates moral obligation, does wrong, ought to be penitent, and to\nchange its moral character.\" And as a proof that this is the ground now\nassumed, the same writer gives us a quotation from Rev. Mr. Harvey, who\nhas been one of the most active in this state in opposition to the\nNew-Haven divines, in which he says, \"A moral being, for aught we know,\nmay commence his existence in an _active_, _voluntary_ state of the\nwill; he may be a voluntary agent from his birth, and thus, in fact, to\na certain extent sinful, and that without supposing that _depravity is\nseated in any thing but the will_.\" This same writer also states that\nDr. Spring, in a treatise on \"native depravity,\" a work which I have not\nat hand, has advanced and defended the sentiment of \"_actual_ sin from\nbirth.\" And has it indeed come to this at last, that this natural\nability, for which Calvinists have so strenuously contended, is nothing\nmore than the power the new-born infant has to commit actual sin on the\none hand, or \"make himself a new heart\" on the other! Alas for\nCalvinism! To what miserable shifts--yes, I must call them _miserable_\nshifts--is this system driven! On this subject I will not express myself\nin accordance with my feelings. The respect I have for the intelligent,\nlearned, and pious gentlemen who have advanced this idea, restrains me\nin this matter. Such a result, in the advocacy of a favourite theory, is\nhowever in strict accordance with the known obliquity of the greatest\nand purest minds. But while we respect the authors of such a theory, and\nwhile we feel the necessity of taking heed to ourselves, lest we also\nfall by the same example of prejudice, we cannot suffer our common sense\nto be imposed upon by such gross absurdities. In this, however, we see\nthat, as before, in trying to maintain their _ability_, they gave up\ntheir _depravity_: so here, in trying to establish their _depravity_,\nthey destroy their _ability_. Nay, what is still worse for this theory,\nthis very attempt to prove that infants are \"_actual_ sinners from their\nbirth,\" is an indirect denial of the doctrine of derived depravity. Why\ndo these gentlemen wish to establish this point? Why, forsooth, in order\nto show that men are _guilty_ from their birth, which is an\nacknowledgment, of course, that they cannot prove them guilty only by\nproving that they have intelligent moral exercise. Consequently it is a\nconcession that this exercise is the occasion and origin of their guilt.\nThis is not the first time that Calvinism, in trying to save itself, has\ngone over and joined the ranks of its opposers. Can the reader see the\ndifference between this doctrine of actual sin from the birth, viewed in\nconnection with its origin and bearings, and the New Divinity, which\nmakes sin consist exclusively in moral exercise? Let these old-side\nCalvinists, then, sheath the sword of controversy which they have drawn\nagainst their brethren, and join in with them to defend, if possible,\nthe Pelagian doctrine which, it would seem, after all, they hold in\ncommon stock. Has the Rev. Mr. Harvey been so active in getting up an\nopposition theological school in Connecticut to teach that the infant\n\"commences his existence in an _active voluntary_ state of the will, and\nis thus (_on this account_) to a certain extent sinful?\" This is clearly\na work of supererogation--a useless expenditure of money and of talents.\nThe New-Haven Theological School is capable--alas! too capable of\ncarrying on this work, especially if Mr. Harvey and his friends will\ncease their opposition, and unite in their assistance. Does Mr. Harvey\nfear that the New-Haven divines will not begin their \"_moral exercise_\"\nearly enough to make it _natural depravity?_ They have given assurances\nthat they will not be particular on that point. Only allow that there is\nno sin previous to the first intelligent act of choice--previous to the\ncorresponding power to make themselves new hearts, and they will be\nsatisfied. They have said already that \"this capableness of sinning, if\nit is not at the exact moment of birth, [and they do not affirm that it\nis not,] commences so early in their existence, that it is proper, for\nall the great purposes of instruction, to speak of it as existing from\nthe beginning of their days.\" Hence we see nothing between these\ngentlemen on this point worth contending about. It will, however, be\nimportant that all who hold to conversion by motives and mere moral\nsuasion should not put the commencement of these \"moral exercises\" so\nfar back that the subject cannot understand Gospel truth; otherwise they\nmay yet get into another difficulty as serious as the one they are\ntrying to avoid. But to the subject. It has been very distinctly shown,\nI think, from the reasoning of the Calvinists themselves, and from the\nnature of the case, that there can be no such intermediate theory as\nthey contend for, between the native impotency of old Calvinism and\nPelagianism. But as this is an important point, I will illustrate it\nfarther by an examination of the _seat_ of this Calvinistic depravity.\nIt is seen, by the quotation above from Mr. Harvey, that he considers\n\"depravity as seated in nothing but the will.\" And this is avowedly the\nsentiment of at least all those Calvinists who believe in natural\nability. It is on this ground that they reiterate incessantly, \"You can\nif you will;\" \"There is no difficulty except what is found in a perverse\nwill.\" It is on this ground, also, that they tell us \"a right choice is\nconversion.\" They do not say a right choice is a _condition_ or a fruit\nof the new birth; but _it is itself the new birth_. But to understand\nthis subject clearly, it is important to know what they mean by the\nwill. It appears to me they use this term with great indefiniteness, if\nnot latitude of meaning. If they mean by this what I understand to be\nthe legitimate meaning of the term \"the mental power or susceptibility\nof putting forth volitions;\" then to say that all depravity is seated in\nthe will, is to be guilty of the gross absurdity of teaching that the\naffections have not a moral character. If by the will, however, they\nmean, as they frequently seem to mean, the affections themselves going\nout in desire after some proposed good, then indeed they establish the\nNew-Haven theory, that all sin consists in moral exercise. Thus by\nplacing all depravity in the will, whether by this is meant the power of\nwilling, or the exercise of the affections, they, in the one case,\nexclude sin from the affections altogether, and in the other affirm the\ndoctrine of Pelagianism. But if by the will they mean something\ndifferent from either of the above definitions, then I frankly confess I\nknow not what they mean. Should they however, change their ground, and\nplace the seat of this depravity in the constitution of man's moral\nnature, as it exists anterior to any act of volition, then and in that\ncase they throw the subject back on the old ground of natural impotency;\nfor to talk of a natural power to change the moral constitution, as it\nexisted prior to choice, and which constitution must, by the law of its\nnature, exercise a controlling influence over the mind, is the same as\nto talk of a natural power to alter one's own nature, or to unmake and\nremake himself. In this case we must have supernatural aid, or we must\nremain as we are.\n\nWe shall not be fully prepared to judge correctly on this subject until\nwe have examined one more preliminary question, viz. What is the precise\nmeaning that we are to attach to the terms, _natural_ and _moral\nability_, as used by the Calvinists? To ascertain this, I have examined\nsuch authors as I have had access to, with care; and I have been\nparticular to consult _recent_ authors, that I might not be accused of\ncharging old and exploded doctrines upon our opposers; and _various_\nauthors, that I might ascertain any varieties that appertain to the\ndifferent Calvinistic schools. In particular, the author of \"Views in\nTheology;\" Dr. Griffin, in a late work on \"Divine Efficiency;\" Rev.\nTyler Thatcher, of the Hopkinsian school; and a doctrinal tract,\nentitled, \"Man a Free Agent without the Aid of Divine Grace,\" written,\nit is presumed, by one of the divines of the New-Haven school have been\nconsulted. There is among them all a remarkable uniformity on this\npoint. If I understand them, the substance of what they say is, \"Natural\npower consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will;\nand moral power is the _exercise_ of these faculties.\" Mr. Thatcher says\nthis in so many words.--The tract alluded to gives this definition of\nnatural power. Dr. Griffin says \"their [sinners'] faculties constitute a\nnatural ability, that is, a full power to love and serve God, if their\nhearts are well disposed.\" It certainly must appear, at the first\nglance, very singular to every mind not embarrassed by theory, that\neither the _possession_ of faculties, or the _exercise_ of faculties,\nshould be called _power_. The idea of _power_ is supposed, by the best\nphilosophical writers, to be undefinable, from the fact that it is a\nsimple idea; but here, strange to tell, we have it analyzed in two\ndifferent forms. Faculties are power--the exercise of faculties is\npower. Now, although we cannot define power, every one doubtless has a\nclear conception of it; and I humbly conceive that the common sense of\nevery man will decide that neither of the above definitions embraces the\ntrue idea of power. The _exercise_ of faculties _implies_ power, it is\ngranted; but every one must see that it is not power itself. And\nalthough the _faculties_ of the mind are sometimes called the _powers_\nof the mind by a kind of borrowed use of the term power, just as the\nlimbs or muscles are called the _powers_ of the body, yet it requires\nvery little discrimination to see that as we may possess these powers of\nthe body entire, and yet they be defective from some cause, as to some\nof their appropriate functions, so we may possess these powers or\nfaculties of mind entire, and yet they may be defective in that moral\nstrength necessary to a holy choice. Hence the possession of these\nfaculties does not even _imply_ power adequate to a holy choice; much\nless are they _power itself_. I marvel therefore at these definitions of\nmoral and natural power, and am thereby confirmed in the opinion\nadvanced in my former number, viz. \"That the whole of this distinction\n(of natural and moral ability) and the reasoning from it, proceed on the\nground of a most unphilosophical analysis of mind, and an unwarranted\ndefinition of terms.\" This may seem a strong statement from so humble an\nindividual as myself, in view of the many able minds that have adopted\nthe opinions here opposed. But neither their opinion nor mine will weigh\nmuch, in this controversy, except as sustained by reasonable arguments;\nand by such arguments the present writer expects to stand or fall. Look\nthen, reader, to both sides of this subject. Dr. Griffin himself seems\nto be at a loss how to explain himself on this subject. When he wishes\nto oppose the New-Haven divines, and guard against their error, he says,\n\"If you mean by power, an ability that works without Divine efficiency,\nI hope I shall be the last to believe that.\" \"And every body knows that\nthe mass of the New-England divines, from the beginning, have\nacknowledged no such doctrine.\"\n\nAnd why is _Divine efficiency_ necessary?--Because man has no ability\nthat will \"work,\" without it. Thus the moment he sets up a guard against\nPelagianism, he throws himself back either upon our doctrine, or upon\nthe old Calvinistic doctrine of \"native impotency.\" There is no standing\nplace any where else. The New-Haven divines are right, if natural\nability is right; and the time cannot be far distant when the love of\nconsistency will drive all, who hold to natural ability, either on to\nthe New Divinity ground, or back to old Calvinism. From this remark the\nreader will see how much depends, if my views are correct, upon the\nproper adjustment of this question. It is in fact the turning point,\nwhich is to give a character to the theology of the Churches. Let us not\nthen be in haste to pass over it. Hear Dr. Griffin farther. \"Now if you\nask me what is that power, which is never exerted without Divine\nefficiency? I can only say, that, in the account of the Divine mind, it\nis the proper basis of obligation, and therefore by the decision of\ncommon sense, must be called a power.\" The doctor had a little before\ntold us, that this power was faculties--he is not satisfied with this;\nand what well instructed mind, like the doctor's, could be? It is\nsomething that forms the \"basis of obligation,\" he knows not what it is.\nHe merely infers there is such a power, because men are held\nresponsible. But this inference will flow quite as naturally, by taking\nthe Arminian ground of gracious ability, and save the other difficulties\nbeside. At any rate, it will save the absurdity of holding to an\nability, that will not \"work,\" without being strengthened by Divine aid,\nand yet that this same ability is sufficient for all purposes of\nobligation without that aid.\n\nWe shall find equal difficulty, if we take up and examine this\ndefinition of _moral_ power. It is \"the exercise of natural power.\" But\nthese same writers tell us that, while we have this natural power\nsufficient without Divine grace to form a basis of obligation, \"we are\nentirely dependent upon God's grace for moral power\"--in other words,\naccording to the definition of moral power, we are dependent upon grace\nfor the _exercise_ of our natural power--and since natural power means\nthe faculties of the understanding, will, and conscience--the statement\nis simply and evidently this: we are dependent upon Divine grace for the\nexercise of our understanding, conscience, and will, in making a holy\nchoice. Why? Because the understanding, conscience, and will are so\ndepraved by nature, that it is not in their nature to \"work\" in this\nexercise, without this Divine grace. Is not this holding the gracious\nability after all? Is it singular then that Dr. Griffin should say, in\nanother place--\"They (sinners) are bound to go forth to their work at\nonce, _but they are not bound to go_ alone: it is their privilege and\nduty to cast themselves _instantly_ on the Holy Ghost, and not to take a\nsingle step in their own _strength?_\" Or is it any wonder that the\nChristian Spectator should say, that \"this statement of Dr. Griffin\nbrings him directly on the ground of evangelical Arminianism?\" And is\nthis the ability that \"the mass of the New-England divines have held to\nfrom the beginning?\" Not exactly. They only slide over on this ground\noccasionally, when they are pressed hard with Pelagianism on the one\nhand, and the old doctrine of passivity on the other. For the truth is,\nas before remarked, they have not a single point to balance themselves\nupon between these two, only as they light upon our ground.\n\nThere is still another difficulty in this moral power, as it is called.\nIt implies the absurdity, that power to obey God is obedience itself.\nFor a right exercise of our natural powers is obedience. But the right\nexercise of our natural power is moral power--therefore\n\nOur moral power to obey God is obedience!! And this will give us a clue\nto the proper understanding of that oft-repeated Calvinistic\nsaying--\"You have power to obey God, if your heart is rightly disposed,\"\nor in short hand--\"You can if you will.\" Now the verb _will_ here\nevidently means the right _exercise_ of the natural faculties--that is,\nas shown above, it means obedience. Hence the whole and proper meaning\nof this notable saying is--\"You have power to obey God, _if you obey\nhim_.\" \"You _can_ if you _do_.\" This is a sort of logic which, when\nscanned down to its naked character, one would get as little credit in\nrefuting, as its abettors are entitled to for its invention and use. And\nyet this is the logic which, in its borrowed and fictitious costume has\nled thousands in our land to suppose that Calvinism, as it is now\nmodified, is the same, or nearly the same with Methodism.\n\nThere is still another striking solecism, necessarily connected with\nthis definition of power. It supposes it to have no actual existence,\nuntil the necessity for it ceases. For in the order of cause and effect,\nnatural power effects the act of obedience; and this effect of natural\npower, producing obedience, gives existence to moral power. Thus we have\npower to obey, super-added to the power that has actually obeyed! If,\nhowever, Calvinists say this is treating the subject unfairly, because\ntheir very definition shows that they do not mean by it any thing which\n_enables_ man to obey--I answer, that my reasoning went upon the ground,\nthat it was what they call it--_power;_ and if they do not mean power,\nthat is only acknowledging the position I started upon, that this\nCalvinistic power is no power at all. And here I ask, in the name of\ncandour, What is the use of calling things by wrong names? What\nconfusion and error may not be introduced by applying common and well\ndefined terms in such a manner, that, when the things to which they are\napplied, are defined, it is seen that the terms thus applied are worse\nthan useless; they directly mislead the mind! It is the direct way to\nbring Christian theology and Christian ministers into distrust and\nreproach.\n\nOne thought more, with respect to this moral power, and I will pass on.\nThe doctrine of Calvinism is, if I understand it, that God controls the\nnatural power of men, by means of their moral power. This some of them\nexpressly affirm. And to show that I am not mistaken with respect to the\nothers, let the reader carefully attend to the following considerations.\nWhat is it secures the fulfilment of the Divine decrees, in respect to\nthe elect and the reprobate? Why do not some of the reprobates, in the\nuse of natural ability, repent and get to heaven? Because they have not\nthe moral power. Why do not some of the elect, in the use of the same\nability, fall into sin and finally perish? Because God makes and keeps\nthem willing in the day of his power--that is, he irresistibly imparts\nto them this moral power. Thus, by means of this, which he keeps in his\nown hands he executes his decrees. For God, of set purpose, so\nconstituted this natural power, that it does not \"work\" without Divine\nefficiency. By moral power; therefore, natural power is controlled. Now,\nto say nothing here of the absurdity of efficiently and irresistibly\ncontrolling one power by another, and yet calling that other the essence\nof free agency, and the basis of obligation--look at the absurdity in\nanother point of view. Since moral power is the exercise of natural\npower, the former must be the _effect_ of the latter. And since,\naccording to Calvinism, natural power is controlled by moral power, it\nfollows conclusively; that the effect controls its cause!! And since the\ncause must act, before the effect is produced, it follows that the\neffect, before it has an existence, acts upon its cause to produce its\nown existence!!! This is certainly a nullification of both cause and\neffect: Such are some of the difficulties of these definitions of\npower--definitions as contrary to the common understandings of men, and\nthe common laws of language, as they are to sound philosophy--definitions\nwhich, if they were always understood, when the terms were used; would\nmake the propositions in which these terms are found, sound very\ndifferently to the common ear. I trust therefore it has been made to\nappear, that \"this distinction of natural and moral ability, and the\nreasonings upon it, are founded on a most unphilosophical analysis of\nmind and an unwarranted definition of terms,\" and that, after all the\nefforts of the Calvinists to find out another alternative, they will be\nunder the necessity, if they would be consistent, either of going back\nto the old Calvinistic ground, of remediless impotency, or of advancing\non to the Pelagian ground of the New Divinity; or they must accept of\nthe Arminian theory of gracious ability. And that the reader may be\nprepared to make his selection, I will here remind him of the arguments\nadduced in favour of the latter doctrine, in the last number, while I\nnext proceed to answer more specifically the objections that have been\nurged against it, which however for an obvious reason must be withheld\nuntil the next number.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER XII.\n\nOBJECTIONS TO GRACIOUS ABILITY ANSWERED.\n\nIn consulting different authors to find the strongest objections that\nhave been urged against our doctrine of ability by grace, I have fixed\nupon the doctrinal tract, already alluded to, entitled, \"Man a Free\nAgent without the Aid of Divine Grace,\" as concentrating in a small\ncompass, and in a clear and able manner, the sum total of these\nobjections. I may not follow the precise order of this writer, and\npossibly shall pass over some of his remarks as of minor importance; but\nthe substance of his reasoning shall receive such notice as I shall be\nable to give it.\n\n1. The first objection is, in substance, this: that without being a free\nagent man cannot be _man;_ that free agency in fact enters into the very\ndefinition of an intelligent, morally responsible being; and therefore\nhe must be such by nature.\n\nThis objection gains all its plausibility from the writer's definition\nof free agency. \"It consists,\" he says, \"in the possession of\n_understanding_, _conscience_, and _will_.\" Now we grant that the being\nwho possesses these is an intelligent voluntary agent. But these\nfaculties, as we have seen, may be disordered, so that, for all holy\npurposes, they may be defective. The understanding may be darkened, the\nconscience may be seared, the power to choose good may be weakened\neither positively or relatively. _Liberty_ is a distinct faculty of the\nsoul; and as such is as subject to derangement as any other mental\nsusceptibility. It has, we say, suffered materially by the fall; so that\nman has not his original aptitude or facility to good. And whether we\nconsider this as a weakness appertaining directly to the faculty of the\nwill itself, or whether we consider it a relative weakness, (which is\nprobably the more philosophical,) resulting from the loss of a moral\nequilibrium in the mind, by reason of the uncontrolled sway of the\npassions, in either case the primary cause and the practical result are\nthe same. Sin has perverted the soul, and given it an unholy declination\nfrom righteousness to an extent which none but God can rectify. With\nthis view of the subject, the writer may call man a free agent if he\npleases; but he is only free to unrighteousness, and not to holiness.\n\nOur objector was aware that his argument might be disposed of in this\nway; and hence in a note he says, \"Some writers speak of man, in his\nnatural state, as _free only_ to evil. But in what does such freedom\ndiffer from mere instinct? With no power to do otherwise, how is he who\nmurders a fellow creature more criminal than the tiger, or even a\nfalling rock that destroys him?\" The fallacy of this argument consists\nchiefly in a misrepresentation of our theory. Instead of holding that\nman \"has no power to do otherwise,\" we believe, as much as this author,\nthat man has ample power at his command to do otherwise; but that this\npower is of grace, and not of nature. Any farther supposed difficulties\ngrowing out of this view of the subject will be explained, I trust\nsatisfactorily, as we advance.[6]\n\n2. \"Every man is conscious that he possesses the faculties which\nconstitute free agency.\"--Here again we must keep in view the writer's\ndefinition. We shall find no difficulty in granting that every man is\nconscious that he possesses the faculties of understanding, conscience,\nand will; but that these, unaided by grace, constitute man free to a\nholy choice, is denied; and this is the very question in debate. To\naffirm it therefore in argument is begging the question.\n\nIt however, the author means to say, as his reasoning on this point\nseems to imply, that man is conscious of being a free agent, in the\nresponsible sense of the term, this is also granted; but then this does\nnot touch the question whether this power is of grace or of nature. But,\nsays the writer, \"When man, under the influence of grace, does choose\nthe good, he is not conscious of any new faculty or power to choose, but\nonly he uses that power in a different manner. The power or faculty\nwhich chooses evil and which chooses good, is the same power differently\nused.\" Whoever disputed this?--understanding by power a faculty of the\nsoul, as this author evidently does. We all acknowledge that the soul\ngets no new faculties by grace; but we believe that the mind, in the\nexercise of its natural faculties, is assisted by grace to make a right\nchoice. But, says the writer, in this connection, \"Power to choose\nbetween two objects is power to choose either.\" If the writer means to\nsay that power to choose either the one or the other of two objects _is_\npower to choose either--this is an identical proposition: it is only\nsaying, _If a thing is, it is_. But if he means to say, when two objects\nare presented to the mind, and the mind finds itself possessed of a\npower to attach itself voluntarily to one, that therefore it has the\n_same power_ to attach itself to the other, this is denied; and as no\nproof is given or pretended by the objector, nothing but a denial is\nnecessary. On this point the founder of the Calvinistic school was\nundoubtedly correct--philosophically and theologically correct--when he\nsaid, \"Man has not an equally free election of good and evil.\"\n\nBut that I may meet this objection founded on consciousness, full in the\nface, I am prepared to assert, and I think prove, that man, so far from\nbeing conscious that he has by nature adequate power to serve God, is\nconscious of the very reverse of this. What truly awakened sinner has\nnot a deep conviction of his utter helplessness? How many experiences of\nintelligent and pious Calvinists could I quote on this point? As a\nspecimen take that of the Rev. David Brainerd, who stands high in the\nChurch, not only among Calvinists, but among all Christians who know\nhim. I quote a passage from his experience quoted by Dr. Griffin: \"I saw\nthat it was utterly impossible for me to do any thing toward helping or\ndelivering myself. I had the greatest certainty that my state was for\never miserable for all that I could do, and wondered that I had never\nbeen sensible of it before.\"--This passage is very strong; too\nunqualified, perhaps, but it is the natural language of a weak sinner,\nconvinced, as all must be before they _can become strong_, of their\nutter helplessness without grace. How fully does such a one prove the\ntruth of Scripture, that \"the _natural_ man receiveth not the things of\nthe Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither _can_ he\nknow them, for they are spiritually discerned;\" that \"no man knoweth the\nFather, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him.\" Hence the\nnecessity that \"the Spirit should take of the things of Jesus Christ,\nand show them unto them.\" Indeed, but for this darkness and weakness of\nthe understanding, the penitent sinner would not feel the necessity of\nthe agency of the Spirit: nor would it in fact be necessary. It is on\nthis ground that the doctrine of natural ability has led to the idea of\nconversion by _moral suasion_. Thus it is evident that a man may be\nconscious of having an understanding, but at the same time be as _fully_\nconscious that that understanding is too dark and weak for holy\npurposes, unaided by grace. The same is also true of conscience.\nExperience teaches us that it often becomes languid or dead, and needs\nquickening. Hence the Christian often prays--\n\n   \"Quick as the apple of an eye,\n      O God! my conscience make;\n   Awake my soul when sin is nigh,\n      And keep it still awake.\"\n\nHence also we pray God to alarm the conscience of sinners. So also we\nlearn from Scripture and experience that the conscience needs purging\n\"from dead works,\" for the very object that we may be able \"to serve God\nwith filial fear;\" we learn also that we may have \"defiled consciences,\"\n\"weak consciences,\" \"seared consciences,\" &c. And here let it be\nnoticed, that whether we understand these passages as applying to the\nregenerate or unregenerate, to derived depravity or contracted\ndepravity, the argument against the objector will in every case apply\nwith resistless force, viz. it shows that this faculty of the soul may\nbecome so disordered as to have its original healthy action impaired,\nand that in this case nothing can give it its original sensibility and\nstrength but the God who made it. If sin does disorder the conscience,\nit disordered Adam's: and if he begat children in his own moral\nlikeness, then his posterity had a similar conscience. And therefore it\nis necessary that, as by the offence of the first Adam sin abounded, so\nby the obedience of the second, grace may abound in a way directly to\nmeet the evil.\n\nLet us next examine the will. Are we not conscious that this also is\nweak? How repeatedly does the awakened sinner resolve and fail! until he\nbecomes deeply impressed that he is \"without strength!\" He tries to keep\nthe law, but cannot; for he finds that \"the carnal mind is not subject\nto the law of God, neither indeed _can be_.\" Hear his complaint! and\nthat we may be sure of taking a genuine case, let us select a Bible\nexperience from Rom. vii; \"I am carnal, sold under sin.\" (How much\nliberty to serve God has a bond slave to sin?) \"That which I do I allow\nnot; for what I would do that I do not, but what I hate that do I.\" \"To\nwill is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find\nnot,\" &c. (See through the chapter.) Hear him finally exclaim, in self\ndespair, \"Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?\" Why, Saul\nof Tarsus! are you not conscious that you have understanding,\nconscience, and will? Why make such an exclamation? Who shall deliver\nyou? _Deliver yourself_. No! such philosophy and such theology were not\nknown to this writer, neither as a penitent sinner, nor as an inspired\napostle. \"I thank God, through Jesus Christ my Lord.\"--\"The law of the\nspirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law [the\ncontrolling power] of sin and death.\"\n\nShould any one say that the apostle was not describing his _conversion_\nhere, but his experience as a Christian believer, I reply: If any thing,\n_that_ would make the passage so much the stronger for my present\npurpose; for \"if these things are done in the green tree, what shall be\ndone in the dry?\" If a saint--one who has been washed and renewed--finds\nnevertheless that his will is so weak as to need the continued grace of\nGod to enable him to do the things that he would, much more is this true\nof the unrenewed sinner. If this account of the apostle's experience\nmeans any thing, _it is as express a contradiction of the doctrine, that\nwe have natural strength to serve God, as could be put into words_. And\nI am bold to say that this is the experience of all Christians. And it\npresents an argument against the doctrine of natural ability which no\nmetaphysical reasoning can overthrow--not indeed an argument to prove\nthat we have not understanding, conscience, and will; but to show that,\nhaving these in a disordered and debilitated state, grace is\nindispensable to aid them, in order to an efficient holy choice. How\noften soever the judgment may be brought to a preference of the Divine\nlaw, it will as often be carried away by the strength of the unholy\npassions until it is delivered by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.\n_We are conscious therefore that we have not natural power to keep the\nDivine law_.\n\n3. But it is objected again, \"that the Scriptures require us to use our\nnatural faculties in the service of God;\" and hence the inference is,\nthat these faculties are adequate to this service.\n\nIt is certainly no objection to our doctrine, that the Scriptures,\ndealing with man as he is, require him to use his natural powers to\nserve God. With what other powers should he serve him? I again repeat\nthat the question is not, whether we have _mental faculties_, nor\nwhether man may or can serve God with these faculties, but simply\nwhether the command to obey is given independently of the considerations\nof grace. We say it is not; and in proof refer to the Scriptures, which\ngive a promise corresponding with every command, and assurances of\ngracious aid suited to every duty--all of which most explicitly imply,\nnot only man's need, but also the ground on which the command is\npredicated. And with this idea agrees the alleged condemnation, so often\npresented in the Scriptures: \"This is the condemnation, that light has\ncome into the world, and men have loved darkness.\" \"He that believeth\nnot is condemned already.\" \"But they grieved his Holy Spirit, therefore\nhe is turned to be their enemy.\" \"How shall we escape, if we neglect so\ngreat salvation.\" These, and many other passages, show that the turning\npoint of guilt and condemnation is not so much the abuse of natural\npowers, as the neglect and abuse of grace bestowed.\n\nThis point may be illustrated by Christ's healing the withered hand. He\ncommanded the man to stretch it forth. What was the ground of that\ncommand, and what was implied in it? The ground of it was, that aid\nwould be given him to do it; otherwise the command to stretch forth a\npalsied limb would have been unreasonable. And yet it was understood\nthat the man was to have no new muscles, or nerves, or bones, to\naccomplish this with; but he was to use those he had, assisted, as they\nwould be, by the gracious power of God. So man, it is true, is commanded\nto use his natural powers in obeying God; but not without Divine aid,\nthe promise of which is always either expressed or implied in the\ncommand.\n\n4. \"The Scriptures ascribe no other inability to man to obey God, but\nthat which consists in or results from the perversion of those faculties\nwhich constitute him a moral agent.\"\n\nIt is true, the Scriptures blame man for his inability--for inability\nthey certainly ascribe to him, and why? Because where sin abounded grace\nhas much more abounded. That sinners are perverse and unprepared for\nholy obedience up to this hour is undoubtedly their own fault, for grace\nhas been beforehand with them. It met them at the very threshold of\ntheir moral agency, with every thing necessary to meet their case. It\nhas dug about the fruitless fig tree. It has laid the foundation to say\njustly, \"What more could I have done for my vineyard?\" If the sinner has\nrejected all this, and has increased his depravity by actual\ntransgression, then indeed is he justly chargeable for all his\nembarrassments and moral weakness, for he has voluntarily assumed to\nhimself the responsibility of his native depravity, and he has added to\nthis the accumulated guilt of his repeated sins.\n\n5. It is farther objected, with a good deal of confidence, that\nArminians, after all, make man's natural power the ground and measure of\nhis guilt, since \"no part of his free agency arises from furnished\ngrace, but it consists simply inability to use or abuse that grace, and\nof course in an ability distinct from, and not produced by the grace.\"\n\nLet us see, however, if there is not some sophistry covered up here.\nArminians do not mean that man's ability to use grace is independent of,\nand separate from the grace itself. They say that man's powers are\ndirectly assisted by grace, so that through this assistance they have\nability or strength _in those powers_ which before they had not, to make\na right choice. To talk of ability to use gracious ability, in any other\nsense, would be absurd. It would be like talking of _strength_ to use\n_strength_--of _being able to be able_. This absurdity, however, appears\nto me justly chargeable upon the natural ability theory, taken in\nconnection with the Scripture account of this matter. The Scriptures\ninstruct us to look to God for strength; that he gives us \"power to\nbecome the children of God;\" that he \"strengthens with might in the\ninner man, that we may be _able_,\" &c. This theory, however, tells us\nthat we have an ability back of this; an ability on which our\nresponsibility turns, and by means of which we can become partakers of\nthe grace of the Gospel. This is certainly to represent the Divine Being\nas taking measures to make _ability able_, and adding power to make\n_adequate strength sufficiently strong_.--Such is the work of\nsupererogation which this theory charges upon the Gospel, for which its\nadvocates alone are answerable; but let them not, without better ground,\nattempt to involve us in such an absurdity. But the strongest\nobjections, in the opinion of those who differ from us, are yet to come.\nThey are of a doctrinal, rather than of a philosophical character, and\nare therefore more tangible, and will, for this reason, perhaps, be more\ninteresting to the generality of readers. Let us have patience, then, to\nfollow them out.\n\n6. _Doctrinal Objections_.--On the ground of gracious ability it is\nobjected that, 1. \"As the consequence of Adam's fall, Adam himself and\nall his posterity became incapable of committing another sin.\" 2. \"Every\nsinful action performed in this world, since the fall of Adam, has been\nthe effect of supernatural grace.\" 3. \"Man needed the grace of God, not\nbecause he was wicked, but because he was weak.\" 4. \"The moral\ndifference between one man and another is not to be ascribed to God.\" 5.\n\"The posterity of Adam needed no Saviour to atone for actual sin.\" 6.\n\"This opinion is inconsistent with the doctrine of grace.\" 7. \"There can\nbe no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions.\" 8. \"Is\nnot this grace a greater calamity to our race than the fall of Adam?\"\n\nI have thrown these objections together, and presented them in\nconnection to the reader, for the reason that they all rest mainly on\none or two erroneous assumptions, to correct which will be substantially\nto answer them all.\n\nOne erroneous assumption of this writer is, that \"there is no free\nagency to do wrong, which is not adequate to do right.\" This writer\nseems to think this a self-evident proposition, which needs no proof;\nfor although he has used it in argument a number of times, he has left\nit unsustained by any thing but his naked assertion. This proposition\nhas already been denied, and an unqualified denial is all that in\nfairness can be claimed by an antagonist to meet an unqualified\nassertion. Our object, however, is truth, and not victory. Let me\nrequest you then, reader, to look at this proposition. Can you see any\nself-evident proof of this assertion? If the Creator should give\nexistence to an intelligent being, and infuse into his created nature\nthe elements of unrighteousness, and give to his faculties an\nirresistible bias to sin, and all this without providing a remedy, or a\nway for escape, then indeed all our notions of justice would decide that\nsuch a being ought not to be held responsible. But this is not the case\nwith any of the sinful beings of God's moral government.--Not of the\nfallen angels, for they had original power to stand, but abused it and\nfell--not of fallen man, for in the first place his is not a created\ndepravity; but, in the case of Adam, it was contracted by voluntary\ntransgression when he had power to stand; and in the case of his\nposterity, it is derived and propagated in the ordinary course of\ngeneration: and in the second place, a remedy is provided which meets\nthe exigencies of man's moral condition, at the very commencement of his\nbeing. This it does by graciously preventing the imputation of guilt\nuntil man is capable of an intelligent survey of his moral condition;\nfor \"as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto\ncondemnation: even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came\nupon all men unto justification of life.\" And when man becomes capable\nof moral action, this same gracious remedy is suited to remove his\nnative depravity, and to justify him from the guilt of actual\ntransgression; for \"if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to\nforgive us our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness.\" It does\nnot appear, then, either from the obvious character of the proposition\nitself; or from the condition of sinful beings, that \"the same free\nagency which enables a man to do wrong, will enable him also to do\nright.\" Hence it is not true that Adam, by the fall, lost his power to\nsin, or that there is now no sin in the infernal regions. It is true,\nthe writer tries to sustain this idea farther, by asserting that \"_that_\nceases to be a moral wrong which is unavoidable; for no being can be\nheld responsible for doing what is unavoidable.\" This is little better,\nhowever, than a reiteration of the former assumption. If the character\nand conduct of a being are not _now_, and never _have been_ avoidable,\nthen indeed he ought not to have guilt imputed to him. But to say that\nthere is \"no moral wrong\" in the case, is to say that characters and\nactions are not wrong in themselves, even where it would not be just to\nimpute guilt. And this is an idea which is implied also in another part\nof this writer's reasoning; for he tells us that, according to the\ndoctrine of gracious ability \"every sinful action performed in this\nworld, since the fall of Adam, has been the effect of supernatural\ngrace;\" and that \"man needed the grace of God, not because he was\nwicked, but because he was weak,\" &c. This reasoning, or rather these\npropositions, are predicated on the assumption, that there is no _moral\nwrong_ where there is no _existing_ ability to do right: in other words,\nthat dispositions and acts of intelligent beings are not _in themselves_\nholy or unholy, but are so only in reference to the _existing_ power of\nthe being who is the subject of these dispositions and acts.\n\nBut is this correct? Sin may certainly exist where it would not be just\nto impute it to the sinner. For the apostle tells us that \"until the law\nsin was in the world;\" and yet he adds, \"Sin is not imputed (he does not\nsay sin does not exist,) where there is no law.\" The fact there are\ncertain dispositions and acts that are _in their nature_ opposite to\nholiness, whatever may be the power of the subject _at the time_ he\npossesses this character or performs these acts. Sin is sin, and\nholiness is holiness, under all circumstances. They have a positive, and\nnot merely a relative existence. And although they have not existence\nabstract from an agent possessing understanding, conscience, and will,\nstill they may have an existence abstractly from the power of being or\ndoing otherwise at the time. If not, then the new-born infant has no\nmoral character, or he has power to become holy with his first breath.\nWhether the subject of this unavoidable sin shall be responsible for it,\nis a question to be decided by circumstances. If a being has had power,\nand lost it by his own avoidable act, then indeed he is responsible for\nhis impotency--his very weakness becomes his crime, and every act of\nomission or commission resulting from his moral impotency, is justly\nimputed to him, the assertion of our objector to the contrary\nnotwithstanding. Hence it is incorrect to say there is now \"no guilt in\nthe rebellion of the infernal regions.\" It is of little consequence\nwhether, in this case, you assume that all the guilt is in the first\nact, by which the ability to do good was lost, or in each successive act\nof sin, which was the unavoidable consequence of the first. In either\ncase, the acts that follow are the measure of the guilt; and hence,\naccording to the nature of the mind, the consciousness of guilt will be\nconstantly felt, as the acts occur. For all practical purposes,\ntherefore, the sense of guilt, and the Divine administration of justice\nwill be the same in either view of the subject. The writer supposes the\ncase of \"a servant's cutting off his hands to avoid his daily task,\" and\nsays, \"this he is to blame, and ought to be punished;\" but thinks he\nought not to be punished for his subsequent deficiencies. But I ask, How\nmuch is he to blame, and to what extent should he be punished? His guilt\nand punishment are to be measured, certainly, by the amount of wrong he\nhas done his master--that is, by every act of omission consequent upon\nthis act, which rendered these omissions unavoidable. Therefore he is\njustly punishable for every act of omission; and you may refer this\nwhole punishment to the first act exclusively, or to all the acts\nseparately: it amounts to the same thing in the practical administration\nof government and of justice. Indeed, to say that each succeeding act is\nto be brought up and taken into the estimate, in order to fix the\nquantum of punishment, is to acknowledge that these succeeding acts are\nsins; else why should they be brought into the account at all, in\nestimating guilt and punishment? Take another case. The drunkard\ndestroys or suspends the right use of his reason, and then murders. Is\nhe to be held innocent of the murder because he was drunk? or was the\nwhole guilt of the murder to be referred to the act of getting\nintoxicated? If you say the former, then no man is to be punished for\nany crime committed in a fit of intoxication; and one has only to get\nintoxicated in order to be innocent. If you say the latter, then, as\ngetting drunk is the same in one case as another, _every_ inebriate is\nguilty of murder, and whatever other crimes drunkeness _may_ occasion,\nor has occasioned. Is either of these suppositions correct? Shall we not\nrather say that the inebriate's guilt is to be measured by the aggregate\nof crimes flowing from the voluntary act of drowning his reason? And so\nin the case before us. Instead then of saying, that on our principles\n\"there is no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions,\" I\nwould say that their present rebellion is the fruits and measure of\ntheir guilt. Thus we see, that a being who has had power and lost it, is\nguilty of his present acts.\n\nAnd by examination we shall find that by how much we enhance the\nestimated guilt of the first act, it is by borrowing so much from the\nacts of iniquity which follow. And will you then turn round and say, the\nacts which follow have no guilt? Why have they no guilt? Evidently\nbecause you have taken the amount of that guilt and attached it to the\nfirst act. And does this make these acts in themselves innocent? The\nidea is preposterous. As well may you say that the filthy streams of a\npolluted fountain are not impure in themselves, because but for the\nfountain they would not be impure; as to say that the current of unholy\nvolitions which unavoidably flows from a perverted heart is not unholy\nand criminal.\n\nAnother clearly erroneous assumption of this writer is, that if it would\nbe unjust for the Divine Being to leave his plan _unfinished_, after it\nis begun, the _whole_ plan must be predicated on justice, and not on\ngrace. It is true, he has not said this, in so many words, but his\nreasoning implies it. For he says this scheme of gracious ability\n\"annihilates the whole doctrine of grace.\" Because God, if he held man\naccountable, was bound to give him this ability, as a matter of justice;\nhence it is not an ability by grace, but an ability by justice. The\nwhole of this reasoning, and much more, goes upon the principle, that\nthe _completion_ of a plan of grace, after it is begun, cannot be\nclaimed on the scale of justice, without making the whole a plan of\njustice. But is this true? Is not a father, after he has been\ninstrumental of bringing a son into the world, bound _in justice_ to\nprovide for and educate him? And yet does not the son owe a debt of\ngratitude to that father, when he has done all this? If a physician\nshould cut off the limb of a poor man, to save his life, is he not bound\n_in justice_, after he has commenced the operation, to take up the\narteries and save the man from dying, by the operation. And if he should\nnot do it, would he not be called a wanton and cruel wretch? And yet in\nboth these cases the persons may be unworthy. The son may show much\nobliquity of moral principle, and yet the father should bear with him,\nand discipline him. The man on whom the physician operated may be poor\nand perverse. Here then are cases in which _justice demands that un\nmerited favour begun should be continued_, or else what was favour in\nthe commencement, and what would be favour in the whole, would\nnevertheless by its incompleteness, be most manifest injustice. Such is\nthe state of the question in respect to the Divine administration. The\nwhole race of man had become obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, in\ntheir representative and federal head, by reason of _his_ sin. This is\nexpressly stated: \"By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to\ncondemnation.\" \"In Adam all die.\" In this situation we may suppose that\nthe strict justice of the law required punishment in the very character\nin which the offence was committed. Adam personally and consciously\nsinned; and so, according to justice, he must suffer. The prospective\ngenerations of men, existing seminally in him, as they had not\nconsciously and personally sinned, could, in justice, only experience\nthe effects of the curse in the same character in which they sinned,\nviz. passively and seminally, unless provision could be made, by which,\nin their personal existence, they might free themselves from the effects\nof sin. Now God, in the plenitude of his wisdom and grace, saw fit to\nmake provision for a new probation for man, on the basis of a covenant\nof grace, the different parts of which are all to be viewed together, in\norder to judge of their character. In this covenant Adam had a _new\ntrial;_ and when the promise was made to him he stood in the same\nrelation to his posterity as he did when he sinned, and the curse was\nout against him. If, by the latter, the prospective generations of men\nwere justly cut off from possible existence; by the former this\nexistence was mercifully secured to them. If by the corruption of the\nrace, through sin, the possibility of salvation was cut off, on all\nknown principles of administrative justice; by the provisions of grace\nthe possibility of salvation was secured to the whole race; and this\npossibility implies every necessary provision to render grace available\nand efficient, in accordance with moral responsibility. If \"God, who\nspared not his own Son, but freely gave him up for us all,\" had not\n\"with him also freely given us all things\" necessary for our salvation,\nwould not the Divine procedure have been characterized both by folly and\ninjustice? If his plan of grace had only gone so far as to have given us\na conscious being, without giving us the means of making that existence\nhappy, would it not have been wanton cruelty? And yet, taking the whole\ntogether, who does not see that it is a most stupendous system of grace,\nfrom the foundation to the top-stone? Let us not then be guilty of such\nmanifest folly, as to take a part of the Divine administration, and make\nup a judgment upon that, as viewed independently of the rest, and then\ntransfer this abstract character to the whole. As in chemical\ncombinations, though one of the ingredients taken alone might be\ndeleterious, yet the compound may be nutritious or salutary, so in the\nnew covenant, if we separate legal exactions and penalties from gracious\nprovisions, the operations of the former may be unjust and cruel, yet\nthe whole, united as God hath combined them, may be an administration of\nunparalleled grace. It is in this heavenly combination that \"mercy and\ntruth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other.\"\nNow, therefore, \"if we confess our sins, he is faithful and _just_ to\nforgive us our sins,\" for on this ground he can be \"_just_ and the\njustifier of them that believe.\" Although justice is thus involved in\nthe system, and to leave out part of the system would be manifest\ninjustice, yet the whole is the \"blessed Gospel;\" \"the Gospel of the\ngrace of God.\" It is objected, I know, that the idea that, but for the\nprovisions of the Gospel, man would not have propagated his species, is\nfanciful and unauthorized by Scripture. The Scriptures, I grant, do not\nstrike off into speculations about what God might have done, or would\nhave done, if he had not done as he has. This is foreign from their\ndesign; and I am perfectly willing to let the whole stand as the\nScriptures present it. But when our opponents set the example of raising\nan objection to what we think the true system, by passing judgment on a\npart, viewed abstractly, we must meet them. On their own ground, then, I\nwould say, the idea that man would have been allowed to propagate his\nspecies, without any provisions of grace, is altogether fanciful and\nunauthorized by Scripture. Will it be said, that it seems more\nreasonable, and in accordance with the course of nature, to suppose that\nhe would? I answer, It seems to me more reasonable, and in accordance\nwith the course of justice, to suppose that he would not. Whoever\nmaintains that the personal existence of Adam's posterity was not\nimplied and included in the provisions of grace, in the new covenant,\nmust take into his theory one of the following appendages;--he must\neither believe that the whole race could justly be consigned to personal\nand unavoidable wo, for the sin of Adam, or that all could be justly\ncondemned for the sin of their own nature, entailed upon them without\ntheir agency, and therefore equally unavoidable; or he must believe that\neach would have a personal trial on the ground of the covenant of works,\nas Adam had. If there is another alternative, it must be some system of\nprobation which God has never intimated, and man, in all his inventions\nhas never devised. Whoever is prepared to adopt either of the two former\npropositions is prepared to go all lengths in the doctrine of\npredestination and reprobation charged upon Calvinism in the sermon that\ngave rise to this controversy, and, of course, will find his system\nsubject to all the objections there urged against it. If any one chooses\nto adopt the third alternative, and consider all the posterity of Adam\nas standing or falling solely on the ground of the covenant of works,\nsuch a one need not be answered in a discussion purporting to be a\n\"_Calvinistic_ controversy.\" He is a Socinian, and must be answered in\nanother place. All that need be done here, is to show the embarrassments\nof _Calvinism proper_, the utter futility of all its changes to relieve\nitself from these embarrassments, unless it plunge into Pelagianism and\nSocinianism, or rest itself upon the Arminian foundation of gracious\nability. It is on this latter ground we choose to rest, because here,\nand here alone, we find the doctrines of natural depravity, human\nability and responsibility, and salvation by grace, blending in\nbeautiful harmony.\n\nHaving noticed some of the erroneous assumptions on which the doctrinal\nobjections to our theory are based, the objections themselves, I think,\nmay all be disposed of in a summary way. We see, on our plan, that, 1.\nAdam did not render himself incapable of sinning, by the fall, but\nrather rendered himself and his posterity incapable of any other moral\nexercise but what was sinful; and it was on this account that a gracious\nability is necessary, in order to a second probation. 2. Sin, since the\nfall, has not been the result of supernatural grace, but the natural\nfruit of the fall; and supernatural grace is all that has counteracted\nsin. 3. \"Man needed the grace of God,\" _both_ \"because he was wicked,\"\n_and_ \"because he was weak.\"--4. \"The moral difference between one man\nand another is--to be ascribed to God.\" How any one could think a\ncontrary opinion chargeable upon us, is to me surprising. It is more\nproperly Calvinism that is chargeable with this sentiment. Calvinism\nsays, Regeneration is a right choice. It says, also, that power to sin\nimplies power to be holy; and of course we become holy by the same power\nas that by which we sin. And it farther says, that the power is of\nnature and not of grace. Now let the reader put all these together, and\nsee if it does not follow most conclusively, that \"the moral difference\nbetween one man and another is not to be ascribed to God.\" But, on the\ncontrary, _we_ say the sinful nature of man is changed in regeneration\nby the power of the Holy Ghost. 5. \"The posterity of Adam\" _did_ \"need a\nSaviour to atone for actual sin.\" For actual sin is the result, not of\ngracious power, as this author supposes, but of a sinful nature\nvoluntarily retained and indulged. If our opponents charge us with the\nsentiment, that grace is the cause of the actual sin of Adam's\nposterity, because we hold that grace was the cause of their personal\nexistence, we grant that, in that sense, grace was a cause without which\nthe posterity of Adam would not have sinned. But if this makes God the\nauthor of sin, by the same rule we could prove that God is the author of\nsin, because he created moral agents--and if there is any difficulty\nhere, it presses on them as heavily as on us. But in any other sense,\ngrace is not the cause of sin. 6. \"This opinion is,\" as we have seen,\nperfectly \"with the doctrine of grace.\" 7. \"There is\" _constant_ \"guilt\nin the present rebellion of the infernal regions.\" 8. \"This grace is a\ngreater\" _blessing_ \"to our race than the fall of Adam\" was a\n\"calamity;\" for \"where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.\"\n\nThus I have endeavoured to _explain_, _prove_, and _defend_ the doctrine\nof gracious ability, a doctrine always maintained in the orthodox\nChurch, until the refinements of Calvinism made it necessary to call it\nin question; and a doctrine on which, viewed in its different bearings,\nthe orthodox Arminian system must stand or fall. I have been the more\nminute and extended in my remarks from this consideration; and also from\nthe consideration that while this doctrine has of late been most\nviolently assailed by all classes of Calvinists, very little has been\npublished in its defence. If the reader has had patience to follow the\nsubject through, he is now perhaps prepared to judge whether our holy\nvolitions are the result of a gracious ability or of natural power.\n\nShould I find time to pursue this subject farther, it would be in place\nnow to examine the doctrine of regeneration; in which examination the\nnature of inherent depravity, and of that choice which is conditional to\nthe new birth, would be more fully noticed. \"This will I do if God\npermit.\"\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER XIII.\n\nREGENERATION.\n\nAn important error in any one cardinal doctrine of the Gospel will make\na glaring deformity in the entire system. Hence when one of these\ndoctrines is marred or perverted, a corresponding change must be made in\nmost or all of the others to keep up the appearance of consistency.\n\nThese remarks apply with special emphasis to the doctrine of\nregeneration. As this is a focal point, in which many other leading\ndoctrines centre, this doctrine must of necessity give a character to\nthe whole Gospel plan. This might be inferred _a priori_ from the\nknowledge of the relation of _this_ to the other parts of the Christian\nsystem, and it is practically illustrated in the history of the Church.\nThere are those who believe, that by the various terms used in Scripture\nto express the change commonly called regeneration or the new birth,\nnothing is intended but some outward ceremony, or some change of opinion\nin matters of speculative belief or the like. Some say it is baptism, or\na public profession of faith; others that it is a mere speculative\nrenunciation of heathen idolatry, and an acknowledgment of the Christian\nfaith; others that it is merely a reformed life; and a few maintain that\nit is the change that we shall undergo by death, or by the resurrection\nof the body. These persons, and all in fact who make the new birth\nsomething short of a radical change of heart, are obliged, for\nconsistency's sake, to accommodate the other doctrines to their views of\nregeneration. Hence they very generally deny constitutional or derived\ndepravity, the inflexibility and rigorous exactions of the Divine law,\nthe destructive character of sin, the atonement, the supernatural agency\nof the Spirit upon the human heart, justification by faith, and the\nlike. Thus a radical error on one point actually leads to _another\ngospel_--if gospel it may be called.\n\nIt does not come within the scope of my present design to enter into a\nrefutation of the foregoing errors. But from the disastrous results of\nthese errors we may infer the importance of guarding carefully and of\nunderstanding clearly the Scripture doctrine of the new birth. Even\nwhere the error is not so radical, as in the instances above alluded to,\nthe evil may be considerable, and in some cases fatal.\n\nThe Arminians and Calvinists agree in this doctrine, in so far as that\nthey both make it a radical change of moral nature, by the supernatural\nagency of the Holy Ghost. But they differ in respect to the _order_ in\nwhich the several parts of the change take place--in respect to the\nmanner and degree of the agency of the Holy Spirit, and also in respect\nto the part which human agency has in the accomplishment of this change.\nAnd in some, if not all of these points, Calvinists differ as much from\neach other as they do from us.\n\nIt is my present purpose to point out some of the more prominent\nCalvinistic modes of stating and explaining this doctrine, with the\ndifficulties attending them: after which I shall endeavour to present\nand defend what we believe to be the Scripture doctrine of regeneration.\n\n_First Theory_.--The notion that the mind is entirely passive in this\nchange, that is, that nothing is done by the subject of it, which is\npreparative or conditional, or in any way co-operative in its\naccomplishment, has been a prevailing sentiment in the various\nmodifications of the old Calvinistic school. It is not indeed pretended\nthat the mind is inactive, either before or at the time this renovation\nis effected by the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, it is said that the\nsinner is resisting with all the power of the mind, and with all the\nobstinacy of the most inveterate enmity, up to the very moment, and in\nthe very act of conversion. So that the sinner is regenerated, not only\n_without_ his _co-operation_, but also in _spite_ of his _utmost\nresistance_. Hence it is maintained, that, but for the _irresistible_\ninfluence of the Holy Ghost upon the heart, no sinner would be\nconverted.\n\n1. One of the leading objections to this view of conversion is, that it\nis inseparably connected with the doctrine of particular and\nunconditional election. The two reciprocally imply each other, and must\ntherefore, stand or fall together. But this doctrine of particular and\nunconditional election has been sufficiently refuted, it is hoped, in\nthe sermon that gave rise to this controversy; if so, then the doctrine\nof passivity and irresistible grace is not true.\n\n2. Another very serious difficulty which this theory of conversion has\nto contend with is, that the Scriptures, in numerous passages, declare\nthat the Spirit of God may be _resisted, grieved, quenched_, and utterly\ndisregarded; and that the grace of God may be abused, or received in\nvain. The passages to establish these propositions are so frequent that\nI need not stop to point them out. But if this be so, then the grace of\nGod and the Spirit of grace are not irresistible.\n\n3. It may be yet farther objected to this doctrine of the mind's\npassivity in conversion, that it is a virtual denial of all gracious\ninfluence upon the heart before regeneration. It has been shown in\nprevious numbers that man was not able to comply with the conditions of\nsalvation without grace--and that the gracious influences of the Divine\nSpirit are given to every sinner previous to regeneration. But there\nwould be no necessity for this, and no consistency in it, if there are\nno conditions and no co-operation on the part of the sinner in the\nprocess of the new birth. Hence the advocates of this doctrine very\nconsistently maintain that the first act of grace upon the heart of the\nsinner is that which regenerates him. Since then this theory conflicts\nwith the Bible doctrine of a gracious influence anterior to conversion,\nit cannot be admitted.\n\n4. This theory of regeneration removes all conditions on the part of the\nsinner to the removal of the power and guilt of sin. It teaches that if\nthe sinner should do any thing acceptable to God, _as a condition_ to\nhis conversion, it would imply he did not need converting; that such an\nidea, in fact, would be inconsistent with the doctrine of depravity, and\nirreconcilable with the idea of salvation _by grace_. And this is the\nground on which the old Calvinists have so repeatedly charged us with\nthe denial of the doctrines of grace, and with holding that we may be\njustified by our works.\n\nThere is something very singular in these notions respecting the\nnecessity of _unconditional_ regeneration, in order that it may be by\ngrace. These same Calvinists tell us that the sinner _can_ repent, and\nought to repent, and that the Scriptures require it at his hand. What!\nis the sinner able and obliged to do that which would destroy the whole\neconomy of grace! which would blot out the Gospel and nullify the\natonement itself? Ought he to do that which would prove him a practical\nPelagian and an operative workmonger? Is he indeed, according to\nCalvinists themselves, required in Scripture to do that which would\nprove Calvinism false, and a conditional regeneration true? So it would\nseem. Put together these two dogmas of Calvinism. 1. _The sinner is\nable, and ought to repent._ 2. _The idea that the sinner does any thing\ntoward his regeneration destroys the doctrine of depravity and of\nsalvation by grace._ I say put these two together, and you have almost\nall the contradictions of Calvinism converged to a focus--and what is\nmost fatal to the system, you have the authority of Calvinism itself to\nprove that every intelligent probationer on the earth not only has the\nability, but is authoritatively required to give practical demonstration\nthat the system is false!! What is this but to say, \"You _can_, and you\n_cannot;_\"--if you _do_ not, you will be justly condemned--if you _do_,\nyou will ruin the Gospel system, and yourself with it? Where such\nglaring paradoxes appear, there must be something materially wrong in,\nat least, some parts of the system.\n\n5. But the inconsistency of this theory is not its only, and certainly\nnot its most injurious characteristic. In the same proportion as men are\nmade to believe that there are no conditions on their part to their\nregeneration, they will be likely to fall into one of the two extremes\nof carelessness or despair, either of which, persisted in, would be\nruinous. I cannot doubt but that, in this way, tens of thousands have\nbeen ruined. We should infer that such would be the result of the\ndoctrine, from only understanding its character; and I am fully\nsatisfied that, in my own personal acquaintance, I have met with\nhundreds who have been lulled in the cradle of Antinomianism on the one\nhand, or paralyzed with despair on the other, by this same doctrine of\npassive, unconditional conversion. Calvinists, it is true, tell us this\nis the abuse of the doctrine; but it appears to me to be the legitimate\nfruit. What else could we expect? A man might as well attempt to\ndethrone the Mediator, as to do any thing toward his own conversion.\nTeach this, and carelessness ensues, Antinomian feelings will follow--or\nif you arouse the mind by the curse of the law, and by the fearful doom\nthat awaits the unregenerate, what can he do? Nothing! Hell rises from\nbeneath to meet him, but he can do _nothing_. He looks until he is\nexcited to phrensy, from which he very probably passes over to raving\nmadness, or settles down into a state of gloomy despair.\n\n6. Another very decisive objection to this doctrine is, the frequent,\nand I may say uniform language of Scripture. The Scriptures require us\nto _seek--ask--knock--come to Christ--look unto God--repent--believe\n--open the door_ of the heart--_receive Christ_, &c. No one can fail to\nnotice how these instructions are sprinkled over the whole volume of\nrevelation. And what is specially in point here, all these are spoken of\nand urged upon us as conditions of blessings that shall follow--even the\nblessings of salvation, of regeneration--and as conditions, too, without\nwhich we cannot expect these blessings. Take one passage of many--\"As\nmany as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God,\neven to them that believe on his name.\" If any one doubts whether\n\"becoming the sons of God,\" as expressed in this text, means\nregeneration, the next verse will settle it--\"Which were born not of\nblood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of\nGod,\" John i, 12, 13. The latter verse I may have occasion to remark\nupon hereafter; it is quoted here to show that the new birth is\nundoubtedly the subject here spoken of. And we are here expressly\ntaught, in language that will bear no other interpretation, that\n_receiving_ Christ and _believing_ on his name are the conditions of\nregeneration. If there were no other passage in the Bible to direct our\nminds on this subject, this plain unequivocal text ought to be decisive.\nBut the truth is, this is the uniform language of Scripture. And are\nthere any passages against these, any that say we cannot come, cannot\nbelieve, seek, &c? or any that say, this work of personal regeneration\nis performed independent of conditions? I know of none which will not\nfairly admit of a different construction. We are often met with this\npassage--\"It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of\nGod that showeth mercy.\" See Rom. ix, 16. But whoever interpreteth this\nof personal and individual regeneration can hardly have examined the\npassage carefully and candidly. But we are told again, it is God that\nrenews the heart; and if it is his work, it is not the work of the\nsinner. I grant this; this is the very sentiment I mean to maintain; but\nthen there may be conditions--_there are conditions_--or else we should\nnot hear the psalmist _praying_ for this, in language that has been\npreserved for the edification of all subsequent generations, \"Create in\nme a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me.\" This is a\npractical comment on Christ's conditional salvation, \"Ask and ye shall\nreceive.\"\n\nSince then this doctrine of passive and unconditional regeneration\nimplies unconditional election--since it is in opposition to those\nscriptures which teach that the Spirit and grace of God may be resisted\nand received in vain--since it is a virtual denial of all gracious\ninfluences upon the heart before regeneration--since it leads the\nabettors of the theory into gross contradictions, by their endeavours to\nreconcile the can and the _cannot_ of their system--since its practical\ntendency is to make sinners careless, or drive them to despair--and\nfinally, since it contradicts that numerous class of scriptures, some of\nwhich are very unequivocal, that predicate the blessings of regeneration\nand justification upon certain preparatory and conditional acts of the\nsinner--_therefore_ we conclude that this theory cannot be true.\n\n_Second Theory_.--To avoid these difficulties, to make the sinner feel\nhis responsibility, and to bring him into action, a new theory of\nregeneration is proposed. This constitutes a leading characteristic of\nthe New Divinity. It is the theory of _self-conversion_. Its advocates\nmaintain that there is no more mystery or supernatural agency in the\nprocess of the change, called the new birth, than there is in any other\nleading purpose or decision of the mind. It is true, they do not wholly\nexclude the Holy Spirit from this work, but his agency is mediate and\nindirect. He acts in some undefinable way, through the truth as an\ninstrument. The truth acts upon the mind, in the way of _moral suasion_,\nand the sinner, in the view and by the influence of truth, resolves to\ngive himself up to God and to his service--and _this is regeneration_.\nThe preparation is of God--but the actual change is man's own work. The\nGod of providence reveals the truth and arranges the means for its\npromulgation, the Spirit of grace applies it to the understanding, the\nsinner looks at it, reflects upon it, and at length is persuaded to set\nabout the work, and regenerates himself!\n\nThat we may be the better prepared to meet this hypothesis, it should be\nnoticed that it is inseparable from the notion that all sin consists in\nvoluntary exercise, or in other words, in a series of sinful volitions.\nRegeneration is a change from sin to holiness--and hence a regenerate\nstate is the opposite of a sinful state. If then a regenerate state is\nnothing more than a series of holy volitions, an unregenerate state,\nwhich is its opposite, is nothing more than a series of unholy\nvolitions. Thus it appears that this doctrine of regeneration by the act\nof the will must stand or fall with the notion that all sin consists in\nvoluntary exercise. Any argument, therefore, brought against this latter\ntheory will bear with equal weight against this new idea of\nregeneration. Bearing this in mind, we are prepared to object to this\ndoctrine,\n\n1. That it is inconsistent with the doctrine of constitutional\ndepravity. This is granted by the supporters of the theory, and hence\nconstitutional depravity is no part of their system. All the arguments\ntherefore that have been adduced in favour of derived, inherent\ndepravity, or that can be urged in favour of this doctrine, will stand\ndirectly opposed to this view of regeneration. The arguments in favour\nof our views of depravity need not be repeated; and the reader is\nreferred to a previous number in which this point has been discussed.\n\n2. Another objection to this theory of regeneration is, that it makes\n_entire_ sanctification take place at the time of regeneration.\nConversion, holiness, are nothing more than a decision of the will; and\nsince the will can never be _more than decided_, of course the decision\nat regeneration is the _perfection of holiness_. On this ground,\ntherefore, though Christians are exhorted to \"cleanse themselves from\nall filthiness of flesh and spirit, _perfecting holiness_ in the fear of\nthe Lord;\" though the saints are commanded to \"grow in grace,\" to\n\"confess their sins,\" that they may be \"cleansed from _all\nunrighteousness_,\" though some of the Corinthian Christians were \"carnal\nand walked as men,\" and for that reason were, after years of experience,\nonly _babes_ in Christ--still, if we embrace this sentiment, we must\ncall the convert, at his first spiritual breath, as holy as he ever _can\nbe_ in any of the subsequent stages of his experience! Surely the\napostles taught not this! And yet so strongly are men impelled forward\nby their systems, this doctrine of perfect holiness at conversion is the\nvery sentiment that many of the advocates of the New Divinity are now\npropagating--a clear proof that it necessarily follows from their theory\nof conversion. This of itself, it strikes me, ought to destroy the\ndoctrine.\n\n3. Another bearing of this hypothesis, and one which I think must prove\nfatal to it, is, that the Scriptures represent this change to be chiefly\nin the affections, whereas this doctrine makes it exclusively in the\nwill. That the Scriptures place the change in the affections chiefly, I\nsuppose will not be denied. If it should be, without stopping here to\nquote specific passages, or use many arguments, one consideration alone\nwill be sufficient to set the question at rest.--True evangelical\nholiness consists in love to God and man; and sin is loving the creature\nrather than the Creator. The apostle brings into view both the\nregenerate and the unregenerate state in this passage--\"Set your\naffection on things above, and not on things on the earth.\" Numerous are\nthe passages which teach that love to God is the essence of the\nChristian character. The affections, therefore, are the seat of this\nchange. But we are told by this new theory the change is in the will. It\nis only to resolve to serve God, and we are converted.--Either this\ntheory, therefore, or the Bible account of this matter must be wrong.\n\nTo avoid this difficulty, it may be said, that a change of the will\nimplies a change of the affections. But this is changing the\nposition--which is, that a decision of the will is regeneration. If\nhowever this new position be insisted upon, it can be reconciled with\nthe phraseology used only by making a change of the affections a mere\n_subordinate_ part of regeneration, whereas the Scriptures make the\nchange consist essentially in this. But there is still a more serious\ndifficulty in this idea, that the change of the will implies a change in\nthe affections. It necessarily implies that the affections are at all\ntimes under the control of the will. But this is as unphilosophical as\nit is unscriptural. It is even directly contrary to the observation and\nknowledge of men who have paid only common and casual attention to\nmental phenomena. The will is oftener enthralled by the affections, than\nthe affections by the will. Even in common and worldly matters let a man\ntry by an effort of the will to beget love where it does not exist, or\nto transfer the affections from one object to another, and how will he\nsucceed? Will love and hatred go or come at his bidding? You might as\nwell attempt, by an act of the will, to make sweet bitter, or bitter\nsweet to the physical taste. How much less can a man, by an act of the\nwill, make all things new, and transfer the heart from the grossness of\ncreature love to the purity of supreme love to God. The Apostle Paul has\ntaught us his failure in this matter. When he \"would do good, evil was\npresent with him.\" \"For,\" says he, \"the good that I would do, I do not;\nbut the evil which I would not, that I do.\" And this is the fact in most\ncases of genuine awakening. Resolutions are formed, but the current of\nthe unsanctified affections sweeps them away. Over the untowardness of\nthe unregenerate heart the will has, in fact, but a feeble influence;\nand this is the reason why the man, struggling with the corruptions of\nhis heart, is driven to despair, and exclaims, \"O! wretched man that I\nam, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?\"\n\nWe shall see hereafter how the action of the will is indispensable in\nregeneration; but not in this _direct_ way to change and control the\naffections, by the power of its own decisions. When I find my will\ncapable of doing this, I must have an essentially different intellectual\ncharacter from the one I now have.\n\nSince the Scriptures make the new birth a change of affections, and this\ntheory makes it a change of volitions; and especially since the\naffections cannot be transferred from _earth_ to _heaven_ by a _mere act\nof the will_, therefore the doctrine which teaches and implies these\nviews must be false.\n\n4. This idea of the character of sin and of the new birth makes man\nsinless, at particular times, even _without_ regeneration. I do not mean\nby this that he is not obnoxious to punishment for past unholy\nvolitions. But if sin consists only in voluntary exercise, whenever the\nmind does not act; or whenever its action is not under the control of\nthe will, there is nothing of sin personally appertaining to the\nman.--When the action of the will is suspended by an all-absorbing\nemotion of wonder or surprise--in sound sleep when the mental states, if\nthere are any, are not under the control of the will--in cases of\nsuspended animation, by drowning, fainting, or otherwise--in short,\nwhenever the mind is necessarily wholly engrossed, as is often the case,\nby some scientific investigation, or matter of worldly business, not of\na moral character, then, and in every such case, whatever may be the\nguilt for past transgressions, there is no personal unholiness. And by\nthe same reasoning we may show that the regenerate pass a great portion\nof their time without any personal holiness!\n\n5. According to the theory we are opposing, regeneration, strictly\nspeaking, means nothing. The work of grace, by which a sinner is made\nmeet for heaven, embraces two essential points, _pardon_ and _renewal_.\nThe former is not a positive change of character, but a relative change,\nfrom a state of condemnation to a state of acquittal. But as\nregeneration, if it have any appropriate meaning, cannot mean a mere\nchange of relation, any construction or system that forces such a\nmeaning upon it does, in fact, do it away. Hence, being _born again,\nbeing renewed, being created anew, being sanctified, being translated\nfrom darkness to light, being raised from the dead_, and numerous other\nscripture expressions, are figurative forms of speech, so foreign from\nthe idea they are used to express, that they are worse than\nunmeaning--they lead to error. But if these expressions mean any thing\nmore than pardon, what is that meaning? This doctrine makes the\nprincipal change take place in the _neighbourhood_ of the will; not in\nthe will itself, meaning by that, the mental power by which we put forth\nvolitions. This _faculty_ of the mind is sound, and needs no change--all\nthe other mental susceptibilities are sound, the essence of the mind and\nthe susceptibilities of the mind are perfectly free from any moral\nperversion. It is the mental _action_ that is bad.--What is there then\nin the man that is to be changed? Do you say his volitions? But these he\nchanges every hour. Do you say, he must leave off wrong volitions, and\nhave right ones? This too he often does. \"But he must do it with right\nmotives,\" you say, \"this acting from _right motives_ is the regenerate\nstate.\" Indeed! Suppose then that he has resolved to serve God, from\nright motives, what if he should afterward resolve, from false shame or\nfear, to neglect a duty, is he now unregenerate? This is changing from\nregenerate to unregenerate, from _entire_ holiness to _entire_\nunholiness with a breath. Truly such a regeneration is _nothing_. But\nyou say, after he has once submitted, he now has a \"governing purpose\"\nto serve God, and this constitutes him regenerate; aye, a _governing_\npurpose that _does not govern_ him. Let it be understood, you cannot\ndivide a volition; it has an entire character in itself; and if it be\nunholy, no preceding holy volition can sanctify it. Hence every change\nof volition from wrong to right, and from right to wrong, is a change of\nstate, so that regeneracy and unregeneracy play in and out of the human\nbosom in the alternation of every criminal thought or every pious\naspiration. Is this the Bible doctrine of the new birth? And yet this is\nall you can make of it, if you resolve it into the mere action of the\nwill.\n\n6. This doctrine of self-conversion, by an act of the will, is directly\ncontrary to Scripture. It would be tedious to me and my readers to quote\nall those passages that attribute this work directly to the Holy Spirit,\nand that speak of it as a work which _God himself_ accomplishes for, and\nin us. There is one passage which is much in point, however, and is\nsufficient of itself to settle this question. \"But as many as received\nhim, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that\nbelieve on his name. Who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the\nflesh, nor of the will of man, but of God,\" John i, 12, 13. This is a\ntwo-edged sword--it cuts off, as we have remarked before, passive and\nunconditional regeneration on the one hand; and also, as we may now see,\nself conversion by an act of the will, on the other. I know not how\nwords can be put together, in so small a compass, better to answer the\ntrue objects of destroying these two opposite theories of regeneration,\nand asserting the true theory. Here is, first--the _receiving of\nChrist,_ the _believing on his name_--this is the condition. Second,\nChrist gives the \"power,\" viz. strength and privilege, to become the\nsons of God. This is the regeneration. Third--This becoming \"the sons of\nGod,\" or being \"born,\" is not in a _physical way_, by flesh and blood,\nnor yet by _human will_, but of or by God. Can any thing be clearer or\nmore decisive?\n\nIndeed the very terms, _regeneration, born, birth_, &c, imply of\nthemselves another and an efficient agent; and then to connect these\nwith the Divine agency, as the Scriptures have done some half dozen\ntimes in the phrase, \"born of God,\" and several other times in the\nphrase, \"of the Spirit:\" to have this called being \"begotten again,\" and\nthe like, is enough, one would think, if words have any meaning, to show\nthat man does not change his own heart. The same may be said of the\nterms _resurrection, translation, creation, renewal_, and various other\nterms the Scriptures use to express this change. Jesus Christ claimed\nthat he had \"power to lay down his life, and _to take it again;_\" but\nthis is the only instance of self-resurrection power that we read of;\nand even this was by his Divine nature; for he was \"quickened by the\nSpirit,\" and raised \"by the power of God.\" But these theorists teach\nthat man has power to lay down his life, and then, after he is \"dead in\ntrespasses and sins,\" he has power to take his life again. Truly this is\ngiving man a power that approaches very near to one of the Divine\nattributes. To Christ alone does it belong \"to quicken whom he will.\" To\nchange the heart of the sinner is one of the Divine prerogatives, and he\nthat attempts to convert himself; and trusts to this, will find in the\nend that he is _carnal_ still. For \"whatsoever is born of the flesh is\nflesh, but whatsoever is born of the Spirit is spirit.\"\n\nLet me not here be misunderstood. I shall endeavour to show, in its\nproper place, the conditional agency of man in this work. I have only\ntime to add, in this number, that I consider those scriptures which\npress duties upon the sinner as applying to this conditional agency. And\neven those strong expressions which sometimes occur in the Bible,\nrequiring the sinner to \"make himself a new heart\"--\"to cleanse his\nhands and purify his heart,\" &c, will find an easy solution and a\npertinent application in this view of the subject. For if there are\ncertain pending conditions, without which the work will not be\naccomplished, then there would be a propriety, while pressing this duty,\nto use expressions showing that this work was conditionally, though not\n_efficiently_, resting upon the agency of the sinner.\n\nIn my next I shall endeavour to show that there is no intermediate\n_Calvinistic_ ground between the two theories examined in this number.\nIf that attempt prove successful, and if in this it has been found that\nthe two theories examined are encumbered with too many embarrassments to\nbe admitted, then we shall be the better prepared to listen to the\nteachings of the Scriptures on this important and leading doctrine of\nthe Christian faith.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER XIV.\n\nREGENERATION, CONTINUED.\n\nAn inconsistency in any received theory is constantly driving its\nsupporters to some modification of their system. This is a redeeming\nprinciple in the human mind, and greatly encourages the hope that truth\nwill finally triumph.\n\nIt has already been noticed that the doctrine of entire passivity, in\nregeneration, is so pressed with difficulties that it has sought relief\nin the opposite notion of self-conversion. But this latter hypothesis\nis, in turn, encumbered, if possible, with still greater embarrassments.\nThe presumption therefore is, that the truth lies between them; and it\nwill doubtless be found, by a fair and thorough investigation, that this\nis the fact. But here the question arises, Can _Calvinists_ consistently\noccupy any such middle ground? In other words, retaining the other\npeculiarities of Calvinism, can our Calvinistic brethren assume any\nposition between these two extremes which will avoid the difficulties of\nboth? A brief examination, it is hoped, will decide this question.\n\n_Third Theory_.--Dr. Tyler is a highly respectable clergyman of the\nCalvinistic faith, and is now at the head of the theological school in\nEast Windsor, Conn., which was got up with the avowed purpose of\ncounteracting the New-Haven theology. We should not therefore suspect\nhim of leaning too much toward the New Divinity. He tells us that the\nonly depravity is to be unwilling to serve God--that there is \"no other\nobstacle in the way of the sinner's salvation except what lies in his\nown will\"--that \"to be born again is simply to be made willing to do\nwhat God requires.\" What is this but the New Divinity? The will is here\nmade, most explicitly, the sole seat of depravity; and regeneration is\nan act of the will. But every act of the will is the sinner's _own act_,\nand therefore the agent, by that act of the will which constitutes\nregeneration, converts himself.--Perhaps Dr. Tyler will say, the sinner\nin this case does not convert himself, because he is \"_made willing_.\"\nGod makes him willing \"in the day of his power.\" It is remarkable what a\nfavourite phrase this is with the Calvinists. It is borrowed from the\nthird verse of the hundred and tenth Psalm, \"Thy people shall be willing\nin the day of thy power.\" Now although the word \"made\" is not in the\ntext; although there is not the _slightest_ evidence that the text\nspeaks of regeneration at all, but on the contrary, it is most evidently\nintended to describe the character and conduct of God's people, viz. the\nregenerate; and although every scholar, at least, among the Calvinists,\nknows this as well as he knows his right hand from the left, yet we hear\nit repeated by the learned and the ignorant, at all times and\nplaces--\"God's people are made willing in the day of his power.\" It is\nnot only a gross perversion of a Scripture phrase, but its repetition,\nin this perverted sense, renders it wearisome and sickening. But,\nwaiving this, it becomes us to ask whether there is any more rational or\nScriptural ground for the idea itself than there is for this use of the\ntext. What is meant by making the soul willing? I confess I cannot\nunderstand it. Is it meant that God _forces_ the soul to be willing?\nThis is a contradiction in terms. To say that God acts directly on the\nwill, and thus changes its determination by superior force, is to\ndestroy its freedom--is to produce a volition without motive or\nreason--which would, at any rate, be an anomalous action of the will.\nAnd what is still more fatal to the theory, it implies _no act_ of the\nsinner whatever, but an irresistible act of the Divine power, which\ntherefore necessarily throws the theory back upon the doctrine of\npassive conversion. There is no avoiding this conclusion, I think, on\nthe ground that God changes the action of the will, by an exertion of\npower upon the will itself. If, to avoid this, it should be said that\nthe will is not changed by a direct act of power, but influenced to a\nholy determination indirectly, through the medium of motives, presented\nby the Holy Spirit--then and in that case we should be thrown forward on\nto the self-conversion system. The sinner's voluntary act, by which he\nregenerated himself, would be as truly and entirely _his own_ as any\nother act of the will; therefore he would be self-regenerated. This\nalso would be regeneration, not by the Holy Spirit, but _by the truth;_\nwhich is another feature of the New Divinity. This also would make all\ndepravity consist in the will, or rather in its _acts;_ which has been\nshown in the preceding number to be unscriptural as well as\nunphilosophical. This objection is valid, whether the depravity is\nsupposed to be in the _power_ of willing, or in the _acts_ of the will.\nBut since, in Dr. Tyler's view, to will in one direction is depravity,\nand to will in another direction is regeneration, and since all that\nmotives _can_ do is, not to change the will itself, but only prompt it\nto new voluntary states, it follows conclusively that Dr. T. makes all\nholiness and all unholiness consist in volitions; and therefore the\n_moral-exercise_ system is true; which is another feature of the New\nDivinity. Truly I may repeat, we do not need another theological\nseminary in Connecticut to teach this doctrine.\n\nFinally, according to this theory of Dr. T., he and all those who reason\nlike him, are chargeable, I think, with a palpable paralogism--they\nreason in a circle. They say, in the express language of Dr. Tyler, \"All\nmen may be saved if they will\"--\"No man is hindered from coming to\nChrist who is willing to come\"--that is, since to will and to be willing\nis to be regenerated, this language gravely teaches us, \"All men may be\nsaved, if they _are regenerated_\"--\"No man is hindered from coming to\nChrist (to be regenerated) who _is regenerated!_\" And indeed this view\nof regeneration not only makes learned divines talk nonsense, but the\nScriptures also. The invitation, \"Whosoever will, let him come,\" &c,\nmust mean, \"Whosoever _is regenerate_, let him come,\" and so of other\npassages. Thus this theory of Dr. Tyler, and of the many who hold with\nhim, is so closely hemmed in on both sides, that it must throw itself\nfor support, either upon the doctrine of passivity, or self-conversion;\nat the same time that in other respects it involves itself in\ninconsistent and anti-scriptural dogmas.\n\nBut that we may leave no position unexamined, let us take another view\nof the subject. Suppose, instead of saying regeneration is simply a\nchange of the will, it should be argued that a change of the will\nimplies a change of the affections, and this therefore is included in\nregeneration. Then I would ask, whether this change of the affections is\nin the order of cause and effect, or in the order of time, _prior_ or\n_subsequent_ to the act of the will. If this change is prior to any\naction of the will in the case, then the sinner has no voluntary\nco-operation in the work; and this brings us up once more upon the\ndoctrine of passive regeneration. The heart is changed before the\nsubject of the change acts. If the action of the will precedes the\nchange of the heart, then this change will be effected in one of two\nways. Either this anterior volition does itself change the heart; or it\nis a mere preparatory condition, on _occasion of which_ God changes the\nheart. In the former case the man himself would change his own heart,\nand this is self-conversion; and in the latter alternative we have a\nconditional regeneration wrought by the Holy Ghost, and this is the very\ndoctrine for which _we contend_, in opposition to Calvinism. If it\nshould be said, this change of the will and this change of the heart\ntake place independent of each other, that would not help the matter,\nsince in this view the change of _heart_ would be passive and\nunconditional. Thus whichever way this system turns, its difficulties\npress upon it still, and it finds no relief. Indeed there can, as I\nconceive, be no intermediate Calvinistic theory of regeneration, and\nthere _can be_ but two other alternatives--either God must renew the\nheart, independent of all co-operation on the part of the subject of\nthis change--and this is the old doctrine of unconditional Divine\nefficiency--or the first acceptable act of the will must be\nregeneration; and this is the new doctrine of _self-conversion_. Let the\nreader, let any one reflect closely on this subject, and I cannot doubt\nbut he will say with me, _There is no third alternative_. The nature of\nthe case will admit of none. The former theory may not contradict many\nof those scriptures that speak of _Divine efficiency_ in the work of\ngrace upon the heart, but it is utterly incompatible with those that\nurge the sinner to duty.--The latter theory corresponds well with the\nurgent injunctions to duty, so abundant in the Scriptures, but is wholly\nirreconcilable with those that speak of Divine efficiency. The true\ntheory must answer to both; and must also correspond with all the other\nparts of the Christian system. Is there such a theory? Every honest\ninquirer after truth will embrace it doubtless, if it can be\npresented--for truth, wherever, and whenever, and by whomsoever\ndiscovered, is infinitely to be preferred to error, however long and\nfondly it may have been cherished. Such a theory I will now try to\npresent--and although I may fail in making it very explicit, and in\nbringing forward all its defences, yet if the general outlines can be\nseen and be defended, it will, I trust, commend itself to the favourable\nnotice of the reader.\n\n_Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration_.--I approach this subject by laying\ndown the two following fundamental principles:--\n\n1. The work of regeneration is performed by the direct and efficient\noperations of the Holy Spirit upon the heart.\n\n2. The Holy Spirit exerts this regenerating power only on conditions, to\nbe first complied with by the subject of the change.\n\nThe first principle I deem it unnecessary to defend farther than it has\nbeen defended in the foregoing remarks. It is not objected to by any\northodox Christians that I know of, only so far as the new views of\nself-conversion, and of conversion by moral suasion, may be thought an\nexception. And this we have reason to hope will be an exception of\nlimited extent and short duration. The sentiment conflicts so directly\nwith such a numerous class of scriptures, and with the most approved\nprinciples of mental philosophy; and has, at the same time, such a\ndirect tendency to annihilate all the essential features of\nregeneration, it cannot long find encouragement in a spiritual Church.\nIt may however make many converts for a time, for men are fond of taking\nthe work of salvation into their own hands; but if it should, between\nsuch converts and the true Church there will ultimately be a separation\nas wide as that which now separates orthodoxy and Socinianism.\n\nThe other fundamental principle seems to follow, almost of necessity,\nfrom the scriptures that so abundantly point out the sinner's duty and\nagency, in connection with his conversion. The principle, however, is\nstrenuously opposed by all classes of Calvinists. The opposite of this\nis in fact the essential characteristic of Calvinism, if any _one_\nnotion can be so called; for however much the Calvinistic system may be\nmodified, in other respects, this is clung to as the elementary germ\nwhich constitutes the identity of the system. Even the New Divinity,\nwhich makes so much of human agency, does not allow it a _conditional\naction_--it allows of no intermediate volition between the mental states\nof worldly love and Divine love, as the occasion on which the transfer\nis made, or the conditional hinge on which the important revolution is\naccomplished. On the contrary, it considers the volition itself as the\ntransfer--the volition constitutes the _entire change_. Thus warily does\nCalvinism, in all its changes, avoid conditional regeneration. Hence if\nI were called upon to give a general definition of Calvinism, that\nshould include all the species that claim the name, I would say,\n_Calvinists are those who believe in unconditional regeneration_. For\nthe moment this point is given up by any one, all parties agree that he\nis not a Calvinist.\n\nBut why is conditional regeneration so offensive? Is it because the\nScriptures directly oppose it? This is hardly pretended. It is supposed,\nhowever, by the Calvinists, that to acknowledge this doctrine would\nrequire the renunciation of certain other doctrines which are taught in\nthe Scriptures. This lays the foundation for the objections that have\nbeen made against this doctrine. It is objected that _a depraved sinner\ncannot perform an acceptable condition until he is regenerated_--that\n_God cannot consistently accept of any act short of that which\nconstitutes regeneration_--that _the idea of a conditional regeneration\nimplies salvation by works, in part at least, and not wholly by grace_.\n\nI have mentioned these objections in this connection, not so much to\nattempt, at this moment, a direct refutation of them, as to advert to\nwhat I conceive to be the ground of the difficulty in the minds of those\nmaking the objections. It appears to me that the difference between us\nresults principally from a difference of our views in respect to the\nconstitution and the constitutional action of the mind itself. The\nphilosophical part of our theology will be modified very much by our\nviews of the philosophy of mind. Let it be granted then:--\n\n1. That the mind is possessed of a moral susceptibility, generally\ncalled _conscience_, which lays the foundation of the notions of right\nand wrong, and by which we feel the emotions of approval or disapproval\nfor our past conduct, and the feelings of obligation with respect to the\npresent and the future; and that even in an unregenerate state this\nsusceptibility often operates in accordance with its original design,\nand therefore agreeably with the Divine will.\n\n2. That the understanding or intellect, which is a general division of\nthe mind, containing in itself several distinct susceptibilities or\npowers, may, in an unregenerate state of the mind, be so enlightened and\ninformed on the subjects of Divine truth as to perceive the right and\nthe wrong; and as to perceive also, to some extent at least, the way of\nsalvation pointed out in the Gospel.\n\n3. That the affections and propensities (sometimes called the heart) are\nthe principal seat of depravity--and these are often arrayed in direct\nhostility to the convictions of the judgment and the feelings of moral\nobligation.\n\n4. That the will, or that mental power by which we put forth volitions,\nand make decisions, while it is more or less, directly or indirectly,\ninfluenced by the judgment, the conscience, and the affections, is in\nfact designed to give direction and unity to the whole mental action;\nand it always accomplishes this, where there is a proper harmony in the\nmental powers. But by sin this harmony has been disturbed, and the\nunholy affections have gained an undue ascendancy, so that, in the\nunregenerate, in all questions of preference between God and the world,\nin spite of the judgment, of conscience, and of the will, the world is\nloved and God is hated.\n\n5. That in those cases where we cannot control our affections by a\ndirect volition, we may, nevertheless, under the promptings of\nconscience, and in the light of the judgment, resolve against sin--but\nthese resolutions, however firmly and repeatedly made, will be carried\naway and overruled by the strength of the carnal mind. This shows us our\nown weakness, drives us to self-despair, until, under the enlightening\ninfluences of grace, and the drawings of the Spirit, the soul is led to\nprayer and to an abdication of itself into the hands of Divine mercy,\nthrough Christ; and _then_, and on _these conditions_, the Holy Spirit\nchanges the character and current of the unholy affections--and _this is\nregeneration_.\n\nIn laying down the preceding postulates I have endeavoured to express\nmyself with as much brevity, and with as little metaphysical\ntechnicality as possible; for the reason that they are designed to be\nunderstood by all. Bating the deficiencies that may on this account be\nnoticed by the philosophical reader, I think it may be assumed that\nthese, so far as the powers and operations of the mind are concerned,\nembrace the basis and general outlines of what we call _conditional\nregeneration_. I am not aware that they are in opposition to an one\nprinciple of Scripture theology, or mental philosophy. And if this\nprocess is found consonant with reason and Scripture, in its general\nfeatures, it will be easy to show that its relative bearings are such as\nmost happily harmonize all the doctrinal phenomena of the Gospel system.\n\nWe plant ourselves then upon these general positions, and as ability\nwill permit, or truth may seem to justify, shall endeavour to defend\nthem against such objections as may be anticipated, or are known to have\nbeen made against any of the principles here assumed.\n\n1. It may be objected perhaps that this is making too broad a\ndistinction between the different mental powers, giving to each such a\ndistinctive action and operation as to infringe upon the doctrine of the\nmind's unity and simplicity. It is believed, however, the more this\npoint is reflected upon by an attentive observance of our own minds, or\nthe minds of others, the more satisfied shall we be that the principles\nhere assumed are correct. That there are these distinct properties of\nmind no one doubts. It is in accordance with universal language, to\nspeak of the intellect, of the conscience, of the will, and of the\naffections, as distinct properties of the mind. The properties of mind\nare as clearly marked by our consciousness, as the properties of matter\nby our senses. And although, in consequence of the invisibility of mind,\nthere is doubtless a more perfect unity in each individual mental\nproperty, than in each distinct quality of matter, still each of the\nmental qualities has its appropriate and distinctive character.\nCalvinists themselves acknowledge this. They allow we have a moral sense\nwhich tests good or evil, even in an unregenerate state; they allow the\nintellect may perceive and approve of truth, even when the heart rejects\nit; they allow that to perceive and to judge, to feel moral obligation\nand to will, are distinct operations of the mind; and that our\nperceptions and our conscience may be right, when our affections are\nwrong. So far then we are agreed, and so far they make distinctions in\nthe mind, as wide as any that have been claimed in the principles above\nlaid down. Theologians, I grant, have, in many instances, confounded in\ntheir reasonings the will and the affections. And this has also\nsometimes been done by writers on the philosophy of the mind. But it is\nmost evident, I think, they have done this without good reason. Mr.\nLocke says, \"I find the will often confounded with several of the\naffections, especially desire, and one put for the other.\" This he\nthinks is an error, of which \"any one who turns his thoughts inward upon\nwhat passes in his own mind\" will be convinced. Rev. Professor Upham, of\nBowdoin College, Maine, himself a Calvinist, as is generally supposed,\nin a late excellent treatise on the will, asserts, and clearly proves, I\nthink, that \"_the state of the mind, which we term volition, is entirely\ndistinct from that which we term desire_.\" Nay, he proves that desires\nand volitions are often in direct opposition. Hence as love implies\ndesire, our volitions may often conflict with our love. And this is\nprecisely the state the awakened sinner is in when he \"would do good,\nbut evil is present with him.\"\n\n2. It may be said, and has sometimes been said, that this view of the\nsubject involves a contradiction; that it is the same as to say, the man\nwills against his preference, or in other words, he wills what he does\nnot choose. I cannot answer this objection better than by an argument in\nProfessor Upham's work, already alluded to, in which he says, of a\nsimilar objection on this very subject, \"It will be found on examination\nto resolve itself into a verbal fallacy, and naturally vanishes as soon\nas that fallacy is detected.\" \"It is undoubtedly true that the common\nusage of language authorizes us to apply the terms choice and choosing\nindiscriminately to either the desire or volition; but it does not\nfollow, and is not true, that we apply them to these different parts of\nour nature in precisely the same sense.\" \"When the word choice implies\ndesire at all, it has reference to a number of desirable objects brought\nbefore the mind at once, and implies and expresses the ascendant or\npredominant desire.\" \"At other times we use the terms choice and\nchoosing in application to the will--when it is applied to that power,\nit expresses the mere act of the will, and nothing more, with the\nexception, as in the other case, that more than one object of volition\nwas present, in view of the mind, before the putting forth of the\nvoluntary act. It is in fact the circumstance that two or more objects\nare present, which suggests the use of the word choice or choosing, in\neither case.\" \"But the acts are entirely different in their nature,\nalthough under certain circumstances the same name is applied to them.\"\nHence he adds, \"The contradiction is not a real, but merely a verbal\none. If we ever choose against choosing, it will be found merely that\nchoice which is volition, placed against that choice which is desire.\"\nAnd this is nothing more than to say that volitions and desires may\nconflict with each other, which we know to be the fact in numerous\ninstances.\n\nIf in reply to the foregoing, and in farther defence of the objection,\nit should be urged, that there could be not only no motive for the\nvolition in this case, but that it would in fact be put forth against\nall motive, since the feelings of the heart would be of a directly\nopposite character, I reply, that it is not true that there would be no\nmotive for the action of the will, in opposition to the sinful\naffections. It is seen already that the judgment in the awakened sinner\nis against continuing in sin, and the rebukes of the conscience for the\npast, and its admonitions for the future, are powerful motives in\nopposition to the unholy affections. The feelings of compunction and of\nmoral obligation gain great accessions of strength, moreover, from the\nterrors of the Divine law, which alarm the fears, and from the promises\nof the Gospel, which encourage the hopes of the awakened sinner. And it\nis especially and emphatically true that under the existing influence of\nthese fears and hopes, the voice of conscience is most effectual in\nprompting the sinner to \"flee from the wrath to come,\" and \"lay hold on\nthe hope set before him.\" Can it be said then that there is no motive\nfor a volition, or a mental effort that shall conflict with the\nunsanctified affections?\n\n3. Again it is said, for every inch of this ground is disputed, that the\naction of the mind under such motives is purely selfish, and cannot\ntherefore perform conditions acceptable to God. To this it may be\nreplied, that to be influenced by motives of self preservation and\npersonal salvation is not criminal; nay, it is commendable. In proof of\nthis but one argument is necessary. God moves upon our fears and hopes,\nfor the _express purpose_ of inducing us to forsake sin, and serve him;\nand he applies these motives to man in his unregenerate state. This is\nso obvious a fact, it is presumed none will deny it. But is it wrong for\nus to be prompted to action by those considerations which God himself\nurges upon us? If he attempts to excite our fears and hopes to prompt us\nto a course of self preservation, can it be wrong for us to be\ninfluenced by this means, and in this direction? I should hardly know\nhow to hold an argument with a man that should assert this--and yet\nthis sentiment is implied in the objection now under examination.\nBeside, these acts conditional to regeneration are not wholly, perhaps\nnot chiefly, from motives of personal interest. Our moral feelings have\na great part in this work. And it is principally by arousing an accusing\nconscience that fear and hope aid in the performance of the conditions\nof regeneration. But whatever proportion there may be of the ingredients\nof personal fear and hope in the feelings that enter into this\nconditional action of the mind, it is certain that the fear of the\nconsequences of sin, and the hope to escape them, are not themselves\ncriminal, much less then are they capable of rendering a complex state\nof the mind, of which they are but a part, unacceptable to God. Indeed\nthis objection to a mental act, merely because it is prompted by self\nlove, has always been to me a matter of wonder. Selfishness is a term\nwhich we generally use in a bad sense, and we mean by it that form of\nself love that leads us to seek our own gratification at the expense and\nthe injury of others, or in opposition to the will of God. But that self\nlove which leads us to seek our own highest interests, and especially\nour eternal interests, without injury to others, and in accordance with\nthe Divine will, is never thought criminal, I believe, except where one\nhas a particular system to support by such a notion. But that system is\nitself of a doubtful character which requires such an argument to\nsustain it.\n\n4. Another objection which has been made to one of the principles above\nlaid down is, that \"it is the province of the will to control the\naffections, and not the affections the will; and that the will always\npossesses the power to do this, even in an unregenerate state.\" If so,\nthen man has power, at any time, by an act of the will, to love God. Let\nhim try--let that unholy sinner try. Can he succeed? You say perhaps,\nfor so the Calvinists have said, \"He can if he will;\" that is, he can\nwill to love God if he does will to love God! This is no great discovery\nsurely, and it is certainly no proper answer to the question. I ask it\nagain, Can he, by a direct act of the will, love God? Do you say, by\nvarying the form of the answer, \"He can if he chooses?\" If you mean by\nchoice the act of the will, this is the same answer over again, the\nfolly of which is so apparent. But if you mean by choice the desires of\nhis heart, then your answer amounts to this: If the desires of the heart\nare in favour of loving God, he can, by an act of the will, love him.\nBut if the desires of the heart are in favour of loving God, the love is\nalready begotten, and there is no need of the act of the will to produce\nit. In that case your proposition would be, the sinner can love God by\nan act of the will, _if he loves him!_ the absurdity of which is too\nevident to require comment. It is thus that the coils of error run into\neach other in endless circles.\n\nBut, perhaps, to help the argument, if possible, it may be urged that\nthe will can decide in favour of a closer examination, and by voluntary\nattention may get such strong perceptions of truth as will give it the\nvoluntary power over the heart. To this I would reply, in the first\nplace, this is giving up the argument, it is acknowledging that certain\npreparatory acts of the will are necessary before the mind can love\nGod--but _this is conditional regeneration_. And it may be farther\nmaintained, in opposition to this sentiment that the mere perception of\ntruth, even when united with conscience, and personal fear and hope, is\nnot sufficient to give the will power over the unrenewed affections. In\nproof of this, Scripture might be adduced; but reserving the Scripture\nargument for the present, we may quote good Calvinistic authority in\nproof that the will may be enthralled by the affections. Professor Upham\nsays, \"Whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always\na greater or less degree of enthralment.\" And then he proceeds to show\nhow the mind may be enslaved by the _propensities_, _appetites_,\n_affections,_ and _passions_. He illustrates; for example, the progress\nof this enthralment in the case of an appetite for strong drink; which,\n\"like a strong man armed, violently seizes the will, binds it hand and\nfoot, and hurls it into the dust.\" Again he says, \"There are not\nunfrequently cases where the propensities and passions have become so\nintense, after years of repetition, as to control, or in other words,\nenthral the voluntary power almost entirely.\" (Treatise on the Will.)\nDr. Griffin, also an able Calvinistic writer, says, in decided terms,\n\"The judgment of the intellect and the decisions of the will are both\ncontrolled by the heart.\"\n\nThe idea of the enthralment of the will, however, may be objected to on\nanother ground, viz. that if admitted it would destroy accountability,\nsince none are accountable for what they cannot avoid. But I have not\nsaid they cannot avoid it; neither have I said we are not voluntary\neither in keeping or discarding the unholy heart. I assert directly the\ncontrary. Every probationer decides whether he will be holy or happy.\nBut his decisions to be holy are effectual only when he seeks that from\nGod which he cannot do for himself. Then, and then only, will God give\nhim the victory over the old man, with the deceitful lusts of the heart.\n_But this is conditional regeneration_.\n\nHaving said thus much in defence of the philosophy of the principles\nlaid down, the way is prepared to show that they accord with Scripture,\nand to defend them with the doctrine which we build upon them from the\nsupposed Scripture objections which have been urged against them. But\nthis will furnish matter for another number.\n\n\n\n\nNUMBER XV.\n\nREGENERATION, CONTINUED.\n\nIn proposing and vindicating, in the preceding number, those views of\nthe philosophy of mind which are supposed to throw light upon the\nprocess of regeneration, it was not intended to be intimated that a\nknowledge of this theory is necessary in order to experience the new\nbirth. In the practical purposes of life men do not ordinarily stop to\nanalyze their mental states before they _judge_, _feel_, and _act_. They\nhave the _practical_ use of their mental faculties, and that suffices.\nIn this way the most ignorant and the most unphilosophical may be saved.\nWhy, then, it may be asked, is it necessary to enter into this analysis\nat all? To this it may be replied, that whenever we can trace the\nadaptation of the provisions of grace and the reason of the Divine\nrequirements to the known facts and laws of the human mind, it will\nstrengthen our confidence in the economy of grace, increase our\nadmiration of the wisdom and goodness of God, and sharpen our weapons of\ndefence against the cavils and assaults of an opposing skepticism. But\nespecially is this philosophical examination necessary whenever a\nsuperficial or an erroneous philosophy would force upon us an erroneous\ntheology. The metaphysical mist with which some theories have veiled the\ndoctrine of regeneration, and the delusive and distorted views that have\nresulted from this obscuration, may be removed and corrected by the\nradiance of a pure philosophy. But as human philosophy is, at best, more\nlikely to err on these subjects than revelation, the former should\nalways be corrected or confirmed by the latter. How is it in the case\nunder examination? How do the assumed opinions correspond with\nrevelation?\n\nLet us glance again at our positions. The principal points assumed\nare--that there is often a conflict between the feelings of moral\nobligation on the one hand, enlightened as they are by reason and by\ngrace, sanctioned as they are by fear and hope, and the unholy\naffections on the other; that under the promptings of the moral feelings\nthe will frequently puts forth its strength to resist and subdue the\nunholy affections, but in every such case the effort fails when unaided\nby the sanctifying grace of God--and that victory is finally gained by a\nconditional act of the will, through which, or on occasion of which, God\nsubdues the passions and changes the heart. These views have been\nvindicated, as being in accordance with the philosophy of mind. The\nquestion now is, Are they sustained by Scripture? I answer, _Yes, most\nclearly_.\n\nIf the Apostle Paul had attempted, by a set argument, to illustrate and\naffirm these views, he could not have done it better or more explicitly\nthan he has done in the latter part of the 7th, and the first part of\nthe 8th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. \"I see,\" says the\napostle, \"another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind,\nand bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my\nmembers.\" _The law of sin in his members_ was undoubtedly the carnal\nmind, the unholy affections. These _warred_ against the _law of his\nmind_, his enlightened judgment, his feelings of moral obligation; and\nin this warfare the former were victorious, and carried captive the\nwill; so that \"the good that he would, he did not, and the evil that he\nwould not, that he did.\" \"To will was present with him,\" but \"how to\nperform, he knew not.\" See the entire passage, for it beautifully\nillustrates our whole theory. Here is the conflict, the struggle between\nconscience and sin; here is pointed out the seat of sin, viz. the\n\"flesh\" or carnal mind, which is but another name for the unsanctified\naffections and appetites; here is the will struggling to turn the\ncontest on the side of duty, but struggling in vain; every effort\nresults in defeat--_it is taken captive, and overcome_.--Despair finally\nsettles down upon the mind, as far as personal strength is concerned,\nand the anxious soul looks abroad for help, and cries out, \"Who shall\ndeliver me from the body of this death!\" Then it is that deliverance\ncomes! Jesus Christ, the Saviour of sinners, sets him free!\n\nProfessor Stuart, of Andover, himself a Calvinist, has shown most\nconclusively, what Arminians have long contended for, that this portion\nof revelation refers specifically to the work of regeneration. But\nwhether this be granted by every Calvinist or not, no man can deny but\nthat the grand philosophical principles heretofore contended for, are\nhere fully illustrated--the same _division_ of the mind--the same\n_conflict_--the same _thraldom_ of the _will_, and the same\n_deliverance_, through _faith_ in Jesus Christ our Lord.\n\nThe same principles, in part at least, are recognized in Gal. v, 17,\n\"For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the\nflesh; and these are contrary the one to the other, so that ye _cannot_\ndo the things that ye _would_.\" In short, all those passages where the\ndifficulty of subduing the carnal mind, of keeping the body under, of\ncrucifying the old man, all those passages that speak of a _warfare_, an\n_internal conflict_, and the like, recognize the principles here\ncontended for. These principles, so frequently adverted to in the\nScriptures, are proved to be in exact conformity with experience. Who\nthat has passed through this change, but remembers this conflict, this\nwar in the members? Who but recollects how his best resolutions were\nbroken as often as made; and how, after various and vigorous efforts,\nhis heart seemed to himself to grow worse and worse? He found secret\ntreason lurking in his bosom even when he was trying to repent of his\npast disloyalty.\n\n   \"The more he strove against its power,\n   He felt the guilt and sin the more.\"\n\nEvery additional effort sunk him apparently but the lower in \"the\nhorrible pit and miry clay,\" until \"the Lord heard his _cry_,\" until\n\"the Lord brought him up, and set his feet upon a rock, and established\nhis goings, and put a new song in his mouth.\"\n\nThat the Scriptures speak of a conditional action of the mind,\npreparatory to the work of regeneration, appears from express passages,\nas well as from the general tenor of that numerous class of scriptures\nwhich enjoin duty upon the sinner, and predicate justification and\nsalvation upon those duties. John i, 12, has already been quoted and\ncommented upon, in which the new birth is suspended upon _receiving_\nChrist, or _believing_ on his name. The many cases of healing the body,\nby Christ, are evident illustrations of the healing of the soul. In\nfact, we have good reasons for supposing that, in most of these cases at\nleast, the soul and body were healed at the same time; and this was\nalways on the condition of _asking_ and _believing_. John iii, 14, 13,\n\"As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son\nof man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish,\nbut have everlasting life.\" Here our Saviour shows the analogy between\nthe cure of the Israelites by looking at the brazen serpent, and of\nsinners by looking to Christ. But how were the Israelites healed? By the\nconditional act of _looking_ at the brazen serpent. So looking at Christ\nis the condition of healing the soul. Take away this condition and the\nwhole analogy is destroyed. Let this condition be understood, and the\ntext will accord with others, equally expressive of conditions. \"Look\nunto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth.\" \"Seek first the\nkingdom of God and his righteousness.\" \"Seek the Lord while he may be\nfound.\" God hath determined that all nations \"should seek the Lord, if\nhaply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from\nevery one of us.\" Will any one pretend to say that this looking and\nseeking implies regeneration? This is mere assumption; where is the\nproof? who would ever infer this idea from the Scriptures themselves?\nWhat! is the sinner regenerated before the malady of his soul, the\npoisonous bite of sin, is healed? Has he found the Lord before he has\nsought him? And must he seek after he has found him? The _kingdom of\nGod_ is religion in the soul--it is \"righteousness, peace, and joy in\nthe Holy Ghost;\" and when we are regenerated, we have it in possession,\nand have therefore no need to seek it. But we are commanded to _seek_\nthe kingdom of God; this, therefore, must be a work preparatory to, and\nconditional of regeneration. \"Come unto me all ye that labour and are\nheavy laden, and I will give you rest.\" \"Take my yoke upon you,\" &c. To\nbe _restless_, and not to have on the yoke of Christ, is to be\nunregenerate; but such are to _come_ and _take_ the yoke, and then, and\non that condition, they will find rest to their souls. \"The Spirit and\nthe bride say, Come, &c, and whosoever will, let him come and take of\nthe water of life freely.\" To take of the water of life is to be\nregenerate; but to this end we must _come_, and must first _will_ in\norder to _come_. \"Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear\nmy voice and open the door, I will come in and sup with him, and he with\nme.\" Before Christ is _in_ the soul, there is no regeneration; but\nbefore he will _come_ in, he knocks, and the sinner must first _hear_,\nand then _open the door_, and on this condition Christ comes in and\nimparts his grace.\n\nBut it is useless to proceed farther in quoting particular texts. They\nmight be extended indefinitely, with a force and pertinency that cannot\nbe evaded: all going to establish the fact that the work of grace on the\nheart is conditional.\n\nWill any one pretend to deny, that the unregenerate sinner is called\nupon to _seek_, _ask_, _repent_, _believe_, &c? And what do such\nscriptures mean? The acts of the mind here enjoined must _constitute_\nregeneration, or they must follow regeneration as an effect of that\nwork, or they must precede it as a necessary and required condition. To\nsay that these acts are the very definition of regeneration itself--are\nonly synonymous terms to express this renewal of the heart, is to make\nregeneration consist in _exercises_ merely--is in fact to make it the\nsinner's appropriate and exclusive work; unless it can be shown that\nthis commanding the sinner to ask, &c, is nothing more nor less than a\npromise that God will ask, seek, repent, and believe for him! But this\nwill hardly be pretended; and the idea that these acts do themselves\n_constitute_ the new birth, has already been seen to be defective and\nindefensible.\n\nTo suppose that these acts follow regeneration, as an effect or fruit of\nthe change itself, is to deny them that position and relation in which\nthey are actually placed by the word of God. It makes one seek, after he\nhas found; ask, after he has received; repent and believe, after he is\npossessed of that salvation, to obtain which these duties are enjoined.\nThe phraseology to suit this theory, should evidently be of an entirely\ndifferent character. When the sinner asks what he shall do to be saved,\nthe answer should be--\"_Nothing_ until God renews the heart; and then\nas a fruit of this you will of course _seek_, _ask_, _believe_,\" &c. If,\nindeed, the sinner is to do nothing until God renews him, why is it\nnecessary that he should first be awakened? Why is the command addressed\nto him at all? Why does not the Holy Spirit immediately renew the heart,\nwhile the transgressor is stupid in his wickedness, instead of calling\nafter him to _awake_, _flee_, and _escape_ for his life? Do you say you\ncan give no other reason than that it pleases God to take this course\nwith the sinner, and to call up his attention to the subject before he\nrenews him? I answer, then it pleases God that there should be certain\npreparatory acts of the mind in order to regeneration: and this is in\nfact admitting the principle for which we contend, and this more\nespecially if it be acknowledged, as it evidently must be, that these\npreparatory mental states or acts are, to any extent, voluntary. Thus,\nnot only is the absurdity of making these acts the _result_ of\nregeneration most apparent; but in tracing out the consistent meaning\nand practical bearing of those scriptures that are addressed to the\nunconverted, we find them establishing the third alternative, that these\nacts of the mind are _preparatory_ to regeneration, and are the\nprescribed conditions on which God will accomplish the work. Thus the\nScripture argument is found to confirm the philosophical view of the\nsubject, and both are strengthened by Christian experience. The doctrine\nof conditional regeneration, therefore, is confirmed by a threefold\nargument, no part of which, it is believed, can be easily overthrown.\nAgainst it, however, there are several strong objections urged, which\nhave already been mentioned, and which we are now prepared to hear and\nexamine.\n\n1. It has been objected, that to admit human agency and co-operation in\nthis change, is to deny salvation by _grace_. But how does this appear?\nSuppose the very conditions are by a gracious appointment--suppose the\noperations of a gracious system are in this way better adapted to a\nmoral government--suppose this conditional action of the mind to be\nitself the result of a gracious influence, enlightening the\nunderstanding, and quickening and arousing the moral sense--finally,\nsuppose these conditions not to be _efficient_, much less _meritorious_\ncauses, by which the mind either changes itself, or renders itself more\nmorally deserving of the Divine favour--I say suppose all this, and then\nshow if you can, how such conditions can detract at all from the grace\nof this salvation.\n\n2. It has been objected, that \"since man never is what he ought to be\nuntil he is renewed and made holy, therefore any act short of that which\neither constitutes or implies regeneration cannot be acceptable to\nGod--God cannot consistently approve of any step that falls short of\nman's duty. It is his duty to be holy, and therefore any thing short of\nthis is sin, and consequently cannot be accepted as a condition.\" We\nshould be careful to discriminate between things closely related, and\nyet actually distinct from each other. It is one thing to be pleased\nwith the character of the mind as a whole, in view of its relations to\nthe Divine law and its necessary qualifications for heaven, and another\nthing to be pleased with a particular mental state, or conditional\nvolition, in reference to its adaptation to a proposed end, or a\nspecific object. For instance: the Calvinists think that an awakened and\nan anxiously inquiring sinner is in a more suitable state of mind to\nreceive the blessing of regeneration, than one perfectly stupid and\nthoughtless. If they do not, why do they try to bring sinners to\nthoughtfulness? Why do they try to awaken them to a sense of their\ndanger, and make them tremble under the view of the Divine displeasure?\nOr why do they call their attention to Gospel provisions and a crucified\nSaviour? Is not this a preparatory process? And have they the Divine\nwarrant for such a course? Is this the method which the Divine Being\ntakes to save his rebellious subjects? Then, doubtless, this method is\nwell pleasing to him: and in reference to this specific end he has in\nview, he is pleased with each successive step in the process. He is\npleased when the shiner pays attention to the word; he is pleased when\nhe is awakened, and when he begins to tremble and inquire, \"What shall I\ndo to be saved?\" This is just as he would have it, and just as he\ndesigned; although the entire character of the sinner is not acceptable\nto him until he is made holy. The very principle, then, objected to by\nthe Calvinists is recognized by their own theory and practice. Now if we\nsay God is pleased to accept of the sinner's prayer, and faith, and\nsorrow for sin, as a condition of what he will do for him, what\npropriety is there in replying, God cannot accept of any thing short of\na holy heart? We know he cannot approve of a heart until it is holy; but\nhe can approve of certain feelings and volitions as suited, according to\nthe Divine appointment, to be the condition on which he will make the\nheart holy. Do you ask on what ground he accepts of this? I answer, on\nthe ground of the merits of Christ; the ground on which the whole\nprocess rests. God does not accept of the prayer, repentance, and faith\nof the _regenerate_, because they are regenerate, and by reason of their\nholiness; but their acceptance is wholly and continually through Christ.\nThrough the same medium and merits the prayer of the inquiring sinner is\nheard and answered.\n\nIf your servant had left you unjustly, and deserted the service he was\nobligated to perform, and you should finally tell him, if he would\nreturn and resume his duties you would forgive the past, and accept of\nhim for the future, would it be inconsistent to say, you were pleased\nwhen he began to listen to the proposal, and pleased when he took the\nfirst and every succeeding step, as being suitable and necessary to the\nend proposed, although, in view of _his_ duty and _your_ claim, you\nwould not be pleased with him, as your acceptable servant, until he was\nactually and faithfully employed in your service?\n\nLet it not be inferred from the above that I advocate a gradual\nconversion. I do not. I believe when God renews the heart he does it at\nonce; but the preparatory steps are nevertheless indispensable to the\naccomplishment of this work. And God is well pleased with the first step\nof attention on the part of the sinner, and with every succeeding step\nof prayer, anxious inquiry, feeling of moral obligation, purpose to\nforsake sin, looking after and attempting to believe in Christ, not\nbecause these are _all_ that he requires, but because they are the\nnecessary preparatives for what is to follow.\n\n3. The foregoing remarks will prepare the way to meet a similar\nobjection to the last, and one to some extent the same in substance. It\nis this: \"Are these conditional acts of the mind holy or unholy\nexercises? If holy, then the work of regeneration is accomplished\nalready, and therefore these cannot be the _conditions_ of that change.\nIf unholy, then they can be no other than offensive to a holy God, and\ntherefore cannot be conditions well pleasing to him.\" In addition to\nwhat has been already said, having a bearing upon this question, it may\nbe stated that the terms holy and unholy may be equivocal, as used in\nthis connection; and thus the supposed dilemma would be more in words\nthan in fact, more in appearance than in reality. This dilemma is urged\nin the argument under the idea that there can be but the two kinds of\nexercises, holy and unholy. And this may be true enough, only let us\nunderstand what is meant. If by holy exercises are meant those in which\nthe entire feeling is on the side of God, I readily answer, _No_, the\nmind before regeneration has no such exercises. If by holiness is meant,\nthat the judgment and conscience are on the side of truth, I answer,\n_Yes_, this is the state of the mind when it is truly awakened by the\nHoly Spirit and by Divine truth. It is entirely immaterial to me,\ntherefore, whether the objector call the exercise holy or unholy,\nprovided he draw no special inferences from the use of a general term\nthat the positions here assumed do not authorize. Sure I am that the\nobjector cannot say there is nothing in the exercises of the\nunregenerate, awakened sinner, such as God would have for the end\nproposed, until he is prepared to say that a fear of the consequences of\nsin, an enlightened judgment, the remorse of conscience for the past,\nthe feelings of obligation for the future, and the hope of victory over\nsin through Christ, all combining to induce the sinner to flee for\nrefuge, and lay hold upon the hope set before him, are all wrong, and\nnot as God would have them? But when a man is prepared to say this, it\nis difficult to see how he could be reasoned with farther, for he would\nseem to have given up reason and Scripture. And yet who does not know\nthat these are the exercises of the soul awakened to a sense of sin and\nits consequences, even while as yet his unholy affections hang upon him\nlike a _body of death_:--Yea, who does not know that it is this body of\ndeath, from which he cannot escape, and this abhorrence of sin and its\nconsequences, that rein him up, and incline him to a surrender of his\nsoul into the hands of Christ, from whom, as a consequence, he receives\n_power_ to become a son of God. \"But what is the motive?\" it is asked,\n\"is not this unholy?\" And pray what does this inquiry mean? If by motive\nis meant the moving cause _out_ of the mind; _that_ cannot be unholy,\nfor it is the Holy Spirit, and the holy word of God, that are thus\nurging the sinner to Christ. If by motive is meant the judgments and\nfeelings of the mind, that prompt to these voluntary efforts to avoid\nsin and its consequences, these are the enlightened understanding and\nthe feelings of obligation, already alluded to, which, I repeat, the\nobjector is welcome to call holy or unholy as he pleases; all I claim\nis, they are what God approves of, and are the necessary conditions of\nhis subsequent work of renewing the heart.\n\nBut perhaps it may be asked here, Is not the sinner, in the performance\nof these conditions, _partly_ converted? I answer, This again depends\nentirely upon what you mean by conversion. If by conversion you\nunderstand the whole of the preparatory work of awakening and seeking,\nas well as the _change_ of the _heart_--then of course you would say he\nis _partly_ converted. If you mean by conversion only a change of views\nand a consequent change of purpose, by which the sinner determines to\nseek, that he may find the pearl of great price--the blessing of a new\nheart and of forgiveness, then you would say he is _wholly_ converted.\nBut if you mean, by conversion, the change of heart itself, the washing\nof regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, then not only is\nnot the work done, but it is not begun. The way of the Lord is prepared\nand the renewal will follow.\n\nThus the objections that have been thought so formidable against the\ndoctrine of conditional regeneration are found, on a closer inspection,\nto be more in appearance than in reality. They receive their influence,\nas objections, rather from their indefiniteness and the ambiguity of\nterms, than from any intrinsic force.\n\nThere is, however, one form more in which an objection may be urged in a\ngeneral way against the ideas of the new birth here advanced. And as I\nwish fearlessly and candidly to state and meet, if possible, every\ndifficulty, it will be necessary to touch upon this. It may be urged\nthat \"the only exercises that can be claimed as conditions of\nregeneration on Bible grounds are _repentance_ and _faith;_ for\n'repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ' are laid at\nthe foundation of all Gospel requirements. Whenever the awakened sinner\ncame to the apostles to know what he should do to be saved, they always\nmet him with, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be\nsaved.' Whenever the apostles went out to preach the Gospel, they\npreached 'every where that men should repent.'\" \"But,\" continues the\nobjector, \"if repentance and faith are the only duties or exercises\nwhich can be claimed as conditions, it is evident there are no such\nconditions; for repentance and faith, so far from being conditions of\nregeneration, are either the new birth itself, or are Christian graces,\nimplying the new birth.\"\n\nThe premises, in the above objection, will not be denied. Repentance and\nfaith are supposed to be the Gospel conditions of regeneration. But it\nis denied that these are necessarily regeneration itself, or that they\nimply regeneration in any other sense, than as antecedents to it. There\nare, it is acknowledged, a repentance and a faith that are Christian\ngraces, and imply the new birth. This is the faith that \"is the\nsubstance of things hoped for.\" It is that principle of spiritual life\nwhich the Christian has in his soul when he can say, \"The life that I\nnow live I live by faith in the Son of God.\" This is that repentance,\nalso, which keeps the soul continually at the foot of the cross, and\nleads it constantly to feel,\n\n   \"Every moment, Lord, I need\n   The merit of thy death.\"\n\nBut because repentance and faith are the necessary characteristics of\nthe Christian, and because they are the more perfect as the Christian\ncharacter ripens, it does not therefore follow that there are no\nrepentance and faith conditional to the new birth. The very fact that\nrepentance and faith were urged by Christ and his apostles, as the\ninitiatory step to salvation, proves the opposite of this. They do not\nsay, Repent and believe the Gospel, and this is salvation, but, \"Repent\nand believe, and ye shall (on this condition) be saved.\" And surely it\nis unnecessary to prove here that salvation in the New Testament\ngenerally means a meetness for heaven or holiness. Our blessed Saviour\nwas called Jesus, because he _saved_ his people _from their sins_.\n\nBeside, it may well be argued, that faith and repentance are acts of the\nmind, and cannot therefore be considered as the new birth itself, unless\nthe mind converts itself, especially since they are _enjoined duties_,\nand must therefore be _voluntary_ acts. It is no where said that God\nrepents and believes for us; but it is expressly and repeatedly taught,\nthat God _renews_ us.--Repentance and faith, then, are our work, but\nregeneration is his. I know it is said in one place, Acts v, 31, that\nChrist was exalted \"to _give repentance_ to Israel.\" But the _act_\nitself of repentance cannot be said to be _given_. This would be an\nabsurdity. How can any one give me a mental _act?_ Hence Dr. Doddridge,\nalthough a Calvinist, very candidly and very justly remarks, on this\npassage, that \"to _give repentance_ signifies to _give place_, or _room_\nfor repentance,\" to sustain which interpretation he quotes Josephus and\nothers who use the phrase in this sense. If then repentance and faith\nare enjoined upon us, as _our duties_, and if they are every where\nspoken of as prerequisites in the work of salvation, and as preparatory\nsteps and conditions to the process of holiness, how can it be otherwise\nthan that these are antecedent, in the order of nature, to regeneration?\n\nIt may farther be argued, in support of this view of faith and\nrepentance, that no sin can be forgiven until repented of--repentance\ntherefore must precede remission of sins. This I suppose Calvinists\nallow, but they say that, in the order of nature, the heart is renewed\nbefore sin is forgiven--and that repentance, therefore, which is either\nthe new birth itself, or the immediate fruit of it, is a condition of\njustification, but not of regeneration. If this be correct, then the\nsoul is made holy before it is forgiven. But St. Paul informs us, Romans\niv, 5, that God through faith \"justifieth the _ungodly_.\" If then there\nbe any antecedence in the order of the two parts of the work of grace,\nwe must suppose that justification has the precedence, and that\nregeneration follows, and hence repentance and faith precede\nregeneration. Indeed I cannot see why repentance is not as necessary to\nremove the sin of the heart as to forgive the sin of the life. If God\nwill not forgive sin without repentance, will he renew the heart without\nit? Has he any where promised this? If not, but if, on the contrary, he\nevery where seems to have suspended the working out of our salvation _in\nus_, upon our repentance, then may we safely conclude--nay, then we must\nnecessarily believe that we repent in order to be renewed. The same may\nbe said of faith. Faith in fact seems to be the exclusive channel\nthrough which every gracious effect is produced upon the mind. The\nsinner cannot be awakened without faith, for it precedes every judgment\nin favour of truth, and every motion of moral feeling, and of course\nevery favourable concurrence of the will. The sinner never could throw\nhimself upon the Divine mercy, never would embrace Christ as his\nSaviour, until he believed. Hence the Scriptures lay such great stress\nupon faith, and make it the grand, and indeed the only _immediate_\ncondition of the work of grace upon the heart. Repentance is a condition\nonly remotely, _in order_ to justifying faith; agreeable to the teaching\nof Christ, \"And ye, when ye had heard, afterward _repented_ not that ye\n_might believe_ on him.\" But faith is necessary _immediately_, as that\nmental state directly antecedent to the giving up of the soul into the\nhands of Divine mercy. And shall we still be told that faith is not the\ncondition of regeneration? The order of the work seems to be--1. A\ndegree of faith in order to repentance. 2. Repentance, in order to such\nan increase of faith as will lead the soul to throw itself upon\nChrist.--3. The giving up of the soul to Christ as the only ground of\nhope. 4. The change of heart by the efficient operation of the Holy\nSpirit.--Now on whichever of these four stages of the process, except\nthe first, the objector lays his finger and says, _That_ is not a\ncondition of regeneration, for it is regeneration itself, it will be\nseen that _that_ very part is conditional. If, for instance, he fix on\nthe second stage, and contend that that is regeneration, which I call\nrepentance _in order_ to regenerating faith; even _that_ would be\n_conditional_ regeneration, for it is preceded by faith--and so of all\nthat follow. And surely no one will pretend that what I call the first\nstage, the faith which precedes awakening and remorse of conscience, and\nthe exciting alternations of fear and hope in the anxious and inquiring\nsinner, is regeneration. And if this first degree of faith is not the\nchange, then it is utterly inconsistent to talk of unconditional\nregeneration, for this faith stands at the head of all that follows--it\nis a mental act necessarily preparatory to the whole work. And as we\nshall presently see, it is an act that depends upon the agency of the\nwill. Hence we are brought again to our conclusion, that the change\ncalled the new birth is effected by the Holy Spirit, on the ground of\ncertain conditional acts of him who is the subject of the change.\n\n\"But the very _nature_ of repentance and of faith, the very _definition_\nof the two mental states expressed by these terms,\" it is said, \"proves\nthat a person, to possess them, must be regenerate; or at any rate, that\nthese states cannot be conditions of regeneration, to be performed by\nthe sinner.\" Let us attend for a moment to this objection in detail.\n\nWhat is repentance? \"It is,\" say some Calvinistic writers, \"a _change of\nmind_. The original means this, and so it should have been rendered; and\nif it had been so rendered, it would have set this controversy at rest.\"\nBut what if we should grant (what I do not believe) that the original\nword means this, and this only, still it would not follow that the\nchange of mind called the new birth is meant by this term. A change of\njudgment is a change of mind--a change of purpose is a change of\nmind--any change of the general current of feeling, such as that from\ncarelessness and stupidity in to a state of anxiety and earnest inquiry,\nwhat shall I do to be saved? is a change of mind.--And such a change of\nmind indispensably precedes regeneration. No person ever, from being a\ncareless, hardened sinner, becomes an anxious and earnest inquirer after\nsalvation, without an important change in his judgment, moral feeling,\nand volitions. Hence this definition does not at all help the objector,\nunless he can prove that the Scriptures always mean by this term that\nchange which they elsewhere call the new birth. Indeed, since we have\nalready shown that repentance is our work, and the renewing of the heart\nexclusively God's work, it follows incontrovertibly, that the change of\nmind called repentance is not the new birth.\n\nIf repentance meant that change of mind called the new birth, then the\nregenerate would be _often born again_, and that, too, without\nbacksliding; for those who are growing the fastest in grace repent the\nmost constantly and the most deeply.\n\nAgain: it is objected, that \"faith is not a voluntary state of mind, and\ntherefore cannot be considered a condition, performed by the sinner, in\norder to regeneration.\" To believe is doubtless, in many instances,\nperfectly involuntary. There are numerous cases in which a man is\nobliged to believe, both against his will and against his desires. There\nare other cases, again, in which the will is not only much concerned in\nbelieving, but in which its action is indispensable in order to believe.\nAnd the faith of the Gospel is pre-eminently an instance of this kind.\n\"Faith,\" saith the word, \"cometh by hearing.\" But hearing implies\nattention; and every deliberate act of attention implies an act of the\nwill. A man can no more leap, by one transition, from a state of entire\ncarelessness into the faith that justifies the soul, than he can make a\nworld. But he can take the steps that lead to this result. To believe to\nthe saving of the soul requires _consideration_, _self examination_, a\n_knowledge_ of the object of faith, or the truth to be believed,\n_earnest looking_, and _prayerful seeking_. But is there no act of the\nwill in all these? It is said that \"the Spirit takes of the things of\nJesus Christ, and shows them unto us.\" And it is doubtless true, that\nthe soul cannot get such a view of Christ as encourages him to throw\nhimself unreservedly upon the mercy of the Saviour, until the Spirit\nmakes, to the mind's eye, this special exhibition of the \"things of\nChrist.\" But when does he do this? Does he come to the sinner when he is\ncareless and inattentive, and show him the _things of Christ?_ No! it is\nonly to the inquiring and self-despairing sinner, who is earnestly\ngroaning out the sentiment in the bitterness of his heart, \"Who shall\ndeliver me from the body of this death?\" And is there no voluntary\naction in all this?\n\nBut it will perhaps be wearisome to the reader to pursue these\nobjections farther. I should not have gone so fully into this part of\nthe subject, but for the fact, that this sentiment of unconditional\nregeneration is considered the strong hold of Calvinism. This point\nmoreover appears to have been but slightly handled by most of the\nanti-Calvinistic writers; and therefore I have felt it the more\nnecessary to attempt an answer to all the most important arguments that\nare adduced in opposition to our view of this doctrine. I am far from\nthinking I have done the subject justice, and may have cause perhaps\nhereafter to acknowledge that some of my minor positions are untenable,\nand that some of my expressions need modifying or explaining, although I\nhave used what care and circumspection my time and circumstances would\npermit in reference not only to the doctrine itself, but also in\nreference to the forms of expression. And as it respects the leading\ndoctrines here inculcated, I repose upon them with entire confidence.\nHowever the theory clashes with that of many great and good men, it is\nbelieved to be the only theory that will consistently explain the\npractice and preaching of these very men. It is, in my view, the only\ntheory that will satisfactorily and consistently explain those great and\nleading principles by which evangelical Christians expect to convert the\nworld to Christ. And, if this be true, the sooner the Christian Church\nis established on this foundation, the better. We have already seen that\na mixture of error in the essential doctrines leads to various mutations\nfrom extreme to extreme of dangerous heresy. How long before the Church\nshall be _rooted and grounded in the truth!_ May He who said, LET LIGHT\nBE; AND LIGHT WAS, hasten that glorious day!\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nFootnotes\n\n[1] Many objections have been made, by the reviewers, to my manner of\nstating the doctrine of predestination. It is objected, that the great\nbody of Calvinists believe, no more than the Arminians, that God\n\"efficiently controls and actuates the human will.\" On a careful, and I\nhope, candid revision of the subject, however, I cannot satisfy myself\nthat the objection is valid. I am quite sure God must control the will,\nor he cannot, as Calvinists teach, secure the proposed end, by the\nprescribed means. It is readily granted that Calvinists deny _such a\ncontrol_ as destroys the freedom of the will. But it is the object of\nthe sermon and of the following controversy to show that Calvinistic\npredestination is, on any ground of consistency, utterly irreconcilable\nwith mental freedom. How far this has been done, of course, each will\njudge for himself.\n\n[2] It seems, to the author of the sermon, but little better than\ntrifling, to object, as some have, to this argument on foreknowledge,\nthat \"God must predetermine his works before he could certainly know\nwhat would take place; and hence, in the order of cause and effect, he\nmust decree in order to know.\" It is readily conceded, that, in the\norder of nature, the Divine Being could not foreknow that a world would\ncertainly exist, until he had determined to create it. But was there no\nprescience back of this? Did he determine to create a universe,\nindependent of a view of all the bearings in the case? If so, he created\nat random and in ignorance. If not, then a view of all the results\npreceded his determination to create; and thus we are led irresistibly\nto the doctrine of the sermon, that \"God foreknows in order to\npredestinate.\"\n\n[3] The review of the sermon, in the Christian Spectator, is understood\nto be from the pen of Doctor Fitch, professor of divinity in Yale\nCollege.\n\n[4] See Christian Spectator, Vol. iv, No. 3.\n\n[5] A part of this sermon has lately been published, in a tract form,\nand circulated with the _avowed_ purpose of counteracting the influence\nof the sermon \"on predestination.\"\n\n[6] A man was afflicted with the hydrophobia. When his paroxysms were\ncoming on he was aware of it, and gave warning to his friends to be on\ntheir guard, that he might not injure them. Suppose, however, he knew of\na sure remedy, but voluntarily neglected to avail himself of it. Would\nhe not in that case be guilty, not only of all the evils that might\nresult to others from his malady; but also of self murder? And yet this\nman's madness was entirely beyond the direct control of his will.","title":"Calvinistic Controversy: Embracing a Sermon on Predestination and Election and Several Numbers, Formally Published in the Christian Advocate and Journal.","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":80803}